STOIC INFLUENCE ON
SELECTED SATIRES OF HORACE

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Thanks to my wife and to Professor D.A. Kidd

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The major portion of the thesis is concerned to examine the interplay between the philosophy of the Stoa and Horace's poetic skills in the composition of that poet's Satires. It is shown that Horace had an intricate knowledge of the terminology of Stoic ethics in particular, and that this knowledge was exploited as a means to imposing a more than immediately apparent formal structure on certain of these conversational pieces. Examples of this type of exploitation in poems which do not have an overall Stoic bias may be seen in Chapters One and Two, while Chapter Three is an in-depth study of the specifically Stoic Satires 2.3.

A problem which naturally arises in a study of this kind is that of Horace's attitude to the validity of Stoic ethics and their proponents at Rome. This question is discussed in full in Chapter Three on Satires 2.3 and in Chapter Four on Satires 2.7. However, the discussion here necessarily embraces the attitude of Horace to other rival schools and to ethical "systems" based on no formal school, notably that of Ofellus in Satires 2.2, while the conclusion is ultimately reached that Horace's own moderate and truly eclectic views are to be found stated in his most sympathetic satire, namely Satires 2.6. This suggestion is discussed in the final chapter. In the critical analyses of the various selected poems the discussion ranges freely over other topics and influences, especially the influence of Roman Comedy on Horace's Satires and, to a lesser extent, the influence of Plato and many other authors not necessarily recognised as sources.
It is hoped that the thesis makes some material contribution to the more accurate placing of Horace's Satires in their total literary context, since that should embrace the philosophical content which Horace expected his contemporaries to recognise and enjoy.
STOIC INFLUENCE ON SELECTED SATIRES OF HORACE

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to examine in some detail the effects of Stoicism upon the form and content of a group of Horatian satires, namely Satires 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 2.2; 2.3; 2.6 and 2.7. What these particular poems have in common is a certain moral didacticism which is often expressed in the language of philosophical commonplace and, of course, enlivened by Horace's ready and often ironical wit. In the composition of these poems Horace draws on an intimate knowledge of Greek philosophy of all periods, from that of the pre-Socratics to that of the Stoics and Epicureans, and an equally intimate awareness of Italian and Roman moral prejudices, derived in part, no doubt, from that immensely influential father and also from his own contact with the Italian class of whom Ofellus in Satires 2.2 is a representative. For this reason the thesis cannot properly be limited to the influence of the Stoics on Horace and his work, nor to Horace's own exploitation of Stoic ideas for his own ethical and literary ends. Where necessary or relevant the influence of Plato and others, especially Epicureans, as in the discussion of Satires 2.6, has been discussed as well, while in Satires 2.2 and the discussion on that poem close attention has been paid to the Italian prejudices voiced by Ofellus. A concomitant of studying those poems in which Horace presents a dialogue or a miniature comic drama, as in Satires 2.7, has been the necessity to examine Horace's attitude to the characters in whose mouths much of the moralising has been placed. Such discussions take place in the
context of the thesis whenever relevant, especially at the close of the discussion of Satires 2.3. It may be seen, therefore, from these preliminary comments that the following chapters on selected Horation satires do occasionally transgress the boundaries of exposition which are suggested by the title. However, I would stress at this early stage that one of the major, if more nebulous, intentions of the thesis is to demonstrate the artificiality of the barriers, which have not so much been erected between the fields of literary criticism and the study of philosophy and its effects, but have been allowed to grow, as it were, by default.

My more particular aim is to show that a detailed, if not necessarily philosophically sophisticated, knowledge of the ethics of the Stoa and of Stoic terminology in general can, on occasion, illuminate vexed problems of structure and of interpretation. This will be shown to be true both of those poems which deal quite specifically with Stoic themes, such as Satires 2.3 and 2.7, and also of poems, the philosophical significance of which is more general, more commonplace. Examples of this type are Satires 1.1 and 2.2. A knowledge of Stoic terminology is of use in the diagnosis of poetical structure, since Horace employs words with certain or possible Stoic connotations to form, or to help to form, the skeletal substructure of the poem. By repeating such key words at crucial structural points throughout the poem, or by employing words of associated, but slightly different, meaning, as for example culpa and vitium in Satires 2.2, Horace both ensures that structural and thematic unity are maintained.

Form and content are as inextricably linked in Horace's Satires as they are in the other masterworks of antiquity and, although one cannot overemphasise the value of knowledge of the
Stoa as a tool to substantiate theories regarding the structure of these poems, nevertheless it is the content of Horace's moral and didactic poems which is of major importance. One should add that the content of Satires 2.3 depends to a certain extent upon Horace's desire to accommodate within the indigenous satiric genre a poetical treatment of the essentially Hellenistic diatribes of the Stoics. What is perhaps of somewhat greater interest is the need to assess by detailed analysis the influence of Stoic ethics upon the moral advice which it is part of Horace's overall intention in the Satires to offer to his readers. Of equal importance is the need to assess the influence of Horace's own individual beliefs and also of his literary designs upon his specific treatment of Stoic topics and persons in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. In fact the tension, which becomes evident between Stoic influence on Horace and Horatian influence upon Stoic thought, emerges as one of the formative elements in the composition of these poems, mirroring that larger and equally fruitful tension between things Greek and things Roman, the influence of which was felt in fields as disparate as poetic and architectural endeavour. It will become apparent from what follows that Horace is himself keenly aware of this tension, which is indeed productive of much of the wit that enlivens Satires 2.2, and Horace's ironical attack upon the rabid nationalism of Ofellus. For it is not only the Stoics who come under fire because of their extremism, their means of expression and their belief in the exclusive rectitude of their own ideas. Horace demonstrates, perhaps implies is a more accurate term, that both parties, Greeks and Romans have much in common and much of value to offer in the search for an ars vivendi in the troubled years that followed the civil wars. What emerges is Horace's belief that the new complexity of existence,
especially of the educated Roman, demands a critical eclecticism in ethics. Only by matching consistently one's behaviour with the demands of the various environments in which it has become necessary to operate can one maintain any kind of happiness or sanity. Horace would be the first to admit that some environments and, accordingly, some life styles are more desirable per se than others, as, in fact, he admits in Satires 2.6. However, the Epicurean case of a life of rustic withdrawal is no longer permanently possible; the more urgent demands of urban life must also be met. Here the ethics of the Stoa and the reasoning which lay behind them could provide, if treated with discrimination born of common sense, an intellectual basis for the traditional values of Roman society with which they were in tune. The Stoic view also was able to supplement those Roman values which themselves were essentially the values of a rustic society adapted to service in the city. That the Roman values were born of a rustic background is, I think, made clear from the comments of Ofellus in Satires 2.2, while Virgil's comments in the Georgics 1.121-128, although of more universal application, would also tend to substantiate this view. What is certain is that the ethics of the Stoics were formulated to meet the needs of people whose normal habitat was the city state. What is not so certain is that these Stoic ethical values were as much in tune with Roman or Italian ideals as has so often been stressed.

My initial concern, therefore, will be to attempt to document this similarity using the comedies of Plautus as my Roman source. My choice of Plautus is governed by several factors: not only was he active at a crucial period during the insemination of the Roman intellect by the Greek genius, but he also was writing for an audience which was not exclusively
aristocratic. His writings are not likely, therefore, to be politically or philosophically tendentious. We also know that Horace was influenced by comic authors, and not only the Greek authors listed at the beginning of *Satires* 1.4, but also by Plautus and Terence. This point will be developed further in the context of the discussion of *Satires* 2.7.

In one sense, therefore, Plautus provides a useful starting point for a discussion of the influence of the Stoic philosophy upon Horace and of the relationship also between traditional Roman views and the ethics of the Stoics, since that relationship must figure largely in any discussion of the moral and didactic element in the *Satires* of Horace. Plautus is an ideal source: he is a writer with no political, philosophical or moral axe to grind. His work is not aimed exclusively at the aristocracy, but appealed to and reflected the attitudes of all strata of society. It is sad that his plays have been neglected as evidence for the history of ideas, although Earl's work on the political implications of Plautine vocabulary is a valuable exception.¹ The fact that Plautus worked from Greek originals naturally presents some problems; how much of the moral comment is Greek, for example, and how much Roman?

It would be as well initially to attempt to clarify in our minds what is meant by the traditional Roman moral values. Terms such as *severitas, gravitas, fides* and, of course, *pietas* come to mind; the reverse side of the coin is represented by such words as *desidia* or *dedecus*. A little further thought usually brings to the surface some familiar, not to say threadbare, quotations: one thinks of for example:

However, we are not much wiser about the real nature of those mores antiqui mentioned with such emphasis by Ennius and, accordingly, any credence which we give to the idea that in Stoicism Horace found a ready and rational supplement, or complement, to Italian ethical values is necessarily uncritical in the extreme. We can learn something more specific from Ennius. However, we must bear in mind that Ennius, especially in the Annales, is concerned with the glorification of Rome. He was not an objective reporter.

On the other hand, Ennius was writing at that same crucial stage in the development of European thought, roughly speaking, as was Plautus. Also important is the fact that Ennius was for some time connected with Cato the Elder who, despite his studied opposition to Hellenic influence in Rome, was posthumously described by Cicero as perfectus mea sententia Stoicus. Ennius, then, was both conversant with the infiltrating Hellenic culture and was also intensely aware of the archetypal Roman virtues supposedly exemplified by the person of Cato. A pertinent question to put at this point is whether Ennius was, in fact, the "mythmaker", and so responsible for the developing belief that Roman ethics were closely paralleled by Stoic ethical doctrine. It is more likely that Ennius had a formative influence on the crystallisation of these Roman ideals, but that they pre-

2 A fragment from the Annales of Ennius quoted by Cic. Rep. 5.1.
3 Virgil, Aeneid 6.851.
4 Horace, Odes 3.2.13.
5 Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 2.
existed the time of his literary output. If this is so, then
we may reasonably expect to find traces of the traditional Roman
ethic in the comedies of Plautus. As will be seen, it is possible
to deduce from the fragments of Ennius' work which are extant
exactly what he meant by mores antiqui. We shall see later that
they parallel, to a certain extent, the ideology expressed by
Ofellus in Horace, Satires 2.2. It is, however, impossible to
ascertain whether any particular Greek doctrine influenced Ennius'
work, since there does not seem to be an adherence to any particular
school, despite Warmington's comment that "Ennius had shown himself
something of an Epicurean."6 The authority for this seems not
only to have been the rumour that he was "of a convivial nature."7
Neither does the alleged self-portrait of Ennius, quoted by
Aulus Gellius at Noctes Atticae 12.4.4, suggest any particular
philosophical attachment, so much as a sound respect for tradition
tempered by an awareness of the value of some of the new
influences. In this respect he sounds like a prototype of Horace.

For purposes of studying the fragments I divide them into
two categories: there are those which deal with martial virtues
and those which illustrate the virtues of peace.

MARTIAL VIRTUE

Apart from being conventionally skilled in the use of
his weapons8 and courageous in the face of his enemy,9 the Roman
must be totally dedicated to the defence of the state before the salvation of which all else pales into insignificance. All else includes not only one's own life, but also that of one's relatives and friends. A famous example of such devotion is Decimus Mus who, according to Ennius, devoted himself to the gods of the underworld with the following words:

\[
\text{divi hoc audite parumper:}
\]
\[
\text{ut pro Romano populo prognariter armis}
\]
\[
\text{certando prudens animam de corpore mitto.}^{10}
\]

This sort of attitude prompts many expressions of patriotic enthusiasm from Ennius: another hero is commemorated in a famous line:

\[
\text{unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.}
\]
\[
\text{noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem;}
\]
\[
\text{ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret}^{11}
\]

The hero in question here, of course, is Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, whose praises were subsequently sung by Cicero, Polybius, Virgil, Livy, Ovid, Suetonius and Silius Italicus - among others.\(^{12}\) It is clear that in this case Ennius stands at the beginning of a literary tradition and that his verses give literary expression to an idea, the significance of military success, which was to appeal to subsequent generations of Romans.

The passages which have been cited or quoted so far are all drawn from the Annales. Certain passages which survive from the tragedies of Ennius also throw light on the nature of military virtue. However, the tragedies pose a problem which is similar to that posed by the use of Plautus' plays as evidence for Roman

12 Warmington gives a full list of these references in his subscript to this passage at R.O.L. 1, p.132.
ethical beliefs. It is necessary to come to some conclusion concerning the extent to which the sentiments expressed by Ennius were indebted to his Greek originals. I would suggest that the plays of Ennius, and also of Plautus, were first selected and then adapted with close attention paid to the sensibilities of the Roman audience.

For example, in the Achilles of Ennius the embassy to the reluctant hero gives the poet the opportunity to commend patriotic virtue and duty. The language and the emphasis are clearly suited to a Roman audience.

The theme of the total sacrifice of things held dear for the sake of the state occurs in the Erechtheus, where the sacrifice of the hero's children is in keeping with the Roman belief in the supreme claim of the state. Ennius employs the same idea, or similar, of children done to death in war in the Telamon:

\[
\text{ego cum genui morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli:} \\
\text{praeterea ad Troiam cum misi ob defendendam Graeciam,} \\
\text{scibam me in mortiferum bellum non in epulos mittere.}
\]

Here we see the ultimate subservience to the state. Children are produced as potential troops.

In conclusion to this discussion of martial virtue one should perhaps add that the beginnings of the idea of clemency to the defeated are to be found in a speech put into the mouth of Pyrrhus of Epirus. There may be a suggestion that the more humanitarian concepts of the Stoics on the nature of man and universal brotherhood are an influence on Pyrrhus' thinking, although the calculated clemency of Odysseus in the Ajax of

13 W. Trag. 6.
14 W. Trag. 319-22.
Sophocles is perhaps a more apposite parallel.

PEACEFUL VIRTUE

We know that in the time of Augustus and of the "restoration of the republic" the propagandists extolled the virtue of meticulously fulfilling one's duty to the gods, the state and to the family: this concept of pietas can be traced back to the time of Ennius and beyond. For in that dream in which Ennius records he was spurred on by Homer to produce the Annales the shade of Homer appealed to Ennius' sense of patriotic duty with the words, o pietas animi. Ennius' means of repaying the debt he owed to his city was singing its praises in poetry. Much later Horace, as is made clear in Satires 2.6 repays his debt to his patron Maecenas by service in the city and the composition of poems. At the beginning of his epic Ennius discusses the origins of the Roman race and, in describing the founding fathers, he stresses their pietas. For this was the particular virtue of Anchises, "Assaracu natus Capys optimus isque pium ex se Anchisen generat." The essence of pietas is that the relationship between the individual and the gods should be without blemish. If the leaders or, better still, the founders of a state are in this position, so much the better for that state. Filial obedience and responsibility is another aspect of pietas which is illustrated by a surviving fragment. Although strictly a matter of private ethics, obedience to one's parents is essential to the health of the community, so essential that it is perhaps misguided to attempt to distinguish between private and public ethics at Rome.

15 W. Ann. 6.
16 W. Ann. 16-17.
17 W. Ann. 22-3.
For the family was considered the nucleus of the state and obedience and loyalty within that nucleus was an ideal safeguard for the future strength and security of the state. In the context of social and family relationships Ennius also praises the concepts of *fides*, *amicitia* and *sapientia*, also the rule of law:

```
pellit tur e medio sapientia, vi geritur res, spernitur orator bonus, horridus miles amatur; haud doctis dictis certantes, sed maledictis miscent inter se sese inimicitiam agitantes; non ex iure manum consortum, sed magis ferro rem repetunt regnumque petunt, vadunt solida vi.21
```

Two further fragments of Ennius, one quoted with warm approval by Cicero at *De Oratore* 1.45.199, sum up the whole concept of peaceful virtue as it was understood by this poet:

```
unde sibi populi et reges consilium expetunt suarum rerum incerti quos ego ope mea ex incertis certos compotesque consili dimitto, ut ne res temere tractent turbidas.22
```

Here an old man is the source of wisdom for his state after a lifetime of service in which presumably his wisdom has been exercised for the greater practical good of his people. For "qui ipse si sapiens prodesse non quit nequiquam sapit", while Cicero records Ennius' praise of the wisdom of Aelius Sextus at *De Republica* 1.18.30, "non quod ea quaerebat quae numquam inveniret, sed quod ea respondebat quae eos qui quaesissent et cura et negotio solverent."24

19 W. Trag. 216.
21 Ibid.
22 W. Trag. 150-53.
23 W. Trag. 269-70.
24 W. Ann. 326.
To sum up the Ennian version of civic virtue: it embraced a) duty to the gods through the state religion and the completion of all necessary rituals in respect of the state religion, b) duty to the state with an attendant respect for the rule of law and c) the duty of any gifted individual to make his skill available for the benefit of the state. We shall see in the discussion of Horace, *Satires* 2.6 that this ideal of duty was not entirely compatible with the personal aspirations of the poet.

It is more difficult to assess how Ennius conceived of the way in which a Roman should organise his private or family life. The necessity for filial obedience and paternal responsibility has already been mentioned. There are also attacks on the shamelessness of contemporary womanhood which no doubt reflect the influence of Cato Maior, as do the attacks on the moral laxity of the Greeks.

It can, therefore, be said with some justification that Ennius, writing as he did close to the contact period between Greek and Italian culture, was largely responsible for initiating the literary tradition of expounding the Roman moral ideals. However, it may be suspected that Ennius' sympathies lie too nearly with the aristocracy for his work to be a valid source of information regarding the true feelings of tota Italia on these topics. Such an author as Ennius may be suspected of originating even, and certainly propagating a political and moral ideal suited to the life-style of his patron. With Plautus the case is different. Writing before Rome was flooded with Greek philosophical ideals, if Plautus seems to lay stress on a particular moral

25 See Malcovati, *O.R.F.* I, p.14 for comment on the authenticity of the Catonic speeches in Livy against, e.g. the extravagance of women, esp. the speech *Pro Lege Oppia* at Livy, 34.1.
concept in one of his comedies, then that would be because it appealed to existing Roman ideas rather than because it seemed good to him to introduce alien ideas. Furthermore, Plautus was hardly a member of the "establishment" and, although it is dangerous to underestimate the general level of intelligence of his audience, one can nevertheless assume that his audience would not have accepted blatantly propagandist sentiments aimed at securing the position of the senatorial class. Any intimations which we may receive from the plays of Plautus about Roman moral standards must, therefore, be considered valuable, especially if our further aim is to consider those moral standards as they are reflected in another genre which has relatively humble pretensions, namely satire and particularly the Satires of Horace. It must never be forgotten that the chief aim of Plautus was to amuse his audience. As a result solemn sentiments in farcical settings abound. One must always take care in interpreting what Plautus appears to be saying, take care to see what comic effect, if any, is intended and what sort of comic effect it is. Also, if it can ever be established that Plautus is speaking in all seriousness, which is as difficult a task as it is in dealing with Horace's Satires, because of the intervening mask of the comic character or medium, then what he is saying in this manner immediately becomes more striking by reason of the contrast with the farce with which it is surrounded. After discussing various passages drawn from the comedies of Plautus, I will briefly compare my findings based upon those passages with the findings derived from the study of Ennius. We will then see that, apparently, the values hallowed

in Roman literature by Ennius, and such dignified followers as Virgil, Livy and Horace, in the Odes especially, but also in Satires 2.2, were in reality firmly founded on genuine Roman and Italian preoccupations. It can then be shown that these preoccupations parallel, to a certain extent, the ethical doctrines of the Stoics as they were known, for example, to Horace at the time he was composing the Satires.

MILITARY VIRTUE IN PLAUTUS

In the Amphitruo Sosia, the slave of Amphitruo, rehearses the tale of his master's valour as commander-in-chief of the Theban forces, the tale with which he intends to delight Alcmena, his master's wife. In a long speech at vv.186-247 and at vv. 250-283 the slave describes Amphitruo as a paragon of military virtue, skilled with arms, brave and possessed of admirable tactical acumen. Amphitruo had cut down the enemy king in person and also knew the precise moment at which to throw his cavalry into the battle. Sosia also admires the enemy for their devotion to duty, even in the face of death. All of this could come from the Annales of Ennius; the traits deemed worthy of praise by both authors are identical, although the effect of Sosia's speech is ultimately comic, since he declares that the only reason he knew that the battle lasted all day was the fact that he missed his lunch.

Ironically it was Amphitruo's devotion to duty that gave Jupiter the opportunity to seduce Alcmena; for Jupiter takes advantage of Amphitruo's genuine concern for his troops to continue his liaison with Alcmena, after Amphitruo has returned to Thebes. Plautus exploits the irony of this situation to the full by making Jupiter declare, as he leaves Alcmena, that he must return to his
legions before he is missed. He stole away in the night and:

\begin{align*}
nunc ne legio persentiscat clam illuc redeundum \\
est mihi \\
ne me uxorem praevortisse dicant prae re publica. \footnote{Amphitruo, 527-528.}
\end{align*}

The Roman audience would fully have appreciated the humour of the situation, being aware of a general's proper duty to his men and to the state.

There is some debate as to the exact tone of the famous soliloquy which is put into the mouth of Alcmena at vv.633-653. Sedgwick is in no doubt:

Whenever Alcmena appears, Plautus forgets his clowning and the tone changes to something not unworthy of tragedy, a high seriousness which would befit a Roman matron. Plautus makes free with the gods and the general, but is overawed by the ideal wife and mother. \footnote{W.B. Sedgwick, Plautus, Amphitruo (Manchester, 1960), p.103.}

One should, however, consider the effect of the setting upon the jewel, as it were: Horace, who learned a good deal of his comic or ironical technique from Plautus, is adept at undercutting the value of a statement by surrounding it with expressions, which are clearly humorous, or by placing them in the mouth of a character, who is himself ludicrous. This is the technique which he employs against the Stoics in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. It seems to me that, in this passage from the Amphitruo, we have a perfect prototype of this Horatian technique. Alcmena's expressions of virtue are spoken immediately after she has been taken advantage of by Jupiter and immediately before she is accused by her husband of adultery. Her words, therefore, "virtus omnia in sese habet, omnia adsunt bona quem penest virtus,"\footnote{Amphitruo, 653-654.} can only be met with
laughter, although an element in that response will be the fact that Plautus' humour is being consciously iconoclastic. Plautus exploits the conditioned reflexes of his audience towards military valour and expertise by making jokes at the expense of the concept on other occasions. The character of the braggart soldier is perhaps the logical culmination of this type of Plautine humour, especially in the characterisation of Pyrgopolynices in the Miles Gloriosus: such parody of military valour would have lacked a certain amount of point were it not that such qualities were lionised, such braggadocio over military achievement common. Finally, although it may be true that the miles gloriosus of New Comedy was a product of the incessant struggles between the successors of Alexander, the type would be common enough in Rome - as a result of the Punic War.

In summing up this section, therefore, we may say that the plays of Plautus confirm that a good deal of importance was attributed to military prowess by his audience. The very nature of that military virtue is identical with that praised in the works of Ennius. If the objection is made that the Greek originals of the Plautine plays were parodying outmoded or "Spartan" military ideals at a time when the mercenary was the backbone of the Hellenistic armies, one could answer that the "received" military virtue of Rome was rather "Spartan" and based on a similar discipline. This is later made clear by Horace, through Ofellus, at Satires 2.2.10-13.

30 Take as examples i) the joke at Epidicus 29-32, where Epidicus' horror that Stratippocolès abandoned his arms in the face of the enemy reflects a genuine attitude, and ii) the dissimulation of Curculio at Curc. 394-397.
PEACEFUL VIRTUE IN PLAUTUS

There is relatively little evidence in the comedies of Plautus on what was discussed in the context of Ennius' work under the heading of civic or political virtue. Plautus is chiefly concerned with the ethics of inter-personal relationships. However, certain passages are helpful.

For example, the daughter of Sagaristo in the Persa impresses the pimp Dordalus with her good sense; she declares that citizens should be trusty and loyal, thrifty and generous, open and truthful and moderate. It almost sounds as if Plautus is parodying the patter of politicians, or such ethical treatises as were produced to propagate the doctrines of the Hellenistic schools. Horace attacks such diatribes in a similar fashion in Satires 2.3. Such a parody would certainly be effective coming from the mouth of a young woman about to be sold as a meretrix. In fact, regarding civic duty, there is more sarcasm and satire than direct comment, as is perhaps natural in comedy and also proper when one traces the origins of the genre back to Aristophanes. We have yet another reason why the study of Plautus is also relevant to the study of Horace in the Satires. On the other hand, the occasional senex such as Hegio in the more serious Captivi declares that nothing is so sweet as serving the public good. His sentiments anticipate those of Ennius recorded above. It is made clear that the expenses incurred in serving the public good are more than compensated by the good report and reputation produced by such action. The impulse to serve the state in peacetime, as well as in time of war, is selfish rather than selfless.

31 Persa, 554-560.
32 Captivi, 498-501.
33 See above p.xi.
One should compare the reasons why good men should be compelled to govern as given by Plato in the *Republic*. The fear of being subjected to the government of men worse than themselves is their prime impulse to political action.\(^3\) Plautus, however, declares that these pillars of society are not always what they seem to be. Cleostrata, wronged by her husband Lysidamus in the *Casina*, fulminates against her husband's friend Alcesimus, who, "senati columna" and "praesidium popli"\(^3\) though he may appear to be, has abetted Lysidamus in an adultery. There is a similar irony in the *Menaechmi*, where Peniculus complains that politics are a waste of time for "honest" men like himself.\(^3\) Just as Plautus was able to exploit apparently cherished beliefs regarding military excellence for humorous effect, so civic duty is a source of similar amusement.

There is more emphasis, however, in the Plautine comedies on the duties and ties of loyalty as they operate on the level of the family. A scene from the *Miles Gloriosus*\(^3\) shows also that Plautus was well aware of the close relationship in kind between the virtues which supported the family and those, the same only on a larger scale, which sustain the state. It is interesting that one of the ways in which Augustus intended to restore the republic and its virtues was to reward those individuals whose duty to the state was fulfilled through their duty to a family and the production of children. This, of course, was one of the duties which both Horace and Virgil were unwilling to fulfil. However that may be, the characters involved in the scene

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34 Plato, *Republic* 347.
35 *Casina*, 534-536.
36 *Menaechmi*, 446-459.
37 *Miles Gloriosus*, 596-812.
from the *Miles Gloriosus* are Pleusicles, the *adulescens*, and Periplectomenos, a good-natured, if rather self-satisfied, *senex*, who helps Pleusicles to fool his rival, the braggart soldier Pyrgopolynices. Palaestrio, the slave, is present to give comic asides. For example, when Pleusicles, a thoughtful and considerate young man, expresses concern that he may be causing embarrassment to Periplectomenos or inconvenience, as he seeks his heart's desire, Palaestrio is shocked.\(^{38}\) That a lover should think of anyone but himself is a contradiction of the comic convention which the slave, as an example of another comic convention, can scarcely endure. The conventions are reversed again, to good humorous effect, a little later in the scene.\(^{39}\) It is here that we learn something about received moral standards, if in a rather surprising manner. So far as Periplectomenos is concerned, seemliness is the criterion of the behaviour of a gentleman and this is a statement which would have held true either in Rome or Athens. However, the moral positions of the two men are diametrically opposed when they come to discuss the advantages, disadvantages and duties of marriage. Periplectomenos, never married, values his liberty to enjoy himself. Pleusicles, supported by Palaestrio, insists that marriage and the getting of children are pleasures and simultaneously duties. Compare the conflicting attitudes of the two men:

Pl. at illa laus est, magno in genere et in divitiis maxumis
liberos hominem educare, generi monumentum et sibi.
Pe. quando habeo multos cognatos, quid opus sit mihi liberis?\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) *Miles Gloriosus*, 616-623.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 644ff.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 703-705.
and also:

Pee pol si habuisse, satis cepisse miserarium e liberis: continuo excruciarer animi: si ei forte fuisset febris censerem emori; cecidissete ebrius aut de equo uspiam, metuerem ne ibi diffregisset crura aut cervices sibi. 41

It is interesting that it is Pleusicles who puts forward the traditional point of view regarding the nobility of the married state. 42 The youthful idealism of Pleusicles contrasts sharply with the seasoned cynicism of Periplectomenos. The debate would lack point, if it did not reflect a contemporary rift of opinion along the same lines in Rome, or, although this does not exclude the idea of the debate at Rome, a rift of opinion between the Epicurean at Athens, who wishes to escape civic and family responsibilities, and the adherent of a more traditional attitude to the family and the state, an attitude supported by the Stoics. Another side of this conflict is recorded by Horace in Satires 2.6, which suggests that this was a continuing debate at Rome also.

Pleusicles, however, is something of an exception, though not such a rare one as may be supposed. For the frank confessions of Charinus at the beginning of the Mercator tell us what a dutiful son should and should not do. Charinus confesses that he is typical of the dissipated offspring, while his father had been hard-working and loyal as a young man. 43 Even though the trappings of this passage are evidently Greek and it may well follow the original text of Philemon quite closely, 44 it is nevertheless an example of Plautus passing on a message which his Roman audience

41 Ibid. 719-722.
43 Mercator, 40-48 and 60-70.
44 E.g. v.61, ex ephebis and v.67, ut spectavisset peplum.
would understand and appreciate. This is especially so, because of the fact that the ideal of rural work and of the profit and honourable satisfaction to be gained by it is also stressed in this passage and it thereby anticipates similar comment in Cato's De Agri Cultura, Virgil's Georgics and especially in the Satires of Horace, 2.2 for example, and Satires 3 and 11 of Juvenal. As the Mercator develops we are made to question the validity of a harsh upbringing as a training for later life, since Charinus' father falls head over heels in love with his son's mistress.

Another example of Plautine irony at work is in the Bacchides. Although the sententious pedagogue Lydus praises Pistoclerus' friend Mnesilocho as a dutiful son in order to put Pistoclerus to shame, Mnesilocho too has succumbed to the arts of the two Bacchises. It is possible that on such occasions as these Plautus has some serious satiric purpose in mind. Plautine irony of this type anticipates Horace's comment at Satires 1.10.14f., "ridiculum acri / fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res." For beneath the general atmosphere of jollity, and that air of lively debauch, which characterises the Bacchides, there is a rather sombre feel. The object of the play is to ridicule hypocrisy. The theme is that age is not automatically any wiser than the youth for the "benefit" of whom it so often pontificates.

Plautus often makes his point best when at his funniest; this is often when he is at his most ironical. In the Amphitruo 991-996 Mercury declares, without any trace of guilt, that he is aiding Jupiter in his designs against Alcmena; Mercury is in the extreme:

45 Bacchides, 453-462.
Me. pater vocat me, eum sequor, eius dicto, imperio sum audiens; ut filium bonum patri esse oportet, itidem ego sum patri. amanti subparasitor, hortor, adsto, admoneo, suadeo; si quid patri volupest, voluptas ea mihi multo maxumust.

Were it not for the fact that pietas was an established mos antiquus, as it were, the more subtle aspects of the humour of this passage would be lost. An interesting ethical question is also raised which is exploited on the human level in other plays: does one's duty to be obedient to one's parents overrule one's own feelings of what is right and wrong? The same conflict between duty to parent and to personal ethical standards occurs in the Asinaria. Philaenium objects to the prospect of working as a meretrix in order to keep her mother. The latter, Cleaereta, raises the spectre of filial duty. Philaenium, however, makes it clear that the obligation is reciprocal and that a demand of the type made of her by Cleaereta forfeits, necessarily, that respect and duty which should properly be owed:

Cl. hoccine est pietatem colere, matris imperium minuere?
Ph. neque quae recte faciunt culpo, neque quae delinquunt amo.46

Eventually Philaenium does succumb, while a similar kind of pressure for a different, but equally dishonourable, motive is put upon the adulescens Argyrippus by his father Demaenetus.47 Similar abuses of pietas occur also in the Cistellaria 40-46 and Persa 344ff.

On the other hand, pietas often does receive its proper reward. Neither is pietas restricted to duty between parents and children. The whole plot of the Menaechmi turns on the search

46 Asinaria, 509-510.
47 Ibid., 829-831.
for and discovery of one brother by another. In the Aulularia, Eunomia's genuine affection for her brother is well brought out, when she counsels him to marry in a sympathetic and touching scene. In the Curculio pietas is rewarded when Planesium discovers the identity of Therapontigonus. Similarly the sustained and conscious pietas of Hanno in the Poenulus is depicted both before and after the discovery of his long-lost children. On his arrival in Calydon, Hanno offers a devout prayer to the gods. This prayer is answered. Hanno thanks the gods and also recognises that they have rewarded his virtue.

Another play which deals specifically with the idea of virtue and its reward is the Rudens. It also raises problems regarding the selfish basis of both Greek and Roman virtue. The very idea of just reward for virtue and punishment for vice is given prominence in the Prologue, spoken by Aresturus, who declares that Jupiter keeps a weather eye on human affairs and makes sure that men get what they deserve. Plautus develops these ideas during the course of the play in which Daemones is ultimately reunited with a daughter and the villains suffer proper retribution.

The three-cornered conversation between Daemones, Plesidippus and Sceparnio in vv. 89-184 shows to advantage the modest and correct demeanor of Plesidippus to his senior Daemones. Daemones' grief for the loss of his daughter long ago is also emphasised. This is itself a mark of pietas. It is perhaps difficult to reconcile Daemones' apparent pietas with his indifference to the plight of the shipwrecked girls, while his

48 Curculio, 637-641.
49 Poenulus, 950-953.
50 Ibid., 1187-1190.
51 Rudens, 9-12 and 26-30.
52 Ibid., 179-184.
solicitude for them when they take shelter at the shrine of Venus is incompatible with the earlier callousness. By contrast Sceparnio was all solicitude, even before the girls meant anything personally to himself or to his master. It is clear that Daemones is motivated by selfishness: the girls only concern him when they are, as it were, his dependents and it is his duty to defend the shrine and their rights of sanctuary. To allow the girls to suffer hurt or injustice then would adversely affect his own reputation. When he discovers that one of the girls is his daughter he is overjoyed, but his satisfaction seems to spring as much from the belief that the gods have acted properly as from any true affection for Palaestra. The words of Arcturus in the prologue are echoed by those of Daemones at vv.1191-1194 and, a little wryly, by Trachalio at v.1176.

It does not seem significant at the denoument that Daemones would have at one stage let them drown, fall off a cliff, that he would have taken sexual advantage of one or both of them. Is Plautus criticising such actions and the motives which prompt them, reflecting them without comment, mirroring a contemporary debate on the nature of virtue and pietas - as Horace does in so many of his poems? It may be that Plautus has produced an unsatisfactorily inconsistent character, because of two different claims upon his talent: one, the desire to make his audience laugh at this lecherous old man and, two, the desire to gain solemn approbation for the well-earned happiness of the dutiful senex who has been reunited with his daughter. All these elements are present: however, Plautus lacks the artistry, does not accept or recognise any necessity completely to smooth over the flaws which these disparate motives create in his work. It is a mark of Horace's special genius that he can reflect contemporary
debate and also make his own comment, within the smaller context of his miniature dramas and diatribes, without straining the artistic and poetic unity and integrity of his work. It is not fair perhaps to talk of Horace improving upon Plautus in the same way that he improved upon Lucilius, as he claims he did himself, since the aims of the comic writer were rather different from his own. However, it will be interesting to note how Horace exploits many of Plautus' techniques of ironical humour and characterisation and dialogue in the Satires, but in a manner which ensures that brevity and even compression take over from diffuseness and repetition. It will also become clear, as the Satires are subjected to detailed scrutiny, that the traditional values, which Octavian was in the process of attempting to resurrect, were, in Horace's time, not greatly different in conception from those given literary form by Ennius and which, if Plautus is an accurate source, were at least recognised as existent by large sections of the Roman populace.

The further question, which has already been foreshadowed as being of importance, relating to the compatibility between Roman values, as now established, and Stoic ethical values can now be faced with better preparation.

War seems to have received but little discussion among the early Stoics, although they recognised it as a proof of the existence of evil in the world. It was, however, stressed that the wise man was under an obligation, by virtue of his capabilities, to serve the state. This may have included the military sphere as well as the civic, if and when necessary. The devotion of the Stoic to government despite personal inclination was ultimately

53 Horace, Satires 1.4; 1.10 and 2.1 (passim).
epitomised by the figure of Marcus Aurelius. Long before then Cicero was attracted by the notion of practical virtue being employed in the political field, also by the reputation which could thereby be won.\textsuperscript{54} There seems to have been a good deal of compatibility between the idea of service to the state as approved by the Stoics and as practised by the Romans. Much the same can be said about the notions of the Stoics regarding the nature of the gods. The Stoics attempted to rationalise the existing ideas in the light of their own version of the truth and the logos, but the forms of worship did not need to change.

In so far as family responsibilities were concerned the Stoic, like the Roman, was expected to procreate. The Stoic precepts on family life are collected by E.V. Arnold and Edelstein,\textsuperscript{55} among others. They were presented for the Roman reader by Cicero in the \textit{De Officiis}. It was the duty of the father to maintain the \textit{rem familiarem}. It was the duty of the child to be loyal and obedient, so long as the wishes of the parent were reasonable. The Stoics aimed at a harmony within the family that should parallel and help to effect that requisite harmony in the state which itself should parallel the cosmic harmony maintained by the deity. It may be that this basic likeness, which, of course, does not extend to all details, between Roman ethics, as mirrored by Ennius, Plautus and others, and the ethics of the Stoa, as adapted by

\textsuperscript{54} Detailed documentation at this stage would be tedious and unnecessary. Such documentation is provided in the body of the thesis, where it is necessary and where relevant.

\textsuperscript{55} E.V. Arnold's \textit{Roman Stoicism} (London, 1911 rep. 1958) is still an extremely useful source, which has not been totally superseded by later and more philosophically mature discussions, e.g. those of Rist and Long. Edelstein's, \textit{The Meaning of Stoicism} (Camb. Mass. 1966) is also a work of great value for those interested in the influence of Stoicism on the history of ideas.
Panaetius, was merely the result of the aristocratic pretensions of stoicism matching the plainly aristocratic basis of Roman moral theory and practice. This point is made by Syme and is commented upon in the discussion of Satires 2.2. However, the similarity was there and had, of necessity, to be taken account of by any person who, like Horace, was intent on subjecting the behaviour of his contemporaries to a thorough and ironical scrutiny and who was willing to make positive submissions as to how the behaviour of his contemporaries could be improved.
CHAPTER ONE

STOIC INFLUENCE ON HORACE SATIRES 1.1 AND 1.2

A

Thanks to the work of Eduard Fraenkel the structural difficulties which were felt to exist in relation to the problematical unity of this poem have now been satisfactorily resolved; it was clear that μεμψυχωρία (dissatisfaction with one's lot) was the main concern of the poem's beginning, and that Horace returned to this topic, perhaps in a rather clumsy manner, towards the end of the poem. What was not immediately clear was how the portion dealing with μεμψυχωρία related to the central and longest portion of the poem, the main concern of which was φιλοπλουτία (avarice, or love of money for its own sake).

Fraenkel declared that Horace achieved unity in the poem by making πλεονεξία (the spirit of competitive self-enrichment) the ultimate source from which sprang μεμψυχωρία and φιλοπλουτία. The transitions from section to section were also eased by the conversational freedom which is typical of satire and, perhaps, which was inherited as a feature from the work of Lucilius.

Furthermore, Fraenkel's discussion of the Greek source material, upon which Horace drew for the composition of this poem, shows

2 E.g., Heinze assumed this in his introduction to this satire in his edition of 1921, believing that Horace contaminated materials drawn from two different Greek sources.
3 Perhaps the most vivid description of a man consumed, allegedly, by πλεονεξία is Demosthenes' picture of Philip of Macedon in such speeches as the De Corona and the Philippics.
4 Horace, pp.92-94.
that Horace’s treatment of the causal links between μεμψιμονία, φιλοπλούτια and πλεονεξία was in keeping with an established pattern within the diatribe tradition. It may be added that it would be out of keeping with the artistic integrity of Horace to employ a structurally flawed composition as an introduction to his first book of satires.

Unfortunately Fraenkel, whose work is so admirable in other respects, seems constitutionally unable to discuss the influence of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy upon Horace’s poems. Although he does mention the diatribe Περὶ αὐτάρκειας (on self-sufficiency) of Teles, which itself derived from the diatribes of Bion of Borysthenes, and which is one of the sources of Horace Satires 1.1, Fraenkel does not think it necessary to say that Teles was an adherent of the Cynic school. As a result Fraenkel fails to make any connection between the Cynic concept of αὐτάρκεια and the closely related doctrine of the Stoics. 5 Rudd, who improves upon Fraenkel’s work in this respect, is aware of the philosophical influence at work upon Horace’s poetry; 6 even so Rudd does little more than point out that the blurring of distinctions between the doctrines of the various schools, “which took place from about (sic) 39 B.C.” onwards, suited the happy eclecticism of Horace. 7 It ought to be pointed out, however, that, rather than talk of a "blurring of

5 Cf. "The early Stoics, Sceptics and Epicureans were supremely confident that a man's inner resources, his rationality, can provide the only firm basis for a happy and tranquil life." A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974) p.4. In other words, a man's own reason was sufficient to procure εὐδαιμονία. Cf., Diogenes Laertius 7.127, αὐτάρκης τε εἶναι αὐτήν (scil. τὴν ἄρετήν) πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, καθά ὥσι τῇ ἐνθαντότω.


7 Rudd, p.19. I cannot explain why Rudd chooses this particular date of 39 B.C. I would have thought that any such blurring would have been as a result of Panaetius' work in the second century.
distinctions", one should think in terms of an already existent large area of common ground in the field of ethics, which was shared by the different schools. This ground was also common to what one may describe as the "homespun" philosophy of the mores maiorum. All the schools in company with the mores maiorum, (and their written expression in law) were concerned to provide a modus vivendi, especially at Rome, where philosophy was nothing if not a practical art. 8 What always remained distinct, within the doctrines of the different schools, were the technical doctrines, aimed nevertheless at achieving a roughly comparable end, and the physical theories with which the ethical systems were inextricably linked. 9 The dangers, inherent in such general statements as those made by Rudd and in the apparent unconcern of Fraenkel for philosophical niceties in discussing the Satires of Horace, are that the attitudes which are thus fostered discourage a proper examination of what traces of particular doctrines of particular schools are used by Horace and with what particular purpose in mind.

Horace's Satires 1.1 for example, provides a rich quarry within which one may unearth pointers towards Horace's own moral outlook and towards his attitude to others who are possessed of more doctrinaire views than he was himself. Even if our sole achievement from investigating the influence of philosophy upon

8 E.g. "hos aliosque talis argutae delectabilisque desidiae aculeos cum audiremus vel lectitaremus neque in his scrupulis aut emolumentum aliquod solidum ad rationem vitae pertinens aut finem uillum quaerendi videremus, Ennianum Neoptolemum probamus, qui profecto ait: philosophandum est paucis; nam omnino haud placet."
Here Gellius, N.A. 5.15 has previously been discussing the ultimately futile debate on the nature of voice; cf. also Cicero, Fin. 3.4 and Tusc. 1.5.

9 I mean the continuum theory of the Stoics and the atomic theory of the Epicureans.
form in Satires 1.1 is to fortify Fraenkel's already impressive position, that will be worthwhile. It will also be possible to question more closely the plausible comment of Lejay that Horace employs the language of all the world, without regard for philosophical profundity.  

**B**

**THE STRUCTURE OF THE POEM**

1-22 An attack upon μεμψιμωρία.

23-27 An interlude upon the "spoonful of sugar" which makes the didactic process more acceptable. This interlude eases the transition from the direct discussion of μεμψιμωρία into the treatment of that fault which cites πλεονεξία as its cause.

28-105 The longest section of the poem which is liberally sprinkled with the kind of anecdote mentioned in 23-27. The dangers of competitive φιλοπλουτία.

106-107 A brief sententia which is of equal validity whether it is taken to refer either to μεμψιμωρία or φιλοπλουτία; it is, accordingly, an ideal bridge passage.

108-121 Horace returns to μεμψιμωρία by an easy conversational twist, which has been well prepared for.  

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11 est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines, quos ultra citróque neguit consistere rectum.

12 For a useful discussion of the formula "illinc unde abii redeo", (v.108) see Fraenkel, pp.97-98.
The tone of commonplace moralising, which is to continue through this and the immediately following satires, is set by the second verse:

2 seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit...

There are deeper implications in Horace's choice of the words ratio and fors than may at first sight appear. On one level of interpretation, Horace intends to draw a distinction between styles of life, which are the result of a conscious choice, and those, which come about as the result of circumstances which are beyond any individual's control. To complain about the former type implies an error of judgement and the necessary acceptance of total responsibility by the individual for that error of judgement. A life dictated by fors however, is obviously beyond the individual's control and can be complained about with a clear conscience, even though the way the individual faces up to such a challenge is within his control. However, there is another, less obvious, distinction which is implied by Horace's choice of the words ratio and fors: this is the distinction between the predetermined life of a man which must be lived according to the guiding influence of divine Providence, the λόγος or ratio of the Stoics, for example, and that kind of life which is a prey

13 Satires 1.2 and 1.3.
14 E.g. "Zeno naturalem legem divinam esse censet eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibitemque contraria." Cicero, N.D. 1.36; cf. also, "rationem quandam per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem vi divina esse affectam putat (Zeno)." ibid. and "lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ca quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria", Cicero, Leg. 1.6.18.
to the vagaries of chance or *fors*, as chance was understood by the followers of Epicurus. By means of this initial and intentional ambiguity Horace prompts the reader to consider this and subsequent poems with full regard for the use Horace makes both of commonplaces and shared doctrines and also of those doctrines which may accurately be attributed to particular philosophical schools.

It is also interesting that, if this conscious ambiguity in the use of *ratio* and *fors* is actually present, Horace recognises a basic duality in the philosophical influence of Greece at Rome. Distinctions are not so much to be drawn between the plethora of different persuasions, among whom may be numbered Sceptics, Cynics, Academicians and Peripatetics, but between the determinists, who are exemplified by the Stoics, and the champions of *Fortuna* and free-will, namely the Epicureans. It comes, therefore, as no surprise to discover that the doctrines with which Horace is most concerned are those which were the property of the followers of Zeno and Epicurus; these were the schools which exercised most influence at Rome. That both the Stoics and Epicureans were themselves deeply influenced by Aristotle and the practical bent, which he gave to ethical speculation in the *Ethica Nicomachaea*, explains, furthermore, why the doctrine of

15 E.g. sed tamen effabor. dictis dabit ipsa fidem res forsitan et graviter terrarum motibus orbis omnia conquassari in parvo tempore cernes. quod procul a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans. Lucretius, 5.104-107

16 E.g. "As in all other cases, we must posit 'tà φαϊνόμενα' and, after first discussing all the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, all the common views 'Ἐυθόδα', ..., or, failing that, most of them and the most authoritative ones." E.N. 1145b2. It is clear that Aristotle placed great importance upon the traditional ethical beliefs of his contemporaries, e.g. ὁνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδόν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται τὴν γὰρ εὐθαμομνίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὗ ἤν καὶ τὸ εὗ πράττειν ταύτων ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐθαμομνεῖν, ibid. 1095al4-20.
"nothing in excess" occurs so regularly in Horace's work. This does not preclude the Peripatetic idea from having its own attraction for Horace; its inherent common sense, as a doctrine which was in essence a systematisation of accepted norms of behaviour, would clearly have appealed to Horace in the light of the values with which he had been imbued by his father. These observations may also induce us, when faced with the "happy eclecticism" of Horace, to look particularly to the Stoics and Epicureans and, perhaps to a lesser extent, to the Peripatetics, when we are attempting to trace the origins of an initially unspecific and unattributable philosophising statement.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the first philosopher mentioned by name in the Satires is a Stoic:

13-14 cetera de genere hoc, adeo sunt multa, loquacem delassare valent Fabium.

According to Porphyry, one Fabius Maximus, "aliquot libros ad Stoicam philosophiam pertinentes conscripsit." How much importance should be attached to an example of ὁ νομικός φίλος is perhaps open to question, especially if Horace is employing the Stoic in a rather ambivalent manner by putting forward the ideas, with which he was himself in sympathy, of the philosopher, but simultaneously attacking the manner in which he expressed them.

Horace may also be raising a smile by the onomatopoeic use of loquacem (13) which indicates the "quacking" of Fabius verbosity. That the reference to Fabius should not be dismissed too lightly, however, is made clear by the fact that, at vv.120-121, Horace

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18 Cf. Horace, Satires 1.6 passim, but esp. vv.81-92.
19 Porphyry, in Serm. 1.1.13.
20 This technique is much in evidence in the later poems, Satires 2.3 and 2.7; it will be dealt with in more detail in the separate discussions upon those poems.
refers in a similarly scathing and personal manner to another Stoic, one Crispinus:

120-121 iam satis est. ne me Crispini scrinia lippi compilasse putes, verbum non amplius addam.

Horace once more emphasises the tiresome verbosity of the Stoics. He plays another humorous, audible, trick in the play on words in Crispini scrinia (120) which is parallel to the effect achieved by loquacem in v.13: also the proliferation of "p" and "l" from lippi (120) to amplius has a particularly scornful ring.

Horace hopes that he will not be confused with any philosophic prattler or scribbler, even though he may share a physical defect with one of them. 21 My main point here is that Horace, by his references to Fabius and Crispinus, links his treatment of μεσωποιοία at the beginning of the poem more closely to the return of the topic at the poem's close, when "dissatisfaction" and "avarice" have been shown to be closely associated by reason of their joint origins in πλεονεξία. Thus, although it would be foolish to suggest that the ethical import of this poem is derived from the Stoa, 22 the fact nevertheless remains that Horace uses two Stoic names to help with both the humour and the structure of this satire. There are also other Stoicising references within the poem and this further emphasises that a full understanding of the poem must depend to a certain extent upon a full appreciation of all the philosophical nuances which it may contain.

21 Cf., non possis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus, non tamen idcirco contemnas lippus inungi.
Horace, Epist. 1.1.128-29
22 Especially in view of the Peripatetic tone of vv.106-107. However, the concept of "nothing in excess" was such common philosophical and moral property that this bridge couplet should not prevent us from examining the poem for other philosophical references.
For example, the phrase "intra naturae finis" of vv. 49-50 is almost an exact translation of the essential meaning of the Stoic tag ὁμολογομενὸς τῇ φύσει, which, when coupled with ξῆν, provided the basic tenet of Stoic ethical doctrine.²³ In the ethical situation, which is here being described by Horace, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the poet employs a consciously Stoicising phrase in order to emphasise, in a specific and by no means commonplace manner, the significance for the understanding of his poem of an understanding of contemporary philosophical ideas and philosophical diction.

More important are the questions which are raised by:

horum semper ego optarem pauperrimus esse bonorum.

The jingle "horum ... bonorum"²⁴ suggests that an unduly ironical emphasis is being placed upon these familiar words for bonorum to be understood as a direct reference to material "goods". It is more likely that, in a context where an ethical choice is indicated (optarem, v.79), Horace is making a covert reference to the Stoic doctrine which held that material wealth was not a true "good", but a thing "indifferent".²⁵ For, as Horace points out

²³ The Greek tag is well illustrated, along with its Latin counterpart at Commenta Lucani, 2.380, p.73, "His versibus declaravit Stoicum Catonemuisse: cuius philosophiae finis secundum Chrysippum ille est ὁμολογομενὸς τῇ φύσει ξῆν, hoc est: congrueret naturae vivere." For a man "to live in accord with nature" he must obey the dictates of "reason", which is that part of his nature that partakes of the divine λόγος, but which is essentially and peculiarly his: cf. Horace, Epist. 1.10.12: "vivere naturae si convenieter oportet."

²⁴ Cf., the jingle at Horace, A.P. 99-100: dulcia sunto, et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto, where the intention is unclear.

²⁵ For an informative list of "indifferents" see Diogenes Laertius, 7.102 and 104; cf., Cicero, Fin. 3.50-l; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 11.62, also Stobaeus, pp.114 and 156. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in the different interpretations and statements concerning the "indifferents", see Madvig's note on Fin. 3.50-51.
here the amassing of these questionable "goods" is not conducive to the acquisition of happiness;\textsuperscript{26} the reverse is the case. Horace, therefore, employs \textit{bonorum} in an ambiguous way, in a way which is far more complex than is at first apparent. This argument is further strengthened if one accepts that there is a similarly conscious ambiguity in Horace's use of \textit{ratio} in the second verse of this satire, where the question of an ethical choice is also implied.

It may also be argued that the discussion which Horace introduces with regard to the need for family and friends in the cases of illness and advancing senescence\textsuperscript{27} is simply an example of selfish common-sense. On the other hand, the Stoics were concerned to point out the duties of family and friends in exactly such situations.\textsuperscript{28} They were not alone among the philosophers in doing this, although the Epicureans, whose disapproval of close family ties, since they put at risk the desired \textit{δικαιοσύνη} of the \textit{sapiens}\textsuperscript{29} can be discounted as a philosophical influence at this juncture. The breakdown of family life among the aristocracy, with its consequently deleterious effect upon the

\textsuperscript{26} At this point Horace is in perfect accord with the Stoics; "\textit{ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut si cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem approbandum sit nobis, ut qui plura habeat ea quae in corpore magni aestimantur sit beatior.}" Cicero, \textit{Fin.} 3.43.

\textsuperscript{27} Vv. 80-91.

\textsuperscript{28} Although the naturalness of human society and friendship is stressed by the Stoics (e.g. in Cicero, \textit{Fin.} 3.62) and they recognised the benefits which sprang from kinship and friendship, yet they stressed that "\textit{nec iustitia nec amicitia esse omnino poterunt, nisi ipsae per se expetuntur}", ibid. 3.70.

\textsuperscript{29} On the other hand the Epicureans did value friendship, \textit{φιλία περιχωρεύει τὴν οἰκουμένην κηρύττουσα δὴ πάσιν ἦμῖν ἐγείροσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν}, Epicurus, \textit{Κ.Α.} 52; at times, however, Epicurus also seems to have been swayed by expediency, \textit{τὴν φιλίαν (γενέσθαι) διὰ τὰς χρείας}. Diogenes Laertius, 10.120.
structure of the Roman society, was something deplored by Augustus and the later satirists. It is, therefore, fair to say that any rational or philosophical backing for the concept of what family duties involved would have been gratefully received. The ethics of the Stoics did provide or were capable of providing such rational backing and here we have a prime example of that compatibility between the Roman concept of pietas and the Stoic concept of "duty".

It is when a relatively large number of such "coincidences" as these Stoic references occur within a single poem that the shortcomings of a critical approach, which does not take adequate account of philosophical influences, become evident. It is sufficient to realise in reading Horace's first satire, as published, that the author wishes his audience to understand in what ways a knowledge of philosophy will contribute to a proper understanding of his work. Later poems show more detailed treatments of specifically Stoic themes, but the programmatic satire of the whole collection not only indicates the general influence wielded over the poet by Hellenistic philosophical ideas, but also indicates in what spirit the poet will deal with the Stoics in particular. We may expect, therefore, that Horace will deal more harshly with the more ludicrous Stoic practitioners, even though he may give assent, perhaps grudgingly, to certain of their ideas. Also, even though he may have disapproved of the

30 As exemplified by the "leges de maritandiis ordinibus" of 19 B.C.
31 Juvenal's attack upon women in Satires 6 is largely motivated by the breakdown of Roman family life which resulted from the wider interests of the women of imperial Rome.
33 E.g. Satires 2.3 and 2.7.
extremes to which these ideas were taken by the Stoics and to the language in which they were couched, Horace recognised the efficacy of the diatribe as a means of persuasion.\textsuperscript{34} It is also clear from this programmatic satire that Horace was willing to utilise philosophical references within a poem to help the unity and structure of the poem. An analysis of \textit{Satires} 1.2 will show that this is the case.

\textbf{STOIC INFLUENCE ON THE STRUCTURE AND MEANING OF HORACE, SATIRES 1.2}

A

Although the subject matter of this satire has tended to lead to its being neglected by scholars,\textsuperscript{35} the difficulties regarding its structure have been examined by Lejay,\textsuperscript{36} Fraenkel\textsuperscript{37} and Rudd.\textsuperscript{38} Fraenkel's discussion of the structure is most useful, Rudd's is marginally helpful, while Lejay and Fraenkel are at their best when discussing the themes of the poem. However, the

\textsuperscript{34} This will be made clear in the discussion e.g. of \textit{Satires} 2.2.
\textsuperscript{35} Palmer's comment in his \textit{The Satires of Horace} (London, 1888), p.32, is typical, "Men are either too generous or too stingy, too dainty or too rude; some given to the coarser or lower forms of vice, others to high and dangerous intrigues. The latter subject occupies the greater part of the satire ... but the method Horace has selected for its treatment makes it scarcely profitable reading."
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Horace, Satires} (Paris, 1911).
\textsuperscript{37} Horace, pp.76-86.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{The Satires of Horace,} pp.9-12.
only discussion of any philosophical influence upon the poem comes from Lejay (p.30) who considers (a) the possibility that the frankness of the poem's expression has a Stoic origin and (b) dismisses any idea of Stoic influence on Horace by maintaining that the Stoics considered intercourse with any woman outside marriage to be wrong, citing Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 3.20. However, the statement of the Stoic view in the *Paradoxa* is in keeping with the extreme position necessitated by the tone of that work, and the fact remains that intercourse with a woman of ignoble status does less damage than intercourse with a virgin, or a woman of noble birth, "lapsa est istius lubido in muliere ignota: dolor ad pauciores pertinet quam si petulans fuisset in aliqua generosa ac nobile virgine; peccavit nihilo minus." The implication of this passage of the *Paradoxa* is in fact consonant with that plea for moderation, which is the major theme of *Satires* 1.2. The Roman Stoics were well aware of the difficulties caused by too strict an adherence, in the sphere of everyday life, to the ideals of the Stoic ethic. This realisation tempted Cicero into a logical blunder in *De Officiis* 1.152 and following, where he attempts to give primacy in virtue to the "social" virtues of iustitia and temperantia over sapientia, because of his desire to stress the practical nature of true virtue. Therefore, although Lejay may be correct in declaring that the Stoics ideally disapproved of extra-marital intercourse, one should remember the gulf between principle and practice in Stoic ethics, a gulf recognised by Cicero.

39 Lejay refers to M. Gemöll, *Die Realien bei Horaz*, 3, p.17 (Berlin, 1895), "se fondant sur un remarque de Zeller, a trouvé dans cette liberté d'expression l'influence du stoïcisme."

40 See Miller's note, ad loc. in the Loeb edition (Harvard, 1913).
and epitomised by his different treatments of Stoic ethics in the
De Officiis and the De Finibus. However, even if one were to
accept that the exclusive nature of Stoic ethics ruled out a
direct influence upon Horace's plea for moderation in this poem,
nevertheless, certain of the structural difficulties are eased,
if due consideration is given to the Stoic ideas on usury and
adultery. For the Stoic attitudes towards usury and adultery
provide a clue to the underlying unity of the poem. The Stoics
looked upon adultery and usury as being closely parallel vices.
On the one hand usury was considered to be a variant of theft,
while adultery, being the taking and enjoyment of another's wife,
was itself a variant of theft:

Éκκλινουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τοῦ Κιτιέως Ζήνωνος

φιλοσοφοῦντες ... διὰ τὸ 'μὴν κοινωνικὸν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν
eἶναι τῷ λογικῷ ξώῳ νοθεύειν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων ἐτέρῳ

προκαταλειφθεῖσαν γυναικα καὶ φθείρειν τὸν ἄλλου ἀνθρώπου

οἶχον.41

This makes it clear that to transgress the human laws, which are
an expression of the divine λόγος,42 regarding adultery is
incompatible with a life ordered secundum naturam. Also the
act of adultery damages (φθείρειν) the property of another, and
implies the removal of something which belongs to another and has
done so for some time (προκαταλειφθεῖσαν).

In the following passage from Stobaeus43 adultery is
listed alongside theft:

γιγνεσθαι δὲ εὐεμπτωσίας καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ἔργα τῶν παρὰ

φύσιν, οἰον εἰς κλοπὰς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ ύβρεῖς, καὶ δὲς

κλέπται τε καὶ μοιχοὶ καὶ ύβρισται λέγονται.

41 Origenes, Contra Celsum 7.63 (S.V.F. 3, p.183).
42 Cf. Cicero, Leg. 1.6.18 (n.14 above).
43 Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.93.1 (S.V.F. 3, p.102).
Although it is obvious that, in such a list where different types of criminal or evil inclinations are being indicated, there is no identification of adultery as a species of theft, nevertheless, their close association in the list is suggestive of a more than coincidental connection. This apparently close relationship is also underlined by the following passage from Plutarch:

οὗ γάρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἔστιν αἰσθήτα συν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια, ἄλλα καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὀμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι.

Here κλοπή and μοιχεία are surely related by being included in a group, the unnamed members of which can be classified by the use of "τῶν ὀμοίων".

Usury is also considered by the Stoics to be a type of theft:

video istic diplomata et syngraphas et cautiones, vacua habendi simulacra, umbracula avaritiae quaedam laborantis, per quae decipiatur animum inaniun opinione gaudentem; quid enim ista sunt? quid fenum et kalendarium et usura misi humanae cupiditatis extra naturam quaesita nomina?

B

Does this relationship between the essential natures of usury and adultery as different types of theft appear in Horace, Satires 1.2? Is there anything else to suggest that Horace had the

44 Plutarch, St. Repugn. 19 (S.V.F. 3, p.21).
45 Seneca, Ben. 7.10.3; note that usura is extra naturam as is κλοπή παρὰ φύσιν in the Stobaeus, Eccl.2.93.1 quoted above. The condemnation of usury as an unnatural means of acquiring an unnecessary end, extreme wealth, is continued in 7.10.4-6 of the De Beneficiis. Cicero, Off. 3.22 declares that to enrich oneself at the expense of others is contrary to the laws of nature and of communities, although no specific mention of usury is made.
Stoics in mind when he was composing this poem?

The main charge which is brought against Fufidius is that of miserliness and of inhumanity in the pursuit of what is owed to him:

14-17

atque
quanto perditior quisque est tanto acrius urget;
nomina sectatur modo sumpta veste virili
sub patribus duris tironum.

Horace likens the inhumanity of Fufidius to that of Menedemus in the Heautontimoroumenos of Terence in that his prosecutions extend not only to others, but also to himself. The relationship between Terence's characterisation of Menedemus and Chremes and the Stoic concept of humanitas, embraced by such authors as Cicero and Seneca, has been explored by Gagliardi. That Horace was aware of Terence's exploitation of this theme is self-evident, while it is extremely unlikely that he was unaware of the Stoic connotations of any mention of humanitas.

It is also significant that, in his first statement in moral terms of the purpose or direction of this satire, Horace employs a word which, though obviously common in its non-technical sense, was yet frequently employed in a quasi-technical sense by

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46 E.g. "... ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas humanitasque patitur", Off. 2.5.18. Humanitas, a concept which sprang from a belief in the brotherhood of all men, since their "matter" and "spirit" were essentially the same, was responsible for the amelioration of the lot of slaves in ancient society. See further under the discussion of Satires 2.7 above.

47 E.g. "Humanitas vetat superbum esse adversus socios, vetat amarum; verbis, rebus, affectibus comem se facilemque omnibus praestat; nullum alienum malum putat, bonum autem suum ideo maxime quod alicui bono futurum est amat", Epist. 88.30.

the Stoics. This word is stultus, which appears soon after the reference to the inhumanity of Menedemus:

23-24 si quis nunc quaerat "quo res haec pertinet?" illuc: dum vitant stulti, vitia in contraria currunt.

Neither is it by any means a coincidence that the next passage of moralising, apart from the Aristotelian nil medium est of 28, is attributed to the Elder Cato, who, for all his lack of humanitas towards slaves, was considered both an archetype of traditional Roman virtue and, in behaviour, a prototype Roman Stoic. Note the wording of the sententia Catonis employed by Horace:

33-35 nam simul ac venas inflavit taetra libido,
    huc iuvenes aequum est descendere, non alienas permolere uxores.

The idea of damaging or taking that which is the property of another is of paramount importance in Cato's understanding of the evils of adultery. This is close to the Stoic attitude to adultery, as may be seen from Origenes, Contra Celsum (S.V.F. 3, p.183). 52

The Stoic reference of this part of the poem is further

49 The Stoic doctrine was that all men who were not sapientes, i.e. had not achieved the summum bonum of virtue informed by wisdom, were fools; e.g. "nunc autem ita disserunt (Stoici), sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. at non semper. commove, senties. sic iracundus non semper iratus est; lacesse, iam videbis furentem", Cicero, Tusc. 4.54; cf. also, "stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est: alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur ... ne audacem quidem timoris absolvimus, ne prodigum quidem avaritia liberamus", Seneca, Ben. 4.27. Horace refers specifically to this paradox at Satires 2.3.32.

