A CASE STUDY IN BROADCASTING POLICY MAKING IN NEW ZEALAND:

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ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this study is to describe and analyse the events associated with the development of the policy enacted into legislation in 1973 for the establishment of three independent corporations to run broadcasting in New Zealand under the overall control of a Broadcasting Council. The Study is designed as a case study of policy development. Attention is focused upon the genesis of the policy and upon the procedures which were used to develop the policy. In explaining the development of the policy, reference is made to the political systems model of analysis, in particularly as developed by David Easton. In Easton's terminology the study focuses upon the inputs to the policy, and upon the conversion process adopted in developing the policy. The study also takes cognisance of a number of media effects theories, especially those developed by Colin Seymour-Ure and Janet Morgan.

The research involved the collection of documentary data and supplementary interview data. The Hon.R.O. Douglas, Minister of Broadcasting at the time, gave the writer access to certain of his papers that are on deposit with the Alexander Turnbull Library. Other than that the documentary data was delimited to documents available in the public domain. The data is first used to summarise events in New Zealand broadcasting antecedent to the period of study and then to analyse the policy-making procedures with reference to the political systems.
The study concludes that the policy was developed very quickly by a small group of people. Although not totally incongruent with the government's election policy, it was a dramatic departure from what was expected and was, to all intents and purpose, a radical new policy. However, overall, the policy was consistent with the new government's aim to move quickly and decisively. The broad parameters of the policy were developed within the political system and a measure of public involvement was subsequently utilised to build support for the nascent policy. The study concludes that there was no mass overt public support for the new policy. It was the result of changes demanded from within the political system and at all stages of the policy-making process, the initiative remained firmly within the political system.

The development of the broadcasting policy was notable for the degree of polarisation it created both within the political system and within the broadcasting organisation. In attempting to explain these cleavages the study concludes that there are permanent tensions between broadcasters and politicians. Such tensions exist because political and broadcasting structures within New Zealand have developed from conflicting philosophical bases; personal perceptions of media effects have determined how politicians carry out their roles as "actors" on the broadcasting "stage", these often conflicting with others' perceptions and with "reality"; and broadcasters and politicians often perceive
themselves as seeking the same ends using vastly different means.

Finally, the study concludes that the political systems model, whilst adequately explaining the policy development process, was unsatisfactory for commenting on the "values" of policies, most particularly why they fail or succeed. As an alternative the study offered a number of reasons for the failure of this policy: The policy-makers failed to gain the support of key broadcasters within the broadcasting structure; the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting had such a restricted brief that it was unable to make changes to the policy that may have generated more support; politicians had media effects perceptions that were incompatible with the principles of the policy; the policy was too radical to be put into place by a three year, one term, government; and the principle pressure groups active in the policy formation process fell into "cumulative" cleavages which highlighted division and prevented if not consensus, then compromise.
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CHAPTER I

THE ISSUE

1. INTRODUCTION

On the 31st January 1973 the Hon.R.O.Douglas, Minister of Broadcasting in the recently elected third Labour Government announced his intention to restructure broadcasting in New Zealand. The announcement took the country by surprise. Labour's election manifesto made no reference to such a major move. Indeed in a mere half a page devoted to broadcasting in the manifesto Labour's aims appeared to be the strengthening of the NZBC and the reinforcing of a long standing policy of commitment to public broadcasting. (Labour Manifesto, 1972). It served warning to existing private broadcasting organisations and those hopefuls waiting in the wings that under a Labour Government public service broadcasting would take priority. (See Appendix A).

Reaction was immediate. Next day the country's newspapers gave much front page and editorial coverage to the announcement. The Minister's press release was not made until 7.00pm on the evening of January 31. However, the Christchurch and Auckland Stars both featured a major article on their third page hinting at the proposed changes and making some very accurate "predictions". The next morning all the major dailies devoted at least half of their front pages to the announcement reporting it, on the whole, quite factually. By the time the evening newspapers came out the headlines were more "bold". NZBC executives shocked,
angry over gvt decision was the four column headline in the Christchurch Star. "Hanging, drawing and quartering performed with the most modern surgical techniques", began the major article on the television page. The evening papers carried a number of comments from unidentified NZBC officials: "People are wandering around in a state of shock. No-one seems to know what's going on or what will happen to them" (Christchurch Star, page 1).

Their surprise was shared by members of their executive and board of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation. So stunned was Director General Lionel R. Sceats that he immediately wrote a letter to his Minister, a thinly veiled plea for information under the guise of "protecting staff morale."

"Your announcement yesterday on the restructuring of Broadcasting in New Zealand is as you stated "dramatic". It has certainly had that effect on staff.

My immediate and urgent concern is to maintain staff morale. There was only a brief reference to existing staff, viz, "one salary structure will apply throughout the Broadcasting Service and the salary levels of existing staff will be protected".

......In the absence of any prior consultation or formal documentation it is extremely difficult for me to give the staff more specific information to which they feel entitled. I regard this matter as warranting urgent attention and would appreciate a written reply as soon as possible."(1)

The passage into legislation of this new proposal was not a smooth one. This study examines the development of Labour's broadcasting policy from the initial announcement through to final legislation, and seeks to explicate the factors that were influential both in the development of the policy and its
2. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of this study is to describe and analyse events associated with the policy enacted into legislation in 1975 for the establishment of three separate and independent public corporations for broadcasting in New Zealand.

In order to describe and analyse the events associated with this policy the following questions will be addressed:

1. Why did the development of a three-corporation broadcasting system in New Zealand become an issue for the nation's policy-makers?

2. What individuals and groups were involved in the development of that policy?
   (a) Who initiated the discussion and why?
   (b) Who supported the idea?
   (c) Who opposed the idea why?
   (d) Which groups had influence?
   (e) What were the bases of the groups' influence?

3. What procedures were followed in the development of the new policy? Specifically, what role was played in the formation of the policy by the Minister of Broadcasting, cabinet and the Labour Party Caucus, the Adam Committee and the
These research questions follow closely those posulated by Hall (1982) in his case study of Educational policy development in Canada.

3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study will focus upon the development of one broadcasting policy; the development of the three-corporation system for New Zealand as legislated by the third Labour Government 1972-1975. There is evidence to substantiate the significance of such research.

In the vernacular of "Star Wars" television can be described as "The Force" of today. It is the frame in which we view the dimensions of our society. It reflects the quality of our culture and the character of our priorities. It is a determining influence on our politics, our economics, our ethics, our aesthetics, as well as our psychological and social perceptions.

Larry Grossman, President, Public Broadcasting Service (Quoted in Cole, 1975, p.v)

Right now television, in every country, is a tool used by "them" to influence "us". The "them" may be advertisers selling a product, politicians pushing a party line, or celebrities offering their views. But the message only flows in one direction.

Alvin Toffler (1975)

What we face is a race. As the arteries of mass communication begin to spread over the Earth, there will be a push toward efficient education, decentralisation, world unification and, on the whole, toward a stiffening of action against the deteriorating situation. In the same period, however, there is almost sure to be a continued rise in population, a
continued increase in pollution, a continued suicidal devotion of man's efforts to dozens of hostile military machines, and all this will keep the situation deteriorating. Which one will win out?

Isaac Asimov (1971)

Statements such as these, far from being uncommon, dominate much of the literature about broadcasting. There is a sense of awesomeness in the writing as if broadcasting like nuclear power is ultimately beyond the control of human beings. Television in particular features prominently across the total spectrum of human endeavour. It has political, cultural, social, economic, commercial, psychological and even spiritual implications. (Smith, 1977, page 9). Yet above and beyond all this it is a superb entertainer. Smith (1977) sees the incompatibility of the latter with the former list as the cause for all the quarrels over broadcasting that have taken place over the last ten years in virtually every country, East or West, where television has reached maturity.

The 1970s, as far as the broadcast media are concerned, may come to be known as the decade of enquiries. All developed societies — and many others — have endeavoured to take their bearings, as it were, in the uncharted oceans of communication issues by holding one or more public investigations.

Many of them have been directed simply at deciding how to reorganise radio and television; others have been directed at more speculative problems posed by modern telecommunications developments. All of them have become aware of the likelihood that any conclusion reached will be quickly overtaken by events. But the speed of change, and its
shifting directions (not all of them forwards), have only encouraged further acts of investigation. (Smith, 1977, page xii)

All this authoritative interest in broadcasting has spawned a significant literature. In the United Kingdom writers such as Briggs (1961, 1965, 1979), Hill (1974) and Paulu (1980) have studied the history and development of broadcasting. Smith (1974, 1977, 1979, 1980), Goldie (1977), Burns (1977) and Schlesinger (1978) have contributed to the growing debate on broadcasting policy. Hood (1980), MacShane (1979), Clutterbuck (1980) and Heller (1978) have researched social issues in broadcasting. Blumler (1979), Butler and Stokes (1974) and the Glasgow Media Group (1976, 1980) have pioneered renewed study on broadcasting and politics particularly as it applies to persuasion theory, agenda setting and accountability.

The volume of literature from America is even greater with Schiller (1970), Katz (1971), O'Keefe (1975), Baggaley and Duck (1976), Friendly (1976) and Levin (1980) being significant contributors.

Although New Zealand is high upon the list of those nations that have had major enquiries and consequential legislative changes to its broadcasting structure, a similar flow of literature has not been forthcoming.

Further, although during the same period Britain developed a number of centres for communication research such as those at Glasgow, Leicester, Leeds and Birmingham universities; Australia introduced media studies to the university curriculum;
and America and Canada continued to develop their long-standing pre-eminence in the fields of communication theory and mass media study; New Zealand failed to respond. By the end of the decade no university had any formal research or teaching programme in the broadcast media and there was a paucity of writing in the area also. Apart from one or two "popular" accounts of broadcasting during the 1960s and early 1970s (Edwards, 1971; Bick, 1970;), an "official" history of Broadcasting in New Zealand that stopped at 1954! (Hall, 1980), and a sample of small and very discrete thesis from a couple of universities (2), there is little to show. Indeed a major public library in a metropolitan centre does not have "broadcasting" listed in its subject files.

Commenting on this lack of serious research into New Zealand broadcasting, Hugh Templeton previously Minister of Broadcasting in the National Government, 1976-1980, said: "it is a fertile field for research, sadly untouched bearing in mind the significance of broadcasting in the political and social history of New Zealand." (3)

There is merit therefore in attempting further research into aspects of broadcasting in New Zealand.

This study will also refer to the range of policy-making models found in the literature and, in particular, will relate the events in question to some of these models. The study concludes that no one model is sufficiently flexible for analysing broadcasting policy formation. Significantly, much of the analysis of policy making overseas that bears most closely on
the New Zealand conditions — that from the United Kingdom — rejects formal structural analysis in favour of a more normative approach which among other things allows for the asking of such questions as what ought to be. (4)

4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The limitations of this study are related to the research methodology used, that is examination and analysis of documentary data and supplementary interviews. The documentary data were limited by availability. Data were obtained from public sources and some supplementary material was made available to the writer by persons who had been involved in the policy making process. In particular permission was given to peruse the personal papers of The Hon. R. O. Douglas and to read some material held by the Opposition Research Unit. Such records are open to a variety of interpretations. The writer did not have access to the files of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation. Available time and limited financial resources restricted the number of supplementary interviews.

The researcher is an inveterate qualifier. It is impossible to commit this study to sweeping statements — as if trying to demonstrate that in some respect or other broadcasting exerts a massive and indiscriminate influence on the views of all exposed to it. Likewise, although subject to nothing short of massive interference, worldwide, by state authorities, it is not possible to state that politicians by definition are paranoiac
when it comes to broadcasting. The study bears in mind the comments of the Pilkington Report (1962), "so far there is little conclusive evidence on the effects of television on values and moral attitudes." Further comments by the Social Morality Council (1974) stress that:

...one conclusion that may safely be drawn from the body of existing research is that broadcast content will often affect different people in different ways, depending partly on the variety of other circumstances in which they are placed. (page 74)

However, the "circumstances" of politicians suggest that they are "placed" vis-a-vis broadcasting in a somewhat unique relationship. Smith (1977, page 15) gives an account of De Gaulle's visit to the newly liberated French Cameroons in 1946. Even then some politicians were aware of the power of the broadcast medium. De Gaulle was a compulsive broadcaster during the war years yet he was "astonished to discover how his image had preceded him." When he heard the vast crowds at the quayside chanting his name, he realised that he would have to get to know this "de Gaulle", the man created by the radio broadcasts, a "secondary self, more potent than the primary self." (Ibid)

Smith goes on later in the book to deliver one of the verdicts of recent research into broadcasting effects:

The General Election Campaign as the creation of organised parties is made to exist by them in ways dictated by the presence of the mass media in general and television in particular. Senior party leaders organise their walkabouts to get the best coverage in the early evening bulletins on all three channels. The content of the big set-piece speeches at public halls in the evenings is designed partly to catch the headline the
following morning, but mainly to get live coverage in the mid-evening news bulletins and the later discussion programmes on television. The morning press conferences given by all three parties are designed to get pithy statements into the early afternoon radio news programmes. (pages 86-87)

The evidence supports the contention that broadcasting dominates politicians lives perhaps more than any other single occupational group in society. "We hate the B.........s! But oh God we need them!," — a comment by one member of parliament confirms that the situation is little different in New Zealand. However both the scope of the study and the limited resources available to the author allows such issues to be raised only in passing.

5. DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The development of policy is dynamic, changing and ongoing. Whatever time period is chosen it will to some extent be arbitrary and the selection of beginnings and endings misleading. A decision was made to delimit this study to the period 1973-1975. On the 31st of January 1973 the Minister of Broadcasting announced a new policy for broadcasting in New Zealand. On the 1st of April 1975 the legislation resulting from the policy became law.

The study is also delimited to available documentary data and to interviews with selected respondents. An attempt is made in this study to evaluate the implementation of the policy under review. However, the comments are limited in scope and need to be
considered within the total spectrum of broadcasting policy-making from 1961 to 1981. Such an evaluation is beyond a study of this kind. It must be left to another occasion.

6. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduced the topic and made some comment upon the significance and scope of the study. Literature pertaining to the study is reviewed in Chapter two, in which consideration is also given to the politics of broadcasting, the subject of this policy-making analysis. The literature on policy-making is discussed, models are introduced, and comments are made on the general role of pressure group activity. The research methodology used in the study is outlined in Chapter three noting in particular the utility of Easton's political systems model. The subject of media analysis is introduced and the case study method outlined. Some comment is also made on the task of interviewing. The antecedents of the policy under study are outlined in Chapter four. Chapter five is the account of events surrounding the development of the policy under study. It is in effect the first part of the case study. Chapter six analyses the events in terms of the theory outlined. The final chapter offers alternative analyses of the events, conclusions are drawn from the study and areas for further research suggested.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

1. THE POLITICS OF BROADCASTING

The current ferment of ideological debate and discussion about the form and content of broadcasting belies its humble beginnings. The first moves to organise regular public radio broadcasts attracted little general attention or concern either in New Zealand or overseas. "identical noises to all and sundry" was a contemporary description of radio quoted by Asa Briggs in his History of the BBC. (Briggs, 1961, page 15)

It seemed to most people, including politicians, to be a matter of relatively minor technical operation in a commercial field or relatively little public importance. (Heller, 1978, page 8)

Indeed, like many developments, radio was imposed on society by a small number of enthusiastic inventors and commercial interests who saw potential profits in manufacturing and distributing the new machines. There is no evidence to suggest that any society demanded the introduction of broadcasting. Such social pressures were a long time in coming.

Other than for the fact that broadcasting's proposed activities intruded upon one of the most jealously guarded sectors of Government - telecommunications, which had always been centrally controlled as a matter of national security, broadcasting may have never attracted governments' interest and
consequent interference. As it was the enterprising moves of radio enthusiasts quickly attracted the attention of always vigilant post office officials. Thus it was the almost accidental combination of state interest and inventorijal enthusiasm that led to the inevitably close involvement of governments with broadcasting. It was scarce allocation of airwaves and not broadcasting content that first brought the fledgling new communications system to the attention of officialdom. As Williams notes in his perceptive book "Television: Technology and Cultural form":

It is not only that the supply of broadcasting facilities preceded demand; it is that the means of communication preceded their content. (Williams, 1974)

Thus broadcasting played little if any role in the perceived government or social services of the time. It was a peripheral activity conceived purely as a function of marketing radio equipment. As Heller (1978) points out, this is exactly the same as today with cable and satellite television, viewdata and teletext all searching for social functions outside the military research that created them. Thus the historical pattern of broadcasting development having form before content is reinforced. This historical precedence of technology over demand explains the remarkable absence of concern shown at the time for what was actually broadcast. In 1925 the Crawford Committee in the UK could dismiss the content issue with few words:

A moderate amount of controversial matter should be broadcast, provided it is of high quality and distributed with scrupulous fairness.
The overall assumption was that everybody agreed on what it was desirable for the public to hear. In New Zealand the emphasis was on "recordings of the world's greatest artists" and "engaging only the best local artists" (O'Donoghue, 1946)

Occasionally there would be a re-broadcast of an outstanding international event such as a Monarch's speech or the Oxford and Cambridge boat race. Indeed any controversy generated by the budding broadcast services seemed to centre around those who saw a commercial disadvantage or threat:

The Press was afraid that broadcasting had come as a strangling enemy, church authorities avowed that this modern intruder would keep people away from church; cricket and football organisations refused to allow their club games to be broadcast lest their patrons should stay at home.....and for years racing clubs refused to allow the word "broadcasting" to be mentioned" (O'Donoghue, 1946, Page 7)

The state's interest in early broadcasting was therefore essentially negative. This being expressed by the state's control of frequency allocation and the legal regulation (by licensing) of the right to receive and transmit messages. There was also an "unspoken" concensus about what should be avoided leading to a set of negative prohibitions: it was necessary to avoid vulgarity, to omit news in deference to newspaper interests, to avoid controversial topics such as politics. "Positive matters of content and social purpose, on the other hand, were originally seen as peripheral." (Heller, 1978, page 12)

What brought about the change? How did the state become so inextricably bound up with broadcasting?
In New Zealand three major factors were influential in determining broadcasting's future relationships with the state:

1. The influence of the BBC
2. The actions of Broadcasters themselves
3. The election of the first Labour Government

(1) The Influence of the BBC

As is many other areas the influence of the "Old Country" on New Zealand's broadcasting development was substantial.

....The United Kingdom had adopted almost from the inception of broadcasting, as part of its system, corporate control as the form most appropriate to the development of this new social service. New Zealand was greatly influenced by the apparent success of the system... (Marshall, 1966, Page 248)

As mentioned earlier matters of transmission and airwaves licensing were the consuming interest of officialdom in the UK as well as elsewhere during the pioneering days of radio. Two exhaustive enquiries into broadcasting dealt exclusively with technical and management problems. The British Broadcasting Co. Ltd. established in 1923, the result of "an accidental conjunction of state interest and commercial enterprise", (Heller, 1978, page 8) was only to have a short life. In early 1926 the British Broadcasting Company Ltd. was replaced by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Created by Royal Charter, it followed an established British tradition of establishing ad hoc bodies of different kinds with autonomous or semi-autonomous status to handle various services and utilities of concern to the general
public. Even at this stage it was seen as having a function not dissimilar to The Port of London Authority or the Forestry Commission.

Developments at the BBC were influenced by two other factors, one less forceful than the other. The first was the so-called "American experience". Throughout British broadcasting history the example of what happened in the United States of America has provided "an immensely influential devil's advocacy of alternatives." (Heller, 1978, page 12). Radio in the United States was developing rapidly on an unstructured and unrestricted "free-enterprise" basis. Peter Eckersley, a pioneer British broadcaster records the American experience as "a great stimulant" and referred to the people who came over to Britain from the States during the 1920's as having made "vast sums of money" in radio. There were "hellfire accounts of chaos and tastelessness, stirring images of freedom, enterprise and imagination". (Heller, page 22). No doubt there was also accounts of technical anarchy and unbridled airwaves piracy all of which helped the two Committees reject outright deregulation and opt for a form of control that would at the least eliminate the profit motive and avoid the possibility of disorderly exploitation of scarce public resources.

The second and by far more dominant factor was John Reith (later Lord Reith) himself. Unique in the world of broadcasting this man towered like a giant over all the other personalities, both broadcasters and politicians, for over a decade. Indeed some would say his "ghost" still haunts the corridors of the BBC.
ensuring his special brand of corporate control remains untouched and unsurpassed. He was a Scot, tall in stature with craggy features that made a gift to political cartoonists.

He came from a religious background and his high standards of moral and religious rectitude had been enforced in sound broadcasting. His word was law. There must be no light entertainment or political controversy on the Sabbath; no breath of scandal must touch any member of his staff; the dignity of the Corporation must be maintained at every point; announcers, even although they were not seen, must wear dinner jackets in the evening. (Goldie, 1977, page 28)

Reith was totally obsessed with the inherent possibilities of radio. The force of his vision and his commitment to efficiency and public responsibility was such that he carried all before him. For him management was essentially an affair of experts to whom it was indispensable to give wide discretionary powers and a liberal freedom to experiment with new methods. "Unencumbered, unembarrassed, and unconditional efficiency" he wrote was the major reason for the establishment of the BBC. It could then be:

normally untrammelled by any political interference, by any delegacy, by any Civil Service procedures, by any political party expectations and claims, by any demands, by impatient shareholders - not one factor of the kind that disquiets the life of most administrators and managers. (Reith, quoted in Wedell, 1966, page 21)

Strong words of independence. But such was Reith's rectitude, his total belief in, and respect for, authority, and total commitment to the values of the British establishment that
in reality the BBC became the voice of the Government. The behaviour of Reith in the 1926 General Strike confirms this. He himself wrote later in his diary, "they know that they can trust us not to be really impartial." (Reith, 1949, page 108). And Baldwin told Reith that Broadcasting had "triumphantly showed itself in a searching test." (Quoted in Briggs, 1961, page 384).

Thus Asa Briggs was able to conclude that it was the form and content of radio services under Reith at the British Broadcasting Company that played a decisive role in shaping the future of broadcasting legislation. Contrary to general belief it was a private company and not the British government that effectively placed broadcasting within the boundaries of a public service. The first Chairman of the BBC Lord Clarendon saw it as an "inevitable and logical result" of the policies adopted right at the beginning of the broadcasting story in 1922. "All this was Reith's doing." (Briggs, 1965, page 3)

Following closely the British experience it is no wonder that New Zealand initially eschewed American commercialism, admired the principles of Reith and copied the structures that he espoused.

(2) The Actions of Broadcasters

Admiration is one thing, the ability to be able to satisfactorily recreate the structures is another. With the limited resources of money and equipment, a much smaller potential listening audience and a country of exceptionally rugged terrain with its pockets of population spread widely apart, New Zealand broadcasting could only poorly copy that which it
admired so much. Further it lacked the genius of a Reith to mould and hold the structure. Good men all were the first directors of the Radio Broadcasting Company of N.Z.Ltd and the New Zealand Broadcasting Board, its successor. But who recalls them now?

