And now, - my country's much applauded friend,
For your productions neat and strictures nice,
Your sage memorials, and your sound advice,
And, if her weal were rightly understood,
Your kind endeavours for the kingdoms good,
So well approved by patriots of all ranks,
Accept my cordial compliments, and thanks.

From the Patriot Bard, Humbly
addressed to the Monitor or
British Freeholder.
The Monitor 108, 13 August 1757.

A Thesis
presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

by

Marie Peters

October 1974
Abstract

The Monitor is one of the few long-lived examples of that periodical form peculiar to the eighteenth century, the political essay paper. Conducted under the patronage of Richard and William Beckford, aldermen and members of parliament, it was written and managed chiefly by Arthur Beardmore, attorney, and the Rev. John Entick, with much help from occasional contributors, the only one of whom that can be identified with any certainty being John Wilkes.

Internal evidence as well as external connections places the Monitor in the tradition of the popular toryism of the City of London. It seems to have been founded in 1755 to reawaken that toryism, both in the City and generally, as an aid to the political ambitions of the Beckfords. At first, in the uncertain political situation of 1755-6, its loyalties in national politics were unclear. In 1756, however, when the storm over the loss of Minorca put wind in the sails of the opposition Pitt had launched the autumn before, the Monitor, with William Beckford, declared for Pitt. From then on its commentary can be used as a valuable indicator both of the methods and of the degree of success of Pitt's attempts to maintain a popular base while in office, especially in the City and among the tories. It promotes the image of Pitt as a 'patriot minister' in foreign and domestic affairs and reflects his skill in using appropriate issues to establish this reputation while avoiding blame for unpopular decisions. Yet it also shows how readily shaken Pitt's 'popularity' was, especially in the early years, by such developments as his coalition with Newcastle, the failure of the expedition to the French coast at Rochefort in 1757 and the decision to send British troops to Germany in 1758. The Monitor commentary illustrates how constantly criticism had to be answered, especially about the German war, even when Pitt's popularity was widened and secured by the victories of the war, and further, how pressure from his supporters out-of-doors could be an influence on Pitt, for example over peace terms. At the
same time, by using the Monitor commentary with other sources, it is possible to trace something of the development of William Beckford's influence in the City and to show that it was not dominant even among the 'popular' interests there until the end of the decade. It seems that Beckford rose in the City on the growing popularity of Pitt more than he contributed to that popularity.

The Monitor commentary goes on to reflect some of the uncertainties of 1760-1, after the accession of George III, particularly the strength of reaction against the war and to show indirectly what a challenge the new circumstances were to Pitt's political strength. It rallies strongly to Pitt after his resignation - and here Beckford's dominance in the City was put to Pitt's service - but its very vehemence and persistence in his defence emphasize what a serious crisis for Pitt the resignation was. In 1762 the Monitor initiates and plays a major part in the intensification of political controversy around the figure of Bute, to the extent of having warrants issued against those concerned in it. After the peace it returns to domestic affairs and re-establishes its interest in constitutional questions. Although it shows some interest in the Wilkes affair arising out of the North Briton 45, its close involvement in politics gradually lapses. This is perhaps partly an effect of the warning of the warrants, but much more the result of Pitt's refusal to take an active and concerted part in opposition. Because of Pitt's wayward contempt for the active cultivation of his political base, Beckford lost his sense of purpose, the City lost its unusually close involvement in national politics, and the Monitor lapses into senility and finally, in March 1765, disappears.

The detailed commentary of the Monitor on politics and foreign policy thus elucidates some important aspects of contemporary affairs. Because of its connection with William Beckford and popular elements in the City in these vital years, its attitudes on constitutional issues show something of the origins
of radicalism. A description of them brings out the Monitor's adherence to, yet uneasiness within, the traditional framework of the mixed balanced constitution, and its distinctive emphasis on the role of the people. The significance of these attitudes is examined by looking at the modes of constitutional discussion the eighteenth century inherited and especially at the 'country' tradition, in which important seventeenth-century ideas were kept alive and which formed a major part of the vigorous constitutional debate occurring in the eighteenth century. The close reliance of the Monitor on this tradition and its sources is shown while, at the same time, the emphasis on a crisis in the constitution, the need for reform and the role of the people was subtly modifying the tradition and creating a genuine radicalism of the left. In the process, without significantly changing its views, the Monitor ceases to call itself Tory and adopts the Whig label. In this subtle modification are to be found the roots of almost all later eighteenth-century radicalism, a radicalism arising clearly out of traditional ways of thought.

Finally in the Epilogue a brief attempt is made to assess the contemporary influence of the Monitor. It was important enough to be copied by a significant number of other publications yet not enough to figure largely in the correspondence of leading politicians and observers. In the development of political comment in the press, this form of weekly controversy appears to mark a transition from the situation where major debate was conducted in pamphlets to that where it found its place in newspapers proper, at a time when political comment was growing in importance in influencing politicians but especially in educating a wider political nation.
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Preface

This is an historian's study of a political essay paper. It is not an examination of a literary genre or a bibliographer's work, such as the students of R. P. Bond might have valuably undertaken. If it had been such, more attention would have been given to style, earlier literary models and sources, to the nature and extent of historical allusions, for example, and to the comparison of different printings and editions. Nor is it intended primarily as a contribution to the history of the press. Disappointingly, too little has been discovered about the Monitor's authorship, management and circulation for that. Unlike those of its famous contemporary, the North Briton, its authors and managers left no records. Further, the much larger task of setting the paper properly in its context in the development of political controversy in the press is only touched on in the Epilogue and has had to be set aside for reasons of lack of time and space.

Instead, this study is intended to show what a piece of ephemeral literature of this kind can contribute to the understanding of the politics of its time. It has been undertaken not because of any belief in the intrinsic merit, originality or validity of this series of essays in political controversy, but rather in the conviction that it is an essential part of the historian's business to understand how the ordinary as well as the extraordinary men of his period thought and wrote about contemporary events. Not only will such an understanding give an insight into the intellectual, social and cultural milieu in which events occurred and without which historical comprehension would be the poorer. It can also illuminate the motives, tensions, hopes and fears in politics, society and culture which influence action. True, ideas are rationalizations of actions rather than constituting or describing motives which directly determine action. Especially at this
popular level they reflect fable and mass emotion rather than the truth. They may not even have been genuinely believed by those who propounded them, although I think that to be effective propaganda must be accepted sincerely at some level. Nevertheless, ideas can help powerfully to shape action and response when other motives and external influences press. Further, it is not only at the heights of politics, in closet, cabinet and commons, that the ideas of those involved need to be understood. It is being increasingly remembered, as the existence of literature like the Monitor demonstrates, that there was a political nation beyond parliament in the eighteenth century. It is often the common ideas of the mass of men that are most influential in history.

Contemporary ideas and explanations of events are, then, one dimension of historical reality. On the basis of this conviction, the two major parts of this study seek to show, first, what can be discovered by relating the Monitor's commentary to events and situations in politics and foreign policy. The impact of those events and situations on the audience for which the Monitor was written can be assessed, as well as the purposes to which the commentary on them was put and its effectiveness for those purposes. Particularly as the Monitor quickly became the instrument of its patron's devotion to Pitt, such an examination can answer questions about the nature of his 'popularity' and how it was achieved, especially in the City of London. Secondly, because the Monitor reflects the views of those in the City among whom urban radicalism was developing, its ideas on the constitution are examined in detail to discover the ideological roots and influences which helped to determine the character of early radicalism.

This is a thesis for which, contrary to the usual process perhaps, circumstances determined the material and the material shaped the questions posed. The Monitor was suggested to me by Dame Lucy Sutherland when I was
looking for a topic in eighteenth-century English history which could be undertaken 12000 miles from the sources. As such it has proved ideal. The core of material, the Monitor itself and related publications, could be readily identified and microfilmed, the major printed primary sources were available in the well-developed eighteenth-century collection of the University of Canterbury Library and I was able to supplement both by several months' work in London on study leave. Only in minor ways, as far as I am aware, was distance a serious handicap. It would have been interesting to delve further into the scattered and diverse sources for City politics; yet to do so properly demands a grass roots sociological approach beyond the scope of this work. Some minor issues and exchanges of controversy could have been more fully followed up given more time in the British Museum. Most important, more could have been done to assess the Monitor's place in contemporary controversy.

It has not, of course, been possible to check all references with the rigour I would have liked. Otherwise, however, the questions which the material itself suggested and which circumstances shaped are those which interested me and seemed valuable to investigate anyway.

I am very grateful to Dame Lucy for her suggestion of so compact a topic which nevertheless has provided, for me anyway, a fascinating entree into the politics and ideas of the period. Dame Lucy did much to deepen and broaden my interest in the eighteenth century in the short interrupted time when she was my supervisor in the 1950's. I am even more grateful to her for her continued interest in my work, her encouragement and suggestions. Any flaws in the way I have made use of her suggestion and shaped the topic are of course entirely my own. To Professor N. C. Phillips, to whom I owe not only my introduction to the eighteenth century but also so much of my training as an historian and my love of my subject, my gratitude is equally warm. Despite the many demands on his time and energies as vice-chancellor of this university, he consented
to act as my supervisor when his assistance was indispensable. He has always encouraged me and demanded rigorous standards.

As always, many others have helped my work in many ways. It would have been impossible without research grants from the New Zealand University Grants Committee and from the University of Canterbury and without the study leave the university granted me in 1972-3. Professor G.W.O. Woodward has given me every encouragement and consideration as have other colleagues in the history department. I benefited much from conversations with those I met in and through the Institute of Historical Research in 1972-3. The staff of the University of Canterbury Library have by their expert and ready assistance done so much to offset the disadvantages of distance from sources. Miss Amy Jamieson, head of acquisitions, has so patiently handled my microfilm orders, Miss Lynley Dovey, now Mrs Ross Spurdle, has shown me how invaluable a reference librarian can be, especially in penetrating some of the mysteries of the British Museum catalogue, while a series of interloans assistants has tracked down books in Australia and New Zealand. The staff of other libraries and institutions I have used have always been helpful. I am particularly grateful to Mr Hollaender of the Guildhall Library and Mr W. J. Smith of the Greater London Record Office (Middlesex Records), for their very thorough answers to written enquiries and to the clerk to the Drapers' Company who sent me a great deal of photocopied material without charge. Finally, my work would never have been brought to final form without the warm and tolerant co-operation of the typists, Miss Bridget Moore, now Mrs Batty, Mrs Michele Downer and Miss Prudence Buttery. Any errors are, of course, my own responsibility entirely.
Quotations and References

All abbreviations and contractions in quotations are rendered in full. Otherwise, the spelling, punctuation and capitalization of the original are retained except where they would be obtrusive (for example in copies of Newcastle's letters) or obstructive to the sense. *Sic* is used as sparingly as possible.

The dates of issues of the Monitor are not given in footnotes where the same issue has been cited immediately before. Consecutive papers are grouped only when they are part of a series. Page numbers are not given because there are too many mistakes in pagination, especially later in the run.

Locations for newspapers and pamphlets consulted are given in the bibliography. In references to newspapers the page is indicated wherever possible.

Abbreviations

Add MSS.  British Museum Additional Manuscripts
The name of the collection is given in the footnotes only if it is a minor one or infrequently referred to.

Eg.  British Museum Egerton Manuscripts.

H.M.C.  Historical Manuscripts Commission.
The full titles of reports are given in the bibliography.

P.R.O.  Public Record Office.

AR.  The *Annual Register*.

GM.  The *Gentleman's Magazine*.

LM.  The *London Magazine*.

RM.  The *Royal Magazine*.

Gaz.  The *Gazetteer*.

LC.  The *London Chronicle*. 
Abbreviated titles for other works are established by the use of square brackets at the first reference where necessary for clarity or to distinguish different works by the same author.
Sir,

Great villainies were suffered to pass with impunity is the remark of an historian, who was sensibly touched with the baseful aspect of his country's ruin; brought on, not by a foreign enemy, but by her own children; whose wicked deeds and infamous characters were no bars to their advancement in power; who only attended to the love of life and to the impulces of ambition, who purchased posts and dignities with the price of liberty, and who being grown above all shame, thought danger more dreadful than slavery.

A H A -
INTRODUCTION

The Monitor: Its Establishment, Authorship and Management

The Monitor, or British Freeholder was a political essay paper, published weekly on Saturdays for nearly ten years from 9 August 1755 to 30 March 1765. It was not a newspaper. Apart from occasional advertisements of its own collected editions or associated pamphlets it contained nothing but a single political essay of six pages (one and a half sheets folio), usually in the form of a letter addressed to the Monitor or to the Freeholder. Yet it would be inappropriate to distinguish such a periodical form, unique to the eighteenth century, too sharply from newspapers proper. Published separately or with news, and at varying frequencies, political essays were an integral part of the development of the English newspaper and particularly of political discussion in it. They were one important element in the great variety of forms and differing combinations of constituent parts which newspapers assumed at this very fluid stage in their emergence.

1. Occasionally, and especially earlier in its life, the paper is made up of more than one piece of comment, and may include verse, squibs, mock advertisements, and extracts from some real or invented work prefaced by an introduction. E.g. the Monitor 6, 13 Sep. 1755; 17, 29 Nov. 1755; 50, 17 July 1756; 51, 24 July 1756; 58, 4 Sep. 1756; 64, 16 Oct. 1756; 452-4, 31 Mar.-14 Apr. 1764. However, the overwhelmingly predominant form is the single essay-letter, after the Monitor 50 almost always addressed to the Monitor rather than the Freeholder.


(Cont'd)
Some form of political commentary in newspapers, even if only by the selection of news, was as old as the taking of sides by their compilers and as their attempts to be critics as well as chroniclers. The periodical essay had its progenitors in the seventeenth century, in crude form in some of the mid-century Mercuriuses, in occasional examples of serialized comment in later times of controversy, and most notably perhaps in the dialogue papers which first appeared in the 1680's. The Monitor occasionally reverts to this older form of comment through dialogue, usually between two persons representing the stock attitudes of opposing sides. The lapsing of the Licensing Act in 1695 allowed more scope for comment in various forms which the unsettled politics of the next two reigns further encouraged. Most important was Daniel Defoe's Review, founded in February 1704, appearing at first weekly and later more often, and lasting, in two series, until mid-1713, and irregularly thereafter. It consisted entirely of various kinds of comment on news, including letters, the main part being a substantial discourse on some question of immediate concern, political, religious, commercial or social. It has been called a landmark in the history of English periodical literature, undertaking critical and instructive commentary of a much higher standard than ever before.

The clear establishment of the essay, political and on other subjects, as a periodical form came in the latter part of Anne's reign in the famous essay papers of that period, written by men of some literary distinction. The Tatler, founded in 1709, established a model which was quickly and

widely imitated. The essay papers varied in form, as to whether they carried news or not, in frequency of publication and in subject matter. Of the predominantly political, apart from Defoe's Review, the most important were the tory Examiner, founded in 1710, in which Swift wrote for some time and which 'pioneered the sophisticated political weekly', and the whig Medley, also founded in 1710, to which Addison, Steele and others contributed. Neither carried news. They were accompanied by shoals of ephemeral imitators, political and otherwise. Such papers developed and systematized the essay as a sophisticated means of comment.

In the Hanoverian period, the essay increasingly found its place in papers combining news and comment. Of this type were the journals which were established in the first Hanoverian decade and became the main form of political paper in the second quarter of the century. Almost always a weekly publication, the journal in its developed form consisted of an essay on a political or other topic, sometimes letters, news under various headings, and advertisements, making up four pages. The Craftsman, appearing first as a six-page unstamped essay alone, only to be suppressed by the stamp authorities, then as a single-sheet stamped essay, went over to the journal form with its forty-fifth issue. Its prominence, together with that of its non-political contemporary, the Crub Street Journal, did much to raise the standard of the form. Other later political papers followed the same pattern. The Old England, or the Constitutional Journal, later Old England, or the Broad bottom Journal, was begun in 1743 as an opposition paper to Carteret. It was written principally by William Guthrie and occasionally contributed to by Lord Chesterfield. It lasted until 1753. Another example was the Remembrancer, established in December 1747 as an organ of that part of the prince of Wales's party under the leadership of Bubb Dodington. The various papers with which Fielding was
associated from 1739 into the 1740's were also of this type, containing some news but dominated by their main article or essay, political, literary or otherwise. Sometimes the essays from one paper were reprinted monthly in pamphlet form; often those from a variety of papers were reproduced, or condensed, in the monthly magazines, notably the Gentleman's Magazine from 1731. The form was carried on in the weekly chronicles of the next generation, although these were not always primarily political. Meanwhile, essays were sometimes found in more frequently published papers, the thrice-weekly evening papers and even the dailies, appearing regularly in the Daily Courant from 1730, and later in the Daily Gazetteer, the major government paper from 1735 to 1742.

Thus had the periodical essay, political and otherwise, been largely absorbed into the newspaper in the first half of the eighteenth century. These were the established and relatively long-lived periodical publications in which the essay played an important part. However, more ephemeral papers, consisting of an essay alone or dominated by an essay as a form of controversy, still continued to appear to serve particular occasions. For example, after the troubles of 1715, Addison wrote the Freeholder to defend the Hanoverian succession, and in 1719 Steele and Addison took opposite sides on the peerage bill in the Plebeian (against) and the Old Whig (for), weekly pamphlets perhaps, rather than papers. In 1723-4 the Duke of Wharton brought out the True Briton, a single half-sheet published twice a week, to rouse up the City against Walpole. The Free Briton (1729-35), on the other hand, was a pro-Walpole weekly political essay sheet. Its authors joined with the writers of the political letters in

3. The Champion, begun in 1739; the True Patriot, 1745-6; the Jacobite's Journal, 1747-8; the Covent Garden Journal, 1752.
the Daily Courant and London Journal to establish the Daily Gazetteer in 1735. The longest-lived of these political essay sheets were the curious Hyp-Doctor, a pro-government paper published from 1730 to 1741, and the equally remarkable Corn-Cutter's Journal (c.1733-1741). The 1740's and especially 1750's saw a large number of ephemeral essay sheets, both political and non-political. Perhaps most notable among the latter was the World, a weekly paper of social satire in the Spectator tradition, published from 1752 to 1757, to which Lord Chesterfield and Horace Walpole contributed. Johnson's the Rambler, 1750-1752, included political as well as moral and social essays and is said to have set a new fashion in political diatribe. More purely political was the Protesstor, on Behalf of the People, of much briefer life, founded in June 1753 to serve the purposes of the duke of Bedford, the leader of the only opposition whig group at the time. Written (as was the news and essay paper the Remembrancer) by the hack journalist, James Ralph, who had also worked with Fielding on the Champion, it took a prominent part in the controversy over the Jewish Naturalization Act which developed soon after. It continued only until November, when Ralph was bought over by the ministry with a pension of £300 a year. 4 In form (six pages weekly with an essay only, for 2d), date and patronage, the Protesstor was the closest progenitor of the Monitor.

The political essay, then, was for most of the first half of the eighteenth century, a major channel through which political comment developed in the newspaper press, one of the main forerunners of the

modern editorial. It formed an integral part of weekly journals, chronicles and miscellanies which were probably the most important forms of political newspaper from the 1720's to the 1750's for sustained and regular political comment. It was often copied in monthly magazines and had appeared in more frequently published newspapers. Although by 1760 the periodical essay had been largely absorbed into the newspaper, the setting up of more ephemeral papers, consisting only or mainly of an essay, at virtually every occasion of controversy suggests that they were found suitable to the needs of, and effective in, occasional debate and propaganda in times of crisis. These papers did not usually outlive the occasion, dying away in months or at the most a couple of years.

This, then, is the political essay tradition into which the Monitor came in 1755. It belongs, of course, to the latter genre, the essay paper. Yet it is unusual in that it is much longer-lived than its immediate predecessors or, as will be seen, than its contemporaries in the same form. The Monitor outlives particular crises and serves a more sustained political objective. In this it is similar to earlier important political papers of more miscellaneous content, including news, such as the Craftsman and Old England, and although different in style, to the Hyp-Doctor. The extraordinary length of the Monitor's existence suggests that the form was still of some importance in the development of political comment in the press. More relevantly to this study, its longevity also suggests that it reflects political interests of some substance and permanence, whose attitudes on contemporary questions are worth examination as part of the political life of its time. It can help to answer questions about the attitudes and degree of awareness and political education among a section of the political nation. For these reasons, and simply as a piece of sustained political propaganda, it is worthy of
study and can yield results of some interest.

* * * * * * *

The Monitor was founded under the patronage of Richard Beckford, member of parliament for Bristol and alderman of the City of London. Beckford was a member of a large and very wealthy West Indian sugar-planting family and, like his elder brothers, was educated in England. From 1754 at least he was a close political associate of one elder brother, William. In 1747 at the age of thirty-eight, William, who held considerable estates in Wiltshire at Fonthill, set out on a political career by being returned to parliament for Shaftesbury, just over the border into Dorset, in the interests of the fourth earl. In the early 1750s, he began an attempt to establish himself in City affairs as a base for furthering his political influence, the first virtual outsider to try to become one of the City's leaders. With the help of the tory interest to which he had attached himself he became in quick succession a freeman by redemption of the company of ironmongers (1752), alderman for Billingsgate (1752) and sheriff (1755), while in 1754 he was elected one of the City members of parliament. In this general election he secured the return of friends for four other seats, including his brother Richard for Bristol. At the same time Richard, too, began

5. Dedication to the first volume of the collected papers, 1756, p.1 and fn.

to lay the basis for a career in City politics. In August 1754 he was made free by redemption of the goldsmiths' company and in the same year was elected an alderman for the ward of Farringdon Without. Having been clothed as a liveryman of the company in January 1755 he was with unusual haste elected prime warden in August. There seems no doubt that Richard was attracted into national and City politics as the associate of his brother and to assist and share in his already considerable success in establishing a foundation in the City for the furtherance of his political career.

Equally clearly, the establishment of the Monitor just at the time of Richard Beckford's election as prime warden was part of the attempt to extend and consolidate this political base. William Beckford already had some direct knowledge of the effectiveness of such a paper. In his days of association with the duke of Bedford in 1753 he had played a leading part in the establishment of the anti-ministerial weekly paper, the Protestor. This paper had provoked considerable comment. Although Horace Walpole dismissed its author, Ralph, as a dull writer whose only ability was 'to be endeavouring to raise mobs by speculative ideas of government', it was effective enough to persuade the ministry - or at least Newcastle - to buy Ralph off. It was not surprising that the Beckfords should turn again such a paper only two years later at a new stage in their political careers.

Richard lived to see the fruits of his patronage only a few months.


He died in January 1756 in Lyons on his way to the south of France to nurse his 'declining state of health'. The paper nevertheless continued, sustained by 'many gentlemen of the same station and principles with himself', whom Beckford had animated 'to concur in the same generous design, which he thought too important to be rested upon the contingency of a single life'. William Beckford's name is never mentioned by the paper in connection with its support and only once or twice and not very conclusively do contemporaries associate him with it. Yet, as will be seen, the paper closely followed his political line. On several occasions it had to defend itself against charges of favouring West Indian interests. It was William Beckford to whom one of those concerned in the authorship of the paper was refused permission to write when taken up on a general warrant in 1762. It would appear then that at least the 'many gentlemen' were close associates of William and shared his West Indian interests, and more probably that he was chief among their number.

Neither of the Beckfords, however, took a direct part in the

9. GM., XXVI, 1756, p. 91; William Beckford to Newcastle, Add. MS. 32861, f. 196.
10. Dedication to the first volume of the collected papers, 1756, p. ii.
12. The arrangements discussed to establish an opposition paper in 1751 may give a clue to the nature of the arrangements to continue the Monitor. It was to be supported by 'about twenty of us, at ten guineas each, and by what else we can get'. ed. Henry Penruddocke Wyndham, [The] Diary of [the late George Bubb] Dodington, [Baron of Melcombe Regis...], Salisbury, 1784, p. 107, quoted in Hanson, p. 121.
foundation of the Monitor as William had done in the \textit{Protestor}.\footnote{Dodington, \textit{Journal}, p.218, 7 [May 1753].}

The actual establishment of the \textit{Monitor} seems to have been the result of the coming together of the Beckfords' interest in such a paper with an initiative at a much lower level. It was not unusual for an eighteenth-century printer to try to keep his presses regularly employed by setting up a paper. According to his own information given in 1762,\footnote{Ed. T.B. Howell, \textit{A Complete Collection of State Trials} ... 33 vols, London, 1809-1826, XIX, c.1033. See Appendix I.} in 1755 Jonathan Scott, a printer, publisher and bookseller established in his own business at the Black Swan, Paternoster Row, for about seven years,\footnote{Henry R. Plomer, G.H. Bushnell and E.R.McC. Dix, \textit{A Dictionary of the Booksellers and Printers Who Were at Work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1726 to 1775}, Oxford, 1932, p.223; Stationers' Hall, [Register of] Apprentices and Turnovers from Apr. 1728 to Dec. 1762, 7 June 1737.} took a step in this direction by mentioning his wish to set up a paper to Dr John Shebbeare whose political works he was already publishing. A few days later Scott was sent for by Arthur Beardmore, an attorney at law, who had heard of his intention. Beardmore asked him to mention to Shebbeare that he and some of his friends also intended to set up a paper in the City. Following this, Scott, Shebbeare, Beardmore and John Entick met at the Horn tavern. Thus were brought together the first publisher and the major authors of the \textit{Monitor}. The meeting agreed that Shebbeare and Entick should have £200 a year each, apparently for writing the paper,\footnote{This appears to be by contemporary standards a very generous allowance. Oliver Goldsmith in 1760 received a guinea for each of his Chinese letters in the Public Advertiser. Charles Welsh, \textit{A Bookseller of the Last Century} ..., London, 1885, p.42. In the 1750's Edward Moore received three guineas for each paper of a sheet and a half in the style of the Rambler for the World. Ralph Straus, \textit{Robert Dodsley} ..., New York, 1910, p.186. Even by the 1770's, journalistic rewards were hardly at the \textit{Monitor} level. I.R. Christie, (cont'd)} while the
profits, after all charges had been paid, should go to Scott. It is clear that Beardmore was acting as Richard Beckford's agent in these arrangements. He was William's solicitor and probably Richard's too. When the papers submitted by Shebbeare to them at this first meeting were apparently not acceptable, it was he and Entick who arranged payment of the proportion of his promised salary which he demanded. They also, with Shebbeare, told Scott that Beckford 'countenanced the paper'. When Shebbeare so quickly withdrew Beardmore and Entick continued the venture and from them Scott received manuscripts until he broke with them in 1762.

John Shebbeare had just begun what was to be a tempestuous career in political writing and in these beginnings can be found some explanation both of the origins and of the brevity of his connection with the Monitor. In 1754 he published The Marriage Act, a novel dedicated to the duke of Bedford, one of the chief opponents of Hardwicke's Act. His criticisms of the legislature for passing the Act led to a secretary's warrant for his arrest, brief imprisonment and a period on good behaviour. The work would almost certainly have brought his name to the


17. Beckford to Pitt [?1759], Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f.111. It is possible that he acted for Richard Beckford in the prolonged and partially successful attempt of the early 1750's to have Richmond Park opened to the public. A Letter to the Common Council of London on their late very extraordinary Address to His Majesty, 2nd ed., London, 1765, p.21 (discussed below pp.21-2)

18. Unless otherwise stated the information which follows on Shebbeare comes from the Dictionary of National Biography.
attention of William Beckford, who was at that time associated with the
duke of Bedford. Further, it was published by Deputy Hodges, a book-
seller of London Bridge, later to be town clerk, and one of the
demagogues among the City tories with whose support Beckford was estab-
lishing himself. In 1755 Shebbeare wrote the first two of his series
of Letters to the People of England, both published by Jonathan Scott.
In 1755 were also published Letters on the English Nation 'by Batista
Angeloni, a Jesuit resident in London', an attack on the Newcastle
administration in Bolingbroke's style of which Shebbeare professed to
be the translator only. The Third Letter to the People of England,
again published by Scott, followed in 1756. This one brought further
trouble with the law. On 4 March 1756 a warrant was issued by the
secretaries of state for the arrest of Scott and seizure of all copies
of the work. This was followed on 8 March by a warrant for the arrest
of Shebbeare himself and the seizure of his papers. Apparently no
case arose from these arrests but they were enough to frighten Scott
who printed no more of Shebbeare's works, except A Letter ... Upon the

of the Modern Language Association, LVII, 1942, p.1062; Philip
Yorke, [The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of]
Hardwicke, [Lord High Chancellor of Great Britai~], 3 vols.,

20. A Letter to the People of England on the Present Situation and Con-
to the People of England on Foreign Subsidies, Subsidary Armies,
and Their Consequences to this Nation, London, 1755. For the
Batista Angeloni Letters the Dictionary of National Biography gives
1756 but the date of the edition listed in the Library of Congress
Catalog is 1755; A Third Letter to the People of England on Liberty,

21. P.R.O., TS 11/655, bundle 2053 (warrants issued by secretaries of
state), p.57.
Yet Shebbeare's career went on its stormy way. Later developments suggest that caution over Shebbeare was justified. He seemed set to attract attention, whether by attempted literary frauds, violent reaction to criticism of his works, or political writings renowned for scurrility. As Horace Walpole said, he appeared to have 'made a pious resolution of writing himself into a place or the pillory'.

His Sixth Letter, published late in 1757, brought another arrest. This time the charge was proceeded with and on 28 November 1758 sentence was passed. It was a heavy one: the pillory, a fine, imprisonment for three years and the obligation to find securities for good behaviour for seven years. It so happened that Arthur Beardmore, as under-sheriff for Middlesex, was called upon to supervise the carrying out of the pillory sentence at Charing Cross. This was so leniently done that Beardmore found himself before king's bench on a charge of contempt of court and was fined £50 and sentenced to two months in the Marshalsea.
A further prison sentence seems to have changed Shebbeare's politics or at least to have determined his direction in the new reign. He could hardly afford otherwise if he wished to continue to write. Apparently while still in prison he wrote a disguised political tract which combined criticism of former administrations with lavish praise of George III and his ministers. He went on to attack Pitt over his resignation, to support peace with France, to defend Bute with disparaging references to the Monitor and Beckford, and to attack Wilkes. He wrote frequently in support of the administration in the Gazetteer. His change of heart brought its reward when in 1764 he was granted a pension of £200 a year. From then onwards until his death in 1788 he was a firm but still outspoken and controversial advocate of ministerial policies, notably on American questions against Price and Burke.

Like that early associate of the patrons of the Monitor, the avowed tory and former jacobite Sir John Philipps, who was among the group of tories who proposed Shebbeare to Grenville for a pension, Shebbeare thus reacted to the accession of George III and the controversies which followed in a way diametrically opposed to the response of the Monitor. His was the toryism of the country gentry rather than that of


London. Yet it is not clear just when his association with the Monitor ended. Scott's information suggests that none of his papers were published, but it was given several years later, after Shebbeare had changed sides, and Scott may have been attempting to ingratiate himself by minimizing Shebbeare's connection. Other contemporaries associate him more consistently than anyone else with the Monitor in its early years. Walpole attributes to him the Monitor 75, of 1 January 1757, a bitter attack on Hardwicke, and the Rev. Thomas Birch, Lord Royston's source of information on politics when he was away from London, connects Shebbeare with earlier numbers, in 1755. Newcastle's informant on jacobite activity, John Gordon, identifies him as the author of the Monitor in 1756. Gordon is an untrustworthy crank and neither Walpole nor Birch is always reliable in his spur of the moment attributions of controversial writings, which may have been more easily made without foundation in these cases because of Shebbeare's notoriety. Yet the sixth edition (1756) of Shebbeare's Fourth Letter was published together with the Monitor 52 and 53 'Applicable to the Letter' (all are concerned with the fall of Minorca), while the Sixth Letter was thought by an opponent of such inflammatory jacobite-inspired libels to come from the same pen as the Monitor of 12 November 1758. In recounting the story of Beardmore's leniency to Shebbeare in the pillory in its obituary for Shebbeare in 1788, the European Magazine refers to him as sometimes assisting Beardmore in writing the Monitor. Chalmers, also, in his General Biographical Dictionary of 1812-17, a revised edition of a work begun in the 1760's, calls Beardmore Shebbeare's coadjutor in the Monitor. The European Magazine includes 'several numbers' (unspecified) of the Monitor, as well as of the Contest and the Citizen and contributions

27. See below pp. 536-9, 556, 559 and fn. 27.
to the Public Advertiser, in its list of Shebbeare's works. 28

More general evidence from a comparison of Shebbeare's known works and the Monitor is not conclusive. Certainly their politics are similar at this time. The Letters are concerned with the same themes as the Monitor: the mismanagement of naval and land forces in America and elsewhere, the evils of foreign mercenaries and subsidies, the national debt, the importance of balance in mixed government, the virtues of liberty, the dangers of corruption, demands for reform. Their antipathy to the Newcastle administration and growing support for Pitt are also similar. There is, however, a suggestion in the title of one of the very few anti-Pitt satirical prints of June 1757, The Treaty or Dr Shabear's Administration, that Shebbeare supported a Pitt-Newcastle coalition long before the Monitor came to accept such a possibility. 29

This suggestion is somewhat strengthened by the supposed association of Shebbeare with the Con-Test, a more slavishly pro-Pitt paper of 1756-7. The Monitor quite frequently shows hostility to the Marriage Act, but this was a stock tory attitude, not unique to Shebbeare. The paper itself makes only one explicit passing reference to Shebbeare on


17 February 1759, but it reveals nothing. 30

Altogether the evidence would suggest, but not prove, that Shebbeare wrote at least occasionally for the Monitor to the time of the trouble over the Third Letter in March 1756 and probably somewhat longer. It seems likely that the connection was over by the time of the legal action against the Sixth Letter. It is after all improbable, though not impossible, in view of Beckford's importance as Pitt's link with the City, that while Pitt was secretary of state legal action would have been taken against one closely associated with a paper under Beckford's patronage - even given the tensions in the coalition ministry, the haphazardness of eighteenth-century administration and Pitt's reputed indifference to the building up of support. Although the other authors and the patron of the Monitor probably were still sympathetic to Shebbeare's politics (as Beardmore's leniency shows) he was too extreme for them. Even the early Letters go much further than the Monitor in elaborating the dangers of despotism from a corrupt parliament and suggesting that men are not bound by the laws it passes, while the extreme anti-Hanoverianism of the Sixth Letter which gave rise to accusations of jacobitism is far beyond anything the Monitor contains.

The Beckfords had many associations with tories who had been but were no longer avowed jacobites; but the jacobite label still stuck to Shebbeare now and later. 31 Such extremism was too much of a liability for a paper designed to build up political influence and not wanting to risk constant affrays with the law. Nor did its printer want to face

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30. E.g. the Monitor, 84, 26 Feb. 1757; 88, 26 Mar. 1757; 116, 8 Oct. 1757; 151, 10 June 1758; 378 (spurious) 16 Oct. 1762. The reference to Shebbeare is in 187, 17 Feb. 1759. See also Appendix V.

the hazards of the serving of a secretary's warrant, which often involved arrest of the printer for questioning, the seizure of papers and the breaking up of presses.

Probably Arthur Beardmore was not originally intended to be a writer for the paper, but rather its business manager, legal adviser and link with its patron. Scott's information makes no mention of any payment to be made to him. The situation may have changed after Shebbeare's defection, when, says Scott, the paper was continued by Beardmore and Entick. Certainly there is no doubt that Beardmore was very closely involved with the paper and by the 1760's his connection with it was widely known. He is named with Entick as one of the conductors of the paper in the spurious editions of October 1762 and as a result of Scott's information he was one of those taken up on the warrant of November the same year. 32

Arthur Beardmore was apprenticed in 1740 to John Alexander, an attorney of Threadneedle Street. 33 Probably by the mid-50's at the latest he had set up on his own account. By this time or soon afterwards he was Beckford's solicitor. This with his appointment in 1758 as under-sheriff for London and Middlesex, responsible for the routine work of the sheriff, suggests that by the end of the decade he had


33. P.R.O., Apprenticeship Registers, IR 1/16, f.21.
achieved some status in his profession. In 1759 he was admitted to the freedom of the Glovers’ Company by redemption, as a preliminary to an entry into City politics. He was elected one of the common councilmen for the ward of Walbrook in 1760. Quickly he became very active in City affairs. He served on innumerable committees concerned both with routine City administration and with questions of national politics, and from 1766–8 was chosen one of the auditors of the chamber and bridge house accounts. As early as 1762 he had attained sufficient prominence in City affairs to be the object of abuse by the pro-government Auditor not for his connection with the Monitor but with the town clerk, Sir James Hodges, as a leading Pitt supporter there. A print of the same year associates Beardmore and the Monitor with Wilkes and the North Briton as Pitt’s chief popular supports, and Beardmore is portrayed wearing a civic chain of honour.

34. See above pp. 11-13; also Birch to Royston, 30 Sep. 1758, Add. MS. 35399, f.41 The appointment as under-sheriff had to be renewed each year after the elections of the sheriffs. Beardmore served at least until 1760-1. Birch to Royston, 9 Aug. 1760, Add. MS. 35399, f.140 (Kyle was successful). Guildhall Library, MS 4592/2 (unfoliated); Corporation of London Record Office, Common Councilmen, Ward List and Alphabetical List, 2 vols., MS.

35. Corporation of London Record Office, Common Council Journals, 62-63 passim. See e.g. 62, f.76, 22 Jan. 1760; f.186, 6 Dec. 1760; f.202, 16 Feb. 1761; f.249, 7 July 1761; f.316, 4 Feb. 1762; 63, f.74, 20 Apr. 1763; f.204, 11 Oct. 1764; f.259, 23 Mar. 1765. One of the last committees on which he served was that to erect a statue of Beckford in 1770 (Journal 65, f.92). Common Hall Minute Book, 8, ff.131, 137, 142.

By this time at the latest Beardmore had established a connection with Pitt's brother-in-law, Earl Temple, and was known as Lord Temple's man. It was to him that Temple sent John Almon when he heard the news of Wilkes's arrest on 30 April 1763 to ask Beardmore to obtain a writ of habeas corpus. Beardmore was later a key witness regarding the events of 30 April. He acted as attorney for Wilkes in initiating his actions on 14 May 1763 against the secretaries of state and the king's messengers for arrest and seizure of papers under the general warrant of 26 April, and for wrongful imprisonment and transference to the Tower under warrants of 30 April. In this connection, Lord Royston referred to him sarcastically as 'the noted Arthur Beardmore'. By November, however, Wilkes had become dissatisfied with Beardmore's conduct of the cases and employed a new attorney, James Philipps. Beardmore acted as attorney also for Brookes, the editor of the continuation of the North Briton, in his action against George Johnstone, governor of Florida, for assault provoked by an attack in the North Briton. Meanwhile in July of the same year Beardmore acted in the same capacity for himself and others.

37. George Nobbe, The North Briton, a study in political propaganda, New York, 1939, p.131; Temple to Wilkes, 20 June 1762, Grenville Papers, I, pp.459-60, quoted ibid., p.45 (Temple makes no mention of Entick which again tends to suggest that Beardmore was the more important in the paper's affairs); George Rude, Wilkes and Liberty, Oxford, 1962, p.155 fn.1, calls him Temple's solicitor in 1770.


connected with the *Monitor* in initiating actions for their 'Assaulting, Imprisoning, and detaining in Prison', and he is referred to by the *Annual Register* in this context as an 'eminent attorney at law'. The awards of damages Beardmore eventually received in these cases, much greater than those of other complainants, suggest his considerable professional status and the loss sustained through interruption of his business. Beardmore's relations with Temple continued close and in December 1764 Temple came up to town especially for the hearing of his case against Halifax and the messengers. In November of the same year Beardmore acted as a liaison between the City and the 'Minority' over arrangements for the attendance of members of the latter at the lord mayor's feast.40

The clearest evidence of Beardmore's growing prominence as one of the popular leaders in the City comes in the virulent attack made on him in 1765 by a pamphleteer over the City address to the king on the birth of another prince. A *Letter to the Common Council on their Late Very Extraordinary Address to His Majesty*, published in September 1765, castigates the presumptuousness of the address in promising support for the king's councils only when 'a happy establishment of public measures shall present a favourable occasion' and insinuating that public affairs are not well-managed at present. It vents its indignation especially on the 'common-council Cicero', the 'Bell whether' who 'directs the principal part of your operations', the 'Leader', the commander-in-chief of the presumptuous 'little people' of common council.

This leader is clearly identifiable as Beardmore (who is once named but not in connection with these attacks) by references to his part in periodical publications including 'that impenetrable performance', the Monitor (by this time defunct), and to his troubles with the law. The common council is urged not to be swayed by 'the private resentment of a despicable individual, no less remarkable for the inflexible obstinacy of his temper, than the undeviating perverseness of his understanding', one 'who has distinguished himself by a turbulent opposition to everything, right or wrong, that has been proposed by his betters'.41 The address aroused much controversy at the time over just the points singled out by the Letter.42

In July 1767 Beardmore was approached by Wilkes for his support for Wilkes's scheme to return to England to stand as a parliamentary candidate for London. His reply was friendly but firmly discouraging. 'I can only say that by my present Situation and indeed out of Interest I am almost constantly amongst the Corporation on Committees etc. And upon my Word I have never heard your name mentioned on these Occasions ....' When Wilkes did return, Beardmore did not vote for him in the City election of March 1768, his vote being already committed to the Beckford interest.43 Perhaps, and with some reason, he shared something of his patron's coolness to Wilkes personally. As a popular leader in

41. A Letter to the Common Council of London on their late very extraordinary Address to His Majesty, second edition, London, 1765. The quotations are from pp.19, 22, 27, 40.

42. PA., 29 Aug., 2, 6, 10, 11, 16, 18, 21, 23, 24 Sep., LC., 3-5, 7-10, 10-12, 12-14, 17-19, 19-21, 24-26 Sep., 8-10 Oct. 1765.

In memory of Mr Arthur Beardmore an Inhabitant of this Parish and one of the Common Council for the Ward of Walbrook. He was a warm and strenuous assertor of the Ancient Laws, Liberties and Constitution of his Country and with Courage and Intrepidity supported the Charters and Franchises of this great City, and to sum up his Character as a public man he had the honour of Living for many years in the strictest friendship with the late Right Honourable William Beckford Esq Lord Mayor of London ...

This plaque is the only evidence found of his date of death, 16 January 1771.46

In fact, Beardmore was much more continuously active in City affairs, although at a lower level, than Beckford was, at least in the early sixties, the period of this study. Beckford was still then something of an outsider in City politics, not closely involved in their day-to-day turns, not over-assiduous in attendance and, unlike other prominent aldermen, serving on few of the major standing committees of the corporation. It appears that Beardmore played a major role as his active agent in the City, in cultivating his popular support and turning it to political ends. Sometimes, indeed, it almost seems as if Beckford was little more than a figurehead. Of this work, the Monitor was a part. In all likelihood, it was more Beardmore's paper than Beckford's, at least in day-to-day control.

Details of Beardmore's life and career have to be gleaned from casual and passing contemporary reference. Ironically, a more deliberate record has been left to posterity of his colleagues on the Monitor, John Entick, a man of lesser standing but one whose name was well-known to contemporaries and near-contemporaries because of his literary facility. He was for all of his life either 'a private tutor, a schoolmaster, or a writer for, and

From Entick's... History and Survey of London... I, frontispiece
and a corrector of the press'. 47

Entick's date of birth is variously given as 1703 or 1713, the earlier date being the more likely. 48 There are more important doubts about his education. Fairly consistently from 1736 in his published works he styles himself M.A. In references to him in articles by Charles McNaught in the East London Observer of 1911-16 entitled 'Roundabout old East London', he is almost always so referred to, yet there is no evidence of his having attended a university, let alone having obtained a degree. Entick's Address prefacing his New Latin and English Dictionary, published in 1771, says only that he had a 'regular Academical Education for ten years at College'. 49 He seems to have displayed some early interest in theological controversy. He opposed Thomas Woolston's allegorical interpretations of scripture in a work on The Evidence of Christianity asserted and proved from facts ..., published in 1729. On the title page he describes himself as a student of divinity.

The following year, in February 1730, he was ordained priest in


48. The Dictionary of National Biography (from where information on Entick comes if not otherwise ascribed) gives the earlier date which seems confirmed if the date of his earliest published work 1728, is correct (see below). Chalmers, in his General Biographical Dictionary, III-IV, pp.214-15, supports the later date apparently on the grounds that Entick is mentioned in a list of writers in controversy with Woolston as a student of divinity aged about eighteen years. The most active period of controversy aroused by Thomas Woolston's allegorical interpretations of scripture and especially of miracles took place in the later 1720s. For Entick's contribution, see below.

the church of England, apparently without first being made a deacon as was usual, and served his first curacy at St Ethelburga within Bishopsgate. In January 1737 he was appointed one of the first two masters of Bancroft's School, run by the drapers' company in Mile End Road, Stepney, with a salary of £30 to be paid from Ladyday 1737. The school opened in 1738. While he was at the school Entick preached regularly in its chapel, for which he received a number of gratuities. He remained at Bancroft's School until November 1753 when he was dismissed after a prolonged and bitter quarrel and enquiry because of his friendship with the wife of his colleague, Joseph Fisher (appointed one of the two schoolmasters in 1745).

In 1760 he married, as his second wife, Elizabeth Fisher, by then a widow, but she died within the year.

Entick had already, before his dismissal, made efforts to supplement his income by writing, it would seem without much success. His first publication, which appeared as early as 1728, was the Speculum Latinum.

50. Ordination Register of the Bishop of London, Guildhall Library MS. 9535/3, p. 241; Subscription Book, Guildhall Library MS. 9540/10, f. 111r. There are thus no grounds for Chalmers' doubts, in his entry for Entick, about whether or not he was ordained.


52. Ibid.; report of the committee to which was referred Entick's Memorial; Heads for Answer to Mr Entick's Memorial, Section 3.

53. Records of the Drapers' Company, John Entick's Answer to the Complaint of Joseph Fisher; Elizabeth Fisher's Deposition of 16 July 1753, which mention a son and married daughter of Entick; Greater London Record Office, St Dunstan, Stepney, Marriage Register, 1754-1762, P93/DUN/40, no. 504, 7 Jan. 1760; Burials, 1744-66, P93/DUN/134, 25 Sep. 1760.
an attempt 'to make Latin neither tedious nor obscure' on a
system he had tried with success when it was his 'lot to be perplexed
with a very dull boy'. In this he gave notice that if encouraged he would
publish his Evidence of Christianity, which duly appeared the next year.
In 1736 he issued a proposal for an annotated edition of Chaucer, to be
published by subscription, but this came to nothing. While at Bancroft's
School he apparently published several treatises against popery and
'a Small Treatise of Arithmetick' but no other record of these has survived.
His representations to the drapers' company in the course of the disputes
leading to his dismissal make reference to 'the great Hindrance' caused to
his 'Employment at the Press' by the insinuations made by Joseph Fisher.
It seems likely that he had contributed to ephemeral serialized works to
 supplement his meagre schoolmaster's income.\(^54\) However, the only other
known works of his before 1755 were his Phaedri Fabulae with notes (1754)
and a pamphlet history of the free masons which first appeared in 1754
and was revised and republished in various forms several times later. This
latter work was published by Jonathan Scott and this prior connection with
Scott may perhaps have been the means by which Entick was brought into the
Monitor venture.\(^55\) Scott's information of 1762 suggests rather that he came
as an acquaintance of Beardmore but the information was given in circum-
stances in which Scott would not wish to acknowledge too much initiative
on his part. Certainly the opportunity of regular employment in writing

\(^54\) Records of the Drapers' Company, Heads for Answer to Mr Entick's
Memorial, Section 6th; John Entick's Answer to the Complaint of
Joseph Fisher. As Andrews, I, p. 165, puts it, he 'wrote many of those
publications which were then brought out in parts by the booksellers,
and which, so dismembered, died'. Chalmers, III-IV, pp. 214-15,
says he 'spent a considerable part of his life in writing for book-
sellers, who appear to have always employed him when they engaged in
such voluminous compilations as were to be published in numbers'.

\(^55\) The British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books
for the Monitor at a much increased salary came at an opportune time. In any case, from 1754 and especially after the demise of the Monitor, Entick's output of occasional works was considerable and varied. Not surprisingly, a reputation for immorality clung to Entick, and Shebbeare, when he had changed sides, insinuated, although apparently without foundation, that he was excommunicated. After his dismissal from Bancroft's School, he lived on at Stepney until his death in May 1773. He was buried with his second wife in the churchyard of St Dunstan, Stepney, where, in his later years, he had occasionally officiated, at least at weddings.

It seems that although he was not a freeholder Entick may have won some political renown among the unruly freeholders of Middlesex, perhaps through the Monitor but more certainly as a result of his continuation of Maitland's History of London. In this he had an opportunity, not only to tell the history of the period covered by the Monitor and beyond from the 'popular' viewpoint and to recount in full up to 1772 Wilkes's dealings with the City, but also to make reference to his own quarrel with the government, thus establishing his reputation as a 'patriot'. It is said


58. Greater London Record Office, St Dunstan, Stepney, Burials, 1767-1784, P 93/DUN/135, 'Burials in St Dunstan Stepney 1773... (May) 28 The Reverend Mr. John Entick...'; Marriage Registers, P 93/DUN/41, 42, 43.

59. His name does not appear in the Middlesex Poll Books, 1768-9 (Greater London Record Office, Middlesex Records, MR/PP.)

60. Maitland, 1772, II, p. 60.
that thus he 'secured a conspicuous place among the Middlesex freeholders and non-electors, prone to "demonstrate" at the Mile End Assembly Room and on the "Waste" of Mile End Green'. It is of some significance, even if only a natural development of the paper's politics and patronage, that the two persons most closely concerned with the Monitor were later warm supporters of the 'popular' cause in London and Middlesex.

Shebbeare, Beardmore and Entick are the three persons indisputably connected with the management of the Monitor by contemporary evidence, Beardmore and Entick for much longer and more intimately than Shebbeare. They are variously referred to in it as authors, conductors, and, in the collected editions, editors. There is no clear evidence of the relative parts played by Beardmore and Entick in its running. It is perhaps significant that, in the controversy of 1762-3, the veiled references in the opposing papers, the Auditor and Briton, to the authorship of the paper are to Entick, while the more frequent references to Beardmore are to his support of Pitt in the City. The last spurious issue of the Monitor, however, refers to both Beardmore and Entick as 'writers'. It seems likely that Entick, with his fluency with his pen, was exclusively an author, while Beardmore, with his organizational and office facilities and his legal training, was in charge of the week-to-week supervision of the paper. Scott's evidence that the Monitor 357, 22 May 1762 (written by Wilkes), came to him in the handwriting of Beardmore's clerk, tends to confirm this. Sometimes, it would seem, his control went as far as determining the paper's line on particular issues and that the tone and attitudes of the paper were his rather than Beckford's. But this is only

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61. East London Observer, 22 July 1916
62. The Auditor 9, 5 Aug. 1962, the Briton 13, 21 Aug. 1762; see above fn. 36; the Monitor 379 (spurious), 23 Oct. 1762 (see below pp. 39-40).
63. See above fn. 37. For Scott's evidence see Appendix I.
speculation.

Similarly, there is very little evidence to help identify the authors of particular papers. True, almost all the papers have signatures, either initials or pseudonyms, and it would appear that these were generally intended to indicate different authors. That this was the case is borne out by three notes at the end of papers, asking correspondents to supply signatures or marks so that they 'may be properly distinguished among the Writers in this Paper'. On one occasion the signature of a contribution was changed from D to E because 'D is a Signature already adopted by a former Correspondent'. However, more than fifty of these different signatures appear in the course of the paper's life, twenty-four initials and twenty-nine pseudonyms. These signatures fall very clearly into groups according to the number of times they appear. More than half (twenty-nine) are used only once and a further twelve fewer than five times. These are the casual contributors. Then there are seven signatures which could be called those of more regular correspondents, four appearing between six and ten times and three between eleven and twenty. Finally, there are five of major importance, three of whom particularly carry the main burden of authorship, contributing thirty-one, fifty-three, seventy-seven, eighty-four and eighty-nine papers respectively, a total of 334 out of 504 or about sixty-six per cent. The three most frequent contributors wrote about half of the numbers and continued to write over the whole period of the paper's life. Such details do not match easily with the known facts about the persons associated with it.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to discover that the epistolary form of the paper was no mere pretence and that about one-third of the paper's

numbers were apparently the work of more-or-less casual correspondents rather than of regular and probably paid contributors. The conductors encouraged correspondence. As was usual in papers of this type (and newspapers as well) almost every colophon indicated the printer's or publisher's readiness to receive letters - post paid.\textsuperscript{65} The notes to correspondents which appear on occasion at the end of papers are confirmation that correspondence was received.\textsuperscript{66} Sometimes such notes were clearly used as blurbs for forthcoming papers or as propaganda on the paper's principles; sometimes they may have been designed to create the impression that much correspondence was received. On many occasions, however, they are equally clearly straightforward answers to genuine correspondents otherwise unknown to the conductors of the paper, promising insertion or consideration, giving instructions, encouragement, or grounds for rejection.

Only about half the contributions mentioned in these notes seem to have been printed. Probably much more correspondence was received than is indicated in them, certainly so if the number of casual contributors is any guide. That there were casual contributions from amateur pens is confirmed sometimes by their style, although on other occasions they are remarkably effective. It would seem that they were used when copy was short and regular writers were pressed, or when they were particularly appropriate to the moment, but that the paper was not heavily dependent on its occasional contributors. A comment in the notes to the spurious editions of 1762, discussed below, would suggest indeed that a rather cavalier attitude had developed towards correspondents. This is confirmed by the only piece of external evidence about occasional contributors, some

\textsuperscript{65} There is one curt request to W. Britain 'to send no more letters, except they be Post-paid'. 231, 22 Dec. 1759.

\textsuperscript{66} There are about forty of these notes, very unevenly distributed. Fourteen appear in 1757 but there are none for 1760, 1761 or 1765. Each of the other years of the paper's run sees a few.
letters of June 1762 from an E. Russell to Scott, the publisher, which have survived in the Wilkes papers at the Guildhall. The letters complain about delay in giving an answer about and returning a contribution which he had submitted to the Monitor for publication and which he apparently later sent to the North Briton. On the other hand, the obvious existence of some reality behind the letter form of the paper was clearly valued for the impression of spontaneous support for the paper's views which it created. To foster this impression, regular contributors are occasionally referred to as correspondents with the implication that their pieces were unsolicited. Sometimes, too, efforts are made to encourage further correspondence from occasional contributors whose articles have been particularly useful. Nothing much can be deduced about the changing popularity of the paper from fluctuations in the number of these very occasional contributors over the years, although there are enough overall to suggest that it evoked some response.

Some of the seven writers whose work appeared more than three or four times but fewer than twenty contribute nothing of great significance. Some, however, are of major importance to the paper's themes, such as the signatory W, who wrote three papers making a historical survey of liberty of the subject and arbitrary arrest in Great Britain and one on political divisions and the proper political behaviour of men of second rank. Other contributors in this group were perhaps called on to help out on particular subjects, especially by writing a series of papers in answer to opponents, in time of pressure.

67. 'All Letters and Papers, sent to the Monitor, shall be diligently considered, and, if not approved, returned, without the trouble which, with great reason, has long been complained of'. 378 (spurious, 16 Oct. 1762; 379 (spurious), 23 Oct. 1762. E. Russell to Scott, 19, 21 June 1762, Guildhall Library MS.214, I, ff.2-8; E. Russell to the North Briton, 24 June 1762, Add. MS. 30867, f. 180.

68. E.g. the Monitor, 70, 27 Nov. 1756; 241, 1 Mar. 1760.

69. E.g. 40, 8 May 1756.

70. 461, 2 June 1764; 462, 9 June 1764; 465, 30 June 1764; 480, 13 Oct. 1764.

appears in the last year of the paper's life. Nine articles signed N.E. were published in nine months, several on important matters of recent controversy, a not inconsiderable contribution. The conductors engaged in communications with him through the usual notes, the tone and content of which show him quite clearly to be a genuine correspondent. After his last contribution they appear to have made an effort to encourage him. At the end of 491, 29 December 1764, there appears this note: 'If N.E. would appoint any time and place for an interview with the MONITOR, it would be thankfully acknowledged'. Perhaps the conductors, faced with some difficulty over continuing the paper, wished to arrange for N.E. to contribute on a regular basis. The regular writers had certainly been carrying the weight of the paper over its last months. Apparently, however, their efforts were unsuccessful. There are no further signed contributions from N.E. and it is possible that the failure to reinforce the writing team had something to do with the lapsing of the paper only three months later. Certainly in the last three full years of its life there is a noticeable increase in the number of contributions from writers of between five and twenty articles.

Finally among these more important occasional contributors there is the only one of all the authors who can be identified with any certainty, O.P. Most striking among his fifteen contributions, which begin in May 1762, is a series of papers on the subject of favourites which makes increasingly daring use of historical and contemporary parallels to attack Bute and the king's mother. It seems clear that the author of

72. 452-4, 31 Mar.-14 Apr. 1764; 463-4, 16-23 June 1764; 467, 14 July 1764; 470-1, 4-11 Aug. 1764; 489, 15 Dec. 1764.

73. 'There has been some mistake, or delay in the way; for the sheet, mentioned in your last, did not come to hand, till these were going to the Press, which is the reason the additions could not be printed.' 464, 23 June 1764. 'The matter mentioned in yours, last Tuesday, is not come to hand. The Monitor received only the Cover...'. 467, 14 July 1764. A note at the end of 466 promises immediate publication of another contribution of N.E. which arrived too late for that week.

74. There were 18 in 1762, 11 in 1763 and 12 in 1764. The highest previous number per year was 9 in 1756 and the lowest a part of one paper only in 1761.

75. On page 34.
these was John Wilkes. He certainly wrote a further paper in the same series, not actually published, but in the same tone and style and headed by the same quotation as five of the others. In view of Beardmore's connections with Earl Temple with whom Wilkes by this time was very familiar, and in view of Wilkes's growing interest in political propaganda, his appearance as a contributor to the Monitor is not surprising. Indeed, Wilkes's more famous North Briton could be regarded as an offshoot of the Monitor in that it was founded largely to answer more trenchantly than could an established paper, whose patrons and conductors were well-known, the challenge of the new ministerial weekly, the Briton. The North Briton was initially intended to serve only this temporary purpose and to last no more than two or three issues. In spite of its unexpected success which prolonged its life far beyond this, Wilkes apparently continued to write for the Monitor and contributed much to the heightening of its controversial tone in 1762-63. As well as the articles on favourites, O.P. contributed two papers on the dangers of the 'family compact' between France and Spain and the foolishness of making peace while it still existed. Early in 1763, after a three-month gap, O.P.'s contributions resumed with two papers in a surprisingly moderate tone. Finally, and most interesting of all, come three papers on the liberty of the press and the subject in May 1763, the first published the day after Wilkes was released from imprisonment in the Tower as the result of his application for a writ of habeas corpus.

75. 357, 22 May 1762; 360, 12 June 1762; 363, 3 July 1762; 366, 24 July 1762; 371, 28 Aug. 1762; 372, 4 Sep. 1762; 377, 9 Oct. 1762; 380, 30 Oct. 1762.

76. See below pp. 38-9.

77. Rea, p. 30. For Temple's caution over what went into the Monitor see below pp. 38-9. The Briton first appeared on 29 May 1762, and in its first number defied the Monitor to give detail to its charges against 'the Favourite'. The North Briton began 5 June 1762.

78. Nebbe, pp. vii, 62.

The second of these three papers is given an ostentatious welcome in a note to the author at the end: 'This Correspondent is desired to continue his Remarks on the 29th Ch. of MAGNA CHARTA, and to transmit them as soon as convenient to the MONITOR, who acknowledges himself greatly obliged to so learned and impartial a Pen'. The opening of the next paper states that this welcome hastened on its writing. The tone of this note is unique. If the evidence of the initial signatures is to be trusted and these articles were in fact written by Wilkes, the conductors of the paper must have known the identity of their contributor. In their note they were obviously enjoying a joke and a little mild irony, as well as drawing attention to the articles. It seems likely that others, too, would by this time have known or guessed the identity of O.P. and would have enjoyed the joke as well as reading the articles with added zest.

Despite the lapsing of the North Briton, however, O.P. made no further identified contributions to the Monitor, which continued to comment occasionally on the issues raised by his arrest while avoiding specific personal support. The paper, like Beckford, never became wholeheartedly Wilkite. Perhaps in part the managers were chastened by the consequences of the extreme controversial tone Wilkes had helped to give to the paper. Of the eight papers cited in the warrants of November 1762 three were signed O.P., and he was the only signatory with more than one paper cited. 80

It is of some interest that this renowned demagogue was for a period closely connected with the paper in what was his first venture into journalism as a means of advancement and that he had a marked influence over its development during this period. It is at least as noteworthy, in assessing the interests which the Monitor represented and appealed to,

80. 357, 22 May 1762; 360, 12 June 1762; 380, 30 Oct. 1762.
that the connection ended when it could well have continued.

The only clear references to authors of the *Monitor* other than Shebbeare, Beardmore, Entick and Wilkes are made in John Nichols's *Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century*. In a list of works by the minor poet and dramatist, Joseph Reed, there are noted 'some numbers of "The Monitor", a political paper, published in the Administration of the Earl of Bute'. Reed (1723-87), a ropemaker by trade, was largely self-educated. His quite extensive literary efforts, almost entirely non-political, were largely pastimes but show a 'caustic wit' and 'much energy.'

When he moved from Stockton-on-Tees to London in 1757 he settled in Sun-tavern Fields, Stepney, so that it is very likely that, with his interest in writing, he came to know Entick who also lived in Stepney. 81 So far, however, the scanty information available has not made it possible to match him with any of the signatories. Nichols also records the claim of the Rev. Dr. John Free, a noted controversialist, to be the author of the idea of an invasion of Normandy, 'first published in the 58th Monitor, Saturday, [4] September 1756'. That Free had some connection with the *Monitor* is supported by its lengthy report of his plea to the London clergy in 1759 for the revival of convocation to discipline the Methodists. The Rev. Thomas Birch in his correspondence with Lord Royston, makes a tantalizingly anonymous reference to the clergyman - author of a particularly controversial *Monitor* which it has been impossible to elucidate. 82

Much more important than these occasional contributors, however, are the five main signatories who wrote two-thirds of the paper. There are very few clues to their identity and none from external sources. It seems


reasonable to assume that Beardmore and Entick were among the most frequent contributors but there is no evidence to say who the others were or whether Beardmore and Entick in fact used a number of different initials to sign their contributions. Nor is there any signatory, regular or occasional, whose contributions might fit the likely association of Shebbeare with the paper. Fortunately, in view of the general consistency of the paper's line on its major themes, with few important exceptions, the identification of the authors, although interesting, is largely irrelevant to a study of the paper's role in controversy.

* * * *

Probably, in line with some, although not all mid-eighteenth-century practice, the week-to-week business management of printing and distribution would have been the province of the publisher who was sometimes also the printer. Scott, the first publisher of the Monitor, had, as has been seen, some financial interest in the venture as he received its profits. The publisher had to take the first impact of any legal action, as Scott had to do in 1757-8, when he was convicted of a libel on the character and conduct of Marshe Dickinson, lord mayor in 1757. The case arose out of the paper for 12 November 1757 which, in urging the City to take the lead in demanding enquiry into recent events in Germany, suggested the possibility of collusive dealing between the City's chief magistrate and the administration. The issue of 6 May 1758 carries at the end a statement of some length in the name of Jonathan Scott, outlining the facts of the case, stating that Dickinson had on application and on payment of costs, forgiven him, and making public retraction and apology. The case does not seem to have attracted any public attention.83

83. The Monitor 121, 12 Nov. 1757; 146, 6 May 1758. The only discovered reference to the case is R. Kenyon to Lloyd Kenyon,? Mar. 1758, H.M.C., Fourteenth Report, Part IV, p. 495, where Beckford's tirade in the debate on the habeas corpus bill against the browbeating by judges of juries is connected with what happened in the case.
The risks arising from personal libel were one thing; those arising out of the attention of the secretaries of state for seditious libel were quite another, as Scott had been warned by his association with Shebbeare. Such attention could threaten a publisher's whole livelihood even if no case resulted. It was over the threat of action for seditious libel against the Monitor that Scott broke with Beardmore and Entick in October 1762. The circumstances of the break are obscure but something can be reconstructed. The events took place against the background of the increasing heat of controversy in the press in general and particularly in the essay papers since the summer of 1762. The Monitor shared fully in this controversy, along two main lines, attacks on favourites and consideration of the proper conduct and terms of the peace negotiations then going on. 84 As its tone became more extreme it is very likely that Scott grew nervous. His nervousness became intolerable over 377, 9 October 1762, another paper on favourites. There is a curious history behind the subject matter of this paper. It was first touched on in what was to have been the third of Wilkes's papers on favourites for the Monitor, which was printed as 361, 19 June 1762, but never published. 85 It seems certain that this was because of the intervention of Temple, who did not want to risk the established reputation of the Monitor, those known to be connected with it and those whose politics it supported, through this very daring piece of writing. 86 The projected paper describes the activities of the favourite, Mortimer, and Isabella, the queen mother, during the minority of Edward III, the disgust of the

84. This controversy is discussed fully below pp. 310-19.
85. Nobbe, p. 44. Two issues numbered 361, 19 June 1762, appear together in one of the British Museum bound volumes of the Monitor (PP. 3611 1(5) and the one on favourites is annotated in Wilkes's hand, according to Nobbe, 'This Monitor was never published. Vide North Briton No. 5 July 3 1762.'
people and the eventual arousing of the young king which led to the 
hanging of Mortimer and the imprisonment of Isabella. In its place appeared 
the actually published Monitor 361, an attack on the Briton, particularly 
over the question of subsidies to the king of Prussia - and Temple offered 
to pay the costs of the substitution. Undeterred, Wilkes published his 
Mortimer essay as number 5 of the North Briton on 3 July. Wilkes's articles 
on favourites continued to appear in the Monitor, however, and as the tempo 
of controversy quickened Temple's caution was either overcome, or, more 
likely, evaded. For 377, the paper which alarmed Scott, is another on the 
Mortimer question, covering very much the same ground and at least as 
daring as the North Briton 5.

It is impossible to say whether Scott took fright when he saw the 
copy or whether the agents of the secretaries of states, impelled by the 
irritation of the administration at the increasing daring of recent articles 
on the peace as well as on favourites, by coincidence chose this moment 
to try to silence the Monitor by scaring off its publisher. The methods 
attempted a few weeks later on the North Briton suggest the strong possibility 
of the latter and certainly legal action against the Monitor was under 
official consideration at this time. 87 In any case, Scott did not print 
377 and within two days of its appearance he was giving information to the 
administration and had brought out his own rival Monitor, the first spurious 
edition. 88

Whether or not he was urged on by government encouragement and money, 
it was natural that Scott with his financial interest in the Monitor should 
seek to continue it and benefit from its established position. His attempt

87. Two printers of the North Briton were scared off by being shown copies 
88. His information is dated 11 Oct. 1762 (see Appendix I). The first 
spurious issue 377 is dated Tuesday 11 Oct. 1762, a mistake either in 
the day or the date as 11 Oct was a Monday.
lasted for three issues,\textsuperscript{89} which, although they disavow recent heats, are by no means wholeheartedly pro-Bute, or, in the case of the first two, readily distinguished from earlier papers. After all, such a \textit{volte-face} would hardly have been acceptable to the paper's readers whom Scott was attempting to capture. At the end of the first and second, however, some of the maxims of the \textit{Monitor} 2, 16 August 1755, its statement of principles, are quoted with this comment: 'Our readers are requested to peruse with attention the following four maxims printed in the second number of the Monitor, and then consider with Candour, how far the conductors of the paper, as they call themselves, have adhered to the principles and views laid down therein'. The third and last spurious issue gets to the heart of the matter, in strong and explicit criticism of the recent conduct of the paper as being inconsistent with its first principles. It is castigated, not without reason, for not remaining true to the maxim of 'measures not men', and for supporting under Pitt policies it condemned in others, while condemning later administrations out of hand for measures it supported under Pitt. The vigour of the present administration in conducting the war is defended and slanderous attacks on Bute deplored. The other essay papers are impartially condemned, too, for lack of propriety and decorum. The paper ends by promising a return to the true principles of the \textit{Monitor} and an impartial consideration of administrations and their measures since the resignation of Pitt. 'We assure the public, that we are neither the hirelings of men, either m[inisterial], or ant[imisterial], nor the advocates of party measures; and that Mr. Beardmore and Mr Entick, are not the writers of this paper'.

would suggest the possibility that Scott was now receiving official encouragement, apparently he did not receive the support he hoped for in his effort to reform the content and tone of controversy and to return to the first principles of the Monitor. No further rival editions appeared to Beardmore and Entick's version of the paper which had continued meanwhile. They published on time the 377 written by Wilkes. 378 and 379 both end with a note to the public disavowing Scott and his works. Scott does not seem to have got much out of the government for his efforts. He was later imprisoned for debt and in October 1763 was still petitioning for help from Halifax and offering further services against the Monitor. Perhaps arising out of this offer, he gave evidence for the administration in some of the Wilkes cases of late 1763, identifying Wilkes's handwriting. There seems to have been no difficulty in finding new publishers.

Numbers 377 to 381 are printed for J. Wilson and I. Fell, also of Paternoster Row. Apparently at the beginning of their publishing career, Fell and Wilson no doubt welcomed what business they could get. Their connection with the Monitor was brought to a rapid end by the warrants of 6 November 1762. Under one of these they, with their printer, John Medley, were taken up and held until they were released on bail, bound by recognizances to

90. 'To the PUBLIC. The Gentlemen, who have hitherto carried on and conducted the MONITOR, or BRITISH FREEHOLDER, observing that their late Publisher continues, under false Pretences to publish a Paper with the same Title, declare, that he never had any other concern with the MONITOR than as a Publisher: that they had sufficient Reasons, to discharge him from their Service; and that there exists a perfect Harmony amongst the Gentlemen concerned, who will continue to support this Paper with the same Constitutional Spirit.'


92. Plomer, Bushnell and Dix give the date of establishment of their business as 1762. Stationers' Hall, Register of Apprentices and Turnovers..., notes that Jacob Wilson was apprenticed on 8 Apr. 1755 to James Hodges, a bookseller of London Bridge, (and associate of Beckford and Shebbeare, see above p. 12), for seven years; the List of Apprentices Bound, Turned Over, Free and Cloathed 1736-87, notes that he was made free on 6 July 1762 and clothed 4 Oct. 1763. There is no mention in the Stationers' Hall records of Isaac Fell.
appear before king's bench on the last day of the term. The cases against the Monitor were not proceeded with, and on 22 June 1763 they were released from their recognizances. They apparently had nothing further to do with the Monitor except to receive damages in the cases of 1764. Yet Fell at least did not give up his connection with the 'popular' cause and was later publisher of the Middlesex Journal.

Although Wilson and Fell gave up the Monitor the man who had printed it for them continued to do so and his name appears at the end of numbers 382 to 393, 27 November 1762 to 12 February 1763. The form of the colophon was altered to read 'Printed and sold by J. Medley, in Paul's Alley, St Paul's Church Yard', instead of 'printed for...'. No evidence has been found to elucidate the arrangements between the later printers and the conductors of the paper. As the form of the colophon remains the same to the end it would seem that Beardmore and Entick from this time continued to deal directly with printers, rather than using the services of men who, although also printers, acted as publishers and booksellers and farmed out the actual printing. Whether the printers continued to receive the profits is not known.

Medley does not seem to have been of much standing in the trade although he had been in it much longer than Wilson and Fell. His connection with the Monitor was also short, for natural reasons this time. He died in February 1763 and was thus deprived of participation in the 1764 cases for damages. For a few weeks his wife carried on the printing in

93. See Appendix IV pp. 600-1, 604-7.
95. He is not mentioned in Plomer, Bushnell and Dix, nor in Nichols. Stationers' Hall, Register of Apprentices and Turnovers..., notes that he was apprenticed 1 Sep. 1741 to a printer, while the list of Apprentices Bound...records that he was made free 4 Oct. 1748. He appears also in the Master and Apprentice Calendar 1719-1762 as taking on apprentices on 5 Aug. 1755, 3 Feb. 1756, 1 Apr. 1760, 1 July 1760. This would suggest that his business was of some size although apparently he restricted himself to printing.
Shoe Lane, facing New Street, where the business had been moved in December. However, the issue of 12 March 1763 announced that 'Mr Medley, late Printer and Publisher of the Paper being dead, the MONITOR No. CCCLXCVIII will be published, on Saturday the 19th Day of this Month, By J. Cooke, at the Shakespere's Head in Paternoster-Row, and will continue to be sold by him every Saturday...'.

At last the paper had found again a printer and publisher whose connection with it was not to be quickly interrupted. John Cooke had been established in business since 1756, first at the King's Arms without Temple Bar, and then, from 1757, in the Strand and, by the time he began to print the Monitor, in Paternoster Row.\[^{96}\] When he took on the Monitor he was thus fairly near the beginning of his career. By the end of it, in 1810, he had established himself as 'an extensive publisher of works in weekly numbers' and had become 'an eminent and successful Bookseller'.\[^{97}\] At least later in his career he was obviously more of a publisher than printer and it is possible that, although the colophon remains as when Medley printed the paper, his longer connection with the Monitor was due to his being more than a mere printer and thus more use in managing and promoting the paper. There is no indication of the reasons for his ceasing to print the paper in November 1764. Perhaps his business was even then developing more in the non-political direction and he did not wish to compromise its growth. The last twenty issues of the paper were printed by T. Knowles, behind the Chapter House, St Paul's Church-Yard. Of him, like Medley, little is known; perhaps he, too, was a 'mere printer'.\[^{98}\]

\[^{96}\] Plomer, Bushnell and Dix, p. 60. They give the date of his move to Paternoster Row as 1766 but he was printing the Monitor there from 19 Mar. 1763. He remained there for the rest of his career. Timperley, p. 838. There are no clearly identifiable references to him in the Stationers' Hall records.

\[^{97}\] Timperley, p. 838; Nichols, III, p. 719. Charles Knight, Shadows of the Old Booksellers, London, 1927, p. 249, refers to him as one of those who made a fortune by 'this illegitimate business', i.e. the publication of small collected volumes of dramatic works rather than single-play octavo editions, superbly illustrated.

\[^{98}\] There is no reference to him in Timperley, Plomer, Bushnell and Dix.
One of the duties of the printer/publisher was to arrange for the sale of paper. Apparently with the first number the arrangements were not adequate to the demand - or the publisher was undertaking a little advertising - for the following note appears at the end of numbers 3 and 4, after the colophon: "Number I, published Gratis, may be had as above; and if any Difficulty should arise in the Publication of this Paper, from any Neglect of the Persons employed in the Delivery thereof, they who are inclined to promote its sale, are desired to send their Names and Places of Abode to the Publisher, and they may be assured of being punctually served". Apart from such direct delivery to subscribers, some indication of distribution arrangements is given by the addition to the colophon in the issue of 12 August 1758, which appeared regularly for about a year: 'and sold by all Booksellers, News-Carriers and Hawkers in Great Britain and Ireland'. This note is added again in a slightly different form from 395, 26 February 1763, almost continuously to the end of the paper's life. 'This Paper may be had of all Booksellers, Publishers, News Carriers and Hawkers in Town and Country at a lower Price, than any other weekly Essay'. In the note of explanation of the change of printers two weeks later further emphasis is placed on the price, 'ONLY Two-pence', the price which the paper carried at its head throughout its life. This emphasis on the price becomes from this time on a regular part of the colophon. It was justified. Whereas at the beginning of its run, 2d was the normal price for a six-page weekly essay, by 1761 Arnet's Free Enquirer was selling at 3d and the other papers of 1762 were 2 1/2d.

98. (Cont'd) or Nichols. The only discovered reference to him in the Stationers' Hall records is in the Masters and Apprentices Calendar 1719-1763, as taking an apprentice 6 Nov. 1759.


100. 397, 12 Mar. 1763.

101. The Protester (1753) and the Confest (1756-7) both sold at 2d. The Test carries no price. The Briton, the North Briton (1762-3), the Patriot (1762), the Intelligencer and the Moderator (both 1763) all sold at 2 1/2d. The Auditor carries no price.
It is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the number of copies of each issue printed or sold. As it was not a newspaper the Monitor did not have to pay stamp duty on each copy. There would be therefore no stamp office records from which to calculate circulation even had the records survived. The scorn with which John Almon states that only two hundred and fifty copies of the Briton were printed\(^{102}\) suggests that the norm for a popular and well-established paper would have been well above this, perhaps rising to over one thousand in times of excitement. The circulation of the contemporary literary weekly, the World (1753-6), has been estimated as fluctuating between 2500 and 3000, but Johnson's Rambler (1750-2), in similar form, reached only about 500. Although the Monitor's market was different, these figures may help to set the likely upper and lower limits of circulation.\(^{103}\) Almon's estimate of the edition figures for the Briton is probably prejudiced but his comment that two hundred and fifty was 'as little as could be printed with respect to the saving of the expense' is likely, in view of his printing experience, to be a just assessment of the printer's situation. If the Monitor's circulation was well over this figure then its publishers, assuming that they all, like Scott, took the profits after meeting printing costs, probably did very well out of it.

It would seem likely, too, that despite its boast of circulation in 'Great Britain and Ireland', 'Town and Country' most of the paper's sales were made in the City, the audience to which it was chiefly directed. Without news it was unlikely to be very attractive to country readers who had to pay heavily for their papers. Yet certainly its contents would

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have appealed, on the whole, to many country gentlemen who could have subscribed through their booksellers. It is important to remember, however, that the actual number sold, even if it could be ascertained, would be no complete measure of the paper's influence. Not only would some copies have been read by many readers in coffee-houses, but also their contents were reprinted by newspapers and magazines. Sometimes this borrowing obviously caused the paper's managers considerable annoyance.

The issue of 17 September 1757 carries below the colophon the following: 'The Monitor is published, and entered at Stationers Hall, according to ACT of PARLIAMENT; and whoever presumes to Print or Publish it, or any Part thereof shall be prosecuted, as the Law directs'. In fact the only entries in A Register of the Copies of Books... at Stationers' Hall are consecutive ones made on the same day in the name of John Scott, for the first two volumes of the collected edition of numbers 1 to 104, and others individually for 105 and 113, 23 July to 17 September 1757, that is, the numbers up to and including the issue in which this warning first appears. Whatever the reason, and the effectiveness, of this sudden rush to establish copyright, it was not persevered with, and, although the warning continued to appear on almost every number for nearly a year, it was, as far as is known, never acted on. It is not clear whether it was directed against all copying which seems to have continued more or less

104. Stationers' Hall, A Register of the Copies of Books...1746-1773, 20 Sep. 1757. The date for 104 is wrongly given as 7 Aug. 1756 instead of 16 July. On 20 July 1757 is entered in Scott's name the pamphlet An Account of the Facts which appeared on the late Enquiry into the Loss of Minorca (see below p.48). It was apparently not usual to enter publications of this kind at Stationers' Hall. Only one number of the North Briton, for example, is entered (10, 7 Aug. 1762), in the name of G. Kearsley, the publisher. However the weekly, the Herald, is entered regularly 1757-59 in the name of J. Wilkes.

105. To the Monitor No. 162, 26 Aug. 1758.
regardless, or only that which was unacknowledged. The Monitor resorted to different tactics in a particular battle with the Gazetteer, attempting to shame its pirates by publicly naming them. The issue of 16 May 1761 carried the following note at the end:

NB The frequent Liberty, which is taken by the Managers of the Gazetteer, to republish the Monitor, by way of Letter to the Printer, without giving the least Hint from where they receive so considerable an Improvement of their Paper; makes it Necessary to assure the Public, that there is not the least Connection between the Writers of the Monitor and those concerned in the Gazetteer, and that all such Liberties are inconsistent with Justice and the Laws of Property.

To this was added the next week:

Notwithstanding this gentle Admonition, the long long Paragraph under the Title London, in last Tuesdays Gazetteer, was Translated from the Monitor, published on Saturday the 16th of this Month.

and the following week:

Notwithstanding this gentle Admonition, the Managers of the Gazetteer continue to invade the Property of the Monitor.

These two paragraphs were then carried for five weeks until 4 July. 106

Unfortunately, copies of the Gazetteer for this period have not survived, so the justice of the complaint and the reasons for the borrowing cannot be assessed. In any case, these were only sporadic objections. Apparently, except perhaps in 1757-8, the managers had no objection to the acknowledged copying that went on fairly regularly throughout the paper's life. 107

The Monitor maintained its steady weekly appearance Saturday by Saturday for the ten years of its life with only one break of two weeks.

106. 304, 16 May 1761; 305, 23 May 1761; 306, 30 May 1761. Carried to 311, 4 July 1761.

107. The extent and significance of this copying are discussed below pp.575-81.
between 6 and 27 November 1762, explained as follows in the next issue, under the date line:

Whose Publication on the 13th and 20th was prevented by the Confinement of the Gentlemen concerned in the MONITOR and of the Printer and Publishers, taken up by Virtue of a Warrant issued from one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State. 108.

This regular weekly appearance with relatively few lapses in quality, was no mean achievement. On two occasions early in its career, extraordinary editions - so-called in their advertisements - were issued on other days but numbered in the ordinary sequence. 109 This practice was not continued. Occasions of greater political importance awaited the regular Saturday issue and received no extraordinary attention. Some of the earlier issues, of no particular importance or theme, are advertised as reprints in later numbers, but again this did not become a regular practice. 110 Probably it arose out of early difficulties in matching production to sales.

Once, the paper's comments on a major event, the loss of Minorca, were expanded into a pamphlet, published on 16 July 1757 and extensively advertised in the paper. 111 Again this is the only example of a pamphlet evolving out of one of the paper's major interests, although it quite frequently commented, favourable and unfavourably, on other pamphlets. Collected editions of the paper for each of its first four years were brought out in

108. The Monitor 382, 27 Nov. 1762.
109. 55, Monday, 16 Aug. 1756; 78, Tuesday, 18 Jan. 1757.
110. E.g. 28, 14 Feb. 1756 (on the Quakers' refusal to observe a fast day) in 29, 21 Feb. 1756; 33, 20 Mar. 1756 (also attacking the Quakers) in 34, 27 Mar. 1756; 47, 26 June (on evil counsellors) in 48, 3 July 1756; 47 and 48 (on the perfidy of continental allies) in 49, 10 July 1756, and 50, 17 July 1756; 47, 48, 49 and 50 (the latter two papers on Minorca and the navy in the Mediterranean) in 51, 24 July 1756.
111. An Account of the Facts which appeared on the late Enquiry into the loss of MINORCA, from authentic Papers, published 16 July 1757, and advertised from the week earlier (103, 9 July 1757) through to Mar. 1760 in various editions.
in octavo and advertised extensively in subsequent issues. The first three volumes were issued in a purportedly new edition on 15 December 1759 at 18/- and a new edition of these volumes was also advertised at the same times as the fourth volume was advertised and appeared. Each volume has a dedication indicative of the political interests of the paper. The first attributes the collected edition to the 'vast demand for the Monitor' and the need to 'satisfy the extraordinary calls of the public.' No collected editions appeared after 1761 and apparently nothing came of an attempt to promote a new edition in 1763. The increasing gap between the end of a year's run and the appearance of the relevant collected edition, and the extensive advertising of the volumes, especially of earlier volumes with later ones, suggest that sales were not quick, despite such 'puffs.'

112. The first volume was published 16 Oct. 1756 at 5/- after being advertised from 7 Aug.; the second on 27 Aug. 1757 (also advertised from the week before, 109, 20 Aug. 1757); the third on 30 Dec. 1758 (advertised 179, 23 Dec. 1758); and the fourth on 6 Dec. 1760 at 6/-, after being promised 'with all convenient speed' from Dec. 1759 (229, 8 Dec. 1759) and advertised as 'Next Week will be published' on 29 Nov. (280). It was advertised until 26 Sep. 1761 (323).

113. 229, 8 Dec. 1759; 230, 15 Dec. 1759. See fn. 112 for fourth volume. The first volume of the 4-volume collected edition in the British Museum (shelfmark PP. 3557 u.a.) purports to be a third edition of 1760 as do the first volumes of the two four-volume sets of collected editions in the Bodleian. The Catalogue notes that a new title page has been affixed to volume I (there is also an advertisement of the Minorca pamphlet at the end) and suggests that the claim to be of the third edition is false. The advertisements in the weekly issues would suggest that there may have been a third edition in 1760; more probably, the publisher, having over estimated demand, used these devious methods of disposing of unsold copies of the first collected volume. Copies of this first volume purporting to be of the third edition and similar to those in the British Museum and Bodleian exist in the Library of Congress, Boston Public Library, and the Library of Columbia University. So far as is known, no copies of later volumes purporting to be of a second or third edition exist.

114. The Monitor, Vol. I, 1756, pp. ii-iii. This advertisement follows the colophon of 415, 16 July 1763 and is repeated occasionally to 441, 14 Jan. 1764: 'Where also GENTLEMEN, who are desirous to promote A New Edition of the MONITOR, or BRITISH FREEHOLDER, With a Political Key, by the Author, Are requested to send their Names to the Publisher, with all convenient Speed, that the Number to be printed may be properly ascertained.... N.B. This Edition will include the EIGHT remarkable NUMBERS, for which the Persons CONCERNED were taken into Custody by Warrants from the Secretary of State.'
as the 'great demand for complete sets' and there 'are but a few left of a very large impression'.\textsuperscript{115} As its content and nature would lead one to expect, the Monitor obviously achieved its impact and won its following as a topical weekly publication rather than as a set of reflective essays to be read at leisure and at some distance from the events which occasioned them. Its nature, content and impact will emerge more fully from an examination of its chronological development in relation to the politics of the time.

\textsuperscript{115} 53, 7 Aug. 1756; 94, 7 May 1757; 95, 14 May 1757; 97, 28 May 1757; 100 18 June 1757; 111. 3 Sep. 1757; 187, 17 Feb. 1759.
PART I

THE MONITOR, POLITICS AND WAR, 1755-1765
At the end of 1759 the managers of the Monitor described its collected volumes to prospective buyers as containing occasional Essays on the true Interest of Great Britain, both in regard to her own Situation, Strength, Commerce, and Government, and to her Alliances and Connection with the Powers on the Continent; and upon several remarkable Events, on which our Glory and Safety from our Enemies, and the internal Peace and Happiness of this Nation greatly depended.

A year later the advertisements of the fourth collected volume claimed that in it 'most of the Political Topics and National Proceedings in the Years 1758 and 1759 are freely and candidly discussed and illustrated'.

Earlier statements avow a more specific critical purpose, 'The intention of the MONITOR... is to commend good men and good measures, and to censure bad ones, without respect of persons...' declares the dedication of the first collected volume published in October 1756. The aim of and claim to impartiality are quite frequently reiterated throughout the paper's life, and are accompanied by promises of and claims to moderation, reason and regard for truth. 1

Yet it would be misleading to read the paper's political comment solely in the light of these conventional and general statements of aim and claims to impartiality. In fact, the paper falls far short of offering a complete commentary on either domestic or foreign affairs. Perhaps the best example of this is its almost complete lack of notice of Ireland, an area of constant concern to contemporary politicians. Even on the Seven

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1. The Monitor 232, 29 Dec. 1759; 280, 29 Nov. 1760; Vol. I, 1756, p. i. For examples of claims to impartiality and moderation see 87, 19 Mar. 1757; 102, 2 July 1757; 270, 30 Sep. 1760; 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 418, 6 Aug. 1763; 475, 8 Sep. 1764.
Years' War, in which the paper is vitally interested, its attention is limited to some theatres only. The paper is not, thus, an independent commentator on political affairs. Rather, it is the vehicle of particular interests concerned with particular lines of policy and avowing certain loyalties. And its commentary must be read with these in mind.

Some indication of what these particular interests and attitudes are is to be gained from the programme avowed in the opening numbers of the paper. The first announces not just an intention of opposition, but an uncompromising anti-ministerialism. In circumstances of crisis at home and abroad it stands forth to emancipate the king from the shackles of an arbitrary administration, to expose to his, and the public view the arts by which his ministers have abused and oppressed his people, to open those paths which lead to true glory, by establishing a mutual confidence between the king and his people to guard against the encroachments of power and to dissect the views of the 'zealots of party'. It seeks to arouse the zeal of a few active, determined and disinterested patriots who even in time of dire crisis and against the arts and ambitions of ministers may do much. The paper carefully distinguishes this opposition to ministers from opposition to the constitution. In the set of fifteen maxims adopted as the paper's statement of principles in the second issue it deliberately rejects any suggestion of jacobitism, that obsolete stigma used by ministers to discredit all opposition. It affirms its loyalty to the king and to the Revolution, and, in the interests of impartiality, declares that it will avoid all factious peevish opposition on 'indifferent' measures and support good government as well as oppose the bad, according to the 'spirit and end of the revolution'.

These early numbers further map out the paper's fields of interest more

2. 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 2, 16 Aug. 1755. For the maxims, see Appendix II.
precisely. They indicate its characteristic intense interest in constitutional questions. The first essay asserts the need for attention to the first principles of government and for drastic remedies to cure the body politic and restore the integrity of government in face of all-pervasive corruption and party division. The set of maxims in the second calls for a more effective law against bribery in elections and for a practical militia scheme to make possible a reduction of the standing army. As it is, the army is insufficient to the demands of war but possibly dangerous in the hands of an arbitrary prince. The third and fourth papers ask for a fair representation of the people, proper definition of the right to vote in county elections, and a check to corruption which is threatening liberty both in elections and the house of commons. This interest in and concern for British liberty stand out, too, in the dedications to the collected volumes, particularly the third, which looks forward to the day, just beginning to dawn, when 'this glorious constitution of ours will be in truth and reality, what it is in theory and appearance - the perfection of beauty; the joy and envy of the whole earth'.

Even when the Monitor is caught in the hurly-burly of policy and strategy through the Seven Years' War this concern for the constitution is never far below the surface.

Closely connected is the paper's interest in the proper management of public finance, referred to in three of the maxims. This, too, was a continuing and characteristic interest. In fact the Monitor is bitterly hostile to the whole business of modern public finance, the development of which since the Revolution is traced in one of its historical surveys. It is condemned with the opprobrious term usury, its engine, the Bank of England, comes in for attack, while chief among the complaints and

a major target of the urgings to reform is the national debt. It is
deplored especially because it creates a vast 'monied interest', a set of
upstarts to vie with and prey upon the landed classes.5 Hostility is
epitomized in a number of scathing references, beginning in the opening
maxims, to 'those harpies, called money-jobbers', those 'rapacious
harpies' who plunder the government while pretending to assist, and
manipulate the stocks to enrich themselves rather than to serve the
nation.6

Another even more important field of interest indicated in the opening
papers is that of foreign policy. The maxims ask that Britain should be
involved in alliances only where British interests are definitely concerned,
and then preferably with great powers, not 'petty German princes, who have
always failed us'. Reliance should be placed on a well-ordered and large
navy, recruited without pressing, 'to assert the dominion of the sea' in
peace and war. Britain's colonies should be cherished and supported,
colonists' rights should be defined and settled according to the principles
of liberty, and they should be governed 'in so gentle a manner, as not to
provoke them to cast off their allegiance'. A federal union should be
promoted among the North American colonies.7 Development of these principles
of foreign policy, especially those concerning relations with Europe, the
use of the navy, and the value of settlement colonies, takes up a major part
of the Monitor's attention.

Only one of the maxims, the last, deals with economic affairs, calling
for every possible encouragement to trade, and to manufacture at home
and in the colonies, with discouragement of all monopoly. Generally, the

1763.

6. 2, 16 Aug. 1755; 22, 3 Jan. 1756; 80, 29 Jan. 1757; 207, 7 July 1759;
210, 28 July 1759; 254, 31 May 1760; 292, 21 Feb. 1761; 306, 30 May. 1761;
307, 6 June 1761; 344; 483, 3 Nov. 1764.

7. 2, 16 Aug. 1755.
paper is overwhelmingly concerned with political - constitutional questions and foreign policy and pays little attention to economic matters as such even when there was an immediate and pressing concern, such as the corn shortage of 1756-7. When it does so its views are on the whole conventional and uninteresting, and it shows little overt realization of the economic interests of men as motives for action. It does, however, demonstrate some distinctive attitudes which further help to define its character. Although it shows the orthodox deference to the importance of land, the economic activity in which it is most interested is trade. Again this is discussed on accepted mercantilist lines but sometimes a strongly anti-individualist is remarkable. Trade which serves to enrich individuals but neglects the country's interest, which benefits the rich and crafty at the expense of the poor and the state, is always to be condemned. Capitalists such as brewers who may offset the increased duty on beer and ale by raising prices are castigated. The serious grain shortage and consequent high price of bread of 1756-7 are attributed, except on one occasion, not to poor harvests and bad weather or even divine judgement, but to the machinations of individuals, those who convert grain from its natural use to the making of gin, and those who interfere with the proper marketing processes, monopolizers, forestallers, regraters and engrossers. Thus the paper takes the 'plot' view of such crises to which English people, especially of the middling and lesser sort, traditionally resorted. Closely connected with this dislike of the economic activities of powerful individuals is opposition to all monopoly in trade and the advantages it gives to big merchants. This is affirmed in the last of the opening maxims and especially in three papers of 1759 with

8. 193, 31 Mar. 1759; 312, 11 July 1761; 78, 18 Jan. 1757; 107, 6 Aug. 1757.

special reference to the East India Company and its supposed misuse of its monopoly and the burden of defence it places on the country.10

The Monitor's views on religion, distinctive and strongly if again not frequently expressed, further help to define its character. The maxims express support for the established religion and also for the measures of toleration already enacted, and this support is reaffirmed with the same balance in the Englishman's political catechism.11 Once again, however, the paper's stance is shown chiefly through its antipathies. It quite frequently refers, with intense hostility because it undermines the established religion, to the Jewish Naturalization Act, enacted and then repealed in 1753.12 It bitterly castigates the Quakers for their failure to observe the fast day proclaimed in 1756 and attacks their political loyalty and religious principles at some length and with some virulence. A rather less virulent hostility is shown much later because of Quakers' criticism of the German War.13 Especially in the earlier years there are unfriendly references to dissenters generally, with clear if implicit opposition to any extension of toleration, especially to political rights, which is maintained in later years.14 In its middle life the Monitor shows a similar hostility to the new schismatics, the Methodists. It presents arguments for a revival of convocation to deal with them and to restore some independent power to the church to regulate its affairs and preserve its peace, similar to that enjoyed by the 'Scotch Kirk'

12. 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 24, 17 Jan. 1756; 44, 5 June 1756; 57, 28 Aug. 1756; 62, 2 Oct. 1756; 63, 9 Oct. 1756; 84, 26 Feb. 1757; 151, 10 June 1758; 256, 14 June 1760; 260, 12 July 1760.
13. 28, 14 Feb. 1756; 33, 20 Mar. 1756; 268, 6 Sep. 1760; 269, 13 Sep. 1760.
15. 200, 19 May 1759; 201, 26 May 1759; 280, 29 Nov. 1760.
The particular character and political loyalties of the Monitor are fairly clearly established by the programme announced in its opening numbers, together with these views on some questions which do not often concern it and which will not therefore be much discussed in what follows. The programme reflects the traditional concerns in both domestic and foreign policy of eighteenth-century opposition propaganda and of the independent 'British Freeholder', whose character the paper assumes in its sub-title. The great concern for the constitution, the suspicion of the executive and calls for constitutional reform, are part of a complex of attitudes with roots in the seventeenth century and developed by eighteenth-century polemicists in opposition to government. Their stimulus was largely a revulsion against the arts of political management which the uncertain balance emerging from the seventeenth-century turmoil made necessary and which Walpole so deftly practised. Closely connected with these activities is the smaller man's distrust of modern public finance and the bureaucratic state, a distrust which grew parallel to these developments themselves, from the later seventeenth century, and arose out of the fear of absolutist tyranny which might be based on administrative and financial efficiency. This powerful complex of political and constitutional attitudes is perhaps best described by the term 'country' and is of such significance in itself and in potential for development that it deserves separate discussion. Meanwhile it helps to establish the tradition in which the Monitor stands.

With it goes a set of attitudes on foreign policy equally well-established in political debate and sketched in outline in the maxims. These attitudes were developed first in reaction to the decisive new bent given to English foreign policy by William III, her full involvement in European politics for the first time as a major power, in accordance with her growing wealth.

16. See Part II.
sea power and staunch protestantism. In response to this new direction and the consequent strategy of full-scale participation in military campaigns on the continent, two divergent views crystallized. One accepted that such involvement and participation were in accordance with English interests and security. The other, strongly tinged with xenophobia, maintained rather that English concerns were being subordinated to those of the foreign dominions of her new king and English resources wastefully frittered away in expensive land campaigns and subsidies to foreign allies. Concentration on the navy and sea power and the colonies would have better promoted the true English interests of trade and security and served the cause of common resistance to the ambitions of France. England should not be involved as a principal in the struggle to preserve the balance of power in Europe. Rather she should take a narrower view of her national security. Fears of the constitutional threat of a standing army and advocacy of a militia in its stead are associated with these views. These opposition attitudes, first laid down in the debates of the 1690's, notably in the moves to reduce the standing army, 1697-1700, and then in the uproar over the partition treaties, were at first those of the 'country' opponents of William III. In Anne's reign they were more specifically tory and became a basic element in the party conflict.

When England's involvement in European affairs was confirmed by the accession of the Hanoverians and given a different twist by the devotion of the new monarchs to Hanover, the tradition of opposition continued in terms fundamentally the same but adapted to the new circumstances. It is to be heard in foreign policy debates throughout the first half of the century, which, although spiced by virulent anti-Hanoverianism, often seem to have been conducted in terms little different from those of Anne's reign. Still in the 1750's it was associated with the tories. Yet it had
a wider appeal. Protests against the subordination of English interests to Hanover and against the expense of subsidies and land war appealed to the patriotism and the purses of the independent country gentlemen in general, for they bore the burden of the war in the land tax. Emphasis on trade and maritime war to protect and extend it was attractive to the mercantile community of the City of London. 17

The Monitor shows more interest in the colonies than is usual in this tradition of opposition to European involvement, closely though they were connected in the eighteenth-century mind with the expansion of trade. Its concern for the rights of colonies arises naturally from its constitutional attitudes and particularly from some strands of the tradition from which they derive. 18 Its fear that they might cast off their allegiance was not unusual. 19 Its suggestion that the American colonies should federate has more claim to originality in England. It clearly has some relation to the proposals of the Albany Conference of 1754 but in conception it is clearly constitutional and nearer the visionary schemes of some of the colonial delegates than the pragmatic purposes of the English government in summoning the conference. 20

The Monitor promotes these traditional opposition views with a specific tory twist. The party label is implicit in the disavowal of jacobitism


in the first number and avowed in the third. Its views on religion confirm this party character and show how original tory pre-occupations survived with more vigour than is always realized in mid-century toryism. Hostility to the Jewish Naturalization Act further illustrates this link with the past, for opposition to any extension of naturalization provisions was another traditional tory shibboleth.\footnote{Holmes, p. 69; Thomas W. Perry, Public Opinion, Propaganda and Politics in Eighteenth-Century England. A Study of the Jew Bill of 1753, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp. 178-81.} It is also one of the political bogeys which show that the Monitor's toryism was not just ideological but was spiced by bitter political antagonisms. The paper hates Walpole, the Pelhams, Hardwicke and all their works and another recurring bogey that exemplifies this is Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753.\footnote{See above p. 16 and fn. 30 and below Appendix V. The nature of mid-century toryism, especially as illustrated in the Monitor, is discussed below pp. 554-6.} Both had been used as occasions of opposition at the time of their enactment; both continued to be used as symbols of the machinations of the hated whigs.

These attitudes would appeal generally to all tories. Other characteristics define the Monitor's toryism more precisely. Its economic views, especially its interest in trade and the bitterness of its antipathy to monopolies, large-scale merchants, financiers and capitalists, suggest a connection with the 'middling sort' of the city and this is reinforced by other internal evidence of the audience to which it was addressed. The citizens of London and their governing bodies are defended against disparaging attacks on their respectability and right to take an interest in national affairs because of their humble status.\footnote{E.g. the Monitor 334, 12 Dec. 1761; 335, 19 Dec. 1761; 404, 30 Apr. 1763; 455, 21 Apr. 1764.} The paper shows a particular concern, in not frequent but regular and striking references, for the welfare of the 'middling sort' and a conviction of their importance to the nation and...
the constitution. 'The strength of the nation lies in the middling and lower class of people; and every means that weakens that strength, exposes the King and Kingdom to the devices of artful, designing, and seditious men', declares a paper of 1761. The plate tax of 1756 is attacked especially as a burden on the middle state of the nation, and the still rankling Marriage Act is said to have laid 'the foundation of destroying the influence of the middling people upon national transactions.'

Sometimes what the eighteenth century would have called the 'lesser sort' are associated in this concern. The pictorial block which appears at the head of the first page of the paper throughout its life and would seem to be intended to define 'the British freeholder' further suggests an intended audience more humble than the aristocracy and gentry who dominated politics. In triptych form it depicts a man ploughing, ships at sea with an open boat in the foreground, and a man weaving. Here are pictured men who work with their own hands or venture in trade, men on the fringes only of the political nation.

This evidence, even without knowledge of the political connections of the Beckfords, would seem to link the Monitor clearly with City toryism. The City had a long tradition of toryism in the eighteenth century, in part it would seem the consequence of that unruly opposition to central government which, for reasons elucidated by Dame Lucy Sutherland, seemed to come naturally to its vigorous corporate bodies below the court of aldermen. It was a toryism of a strident independent 'popular' variety, holding in intense form the anti-executive political and anti-European foreign policy ideas which the 'middling sort' of the City generally found congenial. It was often outspokenly anti-Hanoverian and sometimes explicitly jacobite. After 1745

24. 32, 13 Mar. 1756; 34, 27 Mar. 1756; 116, 8 Oct. 1757; 151, 10 June 1758 (second quotation); 290, 7 Feb. 1761 (first quotation); 442, 21 Jan. 1764.

the opposition of the City was somewhat modified, especially by the conciliatory attitudes of Pelham. Pelham won over the City's most prominent popular leader, the hitherto opposition whig Sir John Barnard, to the government side, and Newcastle continued to benefit from his help on financial affairs after Pelham's death. But although the City was much calmer in its attitudes to national politics, and, after the fiasco of the '45, jacobitism was virtually extinct, toryism had by no means disappeared. It still survived as the most extreme mode of expression of the instinct to opposition and of hostility to the Pelhams and their cultivation of the monied interest, which were far from dead. Its hodge-podge of attitudes is illustrated by Shebbeare in his *Marriage Act* when he links the Marriage Act, the Jew bill, support of monopolistic trading companies, and of paper money as parts of one hated system. Tories still had their rendezvous at the Half Moon Tavern in Cheapside, not far from the Guildhall, and these meetings were sometimes referred to as the Half-Moon Club. They may have on occasions been wider gatherings of those who followed the 'popular' line but are usually associated specifically with tories. Here hostile contemporaries accused the tories of caballing to direct and dictate City affairs. Something of their attitudes and activities can be glimpsed in the later 1750's, in highly exaggerated yet not totally unreliable form, through the biassed eyes of John Gordon in his ill-punctuated and ungrammatical correspondence with Newcastle. To him they are the 'lurking faction', jacobites who now disguise their real beliefs, but who support anything, such as the militia and a reduction of the standing army, which would weaken the power of the crown.


(Cont'd)
and thus prepare for revolution. They are gripped by a deep hatred of Newcastle and his associates. They will undoubtedly show their true colours when ready and are quite certainly aiming to cause great upheavals in the forthcoming new reign. 29 This highly coloured talk, although it probably reflects less the accurate views of those described than what Newcastle wanted to hear, at least bears witness to the survival of a strident and bitter tory faction in the City.

It was with the support of this group that the Beckfords established themselves in the City in the early 1750's. William stood for the City in the general election of 1754 under the patronage of the well-known jacobite and former lord mayor, Alderman William Benn. Benn had been very active in City politics for many years and had trained a group of supporters known as the 'Bishopsgate Boys' (Benn was common-councilman for Bishopsgate from 1730 to 1740) who continued prominent in City politics through the Half-Moon Club after his death in August 1755. 30

The Monitor is clearly designed to appeal to this group and to act as its spokesman. As such it is part of a major political effort the Beckfords were making in the mid-50's, the purposes of which need some further investigation. By the mid-50's, William Beckford already had some years of a political career behind him and had established a position in national

28. (Cont'd) the Half-Moon see The City-Secret: or, Corruption at all Ends of the Town..., London, 1744, pp. i, iv; PA., 18 Aug., 8, 9, 10 Sep. 1755; A Letter to the Common Council of London on their late very extraordinary Address to His Majesty, London, 1765, p. 41. There are many tantalizing references in correspondence and newspapers to the Half-Moon, which could be pursued further to give greater precision to this sketch of City toryism in the 1750's and to identify its personnel.


politics. He was an independent member of parliament of some prominence, on occasion acting as a spokesman for the independents, and of definite tory commitment from the beginning. In 1751, with his patron, the earl of Shaftesbury, he had taken part in attempts under the aegis of the ever-manoeuvring George Bubb Dodington to form a union of independent whigs and tories to be led by Frederick, prince of Wales.\(^{31}\) Some of those associated with him in his election campaign of 1754 were well-known tories of proven jacobite inclination, in the past if not at that time. One of the acknowledged leaders of the tory country gentlemen, Sir John Philipps, stood with Richard Beckford in the tory interest at Bristol and when he came third on the poll was brought in for Petersfield on William's interest. Another West Indian, James Dawkins, who had abandoned his jacobitism as recently as 1753, was brought in for Hindon by Beckford.\(^{32}\)

Undoubtedly the leanings of Beckfords were to unequivocal toryism, not mere independence. Even before they entered City politics they had close relations with leading tories, and although there is no suggestion of jacobitism in their own loyalties they were not afraid to find their political associates among those who had been adherents of the cause.

The Beckfords' behaviour in the house further demonstrates their commitment to the shibboleths of independence generally associated with toryism at this time, as well as showing how closely Richard followed his brother. William quite frequently spoke in extreme terms against the army, and in November 1754, in the debate on the army estimates at a time of threatening danger, the 'two Beckfords only, and very stupidly, opposed the army...'.


Of Richard's performance on this occasion Horace Walpole writes 'the younger Beckford, who had been announced for a genius, and had laid a foundation for being so, by studying magazines and historical registers, made a tedious harangue against standing armies; and moved for 15,000 men, instead of the old number of 18,800'. In April 1755 he took a similar historically founded stand, basing his argument on Anglo-Saxon practice, on the tory side of the debate over the admission of copyholders to vote in the Oxfordshire election of 1754. In this debate and that on the Bristol nightly-watch earlier in the year, which he opposed because it gave absolute powers to a corporation not under popular control, he concentrated on constitutional argument, expressing typical 'country' fears of encroachments on liberty, especially on the freedom of election.  

His aggressive character and strongly-held attitudes are further illustrated by his prominent part in the Richmond Park affair at this time, an attempt, in part successful, to force Princess Amelia to open the Park to the public. Similarly William already had a reputation for forceful views on monopolies. A correspondent in the *Westminster Journal* of 4 May 1754, humorously lamenting being unable to get hold of newspapers in his coffee house, exclaims, 'Not alderman Beckford himself hates monopoly more than I do'.

Yet, prominent though William Beckford may have been among the independents, with Richard following his lead, they were far from typical country gentlemen. For one thing there was their great wealth, and further their West Indian connections. Their father had been speaker of the Jamaican house of assembly and Richard was involved in politics there in opposition to the high-handed measures of governor Knowles.  

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34. For an outline of the affair, see Walpole, *George the Second*,I, pp. 348-9, II, pp. 61-2.

35. GM., XXV, 1755, p. 88.
return for Bristol in the 1754 election. Their West Indian origins linked the Beckfords with perhaps twenty members of parliament of similar connections, some related to them. Among these William Beckford's very considerable Jamaican estates gave him prominence. The numbers and influence of the West Indians in parliament were exaggerated often by contemporaries. They were, nevertheless, a cohesive political interest and a very real part of Beckford's political basis. More widely, the West Indian interest of absentee planters, merchants and colonial agents living in London was influential in politics. They had some organization, of the planters including Beckford, but temporarily only in the 1740's, of merchants by about 1760 and perhaps earlier, and as will be seen brought effective pressure to bear on matters of concern to them, for example the sugar duty of 1743-4, the opening of gin distilling in 1760 and the proposed sugar tax of 1759. 36

More important as distinguishing characteristics were William Beckford's persistence and energetic activity in politics. He was an 'indefatigable speaker' if not always a very effective one in the house of commons. He was much more ready than most country gentlemen to speak out for his passionately sincere if somewhat naive belief in the creed of the independents. His political energy is shown further in his restless search for a leader to carry out the independents' programme, one to whom he could give his wholehearted support. 37 In the early 1750's, despite his tory allegiance, he was associated with the duke of Bedford, under whose patronage he helped to found the Protestant, the views of which are further evidence of his devotion to the independent programme (as well as of its usefulness as opposition propaganda). His


links with Bedford would have brought him into at least some contact with Bedford's patron, the duke of Cumberland. Yet this indirect association with Cumberland apparently did not lead to a total breach with Leicester House. 38 Out of the flirtation with Bedford came, probably, an admiration for his protégé, Henry Fox, which still persisted in 1755. In the notable Mitchell election dispute which was before the commons in March 1755 and on which Newcastle and Fox took opposite sides, Beckford went against the sentiments of many of his tory associates in supporting Fox and declaring a preference for him as a minister over Newcastle. 39

Yet Beckford seems to have been looking for more than a leader in his energetic activity of the 1750's. Although he was already over forty he appears to have been trying to establish a wider political base for himself, to discover a larger political role. His considerable electioneering effort of 1754 was part of this, although how consciously it was intended as more than an attempt to get 'the four brothers' of the family, with one 'good friend and patriot', into parliament is not clear. He was, however, still electioneering for West Indians outside the family in 1756. 40 More certainly part of an attempt to create a wider political base was the intervention, beginning earlier, in City politics and again he called in his brother to reinforce the effort.

In the City Beckford was indeed to find some political base, but it was far from certain to begin with that this would be so. There were certainly foundations for some hope of success. His West Indian activities gave at least some claim to connection with the commercial world of the City while his tory affiliations gave him a good foothold among the 'popular' element in

38. See above p. 8; [John Almon], Anecdotes of [the life of the Right Honourable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham...] [from the year 1736 to the year 1778], 3rd edition, corrected, 3 vols, London, 1793, I, p. 273, - if this is a reliable source.


40. Beckford to Bedford, 21 May 1754, [The Correspondence of John, fourth duke of] Bedford..., with an introduction by Lord John Russell, 3 vols, (Cont'd)
City affairs. Benn's death opened up opportunities for leadership of a non-jacobite toryism while, with the increasing age and lessening activity of Sir John Barnard, there was some chance that the tories could re-establish their dominance among popular opinion. Yet success in exploiting these circumstances, especially for purposes outside the City itself, would require considerable skill. Relations between City and national politics were complex. The City was not, of course, directly concerned with national government. The main business of its corporate bodies, that which took up by far the greater part of their time, was the administration of the City, the management of its lands, the widening of its streets, the care of the old bridge and building of the new, and so forth. Such concerns brought the most frequent points of contact with parliament and the central government, for parliamentary sanction or government funds were often needed, but although sometimes controversial these issues were not 'political'. Other contacts between City and national interests arose when wider questions of commercial or financial policy were in debate. Further than this, the City had a tradition, extending well back into the seventeenth century, of lively if sporadic interest in more general national questions. Its corporate bodies were the most organized and easily stimulated form of expression of public opinion, and no government felt happy if 'a clamour' was being raised in the City. Nevertheless the City's concern with national politics was occasional not continuous and subsidiary to its main pre-occupations. Furthermore, as a corporate entity it was far from united in its attitudes to national politics or indeed anything else. It was not the monolithic entity which the undefined references of contemporaries and historians to 'the City' often suggest. The broad contrast between the

40. (Cont'd) London, 1842-6, II, p. 245; Fox to Newcastle, 11 Jan. 1756, Add. MS. 32862, f. 79.
outlook of the 'monied' interest and the 'middling sort' analysed by Dame Lucy Sutherland was cut across by various commercial interests and party stances and complicated by the interaction of divisions on local and national matters. There was no set pattern of interests and loyalties but rather a shifting kaleidoscope which needs the analysis of a Namier to be properly understood. All in all, it was not easy, especially for a relative outsider such as Beckford, to establish an interest in the City and then turn it to effect in national politics. In the Monitor period anyway, Beckford did not become as fully involved as other leading aldermen in the routine administration of the City. He was appointed to the new bridge committee in 1758 and reappointed in subsequent years to it and the London bridge improvement committee on which he had served from 1757; from 1763 he served on the committee for managing property left to the City in Gresham's will. But frequently he is not listed among the signatories of their reports and his name does not appear on the lists of the other important standing committees appointed each February. His influence in the City suffered accordingly. At the general elections of 1754 and 1761 he faced opposition for his casual attendance on his City duties.

In any case it is not at all certain, at least to begin with, that he had any clear purpose in mind in his activities in the City in partnership with Richard. He was possibly looking as much for a wider tory base of support as a specifically City one. However, despite these uncertainties as to its purpose, the thrust of energetic activity is undoubted and in October 1755, on the eve of the opening of parliament, William was reported to be ready for action there and 'very sanguine of the success of the approaching session


42. Common Council Journal, 61, ff. 258-9, 323-4; 62, ff. 79-80, 192, 317; 63, ff. 62, 64, 103, 159, 160, 236. PA., 1 May, 8 May 1754, front pages; 5 Mar. 1761, second page.
Two months before, as part of this vigorous yet uncertainly directed activity, and in collaboration with Richard, the Monitor was born. Indeed, in its early months it reflects and provides evidence not only of commitment to opposition but also of uncertainty of direction, this continued searching for a political opening and a leader. Always its commentary on politics must be read in the light of the origins, provenance and purpose indicated by its own characteristics and the career of the Beckfords. Yet if it is so read it can help, especially if used with other evidence, to elucidate how William Beckford's political purposes were sharpened and his political base developed, how his role in City politics emerged, and, more important, how general tory and specifically City attitudes to national politics evolved. It becomes, indeed, a particularly valuable piece of evidence of the fluctuating degree of interest in the City in national politics, and more specifically, of the views of important elements in the City (whose strength at any time has to be assessed with the help of other evidence) on politics, war and the constitution over the relatively long and significant period of its existence.

From the Noble Collection, Guildhall Library
Success in discovering and asserting a political role, and in arousing the City to direct interest in national politics would depend on the turn of events on the national scene. Unsettled times would create greater opportunities - and the Monitor certainly began its life in unsettled times. Abroad, Britain was slowly slipping into renewed conflict with France over issues arising out of the expansion of trade and settlement in North America, which the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 and subsequent negotiations had failed to settle. In mid-1755 naval action in America under Boscawen achieved little except irritation while the military efforts of Braddock were drastically defeated. The British response to the French in North America was complicated by the very uncertain European situation, the lukewarmness of Austria, the need to keep the friendship of the Dutch and Spanish by not appearing the aggressor in any quarrel with France, and above all by the threat of French reprisals against Hanover. For strategic reasons as much as out of consideration for the feelings of George II, the neutrality of Hanover had to be secured before Britain went to war with France. In the summer of 1755, this appeared to have been achieved by subsidy treaties negotiated with Russia and Hesse Cassel for this limited purpose. Yet these were to bring uncomfortable domestic political consequences. At the same time, as a response to the French 'provocation' in North America, but only after much hesitation and debate, Admiral Hawke was sent out with a fleet to patrol the channel, with orders to seize all French ships that might come his way. Yet still no formal declaration of war was made. Hawke's patrols were most successful: by the end of the year more than 300 French prizes had been seized, French protests grew heated and fears arose that
naval preparations evident in the Channel ports portended an invasion attempt. Still, however, as relations deteriorated and fears grew, neither side made an open breach. This was the uncertain situation in which parliament met for the session of 1755-6.

The British government's response was further hampered because the political situation was equally uncertain. Indeed, it had never been properly settled since the death of Henry Pelham in March 1754, when his brother, the duke of Newcastle, succeeded him as first lord of the treasury. The chief difficulty was Newcastle's inability to make proper arrangements for the leadership of the house of commons, beset as he was by the ambitions of the two obvious candidates, Pitt (paymaster-general of the forces) and Fox (secretary at war), the strong dislike of the king for Pitt, and his own jealousy of any rival. This problem came to be linked with divisions in the royal family between the king's son, the duke of Cumberland, commander-in-chief of the army, and the princess dowager and prince of wales, and between the latter and the king, divisions of more than usual political importance in view of the advancing age of the king. By August 1755 Newcastle, having failed to avoid both Fox and Pitt by makeshift arrangements which fell apart under their combined attack, had partly turned to Fox and his royal patron, Cumberland, while Pitt had rejected any agreement with Fox and had reached one instead with Leicester House, which greatly strengthened his political position. Still Newcastle did not feel secure, especially as the parliamentary session approached and with it the need to win parliamentary approval of the subsidy treaties. These with their controversial implications of expensive involvement on the continent were disliked by independent members of parliament and even by many leading politicians. He was served with notice of trouble in August, when Legge, the chancellor of the exchequer, refused to sign a warrant for payments under the Hessian treaty until it had been approved by parliament, a refusal repeated in
in October over the Russian treaty.\(^1\) Over the summer and autumn various approaches were made to Pitt for his support but he was too intransigeant and demanding and Newcastle was not prepared to offer enough.\(^2\) Pitt had calculated, it seemed, that he might best improve his political strength and obtain the leading position he felt his due by keeping clear of the administration in its present difficulties and by taking a stand on the subsidy question. This was not inconsistent with stands he had taken in the past, suited the views of Leicester House,\(^3\) and could expect to attract support inside and outside parliament from the strong instinct to oppose 'un British' adventures especially among tories and independents. It might well make his bargaining strength for independent political power irresistible. Even if he were forced out of office in the process, the issue seemed an excellent one on which to raise a storm and stand forth as the spokesman of the nation. 'Popularity' might be used to press Newcastle and force the hand of the much more hostile king. Since the death of Pelham, Pitt had had in mind such tactics to overcome royal disfavour.\(^4\) Now the opportunity seemed to be ripening. On these calculations he continued his efforts to build up a party on this issue, while strengthening his position with Leicester House.\(^5\) Newcastle had no option but to turn to Fox, who had kept free of the growing opposition to the treaties and had given indications of

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1. Rigby to Bedford, 21 Aug. 1755; Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 166; Anecdotes of...Chatham, I, pp. 273-4.
his readiness to be won over. By late September it was agreed that he
should be leader of the house of commons with full confidence, and
after he had faced the opening of parliament, also secretary of state. 6

Thus the combination of the domestic and foreign situations seemed
well set to disrupt the political calm and consensus that had been
Henry Pelham's great achievement. The new parliamentary session which
opened in November indeed saw a great revival of political controversy
and, as was expected, at the heart of it was the question of the defence
of Hanover and the subsidy treaties. The debate on the address in reply
was one of the great occasions of the century, lasting until five in
the morning and turning almost entirely on the references to Hanover
and the treaties in the king's speech. Its high point was the speech
of Pitt, delivered after midnight when the debate had been in progress
ten hours. Speeches on both sides had already tossed about the arguments
of utility and principle for and against the treaties. Pitt brought
all the attacks together in a great outpouring of one and a half hours
'like a torrent long obstructed'. At last, he said, a war was undertaken
'for the long-injured, long-neglected, long-forgotten people of America',
a war in British interests to be fought by the British navy. But
these 'incoherent un-British measures are what are adopted instead of
our proper force', measures that will lead irresistibly to a general
land war on the continent and the wasting away of British resources
so that 'within two years his Majesty would not be able to sleep in
St. James's for the cries of a bankrupt people'. The arguments rumbled on

6. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 Aug., 28 Sep. 1755, Yorke, Hardwicke,
in later debates when the treaties came before the house for particular consideration. 7

In the house of lords, Lord Temple, 8 Pitt's brother-in-law and closest political associate, described by Walpole as 'the incendiary of the new opposition', took the lead in opposing the commitment to the defence of Hanover, supported by Lord Halifax. The weight of the debate was against him, however. Although in the house of commons the force of debate may have been the other way, the treaties were in fact approved by comfortable margins in both houses. 9 Pitt had unmistakeably launched his bid for power, and reaped his reward in summary dismissal, 10 but as yet he had shaken the government with the hot winds of oratory only.