50 For Cato's attitude to slaves see De Agri Cultura 2.7.

51 See Cicero, Paradoxa 2, "Cato autem, perfectus mea sententia Stoicus".

52 See above, p.14.
emphasised by verses 37-46:

audire est operae pretium, procedere recte
qui moechis non vultis, ut omni parte laborent,
utque illis multo corrupta dolore voluptas
atque haec rara cadat dura inter saepe pericla.
hic se praecipitem tecto dedit; ille flagellis
ad mortem caesus; fugiens hic decidit acrem
praedonum in turbam; dedit hic pro corpore nummos;
hunc perminxerunt calones; quin etiam illud
accidit, ut quidam testis caudamque salacem
demeteret ferro. "iure" omnes; Galba negabat. 53

Not only does Horace make light-hearted use of what the Stoics considered the prime ethical impulse, namely self-preservation,54 in his attempts to dissuade the potential adulterer, but it also seems that the clause audire est operae pretium of verse 37 has a Stoic flavour. It sounds like the beginning of a typical Stoic harangue; 55 for it contains in the word pretium (37) the concept of value (déxía), with all the connotations of προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα which that involves. For, although the Stoics posited one unique summum bonum, namely virtue, and one evil, lack of the same, they did believe that such things as wealth, health and reputation, which they classified as "indifferents", could be either preferred or rejected (προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα) in accordance with their value (déxía) in aiding the probationer (ὁ προκόπτων) along the road to the acquisition of virtue.56 This

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53 See my discussion of the same topic with a different emphasis in Satires 2.7 on pp.165f., above. below.
54 E.g. Cicero, Fin. 2.11.33, "nec vero ut voluptatem expetat natura movet infantem, sed tantum ut se ipse diligat, ut integrum se salvumque velit"; cf. Aulus Gellius, N.A. 12.5.7.
55 Cf. The words of the Stoicising Damasippus, quoting Crispinus, at Satires 2.3.77.
56 For a discussion of déxía, προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα see, Cicero, Fin. 3.50 and Diogenes Laertius, 7.106; for a discussion of ὁ προκόπτων see, Cicero, Fin. 3.48, where, although it is admitted that a man may make progress towards virtue, the caveat is added that he is still essentially a fool, "item qui
imitation or reference may be of no more importance than any of Horace's short and sharp attacks upon individual targets,\textsuperscript{57} which punctuate the progress of his satires. However, if v.37 is such an imitation, it serves the purpose of keeping alive an awareness of Stoicism in the readers' mind. One should also add that recte coupled with procedere in v.37 sounds as if it is a specific, if ironical, reference to the Stoic probationer already mentioned. As may be seen from n.56 procedere is the regular translation of προκόπτειν in this technical sense, while recte also is the regular translation of ὀρθῶς, which is itself coupled with προκόπτειν. Also a thing recte factum is an officium or "duty", the performance of which establishes, as it were, the potential for the acquisition of the sumnum bonum.\textsuperscript{58}

Although it is clear that adultery is morally the most reprehensible and also the most personally risky form of sexual release and that affairs with classes of women other than the matrona class are less reprehensible and less dangerous, Horace by no means suggests that, with this reservation "carte blanche" should be granted to the aspiring libertine. One must be wary of the damage that may be done to one's reputation and to one's family estate. As Lejay points out in his note ad loc:

\begin{quote}
Cette satire c’est très important, parce que, mieux qu’ailleurs, on y voit la position pris par Horace dans les questions morales, celle d’un Roman traditionel et pratique.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{57} E.g. the personal attack (ὀνομαστὶ κακωσεῖν) upon Galba in v.46 of this poem.

\textsuperscript{58} For a recent discussion of this branch of Stoic ethics see A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974), pp.179-205, esp. 184-199. On things recte facta see S.V.F. pp.136-145.
However, it is in exactly this area that there is so much common ground between the ethics of the Stoa, as developed by Panaetius and depicted by Cicero in the *De Officiis*, and the traditional and practical morality of Rome as epitomised by the supposed life and morals of Cato Maior. What needs to be said here is that the Roman Stoics in particular laid emphasis upon the value of reputation and in this they diverged to a certain extent from the hard and fast position adopted by such early Stoics as Chrysippus. Therefore, it is not sufficient to say with Lejay that Horace is merely putting the view of a Roman "traditional et pratique", especially in the light of the Stoic references already noted within the poem and the manner in which Stoic views on usury and adultery serve to knit more closely the structural unity of the satire.

As is his custom Horace intersperses serious arguments on the dangers of excess and adultery and on the less reprehensible pursuit of freedwomen with advice in a lighter vein. It is in this lighter vein that we should consider the horse-trading section of the poem, with its message that one should at least have the chance to examine the goods upon which money and effort is to be spent. The reader is then brought back to the major concerns of the poem by a skilled piece of name dropping (Catia,

59 See the relevant discussion above in the introductory section on Ennius and Plautus.

60 Good repute was considered by the Stoics to be an "indifferent", e.g. Cicero, *Fin.* 3.17.57, "de bona autem fama (quam enim appellant ἐὔναικα, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam) Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant: quibus ego vehementer assentior." However, later Stoics, not specified by Cicero in this passage, under the influence of Carneades, did declare, "hanc ... bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositarum et sumendam esse", *ibid.* For an attempted reconciliation of the Roman and Stoic views on *fama* and *gloria*, see Cicero, *Off.* 2.31-88.
in v.95), from where the dangers of adultery are once again brought to the fore, that is to say - commerce with other men's wives. Clearly the pleasure is not worth the candle, if pleasure it is, while the statement that danger adds spice to the hunt and capture has little attraction for Horace. After all, the satisfaction of a desire does not require a grand passion; that, speaking in Epicurean terms, is neither natural nor necessary; on the other hand it contravenes, as noted before, the Stoic injunction to preserve one's own self, one's family and one's fortune. That Horace's attitude to the available serving girl (or boy) is chauvinistic by modern standards should not blind us to the fact that he stands squarely in line with the traditional attitudes of Cato Maior on this very point.

C

To answer the questions which were posed at the beginning of the previous section: the restriction of the examples of vices of excess to the areas of usury and, to a greater extent, of adultery, along with the suggestion that both vices are primarily wrong, because of both a) the damage they do to another's property or fortune, by abusing or appropriating it (theft) and b) because of the dangers to the "criminal", in terms of his loss of happiness (in the case of the usurer) and of more personal attributes (in the case of the adulterer) and c) because of harm to an innocent third party, the slave-girl go-between, in the case of the

61 For the Epicurean analysis of pleasures, both kinetic and static, see Epicurus, Epistle to Menoeceus 127ff.
62 This is an example of inhumanitas, cf. notes 46 and 47 above.
apprehended adulterer, does point to a close connection existing between the wrongs of both usury and adultery; the number of other quite possible Stoic allusions within the poem, especially within the passage of transition between the discussion of the usurer and the discussion of the adulterer, support the contention that the Stoic conception of a kinship in nature between these two vices does provide a unity within the poem which is not otherwise immediately apparent.
CHAPTER TWO

HORACE'S ATTITUDE TO THE STOA AS ILLUSTRATED BY
SATIRES 1.3: AN ANTICIPATION OF SATIRES 2.3 AND 2.7

The foregoing discussions of the first two satires of the first book have shown that Horace exploited his audience's knowledge of contemporary philosophical terminology in order to aid both the unity of the poems and their humorous effect. However, apart from the rather scathing references to the loquacity of Fabius and Crispinus in Satires 1.1.14 and 120, we have as yet no real clue as to what Horace's attitude to the Stoa actually was. We learn something of this attitude from those three Satires which deal with particularly Stoic themes, namely 1.3; 2.3 and 2.7. What is apparent from an examination of these poems is that Horace's attitude to the Stoa was ambivalent. Although Horace often seems to have found himself in sympathy with certain aspects of their beliefs, especially those which were compatible with the mores maiorum, he was unfailingly hostile towards both those extreme and rigid doctrines, which were peculiarly the property of the Stoics,¹ and also towards the manner in which those extreme views were presented. This latter concern was closely linked with his dislike of the manner and method of individual Stoic preachers.²

¹ These doctrines are exemplified especially by those paradoxes collected and expounded by Cicero in the Paradoxa Stoicorum; one should mention as examples here the exclusive nature of the Stoic concept of virtue and wisdom, the condemnation of the great majority of mankind as slaves and fools, and the supposed equality of all acts of wrongdoing.

² The fact that Crispinus and Stertinius were supposed to have handled Stoic themes in verse, amounting on the part of Stertinius to 220 books, would not have endeared them to Horace; see Acro, Ad Hor. Epist. 1.12.20.
The reasons for Horace's dislike will become apparent as we proceed.

Satires 1.3

The structure of this poem does not present the same kind of difficulty as those which confront the reader of Satires 1.1 and 1.2. The structure and meaning of this poem have been discussed before, while, as Fraenkel points out, Lejay's discussion illustrates clearly the connection between the conclusion of the poem and the main body of the poem. In brief the form and content of the poem are as follows:

i) 1-19 Horace comments upon the mercurial temperament of singers and particularly upon that of Tigellius.

ii) 19-75 One should deal with the failings of friends with leniency and tolerance.

iii) 76-142 One should recognise that some faults are far worse than others; the Stoic doctrine that all faults are equal is ludicrous, but so is their picture of the ideally wise man.

Although the introduction to the poem suggests that we may reasonably expect the remainder of it to deal with the inconsistency of all men, or with inconsistency as a common failing, the poem actually shades into an attack upon the intransigence of the Stoics in their belief that all sins are equal. Horace also attacks their picture of the sapiens. Here Horace betrays a certain inconsistency and ambivalence himself. For the attack upon inconsistency in the introductory passage of this poem is

3 E.g. Fraenkel, pp.86-90, and Rudd, pp.5-9.
4 Fraenkel, at p.85, n.5 refers to Lejay, p.63.
5 It is, however, part of Horace's technique in his satirical comment upon human nature to include himself as an example. The effect is to soften the otherwise harsh effects of the criticism. More will be said along these lines in the discussions of Satires 2.3 and 2.7.
entirely consonant with a doctrine which was especially Stoic. Therefore, although Rudd's comment,

This plea for a sense of proportion and a rational scale of penalties is directed against the doctrinaire Stoics who maintained that all sins were equally culpable. The satire ends with a picture of the Stoic preacher, friendless and ridiculous,\(^6\)
is accurate in so far as it goes, it does not go far enough. It fails to account for the evident favour which is implied within the poem for another Stoic belief even more basic to their ethical system, the desirability of a consistent manner of living. Fraenkel notes that disparagement of inconsistency was a particularly Stoic trait,\(^7\) but further comments that such disparagement was not the property of the Stoics alone.\(^8\) However, v.9 of this satire links Horace's expression of this idea very closely with the idea as expressed by the Stoics. Horace's line is:

9  \[\text{nil aequale homini fuit illi...}\]

while the initial section of the poem closes with:

18-19  \[\text{nil fuit umquam sic impar sibi.}\]

According to Stobaeus, Zeno of Citium himself declared that a man whose life was not governed consistently according to one rule


\(^7\) Fraenkel, p.86.

\(^8\) On p.86 at n.4 Fraenkel refers to Plato's praise of the consistency of Socrates at Republic 561c-d and Cicero's comments on Socrates at De Officiis 1.90. It is worth mentioning here the peculiarly Roman virtue of constantia which, although, as it were, akin to Stoic aequalitas, should not be identified with it. However, it is interesting to note Cicero's use of constantia at Off. 1.125, where it is equivalent, in this technical moral treatise, to aequalitas, "nihil est autem, quod tam debeat, quam in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare constantiam."
was bound to be unhappy. At least one Stoic of the later Roman period at least found the idea of consistency as an integral part of virtue particularly attractive; this is clear from the repeated references made to the doctrine by Seneca in his moral letters:

i) perfecta virtus aequalitas est ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi. Seneca, Epistles 31.8

ii) ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi. ibid. 35.4

iii) stultitia semper incipit vivere: quam foeda est hominum lenitas cottidie nova vitae fundamenta ponentium, nova spes in exitu incohantium! quid est turpius quam senex vivere incipiens? ibid. 13.16

iv) quid est sapientia? semper idem velle atque idem nolle. ibid. 20.5

The similarity of the statements both in meaning and in diction to Horace's description of the inconsistency of Tigellius is striking, even though it may be argued that Horace's comments on the foibles of such a target are far removed in spirit from Seneca's advice to Lucilius. However, Horace's exploitation of such ideas expressed in this way adds the humour of incongruity to the opening of the satire and thereby renders it the more amusing and arresting. It is also clear from the Senecan passages that such words as aequalitas were part of the technical Roman vocabulary of Stoicism by the time of Nero. On the other hand, such words were employed by Cicero too in the context of Stoic ethical beliefs:

9 τὸ δὲ τέλος ὃ μὲν ζῆνων ὁμοίως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν τούτο δ' ἐστι καὶ ἔνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχουμένως θόντων κακοδαιμονοῦντων, Stobaeus, 2.7.6a.

10 It should be noted, however, that the commonplace phrase aequo animo need not be explained in most contexts by reference to philosophical ethics, except in so far as philosophical ethics reflect and rationalise the commonplace.
oratorem autem, nisi qui sapiens esset, esse neminem, atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia constaret, unam quandam esse virtutem, et qui unam virtutem haberet, omnis habere easque esse inter se aequalis et pari; ita, qui esset eloquens, eum virtutes omnis habere atque esse sapientem. sed haec erat spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio longeque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat. De Oratore 1.18.83

Here Cicero is primarily objecting to Stoic fashions in argument and rhetoric, although his use of aequalis is parallel to Horace's use of the word at Satires 1.3.9 and, furthermore, in its qualification of virtutes (in the Ciceronian passage) is analogous to, in a slightly different meaning of the word, paria qualifying peccata in verse 96 of the satire. It may also be noted that in verses 69 and 74 Horace employs the word aequum in the sense "equitable". Horace employs these words of cognate meaning and Stoic reference quite consciously to ease the transition from approval of one Stoic notion, that of consistency, to disapproval of another, the paradoxical notion of the equal culpability of all sins.

In the opening section of 1.3, therefore, Horace is utilising a recognisably Stoic doctrine in order to attack Tigellius and the language in which the attack is framed is also recognisably Stoic. That the message is not exclusively Stoic is not at issue. Horace's exploitation, in this approving way, of a Stoic doctrine at the beginning of this poem makes the attacks which he makes upon the Stoa later in this poem and in Satires 2.3 and 2.7 the more interesting. There seems to have been a tension between the acceptable ethical doctrines of the

11 Cf. "Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus." Fin. 3.1.3.
12 See above, n.8.
Stoa and the unacceptable manner in which they were presented. The character of many of those who did the presenting was likewise unacceptable. One is reminded irresistibly here of the criticisms of the church made by C.S. Lewis in his *Screwtape Letters*.13

One also wonders whether the more paradoxical utterances of the early Stoics became an ever greater embarrassment to later adherents of the school in the way that the story of the virgin birth of Christ has caused problems for modern Christian apologists.14 It was possibly the laughter of such critics as Horace which accelerated the modification of Stoicism during its long sojourn in Rome. For, in spite of doctrinaire and hypocritical Stoics,15 the durability and success of Stoicism was largely due to its willingness to adapt itself to circumstances.16 That the later Stoics were aware of Horace and the philosophical relevance of his work is clear from Seneca's comments at *Epistles* 120.20:

\[
\text{qualem hunc describit Horatius numquam eundem,}
\]
\[
\text{ne similem quidem sibi; adeo in diversa aberrat.}
\]

Here Seneca quotes the opening of Horace, *Satires* 1.3 as an example of the veracity and perspicacity of Horatian satire. Seneca is in

14 E.g. John A.T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (SCM Press, 1963), pp. 7-8, "There are ... those ... who see the best, and indeed the only, defence of doctrine to lie in the firm reiteration, in fresh and contemporary language, of 'the faith once delivered to the saints'.... A much more radical recasting ... is demanded, in the process of which the most fundamental categories of our theology - of God, of the supernatural, and of religion itself - must go into the melting (sic) ... we should do well to give up using the word 'God' for a generation, so impregnated it has become with a way of thinking we may have to discard if the Gospel is to signify anything."
15 E.g. those hypocrites attacked by Juvenal in *Satires* 2.
total sympathy with Horace, as may be seen from:

maximum indicium est malae mentis fluctuatio
et inter simulationem virtutum amoremque vitiorum
adsidua iactatio.  
Seneca, Epistles 120.20

It is clear that Seneca took note of Horace's praises of Stoic beliefs and could not have remained insensible of Horace's equally perceptive criticisms.

And yet it is not only in his attacks upon inconsistency that Horace is in sympathy with Stoic views in this satire. When an imaginary interlocutor takes Horace to task for satirising friends:

19-20 nunc aliquis dicat mihi "quid tu?
nulle habes vitia?" immo alia et fortasse minora.

Horace makes it clear that his chiding is gentle in spirit and has a positive aim as befits criticisms which are made by a friend. As Arnold points out, it did not befit the young philosopher to make enemies by harsh criticism. In fact, the right kind of criticism, gentle in spirit, could turn an enemy into a friend. This comment on friendship, although not necessarily nor exclusively Stoic in tone, should, when taken in conjunction with the Stoicising nature of the poem's beginning and the uses of aequum at verses 69 and 74, lead us to look very closely at the grounds upon which Horace takes the Stoics to task in the latter part of the poem.

One reason for Horace's attack is made clear when Horace


18 E.g. "monemus ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum", Seneca, Epist. 95.63. It is interesting to compare Sophocles, Ajax 1376-77, καὶ νῦν γε Τεύκρῳ τάπα τὸδ' ἀγγέλλομαι / ὅσον τὸτ' ἔχθρος ἦ, τοσῶν' εἶναι φίλος.
answers the question nullane habes vitia (v.20) with the words "immo alia et fortasse minora" in the same line. Horace is well aware of his own shortcomings, a fact that adds, rather than detracts from his satire of society at large; his claim here is that his own failings, though real, are minor by comparison with those which he criticises in other people and different in kind. Naturally, therefore, any doctrine which categorically stated that all sins were equal in gravity would have little appeal for him, especially if the doctrine were expounded by a man considered by Horace to be his inferior both as a poet and also intellectually. This is certainly the attitude which Horace displays towards the supposed sapiens and his minion Crispinus at the end of the poem: it is an attitude of mingled antagonism, which is almost personal, and condescension. Whether or not one accepts this interpretation of the tone of the poem, it is indisputable that fortasse minora foreshadows the criticism of the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal. Also foreshadowed is Horace's plea for moderation in criticism, which, although it is in accord with later Stoic beliefs regarding the nature and purposes of amicitia, is nevertheless aimed at the intransigence of the reactionary Stoic attacked under the ironical label of sapiens at the end of the poem. Horace prefers to err on the side of humanity:

vellem in amicitia sic erraremus, et isti errori nomen virtus posuisset honestum.

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19 Cf. Satires 2.3 and 2.7; also in the Odes Horace uses himself as an example, now wiser and older, of the folly at which the particular Ode is directed, e.g. Odes 1.5.13 and 1.16.22, where Horace characteristically introduces me towards the end of the poem.

20 See above n.82: cf. also the discussion of friendship re Sat. 2.6 above.

21 Although Horace is attacking Stoicism, or, at least, one of
However, even here, perhaps in a spirit of irony, Horace employs a word _honestum_, which has inevitable Stoic connotations of Stoic usage for the reader familiar with the language of the Stoics. I say "perhaps in a spirit of irony", because it seems to me an example of typically Horatian wit to apply the word commonly used to describe the unique and rarified virtue of the Stoics to what he ironically describes as an _error_. By means of his irony, which at such times verges on the Socratic, Horace seems to be making the point that many aspects of Stoicism, especially those which deal with the _officia_ of everyday life, had much to commend them, while the extremism, to which men like Stertinius and Crispinus still clung, had not.

Horace introduces his attack upon the Stoic paradox that all sins are equally culpable by suggesting that crimes should be dealt with in proportion to their gravity; in other words, Horace takes the offensive from a standpoint of common-sense and experience, not to say expediency. In so doing, however, Horace uses a word again which has a Stoic flavour, if only because of

the more extreme forms of Stoic doctrines, he is here in accord with the more humane and moderate Stoicism expressed by Cicero, _Off._ 1.136-7 on the virtues of moderation in recrimination, "_obiurgationes etiam non nunquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriere, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest._"  

22 _Honestum_ was one of the words used to describe the _summum bonum_ of the Stoic ethical system, e.g.: "_Zeno is erat qui ... Id appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum_", Cicero, _Academica_ 1.10.36.

23 Horace never made any bones about the fact that his poetry, especially the _Odes_, was directed only at those who by reason of their education could fully appreciate them, e.g. _Sat._ 1.4.73-74; cf. _Sat._ 1.10.73-74 for the circle of friends.

24 One of the major difficulties in which the proponents of the Stoic ethical system found themselves involved was the problem of adequately explaining the transition from the performance of
the demonstrably Stoic ambience of the whole satire to this point. For, at verses 77-79, we have:

\[
\text{cur non ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur, ac res ut quaeque est ita suppliciiis delicta coercet?}
\]

**Ratio** is the word in question. One would not want to push this reference too far, although the conscious use of this word with its readily identifiable Stoic connotations in a passage, which itself foreshadows an attack upon an aspect of Stoicism, may well be another example of Horace's ironical technique, especially when Horace is about to call into question the validity of the *ratio* of the Stoic *sapiens*.26

That Horace attacks the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal from the standpoint of common-sense and experience is made clear by the amusing *exempa*, which he introduces into the poem in verses 80-95. The humanity of his statements on the ethics of crime and punishment are reminiscent of the thought of Protagoras27 and also of Aristotle.28 Horace's attitude is also comparable with that of Cicero. Compare the following lines from the satire with Cicero's remarks which follow:


25 Cf. the ambiguity in the use of *ratio* in Horace, *Satires* 1.1.2 and my discussion of the same at pp.5ff.

26 In the attack upon the *sapiens* who, according to Stoic doctrine, lived in perfect accord with his peculiar nature, i.e. his "rational" element, Horace necessarily questions the validity of both the wise man's way of governing his life, his *ratio vivendi* and hence his *ratio* in the sense of reason.


28 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.4, where, within the context of the doctrine of the *mean*, Aristotle argues that retributive justice should be in proportion to the gravity of the offence or loss.
Both Horace and Cicero are at one in attacking the extreme and theoretical view of the Stoics on the equality of crimes, because it suits their polemical purpose of the moment to concentrate exclusively on that vulnerable aspect of Stoic thought. It is the uncompromising extremism to which both of these men, who are by nature moderates, take exception. Both were, in fact, well aware that, despite this theoretical extremism, the Stoics did not prescribe the same penalties or punishments for all crimes. In the actual world the Stoics were as humane in their theory of punishment as they were extreme in their discussions upon the nature of evil and crime. This can best be seen from the discussions on punishment, clemency and cruelty in the works of Seneca, in particular in the De Clementia, and the De Beneficiis, but also in the De Officiis of Cicero, where Cicero, adapting the Panaetian καὶ ἄνθρωπος shows a particularly humane spirit. The

Cruelty, a vice, is defined at De Clementia 2.4.1 and 3 as "atroctitas animi in exigendis poenis" and "inclinatio animi ad asperiora", while the aims of punishment are described as (i) reformation of the criminal, (ii) the setting of an example to the potential criminal and (iii) the giving of a sense of security to the community by removing offenders, this at Clem. 1.22.1. There is no mention of revenge.

E.g. Ben. 7.20.3; cf. also Cicero, Tusc. 4.21.
passage from the De Officiis 1.89, which is quoted below, is most instructive, because it shows Cicero approving of the thought of a Stoic on the question of punishment with regard to actual crimes, although at De Finibus 4.55 he shows overt disapproval of the extreme view of the Stoics on the equality of all sins. The passage from the De Officiis 1.89 is as follows:

cavendum est etiam, ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem. prohibenda autem maxime est ira in puniendo; numquam enim, iratus qui accedet ad poenam, mediocritatem illam tenebit, quae est inter nimium et parum. quae placet Peripateticis, et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam et dicerent utiliter a natura datam. illa vero omnibus in rebus repudienda est optandumque, ut ii, qui praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae ad puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate dicuntur. 31

Cicero, in reproducing the modified Stoicism of Panaetius, writes what almost amounts to a prose version of Horace's plea for moderation and realism in Satires 1.3. Horace, however, whose purpose is to produce a reductio ad absurdum of the Stoic view, would not even accept the magnifice primo dici viderentur of Cicero. The satirist is not able to give the devil his due, since this process detracts from the caricature of Stoicism, which must itself be extreme, if it is to be satirically effective. A satirist's picture need not have, and does not have in this instance, philosophical validity. It suits Horace's purpose not to examine the rationale which lay behind the paradox and it suits him equally to ignore the more moderate Stoic ideas on punishment already mentioned. If Horace had taken cognisance, within the

31 Cf. Seneca's discussion of anger and punishment in the De Ira; for a history of the topic in the ancient authors, see A. Bourgery, Sénèque, Dialogues (Paris, 1961) 1, pp.xvi-xix.
satire, of these considerations, it would have undercut the vividness of the satirical picture which he paints. Such a technique would be dishonest in a supposedly dispassionate account by one philosopher of the work of another. However, although Horace had the training and intellect to make such a dispassionate study, such was not his purpose in this satire. Also, in a conversation, which is what the individual Satires (or Sermones) purport to be, the aim is not to justify each position adopted in the most convincing way possible. Horace is not composing a philosophical treatise, but attacking, from the standpoint of the common man, or from the standpoint of the common sense of traditional Roman values, or from the standpoint of common sense Aristotelianism. Horace's aim is to be both as destructive and entertaining as possible. That the attack upon Stoic extremism and upon the foibles of such second-rate practitioners as Crispinus is more personal than philosophical in tone may be seen from the way in which Horace sidesteps the interlocutor's explanation of how critics like himself have misunderstood the meaning of Chrysippus' work or consciously ignored that meaning:

126-128 "non nosti quid pater," inquit, "Chrysippus dicat: sapiens crepidas sibi numquam nec soleas fecit; sutor tamen est sapiens."

Palmer explains the meaning of the paradox as follows:

32 Epicurus, for example, also claimed that his philosophy was intended to serve as the means of salvation for the common man, hence he objected to the dialectic and logic of Plato and Aristotle, τὴν διάλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἰπποδοκιμάζουσιν, Diogenes Laertius, 10.31.

33 It may be thought that Horace, in fact, only sympathised with Stoicism when it was compatible with these values. For further comment on this question see the discussion of Satires 2.2 below.

34 For Aristotle's view see Nicomachean Ethics 5.4.
The wise man is potentially a good shoemaker, though he never made shoes; as Hermogenes is a famous singer, although not singing at the time; as Alfenus remained a barber after giving up his trade: in this sense a wise man may even be called a king. 35

Because the response which Horace allows himself to make at this juncture of the poem is typical of the wilful anti-philosophical stance, which he has assumed throughout Satires 1.3, we are not to suppose that he was less capable than Palmer of following the workings of Chrysippus' mind. However, it does not suit his purpose to become embroiled in philosophical debate, so he resorts to abuse, but subtle abuse. It is subtle because he uses other mouths, those of lascivi pueri (v.134), to make fun of the sapiens. The ridicule which is poked at the philosopher is not even original. It springs from the kind of abuse poured on the Academicians by the poets of New Comedy. 36 Also the abuse is subtle, because the final picture, which Horace draws of the

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35 A. Palmer, The Satires of Horace (London, 1888) note ad loc; on the concept of the sapiens as king, see Plutarch, De Tranq. Animi 12.472a (S.V.F. 3.164.23-26), where Plutarch compares the seriousness of this belief among the Stoics with the mockery it inspires among others.

36 The opening of Satires 1.4 shows that Horace intends to write in the comic spirit, if not the "new" comic spirit of the Greeks, although note Satires 2.3.11-12. Philosophers were fair game for satirists from the time of the Clouds of Aristophanes, but, so far as one can judge from the fragments of Middle and New Comedy, the habit of attacking philosophers was especially common among the Hellenistic comic poets: the main targets were the dress and general appearance of the philosophers and also their practical uselessness and their frequent hypocrisy. Typical is Anaxippus' comment in Keraunos: οἵμοι φιλοσοφεῖς ἀλλὰ τοὺς γε φιλοσόφους ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φρονοῦντας ἐφρύσκω μόνον, ἐν τοῖσι δ' ἐργοῖς οὔτας ἀνοήτους ὀρᾷ. On Horace and comedy see Rand, Horace and the Spirit of Comedy (Rice Institute Pamphlets, 24.2), where the author discusses Horace's debt to the comic writers, esp. in his attacks upon the Stoics in Satires 2.3 and 2.7, e.g. "He serves the Stoics in the same style as before, laughing at their auctioneering the while he steals their wares", p.77.
supposed "kingly" wise man, is pathetic in the extreme and so utterly different from the proud conception of the sapiens to be found, for example, in the fourth book of Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, and at the close of the third Book of the De Finibus.

To sum up: Horace, although tacitly approving certain Stoic doctrines, such as the Stoics' praise of consistency, and although employing, for the sake of irony, words with recognisable Stoic pedigrees, such as ratio and honestum, makes it the business of his satire to attack those areas of Stoic doctrine most sensitive to criticism and open to ridicule by the reductio ad absurdum process. Such areas of doctrine are the Stoic paradoxes and the picture of the ideally wise man. Later Stoics, such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, tended to play down the role of such ideas in the overall Stoic philosophy as were best depicted by the paradoxes. The sapiens was readily admitted to be rara avis. 37

This modification of Stoic doctrine, as has been made clear, had its origins in the work of Panaetius, popularised at Rome by Cicero. Cicero recognised that what were of value to Romans were the less extreme of the Stoic doctrines, especially those which described the officia of day to day living. Horace also recognised the value of these "useful" Stoic doctrines; the question which must be asked, however, in relation to Horace's attitude towards these doctrines, is this: how far is Horace's approval limited to those aspects of the Stoic ethics compatible with established Roman custom? Does, as Lejay suggests, 38 Horace give, in the satirical poems, the view of a practical and traditional Roman, who felt that the Stoic ideas were all very

37 E.g. Seneca, De Tran. 7.4, "ubi enim istum (sapientem) invenies, quem saeculis quae- rimus?"
38 Horace, Satires, p.7.
well, but essentially unnecessary? The point can be made that the use of such words as honestum, ratio, and aequalitas bring this latter purpose to the fore; although it is true that they have developed a Stoic aura during the century before Horace wrote the Satires, they did have a strictly Roman ethical and legal pedigree long before that. It was during this period before the intrusion of Greek influence that Rome became great; therefore, the traditional values, which sufficed then and which, to a large extent, parallel Stoic thought now, except where Stoic thought is ridiculously extreme, should be sufficient as a guide for our life now. However, as has been suggested in the discussion of Satires 1.1 and 1.2, Horace could also exploit Stoic tags or doctrines for formative purposes within his poems, while, his main aim, the satire of the contemporary Roman world, could be aided by employing Stoicising attacks, where such attacks were relevant, and by employing the techniques of the Stoic diatribe.

39 This takes as a convenient date for the approximate start of the "contact period" 156 B.C. the date of the "embassy of philosophers"; cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.5.

40 The deleterious effects upon Rome of external influences were made much of by Sallust, Cat. 7-13 and Cicero, Rep. 2.3.5-9; Cato Maior was also concerned with this topic, speaking against, for example, the Athenian embassy of philosophers in 156 B.C.; see Plutarch, Cato Maior 22.
Both the elusive and allusive nature of Horace's treatment of and attitude towards the Stoa have become evident in the foregoing discussion of Satires 1.1-3. Horace's attitude has been particularly difficult to pin down because, except in the latter half of 1.3, the Stoa was only incidentally his focus of attention. However, in Satires 2.3 and 2.7 we have two poems which deal throughout with Stoicism and which should make clearer Horace's attitudes towards the Stoa. This chapter will discuss Satires 2.3 in considerable detail.

Although Satires 2.3 is the longest of the Satires of Horace, the structure of the poem presents no particular problem comparable, for example, with the vexed question of the structures of Satires 1.1 and 1.2. In this satire, as was pointed out by Lejay,¹ the conversation between Horace and Damasippus forms a frame for the speeches which are made by Stertinius to Damasippus and to mankind in general: Stertinius speaks to Damasippus personally from vv.38-76 and to mankind in general from vv.77-295. The introductory conversation between Horace and Damasippus at vv.1-37 and the final altercation between them at vv.296-326 are of comparable length and provide a readily recognisable frame for

¹ Lejay, p.356.
the diatribe of Stertinius. For it is a diatribe which Stertinius produces, expounding, elaborating and illustrating, by means of various exempla, the Stoic paradox ὅτι πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. All men are mad, except the sapiens, declares Stertinius, because they are under the influence of:

a) avarice - vv.82-167
b) ambition - vv.187-223
c) luxury - vv.224-246
d) sex - vv.247-280
e) superstition - vv.281-295

So much is clear, although there are inequalities in the treatment of these chosen topics within the framework of the diatribe. M. Cartault explains these "inégalités" adequately:

Ces inégalités, qui contrastent avec les prétentions logiques du début du discours et avec la raideur de l'argumentation Stoicienne, sont le résultat des libertés que se permet Horace et de sa répulsion pour la symétrie.

One should also add that, apart from the repugnance which Horace may have felt at too perfect a symmetrical arrangement from the point of view of "poiesis", it was his intention to describe as realistically as possible the outpourings of a Stoic preacher, who was not of the first rank. Also, despite "la raideur de l'argumentation Stoicienne", the Stoics were well aware of the advantages of a more disjointed delivery. This point is well made by V. Brochard:

It seems that when the Stoics talk of the necessity of

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2 For a prose treatment of this theme, see Cicero, Paradoxa, 4.
3 This formulation is a modification of that of Lejay, p.356; however, on the division between a) and b) see above, pp.84 ff.
conceiving of a particular thing ... they take refuge in a kind of 'common-sense', in an accumulation of experience felt throughout the world, to certain empirical axioms consecrated by usage, by tradition, especially by language and by the universal consent argument... The fund of shared experience guarantees somehow or other the actual experience of each individual, while to argue against the results obtained in this way is to fly in the face of self-evident truths and dogmata. It is to be self-contradictory and to put at risk the very concept of oral and written communication. There is ... a method of argument per enumerationem simplicem which is made without order and without method, but the results of which would seem to be certain, because they are not contested and because one cannot see the way in which they can be by-passed.\(^5\)

I quote Brochard's description of this particularly Stoic form of argumentation, because it is by no means clear whether or not Horace, although ostensibly satirising Damasippus and Stertinius, is in sympathy with the moralising to which Stertinius gives vent. If, as Rand suggests,\(^6\) Horace is attacking the means of exposition, but appropriating the message, where it avoids extremes, because the reader soon falls into the position of identifying the moralising voice of the poem's centre with that of Horace himself, then Horace is betraying that same sort of ambiguity which has been pointed out in the discussions of Satires 1.1-3. For, if Horace is in sympathy with much of the message of Stertinius, as it concerns the foibles of mankind, why does Horace react so violently towards Damasippus at the end of the poem?

Horace reacts with verbal violence in much the same way as, at the

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\(^6\) Rand, Horace and the Spirit of Comedy (Rice Institute Pamphlet, 24.2).
close of *Satires* 2.7, he reacts with threatened physical violence towards his outspoken slave Davus. Horace reacts violently, because he objects on the one hand, to the form of the exposition (as described by Brochard) and on the other hand, to the personal attack upon himself. This form of exposition is difficult to argue against since it appears to demand a necessary acceptance of the self-evident truth of its content. That Horace recognised the effectiveness of this kind of exposition is made clear by the way in which he utilises the method himself in *Satires* 2.2, in order to expound views with which he had some sympathy, namely the traditional moral views of the countryman Ofellus. There is no difficulty in accepting that a poet can exploit a particular means of exposition, while not approving of the method on moral or philosophical grounds. This merely suggests that the poet is something of an opportunist, with a ready eye for that which will make each poem produced by him as successful as possible. There is, however, some difficulty involved in understanding how a poet can utilise such a "doubtful" means of persuasion to propound views with which he is himself partially in sympathy and yet manifest great indignation when the moral point of some of those views seems to be directed at himself. For, although Horace may well have felt that the extreme position of the Stoic paradox ὅτι πᾶς ἄρσων μαίνεται, as depicted in *Satires* 2.3 was ridiculous, even as the Stoic paradox that all sins are equally culpable was equally ridiculous in *Satires* 1.3, he would have felt much sympathy with the illustrative material he puts into Stertinius' mouth, so that the bare bones of the paradox may be fleshed out. Also, although the fourfold division of Stertinius' diatribe is based upon the categorisation of vices attributed to Zeno by
Stobaeus, nevertheless, Horace gives Stertinius' words an unmistakably Roman flavour by his choice of examples, not the least important of which is Horace himself, who is taken to task by Damisippus. These examples are largely, as Lejay puts it, 
"indéterminés ou anonymes" and "purement Romains". However, if Horace takes these pains to make the diatribe more persuasive to a Roman audience, of which he himself was, within the fiction of the satire, a member, why the indignation and anger which is manifested at the satire's close? The answer may be that a Roman of good-sense, like Horace, or Ofellus in Satires 2.2, does not need a second-rate Greek philosopher to provide a modus vivendi. This feeling of superiority is sufficient to explain only some of Horace's anger towards Damasippus and Stertinius, and would place him in that line of the tradition in satire which goes back to Lucilius who, although he was like Cato Maior, aware of the blessings conferred by Greek literature, was also suspicious of the pervasive influence of things Greek upon Roman society in general. A detailed examination of the Stoic and non-Stoic content of the satire should help to clarify why and how Horace exploits the Stoics in this poem. Such an examination will also give some indication of how to approach not only Satires 2.7,

7 καὶ δὲ τὸιαὐτὰ ἀφφοιτὴν, ἀκολογίαν, ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν, καὶ πάν ὃ ἐστὶ κακία ἢ μετέχον κακίας. Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.57.18.
8 Lejay, p.373.
9 Even the example which Horace uses to illuminate superstition, the sacrifice of Iphigenia, would have been familiar to Roman readers from a Roman context, if only because Lucretius uses the same exemplum at De Rerum Natura 1.80-101.
10 Cf. Lejay, p.380, "Le Romain de bon sens se montre supérieur à tout prétentieux prédicateur, à Crispinus et à Damasippe."
but also the other moral Satires such as 2.2 and 2.6.

**B**

ANTICIPATORY CHARACTERISATION IN VV.1-31

The ironical tone in which Horace deals with Damasippus and, through him, with Stertinius, is set by the opening comments put into Damasippus' mouth by Horace:

1-16  'Sic raro scribis ut toto non quater anno membranam poscas, scriptorum quaeque retexens, iratus tibi quod vini somnique benignus nil dignum sermone canas. quid fiet? at ipsis Saturnalibus huc fugisti. sobrius ergo dic aliquid dignum promissis: incipe. nil est: culpantur frustra calami, immeritusque laborat iratis natus paries dis atque poetis. atqui vultus erat multo et praeclera mirantis, si vacuum tepido cepisset villula tecto. quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro, Eupolin, Archilochum, comites educere tantos? invidiam placare paras virtute relicta? contemnere miser; vitanda est improba siren desidia, aut quidquid vita meliore parasti ponendum aequo animo.'

Note first that, at the beginning of Horace's longest satire, he allows Damasippus to take him to task for literary desidia. Horace suggests that Damasippus mistakes the idleness enforced by serious composition for laziness. Therefore, despite his interest in humanism, which has been inspired by his contact with the Stoics (v.19), Damasippus betrays himself insensitive to the demands made upon an author by his calling. Horace was himself a literary perfectionist, as may be seen not only from the Ars Poetica, but also from the nature of his attacks upon the careless-
ness in composition of Lucilius:

\[ \ldots \text{durus componere versus:} \]
\[ \text{nam fuit hoc vitiosus: in hora saepe ducentos,} \]
\[ \text{ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno:} \]
\[ \text{cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles:} \]
\[ \text{garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem,} \]
\[ \text{scribendi recte.} \]

Horace, *Satires* 1.4.8-13

Horace's irony has added point, when one remembers that one of the reasons for mentioning Fabius and Crispinus, the Stoic writers, in the first satire\(^\text{12}\) was to mock their verbosity, which Horace had no intention of matching. In fact, in *Satires* 1.4.14-21 Horace describes the kind of challenge which the copious Crispinus flings out to such perfectionists as himself. Horace is grateful to the gods because they have endowed him with a sparing and parsimonious genius, *inopis ... pusilli / animi, raro et perpauc\(a\) loquentis.*\(^\text{13}\) Horace did not intend this criticism of his supposed *desidia* to be taken seriously and, therefore, suggests by his inclusion of this criticism, that Damasippus' judgement is to be considered suspect. This does not prevent the description, given by Damasippus, of the frustrations, which the poet endures while in the throes of composition, from ringing true. The description of the symptoms is accurate, the diagnosis of the disease is not.

Horace does not give the name of Damasippus until v.16, neither does he inform the reader of Damasippus' philosophical persuasion until, at v.33, Damasippus refers to Stertinius and, at v.44, to the *Chrysippi porticus et grex.* In other words, the

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\(^{12}\) Horace, *Satires* 1.1.13-14 and 120-121; we note that, by contrast with these copious writers and with Lucilius, Horace reworks what he has written because his ultimate aim is perfection. This is the strength of *scriptorum quaeque retexens*, (2.3.2).

\(^{13}\) Horace, *Satires* 1.4.17-18.
identity of Horace's critic and his beliefs emerge naturally in the course of the conversation.\textsuperscript{14} We are plunged in medias res. However, Horace does prepare his readers, so that the identification of Damasippus as a Stoic comes as no surprise. Horace achieves this by sprinkling terms and references of possible, but not conclusive, Stoic connotation both in the preliminary remarks of Damasippus and in Horace's responses to them. In the speech with which Damasippus opens the satire, the Stoicising references which first occur are as follows:

i) nil dignum sermone canas v.4

ii) dic aliquid dignum promissis v.6

These two clauses are open to various interpretations. Horace is again consciously exploiting the possibilities of ambiguity. The various interpretations are as follows:

i) The phrase\textit{ dignum sermone} is equivalent to λόγου δέκτου and means "worth mention";\textsuperscript{15} parallels in Greek are Herodotus 1.133 and Thucydides 1.73, while in Latin there is little to suggest that\textit{ dignum} and\textit{ sermo} were commonly linked in this way. One could object that\textit{ sermo} is usually used of conversation between a group of people and is not merely a synonym for\textit{ verbum}. On the other hand,\textit{ dignum sermone} may mean "worthy of comment in a conversation".

ii) The phrase may mean "worthy of\textit{ sermo} or satire". This view is untenable. As Lejay says, "C'est supposer au\textit{ sermo} une dignité a laquelle ne songe pas Horace."\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. also the beginning of\textit{ Satires} 2.7, where the reader is plunged in medias res, although the identity of the initial speaker in that poem is established by verse two.

\textsuperscript{15} This is the interpretation, for example, of Palmer in his note on the passage and also of Rudd (p.82 of Penguin translation); cf. also Lejay, p.391.

\textsuperscript{16} Lejay, p.391.
iii) Related to ii) is the interpretation which would lead to translating the phrase as "worthy of publication", i.e. "worthy of inclusion within one of your own satires". The fact that sermo is not found in the singular, meaning a single example of Horace's satires or Sermones, does not preclude the possibility of such an interpretation.

iv) The phrase may mean "worthy of your words", i.e. "worthy of what you said you would do" ... when your environment matched your mood. This interpretation is supported by the dignum promissis at v.6; for although it is un-Horatian to repeat dignum within the space of so few lines, yet, if the meanings of the two phrases dignum sermone and dignum promissis are parallel, the repetition is not harsh, but emphatic. The poet is thought of as being angry (iratus, v.3), because his life of ease and debauch has prevented him from composing anything "worthy of his own comments". Damasippus tells him, therefore, to sober up (sobrius, v.5) and to produce (dic, v.6) something "worthy of the promises he has made".

Of these interpretations ii) is the least likely. Each of the others is possible. However, the repetition of dignum in vv.3 and 6 may have more point than that considered even under iv). Dignum in Latin, like ἀξιόν in Greek, has specific Stoic connotations. Therefore, the repetition may well be intended to have the effect of characterising Damasippus as the Stoic neophyte, upon whose tongue Stoic phrases are ever to the fore. It would

17 Cf. atqui vultus erat multa et praeclara minantis, si vacuum tepido cepisset villula tecto, (9-10).
18 For a discussion of dignum and ἀξιόν in a Stoic sense see Cicero, Fin. 3.50-51.
19 For a discussion of the influence of comedy upon other aspects of Horace's dramatic technique in the satires, see the discussion of Satires 2.7 below.
also be in keeping with the professed Stoic ideals of Damasippus, if he deplored the waste of Horace's talent as a writer and his devotion to the attractions of wine and sleep. For, even as the Stoics believed that a man's actions should spring from a settled disposition of the soul, settled in accord with nature, they also believed that it was a man's duty to choose his vocation in accord with his peculiar genius or talents, which is another way of saying "in accord with (his) nature." This is made clear by Cicero in the first book of the De Officiis:

i) "sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas." 

Off. 1.110

ii) "suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum indicem praebat..." ibid. 114

iii) "itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere." ibid. 115

Therefore, the supposed desidia of Horace would be seen by Damasippus as a dereliction of that duty which he owed to ingenium suum, that is, to his function as a poet. The idea of the

20 On the asceticism of the Stoics see Arnold, pp.258,362 and 409; it was the role of the human reason to suppress the appetites, e.g. "intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse", Cicero, Off. 1.103.

21 See the discussion of consistency below at pp.25-27.

22 It is interesting to compare this Stoic concept of decorum re the individual with the Platonic concept of justice which is propounded in the Republic and which declares that each man should do what is appropriate to his psychological constitution, τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθὲς, τοιοῦτον τι ἢν, ὡς ἐσμεν, ἢ ὁμαλοσύνη ἄλλ' οὔ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πολέμιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἄλλα περὶ τὴν ἔντος, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. Plato, Republic 443e.
dereliction of duty is picked up towards the end of Damasippus' speech:

13 invidiam placare paras virtute relicta?

Once again it is difficult to pin down the exact meaning of virtute relicta, although the general drift is clear from the context; for example, Palmer says, rather blandly, "giving up the castigation of vice is meant." There are, however, various routes by which one can arrive at this conclusion.

i) If we were to take our lead from the opening of Satires 2.2:

\[\text{Satires 2.2.1} \]

we would take virtute relicta to mean "the study of moral virtue being neglected." That is to say: Horace believes that, by refraining from writing such morally edifying poems as Satires 2.2, which, as a form of literature, naturally arouses ill-feeling among those lacking moral virtue, he will ease the odium which he has already aroused. Rather, says Damasippus, he will now be despised as well as disliked.

ii) It is possible to take Damasippus' reference to virtute relicta as being sarcastic in the sense that, although the direct translation of the line would be, "Do you think to assuage the ill-feeling you have aroused in others by leaving alone their virtue?" the implication is that Horace is leaving alone their vices also, which, incidentally, are in the preponderance.

iii) It is clear that interpretations i) and ii) are closely related. However, they do not seem to me to fit closely enough in with the context and tone of Damasippus' remarks to make absolutely perfect sense. I wish to return to the Stoic concept

23 Palmer, n. ad loc. p.277.
of doing oneself justice by attending to the completion of one's own peculiar functions and skills. If we consider that Damasippus is a devotee of what is essentially a Greek philosophical system, then we ought to be aware of the possibility that such a word as virtus in v.13 may be a translation of a Greek concept, especially when it follows the mention of the Greek authors, who are enumerated in vv.11-12. Additionally one can draw the parallel between dignum sermone and ἄξιον λόγου in v.4, even if this is not the prime meaning of this consciously ambiguous phrase. The natural Greek equivalent of virtus is, of course, ἀρετή, which is frequently used in Plato's dialogues with the meaning of excellence in a particular skill or τέχνη, as well as meaning excellence in the business of living. The Stoics also recognised the close relationship between ἀρετή and τέχνη, both in the immediate context of human existence and also, on the cosmic scale, in the organisation of the universe through its interpenetration by the πῦρ τεχνικόν. The human soul was itself thought by the Stoics to be a particle of this πῦρ τεχνικόν, interpenetrating the human body in precisely the manner in which

24 See Cicero, Off. 1.110-115, and discussion on pp.48-49 above.
25 Without wishing to become embroiled in the discussion about the identity of Platona, whether comicus or philosophus, in v.11, a discussion dealt with by Lejay, n. ad loc. and by Rudd (p.163 of Penguin translation in notes on Satires 2.3), I would suggest that the philosopher is, in fact, intended. The Satires are dialogues; the arrangement of these four names with the sequence "philosopher", "comedian-comedian", "satirist" is more satisfying than "comedian" x 3 - "satirist". Also the emphasis on virtus and moral philosophy throughout the poem, along with the immeasurably greater fame of the philosopher, points in the same direction.
26 See discussion above, pp.46-47.
27 E.g. Plato, Protagoras 322d.
28 E.g. S.V.F. 3.49.4-8, esp. ὄλου γὰρ τοῦ βίου ἐστὶ τέχνη ἢ ἀρετή, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ σύμμοιρον. Ἐγγίζεις.
29 E.g. S.V.F. 1.34.21-33 (Stobaeus on Zeno), cf. also, in the Roman authors Cicero, N.D. 2.57 and Acad. 1.39.
the πῦρ τεχνικόν or fiery logos interpenetrated the universe.  

Although the discussion may seem to have drifted away from the meaning of the phrase *virtute relictā* in *Satires 2.3.13*, nevertheless I suggest that there are good grounds for believing that *virtus* in this instance is akin to ὁρευμή in the sense of τέχνη, and that Damasippus is chiding Horace for neglecting to live and work in accord with the virtues, skills or talents of his own peculiar nature. Horace's peculiar skill is the composition of satirical poetry which attacks the shortcomings of others. If this skill is neglected (*virtute relictā*), because Horace is less than assured of his social position, then he will indeed become an object of contempt for not having the courage of his convictions.

If interpretation (iii) is acceptable, then we may say that Horace has seized another opportunity of characterising Damasippus, before his identity and beliefs are formally announced.

Horace's response to these remarks of Damasippus also suggests that they have identified the speaker's beliefs to Horace. For, whereas the fashion of sporting a beard had been the hallmark of philosophers, especially of members of the Academy, pilloried by the poets of New Comedy in the Hellenistic period, in later times the wearing of the beard had become particularly identified as a Stoic trait. So Horace's:

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30 E.g. Cicero, N.D. 2.40-41 and Censorinus, De Die Nat. 4.10, "Zenon Citieus, Stoicae sectae conditor, principium humano generi ex novo mundo constitutum putavit, primosque homines ex solo, adminiculo divini ignis, id est, dei providentia, genitos"; cf. Varro, L.L. 59, "sive, ut Zenon Citieus, animalium semen ignis fīt, qui anima ac mens."

31 E.g. Ephippus caricatures a young man from the Academy in his *Nauagos*: ἐὗ μὲν μαχαλῷα ξύστ' ἔχων τριχώματα, ἐὗ δ' ὑποκαθιεῖς ἄτομα πῶγωνος βάθη, ἐὗ δ' ἐν πεδίλῳ πόδα δεθεῖς ὑποξύρφ... *Edmonds, G.C.F. 3b.14*

32 On the significance of the beard to the Stoic, see A.C.
16-17  
di te, Damasippe, deaeque
verum ob consilium donent tonsore.
immediately makes it likely that Damasippus is a Stoic. Also
Horace's question:
17-18  
sed unde
tam bene me nosti?
allows Damasippus to explain his conversion into a philanthropic
humanist, again in terms which anticipate his identification as
a Stoic in v.44. The description of the effect of Damasippus'
conversion is as follows:
18-20  
postquam omnis res mea Ianum
ad medium fracta est, aliena negotia curo,
excussus propriis.
Although Socrates\(^33\) and Diogenes\(^34\) were perhaps the original,
self-confessed, "citizens of the world", it was the Stoics who
gave a technical basis to the belief in the brotherhood of man.\(^35\)
The idea of the cosmopolis had an obvious appeal to those
concerned with the justification of imperialism, if an actual
empire could be visualised as the manifestation of the Stoic
cosmopolis.\(^36\) However, our concern here is the effect this idea

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van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and the Greek Diatribe,
Eng. trans. by B.L. Hijmans (Utrecht, 1936), pp.119f.

33 Cicero, Tusc. 5.108.
34 Diogenes Laertius, 6.63.
35 The belief is summed up well by Seneca, Epist. 95.52-53,
"omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt,
umnum est; membra sumus corporis magni. natura nos cognatos
edidit, cum ex isdem et in eadem gigneret."
36 Arnold discusses this concept at p.274 of Roman Stoicism,
but without reference to primary sources. The identification
of cosmopolis with patria is implied at Cicero, Rep. 1.19,
but without any intention of justifying the imperium.
Plutarch, De Alexandri Virtute 1.329A makes a contrast
between Zeno's "dream" cosmopolis and the actual empire of
Alexander, τούτο ξήνων μὲν ἐγραφεν ὄσπερ ὅπερ ἡ εἰδώλων
εὔνοιάς φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτείας ἀνατυπωσάμενος, Ἀλέξανδρος
δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον παρέσχεν.
had upon the behaviour of individual to individual and the spirit of enlightened altruism to which it gave birth. However, the very way in which Horace formulates this answer of Damasippus to the question of verses 17-18 suggests, with a degree of irony, that Damasippus is only now interested in the affairs of Horace, because he has no affairs of his own to concern him; he is *excussus propriis* (20). Horace is not prepared to allow a man who is about to criticise him to have genuine altruistic feelings, even within the fiction of a satire. This cynical response on the part of Horace is reminiscent of Menedemus' brusque attitude towards that other well-intentioned, and subsequently ridiculous, meddler Chremes in Terence's *Heautontimoroumenos* 75-76:

Me. Chreme, tantumne ab re tuast oti tibi aliena ut cures ea quae nil ad te attinent? Horace, in fact, expresses surprise that Damasippus has turned away from the love of objets d'art to love of humanity:

26-27

et miror morbi purgatum te illius.

Horace's caustic wit is evident here, not only in the obvious sarcasm and coarse expression of the comment, but also because of the way in which he employs Stoic terminology to add point to this description of a conversion to Stoicism. The metaphorical

use of morbus as a sickness of the mind, which may be cured or purged by the medicine of philosophy, is not peculiar to the Stoics. However, the fact that a parallel use is to be found in the actual Stoic diatribe of Stertinius, within this poem, does strengthen the impression that in vv.26-27 Horace is being consciously witty. The parallel case is at vv.120-121:

120-121 nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem.

By the time we reach the end of the poem we will feel that Damasippus has perhaps swallowed the Stoicism of Stertinius too readily and with too little comprehension of all its ramifications. At this stage of the satire it is already clear that Horace intends us to recognise Damasippus as some sort of a Stoic, before the reference to Stertinius at v.33, to the Stoic paradox ὃτι μᾶς ἀφρων μαίνεται at v.32, and the conclusive reference to Chrysippi porticus et grex at v.44. We would have to be very slow indeed, in fact, if we were not convinced of the Stoic identity of Damasippus by the time we had reached the reference to the paradox and by the reference, at v.35, to the typical Stoic beard which Stertinius instructed Damasippus to cultivate. Knowing Horace's attitude to the Stoics in part, from past comments in Satires 1.3, we are, therefore, warned in advance to expect Damasippus to be ludicrous and loquacious. Horace also suggests, by his ironical plea to be spared from physical violence, that this new passion which has seized Damasippus is of a type which has unbalanced his

38 Chrysippus was, however, especially fond of the parallel between vice and physical ailments, as may be seen from Cicero, Tusc. 4.23, "nimium operae consumitur a Stoicis, maxume a Chrysippo, dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitudo".

39 See above, n.32.

40 Vv.34-35.
mind. Provoked by Horace's flippant irony, in much the same way as Thrasymachus, as portrayed in Plato, *Republic* 1, was provoked by the irony of Socrates, Damasippus reports the circumstances of his meeting with Stertinius and the diatribe which converted him to Stoicism. With great economy Horace has prepared the ground for the delivery of the diatribe, both by his subtle anticipatory characterisation of Damasippus as a new and enthusiastic convert to Stoicism, and by the betrayal of his own cynicism towards the genuineness of Damasippus' beliefs. The delivery of the diatribe, which, though originating with Stertinius, is reported in Platonic fashion by Damasippus, is directly motivated by the conflict between the urgency of Damasippus and Horace's casual amusement.

C

THE PRELUDE, VV.31-46

However, the diatribe itself is anticipated by a tightly constructed passage of fifteen lines which serves as a bridge between the introductory conversation and the main business of the poem. This is an attack upon human nature from the point of view of the Stoic who believes in the validity of the paradox πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. This paradox occurs twice within these fifteen lines - at the beginning and end of the section. On the first occasion Damasippus speaks, as in a fit of pique, and on the second, seeking to justify his acceptance of the paradox, which sprang rather hastily to his lips, he quotes Stertinius' formulation of the paradox, which, in turn, leads into the report of the whole of the diatribe of Stertinius. The structure and text of these fifteen lines, which serve as prelude to the diatribe, are as follows:
Damasippus states the paradox in a fit of temper:—

"o bone, ne te frustrere, insanis et tu stultique prope omnes..."

Damasippus gives his immediate source for the paradox:—

si quid Sterinius veri crepat, unde ego mira descripsi docilis praecepta haec...

Damasippus describes the situation and time of hearing the paradox:—

tempore quo me solatus iussit sapientem pascere barbam atque a Fabricio non tristem ponte reverti.

Damasippus explains the situation:—

nam male re gesta cum vellem mittere operto me capite in flumen, dexter stetit et...

Stertinius dissuades Damasippus from such a misguided and unworthy step. The paradox, of which Damasippus is unaware is hinted at:—

cave faxis te quicquam indignum; pudor, inquit, te malus angit, insanos qui inter vereare insanus haberi.

primum nam inquiram quid sit fuere: hoc si erit in te solo, nil verbi, pereas quin fortiter, addam.

Stertinius states both the paradox itself and the source from which it derived:—

quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex autumat. haec populos, haec magnos formula reges, excepto sapiente, tenet.

These fifteen lines are wrought by Horace into a tight unity by the exploitation of ring structure. If A = "statement of paradox", B = "source of paradox", C = "narrative or explanatory text", then the structure of this passage may be represented as follows:

A B C C C B A.

The mingling of the statement of the paradox and its source
within the lines spoken by Stertinius avoids that stultifying total symmetry to which Horace was so averse. Clearly, then, in order to emphasise the unity of this specific sub-section within the poem, Horace exploits the device of ring-structure and the passages, which, as it were, forge that structure, are different statements of the same Stoic paradox. These statements are coupled with their respective sources in such a way that the first statement, motivated by temper, and its source, Stertinius, anticipate the second statement, which is made by Stertinius, whose sources are Chrysippus and the Stoics. The second statement and its sources anticipate, in turn, that lengthy explanation and illustration of the paradox by Stertinius which forms the major body of the poem. The art, by means of which the major concern of the poem, which is a satire upon human life from the point of view of the paradox πάντα ἀφων ἡμέντα, is introduced, is further disguised by the changes in speaker and in the different moods of the speakers. These changes both of speaker and mood match the formal progression of the poem in such a way that form and meaning complement each other as in a Platonic dialogue or a Sophoclean tragedy, "si parva licet conponere magnis."

However, this prelude to the diatribe of Stertinius is not merely interesting from the point of view of its formal excellence and of its role within the structure of the larger whole. The content too repays study in that we can again see Horace indulging in anticipatory characterisation, but, on this occasion, of Stertinius, and exploiting Stoic terminology and doctrine both towards this end, the characterisation of Stertinius and Damasippus, and also with a view to increasing the wit and

41 See n. 4 to Chap. 3 above (p.40).
humorous content of his poem. It is especially important that we gauge Horace's attitude towards Stertinius as accurately as possible; for it is upon the accuracy of that estimation that our correct interpretation of the poem depends, since no such correct interpretation immediately suggests itself. Horace never makes it clear whether or not we are intended to forget that he is speaking in a persona other than his own throughout this, the longest and most important section of the poem. It is, therefore, necessary to study in some detail the content, as well as the form, of the proem to the diatribe, as well as the form and content of the diatribe itself. Only by so doing can we hope to ascertain what Horace's attitude is, both to Stertinius himself and to the ideas to which he allows Stertinius to give vent.

One should assume that Horace is capable of consciously disguising these attitudes and that he does, in fact, do so for specific purposes, rather than assume with Rudd that "difficulties" of interpretation spring from faulty workmanship. It is dangerous to take refuge in that critical bolthole which charges incompetence to such a painstaking artist as Horace, if a more satisfactory explanation is available. While admitting that Horace and Damasippus are potentially an ideally contrasting pair, Rudd complains:

Unfortunately the picture becomes blurred at a number of points. Damasippus' remark about minding other people's business after wrecking his own (aliena negotia curo, / excussus propriis) might be just inadvertance, but he ought not to use the disrespectful 'spiel' (crepat) in connexion with his teacher's sermon, and he ought not to refer so flippantly to his own beard, which was the symbol of his belief. All these are Horace's jokes and should

42 Rudd, Satires of Horace, pp.174-175.
not be put in Damasippus' mouth.

Rudd seems (consistently) to miss or misinterpret the point of what Horace is actually saying throughout this passage.

Regarding "aliena negotia curo / excussus propriis" (vv.19-20) I have already made sufficient comment; 

Horace undercuts the authority of Damasippus as a speaker and his altruism as a Stoic humanist by the irony of this self-betrayal. Damasippus is shown to be lacking in both sensitivity and intelligence. This we already knew from his misinterpretation of the torments of literary composition.

Rudd also assumes that crepat at v.33 must, of necessity, have a consciously derogatory connotation and translates it by "spiel". Orelli says simply that crepat means "et alta quidem voce, docere solet", without any sense of disrespect; the word is almost onomatopoeic. Lejay says that crepat almost always has an ironical or an unfavourable sense, but declares also that "l'ironie est inconsciente". In other words, Damasippus' comment, "si quid Stertinius veri crepat" does not show any conscious denigration of nor disrespect for Stertinius on the part of Damasippus. However, what Horace does achieve by the use of crepat here is a further stroke in the portrait which he is painting of the raw and enthusiastic, but rather stupid and uncritical, Stoic convert Damasippus. "Distinctions" are not being "blurred", as Rudd would have us believe. Rather the developing characterisation of Damasippus is amusing and consistent, clear and sharp. Further, the reference which Damasippus makes to his beard is

43 See above, pp.52f.
44 Orelli-Baiter, editio tertia, n. ad loc.
45 Lejay, n. ad loc. p.396; cf. also comments on p.386: one may note the use of crepo at Horace, Odes 1.18.5 where, although colloquial, the word is not ironic.
not to be taken, with Rudd, as being flippant. This is Damasippus' response to Horace's ironical comment of vv.16-17. Damasippus is explaining seriously, and perhaps with a rather heavy sarcasm, how he came to cultivate the beard of a philosopher. He is still somewhat nettled by Horace's attitude. A reference to a philosopher's beard is only flippant, if it originates with an opponent of a philosopher. Damasippus' tone is one of injured pride as he springs to the defence and the explanation of his metamorphosis from antique dealer to Stoic neophyte. Thus these are not "Horace's jokes" which are "put in Damasippus' mouth", but examples of Horatian wit. 46

Although the cumulative effect of these errors of critical judgement must have a deleterious effect upon Rudd's overall estimation of the poem, each error or misjudgement is in itself only on a matter of minor detail. More serious is Rudd's misunderstanding of Damasippus' reading of his own, that is, Damasippus' mental state. Rudd writes, 47

Damasippus remains oddly ambiguous about his present condition. Is he insane or not? Clearly we are meant to suppose that after his conversion he is in some sense wiser than before. Yet when Horace begs him not to become violent his only reply is 'You too are insane' (32). Later, after recounting Stertinius' teaching he says 'These were the weapons which Stertinius gave me, so that I could hit back if anyone called me names. Whoever says I am mad will be told as much in reply' (296-8). This seems to imply a lack of certainty in Damasippus' own mind and it weakens the effect of the final gibe in which he is addressed as insane (326).

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46 In n.22 on the sixth chapter of The Satires of Horace Rudd draws attention to the use of "grex" in v.44 of this satire. However, there is surely no suggestion that Stertinius is being irreverent towards Chrysippus and the Greek Stoics. Also "grex" need not have a pejorative sense; indeed, it may be used in a good or laudatory sense, e.g. Cicero Att. 1.18.1; Orat. 1.10.42.

47 P.175.
The root of Rudd's error lies in the sentence, "Clearly we are meant to suppose that after his conversion he is in some sense wiser than before." The fact is that there are no gradations of wisdom, so far as the doctrinaire Stoic is concerned. All men are equally fools until such time as they achieve wisdom although the nature of their individual insanities may differ. The exclusive nature of wisdom (and the wise) parallels exactly the exclusive nature of virtue (and the virtuous). The only sense, in which Damasippus may be thought of as being wiser after his conversion, is that now he recognises the extent of his ignorance. Such was the "wisdom" of Socrates. However, as far as the Stoics themselves were concerned, Damasippus was essentially no wiser after the conversion than he had been before. Therefore, Damasippus, who is by no means a sapiens, is being precise when he says to Horace, insanis et tu..., at v.32. There is no ambiguity about his condition. Similarly, the description of the weapons furnished for Damasippus by Stertinius betrays no "lack of certainty"; he knows that he is insane and takes comfort in the fact that he shares this fate with virtually all mankind. It is in fact, the exploitation of this particular aspect of Stoic belief by Stertinius that persuades Damasippus to give up the idea of suicide. Clearly Damasippus found the arguments of Stertinius convincing and accepted his own insanity as part of the common lot.

48 For a statement of this doctrine see Cicero, Fin. 3.48, "ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilò magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possunt emergere, quam si etiamtum in profundo; nec catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat, ut videat, plus cernit, quam is qui modo est natus: item qui processit alliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihilò minus in miseria est quam ille qui nihil processit; cf. n.56, pp.18f.

49 E.g. Plato, Apology 21.

50 This, despite the fact that sapientem pascere barbam (v.35).
of humanity. The gibe insane at v.326 loses none of its force, as Rudd would have it; for Horace is calling into question the validity of the paradox, upon which the whole diatribe has been based, by declaring in the final verse of the poem, as fact which allows Damasippus no right of reply, that there are degrees of insanity:

326 o maior tandem parcas, insane, minori!

The comparatives at both the beginning and the end of the line show how emphatically Horace scorns the idea of the equality of the intellect of all men. He has, after all, been at pains to show that Damasippus' intellect is no match for his own. And Horace is not making a joke out of the fact that Damasippus is still a fool and insane despite his conversion to Stoicism. Both Damasippus and Stertinius, as Horace well realised, were Stoic "probationers" and thus equally and, what is more important, quite unashamedly fools and insane.