O'Donaghue suggests:

those great business men behind the Charter engaged New Zealand talent in all its branches and were ever on the lookout for the best available talent from other countries.... Under the direction of the Company very many outstanding events studded the programmes..... The Management was ever progressive in seizing the opportunity of introducing sensational happenings to listeners. (1946, pages 7-8)

On the other hand Edwards suggests:

Really bad were the programmes...... In the slang of the day, they were chronic..... Night after night listeners were tuning out stridulous vocalists and fault-fingered instrumentalists, defective elocutionists, unfunny humorists, profoundly uninteresting speakers on recondite topics - the unpaid and untalented seemed almost as numerous as the unemployed; certainly they were as unpopular. (1971, page 56)

Be that as it may, the listening public deserted the A stations in droves for the less secure, less officially acceptable, but overwhelmingly more popular B stations.

It was on 1ZB in Auckland that Colin Scrimgeour - Uncle Scrim of the Friendly Road to most of his listeners - drew the largest listening audience. Scrimgeour was one of the first people to fully understand the power of the new medium. He was also one of the few with the talent to exploit it. His precarious freedom to broadcast from 1ZB was an immense thorn in the flesh
of authorities. So much so that authority began to resent him.

Broadcasting under the Board was heavily regularised and regulated. The B stations, policed by the Post and Telegraph Department were subjected to the constant attention of inspectors whose job it had become to ensure that these stations were as innocuous in their presentations as were those controlled by the Board. Systematically Scrimgeour incurred the wrath of the inspectors, the Board and finally the Minister of Post and Telegraph himself Adam Hamilton. Scrimgeour's crusading Methodist ministry background made him very conscious of the social and moral evils of the depression. He was even more conscious of abuse of power in the political process. His "righteous anger" led him to use his radio station as a platform to attack his opponents. Thousands of Aucklanders became his followers, a devoted audience that "hung on his every word". Scrimgeour's sympathies towards the Labour Party led him into close involvement with the party's hierarchy. He even contemplated standing for parliament in the 1935 General Election. That was not to be. However he made sure that Michael Joseph Savage and others were well aware of the political potential of broadcasting and then set about to use his own position and power to bring about a Labour victory.

A victorious Labour Government was left in no doubt as to the power of broadcasting and a defeated and demoralised opposition were convinced also. So much so that in the last days of Coalition Party office Adam Hamilton used his position to
illegally jam station 1ZB's transmission.

3. The first Labour Government

By 1936 Labour was convinced of the need to "protect" broadcasting from "hostile" elements. Faced with almost total media opposition from a conservative and anti-socialist press, Michael Joseph Savage saw the value of placing broadcasting within the orbit of the public service. Such was this value that he made himself the first Minister of Broadcasting. In 1938 he was recorded as saying "It is a grand thing to have a hand on Radio these days." (O'Donoghue, page 21) Broadcasting in New Zealand was firmly in the hand of politicians and there it remained for many years.

In retrospect, the beginning of broadcasting was an extraordinarily casual affair. As pointed out above, originally, the services were begun in response to technical and commercial demands rather than to popular demand or any preconceived or developed Government policy. Any challenge presented by this fledgling communications medium to state interests was primarily in the field of telecommunications. It was in this area than initial legislation retained for the State ultimate control. The model of the public corporation was conveniently to hand in the U.K. to provide protection from perceived unsavoury effects of commercialism and profit and ensure the independent pursuit of efficiency. New Zealand with much less cultural commitment to these values nevertheless, in true colonial style, followed. As for the awakening disquiet about the social and political consequences of broadcasting, what anxieties that existed in the
U.K. were allayed by Reith's zeal in dedicating radio "to the cause of social uplift and improvement." In New Zealand it was necessary to go one step further. By making broadcasting a Government Department the concepts of broadcasting "in the national interest" or true "public-service broadcasting" came to New Zealand perhaps before any other country. Both concepts, however, have come to dominate the conduct and discussion of broadcasting services.

2. POLICY-MAKING

Policy can be defined as the general principles which guide the making of laws, administration, and executive acts of governments in domestic and international affairs. Policy has to be distinguished from doctrine - the systems of beliefs and values which generate policy and which purport to describe the ends to which policy is the means, and from philosophy, the underlying justification given for doctrine and policy together.

Policy analysis is finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes.

Dye and Robey (1980) identify three separate but interrelated tasks: describing public policy, determining its causes and assessing its consequences.

The descriptive task in policy analysis should not be underestimated. Describing government programmes and policies - surveying enabling legislation, examining authorisations and appropriations, indentifying agencies with responsibilities for administration and implementation, and, most importantly, finding
out just exactly what these agencies do — is a formidable undertaking.

Studies of the causes of public policy — learning why governments do what they do — is an even more challenging task. Early political science texts frequently describe "how a bill becomes law", and many political scientists today continue to focus on the law-making process in their approach to the determinants of public policy. But in recent years systematic, comparative research on determinants of public policy has developed very rapidly.

Still another task in policy analysis is that of assessing the consequences of public policy. This may be the most difficult task confronting the policy analyst: finding out what difference public policy makes in our lives or if it makes any difference at all. (1980, page 3)

This study is basically descriptive, however some attempt is made to look at the determinants of public policy as they relate to decisions on broadcasting during the period under review.

3. THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY

Unlike what appears to be the naive thinking of some public policy determiners, policy analysts cannot approach the task thinking that there is a discrete problem requiring a distinct solution. Rather, as Wildavsky (1979) points out, we must think differently about the nature of social and political action, not as puzzles to be solved ("once and for all" as some politicians are wont to say), but as "problems that may be alleviated or eventually superseded." Policy analysis must be concerned more with problem succession and displacement than with
It is not resolution of policies but evolution that should interest us. A better comparison is to contrast the problems we have now with those we had before. Instead of thinking of permanent solutions we should think of permanent problems in the sense that one problem always succeeds and replaces another. (page 206)

Thus the major question we should perhaps address ourselves to when involved in policy analysis is whether today's response to the problems is more moral or more effective than the solutions they succeeded or which they might replace.

4. MODELS

Various models for policy analysis have been developed over the last thirty years or so. Many are American in origin and reflect that nations commitment to various degrees of behavioural and structural analysis within political theory.

In the 1960's American political scientists and business management theorists diverged from one another; the latter concentrating on the development of decision-making theories the former studying broader based policy analysis. Anderson (1975) distinguishes between decision making models and policy analysis models. He determined that decision-making was a shorter term event contributing to the ultimate development of an overall policy.

5. MODELS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
Decision making theories included:

(1) **Rational-comprehensive**

Probably the best known decision theory which suggests that the rational decision-maker will behave logically and consistently, choosing a decision that will most closely match the original goals after having taken into account all the options and analysed all the various consequences of each alternative choice.

(2) **Incrementalism**

Lindblom (1968) developed this theory to replace rational decision-making in the belief that administrators on the whole do not behave as entirely rational beings. Decision-makers operate in conditions of uncertainty therefore it is prudent to agree about a policy without ever being too clear about what is the most appropriate objective. The science is one of "muddling through". Incrementalism recognises that decision-makers lack the time, often the intelligence and the resources needed to engage in comprehensive rational decisions.

(3) **Mixed-scanning**

This theory whilst agreeing with much of the criticism against rational theory is also critical of incrementalism. Great or fundamental decisions (e.g. declarations of war) do not come within the ambit of incrementalism. Such decisions are highly significant and are probably made within the best attempts at rational decision making. Generally speaking the greater the capacity of decision makers to utilize resources and intelligence
to implement decisions the more scanning they can realistically engage in and hence the more effective the decision making. (Etzioni, 1967)

Decisions are distinguished from policies by suggesting that policies are the cumulative result of decisions taken. Once again there are a number of models:

(4) Group Theory

This states that struggle and interaction among groups of human beings is the central fact of political and social life. Groups make competing and conflicting claims upon institutions and governments. Individuals are only significant in politics when they belong to or identify with groups. Government decisions will reflect the dominant groups and public policy will alter as various groups rise and fall in significance. (Truman, 1951) Criticism of this theory rests upon the argument that it overstates the case. Whilst interest groups are important in society, so are independent and creative individuals and even more so when such individuals are themselves public officials. (Anderson, 1975, page 20)

(5) Elite Theory

This theory suggests that only a small ruling elite actually determine public policy and not the people as a collective mass. Only this small number allocate values for the whole of society. They tend to come disproportionately from the upper socio-economic group in society and they protect their position by ensuring that movement from the non-elite into the
elite whilst difficult is not impossible. It is slow yet continuous to ensure social stability. The masses are suggested to be, on the whole, apathetic and they accept the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy tend to be incremental rather than revolutionary. Elites influence masses more than masses influence elites. This "rather provocative theory" (Anderson, 1975, page 21) focuses attention on the role of leadership with its suggestion that the few govern the many. It is still contentiously debated. (Dye & Ziegler, 1978, page 6)

(6) Functional Process Theory

Lasswell (1956) is the supreme functionalist. He presents a scheme involving seven categories of functional analysis.

1. The gathering of intelligence by policy makers and how it is processed.
2. How are recommendations (or alternatives) for dealing with various issues made and promoted.
3. How general rules are prescribed and by whom.
4. Who determines whether given behaviour contravenes rules or laws and who demands application of such rules or laws.
5. How are the rules or laws actually enforced.
6. How are the operations of policies appraised in terms of their success or failure.
7. How are the original rules or laws terminated, continued or modified.

In true functionalist form—seven words predominate: Intelligence, Recommendation, Prescription, Invocation,
Standard criticism of functionalist theory applies. Its form is too rigid, it fails to respond to psychological variables and to environmental effects. Policy formation is much more than just an intellectual process.

(7) Political Systems theory

In this theory public policy may be seen as a response of a political system to demands arising from its environment. The Political system as defined by Easton (1979) is composed of those identifiable and interrelated institutions and activities in society that make authoritative decisions or allocations of value that are binding on society. Inputs into the political system consist of demands and supports that are made upon it by the environment. The environment is all the conditions and events that exist outside the political system. Individuals, to satisfy their interests make demands on the system and so do groups. Support is rendered to the political system when groups and individuals pay taxes, abide by election results, obey laws and in other ways accept the decisions and actions that recognised authority impose. These impositions are the authoritative allocations of social value and constitute public policy. The concept of feedback ensures that policies, or outputs, are able to be subsequently changed so as to better respond to the demands generated by the environment. Such feedback also has its own effect of altering the character of the political system itself. Policy outputs may produce new demands, which lead to further
policy outputs. And so it continues, producing a never ending flow of public policy.

Harman (1979) as quoted by Hall (1982, page 30) criticises "the limited repertoire of theories" used by most writers and then goes on to develop twelve different models of policy making including bargaining, organisational models and the process model.

6. PROBLEMS OF MODEL APPLICATIONS

There are some major problems associated with applying any of these models to the analysis of social policy in New Zealand. One is inherent in the models themselves. In isolation each model has weaknesses that become apparent the moment they are applied to concrete issues. Some of these weaknesses have been mentioned. Others focus around the merging of public policy and social action - the question of how "theory" or "analysis" can properly be related to practice. White (1976) sees this issue emerging with increasing urgency. Still more are related to perceived confusions between planning and politics. Wildavsky (1979) argues that planning focuses almost exclusively on the ranking of objectives. He argues that politics often seeks upon agreed ends at any cost. Policy analysis models often concentrate on one at the exclusion of the other. Good analysis, claims Wildavsky, must always consider resources and objectives, means and ends, together.

"The proper comparison for the policy analyst
is always between alternative programs, which combine resources and objectives in different ways, but not the one or the other in isolation." (Wildavsky 1979, P73)

A further major problem in applying any existing models to New Zealand lies in the lack of any significant work in policy theory that responds to the peculiar New Zealand conditions. Most theory, as mentioned above, is American in origin and designed to respond to a set of political and social conditions markedly different from those experienced in New Zealand.

What little work that has been done tends to accept as given the overseas models. For example, Ensor (1975) takes the incremental model of decision making as the theoretical basis for an analysis of wool marketing reform and a systems model is identified as being used by Hoadley (1975) and Roy (1975). Polaschek's (1958) seminal work on Government Administration in New Zealand is purely descriptive and the reforms suggested are of an administrative nature only and reflect the historical concentration of training in public administration in New Zealand on the production of the "complete" bureaucrat.

For the purposes of this study the view is held that Easton's political systems theory coupled with elements of group theory (pressure groups play a significant role in New Zealand policy making), elite theory (evidence suggests broadcasting policy was determined by very few people) and incremental decision making (many modifications were made along the way) are all necessary to supply a theoretical basis for this study.
6. PRESSURE GROUPS

(1) Definitions

Alan Robinson (1970) defines a pressure group as:

".....a privately organised group which seeks to influence government policies mainly by means other than that of seeking political office. It differs from a political party which is mainly concerned with obtaining or retaining political office". (page 17)

Levine (1975) states:

"Interest groups when behaving politically may be described as private concentrations of power devoted to the achievement of goals that may not be necessarily shared by the majority of the population." (page 199)

Almond and Powell (1966) suggest:

(interest groups)...."articulate political demands in the society, seek supports for these demands among other groups by advocacy and bargaining, and attempt to transform these demands into authoritative public policy by influencing the choice of political personal, and the various processes of public policy making and enforcement." (page 74)

Each of these definitions is acceptable but further comment is necessary.

Some writers make a distinction between the terms "interest group" and "pressure group". There is the suggestion that "pressure group" has overtones of disapproval. However, the negative connotations of the latter seem hardly strong enough to merit banishment. Further, Robinson (1970, page 52)) draws attention to ambiguities in the meaning of "interest". Beer's (1962) definition as quoted in Levine (1979) is useful:
"By interest we mean here simply a disposition to act to achieve some goal." (page 127)

For the purposes of this study the terms "interest group" and "pressure group" will be interchangeable.

(2) Types of Pressure Groups

A number of typologies of pressure groups have been developed (e.g. Almond and Powell, 1966) but that of Levine (1979) has the advantage of being particular to New Zealand. His classification is shown in figure 1.

He divides groups into those which are "protective" and those that are "promotional". Protective groups have long-term interests and usually have strong sectional or economic backing. He describes promotional groups as being set up to achieve certain purposes relating to particular and often highly controversial political issues. Levine sees them as more transient and yet receiving the most publicity. He attributes this fact to their general lack of political influence with decision-makers hence the need to have a high media profile to attract a wider public.

Beer (1962) also hypothesised a distinction between special-interest groups and general-interest groups, suggesting that the special-interest group is primarily out to benefit itself whilst the general-interest group seeks to benefit others. Levine rejects this:

Since most groups persuade themselves that satisfaction of their own interests will promote the interests of everyone else, this
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of interest group</th>
<th>Basis of membership</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Political influence</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Protect membership; influence budgetary allocations; secure economic benefits</td>
<td>Considerable; participate regularly in the policy process</td>
<td>Trade unions; Federation of Labour; Manufacturers Association; Federated Farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Ideological (may involve local residents and ratepayers in certain disputes)</td>
<td>Protect environment; preserve natural features; oppose pollution; support stringent planning of economic development</td>
<td>Sporadic and irregular; depends on issue and extent of public involvement in ad hoc issues</td>
<td>Ecology Action; Action for Environment; Environmental Defence Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Ideological (may involve affected persons or organisations)</td>
<td>Promote particular structure of values; urge government support to ensure desired pattern of values is implemented; oppose incompatible programmes</td>
<td>Sporadic and irregular; depends on issue and extent of public involvement; elite membership may be decisive</td>
<td>SPUC; ALRANZ; NOW: Women's Liberation; Gay Liberation; SPCS; Concerned Parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>Ideological; racial</td>
<td>Protect membership; ensure that government policies are not prejudicial; influence government's foreign policies to support non-white 'third world' struggles</td>
<td>Considerable at local level; irregular at national level; depends on issue and extent (and content) of media coverage</td>
<td>CARE; HART; Nga Tamatoa; Polynesian Panthers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
distinction requires too subjective an assessment of the "benefits" of group activity to be very useful." (1979, page 128)

Policy analysts who support the Group Theory (e.g. Dahl, 1967; Truman, 1951) argue that all political conflict is group conflict and therefore the whole process of politics must involve antagonism between groups and the consequent success or failure of various groups to win support from the government or administration. Levine does not counter this argument with any passion, which is surprising bearing in mind the significant role individuals have played in New Zealand's political process.

Anderson (1975) believes this position overstates the case for group activity and understates the independent and creative role individuals, particularly in the form of public officials, play in the policy process.

(3) Functions of Pressure Groups

Pressure groups may function basically for the purpose of making demands upon policy-making bodies in order to achieve their own goals but they are also more than that. They help to define the wider goals of the social system and provide a flow both of fresh information and feedback which assists policy-making bodies to keep in touch both with what is happening in society and how opinion-makers are thinking. Some political scientists go so far to suggest that the existence of interest groups is a distinctive feature of democratic politics. (see Levine, 1975, page 199). This seems to unwarrantly suggest that other forms of political society lack such pressure groups.
Cleveland (1972, page 13) lists ways in which pressure groups can be useful to governments:

1. Attempt to initiate or to influence legislation;

2. Help to frame public policy by acting as a linkage between government and a wide field of special organisations and interests involved with it in a continuous, two-way process of consultation and interaction;

3. Disseminate information downwards to mass publics as well as upwards to government by means of advertising and publicity campaigns, letter writing, the writing of telegrams, lobbying and making formal submissions to parliamentary organisations;

4. Provide a flow of information, ideas, suggestions and criticism to activists throughout the whole field of government and politics and thus help to stimulate their performance;

5. Provide an additional channel for the representation of aspects of public opinion which might otherwise not be heard. In this way they augment the work of the political parties and the mass media by expressing specialised and minority opinions;

6. Act as watchdogs, keeping an additional, critical check on the work of government;

7. Define aspects of public opinion at levels which parties only occasionally touch. Parties are interested in winning power at elections. Pressure groups are active all the time. Any group of citizens can form a pressure group and
this helps in the representation of voters who might otherwise be unfairly treated. The two basic democratic principles involved in this are the right to participate in policy-making and the right to petition those in authority and obtain access to them. Pressure group activity allows minorities to be clearly heard - one of the essentials of democracy.

Within the overall framework of policy-making, particularly when referencing systems theory, attention must be given to the relationship between pressure groups and the government in the framing of public policy. Negotiation and consultation are the two types of activity that Eckstein (1960) suggests may occur when pressure groups involve themselves with government in the formation of new policies.

Negotiations take place when a governmental body makes a decision hinging upon the actual approval of organizations interested in it, giving the organization a veto over the decision; consultations occur when the views of the organisation are solicited and taken into account but are not considered in any sense decisive. (page 411)

Whether in negotiation or consultation the success of an interest group in having its viewpoints adopted will depend on its influence.

(4) The influence of Pressure Groups

Hall (1982) suggests that influence is the extent to which an interest group is able to legitimate its demands. Anderson (1975) writes:
The influence of interest groups depends on a number of factors. These may include...the size of the group's membership, its monetary and other resources, its cohesiveness, the skill of its leadership, its social status, the presence or absence of competing organizations, the attitudes of public officials, and the site of decision-making in the political system. (page 27)

Robinson (1970) traces New Zealand's history in terms of pressure group activities. Local and regional groupings dominated the nineteenth century usually concentrating on gaining a fair share of public works. Larger groupings with economic bases vied with each other from the 1930s through to the 1950s. It was the peak of party development and competing groups sought control of the parties in order to control the state. The most recent period has seen the rise of powerful national interest groups concerned with altering or defending details of the centrally controlled economy and the welfare state.

This pattern of development has had a number of stimuli. Robinson (1970, page 52) lists them as:

1. The impact of fluctuations in New Zealand's overseas markets, leading to unified requests for action at the national level and the submergence of provincial and local loyalties;

2. The specialisation of labour in the economy, leading to the self-conscious creation of professional associations based on occupation;

3. Improvements in communication and transportation, enabling
local organisations to amalgamate more easily;

4. The widening range and scope of state involvement in society, leading to requests for special services and the entry of "private" issues into the political arena for settlement by the government.

There is considerable concern in some of the literature about trends in New Zealand pressure group activity that may be unhealthy. Truman (1951) observed that one of the salient features of American interest group activity was the complicated and diverse interlocking of relationships that led a flexible and stabilising element to the American policy making process. Lipset (1963) warns:

A stable democracy requires a situation in which all major political parties include supporters from many segments of the population. A system in which the support of different parties corresponds too closely to basic social divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis, for it reflects a state of conflict so intense and clearcut as to rule out compromise. (pages 12-13).

Levine (1979, page 130) picks up this theme. He argues that political parties and interest groups are more and more corresponding to basic social divisions such as social class, race, sex and political orientation. The "cross-cutting cleavages" so essential for Truman and Lipset's democratic process become "cumulative cleavages" leading to "a state of conflict so intense and clearcut as to rule out compromise." If this is happening in New Zealand then "analysts will have discovered yet another potential source of weakness and
instability in New Zealand's deceptively fragile political consensus. (Levine 1979, page 131).
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the research methodology used in the study. Firstly the case study approach is explained and commented upon. This is followed by a description of the political systems model (Easton, 1965, 1979), which provides the framework for the collection and analysis of data. Secondly media effects models (Seymour-Ure, 1974, Morgan, 1982 and Steele, 1981) are discussed with particular reference to political effects that may influence policy-makers. An attempt to integrate these models is not made at this time but reference is made later to this possibility. Comment is made on the concept of disciplined enquiry and finally, the procedures which this study follows are explained.

2. THE CASE STUDY

The case study approach has had a long history of acceptance as a method of research in social science. Back in 1950 Gee writes of the method:

The case study may be an individual, an institution, a community, or any group considered as a unit for study. Case study method emphasizes the total situation or combination of factors, the description of the process or sequence of events in which behaviour occurs, the study of individual behaviour in its total setting and the analysis and comparison of cases leading to
Most of the books and articles written about policy process take the form of case studies (Hofferbert, 1974). Hofferbert defines a case study as "...an in-depth examination of a particular instance of something...a detailed rendition of a particular dynamic instance that is, in some essential respects, an example of general ...behaviour." (Page 89).

This case study is descriptive in content. It pertains to both the processes of policy making and the substance of the policy itself. The objective is to highlight the processes by which the policies were formed whilst at the same time seeking out the forces that determined the behaviour of the policy-makers themselves.

Case studies tend to have a fairly common format. Hall (1982) lists:

1. A single public-policy decision...or a set of closely related policy decisions is isolated for investigation.
2. The case analyst gives a history of the development of policy in the particular area.
3. Most case studies focus on political conflict. The investigator attempts to identify the interests of the individuals involved in hammering out a policy product. Certain issues are selected because they seem, by some standard or other, to embody "representative" participants in the policy process. Affected pressure groups are identified and an effort is made to assess
the impact of their activities.

4. Finally, an attempt is made to reconstruct, within the context of a bargaining model, the attitude of the participants and the actions they undertook. The various components that are perceived to have been operative in the policy-making process are weighed and their relative effect on the output is gauged and assessed. (page 44)

(1) Advantages of Case Studies

Lipjphart (1971) states that very frequently case studies are praised for their "hypothesis generating power." Nelson (1978) claims this as a very important role. Case studies are seen as the "mining effort which provides the raw materials for that segment of empirical research which follows the mould of: Hypothesis - test - affirmation/contradiction - evaluation - integration." (page 20)

Hall (1982) quotes the classic case of Young (1933) who in a paper that is still widely quoted today listed the many advantages of the case study format. They include:

The method gives a continuous picture over time of an event through the perceptions of those that were involved.