Meanwhile, as the foreign and domestic situations grew in complication and this controversy arose, the Monitor was developing its views. Having established its major fields of interest in its opening four numbers, together with a characteristic mood of dire foreboding and an equally characteristic call for the exertion of the people, over these months and later it concentrates its attention almost entirely on questions of foreign policy. War with France it regards as imminent and inevitable and because great issues are at stake, is eager to see it made official as

8. Richard Grenville, Earl Temple (1711-79) had been a close political associate of Pitt from the early days of 'the Cousinhood' of 'Cobham's cubs' in opposition to Walpole. In 1754 Pitt married his sister, Lady Hester Grenville. His succession to the estates of his uncle, Lord Cobham, made him one of the richest men in England. Although 'the absolute creature of Pitt' and vehement in his support, he often took an extreme or independent line in politics, for example opposing the regency bill in 1751 and the subsidy treaty with Saxony in 1752. In both physical appearance and character he was unprepossessing and his arrogance and intrigues often alienated colleagues, Sedgwick, House of Commons, II, pp. 84-5; W.E.H. Lecky, A History of England in the Eighteenth Century, new impression, 7 vols, London, 1911, III, p. 184.
10. Walpole, George the Second, I, p. 418.
soon as possible. This time Britain must fight for her true interests. These, succeeding papers make clear, are not European territory or glory, or religion, the vain motives of past wars, but the extent of her trade and navigation and the support and defence of her colonies in America. The colonies are the foundation of trade, wealth and maritime power, 'those valuable nurseries of our navigation, markets for our manufactures, and mines from whence we draw the greatest part of our riches', possessions 'without which neither our fleets could be manned, nor our manufactures can be employed'. America, then, is the sole object of the war, and Britain is for once fighting a question of her own. Its defence requires the utmost energy, not mere reprisals and languid measures; the rewards will be worth the expense. The exertion of Britain's natural strength, her naval power, is what her enemies fear and what the paper constantly urges. She should fight until France's navy is destroyed and her colonies reduced to their pristine narrow limits, incapable of threatening in the future. No ambiguous patched-up peace should mar this victory.

The Monitor's emphasis on the central importance of America in the forthcoming struggle with France was far from unique. It was shared by virtually everyone, including the ministers, largely because of the great importance attached to American trade, and expressed, for example, in the lords' address in reply in November 1755.

12. 5, 6 Sep. 1755; 7, 20 Sep. 1755; 16, 22 Nov. 1755; 18, 6 Dec. 1755; 41, 15 May 1756; 52, 31 July 1756. The quotations are from 41 and 52.
13. 5; 15, 15 Nov. 1755; 16; 41; 42, 22 May 1755; 52.
however, was more than usually insistent on this point. On several occasions he avowed a special interest in America, notably at the end of the debate on the army vote on 5 December 1755. Here he belaboured the weaknesses and inconsistencies of a letter from the secretary of state, Lord Holdernesse, to the governors of the American colonies. The letter, he said, was sent to him because 'the Americans looked upon him as their representative, and transmitted their grievances to him'.

In a further American debate on 28 January 1756 he was the only person to propose an increase in the sum of £120,000 offered on a government motion for a reward to Americans who had distinguished themselves in conflict with France. In emphasizing the importance of America the Monitor not only reflected the general interest of the mercantile community but also the special concerns of the West India merchants and of its patron.

Its eagerness for war immediately was not yet so widely shared. All the evidence suggests that City opinion generally was on the whole well satisfied with the measures of the ministry, in spite of such misfortunes as Boscawen's missing the French fleet that he was sent to American waters to intercept. The merchants were flattered by attentions such as messages sent to them notifying the departure of naval ships to various ports, so that their ships could go under protection, and were delighted by the great number of prizes seized. The moneyed men were as co-operative as ever in the usual business of raising the

15. Walpole, George the Second, I, pp. 445-6; II, pp. 4-5. North American trade was very important to the West Indies and most of it went to Jamaica. Even in 1759, at the height of the war, the total value of trade amounted to more than £21/2 million. Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War: a study in combined strategy, 2 vols, London, second edition, 1918, I, p. 355 and fn., quoting GM., XXXII, 1762, p. 533.

year's supplies. There were some differences of opinion over the question of peace or war, Sir John Barnard being for peace while the hopes of destroying the French marine inclined others to war. But the general mood was well reflected in the address presented by the City to the king on his return from Germany in September, which expressed satisfaction at the steps taken to protect commerce and the colonies and promised their 'cheerful contribution' to necessary measures of defence. Again it was shown in the readiness with which the City made preparation for the raising of its militia to meet the invasion threat, in answer to a request from the administration in November. The Monitor might try to convey the impression that the City shared its sentiments, for example, by its approving comment on the address on the king's return in September, but it goes well beyond the explicit sense of the address in implying that it shares the paper's eagerness for a naval war and its strong demands for a change of ministers. There is perhaps some admission of disappointment and confession that City opinion is not so entirely behind the Monitor as it would like to think in its bitter castigation of supposed opposition to the address within the corporation and insinuations of influence by 'the emissaries of a junto,' i.e., the ministers. There is no other evidence of any opposition to the address in the corporation; and any there may have been was certainly not pro-ministerial or in the direction of making the address more pacific. The address as it stood suited the ministry


admirably. One of the paper's writers, Entick, is evidence against it here. Writing later, both in his own History and his continuation of Maitland, he represents the address as an expression of the City's satisfaction with the ministry. Neither Beckford attended the common council which voted the address, which suggests either no great fear of opposition to an address of which they approved, or, more likely, no hope of directing opinion into more warlike expression. 21

In the Monitor's attempts to whip up a national campaign for war (it adjures the nation to follow the example of the City), it is here using for the first time devices it was to become adept in; that is, attributing the supposed imperfections of some action or policy it wished to interpret in its own way, and to praise, to the influence of 'faction', and directly misrepresenting the views of various parties. Even later, in the new year, the City as a whole certainly did not share the Monitor's dissatisfaction, expressed in January, with the administration's 'languid measures' and its demands for something more than mere reprisal by the seizing of prizes, that is, a declaration of war. In April, the City again addressed the king on the continuing invasion threat, expressing similar sentiments of satisfaction and promises of support as before. At the same time, a group of very influential merchants presented a loyal address. 22

From the emphasis on America it follows, in the Monitor's argument, that Britain has no interest in European affairs. It would not matter


to her if France invaded Flanders or if all the German princes fell under the sway of the French. Yet this is in fact unlikely to happen, because it is not in the interests of European states that France should destroy Britain and be masters of the seas. Rather they prefer Britain, who has no continental designs, in that situation. So their own interests will lead them to do what is in British interests, without British intervention - unite against France. Indeed, they are more likely to resist successfully if they are left alone. So arguments concerned with the need for British intervention to maintain the balance of power are misleading. As the history of wars of the last sixty years show, continental alliances bring no advantages to British interests. They merely divert British resources and prove unreliable when asked for help in return. 23

The argument is particularly directed against continental intervention by means of subsidy treaties hiring mercenary troops. Such troops can be no useful addition to naval power, are unlikely to be available quickly enough to resist any threatened invasion and cannot even be relied on to achieve anything against France on the continent. Britain cannot afford the expense of such measures on which millions have been wasted in the past without advantage, when she can scarcely pay for her own preparations. 24

History is appealed to to support the strong line of argument against involvement in Europe, especially to cover the foreign possessions of British princes. Those great princes of the past who 'engaged on the continent', for example, Elizabeth, advanced their money only when the recipients had done their utmost themselves and were in danger of

23. 5, 6 Sep. 1755; 13, 1 Nov. 1755; 16, 22 Nov. 1755; 18, 6 Dec. 1755; 48, 3 July 1756.
24. 11, 18 Oct. 1755; 16, 22 Nov. 1755; 14, 8 Nov. 1755; 18.
Finally, constitutional arguments play a large part in establishing this case. Any payment or promise of subsidies without the consent of parliament is regarded as a breach of the Act of Settlement. If its provision concerning foreign dominions is ignored or whittled away, it would be the end of the control of parliament over finance, for without explicit parliamentary grant money could be found only by diverting it from other sources. It would amount to allowing the king to raise an army without consent. Any such tinkering with fundamental parts of the constitution, which is often part of the ambitious designs of evil ministers, 'opens a gate for the admission of the same confusion, which brought on the revolution'. As for the argument that the security of the Protestant succession demands subsidiary arrangements, the sincerity of those who propound it is open to grave doubt. Religion is more often a pretence for, than a cause of, war, and religious lines are blurred on the continent. No one really sees his religion in danger.

Sometimes some modification is made in this rigidly anti-European attitude. Alliances are acceptable, even desirable and necessary, if they are with great powers and as long as no subsidies are involved. Those who unite with Britain should be her allies, not her mercenaries. The opposition is to subsidies, not to forming 'a confederacy sufficient to maintain the balance of power by land'. Sometimes, even, a strain of European ambition shows itself. Should Britons become slaves, it is

25. 18; 14.

26. 11, 18 Oct. 1755; 14; 24, 17 Jan. 1756; 15, 15 Nov. 1755; 20, 20 Dec. 1755 (The quotation).

27. 18, 6 Dec. 1755.
asked, or by exertion reduce France to her proper limits, make it impossible for her to trouble the peace of mankind, and become themselves the great and glorious arbiters of Europe, for the tranquillity and happiness of every nation in it? The obligation to prevent insult to the king's native country in a British quarrel and to help allies is admitted; but help is due only so far as is in British power and by British means, and trust must be placed in British good faith. Hanover, in fact, has alliances already, for example with the queen of Hungary, and is entitled to the protection of all Germans. It does not need British prodigality. 28

Despite these modifications, the issue is typically seen as a straight choice whether 'H[anover] or the British Empire in America is to be the object of our care', and any deviation from a colonial and maritime war is 'some other interest...fatally set up distant from Great Britain, and as far as the pole from her concerns'. 29 Again, Britain's reliance must be on the sea, where she is more than a match for France and all the maritime powers in Europe, and could utterly defeat France in two or three years and secure the German princes for ever. By land she has never won any advantages and will be beggared by France. '[T]he power of the sea...is the only means of preserving our interest abroad, and our welfare at home.' So why should Britain involve herself at all in European policy? To do so is a measure contrary to common prudence, considering our circumstances at present; - contrary to the general rules of policy, considering us as an island; - contrary to our interest, considered as a maritime power; - contrary to our interest, considered as a trading nation; - contrary to our

28. 7, 20 Sep. 1755; 18; 20, 20 Dec. 1755; 13, 1 Nov. 1755. The quotation is from 7.
29. 20; 18.
interest, considered as a nation deeply debted; - and may
be destructive to the liberties of a free people. 30

Mainly in the context of its argument on European policy, the
Monitor in its early months discounts the reality of the invasion threat
from France. This it does more by appeal to past history than to the
evidence of the present. By raising rumours of invasion France is merely
trying to promote divisions and diversion of the national resources
from the true purpose of the war, and ministers use the phantom fear so
aroused to cozen support for continental connections. In any case, even
were the threat real, Britain could and should rely on her navy. 31

So the Monitor, in the general context of discussion of the proper
aims and conduct of the imminent war, seeks to make the most out of the
debate over the subsidy treaties, from the time they were first rumoured
until their approval in parliament. Most of its arguments also appeared
in the parliamentary debates. It reflects pretty accurately, if not
slavishly, the views of Pitt and those of William Beckford, who spoke
several times in the debates. It does not, however, parallel his suggestion
(not unique to him) that the king should transfer his electoral dominions
to the duke of Cumberland. 32 These traditional 'blue water' views on
Britain's proper relations with the continent could expect ready sympathy
from many elements in City opinion. Joseph Watkins reported to Newcastle
in September that 'the subsidies for Russian and other Troops gives a general
disgust...in short I fear the Gentlemen in the opposition will be too
well supported by the Sentiments of the City'. West found Sir John Barnard
very reticent on the subject. In October Bute was reported to be endeavouring

30. 5, 6 Sep. 1755; 13, 1 Nov. 1755 (second quotation); 15, 15 Nov. 1755
(first quotation).
31. 12, 26 Oct. 1755; 16, 22 Nov. 1755.
'to stir up a clamour in the City against Subsidies' – through his 'old emissary', Richard Glover. However, the expected petition against them did not materialize and Watkins, who had tempered his first report by saying the disgust was expressed with temper and decency and was not a clamour, was very soon explaining that the argument that the treaties were intended only for the defence of Hanover and not for general war had caused fears to abate. Again the Monitor was not yet in accord with dominant City opinion.

In parliament Pitt's newly launched opposition was also facing difficulties in establishing some hold. In tangible support the subsidy debate had been disappointing. After Christmas there was a marked slackening of the mood of controversy and no signs of great opposition energy or popularity. Even proposals in March to bring over Hanoverian and Hessian troops to meet the revived fears of invasion raised no great storm. Although there were 'some murmurings' over the king's message about the Hessians and Pitt and Temple were eloquent in opposition to Lord George Sackville's motion to ask for Hanoverians, there was no serious opposition in either case. Both Hessian and Hanoverians duly arrived in April. When the estimates for the troops were laid before the house of commons in late April and early May, the opportunity was used by Pitt for further attacks on the ministers for the extravagance of the Hessian measure.

34. Watkins to Newcastle, 29 Sep. 1755, Add. MS. 32859, f. 269.
particularly, which hindered proper American and Mediterranean defence, again with little apparent effect. Arguments against German treaties and expensive misdirected measures were revived in the immediately following debates on the request for a vote of credit of £1,000,000 to meet emergencies and make good the treaty with Prussia signed in January, and there were calls for an enquiry into how previous grants had been misspent. Beckford supported the suggestions that little enough had been done with the money already given, while Pitt 'made a fine lamentation on the calamitous situation of affairs, and on the incapacity of the ministers'. The debates, however, turned largely on whether any concession had been made to Prussia's views on the vexed question of the rights of neutral shipping. Indeed, the changing and complex European situation attracted little attention in Britain in these months. The Monitor reflects this lack of interest and pays no attention to developments in Europe until July when the Austrians and Dutch are attacked as ungrateful allies and the Prussian 'subsidy' is contemptuously referred to.

The Monitor does, however, make a major issue of the question of foreign troops. In February, with references to a proposal to use Swiss officers in America which occasioned a considerable parliamentary debate, it takes up the issue of foreign officers and dwells on the evil effects in the past of unwise concessions on provisions in the Act of Settlement. Then, as soon as it was known that the government was asking for foreign troops, the necessity and desirability of such requests are denied. The invasion threat is again minimized. Foreign troops are not to be trusted, are likely to be disorderly, and can serve no purpose. Reliance on them, as on any arbitrary measure, is very dangerous to monarchy. This

38. Ibid., pp. 36-41.
39. The Monitor 48, 3 July 1756; 52, 31 July 1756.
40. 30, 28 Feb. 1756.
argument is pressed with forthright historical examples. Instead a king should trust his people and allow them to defend themselves without the many restraints now placed on their ability to do so. Instead a king should trust his people and allow them to defend themselves without the many restraints now placed on their ability to do so. 41 So the argument against foreign troops in England, and those against subsidies in general, are set in a context of general constitutional concern about threats to liberty and fear of arbitrary rule, particularly the 'grievous apprehensions' raised by the increase of the military power and the threat of a standing army. This threat is expounded at length in a number of papers and associated with the specific issues of the quartering and billeting of troops and the building of barracks for them. 42 Here the paper closely reflects the concern of the London tories as described by Gordon and more particularly of its patron. The conclusion of Walpole's account of Beckford's speech on the debate on the army vote on 5 December 1755 suggests that Beckford supported his friend, Sir John Philipps, who was reported to be the only man in the house to be against a larger number of men for the army than the 34,000 provided for in the vote. Here Beckford's concern for the defence of America, expressed earlier in his speech, and his ingrained suspicion of the army conflicted with each other. 43

The arguments against foreign troops are an integral part of a further major issue of this time, the demand for the reform of the militia laws to restore a 'real militia'. Reform of the militia was a favourite demand of those who for constitutional and ideological reasons feared the standing

41. 32, 13 Mar. 1756; 36, 10 Apr. 1756; 38, 24 Apr. 1756; 40, 8 May 1756.

42. 44, 5 June 1756; 25, 24 Jan. 1756. Other major articles on the threat of the standing army are 19, 13 Dec. 1755; 23, 10 Jan. 1756; 43, 29 May 1756.

43. Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 446; Rigby to Bedford, 6 Dec. 1755, Correspondence of ...Bedford, II, p. 179.
army. Alongside this, interest in an efficient militia as a practical means of home defence to supplement the army had grown under pressure of national danger since 1745. Now, in face of the threat of invasion, George Townsend raised the question at the end of 1755, when it was debated at some length. Pitt presented a detailed scheme with emphasis on the militia as an alternative to the ignominy of paying others for Britain's defence and as a valuable supplement to the standing army, giving additional stability to the constitution. He made a special appeal for the support of the country gentlemen. 'He opened it with a plain precision, and went through it with a masterly clearness. His memory in the details was as great as the capacity he showed for business: he had never shone in this light before.' The bill passed through its various stages in the commons from January to May 1756. The debate, especially in committee, was detailed and often tedious but there was wide support for the measure. Even many of those who had supported the calling in of foreign troops were stung by the shame of having to rely on them and regarded the militia as an acceptable alternative. The measure passed was no idle brain-child of ideological opposition; the men concerned most closely with it had military and administrative experience to devise a practical measure. Yet still the bill was opposed by the government, who, as usual when faced by an unacceptable popular measure, held their fire until it reached the house of lords. Here Lord Hardwicke, the lord chancellor, spoke against it in one of his most famous speeches. Granville, the lord president, dismissed the militia as 'impracticable nonsense, a shoeing

horn to faction'. Strong support for the bill came from the duke of Bedford, among others, and Lord Temple, and stressed its military usefulness as well as constitutional value. The bill was rejected by 59 votes to 23, yet in view of the popularity of the measure Hardwicke was constrained to express support for the militia in principle and readiness to accept a suitably revised bill in the next session. 45

It is hardly surprising, in view of its own maxims and the conviction of its patrons, that the Monitor supports these efforts to revive the militia. Indeed much of its lamentation on the growth of military power and its objections to foreign troops occur in the context of support for the militia. Its papers closely relate to the introduction and passage of the measure, although its arguments follow its own lines. They make much of the constitutional arguments for the militia and its importance in preserving the balance of constitution and the liberty and rights of the people. The restrictions placed on the use of arms by the people are a grievous burden which surely the king trusts his subjects enough to remove. Now they demand this bill in vigorous reassertion of their rights. 46 Yet although constitutional arguments and the popularity of the measure are emphasized attention is also given to the practical usefulness and cheapness of the militia to meet the threat of invasion instead of foreign troops. 47 Finally, in reaction to the lords' rejection of the bill, a historical survey is made to show the usefulness of the militia under Charles II and the dangers to liberty and to the contentment of the people in its decline

45. Western, pp. 127-133; Walpole, George the Second, I, pp. 447-51 (the quotation referring to Pitt's plan is p. 448); Yorke, Hardwicke, II, pp. 262-5; Gilbert Elliot to George Grenville, 25 May 1756, Grenville Papers, I, pp. 160-1 (the Grenville quotation).

46. The Monitor 19, 13 Dec. 1755; 32, 13 Mar. 1756; 36, 10 Apr. 1756; 38, 24 Apr. 1756. For more detail on these arguments see below pp. 468-71.

47. Especially 32; 36; 43, 29 May 1756.
since, while its practical value is again stressed. Surprise is expressed that the successors of the barons could so forget the people's liberty, and that opposition delayed so long if it is true that the measure is defective. The question is then, for the time being, dropped.

In its support for the militia proposals the Monitor was again to some extent at odds with the City of London. The common council twice refused to petition in support of the measure, in November 1755 and again in April 1756. The first motion, to apply to parliament for a more effectual militia bill, arose out of the privy council orders for the City militia to be put in readiness. It occasioned considerable debate and a special meeting of the common council, when a decisive majority secured its rejection on a division. Unusually, both Beckfords were present. On the second occasion it is quite clear that the refusal was due less to opposition to the militia as such than to attachment to City privileges. The common council wished to retain the exemption of the City militia from any general regulation. The bill provided for exemption but the proposed petition specifically asked for inclusion. This time the motion was rejected clearly without a division. Strangely it would seem, William Beckford was the principal speaker for the negative. Yet this merely highlights the fact that the issue was City privileges, not the militia as such. Beckford successfully took a chance to appear as a City champion against speakers who included at least one with government contacts. 49

48. 43.

There is more harmony between the City and the Monitor on questions of taxation to meet the costs of war preparations. The Monitor bewails any increase of the national debt but at the same time is very chary over increases in taxation. A properly conducted war, directed towards the defence of British interests, is within British resources, even if with some strain, without undue increase of debt or taxation, especially if necessary measures of economy are taken against placemen and pensioners. And a sea war has one great advantage over a land one - the money stays within the country. The paper criticizes both the new taxes, on bricks and on bullion, or rather plate, proposed in Sir George Lyttelton's budget of February 1756. On the latter its indignation rises to shrill and exaggerated heights. The tax cannot be regarded as one on luxury; real luxuries like cards and dice should be further taxed first. It will mean hardships to silversmiths and the plate trade. Worst of all, the methods of collection, through commissioners of the excise, are extremely objectionable, involving spying, informing, abuses by searchers and deprivation of trial by jury. Bitter insinuations are made against the minister concerned. Altogether the tax is 'partial in its calculation, destructive of a very valuable and large body of people; injurious to trade in general; oppressive in the act and method of executing; and contrary to the GREAT CHARTER of English liberties'.

These two new taxes were the occasion of some debate in parliament. The City was so aroused that it not only petitioned against the tax but also instructed its representatives to oppose it on the grounds that it

50. The Monitor 7, 20 Sep. 1755; 13, 1 Nov. 1755; 18, 6 Dec. 1755; 5, 6 Sep. 1755; 39, 1 May 1756.

51. 31, 6 Mar. 1756; 34, 37 Mar. 1756. The quotation is from the second paper.

'subjected every Possessor of Plate to the Information of Servants and dissolute Persons', that cases arising out of the tax would not be tried by jury and would be subject to arbitrary penalties, and that it laid an unfair burden on the 'middle and lower Rank of Subjects', as well as for more practical reasons. Beckford was present when the petition was approved. The Monitor's second article on the plate tax is in vigorous and explicit support of the City's petition and defence of their constitutional right and that of others to protest. On this subject the Monitor presents emphatically most of the arguments of the City and opposition in the house of commons and may well have helped to form them. On the brick tax, on the contrary, it is merely echoing arguments used in the house.

Through all this controversy Pitt, having reaped the reward of intransigeance in summary dismissal, had seized every opportunity to try to stimulate dissatisfaction with the ministers, to convict them of incompetence and apathy, and to stir up 'popular' issues. On the subsidy treaties Pitt's eloquent opposition won considerable support from the tories - West comments that of the minority of 105, 76 were tories - but their continuing support was far from certain and anyway could not create a majority. They had still to be actively courted. 'The Tories hate both him [Fox] and Pitt so much, that they sit still to see them worry one another,' said Walpole at this time. Pitt was called reluctantly from his sickbed to oppose Lord George Sackville's motion on Hanoverian troops because it was thought, mistakenly, the tories could be won by it. Instead they 'owned

54. The Monitor, 27 Mar. 1756. The petition was made on 18 Mar.
55. E.g., Walpole, George the Second, I, pp. 422-30, 438-41; II, pp. 4, 7-8; Namier and Brooke, III, p. 292.
56. Walpole, George the Second, I, p. 477; West to Newcastle, 13 Nov. 1755, Add. MS. 32860, f. 471; Walpole to Mann, 16 Nov. 1755, ed. Lewis, XX, p. 510.
that they preferred Hanoverians to Hessians. Pitt's fine plan for the militia was suspected by some to be the product not of sincere belief in the militia but of desire to embarrass the government. However this might be, it proved a more rewarding issue, although not all of the Tories, even, were warmly for it. Yet overall, by the end of the parliamentary session in May 1756, measured by parliamentary and popular support rather than fire of oratory, Pitt's opposition had not got off the ground. Lyttelton writes in April, about his struggles with Legge over the plate tax, 'I flatter myself the opposition to the Plate Tax will not be more popular than that to the Prussian and Hessian Treaties' and at the end of the session could congratulate himself that in an encounter with Pitt 'the House appeared to be on my side'. In June Thomas Potter reported to Pitt 'Hanover treaties and Hanover troops are popular throughout every country. The almost universal language is, opposition must be wrong, when we are ready to be eat up the the French.'

William Beckford was, as yet, an excellent example of Pitt's failure to win support from what seemed obvious sources. He certainly took most opportunities to promote opposition to the government, more than other Tories. Surely his heart must have warmed to Pitt's oratory. Pitt, moreover, was paying some special court to Beckford. In January 1756, when Beckford spoke very warmly on the subject of Knowles's 'tyrannical' government in Jamaica and Fox seemed to defend him, 'Pitt took it up with great warmth and solemnity, cast reflections on Fox for endeavouring


to screen the guilty, and paid great court to Beckford...'. Yet Beckford 'till now had appeared to prefer Mr. Fox' and had in debates in November openly declared his respect for him, as distinct from other ministers. 60 There is some evidence that by early 1756 he and Fox were moving apart. 61 Fox was, after all, now a leading ally of that arch-corrupting whig, the duke of Newcastle, and apparently condoning a lethargic approach to a colonial and commercial war in which Beckford's interests were concerned. Yet still there was no clear breach and Beckford did not commit himself to Pitt. By the middle of 1756 there is evidence that Pitt, through his friend, Thomas Potter, was making some contact with and winning support from some of the City tories. 62 As yet, however, Beckford was not one of these and there were no visible results of the support.

The Monitor's political loyalties are similarly undecided in these early months. It, too, takes a strong opposition line on all major issues, again more clearly than the tories as a whole. It continues to demonstrate a hostility towards and suspicion of ministers both past and present, especially Walpole and the Pelhams, 'the grand corrupter-general and the two B[rother]s, his successors'. 63 But the strength of this hostility fluctuates. In September 1755, in response to the news of Braddock's defeat in America, it breaks out into demands for changes in the administration to remove 'a junto, to whose pusillanimity, ignorance, or corruption, may be placed the courage of our enemies; the ill success of our negociations, and the miscarriage of all attempts to disable

60. Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 3; I, p. 422.
61. Rigby to Bedford, 3 Dec. 1755, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 174.
62. Potter to Pitt, 4 June 1756, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, p. 162.
63. The Monitor 26, 31 Jan. 1756; see also 5, 6 Sep. 1755; 7, 20 Sep. 1755.
our enemies...'. These demands are not persevered with, however, although the general attitude of suspicion and charges of malevolent ambition continue. 64 Criticisms of the conduct of disputes with France are made but except on the questions of subsidies versus the exercise of sea power they are restrained and somewhat hesitant. Much of the blame is attributed to the 'criminal supineness' of past administrations. It would not be 'candid' to charge the situation entirely to the present ministers, although they show signs of following similar policies. 65 Specific hostility to Newcastle is implied or evident on a number of occasions and in March, at the end of an article on the plate and brick taxes an obvious jibe is made at Fox. 66 As yet the paper appears to have no positive political loyalties. It still fixes its hopes generally on the efforts of a few honest, disinterested men, although on one occasion while denigrating Newcastle it lavishly praises Pitt for his courageous opposition to continental connections which has lost him his place. 67

In its first nine months the Monitor thus makes a somewhat tentative beginning which suggests that it was not founded with any clear and definite idea of how to mould the political situation to the interests of its patron. Its general opposition purpose and main lines of argument are made clear within an established tradition of opposition. Only quite slowly does it take the opportunity provided by unfolding events to develop this stand,

64. 8, 27 Sep. 1755; 7, 20 Sep. 1755; 11, 18 Oct. 1755; 20, 20 Dec. 1755; 22, 3 Jan. 1756; 23, 10 Jan. 1756; 24, 17 Jan. 1756; 29, 21 Feb. 1756; 31, 6 Mar. 1756. The quotation is from 8.

65. E.g. 5, 6 Sep. 1755; 11, 15, 15 Nov. 1755; 26, 31 Jan. 1756. The quotation is from 18, 6 Dec. 1755.

66. 9, 4 Oct. 1755; 27, 7 Feb. 1756; 39, 1 May 1756; 31, 6 Mar. 1756 (on Fox).

interweaving constitutional, political and foreign policy concerns, chiefly over the issues of subsidies, the standing army and foreign troops. The paper appears to be attempting to reinvigorate the traditional opposition stance of the Tories in general and of popular elements in the City. On specific issues, it courts City opinion and sets itself up as its spokesman (for example, on the plate tax) or seeks to direct and mould that opinion (in its reinterpretation of the City address on the return of the king in September 1755). As yet, however, on important issues, including that of confidence in the ministers, the Monitor is clearly out of tune with official City opinions as expressed by its common council. It makes no reference to the City's address on the invasion threat in April 1756 presumably because it could not commend the attitudes expressed. Similarly it is often more outspoken than general Tory opinion. Like Pitt, it has not yet got wind in the sails of its opposition and its promotion of the interests of its patron in London politics. Like Beckford himself it has not yet decided its role and specific loyalties in wider national politics.

From the last days of the parliamentary session, however, developments were occurring that would settle these issues for Pitt, Beckford and the Monitor. On 6 May news was received in London of the landing on 17 April of a French force in Minorca, a British possession much valued in the exercise of naval power and defence of trade in the Mediterranean. The crisis which grew out of this over the next six months brought to a head the instability of the political situation which was not to be settled until the middle of 1757. Not unnaturally at the same time Britain's war effort was hampered.

Until news of the French landing was received neither politicians nor public had shown much interest in the possibility of a threat to Minorca. Reports of preparations in Toulon had, in face of the invasion.
threat and with some sound reason, been discounted until indisputable information was received in February and March. Then it was decided to dispatch 'as strong a squadron as can be spared', under Admiral Byng. Byng at last sailed on 6 April, only four days before the French fleet left Toulon. A month later the two expeditions became, suddenly, the focus of British attention.

Pitt seized on the report of the French landing as yet another chance to parade his opposition. On 7 May, in the course of debates on the Hanoverian estimates, he made a bitter attack on the ministry, accusing them of neglect and of 'a wilful, deep-laid scheme for avoiding the war, an intentional loss of Minorca to excuse a bad peace and justify the abandonment of America'. A few days later, in debates on the vote of credit for the Prussian treaty, he renewed his attack, linking it to the grant to Prussia, and declaring he would not consent to it 'for all the great offices conjointly...'. On this occasion Beckford joined in the attacks on the ministers, especially on Newcastle, deploring a lack of leadership, foresight and proper preparation in America as well as the Mediterranean. Newcastle was, typically, thrown into a panic, convinced, with Fox's judicious encouragement, that blame was being fastened chiefly on him. 68

Fortunately for him, the parliamentary session was drawing to a close and Pitt was robbed of his platform. Only later events would decide whether this attack would be any more successful than his earlier ones.

On 18 May, in response to the attack on Minorca, war at last publicly declared by Britain. Three days later Byng fought his muddled and indecisive

68. Yorke, Hardwicke, II, p. 268; Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 34-9; Hon. John Yorke to Royston, 13 May 1756, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 8 May 1756, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 May 1756, Yorke, Hardwicke, II, pp. 289, 290-1 (second quotation. The first is from p. 268).
engagement with the French fleet off Minorca and afterwards, convinced with the advice of a council at war that he could do nothing for Fort St Philip, retired to Gibraltar to await reinforcements. The French attacking force was thus left in undisturbed communication with France and at the end of June the fort fell to them.

The first news of Byng's engagement reached London on 3 June from French sources through the Spanish ambassador. The ministers did not wait for Byng's report; his recall and that of his rear-admiral, Temple West, were ordered immediately and announced. When Byng's own despatch arrived on 23 June it was published in a censored form in what can only be regarded as an attempt to channel public indignation on to Byng. On 15 July, again through the Spanish ambassador, news was received of the fall of Fort St. Philip at the end of June.69

Hitherto public reaction to these events had been rather confused. Now a swell of indignation began to rise, expressed in a great burst of squibs, satirical prints, paragraphs and verses in the papers, as well as by more direct action.70 Despite the efforts of the ministers, not all of the storm was spent on Byng. Their actions, too, were criticized.71 In August and early September nine sets of instructions to members of parliament and eight addresses to the crown showed the extent of criticism of the ministers and their management of the war.72

69. Dudley Pope, At Twelve Mr Byng was Shot, Philadelphia and New York, 1962, pp. 141-5, 155-7; Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 67.
71. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 59, 68.
72. Ibid., p. 69; Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', p. 153 and fn. 5.
and also the most outspoken of the addresses was that from the City of London.

In this developing outcry of public opinion the Monitor plays a major part. From the beginning of the irruption of the Minorca issue into politics in May the Monitor, following the example of its patron in parliament, fans it and the consequent suspicion of the ministers. Its rather hesitant and intermittent criticism becomes much more vigorous and continuous, every paper being concerned in one way or another with their deficiencies and malign intentions and the need for a change. The declaration of war may be only a ministerial collusion to fleece and deceive the people. Money granted for defence has been used not to make proper dispositions of Britain's strength but to build up a dangerous military power, unreliable and useless for practical defence, while the greatest fleet ever in commission is kept idly in port. At the onset of this rising criticism reference is made to the possible loss of Minorca and to the dangers said to be threatening in America and ministers are then and later accused of inadequate measures to meet the threat. Then on 10 July, just before news of its fall was received, and again on 17 July the Minorca issue is taken up in detail. There are reflections on Byng's conduct but it 'does not savour so much of a coward, as of a tool'. Blame is chiefly fastened on the ministers, especially on 'a certain state pilot'. Britain's 'fate ought not to depend upon a single minister', who in a long course of administration had given no proof of his ability, unless in corrupting the people, and loading the nation with an immense and still growing debt. ... Whose patient has this nation been for above thirty years past?

73. E.g. the Monitor 42, 22 May 1756; 44, 5 June 1756.
74. 41, 15 May 1756.
...would you still employ the surgeon, whose ignorance or dishonesty has brought the matter to this pass?' On 31 July this criticism reaches its first climax in a powerful paper, for which, again, the loss of Minorca and the situation in America form the basis. The mood of dramatic foreboding is well conveyed by the opening quotation from Isaiah: 'Cry aloud, spare not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and show my people their transgressions, and the house of Jacob their sins'.

Towards the end the paper affirms

> It is not mere jealousy, but the evident mis-rule of our ministry, which alarms the nation. It is not disaffection, but the love of our constitution, King and country, that prompts us to appear in opposition to bad measures, and to seek after those bad men, who have not applied our money nor our forces for the glory of the crown and protection of our countries and commerce

and, even more luridly,

> if we do not lay hold of the present time to exert that liberty, which is our birth-right, let not posterity wonder to see this monarchy once more usurped by a council of state, and the freeborn subjects reduced to the state of Turkish or Gallic slaves.

On 7 August Sir Thomas Downright, obviously speaking the sentiments of the author, rejects all the moderation and reason of Mr. Timothy Splithair in seeking to explain and exculpate their conduct. Clearly the Monitor is much to the fore in initiating and encouraging the swelling tide of public discontent.

This swelling tide was most anxiously watched by Newcastle and his various informants in the City of London, from May onwards, but especially from late July. As early as 16 June, Pitt remarked to Grenville, perhaps rather optimistically at this stage, 'the Passengers, the City of all denominations, are in alarm, and think the ship

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75. 49, 10 July 1756; 50, 17 July 1756; 52, 31 July 1756; 53, 7 Aug. 1756.
sinking'. 76 Strenuous efforts were made by ministry supporters to prevent the City address. Sir John Barnard expressed his strong disapproval of the whole procedure and advised the lord mayor against calling the court of common council. This merely brought him abuse. The efforts were to no avail. 77 The common council met on 18 August and after considerable debate adopted an address with only three or four dissentients. The address plainly showed the City's disgust at the loss of Minorca 'without any attempt, by timely and effectual succour to prevent or defeat an attack' and their apprehensions about America because of 'the mismanagements and delays which have attended the defence of those invaluable colonies, the object of the present war, and the principal source of the wealth and strength of these kingdoms'. It laments the 'want of a constitutional and well-regulated militia'. In response to their demand for enquiry and punishment, at the presentation of the address on 20 August, the king gave his promise, which was to be fatal to Byng, to save no delinquent from justice. 78

The common council which agreed to the address was said to have been earnestly desired 'by the General Voice of the Citizens of London', and certainly it was very well attended particularly by the aldermen. 79

76. E.g. West to Newcastle, 8 May, 24 July 1756, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 July 1756, S. Squire to Newcastle, 19 Aug. 1756, Add. MSS. 32864, f. 499, 32866, ff. 269-9, 275, 489-9; Pitt to Grenville, 16 June 1756, Grenville Papers, I, p. 168.


78. Birch to Royston, 20 Aug. 1756, Add. MS. 35398, ff. 317-8; Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', p. 154 and fn. 1; GM., XXVI, 1756, p. 408; Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 70.

Leadership in the movement for the address was associated, especially by those sympathetic to the government, with the City tories, sometimes with dark hints of jacobitism. The association, if not the hints, was more or less justified, but support for the address went far beyond what could be manipulated by one group. So strong was the feeling that it was thought unwise by those most favourable to the idea to try to launch a loyal address among merchants more sympathetic to the government. A more exact indication of the leaders in the movement appears in accounts of the meeting. The address was moved by Deputy Hodges, 'one of the City demagogues', who nevertheless had supported the militia petition in April in opposition to Beckford. It was seconded by 'Mr Turner, a West Indian merchant'. William Beckford was prominent in defending the proposal to address, citing precedents of 1641, was appointed to the committee to draw it up, and, when the suggested address was reported back to the meeting, answered the further objections of Sir John Barnard. There are clear hints of divisions among the supporters of the address between those who met at the Half Moon Club and the less moderate protagonists at the Black Swan, but it is not certain to which group Beckford belonged. Jonathan Scott, the printer of the Monitor, had his shop at the Black Swan in Paternoster Row. On the other hand, Beckford is said to have answered Barnard with unusual moderation and not to have given 'the full scope to the Impetuosity of his Temper on a Subject and occasion, which were likely to exercise it'. It does seem, however, from his part in the debates, that his influence was strong, perhaps predominant, over the address. Certainly, divisions or not, events

had opened opportunities for him and the tories generally. Sir John Barnard's position in the City was virtually destroyed by his efforts to stem what he called 'the Impetuosity and Madness of people'; Walpole reported to Mann that he had grown 'almost as unpopular as Byng'. His continued urgings of peace merely emphasized his isolation. As West had remarked earlier, 'perhaps he has not always that Attention to Publick Clamour which a wise Man should have'.

The Monitor, not surprisingly, explicitly supports the City address. On 14 August, just a few days before the common council, it defends the right of free speech and of every subject to enquire and speak out in times of such great evils, and especially to inform the king of his real interest against those who hide it from him. A special issue of 16 August contains 'The Genuine Speech of a Common-Councilman at Athens' urging the need for attention to public affairs. The honour of freemen, it argues, requires their attention to these matters. It was noted by West as part of the campaign in the City. Then, on 28 August, the motives and content of the address are explicitly praised and opposition to it castigated with explicit reference to Sir John Barnard and his arguments. It is regretted that the good patriot ship St John should have been 'most confoundedly eaten by ministerial worms' and perhaps become 'so rotten and crazy as not to be trusted on any service'. Indeed the Monitor (and hence probably Beckford) seems to have been associated with the most violent side of the outcry. With the sixth edition of Shebbeare's Fourth Letter, published at this time, is bound, as well as the Monitor 52 and 53, an inflammatory broadside entitled A Serious Call to the Corporation of London, to Address his M[ajesty] to remove from his Councils and Person

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84. E.g. James Hoskyns to Hardwicke, n.d., Yorke, Hardwicke, II, p. 308 fn.1
for ever, weak and wicked Ministers, etc., and dated 18 August 1756. 86

Meanwhile, more widely, riotous displays of public indignation continued through August and September and disgust was kept alive by a constant stream of comment, more and more forthright. 87 At the end of August Sir John Willes reported to Newcastle from Warwick that 'I never found all sorts of people so uneasy, and so dispirited, as they are at present. The loss of Fort St. Philip is looked upon by everyone in a most melancholy light.' 88 As a result of efforts of publicity in Byng's defence in September there was some swing of public opinion in his favour and even more against the ministers. John Wilkes told Grenville in mid-October that the 'public indignation is rising very strong against Lord Anson, and Byng has now everywhere some warm advocates... Poor Byng is a phrase in every mouth, then comes the hackneyed simile of the Scapegoat.' 89 Newcastle shared Anson's unpopularity and, for reasons less directly connected with the fall of Minorca, Hardwicke, too, was particularly disliked, especially in the City. This intense hostility was associated by one informant with Beckford and the tories. 90 The autumn assizes and the approach of the parliamentary session in October and November brought further formal expressions of popular indignation in instructions and addresses, 'all of them breathing a true patriotic and loyal Spirit'. As in earlier times of public excitement the demands now widened to include the major tenets of the traditional opposition programme:

the militia, limitation of the numbers of placemen and pensioners,

86. The Monitor 54, 14 Aug. 1756; 55, 16 Aug. 1756; 57, 28 Aug. 1756; West to Newcastle, 14 Aug. 1756, Add. MS., 32866, f. 449; see above p. 15 and fn. 28.
87. E.g. Pope, pp. 181-2, 183-191; GM., XXVI, 1756, p. 409, also September and October for general reporting and comment; Potter to Grenville, 11 Sep. 1756, Grenville Papers, I, pp. 172-3.
88. Quoted Pope, p. 183.
90. See e.g. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 29 Aug., the Rev. Henry Etough to Lord (Cont'd)
and the restoration of triennial parliaments. 91

In these months the Monitor keeps up the pressure of its attack on the ministers. At frequent intervals their iniquities are recapitulated and there is a growing demand for enquiry into and punishment of the shortcomings not only of Byng but of the ministers too. 'The only means to restore our reputation at sea is for the King to join heartily with his parliament' in an enquiry. Lessons are preached on the responsibility of ministers and reinforced by historical example. 92 The greater the emphasis on the responsibility of the ministers the more there is a tendency to exonerate or be more sympathetic towards Byng, even before the appearance of publicity in his defence. 93 The people are urged to keep up their demands and the harm that comes from apathy in public affairs is castigated. The paper makes the most of the instructions and addresses which have already appeared 'with so much loyalty to our sovereign and regard for our country', while attacking those more favourable to the ministry (especially one of two rival addresses from Bristol) as examples of the general prevalence of a lying spirit, and making hostile reference to supposed attempts at obstruction in Surrey. 94

Once again the City took a lead in this continuing agitation of public opinion. In September the strength of feeling was shown in a most unusual attempt to challenge the nomination of the senior alderman 'below the chair', Dickinson, for election as lord mayor simply because he had voted for the address to the king to bring over Hanoverian troops. In fact

90. (Cont'd) Walpole, 28 Aug. 1756, James Hoskyns to Hardwicke, [late 1756], (for association with Beckford), Yorke, Hardwicke, II, pp. 310, 307, 308 and fn. 1; Etough to Lord Walpole, 1 Sep., 4 Sep. 1756, Add. MS. 9201 (Coxe papers), ff. 114, 115. On hostility to Hardwicke see Appendix V.

91. Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', p. 154 and fnn. 2, 3; GM., XXVI, 1756, pp. 496-7, 543, 545-6; the quotation is from Maitland, 1772, II, p. 16.


93. Cf. 53 with 57, 28 Aug. 1756 (mock edict at end).

94. 58, 4 Sep. 1756; 60, 18 Sep. 1756 (the quotation); 63, 9 Oct. 1756; PA. 10, 17 Sep. 1756 on the Bristol addresses; Sutherland, 'The City... 1756-7', p. 157 fn. 2, on the failure of the Surrey address.
the rival candidate, Sir Richard Glyn, was first declared chosen, but a poll was demanded and he was decisively beaten. At the end of October, the common council agreed unanimously to instruct its members of parliament, and a most outspoken set of instructions was produced which, alongside the other traditional demands, required the members to refuse supply until a militia had been established. More than in their earlier address, where the militia is regarded primarily as a defence against invasion, the language reflects fear of an increased standing army and foreign mercenaries. Beckford, however, took no part in these events. He did not vote in the mayoral election and he was not present at the common council which agreed to the instructions. The Monitor is similarly reticent. It does give some support to the opposition to Dickinson by referring to a precedent for setting aside a City member from advance to the mayoralty because of his parliamentary conduct and urging citizens 'to be very circumspect in their choice of a chief magistrate'. But the paper makes no reference, direct or oblique, to the instructions of October. In general, its concern over constitutional matters is clear in these months, and frequent references are made to the prevalence of corruption, the need to remedy the 'internal maladies...long working in our own bowels', and specifically to threats of military power and the necessity of a militia. In September the duty of members of parliament to obey instructions is discussed. Nothing, however, is said at this time of placemen and triennial parliaments. Instead of Beckford, the leader

95. PA., 30 Sep. 1756 to 8 Oct. 1756; GM., XXVI, 1756, p. 475.
98. 53, 7 Aug. (the quotation); 54, 14 Aug. 1756; 58, 4 Sep. 1756; 59, 11 Sep. 1756; 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 61, 25 Sep. 1756; 62, 2 Oct. 1756; 65, 23 Oct. 1756; 67, 6 Nov. 1756. The raising of the instructions issue in 61, at the same time as opposition to Dickinson, perhaps suggests that Beckford and the Monitor were connected with the early stages of this second swell of opposition but for some reason dropped interest in it.
in these outbursts was another tory, Alderman Blachford. He was the only alderman to vote for Glyn for lord mayor after the poll of the livery and West reported to Newcastle that he was 'at the head' of the move to vote 'Violent Instructions'. In contrast, although he was present at the August common council which agreed to address the king, he was not appointed to the committee to draw up the address. This confirms the suggestion of divisions in anti-ministerial opinion in the City, divisions in which Beckford, it would seem, was in danger of being worsted as the support grew stronger. Certainly, in the City as more widely in the country and potentially in parliament, as Walpole commented to Mann late in August, 'the warmth on the loss of Minorca has opened every sluice of opposition, that have been so long dammed up.' But in the City, anyway, it was far from clear who, in the place of Sir John Barnard, would control the flood, or even to whom it would turn in national politics. 'It begins to be talked publickly in the City coffee houses, that both sides at Court are doing the business and answer the wishes of France,' West reported to Newcastle in late October. About the same time, however, he also reported that Sir John Barnard was convinced by what he saw in the City that Newcastle had no option but to resign.

The outcry over Minorca was not the only difficulty facing the ministry. Other problems crowded in on them too. From August onwards there were widespread disturbances in reaction to the high price


100. The bare reports in the Journal suggest growing support. E.g. the committee appointed to draw up the instructions included all twelve aldermen present except Cockayne, who was presiding in the absence of the mayor, together with twenty-four commoners; that for the address included only eight out of twenty aldermen present and only eighteen commoners. Common Council Journal, 61, ff. 79-80, 113-5.

of corn. Indeed the years 1756-7 were some of the worst of the century in this respect. Of more immediate political interest was the minor furore caused in September by the affair of the Hanoverian soldier, arrested for the 'theft' of two handkerchiefs and released to the Hanoverian authorities on the orders of the secretary of state, Lord Holderness, which aroused concern among 'zealous constitutionalists' at the apparent exemption of Hanoverian troops from the ordinary processes of the law. At the end of August fighting on the continent, which the British ministers so much feared, began with the Prussian attack on Saxony against British advice. This aroused interest but as yet little public concern in England. More disturbing was the news from America of another important reverse. In early October it was known that the fort of Oswego on Lake Ontario had fallen to the French on 14 August.

It is little wonder that in face of such difficulties Newcastle steadily lost his never very strong nerve. It was Fox who brought affairs to breaking point. Never wholly satisfied and not without cause with Newcastle's treatment of him, Fox now feared a reconciliation between Newcastle and Leicester House and the prospect of being used as a scapegoat by Newcastle while bearing the full brunt of the attack on the ministry in the house of commons. On 15 October his decision to resign was conveyed to the king. Another spokesman for the ministry in the commons was lost when Alexander Murray demanded the vacant position as

102. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy...', p. 79.
103. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 84-5; GM., XXVI, 1756, pp. 448, 475-6; Yorke, Hardwicke, II, p. 276 and fn. 1.
104. GM., XXVI, 1756, carries reports on the European fighting from September; on America see pp. 498, 508-9; Dodington, Journal, p. 347, 3 Oct. 1756.
chief justice, with a peerage, and would take neither refusal nor delay. When approaches to Pitt, reluctantly consented to by the king failed in face of his refusal to serve with Newcastle, on 26 October Newcastle and Hardwicke announced to the king their inability to go on and offered their resignations.\(^{105}\)

Thus even before the meeting of parliament the Minorca issues had filled the sails of Pitt's patriotic opposition, hoisted the previous autumn, and brought him within sight of office. The public clamour was not the only cause of Newcastle's fall.\(^{106}\) But it was important and it helped to determine the composition of the ministry that followed. Emboldened and enabled by it to make his stand on popular issues effective, and in confident assurance of his own strength and ability, Pitt refused to serve either with Newcastle or with Fox to whom the king turned on Newcastle's resignation. Despite the extreme reluctance and desperate efforts of the king, Pitt could not be avoided, although the negotiations did at least have the effect of moderating some of his demands. On 11 November Newcastle formally resigned and four days later the new ministry took office, with the duke of Devonshire, an independent whig of considerable standing but little political experience, as first lord of the treasury.\(^{107}\)

In these months of turmoil these are only scraps of evidence of Beckford's political loyalties. His reputation as a 'patriot' was

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106. Sutherland, 'The City... 1756-7', p. 155.

evidently growing over the Minorca issue and one informant reports
to Hardwicke that the strength of the group with which he associated
in parliament was 'much increased'. In August, at the time of the
City address, Newcastle attributes to him a pamphlet which caused him
and Hardwicke some alarm by urging a union of Pitt and Fox. Even
if the attribution is unreliable it is probably sound evidence of the
views Beckford held, and at the end of the same month it seems that he
was still making some point of distinguishing Fox from the rest of the
ministers and praising his courage. The Monitor provides some
further clues as its own political loyalties and antipathies become
more precisely defined. Not unnaturally, Newcastle and Anson are specifically
referred to in a hostile manner. Special venom is reserved for Hardwicke
and the bitter references to him lend weight to reports that elements
associated with Beckford, Philipps and the tories had some idea of
impeaching him. Fox comes in for some irony on continental measures
in July, and, with the other ministers, another mild dig in August.
He is not harshly attacked, but neither is he in any way defended.
At the end of July the paper makes a brief plea for a union of parties,
and urges the need to distinguish sincere friends and the country's
real interests, which suggests some parallel to views attributed to

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108. Catalogue of Prints and Drawings, III, ii, p. 993, No. 3367:
'Bynyng Return'd; or the Council of Expedients' [26 July 1756] portrays
him with Pitt, Legge, Pulteney, the Townshends, Sir John Philipps,
and others in the patriot side of the balance against placemen and
pensioners. James Hoskyns to Hardwicke, [late 1756], Yorke,
Hardwicke, II, p. 308.

109. A Letter to the Gentlemen of the Common Council, By a Citizen and
Watchmaker, London, 1756; PA., 19 Aug. 1756; Hardwicke to Newcastle,
492-3, 35415, f. 259. Nothing in the pamphlet confirms the attribu-
tion but if it is justified the pamphlet would place Beckford in the
moderate camp. It deplores the extreme patriot demands that all
ministers should be turned out.


112. 57; 65; 67, 6 Nov. 1756. See above p.103 and fn.90 and below Appendix V.
Beckford, but no strong loyalties. As time passes, however, a couple of complimentary references are made to Pitt. Cato, who speaks out unsuccessfully against venality and corruption in Rome, is almost certainly intended as a parallel to him in an article which makes historical comparisons explicitly. By the beginning of October, with the political crisis coming to its climax, the reference is explicit.

The member of parliament of Aldborough, Yorkshire, is held up for admiration for wisdom, ability and disinterestedness in a time of vice and degeneracy.

From the time that the lines of the Devonshire-Pitt ministry begin to settle it is clear that the Monitor on the whole approves the changes, especially the coming to office of Pitt. At much the same time Beckford at last committed himself. Just before Pitt's appointment to office Beckford wrote to him declaring the need for a change of measures as well as a virtually complete change of man in order to introduce a 'new system', expressing the hope that 'as you can, so you will be the instrument of our deliverance' and offering his services.

I have, during my whole life, acted as a private man... In our present political warfare, I intend to act as one of your private soldiers without commission; and be assured I will never desert the cause of liberty and my country, as long as the heart beats in [my] breast.

Beckford was to be true to his promise; Pitt had won one of his most stalwart political allies.

113. 48, 3 July 1756; 57; 52, 31 July 1756.
114. 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 62, 2 Oct. 1756.
115. 69, 20 Nov. 1756.
116. Beckford to Pitt, 6 Nov. 1756, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, pp. 185-6.
GROWING COMMITMENT

NOVEMBER 1756 TO APRIL 1757

The Devonshire-Pitt administration was greeted with enthusiasm by much public opinion outside parliament and by independents within, who took at its face value Pitt's espousal of the 'popular' cause. The Public Advertiser reacted warmly to his declarations. 'The country gentlemen deserted their hounds and their horses, preferring for once their parliamentary duty; and under their new Whig leader, the gallant George Townshend, displayed their banner for Pitt,' one contemporary enthusiastically exulted. George Townshend was a valuable acquisition, not only for his links with the county gentlemen but also for his celebrated gift for satirical caricature, his uninhibited attitude towards the manipulation of popular opinion, and his influence in particular quarters...'. Further, early parliamentary debates made it clear that the main body of the tories (overlapping, of course, with the country gentlemen) were responding at last to Pitt's year-long courtship. A group of fifteen or so leading tory lords and commoners had in fact written a letter inviting their friends to town to support the new ministers and Potter was actively co-ordinating their support - although Beckford was not certain that all the tories

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1. PA., e.g. 4 Dec. 1756, second page; [Richard Glover], Memoirs by a Celebrated Literary and Political Character from...1742 to ...1757, second edition, London, 1814, p. 97; (the quotation is from here); Potter to Temple, [late 1756], Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/53, f. 92.


would see where their true interests lay. Beckford himself could prove an invaluable link with tory-popular opinion in the City. In the debate on the address he made clear his new loyalty to Pitt, declared the satisfaction of those with whom he was connected with the changes and violently attacked the old ministers, although still excepting Fox.

Apart from his connection with Leicester House, which was potentially invaluable but could not immediately be turned to much use, Pitt's standing with these groups was the only possible basis of an independent political position and hence enormously important to him. He had come to office ostensibly on popular terms, although in fact his so-called 'demands' were less stringent than they appeared, fell far short of what his more extreme supporters such as Glover and others in the City wanted, and had been further modified in the process of negotiation. Yet the administration was clearly a weak one. Pitt had few personal supporters, the duke of Devonshire was by no means completely committed to him, the king's heart was obviously not in the changes, Fox's stocks were still high with him, several former ministers remained in important places, and, scarcely surprising in these circumstances, Newcastle kept his majority in the house of commons. Such an administration was not likely to achieve much especially in satisfying popular demands which in such a situation were more than usually politically embarrassing and to which Pitt was far from completely committed. The tory-independent, unused to being close to

the centre of politics, were from their very nature unlikely to be steady reliable allies. The question was whether Pitt could maintain his new-won 'popularity', essential to his independence, in face of the lack of achievement of a weak ministry and while coming to terms with political reality. Could he fix the fluctuating tide of popularity on the side of the ministry, the only way as one observer saw it of ensuring its survival? As Walpole succinctly put it, 'If he Hanoverizes, or checks any inquiries, he loses his popularity, and falls that way: if he humours the present rage of the people, he provokes two powerful factions' (Fox and Newcastle). Could Pitt resolve this dilemma?

On these questions, the Monitor, now part of Pitt's popular support, can throw some light. It shows very clearly the strength of popular demands among Pitt's supporters in the City, along the lines put forward by Glover. It couples its approval of the new ministers with very high expectations of them and, especially at first, with firm warnings to them. Its first comment on the impending changes uses biblical and historical examples, including the revolution of 1688, to show that a mere change of ministers is not enough to remove the evils caused by an abuse of power. They must not forget the principles adopted in opposition as did the patriots of 1742 who 'made us feel their little finger to be heavier than the loins of him, they had devoted [sic] to be the state Jonah'. There must be no coalition with past ministers; rather they must realise 'the necessity of the patriotic system, to cleanse the Augean stable, before any man of great popularity accepts the helm'. Should they forget all this?

'let them remember, that the MONITOR will not fail to tell them in
plain English of their doings'; and the 'good people of England...
will not fail to exert their natural properties, should they be impoverished,
betrayed, and abandoned.'\(^9\)

The high and wide-ranging expectations the Monitor has of the new
ministers are also made clear in these early comments. They must win the
confidence of the people, call to account the plunderers of the public
treasure, proceed without delay with enquiries into recent misfortunes,
take proper measures for the country's defence and pay no lavish subsidies
abroad. A true patriotic system goes further than this, however. It sets
an example against all corruption and strikes at its root, reviving a
languishing constitution by measures to restore and protect the freedom
of parliament, especially by disfranchising permanently every borough
convicted of selling its votes. The king's speech is praised for its
reference to the militia and the sending away of foreign troops but
its comments on the threatening European situation are treated with
cautions and the ministers are reminded very specifically of their earlier
stands against subsidies. In more general ways, too, the high popular
expectations of the new ministers are made clear in their early comments.\(^10\)

The Monitor also illustrates part at least of the reactions of Pitt's
supporters as the life of the administration progressed. The issues on
which Pitt had made his popular stand were in fact set out fairly clearly
in the king's speech and the commons' address in reply, but Pitt's speech
on the address was studiously moderate; 'in short, he spoke like a minister,
and unsaid almost all he had said in opposition'.\(^11\) The programme was not

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9. The Monitor 68, 13 Nov. 1756; 70, 27 Nov. 1756. The quotations are from 68.
11. Parliamentary History, XV, cc. 771-5, 777-8; Waldegrave, p. 88; Lord
Lyttelton to William Henry Lyttelton, 9 Dec. 1756, ed. Phillimore,
Lyttelton, II, p. 542.
pushed with any expedition. Some harrying sallies were made against former ministers but they were not led by Pitt and he was saved by his gout from having to take a stand on them. Of the main issues, a new militia bill was ordered on 4 December and first presented and read on 26 January. The strength of Newcastle's friends in the house ensured a lengthy and harassed passage, in which Beckford played some part as a supporter of Townshend, and the bill did not receive its third reading until 25 March, on the eve of the ministry's collapse. There is no record that Pitt played any part in promoting the bill, despite an urgent plea from Townshend in February, and his illness is not a full explanation of his inaction. The bill went on to be much amended by the lords and before it received the royal assent on 28 June the commons had had to accept some important changes which modified its ideological character if not its military usefulness. Yet on this question the Monitor shows no signs of disappointment. It gives support to the scheme in three papers, on both practical and constitutional grounds and in answer to the attack of 'a scribler' and the petitions of the dissenters. Yet this support could not be said to amount to pressure on the ministry to act more quickly. Only much later, a month or so after the final passage of the bill, does the Monitor protest in detail, chiefly on ideological grounds and with gibes at Hardwicke, against the amendments made in the house of lords. Nor is there other evidence of earlier more

13. Western, pp. 135-40; Commons Journal, XXVII, pp. 627, 667, 924; George Townshend to Pitt, 14 Feb. 1757, Correspondence of... Chatham, I, p. 222.
15. 105, 23 July 1757.
general tory or independent dissatisfaction on this question.

The Monitor, perhaps naturally, shows more interest in financial reforms, especially in December, January and February. 'Among the many evils, which have disgraced our administrations for more than thirty years past, the greatest of all has been the boundless prodigality of the public money, which it will take an age of economy to replace...'. This as well as foreign policy disasters should be the subject of enquiry. On 22 January, just when the estimates and plans for supply were being considered in the house of commons, the first task of the ministers is set as the retrieving of 'our disordered finances', the 'cutting off all superfluous places and pensions, and reducing the rest to more moderate bounds; and...not only bringing the robbers of the nation to justice, but forcing them to refund their ill-got wealth'.

The administration, through Legge, its chancellor of the exchequer, did attempt to implement financial policies in tune with strong popular distrust of the monied interest, the national debt and the raising of money by private arrangement. These were worked out in co-operation with Sir John Barnard who had not abandoned his hostility to Pitt but could not resist the chance to implement his long-advocated reforms. Yet Legge's two chief money-raising schemes, a lottery and an issue of annuities, both unconventional in form, were miserable failures and after his dismissal recourse had to be had to a conventional loan. In his financial endeavours, Legge made only one small effort, in the wine licenses office, toward the achievement of another popular demand, reduction of the number of unnecessary places. Significantly, the Monitor in its discussion of financial reforms,

17. Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', pp. 164-8.
gives its specific support not to the plans of the administration and Barnard, but to Beckford's own idea, aired in the house of commons, for new taxes on tea and salt, thus providing more evidence of divisions and competition among popular forces in the City. 19 This diverted any disappointment over the failure of the ministry's schemes which were never specifically discussed.

The most pressing of the 'popular' demands in the addresses, and a major tory point, was for an enquiry into the disasters abroad and the misdeeds of past ministers. The Monitor continues to press this through February into March. 20 Yet this commitment was the most embarrassing politically for Pitt and very early he began to draw back from it in face of the danger of cementing a Newcastle-Fox coalition or giving Fox a chance to distinguish himself from other former ministers. 21 In fact, some at least of his tory-independent supporters in parliament showed pretty quickly some sympathy with his quandary. They, too, had no wish to bring Fox and Newcastle together and thus force out 'their' minister. The imminence of Byng's trial which was expected to reveal much, Pitt's gout and the impossibility of proceeding without him, provided convenient excuses for delay for some time. 22 But something had to be done, if only for the sake of appearances, in response to the addresses and to satisfy less sophisticated supporters outside, such as the readers of the Monitor.

So, early in 1757, George Townshend took a lead on the matter, consulted with the tories and made the first moves in the house. But still they were

They came to a point only when rumours of impending changes in the ministry began to thicken in March and then on the motion of Fox, who wanted this obstacle to a return to office out of the way. Even then, in a meeting with the Tories, Pitt continued wary; he 'promised his support, but feared he should not be able to speak five minutes for his cough'. When at last, after the Easter recess and the fall of the administration, the enquiry was held, he did make a theatrical appearance and fairly severe speech. But the final result, with every help from Pitt, vindicated the policies of the Newcastle administration. So much for the fury of the addresses. Such behaviour would seem to be likely to place severe strain on Pitt's newly-won Tory supporters. Yet there is no evidence of serious unease, at least with Pitt, over this issue in parliament. Outside, the Monitor continued its exhortations, and reacted to the final outcome by publishing its own pamphlet indignantly refuting the mild resolutions passed by the House of Commons. Yet again Pitt was not blamed. While his ministry was still in office the paper finds sufficient excuse for the delays in the need to pass supplies first and maintains that preparations were well in hand. After the fall of the ministry it holds that this has robbed the people of the fulfilment of their expectations of seeing the guilty punished.

Equally testing to the loyalty of the Tories was the question of help


24. Dodington, Journal, p. 359, 21 Mar. 1757 'or near it'; Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 198, 201, 205, 7, Yorke, Hardwicke, II, p. 351 and fn. 7; Glover, pp. 130-4; GM., XXVII, 1757, pp. 310-12; Symmer to Mitchell, 26 Apr. 1757, Add. MS. 6839, f. 55; Walpole to Mann, 5 May 1757, ed. Lewis, XXI, pp. 85-6. The quotation is from Walpole, p. 201

25. The Monitor 88, 26 Mar. 1757; 89, 2 Apr. 1757; 94, 7 May 1757; 95, 14 May 1757; 99, 11 June 1757; An Account of the Facts which appeared on the late Enquiry into the loss of Minorca, from authentic Papers, published 16 July 1757.
in the war on the continent. On this Pitt had been too much of a realist with a grasp of war strategy to make any 'popular' stipulations in negotiation. But the pressures on him were strong. Both Glover and the Monitor demanded no continental connections and the group most ideologically committed to this kind of foreign policy were the tories. Yet, in his speech in the debate on the address in reply, Pitt spoke of help to the continent when everything had been done 'for yourselves' for 'you must go as far as the interests of this country were combined with those of the Powers on the continent, for combined they were'. The king's speech was held by those sympathetic to the former ministers to have 'enough of Germany in it'. There is even evidence that at this time, right at the beginning of the administration, Pitt considered massive help to Hanover and the continental war but drew back because of the likelihood of trouble with the tories. Certainly the references to Europe in the king's speech brought a warning from the Monitor. Perhaps the fuss made of the sending away of the foreign troops, in fact already decided on before the administration took office, and the dramatic stand of Pitt and Temple against thanking the king for the services of the Hanoverians, were part of a smokescreen for these intentions. In any case, on 17 February Pitt made his first appearance in the house since his re-election to present a message from the king asking for money to support an army of observation.


for Hanover and to enable him to fulfil his engagements to Prussia. The next day he moved, successfully, for a grant of £200,000, despite the gibes of Fox and a lengthy debate, 'even the Tories agreeing to it' and Beckford giving his support in the name of the City. This success was not achieved without some cost. George Townshend was seriously offended and embarrassed by Pitt's move and was only with difficulty persuaded to mollify the independents. Sir John Philipps felt obliged, a few days later, to defend himself and the Tories against charges of inconsistency. And Pitt had to emphasize that no British troops were to be sent to Germany, and the next month he and Legge had to make explicit denials of rumours to this effect, statements which were later to be of some embarrassment in limiting his freedom of action. The Monitor, however, defends the decision, and its arguments give some indication of those used to mollify the Tories. To the Monitor, the small amount of the subsidy and the fact that it is to be paid to secure the alliance of Prussia, no mere puny German prince or far-distant Russia, make all the difference. The alliance is being secured in purely British interests. Anyway, the measures of past ministries, together with the unnatural union of Austria and France, make this move necessary. Foreign connections have not been given the chief attention in British policy; nor has Britain entered as a principal in their quarrels.
A far more serious test to Pitt's popularity than any of these issues, because interest in it went far beyond tory circles, was the fate of Byng. Despite substantial changes in the admiralty his court martial went ahead as planned, and its composition and procedure virtually determined its verdict, announced on 27 January. Its harsh yet curious terms led to a complicated series of attempts to save Byng, with which both Pitt and Temple showed sympathy. In the house of commons on two occasions Pitt spoke slightingly of the court martial and in favour of mercy. Both made representations to the king in Byng's favour. All the efforts were to no avail. After one reprieve of a fortnight Byng was shot on the quarter-deck of the Monarch on 14 March. 33

In deciding this result, public outcry as well as the king's determination played a large part. Again in this case but for different reasons, Pitt's dependence on popular support posed a dilemma. Personally he was inclined to mercy, or at least fairness. More important, politically it was not in his interests to allow popular anger at the early misfortunes of the war to be entirely satisfied by vengeance on Byng. The former ministers ought to bear at least some of the discredit. His tory supporters, not sharing his concern for some possible political arrangement with them, were much more strongly of this opinion. Beckford declared the sentence 'cruel' in the house of commons and supported the bill to release the members of the court martial from their oaths, although acknowledging the unpopularity of any attempt to save Byng. 34 Yet wider public opinion was much more stirred

33. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 121-3, 135-40, 144-8, 152-8, 188-90; Pope, pp. 263-83; Rigby to Bedford, 3 Mar. 1757, Correspondence of... Bedford, II, p. 239.

34. Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 149; Sir Thomas Robinson to Newcastle, 26 Feb. 1757, Add. MS., 32870, f. 221.
by this than any other issue and indignation still ran high against Byng. Not until after his brave death was there a reaction. Much publicity was directed against Pitt and Temple for their efforts in Byng's favour and Pitt himself said that he received threatening letters. One observer even thought his popularity was totally ruined. 35

Certainly feeling ran high in the City. The lord mayor, Marshe Dickinson, told Rigby that 'there was never any thing in the City like the unpopularity of the House of Commons and Mr Pitt... He is not apt to be warm in his expression, but he was so today.' The issue was regarded there as 'a Tyral of the Strength of the Old and New Ministry, in which the latter have greatly lost themselves and exposed their Weakness'.

When the City tories, led by Aldermen Blakiston and Scott, made a last-minute move for a common council to address the king for mercy their request was refused by the lord mayor and there was no doubt that he acted in accord with general City opinion. 36

Having failed to persuade the king to exercise his prerogative of mercy, Pitt had little option but to bow to such opinion. These complications of public opinion demonstrate very well the fragility of Pitt's popularity and show how little use the tories were to him when opinion was really aroused. They also help to explain the strange silence of the Monitor over Byng, through all the time of his court martial and its

35. Symmer to Mitchell, 8 Feb., 11 Mar., 5 Apr. 1757, Add. MS. 6839, ff. 38, 43, 47; Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 138, 140, 144-5; Glover, pp. 120-1; Sharpe, III, p. 61; Calcraft to Abercrombie, 5 Mar. 1757, Add. MS. 17493, f. 51.
aftermath, until 12 March, on the very eve of his execution, a silence all the more significant as the other two weeklies recently founded, the Test and the Con-test, were much occupied with this issue. On 12 March the Monitor comes out strongly for the harshest punishment to demonstrate that commanders are accountable and so by example to restore the vigour and courage of others. Trial by jury is favoured over courts-martial because juries would be less likely to be lenient. The various efforts to secure a reconsideration of the verdict are castigated in detail and the lords, particularly Mansfield, are praised for their resistance to these efforts. 'Thus justice was decreed to take place; and satisfaction is restored to those, who wish well to his Majesty's arms and government.' That the Monitor makes no earlier use of the controversy over Byng's sentence shows that it did not share the dominant demand for his execution and bears witness to the strength of that demand, in that the paper dared not try to counter it. The results would have been too damaging to the popular standing of its patron and his newly-adopted leader. Yet once all hope of mercy was past, Beckford's propagandists were not above trying to make some capital out of the situation. Beckford, like Pitt, having tested public opinion, had to bow to it.

In general argument as well as in reference to specific issues the Monitor shows how Pitt kept a hold on his new allies despite the shortcomings of his ministry and even in face of measures directly contrary to their demands. Even while it is expressing high expectations of the ministry and keeping up some pressure for their fulfilment, it very soon moves to defend the new ministers against criticism. By late December the main

theme of its defence is set. It is unwise to expect too much too soon, in view of the magnitude of the task left by the late ministers. It will take time to overcome the effects of quackery administered to deep-seated disease. It may even be necessary to continue old measures to avoid sudden change. Any ministers who 'sets himself in the gap, between his country and ruin, must expect that faction will snarl and foam.' The Monitor maintains that there are good grounds for hope about the new ministers - although that hope is sometimes mixed with doubt and continuing embarrassment over the 'motley and contrary' character of the new ministry. 38

As time passes, however, this note of caution in the defence disappears, and as much as possible is made of what is done. The dismissal of the Hanoverians is an earnest of good measures to come; Byng is gone; the departments of state promise reform; there are good reasons for some delay in beginning an enquiry in order to allow supplies to be voted for the war; 39 the subsidy for Prussia is different from earlier continental measures. On this latter issue, where the change of attitude is most obvious, the support of the country gentlemen, 'the unanimous approbation of men, who shew that the public good is their only aim', is claimed as the greatest sanction possible of the rectitude of the ministers. 40

As the situation of the ministry weakens the tone becomes even warmer. The difficulties of Pitt's situation are explicitly avowed. 'Great reformations were promised; but alas, the wishes of the public cannot be satisfied, while that power and confidence which were promised, are withheld. What can the most virtuous man do, so long as the enemies of virtue, and of the public, surround the [throne].' Then what has been done is elaborated as favourably as possible. Britons should cease their murmurings

and rejoice in the happy prospect of their once more becoming a virtuous and glorious people. Thus the very political weakness of the ministry could be a positive help in defending its record. Explicitly, as in the case of the subsidies to Prussia and Hanover, or implicitly, over the enquiries or the militia, delays and deficiencies could always be attributed to the difficulties inherited from, or the continuing influence of, the former ministers. They were much more hated by the tories, having kept them in the wilderness for forty years, than they were the enemies of Pitt. The Monitor continues to pour scorn on them while Beckford was prominent in making personal attacks in the house. Thus Pitt could largely escape blame, from the tories anyway, for his own compromises and modifications of his popular stands and expectations of him, especially as his lukewarmness was masked by his convenient (although quite genuine and serious) illness.

Perhaps even more useful in consolidating the Monitor's defence of Pitt and tory loyalty to him were the attacks made on him by other publicists. On 6 November the Monitor boasted that its attacks on the ministry had called forth no defending champion. Its boast was barely in time, for that very day the first issue of a rival weekly paper appeared. This was the Test, written in support of Fox and against Pitt. It was immediately answered on Pitt's behalf by the Con-Test and joined by other more ephemeral publications. The war of the Test and the Con-Test, lasting until July 1757, helped to express and confirm the now inveterate Fox-Pitt duel and forced those who, like Beckford, favoured both,

41. 89, 2 Apr. 1757.
42. 71, 4 Dec. 1756; 89, 2 Apr. 1757; 93, 30 Apr. 1757; Rigby to Bedford, 25 Jan. 1757, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 226; James West to Newcastle, 25 Jan. 1757, Rockingham to Newcastle, 13 Feb. 1757, Add. MS. 32870, ff. 105, 178. On hostility to Hardwicke see Appendix V.
43. Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', p. 162.
44. The Monitor 67, 6 Nov. 1756.
45. Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', pp. 163-4.
or, like Sir John Philipps, leaned to Fox, to make their choice. In deciding that choice, ironically the very effectiveness of the Test militated against its patron. It was far more ably written than the Con-Test, which in comparison seems a lame answering echo although it improves as time passes, and more pungent and committed than the Monitor. Its attacks on the 'Man-mountain', 'William IV', for his supposed monopolizing ambition, nepotism, fake patriotism and turbulent cultivation of popularity, its pointing out as the weeks pass of the apparent inconsistencies between his past and present political behaviour, his compromises, the lack of decisive measures, and especially its mockery of his illness swung sympathy to Pitt.

Again this can be seen happening in the Monitor. Very early, on 27 November, the paper answers the Test's charges of ambition and selfishness and rejects the plea in the latter's first two numbers for a coalition with the men of ability in the last administration. It denies that the present ministers have forced themselves into power at the expense of the ablest politicians and that they lack ability themselves. Every one of the later papers that defend Pitt is in answer to the attacks of the Test which is sometimes explicitly named. Even more explicitly, the Test names the Monitor as one of its opponents and attacks it, especially on the question of European subsidies. Clearer evidence of the effect of this controversy on the Monitor is its increasing animosity towards Fox. By 23 April he is 'that vermin we call a fox', whose memory will stink in the nostrils of posterity and whose claims to

46. Potter to Temple, [late 1756], Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/53, f. 92.
47. The Monitor 70, 27 Nov. 1756.
Any restraint that Beckford may have placed on the paper's attitude to Fox is clearly gone or is ineffective by now. The Monitor does not become, in these months, a mere instrument in the defence of Pitt like the Con-Test. It does not forget its programme, except perhaps on European affairs. Rather, somewhat unrealistically, it regards the administration as making a substantial contribution to its fulfilment. Yet, without the powerful criticism and opposition of the Test, the Monitor might well have remained more detached and true to its name, might have maintained, as its explicit and frequent references to the betrayals of past patriots suggest, a more clear-eyed view.

Pitt's political position was further secured, as Newcastle foresaw it would be, by the circumstances of the fall of the ministry. This arose out of the dissatisfaction of the king and had little to do with Pitt's popular standing, although its decline may have encouraged the king to act. By February and March the king was putting out constant feelers for a change in ministry and doing all he could to provoke a resignation. In the end, Cumberland's approaching departure to command the forces for the defence of Hanover precipitated matters. On 5 April Temple was finally dismissed; when this failed to provoke Pitt to resign he, too, was dismissed the next day. The resignations of Legge and George and James Grenville followed. On 9 April Cumberland left for Germany.

Such precipitate action by the king gave a wonderful opportunity to

50. The Monitor 92, 23 Apr. 1757. He is openly attacked as early as 81, 4 Feb. 1757
51. 68, 13 Nov. 1756; 74, 25 Dec. 1756; 87, 19 Mar. 1757.
Pitt's supporters. His dismissal enabled them to represent him and Legge as the victims of 'the Remnant of the old Ministry, connected with the Patriots in his Majesty's Service and Councils', of the 'old junto', who misrepresented them to the king. Thus they were seen as martyrs to rather than betrayers of the popular cause. To such sentiments, carefully managed by his supporters, far more than to any particular policies, Pitt owed the apparently overwhelming wave of popular support that followed, shown in the 'clamour' after the dismissals and in the 'rain' of gold boxes containing the freedom and compliments of a dozen cities that fell on him and Legge. The ecstatic terms of these addresses bear witness not to their actual achievements but rather to the degree to which eyes which might otherwise have been opened to their shortcomings were closed by their martyr's role. It did not matter that the clamour and the gold boxes were carefully manoeuvred in almost all cases by Pitt's personal supporters and the tories, who had some considerable interest in his fate. Nor did it matter that the most was made of the evidence of popularity, for example by Entick who claimed that 'there was no corporation of any consequence but hastened to show their dislike of their dismissal...'. Despite the sorry performance of the Devonshire administration, summed up in a very clear-eyed way by Glover, Pitt had avoided the bitter denunciations still heaped on Pulteney for deserting the patriot cause fifteen years before. Both contemporaries and historians

56. See e.g. the City's address, Maitland, 1772, II, p. 18, and that of Chester, GM., XXVII, 1757, p. 387.
were impressed and, as Glover recognized, the essential popular basis of his political strength was secured.

Nowhere was this more remarkably shown than in London. Within a few days moves were on foot to present the City's freedom to Pitt and Legge. The leadership seems certainly to have come once again from popular tory circles. Deputy Hodges proposed the motion at the meeting of the common council on 15 April. According to the Test, Beckford was the master-mind behind the move, a sign that he was coming to be recognized as Pitt's spokesman - to the Test, his incendiary - in the City. In fact he was not present at the common council and there is no other evidence about his part in proceedings. Significantly, the Monitor has nothing to say about this City vote either before or immediately after it took place, and then mentions it only in passing in the issue of 23 April. For the time being it was left to the Con-Test to defend the addresses, especially that of London, against the charges of the Test, that they were unconstitutional invasions of the king's prerogative, a most telling point. Altogether, it seems again that Beckford was far from being in control of the swing of City opinion or uppermost among tories there. This time, however, there is none of the signs of divisions among the tories or of whig reluctance that there was over the address and instructions in 1756. No one spoke against the motion. Only Sir John Barnard voted against it. With this exception, opinion at all levels in the City was

59. Ibid., p. 123.
60. PA., 8 Apr. 1757, front page; the Test 24, 23 Apr. 1757; Common Council Journal, 61, ff. 155-6.
61. The Monitor 92, 23 Apr. 1757; the Con-Test 23, 23 Apr. 1757; the Test 23, 23 Apr. 1757.
alarmed at the political changes. True, this alarm did not arise entirely out of devotion to Pitt. Sympathy for Newcastle, who did not look like benefiting from the changes, had strengthened in some monied circles. More important, much of the alarm was due to fears of sinister designs of military government and attempts on the succession on the part of Fox and Cumberland, fears which occupied much of the attention of the Test and Con-Test although not the Monitor in the weeks after the dismissal, and which Pitt was not above stimulating. All these factors, however, with the help of the leadership of the Tories, worked for Pitt and in the City anyway the demonstrations of opinion cannot be dismissed as merely the result of manipulation.

Even if Beckford was not active in the City at this time, the Monitor plays its part in creating and making the most of the swing of public opinion towards Pitt and extolling his achievements. In response to his dismissal the paper's commitment to his cause becomes complete. On 9 April the first of three extracts 'of a Letter from on Board the OLD ENGLAND Man of War at Sea' presents, in allegorical form, the dismissal as the work of the desperate old clan working on the captain, who has never loved him anyway, against Will the west countryman called from his sickbed to rescue the ship. Readers are reminded of the evils to be expected 'when vice prevails and impious men bear sway' and that evil measures inevitably bring retribution, even revolution, from the people. In contrast, the accomplishments of an upright administration under which all Britons have been united are elaborated and praised in a way that bears only occasional resemblance to the actual achievements of Pitt's administration.

'Foreign connections were not disregarded: neither were they admitted to the chief attention of the British policy. Our allies were not to be deserted: neither were we to enter as principals into their quarrels.' Prudent measures of economy and tax relief have been taken; a well-regulated militia is being established; the Hessians and Hanoverians are dismissed; America is made the chief object of armaments, and France the pole to which all councils and armaments are pointed; the system of placemen and pensioners is despised and abolished, so that the people are no longer burdened with taxes to pay them; a free parliament and a disembarrassed ministry are ready to pursue the authors of the nation's troubles to justice. A new note, to be important later, is praise of Pitt for uniting 'all parties to the sovereign and his family'. Now 'every city is striving, who shall first imitate the gratitude of London, with their freedom presented to the firm patriots, who have retired...'. They have retired from offices in which they could no longer serve with quiet of mind, but they will return, like Scipio of old, if called upon again when the clouds thicken under false pilots.\textsuperscript{64}

The paper has long been sure of the answer to the question it poses in these last weeks: on whom shall we cast our eyes as the real authors of our misfortunes?\textsuperscript{65} Now it is also certain to whom it looks for salvation and in this it was in tune with, even if it was not leading, much tory and City opinion.

\textsuperscript{64} The Monitor, 90, 9 Apr. 1757; 91, 16 Apr. 1757; 92, 23 Apr. 1757; 93, 30 Apr. 1757. (quotations in order from the first three papers).

\textsuperscript{65} Especially 88, 26 Mar. 1757.
Despite the certainty of the Monitor and the apparent unanimity of public opinion, in fact political stability was as far away as ever. The most obvious solution was a coalition of Pitt and Newcastle. Hardwicke and Newcastle had long favoured this; elements among the 'monied interest' and others in the City were proposing it; Temple expected it as the outcome of the situation as early as 8 April.\(^1\) Even Pitt, although he might have appeared to 'flying himself upon the people, and the Tories,' and to be 'determined to have Nothing to do either with Fox, or Us', had kept open his contacts with Newcastle and especially Hardwicke.\(^2\)

Certainly without an alliance his political situation was very weak; yet for this very reason he was not likely to acquiesce easily until he had done what he could to secure his independence in the new arrangements. The obvious outcome was delayed for nearly three months in the midst of an unsuccessful war largely because of the difficulties he raised, together with the extreme reluctance of the king. The king much preferred Fox but his unpopularity and that of his patron, Cumberland, made a ministry under him, or even with him in a prominent position, impossible. Eventually, after much abortive wrangling and vain efforts at alternative arrangements, both the king and Pitt were brought to modify their demands and on

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29 June the Pitt-Newcastle coalition kissed hands.

Pitt accepted the new arrangements very reluctantly, describing them as a 'bitter, but necessary cup'. Indeed, they were an almost unalloyed triumph for Newcastle who alone had wanted this outcome throughout and in it had solved the two problems that had haunted him since the death of Pelham: the leadership of the house of commons and the need to persuade the king to accept Pitt as secretary of state. If Pitt was to maintain his prized independence he had to be assured of the continuance of his 'popularity', which had been perhaps his chief claim to power in the negotiations. The immediate and urgent question for him was whether his popularity could survive this arrangement with the arch-corrupter and source of all misfortunes, in the making of which arrangement 'measures' had been scarcely discussed let alone insisted on. How would Pitt's supporters, who had helped to create his popularity, the tories, the country gentlemen, the City, Beckford, the Monitor, take this unpalatable resolution of the situation? As Lyttelton put it, '... how will he now deserve the gold boxes which were sent him for having turned out those vile ministers?'

First reactions were not encouraging. The moneyed men, among whom Newcastle's correspondent, Joseph Watkins, had his contacts in the City, responded warmly enough to Newcastle's return to office but Glover's report that at the time of the coalition Pitt 'stood almost single,

3. Pitt to Bute, 28 June 1757, Sedgwick, 'Letters from...Pitt to... Bute', p. 124.
4. Waldegrave, pp. 130-1; Hardwicke to Lyttelton, 4 July 1757, Lyttelton to Hardwicke, 7 July 1757, Yorke, Hardwicke, II, pp. 410-11
deserted by the country gentlemen, declining in popularity', was probably a more accurate representation of general City feeling. Glover himself was intensely hostile to the new arrangements, and urged Pitt to rely instead on a change of heart in the nation in response to dire calamity. Birch told Lord Royston on good authority that Pitt deemed it necessary to send for James Hodges, recently elected town clerk, 'and explained to him the Grounds upon which himself and his Friends were induced to consent to the Coalition'. George Townshend was certainly seriously offended at the 'ridiculous and dishonest Arrangement of Men' and still in September he was 'a little out of humour'. The tories were no better pleased, it seemed, and there was even talk of gold boxes being recalled.8

The Monitor fully reflects the serious hesitations of the tories and independents in City and country alike when the coalition was first announced. Throughout the long-drawn-out negotiations the paper war had continued unabated. On one side, the Test justified the removal of the so-called 'patriots', attacked their record in office and especially denounced attempts to raise a ferment among the people, mocking specific instances as examples of manipulation of opinion and raising awkward constitutional questions about the propriety of disputing the king's choice of ministry. On the other side, the Con-Test defended the achievements and character of the 'patriots', attacked Fox's pretensions, and deplored attempts to misrepresent the popularity of the dismissed ministers, outlining what it considered to be constitutional methods of expressing dissatisfaction with ministerial changes. The Monitor, although now

7. Watkins to Newcastle, 25 June 1757, Add. MS., 32871, f. 399; Glover, pp. 150-3, 128-30, 143, 144 (the quotation is from p. 150).
8. Birch to Royston, 6 Aug., 1757, Add. MS. 35398, ff. 344-5; see above fn. 5; Calcraft to Loudoun, 10 July, 1757, Add. MS. 17493, f. 60; Bockford to Pitt, 20 Sep. 1757, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 42; Langford, p. 74.
outspokenly committed to Pitt and regarded by the Test as on the other side, still preserves a certain detachment from these weekly exchanges. It first responds to the dismissals and ministerial crisis with some of its clearest and most forceful statements of the role of the people in the constitution. 'When the helm is seized by vicious and impious men:... it is the duty of every individual to join in such measures, as loyalty, liberty, justice and prudence might suggest to preserve that nation from destruction...'. It thus incurred the displeasure of the Test for its republican and levelling doctrine and replied by castigating the attack as springing from 'that unconstitutional and ruinous doctrine of passive obedience' and undermining the very justification of the revolution of 1688. Later, as the crisis was prolonged and at a point when Fox's return to power seemed likely, the paper takes on the delicate task of lecturing the king on the choice of ministers and points out the evil consequences which arise when a king is 'more prone to listen, and give credit to evil counsellors, than to the advice of good men'. The reiteration of the evils of past ministers becomes even more fierce and shrill, and Fox is again particularly singled out even more vituperatively than before. 'We hear indeed, that there is a man, too much like a Fox, an animal of some abilities but always suspected of cheating and pilfering, who boasts that he will sustain the nation's weight.' Clearly Fox is replacing Newcastle as the arch-villain and arch-corrupter in the Monitor's rogues' gallery.

9. The Monitor 93, 30 Apr. 1757; 94, 7 May 1757; 95, 14 May 1757; the Test 26, 7 May 1757.
10. The Monitor 99, 11 June 1757; 100, 18 June 1757; 101, 25 June 1757. (the quotation).
11. 93, 30 Apr. 1757; 94, 7 May 1757; 95, 14 May 1757; 96, 21 May 1757; 97, 28 May 1757; 99, 11 June 1757 (the quotation); 100, 18 June 1757.
While Fox is thus berated, Pitt is still praised, though more now for hopes and expectations cut short by his dismissal than achievements. In contrast to the increasing public alarm at the thought of Fox in office, 'how smooth; how agreeable did everything pass with the public during the short administration of MR. PITT, etc. how has every face mourned at their displacing!' Yet when the paper hopes for a second Cicero to fix at the head of public affairs, no specific reference is made to Pitt. And the Monitor has no specific suggestions to make for a solution to the crisis. Like the Con-Test, though less explicitly, it merely looks to a restoration of the 'patriots'. Although in the early stages of the uncertainties it hopes 'the lion will never couch to the fox' it does not appear to have thought a coalition of any sort a serious possibility. The increasing shrillness of the papers of 18 and 25 June perhaps suggest that some unacceptable solution was feared, yet the coalition as finally worked out in these weeks seems to have come as a bombshell which the paper only reluctantly admits to be a fact. On 2 July the paper's author launches a bitter attack on the idea of such a coalition, raises serious doubts about Pitt if he is contemplating it, and lectures the Monitor on what its attitudes should be if a coalition should eventuate.

Shoul a coalition take place; should the gentlemen, so lately idolized by the nation for the rectitude of their actions, be overcome by the intrigues of a court to join with the heads of that administration, to whose misconduct all the world has placed the losses, and disgrace of Great Britain; then will be the time to convince your readers that no power, nor interest is capable of shaking your honest resolution to give the people alarm in time....

12. 99, 96, 21 May 1757.

13. 93, 30 Apr. 1757.
And it asks,

Might not such a coalition induce a belief that he, who was adored for his upright professions, had veered about; deserted the cause of his country; adopted the German measures, was never sincere in his enquiry after the authors of our misfortunes, and only attentive to serve some private passion or interest in preference to his country?\(^{14}\)

This was indeed plain speaking against Pitt. Almost immediately, however, the incipient criticism of him is muted. The next week's article expatiates again on the unwise of allowing incapable and wicked men back into office and the ill-consequences to be expected if they do return. At the end, however, it reminds its readers that a change of measures could still prevent destruction if there is honesty and integrity at the helm and pins its hope on the promises in the king's speech at the end of the session.\(^{15}\) By this time the Monitor has been caught by fire from the other side for its criticism of Pitt. While the Test with its dying breath ironically claimed to have brought its opponents to see the merits of those they reviled and, in praising the coalition, accentuated the very features least acceptable to Pitt's supporters, the Con-Test, with confidence born of victory, turns to whole-hearted defence of it. With the demise of the Test it turns to vehement expostulation of the Monitor for its criticisms of Pitt. In reply the Monitor denies any attack on 'a virtuous man' but continues, despite the Con-Test's reassurances, to show itself very distrustful of the coalition. 'Do we not know that in such coalitions the odds lie against virtue? it is an old and sacred proverb, that evil communication corrupts good manners', as the behaviour of those patriots who joined the coalition following the

\(^{14}\) 102, 2 July 1757.

\(^{15}\) 103, 9 July 1757.
fall of Walpole shows. The Con-Test’s defence of the coalition is questioned, and its contention 'that party had any share in the determination of that great and worthy patriot, who so long rejected all offers of a coalition' is answered by praise of Pitt for uniting all parties in disinterested service of king and country and promising 'the people a free exercise of their rights and liberties; the king a support of his crown and dignity, and a permanent security to the constitution in church and state'.

Again the Monitor is stiffened in its attitudes, this time of deep-seated suspicion of the coalition, by opposition and attack in other papers, but at the same time its view of Pitt is warmer.

From this time, encouraged by the lull in political debate following the prorogation of parliament for the summer recess, sustained attacks on the coalition lapse. The Monitor takes no direct notice of the Con-Test’s answer to its reply, or of other unfriendly references in the latter’s last numbers. The Monitor never positively accepts the coalition, however. It is merely tolerated and complaints about some of its members still frequently come to the surface in ever-ready accusation of faction. For the present the Monitor apparently comforts itself with

But soon again, (we'll hope) to peerless PITT,  
And strenuous LEGG, the faction must submit.

Its reconciliation with but continued high expectations of Pitt and Legge

16. The Test, 34, 2 July 1757; 35, 9 July 1757; the Con-Test 33, 2 July 1757, 34, 9 July 1757; the Monitor 104, 16 July 1757.

17. The Con-Test 36, 23 July 1757; 38, 6 Aug. 1757.

18. E.g. in the immediate future, the Monitor 106, 30 July 1757; 108, 13 Aug. 1757.
are avowed in the dedication of its second collected volume published at this time.

Clearly, this coalition was accepted by the Monitor only with great reluctance and very much as a second-best. Its reaction is paralleled by that of one of the more ephemeral weeklies, the Crab-Tree, which drops the 'allegorical mask' of its earlier numbers to launch a direct attack even stronger than the Monitor's on the coalition and especially on Pitt and Legge for making such an 'unnatural junction'. Its next number, however, is more sympathetic to 'the two patriots' and urges its readers to wait and judge fairly by results not on mere suspicion. Certainly this was a critical time for Pitt, the seriousness of which historians have not often recognized. Yet the Monitor in its talk of faction also shows one way the situation might be saved. Careful distinction could be made between the Newcastle element and the 'patriot' element in the coalition. Pitt's very weakness in the ministry could be turned to advantage to salvage his popular reputation while he adopted the measures he knew to be necessary, politically or in the national interest. With skill, unpopular moves could always be attributed to 'faction', to the strength of Newcastle and his friends in parliament and the closet, while Pitt threw the spotlight on and took full credit for popular measures. Ewan Fraser has shown with what finesse Pitt practised these arts to protect his political independence, especially before his status was secured by success in war. Not only did he assert his control in cabinet to ensure that policy decisions were in his hands; contrary to the accepted

19. The Crab-Tree 10, 28 June 1757 (Advertisement); 11, 5 July 1757; 12, 12 July 1757.
20. Langford, p. 75.
21. See e.g. ibid., p. 74, quoting Sir James Hodges to Pitt, 14 June 1759, Chatham MSS., xi, fn. 137.
view of himself, which he did much to cultivate, he did not despise the politician's manoeuvres for position, although his methods were unusual and devious. 22 Of the latter, there is good reason to regard the Monitor as both an instrument and a measure of obstacles and success alike.

For, from this time onwards, if not before, Beckford lived up to the declaration of allegiance he had made in November 1756. Although there is no evidence of his views at the time of the formation of the coalition, the attitudes of the Monitor would suggest that he did not accept the coalition 'without some heart-burning'. Yet by late September he had certainly come to terms with the situation, was closely in touch with Pitt and had 'presumed' to be his guarantee to George Townshend 'and many other very worthy Gentlemen'. 23 Soon he became one of Pitt's closest and most devoted followers, and his letters to Pitt, although not frequent, reveal an increasing degree of warmth and intimacy. He offered advice on important questions, was consulted by Pitt on contentious issues, 24 and soon was recognized, by witnesses more reliable than the Test, as a particular friend of Pitt and in some sense his spokesman in the City. Apparently his loyalty never seriously faltered. Obviously, therefore, he would have wished to use the paper of which he was patron to buttress support for Pitt in the City, to maintain that standing with popular City opinion which had developed over the months since the fall of Minorca and which no other minister had endeavoured to maintain while in office. 25

The extent to which he could do this, the degree to which the popular

22. Ewan Fraser, 'The Pitt-Newcastle Coalition and the Conduct of the Seven Years War, 1757-60', unpublished typescript being prepared for the degree of D.Phil (Oxon.), especially pp. 29-32, 40-50. I am grateful to the author for kindly allowing me to see his work.

23. Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', p. 162 fn. 1; Beckford to Pitt, 20 Sep. 1757, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 42.

24. E.g. he offered advice on the appointment of an American commander and on the retention of Louisbourg, Beckford to Pitt, 26 Aug. 1758, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, ff. 46-7; and was consulted on the sending of troops to Germany and on the Cherbourg expedition, Beckford to Pitt, 10 July 1758, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, pp. 328-9. Numerous other examples occur below.

25. Sutherland, 'The City...in...Politics', p. 64.
elements in the City were amenable to such management, can be illustrated at least in part by the Monitor's reaction to the major issues which arose under the coalition. For if it was to maintain its readership, it had to reflect as well as attempt to mould popular opinion - and, as shall appear, the latter process was often more difficult than the former, especially to begin with. The Monitor is, therefore, an important measure of both the methods and the success of Pitt's efforts to make popularity and the role of the 'patriot' minister a major part of the foundation of his political power. Yet the importance of Beckford and the Monitor in securing Pitt's popularity must not be simply assumed but constantly tested against the evidence available. Certainly the evidence for 1756-7 would suggest that Beckford was far from dominating and controlling the support the City had given to Pitt.

In the summer and autumn of 1757, even though initial sharp reactions to the coalition were gradually muted, Pitt's political future was very uncertain. Mere propaganda alone could not save him. Success in war would do so, but would take time. Yet necessary moves in foreign policy were likely to strain further the loyalties of those very groups most offended by Pitt's joining the coalition, but essential as the core of his 'popular' support. The foreign situation had, of course, not stood still while Britain was involved in her long political upheaval. The prospect outside Europe, especially in America, was gloomy enough but more vigorous measures to attempt to deal with it caused no contention. As was to be the case throughout the war, it was European policy that was controversial. There, indeed, by mid-1757 the situation was very gloomy. Just a few days after the coalition took office news reached England that the king of Prussia had been drastically defeated at Kolin on 18 June. His hopes of holding Bohemia, where his efforts
had been concentrated with some earlier success, and continuing an offensive campaign were shattered. The Russians, whose juncture with Austria was confirmed by the Treaty of St Petersburg in January, and the Swedes also threatened Prussia. To add to Frederick's difficulties, in July the French seized Emden, the only important Prussian port as well as the main direct communication line from England to Cumberland. Apparently more threatening to Britain, tensions between the French and the Austrians over the direction of the war effort were resolved, the Austrian barrier towns of Ostend and Nieuport received French garrisons and the Austrian minister in London left without taking leave. Most immediately embarrassing to the British, in the west Cumberland had been unable to resist the superior strength of the French and was forced to retreat before them. In late July, being no longer able to avoid confrontation, he was decisively defeated at Hastenbeck on the Weser. Hanover was left open to the pillage of the French. Thus within the first few weeks of office the coalition was faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Hanover and an ally under serious pressure, who was, in the depths of despondency, putting out feelers for a separate peace with France. The situation seemed to make further British help, for which Frederick had been pressing all year, inevitable.

Yet, of course, this was the very issue that would strain Pitt's support most. As at the beginning of the Devonshire administration, he himself was quite prepared to accept the need for greater involvement in Europe, but he was seriously hampered by his previous declarations.26 In addition to his firm statements in February and March concerning the sending of troops, in May, on the occasion of a motion for a vote of credit for £1,000,000, he had taken what appeared to be another strong stand against

subsidies, although praising the king of Prussia and regarding him as worthy of help. 27 Certainly when he entered the coalition some of his more hot-headed supporters believed him to be much more firmly committed against continental measures than in fact he was, and Hardwicke believed that some promise must have been made to them in return for their support for financial help. Temple later denied that any firm promise against the sending of troops had ever been given. 28 The arguments of the Con-Test in July and August would suggest that Pitt was making a determined effort to modify the views of his supporters on this question. In its exchanges with the Monitor continental connections were the major issue. The Con-Test, having in June expressed the usual fears of over-attention to continental interests, now argues strongly that properly conceived measures, including the sending of troops, may be inevitable and even desirable in changed circumstances and scoffs at the restraints the Monitor supports. Certainly the Crab-Tree hints at some doubts about Pitt's firmness on the question of troops to the continent. 29

The Monitor, on the other hand, makes clear the limits that some at least of Pitt's supporters would still impose on his developing continental policy. Already it had moved some way in defending Pitt's support of a payment to Prussia during the Devonshire administration. 30 In May, following the debate in the house of commons on the vote of credit, it went much further in this direction. The hazardous situation of the king of Prussia, opposed by Russia, France and Austria and the whole Polish interest in Germany, naturally called for the aid of Great Britain, in the interests of preserving the balance of power and

28. Higby to Bedford, 28 June 1757, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 256; Glover, pp. 131-2; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 29 Jan. 1758, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, pp. 197-8; Temple to Pitt, 29 June 1757, Chatham papers, PRO.30/8/61.f.2
29. The Con-Test 30, 11 June 1757; 33, 2 July 1757; 35, 16 July 1757; 37, 30 July 1757, 38, 6 Aug. 1757; the Crab-Tree 12, 12 July 1757.
30. See above p. 120.
defending Hanover. Now it is

with pleasure that Britons begin to feel the happy
effects of those councils, which, in this severe trial
of his Prussian majesty, have enabled him to take the
field and to carry victory on the point of his sword,
without neglecting our own affairs. His destruction
was intended; his ruin might have strengthened the power
of France; he asked our aid: it was necessary to assist
him; but the genius of Britain prevailed: our own security
was first provided for: he was obliged to exert his utmost
strength in his own defence, and not till then assured of
such auxiliary aid, as it was in the power of Great Britain
to give, without entering into new quarrels, or disabling
herself from pursuing those measures which were necessary to
reduce her professed enemy to an honourable and lasting peace. 31

In the interests of consistency as well as out of conviction that
there was a clear contrast, the paper continued to reiterate its charges
against the continental policy of former ministers. This was a 'pretence
of maintaining the ballance of Europe', at immense cost and without
attention to the national strength of Great Britain, only to have 'that
very ballance' destroyed by a single stroke of the pen of the court
of Vienna. 32 So confident is the paper in its exposition, in contrast to
Pitt's still ambivalent pronouncements then, that it appears to be leading
opinion on this crucial issue. In response to the increasingly dire
situation in Europe, from July to September 33 the paper increasingly
clarifies and develops its commitment to some European policy, especially
the support of Prussia. It now clearly admits a positive British
interest in Europe, the balance of power there, and the dangers to Prussia
and Hanover. The object of all British operations must be to oblige
France to employ her armies and exhaust her finances in a war in Germany.

Rather than allowing France to divide the British effort between land and

31. The Monitor 97, 28 May 1757.
32. 97; 99, 11 June 1757; 103, 9 July 1757. (the longer quotation).
33. 106, 30 July 1757; 109, 20 Aug. 1757; 111, 3 Sep. 1757; 114, 24
    Sep. 1757. Contrast the paper's original attitudes to Europe, above pp. 79-83.
sea, the British must divide French power, have her land forces occupied and beaten in Germany, while the British ruin her navy, which is the support of her trade and hence of her large army.

However, having admitted an interest in Europe it defines carefully how that interest should be secured. The best way to achieve the involvement of France in Germany is not to become alarmed and intervene directly as principals. Rather, Britain should wait for others much more directly concerned, for example the German states and the Dutch, to be aroused to their danger and to realize the extent of French perfidy.

To assist a brave, a wise, and a Protestant king, threatened with destruction, is worthy of Britons; to perform our engagements with the elector of Hanover is our duty. But except the Protestant powers on the continent join heartily with us, we ought not in common prudence to venture our blood and treasure in a defence, which cannot deliver our allies from their exhorbitant power, and which in our present circumstances may prove very dangerous, as far as it would deprive us of the means to fight our own battles. 34

Everything should be done to encourage a coalition of interested German powers and to undermine that of Austria and Russia with France, which especially in the case of Russia involves a number of clashing interests. In fact, France has overreached herself, has taken on more than she can long support; simply by keeping out the British have already begun to recover the balance of power. Britain can help an anti-French coalition with monetary support, while pursuing her own interests elsewhere in her own way.

These are the limits and distinctions at which the Con-Test scoffs but which the Monitor steadily maintains. It does go as far as to say that it would recommend the use of British arms if this were really inevitable, but maintains that this is not 'an apparent and immediate necessity'. 35

34. 106
35. 106
The Monitor's arguments indicate some of the restraints on Pitt's freedom of action emanating from his more sympathetic supporters. The first decision of the new cabinet was to reject, against Newcastle's inclinations, Frederick's request for help in the form of a Baltic squadron for which he had long pleaded. Instead it was decided unanimously to explore the feasibility of another suggestion made by Frederick in December 1756 but never reverted to until now, an amphibious operation on the French coast. Pitt pressed ahead with investigations and preparations. Formal approval of the scheme was given on 14 July and details sent to Frederick.36 So was conceived and set in motion the Rochefort expedition, which was to be the major centre of attention and controversy for the next five months.

Preparations for it met with many difficulties, some practical, others pressures arising from the ever-deteriorating situation in Germany. The defeat of Cumberland at Hastenbeck in July opened up the alarming prospect of a separate Hanoverian peace that would certainly offend Frederick, perhaps force him to a peace too and lead to the collapse of the whole continental front. To avoid this, Pitt readily accepted a further extension of continental measures. On 3 August he agreed to further subsidies to Hanover (£400,000), Hesse Cassel (£300,000) and Prussia (£500,000) when parliament met. A week later he concurred in an immediate grant of £100,000 to Hanover from the vote of credit and actually proposed himself a present of £20,000 to the landgrave of Hesse.37 Moreover, he undertook to secure the necessary support of Legge and James Grenville, one of the lords of the treasury.

'[W]e must depart from the rigidness of our declarations', he said to Legge, and he took the trouble to explain his decision carefully to his chief

political allies as a 'commission...upon the grounds of a fated necessity'. Temple accepted it, albeit with some reservations. Bute alone raised serious doubts. Potter apparently was given the same task of explanation among Pitt's lesser supporters and looked forward to having 'to sustain some jokes upon our change of principles'.

For these lesser supporters and others outside the change of principles needed some sweetening, some counterweight to distract their attention. For this purpose the expedition to Rochefort was ideal. It was just the kind of exercise of Britain's maritime strength to divert France in Europe that was valid in the eyes of the proponents of a sea war. And the Monitor promotes it as such. While giving monetary aid to her allies, Britain can exert her own strength in her own interests by deploying her army in America and at the same time using her fleet to occupy the French and make landings on their coast: 'that will presently cure them of marching the strength of their country...beyond the Rhine'. Indeed, as early as 4 September 1756, an article in the Monitor, signed Anti-Gallican and attributing its idea to Dr. John Free, a clergyman and writer, had argued for invasion of the French coast, particularly Normandy, as a legitimate way for Britain to intervene to protect the balance of power in Europe. Much later Free was to claim that his plan thus published was the inspiration of Pitt's ideas. Be this as it may, the Monitor's support confirms the

38. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 Aug. 1757, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 166 (first quotation); Pitt to Bute, [5 Aug. 1757], Sedgwick, 'Letters of...Pitt to...Bute', p. 128; Bute to Pitt [in reply, wrongly dated 11 Mar. 1758], Grenville to Pitt, 14 Aug. 1757, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, pp. 301, 243-5; Pitt to Grenville, 11 Aug. 1757, Grenville Papers I, p. 206 (second quotation); Temple to Pitt, 14 Aug. 1757, Chatham Papers, PRO 30/6/61, f. 23. Potter's comments are quoted in Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 121 fn. 4.

39. The Monitor 109, 20 Aug. 1757 (quotation); 111, 3 Sep. 1757.

40. 58, 4 Sep. 1756; Nichols, Literary Anecdotes, V, p. 691 fn.
political value of the Rochefort expedition to Pitt. This was probably its primary purpose. Therefore he resisted Newcastle's tentative suggestion in late August that the expedition might be diverted to Flanders to meet the apparent threat of invasion from there, and maintained his determination in face of further irresolute hints of cancellation in early September. And to highlight his responsibility for the expedition and give it publicity he resorted to what were to become his typical tactics in uncomfortable situations. He created the impression that only his negative had prevented the sending of British troops to Germany before Hastenbeck when in fact he had probably been prepared to agree, albeit with a smokescreen of opposition; and he was probably also responsible for the current rumour that only he had kept the expedition from being diverted there too.

From its first inception the expedition had attracted much public speculation and enthusiasm. When it finally set out on 8 September it was in the public mind firmly identified with Pitt. The comment of one of Mrs Montague's correspondents was indeed very apt: 'Whatever it is, Mr Pit will either have the glory or disgrace of it, for every one calls it his scheme'. For this reason, Beckford, in the context of his guarantees of Pitt's good faith, 'never longed for our success so much as at the present moment'.

41. Langford, pp. 77-8
42. Pitt to Bute, 5 Aug. 1757, Sedgwick, 'Letters of...Pitt to...Bute', p. 128; Dodington, Journal, p. 368; Fraser, pp. 115-8, 120-3.
44. Mrs Donnellan to Mrs Montague, 15 Sep. 1757, ed. Climenson, II, p. 116; Beckford to Pitt, 20 Sep. 1757, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 42.
The prospects of glory proved short-lived. Once on the move the expedition became a story of yet further delays, excessive caution, lingering councils of war and failure of co-operation between the military and naval commands. Although the Island of Rhe in the Basque Roads was easily taken it was decided to give up the idea of an attack directly on Rochefort and all that eventuated was a botched-up attempt to land at Fouras. Finally on 29 September, with only this to show for an expedition estimated to have cost £1 million, the commanders decided to return home. 45

Such a blow to a policy he had made his own could not have come at a worse time for Pitt. Within a week or so of the expedition's departure had come news that the attempt on Louisbourg had been abandoned. 46 Even worse, on the very day it sailed Cumberland had concluded the convention of Klosterzeven with the French, providing for the immobilization of the Hanoverian troops and the sending home of the Hessian and Brunswick men in the army of observation. Hanover was virtually abandoned to the French and Frederick's flank exposed. 47 In reaction Pitt committed himself even further to direct aid to the war in Germany. He took the lead in expressing the general indignation of British ministers at Cumberland's policy, in getting the king's authority to dissociate the ministry from the convention, in ensuring that it was not ratified and that almost immediately moves began to break it. He pressed steadily for a decisive repudiation and immediate resumption of the offensive by the remnants of Cumberland's army. Early in October he secured the agreement of the rest of the ministers to a refusal to give any financial help while the army remained inactive; on the other hand, an offer was made


47. Ibid., pp. 225-6.
that if the convention were annulled and hostilities resumed the British
government would take the army entirely into their pay. 48 Thus on the
eve of the opening of parliament where Pitt would have to defend his
policies in the general gloom, he was more than ever committed to the
war in Europe. 'I hear [Pitt]is determined to push the King of Prussia's
cause to the utmost, and not to talk of what war shall cost next year,'
wrote Fox to Bedford. 49 Indignation and suspicion of Klosterzeven would
be acceptable enough to the tories and country gentlemen; such commitment
to Europe was unlikely to be so.

With such policies to answer for, the failure of the Rochefort
expedition, the outcry it gave rise to and the threat that it would
disturb the parliamentary session were doubly embarrassing. 'Noise',
'clamour and discontent' began almost immediately. By 15 October Newcastle
considered it worse than the reaction to the loss of Minorca. Thomas
Potter reported to Pitt from Bristol a discontent 'that makes me tremble'.

In the storm, as Potter makes clear, the anti-Hanoverian bogey was out
again. In the city of London as well as Bristol it was insinuated that,
unknown to Pitt, moderating instructions had been sent out to the expedition
that the soldiers were not to be landed, so that better terms could be
obtained for Hanover at Klosterzeven. 'It is to no purpose to talk of
the misconduct of the officers concerned, 'reported Potter. 'The people
carry their resentment higher.' 51 Yet there was another main line of protest
in the storm, 'levelled directly against Mr. Pitt...viz. that the

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48. Ibid., pp. 227-31; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Sep., 18 Sep., 3 Oct.,
8 Oct., 5 Nov., 1757, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, pp. 175-7, 179, 185-7,
194; Pitt to Bute, 19 Sep. 1757, Sedgwick, 'Letters of...Pitt to
Bute', p. 130; Cabinet minute, 7 Oct. 1757, Add. MS. 32874, f. 475.
49. Fox to Bedford, 12 Oct. 1757, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 280
50. Devonshire to Bedford, 15 Oct., 1757, ibid., II, p. 283; Jenkinson
to Grenville, 11 Oct., 1757, Grenville Papers, I, p. 213; Potter to
Pitt, 11 Oct. 1757, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, pp. 277-8; Newcastle
51. Walpole to Conway, 13 Oct. 1757, ed. Toynbee, IV, p. 105; Birch to Royston,
expedition was chimerical, and impracticable, and the production of a hotheaded minister'. Birch reported to Royston that political writers were ready to seize on the failure of the expedition 'to make war upon their late Favourites in the Ministry'.

The Monitor illustrates very well the strength of this clamour and its seriousness for Pitt. From July to September, when it was developing its European policies, the Monitor's confidence in the new administration had increased. At first there are some notes of caution. Yet with the caution goes praise and by 24 September the paper is urging the need to express positive confidence in the measures of the ministry and to show unanimity behind them. The Monitor seems increasingly confident of Pitt's ability to implement the kind of policy it wants and ready to support him.

Then, suddenly, this mood of growing confidence and support was completely shattered by the fruitless return of the Rochefort expedition. The paper's tone again becomes one of bitter complaint and despondency and, with its usual emphasis in times of crisis on the role and rights of the people, it demands a strict enquiry into the reasons for the failure of the expedition with ominous and explicit parallels to the 'just' fate of Byng. 'Shall the twelfth article of war be forgotten, in this case, where every circumstance conspired to the success of a well concerted and well appointed expedition?' Through the demands runs a threatening anti-Hanoverian tone. The suggestion is made that the expedition had secret orders 'to purchase a neutrality for Hanover', equivalent to a breach of the Act of Settlement which a true English parliament will look on with righteous indignation. The demand for an enquiry is extended to include

51. (Cont'd) I, pp. 212 fn. 1, 220 fn. 2.
the activities of Cumberland and his army, and the usual warnings
given of the dire consequences of not satisfying the demand. A number
of papers mulling over the questions to be asked tend to justify Pitt,
to regard the expedition as well-conceived, supported and instructed,
and to point the blame towards the commanders. Yet, although it leans
to anti-Hanoverianism rather than to blame of Pitt, there is no doubt
that the Monitor was seriously out of humour. 54

With the anti-Hanoverian outcry in mind, Potter urgently represented
to Pitt the need for some action to 'obviate what may be attended with
such dreadful consequences'. 55 'Pitt certainly felt the blow severely.
There were two ways out for him. The one he attempted first, vigorously
to Newcastle on 8 October, was to take advantage of the anti-Hanoverian
upsurge and to shift the blame in line with the prevailing
opinion that neither the king nor the duke of Cumberland favoured the expedition
and wanted it to fail in order to show that the only practical measure was
direct intervention in Germany. Yet within a week he had dropped this line
and taken steps to stem the current accusations by publishing in the Gazette
of 13 October the only instructions that had been sent to the expedition while
it was out, a letter countermanding earlier instructions to return by
the end of September. Perhaps he had decided that it was too dangerous
a defence to encourage anti-Hanoverianism, always linked with jacobitism.
More probably he was looking for a more adequate answer to the second
line of protest in the outcry which 'affects him most'. He found his
answer, as the Monitor also did, in turning the blame on to the land officers
in the expedition. For once, Newcastle fathomed his motives:

54. 117, 15 Oct. 1757 (second quotation); 118, 22 Oct. 1757 (first quotation);
120, 5 Nov. 1757; 121, 12 Nov. 1757; Birch to Royston, 15 Oct. 1757,
Add. MS. 35398, f. 380.
55. Potter to Pitt, 11 Oct. 1757, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, p. 278.
He told me yesterday, that he, or Sir John Mordaunt, must be tried; and in describing the present run upon the expedition from some quarters, took plainly the whole merit of it to himself; thinking, (and he thought right) that the measure would greatly increase his popularity, when it should appear that it failed purely from the behaviour of the land officers.'

Pitt's moves had some effect in restoring his reputation - 'mankind do justice to his singular merit' - and in directing blame towards the military officers. But they did not quell the storm. By the last weeks in October moves were afoot in the City to address the crown on the disaster. These, originating among the very elements previously most sympathetic to Pitt, the Half-Moon Club, Deputy Long and others of 'Benn's Boys', raised the possibility of a campaign of addresses and instructions such as followed the Minorca debacle, which could have brought the whole affair before parliament and would have been just as embarrassing to Pitt as to the ministry as a whole. Attempts to exercise an indirect influence having failed, although they did result in some abatement of zeal, the move was averted only by a direct message from Pitt to the lord mayor, carried by one of the privy council clerks, that the king had already ordered an enquiry. It is perhaps some mark of continuing respect for Pitt that the common council was prepared to drop the matter after only a short debate. Indeed Birch reports evidence at the lord mayor's day a little later that his popularity with the crowds was still high.

Yet this was far from the end of his troubles. The dropping of the question was not easily accepted, as the Monitor shows. Fervently


it had urged the City to take its usual lead, expected of them by the whole nation, in pressing for an enquiry. It cannot be supposed that they will be found wanting at the juncture or will allow private schemes' to delay their address. When in fact the address was forestalled the paper explodes in wrath and anti-Hanoverian insinuation. Is it possible that the common council of the British metropolis could be swayed by unsatisfactory messages and by any collusive dealings of their chief magistrate with the men who, their works being evil, love darkness rather than light? Is their lack of watchfulness now not 'a severe innuendo that they are afraid to pursue their resentment against the authors of our miscarriages, lest they should discover a name too sacred to be called to an account'? 'Let them remember that should they ever be prevailed upon, ...to neglect their duty to address his majesty for relief', especially when every citizen demands justice and vengeance, 'their indolence and passiveness will be the forerunners of national destruction'. Yet still some hope remains that other corporate bodies will not be so easily satisfied.

