Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea:
The Netherlands, Neutrality and the Military in the Great War, 1914 - 1918

A Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment
Of the requirements
For the Degree
Of Ph.D. in History
In the University of Canterbury
By Maartje Maria Abbenduis

University of Canterbury
2001
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According to the historian Nils Örvik, the Great War witnessed the decline of neutrality as a valuable foreign policy for small European states. The Netherlands was no exception and faced the daunting task of upholding its neutrality whilst resisting pressure from the two belligerent powers flanking the country (Germany and Britain). Neutrality entailed more than maintaining friendly relations with warring states, it also involved upholding strict standards of impartiality and territorial integrity. The roles played by the armed forces to this end were vital. The Dutch armed forces mobilised with the purpose of protecting neutrality and, if that proved impossible, defending against invasion. It quickly became apparent that the two aims were mutually exclusive - neutrality required dispersion of troops, while defence asked for concentration. The war years only heightened the inadequacies of the armed forces to fulfil both tasks, as they were unable to maintain technological parity with warring states. By 1918, the emphasis for the military was on maintaining neutrality, in all its multifarious forms. By that time, its tasks extended well beyond the expectations of 1914, focusing not only on defence and territorial integrity, but also on policing smuggling, interning foreign soldiers, administering municipal affairs in the “state of war” and “siege”, and helping to preserve public order.

The Netherlands managed to stay neutral during the war, but mainly due to the wishes of the belligerents, rather than its own actions. Nevertheless, the military’s involvement in neutrality matters helped preserve its non-belligerency. By 1918, however, the armed forces were less able to protect neutrality than in 1914: they were not strong enough to act as a deterrent to invasion; and there were not enough soldiers to meet required neutrality obligations in the face of increasing demands from the belligerents. The Netherlands' saving grace was that, during 1918, neither warring side could afford the resources to wage war on another front. While neutrality was safeguarded, by the signing of the Armistice, it ceased being the attractive foreign policy that it had seemed to be in 1914.
While academic research can be an utterly isolating experience, academics never work completely in isolation. They simply would not be able to complete the tasks they set for themselves. I am certainly no exception and have many people to thank for their support, the information they provided me, and for acting as sounding boards. Each of them contributed to the development of this thesis in their own way. Of course, how their ideas and influence have shaped into the written work that is in front of you now, is entirely my responsibility. It goes without saying that any mistakes or errors in it are completely my own.

There are many advantages as well as disadvantages to studying outside the country of one’s research topic. Living in New Zealand meant I could not have been farther removed from the materials I needed for a study of the Netherlands in the Great War. Luckily, the financial aid given by the University of Canterbury’s History Department as well as the Canterbury Historical Association’s Postgraduate Travel Grant, allowed me to travel to the Netherlands on three separate occasions. I am very grateful for this support.

First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Vincent Orange, for all the invaluable guidance, support and, most of all, time he has given me over the last four years, as well as Dr. Campbell Craig for taking over some of this supervision in the very late stages of this work. A further debt of gratitude goes out to Susanne Wolf, who not only shared many of her thoughts and research materials with me on internment and other Great War topics, for which I cannot thank her enough, but also helped obtain source materials, proved to be a very able guide to the archives, and a wonderful friend.

I would like to thank a number of people in the Netherlands who helped my research: Piet Kamphuis and the friendly staff at the Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis (Section Military History) in The Hague for letting me use their archives and helping me in every way possible; Dr Peter Romijn and Prof. Hans
Blom of the *Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie* (Netherlands’ Institute for War Documentation, NIOD) in Amsterdam for allowing me to use the NIOD’s resources and letting me participate in their workgroup on the Great War; Dr. Wim Klinkert at the *Koninklijke Militaire Academie* (Royal Military Academy, KMA) in Breda, for some very helpful thoughts on Chapter 2, helping me come to grips with Dutch military terminology, and showing me around the KMA library; Hans van Lith (President of the Western Front Association of the Netherlands) for taking a day out to drive me around the country looking for monuments; the staff at the *Algemeen Rijksarchief* (State Archives) in The Hague and *Legermuseum* (Army Museum) in Delft; and the staff of Amersfoort, Den Helder and The Hague municipalities for fielding some difficult questions about local monuments.

I would also very much like to express my gratitude to: Dr. Marc Frey at the University of Köln for showing initial interest in my project, giving me a copy of his subsequently published book, and helping me define my subject better; Dr. Hubert van Tuyll (Augusta University) for sending me copies of his unpublished papers and stimulating debate; Dr. Leo van Bergen for sending a copy of his article and a chapter of his thesis to me; Assoc. Prof. Geoffrey Rice in the History Department of the University of Canterbury for the information on the influenza pandemic of 1918 and its tragic results; Prof. Pat Bodger of the Electrical Engineering Department at the University of Canterbury for enlightening me about the intricacies of electric current and explaining how much, passing through thin fencing wire, can kill a person; enthusiasts on the WWI discussion lists <wwi-l@raven.cc.ukans.edu> and <1ww@egroups.com> for some interesting debates, facts and figures. I cannot begin to thank the staff of Interloans Department of the University of Canterbury Library enough for all they have done to get obscure references for me. I must apologise profusely for all the extra work I have asked them to do.

My heart-felt appreciation also goes out to Megan Woods and Dr. Andrew Conway for their patience in listening to my many thesis gripes, and to Andrew especially for all the long hours he spent proof-reading this manuscript. To my aunt, Marianne Hesp, and cousin, Floor Boselie-Abbenhuis, go my deepest thanks for
offering accommodation, company, and hours of mirth during my long stays in the Netherlands. I thank my uncle, Teun Abbenhuis, for finding information on the electric fence for me, as well as Rob de Soete for sending me photos and articles on the fence. My grandfather, Ad van den Broek, must not be forgotten for his stimulation and support. A similar debt of gratitude goes to my parents, Harry and Jacintha, who spent a day out of their holiday in Europe to travel to the Belgian town of Hamont to find the monument erected there in commemoration of the fence. I would like to thank my Dad for his time spent proofreading the Dutch citations as well. But most of all, I thank them for all their love and support, as well as that of my sister Wiesje. This work would not have been possible were it not for them. Lastly, but far from leastly, I thank my partner, Michael. Without Michael not only would I have given up many times, I would not have come out of this thesis intact. Academic research can create some lonely moments. Michael filled these with his optimism and infectious good humour. These are just two of many reasons why this work is dedicated to him.

Christchurch, December 2001
Introduction

A Place Seldom Visited: The Great War and the Netherlands

The First World War made an indelible impact on those who lived through it. No event since the Black Death, neither revolution, religious upheaval or war, had touched the lives of Europeans in such a general and far reaching manner.

Adrian Gregory

If the European past is to be transcended, it is by recognizing and understanding its catastrophic character. And that means returning to the Great War.

Jay M. Winter

Throughout the continent, Europeans met the coming of war in August 1914 with excitement, fear and agitation. This was as true for citizens of a small neutral country in the north-west corner of Europe as it was for the inhabitants of nations who were to fight and die by the million. For over four years, Netherlanders lived in the shadow of a war waged in nearby Belgium and France. Throughout that time, they feared invasion, mobilised their Army and Navy, and prayed that their neutrality would be safeguarded. And it was. But neutrality did not protect them from the effects of warfare. On the contrary, it presented them with challenges, crises, and disasters affecting every facet of life. Over 400,000 men between the ages of 20 and 40 were conscripted into the armed forces, removing them from their families and livelihoods. The war hampered shipments of vital goods, and rationing of fuels and foodstuffs became increasingly common. Hundreds of thousands of foreigners, both civilians and soldiers, sought refuge in this little northern state, presenting a mammoth refugee problem. The government put in place new administrative processes and created special bureaus, but most of all it used the military to handle matters for which it had no other solutions.

The years 1914 to 1918 illustrate how in time of total war, no nation, not even a neutral one, can remain immune from its effects. This was especially true for the Netherlands, which was in close geographic proximity to several major belligerents: Wilhelmine Germany flanked the eastern border of the country; Belgium, scene of much Western Front fighting, was situated on the southern border, with France further south still; and to the west, across the Channel, lay the concentrated naval might of Great Britain. All combatants made demands on Dutch neutrality and used their powerful positions to exact compliance. For example, Britain, France and later the United States stopped Dutch trade with Germany by blockading goods entering Dutch ports. In turn, Germany and its allies threatened to halt all coal exports if the Dutch did not open their transport routes to and from Germany and occupied Belgium. Despite being surrounded, caught “between the devil” (Germany) and the “deep blue sea” (ruled by Britain), the Netherlands managed to remain neutral; mainly by compromising with each belligerent, at times compromising its independence and neutrality, and hoping fervently that its neighbours would accept the compromises.

This thesis attempts to analyse the nature of Dutch neutrality during the Great War, principally by analysing the ways it was upheld and maintained from within the country. The work focuses first and foremost on the Army and Navy and their part in securing territorial integrity, sovereignty and upholding the requirements of international law. These
three issues were essential components of the Dutch state's ability to juggle its other neutrality obligation, namely to present an impartial face to outsiders, with the need to satisfy the particular interests of the warring governments in Dutch non-belligerency. Seemingly, the best way to guarantee neutrality status was to ensure that stronger neighbours were given no reason to invade. To this end, it was as important for the Dutch to maintain a large military presence, in an attempt to deter invasion, as it was to uphold international laws, which could give the justification for attack. Hence, policing the various neutrality regulations (imposed by international requirement as much as national law) was as important to the armed forces as the more traditional role of protecting the country's borders. However, as neutrality became an increasingly complicated matter, as the demands of belligerent states on non-warring countries became increasingly stifling, and as it became increasingly difficult for the Netherlands to retain parity with the technological and military strength of warring states, the tasks of the Dutch armed forces became more complicated and contentious and their ability to protect neutrality less viable.

The coming chapters present an analysis of neutrality in its historical context as a problem of national security and independence. It deals specifically with neutrality as an issue of military importance in time of war. It also tries to answer the following questions: Why was the Netherlands neutral in 1914? How did the country manage to stay neutral throughout the course of the Great War? How did the war affect the nature of that neutrality? So, while the Dutch armed forces play the lead role in much of the following narrative, they cannot be seen in isolation from the many factors that affected and interfered with the successful upkeep of the nation's non-belligerency.

HISTORIANS AND THE NETHERLANDS IN THE GREAT WAR

Before we turn to the story of the armed forces and Dutch neutrality during the Great War, it is fitting to first ask why, given that the First World War was such a seminal world event and presented a significant episode for the evolution of Dutch neutrality policy, historiography on the subject of the Netherlands in the Great War has been relatively scant, at least until recently. It seems that Dutch inattention to the conflict stems more from events that rocked Europe between 1939 and 1945 than from those occurring between 1914

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5 See: the section “In Smit’s Wake”, pp. 21 - 29.
and 1919. As we shall see, during the interbellum years, the Great War was seen as a momentous event in the Netherlands and was commemorated and studied accordingly. It was not until the outbreak of the Second World War, in fact, that the earlier conflict lost the meaning it had in the 1920s and 1930s.

One explanation for the decline of the Great War in public consciousness and historiography is the impact of the German invasion and subsequent occupation in 1940 on successive generations. The period of Nazi control over the Netherlands was the most traumatic event the nation endured since its rebellion against Spanish rule in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Not surprisingly, the Second World War has left an enduring legacy, which continues to influence Dutch culture today. For this reason alone, it is understandable why one war has completely eclipsed another in popular memory and also why historians have focused predominantly on explaining the events of May 1940 and their consequences rather than those of August 1914.

Yet the Second World War also had a more subtle impact on the loss of Great War memory, which relates to popular and historical conceptions of neutrality. During the inter-war years, many Netherlanders believed that their neutrality policy had saved them from invasion between 1914 and 1918. While they understood that the war years had been far from easy, the mere fact that they remained neutral convinced them that neutrality was an inviolable foreign policy, that in future conflicts the large powers would respect their territorial integrity once more. Often, they based their beliefs on idealised conceptions of what happened during that conflict. Many attributed the maintenance of Dutch neutrality solely to careful adherence to international laws and imparting an equally unattached attitude to the warring states, rather than focusing on the compromises involved in upholding non-belligerency. The belief that the onus for preserving neutrality lay with the neutral was widespread and subsumed the expectation that it was in the best interest of the world to respect Dutch neutrality as long as the Dutch did so themselves.

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7 The historian James John Porter went so far as to assign such ideas with a label: “the myth of idealistic neutralism” (“Dutch Neutrality in Two World Wars” PhD. diss., Boston University, 1980, pp. vi - viii).
The rhetoric of politicians in the 1930s often emphasised similar ideas. For example, H. A. van Karnebeek (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1918 - 1929) linked neutrality with independence and European peace in a speech he gave in 1938:

we [the Dutch] are caretakers of a territorial integrity that is highly important for the political balance in Europe and for peace. We are trustees! We are in charge of ensuring that this integrity is not endangered and is not complicated. Our position rests on trust that can be placed [by others] in us. We have, therefore, to avoid the appearance that our position, even in time of peace, is useful to another, whichever, power. Rooted in our trusteeship is an obligation to uphold the integrity of our territory, as well as a categorical imperative of defence. The function that we fulfil in the political structure of Europe is a function that rests not only on our own interests, but on those of Europe. Our calling is not only that of neutrality in time of conflict, but of independence in general as a permanent political manifestation. (italics in original)8

Of course, during the 1930s, not everyone was as optimistic about the Netherlands' international position as van Karnebeek. Several important figureheads, including Nicolaas Bosboom (Minister of War, 1914 - 1917) and General C. J. Snijders (Commander-in-Chief, 1914 - 1918) published memoirs in the 1920s and 1930s explaining that Dutch security would be much harder to guarantee in future.9 The political leaders of the nation, despite


their rhetoric, were also under no illusions. They realised that the Netherlands had few feasible options; it remained a small nation flanked by very powerful neighbours. In many respects, holding on to neutrality was a last ditch effort to maintain some independence on an increasingly insecure and unstable European continent. Nevertheless, the rapid capitulation to Nazi Germany in May 1940 came as a huge shock, shattering the faith so many had in neutrality.