This in itself gives rise to new meanings and new responses. (This is confirmed by Lipjphart's analysis.)

By using the case study method inferences and generalisations are based on an intimate knowledge of the situation and of the habits and actions of the persons interacting. (page 45)
(2) Disadvantages

There are obvious disadvantages also. And as a counterbalance Young lists a number of these. Most importantly, memory, judgment and perception may be faulty. Also the researcher has difficulty in making qualitative checks on much of the data, some of which will be, by its very nature, anecdotal and impressionistic. Finally, some information may be downright false.

3. POLITICAL SYSTEMS MODEL

In opting for a policy science theory that would meet the criteria for a study of public service broadcasting the writer determined on the political systems model developed by David Easton (1965, 1979). The model is used with precision by Hall (1982) in his case study of educational policy-making. Broadcasting like education pervades the total social structure of modern democratic societies. It therefore requires a model that is "total" in its focus. By total is meant that the focus of the model deals with the totality of social behaviour. Easton's framework meets this for he identifies his focus as "the set of interactions abstracted from the totality of social behaviour, through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society." (page 57). Easton believes that his model can be applied to any "para-political" group in which values or resources are authoritatively allocated for members of that system.

Essentially Easton's system is a "black box" process.
Inputs are made, conversion takes place, and outputs result. The system converts demands into decision/policies as outputs.

Society is composed of major sub-sets identified as institutions—schools, churches, political parties, the economy and so on. Individuals react with one another and with these institutions in a pattern that betrays their ways of belief and their activities. That pattern constitutes a distinctive culture. One of these institutions is the political system. Easton labels this as different from the others because it alone is the source of "authoritative allocation of values, those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for society." (Easton, 1979, page 21). A political system emerges within a society simply because demands made on that society by individuals and groups cannot be fully met.

(1) Inputs

Demands and supports comprise the input to the political system. Demand is defined by Easton as:

- an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so" (1975, page 38).

Any system is always facing demands for scarce resources. These demands may arise either from the environment in which the system operates or from within the system itself: Easton calls the latter a "withinput". A withinput he describes as an "awkward term" but it does suggest the source of a particular type of input that is generated not from the environment itself but from
within the political system. People already with power in the political system may use that power to frequent their own ends. In fact, in parliamentary democracies, it is a common way of introducing new policy.

These demands do not arise from the experiences of persons who have acted in roles outside the political sector of society. They emerge directly out of political roles themselves, that is, from within the system. (Easton, 1965, page 55)

Easton is emphasising that these withinputs differ from other demands which are shaped by such parameters as culture, economy, society, religion and the like, whereas withinputs are "politically determined". (page 55)

Not all demands become issues that require action within the political system. Some demands wither away either through lack of strong support or equally lack of strong opposition.

A second element is also present as an input within any political system. This he labels support. This second input is essential to ensure the continuance of the system as a set of processes for converting demands into outputs. Support refers to a necessary condition that takes the form of another transaction, like demand, but qualitatively different. The input of support appears in the form of behaviour - i.e. actions which promote the goals, interests or actions of another, and sentiments - i.e. supportive states of mind such as a "deep-seated set of attitudes or pre-dispositions, or a readiness to act on behalf of another person" (1965, page 390).

Inputs as a form of support can exist then for a total
community, for a particular government structure, for a particular regime, or for a particular action of that regime.

Support can be generated in two ways: Either by outputs from the system which satisfy demands over a period of time or by politicisation of the society. Politicisation is the process by which members of a society come to accept norms of belief and behaviour.

The conversion of inputs in the form of demands and supports into outputs is the policy-making process within the system.

It is the conversion of inputs, through the application of resources within the system, into outputs that approximates a specific act of policy-making. (Schoettle, 1968, page 169)

(2) Conversion Process

The conversion process refers to the process which changes the input into outputs. It is left to other writers to dwell on the process. Easton does not deal at length with it. Two teams of writers, Almond and Powell (1966) and Mazzoni and Campbell (1976) have presented broadly similar ways of analysing the conversion process. There are four distinct areas of analysis.

(a) Interest Articulation. Almond and Powell classify the articulation stage as the beginning of the conversion process. Individuals and groups within society make known their demands by articulation. These demands are communicated to the authorities. For Mazzoni and Campbell this is the "issue definition" stage when the preferences of individuals and organisations are
translated into what Easton classifies as "political issues" thus requiring government action.

(b) **Interest aggregation.** This is the second stage of the conversion process when demands are translated into general policy alternatives. Mazzoni and Campbell see this stage as having two distinct phases:

1. **Proposal formulation:** being the process by which issues are developed as specific recommendations for either a change in policy or for maintaining the status quo.

2. **Support mobilisation:** described as the process by which individuals and groups are motivated to support or oppose the various policy proposals.

(c) **Rule making.** There are two types of rules - primary and secondary. (Almond and Powell, 1966). Primary rules are those laws which require of a person that they act or refrain from acting in stated ways. Primary rules impose duties or prohibitions. Secondary rules are those which give the authority to make and implement primary rules - e.g. a constitution.

**Decision enactment.** The final stage of the conversion process is detailed by Mazzoni and Campbell as decision enactment; the process by which an authority, such as governments, make policy choices from among alternative proposals.

(3) **Outputs**

The conversion process being completed, the decisions and actions of the authorities become the system's outputs. Easton perceives the political system as a vast and perpetual conversion
process. The system takes in demands and supports as they are imputed from the environment and operates upon them thus producing outputs. In turn these outputs satisfy a demand and produce support. The political system relates constantly and dynamically with its environment.

It is useful to interpret political life as a complex set of processes through which certain kinds of inputs are converted into the type of outputs we may call authoritative policies, decisions and implementing actions. (Easton, 1979, page 17)

This study focuses on the interactions resulting from the decision to establish three independent public broadcasting corporations made by the third Labour Government in 1973.

Whilst Easton's theory will predominate in the study it is felt that some attention should be given to other policy theories to explain some of the actions that do not apparently accord with systems theory. Specifically, Elite theory, Group theory and incrementalism will be referred to. These have already been sufficiently explained for the purposes of this study in the previous chapter.

4. MEDIA

It is not too long ago that studies of mass persuasion argued that exposure to mass media messages was unlikely to make any difference to the political thinking of audiences. This "minimal effects" position arose largely from a series of studies conducted in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in the United States and later in Britain, of the role of communication
in election campaigns. A widely accepted view of the typical
effects of the broadcast media on communication was expressed by
Joseph Klapper (1960):

> Persuasive communication functions far more
> frequently as an agent of reinforcement than
> as an agent of change. (page 14)

The theory of those days was simply summed up in
Lasswell's well known paradigm of the communication process,
first published in 1948:

Who
Says what
In which channel
To whom
With what effect

Corresponding to each question is a field of analysis: control,
content, media, audience and effect. This model which became the
focus of much research such as that by Klapper and Greenstein
(1965) was narrow and static. Moreover, it focused enquiry
predominantly upon the audience. Seymour-Ure (1974) criticised
this formula by showing that to answer all the four questions
about the elements of a communication process all that is needed
is for the researcher to concentrate on the process itself (page
42). To find out about content, one examines content; to find out
about senders, one examines sender. But to find out about
effects, what does one examine? There is no group or object
integral to the communication process corresponding to the
"effect" question. The answer depends entirely on prior
questions such as "Effect of what kind upon whom or what?" In the
absence of this question being asked Lasswell and others
naturally gravitated to the audience and hence the predominance.
of audience effects surveys.

(1) A Media Systems Model

Seymour-Ure sees effects as being dependant upon the social and political context in which they operate. His structured analysis states that effects of mass communication operate exclusively on relationships of which he identifies three levels - individual, intermediary group or institution, total system. (I suspect its Easton's total system also although he nowhere says so.) Effects consist of changed relationships within one level or between two levels, with the following possible combinations:

- System/Individual
- System/Institution
- Institution/Institution
- Institution/Individual
- Individual/Individual

Since there is only one "total system" there cannot be any change within that level. The model is outlined in Figure 2.

Using just one element of this model - political systems and the individual - it is clear that the processes of mass communication will have an effect on the politician who uses the media just as much as on the audience who watch it. Seymour-Ure draws attention to this by studying the role of British politicians like Enoch Powell who effectively use the broadcast media to gain their following. Cleveland (1980) highlights the phenomenon in New Zealand:

Muldoon was the first New Zealand politician to fully adapt (underlining added) to the requirements of television reporting, and he succeeded so well that his television image
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political system</th>
<th>Institution/Group</th>
<th>Individual</th>
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<tr>
<td>Entrenchment of the British monarchy</td>
<td>Media coverage of Northern Ireland (1969–)</td>
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<td>Acceptance of the British judicial system and forces of law and order</td>
<td>Northcliffe's impact on the political system (from c. 1896); his own political career</td>
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<td>Role of parties in political systems</td>
<td>Enoch Powell in British politics (1968–)</td>
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<td>TV's effect on the British Parliament</td>
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<td>Acceptance of the importance of general elections in Britain</td>
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<th>Institution/Group</th>
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<td>Relative strengths of political parties</td>
<td>Media role in protecting citizens against bureaucracy; consequences for relations of individual bureaucrats and the bureaucracy</td>
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<td>Effect of televising parliamentary debates upon Government and Opposition</td>
<td>Resignation of Hugh Dalton from Attlee govt (1947)</td>
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<td>Effect of Times Sudetenland article (1938) on relations of European governments</td>
<td>Resignation of J. Profumo from Macmillan govt (1963)</td>
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<td>Institutional consequences of media's power to define political crises</td>
<td>Enoch Powell in the Conservative party (1968)</td>
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<td>Effect of Sunday Telegraph disclosure of secret document on Nigerian/British govs</td>
<td>Downfall of Senator Joe McCarthy (1954)</td>
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<td>Balance of power between President and Congress in the USA</td>
<td>Richard Nixon's candidacy as Vice-President (1952)</td>
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<td>Institution/Group</td>
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<td>Decline of Sen. Muskie's presidential aspirations (1972)</td>
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<td>Macmillan's cabinet purge (1962)</td>
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<td>Resignation of George Brown from Wilson govt (1968)</td>
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<td>(Nixon/Eisenhower relations (1952))</td>
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<td>Kennedy/Nixon TV debates (1960)</td>
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was almost irresistible. He seized every opportunity for media exposure, established himself as a star of a one-man soap opera in which enemies were put down, critics discomfited or shown to be hopelessly wrong, and interviewers rebuked, contradicted, or discredited. (page 191)

Thus another element is introduced to this study. Because it is an analysis of broadcasting, the effects of the broadcast media on the decision-makers must be taken into account when analysing the policy process.

Using Seymour-Ure’s model therefore this study sought the attitudes of the principal actors in the conversion process, their perceptions of the nature of media effects, how those effects are produced and the perceived political context of effects. A summary and explanation of these categories is appended. (Appendix B).

(2) Other Media Models

Two other media effects models are used. Both to help explain the failure of the policy rather than the policy process itself. Morgan (1982) has developed a convincing hypothesis which suggests that the media and politicians will always be in tension because the politician sees the broadcast journalist as invading the politicians territory and taking over the politicians role as the elected representative and spokesperson for the people. The politician sees there being one truth but it is told twice, once by the politician and once by the media. The politician will always resent the second telling for it is often not retold the way the politician would wish it.
The second theory is one put forward by Australian political scientist, Pamela Steele (1981). She likewise sees eternal conflict based on the incompatibility of the Westminster system of cabinet government which demands secrecy, and the mass media systems which are based on the democratic concepts of freedom of information and openness.

Both these models shall be reconsidered in the final chapter.

5. DISCIPLINED ENQUIRY

Systematic investigation is much valued, especially in the physical sciences; it has much to offer the social sciences also. "Lasting changes... (in any discipline)... cannot be safely made except on the basis of deep objective enquiry. " (Cronbach & Suppes, 1969, page 12).

Such systematic investigation can be of many types covering such spectrums as from a laboratory experiment to a mail survey. However there are qualities common to each: they distinguish sound argument from questionable argument, the debate is well controlled, errors if they cannot be eliminated are taken into account, documents are authenticated, reports do not rely on the eloquence of the writer.

Disciplined enquiry does not necessarily follow well-established formal procedures. Some of the most excellent enquiry is free-ranging and speculative in its initial stages, trying out what might seem to be bizarre combinations of ideas and procedures, or restlessly casting about for ideas... (Cronbach & Suppes, 1969, pages 15-
Worthen & Sanders (1973) list three different and yet interrelated elements to enquiry: empirical enquiry, historical enquiry, and philosophical enquiry. Figure 3 illustrates their interdependence. The relative sizes being indicative of what the authors estimate is the frequency of occurrence.

Empirical enquiry is that which encompasses observations and experiments used for the purposes of describing existing conditions, or verifying or disproving claims, statements or hypotheses about relationships. Historical enquiry is the study of the development of organisations of people i.e. cultures, nations etc., the particular lives involved, and the movement of events surrounding those lives. Philosophical enquiry is rational analysis based on formal logic and semantics. It also embraces the study of morals and ethics.

Much of this study will be subsumed under the heading of empirical enquiry for it describes conditions, verifies statements and makes observations. However, it is loosely historical in scope also. It takes on the semblance of a philosophical enquiry on occasion, especially when participants in events comment on the "rights" or "wrongs" of decisions and actions that are the subject of the study. The study reveals a surprising volume of intense personal feelings expressed by participants suggesting a strong philosophical if not ideological commitment to their respective positions.
6. DATA COLLECTION

The collection of data was guided by the research questions outlined in Chapter I. They were framed bearing in mind Easton's political systems model. Thus the questions relate directly to the input - conversion - output constructs identified by Easton. Questions are asked about the genesis of the policy, about key influential groups, about the broadcasting environment at the time the policy was being formulated. Attention is then directed towards the policy-making procedures that were adopted. Finally the study addresses the output phase by delineating the eventual policy.

The two major sources of data for the study were documentary data and supplementary interview data.

(1) Documentary Data

All the events examined in the study happened over ten years ago. Distance from the events to be investigated presents problems and advantages. Problems, because primary records may be lost, damaged or destroyed by the ravages of time; memories become weak and fantasy about "what might have been" is confused with "what was"; participants in the actions move away from involvement in the field under study, others may die. Advantages, because sound historical research more easily carries out critical investigation of events; time allows for a more accurate perspective towards the environment surrounding the events under study; emotions and prejudices that may have dominated proceedings at the time may have "cooled" or otherwise have been
modified. Hindsight can also add an edge to critical evaluation.

(2) Interview Data

Selected interviews were carried out principally to supplement the data collected from documentary sources. The interviews also served as a means of cross-validation. On occasion the interviews assisted with the interpretation of documentary material.

The method of interviewing used was that classified by (Dexter, 1970) as "elite" interviewing. Elite interviews are based on the assumption that the interviewee possesses greater knowledge of and insights into the subject under study than the researcher.

In general, elite interviewing can encompass any interview design within which the respondent is given "non-standardised" treatment. To be specific:

1. it stresses the interviewee's definition of the situation;
2. encourages the interviewee to structure the account of the situation; and
3. lets the interviewee introduce to the maximum extent, his or her motives of what he or she regards as relevant, instead of relying on the interviewer's notion of what may or may not be relevant.

An interview guide was used outlining the major issues of the enquiry and this was also related to the models used as a
basis for the study. (Appendix C). These questions were by nature of "starters" only. Supplementary questions were asked of each person and as a consequence the exact form and structure of the interviews varied considerably.

The relationship between interviewer and those interviewed is worthy of some comment.

Interviewing is rather like a marriage: everybody knows what it is, an awful lot of people do it, and yet behind each closed door there is a world of secrets. (Oakley, 1981, page 31)

However, unlike a marriage, interviewing, particularly in Social Science research must never have the warmth, the informality, the give and take, the equal partnership that one would expect from a "good" marriage. Indeed, the literature suggests exactly the opposite:

Regarded as an information tool, the interview is designed to minimise the local, concrete, immediate circumstances of the particular encounter — including the respective personalities of the participants — and to emphasise only those aspects that can be kept general enough and demonstrable enough to be counted. As an encounter between these two particular people the typical interview has no meaning; it is conceived in a framework of other, comparable meetings between other couples; each recorded in such a fashion that elements of communication in common can easily be isolated from more idiosyncratic qualities. (Benny & Hughes, 1970, page 196-7)

Good and Hatt (1952, page 191) confirm this distancing of interviewer from interviewee. "He (the interviewer) is a professional researcher in this situation and he must demand and obtain respect for the task he is trying to perform. (Underlines
The writer tends to agree with Oakley (1981) that this may be an admirable policy in theory but not only is it very difficult to practice but perhaps contains an irreconcilable contradiction, for, in most cases, the goal of finding out about people through interviewing is best achieved when "the relationship of interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchical and when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own personal identity in the relationship." (page 41) Certainly, the value of a warm and friendly relationship with those interviewed was proved in this study.

(3) Sources

Historical research has been defined as:

...the critical investigation of events, developments, and experiences of the past, the careful weighing of evidence of the validity of sources of information of the past, and the interpretation of the weighed evidence. (Kerlinger, 1973, page 701)

Kerlinger also distinguishes between primary and secondary sources. "A primary source is the original repository of an historical datum...the original record." (page 702) A secondary source is an account or record of an historical even one or more steps removed from the original repository. Researchers are admonished by Kerlinger not to use secondary sources when primary sources are available.

Every endeavour has been made in this study to obtain primary sources. This has not always been possible however. The writer did not gain access to the files of the NZBC. However,
permission was granted to study the personal records of the Hon. R.O. Douglas, Minister of Broadcasting in the Labour Government. The Opposition Research Unit also supplied some papers. Much reliance has been placed on the published report of the Adams Committee and newspaper reports from the period. The parliamentary debates were examined.
CHAPTER IV

ANTECEDENTS TO THE POLICY, 1926 - 1972

1. INTRODUCTION

The rugged terrain which gives New Zealand its unique beauty presents broadcasting with technical difficulties of monumental proportions. Couple this with the wide spread of population over two long and narrow islands with only Auckland able to be considered a population centre of metropolitan status in international terms and the problems are exacerbated. Furthermore New Zealand's history as a welfare state dictates that any public service must be a service to all. All these factors combine to give a broadcasting system that it is estimated would serve a population twenty times as great. (Gough, 1981).

2. EARLY RADIO

New Zealanders were quick to seize upon the advantages of radio. As early as 1922 amateur stations were dotted around the country providing entertainment to their local communities. Commercial pressure and Post Office bureaucracy forced the government into establishing a national system of broadcasting and in 1925 this task was entrusted to the Radio Broadcasting Company of New Zealand Ltd. This private company was charged with the responsibility of providing a regular service to the four main centres of population, Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch
and Dunedin. It was in the latter city that the country's first successful radio station broadcast and Dunedin still boasts the oldest continuously broadcasting station (4XD) in the Commonwealth.

The company was peculiar for its times. It was non-commercial; its income being drawn from a receiver license fee levied by the government and collected by the Post Office. The government also allocated the company an initial setting up grant for capital expenditure and limited by regulation the company's nett profit to seven and a half per cent of income. (Dunoghue, 1946).

As mentioned previously, New Zealand's fascination with things British led the New Zealand government to decide that the company should be replaced by a corporation similar to the British Broadcasting Corporation which was set up in 1926.

3. THE NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING BOARD

The New Zealand Broadcasting Board came into existence in 1932 by taking over the facilities of the previous Broadcasting Company. Meanwhile amateur stations continued to multiply, especially outside the main population centres. By 1932 the number of such stations reached forty-two (Marshall 1966).

By this time radio broadcasting was building up a popular following and there were demands for an expansion of the main services. Early on the Board gained a larger catchment area by
granting affiliation status to eight private amateur installations. They in effect became repeater stations for the Board's programmes. This move was the result of the first official enquiry into broadcasting in New Zealand — the 1933 Coverage Commission (Marshall, 1966).

Further broadcasting legislation in 1934 saw the Board take over responsibility for supervising the programmes broadcast by all private stations. "Unification of the whole system was the obvious aim." (Marshall, 1966).

Significant moves during this period saw the establishment of an alternative programme in the four main centres and substantial improvements to the technical facilities with the establishment of high-powered transmitters sighted on points to achieve the best coverage. These sites remain in use to this day.

In the four year period from 1932 licensed receivers trebled in number reaching 210,000. As Marshall notes this was possibly the only area of growth in what was otherwise a very depressed period.

There was a Minister responsible for broadcasting during this period but like most other countries and for reasons previously outlined this tended to fall within the portfolio of the Minister of Post and Telegraph.

4. THE NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING SERVICE

In 1935 New Zealand had a change of government. The social
policies of the Labour Government took full cognisance of the social forces of broadcasting. Indeed events such as those noted earlier confirmed these policies. (Edwards, 1971). Within a remarkably short period broadcasting fell under direct government control. The 1936 Broadcasting Act abolished the Board and replaced it with the New Zealand Broadcasting Service (NZBS), a government department with a minister firmly in control of a broadcasting portfolio.

This step moved New Zealand's broadcasting policy well away from the ambit of loose government surveillance practised in most other countries. In other democracies ministerial interest was limited to matters of technical consideration and thus came under Post & Telegraph or telecommunications. The first Labour Government clearly meant to have a say in matters of policy and programming. Government interest in these areas remain today.

The Prime Minister, Michael Joseph Savage, quickly confirmed the government's intentions by requiring the Service to carry live broadcasts of the proceedings of parliament, openly acknowledging that the measure was to counter the government's inability to get a sympathetic hearing from an antagonistic and conservative press. Such directives became common place. (Mackay, 1953).

The 1936 Act allowed private amateur stations to remain in operation. However without revenue-earning powers, their financial base remained insecure and over the years all except 4ZD were either absorbed into the national system or ceased operating.
5. COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING

In 1937, one year after the introduction of the new service the government introduced a further development in the country's broadcasting pattern, one that was destined to remain unique in the annals of international broadcasting policy—commercial broadcasting under government public service control. The commercial system was to support and complement the existing national system. Thus the Minister of Broadcasting had control of a single government monopoly in broadcasting with two elements: a national service supported by a receiver licence fee, and a commercial system earning income from advertising. The two elements were merged into a single administrative unit during the second world war and remain that way until this day.

Up until the end of the war broadcasting coverage was limited to national needs. However radio's potential as a world service had been amply demonstrated during world war two, so it followed somewhat logically that New Zealand should launch its own overseas service. This was done appropriately on Dominion Day 1948. However, although begun with a fanfare, international broadcasting was the cinderella of the Service. Limited in scope to the Pacific Islands and Australia, it operated on second-hand equipment from its inception, had little financial support for programming, and was completely overwhelmed by its larger competitors—Radio Australia, The Voice of America and the BBC.

6. DIVERSIFICATION
The government during this period charged the service with expanding far beyond broadcasting into the field of patron of the arts and culture. In 1939 the NZBS undertook the responsibility for publishing the New Zealand Listener which, apart from offering programme information became, and remains today, the country’s leading cultural journal. In 1947 the The New Zealand National Orchestra appeared under the auspices of the NZBC and began the Services entrepreneurial role as concert master for the Nation. Thus the broadcasting body became the largest supporter of the arts in New Zealand providing valuable employment for New Zealanders with creative ability.