It seems that the Monitor is intent on deliberately stirring up another Minorca crisis and finding another scapegoat. It urges the people to the same unanimity that delivered the country from those councils which led to the loss of Minorca and danger to America. This it does with complete disregard for the interests of Pitt, of whose part in the intervention its authors could scarcely have been unaware. Yet Beckford had no part in all this. On the very day that the Monitor first urged the City to take the lead (22 October) he wrote to Pitt from Fonthill where apparently he was confined by illness. He deplores the failure of the

59. The Monitor 118, 22 Oct. 1757; 121, 12 Nov. 1757 (this is the paper over which the lord mayor started a libel action, see above p. 37).

60. 119, 29 Oct. 1757.
expedition but praises the concept behind it and accepts the attribution of blame to the land generals. He is pessimistic about the present situation but optimistic for the future. Only at the end of the letter is the situation in the City mentioned and then with detachment. 'I find the city very uneasy at our late miscarriage. It seems desirous either to address the King, or to apply to Parliament, but nothing was determined when I received my last letters.' He is not mentioned as taking part in any of the preliminary moves and he did not attend the common council of 4 November either to support the motion or oppose it.  

How then to explain the discrepancy between his attitude and Pitt's, and that of the Monitor? Perhaps he simply could not, or did not attempt to, control closely the line taken by the paper assumed to be under his patronage or at least devoted to his interests. More probably, he judged the flood of indignation too great to attempt to stem it without risking the readership of his paper. In either case, the Monitor, together with the motions in common council, bears witness to the heat of those elements in the City which previously had been the leaders of Pitt's support there, and highlights the considerable difficulty of managing the popular forces of the City to any political purpose. Further, again it would seem that Beckford was not particularly active in Pitt's interest there as yet.

More generally, in response to the failure the Monitor displays again two of its chief characteristics in time of crisis: a tone of dire foreboding and high moralizing about the state of the nation, and an emphasis on its constitutional programme. As well as a complete change of foreign policy, constitutional reforms are needed. Measures against bribery and corruption are again recommended. Readers are reminded

61. Beckford to Pitt, 22 Oct. 1757, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, pp. 278-81; Common Council Journal, 61, f. 188.
of the demands of the recent instructions to members for some check to corruption and for triennial parliaments. It is to be hoped that the gentleman of virtue and integrity who now directs the councils of the nation will, after the plan of operation for the present year is settled, pay regard to these other complaints of the people and thus show himself to be a true patriot. The people are again urged to watch over those entrusted with the nation's freedom and arms and it is recalled that the seed of all revolutions lies in the denial of just satisfaction to the people. 63

Even with, or perhaps because of, the appointment of a commission of enquiry into the conduct of the land officers, public interest did not die away and the mood of the people, Walpole reported, was still 'mutinous'. Discussion went on through November into December, turning broadly on whether the blame for failure could be laid on the impracticability of the scheme or on the mistakes of those, particularly the land officers, who led it. In mid-November there was a report that there was to be another City meeting to address the crown. Delay in acting on the report of the commission, presented on 21 November, created further discontent and raised again the danger that 'the city will drive [the government] to be more violent than they would choose to be' and perhaps force the matter to be raised in the house of commons. In fact Beckford did occasion a 'little brush' over the failure of the expedition in the house at the beginning of the session. Perhaps in fact his feelings were more in tune with those of the group in the City with which he associated than his earlier comments to Pitt would suggest, or perhaps he found it politic, as their representative, to give some vent to their indignation. In any case, the 'brush' subsided quite easily. In the meantime, on 30 November, just before the meeting of parliament and perhaps on the insistence of Pitt, a court martial was ordered on Sir John Mordaunt only. It was held on 14 to 18 December and when it found him not guilty there were yet again

63. 122; 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 127; 130. 14 Jan. 1757.
calls in the City for parliamentary action and fears rose again that the session would be disturbed as well as animosity renewed without doors. These came to nothing but still the public debate lingered on until well after Christmas. 64

Likewise the Monitor keeps on returning to the Rochefort expedition. In December it makes quite clear its dissatisfaction with the outcome both of the enquiry and of the ensuing court martial and its dissatisfaction is still being expressed in January. It is impossible, says the paper, to reconcile the justice of Byng's sentence in 1756 for not doing all in his power with that of 1757, acquitting officers for not even attempting to execute instructions. Out of its dissatisfaction the Monitor develops an attack on courts martial in general as typical instruments of arbitrary rule similar to star chamber and high commission. This is accompanied by arguments for trial by jury as one of the liberties guaranteed by Magna Carta. The paper continues to insist on the need for exhaustive inquiry and, like the City generally, suggests that parliament may perhaps carry this out.65

At first in its dissatisfaction at the outcome of the enquiry and court martial the Monitor issues a stern warning to Pitt on the duty of the minister who advised the expedition to search the matter to the bottom. It is, however, brought round to implicit defence of Pitt by the continuing public controversy over the practicability of the expedition to which it first refers in December. Particularly, in two forceful papers of January

64. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 262-5; Walpole to Mann, 20 Nov. 1757, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 153; Mrs Donnellan to Mrs Montagu, [n.d.], ed. Climenson, II, p. 120; Mr G- to Newcastle, 17 Nov. 1757, Add. MS. 32876, f. 4; Lady Elizabeth Waldegrave to Bedford, 26 Nov. 1757, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 305 (the long quotation); Fox to Ilchester, 26 Nov. 1757, Add. MS. 51420,f.81; Symmer to Mitchell, 2 Dec., 30 Dec. 1757, 24 Jan. 1758, Add. MS.6039, ff. 85, 89, 91; Alexander Hume Campbell to Hugh, earl of Marchmont, 24 Dec. 1757, 3 Jan. 1758, H.M.C., Polwarth, V, pp. 337, 338; CM., XXVII, 1757, pp. 535-7, XXVIII, 1758, pp. 3-6.

and February, it sharpens its 'faction' weapon to explain the doubts raised about the expedition. 'It is notorious that there is a lurking faction, which has laboured hard to carry their point in the court martial' and which is responsible for the 'remarkable' arguments in a recent pamphlet. These the paper proceeds to demolish in detail. The faction is identified as that which lately brought the kingdom to the brink of ruin and is accused of undermining the expedition from the beginning in collusion with some of the officers. Easily identifiable references are made to Fox and Newcastle and their supposed greed for power. The Monitor's own several reviews of the facts of the expedition all justify the conception behind it and emphasize the faults of the officers. Others took this line too, and Pitt himself helped to give the debate this turn by evidence at Mordaunt's court martial and by his references in the house of commons to open mockery of the scheme in the army, coupled with his usual hints of opposition in the cabinet as well.

So Pitt was gradually extricated from the threat to his reputation and political strength posed by the failure of the Rochefort expedition. He was helped to some extent by some lucky turns. The disgrace of Cumberland and the consequent weakening of the position of his protege, Fox, after Klosterzeven removed one of the chief proponents of the old continental policy, delighted the tory country gentlemen and altered the balance in the coalition in Pitt's favour. At the beginning of November the European situation began to change decisively with the great victory of Frederick over the French and Imperial armies at Rossbach. Exactly a month later he defeated the Austrians at Leuthen and thus finished clearing them out of Silesia.

66. 125; 131, 21 Jan. 1758 (the quotation); 135, 18 Feb. 1758. The recent pamphlet would be one of those summarized in GN., XXVIII, 1758, pp. 3-6, under the title 'Observations on the Report of the General Officers'.


68. Langford, pp. 75-6.
Russians retired from Berlin and the Swedes from Prussian Pomerania. Meanwhile, the Hanoverians hastened their concentration of troops, and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, one of Frederick's most outstanding officers, was appointed to command them. On 28 November he at last formally denounced the convention and began an advance. Such success encouraged a more favourable attitude to a continental policy in the City. Even the Monitor shows something of this, albeit belatedly, in further lavish praise of Frederick and exposition of the wisdom of support for him. Still, however, any direct involvement is forcefully rejected: 'to pretend to measure swords with the common enemy of Europe in pitched battles on the continent, is making the remedy worse than the disease.' But, as the Monitor amply demonstrated, the process of recovery of Pitt's popularity was slow, still far from certain, and still had not restored him to anything like the apparent heights of the previous spring. The crisis had certainly been a serious one and his political position had been severely shaken over these months.

In this tumultuous time one domestic issue deserves mention as posing a comparable if much lesser dilemma to Pitt. Immediately on coming to office the coalition had to face not only continuing and widespread disturbances because of the high price of corn (on which the Monitor comments on 6 August, but, more serious because more directly political in implication, widespread difficulties in the implementation of the Militia Act. Violent riots occurred in a number of counties in late August and early September in opposition to the drawing up of lists of those liable to serve in the militia. Another grave if less spectacular obstacle was the lack of enthusiasm among the gentry about serving as officers, even where the lords lieutenant did their best to put the act into effect. As a result the implementation of the act had

70. 107, 6 Aug. 1757.
to be postponed until parliament met. 71

All this could not but be highly embarrassing to Pitt, seeming to throw doubt on his ability to judge the popularity of the measure he had espoused. As usual, while waiting to see how deep-rooted the opposition would prove to be, he attempted to throw the blame on others, accusing the lords lieutenant and justices of the peace of not explaining the act properly and claiming that 'the people had been inflamed by art and management'. 72

The Monitor, in its one vigorous defence of the act in the course of the troubles, makes similar accusations. It attributes opposition to the act to fear of the punishments laid down for delinquents, to cowardice generally, lack of patriotism or riotous intent, or to the work of those who could not overthrow the act in parliament and now sought to undermine it in operation. It attempts to answer the two main popular objections to the act, its supposed partiality to the rich and the fear of service abroad, and emphasizes its advantages, both constitutional and practical, to the individual in his private capacity as well as to the nation as a whole. Much later, on 17 December when moves had begun in parliament for an explanatory bill the Monitor makes further reference to the opposition to the act, in the context of pamphlet argument over its implementation in Norfolk, Townshend's own county. It summarizes and commends one of the pamphlets in support of the act, reiterating both constitutional and practical arguments for the militia. 73

The paper thus gives relatively little attention to this important plank of its constitutional programme, despite the difficulties of these

71. Western, pp. 290-4, 122, 140, 145.
72. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Sep. 1757, Add. MS. 32873, f. 547; C. Yorke to Hardwicke, 15 Sep. 1757, Add. MS. 35353 f. 226 (the quotation).
months. It is much more concerned with matters connected with the war. Its relative lack of attention suggests that the issue was not a burning one for its readers and that indeed the militia was not the major popular measure it had been thought to be. This lack of attention must have been acceptable to Pitt who would not have wanted his embarrassment increased by too much emphasis among his supporters on a measure that might have to be dropped or much modified.

Thus it was that in domestic as well as foreign affairs Pitt faced some awkward questions as the parliamentary session of 1757-8 was due to open. This session was to see an even greater commitment of Britain to Europe, culminating, a few days after its close, in the decision to send a considerable body of British troops. So Europe still remained the central controversial issue of foreign policy. Nevertheless, it was handled so skilfully by Pitt that he avoided virtually all the embarrassments that might have been expected from a change in policy which seemed, at least to some contemporaries, to be a sudden revolution, although in fact it had been long in preparation. His skill was materially, perhaps crucially, aided by opportune success, at first that of Prussia which made Frederick a popular hero in Britain, and much later that in the colonial field, especially America, for which his careful planning from November onwards laid the foundations. But for long periods, indeed most of the parliamentary session, he had to keep his supporters happy without the sweetening of British victories. Again the Monitor illustrates both the methods of Pitt's skill and its effects, as well as the effect of these successes, on an important element of his support whose enthusiasm for the war had been somewhat tempered by the Rochefort failure and whose prejudices were to be further aroused by the developments of the

74. E.g. to Almon, as he recounts it in Anecdotes of...Chatham, I, pp.323-9.
year. In fact, preoccupied with the domestic ramifications of the Rochefort failure and in marked contrast to its concentration on foreign events and policy from the previous July to January, it takes no direct notice of the issues arising in the early part of the parliamentary session. This in itself illustrates the problems of reviving enthusiasm for the war among Pitt's erstwhile supporters. However, Pitt's skill in dealing with the issues is undoubtedly reflected in its later attitudes when its gloom is dispelled and its interest revived.

The speech from the throne, which must have been approved by Pitt, left plenty of scope for the development of a European policy, yet when, in the debate on the army estimates on 14 December, Lord Barrington complacently dwelt on its reference to defence of British rights in America 'and elsewhere', Pitt seized the opportunity to take an apparently strong stand on his earlier attitudes. In a great speech 'admired almost beyond any of his orations', he declared that the army to be voted was meant 'for our immediate selves. He had never been against continental measures when practicable; but would not now send a drop of our blood to the Elbe, to be lost in that ocean of gore'. This was one of several such reassurances that troops would not be sent to Germany. 75 In the cabinet, too, Pitt reacted strongly against the pleas coming from Frederick and Ferdinand for British troops. 'It is not the plan of our administration,' he wrote angrily to Newcastle in January, 'and the tools of another system are perpetually marring every hopeful measure of the present administration.' 76 Nevertheless, despite, or more because of, his stand as the protector of British interests, in January Pitt secured the ready support of the house for a grant of £100,000 for supplies for the Hanoverian army, as earlier two millions

had been voted for the general supply of the year without a single negative. In response to reassurances he asked for from Pitt and the latter's castigation of the convention, in debate on the address in December as well as in January, Beckford declared his explicit support for the Hanoverian vote on what Almon called 'the new principle of politics', that the troops were now under British direction and could be used for British purposes. The ready support also sprang from the general admiration of the king of Prussia. Pitt emphasized the opportunities opened by his successes and Chesterfield commented, 'the king of Prussia has united all our parties in his support; and the Tories have declared, that they will give Mr Pitt unlimited credit for this session...'. Whatever the reason the result was satisfactory. Symmer reported to Mitchell, 'Mr Pitt was never more popular than he is at present. They who applauded him last year for opposing, applaud him now for promoting the very same measures.'

As yet the Monitor reflects nothing of this ready support. Insofar as it detaches itself from preoccupation with the aftermath of the Rochefort expedition, its predominant mood is one of gloom, perhaps paralleled by Beckford's despondent, 'He did not know in what hands we were', which brought a sharp response from Pitt in his speech of 14 December. It speaks of the nation's hopes being fixed on a few, with doubts about what they can achieve. True, it does praise the king of Prussia and his recent victories, and speaks pointedly of his fighting for the 'liberty of Europe, and the

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Protestant religion' in words very close to those of the king's speech. But still in late February it is gloomy about the present state and fortunes of the nation and more specifically about inactivity in America and the prospect that Prussia may be forced to a separate peace. Although no explicit reference is made yet to the supplies, hostility to the army, and especially to any army activity on the continent, continues to be made clear.  

Although Pitt was achieving results while standing out as the defender of British interests, there were bigger hurdles yet to face. Pitt's refusals of reiterated demands from Frederick and Ferdinand for more than money made Frederick unwilling to sign the definite convention which British ministers so much wanted and the Monitor's fears of a separate peace were shared by others.  

Then in March, while negotiations were still in hand for a convention with Prussia, the French withdrawal from Emden created very strong strategic arguments for acceding to Frederick's request to send a small British garrison 'to shut the Emden door' until he could secure East Friesland. Pitt readily recognised the opportunity. As usual, however, he took great care to disguise his acquiescence in order to make it more palatable, especially by exaggerating difficulties in the way of the Prussian convention, just when Frederick was relaxing his stand, in order to make acquiescence seem an essential price. At the same time he first took up a suggestion made by Frederick some weeks before of another raid on the French coast, cabinet approval of which could be represented as a recompense for his 'concession' over Emden. When the convention was finally signed in April this was among the various means of British support promised in the accompanying declar-

81. Corbett, I, pp. 251-2; Fraser, pp. 156-9.
ation. It developed into the three-stage expedition to St. Malo, Cherbourg and St. Cas, extending from July to September. Like the Rochefort expedition of the previous year, it was to be a great focus of attention for the rest of the year. From the beginning it was intended to be a much bigger undertaking, the aim being to seize and hold some point on the French coast as a continuing diversion. Pitt took the initiative throughout; although others, both ministers and intended commanders, had doubts, Newcastle records that there was 'no difference of opinion' in the meeting of 19 May which approved the expedition. Certainly its political value to Pitt was obvious: if successful it would again be something of a quid pro quo for his supporters for growing German commitments, a distraction of British public opinion as well as of the French from Germany.

The Monitor shows how effective this could be. From mid-March, perhaps in response to Pitt's stand as the defender of British interests, it returned to a more positive attitude of support for a 'just' war in general and for this war, directed against the overweening ambition, of France, in particular, with an emphasis not heard for some time on the central importance of America as the cause of the war and a rich source of commerce and nursery of naval power. With this revival of spirits, however, goes an insistence on the importance of conducting the war by the right means (perhaps in reaction to the Emden garrison), directing Britain's strength against the navy and commerce of France. On 18 March and again on 29 April the policy of coastal expeditions is explicitly recommended. 'Though not crowned with the utmost advantages, as might have been expected from their force and commission', such coastal expeditions with other exertions of naval strength have deprived the French

82. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 304-5; Corbett, I, pp. 263-72.
of all hopes to play off their state bugbear of an invasion upon our dominions; protected our trade and navigation; ruined their commerce from the four winds, and cut off their last efforts, for continuing the war, and favouring their usurpations on our settlements in America.

Such results are worth much more than the defence of any friend in Germany, while the victories and continuing blockade of Admirals Osborne and Hawke (off Cartagena in late February and in the Basque Roads early in April) claim 'a merit in our annals, prior to the emblazoned trophies of Blenheim and Ramillies'. The paper is convinced that such policies are now 'the chief object of our councils', and 'will make bold' to put forward its own plan to construct ships of shallow draught able to alarm and destroy the whole French coast from Dunkirk to the south of the Bay of Biscay, 'at a very trivial expense'. By making further gestures to such grandiose schemes Pitt could calm navy fears and convince popular opinion that truly British policies were indeed now 'the chief object of our councils', and the Monitor would be his ready ally.

In the meantime, however, the convention, or rather the further subsidy of £670,000 a year to Prussia and money for the continuing support of the Hanoverian army of 50,000 men agreed to in it, had to be approved by parliament. Pitt had not abated his efforts to sweeten the pill for his supporters, in which domestic issues could be as useful as support for coastal expeditions. Having apparently decided that the advantage lay with continuing the militia, he supported with disproportionate enthusiasm George Townshend's bill to explain the Militia Act. The bill was designed both to meet popular objections and to prevent deliberate delay. Newcastle and others were as lukewarm as ever. Townshend wanted to keep off the ideological issues and reduce contention. Pitt, however, showed more enthusiasm than he had over the original measure and more than Townshend.

84. 138; 139; 145, 29 Apr. 1758 (all quotations).
himself. There were good grounds for suspicion that political calculation rather than the merits of the measure lay behind his support. Another tory issue was treated more circumspectly. Apparently even Pitt felt that the motion of Sir John Glynne, seconded by Sir John Philipps, on 20 February, for leave to bring in a bill shortening the duration of parliament was too 'popular' to be given support. He was careful, however, to avoid giving offence. He himself was conveniently absent with the gout, but two of his closest associates, Potter and Grenville, although opposing, expressed sympathy with the aims and principles of the measure while pointing out the difficulties of reform at the present time. Potter referred to the measure to Pitt as 'that silly business'. As John Yorke noted, Grenville's opposition 'was very much managed and minced by the prevailing tenderness for country gentlemen'. Then Pitt promoted Grenville's bill for the better payment of seamen's wages, defeated in the last session but now passed, despite the fear that it was likely to encourage desertion of seamen.

Most contentious by far of all the measures on which Pitt sought to cultivate popular support was the habeas corpus bill, passed by the commons in this session but rejected in the lords. The bill arose out of the problems associated with the use of the writ in cases of alleged illegal impressment. If passed it was likely to increase the difficulties of manning the navy. Nevertheless, Pitt seized the opportunity of a refusal of the writ in one case by Lord Mansfield to vindicate his popularity cheaply and without consultation with other leading members of the administration with legal experience, his supporter, the attorney-general Sir Charles Pratt, drafted the bill 'for explaining and extending the Habeas Corpus, and ascertaining its full operation'.

85. Western, pp. 142-5, 146-154, 180-1; Royston to Hardwicke, 10 Apr. 1758, Add. MS. 35352, f. 5.
86. Parliamentary History, XV, cc.870-1; Potter to Pitt, [n.d], Chatham papers PRO 30/8/53,f.98; John Yorke to Royston, 20 Feb. 1758, Add.MS.35374, ff.144-5.
87. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 214, 289; R. Pares, 'The Manning of (Cont'd)
It passed through the house of commons fairly easily though not without lengthy legal argument and giving rise to vehement attacks by Pitt on lawyers and judges. It certainly attracted the interest of the country gentlemen. Meanwhile the issue had become the object of great public attention. Pratt became a popular hero with Pitt and Legge, to make 'The Three Monosyllables'. As usual the citizens of London were to the fore in the excitement and an unsuccessful attempt was made in late April by persons associated with the Half-Moon to stir up 'a popular storm' against Mansfield over the original case and to get the City to apply to parliament over the issue.

Pitt pressed the matter hard with Newcastle, treating the question as one of maintaining the nation's goodwill, and threatening that 'the nation would be in a flame' if the bill were rejected. More to the point, he declared that there would be dangerous difficulties for his majesty's servants in the house of commons if the measure were defeated.

Nevertheless, in response to the lead of Hardwicke and Mansfield and the unanimous opinion of all the judges, the bill was stopped in the house of lords. '[E]ven Tory Lords, and those most violent in their wishes for it, declared they were convinced...', although the debates brought some sharp clashes with Lord Temple who supported the bill and attacked the lawyers bitterly. Once the lords' debates were over the hubbub subsided with surprising speed, partly because of Hardwicke's skilful management and his promise to ask the judges to prepare a new measure, largely because Pitt had by then...

88. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 287-8; Yorke, Hardwicke, III, pp. 1-5, 7; Newdigate Diary (transcript), 17 Mar. 1758.
90. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 Mar., 14 Apr.,16 May, 21 May 1758; Yorke, (Cont'd)
achieved what he wanted by the clamour. Pitt, supported by Beckford and Grenville, spoke against a move in June to increase the judges' salaries, but they did not vote against it and the measure passed easily. Hardwicke's fears that Philipps and Beckford might renew the campaign because of dissatisfaction with the subsidy for Hesse-Cassel came to nothing. Hardwicke's promised bid never eventuated but neither did the revival of agitation which was again expected in the next session of parliament.

The Monitor follows Pitt pretty closely in its treatment of these domestic issues, much more closely than on the more difficult and less congenial topic of foreign policy. It reminds its readers several times in passing of the importance of the militia question, although only once, on 13 May when the bill was before the house of lords and was being delayed by opposition, is it recommended at any length. On this occasion, however, the issue is used most adroitly for political purposes. It is discussed in the context of praise of Pitt for the great change he has brought in national affairs and together with other measures which show his veneration for the constitution and the rights of the people. The recommendation of the militia is couched in strongly constitutional terms, but the opportunity is taken for another attack on the 'faction' which tampered with the original measures and hampered its operation. The Monitor's treatment of the militia issue would suggest, yet again, that there was relatively little interest in the militia in itself, at least in the City.
that it was not as good an issue for popular appeal as Pitt's enthusiasm might suggest. Yet it could be turned to good political purpose to distinguish the elements in the administration to his advantage so that again he stood out as the defender of the constitution.

In this same paper and later, the Monitor gives its approbation to Grenville's Act for the better payment of seamen's wages, which in the previous paper it recommended in more detail. Consistently with Pitt's attitude and despite the place of the issue in its programme both earlier and later, the paper makes no mention of more frequent parliaments. Beckford did support the motion in typical ranting fashion, but even so he made his distinctions, easing the embarrassment which the defeat of the measure would have caused Pitt. He said he would have preferred a bill for lessening the number of placemen and pensioners in parliament and took the chance to discourse on supposed divisions in the administration and his respect for Pitt alone among the ministers.

The paper is most fully involved in support of the habeas corpus bill. But it does not take up the issue on its own initiative and plays no part in any preliminary clamour. Its first reference is on 1 April, well after the bill had been introduced into the house of commons. This paper gives a history of habeas corpus and of attempts to restrict it. 'We still hear,' it comments at the end, 'of new inventions, or old condemned practices revived and decorated with florid frothy arguments, to deprive the subject of his benefit of this writ.' Yet 'there can be no danger, so long as this nation is blessed with a monarch, who abhors tyranny, and with a chancellor of the exchequer, and secretary of state, and an attorney general, who on all occasions stand forth in the cause of Liberty.' So the Monitor pays its tribute to the 'Three Monosyllables'. Following this the bill is

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94. 146; 147; 170.
simply referred to as one of a number of important measures, this one made necessary by 'servile cavilling lawyers,' to which the house of lords are urged to assent. Only when the bill has been rejected by the lords is it given detailed consideration in a paper which reflects the main lines of debate. The defeat is bitterly attributed to those who promoted Jewish naturalization, who brought on Britain the reproaches of all her neighbours, and were responsible for heavy taxes and the Marriage Act. They do everything to frustrate the efforts of the friends of liberty in the present administration; those who seek to alter the law or extend the power of the judges should remember the fate of Empson and Dudley and Charles I. 96 Generally the defeat gives rise to renewed and even more bitter attacks on and accusations of faction against members of the former administration. In a new line of argument their right to appropriate the name 'whig' is questioned. 97 Again a constitutional issue is being turned to predominantly political purposes.

After 10 June there is little more explicitly on the issue. The Monitor is simply taking up, quite late, a matter of controversy which Pitt had already created and dropping it when he was ready to do so. Beckford supported Pitt in debates on the bill in the house, notably in a typically wild speech on the second reading. 98 Whether or not he was associated with the moves in the City over habeas corpus is not clear. John Gordon represents the Monitor to Newcastle as the bill's leading advocate but his comment comes so late as to make it more than usually unreliable. In any case the Monitor's advocacy was not developed in any detail until

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96. The Monitor 141, 1 Apr. 1758; 142, 8 Apr. 1758; 146, 6 May 1758; 147, 13 May 1758; 151, 10 June 1758.
97. 151; 152, 17 June 1758; 153, 24 June 1758.
98. R. Kenyon to Lloyd Kenyon, 7 Mar. 1758; H.M.C., Fourteenth Report, Part IV, p. 495.
after the attempt to stir up official backing in the city. This attempt is associated by Lyttelton with 'Mr Pitt's faction.' The chief instigator behind the Half-Moon moves for support for Benson's petition was Deputy Long, associated with the abortive attempt to address over Rochefort in 1757. His move was ignominiously defeated at the Half-Moon meeting before it reached the common council. This defeat may have sprung from a feeling, which Mansfield and Marshe Dickinson certainly shared, that the City would be going too far in thus interfering in a legal case. Yet such feelings of reticence were not usual among common councilmen and to some extent at least the defeat shows that Pitt's wooing of popular opinion, abetted by the Monitor, was not completely effective on this issue. It is perhaps significant that the Monitor's support comes mostly later, in May and particularly June, trying to keep the issue alive.

There is certainly plenty of evidence in the Monitor's treatment of these domestic issues that it was using them, in tune with Pitt himself, to enhance an image of him as the defender of the true interests of the nation, and showing how valuable they could be in this. This image could then be used to reflect a more favourable light on his foreign policy, which, by April onwards, the Monitor is coming strongly to defend. The Monitor makes the connection explicitly in two papers in praise of Pitt of April and May. Those councils which now have adopted proper naval measures to compel the enemy to an equitable peace 'have distinguished themselves already by their care of the public liberty and property; their ability to plan means to annoy and distress the enemy by sea; their integrity and

economy in the application of the public money, and their attachment to the true interest of their country...'. The confidence of the nation so engendered must be maintained by the same means as it was acquired, including a veneration for the constitution and the rights of the people. The Monitor does not follow the 'many' reported in the London Magazine, for example, who regarded the defeat of the motion for more frequent parliaments with surprise, having thought 'that the preservation of our constitution at home was now to be attended to, as well as the preservation of our rights and possessions in America'. Certainly by April and May the Monitor has clearly returned to active help to Pitt. The paper has not, however, yet become a mere subservient instrument of Pitt. True, it does avoid comment until later on a new tax that might have been expected to excite its interest, of one shilling in the pound on places and pensions, probably out of support for Pitt in the growing rift between him and Legge which led to open differences over the presentation of the planned taxes for the year. But it does take up issues which Pitt ignored. Consistently with its programme it gives some attention to a measure which, although contentious earlier, was apparently not much noticed at the time, an act moved by Sir John Philipps to secure the rights of freeholders at county elections. Further, the habeas corpus issue stimulated a renewed emphasis on its constitutional programme. Already members of parliament had been reminded of their task to watch over the activities of government and to be conscientious in their duties. Now the measures to be expected of a

100. The Monitor 145, 29 Apr. 1758; 147, 13 May 1758. The quotation is from 145.
101. Langford, p. 76.
103. The Monitor 142, 8 Apr. 1758; 143, 15 Apr. 1758; Commons' Journal, XXVIII, pp. 112,290.
patriot administration to preserve the benefits it confers are outlined. To those already under discussion are added the strengthening of the law against bribery and corruption at elections and the regulation of places and pensions held by members of parliament. Then, for obvious reasons, interest in constitutional questions is concentrated on the role of the house of lords and they are criticized for interfering with the representatives of the people in their attempts to ascertain the rights and privileges of their constituents. Such interference, the beginning of arbitrary power, must be nipped in the bud by instructions and addresses from the people and refusal of supply by the commons if need be. The developing discussion comes to a climax on 8 July in one of the Monitor's most important papers on constitutional questions, calling especially for measures to secure a free parliament. A further paper answers the contention that corruption is necessary to government; another discourses on the proper choice of ministers. As an important postscript comes the insistence on the people's rights to petition or address the throne in answer to attacks on the addresses over the capture and retention of Louisbourg. Still no mention is made in these papers of more frequent parliaments. Not until the eve of the next session when the constitutional programme is again outlined does this question appear. The Monitor's attention to a range of constitutional issues, reflecting as it must the preoccupations of its readers, further shows how valuable some stand on such matters could be to Pitt in keeping this kind of popular support.

Valuable though they might be in this respect, Pitt's popular stands

104. The Monitor 142; 152, 17 June 1758; 147, 13 May 1758; 154, 1 July 1758; 155, 8 July 1758; 157, 22 July 1758; 159, 5 Aug. 1758; 165, 16 Sep. 1758; 168, 7 Oct. 1758; 170, 21 Oct. 1758.
especially over habeas corpus caused serious strains in the ministry. Newcastle was seriously alarmed at the popular clamour. 'Mr Pitt should certainly be spoke to, by some person of great weight and consideration, and showed the consequences to government, which must arise from letting the mob loose in this manner...!' He was bitter, too, about the differences among ministers that had appeared in the house of commons. The king, even more bitterly offended, refused to speak to Pitt at his levees and went as far as to consider ways of replacing him. Newcastle was prepared to threaten him with being left on his own if he persisted in his stands, although he was aware enough that there was no alternative to refuse to countenance the king's suggestion. 105

Nevertheless to Pitt apparently the cost was worth it in protecting his political independence through his popularity. His stands achieved their purpose in keeping the support of the tories, country gentlemen and out-of-doors opinion for developments in foreign policy, especially the convention with and further subsidy to Prussia. Even after Pitt's courting this was no matter of course with such unpredictable and highly independent allies as the tories and with embarrassments such as the annual parliaments motion. In fact Glynne, its mover, was to be one of the tories who later turned against Pitt.106 Some leading tories, however, were so keen to give an impression of wholehearted confidence in and support for Pitt among the 'country party' and so anxious about possible divisions among their more unruly colleagues that they proposed to organize a group of twelve of fifteen to make a previous declaration of


their approval. Beckford was to be one. It is ironic, but also indicative of uncertainties about the tories, that this group included most of the leading figures who Newcastle had thought might be lured away from Pitt because of their dissatisfaction at 'the countenance shewed Alderman Beckford, and Sir John Philips'. The result was that the subsidy for the king of Prussia and further provision for Ferdinand's army passed the house of commons on 19 April without any serious trouble. No tory spoke against it and several supported it; opposition was left to the independent whig, Sir Francis Dashwood, and to a lesser extent to the inveterate independent, Robert Vyner. There may have been more dissatisfaction than was expressed. Sir Roger Newdigate certainly privately disapproved of the measure as 'no British measure'. But all found some way to silence their qualms. Only in the house of lords was there some acrimony. Likewise, at the end of the session on 7 June, a vote of credit allowing a subsidy to be paid to Hesse-Cassel passed smoothly despite expectations of trouble and that Pitt might try to disavow responsibility for the benefit of his tory friends. It was obvious that Pitt was very relieved by their success. It was now that, having achieved his ends, he stopped pressing the habeas corpus issue and despite the defeat in the house of lords his colleagues noticed a marked moderation of his manner.

The grounds on which the moves could be accepted were partly indicated by the advice given through Potter to Pitt by his tory well-wishers. 'The bitter Part of the Pill is Hanover troops, the Sugar Plumb, the King of Prussia.' So the Hanoverian troops should be presented as useful to

Prussia, and as part of the prosecution of the war against France, making possible the employment of British troops in British interests against her. There was still great sensitivity over the possibility of British troops being sent to the continent. If Pitt could not declare against this in principle then he was advised to discuss the possibility in a historical rather than ideological context. Pitt had already laid the foundations of such an approach earlier in the year, making the Prussian alliance and British control over the Hanoverian army seem compatible with what Tories regarded as British interests. Now, in the debate, he took the line that England could not escape continental involvement, as the history of every past reign showed, but (somewhat inconsistently) that the Prussian alliance removed the danger that she might be weakened by the defeat of her allies in Europe and thus reduced rather than increased the danger of her being drawn in.

The Monitor provides further illustration of the grounds on which the moves were accepted. By now it is once again fully committed to the support of Pitt and, explicitly, of the 'immense sums' (now mentioned for the first time) voted for his war plans that year. It supports the plans on the grounds that their object is to defend Great Britain and her colonies by a manifest superiority in America, where the French will feel it most, and, secondarily, to give generous and timely aid to 'our natural ally', the king of Prussia.

As the paper's interest in the war revives, from mid-March onward, so too does its concern for Europe. Echoing Pitt's appeal to pre-Hanoverian history, it argues for a middle course between rejection of all continental measures, which would be departing from the wisest councils of British rulers over many centuries, and full involvement and overdue attention to the continent, such as has been given from the time of William III onwards.

109. Potter to Pitt, [Feb.-Apr. 1758], Chatham papers, PRO 30/6/53, f. 98.
110. Fraser, p. 161, quoting Neville's account of the debate of 19 Apr.
111. The Monitor 147, 13 May 1758.
112. 138, 11 Mar. 1758; 139, 18 Mar. 1758.
The confirmed Prussian alliance is praised and defended as the best way to follow this middle course. In this defence appears a new strongly religious note in the Monitor's discussion of the war. The present precarious state of the protestant interest has brought Britain to ally with the only power able to defend it against the combination of popish powers determined to extirpate it, the only power able to assist Britain against the common enemy of Europe and the British dominions. The great success of the king of Prussia against all expectations suggests divine blessing.

Yet the paper continues to draw very carefully the proper limits to continental involvement. There must be no direct British involvement through the sending of a British army; fear of this is never far from the surface. The evil effects of past involvements are harped on, justification of them by appeal to the balance of power and liberties of Europe rejected, specific measures to exert British naval power are detailed and the good effects already obtained from such policies praised. Surely the daily news of successes in Europe now the Germans are left to themselves should be convincing proof that this is the most natural way to defend the balance of power there. The Monitor's arguments confirm the feeling that Pitt's developing continental measures were accepted by his various tory supporters only with limitations which they believed, or purported to believe, that he accepted too.

Despite one curious paper, which urges moderation in expectations of present efforts as well as in reaction to any setbacks, this return to a more positive support for the war by the Monitor is accompanied by renewed and growing praise of Pitt and his administration. The paper appears convinced that the administration is committed to the policies it advocates; all that is needed now is vigour and fidelity in execution. This praise comes to a climax on 15 July, when the happy results of united and wise

113. 138; 144, 22 Apr. 1758; 145, 29 Apr. 1758; 149, 27 May 1758; 156, 15 July 1758; 139.

114. 150, 3 June 1758.
councils and the disavowal of disastrous past policies are extolled. Victories in India (the news of Plassey was received early in 1758), the capture of St Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River, and successes in Europe are cited as evidence. 115

Then, however, in this very paper, the undertone of concern about direct British intervention in Europe becomes a jarring note. Should this minister be overruled, should continental measures have been merely put off to this time of the year because parliament is no longer in session, or should reliance be placed by those who dread the power of parliament on the prerogative of the crown to command the armed forces, what can be expected but disaster? The people will be disgusted, supplies will be opposed, stock prices will tumble. 116 In these words is adumbrated the sharp reaction of the Monitor to the greatest shock of all those Pitt had administered to his supporters, the sending of British troops to Europe.

Despite his frequent and carefully phrased denials, this move had long been a possibility if the military situation demanded it. Now this seemed to be the case. The new campaign had begun well for Ferdinand, but he was under pressure from the French and there was every reason to help him to maintain his offensive on the left bank of the Rhine. The enlarged army was more than was needed for Pitt's prized expeditions to the French coast, for which anyway the season would soon be over. In any case, cavalry could not be used in these operations and, as Frederick had complained before, it was pointless to keep them at home idle, especially when Anson's successful blockade of Brest removed the fear of invasion. 117 There is some reason to believe that Pitt had made his decision some time before it was implemented and was carefully preparing the

115. 140, 25 Mar. 1758; 145, 29 Apr. 1758; 149, 27 May 1758; 152, 17 June 1758; 156, 15 July 1758.
116. 156.
ground for it. Potter had made it clear to the group of tories organizing support for Pitt that it would be impossible for him to make a declaration in principle against the sending of troops. Certainly in the debate of 19 April, while declaring that he knew of no intention of sending troops to Germany, Pitt made it clear that he did not preclude such a development if the troops could be useful to Ferdinand, provided they served the common interest and did not merely protect petty states - i.e. that they served British not continental interests. In other ways, particularly in what Fraser calls a flurry of frequent and flattering letters to Bute, he seems to have been opening the way for the announcement of a decision he had made by May at the latest.\(^ {118}\)

Significantly he took no open step until after the prorogation of parliament. Then in the latter part of June, just the day before Ferdinand won a great and opportune victory over the French at Crefeld, he proposed to his ministerial colleagues the sending of some 6,000 British troops and four regiments of cavalry to reinforce Ferdinand. Neither they nor the king had any cause to object to a decision made, as Barrington said, 'at the risk (and certainly there is some risk) of popularity'.\(^ {119}\) Pitt maintained with a brave front to Bute, '[t]he publick approbation I have no reason to doubt of, and the rectitude and efficacy of the measure enough demonstrate themselves.'\(^ {120}\) Certainly, in view of the public admiration for Frederick and now, after his victory, for Ferdinand, the measure was

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119. Newcastle to Hardwicke, [23 June] 1758, Newcastle to Rockingham, 24 June 1758, Barington to Newcastle, 24 June 1758, Newcastle to Henry Campion, 15 July 1758, Add. MSS. 35417, f. 238, 32881, ff. 37, 35, 335. Details of the proposal vary in the different sources and were probably altered during discussion.

120. Pitt to Bute, [23 June 1758] Sedgwick, 'Letters of...Pitt to...Bute,' p. 154.
likely to be generally popular except among the convinced anti-Germans. But the latter included, of course, those to whom Pitt looked particularly for political support and they would require careful explanation.

He turned first to Leicester House and his personal friends. Bute, asked for concurrence after Pitt had made his initial proposals, agreed on the understanding that a 'small body should not lead to a great one', to which Pitt replied, 'A thousand real thanks for my noble friend's salutary caution. Be assured, I will not be drawn farther than my own conviction, authorized and confirmed by your concurrence, shall suggest'. After the news of Crefeld Bute was perhaps a little warmer, agreeing that the number of men 'is in truth neither more nor less than, what I had in secret wished to go'. Although he hoped relations with Prussia would be consequently improved, he was still very suspicious of Frederick. The prince of Wales, under long anti-German tutelage and probably reflecting Bute's real views as well as his own, was much less happy about the decision of 'your wavering friend' and feared deeper involvement in 'a Continent war' which, when he came to the throne, would hamper his forming a ministry 'who can have the opinion of the people'. Yet, as Temple suggests, as long as there was no likelihood of Cumberland's being appointed to command the troops, Leicester House would not raise insuperable difficulties, especially if Pitt continued to press the policy of coastal raids with which it was identified. 121

Some of Pitt's personal supporters were also hesitant, if less so. Temple, in the euphoria of the success of the expedition of Cherbourg and maintaining that there had never been any undertaking in principle not to send troops, said the decision must depend upon circumstances and be justified by success. A few days later he showed more doubts. Expressing

121. Bute to Pitt, [reply to letter of 23 June], prince of Wales to Bute, [c. 2 July 1758], Sedgwick, Letters from George III to Lord Bute..., p. 11 and fn. 1; Pitt to Bute, [23 June], 26 June 1758, Sedgwick, Letters of...Pitt to...Bute, 'pp. 153, 155; Bute to Pitt, 28 June 1758, Temple to Pitt, 3 July 1758, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, pp. 320, 324-5.
sympathy with Pitt's difficulties and some approval of the measure, he goes on 'though as one step necessarily draws on many more, in any hands but yours, with such a master, such colleagues, and the whole of the plan of the war taken together, my reluctance would be extreme'. For the time being Pitt had no need to be too deeply concerned about the reaction of the tories in parliament. By the time they reassembled, in five months or so, he could well hope that events would have justified him. However, Beckford, also informed by Pitt of his decision, reflects some of the qualms they would feel. He sets out the rival arguments he hears about the relative merits of coastal expeditions and armies sent to Europe in a way that favours the former (coupled with large supplies to the army in Hanover). He recounts gibes that 'notwithstanding his promise to parliament, Mr Pitt will be obliged to send an army into Germany'. Against this background, Beckford himself does give quite warm approval to the sending of cavalry while warning that if infantry were sent it would cause uneasiness. But he was closer personally to Pitt than most of the tories. The reaction of the Monitor shows more clearly what a shock the decision was to more popular tory opinion in the City and probably to tories generally.

With, or even in advance of, Pitt, the Monitor had developed its European policy well beyond its early rejection of all continental connections. Now, in reaction to Pitt's further advance, which preoccupies it almost entirely through to October, it is strongly critical and even draws back from positions it had earlier defended. In the paper of 29 July in answer to arguments that Prince Ferdinand's offensive, which has won such success but is now under pressure, must be supported for the sake of the

122. Temple to Pitt, 29 June 1758, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/61, f. 27; Temple to Pitt, 3 July 1758, Beckford to Pitt, 10 July 1758, Correspondence of...Chatham, I, pp. 324-5, 328-9. On the expedition at Cherbourg see below pp. 189-91.
religion and liberties of Europe, because of treaty obligations and out of special consideration for Hanover, and that it is better that British troops should be employed not kept idly at home, are put the contentions that Prince Ferdinand's position is his own fault. Britain has fulfilled her treaty obligations. She cannot be expected to sacrifice her own interests in German quarrels, which Germans should be left to fight, or in consideration for Hanover. The Hanoverians abuse their connections with Britain to enhance their own status, whereas Britain has done her best, by the Act of Settlement, to separate her interests from those of Hanover. If France intervenes in these quarrels Britain should act directly against her. More specifically, objections are made to the high cost of transporting the troops, it is maintained that they will arrive too late to be of use and reference is made to the lesson of 1745 as to how France will use the opportunity created by sending troops out of the country. These troops were voted for the British war against France. If they are inactive it must be due to factious opposition to their proper use.

These arguments are reiterated and elaborated in the papers of the next few months. Particularly the criticisms of Prince Ferdinand are developed with a strong anti-Hanoverian overtone. His troops have been used only in Hanoverian interests, not to assist Prussia and the Protestant cause as was intended. In the course of the elaboration the paper draws back from positions recently maintained about proper British concern for the balance of power and the religion and liberties of Europe and tends to deny any British interest in events in Germany. This runs counter to the arguments on which it based its support for Prussia as recently as April. Indeed the paper comes to imply some hesitations about the Prussian alliance itself, not only, as in the first arguments on the issue, about help perverted to Hanoverian rather than Prussian ends. The anti-Prussian note is even clearer in the paper of 2 September where it is argued that the
contentions in Germany arise merely out of the efforts of a confederacy to restrain an ever-mighty member of the Empire. They pose no danger to the liberties of Europe or to Great Britain. The help that Prussia could rightly expect has been given. These changes in the Monitor's argument provide a measure of just how unacceptable the new moves were to those concerned primarily with Britain's maritime and commercial policies. Its strong reactions provide a seismographic record of the shock this development administered to certain elements of City opinion.

It would seem that those who reported that the City recovered quickly from some initial shock and was generally satisfied with the news were misled, at least about those groups who had been first in their support for Pitt. Yet from the beginning the Monitor dissociates Pitt from the move and exonerates him from blame. This is most obvious in the paper of 29 July which, in setting out in dialogue form the arguments for and against the sending of troops, puts the arguments for into the mouth of Harry, clearly intended to be seen as the spokesman for what is regarded as a continuing Pelhamite continental policy, and the arguments against into the mouth of Will. Whether this was done innocently or not, that is, whether the Monitor is the measure of or the instrument of Pitt's skilful tactics, it is impossible to tell. Beckford certainly knew of Pitt's part in the decision, but it is quite possible that Pitt presented it to him as a reluctant one, forced on him, or that Beckford, with his strong streak of naivety, persuaded himself that it was so. After all, those even closer to Pitt and to the decision-making could talk in apparent

123. The Monitor 158, 29 July 1758; 159, 5 Aug. 1758; 160, 12 Aug., 1758 (for criticisms of Ferdinand especially); 161, 19 Aug. 1758; 163, 2 Sep. 1758; 174, 18 Nov. 1758.

sincerity, although in rather a different context, of 'numberless Cabals'. and 'restless Faction' interfering with Pitt's 'salutary Councils'. Or perhaps Beckford encouraged his City supporters, including the authors of the Monitor, in their illusions, whether or not he shared them. Whatever the truth - and a deliberate misrepresentation seems more likely than an innocent one - the Monitor illustrates perfectly how Pitt's popular reputation survived this biggest challenge yet. Its stand, to be effective, must have been broadly acceptable and credible to its readers, and apparently to other tories too, for Dodington did not get very far with his efforts, on the eve of the new session, as 'a missionary to the tories, to blow them up against the English troops sent to Germany'.

The Monitor drives home its point that Pitt was not responsible for the unpopular decision by constant reiteration of the 'faction' argument. On every issue, foreign and domestic, that it discusses before and after the decision, it distinguishes the policies of the present and former administrations and thus, by extension, the policies of the different elements in the present administration. Now, especially, it regards the measures it opposes as the result of the continuing influence of the latter, as 'the offspring of flattery and the talisman of...faction', the result of private interest seeking to ingratiate itself with the king. The accusations of faction are most fully developed in the paper of 23 September where it is attributed to French efforts as in the past to divide and perplex British opinion. Such efforts are not likely to have much effect on those at the helm but 'some game may be played in favour of France, by such as are left of the old pack'. By them, raids to the

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127. E.g. on foreign affairs, the Monitor 139, 18 Mar. 1758 ; 147, 13 May 1758.
coast of France are dismissed as 'impracticable', destruction of ports and shipping is 'unbecoming' and 'ineffectual', the stoppage of trade and navigation is 'piratical', annexing of conquests is regarded with indifference and efforts are made to draw Britain into the hazard and expense of continental war.\textsuperscript{128} By attributing all the measures it dislikes, without distinction, to 'faction', the Monitor still finds it possible to praise the ministers as honest and wise, filled with a new spirit, engaging in war for truly British interests, inspiring troops and fleets with gallantry and the people with happy unity, and thus achieving triumph almost everywhere. Especially it praises Pitt as the minister who exerts his talents and his influence to confine British councils to British interests alone, and attributes opposition to him to his resistance to 'the old measures'. By this resistance 'he maintains the credit of the nation with foreign powers, and will ever be able to raise supplies for the exigencies of such wise disinterested government'.\textsuperscript{129}

Thus by using this convenient half-truth of 'faction' to excuse indiscriminately all the measures it dislikes, the Monitor keeps its faith in Pitt. But there is good reason to think that it was materially helped in doing so by the first of the great victories of the war, the capture of Louisbourg, news of which reached London on 18 August, to be rapturously received.\textsuperscript{130} The news encouraged the Monitor's already renewed emphasis on the importance of America as that on Europe declined.

\textsuperscript{128} 159, 5 Aug. 1758 (first quotation); 166, 23 Sep. 1758 (other quotations); 174, 18 Nov. 1758.

\textsuperscript{129} 162, 25 Aug. 1758; 166; 174 (the quotation).

\textsuperscript{130} GM., XXVIII, 1758, pp. 384-9; Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 312.
The value of Louisbourg to Britain and the blow to France of its loss are assessed in very high terms, similar in fact to those in which Beckford described them to Pitt. The merits of the victories of Crefeld and Louisbourg are compared very much to the advantage of the latter. The capture of Louisbourg, treated so coolly as benefiting only 'the mercantile part of the nation' is in fact a much worse blow to France achieved at a much lower cost. It highlights the way Britain can best defeat her enemy by exercising her own natural strength as a maritime power rather than by supporting the king of Prussia and the elector of Hanover and cutting out work for the French in Germany. Those who ascribe the victory at Louisbourg to the assistance Britain sent to Germany are quite mistaken. 131

Again, the Monitor is drawing back from its commitment to Europe. The emphasis is now on defeating the enemy of Britain, not the common enemy by British measures.

The victory provided yet another issue on which to distinguish the elements in the administration. Newcastle saw the acquisition as a valuable bargaining counter in peace negotiations rather than as a permanent blow to French colonial power. 132 Pitt seemed more sympathetic with the outburst of enthusiasm for the value of Louisbourg and for its permanent retention, expressed in a number of addresses of congratulation on the victory including that from the City of London. The Monitor aligns itself with these addresses. It insists that the great advantage won at Louisbourg must, especially in the light of experience of its return to France at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, be retained in any settlement. The people demand this;

131. The Monitor 162, 26 Aug. 1758; 163, 2 Sep. 1758; 165, 16 Sep. 1758; 168, 7 Oct., 1758 (the quotation is from 162); Beckford to Pitt, 26 Aug. 1758, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, ff. 46-7.

arguments against it based on the strength of France and the fear of offending other powers in Europe are refuted. The paper vigorously defends the right of the City to ask for retention against some strong criticism of it as an impertinent interference with the royal prerogative. Its contrast of the victories of Crefeld and Louisbourg is an answer to other addresses, notably that from Cambridge, which dwelt at length on the advantages of Crefeld and much less warmly on Louisbourg. This outburst of opinion for the retention of Louisbourg, which the celebration of the victory by a triumphal parade of standards to St. Paul's seemed designed to encourage, alarmed Newcastle, while the City's failure to praise the victory at Crefeld caused offence at court.

Louisbourg was the greatest but not the only victory that helped to maintain confidence in Pitt and the war. Earlier colonial victories helped, as did Crefeld and a success over the Russians on the part of Frederick at Zornsdorff. City opinion generally displayed a keen interest in these and almost universally ascribed the successes to Pitt above all others, much to the disgust of Newcastle's garrulous correspondent, John Gordon. Enthusiasm for the war and opposition to any early unsatisfactory peace were strong. At least as potent as victories in securing the enthusiasm of London opinion was the flourishing state of commerce 'not to be paralleled during such troubles', to which the king's speech drew attention in the new session of parliament and which the Monitor later notices. This growing general popularity of Pitt as the result

136. Parliamentary History, XV,c.930;the Monitor 177,9 Dec.1758;182,13 Jan.1759.
of success in war undoubtedly helped and was perhaps in turn helped by the campaign of the Monitor, with others, to exonerate him from any blame from his particular supporters for the commitment to Europe. The Monitor tries to have the best of both worlds for obvious reasons associated with the 'merchantile interest' whose views, as well as more specific tory views, it represents. It opposes the continental measures its supporters detest because of their costliness and because they are seen as a diversion of effort from the promotion of Britain's maritime, trading and colonial concerns. Yet it seeks to preserve the reputation of the minister who alone seems capable of representing their interests and winning the victories they wanted.

Yet there is one strange silence in the Monitor's discussion of events and celebration of successes in these latter months of 1758. On 1 June the expedition to the French coast, planned since March, at last sailed. It had some initial success in the environs of St Malo but, faced with the apparent threat of French opposition, the main attempt was abandoned. After delays caused by stormy weather the fleet made various threatening appearances off Le Havre, Caen and Cherbourg before returning to Spithead at the end of the month to provision. Now Newcastle ventured to suggest that the expedition should go to Dunkirk or Ostend, a move for which Ferdinand and Frederick were asking and for which there were sound strategic reasons in the situation in western Germany. Pitt successfully insisted that it should return to the French coast, although it was in the context of these arguments that he made his concessions about the sending of troops to Germany which largely removed the reason for the diversion. On 1 August the expedition, under new commanders, Marlborough and Sackville having gone with the troops to Germany, sailed back to Cherbourg. Here again it had dramatic initial success but reimbarked in face of French counter-preparations. When it returned on 19 August Pitt ordered it
to sea again as soon as possible. On 31 August it sailed for another attempt on St Malo. Once more a successful landing was made at St Cas nearby but this turned into a humiliating debacle from which the expedition returned home for the last time.¹³⁷

The expedition had attracted considerable public attention and was, like the Rochefort expedition, particularly associated with Pitt.¹³⁸ The reasons for his steady insistence on its continuation are illuminated by the reactions of his political allies, especially after its first return. Leicester House was wholeheartedly behind the expedition as an alternative to German measures, while Temple and George Townshend advised further efforts. Beckford attached great importance to it from the beginning, and after the initial return urged firmness, reporting at length the opinions of 'disinterested' men in favour of the expedition in answer to those who will stick at nothing 'in order to lessen that popularity you have so justly acquired'; 'these diversions will do more good to the common cause, than sending large bodies of men to Germany or the Low Countries.' Cavalry (but not infantry) may well be sent to Europe but 'let me.. entreat you not to be dissuaded from an attempt on the coast of France.... If it was not to succeed, it will have the object of causing a diversion, will keep the enemy in hot water, and prevent their overwhelming by numbers our allies in Germany.'¹³⁹

Although reactions to the first stage of the expedition were mixed, the City anyway seems to have been pleased. The second stage, the seizing

¹³⁷. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 305-7, 313-4; Corbett, I, pp. 275-301; Fraser, pp. 169-71.
¹³⁸. E.g. it is fully reported and commented on in GM., XXVIII, from May to Nov.
¹³⁹. Bute to Pitt, [16 June 1758], [2 July 1758], Temple to Pitt, 3 July 1758, 27 Aug. 1758, Beckford to Pitt, 10 July 1758, Correspondence of... Chatham, I, pp. 318-9, 323-4, 346-7, 328-30.
of Cherbourg, was more generally greeted as a success, again with particular enthusiasm in the City and by Pitt's allies. Pitt encouraged this by having the captured guns put on display in Hyde Park before being taken with ceremony to be stored in the Tower. It is clear that Cherbourg was included as one of the successes which greatly enhanced Pitt's popularity in the late summer of 1758. Then, when the debacle of St. Cas followed and, again as in 1757, a great public debate ensued Pitt was determined that others should take the blame for the failure of an undertaking with which he was so closely associated. In face of the clamour and to the intense annoyance of Leicester House, responsibility was placed on the officers, especially the new military commander, General Bligh, and Colonel Clark, the quartermaster-general. The diversion was on the whole successful. Once again Pitt escaped any substantial blame. Indeed his popularity moderated the criticism.

The expedition was thus a major preoccupation of the second part of 1758. Yet the Monitor gives it scarcely any attention. The paper does occasionally give its general support to attacks on the French coast and indeed suggests its own scheme. Apart from a couple of exhortatory general references in May and June, however, no specific comment is made on the fortunes of the expedition, either its successes or failures, until 11 November. Then it comes only in detailed rebuttal of a pamphlet attacking the conduct of General Bligh in the last stages, ridiculing Pitt for giving

141. Walpole to Mann, 9 Sep. 1758, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 238.
142. Sedgwick, 'Letters of...Pitt to...Bute', pp. 163-5; Calcraft to Fox, 21 Sep. 1758, Add. MS. 51398, f. 29; Birch to Royston, 23 Sep., 30 Sep. 1758, Add. MS.35399, ff.34-6,39-40;Jenkinson to Grenville, 30 Sep. 1758, Grenville Papers, I, p. 272.
143. The Monitor 145, 29 Apr. 1758; 158, 29 July 1758; 160, 12 Aug. 1758; 166, 23 Sep. 1758.
the command to him and demanding a parliamentary enquiry into the conduct of the ministers for giving this advice. The paper calls for humanity and restraint in judgement on the general and attributes the attack on Pitt to 'faction' which continually harasses Pitt's virtuous administration in its efforts to clean the Augean stables. A month later, on 9 December, the paper again leaps to Pitt's defence and upholds the necessity, wisdom and efficacy of the expedition, in answer to a pamphlet on this issue, again attributed to a 'junta' of men responsible for the early crisis in the war. It goes on later to demand full enquiry by the ministry and parliament into the hesitations about taking the command, and in obeying the orders of the commanders of the earlier stages of the expedition, requiring punishment and venting its spleen on those who preferred a command in Germany to one entirely English. Again that behaviour is attributed to 'faction'.

The lack of attention to the expedition during its course is in marked contrast to the paper's intense interest in the Rochefort venture, and its attitude to the outcome and to criticism of the commander is obviously inconsistent with its earlier campaigns for vengeance on inadequate officers. The contrast and inconsistency are not easy to explain. Expeditions to the French coast disrupting navigation were in line both with the interests of the 'merchantile' community and with the Monitor's European policy. Beckford was certainly intensely interested in the expedition, as was City opinion. The earlier successes could have been used to divert attention from the commitment to Europe. Perhaps the Monitor and the particular popular tory opinion in the City that it reflects were disillusioned and sceptical because of the failure of the previous year. Its continued references

144. 149, 27 May 1758; 152, 17 June 1758 (by implication); 173, 11 Nov. 1758; 177, 9 Dec. 1758; 179, 23 Dec. 1758; 183, 20 Jan. 1759; 192, 24 Mar. 1759. The pamphlet attacked in 177 is An examination of a letter published under the name of L[ieutenant] G[eneral] B[lig], and is almost certainly that attributed by Walpole to Dodington and implicitly castigated by Pitt in his speech on the address. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 325-6.
to the value of such expeditions do not suggest this. Perhaps it was too preoccupied with other issues, with the main lines of policy argument of ideological interest to its readers, rather than the detail of events, and this neglect is just part of the increasingly noticeable concentration on a few issues of foreign policy rather than providing a comprehensive commentary. Perhaps, at least at some points, it was demonstrating its greater commitment to Pitt by avoiding subjects that were embarrassing, although its later calls for full enquiry and punishment, more in line with the views of Leicester House than Pitt, would belie this. It is possible that it was torn between Leicester House and Pitt, but this would not explain its silence in the course of the expedition. There is just no convincing explanation. Anyway, this was to be Pitt's last venture for some time in this kind of combined operations. In military terms the costly ventures had been almost complete failures. Yet politically, despite the Monitor's silence here, they had probably achieved what was expected of them, in maintaining Pitt's popularity and his reputation as a proponent of truly British measures in the difficult period before victories provided more solid support.

Apart from this silence, the Monitor in 1758 clearly shows the effectiveness of Pitt's propaganda tactics in the revival of its enthusiasm for the war, to the extent that it becomes, in many ways, an instrument of those tactics. There can be no doubt that as such its support was valuable to Pitt even if it was not unique. The question arises, however, of just how important the Monitor and its patron were to Pitt at this time. There is no doubt that Beckford's intimacy with Pitt was increasing. He was

145. The Monitor 192, 24 Mar. 1759 makes warm reference to prince Edward's part in the expedition which, with its readiness to defend Bligh, brings its attitude closer to that of Leicester House than Pitt.

146. Langford, pp. 78-9.
consulted, or at least informed, about major decisions as one of Pitt's closest allies. He offered his advice on matters of war policy and in one instance anyway, the Martinique expedition, his advice seems to have been the original stimulus to an important development.\footnote{Beckford to Pitt, 26 Aug. 1758, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 47; Fraser, p. 188.} Although he was regarded by many as one of the more wayward tories and sometimes his rash hotheadedness created difficulties in the house of commons,\footnote{Fraser, p. 188.} he gave his support there on all important matters. For example, he enunciated the useful 'new principle of politics' which provided a justification for tory support of German subsidies.\footnote{See above p. 167.} He was wrongly blamed for being the instigator of the embarrassing more frequent parliaments motion, and did not cause the trouble Newcastle and Hardwicke expected over the vote of credit for Hesse Cassel.\footnote{Fraser, p. 188.} On several occasions, he made a point of distinguishing Pitt from the other ministers and on one of these Pitt repaid the compliment in no uncertain manner. In a debate in the house of commons on 7 June on the king's message asking for a vote of credit

> the great Mr Beckford, whom no argument can convince, no defeat make ashamed, nor mistake make diffident, did...stand up...and say he would not oppose that measure, as he had an opinion of the two Commoners in the administration, but in the Peers that composed it, he had no confidence, and ran in foul abuse of them and then ended with a severe censure of the House of Lords in general.

Lord Royston's defence of the peers in answer brought Pitt to his feet in support of Beckford:

> he set forth the great importance and dignity of Beckford personally, and above all, the dignity and importance of an alderman, concluding it was a title he should be more proud of than that of a Peer. This speech has enraged the Lords, offended the Commons, and the City ungratefully say was too gross.
The echoes of this exchange lingered on. 'Astonishing court', one observer called it. In July, Elliot, commenting to George Grenville on popular reports of disharmony in the administration, writes, 'Others... ridicule Habeas Corpus, and still persist in the old opinion that an Alderman of London is inferior to a Peer of England'.

Pitt obviously valued the support of this difficult yet wholeheartedly devoted follower for various reasons. Beckford was one of the most vocal tellers in the house, he was associated with an important if maverick group of them, notably Sir John Philipps, as well as with the West Indians, and he represented the City. If Pitt's political independence was to rest on popularity, the support of popular elements in the City was essential. Yet just how strong, and therefore how valuable to Pitt, Beckford's influence in the City was at this stage is far from certain. There is no evidence to suppose him to have been particularly concerned with the two main expressions of City support for Pitt in these months, the moves over the habeas corpus bill and the address on the fall of Louisbourg. The latter certainly originated among Pitt's particular supporters, was deliberately intended as an expression of faith in Pitt at the expense of other ministers and was not passed without considerable debate. To some extent it was connected with Pitt himself, who used his influence to tone down some of the expressions directed against Newcastle and his associates and condemning the restitution of Louisbourg at the peace of Aix-la-chapelle. Certainly Beckford was in agreement with its sentiments and had expressed his support for the permanent acquisition of the conquest to Pitt. But Pitt's link with the

151. Mrs Montagu to Dr Stillingfleet, 13 June 1758, ed. Climenson, II, pp. 127-8 (for the account of the exchange); Lyttelton to Sanderson Miller, June 1758, Dickins and Stanton, p. 391; Elliott to Grenville, 10 July 1758, Grenville Papers, I, p. 248.
City on this occasion was the newly-elected town clerk, James Hodges, not Beckford, who was not even present at the common council meeting. The unreliable John Gordon does suggest in July that Beckford's influence was rising, over plans to have Sir John Philipps elected an alderman, only to report in October that the situation was so much changed that Beckford was likely to be defeated at the next parliamentary election. Altogether it seems that tory support for Pitt was regained or ensured without any particular effort of Beckford's except through the help the Monitor gave to the process. With the beginning of victories, wider and more general City enthusiasm was forthcoming which, even if it would not allow itself to be used for factious purposes, for example over the address on Louisbourg, to some degree overshadowed the importance of the tories to Pitt. Despite Gordon, who constantly identifies those zealous for the war and Pitt with the 'faction', i.e. tory jacobites, Pitt's popularity in the City was widening its basis. Yet, although Sir John Barnard had in July this year resigned his alderman's gown, no one, certainly not Beckford, had emerged in his place as a leader in this movement.

Whatever the part of the Monitor and Beckford, and despite the ignominious end of the expedition, the nation's mood was rising, Pitt's popularity was growing mightily, opposition was muted, and he had every reason to be satisfied with the year's work and the prospects for the next session of parliament.


THE APOTHEOSIS OF PITT

NOVEMBER 1758 TO OCTOBER 1760

In general 1759 confirmed the happy prospects of the end of 1758 for Pitt. The parliamentary session opened in a spirit of unanimity. In the next few weeks over twelve millions were voted in supplies without any contention or much debate, to the wonder of contemporaries. Throughout the session experienced observers continued to remark on its almost uninterrupted harmony and the lack of opposition and contentious issues. Out of doors too, Pitt's popularity seemed secure. As early as December 1758 Joseph Watkins reported to Newcastle that 'there never was a Ministry so riveted in the affections of the people as the present'.

This apparently happy unanimity, after the crises of the last three years or so, was not surprising especially as the year advanced, in that this was the great 'year of victories' when the tide of the war turned decisively. It was increasingly clear that adequate supplies and direction of the war effort were now likely to achieve results. In North America attention was concentrated on Quebec. After the first successful navigation of the St. Lawrence by a battle fleet, the British established themselves before the town in June for a long and wearying siege. In October news of the fall of Quebec provided the year's greatest triumph. An expedition to the West Indies, planned from September 1758 as a subsidiary operation to

the American war, with the active encouragement and advice of Beckford,\textsuperscript{2} resulted in the capture of Guadeloupe in May, although not Martinique as originally intended. At home, the main preoccupation of the year from February onwards was the long-drawn-out threat of an invasion mounted in desperation by the French. This became increasingly serious in the middle of the year. It was countered chiefly by naval preparations to maintain control of the channel and by a direct blow at French preparations through an attack on Le Havre. The threat was deflected by the great victory of Ferdinand at Minden in August, which saved Hanover for another year and prevented the French from concentrating on the invasion attempt, and by two naval successes. In August, Boscawen's defeat of the Toulon fleet off Cape Lagos prevented the concentration of French naval resources; in November, when at last the main French fleet slipped out of Brest, Hawke put a final stop to their plans by defeating it in Quiberon Bay. The effects of all this on Pitt's reputation were noticeable even in September before the greatest had been achieved. The late successes, Symmer reported, 'have consolidated the Power of the Minister, who has been active in those measures, and raised him above all Opposition', while Newcastle described him as 'more popular every day than ever'.\textsuperscript{3}

Yet, as Pitt's general popularity grew, his particular support was threatened. Despite appearances the year was not without debate and controversy which especially affected those whom Pitt had cultivated as the basis of his popularity and independence, both Leicester House and the Tories. Some decisive developments occurred in the attitudes of the Tories, with some division in their support for Pitt, divisions in which the City Tories were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} Beckford to Pitt, 11 Sep. 1758, \textit{Correspondence of...Chatham}, I, pp. 353-4.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Symmer to Mitchell, 14 Sep. 1759, Add. MS. 6839, f. 146; Newcastle's \textquoteleft business with Lord Mansfield\textquoteright, 4 Sep. 1759, Add. MS. 32895, f. 156.
\end{itemize}
increasingly warm for him and others more and more doubtful. In these developments Pitt, although still trying to woo all, committed himself more openly to Beckford, again at the expense of relations with his ministerial colleagues. Their intimacy grew and was publicly avowed and recognized by others, while the latter's activity in the City increased. The Monitor is at the heart of this controversy and a valuable piece of evidence of it as well as a valuable weapon in directing and holding City opinion for Pitt. Significantly, it is largely preoccupied throughout the year with debate over the main lines of the conduct of the war, rather than with the detail of the campaigns and victories. This involves its return to the defence of continental commitment and increasingly warm support for Pitt.

There was little sign in parliament of trouble with the Tories, although Pitt was concerned about the possibility and with reason, in view of recent developments and debacles and with Dodington active amongst them. He was well aware of the strain that particularly the sending of troops to the continent put on his public support. Yet there were only occasional hints of uneasiness in parliament over continental issues and the failure of the expedition was not even raised. Pitt took the bull by the horns in a forthright speech in the debate on the address, stressing the great cost of what had to be done, and his frankness seemed to bear results. The address was moved by 'a young converted Tory', Sir Richard Grosvenor, who 'called Pitt a blazing star', and seconded by another, Lord Middleton, which Symmer took as an indication of some accommodation between the Tories as a party and Pitt. German measures were included in the general approbation: 'King of Prussia's victories worth all we have

given: those he will gain worth all we shall give.' No tory supported
the independent, Vyner, when he made a speech against the Prussian alliance
in December, which Pitt answered by stressing its importance. Nor did
they support his single dissenting voice when the Prussian subsidy was
voted in January. True, on one occasion Sir John Philipps 'reproached
Pitt with Hanoverizing', and in the debate on the address Beckford's
approval of support for continental allies was somewhat strained and he
sounded the only note of caution in the debate. He insisted that America
should remain the primary object of the war and sought to limit the amount
to be spent on the continent to what had been sufficient the previous year.
He received a most complimentary assurance on the first point from Pitt,
although Pitt would not accept any limitation of amount, and this bore
fruit in January when, in a short but troubled debate on the Hessian subsidy,
Beckford showed a marked change of attitude. In answer to objections and
demands for assurance from a tory and an independent, Northey and Strange,
and in support of Pitt's heated reaction, Beckford declared it 'was giving
money to America by this diversion on the continent of Europe and that if
Hanover were lost, he would vote one hundred millions sooner than not recover
it'. Meanwhile tory consciences had perhaps been eased by being able to
display their continued allegiance to the America-blue-water school of strategy
in a vote of thanks to General Amherst and Admiral Boscawen for their part in
the capture of Louisbourg, moved by Philipps and supported by Beckford.

Thus Pitt seemed to have no real trouble in holding the tories, despite

5. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 325-6 (first quotation); Walpole to
Mann, 27 Nov. 1758, ed. Lewis, XXI, pp. 256-7; Symmer to Mitchell,
24 Nov. 1758, Add. MS. 6839, f. 115; Dodington, Journal, p. 380,
23 Nov. 1758 (second quotation).

6. Fraser, p. 198, quoting Neville diary, 14 Dec. 1758; West's account,
26 Jan. 1759, Add. MS. 32877, f. 351; Pitt to Mitchell, 26 Jan. 1759,
Correspondence of...Chatham, I, p. 401.


8. West's accounts, 23 Nov. 1758, 26 Jan. 1759, Add. MSS. 32885, ff. 524-5;
32887, ff. 351-3, 355; Walpole to Conway, 28 Jan. 1759, ed. Toynbee, IV,
p. 233. The quotation is from West's account of 26 Jan.
his provocative use of parliamentary speeches to reassure actual and potential continental allies. In December, for example, on the motion of thanks to Amherst and Boscawen, he firmly checked Philipps's and Beckford's enthusiasm for the retention of Louisbourg by maintaining it was too early to say what would or would not be restored at a peace and further aggravated the usual tory fears over continental measures by avowing that 'he would not give up one iota of our allies for any British consideration'. This seemed to raise the distinct possibility that once again Louisbourg would be sacrificed to European considerations and was certainly noticed outside the house.  

On the other hand, when questions of policy were not at stake he had been equally provocative in his courting of the tories, making a particular fuss over a demand from Hanover for extraordinary expenses and, contrary to normal treasury practice, sending circular letters to the tories to attend when the demand was debated in the house. From this time dates his emphasis, to be important later and even now achieving results with the tories, that the management of the financial side of the war effort and the extent of its expense were not his responsibility.

Tory uneasiness is shown to a much greater extent in controversy outside parliament, notably in the Monitor. Although it defends Pitt it is certainly disturbed by the ill-success of the expedition. It calls vehemently for a full enquiry and warns that if nothing is done the power of parliament will be brought into contempt and no minister, how

9. Barrington to Newcastle, 6 Dec. 1758, Add. MS. 32886, f. 187; Rigby to Bedford, 7 Dec. 1758, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, pp. 371-2; Symmer to Mitchell, 8 Dec. 1758, Add. MS. 6839, f. 118; Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 326 (the quotation); Fraser, pp. 199-200.

10. Walpole, George the Second, I, pp. 331-2; Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 27 (Walpole puts the incident in 1758 but it appears to be the same one as Yorke recounts for 1759); West's account, 23 Nov. 1758, Add. MS. 32885, f. 525.
virtuous soever and beloved for his wisdom and integrity, will be able to carry his schemes for the public good into execution. More important, indirectly and directly it continues to show concern over continental commitments, with enough parallels to Beckford's attitudes early in the session to suggest that there was more to his uneasiness than appeared in debates. In comment on the king's speech, it extols English victories but clearly attributes them to a total change in policy introduced by the new ministry, towards true British measures, such as the Monitor has always recommended. These have restored the British flag to its ancient dignity, brought respect abroad and union and resolution at home, as well as a great increase in commerce; 'our merchants and manufacturers, our planters and our navigators', are in a flourishing state. The new policy must therefore be persisted in to the end, whatever the difficulties and cost. With Beckford, it insists that America is the first and major interest and there efforts must be concentrated. With him, too, it emphasizes the crucial significance of Louisbourg as the foundation of increasing British strength in America as it has been in the past of the gathering power of France. Louisbourg is the key to destroying French threats to trade. It must never be given up whatever the cost. The value of its conquest to the trade and navigation of Great Britain and of her sugar islands is analysed in detail in a new way in a major paper of 16 December, just after Beckford's exchange with Pitt on this question. Clearly Symmer was right in attributing Beckford's stand to a wish for popularity but the Monitor comment on the sugar islands suggests that he may have had more interested motives too.

12. 175, 25 Nov. 1758; 176, 2 Dec. 1759; 177, 9 Dec. 1758; 178, 16 Dec. 1758; 182, 13 Jan. 1759 (the quotation is from this paper); 196, 21 Apr. 1759; Symmer to Mitchell, 8 Dec. 1758, Add. MS. 6838, f. 118.
More directly, in the midst of praise of Pitt's measures in the opening weeks of the new session, the Monitor shows considerable hesitations over the sending of troops to the continent. It must be confessed, it says, that the money could have been better spent on the hire of 30,000 Swiss troops. It commends Pitt for concentrating on schemes other than continental, for breaking through the old French trick of a diversion into continental war by finding other ways to attack them, and insists that he be not diverted into unwise treaties or a premature peace. The 'chimera' of a land war could deprive Britain of all the successes gained by the exercise of her sea power. Even when Beckford declared so warmly for the subsidies in parliament in January the Monitor gives no explicit support even for the Prussian alliance.

Then, however, the Monitor is stung or pushed into open and explicit acceptance and defence of Pitt's continental policy, back to and then beyond the position developed in 1757-8, by opposition. The process was begun in reaction to a 'simile' written by Soame Jenyns, a little skit on the tories' submission to Pitt and their changing attitudes to continental policy, taken far more seriously than it was intended to be. Whatever its author's intentions, it attracted considerable notice. Because it was likely to touch raw tory nerves, it made Pitt very angry, so angry that Hardwicke had to intervene to protect Jenyns's place at the board of trade. The Monitor's reactions show that Pitt's fears were not unjustified. It prints the simile in full, after an angry spluttering introduction on the

13. The Monitor 176; 182.
use and misuse of ridicule in political controversy, referring back to the Test days and its ridicule of Pitt and Temple. It does not deny the implicit changes against the tories. Rather it seeks to justify their conversion by presenting its own allegory contrasting the corrupt member of parliament and the honest independent. Out of the honourable union of the latter with Pitt have come the offspring Senegal, Louisbourg, Duquesne; another is expected which, if happily born, will be called America. In other words it emphasizes British victories and skirts the point about the continent. 15

This attempted justification of the tories provoked a further attack in the form of a pamphlet—letter dated 23 February, addressed to the paper and entitled The Honest Grief of a Tory. The letter claims to originate in Wiltshire and expresses special dissatisfaction, clearer in its sequel, with the behaviour of William Northey, member for Calne and one of the tories who, although he expressed some reluctance over the Hessian subsidy, on the whole supported Pitt and was one of the group which had declared for him in the last session. Whether genuinely tory or not, the letter was bound to exacerbate tory uneasiness. It praises the Monitor for its past arguments as 'the Voice of those true Englishmen, who zealously called for, and of late triumphed in a change, as they supposed, of Men and Measures. Our whole party, therefore, is interested in your continuing firm on the same honest Principles and Pursuits.' Why then has the paper not vindicated the minister and the tories, with something more effective than spluttering indignation, against the charge of Hanoverian measures? Perhaps it, too, 'has forsaken his Principles, and is basely become the Defender of Germanized Measures and Ministers.' The letter rejects as excessive the Monitor's adulation of Pitt and raises questions about his recent conduct, especially

15. The Monitor 187, 17 Feb. 1759. The simile as reproduced in the Monitor and the rejoinder appear in Appendix III.
his statements about the return of conquests and about the protection of
the interests of allies and Hanover. It would seem that he has succumbed
to ministerial measures, to Newcastle and to corruption. All defences
of German measures are rejected and on them the Monitor is condemned
very effectively out of its own mouth. The tories generally and Northey
in particular are also castigated for their submission. Unanimity has no
value if it results in such measures. Perhaps 'our clamours will secure
a Remnant...who will so far succeed, as to lessen these continental
Expences, and delay our Ruin'.

The Monitor could hardly avoid such a challenge. It is taken up in
'The MONITOR's Vindication of his constitutional Principles', a powerful
document which is a milestone in the Monitor's political development. After
rejecting the relevance of party distinctions especially under an adminis-
tration 'that has cast off the aid of party', and mere anti-court reactions
founded on the belief that 'such as join with a minister, must be sunk
forever in a mass of corruption', the paper comes to the heart of the
question. 'To acknowledge the advantages derived to our country from the
measures pursued under Mr Pitt's administration is another subject of
your honest grief, and burlesqued under the name of canonization and worship
of the minister.' But who can deny that honour is due to Pitt for the benefits
he has brought to his country? Pitt has subdued faction, put his faith
in the rectitude of his measures only, made it possible for the country
to protect itself without foreign troops, delivered the people from the
terrors of a standing army, persuaded the crown to put arms in their hands
and confide in their affections, taken care to prevent the misapplication
of money, not allowed fleets and armies to stand idle, ended the useless

16. The Honest Grief of a Tory, expressed in a genuine letter from a burgess
of —, in Wiltshire to the Author of the Monitor, Feb. 17, 1759, London,
1759, passim. The quotations come from pp. 4-5, 14, 35.
17. The Monitor 190, 10 Mar. 1759.
expenses of parades and encampments when there was no danger from the enemy, and has not allowed Britain to be involved as a principal in continental quarrels, giving men and money only with her chief ends in view. It is not idolatry, the author contends, to acknowledge that such advantages 'reflect a dazzling splendor on his character'.

The present operations in Germany, the paper admits, have been particularly questioned and criticized. Yet they are no mere sacrifice to Hanover and Prussia motivated by a wish on Pitt's part to flatter his master, but a defence of British interests in the 'preservation of a bulwark to arbitrary power and universal monarchy on the continent'. To its former arguments, now revived, about Britain's proper concern for the liberties and religion of Germany and the balance of power, a powerful new one is added. 'Look at our exports: examine the extent of our trade to Germany. Should the Rhine, the Elb, the Weser, the Oder and the whole navigation of Germany be reduced under the power of France, our manufactures and merchandize; our colonies and settlements would feel their loss severely.' The paper's other main answer to the criticism is, as before, that the 'aid sent on this important occasion, differs widely, both in its kind, and its object, from our former connections with the continent', because Britain is not entering as a principal, nor sacrificing her interests and the execution of her natural powers. Further, there is no reason to doubt the rectitude and wisdom of the measures which the Almighty daily blesses with success. 18 The paper ends by casting doubts on its opponent's right to claim the name of tory and suggesting that his motives are jealousy and disappointment.

18. The religious argument comes out strongly in a number of papers at this time, e.g. 175, 25 Nov. 1758. Contrast earlier attitudes above p. 81.
The Honest Grief was followed by A Second Letter from Wiltshire to the Monitor, on the Vindication of his Constitutional Principles, dated 18 March. This affirms its links with the Honest Grief and locates its origins more precisely in a tory club in Calne, and the disillusionment of an old gentleman there with the behaviour of the tories. Again it criticises the Monitor for its panegyrics on Pitt and again it concentrates on the German war. It rejects the Monitor's arguments that the aid now being given is different from that of the past, that a distinction can be made between entering as an auxiliary and as a principal and (a point not recently emphasized by the Monitor) that Britain is bound by honour to fulfil treaties. Again, on all these points and on the arguments from trade recently advanced, it condemns the Monitor even more effectively than its predecessor by quoting the former's own earlier words.

In answer the Monitor reiterates, in another vigorous paper on 12 May, its revived arguments for British intervention in Germany, adding here, in a note of excuse rather than defence, the claims that public faith required the fulfilment of treaties and that any evil in the present measures is due to the difficulties created by past ministers. The paper continues to praise and defend Pitt. It celebrates the successes he has achieved and answers what seems to be a growing swell of criticism, under the surface unanimity and satisfaction, of the mounting cost of the war as well as the extension of German measures. In these papers in answer to the two pamphlets, the Monitor's conversion from its early stand against continental connections and its rejection of the waverings of 1758 are accentuated. However much it may claim that the present continental measures are fundamentally different from those of the past, even if sometimes it seems to excuse rather than

defend, and if it still stresses Pitt's achievements elsewhere, the change is remarkable. Thus spurred by criticism but in tune with the general mood in parliament and the country, the Monitor at last marks and justifies its complete and avowed commitment to Pitt, including, for the first time, the full extent of his continental policy.

Although there is little firm evidence as to its extent, this controversy seems undoubtedly to indicate some split in the tories between the old school, strict in their independence and adherence to ideological stands, and those who were tired of continual opposition and were prepared to follow Pitt. Some of the reasons why the Monitor and Beckford went the way they did can be deduced from the Monitor arguments: victories and flourishing trade and hopes of yet more advantages to come. These influenced the City generally. There is some evidence that the tories were becoming dominant in popular circles in the City and that they were now committed to Pitt on the same grounds as the Monitor. The much more frequent if largely incoherent outpourings of John Gordon to Newcastle in this year often dwell on the growing strength of the 'faction', its changed attitudes towards France, its keenness for the war and its praise of Pitt at the expense of other ministers and past administrations. Two letters refer to the part of weekly papers in all this, one specifically naming the Monitor. Newcastle was impressed enough to note in his 'memoranda for the king' of 20 March.

Accounts from the City.
The hot ones, Mr. Pitt's friends....
That the whole dispute is between the old and the new, administration;
And the old administration cramp Mr. Pitt in his measures, and prevent him from doing or succeeding, as he otherwise would do.

Pitt's popularity in the City went wider than the tories, however, as Watkins noted, and as was witnessed by an address of thanks from twenty merchants of
London for his interest in and measures to protect American trade. 20

There were, however, other reasons more particular to Beckford and
the Monitor for the warmth of their commitment to Pitt's policies, reasons
which the Monitor does not make clear. They were responding to Pitt's
determined wooing of Beckford over the question of a tax on sugar. Such a
new tax was in discussion in the City from late 1758 and was generally
welcomed. Sugar prices were high and it seemed an obvious product to tax
further to take some of the burden of the war off the landed classes. 21 When
Legge opened the budget in early February it seemed likely that the new
fund proposed would be secured by a sugar tax. Now Beckford tentatively
took up the cudgels 'to parry the Blow aimed at the Colonies' and for the first
and only time the Monitor broached the issue. 22 The paper begins with a
lot of general argument in favour of the proposition that taxes

should be raised so as to affect all persons and
things alike, in a due proportion and regard to
ability and value; and with an eye towards the
common interest and liberty which they enjoy under
the laws of England, who have by their fortunes,
industry, and great risk, established a British
Empire in the islands and on the continent of
America.

Then the paper comes to the point. Rums and sugars are already heavily
loaded with taxes. To go further may merely reduce consumption. Further
taxes should fall on all equally, be sufficient to their purpose and not
likely to raise discontent.

20. Gordon to Newcastle, 31 Jan., 20, 26 Mar., 6, 24 Apr., 20 May 1759,
Add. MSS. 32887, ff. 438-9, 32889, ff. 157-60, 243, 388-9, 32890,
ff. 322, 32891, ff. 210-1. The letters of 20 Mar. and 20 May refer
to weekly papers, the latter naming the Monitor. Newcastle's memoranda
for the king, 20 Mar. 1759, Add. MS. 32889, ff. 155-6; Watkins to
Newcastle, 8 Dec. 1758, Add. MS. 32886, f. 223; address from the merchants

ff. 80, 223, 401; Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 349-50.

22. Symmer to Mitchell, 2 Feb. 1759, Add. MS. 6839, ff. 122-3; the
Monitor 185, 3 Feb. 1759.
By the time the proposal came before the house in definite form at the end of February Beckford was 'at the head of the powerful Body of Sugar Planters, Merchants, etc.', in opposition to it. When an appeal from fifty West Indian merchants to Legge failed to secure withdrawal of the measure, Beckford turned to Pitt, who promised his open-minded consideration. Suggestions that the tax should be laid on tobacco instead of sugar raised protests from the Virginia merchants and complaints about the extension of the excise to which, for example, the Honest Grief refers. At Pitt's behest Beckford dropped this idea; the embarrassment it caused is attested in the Monitor's concern to deny that Pitt favoured such an 'unpatriotic' move. Eventually a tax on all dry goods including sugar was proposed in spite of opposition from other interests in the City. Beckford was very reluctant to accept this compromise whereupon Pitt expressed similar reluctance to Legge. In the house on 9 March, when Beckford opposed the tax and suggested others, to be greeted by 'horselaughs', Pitt gave a striking demonstration of his courting of Beckford. He made an extravagant panegyric on Beckford, who, he said, had done more to support government than any minister in England; launched out on his principles, disinterestedness, knowledge of trade, and solidity; and professed he thought him another Sir Josiah Child [whom Beckford had quoted]. 'He looked upon the honour of his acquaintance as one of the glories (though he had but few glories) of his life'. In face of the scepticism of the house he repeated his praise and showed his reluctance to accept the tax on dry goods. This was passed, but even then Beckford did not rest, raising

problems about provisions for the drawback of the duty on re-exported sugars. 24

The Honest Grief and especially the Second Letter from Wiltshire show, and Newcastle confirms, that this was another cause of the split in tory support for Pitt. His 'subservience' to Beckford and to a lesser extent Sir John Philipps, and his courting of the West Indian interest at the expense of what seemed like a fair relief to the landed classes were bitterly disliked. 25 Under such pressures splits incipient over the last year between Beckford and Philipps and other tories were now bursting wide open. Most of the tories supported the bill to increase the salaries of the judges, for example, but Beckford spoke against it, in line with Pitt's opposition which was said to arise out of revenge for the defeat of the habeas corpus bill in the last session. West expected trouble from Beckford, in fact without foundation, over the execution of the tax on places passed the year before. 26 In this division of the tories Pitt took the side of the more extreme and unruly. Not only did this confirm his loss of other tory support - by June, for example, Sir John Glynne was outspokenly against him - but his general reputation was considerably if only temporarily harmed particularly by his attitudes over the sugar tax. 27 More than this, his unjustifiable intrusion into treasury matters when war financing was becoming difficult caused intense strain in relations with his colleagues and his open opposition to Legge.


25. The Honest Grief of a Tory..., p. 38; A Second Letter from Wiltshire..., pp. 8, 31; Newcastle's memoranda for the king, 12 Mar. 1759, Add. MS. 32889, f. 16.


27. Lady Anne Egerton to Bentinck, 13, 23 Mar. 1759, Eg. 1719, ff. 32,
greatly exacerbated the quarrel between them. Pitt's behaviour shows how much he was prepared to risk to secure Beckford and how highly he assessed Beckford's value to him in political support from the West Indian interest, and, through the Monitor which was still Beckford's chief activity there, in the City generally. Strangely, Pitt was not nearly so sympathetic to City representations over the effect on home prices, of the lifting of restrictions on the export of corn and the export was opened. But these representations did not come through Beckford. Beckford was certainly fully converted by Pitt's efforts from the qualms he expressed over continental measures early in the session. In an undated letter almost certainly written soon after the victory at Minden he rejoices in 'so great so glorious an Event, which must convince every Man, of the rectitude of the German system'.

A much lesser issue, but one which is more noted by the Monitor and confirms its closeness to Beckford, shows Beckford representing the interests of tories and lesser merchants in the City, who now seem to be more united in views. In three papers of March to May a strong attack is made on the East India Company for the way it conducts its trade contrary to the interests of the nation and fails to make proper provision for its own defence. The case for opening the Indian trade is argued fully. The Monitor's sudden interest in the company is related in part to a proposal before parliament.

27. (Cont'd) 34; Watkins to Newcastle, 22 Mar. 1759, f. 192; R. Kenyon to Lloyd Kenyon, 25 June 1759, H.M.C., Fourteenth Report, Part IV, p. 496 (see above p.175 ).


30. Beckford to Pitt, [n.d.], Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 111.
for further financial assistance to it to meet the cost of defence, but even more to a motion of Beckford in support of Alderman Blackiston's application for a license to import tea in competition with the company. Sir John Barnard and Philipps spoke for the motion in opposition to the treasury and to Nugent, a tory from Bristol. This was a commercial issue on which popular whigs like Barnard and formerly competing tories like Beckford and Blackiston could easily unite.

The Monitor appears as a spokesman for wider mercantile interests on a more important issue closely associated with the maritime and trade war, an issue on which both it and Beckford felt strongly and which the Monitor played a leading part in developing. This was the question of Dutch carrying of French trade which raised the larger issue of the rights of neutral shipping in wartime. British resentment first began to sound publicly in March 1758 and from August onwards there was a steady stream of news and comments. British privateers began to seize Dutch ships with little regard for neutral rights. The question of how to respond to the torrent of Dutch protests was a difficult one in which Pitt at first supported the commercial interest by opposing any concessions. An open breach seemed only a matter of time. Earlier the Monitor had expressed the hope that the Dutch might realize their true interest in supporting the protestant cause in Europe. When this commercial question arose, however, involving Dutch trade with the


French West Indies in particular, it took up the issue strongly from the beginning in the autumn of 1758. In reply to Dutch insistence on their treaty rights to trade in time of war, the paper maintains that these rights cover only goods which are Dutch property and in any case are conditional on aid being given to Great Britain when requested, in which obligation the Dutch have been most tardy. The Monitor then proceeds to a historical survey to show 'that the Dutch were an ungrateful and deceitful people from the beginning', in trade as well as treaty relations and irreligious and immoral into the bargain. Britain's fatal involvement in 'continental measures' began and has continued largely as a result of Dutch influence and very much to their advantage. Yet they do nothing for their own defence, just waiting to take advantage of opportunities for commerce. They may have become 'a weak and insignificant people ... no longer a power', despised by their allies - but the tone of this attack reveals a sharp commercial jealousy of them.33

The issue was raised by Beckford in the debate on the address in November. Pitt replied tactfully but cautiously about the need to check the abuses of British privateers as well as Dutch breaches of neutrality. Meanwhile the issue was kept to the fore by a steady stream of appeals in prize cases heard by the privy council.34 By the early months of 1759 the situation was acute. On the one hand the considerable public interest aroused was in favour of a strong line against the Dutch. The Monitor gives expression to this in two papers of legal argument at the turn of the year in support of British action and then later, in March and April, in papers which describe the fraudulent practices of Dutch agents in collusion with dishonest

Englishmen and demand resistance to them by whatever means necessary. On the other hand, relations with neutral trading powers other than the Dutch were involved. Because Pitt relied almost entirely for Britain's defence on her naval superiority, this was an issue of some importance. If these neutral powers were to be so offended by the British assertion of the right of search and seizure of enemy goods as to join the French, or even to form a union amongst themselves to protect their trade, the naval situation would be dangerously altered. Further, these nations, especially the Swedes and Russians, were important trading partners of Britain, notably in naval stores and the Dutch held large investments in government funds. Pitt, therefore, had to modify somewhat the strong stand he had taken over neutral trading rights when the issue first arose with the Dutch, at least to the extent of agreeing to the passage of an act of parliament in May, restraining the actions of British privateers. With the coming into effect of this act in June the worst of the crisis with the neutral powers passed. However, the basic cause of the grievances of the Dutch particularly, the assertion of the right of search and seizure, was not removed. Despite the efforts of three Dutch commissioners, sent to England in April, the issue festered on.

Although the Monitor continues to take a strong line on prizes, perhaps out of some realization of the dangers of Dutch hostility it does attempt to persuade them that their true interests lie with Great Britain. Writing as a Dutchman, the author of three papers in January and February argues that, as always, the power of France threatens their liberty and religion. The United Provinces are not strong enough to stand against Britain alone.

35. E.g. GM. XXIX, 1759, pp. 5-8, 144-5; Jenkinson to Grenville, 17, 19 Apr. 1759, Grenville Papers, I, pp. 297, 298; the Monitor 160, 30 Dec. 1758; 181 6 Jan. 1759; 191, 17 Mar. 1759; 194, 7 Apr. 1759.
36. Corbett, II, pp. 5-8; Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 343; GM., XXIX, 1759, pp. 191, 225-6, 238, 240-1, 341.
Instead, they should reach an accommodation and join in a union of all
protestant powers against the ambitions of the French. The Monitor does
not deal directly with the privateers' bill. Its whole concept of limiting
the activities of privateers, however, was not compatible with the strong
line on prizes and therefore not acceptable to the mercantile community as
a whole or to Beckford in particular. At first the latter promised Pitt
to take his line but in the debates, while showing some deference to the need
to placate the neutral powers, he raised objections about the specifications
in tonnage and guns of ships to be licensed and about the admiralty's
power of revocation. His objections all tended to keeping privateering
as free as possible and open to smaller ships. He was answered firmly but
fully and tactfully by Pitt. As a result Beckford lost the support of the
tories which he had had on earlier stages and the bill was passed with only
minor changes.

This issue shows how popular opinion could be an embarrassing pressure
on Pitt. On it he did not sacrifice policy to popularity. Yet he showed
tact and careful reasoning in answering the pressures and he found it wise
to make some gestures to popularity over the prizes appeals, on one occasion
ostentatiously absenting himself in order to be dissociated from any
decision to restore the ship and cargo. Certainly his firmness did not
affect the Monitor's attitude to him. Indeed it declares to take up the
issue despite its close interest in the Dutch question.

38. Beckford to Pitt, [after 24 Mar. 1759], Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19,
f. 115; West's accounts, 30 Apr. 4 May 1759, Hugh Valence-Jones to
Newcastle, 4 May 1759, Add. MS. 32890, ff. 401-2, 486-7, 488-90;
Charles Frederick to Lord George Sackville, 5 May 1759, H.M.C.,Stopford-
Sackville, I, p. 55; Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights
39. Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 354; Pares, Colonial Blockade and
Neutral Rights, p. 106.
At this same time the Monitor takes up vigorously another similar trading complaint against British subjects who assist the French in devious ways to maintain their trade with the Levant, especially in manufactured woollens, to the detriment of Britain. It is to be hoped that parliament will press home its enquiries into this matter, even to the extent of treating such trade as treasonable, and that the people will show their resentment in effective ways. 40 Again, in this paper, the Monitor is acting as a spokesman for commercial interests generally in the City.

In the first half of 1759, then, the Monitor committed itself unequivocally to the praise and defence of Pitt, accompanied by even more frequent references to factious opposition to him, more explicitly than ever identified with the other elements in the administration to which the Monitor is still not reconciled. Indeed by clear implication on two occasions it calls strongly for their removal. Hostility to the 'faction' is evident in the way in which various pieces of propaganda against and criticism of Pitt and any difficulties he faces are attributed to them or their influence. Among other things the 'frenchified' faction is accused of encouraging the Dutch to quarrel with Great Britain and of pushing for an untimely peace. 41 Again these attitudes were shared by the now more united popular opinion in the City, of which the Monitor is more and more clearly a spokesman.

On the major issue of 1759, the invasion threat and the associated question of the use of the militia as a defence, the attitudes of Pitt, the City and the Monitor are again very close, although the Monitor, intent on more controversial matters, does not give much attention to them. In the

40. The Monitor, 189, 3 Mar. 1759; 191, 17 Mar. 1759. A bill 'for the better preventing of the importation of the Woollen Manufactures of France into any of the Ports of the Levant Sea, by or on behalf of any of his Majesty's Subjects' was considered by the House of Commons from Feb. to May 1759 and received the royal assent on 2 June. Commons' Journal, XXVIII, pp. 439, 486, 491, 526, 580, 586, 592, 600, 624.

early part of the year, to Newcastle's despair, Pitt refused at least in appearances to take the threat seriously and to be drawn from his plans for the war. He was resolved to meet the invasion if it did materialize with naval rather than military measures for which he made vigorous preparations and he had no wish to undermine morale by alarmist moves. Part of his reluctance to admit the threat arose out of ambiguities in his attitude to the militia which would have to be embodied if the danger were real and serious. In popular eyes he was the champion of the militia; in reality he was much less committed to it. He feared further riots if it were embodied on a large scale and probably had serious doubts about its military effectiveness. In the middle of the year, however, in face of growing information about French plans and an unfavourable situation in Germany, his attitude to the invasion changed. On 30 May he presented a royal message to the house of commons concerning the invasion threat and the possibility that the militia might have to be embodied. This gave a marvellous opportunity for publicity to those supporters of the militia who felt that full implementation of the act was being deliberately impeded. In the debate on the address in reply the younger Vyner (like his father an inveterate independent) said that another was needed, exhorting the lords lieutenant to do their duty. Cooke of Middlesex took up the idea in a modified form and moved an address asking the king to direct the lords lieutenant to use their utmost diligence to execute the law. This was strongly supported by Pitt, although he defended the lords lieutenant. But still he delayed embodiment, until in the latter part of June the crisis grew more severe and it could no longer be postponed. From

42. Corbett, II, pp. 3-15; Fraser, pp. 209-15.
43. Rigby to Bedford, 30 May 1759, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 362; Parliamentary History, XV, cc. 939-41; Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 356; Western, p. 157.
219.

this time onwards, whether for reasons of politics or military defence, Pitt warmly supported the active use of the militia. The counties which were ready were ordered one by one to mobilize their men. And at the opening of the next session of parliament Pitt was to praise the militia for its contribution to meeting the invasion scare, without which troops would have had to be withdrawn from Germany. His new warmth towards the militia is to be explained by a change of mood in the country, demonstrated most strikingly by the review of the Norfolk militia by the king on 17 July 1759. This enthusiastic mood removed any political reason to fear the results of prolonged embodiment. However explained, Pitt's attitude of contempt for the French threat had a healthy effect on public confidence in marked contrast to the mood of 1757, especially as the summer advanced and nothing happened. Morale was high and money easily raised. Once again Pitt had made deft use of an unpromising situation. Newcastle on the other hand, although he had in fact pressed Pitt for embodiment, was embarrassed, torn between his fear of invasion and his distaste for the militia, bothered by pressure in the City for its embodiment and by gibes at the dilatoriness of the counties in which he had influence and manoeuvres there to outwit him. 44

The Monitor closely reflects this development of attitude. Not until June, after the king's message to parliament, does it make any but the briefest reference to the invasion threat and even later it does not follow the fluctuations of the scare at all closely. In June, in line with Pitt's reaction, it belittles and ridicules the threat, reducing it to an 'artful fright' deliberately aroused to curb Pitt and enervate the national strength. Having belittled the threat in June it is forced to admit it in July and indeed represents it as a great popish confederacy. Still it urges confidence

44. Fraser, pp. 213-8; Western, pp. 156-60.
and reliance on the true strength of Britain, the navy and militia. Its main concern in pacifying the alarm is to prevent the diversion of the war effort from what it regards as the proper lines. In this, of course, it is directly supporting Pitt against others in the administration who wanted more conventional preparation for defence against invasion. Later, the French correspondence captured after the battle of Minden is said to prove that the French invasion plans were a mere diversion to detract Britain from sending help to her allies in Germany. In September there are rejoicings that the invasion threat, again ridiculed, has passed, while in October, right at one of the points of tension, the reduced conditions and strained finances of France are gloated over.\footnote{The Monitor 182, 13 Jan. 1759; 202, 2 June 1759; 207, 7 July 1759; 208, 14 July 1759; 209, 21 July 1759; 214, 25 Aug. 1759; 217, 15 Sep. 1759; 222, 20 Oct. 1759.}

Meanwhile, in contrast to earlier silences, it makes the most use it can of the militia issue. In June it argues that if there is any truth in the threat then the militia is the answer and the Militia Act should be fully executed. An attack on the opposition to the act is driven home in detail. When, in July, the reality of the invasion threat is admitted the same remedy is urged and the same enquiries into the source of opposition to the act are undertaken. The militia is praised in general and as an effective answer to invasion, both at the time and retrospectively. In parallel to Pitt's (and Beckford's) comments at the opening of the next session it is remarked that the militia has made it possible to give help to the Germans, rather than seek it from them. The Monitor's increased warmth on the militia issue reflects the national mood and the propaganda use which could be made of the militia once the mood was clear. Pitt and his supporters could again parade as its champions. Its determination to drive home the embarrassment of Newcastle without care for the consequences
is clear. His fears about pressure on this point were not groundless. 46 Beckford's attitudes, too, were very similar. He went into camp with the Wiltshire militia and from there in October wrote to Pitt in detail about militia affairs, including, ominously, 'great murmurings and heartburnings' among the men about constant employment and hard service. Nevertheless, they were ready, he said, to meet the enemy if need be. But he dismisses the threat of invasion especially in light of the exhausted condition of France. At the opening of the next parliamentary session he drew attention to the contribution of the militia, which, in contrast to the year 1756, and despite the shortcomings of some lords lieutenant, made it possible to 'laugh at invasion' without calling on foreign troops. 47 The City generally and pretty consistently through the latter part of the year shared these views, which Gordon particularly associates with the 'faction', mocking the threat as a joke and a trick to divert Britain from her plans. Birch reported to Royston that the City's failure to address the king over Boscawen's victory off Cape Lagos 'is ascribed to an unwillness to touch upon the topic of an invasion, which can scarce be avoided on such an occasion, the rulers of the corporation still affecting to talk with contempt of all apprehensions of danger from attempts of that kind'. 48 Obviously the Monitor was expressing and in all likelihood helping to form the views which, although particularly associated with the group from which it sprang, were dominant in the City now. Here again there is no doubt that it was an instrument in the alliance of the City and Pitt.

46. 202; 204, 16 June 1759; 207; 209; 215, 1 Sep. 1759; 226, 17 Nov. 1759. For Beckford's attitude, see below.

47. Beckford to Pitt, 1, 11 Oct. 1759; Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, ff. 53-4, 55; West's account, 13 Nov. 1759, Add. MS. 32898, f. 223.

Another episode in the Monitor's comment on the war demonstrates even more clearly its function and value as an instrument of Pitt. It takes very little notice of the very important victory of Frederick at Minden although the battle does appear in lists of victories.\footnote{The Monitor 214, 25 Aug. 1759; 226, 17 Nov. 1759; 288, 1 Dec. 1759.} It does, however, react heatedly to the subsequent controversy over the behaviour of Lord George Sackville and the British cavalry which marred the success for Britain. Criticized by Ferdinand for his failure to obey orders, Sackville asked for and was granted permission to resign his command and return home, 'Ere he could arrive, both the court and the nation were prepared to receive him with little less abhorrence and abuse than had led the way to the fate of Admiral Byng'. He was stripped of his rank and all his offices yet his request for a court martial was at first denied. He then turned to appeal to the public but did his cause little good. Only at Leicester House was he received with any countenance.\footnote{Hardwicke to Charles Yorke, 16 Aug. 1759, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 235, also pp. 139-40; Jenkinson to Grenville, 22 Sep. 1759, Grenville Papers, I, p. 327; Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 323-4, 367 (the quotation); GM., XXIX, 1759, pp. 416-7.}

At first the Monitor reacts heatedly to this controversy, reflecting bitterly on Sackville's conduct and demanding an enquiry. According to Gordon, at this time the Tories in the City were seeking to instigate an address demanding a court martial. Yet within three weeks the Monitor had significantly moderated its attitude. This second lengthy discussion of the affair, in the form of a dialogue between William and George on Lord George's Address to the Nation, is fundamentally critical but puzzled, strong but not bitter in tone, in no sense seeking to raise a Byng-like clamour. It is perhaps intended to represent the attitudes of the king and Pitt who were torn two ways. Neither had any wish to offend European allies by showing leniency as Sackville's reception had shown, and Pitt
was not likely to be influenced in this direction by his now almost completely broken ties with Leicester House. Yet nor had they any wish to see affairs disturbed by another Byng episode, as the initial refusal of the court martial would indicate. Certainly the Monitor seems to have moderated its attitude out of deference to Pitt, with some effect in the City. Although moves there were not certainly dropped they did not come to anything. This, however, cannot be attributed entirely to the Monitor and those it spoke for, for Bute too took a hand to prevent any action hostile to Sackville. 51

In all, over 1759 the Monitor shows itself more clearly not to be interested in the progress and events of the war as such nor even in overall policy, but rather in points of controversy of concern to the interests it represents and to Pitt. Its aim is to turn what it can to his advantage, defending him and the conduct of the war. As has already been seen, little attention is paid to the details of the invasion threat and its rebuff. Nor is the war in Germany followed at all closely. Even more remarkably, although it is noted in lists of victories and acquisitions, the Monitor shows no great interest in the West Indian expedition which Beckford had advocated, because, as yet, there was no great controversy over policy in the West Indies. 52 Even the greatest event of the year, the fall of Quebec, news of which was received in London when public opinion was in deep gloom and induced an extreme reaction especially in the City, receives relatively little notice. The paper does reflect the triumphant rejoicing. Yet almost immediately in the same issue it turns to rebuttal of 'factious' derogation of the victory and Wolfe's achievement. 53


52. The Monitor 196, 21 Apr. 1759; 208, 14 July 1759; 210, 28 July 1759; 223, 27 Oct. 1759; 226, 17 Nov. 1759.

53. 223.
The Monitor's major preoccupation later in the year is with a growing groundswell of criticism of the war, of the continental involvement and specifically the Prussian alliance, and of the cost of the war. Some of this criticism was coming from opponents in national politics, supporters of former governments or adherents of Leicester House now rather than tories; Gordon provides voluminous if confused evidence that it was to be heard also in the City, and even among those who had been advocates of the war. The Monitor was at the heart of Pitt's defence as spokesman for his continental policy and particularly the Prussian alliance and again had to answer charges of change of principles. A bout of abusive and detailed controversy was occasioned in June and July by two pamphlets. A Letter from the Dutchess of M[arlborough]gh in the Shades to the Great Man and A Defence of the Letter from the Duchess of M[arlborough]h...in answer to the Monitor's two Papers, of the 23rd and 30th of June, 1759. The first is highly critical of Pitt for his changes of front on continental policy, especially after his latest return to office when, on the strength of his popularity, he could have rejected old measures. This is the main complaint of the pamphlet and for Pitt's behaviour it rejects all excuses. Instead of refusing continental involvement he has mishandled the whole European situation very much to the detriment of British interests and aligned Britain with a country whose cause is condemned by all Europe and which is now in such a weak condition as to endanger British gains. All this has diverted British efforts against France from their true course. There is no use in praising the unanimity in support of Pitt's measures if this is the result.

To these criticisms of policy the pamphlet adds personal considerations,

accusing Pitt of nepotism, questioning his oratorical skill and doubting whether there is any solid basis in what he has done for his popularity. In reply the Monitor springs to defence of the Prussian alliance on grounds already well established, of religion, kinship and interest. Here is the friend whom British patriots have been recommending for years, a prince fighting, not for conquest but existence, for protestantism, for the rights and privileges of neighbouring states and to prevent a French monopoly of trade in Germany, hitherto supplied by Britain. In such an alliance there is no danger to British interests; nor are undue demands made. Quite the contrary. Britain is able the more gloriously to continue her own efforts in her own spheres of interest as events have shown. Prussia asks in return not help in making conquests nor the sacrifice of colonial conquests, but only assistance so that she is not crushed by a common enemy. Nor are there grounds for arguing that the intervention of Britain has brought greater difficulties on her allies (by provoking the ban of the Empire on them and precipitating the Franco-Austrian alliance) or more enemies for herself. The coolness of Sweden and Russia, the perfidy of Austria, the attitude of Holland and Spain do not spring from the Prussian alliance or the policies of the present ministry. The plea to resume the old alliance with Austria is rejected for considerations of the balance of power, the liberties of Europe and the protestant religion. No lasting peace through the reduction of France could be won that way. At the end of the argument there is a nostalgic glance back to former attitudes. 'I confess it would be better for Britain were there no necessity for our interfering between the Belligerents on the continent'. At present, however,

55. The following arguments are all contained in the Monitor 205, 23 June 1759; 206, 30 June 1759 (the quotation).

56. This commercial motive for intervention in Germany on Prussia's side appears also in 212, 11 Aug. 1759; 217, 15 Sep. 1759.
there is no alternative to the judicious intervention adopted by the present ministry. All criticism of Pitt is rejected. Certainly this is no 'German interest' that he has adopted.

The Defence of the Letter answers the Monitor by criticizing in more detail the Prussian alliance and its adverse effects on the whole European situation. It has put Britain on the wrong side morally, driven Austria into the arms of France and given France an excuse to intervene in Germany. Yet Prussia has shown no real enmity to France but has concentrated on her other enemies. Popular support for the alliance is no reason for it; it is given only because the benefits have been misrepresented and because of misguided faith in Pitt. The writer rejects all the usual justifications on the grounds of religion and the balance of power for intervention in Germany. The argument of obligation to Hanover is also countered. Hanover could have had the protection of the Empire when attacked merely for her British connection. In all it is Britain not France that is being weakened. Only those who are 'Prussia-mad' cannot see the force of these arguments. Both the papers openly acknowledge Pitt's popularity but question the basis for it and the use he has made of it and criticize the Monitor's 'excessive' praise. Neither openly claims any party label, but the high praise of the Monitor's former stands and equally bitter criticisms of its misuse of its talents now in the Defence and the traditional arguments against continental involvement suggest that here is more evidence of bitter division in tory ranks.

The Monitor keeps up the controversy. In a later and yet more detailed development of it in August and September, two further main points of the opposition are rebutted: that Prussia is by inclination a friend of France and is fighting against her only by accident, and that the queen of Hungary is to be pitied because she was deserted by Britain rather than blamed.
for reaching an accommodation with France. The taking up of arms by Prussia is defended. The alliance with her has prevented the fatal consequences of a French alliance with popish and arbitrary powers in the Empire and diverted the French from invasion attempts on Britain. In the September paper, the issue of the Austrian and Prussian alliances is raised in a dialogue between an honest tradesman and a political dragon, 'a secret emissary of those, who, neither capable, nor willing to do anything themselves, envy calumniate and endeavour to blast every advantage gained over the enemies of our country.' Needless to say the latter presents the arguments against the Prussian alliance.

The alliance with the King of Prussia has drawn Britain into a war on the continent, destructive to her true and national interest. It obliges us to support him in his desperate circumstances; and prevents us from reaping the benefit of our maritime superiority, by the concessions, which his interest will require us to make in his favour.

It brings more joy to Prussia than to Britain from British victories. The tradesman answers along lines already well-established. The Prussian alliance provides a diversion of French energies such as Austria would never have done. Austria, moreover, would never have concerned herself with questions of trade, the main point at issue between France and Britain. 'In a word, to this alliance, we ought to place the rapidity of our arms by sea and land.' 'No expense, therefore, can equal the advantages of this Prussian alliance. For, though it must be sufficient to save Prussia, without it Britain cannot be safe', nor hope to achieve her aim of restricting France's centuries-old ambitions. 58

The Monitor's detailed rebuttal and continuing references to the issues, as well as emphasizing the extent of its conversion, show how important it thinks this controversy to be. These were no mere murmurs of discontent but deep-

58. The Monitor 211, 4 Aug. 1759; 217, 15 Sep. 1759.
seated dissatisfaction affecting the tories as well as others. Indeed, as this last exchange particularly makes clear, the Prussian alliance was a crucial issue of war strategy. Because of the alliance, the extreme difficulties of the king of Prussia threatened the whole English achievement elsewhere. To some, taking the short-term view, this seemed good reason to abandon him, to reject again all costly European entanglements. Yet for Pitt, who looked for more than mere preservation of what had already been won, continental involvement had become one of the pillars of his war plans, the way to keep French energy diverted so that victory elsewhere could be complete. He assured Ferdinand 'he shall have what reinforcements, what ammunition he pleases - tell him I will stand or fall with him', and announced to the new session of parliament in November that 'he had unlearned his juvenile errors and thought no longer that England could do all by itself.' And as the infamous 'simile' pointed out, the tories had at first followed him in this strategic reasoning. Some now were drawing back in alarm, but the Monitor and, on the whole, the City, dazzled by victories and led on by hopes of commercial gain, held firm. The maintenance or otherwise of the Prussian alliance was thus truly the crucial issue of the war and closely bound up with how far it should be pressed.

In other ways, too, the Monitor's main preoccupations were the political interests of Pitt. His personal merits, the great successes he has won and the support of the people for him are emphatically stated in answer to the personal criticism which accompanied attacks on his policies. He has merited 'the applause of the public, and the esteem of his sovereign'. The eulogies come to a fitting climax in the paper of 1 December, inspired

59. Pitt's views are well reflected in a conversation which Newcastle reported to Hardwicke, 19 Sep. 1759, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 58. For the quotations see Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 381, 390.
both by the enumeration of triumphs in the king's speech at the opening of parliament on 13 November and by the day of thanksgiving observed on 29 November. The eulogies and the support of the people are the grounds for rejection of all criticism of him; they wipe away the effects of malicious calumny and party spirit. Indeed, in face of merit like this, the claim even to neutrality in politics, far from being praiseworthy, is a mere mask for conspiracy against the measures of a wise and honest administration. Furthermore, the people 'are so thoroughly convinced of [his merit], that all the powers of darkness will never be able to deprive him of their confidence and applause'.

With the eulogies goes denunciation, still, of the efforts of faction against him which he has constantly to endure. Yet again the Monitor traces these efforts and from its short history discovers 'what a faithful and upright minister has to encounter with amongst the men, that have been obliged to make way for his merit', difficulties which may even prevent his properly executing his policies. This is the desperate fear that lies behind the ever-more-bitter accusations of faction which run monotonously through every subject the Monitor now takes up: the fear that the proper continuation of the war policy which has proved itself in victories so valuable to the interests the Monitor represents will be made impossible and its benefits lost. Sometimes the complaints of faction seem clearly to be the same old tory complaints against Newcastle and the 'other elements' in the administration. Sometimes, however, they are overlain with hints of bitterness against opponents who were formerly allies in the tory ranks, those 'sycophants of a junto, who not content without the whole management of affairs, lay it down as a maxim to oppose the minister, right or wrong'. In either case, the fear is the same: that war policy will

60. The Monitor 206, 30 June 1759; 208, 14 July 1759 (the quotations); 211, 4 Aug. 1759; 212, 11 Aug. 1759; 225, 10 Nov. 1759; 226, 17 Nov. 1759; 228, 1 Dec. 1759.
61. Especially 221, 13 Oct. 1759 (the quotation); 228.
62. E.g. 217, 15 Sep. 1759; 221; 228 (the quotation).
be diverted.

The warmth of the Monitor's response to Pitt is partly to be explained by Pitt's courting of the interests it represents, his popular stands and general tactfulness in handling popular support, and partly by these considerations of successful war and opening prospects for commerce. These had also won over City popular opinion generally, had made the Monitor its spokesman and had at last enabled Beckford to bring his influence in the City through the Monitor openly into line with his own well-established commitment to Pitt. This could now be expressed without the equivocations which doubts there had earlier made necessary, and Beckford could thus make the Monitor one means of harnessing City opinion to Pitt's political chariot.

Still, however, Beckford was not Pitt's only link with the City. The latter's relations with Sir James Hodges were developing. The City addresses on the prince of Wales's majority were concerted by Hodges and Pitt to be acceptable to the latter. Pitt did not take Hodges' advice on the export of corn as readily as he did Beckford's on the sugar tax but he did act on his suggestion that some attention should be paid to the lord mayor, Sir Richard Glyn, who duly received a baronetcy during the year. The attention was well worth it, as Glyn proved a very popular lord mayor. 63 Yet there is also some evidence that Beckford was more active personally in Pitt's interest than he had been previously. He took a leading part in opening of a subscription list in the City to encourage enlistment in the army, a move which originated with the Half-Moon club as a gesture of support for Pitt, and his subscription of £105, one of the largest, attracted

63. On the export of corn see above p. 212; Sir J. Hodges to Pitt, 2, 14 June, 12, 30 Oct. 1759, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/40, ff. 139, 137, 135, 134; Gordon to Newcastle, 19 Aug. 1759, Newcastle's memoranda for the king, 19 Aug., 5 Sop. 1759, Add. MSS. 32894, ff. 268, 296, 32895, f. 179; resolution of thanks to Sir Richard Glynn, 4 Dec. 1759, Common Council Journal, 62, f. 56.
In any case there is no doubt that the Monitor was valuable to Pitt as a major propaganda voice in his favour. His political position was still highly unusual. He had the support of the king now as a result of his open avowal of continental policies, but by the end of 1758 he had lost that of Leicester House and during 1759 the breach was widened, among other things by the Sackville affair. He was now more than ever at odds with Legge and there were many tensions, too, with Newcastle and Hardwicke. Temple and Grenville were still allies but otherwise his position rested as much as ever on his popularity. His continued efforts to secure it show that he valued it, and especially in the City, even at the cost of other support. Public knowledge of tensions with his colleagues may indeed have enhanced his popularity by accentuating his independence from those other 'factious' elements that the Monitor and others hated. The political strength that popularity, now backed by success in war, gave to Pitt is illustrated by the squabble over Lord Temple's garter, from August to November 1759. Temple was determined to have the vacant garter, Pitt to obtain it for him as a mark of recognition of his own services and his standing in the administration, and the king, still smarting under the insult of 1757 over Byng, equally determined to refuse. Here Pitt lost the king's support. Not until Temple threatened to resign and Pitt seemed likely to go with him did the king give in. Yet throughout Newcastle and Hardwicke supported Pitt's claim as strongly as they dared and dreaded any thought of his resignation, which they considered a real possibility. Pitt's presence was considered essential to carry the people, whether in a continuation of the war or the making of an acceptable peace.


65. E.g. Hodges to Pitt, 14 June 1759, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/40, f. 137, cited above p. 139 fn. 21.
Newcastle was determined not to give Pitt an opportunity to break with them, 'apprehending the power of his popularity'. So Pitt had to be placated.