It may be thought strange that the Stoic Stertinius takes trouble to dissuade Damasippus from suicide when the rationalis excessus e vita was, as it were, a notorious part of the Stoic ethical doctrine. However, Stoic suicide did not become fashionable at Rome until well into the empire when the Stoicising republican opposition frequently exploited this means of anticipating imperial displeasure, although, during the civil wars,

51 This is surely the point of Horace's description of Damasippus' attitude towards both himself and his poetic efforts and his equally insensitive use of language and lack of common tact when talking of his master.

52 The sapiens was such a rarity that no shame attached to the status of insipiens; on the rarity of the sapiens see e.g. Seneca, De Tran. An. 7.4 (quoted at n.37, p.37 above). Perhaps because he thought himself farther along the road to wisdom than many other fools, Seneca carefully distinguishes between different kinds of proficiens at Epistulæ Moralea 75.8.

53 Notables among the "Stoic" suicides in the reign of Nero, for example, were the Stoic poet Lucan, Thrasea Paetus, Helvidius Priscus, Seneca and, of course, C. Calpurnius Piso.
Cato had set the exemplum at Utica in 46 B.C. In fact, it was only in certain circumstances and for certain people that the Stoics recommended suicide as a viable and justifiable alternative to life. There is also the suggestion in the primary sources that it is never fitting for a fool to commit suicide. The fool never has that wisdom and knowledge which is necessary before a correct estimation of the balance of advantages and disadvantages within his life at any given time and under any given circumstances can be made. Also, the future consequences of any given situation, as well as its immediate consequences and circumstances, are unclear to the man who has not achieved wisdom. Only the man who has achieved wisdom, a wisdom which informs all his actions with a full awareness of their present and future consequences can legitimately take his own life. Thus Damasippus, who is a fool and quite incapable of completely understanding his fate, is in no position to take his own life, if, as Stertinius suggests, a major part of his motive for suicide is a misplaced sense of shame (pudor ... malus, v.39) inspired by the fear of being considered a fool by others who are equally foolish and insane, but whose insanity and foolishness is different in kind. This should finally clear the air of the supposed problem surrounding the

54 Lucan's treatment of Cato Uticensis in the poem Pharsalia shows how Cato became an inspiration to the "republicans" a century after his death, e.g. "victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni", Ph. 1.128: cf. Cato's awareness of the logos within in Bk.9, 566-584, when he feels no necessity to consult the oracle of Ammon.

55 For a full discussion of the question of Stoic suicide see J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969) ch.13; in the primary sources the illegitimacy of a fool's suicide is best described by Cicero, Fin. 3.60-61, but see also Stobaeus, Ecl. p.226 and Plutarch, De Stoic. Repugn. 14, p.1039E. The more "relaxed" attitude towards suicide in the empire is shown by the frequent references to the topic in Seneca's works, e.g.:
   i) Epistulae Morales Nos. 24,30,54,70 and 71 (esp. 12-28).
   ii) Ad Marciam 19-25.
"present condition" of Damasippus.

It has been noted already that the paradox is mentioned twice in the proem, first by Damasippus and then by Stertinius. This repetition has not merely the formal function to which reference was made before. It increases our awareness of the uncertainty with which the very new convert grasps the doctrines of his school. Damasippus' statement of the paradox is provoked by the bland irony of Horace and as a consequence is brief and sharp, with more than a hint of a desire to puncture Horace's evident self-esteem:

32-32 "o bone, ne te frustrere, insanis et tu stultique prope omnes..."

The statement immediately lapses into a reference to its source, Damasippus' humility, when confronted with the authority and impressive character of that source - here the "docility" (docilis) of Damasippus is contrasted with Horace's assurance - and into a vague general commendation of the efficacy of Stertinius' teaching:

33-34 "unde ego mira descripsi docilis praecepta haec, tempore quo me..."

It is only when Damasippus comes to quote the actual advice of Stertinius, by means of which he was dissuaded from suicide, that there is enough authentic Stoic detail in the argument to suggest a proper awareness and understanding of the doctrine. Stertinius advises Damasippus not to do anything indignum, and we see immediately why and how the convert has latched onto this term as a catch phrase, a catch phrase with which he belabours Horace in v.4 and v.6.56 Stertinius' statement of the paradox also has an immediate and practical relevance to the situation in which he

56 See above, pp.46ff.
finds Damasippus, whereas Damasippus is abusing the paradox by exploiting it in an attempt to cause Horace discomfiture. Indeed, within the fiction of the satire, one may believe that Damasippus' report of Stertinius' advice and of his whole diatribe springs itself from a sense of shame at having thus abused the words of his master. Also the understanding apparent in Stertinius' formulation, as reported by Damasippus, suggests that Damasippus, as befits the neophyte, is much happier to report verbatim the words of his mentor than extemporise himself upon a Stoic theme. That Damasippus is indeed quoting Stertinius verbatim may also be understood from the formulaic manner in which the actual diatribe of Stertinius begins at vv.46-48:

\[
\text{nunc accipe, quare} \\
\text{desipiant omnes aequo ac tu, qui tibi nomen} \\
\text{insano posuere.}
\]

With this one should compare also v.41:

\[
\text{primum nam inquiram quid sit furere} \ldots
\]

and v.77 and vv.80-81:

i) \[
\text{audire atque togam iubeo componere} \ldots \quad (77)
\]

ii) \[
\text{huc propeius me,} \\
\text{dum doceo insanire omnis, vos ordine adite.} \quad (80-81)
\]

THE DIATRIBE OF STERTINIUS, VV.46-295

Paradoxically it is more difficult to assess the Stoic influence on a poem, which has, as its confessed topic, one of the paradoxes of the Stoics, than it is to assess the incidental Stoic influence on what one may describe as the more secular poems of Horace. Stoic references in the vocabulary of the diatribe of Stertinius have already been collected and commented
This, therefore, will not be my prime concern, although comment of that kind will be necessary from time to time, especially when examination is made of the Horatian wit which is evident in the presentation of the diatribe. For it is with the form and manner of presentation of this diatribe of Stertinius that I shall most be concerned. I shall attempt to show to what extent the diatribe of Stertinius, as presented by Horace in *Satires* 2.3, follows the accepted form and traditional pattern of the diatribe. The nature and origins of the diatribe are described by A.G. Lee in the introduction to his commentary upon the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* of Cicero; of most interest to us are his comments upon the style of the diatribes:

They display a lively and vigorous style in which humour is mingled with seriousness (σοφωδοιογέλοιον); objections are raised by a supposed opponent; anecdotes, pictures from everyday life, examples from fable, mythology, and history, are introduced. Full use is made of the resources of rhetoric ... Later the diatribe exercised a strong influence on Roman satire, and Horace refers to his writings in this style as 'talks in the manner of Bion', *Bionei sermones* (Epist. 2.2.60). 58

In fact, this style of discourse, a hybrid, born of the parents dialogue and rhetoric, was not only used by its originators the Cynics. 59 It was also exploited by anyone who found it useful for whatever purpose. Among such exponents we may include Horace and Cicero in the *Satires*, *Epistles* and in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*; also, even from the time of Chrysippus, the diatribe and its

57 Lejay, pp.356-390, passim.
59 See Heinze, *De Horatio Bionis imitatore* (Bonn, 1889) and also Teletis *reliquiae*, ed. O. Hense (2nd ed., 1909); ref. is made to these works by Fraenkel, p.92f. in his discussion of Horace, *Satires* 1.1.
techniques were employed by the Stoics, as is made clear in the following extract from a letter of Fronto to the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius:

attende quid cupiat ipse Chrysippus. num contentus est docere, rem ostendere, definire, explanare? non est contentus: verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat, praemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit, personas fingit, orationem suam alii accommodat: ταῦτα δὴ ἔστιν αὐξεῖν, διασκευάζειν, ἔξεργάζομαι, πάλιν λέγειν, ἐπαναφέρειν, παράπτειν, προσωποποιεῖν.

A detailed examination of the diatribe of Stertinius/Horace in this poem along lines of enquiry suggested both by Lee's comments and those of Fronto, will be useful in establishing Horace's intentions which gave birth to a poem of such ambitious length. Such an examination should also indicate Horace's attitude to the Stoa and the ideas which he allows Stertinius to express.

The method of this examination will be as follows:

a) identification of devices listed by Fronto and Lee,
b) description of these devices, and
c) discussion of their functions in their immediate contexts.

This discussion will proceed section by section within the poem, taking as its model for the poem's structure the formal analysis of Lejay (p.356). Finally the questions will be put regarding:

i) the relationship between this poem and the diatribe form,

ii) Horace's literary purposes in writing this poem in this way,

60 Fronto, Ep. ad M. Ant. De Eloqu. 1.146; it may be of interest to draw attention here to Cicero's comments upon and descriptions of the distinctions drawn between dialectic and rhetoric, this in Orator 32.113-115; cf. also Seneca, Epist. 89.17.
iii) the manner in which Stoic ethical concepts are exploited by Horace to serve his satiric purpose.

For convenience of discussion the particular devices which are to be sought out and studied are capable of being categorised as follows:

i) the use of fictional or near-fictional mouthpieces,
ii) exempla drawn from life, myth and history,
iii) other rhetorical devices listed by Fronto. 61

By "the use of fictional or near-fictional mouthpieces" one should understand both those major figures who are introduced to people the dialogue form, which is adopted and adapted by Horace for the overall shape of the satire, namely Damasippus and Stertinius, and also the minor and anonymous objectors and interlocutors with whom Horace contrives that Stertinius peoples his address to Damasippus. The question why Horace should choose Damasippus and Stertinius as his two major figures, apart from himself, must await, however, the completion of the detailed work upon the different sections of the poem. The function performed by the anonymous interlocutors of Stertinius will be of more immediate concern, as will that of the various exempla by means of which, along with repetition, ὀνομαστὶ κυριαρκῆν, and exaggeration and anticipatory preparation, 62 Stertinius achieves

61 Of these devices most are different means of accomplishing that ἀξίωματι which Fronto declares was considered desirable by Chrysippus (see above p.67f.), while the term προεμπνοτικῶς will be discussed naturally under "the use of fictional or non-fictional mouthpieces." For a brief, but useful, discussion of Stoic rhetorical theory see Arnold, pp. 148-150, where special note is made (p.149) of the Stoic predilection for "neatness" or κατασκευή, which is also considered desirable by Fronto.

62 This is my rather tautological translation of the term praemunitio or προσφεύρασαμαι; for a discussion of the term see Cicero, De Oratore 2.75,304; 3.53,204; also Quintilian, 9.2.17.
the necessary αύξησις of his theme.

DISCUSSION OF VV.48-76

Even as vv.31-46 formed the proem to the diatribe of Stertinius and also linked the introductory conversation between Horace and Damasippus with Stertinius' address, so also vv.48-76 form Stertinius' own introduction to his address which expounds and amplifies the theme of the Stoic paradox δι πάς ἀμφων μαίνεται. Stertinius opens his address with an analogy (48-51) which is drawn, as it were, from the idea of straying from the "strait and narrow path"; whichever wrong direction is chosen by different people, their choices are equally wrong. The moral of the analogy is drawn in a manner which demonstrates the vividness of proverbial expression:

51-53
hoc te crede modo insanum, nihilo ut sapientior ille, qui te deridet, caudam trahat.
The vividness of the expression may also be considered to be an example of the use of ὑποθαλάσσω, since the seriousness of

63 It will also be interesting to see whether Stertinius' diatribe is at all compatible with the fourfold Stoic division of the typical rhetorical exercise, described by Diogenes Laertius at Bk. 7.42, τοῦ δὲ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου εἰς τε τὸ προοίμιον καὶ εἰς τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον.

64 Cf. for the image, "unde queas alios passim ... vividere/errare atque viam palantes quaerere vitae", Lucretius, 2.9-10. That the Stoics had an interest in the "parting of the ways" is also suggested by the story concerning their hero Herakles which is recorded at Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.21-34.

65 The best examples of this kind of vivid proverbial expression (outside the comedies of Plautus) are to be found in the Satyricon of Petronius, e.g. "heu heu, quotidiem peius. haec colonia retrostres crescit tanguam coda vituli", 44. One could argue that such farmyard analogies were a legacy of Rome's agricultural background.

66 For a recent discussion of spoudaiogeloion see L. Giangrande, The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature (The Hague, 1972) esp. pp.105-109.
the meaning is no bar to lively or flippant expression; indeed the lively expression renders the meaning more memorable and the moral advice, which is rendered in this way, may be thought of as causing less offence.

The following lines (53-59) give particular examples of the different kinds of insanity implied by the analogy of vv. 48-51. It is shown, in this direct expansion and illustration of the analogy, that men who suffer from very different kinds of insanity are very clearly insane nevertheless, and equally so. The advice of their loved ones has no effect upon their lunatic behaviour (57-59). The direct command of v.59, voiced, as it were collectively, by the madman's beloved ones, again adds vividness to the picture. The effect of this unheeded request is likened to that of the audience striving to awaken the hapless and drunken Fufius (60-62). Here, Horace with an illustration from everyday life in Rome, assuming that the theatre can be so described, again lightens the tone by means of spoudaiogeloion; he also achieves a smile by means of ὅνομαστε κομμαδέαν at the expense of Fufius. The effect of the argument is by no means weakened by what may be termed as "window dressing". The audience is intended to remember the joke and, by association, the moral of the passage in question. The moral is, indeed, underlined itself once again at vv.62-63, which repeat the message of both vv. 51-53 and v.47 and v.32. However, by the time this is repeated at vv.62-63 it has been strengthened precisely in the ways in which we may have expected, following the comments of Fronto. The

Although it is not strictly relevant to this discussion, I feel that v.57 should be punctuated with a comma at the end of the line after "amica"; there is a pleasant irony in thus balancing "amica" at the beginning of the sentence with "uxor" at the end.
following analysis displays this more succinctly:

a) 48-51 - an extended analogy - ἐπαναφέρειν
b) 53 - vivid proverbial image - σπουδαίογέλοιον

c) 53-59 - i) examples "
   ii) the vivid warning "

d) 60-62 - comic aside and example - παράπτετιν, σπουδαίογέλοιον, ὁνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν

e) 62-63 - repetition of message - πάλιν λέγειν

This kind of schematisation can be continued to the end of this introduction to the diatribe:

f) 64-70 - the examples of Damasippus ὁνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν
   and Nerius - exaggeratio

g) 71-74 - a mythological allusion

h) 75-76 - the example of Perellius - ὁνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν

Here it may be seen that the repetition of the moral at vv.62-63 acted as a bridge from the general and anonymous illustrations of the theme in vv.48-59 to the specific connection of the theme with the object of Stertinius' present attention, namely Damasippus. This specific mention of Damasippus enables, even necessitates, the introduction of another pair of proper names, Nerius and Perellius, allowing Horace further opportunity for ὁνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν as he draws his examples from the everyday life of Rome. The passage is further made more memorable by the allusion to Proteus and the metamorphoses which Nerius, Proteus-like, will undergo as he attempts to escape from the clutches of Damasippus. It is also evident that Horace indulges in hyperboles:

69-73 scribe decem a Nerio; non est satis: adde Cicutae nodosi tabulas centum, mille adde catenas:
   effugiet tamen haec sceleratus vincula Proteus.
   cum rapies in ius malis ridentem alienis,
As one might by now expect the major theme is repeated in vv. 74-76, rounding off the introduction and also anticipating the discussions of the various specific types of insanity, with which the remainder of the diatribe is concerned. It is also noteworthy that the examples which have been employed by Stertinius have been concerned from v. 64 with finance and with avarice. This is, of course, related to the ultimate cause of Damasippus' attempt at suicide. It is also, however, a clear demonstration of how the man delivering the diatribe or writing the satire praemunit or "sets up" and anticipates the argument to follow. For that group of insane which is first invoked to pay heed to the wisdom of the Stoa are those who:

78 argenti pallet amore...

However, the attack upon the avaricious is not made until the structure of the remainder of the satire is anticipated by vv. 77-81, of which the clause quoted immediately above is but a single part. This section which is programmatic in its intention and openly didactic in tone is worth printing in full:

77-81 audire atque togam iubeo componere quisquis ambitione mala aut argenti pallet amore, quisquis luxuria tristine superstitione aut alio mentis morbo calet; huc propris me, dum doceo insanire omnis, vos ordine adite.

This invocation to the audience or reader has an impressive or a pompous ring to it, depending upon whether we interpret Horace to be satirising the self-esteem of Stertinius at this stage or intending us to give serious thought to the merits of

68 For the overt demand upon the readers' attention, cf. Sat. 1.2.37; for the treatment of insanity and vice as types of illness see above, pp. 53ff.
what he is about to write, despite the rather odd choice of mouthpiece. Is it art or lack of it that causes the reader to forget that Stertinius is speaking, as the diatribe progresses, until Damasippus' account is interrupted by Horace speaking propria persona? At this stage no positive answer can be given.

THE ATTACK ON AVARICE VV.82-167

The uses and abuses to which wealth can be put and the diverse effects which wealth can have upon individuals are described in this section of the poem. However, the aim is not so much to attack wealth itself, which was considered by the Stoics to belong to the class of things "indifferent", but to indicate by every means possible, to suggest to the intuition, that extremes of behaviour in any direction must be classified as types of insanity, whether, in this instance, the person responsible for that behaviour is miser or spendthrift. It may be noted here that the extremism of the ethics of the Stoics is admirably suited to the satirist's purpose; for the satirist, to be effective, cannot pose as a moderate, but must attack all examples of human folly with equal trenchancy and give the impression that the human race is universally foolish. This seems to be the clue to a proper understanding of Horace's use of the mask of Stertinius in this poem. Also the devices of the diatribe provide a lively means of presenting the case for the universal insanity of mankind. As will become evident, the devices used to enliven the discussions

69 It will be seen from the discussion below that the miniature drama surrounding the death of Servius Oppidius at vv.168-186 is taken as a bridge between the attack upon avaritia and that upon ambitio.

70 On things "indifferent" see above, Chap.1, n.25.
of avarice and ambition and also of superstition and luxury are those already mentioned as belonging to the stock-in-trade of the composer of diatribes and which made their presence felt in the proem to Stertinius' sermon.

After the programmatic invocation of vv.77-81, Stertinius declares that, of all fools and criminals, the avaricious are in the majority by far. However, Stertinius chooses to make this declaration in a rather roundabout manner:

82-83  danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris, nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem.

Why should Horace have chosen this particular form of expression for Stertinius, if not to remind us, by the use of the word ratio, of Stertinius' Stoic beliefs. This is the first quasi-technical word which has appeared, since the introduction of Chrysippus by name at v.44, coupled with the statement of the paradox in vv.45-48. Further, the central position of ratio in v.83 gives it a prominence which is unusual if no particular attention should be paid to it, especially when it is a term which does have significant Stoic connotations. It is also true that the meaning of ratio in the sense of "measure" or "proportion" is especially relevant here, when Horace is talking of the prescribed dose of medicine to which the chronically avaricious should be condemned. Therefore, Rudd's translation, "... they ought, in fact, to receive all Anticyra's output", is essentially

71 The use of these terms earlier in the poem are also examples of prefiguring or praemunitio; for the Stoic nature of Damasippus is thus established or implied before being openly stated.

72 This is one of the major meanings of λόγος in what is recoverable of the writings of Heraclitus, e.g.: πυρὸς τροπαί' πρῶτον δάλασσα, δαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμίου γῆ τὸ δὲ ἡμίου ποιητήρ ... γῆ δάλασσα διαχέεται, καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. Fr.31 Clem. Strom. 5.104.3.
inadequate, while Lejay, although closer than this with his, "je ne sais s'il ne serait pas logique de leur reserver...", also fails to capture the brilliant ambiguity of the Horatian phrase. Although it may, in fact, be impossible to recapture this ambiguity in a language other than latin, mention of its presence ought to be made. Furthermore, if, as seems likely, the Stoic element of the poem is being reinforced consciously by Horace at this stage, one would expect the first exemplum of avarice to be discussed in a particularly Stoic fashion. We could then recognise the advance use of ratio at v.83 as another example of Horace's praemunitio. Examination of the exemplum of Staberius in vv. 84-99 confirms that this is the case. However, the Stoic element within the story of Staberius is introduced with consummate skill by Horace. For, it is within the mouth of Staberius himself, who is the object of the satirical intentions of the passage, that we find language which is most reminiscent of that of the Stoics. While it is true that the words summam (v.84), prudentem animum (v.89) play a role similar to that of ratio in v.83, the most startlingly Stoic language is that which Stertinius places directly into the mouth of Staberius, e.g.:

87-88 "sive ego prave

74 Lejay, note ad loc.; Palmer's "a just view" is perhaps as adequate a translation of ratio as is possible in this context, although Palmer's note gives no justification for this version.
75 The advance characterisation of Damasippus as a Stoic was accomplished in a similar manner by the exploitation of consciously ambiguous terms within the initial section of the poem; see below pp.44-55.
76 Cf. n.71, p. 74: summam is reminiscent of the summum bonum, prudentem animum of one of the Stoic cardinal virtues - prudentia or temperantia.
and which expresses the thoughts of Staberius on the value of money and its supreme importance, as reported by Stertinius. These thoughts are collected and presented by Stertinius as follows:

quod vixit credidit ingens pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acrius, ut, si forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset, ipse videretur sibi nequior: omnis enim res, virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit ille clarus erit, fortis, iustus. "sapiensne?" etiam; et rex, et quidquid volet. hoc veluti virtute paratum speravit magnae laudi fore.

This passage is at once a statement and an explanation; vv.91-94, as far as nequior, give a statement of that "philosophy" by which Staberius lived his life. The statement of the philosophy explains the peculiar nature of the codicil which caused Staberius' heirs such distress. However, vv.94-99 explain in detail the status granted to wealth by Staberius in his life. Wealth was the sine qua non of precisely those aspects of human existence, the existence of which depended, according to the Stoics, on the possession of the true and unique summum bonum, that peculiarly Stoic amalgam of virtue and wisdom. Thus with fine irony the Stoic Stertinius is made to demonstrate by Horace the "poverty" of that man, who believes, in company with Plato's oligarchs, that the true criterion of excellence is wealth. That Staberius is shown as talking in a parody of the Stoic manner is finally made certain

On the Stoic ring of this quotation see e.g. Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.100.15, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν πολλοῖς ὁνόμασε προσαγορεύουσιν. Ἀγαθὸν τε γὰρ λέγουσιν αὐτὴν, ὅτι ἁγιὰ ἡμῶς ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον; also, in the context of the behaviour of the sapiens, see Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.66.14, ... τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πάντες εὑρεῖν τὸν φρόνιμον, καὶ δόσῳ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μᾶλλα καὶ ἡ μῆ ποιεῖ. τῷ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἐπιτελεῖν πάντα καὶ οἶον κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν.
by Stertinius when, acting as his own interlocutor, he slips in the word sapiensne at v.97. "Staberius" immediately answers in the affirmative, declaring, indeed, that the dives is rex, et quidquid volet, (97-98). In fact, the dives is given precisely the same attributes, in large measure, as the Stoic sapiens. This statement can be readily documented. The dives is considered to be virtuous, just, courageous and brave. That is to say, he possesses the four cardinal virtues, which are the attributes of the Stoic who has achieved the summum bonum.78 As a consequence of this, according to Staberius, he can do whatever he chooses; he alone is free, which is the claim made for the Stoic sapiens also, nowhere perhaps more clearly or eloquently than at Horace Satires 2.7.83-88:

 quisnam igitur liber? sapiens sibi qui imperiosus,
 quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent,
 responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores
 fortis, et in se ipso totus, teres, atque rotundus,
 externi ne quid valeat per leve morari,
 in quem manca ruit semper fortuna.

The dives, of course, is insanely afraid of poverty, as Stertinius is at pains to point out; however, the rich man, according to Staberius has also the particular attributes of what Stertinius would describe as the attributes of wisdom. Particular mention is made both of his power over things human and divine and also his regal stature. Compare these statements with the following passages:

a) μόνον γοῦν τὸν σοφὸν οί φιλόσοφοι βασιλέα,
 νομοθέτην, στρατηγόν, δίκαλον, ὄσιον, θεοφιλῆ κηρύττουσιν.

Clement, Strom. 2.420

This should adequately show that Staberius' praise of wealth and the wealthy is modelled upon Stoic praise of wisdom and the wise. The ridiculousness of Staberius' position is thereby vividly shown, if one accepts the validity of the statements of the Stoics on the supremacy of wisdom, as the criterion of excellence, and on the status of the sapiens, as the paragon of virtue. That the majority of mankind do not accept the validity of the Stoics' claims is "proof" of their insanity, especially as, Stertinius points out, the vast majority of mankind are subject to that same desire for wealth, which bedevilled the life of Staberius. Despite his "philosophising" Staberius the miser is insane, but so also is the man whose actions point to the opposite extreme. This extreme is very briefly indicated by the picture of the Greek Aristippus (vv.99-102), while the point of the comparison is made by the question at the close of v.102, uter est insanior horum? Horace recognises that, in Stoic terms, it is impossible to give a satisfactory answer to this question. Both Staberius and the Greek are equally insane. This admission at v.103 performs the transition from one set of exempla, which may loosely be described as "historical", with great neatness to another set, the anonymous characters of which are drawn from the satirist's observation of

79 For further discussion of the "sapiens" see below pp.166ff.in the context of Satires 2.7 and also the passages collected in S.V.P. 3, pp.146-170. For an illuminating study of the whole concept of the "sapiens" see Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism (Cambridge, Mass. 1966).

80 The comic inversion is noted by Palmer in his commentary, but no extensive demonstration is made.
everyday life.

The development of the argument in this passage (vv. 104-128) is a trifle contorted, but consciously so, since this enables Stertinius to make his Stoic point in vv.120-121 the more vividly παρὰ προσοδοκίαν. The argument breaks down as follows:

a) vv.104-108 Any man who hoards articles for which he has no use is insane.

b) vv.108-110 Presumably the man who merely hoards money is similarly insane.

c) vv.111-119 In fact, the typical miser hoards all manifestations of his wealth.

BUT

d) vv.120-121 The majority of men do not find this insane; they are afflicted with the same disease.

e) vv.122-128 Men hoard despite the fact that they cannot take their wealth with them.

The παρὰ προσοδοκίαν of:

120-121 nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem.

is the more striking because of the common-sense arguments, and commonplace context of those arguments, to which it gives such an unexpected close, although the reader should have been forewarned by vv.82-83, as the verbal echoes indicate. In a sense, the reader's attention is distracted, or his intellectual guard lowered, both by the obvious acceptability of what Stertinius is saying in his description of the miser, and also by the vividness of the detail of that description. Therefore, the paradoxical nature of the couplet immediately quoted drags the reader from the state of false security, into which he has been lulled, and within which, presumably, he has been in complete agreement with the speaker, when he finds himself, as pars hominum (121) under
critical fire.

This advantage is exploited in a similarly dishonest manner in vv.122-128, where, instead of producing a piece of direct moralising, which would not have been out of place, Stertinius launches another attack upon the reader. On this occasion the weapon is irony; for Stertinius appeals to the selfishness of the miser with the question:

122-123 filius aut etiam haec libertus ut ebibat heres, dis inimice senex, custodis. 81

Any latent feelings of guilt, that such a question can provoke, are further exploited by:

126-128 quare, si quidvis satis est, periuras, surripis, aufers undique? tun sanus?

Far from promoting a feeling of self-satisfaction in his listener, as was initially suggested by the invitation to share in the scorn felt at the clearly insane of vv.104-119, the satirist has now identified the listeners with the victims of avarice to such an extent that he charges them too with insanity. Once again this reversal has not been achieved merely by the direct exposition of Stoic ethics, but by presuming that the listener (or reader) is well aware of the tenets of Stoic ethics and then, either presenting them by implication from an unexpected quarter, such as Staberius, or not presenting them at all, as is done in vv.122-128. The trap that awaits the "intelligent" listener in verses 122-128 is baited by the reminder of the Stoic ambience of the poem in vv.120-121 and then sprung by the openly critical statement encapsulated in vv.126-128. That Stertinius (or Horace) does make the assumption throughout that the reader is well versed in

81 Cf. Horace, _Odes_ 2.3.20 and 2.14.25.
the basics of Stoic philosophy is made particularly clear from the fact that it is not wealth itself which is attacked in this part of the poem, but the various abuses of wealth, which are possible, and the effect its possession has upon those unfitted for that responsibility.

So far as the Stoics were concerned, wealth in itself was neither good nor bad; indeed it could not be, if there was only one bonum and only one malum. The Stoic position regarding wealth is best understood by reference to the following passages:

a) τών δὲ δυντών φασί τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακὰ, τὰ δὲ οὐδέτερα.... οὐδέτερα δὲ σοι μήτε ὑφελεὶ μήτε βλάπτει. οἶνον ζωὴ, υγίεια, ἕδους, κάλλος, ἵσχύς, πλοῦτος...

Diogenes Laertius, 7.102

b) δικός δὲ λέγεσθαι ἄδικορα ἀπαξ μὲν τὰ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συνεργοῦντα, ὡς ἔχει πλοῦτος, δόξα... καὶ τὰ ὁμοία.

Diogenes Laertius, 7.104

Being of the status of an "indifferent" therefore wealth cannot properly, in strict Stoic belief, materially affect a person's happiness for better or worse, since that happiness depended upon the acquisition of the true, unique summum bonum, which was virtue. However, although an "indifferent", wealth was, nevertheless, a thing προηγμένον, rather than ἀποπροηγμένον and the possession of wealth could have "good" effects, if that possession were properly used:

c) ἀξίων δὲ τὴν μὲν τίνα λέγουσι σύμβλησιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον, ήτίς ἐστὶ περὶ πάν ἀγαθῶν, τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσην τὶνα δύναμιν ἡ χρεῖαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, οὕσιον εἶπεν ἢν τίνα προσφέρεται πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον πλοῦτος ἢ υγίεια.

Diogenes Laertius, 7.105

This concept of the putting of money to good use is especially
relevant in the context of the discussion of Horace's miser. Cicero gives expression to the same sentiment at De Finibus 3.56:

> haec quae praeposita dicimus, partim sunt per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim utrumque.... quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut pecunia. 82

Clearly Horace's skilfully produced and ironical attack upon the miser's abuse of wealth is firmly based on an understanding of the underlying Stoic doctrines. Equally clearly, the effect of the passage can only be appreciated fully, if the reader is himself in possession of such an understanding. 83 A further indication of Horace's skill at characterising his Stoic mouthpiece is given by the fact that part, at least, of Stertinius' objection to the behaviour of the miser mirrors the objection which Damasippus had initially made to the supposed literary desidia of Horace; the talents of both were being neglected. 84

The direct moralising of vv.120-128 concludes with the question tun sanus?, which parallels the use of the question uter est insanior horum? at v.102; for both questions mark the end of a clearly defined section or sub-section of the poem. After the question, on each occasion, the diatribe continues on a slightly different tack; after uter est insanior horum? we have the

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82 For reasons which may be readily grasped Seneca was often at pains to point out the value of wealth in its real terms, e.g. "divitiias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos facerent. ceterum et habendas esse et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor", Dialogues 7.24.5; cf. ib. 21.4; also Ep. 94.5 esp. "nisi opiniones falsas, quibus laboramus, expuleris, nec avarus, quomodo pecunia utendum sit, exaudiet." This special pleading did not convince H.J. Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature (Methuen, 1936) pp.359-360, which contains an amazing attack upon Seneca.

83 It is interesting to compare Cicero's treatment in the Paradoxa, 6, esp. 44, "animus hominis non arca appellanti solet, quamvis illa sit plena; dum te inanem videbo, divitem non putabo."

84 See above, pp.44ff.
illustrations of the miser, which tend towards the general attack on the different means by which the miser amasses money in vv. 126-128, although he has no idea of how that money should properly be used. After tun sanus? the idea of the means by which money is gained leads to a discussion of murder and allows Horace, by mentioning the most famous matricide, Orestes, to further enliven his diatribe with this illustration drawn from myth. The sequence of thought is as follows: men will become thieves and will perjure themselves in order to increase their wealth, but without having any very clear idea of how to employ it to any, or the best, advantage. Their sole concern is that their wealth should not be diminished. The consequences of this attitude are ultimately absurd: even murder will only be condemned as an act of insanity, if it reduces the murderer's capital, that is, if the victims are slaves quos aere pararis (v.129). The murder of a wife or mother, on the other hand, by poison or hanging may, if it is committed for financial gain, still be classed as a crime, but it will not be accounted an act of insanity:

131-132 cum laqueo uxorem interimis matremque veneno incolumi capite es.

Take, for example, declares Horace, moving into his next exemplum, the way in which the majority treat the case of Orestes; apparently they assume that madness descended upon him only after he had committed matricide occisa insanisse parente (v.134), although after the matricide, which was as blatantly an insane act as is imaginable, his action was that of a man who was sane. The reason why the matricide is excused is that Orestes' motive was completely comprehensible in the context of the passage on murder immediately presented in vv.128-132; the motive was not revenge for the death of Agamemnon, but, in the eyes of Horace's/
Stertinius' materialistic audience, the recovery of Orestes' birthright. A small irony is that the need for Orestes to recover the κόσμος was no small part of his motivation, according, indeed, to each of the three Attic tragedians. It is also interesting that, in exploiting the potential of myth to enrich the fabric of the diatribe, Horace does so in a characteristically oblique manner by using the myth to attack the commonplace interpretation of it, and of the motives of those characters who people the myth. This is analogous to the manner in which he attacks the validity of the view that money is the criterion of excellence in vv.84-99; the attack there is oblique, because Staberius is allowed to condemn himself out of his own mouth, according to the account of Stertinius, by praising wealth in terms appropriate, so far as a Stoic was concerned, to the praise of wisdom. However, Horace's ironical use of the myth of Orestes is not as successful; the link between the motive for the murder of Clytaemestra and the murder of the anonymous matrem of v.131 is not made sufficiently clear, while the particularly Stoic irony which underlines the comments and the folly of Staberius is here missing.

The idea of death provides the continuity between the exemplum of Orestes and the miniature comedy of Opimius in vv. 142-157; no other link is provided and the resulting contrast between the dignity of a myth of such literary standing and the low comedy of the story of Opimius is most remarkable, if not memorable. For this is the designed effect within the context of the moral diatribe. The comedy of Opimius, apart from underlining the kinship between diseases of the body and diseases of the mind and so anticipating vv.161-167, adds little that is new to the moralising of the diatribe. However, the "punch line":

157 quid refert morbo an fortis pereamque rapinis?
is so good that, by association, the moralising which follows also becomes memorable and Stertinius also rises in the estimation of his audience. The moralising which follows is especially memorable, because the defences of the audience have been demolished by their responding with laughter to the story of Opimius. Any hostility which may have been felt towards the Stoic identity of the speaker is temporarily removed in the universal solvent of a shared joke, and Stertinius is quick to take advantage of the opening provided by his nimble technique:

158-160 "quisnam igitur sanus?" qui non stultus. "quid avarus?" stultus et insanus. "quid, si quis non sit avarus, continuo sanus?" minime. "cur, Stoice?" dicam. 85

Stertinius hastens to destroy the impression, that may have been fostered by his long emphasis upon the insanity of avarice in all its forms, that avarice is the only type of insanity abroad. To do this, he repeats the analogy between mental and physical ill health with great vividness in vv.161-167. This repetition has been prepared for by the story of Opimius: however, perhaps more important than this example of prefiguring is the way in which Stertinius wrings full advantage from the final line of the story of Opimius. For, after the analogy of illness, and the repetition also of the periphrasis for insanity involving Anticyra (vv.165-166, cf.83), which is in itself reminiscent of the programmatic introduction to the diatribe within the diatribe itself at vv. 77-81, the closing line and one half of the direct moralising,

85 As has been observed already by Palmer, n. ad loc, these sharp interjections and questions are typical of Stoic discourses. They help to vary the pace of the discourse and, indeed, Cicero compares them to marks of punctuation at Paradoxa Stoicorum 1, "Cato perfectus Stoicus minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis quod proposuit efficit." In this satire they mark the divisions between sections and subsections with great neatness.
at this half way point in the poem, echo the purposefully memorable joke of v.157. Compare:

a) quid refert morbo an furtis pereamque rapinis? (157)
b) quid enim differt, barathrone
dones quidquid habes an numquam utare paratis? (166-167)

Horace is making the most expert use of repetition and anticipation, iterat and praemunit; also the repetitions and anticipations are achieved, not merely by single words, but by phrases, sentiments and even syntactical formulae, as in the example recently demonstrated.

This skill in repetition, which avoids the pitfall of monotony by the variations employed in the exploitation of the technique, is made particularly clear by the manner in which Horace manages the transition from the attack upon avaritia to that upon ambitio and, with much concealed art, maintains the continuity and conversational ease and effectiveness of this lengthy satire. The miniature drama, which centres upon Servius Oppidius and his two sons, in vv.168-186 is ideally suited to this role of effecting the transition, since not only is the drama set at the deathbed of a wealthy man, as was the comedy of Opimius, but it is also concerned with the behaviour of the rich man's heirs. Further, the two heirs epitomise individually the two extremes of vice to which wealthy men are prone, and which have been the objects of Horace's attacks as examples of insanity. One son is by nature miserly, the other is a spendthrift:

170-175 hoc moriens pueris dixisse vocatis
ad lectum: 'postquam te talos, Aule, nucesque
ferre sinu laxo, donare et ludere vidi,
te, Tiberi, numerare, cavis abscondere tristem,
extimui ne vos ageret vesania discors,
tu Nomentanum, tu ne sequerere Cicutam.
The father urges moderation on the two sons:

176-178 quare per divos oratus uterque Penatis,
tu cave ne minuas, tu ne maius facias id
quod satis esse putat pater et natura coercet.

I have already mentioned the attractions which the Peripatetic mean seems to have held for Horace; here, however, Oppidius is merely giving vent to home-spun wisdom, although the concept implied by natura coercet (178) does have Stoic connotations coming from the mouth of Stertinius.

However, the switch to the attack upon ambitio is now effected, almost as an afterthought, through the advice of Oppidius to his sons. The advice is introduced by praeterea (179) and, as a literary device, this works extremely well within the context of the continuity of the poem. This is especially so, because a further unifying link is provided by the similarity of the drama of Servius Oppidius, not only to that of Opimius, as has been indicated, but also to that of Staberius, which was the first exemplum in the attack upon avaritia. Both the story of Opimius and Oppidius are "deathbed" scenes, but Oppidius shares with the dead Staberius a desire to impose his posthumous will upon his heirs. There is, of course, variety in the fact that Oppidius' motives are praiseworthy, while those of Staberius were not.

I believe that, by the easy transition from the attack

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86 See above, p. 7, esp. n.17.
87 This is because of the guiding role attributed to divine nature by the Stoics both in physics and ethics: in ethics this attitude is summarised in the tag secundum naturam vivere as at Cicero, Fin. 5.9.26.
88 It is interesting to compare the anecdote concerning Oppidius' advice to his sons in vv.176-178 with the story of the fortunes of the house of Cephalus and Polemarchus in Plato, Republic 330.
upon wealth, or avarice, to the attack upon *ambitio* as an abuse of wealth, Horace is indicating a deeper philosophical unity between these two sections of the poem, a unity which underpins the literary unity. The Stoics were extremely prone to categorise and systematise ethical concepts, both virtues and vices. A prime example of this tendency may be seen in their eager acceptance of the formulae of four cardinal virtues and corresponding vices, and the subdivisions to which these virtues and vices, themselves subdivisions of the *solum et summum bonum* and the *solum vitium*, were themselves subjected. The following may be quoted as an example of this tendency to systematise:

a) τῶν δ’ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πρώτας, τὰς δὲ ταῖς πρώταις ὑποτεταγμένας. πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι.... τῶν δὲ ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταῦτας τὰς μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ὑποτετάχθαι ..... τῇ μὲν οὖν φρονήσει ὑποτάττεσθαι εὔβουλίαν, εὐλογιστίαν, ἀγχύνοιαν, νοονέχιαν....

Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.104

b) ἀνά λόγον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακιῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πρώτας. τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ ταύτας’ οὖν ἀφροσύνην μὲν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολοχίαν ἐν ταῖς πρώταις, ἀκρασίαν δὲ καὶ βραβύνοιαν καὶ κακοβουλίαν ἐν ταῖς ὑπὸ ταύτας.

Diogenes Laertius, 7.93

The fact that, so far as the Stoics were concerned, there was an essential unity in virtue and an essential unity in vice helps to explain this desire to differentiate and categorise the different aspects of vice and virtue. However, if the Stoics do recognise that all virtue is essentially related, to the point of forming a unity, and if the same applies to vice, then some of the strength of my argument concerning the philosophical underpinning of the literary unity of *Satires* 2.3 is lost, unless it

89 For the cardinal vices see above, n.7, p.43.
90 On the unity of virtue, see Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1034.
can be shown that the Stoics, or the Romans, saw some relationship of a special kind between *avaritia* and *ambitio*. For to say that *avaritia* is related to *ambitio* is to say no more otherwise than κόμβουλια is a subsection, as it were, of φρόνησις and both of these are similarly related to δικαιοσύνη. Fortunately for the argument, it can be shown that there was something of a special relationship seen to exist, so far as the Roman, and, more especially, the Roman Stoic, was concerned, between *ambitio* and *avaritia*. This relationship is made quite clear by the following passage:

*expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, tum ad perfruendas voluptates. in quibus autem maior est animus, in iis pecuniae cupiditas spectat et ad gratificandi facultatem, ut nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re publica princeps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non posset. ... nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est. maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae captat oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt.*

Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.25-26

Cicero lays emphasis, as Horace does throughout his attack upon avarice, on the abuse of wealth for political purposes, while he suggests, as does Horace again in the speech of Oppidius, that moderate expenditure on the maintenance of the *res familiaris* is quite justified and, in Roman terms, even necessary and honourable. So Horace, through the figures of the spendthrift son Aulus and the potential miser, Tiberius, attacks not only the vices which they exemplify, but also the long term motives, which are imputed to them by their father. For their ultimate aim is the acquisition of political power and social supremacy through the adroit dispensation of their wealth:
The motive is all important in the Stoic context, as is made clear by the continuation of the Ciceronian passage which was quoted above:

\[
\text{sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest, utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitata fiat iniuria. leviora enim sunt ea, quae repentino aliquo motu accidunt, quam ea, quae meditata et praeparata inferuntur.}
\]

Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.27

It is especially important to emphasise the question of motive regarding the acquisition of political power, because, even as wealth was considered to be an "indifferent", which could be put to good use, even so it was considered to be the duty of the *sapiens* to involve himself in political affairs ἀν μὴ τι καλύπτῃ, ὡς φησὶ Χρύσιππος, Diogenes Laertius, 7.121. Plutarch also records the words of Chrysippus on this topic and they are particularly relevant to the present discussion:

\[
\text{Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἱπποτικῆς γράφων, ὁւτώ ῥητορεύοντι καὶ πολιτεύονται τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τὸν πλούτου δύνατον ἀγαθὸν, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς υγείας' .}
\]

Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1034b

These sentiments were also expressed with approbation by Cicero at *De Finibus* 3.68:

\[
cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque,
\]

91 We may note, in passing, an "anticipation" here of the actual attack upon Horace at vv.307-326.

92 In the leviora ... sunt ea of this passage we notice the common-sense modification of extreme Stoic doctrines introduced by Panaetius and accepted gratefully by Cicero for Roman consumption. For further comments on the question of guilt and intentio see below in the discussion of *Satires* 2.7.72-74 on pp.165ff.

93 See above, pp. 81f.
ut a natura vivat, uxorem aduingere et velle ex ea liberos. 94

E

THE ATTACK UPON AMBITION, vv.187-223

If we accept vv.168-186 as a bridge passage, which has equal relevance to the attack upon avarice and that upon political ambition, the latter attack plunges immediately into an exploitation of the myth of Ajax, brother of Teucer, perhaps to remind us, as quickly as possible, by reference to this famous madman, that the basic subject of the diatribe is insanity. The interpretation of the meaning of the exemplum of Ajax and Agamemnon is not so unclear as was the interpretation of the meaning, in context, of the exemplum of Orestes in vv.132-141. Partly this is because the mythical exemplum in the present case constitutes the whole of the attack upon ambitio, if vv.168-186 are treated strictly as a bridge passage and if vv.214-223 are treated as the moral epilogue of the myth. As a result, the exploitation of the myth of Ajax is self-contained and does not depend for its interpretation upon its place within the context of a larger discussion. The exemplum of Orestes needed to be considered in the context of the attack upon avaritia. Moreover, the philosophical implications involved in the discussion of the motives of Ajax and Agamemnon are more evident and there are clear Stoic implications. The reader is, therefore, aware of where his sympathies should lie, as the debate with Agamemnon progresses. In fact,

94 It is natural, in the light of Cicero's own political career, that he should warmly have supported this particular Stoic tenet; this may be seen especially from the De Republica and the De Legibus.
the reader is forced into the position of an arbitrator to the debate and is skillfully guided into a position of sympathy for the Stoic by the almost Socratic irony of the Stoic interlocutor.

The "trial" of Agamemnon, reminiscent almost of the agon of comedy, may be broken down as follows:

a) 187-192 Opening address; this is marked by the false humility of Agamemnon's questioner and the general irony of his remarks.

b) 193-207 Evidence; Ajax killed one thousand sheep, but Agamemnon killed his own daughter.

c) 208-213 Judgement; Ajax was insane, but can Agamemnon not also be so described.

d) 214-223 Moral; a question of motive; when men pursue "ambitio", what else can one expect.

a) 187-192

Although the initial question of v.187 is neutral in tone, it does suggest that the speaker considers Agamemnon to have reached the zenith of temporal power. Not only has he power of life and death, but even power over the dead. The aspirations of the brothers Aulus and Tiberius have been made concrete in the figure of Agamemnon. However, in the Roman context, the conscious opposition of the arrogant rex and the subservient plebeius in v.188 immediately undercuts the authority and creditibility of Agamemnon:

188 "rex sum." nil ultra quaero plebeius.

Also, the use by Agamemnon of the word aequam (188) and his claim to be iustus, by implication from non iustus (189), coupled with the use of rex, suggests that the device exploited against Staberius in vv.97-99 is once more being employed. That is to say, Agamemnon is describing himself in terms appropriate to the
description of a sapiens. 95 How far short he falls of that ideal will soon be made clear, while the sorry figure cut by the Agamemnon of Sophocles in his Ajax should warn the attentive reader what to expect. The same reader will also be aware of the harsh irony of:

190-191 maxime regum
di tibi dent capta classem reducere Troia! 96

b) 193-207

Although the attack upon ambitio is primarily intended to show the folly of considering political power a worthwhile objective, especially if the motivation of the aspirants is questionable, Horace also anticipates Juvenal's tenth satire by calling into question the value not only of political power, but also of military fame and expertise. This is implied by the description of the ironies of the fate of Ajax, whose patriotic services of time past could not, apparently, outweigh the effects of one act of madness and also by the appearance, at the close of the attack upon ambitio, of the goddess Bellona at v.223.

However, Agamemnon does epitomise the acme of both political and military power. With this power responsibility goes hand in hand; this is his excuse for the death of Iphigenia, which says the prototype Stoic, was as insane, surely, as the slaughter of the sheep:

199-207 tu cum pro vitula statuis dulcem Aulide natam
ante aras spargisque mola caput, improbe, salsa,

95 On Staberius and the sapiens see above, pp.77-78, while on the possible Stoic connotations of aequam see above, pp.26-27.

96 Cf. the prophecy of Polymestor at the close of the Hecuba of Euripides.
rectum animi servas? "quorsum?" insanus quid enim Aiax fecit cum stravit ferro pecus? abstinuit vim uxore et gnato; mala multa precatus Atridis, non ille aut Teucrum aut ipsum violavit Ulixen. "verum ego ut haerentis adverso litore navis eriperem prudens placavi sanguine divos" nempe tuo, furiose. "meo, sed non furiosus."

Even in this descriptive passage the philosophical and Stoic implications are kept to the fore by rectum animi servas? (201) and the contrast between the prudens of verse 206, which is the word used to characterise his own behaviour by the "wise" king, and the constrasting furiose and its denial in non furiosus of verse 207.

It may be of interest to note at this stage that the Stoicising nature of this passage can help to justify a suggested emendation to verse 201. The mss are fairly equally divided between the reading:

a) rectum animi servas quorum insanus quid enim Aiax
which is accepted and printed by most editors97 with a period marked after servas and a mark of interrogation after quorum, and:

b) rectum animi servas quorum insanus quid enim Aiax
which is clearly unsatisfactory. Those who adopt the reading a) explain quorum? as a heated interjection made by Agamemnon; such an interjection would have the force of, for example, the clause quorum haec tendant? which is found at Satires 2.7.21, although the context on that occasion is far different; for there Horace is openly questioning Davus regarding the drift of his comments. As Palmer suggests,98 this supposed interjection

97 These include Orelli, Maclean, Palmer, Kiessling and Heinze, Villeneuve and Wickham.
98 See n. ad loc.
at v.201 is both clumsy in itself and places an unacceptable strain upon the single interrogative word quorsum. Further, the phrase rectum animi is awkward, although parallels may be drawn with Greek usage. An emendation has been suggested which runs as follows:

c) rectum animi servas cursum?

where cursum is accepted in place of both the readings of the manuscripts. Had the initial error been to substitute quorsum for cursum, the further corruption to quorum is explicable in terms of the relatively unfamiliar interrogative quorsum. Although the Stoic connotations of rectum animi have been noted, in rather cryptic manner, by Kiessling and Heinze, they do not appear to realise the support this fact should give to the proponents of the reading cursum. Not only does this reading remove the clumsiness of the interjected "quorsum" and the obscurity of rectum animi, it also has the merit of being more than compatible with Stoic terminology and doctrine. The concept of man making a journey towards virtue is not one that is confined to the Stoics in antiquity or since; however, the emphasis which is placed upon the concept of the proficiens by the Stoics did make this metaphor of the arduous journey to virtue especially


100 Ibid."ὁρδός λόγος ist Terminus der stoischen Philosophie".

101 This emendation seems initially to have been proposed by Boethe, who was followed by Peerlkamp, Keller and Holder, and, most recently, by Büchner, Horaz: die Satiren (Bologna, 1970).

102 The journey from Plato's Cave in Republic 514-518 and Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress are but two examples which spring to mind.
their's and, in the context of this passage, with the recurrence of Stoicising terms, one can only say that the reading *rectum animi servas cursum?* makes sound sense. In passing one may, perhaps, add that it is not uncharacteristic of Horace to intend a play on the meaning of *cursus* as in *cursus honorum.* Presumably he still wishes his readers to realise that Stertinius is attacking Roman customs and society, however widely flung are the areas from which his examples are drawn.

The substance of the defence made by Agamemnon against the charge of the Stoic that the killing of Iphigenia was as insane an act as Ajax's killing of the equally innocent sheep is that the death of Iphigenia was the result of a conscious choice (*prudens*, v.206), dictated by military and political necessity:

> verum ego ut haerentis adverso litore navis eriperem prudens placavi sanguine divos...

Agamemnon's action should have found favour with a Roman audience nurtured on the *Annales* of Ennius; these are the words of Decimus Mus, who devoted himself *prudens*:

> divi hoc audite parumper
> ut pro Romano populo prognariter armis
certando prudens animam de corpore mitto.

*W. Ann.* 200-202

Ennius also recognises that children are born to die; this passage is from the *Telamon*:

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103 E.g. οὐδένα τῶν ἀστείων οὐθ' ὀδοὺ διαμαρτάνειν ... ἄλλ' οὐδὲ παρακάν ἄλλ' οὐδὲ παρακούειν νομίζουσι τὸν σόφον, Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.111 (*SVF* 3.147.16), also εἶναι γὰρ οὗν τινα ἐκλειτεμὲν *τῶν ἐν τάστας ταῖς τέχναις οἰκείων πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀναφέρουσαν αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ibid. 2.74. Cf. also *Cic. Fin.* 3.48 and *Sen. Ep.* 75.8. and 13.

104 See throughout foregoing discussion.

105 E.g. at *Cic. Ad Fam.* 3.11.2; for the common meaning of *cursus* as career or passage of life, see *Cic. Off.* 1.117; *Pro Sestio* 21.47; *Pro Caelio* 17.39, etc.

106 On the universalising and distancing aspects of the use of myth and "exempla", see below, pp.316f.

ego cum genui tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli:
praeterea ad Troiam cum misi ob defendendam Graeciam,
scibam me in mortiferum bellum non in epulos mittere.

The Stoic, however, is suspicious of Agamemnon's motives. These
suspicions are anticipated by *furose* in v.207 and are given
full expression both in the couplet 212-213 and in the moralising
tailpiece to the exemplum in vv.214-223. Consider the whole
passage from v.208-213:

208-213 qui species alias veri scelerisque tumultu
permixtas capiet, commotus habebitur, atque
stultitiane erret nihilum distabit an ira.
Aiax immeritos cum occidit desipit agnos:
cum prudens scelus ob titulos admittis inanis,
stas animo et purum est vitio tibi, cum tumidum
est cor?

Clearly, as far as the Stoic is concerned, a man is insane whether
his criminal act was the result of anger, as was that of Ajax, or
of stupidity and miscalculation, as was that of Agamemnon. Ajax
was mad because, in Stoic terms, he was not able to control his
rage and disappointment at the manner in which the armour of
Achilles was disposed of. Those perturbations of the spirit, of
which anger is perhaps the most severe, must be constrained by
reason, if disaster is to be avoided. Anger was particularly
thought of as a desire to retaliate:

quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiunt,
ut ira sit libido poeniendi eius, qui videatur
laesisse iniuria... 108

Cicero, Tusc. 4.21

Unless controlled it could result in miscalculation.

καὶ γὰρ ἐπιδυμίαν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
πάντα, δόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηρᾶς, οὐ περὶ ἐν τι

For judgements and acts of ethical choice and also "affections" are πάθη of the soul and, if the soul is affected disadvantageously by a burst of anger, then a choice made under such circumstances must be irrational to the extent of overt insanity. Hence anger should be entirely eradicated from the character as it is eradicated in the character of the sapiens. 109 A further proof of the insanity of Ajax was the reason for his anger; his outburst was out of all proportion to the incident which caused it. In Stoic terms again Ajax was the victim of φιλοτιμία, an immoderate desire for glory. 110 This was particularly foolish, since honour or glory, ambitio, laus, fama or gloria are indifferents and incapable of materially affecting the soul for better or worse; this is the view of the fundamental Stoic. 111

109 E.g. "sed Stoici non viderunt esse discrimin recti et pravi; esse iram iustam, esse et iniustam; et quia medelam rei non inveniebant, voluerunt eam penitus excidere." Lactantius, De Ira 17, cf. 18 also Lact. Div. Inst. 6.14. Lactantius talks as a follower of the Peripatetic line to which Seneca objected so spiritedly, one is tempted to say, so "angrily", at De Ira, 1.5-21. Perhaps Seneca's feelings were those of Diogenes of Babylon recorded at De Ira 3.38.1, "... de ira cum maxime disserenti adulescens protervus inspiciendum... 'non quidem' inquit 'irascor, sed dubito tamen, an oporteat irasci'."


111 The status of "reputation" underwent a metamorphosis at the hands of Roman Stoics: originally it was considered an "indifferent", e.g. ἀδιάφορα τοιαύτα ... δόξαν δοξεῖαν, Stob. Ec1. 2.57 quotes Zeno, and an "indifferent" of little worth, "δὲ bona autem fama ... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta utile, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant", Cic. Fin. 3.57; however, "qui autem post eos fuerunt (sc. Chrysippum et Diogenem), cum Carneadem sustinere possent, hanc quam dixi bonam famam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt", ibid.; cf. Seneca, Ep. 79.17; also n.60 above p.20.
At base, however, suggests the satirist, this was the reason why Agamemnon allowed himself *prudens* to sacrifice Iphigenia at Aulis; it was done *ob titulos ... inanis* (212), and we note, in passing, the similarity in sound between *inanis* and *insanus*. For the *φιλοτιμία* of Agamemnon weighed more than the natural ties of affection. What is more, when the decision to kill Iphigenia had once been taken, by a mind already unbalanced by the desire for glory, then anger at the falseness of his own position caused the king to attack the child with a savage intensity which was both unnecessary and unnatural. This interpretation may seem, at first sight, to be itself outrageous by dint of being unnatural and unnecessary. Acceptance of it demands, however, only an acceptance of the fact that Horace knew and could himself interpret with sensitivity the great chorus of the Agamemnon,\(^{112}\) where the sacrifice is described, and a realisation that the attack upon Agamemnon in this satire is made the more complete and satisfying, if the king is found guilty of both the errors, acts of insanity or misjudgement, for which he is punishing the corpse of Ajax.\(^{113}\) That is to say, Agamemnon is insane too because of his *φιλοτιμία*, as was Ajax, and his anger, which is indirectly the result of his *φιλοτιμία*, as was the anger of Ajax. To support this interpretation

\[^{112}\text{Aeschylus, Agamemnon 205-257, esp.:}\
\begin{quote}
\\\text{βροτοῦς ὄρασώνει γὰρ αἰσχρόμητις}
\\\text{τάλαινα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων.}
\\\text{ἐτὰ ἐπ’ σὺν θυμῷ γενέσθαι}
\\\text{θυγατρός, γυναικοποίων}
\\\text{πολέμων ἀρωγὰν}
\\\text{καὶ προτέλεα ναὸν. (217-227)}
\end{quote}
\[^{113}\text{For this interpretation of the guilt of Agamemnon see also Albin Lesky: "Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy of Aeschylus", JHS (1966).}\
\[^{113}\text{From the strict Stoic point of view, which, not unnaturally, is ignored here, it should be a matter of complete indifference as to what treatment the corpse of Ajax receives, e.g. Cicero, Tusc. 1.108; cf. Sen. Ep. 92.34.}\

I would suggest that tumidum (213) means "swollen with anger", rather than "puffed with pride", although both meanings are possible and, perhaps, the phrase in which the word appears, is consciously ambiguous. Furthermore, the use of furoius suggests also the concept of anger, as well as insanity; this is especially so, because anger is an example of insanity and the same opposition, between stupidity and madness, and criminality and madness/anger, which appeared at vv.205-210, especially in:

208-210 qui species alias veri scelerisque tumultu permixtias capiet, commotus habebitur, atque stultitiane erret nihilum distabit an ira.

reappears at the close of the general moral drawn from the exemplum by Stertinius:

220-222 ergo ubi prava stultitia, hic summa est insania; qui sceleratus, et furoius erit...

while further evidence that, in 208-210, Horace is consciously prefiguring the message of the moral epilogue to the exemplum may be found in the concepts of superficial misrepresentation and self-deception found both in the species alias veri of v.208 and in the pathetic (and amusing) lamb of vv.214-220. The unreal nature of ambition itself is further emphasised by the vivid metaphor with which this section closes:

222-223 quem cepit vitrea fama, hunc circumtonuit gaudens Bellona cruentis.


115 Compare Vergil's language used to describe the anger of Aeneas' opponents in the Aeneid, e.g. Turnus: aestuat ingens uno in corde pudor mixtoque insania luctu et furiis agitatus amor et conscia virtus Aeneid 12.666-668

Cf. Cicero, Tusc. 3.11.
The attack, which Stertinius makes upon luxury and ostentatious expenditure, is interrupted by a subsection of considerable length (vv.247-271), which constitutes, in itself, an attack upon those follies which are symptomatic of the excesses of sexual passion. There are several problems which relate to this unusual break within the regular succession of topics in the diatribe. One must ask why this attack upon sex and its effects is included at all, and why at this particular moment within the poem, although, as we shall see, the answers to these two questions are inextricably linked. It is also necessary to establish if any overall continuity exists between the several attacks upon ambition, luxury, sex and, finally, superstition.

The criticism of luxuria opens abruptly by plunging the reader directly into the exemplum of Nomentanus, the moral of which is not immediately clear. However, we do note at once that, by contrast with the examples with which Horace chose to illuminate the attack upon the folly of ambitio, on this occasion Horace feels free to use targets who are drawn from Roman society. It is also evident that Horace is at pains to maintain the continuity and conversational logic of the poem. For the discussion centres once more upon the abuse of inherited wealth

116 The attack upon the abuse of the sexual instinct is not granted a separate identity in Lejay's formulation of the structure of this poem, see above p.39.

117 Cf. the foreign examples used by Juvenal in Satires 10 to demonstrate the folly of praying for military success. Alexander, Hannibal and Xerxes may have been safer targets for ridicule on this score than the Roman generals, who had contributed to the extent of the Emperor's domain.
and the follies of those who have inherited unearned income, as it has done throughout the poem. As a result the Stoic views on the nature of wealth, and on the nature of the uses and abuses to which it may be put, are again the platform, or part of it, from which the attack is launched. The Stoic viewpoint naturally receives a certain reinforcement from this repetition, although more than repetition alone is at work. For the criticism centres upon that unnatural and ostentatious indulgence in the "benefits" of massive wealth, which had already been the target of Rome's indigenous moralists. They too considered luxuria to be, as we shall see, an insidious and corrosive element contributing to the moral decline of Roman society. Stoic doctrine and Roman moralising clearly join forces at this stage in the satire. However, this is an alliance which potentially has perilous consequences for both the argument and even the moral position of a man who is intent upon purveying to his fellows a philosophy which had its origins in Greece. The fact that foreign luxury had long been considered a contributory agent in the breakdown of moral standards may help to explain the intrusion of the attack upon sex and its folly in vv.247-271. However that may be, I would also suggest that the continuity of the satire is aided by Horace's prior exploitation of the figure of Agamemnon both, by implication, in the mythical exemplum of Orestes (132-141) and, expressly, in the mythical exemplum of Ajax and Agamemnon (187-223). It has already been suggested that one interpretation of the guilt or insanity of Agamemnon, on the occasion of the

118 Cf. vv.84-99; 122-128; 132-157 and vv.168-186.
119 For a discussion of the Stoic attitude to wealth see above, pp.81-84.
120 See below in the discussion of Ofellus' comments on luxuria and its deadening effect upon moral sensibility in Satires 2.2.
sacrifice of Iphigenia, as described in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, helps to explain the meaning of the *exemplum* within this satire.\(^{121}\) The action of Agamemnon in stepping upon the purple tapestries, which makes one of the most awesome scenes of the *Agamemnon*, helps to foreshadow the attack upon *luxuria*, which we find in vv.224-280.\(^{122}\) Also the folly of the rich men of vv. 214-220 is used to underline the equal insanity of Agamemnon immediately prior to the attack upon *luxuria*. Presumably the man "lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam" (214) is wealthy; the poor would prefer to eat the creature. Therefore, Agamemnon and the idea of extravagant waste, with which his name is connected, both in terms of human life and the destruction of wealth, prepare the reader for the transition to the formal assault upon *luxuria*, which is made by Stertinius.

The beginning of this assault is clearly indicated by the nunc age of v.224, with which one may compare huc propius me ... (80) and nunc accipe ... (46) in this satire;\(^ {123}\) however, the continuity of the satire, or, at least, the diatribe within the satire, is made evident in other ways less obvious than nunc age, but more obvious than the references to Agamemnon. For the continuity of the diatribe and its organisation is aided by the use of the Stoic term ratio\(^ {124}\) which is repeated throughout the diatribe. Compare the following lines:

83 a) nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem

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121 See above, p.99.

122 Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 914-947; one may note that a contributory cause of Agamemnon's downfall, his flaunting of Cassandra, matches the interlude of vv.247-271 in this satire.

123 Cf. also at Satires 1.1.108.

124 On the Stoic term ratio, see above pp.5ff.
Each of the lines comes at, or very close to, the beginning of a section or sub-section of the diatribe. In each of the lines ratio holds the central position, reminding the reader of the philosophical basis of each of Stertinius' attacks, while in each line the contrast between the rationality of the Stoic and the folly or insanity of the rest of mankind is thrown into relief by the juxtaposition of ratio with words indicating that insanity and folly, namely a) Anticyram ... omnem (183), b) stultos ... insanire (225) and c) puerilius. The effect is made even more obvious by the sandwich effect achieved in v.83 and in v.225, while the rather combative spirit of the diatribe, reminiscent of the ardour of Lucretius, is also underlined in the two later lines, when Stertinius has warmed to his theme, by the use of vincet (225) and evincet (250).

Although the beginning of the Nomentanus exemplum, with which the attack upon luxuria opens, is well signposted, the meaning of the exemplum within the context of the attack itself is not so clear. One of the abuses of wealth to which Stertinius took exception earlier in the poem was its use in the pursuit of vitrea fama (222) and plausus quos fert Agrippa (185). The suggestion on that occasion was that, by using money to buy political advancement, an otherwise undeserving man could achieve renown and influence within the state. However, the man who seeks to advance himself politically in this way is at least

125 At Lucretius 5.735 we find a line which almost seems to anticipate Horace's diction here: "difficilest ratione docere et vincere verbis."