7. LIMITATIONS

In other areas however the NZBS was not nearly as forthcoming. New Zealand stood by as the rest of the world took on television. It was reluctant to offer any comprehensive national news service; as late as 1962 radio offered a once a week (Sunday evening at 9.00pm) survey of the week’s events compiled in the Prime Minister’s Department! Every other day it was content to take live the World Service of the BBC. Talk on radio was strictly controlled. Everything was scripted in advance and genuine discussion on radio was non-existent.

Moreover the Service had great difficulty in coping with the enormous changes in social tastes during the 1950s and early sixties. For example, Elvis Presley, the most prodigious recording star of the late fifties, was producing a record a week and
selling them in the tens of millions. A programme organiser on a
city radio station kept all copies of Presley's discs under the
carpet in his locked office, releasing two each week as the
maximum number to be played. This at a time when the listening
audience was demanding to hear this popular singer constantly.
Discs that contained what was determined as "offensive" material
were physically mutilated to ensure no "accidental" broadcast. In
1960 it was still impossible to hear some songs from the Rogers
and Hammersteins "South Pacific", virtually all of "Kiss Me Kate"
from the pen of Cole Porter was banned and Brecht's "Threepenny
Opera" was censored! To put it in the words of one veteran
broadcaster, broadcasting had become "a bit of a joke."

8. THE NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING CORPORATION

In 1960 television at last came to New Zealand, the result
of a Labour Government decision made two years earlier. It was to
be controlled and operated by the NZBS under similar conditions
and constraints that applied to radio at the time. 1960 also saw a
change of government. Part of the National Party's election
platform was the promise to end the direct government control of
broadcasting. (National Party, "Policy Announcement", page 20). In
1961 legislation was introduced to create the New Zealand
Broadcasting Corporation to take over the functions of the NZBS.
The legislation was passed in the same year, however, the promise
of the government's removal from broadcasting affairs remained an
illusion. (Rowe, 1968).
Confusing lines of control were established in the 1961 legislation. Ultimate authority was vested in three different bodies: the government appointed Corporation, of a chairman and up to six part-time members, to direct policy; the Director General as chief administrator; and the Minister of Broadcasting, a portfolio mysteriously retained to ensure a continued firm hand of government on broadcasting. Parliament continued to debate broadcasting estimates, questions were asked in the House, there was a cabinet committee on broadcasting. All this added up to a total "ever-present environment of political conscience for the NZBC." (Toogood, 1969, page 105).

Furthermore, the Act required the Corporation to comply with government directives, and, under the financial provisions, the Government was to approve all expenditure proposed to be undertaken by the Corporation in excess of $50,000. Whilst the Government made only one attempt to issue a directive and the Corporation, after seeking legal advice, ignored it (N.Z. Parliamentary Debates, 1965, page 2614), the government during this period was particularly insistant on controlling financial expenditure. There were many consequently frustrating delays in building programmes, in purchasing much needed equipment, particularly for television development, and in expansion of services (Cowbroac, 1971).

It was also a period of much unhappiness within the NZBC. In 1961 all management personal merely moved across from the NZBS to the new Corporation taking with them all their years of training as public servants answerable to government. Cautious
management, a perceptible lack of boldness in programming, and the ever-present threat of political interference led to the Corporation losing many of its most creative production personal because of the resulting blandness in leadership.

A top television producer left in 1966 claiming "direct government censorship" of the public affairs programme which he produced (Bick 1968). Administrative weaknesses were the claimed reasons for the resignation of the country's most popular television personality of the period (Edwards, 1971). Charges of political interference reached a head in 1972 when the Corporation dismissed the editor of the New Zealand Listener. While an official enquiry found no evidence of political meddling, the uproar that the incident provoked continued the disillusionment with so called "independent public broadcasting."

9. PRIVATE RADIO

With the passing of the Broadcasting Corporation Act in 1961 a provision was made for the establishment of privately owned broadcasting stations and, although strongly opposed by the Labour Opposition, this was written into legislation. However, before such stations were established the NZBC was required to undertake a review of existing coverage to see if the establishment was justified. It is not at all surprising that the Corporation never found the need, and that no private applications were sought.

However public dissatisfaction with the Corporation's
radio programme became apparent when in 1967 a pirate radio station went on air broadcasting to Auckland from outside New Zealand's territorial limits. At first the government tried to put an end to these private activities. Subsequent public support for the "pirates" was so considerable that the government not only turned a blind, but also a benevolent eye. Eventually legislation was introduced to take away some of the Corporations powers and legitimise the activities of private broadcasters.

10 THE NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING AUTHORITY

This was done with the creation of the New Zealand Broadcasting Authority in 1968. The Authority had three full time members and the chairman had to be a practicing lawyer. The legalistic overtones of this provision meant that the Authority tended to act in a judicial manner. Legal prudence prevailed. The Authority did not see itself as an innovator or bold leader in broadcasting matters. As an entity the Authority had been charged with four functions:

1. To consider and adjudicate on license applications, both public (NZBC) and private;
2. To grant such licenses for up to a five year period;
3. To regulate license holders, both public and private, with directives on programming and advertising; and,
4. To advise the minister on any matters that he may wish to direct to it.

The Authority dealt with all broadcasters, including the public sector. It was also the ultimate authority on licensing
matters, subject only to the Court of Appeal.

Control over the NZBC quickly gave rise to hostility between the two parties. The Corporation resented the interloper that assumed many of its previously exclusive functions and to whom it was now answerable. Not helping in this was the fact that the members of the Authority lacked broadcasting experience. This led to some of their earlier decisions being overturned in the courts (Combroad, 1972).

However, on the whole, the Authority merely continued to retain the standards set previously by the Corporation. They were cautious about easing up the advertising restrictions — radio permitted 18 minutes of advertising per hour, television only six. There were restraints on advertising certain products such as liquor and proprietary medicines. Sunday advertising was banned. Programme directives were minimal. There was no New Zealand content ruling; merely the request that locally originated material be broadcast "as far as possible". However, stations were not to editorialise and there was no political advertising. Private stations were unable to form networks in an attempt to encourage them to provide for purely local needs.

To confirm its caution and keep with tradition, the Authority in 1971 conducted a hearing into FM broadcasting and recommended to the government that there was no need to introduce it in the foreseeable future. This at a time when FM broadcasting was developing with remarkable rapidity elsewhere.
The major reason for the existence of the Authority was to foster private radio. In 1969 the Authority received sixty enquiries and thirteen official applications for licenses, including one from the successful pirate radio station Radio Hauraki. By 1972 five stations were operational, two in Auckland and three in other centres, and the Authority had before it applications from three other companies.

11. TELEVISION

Throughout the period of the Authority the NZBC had a monopoly on television. The Corporation pursued a policy of providing a one channel service to all New Zealanders before embarking on the provision of an alternative service. By 1972 the service could reach 99% of the population. The single television service originated from four stations located in the main centres and supplemented by translator services, some state owned, but many privately owned by television translator societies. These were set up by individuals or groups impatient with the Corporation's reticulation progress and they carried the NZBC's signal to outlying areas. In 1960 an embryonic network service was established but it was primitive and limited to nightly news and coverage of important events. Regular programming was physically transported from one station to another.

It was during this period that current affairs programming on television provided some of the most exciting broadcasting in the country. Programmes like "Gallery" and "Compass" actually topped the ratings for viewer popularity. They were frequently
also the cause of much controversy as the nation, unused to news and current affairs on public service broadcasting, grappled with the social and political effects of such television.

12. FINANCING THE NZBC

As mentioned earlier New Zealand has an expensive broadcasting service due mainly to its scattered population centres and its rugged topography. During the Corporation years most broadcasting development was financed without government largesse (Stringer, 1964). With revenue from license fees, collected by the Post Office and discounted before passing on, and commercial activities both media were expected to pay for themselves and provide enough profit to cover losses in other areas.

This blending of commercial income with taxation revenue enabled the corporation to provide good profits throughout most of the period until 1971. The reversal in that year was blamed by the corporation on increased personal costs, which, many broadcasters anyway were saying, were long overdue, bearing in mind that the body was noted for its modest salary structure. However, perhaps it was also a case of the "chickens come home to roost." The strain of financing such vast activities as the establishment of a national television service from such limited revenue sources must have contributed to the emptying of the coffers.

The Corporation was hamstrung in different ways to other
commercial ventures. As a public body it had strict limitations imposed on its borrowing policy. The entire financing of the large cost of introducing television came out of past radio profits. Television's income not only supported broadcasting's bureaucracy, but also covered the losses of the Orchestra, and the difference between radio's income and expenditure. Unlike many countries when they first developed Television, New Zealand at the same time continued to maintain and expand its radio offerings. Since coming into existence in 1961 the corporation by 1972 had opened 14 new radio stations and had increased transmission power, updated equipment, and improved studio facilities in many others.

While the country joined the international scene by opening its own satellite receiving station by 1972 there were indications of more important changes. Colour transmission was to be introduced and plans for a second television channel and subsequent reorganisational changes came to a head.

13. THE SECOND CHANNEL DEBATE

Whilst it was the stated policy of the NZBC to extend coverage of the first channel to the total population before embarking on alternative programming it was obvious that the Corporation had made an early start on second channel preparations. As long ago as August 1962 the NZBC planned to run a two channel television service each channel sharing the same facilities. (Greymouth Evening star quoting Reeves Harris, Feb 1,
By early 1964 the Dominion reported that plans were being prepared by the NZBC for second television channels in the four metropolitan centres. (Dominion, Feb 22, 1964) Later that year the Director General of the Corporation said: "The opening of a second channel television service in New Zealand could come sooner than most people might think." (Dominion, May 27, 1964). This was reinforced by the Chairman of the NZBC a short time later when he said: "a second television service, beginning in the main centres, would be started as soon as possible." (Dominion, July 13, 1964)

Speculation continued until toward the end of 1964 it became clear that the thinking of the NZBC and the Government were not the same.

The New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation was prepared to proceed forthwith when the Government finally made its decision on a second television channel, the chairman of the Corporation, Dr F.J. Llewellyn, said last night. The Government's procrastination in deciding on the Corporation's second channel proposals made in March was now becoming serious, Dr Llewellyn said. (Dominion, Nov 7, 1964)

and

Mr Scott, Minister of Broadcasting said: "that for reasons I am not prepared to discuss I did not take (the Corporations proposals) to the Cabinet." (Christchurch Press, Nov 7, 1964)

By early in the new year the government's thinking was becoming clearer:

Several alternatives to a second channel owned and controlled entirely by the NZBC have been suggested in a report on future television
services made by the Attorney-General, Mr Hanan, to the Prime Minister, Mr Holyoake. The submissions are believed to suggest that: 
.....There is a strong economic argument against simple duplication of station and transmitter plant and equipment; there is, however, a need for a "second voice" controlled by an authority, public or private or both, distinct from the existing Corporation. (Dominion, Jan 28, 1965)

In 1966 the Central Region Advisory Committee of the NZBC recommended the early introduction of a second television channel. It made no impression whatsoever on the government and silence reigned on the issue for many months despite constant queries, particularly in the daily press.

1969 was an election year. On April 16 the Evening Post reported:

The Minister of Broadcasting, Mr Adams-Schneider, intends making submissions soon to Cabinet for approval to amend the New Zealand Broadcasting Act to enable the NZBC to meet the challenge of private enterprise..... The Board of the Corporation was at present asking for amendments to Act which would provide further independence in areas other than programmes.

In July 1969, UEB Industries, Kerridge Odeon, Wright Stephenson and J.Wattie Canneries made application to start a national commercial radio and television network. The Minister in rejecting the approach said: "There is no chance of a second channel within a year" (N.Z.Herald July 27, 1969).

As the election got closer the National Party made a policy decision to proceed with "urgency" to establish a second television channel. (N.Z.Herald, Oct 20, 1969). The Minister of
Broadcasting said that they had reached the stage where it was certain that "we will have second channel coverage before very long." (Christchurch Press, Oct 24, 1969). In announcing that the Broadcasting Authority would conduct an enquiry into the need for a second channel, including the possibility of colour, he indicated that it was not known when the Authority would have the time to consider it for it was presently busy reinviting applications for private radio stations, following the writ served on it by the NZBC for incorrect procedure.

The Authority began its enquiry in November 1969, continued until November 1970 but did not reach the Minister until August 1971.

In the event anyway the Authority told the Minister in its report that it could make no recommendations on the matter. It felt that to advise on the best way to introduce a second channel and private enterprise competition would lay it open to charges of prejudicing the case against public ownership of a second channel. All the Authority would say was that a second channel should be introduced at an "appropriate time", and that applications for warrants should be called for "no later than two years" after colour was to begin in 1973. Legal prudence still prevailed!

The "urgent" enquiry certainly put paid to the Minister of Broadcasting's belief that:

Government is working towards a second channel as fast as it can. My belief is there will be a second channel, colour or black and white, well before the 1972 elections. (Auckland
Finally, in February 1972, the government charged the Authority with the job of deciding who would get the second channel — but curiously not when they would get it. In fact the hearings did not begin until October 1972, a bare month before the General Election, having been postponed by the NZBC's preoccupation with the inquiry into the Listener editor's dismissal.

14. AND SO TO A GENERAL ELECTION

Such was the situation when Labour came into power in November 1972. The Authority had at long last been coaxed into studying the issue of the second channel. The NZBC was suffering internal strife as creative staff, mainly producers and directors, clashed, as one broadcaster put it — "endlessly", with public service minded administrators. Radio, for many years an highly profitable concern, was quickly losing money and morale as it was drained to pay the development costs of television and fought to stave off competition from the fledgling but aggressive private radio stations vying for the lucrative advertising market. There was tension between the Authority and the NZBC. And tension between the NZBC and politicians. Piqued at the Corporation's decision not to screen a programme featuring himself, Mr Muldoon, then Minister of Finance, commented:

When I took part there was no guarantee it would be shown. But it turned out to be the most interesting piece of television. This has provided an excellent reason why a second TV channel should be in independent hands.
Finally, there was a dissatisfied public. New Zealand television audiences have not been noted for their interest in the finer points of television. A second channel would give them more of what they wanted—entertainment. Letters of complaint to daily newspapers, the Minister of Broadcasting and the Corporation all indicated a preference for an immediate second channel rather than the introduction of colour. The Christchurch star stated on September 7, 1971 that the average citizen "would prefer a choice of two channels on his present set, rather than a prohibitive outlay of up to $900 simply to get one channel in colour. An Evening Post survey revealed an overwhelming preference for a second channel rather than colour (September 4, 1971).

History was repeating itself. Government bowing to the needs of television set manufacturers to have a new market just as they bowed to the needs of the commercial radio manufacturing industry forty years previously. On this occasion however, there was an added pressure: the impending Commonwealth Games in Christchurch just "had to be in colour" to meet international demands.
CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, 1972 - 1975

1. THE ANNOUNCEMENT

On the 31st of January, 1973, the Minister of Broadcasting Mr R.O. Douglas announced Labour's new policy on Broadcasting in New Zealand. He announced the new policy in broad outline only. In essence he called for the conversion of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation into three separate and independent corporations serviced by a third and overriding body, a converted Broadcasting Authority, which would provide the common services shared by the corporations such as transmission facilities, news gathering and supply, programme and advertising standards and certain overseas representations.

The reaction to his announcement was swift and emphasised the surprise which often comes when something is totally unexpected. Literally no-one had predicted such a major change.

Newspapers reflected this surprise. The announcement, said the Timaru Herald, came "virtually out of the Blue"; "Radio, T.V. Reshuffle Bombshell" headlined the Manawatu Evening Standard; "Shock Bold New Move" was the immediate response of the Evening Post. (All February 1, 1973). After all the Labour Party's election manifesto reconfirmed the party's commitment to public service broadcasting but talked in terms of strengthening the NZBC. Three days after the election the newly elected Prime
Minister Norman Kirk announced that the second channel, currently the subject of Broadcasting Authority enquiry, would go to the NZBC regardless of the outcome of the Authority's deliberations (N.Z. Herald, November 28, 1973).

What occurred between the time of the election and the announcement to create such a radically different policy? Roger Douglas, the minister is recorded as saying the the idea just came to him.

"(Douglas) decided the basic fate of the New Zealand broadcasting system while he was sipping champagne at Government House."I stood around sipping drinks and talking to a few of my colleagues," he says. "I suppose the seeds were sown at that stage. Actually, it was not a hard decision to make. Quite obviously...I had no intention of handing a second channel over to private enterprise....I also thought it was too important to give to one group that would then operate two channels from one part of New Zealand. So that ruled out the NZBC.

Well, we talked about those things at the Gov's and, once I saw the pretty obvious alternative, it was also pretty clear what to do with radio". (N.Z.Listener, December 9, 1973, pages 10-11)

Immediately after his appointment, and especially over the 1972 holiday period, he engaged in an intensive study of broadcasting literature, he talked "to broadcasters and to interested parties outside the system".

"People like educationalists who I found had a broader perspective than workers within the industry. (Ibid)

There is a level of sophistication behind the concepts of the announcement that suggests a significant input from sources
that were familiar with broadcasting theory. The Minister spoke of the "intellectual Ghetto" of second channel non-commercial television; he frequently talked about the concepts of "excellence" in broadcasting; about centralism inhibiting the development of regional identity; about the difficulties in monopoly within communication; "lowest common denominator programming" - the result of the ratings war that's permanently embedded in competing commercial television. This is the more significant in the light of his own deprecation:

Mr Douglas says he is not a creative person and he does not have any deep understanding of creative people. He's not particularly interested in the arts, he's not a television philosopher and he has little personal experience to bring to a medium basically concerned with the communication of ideas. (Ibid)

Be that as it may, from the time of conceiving of the idea until its release on the last day of January 1973 it was held tightly within a close circle of consultants. Jonathan Hunt, MP for New Lynn, has been identified as "being helpful" and Hunt himself indicated in the first reading debate in the House of Representatives that he was present when "ideas were thrown around" with the Minister (Hansard Vol 387, page 4856). Others who assisted have yet to be identified. However, very little other consultation went on at this time. Caucus was not consulted (1), the Prime Minister, often a critic of existing broadcasting policy and structures, played no part in the exercise. It seems that Kirk's only comments were to ask the question: "Can it work?" and to make the statement: "It's nice to make a bit of policy rather than what bureaucracy dishes up!" (2) A memorandum,
prepared for cabinet was approved with very little discussion and the Minister made the consequent press release. (3) Above all, no consultation was made with current members of the NZBC's executive or Board. They were shocked and resentful at the announcement, fearful of the changes, and, the evidence suggests, consequently uncooperative and at times perhaps even obstructionist. (4)

The attitude of the NZBC can be ascertained from press comments by members of the Board, the editorial position of the NZ Listener, and correspondence and comments recorded elsewhere. The Listener of February 26, 1973 talked of the "Broadcasting bombshell", of "fragmentation", of "neglected experts". M.H. Holcroft, in that edition, wrote a highly passionate editorial in defence of the NZBC. The Auckland Star headlined: "NZBC Head: I cannot hide my worry at the shakeup" (February 2, 1973), and the Christchurch Star: "Nobody Told Us — Fume NZBC Staff" (February 1, 1973)

On February 8, The Minister met with the board of the NZBC and answered written questions. Shortly after that meeting Major-General W.S. McKinnon spoke. His was a dignified defence of his Corporation, highlighting what he saw as its strengths and the perceived weaknesses of the new system. (5) In less public situations the Corporation was more free in its comments: "...its a complete carve-up!"; "...deathknell"; "minister delighted in letting off a bombshell without any prior consultation with those... responsible for broadcasting"; "...one senior man is already in hospital suffering from the strain...since the
The Minister clearly had not consulted at all with his organisation. This he justified at the February 8 Board meeting by saying that at times Governments have to decide policy "independently" and that he was sure the Board would "appreciate" this. (7).

Public reaction to the announcement varied. The newspapers tended to be critical, highlighting expense, a multiplying bureaucracy and the socialist tendencies of a Government ideologically opposed to private enterprise. However some, like the Wellington Evening Post stated that "it could pay off" (February 1, 1973). Letters to the papers were generally supportive. In fact such support that there was combined with a lack of any significant flow of correspondence led the New Zealand Listener to comment:

The silence with which the Government's proposal to dismember the NZBC was received could have indicated approval rather than apathy, ... Newspapers criticised the plan: their readers generally remained silent, or mildly applauded; and in our columns, where the subject could have been expected to receive full attention, only a few letters appeared. (June 11, 1973)

2. THE COMMITTEE ON BROADCASTING

On March 30, 1973 the Minister of Broadcasting announced the appointment of the Committee to advise him. The Committee's task was to prepare a White Paper, and to prepare or have prepared a draft of the legislation that would be necessary to
give effect to the policy as presented in the White Paper. The committee consisted of:

Professor Kenneth Adam, of London;
Professor Robert McDonald Chapman, of Auckland;
Dr John Lochiel Robson, of Wellington, and
Dorothea Frances Turner, of Wellington.

The Committee was to report not later than July 31, 1973. (See Appendix D). The committee had technical advice from Ronald McDonald, an Australian and the Committee's secretary was Ira Buckingham.

The Minister placed a great deal of importance on the Committee. He saw both its status and the work it would do as crucial to the success of the whole reorganisation. There was little time for him to select the Committee. Such was the shortness of notice that many of the Ministers choices had to be forgone. It would appear that there was something of a scramble to find an "appropriate" person to chair the Committee. The Minister had determined that it should be an "overseas expert" of sufficient standing to gain as much public acceptance of the recommendations as possible. The list of names canvased, many of whom were approached, is lengthy and Professor Adam was far from being "first choice". The assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was enlisted and approaches on the Ministers behalf were made from both London and Washington. (9) The Government, to quote the New Zealand Herald, even "went outside official channels in search of the Committee's head" (April 24, 1973), Geoffrey Cox, one of those suggested but unavailable, actually contacted Adam and asked if he would be interested. Adam had been lecturing in
the United States as a visiting Professor at Temple University in Philadelphia, having resigned his position as head of BBC Television after differences of opinion over policy. Leave of absence from the University was obtained, and Adam was able to accept the position. Professor Chapman was a prominent academic with an extensive knowledge of broadcasting affairs. Lady Turner had been one of the first to congratulate the Minister on his new policy, she was also a regular broadcaster. Mr Robson was a retired head of the Justice Department and an expert on public administration.

The Committee's task was formidable. Given the basic policy already decided by the minister i.e. three separate and independent corporations, two for television and one for radio; an overriding authority to provide common services and to carry out the functions of the existing Broadcasting Authority; regionalising the corporations so that programming was decentralised; and ensuring that the mixture of commercial and non-commercial broadcasting was maintained. The Committee had to put flesh on the bones, fill out all the detail and write and present the result in a way that would ensure both acceptance and performance. Appendix E is a checklist of all this issues the committee was asked to deliberate upon.

The Committee worked hard. Six and seven day weeks were common. They travelled widely throughout New Zealand visiting over forty centres, received some 1,500 submissions, 70 of them being substantial and were able to report within the deadline.
Adams liked to "meet the people". He called it "taking the temperature of the local citizens." (Listener, August 8, 1973).