At the same time, the Nazi occupation undermined the importance of the entire era of neutrality in the country’s popular history. Non-involvement in the Great War ensured that this conflict lost its original significance after 1945, which helps to explain why, until recently, Dutch historians have not paid it due attention. They did not view the First World War as an important or unique episode in their national history, seeing it only as one event, among many, that tested neutrality during the Netherlands’ supposedly “long nineteenth century”, spanning from 1813 to 1940. In the process, they perceived the war almost wholly as an external event with little impact or developments within their own borders. This selective focus has skewed Dutch history, as the historian M. C. Brands rightly warned, in that the supposed break with the past did not come in 1914, as it did for the rest of Europe and much of the world, but in 1940. The Netherlands’ “twentieth century” was very short indeed (from 1940 - 1991). It has also meant that some Dutch historiography,
even on the subject of World War II, is at variance with international scholarship that identifies the second of the two world wars as a continuum of the first, a Thirty Years’ War of the twentieth century.14

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE GREAT WAR

During the Great War itself, people could not get enough information about what was going on around them. When M. W. F. Treub (Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Industry until October 1914, then Minister of Finance until January 1916) published a book entitled Oorlogstijd (Wartime) in 1916 in which he candidly detailed the economic predicament of the Netherlands in the war, it was so popular that a second edition graced the shelves of bookstores the following year.15 A number of general works on the war situation also appeared during the war.16 These presented a broad account of the conflict, its battles and effects, and each, unfailingly, included at least one chapter on the Netherlands, emphasising its susceptibility to the perils of war. They were targeted as much at youths as adults: in a rather bizarre manner, for example, a meat processing factory in Deventer printed a book for adolescents, which included information on their country’s uncertain situation, and distributed collectable picture cards that could be pasted into it.17 Yet the Dutch were not alone in bringing attention to their plight in the war: foreign books of the time accorded entire chapters to the neutrals (especially Switzerland and the Netherlands).18 This trend continued during the interbellum period.19

19 See: fn 41 below.
Another favourite theme for publications during the Great War was the deployment of the armed forces. The Netherlands’ Army (Nederlandse landmacht) mobilised along with the Navy (zeemacht) and fledgling Air Branch (luchtvaartafdeling) on 1 August 1914. By mid-1919, over 400,000 personnel had served their country in some capacity as soldiers, sailors or airmen. None of them, however, did any fighting. Despite the monotonous daily routine of most soldiers, the mobilisation fascinated civilians, perhaps because everyone knew someone who had mobilised, and many villages, towns and cities, especially in the south, housed, fed and entertained large numbers of troops for years upon end. As a reflection of the universality of the mobilisation experience, a substantial number of publications appeared on the topic between 1914 and 1919.²⁰ A. M. de Jong’s notes (notities), for example, published under the pseudonym F. de Waes in de Nieuwe Amsterdammer (New Amsterdammer), were very popular. The notities were later reprinted in a compendium, as was the novel de Jong wrote based on his years as a conscript.²¹


²¹ A. M. de Jong, Notities van een landstormman. [Notes of a landstorm man] (edited by Johan van der Bol) Amsterdam: Em. Querido’s Uitgeverij, 1975; A. M. de Jong, Frank van Wezels Roemruchte Jaren. Militaire Roman,
Through the medium of newspapers and periodicals, the Dutch also kept a close eye on the “reuzenstrijd” (gigantic struggle). The horror of war shocked but also excited people. Many Netherlanders, especially those in the south, witnessed the war sometimes as spectators - during the opening months of conflict several battles waged close to the Dutch border - at other times by hearing and feeling the reverberations of artillery bombardments from Belgium. The daily, weekly and monthly journals paid constant and almost exclusive attention to military campaigns unfolding around the globe. The unprecedented nature of what was happening made it a fascinating and much-desired topic for readership and discussion, if at times it was voyeuristic. Verwey described the tense anticipation experienced by many during major sieges along the frontlines in Belgium and France:

There is something breathtaking in the expectation [experienced] during large battles. Europe listens. And while we - foolishly - catch ourselves with the desire to strain our ears to listen if perhaps the rumble of cannon thunder on the borders of France can be heard here, and to stretch our eyes from the Dutch dunes to see a fleet off the Belgian coast, we are taken up in the universal speechlessness and know no longer what to think or how to express ourselves.

The Dutch had ample information on the war available to them. Journalists of illustrated magazines, for example, travelled to the Western and Eastern Fronts to chart the progress of the various armies. They perused news from both sides, and because the Dutch media were not plagued by the same censorship restrictions as the press in the fighting countries, information that would have been kept out of newspapers elsewhere was printed.

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22 Headline, Soldatencourant. no. 144, 18 July 1915, front page. Even a cursory glance at a variety of Dutch newspapers during the war verifies this statement. The Section Military History of the Royal Dutch Army (Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, Koninklijke Landmacht) in The Hague as well as the Army Museum (Legermuseum) in Delft hold voluminous scrapbooks filled with hundreds of items snipped out of various magazines (including De Prins, Het Leven Gelijktijdig and Panorama) between 1914 and 1919.

23 "Er is iets ademloos in de afwachting tijdens groote slagen. Europa luistert. En terwijl men - dwaselijk - zich betrapt op de lust het oor te spannen of het niet hier misschien het gedreun kan opvangen van het kanongebulder dat op de grenzen van Frankrijk gaande is, en de ogen uitzet om van de hollandsche duinen een vloot op de belgische kust te zien, voelt men zich in de algemeene sprakeloosheid opgenomen en weet dat men langer noch denken noch zich uiten kan." (August - September 1914) in Albert Verwey, Holland en de Oorlog. (Handboekjes Elek 't Beste) [Holland and the war] Amsterdam: Maatschappij voor Goede en Goedkoope Lectuur, 1916, p. 10.

As a result, the Dutch were better informed than the citizens of the combatant nations because they could receive and print information from both warring parties and show news clips from the respective frontlines in movie theatres. That other states believed such freedom to publish was damaging can be seen from the large number of articles they blacked-out when copies of Dutch newspapers arrived in Britain, Belgium, France and Germany. In 1914, the Dutch Minister in Brussels even requested that his government enforce a ban on the export of the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* (New Rotterdam Newspaper, NRC) to Belgium as it was causing anger among Belgians for its supposedly pro-German attitudes.

Nevertheless, Dutch journalists did not have complete freedom and were subject to censorship even before they could commit their stories and pictures to print. For example, in 1914, *Het Leven Geïllustreerd* (*Life Illustrated*) warned its readers (including a large number of Belgians) that it had no choice but to publish more material from the German than the Allied side of the war, because the Allies would not allow foreign press agents close enough to their battlefronts. Belligerents also released articles to Dutch newspapers in an attempt to get greater coverage of their viewpoint. The combatant governments placed considerable importance on ensuring that Netherlanders remained positive towards them, under the impression that favourable public opinion was essential in case the neutral joined the conflict on their side. To this end, both Britain and Germany pursued an active propaganda policy in the Netherlands, publishing Dutch language magazines, releasing

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25 See: Chapter 8, pp. 283 – 290, for more about censorship in the Netherlands during the Great War.
29 *Het Leven Geïllustreerd.* 9, 40, 6 October 1914, in SMG/DC, [Miscellaneous copies of *Het Leven Geïllustreerd.* 1914 - 1919], 0212/233, p. 1233.
postcards with anti-German or anti-British points of view, and “leaking” damaging news items.30

Within the Netherlands, the government and military controlled the content of newspapers. Censorship restrictions, however, operated on a different basis from those of belligerent states.31 Unlike the belligerents, who tried to keep strategic details, casualty rates and information on military campaigns out of their press, the Dutch censors looked almost entirely for what they considered bias in reports. Any news item considered too extravagant was rejected as “unneutral” and deemed inappropriate. Censorship in the Netherlands had as its sole aim the maintenance of neutrality, because any suggestion of partisanship could jeopardise relationships between the Dutch government and its neighbours.32 Undoubtedly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Loudon, spent a substantial amount of time answering complaints from foreign diplomats about “unneutral” newspaper items.33 But, as we shall see in Chapter 8, censoring in terms of neutrality was a difficult and sometimes impossible task and was not implemented as satisfactorily as some authorities or belligerents may have liked.


31 For more, see: Chapter 8, pp. 283 – 290.

32 Commander of Field Army, Lieutenant-General G. A. Buhlman, to Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General C. J. Sniiders, 5 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf, mede als onderdeel van het Algemeen Hoofd kwartier, 1914 - 1940” [Archives of the General Staff, also part of General Headquarters, 1914 - 1940], entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 90.

In 1917, *The Times History of the War* described the war years as “an epoch” in the Netherlands’ history, and in the 1920s and 1930s the Dutch readily agreed. As A. S. de Leeuw stated, in a history of the country published in 1936: it was not his job to narrate the events of the war as these were too well known to be easily forgotten. The scholarship of P. Luyckx and G. H. J. M. Olthof has shown that it was the First World War, rather than the Second World War (as many believe) that sparked the first surge of interest in contemporary history in the Netherlands. A number of notable (and not so notable) figures published their recollections of the war years during the interbellum period, and a number of books emerged detailing the history of the Netherlands during the war. Of these, the very good works by P. Ritter, H. Brugman and Charlotte van Manen, were, until the recent publication of Paul Moeyes’ history, the only overview studies available in Dutch on the

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domestic context of the war.39 They are particularly important for their depiction of wartime hardships and the many internal and external threats faced by the nation. Similarly, international attention lingered on Dutch war experiences as well. Charles Morgan, for example, wrote a very interesting fictional account of his time as an internee in neutral borders that was published in 1932.40 Several scholarly works appeared in English, which paid attention to neutrality and especially to the economic impact of the conflict.41

Right up until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Great War featured large in the writings and consciousness of Netherlanders, as it did for other Europeans. Historians have argued that the process of memorialisation aided in giving war prominence over other events in the collective memory of combatant nations; the cultural significance of war being related to the extent a conflict was internalised into national consciousness.42 “Memory”, according to Kate Darian-Smith, “is not just a personal process but a collective and

socialised activity”. After 1919, Dutch men and women also commemorated the Great War in a variety of ways. How they did this, given that the war was well-known around the globe for its unique character of memorialisation, provides significant insight into why the Dutch allowed the conflict to slide from memory after 1940.

A substantial amount of interwar literature fed the ready market of the hundred of thousands of men who had served and their families. Between 1914 and 1918, conscripts complained about the nature of the mobilisation. After 1919, they wrote increasingly nostalgic accounts. “Military societies” had a similar purpose of reminiscence and romanticism. Their main aim was the celebration of the annual anniversary of the first mobilisation day (1 August). They also gave financial aid to ex-soldiers and some, like the Nationale Bond “Het Mobilisatiekruis” (National Union “The Mobilisation Cross”), had a more educational role: they tried to ensure that “lessons of 1914 - 1918 be kept in our thoughts”. It was on the eve of the Second World War that this organisation published a commemorative booklet in remembrance of 25 years since the outbreak of the First World War.

For a large part, such remembrances and literature helped foster false ideas about the viability of neutrality. A. Captijn, for example, ably portrayed the popular trappings of neutrality ideals in his play Vlag en Vaandel (Flag and Banner), published in 1931:

This is the land of Justice and Freedom
This has always been the land of peace;
That freedom will only be broken
If our country’s neutrality
Is unlawfully breached....

... Our army today

46 Ibid.
Counts two hundred thousand men,
Then there is the Navy
And others who help;
Also our national character is widely known,
Persevering by nature,
It will not yield to any foreigner,
And when necessary, will not spare any effort.47

At some commemorations, Great War soldiers and sailors were even turned into heroes, not because of their military prowess, but because they provided a tangible entity to thank.

When on 31 July 1924, the tenth anniversary of the mobilisation was remembered in Maassluis, it was with gratitude that the mayor of the town proclaimed that conscripts had been responsible for keeping the country out of the war.48

There were other ways by which the Dutch observed the mobilisation, their neutrality and those who died. Among these can be counted the issue of commemorative medals, including the “bronze mobilisation cross” and its civilian partner, the “white mobilisation cross”, which were awarded during the 1920s by the Nationale Bond “Het Mobilisatie Kruis” in a typically Dutch manner, because eligible soldiers were required to pay for the honour of receiving the decoration.49 While all ex-servicemen, including Snijders, were eligible to receive the bronze accolade, civilians received the white medal in recognition of extraordinary acts in aid of the armed forces. Its first recipient was Queen Wilhelmina, patron of the Koninklijke Nationale Steuncomité (Royal National Support...
Committee), the association responsible for safeguarding the standard of living of citizens, including a large number of soldiers and sailors. Other remembrance medallions had more limited target groups, such as those of the Nederland Overzee Trustmaatschappij (Netherlands’ Oversea Trust Company, or NOT, a consignee company for imported goods), or one that recalled the Fuel Commission and its rationing measures.\(^5^0\)

The most tangible and permanent symbols of remembrance were monuments. There were a number of these built in the 1920s, although by no means as many as in the former combatant nations. A recent booklet distributed by the Western Front Association of the Netherlands listed sixteen monuments and a similar number of plaques for the entire country.\(^5^1\) This is barely one memorial per 420,000 citizens in 1919, a very small number when compared to France’s 30,000 Great War monuments (one per 1,320 people) or to the 1,500 monuments built in the Netherlands after 1945.\(^5^2\) That Great War public shrines were constructed at all, however, does indicate that many in the Netherlands believed the war was worth commemorating and merited raising money.

One of the most important monuments is the mobilisation memorial on the Scheveningen beachfront in The Hague. Officially unveiled by the Queen on 20 September 1921, it acknowledged the contributions made to the country’s safety by the armed forces between 1914 and 1918.\(^5^3\) The funds for its design and erection were collected from public donations by the organisations Ons Leger and Onze Vloot in co-operation with The Hague’s

\(^5^0\) W. K. F. Zwierzina, “Penningen betrekking hebbende op de Nederlandsche koopvaardijvloot tijdens den wereldoorlog” [Medals which relate to the Dutch merchant fleet during the world war] in Hoogendijk (ed.), De Nederlandsche Koopvaardij in den Oorlogstijd pp. 426 - 429.


Municipal Council. A plaque was attached to the side of the memorial in 1932 in recognition of Snijders’ role as Commander-in-Chief during the war. After Snijders’ death in May 1939 and in his honour, hundreds of people attended a wreath-laying ceremony there.

Another monument of thanks, but one that was erected amidst some controversy is the Belgenmonument (Belgian monument) in Amersfoort, built during the 1920s. The memorial pays homage to the Dutch for aiding Belgian internees and refugees during the war. Significantly, a small museum was to have been built close by, which would have housed a collection of items dealing specifically with the refugees. The museum never eventuated, a result perhaps of anti-Belgian sentiment after Belgian demands at the Versailles peace negotiations for the annexation of the Dutch provinces of Limburg and Zeeland. There is, however, a wall raised behind the main building of the monument, depicting sculptured allegories of “Sadness” (Droefheid), which were to have formed part of the museum.

There are a number of other memorials littered around the countryside. For example, in the heaths of the Veluwe in the province of Overijssel a single rock with plaque attached recalls the Belgian refugee camp that stood on that spot, many kilometres from any town or village. Not so very far away, amidst the forests near Nieuw Milligen, a lone white pillar still stands among the trees in recognition of the barracks that were built there during the mobilisation, first occupied in October of 1915 by the 12th Regiment of Infantry. The war monument in Winterswijk is also important. It recalls, with thanks, Dutch neutrality between 1914 and 1918.

55 “Gedenkteeken voor Leger en Vloot, aan de Boulevard te Scheveningen. Mobilisatie 1 Augustus 1914”, Haags Gemeentearchief. During World War II, German occupiers removed the plaque from the monument. In 1948, the monument and Snijder’s plaque were restored to their former interbellum glory (D. van den Berg, Cornelis Jacobs Snijders (1852 - 1939). Een leven in dienst van zijn Land en zijn Volk. [Cornelis Jacobus Snijders (1852 - 1939). A life in service of his country and his people] The Hague: Beveedeem, 1944, p. 123, fn 1).
56 Het Vaderland. Sunday 28 May 1939, front page, in SMG/DC, “Snijders, Cornelis Jacobs 29.9.52” 397/S.
58 Ibid. p. 68.
59 Ibid.
60 Western Front Association (Nederland), 1914 - 1918 In Nederland p. 9.
The commemorative behaviour of the Dutch developed quite differently from that of peoples who had lost an entire generation of youth to the hostilities. While most Dutch monuments were built in gratefulness of their neutrality, communities in nations that had fought built memorials to grieve.\(^{61}\) Almost every town, city, village and neighbourhood in former belligerent countries hosts at least one such monument.\(^{62}\) They helped to give meaning to the mass of human lives killed and maimed.\(^{63}\) They also provided a focal point for collective sorrow, and served to ensure all would heed the warning: “lest we forget”.\(^{64}\)

The Dutch did not have hundreds of thousands of casualties to mourn, nor the monuments to remember them by. Nevertheless, they did have some. On the Scheveningseweg, the road connecting Scheveningen to the city of The Hague, the *visschersmonument* (fishermen’s monument) was officially unveiled in the presence of the Queen on 26 September 1922, “in remembrance of the around 300 fishermen from Scheveningen who lost their lives at sea during the world war 1914 - 1919. They are where there is no night nor mist.”\(^{65}\) A few weeks later, on 14 October in Den Helder, Queen Wilhelmina publicly opened the *marinemonument* (Navy monument), a column erected in memory of the 58 naval personnel who died in the Netherlands and Netherlands’ Indies during the war.\(^{66}\) A special committee was established to organise the collection of money and to build with these funds a fitting remembrance to the sailors. The committee included many important public figures such as J. J. Rambonnet (Minister of the Navy, 1913 - 1918) as well as many provincial governors. Queen Wilhelmina was patron of the monument.\(^{67}\) In 1939, the names of the crew of the Royal Dutch Navy ships *Van Ewijck* and *Jan van*...
Gelder, which had sunk when they hit a minefield near the island of Terschelling, were added to the column. It would not be the last time the memorial was altered. 68

**ELIMINATING GREAT WAR MEMORY, MAY 1940**

While during the interwar years some groups of ex-soldiers celebrated their mobilisation annually on 1 August, the government did not assign a national day of remembrance to the war. There simply was not the same need to remember; there were no “communities of the bereaved” in the Netherlands. 69 Although their war experiences were significant, they were not emotionally overpowering. As a result, Great War remembrance traditions did not take a strong hold of Dutch culture and there was no long-term internalisation of the war in their national historical consciousness. 70 Quite in contrast, the most culturally defining moment for the Dutch in the twentieth century was the German invasion in May 1940. The experiences of Nazi occupation left a long-lasting impression and pushed memories of the Great War to the side. Hence, the desire to remember as the rest of the world had done after 1919 came for the Dutch in 1945.