Yet on this very question of making an acceptable peace, public opinion as voiced by the Monitor, for example, could be an influence, still even a pressure, on Pitt as well as a support to him. The question of peace making had been in the air from late 1758 and first arose seriously from the middle of 1759 to April 1760. Despite its primary concern with continental policy, the Monitor gives this new issue increasing attention in 1759 and becomes preoccupied with it in 1760. From December 1759 to May 1760 it is its only foreign policy interest.

Frederick had been for some time advocating an early peace. Hardwicke and Newcastle, alarmed at the prospects of financial difficulties and political opposition to a campaign based on a struggle to save Hanover, also favoured peace at least from the time of the fall of Louisbourg in 1758. France's colonial losses, the increasing hopelessness of the invasion attempt and especially the desperate state of her finances inclined her chief minister, Choiseul, towards a separate peace with Britain, brought about by Spanish mediation. Spain's interest was quickened by the ambitions of her new king, Charles III, to play a role in Europe and by the implications of a major change in the balance of power in America as a result of the fall of Quebec, fears adeptly played on by France. Approaches to Britain, were, however, at first rebuffed by Pitt who wanted to make the most of French difficulties, although he acted with some caution when he realised the Spanish fears and the potential threat they posed. Offers of Danish mediation were likewise refused. After the battle of Minden in August 1759, however, Pitt first began to think seriously that an early peace might be desirable, especially as Frederick's situation continued critical. Means were therefore

found to counter these French and Spanish pressures towards a separate peace. Taking up an idea originally suggested by Frederick in one of his bouts of despair and at first discouraged by Pitt, the British proposed a joint declaration with Prussia in favour of a general peace congress to be made at the end of the campaign, when the long-awaited news of the fall of Quebec was likely to have been received. This declaration was formally made on 25 November to the representatives of the belligerent powers at the Hague. It initiated long months of fluctuating and eventually fruitless negotiating. The refusal of Austria to contemplate negotiations before Prussia was finally crushed made a general congress impossible. Choiseul continued his efforts to initiate separate negotiations with Britain, but Britain, still insisting on the formal inclusion of Prussia, would not give him sufficient loophole to desert his Austrian ally. Separate discussions begun at the Hague in January between British and French ministers came to nothing. When at last the answers to the joint declaration were given in early April they were, as expected, tantamount to a refusal of a general congress. By May all negotiations were, for the time being, over. 67

It was at Pitt's insistence that the demand for the formal inclusion of Prussia was adhered to and the chance of negotiations lost. Yet some major questions arise about Pitt's attitude. Despite his ready refusal of Spanish mediation, there is evidence to suggest that in the autumn of 1759 he was not ill-disposed to the idea of a peace, at least when the conquest of Quebec was achieved. True, in June he had promised Frederick that 'no peace of Utrecht will again stain the annals of England.' But this did not bind him to insist on the participation of Prussia at all stages. His despairing conversation with Lady Yarmouth in September, in face of the deteriorating German situation, would suggest that he had hoped soon to be able to negotiate a peace from strength, based on completed conquests in America.

67. Corbett, II, pp. 72-7; Yorke, Handwicke, III, pp. 142-6; Fraser, pp.186-8, 255-8.
the West Indies and Africa. Certainly Newcastle was convinced in October that he 'seemed really desirous of peace this winter and upon reasonable terms'. He had carefully avoided any commitment to retain Louisbourg and was not talking of insisting on Quebec. Hardwicke, too, a more sober judge, thought his ideas quite reasonable and far from the extremes of popular opinion which was insisting on holding everything and reducing France to nothing. They were more moderate, too, than the king's terms. He was against peace at this time because there was no hope of territorial gains for Hanover and therefore stood out for high terms in America. A lengthy reference was made to the hope for peace in the king's speech, apparently on Pitt's initiative and certainly with his approval. In the debate on the address he spoke cautiously about the prospects but Walpole at least was convinced of the sincerity of his interest. Certainly at first he worked actively for peace and as late as February Newcastle thought that he seemed earnest for it. 68

Yet Pitt took the stand that made negotiations impossible and by April 1760 was making adamant declarations against peace. 69 Now, for the first time it seems that he considered that an eventual settlement based on a fundamental change in North America, perhaps the retention of all Canada, might be practicable. This would of course require another campaign. The increasing difficulties in the way of peace at the time, together with various pieces of intelligence suggesting that France regarded Canada as of little value, 68 Pitt to Mitchell, 12 June 1759 (first quotation), Newcastle to Pitt, 3 Nov. 1759, Correspondence of ...Chatham, I, pp. 411, 448; memoranda, 12 Oct. 1759, West's account, 13 Nov. 1759, Newcastle to Kinnoull, 15 Feb. 1760, Add. MSS. 32897, ff. 32-3, 32890, f. 223, 32902, f. 194; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Sep., 31 Oct. 1759 (second quotation), Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 Oct. 1759, 5 Jan. 1760, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, pp. 58, 242, 239, 242-3; Symmer to Mitchell, 13 Nov. 1759, Add. MS. 6839, ff. 150-1; Parliamentary History, XV, c. 949; Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 390-1; Fraser, pp. 231-7. On Pitt and Louisbourg, see above p. 201.

may have contributed to his changed attitude. Probably more decisive was the pressure of public opinion, as it became clear that any suggestion of restoring North American conquests would compromise his valued popularity. Earlier Pitt had as usual made preparations to avoid this by representing a peace as essential to the king of Prussia and a response to his needs. Now, in conjunction with his own changing ideas, he probably saw this as hardly likely to be an effective excuse. Certainly in April, by which time there was a clear divergence between Newcastle and Pitt on the question of further negotiations and Pitt was vehemently insisting on the continuation of the war, Hardwicke explained his change of attitude in this way.

Your Grace says that you begin to be of my opinion about Mr Pitt's disposition as to peace. I never said that he might not wish it, but I have said and do think, that he hardly knows how to set about it. He sees that in order to obtain peace, so much of our acquisitions must be given up; and the populace, who have been blown up to such an extravagant degree, and of whom he is unwilling to quit his hold, will be so much disappointed, that he is ready to start at the approaches to it.

The Monitor certainly shows how strong and adamant popular pressures were and from those very elements of public opinion on which Pitt especially relied. Its attitude is clear and consistent. From the beginning it has regarded the war as a fight to the finish to reduce the power of France which no ambiguous patched-up peace should interrupt. As early as April 1758 it argues that any peace must be made on the principle of uti possidetis. As the issue comes more to the fore the Monitor's hostility is increasingly clear. Suggestions of peace are attributed to 'faction' and a firm stand is taken against an 'untimely' peace, made before the objects of the war are fully achieved and while Britain is still able to press on vigorously with conquests. No conquests should be given up. When, in the middle of

70 Fraser, pp. 246-8.
71 Ibid., pp. 229-30.
72 Hardwicke to Newcastle, 10 Apr. 1760, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 245.
1759, the Monitor becomes the spokesman for the Prussian alliance, to these demands is added no abandonment of Prussia.\textsuperscript{73}

From December 1759 to May 1760 the question of peace is intensively discussed. Although the joint declaration of Great Britain and Prussia is published in full and warmly praised, various lines of argument are developed and elaborated to urge caution in the pursuit of peace. Over and over again the dangerous ambitions and perfidy of France are emphasized and the need to reduce her power completely is increasingly stressed. France is in such a condition that she must soon submit to a peace that will restrain her; the chances of this must not be marred by premature moves. With these emphases goes renewed insistence on the justness of the war Britain is fighting. It is a war begun in self-defence, fought to secure a lasting peace and blessed by providence with great success. Whatever the blessing of peace, Britain should have no qualms about continuing to fight until a just and lasting peace can be won. Indeed to do otherwise would be to flout providence. Increasingly, however, commercial motives are made obvious. 'Our dispute is about the extent of trade: whether the trading genius of Britain or of France shall prevail.' The single question is whether it is more politic to have a rich or a poor enemy. Pitt is praised for pursuing the war in such a way as to win back by trade the treasure sent out, thus maintaining the war in Germany out of the profits of captured trade.\textsuperscript{74}

The discussion of the question of peace is chiefly interesting for the developing debate over specific terms, especially which colonial

\textsuperscript{73. The Monitor 145, 29 Apr. 1758; 175, 25 Nov. 1758; 182, 13 Jan. 1759; 196, 21 Apr. 1759; 202, 2 June 1759; 206, 30 June 1759.}

\textsuperscript{74. 230, 15 Dec. 1759; 214, 25 Aug. 1759; 217, 15 Sep. 1759; 218, 22 Sep. 1759; 220, 6 Oct. 1759; 222, 20 Oct. 1759; 224, 3 Nov. 1759; 225, 10 Nov. 1759; 226, 17 Nov. 1759; 227, 24 Nov. 1759; 232, 29 Dec. 1759; 233, 5 Jan. 1760; 237, 2 Feb. 1760. Fear of an unsatisfactory peace comes through the praise of Pitt occasioned by the celebration of victories in the king's speech at the opening of parliament, 228, 1 Dec. 1959; the quotation is from 278.}
conquests, if any, to relinquish. The paper is much less interested in European terms except in so far as they affect French power. As the months pass the Monitor's ambitions grow, especially in connection with America. At first, in August 1759, its demands are in tune with the original one that the French colonies and commercial and religious activity be reduced to their narrow pristine limits. By October, still before the news of the conquest of Quebec, she is to be excluded entirely from the American fisheries and if possible from the fish and fur trades, too. At the end of December, well in advance of Pitt's thinking, the possibility is raised for the first of a total exclusion of the French from Canada. At this time it is granted that the other conquests made, Guadeloupe, Senegal, Goree, are not as important as those in North America. They should not be given up easily but the suggestion is that in certain conditions they might be relinquished. By February, however, in response to the beginnings of the great Canada versus Guadeloupe debate, any distinction between 'necessary' and 'unnecessary' conquests is rejected. The criterion should not be primarily the advantage or necessity to Great Britain but the weakening of France. On this basis a detailed argument is put forward for the retention of the French sugar islands and indeed for the further conquest of Martinique. In this, the Monitor is in tune with (and probably following) the first answer to Douglas's A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men, which initiated the public debate over peace terms and itself was in line with the Monitor's attitudes of December, treating all conquests except those in North America as negotiable. The Monitor's first reaction

75. 232; 233; 246, 5 Apr. 1750.
76. 16, 22 Nov. 1755; 214, 25 Aug. 1759; 220, 6 Oct. 1759; 232, 29 Dec. 1759.
77. 233, 5 Jan. 1760; 237, 2 Feb. 1760 (the major of the two papers).
to the growing debate, out of step with the views to be adopted by most West Indian interests, emphasizes its greed for conquests and commercial gain. Arguments that the European powers would not tolerate such gains to Britain are countered, first, by the argument that the law of nations and of arms allows them and then by the contention that Spain and Portugal can no more be affected by British gains in North America than she is by their privileges in the south. It might even appear to the advantage of Europe that the vast and rich continent of North America be under the domination of Great Britain 'which is an island, and whose interest forbids her making any conquest on the Continent', than of France whose ambitions have troubled Europe for more than a century. France herself is in no condition to object to such terms. The argument that the King of Prussia will have to be saved by the sacrifice of some British conquests begs the question.

When, at last, the answer of the powers to the Anglo-Prussian declaration was made public in April the Monitor treats it as a mere cover for their determination to carry on the war. As the sincere offer of Great Britain and Prussia has been frustrated there is clearly nothing to be done but to pursue the struggle with all vigour until France and her allies are forced to accept terms which will prevent future disturbances. The paper ends this stage of its discussion of the possibility of peace with a general essay urging the importance of loyalty and unanimity in peace negotiations as much as in war.

78. A Letter addressed to two great men on the prospect of Peace; and on the Terms necessary to be insisted upon in the Negotiation, London, 1760; An Answer to the Letter to two great Men, containing remarks and observations on that piece..., London, 1760 (noted in LM. XXIX, 1760, p. 56, monthly catalogue of books for January); W. L. Grant, 'Canada versus Guadeloupe, an Episode of the Seven Years' War', American Historical Review, XVII, 4, July 1912, pp. 735-6, 742.


80. 249, 26 Apr. 1760; 251, 10 May 1760.
If the Monitor is following rather than leading Pitt in its insistence in these last papers on the interconnection of the colonial and continental wars, as it followed him in commitment to the latter, in its emphatic and consistent demands for a strong no-compromise peace it takes the lead. From the beginning it took this stand; as time passes and British successes grow, its appetite increases indiscriminately. In this it is once again reflecting an important section of City opinion - although not that of the 'monied' interest and what Gordon calls the well-intentioned sort, the zealous well-wishers to government. There is plenty of evidence that they were increasingly concerned about the strain of the war on British resources and felt that the successes already won were sufficient to negotiate a good peace. Their views were reflected in the way that rumours about the progress or otherwise of negotiations affected stock prices. But Gordon also reiterates that the 'faction', that is popular opinion now led by the tories, as well as wider mercantile opinion, wanted a continuation of the war from which it was benefitting. Their views were expressed by Beckford at the opening of parliament in November 1759.

Mr Beckford made a very long speech...that France was so low that we might have what peace we pleased, that the moneyed men were for any peace but he hoped as we had sufficient Resources for ten years war We should have an Able Minister procure such a peace as should last to future generations.

Pitt, in reply, while expressing the wish for peace already noted, and checking his criticism of the monied interest by pointing out its importance to public credit, gave some cautious support to Beckford. He stressed the need to be prepared to carry on the war in its totality and to back the search for peace with success in arms. Such views were unlikely to


82. West's account, 13 Nov. 1759,Gordon to Newcastle, 4, 28 Nov. 1759, Add.
be popular among the landed classes generally, including the country tories, but they certainly were dominant in that section of public opinion to which Pitt, through Beckford and others, had particularly committed himself. They were, therefore, a factor which could not be ignored in any negotiations.

As yet, however, although there was much public discussion of the possibility of peace, controversy over possible terms was only beginning and Pitt's attitude was not yet in issue. Still the question most likely to be embarrassing to him was the continental war. At the beginning of the parliamentary session he made clearer than ever his open commitment to it, his emphasis in reply to Beckford on the totality of the war being designed to stress its importance. He spoke of the need to reinforce Ferdinand's army and in January, April-May and July further troops were duly sent. Nevertheless this was still an uncomfortable issue. The tory country gentlemen were divided in their attitude but on the whole opposed. Pitt wrote somewhat hesitantly and apologetically to Temple over the July reinforcements, and especially earlier while parliament was still sitting, took his usual care to disguise his initiatives. As in previous years, his tactics included taking up popular issues which conveniently arose, to the annoyance of Newcastle and the king who for once saw through his motives.

Although the Monitor has little to say in defence of the continental war from November 1759 to mid-1760, it does give some support to Pitt on these questions.

One of them was a bill concerning the enforcement of property qualifications of members of parliament. This, a measure of the tory country

82. (Cont'd) MSS. 32898, ff. 94, 223, 32899, f. 167; Symmer to Mitchell, 13 Nov. 1759, Add. MS. 6939, ff. 150-1.
83. West's account, 13 Nov. 1759, Add. MS. 32898, ff. 223-4; Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 390, 400; Corbett, II, pp. 78-85; Marshall, p. 319.
84. Western, p. 168 (on the tories); Lord Talbot to Dodington, 25 Aug., 1 Sep. 1760, H.M.C., Various Collections, VI, pp. 45, 47; Pitt to Temple, 22 July 1760, Grenville Papers, I, p. 347; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15, 30 Mar. 1760, Newcastle to Devonshire.

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gentlemen in the tradition of place and pension bills, was introduced in February by Sir John Philipps and Beckford, after they had asked Pitt for assurances that the administration would not oppose the measure 'in consideration of the assistance, which they had given to the king's measures'. Pitt declared his support for the measure but left the government line to Newcastle. Neither really wished to disrupt the administration over the issue. Newcastle disliked the bill especially because of the difficulties it would cause in the approaching general election, but saw to it that a modified version of it was eventually passed, despite opposition from his more hot-headed younger supporters. As a result of their pressure the provisions of the bill regarding the taking of an oath by members and seeking to ensure that the qualification was permanent were watered down. Pitt made as much capital as he could out of the bill and its difficulties. He objected to the changes and took the line he found convenient on other occasions, that he could do nothing in face of Newcastle's control of the house. In the final debate on 21 April he represented the measure as a small return to those who had given fifteen millions a year for the war. In the house of lords Temple, who had taken a close interest in the commons debates, 'supported it insolently, threatening disunion if it were not allowed to pass', which Hardwicke complained that he 'winked at many things for the sake of union'. Despite these hints of acrimony, when the bill eventually became law on 22 May Newcastle was probably right in

84. (Cont'd) 8 Apr. 1760, Barrington to Newcastle, 18 Apr. 1760, memoranda for the king, 2 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32903, f. 297, 32904, ff. 102, 260, 424, 32905, f. 242.


regarding it as a sign of the basic unity of the administration. 87

It is hardly surprising, in view of Beckford's role, that the Monitor gives the measure its warm support in two papers in March and May, referring in the latter to the imminence of an election. It is treated as a major measure of parliamentary reform, in line with place and pension bills and indeed 'the first and principal security for...the freedom of parliament'. Some opposition arguments, especially objections to the multiplication of oaths and the consequent increase of occasions for perjury, are answered, but too late to be of any effect on debate. With praise of the measure go, first, encouragement to the administration to show by its support that the minister is not aspiring to undue power and can remedy old evils, and, then, praise for adding to glory abroad the conquest of faction and undue influence at home. 88 Yet the paper takes up the issue late, shows no anger at the dilution of the measure in its passage through parliament and makes no particular use of the 'faction' argument which could have been turned so readily to this issue. Two other widely-spaced general papers in late 1759 and 1760 keep alive the Monitor's concern with constitutional questions, perhaps with the election in view. They remind readers of the evils of corruption and party and of the importance of an uncorrupt parliament. The latter particularly is a significant paper, keeping the issue of parliamentary reform before its readers. 89 But the Monitor's treatment does not suggest either that it regarded these constitutional questions as of prime importance or that it was interested in emphasizing Pitt's propaganda use of them.

Even less does it support him over the other 'popular' question on

87. Newcastle to Hardwicke 4, 5 Mar. 1760, West's account, 21 Apr. 1760, Add. MSS. 32903, ff. 82, 98, 32905, f. 14; Walpole, George the Second II, pp. 436-7; Newcastle to Kinnoull, 1 June 1760, Add. MS. 32907, f. 16. The quotations are from Walpole.
89. 231, 22 Dec. 1759, 260, 12 July 1760.
which he took a stand, the militia. Two matters concerning it caused contention in this session: the extension of the scheme to Scotland and the question of some relief from the central government for the family allowances each county paid its militiaman when their militia was embodied. In response to some public agitation stimulated by the invasion scare of 1759, the house of commons considered the question of a Scottish militia in March and April 1760. The scheme aroused considerable suspicion, partly from fear of arming the rebel highlanders but mainly because the financial cost would have to be met largely by England. As a result of this and of the perhaps reluctant hostility of Newcastle, under pressure from his 'young friends', the bill was rejected on its second reading. At least the efforts of Newcastle brought Pitt out somewhat inconclusively in favour of the scheme after some earlier indecision. Beckford, too, was among the supporters and Newcastle expected 'all the City' to be for it. 90

The Monitor notices this issue on only one occasion, on 22 March, just before the bill was introduced and well before Newcastle resorted to all the arts of parliamentary management in his opposition. The paper is warmly in favour of the measure, arguing for it along the same lines as those used in the general debate and asserting once again that the militia is part of the rights of a free people. 91 No further mention is made of the issue. Neither does the paper mention at all, although Beckford spoke for the bill, the more seriously contentious issue of the burden on the counties of family allowances for the English militia. This brought Pitt and Newcastle into such violent dispute as to threaten a breach. A compromise was reached only to be rejected by the commons. Pitt, however, had been encouraged, indeed he was left with little option but to commit

90. Western, pp. 162-7; West's accounts, 15 Apr. 1760, Newcastle's memoranda for the king, 15 Apr. 1760, Add. MS. 32904, ff. 392, 394, 388; Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 437.

91. The Monitor 244, 22 Mar. 1760
himself even further to the militia cause and to the larger question of prolonging its life when the current legislation expired.\textsuperscript{92} It has been suggested that Pitt took his stand partly to offset the unpopularity of his continental measures among the tory country gentlemen and partly from the practical need to check the decline in popularity of the militia because of its long embodiment. The Monitor's lack of attention to militia questions, in marked contrast to its propaganda use of them in 1759, suggests that it does not consider them of any use in its support for Pitt or as a means of diverting criticism of the war. It would confirm that the militia was indeed losing its popularity and its status as a 'country' rostrum and that what agitation there was in 1760 lacked intensity and depth.\textsuperscript{93} Pitt could no longer expect to buy much support this way. It might arouse rate-paying country gentlemen but for the city 'tories' anyway it was, like other constitutional matters, a question of relatively minor importance beside those of the war. Pitt had their support now because of his conduct of the war and not mainly as a defender of the constitution as had been the case in 1756-7 and to a lesser extent even as late as the controversies of 1759.

There were plenty of occasions when the Monitor could have paid more attention to these issues but chose to resort to insubstantial articles instead.\textsuperscript{94} There was, however, another reason besides lack of interest for its silence. As well as its preoccupation with the question of peace, the paper had its own pressing domestic concern during this session, a concern which it was instrumental in making a major issue and which shows it being used for the first time, much more than over the sugar tax of the previous year, as a spokesman for Backford's particular interests. This was the removal of the prohibition on the distilling of spirits from grain.

\textsuperscript{92} Western, pp. 168-173; Newcastle's memoranda for the king, 2 Apr. 1760, West's account, 8 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32904, f. 161, 32905, f. 339.

\textsuperscript{93} Western, pp. 168-70, 174-5; Fraser, pp. 258-9, 261.

\textsuperscript{94} E.g. the Monitor 254, 31 May 1760; 256, 14 June 1760 (two parodies

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When grain distilling was prohibited by an act passed in February-March 1757, largely as an attempt to alleviate the shortage of grain, the Monitor took little notice, although it had advocated such a step. The prohibition was continued by later acts. By the time of the continuation in December 1759, however, the substitution of a heavy duty for the absolute ban was being actively considered by Newcastle and his various advisers on financial matters. Petitions in favour of the reopening of the distillery began to come in some numbers and provoked counter-petitions supporting the ban. At the beginning of the session, the house of commons set up a committee of the whole house to consider the state of the distillery, to which the petitions were referred. By the end of the year the issue was important enough for the supplement to the Gentleman's Magazine to carry a 'View of the Controversy concerning the Malt Distillery'. At this time Newcastle considered that the general opinion was in favour of reopening coupled with a heavy duty.

However, one of his advisers had already raised the question 'whether or not the City of London, Bristol Etc who appear to be so much against the distillery from grain are not influenced by motives of interest, expecting a high price for their rum and molasses?' - and the Monitor proceeds to give an answer. As early as 8 December it was opposing the petitions for reopening and answering insinuations that opposition arose from those interested in other distilling. In January, when more petitions were coming in, three further papers present arguments for continuing the ban, while a further series in February and March answers various contributions to the controversy.

94. (Cont'd) of Tristram Shandy, published in April in its large second edition); 231, 22 Dec. 1759; 242, 8 Mar. 1760; 255, 7 June 1760.


Further single articles discussing in detail the bill which ended the ban followed on 29 March, 12 April and 19 April. This issue thus fairly can be said to be the paper's major preoccupation in the early months of 1760. From references in some of the counter-propaganda and the reflections of the controversy in the Gentleman's Magazine and Public Advertiser it is clear that the Monitor was regarded as a chief spokesman on one side of a major debate. 97

Meanwhile, the proposals had come before parliament. On 4 February, on the basis of the report of the committee on the distillery, four resolutions were agreed to and referred to the committee of ways and means. These placed a large additional duty on all spirituous liquors, whether distilled in Great Britain or imported, to be coupled with a drawback of the additional duty on home-distilled spirits on export and an additional bounty for the export of corn spirits. These proposals put at a serious disadvantage distillers from other substances than corn and those who produced their raw materials, particularly the distillers of rum from colonial molasses. 98

In such circumstances it is hardly surprising to find Beckford taking a leading part in the crucial discussions of these proposals and examination of witnesses which took place in the committee of ways and means. Furthermore, he sought and won the active support of Pitt. He promised Pitt to 'take no steps in this affair, without your approbation' and in the first of two letters discussing the details of debates he writes 'without your presence and protection, I shall not dare to enter into the debate, for in this Question

97. Murray to Kinnoull, 30 Nov. 1759, Add. MS. 32899, f. 213; the Monitor 229, 8 Dec. 1759; 334-6, 12-19 Jan. 1760; 238-41, 9 Feb. -1 Mar. 1760; 245, 29 Mar. 1760; 247, 12 Apr. 1760; 248, 19 Apr. 1760; GM., XXX, 1760, pp. 18-24; PA., 29 Feb. 1760, second page, 3 Mar. 1760, second page. The contributions to the controversy referred to by the Monitor are Queries in Defence of the Malt Distillery (printed at the beginning of the following); The true State of the British Malt Distillery. Being a defence of Mr. M[a]wb[e]y's Queries..., By a British freeholder, London, 1760 (which refers to the Monitor on p. 13); a letter in the Gazetteer of 22 Feb. 1760 which attacked the Monitor accordingly to the latter.

98. Commons' Journal, XXVIII, p. 746; Beckford to Pitt, 26 Feb. 1760, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 59; Memorial of the Committee of West India Merchants in London (to Newcastle), [Feb. 1760], Add. MS. 32902, f. 460.
I am the object of Envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness.' 'The Planters and Merchants look on you,' he says in the second letter, 'as the only Protector they have left... I am thoroughly convinced that nothing will be moved in favour of the Sugar Colonies in the House, that you shall not settle in the Cabinet.'

It seems the Pitt's support was won relatively late in the day, after the proposals were made public and the alarm raised, but from February onwards he gave it fully, both publicly and in ministerial discussions. This support was in opposition not only to the proposal of Newcastle's but also to one actively carried on and supported in the ministry and house of commons by his closest colleagues, particularly Grenville. It was hampered only by Pitt's illness, not by any discretion.

When the committee of ways and means reported to the house on 26 February two of its eleven resolutions placing the additional duties were contested but without success, and a bill was ordered to be prepared on the basis of these and the earlier resolutions. The bill 'to prevent the excessive Use of Spirituous Liquors by placing an additional Duty thereupon; and to encourage the Exportation of British-make Spirits', was read the first and second time on 7 and 13 March and committed without debate.

Meanwhile, City opinion had been mobilized in opposition to measures which affected not only the colonial trade in rum and molasses but also the slave trade. But it is probably a measure not only of these interests but also of the growing strength of Beckford's influence on common council that a petition to the house of commons against the opening of the distillery was agreed to, if not without some difficulty, on 13 March, with Beardmore


of the committee to draw it up. West Indian interests were not strong enough, however, to carry, apparently on the spur of the moment in the flush of victory, a motion much later in the meeting and after administrative business had been dealt with, for a similar petition to the house of lords. At the same time, a petition from city merchants was being circulated, and although Joseph Watkins reported to Newcastle that it was not signed by many, he deplored the 'noise' the issue was creating, especially with Pitt's encouragement to 'the sugar people', and the fear of disunion in the ministry that it occasioned among 'well meaning men'. 102

The presentation of the City petition on 17 March and that of the merchants on 21 March seems to have reinvigorated the opposition, but it had little success in lengthy debates on 21 March on the house's instructions to the committee on the bill. Beckford bewailed Pitt's absence and begged further help to soften Grenville and Legge. The report stage on 24 March saw a narrowly lost division on a motion to recommit the bill. With the bill then ordered to be engrossed, little more could be done, although Beckford did speak yet again on the third reading. The bill passed the house of lords quickly, without amendment or division, and received the royal assent on 15 April. 103

Beckford had lost the fight overall but in the course of it he had demonstrated his growing influence in the City, and even more important, the strength of his influence with Pitt. Their personal intimacy was growing ever warmer over this year. 104 Pitt took up this issue at Beckford's urging:

104. See e.g. Beckford to Pitt, 7 Jan. 1760, Correspondence of...Chatham, II, p. 11; Mrs Beckford to Lady Hester Pitt, 23 June 1760, Beckford to Pitt, 1 Sep., 18 Oct. 1760, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, ff. 123, 63, 65.
and again pressed it with little regard for ministerial propriety or even for his closest colleagues, let alone the difficulties of war finance. He risked offence not only to his colleagues but also to other Tory allies on what was in fact a question of conflict between the landed and commercial interests and the *Monitor* felt it necessary later to answer charges that he was under the influence of 'a set of monopolizers' and 'a faction'.

This made his concurrent courting of the Tories over the militia and particularly the Qualifications Act, and Beckford's co-operation with Sir John Philipps on the latter, even more necessary and important, but equally more likely to be regarded with some suspicion.

In the exercise of Beckford's growing influence the *Monitor* was an important instrument. It takes up the issue early and much more fully than it did the sugar tax, and provides support throughout. In this issue, of which it makes so much, it is reflecting the views of a relatively narrow constituency, not the City as a whole or even its 'popular' elements for which it has increasingly become the spokesman on other matters in the last two years. It is perhaps a measure of Beckford's growing strength that he felt able to use the *Monitor* so blatantly on a matter of self-interest without fearing offence to his supporters. It is not surprising, however, that the paper had to answer, both now and later in the year, insinuations about its patronage when it had so clearly demonstrated its close connection with West Indian interests.

The *Monitor*'s treatment helps to fill out the story in some interesting ways. It shows how early the interested parties were alert to the possibility of some change, even when the act prohibiting corn distilling was being

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105. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 5 Mar. 1760, Add. MS. 32903, f. 100; the *Monitor* 272, 4 Oct. 1760.

106. 229, 8 Dec. 1759; 236, 26 Jan. 1760; 2389 Feb. 1760; and especially 270, 20 Sep. 1760.
further continued. Its consideration further illustrates the arguments used to cloak self-interest. The most obvious, of course, are those arising from the physical and moral benefits to the people and the nation to be expected from a continued ban. The claims of property rights or the sanction of old laws are rejected on the basis of overruling public good and opponents are branded as 'private adventurers', 'pests'. Then the paper argues at some length that spirits distilled from corn are worse in their effects than other spirits and the use of corn in this way poses the constant danger of prices being forced up as they were in the past. In contrast, other spirits are less harmful, are necessary for the Africa trade and cannot be fairly blamed for the current high price of sugar. However, in an excess of self-righteousness and to divert accusations of special interests behind its campaign, the paper affirms that if necessary all distilling should be banned except in small quantities for medicinal purposes. The demands of public revenue and the necessities of the state are also dismissed as grounds for reopening the distillery.

Although in the Monitor's estimation the crux of the argument is the advantage to the nation of the banning of the distillery, its own discussion shows that the really telling issue, which became more crucial as the controversy developed, was the interest of the landed classes. At first the paper tries to refute the contention that agriculture is adversely affected by the ban, but it would seem that the paper finds its own arguments ineffective. It comes to admit the landholders as the greatest plea in favour of corn distilling and turns instead to moralistic outbursts in a typical vein against the wickedness of growing corn for spirits, of making

108. 229; 236; 238, 9 Feb. 1760; 239, 240; 247.
109. 234; 238; 245.
110. 234; 236; 238; 240.
money out of propagating drunkenness and vice and against the high living of farmers who have rejected the simplicity of ancient rural ways, while rather weakly suggesting other uses of land. The sense of growing frustration in the paper on this side of the argument helps to indicate the strength of the forces on the other side. Finally, the Monitor's references and answers to opponents show to what extent this was a heated and divisive issue, particularly in the City. Its discussion throws more light on events there. One of the later papers, signed 'A Common Councilman' in answer to a letter so addressed, refutes the charge that the City was 'an advocate for Geneva'. The failure to petition the lords, it claims, was due to the over-confidence of absent common councilmen who were persuaded there could be no opposition, and it gives some information on the substance of the petition. The paper does all it can to keep the issue alive. As on other occasions, it makes large and unsubstantiated claims of support, especially as the situation becomes less promising. The weight of opposition, it asserts, was against the measure, as shown in strenuous opposition in debates, in addresses presented by the richest, most respectable and industrious part of the nation and in continuing controversy. In fact the balance of the petitions was strongly for the opening of the distillery. The truth is more exactly revealed in the paper's disillusioned perplexity over why there was not more substantial support from corporate bodies and influential people. Certainly the Monitor, anyway, took this matter, one on which it could hardly expect to widen its support, very seriously, more seriously indeed than the larger domestic issues, closer to its avowed principles, which arose in this session. This misdirection of its energies and those of its patron is yet another example of Beckford's waywardness - to say nothing of Pitt's.

111. 240, 241.
112. 247, 12 Apr. 1760.
Other than this, the Monitor shows little interest in questions of domestic controversy not of direct concern to Pitt. For example, it gives only passing attention to the court martial at last held on Lord George Sackville at his insistent request. The court sat from 29 February to 3 April, its proceedings being delayed by the question, referred to the judges, whether it could try a person no longer in the army. The unexpectedly mild verdict of guilty of disobeying orders brought further harsh retaliation from the king. In view of the intense interest and hostility of public opinion, the attitude of the king and Pitt's commitment to Prince Ferdinand, Sackville was lucky to escape the fate of Byng. Nevertheless, propagandists did not hesitate to attack the court and its findings on his behalf. 114 Only in reply to them does the Monitor comment on the event, firmly justifying the court against charges of partiality, representing the criticisms as further examples of the spirit of disobedience in Sackville, and commending this exercise of royal justice as fair but firm in example to others. The paper does show some uneasiness about the questions being asked as to why he was not treated like Byng. Only the judges in the two trials could answer, it says. 115

The Monitor shows no concern at all over the constitutional question about the supposed extension of martial law which was raised by the case. This caused some uneasiness to independents and others in parliament and outside, as it certainly would have done to the Monitor's original patron, Richard Beckford. 116 Nor does it take any note of another issue concerning the army raised by Sir John Philipps in the early days of the parliamentary session, the failure of three members to vacate their seats when given general commissions as officers in the army. Indeed the

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114. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 413-7; Yorke, Hardwicke, III, pp. 140 1; Newcastle to Mansfield, 1 Mar. 1760, Add. MS. 32903, f. 6; Lady Anne Egerton to Bentinck, e.g. 4, 14 Mar., 16 May 1760, Eg. 1719, ff. 96, 99, 124; Walpole to Mann, e.g. 26 Mar., 20 Apr. 1760, ed. Lewis, XXI, pp. 384, 387; Rigby to Bedford, 24 Apr. 1760, Correspondence of...Bedford II, p. 413.

115. The Monitor 250, 3 May 1760.

116. Lady Anne Egerton to Bentinck, 4 Mar. 1760, Eg. 1719, f. 96; Dodington to Lord Chancellor Bowes, 8 Apr. 1760, H.M.C., Various Collection, VI, p. 45.
Monitor apparently shares in the deliberate overlooking (according to Walpole) of the similar issue of the failure of George Townshend to vacate his seat on resuming his position in the army. In the early weeks of the parliamentary session and later, Townshend's reputation, especially his part in the fall of Quebec, was the subject of some public discussion both in and outside parliament. Pitt and Beckford both commended him in high terms and the Monitor, in the dedication to the fourth volume of its collected edition, published later this year on 6 December 1760, follows suit. His continued popularity among the independents which this praise reflects allowed his constitutional sins to be overlooked even when those of others were raised. Such 'country' issues would certainly have been fuel to the Monitor in its earlier days; now it was pro-administration and the cooling of its zeal on these ideological issues is a further measure of its commitment and that of its patron, and the lack of concern of City tories if not of others like Philipps.

The distillery issue made a substantial break in the Monitor's preoccupation with foreign policy, but it soon returns. Again it shows little interest in the course of the war, even in the further great victories of 1760 in India and America. Its only comment on the fall of Montreal, news of which reached London on 4 October, comes in praise of the City address of congratulation presented on 16 October, which is cited at length to prove that the people are still zealous in support of the war. Insofar as it is concerned with the course of the war in 1760 it is once again the general question of continental operations which engages its attention. Indeed the fortunes of the war in Europe were still the crucial and controversial consideration, however much America might be central to British


ambitions. Frederick's situation was as gloomy as ever. Grave doubts were expressed by those most closely concerned as to whether he could mount and survive the further campaign which, by May, had become inevitable. Yet if he collapsed, Ferdinand could hardly go on holding Hanover. Without this, indeed without some striking success in Westphalia to change the whole continental situation decisively, Britain could not be assured of reaping the full harvest of her maritime and colonial triumphs. It was no longer a question of simply diverting France to allow victories elsewhere. France had to be defeated to secure these victories. If France could still retain some offensive strength on the continent a compromise peace would be forced, not just out of compliance with the king's Hanoverian susceptibilities but out of a realization of British interests in Europe. 119 Through 1760 Pitt and his propagandists were only too well aware of these crucial considerations.

Despite the British reinforcements, Ferdinand's campaign brought little comfort to Pitt. He faced superior French forces and only the dissensions of the French kept him from a decisive defeat. As it was, 'the French soon over-ran Hesse, seized Gottingen and Munden, and were at the eve of possessing Hanover'. In face of these disappointment even Pitt's doubts rose. The European sphere of the war seemed unable to meet the new demands that his strategy put on it. Another request for reinforcements was refused with some asperity and in September Pitt declared to Newcastle that 'without a battle [i.e. a decisive encounter not just holding action] I will not be for the continuance of the measures in Germany another year'. Yet in October Ferdinand was defeated in an attempt to overcome the very weak French guarrison of Wesel and his army was driven back. On 8 October the Russians took Berlin 120.

120. Walpole, George the Second, II, pp. 450-1 (first quotation); Corbett, II, pp. 85, 97-9, (second quotation), 104; Fraser p. 274.
In an attempt to relieve the situation in Germany, in September the idea of a diversionary raid on the French coast was revived. Against Newcastle's inclination, Belle-isle at the mouth of the Loire was decided on as its object and the aim was to be its conquest as a bargaining counter in peace negotiations and a deterrent to Spain. Planning proceeded, albeit uncertainly in view of the lateness of the season and the lukewarmness of officers and other ministers. Not until late November, after the death of the king had caused another disruption, was the expedition postponed for the last time. The threat of action had some diversionary effect, but too late to make any substantial difference to Ferdinand's position.121

Not surprisingly in view of the setbacks on the continent, in marked contrast to successes elsewhere, criticism of the cost and burden of the German war was growing. Indeed this was just part of a rising tide of criticism of the war in the course of 1760. Behind the facade of the euphoria of the parliamentary session and despite Pitt's boasts of success bringing unanimity, there were notes of concern. An exchange between Sir John Philipps and Pitt, for example, in the debates on the army estimates, turned among other things to the question of economy and brought Pitt to declare that 'to push expence was the best economy'. In contrast, Beckford was ostentatiously helpful over a government loan and avoided his approval of arrangements for supply publicly before Philipps and others.123 Such notes of concern became a chorus by mid-1760.124 They were to be heard in the City and even among the City Tories.

121. Corbett, II, pp. 95-103.
122. The same sort of comments on harmony and unanimity were made of this as of the last session at least in its early stages. E.g. Walpole to Mann, 16 Nov. 1759, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 344; Bishop Thomas to Edward Weston, 23 Nov. 1759, H.M.C. Tenth Report, Part I, p. 319; Mitchell to Symmer, 8 Jan. 1760, Add. MS. 6839, f. 155.
124. See e.g. Anecdotes of ... Chatham, I, pp. 346-7, for a disparaging account of the main lines of criticism and for a sympathetic account, Dodington to Lord Talbot, 4 Oct. 1760, Dodington, Journal, pp. 389-96; See also (Cont'd)
Sir John Philipps's influence had always been strong with them and now it was tending more and more in a different direction from Beckford's. Yet at the same time as he mentions these tory tensions, John Gordon also refers to the 'faction's' desire to have Beckford 'a continual member'. And the tensions highlight the importance of his paper's continuing and unwavering support for Pitt.

In several vigorous papers of the summer and autumn the Monitor defends the continental war. True, it explicitly acknowledges the criticism of it. Certainly, it says, there is much room for contrast between the measures of 1760 and those of previous years which won such acclaim for frugality and a proper understanding of British interests in regard to the continent. Rightly 'such a view of the present state of Britain, attracts the attention of every friend to his country.' The war is indeed 'the most chargable [sic] and extensive, that we have ever been engaged in'. But these results are the necessary consequences of pursuing the aim of the war, the reduction of French power. First, and with great success, France's trade and navigation were destroyed; but her power rests also on the extent of her dominions and influence on the continent. If these are not restricted, if she is permitted to destroy the liberties of Germany, she will be able to obstruct British trade and eventually turn all her strength against Britain. Then not even Britain's success in the first great object of the war, America, would be secure. 'Thus you see, that a measure, which at the beginning of the war was bad, is now, by becoming necessary, just and good', in strict accordance with the interests of Great Britain and adopted out of self-defence. In part these developments have been made necessary by 'the policy

124. (Cont'd) Lady Anne Egerton to Bentinck, 10 Dec. 1759, Eg. 1719, f. 81; Talbot to Dodington, 25 Aug., 1 Sep. 1760, H.M.C., Various Collections, VI, pp. 46, 47.

125. Gordon to Newcastle, 26 June, 12 Sep. 1760, Add. MSS. 32907, ff. 384-5, 32911, ff. 257-8; Calcraft to Colonel Harvey, 29 July 1760, Add. MS. 17495, f. 85. On Sir John Philipps's influence see above p.196 and Gordon to Newcastle, 12, 15 July 1759, Add. MS. 32893, ff. 13-14, 64.
of our enemies'. In response the ministry's measures have been consistent and harmonious throughout, complementary to each other in destroying French power, and never deviating from the true interest of king and country. The war 'has been conducted on a better plan and with greater vigour, than any this nation has entered into of late years'. For these reasons Pitt does not deserve the fickle treatment of public opinion which has swung from showering gold boxes and toasts to ungrateful attacks. So the Monitor, again in response to criticism, develops a yet more sophisticated and coherent defence of the German war as a further measure of its now unwavering commitment to Pitt.

Not surprisingly, these arguments provoked an answer in the form of *A Letter to the Monitor, by an Assembly of Brethren called Quakers*. This 'very angry letter' the author of the paper complained of feels called upon to answer, perhaps because it is so close to the paper's earlier views. The Monitor has not argued for a reduction of the navy, although its main offensive role is now past. Nor has the paper called for the conquest of France by land. It has, however, stressed the need to check France's land forces now that the main sources of her strength have been cut off. The usual arguments for British interest in European affairs are advanced again, with emphasis on the commercial motives, and the usual distinctions are made between the present continental policies, which are in tune with British interests, and those of the past. The insinuations which the Quakers make against Britain's allies have no justification either. Nor, in defending them and a continental policy, has the Monitor forgotten its principles which have won it such a good reception, the naval strength of Britain and the

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126. The Monitor 257, 21 June 1760 (first and third quotations); 274, 18 Oct. 1760 (other quotations).
127. According to the Monitor, this was first published in the Edinburgh Evening Courant of 18 Aug. 1801., XXX, 1760, pp. 274-7, prints the Letter.
prime importance of America. 128

In the course of its defence of Pitt and his policies the Monitor makes several references to landings on the French coast, at first in a general way, but increasingly more specific and grandiose in conception, and not entirely in accord with the denial of any support for an invasion of France. 129 These perhaps spring from some inkling of the plans in hand but certainly not from inside knowledge of their scope and intention. Rather the references reflect the impatient frustration of the mercantile community at the stalemate in Germany in contrast to their sense of British power elsewhere, and their hope for some decisive blow - frustrations which Walpole saw the proposed expedition as designed to placate. Certainly the preparations aroused optimistic rumours in the City. 130

The Monitor's unfailing enthusiasm for the war is shown further in continuing discussion of the possibility of and proper terms for peace, which remain its predominant preoccupation in the latter part of the year. Despite the collapse of formal negotiations fairly general speculation about the possibility continued and kept the issue alive. Pitt's interest was revived, especially if Belle-isle could be gained. But then the unfortunate developments on the continent dashed his hopes of satisfactory terms so he concentrated on preparations for a further campaign. In October Beckford expressed his hope that the fall of Montreal and the distresses of France would make a safe and honourable peace possible but urged Pitt to 'make the Peace with the same firmness as you have carried on the War'. 131

The Monitor reflects these attitudes.

128. The Monitor 268, 6 Sep. 1760 (the quotation); 269, 13 Sep. 1760.
131. Fraser, pp.269-71,274;; Beckford to Pitt, 18 Oct. 1760, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 65.
Its discussion of the issue continues many lines of argument already established, reiterated in answer to controversy. Britain is engaged in a just war begun and continued out of necessary defence of national interests and to ensure a lasting peace. In more detail and with more emphasis it is asserted that the war was provoked and has been widened by France. France must be disabled from ever pursuing her ambitions again. No mercy or humanity can or should be shown to an unjust, barbarous enemy.

The present states of both France and Britain are analysed, the former in some detail, to show, in answer to claims to the contrary, that France can soon be forced to make peace on acceptable terms. On the other hand Britain can easily continue to support the admitted burdens of the war because of her commercial advantages. The victories she has won and further successes to be expected are stressed.

Again the discussion is chiefly interesting for its consideration of the terms to be demanded of France. Increasing severity is shown in the demand that hostilities must not be suspended until France has formally relinquished all her conquests and made satisfaction to both individuals and nations for losses and expenses sustained. The suggestions for a settlement in Europe have an air of unreality and imprecision about them. The interest is obviously in the colonial sphere. The advantages of North America continue, in answer to contentions to the contrary, to be rated very highly. It adds more to Britain's riches than all Peru and Mexico to Spain's. So, before any congress begins, France must give up all claims to the areas on which she encroached there and which have not been reconquered. They are not to be the subject of any debate.


134. 266.

135. E.g. 258, 28 June 1760; 265, 16 Aug. 1760.
More than this, with growing emphasis as the fall of Montreal is expected, it is asserted that France cannot be allowed to return to any footing in North America. Britain's interests and trade in North America are so valuable that they cannot be safe unless the ever-ambitious French are driven out. New arguments appear at length to justify Britain's claim to the whole of North America, arguments based on discovery, occupancy, charters and relations with the Indians.  

As for other conquests in the colonial field, the demand is still in general for no return of any of them but there are some implicit hints of readiness to give up some in return for substantial concessions. Now are heard more clearly in the Monitor echoes of the controversy that was growing over the relative merits of retaining Canada or Guadeloupe. It is suggested that as the French are probably now driven out of all North America except Louisiana, which is therefore no use to them, they could perhaps cede this in return for Guadeloupe and thus complete the security of the British colonies and trade. The Monitor rejects angrily the insinuation that its emphasis on the importance of North America derives from the interest of West Indian planters in keeping up the price of sugar.  

As usual, arguments which the Monitor does not like are attributed to faction or a French interest. The burdens of the war in debt, taxation and interruption of trade are admitted but they are not intolerable and there are compensating advantages. A precipitate peace made just to ensure relief from taxation, before conquests in Africa, India and America are completed and lasting advantages secured in trade, liberty and property, would be disastrous. If France persists in her obstinacy then Britain,
too, must persist with the war. The address of the City of London on the fall of Montreal is quoted as evidence that the people still retain their zeal and unanimity and confidence in the ministers and are not alarmed by accumulating debt or new taxes. It is an example that every subject should follow.\textsuperscript{138}

In the same mood, and in tune with Beckford at the opening of the previous parliamentary session, the \textit{Monitor} not only continues to remind its readers of the great victories Britain has won but also to defend Pitt against a wide range of criticisms, 'the insinuations and inventions of a base pen', covering his whole term as secretary of state. He is defended by contrast with preceding ministers and their bad management of earlier wars, and by comparison with his present colleagues, with some deprecatory gibes at Newcastle. Certainly Britain's successes are not entirely due to him, but he planned and managed them and his contribution can be measured by comparing the situation of the country when Pitt came to power with that at present. Significantly, constitutional issues figure in this praise only in a very general way. The emphasis is clearly on Pitt's conduct of the war. This concern to defend Pitt in all respects and particularly to prove that the German war was not a deviation in his concentration on British interests, showing a strong awareness of growing criticism but at the same time vigorous and sophisticated answers to it, emphasizes yet further the \textit{Monitor}'s major purpose now. It is the mouthpiece of Beckford's support for Pitt and is seen as such. This is especially evident when the \textit{Monitor} defends Pitt against the charge of being under the influence of 'a set of monopolizers', and supported by a 'faction'. How, it asks, can the support of every honest Briton who wishes well to his king and country be called a faction?\textsuperscript{139}


\textsuperscript{139} West's account, 13 Nov. 1759, Add. MS. 32898, f. 223; Walpole, \textit{George the Second}, II, pp. 389-90; the \textit{Monitor} 272, 4 Oct. 1760; 274, 18 Oct. 1760. (The quotations are from 272.)
The Monitor is able to answer with confidence this charge against Pitt and to speak out firmly against an early or unsatisfactory peace because more certainly than ever now it is reflecting dominant City views. These were clearly expressed in the City's address on the fall of Montreal. Beardmore was on the committee which drew it up and it parallels the Monitor in its references to a 'restless and insidious enemy, evermore dangerous in peace than war', and its urgings to 'preserve this valuable acquisition' and to prosecute 'this just and necessary war' so as to be able 'to dictate to the aggressors, the terms of a safe and honourable peace'. Hardwicke was surprised that Pitt had allowed his supporters to speak so strongly about 'preserving'. Pitt, like the Monitor, justifiably took the address as clear support for continuance of the war, promising 'a million in every line', although Newcastle was equally justified in pointing out that 'those gentlemen were not the persons who would furnish the government with money.'

Unlike the country tories the City was not wavering. True, only ten days later the common council's address to the new king did reflect criticism of the war to the extent of referring to it as 'bloody and expensive', echoing the king's own words to the privy council. Nevertheless it still expressed the hope that the new king should carry it on as prudently and successfully as hitherto, until an end could be made in a firm and honourable peace. The general adulation of the City for Pitt at this time is shown in the glowing inscription on the foundation-stone of the new Thames Bridge at Blackfriars, laid on 31 October. The bridge was originally known as Pitt's Bridge and the inscription speaks of his inspiration of the commanders and forces of

the kingdom to the great benefit of the nation and the restoration of the ancient reputation of the British Empire. 141

In this City opinion it would seem that Beckford's influence had grown stronger than it was in 1759. In addition to the support he was given over the distillery issue and to Gordon's reference to the wish to have him as a 'continual member', he helped to defeat a complicated, strenuous and lengthy attempt to prevent the election of Alderman Blakiston and lord mayor. This attempt appears to have emanated from some tory circles warmly inclined to Sir John Philipps and to have had some connivance from Newcastle. It was especially important because of the imminence of a general election when Sir John Barnard would no longer be standing as a candidate, and was linked with plans for it. It was linked, too, with a contest over the earlier annual election of sheriffs, in which Beardmore was a leading agitator for the successful candidate. 142 Yet still Sir John Philipps's reputation was high in the City. Gordon refers to him as 'the sole director' of the counsels of the 'faction' and there was talk of his standing as a candidate in the general election as a successor to Barnard. 143 In view of his growing uneasiness over the war, his continuing influence was likely to be a challenge to Beckford's. These cross currents behind the City's enthusiastic support for Pitt, of which the Monitor itself gives evidence in its anxiety to answer criticism and dissatisfaction, emphasize how important it was that Pitt's case was put


so regularly and forcefully by Beckford's paper. Through it Beckford was indeed learning to turn his influence in the City to political ends even if it did not bring him success in the issue closest to his interests, the distillery. 144

144. Namier and Brooke, II, p. 76.
Suddenly, if not unexpectedly, on 25 October 1760 George II died, and the relative stability of the political world since the coming to office of the Pitt-Newcastle coalition was disturbed. In fact on the surface there were few changes. The young George III and his advisers, the earl of Bute, accepted, albeit reluctantly, that there was no immediate alternative to the coalition and that the war which had brought such brilliant successes could not be precipitately and perhaps inadequately ended. Room was found for Bute, first as groom of the stole with a place in the cabinet and then in March 1761 as secretary of state, without displacing the existing leading ministers.

Underneath, however, the new situation created all sorts of uncertainties and in fact meant a marked change in Pitt's political situation. Until now Pitt had exploited Newcastle's devotion to the burdens of office and unwillingness to precipitate a separation and put pressure on him to secure his own control of policy through Newcastle's influence with the king and large majority in the house of commons. At the same time he had often used Newcastle's dominance with both king and commons as a skilful disguise of his own responsibility for policies which would damage his valued popularity. Although by the end of the reign, with the success of the war and his own increasing standing with the king, he had become more open about the real situation, the degree of controversy about some

1. Fraser, p. 281.
aspects of the war still made some subterfuge desirable. Now, with
Bute's influence uppermost with the king, and after Pitt had rejected all
attempts at reconciliation between them, he could no longer rely on the
same control of policy. This was dramatically shown in the tussle over the
wording of the king's first speech to the privy council, when only with
great difficulty did Pitt secure a change in the printed version from
references to this 'bloody and expensive' war and the need for an 'honourable
and lasting peace' to 'an expensive but just and necessary war' and an
'honourable peace, in concert with our allies'. As Symmer acutely observed,
Pitt would not easily work in partnership when hitherto he had enjoyed
all the glory. Nor could he easily use the same methods to protect his
popularity especially on the hottest issue of all, the German war.
By no stretch of the imagination could Bute be represented as controlling
the house of commons, while increasingly as time passed Pitt's coalition
with Newcastle seemed obviously a matter of choice not something reluctantly
accepted. Walpole suggests growing disgust in the City at this, although
the common council's address on the accession shows the popular side of the
City still amenable enough to Pitt's influence to be outspoken in support
for the coalition or at least for 'those Councils by which that war hath
hitherto been so successfully conducted'.

The uncertainties of the new political situation are reflected
indirectly in the Monitor in the noticeable relaxation of its intense
concentration on questions of policy and controversy and the considerable

4. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Oct. 1760, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, pp. 304-5;
Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 8; Lord Holland's Memoir on the Events
attending the death of George II And the Accession of George III,
ed. Countess of Ilchester and Lord Stavordale, The Life and Letters of
Lady Charlotte Lennox, 1745-1826, 2 Vols, London, 1901, I, p. 6;
5. Walpole, George the Third, I, p.11; Common Council Journal, 62, f. 159.
increase in the number of articles with little political point. The king's accession, coronation and marriage give rise to a series of articles on the role of the king. The paper is lavish in its praise both of George II and George III and in its hopes of the latter, inspired particularly by his proclamation against vice, his promise and practice of economy and his return to proper principles of foreign policy. The fall of Belle-isle in June 1761 is hailed as the first fruits of the unity of the nation under a patriot and native sovereign who practises a 'British theory of government and administration' for the first time since Queen Elizabeth. These hopes and praises, however, are accompanied by much monitorial exhortation, often presumptuous in tone, about the high duties and responsibilities of kings and the temptations that surround them. Much of the advice concerns the proper choice of ministers and in this occur some hints of uneasiness about the king's associates such as were expressed more crudely in papers put up in public places early in the reign. These revive a little at the time of Bute's appointment as secretary of state but as yet they have not displaced old hatreds. Hostile references to Newcastle and Hardwicke and warnings against those who gained an ascendancy over the late king are more definite than uneasiness about Bute. Pitt is praised in contrast to other ministers, implicitly in April, explicitly in July just after the fall of Belle-isle, as the patriot minister who has achieved so much and from whom, with a patriot king, so much more is expected. The praise of Pitt is not without some qualification, however.


8. 299, 11 Apr. 1761; 282; 298.
'It must not be forgot', says the paper, 'that it has been impossible, as yet, to cleanse the Augean stable so well, as to have no room for complaint,' and from this arise measures apparently out of character with the minister. In all, the Monitor's political loyalties, although not greatly changed, are somewhat muted in these months, for reasons soon to be further elucidated, and reflect something of the uncertainties of the new reign. In stressing that the king should not allow himself to become a tool of any individual or group the Monitor is in accord with Beckford's declaration to Bute 'that he wished to see the King his own Minister', although Beckford certainly did not waver in his support of Pitt and was more clearly than ever regarded as one of his close associates. Such sentiments reflected hostility to Newcastle or perhaps suspicion of Bute (although Beckford publicly declared his approval of Bute's appointment as secretary of state) not doubts about the patriot minister above party.

The general election of 1761 gives the Monitor the occasion for some of its most extended discussion, set in a historical context, of the importance of the free and frequent choice of parliaments and the iniquities of the Septennial Act. At the same time the duties of a member of parliament are expounded and the electors given detailed advice on how to exercise their choice wisely. This discussion shows the Monitor's ideological programme not forgotten. It comes out when occasion stimulates it. But the discussion has little specific relevance to events in the election, not even to the City elections, where Beckford faced some trouble. Despite the rumours of the previous year and the vote to him of the City's freedom this year perhaps in preparation for the election, Sir

9. 298; 311, 4 July 1761; 295, 14 Mar. 1761 (the quotation).


John Philipps was not a candidate. The main interest of the election was the failure of Sir Robert Ladbroke, a senior alderman and a Newcastle supporter, to win the livery nomination yet his going on to top the poll at the expense of another Newcastle man, Sir Samuel Fludyer. The whigs were obviously divided. Beckford, however, was challenged at the nomination meeting for neglecting his duty as an alderman and for an hour faced the groans and hisses of the audience before being able to plead in excuse his duties in the house of commons and as a militia officer.

Despite some support from the ordnance office and board of trade, Beckford still came only third in the poll and at one stage was lower than that. He was, however, ahead of Sir Richard Glynn, another popular City figure, who overtook Fludyer only at the last minute to secure election.

The Monitor takes surprisingly little notice, too, of another major City issue of 1760-61 in which Beckford was deeply concerned, the reorganization of the City militia. This, which had been excluded from the provisions of the Act of 1757, was felt to be inefficient and a disgrace to the City. In December 1760 a committee of common council, including both Beckford and Beardmore, was appointed to consider the matter and on 20 December reported in favour of petitioning the king to grant the commission of lieutenancy for the City militia to the lord mayor, aldermen and commoners, a suggestion accepted only after considerable debate, when the committee was ordered to draw up the petition. At this Newcastle became greatly alarmed because of the intrusion on the prerogative, which he melodramatically saw as parallel to the events of 1642. With Bute's help, he organized a careful attempt to avoid the petition's being presented, fearful all


the time that Pitt would take the question up in concert with his 'Friends in the City'. But his efforts were to no avail. By the latter part of January at the latest Beckford was very much in control of the affair (despite reports to the contrary to Newcastle), with the warm support of lord mayor Blakiston and the knowledge of Pitt, and was actually in communication with Bute over it. With Pitt's encouragement he took the lead in the common council meeting of 11 February when, after some debate, a petition was carried by a large majority of councilmen. It is not entirely clear what happened afterwards but it would seem that the City's petition was not granted. In late 1761 and 1762 Newcastle was still discussing possible nominees for a new commission in the hope that 'this affair, which has depended so long, (partly through my fault) may now be dispatched'.

This affair indicates Beckford's growing leadership in City affairs, and his increasing strength in common council in alliance with Hodges now, and in liaison with Pitt, as Pitt's man. His intervention was regarded as important, indeed crucial, by Hardwicke, Bute and Newcastle. Yet the Monitor gives the question only one paper early in its development, on 27 December, after the first council meeting. It praises the virtues of the militia but draws attention to the imperfect implementation of the Militia Act, especially in the City of London, and argues for a militia under the sole


17. E.g. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 1 Feb. 1761, Add. MS. 32918, f. 177.

direction of the body corporate, not a lieutenancy, in place of the useless and burdensome trained bands. That is all on this question so important to Beckford although not to Pitt. On the major militia issue of 1760, the question of provision for its continuation when the current Act expired, over which militia zealots became very warm and Newcastle and the old king very agitated, the Monitor has not a word to say. Only months later in April and May 1761 does it devote three papers to one of its most important expositions of the dangers of standing armies, apparently stimulated by the possibility of peace and a reduction of the army. Its silence would suggest that although he could not completely drop them militia questions were now a greater embarrassment than a weapon to Pitt. It would also seem to indicate that although a general ideological interest remained, the practical issues were of no great interest to City readers and of no value in cultivating his support there, however much Pitt may have claimed to Newcastle and Hardwicke to the contrary about their importance to his followers generally.

The Monitor does take up one political issue which aroused City and other reaction, the new duty of three shillings a barrel on strong beer and ale, made necessary by the ever-increasing cost of the war. Over this it shows an interesting tug of allegiances. At first the paper joins the opposition, expressed in parliament by George Grenville and outside in strong popular reactions. The tax is inefficient and inequitable, says the Monitor, and alarming to the disinterested and industrious and especially to the inferior sort of people. Instead the duty on malt should be raised. Pitt, however, forced to be more considerate now of the unity of the administration, had even earlier given his strong support to the new tax, to Hardwicke's surprise. And the Monitor quickly changed its attitude. By early February

19. Western, pp. 175-80; the Monitor 300-302, 18 Apr.-2 May 1761.
it is criticizing those who attack a measure and stir up public hatred on prejudice and rumour, without proper knowledge. Maybe the tax is not perfect but whatever the dissatisfaction there is no excuse for the heats and excesses of attacks on the government;

far be it from a free people, who boast of their loyalty and justice; to usurp upon the prerogative of their guardians and rulers, by an unseasonable and unwarrantable opposition to an act of the legislative power; and to give credit to the many ill-grounded reports spread to defame and injure individuals, under the specious appearance of liberty and public good... And to insult the powers in being for executing an act passed by the representatives of the people, borders too much upon rebellion, to be defended.

Only a repeal by parliament can alter the situation. 'Let us..., whatever may be the event of this act, study to be quiet.' It is truly remarkable evidence of the Monitor's subservience to Pitt that it modifies so far its usual views on the role and rights of the people in the constitution. Yet, perhaps in order to preserve its influence among the citizens of London, the Monitor does not directly give up its criticisms of the Act, especially of the way that brewers may take advantage of it and it reflects later controversy over the attempts of brewers to use the Act as justification for raising prices. The Monitor argues strongly against their right to do so but says that their attempts should be blamed on their own greed, not on the promoters of the Act, a clear move to deflect hostility from the government to the easily-hated capitalist brewers. 21

Similar tugs of different allegiances on the Monitor are to be seen on much more important questions, in the attention the paper gives to foreign policy. In this field the uncertainties created by the new reign because of the known views of the king and Bute against the German war and in favour of peace were greatly exacerbated by the simultaneous impact

of a famous pamphlet. Israel Mauduit's *Considerations on the Present German War* was first published in November 1760, went through six reprints in three months and was followed by three other works on the same subject. It brought together into a powerful, clear and sustained exposition, most ably written, the various already-existing threads of argument in opposition to the war, in a way that was in fact very close to the earlier stands of the *Monitor*, setting them in a general strategic argument. And it came at the right time, when public uneasiness was mounting. By all accounts it had a remarkable effect in precipitating and crystallizing opinion against the war.  

To enhance its impact, the situation in Europe was very grey. In March 1761 the long-discussed attack on Belle-isle at last was undertaken and was successfully completed by 8 June, to the accompaniment of much controversy about its usefulness. But in Germany, although Ferdinand began the campaign with some vigour and success, he faced vastly superior forces and it ended with his having to abandon all Hesse to the enemy. Frederick, although he won a great victory over the Austrians at Torgau on 3 November, was able to do little else against his enemies from all sides. The Austrians and Russians wintered in his dominions. It was clearer than ever that his resources were severely strained and that he was unlikely to be able to hold out much longer.

The result of all these circumstances was a mounting volume of criticism of the war, generally in the country as observed by Symmer and particularly in the City, with the 'solid arguments' to support it there outlined by Gordon.  

Early in 1761 Bute was under strong pressure from Dodington to put himself at the head of those supporting an immediate withdrawal from the German war and the making of a separate

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peace. Through Glover, Dodington was seeking to encourage these views in the City, to the intense annoyance of Pitt. Concern over the mounting cost of the war, especially the German war, showed itself in parliament, in critical comment on Pitt's motion for the Prussian subsidy, on a vote for forage expenses to Hanover and in March when the administration had to ask for £400,000 demanded by Hesse for indemnification under the secret articles of its last subsidy treaty. At the beginning of the session Pitt declared strongly for the continued prosecution of the war, although he checked Beckford angrily when the latter proposed even more vigour than before, but, as the criticism arose, in typical fashion he sought to divert blame for its expense to Newcastle at the treasury. He took up very vigorously with Newcastle on several occasions both the general cost of the German war and particular matters such as the Hessian demands, accusing him of extravagance, mismanagement and deliberate obstruction of the continuation of the war and threatening to declare his opinion and promote enquiries in the commons. Although there is no evidence that he carried out his threat, Beckford did support his tactics in the house, taking up on at least two occasions the cry against the expense of the war and attributing the 'notorious' extravagance to Newcastle's deliberate mismanagement at the treasury designed to make impossible the continuation of the war. Significantly on one occasion it was reported that he was 'supported very coldly...Sir J. Philips not

25. Rigby to Bedford, 22 Dec. 1760, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 426 (Rigby's reference to the Russian subsidy must be a mistake for Prussian; see Commons' Journal, XXVIII, p. 1006, 22 Dec. 1760.) Lady Anne Egerton to Bentinck, 17 Feb. 1761, Eg. 1719, f. 210; Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 29-30.
speaking'. 27 Hardwicke was certainly right in attributing Pitt's irascibility to concern over his popularity. Indeed he accused Newcastle and others of trying 'to blow up the people' against the war. But Pitt was not unaffected by the outcry. In the last year he had made difficulties over continued reinforcements to Germany in face of lack of success; in March 1761, in the context of negotiations with Bute over his taking office as secretary of state, he declared his willingness to abandon the continental war if the king wished, although he thought it a right measure. 28

The impact of the mounting criticism of the war is shown soon and very strongly in the Monitor. It takes up the king's emphasis on his British origins as an occasion to express the hope that continental connections will become less influenced by German considerations and more constitutional, in accordance with the Act of Settlement. Even more remarkably, in three papers in January it aligns itself with the criticism and with explicit reference to Pitt. The history of England since the Revolution is used yet again to show the dangers of excessive continental connections which in the past have raised up ungrateful allies and divided rather than united the Germanic body against France. A change from such ruinous measures has brought such success. Yet now a reversion to them is threatened:

the last year's expense; the particular attention paid to the increase of our land-forces in Germany; the inconsiderable efforts made with our navy, and the more inconsiderable progress made by the vast army in British pay upon the continent, are bad symptoms of a relapse....To proceed further might bring on such a paroxism, as to shake the constitution in such a manner, as never to recover its former strength and firmness.

Even now the relapse has altered the fortunes of war: 'from the moment Britain altered her resolution not to send a man into Germany, and engrafted the

27. Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 29-30; Charles Yorke to Newcastle, 16 Feb. 1761, Add. MS. 32919, f. 38 (the quotation).
cause of Prussia and of other German friends, upon the stock of the British contest with France in America, the event of the war became visibly uncertain. All the advantages won by Prince Ferdinand do not amount to the value of the least acquisition made on the national plan. France has succeeded in embroiling Britain on the continent against a whole coalition, disuniting the people and making them clamorous for peace. Moreover, the task of peacemaking is complicated by the continental involvement, because concessions will be asked from Britain for the restitution of the losses of her allies. Britain must revert to a middle line. 'To engage without reserve, and in such a manner as to deviate from the true interest and purpose of Great Britain in this war, or to renounce all regard for the liberties of Europe and the Protestant interest...would be almost equally ruinous.' She must bring her commitments into line with her own interests and practise a 'seasonable desisting' from attachment to the continent which alone can save her from the misery of her allies.29

The intensity of this reversion away from the commitment to and defence of the Prussian alliance and German war in 1759-60, back to attitudes the Monitor held earlier, did not last beyond these three papers. The paper was soon diverted to other things than foreign policy, the beer tax and the elections. The occasional doubts it continues to express are put more gently without the explicit criticism of Pitt and it is brought back to his support, although not yet as warmly as before, by fears of ministerial changes.30

But the very intensity of the brief reaction, together with the Monitor's avoidance of foreign policy topics when they had been its staple, suggests the strength of the anti-war swing in the City. Even the Monitor, apparently, had to compromise in order not to lose its readers. A realization of the

29. The Monitor 280, 29 Nov. 1760; 286, 10 Jan. 1761; 288, 24 Jan. 1761 (the first and third quotations); 289, 31 Jan. 1761 (the second and fourth quotations).

30. 291, 14 Feb. 1761; 297, 28 Mar. 1761; 298, 4 Apr. 1761, 308, 13 June 1761.
impact that criticism of the war was having there would give added point to Pitt's anger at Dodington's moves in the City. The swing of opinion probably had much to do with opposition to Beckford at the election. Although the explicit criticisms answered by him at the livery meeting do not suggest so, he was both opposed and promoted, not surprisingly, as Pitt's friend, closely associated with his policies. He himself claimed 'the honour to have those for Enemies, who are not well wishers to Mr Pitt' and Hardwicke thought Pitt's irritability at the time had much to do with the opposition to Beckford in the City. Indeed Pitt had every reason to worry. The very heart of his popular interest was being threatened. Although almost everyone in positions of importance in politics still spoke of his popularity, now, with opinion swinging against the war, there was more than a grain of truth in Newcastle's claim that it consisted of 'Beckford, and the Common Council' and now that basis was being challenged. As yet, however, as the militia affair and the election showed, it was still strong enough, and it could still in June, over the capture of Belle-isle, secure an address deliberately intended as an explicit compliment to Pitt and his policies. Beardmore was on the committee which drew up the address which, with its lavish praise of the conquest, its hopes of forcing France to an acceptable peace, but in the meantime giving assurances of support in the prosecution of a just and necessary war, was rightly considered to reflect the views of Beckford and Beardmore. Such a success was especially valued as the product of an alternative policy to commitment to Germany, the use of British forces directly against France as both the Monitor and Mauduit

31. Beckford to Pitt, 5 Mar. 1761, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 67; Beaven, I, p. 292 (quoting an election verse); Hardwicke to Newcastle, 18 Apr. 1761, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 317.
The main concern of the year after the new king's accession was the renewed peace negotiations with France. In its attitude to them the Monitor again shows significant if less marked changes. It was on Frederick's suggestion early in 1761, and again a reflection of his desperate situation, that contacts with France were resumed for a separate peace out of which he thought a general peace would soon grow. In view of the change in public opinion at home, Pitt's initial reluctance was overcome. The new French war minister, Choiseul, seemed eager for peace too, which France's situation seemed to require. Approaches were made which resulted in the exchange of the agents Stanley and Bussy in April, while a congress of all the belligerents was opened at Augsburg. The crucial exchanges were those between France and Britain. Over the next four months proposals and counter-proposals went backwards and forwards against a background of continuing British successes, Belle-isle in June, the news of the fall of Pondichery and Dominica in July. As time passed the negotiations came to turn partly on the terms on which the part of each country in the German war should be ended (and Britain refused to break her commitment to Frederick) but chiefly on the question of the extent of the French exclusion from the North American fisheries. On this they became more and more deadlocked. In the course of the negotiations the differing attitudes of various ministers to their outcome became clear. At one extreme, the duke of Bedford emerged as the spokesman for the view that it was unwise to humiliate France too far and thus provoke the jealousy of other powers. Newcastle was as usual, and with reason, concerned over the cost of the war and on some points he and Hardwicke supported Bedford. Bute and George III took an intermediate position; they wanted peace, but
on the best terms possible for reasons of popularity if nothing else.
Pitt took the firmest line, insisting on high terms and hoping for further successes, but even he was prepared to negotiate over what was to be kept and what given up. In December he laid it down that we must give up considerably, but we must retain a great deal at the same time. He divided his propositions then, either to retain all Canada, Cape Breton and exclude the French from their fishery on Newfoundland, and give up Guadeloupe and Goree; or or retain Guadeloupe and Goree with the exclusion of the French fishery on Newfoundland, and give up some part of Canada and confine ourselves to limits of the lakes etc.

By April he was for insisting on the whole of Canada, Cape Breton and the exclusive rights to the fisheries and islands. In fact, Canada was insisted on throughout the negotiations without any disagreement among the ministry, whatever the fury of debate outside. Newcastle had been converted to this in 1760, on the grounds of its importance to the North American colonies. Pitt stood out not so much over general terms, although there were disagreements there on which he took a hard line, but in imperious attitudes to his colleagues and inhibition of debate. He did take a very unyielding line on the fisheries question, however, at first with the backing of his colleagues but persisting even when they had agreed to concede the fisheries and an island as an abri for French boats. Both Newcastle and Bute thought this an issue which particularly concerned the City and Bute regarded Pitt's attitudes as adopted to please his friends there. But after his defeat he again seemed keen for peace.

As over the negotiations of 1760, the evidence of the Monitor can throw light on the popular pressures on Pitt which at least help to explain his motives. This year, as it turns to the question from May onwards,

it shows itself much more favourable to the idea of peace. Already several references had been made, in a tone rather different from that adopted earlier, to the need and desire for peace. Now there seems a good hope of it. The arguments of those who are against a peace out of hopes of further victory or fears that the distressed state of Britain's allies throws in doubt her retention of her conquests are now rejected. The aims of Britain's just and necessary war have been achieved. War is a burden on the country and an end should be sought as soon as possible. Subsidiary foreign interests should not be allowed to interfere. It is still insisted, however, that the peace must be an advantageous one secured by force of arms, not dependent on treaties, and negotiated by those with a clear grasp of the nation's interest. Not too much attention should be paid to the universal concern of the people for peace, which may be ill-considered or even stirred up by the crafty wiles of the French, against which constant warnings are issued. In the meantime, the war should be vigorously prosecuted.  

The discussion is again very much concerned with possible terms and the demands are still high. New ones, but in line with established interests, concerning Britain's sovereignty of the seas are put forward. More clearly than before distinctions are made between conquests that are essential to the security of British possessions or trade, which must be kept, and those that are not and therefore can be used as bargaining counters. The security of the African, Asiatic and China trades requires the retention of Senegal and Goree and the conquests in India - the first time the Monitor has shown any great interest in the Indian victories.

It is emphasized that Britain cannot be expected to give up anything to her

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38. 303.
hurt for the sake of allies, and the example of Utrecht is used to show
the difficulties which allies can create in peace conferences. The national
interest alone should be the basis of negotiations. 39

The fisheries question features but does not loom large in these
discussions of terms, which suggests perhaps that its importance to Pitt's
friends in the City was exaggerated, although it is strange that he
himself should miscalculate on this. Much more clearly than before,
the Canada versus Guadeloupe controversy, which was the main point of
public interest and still growing, is at the centre of the Monitor's
considerations. In a series of three papers in July and August it answers
what Grant calls perhaps the most able of the pamphlets in the controversy,
entitled Reasons for keeping Guadeloupe at a Peace preferable to Canada,
explained in Five Letters from a Gentleman in Guadeloupe to his Friend
in London. In its reply it mentions favourably a much inferior answer,
A Detection of the false Reasons and Facts, contained in the Five Letters...
by a Member of Parliament, which was attributed by the Auditor to Beckford,
probably solely on the grounds of the trends of its argument which are
very close to those of the Monitor. 40 The Monitor attributes the arguments
in favour of Guadeloupe to French influence. It rejects attacks on the
motives of the sugar planters and merchants, especially the suggestion
that they want to keep the price of sugar high. The present high price
is not due to lack of territories. Then it strongly states the advantages
of Canada. Without it, the security of British possessions in North

39. 303; 304; 307; 313, 18 July 1761; 315, 1 Aug. 1761.
40. Grant, pp. 736-7; the third and fifth letters in the first pamphlet
are dated 26 Oct. and 12 Dec. 1760; Almon, Anecdotes of... Chatham,
dates it Aug. 1761. Full title of the second pamphlet is A Detection
of the False Reasons and Facts, contained in the Five Letters, Entitled,
Reasons for Keeping Guadeloupe at a Peace preferable to Canada, in
which the Advantages of both Conquests are fully and impartially
stated and compared. By a Member of Parliament, London, 1761. The
Auditor 28, 2 Dec. 1762, attributes it to Beckford.
America, the whole point of the war, would be lost. Moreover, Canada has much to offer in trade, especially the fur trade, and is far more important for the encouragement of navigation than the West Indies. If the French are excluded it is no longer true to argue that island colonies are preferable to continental ones. Then North America will secure such an increase of wealth, power and influence to the mother country as to be worth far more than a small sugar island. There are no grounds to fear the depopulation of the mother country through the acquisition of such a large settlement colony. As to the argument that our American plantations, by increasing their territory, will prove less governable, and will be disposed to rival in trade, and even cast off their dependence upon, and the sovereignty of, the mother country; and that the only way to prevent the total defection of our American plantations, is to leave France in possession of Canada, these are possible but not necessary consequences. Britain may become so corrupt that a great empire in North America will rise as the instrument of heaven against her. But it is more likely that the increase of the strength of the colonies will be turned to the aid of the mother country against both domestic and foreign foes. As long as they have room to expand and labour is dear they are unlikely to turn to manufacturing. Furthermore, they have no grievances to stimulate revolt but rather share the benefits of liberty, religion, commerce and protection. And in fact they could join with the enemy more easily, if they were so inclined, if the French were still in Canada. So all the arguments against the retention of Canada are injurious to Great Britain. 41

The Monitor's comments on this series of negotiations shows a much stronger desire for peace than earlier. There is no emphasis now

41. The Monitor 304, 16 May 1761; 314-316, 25 July-8 Aug. 1761; 319, 29 Aug. 1761. The quotation is from 316.
on Britain's ability to continue the war except in absolute necessity. Except briefly over Belle-isle there is not the same mood of exuberant victory or paeans of praise of Pitt, and there are suspicions of allies. Nevertheless, despite the very marked hostility to the German war and criticism of Pitt early in the year, there is no softening in the peace terms demanded. Pitt was justified in feeling that here at least on the question of peace he had his popular support behind him in making a firm stand in general even if on particular issues there was some disparity of interest.

As the negotiations lengthened the Monitor's suspicions of French protraction and deviousness grew and it eventually comes to argue that as France has refused an equitable peace it is safe and just to continue the war. By the beginning of October it regards the negotiations as over. In fact they had come to an end in mid-September, not over the fisheries question but over the issue of Spain which came to the fore as deadlock developed. Suddenly in July the French had formally associated themselves with the grievances the Spanish had been vigorously expressing since September 1760 over ships seized before the outbreak of war, the British settlers in Honduras Bay and the cutting of logwood there, and Spanish claims to the Newfoundland fisheries. The French now demanded satisfaction of these grievances and suggested that Spain be asked to guarantee the forthcoming treaty between Britain and France. The cabinet was united in vigorous rejection of these suggestions. In mid-August the Family Compact and a special convention between France and Spain were signed. They were secret, of course, but it was evident that the two powers had come to some agreement. A month later, after the last exchange

42. 321, 12 Sep. 1761; 323, 26 Sep. 1761; 324, 3 Oct. 1761.
of offers, Stanley was ordered to ask for his passports and the negotiations came to an end. On 3 October the Monitor makes its first reference to the possibility of Spanish help to France but argues there is no need to fear its effects.

Controversy over the attitude which Britain should take towards the increasingly provocative Spanish stance and growing evidence of its understanding with France caused dissensions among the ministers and led to a series of stormy cabinet meetings. On the one hand Pitt, supported only by Temple, was for seizing the initiative by immediate decisive action against Spain, at least the recall of the British ambassador, at best the interception of the Spanish treasure fleet. Other ministers, unready to add another war to the one they wanted to end, favoured a more cautious diplomatic approach to investigate Spanish intentions. This time Pitt could not break the united front against him and, despite alarm at his hints of resignation, no grounds of compromise could be found. On 18 September Pitt and Temple insisted on drawing up their advice in writing for presentation to the king. At a final meeting of 2 October, Pitt announced his intention to resign, using the famous words which were to resound through the ensuing controversy.

I was called by my Sovereign and by the voice of the people to assist the State when others had abdicated the service of it. That being so, no one can be surprised that I will go on no longer since my advice is not taken. Being responsible I will direct, and will be responsible for nothing that I do not direct. 43

Three days later, on 5 October, Pitt surrendered the seals to the king, promising no factious opposition in parliament. On 9 October Temple followed him.

The resignation of Pitt was the first major political event in the

43. Tunstall, Pitt, p. 305.
new reign. After the comparative calm of 1757-61, it resulted immediately in a major revival of political controversy both within and outside parliament and had repercussions on political life for the rest of the 1760's. More directly to the point here, it led to a clarification of the allegiances of both the Monitor and the popular part of the City in the new reign. The resignation was the result of clear policy differences rather than malevolent political intrigue; but it was also the result of the political uncertainties which the new reign had brought, particularly of Pitt's impatient frustration at his loss of sole control of policy. Having lost this one support of his political position, he decided to turn to others. Several competent contemporary observers suggest that Pitt's intransigent demands were intended to lead to resignation so that he would not be associated with a peace which, whatever its terms, could not meet the expectations of his popular supporters. Already there was some suggestion that his popularity was waning. Now, with his position in the cabinet weakening too, he made a gamble to save the popular basis of his political power which he had always so much valued. The next weeks and months were to show what a desperate gamble it was.

Popular reactions outside parliament were the first to be felt. They were watched with the greatest interest and concern by all politicians. In the City, opinion was at first varied. The 'monied interest' continued well-disposed to the administration, according to Newcastle's reports, but the popular reaction was initially one of indignation, and preparations were made for the calling of a common council to express this in some way.


But then this popular indignation was perplexed, perhaps deliberately, by the announcement, simultaneously with the publication of Pitt's resignation in the Gazette of 9 October, of the award of a pension of £300 per year to him and a barony to his wife. First rumours of this were met with incredulity and Beckford made strenuous efforts to spread replies that Pitt had refused the offers. When the rumours were confirmed, incredulity turned to indignation. One observer at least, Sir George Colebrooke, had already expected Pitt's reputation to suffer the fate of Pulteney's if he accepted any reward and it looked as though his expectation would be fulfilled. When the common council met on 13 October it broke up without taking any action over the resignation. 47

The Monitor fully reflects these initial confusions. Its paper of 10 October makes no mention of the resignations, yet is quite different in tone from those immediately preceding it, suggesting shock, bewilderment and an indignation uncertain of its precise object. It is a general and sometimes vehement discussion of the difficulties and dangers of power in general and of the position of the king in a mixed monarchy in particular, especially in the wise choice of ministers. In conclusion to its survey, in evident perplexity, it turns its wrath on its long-standing enemies, Newcastle and his associates, with a comment on the ill effects at home and abroad of a dishonourable peace made in the last reign under the advice of bad councillors. It is greatly to be hoped, therefore, that 'none of those counsellors...be consulted...about the peace,' which is to end the present war. 'Should they threaten to resign; let them depart.' If they should presume to try to assert their power, it is hinted that they can be dismissed.

The paper of the next week is more explicit about events but still uncertain in reaction. 'A late resignation at court,' it says, 'has cast so general a damp upon the spirit of the nation, that it requires all the assistance, that prudence can bring, to quiet the minds, and to prevent hasty conjectures and dangerous resolutions amongst the people.' At least this time the nation is not in the danger it was in after resignations in the past, when great evils had to be rectified. This minister has resigned in full credit with the people and the king, leaving a free parliament and a patriot king. Nevertheless, there is much to be clarified about the late 'and, to all appearance, dissatisfactory' resignation. Was it owing to bodily infirmity - or to the unnatural opposition to necessary measures on the part of the remnants of the ministry so successful in the coalition of '42 (another gibe at Newcastle)? If they still have a footing around the throne, then parliament and people should take action, especially if peace overtures are to be resumed and especially on the question of the fisheries. Although the tone is still warm towards Pitt and there is no hint of dissatisfaction over the pension and peerage, the mood is predominantly one of bewilderment taking refuge in instinctive anti-Newcastle reactions. It amply suggests the embarrassment of Beckford and the confusion of others in the City. As the Monitor later admitted, the response of the City to the resignation was 'a general stagnation of sentiment' to Pitt's disadvantage, and the whole City and all other 'lovers of their country' were alarmed and despondent at the idea, whether artfully spread by his enemies or inferred from the announcement in the Gazette, that Pitt had deserted his country for a pension. 48

No wonder, with the very heart of his popularity threatened, that Pitt

48. The Monitor 325, 10 Oct. 1761; 326, 17 Oct. 1761 (Newcastle noticed bitterly this attempt to turn the blame on him, to Devonshire, 21 Oct. 1761, Add. MS. 32929, f. 428); 330, 14 Nov. 1761.
felt compelled to take action to defend himself. On 17 October there appeared in the Public Ledger a copy of a letter from Pitt which did not name the recipient but which in fact was written to Beckford on 15 October. This explained that his resignation was the result of differences of opinion over Spain and that the rewards followed it, removing the imputation that Pitt had in some way been bought off by the court. Naturally the letter attracted great attention. More than 3000 copies of the paper were sold before noon, by which time the Gazetteer had reprinted its issue for the day with the letter in it, and other papers followed. Leading politicians might indignantly criticize its revelation of cabinet secrets and accuse Pitt of disappointed revengefulness, but the letter served its purpose in bringing back Pitt's 'mad noisy City friends, who were, for a time, displeased with him'. Soon the City was all 'fire and flame'.

On 22 October the common council again met and this time passed unanimously a vote of thanks to Pitt for having aroused the 'ancient spirit' of the nation and greatly extended the sphere of trade and commerce, at the same time expressing their sorrow at his loss at so critical a moment. Instructions to their members were also agreed to, urging them to continue his policies, to insist on no peace without the retention of all, or nearly all conquests, especially in North America, and on the vigorous prosecution of a just and necessary war to reduce France's remaining colonies. They were also to demand an enquiry into the application of supplies over recent years, and into the accounts for forage in Germany. The proceedings were not without

some debate. There was division over the motion regretting the loss
of Pitt, a motion urging him to accept the seals again whenever they
were offered was defeated, and a proposal that an enquiry should be made
into the circumstances of his resignation, made at a preceding private
meeting, was not raised. All these motions touched on the delicate question
of the king's prerogative. Further, in the course of debate, several
expressions in the instructions were softened and the first City member of
parliament and 'father' of the City opposed that on supplies. Yet overall
there was no doubt of the prevailing sentiments of the City or of where
the initiative lay in directing them. Beckford 'roared prodigiously',
treating opponents with great contempt. Moreover, the motion on supplies
and the special attention to the question of forage accounts clearly reflected
his and Pitt's tactics in the previous parliamentary session of diverting
blame to Newcastle for the expense of the German war, the old 'faction'
argument. The alliance of Pitt and the City had been restored. As
Newcastle righteously bewailed, 'they want mischief, violence and clamour;
and, if Mr Pitt will join in that, they don't care what money, or what
rewards he has.'

The City lived up to Newcastle's expectations even more riotously on
the day of the new lord mayor's banquet, 9 November, when, according to
custom in the first year following an accession to the throne, the king and
queen attended. Temple and Pitt also attended on Beckford's special request.
'It is the Universal desire of the people, of all denominations' he wrote
to Temple, 'and a refusal, at this Critical Juncture, would dampen the
ardour and publick Spirit of every well wisher to his Country.' Both along

52. Newcastle to Devonshire, Newcastle to Barrington, 22 Oct., account of
common council meeting, 22 Oct., memoranda, 22 Oct. 1761, Add. MS. 32929,
ff. 437, 446, 442, 435; Birch to Royston, 27 Oct. 1761, Add. MS. 35399,
f. 262 (the quotation about Beckford); GM., XXXI, 1761, pp. 477-8.

the route and at the Guildhall, they were greeted with greater acclaim than the king himself, sometimes in circumstances contrived to point the contrast, while Bute was hissed and pelted by the crowds and only narrowly saved from worse harm. There was little doubt that the demonstration was organized, and the leading part in it was attributed to Beckford. The lord mayor's enquiries discovered that he 'had visited several public-houses over night, and had appointed ringleaders to different stations, and had been the first to raise the huzza in the hall on the entrance of Mr Pitt', although he denied all knowledge of the mobbing of Bute. Viewed from the other side there is no doubt that he deserved Fox's appellation, 'toad eater to the mountebank'.

Not surprisingly the Monitor followed him in service to Pitt. By 24 October, after its initial bewilderment, the paper had embarked on the many-sided and glowing defence of Pitt which was to engross its attention for the next three months and to be referred to often after that. So far, then, Beckford and the Monitor were proving their worth to Pitt in his gamble on the revival of his popularity. Despite the earlier waverings and the present flickers of opposition from more sober and responsible citizens, the stronghold of Pitt's popular support in the City had been secured. This was all the more important as only a handful of other cities followed London's example in voting thanks to Pitt.

There was little that even the most skilful propaganda could represent as an expression of support like the 'rain of gold boxes' of 1757. 'The City and the trading part of the nation' might be warm for Pitt, especially as the

54. Beckford to Pitt, 6 Nov. 1761, Thomas Nuthall to Lady Chatham, 12 Nov. 1761, Correspondence of...Chatham, II, pp. 165, 166-8; Beckford to Temple, 6 Nov. 1761, Chatham papers, PRO 30/8/19, f. 73; Walpole to Mann, 14 Nov. 1761, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 546; Walpole, George the Third I, p. 70; John Brewer, 'The Misfortunes of Lord Bute: A case study in Eighteenth-Century Political Argument and Public Opinion', Historical Journal, XVI, 1, Mar. 1973, p. 5; Lord Holland's Memoir, p. 53. The first quotations is from Walpole, I, p. 70.

55. Walpole to Mann, 14 Nov. 1761, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 546, mentions Exeter, Stirling and York; Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 66, 96, adds Chester, Dublin and 'other cities and towns'.
prospect of war with Spain opened up ever more enticing hopes of plunder and commercial gain, but 'the cooler part of the nation, and the landed interest in general are sick of the war'. The basis of Pitt's popularity was obviously narrowing.

Meanwhile, the first session of the new parliament had opened early in November. In it, the resignation brought to the surface issues which before had simmered below, together with new ones, breaking the relative calm of the period of the coalition ministry with a new series of great debates with major speeches from Pitt. These debates turned on four main themes. There was much reference, especially by those now in opposition, to the uncertainties of the political situation, to new divisions and factions, and argument over the propriety of Pitt's letter of explanation of his resignation, particularly his contention that he resigned in order not to be responsible for measures he was no longer suffered to guide. This led to some heated exchanges over the necessity and desirability of a 'first minister' in such troubled times, in which both Temple and Beckford took a prominent part. Rigby, among others, rubbed home the irony: 'But what! had the city instructed its representatives to demand a First Minister? He had heard the Excise adopted by a sort of First Minister.' Three major questions of foreign policy naturally had much consideration. The issue of relations with Spain and Spanish intentions was fully aired. Then the merits or otherwise of the German war were hotly debated, much


57. The major occasions of debate before Christmas were on the address in reply, 13 Nov., on the estimates for the land forces later in Nov., on the vote for the army in Germany on 9 and 10 Dec. and on 11 Dec. a private motion for papers relating to the Spanish claim to a share in the North American fisheries. Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 69, 71-7, 79-83, 85-96.

58. Ibid., p. 91.
more so than they had been in parliament earlier, although most of the arguments had already appeared in public controversy. Pitt made several full defences of his German policy, in the debate on the address using his famous phrase that 'America had been conquered in Germany.' 59 Thirdly, the course of the peace negotiations and especially the fisheries question were discussed. Pitt, taxed by Beckford with having softened on this issue, now took a firm stand against any further concession, claiming as usual but with justification that he had been overborne by numbers. 60 At first these pre-Christmas debates were fairly moderate in tone. Although Pitt took the opportunity of defending his policies and conduct at some length, he did not set himself up in defiant opposition. As the weeks passed, however, the heat grew and the last debate was the occasion of a vehement attack on Pitt by a new and unknown member, Colonel Barre, which aroused much unfavourable comment. Pitt treated it with disdain but was criticized by some for his failure to give it dignified rebuttal. 61

By the time the parliamentary session resumed after Christmas the war with Spain which Pitt had sought to precipitate had in fact been declared on 4 January. Naturally much debate was occasioned by this development. Then a little later the question of the German war was again brought before parliament by the duke of Bedford and Rigby in debates which embarrassingly reflected the acute divisions in the ministry on this issue. From February onwards, however, the situation in parliament was quieter until May, when the king's message concerning aid to Portugal, under attack by Spain, revived debate. Pitt made another speech defending his German policy, again favouring vigorous prosecution of the war everywhere and giving some if not total support to attacks on the treasury for excessive expenditure. 62

59. Ibid., p. 76.
60. Ibid., pp. 73, 77.
These debates were, of course, even more important as a test of continuing support for Pitt than reactions outside. In this respect they were hardly encouraging. Grenville had told Hardwicke before the session opened that he 'did not imagine that Mr Pitt would have any great following of the Tories...and that Sir Charles Mordaunt and the soberer part of them were sick of Mr Pitt's measures of war, more especially continental, and of the immense expense'. His forecast proved to be correct. Two Tories answered Beckford in the debate on the address, on just these points. Rigby, in attacking the German war, claimed to speak for the country gentlemen, and in the private motion of 11 December, for papers relating to the Spanish claim for a share in the fisheries, their lack of support was obvious and contributed much to the humiliation of Pitt's defeat when the motion was rejected without division. Pitt was further mortified by a sense of lack of support from the house in face of Barre's vicious attacks. After a major speech on the Spanish question in January he took no further part in debates until May, there having been no sign of any strengthening of support. Some of Pitt's erstwhile relatively prominent supporters, such as George Townshend and Richard Glover, were now disillusioned with him and turning to place their hopes on the new king, although Townshend still defended the German war. There was some justification, then, for the king's remark after the debate on the Spanish policy in December: 'I suppose his party consist of that Lord [Strange], Mr Beckford, Mr Cooke, and perhaps a

very few more who are of the same hot headed stamp. Pitt certainly had
good reason to be grateful to Beckford for his part in these debates.
The latter now stood out as the most vocal and active of his committed and
recognized supporters. He spoke at great length 'with his usual rhodo-
montade' on the address, expatiating on the strength of Britain's present
situation, supporting the desirability of a defiant answer to Spain, defending
the German war although admitting its expense and demanding that two
things be obtained in a peace, 'the security of America and of our fisheries'.
He defended the German war again on 9 December, seconded the motion on
Spanish papers, and rescued Pitt in his embarrassment at Barre's attack
by challenging him over the use of the king's name. After Christmas
he 'harangued' at length on the ease with which the country could wage the
war with Spain and in May he joined with vigour in accusations of weakness
and irresolution in the ministry, declaring 'that the City suspected the
ministry of wavering, and demanded to have their old minister again'.

If Beckford was deeply involved in controversy in parliament, the
Monitor was equally so in that raging outside. Its defence of Pitt springs
from the concerns of this, rather than what was going on inside parliament.
The controversy was equally testing to Pitt's political position as the
initial reactions to his resignation in the City, and at least as important,
so far as 'popularity' was concerned, as the parliamentary debates. It
was in large part provoked by government and especially by Bute's efforts
in conjunction with Dodington and Fox to create a favourable press after
the resignation, which resulted in 'pamphlets and satire' traducing Pitt.

64. Dodgington, Journal, p. 441 fn. 1; George III to Bute, 11 Dec. 1761,
[ c. 18 Dec. 1761], Sedgwick, Letters of George III to Lord Bute,
pp. 73-4; Newcastle to Devonshire, 9 Dec. 1761, Add. MS. 32932, f. 90;
Charles Townshend on the Supplies for the Army 1761, [December], Add.
MS. 38334 (Liverpool papers), ff. 19-22.

65. Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 72-3, 88, 127; Newcastle to Devonshire,
9 Dec. 1761, West's account, 25 Jan. 1762, Add. MSS.32932, f. 90,
32933, f. 477; John Millbank to Rockingham, 28 Dec. 1761, Memoirs of...
Rockingham, I, p. 82. The quotations are from Walpole.
Then, in December, it becomes involved in a bitter and
295.
These in turn affected newspapers initially well disposed, although
Walpole thought that the first efforts had by their very violence helped
to confirm the City reaction in Pitt's favour. There is little doubt
that, overall, Pitt had the worst of the pamphlet and newspaper controversy.
Almon refers to 'prodigious streams of abuse...in all the channels of
conveyance to the public'. Both the Monthly Review and the Critical Review
remark disparagingly on several efforts in his defence although generally
they were not hostile to him. The Monitor itself makes wondering and
increasing allusion to the bitter personal attacks on him. There is
equally no doubt that the Monitor was a, if not the, mainstay of Pitt's
defence. It answers some of the major contributions to the debate. On
14 November it takes up one of the earliest pamphlet contributions to the
controversy, A Letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of B[ute], which had
argued very convincingly that 'the resignation of one minister, be his
abilities, his station, and his popularity ever so great, never can, or
at least never ought, in the present juncture of unanimity, distress the
measures of a prince beloved by his people, or a people, or a people trusted
by their prince'. Then, in December, it becomes involved in a bitter and
prolonged exchange with the author of probably the most effective attack
on Pitt, A Letter from a Right Honourable Person and the Answer to it,
translated into Verse..., by Philip Francis. This makes its points especially

66. Brewer, pp. 12-13; Hardwicke to Royston, 17 Oct. 1761, Harris, Hardwicke,
III, p. 265; Walpole to countess of Ailesbury, 28 Nov. 1761, ed.
Toynbee, V, p. 147; Birch to Royston, 19, 27 Oct. 1761, 2 Jan. 1762,
Add. MS. 35399, ff. 261, 263, 267; Walpole, George the Third, I, pp.
66, 83, 85, 96-7.
67. Haig, p. 50, quoting Memoirs of John Almon, Bookseller of Picadilly;
pp. 468-9; the Critical Review, Nov. 1761, pp. 394-5, Dec. 1761,
p. 478; the Monitor 330, 14 Nov. 1761; 332, 5 Dec. 1761; 354, 1 May 1762.
68. 330, 14 Nov. 1761; 332, 28 Nov. 1761; A Letter to the Right Hon. the
Earl of B[ute], on a late important Resignation and its Consequences,
the quotation is from p. 75.
through the notes to its verse rendering. The Monitor's bitterly polemical answer to it provoked a rejoinder, A Letter from the Anonymous Author of the Letters Versified to the Anonymous Writer of the Monitor which rebukes the Monitor for becoming 'strangely passionate of late', for its personal attacks on all but 'the Right Honourable, and his patriotic Friends...the well-instructed Alderman, and That Flower of City Knighthood, Sir James...', and for its unsubstantiated insinuations against a 'Frenchified faction' and assertions that no letter from Pitt to Newcastle requesting a pension exists. It concentrates mainly on the German war and its expenses and contains many mocking references to Beckford and Hodges and jibes at Pitt and Beckford for not answering Barre's charges of inconsistency. The Monitor also takes much notice of various letters hostile to Pitt in the Gazetteer as earlier it had noticed them in connection with the peace. These occasion some of its most hostile references to the Gazetteer but because the latter has not survived for these months the exchange cannot be described in any detail. It is of interest that the Monitor does not take up, at least not explicitly, Shebbeare's contribution to the attack on Pitt, A Letter to the Right Hon. Author of a Letter to a Citizen, with Animadversions on the Answer thereto and on the behaviour of the Corporation of the City of London. Indeed, so concerned is it with the defence of Pitt that it takes little notice of the strictures fairly generally made on the behaviour of the City and its

69. The Monitor 333-4, 5-12 Dec. 1761; Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 96, says that a vote of thanks to Pitt for his services to the country was rejected at Leicester after the reading of this pamphlet, which the Monthly Review notes in Nov., p. 390. See also the Monthly Review's praise of its sequel, p. 501.

70. The pamphlet is noted in the appendix to the Monthly Review, 1761, p. 501, and in the Critical Review, Jan. 1762, p. 75. The quotations come from pp. 7, 8, 20 and the reference to a letter about a pension is on p. 11.

71. The Gazetteer letters are referred to in A Letter from the Anonymous Author..., p. 10; the Monitor 304, 16 May 1761; 330, 14 Nov. 1761; 332, 28 Nov. 1761; 338, 9 Jan. 1762.
instructions, although one paper is devoted to their defence. Later, in April, May and June, the pamphlets occasioned by the publication of the Papers Relative to the Rupture with Spain, on which Wilkes's Observations marked his major debut into political controversy, are fully commented on, the Monitor being drawn in by an 'abusive' notice in A Full Exposition..., one of the answers to Wilkes. The Monitor is frequently referred to or quoted in other works in the controversy and government authors were directed to attack it. Although it is far from taking note explicitly of all contributions to the debate, there is no doubt that it was central to it. An examination of its defence can therefore do much to illustrate the main lines of argument.

The defence follows three main lines: the justification of Pitt's foreign policy, the constitutional propriety of the resignation and Pitt's explanation of it and answers to personal attacks. Not surprisingly, the paper accepts without question Pitt's explanation that his resignation sprang from policy differences over Spain, so naturally much of the argument turns on whether or not his assessment of the intentions of Spain was a just one. As events move towards war and especially when papers on the subject are published the discussion becomes more and more detailed. First, history is surveyed to show that Spain, like France, is insatiably ambitious, unduly jealous of Great Britain and perfidious. Only Pitt's vigorous measures were the answer. To one bad measure, allowing France to share the fisheries, he was prevailed on to agree; he would rightly accept


73. The Monitor 352-3, 17-24 Apr. 1762; 358-9, 29 May-5 June 1762.


(Cont'd)
no more compromise. Sometimes through these elaborations of Spain's unfriendliness shine glints of City ambitions. If Pitt's measures were followed Britain might soon import herself the produce of the mines of Mexico and Peru. Later, the paper is concerned to answer the charge that Pitt was implacably set on war against Spain, that he was guilty, as accused in the memorial of the Spanish ambassador published in the *Gazetteer*, of unbounded ambition and haughtiness. On the contrary he responded merely with the necessary firmness of a wise and steady statesman, sincerely conciliatory until convinced of his opponent's obduracy. Later still, the controversy over the published papers on the breach with Spain provokes a detailed consideration of the evidence they provide and of their completeness. The paper supports the contention that papers are being deliberately held back to help to justify the ministers and destroy Pitt's reputation and maintains its contention that Spain's unfriendly intentions were clear enough to justify Pitt's stand. There was apparently every need for this careful defence of Pitt's Spanish policies in the City, for there is strong evidence that as the prospect of war with Spain became a reality not only the 'monied interest' but merchants, more fearful of disruption than hopeful of increase of trade, and others including some of Pitt's 'greatest Admirers' grew wary. When the declaration of the Spanish ambassador threw the blame on Pitt it was a question 'whether that will not lose him with the People, who do not relish the Legacy he has left them as a minister'.

The City no longer shared Beckford's easy confidence of two months before

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74. (Cont'd) Nov. 1761, p. 477 and noted as 'that zealous advocate for the late great Minister' in the *Monthly Review*, appendix. 1761, p. 501.


'about the comfortable state, in which he represented the Nation to be.' 77

The defence of Pitt's foreign policy widens out to include the even more contentious question of the German war, over which controversy still raged in the wake of Mauduit's various works, even more outdoors than inside parliament according to Symmer. Financial interests at least in the City were very much concerned about the burden of it. 78 Frederick is described by the Monitor as the ally 'who is best able to assist us in the execution of those plans on the continent, which are at all times necessary for the protection and extention of our trade and commerce' and to prevent French attempts at a monopoly. Without continental connections there would have been no hope of preserving the North American trade either, or the Protestant interest, the balance of power and the liberties of Europe. The arguments of commerce now figure very prominently beside these long-established justifications. Later, attacks on the king of Prussia are rejected as perfidy towards allies which would soon forfeit 'all faith and interest with the princes and states upon the continent; without which our commerce would soon dwindle to nothing'. Pitt is defended against the charge that he adopted continental measures out of complaisance to the old king. Once again the excessive expense of the war is blamed on 'a set in the ministry, who could not bear to see him above their heads, who grudged his success, and loaded every measure...with such extraordinary expences' so as to discredit him and bring him down. Later, in February, various suggestions are offered about ways of financing the war more economically, such as raising supplies 'within the year' instead of adding to the national debt, and supplying the German army from Britain rather than sending money

77. Newcastle to Devonshire, 3 Dec. 1761, memoranda, 7 Dec. 1761, West to Newcastle, 29 Dec. 1761, Add. MSS. 32931, ff. 388, 427, 32932, f. 404; Symmer to Mitchell, 1 Jan. 1762, Add. MS. 6839, f. 246 (the second quotation); Birch to Royston, 2, 9 Jan. 1762, Add. MS. 35399, ff. 266-7, 270 (the first and third quotations).

abroad. Three papers in December and January provide a full answer to the charge that Pitt has tricked the nation into a ruinous continental war inconsistent with his former principles. Again a sharp distinction is made between the ruinous policies of his predecessors and those of Pitt. Despite the burden of these policies, he accepted office in face of national disaster and in response to the urgings of his patriotic friends. Soon he showed how he could adapt them to the true interests of Britain by means of the Prussian alliance. While Prussia was exerting herself in diverting France on the continent Pitt wisely refused to send troops; but when circumstances became more favourable then troops could be spared without any diminution of effort elsewhere. So 'whatever share Mr Pitt took in the German war, he improved it for his country's interest.' The only valid objection is the enormous expense; but yet again it is elaborated at length that this is not his fault. This series of papers seems to answer in anticipation the argument of a pamphlet dated 18 January 1762 and misleadingly entitled Observations relating to British and Spanish Proceedings. This quotes at length the Monitor's dialogue of 1758 between Harry and Will in order to attack Pitt's adoption of continental measures in defiance of the principles there enunciated. It rejects all justifications of the measures and suggests - this seems its main point - that Pitt's whole war policy has been dictated by subservience to West Indian interests. Apparently the Monitor disdained to take up this challenge directly.79

In answer to yet more detailed and 'singular invectives' against Pitt, the Monitor defends, also in detail and by a survey of the course of the

79. The Monitor 331, 21 Nov. 1761 (the first quotation); 334, 12 Dec. 1761 (the third quotation); 336, 26 Dec. 1761; 337, 2 Jan. 1762; 339, 16 Jan. 1762 (the fourth quotation); 343-6, 13-27 Feb., 6 Mar. 1762; 348, 20 Mar. 1762; 349, 27 Mar. 1762; 359, 5 June 1762 (the second (quotation). For the Observations..., see above fn. 74. For the dialogue of 1758 see above p. 184.
war and its major events, Pitt's claims to a major share of the credit for the successes of the war, as their planner and inspiration. Through all the defence of Pitt, as well as in more general papers concerned with the war at this time, the lesson is as before: Pitt's policies must be continued. "Intrepidity and perseverance in vigorous national measures, are the surest and only means to reap the benefit of our arms." The Family Compact is an extended and more dangerous form of the overweening ambitions of France, as is demonstrated by their memorial to Portugal, which among other things raises the prospect of a religious war to extirpate protestantism. In face of such ambition there is no doubt of the justness of Britain's part in the war and she has still ample strength to fight on while her enemies are reduced to extremities. So it is necessary, desirable and possible for Britain to push on with the war with all vigour, to give all possible aid to Portugal (an opinion not universally shared in the City) and to listen to any proposals of peace only with the sword in the hand, like Pitt.

On the future of the German war the paper is more equivocal. Its justification is more retrospective and hope springs not from further vigorous British action but from changing circumstances, particularly the sudden death of Elizabeth of Russia and the accession of the strongly pro-Prussian czar, Peter, which dramatically changed Frederick's dire situation. The Monitor hopes for much from the possibilities thus opened up. It still continues to insist that despite these changed prospects for Prussia allies must not be abandoned and that duly regulated continental

80. The Monitor 348 (the quotation); 349.
81. 340, 23 Jan. 1762; 341, 30 Jan. 1762; 342, 6 Feb. 1762; 350, 3 Apr. 1762, 351, 10 Apr. 1762; 355, 8 May 1762; 356, 15 May 1762.
82. 329, 7 Nov. 1761 (the quotation); 340; 341; 355; 356. On City opinion on aid to Portugal see Watkins to Newcastle, 12, 26 Feb., 26 Apr. 1762, Add. MSS. 32934, f. 309, 32935, f. 93, 32937, f. 412.
connections are wise, yet in the same paper it strongly argues for a reversion to Britain's traditional reliance on naval strategy and a militia.

It is clear that the main theatres of the vigorous prosecution of the war it urges are to be elsewhere. 83

Equally prominent, at least at first, with foreign policy in this controversy was the argument over the constitutional propriety of Pitt's justification of his resignation, particularly again his claim to 'guide' measures. This was rejected as insolent and unconstitutional and prompted cutting attacks in pamphlets on Pitt's arrogance. 84 The Monitor admits that over Spanish policy Pitt's was only one voice against a majority and usually the majority rightly carries the day. Pitt, however, was more than the ordinary single voice. In time of dire disaster he had been entrusted with the sole planning and execution of war measures and had achieved great success. Now, suddenly, he was reduced to the status of a mere individual again by a majority misled by selfish motives. Yet he, because of his position, would be held chiefly accountable to king and people for the outcome. He resigned, therefore, not out of any wish to be a 'dictator' but because he could not exercise his own office as secretary properly and because he was determined to avoid becoming the passive instrument of iniquitous measures. In contrast to Walpole, and to Essex, he was not seeking to usurp power not lawfully delegated to him or to guide without due subordination to royal authority, but to execute the office given to him. To have continued to acquiesce in measures of which he did not approve would have been a breach of the trust of the people who had given him their confidence. A mere protest would not have removed his responsibility, either formally or in

83. The Monitor 342, 6 Feb. 1762; 346, 6 Mar. 1762; 350, 3 Apr. 1762.
84. E.g. Walpole to Mann, 14 Nov. 1761, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 546; Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 66.
the eyes of the people, as the blame heaped on him over the German war and
the fisheries concession shows. 'Therefore the resignation...of the right
honourable gentleman from a post he could not defend, and at a crisis, in
which he must have lost his honour, had he continued therein, is defensible
by common reason and upon the principles of patriotism.'\textsuperscript{85} So the Monitor
claims for Pitt a special position, in part conveyed by the confidence of
the people, which gave his views special weight and placed on him special
responsibility which a majority vote could not override. In this sense he
was 'at the helm' and if his measures were overridden he had no honourable or
constitutional alternative but to resign. In these arguments the paper is very
close to Pitt's own claims put to the cabinet in the meeting of 2 October and
in his letter to Beckford, and defended in parliament.\textsuperscript{86} It breathes much
of Pitt's own arrogant self-confidence. Surprisingly, but fortunately
for its own consistency in the months ahead, the paper does not go to the
lengths of Beckford and Temple in asserting the need for a first minister.
In answer to the subsidiary criticism that Pitt had no right or need to
publish his reasons for resigning, the Monitor elaborates on the strong
popular despondency in the City and elsewhere and the threat to his well-
earned reputation. His political existence was at stake; he had a right to
defend himself and the divisions in cabinet he revealed were already in fact
well known.\textsuperscript{87}

In the early papers in defence of Pitt much play is made on the reaction
of the people, first their bewilderment, then their fear and apprehension
of the consequences of Pitt's removal. He is the first minister to resign
in full esteem with the nation. Therefore

\begin{quote}
let every good, honest and loyal subject unite in
most dutiful wishes, and endeavour to prevent the unhappy
turn, which an alteration in his measures must necessarily
produce at this juncture...let us hope that his Majesty has
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{85} The Monitor 328, 31 Oct. 1761; 330, 14 Nov. 1761; 331, 21 Nov. 1761 (the
quotation); 332, 26 Nov. 1761.

\textsuperscript{86} Yorke, Hardwicke, III, pp. 279-30; Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{87} The Monitor 330, 14 Nov. 1761; 331, 21 Nov. 1761.
wisdom and goodness enough to detect and frustrate all
bad intentions...and to restore to his faithful people that
peace of mind, satisfaction and content, which they have so
manifestly shewn under the ministry of Mr PITT, by replacing
him with effectual power and authority in the management
of the national interests.

Of course the people have no right to dictate to the king his choice of
ministers but a wise king will not totally disregard their views. Here the
paper seems well set to return to its favourite device of rousing the people.
Surprisingly, as it gets involved in defence of Pitt's foreign policy,
this tactic is not continued. Some time later, in response to sarcastic
attacks, the City's right to address and instruct is defended fully. Yet
no effort is made - perhaps out of hopelessness of success - to stir up
addresses and instructions elsewhere. 88

Finally in its defence of Pitt, the Monitor becomes more and more
involved in answering personal attacks against him. The pension is a just
reward for national services openly rendered not a return for some secret
services past or promised, and as such it is not inconsistent with Pitt's
past professions which condemned only corrupt pensions. Current accounts
of Pitt's last interview with the king, with their tales of obsequious
thanks and tears of gratitude, are denied, apparently because they implied
an excessive sense of obligation. Much later, criticisms of Pitt's
coalition with Newcastle, that it was a connivance in the dissipation of
public money, are rejected. Finally, insinuation that Pitt's popularity
is the product of mere political 'enthusiasm' or of much pains in promoting
it are also indignantly denied. It is grounded only in his merit and
successes. As time passes the paper expresses fear that the acrimonious
attacks on Pitt will disrupt national unity and the vigorous prosecution
of the war to the advantage of the enemy and probably with their encourage-

88. 326, 17 Oct. 1761; 327, 24 Oct. 1761 (the quotation); 328, 31 Oct. 1761;
330; 331; 335, 19 Dec. 1761; 338, 9 Jan 1762.
ment. The people and especially their rulers must dispel and disappoint these enemy hopes. 89

In all, then, Pitt is the patriot minister, above detraction and scandal. 90

So involved does the Monitor become in his defence that it makes no reference at all to the questions of the militia which were again agitated in these months. Pitt and Temple warmly took up the question of its continuance, now urgent, and a bill was introduced in December 1761, and after considerable debate, passed in April 1762. Beckford spoke in debate on 19 March in support of a 'perpetual' militia. Again obviously the question was not considered of great importance to the Monitor's readers. 91 More surprisingly, the preoccupation with the defence of Pitt runs over the time of Newcastle's resignation to which no direct reference is made. The resignation arose out of differences over the German war, particularly over whether the subsidy to Prussia should be continued and parliament asked for a vote of credit of £1 million or £2 million, to provide for the subsidy as well as aid to Portugal. Newcastle, with Devonshire, felt that honour and Britain's need for some ally in Europe demanded the renewal of the subsidy despite the bellicosity of Prussia, but was isolated in the cabinet. On 12 May the house of commons was asked for a vote of only 1 million; on 26 May, Newcastle's resignation was finally made public. The Monitor reflects this second major political development of the reign only in somewhat less antagonistic references to Newcastle and a direction of its antipathy more generally to the present ministers. Disparaging of public traducings of Pitt merges into a growing attack on them parallel to Beckford's in parliament, as inexperi-

89. 333, 5 Dec. 1761; 334, 12 Dec. 1761; 349, 27 Mar. 1761; 351, 10 Apr. 1762; 355, 8 May 1762. For the stories of Pitt's interviews with the king, see AR., IV, 176, pp. 44-5.


91. Western, pp. 184-93.
enced, irresolute, unproven in ability, self-seeking. The 'harvest of our successes is left in the hands of reapers, who have not had opportunity to give many proofs of their abilities for such a work'. With the first brief reference to the evils of favouritism at the end of the paper of 1 May and the first extended attack on 22 May the Monitor is clearly moving from the defence of Pitt to the next and most aggressive stage of its political battles. 92

In these crucial months following his resignation, when Pitt's political position faced a series of real crises and tests, there is no doubt of the importance to him of the Monitor in public debate or of Beckford in parliament and the City. In the City Beckford was clearly prominent now as a popular leader, his awkward personality not always conducive to co-operation perhaps, but as devoted to Pitt as ever and with Beardmore as his loyal ally and henchman. 93 As his position in the City strengthened he began to develop - or at least there is more evidence of his talking about - his popular radical programme in tones similar to those never far from the surface in the Monitor. Expatiating on the strength of the nation in his speech on the address in reply in November 1761 he talked much of 'the people':

The sense of the people, Sir, is a great matter; I don't mean the mob; neither the top nor the bottom, the scum is perhaps as mean as the dregs, and as to your nobility, about 200 men of quality, what are they to the body of the nation. Why, Sir, they are subalterns.... I say Sir they receive more from the public than they pay to it....When I talk of the sense of the people, I mean the middling people of England - the manufacturer, the yeoman-the merchant, the country gentleman, they who bear all the heat of the day, and who pay all taxes to supply all the expences of court and government. They have a right Sir to interfere in the condition and conduct of the nation which makes them easy or uneasy who feel most of it, and Sir the people of England, taken in this limitation,

92. The Monitor 351, 10 Apr. 1762; 354, 1 May 1762; 355, 8 May 1762; 357, 22 May 1762. For Beckford, see above p. 294. The quotation is from 355.

93. Hardwicke (to Newcastle, 1 Feb. 1761, Add. MS. 32918, f. 177) hints that Beckford's intervention might cause division among the supporters of the reorganization of the City militia. As it turned out, however, his leadership was successful. Birch to Royston, 27 June 1761, Add. MS. 35399, f. 209, makes one of the few joint references to Beckford and Beardmore.
are a good natured, well intentioned, and very sensible people, who know better perhaps than other nation under the sun whether they are well governed or not.

And in his speech to the livery after his re-election in 1761 he spoke of the one deficiency in the constitution, 'that little pitiful boroughs send members to parliament equal to great cities; and it is contrary to the maxim, that power should follow property.'

Pitt's popularity might well be lessening elsewhere, although to some degree he was saved by Bute's failure to make peace and avoid war with Spain, but Beckford and the Monitor had preserved for him a strong foothold of popularity in the City, to use if he could or would.

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94. Add. MS. 38334 (Liverpool papers), f. 29; LEP., 4-7 Apr. 1761, front page.
95. Symmer to Mitchell, 29 Jan., 19 Mar. 1762, Add. MS. 6839, ff. 251, 259; Lord Holland's Memoir, p. 75.
Following the resignation of Newcastle, the ministry was reconstructed, Bute becoming first lord of the treasury and George Grenville taking his place as secretary of state, with his brother-in-law, Egremont, as the other secretary. As chancellor of the exchequer, Bute at length appointed Sir Francis Dashwood, an independent of eccentric reputation but with no experience in office and little ability in finance. Despite the removal of Pitt and Newcastle the ministry was made no more united by the changes and political uncertainty and instability simply increased. Parliament was soon prorogued, so the ministry had some respite from the direct effects of their weakness. Over the next six months, the duke of Newcastle, disorientated in an unaccustomed position, dithered between constitutional propriety and open opposition; Hardwicke urged caution, while Pitt scorned any formal connection with Newcastle, and the royal family, especially the duke of Cumberland, again began to take a hand in political manoeuvring. Bute and his colleagues, concerned to strengthen their position, held out several baits to Newcastle and even to Pitt, which were refused. What would come of this jostling and negotiating would not be clear until parliament met.