126 On the Stoic attitude to fama, see above, pp.98f.
paying lip-service to those established ideals of behaviour to which the Roman male should traditionally aspire,¹²⁷ and his "advance" will be in that area of endeavour within which the Stoic sapiens will also be duty-bound to involve himself.¹²⁸ The ambitious and corrupt politician is mistaken chiefly in the belief that money can purchase political acumen as well as political power. Stertinius objects to the means by which a politician of this kind gains advancement and also to the motives which lead him into vast expenditure for the sake of vitrea fama. It is as if reputation were itself worthy of possession irrespective of how that possession was gained.¹²⁹ Such a character is undoubtedly undesirable and, from a Stoic standpoint, insane; the political and social situation of which he is a symptom is also undesirable. On the other hand, Nomentanus and men like him are symptomatic of the same disease at a more advanced stage. The mere possession and ostentatious waste of wealth is now counted sufficient grounds for fama. An examination of the exemplum of Nomentanus demonstrates that the kind of respect which was formerly given freely to the properly deserving¹³⁰ is now bestowed upon men like Nomentanus, who have not even earned the wealth which they distribute with such a lavish hand.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Exemplified best of all in Roman literature by Virgil's Aeneas.
¹²⁸ See above, n.198.
¹²⁹ For the Stoic views on motivation and intent see below pp. 165ff.
¹³⁰ One feels that the portrayal of Nomentanus' "court" is intended to contrast unfavourably with Cicero's pictures of the Scipionic circle in the De Amicitia and De Senectute and Horace's own portrayal of the men who gathered around Maecenas and Augustus, e.g. Sat. 1.5 and 1.9.48-60: cf. also Sat. 1.6 and 2.6.
¹³¹ The progress of the disease described by Horace calls to mind Plato's portrayal of the falling away of the constitutions of the city-state from the ideal depicted in the Republic. Reason gives way successively to spirit, and then various types of appetite as the governing principle both in the
Horace indicates by his use of *edicit* in v.227 that Nomentanus, on receiving his inheritance, immediately adopts, parvenu though he is, a manner of speaking which is more suited to the dignity of a Roman praetor than to his own situation.\(^{132}\)

226-230 hic simul acceptit patrimonii mille talenta edicit piscator uti, pomarius, auceps, unguentarius ac Tusci turba impia vici cum scurris faktor, cum Velabro omne macellum, mane domum veniant.

The incongruity caused by the juxtaposition *edicit* with *piscator* etc. is typical of Horace in his comic mood.\(^{133}\) The humour derives from the fact that *edicere* is commonly used as a word to describe the summoning of the senate,\(^ {134}\) an army\(^ {135}\) or the holding of an election.\(^ {136}\) As a technical term, it is also used to describe the public announcements of a praetor, especially when, on entering office, he sets out the rules by which he will be governed in the administration of justice.\(^ {137}\) The legal parody is maintained by the manner in which the spokesman *leno* (231) speaks to

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\(^{132}\) Horace employs the word, with similarly ironical overtones, in *Satires* 2.2.51, where the praetorian connection is made quite explicit in v.50.

\(^{133}\) For further examples of such incongruity see below in the discussion of the Comic and particularly Plautine influence on Horace, *Satires* 2.7.

\(^{134}\) E.g. Cicero, *Ad Fam.* 11.6.

\(^{135}\) E.g. Livy, *Historiae* 31.11; 22.12.

\(^{136}\) E.g. Cicero, *Ad Q. Fr.* 2.2.2.

\(^{137}\) At *De Finibus* 2.74 Cicero argues to the effect that no man can hold Epicurean views on the nature of the *summum bonum* and honourably enter public life with any hope of success; for, "est enim tibi edicendum quae sis observaturus in iure dicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi erit visum, aliquid de maioribus tuis et de te ipso dices more maiorum." The parallel between this procedure and the behaviour of Nomentanus is obvious.
Nomentanus,\textsuperscript{138} although the colloquial \textit{domi est} adds an element of the humour of incongruity:

\begin{align*}
\text{quidquid mihi, quidquid et horum} \\
\text{cuique domi est, id crede tuum et vel nunc pete} \\
\text{vel cras.}
\end{align*}

while a certain amount of particularly Stoic humour is introduced by the use of \textit{aequus} to describe Nomentanus at v.233:\textsuperscript{139}

\begin{align*}
\text{accipe quid contra haec iuvenis responderit aequus:} \\
\text{"in nive Lucana dormis ocreatus, ut aprum} \\
\text{cenem ego: tu piscis hiberno ex aequore verris.} \\
\text{segnis ego, indignus qui tantum possideam: aufer:} \\
\text{sume tibi decies; tibi tantundem; tibi triplex} \\
\text{unde uxor media currit de nocte vocata."}
\end{align*}

The precise meaning of \textit{aequus} in v.233 is difficult to ascertain, because of the irony of the passage, which depends to a large extent upon the meaning of this very term. Although Rudd's decent transfers the spirit of irony neatly into his translation,\textsuperscript{140} it does not communicate the essentially legal and maqisterial flavour of the original, which has, after all, been sustained throughout the exemplum by the use of \textit{edicit} (227) and \textit{vel nunc pete vel cras} (232). If the whole approach of Nomentanus is intended by the poet as a parody of the behaviour of the budding magistrate, which is, after all, in keeping also with the spirit of the attack upon \textit{ambitio}, then \textit{aequus} must be taken and understood in that context. Perhaps the most common meaning of \textit{aequus} is "equitable" and "impartial": this in respect of behaviour

\textsuperscript{138} Palmer is aware of these ironical devices (n. ad loc.), as is Lejay (n. ad loc.); neither, however, do more than point out that the irony exists, without explaining the purpose of the parody and irony. On the legal aspect of \textit{vel nunc pete vel cras} (231), see Palmer n. ad loc.

\textsuperscript{139} On \textit{aequus}, in its Stoic senses, see above pp.25-27.

towards others.\textsuperscript{141} This is more than compatible with the demands of the present context, where Nomentanus apes the behaviour of the praetor, especially since at Cicero, \textit{Verrines} 2.4.65 we find aequus coupled not only with praetor, but also with sapiens, in the phrase, \textit{praetor aequus et sapiens}. From a more philosophical work of the same author, one may compare \textit{aequissimus aestimator et iudex} at \textit{De Finibus} 3.2. Although no great claims can be made regarding the interpretation of aequus in v.233 of the present satire, upon the basis of the commonplace juxtaposition of aequus, sapiens and praetor in the passage from the \textit{Verrines}, nevertheless the juxtaposition does show that the concept of justice and wisdom were, not unnaturally, closely linked in popular political jargon, as they were in the more sophisticated jargon of Stoic ethical theory. Therefore, when the Stoicising Stertinius uses the word aequus to describe Nomentanus in a context where ironical use has already been made of traditional political conventions, the reader is surely intended to respond both to the political, and Roman implications of the word, and also to the philosophical connotations of the term.\textsuperscript{142} That the Stoic connotations are indeed present and should be appreciated is made even clearer by the recollection that, at the beginning of this poem, Damasippus attacks Horace in Stoic terms, which are echoed in the Nomentanus \textit{exemplum}: compare, for example:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{iratus tibi quod vini somnique benignus nil dignum sermone canas...} \textit{(3-4)}
\item \textit{dic aliquid dignum promissis...} \textit{(6)}
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{141} E.g."praebere se aequum alicui", Cicero, \textit{Ad Fam.} 2.1.

\textsuperscript{142} This is especially true since the implication of the whole satire is that only the Stoic sapiens, who, by definition is aequus, escapes the insanity which afflicts mankind.
c) vitanda est improba Siren desidia, aut quidquid vita meliore parasti ponendum aequo animo... (14-16)

with the following:

a) iuvenis responderit aequus (233)

b) segnis ego, indignus qui... (236)

and it becomes clear once more when Damasippus derived his vocabulary of criticism. Also the burden of the attack upon sexual passion in vv.250-271 is that it induces behaviour which is marked by a lack of moderation and equilibrium,\textsuperscript{143} while the Stoic concept of consistency was central to the interpretation of the structure of \textit{Satires} 1.3.\textsuperscript{144}

To summarise the intended effect of the \textit{exemplum} of Nomentanus: society at Rome has reached such a low moral ebb that all values and standards of excellence and repute have been turned upside down.\textsuperscript{145} The mere possession of enormous wealth is sufficient to guarantee the fortunate and foolish heir the adulation of men the very existence of whom would have been scorned by the moralists of an earlier period.\textsuperscript{146}

The following examples of notorious extravagance and waste underline further a connection which exists between the folly of ambition and the folly of extravagance. For both ambition

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Vv.259-271.
\item \textsuperscript{144} See above, pp.25-27.
\item \textsuperscript{145} The free association of Nomentanus with the "Tusci turba impia vici" of vv.227-229 could argue for an Horatian attack upon the excessive humanitas of the iuvenis ... aequus.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Attacks upon extravagance are legion. Some which antedate Horace are:
\begin{itemize}
\item i) Lucilius, 19 frg. 557f.; 29 frg. 806f.
\item ii) Sallust, Cat. 12.
\item iii) Varro, \textit{Eumenides} (see Norden, In Varronis Saturas Menippeas observationes selectae (Leipzig, 1891, p.329f.).
\item iv) Cicero, \textit{Rep.} 2.3.5-9.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
and luxury, as well as being considered ultimately insane ways of using wealth, have another aspect in common. This concerns the question of motivation yet again. The exempla, in vv.239-249, of the filius Aesopi and the Quinti progenies Arri show that the ambitious and the wastefully extravagant are both interested in establishing fame or, more accurately, notoriety. The continuity between the exemplum of Nomentanus and the illustrations of this desire for doubtful reputation is established quite simply. The willing wife of v.238:

\[237-238\]

\[tibi\ \text{triplex}\]
\[unde\ \text{uxor} \\text{media\ currit\ de\ nocte\ vocata}\]

relates to Metella, wife of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who was also a notorious adultress. Both of these women in turn anticipate the cause of the lover's anxieties in vv.259-271 and, therefore, further aid the continuity and structure of the poem. However, is it, in fact, totally clear that the two examples of extravagance and frivolity, which are described in vv.239-246, effect that temporary concentration upon the desire for notoriety which was adumbrated above? If the date of this satire is approximately 33 B.C. then it would have been written in that period when Octavian was fomenting public opinion against Antony and Cleopatra in preparation for the final struggle for absolute power. In that case, such stories as that concerning Cleopatra's consumption of a great pearl in 42/41 B.C. would have been rife. The moral of such a story, in terms of political propaganda,

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147 For the historical details concerning Metella and her connection with the son of Aesopus, see Palmer's note ad loc.

148 The story of Cleopatra and the pearl is recounted at Pliny, H.N. 9.58; it matters not whether the story was true, only that it could have been used as a weapon against the reputation of Antony and Cleopatra.
would have been that this eastern woman was corrupting the honest Antony by a combination of sexual depravity and ostentatious extravagance. It seems likely, therefore, that the story of the filius Aesopi and his pearl is intended to call to mind the even greater ostentation and notoriety of Cleopatra, while the bringing to mind of Cleopatra also anticipates the attack on sexual excess in vv.247-271. Furthermore, the very wording of 240-241 scilicet ut decies solidum absorberet, aceto diluit insignem bacam.

suggests that the actor's son is motivated by a desire for notoriety or, perhaps, that the poet cannot conceive of any other motive explicable in the context of such extravagance, although it could be suggested that to "acquire" the pearl in this way (absorbere) was to possess it to the ultimate degree, by making it part of one's physical constitution. The poet's incomprehension of the rationale behind the act is suggested by scilicet, while the potential notoriety of the deed is established within the two lines both by the specific description of the pearl's value and by the emotive insignem. The two sons of Q. Arrius are mentioned as examples of culinary extravagance and general frivolity; they contrast with the culinary modesty and moral earnestness of Ofellus in Satires 2.2 and with the sensible relaxation of Horace's friends in 2.6, while they are of a kind with the epicures of Satires 2.4 and 2.8.

149 Apparently the pearl was worth only one third of the value of the services of the uxor vocata in v.238.
G

THE ATTACK UPON THE INSANITY OF
SEXUAL PASSION VV.247-280

As has been noted before, this subsection of the attack upon luxuria constitutes a self-contained and consistent attack upon the insane behaviour of those men whose minds are deranged by the demands of sexual appetite. The mention of the willing wife of v.238 and of Metella in v.239, along with the inevitable reference to Cleopatra in vv.239-242, has foreshadowed this attack upon sex quite adequately, as has the reference to the behaviour of Clytaemnestra earlier in the poem. Furthermore, it had become a commonplace of moral writers that sexual extravagance went hand in hand with financial irresponsibility and extravagance, perhaps nowhere more obviously than in the plays of Plautus and Terence. It was to remain a commonplace of moral didacticism at Rome, culminating in Juvenal's coordinated assault upon luxury, foreign influence and sexual depravity in his sixth satire. Such moralists had the support of the Stoics, if they wanted it; for the attitude of the Stoics to sex was compatible with the traditional moral viewpoint of the Romans and is reflected in this attack made by Stertinius in vv.247-271. On

150 See p.101.
151 This is implied in vv.132-141.
152 The expenditure of the family fortune upon amicae was a charge frequently levelled at the adulescentes of Roman Comedy, e.g. Plautus, Most. 15.33, where the honest countryman Grumio complains to Tranio, the city slave, about the ruination of both the character and fortune of Philolaches. For the relationship between moral and financial collapse, see also Plautus, Trin. 223-241; for the traditional Roman view, see Cic. Off. 3.15.63, where great emphasis is placed upon the sacrosanctity of the res familiares.
occasion the Stoics also were inclined to correlate wealth and sexual depravity, especially when the sexual instinct was exploited for financial gain. This is evident from the following:

\[ \text{δοξεὶ καλὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ Στοᾶς λέγεσθαι'} \quad \text{τὸ διὰ καὶ ξανόμενον οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν'} \quad \text{πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ διὰ πορνοβοσκίας καὶ δύνας γίνεται'} \quad \text{οὐκ ἀρα ὁ πλοῦτος ἀγαθὸν.} \]

Alexander Aphrod. Comm. in Aristot. Topica 2.107 (Ald. p.201.21)

While this passage is clearly using πορνοβοσκία as an example to prove the point that money is not capable of being classed as a "good", if its means of acquisition can be disreputable, and nothing more, nevertheless, it shows the close connection in the puritanical mind between wealth and sex. This is a connection which Stertinius has already pointed out; for the uxor vocata of v.238 is an example of πορνοβοσκία at work; further, the emphasis in the actual attack upon sex in the satire is upon sex which has been procured by money:

\[ \text{252-253 an meretricis amore sollicitus plores...} \]

and the conversation, which Horace adapts from the beginning of the Eunuchus of Terence, concerns sex for which it is necessary to pay.

So far as the Stoics were concerned, sex was an instinct or impulse (ὀρμή), which was essential for the preservation of both the species and, therefore, the state. Necessarily it was, then, compatible with the basic ethical instinct of self-preservation. 154 Accordingly it was the duty of the wise-man to love, 155 even as it was the duty of the wise-man to take part in

154 See Diogenes Laertius, 7.85, where the Epicurean view that pleasure is the prime ethical instinct is also attacked; cf. Cic. Fin. 3.16.
155 E.G. "Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt"; Cicero, Tusc. 4.34.72.
the political life of the state.\textsuperscript{156} This love should exist within the context of marriage, within which estate the Stoics recommended that the union should be founded upon comradeship and mutual respect and equality.\textsuperscript{157} The subordination of female dignity in prostitution was, therefore, abhorrent to the Stoics, ideally speaking, but they objected to prostitution on practical grounds also, since prostitution undermined both the need for entrance into marriage and also the stability of the marriage contract.\textsuperscript{158} Debasement of the sexual instinct into a mere desire for irresponsible σωματικῆς συνουσίας,\textsuperscript{159} where the motivation was mere gratification of personal pleasure was considered both indecorous and potentially destructive; for τὸ ἑρωτικὸν πάθος οὔχ δειον ἄλλα ταραχῶδες.\textsuperscript{160} It was part of the task of σωφροσύνη to control the ἑρωτικὸν πάθος, especially in the young, since οὕθεις γαρ γερόντων καὶ ἀκμῆς ὄφαν μὴ ἔχοντων ἔρα.\textsuperscript{161} The role of σωφροσύνη in the guidance, not to say suppression, of the appetites is described by Stobaeus at \textit{Ecl.} 2.63.6 \textit{W}:

τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης ἕδον κεφαλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁμμᾶς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ ἰδρωσθὲν αὐτὰς προηγομένως.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{156} See Cic. \textit{Fin.} 3.68, also above p.90.
\textsuperscript{158} The practical bent of Roman ethics takes a different direction regarding prostitution, which is epitomised by the anecdote concerning Cato Maior at \textit{Acro, ad Hor. Serm.} 1.2.32. Indulgence is sanctioned before marriage - in moderation.
\textsuperscript{159} Andronicus, \textit{Περὶ πάθων} 4.
\textsuperscript{160} Philodemos, \textit{De Mus.} p.67 Kemke.
\textsuperscript{161} Sextus, \textit{Adv. Math.} 7.239.
\textsuperscript{162} The corresponding virtue in Roman terminology is, of course, temperantia or moderatio, e.g. "temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio", Cic. \textit{Inv.} 2.54.164; cf. id. \textit{Fin.} 2.19.60 and 1.14.7, also, "temperans, quem Graeci σωφρονα appellant eamque virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, nonnumquam etiam modestiam." id. \textit{Tusc.} 3.8.16.
The hallmark of the man who governs his impulses in this way is moderation and good sense, qualities notably lacking in the men criticised in vv.247-271, which brings us to a consideration of the actual attack which is made by Stertinius.

That we are again dealing with a failing best described in terms of mental illness and to be remedied only by the appropriate virtue is made clear by ratio in v.250 and amentia in v.249, where we may suspect Horace is punning, and insignia morbi at v.254. The pangs of love reduce our behaviour to the level of that of children. Examples of such childlike behaviour form a frame for the description of both the conversion of Polemon and the adaptation of the opening of Terence's Eunuchus. The first examples of childishness occur at vv.247-249, the second group at vv.272-275, which, according to the schematisation followed so far,163 is outside the attack upon the effects of the unbridled sexual impulse. It seems as if we have here another example of that disguised transition from one topic to another, which was employed by Horace to such good effect in the bridge passage of vv.168-186.164 Although there is no such obvious ring structure in this passage on sex as there was in vv.31-48,165 nevertheless there is repetition of the "house of cards" concept at v.275 (aedificante casas) from v.247 (aedificare casas), both of which phrases occur at the beginnings of their respective lines, coupled with

163 See above, p.40 and p.101f.
164 For discussion of this passage, see above, p.55.
165 C.O. Brink, Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles (Cambridge, 1963) p.6 comments on this device of "gliding" from one topic to another in the context of the structure of Horace's Ars Poetica vv.294-306, "The textbook is played down by this conversational and partly humorous way of constructing the link - but it is a link for all that, joining two distinct portions of the poem."
illustrations concerned with apples, the first in the centre of
this section at v.258 and the second at, or beyond, its close at
vv.272-273, points up the total unity and cohesion of this section
in an extremely marked manner. It may be that the poet felt it
necessary to underline the unity of this passage in this perhaps
rather obvious way, since there is little of that continuity of
thought and theme which marked the assaults upon avarice and
ambition. Consider the passage in detail:

247-257 To fall in love is the mark of an immature nature
and more childish than childish games. Mature
judgement can wean us away from such insanity.
Polemon put away childish things.

258-259 A major characteristic of the unformed
childish nature is inconsistency.

260-271 So it is with the man in love; neither is he
master of himself nor does he know his own
mind. He shows no moderation or consistency.

Compared with the tone of the attacks upon avarice and ambition
and luxury, this assault upon the abuse of sexuality is rather
light-hearted. The very emphasis upon the fact that such passions
are particularly a malady which affect young men suggests that,
like Polemon listening to Xenocrates, Horace and others can out-
grow such foolishness: this is consistent with the Stoic view
already mentioned that οὗθεν γερόντων ἐρᾷ.166 The light touch
of the section also allows the reader or audience some relief from
the dour and uniformly gloomy picture of humanity which is painted
in the earlier portion of the diatribe. Since the diatribe is
drawing to its close, it is also necessary that its tone should be
lightened somewhat, as it is by the mention of the conversion of

166 See n.161 above p.114.
Polemon, so that the audience will be impressed with the idea that there is hope and that this hope rests with the creed which the speaker is attempting to impart. Further, the spirit of comedy, which is invoked by the adaptation of a genuine comic scene, cannot allow of total pessimism. However, the reader is brought back to the harsh realities, after this flight of fancy, by the brutal adde cruorem stultitiae... of vv.275-276, and the whole of the passage which intervenes between the end of the direct assault on sexuality and the beginning of the attack upon superstition.

As was mentioned above in the brief structural analysis of this passage, the major symptom of the young man's sickness is his inconsistency and total lack of self-control. In his condition that self-control can only be achieved by σωφροσύνη or temperantia, as is pointed out by the slave:

265-271

servus non paulo sapientior: 'o ere, quae res nec modum habet neque consilium, ratione modoque tractari non vult. in amore haec sunt mala, bellum, pax rursum: haec si quis tempestatis prope ritu mobilia et caeca fluitantia sorte laboret reddere certa sibi, nihil plus explicit ac si insanire paret certa ratione modoque.'

The first point of interest is that, in keeping with the traditions of comedy, the slave is portrayed as non paulo sapientior than his master. However, this slave, drawn from the Eunuchus, is not of the type of cunning slave epitomised by Tranio in the Mostellaria, but rather of the sententious slave, typified by Parmeno in the Hecyra of Terence, and commoner in the more humane

167 For a detailed discussion of the importance of consistency in Stoic doctrine, see above, pp.25ff.
168 The slave is Parmeno, the adulescens Phaedria.
comedies of Terence than in the plays of Plautus.169 The Stoic Stertinius, with his necessary leanings towards *humanitas* in the treatment of slaves, readily finds a Terentian slave to suit his moral purpose within this poem, within which the *humanitas* of the Stoics has already been featured.170 Furthermore, it seems likely that the idea of a slave, giving sound advice to an unreceptive master, appealed to the Horatian sense of humour, if we are to take this incident, within *Satires* 2.3, as anticipatory of the tirade of Davus against Horace himself at *Satires* 2.7.

The sententious slave has the acumen to perceive that a love affair is totally incompatible with that reasoned moderation by which, according to the Stoics, all our emotions and appetites should strictly be controlled. It should, however, be noted that the ascription of the lines of dialogue in the manuscript of Terence is in some doubt, especially regarding the juncture at which the slave breaks into the conversation. No consistency of life in accord with reason can be expected or achieved and maintained, if a man allows himself to fall prey to *amor* or ἐρως; as well to attempt consciously to become insane in accord with reasoned moderation. The phrases *ratione modoque* (266) and *certa ratione modoque* (271) at the beginning and end of the slave's address to his master171 are clear periphrases of *temperantia* and *moderatio*, while the clause:


170 See above, pp.52ff., see also below, pp.151ff. with reference to Horace's initial tolerance of the behaviour of Davus at the Saturnalia.

171 There is some dispute as to where the slave's speech does end; Rudd extends the slave's speech to v.281 in his translation, destroying the effect of the repetition of *certa ratione modoque*, but facilitating the interpretation of the structure of vv.272-281.
265-266

Quae res
nec modum habet neque consilium...

also encloses the concept of emotional moderation within itself.

A comparison with Terence's language is instructive:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ere, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum}
\text{habet ullum eam consilio regere non potes.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{incerta haec tu si postulas}
\text{ratione certa facere nihilo plus agas}
\text{quam si des operam ut cum ratione insanias.}
\]

Terence, \textit{Eun.} 57-63

Although the concept of control, which is implied by the use of
\textit{regere} at \textit{Eunuchus} 58 is softened to \textit{tractari non vult} by Horace
in \textit{v.267}, even so the specifically Stoic nature of the adaptation
is emphasised by the prominence which Horace gives to the phrases
\textit{ratione modoque} (266) and \textit{certa ratione modoque} (271), especially
since the word \textit{ratio}, as has been indicated,\textsuperscript{172}
plays a prominent
role in the overall structuring of the Stoic diatribe.

The oscillation between states of war and peace, which
is the lot of the committed lover, is taken directly from the
Terence, while the picturesque image in:

\[
\begin{align*}
268-270
\text{haec si quis tempestatis prope ritu}
\text{mobilia et caeca fluitantia sorte laboret}
\text{reddere certa sibi...}
\end{align*}
\]

is Horatian, and quite in keeping with such vivid similes as
"velut silvis, ubi passim / palantis error certo de tramite
pellit..." of \textit{vv.48-52}. The concept of intellectual blindness,\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{172} See, p.103f.above.

\textsuperscript{173} The concept of intellectual blindness is not limited to the
Stoics, nor even to the philosophers, although the concept is
common in Lucretius, e.g. 3.59, of the passions, and also at
2.14, the famous \textit{o pectora caeca}! The most famous philo-
sophical use of the concept is in Plato's analogy of the cave.
In non-philosophical literature the interplay between physical
and intellectual blindness in \textit{Oedipus the King} provides one
implied in the image in vv.268-270, is also anticipated at vv. 43-44, on the first occasion at which a specific and famous Stoic name, that of Chrysippus, is mentioned. The idea of mental blindness is most apposite in a treatment of the paradox \( \delta\eta\rho\omega\nu \nu\alpha\iota\nu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\iota \), and continues the illustration of mental illness in terms of physical disability which has been a continuing aspect of this satire, an aspect brought to the fore again in this section of the poem by the ponas insignia morbi of v.254. As well as being Horatian and in keeping with the vivid images of the satire, the conceit of the storm, as well as the insertion of the comic scene into the poem, is entirely consonant with Fronto's description of the expository techniques of Chrysippus, attention to which has already been drawn. 174

It should be added, as a footnote to this discussion, that a man who governs his emotions in the manner prescribed by the Stoics will remain aequus and his behaviour will remain consistent with reason. The concept of equanimity and consistency is, as it were, anticipated by the application, albeit in a spirit of irony, of the epithet aequus in a different, but related sense, to the foolish young Nomentanus at v.233.

THE PURPOSE OF VV.272-280

The attack upon the insanity of sexual passion was given no independent status within the structure of the poem by Lejay, who seems to have thought of it as a subdivision of the attack of the most chilling examples of continuous dramatic irony which is extant.

174 See above, pp.67ff.
upon luxury and an example of indisciplined wastage of the res
familiaris. I have treated the attack upon the insanity attendant
upon sexual passion, as if it came to a close with the finish of
the comments of the sensible slave at v.271. At v.281 we have
the clear beginning of a fresh attack, this time upon the madness
of excessive religiosity; this leaves us with the problem of what
to make of the nine lines of vv.272-280. For, although these
lines do not conclude the interrupted attack upon luxury, neither
do they easily form an epilogue for the attack upon insanity
caused by sexual desire. The lines divide naturally at sanior in
v.275 and the simplest explanation of their function is to consider
vv.272-275, as far as sanior, as the structural completion of the
formal attack upon sexual passion, structural in the sense that
nothing new is added in terms of content; on the other hand, vv.
275-280, from adde cruorem / stultitiae... form a bloody post-
script, which is intended to remind the reader that, although the
topic of sex can be treated with a degree of frivolity, sexual
passion is also the stuff of tragedy. For the "crime of passion",
which is mentioned here, along with the suicide of the murderer,
stands in bleak contrast to the comic plots of Plautus and Terence.
The realities of unbridled passion are murder and suicide. A
further sordid connection is made with the earlier portion of the
satire in that the abuse of money is still below the surface,
since the name Hellas suggests that Marius' destructive passion
was for a courtesan.

The problem was raised above as to why the attack upon
luxury was "interrupted" by this attack upon sexual licence; it

175 See above, p.116 where there is an anticipatory discussion
of the problem.

176 P.101.
can now be seen that the attack upon luxury is not interrupted, nor even is it modified into the attack upon sexual licence. Further, as again has been pointed out, foreign influence and luxury imports and the importation of un-Roman behaviour, coupled with the lack of foreign military pressure, was cited by Roman moralists as causes of the decay in the ethical standards pertaining at Rome. This kind of attack was also often related to scathing comments upon the unhealthy influence of the Greek philosophical schools.

It should be added, perhaps as a postscript to the passage on sex, that Horace indicates in characteristic fashion by exploiting "ring structure" that it should be treated as a complete entity in the structure of the poem. For we have in v.275 the phrase aedificante casas echoing the aedificare casas of v.247; also characteristic of Horace's careful composition is that these two playful usages of aedificare anticipate Damasippus' criticism of the author at v.308.

I

THE ATTACK UPON SUPERSTITION VV.281-295

One of the more interesting aspects of this attack upon the folly of superstition is that, were it not for the reference to Chrysippus (287) to signal the imminent close of the diatribe, even as reference to him had signposted the beginning of the diatribe at v.44, there would be little to indicate that the attack is being spoken by a convinced Stoic, who is intent upon

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177 See above, p.110 esp. n.148.
178 Cato Maior, for example, supported the expulsion of all philosophers from Rome as recorded ap. Gellius, N.A. 15.11, while Cato's reaction to the embassy of philosophers (156 B.C.) is recorded by Plutarch, Cato Maior 22: see also p.36, n.36.
converting another to his own beliefs. It is the kind of attack which one would expect to come more naturally from an Epicurean, or from a man professing the Epicureanising sentiments to which Horace himself gives expression at *Satires* 1.5.101-103:

namque deos didici securum agere aevum,
nec si quid miri faciat natura, deos id
tristis ex alto caeli demittere tecto.

Also, the death of Iphigeneia, which was used by Horace as evidence for the madness of Agamemnon in vv.199-220, would have been familiar to a cultured Roman audience from Lucretius' use of the incident as an example of "tantum religio potuit suadere malorum" at *De Rerum Natura* 1.80-101. For, although one can trace attacks upon the conventions of religious observance and worship as far back as Xenophanes and Heraclitus,179 it was the Epicureans who made this their special concern in their eagerness to free men from fear of death and fear of the gods.180 It may be that Stertinius is attempting to win support by suggesting that the Stoic view of nature and of life is not dissimilar in certain aspects to the more "popular" philosophy of the Epicureans, although it is difficult to imagine a doctrinaire Stoic taking this line of action. It may be that Horace is, in fact, satirising the Stoics for their supposed exclusiveness, which yet allows them to put forward arguments which not only have an Epicurean flavour, but even include words such as *casus* in v.292 that loom

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179 E.g. Xenophanes, frs. 11,14 and 16 (DK) also Heraclitus, frs. 14 and esp. fr. 5 (DK), καὶ τοῖς ἄγάλμασι δὲ τοιτέους εὖχονται, ὡμοτὸν εἰ τις ἔμοισι λεσχηνεώσατο, οὗ τοι γιγνώσκων θεοὺς οὖν ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσι.

180 The Epicurean aim of philosophy is perhaps best summarised by Virgil:

felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas:
atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari. *Georgics* 2.490-492
particularly large in the beliefs of the Epicureans. However, this difficulty can best be solved by examining exactly what is the object of attack in vv.281-295 and by comparing that examination and its results, both with the earlier attacks upon different kinds of folly within the poem, and also with the Epicurean and Stoic views upon prayer and the gods. For, if the difficulty is not solved, then substance will be given to Rudd's claim that the eclecticism of Horace was facilitated by blurring of distinctions between the beliefs of the various schools, a blurring which had allegedly taken place during the later Hellenistic period.

The freedman of vv.281-287 is attacked because he prays to the gods to make a unique exception in his case and to save him from death. He mistakenly believes that death is an evil, when it is in fact, or should be, merely a matter of indifference. The ignorance of the freedman, however, extends far beyond his mistake regarding the nature of death and his beliefs with regard to the role played by the gods. The mistake regarding the nature of death is indicative of a total ignorance regarding the nature and, therefore, the purpose of life. For the freedman's motives for praying for an indefinite extension to the span of his life can only be construed as aiming at a continued enjoyment of, or quest for, wealth, political power and illicit sexual relations, if the attack upon his prayer is read, as it needs must be, as completing that series of attacks upon human folly which is formulated within the diatribe. The misunderstanding of the nature and, therefore, the function of prayer argues for the

181 The word is used in an ironical spirit of Epicurean doctrine at Cicero, N.D. 1.32.90, "sed tamen quis iste tantus casus, unde tam felix concursus atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nascerentur." Cf. ib. 2.2.6, also Lucretius, 6.1096.

182 Rudd, pp.16-35; see disc. above pp.2ff.
existence of an overall ignorance, or ἀφροσύνη, of the workings of the cosmos and its organisation for the best under the guidance of the divine logos or Providence. Particular instances of this overall ignorance betray themselves in the cardinal vices of ἀκολασία and δικία and are demonstrated in action by the misguided means and motives of the foolish and insane in their quest for illusory goods. This ignorance and folly is compounded by the abuse of these illusory goods, notably wealth and political power, when once they have been achieved, yet, in its various aspects and subdivisions, this ignorance is merely an extension of that overall insanity and ignorance of which the behaviour of the superstitious freedman is symptomatic.

The superstitious mother of vv.289-295 is similarly misguided in believing that, on the one hand, the gods concern themselves with the fate of individual humans and, on the other hand, that an extension of life on this earth is necessarily beneficial. Also her promise to the gods that her son, if cured, nudus / in Tiberi stabat (291-292), betrays absolute ignorance of the basic workings of physiology, which are, also, under the guidance of the divine logos in its guise, subdivided, as the interpenetrating human ψυχή.183

The attitude of the Stoics towards the gods and towards prayer is more complex than that adopted by the Epicureans, who denied not that the gods had any existence, but that they had any concern with human affairs or even with the workings of the

183 In the following passage Cleanthes is described as ascribing each element to its proper place, καὶ οὗτος (scil. Κλ.) ἄνωμα τὰς ἀληθείς ἀρχὰς, θεόν καὶ ὅλην. καὶ τὴν μὲν γὴν μεταβάλλειν εἰς ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εἰς ἄέρα, τὸν δὲ ἄέρα ἀνω φέρεσθαι, τὸ δὲ πῦρ εἰς τὰ περιγέφειας χωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν δὲ ὅλων τοῦ κόσμου διήκειν, ἢς μέρος μετέχοντας ἡμᾶς ἐμψυχοῦσθαι. Hermias, Irris. Gent. Phil. 7 (S.V.F. 1.495); cf. Plut. De Virt. Mor. 451 B.
Similarly, the attitude of the Stoics towards death and eschatological problems in general is more complex than that of the Epicureans, who simply denied the possibility of any post mortem individual existence and, therefore, of post mortem punishment for transgressions committed in a terrestrial existence. Death was described in almost Socratic terms by the Stoics as the separation of the soul from the body. Of the eight parts of the soul (each part isolated according to a specific function) it is the ἡγεμονικόν which survives death ἐν φαινομην and separates from the body. Although there was some dispute among the Stoics themselves regarding the question of whose souls survived and for how long and also whether souls which did survive were punished or rewarded. Cleanthes, for example, seems to have believed that all souls survived until they were reborn as a result of the final ἐκπόρωσις, while Chrysippus believed that only the souls of the wise won individual immortality. Cleanthes' view was enthusiastically adopted by the early Christians, but...
I feel that the emphasis upon the name of Chrysippus in this poem and the despite shown for the *insipientes* by Stertinius argues that he too believed that immortality was the privilege of the wise, or, at least, those who are consciously striving after wisdom. Therefore, rather than pray simply to avoid death, men should train themselves in life in a preparation for death and also ensure that their children are aware of the need for this training. It may be noted here that Horace introduces two human fears to thwart which the philosophy of Epicurus was consciously formulated, namely the fears inspired by death and the popular conception of revengeful gods. These are mentioned at vv. 281-284, where the aged freedman begs the gods to preserve him alone from death, and at vv.290-295, where the anxious mother is diagnosed as suffering from fear of the gods, *timore deorum* (295). Both of these individuals seem less than well educated and to belong to that class which was of particular concern to Epicurus. Possibly Stertinius is suggesting that, although Epicureanism was designed to remove the anxieties of the "common people", it had failed in this aim and that Stoicism actually provided a more satisfactory solution to the perennial problems of human existence, even though the demands made upon the intellect by Stoicism were, at first sight, beyond the capabilities of the common people.

Further, the Stoic concept of prayer and of the gods did not allow for the making of such individually selfish requests which are parodied in vv.281-295: for, on the one hand, a man

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191 The inconsistencies and difficulties of the religious beliefs of the Stoics are discussed by Arnold, pp.216-237, esp. p.217, "All through the Roman period the Stoics held in theory a definite and consistent position... in the application... to practical problems they showed that variation of standard and temperament which history has always to record even of societies of honourable and intelligent men."

192 This dictum is again reminiscent of Plato, *Phaedo* 64B.
should not pray for things for which he cannot openly ask the
gods, while, on the other hand, it is by no means certain that
the gods concern themselves with such individual trivia, which
should more properly be the concern of the individual himself.
Ideally a man's prayers should be for what Juvenal describes in
the famous lines of his tenth satire:

orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano.
fortem posse animum mortis terrore carentem,
qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat
naturae, qui ferre queat quoscumque labores
nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil...

Juv. 10.356-360

By the time of Seneca and Epictetus, and also of Marcus Aurelius,
prayer had developed virtually into an examination of a man's own
soul "to know whether it is in tune with the purpose of the
universe." This ideal of living in accord with nature and
also that ideal described by Juvenal, is far removed from the
ignorant and foolish behaviour of the freedman and anxious mother
here satirised by Horace.

193 This precept is attributed by Seneca, Ep. 10.5 to one
Athenodorus, probably the Stoic of that name from Tarsus
c.130-160 B.C., and is exploited by Juvenal in his tenth

194 The picture of the Stoic Jupiter at Seneca, N.Q.2.45.1 and 3
is out of sympathy with the concept of such a personal approach,
although there was dispute among the Stoics on the extent of
influence felt by individuals upon their affairs from the
gods. Compare, e.g., Cic. N.D. 2.65.164 with Cic. Off.
2.6.19; Sen. N.Q. 7.30.3; Cic. N.D. 2.66.167.

195 Arnold, p.236, refers in his notes to Sen. Dial. 5.36.2 and
Epictetus, Disc. 3.10.2 and 3.

196 A more detailed discussion than the foregoing of problems
which relate to Stoic attitudes to prayer, free-will and
evil may be found in A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy
(London, 1974) pp.163-170 and, by the same author, "The Stoic
Concept of Evil" PhQ 18 (1968) pp.329-343.
The extended quotation of the diatribe is closed by Damasippus at v.295 and in vv.296-299 Damasippus rounds off his exposition with a brief postscript. The burden of this is that these are the various types of argument taught him by Stertinius:

posthac ne compellarer inultus.

This reason betrays a considerable movement away from the original aim of Stertinius, which was to dissuade Damasippus from suicide, as reported in vv.34-41, although the reason which was originally given why Damasippus should not take his own life is brought back to mind by the vivid final couplet of Damasippus' recital:

dixerit insanum qui me totidem audiet atque respicere ignoto discet pendentia tergo.

which echoes in sentiment:

hoc te crede modo insanum, nihilo ut sapientior ille, qui te deridet, caudam trahat.

Damasippus is immediately given the opportunity of putting the efficacy of Stertinius' instructions to the test, although we remember that his initial and unprovoked attack upon the desidia of Horace was rather inept; for Horace accepts the implied challenge by throwing out a question which serves as an introduction to the final conversation and altercation between himself and Damasippus. This conversation from vv.300-326 parallels the introductory conversation of vv.1-31; both conversations form the frame within which the diatribe itself is set.
THE FINAL ALTERCATION VV.300-326

The ironical challenge, which Horace flings out to Damasippus in vv.300-302 and which was inspired by Damasippus' confidence in his new faith, ensures that the final altercation between the author and his creation springs naturally from the close of Damasippus' speech. However, the meaning of:

300-302 Stoic, post damnum sic vendas omnia pluris, qua me stultitia, quoniam non est genus unum, insanire putas? ego nam videor mihi sanus.

is obscure, within the overall context of the poem, although the literal meaning is not in any doubt. A proper understanding of the passage, especially of v.300, is necessary if the reader is properly to grasp the tone in which the whole poem closes. I assume that the tone is ironical and this is immediately suggested by Horace's use of Stoic at the beginning of the address to Damasippus.197 The treatment of Damasippus in the opening conversation with Horace (1-31) matches the irony with which the figure of Damasippus is handled in the close of the poem. Horace's attitude has not been changed by the substance of the diatribe which has been regurgitated by Damasippus. Rudd's translation is accurate in both tone and meaning:

My dear Stoic, to make up for your losses may you sell everything / at a profit! But in what folly (there are several forms) do you think / my madness consists?198

197 The ironical use of the vocative Stoic is akin to the use of the adverb philosophe in an ironical sense at Plautus, Rud. 4.3.37 and of the verb, philosophor, id. Capt. 2.2.34; Ps. 2.3.21 and 4.2.18. Cf. n.36 above, p.36.

198 Rudd, Satires of Horace and Persius, p.91.
although English idiom demands the breaking of the sentence into two independent structures. The irony lies in the use of the vocative *Stoice*, as mentioned above, as a virtual pejorative and in the fact that the ostensibly polite prayer or wish\(^{199}\) of v.300 is intended as a venomous reminder of that financial crash, which had been instrumental in bringing Damasippus to Stoicism.\(^{200}\) Horace suggests that there is but little reason to suppose that the Stoic Damasippus will be any more successful as a philosopher, on his present showing, than he formerly was as a man of business. It is also possible that Horace is here exploiting syntactical ambiguity to some advantage in order to give an added edge to his challenge to Damasippus. For, although *post damnum* balances *omnia pluris* within the same clause and should be construed within the ambience of this extraneous wish clause, nevertheless its position immediately following the ironical *Stoice* (and conjoined with it by reason of its placement immediately before the caesura of v.300) does suggest that the reader is being invited to remember the implication of the confessions of Damasippus at vv.18-26, that he only became a Stoic after and as a result of his financial crash. If this implication is present in "*Stoice, post damnum*", we have a useful example of Horace relating, in a quite subtle manner, the two portions of the frame

\(^{199}\) It is interesting to note that this optative meaning of *sic* and the subjunctive, divorced in direct sense connection from its surrounding sentence, is particularly a feature of the Augustan period. The meaning is, "as I hope that..." and the clause is usually followed by an imperative, e.g. Virgil, *Ecl.* 9.30 and 10.4, *Horace, Odes* 1.3.1. At Ovid, *Met.* 8.857-861 we find the *sic* clause followed by *dic ubi sit*, which is parallel to the present case in that a question, indirect, is introduced. At v.301 in this poem it is not difficult to "understand" such an imperative as *dic*.

\(^{200}\) Vv.18-26.
within which the diatribe of Stertinius is set, while, by the same means, the characterisation of Damasippus is shown to be consistent throughout the poem. Also the ironical tone of the setting may be thought of as contributing to the undercutting of the authority of the diatribe itself, especially when Damasippus makes a somewhat clumsy effort to apply the precepts of Stertinius to Horace during this final section of the poem. The efforts of Damasippus are clumsy, despite the fact that in vv.303-307 he gains an apparent, but temporary and illusory, advantage, since Horace grants Damasippus a debating point, the acquisition of which is neatly set up by Horace's confident claim to sanity, ego nam videor mihi sanus (302). The rejoinder which Damasippus makes is as follows:

303-304 quid, caput abscisum demens cum portat Agave gnati infelicis, sibi tunc furiosa videtur?

Horace acknowledges the validity of this tragic example, by means of which Damasippus demonstrates that he has learned something of the techniques of his master. Even this acknowledgement is, however, barbed with a degree of sarcasm and irony. For, although

201 One may compare Horace's use of ring structure within the poem as at vv.31-46; see discussion above pp.56f.

202 Compare the Plautine technique of undercutting the stature of what should be an imposing or dignified character or speech exemplified by the portrayal and soliloquy of Alcumena at Amphitruo 633-653. As noted in the introduction, I differ from W.B. Sedgwick, Plautus: Amphitruo (Mass. 1960) n. ad loco. on this point, also from G. Karl Galinsky, The Herakles Theme (Blackwell, 1972) p.128.

203 In fact, Horace adopts the role of "victim" to the Socrates of Damasippus. However, the irony on this occasion all comes from the "victim", while the false-confidence, which is the mark of such Socratic victims as Euthyphro, Meno and Thrasymachus in the Euthyphro, Meno and Republic 1 of Plato, is here the mark of Damasippus, the would-be Socrates.

204 Damasippus attempts to exploit the exemplum drawn from myth, especially myth which has been made the subject of Attic tragedy; cf. in the diatribe vv.132-141 and vv.187-223.
Horace admits defeat, his use of the words *stultum* (305) and *insanum* (306), at the opening and closing of his admission is clearly ironical, as was the use of *Stoics* in v.300. When an opponent employs the jargon of the opposition the tone is usually sarcastic. While it may be argued that the terms *stultum* and *insanum* are not specifically Stoic, although they have both been used within the body of the diatribe, the particular question which Horace puts to Damasippus in vv.306-307 is undeniably Stoic in its phraseology, both in general and also within the specific context of this poem. Also, this specific question, couched in specific Stoic terms, has been anticipated and prepared for by the more general vv.301-302, with their rather more commonplace, but still Stoic vocabulary. The specific sentence at issue is:

\[
\text{tantum hoc edissere, quo me aegrotare putes animi vitio?}
\]

which picks up that attitude towards mental illness, which has been an ongoing part of the poem. Encouraged by his initial success, or apparent success, Damasippus forges ahead with a Stoicising attack upon the character of Horace, an attack which is formulated along lines which are suggested by the content of the diatribe of Stertinius. Rudd points this out at p.181:

Most of the forms of lunacy already mentioned are referred to again in the epilogue. Horace, says Damasippus, is ambitious in his building programme; he has a terrible temper (the word used is 'rabiem'), he lives recklessly beyond his means; and he is wildly promiscuous. One is given the impression that, if Horace had not interrupted, Damasippus would have completed the list with superstition.

205 Compare, for example, Cicero's use, sarcastic use, of Epicurean technical terms at N.D. 1.26.74.

206 E.g. at vv.32,40,48,54,63,67,81,102 and so on.

207 See above in discussion of vv.26-30 on pp.53f.
But superstition, like greed, was so out of character that Horace would not allow himself to be accused of it, even as a joke. 208

However, these comments, insofar as they are capable of being tested, are only true, or demonstrably so, to a certain extent. While it is certainly true that Horace displays ill-temper, once he has become the object of Damasippus' didactic attention, evil-temper was not in itself an object of attack in the diatribe of Stertinius. The only excess of emotion which was attacked was the excess of sexual passion and the folly which it could engender. Rudd does suggest in this same discussion that there is but little continuity in the total development of the poem, but in making this suggestion, which contains an inkling of the truth, he fails to recognise the real truth which is that, on the one hand, the logic of the diatribe is most certainly consistent, and, on the other hand, so is the characterisation of the insensitive Damasippus. Part of the characterisation of the insensitivity of Damasippus springs from the description of him attempting misguidedly to apply the Stoic precepts of Stertinius to the very possibly genuine foibles of Horace, who was, after all, not above pillorying himself when it suited his purpose and so long as that pillorying was of relatively minor flaws. 209

However, the first charge which is laid against Horace by Damasippus is in fact drawn from the moralising of Stertinius and his attacks upon the abuse of money for the sake of personal advancement and the enjoyment of luxury. If one were to take these attacks at all seriously, one could suggest that Satires 2.2 and 2.6 are a sufficient answer to the charge of luxury,

209 See above in the discussion of Satires 2.7.
especially since *Satires* 2.6 closes with a fable which is told rather better than that which is essayed by Damasippus in vv. 314-320.²¹⁰ In answer to the charge that Horace, like the young man of vv.185-186, is intent upon emulating his betters, one may cite the picture of the circle of Maecenas, as it is painted in *Satires* 1.6 and in 1.9.43-53, as evidence, on the one hand, that such emulation was not in Horace's sphere of ambition and, on the other hand, that Damasippus' view of the life of Maecenas and his circle was as misguided as that of the social climber of *Sat.* 1.6. Not only are the attacks of Damasippus misguided, they are also inconsistent, despite the fact that they are launched by a Stoic, who should have prided himself upon both the consistency of his own life and that of his arguments.²¹¹ For, although Damasippus attacks Horace's supposed desidia in the introductory portion of this poem, at the close of Horace's longest poem he declares that any man who writes poetry is insane:

321-323  addit poemata nunc, hoc est, oleum addit camino, quae si quis sanus fecit sanus facit et tu. non dico horrendam rabiem.

Damasippus attempts irony, not realising, or not being allowed to realise by Horace, that this enthusiasm for irony, for fighting, as it were, fire with fire, is leading to inconsistency. Further, the charge of evil-temper which is laid against Horace in v.323 does not sit easily with the patience with which Horace has endured the protracted sermon of the Stoic. The injustice of

²¹⁰ Rudd notes (p.177) that the Greek version of the fable of the calf and the frog is "more poignant than Horace's in its detail"; I would suggest, tentatively, that Horace consciously writes a weaker version than that of Babrius (28), because he wishes to undercut the persuasiveness of Damasippus' attack.

²¹¹ For the importance of consistency to the Stoics, see above pp.25ff.
this charge, coupled with the extremely personal comments of v.325, convinces Horace that his patience has been stretched far enough. Having come to this conclusion, Horace calls off the audience with a joke, again laden with irony, which sums up his attitude to Damasippus:

326 o maior tandem parcas insane minori!

For the major message of the diatribe of Stertinius, which was originally intended as a *consolatio* to Damasippus, was that all men are equally mad, except the *sapiens*, even as all sins are equal. Therefore, Horace's jibe that, fool though he may be himself, Damasippus is a bigger one, has added bile, while the *maior* of v.326 calls to mind the *maior* of v.318. Thus Horace suggests that, if he himself is akin to the mother frog in emulating the life style of Maecenas, Damasippus is guilty of a parallel failing in emulating, unsuccessfully the philosophical vigour and rigour of his own master, Stertinius.

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PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE INTERPRETATION OF *SATURES* 2.3

Before embarking on the detailed study of this poem, I pointed out that, even though the structure of this lengthy satire did not present any great mysteries for explication, if only on account of what Rudd describes as its "architectural unity",212 there were several other equally fundamental issues. These did require further elucidation.213 Paramount among these other issues was the question of

212 Rudd, p.188.
213 See above, pp.39f.
Horace's motivation regarding both the content of the poem, in terms of its moral didacticism and also in terms of those characters, Damasippus and Stertinius, who were created by Horace in order to communicate that didacticism and message in a particular way, a Stoic way, and also regarding the form of the poem, in terms of the length and importance within the poem of the Stoic diatribe of Stertinius. Put it more simply; why did Horace write this poem at all and why in this particular way? Related to the question and problem of why Horace places the central, longest and most important part of the poem into the mouth of another, whom he has been at some pains to ridicule, \(^{214}\) is the question whether Horace is, in fact, so inept as to allow "the picture to become blurred at a number of points" \(^{215}\) with the result that the reader is never sure whether he is listening to the voice of Horace or of Damasippus/Serttinius. If, on the other hand, this "blurring", always admitting that it exists, is conscious, what is Horace's reason for so confusing his readers that they are in a state of uncertainty regarding this vital question. It may, in fact, be argued with some conviction that Horace takes a certain amount of trouble to ensure that no such blurring does take place and that, if "the satire's central idea is rather weak - at least in the form presented by Stertinius", \(^{216}\) there may well be some good Horatian reason for this alleged weakness. Following on from these considerations is the perennial question of Horace's attitude to the Stoa as it is illustrated by this poem; there is also the related, but different, question of the attitude which

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\(^{214}\) Horace does this both in the introductory conversation, see pp. 44-55 above, and in the final altercation, see pp. 130-136.

\(^{215}\) Rudd, p.175.

\(^{216}\) Ibid., p.188.
Horace adopts towards Damasippus and Stertinius, who are his creations within the details of the fiction of the poem, but presumably also are representative of a group of active stoics. In the answers to these final and extremely complex questions may lie the solution to the problem of why Horace exploits the device of the mask of the Stoic preacher and whether this poem is ultimately successful.

The basic question of why Horace wrote this poem and why in this particular way can be provided with at least three different, but nevertheless related, answers. The answers are related in that they are complementary to and not exclusive of each other. Some of what follows may seem too much a statement of the obvious, although the overall picture is obscured by the complexity of Horace's motivation.

Horace states elsewhere in the Satires that his aims are moral and didactic; in this he follows not only in the footsteps of Lucilius, but also of Lucretius. Horace also anticipates the moral earnestness of Persius and also, on occasion, the vigour of Juvenal. In Satires 2.3, therefore, we

217 Stertinius, we know, was both a Stoic and a poet; cf. the comments of Horace at Ep. 1.12.20: Empedocles, an Stertinius deliret acumen. Teuffel comments on Stertinius at Röm. Lit. 250.4: the fact that the name bears such a close resemblance to the latin word for to snore (sterto) suggests that Horace was either opportunistic or inventive.

218 The moral purpose is most evident in the diatribes, such as Sat. 1.1; 1.2; 1.3 and 2.2; 2.3; 2.7, but also comes across in the attacks upon gluttony and ostentation in 2.4 and in 2.8 and in the attacks upon the captatores in 2.5.

219 Horace acknowledges his debt to Lucilius who "sale multo / urbem defriciut", Sat. 1.10.3-4, although, like Ben Jonson of Shakespeare, he felt that his prosody was careless, ibid. 56-74.

220 Although Horace lacks the philosophical fervour of Lucretius, yet the Epicurean poet's attacks upon human folly, especially when caused by ignorance of the true nature of gods or death is anticipatory of Horatian satire.

221 Compare Persius, 3.63-76 with the tone of Hor. Sat. 2.3.

222 Horace, Sat. 1.2 is anticipatory of Juvenal in both its vigour and its subject matter.
may assume that part of his aim is the expression of moral ideas in a didactic manner and that his concern is to attack and ridicule the various follies of mankind. In fact Horace does attack and ridicule the follies of mankind, especially where those follies express themselves in behaviour which is avaricious, ambitious, luxurious, sensual and superstitious. However, as well as satirising mankind in general, Horace has a second and more specific satirical purpose; for Horace wishes to attack those who themselves attack mankind, but who do so from an excessively theoretical and extreme philosophical stance. Such men are those philosophers whose theories had long been considered irrelevant, and whose behaviour was often attacked as hypocritical. Horace chooses Damasippus and Stertinius as representatives of this class of men in much the same way that Aristophanes pilloried Socrates as a representative of the Sophists in the Clouds or Lamachus as a representative of unthinking militarism in the Acharnians. That Damasippus and Stertinius are Stoics of a kind involves further ramifications, which will soon be made apparent. Suffice to say now that Horace objects to the gross enthusiasm of the novice Damasippus and to his uncritical acceptance of the extreme doctrines and the extreme presentation of those doctrines which are characteristic of the diatribe of Stertinius.

If the first two reasons adduced for Horace's composition of this marathon poem can be characterised by the terms "moral" and "satiric", then the third reason, which I am about to adduce,

223 The irrelevance and hypocrisy of philosophers was often attacked by the writers of New Comedy, e.g.: on the uselessness of philosophers, Amphis, Amphicrates E. p.315.6.

224 On the hypocrisy of the philosophers, see esp. the attacks upon the vegetarianism of the Pythagoreans, E. p.525.9 and p.527.12-15; also E.p.285.226; 213.113; 393.36 (on the Cyrenaic Aristippus); 177.33; 253.1; 177.33 etc.
can be characterised by the term "literary". For Horace does seem to have been fascinated by the diatribe form as it was exploited by the popular philosophers of his own day and of the Hellenistic period. As was pointed out by Brochard, the diatribe was undoubtedly effective as an instrument of persuasion. Cicero had attempted with a certain degree of success to give polished literary expression in Latin prose to the diatribe form, this in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*. As A.G. Lee writes:

> From what Cicero says in his preface to *Brutus* it is clear that his interest was aroused not so much by their (the paradoxes') substantial truth or their Socratic ancestry as by the artistic problem which an attempt to cast them into a popular and persuasive form would present.

The same desire to overcome an interesting technical problem may well have been active in Horace's mind at the time of the composition of this poem, which, I tentatively suggest, is a lengthy attempt to give a reputable form and presentation in Latin verse to what may have seemed at first sight to be relatively uncompromising material, even though suited to the satiric genre more than any other. We know that Horace did pride himself as an innovator in the field of Latin poetry from his own comments upon the achievement enshrined in the *Odes*, while, at a later date, it seems likely that the *Epistles* of Horace were the first verse letters of antiquity. Also, despite the derivative nature of

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225 See above, pp. 40f.
228 The prose letters of e.g. Plato, Epicurus and Cicero antedate the *Epistulae* of Horace, but none of the earlier writers of the literary epistle seem to have operated in verse.
much Latin poetry there was nevertheless always great "kudos" to be had from achieving the status of an innovator; this, of course, was not confined solely to the literary field. Our final judgement upon the merits of Horace's diatribes in verse, namely Satires 2.2; 2.3; 2.7 and, to a lesser extent 2.6, must depend upon the extent to which we consider that Horace was successful in transposing into Latin verse what was essentially a Greek, spoken, sometimes impromptu method of persuasive discourse.

One mark of the possible lack of success with which this transposition was effected by Horace could be the alleged blurring of the distinctions between the speakers within the fictional dialogue and the voice of the poet who, after all, is constantly manipulating his puppets from behind the scenes in order that they may serve his particular purpose. I feel that one should talk rather of the conscious existence or non-existence of such blurring rather than ascribe incompetence to the poet, unless no other interpretation of the facts presents itself. For if such blurring does exist, then it is explicable along the following lines:

Horace recognises the validity of what the Stoics say, at least in large measure. What the Stoics say is compatible with his own largely traditional views. Thus, after the introductory and extremely amusing and arresting conversation in which, as has been demonstrated, Horace takes great pains in his anticipatory characterisation of Damasippus and Stertinius, creating characters who "make an excellent foil for the ironical Horace", the

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229 This may be seen from the list of the "blessed" innovators in Virgil's underworld in Aeneid 6.661-664; here V. is in accord with Stoic doctrine on men who enjoy apotheosis for "services rendered", see Cic. N.D. 2.24.62.

230 See above pp.44-55.

231 Rudd, p.174.
sharp distinction is allowed to disappear, so that the reader eventually accepts the voice of the moralising section of the poem as the voice of the poet himself. This illusion is ultimately destroyed when the "Horace" within the dialogue asks Damasippus to characterise, in turn, Horace's particular brand of insanity. Thereby a satisfactorily comic ending is achieved, to parallel the beginning of the poem, but the validity of the criticisms levelled at human nature in general, with which the central portion of the satire is concerned, is not affected. Such an interpretation does have a certain plausibility, but is, I feel, spurious, smacking too much of special pleading. If the poem is read with a full and continuing awareness of the distinctively Stoic nature of the diatribe of Stertinius, not only in terms of its overall form, but also in terms of those devices described by Fronto as quite particularly characteristic of the persuasive style of Chrysippus, who is mentioned by name twice within the poem, then it is difficult to understand how a reader can come to believe that he is listening directly to the voice of Horace, undistorted by the obvious Stoic mask through which the poet's words are being filtered. Also, the vocabulary of the diatribe is consciously studded with allusions to Stoic doctrines, as has been demonstrated; the Stoic paradox, which is the central idea of the discussion is never allowed to be far from our thoughts; Horace has taken great pains to show not only that Damasippus was a Stoic reporting a Stoic, but also that he himself is somewhat sceptical of Stoic advice which comes from such a philosophical parvenu. This scepticism on the part of Horace is part of the

232 Ep. ad M. Ant. de eloqu. 1.146.N; for a discussion of these terms, see above pp.67-69.
233 This at v.44 and v.287.
final impression which one carries away from the poem after the final altercation between Horace and Damasippus. It seems, therefore, unlikely that we are intended to think the voice of the central section of the poem belongs to anyone else than the Stoic Stertinius, whose words are being reported to Horace by Damasippus. Similarly, we are never in doubt in Satires 2.7 that the preaching voice belongs to Davus, although the characterisation is perhaps more strongly maintained throughout the poem, especially by the frequent interjections of Horace; that poem is also considerably shorter. I would also argue that in Satires 2.2 we should always be aware that the major speaker is Ofellus. The technique of Juvenal in these matters is rather different.

Where does this lead us, however, in our quest to answer the question of how Horace felt towards the Stoics in general and towards Damasippus and Stertinius in particular? It was shown earlier that, on a small scale, Horace is prepared to exploit Stoic terms and doctrines both to aid the structure of his poems and to add colour and intellectual stiffening to his attacks upon the folly of his fellow citizens. This tendency is taken to its logical conclusion in Satires 2.3; not only does Horace exploit Stoic tags to aid the architecture of his poem, but, within a conversational and comic form and frame, Horace utilises a Stoic form and a Stoic mouthpiece and a Stoic doctrine in order to achieve with the maximum economy the fulfilment of his

234 See discussion below, Chap.4.
235 See discussion below, Chap.5.
236 In, e.g. Juvenal 1.3, the mask of Umbricius is but a thin disguise for the saeva indignatio of Juvenal.
237 See discussions of Satires 1.1; 1.2 and 1.3 above.
tripartite aim. Horace satirises human folly in general and simultaneously attacks those aspects of "Stoics" and Stoicism which he found particularly offensive. He also attempts to put into an acceptable literary form the popular diatribe of the street philosopher without materially affecting its nature.

It may be objected that the simultaneous attack upon both human folly and the representatives of the Stoa selected by Horace would undercut the authority of that attack upon human folly which is perhaps the major aim of the poem. This is not the case: the very extremism of doctrine, to which Horace takes exception and which was characteristic of the fundamental Stoic, and that extremism of expression, to which that extreme doctrine led, was, and is, ideally suited to the polemical spirit of moral satire. Horace's recognition of this fact enables him to kill three birds with one stone, while he smiles the smile of Socratic irony; for he effectively satirises the foibles of his fellow men, mocks the enthusiasm of the newly converted Stoic and, finally, makes a successful experiment with a new sub-genre in Latin poetry.

The use of the Stoic mask grants further advantages to Horace by distancing the author from the victims of his satire who, it would seem, had been both ruffled and vocal in the past. Similarly, the attacks, which Horace allows or invites the Stoic to make against himself as author, lessen the natural hostility which is felt towards one who, by the very action of writing moral satire, appears to set himself up as something more virtuous than his neighbours. This aspect of the use of the mask, both Stoic and traditional Roman, is discussed in more detail in the discussions of Satires 2.7; 2.2 and also 2.6 which follow.

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238 This from the evidence of Satires 1.10 and 2.1.
will also be necessary to consider, especially in the detailed discussion of Satires 2.7, whether Horace's treatment of the slave Davus and his peculiar brand of bastard Stoicism is consistent with the theories which were put forward in answer to the difficulties encountered in the course of the detailed discussion of Satires 2.3. Rand, in his typically eloquent Horace and the Spirit of Comedy preempts to a certain extent my own comments on the diatribes of the second book of the Satires with:

It (Satires 2.7) is a satire on the Stoics, whose diatribe Horace imitates, only to hoist them with their own petard. Yes, but this is not real Stoic doctrine, but only what Davus has absorbed at third remove from the concierge of Crispinus, himself a street-cleaner, a most lowly scion of the lineage of Zeno. 239

However, I hope that my own more detailed study will yet be able both to substantiate what Rand suggests and make its own contribution to a proper understanding of the diatribes.

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239 Rice Institute Pamphlets 24.2, p.73.
Davus, who is one of Horace's household slaves, takes advantage of the licence which is afforded by the Saturnalia and launches a critical attack upon certain aspects of his master's character. Horace suffers this criticism until his patience can endure it no longer; he then drives off an unrepentant Davus with threats of physical violence. Davus attacks Horace from something akin to the standpoint of Stoic ethics, although his personal acquaintance with that field of study comes from a doubtful source, the doorman of Crispinus, who was himself even not held in any high esteem by Horace. The structure of Satires 2.7 is as follows:

1-5 Prologue: Davus breaks in upon Horace, wanting to speak frankly to his master.

6-20 Davus moralises in general terms on inaequalitas.  

21-22 Horace interrupts with the question, "quorsum haec tam putida tendant?"

22-27 Horace is himself accused in general terms of inaequalitas.

28-43 Davus gives examples and compares Horace unfavourably with himself and Mulvius.

43-45 Horace makes an unspoken interruption.

46-71 Davus attacks the sexual proclivities of Horace.

72 Davus anticipates Horace's unspoken "non sum moechus".

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1 Crispinus is the object of Horace's mockery at Satires 1.1.120-121.

2 For the Stoic content of the criticism of inaequalitas, see above in the discussion of Satires 1.3 pp.25ff.
Horace would be moechus, if he could, says Davus and the intention is important. Horace is a slave to his desires and, therefore, less free even than Davus.

Only the sapiens is truly free.

Horace, however, cannot benefit from this sound advice. The standards of society which adjudge Horace a better man than Davus are at fault.

Horace is also subject to another master which he cannot escape, the atra comes (115) which is cura (114).

Horace threatens physical violence to drive Davus away. Davus ends with a joke, "aut insanit homo aut versus facit." Horace threatens to banish Davus to a country estate.

Before discussing the content of this poem in any detail, it may be worth while to point out an interesting feature of its structure which ensures that this poem, although parallel in many ways to Satires 2.3, also has close connections with the Socratic dialogue and the dialogue of comedy. Although, as Davus warms to his theme and grows in confidence, the interruptions which are made by Horace become fewer and farther between, nevertheless they are frequent enough to ensure that the fiction of a conversation is more convincingly maintained than in Satires 2.3. This is not to suggest that the structure of the longer poem is inadequate by comparison, but that in 2.3 Horace's intention is to satirise particularly the form of Stoic exposition in the hands of a novice, as well as the content, while in Satires 2.7 Horace is more concerned perhaps with content per se, since the question of slavery was of more immediate moment than the question of

3 This is reminiscent of the close of Satires 2.3 especially vv.321-322.
insanity, and with the comic possibilities of a conversation with a slave. A germ of this idea exists in Satires 2.3 when the slave, in the exemplum so neatly adapted from the beginning of Terence's Eunuchus, is described by Stertinius as "servus non paulo sapientior" (2.3.265). The comedy which Horace produces in Satires 2.7 is closer to reality on two counts: Davus is by no means wiser than his master and the relative positions of slaves and masters are only temporarily forgotten. When Davus in full spate attacks his master rather too nearly, Horace asserts his ultimate authority and dismisses the slave abruptly with threats of dire punishment. This growth of confidence and its termination by Horace with a Catonic threat can be represented diagrammatically; the following lines are approximately in scale to the length of the various sections of the poem:

PROLOGUE ______ vv.1-5
D. (a) ___________________________ vv.6-20
HORACE (a) ___ vv.21-22
D. (b) ___________________________ vv.22-42
H. (b) ___ vv.43-44
D. (c) ___________________________ vv.46-71
H. (c) ___ v.72
D. (d) ___________________________ vv.71-115
ALTERCATION_____ vv.116-118

The different lines match the basic divisions of the poem. It can clearly be seen that the growth in Davus' confidence is matched by the manner in which he manages to monopolise the conversation, until such time as Horace thinks it necessary to call a halt. An examination of the content of these sections will enable us to see if Horace's exploitation of the figure of Davus parallels at
all his exploitation of the figures of Damasippus and Stertinius in *Satires* 2.3 and if, despite his caricature of Stoic personnel, he also, as in 2.3, exploits the doctrines of the Stoics to give weight to his own attacks upon the foibles of Roman society. We should also consider the purpose of those attacks which are made upon Horace's character in this context.