The intensity of the Second World War experience ensured that two public holidays are dedicated to war memory - *Herdenkingsdag* (Remembrance Day) and *Bevrijdingsdag* (Liberation Day) - commemorated each year on 4 and 5 May. The first remembers those who suffered and died during the war, the other celebrates regained freedom afterwards. Over the years, Remembrance Day has evolved and now observes other periods of conflict as well. For example, the official commemorations held at the monument in the square of the Royal Palace in Amsterdam, also recognise all women and men who served and died in service of their country - in military or peace-keeping operations - from September 1939 onwards. All post-1945 conflicts are included, yet the war that saw around 400,000 conscripts mobilise between 1914 and 1919 is not.

Due to the loss of the Great War from the public and historical mind, Dutch monuments built during the interbellum have suffered extensively from neglect over the last 60 years. It is striking that in the Netherlands the Great War has lapsed from public

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68 Correspondence with Bert van der Meer, Head of Section Communication of Den Helder’s Municipal Council, June 1999.
69 Winter, *Sites of memory, sites of mourning* p. 6.
70 Brands, “The Great War die aan ons voorbijing” p. 10.
consciousness, and that even though World War One monuments still stand they have become almost “invisible”. Not only are they difficult to locate, many are in a desperate state of disrepair, others have fallen victim to weeds, and some have been entirely altered. The mobilisation monument in Scheveningen, for example, still exists, yet finding it without knowing its exact position is complicated. It took a photo from the 1920s with identifiable buildings in it for me to locate the statued obelisk on the beach. The visschersmonument proved even more difficult to find, and suffers from severe neglect. It stands among overgrown bushes and scrubs almost obscured from the road by trees and has become an easy target for graffiti artists. The municipality of Amersfoort, however, embarked in November 1998 on a grand-scale restoration of the impressive belgenmonument and its gardens in their community. Locals hope that as a result of the restoration process, the monument will be placed on the rijksmonumentenlijst (State Monument List).

Most symbolic of all in terms of Great War neglect is the marinemonument in Den Helder. In the closing months of World War Two this memorial was hit during an air raid on the town. Locals restored it after 1945: the process included the removal of the inscription to the 1914 to 1918 years, the covering up of the 58 original names on it with marble slabs, and its rededication to “those who died”, by which both the citizens of Den Helder as well as all those who were killed while in pay of the Navy are implied. The monument is now the official World War Two monument for the port city, and is the scene for wreath laying ceremonies every year on Remembrance Day. Nothing on the memorial itself harks back to its origins, to the Great War, nor do the commemorations recall the previous world conflict.

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71 Kooiman (ed.), De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht p. 735.
73 Correspondence with Bert van der Meer, Head of Section Communication of Den Helder’s Municipal Council, June 1999.
Illustration 1 and 2: Den Helder Monument

The “Navy Monument” in Den Helder as it stands today in commemoration of the Second World War. Note the marble slabs covering up the original 58 names of sailors who died during the Great War. Nothing on the memorial recalls its original purpose, namely, the remembrance of those who died in the Dutch Navy between 1914 and 1918.

(Source: Maartje Abbenhuis)

IN SMIT’S WAKE

It would be highly misleading to claim that since the Great War was largely forgotten after the end of the Second World War there is no post-1945 historiography available on the Netherlands in the Great War. Of what is available, however, most pertains to international relations, trade, and neutrality laws. C. Smit was the first major author since the 1930s to attempt a revival of Great War study. In the 1960s, he was responsible for editing several volumes of Bescheiden Betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland (Documents regarding the foreign policy of the Netherlands).74 Using these sources almost

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exclusively, he wrote a series of books and articles on the topic of the Netherlands between 1914 and 1919. The most important of these, the three volumes of *Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog* (*The Netherlands in the First World War*), despite their promising title, were little more than a study of foreign affairs policy and Dutch international relations. Much criticism was levelled at this work, which incited Smit to write a somewhat apologetical collection of essays, *Tien Studiën* (*Ten Studies*), in which he brushed up on topics he failed to cover in the previous three books. Yet his publications were mainly descriptive with very little analysis and the reader’s overall impression is that Smit did not attempt to impart either a systematic survey of foreign policy or the motivations behind neutrality. There is, therefore, a particular need to revise *Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog* and remedy these shortcomings, especially when examining the intricacies of Dutch foreign relations. The historian, Marc Frey, has recently taken some important steps to rectify Smit’s limitations by analysing the economic implications of Dutch foreign policy with Germany, Great Britain and the United States. It is indicative that despite their critique of Smit, few

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of his contemporaries attempted to address the issues he missed, at least not in great detail. Their scholarship during the 1950s and 1960s dealt with similar subject matter as Smit, but it tended not to extend beyond the odd article. 79

Smit did manage, however, to attain some recognition for the war. It was during the 1970s, following the publication of Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog, that the Great War received mention in several overview histories, including Gerald Newton’s The Netherlands: an Historical and Cultural Survey, and a good chapter by W. von der Dunk in Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (General History of the Netherlands). 80 Another significant achievement during this decade was R. L. Schuursma’s eleven volumes surveying the European war, including several chapters on the Netherlands and neutrality. 81 Studies of the war as a topic integral to Dutch history were not as forthcoming.

In the last 20 years there has been a revival of sorts in the writing of the history of the Dutch nation in the war. Of note are the book and articles by Marc Frey on trade relations, 82 H. A. R. Smidt’s works on the export industry, 83 Hubert van Tuyll van
Serooskerken’s study of diplomatic-military relations, and a large number of good, although not comprehensive, articles and theses on the internment of soldiers, the exchange of POWs, and the refugee crisis. Other detailed studies on neutrality have also appeared.


Although they all fill important lacunae, most are devoted to international events. Frey’s work, while filling many important gaps in understanding of the period, was written from the perspectives of Germany, Great Britain and the United States. Smidt, despite his very good explanations of ministerial policy, concerned himself with trade going abroad. Van Tuyll focused on the important role played by Dutch diplomats and spies, yet also dwelled on the impact of military plans and strategies of the belligerent powers. The scholarship on internees and refugees had as its principal characters foreigner which found themselves on
the neutral side of the border, the highest ranked being Kaiser Wilhelm II himself, who fled imperial Germany on the eve of revolution, and sought refuge in the Netherlands. 87

Although these topics are essential to attaining a comprehensive knowledge of the Netherlands’ plight in the war, research in these fields is far from complete, especially in research addressing the internal and social consequences of the war on the Netherlands. 88 Until 2001, only a few fringe works existed in this field including a thesis on coal distribution, a small book on the sea-fishing industry, and a pivotal study by A. M. P. Kleijngeld of mobilised troops in the city of Tilburg. 89 Kleijngeld not only ventured into “new” military history by concentrating on societal effects of the armed forces’ mobilisation, but he is one of few historians who have taken these aspects of a neutral’s predicament into account. Lately, Paul Moeyes’ book Buiten Schot (Out of Shot), provides a broad narrative and, at times, anecdotal history of the Netherlands in wartime, moving between international and domestic events of significance. 90 It is a timely addition to the study of the Netherlands in this seminal conflict, and illustrates, if anything, the need for more detailed research on subjects that Moeyes only has a chance to encounter briefly.

“Traditional” military historians have given somewhat more attention, but far from enough, to the war. There is some comparative work available on the relative merits of the three mobilisation periods (1870, 1914 - 1919, and 1939 - 1940), although the assessments are incomplete. 91 The only attempted in-depth study of the Netherlands’ armed forces in the Great War is a Masters thesis by James Bout, which although accurate in broad facts is far from comprehensive. 87

90 Moeyes, Buiten Schot.
from flawless in detail and analysis. While Bout presented some important ideas about the Dutch military, at times he relied too heavily on the benefit of hindsight, at others failed to provide evidence, and, as a result, made faulty assumptions and numerous sweeping statements about the nature of the Netherlands' defences in the period 1870 to 1914; the wartime mobilisation; and the lack of insightfulness presented by the nation's civilian leadership. Wim Klinkert, on the other hand, has written some very informative articles on a similar subject as Bout and his Vaderland Verdedigd provides a succinct history of the Army and defence before 1914.

As the works by Moeyes, Frey, and van Tuyll attest, the historical profession has rediscovered the subject of the Netherlands in the Great War of late. No doubt, a plethora of works will appear in the near future, aided in no small part by the attention given to the topic by the Nederland Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (Netherlands' Institute for War Documentation, or NIOD) and some Dutch universities. Perhaps, M. C. Brands' paper in 1997 on Dutch neglect of the subject has struck a nerve.

What is especially interesting is that historiographical neglect of Dutch neutrality in the Great War corresponds with similar disregard of other neutrals' experiences. The Danish historian, Carstren Due-Nielsen, for example, has made similar conclusions about

93 Ibid. pp. iii, 4, 16.
96 Brands, “The Great War die aan ons voorbijging".
the writing of Denmark's war history. Perhaps the cue for the lack of interest has come from the international historical profession itself. It is undeniable that histories of wars tend to cast the role of neutrals to the peripheries. Wars are, after all, about belligerents and not about non-participants. When neutrals do feature in the general history of the war, they are analysed almost exclusively in terms of their impact on the outcome of the conflict or on the belligerents' ability to continue fighting. Since the Carnegie Studies of the 1920s and 1930s, the domestic history of neutrals or neutrality in the Great War has been largely ignored. There are, of course, a number of books available on the theory of neutrality, but very few on its effects on the internal workings of a specific nation-state. When mixed with the language barrier - most of Europe’s neutrals, save Switzerland and Spain, speak languages unique almost entirely to their own territorial borders - the neglect becomes almost explicable.

Yet it took more than military forces to fight the First World War. It was a conflict of immense scale involving the economies, industries, material resources and work force of all the belligerents and often those of neutrals as well. Now that the writing of the history of how the belligerents fared has been written and rewritten numerous times, recovery of how the neutrals experienced the war is required. Without the neutrals, Great War study would be incomplete. It is imperative, therefore, to follow the examples set by Schmitt, Neutral Europe between War and Revolution and a growing number of others, not only to salvage...
the war experiences of the various non-participating nations, but also to place them within the spectrum of war and society literature.\textsuperscript{100}

**DUTCH NEUTRALITY, THE MILITARY AND THE WAR**

While the subject of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the Great War has received attention from historians in various formats,\textsuperscript{101} the mechanisms involved in upholding neutrality have yet to receive due stress in their scholarship. This thesis investigates the part played by the Dutch armed forces in maintaining national security, upholding territorial integrity, and safeguarding the nation’s international obligations during the war. It is, above all, a study of neutrality from within the country, rather than a study of Dutch relations with their neighbours, or the impact of neutrality on warring states, although inevitably these matters receive due mention. The following chapters keep broadly to a chronological order, but are arranged thematically, each dedicated to one aspect of the military’s multivarious neutrality tasks, or to the consequences of that neutrality for the armed forces and, more broadly, on Dutch society.

The history of Dutch neutrality on the eve of the Great War is portrayed in Chapter 1. The focus of the chapter is on three inter-related reasons as to why the Netherlands was able to remain out of the war in 1914 when its only neutral neighbour, Belgium, could not. Firstly, neutrality was in the interest of the Dutch state: an alliance with one of the warring sides was clearly not an option since it would entail either losing colonies to the Allies, or facing invasion by a stronger Germany. Furthermore, since the Netherlands had no territorial ambitions on the European continent, it had nothing to gain by going to war. Likewise, neutrality would guarantee (it was hoped) continued trade relationships with belligerents and other neutrals. Secondly, remaining neutral was in line with the nation’s


\textsuperscript{101} See: section “In Smit’s Wake” pp. 21 - 29.
traditions of *afzijdigheid* (remaining aloof) in international affairs and reflected general public opinion about the role of the country in the world.

Of course, the desire of the Dutch to stay neutral mattered little if any of the great powers had sought to capture the Netherlands. In other words, the third and undoubtedly most important reason for the survival of Dutch neutrality was that it depended on the will of stronger states. Germany could easily have crossed through Dutch territory on its way to France, as it did to Belgium and Luxembourg during the night of 3 and 4 August 1914. The Netherlands, while it had an army of significant size (200,000 soldiers mobilised on 1 August 1914), could not prevent or halt a concerted attack by the large conscript armies of Germany or France, or even Great Britain's well-equipped and properly-trained volunteer force - a true reflection of the Netherlands' small power status. Yet both the Central and Allied powers had distinct interests at stake in Dutch neutrality and feared occupation of the territory by their opponents above all. Keeping the Netherlands non-belligerent prevented the warring sides from capitalising on the strategic, economic and territorial advantages capture of the country may have given, but it also kept these advantages from their enemies.

Where Chapter 1 gives the contextual background to Dutch neutrality on the eve of the Great War, Chapter 2 provides a similar analysis for the Dutch armed forces. It provides an overview of the make-up of the Army, Navy and fledgling Air Force in 1914, and illustrates how each was expected to protect the nation if invasion came. In turn, the chapter functions as an essential introduction to the problems involved in upholding neutrality regulations as well as maintaining defensive capabilities. It also provides context to later discussions on the relative value of mobilisation and defence, the complexities of supporting a conscript army during more than four years of crisis, and the problems associated with modernising the military to maintain parity with warring states. The chapter highlights a recurring theme, namely, that the viability of the armed forces was central to the viability of the country's neutrality.

Chapter 3 addresses the “mobilisation days” of late July and early August 1914 and looks at how the Dutch prepared for war and neutrality, the importance of the “Api Api” telegram in aiding these preparations, as well as civilian responses to the mobilisation. The mobilisation itself is analysed in terms of its relative military worth. The inadequacies of mobilisation are highlighted since they affected the ability of the armed forces to fulfil their neutrality obligations during the years of conflict ahead.
Chapter 4 introduces the international obligations of the neutral state in time of war. It also mentions the role played by the armed forces in preserving the regulations and evaluates their most clearly identifiable task, namely the protection of territorial sovereignty. Before turning to external breaches of territorial integrity and illustrating how strict adherence to international law often had to give way to compromise, the chapter looks at what part deterrence played in the maintenance of neutrality and in dissuading other nations from invading. The chapter also addresses the fundamental contradiction involved in assigning the military both the duty to defend the country and the duty to protect its neutrality, at times mutually exclusive goals given that what was important for defence did not necessarily correspond to what was best for the protection of non-belligerency. The contradiction between defence and neutrality became more pronounced during the war as the value of military deterrence decreased and the likelihood of the Netherlands becoming a belligerent increased.

The requirement to intern foreign soldiers and their military equipment if they strayed onto neutral soil, proved to be one of the most time-consuming and resource-draining aspects of the military’s responsibility to safeguard territorial integrity. Chapter 5 illustrates how easily the war situation could overtake the ability of the nation and nation’s armed forces to cope, namely by recounting the arrival of 30,000 Belgian and British internees on Dutch soil in October 1914, along with nearly a million civilian refugees from in and around the Belgian city of Antwerp. While the civilian refugees did not present a neutrality responsibility as such, it placed severe strains on civilian and military resources. The internment of foreign military personnel proved to be one of the least controversial of neutrality responsibilities, and the Dutch government was able to capitalise on its role as upholder of international law by initiating POW exchanges through the country, and acting as a safe-haven for escaped POWs and deserters. Yet dealing with the foreigners removed many Dutch troops from the borders and from other essential neutrality tasks, illustrating how easily the armed forces overstretched their ability during the war years.