If the ministry was given some respite from attacks in parliament, its situation was less happy in other respects. The 'violent fermentations in the political world', sparked off by the resignation of Pitt, continued elsewhere, and were manifested particularly in a violent and remarkable
campaign against Bute.¹ There had been some hints of hostility to him and the king's mother early in the reign but these had soon subsided.²

Now the major initiative in intensifying the attack was taken by the Monitor. Already its antipathies had been directed away from their traditional focus on Newcastle's 'faction' to increasingly bitter attacks on other ministers. Now on 22 May they were given new force in a daring paper on favourites.³ The initiative was that of a new hand, one who had first tried his skill with some success on the Spanish papers question and saw his chance of furthering his political fortunes in the growing excitement - John Wilkes. His sally attracted immediate attention even at the heart of politics. Mrs Montagu was asked her opinion of it by a courtier in the sacred precincts of the king's drawing room.

Soon, on Temple's initiative, Wilkes's rather too provocative energies were largely diverted away from the established Monitor to the North Briton, the first issue of which appeared on 5 June.⁴ These papers were to form the spearhead of the campaign against Bute. Meanwhile Bute had taken a hand against his adversaries. On 29 May the first issue of the Briton, written by Tobias Smollett, appeared as an explicit answer to the Monitor.

It was joined on 12 June, after the appearance of the North Briton, by the Auditor, written by Arthur Murphy.⁵ Soon a great battle of the weeklies was raging, surpassing that of 1756-7 in vehemence and virulence, and

1. The campaign is described fully by Brewer, especially pp. 5-17.
2. See above p. 267.
3. The Monitor 357, 22 May 1762. Brewer (p. 12) dates the intensified attack from the appearance of the North Briton but Wilkes's efforts in the Monitor mark the real beginning, as the Briton 10, 31 July 1762, recognizes. Dodington, now Lord Melcombe (to Bute, 13 Apr. 1762, H.M.C., Various Collections, VI, p. 53) gives an even earlier date for the attacks 'in writing...in the strongest and most audacious manner', but this is not borne out in the periodical literature.
5. Other weeklies made short-lived appearances, e.g., the pro-Pitt Patriot which ran for five issues from 19 June.
attracting much attention. 'The new administration begins tempestuously,' wrote Walpole to Mann. 'My father was not more abused after twenty years than Lord Bute is in twenty days. Weekly papers swarm, and like other swarms of insects, sting.' Symmer, too, commented on the 'Storm of abusive Opposition...from periodical Papers,' The Gentleman's Magazine began a new feature, a regular report on the political papers, with summaries and often extensive quotation, in June, with the comment that the 'Political Disputes which have for a long time been suspended, seem, upon the late change of Ministry, to be revived with greater virulence than ever'. Other magazines at least began if they did not persist with similar features, and many newspapers carried extracts of varying lengths from the weeklies. At the same time the onset of the weekly interchanges provoked an "avalanche" of other forms of propaganda, pamphlets and letters in the newspapers, predominantly anti-Bute. As Campbell, one of his pensioned writers, had warned Bute, his efforts to secure a favourable press and especially the foundation of government weeklies had simply set off a press war of a kind in which defence is always less successful than attack.  

The great battle, only the Monitor's part in which can be done justice here, ranged over all the major issues of controversy, especially in foreign policy, since the beginning of the war, in attack and defence of the leading persons involved. Although Wilkes's chief efforts were diverted to the North Briton where he turned them at first chiefly to the anti-Scottish theme against Bute, Beckford and Temple and the writers and papers they patronized


7. GM., XXXII, 1762, p. 269; the RM. and Scots Magazine began similar features and the PA., LC., LE., St James's Chronicle and Lloyd's Evening Post carried extracts. For other propaganda and Campbell's warning see Brewer, pp. 12, 15, 16-17.
evidently worked with some degree of co-operation. 8 Certainly Wilkes continued to write for the Monitor and indeed provided the main distinctive thrust of its part in the attack on Bute, through a series of papers on the favourites theme he had initiated, extending until the end of October. These use the well-tried device of historical examples, a device Wilkes used only once in the North Briton and that in the number originally intended for the Monitor. 9 The papers show, despite disingenuous disclaimers of any contemporary parallels and mock relief that none are possible, the devastating effects that could be achieved by this means of avoiding the rigours of the law. First a contemporary but foreign example is used, Count Bruhl of Saxony, then La Pompadour of France and a series of English ones. Probably the most daring of all in its implication, apart from the parallel between Bute and the king and Sejanus and Tiberius suggested by the motto of the first two, is the paper of 9 October, dealing with Isabella, the wife of Edward II, and Mortimer. The lesson of the series is well-stated in the opening paper:

Reading this passage in Tacitus, it readily occurred to me how dangerous it is both to the prince and his people, for him to have a favourite; or to be so weak as to give himself up to the management of any one of his subjects, in the government of his dominions, and in the pursuit of national glory. Where this has been the misfortune... [t]he king has ended his days in anxiety and distraction, and his subjects crushed to pieces by oppression.

A favourite, the paper goes on, is one who without any merit, experience or recommendation, has been able to acquire an almost exclusive influence. The reiterated theme of these papers is the means used to achieve this: sycophantic flattery, the pretence of some special affection for the king, a 'female partiality' helping the favourite in his rise. Frequently,

the favourites are of foreign origin and prefer their own countrymen to positions of importance (but the Monitor leaves to the North Briton most of the play on anti-Scots feeling). Once their hold is established it is virtually unbreakable. The result is the subordination of the public good to the private interest of the favourite in his search for arbitrary power. More particularly, his ascendancy is likely to lead to vacillation in foreign policy, mismanagement of war, diversion of effort to the favourite's schemes for arbitrary power, an inglorious collusive peace 'at any price', misapplication of public money, contempt for the nobility, the edging of all able men out of office. The people will become discontented and will assert their right to protest until at length the king himself will be in danger, the glorious prospects of his reign ruined by recourse to favourites.

The contemporary applications are manifold and manifest. The Sejanus - Tiberius references in the early papers provoked challenge from the Briton until the ministerial paper quickly learnt the dangers of drawing its opponent's parallels for it. The telling parallel suggested in the La Pompadour paper between the award of the order of the Holy Ghost to the empty-headed de Bernis with whom she was infatuated and the award of the garter to Bute was particularly noted by Almon as causing offence.10 Certainly the general lessons are unequivocally insisted upon: 'a limited monarchy, a mixed government, a free people, and the most severe laws for the punishment of evil counsellors' have not preserved Britain from favourites. Therefore, 'no time can be improper; no care too premature, to recollect, and to inculcate the disasters, and the means, by which they fell upon our ancestors'. All princes and all favourites should be

10. The Briton 1, 29 May 1762; 3, 12 June 1762; the North Briton 1, 5 June 1762; the Monitor 357; John Almon, [The History of the Late] Minority. [Exhibiting the conduct, principles, and views of that party during the years 1762, 1763, 1764 and 1765.] London 1766, p. 59 fn.
warned. In answer to the series, the Auditor attempted the portraits of the favourite of the venal and the favourite of the mob unflatteringly compared to the favourite of the prince but there really was no effective answer to this skilful use of historical examples which could avoid the Briton's mistake of making the parallels explicit.

The campaign against Bute was not solely concerned with his personal position, however. It was even more concerned with his policies and success as a minister, and papers on these are interspersed with those on favourites. In fact the colonial war anyway continued to be successful. The final fall in February of Martinique, against which an expedition had been planned and launched in 1761, was followed by most of the remaining French West Indian islands. Attention was then turned to the strategic Spanish centre, Havannah, which bore fruit in August with its fall after a two months' seige. Plans made at the same time for another blow against Spain resulted in the fall of Manilla in the Philippines in October. Rich prizes were captured by the British navy. The only real setback to British arms was the capture of Newfoundland by the French in June, but they were fairly easily expelled three months later.

Uppermost in the minds of the ministers, however, were hopes of peace. Secret approaches were resumed within ten days of Pitt's resignation and by the beginning of April were at a stage where direct formal negotiations could begin again. In the exchanges which followed, the chief issue was the West Indian settlement. The British held out for some time for the retention of Santa Lucia with its excellent harbour but against the wishes of Grenville this was not persisted with. Other difficulties arose over the exact details of the Mississippi line as the boundary of the hinterland of the British

11. The Monitor 363, 3 July 1762; (the quotations); 372, 4 Sep. 1762; 377, 9 Oct. 1762.
12. The Auditor, 2, 17 June 1762; 5, 8 July 1762.
American colonies. By the end of August the negotiating powers were ready for a formal exchange of plenipotentiaries. In early September the duke of Bedford left for Paris while the duc de Nivernois came to London. While the final terms were being hammered out the long-expected news arrived of the fall of Havannah. This caused further division among the British ministers, the majority holding out against Bute and the king for demanding some compensation for its return. Eventually Florida was demanded, and France was so keen for peace that she was prepared to cede what was to remain of Louisiana to Spain if Spain agreed to the British demand. News of the fall of Manilla came too late to affect the terms. The preliminaries were signed in Paris on 3 November and arrived in London on the 9th, the opening of parliament having been delayed until the 25th to allow for their consideration. On 1 December the cessation of arms by sea and land was formally proclaimed in Britain.

Especially as continued British successes whetted appetites, public interest in events and the negotiations was intense, and the varying estimates of success or failure were reflected in fluctuations of the stocks. The weeklies both reflected and stimulated this interest by their constant debate of the issues involved. The Monitor (with the North Briton) refuses to allow any credit to the present ministry for any further successes. 'Should they be ascribed to the wisdom and vigour of the present administration; it would be dressing the jackdaw in the peacock's feathers.' Rather they are responsible for delays in sending help to Portugal and for failures which throw in doubt Britain's continued naval control of the Mediterranean. A little later the fall of Newfoundland provides grounds for the elaboration of this theme and for a contrast of

their 'achievements' with those of Pitt. Naturally the ministerial papers take a different view. To this particular aspect of the debate the Monitor adds nothing substantial or distinctive.

More widely, the argument ranges over the whole of Pitt’s foreign policy and in answer to reiterated old charges against him for changing his principles over the German war the Monitor again engages in his defence. The Briton’s attacks on the Prussian subsidy are rebutted with the well-established defences of the alliance and a new and strong assertion of its popularity. If the ministers hope to win public support by abandoning Prussia in the name of frugality and economy then they will be disappointed. This is again emphasized much later when the virtues of Pitt’s middle way in German connections are again extolled. Not only have the ministers’ policies lost Britain the Prussian alliance, but they have left very little hope of any other alliance to take its place in helping to defend Britain’s continental interests. The character of the king of Prussia is defended and accusations that he has sent emissaries to encourage the attack on the ministers is indignantly denied. There was little new in these exchanges over German policy except their reflection of the deterioration of Anglo-Prussian relations in the course of the peace negotiations, which occurred not because Prussian interests were sacrificed but through mishandling and misunderstanding on both sides. Despite the Monitor’s denials there is little doubt that Frederick did intervene in the City and more generally to try to influence British public opinion. The main interest of the ministerial papers, however, was the well-worn accusations of inconsistency against Pitt which in

14. The Monitor 361, 19 June 1762 (the quotation); 367, 31 July 1762; 368, 7 Aug. 1762; e.g. the Auditor 9, 5 Aug. 1762; the Briton 12, 14 Aug. 1762.
15. The Briton 3, 12 June 1762; 5, 26 June 1762; the Auditor 2, 17 June 1762.
fact persist longer than the Monitor's defence. 18

The chief argument, especially as the debate progressed, was over the forthcoming peace. The prospect of peace is the chief reason the Monitor gives for uneasiness over the present ministers. What kind of peace can be expected from ministers whose partisan scribblers describe the present war as 'kindled by ambition and rapacity, fomented by a British minister in servile compliance with the prejudices and predilections of a weak sovereign'? 19 On this crucial question the Monitor concentrates its attention, making its fears plain especially in three articles describing in detail events leading up to the treaty of Utrecht and drawing close and explicit modern parallels. When Britain had won great success in war, France was seeking for peace on British terms and there was every hope of obtaining it, a change of ministry was brought about 'by the management of a favourite lady', 'the intrigues of a proud ungrateful woman'. As a result, allies were abandoned, the chance of a proper peace was lost and instead France was able to win back in England what she had lost in Flanders. What if those in power now should behave in a similar way? Certainly the French have hopes of profiting as they did before, and there is room for suspicion that the press is being used as it was before Utrecht, 'busily corrupting the minds of the people, with false and abusive representations of...men and measures...; and with invectives against our allies...and also with an unseasonable and fruitless desire of peace....' 20 Later articles reiterate with greater detail than ever the well-established themes of French deviousness in negotiation and duplicity in keeping treaties and of how Britain has always been likely to lose in treaties what she wins

18. E.g. the Auditor 22, 21 Oct. 1762; the Briton 30, 18 Dec. 1762; 28, 12 Feb. 1763.
20. 362, 26 June 1762 (the first two quotations; 364, 10 July 1762; 365, 17 July 1762 (the third quotation).
in battles. 21

Again, the aggressive threat of France and Spain to Britain's essential interests, particularly its trade, is stressed, especially in two articles apparently written by Wilkes. Britain can be said to be in a natural state of war with France and the danger is greatly enhanced because of the Family Compact. This has already revived the exhausted state of France and if allowed to continue will drastically affect British commerce. Sources of bullion will be cut off, supplies of fine wool from Spain lost, and the Levant trade will be at the mercy of Spain. With the decline of trade, Britain would no longer be able to retain mastery of the seas, and not only trade but estates would suffer. It is essential, therefore, that the Family Compact be broken. No peace, whatever its terms, would be any use without this condition. Thus the old demands for vigorous prosecution of the war are given a new thrust. 'Therefore instead of treaty, let war continue.' 22

In answer to A Letter to a Gentleman in the City, a four-page half-sheet according to the Monitor dispersed with great diligence at the Royal Exchange and other public places and franked by post all over the kingdom, the Monitor justifies this 'clamour' of the people against peace and for continued war. The clamour is based on facts, the facts of conquests which increase Britain's trade and strength and make a prosperous war more advantageous than a peace which would deprive her of trade and strength. A survey of the course of the war justifies British measures in it; there are no grounds to hope for a better peace this year than last. If properly pursued the war against Spain and the defence of Portugal are within Britain's capabilities and, in contrast to the situation in France, money can be readily raised if the war is put into the hands of those in whom the

22. 369, 14 Aug. 1762, 370, 21 Aug. 1762 (the quotation); also 365, 17 July 1762; 373, 11 Sep. 1762; 374, 18 Sep. 1762; 381, 6 Nov. 1762.
people have confidence. 23

Those who oppose the supposed terms of peace now under negotiation are not inveterate enemies of peace, but they do demand that the conditions should offer proper indemnification for the expenses of the vast extensions and continuation of the war provoked by France and Spain and the giving up of every 'bone of contention'. There is little new in the elaboration of these demands either before or after the publication of the preliminaries. North America is central to them, all conquests necessary to security must be kept, reliance must not be placed instead on guarantees in treaties. Justice must be done to allies. Demands against Spain concerning rights in the isthmus of Darien and logwood cutting are added. In the West Indies France and Spain must not be allowed to keep islands which enable them to interfere with British navigation and engross the balance of power or trade. Specifically, Martinique, Guadeloupe and Cuba and later the neutral islands are insisted on. Some of the later specifications can be put down to perverse reactions to the published terms. For example in September it is demanded that France must not be allowed to fortify settlements such as Pondichery. When the terms of the preliminaries did limit French settlements, the demand was raised to retaining Pondichery. The answer to the standard objection to such terms, that they would arouse the jealousy of Europe, and to the less often heard one that they would ruin Britain herself, is given only later in December, following its objections to the published preliminaries. The Monitor now develops in detail the argument put forward before that neither the maritime nor the continental European states have anything to fear from Britain but everything to fear from the Family Compact which threatens the

liberty and trade of all Europe. The conquests made will obviously benefit Britain's maritime and commercial power while weakening her enemies. Only if the enemy is left in any position to challenge them will they be a burden.  

Along these lines, most of them well-established in the paper's propaganda, the Monitor contributes to the clamour over the peace. It begins its discussion, with its fears of the kind of peace the ministers may make, earlier than the other weeklies, but from September onwards this issue was the main focus of all the papers, the argument turning mainly on whether or not the supposed or actual terms were the best that could be achieved and not significantly different from those of 1761 to which Pitt was prepared to agree. The commercial motives behind the Monitor's demands for a persistence in the war are more obvious than ever but so too is the distorting effect of the political motive to find the ministers lacking. The Auditor, like other earlier opponents, is well able to find material in the Monitor's own words to convict it of inconsistency in general and in particular over peace terms. Most daring and direct of all the expressions of antipathy is that which comes in reaction to the first hints of what the peace terms could be, when the paper bewails the vanished expectations of a glorious reign and sums up its fears:

if England, once more becomes the dupe of her enemies, and the House of Hanover deliver her interest up to the dubious advice and conduct of a STUART; should he, under the name of peace, prevail with his royal master to adopt such measures, and to pursue such councils, as might deprive him of the confidence and aid of his allies; alienate the affections, and provoke the dislike of his subjects; weaken the hands of government; restore the strength of our natural enemies; sow the seed of intestine broils, and encourage the pretensions and interest of that family, which France and Spain have so often threatened, and will never lose any opportunity, to place upon the throne of these kingdoms.

24. 374-6; 382, 27 Nov. 1762; 383, 4 Dec. 1762; 384, 11 Dec. 1762.
then Britain will indeed have no occasion for joy and mirth at the prospect of peace. Even explicit and detailed praise of Pitt and his policies, so obvious in the Monitor a few months before, becomes almost lost in this antipathy, although of course it is implicit in most of the papers.

At times in its argument the Monitor claims to take its stand on the voice of the people. The terms it proposes, it says, are derived from the unanimous and precise voice of the nation.

This is the voice of those that love their country; which, though it only whispered the disgusting effects of that change which took place, in the ministry, about ten months ago, grows louder and louder; and it is to be hoped will prevail with a sovereign...to make no peace upon the conditions we have seen, or the nation will be undone.

As far as the City, in the popular not the monied sense, is concerned, the paper probably was justified in making such claims. The careful attention of the ministers in informing the City of the exchange of negotiators (the undersecretary of state wrote to the lord mayor on 30 August, on Egremont's orders, so that the news could be made public in the City as soon as possible and manipulation of the stocks be prevented) perhaps further stimulated an already strong interest. There were contradictory reports at first about the City's attitude but by early September, when Bedford left for Paris, it was by all reports settling into definite hostility to negotiations. The City's sentiments were expressed in violent language in coffee houses, papers posted up in public places, and 'an Inundation of such Infamous, obscene and Shocking Prints as were never before known in England', while Bedford was hissed as he passed through the streets. His motives and ability as a negotiator were highly suspect, doubts which the Monitor and North Briton reflect. There was talk that 'the old Agitators in the Common

27. 376, 2 Oct. 1762; see also 373; 375, 25 Sep. 1762.
Council' were planning an address to congratulate the king on the prospect of peace 'but expressing their hopes, that no Terms will be admitted in the Treaty inconsistent with the Honour and Interest of his Kingdoms, or unsuitable to the extraordinary Successes of the War.'

The fall of Havannah merely exacerbated the City's demands. This time an address did eventuate, lavishly praising the value of the conquest, asking for a vigorous pursuit of the war until the Family Compact was dissolved and promising warm support and contributions until a peace 'adequate to our glorious successes' could be obtained. Similar sentiments had been expressed earlier, on the fall of Martinique, and there is little doubt about where the leadership came from. Both Beckford and Beardmore were on the committee which drew up the Martinique address and Beckford was on that for Havannah. His views against a separate peace, which he was said to have expressed to Pitt, were reported to Newcastle.

The frequency with which Beckford, Beardmore and Hodges are the butts of the ministerial papers confirms that they were recognized as the instigators of the City attitudes, and the Auditor once acknowledges the Monitor as 'the maker of a political creed for a particular set of men in the city'.

Moreover it was just at this time that Beckford was elected lord mayor. The election, with only one vote against, probably his own, was in the normal order of seniority, so cannot be taken at


31. E.g. the Auditor 2, 17 June 1762; 4, 1 July 1762; 7, 22 July 1762; 12, 26 Aug. 1762; 16, 18 Sep. 1762; 18, 25 Sep. 1762 (the quotation); 19, 30 Sep. 1762, the Briton 15, 4 Sep. 1762; 25, 10 Nov. 1762. See also Catalogue of Prints and Drawings, IV, p. 213, No. 3985 (referred to above p. 19).
face value as evidence of City support for his views. It did take place, however, in odd circumstances. In August Beckford had attempted, unsuccessfully for lack of a quorum, to resign his gown as alderman on the grounds raised against him in the election campaign that his attendance on his duties as a militia officer and member of parliament were inconsistent with that as magistrate of the City. Entick's History reports secret opposition to his election because of his stand against the malt distillery. The day before the Michaelmas election, Beckford again attempted unsuccessfully to resign his gown, only to be elected the next day without opposition. Entick and Birch both suggest that his opponents did not persist in their opposition in order to put him to the expense of being fined for declining the office, but Beckford turned the tables on them by declaring that despite his poor health, having been honoured by election, he would serve to the best of his ability. Beckford certainly had a strong streak of perversity and may have been truly intending to throw in the sponge. In view of his apparently increased interest in the City reflected in increased activity there over the last two years and more, however, it seems likely that his tactics were designed to bring out into the open and decisively defeat the undercurrents of opposition to him, in which, according to Birch, he was successful. Despite considerable exasperation at his earlier attempts to avoid the office, his speech on acceptance, by emphasizing the 'Independency of the City, regained the popular voice in loud acclamations' so that he 'seems likely to have interest enough again to add new Vigour to the Spirit of Faction there'. The author of the memoirs of his son certainly suggests that, although elected against his own will, he accepted out of a desire to serve his friends, especially Pitt and Temple, by directing 'towards their interests in the state the important influence
of the city', a suggestion that is entirely consonant with his past and present behaviour. 32 The election was quite ignored by the Monitor.

There were few doubts, then, of the effects in the City of the campaign against the peace or that, with Beckford as lord mayor, its 'spirit of faction' was likely to increase. The number of pamphlets addressed explicitly to the City over the peace suggests the importance attached to its views and hence the importance of the Monitor as their major expression. 33 Other trading cities expressed objections, too, and some observers thought the City's ill-humour against the supposed terms and high expectations of advantages to be won was general throughout England. 34 The campaign merged naturally into wider hostility to Bute. Among the vicious prints circulating in the City was one advertising for another Felton, and Bute received yet another rough reception when he ill-advisedly attended the lord mayor's banquet on 9 November. Theatre audiences applauded attacks on favourites and roared out against Scots.

Newcastle, anyway, felt as early as July that the campaign was having a wider effect in the country although Hardwicke was more cautious about the effects of the 'run and a cry' kept up by the Monitor and North Briton. Other later reports tended to confirm Newcastle's view and to show effects among more substantial opinion. The gentlemen at the high sheriff's dinner at Surrey were the cause of much attention and conflicting stories when they refused to drink Bute's health, while by 1763 there was evidence of bitter hostility in Yorkshire. In November, at the opening of parliament,


33. E.g. A Letter to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, Common Council, and Citizens, of London, Concerning the Peace now in Agitation between Great Britain and France, London 1762 (this on p. 21 refers to the Monitor); A Letter to the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor, The Worshipful Aldermen, and Common Council; The Merchants, Citizens, and Inhabitants, of the City of London. From an Old Servant, London, 1762; and also A Letter to a Gentleman in the City (See above in fn. 23)

34. Symmer to Mitchell, 10 Sep. 1762, Add. MS. 6839, f. 284; Royston (Cont'd)
Bute had yet another taste of mob violence when despite efforts at concealment he was hissed and pelted on his way both to and from the house.  

It was hardly surprising, then, as this mood made itself evident, that Bute or his agents felt that something must be done about those who were provoking it, especially as the parliamentary sessions to which the peace preliminaries would be presented approached. Whether or not the breach between the conductors of the Monitor and their printer was the result of official pressure, the warrants of 6 November certainly were. In them, three papers on favourites and five on foreign policy were cited as actionable. At first sight, the choice seems curiously haphazard in several ways. Only the first two and the last of the 'favourite' articles are cited, although others are equally objectionable and as likely to bring the government into disrepute and incite disaffection among the people, thus providing grounds for a case of seditious libel. Perhaps tact and sound sense about publicity forbade the mention of those papers most suggestive of Bute's supposed relations with the princess dowager. Certainly it seems that the Sejanus reference in the text of the first number carried particular weight. Then there is a long gap of three months between June and September, when no papers are found objectionable. This excludes among others the outspoken parallels in the papers relating the circumstances leading to the treaty

34. (Cont'd) to Birch, 30 Sep. 1762, Memoirs of...Rockingham, I, p. 124; Burke to Charles O'Hara, 30 Oct. 1762, ed. Thomas W. Copeland, [The]
36. See above p. 39 and below Appendix IV, p. 599.
38. 357, 360, 380.
of Utrecht. The cited paper of 29 May, the first of two on the Spanish papers, is a violent criticism of the paper it is answering but says little about the administration except to criticize the suppression of some of the papers. Certainly the paper of 11 September, the first in reaction to inklings of the proposed terms, is very outspoken and could be regarded as inciting the people to disaffection while that of 2 October suggests very forcibly that dislike and distrust of the present ministry is the explanation of any reluctance of the people to support the war. The two last papers on foreign policy are general ones, published while Scott was trying to set up his rival Monitor, on how Britain lost, in peace treaties in the medieval past, the great conquests she had won in battle. In themselves they are relatively weak. Yet they are presented as 'anecdotes of measures and men' which may help to form a judgement of the present peace, and abound in damaging parallels. The text at the head of the second implies that the present ministers may be fools. Altogether, except for the papers on favourites which still seem in some ways haphazardly chosen, and the first early one on foreign policy, on closer examination the papers cited prove to be those where criticisms of the present ministers likely to damage their good repute are most explicit and suggestions of likely or actual disaffection among the people are strongest. Certainly they, with most of the papers of these months, provide some justification for the bitter accusations in Scott's last spurious Monitor, of deviation from original principles of impartiality into excessive praise and even more excessive obloquy and defamation, although, except in the implications which counted so much to contemporaries, they were little worse than earlier attacks on Newcastle. Yet in terms of policy, in broad outline if not always in

39. 362, 26 June 1762; 364, 10 July 1762; 365, 17 July 1762.
40. 378, 379.
41. 379 (spurious), 23 Oct. 1762.
detail, the paper's line in these months is consistent with its long-term foreign policy aims and its consistently stated views on a peace. Only on the German war is it seriously open to charges of inconsistency.

In the short term the warrants came to little. Cases against those arrested were not proceeded with and they were released from their bonds. Nor was the paper silenced. After two weeks of silence it resumed, somewhat subdued certainly and more careful to justify itself, but still firmly committed to its policies and antipathies. The North Briton, despite threats to itself, the example made of the Monitor and continued open references to possible legal action in the ministerial papers, carried on its defiance unabashed.

In other aspects of their preparations for the session of parliament, however, the ministers had more success. Having failed in earlier approaches to Newcastle, and after Grenville had made himself unacceptable by his firm stand in the last stages of negotiation, Bute approached Fox. He declined to take Grenville's place as secretary of state but was prepared to face Pitt as leader in the house of commons. Despite Hardwicke's expectations that this would merely bring in the most unpopular man to support the most unpopular measure, and Devonshire's warning to Fox that 'your juncture at this time with Lord Bute will rather tend to inflame than quench the fire', the move aroused little comment, even from the North Briton and Monitor.

The situation was further clarified by Devonshire's resignation, barely forestalling his dismissal, of his staff as lord chamberlain and two further resignations that followed. So the cabinet was prepared for a more united defence of its work. On the other side the opposition was disunited.

Newcastle was somewhat confirmed by Devonshire's resignation in making

42. See below Appendix IV, p. 601.
43. E.g. the Monitor 383, 4 Dec. 1762.
44. E.g. the Briton 32, 1 Jan. 1762; the Auditor 34, 8 Jan 1763. The North Briton mentions the action against the Monitor in 27, 4 Dec. 1762.
45. Devonshire to Fox, 14 Oct. 1762, ed. Ilchester, Letters to...Fox, p. 163;
a stand in opposition, although it did not bring all his former friends
still in office to his side. There were hesitations still among some of his
supporters about opposing a peace so little different from one they might
have negotiated, especially in association with Pitt and his violent
supporters. Despite the fluctuating hopes of those concerned, including
Beckford, and much negotiation, Pitt would still not commit himself
to any united action with Newcastle or to any opposition, although he had
declared against the peace. Although still firm in his long-standing
opposition to Bute as head of the ministry he was equally still aggrieved
at what he considered Newcastle's 'desertion' of him at the time of his
resignation, and complained that he was 'out-Toried by Lord Bute and out-
Whigged by the Duke of Newcastle'. He was once again affected by the gout
which made it doubtful whether he would appear at the opening of parliament. 46

Walpole certainly expected trouble when parliament met, although
Symmer thought it might all turn out to be 'but a Bug bear'. 47 In the event,
the latter was proved right. The great storm collapsed into a storm in a
teapot when the session opened. On the first day, in absence of the leaders,
Pitt with the gout, Fox seeking re-election, the address in reply was
passed unanimously in both houses, although Beckford took part in some

45. (Cont'd) Hardwicke to Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1762, Yorke, Hardwicke, III
p. 42; Newcastle to Charles Yorke, 25 Oct. 1762, Add. MS. 32944, ff. 18-9;
Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 156.

46. Account of interview between Thomas Walpole and Pitt, 13 Nov. 1762 (the
quotation), Hardwicke to Newcastle, 15, 27 Nov. 1762, Yorke, Hardwicke
III, pp. 430, 433, 436; Thomas Walpole to Newcastle, 17 Nov. 1762, Add.
MS. 32945, f. 68; Walpole to Mann, 9 Nov. 1762, ed. Lewis, XXII, pp. 95-6;
Temple to Wilkes, 21, 25 Nov. 1762, Grenville Papers, II, pp. 3-4, 7;
Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 173. The intricacies of opposition
politics from 1762 to 1765, the influences on Newcastle and the
fluctuating efforts for a union with Pitt, are well described in D. H.
Watson, 'The Rise of the Opposition at Wildman's Club', Bulletin of the
Institute of Historical Research, XLIV, 1971, pp. 55-77.

47. Walpole to Conway, 4 Oct. 1762, ed. Toynbee, V, p. 261; Walpole to
Montagu, 14 Oct. 1762, to Mann, 28 Oct. 1762, ed. Lewis, X, p. 45;
XXII, p. 93; Symmer to Mitchell, 9 Nov. 1762, Add. MS. 6839, f. 299.
abuse of the peace, particularly the value of Florida, thereby winning Temple's warm praise, and for once being well-received in the lower house. The first real test for the opposition came on 9 December when, after a delay to enable Pitt to be present, the preliminaries were considered. It proved a fiasco. Grafton, Newcastle, Hardwicke and Temple spoke in opposition in the lords but the preliminaries were approved without division. In the commons, Beckford took the lead, proposing their reference to a committee of the whole house, but the house would not hear him. Then debate was interrupted by the dramatic arrival of Pitt, borne in the arms of his servants, dressed in black velvet and swathed with flannel, and accompanied by the acclamations of the crowd out of doors. His three-and-a-half hours speech, considering in detail whether the preliminaries lived up to the successes of the war, was ineffective, 'very tedious, unconvincing, heavy, and immethodical', delivered without his usual fire and with obvious signs of the strains of illness. He left before the division, having further dispirited his supporters by declaring himself unconnected and speaking as though his political career might well be over. Unexpected and effective support for the peace terms came from Charles Townshend, who had just resigned and was expected to be violent in opposition. When a division was unwisely forced the figures were 319 to 65 in support of the preliminaries. 'How astonished the Public was! when the explosion of this bomb proved to be but the bursting of a bubble'.

48. Rigby to Bedford, 26 Nov. 1762, Correspondence of...Bedford, III, p. 160; Temple to Wilkes, 28 Nov. 1762, Grenville Papers, II, p. 8; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 29 Nov. 1762, Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 438; Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 174.

Despite continuing hopes that a 'great flame' would soon rise out of the 'general discontent' the opposition never recovered from this blow. Instead it 'died in the birth'. Another effort to get Pitt to put himself at its head failed and scarcely any further attempt was made to oppose the peace which, after Christmas, quietly went on its way through parliament and was finally signed in its definitive form on 10 February. 'There does not, indeed, seem to be any kind of material in this Opposition to obstruct or delay business,' wrote Rigby. 50

It seems that, at least on the question of peace, the vote in the house of commons reflected and affected public, if not City, opinion which, having made an independent assessment of the peace terms, found them not lacking in achieving the main objects of the war - or desperately wanted peace. In late November Hardwicke was convinced that 'the generality of the Parliament and of the nation (abstracted from the interested or wild part of the City of London)' was strongly for peace, while Symmer noted at the end of December that the 'Public talk very differently of the Peace from what they did a month ago' and others confirmed their views. 51 There were even some hints of changing opinions in the City. Almon refers to the failure of the City to petition against the preliminaries and attributes it to Beckford's secret connivance with Bute in approaches to Pitt, while the North Briton, too, ironically attacked Beckford on this score. 52 Any change


there may have been there, however, much less marked. In December merchants were still agitating against the West Indian terms and Boswell reports a coffee house conversation of the same time in which a citizen spoke in favour of continuing the war and on the whole against the peace. Although the court of aldermen did at length congratulate the king on having relieved his people from 'the increasing Burthens of a long and expensive though glorious and successful War', the common council ostentatiously said nothing, now or later.53

The Monitor certainly kept up its campaign while the peace was going through parliament. Up to the crucial debate of 9 December it continued its strong arguments against the peace, with a brief, non-committal reference to the debates in the issue of 11 December. Afterward it engages in a detailed examination of the preliminaries in a series of thorough if hardly fiery articles which carefully justify their criticism and disavow misrepresentation and abuse. They find something to criticize about every article of the treaty, which in general is said to show great and unjustified generosity to France. France has taken great care in the framing of every article whereas British negotiators have been lax and careless over the wording of the treaty and the defence of British interests. This must be corrected in the definitive treaty. Like Pitt in his speech in the house, the papers complain especially about the fisheries, rights in which were granted to France with two islands as a base, the terms relating to the East Indies (where French trading stations were restored), the German articles, especially the provisions for the evacuation by France of her conquests, which are said to be a mere pretence to free the British ministry from accusations of disloyalty to an ally, and the return of Havannah, which is valued highly. Significantly, although complaints are made about the return of Santa Lucia, less is said about Martinique and Guadeloupe and about the West Indies generally (where

53. Burke to Charles O'Hara, 9 Dec. [1762], Correspondence of...Burke, I, p. 159; Boswell's London Journal, p. 149, 11 Dec. 1762; the North Briton 35, 29 Jan. 1763; Corporation of London Record Office, City addresses from 1760 to 1812 (MS.), p. 11; Sharpe, III, pp. 72-3; see below pp. 343-5.
relatively little was retained), except that the whole of Louisiana should have been ceded for the two major islands. Also unlike Pitt, the paper finds nothing to praise. Except the fisheries, nothing was returned in North America. Yet, argues the paper, the British American colonies will never be secure while the French have any rights at all in Louisiana or in the navigation of the Mississippi (the paper regards the French, not the Spanish, as having these rights). In allowing these claims, undoubted British rights by prior discovery and conquest are being sacrificed; by right of prior discovery, the existing British colonies have the right to expand to the sea or until they meet lands occupied by another Christian power. Then the paper is not satisfied that a clear right has been established over the question of cutting logwood in Honduras Bay. A general complaint is reiterated in regard to several articles that while the rights of former French subjects in territories now British are protected, nothing is done to protect the rights of British subjects in territories to be returned to France. The series is followed by a last plea for precision in forming peace treaties with detailed reference to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. In all, despite their moderate tone, these papers show the extremes to which City sentiment could go, well beyond Pitt, in criticizing the treaties and demanding the full fruits of war.

Almost at the end of the paper's preoccupation with the subject of the peace come two issues which made abundantly clear its political objectives. Once again and more pungently than ever, the criterion of success is applied to help to form 'candid and just sentiments in the present political controversy and to adjust the merits of the late and present administration'. Pitt's successes in foreign policy are described in detail and, interestingly, the merits of his domestic measures, his advocacy of the habeas corpus bill, the establishment of a militia, and his concern for the better payment of...

sailors, are revived in his praise. 'But the character, in which Mr Pitt
endears himself most with his fellow-subjects, is that of a negotiator,'
showing firmness, zeal and penetration. In contrast the foreign policy and
peace-making of his successor are described most disparagingly and his
boasted attempts at 'economy' in the public offices are said to amount to
no more than the replacement of one set of men, to whom the nation owes
its successes, by another. This paper is followed by one signed with Wilkes's
nom-de-plume, asserting in no uncertain terms the duty of all proved unfit
in public office to resign. Otherwise discontent will grow, faction will
replace loyalty and patriotism, government will be clogged and corruption grow
rampant. No room is left for doubt about the person for whom the lesson is
intended and a disavowal of any particular identification merely makes
the point more obvious, especially when it is coupled again with glowing
and explicit praise of Pitt. 55

For the moment, anyway, the Monitor was not to have its satisfaction.
In the meantime, after this, except for the two general articles on the perfidy
of France which follow at the time of the signing of the definitive treaty
and an ironic reference to a peace of an adamantine nature said to have been
made, the Monitor turns abruptly away from foreign policy. 56 Although
it says very little about the fortunes of the peace in parliament and does
not get drawn into the debate between the North Briton and Briton about
the character and validity of the victory there, 57 both the Monitor and
its audience and Beckford must have been very disappointed with the showing
of opposition there. Beckford had certainly hoped and worked for an active
opposition. 58 The chief reason for its ineffectiveness was without doubt

55. 390, 22 Jan. 1763 (all the quotations); 391, 29 Jan. 1763.
56. 392-3, 5-12 Feb. 1762; 396, 5 Mar. 1763.
57. The North Briton 30, 25 Dec. 1762; 31, 1 Jan. 1763; the Briton, 32,
1 Jan. 1763; 33, 8 Jan. 1763.
58. E.g., Thomas Walpole to Newcastle, 17 Nov. 1762, Add. MS. 32945, f. 68.
Pitt's attitude, his refusal to tolerate the necessary political organization and co-operation with others. This arrogant detachment was a very dangerous stance to take if he was to maintain his political strength. He had now irrevocably lost the support of virtually all the tories who before had been an important source of independent support but now found a patriot king more attractive than a patriot ex-minister opposing peace. Nearly all of them voted against the opposition's first motion to have consideration of the preliminaries delayed so Pitt could attend. The king himself commented on the abstention of Sir John Philipps, whose waverings in his loyalty to Pitt were now such that he had been approached to second the address. Political ineffectiveness would sooner or later put a strain on the loyalties, or at the least the enthusiasm, of Pitt's remaining allies, the City and Beckford. Already an uncomfortable disjunction was appearing between opposition inside parliament and without doors. As yet, however, there were no obvious signs of strain and Beckford as lord mayor was in a strategic position to hold the City for Pitt - if only the latter would use it.

LONG DECLINE

FEBRUARY 1763 TO MARCH 1765

Following the passage of the peace-treaty through parliament and its signature in definitive form in February, the Monitor turns sharply away from foreign policy to domestic and constitutional concerns. Remarkably quickly, in nine papers from 19 February to 9 April, it re-establishes and elaborates the full range of its constitutional interests by taking up again the patriotic stance on domestic issues and considering the patriotic duty of all, from the king downwards, in peacetime.¹ While urging some caution about the dangers of revival of faction and excessive concern over liberty which can upset the balance of the constitution as much as excess of the prerogative, the Monitor nevertheless remembers that some years ago it taught its readers to hope for much from a few disinterested patriots. Now perhaps they may heal the wounds of war, taking the opportunity that offers, under a virtuous king, to look to both the internal as well as the external peace of the nation and to avert the dangers which threaten Britain's happy constitution.

Description and praise of the mixed limited constitution, 'established upon better principles, and in a better manner than that of any other nation now existing', ring more clearly than ever through these early peace-time papers. So do praise and definition of the liberty which is its 'soul'. English liberty consists in a form of government providing equally for the dignity of the supreme magistrate and the safety of the people, and in laws which determine both the measure of the royal prerogative.

¹ The Monitor 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 395, 26 Feb. 1763; 396-8, 5-19 Mar. 1763; 399, 26 Mar. 1763; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 401, 9 Apr. 1763.
and the subject's obedience. The origins of this liberty are found in Anglo-Saxon times, its bulwark in Magna Carta. Though English history it has been preserved because the people 'have always availed themselves of their original and chartered right of opposing force to force, and so to deliver down to their posterity that beautiful frame of government, which in our days secures happiness to the nation, and makes us the envy of our neighbours.' However, liberty and the constitution have often been threatened, especially in recent times by a servile house of commons and the malpractices of evil ministers. Specifically the Monitor expresses and elaborates, with reference to its original maxims, its concern about the 'vast increase of the national debt' and the load of taxation which, through the thousands of placemen they bring in their train, threaten the independence of the parts of the constitution. The economy that has begun to dawn must become universal, with a complete reform of the revenues and abolition of places. The idea that corruption is a necessary 'engine of government' must be refuted and measures taken to secure the dignity and independence of parliament through the regulation of elections, laws against bribery among both electors and elected, triennial parliaments, an effectual place bill and regulation of the bestowal of titles. Further, liberty of the press and the subject's right to the writ of habeas corpus must be secured. The threat of a standing army to the balance and indeed the very existence of the constitution and the liberties of the people and the need to rely on the militia are developed especially fully and trenchantly, with a strong warning to the government, king and parliament about the consequences in vexation of the people of trying to keep up the army in peacetime.

2. The quotations are from 394 (the first two and the last two), 400 (the third).
This new bent of the Monitor's closely parallels a revival by the Tories of 'country' concerns in parliament after the passage of the peace. In this, both those who had gone over to the new king and his minister and those like Beckford who remained loyal to Pitt acted in concert, suggesting that their divisions were not so great as recent controversy would indicate. On 22 February, in a full house, Sir John Philipps proposed and Beckford seconded a motion for a commission of accounts to enquire into the disposition of the money voted during the war. The proposal was not acceptable to the government in this form but Bute was anxious not to offend his tory friends on such a 'popular' measure. Instead of a commission, Sir Francis Dashwood, the chancellor of the exchequer, suggested a select committee of the house to be chosen by ballot, which Philipps was persuaded to accept although it was generally regarded as likely to be less effective. Beckford took the opportunity to strike out on his own line, similar to that of the Monitor earlier, that if the war had been continued and a glorious peace obtained instead of one more infamous than the peace of Utrecht, the public debt would have been lessened. Also in accord with the Monitor, he discoursed on the great burden of debt and taxation as things stood. His criticism of the peace was answered by Glover who nevertheless supported the original motion. Newcastle was very much afraid that Beckford would be chosen for the committee but he was not. The committee, although it was renewed the next year on Philipps' motion again, created little further stir.

Equally close to the Monitor's concerns was the tory opposition to the proposed size of the peacetime army, as revealed in the army estimates.


presented on 25 February and debated early in March. Before the estimates were presented the tories brought concerted pressure to bear on Bute and Sir Francis Dashwood and secured some reductions. In the house, Beckford attempted to carry on the opposition, expressing a wish to see the army even smaller because it was dangerous to liberty and increased the influence of the crown. This further opposition was stifled by Pitt who supported the proposed figure and even wished it were larger because the peace was so precarious. According to Rigby he took this line 'against the strongest remonstrances of Lord Temple and his friends'. He was apparently not interested in a revived 'country' opposition as a path to popularity, although he had given some support to the general demand for economy when he returned to active participation in debate in March. Instead he belaboured the tories for their inclination to the court.

The Monitor's three papers on the danger of a standing army began just when the estimates were being debated in parliament and the opening number refers with dissatisfaction to the proposals made. The concerted action of the tories proved shortlived, however, perhaps under pressure of Pitt's attacks, and so too did the closeness of the Monitor's concern with what was going on in parliament. It does not take up in any detail or with any great zeal the most contentious of the issues which came before parliament after the peace, Dashwood's proposals for an additional excise duty on cider and perry. A further extension of the excise, however valid and unexceptionable as a financial measure, was a marvellous opportunity to arouse 'country' prejudices. Coming as it did when some reduction of


6. Newcastle to Devonshire, 5 Mar. 1763, Mr West's paper, 23 Mar. 1763, Add. MS. 32947, ff.162, 265; Rigby to Bedford, 10 Mar. 1763, Correspondence of ... Bedford, III, pp. 218-9; Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 195. Despite the late date of West's paper it clearly refers to these debates.

taxation was expected after the war, and with the land tax still at its maximum of four shillings in the pound, it was likely to be even more strongly opposed. In parliament the tax went through with comfortable majorities although it was vigorously fought and did serve to bring Pitt firmly over to leadership of an opposition in the commons. Outside, the cider counties immediately began to organize petitions for its repeal and violent protest was sporadic through the summer, together with vigorous controversy in print. The City of London, although it had no direct interest in cider, took up the issue in a major way which attracted much attention and criticism of its presumptuousness. Common council presented a petition to the house of commons and instructions to its representatives while the tax was being debated there. When this proved of no avail it petitioned the lords and eventually even the king, asking him to refuse his assent. Bute, hearing of this last step according to Almon through Philipps and Sir Richard Glyn, intervened in an attempt to stop it, apparently by an assurance to Hodges that the Act would be repealed in the next session of parliament. His attempt merely heightened the controversy. Hardwicke thought the City moves were concerted with Pitt and Temple through the Half-Moon group. In response to appeals from Exeter the City's interest continued well into the summer, and on the eve of the next session it resolved on a further petition for the repeal of the objectionable parts of the Act.

Beardmore was on the committee of twelve that drew up all the City petitions and Beckford, of course, as lord mayor, presided over the meetings.

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9. Common Council Journal, 63, ff. 72, 73, 74, 75-6, 88, 131, 134; PA., 23 Mar. 1763, second page, columns 2 and 3; West's account of debate in house of commons, 23 Mar. 1763, Add. MS. 32947, f. 267; Almon, Minority, pp. 109-15; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 29 Mar. 1763, Yorke, Hardwicke, III p. 456; Daniel Wray to Royston, 26 Apr. 1763, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 8 June 1763, Add. MSS. 35401, f. 269, 32949, f. 56.
of common council. His part in the proceedings was noted in satirical verses in the *London Magazine* at the end of the year. Yet the *Monitor* makes virtually nothing of the issue, at least until the Act was through parliament and then only in a partial way. True, it does make some brief general references to the iniquities of the excise in the course of re-establishing its constitutional interests in late March and early April, when the bill was in the last stages of enactment. The second of these is connected with references to a servile house of commons which

would enter into all the measures of a court without consulting their constituents; without admitting the people, who chose them, the privilege to inform them of their apprehensions, and to instruct them how to guard against encroachments upon their Liberties.

On 9 April a more extended elaboration is given of the threat which the excise laws pose to liberty, but again it is in general terms in the context of constitutional discussion. Only after insinuations had been made in public controversy about the validity of the petitions and protests against the measure does the *Monitor* come out with one of its strongest and most important statements of the rights of the people outside parliament to petition and instruct their representatives, to give their consent to taxation, to be heard against a parliamentary majority and to give their voice for or against a minister. Equally strongly it defends the weight and respectability of the opinions expressed. 'It is not the voice of the mob at St. Giles's, nor the political rant of injudicious, and, perhaps, misinformed newsmongers' but a prodigious number of constituents, the almost universal voice of the nation outside parliament, reinforced by nobles and gentlemen whose loyalty is unimpeachable and by the City of London, people whose voice merits the attention of the crown. The right of the City to petition the crown when its earlier petition was ignored is

11. The *Monitor* 399, 26 Mar. 1763; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 401, 9 Apr. 1763.
particularly defended. The following paper is another paean in praise of liberty. Of the definition of the Englishman's liberty, which is given at length, the right to petition, instruct and express dislike of as well as assent to an act of parliament forms part, and criticism of the City for petitioning against the excise is ranked with past attempts of evil ministers against liberty. Thus the Monitor does not take the initiative in a campaign to stir up the prejudices of the people against the cider tax for political purposes, as it did earlier in 1756 for example, despite the fact that Pitt, Beckford and Beardmore were doing just this. Rather it defends the City's actions after the event and uses the whole issue as an occasion to establish its general political philosophy by making some important general statements about liberty and the rights of the people. In this it is very different from the North Briton, some of the last numbers of which in March contain some detailed and trenchant criticism of the financial measures of the administration, including the cider tax.

In fact, the Monitor's preoccupations are increasingly divorced from actual political events and issues. Its comment had never been comprehensive; now, with the coming of peace, its lack of specific reference to politics is more and more obvious. It takes no notice of Bute's resignation (even though it was 'the subject of triumph in the City') or of the reconstruction of the ministry that followed, except to publish a general essay about the favourites of James III of Scotland which makes the well-established

12. 403, 23 Apr. 1763; 404, 30 Apr. 1763.
13. 31, 6 Mar. 1756; 34, 27 Mar. 1756 (over the plate tax); see above p. 90.
points about favourites while disavowing any particular application.
Here again it contrasts with the North Briton which delayed publication
explicitly because the political situation was uncertain. 15

Even more surprising is the Monitor's restrained and detached reaction
to the repercussions of number 45 of the North Briton, published on 23
April 1763. There is no doubt that Wilkes's arrest, and his release on a
writ of habeas corpus by the court of common pleas, aroused great public
excitement, especially in the City, and that they and their repercussions
became a central political issue. Interest was kept alive by Wilkes's
brilliant showmanship, his letter to the secretary of state complaining of
the 'theft' of his papers, the threatened duel in Paris with the Scotsman,
Forbes, as well as by such moves as his dismissal from the Buckinghamshire
militia and that of Temple as lord lieutenant and the long series of actions
for damages that went on over the summer. 16 In the cases involving Wilkes
directly Beardmore was fully involved as his attorney until their breach
in November. Perhaps there was friction from the beginning. Beckford
had more immediate reason for personal distaste for Wilkes.
He had been mocked in the North Briton for his misuse of Latin phrases
and his methods of arguing and indirectly attacked for not more positively
opposing the peace in the City. Wilkes apparently continued to show
hostility, although for Temple's eyes blaming it on Churchill. 17 Yet
after some initial reluctance Beckford encouraged the City's support for
Wilkes and had some friendly contacts with him at least later in the year,

15. Birch to Royston, 9 Apr. 1763, Add. MS. 35400, f. 36; the Monitor 402,
16 Apr. 1763; the North Briton 45, 23 Apr. 1763, which reprints an
advertisement of 13 Apr. concerning delayed publication.
to Hardwicke, 1 May, to Devonshire, 2 May 1763, Add. MS. 32948;ff.202,203;
Daniel Wray to Royston, 6 May, Hardwicke to Royston, 17 May 1763,
York, Hardwicke, III, pp. 494, 497.
17. The North Briton 39, 26 Feb. 1763 (the praise is assumed to be ironic as
there is no evidence that Beckford even attempted to call a common council
to protest over the peace); 43, 26 Mar. 1763; ed.John Wright, Sir Henry
Cavendish's Debates of the House of Commons, during the Thirteenth
Parliament of Great Britain..., 2 vols, London, [1841-3], I,p.47; Wilkes
to Temple, 5June [1763], Grenville Papers, II, p. 59.
offering some assistance. Even later, in 1765, he was to praise Wilkes for the stand he had made to the benefit of his country. Perhaps, however, the coolness of the Monitor offers further evidence of Beardmore's and Beckford's real feelings, at least initially.

It certainly does not leap to the issue with excitement as yet another way to embarrass the government and whip up popular support. True, it does make fairly immediate reference to the affair, first indirectly, then explicitly on 14 May, in the first of two papers on liberty and the provisions of Magna Carta. Moreover, if the signature initials of these articles are a reliable indication, they were written by Wilkes himself, although their tone is so moderate in contrast to Wilkes's other provocative propaganda after his commitment as to raise doubts about the reliability of the signatures or to suggest that they were written some time earlier for general use and used appositely now, perhaps with some small changes to make them relevant to events. In any case they are in tune with the Monitor's later comments on the affair in that they turn the concern for liberty already well-established in recent papers more particularly towards the liberties of the individual and mention the need for protection against unlawful seizure of persons and goods and imprisonment, without elaborating the issues. A later paper has more to say about search and seizure of persons and property and arbitrary imprisonment, elaborated with detail relating to Wilkes's arrest, but these are by no means its only concern. More important and with clear reference to the affair, the Monitor makes a major statement

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18. Grenville Papers, II, p. 158; Beckford to Wilkes, 19 Dec, 1763, Add. MS. 30867 (Wilkes papers), f. 242; Walpole, George the Third, II, p. 42; Sutherland, The City...1768-1774, pp. 9-10. T. Walpole to Newcastle, 12 May 1763, Add. MS. 32948, f. 270, says of Beckford that he 'recovering the slip he had made talks violently against the Ministry and even interests himself in favour of Mr Wilkes's -', which suggests some initial hesitation in Beckford's reactions.
on freedom of the press, a moderate article deploring licentiousness while rejecting any suggestion that it is limited to anti-government papers and defending the liberty to oppose. It pleads for a clarification of the law concerning the press. The Wilkes affair at first, then, gives some particular twist to the general concern for constitutional issues rather than immediate political controversy which is becoming characteristic of the paper. That is all. No interest at all is shown in Wilkes himself as a popular hero or incendiary issue.

Older issues were kept alive for the Monitor in these months by the series of addresses in support of the peace promoted by the administration and presented from February onwards, coming to a climax in May and June. Several of the later ones include deploring references to disrespect shown to the crown and attempts at sedition, and urge the need for unanimity. The addresses were the occasion of some political contention, being hindered wherever possible by leading opposition politicians. The duke of Newcastle as chancellor and Hardwicke as steward publicly dissociated themselves from the address presented by the university of Cambridge. Pitt did the same with the address from his constituents at Bath and openly quarrelled with some of his supporters there over it and the address from the clergy of Gloucester.

In Buckinghamshire the new lord lieutenant obtained an address after some opposition. Newcastle was able to resist an attempt in Surrey in July and Yorkshire also did not address. In London the question of whether the City would address or not became a major divisive issue connected with attitudes to the 'spirit of faction' typified by Wilkes. On 10 May, on a surprise motion according to one account, the court of aldermen decided

19. The Monitor 405, 7 May 1763; 406, 14 May 1763; 407, 21 May 1763; 408, 28 May 1763 (on freedom of the press); 409, 4 June 1763. On the signature initials see above pp. 33-5.

20. The London Gazette, Feb.-Aug. 1763; Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 384; Sedgwick, Letters from George III to Lord Dute..., p. 218; Correspondence of...Chatham, II, pp. 223-7, 253-7; GM, XXXIII, 1763, pp. 360, 376-7; Wilkes to Temple, 15 July [1762], Grenville Papers, II, pp. 76-7; Almon, Minority, p. 90.
to present an address. When the prepared address was approved on 12 May it caused some debate and the word 'honourable' was removed as a description of the peace, leaving only 'advantageous'. Beckford did not preside at this meeting; nor did he go to present the address, which was accompanied by only eight aldermen and greeted in the City streets by the hisses of the crowd and the muffled bells of St. Bride's and St Mary-le-Bow. The address refers to 'a spirit of faction' unhappily arising and expresses apprehension that silence might be interpreted as encouragement of practices they detest and abhor. At the same time a group of merchants resolved to call a public meeting which decided on an address with little opposition. The address, very carefully phrased to attract as much support as possible but including an expression of abhorrence of disrespect to the king, received over nine hundred signatures and was a considerable expression of City opinion, despite opposition attempts to depreciate the number and quality of its supporters. Bells were not muffled on this occasion. Meanwhile, sarcastic gibes had appeared in the papers about the failure of the City as a whole to address. Thomas Walpole thought the aldermen had proceeded as they did because they did not dare call a common council. If they were cautious events proved them right. On the request of a number of members (Alderman Paterson and five others) Beckford agreed on 17 May to the summoning of a common council for 31 May. The day before, however, a meeting at the Half-Moon tavern showed itself so much against a motion for an address that it was withdrawn and the common council gave its attention to the letter from Exeter on the cider tax. The whole issue caused much controversy and division even of 'popular'
elements (Sir Richard Glyn was among the aldermen who supported their address, although the Half-Moon did stand firm), related not only to past but also to present issues raised by Wilkes.

Although the addresses raised matters which were central to the Monitor's earlier concerns and although they caused much contention in the City, again it did not take them up while they were a live political issue. From 11 June to 9 July, when the presentation of addresses was beginning to tail off and well after the crucial events in the City, the paper contains a series of five essays which show, by historical examples from the protectorate to the present, the attempts made to use addresses procured by ministerial influence to create an appearance of popular support as a basis for further dictatorial action. An explicit parallel is drawn to present circumstances when it is noted that only on one occasion in the Restoration period did the court succeed in influencing the City of London, and then the court of aldermen took it upon them to address in the name of the City. Only when addresses and other expressions of opinion arise spontaneously from the people or dare to draw attention to the difficulties and dangers of particular measures should they be heeded. By the end of the series the point made at the beginning is clear. Addresses 'for the approbation of the measures of a court, when zealously promoted and solicited by their advocates and partizans', which give thanks for measures the people really condemn in order to establish a ministry of whose abilities they have doubts, are not to be greatly regarded. The series ends with another encomium of Pitt and a review of the administration of his successors which makes clear in specific terms the Monitor's hostility and praises the rejection by the City and other

23. (Cont'd) Sir William Baker to Newcastle, 29 June 1763, Add. MS. 32949, f. 231.
great and respectable' bodies of efforts to win support.\(^{25}\) The Monitor's political loyalties are thus yet again made clear but the series could hardly be called a major contribution to current controversy nor even a retrospective defence of the City's attitudes and actions such as was attempted on the cider tax question.

Yet if the Monitor was increasingly detached, Beckford was still taking a hand in the general political situation, which continued to be unsettled. On the one hand the ministry, reconstructed after Bute's surprise resignation around Grenville, Egremont and Halifax, was very narrowly based and did not have the full confidence of the king. On the other hand there was still no firm alliance of those in opposition and several attempts were made to win over support for further changes in the ministry. The most important of these, an approach through Bute to Pitt, was made at the end of August following the sudden death of Egremont. On 27 and 29 August Pitt had two lengthy interviews with the king but the negotiation collapsed, apparently over the far-reaching demands made by Pitt. Much public controversy followed, chiefly from the court side, over responsibility for the breakdown.\(^{26}\)

Beckford was closely involved in these negotiations. The initial contact between Pitt and Bute was made through him, Walpole says that he was consulted by Pitt between the two interviews, and Bute used him to attempt to modify Pitt's demands. These circumstances lend some weight to suggestions of an earlier rapprochement between Bute and Beckford going back to January, when there were rumours of negotiations between Bute and Pitt through Beckford and Philipps. Such a rapprochement is postulated by Almon to explain Beckford's failure to prompt the City to move in protest against the peace terms.\(^{27}\) If there is any truth in these rumours they, together

\(^{25}\) The Monitor 410-414, 11 June-9 July 1763.

\(^{26}\) Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 227-33; GM., XXXIII, 1763, pp. 451-4.

\(^{27}\) Beckford to Pitt, [25 Aug.1763], Correspondence of... Chatham II, pp. 235-6; Walpole to Mann, 1 Sep. 1763, ed. Lewis, XXII, p. 160; Grenville's diary, 29 Aug. 1763, Grenville Papers, II, pp. 201-2; Newcastle to Devonshire, 15 Jan. 1763, Add. MS. 32946, f. 46; Almon, Minority, pp. 214-5. Beckford's contacts with Bute may be the 'slip' referred to by T. Walpole in May. See above fn. 18.
with Beckford's part in the August negotiations, suggest that, once the issues of war and peace were removed, Beckford was not so divided in political attitudes from Sir John Philipps and others of his earlier tory associates that had gone over to Bute and the court, although Philipps on his part was still adamant in his new hostility to Pitt and strongly deplored the approach to him. They had decided one way while Beckford was pulled in two directions and still more strongly to Pitt, of course. But at least he had some realistic appreciation of the circumstances in which a return to power by Pitt was likely and would have welcomed a Bute-Pitt alliance. He was certainly disappointed at the failure and there are some hints of differences with Pitt over the latter's attitudes, particularly his insistence on the inclusion of 'the Duke of Newcastle's Friends'.

Others of Pitt's supporters in the City were, however, apparently not so happy over suggestions of a connection between Bute and Pitt. Popular suspicion of and antipathy to Bute still ran high and the Monitor reflects this now stereotyped public attitude to him rather than Beckford's more realistic one. True, it had certainly relaxed the virulence of its campaign since the warrants of November 1762, and although in January it was still making its political loyalties pretty clear, since then hostile references to the ministers, whether Bute or his successors, had been few and general. The paper of 16 July is a prophecy of doom to England from Scotland, but it is a general catalogue of complaints of the English against the Scots rather than an attack on their present influence.

However, on 17 and 24 September when controversy over the abortive negotiations was rising, the paper renews its attack on recent ministers and


policies by means of an account of the reign of Henry VI. Through daring historical parallels attention is drawn yet again to the making of a disadvantageous peace after victorious war, to breaches of the peace by the enemy while the English were distracted by disunity at home, to the influence of a woman, the growth of party divisions and especially to the rise of a favourite without ability. In the second paper the activities of the duke of York against the king are so described as to suggest Jacobite influence behind Bute. This reversion in detail to the old themes of a bad peace and evil favourites is clearly a response to the abortive negotiations. The following papers, on the choice and powers of a leading minister and on the proper education of a prince, the latter with comments on the unfortunate education of Louis XV which obviously parallels the king's own youthful experience, reinforce the themes. A little later the death of Count Bruhl of Saxony provides the occasion for yet another examination of the evils of favourites. With old antipathies go established loyalties. On 22 October Pitt is defended yet again against the 'licentiousness in the art of scribbling', which will discourage the virtuous from taking office. A nation that so drives out a good minister and allows him to be degraded is in decline and worse is bound to follow. The paper ends with a forceful reminder that England has laws to punish evil ministers and measures, such as those that now call aloud for national justice.  

Apart from this revival of old themes in response to political developments, from July to November the Monitor is still preoccupied with developing fundamental constitutional themes in a general way with usually only slight reference to contemporary events. With the cases arising out of the North Briton affair and then before the courts clearly in mind, the liberty of

the individual and the protection it should have from the law are further explored. The value of liberty of speech and the press is elaborated and the wilful misinterpretation of decent words and plain facts as an intention to disturb the peace is deplored, together with the prosecutions that arise therefrom. More striking, but with no apparent specific contemporary reference, are three papers which are of major importance in establishing the paper's views on the people as the origin and end of all legitimate government, with a continuing role in supervising that government and if necessary acting to restore it to its original principles. These ideas are perhaps the most distinctive and important of the Monitor's views on the constitution. Another important general paper examines the proper basis of the king's title and authority and refutes any revival of divine right notions. This is in response to a complaint against the address of the City on the birth of another prince, which had referred to the Hanoverians having been 'chosen' to defend the glorious revolution. Some lesser papers on constitutional themes appear perhaps to be makeweights, used when other more telling subjects were not to hand, but even these serve to reaffirm the outlines of the Monitor's constitutional theory.

This preoccupation with general constitutional themes is not seriously interrupted by the opening on 15 November of the parliamentary session which was dominated by the repercussions of the Wilkes affair. The Essay on Women was condemned by the house of lords, the North Briton voted a seditious libel by both houses and ordered to be publicly burnt. The commons eventually accepted the ministerial view that privilege did not extend to seditious libel and after Christmas Wilkes was duly expelled 'with scarce a negative'. Two questions still remained, Wilkes's complaint

33. 417, 30 July 1763; 418, 6 Aug. 1763.
34. 421, 27 Aug. 1763; 422, 3 Sep. 1763; 428, 15 Oct. 1763.
35. 423, 10 Sep. 1763.
36. 416, 23 July 1763; 419, 13 Aug. 1763; 420, 20 Aug. 1763; 432, 12 Nov. 1763.
of breach of privilege postponed from the opening day of the session, and the general issue arising from it of the legality or otherwise of general warrants. The first came to a climax on 13-14 February in the longest debate of the commons on record to that time. After a series of close votes the complaint was eventually dismissed. When on 17 February Sir William Meredith moved to have general warrants declared illegal the adjournment was carried by only 232 to 218. 37

Pitt took a vigorous part in these debates, although carefully distinguishing between Wilkes himself, whom he described as 'the blasphemer of his God, and the libeller of his King', 38 and the general issues of principle. Temple, too, was at the heart of the controversies. So was Beckford, and unlike Pitt he gave personal support to Wilkes by his part in the debate on Wilkes's expulsion on 19 January when, on the issue of whether or not Wilkes wrote the North Briton 45, 'Mr Beckford divided the House every minute to gain time, and said he would hinder their proceedings by that means'. He also spoke in support of prior consideration of Wilkes's complaint of breach of privilege on 15 November, again in defence of privilege in the case of seditious libel on 23 November and on that and general warrants on 3 and 6 February. He had declared his intention to speak on 13-14 February, although Walpole does not record his speech. About this time, apparently for his comments on the address on 16 November, he was criticized as a demagogue, 'the scavenger...to throw dirt upon Government'. 39

37. Walpole, George the Third, I, 245-51, 255-62, 278 (the quotation), 280, 282-302.
38. Anecdotes of... Chatham, I, p. 497.
The City took a keen interest in the debates, and the public burning of the *North Briton* on 3 December at the Royal Exchange led to 'a great riot'. 'The paper was forced from the hangman, the constables were pelted and beaten, and Mr Harley, one of the Sheriffs, had the glass of his coach broken, and himself was wounded in the face....' This disorder led to a bitter attack in the house of lords on the lord mayor and the City authorities for their failure to take action and a vote of thanks to the sheriffs for their efforts. In the commons, although Rigby made a similar attack, the ministers were wise enough not to take on the City. 40 The City itself continued to be deeply divided over Wilkes. A similar motion of thanks to the sheriffs in common council was defeated by the casting vote of the lord mayor (now Bridgen). But late in February the common council did vote to thank their members of parliament for their 'zealous and spirited' efforts against general warrants and to instruct them to continue to pursue their duty vigorously against arbitrary and illegal violations. At the same time the freedom of the City was voted unanimously to Pratt explicitly for his decisions on general warrants. Beckford was present at the common council and later controversy makes it clear that he was prominent in determining the outcome. Beardmore was appointed both to the committee to draw up the thanks and to that to commission Pratt's portrait. 41

The *Monitor* greets the parliamentary session with exhortations to impartiality, patriotic independence, uprightness and outspokenness, pointing out the dangers of a pusillanimous or corrupt parliament. But only once, on 11 February, does it take up a subject of parliamentary debate connected with the Wilkes questions, when it quite fully discusses

41. Common Council Journal, 63, ff. 146, 166-7; see below p. 352.
the question of 'secretary's warrants', elaborating complaints against them much as they were made in the house. They are treated as the post-revolution equivalent of attempts in the past to undermine the law through the courts of high commission and star chamber and by means of the dispensing and suspending powers, on the part of those not content with their legal power. The next paper, an allegory on a procession to the temple of liberty which finds that

the gates thereof, and all the avenues were barricaded with the plunder of the public; and the majority of the - had associated, and entrenched themselves deeply behind ditches filled with corruption, fully resolved to bid defiance to Liberty

is a trenchant enough comment on the outcome of the debates. 42 But that is all. Nothing is said on the issues of privilege, nor are the attacks on the City in the house of lords taken up nor immediate support given to the City stands in honour of Pratt and their representatives. Only much later, in April, when the City's actions had been attacked, does the Monitor take the issue up. Then two very cogently argued papers answer the criticisms in A Letter to the Common Council of the City of London with Remarks on Lord Chief Justice Pratt's Letter to the City of Exeter. This pamphlet accuses the City of presumptuousness, of seeking to set itself up as an imperium in imperio by expressing opinions on matters beyond its cognizance and competence, and questions the right of common council to instruct members of parliament, which only the constituents at large can properly do. The City, it says, has been misled by 'a clamorous and shallow Member, who BELLOWS forth the spirit of faction, ... and who, born to command slaves, is himself a servile agent to the artful mover of opposition'. Responding perhaps mainly to this gibe at

42. The Monitor 433, 19 Nov, 1763; 445, 11 Feb. 1764; 446, 18 Feb. 1764.
Beckford, the Monitor defends the right of common council to interest itself in matters beyond the narrow concerns of City government, because it is representative of virtually all the inhabitants of the most opulent and respectable city in the universe [sic], because such matters are in the widest interests of the City and to express opinions on them is part of the rights of all Englishmen. In doing so the City is not arrogantly setting itself up as an imperium in imperio, nor claiming to have the least say in judging decisions of the supreme courts of the land. Nor is it seeking to determine questions still depending in the legislature, nor to dictate to the rest of the kingdom. If other corporations (such as Exeter) have followed suit it is of their own free will. The City's opinion is properly expressed through common council which has the basis of its authority not in the livery nor even in the wider body of freemen but in the whole body of inhabitants, freemen and others, who elect its members. Common hall may elect the members of parliament but it represents only the livery which is not a necessary part of the body corporate and in which the tumult and confusion of a large assembly can often distort the true opinion of the people. In any case, the livery is still free to act if it so desires. The second paper concludes with some defence of Pratt against charges of acting inconsistently with his behaviour when attorney-general, and of the court of common pleas against attempts to reduce its authority. The two papers comprise one of the Monitor's most effective defences of the rights of the City in national affairs, as it sees them, and of the common council as its voice. But they come defensively not offensively, and late in the political battle.

For most of the parliamentary session, from 26 November to 14 January, 445-6, 21-28 Apr. 1764; the first pamphlet (London, 1764) was followed by A Second Letter to the Common Council of the City of London, with Remarks on Lord Chief Justice Pratt's Answer to Sir Thomas Harrison the Chamberlain, London 1764, of which the Monitor takes no note, although it is similarly contemptuous of the City. The quotation is from pp. 13-14 of the first pamphlet.
the *Monitor* was taken up with a series designed to illustrate the mischief caused by party divisions. The historical examination, which makes up most of the series and is largely concentrated on the reigns of Charles II and James II, is designed to show how parties run to excess and how kings and people have been misled into support for them. It ends with an expression of marked hostility to the supposedly continuing and now dominant tory influence, associated with France and disastrous peace-making. 

Only in the paper of 7 January, the penultimate of the series, is there any specific comment on recent events, in the form of a quite lengthy digression on the evils of the practice of dismissing army officers for political reasons. This is obviously a reference to the dismissals of Shelburne and Barre (who had now deserted Bute for Pitt) from their military posts and the taking of his regiment from General A'Court for their votes on the motions concerned with Wilkes. This question was not to become a major issue until the dismissal of Conway some months later, but for some reason the *Monitor* takes it up early. The rest of its comment in this period to the end of February consists of two general papers on the dangers of wicked men in high places and one on the threats to liberty arising out of the method of appointment and powers of the land tax commissioners and out of the appointment of unsuitable justices of the peace.

One event in public controversy outside that attracted the attention of parliament the *Monitor* does take up as a major issue because it gives it occasion further to expound constitutional ideas. This was the publication of *Droit le Roy*, a strange revival of high prerogative and divine right ideas, which was condemned unanimously by the house of lords.

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on the motion of Lord Lyttelton on 21 February, the house of commons following suit on 24 February. The Monitor takes the occasion to develop two major constitutional themes in new theoretical depth, the origin of political power and the virtues of mixed monarchy. With the help of Hooker and Defoe it asserts that the origin of all legitimate government lies in the prior power of the people and that it is established by contract or covenant with them. It is all power, not just kingly power, that is ordained by God. The people are left free to determine the nature of their government and to limit its powers to what they specifically grant. This point is referred to in later papers to emphasize that the people cannot be supposed to have given up any right not expressly conferred in the contract. This, of course, is no new doctrine for the Monitor but previously the main concern was to assert the present rights of the people in a settled constitution. Now it is to establish the theory of the origin of government in agreement with the people. Having done this, the rationale and virtues of mixed monarchy are elaborated. The proper powers of the parts are examined and the ways they are to be defended explained. The major question of what is to be done if the necessary concurrence of the parts in a mixed government breaks down is the occasion for another important assertion of the rights of the people. These questions were to be taken up again in different ways on several occasions in the next and last year of the paper's life.

While the Monitor was thus occupied with high theory the opposition in parliament, which had attained a brief unity and a near victory on the question of general warrants, had collapsed again into apathy. Little effort was made to exploit the issues of the revision of the Cider Act, the proposed revision of the Marriage Act which had caused such contention a decade earlier, Grenville's proposals to tax the American colonies or

45. [Timothy Brecknock], Droit le Roy, Or a Digest of the Rights and Prerogatives of the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, By a Member of the Society of Lincoln's Inn, London, 1764; Parliamentary History, (Cont'd)
his budget, which sparked off a long public controversy. The collapse
destroyed the inspiration and drive behind Wildman's, the opposition
dining club meeting in a tavern in Albermarle Street which had emerged
late in 1763, chiefly out of the efforts of Newcastle's younger, more
energetic supporters, and had contributed much to the near victory over
general warrants. Temple's A Letter from Albermarle Street to the
Cocoa Tree, although it sparked off some public controversy about the
principles of government and opposition supporters to which the Monitor
later makes reference, was really a last despairing effort to preserve
the unity of the opposition. Instead, the various groups seemed
paralysed, according to Walpole, by expectations of negotiations. There
were renewed rumours of contacts between Pitt and Bute, again through
the good offices of Beckford, who had said that he would declare his
regard for the latter in his intended speech of 13-14 February. But in fact
the ministry emerged stronger from the parliamentary session, largely
because of the collapse of the opposition, and nothing came of negotiations.

In this ineffectualness of opposition probably lies the explanation
of the apparent gap between Beckford's activities and attitudes and the
Monitor's detachment from events and general moderation of tone. The
disjunction between politics, particularly political opposition, within and
outside parliament was growing. In the City Beckford was still fully
involved. His mayoralty had been both splendid and successful. On
the occasion of the election of his successor he made "no bad

45. (Cont'd) XV, cc. 1418, 1420; Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 304-6;
the Monitor 447-8, 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1764; 450-1, 17-24 Mar. 1764; 464,
23 June 1764; 474, 1 Sep. 1764. For the Monitor's earlier expositions
of the rights of the people see e.g. 421, 27 Aug. 1763; 422, 3 Sep.
1763; 428, 15 Oct. 1763.

46. Walpole to Mann, 20 Feb. 1764, ed. Lewis, XXII, pp. 206-9; Walpole,
George the Third, I, pp. 302, 281-2, 285, 306, 309; Almon, Minority,

47. Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 303-4; Grenville's diary, 12 Feb., 7 Mar.
1764, Grenville Papers, II, pp. 490, 494-5; Walpole to Hertford, 24 Feb.,
11, 27 Mar. 1764, ed. Toynbee, VI, pp. 21-2, 25-6, 34-5; Rea, p. 105,
quoting Barrington.
speech', referring to the 'critical and difficult' times, expressing his faith in the City's example of moderation and concluding with a ringing assertion of 'the glorious principles of the revolution' well calculated to stir the sentiments of his hearers. It was 'firm and explicit, without being indecent or warm'. The customary thanks voted to him at the conclusion of his term were more warm and profuse than usual. Although on almost every political issue of the year the City was clearly divided, on the whole the opposition had retained the upper hand. The failure of common council to address on the peace was a serious setback for the ministry and its moves over general warrants, in which Beckford took a leading part, were even more so. Bute, and after him Jenkinson, were developing City contacts, notably with Sir James Hodges, but as yet anyway, in spite of Hardwicke's hints of division in the Half-Moon club, Beckford could be said to have maintained a significant power base in the City for support for parliamentary opposition. Beardmore, too, had continued active in support of Beckford. In national politics, too, in most major issues in parliament and even in ministerial negotiations, Beckford was still fully involved. Yet he was unable to link the two spheres of activity satisfactorily, to bring to bear on national politics the weight of the popular party in the City, because of the weakness of the opposition. And again this weakness was very largely due to the attitudes of Pitt, his refusal to commit himself to any union in active opposition. Nor would he now cultivate popularity with any vigour. According to Newcastle, he now 'spoke with much less respect of the City and regard for popular applause than I have ever heard him before'. He was indeed, as the new Earl Hardwicke

48. Entick, History and Survey of London..., III, p. 223; LC, 21-23 Apr. 1763, p. 391; GM., XXXIII, 1763, p. 514; C. Townshend to Temple, 3 Oct. [1763], Grenville Papers, II, p. 133; Common Council Journal, 63, f. 133. The quotations are from Townshend and GM.

commented in April 1764, _animal sui generis-un unique._ Not only did Pitt's waywardness make Beckford increasingly isolated politically, divided from his former tory friends by his continuing loyalty to Pitt yet not at the heart of opposition, not a member of Wildman's club, for example. It also robbed the City of a focus in national politics for its loyalties. Grenville had some perception of the effects of this disjunction when he told Charles Yorke in December 1763 that the clamour of the people could not be appeased by any change of ministers 'since it was no longer a cry for the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Hardwicke, or even Mr Pitt, but for Pratt and Wilkes'.

In this disjunction the Monitor was losing its raison d'être as a political instrument to mould City opinion and bring it to bear on national politics. To this situation it reacts not with the demagogic tactics of the North Briton - if Beckford was acquiring the reputation of a demagogue at this time it could not have been by association with the Monitor - but with general constitutional discussion of some considerable interest and significance. This discussion is different from its earlier establishment of its attitudes through stock reflex reactions to specific issues in attempts to make political capital; it is much more considered, more theoretical, and detached from specific issues, more soundly based on arguments. But it cannot disguise the fact that as a commentary on politics the Monitor was lapsing into senility, increasingly out of touch, deserving the strictures of dullness passed on it by both friend and foe.

Political controversy went on, new papers were founded, both for the government and for the opposition, some brief, some longer-lived, which

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50. See e.g. on Pitt's attitudes in general, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 28 Sep. 1763, Charles Yorke to Newcastle, 13 Oct. 1763, Yorke, _Hardwicke, III_, pp. 530-1, 533-4; and on his attitudes to the City and popularity, Namier and Brooke, _III_, p. 296; Hardwicke to Charles Yorke, 11 Apr. 1764, _Memoirs of...Rockingham_, I, p. 177.


52. E.g. in the _Moderator_, 1, 19 Nov. 1763 (its only issue); the _Contrast_ 24, 14 Dec. 1763 (its final issue). See also, earlier, the _Schemer_, 24, 8 July 1762, and, later, the introductory essay to the collected edition of the _Contrast_, 1765, p. 34.
were closely and continuously involved in political comment. One, the Plain Dealer, is consistently hostile to the City, and gibes at Beckford, and even Beardmore. The fact that the Monitor is scarcely referred to simply emphasizes that politics was passing it by.

The Monitor's loss of purpose and direction becomes even more obvious in its last year. The parliamentary opposition remained divided and enervated. After the end of the session the dismissal of General Conway from his post in the bedchamber and his regiment for his votes on Wilkes issues, especially general warrants, contemplated earlier but delayed until now by Grenville's caution, gave them a new recruit of some value and a new issue of some potency. It was much discussed in the press and pamphlet literature and among politicians. The Monitor, which had already discussed the question of the independence of army officers following the earlier dismissals, now takes this further example up pretty quickly. The issue of 5 May studies earlier examples of such dismissals to show that only when states begin to fall into corruption are officers disgraced at the will of their superiors. The royal prerogative of appointment and dismissal should be used only for military not political reasons. Otherwise the independence of parliament, so essential to the constitution, will be endangered and England will have the appearance only, not the reality of liberty. The paper ends with a

53. Notably the Plain Dealer, pro-government and anti-Wilkes, which ran for fifty numbers from May 1763 to April 1764; the anti-government Contrast, with twenty-four issues from June to Dec. 1763; and the much briefer anti-Wilkes Champion, with two issues in Apr.-May 1763 in answer to the North Briton, and the one Moderator of 19 Nov. 1763, perhaps founded to answer the briefly revived North Briton of 12 Nov., in preparation for the parliamentary session.

54. E.g. the Plain Dealer 28, 19 Nov. 1763; 34, 31 Dec. 1763; 49, 14 Apr. 1764.

55. Only in the Plain Dealer 12, 30 July 1763; the Contrast 14, 28 Sep. 1763 and above fn. 52.

56. George III to Grenville, [25 Nov. 1763], Grenville Papers, II, p. 166; ed. John R. G. Tomlinson, Additional Grenville Papers 1763-1765, Manchester, 1962, p. 119 (introductory note); Walpole, George the Third,

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suggestion of the need for a parliamentary enquiry into the causes of the king's displeasure in this case and who advised him. Yet although controversy rumbled on the Monitor makes no more of the issue. The City, apparently, was not greatly excited by it. Nor, despite the efforts of Walpole, Conway's devoted cousin, did the opposition take it up with vigour.57

Charles Townshend's quite far-ranging suggestions, a little later, for a vigorous and united opposition over the parliamentary recess met with no more response. Other issues arose in the course of the year, such as difficulties with France and Spain over the fulfilment of the terms of the peace treaty, particularly the rights of British merchants to cut logwood in Honduras Bay, the so-called Manilla ransom bills, France's promise to pay her Canada bills and to destroy the fortifications of Dunkirk. Friction occurred in the West Indies, the Gambia and in Newfoundland. Domestic issues included the harsh attitude towards the press shown by Lord Mansfield in several judgements. Yet neither the domestic nor the foreign issues inspired any great enthusiasm.58 Still the opposition was hampered by divisions, aristocratic inertia in exploiting the possibilities of arousing public opinion, the deaths of three leading figures, Hardwicke, Legge and Devonshire, in the course of the year, but above all still by the attitudes of Pitt. As a result, as Walpole commented on at least two occasions, politics 'are dead asleep.'59

The Monitor makes some sporadic attempts, in the months of the recess,

56. (Cont'd) I, pp. 71-4, 319-26, II, pp. 3-4; GM., XXXIV, 1764, pp. 212-3, 240-1, 362-9, 417-22; Rea, p. 94.
57. The Monitor 457, 5 May 1764; C. Townshend to Newcastle, 28 Apr. 1764, Add. MS. 32958, f. 226; Walpole George the Third, I, pp. 325-6.
58. Charles Townshend to Lyttelton, 2 May 1764, ed. Phillimore, Lyttelton, II, pp. 653-60. On the possible issues see e.g. Grenville Papers, II, pp. 380, 390-1, 395-9, 411-3, 417-24, 434-6, 438-9, 440; Additional Grenville Papers, pp. 320-1; Walpole, George the Third, II, pp. 10-12, 63-4; GM., XXIV, 1764, pp. 300, 331, 388-9, 448, 541, 590-1, 598; Walpole to Hertford, 9 Sep. 1764, ed. Toynbee, VI, pp. 113-4.
to take up some of the issues that arose. In two papers in June it defends those who supported the motion against general warrants against charges of 'displaying the banner of sedition', of being motivated by a lust for dominion rather than genuine interest in the cause of liberty, and of supporting Wilkes while trying to hide the fact. The attacks had been made in a letter 'To the Leading Members of the late Minority in the House of Commons' published in the Gazetteer of 23 May. Although much of the first paper is concerned with attacking the writer of this letter and his methods, the second provides the most cogent recapitulation yet of the grievances complained of in the treatment of Wilkes in the execution of the general warrant and of the arguments against general warrants in themselves. Also in response to controversy, this time that stimulated by Grenville's budget, but again particularly a letter in the Gazetteer of 25 June, the Monitor defends 'the late ministry of glorious memory' against charges that it was responsible for the present size of the national debt and the consequent continued high level of taxation. It won sureties for the debt it incurred in the successes of the war. What has since happened to those securities is the question. 60

Another hot contemporary issue which the Monitor touches on is the affairs of the East India Company and particularly the much-contested decision of March-April 1764 to send Clive back to Bengal to try to remedy abuses in company affairs there. As a proprietor in the company, Beckford must have been interested in this decision. On 19 May, about a fortnight after the settlement of Clive's terms of reference, that is, when the struggle was over, the Monitor attacks the increase of the powers of company servants and especially the military power given to Clive in a way that is in accord with its general

60. The Monitor 463-4, 16-23 June 1764 (the Gazetteer carried a quite lengthy series of Letters to the Minority in 1764. See e.g. numbers X, XI, XIII and XIV in the issues of 2, 4, 11, 15 Oct.); 467, 14 July 1764 (which refers for the only time to the controversy over the budget in the Budget, the Looker On, the Contrast and other publications).
constitutional attitudes but only very distantly related to its earlier attacks on the company. 61

A rather more sustained interest is shown in questions of foreign policy in these months. In response to the difficulties over fulfilment of the peace treaty the Monitor takes up again the theme of the untrustworthiness and insolence of France and Spain, at first in a general way and then with reference to the need to stimulate the spirit of the ministry in dealing with them. In August, in response not to the grievances themselves, but to complaints about them in the revived North Briton criticized in the second 'Letter to the Minority', published in the Gazetteer of 6 July, the paper deals in great detail with the case of logwood-cutters in Honduras Bay. Later, in October, a wider consideration is given to the breaches of the peace by France and Spain in India, North America, Africa and Honduras, which the Monitor is given the credit (not unjustly) of having foretold. Readers are reminded yet again that Britain's quarrel with France is no slight, easily-patched up one, but 'antient, hereditary, and, perhaps, perpetual.' Especially now that she is dangerously united with Spain, vigour and courage must be shown in defence of the balance of power. 62

It is interesting that, as always, foreign policy arouses most response from the Monitor. Yet none of these specific issues of contemporary controversy, not even those of foreign policy, does it fully exploit. They do not fire its enthusiasm or encourage it to persistence. Most of them are taken up not on the paper's own initiative, but in response to other controversy, and the Monitor's contributions amount to only occasional sallies into the not inconsiderable propaganda exchanges going on in the


62. 454, 14 Apr. 1764; 467, 14 July 1763; 470-1, 4-11 Aug. 1764; 479, 6 Oct. 1764; 480, 13 Oct. 1764; 489, 15 Dec. 1764. The quotation is from p. 479.
columns of newspapers and in pamphlets. Once it does attempt to assess the principles involved in the arguments between the supporters of government and opposition and the result is of some importance in tracing its changing use of party names as well as its political loyalties, in the person of a country gentleman come to town, it considers the rival claims of the two political clubs, the Cocoa Tree, for long the meeting place of the tories, and now associated with the ministry, and the Coterie (the name sometimes given to the meeting at Wildman's). Only 'an important question of Liberty' could distinguish between their protestations of patriotism and devotion to the people and indicate the division between the 'friends of liberty' and the 'slaves of power' which has now replaced that between country gentlemen and courtiers. Despite all pretences to the contrary, the former are whigs, the latter tories, and no real union between them, such as was being called for by some well-meaning but misguided men among the tories, is possible. True, Pitt had managed to achieve a union of parties without confounding principles. But too often such a union is only a mask for pretended conversions of which there were many well-rewarded examples in the last reign. Now, since the fall of the great minister's happy administration, the tories are showing their true colours again, those of prerogative and arbitrary power. The taking of such tories into office with whigs who are not true to whig principles and are more attached to a minister than to the king cannot be 'the coalition or extinction of parties and party names, wished for or desired by Englishmen' but rather is a dangerous sham. So the Monitor takes up a clear party stance, on the whig side now, definitely

63. See e.g. Almon to Temple, 14 Aug. 1764, Grenville Papers, II, pp. 428-30; GM., XXXIV, 1764, pp. 225-9, 355-9, 438-40; Rea, pp. 107-9, in addition to references in fnn. 56, 60.
aligning itself with the whig opposition, the supporters of liberty and the
protestant succession, rejecting any of Beckford's leaning towards the court
which it may have shared. It shows some sympathy with its former allies,
'the remains of those country gentlemen, who were called Tories, but acted
upon Whig principles, for the preservation of the constitution', who are
still to be found among the members of the Cocoa Tree. But it regards them
as misguided and firmly rejects their calls for a coalition. 64

The Monitor's political loyalties may thus be made clear in this
one paper, but its political involvement is nonetheless still slight. And
constitutional discussion is no adequate alternative. Some important
constitutional articles of a general character continue to appear, on the
definition of the powers and relationships of the parts of the mixed
constitution and on liberty. Three papers of June, which make a historical
survey of liberty of the person and freedom from arbitrary arrest and the
threats to them from before Magna Carta to the post-revolutionary period,
are particularly important for the clear statement, by way of introduction
in the first paper, of the interest of all Englishmen in the 'breviate'
of their rights, liberty and property. He who has no other property
has a property in his liberty so all are concerned in the constitution.
'Liberty is congenial [congenital] with our constitution.' In two papers in
July and September, the second another paean in praise of liberty,
vigorous statements are made in support of freedom of the press and speech,
the bulwark of liberty and symbol of good government, a necessary part
of the constant watch that must be kept on rulers to prevent any encroachment
on liberty. Again this is at the same time another statement of the role of
the people in the day-to-day working of the constitution. 65 Apart from
these papers, however, the Monitor is not so much concerned in this last

64. The Monitor 458, 12 May 1764. A more explicit reference to the revival
of high tory doctrines is made in 497, 9 Feb. 1765. The Monitor's use
of party names is discussed fully below pp. 550-70.
65. 461, 2 June 1764; 462, 9 June 1876; 465, 30 June 1764; 473, 25 Aug. 1764;
(Cont'd)
year with discussion of fundamental points of constitutional theory. True, it does hammer on expounding some of its old shibboleths, the importance of the independence of the house of commons and the necessity therefore to regulate placeholders, the need for the king to take advice in full privy council and not in secret cabinet councils, the nature and limits of the king's prerogative and the responsibility of ministers, the evils of corruption, political and otherwise, and its dangers as a means to despotism. But these discussions are more like its earlier constitutional comment, hammering away at well-worn themes rather than attempting any fundamental exposition of the nature of the constitution. They do, however, occasionally give rise to significant and pregnant statements such as that the house of commons, 'being vastly the majority', is 'the only indispensably necessary part of a commonwealth'.

The major preoccupation of the paper, especially from mid-1764 onwards, is neither specific events and points of controversy nor fundamental constitutional argument, but a growing concern over the general drift of contemporary politics. This shows itself in the general constitutional articles in notes of fear of threats to liberty from the court. It is more strongly and distinctively shown in expressions of alarm at the effects of faction and commotion among the people, which increase in number from mid-1764 and become a major preoccupation, mentioned, if only in passing, in almost every paper. The first expression is in the form of a fable which draws attention to the close connection between liberty and faction but the danger which the latter poses to the former. Several later papers analyse in a general way the causes of public dissension and discontent and

65. (Cont'd) 485, 17 Nov. 1764; 491, 29 Dec. 1764, 498, 16 Feb. 1765.
66. 452-3, 31 Mar. -7 Apr. 1764 (the quotation is from the second paper); 454, 14 Apr. 1764; 466, 7 July 1764; 469, 28 July 1764; 504, 30 Mar. 1765.
the dangers of the factions that arise if these are left unchecked. Ways of avoiding sedition and faction are considered and competition for office, or between supporters and opponents of a particular government, is stressed as a major cause. The best remedies are wise princes and ministers devoted to the public good. The theme is developed with obvious and sometimes explicit reference to current politics. A wise prince will not continue to employ ministers who have made themselves odious and contemptible to the people, and it is the worst of all crimes for such men confidently to continue in office. Even a man who is cast out for opposing wrong measures should not act or be supported by others so as to disturb the quiet of the country. Further, in the interests of healing breaches in the commonwealth, there should be moderation in both prosecution and defence of offending ministers.

Amidst the variety of altercations, in our political debates, concerning the measures of the present ministry, and the conduct and abilities of those in power, and about the In's and Out's, majority and minority, the litigants would do well to lay aside all heat and party zeal, and instead of being carried away in the current of faction they should adhere to these councils of moderation. Both ministers and their opponents should overlook persons and concentrate on mending things.

It is perhaps in the context of these pleas for moderation, arising out of fears of the effects of faction and division, that the otherwise inexplicable paper of 17 November 1764 is to be understood. This is a major statement on the proper powers of the people which refutes the arguments that all power belongs to them and that they should be appealed to as arbiters in disputes, in such a way as to undermine and even reverse earlier Monitor views on the role of the people and their relations with their representatives in parliament. References to the causes and

68. 460, 26 May 1764; 472, 16 Aug. 1764; 475, 8 Sep. 1764, 476, 15 Sep. 1764; 477-8, 22-29 Sep. 1764.
69. 466, 7 July 1764; 475; 476 (the quotation); 484, 10 Nov. 1764; 485, 17 Nov. 1764, discussed more fully below pp. 423-4.
evils of faction occur in almost every one of the later papers, even those concerned primarily with other themes. Such councils of moderation were in tune with Pitt’s attitudes to Wilkes and to opposition in general at this time but they were hardly the way to effective impact for the Monitor any more than for Pitt.

Not unnaturally, out of this deprecation of division and faction arises some consideration of the proper behaviour of the ordinary man in politics. Despite the paper’s earlier clear commitment to the whig side, he is sharply warned against party. ‘Enter into no party schemes. It’s a great chance you will be babbled.’ On the other hand, he cannot remain neutral when great issues are at stake nor can he trim from one side to the other without risking his reputation. He must just persist with steady courage, setting a good example and looking for opportunities to heal his country’s wounds. The marked antipathy in these papers to a ‘flying squadron’ in politics which changes sides according to circumstances, and to the man who stands neutral, is perhaps further evidence of a breach with the old-fashioned tory, the independent country gentleman, and certainly reflects a heightened sense of great issues at stake in current politics.70

Another way in which the Monitor reflects its distaste for the state of contemporary politics is byreviving its well-established general complaints against favourites or evil ministers. 71 With these go others more specifically directed against the present minister. They are explicitly regarded as the same ministry as that which succeeded to Pitt, and are criticized for the peace they made, for their supineness in face of French and Spanish encroachments, for their financial measures and their bogus claims to frugality and economy. They are further accused of

70. 468, 21 July 1764 (the quotation); 480, 13 Oct. 1764; 481, 20 Oct. 1764.
71. 466, 7 July 1764; 468; 469, 28 July 1764; 473, 25 Aug. 1764; 475, 8 Sep. 1764; 478, 29 Sep. 1764.
incurring public hatred by misconduct and violent proceedings, of stopping or slurring over enquiries of the highest import to the liberty of the subject and the privilege of parliament, and of unconstitutional and vindictive prosecutions against those who draw their pens in defence of liberty. It is ironical that one of the counts against them is the displacement of the old nobility, 'the ancient, the true pillars of the glorious revolution settlement', some of whom have served every prince of the present royal family, when earlier the very men so indicated were those most bitterly accused of being a faction of evil and corrupt ministers.

The usual injunctions to the king concerning the dangers of evil ministers and factions reach a climax in a series of papers in November and December on the powers and duties of princes. These emphasize how much a prince can do to remedy the grossest evils in a state, corruption, lack of economy and attention to public affairs, and above all faction, especially if he shows wisdom in the choice and support of able councillors. Arising out of these lectures to the king come two of the three last single papers of the Monitor which again return to questions of fundamental constitutional importance, ones closely connected with ministerial mismanagement. They consider whether the legislature has the right to interfere in the executive, whether individuals have the right to protest and whether the other two estates may oppose the will of the monarch. They may perhaps be related to the debate over whether parliament should concern itself with general warrants. Superficially they appear to be a cautious retreat, parallel to that on the rights of the people and made out of concern for the balance and independence of the parts of the constitution, from earlier attitudes which stressed the accountability of the executive.

Yet in fact they amount to a justification of interference and resistance

72. 466; 467, 14 July 1764; 473; 479, 6 Oct. 1764; 483, 3 Nov. 1764.
73. 458, 12 May 1764 (the quotation); 460, 26 May 1764.
74. 486-7, 24 Nov.-1 Dec. 1764; 488, 8 Dec. 1764; 490, 22 Dec. 1764.
on occasions of crisis which could be stretched to fit almost any circumstances and certainly those which the Monitor believed to exist at the time. 75

For most of its last year, then, the Monitor lapses back into old stock anti-ministerial attitudes in a mood of impotent regret. These lack the vehemence which gave them some distinctiveness before, especially in appeals to the people to act against the ministry. Indeed, they are accompanied by deprecation of faction and appeals to moderation which give an impression of detachment. There is even some explicit moderation of the incipient radicalism of the paper which sprang from its vehemence against ministers. Altogether, the paper has lost the heated sense of close involvement which gave its initial tirades against ministers such burning fury.

There was nothing in the activities of the opposition in the earlier part of the 1765 session of parliament to revive it. The session did not open until 10 January, and Pitt took no part in it, ostensibly because he was confined by the gout. There was some pressure for a vigorous opposition but no one issue was found which could inspire and unite. The dismissal of Conway was raised on several occasions but, as the second earl of Hardwicke had forecast, this 'will make a meal's meat, but will not keep the house'. Attempts to revive the Wilkes issues led to one spirited and lengthy debate but little more. Other issues, foreign policy, the Cider Act, fleetingly appeared but a call of the house on them on 20 February came to nothing because Pitt was not there. In March the question of removing the attorney general's power of lodging ex officio informations was raised at last, only to be decisively beaten. 76 There were other issues had there been a

75. 491, 29 Dec. 1764; 498, 16 Feb. 1764. Both are more fully discussed below pp. 405-7, 424.

76. Anecdotes of...Chatham, II, p. 12; Hardwicke to Charles Yorke, 3 Aug. 1764, Memoirs of...Rockingham, I, p. 178; George Onslow to Newcastle, 13 Dec. 1764, Add. MS. 32964, f. 279; Walpole, George the Third, II, pp. 31, 34-48, 56, 58-61; Watson, pp. 74-5.
general will to use them, Gilbert's bill for regulating the poor, for example, and Grenville's measures, both those already enacted and those now proposed, for raising money in America. But already by Easter the opposition was again clearly in disarray. Yet again Walpole was writing, 'Politics have dozed, and common events been fast asleep.' They were to awaken again, after Easter, when the consequences of the king's recent illness became a major political issue in contention over the regency bill. But by then the Monitor had gone.

Over the period of the parliamentary session until Easter, it is occupied almost entirely with two long series of papers. One of them is relevant and apposite, giving an 'abstract' of a recently published pamphlet which attracted great attention. Entitled An Enquiry into the Doctrine, lately propagated, concerning Libels, Warrants and the Seizure of Papers, upon the principles of Law and the Constitution, and attributed to John Dunning, then a rising lawyer, with help from Pratt and others, it set forth very effectively the case for a free press, especially over the issues raised by the Wilkes affair. The Monitor's abstract brings together the continued brief references to these issues that it had been making into its most complete, coherent and forceful discussion of them. But the inspiration was at second hand. The second series, on the history and character of the United Provinces, presented to give the politician necessary knowledge of foreign states, has some interest but lacks any contemporary point. It perhaps was an attempt to change the character of the paper more towards that of a general essay paper. If so, it was unsuccessful. The next issue was the paper's last, whether as the result of some sudden crisis or just because its waning spirit.

79. Jarrett, passim.
80. Later editions were entitled A Letter concerning Libels, Warrants and the Seizure of Papers: with a view of some late proceedings and the
finally died it is impossible to tell. The paper itself gives no indication but it perfectly reflects the mood and preoccupations of its last months. It considers again the dangers of contention over political place, the threat of corruption as illustrated by the example of Rome, the merits of the English constitution which protects the country from such threats so long as a wise and good king chooses wise and able ministers. It dwells on the characteristics of the true patriot and the good minister, rejecting any sharp distinction between them and showing that both roles can be abused. The tone is general throughout; there is no clear relation to the current political situation, or call to action to the king to dismiss his ministers or to Pitt to assume office, although both could be inferred. 81

The Monitor no longer seems to know what it wants. And so its voice falls silent.

Its demise now, like its prolonged decline, was the result of changing political circumstances and their effects on Beckford. He was still active in parliament. He raised the question of the Manilla bills in the debate on the address, and, in connection with Conway's dismissal, proposed a reduction in the size of the army and countered the suggestions that it was necessary for the support of the civil power. He took part in the debate on general warrants taking the opportunity, as already noted, to express some personal support for Wilkes. In response to an expression dropped by Charles Townshend he spoke warmly on the freedom of the American colonies, and later in the session opposed Grenville's Stamp Act.

80. (Cont'd) - defence of them by the majority. The pamphlet was published by Almon, who was prosecuted for it although the case was not pressed. Walpole, George the Third, II, pp. 48-9. For its origins and reception see Rea, pp. 110-13; also Walpole to Hartfort, 3 Dec. 1764, ed. Toynbee, VI, p. 154; Walpole to Montagu, 16 Dec. 1764, Montagu to Walpole [c.3 Jan. 1765], Walpole to Mann, 13 Jan. 1765, ed. Lewis, X, pp. 139, 146, XXII, p. 274.

as he had the year before when its proposals were first mooted.\(^{82}\) His interest in City affairs, however, was waning. In the year after the end of his mayoralty in November 1763 he attended only two common councils (one of these being that in February 1764 in which he took a lead on the question of general warrants). In the year beginning in November 1764 he attended no meetings.\(^{83}\) There is little evidence about activity and attitudes in the City in this last year of the Monitor’s life. In Townshend’s plan for opposition Sir William Baker, Newcastle’s contact with the City, was to 'put the City in motion' but there is nothing to suggest that he tried to do so or that, if he had, Beckford and his followers would have supported him. Beardmore, anyway, was still active in some attempts to link the opposition with the City by getting leading members invited to the lord mayor’s dinner. And later events in 1765 over the address on the birth of a prince were to show that the popular party under his leadership was still strong.\(^{84}\) Other evidence suggests, however, that the ministry was having some success in re-establishing connections with the City and that Hodges, for one, had now definitely been won over. Certainly Grenville carefully supported the City in its application for money for the new bridge, in face of hostility expressed by Rigby because of the City’s activity over the cider tax.\(^{85}\) What does seem to be clear is that the City’s close interest in national affairs was declining and with it Beckford’s efforts to turn his influence there to effect in national politics.

Beckford’s diminished activity may have been due to the ill-health

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82. Walpole to Hertford, 10 Jan. 1765, ed. Toynbee, VI, p. 165; Walpole, George the Third, II, pp. 34, 35, 42; Namier and Brooke, II, p. 76, quoting Harris’s Debates, cf. Birch to Royston, 14 Mar. 1764, Add. MS. 35400, f. 151, on the debates of the previous year.

83. Common Council Journal, 63, ff. 147-9, 166-7 and passim, 1763-5.

84. Watson, p. 71; Almon to Temple, 12 Nov. 1764, Grenville Papers, II, pp. 458-9; on the address, see above pp.21-2.

of which he complained in 1762 and again in 1769. It seems more likely, however, that it was the result of the loss of the political purpose behind his cultivation of his City influence. It had been built up primarily so that it could be brought to bear on national politics in the interests of the leader to whom he had committed himself in 1756. Yet since 1763 that leader had apparently resigned himself to political ineffectiveness. He had refused to lead a vigorous opposition, to cultivate popularity with his former finesse or to take advantage of opportunities to return to office. The explanation of his behaviour, so different from the energetic exploitation of opportunities in the 1750's, would require an examination, beyond the scope of this study, of his complex character and the influence on it of his medical history. Its effects on his erstwhile allies and supporters are more relevant and easier to determine. It heightened that disjunction between opposition in parliament and without doors already apparent in the 1763-4 session, in which the City lost the close involvement and interest in national affairs of the war years. It was probably inevitable that this should happen. City engagement in national affairs was of its nature only sporadic; as the excitements of the war and the contentions of the peacemaking and then the Wilkes issue died down there was little to form and invigorate a specific or dominant City view. Contrary tendencies and other interests could come to the fore. The vagaries of Pitt only accentuated these tendencies. Taken together, however, they deprived Beckford of his political purpose and the Monitor of its raison d'être as an instrument in this purpose. It took wings, and, like Beckford, found its role, with the coming of war and the rise of Pitt. It is not surprising that with the ending of the war and the virtual retirement of Pitt it

86. Entick, History and Survey of London..., III, p. 218; Memoirs of William Beckford, p. 38. He made his will in June, 1765. Guildhall Library, Noble Collection, Box C 78/T.
lapsed into 'sleepiness of argument' and 'impenetrable performance', declined and died. 87

Some acute observers had realized the gap opening up between the parliamentary opposition and its potential supporters outside and had blamed it on the lack of able writers to stir the one on behalf of the other. 88 Charles Townshend in his plans for a more vigorous opposition had suggested the founding of a daily paper and in October 1764 plans for a new weekly were actively being considered. 89 That no one thought of using the Monitor for this purpose reflects Beckford's isolated position in opposition and the Monitor's narrow function as his instrument and the voice of the City interests that supported him. Its standing was such that it would not have been capable of fulfilling this role. Perhaps also reflected is the extent of the Monitor's decline in liveliness and involvement in politics.

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Nevertheless its commentary on politics over its ten years' life is of some interest to the historian. With the help of other evidence it throws some light on the diversity of trends and groups in the City. More particularly it illustrates the attitudes to national politics and especially to Pitt of those popular interests to whom Beckford hoped to appeal. It shows how chequered and slow was the process of commitment to Pitt, how even at its height it was not unquestioned and had to be defended. Yet it was rallied and confirmed in time of need in 1761, when the Monitor was probably at the peak of its influence, only then to become gradually disillusioned. The Monitor itself shows no overt signs of this disillusionment. It remains

87. A Letter to the Common Council of London on their late very extraordinary Address to His Majesty, pp. 26-7.
88. Walpole, George the Third, I, p. 303; Annual Register, 1765, pp. 16-18; Almon to Temple, 14 Aug. 1764, Grenville Papers, II, pp. 430-1.
89. See above fn. 58; Almon to Temple, 12 Nov. 1764, Grenville Papers, II, p. 458; Rea, pp. 93-4.
clear to the end in a general way that its loyalties still lie with him
and that old issues like the circumstances of his resignation still rankle. Yet some disillusion is reflected in the decline of specific praise of Pitt and the last paper does not name him in its consideration of patriots and statesmen.

More widely, a study of the Monitor's commentary as it relates to national and City politics over these years throws some light on the nature of Pitt's 'popularity'. The whole story shows how skilfully and deliberately he cultivated it as a basis for political power before and during his coalition with Newcastle and how, sometimes excessively, his colleagues respected it. The Monitor commentary in itself shows how potent was the legend of the 'patriot minister', both positively in its continued glowing praise of Pitt for achievements which, especially in the domestic field, did not in reality live up to the praise, and negatively in its ready attribution of all disappointments to 'faction'. Yet the story also suggests, although it does not prove, that in reality the much vaunted popularity was not as widely and securely based as sometimes would appear. Undoubtedly at the height of successful war in 1759-60 Pitt was the darling of the nation. But after that his identifiable and effective support was narrowed down to the City and then to certain interests only in the City.

For some of this narrowing, as the story shows, Pitt himself was responsible not only latterly in his refusal to cultivate popularity any longer, but much earlier, because of his commitment to Beckford beyond the exigencies of politics and even at the expense of damaging his relations with other tories and independents. This commitment, shown particularly over the sugar duty and distillery issues in 1759-60, highlights the curiously close relationship between the two men. Pitt was notorious among

90. E.g. the Monitor 458, 12 May 1764; 466, 7 July 1764; 475, 8 Sep. 1764; 476, 15 Sep. 1764; 487, 1 Dec. 1764.
contemporaries for his aloofness and awkwardness in personal relationships and had few close political associates.  

Beckford, too, was an unusual personality, impetuous and ostentatious in temperament, neither his behaviour nor his 'heap of confused knowledge' controlled by much intelligence or judgement. Whatever the response of the City to his 'boldness, promptness, spirit', he did not readily inspire respect among fellow parliamentarians. Walpole dismissed him as 'that noisy vapouring fool' while Lord Holland coupled him with Hodges as 'two illiterate and silly fellows as ever lived'. Yet somehow these two awkward characters were genuinely drawn to each other into a relationship of real warmth and respect on both sides which lasted until Beckford's death in 1770. The relationship was well-known to contemporaries. Walpole noticed Pitt's unusual degree of deference to Beckford over the sugar tax. In a manuscript annotation to the fourth edition of his Considerations on the Present German War, Mauduit wrote

> During the whole of Mr Pitt's administration, no one had so much of his confidence as Mr Beckford. He was made to believe that he held the City by Beckford's means, and gave free admission to him, while he kept himself inaccessible to every one else. The revealer of his will in the House of Commons was Mr Beckford, for Mr Pitt himself seldom went thither. I heard him making most fulsome panegyric on Mr Beckford's abilities and three times following insult the whole House for presuming to laugh at Mr Beckford's professing disinterestedness.

Mauduit goes on to attribute Pitt's refusal to follow an active policy of conquest in the West Indies to Beckford's interested influence, while Hardwicke retails, while discounting it, the belief of some of Pitt's enemies that he supported the retention of North America at the peace for the same reason. These assessments of Beckford's influence over Pitt by

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92. The quotations come from Walpole, George the Third, IV, p. 104.


94. PA., 23 June 1770, second page.

95. Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 350; Mauduit is quoted in Grant, p. 742; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 Apr. 1762, Add. MS. 32936, f. 310.
comparative outsiders to politics are undoubtedly exaggerated but they
do bear witness to the impression the friendship of the two men made on
contemporaries.

Because of this and because of the lengths Pitt went to identify
himself with issues Beckford was promoting out of narrow self-interest
(although he was also capable of rebuking Beckford on occasion), the
relationship raises questions about Pitt's judgement as a politician.
It is doubtful whether Beckford's political value to Pitt was such as to
justify the consequent sacrifice of other support. Certainly he was a
prominent speaker but his speeches were frequently ill-considered or ill-
delivered and more often the objects of mirth or boredom than serious
attention. In the City his loyalty undoubtedly bore fruit for Pitt,
especially when he most needed it in the early 1760's, even if he did not
use it to full advantage. Earlier it would be unwise to attribute
too much of Pitt's growing popularity there to Beckford's efforts. In
a sense Beckford rose to prominence in the City on Pitt's reputation at
least as much as Pitt profited from his exertions, and Pitt's general
standing in the City was most to be attributed to his success in conducting
the war. Certainly Beckford could be useful among the considerable West
Indian interest both in the house of commons and in the City, and in the popular
party in the City, but whether this is enough to justify Pitt's apparently
high assessment of Beckford's importance to him is doubtful. In all,
the relationship as highlighted by the Monitor's role in politics is yet
another aspect of his strange enigmatic character both as a man and

96. Thomas, pp. 231, 240; Namier and Brooke, II, p. 75. For contemporary
comment on Beckford's conduct in the house see e.g. Walpole to Conway
1758, Add. Ms. 35374, f. 144; Symner to Mitchell, 24 Nov. 1758, Add.
Ms. 6839, f. 115; Lady Anne Egerton to Bentinck, 13 Mar. 1759, Eg. 1719,
ff. 32-3; Halifax to George III, [16 Nov. 1763], ed. the Hon. Sir John
Fortescue, [The] Correspondence of King George the Third [from 1760 to
December 1783], 6 vols, London, 1927-8, i, p. 60; A Letter from a Right
Honourable Person...translated into verse, p. 10; Walpole,George the Second
II, pp. 350-1.

97. Walpole certainly thought his death in 1770 a major blow to Chatham's

(Cont'd)
The Monitor's commentary also shows how, under the influence of political developments and changing interests and issues, but with a fairly constant constitutional programme and disposition to opposition to government, popular elements in the City ceased calling themselves tory, adopted the whig label and strengthened their radical overtones. As yet the constitutional programme was a secondary interest, subordinated to foreign policy and political considerations (as in the case of the militia) as the war develops, not enough yet in itself to engage the interest of readers. Yet, in its increasing concern with fundamental constitutional questions raising radical issues, the Monitor gives some clue of the direction in which an important section of City attitudes to national politics was to swing and settle when they next became closely and for some length of time involved in national politics, in the ramifications of Wilkes's stand in the Middlesex election in 1768. Then, as Grenville foresaw, they would look to leaders outside parliamentary politics. In these later events Beckford, after another burst of activity in support of the Chatham administration and yet another disillusionment with his leader, was to attain an even greater prominence in the City, while developing the radicalism he had adumbrated earlier, especially in 1761. Elected in the midst of these events to a highly unusual second mayoralty and cut off in its midst by his sudden death, he is commemorated by a statue in the Guildhall among company very much more distinguished. In all this the Monitor, of course, played no part. Yet its subsidiary preoccupation with

97. (Cont'd) influence in the City then, George the Third, IV, p. 104; and later Chatham spoke highly of his standing in politics to his son, ed. Namier and Brooke, II, p. 78.

98. See above p. 356.

99. See above p. 306-7; Namier and Brooke, II, pp. 77-8; Sutherland, The City... 1768-74, passim. Beckford's statue stands with those of the two Pitts, Nelson, Wellington and Churchill.
constitutional questions is of such interest, particularly in tracing the
troots and the growth of the radicalism that was thus to be displayed,
that it deserves closer examination.
PART II

THE MONITOR ON THE CONSTITUTION
Constitutional comment comes naturally to the writers of the *Monitor*. Characteristically of their age they frequently assess the particular issues, foreign or domestic, with which they are preoccupied, in the light of broad constitutional principles and attitudes. Unwise policies and bad measures are seen as arising out of defects in or abuses of the constitution. If these are removed good and effective government will result. Suggestions of constitutional reform are made as part of schemes for the complete redirection of government. Along such lines of discussion the *Monitor* essays move easily between particular issues and events and general constitutional comment.¹ Usually the comment is brief and undeveloped and concerned with the contemporary state of the constitution rather than its origin and nature. This is especially so in the first of the two periods of the *Monitor*'s life when constitutional comment is most frequent, its early years, when it arises out of concern over the crisis in foreign policy and the political changes associated with it, and is dominated by righteous indignation against the iniquities of the 'late ministry'. Only later, in the second major period of interest in the constitution, after the coming of peace early in 1763, is the discussion more often closely argued, concerned more with fundamentals and less directly related to specific issues and measures.²

1. The intermingling of constitutional and other considerations is shown, e.g. in the *Monitor* 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 2, 16 Aug. 1755; 6, 13 Sep. 1755; 26, 31 Jan. 1756; 93, 30 Apr. 1757; 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 126, 17 Dec. 1757; 147, 13 May 1758; 170, 21 Oct. 1758.

2. Essays with considerable constitutional comment are distributed as follows:— 1755 (Aug. to Dec.), 12; 1756, 33; 1757, 25; 1758, 18; 1759, 12; 1760, 14; 1761, 27; 1762, 9; 1763, 42; 1764, 44; 1765 (Jan. to Mar.), 8.
What emerges from these constitutional comments is not a systematic, closely reasoned political philosophy, but rather a set of working ideas, of accepted assumptions generally taken for granted and stated without question or justification, usually piecemeal, as criteria for judgement when circumstances suit and controversy dictates. Yet together they form a fairly complete set of constitutional attitudes and ideas which illustrate how some men looked at politics and the constitution in the mid-eighteenth century, and demonstrate the prejudices and assumptions which may have affected their actions.

Because of the Monitor's part in building up the popular following of William Beckford and because of his importance in the evolution of London attitudes towards radicalism in these and later years, it may fairly be assumed that in these attitudes and ideas are to be found some of the major ideological roots of early radicalism. It therefore seems worthwhile to construct out of the Monitor's patchwork of varied and scattered comment a more coherent and complete account of the constitution than the paper itself presents at any one time, and then to consider at some length the origins and significance of the account so constructed, which is representative of an important strand of eighteenth-century thinking at a crucial stage in its development. This task is undertaken not in order to assess the merit of the result as a political philosophy, but to consider what it can show about contemporary society and politics and developments taking place in them. A study of the way men rationalized their circumstances, of the ideas to which men turned to express their feelings and justify their actions, of the language in which they made their demands, is part of the historian's business in illuminating the past. Such a study raises questions about the complex relations between events and thinking about them, between external stimuli and ideas in determining action. Yet it is possible to suggest
that these ideas and attitudes coloured responses and provoked certain demands when external circumstances pressed in the same direction.

Certainly the study should elucidate further the origins and nature of early radicalism.
The Framework of the Constitution

Its Origins and General Nature

The authors of the *Monitor* share the admiration of the constitution typical of the eighteenth century, although this admiration is constantly tempered by a deep concern about its contemporary state. When working properly it is 'the most perfect form of government, that ever was instituted', 'established upon better principles, and in a better manner than that of any nation now existing'. It deserves this praise because it secures the proper ends of government, that is, the good of the people and the security of their rights and privileges. These are most usually defined as liberty and, rather less frequently, property, which together are the 'very briefiate' of the rights and claims of Englishmen. Occasionally other associated rights, such as security of religion and the laws, are mentioned but liberty is fundamental, the very essence of the constitution. All are born to liberty; the man who has no other property has a property in his liberty. The history of English liberty is the history of the constitution. Britons are different from the French, the Spanish, or the 'Musselman at Constantinople', and envied by them, because they have the happiness to live under 'what is understood by a free government' and are 'the ONLY free nation'.

Not only does government exist for the good of the people; it also derives its authority from the people. Notions of divine right are 'absolutely worn out of the minds of men', 'entirely exploded'. Although government

3. For the first two quotations, the *Monitor* 130, 14 Jan. 1758; 394, 19 Feb. 1763; for those about liberty, 461, 2 June 1764; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 404, 30 Apr. 1763; 421, 27 Aug. 1763; 85, 5 Mar. 1757; see also 19, 13 Dec. 1755; 203, 9 June 1759; 447, 25 Feb. 1764; 3, 23 Aug. 1755; 6, 13 Sep. 1755; 118, 22 Oct. 1757; 401, 9 Apr. 1763.
may in origin be designed by God for the happiness of mankind, the people, existing before any organs of government, are the immediate origin of all power. Scripture shows that all powers, not just kingly power, are ordained of God; the particular forms of government are decided by men.  

Legitimate power is acquired by contract with the people. 'Rulers govern everywhere by God's permission, while they govern according to covenant with their subjects.' This is the Monitor's consistent explanation of the basis of the authority of particular governments. In its fullest exposition of contract ideas, supported by a lengthy extract from Hooker, it is argued that a state of nature, in which each man was master of his property and liberty, must be supposed to have existed prior to government. In this state of nature some regulation is made necessary, for the good and quiet of the whole society, by the anarchy arising out of a steady increase in numbers. So men give up some of their rights and place themselves under a form of government devised by themselves and entrusted to those in whom they have confidence. However, it cannot be imagined that they place themselves in a worse position by these actions. Indeed, they have no right or power to deliver up their preservation or the means of it to the absolute will of any man. So the grant of power is limited by the right of self-preservation and the people have the right to preserve what they have no power to give away.  