"One was aware of the intense interest throughout New Zealand in broadcasting and the proposed activities." (Ibid). The Listener described how the Committee "barnstormed".

It usually involved asking the mayor to get together all interested groups, such as the Chambers of Commerce, headmasters, women's organisations, farmers federation. Informally the Committee took every opportunity to talk to drivers, receptionists, chambermaids, people in bars. "Maybe it wasn't scientific but it certainly was illuminating", says Adam. (August 8, 1973)

Adam was able to say that the Committee found "nothing to suggest that the public were not happy with public service broadcasting." (Ibid) What else did the Committee find?

The overall tenor of submissions was favourable to the proposed restructuring. Individual submissions tended to be the most supportive and uncritical. Those that came from more substantial organisations tended to reflect greater "realism" and less idealism. Interest groups within the broadcasting structure tended to reflect their own conservatism or liberalism, engineers showing strong reactions against the new structure, announcers very cautious, journalists and producers supportive to the extent of, at times, showing strong enthusiasm. These views tended to be in line with the threats or, conversely, opportunities perceived by these groups in employment terms within the new structure. Engineers resisted strongly the three
corporation set-up arguing against it in engineering and economic
terms. They also did not want a separate central body controlling
common services. If the split was to go ahead they would have
wished for three separate engineering and technical services.
Announcers were particularly concerned with maintaining
standards, and most particularly standards of the spoken word and
saw competing commercial television as a threat to these.(12)
Some staff submissions, were highly critical of the NZBC.

The extensive and almost standard condition of
total secrecy concerning the internal workings
of departments of state also apply in the
NZBC. It should be noted that the Corporation
has disciplined and dismissed employees for
criticising its decisions in
public...Because one of the prime functions
of the publicly owned broadcasting system is
to create an informed community, it should not
take advantage of its power as a communication
monopoly to stifle debate on its own
performance, or to hinder the development of
the dialogue which must exist between
broadcasters and the community they
serve.(Submission from four producers)

There was an interesting dichotomy noticed by the
Committee as it travelled around New Zealand. Within the main
centres where transmission facilities were good interest
concentrated around programmes and programme content. In rural
New Zealand and the many small communities that serve it, the
dominant interest was the quality of transmission and the
extension of services.(13)

Total opposition to the proposals did not prevent the
National Party from presenting submissions which interestingly
included:

The National Party believes that one of the
pillars of a democracy is the free expression of a wide range of differing views, opinions and interpretations. The provision of alternative views is vital in broadcasting when the instantaneous presentation of news and current affairs has a powerful and dramatic effect. We urge therefore that each corporation have a separate news service. (National Party Submissions, page 8)

Relations between the National Party and the Committee were, on the whole, cordial. (14) The Committee not only heard the party's submissions, but also met informally with the parliamentary leadership of the party on June 6, 1973. Notes taken at that meeting included the following:

The National Party could not but agree that three corporations would open up an immense number of opportunities for news and current affairs activity. This would be useful. Each corporation would presumably use existing news agencies. To that extent each would be drawing upon a common source of news. The Party wanted to urge however that each corporation have its own news service.

and

Mr Adams-Schneider said he could clearly remember how the problem of questioning a minister on broadcast programmes arose in 1961. It was then that the first question on programming was put. A point of order was raised that the Minister could not be held responsible to answer such a question. The Speaker, Mr Algie, ruled it to be in order. That decision opened up the whole field of questioning that had ensured.

and

Mr Marshall said that the National Party intended to abolish (the portfolio of Minister of Broadcasting) if it had been returned to power last November. (15)

In the acknowledgments in the Committee's reports it states:
The Committee wishes to record its appreciation of the considerable assistance it received from the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation, the New Zealand Broadcasting and the New Zealand Post Office. (Page 142)

This can be contrasted with the following, taken from Notes for Discussion with the Committee on Broadcasting, prepared by the secretary: (16)

The Authority, for its part, has assured us of its intention to assist. The NZBC, for a variety of reasons, adopts a rather different attitude to the Committee and the Government's objectives.

Furthermore, in the notes of a preliminary discussion with the executive of the NZBC, the Committee's secretary records that the Corporation wanted no informal or personal contact with the Committee but wished to conduct all its dealings with the Committee by correspondence. One source maintains that the NZBC was continuously disruptive of the Committee's deliberations; at one stage it being reduced to "enquiring of telephone receptionists what land, buildings and other capital assets were associated with a particular broadcasting station." (17)

The Committee's work was, on the whole, free of tensions and disagreements. However, the debate on the structure and size of the "controlling body" i.e. the Broadcasting Council was long and divisive. One member's ideal "council" being a body of "wise men" whereas other members wanted a more pragmatic basis for the Council's activities. This difference of opinion is highlighted in the report where some committee members pushed for a sixth member of the Council to handle the "mechanics of division and consensus" (Page 24). The draft bill continued this division of
opinion by offering alternative Council membership sizes. (18)

The Committee's workload was extraordinarily heavy. Perhaps the Minister was expecting a little too much from four people in so short a time. Evidence of the speed with which the committee worked and the consequent strain exists. Whether it affected the quality of the result is arguable. However, one significant slip suggests that it may have. Professor Adams reviewed for the New Zealand Listener April 4, 1974 a European Broadcasting Monograph called "Structures and Organisation of Broadcasting" by Albert Namurois. In the review Adams said that if he had known of "the existence of the document (at the time) it would have been an important source book (for the Committee's deliberations)". Major-General McKinnon, Chairman of the NZBC, drew the attention of the Committee to the book and made significant reference to it in his own submissions to the Committee in May 1973!

The Committee worked in closed session, without public hearings. Other than for its public forums in various centres and the invitation to some persons to appear before the Committee, submissions were in writing. The Committee's terms of reference required it not to divulge its findings before reporting finally to the Minister. Thus it was able to work, on the whole, without the spotlight of public attention. Questions were asked from time to time in Parliament, usually by the Opposition Spokesman on Broadcasting the Hon. H.J. Walker. These reflected the Opposition's continued rejection of the restructuring proposals.
The Report was in the hands of the Minister by due date and released to the public in early August.

3. RECEPTION OF THE REPORT

Newspaper response to the Report was varied. The Christchurch Press headed its editorial "The N.N.N.Z.Z.Z.B.B.B.C.C.C." It was not at all complimentary about the proposals and even less so about New Zealand Talent, suggesting that real ability to entertain to an acceptable broadcast standard was a skill held by a very few people. "New Zealanders in large doses are not always very entertaining." (August 4, 1973, page 12). The Dominion in Wellington and Dunedin's Otago Daily Times gave a cautious "thumbs up" to the proposals. Whilst Minhinnick, the New Zealand Herald's cartoonist probably summed up that paper's attitude. He showed the Minister of Broadcasting as a snake-charmer encouraging four tangled snakes, labelled "corporations", from a basket called the Adam Report. (August 4, 1973)

Generally, constructive comment indicated full support for the revitalisation of radio that the changes would bring, but expressed reservations about what turned out to be the most controversial part of the report and ensuing legislation - competitive/complementary two-channel television programming. What the Report called "Guided Competition".

The comments of Robert Cornell, then head of Management Services for the NZBC reflected this general concern:
While the Committee does not see their co-existence to be diametrically opposed, still they do not, perhaps could not, offer any clear plan as to the practical attainment of complementary yet competitive programming. (N.Z. Listener, August 27, 1973)

Opposition to the policy, as it grew, repeatedly came back to this theme.

Gregory (1974) laid a more substantial criticism on the Report. Quoting from the 1960 Pilkington Report on Television in Great Britain he said that fragmentation meant that none of the individual corporations would possess sufficient authority to conduct their affairs as they saw fit.

Authority and responsibility for the exercise of authority should go together. Regulation by one body of a service provided by another makes for negative, after-the-event control, and a lack of positive purpose in the regulatory body. It is in the provision of the service that the positive purposes of broadcasting reside; and those who shape those purposes should in fact be responsible. (para. 424)

Further, Gregory said:

It will be interesting to see how two television channels competing for advertising revenue are able to subsume the necessities of commercial competition based on market demands, with the wider task of developing a public service based on enlightened leadership. (page 74)

He suggests perhaps a "philosopher-king" as Director General.

These criticisms were later to become significant, but at the time the Committee's report was given a qualified blessing. Even the Listener saying: "A first reading of its report
indicates that it has done a difficult job with flair and imagination." (August 27, page 12)

4. THE LEGISLATION

Parliament opened early in 1973. The Governor-General's speech was given on February 13. In that address mention was made of the Government's intentions to restructure broadcasting. The first substantial comment from the Opposition came in the Address and Reply debate the following week. The Leader of the Opposition the Hon. J.R. Marshall then raised what was to become the basis of repeated criticism from that side of the house. The NZBC was a fine organisation; the new structure was less efficient; it was more costly; there was unnecessary duplication and there had been no consultation with broadcasting authorities. The Minister replied, in the same debate, on March 1 stressing the beliefs of the Government in the proposed changes and confidence in the consultative process they had laid down. On March 7 a debate, initiated by the Opposition, and calling for a return to the status quo for the time being, was held. The main feature of the debate being a lack of a quorum that held up progress for some minutes. The Broadcasting Committee was announced in the House on March 14. On March 15 a short bill was introduced proscribing the rights of the Broadcasting Authority to issue warrants to Private bidders. This bill was in keeping with the Government's election manifesto pledge to keep broadcasting in the public domain. A further debate was held on June 13, this time initiated by the Government but once again going over the same ground as
The Adam Committee had produced draft legislation as part of the White Paper proposals. It was assisted in this by the law drafting office which gave the Committee a memorandum based on previous legislation and on work done by the International Radio Consultative Committee of the International Telecommunications Union. This draft bill was slightly modified and presented to the House of Representatives for a first reading on September 12.

The Debate was not a particularly good one. As happens frequently in New Zealand's parliament the Opposition did not receive copies of the bill until minutes before its introduction. This is reflected in the lack of detail in the Opposition's response. A total of 12 members participated in the debate. The Hon H.J. Walker responded to the Minister's introduction and made only a few points, all of which were quickly answered by the Minister. The remainder of the debate was not much more than points-scoring. The Minister moved that the bill be referred to a select committee and the debate ended in under one hour. (Hansard, Vol 385, page 3467)

The Select Committee met for the first time on September 26 and on six further occasions, the final meeting being held on October 17. The Committee comprised:

**Government:**
- Hon. R. O. Douglas
- Mr. O'Flynn
- Mr. Mayson
- Mr. Quigley

**Opposition:**
- Hon. H. J. Walker
- Hon. L. R. Adams-Schneider
- Mr. Comber

Submissions were written and circulated in advance. They
were therefore not read in the Committee thus allowing greater time for question and discussion. A total of sixty-one submissions were received. These resulted in thirty-nine amendments being made to the bill. (20) Only one submission was totally opposed to the concepts behind the bill. The remainder were supportive to a greater or lesser degree, ranging from the Television Producers and Directors Association who indicated total support through to the New Zealand Public Service Association and the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council both of whom had substantial critical comments to make. A summary of the changes is listed in Appendix F.

The bill was reported back from the Committee on October 17. The irreconcilable differences between the two parties can best be seen by contrasted speeches from the principle spokesmen during the report-back debate. The Hon. H. J. Walker, Opposition:

The evidence placed before the committee clearly showed that the proposed fragmentation of the NZBC is not in the public interest. According to the evidence submitted, under fragmentation programme standards could be lowered, costs could be appreciably increased, and the upgrading and New Zealand-wide coverage of the first television channel will be seriously delayed. ...The Bill is contrary to the Labour Party's policy as enunciated at the last general election and as stated in the party's manifesto.... I want to move an amendment to the motion before this House, "That all the words after the word "that" be omitted, and the following words substituted: "the Bill be referred back to the committee for further examination with a view to not proceeding with the fragmentation of the NZBC."" (Hansard, Vol 387, page 4438)

The Minister of Broadcasting replied:

After listening to the member for Papanui
can only conclude that we must have been sitting in different committees. I oppose the amendment he has moved, and I do not believe it is in the public interest, as he has claimed, that the Bill should be referred back to the committee. In fact, in the main the submissions presented supported the Government's policy. I should like to make the point that the changes made by the committee do not alter in substance the bill as it was originally introduced, but do, I believe, improve it. (Hansard Vol 387, page 4440)

The final speaker, Mr V.S. Young, before the amendment was put and lost by a majority of 17, said:

The whole idea, dreamed up by I know not who, but for which the Minister takes responsibility, is no more than an Alice in Wonderland outfit. It will be of no benefit to broadcasting, television, the news media or the people of New Zealand, and the Bill should be referred back to the committee for reconsideration. (Hansard, Vol 387, page 4449)

The second reading debate was held on November 6. In contrast, the first part of this debate was a model of Parliamentary courtesy and procedure. The Minister of Broadcasting (R.O. Douglas) made a long and detailed speech that was frequently interrupted by courteous and perceptive questioning by Mr Adam-Schneider from the Opposition. Douglas answered each question well. It was during this debate that the Opposition first raised the compatibility of competitive yet complementary television programming. An issue that was to dog both this debate and also future argument on Labour's broadcasting policy. Urgency was taken by the Government on the second reading and it was completed just before midnight.

The committee stages of the Bill took place on November
14, 20 and 21, the Opposition forcing many divisions during the clause by clause debate. The Government conceded an amendment to Mr Adams-Schneider on clause 74a, subsection 1. (Hansard, Vol 388 page 5306) It was an amendment by way of addition of a clause requiring the Minister to table in Parliament any amendments to the conditions of warrants for private stations within 28 days of such a change.

Finally in what Bassett (1976) called "a rather brief but acrimonious debate" the Bill was read a third time on November 21.

The Bill became law on December 18, 1973. On December 11 the new boards of the corporations and Council were announced and on the Act coming into force took over as a reconstituted NZBC Board.

5. THE INTERREGNUM

Shortly before the Adam Committee finished its deliberations, Adams wrote to the Minister of Broadcasting saying inter alia:

We believe that in order to avoid a period of indecision in which those opposed to the new broadcasting proposals will have opportunities to attack the White Paper, it is imperative that the Bill be introduced in August and, preferably in the first fortnight. Unless (this is so) you as Minister will tend to lose the initiative. (21)

Not only was the Bill delayed until Mid-September, but there was also a delay between the signing of the Bill into law
in early December and the Act coming into force on April 1, 1974. However, it was not until twenty months after the White Paper was tabled, April 1975 that the Act became operational in total. It took that long for the NZBC to finally be abolished, the three corporations to come on air and the BCNZ to take on its statutory role.

It was during this period that serious opposition to the Act began to emerge.

As early as 1973 the National Party had been looking for ways to stop the abolition of the NZBC. Walker, as Minister of Broadcasting in the National Government, along with Adams-Schneider, the previous Minister, had built up a close relationship with the NZBC hierarchy. This was reflected both in the nature of appointments to the Board and dealings with the Executive of the Corporation. In 1969 the Government (National Party) Caucus was overwhelmingly in favour of private television in competition with the NZBC. By 1971 the Caucus had been convinced that the NZBC should have the second channel. Indeed, even although the Broadcasting Authority at its hearing granted the second channel to private enterprise, members of the National Party were quietly confident that the NZBC would regain that right after an appeal to the courts — something it had successfully done in the past. (22) Major-General McKinnon, Chairman of the NZBC and a National Party member wrote to Douglas on April 27, 1973 suggesting the alternative proposal of one corporation and three services! (23)
By mid 1974 the newspapers were uniting in opposing the two-channel television service. The Wanganui Herald called the second channel an "extravagance" (June 6, 1974), the New Zealand Herald referred to "storm clouds over second channel" (April 24, 1974), the same paper "leaked" a story that a report to the NZBC indicated that over six hundred new staff would be needed to run the second channel (June 6, 1974). This was immediately contrasted with the original NZBC plan to run a small non-commercial second channel operation — the one referred to the Authority hearing — which would employ only nineteen more staff than already then employed by the old NZBC. The Southland Times attacked the "costly second channel" and, adding parochialism to righteous anger, lambasted the channel for beginning its transmissions only in Auckland. (May 7, 1974)

Staffing levels were criticised. Gordon Dryden, the unsuccessful applicant for the television warrant at the Authority hearings, claimed that he planned a total national television service with four hundred people on the staff. (24)

Finally, it was becoming apparent that the capital costs for the extension of Television One to the last one per cent of the population, coupled with the costs for bringing Television Two's coverage up to or close to Television One was escalating rapidly and the Government was going to have to help in the long term.

Even the Government's own MP's were becoming critical, and although not speaking out publicly, were putting pressure on the Minister. (25)
When Television Two at last went on the air barely four months before a general election, broadcasting was once again becoming a political issue and the corporation structure was far from secure.
CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY

1. POLITICAL SYSTEMS THEORY

Analysing the events using Easton's theory there is no evidence to suggest a sustained and generalised demand being transmitted from the environment to the political system immediately subsequent to the 1972 general election. There was some pressure for second channel coverage, particularly in the four main centres. However in some of the rural and provincial electorates the pressure was more for the introduction or improvement of first channel television. Three of the four politicians spoken to by the writer said that television matters were low on the priority of issues raised by the general public. (1) However it would appear that commercial pressure for a substantial changes to broadcasting's structure had been in evidence for some time. (2)

The narrow base from which Labour's broadcasting policy developed does support an elitist interpretation of the development of broadcasting policy at that stage. Certainly, on the Minister's own admission, only a small number of persons was involved in allocating the values for this particular policy, and were not typical of the masses who are governed and undoubtedly represented higher socio-economic factions within our society. The policy, as initially enunciated did not reflect the
demands of the masses but rather the prevailing values of an elite.

Finally, in recalling Dye and Ziegler's (1978) matrix of elite theory, the policy when first announced elicited very little response from the masses even if calling the masses "apathetic" is going too far. Thus the inputs would be classified by Easton as "withinputs", i.e. initiated from within the political system:

(1) The Conversion Process

Under these circumstances the conversion process adopted is of special interest. It can be analysed almost exclusively using the Almond and Powell (1966) model of the conversion process. The three steps are (1) interest articulation, (2) interest aggregation, and (3) rule making.

(a) Interest articulation. This is the process by which groups and individuals make known their demands. In a sense the government had already become aware of these demands. They had been "telegraphed" through the informal interest group activities. It knew that there was dissatisfaction within some groups in the NZBC, that delays in establishing the second television channel had become a public issue, that there was an uneasy relationship between the broadcasting authorities and the politicians.

In order to focus this demand the Government set up a process of consultation. This "opening-up of the policy making process" (Hall, 1982, page 83) meant that the Government was
prepared to at least put its own policy under scrutiny. It may have been made in an elite environment but would be tested in the political system. The consultation process was initiated with the White Paper. By calling for submissions it allowed interested groups and individuals to comment on the policy. By travelling around New Zealand the way it did the committee was able to, at least in to a limited degree, consult with the masses.

The composition of submissions is interesting. Of the 1500 only some 80 were classified as substantial—the type of presentation expected of active pressure groups—the rest was either informal or in simple letter form. The Minister, in setting up the committee, could therefore be stated as having removed the broadcasting issue from the arena of debate and by doing this should have set the machinery in motion for the development of some broad parameters for alternative policies thus following the function of interest articulation. However, it should be said that the very narrow terms of reference given to the Committee considerably restricted its ability to do this and somewhat limited the role the committee could play in interest articulation.

(b) Interest Aggregation. This is the phase when demands are converted into general policy alternatives. The Mazzoni and Campbell (1976) adaptation of Easton's theory divides this stage into two—proposal formulation and support mobilisation.

(i) Proposal formulation: In this process issues are developed as specific recommendations for policy change. This is exemplified in this case by the publication of the White Paper
and the accompanying draft legislation. In this case the alternatives were a choice between the existing broadcasting system and the new one proposed as an elite theory and modified by the interest aggregation process. However the White Paper itself was a motivator of other alternatives. Some, like Major-General McKinnon's three services proposition, remained within the policy process and were rejected by the elitist element in this policy process. Others were generated more publically, like the proposal of C.G. Costello to the select committee suggesting a compromise structure. (Appendix F).

(ii) Support mobilisation: This also had its genesis in the publication of the White Paper. The Paper was very much an appeal to New Zealanders to back the new proposals. It used a familiar mode of argument to generate support.

The vast majority of correspondents... saw in the proposed extensions of broadcasting not only as an opportunity for more varied diversions but also as a source of education and citizenship. (page 7)

The assumption was that 'you too' would see it this way.

Furthermore.

We have, as a committee, seen and read enough since we were convened to dispose of the fear that what the New Zealand audience wants is to watch and listen to bad programmes. On the contrary, it wants to watch and listen to good programmes. Its tastes are neither undemanding or predictable.

A somewhat condescending congratulatory message. Unsound logic but totally approved marketing!

In this way society is prepared to support the legislation and the changes it will make as being in their best interests, as
being "good" for all, as being a sound alternative - even although no other alternatives were soundly canvased due to the elitist approach at the beginning of the policy process.

Support mobilisation also occurred when the Committee went visiting. It not only listened, it explained what it intended to do, thereby encouraging support for the policy. A further element in the process was the choice of committee. The Minister was very conscious of the need to have a quality committee. The calibre of membership would determine its effectiveness as an opinion leader and persuader.

(c) Rule Making. The final stage of the conversion process as described by Mazzoni and Campbell (1976) is rule making or decision enactment. This is the output phase within the Easton model represented for Easton by decisions and actions of the authorities. This study argues that the process to introduce a radically new broadcasting policy was begun by an elitist decision made within the Government and more specifically by the Minister himself. It was an Easton type withinput decision and not one made in direct response to any clearly defined input from the environment. With the policy decision made, the conversion process, although it involved some of the steps mentioned above, became primarily one of legitimation. The Government was not required to make a choice between a number of alternatives. What little choice it was involved in was no more than deciding what minor changes it would make to the already defined policy to either improve it, or placate a particular group. The conversion process, in summary, required the development of the finer
details of the policy and the mobilisation of public support for the policy. The White Paper was geared towards these ends.

The final stage of the rule making process lay with the passage of the Bill through Parliament. In this example the promulgation of the policy preceded the legislation. The White Paper quickly generated the necessary legislation. Because of the elitist beginning of this policy a safe conclusion is that there was a high degree of compatibility between the aspirations of the government and the recommendations of the Adams Committee.

In this respect it is interesting to note the parting comments of Adam to Walker. According to Walker’s recollection, when asked if he had had a free hand would he personally have done it this way he replied: “I’m sorry, that is a political question and I can’t answer it, but please don’t think too badly of me after I’ve gone.”(3).

Analysis of the case study using Easton’s theory is compact but not very satisfying. Applying any imported and unadapted theoretical model to indigenous events hardly ever is. An alternative hypothesis is therefore suggested in the final chapter.