Economic neutrality was not a recognised responsibility of the Dutch armed forces, except with regard to military contraband, as Chapter 6 describes. Given the emphasis placed on economic warfare by the belligerents, however, the pressure on the Netherlands to abide by rules and regulations that extended beyond contraband issues ensured that military involvement in trade matters, especially in the policing of smuggling activities,
became increasingly more prevalent. Troops had not prepared or trained to become a "police force" for the movement of goods, nor were there enough soldiers available to fulfil the task properly, which emphasises another recurring theme that the ability of the Netherlands to remain neutral took large numbers of soldiers away from defensive duties.

It is out of economic concern, especially the phenomenal rise in smuggling, that the government granted controversial and wide-ranging emergency powers to the military. Initially, the jurisdiction of the "state of war" and "siege" were confined to border areas, ports and waterways, but by the end of 1917 encompassed nearly three-quarters of the country. Chapter 7 considers the powers given to the armed forces in the "state of war" and "siege", as well as some of the consequences involved in using a law designed as a temporary measure to a protracted period of military, economic and social crisis. The chapter focuses primarily on legal aspects of the "state of war" and "siege" laws, because this aspect of neutrality maintenance has received little attention in scholarship and because it had a considerable impact on the armed forces’ ability to uphold "internal neutrality", namely, on their ability to keep Dutch residents from breaching required neutrality standards. Subsequently, Chapter 8 considers the types of "internal neutrality" responsibilities attended to in the "state of war" and "siege", including smuggling, espionage, censorship and the movement of people and their property. Germany's unique response to Dutch neutrality, namely by erecting a deadly electric fence along the Dutch-Belgian border is also mentioned. The fence illustrates how important Dutch neutrality actually was for Germany, but also indicates how the Germans tried to keep the advantages neutrality provided to the Allies at a minimum.

In Chapters 9 to 12, the thesis moves away from the manner in which the armed forces protected neutrality, towards an analysis of how the war influenced the ability of the country, and especially the military, to uphold neutrality. Chapter 9 answers the question: how does a neutral nation resource and maintain an armed force and retain a minimal level of parity with the warring sides? Put simply, with great difficulty. Because the Netherlands was a small nation, it was not industrially self-sufficient. As a neutral, of course, it could not obtain necessary military goods from outsiders without encountering problems. In other words, the Dutch suffered the fate of a small industrially weak nation in wartime, unable to preserve even nominal technological equality with its warring neighbours.
The inability to keep up with their neighbours applied equally to the human strength of the military. Chapter 10 acknowledges how the Dutch could not produce the mass conscript armies needed to fight and win in this war. It also introduces the notion that part of the problem was a decisive lack of public willingness to support the military in its drive to increase the size and strength of the Army. The chapter is devoted to the issue of demobilisation, an extremely popular political agenda during the war years, and illustrative of the polarisation between the expectations and opinions of the military and civilian leadership. Of course, the ability of a nation to stay neutral relied heavily on the willingness of its people to support that neutrality in all its forms.

The crises of 1918, the year in which the neutrality difficulties discussed in the previous ten chapters collide, receive exclusive attention in Chapters 11 and 12. The Netherlands faced social turmoil in 1918 due to a severe lack of foodstuffs and coal, war weariness, and the Spanish influenza pandemic. A wave of “anti-militarism” spread through the country at the same time as the Dutch government faced its severest test of non-belligerency yet. Its actions and those of the armed forces during this year demonstrate that the nation’s primary aim was no longer upholding neutrality, but staying out of the war at whatever cost. The costs involved, however, were high and included the loss of international independence and the well-being of citizens. It also included a series of military mutinies and the forced resignation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It is in the final chapter that the price of staying neutral become all too clear, as does the realisation that the Armistice came none too soon for the Dutch nation.
A Nation Too Small to Commit Great Stupidities: The Netherlands and Neutrality, 1813 - 1918

It was as if it was self-evident that nobody would busy themselves with the Netherlands

H. T. Colenbrander (1920)

The essence of neutrality is the avoidance of war: namely, the avoidance of being involved in the wars of others. But despite its deceptively simple definition, neutrality is not a homogeneous concept. It has changed meanings over the centuries, reflecting the concerns of states adopting it as their foreign policy and those desiring to challenge its validity.

Neutrality has a long history going back as far as the sixth century B.C.E. when Milesians abstained from supporting either Ionian Greece or Persia. During the Middle Ages, it was common practice for warring parties to refrain from sinking ships of countries not involved in the conflict. In the fifteenth century, neutrality became a vaguely defined quasi-legal term referring to nations that opted out of a particular war. Neutrals at that time could profess partiality to one or other side and could supply it with all manner of materials, including military goods. Neither contraband regulation nor impartiality were widely followed, although neutral ships were protected from privateering. Napoleon’s disregard

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1 H. A. Lorentz, Dutch physicist and Nobel Prize winner, late nineteenth century, in Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. xii (also in Vandenbosch, “The small states in international politics” p. 303).
2 “Het was alsof het vanzelf sprak, dat niemand Nederland moeien zou” (in H. T. Colenbrander, “De internationale positie van Nederland tijdens, vóór en na den wereldoorlog” [The international position of the Netherlands during, before and after the world war] in Brugmans (ed.), Nederland in den oorlogstijd p. 103).
5 Ørvik, The Decline of Neutrality pp. 11 - 12.
for the proclaimed non-belligerency of several European countries, including the Netherlands, entailed the death of old-style neutrality, and the birth of neutrality based on international law. During the 1800s, neutrality, influenced by the American Act of 1794, had as its cornerstone the maintenance of territorial integrity and impartiality. International conventions, such as those formulated at the Paris Conference of 1856, at Geneva in 1864, in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and at the London Conference in 1909, aimed to regulate the laws of warfare and the rights and obligations of neutrals in time of conflict and peace. They provided the basis for neutrality in the twentieth century.

Since then, in legal terms, neutrality defines a relationship among nation-states in wartime, namely between those who fight and those who choose not to. Although nations can profess neutrality in peacetime, the conditions of neutrality only apply in time of conflict. International neutrality laws place clear obligations on the behaviour of belligerents and non-participants with regard to each other, and in return guarantee the latter certain rights of territorial integrity, security and unhindered trade (except for contraband). For these reasons, it is an extremely attractive option for states that have little to gain and much to lose if they are involved in war. Needless to say, neutrality is much more than a definition in international law. Neutrals have to work within the complex web of inter-state relationships, which often do not adhere to the wording of legal documents nor to the arbitrary wishes of countries wanting to remain detached from the activities of their neighbours. Hence, in time of war, neutrals tread unsteadily, much like a juggler walking a tightrope. They have to balance themselves between the demands and concerns of the warring sides while attempting to keep their own interests in play. It is all too easy for the juggler to lose balance, drop the balls, and plummet into the beckoning void.

During the nineteenth century, nations regarded neutrality as a viable foreign policy. Small states were especially attracted by neutrality, as it seemed to guarantee some control over their destinies in an international arena where great powers grew ever stronger. In real terms, small states could not compete, or even attempt to compete, with the armed might or accumulative resources of their neighbours. Adhering to strict neutrality became an exceedingly appealing option to protect their sovereignty. The international move to regulate and clearly define laws for the conduct of countries in wartime, helped increase

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7 Örlik, The Decline of Neutrality pp. 16 - 17.
8 Ibid. pp. 18 - 21; Rubin, “The concept of neutrality” pp. 22 - 23.
these expectations. It was not for nothing, then, that the word "neutrality" (neutraliteit) in the Dutch language has associated connotations of zelfstandigheid (independence) and afzijdigheid (aloofness).

Yet the implementation of neutrality as foreign policy was far from easy, especially for a small country. Despite attempts at aloofness and the expectation "that nobody would busy itself" with a neutral, nations like the Netherlands were not cocooned from international realities. Neutrality did not guarantee independence in time of war, although it was a way of possibly safeguarding it. Instead, states relied on two vital prerequisites for their neutrality to work: firstly, the means and ability to uphold the necessary neutrality regulations and to protect themselves from internal and external breaches thereof, and, secondly, the willingness of other states to recognise their status. Neutrality can only work, therefore, if a country can uphold its own security in the face of possible threats and other nations do not wish to force the neutral into a conflict. As Efraim Karsh explained:

On the face of it, neutrality is the opposite of the 'typical' policy followed by the small state. Given its narrow power base, one would assume a tendency on the part of the small state, particularly while confronting a great power, to try to balance its inherent weakness by drawing on external sources of strength. Neutrality is the opposite situation: one in which the small state, of its own accord, chooses to rely exclusively on internal sources of strength rather than on powerful allies. But if neutrality does not constitute the 'typical' policy of the small state, it clearly and blatantly depicts both the relative weakness of the small state, as well as the room for manoeuvre available to it.  

The Netherlands in the Great War provides a fascinating case study of a small weak state with this nineteenth-century interest in security. It managed to stay out of the world conflict while all of its neighbours, including neutral Belgium, with which it had most in common, were dragged into the war. It could easily have suffered the same fate as Belgium. Why did the Netherlands not become a belligerent between August 1914 and November 1918? How did it remain neutral? These two questions form the basis of this study. They are especially pertinent given the well-substantiated claim that the Great War witnessed a decline in the viability of neutrality as a foreign policy option for small states. Nineteenth-century conceptions of neutrality based on international law were not tenable

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10 Ibid. p. 4  
11 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 313; Örvik, The Decline of Neutrality.
during a general war involving the world’s major powers. As Wilhelm Carlgren stated in relation to neutrality in the Second World War, which holds equally true for the Great War:

in the Great Powers’ scheme of things … respect for neutrality and the rules of neutrality carried far less weight than regard for their [own] interests. A small country, which wished to live through a World War with its freedom and independence intact, was obliged to adopt in full measure a corresponding scale of values. 12

This leads to a further question also explored in this text: What value did neutrality have in protecting Dutch security and independence in the face of great power demands? Put simply, very little.

The survival of Dutch neutrality during the Great War relied on many different factors. First and foremost, it depended on successful diplomacy and trade negotiations with the warring parties, especially Great Britain, Germany and (after 1917) the United States. Dutch relations with the belligerents have received much, although by no means exhaustive, attention in the historiography of the war. 13 Secondly, how the great powers viewed the advantages and disadvantages of Dutch neutrality was vital to its continued feasibility. Historians have given considerable thought to this aspect of neutrality maintenance as well. 14 Thirdly, what the Dutch did to protect themselves from neutrality violations, to advertise the benefits of neutrality (in the eyes of belligerents) and to diminish its costs, had an equally important bearing on whether ultimately they would stay out of the war. It is this third aspect - the internal requirements of neutrality - that has received far less notice in the study of neutrality or in the history of the Great War. Consequently, this thesis will focus on the internal mechanics of neutrality rather than on diplomacy or on great power politics. Of course, none of the three elements exist in isolation, nor can they be studied as such, since what a neutral does affects, and is closely related to, its relations with other states, which, in turn, affects how they view the merits of neutrality. The choice for the researcher is in deciding from which angle to pursue the issue.

13 As examples: Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands; Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Three volumes; Porter, “Dutch Neutrality”; Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I.

For the Netherlands, staying neutral was an extremely complex matter given its peculiar situation in Europe and given the intense interest of the warring powers in its activities. It had to uphold international laws, maintain impartiality, preserve territorial integrity, protect trade relationships and heighten military deterrence. Since the Dutch were unlikely to enter the conflict of their own accord, they could only be forced to join through an openly belligerent act. Everytning they did, therefore, had the potential to give reason for either the Allies or Central Powers to reassess their interests and to interfere. What was so peculiar about the Netherlands was that it was so vulnerable: it was surrounded by major military powers (Germany, Great Britain and France); was geographically wide open to invasion; had immense strategic value; ruled a large and virtually undefended empire with numerous natural resources; and relied on foreign sources for military supplies, grain, fertilizers and fuel. More than any other European neutral, excepting perhaps Belgium,

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16 Smidt, “Dutch and Danish Agricultural Exports” p. 140.
there seemed to be every reason for the belligerents to force the country into the war. Yet in its vulnerability also lay the key to the ultimate success of its neutrality. The warring sides could not allow their enemies access to the advantages that capture of the nation afforded. It was better to have the Netherlands neutral than to have it participating in the war on the other side. Being caught between the devil and the deep blue sea may have been the bane of the Netherlands; in the end, it was also its saving grace.

THE ALLURE OF NEUTRALITY

To understand Dutch neutrality in the Great War requires knowledge of what attracted them to it in the first place. After the Napoleonic Wars, the Netherlands no longer counted among the influential nations of Europe. It effectively became a third-rate power when Belgium seceded in 1839. Security issues were paramount for the newly-established monarchy, but allying with one of its stronger neighbours was difficult principally because the Netherlands acted as a buffer zone at first between France and Britain, and later between France, Britain and the new German Empire. An alliance with one might provoke invasion by another. The country was strategically significant for these powers not only because of its geographic position, but also because it controlled the mouths of three important rivers, namely the Rhine, the Maas (Meuse) and the Schelde (Scheldt). The Rhine linked the North Sea with the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr and stretched into Alsace and Lorraine, provinces often fought over by French and Germans. The Maas river ran from the Netherlands through Belgium (Namur) and down into France. In turn, the Schelde was the only outlet to the sea for the Belgian city of Antwerp, and was considered, like the Maas and Rhine, to be a vital trade route into the continental mainland. Control of one or all three rivers gave significant territorial and strategic advantages in north-west Europe.

In many ways, the Netherlands profited from its geo-strategic position, because each of the powers had sufficient reason to keep the others from exerting too much influence over it.\(^{17}\) This was especially important because against the armed forces of its neighbours, the Dutch Army and Navy stood little chance. Not only were they out-matched by the material superiority of Germany, France and Britain, geographic considerations made

effective defence even more difficult. Unlike another neutral, Switzerland, the Netherlands lacks defensible boundaries. While the Swiss can hide relatively securely behind their mountain ranges, the Dutch have no such advantage. Theirs is an extremely flat country apart from a couple of hills, which they enthusiastically call *bergen* (mountains). Their only other natural ally is water. An elaborate inundation network could be brought into play (*Nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie*, New Holland Waterline) with the potential to hold up any attackers coming from the east. However, its success relied on adequate foreknowledge of a pending invasion as the raising of water levels took several days. The railway system complicated defence further because the lines ran sufficiently close to the border with Germany to require a full-scale mobilisation three days before an expected attack from that direction - otherwise they could be captured pre-emptively.\(^{18}\) In other words, defending level territory against a well organised, well-trained and much stronger armed force was going to be virtually impossible.

\[\text{Map 1: The Netherlands in Europe, 1914}
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\(^{18}\) Schulten, “Van neutralisme naar bondgenootschap” p. 11...
The advantages of neutrality were, therefore, obvious. The security of the Netherlands within Europe was complicated, however, by the possession of a large empire outside the continent. For centuries, it had looked abroad for its prestige, status and commercial strength. The colonies, especially the East Indies, were critical to the economic development of the motherland; moreover they entitled the Dutch to a measure of international standing.19 Between 1880 and 1914, during the so-called “Age of Empire” when European states along with the United States and Japan aimed for the formal and informal domination of the world,20 the Dutch recognised that their many colonies might become the objects of international rivalry. The issue of empire thus became important to the policy of neutrality at home, as a threat to an overseas possession could result from a conflict within Europe while an imperial dispute could influence a continental war.