Such contracts may result in varying forms of government. To know the terms on which government has been set up by the people in Britain one must look at the law. The contract is not a mere artifice of reason to

4. For the two quotations 2, 16 Aug. 1755; 450, 17 Mar. 1764; 447, 25 Feb. 1764; 448, 3 Mar. 1764; 450, 17 Mar. 1764.  
5. 421, 27 Aug. 1763 (the quotation); 447; 448; also 3, 23 Aug. 1755; 19, 13 Dec. 1755; 54, 14 Aug. 1756; 94, 7 May 1757; 95, 14 May 1757; 421, 27 Aug. 1763; 423, 10 Sep. 1763; 428, 15 Oct. 1763; 464, 23 June 1764.  
6. 428.
explain the nature of government; in Britain anyway it is a historical reality, or rather a series of historical realities, embodied in 'certain laws or statutes'. In the parts of the common and statute law which settle the bonds of society, the powers of the crown and the freedom of the individual are to be found the foundations of the constitution. They are equivalent to a series of contracts of limitation for each part of the constitution, renewed by the king on his part in his coronation oath. These 'certain laws or statutes' are most commonly detailed as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, the 'three main Stays of the OLD ENGLAND'. Such laws are fundamental laws, not to be repealed. Accordingly, the Monitor protests about the repeal of sections of the Act of Settlement and alleged breaches of the remaining clauses. 7

English liberties go back further than Magna Carta or any charter or confirmatory laws, however. These are merely 'recognitions of what we have reserved unto ourselves, ...and what have always appertained unto us by common law, and immemorial customs' or which, alternatively, go back to when the first freeholders submitted to the first king in a past shrouded in oblivion. Here contract theory merges, in lines of thought which Richard Beckford was apt to expatiate on, with the idea of the ancient constitution, 'a government, that so many centuries ha[ve] conspired to raise', 'that beautiful frame of government' delivered down to posterity by the repeated efforts of the people in protection of the constitution. This is a constitution which has its origins back in the comitia of the days of Claudius Caesar and in the witanagemot and michel or great genote of the Anglo-Saxons and which has survived several

7. 30, 28 Feb. 1756 (the first quotation); 19, 13 Dec. 1755; 279, 22 Nov. 1760; 497, 9 Feb. 1765; 192, 24 Mar. 1759 (the second quotation); on protests about the Act of Settlement see e.g. 30, 28 Feb. 1756 and below pp.445-6; for other references to Magna Carta see e.g. 34, 27 Mar. 1756; 40, 8 May 1756; 406, 14 May 1763; 407, 21 May 1763; 448, 3 Mar. 1764; 461, 2 June 1764; despite the importance of these particular 'laws and statutes', sometimes it seems as if the whole of the law is being equated with the contract, the constitution e.g. 419, 13 Aug. 1763; 421, 27 Aug. 1763; 448; 497.
conquests and changes of government, even that of the Normans although they did all they could to destroy liberties.  

There is no doubt among the authors of the Monitor, just as there was little among Englishmen generally, about the kind of government thus established. Writers on government, says one essay, are 'unanimous in opinion, that the most perfect form, which human wit can invent, is that, wherein the three powers; the regal, the aristocratic and popular are so artfully mixed, and made a check, each upon the other, that neither can predominate and destroy the other .... Such is our British constitution....' In Britain, the covenant of the people has set up a limited or mixed monarchy, a monarchical mixed government, composed of king, lords and commons. The various laws and statutes comprising the contract define the roles of the three parts. The objection that mixed government must tend to either one or other of its three elements and degenerate is vigorously refuted, as is, even more vigorously, the royalist argument, based on the necessity of a sovereign power, that mixed government is 'a cheat'.

It is the balance of the different parts of this mixed government which ensures its excellence. The happiness the nation enjoys under limited monarchy would soon be destroyed if one part trespassed on another. 'For there is no medium in Britain between perfect tyranny and mere anarchy and confusion; whenever one part of the constitution usurps upon another.' It is vitally important, therefore, to defend the 'balance of power' in the constitution, to support 'that main prop of constitutional liberty'. Intervention of one

8. 448 (first quotation); 30; 130, 14 Jan. 1758 (the second quotation); 400, 2 Apr. 1763 (the third quotation); and e.g. 293, 28 Feb. 1761; 406; 448. For Richard Peckford's views see above p. 65.
9. 96, 21 May 1757 (the quotation); and e.g. 30, 28 Feb. 1756; 279, 22 Nov. 1760; 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 428, 15 Oct. 1763; 450, 17 Mar. 1764.
10. E.g. 19, 13 Dec 1755; 404, 30 Apr. 1763; 448, 3 Mar. 1764; 473, 25 Aug. 1764.
part in the functions of another is justifiable only in the utmost crisis. Otherwise the equality of power and the harmony of parts must be preserved, so that it may still be said of the constitution that 'It's soul is liberty: its actions harmonious, and its motions uniform'. 12

The Monitor gives or implies at different times varying definitions of the liberty that is the soul of the constitution. Sometimes it uses the term very broadly. The liberty of any country is said on one occasion to depend on the freedom of its constitution, the equity of its government, and the power it has to defend itself against foreign enemies. 13 A more strictly constitutional definition of liberty maintains that it consists in a form of government providing equally for the dignity of the supreme magistrate and the safety of the people, and in laws which define both the royal prerogative and the subject's obedience, so that the welfare of the nation does not depend on one man's will. A free government is thus basically one 'where royalty is limited by Laws, and the reason of things'. Sometimes the rights and functions guaranteed by law, custom or principle to the various parts of the constitution are regarded as making up the liberty which it protects and which is threatened by any abuse of it. 14

Sometimes this definition of liberty as the rule of law is extended to require a share in the making of that law. 'The nature of freedom consists, in being governed by equal and standing laws of our own making.' 'Hence we collect the excellency of our national constitution, in which we are liable to no laws, but such as are made by our representatives; nor subject to any contribution, tax or pecuniary supply, but what they vote and voluntary [sic] grant.' 15 At other times the emphasis is on personal liberties, liberty of

12. 40, 8 May 1756 (first quotation); 395, 26 Feb. 1763 (third quotation); 447, 25 Feb. 1764 (second quotation); 491, 29 Dec. 1764; 485, 17 Nov. 1764; 394, 19 Feb. 1763 (fourth quotation).

13. 319, 29 Aug. 1761.

14. 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 421, 27 Aug. 1763 (the quotation); and e.g. 404, 30 Apr. 1763; 446, 18 Feb. 1764.

15. 34, 27 Mar. 1756 (first quotation) cf.442, 2 Jan. 1764; 293, 28 Feb. 1761 (second quotation).
the person, of goods and estate, the right to be tried only according to
the law and by one's peers, protection from arbitrary and excessive 'justice',
the right to the writ of habeas corpus. 16

Often, however, the definition of liberty is less conventional and
legally oriented, or a wider sense is associated with a commonplace definition.
Liberty is the right and ability to give one's opinions of the laws before
they are passed and to make the executors of the laws accountable to the
people. Action to enforce such responsibility is 'the practice of that
spirit of freedom, which preserved the British Constitution from the injuries,
that have enslaved its neighbouring states'. The boast of being the 'ONLY
free nation' is an empty one if the people submit to measures that will
beggar them. The right to supervise government and to speak out without
fear of repression against bad measures is essential in a free state. '[W]as
there ever a nation which enjoyed its liberty after it lost its freedom of
speech?' 17

The various meanings given by the Monitor to liberty are most compre-
hensively brought together in an essay of 1763: 18

What is Liberty? says a slave of a party. Let him attend,
and if he be not deaf and hardened, he must confess that
Liberty is the birthright of an Englishman, who is born
free from all pains and penalties, but such as he shall
bring upon himself in course of law; and free for protection
and relief from the laws: free to make laws, and to be tried
under those laws by a jury of his fellow subjects: free to
complain when aggrieved, and free to take all legal methods
to obtain redress from any part of the legislative power.
Thus Liberty, when challenged by an Englishman, is his
security from tyranny and arbitrary power; a right to seek
redress when injured, and to oppose any measures or pro-
ceedings, he apprehends may hurt his person or his property;
...He may express his dislike, as well as his assent to any
bill, before carried into a law; and he is not to be denied the

16. E.g. 406, 14 May 1763; 407, 21 May 1763; 409, 4 June 1763; 417, 30 July 1763.
17. 34, 27 Mar. 1756; 118, 22 Oct. 1757 (first quotation); 85, 5 Mar. 1757
(second quotation); 474, 1 Sep. 1764; 89, 2 Apr. 1757 (third quotation).
The Monitor's vigorous defence of freedom of speech and the press is
discussed more fully below pp. 418-9.
18. 404, 30 Apr. 1763.
liberty to remonstrate against an act of parliament, though he is bound to obey, while it remains in force. It is the measure of the subjects obedience, and his defence against the encroachments of the executive power. It is a terror to evil counsellors and the harbinger of peace and happiness to a just and wise prince.

Yet liberty is always something more than just constitutional provisions or particular freedoms. It is a rich quality of life, the basis of a sound and healthy society, of superiority in commerce and national strength, courage and industry, which no wise king would want to see undermined. 19

Such is the liberty which the balance of the mixed constitution preserves for Englishmen, achieving a just mean, a wise middle, between a weak government that would be pernicious to the people and an unjust one that would oppress them, taking away only so much liberty as is necessary for the good of the people. 20

The process of forming the constitution, of protecting the balance, of preserving liberty, is a process which goes on, not something which happened in the past and is now finished. It is impossible to have a fault-free system of government. All forms of government are imperfect or, even if perfect to begin with, tend to degenerate. All constitutions need to be 'furbished up', revised to bring them back to first principles. 21 The British constitution is better than most because the vigilance of the people in the past has kept it close to its original principles. This vigilance must not be relaxed. In any state, whatever the form of government they have established, the people as the origin of power may resume it. If they have given up their whole power and established an absolute monarchy they can only resume it by casting off their allegiance and ending government.

19. E.g. 399, 26 Mar. 1763; 450, 17 Mar. 1764; 474, 1 Sep. 1764.
20. 279, 22 Nov. 1760; 400, 2 Apr. 1763.
21. 395, 26 Feb. 1763; 449, 10 Mar. 1764; 472, 18 Aug. 1764 (the quotation); 1, 9 Aug. 1755.
In a limited mixed government the people have much more scope to act without destroying the whole constitution. Indeed the very constitution allows them the fundamental security of making successive and continual provision as necessary. This right which the English people have exercised in the past must be resorted to in the future, to keep the constitution sound and to add, if necessary, to the law defining the contract which is the foundation of all legitimate government.  

Here, in this constantly reiterated insistence on continual vigilance and activity by the people, is to be found the theme which most distinguishes the Monitor's thought from the commonplaces of the eighteenth century. So frequently emphasized, this theme destroys the effect of the pleas at the beginning and the end of the paper's life against innovation, undermines its insistence on mixed balanced government, and gives it some claim to radicalism.

The Monarchy

The Monitor's attitude to the monarchy is curiously shot with ambiguity. Within the framework of mixed government its authors are prepared to allow a large role to the king and expect much from him. This high view of the monarchy is coupled with careful and often obsequious respect towards the reigning kings. Yet government is always suspect and kings have constantly to be reminded of their duties and exhorted to use their powers wisely. One author holds that the 'failings, errors or prostitution [of the executive power], have been the causes of all the convulsions and revolutions in this nation'. Although the machinations of ministers rather than monarchs are usually blamed for the evils of government, the Monitor

22. 1; 94, 7 May 1757; 95, 14 May 1757; 449, 10 Mar. 1764; 378, 16 Oct. 1762 (spurious); 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 428, 15 Oct. 1763; 421, 27 Aug. 1763.
23. 9, 4 Oct. 1755; 497, 9 Feb. 1765.
24. 488, 8 Dec. 1764.
is quite prepared to preach to and warn kings, even to threaten them about the consequences of not listening to the demands of the people or not remembering the limits of their power.

This ambiguity is shown in discussions of and references to the origins of the king's power. Usually, in line with the Monitor's general ideas, the king is held to derive his authority from the people. They have the power, reserved in their contract, to limit or exclude kings and elect new ones. They exercised this power at the Revolution as they have done on numerous other occasions in English and Scottish history and could do again, if necessary. The present king reigns by title based on the Act of Settlement, the 'act of the people in parliament assembled'. His claim to authority has nothing to do with divine hereditary right, although hereditary succession is not inconsistent with limited monarchy if such were the terms of the original covenant. It is the consent of the governed only that can give the right to succeed. The pressure of events and particular discontents constantly reinforces this emphasis on the people as the origin and hence the control of the king's power, claiming a 'property in the royal actions'.

At times of special formal significance for the monarchy, however, such as the coming of age of an heir or the accession of a new king, a more traditional tory note is apparently struck. The heir or new king is reminded that his power comes from God, that it is 'God who establisheth [kings], and not men'. On one occasion it is insisted that force should never be used against the person of a monarch. He is irrevocably invested with sovereignty unless he voluntarily chooses to abdicate. He should not, therefore, be resisted lightly, and never by force (although resistance

is justified and force may be used against his advisors and those executing his commands.\textsuperscript{26} It is usually clear, however, that these appeals to the divine origin and irrevocable nature of kingly power are little more than pious platitudes to add solemnity to exhortations to a new king. He must exercise his power as a trust, forget himself in service, be a father to his people. His power is given him by God for the good of the people and in the exercise of it he is accountable to God. It is never the people who are exhorted to remember that the king's power comes from God, although they are warned that a wicked king may be divine retribution for vice and corruption. The emphasis is always on the limits of the king's power, on his duties, on the pitfalls of his position. '[H]is power is unli mitted in no other sense, but to give an unbounded extent to his zeal and fidelity to God.' Hence the implications of this view are far from incompatible with the explanation of the king's power more in keeping with the general political theory of the Monitor. Both agree that the king is bound to use his power for the good of the people, not his own aggrandisement. Both insist on the king's subjection to the law.\textsuperscript{27}

Similar differences of emphasis appear in discussions of the extent of the king's power. Frequently and in many different ways the limits of his power are stressed. Because 'lex facit Regem' the king is bound, of course, to rule according to the law and his duty is primarily to carry out the law. He executes what the constitution requires or the legislature ordains. 'When all this is done, the administration is complete.' The maxim that the king can do no wrong does not mean that the king can do as he likes. He can only do what the law empowers. Rather it means that ministers are to be held responsible and cannot plead his command as excuse.\textsuperscript{28}
can claim no specific power except those explicitly granted him; in any dispute he must produce evidence of such a grant; and any powers not granted remain with the people. They should avoid entrusting too much power, even to virtuous and trustworthy princes, because such powers will remain possibly to be misused by a bad prince in the future. Instead, under a good king they should seek to remedy any defects in their liberty so that they cannot be oppressed later. Only to a prince who faithfully fulfils his trust under the law do the people owe full obedience.

Mutual confidence between king and people is essential to the proper working of the constitution and to national glory and happiness. If such mutual confidence is to exist then princes must have no affection injurious to their people, while the people must not succumb to faction and discontent which can nourish confusion and rebellion and force a king 'to become a tyrant in his own defence'. By far the greater effort is devoted to insisting that it is in the true interest of the king to have the esteem of his people than to teaching the people to deserve the confidence of the king. A whole paper is devoted to the text that 'A prince, that dissembles with his people, teaches them to do the same with him'. He invites opposition. The same paper and others assert that the people never fail to assist when trust is put in them no matter what the difficulties. Britain's monarchs have always flourished when they relied on their people.

In practice, it is made clear over and over again that relying on the people, keeping faith with them means listening to their demands and remonstrances.

31. 127, 24 Dec. 1757 (first quotation); 72, 11 Dec. 1756 (second quotation); 325, 10 Oct. 1761; 478, 29 Sep. 1764.
over grievous measures or ministers. The king who does so attend to the voice of his responsible subjects, who is prompt in the execution of justice, the punishment of malpractices and the defence of the constitution, will reign happily. Mixed monarchy will be seen working ideally and liberty will flourish. 32

Indeed, the happiness of the British constitution arises from these limits placed on the king's power. 'And happy is the nation whose constitution is so poised and tempered, and the administration so disposed and divided into proper channels, that the passions and infirmities of the Prince cannot enter into the measures of his government.' Such restraints are not onerous. They merely prevent a prince from doing mischief and only human frailty could make him resent them. Indeed, absolute monarchs are not to be envied. The king of a free people who properly understands his position and remembers that the 'true interest of King and People is one and the same, and inseparable' has a much more honourable and secure title than have arbitrary and despotic kings. The love of the people is the best security of a throne. 33

Such a king in reality enjoys wide powers. In many essays the extent rather than the limits of the king's power is emphasized. It is sufficient for all the purposes of government, sufficient for him to be able to take firm, independent initiatives. His prerogative is two-fold, 'consisting partly of such enumerated particulars as are ascertained to him by express laws...; and partly consisting in certain things, for which there being no particular provision made by law, it is left to the Prince's discretion to do therein what he shall judge most conducing to the public benefit...'. 34

Within this scope left by the law the king has enormous possibilities of

32. 36, 10 Apr. 1756; 54, 14 Aug. 1756; 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 99, 11 June 1757; 376, 2 Oct. 1762; 401, 9 Apr. 1763; 403, 23 Apr. 1763.
33. 473, 25 Aug. 1764 (first quotation); 59, 11 Sep. 1756 (second quotation); 466, 8 Dec. 1764.
34. 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 56, 21 Aug. 1756; 450, 22 Dec. 1764; 454, 14 Apr. 1764 (the quotation).
serving the public good, of making civil government as perfect as it can be. The king can do no wrong gives merely a negative view of the king's powers; rather his positive powers of doing good, should be emphasized. When a virtuous king preserves the right relationships with his people and does not make use of crises to extend his own power, then much is to be hoped for in the restoration of the constitution and of liberty and in provision of better security for the future. Even the grossest evils can be remedied. Disorders may be cured, public confidence restored and the benefits of peace secured. Such benefits amply justify 'what it costs the people to maintain the kingly office'.

With great opportunities go great responsibilities. The frequent stress on these further emphasizes the large constitutional role envisaged for the king. The most important task of the king is the choice of counsellors. The king's prerogative of choice is allowed. 'It is acknowledged that his majesty has an undoubted right to execute his trust by what servants he pleases.' 'To be sure, the people have no right to the nomination of the King's ministers.' Yet the king is not infallible; nor are the people insensible or without judgement. And they have not given up their right to call the king's ministers to account. Their views, when clearly expressed either for or against possible ministers, should not be totally disregarded.

The main burden of choice, however, remains the king's and demands high qualities of him. Above all he must have wisdom. Good counsel cannot make up for the lack of wisdom in a king for without the ability to choose wisely there will be no good counsellors. Over and over again

35. 395, 26 Feb. 1763; 401, 9 Apr. 1763; 486, 24 Nov. 1764; 488, 8 Dec. 1764 (the quotation); 490, 22 Dec. 1764.
36. 99, 11 June 1757, 330, 14 Nov. 1761.
the importance of sound choice is reiterated.\(^{37}\) Then, having exercised his choice wisely, the king must maintain the proper relationships with his ministers. He must be independent of them, not giving up total power to them. Particularly dangerous is the upholding of one favourite minister who will be in a position to monopolize power and become virtual ruler instead of the king, probably in the process setting the king against his subjects by misrepresenting their views. A faction can likewise usurp the king's power. If a king so becomes 'a prey to a minister' he is deprived of both government and reason, and, worse still, of 'the natural intercourse, which is necessary to maintain good harmony with his subjects'. On the other hand, when the king finds an able, discreet and virtuous minister, who is not self-seeking and will not root himself in power by establishing his faction in places, he should be given full confidence. The king must always firmly show his determination to choose and reward servants of merit.\(^{38}\) If he succeeds in the difficult task of choosing good counsellors and keeping the right relations with them the results will be success abroad and confidence, harmony and union, tranquillity and contentment at home. If he does not succeed, the way will be open to all kinds of dissensions and dangers to the constitution at home and disasters abroad.\(^{39}\)

Closely associated with the task of choosing ministers wisely is the king's duty to maintain harmony in the nation, avoiding faction and healing divisions. Dissension is usually caused by misrule. Vitally important in reducing faction is the king's example of virtue and devotion to the public good, his initiative and leadership to others. A prince who


\(^{38}\) 56; 100, 18 June 1757 (the quotations); 101, 25 June 1757; 282, 13 Dec. 1760; 298, 4 Apr. 1761; 325, 10 Oct. 1761; 426, 1 Oct. 1763. See below pp. 431-4.

\(^{39}\) E.g. 311, 4 July 1761; 431, 5 Nov. 1763; 443, 28 Jan. 1764.
dedicates himself to the ending of discord will always find at least a part of the people left untainted and ready to help. The task will take time, prudence and courage, but is not impossible and has been done before in England. The connections between the two main aspects of good rule and the results of success or failure are again highlighted from a review of English history:

As many of our Princes as ruled well and wisely, were blessed with peace at home and success abroad, and...they who did otherwise, and trusted the administration in unsteady, furious or unskilful hands, were never without popular insurrections and intestine broils; nor can any other be expected in the nature of things, where ministers of state seek their own and not the public good.40

Because the duties of monarchy are so great and difficult, the temptations and dangers that can arise from the exercise of executive power are considerable. The holder of high office is reminded of the insidious influence of prosperity, position and flattery and the threat of intrigue and deceit among over-powerful counsellors.41 Kings are sometimes warned in no uncertain terms, especially in the paper's earlier years and with pointed lessons from history, of the consequences of succumbing to these dangers. No king who did so 'ever escaped the resentment of his subjects'. Later in its life the Monitor seems more concerned with the iniquities of ministers than with those of kings.42 More typically, the overt attitude to kings of the time is very correct and careful, complimentary to the point of excess. This is often suggestive of irony, especially in the light of the bitter criticisms levelled at various government policies. A long catalogue of possible evils can end with the assurance that such evil and and mistaken devices of previous reigns are not to be feared under the

40. 395, 26 Feb. 1763; 472, 18 Aug. 1764; 475, 8 Sep. 1764; 477, 22 Sep. 1764 (the quotation); 478, 29 Sep. 1764; 488, 8 Dec. 1764.
41. 279, 22 Nov. 1760; 281, 6 Dec. 1760; 282, 13 Dec. 1760; 325, 10 Oct. 1761.
42. 40, 8 May 1756; 45, 12 June 1756 (the quotation); 101, 25 June 1757; 325; 464, 23 June 1764.
present excellent king. On occasions of special importance, however, expressions of loyalty go far beyond such ambiguous praise. Both George II (only after his death) and George III are on occasion given the supreme accolade of the title of 'patriotic king'.

Some of the most striking summaries of the constitutional role of kings illustrate well this combination of stress on the opportunities open to kings and on their onerous duties:

The annals of every mixed government, where a sovereign reigns over a free people, record with what justice and firmness, he has opposed all attempts of one part of the legislature to encroach upon another; with what resolution and vigour he has resisted those, that have sought to over-thrown the constitution, to strike at the liberty, or to ruin the interest of his country; with what diligence and circumspection he has preferred the virtuous and wise to his councils... and discerned between good and wholesome advice, and the evil and deceitful overtures of such, who lie in wait to sell their king and country for their private gain; and what perplexity, he has laboured under, before he has been able to get clear of those veterans in the art of deception and falsehood; in the mystery of influencing the cabinet, and in the means to terrify kings, to disunite them from the affections of their best subjects, and to magnify their own interest and power.

Another such summary occurs as part of the 'Englishman's Political Catechism', in a lengthy and adroit parody of the Lord's Prayer. On other occasions, the qualities and characteristics of good kings are elaborated. Such visions of the king ruling actively and vigorously within the limits imposed by the origins of his power, upholding the constitution and liberty with the support of his people and in defiance of bad counsellors and thus securing the welfare and glory of his country, are characteristic of the Monitor. This is the constitution working at its best. The authors can envisage no other form of executive government.

43. 79, 22 Jan. 1757; 83, 19 Feb. 1757; 299, 11 Apr. 1761; 344, 20 Feb. 1762; 468, 21 July 1764; and, as example of irony, 65, 23 Oct. 1756; 406, 14 May 1763. Such irony and use of historical examples were, of course, devices typical of eighteenth-century political writing in its efforts to avoid the law.

44. 276, 1 Nov. 1760; 309, 20 June 1761; 310, 27 June 1761; 326, 17 Oct. 1761.

45. 325, 10 Oct. 1761 (the quotation); 420, 20 Aug. 1763.

46. 311, 4 July 1761; 401, 9 Apr. 1763.
Yet with this goes, equally characteristically, a strong conviction that a fall from grace on the part of the king is always imminent, that he must be constantly urged to fulfil his duty. There is evidence of a strong suspicion on the part of the authors that their view of the working of the constitution is not realistic, that kings cannot be trusted in this way. In the last resort they have little faith in the possibility of a patriot king. Rather they seem to believe that the emphasis in the constitution should be elsewhere, on the control of the people over the king. Here in this never overtly resolved ambiguity lies one major distinguishing mark of the Monitor's attitudes.

The Houses of Parliament

Parliament, the legislative part of government, is made up of the three elements of the mixed constitution, king, lords and commons. This arrangement is fundamental to the constitution. Through the legislature the people exercise the rights they have reserved to make laws for their well-being and to supervise, punish and amend the executive power which they have established. 'This is the power of Britons, and is lodged in the legislative body of king, lords, and commons.' In performance of their legislative role the parts of the constitution must act in concurrence.

In practice, however, the Monitor plays down the king's role in legislation, and the houses of parliament are more often regarded as set against the king as checks on his exercise of his executive functions. 'A parliament is the fountain from whence all our laws spring forth. It is the bulwark of our liberties: the boundary, which preserves Britons from slavery, and the bank to fence off the inundations of tyrannical rule and arbitrary power.' The houses of parliament have vested in them,

47. 19, 13 Dec. 1755 (the quotation); 3, 23 Aug. 1755.
Always the independence of the two houses from the king is insisted on. Sometimes this insistence is in terms which suggest a separation of legislative and executive functions and on one occasion such a separation is explicitly upheld in theory. More often the powers allotted to the different parts of the constitution to exercise independently are not sharply differentiated into legislative and executive functions. Thus the Monitor's strong emphasis on the houses of parliament as checks on the power of the executive never amounts to a fully-fledged doctrine of the separation of powers. The king's part in legislation is never denied and the concern is for the separation of bodies representing different constitutional types or different interests in society rather than the separation of powers.

The Monitor distinguishes between the roles of the lords and commons in acting as bulwarks of the constitution. Its references to the house of lords as a separate element in the constitution are, however, relatively infrequent and what is said is usually quite conventional and unremarkable. It provides, of course, the aristocratic element of the mixed constitution. Aristocracy as a form of government has the advantage of bringing together in the great council of the nation the ablest men, whose advice should be heeded. It is clearly considered to be important that the nobility should continue to command respect and that new creations should be carefully made.

48. 155, 8 July 1758; 252, 17 May 1760; 293, 28 Feb. 1761 (the quotation) 450, 17 Mar. 1764; 498, 16 Feb. 1765.
49. E.g. 23, 10 Jan. 1756.
50. 491, 29 Dec. 1764, discussed more fully below pp. 405-6.
On the other hand, aristocratic rule by itself is prone to faction and division. In mixed government this is offset by the monarchical element, which provides the necessary leadership, while the house of commons has so absolute a guardianship of the liberty and property of the subject that there is no danger of ruin to the people from 'a government of nobles'.

The main role envisaged for the house of lords is, however, not the giving of advice but the preservation of the balance of the constitution against the pressure of the other two elements, which are obviously regarded as much more active and vigorous. 'The operation and dignity of that illustrious assembly, consists in correcting the encroachments, which either the monarchical or democratical part of the constitution may make upon each other. - The balance is in their hands.' They must preserve the harmony as well as regulate the action of the whole machine. In particular, they have the privilege of deciding questions at issue between the king, in the exercise of his far-reaching executive powers, and the subjects, for whose good those powers must be used. It is this judicial function which makes them the barrier between prince and people. To perform this properly they must make an independent judgement of measures. 'Their institution arises from their independency upon both the other parts. - And consequently that august assembly must be most independent.'

The emphasis placed on the judicial, balancing function of the house of lords varies with circumstances, in a way which illustrates well the occasional nature of the Monitor's constitutional comment. The lords win praise when they reject a bill for an enquiry into the court martial of Admiral Byng, introduced in the hope of modifying the sentence. They have acted as 'council to the king and guardians of their

52. The Monitor 450, 17 Mar. 1764; 322, 19 Sep. 1761, and on the importance of a respected nobility, 102, 2 July 1757; 322, 19 Sep. 1761.
53. 147, 13 May 1758 (both quotations); 450.
country', stepping in when king and commons were imposed on. Yet, when they reject the habeas corpus bill of 1758, a measure passed by the commons with the approval of the Monitor, they are reminded at length of the dangers of interfering with questions concerning the liberties and remediying the grievances of the people. Such interference can only be justified if encroachments on the prerogative are involved. If extended beyond this it may lead again to excessive enlargement of the powers of the lords as it has in the past. 'An arbitrary nobility is worse than an absolute monarch.' The people are urged without hesitation or delay, to '[n]ip thurst for arbitrary power in its bud' by urging the commons to appropriate action through instructions and addresses. 54

Of course the lords are also recognized as having a more explicitly judicial role as the highest court of judicature in determining appeals from inferior courts. It is indicative of the Monitor's relative lack of attention to the house of lords that this is the only role assigned to them in an essay which discusses the origins and working of the constitution at length in answer to divine right ideas. Further, in discussion of the danger of different parts of the constitution overstepping their limits, the only such threat that it is suggested the lords might make is the hearing of cases in the first instance. 55 At other times distrust is shown of certain elements in the lords thought to be too subservient to the administration in rejecting popular measures: a new peerage raised out of the dust, a bench of bishops attached to this world, and Scottish peers. 56

In general, while the paper does not pay much attention to the lords, it does recognize the need to preserve a properly limited role for the

54. 86, 12 Mar. 1757 (first quotation); 154, 1 July 1758 (other quotations).
55. 154; 473, 25 Aug. 1764; 448, 3 Mar. 1764.
56. 94, 7 May 1757; 154, 1 July 1758.
peerage if the inherent tendency to deterioration in the constitution is to be controlled. Yet this role, allowed in theory, is at the mercy of the exigencies of practical politics. As with the monarchy, the demands of opposition can undermine the independent function of the lords in favour of the control of the people.

The greater importance of the house of commons is suggested throughout in the much greater attention given to it. Even where 'parliament' is the term used in discussion it is often clear from the context or emphasis that the writer has the house of commons in mind. The implied superiority of the house of commons is based partly on its historic role in resistance to oppression, but mainly on its representative character. It, far more than the house of lords, constitutes 'the nation's representatives'; 'being vastly the majority' it is 'the only indispensably necessary part of a commonwealth'. In this 'national court' 'the meanest subject claims an interest and common right' through the house of commons. The house of commons thus provides the advantages of democracy. It fosters liberty, which in turn encourages both courage and industry and gives Britain superiority in commerce and national strength. The disadvantages of democracy, tumults, violence, licentiousness, are kept in check by the elements of monarchy and aristocracy.

In discussing the constitutional role of the house of commons the Monitor's emphasis is much more on its checking of other parts and on conditions necessary for it to be effective as a check, rather than on the ways in which its powers are in turn controlled. Its part in preserving

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57. 449, 10 Mar. 1764.
58. E.g. 260, 12 July 1760; 377, 11 Oct. 1762 (spurious); 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 422, 3 Sep. 1763.
59. 293, 28 Feb. 1761 (third quotation); 377 (spurious - first quotation); 453, 7 Apr. 1764 (second quotation); 450, 17 Mar. 1764.
the balance of the constitution has two connected aspects: with, but much more than, the house of lords, it acts as the 'great inquest of the kingdom' in supervising and controlling government; and it provides the 'great bulwark of popular liberty'. Its members, 'who are representatives of the people in parliament assembled, act in a double capacity for the welfare of the whole'. They advise and grant aid to the king and guard against injury to the subject.  

The prototype of the house as guardian of liberty is to be found in the general assemblies of the people of Saxon times, which approved kings before they could legally possess the crown, provided for redress of grievances, made laws, imposed taxes and decided all affairs of consequence for the public good. The house of commons, representing these general assemblies of the people, later took over and has preserved the essential parts of this liberty through all the subsequent changes of history. Its frequent opposition to arbitrary princes is traced from Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights. Still it is necessary at all times to work 'to preserve our constitutional Liberty', learning from the example of times past how to defend it whereever the attack may come. The people of England still place their chief trust in their representatives for the defence of the constitution and the support of liberty and property.

The importance of the house of commons as the guardian of liberty is insisted on more fully in the later years of the paper's life. Throughout, however, the house is exhorted to fulfil the other aspect of its task, its part in supervising government. The two houses together prevent the king from using his power wrongly. The house of commons in particular restrains

60. 293 (third quotation); 448, 3 Mar. 1764 (first quotation); 473, 25 Aug. 1764 (second quotation). See also 63, 9 Oct. 1756.

61. 400, 2 Apr. 1763 (the quotation); 252, 17 May 1760; 260, 12 July 1760; see also 77, 15 Jan. 1757; 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 155, 8 July 1758.
the power of peace and war by its privilege of granting money and controls evil counsellors by its right of impeachment. The latter is 'founded upon most rational principles of government', without which it would be impossible to punish great offenders and with which the house can prevent the state being overturned. The house should hear complaints against government and redress them, and should speak out against those responsible for miscarriages in war and insist on punishment. It should be particularly careful about the granting of taxation in wartime, doing so only after careful enquiry. Further, the commons must take steps to secure a change of ministers if necessary.

'Nor will all these precautions deliver us from our grievances, should our representatives neglect to place the trust of the national affairs under better management.' Examples from the reigns of Richard II and William III are referred to to show that it is always proper for parliament to insist if necessary on reforms and changes of ministers before making a grant of money. At the time of the resignation of Pitt in 1761 and when Conway was dismissed in 1764, the house is again reminded of its task of getting rid of evil advisers.

Free speech in parliament must be upheld, to make sure it remains true that '[a] parliamentary enquiry has always been dreadful to a bad minister, and to evil counsellors'. Without such remedies the plight of the nation would indeed be bad. 62

Usually the Monitor insists on the supervisory role of the house of commons with little concern for the balance of the constitution that it professes to uphold. In two papers in the last few weeks of its life, however, its authors appear to become sensitive on this point. 63 The first roundly asserts the necessity for a careful distinction between the executive and legislative functions in a well-ordered constitution and describes the dangers which arise if mismanagement forces the legislature to intervene

62. 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 7, 20 Sep. 1755 (second quotation); 118, 22 Oct. 1757; 119; 326, 17 Oct. 1761; 433, 19 Nov. 1763 (third quotation); 440, 7 Jan. 1764; 450, 17 Mar. 1764; 457, 5 Mar. 1764; 473, 25 Aug. 1764 (first quotation).

63. 491, 29 Dec. 1764; 498, 16 Feb. 1765.
in the executive. If this happens 'the government must in time become aristocratical; and perhaps end in a democracy'. Enquiry, regulation, punishment are the proper concerns of the legislature only in the last resort. Normally they should proceed by exhortation and advice, seeking to mend by degrees only. Otherwise, 'the more they interfere in the management of public affairs; the ministry will be the less accountable for the event'. The legislature will lose respect and tyranny may result. Nevertheless, mismanagement may force resort to extraordinary remedies in cases of absolute necessity. In such circumstances the legislature cannot be accused of intermeddling, for the executive has either failed to act or cannot be countered by the subordinate parts of government. The legislature is merely stepping into a gap. To be more sure of success it should concentrate on one crime or example of mismanagement at a time.

There is a similar sort of restraint apparent in the second of these papers, on 'How far the two estates may, in a mixed and limited monarchy, oppose and resist the will of the monarch?', the last paper of political substance in the Monitor series. It notes that if a monarch's commands exceed the limit of the law then subjects have petitioned, appealed, denied subsidy, and even withdrawn obedience in order to bring him back to legal government. Yet, although it admits that opinions differ, it declares firmly that force ought never to be used against the person of the monarch. He is irrevocably invested with sovereignty. Only his desertion or abdication of the throne by his own voluntary act can justify desertion of him. Despite this firm assertion, however, the limit on the right of resistance is neatly skirted by a distinction between the person of the monarch and his advisers or officers. Force can be used against the latter without any violation of divine ordinance or legitimate authority, if no other means of preventing oppression and breaches of the law can be found. Without such power of resistance, any
limitation of government would be meaningless. Such a power belongs to the estates by the very reason of their institution. To exercise their trust they must be able to preserve as well as to make laws, by force if necessary, as well as by supplication. The short-term disorders that such a right may lead to are preferable to the long-term decline of the constitution that would result without it. The paper ends with the frank assertion that whenever power is misused the houses of parliament may assume it, and have done so, interpreting themselves as acting according to the king's true will.

Despite the evident restraints of the theory of mixed government in these two papers, it seems clear that interference and resistance in almost any specific circumstances could be justified by their arguments. After all, the forceful resistance to the person of a monarch that is rejected in the second was increasingly only an academic issue in the eighteenth century. Once again the emphasis is such that the Monitor, despite its deference to theory and under pressure of its opposition position, seems rather uneasy within the accepted framework of mixed monarchy and the balanced constitution.

Yet although it may insist on the house of commons' duty to supervise and right to resist in strong terms the Monitor is concerned that it, too, may abuse its powers. Parliaments are not infallible any more than kings are, as past history, notably in Stuart times, amply demonstrates. They are not to be trusted with uncontrolled power any more than other parts of the constitution. The Monitor does not, however, usually suggest that other constitutional bodies should act as a check on the commons. Rather, it is concerned to protect the correct functioning of the house by ensuring its independence of other parts and its proper composition. The benefits deriving from a house of commons come only 'when this is a true representative, and free from external force and private bribery'.

64. 295, 14 Mar. 1761 (the quotation); 422, 3 Sep. 1763; 434, 26 Nov. 1763.
The importance of independence is reiterated both positively and negatively. The proper working of the constitution depends not on outward forms and appearances, such as always having a parliament. The French have that yet they are abject slaves. It depends rather on the reality of a parliament independent of the administration which is in the interests of both government and people alike. Then public spirit, unity and harmony will prevail. On the other hand, nothing favours national disaster so much as a weak and corrupt parliament. A parliament made up of ministerial creatures is an instrument of slavery and despotism. '[T]he doors of that place, where our complaints ought to be heard and redressed, would, in the end, be for ever shut against us'. Ruin will be at hand. Over and over again the theme is elaborated: 'this nation cannot be ruined but by its parliament'.

This independence must be protected in two main ways. Placemen and pensioners should be excluded, to protect the 'original right to an uncorrupt house of commons; and to restrain the undue influence of the ministry over the representatives of the people'. Further, freedom of elections is essential. The 'privilege of being under the protection of a parliament in his own choice' is the most valuable part of an Englishman's birthright. Parliaments 'ought to be chosen with an entire liberty; and without either force or pre-engagement' or pressure from ministerial and aristocratic influence. Care for the independence of the house is especially necessary when parliaments are septennial. Lengthy terms for parliaments make any abuses more threatening because more long lasting.

65. 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 23, 10 Jan. 1756; 155, 8 July 1758; 260, 12 July 1760; 293, 28 Feb. 1761; 294, 7 Mar. 1761; 295; 433, 19 Nov. 1763 (second quotation); 440, 7 Jan. 1764; 457, 5 Hay 1764.

66. 56, 21 Aug. 1765; 119, 29 Oct. 1757 (first quotation); 130, 14 Jan. 1758; 155 (third quotation); 170, 21 Oct. 1758; 293 (second quotation); 378, 16 Oct. 1762 (spurious), the only paper which dwells on the danger of aristocratic influence. On septennial parliaments see also below pp. 439-40.
The independence of parliament depends in large part on proper, careful and responsible choice of representatives by the people. In their hands lie the remedies. If they do not pay attention to the proper exercise of their valuable right how can they expect the king to respect it? 67

The Monitor is concerned that the right of choice should remain in the hands of those most likely to exercise it responsibly. Thus it strongly deplores the 'attack' on the rights of freeholders through the admission of copyholders to vote in the infamous Oxfordshire election of 1754. This practice is dangerous mainly because it opens the vote to the less wealthy and independent and makes it possible to influence elections in counties in new ways. On one occasion the Monitor, with its original patron, Richard Beckford, even suggested that the freehold qualification for the country franchise should be raised from forty shillings to £40, no more, it maintains, than the modern equivalent. 68

Much depends, too, on the individual member of parliament exercising his trust conscientiously. 'When a gentleman is chosen a member of parliament, he is admitted counsellor for his sovereign in national affairs, as well as trustee for the people' - or, in other words, he sits as both patriot and subject - 'and in both these respects he is in honour and justice bound to give opinion freely and sincerely'. He must be watchful, conscientious in attendance, not preferring family interest or private engagement to his trust. He must show both wisdom and vigour and not allow himself to be daunted by opposition. Above all, he must be true to the dictates of his own reason and judgement, not becoming a tool of party or being tied to a minister by

67. 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 252, 17 May 1760; 294, 7 Mar. 1761; 296, 21 Mar. 1761.
68. 77, 15 Jan. 1757; 155, 8 July 1758; see also below p. 438, and for Richard Beckford, Parliamentary History, XV, c. 454.
expectation of rewards. If he allows his independence to be compromised in either way, but particularly, the latter, he is guilty of a breach of trust. 69

The sort of men most likely to preserve this independence are 'gentle- men of family, fortune, and character or interest in their county'. The Monitor therefore strongly supports the enforcement of the property qualifications of members of parliament and the new ways of ensuring this enacted in 1760. The indigence of a member makes him a prey to pension-mongering ministers; low fortunes and bad principles are always likely to go together. Men of property, on the contrary, are likely to be much more careful of the public good and economy, just because their property gives them an interest in both. If property qualifications are not enforced parliament will come to be composed of 'lowest tools, and vilest sycophants'. It will degenerate as similar bodies have done elsewhere and will meet to establish grievances rather than to remedy them, to support ministers it ought to punish and to grant money without account. The bill to secure the enforcement of property qualifications is indeed rated as the first and principal security for the freedom of parliaments, of much greater value than place bills or any previous measure. 70

In protecting the role of the house of commons in the constitution, the Monitor is concerned with its proper composition as well as its freedom. Because the people exercise their share in the legislative through representatives and are therefore at a disadvantage in comparison with other elements, it is most necessary 'that they should be truly and fairly represented'. The house of commons was at the beginning, and ought still to be, representative of

69. The Monitor 23, 10 Jan. 1756 (the quotations); 142, 8 Apr. 1758; 293, 28 Feb. 1761; 433, 19 Nov. 1763.
70. 243, 15 Mar. 1760 (both quotations); 252, 17 May 1760.
the whole people, in a proportion as equal as possible. As well as being in accord with the purpose of the house a truly representative electoral system will protect its independence.71

Much as the Monitor is concerned with ensuring the independence of parliament, this is not its only counter to the possibility that parliaments may abuse their powers. The house of commons is also subject to control, not from the formally established parts of the constitution but from its constituents. This is the one direction from which the representative's independence is definitely and properly limited. Indeed in a considerable number of papers a member's readiness to resist corruption is treated as naturally proportionate to his willingness to listen to instructions from his constituents; the latter guarantees the former. 'What would it signify... to boast of a free parliament, which from the moment of their election, apprehend themselves at liberty to vote contrary to the instructions of their constituents, and to gratify a minister with their voices at the public expence?' Those who will not submit to instructions are those whose hearts are prone to follow the dictates of sycophants.72 It appears that only these two paths are envisaged. There is no middle road of independence of both. The authors of the Monitor apparently do not even realize the incompatibility between this attitude and their demand that a member should be true to the dictates of his own reason and judgement.

In these two latter considerations the Monitor reaches beyond its dominant preoccupation with the supervisory role of the house of commons and with the conditions necessary for its fulfilment. To this is added concern for the proper representation of the people and the influence of their views at least partly as ends in themselves and because in the last

71. 3, 23 Aug. 1755.
72. 61, 25 Sep. 1756; 93, 30 Apr. 1757 (the quotation). See also below pp. 414-6.
resort they alone can keep it true to its role. The house is well on the way to acquiring a new master in the people.

The People

In its political and constitutional discussion, the Monitor makes more frequent reference to 'the people' than to any other element. They are the origin of governmental authority and their welfare is its sole purpose. It is the people who exercise vigilance and keep the constitution true to its first principles. In their outcry when it is 'loud and universal' it is 'impossible for the dearest ear, not to perceive the voice of GOD'.

It is quite possible within the framework of traditional mixed constitution theory to talk grandiosely of the rights of the people and to mean the house of commons. According to this theory as generally accepted in the eighteenth century the democratic element of the constitution is to be found in the commons. The right of electing representatives to the house exhausts the rights of 'the people' in the wider sense. Once elected the house of commons acts for and as the people. Those outside may be allowed the right to make their views known to the house or to other parts of the constitution for their consideration. The power of decision and action, however, the motive force in the constitution, lies within its formally constituted bodies. Only thus could the balance of the elements be maintained.

Sometimes the Monitor speaks clearly in this way or is at least open to this

74. See e.g.V.H.H. Green, The Hanoverians 1714-1815, London, 1968, pp. 31-2; Kramnick, p. 173; James Boulton, The Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke, London and Toronto, 1963, p. 33. The earlier views of C. J. Fox illustrate this attitude well. In 1770, in debates on the Middlesex election petitions, he maintained that only in the house could the views of the people be ascertained. 'Here the people are represented, and here is their voice expressed'. The legal representatives of the people are the people. In 1780, when he had become a 'man of the people', he modified his views only slightly. Still, generally, the voice of the people was to be collected in the house of commons. In 1784, appealing to his electors at Westminster, he explained that 'to secure to the
interpretation. 75

Much more often, however, the Monitor clearly envisages rights for the people other than just representation in the house of commons. They are urged not to be silent in face of threats to their liberty. These may take the form of attempts to divide or corrupt them or to divert them from directing their representatives and insisting upon enquiry into and punishment of misdeeds and proper application of public money. In times of quiet the people are bound to acquiesce in the administration of established law 'and to leave the direction of national concerns to the wisdom of the senate'. But when established laws are displaced 'coolness and moderation are not proper means for preserving the constitution'. It becomes 'every true Briton to take such measures, as the constitution of the nation might enable him, in his proper station' to prevent fatal consequences to the constitution. So the people of this country have acted in many glorious past exploits. 76

On two occasions particularly the rights of the people, independently of the house of commons, to watch over the workings of the constitution are strongly asserted. One paper expounds at length a quotation from John Trenchard. 'Every private subject has a right to watch the steps of those, who would betray their country; nor is he to take their word about the motives of their designs, but to judge of their designs by the

74. (Cont'd) people of this country the weight which belongs to them in the scale of the Constitution, has ever been the principle of my political conduct'. Yet he had spent the past three months in vigorous debate with Pitt asserting the responsibility of ministers to the house of commons and the irrelevance of opinion outside. Parliamentary History, XVI, cc. 1264-6, XXI, cc. 336-7; C. S. Emden, The People and the Constitution, second edition, London, 1956, p. 54, quoting Fox's 1784 election address.

75. E.g. the Monitor 19, 13 Dec. 1755; 95, 14 May 1757; 294, 7 Mar. 1761; 403, 2 Apr. 1763; and especially 485, 17 Nov. 1764, discussed below pp. 423-4.

76. 52, 31 July 1756 (third quotation); 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 93, 30 Apr. 1757 (first two quotations).
events.' The people have done this to good effect in crises in the past. Yet it is not only in crises that they have the right to pronounce their opinion on those entrusted with the management of public affairs. Then, much later, it is asserted to be the right and duty of every man to expose public iniquities. Britons should learn from the high regard paid to the people in ancient Greece and Rome to allow them in the defence of liberty, a justifiable jealousy towards their rulers—whereas princes and magistrates should be jealous for and not of the people.77

The distrust of the house of commons as well as of other parts of the machinery of government implied here becomes quite explicit when it is asserted that there is as much need for patriots and people to be watchful of parliament as of ministers. The people of England have never looked with indifference on misconduct of their representatives any more than on misconduct of the court. It is proper for them to be ready to show their dislike or esteem in decent lawful ways and to resume the power they have delegated if necessary. The right of the people to a role separate from that of merely being represented in the house of commons is most explicitly stated in a paper published on the same day as the North Briton. 'The voice of the English nation, was never confined within the walls of St. Stephen's Chapel.' That voice, so often silenced and influenced, is not the salutary one which has so often saved the nation. 'The voice of our representatives was never looked upon to be infallible. It is constitutional, but not the only constitutional voice of the nation.'78

In electing a representative the people do not give up all their rights, any more than they give them all to a king. 'When the people, I mean the freeholders and all, that have a right to elect a member to serve, not to sell,
them in parliament, elect a representative they entrust him not with all their voice, but only to preserve liberty and the constitution. Nor do they abandon all care for these once a representative is elected, and they are still quite entitled to express their concern. A member is 'no more than the representative of his constituents, and entrusted by them only as a guardian of, and not to sport away their liberty and property'. In past times, says the Monitor, the member had a close relationship of service to his constituents. 'The office of senator was then looked upon as a duty or charge to be performed under the direction, and for the particular advantage of his constituents. He was obliged to defend them in parliament... he also explained the law to them, informed them of the proceedings in parliament... and took care of their civil concerns.' On their part, the constituents empowered their representative to raise money, and defrayed the expenses arising out of attendance in parliament. This happy relationship has been perverted over the centuries with many consequent evils. These can be remedied only by careful choice of representatives and by returning to the old kind of relationship and a close connection between the house of commons and the people. To ensure this the people have every right to be watchful over their representatives, who are bound, on their part, to accept direction. The predominant motive in insisting on this close relationship which compromises the independence of the member appears over and over again. It is to prevent corruption which will destroy liberty. Yet this is not the only motive. There is another which is perhaps best expressed in the words of 'The Patriot Bard' in 1757, when great reforms were hoped for:

'And may the commons faithfully fulfill
Of their electors the decisive will,
Conscientiously perform (as is but just)
In every point, their great important trust.'

79. 61, 25 Sep. 1756 (second quotation); 260, 12 July 1760 (third quotation); 403 (first quotation).
The people's will should be supreme. 80

In three important papers in late 1763 and early 1764 the role of the people in the constitution and their relations with its formally constituted bodies, especially the house of commons, are thoroughly explored. 81 The first of these, expounding a quotation from Defoe, asserts that an Englishman needs to know more of his constitution than the powers of its three parts and the necessity of preserving a balance, points which the Monitor has frequently and justly examined. He ought also to know that these parts did not make each other. They owe their institution to the pre-existing power of the people; they must govern for the benefit of the people; the people may resume their original rights and deliver the other parts if any one should trespass the limits laid down. The constitution thus carefully preserves the rights of the people to make successive and continual provision as necessary for the security of their rights and the supervision of the executive, in which they are assisted by the house of commons and house of lords. There could scarcely be a clearer statement of the role of the people as a pre-existing and continuing power outside the framework of the mixed balanced constitution of king, lords and commons.

The second paper, written by the same author as that which, a few weeks before, asserted that the house of commons could betray its trust, answers objections to this view and to the opinions of the author of the paper just discussed, whose views he recapitulates. He acknowledges that the people have no right to stir on every trifling occasion and that they must allow time for redress. Only when fundamental rights are attacked and the grievance is not remedied should the people, or any part of them, act. Then their

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80. 61; 108, 13 Aug. 1757 (quotation); 400, 2 Apr. 1763.
actions and judgements must be confirmed by the estates of the kingdom in some solemn vote or declaration even if not in a formal parliament. The author has the Revolution explicitly in mind in his qualifications. Yet, he says, unless his opponents allow his basic arguments they will find it very hard to defend the Revolution. The people must act responsibly but there is no doubt of their right to judge when their rights are invaded and to act if necessary.

The last of these key papers discusses the vital question of what happens in a mixed constitution when disputes arise between the parts. This, says the paper, is the one great inconvenience of mixed government. There is no constituted, legal, authoritative judge of fundamental controversies arising between the three estates. And there is no cure for this fault, for any such power would ipso facto be absolute, destroying mixed government. Thus, apparently, the author is retiring within the traditional framework, content to acknowledge the existence of this defect. He does, however, proceed to suggest what must be done if such controversies do arise. There must be an appeal back to the first principles of government, to the community as if there were no government. Both sides must be at liberty to present their arguments fully in the press, because only thus can the public assess the merits of the case. So the people, outside the framework of government, must be called upon to decide disputes. The Monitor, while ostensibly adhering to the old constitution, has in fact made them the arbiter that it acknowledges will destroy mixed government.

The frequency with which the Monitor exhorts the people to action makes it quite clear that their roles is not restricted to occasional action in matters of high constitutional moment at times of crisis. Indeed, because
the Monitor sees so many day-to-day issues, foreign and domestic, as involving questions of constitutional principle and assesses them in this light, it makes no clear distinction between the people's part in forming and protecting the constitution and their part in day-to-day government. They are called to constant and vigorous watchfulness and activity.

If the people are to be informed about and watch over government freedom of speech and the press must be assured. The Monitor's vigorous argument for a generous conception of such freedoms, not just mere absence of licensing, indicates the importance it attaches to the political activity of the people. These freedoms are what make men rational creatures, able to exercise their understanding and practise true virtue. They have brought great benefits in the past. Always they are the symptom of good government, showing that the governors having nothing to fear, and a great bulwark of liberty, essential to its preservation. 'Therefore, everyone, that loves liberty, ought to encourage freedom of speech.' These freedoms are essential because they make it possible for the people to speak out, as is their duty, in defence against servile parliaments and ambitious ministers, in print if that is the only means available to them. Those who speak out should not be accused of libel. 'Calumny is pernicious, but accusation is beneficial to a state.' '[I]t ever should be adopted for sound doctrine in the law, that it is libellous, and a licentious use of liberty of the press, to oppose the mal-practices of bad men in power' it would be the end of the British right to oppose slavery. Further, the point is made that 'whatever is said, or written against the administration, is not to be regarded as an attack upon [the king's] throne; otherwise, no act of a minister could ever be arraigned, and no liberty of the press exist'. The proper interpretation and administration of the law of libel is essential to preserve the people's right of criticism. 'The liberty of exposing and opposing a
A bad administration, by the pen, is among the necessary privileges of a free people, and is perhaps the greatest benefit that can be derived from the liberty of the press." One essay of late 1762 even suggests that public interest in and differences of opinion over political matters are only to be expected, may be enlightening, and should not be met by deploring cries of disunion or accusations of sedition. 82 It is of course desirable that public clamour should be kept within reasonable bounds and should observe the limits of the law and the constitution. But it is utopian to expect perfect good manners in public disputes. 'And though it must be confessed, that those public accusations sometimes may exceed the bounds of decency, and even of strict truth; it is less hurtful, less criminal, than to let a ruinous measure, or bad man escape public censure, justice and punishment.' 83

By various constitutional means at their disposal the people can proceed from mere complaint to action, making their will known to the 'father of our country' and insisting 'upon what is right from the guardians of our liberties'. These means include instructions, addresses, petitions, remonstrances. Their use is urged, and the right to use them defended, on many occasions. 84 It is legally constituted corporate bodies, such as borough corporations, or others of some legal and constitutional standing, such as county meetings or grand juries at the assizes, rather than ad hoc groups that are expected to act in these ways. Of these the City of London is looked to to lead the way. Its historic right to address and instruct on matters of general concern and not merely on its own narrowly conceived special interests is defended at length against attack. 85

These are the traditional methods of action for the people, which the

82. 2, 16 Aug. 1755 (third quotation); 377, 11 Oct. 1762 (spurious); 408, 28 May 1763; 418, 6 Aug. 1763; 433, 19 Nov. 1763; 451, 24 Mar. 1764; 454, 14 Apr. 1764; 468, 21 July 1764 (first quotation); 474, 1 Sep. 1764 (second quotation); 492, 5 Jan. 1765 (fourth quotation); 493, 12 Jan. 1765 (fifth quotation).

83. 405, 7 May 1763; see also 51, 24 July 1756; 377 (spurious), 395, 26 Feb. 1763; 416; 468; 474 (the quotation).

84. E.g. 60, 18 Sep. 1756 (both quotations); 154, 1 July 1758; 165, 16 Sep. 1758; 168, 7 Oct. 1758; 248, 19 Apr. 1760; 403, 23 Apr. 1763; 404, 30 Apr. 1763; 405, 7 May 1763; 420, 20 Aug. 1763.

fn. 85. over page.
Monitor extends to their limits. But what if these prove ineffective? The dangers of thwarting the will of the people are quite often elaborated on and dire but vague threats are made. 'When a general shew of dislike: when instructions to their members: when petitions to parliament: when addresses to their sovereign meet with no redress, and are thrown aside as impertinent, disobedient, or factious, they have always resumed their authority.' Occasionally the threat is more explicit. Rebellion 'in itself...one of the most odious crimes' is the only remedy the nation has had from time to time. The Glorious Revolution is cited as one of many examples of what happens when the people find abuses intolerable. 86 On two occasions a most important specific suggestion is made, arising out of an interpretation of the events of 1688-9, about how the people could in practice proceed to this further resistance. They could resume their power if necessary through 'a convention of such persons, as they think fit to entrust with the redress of their grievances, and with their power to act for the common interest of the nation: as we saw them act gloriously, at the time of the Revolution'. The same writer refers on a later occasion to the action of the people being confirmed by the estates of the kingdom in a solemn vote or declaration, not necessarily in parliament but, perhaps, in a convention. It seems that such a convention would not just take the place of a parliament not in existence, as at the Revolution, but would also be a rival to parliament. 87

The Monitor has much less to say in definition of that vague term 'the people' than it says in asserting their rights. From what is said it is clear that its authors are no supporters of crude mob violence. 'It is

85. E.g. 52, 31 July 1756; 168, 248; 335, 19 Dec. 1761; 455, 21 Apr. 1764.
86. 20, 20 Dec. 1755; 38, 24 Apr. 1756 (first quotation); 40, 8 May 1756 (second quotation). See also e.g. 68, 13 Nov. 1756; 91, 16 Apr. 1757; 94, 7 May 1757; 120, 5 Nov. 1757; 125, 10 Dec. 1757; 179, 23 Dec. 1758; 169, 3 Mar. 1759; 197, 28 Apr. 1759.
87. 422, 3 Sep. 1763; 428, 15 Oct. 1763.
not the voice of the mob at St. Giles's, nor the political rant of injudicious, and, perhaps, misinformed newsmongers, that is now, or ever was affirmed ... to be the voice of the people.' Rather it is the body of the nation, the 'opulent middle-state of the people', in which the constitution finds its bulwark; tradesmen and manufacturers and others in danger of oppression from the drones of society, gentlemen and nobles. It is the 'middling sort' of people, of respectable economic status and social standing, those who contribute to the national expenses, that are to be heeded. This represents a new emphasis within the 'political nation' at the expense of the dominance of the landed classes, reflecting the discontent of the 'middling sort' of the City with their political status, rather than any extension of it. Indeed the implication of one paper which asserts the rights of the people most vigorously is that 'that people' are those who already have the right to vote. 'When the people, I mean the freeholders and all, that have a right to elect a member....'88

This conservative definition of 'the people' is confirmed by the little that the Monitor has to say about the franchise. Far from suggesting any extension, it provides a rationale of the traditional franchises which has little relation to contemporary facts:

And, that every part of the people might have a proper share in [the invaluable privilege of election], we may observe it has been provided [by ancient custom and usage] that in boroughs, where there was no corporation, every inhabitant had a right to give their vote: in cities and towns corporate the election...was judiciously reserved to that part of the people called the freemen, who, for their abilities and station in life, were reputed the most able and fit to determine...: and in counties or shires, in which the landed interest of the nation is more particularly represented by their knights..., none were admitted to be electors, but such as came under the peculiar denomination of freeholders.

88. 116, 8 Oct. 1757 (second quotation); 157, 22 July 1758; 165, 16 Sep. 1758; 403, 23 Apr. 1763 (first and last quotations); 455, 21 Apr. 1764.
The Monitor does acknowledge that there have been many attempts against the rights of particular boroughs and corporations. Yet only on one occasion does it briefly suggest any dissatisfaction with the contemporary state of borough franchises. Its only suggestions for change is that the county qualification be raised. Although it is concerned in other ways for the representation of the people, its dominant consideration in connection with the franchise is the independence of voters, to protect the independence of the house of commons. 89

Only in indirect ways is any widening of the view of who comprises 'the people' hinted at. In the Monitor's insistence on a wide definition of liberty as the right of the people to an active involvement in government it asserts that '[t]he meanest subject claims an interest and common right in this national court, and in its power, privileges and jurisdiction'. He too has a part in the involvement. Again, the importance even for the least of Englishmen of the struggle to preserve liberty is pointed out. Liberty and property are the 'very breviate' of the rights and claims of Englishmen and he who has no other property has a property in his liberty. Even he, by implication, is part of 'the people'. 90 In the Monitor these hints are undeveloped. They provide, however, the roots of lines of argument to be much more important later.

Vigorous as its argument often is, the Monitor does not entirely abandon caution in its views on the role of the people. Usually these notes of caution are clearly occasioned by the politics of the moment. When, in 1761, a new duty on beer and ale was passed, the suggestion of which the paper had previously opposed, it argues against prejudiced and hasty antagonism to it.

'But far be it from a free people, who boast of their loyalty and justice;

89. 143, 15 Apr. 1758 (the quotation); 155, 8 July 1758. See above pp. 408-9.
90. 293, 28 Feb. 1761; 461, 2 June 1764. Note also the emphasis on the rights of every private subject to watch over government (above pp. 413-4) which carries the same implications.
to usurp upon the prerogative of their guardians and rulers, by an unreasonable and unwarrantable opposition to an act of the legislative power;...under the specious appearance of liberty and public good...Let us, therefore, whatever may be the event of this act, study to be quiet.' Caution is stressed on other occasions when the political motivation is not so clear. The people are warned that they can endanger the constitution and exceed their role in it by licentious opposition in peace time when they should endeavour to promote tranquillity. They can be deceived by frenzy and faction.  

None of these cautions is inconsistent with the large role attributed to the people in other papers. One essay, however, late in the Monitor's life, stands out as a direct reversal of the general trend and a return to more clearly orthodox mixed constitution ideas. It reminds its readers that the excellence of the British constitution depends on the equality of power of the three parts. There will be harmony amongst them only if each part keeps to its own role and acknowledges that of the others. Both extremes which have been put forward in political discussion - the absolute power of the sovereign or all power to the people - must be rejected. As previous authors have adequately refuted the former the present writer intends to combat the excessive claim made for the people and to explain their power.

In doing so, the writer maintains, it is necessary to distinguish between the powers of the people at large and those of their representatives. 'The rights and privileges of the House of Commons are the people's rights and privileges transferred, and passed over from the persons electing to the persons elected.' 'When the commonalty have once made their choice, their whole power is devolved and delegated.' They may instruct their member and a wise member will pay heed to such instructions but he is not to be bound

92. 485, 17 Nov. 1764.
by them. He is to take into account the national interest as a whole and to remember that 'when the representatives are assembled together, they don't properly represent their counties and boroughs, but they effectually represent the whole kingdom'. Nor should the people be appealed to in cases of disputes between the parts of the constitution. Such clashes, which are alarming because they make a breach or chasm in government, are not always to be avoided. They can be solved, however, without damage to the public peace so long as only constitutional remedies (unspecified) are applied. If the 'multitude' is made the arbiter of disputes, it is in fact being called on to wrest from the representatives the part of government they are entitled to hold. The equality of power will be destroyed and discord and even overthrow of the constitution will result as Charles I and his opponents discovered. It is equally dangerous to have a parliament under constraint of clamour from the people who have been taught to think that they have distinct rights from those of their representatives as one under the control of a ministerial faction. If the independence of the house of commons is undermined from whatever direction the first steps to slavery will have been taken.

There could hardly be a more explicit statement of orthodox views. The same attitude is reflected in the other late paper which discusses the circumstances in which the legislature should intervene in the executive. It argues that if individuals are allowed to meddle in government when things go wrong on the grounds that their contract is broken, then turbulence, faction and discord will result. If intervention is necessary the legislature must undertake it. There is no way of reconciling these views, which are part of the generally more conservative tone of late papers on constitutional questions, with those expressed so strongly a year and less before.

93. 491, 29 Dec. 1764.
There is, however, no doubt that the earlier views are the more characteristic and much more frequently expressed. The constant appeals which the Monitor makes to 'the people' as a weapon of pressure in opposition confirms this assessment. They are very often reminded of the need for watchfulness and action and are exhorted by past examples. If the people had remained silent Wolsey and Cromwell, Buckingham and Strafford, Arlington and Clifford and James II would have succeeded in their designs. The people are credited with recent victories over the excise and the 'Antichristian naturalization of the Jews', in forcing a change of ministers and bringing Pitt to power. On the other hand, there are almost as frequent reminders to governors of the dangers of not satisfying the people. Whether soundly based or not, the people's opinion of their rulers is of great importance. In free countries it cannot be courted by artificial means, or put off by pretences and devices. It must be won by wise and just administration which respects the constitution and the people's rights.

Despite its conservative definition of 'the people' and some hesitations and caution, the predominant characteristics of the Monitor's views on the people are indeed distinctive and significant. The people are the origin and end of all legitimate government, called on to take the lead in a process of frequent constitutional renewal, through a constitutional convention if other means fail. They are an entity separate from the parts of the mixed constitution: they direct their members of parliament, they make their demands known to the king, they enforce the responsibility of ministers, they have the right to

94. 20, 20 Dec. 1755; 38, 24 Apr. 1756 (the quotation); 40, 6 May 1756; 46, 19 June 1756; 52, 31 July 1756; 55, 16 Aug. 1756; 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 89, 2 Apr. 1757; 97, 28 May 1757; 100, 18 June 1757; 118, 22 Oct. 1757; 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 121, 12 Nov. 1757; 147, 13 May 1758; 210, 28 July 1759; 293, 28 Feb. 1761.

95. 3, 23 Aug. 1755; 147; 466, 7 July 1764 and references in fn. 86 above.

96. See below pp. 430, 436.
be informed by free discussion of political issues in the press, they it is who must settle disputes among the parts of the constitution. Their will should be supreme. The exercise of these rights by the people helps to create a happy confidence between them and government, as well as protecting the constitution. They may sometimes be inconsistent, credulous, lacking in persistent zeal, but generally they are capable of judging political affairs. If government policy is beyond their comprehension 'there is certainly knavery at the bottom'.

97 No doubt such appeals to the people are a convenient weapon of opposition. Yet they are made in such a way as to impinge strongly on constitutional theory and to amount to the most striking element of the Monitor's view of the constitution.

97. 13, 1 Nov. 1755 (the quotation); 95, 14 May 1757; 130, 14 Jan. 1758; 118, 22 Oct. 1757; 212, 11 Aug. 1759; 351, 10 Apr. 1762; 424, 17 Sep. 1763.
THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF THE CONSTITUTION

The dominant tone, the characteristic attitude, of the Monitor in constitutional discussion is not satisfaction that the excellent British constitution is working as so far described. Rather, discussion is pervaded from the first paper to the last by a sense of crisis, by a conviction that the constitution is threatened by a deliberate conspiracy, the 'deepest-laid schemes of a faction confederate with hirelings and pensioners in fraud, to cheat the people'.

Constitutional crisis is not unique to the present. Over six hundred years 'the affairs of our own nation... have degenerated from bad to worse'. They have been patched up by revolutions from time to time, but ambition and the lust for power have always revived. Even the Glorious Revolution itself, a glowing example of the exercise of the people's rights to protect liberty and the constitution, is not without its defects. It was too concerned with past grievances rather than possible future threats, so that it did not remedy all the ills of the constitution. If steps are not taken to counter present threats, the state of the people will be worse than ever before. Everyone, therefore, must still work to preserve the constitution. 'If we do not lay hold of the present time to exert that liberty, which is our birthright, let not posterity wonder to see this monarchy once more usurped by a council of state, and the freeborn subjects reduced to the state of Turkish or Gallic slaves'. They shall see

1. The Monitor 400, 2 Apr. 1763. See also e.g. 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 155, 8 July 1758; 296, 21 Mar. 1761; 311, 4 July 1761; 327, 24 Oct. 1761; 378, 16 Oct. 1762 (spurious); 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 457, 5 May 1764.
Those crowns of freedom, which our fathers won,
Fall leaf by leaf, from each degenerate son.  

The progress of arbitrary power is variable. Sometimes it rushes
'like a tyger'. More often it 'creeps and steals', comes subtly as part
of a complex conspiracy. Then it is the product of delusive measures by
which the people are divided, or of those contrivances which by driblets
'freeze and drain the middling people of their property' and repeal their
rights and drain their power 'by sap'. Watch should be kept against all
innovations, to nip oppression in the bud. Little things can lead to big,
and some measures are obviously experiments and preludes to further attacks.  

Throughout there is this sense of frailty and vulnerability of
English liberties. This is strongly linked with an awareness that others
elsewhere who had similar advantages in the past no longer are so lucky.
Britain is almost the only example of limited monarchy where liberty has
not yet expired. In view of the oppression and slavery elsewhere in
Europe, 'it may be more owing to the accident of our situation, than to
our wisdom, integrity and courage, that this frame of our constitution
has a being'.  

Care must be therefore taken that the constitution is not
undermined in the ways that have destroyed liberty in other countries:
the chief dangers are considered to be the abuse of power by ministers,
corruption, dissension caused by partie; the maintenance of a standing
army, abuse of legal processes and rights and breaches of 'fundamental'
laws leading to innovations in constitutional practice.

Ministers

Ministerial abuse of power is the most likely source of danger to

2. 449, 10 Mar. 1764 (first quotation); 52, 31 July 1756 (second quotation);
473, 25 Aug. 1764 (third quotation). On the Glorious Revolution, see 2,
16 Aug. 1755; 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 95, 14 May 1757; 422, 3 Sep. 1763; 428,
15 Oct. 1763.

3. 32, 13 Mar. 1756 (all quotations); 34, 27 Mar. 1756; 60, 18 Sep. 1756;
116, 8 Oct. 1757.

4. 60; 243, 15 Mar. 1760; 302, 2 May 1761 (the quotation); 396, 5 Mar.
1763; 468, 21 July 1764.
the constitution. For every prince undone by his own vices, the reigns of ministers have been made unhappy by the corruption, ambition and treachery of ministers. This is especially true now that the royal prerogative has been sufficiently defined. So, because now the chief danger to liberty is from the servants of the crown, because 'ministerial despotism has taken large strides in this kingdom' especially under the Hanoverians, the *Monitor* sets out on various occasions to examine the proper powers of ministers and how they are abused.5

Ministers are recognized as necessary aids to the king in the task of government but only if they behave properly are they compatible with the interests of his subjects. They should build and maintain their power on three bases: the king's choice, their own ability and integrity, and the support and esteem of the people. They must avoid self-seeking and act out of concern for the national interest.6

The *Monitor*'s defence of Pitt in the intense debate over his resignation in 1761, which forces the paper to reconcile its claims for him with its habitual distrust of ministers, makes it especially necessary to describe the legitimate powers of ministers. A minister is entitled to claim sufficient power satisfactorily to execute the affairs of his office, for which he will be held responsible. He should stand up for measures connected with his position which he feels to be necessary and should resist courses of action he believes harmful. He would be at fault if he acted otherwise out of complaisance or desire for security in office. He must be ready to resign if he feels he can no longer be of service with honour. He must also be ready to relinquish office willingly if he is unsuccessful or incompetent or unpopular with the people. He must not attempt to use his supporters to resist. If he is

5. 29, 21 Feb. 1756; 298, 4 Apr. 1761 (the quotation); 422, 3 Sep. 1763; 474, 1 Sep. 1764.
6. 5, 6 Sep. 1755; 391, 29 Jan. 1763; 426, 1 Oct. 1763.
wrongly judged he will rarely fail to be called back again and he must tolerate mistakes because it is so important that public figures should be freely criticized, to restrain them from evil measures. Indeed, in all his actions in and out of power, a man aspiring to high office must not seek to dictate to the crown or to impose himself or his measures. Although he is entitled to lay down some conditions to ensure his effectiveness he should not be over-rigid in adhering to them. The king must always retain a power independent of that which he delegates to his ministers. No minister or group of ministers should be 'permitted to grasp universal influence in domestic business'.

Yet ministers are not only accountable to the king but also responsible to parliament and people for all actions of the executive. 'The King can do no wrong' but ministers certainly can. 'They are answerable for the counsel they give, and for their conduct in the administration of government; each for his particular part; and the prime, or sole minister, when there happens to be one, for the whole.' They cannot plead the king's command as an excuse even when their actions (the calling in of troops, for example) are the result of his personal wishes. In a government of laws rather than men, ministers are both free and obliged to make the laws, not the prince's command, the rule of their action. Nor can they plead any other excuse, whether ignorance, misfortune or defects of the constitution, not even the opinion of the judges or the concurrence of 'the council board'. Even the mere setting of the seals of office on a public instrument drawn up by order of council makes a minister responsible for what it contains. The constitution rests on this accountability of ministers.

7. 330, 14 Nov. 1761; 331, 21 Nov. 1761. See also 36, 10 Apr. 1756; 110, 27 Aug. 1757 (by allegory); 298, 4 Apr. 1761 (the quotation); 391; 475, 8 Sep. 1764; 476, 15 Sep. 1764, and above pp. 302-3, 396.

8. 36, 10 Apr. 1756; 95, 14 May 1757; 295, 14 Mar. 1761; 332, 28 Nov. 1761; 371, 28 Aug. 1762; 426, 1 Oct. 1763; 446, 18 Feb. 1764 (the quotation); 454, 14 Apr. 1764; 488, 8 Dec. 1764; 490, 22 Dec. 1764; 491, 29 Dec. 1764.
To ensure that the ministers who give advice are known and can be called to account the king should conduct his business in the privy council. The repealed clause of the Act of Settlement providing for this is discussed with approval. '[T]he constitution of Great-Britain has appointed [this] council, without which the King cannot act.' Free discussion of matters in a 'council general' including others than just officeholders further helps to prevent ministerial abuse of power by controlling the departmental heads. They should be consulted by the king on matters affecting their departments but to consult them only would give them too much power. So the council was used in happiest times when Britain flourished; when not so used, wrong measures have resulted. 9

Good ministers who observe these canons of conduct can remedy the worst evils in a state, especially in company with a wise prince. 10 Unfortunately, however, ministers are rarely of this nature. They are far more often power-hungry, wicked and ambitious, complaisantly and unscrupulously flattering their way into power and clinging to it regardless of the interests of the nation. They demand a monopoly of power and in doing so usurp the authority of the king under pretence of a faithful attachment to his interests, alarming him with stories of threats to his throne. They begin to imagine that they are above the law. They aspire to the control of a numerous standing army officered by foreigners, to the disposal of all moneys and places of trust and profit. They build up an interest through the nation by the disposal of places, rightly the province of the crown. They even attempt to control a complaisant parliament and hence secure the legislative power. Once in power, such men stop at nothing to secure themselves. They persevere in mistakes rather than admit

9. 36 (the quotation); 159, 5 Aug. 1758; 295; 452, 31 Mar. 1764.
10. 486, 24 Nov. 1764.
them. They ruin the country by ignorance, negligence and corruption rather than retire. To screen themselves from the resentment of king and people they engage in 'a multiplicity of destructive schemes'. They sacrifice all to ambition and avarice, determined that if they fall the nation shall fall with them. 11

The intrigues of such over-powerful counsellors, 'the illegal claims of factious Oligarchy', are among the greatest difficulties which face a limited monarch. If the king succumbs and gives himself and his people up to the management of a minister and his hirelings his prerogative is likely to be misused. It will be made the 'choke-pear' on which to try to stop all adversaries. The king will be misled from good intentions into unconstitutional measures. The sentiments of the people and their leaders, and of the wisest and best of his subjects, will be misrepresented to him out of jealousy and distrust, so that he begins to think his friends to be foes. So he will be deprived of faithful counsellors, set at odds with his people and exposed to their resentment by the 'ministerial philm that so frequently intercepts the light of truth in the sight of monarchs'. Once such men have fastened themselves on his power it is extremely difficult for the king to rid himself of them. 12

Such men it is who have inaugurated the dangerous innovation of the cabinet council. By the acts of sycophantic evil men insinuating themselves into and seeking to monopolize the king's confidence

were those Cabals first introduced and established, which have been since dignified by the name of Cabinet Councils: a Monster unknown to our antient Constitution, which nevertheless stares us now as boldly in the face, as if it was an essential part of it. In these Cabals

11. E.g. 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 15, 15 Nov. 1755 (the quotation); 29, 21 Feb. 1756; 30, 28 Feb. 1756; 36, 10 Apr. 1756; 41, 15 May 1756; 51, 24 July, 1756; 52, 31 July 1756; 280-3, 29 Nov. - 20 Dec. 1760; 298, 4 Apr. 1761; 325, 10 Oct. 1761; 331, 21 Nov. 1761.

12. 1; 15; 32, 13 Mar. 1756; 52; 56, 21 Aug. 1756 (third quotation); 294, 7 Mar. 1761; 298 (first quotation); 325; 420, 20 Aug. 1763; 426, 1 Oct. 1763; 454, 14 Apr. 1764 (second quotation).
have all those pernicious counsels been hatched, which in the late reigns so alienated the affections of the people from their Kings....

The cabinet council is, of course, detested as a secret method of deciding measures by which a minister can avoid being made answerable to parliament and people. By implication it also provides a tool for an unscrupulous party leader, a way in which ministers by acting together can increase their ability to dominate the monarch and parliament. 13

The Monitor's attitude to a leading or prime minister is somewhat ambiguous. Sometimes the term 'primier' or more often prime minister (frequently not fully spelt) is used in contexts which show it to be a term of disparagement. 'In the judgement of this [the present] age, and never was the nature of government ... better understood, a prince, who governs himself has no need of a prime minister.' 14 On other occasions the term is used neutrally, in contexts which indicate acceptance of a prime minister as a normal part of government. 15 Sometimes, however, even while the tone is one of neutral acceptance, the emphasis is on the difficulties and dangers of the position and the need for careful choice by the king and proper supervision so that the subject is not elevated above the prince. High qualities of self-abnegation are called for and those who fill the position satisfactorily are very rare '[W]here is he who ever acted in the character of Prime Minister, except MR PITT, in this kingdom, without a national discontent at his measures?' 16 It is pretty clear that the Monitor

13. 295, 14 Mar. 1761; 331, 21 Nov. 1761; 332, 28 Nov. 1761; 452, 31 Mar. 1764 (the quotation). Sometimes, however, the term is used neutrally, as referring to an accepted part of government. E.g. 328, 31 Oct. 1761; 351, 10 Apr. 1762; 359, 5 June 1762; 362, 26 June, 1762; 390, 22 Jan. 1763.

14. 357, 22 May 1762. See also e.g. 51, 24 July 1756; 73, 18 Dec. 1756; 102, 2 July 1757; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 401, 9 Apr. 1763; 402, 16 Apr. 1763; 451, 24 Mar. 1764.

15. E.g. 367, 31 July 1762; 377, 11 Oct. 1762 (spurious); 446, 18 Feb. 1764.

16. 391, 29 Jan. 1763 (quotation); 426, 1 Oct. 1763.
considers that concentration of ministerial power in one set of hands renders it even more suspect than usual. That this suspicion is never far below the surface is shown in the use of the term occasionally as a synonym for favourite. 17

There is, of course, no doubt about the Monitor's attitude to a favourite, nor of the political motivation behind it. Over and over again, in some of the most extreme writing in the series, the evils of favourites are elaborated. Yet this politically determined attitude is merely an intensification of the Monitor's characteristic distrust of ministers, particularly those who seek to monopolize power. This distrust is clear from its first number and the days of its opposition to Newcastle and his colleagues. A favourite is simply a particularly dangerous kind of self-seeking minister, one who without any merit or recommendation acquires and maintains an uncontrolled ascendancy over the king by playing on his easy temper and goodness or his weaknesses, inexperience and foibles. The direst consequences follow such intrusion into power, not only to the nation, but to the king himself who may be forced into exile or worse by the resentment of the people. Royal power can be perverted, the people oppressed and the constitution upset by a court minion more than by any other abuse. Yet however secure a favourite may think himself in his monopoly of power, his malpractices will bring inevitable justice; nothing can deliver him in the end from the resentment of the people.

Let not success in illegal and arbitrary proceeding, nor the dependence on power in their own hands; nor even the favour of their Prince, prompt any one to attempt the ruin of their country. No man should rely too much upon their strength of parts, which at last may fail: for the world has seen the ablest evil counsellors want skill to prevent their own ruin. 18

17. E.g. 366, 24 July 1762; 401, 9 Apr. 1763; 402, 16 Apr. 1763.
18. 357, 22 May 1762; 360, 12 June 1762; 363, 3 July 1762; 366; 371, 28 Aug. 1762; 372, 4 Sep. 1762; 377, 9 Oct. 1762; 380, 30 Oct. 1762; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 401; 402; 424, 17 Sep. 1763; 425, 24 Sep. 1763; 430, 29 Oct. 1763; 431, 5 Nov. 1763; 473, 25 Aug. 1764; 480, 24 Nov. 1764 (the quotation). See also above pp. 311-3.
The improper delegation of the king's authority and monopoly of power by ministers have led to many catastrophes. All the measures of recent years which the Monitor dislikes 'are entirely owing to the inexcusable supineness, and gross stupidity, or to the sinister design and treachery' of ministers. Worst of all, they introduce 'a system of government dangerous to the crown and to the constitution' because ministers secure power at the expense both of the prerogatives of the crown and of parliament. Ministers, and especially a prime minister, are thus dangerous because they concentrate rather than diffusing or balancing power. Their engrossing of power threatens the balance of the constitution, 'it being contrary, or at least abhorrent, to our constitution, to entrust so much power in the hands of any one subject, as must necessarily be vested in a Primier'.\(^{19}\) Further, the practices of ministers encourage other constitutional evils. Corruption, faction, a standing army, breaches of the law and invasions of the rights of the people are their weapons in securing power.\(^{20}\) If ministers are not checked it will no longer be the king who reigns. The constitution will be turned into an oligarchy.\(^{21}\)

The virulent anti-ministerialism of some strands of eighteenth-century political propaganda of which the Monitor is part has a different quality from seventeenth-century attacks on ministers. Then, the developing demand for ministerial responsibility was a constitutional device to allow attacks on policies often known to be the king's. Now that the king's prerogatives have been limited it is ministers themselves who are the bogey, the threat to liberty and the constitution. The strong and characteristic distrust of the executive power, born of seventeenth-century experience, has been transferred from king to ministers. Indeed in the

\(^{19}\) 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 83, 19 Feb. 1757 (first quotation); 298, 4 Apr. 1761 (second quotation); 400, 2 Apr. 1763 (third quotation); 451, 24 Mar. 1764.

\(^{20}\) E.g. 1; 29, 21 Feb. 1756; 426, 1 Oct. 1763; 448, 3 Mar. 1764; 468, 21 July 1764.

\(^{21}\) 298, 4 Apr. 1761.
view of the Monitor the independent authority of the king is one of the safeguards the constitution provides against ministerial abuse of power. Yet the Monitor asserts another safeguard, the responsibility of ministers to parliament and the people, and there is no doubt about which it considers more effective.

Of this all ages afford us precedents: and nothing but the neglect of this, in not making so frequent and signal examples of parliamentary justice, among ministerial dispensers of our Laws, as our ancestors used to do, has, at any time, been the encouragement and cause of usurpations, and invasions of the laws, immunities, rights and privileges of a free people.22

This second safeguard is not entirely compatible with the first although attempts are made to reconcile the two.23 Nor is it entirely compatible with the traditional framework of mixed balanced government. This certainly allows parliament to call the executive to account when necessary but it does not permit the intrusion of the people directly. Here yet again the Monitor’s insistence on constant supervision not only by parliament but by the people gives a distinctive emphasis to its ideas.

Corruption

One of the most constantly reiterated complaints about the present state of the constitution is of the prevalence of corruption. Again this is a complaint against the executive, against the practices of ministers. By corruption is usually meant the precise forms of political corruption of the legislature and electorate by the executive, and the erection of such practices into a system of government.24 The Monitor does not clearly use the term in the Machiavellian sense of general constitutional deterioration,

22. 448, 3 Mar. 1764. See also e.g. 46, 19 June 1756; 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 426, 1 Oct. 1763; 454, 14 Apr. 1761.

23. E.g. in 420, 20 Aug. 1763, where it is said that the protests of parliament and people are ineffective or slow in effect unless the king delivers the country from a bad administration.

24. 147, 13 May 1758; 157, 22 July 1758; 394, 19 Feb. 1763.
although occasionally this sense could be inferred. On some occasions, the term corruption is used in a more general sense, meaning a state of moral and social decline among the people arising out of prosperity and wealth. Of this general decline political corruption is a part, sometimes seen as cause, sometimes result. In any case political corruption is integrally connected with the general moral state of the nation on which the Monitor is prone to dwell in highly-coloured pessimistic terms.

Corruption is not just a modern phenomenon. It grows out of man's perversion of his God-given nature over the centuries and all peoples are prone to it. All the mighty ancient empires fell under its weight. In English history it is possible to give examples of efforts to corrupt parliaments from the time of King John, or even earlier, in the reigns of the Norman kings. The modern practice of corruption dates from the reign of Charles II, 'when the parliament, the strength and glory of Britain, was filled with a band of abject pensioners'. The art of corrupting parliaments rose to a new height in his reign and that of his successor. Attempts were made, at the time of the Revolution and subsequently, to guard against such abuses, chiefly by acts excluding placemen. These proved inadequate, partly because the real root of trouble, the presence in the house of men of no property who could be easily corrupted, was overlooked, and because innovations such as the cabinet council, made up of men making their fortunes, encourage the persistence of the abuses. Hence scarcely had the limitations been erected before a way round them was found by a 'state-


26. E.g. 38, 24 Apr. 1756; 73, 18 Dec. 1756; 140; 278, 15 Nov. 1760; 469.

27. 17, 29 Nov. 1755; 466, 7 July 1764; 489, 15 Dec. 1764. References to Roman history are particularly frequent. E.g. 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 20, 20 Dec. 1755; 26, 31 Jan. 1756; 27, 7 Feb. 1756; 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 231, 22 Dec. 1759; 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 466; 469.
engineer', who acted on the principle that 'every man has his "price'' and introduced a secret commerce between ministry and members more dangerous than ever before. It was he, Sir Robert Walpole, who taught posterity how to destroy the independence of parliament. He was 'that father of corruption', 'the GRAND CORRUPTER', 'that never enough to be detested minister', who first reduced corruption to a system. So it has come about that a minister has been more able to carry his point in parliament since the Revolution than before. 'If some princes oppressed us with an high hand before this remarkable period; there have been frequent instances, wherein our representatives have attempted to sell us to the spoiler, since the Revolution; notwithstanding the Bill of Rights, and other salutary acts, to secure the freedom of elections, to punish bribery and corruption, and to prevent false returns to parliament.'

The system developed by Walpole was carried on 'by the two Brothers, his successors', who extended the attack to freeholders in county elections (in the Oxfordshire election of 1754), undermining their voting privileges because they had shown themselves otherwise incorruptible. By admitting copyholders to the vote they opened the way to those more susceptible to influence. More than this, by introducing uncertainties into county elections, they provided grounds for disputes, to be settled by the house of commons under ministerial influence. It was these ministers who brought to a peak the pernicious scheme of relying for the success of their administration and the security of their persons not on measures for public welfare, but on the buying of majorities.

With the coming to office of Pitt in place of this 'corrupt and
inglorious administration, ... the objects of popular distrust and jealousy', the danger has somewhat declined and better things are hoped for. Yet there is no doubt about the magnitude of the problem. The gangrene of corruption has spread from head to foot and is now openly established and accepted. It has been practised on the house of commons, now composed largely of pensioners and placemen, and in elections, when there is a vast profusion of public money and representatives are imposed on boroughs. It has led to political appointments in the navy, made because of 'connections in parliament and family interest to carry ministerial measures', and, on the other hand, to deferment of promotion for political reasons. Misguided awards of honours and unworthy preferments in the church, and collusive dealings between ministers and contractors for naval stores are also alleged. The paper's frequent concern over the mismanagement of public finance is motivated at least as much by concern about corruption as by desire for economy. Among other things, the vast increase in the national debt and the number of placemen concerned with the collection of taxes as the result of war are not only a burden to the people but have created an 'infinite dependence upon the crown' throughout the kingdom and among many degrees of men and threaten the balance of the constitution.

The possibilities of corruption in elections are greatly enhanced by the existence of 'small and almost extinct burroughs'. Such boroughs where votes could be bought for ministerial candidates helped to make it possible for previous ministers to rely on the security of a majority in the house of commons to support them in all circumstances. Incentives to

30. 130, 14 Jan. 1758 (the quotation); 311.
corruption are increased, too, by a long term for parliaments which means a longer period of return for effort, either in securing election or in assuring the support of members once elected. The Septennial Act is 'that great encouragement of bribery and corruption!' Septennial parliaments have produced no real benefit. Rather they have helped in various ways to lesson the independence of the commons and to increase the power of the crown, by providing opportunities for corruption. 33

So the situation has come about where corruption has 'become so excessive in every branch of government, that unless it feels some immediate check, it will inevitably subvert the constitution'. The real danger threatening Britain is not from the French but 'from the corruption and profligacy of our own people'. England, though not conquered by a foreign enemy, may be reduced by her own parliament. What war, then, is of more consequence to the people 'than that which is levelled against those, who, entrusted with the legislative power, would leave neither right nor justice in the state'? Examples from classical Rome are often invoked at length to enforce the point. The Roman republic fell, it is explained in the course of a detailed examination, because its 'beggarly, corrupt and servile set' was inadequate to face the crisis after Caesar's death. 34

Corruption is dangerous to the constitution because it upsets its essential balance and interferes with the roles of its different parts. 'If the Crown should by places, pensions, or any undue influence, procure a majority of votes to grant whatever the ministry proposes' the constitution will be destroyed because the two houses will be unable to carry out their basic function to act as a check on the crown. The house of commons will

33. 3, 23 Aug. 1755; 56, (second quotation); 130, 14 Jan. 1758; 155, 8 July 1758 (first quotation); 170, 21 Oct. 1758; and, more briefly, 59, 11 Sep. 1756; 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 64, 16 Oct. 1756; 119, 29 Oct. 1757.

34. 16, 22 Nov. 1755 (second quotation); 20, 20 Dec. 1755 (third quotation); 27, 7 Feb. 1756 (fourth quotation); 130 (first quotation); 260, 12 July 1760.
become 'the representative of the minister, not of the people' and instead of being the 'guardian, and the assertor of the people's rights' will be the instrument of slavery and despotism. More generally, corruption, particularly in elections, will reduce the effectiveness of the voice of the people, make them apathetic and purposeless, and prevent their playing their constitutional role. What would the reign of Charles I have been like had he and his ministers had the advantages contemporary ministers have in controlling the people and parliament? Corruption, then, is a first step to arbitrary measures, the surest way to tyranny, the direct road to absolute monarchy. 35

Corruption does not only endanger the constitution, serious though that threat is. It also contributes to all kinds of other 'internal maladies'. Mistaken measures and villainies are suffered to go unchecked so that the country is ruined not by foreign enemies but by its own children. Corruption is the explanation of the decline of Britain's reputation in recent years and is frequently presented as the cause of all the measures against which the Monitor fulminates. 36 So, even though the nation is delivered from oppression and tyranny, the evils of corruption run riot, poisoning virtue and murdering public spirit at all levels of society. Rome fell victim to such evils. Britons, Greeks and barbarians will be ruined as surely unless a firm stand is made. 37

Party

The idea the English have of a Party, is the uniform conduct of one part of the nation, in their political

35. 1, 9 Aug. 1755 (second and third quotations); 23, 10 Jan. 1756 (first quotation); 260; 311, 4 July 1761; 469, 28 July 1764. See also above pp. 407-11.
36. 46, 19 June 1756 (the quotation); 147, 13 May 1758. And for typical lists of grievances attributed at least in part to corruption, 62, 2 Oct. 1756; 260; 311.
37. 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 27, 7 Feb. 1756; 127, 24 Dec. 1757; 466, 7 July 1764.
38. The Monitor's use of party names is discussed separately below pp. 550-70.
sentiments and actions, in opposition to the measures and principles of another part of the nation: ... Of which we have had a variety of instances in Roundhead and Cavalier; Whig and Tory; Court and Country Parties.

Such 'uniform conduct' is, surprisingly to modern ears, 'universally acknowledged' as an evil of which all seek to be rid. From the first to the last issue of the Monitor party is deplored.

'Uniform conduct' is reprehensible because all parties tend to forget their principles and go to extremes. 'Is it not ... amazing to see honest Tories so often foolishly defending knavish Tories; and untainted Whigs protecting corrupt Whigs, in instances, where they act against the principles of all Whigs.' 'The good of party is in supporting principles: the evil of party is to follow persons.' Both the supporters and opponents of Charles I, for example, were led astray because they did not remember this. Two strong factions full of animosity against each other, opposing simply for the sake of opposition without examination of the grounds for debate, are said on one occasion to be the most dangerous disease which can afflict a free country and a sure sign that something is wrong with the functioning of government, usually the executive.

Parties endanger the proper working of the constitution and the public interest because they promote division; a kingdom divided cannot stand against either domestic or foreign dangers. Indeed in wartime the discord that a 'factionist junto' causes can be more dangerous than the armaments and policies of the open enemy. In contrast, if 'that hydra of the state, that monster party' can be destroyed then union and integrity in the nation's councils have produced union and confidence in the subjects

39. 434, 26 Nov. 1763. The term 'faction', although often used interchangeably with 'party', is particularly reserved for those who set themselves up against the interests of the nation and the constitution (as seen by the Monitor) e.g. 460, 26 May 1764.

40. 395, 26 Feb. 1763; 434 (second quotation); 441, 14 Jan. 1764; 468, 21 July 1764 (first quotation); 478, 29 Sep. 1764; 488, 8 Dec. 1764; 491, 29 Dec. 1764.
and a readiness to grant money freely. Division is not, however, dangerous only in wartime; it undermines that confidence between government and people so necessary to the proper working of a mixed constitution. It interferes with the exercise of the people's constitutional role by keeping their minds in a 'continual flutter' and thus confusing their judgement of the aims and designs of those who lead them. It also endangers the balance of the constitution. A strong faction against any part of the constitution may lead to the people's being called in too readily as arbiters, thus endangering the constitution as much as factious attempts to enlarge the prerogatives of the crown. The constitution can be as much damaged from one extreme as the other. In these circumstances discord can well grow fatal. 41

Party divisions interfere with the workings of government in a number of more specific ways. The king may be deprived of the 'assistance of some of the ablest of his subjects' because he is encouraged to distrust one set of men and taught to believe that they are opposed to 'his person, family, and government' - typical tory complaints against the whigs. Good men will be frightened away from service to the king if faction and ambition are rife, because party interferes with, indeed directly contradicts 'the grand maxim of disinterested service to ... king and country' which unites 'the intelligent and well-meaning of all denominations to promote the public good'. Party, instead of uniting all in service, clogs the wheels and tears out the vitals of government, through the effects of selfish ambition. 42 It is a typical tool of wicked ambitious ministers, something they will use to gain ascendancy over the king, to provide a means of

41. 153, 24 June 1758 (first and third quotations); 166, 23 Sep. 1758; 183, 20 Jan. 1759 (second quotation); 351, 10 Apr. 1762; 395; 409, 4 June 1763; 460, 26 May 1764; 481, 20 Oct. 1764; 485, 17 Nov. 1764.

42. 1, 9 Aug. 1755 (first quotation); 2, 16 Aug. 1755 (second quotation); 104, 16 July 1757 (third and fourth quotations); 153; 298, 4 Apr. 1761; 472, 18 Aug. 1764; 478, 29 Sep. 1764.
ruling, to protect themselves from punishment or to force themselves back into power, at the expense both of the king's prerogative and the rights and liberties of the people. Together with corruption, it has been one of the chief means of the growth of ministerial despotism since the reign of Anne. There can be no hope of stability for the kingdom while 'the constitution is made to give way to the private interests, or it may be the spleen, of either party.'

So when men in power have apparently resolved to rule by party, the alarm cannot be too universal or too early, and should not be restrained by any notion of loyalty to king or country. 'The minister that is obliged to maintain his power by party, ought always to be suspected.' Under a free government, whatever ministers may do, it is in the interests of both the sovereign and the people to guard against party and faction. So the paper's readers are exhorted 'hearken not to the note of discord, which is calculated to break us into parties, that our liberties may fall a more easy prey to their arbitrary principles, or to the force of an open enemy.' 'A union of parties is the strength of the whole' whereas division is 'the grand machine' of tyrants. It is the 'voice of a true Englishman', with which the Monitor has harangued the public for some years, 'to assert the iniquity of fomenting parties, and to commend an administration that has cast off the aid of party.'

If support of party is so reprehensible and dangerous what is the proper way for an individual to behave in politics? The individual member of parliament is, of course, bound to give his opinions and vote freely and independently according to conscience, after a matter has been debated. He must avoid opposition for its own sake. 'It is repugnant to the

43. 2; 153; 190, 10 May 1759; 298; 468, 21 July 1764; 478; 504, 30 Mar. 1765.

44. 52, 31 July 1756 (third quotation); 153 (second quotation); 166, 23 Sep. 1758 (first quotation); 190, 10 Mar. 1759 (fourth quotation); 409, 4 June 1763.
character of a virtuous and wise man, to oppose a minister, because he is a minister. 'Enter into no party schemes,' he is warned. 'It's a great chance you will be hobbled'—unless it is a share of the spoils he is after. Instead he should value an honest man of any party 'and let neither private acquaintance, personal alliance, or party combination stand between us and our duty to our king and country'. The Monitor adopts for itself (although it is not always true to it) a similar code of conduct, disavowing faction, maintaining its independence and its concern for measures not men.

Yet there is need for unity against the 'betrayers, the plunderers, the sellers of the constitution and nation'. Opposition to evil ministers can hardly be effective unless there is some steadiness and unanimity about it. The men who stand neutral in such controversies are roundly condemned as opportunists.

A neutral in regard to the interest of his country is little better than a common incendiary conspiring against the measures of a wise and honest administration. Those who seek a coalition of men of fundamentally opposed points of view, possible only if principle is sacrificed, are also condemned.

Then 'What is a man to do, who does not pretend to rule, and who has taken upon him no other part than to join with those, who, he believed, had the better cause'? Particularly in two papers the Monitor struggles with

45. 10, 11 Oct. 1755 (first quotation); 416, 23 July 1763; 419, 13 Aug. 1763; 468, 21 July 1764 (second and third quotations).
46. See e.g. 2, 16 Aug. 1755; 102, 2 July 1757; 369, 14 Aug. 1762 and above p. 51.
47. 10, 11 Oct. 1755 (first quotation); 211, 4 Aug. 1759 (second quotation); 458, 12 May 1764.
this question. Such a man cannot be neutral. Further, only one of very
superior ability and established reputation can act as a moderator by
inlining, as has been the practice, 'sometimes to one side, and sometimes
to the other side, or to trim between parties'. Others who act this way
will be suspected of levity, arrogance or self-interest. This is not to
say, of course, that a man should never change his party, if it is proved
beyond all doubt that it is in the wrong and going to extremes. But then
he may be convinced that both sides are in the wrong. Even so, to retire,
fly from public affairs 'when liberty, precious liberty, English liberty
is under consideration' is to be guilty of patricide. Good men can only
persist with steadiness and courage in setting a good example, whatever the
odds and the accusations levelled against them, looking for opportunities
to heal their country's wounds, and never despairing of the public
however envenomed they may be by faction.48

So some steadiness and uniformity of conduct are necessary to
effectiveness in politics. There can be no mere opting out and standing
neutral. If this steadiness means opposition it is not necessarily to be
condemned. Opposition to ministers is not inevitably factious, directed
to raising false and injurious suspicions of government. Proper opposition is
that aroused by the character and measures of individuals, by unwise and
unjust administration, not to authority as such, nor to a man merely because
he is a minister. Opposition in the public interest to unwise measures, to
attacks on the constitution or to protect liberty, is one of the rights of
the people. Such action, on honest and constitutional principles, is
opposition to the causes of intestine division, not the promotion of it,
and is shown by the example of Rome usually to be beneficial. The
constitution provides legal and parliamentary ways of procedure against
bad advisers and great good can come from such legal and constitutional

48. 480, 13 Oct. 1764 (all quotations); 481, 20 Oct. 1764.
opposition. Indeed the constitution is derived from it. As long as excesses are avoided the right to speak out is part of free government. The sorts of distinction that help to distinguish justified opposition from faction are clear when the Monitor attempts to defend its own vigorous attacks on ministers and its call for action:

It is not mere jealousy, but the evident mis-rule of our ministers which alarms the nation. It is not disaffection, but the love of our constitution, King and country, that prompts us to appear in opposition to bad measures, and to seek after ... bad men .... [It is necessary] to revere the men who are advocates for liberty, and to oppose licentiousness. These [criticisms of ministers] are the words of Britons, who espouse no party but that of their country; and would engage in no quarrel, where the British honour and interest are not concerned. 49

Nevertheless, the dangers of party should never be forgotten. Divisions are always likely to become extreme; it is always more easy to inflame than to moderate and those who first begin divisions have a great responsibility. 'Therefore no man should keep up and foment divisions, with a supposition that he can put an end to them when he pleases: the business soon grows too big for him.' And 'whosoever joins himself in the beginning to a party, with any other intention than to take all opportunities of reducing both sides, as soon as possible, to terms of accommodation, [in the interests of the public]... can't be called an honest man, nor a good patriot'. 50

It is, of course, part of the duty of a good and wise king to rely not on faction, but on parliament, inspired by the people. 51 Likewise a good minister will not rely on party. He does not form 'any secret connections with people in power and office, to establish himself more

49. 3, 23 Aug. 1755; 10, 11 Oct. 1755; 30, 26 Feb. 1756; 52, 31 July 1756 (the quotation); 54, 14 Aug. 1756; 77, 15 Jan. 1757; 352, 17 Apr. 1762; 377, 11 Oct. 1762 (spurious); 481; 482, 27 Oct. 1764. 481 is one of the few papers which suggests that divisions in politics are natural (cf. 377 (spurious). They become dangerous only if factions become inveterate and public interest is completely forgotten. On the right of free expression see above pp. 418-9.

50. 481.

51. See above pp. 396-7.
securely in place'. He seeks to unite the parties and to extinguish party distinctions, yet without sacrificing his principles. Pitt is regarded, of course, as the great exemplar of one who promoted unity and harmony and destroyed all party connections. For this he is repeatedly extolled:

What a sudden revolution is wrought in the character and temper of the nation? To dissentions and divisions, have succeeded unity and harmony .... At present all party-disputes seem to be laid asleep .... The whole body of the nation seems to have been inflamed with one common spirit, and to pursue one common interest.

This is the basis for the restoration of Britain's reputation abroad by the glorious victories inspired by Pitt. The support which 'every honest Briton' that wishes well to his king and country gives to such a minister cannot be called a faction. 52

In some ways the Monitor's references to and discussion of party are the least convincing and clear element in its constitutional attitudes. Its partisanship and bias seem even more obvious than usual. Accusations of party and faction are directed against those to whom the paper is opposed. Those who support the Monitor's friends are not so to be castigated. More generally, its cries seem designed to rob a minister of the support which gives him power and hence makes him effective. In its discussion the Monitor is obliged to make a number of artificial and unconvincing distinctions between justified and factious opposition, between the people's right to speak out and unjustified party commotion, between proper and partisan support for a minister, distinctions which can be seen as purely subjective and grounded in the likes and dislikes of the writers. Their artificiality is not entirely disguised by the self-righteous tone with which, as in so much of the Monitor's discussion, they are cloaked.

Nevertheless it is clear that behind these partisan outcries are some

52. 152, 17 June 1758 (second quotation); 183, 20 Jan. 1759; 190, 10 Mar. 1759; 228, 1 Dec. 1759; 272, 4 Oct. 1760 (third quotation); 282, 13 Dec. 1760 (first quotation); 458, 12 May 1764.
genuine constitutional reasons for dislike of party. It is seen as fundamentally dangerous to mixed balanced government because it disrupts the harmony and confidence between the parts which alone can overcome the clogging tendencies of the necessary checks and balances, because it can be a support for over-powerful ministers and all the dangers they pose, because thus it can threaten the proper role of the king, the independence of members of parliament and the liberties of the people. Yet even more firmly the Monitor believes in the need to watch and very often to oppose ministers, in the people's right and duty to speak out and make their grievances known. Much of the uneasiness and the apparently artificial distinctions arise from valiant attempts to reconcile these not wholly compatible beliefs. Alongside its general condemnation of party which is in line with mainstream eighteenth-century attitudes, the Monitor, in response to its particular circumstances and in company with a growing undercurrent of opinion which reacted to the same incompatibilities of theory, erects a justification of opposition containing many seeds of later defences of party and of uniform conduct in politics based on legal and constitutional principles.

The Standing Army

Another typical tool of tyrants and bad ministers which is a threat to the health of the constitution is a 'standing' army, a permanent professional military force. Some sort of military force is recognized as necessary for internal and external security. It is essential, however, to subject it to proper limitations and to keep it dependent upon some

53. Some of the subtleties of eighteenth-century attitudes to party are discussed below pp. 489-90, 501-2, 512, 537.

54. The Monitor is concerned about this danger in two main periods: early in its life, when foreign troops were being used in England and in the agitation for a Militia Act; and again in two series of articles, one in April 1761 when peace seemed possible and the other in March 1763 when peace had come and the reduction of the army is urged.
part of the constitution, so that it does not grow beyond its auxiliary status and upset the balance of the constitution, usurp the government and destroy the liberties of the people. 'Standing' armies are always particularly likely to get out of hand. Even if they are necessary in wartime and no cause for alarm under a good prince, there is always a danger that they may later be misused. They are likely, too, to turn against their makers and get out of control. 55

If such an army is allowed to become established it may be used by the executive against parliament, perhaps to threaten force, to compel through fear, but also as a source of influence and patronage. It can be used directly against the liberty of the people too. If established as a support for arbitrary government it can prevent the people rising up to resume their threatened rights. Or it can be and is used in more subtle ways. For example, it can be billeted on the people by act of parliament as was done under William III and continued for more than sixty years. Such a 'silent scheme' can just as effectively preclude all measures by the people in support of liberty, quite apart from putting civilians at the mercy of soldiers and imposing a ruinous burden on top of war taxation. Further, a minister could well use quartering on civilians as a way of punishing a borough which refused to elect his candidate. In these ways a powerful standing army could enable ministers to make themselves absolute and change the government into an oligarchy. What may a bad minister not do with fifty thousand troops? 56 If parliament allows such a situation to arise legally through its compliance it will make it the more easy for a future minister, possessed of an army created according to the law, to support himself against the law. Even parliamentary control and the dependence of the army on annual parliamentary grant and consent is not

56. 19; 23, 10 Jan. 1756; 25; 44, 5 June 1756; 52, 31 July 1756; 396.
necessarily a sufficient safeguard. Parliament has not always had the power to disband the army when it wished, and ministerial influence may ensure that annual parliamentary approval is no more than a formality. Better never to allow such an army. 57

This use of a standing army by the executive against parliament and people seems the most likely contemporary danger. However, standing armies can also usurp the government themselves, and dictate to the king as well as to parliament and electors. Furthermore it is not the size but the mere existence of any mercenary force that threatens ruin to the constitution by upsetting the balance of its parts. 58

Lessons from ancient, medieval and modern history and from the fate of foreign nations show how easily the delicate nature of the constitution may be destroyed by the establishment of a standing army. Indeed modern Europe is almost uniformly subject to oppression and slavery, and the differences between the British who have kept their liberty and these other people who have lost theirs are due to their having allowed a standing army. They date their misfortunes from the time they allowed themselves to be disarmed and permitted such armies. 'A standing army was the rock, against which free states have been dashed to pieces.' No free nation ever tolerated one. English history reinforces the point in various ways, chiefly by showing that kings who wish to win the affections of their people must disband their armies while those who rely on an army endanger their thrones. But standing armies are not only dangerous to kings. When parliament found it had to raise its own army against Charles I, it soon discovered that it could not control the results and that armies were dangerous to it too. Its army interrupted the making of peace with the king and robbed and plundered the people. It was the army, misled mainly

57. 19; 23; 25; 30, 28 Feb. 1756; 44.
58. 19; 396, 5 Mar. 1763; 397, 12 Mar. 1763; 398, 19 Mar. 1763.
by the 'iniquitous asiprings' of Cromwell to the throne, that cut off the king's head, destroyed the constitution both in church and state, and eventually destroyed parliament itself.

Such is the dependence! such is the danger of a standing mercenary army! This was the very army that had been raised by the parliament in the cause, and for the sake of liberty. And it was an army composed of men, who valued themselves upon their religious and moral principles and practice.

If this army did such things to a parliament that treated it well, what is to be expected from one raised by a prince or ministry to extend their power? Thus the examples of past times and other places show that a standing army has always lessened both the security of rights and liberties and the affections of the people for their kings. 'The true interest of King and People is one and the same, and inseparable; and ... a large mercenary army is equally dangerous to both.'

Yet, despite this lesson, the real threat of standing armies in Britain, as the instrument of kings and ministers, has arisen since this time and its beginnings can be traced to popish influence over Charles II and the circumstances of his return and reign. The threat increased under James II - until at last the king went beyond all bounds and was resisted. At the Revolution all patriots expected deliverance from this threat to the constitution, but again they were disappointed. Ever since parliament has been persuaded by arguments of external danger, by fear of popery and French invasion, and by promises of early disbandment, to allow ever-larger armies at ever-greater cost. So, artfully, as part of the machinations of obnoxious ministers, have the chains of a standing army been fixed again. The habit of acceptance is so established that Britain is now threatened with the fate of the rest of Europe. How wise were those who tried to guard against such a situation, and how careful should the representatives

59, 19; 23, 10 Jan. 1756; 25, 24 Jan. 1756; 59, 11 Sep. 1756 (third quotation); 300, 18 Apr. 1761; 302, 2 May 1761 (first quotation); 396; 397; 398 (second quotation).
of the people be in the exercise of the rights they have to allow standing armies in situations of imminent danger. 60

There are various practical considerations to add to the constitutional ones in the case against standing armies. They are very costly; because of this they hinder trade and prosperity; they are unnecessary in Britain's insular situation which makes the navy her natural strength. Machiavelli has warned princes against allowing subjects to make arms their profession and Bacon has pointed out that mercenary armies, because they have estates to make rather than to hold, are more fit for invasion than defence. Mercenary soldiers are indifferent to anything but their pay and have no interest in winning or ending a war. In fact they reduce war to a system, a way of living upon the public stock. They are recruited from the vagrants and scum of society for whom the alternatives would have been beggary or a house of correction. They are therefore of a character that will scruple at nothing. The laws that govern them as soldiers, as well as their training, must enhance these qualities in them, making them the natural instruments of tyranny. The fact that they are set apart from the people by their training and conditions of life, especially by their living in barracks, enhances the differences between their interests and those of the nation. It is not safe for the state that such men should be armed. 61

For both practical and constitutional reasons, the most dangerous and expensive form that a reliance on mercenary professional soldiers can take is the calling in of foreign troops to defend the country or the allowing of foreign officers in the army. Foreign troops are not likely to be reliable in danger. Their use suggests an unjustified distrust of the people, who hate them, and is particularly dangerous to the constitution as history again shows. It is a 'usual resort of arbitrary power', a way

60. 19; 23; 25; 43, 29 May 1756; 301, 25 Apr. 1761; 302; 396; 398.
61. 19; 25; 44, 5 June 1756; 59, 11 Sep. 1756; 76, 8 Jan. 1757; 300, 18 Apr. 1761; 302; 398.
of burdening and restraining the people and raising jealousies among them and between them and their king. 62

Thus, seeing a standing army, or the continuance of standing forces in this nation, when their service is at an end, is so grievous and vexatious to the people; so abhorrent to the national constitution; so hazardous to the government, and so cautiously to be granted by parliament, it cannot be imagined that any wise king or minister would seek to enlarge the army unnecessarily or continue it in peacetime. If they do so, they are justly to be suspected of not trusting the people as they should and of tyrannical intentions, and are to be resisted. 63

Abuse of the Law

The laws are the defence of liberty and the foundation of the constitution. The happiness of king and subjects depends on due observance and reverence for the laws; only thus can Britons remain freemen and civil government be kept safe. 'Yet, notwithstanding all these notable precautions [of the law], power [is] always seeking, finding, or making ways to break in upon Liberty.' Only too often have attempts been made, by judges and by ministers, to wrest the law to arbitrary purposes. Only too often has the law been made a plaything of ministers, one of ways in which, since the Revolution especially, they have encroached on liberty. 64

Distinct from the general body of the law, respect for which is essential to freedom, are certain laws and statutes of such importance as foundations of the constitution that they can be regarded as fundamental laws. 65 Attacks on these laws are especially dangerous. Nevertheless the

62. 30, 28 Feb. 1756; 32, 13 Mar. 1756; 36, 10 Apr. 1756; 40, 8 May 1756; 41, 15 May 1756; 44; 59; 76.
63. 59; 300, 18 Apr. 1761; 396, 5 Mar. 1763 (the quotation); 398, 19 Mar. 1763.
64. 141, 1 Apr. 1758; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 417, 30 July 1763; 461, 2 June 1764 (the quotation); 490, 22 Dec. 1764; 497, 9 Feb. 1765.
65. See above p. 385.
constitution has been threatened in this way. The provisions of Magna Carta, the great charter of liberties, have been attacked in various attempts made on the liberties of the subject. Designing ministers have also attempted alterations of the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, despite the fact that they, too, are 'a fundamental and sacred part of the constitution of the united kingdoms' and that the king's very title to the throne could be endangered if it is once allowed that parliament can alter and abrogate the established laws in the original contract of government. Various clauses of the Act of Settlement have been repealed and the provisions concerning the king's going abroad have been relaxed, with grievous consequences. More recently and during the Monitor's lifetime, continental connections, the granting of subsidies to European allies and the use of parliamentary grants raised for unspecified purposes to finance operations in Germany, are represented as breaches of the provision that the king may not wage war for any territory not belonging to the British crown without the consent of parliament. Further, the suggestion that foreign officers may be appointed to serve in America, would be, if allowed, a breach of the clause forbidding the granting of office and favours to foreigners. Such schemes are not only undesirable in themselves but also dangerous because they are breaches of the constitution, small perhaps but from such precedents of annulment and abrogation greater threats could come. 66

The passing of the Septennial Act was a further breach 'made upon our constitution'. It is an alteration of the primitive constitution of parliament, a denial of the rights of electors 'by the original laws of the land to chuse representatives every three years', a right confirmed at the Revolution and once considered a most sacred and valuable privilege

66. 20, 20 Dec. 1755 (the quotation); 30, 28 Feb. 1756; 56, 21 Aug. 1756; 100, 18 June 1757; and, on Magna Carta, e.g. 133, 4 Feb. 1758; 461, 2 June 1764.
then established. All such innovations are to be dreaded 'in particular and in principle' and should be vigorously resisted by parliament and people. 67

Beyond these fundamental laws, the general body of the law can be and has been perverted to the detriment of particular liberties. Any extension of the excise laws, for example in the proposed new taxes on brick and plate in 1756 or the cider tax of 1763, is just such a threat which the Monitor expounds along conventional eighteenth century lines when convenient, although not making a major theme of it.

In whatever form the subject discovers an extension of the laws of excise, he cannot be too early in his opposition. Because of these laws the prerogative is extended, and the people are deprived of the liberty, which they claim of being tried by JURIES, under the great charter of the realm. 68

Most emphasized are the dangers to trial by jury, in this and especially in other contexts, notably the trial by court martial of officers suspected of dereliction of duty in the conduct of the war and the contemporary debate over the role of juries in libel cases. In the first, trial by jury is urged as a way of ensuring stricter enquiry and harsher punishment where the interests of the nation and not just questions of military or naval discipline are at stake. This way of pursuing the Monitor's vendetta against Admiral Byng and others held responsible for the poor progress of the war is decently though thinly disguised by appeals to the antiquity of trial by jury and the danger of innovation. Over the second issue wider questions are raised. The right to the lawful judgement of one's peers as provided for in Magna Carta is presented as a protection against arbitrary or corrupt judges and against despots in general. The direction of juries

67. 30, (third quotation); 56 (first quotation); 93, 30 Apr. 1757 (second quotation); 170, 21 Oct. 1758; 260, 12 July 1760.

68. 31, 6 Mar. 1756 (the quotation); 34, 27 Mar. 1756; 133, 4 Feb. 1758; 400, 2 Apr. 1763; 401, 9 Apr. 1763; 403, 23 Apr. 1763; 445, 11 Feb. 1764.
to enquire into matters of fact only and not to concern themselves with matters of law and intent is an intrusion on this right similar to those made in the past by such men as Empson and Dudley. It is an unwarrantable extension of the power of the judge. Should this new practice become established then one defence against arbitrary judges will be removed and juries too will become an instrument of the executive. 'Thus juries, which hitherto have been the protection and deliverers of the innocent, may be made a snare or engine of oppression and unreasonable prosecutions.'

The concern to protect trial by jury in both these connections arises not so much out of a desire to protect the individual, but out of the need to preserve the role of the people in the constitution. Trial by jury guarantees their right of inquiry into and punishment of those responsible for national disaster and their right of free comment against the wiles and encroachments of those in power. The question of the threat to individual liberties by the perversion of the law arises more clearly out of discussion of projected reforms of the law governing the writ of habeas corpus in 1758. This writ, said to be coeval with the constitution and vital as a safeguard against arbitrary imprisonment, has been challenged and defended on several occasions in history but still it is threatened by 'innovations' which limit the subject's right to it and extend the discretionary powers allowed to judges.

The most extended expressions of concern about perversions of the law to the detriment of liberty and especially the liberty of the individual come with the return of the paper to domestic and constitutional issues on the coming of peace in 1763, and arise especially, of course, out of the proceedings against Wilkes. The fundamental constitutional importance of the liberties of the subject for their own sake is strongly asserted. As

69. 86, 12 Mar. 1757; 133; 148, 20 May 1758 (the quotation); 170, 21 Oct. 1758.
70. 141, 1 Apr. 1758; 151, 10 June 1758.
soon as attempts are made on these, men in power begin to undermine their own state and authority. All arguments against the liberty of the individual tend to the destruction of the constitution by opening up its life veins. Attention is concentrated on Magna Carta, the great bulwark for English liberties against arbitrary power, and the ancient rights it is said to confirm and guarantee: protection against arbitrary imprisonment, against detention without bail except in serious cases, against grievous litigation and excessive fines; trial by due process of law and by one's peers, the most perfect sign of liberty from the earliest times; and liberty of goods and estates. The relevance of Magna Carta in modern times may have been questioned by some but it is still the pulse by which threats to liberty are recognized. 71

The particular 'abuses' of these liberties of the individual in the Wilkes affair are on one occasion detailed thus:

The apprehending Mr. Wilkes, together with the seizure of all his papers, by a warrant, in which he was not named; the rigor with which that warrant was executed upon him; the further violence, which probably would have attended this unfortunate step, had it not been for the superior discretion of the messengers employed; his commitment, in consequence, to close custody, so as not to allow the admission of a friend to assist him, or a lawyer to advise with, in applying for that remedy, which the law itself has wisely provided for every man under confinement; and all this without so much as the pretence of a charge of high treason; has justly raised an alarm through the whole kingdom. Which the use made of those papers afterwards has not tended to lessen.