I shall discuss the poem section by section, utilising the notation which is to be found in the margin opposite the above diagram.

**PROLOGUE**

The opening of the poem anticipates closely the direction which the satire is to take:

1-2 *iamdudum ausculto et cupiens tibi dicere servus pauc a reformido.*

This reference, which Davus makes to his own status as a slave, apart from identifying immediately his relationship with the poet and, thereby, setting a standard of expected behaviour for their current and observed interaction, anticipates especially his later statement of the Stoic paradox that only the *sapiens* is truly free. Like Damasippus in *Satires* 2.3, Davus has only recently been recruited to the ranks of the Stoics and is fired with enthusiasm for their moral theories. As Damasippus found some comfort and confidence in the idea that all men were as incompetent and as insane as himself, apart from the *sapiens*, even so Davus finds encouragement in the Stoic belief that all men are

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4 See esp. vv.83-88.
equally slaves, apart from the exceptional sapiens. This belief, coupled with the freedom traditionally granted by the Saturnalia, encourages Davus to repay Horace for some of the verbal punishment which he has had to endure throughout his lifetime as a slave. This follows the possible interpretation of *iamdudum ausculto* (1), which is offered by Palmer, in his note, as an alternative to the interpretation, which he actually prefers, that Davus had been listening to Horace scolding some other slaves, and which is, itself, the third of a series of possible explanations. These are listed as follows: "(1) while Horace was reciting the last satire (Bent.); (2) while Horace was reading out or talking to himself (Or.); (3) while Horace was scolding some slaves (old comm.); (4) listening at the doors for his master's commands (Heind.); (5) perhaps listening until Horace awoke from sleep, or rose from his *lectus lucubratorius*." Palmer, in support of the contention that Davus wishes to pay Horace back for previous scoldings, which he has himself endured, refers to Juvenal 1.1: "semper ego auditor tantum, numquamne reponam?" On balance this is also the interpretation which I would support, although I do feel that, of the above explanations, (2) has much to recommend it. The idea of the slave interrupting the private, but spoken, musings of his master, possibly self-critical musings, has something attractive to offer in the light of the attack which Davus is himself about to launch against his master. For it is clear that Horace portrays Davus as being motivated by a genuine concern for his master, a concern which suits a slave who is "amicum/mancipium domino et frugi quod sit satis..." (2-3). Davus' attitude and self-praise is reminiscent of the behaviour of the loyal slave in Roman comedy, as is much

5 For a discussion of the loyalty of the Plautine and Terentian
else of his behaviour in this poem. This will become apparent as
the discussion advances. However that may be, Horace is intrigued
by this interruption, or irruption, which is made by Davus and
allows the slave to have his say:

4-5    age, libertate Decembri,
quando ita maiores voluerunt, utere; narra.

Horace suggests that it is only the freedom which is granted by
the Saturnalia which will enable Davus to talk to Horace almost as
an equal. On the other hand, one could also suggest that the
initial tolerance, which Horace extends towards Davus, was
fostered by that spirit of humanism which is reflected in the
treatment and portrayal of slaves and prostitutes in the comedies
of Menander and Terence. The effects of this spirit of humanity
upon even those members of society who had not actively embraced
Stoicism may be seen in the slow but sure easing of the slave's
lot from the time of Cato Maior to that of Marcus Aurelius, who
actually introduced legislation to protect the servile classes.

Significant stages within this progression may be seen reflected
in the comments of various authors, not all of whom are Stoic.

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slave see Duckworth, The Nature of Roman Comedy (Princeton,
1952) pp.251-253; Phaniscus in Plautus, Most. 859 displays a
timidity similar to that of Davus and also comments that such
timidity is the mark of a useful and devoted slave.

6 Cf. above, n.142.

7 For legislation regarding slavery and the influence on that
legislation of the philosophy of the Stoa see Arnold, pp.
402-403, who refers also to Renan, Marc-Aurèle pp.22-23 and
Maine, Ancient Law pp.55-56.

8 The Stoics rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian concept of
the natural slave; e.g. Philo, Sept. et Fest. Di. p. 283 M,
ἄνθρωπος γάρ ἐν φύσεώς δούλος οὐδεῖς. However, the economic
dependence of the ancient world upon slavery ensured that the
Stoics urged the amelioration of the lot of the slave,
rather than the abandonment of the system. Cicero and Seneca
were in the forefront of those who urged that slaves deserved
more humane treatment: e.g. Cic. Rep. 3.25.37 and Off.
1.13.41; Sen. Ep. 47.1-2; Ben. 3.18.2; 3.22.1; 3.22.3.
Horace, who was, in certain respects, an admirer of the *mores maiorum*, feels guilty at acquiescing in the liberality of the Saturnalia, even though this liberality had been willed by the ancestors, "ita maiores voluerunt" (5). Horace reverts to Catonic harshness only when his patience has been severely tested:

117-118

ocius hinc te

ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino. 10

Horace had other and more personal reasons for treating slaves with a degree of compassion and humanity, since he was himself the son of a freedman, was not afraid to publish the fact and had praised Maecenas for not holding his origins against him.11 In this sense, therefore, Horace would have had some basic sympathy for the idea that slave and free were essentially the same.12

However, whatever Horace's precise motivation, even if his major desire is to launch the satire in a vivid and interesting way, this prologue of four to five lines does suggest that Horace had more in mind than simply the freedom of the Saturnalia, even although this provides a valid excuse, if one is necessary, for listening to a slave. Davus takes his opportunity, but initially with diffidence, being unwilling to become too personal too

9 See below in discussion of *Satires* 2.2 and 2.6.
10 Cf. Plautus, Capt. 760ff., also Most. 4.
11 E.g. Horace, *Satires* 1.6.45-48:

nunc ad me redeo libertino patre natum,  
quam rodunt omnes libertino patre natum,  
nunc quia sim tibi, Maecenas, convictor; at olim  
quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno.

I do not think it too daring to sense an air of defiance in the repetition of "libertino patre natum", in the above passage, which is possibly symptomatic of a certain insecurity regarding the foundations of his position within the circle of Augustus and Maecenas.

12 E.g. Lactantius, Div. Inst. 3.25, "quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices et rusticos et mulieres doceri, ut sapiant ... senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, qui et servi et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt."
quickly. Rather Davus treads warily and makes a general statement to test his master's reaction.

C

DAVUS (a), VV.6-20

Davus praises consistency by attacking its opposite in a manner which is reminiscent of Horace's earlier treatment of the theme in Satires 1.3; however, unlike any true Stoic, Davus ultimately declares that a life of consistent debauch is preferable to a life which swings from one extreme of virtue to the other of vice:

18-20 quanto constantior isdem 
in vitis, tanto levius miser ac prior illo, 
qui iam contento, iam laxo fune laborat.

Horace knows that no true Stoic could subscribe to such a view, or even represent it, and, by the attribution of such a view to Davus, he both undercut the authority of Davus as a moralist, in advance of that moral attack, which he is about to arrange that Davus should launch against him and Horace also demonstrates, as he did with Damasippus, whose authority he also undercut in advance of his (or Stertinius') diatribe, that the fresh convert is not the safest mouthpiece, however enthusiastic he may be, for a philosophical system. Horace also demonstrates, as the satire develops, that an "educated" slave can learn of concepts and theories which are capable of seriously undermining the stability of the established social and economic system, however laudable those concepts may be from a purely altruistic and humanitarian point of view.

On a matter of finer detail, however, it is interesting to note a possible example of Horatian wit in v.20. The line in
question runs as follows:

20 quidam contento, iam laxo fune laborat.

where the origin of the proverb, which is being used by Davus, is unclear. Palmer dismisses the idea that the image is derived from rope-walking and suggests that perhaps the idea of a tow-rope is most appropriate.13 This is the line taken by Rudd in his translation,14 while Lejay is unusually unhelpful and refers to Horace Ep. 1.10.48, where the concept again seems to be of a tow-rope.15 The idea would then be that a man who was being towed, as a slave or prisoner, which is a concept which is compatible with the continuing context of the satire, would suffer a degree of discomfort (laborat) from being towed too severely with a tight rope or from becoming entangled in too loose a rope. However, this does seem to be a rather obscure illustration of the basic concept that extremes are to be avoided, unless there is some added point, which appears to have been overlooked. A clue lies in the concept of tension, upon which the image of the rope depends. "Tension" had played an important role in both physical and ethical theories since the time of Heraclitus.16 The idea that the soul is a kind of tension or harmony is explored by Plato in the Phaedo.17 However, it is in the philosophy of the Stoics

13 Palmer, n. ad loc. p.359.
14 Rudd's translation runs as follows, "...the unfortunate / creature who is now chafed and now entangled by the rope", p.106.
15 Lejay, n. ad loc. p.565.
16 E.g. Heraclitus, fr.51 (Hippolytus, Ref. 9.9.1), οὗ εὐνικῶς διαφερόμενον ἐκνητῷ ἐμφάνεται παλίντονος ἀρμονίη δικωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης. I accept the reading παλίντονος, as supported in Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Camb. 1962) pp.193f., against παλίντροπους, supported by Vlastos, AJP 76 (1955) 348ff., although, even if one were to accept Vlastos' reading, one would have to accept the existence of τόνος within the lyre or bow.
17 At Phaedo 91c-95a Socrates dismisses the epiphenomenal view that the soul is an "attunement", although he admits that, were the soul to be described in such terms, the virtuous soul would be a soul perfectly "in tune".
that the concept of "tension" or τόνος assumed its greatest importance in both the fields of ethics and physics, as was natural in a non-atomic materialistic philosophy based upon a "continuum" theory of physics, in which τόνος was the material expression of the all-pervading role and purpose of the divine logos. Leaving aside the role of τόνος, in what may be described as physics, as being strictly irrelevant to Horace, Satires 2.7.20, let us concentrate on the role of τόνος within the soul in the field of ethics, since the illustration of the rope is designed to illuminate a situation, which has arisen in a discussion of an ethical topic. Even as the τόνος, which is present in that πνεῦμα, which interpenetrates those bodies, considered by the layman to be "inanimate", is responsible for the maintenance of those bodies in a relatively stable existence, even so the τόνος, which is maintained within the more sophisticated human organism by the human individual's share of πνεῦμα, or his soul, and which also exists within the soul, is responsible for the maintenance of a man's physical being, his capacity for locomotion and also for the moral state of his soul and intellect - and for the efficiency of the latter. That the physical health and mental health of an individual were maintained by an analogous

19 See Plutarch, De Virt. Mor. 451B; cf. Sextus Emp. 9.81.
20 E.g. Chrysippus ap. Gal. 5, p.287 Kühn, ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα ἐστὶ σύμφωτον ἡμᾶς συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον ἐστὶ δὲ τῇ ζωῆς συμμετρίᾳ παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι; cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.157. On the relation of the human soul to the world soul, see e.g. Marcus Aurelius, 2.4; Epictetus, Diss. 1.14.5f.
process\textsuperscript{22} is made clear at Stobaeus, \textit{Ecl.} 2.62.15 W, from which the following extract is particularly relevant to our present purpose:

\textit{kai \omicron o\omicron \omega\omicron \upsilon\omicron \omega \tau\omicron \sigma\sigma\omega\tau\omicron \iota\chi\omicron \omicron \nu \tau\omicron \sigma\omicron \omicron \omicron \upsilon \omicron \omicron \sigma\nu\omicron \xi\omicron \omicron \nu \lambda\nu\delta \nu \epsilon\nu \omicron \omicron \rho\omicron \omicron \omicron, o\omicron \omicron\omega\nu\omicron\omega\omicron \eta \tau\eta\zeta \zeta \omicron \psi\upsilon\kappa\omicron \omicron \xi\omicron \omicron \nu \tau\omicron \sigma\omicron \omicron \omicron \upsilon \omicron \omicron \sigma\nu\omicron \xi\omicron \omicron \nu \tau\omicron \sigma\omicron \omicron \omicron \upsilon \omicron \omicron \nu \eta \mu\nu\eta\ldots.}

For Stobaeus lays emphasis upon questions of choice and action which are particularly relevant to the field of ethics, since the Stoic virtues are subdivisions of knowledge, which are concerned with choice in particular spheres of activity. That the concepts of \textit{\epsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron} and \textit{\tau\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron} are closely related is made clear by the following extract from Stobaeus, \textit{Ecl.} 2.74.16W, \textit{\epsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron} \textit{\epsilon\zeta\iota\nu\phi\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\sigma\iota\omicron\iota\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\n
clearly if the reader bears in mind that *contento* is a veiled reference to the εὐτονία of a virtuous Stoic soul and that *laxo* is a reference to the immoral Stoic soul which is lacking the requisite τόνος. This interpretation is made even more likely by the emphasis which is placed upon another aspect of τόνος or *intentio*, in the moral sense of "intention" in vv.72-74 of this satire, especially since another illustration is utilised there by Horace which involves questions of physical tension and restraint.  

There is also an extremely humorous exploitation of the concept of "tension" by Horace in vv.47-48:

\[\text{acris ubi me natura intendit...}\]

where the notion of sexual tension, both physical and psychological, is employed and is coupled with a domineering *natura*, according to the dictates of which the good Stoic should organise his whole life! It should be added that *laxius* is used in a pejorative sense by Roman authors without any particular Stoic reference.  

Horace characterises Davus' abuse of Stoic doctrine by the epithet which he employs to describe it in his interruption (Horace (a)) at vv.21-22:

\[\text{non dices hodie quorsum haec tam putida tendant, furcifer?}\]

When applied to argumentation or literature the adjective *putidus* carries the meaning of "unnatural", "disagreeable", or "affected".  

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24 See the discussion below at pp.165ff.
26 E.G. Cicero, *Off.* 1.37.133, *hi* (Catuli) autem optime uti lingua Latina putabantur; sonus erat dulcis, litterae neque expressae neque oppressae, ne aut obscurum esset aut *putidum*, sine contentione vox nec languens nec canora.
Further, by apostrophising Davus as *furcifer* in v.22, Horace attributes to Davus, by association, the more unseemly characteristics of the comic slave, taking up and implicitly rejecting the self-praise of "amicum / mancipium domino et frugi..." in vv.2-3. For *furcifer* is a common term of abuse applied to the scheming slave both in the plays of Plautus and, to a lesser extent, in the plays of Terence.\(^{27}\) By employing this term Horace warns us against taking this particular poem any more seriously than we would a comedy of Plautus or Terence. The poet also reminds us of the status of Davus and so, once more, undercuts the authority of the attack which is to come. It is by now clear enough to the reader "quorsum haec tam putida tendant". The ostensible *exemplum* Priscus is an obscure figure, who is quite unknown to us. Furthermore, it is clear, in the light of the accusations which Davus aims later\(^{28}\) at Horace regarding his sexuality, that the poet is the implied object of criticism in:

> iam moechus Romae, iam mallet doctus Athenis vivere...

Horace had studied philosophy at Athens and felt the demands of sex as much as the next man.\(^{29}\) In fact, Horace's suspicions

\(^{27}\) E.g. Plautus, Ps. 1.3.27; Am. 1.1.129; As. 2.4.78, etc. and Terence, And. 3.5.12; Eun. 4.7.28; cf. also Cicero, Deiot. 9.26.

\(^{28}\) Vv. 46-71.

\(^{29}\) E.g. Satires 1.5.82-85; Horace has too much common-sense to be overly troubled by the supposed tension between the demands of body and spirit. This "conflict" receives perhaps its best known treatment at Plato, Phaedo 64c-676, although the overlying moral purpose of the *Phaedo* obscures the fact that the historical Socrates was not averse to physical pleasure. See R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Camb. 1972) p.47, "... he (Soc.) can on occasion enjoy his wine, and drink with the best; but he is, in the Greek phrase, 'master of himself' (κρατών αυτού), one who is not to be overcome by pleasure (ηττων ηδονής)." One can see how the alleged character of Socrates anticipated that of the *sapiens* as described by Davus in this poem. The *sapiens* is *sibi imperiosus* (v.83), a reasonable translation of κρατών αυτού.
regarding the direction in which the satire is leading are confirmed by the "ad te, inquam" of v.22. Davus attempts to substantiate his claim in the next section of the poem.

DAVUS (b), VV. 22-42

Davus comments on the supposed devotion which Horace feels for the mores maiorum, to which, as if in anticipation, reference had already been made in vv. 4-5. Davus calls into question Horace's sincerity in praising the life-style of time past and, by so doing, suggests a key to the interpretation of the moralising of Ofellus in Satires 2.2. Apparently Horace pays only lip-service to the traditional ways. A twist is given by Davus to the treatment of μεμωμορία with which Horace chose to open his first satire. Horace has no real desire to return to the old ways:

22-27 laudas
fortunam et mores antiquae plebis, et idem
si quis ad illa deus subito te agat, usque recuses,
aut quis non sentis quod clamas rectius esse,
aut quia non firmus rectum defendis et haeres
nequiquam caeno cupiens evellere plantam.

The alternative reasons which Davus gives for Horace's hypothetical refusal to join his ancestors are interesting. Either

30 For a discussion of Horace's attitude towards the mores maiorum see in the discussions of both Satires 2.2 and also 2.6, esp. his attitude towards Ofellus in 2.2.
31 Cf. Satires 1.1.15-19: si quis deus "en ego" dicat "iam faciam quod vultis: eris tu, qui modo miles, mercator; tu, consultus modo, rusticus; hinc vos vos hinc mutatis discedite partibus: eia! quid statis?" nolint.
Horace's praises of the mores maiorum are insincere and hypocritical, or Horace has not the strength of character which was required to fit one for the old ways. The terminology which Davus employs shows, as did that employed by Damasippus in Satires 2.3,\(^{32}\) that the neophyte can use Stoic jargon, even if he does not fully understand it. For rectius of v.25 and non firmus rectum of v.26 are consciously employed Stoic terms.\(^{33}\) For, although I cannot place firmus as a Stoic technical term, partly because of its more general reference, as a synonym of stabilis, it does have possible Stoic connotations. At Cicero Tusc. 4.53, for example, the meaning of stabilis in the passage:

\[
\text{fortitudo est igitur \ldots conservatio}
\]
\[
\text{stabilis iudicii in eis rebus,}
\]
\[
\text{quae formidulosae videntur...}
\]

is clearly parallel in sense to the meaning of firmus in Sat. 2.7.26; the reference is to psychological fortitude in both cases. The use of caenum in v.27 also has a surprisingly Stoic reference, although it is a reference which is perhaps more compatible with the subject matter of Satires 2.3; for Cicero at Tusc. Disp. 4.24.54 employs the term in the context of the paradox that all men save the sapiens are insane:

\[
\text{Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt}
\]
\[
\text{\ldots nunc autem ita disserunt, sic se dicere, omnes}
\]
\[
\text{stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. at}
\]
\[
\text{non semper. commove: senties.}
\]

The terminology is, therefore, sufficient to show that the attack has some basis in Stoic theory, but in what ways does Davus believe

\(^{32}\) See discussion above on anticipatory characterisation in Satires 2.3, pp.44-55; in this satire (2.7) the Stoa is, similarly, not mentioned directly till v.45, where Davus refers to Crispinus.

\(^{33}\) On the Stoic connotations of rectum see above, p.105, esp. n.182 and Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.100.15; also 2.66.14.
that his master particularly falls short of the Stoic ideal, apart from his obvious μεμψημονία? Coupled with this flaw is the fact that, when at Rome, Horace wants to be in the country and to enjoy freedom from business, although the Stoics demanded an active virtue,34 as did the mores maiorum. The Stoics also demanded a constant surveillance of self and one's motives,35 and a certain asceticism.36 However, it is mistake of Davus to accuse Horace of hypocrisy in respect of such matters, if Horace had never been a confessed Stoic. On the other hand, it is legitimate to attack Horace on those points where he falls short of the behaviour to be expected of a devotee of the mores maiorum, especially his unwillingness to marry, which is relevant to Davus' attack in vv.46-74, and his aversion to political involvement in affairs of state. Point is added to the form of Davus' attacks in these cases because of the close connection between the Stoic and the traditional Roman view.

The beautifully observed description of Horace's eagerness to drink and dine with Maecenas, despite his protestations of vv.29-32, which again are reminiscent of Satires 2.2 and 2.6, comes very naturally from one of the slaves thrown into urgent action by Horace's demands for oil. The placing of these comments

34 The active involvement of the sapiens in politics is recommended by Cicero, Fin. 3.20.68; see also above, p.90. Seneca stresses at Ep. 95.10 that the traditional wisdom is strengthened by the understanding which comes from a philosophical (Stoic) grasp of the mysteries of the universe.

35 False motivation, especially in the field of political ambition, was a target for attack in Satires 2.3; however, Davus cannot accuse Horace of such a failing which is not compatible with non-involvement in politics. The motives behind that non-involvement should perhaps be questioned themselves. The ultimate criterion is whether one's motives are satisfactorily explicable to oneself. See, Seneca, Dial. 5.41.2.

36 For a discussion of Stoic asceticism, see Arnold, pp.258f.
into the mouth of a slave allows Horace to compare naturally the merits of the free and of the slave in the light of Stoic views on the unique freedom of the sapiens. The choice of Davus as mouthpiece achieves more than one purpose, as did the similar utilisation of Damasippus in Satires 2.3, and as does the characterisation of Ofellus in Satires 2.2. A major consideration in Satires 2.7 is the degree of dramatic effectiveness with which the dialogue within the satire is endowed. This is in very large measure achieved by the contrast between Horace and his interlocutor in station, character and intellect. Horace also achieves by this technique a degree of verisimilitude for the action and setting of his miniature drama. The danger of monotony, which is potentially existent in direct moralising, is also avoided. In addition Horace makes clear, by his actual composition of the satire, the links which he has declared to exist between satire and comedy. 37

Davus now begins to concentrate on the supposed superiority of Horace to Davus himself and Horace's other slaves and parasites, declaring that that superiority is merely a matter of convention and that Horace is a hypocrite to attack the flaws of others (presumably in the satires) and wrap up his own vices in polite euphemisms. 38 Davus claims that, slave though he is, he can show that Horace is more stupid than he:

42-45

quid, si me stultior ipso quingentis empto drachmis deprenderis? aufer me vultu terrere; manum stomachumque teneto, dum quae Crispini dociut me ianitor edo.

37 These links are noted specifically by Horace in the "literary" satires, e.g. Satires 1.4 and 1.10, but also at Satires 2.3.11-12.

38 These words are an adaptation of Rudd's translation at p.107.
These lines also include what I have described as Horace's unspoken interruption. It is an interruption which Davus brushes aside; for the slave is determined to have his way. As in the previous section of the poem Davus' criticisms were reminiscent of Horace's attacks upon the chronically dissatisfied in Satires 1.1, the following section bears at times a close resemblance to Horace's attacks upon adultery in Satires 1.2.⁴⁰ It appears that Horace is arranging for Davus to take him to task for his temerity in attacking others when his own record is not without blemish. It may be that Horace is at pains in this satire to show that, although he has faults of his own, they are "immo alia et fortasse minora."⁴⁰ Also the attacks upon himself are rendered less effective because of their source, while they reduce the sting of his own attacks upon others. That Horace did respond to adverse criticism of this kind in the real world is clear from Satires 1.10.1-4.

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DAVUS (c), VV. 46-71

Davus takes his pleasure with an honest whore, but Horace hankers after an adulterous and, therefore, extremely dangerous relationship. What dangers there are are described by

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39 Rudd, p.191 comments, "In tone and subject this takes us back to 1.2, in which adultery, with all its dangers and indignities, is contrasted with a casual liaison." However, although he declares that the treatment in 2.7 is more sophisticated he draws no conclusions from the increased sophistication and the repetition of "tone and subject".

40 Satires 1.3.20: hence Horace's impatience with the Stoic paradox that all sins were equal; see discussion above, pp.31-36.
Davus in vivid and in humiliating detail.⁴¹ The picture is so vivid that one wonders here whether Horace has been influenced by a scene from mime performances; certainly no scene from extant comedy is so explicit. Of greater importance from our point of view is that voluntarily to subject oneself to such danger in the search for sensual pleasure runs counter to the basic ethical instinct of the Stoics, that of the preservation of self.⁴² However, Horace reacts quite violently to the criticisms, which Davus has made, with "non sum moechus" (70). Rather, these words are placed in the mouth of Davus as an anticipation of Horace's protestations of innocence. This introduces with great neatness the idea of the importance of "intention" in criminality and guilt. One feels that Horace himself felt this to be a matter of some importance if, as Rand would have it,⁴³ "from first to last, for all his dallying with comedy... (he was) ... engaged in a course of self-analysis and self-improvement." Also, despite the incongruity of the comic setting and even the untrustworthiness of the source, the doorman of Crispinus, Davus goes on to state or imply the Stoic doctrine of intention with some accuracy.⁴⁴

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⁴¹ E.g.
metuens induceris atque
altercante libidinibus tremis ossa pavore.
quid refert, uri virgis, ferroque necari
actoratus eas, an turpi clausus in arca,
quo te demisit peccati conscia erilis,
contractum genibus tangas caput? (56-61)

⁴² See Cicero, Fin. 3.16 and discussion on dangers of adultery in Satires 1.2.127-134 and vv.41-54; cf. the treatment above on p.16, also Cic. Fin. 2.11.33 and Aulus Gellius, N.A. 12.5.7.

⁴³ Rand, Horace and the Spirit of Comedy, p.94.

⁴⁴ On the attitude of the Epicureans to intention see A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974) pp.70-71, where it is stressed that fear of apprehension is what, according to Ep. K.A. 34; 35; 37 and 17, prevents men from committing acts of injustice: cf. Lucretius, 3.1013-23.
The discussion of \textit{intentio} is introduced by an illustration which is extremely consonant with Davus' position as a trusted slave. The illustration as well as emphasising his position as a slave also anticipates the statement of the paradox that only the \textit{sapiens} is free, the statement of which will occupy a good proportion of this section of the poem. The subject is also one which would naturally arise in conversation among educated slaves whose masters were given to philosophising. The initial statement of the doctrine of intention is as follows:

72-74 "non sum moechus" ais. neque ego, hercule, fur ubi vasa praetereo sapiens argentea. tolle periculum, iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis.

Compare Arnold's statement of the belief on p.286 of \textit{Roman Stoicism}; "Virtue is a state of mind, a disposition of the soul; it is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (\textit{inclinatio}), its aim (\textit{intentio}), its desire (\textit{βούλησις}, \textit{voluntas}) is everything; the performance through the organs of the body is nothing."

Cicero puts it well at \textit{De Finibus} 3.9.32:

\begin{verbatim}
sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est, etiam sine effectu.\end{verbatim}

At first sight it may appear strange that Horace allows Davus to misconstrue Stoic doctrine in vv.18-20, but puts an accurate representation of the doctrine of intention into his mouth a mere fifty lines later in the same poem. One possible conclusion is that Horace wished initially to detract from the authority of

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item 45 Cf. also Seneca \textit{Ep.} 95 and 97; \textit{Ben.} 2.31.1 and Epictetus, \textit{Diss.} 1.29.1 and 2.
\end{itemize}
Davus as a critic so that, even when he does speak accurately and with good sense, the power of his criticism is somewhat wanting in effectiveness. A further consideration is that Horace allows Davus to overstate the case in vv.1-20 in order to exploit the play on the word *contento*, attention to which has already been drawn. It has also been pointed out above that the verbal play with the concept of *rōvōc* helps to unify the structure of the satire by anticipating the exposition of *intentio* in vv. 72-74 and *intendit* in v.48. This is made even more certain by Horace's choice of metaphor in vv.73-74:

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tolle periclum,
iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis.
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Remove the tight reins by means of which man's animal tendencies are governed and, given free rein, those tendencies take over and run wild. The *frenis remotis* of v.74 is closely parallel to the *laxo fune* of v.20.

It should be noted that the word *sapiens* in v.73 also has a special significance. On the one hand *sapiens* here anticipates the description of the Stoic *sapiens* in vv.83-88. For the comparison of the "free" Horace, who is "enslaved" to his inclinations, and, accordingly, less free than the "slave" Davus, the comparison made, in vv.75-82, with Davus, enables Davus to move on easily in v.83 to the question, "quīscam igitur liber?" with the answer "sapiens sibi qui..." to follow naturally. However, the use of *sapiens* in v.73 is not only for the purpose of easing the transition to the discussion of the Stoic *sapiens* by the technique of foreshadowing or *praemunitio*. For,

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46 See also discussion of Stertinius' attack upon excess of sexual passion in *Satires* 2.3.250-280 at pp.112-122 above.

47 For *praemunitio* as a typical device of the diatribe see discussion of *Satires* 2.3 passim.
although Horace allows Davus to make a point, which is valid from a Stoic viewpoint, namely that Horace is guilty of adultery, because of his intentio or voluntas, Horace's wit reduces the effectiveness of that point, be it valid or not. The immediate connotation which a reader would place upon sapiens by the time he had reached v.73 is that it is the epithet normally applied to the Stoic sage. However, all that Davus wishes to say is that because he was aware of the risk of apprehension and punishment, because, that is, he was sapiens (aware), he passed by the chance of stealing the silverware. Davus admits, therefore, that he is as guilty of theft as Horace is of adultery; on the other hand, Davus' claim is that he is superior to his master in that he admits this guilt to himself. The reader is amused, however, by the fact that Davus describes himself as sapiens, if only because he is aware of the picture of the Stoic sapiens which is painted, for example, by Cicero at De Finibus 3.22.75:

quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit quod honestum esset id esse solum bonum, semper sit nescesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat quae irriteri ab imperitis solent...

Therefore, Horace exploits the difference between the technical and the non-technical meaning of sapiens in order to point the finger of ridicule at the earnest Davus, even as the finger of ridicule was pointed at the true sapiens by the imperiti of Fin. 3.22.75. Horace also exploits the particularly Plautine

48 Part of the point of Horace's witticism is that the more serious of the Stoic writers openly admitted the infrequency with which men achieved the status of sapientes, e.g. "ubi enim istum (sc. sapientem) invenies, quem tot saeculis quaeque?" Seneca, De Tran. An. 7.4 and also оυτε ουτον ὁ Χρύσηππος ἀποφαίνει ὁποῦδαιον οὔτε τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων, Plutarch, De St. Rep. 1048 E.
technique of incongruity by means of which the authority or
dignity of a serious statement or description is made to appear
ludicrous because of the circumstances which surround that state-
ment or description, and also because of the established character
of the speaker. 49

Accordingly, although the description of the unique
freedom of the true Stoic sapiens which follows in vv.83-88 may
well be described by Rudd as "the noble description of the truly
free man", 50 its effect is somewhat tarnished by the setting into
which this pearl of wisdom is placed by Horace. This aspect of
Horace's treatment of the Stoics also escapes the notice of
E.V. Arnold 51 who, although he accepts that as "in the main an
Epicurean" Horace is "entitled to use the Stoic paradoxes as
matter for ridicule", does not, in his necessarily brief comments,
realise that, in the Satires at least, this ridicule has wider
implications. It is also done in a manner more subtle than
Arnold has the space to describe. For there is nothing inherently
ridiculous in Davus' exposition of the freedom of the sapiens,
any more than the exposition of the theory of intention was
ridiculous; it is the context of these expositions and the
character of the person who produces them, which are instrum-
ental in achieving the satiric and comic effect.

After he has completed the description of the freedom

49 Take, for example, the comments upon military virtue which
are put into the mouth of the craven slave Sosia at Plautus,
Amph. 186-262; their authority is undercut by the delight-
ful comment at vv.253-254, "haec illist pugnata pugna usque
a mani ad vesperum / hoc adeo hoc commemini magis quia
illo die imprasus fui!"

50 Rudd, p.192.

51 Arnold, Roman Stoicism p.286, n.96 and p.389, 432. It
seems that Arnold recognises also, along with Kenneth J.
Reckford, Horace (1967) p.109, that there was an increasing
awareness in Horace of the value of Stoic ethics, although
this is more especially true of the time of the composition
of the Epistles.
of the sapiens, in this, his longest unbroken speech within the satire, Davus places ever increasing emphasis upon Horace's lack of genuine freedom. By the question:

88-89  potesne ex his ut proprium quid noscere?

Davus suggests that Horace's case is, in fact, quite hopeless and this is further made clear by the following comments:

92-94  "liber, liber sum" dic age. non quis; urget enim dominus mentem non lenis et acris subj ectat lasso stimulos versatque negantem.

Apart from the fact that we note that the concept of τόνος is brought to the fore in lasso of v.94, it is evident also that the technique of incongruity is present. For the sentiments which are expressed in these three lines call to mind inescapably that "savage master" from which Sophocles was, according to Cephalus in Plato, Republic so pleased to escape. The story would also have been familiar to readers without Greek from Cicero's adaptation of it in the De Senectute. The idea that Davus should echo such a one as Sophocles or, more particularly, Cato Maior, when one considers his attitude to slaves, is so irresistibly amusing that it inevitably detracts from the impact which his words of criticism can make, even though the picture of Horace's agonising does make convincing reading.

The case which Davus is making against Horace does,

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52 καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφόκλης ποτε τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμενον ἐρωτωμένω ὑπὸ τῶν τινῶν: 'Πῶς, ἔφη, ὁ Σοφόκλης, ἡ ἔχεις πρὸς τάφροδισια; ἐτι οἶδ' τι ἐν γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι.' καὶ δὲ, 'Εὐφήμει,' ἔφη, 'ἀνέρωσε' ἄσμενέστατα μὲν τοιί ἀυτῷ ἀπέφυγον, ὡσπερ λυτρωτά τινα καὶ ἄγριου δεσπότην ἀποδρας.' Plato, Rep. 329b-c.

53 Cicero adapts the foregoing passage as follows: "bene Sophocles, cum ex eo quidam iam affecto aetate quaeret, utereturne rebus veneriis, 'di meliora!' inquit; 'ego vero istinc sicut a domino agresti ac furioso profugi.'"
however, lose a considerable amount of its force in the examples which follow and which generally provoke Horace into responding with threats of violence and other even direr punishment. For, although Horace cannot properly deny that he does feel the effect of those appetites which, with soul, are common to all men, and that he is, if one accepts the logic and terminology of the Stoics, the slave of these appetites, at least to a certain extent, he can nevertheless deny most strenuously that Davus is his equal in other respects too, especially those which demand a particular skill or capacity. The provocative fallacy in the case which is laid against Horace by Davus is that shared humanity, or equal humanity, although involving shared mortality, also involves equality in any particular skill or capacity. In matters of aesthetics and artistic appreciation it may be true, arguably, in Sophistic terms, that each man's perceptions or interpretations are true for himself; however, it is not, or should not be, true that the layman's interpretation should also hold good for others, unless the layman can "give an account", to borrow a phrase from the Theaetetus, of his interpretation, which is acceptable to men who have established a reputation among critics and practitioners. In misjudging the quality of Horace's poetry, as a result ofunderestimating its real "quantity", Damasippus had made a similar mistake at the opening of Satires 2.3. It is a mistake which Horace apparently saw as characteristic of the enthusiastic Stoic neophyte who, when carried away by the validity of one portion of his system, was eager to apply the whole of the

54 Plato, Theaet. 201c-d: Plato would also have sympathised with Horace that equality in freedom did nothing to guarantee equality of capacity; see Rep. passim.
55 See above, pp.44-55.
system, in a somewhat uncritical spirit, to the whole spectrum of human behaviour. If taken to such uninhibited, or unbridled, lengths such an enthusiasm for a doctrinewhich, if properly directed, could become an effective weapon of persuasion in the hands of a writer of satire, becomes, in fact, counter-productive by making both itself and its adherents appear ridiculous. This surely is the point of Davus' claim to equal expertise with Horace in the matter of interpreting paintings in vv.95-101. One should also note that in v.97, only a little over twenty lines from the close of the poem, Horace takes the opportunity to use **contento** again, only a short interval after **lasso** in v.94. Both of the words echo the **contento** and **laxo** of the troublesome v.20. It may be that Horace is suggesting, with tongue thrust firmly into cheek, that the Stoic neophyte naturally enjoys a painting in which the action of the fiery **pneuma** is so evident. It may be added here that I understand **contento poplite** (97) as applying to the straining limbs of the painted gladiators: this is in agreement with Palmer and against Rudd's rather prosaic "with legs rooted / to the spot", which applies to the figure of Davus, who is standing, apparently transfixed with awe, before the painted scene. The underlying notion of the τόνως of limbs, which are fiercely involved in battle, seems more

56 It is interesting to note, in following this line of enquiry, the following fragment of Heraclitus, ὕψασι ἄργα ἐοίκος, παρακάτω τινὰ Ἐν οὖν νοόσις, fr. 136 Βodl. ad Epictetum, p.lxxxiii Schenkl: the close relationship, sometimes confusing, between what may be described as the literal and metaphoric uses of the term "fiery soul" or **pneuma** lived on in Stoic doctrine, derived from Heraclitus, e.g. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1.18.42 (with ref. to Panaetius) and, more particularly, ibid. 1.18.44, "cumque corporis facibus inflammarī soleamus ad omnes fere cupiditates."

57 Palmer, n. ad loc. p.365.

appropriate than the static τόνος of Davus' musculature as spectator.

The attack, which Davus makes in vv.102-111 on the expensive eating habits of Horace, suffers from a flaw similar to that which vitiates the effect of the attack made on Horace's reputation as a critic of works of art. The suggestion is made that Horace enjoys food, only if it is expensive and difficult to obtain, even as the equally unfounded suggestion was made that Horace's sexual appetite was also only whetted by the prospect of adulterous and therefore dangerous or otherwise expensive conquests. Regarding sexual satisfaction, Horace had shown in Satires 1.2 that he disapproved of the dangers of adultery, while regarding gluttony and the alleged appetite for expensive and exotic foods, there is more than enough to suggest in Satires 2.2; 2.6 and 2.8 that this attack too is unfounded. If Davus' attack is true then Horace must be accusing himself of hypocrisy, which seems unlikely. However: to return to the parallel with Davus' attack upon Horace's position as arbiter elegantiae in the field of aesthetics. Horace exploits the figure of the aggressive Davus for two purposes, both of which dovetail neatly with conclusions which were reached in the final discussion of Satires 2.3 above. For, if we can acquit Horace of the charge of hypocrisy, which I think we must, Horace utilises Davus to attack the problem of luxuria from a perspective which is different from that employed in Satires 2.2; 2.6 and 2.8 and which is more akin to the kind of attack made upon luxuria in Satires 2.3. Also, even as Damasippus was himself a target for

59 It is a small irony that Damasippus of Satires 2.3 was an "expert" in the art trade before the crash which brought him to Stoicism.
60 See pp.136-145 above.
Horace's wit in *Satires* 2.3. Davus is exposed in *Satires* 2.7 as a man whose moral strictures are lacking themselves in discrimination. For they are the uncritical moral strictures made by a man whose philosophy has blinded him to those skills and discriminatory powers which spring from experience and environment. This is a particularly serious flaw in the character of a would-be Stoic, since in Stoic ethics there is ever a paramount importance attached to the role of knowledge and choice. Horace seems to be asserting that, although he is not himself a Stoic, he knows enough of genuine Stoicism to recognise the shortcomings in the effusions of such ill-informed "Stoics" as Davus. To drop to the level of platitudes, Horace is suggesting, in an admittedly humorous and relatively frivolous manner, that "a little learning is a dangerous thing", especially when it finds its way into the heads of men whose position in society makes that learning a potential source of instability within society.

Although the attacks, which Davus makes upon Horace's claim to superior knowledge in the fields of aesthetics and "haute cuisine", can be shown to be fallacious from the evidence of Horace's own *Satires*, the final and most provocative attack made by Davus is worthy of more serious attention. For not only does it trigger Horace's outburst with which the poem closes, but also, in vv.111-115, Horace allows his creation to employ such serious and powerful imagery that the lines leave an indelible mark upon the reader's mind as he lays the poem to one side. The lines in question run as follows:

111-115

*adde quod idem*

*non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte ponere, teque ipsum vitas fugitivus et erro, iam vino quaerens, iam somno fallere curam: frustra; nam comes atra premit sequiturque fugacem.*
Whereas in vv.83-88 the picture of the sapiens, although serious enough in itself, was undermined by its setting, the pessimism of this picture is not affected by its setting. For, although it is true that the attacks upon Horace's aestheticism and luxuria which precede it are fallacious, they tend to throw into more sombre contrast this general attack upon the human predicament. Also the fact that nothing follows, apart from the brief altercation between Horace and Davus, which itself ends on a harsh note, allows the sombre tones of the lines to be maintained without any loss of intensity.

Satires 2.7 is pervaded by a certain comic aura or spirit, because Horace exploits such comic devices as the figure of Davus. Nevertheless, it seems that the message of vv.111-115 is intended to be taken seriously. This is not to suggest that there is any inherent incompatibility between the spirit of comedy and a serious or didactic intention. As Horace himself elsewhere declares, he is following in the footsteps of the comic writers of Greece, whose works and intentions were frequently didactic and were, further, adopted and adapted by Plautus and Terence. It is not, therefore, a question of over-dignifying these lines, if one considers that, despite the comic mouthpiece, they are a serious expression of Horace's own views. It seems that Horace, when in a pessimistic frame of mind (and this may be the implication of the opening of this poem) was dissatisfied with his own condition which he considered to be symptomatic of the human condition at large. Corroboration for

61 On the nature of Horace's concluding threat in vv.117-118, see below pp.183ff.
62 Cf. Horace, Satires 1.4.1-5; also Sat. 2.3.11-12.
63 For a discussion of the various interpretations of the opening of this poem, see above, pp.149-153.
this idea is to be found in Horace Odes 3.1, one of the poet's most consciously dignified and serious works, where the theme of Satires 2.7.111-115 reappears and is further developed.64

My purpose at the moment, however, is to demonstrate how the delicately maintained balance between the lighter and more sombre overtones of the picture is maintained, until such time as the poet feels it opportune for the poem to become, however fleetingly, totally and essentially sombre. The maintenance of such a balance and the management of such transitions are among the most difficult tasks to confront the aspiring satiric poet. It is clear from the evidence of this poem, and especially from its close, that Horace was an adept in this particular area. The lighter comic element is initially maintained by Horace's use of such words in the description of himself that can be thought of as having been borrowed from the vocabulary of the Roman comic writers. The words in question refer to runaway slaves; they are fugitivus (113), erro (113) and, at the very end of the section the frequentative form fugacem (115). Fugitivus, as a noun, bears the meaning of runaway slave, e.g. "Quis sit fugitivus, definit Orfilius: fugitivus est qui extra domini domum fugae causa, quo se a domino celaret, mansit." Dig. 21.1.17; erro, a rarer word than fugitivus, is also used of runaways, e.g. Pliny, Ep. 2.10.5, while fugax is a frequentative synonym for fugitivus, which stresses the constant efforts made by Horace to escape his metaphorical servitude. The best parallel use of fugax in Horace is at Odes 3.2.14, "mors et fugacem persequitur virum." The constant references made to Horace as a runaway slave clearly underline the fact that Davus is still

64 See below, pp.181ff.
expounding the Stoic paradox that only the sapiens is genuinely free. That Horace is still maintaining the Stoic persona of Davus is further made clear by the use of recte in v.112. However, that Horace himself disapproved heartily of exactly this kind of inconsistency and that he was capable of attacking such inconsistency in proper Stoic manner, proper by contrast with the improper and distorted Stoic viewpoint of Davus, is demonstrated in my earlier discussion of Satires 1.1. The fact that Horace produces in Satires 2.7 a character, namely Davus, who accuses Horace of the very vice pilloried by the poet in Satires 1.1, gives added spice, through irony springing from reminiscence, to our enjoyment of the poem at present under discussion. Horace also enjoys those advantages in Satires 2.7 which arise from the exploitation of a miniature dramatic form and which were listed in the conclusions reached after the discussions of Horace's treatment of the figures of Damasippus and Stertinius in Satires 2.3.

According, then, to Davus, a real slave in the conventional meaning of the word, Horace is the really real slave. For, although Horace enjoys the supposed freedom of the civis Romanus, he has but little control over his appetites, his interests or, particularly, his ambitions to emulate his "betters". It is possible to dismiss some of these criticisms, within the framework of the miniature drama with which Horace is presenting us, as either totally unfounded or inspired by a natural jealousy and a jaundiced sense of injustice. It is implied that Davus (and presumably others) believes that Horace harbours similar feelings towards Maecenas. This sense of injustice itself springs from a nagging discontent with the existing social order, a discontent fostered and fomented by a palpably limited grasp
of the true meaning of the Stoic cosmopolis. Davus' own source is, after all, servile, the Crispini ... ianitor (45). Such considerations are inspired by the realistic manner in which Horace has depicted, indeed created, the figure of Davus. As we turn our attention to vv.114-115, however, we realise that although the comic mask of Davus is still in position, as it were, the voice is even more patently that of Horace himself than it was earlier in the poem. For the words which Horace speaks through the comic mask of Davus in vv.114-115 have a deeper significance than is compatible with merely extending further the realistic characterisation of the slave. We become acutely aware of the moral and didactic tone of the poet's voice as he expresses his own reservations about the quality of his own style of life and that of his contemporaries and friends within the circle of Maecenas.

Certain Stoic doctrines may be utilised to point out the unsatisfactory nature of such a life style. Stoicism, however, is not by any means a complete answer; again it is made clear, as it was in Satires 2.3 that Horace particularly disapproves of Stoic sentiments when they are expressed in an extreme and inaccurate manner and when they sort ill with what may be described loosely as the mores maiorum. Accordingly, Horace disapproves of Davus' exposition of the virtues of consistency in vv.6-19, because, as has been pointed out, it could not have been made by any intelligent Stoic, or by any individual familiar with the realities of the Stoic system. Even as Davus' comments seem ludicrous by contrast with Horace's exposition propria persona in Satires 1.1, so do the slave's attacks upon Horace's sexual proclivities by comparison with Horace's own comments in Satires 1.2. On the one hand it may be felt that
the attacks which Horace makes upon himself, through the exploitation of the figure of Davus, allow the poet to set himself up as a sympathetic and humane critic of human behaviour. For, it is implied, he understands, in a very personal way, those temptations and doubts which assail mankind. The sting of his attacks is thereby reduced: the device is also used to good effect in Odes 1.5; 1.16 and 1.33. However, the increase in the sophistication of the form of Satires 2.7, with its exploitation of comic devices and its dialogue nature, would suggest that Horace is concerned to exploit the persona of Davus for more than merely the distancing effect which has just been described, and which was also achieved by the exploitation of Damasippus and Stertinius in Satires 2.3. Even as the figures of Damasippus and Stertinius, coupled with the development of the diatribe into a literary and satiric form, gave variety to Horace's criticisms of human nature in Satires 2.3 and allowed him to test the literary potential of the diatribe, just so, the figure of Davus and the miniaturisation of the comic genre, which is accomplished by Horace in Satires 2.7, allow him to give both variety and interest to his essay upon the vanity of human wishes and to test the possibilities inherent in the concept of the miniaturised drama. Comparing the minor with the great, the blend of humour, character and philosophical discussion is reminiscent of the Socratic dialogues of Plato; one could even compare the figure of Davus with Plato's unflattering representations (or creation) of such sophists as Euthydemus and Thrasymachus.

To return, however, to the content of the final criticism

65 For more specific reference to Platonic dialogues in Horace's Satires, see Fraenkel, Horace pp.136-137, esp. n.1 on p.136.
which Horace puts into Davus' mouth and which, it is interesting
to note, would have come with almost equal conviction from an
Epicurean. Anxiety for one's position increases with the
importance of the position which one has achieved. Anxiety for
one's wealth in proportion to the increases in the wealth which
one has amassed. Horace agrees with the Stoics (and the
Epicureans) that an unceasing and falsely motivated quest for
social superiority can only lead to dissatisfaction and anxiety,
especially when such superiority is based upon the possession and
display of wealth. Death, which can be described as comes atra,
and which is a portion of that cura, or a cause of it, which
occurs in v.114, must also be an object of greater fear to those
who feel that they have much to lose in terms of material possess-
ions and worldly status; by contrast the poor can even look
forward to death as a release. That Horace is being deadly
serious in his comments at this stage is evident from the
startling impact of the phrase comes atra (115): for the use of
comes in a figurative sense is well established in philosophical
verse by Lucretius and the connotations of the word in the De
rerum natura seem inevitably to be sombre. In his description
of the plague at Athens, for example, in Book 6 Lucretius uses
comes as follows, "malis erat angor / assidue comes..." and at
v.1159, where Lucretius mistranslates, or adapts, the physical
ταλαιπωρία of Thuc. 2.49.3 into psychological terms. The use

66 The similarity between Horace's use of comes and that of
Lucretius is remarked upon below: one would almost believe
that Horace is suggesting that for all practical purposes
the beliefs of Stoic and Epicurean are parallel (and little
different from those of Ofellus?); cf. also, Lucr. 5.1129f.
67 This was a recurring theme in Middle and New Comedy, e.g.
Diphilus at Edmonds, 3a p.141.88.
made of *comes* by Lucretius at 6.1159 parallels Horace's usage at *Satires* 2.7.115, if we read Lucretius' *angor* as closely parallel to *cura* in v.114 of this satire. At Lucr. 3.290 we find that *aura* is the *comes* of *formido*, while, at Lucr. 2.580, we find that the *comites* of *mors* are the cries of those who mourn. The idea of death and the fears that beset mortality seem inseparable from the figurative use of *comes* in the *De rerum natura*. It is in keeping with Lucretius' purpose as a purveyor of Epicureanism to stress this factor in his poem, since Epicureans held that the idea of death was inevitably, but needlessly, accompanied in the minds of the uninitiated with concern for or fear of what would ensue after death. This anxiety is always present and cannot be assuaged by wine, nor does sleep, in which dreams may come, provide any temporary respite. At Lucr. 3.1046-1052 we find a juxtaposition of sleep and drink with *curis* that seems to anticipate Horace's *vino ... somno* in *Satires* 2.7.114 and the similar *vini somnique benignus* of 2.3.3. The sombre use of *comes* is also found at Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.8.19 in the simile, "exanimatio ... quasi comes pavoris."

It was in accord with the spirit of Davus' final criticisms in this poem that Horace had depicted himself in *Satires* 2.6 as praying for a modest sufficiency of material comfort. The farm there described as being well away from the turmoil of Roman urban life symbolised an ideal which was neither Stoic nor Epicurean; it was unequivocally an Italian ideal which, although it was capable of being lent support by the tenets of the Hellenistic schools, was quite independent of them in origin.69

69 One would say that it was a Mediterranean ideal, especially when one thinks of Virgil's farmer at *Georgics* 4.116-148; not, however, that Horace was unaware of the advantages of rational support for intuitively held beliefs. However, this aspect of the *Satires* is dealt with under the discussions on *Satires* 2.2 and 2.6.
However that may be, it is appropriate here, to further strengthen the suggestion that the message of vv.111-115 is totally serious in intent, to examine Odes 3.1 which expands Satires 2.7.111-115, 70 echoes much of Satires 2.3 and, with 2.3, anticipates much of the pessimism of Juvenal, Satires 10. For in Odes 3.1 we find that the rich and powerful man cannot sleep, although sleep does not feel too proud to visit the cottage of a poor and humble man or, it is implied surely, a modest farm in the Sabine hills:

non Siculae dapes
dulcem elaborabunt saporem,
non avium citharæque cantus
somnum reducent: somnus agrestium
lenis virorum non humilis domos
fastidit...

Odes 3.1.18-23

Fear can climb as high as the wealthy man can build:

sed timor et minae
scandunt eodem quo dominus...

ib. 37-38

Black anxiety rides pillion passenger to the wealthy:

post equitem sedet atra cura.

ib. 40

Neither wine nor Persian nard can remedy ill health:

delenit usus nec Falerna
vitis Achaemeniumque costum.

ib. 43-44

The final stanza of the poem sums up the message not only of this ode, but also of the conclusion of Satires 2.7:

70 It would be interesting to consider whether Horace's Odes often expand with lyric freedom the message of the more prosaic Sermones: this would provide an interesting parallel to the Attic tragedian's use of the chorus.
What we have therefore in this poem is a reiteration in "direct" lyric form of an idea first formulated in verse by Horace in the Satires. It may be that, at the time when the Satires were under composition, Horace did not feel sufficiently secure of his position within the circle of Maecenas and Octavian to give direct expression to ideas which could be construed as ungrateful criticisms of life under the new regime. When, however, such moral strictures as those encapsulated in Odes 3.1, and obliquely in Satires 2.3 and 2.7, began to serve the moral and political purposes of the Princeps, Horace was able to give them direct expression. Although this may sound somewhat hypothetical we do know that Horace responded violently to adverse comments made upon the Satires of Book 1; we can tell from Satires 1.10 and 2.1, for example, that others thought his poems excessively severe. Hence, perhaps, the distancing technique made possible in the second book by the exploitation not only of such Stoic figures as Damasippus, Davus and Stertinius, but also of Ofellus in Satires 2.2. For it has been suggested that, in Satires 2.2, Horace takes the risk of enunciating a measure of political comment through the medium of Ofellus. However that may be, what is quite clear is that it is necessary to treat Satires 2.7.111-115 with all seriousness as an expression of a view which Horace held consistently over a lengthy period of his life. We have in the Satires, as it were, an anticipatory recusatio and apologia. For, if Horace felt guilt at all about anything in his

71 Cf. also Satires 2.3.307-313.
later years, at the time, for example, when he was working on the *Epistles*, it was because he had been less active in civic and governmental affairs at Rome than Maecenas or Augustus would have liked and than certain individuals, much to his chagrin, believed.  

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**THE FINAL ALTERCATION, VV.116-118**

The spell woven by *comes atra* is broken by these rumbustious final lines where Horace demonstrates that in this world fact is more important than theory by threatening to exercise his rights as the actual master of Davus:

116-118

unde mihi lapidem? "quorsum est opus?" unde sagittas?
"aut insanit homo aut versus facit." ocius hinc te
ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino.

Horace verbalises the mute threats of vv.43-44 and Davus' status as a slave, according to the definitions of the Roman world, is made emphatically clear by the threats of Horace; what is more the rather weak joke of Davus in v.117, although it has a certain ironic ambiguity, as may be seen from the comments which presently follow, establishes Davus once again not only as a slave, but as a comic slave. The inversion of roles of master and slave which had been sanctioned by the Saturnalia is now over.  

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72 In this respect Horace's personal inclinations were in tune with the advice of the Epicureans on the question of political involvement, e.g. Epicurus, ap. D.L. 10.141 and cf. also Lucr. 5.1129f.

That certain individuals misunderstood Horace's position in the imperial circle is indicated by the attitude of Horace's interlocutor in *Satires* 1.9.

73 Cf. the jokes of Tranio at Plautus, *Most.* 1149-1152 which are made to Theoropides, even although, or perhaps because, Tranio's machinations have been discovered.
Also, although the ending of the poem is abrupt, it is necessary that this interview should have come to a sharp close when the tension, to borrow a Stoic term, which Horace depicts increasing within him, finally reaches breaking point and his temper gives way. The ending is parallel to the ending of *Satires* 2.3, while, as has already been suggested, the subject matter of the whole of 2.7 is reminiscent of that of the earlier satires. More particularly, the final expostulation of Davus is clearly reminiscent of Damasippus' foolish attacks upon the alleged literary desidia of Horace in *Satires* 2.3. For Davus' comment, "aut insanit homo aut versus facit..." in v.117 is Horace's final jibe at the Stoics, or, at least, at such imitation or supposed Stoics as Damasippus and Davus. Davus identifies the composition of poetry with a symptom of insanity. On the other hand, Damasippus in *Satires* 2.3 had criticised Horace for not writing anything worthy of his muse. He had gone on to declare that Horace, along with all other men except the sapiens, was insane and had concluded with the statement that Horace's poems were conclusive proof of his insanity. This was a line of thought which Horace suggested did not bear close examination. Such false argumentation and inconsistency is consciously called to mind by Horace in v.117 of this poem, where Davus too is shown as being unsympathetic towards his master's art. The major irony is that it would appear that Horace agreed that a degree of insanity was an essential element of the poet's character. This is evident from the only partially humorous close of Horace's *Ars Poetica* (vv.453-476). Considering the treatment received at the hands of "philosophers" by Horace, it is especially interest-

74 The point is made by Rudd, p.194.
ing that the most patently insane poet of all was the pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles:

deus immortalis haber
dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam
insiluit. sit ius liceatque perire poetis.

Horace, A.P. 464-466

That Horace was well aware of Empedocles' philosophical pretensions is intimated in typically Horatian manner: ardentem and frigidus imply two of the primary opposites which were subsumed into the Empedoclean elements of earth, air, fire and water!

To return to the close of Satires 2.7: after the sombre tones of vv.114-115 the tone of the poem's ending is considerably lightened. However, a harsh element does now obtrude which is consistent with the darker aspect of Roman comic humour. For although Horace relates the close of the satire to that same spirit of comedy which, in different guises, has permeated the whole, the threats which he utters as master are uncomfortably redolent of the realities of the slave's lot. Plautus was able to exploit this reality by comparing it with the unreality of the world of his successful slaves. Grumio, for example, at the beginning of the Mostellaria wishes harsh and actual punishments and service in the country on the devious and unrealistic Tranio. One can also call to mind the fate of Tyndarus in the Captivi.

More particularly, Horace's words "ocius hinc te / ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino" (117-118) are reminiscent of Cato Maior's advice concerning sick, elderly (and possibly recalcitrant) slaves at De ag. cult. 2.7. Perhaps, indeed, from our point of view the final irony of this most ironical satire is that, although Cato was posthumously declared a sapiens, his advice regarding slaves and his attitudes towards women were almost totally unaffected by that spirit of humanitas which was
one of the more positive contributions of the Stoae in the general field of ethics.

This leads to my final comment upon this poem: despite the irony with which Horace treats the figures of Davus and those of similar persuasion, enough of what they say seems to recommend itself to Horace as being worthy of serious attention. As may be seen from Satires 2.2 and, possibly, 2.6, a totally reactionary desire to return to the way of life of Cato Maior and his generation, as Horace and his contemporaries understood it, was as unrealistic as it was ultimately undesirable. However, Horace, I believe, saw some prospect, at the time of the composition of the Satires, of combining the best of what the Hellenistic schools had to offer with what was worth retaining in the mores maiorum after the depredations of the past century of civil war and unrest. Something of this combination may be found in Satires 2.2 and 2.6 and, later, in the Epistles.

Cicero seems to have recognised that one of the values of philosophy lay in this direction:

Quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent "tempori parere" et "sequi deum" et "se noscere", et "nihil nimis", haec sine physicis quam vim habeant (et habent maximam) videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere; nec vero pietas adversus deos nec quanta iis gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest.

Cicero, Fin. 3.22.73
CHAPTER FIVE

A DISCUSSION OF SATIRES 2.2

These two poems are most readily comprehensible or, at least, best approached, in the light of a certain tension, not to say conflict, which clearly existed within Horace. This tension was between what may be called, for the sake of convenience, the "cultured" and the "uncultured" aspects of the poet, if we understand cultured to mean "imbued with Greek culture". For, on the one hand, the poetry of Horace, from the most dignified and high flown lyric to the more prosaic and didactic genres exemplified by the Satires and the Ars Poetica, displays a deep, thoroughgoing and informed admiration for both the prose and poetical works of Greek literature. Moreover, the recently completed discussions of Satires 2.3 and 2.7 demonstrate an intricate knowledge of both the details of thought and expression of the Stoic school. Like other Roman poets before him, from Ennius to Catullus, Horace saw himself as adapting as well as adopting, as emulating and even improving upon the work of his Greek originals. It is also evident from

1 For Horace's knowledge of Greek lyric poetry, see e.g. Fraenkel, ch.5, pp.154-224 and also L.P. Wilkinson, Horace and his Lyric Poetry (Cambridge, 1968) pp.87-122; on Horace's acquaintance with e.g. the dialogues of Plato and Fraenkel, p.136f. and also below, pp.199 and 202.

2 The comments of Otto Skutsch, Studia Enniana (London, 1968) p.1 are interesting and relevant, "... his (Ennius') work and person seem to typify and crystallise in exemplary fashion that Roman attitude which made the Romans for ever the imitators of the Greeks, and yet creators in their own right. Nor was that attitude unconscious; it was deliberate, explicit and full of confidence and pride." For a playful expression of this type of national pride, see Propertius, 2.34.65-66.
elsewhere that Horace was considered to be something of an authority on things artistic - and hence on things Greek. 3 As far as the sophisticated side of Horace's character is concerned, one should also note his occasionally condescending attitude towards the naive Italian rustic or provincial magistrate, an attitude which he shared with his smart friends and which, being a betrayal of his own origins, was perhaps most evident when in their company. 4 He did after all value their intelligent and sophisticated appreciation of his art, 5 which must, necessarily, have been more subtle and penetrating than that of which Ofellus of Satires 2.2 and the congenial Cervius and Arellius in 2.6 were capable. It was only in town that such learned company was always available, hence what may be called Horace's love/hate relationship with Rome, which was observed, but misunderstood, by Davus. 6

On the other side of the coin we have the picture of Horace as the sturdy provincial son of a former slave, who, although coming from one of those areas of Italy most open to Greek influence, is an Italian and is imbued as such with Italian rustic values picked up at his father's knee: these are values which he never overtly rejects. 7 That same father is also depicted affectionately by Horace as being suspicious of the

3 See Satires 2.7.95-101 where Horace is described ironically by Davus as "subtilis veterum iudex et callidus"; it is hardly necessary to mention again Horace's debt to the Greek comic writers which is recorded at Satires 1.4.1-5 and 2.3.11-13. For a discussion of the latter passage see pp.44ff.
4 See e.g. Satires 1.5.51-70 and 97-103.
5 E.g. Satires 1.10.76-92, where special mention is made of Maecenas, Virgil and Octavius, the company of whom would be found and enjoyed in Rome.
6 See Satires 2.7.28-35, esp. "Romae rus optas, absentem rusticus urbem / tollis ad astra levis."
7 See Satires 1.6.71-99.
very education which he so dearly wanted his son to enjoy:

aiebat: 'sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu
sit melius, causas reddet tibi: mi satis est si
traditum ab antiquis morem servare tuamque,
dum custodis eges, vitam famamque tueri
incoluem possum; simul ac duraverit aetas
membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice.' sic me
formabat puerum dictis.

Satires 1.4.115-121

The whole of this passage has been quoted for two reasons:
sapiens, in its ironical application to an unspecified philoso-
pher, anticipates the attacks upon the Stoic sapiens in Satires
2.3 and 2.7; secondly, there is, I think, an example of
Horace's wit vis-a-vis the philosophers. Compare v.120 of this
passage, which denounces the efficacy of philosophically
supported ethics, with a verse from the most seriously philoso-
phical of Rome's didactic poets, Lucretius. The line of
Lucretius in question is as follows:

quae quasi membranae vel cortex nominitandast...

De rerum natura, 4.51

which occurs in Lucretius' exposition of the notoriously
difficult problems connected with sense perception, especially
vision. In the following line (4.52) we find formam. Is it
too much to believe that the membra animumque, sine cortice and
formabat of Horace are conscious echoes of Lucretius? The
reminiscence has added effect, if the major point of Horace's
father's objections to the work of the sapiens is that it is
irrelevant and technically difficult. As Ennius said in the
same vein "philosophandum est paucis; nam omnino haud placet."9

8 For a full discussion of the attacks upon the Stoic sapiens
in 2.3 see above, esp. pp.130-136.
9 This is quoted by Aulus Gellius 5.19.9; it is also cited by
Cicero at Tusc. 2.1 and De Or. 2.156; cf. also Plato,
Gorgias 484c.
On another occasion, in words which are even more familiar, Ennius anticipates the tenor of Horace's father's words with, of course, "moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque." Ennius too was aware of a certain conflict within himself between his national pride and admiration for things Greek; Horace, therefore, is writing in a certain tradition of truculent, but enlightened, nationalism in the composition of his poetry. The tension, which can produce such sophisticated witticisms as that indicated in the relationship between Satires 1.6.120-121 and Lucretius 4.51-52, and which arises because of the conflicting claims of divergent loyalties upon Horace's poetry may, if properly understood, enable us to read such "Italian" poems as the satires under discussion with a greater sensitivity than would otherwise be possible. The complexity of the humour, to take one facet of the poems as an example, which is evolved by reason of Horace's conscious exploitation of this tension can be seen from the fact that the "Epicurean" witticism of Satires 1.4.120-121 is written by Horace into the mouth of his father, when his father is actually denigrating the value of just such technical theories as those which were expounded by the Epicureans.

Another aspect of this ambivalence of attitude towards things foreign in general, and especially to things Greek, should be mentioned before the more specific problems of Satires 2.2 and 2.6 are tackled: this is the effect of the supposed moral decline of Rome, the beginning and spread of which was linked by moralising poets and historians alike to the ever increasing......
expansion of the imperium Romanum beyond the confines of Italy and Sicily. However, it is with the more domestic effects of this large movement that Horace is concerned, although his continued attempts to escape to the country may be seen as attempts to escape from the effects of this supposed decline in urban morals into an area, the country, where older values still held sway. It is interesting that this decline was thought of as taking place because of a constant and consistent erosion of those older values, which were also considered by some to be compatible in a remarkable way with the basic Stoic ethic. However, Stoic ethical values were not necessarily compatible with Roman ideas, as was made abundantly clear by Horace himself in Satires 2.3 and 2.7, especially when they were formulated by some of Horace's less philosophically gifted contemporaries. The same reservation has been made more recently and with some force by Sir Ronald Syme in The Roman Revolution, p.57:

As for the tenets of the Stoics, they could support doctrines quite distasteful to Roman Republicans, namely monarchy or the brotherhood of man. The Stoic teaching, indeed, was nothing more than a corroboration and theoretical defence of certain traditional virtues of the governing class in an aristocratic and republican state. Hellenic culture does not explain Cato; and the virtus about which Brutus composed a volume was a Roman quality and not an alien importation.