Since the Netherlands was a militarily weak state, it was unable to adequately protect its overseas dominions. Instead, it looked to consolidate its hold over those colonies that were deemed most important (especially to trade)21 and remove itself from areas that were indefensible or jeopardised relations with other states. It pulled out of the Gold Coast in West Africa in 1871 for these reasons, while furthering its hold over the East Indian archipelago in Bali, Aceh and Celebes.22 Another related complication of empire was that only British naval power could effectively protect the Dutch empire.23 But an alliance with Britain could not guarantee security within Europe: the British had only a small standing army to deploy against Germany, the nation most likely to threaten the Netherlands. At any rate, many Dutch loathed the idea of an alliance with Britain especially during and after the Boer War (1899 - 1901), a conflict that fomented profound pro-Afrikaner (and anti-British) sentiments among them.24 Likewise, if the Dutch had been willing to overlook the French invasion in 1795, a coalition with France was another possibility, although this risked

23 Ibid. p. 102; Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy pp. 83 - 84.
24 Ibid. p. 102; Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy pp. 83 - 84.
worsening relations with Germany, their closest neighbour and strongest economic link. In the careful balance of power wrought in the late nineteenth century, obvious allies were few and far between.

Map 2: The Netherlands, 1914
Marking major railway lines, towns and fortified positions (large grey lines)

Neutrality, furthermore, made extremely good business sense. Over the ages, the Netherlands developed as a commercial mediator within and outside Europe. Economically, it relied heavily on seaborne trade. In 1914, for example, the Dutch merchant marine was larger than that of the French, Italians or Spanish. Their merchants were able to capitalise on the country’s favourable geographic placement, giving easy access to the seas and useful river routes into Europe. They relied on peaceful conditions so that distribution of their
goods went ahead unhindered. In time of war, this access was endangered, but neutrality, at least in theory, allowed markets to be maintained and kept sea-routes open. Trade concerns played a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy, which was made even more necessary as the Netherlands had substantial reciprocal trade relationships with both Britain and Germany, where its goods and freight were exchanged for German and British raw materials. The Netherlands could not give up one trading partner for another. This made neutrality, in case of a war between Germany and Britain, a matter of economic prudence as well as military necessity.

Yet over time, neutrality became more than a recognised key to independence and profitable trade. By the turn of the century, it was a raison d'être for Dutch national character. Neutrality symbolised Dutch virtue in the popular mind. Its moral quality was closely linked to the ideology of the religious blocs in Dutch society. Political-religious leaders, such as Abraham Kuyper, proclaimed that his nation fulfilled a missionary role in the world, that it was predestined to preserve international peace and the legal order by means of setting a religious and moral example. This had the result of turning neutrality into an inviolable principle, as much a “sacred political dogma” as a religious one. But, even the non-religious zuilen (literally “pillars” or social blocs) were attached to neutrality, as it was an important aspect of national identity. In many respects, neutrality existed as a unifying theme across the various social ranks, reflecting a commonly-held view of history. Neutrality was seen as the next logical step in a proud tradition of religious freedom and human rights, harking back to the Golden Age of Grotius in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a time when the Netherlands stood at the pinnacle of economic, artistic and intellectual prowess.

Even with its large empire, by the turn of the nineteenth century, the Netherlands could not compete effectively in global-power politics. Instead, neutrality gave it a claim to international significance. For the Dutch, involvement in the legalisation of neutrality carried with it cultural self-esteem. Neutrals did not resort to violence (except within their

own colonial sphere), but rather to rights and obligations set down by international law. A people who could place themselves above power politics and military ambitions were morally superior: more learned, more cosmopolitan, and more unselfish. By holding the Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 in The Hague, and building the Carnegie Peace Palace in the same city, the Dutch enhanced this self-portrait: the Netherlands was a nation unlike others, having outgrown political and military ambitions and concerned only with peaceful trade.

Such perceptions of neutrality were entrenched in Dutch identity by 1914. Of course, the perceptions themselves did not greatly influence foreign policy choices made during or after the war, but they did legitimise non-involvement among the population. In other words, even if a useful alliance had been on offer in July and August 1914, which it was not, it is unlikely that the Dutch government would have welcomed it as long as the country was not in immediate danger. Its chosen path was clearly to remain aloof (afzijdig) from the fighting if this was at all possible. This is what the Netherlands had done successfully in the Franco-Prussian war (1870 - 1871), which had seen its armed forces mobilise for several months, and what it would continue doing as long as the rest of Europe allowed it.

THE CORNERSTONE OF NORTH-WEST EUROPE

The Netherlands held a strong position in the balance of power in nineteenth-century Europe. In 1815, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the great powers sanctioned the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a territory that included all of Belgium. The united Low Countries acted, as mentioned above, as a buffer zone between France, Great Britain and Germany. In this circumstance, neutrality was attractive, because siding with any of the large states would have upset the security equilibrium and given considerable

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29 The Dutch offer to Belgium in late July 1914 for military co-operation in case of a German invasion of both countries will be discussed in Chapter 3, p. 106. The offer was quickly withdrawn when Germany guaranteed Dutch neutrality without doing the same for Belgium.
territorial advantage to an ally. Even combined, Belgium and the Netherlands were not large enough to exert significant influence in international affairs; they were, in the words of one commentator, “too large for a napkin but too small for a tablecloth”. This would remain a major stumbling block to closer Dutch-Belgian relations after Belgium seceded from the Netherlands in 1830. Once Belgium attained official independent status in 1839, its geo-strategic importance (bordering both France and Germany and providing a territorial barrier between Britain and France) was heightened. For almost entirely this reason alone, Europe’s major powers (Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia) imposed a state of permanent neutrality on Belgium, guaranteeing that they would come to its rescue if it were attacked. The Netherlands, on the other hand, did not have its neutrality guaranteed, principally because it was not as pivotal to separating the west European nations. Yet the conditions that forced neutrality on Belgium made it equally attractive as a voluntary foreign policy for the Netherlands.

With the rise of Germany/Prussia as a major power in Europe and the creation of Bismarck’s complicated system of alliances (1862 - 1890), the leanings of particular states (however small) became increasingly important. Countries like the Netherlands had the potential to upset the Bismarckian balance drastically and, as a result, small European states gained significance far beyond their size. By staying neutral, the Netherlands helped maintain the status quo. To a certain degree, the Dutch were aware of their potential to disturb the peace and believed that their neighbours would respect their neutrality for the same reason. It helped reinforce the idea that neutrality was not only sacred to themselves but to other Europeans as well. This belief was borne out by the Franco-Prussian war, when the French and Germans respected both the neutrality of the Netherlands as well as that of Belgium.

In the dozen or so years leading up to the outbreak of the Great War, two increasingly antagonistic camps replaced Bismarck’s careful balance-of-power system. Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary found themselves surrounded by a loose alliance of

32 Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. 245.
34 Paul W. Schroeder, “The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System” The International History Review. 6, no. 1, February 1984, p. 3.
35 Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy pp. 4, 59; Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Eerste deel p. 4.
Russia, France and Great Britain. In the atmosphere of tension and rivalry that pervaded these years, the neutrality of certain states took on a different significance. As the likelihood of conflict became more a question of "when" than "if", neutrals could not simply hope that their sovereignty would be recognised by the two powerful factions. The range of advantages and shortcomings of neutrality now came into sharp focus, affecting the options open to the major powers as well as the likelihood of nations, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, being forced into a war. It was no longer a question of neutrals helping to keep Europe at peace, but rather of avoiding becoming involved in war themselves. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the Netherlands (and many other small states) embarked on improving their armed forces and defences from 1899 onwards.36

Whether a small state entered the Great War between 1914 and 1918, was decided principally by the policies of the most powerful belligerents. Hence, Belgium was invaded by Germany in August 1914 because it provided the easiest route for the German armies to reach France. Italy and Romania decided to join the Allied war effort in May 1915 and August 1916 respectively because the potential gains were too good to pass by (as long as the Allies were victorious). With similar justifications but from the other side, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in September 1915.37 The Netherlands did not follow suit.

An important reason for Dutch neutrality during the war, and one often stressed by historians, was the reluctance of the key belligerents, especially Great Britain and Germany, to force the Netherlands' hand or to invade. Germany's original Schlieffen Plan (1905), however, did provide for German armies to move across the Dutch province of Limburg (jutting between Belgium and Germany) through Belgium to sweep around Paris and so defeat France. Its architect, the Chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen, believed it provided the most direct and useful route to France, a goal worthy enough to justify the violation of the acknowledged neutrality of both Low Countries.

36 See: Chapter 2, pp. 56 - 96.
Nevertheless, Schlieffen’s successor, Helmuth von Moltke, made a drastic change to the plan in 1908, avoiding Dutch territory entirely and squeezing all his armies through the small section of the German-Belgian border instead. He had good reason. While crossing over Limburg made sense in logistical terms, allowing the German armies to avoid the heavily defended fortifications at Liège (Luik) and giving five more railway lines into Belgium, it also meant that the Netherlands would be dragged into the war. The 200,000 men in the Dutch Army - by no means a negligible number - would have to be defeated.

before troops could move southwards towards France.\textsuperscript{39} Since the speedy defeat of France was the initial goal, it might fatally delay the advance and furthermore undermine the ultimate purpose of the Schlieffen Plan. This aimed to conquer France as quickly as possible so that Germany could then concentrate its forces on the eastern frontier against France’s ally Russia before it fully mobilised, and here the extra time and resources freed up by avoiding the Netherlands were crucial. At the same time, in acknowledgement of Britain’s interest in the mouth of the Schelde, a German invasion of the Netherlands through Limburg could precipitate an attack by Britain on the Schelde towards Antwerp, thereby throwing the rapid defeat of France and the success of the plan further into disarray.\textsuperscript{40}

A second, and similarly prescient, reason for keeping the neutral out of a future war involved economics.\textsuperscript{41} For von Moltke, the potential strangulation of Germany’s domestic economy through a blockade by Britain’s Royal Navy figured prominently. Neutral countries could continue supplying foodstuffs and other materials (except for contraband), offsetting the disadvantages of the blockade. The Netherlands was especially important because Rotterdam was already the second most valuable gateway for overseas goods imported by Germany.\textsuperscript{42} As well, the potential opportunity of obtaining vital raw materials from the Dutch East Indies (especially quinine, rubber, tin and petroleum)\textsuperscript{43} could not be ignored. Forcing the Netherlands into the war would see this trade go entirely to the \textit{Entente Cordiale} instead.\textsuperscript{44} It was much better, therefore, to keep the Netherlands neutral so that it could remain the economic “windpipe” through which Germany could “breathe”,\textsuperscript{45} at least while Germany had not yet defeated Russia.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Tuyll, \textit{The Netherlands and World War I} p. 26.
  \item Frey, \textit{Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande} p. 38.
  \item There is some debate on whether von Moltke had economic or strategic considerations in mind most when he altered the Schlieffen Plan in 1908-09 (J. A. Fortuin, “Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Een onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog” [The Netherlands and the Schlieffen Plan. An investigation into the position of the Netherlands in German military plans before the First World War] \textit{Militaire Spectator}. 149, 1980, p. 32; Baer, “The Anglo-German antagonism and trade with Holland” p. 129; Tuyll, “The Dutch Mobilization”; Tuyll, \textit{The Netherlands and World War I} pp. 24 - 28). No doubt, both factors were important although von Moltke’s main concern would have been military expediency.
  \item Frey, “Bullying the neutrals” p. 228.
  \item Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 100.
  \item Vandenbosch, \textit{The Neutrality of the Netherlands} p. 4.
  \item “Es muss unsere Luftröhe bleiben, damit wir atmen können” (Helmuth von Moltke, in Schulten, \textit{“The Netherlands and its Army”} p. 78)
\end{itemize}
When Germany invaded Belgium during the night of 3 August 1914, it had the economic importance of Dutch neutrality very much in mind. The day before, the German government officially recognised the neutrality of the Netherlands, although it was quick to request that the Dutch give it benevolent (wohlwollend) treatment. At least until late 1916, the importance of the Netherlands as a source of foodstuffs, especially agricultural products, for Germany cannot be underestimated. The million tonnes received by Germany from the Netherlands in 1915 and 1916 accounted for 50 per cent of Germany’s agricultural imports. Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg even asserted that his country could continue fighting on two fronts until the end of 1916, due entirely to this trade. There were other reasons for appreciating Dutch neutrality as well: the Netherlands provided flank cover against a possible amphibious assault by the Allies on Germany’s western frontier; blocked water access (via the Schelde) to the occupied Belgian city of Antwerp; and granted credit for Germany’s many foreign purchases.

During 1917, the situation changed. The Allied blockade became more successful, especially after the United States entered the war, and neutral countries started relying almost exclusively on their domestically-grown produce to feed themselves. This reduced the volume of goods available for trade with Germany, which was further decreased after the Allies negotiated a series of agricultural agreements with the Netherlands, forcing it to export half of its surplus across the Channel. Even smugglers had fewer goods available to move over the border. The attraction of Dutch neutrality, therefore, dimmed for Germany in the last two years of war. In recognition of this, the German leadership had few qualms in demanding more comprehensive concessions from the Dutch. As a result, the threat posed to Dutch security increased many times. Although Germany came to the verge of declaring war on the Netherlands on several occasions after February 1917, it never did so, mainly because it had more urgent war aims. Diverting troops and resources to a peripheral

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46 Dutch Minister in Berlin to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 August 1914, in ARA, “Kabinetsarchief e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940 (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Kabinet en Protocol, 1871 - 1940)” entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 231; Note from German Minister in The Hague, F. von Müller, to Dutch government, 3 August 1914, in Smit (ed.), Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 - 1919. Vierde Deel 1914 - 1917 p. 11.
47 Frey, “Bullying the neutrals” p. 233.
48 Frey, “Bullying the neutrals” p. 233.
49 Bas, Waakzaam en Weerbaar p. 30; Rooseboom, Militaire Aardrijkskunde van Nederland p. 7; Koch, “Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog” p. 105.
50 For more on smuggling, see: Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
campaign could not be justified as a major concern. Admittedly, strong reasons for invading the Netherlands did exist - among which the use of the territory as an Allied spy base must not be underestimated - but they were definitely less important than the defeat of the Russians in the east and the rest of the Allies and associated powers in the west. For Germany at least, continued Dutch neutrality remained preferable to opening up another front.

For Great Britain (the other potential threat to the Netherlands), there was one compelling reason why it would not violate the neutrality of the Netherlands in 1914, however much it may have wanted to do so. It simply could not infringe the rights of a neutral when it had ostensibly entered the war in the name of protecting those of “little Belgium”.\(^51\) Hence, on 5 August, it also declared it would respect Dutch neutrality as long as it received the same rights as the Central Powers.\(^52\) In terms of blockading Germany, the irony of the situation was that it would have been much better for Britain if the Netherlands had entered the war on either side. For the same reason why Germany valued Dutch neutrality – to circumvent a blockade - the Allies despised it. As a report of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) concluded in December 1912:

In order to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear upon Germany, it is essential that the Netherlands ... should either be entirely friendly to this country, in which case we should limit their overseas trade, or that they should be definitely hostile, in which case we should extend the blockade to their ports.\(^53\)

It is little wonder then, that Britain and its allies had few reservations about restricting Dutch shipping or preventing imports intended for transit to Germany reaching Dutch shores. Along with Germany’s U-boat attacks on neutral ships, the Allied blockade of neutrals presented one of the most blatant contraventions of neutrality laws.

In practical terms, however, even if it had wanted to seize Dutch territory, Great Britain had few realistic chances of doing so. Germany simply would not have allowed it, and it was highly unlikely that an amphibious assault by the Allies could succeed before the

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\(^{51}\) Baer, “The Anglo-German antagonism” p. 84.

\(^{52}\) Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” pp. 21, 39. There was some delay in Britain’s guarantee of Dutch neutrality, namely because it hoped the country would side with the Allies (see: N. K. C. A. in 't Veld, “Spannende dagen. De reactie in Nederland op de Duitse oorlogsdreiging in Augustus 1914” [Tense days. The reaction in the Netherlands to German war danger in August 1914] in Schuursma (ed.), 14-18 Volume 2, p. 350).