2. MEDIA THEORY

The political effects thesis (Seymour-Ure, 1974 and Morgan, 1982) is supported by this case study. The evidence collected being both empirical and personal. Without exception all politicians and broadcasters acknowledged the “power” of the
media, particularly television. In seeking what effect the media had on the politician who uses it, the writer had a striking example. A Saturday visit to one politician caught him in the midst of preparing a press release for that day. "If it goes out at the weekend its got a greater chance of exposure because overseas stories and local political stories are scarce and will not crowd it out." Why such attention to exposure? "A politician survives by exposure. The Television image of the leader could win or lose an election."(4)

Others confirm this reaction. Broadcasters, although more cynical, still used the word "power" with frequency and freely acknowledged that their dealings with politicians confirm in them that the politician sees the media as powerful. Seymour-Ure's thesis is that whether it is or is not powerful, the individual's perception that it is will influence behaviour.

During the period under study both leading politicians and senior broadcasters talked publicly about the "power" of broadcasting, the "special responsibility of broadcasters" and the "uniquely pervasive role" of television in our society. (5)

Observation during the period under study confirms Morgan's thesis that politicians are unable to leave broadcasters alone. The stated policy was:

We want to get rid, as we believe the Government does, of what has been described as "the omnipresent environment of political conscience." (White Paper, page 10)

Yet during the period the Deputy Leader of the Opposition was reported in one newspaper:

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Mr Muldoon agrees that the NZBC was due for a shake up. He referred to the NZBC as a "monolithic structure with the hide of a rhinoceros. What went on inside was nobody's business." (Dominion, February 14, 1973)

Furthermore, the Prime Minister of the party proposing this legislation was involved in more than one incident during the period. He involved himself in a somewhat unbecoming argument with a talk-back journalist on radio, threatening both the station and the broadcaster with legal action (Sunday Times June 30, 1974). He attacked the television programme "Gallery" over an item that featured the Opposition spokesman on immigration and three young Fijian boys on the issue of overstayers. Commenting on broadcasters policy of saying that politicians "declined to appear", Kirk said:

"Gallery gives the impression that it has special duties. It has no such duties at all. Gallery has power and that demands responsibility. (N.Z.Listener, September 17, 1973)

Politicians who made complaints about broadcasting during the period of the study included; Mr Harrison, Mr Thompson, Mr McCready, Mr Muldoon, Mr Kirk, Dr Finlay.

Morgan's hypothesis that truth has two versions, as its told by the politicians and as its reported by the media, is used to explain the forever uncomfortable relationship, the uneasy truce, so easily broken that lies between the politician and the mediaperson. She sees it as a symbiotic relationship. The politician needs the media to tell his or her truth, yet the media will often tell it their way and not the politician's.
Firmly believing in their own versions each exposes the other to constant misinterpretation.

Seymour-Ure hypothesises that the individual's perception of the media is just as important for the performer as it is for the audience. Politicians shape their performance by their perception of the medium they perform on. Morgan's hypothesis is of two truths inextricably bound together, needing each other to survive, yet in that need forever ensuring tension and misunderstanding by "misappropriating" each other's truth. It is the belief of the writer that much of the behaviour of politicians during this period supports these theories and leave the way open for further study.

3. PRESSURE GROUPS

Using Levine's (1979) dichotomy of pressure group activity between promotional and protective, the role of the promotional grouping was less significant in this study. The protective groupings played a larger role. This can be explained by the nature of events. As pointed out earlier, using Easton's model, the inputs for change did not come from the environment. There was not a strong mass movement for substantial broadcasting changes. Therefore promotional groupings would not have been formed for this specific policy change. Existing promotional groups that have some longevity did contribute but they were the lesser actors. Because the proposed changes had great significance for groups working within broadcasting those with established protective groupings were highly active. The Public
Service Association, the various occupational groupings within broadcasting, the political parties, and the media were all featured.

One grouping that, for the purposes of the study, would fit into a pressure group definition was the small coterie of top NZBC executives that centred on the Director-General. As mentioned earlier, this small, but powerful group, played a significant and, on the whole, disruptive role in the policy formation process. One source suggested that they formed, with others, a tightly-knit grouping based on the office of the Opposition spokesman on Broadcasting. (8) This involvement lasted for the duration of the exercise. Certainly their intentions were the protection of the existing NZBC. Sources close to the policy process have suggested that they were acting in true pressure group fashion in protecting their own interests also. (9)

Many of the changes that were made to the draft legislation were the result of successful pressure group activity (see Appendix F) and the White paper acknowledges the contribution of some 84 organisations that made substantial submissions. However, reinforcing a previous comment about Levine's typology, many more contributions were made by individuals and some of these were also successful in generating change.

There were absolutely no bipartisan approaches to this policy study. Cleavages were firmly down party lines. The divisions within the NZBC aligned themselves with these
cleavages. The Administration being seen as supporting the National Party approach, the more liberal producers and directors siding with Labour Party policy. This separation was carried over to "outside" organisations also. The more liberal tending to support the proposals, conservative groups being more critical. This perhaps gives some support to the worrying trends identified by Levine (1979) that cumulative rather than cross-cutting cleavages are dominating New Zealand society. It should be emphasised however that the study is too narrow both in scope and social importance of the subject matter to give too greater emphasis to this support.

4. THE PRIMACY OF PRAGMATISM

Two comments stand out. One politician said that "a party needs to keep its policy bland to give freedom." Another said: "the party didn't make policy the ministers did." Both talked about the need to be pragmatic. Now pragmatism has a long and noble history. As it was conceived by such people as William James and C.S. Peirce it was a philosophical position that could be defended with some vigour. Stated simply pragmatism is based on the concept that the meaning of any proposition is its logical consequences.

In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception. (McGill 1968, page 247)

Adapting the philosophy to a political context has
produced such concepts as instrumentalism and John Dewey's experimentalism. In many of the conversations the writer had with politicians and broadcasters the phrase "pragmatism" was frequently used. It was used most often in the context of the need for a broadcasting policy to be "pragmatic", or that the policy under review was not pragmatic. This unfortunate confusion between pragmatism and practical was too often present. It appears that the broadcasting policy of the third Labour Government was above all else an exercise in pragmatism. It was conceived entirely in terms of its outcomes. The consequences of the policy really became the basis of the policy itself. Both the Minister's initial announcement and the White Paper devoted much to what they saw as the outcome of the policy. They often addressed the problems in terms of their outcomes, i.e. the way they addressed the debate on the future of radio, the arguments for decentralisation, and so on. Pragmatic does not necessarily mean it will work! Pragmatism is often contrasted with idealism. That is not a logical negation. The policy under study was idealistic but it was also pragmatic.

This little "homily" is served because each of the statements above, and they are interesting statements in themselves, had annexed to them "that's being pragmatic".(10)

5 SUMMARY

This chapter has observed the events under study in terms of the political systems model for policy-making proposed by David Easton. It concluded that the model can be used to describe
the process but can do little more. It would be more interesting to observe what the outcome of the policy was in terms of a theoretical hypothesis. This is attempted in the final chapter.

Further, the chapter reflected on the role of pressure groups in the policy process and also attempted to apply current theories of media political effects to the process. These are raised again in the final chapter which looks at reasons for the policy's failure.
CHAPTER VII

THE FAILURE OF THE POLICY

1. MEDIA ISSUES

There appears to be one major media policy issue which contributed to the failure of the policy under study. A further policy, relating to radio, was highly successful.

(1) Complementary v Competitive

A key concept in the Adam Committee's report and a cornerstone of the legislation was what the Committee called "Guided Competition".

Out of this a new definition of public broadcasting could emerge, which would be "sui generis", but which could also offer an example to other broadcasting organisations which are in some cases themselves looking anxiously at the need for restructuring.

The co-existence of complementary and competitive planning does not seem to us to require that the total philosophies of the two television channels have to be diametrically opposed.... Both channels will be in a considerable degree and naturally complementary for five nights of the week, when one..., will be non-commercial, and rivalry will tend to be confined to the 2 nights when both are seeking advertising support. (page 40-41)

The Committee was cautious not to define the concept too carefully. Critics suggest they could not (1), the Committee had other reasons:

The Committee does not feel that it should lay down in advance precise detail of what complementary planning may come to mean. That
is a matter for the Council and for its representatives from the television channels to work out....(page 41)

Much of the success of the television restructuring was based on the ability of the two channels to be both complementary and competitive. (The Committee, ironically, did not mention that the last time such a division occurred in New Zealand Broadcasting, when radio had two separate controlling bodies from 1936 - 1943, only one body was commercially based. That division ceased when a unified control was introduced supposedly as a wartime cost-saving measurement. (2)

However, that period of radio was referred to more than once during debates on the policy. The Adam Committee was determined to avoid a "minority/majority split" happening in television.(3) There seemed to be a strong fear of "elitism" within the Committee. They wanted to avoid, for television, the "intellectual ghetto" they saw radio having created with over 80% of the listening audience opting for the commercial and light entertainment stations. They saw this as "cutting down the variety of communication which the audience will encounter by tuning to their favourite station."( Page 18)

Mixing the character of both TV channels and altering their commercial and non-commercial programmes must have the effect of reducing this self-segregation and minimising the division of communicated experiences within the community. (page 18)

(The writer finds it significant that such thinking, a sort of cross cultural fertilisation - combining wands with needs - was prevalent in 1970's educational literature.)(4)
The Committee wanted to ensure that the broader concept of mass media communication, as it has come to be enshrined in public service broadcasting, should have a high profile:

The assignment of a non-commercial role to both television services will therefore act as a constant reminder to them that they exist "to inform, to educate, and to entertain" and that their commercial activities are solely a means to a public end. (page 18)

(It is interesting to note the order that the committee selects for these three "benchmarks" of public service broadcasting and to compare them with broadcasting's own priorities.)

Criticism of the concept was first raised in Parliament during the second reading debate on November 6. The Opposition spokesman on Broadcasting Hon H.J. Walker:

If there is competition for advertising there will not be complementary programmes - that is alternative programmes. If there are endeavours to have complementary and competitive programmes on both channels, the programmes have to be regulated. (Hansard, Vol , page 4851)

Walker, in support of his argument, referred to the evidence of both Alphonse Quimet and Hew Wheldon given to the Broadcasting Authority's hearings into second channel allocation in 1971.

Quimet, Chairman of the board of Telstat, Canada, and a former Chairman of the Canadian Broadcasting Commission said:

In my opinion the key question which, when answered, will provide the framework for all other elements to fall neatly into place, is whether New Zealand's second television service should be complementary to or "competitive with" the existing service? It cannot be both at the same time. (page 27)

He was supported by Mr Hew Wheldon, Managing Director of
Television for the BBC:

That you can be, in the long run, both complementary and competitive at the same time...is strictly for the birds. In terms of hard experience, it is a pipe dream...it has always been in my experience, at best a pious intention, and generally, in fact, so much eyewash; and indeed has been so proved. (page 27)

The Government was convinced that the Adam Report suggestions would work and resisted any change. However within six months of Television Two going to air the Chairman of Television One, Mr R.G. Collins, said publicly:

The present state of television broadcasting in New Zealand has followed inexorably from the prescriptions laid down in the Adam Report...Every experienced broadcaster reading the Adam Report recognised very quickly what the television result would be. In a country of this small population base, two commercial channels competing hard for advertising revenue, and wishing to expand the total revenue, must inevitably throw out two broadly similar programme patterns. The "small" complementarity of not broadcasting like against like can easily be achieved; but the larger complementarity of producing two quite different programming patterns can never be achieved under the Adam prescriptions, simply because under those prescriptions it is a financial impossibility.

If the members of the Committee did not appreciate this, one would be left musing about their qualifications. If they did appreciate it and disapproved, it was open to any one of them to record a dissent. The probability, of course, is that with personal misgivings they hoped for the best. (N.Z.Listener, March 13, 1976)

Professor Chapman and Mr Robson have, to this day, remained silent on these matters. Lady Turner spoke out early in 1976 expressing strong disappointment at the direction that both channels were taking. "...TV1...was awful, but I never expected
much good to come out of Avalon, which is a grandiose monument to centralism. She also felt let down by TV2. "The discrimination and vitality of Auckland, the marvellous things of Christchurch, the solid glory of the place, are just not coming through." (N.Z.Listener, March 6, 1976)

(2) Radio

The criticism levelled at television both during the interregnum and in the period immediately following the establishment of the four corporations, significantly omitted radio.

With a few exceptions - the consensus is that radio has come back into its own. (N.Z.Listener March 5, 1976, page 15)

It was acknowledged that the Adam proposals had allowed radio to break free from television which had been, at one and the same time, a "hulking shadow of a progeny" and a financial and competitive burden. Thus the Listener was able to say:

Its potential is being realised particularly in the fields of news and current and community affairs programmes. (Ibid)

The article went on to comment, however, that it felt that these changes that had occurred for the best in radio would have been possible without the complications of a "completely new structure".

Gregory (1974) predicted that a revitalised radio could become the centrepiece of broadcasting in New Zealand.

It is not unreasonable to expect that Radio New Zealand could emerge as the institutional leader in the future New Zealand broadcasting system. Untroubled by the need to compete to the extent that the two television networks
will be, and gaining dynamism through its ability to play an important role in the life of local communities, radio might emerge as the central institution of New Zealand broadcasting. (Page 75)

The consensus among broadcasters in radio is that the restructuring "saved public service broadcasting in New Zealand", gave radio a new "lease of life", and, because television was the dominant medium, allowed radio to "get on with its job unfettered and untrammelled by the high profile attention devoted to television. (5)

2. POLITICAL ISSUES

It is suggested that a significant number of political issues played a role in the lack of success for the policy under study. Although a slow process, legislation from 1976 onwards, whilst initially accepting the two channel dichotomy, inexorably ate away at the basic concepts and structures, until by 1982 unified controlled was re-established.

(1) The Political System

Pamela Steele (1981) argues that the heart of the issue of policy-making in broadcasting lies in a yet to be acknowledged eternal conflict between the mass media and any Westminster system of cabinet government. Media organisations are caught within a model that is incompatible with the rules and conventions that govern the behaviour of the media's most important subject categories - politicians and public servants.

The major reason for conflict between the mass media and cabinet government is that the model of cabinet government, based on the principle of secrecy, has been superimposed upon a
political system based upon the principle of freedom and the associated concept of open government. It is upon the principle of freedom that journalists and the mass media are functioning within the political system, placing them in direct conflict with the principles underlying cabinet government. (page 1)

She goes on to argue that the democratic model predates the Westminster model by sixteen hundred years. It has a longer and hence greater heritage than the Westminster model that began evolving from the "distinctive social milieu of Britain." (page 3) The Westminster model has been "superimposed" on the democratic model. She believes that whilst democracy has stood the test of time, the "constitutional framework of cabinet government is almost entirely anachronistic and archaic". (Ibid) Steele sees the Westminster model departing from the framework of the democratic political system in many ways but it is demonstrated no more strongly than in its involvement with the mass media.

Access to, and use of, information is the main arena in which the government and the media do battle. The cabinet model, supposedly based on the concept of collective responsibility, requires information discussed by ministers to be confidential. It also requires officials advising ministers to remain anonymous and keep their counsel also.

Whilst the cabinet system of government has been around for a long time, the mass media has developed as a significant means of communication within the political process only recently. Newspapers with limited impact began mass circulation
in the nineteenth century, radio and television are not a half-century old. Yet the rapid growth of the media continues with continuous pressure for more stations, greater access and swift expansion of services. The imposition of this mass media technology upon the Westminster system has been a burden hard to bear. It is significant that even today journalists are located within Parliament on the basis of privilege, a privilege that parliament may withdraw at any time.

Journalists may act upon the principle of press freedom but in New Zealand, as with Britain and some other Commonwealth countries, there is no legal basis for their position. Indeed, a British High Court ruling, widely referred to in the news media at the time, ruled that journalists, under British law, have never had any absolute right to protect the confidentiality of their sources. Granada Television was ordered to name the person who leaked to it confidential documents belonging to the British Steel Corporation. (5)

Steele's thesis is that as long as the government and the media operate under different sets of principles, rules and conventions they will remain in a permanent state of conflict. If this is so then no broadcasting system is capable of being freed from "the omnipresent environment of the political conscience" (Adam, page 10) whilst the cabinet system of government remains in New Zealand. And furthermore, the statement of the new Chairman of the BCNZ, upon the abolition of the policy under study:
I seek to create an atmosphere of continuity, so that people in authority recognise the same sense of purpose as those putting the sound on the air. (N.Z.Listener, July 3, 1976)

suggests, using Steele's analysis, that either democracy gives way to secrecy, or secrecy is given up. Significantly the legislative changes made in 1976 were to broadcasting and not to the New Zealand constitution!

Steele was writing in 1981 some months after the introduction of a Freedom of Information Act in Australia. She saw the Act as making no significant difference to her theory. It is too early yet to predict whether a similar Act here will have any impact.

(2) Accountability

Politicians, who often deal with the same "product" as broadcasters, are conscious of the fact that if they handle the "product" unsatisfactorily they are held accountable to the electorate every three years. Contrary to this, broadcasters have permanent jobs. The new National Government wanted to restore "political accountability to broadcasting".

With its "three million shareholders", our public broadcasting service depends for its near-$60m income on about 50 per cent public money - from licences - and the rest from advertising. With so much public finance involved, together with the capital required for its burgeoning development programmes and its educational, cultural and entertainment responsibilities, the broadcasting service "in our view requires ministerial responsibility and a greater degree of accountability to Parliament" (Hugh Templeton, interviewed in the N.Z.Listener, July 6, 1976)

With such a policy no broadcasting system, independent of direct ministerial control could survive.

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However there is confusion between accountability and responsibility. This is highlighted in the current controversy over UNESCO's attempts to establish international standards for the mass media. The McBride Report (1979) suggests that the third world is dominated by first world media services. These on the whole are not understanding of the particular problems of developing nations. Whilst not wanting to exert control over media reporting the report suggests that media responsibility could be exercised "more fairly" for the journalist is accountable to the concepts of "truth and accuracy". Further, Heller (1978) points out the very significant difference between what is called the "national interest" and what is called the "public interest". This difference can lead to conflict as it did most recently during the Falklands War. The Government's desire for the media to "serve the national interest" came into deep conflict with the media belief that it was in "the public interest to be informed". When Sir Terence Lewin (Chief of Defence Staff) was asked whether deceiving the press or deceiving the public through the press was reasonable, he replied:

I do not see it as deceiving the press or the public; I see it as deceiving the enemy. What I am trying to do is to win. Anything I can do to help me win is fair as far as I am concerned, and I would have thought that that was what the Government and the public and the media would want too. (Harris, 1983, page 94)

This is contrasted with the American view:

The American view of war reporting stems not only from the First Amendment guarantee of a fair press, but from a simple democratic conviction that the taxpayer has a right to know how his money is being spent and to express his opinion about it. (The "Guardian"s" correspondent in Washington
Both the McBride view of accountability and that expressed by Harris suggest that the media can be accountable without requiring ministerial control. Politicians in New Zealand have too narrow a view of accountability and other than accepting their own capabilities to act responsibly, deny that capability in others, particularly within broadcasting. It appears that its broadcasters the politicians most readily seek to control. The press which does a similar job seems tantalisingly out of reach. Politicians tend to compensate by verbally attacking press journalists they do not favour. If the emphasis on accountability in New Zealand lies only within the legislature then, while the Westminster model remains, there is little scope for the development of broader and more flexible concepts of accountability. Some form of Ministerial control of broadcasting seems inevitable. However, the New Zealand politician seems reluctant to be seen to control. New Zealand's intimate society allows them therefore to try and influence. This "informal" political pressures has been very evident in broadcasting.

(3) Speaking for the Public Interest

Jane Morgan suggests that a major clash within political systems such as ours that mitigate against truly independent broadcasting lies within the conflict over who has the "right" to interpret and speak for the public interest. She identifies three powerful groups who claim this right: Public Servants who believe their task is to do just that on behalf of their Ministers unto whom they are accountable; Politicians, who believe that they
are elected to interpret and speak for the public, and have to face them every election for an accounting, and who, strangely, accept the perceived role of the public servant because it is not carried out in public, and, on the whole, assists them to more ably state their case; and the broadcasters and journalists of the mass media.

Politicians and officials are "temperamentally alike. Both lay stress on legitimacy and accountability." (page 60) However their authority is derived from different sources, one from election and the other from appointment. It is this division and yet unity that makes up what Morgan sees as the political and bureaucratic conscience. It is these two kinds of person that have the authority to make decisions that affect broadcasting. Is it any wonder then that they will unite to keep, at the very least, a loose rein on broadcasters? In New Zealand this process has a double implication for broadcasting for many years was controlled directly by public servants, and more recently, those same public servants under the guise of a corporation. Using this analysis, the 1972 policy was, for New Zealand, a rare attempt to allow broadcasters to "freely interpret and speak" for the public.

(4) Leadership

Gregory (1974) argued that the new structures would fail
on leadership counts. He saw the fragmentation of responsibility as weakening the total broadcasting organisation particularly in relations with its political masters. He called the restructuring irrelevant at best and irresponsible at worst:

It is irrelevant because the problems that the government professed to be concerned about are likely to remain within the new framework unless the right type of leadership is able to establish itself; and it is irresponsible because the restructuring itself makes it less likely such leadership will emerge. (page 73)

The leadership problems that he saw existing in the previous NZBC and remaining in the new structures were: (a) it allowed production of programmes to be overburdened by bureaucracy because the leadership failed to create sound professional and administrational relationships between executives and programme production staff; (b) it allowed non-commercial radio to become bland and lacking in vigour; (c) it neglected to have clearly defined organisational objectives; and (d) it failed to grasp the difference between formal statutory powers and the many informal powers that it could have created.

He saw none of these problems being solved by the new structure because fragmentation of leadership would weaken even further the chances of strong leadership emerging, thus increasing the reluctance to take informal power to itself. The need to engage in commercial competitiveness would continue to make non-commercial broadcasting bland and lacking style. New Zealand was too small to allow the deep-rooted institutionalism, so necessary if an organisation is to "believe in itself", to grow in four separate bodies when such a concept had great
difficulty flowering in a much larger organisation. "The identity of the local grocer becomes more tenuous in relation to the number of grocers in the same street." (Page 75) Prophetically, Gregory foresaw the reuniting of the broadcasting structures as inevitable; he only misjudged the time - it happened sooner than he thought.

(5) The Time Factor

One of the many questions raised about the events under discussion surrounds the inordinate delay between the legislation coming into force on December 12, 1973 and the actual establishment of the Broadcasting Council of New Zealand some twenty-one months later. At the time the Minister of Broadcasting announced the new policy he said:

We aim to have the second channel established about October 1974. To enable us to do this it will be necessary for us to call tenders for various equipment at an early date. (N.Z.Listener, March 23, 1973)

Yet it was not until six months later, September 21, 1973 that the Minister tabled in the House of Representatives the following instruction to the Director General of the NZBC:

In accordance with Government policy to establish a nationwide second television channel in New Zealand as expeditiously as possible, I direct you, in terms of section 11 of the Broadcasting Corporation Act of 1961, to proceed with the preparation of the necessary submissions to Government seeking financial approval to call tenders for the provision of transmitters and transmitting aerials for the second channel and such microwave networking facilities as are necessary.

It was well known that such equipment had to be specially
made and that it would take around eighteen months for the whole process from tender to operation to take place. Early in the year (February 1973) the Minister received a formal request for approval to purchase equipment to upgrade existing television facilities. The Director-General, in the request, pointed out the long delays that the process would be subject to.