11 Rudd, in his preamble to a discussion Satires 2.2, stresses this aspect of the Roman mentality, and refers to the valuable work done by Earl in The Political Thought of Sallust (Camb. 1961) ch.1 and 4 at n.5, p.296 on Chapter six of his The Satires of Horace. Rudd refers also to Polybius 31.25.3ff; Pliny NH 17.244; Sallust Cat. 10.1 and Jug. 41.2; Velleius, 2.1.1-2. To this list one ought to add Juvenal 6.292-300, esp. "prima peregrinos obscaena pecunia mores / intulit, et turpi fregerunt saecula luxu / divitiae molles." vv.298-300.

12 At the time of the composition of the Epistles Horace still was torn between his duty to Maecenas in Rome and his cherished independence on the Sabine farm; see Epistles 1.7.
Syme does admit elsewhere, however, that philosophy "could provide a rational explanation of the nature of things" and "comfort in adversity".\(^{13}\) Both Stoics and Epicureans would have claimed that their respective systems were capable of making just such a provision.\(^{14}\) Also, as we shall see, some claimed that the traditional mores and praecepta of rustic Italy were alone sufficient for this end. Horace, however, seems to suggest that no one way is in itself totally adequate. This is also implied by Syme who declares, "There is no warrant for loose talk about conversion to Stoicism, although this Epicurean (sic) man appeared to surrender to a Romantic passion for frugality and virtue, a fervent sympathy with martial and imperial ideals."\(^{15}\) There was, in fact, no sudden surrender to ideals of frugality and virtue at the time when Horace was composing "the Roman Odes", as may be seen from the emphasis placed upon these concepts in Satires 2.2 and 2.6; neither is there anything inherently surprising in conceiving of an Epicurean, admitting for the moment that Horace was such, being frugal and virtuous, if his devotion to the "faith" of Epicurus was genuine.\(^{16}\) That apart, however, Syme does recognise, both in his general discussions of the Roman character and in his specific comments upon Horace, those two elements, native and alien, which between them created that tension, which has already been described as existing in the moral and poetical consciousness and, indeed, in

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14 On the Stoic ethical aim, see Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.138; on the ethical aim of the Epicureans, Lucretius 2.7-19.  
15 *The Roman Revolution*, p.416f.  
16 On the asceticism of the genuine Epicurean, see e.g. Cicero's comments on temperantia at Fin. 1.47-48, but especially Lucr. 2.20-33; 5.1118-1119; 6.9-24, the last of which passages is also relevant to Davus' comments upon the anxieties of the rich and powerful in Satires 2.7.
the political consciousness of Horace. The polarisation of opinion and emotion, which was the natural result of this inner conflict, may be schematised as follows, although one would hasten to add that the schematisation is intended as a guide to rather than as a definitive statement of the tensions to which Horace shows himself to have been subject:

A. CULTURE v. NAIVETY: this is the elemental polarisation, already discussed in general terms, which has been described as being between things Greek and things Italian. One can point to more specific sub-conflicts, which are symptomatic of this overall division:

B. TOWN v. COUNTRY: this conflict is also illustrated by poems other than Satires 2.2 and 2.6. On one level the conflict is between the very different attractions of life in the town and in the country. The moral conflict, however, is further epitomised by another sub-conflict:

C. FORMAL PHILOSOPHY v. NATIVE WIT: this conflict, which is the more readily comprehensible in the light of the comments ascribed to Horace's father in Satires 1.4, is epitomised by the differences between the mores of Ofellus (Sat. 2.2) and Arellius (2.6) and those of the Stoics ridiculed by Horace in Satires 2.3 and 2.7.

Although the initial impression which one derives from a reading of Satires 2.2 and 2.6 is that it is the native element in this conflict which ultimately emerges triumphant, even as it does in the later and less philosophically aware and

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17 E.g. Satires 2.7.28-37, but also Horace, Epistles 1.7 and 1.10; one could also describe the persistent suppliant and would-be client in Sat. 1.9 as an example of the evils of city living; cf. also Odes 3.29 to Maecenas.
competent satires of Juvenal,\textsuperscript{18} it soon becomes evident, upon a closer inspection, that this "victory" of the native element over the alien importation is not by any means total. Horace appears, in fact, as an advocate of a compromise which is of such a kind that the satirist seems to encourage by every means at his disposal the adoption of a genuine ethical eclecticism.\textsuperscript{19} A large part was played in the success of Horace's literary output by the skilful combination of the fruits of an exceptional education in Greek literature and philosophy with an innate respect and admiration for the best in Roman and Italian moral and literary practice. I believe that Horace implies that the best means of successfully achieving an appropriate \textit{ars vivendi} lie in a parallel course of action on, as it were, the moral as opposed to the literary front. Horace suggests that both the traditional Roman ways of ethical theory, or, rather, practice, and the theoretical Greek approaches to ethical practice have much to contribute towards the formulation of such an \textit{ars vivendi}, if they are allowed to operate in concert. Similarly, neither the Roman nor the Greek way is capable alone of gaining a satisfactory result, since Roman life itself now is an inextricable mixture of Greek and Italian elements.

The following detailed discussion of Satires 2.2 and 2.6 should demonstrate quite adequately the interplay between the Greek and Roman elements in the literary construction of even the most consciously Italian of Horace's satirical poems; it will also be my intention to show that, in Horace's view, a

\textsuperscript{18} One thinks especially of Juv. Satires 3 and 12.  
\textsuperscript{19} Rudd, p.19, makes comments of this kind, but is more concerned with the blurring of distinctions between specific schools than with Horace's exploitation in detail of that polarity of thinking to which attention has been drawn.
totally reactionary ethical stance could no longer be considered at all viable, especially given the then current political situation. The compulsive irony which Horace seems bound to exploit makes the successful achievement of this secondary intention a relatively simple matter directly consequent upon the critical exposition of the primary intention as stated. For, although Horace presents Ofellus as a reactionary Italian who, in Lejay's words, which paraphrase vv.2-3, is "un sage en dehors des formules, un homme rustique qui ignore les raffinements intellectual", the reader is nevertheless constantly made aware of the subtle Horace, philosophically acute and amazingly literate, manipulating the "mask" for his own ends - as he did so successfully in Satires 2.3 and also 2.7. To what ends Horace does manipulate the mask of Ofellus is a question which must await the completion of an analysis of the poem.

DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SATIRES 2.2

A

THE PROEM: vv.1-8

The single word boni, about which the crucial first line of this satire pivots, epitomises in itself those tensions between Greek and Roman ideals and concepts which perform an

20 Pp.311-327 for the discussion of this poem in Lejay's commentary which, as usual, is most helpful; on this occasion, however, Lejay's contribution is vitiated to a certain extent by his desire to believe literally in the veracity of Horace's portrayal of Ofellus. On this, see Rudd's comments on p.17, "... who (Lejay) tells us (p.313) that Ofellus could have had some rolls of Lucilius in his house. Presumably he also had works of Stoic or Pythagorean philosophy, for in v.79 he speaks of bodily indulgence as nailing the soul to the earth."
important structural role throughout the two satires at present under discussion. A clear grasp of the functions performed by these tensions is central to a full understanding, not only of the meaning of these peculiarly Italian poems, but also of Horatian satire in general. The first line reads as follows:

1 Quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo...

Since *boni* may appear, at first sight, to be innocent of any such bilateral sophistication, as has been suggested adheres to it, an examination of its total significance and function within its context is necessary. On its initial impact, in fact, *boni* seems to be a peculiarly Roman word in keeping with the Roman, or rather Italian, genius of Ofellus as described in vv.2-3. It may well, therefore, appear perverse to suggest that, so far as Horace's extremely literate readership was concerned, it would also sustain connotations which were markedly Greek. For the Latin *boni*, as well as being a respectable Latin vocative, is also the Latin equivalent of the Greek vocative ὄψαθοι and, as a natural result, shares some of those associations which are inseparable from the Greek word, especially when conjoined with καλός in καλοὶ ἄγαθοὶ. That the term is particularly suitable, when the group to which reference is being made is conservative in outlook (not to say reactionary), is made clear by an example to be found at Aristophanes, *Knights* 843:

οὐκ ὄψαθοι ταύτ' ἐστιν πω ταύτη μᾶ τὸν Ποσειδῶ.

Here Cleon harangues the chorus, reminding them of his exploits at Pylos, even as it was Cicero's habit to remind conservative audiences of his role in the discomfiture of Catiline, at a time when all the *boni* worked successfully together. However that may be, the chorus of knights were of a class, to the Italian equivalent of which it may be supposed that Ofellus and
his friends belonged, both materially and spiritually. It is also interesting to note that Cleon, like Ofellus, was intent upon persuasion, as was Socrates at Plato, Protagoras 311a, where in tones of gentle remonstrance, Socrates characterises his interlocutor as ἄγαθός. 21 This is also the tone of boni in Satires 2.2.1: for the tone is not, I think, ironical, as is implied by Lejay, when he refers to certain parallel usages of the vocative boni in the comedies of Plautus and Terence. 22 It is not necessary to presume, at least at this stage of the discussion, that Horace is here reflecting a marked Plautine or Terentian influence, although comic precedents are acknowledgedly exploited by Horace in the composition of the satires; however, Ofellus cannot be as readily identified with any standard comic prototype as can, for example, Davus in Satires 2.7, although there are aspects of the reactionary and sententious senex about him. 23

Irony is also, perhaps inevitably, brought to mind by the reference just made to the parallel vocative ἄγαθός at Protagoras 311a. Horace's felt debt to Socratic irony has already been mentioned, as has his debt to the form, content and method of the Socratic dialogues of Plato. 24 There is no advantage to be gained on this occasion, however, by imagining that Ofellus is aiming shafts of Socratic irony at the recipients of his homely praeeptum, even before he is well begun. After

21 Cf. Plato, Prot. 314d.
22 Lejay (note ad loc.) refers to Plautus Captivi 954; Casina 725; Pseudolus 1145 and to Terence Adelphoe 556,557; Andria 616 et al: his is also the ref. to Aristophanes, although he does no more than record the use of ὄγαθος.
23 See above in discussion of comic influence on Sat. 2.7 in Chap.4.
24 Fraenkel, p.136f.
all the interlocutors have had no opportunity to express any contrary opinions. For the form of the first sentence precludes any contention that the reader is breaking in upon a discussion, which is already in full swing.

By apostrophising his audience as *boni* Ofellus, in a rather Ciceronian manner, if I may anticipate momentarily some future comments, identifies both himself with his audience and also their common interests with his own. As yet, therefore, irony is something which runs counter to his purpose, within the fiction of the poem, as he attempts to persuade his audience to his own point of view. Irony at this stage could only alienate the sympathy and attention of his audience. On the other hand, Horace, as I am endeavouring to demonstrate, is consciously and with subtle wit exploiting a kind of literary irony by means of the ambiguity and equivocal meanings of the words, such as *boni*, which he puts into the mouth of Ofellus.

The conservative connotations of ὁγαθοί have already been hinted at, when reference was made to the collective character of the Chorus of the *Knights*, who were termed ὁγαθοί in Cleon's harangue. If *boni* is necessarily to be associated with ὁγαθοί, then, in the context of Ofellus' address to his peers in the first verse of this poem, it must also be associated with the phrase καλὸς ὁγαθός, a directly flattering title with the meaning originally of "traditional gentlemen". I say "originally" because it is extremely interesting, from our point of view, to trace the development of the meaning of this phrase in the full knowledge that Horace would have been equally in possession of this information, though not Ofellus. For, although the original implications of καλὸς κάγαθός may have been flattering enough to Ofellus, if one could imagine that such an
unmitigated xenophobe could take pleasure in being associated with anything Greek, the later and more philosophically oriented associations of the phrase could not but have proven disagreeable to him, if one could imagine him being aware of them. Ofellus' lack of awareness is, however, not material; what is material is Horace's total awareness as author and the awareness which, as author, he expects from his readers.

The traditional meaning of καλὸς κάγαδὸς is well attested: the phrase was usually applied to the kind of man who enjoyed to the full both the benefits and the responsibilities which derived necessarily from the possession of inherited wealth, based in the possession of land, and that general mystique supposed to be the prerogative of the aristocracy. Theognis it was who perhaps first imputed a moral as well as aesthetic and substantial dimension, to καλὸς; this "natural" virtue became suspect in the great fifth century debate between the proponents of φύσις and the devotees of the primacy of νόμος. It then became customary for philosophical writers, especially Plato, to employ the traditional gentleman's "definitions" of, for example, justice, piety and virtue as the norms against which to measure such rival theories concerning ethical behaviour as those put forward by Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Socrates in, of course, Plato's Republic.

25 E.G. Hdt. 1.30; Thuc. 8.48; Xen. Hell. 5.3.9 and Cyr. 4.4.23.  
26 Theognis, v.438.  
27 For a recent, succinct and lucid account of this debate, see W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge, 1971) pp.55-134.  
28 On traditional "justice", see Cephalus in Republic 331b-c, on "piety", Euthyphro 5d, and on "virtue" and its teachability, Meno, passim.  
29 For a penetrating discussion both of the use of the normal definition of justice in the Republic as, as it were, a datum line, and of other concepts of justice, see Sir Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory (London, 1964) pp.168-238.
Aristotle, in his rationalisation of the traditional Delphic ethic of μηδὲν ἄγαν, takes the whole process a step further by developing the meaning of καλὸς κάγαθὸς in a technical sense, until it becomes the equivalent of Aristotle's man of practical virtue, ὁ τελείως σοουδαίος, the completely virtuous man of the Nicomachean Ethics. He is, of course, still well aware of the traditional meaning of καλὸς κάγαθὸς, as may be seen from his use of the phrase in a different context at Politics 4.8.4. The way was thus opened by Aristotle for the Hellenistic philosophers, who, in the context of Roman ethical theory, are of paramount importance, to use καλὸς and ἀγαθὸς as equivalents of σόφος or prerequisites, in their substantive forms, of σοφία, while τὸ καλὸν became identified with the summum bonum of the Stoic school. In fact, to use Latin terms, the sapiens, in the Stoic context, is automatically bonus. I think it is clear, therefore, that boni, in the first verse of this satire, is redolent not only of traditional Greek and Roman ethical values, with which Ofellus was in sympathy, but also of those Hellenistic philosophical notions to which Ofellus' address is designed as a corrective or counterblast. This is, I think, especially likely, when it is also realised that the opening of this line, within which boni plays an important structural role, is cast in the form of a question which could itself serve as a paraphrase of the title of Cicero's major work on Hellenistic ethical theories, the De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. To counter any suggestion that it is ludicrous so to

30 Aristotle, E.N. 2.9.2 etc.
31 So also did τὸ ἀγαθὸν: see e.g. Diogenes Laertius, 7.100, καλὸν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθόν; cf. Cicero Fin. 4.68.
inflating the significance of a single word, which has an adequate and respectable Latin meaning, I would again declare that it is an axiom essential to my whole approach to Horace that he, like Cicero, desired an extremely intelligent, sophisticated and scholarly audience, unlike Lucilius, who apparently only demanded a moderately well-read audience. We know from elsewhere that Horace thought that he was improving upon the literary quality of Lucilius' satires. One can also presume that the content, as well as the way in which it was handled by Horace, was more sophisticated in his work than in that of Lucilius.

As will become clear this makes Lejay's comments on the tone of Horace's proem difficult to follow. For, in his discussion of the indirect question with which Horace opens the address of Ofellus, Lejay detects a note of simulated embarrassment. Horace, claims Lejay, excuses himself for the banality of the opening sentence and in vv.2-3 disclaims any responsibility for original authorship:

\[ \text{nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praecepit Ofellus rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva.} \]

32 Rudd, p.170, hints at some Horatian subtlety here with his comment, "it is a kind of accident to which Horace is markedly prone"; however, he does not develop further the idea of ambiguity in the meaning of \textit{boni}, further, that is to say, than a reference to the Greek \textit{οὐαδοῖ} and the Platonic provenance of "nec meus hic sermo est". For a more detailed discussion see below.

33 \textit{De Finibus} 1.7, where reference is actually made to Lucilius.

34 We learn this from a quotation at Cicero \textit{De Or.} 2.25, "Persium non curo legere, Laelium Decimum volo".

35 E.g. \textit{Satires} 1.4.6-13 and 1.10.1-15: it is interesting that in Sat. 2.1 Horace not only stresses his genuine debt to Lucilius (N.B., esp. "Lucili ritu nostrum melioris utroque", v.29), but also, in the poem immediately prior to 2.2 in the collection implies possible criticism of the settlement of veterans. See discussion on Ofellus' political comments below.

36 Lejay, n. ad loc. p.328, "Hor. s'excuse aussitôt d'émettre cette banalité."
The wit is at once more subtle and more packed than Lejay imagines or, for that matter, than seems apparent to Rudd. To dispose first of the charge of supposed banality: an examination of *Satires* 2.6.70-76 indicates that Horace felt that, far from such questions being banal, or even irrelevant, they were precisely the topics upon which he enjoyed relaxed and intelligent conversation with his neighbours. Also, if one considers that this particular satire is to a certain extent Socratic in tone, then this initial question, reminiscent of the abrupt opening of the *Meno* of Plato is totally suitable.

That Horace is in fact operating at a highly sophisticated level of literary allusion, and allusion to Greek literature, at the beginning of a satire which is devoted ostensibly to the expression of an unsophisticated and essentially Italian view is further made clear by the content, organisation and intent of the second line of the poem. For although Horace is not by any means apologising for the banality of the opening statement, knowing full well that in philosophical terms it is not the bare statement, but only its expansion and discussion of it, which can admit of a charge of banality, he is, nevertheless, distancing himself from the views which are about to be expressed and at the same time ensuring that he is not identified either with the person or persona of the character into whose mouth he has himself placed these views. As will become clear, Horace is neither totally in agreement with the views which he places in the mouth of Ofellus nor does he discount their value entirely,

37 Esp. 2.6.76, "... et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius".

any more than he entirely discounted the value of some of the ethical ideas and precepts which he was pleased to place in the mouths of Damsippus and Davus in *Satires* 2.3 and 2.7; it should be added, however, that Ofellus is generally dealt with in a far kinder manner than are either Davus or Damsippus. This is natural, if one considers that Ofellus, although presumably liber rather than libertus, reflects attitudes dear to the heart of Horace's own father. However much one may admire the achievements of an alien culture, the effects of one's own culture and environment upon both character and spirit are ineradicable. However that may be, consider v.2 of *Satires* 2.2 in detail:

2 nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praepedit Ofellus...

The balancing of the possessive meus, at the beginning of the line, with the contrasting proper name Ofellus, at the line's close, suggests a deeper significance than can be explained adequately by the postulation of a desire to demonstrate metrical virtuosity for its own sake: this especially when the balancing occurs in the work of a poet as conscious and as careful in his composition as was Horace. It is likely that a contrast in temperament, education and, therefore, in outlook is indicated as existing between the poet and his present mouthpiece by the existence within the single line of the physical gulf between the two words which specifically refer to the two individuals. The nature and extent of this psychological gulf, indicated by the exploitation of metre and of word order, is further highlighted by the various contrasts between v.3, which further qualifies and characterises Ofellus, and the clause "nec meus hic sermo est" in v.2. For although this clause contains
Horace's own term, which he employs elsewhere as a label for his satirical works, his essays in the only native Italian contribution to the tale of literary genres, it is also, on the other hand, so replete with Greek literary allusions that in its own brief compass it epitomises, if one takes into account the undoubtedly Italian reference to sermo to the satiric genre, the Janus like nature of Horace's attitude to things Italian and things Greek. Horace's exploitation of irony as a facet of his very literary wit is also in evidence: the literary allusions and associations which are triggered by "nec meus hic sermo est" are as alien as can possibly be to the staid and unsophisticated common sense of Ofellus. The allusions are to Euripides, to Plato and Callimachus: Euripides was perhaps the most sophisticated and sophistic of the great tragedians, Plato the philosopher most divorced from the harsh realities of the phenomenal as opposed to the ideal world, while Callimachus was a representative of a new wave of poetry, consciously breaking new ground and out of sympathy with traditional ideas.

By this typically allusive use of an apparently innocuous phrase at the beginning of this satire Horace achieves several ends: not only does he dissociate himself well in

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39 Horace's title for the Satires was Sermones, but also see esp. Sat. 1.4.39-48.

40 Lejay (n. ad loc.) lists Eurip. Melanippe 484 (Nauck) and Helen 513, λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐμὸς, σοφῶν δ' ἐμὸς, which may be related to the sapiens of v.3: on the sophistication of Euripides see R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "Euripides: Poietes Sophos", Arethusa 2.2, 1969.

41 The Platonic reference is to Symposium 177a where the speaker is the rather dry and pedantic physician Eryximachus.

42 See Callimachus, Hymns 5.56, μὴθος δ' οὐκ ἐμὸς, ἄλλ' ἔτταρον. It may be of interest to note that Callimachus' Hecale probably introduces a new type of epic heroine from the same social grouping to which Ofellus himself belonged. Horace follows new literary directions, while simultaneously presenting a character out of sympathy with them.
advance from the ideas both moral and political, which he places in the mouth of Ofellus, but he also serves notice of his intention to exploit opportunities for witty and learned ambiguities as they may arise, whether or not they cut across the prevailing current of Ofellus' stream of eloquence which is, anyway, carefully stage-managed by the poet. For Horace also in v.2 establishes his own credentials, as a man who is well versed in the best of the Greek dramatic and philosophical authors and able to exploit that knowledge in an almost Socratic manner, before, in v.3 he moves on to characterise Ofellus as a peculiarly and consciously Italian individual, both in spirit and in education:

3 rusticus abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva.

Our attitude to Ofellus in the remainder of the poem and, accordingly, to the pronouncements which he makes, depends upon the impression which this particular line makes upon us. As will become evident that impression is by no means as totally favourable as some would suggest, especially those who believe that the words which Horace puts into Ofellus' mouth are entirely consistent with the poet's own ideas and beliefs. For Horace's description of Ofellus in this line (v.3) is quite consciously double-edged: neither rusticus nor crassus are adjectives which could have been taken on an initial hearing as unequivocally complimentary, especially in satiric verse and also before a smart and sophisticated audience. Even though the possibility of undue comic influence upon this poem has

43 For potentially dangerous political comment, see vv.126-136.
44 E.g. Lejay, "Horace se contente de presenter son porte-parole, un sage en dehors des formules, un homme rustique, qui ignore les raffinements intellectuels," in his introductory discussion of this poem, pp.311-327; cf. Palmer, n. ad loc. p.255.
already been played down, nevertheless I would suggest that because of its association with dullness and stupidity in comic and other literature, although agrestis is more commonly used in a derogatory sense, rusticus here also possesses inevitably derogatory overtones regarding the basic stupidity and dullness of Ofellus. This is not to deny to Ofellus some of the more desirable attributes of the rusticus such as honesty. However, such honesty is often the result of naivety, so far as the urbanus is concerned, rather than of any conscious virtue. Since, moreover, Horace uses rusticus with a similarly ambivalent meaning in a similarly ambivalent context at Satires 1.3.31, it seems unlikely that rusticus in v.3 of this satire is being used in a totally neutral or in a totally complimentary sense. This feeling that there is a certain ambiguity or ambivalence evident in Horace's attitude towards the intellectual stature of Ofellus at least, not to mention his moral and political ideals, is further emphasised by the phrase crassa Minerva with which the line ends. This phrase balances and complements rusticus in the structure and meaning of the individual verse, while the whole hexameter pivots about the word sapiens. Both rusticus and crassa Minerva qualify sapiens, which, as has been amply demonstrated, seems incapable of sustaining a simple and straightforward meaning in the context.

45 See above, p.197.
46 E.g. Plautus, Persa, 2.1.2, but more especially Most. 1.1.39, where the rusticus Grumio berates the dishonesty of the urbanus Tranio: n. also Vergil, Eccl. 2.56 where Corydon is apostrophised as rusticus, surely "naive".
47 E.g. Cic. Leg. 1.14.41: "o rem dignam, in qua non modo docti, verum etiam agrestes erubescent."
48 In Rosc. Am. Cicero illustrates the countryfied honesty of the accused: this defence necessarily depicts the accused as something of a bumpkin.
49 "rideri possit eo quod / rusticius tonso toga defluit et male laxus / in pede calceus haeret: at est bonus..." Sat. 1.3.30-32.
of Horace's moral and philosophical satire. It has already been suggested that rusticus, if read in an ironical fashion, devalues Ofellus' intellectual standing with the audience; by the same token crassaque Minerva qualifies that intellectual standing in a manner which is not necessarily complimentary.

It is clearly suitable for the intelligence, the "stock of brains" as Palmer's note puts it, of such a typical and conscious Italian as Ofellus to be described or put in terms of the specifically Italian goddess of wisdom, Minerva. It is not quite so clear, however, why she should be described as crassa, unless she simply stands for "wisdom" as Vulcan stands for fire at Satires 1.5.74: Palmer explains that, as well as goddess of wisdom, Minerva is also the goddess of spinning and weaving. Therefore crassus is a suitable epithet, if rather learned, in that it applies equally to the quality of thread, or the quality of brains or intellect. However subtle this play on words may be, as Horace combines both aspects of Minerva's patronage in the phrase crassaque Minerva, and there is a suspicion that the critic is perhaps oversubtle, the overall result can hardly be thought of as being complimentary to Ofellus. The poet is going to great lengths to show not only his own subtlety, but also the lack of subtlety of Ofellus. One would even be tempted to suggest that Horace's desire to demonstrate his own intellectual dexterity through a calculated assault upon the mental equipment of Ofellus goes a stage further. For, although it is true that

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50 Although Altheim, Greichische Götter, p.142, n.4 believes Minerva to be an Athena, borrowed through Etruria, most scholars think her indigenous to Italy: if my interpretation of Horace's choice of her name here is correct, it would be evidence in favour of the beliefs of most scholars.

51 E.g. Vergil, Aeneid 8.409; Ovid, Met. 4.33; Propertius 2.9.5.
the phrases, almost proverbial, *pingui* or *crassa Minerva aliquid facere* commonly mean "without skill" or "without formal education", I would suggest that, where Horace is contrasting Ofellus, who is "unschooled" (abnormis, perhaps), with his own highly educated self, the phrase *crassa Minerva* must be understood in the context of materialistic and physical theories on the nature of the human intellect. However startling this may sound initially, further investigation will show it to be a persuasive and attractive interpretation of *crassa Minerva*.

At Horace, *Ars Poetica* 385-6 we find the following use of Minerva:

\[
\text{tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva:} \\
\text{id tibi iudicium est, ea mens.}
\]

Here Minerva is being used to represent that decision making and sovereign aspect of the soul, the mind, which the Stoics called τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν. Nothing is said or done, suggests Horace, without the consent of that rational part, *nihil invita Minerva*. Mention of the Stoics is not out of place here, since we find at Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.31.110 the following sentiment expressed:

\[
\text{sic enim est faciundum ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriae nostram sequamur ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugnante natura.}
\]


53 It is interesting that on occasion the Stoics themselves identified Athena with wisdom in much the same way; e.g. Diogenes Laertius, 7.147. ‘Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ (sc. φασι) κατὰ τὴν εἷς αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ, and also S.V.F. 3.235.1, where the comment is made in Philodemus, *de Mus.* 4, p.105 Kemke, that ‘Ἀθηνᾶ = φρόνησις.'
The apologetic *ut aiunt* of Cicero warns the reader that he is employing a colloquial or proverbial expression in *invita Minerva*. The phrases *crassa* and *pingui Minerva* are also used proverbially and, as this is the case, are apt enough for employment in qualifying the intellect of Ofellus. However, *crassa Minerva* does have more sophisticated associations than are appropriate, if it is Horace's intention merely to comment on the stolid good sense of his mouthpiece. For *Minerva*, as has been demonstrated, is capable of being used in a modestly philosophical work which is aimed at producing a practical *modus vivendi*, even as are the *praeecepta* of Ofellus.

It is at this point in the argument that the term *crassa* assumes greater significance than can adequately be explained by references to Minerva's role as patroness of the weaving trade. In Stoic doctrine the human soul was a material entity constituted from the same materials as, is, indeed, a part of that same *πνεύμα*, a mixture of air and fire, craftsmanlike (*τεχνικός*) in its effect, which animates, maintains and organises the cosmos. The station of each object within the hierarchy of being posited by the Stoics depended, as it were, upon the quality of the air and fire mixture which maintained its peculiar tension or *τόνος* and through that its material equilibrium. The cohesive force or *εξίς* within a stone, for example, is the same *πνεύμα* in operation as that which, in a less gross form, maintains the nature or *φύσις* peculiar to a plant, while this *φύσις* is in

54 Col. Praef. 33; Cic. Laelius 19; cf. also Horace, Ep. 1.4.15.
55 On the rationality of the Stoic arché and the role and meaning of logos in the universal and individual context, see H.A.K. Hunt, A Physical Interpretation of the Universe: The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic, pp.26-44 (Melbourne 1976).
56 On τόνος and tension exploited by Horace, see above pp. 156ff. in the discussion of Satires, 2.7.
turn more gross than that mixture of air and fire, that ψυχή which, being a spark of the divine logos, animates and maintains the peculiar nature of men in their unique position within the cosmos. The qualitative differences between the various πνεῦμα types mentioned depend upon the ratio, within the mixture, of air to fire. The greater the proportion of fire, the more rarified the mixture and, accordingly, the higher on the scale of being of the object blessed with the more rarified mixture.

Similarly, within the spectrum of a single species, the more rarified the πνεῦμα in an individual man, for example, the sharper his intellect and, for that matter, the better the prospects of his soul both in its terrestrial existence and after it has been separated in death from the body, according at least to Chrysippus. This is particularly interesting in the light of the comments put into Ofellus' mouth at vv.70-79, where in a manner reminiscent of the lay view, ridiculed in Plato's Phaedo, Ofellus declares that gluttony weighs down the soul, even after death:

quin corpus onustum
hesternis vitiis animum quoque praegratat una,
atque adfigit humo divinae particulam aurae.

(77-79)

A full discussion of these verses and the context in which they appear must await the full discussion of Ofellus' praecepta


58 Compare the excellence of the fierier souls according to Heraclitus and the soddenness of drunken souls, fr.117, Stobaeus, Anth. 3.5.7.

58 Plato, Phaedo, Εμβροθες δέ γε, ο φίλε, τοῦτο οξείοθαι χρή εἶναι καὶ βαρύ καὶ γεώδες καὶ ορατόν' ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐχούς ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχή βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ορατόν τόπον φόβῳ.
which follows. However, suffice to say at the moment that Horace's description of Ofellus as being sapiens ... crassa Minerva would be far from complimentary from a Stoic point of view. In fact, from a Stoic point of view it would be a contradiction in terms.

To complete our study of v.3, we must now consider the phrase abnormis sapiens; although there is some doubt about the exact reading of the MSS at this point, there seems little doubt as to the meaning of abnormis or ab normis or, even, abnormi. Palmer translates with "an unschooled philosopher" who is not "bound by the rules of any sect." Rudd translates neatly, "an unprofessional philosopher". In his explanatory note Lejay quotes from Cicero, Laelius 18 to illustrate this type of expression, but from a slightly different perspective, "quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant ad istorum (sc. Graecorum) normam fuisse sapientes." To a certain extent Horace's description of Ofellus as abnormis / ab normis sapiens anticipates his own description of himself at Epistles 1.1.14; there Horace declares himself to be "nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri." One could argue that this fact adds weight to the arguments of those who suppose, with Lejay, that the views of Ofellus, as recorded by Horace, can be equated directly with the poet's own. However, that such an interpretation is not valid has been demonstrated amply by the delineation just completed of Horace's ambivalent attitude towards his mouthpiece,

59 There is a useful discussion of various readings in the apparatus criticus attached to Lejay's text and commentary, p.328.
60 Palmer, n. ad loc.
Ofellus, and necessarily, therefore, to the sentiments expressed by him. Horace's depiction of Ofellus at the opening of this satire is anticipatory rather of his treatment of the sanguine proficientes Damasippus and Davus in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. For, even as Horace's gentler ridicule of Ofellus demonstrates, in the manner of its achievement, a subtlety of wit and an acquaintance with Hellenistic philosophy alien to our carefully acquired conception of the attainments of Ofellus, even so in Epistles 1.1, although disclaiming allegiance to any particular philosophical mentor, Horace nevertheless advertises his knowledge of their doctrines. He adopts philosophies according to circumstance and mood. As his satirical humour is opportunistic, so is his philosophical allegiance. In the light of all this we should be wary of likening Ofellus to Cato Maior; for Cato, despite his politically motivated antipathy to things Greek, was well aware, nevertheless, of their aesthetic and philosophical value. That is, unless Cicero's portrait of him in the Cato Maior is vastly astray. 62

It is not only the nature of Horace's complex attitude towards Ofellus which is adumbrated in the opening lines of this poem. Even while Horace is depicting Ofellus as an aggressively proud Italian with little time for alien culture and no sympathy with imported ethical theories of a technical nature, he simultaneously anticipates the major recurrent themes of the poem, which are also among the major recurrent themes of his satires in general. This anticipation is achieved with great economy. The major themes of the poem are intimately

62 See also Kienast, Cato der Zensor, seine Persönlichkeit und seine Zeit (Heidelberg, 1954) and Della Corte, Catone Censore (Firenze, 1966).
linked with the xenophobic attitude which Horace ascribes to Ofellus. Horace's aim appears twofold, both aspects again intimately related. On the one hand Horace wishes to demonstrate that the traditional Roman or Italian views on questions of morality and ethics can stand no longer in isolation as a valid guide for individual behaviour. The current environment is too much infiltrated with alien influences to allow such an ostrich-like stance as that adopted by Ofellus to maintain any satisfactory practical effect. One aspect of this growing complexity is emphasised by the political comment introduced by Horace towards the poem's close. The urbs Romana had a constitution which had ultimately proved incapable of sustaining the strain imposed upon it by the weight and extent of the imperium Romanum. In a similar, even a parallel way, the mores maiorum were incapable alone and without modification of sustaining the demands made upon the individual by the complex society within which he found himself. In addition it was Horace's intention also to show that the Italian views which he puts into the mouth of Ofellus have much to commend them. They are, after all, based upon sound common sense and broad experience of life, as were the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle and, more relevantly perhaps in the light of much of what is said in Satires 2.2, of the peculiar "hedonism" of the Epicureans. In fact, briefly to anticipate a general conclusion on the nature and import of Horace's satires, Italian ethics, supported by Greek culture and moral theory, defended by men capable of utilising the best of both worlds, Greek and Italian, should perhaps in Horace's view have formed the basis of daily behaviour for intelligent Romans in the period immediately after the civil wars.

If this is a correct understanding of Horace's dual
intention, the next question is how does the present satire attempt to fulfil that purpose and, secondly, how successful is it in its attempt.

The first approach which Horace adopts is to present the praecepta of Ofellus, abnormis sapiens though he may be, in the form of a diatribe. As this discussion progresses it will become clear that Horace, writing in a peculiarly Italian genre, namely satire, and ostensibly reporting (nec meus hic sermo est) the ideas of an unashamed Italian, namely Ofellus, nevertheless finds it useful to employ techniques of persuasion which are the mark of the diatribe form, which was itself the typical vehicle for expression of the proselytizing Hellenistic philosophers. 63 Secondly, Horace also finds it expedient to utilise technical terms in the reporting, or rather in the composition, of Ofellus' diatribe. These terms immediately trigger associations with the actual technical usages of the Hellenistic schools. There is, indeed, a certain amount of humour to be extracted from the juxtaposition of the homely illustrations, especially those of a culinary nature, with which the satire abounds, with potenti-ally technical language. This is the type of humour of incongruity which Horace exploits in the initial discussion of the attributes of Ofellus. If indeed there is a specific comic influence upon this satire, this is where it is to be found. 64 Of more importance, however, than the transient comic effect is the fact that Horace is able to suggest by means of these carefully managed and arresting juxtapositions, that not only is it impossible to discuss effectively or propound ethical

63 For a discussion of the characteristics of the diatribe as they affect Horace, Satires 2.3, see above pp. 65-69.
64 For a discussion of the element of incongruity in Plautus see Segal, Roman Laughter (Harvard, 1968) ch. 1.
topics at any length, without using the methods of those very philosophers whose efforts one affects to disdain or ignore, but it is also impossible to avoid this inconsistency in the details and language of one's arguments. And, since, as Horace points out elsewhere, all inconsistency is to be avoided, it is far preferable to acknowledge a debt of gratitude where it is due, than to persist in fruitless and bigoted ideological insularity.

Before continuing I would also suggest that the preceding paragraphs have disposed of one of the major obstacles which Lejay sees as standing in the way of a clear understanding of the poem. For in his discussion Lejay declares (p.312) "La tâche est vaine de vouloir distinguer ce qui appartient à Horace et ce qui revient à Ofellus. La fiction permet au poète de mélanger, suivante son habitude, les mots d'auteur aux tirades de personnage et de mystifier un peu le lecteur." The mystification of the reader is caused by difficulties which arise when attempts are made to distribute the dialogue precisely between Horace and Ofellus. Lejay, by contrast with the majority of editors wishes to attribute vv.1-52 directly to Ofellus, considering verses 2 and 3 as an interjection by Horace. That is to say, Lejay believes we have another opening in medias res, where we are not immediately aware of the identity of the speaker. However, Lejay is creating problems, which do not exist, and the answer to which he has anticipated himself in the words "de mystifier un peu le lecteur"; for, if Horace's intention is to mystify the reader, which I doubt, that

65 For Horace's discussion of the importance of consistency see Satires 1.3 and my discussion of that poem above, pp. 23ff.

66 Cf., for example, Satires 2.3; 2.7 and 2.8.
mystification is intended to facilitate the ambiguities, which are central to Horace's main purpose in the poem. Lejay brings these difficulties upon himself, as is noted by Rudd, by wishing to understand Ofellus as a gentleman farmer who, although, through no fault of his own, fallen on hard times, nevertheless retains the benefits of a liberal education.\footnote{E.g. Lejay, p.312, "N'oublions pas qu'avant d'être fermier, il a été propriétaire ... il est tiré de la vie contemporaine."} Lejay has been captivated by the plausibility of Horace's fiction. One should also remember that Horace usually only allows his creations to speak in a "ton doctoral" when he wishes to hold them or their ideas up to a certain amount of ridicule. This is certainly the case with Damasippus and Davus in \textit{Satires} 2.3 and 2.7. It is a pity that Lejay feels the need to accept an authentic biographical accuracy for the depiction of Ofellus. This basic error not only leads him into difficulties regarding his overestimation of the intellect of Ofellus, an overestimation which itself necessarily springs from Lejay's profound understanding of the source material for Ofellus' diatribe,\footnote{I am indebted to Lejay's commentary for the majority of the references to source material which occur in the following pages; this should serve as an anticipatory acknowledgment.} but also blinds him to the way in which Horace exploits the complex pattern of source material and to his purpose in doing so.

Although this interlude of discussion may have seemed a trifle inorganic within the developing and detailed discussion of \textit{Satires} 2.2, it did seem advantageous to anticipate at some length the course of the investigation of the remainder of the poem, even as the tone and content of the poem are themselves foreshadowed by Horace in vv.1-3.
Whether we now treat v.1 as Horace's report of Ofellus' verbatim words, or as a modified version, along with the rest of the poem, of the praecepta of Ofellus is strictly irrelevant. Within Horace's Satires the master of the composition is always the poet. Therefore, although it may be true that "Quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo" is an undoubted commonplace and that, perhaps in a spirit of irony, Horace disclaims ownership, even so, the line is as it is because Horace wanted it to be. While certainly commonplace in its almost Christian equation of poverty with virtue, the line is consistent with the not totally favourable impression Horace is ensuring that his mouth-piece initially makes. Horace wishes to develop a picture of a man who instinctively mistrusts the intellectual and who fears such a creature through ignorance.69 One is reminded of Cicero's comments at De Officiis 2.87:

sed de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, vellem etiam de utenda, Commodius a quibusdam optimis viris ad Ianum70 medium sedentibus quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur.

In its attempt to reduce questions of ethics to such a basic level and its conscious spurning of theory, this passage seems almost as perverse as Socrates' choice of the just man as the ideal thief in Republic 1,71 although Cicero lacks Plato's irony. However, Cicero, unlike Ofellus, does recognise that "utilitatum comparatio ... saepe est necessaria." Then it is that the mind which is best trained rationally to investigate circumstances will prove superior to the mind of the abnormis sapiens. Horace

69 Cf. Plato's Meno and the attitude of Anytus to the Sophists at 90-94.
70 There is some confusion in the MSS of the De Officiis at this point, although the general meaning is clear enough; practical men of affairs are more trustworthy than philosophers.
71 Plato, Republic 334.
too would recognise this fact and would realise also that it was a shortcoming in men of Ofellus' type that this was a concession unlikely to be made by them. However that may be, Cicero elsewhere too praises poverty as the nursemaid of respectability and honour, quoting Caecilius to this effect at Tusculans 3.56:

nam aut ipsius rei natura qualis et quanta sit quaecumque quaerimus, ut de paupertate non numquam, cuius onus disputando levamus, docentes quam parva sint quae natura desideret, aut a disputandi subtilitate orationem ad exempla tradecimus. hic Socrates commemoratur, hic Diogenes, hic Caecilianum illud:

saepe est etiam sub palliolo sordido sapientia.

cum enim paupertatis una eademque sit vis, quidnam dici potest quam ob rem C. Fabricio tolerabilis ea fuerit, alii negent se ferre posse?

Not only does Fabricius\(^\text{72}\) seem to serve as a prototype almost for Ofellus, but the very form of the method of investigation described by Cicero anticipates the "quae virtus est quanta" of the opening line. The point here is not, of course, that Horace necessarily used the Tusculans as a source for the composition of this satire, although this is not itself beyond the bounds of possibility, but that the form of words which he places into Ofellus' mouth is redolent of a type of formal ethical discussion which, originated by Socrates and his contemporaries, recorded by Plato, was finally imitated in the dialogues of Cicero. Take this into account with the Platonic overtones of "nec meus hic sermo est" and one can see that the portrait of Ofellus is not as simple as some would have us believe.

\(^{72}\) Fabricius' historicity is well established: Cic. Or 2.268; Off. 3.86; Planc. 26.60: Val. Max. 4.4.3; Gellius, 1.14; Juv. 9.142 and Plin. 33.12.54 and 153.
It seems that the idea of poverty and virtue enjoying some special relationship was one which had a continuing attraction for Horace, although his concept of what constituted poverty could well have astounded the less fortunate of his contemporaries. This question will reappear in the context of the discussion of *Satires* 2.6: however, more relevant for the moment is a later work, the sixteenth poem in *Odes* 2. In this poem Horace returns to the theme of the cares which attend the wealthy. From our present point of view it is something which Horace writes towards the end of the poem which is important:

$$\text{mihi parva rura et}$$
$$\text{spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae}$$
$$\text{Parca non mendax dedit et malignum}$$
$$\text{spermere vulgus.}$$

*Odes* 2.16.37-40

Although I would hesitate to number Ofellus with those scathingly described as *malignum vulgus*, I would suggest that what distinguishes Horace, not only from the common herd, with their vulgar aspirations, but also from Ofellus, with his dour and stolid common sense, is the poet's obvious delight and expertise in Greek literature, a delight which is highlighted in this ode by "spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae."

It is also appropriate at this stage of the discussion, if we can take our cue from the tone and content of the poem's opening, to outline briefly the views of the major Hellenistic schools on the related questions of poverty, virtue and asceticism. Such an outline will anticipate those associations which will inevitably be made as discussion of the poem develops. For it is not the formal element of the diatribe delivered by

73 Cf. *Satires* 2.7 ad fin.
Ofellus that alone is anticipated by the ethical discourses of the Greeks; the content too is anticipated, naturally, as Horace consciously and obviously exploits Greek source material directly and also through the medium of Cicero's dialogues. Although Ofellus would have been in sympathy with, as it were, a statement formulated along the lines of "praecepta quidem haec tota nostra sunt", Horace, on the other hand, is only too well aware of the dubious nature of such a claim. For Horace was the first to acknowledge his own debt, as a satirist, to the related elements in the works of the Greek authors both directly and also through the medium of Lucilius. 74

The developing attitudes of the Stoics towards both the question of poverty and the status of the pastoral ideal make a fascinating study in the light of this poem and the Italian attitudes which Horace presents in it through the diatribe of Ofellus. On the whole the views of the Stoics are not too far removed from those of Ofellus. I hesitate to say on this occasion that the views of Ofellus are "compatible" with those of the Stoa, and this is not simply because of his vehement claims to an Italian independence of spirit. For, although it is true that Horace utilises his own knowledge of Hellenistic philosophy in the composition of this poem, I think that the point should be made also that it is quite possible, even likely, that the moralising of the later Stoics, such as Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, may owe as much to Horace's persuasive formulation of Italian ethical values, in such a

74 Horace mentions the following Greek authors explicitly: Archilochus (Ep. 1.19.25), Bion (Ep. 2.2.60), Eupolis, Cratinus and Aristophanes (Sat. 1.4.1) and also Plato, the philosopher, and Menander (Sat. 2.3.11-12); on his debt to Lucilius, see Satires 1.4; 1.10 and 2.1.
poem as this, as Horace's poem is indebted to Hellenistic views received through both the medium of Cicero and of the lectures which Horace attended in Athens. The views of the later Stoics may then fairly be described as examples of Roman Stoicism.

The early Stoics considered that poverty was an indifferent and, therefore, incapable of materially affecting the happiness of any individual. In accord with this belief in the δεισιδαιμονικός status of πενία the Stoics attacked the conservative views of the aristocratic poet Theognis with great vehemence. This fact is recorded by Plutarch at Comm. Not. 22.1069d:

τὸν τοινυν θεόγνιν αὐτοι παντελῶς ἀγεννὴ καὶ μικρὸν ἡγούνται λέγοντα
χρῆ πενίην φεύγοντα καὶ ἐς μεγακήτεα πόντον,
ὅππεριν καὶ πετρών, κύρινε, κατ' ἡλιβάτων·
οὕτως ἀποδειλίζοντα πρὸς τὴν πενίαν ἀδισοφορον οὖσαν.

I have quoted this in full since it neatly combats Syme's view of the aristocratic bias of Stoicism, although this may, if present at all, have developed after the transmission of the doctrines to Rome. However, although Theognis was taken to task for having the temerity to express the traditional Greek view that poverty was an evil, the Stoics did compromise to the extent that they listed πενία, along with ill-health and ugliness, as something ἀποπροηγμένου or, as Cicero puts

75 The attitudes of Zeno and Chrysippus in this respect are recorded at Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.57.18 and also at Diogenes Laertius 7.102, where ἀρετῆς is mentioned as the opposite of πλοῦτος, equally δεισιδαιμονικός.

76 The Roman Revolution, p.57; the passage is quoted in full at p.191 above.

77 E.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.121 (on the views of Chrysippus) and also Sextus, Adv. Math. 11.59; cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.83.10.
it, \textit{reiciendum}. In doing this they reflect the practical view, and its influence, of Aristotle and the Peripatetics.\textsuperscript{79}

There is, of course, nothing surprising, given the ever-present and ubiquitous nature of poverty and its effects upon the quality of life,\textsuperscript{80} in the fact that the Stoics were interested in questions relating to the status and effects of poverty from the very beginning of the activities of the school. That this was a continuing concern is shown by Seneca's report of a difference between Posidonius and Antipater of Tarsus on the question of defining the essential nature of poverty at \textit{Epistles 87.38}: the conclusion of this passage of arms was that Antipater defined poverty as "non per positionem ... sed per detractionem ...
Graeci \textit{w}αν\textit{ đ}ε\textit{ρο\textit{σ}ουν} dicunt.... paupertas enim est non quae pauca possidet, sed quae multa non possidet." However interesting this debate on the nature of poverty may be in itself, it is of especial interest in the context of the present discussion in that it shows continuing concern with poverty among the Stoics at the time of the transmission of their doctrines to Rome. Up until this stage, however, it does seem that \textit{πε\textit{ν}ία / paupertas was treated on the whole as something undesirable, \textit{δπο\textit{πrosis}με\textit{υυνo or reiciendum.}

It has been suggested on occasions from the time of Aeschylus and Sophocles\textsuperscript{81} that wisdom and virtue were most often

\textsuperscript{78} Cicero, \textit{Fin. 3.50}. "itemque eorum quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem ... Zeno ... quod \textit{δπο\textit{πrosis}με\textit{υυνo nominavit}: cf. Seneca, \textit{Ep. 85.30}.  

\textsuperscript{79} The views of Aristotle on the material prerequisites for \textit{ε\textit{υσιωνία are summarised neatly by G.E.R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought (Cambridge, 1968), p.213f.  

\textsuperscript{80} The dominant influence of poverty, discussed by Aristophanes in the \textit{Wealth}, remained a topic of importance to the writers of New Comedy.  

\textsuperscript{81} The most famous statement of this idea is in the great lyrics
the fruits of bitter suffering. This had also been at least a possible implication of the *Odyssey*, that patience in the face of cumulative misfortune will eventually be rewarded. This implication was drawn by the Stoics themselves, who also counted Herakles along with Odysseus among the posthumous *sapientes* of antiquity. Herakles was deified also because of his services performed on behalf of suffering mankind. Plato had suggested earlier, in his image of the prisoner enduring physical and psychological discomfort in his escape from the cave to true enlightenment, that knowledge could only be achieved through suffering and the suppression of earthly instincts. In Roman literature Virgil preached the doctrine of *labor improbus* in the *Georgics*, while it has been argued that the *Aeneid* can be interpreted as the pilgrimage of Aeneas through suffering to perfection in leadership. It was natural that this concept should have an immediate appeal to the Stoics in the light of the importance which they placed upon the activities of the *proficiens* on his pilgrimage towards the *sumnum bonum* of virtue in wisdom. In fact, such later Stoics as Seneca attempted to moderate the strictness of the absolute distinction of the Agamemnon's first stasimon; the Oedipus Coloneus is Sophocles testament to the validity of this concept.

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82 Cf. Horace's comment, in Stoic spirit, at *Epistles* 1.2.17-18.
83 E.G. Seneca, Dial. 2.2.1, "Vlixen et Herculem ... Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum."
84 E.g. Cicero, Off. 3.5.25, "Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio caelestium collocavit."
between sapiens and stultus, following here in the footsteps of Panaetius. Perhaps the later Stoics felt that too little encouragement was provided for the proficiens by the rigid adherence to the principles of Zeno and Chrysippus, whose advocation of an imperceptible struggle towards virtue must have seemed an endlessly unsatisfying task. To return, however, to the question of poverty; it can be seen that, as the visage of poverty, the risk of poverty and its cruelty grew sensibly less severe, as the distance from poverty of the practitioners of Stoicism increased, so poverty could be considered as something to temper the soul's toughness in its pilgrimage towards virtue and wisdom. This idea, working in concert with the very Roman notion that wealth, especially imported wealth, was deleterious in its effects upon the mental and spiritual health of the individual, as is pointed out by Ofellus, led to a situation where Stoics confused the merits of asceticism with the unconscious effects of poverty. This attitude is especially evident in Seneca, where the very vehemence of the attacks upon luxus, anticipating the indignation of an impoverished Juvenal, seem to argue for the excellence of poverty:

88 Seneca, Epistles 75.8, "inter ipsos quoque proficientes sunt magna discrimina: in tres classes ut quibusdam placet dividuntur."
89 Cf. Cicero on Panaetius at Fin. 4.79.
90 This perhaps confirms Syme's view (see above p.191) of what Stoicism ultimately became, as the ideals of the founders were eroded and the doctrines became adapted to the moral code of the Roman senatorial class.
91 As early as Aristo of Chios (c.250 B.C.), however, we find it stated that οὕτως ὁ μὲν πεπαιδευμένος ἐν πλούτῳ καὶ ἐν πενίᾳ οὐ ταράττεται, ὃ δ' ἀμαίνοντος ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.218: this is particularly interesting in the light of Ofellus'/Horace's comments at the close of this satire.
92 Juvenal also sees virtue and poverty as going hand in hand, although in his opinion poverty is the necessary result of virtue rather than vice versa, e.g. Juv. Satires 1.74, probitas laudatur et alget!
a) fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem,
   Seneca, Dial. 1.49
b) quem specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt.
cuius pedes inter fomenta subinde mutata temuerunt,
cuius cenationes subditus ac parietibus circumfusus
calor temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo
stringet. ibid.
c) audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus
invidetur - molliter vivit hoc dicunt - mollis est.
   Epistulae, 82.2. 93

As will shortly be seen, such comments as these seem to echo
those made by Ofellus within Satires 2.2: they also echo the
sentiments of generations of Roman satirists from Lucilius to
Juvenal and of Roman historians from Cato Maior to Tacitus. 94
They parallel, moreover, the famous comments of the New Testament
regarding camels and eyes of needles, while the emphasis upon
toil as a prerequisite for virtue 95 anticipates both Words-
worth's Character of the Happy Warrior, who was:

   More skilful in self-knowledge, even more pure,
   As tempted more; more able to endure,
   As more exposed to suffering and distress

and Tennyson's briefer comment,

   'tis held that suffering makes us wise, 96

93 These references are taken from Arnold's Roman Stoicism
p.362: Arnold also refers to Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.29.78 and
3.29.75, where the Spartans are used as examples physical
and moral excellence: cf. Seneca, Ep. 14.9; 17.5; 20.7;
80.6 and 123.16.
94 E.g. Polybius, 31.25.3ff.; Sallust, Cat. 10.1 and Jug. 41.2;
Velleius, 2.1.1-2: cf. Tacitus' comments upon the "noble
savage" in the Germania, and his description of Calgacus in
Agricola.
95 One should add that the early Stoic attitude to πόνος was
consonant with their attitude to the more specific problem
of poverty; πόνος were ἀδιάφοροι. Take, for example,
Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.57.18 where πόνος is considered as the
opposite of ἔδομη and equally as an ἀδιάφορον.
96 Tennyson's In Memoriam.
which is perhaps a suitable note upon which to return to Horace's poem, with the hope expressed that these comments upon Stoic attitudes to poverty will allow the commentary upon the satire itself to continue now with less interruption. Any briefer comments upon, for example, the asceticism of the Epicureans will be interleaved with the ongoing discussion of the satire. The necessary discussion of Stoic and Epicurean attitudes towards the advantages and disadvantages of rural life will also appear within the context of the discussion of the poem.

After the packed and evocative detail of the first three verses, it comes almost as a relief to enter line four and to realise that, although the discite, at the beginning of the line, sounds like the beginning of a diatribe, or, rather, perhaps, a didactic poem, the following portion of v.4, and the lines which immediately follow (5-2), lapse into commonplace. However, although the message of these verses is familiar enough to readers of satire and history, as has been indicated above, the composition of the lines is less innocent of that tension between Hellenistic and Roman influences than might at first sight appear. For, although the message is that of Roman satire, the language in which it is couched has undeniable philosophical associations which sort ill with Ofellus' status as rusticus.

Ofellus suggests that a man's ability to exercise moral choice suffers lamentably when his eyes are blinded by the coruscations of the rich man's plate and dinner table:

\[
\text{4-6} \quad \text{discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentis,}
\text{cum stupet insanis acies fulgoribus et cum}
\text{acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat.}
\]

97 For a discussion of the diatribe form, especially as utilised by the Stoics, see above in the discussion of Satires 2.3 pp.66ff.
The eyes are blinded, stupet acies, by the insanis fulgoribus and, as a result, the intellect too is dumbfounded. This is shown by the fact that the mind rejects morally better courses of action, animus meliora recusat, because of its inclination to falsis, things of no real worth or validity, which parallel, in their effect upon the mind's eye, the effects of lances mensasque nitentis upon the physical organ of sight. It is true that this may initially seem to be philosophically entirely neutral in tone, reflecting, as it does, the traditional common-sense and commonplace ethics of Ofellus. The analogy between physical and mental blindness is an obvious one, even though it is true that the most magnificent exploitation of its ironic and dramatic potential is to be found in the Oedipus the King of Sophocles, while Plato's analogies of the Sun and the Divided Line initially perhaps placed it in the shared fund of philosophical imagery. On the other hand, the analogy between the actual eye and the eye of the mind, or the intellect, does have particular significance for the adherents of the materialistic philosophies such as Epicureanism and the doctrines of the Stoics. Both of these schools recognised the necessity of interaction between what the proponents of abstract existence termed "body" and "mind", as if the two concepts were substantiously distinct; such interaction, they argued, proved the material nature of mind and, accordingly, of the operation of

98 This is best summarised in Oedipus' famous line at v.371, ὑφὸς τά τ' ὥτα τὸν τε νοῦν τά τ' ὁμματ' εἶ.
99 Plato, Republic 507-514: the most persuasive interpretation of these two analogies is that of J.B. Raven, Plato's Thought in the Making (Cambridge, 1965) which pays especial attention to the role played by the visible world as a "model" for the operations within the world of forms.
100 Cicero, Acad. 1.39, "(Zeno) nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea (natura) quae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficercet aut quod efficeretur, posse esse non corpus"; cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 1073e.
perception and thought through contact, which again argued for the validity of initial sense impressions. In so far as a man of Ofellus' intellectual standing can be said to have thought about the problems involved in the relationship between body and mind, we can safely align him with the materialists, since the concept of abstract existence, devoid of extensions in space, came late to the philosophers of Greece and is, perhaps, beyond the scope of an amateur. Horace, indeed, wittily suggests by the phrase crassa Minerva in v.3 that Ofellus is intellectually allied to the materialist cause, the adjective crassa being particularly suited to the discussion of materialistic philosophy, while guanta also, in v.l, argues for a materialistic attitude to the definition of an ethical question.

It does, however, become more difficult to dismiss stupet...acies as simply an example of an obvious and well known analogy, when one takes into account the words used by Horace to describe the source of the stupefaction of the eyes, namely insanis fulgoribus. For it becomes evident that the connection between the formal and conscious materialism of the Hellenistic schools and the naively unconscious and philosophically uninformed materialism of Ofellus is far from accidental. Horace arranges the connection both to demonstrate the impossibility of philosophical discussion without recourse to technical jargon

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101 Cicero, Fin. 1.21 on material nature of Epicurean theories of perception; cf. Lucretius, 4.26-268; 522-705; 722-817; 877-906.


103 When the breakthrough took place to the apprehension of the abstract is, of course, difficult to define, although it is clear that the λόγος of Heraclitus and the νοῦς of Anaxagoras are on the brink of moving from material cause to an abstract concept of formal or final cause. See the discussions of W.K.C. Guthrie, The History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1965) Vols.1 and 2.
derived from the work of the Greeks and also to enliven the humour of the poem's opening by ostentatiously placing philosophical ambiguities into the mouth of the supposedly staid and unimaginative Ofellus.

In his note on v.5 Lejay treats insanis as "excessifs" and gives examples from Plautus and Cicero. Lejay substantiates this interpretation by giving further examples of the adverb insanum; these examples are also taken from comedy and are thereby the more persuasive, if only because of Horace's acknowledged debt to Plautus and Terence. Of these examples, however, one, from Plautus, Mostellaria 908, is of especial interest in the present context: it runs, "insanum bonam (porticum)," which sounds very much like a Plautine pun on porticus (Stoa), and the intellectual attributes of those who have not achieved the status of sapientes, namely the insani et stulti.

Although, in short, "excessifs" may be a common enough meaning for insanus, it hardly does justice to the tightly woven pattern of Horatian humour at this juncture. Indeed, it seems perverse to ignore the meanings of insanus along the lines of "mad", "insane" and "foolish". For insanus can quite properly be applied to inanimate objects as well as to the demeanour and appearance of human beings or animals. However, it must be admitted that when the word is applied to inanimate objects the author's intention is invariably to invest those objects with human characteristics, especially malevolence.

104 E.g. Plautus, Trin. 673, insanum malumst; cf. Cic. Mil. 85. One should also note Horace, Odes 1.34.2, where there is an ironical allusion to the Epicureans.
105 E.g. Plautus, Bacch. 761; Most. 908; Mil. 24.
106 E.g. of "waves" at Virgil, EcL 9.43, and "winds" at Tib. 2.4.9.
A meaning of *insanus* which may be to the fore in the present instance is "that which causes madness", although the authority for this interpretation is a little late. On the other hand Lucan, who describes *fames* as *insana* at Bk. 7.413, has undeniable Stoicising tendencies. Consider this meaning of *insanus*, this active meaning, in the light both of the Stoic paradox that all save the *sapiens*, which word has already been employed in v.3, although possibly ironically, are in fact *insani*, and that the *sapiens* alone is never subject to or victim of amazement, never, indeed, can be described as *stupet*. Surely, then, that glitter which blinds the eyes and causes, because of the material connection between mind and eyes, the intellect to ignore the path of true wisdom, to become *acclinis falsis*, which phrase has Stoic connotations of its own, can very reasonably and, in this context, wittily be described by the phrase *insanis fulgoribus*. The phrase means "maddening" or, perhaps, "stultifying glitterings"; Rudd's "senseless", although it correctly captures the basic notion of folly, does not communicate, however, the active nature of *insanus* in this particular instance.

I have suggested also that v.6 is replete with Stoic allusions: in fact, in the case of this line the allusions are so indisputably present that they corroborate the statements made more tentatively in the case of v.5. The sixth verse runs as follows:

6  *acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat.*

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107 On this particular Stoic paradox see Cicero, *Paradoxa* 4.
108 Diogenes Laertius, 7.123 records that, according to the Stoics, ἐτύ γε τοῦ σοφοῦ οὐδὲν δαμαίζειν τῶν δοκοῦντων παραδόξων: although the context is that of physics, the wisdom of the *sapiens* should never be at a loss in any field.
Rudd translates well with:  

... and the mind 
swings in favour of the sham rejecting better things.  

The adjective *acclinis*, meaning "inclined towards" is described 
by Lejay in his note as rare, although he does give two 
comparative references, one, literal in meaning, to Vergil,  
one, figurative, to the *Histories* of Livy.  

The concept of a psychological "propensity" or "proclivity" towards or for 
anything is usually expressed in Latin by such adjectives as 
*proclivis, promptus, pronus* and *propensus*; the abstract 
nouns which are employed in the expression of this concept are 
*proclivitas* and *propensio*. Both the adjectives, especially 
*pronus* and *proclivis*, and the two abstract nouns are used in the 
Latin discussions of the Stoic concept of *εὐεμπτωσία*, the 
cognate adjective of which, parallel in meaning to *pronus* and 
its fellows, is *εὐεμπτωτος*; this concept of *εὐεμπτωσία* is 
particularly relevant to the ethical discussion of which the 
line in question is a part. 

The definition of *εὐεμπτωσία*, 
according to Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.93.1 is as follows: 

εὐεμπτωσίαν δ' εἶναι εὐκαταφορίαν εἰς πάθος ὡ τι 
tῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἔργων, οἷον ἔπιλυσίαν, ὀργιλότητα, 
φθονερίαν, ἀμφοχάλιαν καὶ τὰ ὁμοία. γίγνεσθαι δὲ 
εὐεμπτωσίας καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ἔργα τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, 
οἷον εἰς κλοπᾶς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ ὀθρείς, καθ' ἄς 
κλέπται τε μοιχοὶ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ λέγονται. 

This definition describes that disposition of the soul towards  

111 Virgil uses the word at *Aeneid* 10.835 in the phrase 
adclinis arboris trunco. 
112 The reference to Livy is more relevant and occurs at 
Bk. 48.9, "adclinaturos se ad causam senatus". 
(not unnaturally in *libidines*) and *Tac.* *Ag.* 41.
those wrongful acts, which are contrary to the dictates of nature, and which a soul, capable of rational processes and decision making, would take it upon itself to suppress. In other words a soul or mind which operates secundum naturam would repress εὔμητρωσία even as it would suppress the effects of τὰ πάθη; indeed, the πάθη and εύμητρωσία operate in a parallel and deleterious fashion. However, the mind which is the subject of recusat in verse six is incapable of performing its proper rational function. Like the eye which is, as it were, the window of the soul or mind, and which has had its perceptions dulled and blunted by the environment within which it finds itself, the mind or soul is functionally impaired. Because, therefore, the functions of the mind have been dulled, the mind has become acclinis falsis, "liable to hanker after false things". These falsa must be considered as vitia or mala, if we identify them through their obvious opposites encapsulated in the words meliora recusat. The fact that Horace uses the comparative shows that he does not intend to follow Stoic doctrines too closely; after all, the δύσιμφρα are all equal, if not the same in kind. It is a mingling, which is itself unconscious and uncritical, of common-place and technical vocabulary which best serves Horace's purpose as already outlined. However, by dint of vocabulary, which is reminiscent of technical Stoic language, Horace suggests, through Ofellus, that the proper function of the rational soul, which is the making of discriminatory

114 It is worth noting that Horace's choice of acies for eye was governed by Cicero's frequent use of the word in connection with mentis, ingenii and animi as the "mind's eye", e.g. Leg. 1.60; Acad. 2.122; ND. 2.45; Tusc. 1.73.

115 See Cic. Paradoxa 3, also discussion of Satires 1.3 above and Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7, p.106.21: ἦνα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ' ὀμοια.
and nicely calculated ethical choices based upon the evidence provided by perceptions and memory, is sensibly impaired by a wealthy environment, since the processes of visual perception and intellectual comprehension of visual presentations are closely parallel to the processes involved in the making of a rational ethical choice. A detailed examination of meliora recusat further strengthens the impression that Horace is exploiting technical Stoic ideas in his treatment of Ofellus. For we necessarily become embroiled here with the Stoic concept of "assent".