\(^{53}\) Quoted in Ferguson, The Pity of War p. 67. See also: Frey, “Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands” p. 543; Frey, “Bullying the neutrals” p. 229.
Kaiser's armies captured the Netherlands' heartland. Despite the CID's assertions in 1912, Britain did not wish to see Germany in command of the Netherlands during the Great War. It would not only have opened up ports on the North Sea and English Channel, from which the Germans could launch naval operations, it would also have given the Germans airfields close enough to bomb the British Isles. Likewise, enemy control over the mouths of the Rhine, Maas and Schelde had to be avoided. Moreover, the potential long-term consequences of German dominance over the Netherlands frightened British policy makers:

Practically [they] recognized that while Germany had a very great interest in keeping Holland [sic] neutral in an Anglo-German war, as this would assure her a flow of goods through the Dutch neutral ports in spite of a British blockade, the British had an almost equal interest in a neutral Holland, for the moment Holland ceased to be neutral she would be overrun by Germany and though Britain would then be able to block the traffic over Holland, the end of the war would probably find the Germans so strongly entrenched in that country that some sort of close, permanent relations between the two countries would have to be acquiesced in.  

In such a scenario, the only real benefit would have been the capture of resources in the Dutch East Indies, but this was definitely a minor bonus if Germany already controlled all of north-west Europe.

If it was preferable to have the Dutch on the Allied side rather than neutral, it was certainly preferable to have them neutral than occupied by Germany. This at least allowed the Allies to use the Netherlands as a base from which to obtain intelligence from Germany and occupied Belgium, and enabled Belgians to escape and join the Allied armies. In fact, the Head of the British Imperial General Staff acknowledged that if it had not been for its intelligence operations in the Netherlands, its entire secret service could have collapsed during the war. Germany was also gravely concerned about Allied intelligence operations, so much so that in 1915, it went to the huge expense and effort to erect a barrier along the 300 kilometres of Belgian-Dutch border, in the form of an electric fence that killed anyone who tried to cross through.

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54 Bas, Waakzaam en Weerbaar p. 30.
55 Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. 105.
56 Smit, "Nederland in de Zevenjarige Oorlog" pp. 184 - 185; Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 162.
57 Smit, "Waarom" p. 85.
58 For more, see: Chapter 8, pp. 275 - 283.
Despite these advantages, Dutch neutrality remained an on-going problem for Britain during the war. While the Allies remained on the back foot militarily, they could not afford to have the Netherlands join Germany. This meant that right up until September 1918, when the tide on the Western Front finally turned in favour of the Allies, they had to ensure the Dutch were kept from participating. It meant that while they pressured the Netherlands into all sorts of economic concessions, when it came to the crunch, Dutch independence had to be accorded higher priority. Through 1917 and 1918, the Allies had little choice but to let the Netherlands compromise its neutrality in favour of the Central Powers. With the increased pressures placed on the Dutch by the Germans, neutrality ceased being as attractive as it might have been for the Allies, yet they could not afford to violate it themselves. Thus, it was the balance of conflicting great power interests in the Netherlands that was chiefly responsible for keeping the country out of the war.59

**DUTCH NEUTRALITY DURING THE GREAT WAR**

While the major belligerents had much to do with the continued non-participation of the Netherlands in the Great War, this would have been impossible if it had not done everything in its power to make neutrality attractive to them. Because the neutrality stakes were so high, how ably the country exercised its obligations and agreements was central to its continued non-belligerency. As a result, not only did the Dutch have to uphold the strictest standards of impartiality, they also did their utmost to abide as closely as possible by the relevant international laws, at least for as long as this was possible. Next to the United States (before it became a belligerent), the Netherlands was the most vocal neutral state in its protests against neutrality violations.60 But when both protests and recourse to international law failed, only flexibility and compromise could take its place. Neutrality may have had idealistic connotations in the public mind, but its preservation had a clear end: to stay out of the war at whatever cost.61

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61 Koch, “Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog” p. 95.
To this end, the Dutch placed a strong emphasis on humanitarian activities. They sent ambulances to the various war fronts in eastern and western Europe, facilitated food shipments to occupied Belgium, enabled the exchange of injured prisoners of war between Britain and Germany (at the expense of the neutral government), and offered to intern POWs as well as enemy civilians within their own borders. They also tried to facilitate peace negotiations, albeit unsuccessfully, again with the hope of being seen as indispensable. Likewise, Dutch diplomatic staff looked after the interests of citizens of various belligerent nations who resided in enemy territory: they represented Turkish, Austria-Hungarian and German civilians in China, Brazil, Greece and Siam (all Entente-friendly states) during the war, and did the same for Allied expatriates in Germany, occupied Belgium, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Apart from humanitarian activities, everything was done within their own borders to dissuade would-be invaders and uphold neutrality standards. The mobilised Army and Navy manned the frontiers, patrolled territorial waters, and sought to increase the size and strength of their forces and defences. Military deterrence was a central component of neutrality: other states might think twice about invading if the costs involved were deemed too great. While the Netherlands could never compete on anything like equal terms with the armed might of Germany, Britain or France, it could, so it hoped, enlarge its military sufficiently to be seen as a nuisance. The military was equally important for the practical aspects of maintaining neutrality: by preventing border violations, whether they came in the form of foreign troops, smuggled goods, spies, or even aeroplanes flying above the Netherlands. These tasks were essential, firstly, because they signalled that the country had the right intentions and was prepared to do its utmost to protect itself, and secondly, because they ensured that the belligerents could have no legal reason to invade.

Naturally, both sides tried to gain maximum advantage out of Dutch neutrality and endeavoured to minimise the benefits for their opponents. Initially, their demands were  

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64 For the internment and exchange of POWs, see: Chapter 5, pp. 164 - 197.

65 Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy* pp. 130 - 131; Smit, “Waarom” p. 86.

66 For more on the value of deterrence and its decline, see: Chapter 4, pp. 140 - 145.
relatively easy to accommodate and the compromises made did not interfere too drastically with the strictures of international law nor with the well-being of the country. After the first year of conflict, as the costs of war increased, the numbers of casualties rose, and the stalemate on the Western Front deepened, the belligerents used the neutrals to claim advantage over their opponents in other ways. By late 1915, economic warfare among the belligerents intensified, by means of blockade and the indiscriminate sinking of enemy merchant ships. Increasingly, neutral nations became the victims of this warfare and the Netherlands was no exception. Through 1916, economic restrictions imposed by Great Britain and Germany made the Netherlands’ position increasingly difficult and upholding strict neutrality ultimately untenable. Finding compromises took far greater diplomatic skill than ever before and, once the United States entered the war in April 1917, it was nigh impossible to steer a middle course. During the last two years of war, the Netherlands’ situation was precarious. In attempting to stay out of the war at whatever cost, it lost most of its independence and its domestic economy suffered immensely as a result of widespread shortages of vital goods.

By 1917, many of the advantages of keeping the Netherlands neutral had been lost to the Allies and Central Powers as well. On top of this, the deterrence value of the Netherlands’ armed forces had decreased significantly. On all grounds - diplomatic, economic and military - neutrality had been severely circumscribed. What kept the Netherlands out of the war now was not its strict adherence to law or its abidance by impartiality standards, both of which had to be renegotiated with the combatants. Continued non-belligerency also did not depend on the reasons why Great Britain and Germany had respected it in August 1914. It would seem, rather, that neither Britain and its associates or Germany and its allies were willing to force the Netherlands into the war. They did not have the resources available to divert troops to another field of battle and even if they found them, troops left on garrison duty would be unavailable for more pressing needs. Instead, the combatants forced as many concessions out of the Dutch as possible, who, in turn, tried to accommodate them wherever possible.

67 For more on the maintenance of economic neutrality, see: Chapter 6, pp. 198 - 230.
CONCLUSION

In August 1914, the Dutch upheld neutrality as the best available option to protect their independence and vital interests. They feared inclusion in the conflict and above all feared invasion by their German neighbours. It was a huge relief when all the belligerents confirmed Dutch neutrality. But the price of peace was high. It involved negotiating with their neighbours, often at the cost of their own welfare and security. It forced the nation into four protracted years of military mobilisation, economic distress (although, as we will see, some Dutch did very well out of the war), and internal strife. The country may have kept out of the conflict, but it surely did not remain divorced from its effects. By the time of the signing of the Armistice in November 1918, its independence had been seriously undermined and neutrality no longer safeguarded its well-being.

The following pages will take up the story of how the allure of neutrality, which gleamed so brightly for an entire century (1813 - 1914), could be dulled within the space of a little over four years. It does so by analysing the mechanics involved in staying neutral during a world war: what does a country have to do within its borders to uphold the required standards and keep invaders away? Specifically, the role played by the armed forces, the so-called “police force” of neutrality, will be evaluated. Of all the resources and institutions available to the Dutch government, it was the military, and especially the Army, that was used to protect the territorial integrity, sovereign existence and security of the country. How successful it was in undertaking these tasks will be assessed, as will the difficulty of keeping an armed force of hundreds of thousands of conscripted men mobilised for such a long period of time without ever entering into battle. Above all, what the next eleven chapters hope to illustrate is how dangerous walking the tightrope between peace and war actually was.
In August 1914, the Dutch armed forces mobilised according to a set of strategic directives designed initially in 1911 and revised in 1913 by the General Staff under the leadership of Lieutenant-General C. J. Snijders. The strategic scenarios had changed little since the Franco-Prussian War and focused on defending the centre of the country. Most cities, industrial and commercial areas were located within the aptly-named Vesting Holland (Fortress Holland) that encompassed the provinces of North and South Holland. At the core of the fortress, 42 fortifications circled the city of Amsterdam, the position to which armed forces (and civilians) would retreat if the outer defences were breached. With some justification, commentators described the fortified position as one of the strongest in Europe, although, given vast improvements in mobile artillery after the turn of the century, its strategic value had decreased significantly by 1914.

1 "Wij leven vrij, wij leven blij, Hoezee!
Aan onrecht doet geen man van ons ooit mee
Daarom wie onze grenzen schendt
Zal vinden hier een leeuwenbent.
Hoezee, Hoezee, Hoezee!" (Willem Steiner “Mobilisatie Augustus 1914” [Mobilisation August 1914] poem, in Stadsarchief Dordrecht, inventory no. 489, Cat. no. 22.952).
2 For an outline of the directives see: Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd pp. 399 – 402. The rank Lieutenant-General was roughly equivalent to the British rank of Lieutenant-General, except that the Dutch ranking system went from Colonel straight to General-Major (Major-General), missing the rank of Brigadier. Nevertheless, a General-Major had two stars and a Lieutenant-General had three (as did their British equivalents). See: Appendix 1, p. 451.
3 “Memorandum: An Operation against Antwerp”, German plan for invading Belgium and the Netherlands, November 1897” (translated text) in J. Steinberg, “A German Plan for the Invasion of Holland and Belgium, 1897”
The strength of the defences lay in the use of inundation, reflecting the extraordinary topography of the countryside. The featureless terrain, which gives the Netherlands its characteristic landscape so cherished by tourists, artists and locals alike, poses a defensive nightmare. Flat territory gives little natural protection so fortified lines and inundations were vital. Flooding has been one of the country’s greatest enemies, but over the centuries the Dutch developed an intricate network of sluices, canals, dykes and dams to control water levels and irrigation. When necessary, the network used to keep water out could be reversed to flood the plains and thereby, it was hoped, halt any advancing

invaders. The inundations were regulated from the New Holland Waterline, Fortress Holland’s first defensive line in the east.

The Netherlands’ geography provided another major dilemma for strategists. The provinces of Limburg and Zeeland, both of great interest to Germany, Britain and Belgium, were virtually impossible to defend. At the foot of the country, Limburg jutted out like a land peninsula into Belgium and Germany. For the strategist, the entire province was too thin, too flat and too long. An invader could easily cut off troops stationed in the province from the rest of the country. Defence was further complicated by the Maas River, which ran along the Belgian border seemingly slicing Limburg from the rest of the Netherlands. As a result, the strategic directives allocated only token defence to Limburg: enough troops to blow up bridges, protect borders and make any advance through the slender territory difficult. Yet this paper-thin bulwark was absolutely necessary to deter Germany (the major benefactor of the Limburg route) from invading, and to convince other nations, especially Britain and Belgium, that the Dutch would protect their territorial integrity.4

In the decade before the war, Germany also put pressure on the Netherlands to ensure that Zeeland and the mouths of the Schelde were adequately protected. The province consisted of a series of islands, split from each other by river tributaries and sea inlets. Like Limburg, troops stationed in Zeeland could easily be isolated from the rest of the country. Here again, High Command allocated a token force. Using warships to cut off the river mouths was another option, but the Netherlands’ Navy was not large enough to meet a concerted attack by either the British Royal Navy or the German Imperial fleet. An option considered in 1910, amid much international controversy, involved constructing a strong fortified position at Vlissingen (Flushing).5 Britain, Belgium and France accused the Netherlands of giving in to German pressure on the matter, implying neglect of neutrality were the nation to go ahead with its plans. In the end, although foundations were laid, the project was abandoned. While artillery pieces destined for Vlissingen were ordered from

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4 Hubert van Tuyll came to a similar conclusion (Tuyll, “The Dutch Mobilization” p. 732).
5 For further information about the proposed Vlissingen fortification and its ultimate failure see: I. L. Uijterschout, 
the German Krupps factories, the Great War broke out before they could arrive. Krupps refused to fill any foreign orders after August 1914.\(^6\)

One major change in strategy after 1900 was the move away from static defence. Here, Snijders was influenced by a European trend that stressed offence as the best means of defence.\(^7\) Under his leadership, the focus of the army shifted from concentrating all troops in a defensive posture within Fortress Holland to creating mobile units of infantry, cavalry and artillery, responsible for halting and perhaps repelling an invasion before it reached the fortified heart of the country. The spread and capacity of existing railway lines made the operation of these mobile forces particularly feasible.\(^8\)

In the directives of 1911 and 1913, the scenarios discussed by the General Staff pitched Germany in a war against Britain or France. In either case, an invasion was possible from the east (by Germany) or west (by Britain).\(^9\) It was also conceivable that armies retreating out of or marching through Belgium could cross the Netherlands’ southern border. Conventional war scenarios - where one country declares war on another and each mobilises accordingly - were of little use. Troops had to be prepared to meet every threat and every breach of territory. In effect, they had to mobilise in three, if not four, directions and in such a way that they protected all waterways, sea-inlets and land borders. To meet these various defensive tasks, the Army was divided into units with distinct responsibilities. The Field Army’s *afwachtingsopstelling* (”waiting position”) saw each of the four divisions and the Cavalry Brigade mobilise in different directions. Garrisons manned Fortress Holland and prepared the inundations of the New Holland Waterline, while the rest of the *landweer* (reserve force) deployed along the border and coastline. Specialist engineering troops readied the destruction of major bridges (especially those across the Maas).

Successive Chiefs of Staff and Ministers of War made improvements to the organisation of the armed forces after 1898 by replacing obsolescent weaponry for modern equipment, unifying command structures, and putting in place steps to facilitate the transition from peace to war.\(^10\) They ensured that the size of the armed forces increased considerably in this period through personal conscription (where individuals were barred

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\(^6\) Klinkert, *Het Vaderland Verdedigd* p. 399.

\(^7\) Klinkert, “De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 28.

\(^8\) Klinkert, *Het Vaderland Verdedigd* p. 154. For an outline of the railway system, see: Map 2, Chapter 1, p. 42.

\(^9\) Ibid. p. 400.

\(^10\) Ibid. p. 399; Uijterschout, *Beknopt Overzicht* p. 441.
from paying others to do their service for them) and the introduction of new categories of conscription. Once mobilised in August 1914, the Netherlands boasted about 200,000 troops at home, most serving in the Army, with 9,000 in the Navy, and a handful helping the fledgling Air Branch fly its four aeroplanes. Another 33,000 mainly native Indonesian soldiers served in the East Indies’ Army, which was permanently posted in the colonies. Unfortunately, the many positive steps taken to modernise, strengthen and develop the military in the two decades before the outbreak of the Great War came so rapidly, that the military administration was still catching up. This meant that soldiers mobilised in 1914 were subjected to different legislation, were at various stages of training, and were led by officers of varying degrees of competence. As we shall see, alongside considerable material shortages, it complicated the mobilisation of the armed forces and made the fulfilment of their wartime responsibilities all the more difficult.