The Minister was aware of the necessity to have the second channel operational and the new structures well in place during his first term of office to prevent it becoming too much of an election issue in 1975. Furthermore the Adam Committee was aware of this urgency. As previously mentioned the Chairman of that Committee wrote to the Minister urging all speed. Why did the Minister not issue the Directive earlier? Why did the NZBC not take upon itself to seek the initiative?

The writer was not able to obtain satisfactory answers to these questions. It is clear, however, that the late start to the new regime did contribute to the Government's difficulties in the 1975 general elections. The structures had no time to settle down, to prove themselves, to cope with the controversies that inevitably arose, before the issue became an election one.

It is clear, furthermore, that the NZBC executive would not have been particularly helpful in urging on the Government's policies to success. Did unnecessary delays occur within the Corporation?

With these delays, why did the Minister not hold off implementing the legislation until it could be put into practice?
These are questions that still need answering. Meanwhile it is suggested that the policy was perhaps too large, too radical, and perhaps too important to be accommodated within the short three-year life of a New Zealand Parliament. Particularly for a one-term government - something uncommon in recent New Zealand history

3. FINANCIAL ISSUES

Independence, in the final analysis, is finance. Independence in broadcasting is not just the freedom to film, edit and screen the news and current affairs of your own choice, to select programmes for broadcast within the frameworks and policies selected by you, to choose who shall speak on your behalf and when. Lasting independence for broadcasting comes when there is a conscious abstention by government from the exercise of its legislative prerogative, when the broadcasting body is placed on a firm financial footing and when all matters of finance, both capital and cash flow, are the sole responsibility of the broadcasting body. As long as the broadcasting bodies have to apply to the government for approval on capital expenditure, and as long as the government, and the people of New Zealand, refuse to accept that for three million people to have a fully independent broadcasting system offering variety and choice, they will have to pay for it; in other words public broadcasting standards cannot be maintained by commercial revenue alone; then
broadcasting will not be, indeed, cannot be independent. The abolition of the post of Minister of Broadcasting was not enough.

The Adam Report, whilst acknowledging that cost for the broadcasting system would increase and that the licence might go up, did not fully expound the financial dilemma that faced broadcasting in New Zealand. The country wanted, perhaps had, a broadcasting system equivalent to Britain and other countries with considerable large populations but was not prepared for the costs this would incur. Overspending by New Zealand governments is a favourite target for the mass media. It is no wonder that the press picked up on this issue very early and that it was used very effectively by the opposition during the 1975 campaign. (Levine, 1980, page 27)

Perhaps as long as New Zealand wants a broadcasting system that it is either unable or unwilling to pay for the country will need to keep broadcasting under some form of government financial control.

4. INCREMENTALISM AGAIN

None of New Zealand’s attempts to organise broadcasting have seriously faced up to the need to guarantee the autonomy of broadcasting; instead they have concentrated on problems of profitability, administration, and accountability. Policy making in broadcasting, as in most other policy areas, has been incremental; it has lurched from one financial crisis to another, and from one election campaign to the next. (Cleveland, 1980, page 184)

Lying within this historical “habit” of incremental policy
making is perhaps a major reason for the failure of the policy under study.

Historically, policy in New Zealand has been made in Lindblom’s (1968) “give and take” arena. Decisions are made within frameworks limited by time, by the intelligence of the decision-makers, by uncertainties, and lack of resources. New Zealand politicians both praise and have been praised for their practical nature. On the whole New Zealand decision makers make short, limited yield, practicable and acceptable decisions. Our policy-makers muddle through.

The reasons for this could be many: the historically canny and cautious people that made up the country’s pioneer stock, the paternalism bred by New Zealand’s colonial heritage which leaves difficult decisions to the “Mother Country”, the egalitarian nature of the society which breeds an inbuilt “right” for everyone to “have a say”, the small population which, at one and the same time, makes politicians more accessable and more vulnerable, the short political cycle, the limited horizons of the average New Zealander.

the New Zealand dream has never been, for the majority of its inhabitants, the hope of making it big, going west or even rising up the class ladder. Essentially materialist, gentle, unambitious, it fixed upon a modest home on a separate plot of land, a protected job in both senses of limited competition and assured employment, free education for children, and a mild boom to make it possible for the restless to achieve spatial if not social mobility (Levine, 1980, page 11)

Thus the New Zealand decision-maker is encouraged to search for the acceptable rather than the optimal solution.
the acceptable rather than the optimal solution.

Policies which are discontinuous, radical or unpopular tend to be avoided by policy-makers and are only encountered at times of crises or great public dissatisfaction. The 1935 Labour government was able to push through extremely radical social policies because of the depression and the resultant hardships that prepared the population for change.(7) Likewise the Liberal government, prior to the turn of the century, was able to build on the collapse of provincial government and the need to push through communication networks that would mould the nation.(8) Otherwise, except for times of war, policies that espoused radical or discontinuous change were not popular or successful. Successful politicians avoided them.

On occasion, when such radical change has been resorted to it has usually been the result of pressure from the group affected to bring about the change and such change has had limited effect outside the boundaries of the group concerned.(9)

The broadcasting changes, which were radical and discontinuous, were not in response to such pressure. Nor was it a time of national crisis. Every change in broadcasting legislation since 1936, and there had been many, were incremental in nature, building upon the organisation that already existed and tampering with the structures. As mentioned previously, even the change from government department to corporation in 1962 was more a change in garb than a new body.
There was no public demand for such radical change. The public, if it voiced its feelings at all, related its wants more to second channel coverage and improved first channel coverage. There was therefore, no substantial support for the policy to counter opposition. And opposition came from two highly articulated and interested pressure groups - the newspaper lobby, which had deep motives of its own for not wanting the change, and the National Party opposition.

It is significant that three major and discontinuous policies introduced by the third Labour government suffered similar fates, they were either substantially modified or reversed. These were the broadcasting policy under study, the Local Body Reform Bill, and the New Zealand Superannuation Scheme.

Perhaps this analysis presents a major problem for governments of reform and change elected to power other than at times of national crisis. Certainly the two Labour Party governments that have been elected to power as a result of normal preference for change have not survived re-election. The New Zealand voter has shown loyalty over many years to a party that if it has not the slogan "incrementalism" written in its manifesto certainly has the phrase "steady does it."

5. SUMMARY

The Political Systems model allows for an explanation of the policy process but does little to highlight reasons for a
policy's failure, unless that failure lies in some crucial process in the policy formation that was omitted or grossly distorted. The previous chapter demonstrates that this was not the case for this study. Further, the model does little to take into account the peculiarities of the New Zealand environment, the system of inputs so vital to the conversion process.

This chapter has highlighted a number of possible reasons for the failure of the policy. It is the writers belief that they all could be said to "play a part" in the outcome. Within purely media issues the concept of Guided Competition failed. It failed because the Adam Committee was unable to clearly define it and the two television channels who were left with the task were too locked into the survival game to give sufficient attention to it.

Political issues include, Pamela Steele's hypothesis that conflict is inevitable; the concept of accountability which leaves politicians either having to face up to broader meanings of the concept or confining it within the narrow boundaries of "ministerial responsibility"; and the time factor, which is always crucial in political decision making and which is extra crucial when the political system has such a short term life as in New Zealand. The costs of policies and the costs of their implementation have to be within acceptable public parameters. If not costs can quickly become part of the input process which forces a modification of the conversion process and in Easton's model a consequent modification of the policy. Finally it is suggested that the policy under study was incongruent with the
broad history and tradition of incrementalism within New Zealand policy-making. This places an inordinate strain upon both the policy and the policy-makers and impairs the policy's progress.

6. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A study of this size and scope can only raise issues and make tentative suggestions. Broadcasting policy in New Zealand requires substantial academic research. The period immediately following the one under study continues the unseemly volume of legislation on broadcasting matters with legislation making incremental adjustments to broadcasting occurring in every year until 1982.

Major changes have occurred in the broadcasting structure of most western nations during the last ten years. (Smith, 1978) and in New Zealand the changes have been both severe and frequent. Why is broadcasting such an attraction for the legislators? Why cannot New Zealand follow the lead of most other nations and give broadcasting a substantial period without interference to develop its own philosophy of broadcasting? At least the BBC, often held up as the ultimate model of broadcasting standards, is given 10 years between each charter review. These and many of the other question raised in this paper are worthy of study within the context of broadcasting in New Zealand.

Most significantly however, it is the writers view that there is scope for the examination of policy development and application within the New Zealand context. Such a study could focus on the
problems of introducing, successfully, radical or discontinuous public policy within this country.
NOTES

CHAPTER I

(1) Letter dated February 1, 1973 and marked "URGENT"


(3) Interview, August 11, 1983


CHAPTER V

(1) Four Government MP's confirmed this was so. Mr M. Moore does not recall the matter even being announced in caucus before the general announcement.

(2) Interview with Hon R.O. Douglas

(3) A 13 page document which relates the new policy to what was announced in the manifesto and endeavours to reconcile the two. However, even this paper differs markedly from the subsequent announcement. For example, each of the corporations, it is suggested in the cabinet paper should be located in a different centre, and the names used for the two television channels were respectively "Dominion Television" and "The New Zealand Television Corporation".

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(4) Newspaper reports confirm their shock. Future behaviour as recounted later, suggests lack of cooperation and perhaps obstructionism.

(5) See New Zealand Listener, March 27, 1973

(6) Recorded in notes of a Preliminary Discussion between the Committee's secretary and senior NZBC Executives.

(7) Notes of Minister's answers to questions at NZBC Board Meeting March 8, 1973

(8) Comment recorded at interview

(9) There is considerable correspondence between the Minister and Foreign Affairs on the matter. Names prefered included: Hugh Greene, Richard Attenborough, John Freeman, Waldo McQuire, Fred Friendly, Geoffrey Cox, Stuart Hood, and Lord Hill.

(10) The writer believes, but cannot confirm, that differences occurred over what Adam saw as "elitist" policies pursued by BBC2.

(11) Interview with Douglas

(12) Staff group submissions to Committee on Broadcasting

(13) Interview with Douglas

(14) Notes on Discussion between the Committee and National Party MPs - Marshall, Adam-Schneider, Walker, held on June 6, 1873

(15) See (14)

(16) Notes prepared for discussion with the Committee on Broadcasting

(17) Source to remain confidential

(18) The question raised is one of "balance of power". If the three Director-Generals should combine against the two appointed
members they would out-vote them. However, with three appointed members the casting vote of the Chairman would favour the appointed members.

(19) This source was acknowledged by the Committee

(20) See Appendix F

(21) Letter to Douglas from Adam dated July 11, 1973

(22) Hon H.J Walker in interview said that he was "quietly convinced" that the NZBC would get the second channel at the Authority hearing. Earlier, the National Government caucus had been favourably disposed to a private enterprise second channel. It is believed that the combined approach of the "big five" companies to run the second channel made the caucus realise that the NZBC relied on those very same five companies for a large percentage of its revenue from advertising. Support for the NZBC was quickly re-established.

(23) Letter to Douglas dated April 27, 1973

(24) Press Association report, Christchurch Press, June 7, 1974

(25) Interview with Douglas

CHAPTER VI

(1) The writer can confirm this also, being a candidate during that election.

(2) This was heaviest when a consortium of five large companies, Kerridge-Odeon, Fletchers, Watties, NZ Forest Products and Wright Stephenson, applied for a warrant. Walker recalled: "They were so confident they even supplied me with press releases that they wished me to make under my own name!"
(3) As recounted by Walker in interview

(4) Mr M. Moore, in interview

(5) A casual study of speeches made by both broadcasters and politicians confirms this. e.g. Douglas in a speech to the Advertising Institute of New Zealand on April 24, 1974 said that ".....broadcasting brought to mind the interaction of old Greek City-States, but this time the broadcaster has in his hands a huge unseen audience who can...feel their involvement....."

(6) A detailed coverage of many of these complaints appeared in the New Zealand Listener, April 4, 1974

(7) e.g. Nga Tamatoa, Citizens' Association for Racial Equality

(8) Interview with Walker

(9) Confidential source

(10) Comments in interview with both Douglas and Walker

CHAPTER VII

(1) See Letter in NZ Listener, March 13, 1976 from R.G. Collins, Chairman of TV1

(2) See Edwards J, (1971)

(3) Interview with Douglas


(6) As reported in STEELE, (1981)

(7) See SUTCH, W.B. Poverty & Progress in New Zealand, Reed, 1969

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(8) See SINCLAIR, K. A Short History of New Zealand, Penguin, 1965

(9) For example the recent decision to centralise all meat marketing overseas in the hands of the Meat Board
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LABOUR favours the present principle of public ownership of the facilities of Broadcasting and Television. The main object of that policy is to provide the best, most independent, and enterprising television and radio that can be provided. A further objective will be to provide the highest possible New Zealand content in both broadcast programmes and capital equipment.

POLICY DETAILS

1. Corporation control of the facilities of both radio and television is considered in the best public interest and will be supported without infringing the freedom of existing licence-holders.

2. The N.Z.B.C. will provide a nationwide radio and television coverage of both a commercial and non-commercial character. Its responsibility will include the preparation of programmes on education, the arts, consumer interests, sports, public affairs, and news, in addition to general programme material.

3. The establishment of the second television channel will proceed with expedition. This channel will have a colour capability.

4. Responsibility for the provision of all technical facilities for television in New Zealand will rest with the N.Z.B.C. but regional councils will be given a measure of local control. These councils will be charged with providing adequate local content and with determining leasing arrangements for a designated viewing period. Such arrangements will involve some competitive tendering for both programme and advertising time.

5. The N.Z.B.C. will be required to ensure that the sound broadcasting system makes adequate provision for programmes of popular interest to young people. The regional councils will be similarly charged in the field of television.

6. A television education system with the widest possible application will be instituted. Emphasis will be placed on training in television techniques so that advantage can be taken of the latest overseas development in educational television. The concept of a "University of the Air" will be promoted.

7. The Broadcasting Authority will be restructured and charged with the independent oversight of programme standards. It will also form an appeal authority empowered to receive and act on complaints lodged by the public.

8. Within technical limitations, complete TV coverage of the country will be given a high priority.
APPENDIX B

(a) The nature of media effects

(i) Media may be a necessary and sufficient cause of a political effect; a necessary but not a sufficient cause; a sufficient but not a necessary cause; and the catalyst or occasion of a political effect.

(ii) All political effects are initially upon individuals. They consist in increments of information, which may or may not modify attitudes which may or may not modify behaviour.

(iii) Political effects may be primary (i.e. on an individual directly concerned in a communication process) or secondary (i.e. upon individuals not directly concerned in that process).

(b) The production of effects

Media effects so defined may be produced by:

(i) One or more elements of a particular communication process: i.e. sender, message, medium, receiver;

(ii) the communication context: i.e. the timing (and sequence) of that communication; its frequency (strictly, its similarity to previous communications); its intensity (in relation to other, possibly competing, communications).

(c) The political context of effects

(i) Effects of a communication process may vary according to the level of political relationships considered. These relationships may be between individuals, institutions (or groups) and the political system, in a variety of possible combinations.

(ii) The significance of media-induced effects on those relationships will depend upon the virtually endless range of political questions in which an inquirer may be interested.
APPENDIX C

GENERAL INTERVIEW GUIDE

The elite interviewing approach does not require that a specific set of questions be asked of each respondent (as in a structured interview.) Nevertheless, an interview guide is necessary to direct attention to the major areas of enquiry.

The interview guide presented below also relates to the issue statements outlined on page 3.

(1) Genesis of the Concept:
- Is it possible to identify the origin of the concept?
- Why did the broadcasting changes become an issue?

(2) Identification of key influentials/groups:
- What individuals and groups were involved in the development of the policy?
  - Who initiated discussion on the idea and why?
  - Who supported the idea?
  - Who opposed the idea and why?
  - Which groups had influence?
  - What were the bases of the group's interest?

(3) Development of policy:
- What procedures were followed in the development of the policy? Specifically, what role was played in the formation of the policy by the Committee on Broadcasting?
  - What were the critical incidents or events in the
development of the policy?

(4) Awareness of political influence:
    - what was the political climate surrounding the development of the policy?

(5) Awareness of media issues:
    - what perceptions were held as to the role of the media, particularly broadcasting?

INTERVIEWS

The Following people were interviewed:

Hon. R.O. Douglas, MP and former Minister of Broadcasting for the period of the study.

Hon. H.J. Walker, former Minister of Broadcasting and Opposition spokesman on broadcasting for the study period.

Mr M. Moore, MP

Mr Alan Martin, Director General, Television New Zealand

Mr Geoffrey Whitehead, former Director General of Radio New Zealand

Mr Des Monaghan, Head of Programmes, Television New Zealand.

Mr B. Parkinn, Head of programme purchasing, Television
New Zealand

Mr John Craig, Programme Supply Manager, Radio New Zealand

Mr Brian Jamieson, Chief Assistant to the Director-General, Television New Zealand.
APPENDIX D

Appointment of Committee to Advise the Minister of Broadcasting

1. The exercise of authority given to him by Cabinet pursuant to the Government's policy of creating a new system of control and operation of broadcasting (including television) in New Zealand under publicly owned but competitive channels, the Minister of Broadcasting hereby appoints

   Professor Kenneth Adam, c.b.e., of London;
   Professor Robert McDonald Chapman, of Auckland;
   Dr John Lochiel Robson, c.b.e., of Wellington; and
   Dorothea Frances Turner, of Wellington

   to be a Committee, of which Kenneth Adam shall be Chairman, to advise the Minister upon the said policy.

2. The Committee shall consider and report to the Minister upon the manner in which the said policy should be carried into effect, including the principles on which the publicly owned system should operate and the ways in which competition between channels can be encouraged, the co-ordination of the technical facilities of all channels, the administrative arrangements and other relevant matters, including any specific matters that may from time to time be referred to it by the Minister.

3. For the purposes aforesaid, the Committee is authorised and empowered to make any inquiry or investigation it may think fit in whatever manner it chooses.

4. The Committee is directed to prepare a White Paper and to prepare or have prepared a draft of the legislation that will be necessary to give effect to the policy as presented in the White Paper, and further to prepare and set out a detailed scheme of the practical steps necessary to set up the machinery to carry out the policy and ensure a smooth transference of the functions and operations of the present authorities to those to be constituted under the new legislation.

5. The Committee is directed to report to the Minister not later than 31 July 1973, or such later date as the Minister may specify by notice in writing to the Chairman, and in the meantime not to publish or otherwise disclose the contents or purport of its report or any information obtained by it during its deliberations.

Dated at Wellington this 30th day of March 1973.

R. O. DOUGLAS, Minister of Broadcasting.

ON PRINCIPLE

A1 What should be the main aims of broadcasting in New Zealand?

A2 How best can New Zealand broadcasting include the principles of competitive enterprise within a system of public ownership?

A3 The size, scope and composition of the boards of the operating corporations.

A4 The structure and scope of the central organisation concerned with the supervision of broadcasting standards and the provision of common services.

(a) The size, scope and composition of the board.

(b) Should the working corporations provide one director each for this board? Should the private operators be represented?

(c) What common services should be provided?

(d) How should the existing private warrant holders be regulated?

(e) What provision should be made for future non-commercial private warrant holders?

A5 What should be the relationship of the new boards to the Government? Specifically, should there be a Minister of Broadcasting once the new structure is in running order?

A6 Who should control The Listener, how should this be done, and should it be represented on the central board?
The place and financing of the present NZBC Symphony Orchestra, and the relationship of broadcasting in general to the arts.

The place of educational television in this structure. How is it to be paid for? Who is to design the programmes? Who is to make them? How and when are they to be transmitted?

Should the provisions of the Copyright Act 1962 apply to the programmes of any of the Corporations, or should their rights be enlarged or restricted?

How can the New Zealand content of programmes be encouraged, and how far should this be done?

How a substantial measure of complementary programming is to be secured?

What steps should be taken to avoid needless duplication in the coverage of news while still guaranteeing freedom in news presentation - specifically:

(a) How programmes or programme opportunities such as major sporting events can be competitively bid for, allocated or shared between the television corporations.

(b) Whether the provision of a news service should be the responsibility of the radio corporation or central body.

(c) In either circumstance, what should be the relationship of any New Zealand-wide news service to television news or current affairs programming.

The constitution, staffing dissemination and limits of the news service, including the sporting news service.

The desirability of establishing some form of overseas representation for news purposes.
B5 What policy should apply for the purchase of overseas television programmes to enable New Zealanders to see the best of these programmes without unnecessary increases in costs?

B6 How should programmes desired by both corporations be allocated between them?

B7 How to achieve the best balance between local origination of radio programmes, regional networking, four-centre networking, and New Zealand-wide networking.

ON PEOPLE

C1 How the status, promotion and salary structure should be determined for the different corporations.

C2 How best to protect the interests of present NZBC staff during the change-over, particularly in such matters as salary and superannuation.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

D1 How best to provide technical facilities for both radio and television services, having in mind the need to conserve the resources of technical skills, equipment and station facilities. This also applies to linking requirements as microwave stations have been established by both the Post Office and NZBC and these resources should not be duplicated unnecessarily. The shared use of these stations when established should also be taken into account.

D2 Examine and advise on -

(a) The most appropriate organisation to prescribe technical standards;

(b) The extent to which the television and sound radio broadcasting corporations should separately provide technical facilities for their own use;
(c) The extent to which they should rely on facilities provided by some other organisation;

(d) What organisation, either existing or to be set up, would be most suitable for providing technical facilities for the broadcasting corporations.

D3 In considering D2, the following matters should be taken into account:

(a) The need for adequate integration of technical with other aspects to secure desired standards in overall performance;

(b) The need for efficiency and economy in the provision of technical facilities;

(c) Personnel aspects.

ADMINISTRATION

E1 Whether the committee should lay down structural guidelines for the new corporations and, if so, what those guidelines should be.

E2 The names of the new corporations.

E3 In what form the corporations should report to Parliament.

E4 Whether there should be a Broadcasting Council in New Zealand and, if so, what its constitution and powers should be.

E5 How the regional programme advisory bodies should be selected and related to the radio and television corporations?

REGIONAL BALANCE

F1 How best to establish effective liaison between the corporations so that needless duplication in premises and staffing is avoided.

F2 Where the radio corporation should have its headquarters.
**FINANCES**

**G1** How the control and ownership of the NZBC's existing assets should be reallocated, including Avalon, under the new broadcasting system.

**G2** How licence fee revenue should be split between the three operating corporations and the central body.

**G3** How rates for central services should be fixed.

**G4** How charges for the news service should be fixed.

**G5** The determination and distribution of advertising opportunities between the two television channels.

**G6** Setting standards for and controlling advertising on public and private radio and on television.

**CHANGEOVER**

**H1** What steps should be taken to hasten the changeover to the new system with the least possible disruption and specifically:

- (a) How staff should be reallocated to achieve the dual aim of promotion on merit whilst safeguarding the rights of current NZBC staff to continued employment.

- (b) Who should be in charge of this reorganisation.
APPENDIX F

BROADCASTING BILL, AS REPORTED FROM THE BROADCASTING BILL COMMITTEE

CHANGES FROM INTRODUCTORY BILL

Clause 4. Terms of office of members of Council

Changed to 'any one or more of the first appointed members of the Council may be appointed for any term less than 3 years'.