On other occasions complaints are made of the excessive language of the warrant and the bail demanded, amounting, it is strongly hinted, to a power to fine for crimes of the government's own invention. 72 Discussion centres on general warrants, which are regarded as part of a long history of attempts at arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, equivalent to a revival of

71. 406, 14 May 1763; 407, 21 May 1763; 417, 30 July 1763; 461, 2 June 1764.
72. 409, 4 June 1763; 445, 11 Feb. 1764; 464, 23 June 1764 (the quotation); 493, 12 Jan. 1765; 494, 19 Jan. 1765; 497, 9 Feb. 1765.
the practices of star chamber but not in any way to be justified by ancient usage. Even if they had been used in remote times, which is doubtful, 'no precedents certainly can ever make that legal, which is of itself against the law of the land'. They are condemned on general constitutional grounds, too, because the people say they never gave up to their rulers the power of issuing general warrants, and, in any case, they cannot be supposed to have left the state of nature to make themselves even more exposed to fears and continual dangers. Nor can general warrants be justified on grounds of necessity. True, it is essential to have ways of proceeding against treason and sedition, but these must be carefully defined, based on sufficient grounds and properly executed. General warrants are none of these. In fact they create the ability to restrain the liberty of a person without due legal process. All in all, the whole proceedings against Wilkes are reprehensible because they were violent and illegal, amounting to 'lawless tyranny' especially in the case of such an ambiguous offence as libel. Libels are not idle sport, and men must take the consequences of what they write but they should be prosecuted in the ordinary way and not through vindictive manipulation of the law.

Yet, even while attention is focused on breaches of these rights of individuals for their own sake, their more general constitutional importance is recognized, as illustrated also in the Wilkes affair, in securing to the people as a whole their role in the constitution and their rights of free speech, freedom of the press and opposition. Magna Carta is a bulwark not only of individual liberties but also 'against the attempts of those, who sought to establish their own power about the throne, by deterring the people from opposing their measures, either in word or

73. 409; 445 (the quotation); 456, 28 Apr. 1764; 461, 2 June 1764; 462, 9 June 1764; 464; 465, 30 June 1764; 493. It is not always clear whether all warrants issued by the secretaries of state or just general warrants are being condemned.
74. 445; 484, 10 Nov. 1764; 493; 494, 19 Jan. 1765 (the quotation).
writing' by such illegal methods as harsh prosecutions, deliberate misinterpretations and misrepresentation, and polemical argument from the bench designed to bewilder juries. The connection between the general constitutional role of the people and the specific liberties of the subject is quite clear. Men ought to be able to raise the alarm without hindrance against ambitious ministers and their attempts to extend their powers. Yet in fact the law has been used as a hindrance in times past, in star chamber, and is being so used again in the present by the revival of star chamber practices. 75

These wider issues are evident in the discussion, provoked by the Wilkes affair, of the unsatisfactory state of the law of libel and the way it is enforced, the most cogent consideration of which comes in the series of papers near the end of the Monitor's life which summarize the arguments of the pamphlet, An Enquiry into the Doctrine concerning Libels, Warrants and the Seizure of Papers... The law as it stands does not control licentiousness and is biased against opposition. It is based upon the 'pernicious doctrine' of libels set up by judges before the Revolution, according to which it was immaterial whether the writing complained of was true or false, against a good or a bad man, living or dead, and which regarded every libel as an offence against the peace, even an actual breach of the peace. Such doctrine, if established, especially in cases of criticism of public men, is only one step from complete despotism. Driving men out of public employment is not a loss for which they have any right to damages, because they should hold these employments only during good behaviour, and of that behaviour the people should be the judge. In such cases the truth of the article complained of should be an absolute defence. It is even more reprehensible to try to present the mere questioning of acts of ministers as high treason. Such criticism is usually seeking only

75. 407, 21 May 1763 (the quotation); 409, 4 June 1763; 418, 6 Aug. 1763; 473, 25 Aug. 1764.
to replace one minister by another. It is not an attack on government as such and therefore is not even dangerous to public peace. 76

The ways libel cases are conducted make the law even more onerous. The initiating of cases by information of the attorney-general (much more common in libel cases than in any others) is a star chamber practice. It is remarkable that it is not disputed 'for, by this mode of prosecution, as the crown never pays costs, it is in the power of the Attorney General to harrass the peace of any man in the realm, at his pleasure, and put him to a grievous expence, without ever trying the matter at all, and without any possibility of redress, or retaliation'. As if this, and the demanding of sureties for the peace when no actual breach has occurred, are not enough, some lawyers have further revived star chamber practices by disputing the rights of juries. Again the dangers of the limitations placed on the rights of juries to decide questions of law as well as of fact are emphasized, both for legal reasons and for one major political and constitutional reason. In ninety-nine cases out of one hundred informations for libel are a dispute between ministers and people. In such circumstances the rights of juries are a great bulwark of liberty which has saved the constitution often and should never be resigned. There are two pillars of the constitution: parliaments and juries. One must be independent of the crown, the other of judges, if the constitution is to be secured. 77

As always the Monitor's fluctuating concern over 'abuses' of the law on the part of unscrupulous ministers is determined and nourished by its political partisanship. Yet it is of a piece with the rest of its constitutional attitudes. In the eyes of its authors the law is the vital

76. 408, 28 May 1763; 492-497, 5 Jan. 1765 - 9 Feb. 1765. The quotation is from 492. For the pamphlet see above p. 370.
77. 492 (the quotation); 493; 497. See also 409, 4 June 1763; 417, 30 July 1763; 445, 11 Feb. 1764.
bulwark of liberty against power in two main ways: generally, it is the framework of the constitution and of this framework the 'fundamental' laws are the foundation; more particularly it protects the personal liberties of the subject which are valuable in themselves as part of the rights of individual Englishmen and as a guarantee of the ability of the people as a whole to play the role in the constitution envisaged for them.

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The Monitor thus sees the contemporary constitution as gravely threatened from various directions, each represented at one time or another as the major danger, and all usually interconnected as part of a pernicious conspiracy of ministers. This sense of deep discontent and impending doom is an all-pervasive note sounding through the Monitor's discussion of the constitution and often the immediate preoccupation of its authors in their comment on current politics. It is this that explains the drive and urgency behind the call to the people to be alert and active and it does much to give to the Monitor's constitutional attitudes their distinctive quality, their particular radical tone.
Clearly the Monitor considers that something should be done to preserve the constitution from the threats which assail it. Despite past attempts to settle the constitution and the roles of its parts in laws and statutes, particularly in the Revolution, there is room for further measures. In fact, the failure to perfect 'that great and happy work' has opened up new opportunities to unscrupulous men.1

The return of members from 'small and almost extinct burroughs' is 'one of the grievances, which at the revolution passed unnoticed'. The presence of too many men of no property in the house of commons is another evil which escaped the 'sagacious contrivers' in the amendment of the crazy state of the constitution at the Revolution and at the time of the passing of the Act of Settlement. Place bills, in the forms enacted, have been quite insufficient protection against it. So the country has been endangered by corrupt representatives after the Revolution as by high-handed princes before, 'notwithstanding the Bill of Rights, and other salutary acts, to secure the freedom of elections, to punish bribery and corruption, and to prevent false returns to parliament'. In fact, although the Revolution restored the charters, annulled innovations in the rights of election and left every elector free, corruption and the management of elections have actually grown. The revival of the militia is yet another necessary measure from the neglect of which at the Revolution the country has smarted. 'Neither did the Revolution

1. The Monitor 147, 13 May 1758 (the quotation); 260, 12 July 1763; 400, 2 Apr. 1763. See above p. 427.
deliver the nation from vexatious imprisonment, and uncertainty of deliverance. 1

The provisions of the Bill of Rights concerning the personal liberty of the subject are most inadequate. 2

In all these respects further reforms are necessary. Sometimes particular remedies are proposed, their nature easily to be deduced from the description of the constitution and its present state; sometimes a general alertness and vigorous activity along established lines are urged. Whichever it is, the action is always conceived of as a restoration of the constitution, a return to its first principles, the preservation of its essential characteristics against innovations, against the schemes and devices of ministers, 'those arts and innovations, which deprive the people of their freedom, and the king of their confidence and affections'. 3 This is the attitude taken even where, as is usually the case, it is not claimed that the particular measures proposed are supported by ancient precedent.

Although the first paper refers to the need for drastic remedies to cure the body politic, the Monitor more usually insists that reform should not be sweeping and 'root and branch'. Over-rigorous reform can beget new ferments rather than the reconciliation which will spring from moderation. Reform should, however, be undertaken immediately, even in times of crisis and war. 'Now is the proper season to recover our lost credit and reputation', not only by a vigorous foreign policy, but by necessary internal measures which will provide the foundation for such a policy. To the objection that those who ask for reforms are ignorant well-meaning speculative politicians, the Monitor answers that they dream of relative not absolute perfection.

2. 147; 155, 8 July 1758 (first two quotations); 252, 17 May 1760 (third quotation); 260 (fourth quotation); 294, 7 Mar. 1761; 465, 30 June 1764 (last quotation).

3. 299, 11 Apr. 1761 (the quotation); 497, 9 Feb. 1765.
Abuses should not be allowed to grow until they rule the constitution just because full perfection is unattainable or because man himself is imperfect. 4

Reform of Parliament

A true patriotic system must establish 'a free parliament, not bought of the indigent, avaricious or unthinking electors; nor corrupted by the influence of the court; [this] is the chief means to give life to the languishing constitution'. 5

To this end, elections must be purified and kept free of undue influence. Throughout its life the Monitor supports more effective measures against bribery at elections and particularly, in its second number, the suggestion to be put forward as a bill before the 1768 elections by William Beckford, that members should be required to take an oath that they had not used bribery in their elections. 6 It is noteworthy that measures against bribery are the reform which the Monitor persists longest in calling for, but that its last reference proposes not a strengthening of the law but merely the resolution of the electors and their representatives not to offer or accept bribes. On one occasion a different and harsher remedy is proposed: the permanent disfranchisement of every borough or corporation convicted of selling its votes. On another it is suggested that it is necessary to remove from elections the influence, menaces and intrigues of excisemen and all other officers of the crown. 7 This is one of the few new specific proposals for reform made late in the paper's life and is an interesting foreshadowing of William Dowdeswell's clause to disfranchise customs, excise and salt officers, suggested for Beckford's bill of 1768, moved in slightly different

4. 1, 9 Aug. 1755; 39, 1 May 1756; 77, 15 Jan. 1757; 152, 17 June 1758 (the quotation); 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 126, 17 Dec. 1757; 157, 22 July 1758; 484, 10 Nov. 1764.

5. 70, 27 Nov. 1756.

6. 2, 16 Aug. 1756; 15, 17 June 1758; 155, 8 July 1758; 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 401, 9 Apr. 1763. For the Beckford bill see Sutherland, The City...1768-1774, p.11; Namier and Brooke, II, p. 77; Commons' Journal, XXXI, pp. 545, 621.

form as a bill in 1770, and finally enacted in 1782 as Crewe's Act.

Then there is a need to ascertain the law of elections. To make sure that the right to vote is kept in the hands of those with sufficient property and independence not to be easily influenced, the Monitor warmly supports the Act to secure the rights of freeholders as against copyholders in county elections passed in 1758. As noted before it even proposes an increase of the freehold qualification from forty shillings to £40. Otherwise it is hardly concerned with the franchise which, in its view, already gives 'every part of the people... a proper share in this privilege'.

The elimination of corruption from elections would be greatly assisted if the 'small and almost extinct burroughs' were abolished. 'If the electing power was to be transferred from the petty and inconsiderable burroughs to such as are remarkable for their wealth, dignity and number of inhabitants, I am persuaded no money would be able to buy their votes.' Yet there is another and very significant reason for the abolition of rotten boroughs: the need to secure the true and fair representation of the people. In the Monitor's view it is doubtful whether this is secured in present circumstances, when the electors in 'that rotten part of our constitution', the small boroughs, can be bought. Can the representation be said to be fair 'so long as a few drunken alchouse-keepers, nay, a single farm shall be enabled to send as many representatives to the great assembly of the nation convened in parliament, as the most opulent and extensive county in the kingdom?'

What reason can be assigned that the poor barren county of Cornwall should return forty-four members for parliament, and the rich and fruitful county of Chester and its city return no more than four? Why should such a deserted place as Old Sarum, totally under the command of one landlord, send two representatives to parliament, whilst many other towns, which deserve the title and privilege of cities, send no representatives at all... who, that wish well of their country, can think that a parliament constituted under these circumstances,

does truly and fairly represent the people, when it is evident, that the majority, and the richest of them are by such inequalities excluded from an electing vote? yet, how easy might it be for the legislature, actuated by a public spirit, to deliver the nation from this weight upon their constitution.9

More frequent elections would also help to reduce corruption. The Monitor therefore calls on occasion for the repeal of the Septennial Act and the reintroduction of triennial parliaments. Here it can most easily claim to be restoring the constitution. Triennial parliaments are much more agreeable to the constitution. 'Till this be restored we cannot expect a free parliament.' Again, triennial elections are desirable not only because they would make corruption more difficult, but also because they would increase the influence of the people. This is valuable as a counterweight to other influences but even more as an end in itself. 'Nor can any other expedient be contrived to secure the interests of the people, or to maintain the integrity of their trustees.'10

If parliament is to be free its members once elected must not be subject to undue influence from the court. The Monitor therefore supports the need for further regulation of the presence of placemen and pensioners in the house of commons. It praises measures taken by the Irish house concerning pensions and hopes that they will be imitated in England, for all pensions, unless granted in reward for eminent service, are a grievance. Attention is drawn to a bill several times passed by the commons in the time of Walpole, but thrown out by the lords, and to the demands for the removal of this grievance in the 'late instructions' (i.e., those of 1756) of constituents to their representatives. The clause of the Act of Settlement concerning placeholders and pensioners is recommended as something which will appeal to all true Englishmen. Further measures, possibly along the

9. 3, 23 Aug. 1755 (other quotations); 155, 8 July 1758 (first two and last quotations).

10. 130, 14 Jan. 1758 (second quotation); 170, 21 Oct. 1758 (first quotation); 401, 9 Apr. 1763.
same lines, are necessary to prevent members holding pensions or places which control their voices in the house, and other steps should be taken to prevent the multiplication of offices. To ensure that members are of sufficient standing to be independent and to be able to judge the nation's interests rightly, their property qualifications should be strictly enforced and the Monitor supports the Act of 1760 to this effect.\(^\text{11}\)

For the house of commons to function properly and to fulfil its constitutional role, then, these specific reforms are necessary, to ensure its independence and to make certain that it is truly and fairly representative of the people.

The Militia

Proper provision must be made for the internal defence of the country, to render unnecessary the use of foreign troops and a standing army in peacetime. An alternative is readily available in the revival of the militia, that 'ancient practice' which won for the British a reputation for valour and skill in arms but which was laid aside because of disputes under Charles I. Despite efforts under Charles II it was not properly revived then, nor at the Revolution. For forty years now the people have been struggling with the ministry for arms and for an adequate militia.\(^\text{12}\)

The militia is the only legal means of defence compatible with and not endangering the principles of the constitution. It is, indeed, one of the principal parts of the constitution; without provision for it other measures of reform will be mere inanitas verba. It is the way in which the natural and artificial strength of a kingdom, that is, property and military power, can be reconciled. If these are not united 'the balance of power in the constitution will be overset and destroyed....Wherever the ...armed power is, there

\(^{11}\) 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 130; 152, 17 June 1758; 170; 243, 15 Mar. 1760; 252, 17 May 1760; 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 453, 7 Apr. 1764; and above pp. 240-2.

\(^{12}\) 38, 24 Apr. 1756; 43, 29 May 1756; 76, 8 Jan. 1757; 113, 17 Sep. 1757; 147, 13 May 1758; 152; 204, 16 June 1759; 284, 27 Dec. 1760; 396, 5 Mar. 1763.
the government will center also in a short time'.

Frequently the same basic point is made in a different way. The militia is the form of military power consonant with the originating role of the people in the British constitution and with their continuing liberties. 'In a nation, where the crown is the gift of the subject, what power is so proper to defend the sovereign's rights as an army raised from amongst those, who placed him on the throne?' The militia is part of the rights of a free people; true liberty consists 'in having a power of defending ourselves'; whosoever entrusts his defence to anyone but himself is a slave. So the people in Britain have reserved the bearing of arms to themselves. It is essential that they should have this right restored if they are to continue to be the only free nation. The militia will act as a school for the lower classes particularly in their constitutional rights, to teach them to fight for their liberties and to serve their country as a free people and to show them how much better their situation is than that of any others in Europe.

The militia is, furthermore, the only form of military power which allows the government to win the affections of its people and which preserves that harmony and confidence between prince and subjects which is the true safety of the state. 'And no minister ought to dread any bad effects from a well regulated and disciplined militia in this island, unless he is grasping at more power than the freedom of our constitution allows him.'

The Monitor is just as much concerned with the practical as with the constitutional value of the militia and in most papers on the subject the two lines of argument run side by side. It is a desirable defence force because it is chosen not out of the dregs of the people but out of 'the freeholders, land-owners, substantial farmers, and other persons of some property', who have

13. 19, 13 Dec. 1755; 38; 59, 11 Sep. 1756; 147; 396 (the quotation).
14. 19; 32, 13 Mar. 1756 (first quotation); 85, 5 Mar. 1757 (second quotation); 126, 17 Dec. 1757; 244, 22 Mar. 1760; 284, 27 Dec. 1760.
15. 19 (the quotation); 32.
a 'portion in the public adventure'. They will be well-informed about the interests and constitution of their country and sensible of the dangers if they fail. The officers include gentlemen and noblemen who own some of the greatest property in the country. They are spurred not by ambition or need, but by public service and a sense of the national interest. Such officers and men will be courageous, vigorous and skilful in the use of arms because the ties of duty, affection and interest urge them on. They are quite equal to the discipline and art of modern war. They will be much more reliable in face of the enemy than a mercenary army because they are defending their own homes and land. 16

Then the militia is effective in defence because it is always ready; it extends over the whole country, especially along the whole coastline, in a way a regular army cannot; and it cannot be beaten finally without a total extinction of the people. It is a 'many headed monster'. As such it wins most respect abroad and strikes great terror into the hearts of the enemy. And it is much less burdensome than would be a mercenary army adequate to the task. 17

Altogether, then, the militia is a most frugal and rational means of defence. Moreover, it is likely to be of use against internal disorders. It puts the nation into a proper state of defence against riots and insurrections against 'the frequent tumults of the desperate mob', as well as against invasions. It could well take part in law enforcement duties such as those of nightwatchmen, in London anyway. 'A well regulated and properly chosen militia would be able speedily to suppress all risings, and protect us against a lawless drunken mob,

16. 19 (second quotation); 38, 24 Apr. 1756; 76, 8 Jan. 1757; 85, 5 Mar. 1757 (first quotation); 215, 1 Sep. 1759. The reliability of militia forces is illustrated from historical examples, British, foreign and classical. 32; 76; 397, 12 Mar. 1763.

17. 19, (the quotation); 38; 43, 29 May 1756; 113, 17 Sep. 1757; 126, 17 Dec. 1757; 215; 244, 22 Mar. 1760; 284, 27 Dec. 1760; 397.
and from their robbing the industrious part of mankind as they have done.'

The militia, then, is necessary for both practical and constitutional reasons. It is the only alternative to submission to the enemy or to tyranny. 'Therefore let the militia be restored; and Britain will have nothing to fear from foreign or domestic foes.' 'And can it be thought that the friends of our king and constitution will ever murmur at the means that restores to them their ancient freedom; that puts them into a capacity of defending themselves against both the force of an enemy and the ruinous measures of a ministry; and besides gives them possession of several valuable privileges?'

With such arguments the Monitor buttresses its support which its political loyalties would in any case have determined for the militia measure of 1756, defeated in the house of lords, for the Act passed in 1757 and for its effective implementation.

Other reforms

To secure the constitution reforms are necessary in other directions, including measures to ascertain the liberty of the subject, to make sure that no ministers can deny any subject personal liberty and particularly to defend the subject's right to the writ of habeas corpus and limit the discretionary powers of judges in granting it. Some specific suggestions are made, too, about reforms of the law of libel to protect freedom of speech and the press. The law of libel should be defined and fixed punishments applied to both government and opposition writers. Especially the rights of juries to decide the whole issue should be established and the defence of truth allowed in public libel cases. General warrants should be confirmed as illegal both by legal determination and by motion of the house of commons.

The Monitor vigorously defends the right of the house of commons, as the
guardian of rights and liberties, to act in an issue like this over which the public is deeply aroused and concerned.  

Good sound economical administration must be provided for, because 'liberty and good oeconomy of the public treasure have always been known to keep pace with each other'. 'Negligence in the management of the public treasure and revenue, opens a gate to all sorts of disorder', including threats to the constitution, and gives great opportunities for fraud and plunder by ministers and office-holders. It imposes burdens of heavy taxes on the people, disabling and oppressing them, and giving rise to discontent, faction and even rebellion. In contrast, the harmony necessary between government and people will be easily preserved by a frugal minister, and reforms and reductions in public offices will decrease the threat of the improper use of influence. 'Therefore nothing contributes more to the felicity of princes, than to be well and faithfully served in this chief branch of government.' It is not surprising that the call for the correction of frauds and abuses in the revenue and public offices and for a system of economy in the financial part of government, made at the beginning of the paper's life, should be repeated among other more clearly constitutional concerns as one of the measures to be expected of a 'patriot' administration and to be wished for on the coming of peace. More specifically, a charge on offices and pensions, enacted in 1758, is commended as a way to avoid extra burdens on the people in time of crisis, although reduction of offices and measures to prevent their multiplication are regarded as even more necessary and beneficial. To reduce the burden of the national debt supplies should be raised 'within the year', that is, the total expenses should be provided for by the receipts of the year. This also encourages economy in ministers and

21 (Cont'd) 445, 11 Feb. 1764; 492, 5 Jan. 1765; 493, 12 Jan. 1765; 497, 9 Feb. 1765.

22. 463, 16 July 1764; 464, 23 June 1764; 495, 26 Jan. 1765; 496, 2 Feb. 1765.

23. 80, 29 Jan. 1757 (first quotation); 394, 19 Feb. 1763; 483, 3 Nov. 1764 (second and third quotations).
watchfulness on the part of parliament and people.

These, then, are the specific reforms which will help to save the constitution. The Monitor cannot be said, however, to have campaigned in a prolonged, vigorous and committed manner for any of them, with the exception, perhaps, of the militia. Its references to triennial parliaments, the abolition of rotten boroughs, place and pension bills, laws against bribery and so on, occur in only a handful of the five hundred and four essays, and are very much concentrated in the first three years. Of the measures to secure the independence of parliament only the property qualifications of members receives any substantial discussion after that (in 1760). The measures are very rarely raised when the Monitor returns to preoccupation with constitutional discussion from 1763. Demands for specific reforms cannot be ignored as part of the Monitor's constitutional attitudes; one essay in 1758 conveys the tone of profound and impatient specific discontent with the current state of the constitution too strongly not to carry considerable weight. Yet they are far from the most constant and striking feature of the Monitor's call to action.

The Monitor's most consistent remedy for constitutional ills is, rather, the proper behaviour of, the correct realization and fulfilment of their roles in politics by all concerned, from king to people. It is to kings, ministers, members of parliament and ordinary men who will act in the ways described in earlier sections that the country looks for its salvation. They will merit the highest of political titles, that of patriot.

Patriots are those who love their king and country and who serve the country to which they owe everything without thought of private gain. They are men of

24. 2, 16 Aug. 1755; 39, 1 May 1756; 152, 17 June 1758; 170, 21 Oct. 1758; 343, 13 Feb. 1762 (the only paper suggesting the raising of supplies within the year); 394. See above p. 173.

25. 401, 9 Apr. 1763 is the only one of the later papers that gives a comprehensive list of desirable specific reforms.

26. 155, 8 July 1758.
integrity who diligently enquire into the conduct of government, sparing
no man, whatever his station. They keep themselves aloof from full engagement
in the proposals and schemes of government so that they may be free to judge.

'As a patriot' a member of parliament

keeps his eye on the country, to vindicate the public
liberty, to make wholesome laws, to stop the leaks,
which may happen in the great vessel of state; to
search into and to punish corruption and oppression;
to improve and advance trade, to do all in his power
towards redress of grievances, and to contribute, as
much as in him lies, to promote the welfare of the
people, he has the honour to represent.

He is not implacably opposed to government although he may tend to distrust
it. On the contrary, he will seek to heal divisions, cement union and curb
faction. Hence he will support 'wise and virtuous measures of the administration;
making always some allowances for the frailties of human nature'. A patriot is
distinguished above all by his impartiality, his refusal to follow the dictates
of others, his determination to exercise his own reason and judgement and to
judge measures not men. For such independence, patriots have been abused by
both whigs and tories in power for sixty years, and they will continue to
be traduced. Yet they must stand firm and speak out, be they of greater or
lesser importance, in parliament or the press according to their situation.
Nothing can deprive such men of the love and confidence of the people. They
will be marked by their true popularity.27

Similarly the minister who 'depends upon the rectitude of his intentions,
and is open to conviction, and to receive information from such, as are found
capable to instruct him', who takes advice from the best sources possible and
who seeks no security in a corrupt parliament, deserves the title of patriot
minister. And a king who takes counsel from all honest men, who has no

27. 4, 30 Aug. 1755; 10, 11 Oct. 1755; 260, 12 July 1760; 293, 28 Feb. 1761
(first quotation); 308, 13 June 1761; 330, 14 Nov. 1761; 395, 26 Feb. 1763
(second quotation); 422, 3 Sep. 1763; 433, 19 Nov. 1763.
interest but that of his people, and makes public good the touchstone of his action, who uses his favours to reward merit and virtue, who rules by gentleness and not force and inspires love and gratitude rather than fear, is a patriot king. 28

Despite the difficulties and despite past betrayals by so-called patriots, much is hoped for from such men. Patriots must unite and set themselves against the 'betrayers, the plunderers, the sellers of the constitution and nation' and clean the 'Augean stable'. 'A few active disinterested patriots' may soon heal the wounds of war and remedy the defects in the constitution. 29 Above all, if the people are watchful and active in their concern for government and the constitution and their right of free speech and a free press is protected, then those above them will be encouraged to fulfil their roles properly, the necessary specific measures will be passed and the constitution will be preserved according to its first principles.

Such remedies may seem less interesting and important, less indicative of reforming zeal, than a full programme of specific measures actively and consistently campaigned for. Yet as preached by the Monitor and arising out of its driving concern about contemporary threats to the constitution, there is no doubt about their powerful propaganda appeal and their significance for the working and nature of the constitution.

Ostensibly, the Monitor's political and constitutional comment moves within the framework of the theory of the mixed balanced constitution, accepted virtually without question as the stock-in-trade of eighteenth-century constitutional ideas at least at the level of ordinary political controversy. Particularly, it shares in exaggerated form that suspicion of all power which

28. 311, 4 July 1761.
29. 10, 11 Oct. 1755 (first quotation); 68, 13 Nov. 1756 (second quotation); 394, 19 Feb. 1763 (third quotation); 475-478, 8-29 Sep. 1764; 480, 13 Oct. 1764; 481, 20 Oct. 1764; 483, 3 Nov. 1764; 484, 10 Nov. 1764; 486, 24 Nov. 1764 On past betrayals by patriots see 9, 4 Oct. 1755; 10; 68, 13 Nov. 1756; 74, 25 Dec. 1756; 127, 24 Dec. 1757; 333, 5 Dec. 1761.
is a major motive in the praise of this form of government. It does realize that there are some possible disadvantages in mixed balanced government. The three elements may 'by crossing and jarring,...clog the wheels of government'. It may on occasion be a disadvantage not to have an 'absolute and supreme power' in government able to get things done. The lack of a legally constituted authoritative judge of fundamental controversies between the three estates is also recognized as a major inconvenience in mixed government. Yet such notes of complaint are rare. More usually the Monitor seeks to avoid the clogging and jarring of government by insisting on the need for harmony between the parts. It is to achieve this harmony and to avoid division and obstruction that the various participants in government are urged to behave in the ways enjoined upon them. Particularly the Monitor urges the unity of king and people against ministers. Each of the threats to the constitution that it detects is seen as such either because it is a dangerous concentration of power or because it interrupts the harmony of king and people, or because it does both.

Yet this ideal of harmonious operation of the mixed constitution, the natural and spontaneous agreement on and support for necessary measures, making effective yet safe government possible is obviously not realistic. It is the ideal of the politically inexperienced or naive - or of the opposition polemicist - which pays little attention to the demands of practical politics and effective government in eighteenth-century circumstances. The Monitor can give no convincing answer to the argument that corruption is necessary if mixed government is to work, but merely bewails such a dangerous doctrine and pessimistic view of human nature. It distrusts positive government (except perhaps the never-realized ideal of a benevolent, virtuous and active monarch)

30. 451, 24 Mar. 1764 (first quotation); 155, 8 July 1758 (second quotation).
31. 157, 22 July 1758; 394, 19 Feb. 1763.
and the means which make it possible, and dismisses any accumulation of power as the fruits of ambition and self-interest. Yet it demands effectiveness, especially in war, and bitterly castigates failures.

There are more positive indications than these that the Monitor is not entirely happy within the framework of the mixed balanced constitution, that it has doubts about the practical validity of the ideal it has set up. This uneasiness is to be deduced from emphases and trends of discussion rather than from overt statements. It has already been suggested that there is reason to doubt, for example, whether the Monitor really accepts its vision of the king ruling actively and vigorously in defence of the constitution. It has too deep a sense of the 'failings' of actual kings and of the need to urge and supervise them. In controlling ministers the Monitor certainly maintains that active supervision by the king should play a part. Yet with some inconsistency and much greater vehemence and urgency the responsibility of ministers to parliament and people is stressed. On occasion the house of commons is reminded that the balance of the constitution will be disturbed if it interferes too lightly in the affairs of the executive. Yet much more often and strongly its role as the great inquest of the nation supervising government is insisted on. The Monitor is not really happy with the notion of an independent executive, however checked and balanced. Out of its deep suspicion of governmental power arise these inconsistencies which throw doubt on its acceptance of the fundamental principles of mixed government.

Then, too, the independence of the house of commons is compromised by the insistence on close relations between constituents and their representatives. The independence of all parts of the constitution is undermined by the vigorous insistence on positive rights of free speech and a free press, not just mere absence of censorship, as part of the checks on power.

All these implicit hesitations and inconsistencies are sharpened by the
Monitor's conviction of a contemporary crisis in the constitution. More important, they are related to the theme which also arises out of its intense suspicion of power and conviction of crisis and which dominates the Monitor's discussion of the constitution; its insistence on the role of the people. This rescues the Monitor from trite conventionalities and unreal ideals. In emphasizing this, as well as educating and arousing the people to fulfil it, for whatever motives, the Monitor has found, albeit hesitantly, embryonically, and without full appreciation of its consequences, a much more realistic answer to the problems of controlling and directing government than the accepted platitudes of mixed government. In doing so it has moved towards a more modern idea of government.

Of course it is possible to dismiss the Monitor's ideas on the constitution as mere opposition cant or as attitudes assumed for the purposes of effective full-blooded polemics to serve the needs of the moment. To some considerable extent it must be allowed that the paper's attitudes are determined by its political partisanship and its more or less habitual opposition to government. Yet to be effective as political propaganda the ideas and attitudes must have been in tune with the assumptions and prejudices of readers and potential supporters and attractive to them. Further, they are more than just the results of cynical manipulation by politicians of the people's prejudices. The energy, general consistency and readiness with which they are promoted suggest that, in an age of strong ideological commitment, they were genuinely believed in by the paper's patrons and authors. A study of their background and of the context of ideological debate in which the authors of the Monitor wrote will suggest that they were accepted by many others at various levels of political involvement. They are indeed representative of a major line of eighteenth-century thought which kept alive, to an extent not always fully realized, some important seventeenth-century ideas and was, in the middle of the eighteenth century, reaching a watershed in its development.
The Hanoverian Inheritance

At the level of commonly accepted assumptions among those interested in politics, the Hanoverian eighteenth century inherited from seventeenth-century thought and experience an amalgam of ideas and attitudes, composed of three main strands. The strongest strand, certainly, was the theory of mixed government. Very much intertwined with it were appeals to history and the ancient constitution and to reason and the laws of nature. The amalgam was shared by virtually all sides in constitutional debate: it was the basis of commonplace whig thought; yet with differing emphases it was the mainstay of all but extreme and unrepresentative authoritarians and believers in divine right among the tories.

The notion of mixed government in its English form evolved naturally out of indigenous mediaeval ideas of the limitations on English kings, notably Sir John Fortescue's famous description of the English monarchy as dominium politicum et regale, royal but limited by the rights of parliament to agree to laws and taxation. These indigenous ideas were subject to strong classical influences from the sixteenth century onwards. With these influences came the ideas of Aristotle and his disciples, of the Greek historian Polybius, of Cicero and Plutarch, and of their modern exponents, Guicciardini, Contarini, Erasmus, and above all Machiavelli. Out of these developed the theory that only a constitution which combined the three 'pure' forms of government - monarchy, aristocracy and democracy - could

avoid degeneration. Suddenly launched into the limelight by Charles I's Answer to the XIX Propositions put to him by parliament in 1642, this mixed government theory became in variously modified forms a major frame of reference for virtually all controversy, largely because it was so adaptable to differing emphases. It received its most learned exposition under strong classical influence at the end of the Interregnum, in the works of the 'classical' republicans. Mixed monarchy, the more congenial naturalized form, triumphed at the Restoration and continued dominant when new issues arose between crown and parliament. At the climax of the tension in the Exclusion crisis and again in the Revolution old expositions were reprinted and well-tried arguments from them aired. The triumph of the most explicit proponents of the theory in 1689 confirmed its general acceptance. In the eighteenth century it was expounded and elaborated by a succession of leading writers on the constitution, while at a lower level its tenets were indeed commonplace accepted axioms, part of the very matrix of the ordinary political Englishman's thinking.

Yet it was not the whole of the seventeenth-century inheritance. In the early Stuart period constitutional argument, both in and outside the law courts, was conducted almost entirely in indigenous lawyers' terms. Under the influence of Sir Edward Coke, the concept of law based on immemorial and unchanging custom going back beyond the oldest precedent, a concept not new in itself, became newly important in controversy. With the immemorial common law came the ancient constitution, the customs of the high court of parliament as well as the royal prerogative. Perverted to

exclusively parliamentarian purposes as the gulf between king and parliament became unbridgeable, this mode of argument from immemorial existence to present right nevertheless survived into the second half of the century as one of the chief modes of political discussion used by all except extremists. The notion of ancient rights clearly influenced the Revolution settlement in its detail, while ancient constitution ideas were of major importance in the ideology of the Revolution, allowing men to explain reassuringly and satisfactorily what they were doing. Whig historiography, presenting the continuous history of English liberty, triumphed over more sophisticated royalist criticisms from 1688.  

Distinct from, yet closely associated with, these purely English ancient constitution arguments was the belief, gaining popularity more widely in Europe, in 'Gothic' constitutions. According to this belief, the mediaeval forms of government and laws of western Europe, including those of England, were derived from the Goths, a generic term for the early Germanic settlers of northern Europe and heirs of the Roman Empire there. Gothic constitutions were praised for the preservation of liberties and the limitation of kingship. Such a belief was to be found in common law circles in England from the 1560's and ran parallel to indigenous ancient constitution ideas in debates in the seventeenth century. As the century progressed there was probably a greater willingness to see parallels to English institutions in other 'Gothic' monarchies of earlier times. Certainly there was a great concern to understand why ancient liberties had declined and disappeared elsewhere, in order to avoid a like fate in England.


Belief in the ancient constitution or in Gothic monarchy was not inconsistent with the theory of mixed monarchy. Appeals to history to prove the utility of mixed constitutions in ensuring stability had always been a major part of the classical exposition of the theory. Most thoughtful Englishmen, avowed new-modellers aside, believed they were merely describing an already existing constitution, handed down the generations, when they asserted that England was a mixed monarchy. So the two commonly accepted modes of argument were amalgamated. Yet in the process the nature of the appeal to history was subtly changed. Instead of arguing, as the common lawyers did, from the continuity of past rights to their sanctity in the present, the past was invoked to prove the utility in practice of theories derived from observation or reason. History illustrated what was useful rather than proving what was right. This change in emphasis was hastened by the decline of the intellectual influence of the inns of court and the more sophisticated attitudes of the age of reason. 7 Old habits of thinking died hard, however, especially at the popular level. If it was less necessary as well as less valid in the eighteenth century to argue from history to defend liberty, Englishmen nevertheless habitually continued to describe their liberties as inherited from their ancestors without too much concern for the logic of argument.

These two main currents in the stream of seventeenth-century thought were further combined with and modified by an appeal to abstract principles deduced by reason. The notion of popular sovereignty, that all power derived from the people and could only be rightfully exercised with their consent and as a trust to be withdrawn if abused, and the closely related concept of a contract by which the people set up a government to protect their rights had deep roots in mediaeval thought and in sixteenth-century theories of resistance, both protestant and catholic. They were revived and

thoroughly aired in the mid-seventeenth-century English turmoil. Although their association with revolutionary extremism provoked reaction against them, they appear again in whig arguments in the years of the Exclusion crisis and in the debates and literature of 1688-9 and its later justification, though seldom untempered by other arguments in a mixture which reflects the very nature of the Revolution. The very respectability and moderation of the Revolution helped to vindicate the principles it could be said to demonstrate, to rescue them from the stigma of 1649 and to ensure their survival into the eighteenth century.

These rational principles had as their greatest exponent the only political philosopher of stature which the later seventeenth century produced, John Locke. Yet Locke is less important as a mentor of whiggism as it passed from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries than is commonly thought. During his lifetime and for most of the next century his reputation was primarily as a philosopher. His major work on politics, the Two Treatises, was published anonymously, its authorship kept a closely guarded secret until his death in 1704. After that it was known chiefly in formidable collected editions and not expounded or examined in any detail or applied to contemporary circumstances until the later eighteenth century, except to some extent in Ireland. The main lines of whig attitudes were formed before Locke's works achieved any prominence. His friend, James Tyrrell, is more typical, both in his answer to Filmer, Patriarcha non Monarcha (1680), and in his post-Revolution Bibliotheca Politica (1691-1702), in his combination of appeals to mixed monarchy, ancient liberty and popular


soverignty and contract. It is at least as necessary to be aware of mixed monarchy and ancient constitution ideas and of the broad tradition of popular sovereignty, consent and contract theories, as to grasp the theory of Locke in order to understand how eighteenth-century Englishmen regarded their constitution. There was no sudden dawn and blaze of rationalism alone in the age of reason.

It is equally important to realize that this amalgam of ideas and attitudes, a glorious muddle of logic about political obligation perhaps but apparently a deeply satisfying explanation for most ordinary political Englishmen, could be held with widely differing emphases in the eighteenth century. The prevalent tone became deeply conservative, justifying a past revolution necessary to secure the position of the political classes without opening the way to further change. Yet something was preserved of its more radical origins. To understand what it is necessary to remember that this amalgam was fused first in recognizable form on the whig side in the fires of the Exclusion crisis. A closer examination of whig thought when it was intense opposition thought reveals elements and directions in it which were suppressed in its main line but not altogether lost when the exigencies of opposition were removed. Indeed they were to provide the main line of much opposition propaganda for the next century.

It is particularly illuminating of the implications of this opposition whig thought to examine the legacy to it and the continued influence in it of republicanism. The survival in whiggism of republican ideas, that is, demands for a strictly limited executive if not a formal republic, has long been recognized. The contributions of Harrington and other 'classical' republicans particularly, those secular in outlook and influenced above all by classical models - Andrew Marvell, Algernon Sidney, Henry Nevile, John

11. Wormuth, pp. 96-7; Zagorin, p. 163.
Trenchard, Walter Moyle and others - have been examined in detail more recently by J.G.A. Pocock and Caroline Robbins. Pocock draws attention to some fundamental characteristics and concepts of Harrington's thought which, more than his detailed and esoteric utopian schemes, were influential later, particularly his commonwealth of independent freeholders, equated to the citizens of classical times, and his interest in classical and Renaissance writers on mixed government. From him and from the sources directly, his admirers learnt of the causes of degeneration in constitutions, of the virtues of the mixed, balanced constitution, of the constant alertness necessary to prevent the corruption, in the widest sense, which could undermine it, and, from Machiavelli particularly, of the need to return frequently to first principles to preserve it.

However, his view of history, which rejected the Gothic monarchies that followed Rome as inherently unstable, had to be reversed so that it could be reconciled with the ancient constitution and the ancient constitution absorbed into the classical ideal and seen once again as an example of a mixed balanced government. Harrington's view that monarchy must find support for its military followers either in a landed nobility or in bands of household guards and servants, both forms of support being equally unstable, was altered to draw a contrast between support of the monarchy by lords and commons in agreement with the constitution and support by a standing army which would destroy the constitution. His insistence on the necessity of a balance between governmental power and the independence of property, to prevent the encroachment of the former on the latter, is redefined and expanded to maintain the necessity of a jealously-preserved

separation and balance between the power of the crown and that of the organs of independent property owners, lords and commons.  

This adaptation of Harrington's views began, according to Pocock, about 1675 in the circle around the earl of Shaftesbury. The members of parliament to whom Shaftesbury's leadership gave an unusual degree of organization from the late 1670's were first known as the country party. Likewise, the ideological attitudes which he and his pamphleteers developed, largely from Harrington and classical sources, can best be called a country ideology. The name is appropriate not so much because it idealizes the independent country gentleman and appeals to his prejudices as because it claims to represent the interests of the nation at large against a small corrupt faction, the court and its minions, who are conspiring to subvert the constitution and enslave the nation under the forms of law. It sees a basic dichotomy between court and country (or nation) in society, government and within parliament. Its chief characteristic is an intense suspicion of governmental power, stimulated by a growing professionalism in government in the later seventeenth century. The court or administration constantly tends to encroach on the balance of the constitution, to become a monstrous engine of corruption in the wider Machiavellian sense. Against this threat the independent property owners, especially the country gentlemen, must be active in defence of national interests in parliament and outside, particularly in a militia. Above all, the strict independence and separation of the parts of the mixed balanced constitution must be vigorously maintained by constant reference to the first principles to be found in the ancient constitution and through the jealous watchfulness of patriotic individuals and parliament as a whole. Classical influences heightened

15. Ibid., p. 558.
this emphasis on the importance of public spirit and 'virtue', in the sense of service, on the part of enlightened individuals.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus were Harringtonian and classical concepts found adaptable to the needs of the country or whig opposition in appealing for the support of the independents in parliament. Also carried in this developing opposition ideology were other important elements of republican thought described by Caroline Robbins. It paid much attention to the lessons of history, classical and 'Gothic', and was particularly concerned to describe and explain the general decline of liberty seen in Europe over the past two hundred years. Among their proposals to restrict the power of the executive republicans stressed the resistance rights of the people. Everyone had the natural right to discuss, criticize and oppose government and freely to express his views. Earlier republicans proposed specific limitations on the executive and the appointment of special councils or officials to protect the law. As time passed they grew more pragmatic and came to see parliament, with the help of independent judges, fulfilling this role as the guardian of liberties. If parliament was to fulfil this role adequately various reforms would be necessary. The republicans continued to suggest such measures as the ballot, some rectification of constituencies and the franchise and simplification of the law governing elections. In these respects, they later maintained, the Revolution had been deficient.\textsuperscript{18}

The later 1690's saw a further elaboration and strengthening of this modified republican-country ideology. Algernon Sidney's \textit{Discourses Concerning Government}, which perhaps best exemplify this kind of thought, were first published in 1698. John Toland, the deist, published collected editions of the political works of Milton and Harrington and elaborated the cause of liberty in its modified classical republican form in his own


\textsuperscript{18} Robbins, \textit{Republican Tracts}, pp. 43-50, 54-6.
Anglia Libera. The vigorous standing-army controversy of 1697-9, which provoked a greater amount of ephemeral political literature than any issue since the Exclusion crisis, was particularly important. The works of John Trenchard, Walter Moyle, Andrew Fletcher, the Rev. Samuel Johnson and John Toland are, on this question as on others, clearly within the seventeenth-century republican tradition. In elaborating the bogey of a standing army, first posed in the 1670's, their argument is largely concerned with constitutional principles. A standing army threatened the balance of the excellent English constitution, the limitation of the monarchy, the independence of parliament and the subject's right to resist in defence of the laws. Appeals to history and parallel European experience were also elaborated in more detail than hitherto, drawing heavily on Robert Molesworth's *An Account of Denmark* (1693) which studies the process whereby free states succumb to absolutism. It was in this controversy that the picture of England as a haven of liberty to be saved from the remorseless advance of absolutism evident elsewhere was drawn in detail. Andrew Fletcher's *A Discourse of Government with relation to Militias* (1698) contributed particularly to this. Pocock points out that Fletcher is drawing attention to the effect of money on society, and especially the rise of government by money, of the modern state and its administrative bureaucracy, in place of feudal services.¹⁹ Hostility to government by money, to public finance, the national debt and those who held and manipulated it, becomes a marked characteristic of the country attitude, a development of its dislike of professional administration. New forms of public finance added to government's power to induce the co-operation of subjects through patronage

and financial pressure. The arguments of this controversy, so much stronger in opposition to than defence of the standing army, echoed and re-echoed through the eighteenth century in print and in parliamentary debates. There is no doubt that these three years of debate, so much derived from classical republican ideas, are of considerable importance in shaping a major theme of eighteenth-century opposition propaganda. 20

One of the leaders in parliament of the opponents of the standing army was Robert Harley. It is possible to see his political career, sometimes apparently unprincipled and opportunist, given coherence and consistency by very similar country ideas throughout. His correspondence reveals a belief in mixed balanced government, which could represent the interests of the nation as a whole and not some greedy court faction. This led him to resist what he saw as a still-too-powerful royal prerogative in William's reign yet to support the crown against the evils of government by party under Anne. He seems to have been the first to elaborate in detail the reasons why party was reprehensible, although many of the points he makes are to be found among whigs and trimmers in Charles II's reign. Party led men into extremes rather than encouraging the service of the nation. It was the tool of selfish ambitious men whose practices and policies threatened the liberties of the people. It was injurious to the royal prerogative which, properly exercised, was a guarantee of the constitution and liberty. In all, it interfered with the harmonious working of the mixed constitution. 21 Deprecation of party was an almost universal sentiment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but it was particularly strong in opposition thought largely in the form which Harley gives it. It did not, however, always accord easily with the equally strong belief that freedom to express one's opinions was an important part of English liberty and that a

20. Schwoerer, pp. 188, 208-10; Western, pp. 89-90.
variety of opinion invigorated a state, expressed quite frequently by the classical republicans as well as by their mentor, Machiavelli. There was from the first an unresolved, indeed unrecognized ambivalence in country attitudes towards party.

The importance in practical politics of the set of attitudes roughly described as 'country' has been realized for some time. Before the Civil War, and again in the suspicions of Charles II's reign culminating in the Exclusion crisis, some men came to believe that the nation must be protected against a small corrupt oligarchy of favourites at court and their minions, placemen in parliament, that ministers must be forced to govern honestly, economically and with respect for the law and due consultation of parliament, that corruption must be rooted out and, above all, that the constitution, religion and property must be defended. In the intense party controversies of the post-Revolutionary period, substantial numbers of men continued to think in this way and in addition to hate party not only because it disturbed harmony but also because it undermined their independence. Such attitudes continued to be characteristic of the independent country gentlemen of the Hanoverian period.

They have sometimes been dismissed as mere stock political attitudes reflecting superficial and conventional thought, in contrast to whig-tory issues devoid of ideological content. Yet if the ideological roots of these attitudes are appreciated they will be seen as much more interesting and substantial. They are the vehicle by which some important ideas were carried into the eighteenth century. The classical republicans gave to the country tradition its insistence on the strict independence of the parts of the constitution. From them came, too, the classical Harringtonian


ideal of political independence. Their insistence that the Revolution settlement was not final, that there must be further adaptation and continual vigilance to keep the constitution true to its first principles, kept alive, among other things, discussion of parliamentary reform. Concern for the rights of the people to participate in politics and to resist government if necessary also survived strongly. All these ideas were to remain potent through the eighteenth century in opposition propaganda, maintaining a continuous liberal tradition and making that century's political thought much more complex and much less tranquilly dominated by a moderate whig consensus than it is usually represented to have been. For all this the country tradition in its various manifestations and developments was the vehicle.

It was clear by the end of Anne's reign that although the country tradition developed among the whigs as their party identity was forming in the Exclusion crisis it was tied to no one set of party ideas. After the Revolution it was carried on in practical politics chiefly by Harley and his associates in the new country party. Harley's origins and early political loyalties were whig. In the 1690's he regarded himself as old whig as an alternative to country, contrasting himself with the modern whigs of the junto who, he maintained, had dropped old policies and the cause of liberty when power was in sight. This distinction was elaborated by Charles Davenant in A True Picture of a Modern Whig (1701) and reiterated often in the eighteenth century. Yet Harley was listed in some divisions as a tory, certainly courted tory support for his new country group and of course emerged by the next reign as a tory leader. His classical republican and other political associates were variously labelled whig and tory.25

When, in Anne's reign, party issues came to dominate again in place of the court-country conflict of the 1690's, there was no longer a clearly-

defined country group. Yet country attitudes still survived and showed themselves in typical proposals in parliament. Those who supported these measures came from both parties, probably more from the tories than the whigs. Some contemporary whigs still thought of country as merely equivalent to the 'real' or 'staunch' whigs, the 'old whigs' of the 1690's. Yet avowed tories like Sir William Wyndham were among those who supported annual parliaments and the ballot, clear country questions. Indeed one measure that earlier had been and for the first half of the eighteenth century was to continue a country shibboleth, the Landed Qualification Act, was passed largely as a tory government measure in 1711 under St. John's wing. 26

Sometimes the important seventeenth-century ideas in the country ideology have been seen as part of the whig canon, carried into the eighteenth century by 'real' or 'commonwealth' whigs who preserved them from the general torpor which descended when whiggery became official. 27 Yet this view fails to take into account the degree to which such ideas were shared by non-whigs and created genuine constitutional debate in the Hanoverian period. Undoubtedly this sharing was in differing degrees of intensity and explicitness. Classical republican and extreme whig ideas in their purity were kept alive perhaps only by a few brave spirits, mostly coffee-house politicians earlier in the century and not-very-influential literary circles later. They were probably more important in America than in England until they were reimported in the nineteenth century. 28 Yet in modified forms their influence was far wider and more important than this in practical politics and contributed much to the roots of English

27. Notably in Robbins, Commonwealthman.
radicalism without having to be reim imported from abroad. This contribution can be better assessed if these survivals are studied as part of the country tradition transcending party lines.

Some Hanoverian Developments of the Country Tradition

The first important and influential exposition of opposition ideology in the Hanoverian period belongs clearly to the 'real' whig, republican inheritance. In the unsettled early years of the Hanoverians John Trenchard of the standing army controversy again took up his pen on political questions, in collaboration with a much younger colleague, Thomas Gordon. From 1719 to 1723 they co-operated, first in writing the Independent Whig, a weekly publication which came out throughout 1720. Except for the manifesto which preceded it, The Character of an Independent Whig, it deals mainly with religious questions, being strongly anti-clerical and in favour of the rights of dissenters. Then from late 1720 Trenchard and Gordon contributed regular letters to the London Journal over the signature of Cato. Some deal exclusively with contemporary political issues but others show as well a keen concern for general questions. The unusual quality and influence of these letters, which continued in the Journal until Walpole bought over the paper's proprietor late in 1722 and then until July 1723 in the British Journal, can be judged by the controversy they aroused and by their frequent republication in collected form later in the century. 29

Cato's Letters can justly claim to be written in the 'great cause of liberty', the nature and virtues of which the headings of many of the letters trumpet aloud. Liberty, widely defined, is an inalienable right of all mankind. Tyranny, its opposite, is drawn in lurid colours. In face of this inalienable liberty, governments have only limited powers. Divine

right is unequivocally rejected. Governments are created by men for the
general good and can be called to account for breach of trust by the
people who set them up. The judgement of the people is generally to be
relied on in political matters and the free speech essential to its
exercise is defended in face of the restrictions of the law of libel. 30

Power, however, has an 'encroaching Nature' and is 'ever to be
watched and checked'. It threatens particularly in the form of corruption
(of morality and manners in the wider sense as well as politically),
through ambition, faction, the designs of wicked ministers, standing armies.
Such abuse of power can be prevented only by the most careful watchfulness
and by proper measures and devices, such as frequent elections and
rotation in office. 31

This writing, thus baldly described, is clearly 'country' in its fear
of power and devotion to liberty but more specifically 'real' whig of the
appeal to reason, nature and natural rights genre. It is also obviously
of the classical republican tradition. The debt to Sidney particularly
and the influence of Harrington are clear. Specific devices of the
republicans such as rotation in office are still being put forward.
Trenchard and Gordon show their typical admiration of liberty preserved
in England while it was being lost everywhere else, and a strong interest
in the classics. Indeed Gordon was to do much to perpetuate in the
eighteenth century the drawing of political lessons from the classics,
especially from the crucial period of the decline of the Roman Republic,
by his very influential translations of Tacitus and Sallust. 32

30. See especially Letters 15, 32, 62-8, 71, 73, 100, 101 in ed. Jacobson,
32. Ibid., pp. xxix -xxx, xxxiii-iv, xlvii-vi, lxiii-iv, Letter 84,
pp. 210-5.
Yet these writers have some distinctive characteristics. They have much to say on religious controversy and so little on the two topics which figure so prominently in most other writing of this tradition: the virtues of mixed government and of the ancient English constitution. When they discuss necessary limits on government they do not expound the virtues of a mixed balanced constitution, although they adopt an Aristotelian classification of constitutions. They refer occasionally to the excellent 'ancient Constitution of England' and to 'Heaven and our worthy Ancestors' who have better secured liberties in England than they are safeguarded elsewhere. Yet they never dwell on historical argument. In so far as they use history they do so to exemplify rational principles of government, or to circumvent the laws of libel by criticizing past ages in obvious parallel to the present. They have very little to say particularly about the English constitution. The tone of argument is above all abstract and rational. In their timeless and general quality as well as in some turns of argument they are strongly reminiscent of Locke.

There seems no doubt that these pieces of ephemeral political literature were widely influential in England in the first half of the eighteenth century and perhaps were even more so in America, then and later. They helped to preserve at the popular level of political propaganda the extreme whiggery of opposition rather than government, and to bring this strand into the Hanoverian opposition or country rhetoric. Yet, although they can be regarded as standing at one extreme of the political spectrum, their ideas and sometimes their actual words were taken up by the next and in some ways very different major vehicle of the country tradition, the Craftsman.

33. Ibid., pp. 64-5, 122, Letters 75, 76, pp. 201-10, 213.
34. Ibid., pp. xlviii-1x.
The Craftsman was, of course, the main publicity organ of the opposition to Walpole.\textsuperscript{35} The very length of time that Walpole was in office and the vehemence of the opposition which, for various reasons, he aroused, make his period an important one in establishing the main lines of opposition debate. The opposition, of varied origins and motives and never entirely united, was stamped with its particular propaganda tone by Bolingbroke and the able literary circle that gathered around him, including Pope, Gay, Swift and Lyttelton.\textsuperscript{36}

There are some good reasons for regarding Bolingbroke's political attitudes as belonging to the opposite political extreme to those of Trenchard and Gordon. The predominant impulse was an aristocratic nostalgia for a patriarchal landed society without the disrupting influences of commerce and finance which, in Bolingbroke's view, had virtually created a new political and social order since 1688. Salvation was sought most strikingly in the admittedly unrealistic dream of a patriot king, or, more realistic but conservative or even reactionary, in the vision of the leadership of young aristocrats, rather than in a new rationalist vision of society and government based on contract. Indeed the political philosophy behind the propaganda, the thinking about the origins of political society and government and about natural law, belongs to a stream of criticism of Locke and other whig individualistic and egalitarian thinkers whom Trenchard and Gordon would have accepted. Bolingbroke's political philosophy is conservative and traditional, aristocratic and hierarchical, rejecting liberal contractualist views on grounds of their artificiality.

\textsuperscript{35} The Craftsman... was founded in Dec. 1726 and conducted by Nicholas Amhurst. Its first forty-four numbers, consisting of an essay only, were published twice weekly. With the forty-fifth (13 May 1727) it changed its title to The Country Journal; or, the Craftsman and became a weekly in journal form. Morison, pp. 109-11.

\textsuperscript{36} The most useful study of this circle is Kramnick's, but H.T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke, London, 1970, ch. 11, is also useful. Two of Bolingbroke's most important works, A Dissertation upon Parties (1733-4) and Remarks on the History of England (1730-1), first appeared in the Craftsman and he probably wrote other essays for it. Kramnick, pp. 18-9 and fn. 43.
and lack of concordance with sociological and psychological facts.  

Yet at the level of political polemics, of propaganda about current politics in search of political support, where the concern is with the actual machinery and workings of government rather than with its origins and nature, these differences of impulse and political philosophy had surprisingly little effect. In this context, contract language is not necessarily a philosophical explanation of the origins of government but a comment on how it should work. Preoccupation with a mixed balanced constitution arises from the same kind of concern about which governments work best. It is with this level of political thinking that both the classical republicans and Bolingbroke in his opposition to Walpole are concerned. At this level Bolingbroke has so much in common with Trenchard and Gordon as to throw grave doubts on the validity and usefulness of the notion of a spectrum of political ideas stretching between whig and tory antitheses. It is therefore useful and revealing to consider Bolingbroke as a major contributor to the development of country-opposition thought, keeping alive, developing, settling its lines of argument at the mid-point in the century of its significance and giving rise to considerable constitutional debate - indeed as 'the last and most spectacular of the neo-Harringtonians'.  

Bolingbroke's debts to Machiavelli and his less frequently observed debt to Harrington take him back to some of the main sources of the tradition. He shared the fear of government by money characteristic of country attitudes since the late seventeenth century and greatly strengthened

by developments arising out of the long wars of Anne, the Bank crisis of 1710 and the South Sea bubble of 1720. His vision of a society and political structure based on the independent landed man, master of his household and set in the English social hierarchy, and his equation of the citizen with the independent owner of real property are both Aristotelian and Harringtonian in inspiration and fundamental to the neo-Harringtonian point of view. 39

The terms and lines of Bolingbroke's debates with Walpole's publicists are those of country against court and demonstrate both the continuity and the development of the traditional lines of controversy. The superiority of a mixed balanced constitution is accepted by both sides. Yet Bolingbroke's approach, determined by the distrust of power characteristic of the country tradition, is to insist on the independence of the parts to the fullest extent allowed by the constitution. Because this independence was not sufficiently provided for at the Revolution, further measures are necessary to protect the freedom and ensure the frequency of elections, which should be annual or at the least triennial, and to guarantee the independence of members once elected by strict exclusion of placemen. Walpole's defenders, on the other hand, emphasize the necessity of some dependence among the parts of the constitution in order to make government possible and to enable the crown to fulfil its executive role. 40

The methods by which Walpole's government sought to secure the 'necessary' dependence of the legislature raises for Bolingbroke the ogre of corruption, one of his predominant preoccupations. He is concerned not just with court influence over the house of commons, nor only with political corruption generally, but with these as part of the corruption

of society in the widest sense. Traditional social values as well as the established balance of landed property and power in the constitution are being threatened by economic and financial developments and the emergence of new forms of wealth. The degeneration of manners as the result of the growth of luxury and a mercenary attitude is leading to the decline of public spirit. This in turn threatens liberty, which can survive only if the people are alert, and makes political corruption easier. Only a general reform of morals and manners and a revival of public spirit can save Britain from the fate of Rome. 41

These arguments about the present state of the constitution are illustrated by appeals to history in which, again, Bolingbroke is firmly in the ancient constitution, neo-Harringtonian tradition. He sees the ancient constitution perfected under Elizabeth, threatened again in the seventeenth century and secured at the Revolution, although not completely against new threats which have since arisen. Walpole's propagandists, on the other hand, using the material and arguments of seventeenth-century tory historians, mock at the ideas of a continuous history of liberty and of the ancient constitution. Instead, they regard real liberty and the balanced constitution as having been established at the Revolution and to be defended not by an appeal to history but according to the timeless principles of reason and nature. 42

These were the main lines of the constitutional debates of the period. From these major concerns other issues arose. The evils of monopolizing ministers are expatiated upon and the charge of being a 'prime minister' is one of those levelled at Walpole. 43 The evils of a standing army are

analysed. Further, it is argued that if parliament is to be truly independent of court influence it should be kept close to the people, through frequent elections and through close relations between members and their constituents. Like other trustees or delegates the people's representatives are answerable to their principals and should accept instructions from them. Against this, supporters of the government stress the more established line of argument that members once elected represent the whole nation and are not bound to the views of one set of constituents.

Here the argument over the relations of members and constituents raises the wider question of the role of the people in the constitution. To accept Bolingbroke's views, argue the government propagandists, would be to upset the balance of the constitution and turn it into a democracy. The whole body of the people have a part only in the initial establishment of government. Once this is done their authority passes to the institutions they have established, to be resumed only at elections or in dire emergency circumstances. The Craftsman, on the other hand, argues for a much more continuous involvement of the people, not just their representatives, in politics through frequent election and through close relations with their delegate members of parliament. In their watchfulness and vigour lie the fundamental safeguards of the constitution; they have the right to be informed about political matters and to resist if government errs; only if they are degenerate and corrupt will the constitution be lost.

Out of Bolingbroke's fundamental distrust of power and insistence on the independence, watchfulness and vigour of parliament and people comes an important twist to accepted attitudes on party in politics. Bolingbroke is usually regarded, with some reason, as a prominent exponent of the distaste for party divisions which was a stock eighteenth-century attitude by no means confined to opposition propagandists. However, because he maintains that power is always dangerous and especially that the constitution is threatened by contemporary methods of government, he calls on men inside parliament and out to act in defence of the constitution. He sees that effective action requires something like party unanimity. So he comes to draw more sharply the distinction between party, which is acceptable, and faction, which is not. When men act together on principle for the national interest their activities are justified. If their conception of the national interest is an accurate one they may be regarded as the nation in action, rather than just one part of it. Furthermore, the temptations of power and the proclivities of governments mean that such a party is likely to be in opposition. Indeed, opposition is often essential to the health of the constitution. Even a good government needs to be reminded of its purpose; a mere change of men and not measures is not enough.

Bolingbroke was able to defend opposition, contrary to eighteenth-century convention, because he makes two important related distinctions: between the constitution and the government of the day so that the government can be opposed without disloyalty to the constitution; and between the king, who is a part of the constitution and therefore cannot be personally opposed, and his ministers who are merely members of the government. The two distinctions, together with Bolingbroke's basic

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47. Parties, Works, III, especially pp. 35-139.
presuppositions, lead him to make, in his justification of opposition, an important contribution to the development of British attitudes to the constitution, while the distinction between party and faction, not original to Bolingbroke but elaborated by him, opened one way to reconcile some of the ambiguities in the country attitude to party.49

This useful clarification and development of attitudes to organized and united activity in politics arises from the distrust of power fundamental to the country tradition. In its main lines Bolingbroke's extensive political propaganda is clearly within that tradition and helped to establish it as a major component of eighteenth-century political controversy. His writings show something of the liberal aspect of this polemic and particularly how it kept alive, despite all the admiration of the mixed balanced constitution and its triumvirate of king, lords and commons, some interest in the 'people' outside these formally constituted bodies. However vaguely defined the notion of the 'people' and whatever the motives of the appeal, the survival of such ideas is important. Yet the liberal side of the tradition of opposition rhetoric is somewhat muted in Bolingbroke by his nostalgia for the aristocratic past, his concern for social hierarchy, and his conservative political philosophy. It is muted even more by the solution he propounds for the crisis of the constitution. His Harringtonian analysis of the effects of the development of new forms of property on the balance of political power leads him into a pessimism about the future of the constitution from which he sees no escape. Caught in this impasse, he relapses from Harrington to Machiavelli. In the end, he does not propose structural changes, either social or political, to remedy Britain's corruption as Harrington might have done.

49. Parties, Works, III, pp. 6, 157-8; Kramnick, pp. 153-63. Bolingbroke's justification of opposition, like his distinction between party and faction, was not unique to him (see e.g. The Sentiments of a Tory, 1741, printed in Donald J. Greene, The Politics of Samuel Johnson, New Haven, 1960, pp. 275-6 and Robbins, "Discordant Parties", p. 533) but his was probably the most influential exposition.
Instead, in his last and most famous work, written in 1739 and not published until 1749, he explains the corruption in Machiavellian terms of the inherent tendency in human nature as in other things to degenerate, and proposes as the only saviour of a totally corrupt people the near-miracle of a patriot king. In fact Bolingbroke has no realistic remedy for the crisis of the constitution. Because of his profound pessimism he is fundamentally unconstructive. Britain's salvation depends on miracles and exceptional good fortune. In this relapse into humanist dreaming in face of inexorable economic and political changes, much of the radical impulse behind the country rhetoric is lost. The emphasis on the people is nullified when they are regarded as totally corrupt and unable to save themselves. Only a reactionary backward-looking radicalism of the right remains. 50

That the same framework of ideas continued to be held with different emphasis is shown in the career and beliefs of Sir Francis Dashwood and his closest political associates, William, second Baron Talbot, and Philip, second Earl Stanhope. 51 Their political beliefs sprang from typical country-republican assumptions. They insist on the importance of preserving the balance of the parts of the mixed constitution. They share to the full that suspicion of the designs and ambitions of ministers which is typical of the tradition. 'Ministerial Power is therefore only to be dreaded and guarded against [in the interests of liberty] with the utmost Care, Prudence, and Vigilance. Their Schemes and Measures are to be entertained with great Caution and Jealousy, and all unconstitutional Acts punished with the greatest Severity...' wrote one independent in 1747. In the same year

50. Kramnick, pp. 35, 36, 166-9. The hope for a great legislator and leader, a patriot king, was not entirely foreign to the classical republican tradition. Kramnick, p. 165.
in his own Address to electors Dashwood uses similar language recurringly.\footnote{52}{Ibid., pp. 2-3 (the quotation), 18, 160, 162.}

The basic tenet of their creed as independents is that the house of commons' task is to criticize, limit and control government so that it may be duly subordinated. If the house is to fulfil this task then it and its members must be independent, both of government influence and of party. This independence, they thought, had been largely undermined by developments since 1689 and especially since 1714, notably the use of patronage to build up government support. The necessary reforms, repeal of the Septennial Act and frequent, preferably annual, elections, with further regulation or abolition of places tenable with a seat in parliament, are presented as a restoration of the true constitution, of its 'Frame', 'Spirit', 'Beauty' and 'Harmony'. Dashwood's Address of 1747 calls for the imposition of pledges on candidates to support these necessary measures. He was prepared to pursue them even in the crisis of 1745, on the typical country argument that at such a crisis domestic reform was most necessary to win the support of the people. Dashwood's Address also called for the establishment of a militia so that the 'ante-constitutional [sic] Tool of Power, a Standing Army', could be abolished in peacetime. He actively campaigned for this as for other reforms and in 1745 drafted a bill, the main lines of which were repeated in the bill of 1756 and the Act of 1757.\footnote{53}{Ibid., pp. 2-4, 10, 23-4, 26-7, 161-3 (the quotation is from p. 162). Cf. Talbot's explanation of his independence, and Stanhope's Declaration of 1751, ibid., pp. 19, 164-7.}

In the language in which they support these specific reforms Dashwood and his associates are true to the tradition. They speak in glowing terms of the blessings of liberty, they have an exaggerated belief in the extent and significance of political corruption and general depravity in contemporary Britain and they express grave concern about the future.
of the nation. They call for swift and vigorous action to save the country from impending doom.  

The most striking feature of their political creed, however, is the extent to which liberal ideas on 'the people' are present in it. Talbot and Stanhope restate in clear terms the belief that government is instituted by compact for the good of the people, is based on their acquiescence and involves properly as little curtailment of their liberty as possible. In a limited monarchy, says Talbot, 'the majesty is in the people'. The king owes his title to their election and is their servant, subject to the law as they are. This is perhaps little more than an explicit statement of generally accepted whig theory. The practical consequences they draw from the theory were not so generally accepted. In the classical republican tradition they insist on the vital importance of public spirit and vigour among the people in constant defence of the constitution. The independence of the house of commons and its members they call for is not independence from the people. Again in the tradition, they insist on close relations between the people and their representatives. Frequent elections are desirable not only to conform with ancient usage nor merely to reduce dependence on the court, but also to secure 'the proper Dependency of Deputies on their Principals'. Members are 'properly speaking, the Attornies of the people'. Dashwood argues for the demanding of pledges from candidates at elections not just to get support for the reforms he regards as essential but because the electors have the right 'to make Terms on behalf of yourselves and the Nation, with those you constitute and appoint to represent you'. Both Talbot and Stanhope include freedom of the press prominently among their constitutional principles. Stanhope ranks it with frequent parliaments, place bills and a militia,

54. Ibid., pp. 159-63, 164-7.
calling it an inestimable blessing, of the greatest utility in preserving liberty and property and informing the people. 55 Altogether, the consent of the governed is not expressed only in some long-distant compact, but in their continuous activity and in reference to them. Again these views are not new, but rather firmly in the tradition. What is noteworthy is their continued survival, after the final pessimism of Bolingbroke, and the renewed emphasis and sincerity with which they were expounded and supported by men of some standing in political circles.

Dashwood was variously labelled by contemporaries as tory, jacobite, republican and whig. The opprobrious label jacobite was undeservedly incurred because Dashwood's persistent advocacy of constitutional reform and strict inquiry into governmental conduct, regardless of national circumstances, seemed to suggest that he was no friend to the present establishment. The prince of Wales' use of the term republican is perhaps justified by the extent to which Dashwood and his associates shared the modified classical republican tradition. The description which is most appropriate is that Dashwood and his associates would probably have chosen themselves. They were 'real' or 'old' whig of 1688-89 vintage or earlier, as distinct from the nominal whigs who in government had betrayed the principles of whiggery. 56

Yet there was some excuse for calling Dashwood a tory, as historians as well as contemporaries have done, for the country ideology and rhetoric still crossed party lines, such as they were, as it had done earlier in the century. Its attitudes were shared and its programme supported by men who were called tory more properly than Dashwood and who accepted the

55. Ibid., pp. 18 and fn. 1 (first quotation), 23 (third quotation), 160, 162 (fourth quotation), 164, 165 (second quotation), 166.
56. Ibid., pp. 15-16, 17-25, 34; Namier and Brooke, II, p. 300.
label. It was the rhetoric and ideology of opposition not that of a party. Whether its proponents called themselves whig or tory seems to have been largely a matter of family tradition and association, especially in the case of the tories. 57

Nevertheless, the party names were not entirely without meaning. There were real differences between Dashwood and his friends and the tories, differences which the attempts to form a united opposition brought out. The tories would not accept Stanhope's Declaration of 1751 at least partly because of its emphasis on the people's rights as the basis of its programme. Even less would they have liked Dashwood's 1747 Address with its support of pledges. This difference in the sentiments behind their common programme and behaviour probably reflects differences in underlying political philosophy similar to those between Bolingbroke and Trenchard and Gordon. Those of a more conservative bent were perhaps more inclined, like Bolingbroke, to put their reliance on a great legislator or leader, a patriot prince, rather than on structural reforms or the vigour of the people. 58

Unfortunately there is no manifesto of the tories comparable to that of Stanhope which could clarify the differences. There is, however, one sharp distinction in attitude which seems to coincide with these. On the question of religion, those with a whig outlook within the country tradition were much more favourable to, and indeed active in support of, further concessions to the dissenters than were the tories who vigorously asserted the position of the established church. 59

The 'old whig' and tory labels are thus of some use in distinguishing differences of emphasis within the country tradition. Yet the difference is no more than one of emphasis, a liberal or a conservative bias according to taste and temperament, sharpest over religion and not nearly so clear on constitutional questions. The labels must not be taken to suggest an absolute distinction of opposite political poles. The common programme of measures on which all could agree is probably indicated in the prince of Wales's declaration of 1748. Furthermore, the particular slant with which the country attitudes were held by individuals in the middle of the century did not determine the ways in which they were to develop their views and make use of the ideology later. Thus the distinction of emphasis cannot carry too much weight. In the end it was the ideology as a whole rather than differences of basic political philosophy among those who held it that was influential.

The 'lamentations on the ruin of England', in Horace Walpole's phrase, the concern for contemporary degeneration and the predominance of commercial values, and nostalgia for past times, pervade much of the general literature of the early eighteenth century. The mood is to be seen without any popular bias and sometimes tainted with bitter misanthropy in the writings of Swift. Pope and Gay satirized the new England and Walpole's politics and praised the old social order, while Pope looked for salvation from a patriot king. Lyttelton's Persian Letters see England's history and constitution in Bolingbroke's terms. James Thomson's poems,

60. Proposals carried from H[is] R[oyal] H[ighness], By Lord Talbot and Sir Francis Dashwood to -, 8 Feb. 1748, Correspondence of...Bedford, I, pp. 320-2. Bolingbroke has so much in common with Trenchard and Gordon or Dashwood that it obscures more than it illuminates to describe him as expressing the tory reaction to the new whig world of post-1688, as does Kranmick, p. 110, but more especially his reviewer in the Times Literary Supplement, 10 Apr. 1969, pp. 377-8.

Britannia (1729) and Liberty (1735-36), are major statements of the
country ideology, especially on liberty and the current state of the
constitution. The intensity to which the denunciation of corruption could
rise is shown at a lesser literary level in the perfervid early work of
James Burgh, Britain's Remembrancer: or, The Danger Not Over..., written
in the shadow of the 'forty-five. The works of the most commonly read
historian of the time, the Huguenot exile, Rapin de Thoyras, who came to
England finally with William III, gave their support to the ideology. His
History of England, published in England between 1725 and 1731, was the
standard work before Hume's in the middle of the century, which was written
at least partly to correct Rapin's extreme whiggish bias. Rapin's work was
a vast storehouse of proofs over one thousand years of the country view
of English history and a paean of praise of mixed government, stressing
the continuity of English liberties from their Germanic origins in Anglo-
Saxon days. Its main points had already been outlined in 1717 in his
A Dissertation on the ... Whigs and Tories.63

The rhetoric was, however, not only for pamphlets, newspapers and
coffee-houses but also erupted into the centre of practical politics, for
example over the Septennial Act, the peerage bill, the South Sea bubble,
the excise, the fall of Walpole, the Jewish Naturalization Act, the
upheavals of 1755-57. The 'old' whigs as well as the country tories
created many difficulties for Walpole in the 1730's.64 Questions
concerning the freedom and frequency of elections, the qualifications of

62. Kramnick, ch. VIII (the Walpole quotation is from p. 205); Bailyn,
pp. 49, 86-7; Alan D. McKillop, 'The Background of Thomson's Liberty',
The Rice Institute Pamphlet, XXXVIII, 2, 1951, especially pp. 1, 18-21,
41-58, 74-85, 86-100.

63. Herbert Butterfield, 'Narrative History and the Spade-work behind it',
History, LIII, June 1966, p. 170; A.R. Myers, 'Richard III and Historical
Tradition', History, LIII, June 1968, pp. 189-90; Weston, p. 7.

64. See e.g. Kemp, King and Commons, pp. 39-43; ed. John F. Naylor, The
British Aristocracy and the Peerage Bill of 1719, London, 1968, especially
ch. III; Kramnick, pp. 68-70; E. Raymond Turner, 'The Excise Scheme of 1733',
English Historical Review, XLII, 1927 pp. 34-57; Kendrick, passim;
Perry, especially chs VI, VII.
members of parliament and further regulation of places and pensions quite
frequently arose in parliament both then and earlier and later. From the
1740's the need for militia reform was discussed. Debates on these issues
turned mainly on constitutional themes: the powers of government and the
liberties of the people, the relationships of the parts of the constitution,
relations between members and their constituents, the propriety of outside
pressures on parliament and the publication of parliamentary debates, the
freedom of the press. At times of crisis, too, the debates could
stimulate action outside parliament. At least some of the political nation
responded to urgings to protest against the excise in 1733. The
instructions and petitions of the crises of 1739-41 and of 1756 demand the
essentials of the country programme, the restoration of the independence
of parliaments by place and pension bills and reduction of influence over
elections, shorter parliaments and a militia to replace the standing army.
The country ideology, thus, was no mere literary rhetoric divorced from
political realities, but the language of everyday debate.

This survey of some eighteenth-century developments makes it clear
that some grasp of the importance of this tradition of thought as well as
action and attitudes conveniently labelled 'country' is essential to the
understanding of the constitutional and political debate of the time.

Shaped in the stormy controversies of the middle and later seventeenth

65. On motions and discussion in parliament see e.g. Kemp, King and Commons,
pp. 49-50; Dashwood, p. 20; Dickinson, pp. 193-230; Sedgwick, House of
Commons, pp. 42, 45; Helen E. Witmer, The Property Qualifications of
reform see Western, especially chs IV,V. On discussion of the
publication of debates and freedom of the press see Nichol Smith, pp.
353-6; Parliamentary History, X, cc. 800-12; Hanson, pp. 21-2;
Frederick Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776,
Urbana, 1952, pp. 382-3. On relations of members with their constituents
see above fn. 45 and below fn. 71.

45-6; Rudé, pp. 15-6; Sutherland, 'The City...1756-7', pp. 153-4.
century, the tradition had acquired its distinctive cast by its turn and continued strongly in the next. It is the cause of patriotism in the eighteenth-century sense, of those who believed they had the true interests of the nation at heart. Its foundations are a deep distrust of power born of seventeenth-century experience, and a high evaluation of liberty. To check the one and preserve the other a mixed, carefully balanced constitution, its parts kept independent, is the best form of government. As the tradition learnt from Machiavelli, however, the constitution must be constantly renewed by reference to its first principles. It is not yet in the country view, even after the Revolution, sufficiently protected against dangers, especially against new encroachments on the strict independence of its parts. The basic suspicion of governmental power is now concentrated on ministers who manipulate these new threats, on their secret cabals and 'cabinet councils' which illicitly overshadow the constitutional meeting place of the king's advisers, the privy council. Ministers are the more easily attacked as villains because they can be represented as somewhat outside the tripartite mixed constitution, a kind of fourth estate unknown to it. The most dangerous threat which they wield is corruption in its varied forms. Political corruption threatens the proper exercise of the supervisory checking powers of parliament. Social and moral corruption, the undermining of traditional values, saps the vigour of the people and is thus equally a danger to the constitution. Corruption is thus viewed in the wide Machiavellian-Polybian sense of dependence leading to degeneration of the balanced constitution.

67. For the eighteenth-century use of the word patriot see Kemp, 'Patriotism', pp. 38-9.


69. Clarendon first helped to establish this idea, which became a persistent attitude in late seventeenth-century as well as eighteenth-century debates and is expressed, of course, in the Act of Settlement (Clause III). Dailyn, pp. 124-6; Kemp, 'Patriotism', p. 38; A.H. Dodd, The Growth of Responsible Government from James the First to Victoria, London, 1956, p. 64.

The best defence against the encroachments of power and the threat of degeneration is the energy of the people in protecting the constitution and supervising their governors. The term 'the people' is usually undefined, and it is generally clear by implication that a restricted definition is intended. Nevertheless, important liberal ideas were kept alive by this usage, the more so because of the very vagueness of definition which made it capable of easy, even unconscious extension. The ideas were the more influential in that they were diffused widely in the ideology and not confined to extreme fringe groups. Further, the tradition promoted a programme of specific reforms, envisaged as bringing the constitution back to its ideal state, protecting the independence of parliament and people and incidentally keeping very much alive the idea that the current house of commons was far from perfect. It also promoted, especially in the eighteenth century, a challenge to accepted ideas on the relations between members of parliament and their constituents which stressed the control of the latter. In some of the supporters of the tradition and in varying degrees of explicitness, the insistence on the need to supervise government leads to a justification of opposition which marks a significant change in ideas on party. As the emphasis moved from the need to ensure the harmonious working of the parts of the mixed constitution to the importance of supervision and control so the way opened for a justification of party in closer accord with fundamental ideas on liberty than the usual blanket condemnation.

Perhaps the most striking feature of this rhetoric of constitutional criticism is the mood of foreboding and pessimism about the contemporary state of the constitution, the overwhelming sense of the fragility of liberty in face of the aggressive expansionist tendencies of power, which

71. See above p. 500 fn. 45: Sidney and Toland, in the seventeenth-century republican tradition, had propounded more or less the accepted view. Alfred De Grazia, Public and Republic, New York, 1951, pp. 29, 36; Kemp, King and Commons, p. 44; Kramnick, p. 173. It was the case of the Kentish petitioners, in 1701, that first stimulated the country challenge to it. Gooch, p. 296.
is so deeply part of the tradition that it cannot be dismissed as mere
cant. Certainly it is held with such conviction that in favourable
'circumstances it could be a driving force behind the development of the
tradition and its explosion into action.\textsuperscript{72}

The long and vigorous life of these attitudes, which became the natural
and habitual language of opposition for a century or more after the 1670's,
can be explained by their ability to reflect varied reactions to
exclusion, voluntary or otherwise, from close association with government.\textsuperscript{73}
The ideology is obviously very adaptable to the purposes of ambitious
politicians, a convenient platform for attack on the government and an easy
way to popularity. This is perhaps why Bolingbroke adopted it. Yet although
it could be cynically used for expediency's sake it was undoubtedly
strongly and sincerely held by many of its proponents. It could express
the backward-looking nostalgia of the country gentleman innocent of the
realities of politics and the bewilderment of those who had lost their
bearings, politically or socially, in changing times, as well as it could
serve the ambitions of frustrated politicians. It was the very \textit{raison
d'\'etre} of the convinced independent who felt it his duty to hold himself
aloof from the shady processes of government which he could barely under-
stand. Yet nostalgia and reaction were not the only motives behind the
tradition. Equally it could express the suspicions and resentments of
classes and sections of the population feeling increasingly aggrieved at
their exclusion from adequate political influence and at odds with the
classes who had such influence. For these reasons it was strong throughout
the century among the 'middling sort' of the City of London.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} This summary of the characteristics of the country tradition owes much
to Bailyn, pp. 45-51 and ch. III, especially pp. 55-85, but the tradition
was more pervasive and influential than he suggests, pp. 51, 54.

\textsuperscript{73} On the country rhetoric as the vocabulary of alienation see J.G.A.
Pocock reviewing Kramnick, \textit{Journal of Modern History}, XLIV, 2, June 1970,
pp. 252-3, 254.

\textsuperscript{74} Sutherland, 'The City...in...Politics', p. 58; \textit{The City...1768-1774}, p.7.
social and economic conditions of a prosperous and rapidly developing
city and political conditions which gave a share in City government to
a wide range of its citizens were not favourable to the hierarchical
outlook and the assumed social superiority of the dominant landed classes.

Because the ideology was that of groups and classes on the edge of
politics rather than at their heart its view of the constitution
undoubtedly was divorced from the political realities of making it work
under the Hanoverians. Yet it is none the less important for its lack of
realism. It was indeed a deeply entrenched and very much alive habit of
thought of pervasive influence. Whig and tory disputes might have lost
much of their relevance in the earlier Hanoverian period but it was not as
a consequence without strong ideological divisions. These suggest that
behind its superficial constitutional calm, its evident political
stable, there was wider dissatisfaction with the current state of the
constitution and with the 'lax political pragmatism' of post-1714 politics
than is usually recognized.75

The Monitor's Debt to the Country Tradition

Clearly the Monitor belongs squarely within this country ideological
tradition. In its explanation of the origins of the constitution and
definition of its nature the paper illustrates the mainstream eighteenth-
century amalgam of contract-ancient constitution-mixed monarchy ideas.
The notion of contract is not usually fully or exactly explored, but
rather used in passing to insist that the origin of all power lies with
the people and to justify action on their part. On the one occasion when
it is analysed with state of nature preliminaries and some hint of natural

75. The widespread jacobite learnings Sedgwick has uncovered at least in the
early Hanoverian decades suggest the same conclusion. House of Commons,
I, pp. 62-78.
rights, Hooker is quoted. Certainly the Monitor is more interested in the specific characteristics of the British constitution than in universally applicable general principles. In investigating the former it makes a strong appeal to history. The basis of its appeal is never explicitly stated but it appears to be of the eighteenth- rather than the seventeenth-century kind, exemplifying rather than conferring right. In elaborating its description of the constitution as a mixed monarchy the Monitor often seems clearly to echo some of the prominent documents in seventeenth-century controversy, showing, if not a direct debt, how firmly and widely held the ideas derived from the formative period of the amalgam had become.

The Monitor shows a more specifically country twist to its attitudes in its insistence on the importance of frequent return to first principles to avoid degeneration and its emphasis that the task of forming and protecting the constitution is a continuing one. Its country bent becomes even more obvious when it elaborates on specific issues and the functioning of particular parts of the constitution. In fact it displays all the major country characteristics and the general parallels to the tradition are so obvious as to need little further emphasis. Even its uneasiness within the mixed monarchy framework, its assertion of control at the expense of independence, is at least implied in the tradition. So too, for example, are its ambiguities on party. It is possible, however, to elucidate its debt to the tradition more specifically than merely alluding to general parallels, by taking up the clues provided by the quotations with

77. The king's Answer to the XIX Propositions and particularly two parliamentary replies to it, Philip Hunton's Treatise of Monarchie and the anonymous Political Catechism. Weston, pp. 7, 36-40, 92, 263-5, 269-79.
78. See above pp.448-9, 477-8.
which each paper is headed and by the references occasionally made in
the text of the essays. Sometimes, too, unattributed borrowings can be
detected. Such a necessarily haphazard method will not yield a comprehensive
list of the Monitor's sources. The results, nevertheless, are of some
interest in illuminating the extent and nature of the Monitor's debt.

It may be that the Monitor's Machiavellian ideas, the most important
of which is the insistence on the need to return to first principles, came
in part directly from the new English edition of Machiavelli's works which
appeared in 1762. Certainly approving references to Machiavelli are
quite frequent (although the adjective Machiavellian is used pejoratively),
his influence is more noticeable in the latter part of the paper's life,
and he is quoted at the head of a paper on foreign policy in 1764. Any
direct influence would merely reinforce, of course, the strong Machiavellian
elements to be derived from the main sources of country thought. The
authors of the paper certainly knew, for example, the works of Sir
Charles Davenant, an economist and statistician of the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries who also wrote extensively on politics and
was 'one of the era's keenest Machiavellians'. The paper appeals to him
at one stage with Machiavelli on the need for wisdom in princes, and the
following essay on the same theme is signed D'Avenant as well as quoting
from him. He is not explicitly referred to again but it is likely that
he was a source of the Monitor's Machiavellian lines of thought. More
particularly the paper was probably indebted to him on two typical country

79. See below pp. 534-5.

80. *The Works of Nicholas Machiavel... newly translated from the originals
by Ellis Farnworth*, 2 vols, ... London, 1762. The Monitor 150, 3 June
1758; 378 (spurious) 16 Oct. 1762; 398, 19 Mar. 1763; 474, 1 Sep.
1764; 475, 8 Sep. 1764; 478, 29 Sep. 1764; 479, 6 Oct. 1764; 480
13 Oct. 1764; 486, 24 Nov. 1764. The only hostile reference is 83, 19
Feb. 1757, although the adjective is used pejoratively in 27, 7 Feb.
1756; 356, 15 May 1762.

81. Kramnick, pp. 164 (the quotation), 237-43; Pocock, 'English Political
Ideologies', p. 577; Gooch, pp. 187-9; the Monitor 475, 8 Sep. 1764;
476, 15 Sep. 1764.
themes. He was one of the first to take up the appeal from the new whigs in office, who have betrayed their principles, to the old. The Monitor makes very similar accusations and indeed parallels Davenant's suggestion that this betrayal of principle is particularly dangerous because no one will suspect patriots and favourites of the people of such treachery. Then there is a close similarity in the development of ideas about ministers, especially prime ministers or favourites, and the dangers they pose. Indeed the paper which quotes Davenant uses one of his examples of favourites in the past who have fallen from great heights - Wolsey.

One of the Monitor's references to the Machiavellian notion of a return to first principles to avoid degeneration occurs in a paper which begins with a plea for the publication of the sentiments of Sir William Temple on popular discontents and then goes on to analyse various causes of such discontents. Both here and on another occasion Temple is quoted on the imperfections of all kinds of governments and their tendency to decay. It may be that this important Machiavellian idea came to the Monitor partly through the works of this moderate royalist diplomat of the pre-Popish plot era who apparently integrated into his support for monarchy a number of liberal, even broadly republican, ideas of the pre-Restoration period. His laudatory and very popular Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands, published in 1673, is also quoted by the Monitor.

Harrington is not directly referred to in the paper and most of its Harringtonian-country characteristics are almost certainly derived from intermediate sources in the tradition. One essay, however, that which complains of a lack of absolute power in the constitution to remedy

82. The True Picture of a Modern Whig, 1702; Kramnick, pp. 240-3; the Monitor 37, 17 Apr. 1756.

grievances, has a striking Harringtonian quality unique in the series. 84 This weakness in the constitution, it explains, arises because of the division of property and power which lays a foundation for perpetual disagreement and jealousies between sovereign and subjects. The people have the property but the king has power and prerogative over it. Thus the constitution is such that there is always an ebb and flow and the scales seldom stand even between king and people. In fact there is a sort of perpetual civil war. No remedies are suggested by the paper for this fundamental disorder, nor is the constitution analysed in such Harringtonian terms again. It could have been directly inspired by a reading of Harrington or could be a maverick version of Bolingbroke's neo-Harringtonian view of English history. Whichever it is, it is unusual in its striking note of dissatisfaction about the contemporary balance of property and power between king and people. On one occasion the Monitor uses Harrington's celebrated phrase, 'a government of laws and not men', but with nothing to suggest that it was taken directly from Harrington. 85

Sidney is directly cited twice by the Monitor, on both occasions on the theme of the danger of corruption in a general sense as a prelude to tyranny and the importance of a virtuous and watchful people. On both occasions the theme is supported by lengthy references to Greek and Roman history. 86 It seems certain that Sidney was known directly to the authors of the Monitor. It is likely, therefore, that other themes in the Monitor which appear strongly in Sidney in very similar terms owe something to his influence, for example his lengthy repeated insistence that government is founded on consent and that the people have the right

85. 468, 8 Dec. 1764.
86. 55, 16 Aug. 1756; 469, 28 Jul. 1764.
to choose their own form of government, and his definition of liberty, analysis of its benefits and fear for its survival. His frequent appeals to a wide variety of history must have been congenial, as also his insistence that kings are under the law. Two more particular parallels of thought point more certainly to a direct influence. Sidney argues that absolute monarchy is unstable and therefore no advantage to the monarch; the Monitor in a similar view insists that the limited prince's throne is more securely based, being founded on the love of his people. Further, Sidney asserts that 'a general presumption that Kings will govern well, is not a sufficient security to the People'; the Monitor likewise stresses the need for checks even on a good prince. Otherwise his powers may be misused in future by a bad one.

On some important points the Monitor shows a clear debt to Locke which suggests that his political works may have been more closely studied in the mid-eighteenth century than recent research has suggested. He is quoted twice to begin papers of a constitutional nature (and once in another context). In both papers Lockean influences are strong in the text as well. The first quotes Locke's opinion that any alteration in the methods or rights of election without the consent of the people is equivalent to a change in the legislative and therefore to a dissolution of government. The essay begins on a Lockean note, asserting that the preservation of property is the chief end of government and the reason that a legislative power is necessary. It then turns away from Locke to some mixed monarchy theorizing. The two main themes, however, are the importance of a fair representation of the people and of a proper regulation of the right to election. In strongly deploring the existence of rotten boroughs the paper

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echoes Locke's words in a way which suggests that on this topic, here
given the more full of its two considerations, the Monitor had its ideas
reinforced by Locke. Further, in this same essay, the Monitor attempts to
forestall accusations of jacobitism and rebellion by arguing that rebellion
is 'an opposition, not to persons, but, to the authority in being', which is
again sufficiently close to Locke to suggest direct influence. Locke would
be likely to agree, too, with the assertion that follows that the people
are always likely to be disaffected under a tyranny yet cannot for this be
properly branded as rebels. 88

The other Locke quotation is of his definition of usurpation and
tyrranny and is used to head a discussion of general warrants. The
quotation is only generally related to the argument of the passage, which
is a moderate and reasoned consideration of general warrants. On two
points, however, there are close parallels to Locke. The trust argument
is used rather than contract to insist on the limits on government and
further it is argued that men, in entering society, cannot be supposed to
have given up anything to their harm. These arguments occur in other
places, the latter more than the former and sometimes more strongly
reminiscent of Locke. 89

There are other specific points on which the Monitor argument bears
a resemblance to Locke without evidence of any direct connection. The
quite frequently elaborated idea that a righteous prince has no need to
fear his people and indeed will find in them his chief support perhaps is
taking up suggestions of Locke. His definitions of liberty may have had
some influence although they were by no means unique to him. More


important, his wide definition of the property, the preservation of which is the chief end of government, 'that is, his life; liberty and estate', is perhaps the inspiration for the Monitor's significant remark that the man who has no property yet has a property in his liberty.  

There is enough evidence to say definitely that the authors of the Monitor had a direct knowledge of the contents of Locke's Two Treatises. However, the main point of the recent work on Locke's influence stands. Locke does not give any particular turn to the Monitor's ideology. Rather he is used occasionally to support a wider tradition of thought on particular points. Certainly his influence is not dominating or distinctive. Particularly the Monitor could not have derived from Locke its ideas on the crucially important subject of 'the people'. Locke's theory of consent 'is a theory of how individuals become subject to political obligations and how legitimate political societies can arise. It is not in any sense whatsoever a theory of how government should be organized', that is, it is not concerned with the continuing relations of government and governed, with the rights of the people in the day-to-day working of government. His is a 'theory of popular consent without popular control', particularly if his writings on toleration are placed alongside the Two Treatises. His arguments would not easily be adapted to support the kind of continuous involvement of the people in government which the Monitor, with country propagandists in general, supports. Indeed they are far more suited to the conservative orthodoxy.

It is possible to identify beyond doubt the sources of four of the most telling of the later Monitor papers on the role of the people. Two of these are prefaced by striking quotations from Defoe. As interpreted

90. **Two Treatises**, The Second Treatise, paras 168, 209, 22, 57, 87; Behrens, pp. 48-9; The Monitor 461, 2 June 1764.


by Kramnick, Defoe is the unashamed apologist for the new post-1688 Walpolean England, glorying in social change and economic development, extolling the self-made man and popularizing an individualistic Lockean theory of the origins and purposes of society and government. 93 This was not the traditional amalgam within which the country attitudes developed. The source of the Monitor quotation, however, is The Original Power ... of the People of England, which did originate in typically 'country' circumstances, out of Defoe's defence of the Kentish petitioners of 1701 in their dispute with the house of commons. 94 The Monitor does not adhere to its arguments closely in either of the two papers which quotations from it open. The paper which follows the first, however, is so close to the Defoe pamphlet in material and argument as to leave no doubt that it was before the author as he wrote. It contends strongly for the need to supervise parliament as much as any other part of the constitution and includes, in words almost identical to Defoe's, one of the Monitor's two references to the right of the people to resume their power by acting through a convention. 95 The second paper which opens with a Defoe quotation is that which examines the origins of government with the help of Hooker and in answer to Droit le Roy. 96 Only at the end, when it returns to the point made in the quotation at the beginning, is there any similarity to Defoe.

The first of the papers which quotes Defoe develops its argument on the rights of the people with even closer reliance on a more significant source, a Revolution pamphlet attributed to Robert Ferguson, A Brief Justification of the Prince of Orange's Descent into England... From

93. Kramnick, pp. 188-200.
95. The Monitor 422, 3 Sep. 1763.
96. See above pp. 384, 354-5.
the second paragraph onwards the Monitor follows the pamphlet step by step, with frequent and lengthy quotations although naturally with less elaboration. Not quite as close, but still very striking, are the parallels and quotations in the sequel to the second paper which quotes Defoe in answer to Droit le Roy. A somewhat earlier paper, written soon after the first paper showing a debt to this pamphlet, probably owes much to it in arguing the right of the people in parliament assembled to change the succession to the throne, again in answer to divine right theories. This paper begins with one of the Monitor's statements that men cannot be supposed to have given up anything to their detriment in setting up a government, a point also made in the first paper based on this pamphlet and clearly derived from it in these instances, if not in others.

It is interesting to find such indisputable evidence of sources among the most whiggish writing at the turn of the century for these papers which are some of the Monitor's most lengthy and substantial expositions of its views on the people. It is important, however, to remember that these views permeate the paper from its beginning. Although they may have been strengthened by the reading of these pamphlets, they are not suddenly derived from these sources alone, but rather from the tradition as a whole.

Another source from which the Monitor undoubtedly derived something of its distinctive emphasis on the people is Cato's Letters. On this theme, they introduced a new note into the country tradition, a more urgent and vigorous assertion of an active and continuous role for the people in detailed


98. The Monitor 448, 3 Mar. 1764.

99. 423, 10 Sep. 1763; cf. A Brief Justification..., pp. 135, 142-4. Other papers in which the point is made with no obvious debt to the pamphlet are 450, 17 Mar. 1764; 464, 23 June 1764.
supervision of government, not merely in its origins. Trenchard is quoted only once with attribution, a quotation which from its tone can almost certainly be said to come from *Cato's Letters* and which introduces a paper asserting the right of the people to express their views on events and policies. On other occasions the *Monitor* follows the arguments of *Cato's Letters*, and indeed echoes their words, but without acknowledgement. It too believes, though less insistently than Trenchard and Gordon, that the people are seldom mistaken over their true interests unless they are misled. It insists often, as they do, on the wisdom and, indeed, the necessity in all government, of listening to the people and winning their affections. And it suggests the same ways for the people to make their complaints known. Only those who have given cause for complaint can fear the voice of the people. These points would seem to owe something to a direct acquaintance with Trenchard and Gordon. The same tone is not found so clearly in any other proponents.

Again there are strong parallels of thought and expression on the question of freedom of speech and the press, another strand in the tradition which comes into prominence in the Hanoverian period, especially under Walpole. Like *Cato's Letters* the *Monitor* believes that freedom of speech is the great bulwark of liberty and the symptom and effect of a good government. Both quote Roman history to show that suppression only makes a work more popular. The *Monitor* echoes the conclusion of Gordon in *Cato's Letters*. The parallels of expression are too close and frequent to be coincidental. Later in the same paper the *Monitor* turns to consider party and the way it can mislead ordinary men. Again it quotes almost word for word from the following number of *Cato's Letters*, this time one

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100. 208, 14 July 1759.

by Trenchard. Again it seems safe to conclude that this Monitor essay was written with Cato's Letters open before the author.

Less obviously, the Monitor may well have derived its praise of liberty and elaboration of its blessings from Trenchard and Gordon for whom this is a major theme in the tradition of Sidney but with his account of the advantages of liberty expanded. Again, many other Monitor themes, notably its concern with public morality and manners, may well have been strengthened by, or owe something in expression to, Trenchard and Gordon.

Certainly two of Trenchard's earlier works on the standing army, one written in collaboration with Walter Moyle, were known and used by the Monitor in its two later series on this subject, although they are never named. Each of the three papers in the first series is headed with part of the quotation from Horace which appears on the title page of Trenchard and Moyle's An Argument Shewing, that a Standing Army Is inconsistent with A Free Government... The debt to this pamphlet is most obvious in the last paper. It virtually quotes Trenchard and Moyle on the chance survival of liberty in England in contrast to the oppression and slavery in Europe, in the description of a standing army as a rock against which free states have been dashed to pieces and in elaboration of the virtues of the militia especially in that it makes no difference between the citizen, the soldier and the husbandman. The final disclaimer of any intent to criticize the armies raised with the consent of parliament for the present 'necessary and just' war and the wish that they should be rewarded, perhaps with a gratuity, without danger to the constitution, is


taken straight from Trenchard and Moyle's last paragraph. In the final Monitor series on the subject the arguments again closely parallel the pamphlet, perhaps most strikingly on the need to keep the natural and artificial strength of a kingdom in the same hands if the balance of the constitution is to be secured and in the praise of the Gothic idea of a militia to achieve this. The series ends with references to and quotations from Machiavelli, Bacon and a French author in identical terms to those of Trenchard and Moyle (except that the French is translated!) 104 In these and other ways there is irrefutable evidence of direct knowledge and close use of the work.

Trenchard's A Short History of Standing Armies in England (reprinted in 1749, 1751, 1752) 105 was apparently equally well-known to the Monitor and these same two series are again indebted to it. Surprise that an army raised in the cause of liberty could turn against parliament is expressed in virtually identical words, as is praise of the whigs (significantly given the adjective old by the Monitor) who opposed Charles II's few guards and were alarmed at the much greater measures of William's reign. The argument that those who first proposed the continuation of a standing army in peace time, when circumstances were favourable to its disbandment, are most culpable is developed in terms similar to Trenchard's arguments about his own time. His point that an army if continued will soon become an accepted part of the prerogative is made. The Monitor's fear that quartering of soldiers may be used as a means of electoral pressure perhaps also owes something to Trenchard. 106

104. Cf. 302 with An Argument..., pp.3-4, 6, 7, 29-30; the Monitor 396 with pp. 3, 4; 397 with pp. 7-10; 398 with pp. 7, 15-16, 18-19, 23-4.
105. Schwoerer, p. 209.
The preface to this Trenchard pamphlet is directly quoted twice in varied contexts. Trenchard's striking comparison of government to clockwork, quite unlike the usual general comments of the Monitor on the nature of government, is repeated in a paper on taxation. 'The government of all states is a mere piece of clockwork; with springs and wheels, which must act after a particular manner, and therefore the art is to constitute it so as to make it move to the public advantage, to the interest of the governors and the governed.' The argument which Trenchard develops from this parallel that if the house of commons is free from corruption it will 'act mechanically' in the people's interests is taken up some time later in quite a different context of comment on the approaching election of 1761. 'The freedom of this nation depends upon the people's chusing the House of Commons, who are a part of the legislature, and have the sole power of granting money.' Great benefits arise '[w]hen this is a true representative, and free from external force and private bribery'. The constitution is maintained and offenders are automatically punished 'with an ax or a halter, as naturally as the clock strikes twelve, when the hour is come'. This is the fountainhead from which the people expect all their happiness. The same paper also follows Trenchard in deploring the innovation of the cabinet council, which detracts from the accountability of ministers. With Trenchard the innovation is attributed to Charles II and contrasted with the proper operation of the privy council 'where every man subscribed his opinion, and thereby became answerable for it', and traced to French practice under Charles IX, who decided on the massacre of protestants in such a body. There is a further close parallel to the preface in an early Monitor which criticizes the art of 'splitting and multiplying employments' and, like Trenchard, gives the examples of the treasury and admiralty. 107 These debts on general constitutional questions

range over the Monitor's whole life, unlike those on the standing army which are concentrated in its latter part. In the same paper of 1764 which uses Harrington's phrase, 'a government of laws and not men', arguments similar to Moyle's that a factious liberty is better than a settled tyranny also appear, so possibly other works of his were known too. 108

Much less significant than these borrowings are three quotations, one used twice, from the Maxims of the marquess of Halifax. Use is made of the pithily expressed sound common sense of the Trimmer to drive home stock country attitudes. The king is urged to listen to the voice of his people and to be frank with and responsive to them. Point is given to criticism of ministers who neglect the true interests of the country, in their conduct of foreign policy particularly. 109 Halifax's downright common sense and pragmatic utilitarian attitudes are in sharp contrast to the Monitor's ideological commitment and adherence to axiomatic constitutional views. Yet in many respects his conclusions would have been congenial to the Monitor. His works may have helped to confirm some of its views, or, more likely, provided a stock of readily available and pointedly expressed texts.

A quotation from Swift is once used in a similar way to head a paper on the national debt which apparently owes no more to him. 110 Another of the Monitor papers, however, makes striking but unacknowledged borrowings from Swift's Examiner. The essay of 26 May 1764 opens with the statement that the people are seldom mistaken over their true interest if they are left to their own judgment. Yet they can be deceived in various ways. This proposition is elaborated in a manner and with examples virtually identical to the Examiner 24, where the initial observation is attributed to

108. The Monitor 488, 8 Dec. 1764; Robbins, Republican Tracts, p. 44.
110. 467, 14 July 1764.
Machiavelli. Then the paper goes on to illustrate how the people can be deceived by licentiousness and faction by giving a fable of Liberty, who, because of the frowardness of her youngest daughter Faction, is thrown out of heaven and wanders the earth, the daughter fomenting trouble everywhere. This idea of a mythological genealogy of faction was a fairly common eighteenth-century literary device, and Thomson's poem Liberty traces her migrations until she finds her happiest of all homes in England. But the form in which the Monitor uses the device is clearly again borrowed from Swift, this time the Examiner 31, so close are the parallels. A close study of the Examiner could well reveal other unacknowledged debts of the Monitor to this forerunner in occasional propaganda of similar tone.

It is very difficult to assess just how far and in what ways the Monitor is indebted to the most recent and most extensive elaboration of country ideas in the writings of Bolingbroke. The similarities of thought are many, striking and obvious, while the differences are minor ones of emphasis. It would seem obvious that Bolingbroke must have been known to and have influenced the authors of the Monitor. Yet such an influence is never directly acknowledged. Bolingbroke is quoted once to begin an essay but he is not named. He is twice referred to in the course of papers, once with approval, once with contemptuous disapproval. This hostile reference, to the publication of his posthumous works, which, together with 'other deistical tracts' are said to give the impression that Christianity had been abolished by law, gives one clue to why the Monitor may not have wished to acknowledge his influence. In the collected works, published posthumously in 1754 just a year before the Monitor was begun, Bolingbroke's

111. 460, 26 May 1764; the Examiner 24 and 31, quoted in Pat Rogers, 'Swift and Bolingbroke on Faction', Journal of British Studies, IX, 2, May 1970, pp. 91-2 and fn. 35, 97-8; Kliger, p. 31.
112. The Monitor 446, 18 Feb. 1764; 130, 14 Jan. 1758; 62, 2 Oct. 1756.
theological dissertations defending a deist position appeared for the first time. They were greeted with scandalized horror according to Horace Walpole and Dr. Johnson. Furthermore, the Bolingbroke of the 1730's, the leader of the opposition to Walpole who disavowed his tory past, was never entirely trusted by contemporary tories. 

It is hardly surprising that the Monitor, avowedly tory to begin with and a defender of the established church, should hesitate about acknowledging a debt to him. Yet it is not at all certain how far there is even an unacknowledged debt, however obvious it may seem. Bolingbroke's leisurely, even ponderous style is very different from the Monitor's. Only occasionally on constitutional matters are there verbal similarities which point irrefutably to a direct debt. Otherwise, for all that can be deduced, the similarities in thought are due to indebtedness to a common tradition rather than of one to the other.

Verbal echoes are most obvious in a paper which is headed by a quotation from the dedication to A Dissertation upon Parties and is an account of a dream-allegory about a procession to the temple of liberty. The 'courteous bystander' who explains the meaning of the procession and reveals himself as the genius of England, speaks the language of Bolingbroke in the dedication to this work, most obviously and in fact in direct quotation on the responsibility of ministers and a prime minister.

Another unacknowledged quotation from A Dissertation occurs in the Monitor's description of the language of whigs as the power and majesty of the people, an original contract, the authority and independence of parliament, liberty, resistance, exclusion, abdication, deposition. The Monitor like Bolingbroke in A Dissertation undertakes to give a history of parties from the later seventeenth century. The general theme is the same, the


tendency of parties to go to extremes and distort their principles, but
the treatment is different and few direct parallels are detectable. The
Monitor gets embedded in factual detail while Bolingbroke frequently'
indulges in lengthy general analysis, reflection or digression. 115
Generally on the question of party, although there are clear similarities
there are also important differences of emphasis: to begin with, the
Monitor stresses the betrayal of their principles by the whigs since the
Revolution, rather than the irrelevance of party distinctions,
Bolingbroke's main point; it does not develop the court-country antithesis
with Bolingbroke's thoroughness.

The one approving reference to Bolingbroke in the Monitor indicates
a line of thought probably strengthened by his influence. A paper on the
dangers of corruption draws attention to Bolingbroke's supposition, which
it says is no chimera, that a parliament could become so complacent as to
grant, in its first session, money, credit and power for seven years, and
praises the constitution in terms very similar to some of Bolingbroke's.
Bolingbroke strongly insists that parliaments must be kept true to their
trust as much as princes, an idea the Monitor takes up elsewhere from
Defoe. There is much in the Monitor on the dangers of a parliamentary
tyrranny, sometimes with close verbal similarity to Bolingbroke, sometimes
diverging from him both in language and argument. 116

The Monitor insists, as does Bolingbroke, on the shortcomings of
the Revolution and suggests the same remedies, but there seems to be little
direct borrowing of ideas on this theme which was, after all, a fairly
well-established part of the tradition before Bolingbroke wrote. Similarly

115. Cf. the Monitor 24, 17 Jan. 1756 with Parties, Works, III, p. 38; the
Monitor 434-41, 26 Nov. 1763-14 Jan. 1764 with Parties, Works, III
pp. 47-125.

116. Cf. the Monitor 130, 14 Jan. 1756, 422, 3 Sep. 1763 with Parties, Works,
III, pp. 183, 167. See also the Monitor 77, 15 Jan. 1757; 260, 12
July 1760; 433, 19 Nov. 1763 and Parties, Works, III, pp. 166, 214-5,
271, 273-6.
on corruption, although the Monitor perhaps learnt from Bolingbroke to
dub Walpole 'the grand corrupter' and its general insistence on the
theme is similar, there is no close identity of language. Surprisingly
this also seems to be the case on the monarchy, where no verbal echoes
have been detected. Bolingbroke's was the most elaborate treatment yet of
the duties of and expectations from a king in the mixed constitution
threatened with corruption. The Monitor's general line on the duties and
responsibilities and hopes of kingship is certainly very similar. Yet the
debt is not obvious, certainly not to The Idea of A Patriot King. Much
could have come from elsewhere in the tradition. And again there are
differences of emphasis. The Monitor is much more inclined to warn, and
much less disposed to expect miracles from a patriot king.

Clearly parts at least of Bolingbroke's works were known to the
authors of the Monitor. Yet the Monitor is no cheap imitation of
Bolingbroke. Its methods of using sources were such that if its debt to
Bolingbroke was as great as the general similarities between them at first
suggest, the direct verbal quotations would be much more obvious and
frequent. These general similarities show less a direct debt and more how
deeply entrenched the tradition of thought and set of attitudes were in
eighteenth-century propaganda.

The Monitor apparently owes little to contemporary or near-contemporary
non-indigenous sources for its political and constitutional thought.
Pufendorf's Law of Nature and Nations (1672) is quoted once, but to begin
an essay on the evils of trading monopolies as demonstrated by the East
India Company. Montesquieu is quoted twice but both quotations are just
general comments on the nature of the English and introduce papers not
concerned with constitutional issues. He is quoted once in the text of
an essay in a minor way. The only non-English source which appears to
strengthen a particular line of thought on the constitution is the

This introduces a major consideration of the ways to choose and proper powers to give to a leading minister.

As indicated by the very high proportion of its quotations which are in Latin or, less often, Greek, the **Monitor** makes very frequent use of classical and especially Roman example and history. This is so much a part of the inheritance of the eighteenth century in political discussion and particularly part of the habits and intellectual weapons of the creators and exponents of the country tradition, that it is impossible to isolate any one influence.

The general impression created by this necessarily incomplete study of the background and sources of the **Monitor**'s ideas on the constitution is that it was giving expression to a firmly established set of attitudes to which it recurred quite naturally, making use of established habits and accepted axioms rather than consciously formulating or reformulating an ideology based on carefully selected sources. Its authors were obviously aware of certain writers and works important in establishing ideas it found sympathetic, but they seem to have used such sources haphazardly, according to what came to hand at a particular moment, rather than assessing carefully the best source for a particular topic. Significantly, although they called themselves tory to begin with, they seem to have found the more liberal, 'whiggish' expositions of the tradition most congenial. It is perhaps also significant in a quite different way that the most wholesale, although usually unacknowledged, borrowing comes in the waning post-war years of the paper's life, a further suggestion of loss of inspiration and purpose. The overwhelming conclusion is that its
authors were original in very little. Yet because of this they are not necessarily insignificant. Because thought was not divorced from action, the particular emphasis and balance with which the Monitor holds the tradition in the particular circumstances in which its authors wrote are of some interest in explaining contemporary developments.

A note on the quotations in English used to introduce Monitor papers.

Of the 504 papers, about 150 are introduced by English quotations. Of these about eighty are from the bible. A further six come from general literary sources of no particular significance in indicating sources of political thought: three Shakespeare, one Spenser, one Milton (from Paradise Lost, not from his directly political works), one Hakluyt, on the importance of sea power to England. Hobbes' De Cive is quoted once but in a non-constitutional context, on the importance of fair distribution of the burden of taxation (the Monitor 185, 3 Feb. 1759).

Samuel Butler's Hudibras (published in three parts, 1663, 1664, 1678), a Restoration satire on presbyterians and independents which won the approval of Charles II, is quoted four times, once in a setting appropriate to the source, to herald an attack on quakers (28, 14 Feb. 1756). This work was well-known to the eighteenth century through frequent new editions, including one in 1726 illustrated by Hogarth. Its blunt language would seem to have suited the mood of the Monitor but it had little to offer in the way of reflection on the constitution. Although two of the quotations introduce papers of political or constitutional importance, they do little to shape their thought (29, 21 Feb. 1756; 104, 16 July 1757). In a similar way, but much more daringly, a satirical work of 1688, The English Memorial, is used on three occasions (the same quotation each time) at the beginning of papers which deal with the dangers of weak kings and evil counsellors. 'If men will take the same Measures, they may easily bring their Hogs to such another Market' - a clear hint that 1688 could happen again (40, 8 May 1756; 45, 12 June 1756; 47, 26 June 1756).

Six other quotations come from varied sources of little literary or constitutional interest. Fifteen come from various parliamentary proceedings and enactments: four statutes are cited, the obvious ones, Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights (twice) and the preamble to the Militia Act; a resolution and address of the house of lords in 1704, regarding habeas corpus, are referred to three times; the parliamentary roll of Henry IV is quoted on the functions of the king, lords and commons, to introduce an important constitutional essay (473, 25 August 1764); the speeches of two sovereigns to parliament are quoted, three of William III's, and two of Anne's (one of them three times).

Translations of the classics are sometimes quoted. Sallust is quoted once to introduce a general essay on corruption, without a translator being named. Creechy's Horace is twice quoted, Guthrie's Cicero

Addison's verse tragedy Cato is used three times, one of them extensively in the paper as well, as a rather different source of Roman examples (the Monitor 60, 18 Sep. 1756; 91, 16 Apr. 1757; 158, 29 July 1758). Two Greek quotations are given in unattributed quotation, one of Demosthenes, the great Greek orator who led resistance to Macedonian conquests, and one of Dionysius, almost certainly Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the rhetorician and historian, admirer of Rome and writer of a Roman history intended as an introduction to Polybius. Only the remaining twenty or so quotations (those discussed in this section) are of much use in indicating sources of ideas.

The Significance of the Monitor's Attitudes

There seems good reason to believe that the country tradition reached a major watershed in its development about 1760. Those who shared its attitudes had never, of course, been a homogeneous group, let alone an organized and united one. Yet they had reacted in broadly similar ways to political events and upheld a common basic programme. To the accession of George III and the political circumstances of the 1760's, however, they responded very differently. As a result, after the 1760's, it is no longer possible to speak of a country tradition as one main strand in political controversy and a major determinant of political behaviour. In part this is the consequence of some decline, in response to changing circumstances and climates of thought, of ideologically determined attitudes to issues such as the militia or foreign policy. More, however, it is due to the diversion of country attitudes into several different lines of political development in the later eighteenth century.

119. Thomas Creech, The Odes, Satyrs and Epistles of Horace..., London, 1684 (later editions 1688, 1711, 1715, 1720, 1737); William Guthrie of Brechin is listed as translator of Cicero's Offices (1756), Orationes (1745, 1758, 1778 etc.), De Oratore (1742) and Letters (1752). The British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books. 120. Ed. Catherine B. Avery, The New Century Classical Handbooks, New York, 1962. His Roman history was published in translation by Edward Spelman in 1758; Peter Campbell, 'An Early Defence of Party', Political Studies, II, 2, 1955, p. 166. 121. Western, e.g. pp. 140, 182-3; Fraser, pp. 281-2. To some extent the Monitor, in its conversion on foreign policy and its varying use of militia issues, shows this trend.
The watershed did not dam the stream. Rather was it divided into at least three separate courses.

To Sir Francis Dashwood and other independents in parliament of both whig and tory label and ancestry, the new reign seemed to offer a genuine chance of a new beginning. To them, the young king had admirable qualities and the right attitudes on questions ranging from the decline of public morality to the militia, the dictatorial propensities of ministers and the evils of party. He called for and deserved to have the support of all men of principle. He and his chosen minister could be trusted to inaugurate a new era in politics. Those who had no ulterior motive behind their country attitudes except a distaste for professional politicians could genuinely find much to win their approval in the expressed intentions of George III. 122

So the tories came to court, and Sir Francis Dashwood became an officeholder. He remained one, except for a brief interlude during the first Rockingham ministry, for the next twenty years. Yet his independence was not compromised. Although some came to number him among 'Bute's friends', it was as an independent that his support was valued by various ministers from Bute to North. And it was in the spirit of independence and the country tradition that he took office. His interest in office was not that of a politician but an administrator. Both at the treasury and in the post office he initiated changes which heralded and influenced the administrative reforms of the younger Pitt. 123 In this way one of the impulses of the country tradition, the desire for cheap, efficient, unburdensome, incorrupt and apolitical administration, led forward to the movement for administrative reform and one important aspect of the modernization of British government and the constitution.