**HAVING TO DO ONE’S DUTY**

According to the Constitution, all male citizens were responsible for defending their country and overseas possessions. As was common throughout Europe, this meant that the government compelled men to serve in the military. In 1898, it finally introduced personal conscription into law after 25 years of opposition to the original legislation, bringing the country one step closer to attaining truly representative armed forces. Most of the conscripts served in the Army, because the nature of naval service suited volunteer sailors better: they had to be available in peace and wartime, often in the colonies, and ships required continuous skilled maintenance.

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11 See: fn 140 in Chapter 3 for further details.


13 Article 180 of the *Grondwet* (Constitution) in Kooiman (ed.), *De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht* p. 42.


Volunteers, mostly career soldiers, filled the majority of officer ranks in the Army and Navy. After 1901, conscripts could be forced to become non-commissioned officers, but at least until the outbreak of war, few ever were, mostly because successive governments were unwilling to force individuals into the higher ranks, even if the 1901 and 1912 Military Laws allowed them to do so.16 Low pay and a general dislike for military service discouraged the Dutch from volunteering.17 According to one nineteenth-century commentator, officers were perceived with the same disdain as farmers, being neither greatly liked nor appreciated.18 It was not that the Dutch were necessarily anti-military in these outlooks, but they were definitely non-military: the armed forces were necessary but they remained an “evil” nonetheless.19 Militarism, such as held sway in Germany, France and other European nations, was an alien concept to the Dutch. They perceived it as unnatural to place the army in a spot of primary importance. This place was reserved for trade, finance, transport and industry.20

Dutch non-militarism related closely to their neutrality beliefs. A neutral state was in principle non-aggressive, as an instrument of aggression, therefore, the armed forces were little admired, despite the fact that Dutch history was sprinkled with great military victories on the continent and abroad that continued to be celebrated around the turn of the century. The Netherlands undertook several long and aggressive military campaigns in the East Indies, especially in Acheh (1873 – 1900) but also in Bali (1906) and Celebes (1910).21 Yet many did not view the Indonesian campaigns as expansionism, but rather as asserting control over territory that the country already “owned”. They were domestic matters deemed of little concern to the outside world, and bearing no relationship to the Netherlands’ neutrality policy or passivity on the international scene. Yet there was a latent

understanding that nations wanting to become great, as the Netherlands had been great in the past, needed to use their military resources for this end. Neutrals, on the other hand, could not harbour such ambitions without seriously risking the credibility of their status. These beliefs go a long way to explaining why few people voluntarily joined the armed forces, why conscription was absolutely necessary, why there were considerable officer shortages before and during the war, and why the mobilisation was so unpopular among the Dutch public.\textsuperscript{22}

Alongside the implementation of the personal conscription law in 1898, the increase in conscript numbers and the establishment of the \textit{landweer} and \textit{landstorm} (second reserve force) signalled important changes to military service. The length of conscription, type of training and requirements of service were also adjusted in the decade leading up to the outbreak of war. Hendrik Colijn (Minister of War between 1911 and 1913) was especially successful in legislating improvements. By 1913, when parliament accepted his \textit{Landstorm} law, the State could call up almost every male citizen under the age of 40 for some type of military employment.

On 1 January following the year of their eighteenth birthday, all men were required to sign themselves up for a conscription lottery, which occurred in the year they turned 20.\textsuperscript{23} Once signed into the books, the prospective soldiers were summoned to a military commission that decided on their eligibility. There were several grounds for disqualification, including certain physical criteria, such as heights of less than 1 metre 55 centimetres, medical and mental unfitness, a brother who was already serving, previous dismissal from the armed forces, a religious vocation, or a criminal record.\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Kostwinnaarschap} ("breadwinner's status") could also be pleaded and, if the Minister of War agreed, exempt a person from conscription, as long as his family was economically disadvantaged.\textsuperscript{25} If a conscript intended to move to the colonies in the near future he could avoid compulsory service as well, a clear indication of the importance of empire to the national well-being.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{22} For more on the "non-military" attitude of the Dutch see: Dunk, "Neutralisme en defensie"; Blom, "A necessary evil"; Klinkert "The Salutary Yoke of Discipline".
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Staatsblad. no. 21}, 2 February 1912, Article 2.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.} Articles 4, 16, 21, 23 - 30, 36, 58.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.} Articles 21, 32.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.} Article 21.
Interestingly enough, in an attempt to obtain the best possible soldiers, a tightening of fitness criteria occurred in 1912 so that fewer men passed the medical examination.\textsuperscript{27} Effectively, it cancelled the supposedly random nature of conscription and made the lottery less significant. For example, in Dordrecht in 1914, 477 young men were eligible for conscription. Of these, 132 were freed through brother service, previous military employment, \textit{kostwinaarschap}, religious association and criminal behaviour. Another 150 were rejected due to medical unfitness. In all, 195 were made available for the lottery of which 187 were conscripted. Therefore, only eight were released by lottery, very few compared to the huge number declared unsuitable on medical grounds.\textsuperscript{28} During the war, the medical criteria were readjusted so that as many men as possible could be conscripted; the lottery was also abandoned.\textsuperscript{29} Quantity rather than quality became paramount, as elsewhere in Europe.

Despite population rises since 1861 (from three and a half million to five million), it took forty years for the yearly conscription figure to rise from 11,000 set in that year to 17,500 in 1901.\textsuperscript{30} The imbalance improved further in 1912 to 23,000 per year.\textsuperscript{31} Yet, as the Dordrecht example above illustrates, up to 50 per cent of twenty-year olds were never conscripted and, therefore, never served. In 1914, Munnekrede estimated that as many as 600,000 men of military age (between 17 and 40) were not involved in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{32} Another problem was the quality of training conscripts received. From 1901 onwards, 70 per cent of the yearly intake was fully trained (eight and a half months for unmounted and 18 months for mounted troops), while the rest trained for only four months.\textsuperscript{33} Compared to the two years training undertaken on average in the conscript armies of Germany and France, it would prove to be far from sufficient once hostilities commenced.\textsuperscript{34}

Successive Ministers of War faced severe problems in trying to increase the military budget, as parliament typically loathed spending money on defence. One Minister,
H. P. Staal (1905 to 1907), was even forced to resign in 1906 when the First Chamber of the Estates General refused to accept his proposals.\(^{35}\) Hendrik Colijn, however, did manage to implement widespread changes in the armed forces when he took office in 1911. International crises, in Morocco, the Balkans and elsewhere, made the Netherlands’ position far more precarious. Europe was becoming increasingly unstable and in recognition of the need to boost security, parliament became more amenable to improvements and expenditure. Colijn’s Military Law (1912) ensured that the armed forces became more youthful by increasing the numbers of men conscripted yearly, while decreasing the length of time they spent in military service.\(^{36}\) Instead of eight years, navy sailors now served five, and infantry six years. Colijn also eliminated the four months period of training: all troops received eight and a half months, except for those deemed unable to complete this, who were instructed for six and a half months.\(^{37}\) Specialists, such as cavalry and gun-layers, served and trained longer: fortress artillery and torpedo corps received 15 months instruction, while mounted troops were trained for two years.\(^{38}\)

Many of the military laws passed between 1898 and 1913 were not retroactive. Thus, when soldiers mobilised in August 1914, they served under different regulations, as well as having different levels of proficiency. The four oldest contingents (in the landweer) had become military initiates under the 1861 Militiewet, most others under the laws passed between 1901 and 1911.\(^{39}\) In other words, the level of expertise enjoyed by soldiers during the mobilisation varied greatly, especially between troops trained for only four months and those who received eight and a half months or more. Among specialist sections, such inconsistencies were even more glaring. The improvements made by Colijn in 1912 only applied to intakes conscripted from 1913 onwards. The 1914 contingent of infantry as well as the 1913 and 1914 cavalry and mounted artillery troops levied in 1913 and 1914, had not yet completed training by the time the government declared the August mobilisation. In effect, only the 1913 infantry intake fully benefited from Colijn’s legislation. The latest laws were unable to make a significant impact. This, in turn, influenced the course of the

\(^{35}\) Ibid. pp. 144 - 146.
\(^{36}\) See: Appendix 2, p. 452.
\(^{37}\) Staatsblad. no. 21, 2 February 1912, Article 76.
\(^{38}\) Ibid. Article 6; Uijterschout, Beknopt Overzicht p. 436.
\(^{39}\) Klinkert, “De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 27.
mobilisation in August 1914 and meant that Colijn’s laws would remain relatively ineffective during the war, as new troops were made war-ready as quickly as possible.

**NOT TRUE RESERVES: LANDWEE TROOPS**

Around 122,500 of the 200,000 men mobilised in August 1914 served in the conscript military; the rest served in the landweer.\(^{40}\) The 1901 Landweer law created a reserve force that replaced the old-fashioned and highly-ineffective schutterijen (militia reserves).\(^{41}\) Effectively, landweer service was an extension of a soldier’s conscription and transfer from the military did not affect rank or specialty.\(^{42}\) The main effect of the law was to extend the length of conscription by seven more years. Revisions to the legislation in 1913 decreased this to five years, while all existing landweer troops had their service shortened by a year or more.\(^{43}\)

Like the schutterijen before it, the landweer was organised at a regional level.\(^{44}\) The eleven Dutch provinces were divided into 48 landweer districts, each the base for resident conscripts. Localisation allowed troops to serve in the vicinity of their homes, cutting the cost of accommodation and travel as well as shortening mobilisation times. There were other logistical advantages. The provinces with the greatest defence needs had the largest populations and supported the greatest numbers of landweer troops. Map 5 (below) illustrates the number of landweer districts supported in each province. It clearly indicates that nearly one-half of all the battalions were housed in the provinces of North and South Holland, where the population density was highest. The landweer residing in these two provinces were used as fortification troops in Fortress Holland, with those living in Amsterdam occupied the city’s fortifications. Outside Fortress Holland, the greatest concentrations of landweer (and population) were in North Brabant, Gelderland and Limburg, areas where the Field Army, once mobilised, would also be located. Landweer here were used either in support of the Field Army or as border guards. The map clearly

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\(^{40}\) Schulten, “The Netherlands and its Army” p. 76.

\(^{41}\) See: Appendix 2, p. 452.


\(^{43}\) Staatsblad. no. 148, 28 April 1913, Article 2; “Wet van 24 Juni 1901 gewijzigd” in Abel (ed.), I. Landweerwet Article 7.

\(^{44}\) Klinkert, “De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 27.
highlights how High Command focused defence in two areas (the south and centre), leaving the rest of the country with far fewer troops.

Map 5: Landweer districts

Greater coherence was given to army structure in 1913, when the army and landweer organised into units specific to their area of residence. All conscripts served with other locals in an army battalion and they transferred together into a corresponding landweer battalion. For example, in the city of Gouda there were four conscription districts. On entry into the army, men in district 1 served in the II Company of 15 Regiment Infantry. After six years service, these same men transferred into the 29 Landweer Infantry
Battalion. All future conscripts from Gouda would be stationed in the same formations, allowing greater ease of replacement and administration. Unfortunately, this re-organisation came too late for the outbreak of war and had by August 1914 only been applied to the very latest of army and landweer sections. There were exceptions. Specialised troops, including fortified artillery sections, were more closely associated with their army equivalents. By concentrating fortified artillery continuation in skill, training and organisation could be achieved. However, the plan was again too late to be fully operational by August 1914, although it was implemented during the war.

The role of the landweer was hotly debated within military command after its creation in 1901, especially whether it should be a reserve force, a complement to the Field Army, or fulfil a more specialised function on the borders. Many believed that the force was incapable of anything other than reserve duty. Nevertheless, in 1910, several sections trained specifically for border duties. Others served under Territorial Commanders, in the fortified positions, and in the Field Army. Therefore, by 1914, the landweer had become an integral part of the Army with specialised tasks that were not delegated to other sections. Consequently, it was not a true reserve force. Yet argument raged over the readiness of the troops and whether retraining for a paltry six days was anywhere near enough for the important roles assigned to them.

The Safety Net: The Landstorm

Colijn’s Landstorm law (1913) created the reserve effectively lacking after the landweer had become an indispensable part of the regular army. It was a means of getting as many people to defend the country as possible, by allowing the government to conscript

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45 Kooiman (ed.), De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht p. 54.
47 Ibid. p. 65.
48 For a concise outline of the debate: Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd pp. 391 - 397.
49 Snijders condemned the landweer in a 1906 article because of their lack of training and experience (in W. E. van Dam van Isselt, “De wijziging van de landweerwet” [The change in the landweer law] Onze Eeuw. 1912, p. 218, fn 1).
50 Ibid. pp. 215, 229 - 331.
all men aged between 20 and 40 years. In many respects, the reserves acted as the defensive safety net and intentionally rendered the recent shortening of service as good as ineffective. Yet there were restrictions. Most importantly, landstormers could only be called up if the country was at war, threatened by war, or involved in some other extraordinary circumstance or crisis. They were to be used solely for emergencies, a reason why conscription in the landstorm was so difficult to evade. An important distinction existed regarding conscription as well. Men who had served in the military at some stage (as either conscripts or volunteers) and had not yet reached 40 years of age were liable for “armed” service. “Unarmed” service applied to all others who had avoided conscription. They were placed on the books as soon as they were freed from the conscription lottery. Unlike their armed equivalents, it was not intended that unarmed landstorm troops would ever fight but would be used in support of front-line troops in supply, administration, and construction roles.

Neither the armed or unarmed landstorm were mobilised in August 1914, although officers did receive summons on 13 August. The government also placed other landstorm ranks on alert at this time. This caused grave concern among civilians who did not fully understand the implications of the recent legislation and feared that all men (regardless of military experience) would be conscripted. In reality, the declarations only applied to soldiers who had left the military since the inception of the landstorm legislation a little over twelve months earlier.

However, the opportunity to expand the landstorm was too appealing for Nicolaas Bosboom (Minister of War, 1913 - 1917). When it became clear before Christmas 1914 that the war would last many more months and that, consequently, the army would remain

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53 Staatsblad. no. 149, 28 April 1913.
55 Utrecht en de Oorlogstoestand. Overzicht van de Gevolgen der Mobilisatie en de Voornaamste Maatregelen, Door of Vanwege het Gemeente-Bestuur Genomen. [Utrecht and the war situation. Overview of the consequences of the mobilisation and the most important measures taken by or because of the municipal-government] Utrecht: publisher unknown, 1914, pp. 9 - 10.
mobilised, he called on parliament to increase the size of the landstorm. Bosboom introduced two new landstorm laws in 1915.\textsuperscript{56} The legislation passed in June, applied landstorm status to any soldiers who had left the military between 1911 and 1913 and had not yet reached the age of 40.\textsuperscript{57} For the first time, a military law became retroactive. Yet it still applied only to men who had some military experience. The distinction between “armed” and “unarmed” ensured that it was far less likely for men who had never completed any military training to be called up. The legislation passed in July 1915, however, reversed this.\textsuperscript{58} Men with no previous military experience could now be conscripted, starting with those freed from the lottery in 1915. Brother service and kostwinnaarschap no longer excused them. The conscription was restricted, however, to those who had not turned 30 years old. Training for new troops returned to four months. The landstorm replaced regiments mobilised since August 1914, beginning with the oldest landweer regiments in the fortifications and at the borders, followed in 1916, with military regiments.\textsuperscript{59}

In Chapter 10, the furore surrounding the landstorm regulations will be dealt with in considerable detail.\textsuperscript{60} Suffice it to say, here, many Dutch were not pleased with the new function given to the supposed “unarmed” landstorm. Many were angry that the original intention of the law had been supplanted. Yet the Landstorm law was revised twice more, each time heightening the importance of the landstorm as a vital part of the military structure. In 1917, parliament formally removed the distinction of “armed” and “unarmed” service, and prolonged landstormers’ service beyond the end of the mobilisation.\textsuperscript{61} Snijders strongly urged the change, arguing that as the landstorm had been trained at great expense, it should remain available for future defence.\textsuperscript{62} In 1918, other alterations were made in the hope of finding enough replacements for mobilised soldiers going on leave. All men under

\textsuperscript{56} For details of the two 1915 landstorm laws see: De Landstorm Uitbreiding.
\textsuperscript{57} Staatsblad. no. 242, 11 June 1915, Article 1.
\textsuperscript{58} Staatsblad. no. 345, 31 July 1915.
\textsuperscript{59} Staatsblad. no. 361, 29 July 1916, Article 1.
\textsuperscript{62} Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 30 October 1916, and reply, 3 April 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 659.
the age of 25 who had not yet been conscripted could be re-examined as often as the
government wished, and, as long as they were medically fit, could enter the landstorm.
During a second mobilisation or a declaration of war, the same would apply to men over the
age of 25.63 The country had all but imposed general conscription.