--- Gives Minister more flexibility with his first appointments.

Clause 10. Remuneration and expenses of members of Council and Committees

New subsection (3) changing source of remuneration from "out of the funds of the Council" to "Consolidated Revenue Account"; thus putting an item on the Estimates, thereby allowing a debate in the House.

Clause 11. General functions of Council

(1) (c)

Clause changed to allow more flexibility in the Television Corporations' use of the news made available to them by the Council. - "to gather news and make it available to TV-1 and TV-2 for their use in the planning, production and presentation of news bulletins and related programmes, and for that purpose to receive news gathered by Radio New Zealand." (Suggested in submission by Messrs George Andrews and David Beatson, current affairs contract employees of NZBC).

(1) (cc)

New clause making it a function of the Council "to establish, extend and improve New Zealand sources of news in other countries", i.e. allowing for New Zealand news representatives overseas. (Suggested in submission by Messrs George Andrews and David Beatson).

(1) (j)

Addition of word public, thus limiting the Council's responsibility for representation of New Zealand's broadcasting interests at conferences, etc. to representation of the public corporations. This enables private broadcasting interests to represent themselves, if they so wish. (Suggested in submission by Federation of Independent Commercial Broadcasters).
New clause making it a function of the Council to establish a procedure for adjudicating upon any complaint from any person who believes himself to have been treated unjustly or unfairly in any programme broadcast.

Clause 12. Symphony Orchestra

(1A)

New clause stating that the Council shall organise and present concerts to be given by the Orchestra for the general public and make the services of the orchestra, or any section of it, available.

(Submission from Association of Ballet and Opera Trust Boards).

(2)

"Consultation with the State Services Commission", with regard to terms and conditions (salaries, allowances or otherwise) deleted in view of Orchestra's type of casual employment.

(5)

Clause rewritten to avoid confusion over delegation.

Clause 13. General powers of Council

(2) (c)

Clause widened to enable programme research.

(Submission from Churches' Education Commission).

(2) (k)

Clause extended to cover negotiations with organisations representing contract employees.

(Submission from Actors Equity, N.Z. Musicians Union and Public Service Association).

(2) (l)

Clause widened to allow Council to undertake training.

2 (11)

New clause giving Council power to combine with any organisation to promote and undertake training for persons engaged in or intending to engage in the arts or educational or other activities with which broadcasting is concerned.

(Submission from Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council).

(3)

Council given permissive power to make results of audience surveys available to other persons (Submission from Mr R. Kerridge).
Clause 14. Council may make rules

This clause made mandatory.

Clause 16. Use of Council's property for purposes of Corporations

Clause rewritten. Council given permissive power to make arrangements for its property to be used by any of the Corporations or by any person, or body of persons with whom any of the Corporations has arranged for the supply of programmes.

(Submission from Pacific Film Productions). See also new clause 51B.

Clause 21. Levy

(1) Drafting alteration.

Clause 27. Accounts

Alteration requested by Audit Department.

Clause 30. Officers and Employees of Council

(2) Struck out - accepted suggestion by P.S.A. that this and also Clause 54 (5) are unnecessary. This provision usually covered by insurance.

(3) Drafting alteration - conforms now with other clauses which refer to salary scales.

New Clause 30A. Delegation of powers of Council

Suggested by NZBC Engineering Association, who also wanted the Council to have the same powers as given to the Corporation in Clauses 53 and 55.

This clause could allow, for example, delegation of the publication of the N.Z. Listener direct to the Editor, rather than through the Secretary of the Council.

New Clause 41A. General functions of Corporations

This clause answers to some extent those submissions which wanted inclusion of "the public interest" in the functions and powers of the Corporations and Council.
Clause 44. Deputy Chairmen of Corporations

(2) Rewording to enable Deputy Chairman to resign.

Clause 47. Meeting of Corporations

Wording made more clear.

Clause 50

New subsection 3 providing for money payable under this section to be paid from the Consolidated Revenue Account, not from the funds of the Corporation as originally provided in Subsection 2. This enables an item to be placed on the Estimates.

Clause 51. Powers of Corporations

(2) (g) Original clause struck out and new clause added making audience research surveys carried out by the Corporations an extension to those carried out by the Council. The Corporations will not be able to compete with the Council with respect to audience research.

(2) (i) Addition after the word "or" in line 38, of the words "educational or".

(2) (j) Addition after the word "and" in line 44, of the words "educational and".
Both widened after submissions to the Select Committee.

New Clause 51A Use of Radio New Zealand's facilities for broadcasts by certain organisations

Allows Radio New Zealand to lease or hire its studios, facilities and equipment to any organisation desiring to engage in non-commercial radio broadcasts relating to education, religion or the arts. Every such contract or arrangement must be made with the consent in each case of the Council.

New Clause 51B. Use of Corporation's property

New clause giving the Corporations permissive power to make with any person such contracts or arrangements as it thinks fit for that person to have the possession or use, for any purpose which in its opinion will contribute to the purposes of broadcasting.

(Submission from Pacific Film Productions). See also Clause 16.
Clause 52

"Provide", in line 37, changed to "produce". Allows each Corporation to enter into contracts to have programmes produced. However, programme purchase will still be made by the Council, as set out in Clause 13 (2) (j).

Clause 54

(4) (b) Clause changed to provide for terms and conditions of service of contract employees to be determined by the Corporations, not the State Services Commission.

(5) Clause struck out - see note about Clause 30 (2).

(6) Insertion of words "employer-subsidised" after the word "other" in line 21 - clarifies type of superannuation scheme.

Clause 61. Accounts of Corporations

Alteration requested by Audit Department.

Clause 64. Temporary reconstitution of NZBC

(5) Sub-clause widened to allow appointment to the Council.

New sub-clause added to ensure that until terms and conditions of employment are determined under the Act (i.e. in Clause 54) officers or employees shall remain subject to the same terms and conditions of employment as previously applied to them.

(6) Drafting addition consequent upon widening of subsection (5).

Clause 67. Officers and employees of NZBC

New sub-clause (3) providing that the salary and allowances payable to a person transferred under subsection (2) shall not be less than those payable to him immediately before his transfer.

Clause 70. No network programmes

New sub-clause (2) permitting, with the prior approval in writing of the Council, the networking by private warrant holders of programmes covering any specified event of special significance and major public interest.

New sub-clause (3) defines the term "network".
Clause 74. Renewal of warrant

New sub-clause (4A). Further machinery clause.

New Clause 74A

New clause enabling the amendment of private radio warrants and providing the machinery to do so.

Clause 75. Transfer of warrant

(7) Further machinery clause.

Clause 80. Appeals

Further machinery clauses.

Clause 81. Broadcasts in cases of emergency

(1) Deletion of words "item or" to avoid any possible confusion over definition of words. (Item tends to refer to news item).

(2) Original clause struck out. New clause requiring the corporations to state that the announcements have been made on the direction of the Minister.

(N.B. This is the only clause which gives the Minister the power to direct the corporations).

Clause 82. Short-term broadcasting authorisations

(1) Extended to allow the Minister to grant an authorisation for a specified period not exceeding 12 months to an educational or scientific institution or organisation for the purposes of research or experimentation or for the purpose of training persons in broadcasting.

Clause 91. Superannuation service of officers and employees

New sub-clause (6) defining the term "controlling authority".

New Clause 91A

Providing for the appointment of employees to the Public Service for one year after the abolition of the NZBC and the NZBA, as if they were officers. This clause is similar to that passed earlier this year relating to hospital and education services.
New Clause 91B

(1) Provides that nothing in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act shall apply, thus reenacting present NZBC law.

(2) Under this new sub-clause, regulations may be made providing for the settlements of disputes in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of employment, and also providing that the decisions of this body can be binding on all parties affected by such decisions.

Clause 94. Taxation

New sub-clause 1A - reenacts present NZBC law making the Council and Corporations liable for the payment of land tax.
1. **Mr Bob. Kerridge** - Support for Bill

1.2 Accepted - change to Clause 13, subclause 3.

1.1. Not accepted.

1.3 Covered by 11 (1 A) 13 (1).

1.4 Changed word Clause 52 from "provide" to "produce".

2. **Mr Michael Maxwell** - Orchestra

Make provision for "a fully professional management".

Clause 12(2) provides that this can be done.

3. **Pacific Film Productions** - Mr John O'Shea

1. Clause 13, subclause (2) para. (j) - Not accepted. Corporation responsibility.

2. Clause 16, subclause (1) line (2-3) Partly accepted.

   See also amendment to clause 51, new clause 51 (B).

4. **Wellington Polytechnic**

   Clause 82 Extension to period of short term broadcasting authorisation.

   Agreed to for educational or scientific institution or organisation.

5. **Churches Education Commission**

   Made 11 recommendations - most of which were administrative rather than legislation matters.

   Clause 13 (c), however, was widened to cover research in programmes.

6. **N.Z. Radio and Television Journalists Society Senior Editorial Staff NZBC News Service**

   Clause 11 (1) (c). Reworded to provide for more flexibility in gathering, planning, production and presentation of news.
7. The Manaki Society

8. Mr Gordon Dryden

1. Suggested amendment Clause 11 (1) (c) – see 6 above.
2. Suggested change to terms of office of members of Council – Rejected.

9. Dr Bryan Trenwith

Wanted one channel free of advertising – Rejected

10. McNair Surveys NZ Ltd

Proposed amendments to Section 13 (2) (c) – met in part but substantially 51 (2) (g) rejected

11. Submissions on behalf of Film Sound Technicians, DN TV2

Expressed concern about position of Film Sound Technicians in Christchurch and Dunedin – also extension of contract services. Fears expressed groundless – uncertainty over future main problem.

12. Mr Frank Curzon-Hobson – Contract Television Producer, NZBC

13. Committee of Small Magazine Editors & Publishers Australasia

Specific clause concerning educational broadcasting. Matter provided for in general way.

14. The Pre-School Association (Inc.)

Wanted advisory committee on pre-school programmes. Administrative matter.

15. Mr D.J. Monaghan – Television Producers and Directors Assn.

Support.
16. B. McLaughlin - on behalf of group of NZBC programme-makers
Concern over employment - misunderstanding of family tree

17. New Zealand Electronics Institute Inc.

18. Telepress News

19. Messrs G.I. Andrews and D.C. Beatson
(1) News - accepted.
(2) 50% quota - not accepted but policy statement that this is aim.
(3) Rules - not accepted.

20. Mr L.G. Lukey - Educational Television
Accepted in part.

21. Independent Broadcasting Co. Ltd.
Required that provision be made to cover amendment to warrants - accepted.

22. Asia Pacific Research Unit
The aim of this submission is to invite Parliament:
(1) to consider the statement of 'first principles' in the proposed Broadcasting Act;
(2) to ensure the national interest is secured through adequate provision for news and analysis of New Zealand's international relations;
(3) to extend the contribution the Broadcasting Council and Parliament should make to educational television;
(4) to provide for adequate public access to material that has been broadcast and is desired by affected or interested citizens for reference;
(5) to make provision for the review and repeal of law and convention that inhibits free speech.
23. **Mr J.C. Dakin**

Made submissions on two particular features:

1. the absence of any statutory provision imposing upon the broadcasting corporations or the BCNZ a responsibility for producing and transmitting educational programmes

   ACCEPTED IN PART

2. the lack of provision in Clause 68 for the granting of a warrant to a private non-profit organisation such as an educational institution, permitting it to establish and operate a broadcasting station.

   ACCEPTED

24. **Mr H.W.J. Nixon**  Advertising-free channel

25. **Group of NZBC Transmission Officers.**

Summary of Recommendations

(a) Clarification of the role of the Council's chief executive in Clauses 9, 13 and 30, if necessary by the addition of a new clause.

(b) Amendment to Clause 11 with regard to the distribution and transmission of programmes.

(c) Amendment to Clause 13 covering the allocation and control of transmission frequencies; also provision for the Council to handle technical functions of Corporations where appropriate.

(d) Support for Clause 22, the borrowing powers of the Council.

(e) Minor amendments to Clauses 36, 39 and 41 covering the functions of the three Corporations.

26. **Mr R.E. Coury - News**

27. **Mr P.H. Rothschild**

28. **Film Cameramen - DN TV2**

Concern over one or two aspects of employment. Details of needs of Dunedin in next 5 years.

Film Camera Section.

Make provision for private low powered religious radio station in specific communities.

Accepted, New clause 51A - Use of Radio New Zealand facilities for broadcasts by certain organisations - may, with the consent of the Council, enter into contracts and lease or hire studios, etc. to organisations broadcasting non-commercial programmes relating to education, religion or the arts.

30. Television Presentation Directors' Society Inc.

1. Clause 13 (2) (k) - wanted consultation with organisations such as theirs - Not accepted as legislative matter.

2. Clause 67 (2) - wanted additional words "provided only that this office or position is directly associated with the officer's present position, whether or not the transfer involves a change of location" - Not accepted.

3. An independent news service is highly desirable.

Accepted, Clause 11 (1) (c) reworded to provide for more flexibility in gathering, planning, production and presentation of news.

31. NZBC Engineering Association

Clause 9 - amend to permit the Chief Executive of the Council the same access to Council meetings as the Directors-General of the Corporations.

Not accepted. Administrative matter

Clause 30 - amend to allow powers in Clauses 53 and 55 - partially accepted - New Clause 30A - delegation of powers of Council - to the Secretary or any other officer of the Council.

Clause 11 (1) (b) - amend to read "to distribute and transmit television and radio programmes from the studios of the Corporations and to develop, extend and improve these distribution and transmission services in the public interest". Not accepted - Clauses 39 and 41 - functions of Television Corporations cover this - "establish and operate a television service for the whole of New Zealand, and from time to time develop, extend and improve that service."

Wanted other changes centralising engineering and technical services in the Council - not accepted.
32. A.S. Harris

33. J.B. Elkind

Clause 11 (1) or elsewhere - insert paragraphs enabling co-operation with educational institutions, etc. by making such resources as original tapes, transcripts, etc. available on a hire basis for the purposes of teaching, research and scholarship - Not accepted.

34. Public Relations Institute of New Zealand.

Clause 11 (1) (c) - add words that will provide a statutory right for any member of the public to have access to printed transcripts of newscasts - Not accepted

35. N.Z. Theatre Federation

Clause 21 - extend power to include the right to levy private commercial radio and other stations of an amount to be paid to an organisation such as the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council for the encouragement of the performing arts. Not needed - power to levy is sufficient.

36. Association of Ballet and Opera Trust Boards

Spell out activities of the Symphony Orchestra

New Clause 12 (1A) - "The Council shall organise and present concerts to be given by the orchestra for the general public or any section of the general public; and may make the services of the orchestra or any section of it available to persons or bodies engaged in the performing arts, for the purposes of public performances."

37. Newlands Broadcasting Society

Clause 68 - be amended to permit private, non-profit-making, VHF/FM broadcasting - Not accepted - too expensive at this stage.

38. J.P. Carter

39. Federation of Independent Commercial Broadcasters (N.Z.) Ltd.

Clause 3 - consult with private stations before recommending appointment of 3 independent Council members by Governor-General - not accepted. Minister would accept nominations.

Clause 11 (j) - be reworded to make it clear that this power is to appoint representatives of the three corporations, and not the independent private radio stations. Accepted. Reworded to cover 'public' broadcasting interests.
Clause 13 (2) (c) - allow only commissioned audience surveys.
Not accepted - Corporations will be permitted to conduct their own audience surveys.

Clause 21 (1) - amend to require consultation of private stations before regulations are passed and specific levies imposed. Not accepted

Clause 36 - amend to require Radio N.Z. to obtain prior approval of Broadcasting Council before establishing a commercial radio station in an area where there is an established private radio station - Not accepted

Clause 70 - provide for networking in some instances, subject to the prior approval of the Broadcasting Council. Accepted. See Clause 70 (2) and (3).

Clause 76(1) - suggested change from 'shall' to 'may' - Not accepted.
A number of minor breaches could constitute a serious breach.

Clause 74 - sought provision enabling amendment of warrants. Accepted - see clause 74A

Churches' Committee on Broadcasting
Clause 8 - sought specific mention of Central Religious Advisory Committee. Not accepted. Acceptance in principle of Adam Report should cover this.

Actors Equity of N.Z.

(1) Legal recognition in Bill - Partially accepted. Name not spelt out. See Clause 13 (2) (k).

(2) Provision for arbitration for disputes. Accepted. See new Clause 91 B (2).

Announcing Staff of the NZBC
Sought to have entire announcing staff employed and controlled directly by Broadcasting Council. Not accepted as legislative matter.
New Zealand Public Service Association

(1) Clause similar to Section 17(8) of 1961 Act. Accepted. See new Clause 91B (1).

(2) Negotiation with Musicians Union and Actors Equity on fees for casually employed artists - Partially accepted - names not spelt out - see clause 13 (2) (k).

(3) Mandatory Disputes Authority with binding decisions. Partially Accepted - see new Clause 91B (2) - may make regulations providing for the settlement of disputes, and for the decisions of any body to be binding on all parties affected by such decisions.

(4) Staff representation on Appointment Committees - Not accepted as legislative matter. Matter for negotiation with new Corporations.

(5) Appointments Review Committee - Not legislative matter - to be negotiated with new Corporations.

(6) Clause 67 - want new subsection providing that employees transferring from the Council to one of the Corporations be assured of the same terms and conditions of employment, salary and allowances as they enjoyed as members of the Council - Accepted - See new Clause 67 (3) - applies to salary and allowances.

(7) Amend legislation to allow for the financial stability of the Broadcasting organisations to be guaranteed by the Government - Not accepted.

(8) Clause 12 - delete requirement to consult with the State Services Commission. Accepted. See Clause 12(2).

(9) Clause 13 - suggest Council undertake training programmes if there is to be any unity of standards - Partially accepted. See new clause 13(2) (11).

(10) Clause 30 - suggest Council have power to delegate - Accepted - see new clause 30A

(11) Clause 30(2) - suggest this and clause 54 (5) are unnecessary. Accepted - have been deleted.

(12) Clause 91 - does not indicate who is to be the controlling authority. Accepted - see new clause 91 (6)
44. **Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council**

(1) **Short Title** - add "in the public interest". Not accepted

(2) **Clause 2** - interpretation of term 'broadcasting' - tends to cover only that part of broadcasting which occurs after a programme has been prepared.
Not accepted - definition virtually the same as in 1961 and 1968 Acts.

(3) **Clause 11 (1) (a)** - add "in the public interest".
Not accepted

(4) **Clause 11 (1) (j)** - amend to read "to take part in... and the activities with which broadcasting is concerned...." 
Not accepted, although clause amended to cover representation of New Zealand's public broadcasting interests.

(5) **Clause 12** - amend to read...."the Council shall in the public interest take over and continue the control and administration...." 
Not accepted in that form. However, see new Clause 12 (IA) - Council shall organise and present concerts, etc.

(6) **Clause 92** - recommends that whole of Orchestra's deficit be borne by the taxpayer.
Not accepted - misinterpretation of clause.

(7) **Clause 13 (2)(1)** - extend to cover arts and educational and other activities with which broadcasting is concerned.
Accepted - see new Clause 13(2) (11).

(8) **Clause 13 (2)(m)** - exclude the word 'broadcasting'.
Not accepted.

(9) **Clause 13(2)(o)** - new clause ensuring that the facilities and equipment of broadcasting are used in such a manner as may be thought fit for the purpose of promoting and assisting in the development and carrying on of these arts, educational and cultural pursuits which are usually included in the purpose of broadcasting - Partially accepted - covered by clause 51(2)(j). See also new clause 16 and Clause 51B.
(10) Clause 14 - change may to shall. Accepted

(11) Clause 14(1)(d) - add "immediately" after 'providing' and add (b) 'That all advertising programmes shall have 100% New Zealand content. Not accepted - present NZ.B.A. rules will apply until new rules are made.

(12) Clause 14 - Add new subclause (i) providing that private broadcasting stations participate in the arts and education to a degree at least equivalent to that of the television stations and Radio New Zealand. Not accepted.

(13) Clauses 39 and 41 - add "in the public interest". Not accepted.

(14) Clause 51(2)(l) - widen to cover and arts and activities with which broadcasting is concerned. Not accepted.

(15) Clause 51(2)(j) - delete words "that are usually included in the purpose of broadcasting", and reword last phrase "educational, artistic and cultural pursuits". Partially accepted - added "educational".

(16) Clause 51(2)(k) - widen to cover "educational and other services". Not accepted.

(17) Clause 51(2)(l) - delete words "consider of benefit to the service carried on by the Corporation". - Not accepted

(18) Clause 51(2)(m) - Delete word "broadcasting". Not accepted

N.B. New clause 41A - goes some way to meet Arts Council requirements.

45. National Council of Women of New Zealand

Clause 3 - Suggests Appointing Committee along lines of that set up to make appointments to the Consumer Council. Not accepted

Clause 11 - suggests more specific guidelines as to:
(1) proportion of time allowed for advertisements,
(2) proportion of time allotted to serious and informative features,
(3) proportion of time for educational programmes.
(4) proportion of time for programmes for specific groups of people.

Not accepted - will be done by rules

Clause 48 - suggests women be well represented on Advisory Committees.

Clause 51 (I)(j) include educational. Accepted

46. C.G. Costello

Opposed abolition of New Zealand Broadcasting Authority. Supported abolition of Minister of Broadcasting.

47. Friends of the NZBC Symphony Orchestra

Submit that orchestra must be assured of essential funds during periods of escalating costs, and that a commitment from the Consolidated fund must be of such a character as to leave no doubts over the future of the orchestra.

Answered by Section 92 (2) (a)

48. Mrs J. Duncan -

49. President, N.Z. Electronics Institute - one central body responsible for engineering work of both television and radio.

Not accepted

50. P.S.A. Waikato Broadcasting Sub-group

Requests clarification of intent as to Hamilton's position in the television future of New Zealand.

Not accepted as legislative matter.

51. New Zealand Musicians Industrial Union of Workers

Recognition of their union.

Partially accepted. See new Clause 13(2)(h).

52. Dominion Association of the Blind

Suggests various programme improvements for radio. Describes receivers used overseas which are capable of only receiving television sound, and which are not equipped with a picture tube. Requests that such a receiver be not subject to a television licence.

Not accepted, as legislative matter.
53. **New Zealand Law Society**

Clause 80 (5) - power of review should be completely unfettered.

*Not accepted* - Law Draftsman's memo. indicates that present law is being re-enacted and that full hearings are allowed for at all stages.

54. **Nga Tamatoa**

Recommend that 1 ZM be converted to a Maori radio station, and that a repeater be built at Rotorua. Polynesian station in Legislation and White Paper

55. **New Zealand Radio DX League**

"Urge the Select Committee to endorse the proposals of the Adam Committee regarding the future of New Zealand's radio voice to the world".

*Not accepted* as legislative.

Ask that consideration be given to the technique of synchronisation of transmitters already established throughout Europe and now being introduced in Australia.

*Not accepted* as legislative.

56. **Mrs D. Matthews**

57. **Mrs E.J. Doherty**

58. **C.M. Paul**

Urged more Maori programmes.

*Not accepted* as legislative.

59. **Mr H. Pomana**

Continuation of programme - Te Reo O Te Maori.

60. **Mr S. Leonard-Taylor**