122. Kemp, Dashwood, pp. 7, 51-2, 63.
123. Ibid., chapter III, especially pp. 68-79, 87-90.
If some of the genuine independents felt that they could now support government, those whose political ambitions were thwarted in the 1760's bent country ideas to other purposes. The Rockingham group were taught by Burke to see in royal influence and secret cabals the causes of their grievances and a dire threat to the constitution. In this they were heirs of much country thinking. Their partial adoption of country attitudes led naturally to the elaboration of the programme of economical reform between 1780 and 1782, a sophisticated version of part of the stock opposition platforms. Yet in various ways Burke gave a peculiar twist to the ideas he inherited. Not only did he justify party in a way which was against much of the country grain, although it owed something to Bolingbroke's justification of opposition which the Monitor partly takes up and to other strands of the tradition which regarded parties as concomitant with liberty. He also turned his party's chief hostility not against overweening ministers who usurped royal functions, but against an active royal prerogative itself. The events of 1783-84, when the king won wholehearted popular support in his revenge on the 'ambitious', 'corrupt' and 'self-seeking' ministers of the Fox-North coalition, were to show how contrary to deep-seated popular prejudices such an adaptation of the tradition was. King and people against ministers is the country clarion call. If it robbed the king's favourite of his reputation in the 1760's, it served the king well in these later years.

Country ideas and language contributed most, however, to the third current flowing from the watershed of the 1760's, that is, radicalism. Historians have long sought for the beginnings of modern British radicalism as far back as the 1760's. From then and especially from 1769 they have traced a continuous if variously argued demand for parliamentary reform, fed by a growing sense of fundamental discontent with the current

124. Namier and Brooke, I, p. 188.
state of the constitution. Such demands and feelings, they point out, were first crystallized in the excitements aroused by John Wilkes, that flamboyant demagogue so adept at presenting his personal adventures as touching the liberties of all Englishmen. More recently, historians such as George Rudé and Dame Lucy Sutherland have investigated the circumstances that enabled Wilkes to stimulate a genuine radicalism in the metropolitan area in these years. Dame Lucy in particular has drawn attention to a new and distinctive phase in the long tradition of opposition to the national government among the independently-minded merchants, craftsmen and tradesmen of the City of London, expressed through the City's well-established organs of government. In the 1750's and 60's this City opinion had its sense of self-importance increased by its association with Pitt in his war ministry and then was frustrated by his resignation and political impotence. Out of the intense suspicion of national politics inflamed by this and other events of the 1760's, further encouraged by social and economic troubles and fastened on Wilkes as a hero, came the intense popular excitement of 1768-70. The new phase in London attitudes was distinguishable from its traditional anti-ministerialism in that 'the City began to some extent to dissociate itself from the politics of Opposition as well as those of Government, to feel resentment at its place in a political system dominated by interests in many ways alien to it...'. '[H]e both carried the argument further than was acceptable to any of the main groups - whether 'Whig' or 'Tory' - in Parliament, and...it deliberately chose to make its main appeal to the "political nation" outside Parliament itself.' In such circumstances radicalism was born.


126. Rudé, Wilkes and Liberty; Sutherland, 'The City...in...Politics'; The City...1768-1774.

127. Sutherland, The City...1768-1774, pp. 5, 7 (the quotation) - 9, 12; George Rudé, John Wilkes and The Rebirth of British Radicalism, Wellington, 1962, p. 24.
It is in demonstrating the contribution of the country tradition to these developments that the Monitor is of some significance. It does not survive to see the climax at the end of the 1760's, when its patron, William Beckford, was to play a major part, but its ten years of life cover a substantial and important part of the change with which he was so closely associated. It is therefore a very valuable source in which to study the framework of constitutional ideas that Beckford found appropriate to build up his popular following, that is, those which appealed to the 'middling sort' of London as an expression of their political frustrations. In taking naturally to the language of the country tradition, it demonstrates how adaptable that tradition was to express this particular kind of exclusion from close association with government. Further, the Monitor shows how the tradition, because of its particular constitutional terminology, its suspicion of government and search for controls over it, had within it strong potential for the development of a genuine radicalism of the left, pressing for constitutional change rather than restoration. 128

Its radical potential arises partly from the particular emphases with which the Monitor holds the tradition which show again how much earlier thinking of a republican kind was kept alive in it. The Monitor uses the tradition to insist on the control of king and ministers. It insists on the supervisory role of the house of commons in place of the various checking devices of the early classical republicans and it asks for reforms to make the house adequate to this role. It places a high value on liberty defined in a wide manner. Always it stresses the supreme

128. The transition from country to radical ways of thought was first and most easily made in London. Even in 1759, John Gordon was linking the popular tory interest there (what he called the jacobites) and the 'No Kings men' or 'common wealth men', perhaps remnants of earlier republicans, more likely extremists of the popular party. Add MSS. 32894, f. 16, 32898, f. 227. The same sort of association of the popular party in the City with 'Oliverian or Republican attempts' is made by implication by James Hoskyns to Hardwicke, [late 1756], Yorke, Hardwicke, II, p. 308.
importance of the people.

Yet if the Monitor shows how much was kept alive in the country tradition it also marks the beginning of a subtle transformation in it towards the realization of its radical potential. The impulse towards a transformation came from the belief that contemporaries were faced with a crisis in the constitution arising out of ministerial conspiracy. Such a belief was typical of the tradition, but reached a new level of intensity from this time in response to circumstances and especially to the upheavals of the 1760's. Fears of crown influence, favourites, secret cabals and particularly of Bute were very widely shared by men of varying political attitudes. They included printers, pamphleteers and publicists, of whom Burke, of course, is the best known, men of the highest political status such as Pitt and Rockingham, and some with close knowledge of politics like Horace Walpole, to say nothing of the ordinary 'middling' citizens of London. The details of their interpretation differ, but their conviction of dire crisis is the same and is expressed in private diaries, letters and conversation, as well as publicly in speeches and pamphlets. There may have been little ground in fact for their suspicions. Yet they were none the less real and, in the minds of those most fundamentally dissatisfied with the status quo and in their spokesmen such as Catherine Macaulay and Alderman Sawbridge, they were a powerful stimulus to radicalism. 129

The Monitor certainly shares this conviction of crisis and its essays show how the stimulus began subtly to change the tradition of opposition thought among some of its proponents in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The sense of deep discontent about the contemporary

state of the constitution gives greater urgency to demands for reforms to remedy defects still left despite the Revolution, or developed since. The reforms asked for tend to go beyond protecting an ideal constitution from danger and decay and to involve, implicitly if not explicitly, completing an imperfect work.

As has been shown, however, the Monitor's chief insistence is not on these specific reforms, which were, in any case, almost all derived from long-established anti-ministerial programmes, but on the proper realization and fulfilment of their roles on the part of all the elements of the constitution from king to people. In analysing these roles the Monitor uses its constitutional theory in a radical way, to criticize existing arrangements. Its criticisms become more than nostalgic reaction because they are framed in ways which, in fact if not intentionally, undermine the theory, ask for more than restoration to ideal perfection and involve constitutional change. They give rise to the tensions already indicated in the Monitor's acceptance of the mixed balanced constitution. These are the result of friction between two not entirely compatible basic elements in the tradition it inherits. The mixed government theme emphasizes the balancing of interests so that stable government may be possible and liberty may be preserved. This comes pre-eminently from the classical-Machiavellian-Harringtonian republican sources. The second theme, which stresses the role of the people and the importance of consent, in part derives from these sources but is very much strengthened by the appeal to reason and contract elements of the amalgam. The authors of the Monitor take up, from the first theme, the Machiavellian concepts of the importance of a public-spirited, virtuous and watchful people (derived chiefly through Sidney) and of the need for frequent return to the first principles of the constitution (derived apparently from Temple), which is equated with appeal to the people. These they combine with more explicit
ideas of reversion of power to the people when the constitution is abused, ideas which might appear to be derived from Locke but in fact come, at least in some of their most explicit expressions, from other Revolution literature and Defoe. Out of such a combination of some of the elements of the tradition emerges the Monitor's distinctive emphasis on the people, which does most to compromise its acceptance of the mixed government framework. 130

Here the Monitor's argument is radical in a way which, more than any other, involves a fundamental alteration in the constitution. Here lies its major claim to the upsetting of established ideas about the constitution and government and even to democracy in one sense. True, the dominant motive in the insistence upon the people is to protect the independence of parliament from the encroachments of the court. It is not, however, the only motive. There is concern about their proper representation in parliament and about their influence over their representatives as ends in themselves. 131 The Monitor adds to earlier anti-ministerial programmes the demand of the 1760's for a more equal representation of the people and revives an attack on rotten boroughs that had been muted since Locke, in the Shaftesbury-whig tradition, mocked at Old Sarum and since tories and others in Anne's reign and shortly after took up the same complaint. Although the grievance appeared occasionally later, it was not an established part of the country anti-ministerial programme in the way that the call for more frequent parliaments was. 132 In reviving it the Monitor

130. The Monitor's views on the people are summarized above pp. 425-6. See also above pp. 517, 518-9, 521-4.
131. See above pp. 414-6, 466-7.
is beginning to go beyond complete preoccupation with independence to more genuinely democratic concerns.

A similar democratic potential is implicit and even on occasions explicit in the Monitor's insistence on liberty. Of course, emphasis on the importance and uniqueness of the liberty guaranteed by the English constitution was a commonplace among eighteenth-century propagandists of all shades of opinion. The definition of liberty in terms of consent to laws and taxation was in itself no startling innovation and was probably broadly acceptable to most Englishmen as the essence of the constitution. But it is interpreted by the Monitor so as to involve the active and continuous expression of opinion by the governed on acts of government. Liberty means the involvement of the people in government, government with one's own active consent almost in Leveller terms. This insistence on liberty so widely defined even begins to lead the Monitor by implication to a more democratic definition of 'the people'.

Bernard Bailyn in his perceptive study has shown how important country ideas were in helping to determine the reactions of Americans to apparent threats and how they were developed, in American hands, into a revolutionary ideology. A study of the Monitor shows that much the same sort of development of the tradition was taking place in England at the same time, less dramatically perhaps but in ways important in deciding the character of early English radicalism. The parallel to American developments is especially close on the question of the nature of representation and consent to government. Like the Americans, the Monitor upheld a delegate theory of representation and used this to insist on close relations between representatives and constituents. Hardly less than the Americans the Monitor insisted that representing the people was a trust, for their

133. Wormuth, pp. 163-4, 167; see above pp. 387-8, 422.
134. Bailyn, ch. V.
exercise of which representatives should be held strictly accountable. And, like the Americans though more tentatively because of its early date, the Monitor begins to argue that representation should have some relationship to population, should mirror the community. If the American arguments led to a recovery and elaboration of conceptions of government by the active and continuous consent of the governed that had flourished briefly a century earlier, during the Commonwealth period, and had then faded during the Restoration, such concepts are clearly present in Monitor thought too, and are indeed one of its most striking features.

Even more striking as foreshadowing American developments are the Monitor's suggestions on the active constituent power of the people. They are the creators and guardians of the constitution, able to resume power when necessary. Most striking of all is the suggestion, made twice, of how in practice the people might exercise their power through a convention. It would seem that the constitutional convention as a practical expression of the sovereignty and constitution-making powers of the people was not so distinctively a product of American grass roots as has been argued. American developments of the notion from the 1770's had deeper roots in eighteenth-century English opposition thought, possible in a radical London version of the events of 1688, than has hitherto been recognized.136

On the question of the nature of rights and the notion of a fixed written constitution the Monitor does not parallel the Americans so closely, although some of the implications drawn on by them are there. It scarcely touches on the last of the basic issues they re-examined, the concept of sovereignty. Yet a comparison of American developments of the radical content and potential of the country tradition with the Monitor serves to

135. Ibid., p. 172.
emphasize that such developments were by no means unique to America. They were beginning in England as early as 1755-65. The country tradition could serve English radicals as well as American revolutionaries. Indeed it would seem that the existence of this powerful tradition actually encouraged the emergence of radicalism and helped to determine the form it took when circumstances pressed. Like the Americans, potential English radicals were stimulated in their reactions to apparent crises by the existence of these habits of thinking, this particular political language. Certainly there was no need for Englishmen to wait to reimport their radicalism after its development in America; nor did they need to revive long-forgotten ideas. Rather they evolved their own by a refurbishing and redirecting of ways of thought kept very much alive in a major stream of eighteenth-century thinking. It is an old-fashioned radicalism, limited to constitutional and political issues, like the Monitor having little sense of class consciousness, of the economic interests and social concerns of men. Yet in fact this concern with the constitution was no narrow one. The constitution was held to determine the way of life of the people, to be

137. Bailyn, pp. 172-3, tends to overestimate the uniqueness of American development of their inherited thought, especially on the questions of representation and consent, and to underestimate the degree of survival of seventeenth-century ideas in the country tradition.

138. Gooch, p. 298, says 'With the accession of the House of Hanover the chronicle of democratic thinking in England becomes silent for half a century'. Even Christie, who stresses the backward-looking character of eighteenth-century radicalism, says, I think misleadingly, that it was 'separated by over a century from the last period, during the years of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, when there had been any comparable discussion or agitation of reformist and radical ideas'. Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, London, 1962, p. 222. Rudé writes of the 're-birth' of British radicalism in London in the time of Wilkes after it 'lay buried for many years after the Restoration'. Wilkes and the Re-birth of British Radicalism, p. 11.

The continuity between the 'country' tradition and early radicalism is no new discovery. See e.g. Pocock, 'English Political Ideologies', pp. 581-2; Sutherland, The City...1768-1774, p. 7; 'The City...in... Politics', pp. 71-2. A study of the Monitor, however, allows the transition to be charted in detail.
inseparable from their social, economic and cultural as well as their political welfare. Here again there was potential for development. 139

There is no doubt that in this metamorphosis of the component strands of the country tradition, begun in the Monitor and other contemporary writing, are to be found the origins of the main lines of reforming thought for the rest of the century and beyond. In the specific programme of parliamentary reform which the Monitor supports at one time or another, it foreshadows almost exactly the three-fold platforms of two later radicals, Beckford in 1769-70 and Christopher Wyvill of the county associating movement of the 1780's: place and pension bills, shorter parliaments and a more equal representation of the people - which means at first not franchise reform but redistribution of seats. 140 And there seems no doubt that the paper would readily have accepted the more specific later formulations of these demands, both in the county movement and in the younger Pitt's reform proposals of 1783 and 1785. True, by the 1780's, it is necessary to distinguish these proposals as coming from moderate rather than extreme reformers but it is they, more than the extremists, that are in the tradition leading to constitutional adjustment in 1832. And if the Monitor is chiefly concerned not with democracy in the modern sense and the rights of individuals but with the independence of parliament and a more equal representation of interests, with alleged restoration rather than renovation of the constitution, then so, too, were these later reformers. They wanted to go back to the roots, not to reform up from the roots. Wyvill and Pitt, unlike the Monitor, did move towards some extension of the franchise, but only very cautiously, and always with these same motives in mind. 141 Further, the Monitor foreshadows the instrument of the

140. Sutherland, The City...1768-1774, p. 23; Christie, pp. 73, 81.
141. Christie, Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, pp. 188-9, summarizes Wyvill's arguments.
county movement, an association or convention of the people to promote
reform and even envisages such an organization in its extreme form, as a
rival to parliament.

Even the more extreme radicals, who developed more truly democratic
ideas especially on the franchise and produced in London by the eighties
the six demands of the later Chartists, thought largely within this framework
and used its sources. Some of them developed their ideas on the
franchise by extending the notion of a property-based right in ways hinted
at by the _Monitor_ in another context when it said every man had a property
in his liberty. James Burgh argued that:

> Every man has a life, earnings, a right to a religious
> profession and worship according to his conscience, etc.,
> and many men, who are in the state of dependence upon
> others, and who receive charity, have wives and children
> in whom they have a right.

The poor man also contributes much in taxation. On these grounds he should
share in choosing the law-givers. The duke of Richmond based his plea for
universal suffrage on a similar argument that every man needed some means
of defence against unfair taxation and oppressive laws. Even Major
John Cartwright, who developed more clearly than anyone else in the 1770's
and 1780's a theory of representation founded on personality rather than
property, still used arguments very like Burgh's, and emphasized the
independence of parliament and preservation of mixed government. At least
until 1780 he supported a high property qualification for M.P.'s; later
he favoured payment of members, but still for the same reason, to preserve

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142. The Society for Constitutional Information, a propaganda organ of the
'extreme' radicals founded in 1780, published not only the works of
Robbins' 'Whig Canon' but also lengthy quotations from Bolingbroke.
581-2.

143. Christie, Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, pp. 55-6, quoting [James Burgh],
_Political Disquisitions; or, An Enquiry into Public Errors, Defects, and
from the Committee of the Ulster Volunteers to the Duke of Richmond and
the Duke of Richmond's answer, 1783.
And the tensions evident in the Monitor could even be said to prepare the way for the rejection, characteristic of the 'pure' democrats of the 1790's and later, of mixed balanced government and the restoration of the ancient constitution. Midway in this process, in the 1770's, stands James Burgh. In his Political Disquisitions he talks the same language and uses the same sources as the Monitor; yet he has virtually removed the king from consideration. There is no section in the work devoted to the monarchy.

Developments were to prove that fundamental change did in fact result from the assertion of a greater role for the people characteristic of the Monitor. If, as I.R. Christie says, from the 1760's onward 'the genius of government through free public discussion was astir, cracking the bonds of its chrysalis, groping towards the sunshine maturity of the 1820's', then the Monitor certainly had a part in arguing for and, indeed, beginning the stir. If, as N.C. Phillips has rather less colourfully put it, public opinion was to be a 'new weight' thrown 'into the balance of the Augustan constitution and by the mid-nineteenth century to transform English politics', then the Monitor is calling for this and incidentally helping to create it from the 1750's. If 'the people' were called on first, as in the argument of the Monitor, to guard the independence of parliament against monopolizing ministers, they were to remain to take control and to extend eventually to include all the nation in the 'political nation'. There was indeed great potential for change both in the theory and in the working of the constitution in this emphasis on the people.

So great is their debt to the traditional modes of opposition thought that there is room for doubt about the usefulness of the often very loosely

144. Polo, p. 465; Christie, Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, pp. 62-3; Weston, p. 152; Davis, p. 64.

employed name 'radicalism' as applied to the movements of the later
eighteenth century. It might be less confusing to regard them as
developing expressions of the country tradition. Changes did come, of
course, penetrating down from more academic levels. Price and Priestley
revived the general speculative rationalism of Locke, alien from the
tradition in its methods of argument if not entirely in content. The cool
rational utilitarianism of Bentham comes from other eighteenth-century
influences. The impact of the French Revolution brought at least a new
language to express native ideas, and Paine administered a resounding shock
to radical thinking. Yet this study suggests that there is very little
new in eighteenth-century English radicalism of any variety, very little
that cannot be charted back to the country tradition and well into the
seventeenth century. The roots of the decline of the mixed balanced
constitution, as political and social circumstances changed, lie deeply
imbedded in its very hey-day, at least as much as in the French or Industrial
Revolutions at its end.

146. Dame Lucy Sutherland refers to '... that ill-defined upsurge of opinion
which we call eighteenth-century Radicalism...'. (The City...1768-1774,
p. 4). Generally historians seem to use the term of the later
eighteenth century in two overlapping senses. They call demands for
parliamentary reform 'radical' even if the nature and extent of the
demands and the arguments supporting them would not have been given this
name in the nineteenth century. More widely, the term is used to denote
a fundamental discontent with the current state of the constitution and
politics, distinct from opposition to particular ministries or policies.
While there are continuities forward to nineteenth-century developments
in both cases, there are also substantial differences which give rise to
further doubts about the usefulness of the description 'radical',
although on some grounds it can be justified.
A NOTE ON THE MONITOR'S USE OF PARTY NAMES

Despite its attacks on party division and faction the Monitor does on occasion use the party labels Whig and Tory and apply them to itself. In doing so, it passes through three distinct and very different phases. A consideration of these can contribute something to a precise understanding, such as Sir Lewis Namier called for, of how these labels were used in the mid-eighteenth century.¹

In its early life the Monitor clearly regards itself as Tory. It takes care to define the nature of its Toryism, denying the 'obsolete stigma' of Jacobitism which, it says, is used indiscriminately against all opposition. This is unjust, because its opposition is against persons, not the authorities in being. Those who so oppose are in fact as zealous and affectionate to the king and his family as those they oppose.² Nor are the authors of the Monitor, so they claim, old Tories of seventeenth-century vintage, men descended from the cavaliers who for various reasons, respectable and otherwise, distrusted and opposed all efforts to preserve liberty. Many of the soundest of these old Tories had their eyes opened under James II and rightly changed their principles. Now 'the maxims of the modern Tory' are 'grounded on that system of politicks, which is to guard the throne from a corrupt ministry, and to maintain the rights of the people against every system of power, which has, or may oppose them'. The rights of the crown, the liberties of the people, and harmony between

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¹ Sir Lewis Namier, 'Monarchy and the Party System', Crossroads of Power, p. 231. J.B. Owen makes a similar plea in reviewing Plumb, Political Stability, History, LIV, Feb., 1969, p. 107, where he says 'these party labels meant different things to different men, and it is time we asked "what?" and "to whom".... The answers are likely to be more than a little complicated'.

² The Monitor 2, 16 Aug. 1755; 3, 23 Aug. 1755; 153, 24 June 1758; 453, 7 Apr. 1764.
them: this is the grand cause of liberty in which the modern tory asks all to join as he rises up to defend king and country against men corrupted by spoils. The tories properly so called are

of that stamp, which opposed the disarming of the people; the introduction of a standing army; the requisition of foreign mercenaries; the hunting of wars on the continent; the neglect of our colonies; the payment of subsidiary treaties; the bribing of parliaments, and the increase of placemen and pensioners.3

If the tories have rightly changed their principles and adopted the cause of liberty, the whigs seem dangerously to have abandoned their old whiggery and taken up out-dated tory notions. Frequently and vehemently the Monitor undertakes 'an enquiry, whether the nominal whigs in these days act upon the principles of those, who brought about the REVOLUTION' and shows how modern whigs have fallen into arbitrary principles.4

The language of the old whigs was the power and majesty of the people, an original contract, the authority and independence of parliaments, liberty, resistance, exclusion, abdication, deposition. They took the lead in opposition to Charles II and James II. Later they opposed standing armies, the land war and the great increase of the national debt. Such true whiggish principles, acted on out of public spirit 'to guard the throne from anarchy and the people from tyranny', will always be reverenced.5 Yet how can the behaviour of modern whigs be reconciled with such principles? Over the last half-century the whigs have abandoned their principles and been corrupted by power. Even by the end of the seventeenth century, it is suggested, some were showing a dangerous change of attitude which threatened the constitution. Then under George I a pack of wicked men took advantage of his ignorance of the laws and the spirit of the people

3. 37, 17 Apr. 1756; 3 (first quotation); 190, 10 Mar. 1759 (second quotation).
4. 37 (the quotation); 3.
5. 24, 17 Jan. 1756; 37; 302, 2 May 1761; 153, 24 June 1758; 95, 14 May 1757 (quotation).
to advise the use of foreign troops. They were determined to monopolize
the royal favour and confidence by making the king jealous of his subjects.
As for contemporary whigs, they are 'Whigs out of interest, and not out
of principle'. 'Dominion is their idol', in search of which they have
supported various breaches of the constitution; their whiggism is a mere
pretence behind which, in pursuit of mercenary ambition, they sap the
foundations of freedom. They have outlived the memory of a contract that
sets bounds to power and of their advocacy of the authority and independence
of parliament. Instead, they now cry up the prerogative of the crown and
the lessening of the power, even the disarming of the people. The danger
which first appeared in William's reign that whigs would take up tory
principles when tories abandoned them seems thus to have been realized.
They are even attempting to restore 'that unconstitutional and ruinous
doctrine of passive obedience' by opposing the rights of the people to
protest and stigmatizing as republicans and levellers those who support
these rights.  

The Monitor's open avowal of the name tory in its first few years
confirms yet again the well-established fact that there were self-admitted
tories in politics in the 1750's. 7 Of more significance is its attempt
to trace the lineage of these 'modern' tories. The account it gives of the
major changes in the attitudes and ideas indicated by the party labels since
the seventeenth century was a fairly well-established one among opposition
propagandists, going back at least to Davenant's A True Picture of a Modern
Whig (1701). Even Lord Hervey, no opposition propagandist, gave a similar

6. 37; 32, 13 Mar. 1756; 153, 24 June 1758 (first two quotations); 299,
11 Apr. 1761; 24, 17 Jan. 1756; 95 (the quotation).
7. Owen, p. 66-7 fn. 1; Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution,
pp. 191-202; Namier and Brooke, I, pp. 184-5; B.W. Hill, ['Executive
Monarchy and the Challenge of the] Parties, [1689-1832; Two Concepts of
Government and Two Historiographical Interpretations'], Historical Journal,
account in 1727. It is somewhat different in emphasis from but not
totally in contradiction to the better-known Bolingbroke version of the
'country' history of parties. Bolingbroke insists that all grounds for
party distinction have disappeared. His views, foreshadowed by various
observers, English and foreign, who noted the similarities between moderate
whigs and moderate tories, were also taken up many times by those who
deplored the continued existence of parties.8

It has been argued that Bolingbroke's views could be said to be in
accord with modern historiography.9 His account, written in the 1730's,
of the nature of political divisions in terms of court and country rather
than whig and tory is certainly in broad outline very similar to that given
of the 50's and 60's by Namier. Yet it is not so certain that such an
account can be read back to the early decades of the century, as Bolingbroke
read his and Robert Walcott reads Namier.10 It could well be maintained
that the Monitor's thesis is much more in accord with recent work on this
earlier period which shows convincingly how some tory supporters, shaken
by the Revolution, took up the pre-Revolution country-opposition views of
the whigs, while developing stands on the new issues of the post-Revolution
period. Thus they preserved the distinctive identity of their body of
principles, although on different lines from pre-Revolutionary days.11

The Monitor is possibly not quite so accurate in its Hanoverian history of
the tories. Its protest against the practice of labelling all opposition

II, 1931, I, p. 3, quoted in E. Neville Williams, The Eighteenth Century
Constitution 1688-1715, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 183-5; Bolingbroke, Parties,
521-2; John Douglas, Seasonable Hints from an Honest Man, 1761, quoted in
Williams, pp. 185-6. The pamphlet The Sentiments of a Tory (1741)
presents a similar view to that of the Monitor, in contrast to Bolingbroke.
Green, pp. 273-4.


1956.

11. Plumb, Political Stability, pp. xiv-v, 187, ch. V; Holmes, chs II and
III especially.
relevant to contemporary issues and created vigorous constitutional debate, however fictitious that may have been.

Further, the country-constitutional element is not all that is in the Monitor's definition of modern toryism. It takes a stand on foreign policy which is clearly related to the tory line in Anne's reign on one of the major divisive issues between the parties. Other links with earlier tory principles appear in the Monitor's general attitudes on religion and on modern financial operations. Indeed of the great issues of the post-Revolutionary period of party struggle almost all are relevant in some way, much moderated, perhaps, especially in the case of religion, to contemporary affairs. At least they were felt to be so by contemporaries as judged by their polemical skill in seeing present issues exaggerated to parallel past crises. Thomas Perry has shown very precisely, over the naturalization bill of 1751 and the Jewish naturalization controversy of 1753, how important these old attitudes, formed in Anne's reign, could become on occasion in the middle of the century, how toryism could still come alive in a vigorous ideological stand. The Monitor's vocal contribution to the propaganda campaign of 1755-57 on an avowedly tory platform confirms his point. It can be misleading to take too sweepingly, as applying to all political life, such assertions based on a study of the house of commons as that it 'was universally recognized around 1754 that the old party denominations of Whig and Tory no longer corresponded to political realities and that the issues which formerly distinguished them were dead'. Toryism did mean something to some contemporaries in the mid-1750's; the tories were a distinct group to whom Pitt could direct a specific appeal.

Yet admittedly it is very hard to define the term precisely or to

15. See above pp. 53-6.
16. Perry, especially pp. 29-31, 179-80, 189-193; Hanier and Brooke, I, p. 186 (the quotation).
use it meaningfully to describe individuals. Others who would not have called themselves tory shared at least to some extent the views attributed by the Monitor to the tories. In many respects the Monitor was closer to 'real whigs' like Dashwood than to the tories with whom the prince of Wales attempted to come to an agreement in 1747. It represents the well-established popular tory tradition of the City, with its radical overtones, rather than the toryism of the parliamentary country gentlemen. Yet even this distinction between the country gentlemen and the forerunners of urban radicals among the tories of the 1750's cannot be made too sharply. Sir Roger Newdigate, the 'archetypal' tory country gentleman, is to be found speaking the language of urban radicals in appealing to the good judgement of the people over the Jewish Naturalization Act in 1753.

The Monitor's vindication of new tory principles and behaviour and accusations against contemporary whigs are concentrated in the first three years of the paper's life, the period of its virulent attack on the old ministers and support for ministerial changes to wage the war. As the Monitor becomes deeply involved in the second main phase of its engagement in contemporary politics, the defence of Pitt's government and especially his foreign policy, it apparently begins to have difficulty in defending itself against charges of having abandoned true tory principles. Something of this discomfiture appears in the paper entitled 'The Monitor's


18. Namier, 'Monarchy and the Party System', p. 230; Perry, p. 182. He had, after all, been member for Middlesex, 1742-7 (Owen, p. 333).

19. Attacks on the 'pretended whigs' do continue, much less frequently, after this, as part of the Monitor's support for Pitt and explanation of the difficulties and opposition he encountered. E.g. the Monitor 221, 13 Oct. 1759; 299, 11 Apr. 1761.
Vindication of his constitutional Principles' in answer to the critical pamphlet-letter called *The Honest Grief of a Tory*. After reflecting at length on the evils of party division the Monitor denies that a tory can be only 'a professed anti-courtier; that a minister cannot be free from corruption, and that such as join with a minister, must be sunk for ever in a mass of corruption'. It proceeds to defend Pitt's policies at length to show that he has attempted only what is constitutional and in the best interests of the people. It defines 'true' tory principles and accuses its critic of being merely a pretended tory, one of the 'unkennelled' faction of the late administration who now take on the name of tory in order to spread disaffection among the real tories who seek their country's good. 20

If on the one hand the Monitor defends itself by vituperation against its critics and by endeavouring to show that Pitt's policies are consistent with tory principles, it also replies to criticism by increasing emphasis on the irrelevance as well as the undesirability of party divisions. This answer could also be given to whigs who attacked Pitt for his reliance on the tories. 21 The same paper expresses amazement that people can still assume party labels under a ministry 'that disdains the aid of party, and has long since given the coup de grace to the opposition of Whig and Tory, which had served iniquitous ministers, in several reigns, for a skreen to their ruinous measures...'. Under a good minister what was implied from the beginning of the paper's life becomes increasingly clear. All the distinctions of whig and tory that still exist are so altered as to become unrecognizable. True whigs and modern tories should agree and these names of distinction become 'quite abolished and

20. 190, 10 Mar. 1759. See above pp. 204-8.

forgotten', if only the whigs remained faithful to their principles. 22

The Monitor never fully reconciles itself to Pitt's coalition with
Newcastle, but it urges the unity which it says self-interest dictates in
face of danger at home and abroad. In fact it claims frequently that Pitt
by following right measures has achieved the 'hearty union' it desires.
'At present all party-disputes seem to be laid asleep: those old
distinctions of Whig and Tory, which have so long distracted the nation ... are no more heard of' despite the efforts of the late ministers to perpetuate
them. 23 There is nothing in this urging of united support for a good
minister as a general principle that is contrary to standards of political
behaviour urged earlier by the Monitor (even though it is forced into some
awkward volte faces in defence of Pitt's foreign policy).

Occasional echoes of the insistence on the irrelevance and undes-
irability of party distinctions characteristic of this middle phase of
the paper's life continue to the end. 'There's not a man of sixty years,
attentive to the administration of the state, under Whig and Tory, but
must acknowledge, that either of them in power, when grown wanton in the
abuse of it, or endeavoured to maintain themselves in its enjoyment, by
illegal and unwarrantable measures, have made it a necessary shield for
their own protection'and have encouraged their followers to traduce
opposition with opprobious names, such as republican or jacobite.

Is it not, therefore, amazing to see honest Tories
so often foolishly defending knavish Tories; and
untainted Whigs protecting corrupt Whigs....
They might soon be convinced by conferring notes, That
they have but one common interest; the interest of
their country... 24

22. The Monitor 190, 10 Mar. 1759 (first quotation); 37, 17 Apr. 1756
(second quotation).
23. 119, 29 Oct. 1757; 152, 17 June 1758 (the longer quotation).
24. 433, 19 Nov. 1763 (first quotation); 468, 21 July 1764 (second quotation).
The latter in its complete form is virtually a direct quote from
In its claim that party differences had been extinguished under the true patriot administration, the Monitor is in line with much other contemporary comment which apparently felt that whatever distinctive identity had remained to the tories up to that point was now lost in their support of Pitt. Modern historians have this time chosen to accept the validity of contemporary comment about the 'extinction of parties' in the later 1750's and early 1760's. It appears to be generally agreed that party labels then lost any remaining content or usefulness in indicating political behaviour. These historians point out the realities behind the claim and the forces operating to make it true: Pitt's cultivation of tory support, his concerting of important measures with them, tory sympathy with the 'country' aspirations of George III, and support of the administration of Bute, the extinction of any remaining jacobite pretence with the accession of a young British-born and educated prince of the fourth generation of the new dynasty. It seems indeed that the late 1750's and early 1760's mark a significant point in the use of party labels to indicate political principles, a watershed for toryism as well as country attitudes, dispersing its supporters in various directions. The 'modern toryism' of the Monitor's first period was dying. Its proponents, especially it would seem those in the City, were ripe for conversion to support of a minister who paid some court to their susceptibilities. In the process and under the impact of the war and its aftermath, the stock


27. E.g. Beckford went on to lead the City 'radicals' while Shebbeare and Sir John Philipps both came to support the administration in the new reign. See also Namier and Brooke, I, p. 188.

toryism with which the Monitor started life was fundamentally changed, its old shibboleths, most notably those of foreign policy, were finally relinquished, so that there were some grounds for contemporary accusations that it had forgotten its original principles. Not all the distinctive content of 'modern toryism' was lost, notably not its constitutional attitudes, but what emerged from the change was something that was no longer recognizably or explicitly tory.

References to whigs and tories are not very frequent in the paper's middle years. Gradually, however, a further shift in its use of party labels becomes apparent as the paper returns to unmitigated opposition to government following the fall of Pitt. The change is foreshadowed, perhaps, in the unfavourable references to 'modern tories' who are too rigid in their anti-ministerial attitudes and fail to commit themselves wholeheartedly to Pitt. It becomes explicit much later (1761-62) in the context of warnings against evil counsellors and consideration of the possibility of peace with France, when the tory administration of Anne's last years is regarded with unremitting hostility. From this time onwards unfavourable references to tories are quite frequent. A lengthy series of articles in 1763-4 gives a history of parties from the reign of Charles I. It presents a most unflattering picture not only of pre-Revolution tories, 'whose principles have always leaned to the establishment of arbitrary power', but also of tories after the Revolution. Under William and Mary they did all they could to keep up party animosity while in Anne's reign, when they at last managed to come to power, they endangered liberty, property, the constitution, the church and Britain's external power with

29. The distinctively tory religious attitudes of the Monitor are also much pronounced in its earlier than in its later days. See above p. 56.
30. The Monitor 325, 10 Oct. 1761; 362, 26 June 1762; 364, 10 July 1762; 365, 17 July 1762; 425, 24 Sep. 1763.
their policies. Only the accession of the house of Hanover saved the protestant succession and committed the administration to the 'true patriots of Liberty'. Yet even this has not meant the end of tory influence. They survive with French help and have at every crisis encouraged rebellion at home and from abroad and hindered England's advantage. 'This will be the case, so long as the friends of Liberty are driven from the presence and councils of their Sovereign, and their places shall be filled with men, whose former actions have disclosed a dislike to the House of Hanover, and an affection for arbitrary and unconstitutional measures.' Tories so described have no recognizable affinity with the 'modern' tories of 1756-7. It is apparent that the Monitor is coming to regard itself as whig and the ministers of the king as tory.

This alteration in the Monitor's party sympathies and in the meaning given to party labels becomes quite clear in the last year of the paper's life and seems finally to be determined by the issues aroused by the Wilkes case and the concern over liberty which these intensified. In attempting to guide its readers in the confused political situation it sees as having arisen since the fall of Pitt, the paper reverts to a more conventional and pejorative use of the term tory, the seventeenth-century stereotype as seen through eighteenth-century whig eyes. Tories are supporters of the prerogative and arbitrary power while whigs are for liberty. A tory who defends liberty is a contradiction in terms. They will never change their real nature despite attempts to confuse distinctions. It is vital to test those who claim the name of patriot on a great question of liberty, and to distinguish the rank tory and the rotten whig who joins him out of private ambition from the sound whig. Especially is this so now, when there is a real danger of the revival of arbitrary

31. 434-441, 26 Nov. 1763 - 14 Jan. 1764. The quotations are from 435 (the first) and 441 (the other two).
principles, when tories are openly accepted at court and in the administration and are able to avow and act upon principles they formerly pretended to renounce. The situation is such that for an honest patriot there can be no neutrality in the divisions which beset the country. The issue is one of liberty versus Caledonian toryism. Nor in such circumstances is a coalition possible without signs of a clear conversion of the tories and proofs of their so newly discovered loyalty.  

The Monitor occasionally uses other terms than whig and tory to describe past and current political divisions, most commonly those of court and country. The court-country division seems to be regarded as a more fundamental one than that between whig and tory, arising more readily and naturally. On one occasion it is explained as occurring because of imbalance of property and power between king and subject which leads naturally to fears and jealousies. More often the division is seen as arising because of wicked and incapable ministers who create a lack of confidence between court and country or deliberately provoke divisions to screen themselves.  

Neither the attitudes and tenets of each side nor their relations to whigs and tories are explored in any detail, but as would be expected the tone of references is usually favourable to the country side.  

Despite obvious changes in the use of the names whig and tory the Monitor's line is not without some consistency. The emphasis moves from  

32. 458, 12 May 1764; 480, 13 Oct. 1764; 497, 9 Feb. 1765.  
33. 155, 8 July 1758; 190, 10 Mar. 1759; 243, 15 Mar. 1760; 391, 29 Jan. 1763; 453, 7 Apr. 1764.  
34. For passing references to the connections between these and whig-tory divisions see 168, 7 Oct. 1758; 187, 17 Feb. 1759; 436, 10 Dec. 1763; 437, 17 Dec. 1763; 458, 12 May 1764.
concern over misguided policies and corruption to a more general fear for liberty. Yet, throughout, devotion to what it regards as Revolution principles is the avowed touchstone, by which true patriots are to be distinguished from those who merely claim the title. Further, the unavowed but fundamental driving force of anti-ministerialism is clear and makes it easier to understand the volte-face in use of labels. Probably the 'middling sort' of the City in general were not so much committedly tory as opposed to the political establishment. To oppose the 'hereditary whig' ministers of George II the label tory had to be adopted if party names were to be used at all, and some in the City had sufficient sympathy with acknowledged tory attitudes to take the name without much difficulty.

Fundamental opposition was no less strong in the new reign than the old, especially after the resignation of Pitt in 1761. Yet new circumstances as seen by the City seemed to require a new language for it. The tories had apparently come to court, the king's favourite was a 'Stuart', whigs of Revolution families were losing a lifetime's hold on office. A tory nomenclature hardly suited opposition in such circumstances. When, on top of all this, new threats to liberty were discovered, it was more natural to revert to an older definition of toryism to decry the same enemy, ministers.

In its volte-face the Monitor parallels and illumines that of its patron. Both Richard and William Beckford were avowedly and undoubtedly tory in both principles and connections in the 1750's. The insinuation in a paragraph in the Public Advertiser during the City election campaign in 1754 that at Bristol William had called himself a 'REAL WHIG' and that therefore in London he could at best be only a nominal tory is, if true, less a slur on his toryism than an indication of the closeness between surviving real whiggery and the popular toryism with which Beckford was identifying himself in London, and in the spirit of which he avowed himself to Bedford as 'zealously attached to the Protestant Succession and to the
liberties of the people'. 35 Yet in 1763 Beckford declared in the house of commons, 'I am, Sir, a Whig'. In condemning the doctrine of passive obedience then as he had in 1765, in defending Wilkes, to condemn a whig ministry for acting on tory principles and in 1769 to accuse others of 'rank Tory doctrines', he was presenting the newly revived stereotype of toryism. 36

Whatever the reason for this change in usage on the part of the Monitor and its patron, the revival and highly-charged, even if not frequent or regular, use of party labels indicates that the audience for whom the Monitor was writing firmly believed that important principles were at stake in contemporary politics and that the old party names still had some relevance in new circumstances to distinguish these principles. In these new circumstances it was no longer true to their perception of politics to emphasize the lapsing of meaningful party distinctions. Furthermore, it was not only the readers of the Monitor who thought so. The changed content the Monitor gives to whiggism and toryism in these years is no mere freak aberration among propagandists on the extreme edge of the political nation. In contemporary political debate many more illustrious politicians than the authors of the Monitor give a new meaning to, or rather revert to an older meaning for, party labels, and not only for propaganda purposes.

It is true, certainly, that if toryism is increasingly difficult to define in the Hanoverian period, whiggism is even more attenuated. under

35. See above pp. 63-5. PA., 25 Apr. 1754, front page; Beckford to Bedford, 21 May 1754, Correspondence of...Bedford, II, p. 146. The evidence of his brother's early connections and of the Monitor would suggest that Namier and Brooke (I, p. 60) are wrong in calling Richard a tory only by courtesy, despite the confusing reference of Walpole (George the Second, I, p. 357) to the debate on the army estimates in Nov. 1754, when one of the Beckfords (it is not clear which) apparently identified himself then with a 'whig' opposition to a 'tory' ministry.

36. Namier and Brooke, II, p. 75; Walpole, George the Third, II, p. 42.
the adulterating influence of conversion to the established creed. Yet contemporaries continued to use the term, apparently believing it to have some content and relevance. And it has been shown to be possible to distil some distinctive meaning, significant if not very precise or universally accepted. This meaning, particularly the anti-monarchical impulse, the wish to constrain the king's personal activity in politics, which is seen as fundamental to all its varieties, became newly relevant at the beginning of the reign of George III. At least it became so in the eyes of suspicious Londoners who saw their idol fall, and of established politicians and their connections suddenly finding their hopes of office gone. Thus the name whig was appropriated by the opposition to George III's early administrations both in and outside parliament. Some rested content with the elaboration of new anti-monarchical opposition shibboleths. In others revived whiggism took a more popular form. To them, aristocratic juntos and an unrepresentative house of commons, insensitive to outside opinion, were as threatening as excessive monarchical pretensions. They saw other questions of the sixties as involving equally important whig principles, particularly the Wilkes affairs and all their ramifications which raised the whole question of 'liberty'.

Relatively superficial search readily throws up contemporary comment expressing a sense of the revived relevance of whig principles and the need to refurbish them. Burke among the more conservative whigs indicated the inadequacies of the unthinking whiggism of those long in office in his comment that '[t]o be a Whig on the business of an hundred years ago, is very consistent with every advantage of present servility'. Under

his tutelage the Rockingham group revised the country whiggery of the Pelhams. Horace Walpole's is the reaction of more popular whiggism; in his eyes the constitution emerged from its 'attainable optimum' of the years 1750-56 to face a series of threats lasting the rest of his long life. Against the successive threats of king, aristocrats and people (in France), Walpole upheld his view of the balanced constitution and showed his real and abiding concern for 'liberty'.\textsuperscript{38} Of those more prominent in politics, Pitt illustrates best the popular whig reaction. Despite the support of the Tories for his war ministry and his periodic stands as the enemy of all party, Pitt was as adept as any in seeing new issues in the early sixties which raised whig principles. As early as November 1762 he told Thomas Walpole that the old distinction of whig and tory was reviving. During the Grenville ministry he insisted to the duke of Newcastle that the term whig would become meaningless if it did not involve making a signal stand against the principles of government then in operation. 'There is a distinction between right and wrong - between Whig and Tory', he asserted on yet another occasion.\textsuperscript{39} Such examples are enough to suggest that the Monitor was not alone in thinking that principles were at stake in the events of the 1760's and that party labels were relevant to describe them. It may be true in fact that all politicians of the time, whether in or out of office, were whigs in their own eyes and that their claims were largely justified by connection, conversion or doctrine. It may be strange to see the recent Tory, Dowdeswell, leading the Rockingham whigs in the house of commons.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, Works, 1852, III, pp. 115-6, quoted in Pares, George III and the Politicians, pp. 48-9; Hill, 'Parties', pp. 394-5; Foord, 'The Only Unadulterated Whig', pp. 34-43.

\textsuperscript{39} Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 431, quoted in Pares, George III and the Politicians, p. 56 fn. 1; Yorke, Hardwicke, III, p. 516, quoted in Herbert Butterfield, '[Some] Reflections On the Early Years of George III's Reign', Journal of British Studies, IV, 2, 1965, pp. 100-1; the quotation is from Dodd, p. 114 (no source given).

\textsuperscript{40} Namier and Brooke, I, p. 188.
Nevertheless, some contemporaries felt strongly that new issues had arisen to distinguish true from false whigs.

These false whigs came to be called tories in opposition propaganda, in line with well-established practice illustrated by the Monitor from its beginning. Wilkes reflected the propaganda in 1767 when he wrote to Almon, 'You can never trust any ministers in our country. The Whigs in power turn Tories; though alas! the Tories do not turn Whigs'. In the same vein, Horace Walpole said of Grenville during his administration that he might call himself a whig but he had really become a tory since, besides being despotic by nature, he had taken over from Bute 'the standards of the prerogative'. Pitt told the king himself in August 1763 that Grenville's ministry 'was not founded on true revolution principles; that it was a tory administration'. There was, of course, little justification in fact for such accusations, much less than for the opposition's take-over of the whig label. Nor would those to whom it was given accept the tory label. Even two of the chief purveyors of the myth, Walpole and Burke, on occasion implicitly admit the lack of substance in their propaganda by distinguishing 'real' tories of pre-1760 vintage from court supporters.

Yet the opposition propaganda was very potent and the Monitor was not alone in it.


Alongside the new court tories of opposition propaganda, some avowed old tories lingered on, not wholly committed to the new court, still distinguishable for a time among the independent country gentlemen and still often very close to the popular kind of whig in political behaviour. The avowed toryism of Hume and Johnson in his later career is on a different plane again, tory chiefly in being a sceptical pragmatic reaction against the prejudices and shibboleths of whiggism. Such a variety of contemporary usage certainly increases confusion about the meaning of toryism and deprives the term of much significance in the later eighteenth century except as evidence that those who hurled it around believed, to some extent sincerely, that some principles were at stake.

The consideration offered here of the use of party names is a very minor one in the study of the nature and importance of parties in the mid-eighteenth century. It is in no sense an attempt to question the description, built upon the work of Sir Lewis Namier, of the workings of politics centred on the house of commons in which organized divisions based on intellectual tenets, principles or policies played very little part. It does not attempt to deny the difficulty of using the labels without confusion about individuals or groups, or to predict behaviour. Nor does it suggest that when they are used they refer to organized and politically effective groups. Certainly politics, at least at their heart in parliament and cabinets, and political debate, even in the Monitor, could be conducted for long periods without reference to whigs and tories and the use of the labels in the house of commons and elections became less

and less frequent from the 1760's to the 1780's.\textsuperscript{44} Even in understanding political controversies and the fundamental divisions in political attitudes, the court-country antithesis is unquestionably closer to reality and of more use.

This study does, however, seek to point out that some of the more extreme formulations of such views can be misleading if they seek to suggest that 'the detested names of Whig and Tory' can be exorcized from politics altogether.\textsuperscript{45} There was more to the political life of England in the mid-eighteenth century than cabinets, parliaments or even elections. In the preoccupation with describing these accurately, the activities and interests of the wider political nation have sometimes been forgotten. Party names did not disappear from the political language even of leading politicians and certainly not from that of political propaganda among this wider political nation.\textsuperscript{46} They were used without precision, and, as the \textit{Monitor} clearly shows, without continuity of meaning, but they were used with some point. Particularly their use indicates that clashes of principle and ideas were felt to be at stake in contemporary politics.\textsuperscript{47} As it is surely part of historical understanding to study and assess the significance of the language contemporaries used to describe their view of politics and the questions of their time, historians must acknowledge and attempt to assess this usage. Even if it is purely polemical or the result of 'illusions, exaggerations or misconceptions' about the nature of contemporary politics,\textsuperscript{48} it is still part of the wider context in which


\textsuperscript{45} The duke to the duchess of Marlborough, 9/20 Oct. 1704, quoted in Holmes, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{46} Perry, p. 191; Hill, 'Parties', pp. 389-93.

\textsuperscript{47} This is particularly clear in Walpole to Hertford, 3 Aug. 1764, ed. Toynbee, VI, pp. 95-8.

\textsuperscript{48} Perry, p. 193.
politics were conducted and in which men acted, and to some extent can help to explain their actions. At the very least it helped to ensure the survival of the party labels until, with the simplification of group politics in the 1770's and 1780's, the opposition usage came to have some relation to the realities of political organization and the names lived on. They were to be given a revised content once more and to be accepted by both sides in the early nineteenth century, after further and greater issues had arisen and political circumstances changed again.

It is indeed hard to assess the impact of propaganda, debate and concern for principles, as partly expressed in the use of party names, on the realities of politics, the decisions made in cabinets and votes in parliament. Concern about principle and susceptibility to propaganda was strongest in those away from the heart of politics, on the edge of the political nation, the independents in parliament, the country gentlemen and the 'middling sort' of London. 'It was mostly noise that they generated, rather than effective political energy.' Yet their outbursts were not wholly without immediate impact. In the longer term, propaganda and debate about principles in politics did signalize and assist the wakening of a wider section of the nation to political interest and helped to open politics more to their pressure.

49. Namier and Brooke, I, especially pp. 198-203.
50. Perry, p. 191.
EPILOGUE

How Influential was the Monitor?

This study has so far assumed that the Monitor is of some interest and importance to the historian, partly because of its length of life and the significance of the period it covers, partly because of the audience to which it is addressed and the interests it reflects.¹ The two major sections of the study have sought to justify this assumption by demonstrating what can be learnt from a critical consideration of the Monitor's commentary on events. Before too much is claimed for it, however, some more careful attempt must be made to assess its contemporary influence and its importance in the development of political comment in the press. This is a difficult task. On the first point, the materials just do not exist to reconstruct the major piece of evidence on which an assessment should rest, the circulation figures.² A judgement on the second demands a close knowledge of the nature and volume of comment in other vehicles of expression, particularly the newspaper and pamphlet, which would by itself make another major study.³ Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be reached, chiefly by considering the degree to which the paper was noticed

¹. See above pp. 6-7, 70, 381-2, 478, 539.
². See above p. 45.
³. Beginning with some detailed knowledge of what issues were of concern to contemporary politicians, such a study could proceed to select short periods of special interest, or more randomly sampled months, for a survey of discussion in newspapers and pamphlets. The notices in the Critical and Monthly Reviews provide valuable information about what pamphlets were being published. The study would be limited of course by the patchy survival of sources and the difficulties of locating pamphlets but certainly enough has survived and can be located to make a worthwhile exercise. One problem would arise from the way in which letters and articles were often copied without acknowledgement from one paper to another; e.g. the reports of the Monitor and the Champion in PA., 9 May 1763, and L.C., 7-10 May 1763, are in identical words, with identical introductions. It would be difficult to know for which paper material was originally written.
by contemporaries.

One point needs to be made strongly first. Even the briefest acquaintance with eighteenth-century political debate, whether in parliament or in propaganda outside, will raise doubts about the originality of the Monitor. Not only were its general lines of argument, on continental connections and a maritime strategy, on religious and economic issues, on the nature of the constitution and threats to it, frequently anticipated. Even more specific points, for example that an invasion scare is being created by ministers so that they may more easily impose on the people, or that the hiring of foreign mercenaries is a breach of the Act of Settlement, were perennials of political debate. On some significant occasions, as has been shown, the Monitor took its very words from its predecessors. It was clearly drawing on a firmly established pattern of political argument, a consensus as to what were the major issues, in which events were moulded to preconceptions as often as preconceptions to events. Political debate in the eighteenth century was in some respects more lively than is often realized; in others it was monotonous. It would be interesting to know how far down the social scale this rhetoric was accepted, to consider more closely how nearly it related to the interests of men. However unoriginal, it is still evidence of how contemporaries perceived reality, and in the Monitor's version of it can be seen the subtle modifications it is undergoing in response to changing circumstances, in foreign policy assumptions, in political attitudes and labels, and in constitutional ideas. The stock attitudes emerged from the 1760's weakened, adapted. On these grounds, mainly, not originality, the study of the Monitor is to be justified.

The Monitor's impact on contemporaries can be gauged to some extent by the

4. E.g. see Sedgwick, House of Commons, I, pp. 36, 39, 43.
5. Political prints illustrate the same point. See George, passim, especially pp. 1-3.
degree to which it was noticed by other publications. The Annual Register, commenced in 1758, gives neither it nor its more short-lived companions any attention in its reviews of essays and books, although it does give some account, in its chronicle, of legal proceedings involving the Monitor and North Briton. The two major literary reviews, the Critical and the Monthly, take a little more heed at least of the collected editions of the paper. Both are condescending in attitude, especially towards any pretensions to literary style, historical knowledge or wit. The Monthly Review goes to some length to show up the political inconsistencies of the Monitor and does not consider its authors equal to the character of political writers. The matter of the first two volumes could, it considers, easily have been included in a twelve-penny pamphlet, although later it does comment that the Monitor has given a smart reply to The Honest Grief of a Tory. The Critical Review gives rather more notice and after its initial humorous contempt becomes somewhat warmer. It quotes the dedications of the second and third volumes as especially worthy of attention and considers many of the papers worth perusing, some being written by a more masterly hand, although often they lack anything new, striking or animated. Its remark in 1759 that the Monitor cannot be blamed for continuing its admonitions while the public continues to listen suggests that it thought the Monitor had some considerable audience. Both the reviews comment with some sympathy to the Monitor on the attack on it in A Letter from the Anonymous Author of a Letter Versified to the Anonymous Writer of the Monitor, just after Pitt's resignation. Neither gives any noticeably greater or warmer notice to the North Briton or any other weekly paper.

Such publications concerned themselves chiefly with works of some substance or literary pretension. Catering less critically for the omnivorous appetite

6. These publications have not, even when they survive, all been read in their entirety for the Monitor period. Where available, indexes have been used; sample months, one early and one late in each year, have been looked at in detail to check the accuracy of the index or to supply some grounds for conclusion where there is no index. Other material has come to light by chance or as a result of quick thumbing through.


(Cont'd)
of the eighteenth-century mind were the monthly magazines, containing articles and letters, reviews and extracts of current works of a wide variety, news and miscellaneous information, the _Gentleman's_ and _London Magazines_, the _Royal_, the _Scots_, and briefly, the _Literary Magazine_. One of their original purposes had been to include a summary of the more important contents of the daily and weekly papers. Almost every month in the _Monitor_ period, rather less in the later years, the _Gentleman's Magazine_ reproduced at least one of the general essays from other papers. It gives markedly less notice to political essays. Extracts are taken from the _Monitor_ only three times in 1756 (it is also referred to once) and 1757, once in 1759, once in 1760 (from two papers on corn distilling, with a favourable reference to their 'Strength of Argument') and twice in 1761. In June 1762, in response to the beginning of the battle of the weeklies, the magazine commences its _Account of the Political Papers_, in which the _Monitor_ is included and which continues until December. Then it loses interest. Until March 1763 it gives some extracts from papers it considers 'to be the production of masterly pens'. These do not include the _Monitor_. After that there is nothing. The magazine appears to turn to pamphlets for political interest.

The _London Magazine_ notices the _Monitor_ only rather more frequently, beginning with its earliest numbers. It did not, however, introduce a special feature in 1762-3, and its attention drops markedly in the 1760's. Johnson's short-lived _Literary Magazine_ of 1756-8 noticed the _Monitor_, _Test_ and _Con-Test_ equally in 1756, three times each, and the _Monitor_ three times in 1757.

7. (Cont'd) -301, XX, 1759, pp. 186, 268, XXV, p. 501.
8. E.g. the _Connoisseur_ and the _World_ in 1755-6, the _Idler_ in 1758-9, the _Schemer_ in 1761.
11. The _Literary Magazine_ (only one volume, for 1757, and the index of another, 1756, are available in the British Museum) 1756, pp. 352, 357, 399, (for the (Cont'd)
Even less attention is given, judged by their indexes, by the Scots Magazine and the Royal Magazine (the latter founded in 1759). Altogether enough attention was given to the Monitor, in the Gentleman's and London Magazines particularly, to bring it to the attention of their readers, but far from enough to establish it firmly as a major source of political comment. This is no reflection, however, on the merits of the Monitor relative to other papers of its kind; no more attention is given to them. Clearly the magazines had developed far past their original purpose to include the most important material from more frequent publications.

Much more substantial is the notice given to the Monitor by the newspapers and in this the evening papers, published three times a week on the post days and circulating widely in the country, are predominant, particularly two of them founded in the Monitor's life-time, Lloyd's Evening Post and the London Chronicle. In the two years after its foundation in July 1757, Lloyd's Evening Post gives extracts of virtually every issue of the Monitor, of varying but significant length. When the run of surviving papers resumes in mid-1760 the number of extracts has dropped markedly and remains lower until mid-1762. In the latter part of 1762 the paper carries a feature entitled 'Extracts from the Weekly Periodical Papers' which again notices the Monitor each week, although much more briefly, in a few lines rather than a column or more, and with the other weeklies. This continues until late March 1763. From then on until the end of 1764 the practice varies between such short extracts of the Monitor with other papers and longer extracts of the Monitor alone. In 1765, suddenly, there is nothing. On the surviving evidence then, for almost half the Monitor's life, from mid-1757 until mid-1759 and from mid-1762 until the end of 1764,

13. The newspapers selected for examination were determined partly by the runs available in the British Museum and Bodleian Library, mainly to be as representative as possible of the types of papers published in London. Locations are indicated in the bibliography.
Lloyd's Evening Post gives it some acknowledged publicity virtually every week, with occasional notice for most of the rest of the time. Such attention was more important than the condescending tone of the Post's review of the collected Monitors in 1759. It must have considerably increased the paper's readership, especially in the country where many readers would not have been prepared to incur the expense of subscribing separately to a paper not carrying news.

Similarly the London Chronicle, which began life in January 1757, seems to have noticed at least half the issues of the Monitor, usually at some length, until mid-1760. Then the number extracted falls to about one-quarter of the issues and remains at this level, about six noticed each half year, until the beginning of 1764, except for a further fall in the first half of 1762 and a marked rise in the same period of 1763. In 1762-3 the extracts are generally shorter and associated with other papers. No extracts at all have been found for 1764 and 1765.

As well as news, the London Chronicle carried from its beginning a considerable variety of other material, essays both general and political, extracts from and reviews of books and pamphlets, and letters. In other words, it was a paper of comment as much as news, even if little of the comment was original to it. In its earlier years the Monitor extracts formed a substantial part of its political comment, with letters and extracts from pamphlets. In the 1760's, the number of articles and letters written particularly for the London Chronicle, many on political subjects, appears to increase. By 1764-5 the number of essays, both general and political, has decreased, although lengthy extracts from pamphlets continue. The Monitor would appear to have been squeezed out partly by some decline in interest in the essay, partly by the Chronicle's development of its own comment. Lloyd's Evening Post began life with the
declared intention of following the general pattern of the London Chronicle, but by 1760 the amount of comment had declined considerably and it became more a news and advertisement paper, although continuing to have a fair number of letters. Apart from them, it seems to have made little attempt to develop its own comment. Even more than for the London Chronicle the Monitor can be said to have provided a major part of its political comment.

Two other papers, also founded in the Monitor's life time, give it less but still considerable notice. The St James's Chronicle, an evening paper of the established kind founded in 1761, ignored it until the controversies of 1762-3 brought its attention first to the new papers, then to the Monitor. From then on it gave extracts of varying but usually considerable length, of most numbers of the Monitor, with other weekly papers when they existed, and it alone, of all the papers examined, continued to pay some attention to the Monitor until the end of the latter's life. Although it was never dominated by political comment, it carried quite a lot, especially at times of excitement such as Pitt's resignation, including series of political letters ostensibly written for it and extracts and accounts of pamphlets. Yet the copying from the Monitor and other papers was a substantial part of its political content. The other paper to give considerable attention to the Monitor was a weekly of the chronicle-journal type, the Universal Chronicle, begun in April 1756. It began by noticing the Monitor virtually every week and this formed a large part of its political comment, although it also had letters and, from May 1758, its own general essay, the Idler. Its attention to the Monitor and the amount of comment generally, declined in late 1759 and early 1760 and in 1760, when it amalgamated with the Westminster Journal, the latter's essay began to provide most of its comment. No copies for the period survive after March/April 1760, but in its early years anyway it can definitely be said to have helped to boost the

15. This statement is based on checks of two sample months a year; the paper has no index.
16. The Universal Chronicle; or, Weekly Gazette. It was known briefly, from its (Cont'd)
Monitor's readership.

More copies survive of the other chronicle founded at the same time, the New or Owen's Weekly Chronicle, but it apparently paid less attention to the Monitor except in its first few numbers, when the essays provided by far the greater part of its comment. In later 1758 and 1759 references are only occasional, at most two a month, and there is nothing in the surviving papers for 1761 and 1764, by which time there had been an increase in other political comment, especially letters. The one copy extant for the relevant period of 1762-3 has an account of the weekly papers, including the Monitor. Owen's Weekly Chronicle began with the avowed aim of defeating the high price of newspapers by offering more news and extracts from the best literature at a cheaper rate, but very soon its news far outweighed its comment. By 1764 it was much changed, had added the Westminster Journal to its heading and carried it as its second article after its own essay, the Babler, but otherwise had little comment, political or otherwise, and relatively few letters. The few copies that survive of the weekly Westminster Journal as a separate paper show no signs of copying of the Monitor, although it included considerable comment and was largely political. Neither does the weekly of even older vintage, Read's Weekly Journal, which, although it carries articles of general and especially historical interest, never in this period really develops correspondence or political comment.

Although two of the new evening papers found the Monitor a useful addition to their material, apparently the older ones did not. The Whitehall Evening Post, founded in 1718 by Defoe, remained a news and advertisement paper, with only an occasional letter and no other comment. It takes no notice whatsoever

16. (Cont'd) fifth to thirty-ninth number, as Payne's Universal Chronicle, and from the beginning of 1760 incorporated and Westminster Journal in its title

17. It is Owen's Weekly Chronicle; or, Universal Journal, from its second number.

18. Ibid., 19-26 Feb. 1763, p. 66.

19. Ibid., 8 Apr. 1758 (the one issue entitled the New Weekly Chronicle).

20. The history of the Westminster Journal is obscure. Both the Universal Chronicle from 1760 and Owen's Weekly Chronicle from 1764 incorporated its

(Cont'd)
of the Monitor. In a very different class was the London Evening Post, begun in 1727 and long known for its obvious political bias towards the 'patriotic' opposition, expressed chiefly in letters, some of which were professionally written for it, and embryonic editorials as well as slanted news. 21 Throughout the Monitor period it continued to be a strongly political paper. Although their politics were very similar, it makes relatively little acknowledged reference to the Monitor. For 1755-6 only one reference in a footnote was discovered. From 1757-61 there is on average one reference each year for the two months examined, together with another in 1757 noticed by chance. 22 In June 1762, like so many other publications, it begins a feature on the weekly controversies entitled 'Literary and Entertaining Articles from the several Publications' which continues to August 1763 although irregularly. It notices the Monitor frequently, along with other papers. By the end of 1763 copying from the essay papers had been dropped and no reference to the Monitor has been found in 1764-5.

The papers that were to become the major political papers of the 1760's were the morning dailies, especially the Public Advertiser and the Gazetteer. 23 Until 1763, although the number of letters it carried was gradually increasing, the Public Advertiser was primarily a newspaper. In March 1763 it changed its format to four columns and announced a new editorial policy. 24 As a result, its political content, paragraphs, accounts of pamphlets and particularly correspondence, increased markedly. From this time it also included on its back page extracts from the political weeklies. It gave particular attention to the last few numbers of the North Briton but after its demise began

20. (Cont'd) name in their title and its essay in their content, yet separate copies of the paper survive until 1810. There are, however, none in the British Museum for the years 1760-Aug. 1764.


24. PA., 14 Mar. 1763, front page.
to include the Monitor. It continued to notice it, with other papers, if
only briefly and increasingly briefly as time passed, every Monday until
December 1764, when the feature was dropped. The surviving copies of the
Gazetteer for this period are hardly sufficient to make a judgement possible, but it, too, commenced a series on its back page in June 1762 on the political
papers and noticed the Monitor, amongst others, at least until the end of
the year. There is no evidence of other copying. Like the Public Advertiser
and especially in the 1760's it was developing its own political comment.

It has not been possible, because of limited time with the sources, to
make any attempt to discover how far the Monitor may have been copied by
the rapidly developing if still largely unoriginal provincial press. Certainly
provincial papers carried essays; certainly some were copied, like other
material, from the London papers, especially the evening papers; probably
the Monitor was often included. By chance, one example has been found.
The Monitor's mock 'Advertisement' about the loss of Minorca at the end of the
paper of 24 July 1756 also appeared in the Oxford Journal. More important is
one piece of evidence that the paper itself circulated and caused some stir
in relatively distant Warwickshire in 1756. More than this cannot be said.

This somewhat cursory study of contemporary newspapers suggests that there
was a wide range of practice concerning the nature and amount of political
comment in them. Some were and remained predominantly news and advertising
papers. Others under various stimuli in the period, particularly a growing
public appetite, significantly developed their own political comment in
various forms, although the editorial remained embryonic only. Such papers,
like the Gazetteer, Public Advertiser and London Evening Post, with already
established circulations, had only occasional use for the Monitor. Still
others aimed to serve a wider function than the mere conveying of news.

26. Langford, p. 80; G. A. Cranfield, The Development of the Provincial
Newspaper, 1700-1769, Oxford, 1962, pp. 102-3, 103-4, 114-5; R. M. Wiles
Freshet's Advices: Early Provincial Newspapers in England, [Columbus], 1965,
27. Marshall, p. 283 fn. 1, cf. the Monitor 51, 24 July 1756; E. F. to Granville,
especially for those who did not have access to the newspaper reading rooms of the day, the London coffee houses. They carried a great variety of comment although they had, at least to begin with, few pretensions to originality. The Monitor may have been despised at the literary heights but to these papers, Lloyd's Evening Post, the London, St James's and Universal Chronicles, it made a significant contribution. It is possible that the accusations of copying first made by the Monitor in September 1757 arose because of the practice of the first two of these papers which began in that year. Yet it is still difficult to know what importance to attach to these accusations. Other papers, including the Gazetteer which the Monitor so bitterly attacked later for unacknowledged copying, made them too. It still seems unlikely that the Monitor would seriously object to the publicity given by acknowledged copying against which, anyway, complaints had no apparent success. A much closer study of the papers would be necessary to assess the amount of unacknowledged copying.

The substantial copying of the Monitor in these papers suggests that the weekly political essay was a form of commentary of some importance. So does the notice given, usually in special features, by all the newspapers and magazines to the exchanges of 1762-3. Of the weeklies the Monitor may not have been the most striking; but it should be remembered that it was by far the longest lasting, and for the periods in which it had rivals or collaborators it is given as much attention by the newspapers.

Yet, of course, the weeklies were not the only form of controversy. Pamphlets were still written in abundance and liberally extracted in newspapers and magazines; letters to newspapers were becoming increasingly important. In describing the Monitor's involvement in politics reference has already been made to several important occasions when it became involved in controversy.

with pamphlet - or letter - writers. Other examples could be mentioned. 29 Together these suggest that at times at least the Monitor was at the centre of controversy, although the decline in the attention given to it in 1759-61 in the papers that noticed it most also suggests that its preoccupation with a few broad issues of war strategy was not of such compelling concern to all contemporaries, that their range of interest was somewhat broader. To assess fully, however, how deeply the Monitor was involved in the main lines of contemporary debate, to what extent its issues were the major issues or whether there were matters important to contemporaries which it ignored, to know how often it was noticed and answered by letter-writers and pamphleteers, would require a much fuller study. This could well be part of a valuable study in depth of the development of political commentary in the press which would make possible some firm conclusions about how fully as well as in what forms political issues were aired in the press. Such a study might well confirm the impression that like the Monitor contemporary newspapers ignored or skirted over many issues while becoming obsessed with others, and that it was not until much later, perhaps after 1815, that 'public criticism of parliamentary [and other political] affairs became immediate and specific, instead of being belated, and confined mostly to general issues'. 30

Be that as it may, overall it would seem that the forms of political commentary were in process of transition from the pamphlet, which had been the major form of substantial debate for earlier generations, to the newspaper, to be the fourth estate of the nineteenth century, and that the essay paper was an intermediate stage, replacing the one at least as the centre of political

29. The Monitor is answered or commented on in Lloyd's Evening Post, 14-16 Aug. 1758, p. 158; Owen's Weekly Chronicle, 28 July-4 Aug. 1759, p. 243; Ph., 29 Feb., 13 Mar., 9 Apr. 1760, second pages; GM., XXX, 1760, pp. 374-7; LM., XXXI, 1762, pp. 571-3; Lc., 27-9 May, 2-4 Sep. 1762, pp. 510, 225-6; and in the following pamphlets: A Letter to the Monitor, occasioned By his heavy Censures and Calumnies in his Paper of last Saturday upon the Dissenters, [London], 1757; Further Objections to the Establishment of a Constitutional Militia: Being a Reply to the Monitor,... and Many other Formidable Opponents;... London, 1757; A Letter to the citizens of London, [London], 1758; [John Shebbeare], Invincible Reasons for the Earl of Bute's...
controversy, being copied by the other. There is certainly plenty of contemporary comment in the vein that frequent and regular publications were the most effective form of propaganda. Hardwicke recommended 'short Papers of justification, writ with Spirit and published in the Daily Papers,' to Newcastle in August 1756 as a defence against the onslaught over Minorca, and repeated his advice a few days later with the comment that 'I really believe these short diurnal Libels do more harm than the larger Pamphlets, because they are more read, and spread more amongst the common People'. The same advice was being given by an anonymous correspondent of Granville's whose letter is preserved in the Hardwicke papers. A few months later, in the height of the Test-Con-Test exchanges, the setting up of an occasional paper in Newcastle's interest was briefly considered but rejected. In the next year, however, another correspondent of Newcastle's expressed himself strongly about the popular effect of the eagerly read 'Journals', as he called them, mentioning the Monitor specifically. Walpole noticed the change from pamphlets to 'anonymous letters in the daily newspapers' in 1763, at the same time as Daniel Wray commented to Lord Royston on the pernicious effects of canvassing political questions in papers priced at twopence-halfpenny (that is, the weeklies), instead of in substantial pamphlets costing a couple or shillings. When those in opposition thought of establishing a new organ of publicity in 1764, both a daily and a weekly paper were considered, at different times. 31 Historians, too, have observed the change. 32 The transition


32. On next page.
from pamphlet to essay to newspaper was not a clearly defined and steady progression. Walpole was still observing it in 1779 in much the same terms as in 1763. Weeklies may have caught the public eye in 1762-3 but in 1764 pamphlets seem to have been the vehicles of the major controversies, and pamphlets on parliamentary reform were more numerous after 1780 than in the earlier 1770's. Ehrman would date the change from the 1770's rather than earlier. Yet some sort of transition there was - and the late fifties and early sixties, the life-time of the Monitor, and especially the great exchanges of 1756-7 and 1762-3, were a time when, for a short period, the give and take of blows in weekly essays seemed more effective than the occasional pamphlet or contributions directly to newspapers. But the decade saw great developments in newspapers. In 1769, when Beckford wanted another propaganda organ, he helped to establish not another weekly essay paper but a newspaper, the Middlesex Journal.

So the Monitor and its form, the essay paper, were of some importance in the development of political comment in the press. Yet a further question arises. Who noticed its commentary? Reading of the considerable body of


33. Walpole to Mann, 9 Mar. 1779, ed. Lewis, XXIV, p. 451; Christie, Wilkes, Wywill and Reform, p. 231; John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, London, 1969, p. 143. Observation of newspapers in the 1760's would suggest that Ehrman dates the change in their political content (except the development of parliamentary reporting) rather late. In 1764 several pamphlet debates appear to have raised the same kind of interest as the weekly exchanges of the previous year: e.g. on general warrants the various defences of the majority and the minority and the exchanges with the Cocoa Tree (Almon Anecdotes, I, pp. 78-81, Rea, pp. 107-9); on the dismissal of Conway (Walpole, George the Third, II, pp. 3-4, Rea, pp. 94-5); some, like the celebrated Letter concerning Libels, grew out of editor's censorship of newspaper correspondence (Rea, pp. 116-11). See above pp. 352-3, 356, 359, 361 fn. 60, 370. Almon (to Temple, 14 Aug. 1764; Grenville Papers, II, pp. 428-9) comments on the effectiveness of these pamphlets.

34. Fox Bourne, p. 198; Nichol Smith, pp. 351-2.
correspondence left by the major political figures of the period reveals
very little. The most numerous references come in the letters of the well-
informed observers on the edge of politics, rather from those involved at
the centre. The Rev. Thomas Birch, historian and biographer and protege of
the Hardwicke family, writes to Lord Royston, Hardwicke's eldest son who was
interested but not closely involved in national politics, when he is out of
London, reporting what is going on on the observable periphery of politics,
in the City, for example, where he had excellent sources of information, and
in political propaganda. He notices the beginning of the Monitor in 1755
and, especially in its early years, gives Royston a brief, usually unsympath-
etic, comment on its content most weeks that he writes. Like that of the
newspapers, his interest apparently waned between 1759 and 1762 (although
there are three references in 1760), to revive somewhat with the beginning
of the weekly exchanges in June 1762. There are no references to the Monitor
in the correspondence after 1763. Symmer, who reported regularly on home
politics to Andrew Mitchell, British envoy in Prussia, and who might have
been expected to be interested in the paper's views on European policy,
does not notice it until the controversies of 1762 and then only twice. Even
Walpole, in his voluminous and well-informed correspondence, finds it worthy
of reference apparently only twice, once for the notorious attack on Hardwicke
in January 1757 and once a humorous passing comment in 1762. 36

1760, 1 June, 3, 31 July, 13 Nov. 1762, Add. MSS. 35398, ff. 278, 291,
302, 337, 345, 356, 373, 402, 35399, ff. 8, 22, 41, 61, 167, 169, 178,
285, 290, 311, 35400, f. 28. There is one letter of 23 July 1763
referring to the decision to take action over the warrants of 1762, Add.
MS. 35400 f. 87. The letter of 4 Oct. 1760 refers to the authorship of
the Doll Common Monitor, 187, 17 Feb. 1759 (see Appendix III) but in a
way that it has been impossible to elucidate. Occasionally Royston
comments on the Monitor in reply to Birch, e.g. 29 Sep. 1757, Add. MS.
35398, f. 369.

36. Symmer to Mitchell, 30 July, 10 Sep. 1762, Add. MS. 6839, ff. 279, 284;
Walpole to Mann, 6 Jan. 1757, 31 July 1762, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 39, XXII,
p. 60.
Certainly Newcastle knew of the existence of the paper. Some of his less-important correspondents occasionally mention it to him, Gordon agitates about its pernicious effects in London, and his secretary, Hugh Valence Jones, sent him a copy, together with the *North Briton*, in July 1762. Yet he did not regularly read it as apparently he did the *Test*; he had to send for a copy of the issue attacking Hardwicke.\(^{37}\) And, apart from some discussion between Newcastle and Hardwicke about this number, there is only a handful of references to the *Monitor* by them or their leading correspondents. Bearing in mind the immense volume of the Newcastle papers and his extreme sensitivity to attack this infrequency of reference is remarkable. He was hurt when the *Monitor* set him 'up to be pelted at' after Pitt's resignation in 1761; and piqued that it did not notice the appointment of Fox to lead the house in 1762. That is all.\(^{38}\)

At least as significant are the occasions when and sources in which the *Monitor* is not mentioned. No references have been found in any of the other collections of correspondence examined, except the few by Temple noted at various points in this study. Pitt was notoriously uncommunicative; still, his only recorded opinions are expressions of hostility towards such publications.\(^{39}\) Newcastle clearly regards the *Test* and the *Con-Test* as central to the controversy of 1756-7, was far more concerned about attacks made on him and Hardwicke in the *Test* than over any in the *Monitor*, and had to deterred from launching an answer.\(^{40}\) Similarly Walpole, describing in his *Memoirs* the

\(^{37}\) West to Newcastle, 6 Sep. 1755, 14 Aug. 1756, J. Gordon to Newcastle, 14 Sep. 1756, 21 July 1758, 20 May 1759, Mr G. to Newcastle, 17 Nov. 1757, Hugh Valence Jones to Newcastle, 3 July 1762, Add. MSS. 32659, f. 10, 32666, f. 449, 32867, f. 299, 32882, f. 34, 32891, f. 211, 32876, f. 4, 32940, f. 235. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 Jan. 1757 (Yorke, *Hardwicke*, II, p. 384) says that he had to send for the *Monitor* while a letter of 20 Feb. 1757 (Add. MS. 32870, f. 203) suggests that he saw the Test regularly.


\(^{40}\) Newcastle to John Roberts, 26 Dec., to Sir Thomas Robinson, 27 Dec. 1755, (Cont'd)
'paper-war of the most inveterate kind' which faced the Devonshire administration, mentions only the Test and the Con-Test, and even when, writing to Mann shortly afterwards, he mentions the Monitor and its attack on Hardwicke, he still clearly regards the Test and Con-Test as the centre of the controversy and the attention it has aroused. Again, in the exchanges of 1762-3, the North Briton receives much more attention from him. The Monitor is mentioned only as 'another opponent periodic satire' the prosecution of which did not deter the North Briton. He comments on the outrageous Isabella and Mortimer North Briton without any reference to the Monitor on the same theme. In describing the public dislike of the peace and the continuing controversy outside while the parliamentary session proceeded smoothly, again only the North Briton is mentioned. 41 Wilkes himself, describing the impact of the early North Briton trials in July 1763 on the public and especially the City and assessing the general importance of his stand, says nothing of the Monitor - but he was nothing if not egotistical. 42 Most telling of all because most likely to be sympathetic, Almon, in recounting the foundation of the Briton, North Briton and Auditor, ignores the Monitor. Indeed he says that Bute had not at that time 'met with any regular and formidable attack'. True, on another occasion, he does, in a footnote, mention the warrant against the Monitor and call it 'a noted political paper', and in his History of the Late Minority he gives a fuller account of the offence the Monitor gave to Bute and the reasons for the action against it. But when he is writing of the great battle


41. Walpole, George the Second, II, p. 109; Walpole to Mann, 6 Jan. 1757, ed. Lewis, XXI, pp. 38-9; Walpole, George the Third, I, pp. 140-1 (the quotation), 152-3, 190.

42. Wilkes to Temple, 9 July 1763, Grenville Papers, II, pp. 71-2.
against Bute it is the North Briton he remembers. It was the North Briton, too, without the Monitor, that caused trouble to Bamber Gascoyne in a by-election at Maldon in April 1763. Finally, the Critical Review, in surveying the opposition papers of the whole Hanoverian period as a prelude to its review of the collected North Briton, has nothing to say of the Monitor, briefly dismissing as generally ineffective the 'inundation of Tests, Contests, and a thousand other papers that overspread the land, during the scramble for power after the death of Mr Pelham'. 44

Such lack of attention does less than justice to the Monitor's role, especially in the controversies of 1762-3. The Monitor made some impact in quickening the pace of debate before its rivals began, as Mrs Montagu bears witness. 45 It is true that the two government papers do tend to move the emphasis of their attack from the Monitor, the original raison d'être at least of the Briton, to the North Briton. But they never entirely forget the Monitor and, although its tone may have moderated after the warning of November 1763, it does not give up the fight. 46 It lacked the sharp cut and thrust of and especially the gift for invective and satire of the North Briton, it could get bogged down in detail, for example in analysing the peace, and 'dry, dull, stale, historical extracts', but often it has more solidity and long-term interest. 47 Yet, whether it is unjust or not, one cannot escape the conclusion that the lack of contemporary notice measures the lack of impact made by the Monitor. It clearly did not create the éclat of the Test, the Con-Test and especially the North Briton. It seems to have had most effect

43. Almon, Minority, pp. 58-60 fn. (the reference to the Monitor), 77-8, 127; Bute, pp. 55-5, 81 fn. (the quotation), Anecdotes, II, pp. 3-12.


46. The Briton seems to turn away from the Monitor as early as 4, 19 June 1762, and more noticeably in 23, 30 Oct. 1762, and the Auditor in its September numbers, though both return to it later. On the Monitor see above pp. 326, 330-1.

47. On next page.
in its early years. Once committed to its long defence of Pitt and his war, its monotony, broken only by its taking up of narrow issues like the sugar tax or the distillery, deterred attention. Changing circumstances and new talent stirred it to brief vivacity again in 1762-3 but soon once more it stagnated. Certainly its later years, however interesting to the historian of the origins of radicalism, in contemporary eyes deserved the strictures of dullness passed on it. The decline points not only to the loss of political purpose by Beckford and the City, but also to the defects of the essay-paper form as a vehicle of propaganda over a long term. The Monitor's experience would suggest that it was more suited to particular occasions and immediate situations, for which effective and striking attack could be maintained, than to sustained debate on a limited number of themes. Without the variety of news and other material it was hard to maintain consistent interest in a single political viewpoint, easy to lose steam.

The Monitor, then, was a piece of political propaganda of relatively minor importance to contemporaries, just as its patron was of relatively minor status in politics. Goldsmith's gently mocking reference to it, with other papers, in 'The Description of a Person discontented with the present Government and Apprehensive of the Loss of our Liberties' at the beginning of chapter nineteen of The Vicar of Wakefield, first published in March 1766, together with the condescending tone of the Reviews, put it in its place. It was of some significance in supplying political comment to some newspapers at a particular stage in their development. It attracted very little attention, however, from those who conducted politics. They may have read it; they did not often find it worthy of remark. There is little reason, therefore, to think that they were influenced by it or that they thought others would be to any extent that needed to cause concern.

47. Introductory essay to collected edition of the Contract, 1756, p. 34.
48. See above p. 358.
Here again is raised a much wider question, that of the impact of the development of the press on politics, which again could only be properly answered gradually, on the basis of more particular studies. Was all the comment it generated mere noise and empty fury or did it have some influence, on votes in the house of commons, for example, or on government credit, and hence on government decisions? There is enough evidence to confirm that governments were, at least on occasion, concerned about agitation in the press, that they kept an eye on what was going on with a view to action if necessary, and, more generally, that they felt uncomfortable and threatened if a sense of a lack of public confidence was created, hard though it is to analyse sometimes exactly how they feared it could affect them. Few would deny that Newcastle in 1756 and Bute in 1762-3 and, later, Grafton in 1769-70 were shaken by storms of public opinion expressed partly through the press, although other weaknesses also, not least personal ones, contributed much to their dilemmas. It is probable that Pitt's attitude towards peace negotiations in 1759-60 and even 1761 was affected by debate in the press. Certainly, in the fifties at least, he found it worthwhile to cultivate 'popularity' which, in part anyway, needed the press for expression. Michael Roberts has produced convincing evidence, for years only slightly later, that the attitudes of ministers in foreign affairs were much affected by consideration of public opinion, ill-informed and sporadic though the latter was, and that foreign governments paid even excessive attention to opposition propaganda and attacks in the press. The growing volume of political comment in the press is probably less important, however, for any influence it exerted on specific decisions and events than for the way in which it gradually widened and educated the audience before which politics were conducted and thus helped in the long term to bring the people back into politics.

Whatever the contemporary impact of the press in general and the Monitor

49. Rea, The English Press in Politics 1760-1774, provides much valuable information but is too sweeping and injudicious in the general conclusions he draws on the influence of the press, e.g. pp. 15, 28.

as part of it, the study of the Monitor, even if conducted here at somewhat excessive length, is illuminating to the historian not least for what it shows of this wider dimension to eighteenth-century politics and especially of the attitudes of its particular audience in the City of London.
APPENDIX I

Jonathan Scott's Information of 11 October 1762

Declaration made by Jonathan Scott, 11 October 1762, at St James's Westminster, before Edward Weston, justice of the peace for Westminster and assistant to the Earl of Halifax as Secretary of State.

'The voluntary information of J. Scott. In the year 1755, I proposed setting up a paper, and mentioned it to Dr Shebbeare, and in a few days one Arthur Beardmore an attorney at law sent for me, hearing of my intention, and desired I would mention it to Dr Shebbeare, that he Beardmore and some others of his friends had an intention of setting up a paper in the city. Shebbeare met Beardmore, and myself and Entick (the plaintiff) [in the case Entick v. Carrington] at the Horn tavern, and agreed upon the setting up the paper by the name of the Monitor, and that Dr Shebbeare and Mr Entick should have 200l. a-year each. Dr Shebbeare put into Beardmore's and Entick's hands some papers, but before the papers appeared Beardmore sent them back to me (Scott). Shebbeare insisted on having the proportion of his salary paid him; he had 50l. which I (Scott) fetched from Vere and Asgill's by their note, which Beardmore gave him; Dr Shebbeare upon this was quite left out, and the monies have been continued to Beardmore and Entick ever since, by subscription, as I supposed, raised I know not by whom; it has been continued in these hands ever since. Shebbeare, Beardmore and Entick all told me that the late alderman Beckford countenanced the paper: they agreed with me that the profits of the paper, paying all charges belonging to it, should be allowed me. In the paper of the 22d May, called Sejanus, I apprehend the character of Sejanus meant lord Bute: the original manuscript was in the handwriting of David Meredith, Mr Beardmore's clerk. I before received the manuscript for several years till very lately from the said hands and do believe that they continue
still to write it. Jona Scott, St James's 11th October 1762.'

'The above information was given voluntarily before me, and signed in my presence by Jona. Scott. J. Weston.'

Source: Ed. T. B. Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials..., 33 vols., London, 1809-1826, XIX, col. 1033. See also, for a manuscript copy, Add. MS. 22131 (Wilkes papers), f. 2.
I. A determination to support his present majesty and his family, against
the pretender and all his adherents; and in one body to give any
publick and solemn test of their attachment to his person and govern-
ment.

II. To support good, as well as to oppose, bad government; and to make the
spirit and end of the revolution, the only measures of their conduct,
either in supporting or opposing the administration.

III. To correct with temper the frauds and abuses in the revenue; and narrowly
to look into the state of all the publick offices, the accounts of all
contractors, and clerks, in the several departments, particularly those
of the treasury, army, and navy.

IV. To discourage those harpies, called money-jobbers, who, under the pretence
of assisting government, become the plunderers of it.

V. To establish a system of oeconomy in all matters relating to the
financial part of the government.

VI. To support the established religion; to encourage the present temper and
moderation of the church; and to oppose any spirit of intolerance or
persecution.

VII. To avoid all peevish oppositions to the measures of an administration,
especially where they are indifferent, or not absolutely essential to
the public welfare: but

VIII. To conform as much as possible, to the temper of the times, and to
distinguish the practicable from the impracticable; and not to press
any measure so far, as to disturb the harmony of government, or to
give any advantage to the enemies of his majesties family by raising and
fomenting a faction.
IX. To endeavour by a more effectual law, than is now in force, to discounten­
ance and punish in the severest manner, as well those, who directly,
or indirectly offer, or give a bribe to be chosen; as those, who
receive one: and to oblige all persons returned members of parliament
to take an oath at the table, that they have not offered, or given a
bribe, or made use of any undue influence, &c. &c. &c. in order to be
elected; before such person shall be permitted to take his seat, and
vote in parliament.

X. To engage in no foreign alliances, where the interest of Britain is
not immediately and essentially concerned: and, when alliances may be
judged necessary, and any foreign subsidies are to be granted; to prefer
alliances with Russia, the Empress Queen, the King of Prussia, the King
of Sardinia, and other great powers, to those with petty German princes,
who have always failed us; and to proportion the subsidies to the
abilities of our own nation, and not to the wants of those, who apply
for them.

XI. To assert the dominion of the sea by a large and well ordered navy;
to place our chief dependance in such a navy; to keep in constant pay,
in time of peace, as well as war, a powerful body of seamen; and
for their encouragement, and to avoid, as far as it is possible, the
odious, as well as unconstitutional method of pressing; to invite them
into the publick service by bounties, and to pay them with the same
punctuality and regularity, which is observed in the payment of the land
forces.

XII. To cherish and support our colonies; those sinews of our naval strength,
on which avowedly the very being of this kingdom depends; to define and
settle the rights and privileges of the subjects, residing in those
colonies; to model them more agreeable to the system of liberty,
maintained in their mother country; and to contrive a better and
more effectual method, than the present, of curbing and punishing
licentious, arbitrary, and tyrannical governors.

XIII. To promote a foederal union amongst the Northern Colonies in America;
and to govern them in so gentle a manner, as not to provoke them to
cast off their allegiance.

XIV. To arm the people by a temperate and practicable militia-law, and in the
meantime to allow the present number of standing forces, by a law made
from year to year; in hopes, that when his majesty or his successors
see themselves absolutely established in the universal affection of
their subjects, he or they may be graciously induced not to ask them
in time of peace; as they always foster up a jealousy in the minds of
the people, by their danger to liberty: and more especially, as the
number of standing forces, now in pay, are not sufficient for our
defence against a foreign enemy; and yet would be too formidable a
body under the direction of a violent and tyrannical king: besides,
the reduction of our expences, by such a measure, would greatly increase
the national stock.

XV. To give every possible encouragement to the trade of this kingdom, and
for that purpose to discountenance all kind of monopolies, and to
encourage our manufactures, both at home, and in our colonies.
APPENDIX III

The Simile and Doll Common Fragment from the Monitor 187, 17 February 1759

A SIMILE

Corinna in the Country bred
Harbour'd strange Notions in her Head,
Notions in Town quite out of Fashion:
Such as that Love's a dangerous Passion,
That Virtue is the Maiden's Jewel,
And to be safe, she must be cruel.

Thus arm'd she had long secur'd her Honour
From all Assaults yet made upon her,
Had scratch'd the impetuous Captain's Hand,
Had torn the Lawyer's Gown and Band,
And Gold refus'd from Knights and Squires
To bribe her to her own Desires:
For, to say Truth, she thought:
It hard,
To be of Pleasures thus debarr'd,
She say by others freely tasted,
So pout'd, pin'd, grew pale, and wasted:
Yet, notwithstanding her Condition,
Contin'd firm in Opposition.

At length a Troop of Horse came down,
And quarter'd in a neighb'ring Town;
The Cornet he was tall and young,
And had a most bewitching Tongue.
They saw and lik'd the Siege begun:
Each Hour he some Advantage won.
He ogled first; she turn'd away;
But met his Eyes the following Day:
Then her reluctant Hand he seizes,
That soon she gives him, when he pleases;
Her ruby Lips he next attacks:
She struggles; in a while she snaks;
Her snowy Breast he then invades;
That yields too, after some Parades;
And of that Fortress once possest,
He quickly masters all the rest.

No longer now a Dupe to Fame,
She smother's or resists her Flame,
But loves without, or Fear, or Shame.

So have I seen the Tory Race
Long in the Pouts, for want of Place,
Never in Humour, never well,
Wishing for what they dar'd not tell,
Their Heads with Country - Notions [fraught,
Notions in Town not worth a Groat,
These Tenets all reluctant quit,]
And Step by Step at last submit
To Reason, Eloquence and PIT.

At first to Hanover a Plum
Was sent; They said - A trivial Sum,
But if he went one Tittle further,
They vow'd, and swore, they'd cry out [murder;
Ere long a larger Sum is wanted;
They pish'd and frowned — but still [they granted:
He push'd for more, and more again —
Well — Mony's better sent, than Men:
Here Virtue made another Stand.—
No — not a Man shall Leave the Land.

What? — not one Regiment to Emden?
They start — but now they're fairly hem'd in:
These soon, and many more are sent;—
They're silent — Silence gives Consent.
Our Troops they now plainly see,
May Britain guard in germ:
The Hanoverians, Hessians, Prussians
Are paid, t' oppose the French and [Russians;
Nor scruple they with Truth to say,
They're fighting for America:
No more they make a Fiddle-Faddle
About an Hessian Horse, or Saddle:
No more of Continental Measures,
No more of wasting British Treasures;
Ten Millions, and a Vote of Credit.
'Tis right — He can't be wrong, who [did it:
They're fairly sous'd o'er Head and [Ears,
And cur'd of all their rustick Fears.
DOLL COMMON

A Fragment

So, lost to Sense of Shame and Duty, Doll came to Town to sell her Beauty:
Caelia her Friend with Heart felt Pain
Had preach'd up Virtue's Lore in vain:
In vain she tried each winning Art;
For Doll had Lewdness in her Heart.
Thus beat to be a sorded Whore,
She knock'd at Prostitution's Door,
**arose, and let her in,
And stroak'd her Cheek, and chuck'd her Chin;

While far from Whimpers, Sobs or Keeping,
Doll curt'sied, and was soon in Keeping:
Now in Hyde Park she flaunts by Day,
At Night she flutters at the Play.
This Keeper, and a second died;
Now Doll is humbled in her Pride.
At Length she comes upon the Town;
First palms a Guinea, then a Crown;
Nay, Slander says, that underhand,
The forlorn Wretch would walk the Strand;
--~---
'Till grown the Scorn of Man and Woman,
A Pot of Beer would buy Doll Common.

Mean Time, deep smit with honest Flame
Caelia espoused a Youth of Fame;
From the chaste Bed fair Issue sprung;
With Peals of Joy the Country rung.
Again the Matron pregnant grown,
Now hastens to lye-in, in Town.
There, near the Park, Doll common found
Her, (Her little Family around her)
Then Doll began-----So modest Miss!
Is all your Prudery come to this?
Why, by your Apron's Round, I see,
Your e'en a Strumpet rank, like me:
"Quite cured of all your rustick Fears," "And fairly scou'd o'er Head and Ears."
Coy sin'ring Maids I find can sin:
For Shame, your Belly's at your Chin:
In Spite of all your virtuous Lore,
You're now become an arrant Whore.
Fair Caelia's Cheek a Blush o'er
[spread; And thus with calm Disdain she said:
That Love possesses me, 'tis true;
Yet Heaven be prais'd! I am not you:
"My Head's with Country Notions fraught,
"Notions (to you) not worth a Groat."
Aided by every virtuous Art,
A generous Youth has won my Heart.
Yet never did I yield my Charms,
Till Honour led me to his Arms.
My Charms I never basely sold;
I am no Prostitute for Gold;
On my own Rents I lived before,
Nor has my William added more.
Wealth is our Scorn; our humble Labours
Aim but to serve, or save our Neighbours.
See—Heaven has blest our chast Embrace;
Behold this little smiling Race,
The Offspring of an honest Bed—
Here, Senegal, hold up your Head;
This tawny Boy, his Parents boast,
Shall bring us Gold from Africk's Coast:
And mark these Twins of Indian Mien,
This Louisbourgh, and the Du Quesne:
Their bold and honest Looks presage,
They'll be our Comfort in old Age.
And if the Babe that swells my Womb,
To a propitious Birth shall come,
O'er joy'd I'll bless the happy Day;
And call our Child America.

Thus Caelia spake with modest Grace,
But Rage deformed the Harlot's Face:
Her fiery Eyes began to roll,
A Bag in Look, a Fiend in Soul:
And now she vomits forth the Din
Of Oyster Wenches drunk with Gin.
Nay, Rumour scruples not to tall ye
The Strumpet kicked the Matron's Belly:
Of the fair coming Birth afraid;
For black Abortion was her Trade.
APPENDIX IV

A Note on the Cases arising out of the Warrants of November 1762 naming those concerned in the Monitor

The Monitor's first brush with the law in 1757, although it led to a conviction, attracted little attention and had no repercussions. In contrast, but not surprisingly as a charge of seditious libel initiated by the secretary of state was involved, the second was of much more consequence, even though the charge was not proceeded with. It led to a complex series of cases the decisions of which were of major importance in settling the legal status of warrants of secretaries of state and in establishing more firmly liberty of the individual and of the press.

The warrants of 6 November 1762 certainly appear to be part of a tougher attitude of the government towards the press in response to the attacks on Bute and the controversy over the peace. The Monitor's articles may have been more personal and more directly offensive to the king in the height of controversy in 1762, but they were probably no more virulent and certainly no more seditious than those of earlier periods of intense controversy. Already, immediately after the daring Mortimer article of 9 October, however, action against the Monitor was under consideration, probably on the basis of Scott's information of 11 October. Further copies of the Monitor were bought by the messengers on 15 and 18 October, undoubtedly for official assessment. On 3 November these and a later number were again referred to the law officers for their opinion and on 6 November the warrants were issued, naming these Monitor with two more, the most recent ones. November was also to see the

1. See above p. 37.
2. See above pp. 324-6.
first moves against the North Briton, copies of which were referred to the law officers at the same time as those of the Monitor. ³

Four separate warrants were issued for the apprehension, respectively, of Entick, Beardmore, his clerk, Meredith, and, all on one warrant, the publishers, Jonathan Scott, Isaac Wilson and John Fell, and the printer John Medley. Scott's name seems to have been included for appearance's sake only; there is no evidence to suggest that he was taken up. Each warrant authorizes the king's messengers, in the king's name and on the authority of the secretary of state, to 'make strict and diligent search for' the named person(s) and, having found him, 'to seize and apprehend, and to bring [him], together with his books and papers, in safe custody before me to be examined concerning the premisses, and further dealt with according to law'. The warrants name eight numbers of the Monitor, described as 'very seditious papers...which contain gross and scandalous reflections and invectives upon his majesty's government, and upon both houses of parliament'. The warrants thus differ in several respects from the more famous general warrant issued over the North Briton ⁴. Most important, they name the persons to be apprehended and they do not designate the papers complained of as 'treasonable'.

The events accompanying the arrests are described in the various legal proceedings which followed. The warrants were for some reason not served until 11 November. Beardmore was apprehended about 10 a.m. He alleged, with the support of Meredith, that the messengers were at his house four hours, during which time they searched it violently and thoroughly, taking away large

quantities of papers, printed and written. He, too, of course, was taken
and 'closely' imprisoned for six days in the house of one of the messengers,
Blackmore. His wife was permitted to be with him and he was able to send for
a Mr Wimbolt to manage his business, but he was not allowed the use of pen,
ink and paper for two days, to see a client alone, or to write to Beckford.
When the latter, newly sworn in as lord mayor, applied to bail him, the
officer responsible neglected it, 'alleging, that the Monitors were much
too voluminous to be inspected'. After six days, he was at last bailed to
appear in king's bench the next term. Entick was apprehended about 11 a.m.
and complained of the behaviour of the messengers in terms similar to those
of Beardmore. He, too, was bailed after six days. In both cases, the books
and papers seized were delivered to Lovel Stanhope, law clerk to the secretar-
ies of state and a justice of the peace for Westminster. He was authorized to
take depositions from those to be examined by the secretaries of state and
conducted the examinations in this case. No evidence exists about the
treatment of the others arrested, but they, too, were bailed on the same
terms a day or two later. 5 Nothing further happened. The cases were not
proceeded with and on 22 June all except Medley, who had died meanwhile,
were released from their recognizances by the court of king's bench. 6

Why the cases were dropped is not clear. Perhaps there was never any
intention to press them. Rumours that no action was to be taken were
abroad very soon and less than a month after the arrests the North Briton
found it necessary to rebut suggestions that 'some private conditions are
settled' and that the bail was merely for appearances, in ironic righteousness
refusing to believe that any minister would make such an arrangement. Almon
offers two explanations of the failure to proceed: first, that the ministry

5. English Reports, XCV, pp. 790-1, 807-8, 810; LM., XXXIII, 1764, p. 266;
BM., X, 1764, p. 276; AR., VII, 1764, p. 73. The recognizances for bail
are at P.R.O. SP 44/87, pp. 157-8. Beckford's name does not appear as a
surety.

6. AR., VI, 1763, p. 82; GM., XXXIII, 1763, p. 312.
feared 'that such a prosecution would carry the appearance of certain persons having so strong a sensibility of parallel cases, that they could not avoid fitting caps to their own heads'; secondly, that the ministry 'seemed to be alarmed with the impression it made on the minds of the people all over England, who are ever jealous of the liberty of the press...'. The first explanation probably carries the greater weight, together with less important than the smooth passage of the peace through parliament. Whether or not in fact the intention was only to frighten, it seems to have had that effect. Although there are no solid grounds for thinking that some secret explicit deal was made with the managers of the Monitor, and they certainly continued their opposition, the shrill edge was taken off the tone of controversy in the paper.

Here matters rested for the time being. The arrests naturally attracted the attention of Wilkes who, in spite of Temple's urging caution, visited Beardmore while he was in custody and, at least according to his later claim, tried to persuade him to seek damages immediately for wrongful imprisonment for himself and his clerk. Beardmore, unlike Wilkes, was too cautious, although he did send Wilkes a copy of the warrant. It was not until the successful outcome, in June and July 1763, of the first cases for damages arising out of the arrests under the general warrant concerned with the North Briton that Beardmore was emboldened to move on his own and his colleagues' behalf. In July Halifax was informed of the intention to bring actions. By September the actions were commenced. Separate but parallel complaints of trespass against the messengers and of wrongful imprisonment against both Halifax and the messengers were involved on behalf of all the plaintiffs.

7. The North Briton 27, 4 Dec. 1762; Almon, Minority, p. 59 fn.; Almon, Bute, p. 81 fn.


They proceeded slowly. On 29 February 1764 Beardmore's action against the messengers came on at the Guildhall before lord chief justice Pratt. The attorney-general proposed, and Beardmore and his counsel readily agreed, that his action against Halifax and the messengers jointly for false imprisonment should be tried on the same record, and 4 May was appointed for the trial. When that day came, however, only the complaint against the messengers was raised. Beardmore, who had among his counsel Sergeant Glynne, the recorder of London, James Eyre, and Dunning, offered evidence that he had suffered considerably in the conduct of his business in being confined so long. The defence pleaded the justification of the warrant and the circumstances necessary to its fulfilment. Scott appeared, to give the substance of his information to the secretary of state as the basis for the warrant. After a trial lasting seven hours, Pratt in his summing up declared the seizure of person and papers to be illegal and the trespass and imprisonment not to be justified by any plea whatever, but urged moderation in the assessment of damages because the messengers were only servants. After about three-quarters of an hour the jury brought in their verdict for damages of £1000, whereupon 'there was an universal shout from a considerable number of spectators'. Later in the month the case was reargued in Westminster Hall before all the judges on a motion for a new trial on grounds of excessive damages. After two days of counsels' pleadings, on 26 May the motion was overruled and the verdict was established on the unanimous decision of the judges. Their decision was partly due to doubts as to whether the precedents showed that the court had the right to grant a retrial in the circumstances of this case. They did, however, support the view that the powers assumed by the secretary of state were unlawful, the warrant illegal and the case one which 'concerns the liberty of every one of the King's subjects'. Thus the legality of the warrant was a central issue in this trial. Nor did the judges accept the argument that the damages were excessive because a distinction ought to be made between a magistrate and those
who executed his commands. The damages were to be considered as awarded against Lord Halifax. The account of this rehearing makes it clear that Beardmore had asked for £10,000 damages. It is also clear from Beardmore's offer, after the establishment of the verdict, to forego it if Halifax would consent to the joint action against him and the messengers coming to trial, that Halifax was using the same tactics of delay, chiefly his privilege as a peer, against the Monitor complainants as against those of the North Briton.

On 21 June at the Guildhall before a City court, that of the secondary of the Wood Street compter, on a writ of enquiry for damages, Wilson and succeeded in their action for trespass against three of the messengers and were awarded £600 damages. However, in Entick's case, also for trespass against the four messengers and heard in Westminster Hall in the court of common pleas before Pratt on 20 July, the jury entered a special verdict leaving the questions of law to be decided by the judges after further argument. The defence rested on grounds similar to those in Beardmore's case with special emphasis on Halifax's authority to issue the warrant and the messengers' situation as mere servants. The jury found the defendants not guilty of the whole trespass alleged. On the complaint of breaking, entering, remaining in the plaintiff's house and searching for and seizing papers, however, they rehearsed the undisputed facts and drew attention to a point not mentioned by the defence, that similar warrants had been frequently used since the Revolution. But they declared themselves ignorant of whether the actions thus affirmed constituted a trespass and prayed 'the advice of the court thereon'. If the court found the actions to be a trespass, they assessed the damages at £300 with forty shillings cost (not the £2000 for which Entick had asked). On the defence that the messengers were mere servants, the jury found clearly for the


plaintiff that the defendants 'in their own wrong broke and entered, and did the Trespass'. This special verdict left the major issue of trespass, involving the legality of the warrant, still to be argued by the court. Yet this was noticed by few contemporaries and the case is reported as awarding Entick unconditionally the damages mentioned.12

Meanwhile efforts were being made to bring Halifax to court by the use of the writ of *distringas*. David Meredith's case was used as the test one. No record has been found of the first issue of the writ, but on 27 June 1764 the court of common pleas increased the penalty to £500 on an alias (i.e., second or further) *distringas*, on the grounds that the action had been commenced for twelve months but still the defendant had entered no appearance.13 Halifax could no longer afford to ignore the cases and in December they came at last to trial in Westminster Hall, again in common pleas before Pratt and a special jury. Beardmore's case was heard on 11 December, and after a trial of eight hours the jury took about three-quarters of an hour to award him £1500 damages, inclusive of the £1000 which he had already been awarded against the messengers but had not yet received and which Halifax was now obliged to make good. The next day in a series of short trials Entick was awarded £20, Wilson £40, Fell £10 and Meredith £200.14 It is not clear exactly why the damages in Beardmore's case should include those already awarded, whereas those in the other cases obviously did not. The most likely explanation is that Beardmore's cases against messengers and Halifax, while not actually heard at the same time, had been united on the one record and the court had explicitly stated that his damages were to be considered as awarded against Halifax. This had not happened in the other cases and Meredith had not in fact proceeded


with a separate case against the messengers. The much larger sum awarded to him at this stage shows that the damages already granted to the others were taken into account although not included. The considerable discrepancy between the total amounts awarded to Beardmore and to the others must reflect the jury's conviction that Beardmore's business was more important and had been more seriously interrupted than that of the others.

These trials involving Halifax naturally aroused great interest, particularly the first and decisive one. Temple came up to town especially to be present, the only person of rank thus to avow his interest. Newcastle was kept well-informed by his correspondents. He was puzzled by the amount of the damages given to Beardmore, especially when his correspondents told him that neither the legality of the warrant nor proof of libel was argued. No full legal records survive of these cases, but contemporaries were certainly of the opinion that the legality of the warrants was not in question and that Beardmore's case, and presumably the others, turned on whether there were just grounds to suspect his guilt and especially on the length of time he was detained and the manner of his examination. The damages were grounded on the conviction that the plaintiff was held an excessive time and was examined by a mere clerk, Lovel Stanhope, not legally authorized. It also seems clear that Pratt was of the opinion that Halifax had no proof or even grounds for just suspicion of Beardmore's guilt on the charge of being an author of a libel, although this point was not the main one on which argument rested. It seems odd, in view of Pratt's clear declaration against the warrant in Beardmore's case against the messengers, that their legality was not raised. Temple certainly thought so and suspected a trick especially in the avoidance of the further question of the seizure of papers, although this was not the issue in these cases. Indeed the ministry was still fighting the whole issue, and in these cases they did so by the grounds of their defence, which probably helped
to keep the issue out. Nevertheless, despite their relative success, the
decisions were challenged and on 7 February 1765 Beardmore and Meredith had
to show cause why the verdicts should not be set aside. The verdicts were,
however, established, for Wilson and Fell as well as Beardmore and Meredith. 15

Entick's judgment was not confirmed, perhaps because his case against the
messengers still remained to be settled. It is clear from the damage figures
that the cases were considered to be connected. In his case against the
messengers the wider issue of the legality of warrants for the general seizure
of papers was finally decided. The special verdict was argued twice before the
judges of common pleas in the first half of 1765, on 13 May and 18 June,
Sergeant Glyn taking the leading part for the plaintiff. The final argument
was heard in the Michaelmas term on 20 November and at last on 27 November
Pratt, now Lord Camden, delivered the judgement of the court in favour of
Entick. 16

Camden's judgement is a most notable and incisive one, perhaps the clearest
and most comprehensive in all the cases involving civil liberties arising
out of the warrants against the North Briton and Monitor and especially
impressive on the powers of the secretaries of state and individual privy
councillors. It covers many issues already raised in the North Briton cases
but centres on the question of the seizure of papers. 17 Camden first decides
that the secretaries of state cannot be considered to be conservators of
the peace and that therefore their officers cannot come within the equity
of 24 George II, an act protecting constables in the execution of warrants.
The defence, therefore, had to rest on the legality of the warrant and the
defendants' having acted in obedience to its terms. As his third question

to Newcastle, 12, 13 Dec. 1764, W. Powell to Newcastle 12, 14 Dec. 1764,
Newcastle to Powell, 13 Dec. 1764, Newcastle to Onslow, 13 Dec. 1764, Add.
MS. 32964, ff. 264, 273-4, 280, 281, 283, 289; AR., VIII, 1765, p. 64.

16. AR., VIII, 1765, pp. 88, 101; Guildhall Library, MS. 214, III, ff. 327-8;
Maitland, 1772, II, p. 60; State Trials, XIX, cc. 1036-74.

and H.G. Hanbury, 14 vols, London, 1956-64, X, pp. 658-72, considers the
issues raised by all the North Briton-Monitor cases, pp. 668-71 dealing
especially with this case.
Camden briefly considers the latter point and maintains that the messengers had not observed the warrant in two respects; they had not taken a constable with them and they had not taken the papers seized to Halifax. But much more important in his estimation and in its consequences was his fourth question, the legality of the warrant. He dwells at some length on the very wide powers claimed in the warrant against persons who might well be innocent and the great degree of intrusion involved on the individual, his house and property. One would expect, he says, that the law to warrant such wide powers should be as clear as the power is exorbitant. Otherwise, as an invasion of property the protection of which is the great end for which man entered society, the exercise of such powers is a trespass.

Camden then dismisses, one by one, the arguments of the defence counsel in support of the legality of the warrant. To the justification that such warrants have been frequently issued since the Revolution, executed without resistance and never questioned in court, Camden replies that practice of such recent origin cannot make law; especially the 'obscure practice of a particular person' or a non-judicial office cannot make public law. Submission to the practice has been merely 'a submission of guilt and poverty to power and the terror of punishment' which cannot help to establish a universal law. He goes on to deny that English law can allow any argument of public necessity or acknowledge a 'law of state' different from the common law. He finds no justification for the powers claimed in the office of secretary of state or privy councillor as such. The only justification is the practice of star chamber continued in procedures under the Licensing Acts, now lapsed, and the opinion of the judges during a lapse of the Act in Charles II's reign, an opinion which cannot make law without 'an antecedent principle or authority' to support it. Finally, he rejects the argument of utility, that such warrants can be used to discover evidence of crime. Such indiscriminate searches for papers are not allowed by the law in cases of much more serious crimes because
they are so liable to abuse against the innocent; they are even less justifiable in the case of libel, a crime that has to be committed 'in open daylight'. Therefore, although he ends with a strong condemnation of libels and the threat they pose to liberty and good governments and supports the propriety of firm action against them, the decision is clear: 'upon the whole, we are all of the opinion, that the warrant to seize and carry away the party's papers in the case of a seditious libel, is illegal and void'.

Thus the case was firmly decided on the issue of the warrant in respect of the seizure of papers, confirming Camden's direction to the jury in Beardmore's case against the messengers. There was no real need for the resolution of the house of commons accompanying that against general warrants in April 1766 against the seizure of papers in libel cases. Indeed such a resolution could not change or even confirm the law thus affirmed in court. The right of the secretary of state to arrest named persons on charges of seditious libel was not so clearly decided because it was not at issue here where the complaint was trespass, as it would have been in the cases of false imprisonment. It was, however, raised in the course of the judgement and clearly rejected, as it had been in Beardmore's case against the messengers which, unlike the other cases against them, was for both trespass and false imprisonment. The complaints of false imprisonments in this and in all the cases involving Halifax turned chiefly on the unreasonable execution of the warrant rather than its legality. Despite the lack of clear decision on this issue, the outcome of the prolonged series of Monitor trials was a major advance in civil liberties, which in turn reduced the harassments under threat of which the press operated in the eighteenth century. And it demonstrates the major contribution of Camden in common pleas to that advance.

Among the members of the Newcastle administration, Hardwicke was the target of particular and sustained hostility from the Monitor less in volume perhaps than that shown to Newcastle but more specific. He is viewed with distaste because of his lowly origins, his great wealth and his alleged nepotism.\footnote{1}

The Monitor's general dislike of lawyers is directed particularly against him.\footnote{2}

His Marriage Act, an eminently reasonable and necessary measure it would seem, comes in for a number of unfavourable references\footnote{3} and the failure of popular measures later is attributed especially to him, not without reason in the case of the habeas corpus bill of 1758.\footnote{4}

The most virulent attack comes in the Monitor of 1 January 1757,\footnote{5} in which, in the character of Grypus, he is compared to unpopular lords chancellor in the past including Bacon, Jeffreys and, in detail, Wolsey. Attention is drawn again to Hardwicke's ignoble origins and he is accused of having all Wolsey's bad characteristics but none of his good. He shows greater selfishness and cunning and even more rapacious greed in satisfying the demands of his family. He has tyrannized over his sovereign, advised the use of foreign mercenaries, prostituted appointments in both church and state to the detriment of liberty and religion, and deliberately conspired against the ancient nobility and the whole British race. He has now fallen, but should he be allowed to escape with his wealth and title (a clear hint of impeachment or attainder)?

This Monitor, judging by the evidence that has survived, attracted more contemporary notice than any other single issue. Both Walpole and Mrs Montagu

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. The Monitor 57, 28 Aug. 1756 (the signature to the mock edict at the end); 65, 23 Oct. 1756; 76, 8 Jan. 1757; 79, 22 Jan. 1757; 88, 26 Mar. 1757; 89, 2 Apr. 1757.
\item 2. 67, 6 Nov. 1756; 96, 21 May 1757.
\item 3. 67; 84, 26 Feb. 1757; 88, 26 Mar. 1757; 116, 8 Oct. 1757; 151, 10 June 1758; 378 (spurious), 16 Oct. 1762.
\item 4. 105, 23 July 1757; 154, 1 July 1758. See above pp. 115, 167-9.
\item 5. 75.
\end{itemize}
comment on it, the former wittily, the latter with some vehemence. Hardwicke wrote at length to Newcastle about it, ridiculing its abuse but considering at some length its possible origins. Certainly he is right in attributing the timing of the attack to the struggle for office and to fears of the king's 'inclination to take us again, of which the language has been too open'.

He is quite incorrect, however, when he links it to the same sources as wrote and supported the Test and apparently thinks that the Monitor has 'panegyrized and courted' Fox. Certainly the attack on Hardwicke appears before the Monitor has explicitly set itself in opposition to the Test and before its major attack on Fox. Still, Hardwicke's views are a strange misreading of the Monitor's politics (more so, perhaps, than of Beckford's, if Hardwicke knew of the connection) and confirm the impression that he and others had not paid close attention to it. His mistake is perhaps partly due to his own strong preference for Pitt as an ally and his reluctance, therefore, to associate the attack with sources leaning towards Pitt, although Hardwicke was quite realistically aware of the embarrassment Pitt's City and tory allies could cause.

Newcastle, having at last obtained a copy of the offending paper, replied on 9 January with suitable 'indignation, abhorrence and resentment', which he says is shared by all he has spoken to. He mentions with some scepticism the intention of Lord Bath, reported by Mansfield, to make a complaint in the house of lords. Newcastle accepts without question Hardwicke's explanation of the origins of the attack. Lesser fry, in hopes of patronage, took up the cudgels on Hardwicke's behalf but apparently without encouragement. The attack was considered best

6. Walpole to Mann, 6 Jan. 1757, ed. Lewis, XXI, p. 39; the letter of Mrs Montagu cited in Yorke, Hardwicke, II, p. 381 fn. as referring to the Monitor's comparing Hardwicke with Wolsey and Jeffreys is wrongly dated 12 Nov. 1756 as this Monitor of 1 Jan. 1757 is the only one that meets the description.


9. See above p. 586. If Hardwicke did know of the Monitor's association with Beckford this is perhaps further evidence of uncertainty about his attitude to Fox despite his growing loyalty to Pitt. See above p. 112. In Aug. 1756 Newcastle had attributed to him a pamphlet urging a union of Fox and Pitt. See above p. 109 and fn. 109.

10. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 Jan. 1757, Yorke, Hardwicke, II, p. 384. There is no evidence that Bath carried out his intention.
forgotten. 11

The origins of the Monitor's particular distaste for Hardwicke seem to lie in general tory antipathy towards him as a leading and obviously successful member of the whig establishment, and in particular tory-popular dislike of the Marriage Act. 12 This was represented as likely to increase the wealth and therefore the political influence of the aristocracy and hence to be dangerous to popular liberties as well as to healthy population growth. In addition, there were moral and religious objections that, by putting obstacles in the way of easy marriage, it would encourage irregular liaisons and disrupt family life. The Monitor says it

laid the foundation of destroying the influence of the middling people upon national transactions, and of lessening the increase of the human race, or of propagating fornication.

Further, the Act was thought likely to increase the powers of chancery and lawyers in general. Such objections were expressed not only in propaganda such as Shebbeare's novel and the London Evening Post where, as elsewhere, it was linked with the Jew bill as another attack on religion, but also by such eminently respectable critics as Blackstone, Bedford and Charles Townshend (who admittedly had political motives for their opposition), Walpole and Speaker Onslow, the latter typical of independents in this as in his other views. 13

As has been commented already, such opinions were common to all tories and others of 'popular' inclination. The hostility to Hardwicke seems, however, to have been especially virulent in the City, and the hint at the end of the infamous Monitor that measures should be taken against him is an


12. See above p. 60. The personal criticisms of Hardwicke were not confined to tories. Harris, Hardwicke, III, pp. 510-36.

interesting piece of confirmatory evidence of the rumours of intentions there, associated particularly with Beckford and the tories, to move for his impeachment. 14

As the years pass the Monitor's hostility becomes less specific and more merged in general accusations of faction. Never, however, is there any hint of warming sympathy as there was to Newcastle in 1762.

14. See above pp. 103, 109, and also Etough to Birch, 1 June 1[7]57, Add. MS. 9201 (Coxe - Etough papers), f. 128.
Except for primary sources, this bibliography does not aim to be an exhaustive list of all the material used in the preparation of this study. It includes only works which have made a substantial contribution. Works referred to only once in the footnotes (where full details are given) but otherwise not substantially used are not listed. Standard reference works are also excluded.

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