The concept of assent or συγκατάθεσις or assensio is implied, positively, by acclinis, in the sense that "assent" is given to unworthy choices of action or preference and, negatively, by recusat in the sense that "assent" is withheld from worthwhile (aestimanda / προηγμένα) courses of action. In the workings of sensory perception, according to Stoic doctrines, the senses present a picture (φαντασία / visum) to the mind. The picture implies a statement; e.g. "this is a man"; the statement can be accepted or rejected. If the φαντασία is consonant with experience and stored knowledge (ἐπιστήμη / scientia) then assent (συγκατάθεσις / adsensus), which is an act of will and, therefore, within our power can be given. The φαντασία thereby becomes an item of comprehension (φαντασία καταληπτική / comprehensio) the store of which forms the memory or bank of ἐπιστήμη. This is the theory of Zeno in its essentials, as described by Cicero in the Academica 1.40-41.116 The operations of the mind in reaching moral decisions are closely

parallel: a set of circumstances, or an emotional impulse, which demands an ethical choice, causes a φαντασία to be presented to the mind which either gives or withholds "assent" to the course of action which is prompted by the ὀρμή or appetite. Even as the granting of assent to a visual φαντασία depends upon the "clearness" of the φαντασία or its ἐνδόγεια / perspicuitas, just so the granting of ethical assent properly depends upon the clarity of the mental perceptions and the healthiness of the mind or soul. As Arnold puts it, a healthy assent leads up to a right action: a false assent to a blunder or sin." In other words, one of the functions of a healthy mind was to distinguish true things from false things, so that

\[ \text{acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat} \]

is an extremely succinct expression of a view so compatible with that of the Stoics as to be, apart from the comparative in meliora, almost identical. Moreover, it is important to stress that in the Stoic view it was impossible for ethical decisions to be made without antecedent sensory stimulation, even as it was impossible for the mind to create images without at some time having been subject to stimulation by a φαντασία, "assensio non potest fieri nisi commota viso", which gives added point to the juxtaposition here of acies and animus. It would

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117 Cic. Acad. 1.11.41, "visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed iis solum quae propriae quedam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur."

118 Roman Stoicism, p.256f.

119 Cf. Cicero, Fin. 3.17, "a falsa aurem assensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus quae sint contra naturam arbitrabantur"; cf. Cic. Div. 2.106.

120 E.g. S.V.F. 2.21.8; 2.35.12; 2.283.17.

121 For the phrases acies animi or acies mentis see, e.g. Cic. ND. 2.17.45; Tusc. 1.30.73 and Ecn. 2.3.93.
seem that Ofellus was very much in sympathy with Zeno, of whose ideas Cicero writes:

\[
\text{errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat.}
\]

\textit{Academia 1.42}

One should say finally with reference to this line that the verbs which are normally associated with the withholding of assent from either a visual or psychological presentation are \textit{abnuo, renuo} and \textit{denego}. 122

The same complexities of interpretation are not present in v.7, the main purpose of which is clearly to prompt the question \textit{cur hoc?} the answer to which forms the bulk of the first main section of the poem. There is in \textit{verum} (7), however, the suspicion of a pun: for, although the syntax of this opening sentence demands that \textit{verum} here be read as an adversative conjunction, which points up the contrast between "inter lances mensasque nitentis" and \textit{hic}, nevertheless, there is a temptation to see in \textit{verum} a covert reference to the true virtue which the mind \textit{acclinis falsis} refuses to accept, \textit{meliora recusat}. Also the contrast between \textit{hic} and \textit{inter lances} ... as competing environments for the pursuit of wisdom would make the reading of \textit{verum} as "truth" an attractive proposition, were it not for the asyndeton which this would involve. Were it not for the fact that a "true" \textit{verum} appears almost immediately in v.8, in the clever phrase \textit{male verum}, there would be a temptation to attempt to manipulate the insertion of a colon or its equivalent.

122 On the other hand, cf. Pliny, \textit{NH.} 37.13.76, "(falsae gemmae) recusant limae probationem", while at Cicero, \textit{Mil.} 36.100 there is ample proof of the synonymity of \textit{abnuo} and \textit{recuso}. 
at the close of v.7. However, Horace is more subtle than the potential textual critic; the appearance of verum in v.8 as well as in v.7 both serves to ease the transition from the poem into the first major section of the poem and also to indicate the exact similarity in form between these two words of quite different meanings. That the quest for truth, moreover, is not an isolated topic in Horace confined to this passage may be seen from Horace's use of the phrase quaerere verum in Epistles 2.2.45. It is almost as if by consciously and clearly exploiting the potential ambiguity of a single common word Horace is demonstrating and anticipating the potential for such exploitation in poems which deal with ethical issues. It is clearly immaterial whether the leading figures in such satires are professed philosophers or not. In fact, Ofellus' very denial of any philosophical allegiance hightens the humour of such word play in Satires 2.2.

B

LUXURY CORRUPTS: VV.8-52

Nothing in the way of originality can be claimed in what follows regarding the identification of possible source material for the diatribe of Ofellus. The debt of the critic here is to the work of Lejay, Hense and Thiele; however, the way in which the sources were exploited by Horace is capable of sustaining a fresh examination, as is the nature of his

123 Acknowledgement has already been made to the thoroughness of Lejay's commentary. Hense's work on sermo Bioneus Rh. Mus. 47 (1892), pp.221ff. is invaluable, as is Thiele's on the asceticism of Socrates at Hermes 41 (1906), pp.581ff.
attitude towards Ofellus and, no less important, the attitude
which Horace indicates is held towards such men as himself by
Ofellus and his kind. Horace himself, in fact, could not have
claimed any originality here on the score of content. The
commonplace that hunger was the best sauce for a meal and that
luxury inhibited the pleasure of food by making the palate jaded
was very well worn. Typical are Varro's comments, "sitienti
videri aquam mulsum, esurienti panem cibarium siligineum";\(^\text{124}\)
in a more philosophical context we find the following statements
of Cicero:

a) Socratem qui voluptatem nullo loco numerat audio
dicentem cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim.  

De Finibus 2.90

Here a Stoicising speaker rejects the Epicurean claim that
pleasure is the supreme good on the grounds that this belief
makes fortune beatae vitae domina, even though Epicurus claimed
that fortune interfered but little with the wise man.\(^\text{125}\) Far
preferable is the self-sufficiency of the Stoic sapiens, to
which, it may be thought, Ofellus approximates in his shrugging
off of the effects of fortune.\(^\text{126}\)

b) An Scythes Anacharsis potuit pro nihilo pecuniam ducere,
ostrates philosophi facere non potuerunt? illius
epistula fertur his verbis: Anacharsis Hannoni salutem.
mihi amictui Scythicum tegimen, calciamentum solorum
callum, cubile terra, pulpamentum famæ; lacte, caseo,
carne vescor.  

Tusc. 5.90

Here by contrast the speaker praises Epicurus (hic vero ipse
quam parvo est contentus)\(^\text{127}\) at the expense of "pompous" (isti

\(^{124}\) Varro, 28 Riese, Non., p.88.
\(^{125}\) Fin. 2.89.
\(^{126}\) Cf. vv.126-136 of Satires 2.2.
\(^{127}\) Cicero, Tusc. 5.89.
Stoics; a new note is introduced by Cicero which, consonant with the doctrines of Epicurus, as we shall see, also seems to be at one with the attitude of Ofellus. Not only is the sensible man content with a mere sufficiency, he positively rejects wealth. Once more the archetype of asceticism is Socrates: "in pompa cum magna vis auri argentique ferretur: Quam multa non desidero! inquit." Although Cicero's attitude towards the asceticism of Epicurus may seem oddly ambivalent in the light of these almost contradictory passages, one should bear in mind the quasi-dramatic form of these dialogues. Also it is not the asceticism of Epicurus with which the philosophically critical Cicero takes exception in Fin. 2.90; rather he is concerned that the ethical basis upon which such an asceticism depends is intellectually unsound.

However that may be, it is merely necessary to note at this juncture that the asceticism which Horace ascribes to Ofellus is in tune with the asceticism which in Socrates was an object of praise, which was emulated by the disciples of Zeno and Epicurus and which was commended by most of the Roman authors whose work had any philosophical or moral bias. Mention will be made of the beliefs of both the Stoics and the Epicureans as they become relevant to the continuing detailed discussion of the satire.

As has been indicated verum in v. 8 has the meaning "truth" but its appearance has been neatly anticipated by the

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128 Cicero, Tusc. 5.89, "qui tandem isti grandiloqui contra haec duo, quae maxime angunt, melius se habent quam Epicurus?" This a description of Stoics no doubt greatly pleasing to Horace; cf. Sat. 1.1.13-14 and 120-121.

129 On what constituted a sufficiency for Horace, see Sat. 2.6.

130 Cicero, Tusc. 5.91.
adversative verum in v.7. The transition from proem to discussion is eased in a manner ironical enough to anticipate the tone of the humour of the remainder of the poem. The oxymoron, for example, which Horace immediately springs upon the reader in the phrase male verum in v.8, is convincing evidence of this. For Horace has juxtaposed what are virtually synonyms of the summum and solum bonum and the summum and solum malum of Stoic ethical theory. The corruptus index of v.9 is analogous to the stupefied animus of v.6 which was incapable of operating rationally in its proper function of distinguishing true from false, goods from evils.

Now, in almost Socratic vein, Ofellus continues to moralise, using illustrations drawn from the activities of everyday life, from hunting and physical exercise. These illustrations are not, however, without a hint of Horatian subtlety; for Horace manages to suggest, to those who know his poetry well, that Ofellus is shaking an admonitory finger at Horace. In this Horace anticipates the more rigorous and direct criticism of himself which he puts into the mouths of Damasippus and Davus in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. The attack upon Horace, or rather perhaps on certain aspects of Horace's behaviour and interests, is included parenthetically in vv.10-13:

10-13 vel si Romana fatigat
militia adsuetum Graecari, seu pila velox
molliter austerum studio fallente laborem,
seu te discus agit, pete cedentem aera disco

Horace confesses elsewhere to being constitutionally averse and physically unsuited to exercise, even when its labours are

131 E.G. Aulus Gellius, NA. 12.5.7.
disguised with the pila velox.\textsuperscript{132} Neither was Horace's record of military achievement in any way outstanding, except perhaps in the sense that it allowed him to imitate the behaviour of some of his favourite Greek poets.\textsuperscript{133} Ofellus' use, in contemptuous tones, of adsuetum Graecari is then justified as an attack upon Horace and his interest, both literary and philosophical, in Greek culture. It is justified, that is to say, from the blinkered and narrowly xenophobic standpoint of such a one as Ofellus. This is the picture of Ofellus which Horace is at pains to present. The attack upon Horace needs no overt rebuttal of the type which is meted out to Damasippus and Davus. Horace is constantly, but covertly, undermining the extreme position which is adopted by Ofellus. For the audience for which Horace was composing this piece would have recognised that Ofellus' own diatribe, as produced for him, of course, by the poet, was inevitably and quite consciously indebted to ethical terminology and theory which ultimately derived from the Greeks.

I would also suggest that in v.12 Horace wishes to remind the reader of his own aims as a poet and moralist involved in the composition of satire. The line, which is neat and carefully constructed, runs as follows:

\textbf{12 molliter austerum studio fallente laborem}

Horace's aim was to point out to his audience the folly of mankind: two of the means by which this aim was to be achieved

\textsuperscript{132} Horace, \textit{Sat.} 1.5.48-49, "\textit{lusum it Maecenas, dormitum ego Vergiliusque; / namque pila lippis inimicum et ludere crudis.}" For the sentiment of \textit{Sat.} 2.2.10-13, cf. \textit{Odes} 3.24.53.

\textsuperscript{133} See \textit{Odes} 2.7.10: Horace's attitude towards his military career was always whimsical (cf. parmu1a, the diminutive). There is reference to the behaviour of Alcaeus, Archilochus and Anacreon.
were the gentle mockery of himself, an example of which we have already observed in this poem, and the gentle mockery of others, since "ridiculum acri/fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res." This sugaring of the ethical pill is analogous to the use of the ball, which, Ofellus condescendingly maintains, eases the burden of physical exercise.

Although the language of vv.14-15, "cum labor extuderit fastidia, siccus, inanis / sperne cibum vilem" is extremely vivid, there does not seem to be any particular philosophical reference. On the other hand, the use of siccus in v.14 is worth noting perhaps in the light of Heraclitus' praise of the dry soul, a viewpoint which was consonant with the Stoic concept of νεύμα as the material basis of both the human and the cosmic soul. However, it is clear that here the adjectives siccus and inanis apply much more particularly to the physical aspect of the soul and body duality, from which aspect all the evil humours have, as it were, been purged by violent exercise. It is, nevertheless, worth remarking that Horace has already expended a good deal of poetic energy in reminding us of the inextricable links between the physical and psychic aspects of man.

In vv.18-20 Ofellus sums up his message to date in the following way:

unde putas aut
qui partum? non in caro nidore voluptas
summa sed in te ipso est.

The source of pleasure exists within the individual, the perfect and adequate satisfaction of whose desires is the actual cause of pleasure. Pleasure has nothing to do with the expense of

135 Heraclitus, fr. 118 ap. Stob. Anth. 3.5.8; cf. on Stoic Ψυχή, SVF, 2.218.38f.
the items by means of which a natural and necessary appetite is satisfied. Here Ofellus is talking in a way which bears a close resemblance to the doctrines of the Epicureans as expressed by Cicero at Fin. 1.45f.:

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quarum (cupiditatum) ea ratio est ut necessariae
nec opera multa nec inpensa expleantur; ne naturales
quidem multa desiderant, propter quod ipsa natura
divitias quibus contenta sit et parabiles et terminatas
habet, inanimum autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec
finis inveniri potest. 136
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Horace is fully aware of the technicalities of both the Epicurean and Stoic doctrines and is able to exploit this knowledge whenever necessary. On this occasion it is not his purpose to show simply that Ofellus' point of view is basically Epicurean, although it is consonant with an Epicurean standpoint, or basically Stoic, although the asceticism advocated by Ofellus is akin to that advocated by Cicero at Off. 1.106. In fact, if one were to consider the origins of Epicurus and the stated aims of his philosophy of the "common man", 137 it would not be surprising to find close affinities between his ethical doctrines and the views attributed by Horace to Ofellus. And such a consideration would strengthen Syme's claim that Stoicism became the acceptable code for an aristocratic elite. However, so far as Ofellus is concerned, anything Greek is despicable and potentially dangerous. He is unaware of the similarities between the views he expresses and those of both the rival Hellenistic schools on the merits of asceticism. Yet he would no doubt shrink with horror from association with either group.

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137 Epicurus' parents farmed in Samos, see D.L. 10.1, while he prided himself on being untutored, παιδείαν ἄδε πᾶσαν, μαθότε, φιλογειοι, ib. 6: cf. Athenaeus 13.588 A.
One can compare the attitude of Anytus to the sophists. 138 Ofellus, I feel sure, would have felt particularly offended at the suggestion that his ideas have much in common with those of a school the professed sumsum bonum of which was voluptas. It is this blindness which Horace satirises, even as he admits the validity of much of the ethical advice the untutored mind has to offer. 139

Horace now has Ofellus concentrate upon the details of diet and the deleterious effects of a luxurious diet upon taste, both in its physical and in its aesthetic and moral senses; for Ofellus continues to emphasise the links between bodily and spiritual or mental health. The subject matter here gives Horace only small opportunity to exploit the type of play on words with which the moralising opening of the poem was replete. It would anyway have been prodigal of Horace to reduce the effect of such ambiguities by squandering his resources. On the other hand, Horace neatly takes advantage of the more limited opportunities which present themselves, with the result that the intellectual tempo of the poem is not allowed to slacken. 140

138 Plato, Meno 92 C.

139 One should note in passing here that the idea of the power for pleasure existing within the control and nature of the individual smacks of the Stoic concept of αὐτάρκεια, which is best summed up for present purposes by Diogenes Laertius, 7.127, αὐτάρκη τε εἶναι αὐτήν (τὴν ἀρετήν) πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καθά φησι Ζήνων.

140 It is worth noting that, in entering the field of diatetics, Ofellus is again embracing a complex discipline with all the arrogance of the untutored layman; this is part of the intellectual humour of the poem. On diatetics in the ancient world, see Hippocrates, Περὶ διαίτης ὑγείας; Περὶ σωματικῆς 1-4, also Galen, Ὑγειεύον, 1-6 and Philostratos, Περὶ Γυμναστικῆς. For modern discussions see L. Englert, Studien z. Gesch. d. Med. (1929) and J. Marcuse, Diätetik im Alterthum (1899). Rudd discusses this element of Satires 2.2 in The Satires of Horace pp.161-173; he also refers in his notes to the useful study L'Alimentation et la Cuisine à Rome (Paris, 1961) by J. Andrè.
The vividness of the detailed description ensures that audience attention is maintained by more orthodox methods.

Two methods are employed by Horace to maintain the intellectual tempo of the poem. One is merely the continuing use of words put into the mouth of Ofellus which have wider philosophical connotations than would possibly be suspected by that character, supposing, as we must, that the continuing characterisation of Ofellus is consistent with Horace's own description of him in the opening verses. Secondly, Horace increases the thematic importance within the poem of the conflict between reality and illusion, true and false judgements; on a very basic level, as intended by Ofellus, this involves us in a discussion of ostentation in diet. However, in the light of Ofellus' own description of the link between physical appetite and senses and the impulses and aptitudes of the mind and soul, one must assume that Horace is covertly introducing a highly sophisticated element into Ofellus' discussion. This, again, will be seen to be more complex than Ofellus, as presented, could ever have suspected and with a longer intellectual history. This incongruity is a conscious part of Horace's presentation of the character. Since, however, the thematic complexity becomes apparent only through the language in which Ofellus' moralising is couched, it would be more sensible initially to discuss possible ambiguities in that language.

A phrase which immediately catches the eye, because of the irony which is evident in its placement in the mouth of Ofellus, is *pinguem vitiis albumque* in v.21. Ofellus is describing the unenviable physical state of the man whose sensibilities have been blunted by overindulgence. Such a man is pale and gross as a result of his *vitiis*. Even though his faults
lie in the direction of "gluttony" it is, I think, doing less than justice to translate the general vitiis by the particular "gluttony", as does Rudd. 141 "Vices" would be more appropriate, in that Horace is consciously using a word here which calls to mind the Stoic summum malum. This is not far-fetched. After all, as we shall see, the poet uses honor in a similarly ambiguous way in v.28, while virtus (1), sapiens (2), insanis (5), verum (8), and, possibly, siccus and inanis (14) are sufficient anticipation of such an ambiguous use of vitium. Moreover, the use of vitiis in conjunction with pinguem is intended to call ironically to mind the description which Horace gives of Ofellus himself in v.3 as sapiens ... crassaque Minerva. As was suggested above in the detailed discussion of this line, this description would have been a contradiction in terms so far as a Stoic was concerned. For, nobody who is possessed of a mind or soul which can be described physically as crassus can legitimately in Stoic view by described as a sapiens. However, in v.21 Ofellus, crassa Minerva, according to Horace, describes the glutton as pinguem vitiis. Clearly vitia and Minerva balance each other or, perhaps more accurately, are parallel, as being words which do inevitably call to mind the extremes of the Stoic ethical spectrum. One should remember here, if there seems too much of a gulf between an attack upon the particularly physical vice of gluttony and its visible effects, and the concept of the sole and "supreme" evil, that Ofellus himself has been at pains to point out that all the discriminatory faculties are impaired in efficiency by indiscriminate gluttony. Furthermore pinguis and crassus are synonymous. Horace, there-

141 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius, p.98.
fore, may be thought of as allowing his speaker to condemn himself out of his own mouth by allowing or ensuring that that speaker describes a man, who is used as a type of the gross vice of gluttony, in language which, if this interpretation is correct, is consciously reminiscent of the language used by the actual poet to describe the speaker himself. That language is, moreover, reminiscent itself of the terminology of the Stoics. The tension between the Greek and Italian elements in the characterisation of Ofellus is thereby maintained, as is the humour which depends upon the recognition of that tension. That Horace is using his by now familiar technique of foreshadowing to give an internal unity and cohesiveness to the loose and conversational structure of the satire is confirmed by the appearance in v.25 of the phrase corruptus vanis. For not only does corruptus here echo the same word, which occupies the same position in v.9, where it qualifies the judge who is incapable of grasping the truth, but vanis in v.25 also echoes insanis (5), falsis (6) in meaning and anticipates the angry vocative insane at v.33, which necessarily has Stoic connotations if only because of the infamous paradox that all save the sapiens are insanii.

Attention has already been drawn to the possible ambiguity in honor in v.28: the context within which the word appears is as follows:

25-28 corruptus vanis rerum, quia veneat auro rara avis et picta pandat spectacula cauda; tamquam ad rem attineat quicquam. num vesceris ista quam laudas pluma? cocto num adest honor idem.

It is interesting here to note how Horace has adapted the sentiment which was received from Lucilius in the following manner: "cocus non curat caudam insignem esse illam, dum
Horace's treatment is at once more vivid in that the plain statement has been developed into the question and answer which is so typical of Horace's style in the composition of his diatribes. One also notes that pinguis is applied by Lucilius to the bird, while Horace has derived more benefit from the word by applying it above (v.21) to the glutton himself. The other major difference is the substitution of a clause, in which honor appears as a subject, for the rather less arresting phrase candam insignem of Lucilius. If we assume that Horace was, as ever, intent on improving upon his original, as the imaginative use of pinguis would indicate, it should be possible to detect in what way honor may have been thought of as an improvement upon the adjective insignis.

The meaning of honor seems clear enough: it is translated by Lejay as "éclat" and he cites also Epodes 17.18 and Odes 2.11.9, to which one could add Epodes 11.6. Rudd translates the entire question:

28 cocto num adest honor idem?
by, "Does the thing look equally splendid cooked?" If Horace means simply by honor the beautiful appearance of the bird, one should nevertheless note the further associations which the word inevitably had for Horace's Roman audience, especially when involved in reading a poem which is dedicated to the presentation of a particularly Italian character and of his views. There is also a possible irony and a more elegant one in that Roman

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142 Lucilius, 27.12 M, 536 B.
143 Note ad loc. p.334.
144 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius, p.78.
145 E.g. Cic. Brut. 81.281, "cum honos sit praemium virtutis iudicio studioque civium delatum ad aliquem qui eum sententiis, qui suffragiis adeptus est, is mihi est honestus et honoratus videtur": cf. Cic. Fam. 10.10.1.
writers on Stoicism, in dealing with the important topic of the values and motives of the acquisition of good repute, regularly used to identify honor, meaning "reputation" with fama and gloria, and hence with the Stoic concept of δόξα in its non-epistemological sense of reputation. This necessary association of ideas has the following consequences: as well as the bird being considered an object of aesthetic delight because of its tail, the beauty of which does not survive the oven, the reputation of notoriety, which comes from such extravagance, and which is also implied by laudas in v.28, does not survive the dinner table either. Also, coming from men of corrupt judgement, corruptus vanis rerum (25), such praise and attendant repute is worth less than nothing. Like Juvenal after him and Plato before, Ofellus deplores the decline in popular standards of excellence by comparison with which the granting of reputation is governed. Not only, therefore, does Horace enjoy himself at the expense of Ofellus' pretentious moralising, but he also reaps the formal benefits of employing another "signpost" word by means of which he is able to endow his poem with a real but unapparent unity.

One of the ways, therefore, in which Horace enlivens the moralising of Ofellus is by employing terms in the mouth of Ofellus which are far more sophisticated than such a character would naturally use. Even as Horace presents Ofellus

146 For discussions of fama, gloria and honor and their status, see Cic. Tusc. 3.2.4 and 5.16.46; for Horace's use of fama (in a Stoicising poem) see Sat. 2.3.95.
147 In Juvenal, Satires 6 the poet complains that Pudicitia has given way to luxuria as the criterion of female behaviour.
148 For the gradual substitution of "reason" as the guiding political principle, initially by "spirit" and then the various types of "appetite", see Plato, Rep. Bks. 8-9.
as blissfully ignorant of the subleties of his vocabulary, so also he allows Ofellus to introduce and discuss philosophical topics in a popular and naive fashion. Horace and his audience knew that these topics and similar ones had exercised the most gifted minds of Greece and Rome for generations. One feels, therefore, that Ofellus' confidence in these areas is the result of presumption born of ignorance. There is no comparison between the moral effusions of Ofellus here, moreover, and the ethical discussions of Horace and his friends as they are mentioned in *Satires* 2.6: Horace and his friends enjoy that modesty which should spring from a liberal education. Only the ignorant can dogmatise as freely and as naively as Ofellus, ignoring the value of the contributions of other men. The question of the nature of virtue, "quae virtus et quanta?" with which the satire opens, is a case in point, even though it may be admitted that the general nature of such a question itself qualifies the question as suitable for general discussion along popular lines. Of greater philosophical depth and significance is that question which the whole of the first part of Ofellus' diatribe raises, namely: what is really real and how can we distinguish reality from illusion? This question extends into both the fields of physics and ethics, especially into the physics and ethics of the schools of Epicurus and the Stoics. For it was a major concern of these rival Hellenistic schools to justify their particular ethical beliefs and teachings by relating them to their total world views. Ofellus constantly harps upon the deception of the ignorant by gaudy appearances and upon the corruption of the critical faculties through a lack of temperance or moderation. However, his views are expressed in such a way that it is evident that he has no real conception of what
distinguishes reality from illusion. I am not suggesting that Horace is totally unsympathetic towards Ofellus, whom he presents as an example of what has become something of an anachronism, one of nature's gentlemen. In the same way Plato is not unsympathetic to the conservative and elderly Cephalus at the opening of the Republic\(^{149}\) but he does introduce that character to show that, as times and circumstances change, so too must the traditional views on morals and behaviour, if those views are not to become morally bankrupt. As in the Republic Plato is not sympathetic to the sophistic views put forward by Thrasy-machus\(^{150}\) and Glacon\(^{151}\) on justice, but recognises that they must be heard and refuted, so Horace, though aware of a need for change, since Ofellus' views are no longer adequate, does not totally agree with such Stoic ideas as are expressed by Davus and Damasippus. Such views, however, must be taken into account, tested and then utilised in conjunction with what may be allowed to survive from the traditional mores and in conjunction with whatever other approaches seem suitable in the light of society as it is and the constant changes within it. Horace indicates the poverty of much traditional thought on morality by emphasising the limited appreciation traditionalists have of the complexities which confront the conscientious moralist. The level of sophistication, however, at which such a moralist as Ofellus is allowed to operate by Horace is indicated by his concern over the appearance of peacocks and the size of fish. Ofellus does not indicate that the ostentatious expenditure on such luxuries as these is to be thought of as

\(^{149}\) Plato, Republic 331b esp. of 327-336a.
\(^{150}\) Ibid. 336a-354c: termed Radicalism by Barber, Greek Political Theory (London, 1964) p.179.
\(^{151}\) Ibid. 357-367e.
symptomatic of a deeply seated malaise. Socrates was always willing, it is true, to utilise commonplace examples to illustrate concepts of much more significant ethical moment; at least, this is true of Plato's representation of him.\textsuperscript{152} There is no intimation here, however, that Horace is treating Ofellus with the same respect as that shown to Socrates by Plato. One could rather level the same charge at Ofellus, with some degree of justice, which he himself levels at his own targets, namely:

\begin{align*}
35 \quad \text{ducit te species video.}
\end{align*}

For \textit{species} here fulfils a dual function: it sums up both the object of Ofellus' attack and simultaneously and ironically indicates that area within which Ofellus' own shortcomings as a moralist are most painfully apparent. Since, as well as its simple meaning of surface "appearance", \textit{species} is also the word used by the Latin authors to translate the technical terms \textit{φαντασία} and \textit{εἴδος}, Ofellus is once more being made by Horace to employ a word which is more complex in its associations than he can possibly appreciate. In the light of the untutored comments of Ofellus on sense-perception and intellectual decision in vv.3-9\textsuperscript{153} there seems little doubt that Horace's use of \textit{species} is consciously humorous and ironical for the reasons which have already been stated. There is, furthermore, an additional and equally conscious irony in v.35. This is the juxtaposition of the confident \textit{video} of Ofellus and that \textit{species} which Ofellus "sees" so misleads those who are less acute than himself.

The remainder of Ofellus' attacks upon the variously

\textsuperscript{152} Plato's example of the insane friend to whom it would not be "right" to return arms at Republic 331 is a trivial example which consciously illustrates a larger problem.\textsuperscript{153} For a detailed discussion, see above pp.226ff.
corrupting effects of luxury upon the Roman way of eating and also upon the sensible and intellectual awareness of his contemporaries reiterates and reillustrates the charges which have already been made.

It may be possible that the manner in which the discussion of the details of Ofellus' attack upon the intellectually debilitating effects of luxury has been carried out has obscured a further important element in Horace's portrayal of that character and in the characterisation of Ofellus' comments as philosophically naive. Not only does Ofellus use words without a full grasp of their meaning, according to Horace, but Ofellus' attack has an unusual degree of formal excellence. A decision has to be made here as to whether Horace would sacrifice the formal excellence of one of his own poems, in order the more realistically to produce a portrait of one of his characters, or the formal excellence of the diatribe put into the mouth of Ofellus is a further element in Horace's attack upon that character. My suggestion is that the formal excellence imposed upon the diatribe of Ofellus, at least in its constituent parts, by Horace is intended to have a similar effect upon the attentive reader as that which is achieved by Ofellus' unconscious use of a partially technical vocabulary. For not only is it quite impossible for such a speaker as Ofellus, who is intent upon expressing traditional ethical views, to avoid technical terms in such an ethical discussion, but it is also equally impossible for such a speaker, who is bent upon successful persuasion, to avoid that formally effective manner of speaking which is affected by such figures as Damasippus and Stertinius, the antics and beliefs of whom would surely have been an anathema to such a figure as Ofellus. Even if we consider that Horace's
bent for comedy and naturalism in the composition of the *Satires* did not extend as far as the creation of poems which were consciously flawed, irrespective of the characters with which he peopled them, there is still an element of humour present in having the uncultured rustic speaking in such a formally conscious manner; it is the humour of incongruity. 154

That there is a readily definable substructure evident in Ofellus' attack upon luxury may be seen from the following analysis:

a) Vv. 8-9 A general statement
b) Vv. 9-18 A general illustration
c) Vv. 18-22 Moralising
d) Vv. 23-30 A "fowl" illustration
e) Vv. 31-34 A "fishy" illustration
f) Vv. 35-38 Moralising
g) Vv. 39-50 A general illustration
h) Vv. 50-52 A general statement which culminates in an arresting and "punctuating" statement:

50-52

\[
\text{ergo}
\]

\[
\text{si quis nunc mergos suavis edixerit assos,}
\]

\[
\text{parebit pravi docilis Romana iuventus.}
\]

As can be seen from this analysis of the attack upon luxury, Ofellus' arguments are expressed in an extremely symmetrical, and satisfying form by means of which the attacks upon luxury and capricious expenditure are given greater impact.

Verses 53-55 form a bridge passage between the attack which Ofellus makes upon luxury and that which is made upon the

154 Part of the subtle texture of the humour in the admittedly more artificial and pastoral world of Theocritus and Virgil is achieved by the poets through their exploitation of the tension which exists between the formal perfection and elegance of content of the *Idylls* and *Eclogues*, especially in the amoebean compositions, and the supposed rusticity of the characters who appear and perform in them.
equally undesirable folly of "stinginess"; although described as a "bridge" passage vv.53-55 may also be thought of, within the overall structure of the poem as part of the general statement with which Ofellus introduces his attack upon that vitium which is the extreme and opposite of luxus.

**C**

**STINGINESS EQUALLY ABHORRENT: VV.53-62**

Ofellus continues his attack upon what he considers to be ethically misguided styles of life by declaring that, in his judgement, a proper asceticism is far removed from the vice of meanness:

53-54 sordidus a tenui victu distabit, Ofello iudice...

As Lejay points out, Ofellus is in sympathy here with the sentiments of Epicurus, as he had been in vv.19-20. Ofellus' choice of vocabulary is, moreover, reminiscent of Cicero's comments at Fin. 2.90:

negat (Epicurus) tenuissimo victu, id est contemptissimis escis et potionibus minorem voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis ad epulandum.

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155 I believe, with Palmer (n. ad loc.) that Ofello iudice is spoken by Ofellus himself: this solves most difficulties regarding attribution of lines, cf. Ovid Her 4.74; one should also note that Ofellus had himself talked of corruptus iudex in v.9, so that, in perhaps a slightly arrogant manner, Ofellus sets himself up as a model with which unfavourably to compare others less gifted in wisdom than himself.

156 N. ad loc.: also more fully on p.316, where the similarities are noted between Ofellus' views and those expressed by Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus, this with regard to vv. 80-88 of this satire. On Epicurus and asceticism, cf. also Cic. Tusc. 5.102; Off. 2.58,64,75 and 1.102 and 106; cf.
However, as has been pointed out already, a proper and moderate asceticism was not the property of any particular school, although the philosophically untutored would see such an asceticism as more appropriate to the Stoa than to the Epicureans. The opponents of the Epicureans most certainly canvassed this view.157 The beliefs of the Cyrenaics alone perhaps should have merited that kind of charge. However that may be, it was generally accepted that the life-style of the earlier Stoics, especially Zeno,158 were marked by a moderate asceticism and it is likely that in this, as in other matters, the Stoics were under the influence of the Peripatetics.159 It is certainly evident that Ofellus' words reflect the attraction which the common-sense and moderation of Peripatetic ideas held for his creator:

54-55 nam frustra vitium vitaveris illud si te alio pravum detorseris.

After the general statement of vv.53-55 Ofellus once more descends to particular description and illustration, as he had done previously in his attack upon luxury and the evil effects of excess in that direction. In fact, one could suggest

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158 See e.g. Diog. Laertius, 7.10.

159 On the influence of the medium aureum on the ethics of the Middle Stoa, which period is of especial significance in this context, because of its influence upon those Stoic ideas introduced to Rome through, for example, Panaetius, see esp. Schmeckel, Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa (Berlin, 1892) p.221. Something has already been said on the influence of Aristotle's thought directly on Horace in the discussion of Satires 1.1 p. 7 and n.17.
an alteration to the overall structural plan of the satire in line with which this discussion is being developed. After the initial general statement of the subject matter in vv.1-8, Ofellus describes particular follies in vv.8-69, excesses in the direction of luxury in vv.8-52 and in the direction of meanness in vv.55-69, while vv.53-55 serve as a bridge between these two subsections of Ofellus' initial attack. Clearly, the implication of this whole assault is the unremarkable one that the ideal lies in a mean course between excess and defect. This is pointed out explicitly a little later in vv.63-69, which pick up once again the Peripatetic or common-sense view, which has been implicitly anticipated in the discussions of luxury and meanness and explicitly again in the bridge or pivot passage of vv.53-55. The advantages of a moderate life-style are then elaborated upon in vv.70-79. The remainder of the poem is then directed towards a discussion of more immediately relevant political topics. This switch of direction is neatly encapsulated within vv.99-101 and anticipated by the references to the age of Roman heroes in vv.89-93 which compared so favourably with the decadence of contemporary times, as described, in terms of decadence and reputation, in vv.94-99.

However, whether one treats the attacks upon luxury and meanness as balancing elements of a general attack upon human folly in the attempts of humankind to discover "quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit..." (1), or as a more fragmentary assault is largely irrelevant to the present discussion, except in so far as Ofellus' exploitation of neatness of form is considered humorous and ironical in itself. The major element of humour within the satire is still the fact that Ofellus denies the value of things Greek, yet, in his "Italian" moralising, is
constantly, if unconsciously, reminding the reader of Greek ethical doctrines which are drawn from the whole spectrum of Greek philosophical thought.

The exemplum with which Horace provides Ofellus as an illustration of the vice of meanness in vv.55-62 is a case in point. The humour of the passage goes beyond the vividly amusing description of the dietary habits of Avidienus. This name itself is clearly designed to conjure up the concept of avarice in the reader's mind, because of its similarity in sound to *avidus* (despite the difference in the quantity of the initial "a") and *aviditas*; this, however, is the kind of rather obvious pun which Horace allows Ofellus consciously to make. More subtle and outside of Ofellus' range of appreciation is the play on words which Horace exploits through his knowledge of the ostentatious asceticism of the followers of Antisthenes and Diogenes known as the Cynics. Therefore, when Ofellus mentions that the nickname of Avidienus is Canis:

56 cui Canis ex vero ductum cognomen adhaeret...

Horace's intention is that his audience will see that this nickname has not merely been earned by his bad temper, as was the nickname of the original Cynics,¹⁶⁰ but because of the similarity of his excessive and tiresome niggardliness to the asceticism of the Cynics, which was also thought of as being excessive and tiresome by their critics. Not but what, it's interesting that in *Epistles* 1.17.13-35 Horace, speaking on his own behalf, mentions Aristippus in favourable terms: his contention is that the intellectual honesty of the Cynic and the true value of his...

¹⁶⁰ In his note to v.56 Palmer mentions the Cynics, but does not draw any conclusion apart from that connected with evil temper, itself the result of miserliness.
moral convictions are, despite his material poverty, worth much more than the material goods of the wealthy. Also, the independence of spirit of the Cynics is considered desirable:

\[
\text{principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est.} \]

Here Horace endeavours to maintain his supposed independence of Maecenas and Octavian. However, the major point now at issue is the opportunism of Horace as a satirist, especially in his treatment of the Greeks whether openly, as in *Epistles* 1.17, or more covertly in *Satires* 2.2. My suspicion is, therefore, that Canis in v.56 is a conscious reference on the part of Horace to the Cynics and their asceticism. Ofellus is unaware of the associations of the word and, one can suggest, would again have been disgruntled to discover that this Latin nickname was reminiscent of an appropriate Greek philosophical school. One should add finally that, in *Epistles* 1.17.30, Horace uses canis in a proverbial expression not dissimilar to that which is found in v.64 of *Satires* 2.2. It would be something of a coincidence if, in two passages, one of which is specifically concerned with the adherents of Aristippus, the word canis should be used in proverbial expressions and yet not have reference, in the author's consciousness, to the Cynics in both contexts, especially since both contexts are consonant with the ideas of the Cynics. It is also interesting that in *Epodes* 6.1-2 Horace uses canis and lupus in opposition, as he does in v.64 of *Satires* 2.2; in *Epodes* 6 Horace chides the watchdog that barks at unoffending guests and yet maintains silence at the approach of a wolf. Surely Horace is here enjoying a subtle philosophical joke also— at the expense of Plato, *Republic*, 375f. where the excellent

\[161 \text{Epistles 1.17.35.}\]
guard-dog, analogous to the "guardians" of the ideal state, demonstrates great judgement in discriminating between friend and foe. It would seem that the subtle philosophical joke is a typically Horatian trait. I would also suggest that the words, _ex vero ductum_ are intended to pick up _verum_ in v.7 and _male verum_ in v.8, which have already been discussed in terms of the problems associated with reality and illusion. At this stage it also is interesting to note further "signposts" by means of which Horace helps to maintain the unity of the poem and its coherence as an artistic whole. I refer to the fact that _lupus_, which is about to occur again at v.64 has already appeared at v.36, while the empty stomach of v.18 was described as _latrantem_.

We shall also see in the discussion of v.76 that the pale complexion of the glutton has itself been anticipated by the appearance of both extreme kinds of malefactors at v.21 and, in a more subtle manner at v.61. Discussion of these instances of "signposting" must await discussion of the most daring expressions of philosophical sophistication put into Ofellus' mouth by Horace, this in vv.76-88. Meanwhile, Ofellus, prompted by "Horace" moves into a positive description of how to live virtuously on a small income.

D

THE BENEFITS OF A PROPER ASCETICISM AND FRUGALITY: VV.63-99

As was mentioned immediately above Ofellus is induced

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162 It may be that vv.89-99 should be thought of as a bridge or pivotal passage anticipating the content of vv.99-136.
to move on to a more positive disquisition by two questions which, I would suggest, are put, in the manner of diatribe as exploited by Horace, by his audience, that is to say either "Horace", or an imaginary interlocutor. Generally speaking the two questions:

63-64 quali igitur victu sapiens utetur, et horum utrum imitabitur?

are punctuated as if they formed an integral part of the continuing stream of Ofellus' monologue, presumably because they repeat, in a slightly different form, the question with which the satire opened. I would, however, prefer to punctuate them as, for example, Garrod punctuates the question cur hoc? in v.7. A similar interruption in vv.63-64 would seem to be in keeping with Horace's usual technique of broken diatribe, which is seen perhaps to its best advantage in Satires 2.7. After approximately fifty-five lines of monologue such an interruption is, in fact, overdue and, if the interruption is seen as an important reminder of what the original question at issue was, so much the better. I would also suggest that the questions may readily be thought of as reflecting a certain amount of typically Horatian irony. Take, for example, the word sapiens, all the connotations of which are by now adequately known, in v.63. Its appearance in v.63 is anticipated by its appearance in v.3, where Horace interpolates his description of the rustic sage. It has already been argued, I hope convincingly, that Horace's description of Ofellus in vv.2-3 is ironical, because of the ambiguities which the poet exploits. Added support has been found for this ironical interpretation in the substance of

Ofellus' complaints about luxury and meanness. Accordingly, it is natural to assume that Horace is now openly employing a word in an ironical sense which formerly, in an exactly similar metrical position in v.3, had been used ironically, but in, as it were, an "aside". Since Ofellus has been speaking as a self-confessed sapiens, which even the most arrogant Stoic never was guilty of, it is very likely that sapiens in v.3 is an example of Horace at his most dangerously and quietly satirical, especially if we believe that Ofello iudice in vv.53-54 is spoken as a confession of excellence by Ofellus himself. One can fruitfully compare cur, Stoic? and Stoic in Satires 2.3.160 and 300, where Horace is allowing an enthusiastic proficiens to demolish slowly and surely any claim he might like to make to progress on the way to the summum bonum and the wished for status of Stoic sapiens.

One might also suspect that Horace wishes the reader to think of these questions as being put by the poet, because of the almost pun in utetur in v.63 and utrum in v.64. Also the proverbial answer to a real philosophical question, the answer, that is, in "hac urget lupus, hac canis, aiunt." (64) is especially in tune with Horace's description of Ofellus as presented in vv.2-3 to suggest that the rustic sage is taking a positive delight in answering his impatient questioner in a manner which is as remarkable for its oracularity as for its rusticity. In his note on sapiens in v.63 Lejay, who sees no hint of irony, also refers to the beginning of the poem, "tel qui'il est défini en début et qu'Hor. le dépeint dans ces satires, l'homme pénétré des traditions romaines qui sont des traditions de sens pratique et d'équilibre moral." However, Lejay considers that Horace is presenting Ofellus as an ideal
while, of course, my contention is that Horace is as aware of the shortcomings of Ofellus' own narrow approach to ethical questions as he is of the shortcomings of the Stoic, the Epicureans or the Cynics. Aristotle recognised the value of the advice from the man of practical virtue in the formulations of a *modus vivendi*, but nevertheless saw the necessity to bolster the advice given by Ofellus' prototype, as it were, with sound rational argumentation. Ofellus, on the other hand, proceeds by precept and example. Horace was as aware as Plato that the blind traditional view was ultimately and necessarily inadequate.

The only other factors worthy of special mention, from the point of view of this discussion, in vv.63-69, which enclose the first part of Ofellus' switch to positive advice, are the *humanitas* recommended by Ofellus in the treatment of slaves in:

66-68

Albuci senis exemplo, dum munia didit saevus erit...

and the use of *vitium* again in v.69 where, I would contend, the irony, which Horace intends, springs from the fact that Ofellus is so lacking a sense of proportion in questions of ethics that he can describe a relatively minor social solecism in terms more suited to a discussion of mortal sin or, to be less anachronistic, of the *summum malum* of the Stoics.

We come now to a passage which is of central position and, therefore, not surprisingly, of central, even crucial, importance for a full and proper understanding of the poem. On the interpretation of the passage, which is itself centred about the *divinae particulam aurae* of v.79, depends also that interpretation of Horace's attitude towards Ofellus, which it has
been the purpose of this discussion consciously to further. It is here, moreover, that that supposed tension between the inevitably Greek connotations of Ofellus' comments on the soul and his character as an Italian xenophobe is at its most apparent. The basic question, which must now be asked, and finally answered, is whether Horace intends his reader to understand this tension as a humorously exploited means to achieve the undercutting of the authority of a man who has the arrogance to consider himself to be beyond the effects of an otherwise massively influential foreign culture. For either this is Horace's intention, or it is to depict, in laudatory manner, Ofellus as a man who genuinely has no need for what an alien culture can provide for him in the way of support for his traditional and time-honoured beliefs.

Horace maintains a continuity, despite the subdivisions of the poem's structure by the use once again of victus tenuis in v.70. These words echo the phrase a tenui victu of v.53. Similarly the question of the poem's beginning is picked up by the form of the more specific indirect question in vv.70-71; in the same way the ironical sapiens of v.63 was an echo of the equally ironical sapiens in v.3. The most telling example of this kind of cross connection within the poem's structure comes in the use of pallidus in v.76: clearly the word picks up the albumque of v.21, where the victim or devotee of excess is described in terms anticipatory of the present discussion even down to the use of pinguem vitiis, which, also in v.21, is

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164 One should note also here that the somewhat rare albatus occurs in v.61, while the name Albuci senes occurs at v.67; although the first example refers to the festal dress of the miser, it is interesting that in respect of a certain kind of pallor his appearance matches that of the devotee of luxury in v.21 and v.76.
anticipatory of "corpus onustum / hesternis vitiis" in vv. 77-78: mention has already been made of the repeated use of vitium within the satire, as, for example, at v.54 and v.69. However, this use of verbal signposts, although it often depends upon words which are capable of covering extensive areas of meaning, both philosophical and lay, as vitium in this satire and ratio in Satires 2.3, is not quite so intriguing as the force of the quasi philosophical comments which are found in vv.76-79:

76-79 vides ut pallidus omnis
cena desurgat dubia? quin corpus onustum
hesternis vitiis animum quoque praegravat una,
atque adfigit humo divinae particulam aurae.

It has often been noted that Ofellus' words at this juncture have a philosophical ring. The point is made by Palmer, for example, who refers to Plato, Phaedo 83d, "where Socrates says that each pleasure and each pain have, as it were, a nail, with which they nail the soul to the body and make it corporeal." He continues by declaring that the divinity of the soul was "a dogma of the Stoics and Pythagoreans"; Palmer then refers the reader to a number of useful illustrative passages, but does not comment further upon why Horace has introduced this particularly striking passage at this particularly central and important point in the body of the poem. The comments of Lejay

165 The text of the Phaedo 83d is, ἐκάστη ἡδονή καὶ λύπη ὡσπερ ἦλθον ἔχουσα προσῆλθεν αὐτήν (τὴν ψυχήν) πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερνὰ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ.

are at once fuller and, to a certain extent, less satisfactory. Lejay also refers to the passage from the *Phaedo*, which is cited by Palmer, but attempts to make a distinction between the aims of the Platonic and the Horatian images; "l'image est cependant très différente dans Horace: le corps, alourdi par l'orgie de la veille, est comme un poids qui entraîne l'âme et la fixe à la vase ... dans Platon, le plaisir cloue l'âme au corps; dans Horace, le corps maintient l'âme sur le sol." Lejay continues and cites two passages from the works of Seneca, namely *Epistles* 65.16 and the *De Brevitate Vitae* 2.3, where the Stoic author seems to echo the sentiments of Horace, although Lejay has already discounted the idea that Ofellus' words have a particularly Stoic origin; "on songe d'abord à l'attribuer aux Stoiciens.... mais Ciceron l' a trouvée dans la tradition pythagoricienne." Rudd in the text of *The Satires of Horace* (p.171) dismisses Lejay's contributions on this topic rather in an ironical manner; "even this is not too much for Lejay, who tells us (p.313) that Ofellus would have had some rolls of Lucilius in his house. Presumably he also had works of Stoic or Pythagorean philosophy, for in v.79 he speaks of bodily indulgence as nailing the soul to earth." In his note on p.297 Rudd adds, "The closest parallel seems to be Plato (*Phaedo* 83d), who says that every pain and pleasure nails the soul to the body." While it is true that Lejay tends to overemphasise the education and learning of Ofellus, this mistake is the result of a desire to see *Satires 2.2* as an artistic and satisfying
whole, in spite of a certain puzzlement concerning Horace's aims, or perhaps, confusion concerning Horace's aims in producing the poem. As will be shown shortly, Lejay's interpretation must be questioned, both in general terms and also in detail. Rudd is himself on rather shaky ground here, I fear: he writes:

If, however, one believes (as I do) that the setting is Rome and that Horace is transmitting the teachings but not the words of Ofellus, then the old farmer becomes a rather feeble device. Clearly he is supposed to have some kind of independent existence which will prevent the reader from ascribing all the sentiments in the poem to Horace. But for the most part Ofellus is too vague and shadowy a figure to perform this function, and so dramatically 2.2 is weaker than several of the other pieces.169

I doubt whether a character, who is described as:

3 rusticus abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva...

can be thought of as either "vague" or "shadowy". However that may be, let us examine Lejay's comments before returning to Rudd's assessment of the poem.

It is interesting that, although Lejay draws a very proper distinction between the images of Horace in vv. 76-79 of this satire and those of Plato in Phaedo 83d, he does not mention that the effect of making the soul like the body is to keep it close, as it were, to the earth. In fact, this very point is made by Plato himself in another related passage of the Phaedo which describes in a humorous vein how a soul which is weighed down with corporeal vices is rendered thereby somehow more corporeal itself and is, therefore, bound, on its ultimate separation from the body, to exist in a kind of limbo, neither

169 Rudd, p.171f.
released from this world nor yet of it. As a result it frequents graveyards. Hence malevolent ghosts are explained. Such an unfortunate soul's fate is exactly parallel to that in store for such a one as is described by Horace in vv. 78-79. The fact that Lejay appears to miss this closer parallel is significant, since he does not appreciate that Horace is now exploiting an irony which is not unworthy of Socrates himself. For in Phaedo 70a5 and 81c-d Plato is at pains to ridicule those who believe in the material nature of the immortal soul, since, as it later becomes clear, immortality is not compatible with a material nature. Plato also ridicules those whose beliefs concerning the soul are so naive that they not only feared for its safety, if death took place on a stormy day, but also felt that it could somehow be physically adulterated by a life of sin. By overstating such commonly held or traditional beliefs Plato was able to demolish them before he moved on to the more positive discussions of the later portions of the dialogue. I would suggest, therefore, that the irony here exploited by Horace comes from the uneducated farmer giving vent to ideas on the nature of the soul, in all seriousness, which call to mind ideas mentioned in the Phaedo for the sake of light relief - and only so that they could be humorously dismissed. There is also a possible irony in the fact that the materialistic ideas, which were attacked by Plato in the Phaedo, were, in a sense, prototypes of the thoroughgoing and conscious materialism of the Stoics and Epicureans, whose own theories regarding the material nature of the soul were derived ultimately from the ideas of Heraclitus, Anaxagoras and the atomists of the fifth century,

170 Plato, Phaedo, 81D.
Leucippus and Democritus. The crude materialism of Ofellus is certainly a rough reflection of the developed materialism of the Hellenistic schools. Yet in Horace's poem this crude materialism appears cheek by jowl, as it were, with a clear reference to that portion of a Platonic dialogue which reduces to the absurd those physical explanations of the nature of the soul which apparently were held by men as naive as Ofellus is depicted by Horace to be.

It is not, therefore, surprising that editors and literary critics are torn between a choice of Platonic or Pythagorean or Stoic origins for the ideas appearing in this section of the poem. It is in Horace's best interests, as he devalues Ofellus in a manner which is parallel to the devaluation of the equally dogmatic Damasippus and Davus, to leave the question vague, even as Virgil's poetic underworld in Æneid 6 is deliberately hazy in its provenance. I also feel that this discussion of the conscious literary and philosophical ironies, with which this passage is replete, should also serve as a possible counter to those misgivings felt by Rudd and quoted above. Horace is in complete control of his material, as is inevitably the case. Accordingly, the character portrayal of Ofellus is produced precisely to serve Horace's purposes. This, as has been indicated, is to depict the folly of any view which is too narrow to benefit by whatever help is available, no matter how they may feel emotionally towards the source and origin of that help.

One should perhaps conclude the discussion of this section of the poem with a brief note on tenuatum in v.84 in order

171 Rudd's translation of cena dubia (77) as "problem meal" misses the humorous reference to Ter. Phormio 2.2.28; the translation suggests that he had in mind the disguised dishes at Petronius, Sat. 56.
to show how watchfulness for examples of Horace's wit at Ofellus' expense must be maintained. Clearly the tenuatum corpus of v.84 is consciously contrasted by Ofellus with the corpus onustum / hesternis vitiis of vv.77-78, which had such a deleterious effect upon the unfortunate soul with which it was united, animum quoque praegravat una. The tenuatum corpus is, according to the logic of the passage, likely to be less of a burden to the soul to which it is united. It comes, therefore, as no surprise to discover that the air and fire, which form the rare πνεῦμα that animates the universe, is itself tenuis or in the words of Alexander Aphrodisias, τὸ τε πῦρ καὶ τὸν ἄερα λεπτομερῆ τε καὶ κούφα καὶ σῶτον δύνα. The human soul is, in Stoic doctrine, a spark of that divine flame, as Censorinus tells us, "primosque homines ex solo, adminicul'o divini ignis id est dei providentia genitos." Generally speaking, the more rarified or fiery that human soul, and the less influenced by the crass material ὄλη, the happier and more efficient it was. I would hesitate to suggest that all this was in the mind of Horace when he composed v.84; nevertheless, such subtlety is a mark of his humour and would be appropriate at this juncture after the provocative lines which centre about divinae particulam aurae. Also, the formal advice with which the poem ends would demand, as we shall see, a soul the dispositions of which and the inner harmonies of which reflect the workings of a properly attenuated and fiery logos.

There is further undermining of the authority of Ofellus

173 Censorinus, De Die Nat. 4.10.
174 See e.g. Seneca, Dial. 7.3.3: the emphasis on physical ills as the result of excess causing mental discomfort is also reminiscent of Cic. Tusc. 4.13.30.
in Horace's description of this reactionary Italian's praises of time past and his desire to be transported to the time of antique Romans:

92-93 has utinam inter

heroeas natum tellus me prima tulisset!

Although, in fact, Ofellus expresses a wish that he had been born long ago rather than that he could return to the days of yesterday, nevertheless one is bound to remember, to Ofellus' disadvantage, both Horace's attacks upon μεμψιμορία, in the first person in Satires 1.1.15-22, and through Davus at his own expense in 2.7.22-27. The second of these two references is particularly relevant:

laudas

fortunam et mores antiquae plebis, et idem

si quis ad illa deus subito te agat, usque recuses,

aut quia non sentis quod clamas rectius esse,

aut quia non firmus rectum defendis, et haeres

nequiquam caeno cupiens eveillere plantam.

Satires 2.7.22-27

There is no suggestion in Satires 2.2 that Ofellus is anything less than genuine in his devotion to Rome's past. However, there is throughout the poem a clear suggestion that a reactionary nature, which is as blinkered and as undiscriminating as that which is possessed by Ofellus, is not only more than slightly ludicrous to an educated observer, but also unhelpful. It is also ironical that Ofellus' judgements should appear to be lacking in discrimination when a large part of his own evident self-satisfaction is dependent upon a confidence in his own untutored ability correctly to distinguish which mode of life is most beneficial. In the light of this Horace's introduction of:

89-90 rancidum aprum antiqui laudabant, non quia nasus illis nullus erat...
into Ofellus' arguments is particularly amusing, especially when, immediately after the wishful thinking of vv.92-93, Horace has Ofellus complain again of the folly of mankind in not being able to discriminate between what truly is conducive to a worthwhile reputation and what behaviour simply brings notoriety for excess and luxury.

The interlocutor of vv.99-101, although himself misguided, sees that, if Ofellus has a potential weak point, it is his inability to distinguish between cases:

99-101 "iure" inquit "Trausius istis iurgatur verbis; ego vectigalia magna divitiasque habeo tribus amplas regibus."

It is as if the interlocutor, and here we may perceive Horace's guiding hand, considers Ofellus to be as unswerving in his devotion to an ethical ideal as were the Stoics in their devotion even to the paradoxical consequences of their peculiar philosophical beliefs. However that may be, the structural purpose of the interruption which is contained in vv.99-101 is to swing the discussion to matters of immediate consequence which, in their political and social relevance, contrast sharply with moral generalisations concerning an age of honour now long dead. The question which, I feel, is implied in the remainder of the poem is whether or not traditionalism, as epitomised by the attitudes struck by Ofellus, can provide a totally satisfactory answer to life's problems in the face of the complexity and consequent tensions in the immediate post civil war period. Can, in short, the final return of Ofellus to generalisation in:

135-136 quocirca vivite fortés, fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus.
be taken seriously as Horace's short answer to a major ethical dilemma? It seems unlikely, when the general tone of the final couplet follows the particular political reference of the section which precedes it. However a satisfactory answer to the question can only be hazarded when the final section of the poem has been considered in detail.

E

CONCLUSION: VV.99-136

There are certain structural difficulties which relate generally to the substructure of the poem's conclusion and specifically to the distribution of the lines between the speakers, Ofellus and Horace. I would suggest that the following schematisation of poem's conclusion will provide at least an adequate guideline for our treatment of it:

a) Vv. 99-111 - Altercation between Ofellus and an anonymous interlocutor: the duties of the wealthy man.

b) Vv.112-115 - Interruption by Horace: this is parallel, in a structural sense, to Horace's comments in vv.2-3.

c) Vv.116-136 - Conclusion of Ofellus' diatribe: the essential independence of the land.

This final section of the poem is largely concerned to expound two commonplace themes, the duties of the wealthy man and the independence of the good earth. There are but few major difficulties of interpretation, although it is possible that Stoic terminology may help to explain a puzzle in v.123:

123 post hoc ludus erat culpa potare magistra
where the problem revolves around the exact meaning of the phrase *culpa potare magistra*, although it seems to be generally agreed that the infinitive depends upon *ludus*. The meaning of *post hoc ludus... potare* is then either, "after this we enjoyed a drinking game" in which *ludus* is specific, or "after this it was our pleasure to drink", in which *ludus* must refer to the general air of relaxation that benefitted the holiday festivities. That previous editors have found the striking *culpa potare magistra* a stumbling block to their understanding is clear from the various emendations which have been suggested: *cuppa*, by Lambin; *cupa* or * nulla*, by Bentley; *pulpa*, by Heinsius and *nupta* or *Polla*, by Peerlkamp. These are dismissed by Lejay as "inutiles" and he continues in his notes to v.123 to give his own views, which attempt to explain the text as it stands by reference to Plautus, *Stichus* 725 and also to the comments of Porphyry, "si quando libere potare volebant antiqui, id est sine archiposia, dicebant se magistram facere culpam." Lejay's explanation is as follows:

> Après qu'une de ces fautes avait été commise, les autres convives obligeaient le coupable par leurs cris à vider une coupe.175

This is the meaning which is adopted by Rudd, whose translation is, "Then we played drinking games where a failure means a forfeit."176 This, however, is a considerable expansion of the latin and demands that *culpa* have the meaning of *multa*, which is used in the Plautine reference for an actual forfeit of a goblet of wine which the loser foregoes. This does not suit

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175 Lejay, n. ad loc. p.353.
the idea of drinking freely which is demanded by the festal atmosphere of the passage which seems to anticipate Horace's pleasant party in *Satires* 2.6.67-70. However, Palmer too accepts the meaning of "forfeit" and takes to task Porphyry in the same breath with, "this shows he simply knew nothing whatever about it." The same rather unsatisfactory reference to Plautus is repeated. At the end of his note almost, as it were, for the sake of completion, Palmer comments that some have offered a different explanation; he cites M' Caul (1833, ed. Wheeler), "that *culpa* means 'excess' - 'each person took as much as he pleased, restricted only by the feeling that excess was culpable'." A case can be made out in support of this view with the aid of Stoic terminology. It becomes apparent that M' Caul was working along the right lines in observing the spirit of the passage as a whole. The holiday drinker should be allowed to drink freely, both in the sense of "deeply", as understood by Porphyry, and also in the sense of *solutus legibus insanis*, to employ the phrase of Horace at *Satires* 2.6.68f. That Ofellus should wish his holidaymaker to be free of *legibus insanis* is all the more natural, since it would appear from Lejay's note that such laws were peculiarly Greek. How, though, can *culpa*...*magistra* mean "freely" in either of the required senses? How can M' Caul's view be substantiated or modified; for modified it must be, since *culpa* must of necessity contain within its meaning, whatever complexion that meaning has acquired, the idea of a crime committed or a mistake or error already made.

177 Palmer, n. ad loc.

178 Lejay, n. ad loc. p.353, "Au contraire dans le coutume Grecque décrite dans les *Odes* ... *Odes* 1.4.18 et 2.7.25."
In this culpa is closely associated with the Stoic term vitium; for culpa, meaning "sense of guilt", is the awareness of vitium, once that vitium, through an error of judgement or lapse in virtue, has been committed. The relationship between these two words was known to Horace: this is clear from Satires 2.6.7 where both words are among a group of terms which have consciously Stoic or other philosophical connotations. However, perhaps the most useful parallel which can help to solve the puzzle of culpa in v.123 of Satires 2.2 is to be found in the Stoic satirist, and admirer of Horace, Persius in Satires 3.32-34:

sed stupet hic vitio et fibris increvit opimum pingue, caret culpa, nescit quid perdat, et alto demersus summa rursus non bullit in unda.

This passage translates as follows:

But this man is dumbfounded by his vice and the fat grows rich in his entrails, he lacks any sense of guilt, and submerged deep he will not bob again on the surface.

Take the passage clause by clause, the object of Persius' attack is "dumbfounded by his vice", his intellect is deadened. This parallels the dulling of the senses, physical and intellectual, which Ophellus attacks in Satires 2.2.9, corruptus iudex, v.21 pinguem vitiis, v.25 corruptus vanis rerum and, finally, the whole passage vv.76-88, which is discussed above.180 Equally the ability of Persius' victim to make proper moral judgements and to realise his moral danger has been ruined so that nescit quid perdat, because of the crassness of his intellect which

179 Cf. Cic. Fam. 7.3.4, "vacare culpa magnum est solacium"; Sen. Phaedra, 163, "animus culpa plenus"; also, Juv. 1.167.

180 See above, pp.264ff.
has resulted, in fact, in the loss of all sense of shame, of guilt, caret culpa. The culpa, although lost, is still thought of, however, as being potentially operative after those vitia which have stultified the intellect have been committed. One should also note that the actual physical debasement of Persius' target is described in terms reminiscent of Ophellus' attacks upon the debauched and also of Horace's wry implications regarding the intellectual attainments of his "mask". For Persius uses pingue, which is almost an echo of pinguem vitiiis in Horace, Satires 2.2.21 and of corpus onustum / hesternis vitiiis in v.77f. It has been, therefore, established that culpa can mean a sense of guilt occasioned by a lapse of moral control. It has also been established that the holiday drinking at the close of Satires 2.2 is anticipatory in spirit of Horace's convivial evening towards the end of Satires 2.6. So much is made clear by the plainness of the fare on both occasions and also by the conviva...vicinus of Satires 2.2.119f. It would seem, therefore, that by writing culpa...magistra in Satires 2.2.123 Horace means that each individual's drinking will be governed not by artificial rules nor by the dictates of anything but his own conscience or the hardness of his own head on that particular occasion. The individual will know when his personal limit has been reached only when he has transgressed it, so that the warning sensation can properly be described by the phrase culpa potare magistra. If he continues to drink, the individual will be fully aware, through the promptings of Culpa of what he is doing. However, on this holiday occasion, when normal rules are relaxed, the individual is free to act according to his

181 The freedom granted to Davus in 2.7 is a useful parallel: Horace becomes only too aware of his mistake when it is, as it were, too late.
nature or will, secundum naturam. A suitable rendering would perhaps, therefore, be, "according to conscience's guidance". This would be in keeping with Horace's constant irony towards Ofellus. If one of Ofellus' reasons for rejecting the silly drinking games was that the rules were influenced by foolish Greeks (and this devalues the explanation of culpa ... magistra adopted by Orelli, Lejay, Palmer and Rudd), then the fact that Horace places the phrase culpa potare magistra, which is only totally comprehensible via Stoic terminology, into Ofellus' mouth at the moment he rejects the leges insanae is in itself a supreme irony.

As far as the other matters, which arise in the context of the poem's close are concerned, Lejay has a full discussion of the concept of "generosity" and also of the "independence" of the land in p. 317f. of his introduction to Satires 2.2. Horace's words on wealth correspond to a theme developed by the Cynics, which is of especial interest after the pun on Canis discussed above with reference to v. 56. Cicero records the Stoic contribution on this topic at De Officiis 3.63, where he attributes the idea to Hecato of Rhodes. The concept can, however, be traced back to Socrates along with many of the commonplaces of Hellenistic philosophy. Lejay's conclusion is as follows:

Nous sommes reportés encore à Anacharsis et à Socrate, c'est-à-dire à ce mélange de sagesse populaire et d'idées philosophiques où il est impossible de dēmēter l'enseignement réel du Socrate historique. L'idée elle-même n'est ni grecque ni latine, ni philosophique ni

182 Lejay quotes Musonius, ed. Hense, p. 108.14 in support.
183 Stobaeus, Flor. 94.34 M, τὸν πλούτον ὁμοίως φίλων ἐκπαίδ. καὶ ἀποφάσιστον εἰς τὰς καλὰς δεὶ παραλαμβάνειν πράξεις.
'populaire: elle est antique. Elle correspond tout particulièrement à des préoccupations urgentes chez les contemporains d'Horace et il lui a donné une expression conforme à ces soucis. Une idée qui est commune à tout le monde n'appartient à personne.

While in general agreeing with Lejay's comments here, especially regarding Horace's desire to give a literary expression to the anxieties of his contemporaries, I find the definition of these views as vaguely "antique" as somewhat unsatisfactory. It is clear that Horace thought of the ideas expressed in Ofellus' speech as both Italian and yet Greek, rather than neither or neutral. Without the tension between the Greek and Italian elements within the formal literary expression of these ideas, at the very least a good deal of the humorous effect of the poem would be destroyed. It may be as well to remind ourselves here of Coleridge's comments to the effect that, "the creative imagination shows itself most intensely in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities." Horace achieves such a balance between things Italian and things Greek within this poem, and part of his success is in the development of Ofellus as an outmoded figure who is himself unaware of or who consciously ignores a large area of human culture and thought.

I also feel that Lejay could have made somewhat more of the discussion of benignitas in the De Officiis of Cicero: in fact, whereas Lejay's reference is to Book 3.63, a more useful discussion for our purpose is to be found in Book 2.52-64. I say that this discussion is more useful, since it contains a cautionary note, which may, if also present in vv.101-106 of Satires 2.2 even by implication, do something to anticipate that political comment in vv.116-135 which has been thought of
as a veiled criticism of Octavian parallel to Virgil's comments in Eclogues 1. Cicero is at pains to point out that the liberality of the wealthy man is praiseworthy, but easy, costing little, while the liberality which a man of slender means accomplishes by way of personal service is truly valuable. Ofellus' suggestion that the wealthy man is at relatively greater risk in the face of fortune, ad casus dubios, is parallel to Cicero's comments on the trials that attend wealth. The point is also made by Cicero that the wealthy man must carefully examine his motives before expending great sums on public works. This is of interest in the light of "quaré / templæ ruunt antiqua deum?" in vv.103-104, and also in the light of the programme of public works, which was ultimately undertaken by Octavian. Syme's comments are relevant here:

Two deities deserved special honour. In 29 B.C. the temple of Divus Julius vowed by the Triumvirs was at last dedicated. The next year saw the completion of the great temple of Apollo on the Palatine. 184

Thus, when this poem was written these major works were either envisaged or in train. One could perhaps be surprised at Apollo receiving such an honour at the hands of Octavian. Syme is again most helpful:

Phoebus, to be sure, was Greek in name and origin. But Phoebus had long been domiciled in Latium. Though the national spirit of Rome was a reaction against Hellas, there was no harm, but every advantage, in invoking the better sort of Greek deities on the right side, so that the War of Actium could be shown as a sublime contest between West and East. 185

The "War of Actium" was still in the future when Horace wrote

184 The Roman Revolution, p.447f.: in this context, note Odes 3.6.
185 The Roman Revolution, p.448.
Satires 2.2 at some time between 35 B.C. and 30 B.C. However, Octavian's Tota Italia campaign was in full swing, as he attempted to enlist the support of Italians against Antony's forces in the East. However, it would seem that, if the work on the temple of Apollo is thought of as significant, the Tota Italia campaign was not as narrowly xenophobic as might be imagined. In this case Horace's misgivings regarding the blind nationalism of Ofellus could well have found favour with Maecenas as Octavian's adviser in matters of propaganda. The supposed cautionary note regarding excessive expenditure on temples and public works, as sounded by Cicero and, perhaps, thereby implied in Horace's poem can also be taken as consonant with a certain unease in aristocratic circles, which still existed both regarding the absolute legality of Octavian's position in the period before Actium and of his behaviour during the settlement of confiscated land on the allied veterans after the victory of Philippi. A final thought, which, although fanciful, may yet be of interest. At the time at which Horace was composing Satires 2.2 the two most powerful of the advisers of Octavian were Horace's own patron Maecenas and M. Agrippa, two men who emotionally and also intellectually were poles apart, mirroring in their different characters the tension between inward looking parochialism and enlightened awareness of other cultures. I see Agrippa as a wholehearted and practical advocate of the Tota Italia campaign, intent on mobilising public opinion against Antony and Cleopatra and in favour of Octavian by stressing the

186 Ib. 276-293, which concludes aptly with the quotation from Aeneid 8.678f., "hinc Augustus agens Italos in proelia Caesar / cum patribus populoque, penatibus et magnis dis.

187 For a literary conflict between Agrippa and Maecenas, see Dio. Cass. 52.2-40.
material benefits, especially in terms of public works, which would accrue to Italy under the guidance of Octavian. I see the more subtle Maecenas mobilising his own rather different resources towards a similar end, but the genius of his poets and his own liberal education, coupled even with his peculiar status as an Etruscan aristocrat, militated against his advocating too exclusive a view of Italian excellence. As has been mentioned before, Virgil also had somewhat harsh comments to make after the degradations of 40 B.C. Ultimately, however, poets and patrons reached a compromise when the best of Italian and the best of Greek influences combined to produce Virgil’s Aeneid and the Odes of Horace. It is interesting to note that in Odes 1.6, under the guise of a conventional recusatio, Horace gives his sole and rather sketchy acknowledgement to the achievements of Agrippa, whose attitudes are perhaps reflected by those of Ofellus in Satires 2.2, even as the poet’s subtle delight in the details of Greek philosophy and literature reflected the interest of his patron in those topics. Even if one were not to venture so far, it is interesting that this brief attempt to place Satires 2.2 in its historical and political context, because of the political implications of the poem’s ending, has served to substantiate in this way suspicions which were aroused by a slow and careful reading of the poem. Having said this, I think it is clear in what spirit Horace intends the commonplace advice of vv.135-136 to be taken.

188 See Eclogues 1.70-72.
189 Horace, Odes 1.6.5-20, esp. 5-12.
Much of the labour has been removed from the preparation of the following discussion of Satires 2.6, because of the amount of attention which this particular poem has received at the hands of such men as Lejay, Fraenkel, Brink and Rudd. It is hardly surprising that this carefully composed and attractive poem, with its readily recognisable themes and its famous tailpiece, so to speak, should have received relatively more critical attention and acclaim than Horace's other satires. For there is a consensus of opinion that this poem is superior to the other satirical works of Horace: thus Brink, "... one of the best, perhaps the best, of these poems, the 6th of the Second Book of the Satires - Hoc erat in votis",¹ and also Fraenkel, "Perhaps it is unfair to judge the rest of the second book by the standard of the uncommonly happy sixth satire."² It is possible that this critical consensus springs in part from the fact that Satires 2.6 harbours less difficulties of structure and content than other longer and more complex works such as Satires 2.3. This relative directness of approach is itself directly attributable to the fact that Horace speaks

² Fraenkel, p.144.
propria persona throughout the poem, apart from vv.79-117 at the end, with the result that the critic is spared the necessity of calculating what effect the "mask" has in distorting the poet's message. However, although the poem has been fairly exhaustively examined, certain details and themes can be discussed again in the light of work reported in the foregoing sections. Also it is the privilege of each new critic to assess and perhaps to modify the findings of his antecedents in the field.

Of the work already done on this poem, it seems to me that Brink's, On Reading a Horatian Satire takes perhaps the best total view of its form and content, although, naturally because of the nature of the Todd Memorial Lecture series, the detailed evidence for that total view is not provided. Brink's analysis of the tensions which exist within the poem, and which are instrumental in imposing the discipline of form upon it, is very much in keeping with my own views on the different, but equally formative, tensions which operate within and upon Satires 2.2. Certainly, Brink's analysis and understanding of the complexity of these tensions, a complexity which goes far beyond a simple polarity between Horace's attitudes to the town and country and to Maecenas and Horace's rustic neighbours, serves as a useful corrective to the perhaps rather simplistic interpretations of the poem such as that put forward by Lejay.3 Moreover, Brink's comments on what he calls the "moral dialectic" of the satire are extremely useful and deserve quotation:

3 E.g. p.512, "Le fond de la satire est une opposition entre la vie de la ville et celle de la campagne."
No better name than 'moral dialectic' occurs to me for the way in which the poet has shaped his material. It is not the dialectic of the philosophers, yet it is a strongly rational principle. Two pairs of logical opposites or contradictions are made to serve their purpose. One pair is dominant, the other is subordinate. The dominant pair is Horace the countryman: Horace the townsman. The countryman provides the framework: Horace begins with the country, and returns to it in a circle at the end. The city forms the centre of the poem, surrounded by its antithesis. The subordinate pair is Horace's indebtedness to Maecenas for his countryman's existence and Horace's indebtedness to Maecenas for his townsman's existence - the former only implied ... but so forcibly implied that no one ... has ever doubted it; the latter explicit. 4

Such an analysis of the opposites within the poem issues in the following structural scheme, which I adopt myself in my discussion of the poem:

a) Vv. 1-15 - Horace's modest rustic ambitions
b) Vv. 16-59 - Horace's urban toils
c) Vv. 60-76 - Escape to the country
d) Vv. 77-117 - The fable of the mice. 5

As can clearly be seen a) and c), both about fifteen lines in length, form introductions to b) and d) which are the major sections of the poem and which are also comparable in length.

Before moving on to a detailed discussion of the poem, however, I must take issue with one of Brink's conclusions, and also consider both the strengths and weaknesses of the cases which have been presented by Fraenkel, Lejay and Rudd.

Brink takes issue with those "who take Horace literally,

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4 Brink, p.11.
5 Lejay's structuring of the poem on p.523 is marginally different, but not so as to cause any great difficulty of interpretation.
and think that he tells us something about his person." Brink continues, "They are mistaken. He only seems to talk about Horace the individual. For ... the traits which he discloses are so selective, so sharply overstated or typified, that in fact we learn very little about himself, though we may learn something about ourselves and the world, if we wish to."\(^6\)

Without in any way disputing the validity of the final portion of this statement, I would take issue with Brink's denial of autobiographical validity in Horace's satires. While it is true that the disclosures, which Horace makes are selective and, indeed, so selected to further his moral and didactic ends, it is also true that his description of the details of the journey in *Satires* 1.5 is selective, as is the portrayal of the "Pest" in *Satires* 1.9. In 1.5 Horace gives particular attention to those elements of the journey which he himself found particularly amusing or distasteful. Why else should so much time be devoted to the slanging match between Messius and Cicirrus in vv.51–70? Selection by the artist is surely the element which distinguishes art from catalogue, yet both art and catalogue can be true in their own way. In the same way that the realism of the novel is not the realism of history, so the realism of Horace's satires is not the realism of, for examples, the letters of the younger Pliny. Horace's satires are immeasurably more entertaining, because of the selection and organisation of material. Yet selection is not exclusive of validity, even if that validity is not what one would demand of a more documentary approach. Certain truths about Horace's moral stance can, I believe, be abstracted from Horace's *Satires*

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6 Brink, p.12.
2.6, especially if consideration of this poem is tempered with information derived from Satires 2.2 and elsewhere, especially 1.6, as is noted by Lejay and Rudd, and also Satires 2.3 and 2.7.

One should, however, stress here that it is likely that Brink's cautionary tone is intended as a warning to those who would follow too closely in the footsteps of Lejay \(^7\) and, like him, attribute too much in the way of literal truth to the portraits within the poems. This trait is particularly strange in Lejay, when one considers the vast extent of the attention which is paid by him to the tracing of the different literary sources of the philosophical ideas which are utilised by Horace in the composition of these poems. Lejay's approach, however, is vitiated to a certain extent by his desire to ignore the evidence which he is himself so adept at accumulating and exposing and to postulate that the moral philosophy of Horace is more strictly to be attributed to the exploitation of a fund of folk belief. Although it is true that such a fund existed, it had been given literary shape since at least the time of Ennius, \(^8\) and had, since then, been contaminated by Hellenistic ideas. Few were more aware of this than Horace. In keeping with this desire to see Horace as the mouthpiece of this fund of traditional beliefs is Lejay's desire to see Ofellus, for example, as "un des se plus humbles représentants" of that class "à laquelle appartient Virgile, Ovide, le père de Cicéron." \(^9\)

The inadequacy of this view was demonstrated in the discussion of Satires 2.2.

The literary scholarship of Fraenkel is, of course,

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7 Lejay's views are put forward in both his introduction in pp.512-523 and his commentary upon the poem.

8 See introduction to thesis, above pp.vi-xii.

9 Lejay, p.517.
unimpeachable, both in respect of primary and of secondary sources, even as was Lejay's knowledge of Horace's indebtedness to the philosophical treatises of Cicero. Especially important and valuable are Fraenkel's references to the seminal works of such scholars as Heinze and Wieland. However, despite the wealth and value of the literary armament that Fraenkel brings to bear upon the poem, on occasion he seems thereby blinded to the gentle irony of the poet. Also, his discussion of the moral ideas which are expressed by Horace and Cervius, while stressing again the dangers of the approach adopted by Lejay, "no sensible reader will be tempted to believe that peasants in the region of Vicovaro, whether sotto il buono Augusto or in any other age, would talk as if they had perused Cicero's de finibus bonorum et malorum", is itself brief, includes no comment on the tension set up within the poem by such "educated" peasants, and, indeed, could with fairness itself be described as commonplace.

Take, for example, the following:

Solid honesty, combined, perhaps, with a good deal of shrewdness, and steadfast principles are indeed at home in these humble cottages, where one spurns the sophistication and idle talk of the townspeople. The form in which Horace makes his rustic friends talk about the things which they hold most precious is a form lent to them by the poet, but the substance of their talk and the scale of values which is manifested in their meditations are their own.

I am not entirely sure that the form of "their meditations" can be so absolutely divorced from their "substance", since, as was shown in the discussion of Satires 2.2 the Greek influence

10 See Fraenkel's comments, p.140, and nn.1 and 4 on that page.
11 Fraenkel, p.143.
12 Fraenkel, p.144.
upon both is considerable, if only because of the mutual interaction which demonstrably took place between Hellenistic and Roman ethical views in the period from the middle of the second century B.C. to the time of the composition of Horace's *Satires*. Insufficient account is taken of this fact by Fraenkel, whose comments on the moral direction of the poem show a good deal of insight, but also a somewhat blinkered attitude towards the possible influence of the philosophers.\(^{13}\)

Although Rudd declares that, "It was one of Horace's aims to arouse men's self-respect, but he was not so cynical as to believe that pudor was a prerogative of the senatorial order"\(^{14}\) (and few can have felt that by the end of the first century) and seems to be in accord with Fraenkel's comments on Horace's praise of "the rules of sound economy", "moral decency", "the limitations of human decency" and "wisdom pleasing to the gods whoever they be",\(^ {15}\) nevertheless his initial approach to *Satires* 2.6 is from a different direction. He couples it with 1.6 and comments upon the change undergone by the relationship between Horace and Maecenas\(^ {16}\) and, stressing Horace's desire that his good fortune be permanent, declares that primarily, "This is a poem about wishes."\(^ {17}\) I would suggest that such a statement is in the nature of an eye-catching oversimplification, which the remainder of Rudd's chapter does little to substantiate, although interesting things are said about the prayers to Mercury and Matutinus. However, Rudd misses the

\(^{13}\) Mention has been made above of Fraenkel's relative blindness in this respect, see pp.2f.

\(^{14}\) Rudd, p.165, with reference to *Satires* 2.2.

\(^{15}\) Fraenkel, p.139.

\(^{16}\) Rudd, p.253; the point is also made by Lejay, p.322.

\(^{17}\) Rudd, p.243.
significance of pingue in v.14, although, again, the breadth of his approach may be the reason for this, even as it is the reason behind his very informative discussion of Horace's developing association with Octavian. However that may be, Rudd's prime interest is in Horace's attitude to prayer here and he suggests that, "The predominant spirit is Epicurean." It will be the aim of the following discussion both to test the validity of this bold statement, and to attempt to throw further light upon problems raised by the discussion of the views of Fraenkel, Lejay and Brink. However, in conclusion to this section, I would quote Rudd's comment on the fable of the two mice, since it shows a full awareness of the tensions discussed by Brink. The comment also encapsulates a good deal of truth regarding the special and intricate genius of Horace in the Satires:

...the tale we are given is so serious that it sums up a great deal of the satire's message, and though told by a country neighbour it shows the poet at his most urbane.

How seriously we are intended to take and treat a tale which concerns the misadventures of two mice and which, on occasion, resounds with the hollow thunder of mock epic, is a difficult question. However, this aspect of Horace's poem will receive attention in due course.

Before moving on to a discussion of Horace's mice and other details of the poem, certain prefatory remarks are necessary, since they will indicate the direction which the detailed

18 Rudd, pp.256-7.
19 Rudd, p.250.
20 Rudd, p.245.
discussion will follow. For a distinction ought to be drawn at the outset between the nature of prayers and supplications, which are directed towards some particular being, human or divine, and those vaguely expressed desires, described as wishes, and which have no particular patron in mind. I make this distinction both because of Rudd's comment that "this poem is about wishes", when it is demonstrably about prayers, and because of the direction I intend to take in the discussion myself. As is indicated by the various meanings which are attached to votum, especially that of the actual object vowed in thanks and anticipation of success, prayer implies that success imposes a certain obligation upon the suppliant. Wishes imply no such obligation, since they are made with no specific benefactor in mind. The relationship, moreover, between suppliant and supplicated deity or person is parallel to the relationship between patron and client in republican politics and, in its more developed form, between Maecenas and Horace. It should be clear from these preliminary remarks that it is my intention to deal with this poem from the point of view which accepts that the poem's major concern is with prayer, and with the status of those to whom prayers are extended. In keeping with that view of prayer, which is implied by Horace's use of the word votum, not only in v.1, but also in v.59 at the close of b) with non sine votis, this will also necessitate a discussion of the obligations and duties which are imposed upon the favoured recipient of divine largesse. It will be shown that the

21 The original meaning of votum seems to have been the "promise" made to the entreated deity. The transfer in meaning to the actual object vowed, as, e.g. at Virgil, Aen. 3.279, is easy.
22 Horace's votum is moderation in his demands and satisfaction with what he has received, hence, Sat. 2.6.14-16.
obligations, which are owed and genuinely felt, may be in conflict with the enjoyment of the objects of the original prayer. This confrontation between desire and duty sets up a typically Horatian irony and tension, while, as a result, the nature of what constitutes a proper object for prayer becomes suitable meat for discussion, as are the Stoic and Epicurean views on the matter in so far as they are relevant. The town and the country, as the rival settings for both the obligations of Horace and his aspirations, will also bear discussion, as will, again, the Stoic, Epicurean and Italian views on their respective merits, in so far as these have not been discussed in the study of Satires 2.2 and in so far as they are relevant. What certainly is relevant is the catalogue of questions, which Horace describes as the basis of conversation with his friends in vv.72-76, since they embrace or imply both the vexed question of what ought to be desired and, relevant particularly to Horace's situation, the problem of the motives and bases of friendship:

72-76

sed quod magis ad nos pertinet et nescire malum est agitamus: utrumne divitiis homines an sint virtute beati; quidue ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos; et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius.

Far from being a mere catalogue of commonplace philosophical topics, this list is of particular relevance to Horace and men in his situation vis à vis a patron and also to the encircling subject matter of his poem - "sed quod magis ad nos / pertinet et nescire malum est."
Although Horace's desire for a modest farm and garden, well watered and wooded, may in origin have been an example of wishful thinking, which was itself inspired by an idealised and even Pastoral view of his own rustic Italian background, the fact that the gods have responded more than generously to his wishes has put him under an obligation to them:

3-4  auctius atque
      di melius fecere, bene est.

Who these gods are is momentarily left unclear, although Horace's audience and readers are aware of the generosity shown to the poet by his patron Maecenas. Brink declares that, "Commentators have always taken it for granted that this satire is a tactful and delicate way of expressing the poet's thanks to his patron for the gift of the Sabine farm."\textsuperscript{23} Although Brink does acknowledge that there is an element of truth in this, he also adds that the pleasure which Horace derives from possession of the farm is not entirely unalloyed, since, "Horace is indebted to him (Maecenas) not only for his countryman's existence but also for his townsman's existence, which is as much the basis as it is the negation of the other."\textsuperscript{24} The implication is that Horace's reticence in refraining from naming Maecenas as the specific benefactor is not only governed by tact and delicacy, but also by a desire on the poet's part to allow himself room for comment which may have within it an element of criticism.

\textsuperscript{23} Brink, p.10.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. 8f.
One may perhaps compare the similarly veiled comments in *Satires* 2.2 which concern the resettlement of veterans and the problems caused thereby, a topic which, incidentally reappears in this poem at vv.55-56.

While it is true, however, that there is no explicit reference to Maecenas in this opening section of the poem, the poet's indebtedness to his patron is nevertheless clearly implied in a number of ways. As has been suggested, and as will become evident, deities of various kinds continue to appear as the satire progresses. After mention of the anonymous *di* of v.4 (and these occur in one guise or another elsewhere, as, for example, in v.20, *sic dis placitum*, v.52, *deos quoniam proprius contingis*, v.54, *at omnes di exagitent me* and at v.65, *o noctes cenaeque deum*) Horace makes his prayer for security and continued enjoyment of his farm to Mercury:

4-5

nil amplius oro,
Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis.

An amazing and unnecessary amount of concern has been generated by this apostrophisation of Mercury, which should not be taken much more seriously than the conventional *reкусatio* of Virgil, for example, at *Eclogues* 6.3f., where the god in question is Apollo or of Propertius 2.1. Take Fraenkel's comments as an example of what may be described fairly as an overly literal approach:

If Horace expected his readers, Maecenas and his other friends, to take this prayer to Mercury as the manifestation of a belief in the god as his personal benefactor, he would indeed be guilty of hypocrisy. It is, however, safe to assume that he relied on the sympathetic understanding of these enlightened men whom he knew to be capable of seeing the difference between the feelings that lay behind the prayer and the form
in which he expressed them.\textsuperscript{25}

In short, Horace's apostrophisation of Mercury, which deity can be described as Horace's particular tutelary deity,\textsuperscript{26} is a graceful compliment to Maecenas, although Horace's later portrayal of himself as a messenger of rather different gods than the Olympians, namely of Octavian and Maecenas, does put a somewhat wry complexion upon the compliment. That Horace's spirit of irony is, as ever, present in the prayer to Mercury and in the verses which follow is also evident. It seems to me that in vv.6-7 Horace consciously echoes a Platonic statement of traditional virtue, which is put into the mouth of the aged Cephalus in the first book of the \textit{Republic}. Cephalus declares that, in terms of making money, he lies in a mean between the profligacy of his father and the tight-fisted acumen of his grandfather.\textsuperscript{27} By this reference to the \textit{Republic}, which parallels the almost undoubted references to the \textit{Phaedo} and \textit{Symposium} in \textit{Satires} 2.2, references which are cited above,\textsuperscript{28} Horace maintains that tension between the sophisticated content and the indigenous form of his pedestrian muse, \textit{musaque pedestri} (17), a tension itself productive of the sparkle and life of the poems. One should also note that Horace's very moderation is an indication of his liking for the Golden Mean of the Peripatetics, \textit{modus agri non ita magnus} (1), his garden (\textit{hortus} in v.2) has inevitable associations with the life style of the Epicureans.

\textsuperscript{25} Fraenkel, p.140f.: one should mention in this context the number of times that Horace uses "o" in this poem about prayer. It occurs in vv.8,10,51,60,63, and 65.

\textsuperscript{26} This may be seen from Horace, \textit{Odes} 1.10; 2.7 and 2.17; the connection between divine and human patron as providers of wealth and supporters of the poet's art is clear.

\textsuperscript{27} See Plato, \textit{Republic} 330b.

\textsuperscript{28} See above, pp.197,199,204 and esp. 262-268.
ideally enjoyed, while the terms *ratione* (6), *vitio* (7) and *stultus* (8) equally inevitably have Stoic connotations. *Ratio* is, as has often been noted, a direct translation of the all pervading λόγος, *vitium* is, as it were, the *ultimum malum*, while a *stultus* is every person who is not a *sapiens*. This final comment has particular verisimilitude in that a discussion of prayer, in a Stoic sense, and of the paradox that all save the *sapiens* are *stulti* was contained within the lengthy third satire of this book. More important, however, than these possible examples of Horatian wit is an acceptable explanation along Stoic lines of the joke which is made by Horace in vv. 14-15:

14-15 pingue pecus domino facias et cetera praeter ingenium, utque soles custos mihi maximus adsis.

Rudd recognises the literary humour of this brief prayer with its antecedents in Callimachus, *Aetia* 1.23.24 and Virgil, *Eclogues* 6.4-5, while Lejay refers to Ovid, *Met.* 11.148 and to Petronius, *Sat.* 70.1. Rudd's explanation is accurate, in so far as it gives the motive for Horace's joke correctly, but does not pick up the similarity between what Horace's prayer asks will not happen to his own intellect and what was, apparently, the fate of Ofellus' intellect in *Satires* 2.2.3. Horace plays upon the desirability of fatness as an attribute of sheep and its unfittingness as an attribute of intellect, especially if the physical nature and explanations of the intellect given by the Stoics, and discussed in the context of

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29 E.g. Cic. *Fin.* 5.1.3 and *N.D.* 1.33.93.
30 See in discussion of *Satires* 2.3 above, pp.39-145.
31 Rudd, p.305, n.3.
32 Rudd, p.244, "The slight inconsistency in the prayer for wealth is muffled by the introductory si quod adest gratum"
Satires 2.2.3 above, are borne in mind, as inevitably they must be after the introduction into the antecedent lines of ratio, vitium and stultus and the memory of Stoic attitudes towards prayer expressed in Satires 2.3. That the ambiguities of pinguis had an abiding attraction for Horace, especially when intent upon the materialistic philosophies, is clear also from Epistles 1.4.15-16:

me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises
cum ridere voles Epicuri de grege porcum.

where a similarly self-derogatory tone is present.

B

HORACE'S URBAN TOILS: VV.16-59

The transition to the discussion of the troubles attending upon Horace as he fulfills his duties to Maecenas in the city is managed economically in vv.16-19. While in his country retreat, where he loves to compose his poems, he is free from the dangers and discomforts of the city. Of great importance to Horace is the fact that it is only while he is in the country that he can consider himself to be his own master. The irony is that that independence and freedom, which he may from time to time enjoy there, is dependent upon the continuing demands which his proximity and indebtedness to Maecenas lay

iuvat, and is then blown away completely in the joke which follows."

33 See Rudd's discussion of this transition, p.244.
34 If we are to believe the beginning of Sat. 2.3, the country was where he found peace and time enough for composition.
35 Compare Davus' comments at Sat. 2.7.28-42.
him open to. It is interesting to note the emphasis upon
Horace's lack of freedom of action in the picture of his life
in the city. After invoking Matutinus as the prosaic muse of
his prosaic verse, Horace describes that deity as the god who
marks the beginning of a day of toil:

20-23 Matutine pater, seu "Iane" libertius audis,
unde homines operum primos vitaeque labores
instituunt, sic dis placitum, tu carminis esto
principium.

Horace's anticipation of a day devoted to opera and vitae labores
is not disappointed: Matutinus himself arouses the poet and
in vv.23-39 we are treated to a bustling description of the
different aspects of that obligation, the nature and origin of
which has already been identified and which Horace feels
compelled to discharge in order to repay Maecenas. We are also
made aware of the ill-feeling to which Horace is subjected.
This is occasioned by the jealousy and ignorance of those
who overestimate his influence with the powers that be. It is,
of course, a continuing complaint in Horace's Satires that the
poet's artistic motives and social position are quite mis-
understood. Even so, one feels that the picture here of the
behaviour and treatment to which Horace is subjected is an
accurate one which contrasts effectively with the description of
rustic contentment, free even of foolish rules about drinking,
of the noctes cenaeque deum (65) enjoyed away from the company

36 E.g. the derisive cry of "Fortunae filius" at v.49.
37 Two characters who misunderstand Horace's artistic aims and
methods are specifically Damasippus in Sat. 2.3 and Davus
in 2.7. Unknown detractors are taken to task in the
literary poems 1.10 and 2.1, while Horace's social position
is misinterpreted especially by the pest in 1.9.
38 Vv.67-70, esp."solutus / legibus insanis."
of the urban deities such as Maecenas and Octavian. However, before discussing the true nature of divine status and happiness, it would be as well to follow through the depiction of compulsion in Horace's journey through the day at Rome. For the concept of duty and compulsion is present in officio in v.24: the specific meaning attached to the word here is of the early morning greeting rendered to patron by his client and which is described so virulently by Juvenal at Satires 5.19-23. The word officium also implies the general obligations of client to patron and even embraces those duties of each citizen to the state and of the corporate state to the gods, which are embraced themselves under the general concept of pietas. At the same time officium, as a technical Stoic term translating τὸ καθήκον, implies that Horace's journey through his Roman day parallels the lengthy and arduous journey of the proficiens towards the distant goal of virtue in and through wisdom which is the summum bonum of the Stoics. Horace's case is more severe than that of the proficiens, since not only is Horace's journey not voluntary, but he also knows that escape is possible by making an actual journey to his country retreat, "in montes et in arcem ex urbe" (16). This escape is not made, within the

39 Seneca at Ben. 3.18.1 makes the useful distinction between an officium, rendered to one whose claim to it is recognised, and a beneficium which is a service or kindness rendered where there is no claim: "officium esse filii, uxoris, earum personarum quas necessitudo suscitat et ferre opem iubet."

40 On pietas seen in terms of the fulfilment of officia see introduction, pp.xvii-xxvii.

41 See Cic. Off. 1.3.8f., "perfectum officium rectum opinor vocemus quoō Graeci κατόρθωμα: hoc autem commune καθήκον vocant." On the essential role played by officia in all aspects of Roman life as understood by Cicero see Off. 1.2.4f.

42 Lejay discusses Horace's use of the day and day's journey as a symbol of life's pilgrimage at p.513, and also in his n. on 1.6.128.
fiction of the poem, however, until v.60 and, in the meantime, the imperative urge, put into the mouth of Matutinus in v.24, speaks of compulsion, as do necesse est in v.26 and luctandum and facienda in v.28. The sense of pressure is maintained by urget in v.29 and by pulses in v.30. I would also suggest that the impersonal ventum est in v.33 adds to the impression that Horace is not master of his own soul while in Rome. It also seems a supreme irony that Horace, who vividly demonstrates in this way his own lack of freedom, becomes himself the object of prayers and supplications and of importunate "clients". First Roscius (35) begs for his attention, although orabat reads almost as a euphemism for "demands", the scribae (36) follow suit and finally an anonymous, but persistent, suitor in v.38 assails him: this final instance, before the interlude of vv.40-48, has in cura both an imperative, which is suitably peremptory in tone and sound, and a word which in its substantive form sums up much of the idea of the load which Horace feels falls upon his shoulders as he shifts from status of country gentleman to urban slave. One may compare the ambiguity of verum which is exploited by Horace in Satires 2.2.7 and 8. For it is clear that this is the position which Horace suggests he holds when in Rome or with Maecenas. It still gives him pleasure, but his position is by no means as grand as those who like to look upon the circle of Octavian as gods would seem to believe.

The quiet and even trivial informality of vv.40-48, although they end in an outraged invidiae noster, form an island of calm reality in the surging race of life at Rome. Horace is too honest it seems to preen himself merely because of his propinquity to the great. For Horace's favours are not
sought after for his own sake:

51-53  o bone, nam te
     scire, deos quoniam propius contingis, aportet,
     numquid de Dacis audisti?

Maecenas and his powerful friends are "gods"; so far as Horace too is concerned they are "gods", since they have the power to send him back to the country, where he feels that he belongs, and, as his bitter rejoinder in vv.54-55 suggests, because they have the power to punish any indiscretions, had the knowledge sufficient for him to be able to commit any:

54-55  at omnes di exagitent me
       si quicquam.

The stress here seems to be on the omnes in the phrase omnes di. These are the somewhat nebulous group of gods whom we have already come across and whose anonymity has given Horace the opportunity to compliment Maecenas and also refer to the household of Octavian as gods. This is in v.4 and in v.22, also in v.52; they reappear in a specifically Epicurean guise at v.65. The individual gods who, apart from Mercury and Matutinus who have already been discussed, help to keep the concept of divinity alive in the reader's mind are Hercules in v.13, Libitina in v.19 and Fortuna in v.49, while it is also a temptation to give rumor in v.50 a capital letter, so that as a personification it would parallel Virgil's Fama in Aeneid 4.173ff. and Petronius' Fama in his Bellum Civile, v.211 in the Satyricon, 123. One should also mention in this context the phrase ante Larem in v.66. By his use of mortalem in v.58 Horace also emphasises that mere propinquity to the great does not confer divinity. The only "divine" happiness, which a man of Horace's capabilities and pretensions can aspire to, is to be
found away from the toils of the city, since:

59  perditur haec inter misero lux non sine votis.

There is in non sine votis, I believe, a hint not only of the silent prayers which Horace makes for release, but also of those not so silent prayers which are directed at him as a functionary of Maecenas.

C

ESCAPE TO THE COUNTRY: VV.60-76

It is consistent with Horace's beliefs regarding the most effective means of satirical composition and with his frequent use of himself as a target, and therefore a medium, for satirical comment that he eases the transition between the attack upon the city's toils to the praise of country bliss by making gentle fun of himself and enjoying a joke at the expense of the Pythagoreans. For vv.60-62 seem to anticipate Davus' comments, misguided though they may be, at Satires 2.7.111-115, and are also reminiscent of the equally misguided comments put into the mouth of Damasippus at the start of Satires 2.3, especially in vv.3-4 and vv.11-16. There is further evidence of Horace's skill in maintaining the thematic and structural continuity and unity of his poems in the way in which mortalem in v.58 is picked up both by sollicitae iucunda vitae, which occurring at v.62 anticipates itself vv.93-97 of the urbane mouse's speech in the tailpiece, and also the joke at the expense of the beliefs of the Pythagoreans. Further there is here a case of continuity by contrast, which may explain why Horace introduces the devotees of Pythagoras at all at this
stage of his poem. Whatever the reason for abstaining from beans, what is certain about the doctrines of the Pythagoreans is that they adhered to a belief in the immortality of the soul, in metempsychosis and, therefore, in the necessity of cultivating the soul during its terrestrial sojourn in a human body. The obligations, which this belief puts upon the human being who, as it were, temporarily leases the immortal soul, are quite at odds with the popular Epicurean view expressed by the town mouse at vv.93-97, and which are implied by Horace's own picture of Epicurean friendship in the banquet and good conversation of vv.65-76. It may also be that Horace has in mind the views on the immortality of the soul which were crudely expressed by Ofellus in Satires 2.2, where, as was indicated above, there were specific and ironical references to the theories ridiculed by Plato in the Phaedo.

Since, however, one of the major themes of the poem is the true nature of divinity and which, if any, of mortals can aspire to such a status, it might be of use at this juncture to consider the views of the Epicureans and Stoics, to see if they can throw any light upon the problem as it exists within the poem, especially since the gods make their last overt appearance within the satire at v.65, where, as has been stated above, the aura is Epicurean:

65-67 o noctes cenaeque deum quibus ipse meique ante Larem proprium vescorvernasque procaces pasco libatis dapibus.

The aura is Epicurean especially in the sense that the gatherings

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43 See Lejay's note ad loc. for a discussion of the ancient views on this particular taboo.
44 On the influence of Pythagorean views on Plato, see Bluck's Meno (Cambridge, 1964) pp.61-75.
of Horace, his slaves and his friends, who are all freed from all care and restraint, reflect the life of ease and perpetual contentment, of secure ἀταραξία, which was the prerequisite of the gods as conceived of by the Epicureans, the almost Homeric picture of which is presented to us by Lucretius at De Rerum Natura 5.1169-1193. The security of Horace is suggested by the word proprium in v.66 and it seems that Horace is already anticipating a successful outcome for his request to Mercury in v.5. The parallel with the blissful state of the gods of Epicurus is especially emphasised also, since Horace and his friends have no concerns with the affairs of other mortals, even in a frivolous sense and certainly no desire to interfere in them. Horace and his friends appear to utilise, if that is not too strong a word, the gods of the Epicureans as they were intended to be utilised by the master himself, that is as models of a perfection of eternal bliss. No positive material benefits (or damage) was to be derived from them and, therefore, no obligation, other than the pleasant one of imitation, was due. As models of a perfection towards which humans could but aspire unsuccessfully they were elements in what Bailey describes as "a fine conception of religion and far more exalted than the traditional beliefs which Lucretius decries."

However, such an ideal view of life and religion, abstracted from the cares of contemporary life, is not permanently tenable by a man whose duty to his actual benefactor keeps him

46 Vv.70-72.
47 Vv.72-73.
at times in the city and whose enjoyment of those noctes cenaeque deum is the fruit of that service. Also, the life of Epicurean withdrawal, however amenable it may be, takes on the complexion of the parasitic, if the proper officia, which are the ultimate prerequisites of that existence, are not performed. The life of the Epicurean community, which appears mirrored in the society of Horace and his neighbours, is only tenable if security is provided by a stable government. Stable government and the rigours of city life, which are the inseparable concomitants of stable government, demand a philosophy which is made of sterner stuff. Thus it is that Syme writes, "This Epicurean man appeared to surrender to a Roman passion for frugality and virtue, a fervent sympathy with martial and imperial ideals." Part of Horace's willingness to endure the discomforts of city life sprang from a clear-sighted recognition that a compromise between aspirations and realities was required, if the aspirations and ideals were even temporarily to be enjoyed. It was equally the result of Horace's clearness of vision, which is, after all, not out of place in a satirist, that he recognised that the exclusive and abrasive idealism of the Stoics, as pilloried in Satires 2.3 and 2.7, was also unsatisfactory as an exclusive answer to the complex practical problems involved in surviving contemporary society. Cicero in the De Officiis was well aware too of the need to adjust the rigour of Stoicism to the demands of political and social expediency. The views put into the mouth of Ofellus in Satires 2.2 were equally unsatisfactory as an exclusive guide to the good life, if such a single concept was even itself viable. For

it is clear that, if we take Horace as an example and employ the satirist's own technique, he was himself required to function on different levels in different environments, only some of which were congenial to him. Even as Horace's descriptive satires, such as 1.5; 1.9; 2.4 and 2.8, mirror the variegated nature of the life he enjoyed, and alternately endured, and also the diverse environments within which he lived it, so it seems that the satires of "moral dialectic", such as 2.2; 2.3; 2.6 and 2.7, display, often in an ironical manner, since that is an essential element of Horatian satire, the different types of moral philosophical theory, exotic and indigenous, through the knowledge and sifting of all of which Horace suggests he is enabled to survive the demands of life in an increasingly complex society.

Horace's own intimate knowledge of exotic philosophies also enabled him to rationalise, often ironically, the attitudes of others less gifted than himself to his own patron Maecenas and to Octavian. It also enabled Horace to investigate rationally his own feelings towards Maecenas in the light of discussions upon friendship which were an essential part of both Epicurean and Stoic ethical theory. The treatment of the circle of Octavian in Satires 2.6 as "gods" by the importunate nuisances who assail Horace is an example of ironic comment and rationalisation on the poet's part, a comment which holds the views of the Epicureans and Stoics firmly in mind. For, if we take the Epicureans first, it was the habit of later Epicureans to treat as a god the founder of the school himself. This was because of the benefits which he had showered upon ordinary mortals, who were therefore indebted to him, and despite the fact that Epicurean physics denied any possibility
of survival for the human soul as an independent and intelligent entity. The famous apostrophisation of Epicurus as a god by Lucretius in *De Rerum Natura* 5.8-12:

\[
dicendum est deus ille fuit deus, inclute Memmi, qui princeps vitae rationem invent eam quae nunc appellatur sapientia, quique per artem fluctibus e tantis vitam tantisque tenebris in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit.
\]

is the most famous example of this attitude towards a great human benefactor, while it is also reflected, in a sense, in the description of those whose services had qualified them for a life in Elysium in *Aeneid* 6.50 Epicurus himself made clear that men who lived according to his doctrines also were like the gods, in everything except presumably their immortality. This sentiment is recorded at *Epistle to Menoeceus*, 135, \(\delta \varepsilon \, \omegaς \, \Thetaεις \, \epsilon ν \, \lambda νδρωποις\), which seems to be an anticipation of v.65 in this poem.

More important, however, for our present purpose is the attitude of the Stoics towards those who might be described as gods, although their basic, and unshakable, belief was pantheistic rather than either polytheistic or monotheistic. The whole cosmos is an intelligent living creature endowed with life and intelligence by the interpenetration of the divine πνεύμα or λόγος called in Latin *ratio* or *Providentia*,\(^{51}\) and thought of as benevolent. However, the Stoics found it convenient to employ the language of conventional religion with

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50 Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.660-665; Virgil clearly thought that Octavian merited the title *deus*, at least in poetry, at *Eccl.* 1.6-8.

51 E.g. Cicero, N.D. 2.22, "nihil quod animi quodque rationis est expers id generare ex se potest animament compotemque rationis. mundus autem generat animantes compotesque rationis animans est igitur mundus composque rationis."
regard to naming the different aspects of divinity and, on occasion, their devotional literature, for example Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, matches the genuine religious enthusiasm of Aeschylean tragic lyric. Their reverence for the sapiens in whom the divine spark burned most brightly, and their generally anthropocentric view of the cosmos, which they conceived of as being created for the sake of gods and men, naturally led them to develop an idea of the divinity of such persons who had conferred great benefits upon humanity. It would certainly seem from the thought put into the problem by the Roman Stoic and pontifex maximus, Q. Mucius Scaevola, consul in 95 B.C., that the conflict between Stoic views on the gods and popular views was a cause of some concern. He overcame "the difficulty about the popular religion by distinguishing on Stoic lines three classes of deities, (i) mythical deities, celebrated by poets with incredible and unworthy narrations; (ii) philosophical deities, better suited for the schools than for the market place; (iii) civic deities, whose ceremonies it is the duty of state officials to maintain, interpreting them so as to agree with the philosophers rather than with the poets."

In addition to this group of three, and relevant to our study of

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52 E.g. Minucius Felix Octav. 19.10, "idem (Zeno) interpretando Iunonem aera, Iovem caelum, Neptunum mare, ignem esse Vulcanum, et ceteros similiter vulgi deos elementa esse monstrando, publicum arguit graviter et revincit errorem."

53 As demonstrated esp. by Cic. Fin. 3.75.

54 E.g. Stobaeus, Ecl. 1, p.184.8 W, κόσμον δ' εἶναί φησιν ὁ χρόνιθε τοῦ σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων' ἡ τὸ ἑκ θεῶν καὶ ἄνθρωπων σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. For a humorous comment on this aspect of Stoic teleology see Cic. Fin. 5.38, "ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret"; cf. also Cic. Fin. 3.64.

55 Arnold, Roman Stoicism p.384; the source quoted is Aug. Civ. Del. 4.27 and 6.5; the authority is Varro.
Horace's attitudes and those of the plebeians in *Satires* 2.6, we may cite Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 1.38:

> At Persaeus, eiusdem Zenonis auditor, eos dicit esse habitos deos a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, illa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina.

Maecenas was certainly a person from whom Horace had received *magna utilitas ad vitae cultum*, which would qualify him, if ironically, for divinity according to the Stoic Persaeus, while in providing Horace with the means by which "fluctibus a tantis vitam tantisque tenebris / in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit", he was at least as deserving of the title *deus* as was Epicurus himself. Octavian also, by now *divi filius*, could be thought of as *deus* in these terms, because of his services to Rome and Italy, and because of the obligations which the people of Rome and Italy owed to him. Part of the humour of this situation lies in the fact that, while it is possible for the naive and philosophically ignorant to think of the circle around Octavian as godlike, if only because of their personal power, wealth and, possibly because of their vaunted services to Italy, it was surely not possible for Horace to take any such notions seriously, although he was aware, as no doubt were Octavian and Maecenas, of the philosophical rationalisation capable of giving a degree of intellectual strength to such a theory. After all, Horace had accompanied Maecenas in a journey across Italy which was to culminate in Octavian officially employing the title *divi filius*, a journey during which

56 Octavian assumed the title of *divi filius* in 40 B.C. after the Treaty of Brundisium, the journey to which meeting with Antony is described in *Satires* 1.5, which also explains the sarcastic attitude adopted towards Fonteius Capito, "ad unguem / factus homo", 1.5.32-33.
Maecenas at least had shown human interests in keeping with the frivolities in which Horace was allowed to participate according to the authority of the poet's disclaimer in vv. 40-46 of this poem, e.g.:

42-45  
quam tollere raeda  
vellet iter faciens et cui concredere nugas  
hoc genus 'hora quota est? Thraex est Gallina  
Syro par?  
matutina parum cantos iam frigora mordent.'

These comments on Maecenas prompt a further, perhaps ironical, question: is it possible to be on friendly terms with a god, outside of the poetical world of conventional epic, a world into which Horace was unwilling to venture? For, if the nature of prayer and of those beings who may be considered as justifiable objects of veneration, is a major theme within this poem, Horace is also interested from an intensely personal point of view in the way in which his relationship with Maecenas should be handled, since not only is Maecenas seen as a divine benefactor, within the humorous fiction of this poem, but he is also Horace's friend, though not apparently as close a friend, according to Horace, as some would choose to believe. The two themes of prayer and friendship are related and they throw into sharp focus the central question of concern both to Stoics and to Epicureans regarding friendship: is it motivated by self-interest or disinterested affection. If disinterested affection is impossible, because of the giving and receiving of benefit and service, is friendship doomed? This is the point of the extremely serious and personally relevant question in v.75:

75  quidue ad amicitias usus rectumne trahat nos?

57 E.g. "lusum it Maecenas...", 1.5.48.
Friendship had long been a topic of philosophical discussion from the time of Plato's *Lysis* and the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, while Cicero's *De Amicitia* or *Laelius* seems to reflect the work on the topic of the Peripatetic Theophrastus, according to Diogenes Laertius and Aulus Gellius. A major concern was to distinguish between sexual passion, which often was thought of as destructive, and friendship which, by contrast, contributed to the οὐδαμοσία of the individual. The Stoics too were interested in discussions on the nature, motivation and standing of friendship, as can be seen from the fact that titles to this effect (Ὄερὶ φιλίας) are attributed both to Cleanthes and Chrysippus. On occasion the Stoics went so far as to declare that friendship was something per se colenda, placing it in company with, for example, the exalted virtue of justice. On the whole, however, the Stoics were concerned with the concept of amicitia in relation to the sapiens, since they recognised that "friends" chosen mistakenly were potentially dangerous to the moral health of the proficiens, and the identification of "friends" had been recognised as problematic in philosophical circles since at least the time of Plato. The risk to the proficiens is spelled out vividly by Epictetus in *Discourses*, 3.16.3, "It is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered in soot without being a partaker of the soot himself." Accordingly, one only chooses one's friends with great care, although a true friend becomes an alter ego, while a sapiens

58 See SVF. 1. Cl. 1.107.34 and Chr. 3.204.27.
59 E.g. Cic. *Leg.* 1.18.49.
61 Diog. Laertius, 7.23.
was naturally the *amicus* of all other *sapientes*, since, as Cicero writes at *De Natura Deorum* 1.44.121, "nihil est enim virtute amabilius." Such exclusive and extreme views, typical of the intransigence of the Stoa, are of only limited relevance to Horace's discussion of his relationship with Maecenas in *Satires* 2.6.

The same kind of denial cannot, however, be made with regard to the views of the Epicureans on this topic, since the Epicurean views and even controversies regarding the nature, motivation and advantages of friendship do seem accurately to be mirrored in Horace's own thoughts and questionings as expressed in this poem. For one of the most interesting results to come from examining this satire in detail is that Horace appears to be intimately acquainted with the internal disputes of the Epicurean school regarding the basis of friendship and with those divergences of opinion, rare among Epicureans because of the authority of the Master, which are discussed by Cicero at *De Finibus* 1.65-70 and 2.82. These same divergences of opinion were probably occasioned themselves by misguided attempts among the later Epicureans to account for apparently contradictory statements in the *Vatican Sayings* of Epicurus. The twenty third of these *Vatican Sayings* is a useful example, since it declares both that the basis of friendship is, in common with the basis of justice, self-interest and also that "it is desirable for its own sake." The potential ambiguities in such a statement have been compounded rather than clarified by such modern scholars as Cyril Bailey who writes, following Torquatus' description of unorthodox Epicureans responding to criticism of the Academy at *De Finibus* 1.69, that "it is probably safer to suppose that Epicurus did, as usual, found his advocacy of friendship on the
purely utilitarian motive of personal advantage in protection and the pleasures of intercourse, but on that foundation grew a true sense of the more unselfish enjoyment of friendship for its own sake." 62 The more objective approach of J.M. Rist 63 is more helpful, however, in any attempt to gain a clearer understanding of the various elements in the original Epicurean concept of friendship. The basic point at issue in the Epicurean debate is also put by Horace in v.75: are we drawn into the bonds of friendship by expediency, or are (or should) our motives be altruistic? Closely related is the question of loyalty to friends. If the basis of friendship is indeed self-interest, then, "if my own interests clash with those of my friend, do I simply set aside the interests of my friend?" 64 This must be the death of genuine friendship, especially if one's friend took the necessary initiative in forming the friendship, since "it will only occur if one of the parties takes the initiative and first bestows benefits on the other. These benefits, if returned in kind, begin a friendship which will help us to obtain that quietness of mind and body which is the supreme pleasure." 65 Indeed "without friendship a man cannot live a secure and tranquil life." 66

The problem revolves around the precise meaning of the

62 Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, p.520.
63 Much of the following discussion is indebted to the chapter, "The problem of friendship", in Rist's Epicurus: an Introduction (Camb. 1972) pp.127-139.
64 Rist, p.129.
65 Rist, p.129.
phrase δι' ἑαυτῆν αἰρετῆ and we should not be distracted by the occasionally lyrical language of Epicurus when writing on friendship. As Rist points out, the phrase appears to be closely parallel to the Stoic προηγμένον; even as τὰ προηγμένα are chosen by the Stoic proficiens, because they will help to form an ultimately ideal character, so friendship is described by Epicurus as δι' ἑαυτῆν αἰρετῆ, since it is an immediate and unqualified means to the desired aim of an enduring ἀταραξία. As was noted above, the Stoics were willing to describe amicitia as per se colenda and to link it with justice; even so the Epicureans linked friendship with justice and the other virtues as different means to the end of pleasure which was the sumnum bonum of their philosophy.

One would now be justified in questioning the relevance of this discussion to the interpretation of Horace, Satires 2.6 and to Horace's own predicament which is described in it. For I take issue here with Brink's comment that the poem is not essentially autobiographical. Take from the satire the obvious conclusion that the turmoil of life at Rome disrupts that ἀταραξία, which Horace indicates that he can only achieve in those noctes cenaequ deum of rustic withdrawal. A less obvious reason than the traumatic effects of ambition and pressures of duties as to why the Epicurean should avoid the city is described by Rist, "In the public life of the polis we are not only risking the everyday dangers which will arise from

67 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p.72f. makes this point, in company with Bailey, Lucretius, proleg. to v.1, p.65.
68 Rist, p.130.
69 See above, n.59.
70 Brink, p.12; see above, pp.284f.
the hostility of our enemies, but even more seriously, we face losing our friends. Friendship, as we have seen, depends on benefits given, received and reciprocated. If Horace reciprocates to the benefits of Maecenas, as Maecenas would have him reciprocate, by rendering service in the city, Horace puts at risk not only his own ἀταροξία, but also the ultimate source of that ἀταροξία, his friendship with Maecenas, and also, and perhaps most importantly, his prospects for an enduring ἀταροξία. It is hardly surprising that his prayer to Mercury is for security in his happiness, that he mentions the fate of the dispossessed in the context of urban strife, that the satire ends on the same note, as the country mouse twitters:

116-117

me silva cavusque
tutus ab insidiis tenui solabitur ervo.

It seems to me that Horace asks the following question in this poem, at least by implication: should he treat Maecenas as a friend, with all the ties and dangers which that involves, and then live at times a life that would inevitably place a potentially disasterous strain upon that friendship, or, to return to an earlier theme, should he treat Maecenas as a patron merely, almost as a benevolent deity? The latter course would be the safer. Horace could enjoy the benefits of his association, repay formally by discharging duties in town and so securely anticipate the pleasures of less demanding friendships with his country neighbours, with whom he could agreeably discuss the nature of friendship. As has been indicated already the concept of security in friendship is of prime importance and not only

71 Rist, p.128f.
72 Vv.5 and also 15.
73 Vv.55-56.
for present peace of mind. The pleasure of anticipation is a very real one for the Epicurean, even as the memory of a friend long dead can give pleasure. Rist puts it as follows:

Epicurus does not talk about receiving; that he implies would be mere bartering (μαμηλεσε). Rather he thinks about our expectations for the future. Yet although friendship provides such advantages, we must not rush into it - the risks of betrayal are too great - nor must we accept into our friendship those who are too eager for it. They are as unsatisfactory as those who are too ready to avoid friendship altogether."

At risk of labouring the obvious: Horace would not barter with a friend. Such behaviour would smack too much of the political amicitia of the republican period, and would expose a promising relationship to the dangers of degeneration into the type of amoral and mercenary travesty so hated by Juvenal. We can also see from Satires 1.6.70, carus amicis that Horace himself had a genuine concern for the meaning of friendship and his own relationship with his friends. It was preferable, then, to treat Maecenas and Octavian as benevolent deities, more distant than friends, not quite so impersonal as mercenary patrons. It seems to me that these comments satisfactorily unite the two major themes of the satire without undue strain, because of the general philosophical awareness which Horace demanded of his

74 Rist, p.134f.: Horace anticipates country pleasures in vv. 60-64: o rus, quando ego te aspiciam? quando licebit nunc veterum libris, nunc somno et inertibus horis, ducere sollicitae iucunda oblivia vitae? o quando faba Pythagorae cognata simulque uncta satis pingui ponentur holuscula lardo?

75 Juvenal's disgust at Domitian's treatment of his cabinet in Sat. 4 is matched by his horror at the similar way in which Virro treats his dinner guests in Sat. 5; the point here is that Juvenal considers the imperial household a model which is aped in its manners by the disreputable. Horace recognises the potentially deleterious effect upon givers and receivers of the patron/client relationship. The relationship is incompatible with friendship if such a degeneration takes place.
readers, an awareness which would ensure that they knew of the various attitudes to divinity, discussed in the context of Horace's prayer to Mercury, and also of the Epicurean concept of friendship. If this interpretation of the bulk of the poem, which is spoken *propría persona* by Horace, confirms suspicions regarding its Epicurean tone, what are we to make of the tale of the town mouse and his rustic friend, the fable with which the satire closes?

D

**MYTH: VV.77-117**

Mention has already been made of Rudd's comment on the fact that the fable of the two mice sums up much of what the satire is about, is serious in tone and, in common with the remainder of the poem, is predominantly Epicurean in spirit.\textsuperscript{76} It will be the intention of this discussion to show briefly how the fable summarises the remainder of the poem by deft repetitions and word play and also what aspects are particularly Epicurean in the way that the "escape to the country" and the emphasis upon friendship reflected very real Epicurean preoccupations. I will also suggest in conclusion a way of treating the fable as an integral part of the total edifice of the satire.

The conflict of loyalties and interests between life in the town and in the country is immediately made clear by Horace's careful arrangement of the word order at the opening of the fable:

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\textsuperscript{76} Rudd, p.245; see above, p.289.
79-81 olim

rusticus urbanum murem mus paupere fertur
accepisse cavo, veterem vetus hospes amicum...

The almost crudely ostentatious and repeated use of chiasmus in *rusticus urbanum murem mus* (80), in *paupere fetur accepisse cavo* (80-81) and in *veterem vetus hospes amicum* (81) immediately advertises the themes of town and country and all that entails, of poverty and wealth and the obligations, finally, of friendship, as exemplified in the ramifications of *hospes* (81). However "careful" (*asper et attentus quaesitis*) the country mouse may be, he is yet nevertheless willing to entertain his friend as lavishly as his modest means will allow. The situation immediately answers v.75. The meal which he provides is reminiscent of Horace's anticipations of future pleasures in vv.63-70 of this poem, but also is reminiscent of Satires 2.2.66-69 and 118-125, especially when one bears in mind the *longum post tempus venerat hospes* of the latter passage. In terms of repetition as a means of achieving continuity of theme and content within Satires 2.6 itself, one should compare vv.63-64 with vv.85-86. An irony within the developing poem and fable is that, in his attempts to provide an easeful environment for his friend, an environment parallel to that anticipated in vv.60-62 by Horace in the city, an environment within which a pleasant philosophical discussion can take place, parallel to that anticipated by Horace in vv.70-76, the country mouse provokes an outburst of what may with justice be called distorted Epicureanism on the part of the town friend. The Epicureanism is distorted by the pressures and unnatural and unnecessary pleasures associated with life in the city. In fact, it seems that Horace is taking to task that very eclecticism and
philosophical or ethical opportunism to which he is himself occasionally prone. For, although the town mouse implies an authentic version of Epicurean belief regarding the brevity of human life as the basis of his urge towards hedonistic indulgence, that excessive hedonism, which brings risk in its train, is diametrically opposed to the demands of that ἀγαθόν which it was the purpose of the hedonic calculus to obtain:

93-97 "carpe viam, mihi crede, comes; terrestria quando mortalis animas vivunt sortita, neque uella est aut magno aut parvo leti fuga: quo, bone, circa, dum licet in rebus iucundis vive beatus; vive memer, quam sis aevi brevis."

Horace criticises this "philosophy" by ensuring that it is first contrasted with his own experience of town and country. This he achieves by the verbal echoes between mortalem (58) and mortalis (94), iucunda oblivia vitae (62) and in rebus iucundis vive beatus (96), while quid te iuvat of v.90 may be an echo of v.13 and si quod adest gratum iuvat. Certainly the conflict between the opinions of the mouse and those of Horace, as expressed in the earlier sections of the poem, again mirrors the questions which are discussed by Horace and his friends and which are listed in vv.72-76, especially perhaps the topic outlined in v.74, which echoes itself the opening of Satires 2.2, showing again the close relationship between these two poems.

The topic is:

73-74 utrumne divitiis homines an sint virtute beati.

Apart from the implication that money and virtue are incompatible, the most interesting thing to note is that the desirability of happiness is not in question, only the means to that end. As may be seen beati in v.74 also anticipates v.96, vive
beatus. Further, the discussion, implying the denial of an afterlife as an individually surviving and intelligent entity capable of punishment or reward, echoes the joke in v.63 and references already commented upon to Plato's Phaedo in Satires 2.2. It also seems likely that the "neque ulla est / aut magno aut parvo leti fuga" of vv.94-95 is intended to revivify in the reader's mind the contrast between the status of Horace and his powerful benefactors which is a major theme, especially in vv. 29-59.

The country mouse is persuaded to accompany his friend surreptitiously and by night into the city. The mock epic tone intimates the insignificance of the two mice both physically and intellectually. The new host officiously entertains his guest on other people's leavings. However, the happy evening amidst these deceptive "goods" (110-111) is disrupted by the irruption of humans, noise and giant dogs. The "goods" of town life are specious and almost fatal, magisque / examines (113-114). That which was to make brief life worth living almost curtails life entirely.

Even this brief discussion of the fable of the two mice shows how it reflects themes which are drawn from every different section of the poem and treats them now as parts of a coherent and vivid whole, as indeed they are, but in a slightly larger context, in the satire as a whole. It is I think clear from what has been said that a knowledge of the philosophical views on the nature of the gods, prayer, friendship and the various "true goods" stands the reader in good stead in his attempts to see the satire as a unity. Brink, in fact, talked of the "moral dialectic" of the poem, Rudd of its Epicurean spirit, while Fraenkel, to a lesser extent, and also
Lejay, acknowledge its moral earnestness. The "moral dialectic" is, in fact, consciously related to the formal philosophical discussion or dialogue both by the references to Plato's Republic in vv.6-7 already mentioned and also the catalogue of topics at vv.69-76, which immediately anticipates the content of the fable, even as it summarises the themes of vv.1-76. I would suggest that the fable of the two mice plays a role within the miniature dialogue of the satire which parallels the role of the Platonic myth at the culmination of such dialogues as the Gorgias, the Phaedo and the Republic. The practice was also adopted by Cicero in the Somnium Scipionis at the end of his De Republica. Indeed, it may be a consciously ironical stroke on Horace's part to deny such beatitude to the statesman after the virtual apotheosis of Scipio in Cicero's myth. However that may be, even as Plato's myths draw together the dialectical threads into a consciously beautiful pattern in which logical necessities are transcended, even so the mock-myth of the two mice "transcends" the demands of dialectical necessity to summarise and illustrate in a remarkably vivid and memorable manner all the themes dealt with by Horace in a more prosaic fashion in the earlier sections of the poem. One should stress that, as in a Platonic myth or allegory it is naturally impossible to draw a one to one relationship between elements of the myth and elements of the dialectic, so in Horace's myth the parallelism between the mice and the protagonists in the earlier portion of the poem is not exact. However, it is reasonable to suggest that Horace's position vis à vis the ideal life of the country is reflected, in its modesty of aspiration and emphasis upon peace of mind, by the life style of the country mouse, while the urban life advocated by the mus urbanus, although having
undeniable attractions for Horace as a literary artist, also reflects the discomfort and dangers of service in Rome. There is a further parallel with Platonic thought: although a great artist and literary creator in his own right, Plato bans the artist from the ideal state, because of potential dangers that true reality may become distorted. Horace, in this poem, seems to declare that the benefits of living away from his discriminating literary audience at Rome outweigh the disadvantages. This is the final message of the poem. However, as we realise from the Epistles and the existence of the Odes, the artist was ultimately willing enough to risk his friendship and his calm in the quest for literary perfection. In fact, the one officium which Horace was obliged to discharge for his patron and which was in tune with his natural inclination was the composition of poetry, which, according to Horace, was best done in the peace and quiet of the country.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

It has sometimes seemed impossible to comprehend, when reading Horace's Satires in the kind of detail which a study of this nature has necessitated, how any single poet could have absorbed and unostentatiously utilized so much of what was best in the literary and philosophical traditions of Greece and Rome. For it is not merely the extent of Horace's reading which inspires amazement, but also the lightness of touch with which the poet is able to organise and dispose his material. In coalescing, selecting and moulding to his purpose this vast array of disparate material, it is not surprising that his rate of progress appeared to such of the uninitiated as Damasippus to be painfully slow. Horace has shown himself to be intimately acquainted not only with such admitted sources as the writers of Old Comedy and also Lucilius, but to have a deep knowledge also of Attic tragedy, of the epics of Homer and the didactic poems of Hesiod. Equally important in the creation of the Satires have been the contributions of Plautus and Terence. References have been made to all of these authors in the course of the preceding discussions of but a proportion of Horace's satirical works. Horace has also been shown to have been intimately aware of the doctrines not only of Plato and the Academy, of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, but also of Epicureans, Cynics, Cyrenaics and Stoics. Horace's knowledge has extended to the manner in which the various philosophical schools propagated their ideas and this knowledge has on occasion had a formative influence in the composition of his poems. Platonic influences are evident, as has been pointed out, on the structure of Satires 2.6. This poem is
significantly influenced in its content also by Epicurean views on friendship and by Stoic views on the concept of duty and also on the nature of the gods. In fact, of all the various philosophical persuasions the one which has had the most pervasive influence in various ways, not least upon the content of Horace's longest satirical effort *Satires* 2.3, is the philosophy of the Stoics. It is not particularly difficult to understand why.

One reason, adumbrated in the Introduction and enlarged upon in the body of the thesis, is historical. At a time when Octavian and his circle were formulating policy with the "restoration of the republic" in mind, the now established fact that the ethics of the Stoa, as developed by Panaetius, formed a rational supplement to the *mores maiorum* carried considerable weight. Also the concept of the *imperium Romanum* paralleling the Stoic cosmopolis must have had a considerable pull for a man as alive to the possibilities of propaganda as was Octavian. As a member of the circle of Octavian through his connection with Maecenas Horace was well aware of the political necessities and advantages of adopting and adapting Stoicism as a further means by which Octavian could achieve his political ends. Although it is clear from Horace's own words that he was not a devotee of any particular school, nevertheless Syme's "Epicurean man" seems quite apposite. Horace was also proud to be an Italian and proud of the moral stature of his freedman father. It becomes clear, however, from his attack upon Ofellus in *Satires* 2.2 and his own inner tensions betrayed in *Satires* 2.6 that he recognised the futility of thinking that any single way of thinking, philosophical or not, whether native or alien, could serve as a unique *modus vivendi* amid the complexities of
life as they challenged Horace and his contemporaries. It is also clear that very many of the aspects of the Stoic philosophy, and certainly of certain Stoic practitioners, were repugnant to him. Accordingly he attacks their extremism and exclusiveness of approach in such poems as *Satires* 2.3 and 2.7: but, despite these attacks, it is clear, as has been made clear in the discussions of these poems, that Horace was aware of much that was of value in the ethical theories of the Stoics. At the very least, the Stoic ethical stance was yet another which, adopted by a character within a poem, could provide Horace with another platform from which to observe, describe and instruct humanity. Neither should one ignore the challenge to the poet as an innovator to produce an artistically viable end product from such relatively intractable material as the Stoic and Cynic diatribe. On the other hand, poetically intractable as the diatribe may have been, Horace seems to have recognised the uniquely persuasive techniques of the diatribe as being suitable for exploitation in the propagation of material which is not essentially Stoic. It may be said with some justification that *Satires* 2.2 and 2.6, although they do not have the same exclusively Stoic aura, naturally, as *Satires* 2.3 and 2.7, nevertheless exploit the diatribe form, as well, of course, as exploiting comic and Platonic influence. It is not perhaps surprising that the most eclectic of the Hellenistic philosophical schools should prove of use in these various ways to the most eclectic of Rome's moralising poets. For even though Stoic doctrine could be and, indeed, often was extreme, as was the expression of doctrine, the Stoa was always willing to adapt and to adopt. This adaptability, perhaps more accurately to be described as opportunism, made Stoicism an ideal tool or
butt in the hands of Horace. So much so that it is again perhaps more accurate to talk of the interaction between Horace and the Stoa than the influence of one upon the other.
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