FEW AND FAR BETWEEN
VOLUNTARY LANDSTORM CORPS

There were opportunities to volunteer in all the military services, but despite
efforts to increase acceptance of military readiness among the general population, few
actually volunteered. In 1867, King Willem III passed a declaration allowing the creation of
rifle clubs and other voluntary associations relating to national defence.64 As long as they
were registered, these clubs could participate in shooting and target practice.65 There was a
dual purpose behind the declaration: firstly, to provide an unofficial army reserve in the
event of attack and secondly, to encourage pride in military activities. By 1914, around 400
rifle clubs and similar societies existed with a total membership of 18,000.66 The
Landstorm decree of 1913 raised the possibility of these clubs forming voluntary landstorm
sections within the army, once it mobilised, with the aim of integrating the societies - with
members experienced in handling weapons - within the military structure.67

On 4 August 1914, the government issued a decree allowing voluntary association
within the landstorm.68 Some groups enthusiastically answered this call-to-arms. The
Ochtendblad (Morning Newspaper) on 4 August included several such advertisements: one
old "Transvaal soldier calls up true fatherlanders for a volunteer corps", the Netherlands'

63 Staatsblad. no. 257, 20 April 1918.
64 For the text of the 1867 Royal Decree see: W. J. M. Linden, “De Vrijwillige Landstorm” [The Voluntary
Landstorm] Orgaan der Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap. 1916 - 1917, Appendix I, pp. 557 -
559.
65 Ibid. p. 467.
66 Ibid. p. 469.
67 Staatsblad. no. 273, 12 June 1913, Articles 53 - 56. It must be remembered that the vrijwillig landstorm (voluntary
landstorm) and the landstorm proper that existed during the Great War were not related to later organisations that
also used the name landstorm. They must not be confused with the bijzondere vrijwillige landstorm (extraordinary
volunteer landstorm) for example, which was established in November 1918. This organisation was a civilian militia
made up of men who wanted to protect their queen and nation from the revolutionary spirit that seemed to threaten
that month. Members of the bijzondere vrijwillige landstorm were not interested in defending the country against
outside threats, only against civil unrest caused by revolutionaries. All of the Great War landstorm organisations also
bore no relationship to the Waffen SS affiliation with the name Landstorm Nederland, which was established by Nazi
sympathisers during the Second World War.
68 For the text of the Royal Decree and regulations regarding the establishment of voluntary landstorm corps see:
Zionist Student Organisation urged its members to establish a similar unit, as did the Student Corps in Delft. The next day, the newspaper stated that 61 students at the university were prepared to serve their Queen in the voluntary landstorm if she would have them. Such eagerness was isolated, however. One contemporary commentator estimated that only six to seven per cent of rifle club members joined up. By early 1915, the voluntary landstorm consisted of barely 2,000 men. Lists made in the municipalities of those wanting to join the volunteer landstorm had no more than two or three names on them.

Disdain for military service limited membership in rifle clubs and the voluntary landstorm, which existed as a separate entity from the rest of the landstorm and army. Members trained only for the eventuality of war and could not be mobilised until the country was invaded. They were viewed as a peculiarity among soldiers and civilians alike because they chose to become involved with the army on a voluntary basis and without pay. Not surprisingly, the volunteer associations had a unique character that stood out when compared to regiments of conscripted troops. Some of the newly-formed corps established proud traditions that lasted well into the 1920s. They designed their own coat of arms, banners and flags, and paraded with them in public. After the war, many continued with sporadic training exercises and yearly reunions.

Few of the 18,000 members of rifle clubs and other associations that purported to be supporters of defence enlisted in the voluntary landstorm in August 1914. No doubt, many were conscripts already. For the rest, perhaps their reasoning reflected the lack of organisation within the army, or the fact that most military commanders were pre-occupied with mobilisation and paid little attention to volunteers. A far more likely reason was that many did not desire to leave their civilian lives. Joining the landstorm implied at least ten

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70 Linden, "De Vrijwillige Landstorm" p. 509.

71 Linden, "De Vrijwillige Landstorm", p. 509.


73 Linden, "De Vrijwillige Landstorm".
hours military training a week, and if war was declared, full-time inclusion within the army. It also meant obeying army orders, following army regulations and being disciplined according to army rules. A possible contributing factor - especially after stories reached the Netherlands of Belgian civilians executed as franc-tireurs by the Germans - was fear that invaders would not accept their uniforms (an orange band with the emblem of the Netherlands imprinted on it, worn on the right arm) as a sign of their military allegiance.

Few preparations had been made for the organisation, administration and deployment of the volunteer landstorm within the army. They lacked weapons, experienced leaders and instructors. Although training was compulsory for volunteers, disciplinary measures did not exist to ensure that troops turned up each week. According to one source, 70 per cent of the voluntary landstormers were missing at some training sessions. Part of the problem was the lack of encouragement shown by military officials. Officially, volunteer landstorm sections were responsible to the provincial Territorial Commander. However, more often than not, communication was lacking between them. Once an Inspector of the Landstorm was appointed in February 1915, many of these communication, administration and discipline problems were rectified. The landstorm sections were now also able to form into fully functioning corps.

The numbers involved in the voluntary landstorm more than doubled during the war, although it was still only attracting a small fraction of possible recruits. By November 1918, 194 officers, 1,375 non-commissioned officers and 5,207 other ranks served as volunteer landstormers. During 1917, the organisation counted nine landstorm corps

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74 Ibid. p. 504.
76 Cappelle, “Vrijwillige Landstornafdeelingen” p. 23.
77 Munnekredes, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” p. 31.
78 Linden, “De Vrijwillige Landstorm” p. 494.
80 Commander-in-Chief to all military commanders, 15 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 137.
(landstormkorpsen), four companies and 19 sections. The true number of volunteers may have been much higher, since membership fluctuated as they were conscripted into other military formations, including the landstorm proper. Conscripts received no special status or any recognition of their previous volunteer association. Officers were a little more fortunate. Early in 1917, the government ruled that they retained their voluntary landstorm rank on conscription because the army was in desperate need of officers. However, by mid-1917 it became clear that many of the landstorm officers were not adequately trained, requiring instruction to meet acceptable standards.

**AT THE TOP OF THE HIERARCHY**

Once mobilised, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was responsible for all troops and their deployment in the Army, Navy and Air Branch, as well as for defence strategy and neutrality measures. The government appointed C. J. Snijders to this position on 31 July 1914, promoting him to the rank of full general. He would hold the post until his resignation on 9 November 1918, when Lieutenant-General W. F. Pop (previously Deputy Chief of Staff) replaced him until demobilisation was completed in September 1919. At that time, the armed forces returned to peacetime organisation and the office of supreme commander was suspended. The Commander-in-Chief was accountable only to the government and monarch. He acted as point of liaison between all the forces and the government, and, therefore, also played an important part in informing and advising the Minister of War and Minister in Charge of the Navy.

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83 Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 146. See: Kooiman (ed.), *De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht* pp. 72 - 73 for further details on landstorm organisation.
84 Linden, "De Vrijwillige Landstorm" pp. 532 - 533.
85 Inspector of the Landstorm, "Overzicht van de uitkomsten, die met den vrijwilligen Landstorm zyn verkregen, alsmede de ter zake opgedane ervaringen, gevraagd by schryven van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht dd. 24 May 1918, O.V.I 122980 (G.S. NO. 4960) 3e gedeelte: Het jaar 1917" [Overview of the results, of the voluntary landstorm, as well as experiences requested by the Commander-in-Chief dated 24 May 1918 ... Third part: The year 1917] 26 June 1918, pp. 37 - 39, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
Snijders’ tenure at the top was not without controversy or conflict, yet he was an extremely effective leader who had an extraordinary capacity for involving himself in every military subject, however menial or seemingly trivial.\(^88\) His personality defined his function, and he took his work extremely personally. Perhaps, this made the inevitable conflicts with cabinet ministers and parliamentarians more intense and explosive. It also ensured that everything that occurred during the mobilisation bore Snijders’ stamp. He was the face of the mobilisation, and was readily recognised as such by the general populace, who encountered this “small man” in newspapers, magazines and on propaganda postcards.\(^89\)


Snijders' General Staff was housed within General Headquarters in The Hague. It was split into four departments each with specific responsibilities. GS I (Department I) was responsible for strategic and operational orders for the Field Army, the territorial troops, border and coast guards as well as the landstorm. It worked closely with GS III, which supervised all intelligence activities including espionage, reconnaissance, and other forms of information-gathering. There were two other General Staff departments: GS II, which supervised fortified positions and naval operations, and GS IV, which was established during the mobilisation to look after everything related to neutrality, including censorship, trade, smuggling, judiciary problems and civilian rights.

The Commander of the Field Army - a post held by Lieutenant-General G. A. Buhlman until December 1915, then by Major-General (Generaal-Majoor) W. H. van Terwisga - worked in close contact with Snijders. Whereas Snijders worked from his office in The Hague, both Buhlman and van Terwisga moved with Field Army headquarters around the south of the country. Their responsibilities varied but focused principally on deploying the Field Army so that it best met strategic directives set by GS I. Interestingly enough, unlike the Commander-in-Chief, the Field Army command position was a permanent one, existing both in peace and wartime, which was unique in Europe and reflects the importance of this mobile entity in Dutch strategy. Not surprisingly, Buhlman

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93 Kooiman (ed.), De Nederlandsche Strijdmaacht p. 41.

94 “Algemeen instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger, geldende voor den duur, dat de strijdmacht gemobiliseerd is” [General instructions for the Commander of the Field Army for the time that the armed forces are mobilised] July 1914; “Bijzondere Instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger, geldende van 10 Augustus 1914 tot nadere kennisgeving” [Extraordinary instruction for the Commander of the Field Army, applicable from 10 August 1914 until further notice] 10 August 1914, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.

and van Terwisga were important advisors to Snijders but also enjoyed a large degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{96}

Yet, during the war, the two commanders did not always exercise complete control over the four infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade of the Field Army. Snijders assumed tactical leadership of Divisions I and II after 4 August 1914 when Germany invaded Belgium, an event that shifted the main focus of the army to the southern provinces. Although Buhlman continued to be responsible for the daily operations of the two divisions, he could not move them or change their operational goals without first consulting Snijders.\textsuperscript{97} Officially, there was no need for Snijders to involve himself so directly, as he already had the power to overrule orders given by Buhlman. This action is, however, symptomatic of Snijders' hands-on style. As Commander-in-Chief, he wanted to influence everything that happened in the military and the Field Army was too important to leave even to the most capable commander.\textsuperscript{98}

Snijders' concern for and direct involvement in the Field Army was none more apparent than when Buhlman fell ill in August of 1915. Rather than replace him, a new function was created - Commander of Division Group “Brabant”- to which van Terwisga was appointed. In this role, van Terwisga held responsibility over Divisions III and IV stationed in North Brabant, Limburg and south Gelderland (below the Waal river). Snijders took over direct command of Divisions I and II.\textsuperscript{99} The situation only returned to normal when Buhlman came back in October 1915: van Terwisga and Snijders relinquished control of their divisions, although the Division Group “Brabant” remained in being.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{96} Snijders, “De hoogere bevelvoering” pp. 556 - 557.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. pp. 566 - 568; “Bijzondere Instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger” 10 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
\textsuperscript{98} For Snijders' reasoning for more direct control over the Field Army see: Snijders, “De hoogere bevelvoering” pp. 567 - 568.
\textsuperscript{99} Chief of Field Army Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel M. D. A. Forbes Wels, to the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War, 17 August 1915; Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 19 August 1915; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of Division Group “Brabant”, Commander of Division I, Major-General J. van Delft, and Commander of Division II, Major-General J. Burger, 27 August 1915; all in ARA, “Koninklijke Landmacht. Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” [Royal Netherlands’ Army. Archive of the Headquarters of the Field Army] entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 167. There was tactical advantage involved in concentrating troops in Division Group “Brabant”, as van Tuyll has pointed out (The Netherlands and World War I pp. 106 - 108).
\textsuperscript{100} Chief of Field Army Staff to Justice of the Peace in Elst, Mayor of Elst and Mayor of Ghent, 18 October 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 179; Commander of the Field Army, Report, July 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
Other commanders directly accountable to the Commander-in-Chief included those at the major fortified positions within Fortress Holland, and the *Territorialen Bevelhebbers* (Territorial Commanders), who took charge of troops not in the Field Army or fortified positions. Mostly, they supervised *landweer* and *landstorm* activities, though they had other responsibilities as well. For example, the Territorial Commander of North Brabant looked after the Colonial Reserve stationed in the Netherlands,\(^{101}\) and Overijssel’s commander directed artillery emplacements in key cities in his province, such as Zwolle.\(^{102}\) At times, the provincial commanders were placed under direct command of a higher military authority (including divisional commanders) although usually they retained their independence and were answerable only to Snijders.\(^{103}\) In 1917, two new command posts were created, the Commander of Limburg and the Commander of Zeeland, responsible for the difficult defence of their specific province, and ranked immediately below the Commander-in-Chief. Snijders was also superior to the Commander of the Navy, the Director of the Dockyard at Willemsoord, and commanders of individual ships and vessels.\(^{104}\)

More often than not, coastal fortification commanders also directed warships movements within territorial waters. The commanders were not necessarily naval officers. For example, while the Commander of the Fortified Position of Den Helder, a navy officer, was responsible for defence of the fortification, the coastal batteries and naval movements into and out of the port, the Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, an army officer, commanded the movements of ships and submarines entering and leaving the city’s harbours.\(^{105}\) Likewise, coastal guards were often a mixture of army *landweer* troops and

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104 “Instructie voor den Opperbevelhebber” in Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* Appendix C., p. 393.
105 Commander-in-Chief to Commander Fortified Position of Den Helder, Commander of the Fortifications on the Maas and Haringvliet, Commander in Amsterdam, ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 39.
naval troops (including its landweer). Despite the existence of two separate Chiefs of Staffs, two separate military headquarters, there was a considerable amount of co-operation between the sea and land-based services, caused more by necessity than desire. Yet there was little love lost between the two forces: officers did not interact socially together, nor did the Navy appreciate its secondary status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the Field Army (CV)</td>
<td>‘s Hertogenbosch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the New Holland Waterline</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the Fortified Position of Den Helder</td>
<td>Den Helder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the Mous of the Maas River as well as Haringvliet</td>
<td>Hellevoetsluis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the Fortified Position of Hollandsch Diep and the Volkerak</td>
<td>Willemstad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Commander in Friesland (TB)</td>
<td>Assen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Commander in Overijssel (TB)</td>
<td>Zwolle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Commander in North Brabant (TB)</td>
<td>‘s Hertogenbosch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Commander in Zeeland (TB)</td>
<td>Middelburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Commander in Holland (TB)</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1: Army Commanders Under Direct Authority of the Commander-in-Chief, 1 August 1914

107 Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 326.
108 Annotated version of table “Autoriteiten ressorterende onder den Opperbevelhebber en niet tot het Algemeen Hoofdkwartier behorenden” [Authorities responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and not part of General Headquarters] in ARA, “Archiefen van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
109 The Field Army’s headquarters moved to Oosterhout in October 1914 (Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, P. W. A. Cort van der Linden, 22 February 1915, in ARA, “Archiefen van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Klinkert, “Verdediging van de zuidgrens” p. 215).
Map 6: Districts of the Territorial Commanders

FIELD ARMY, GARRISON AND TERRITORIAL TROOPS

The Field Army was the most important operational component of the Army. Consisting of nearly 90,000 troops (see Table 2), it was responsible for meeting and possibly defeating an invasion. If the enemy was too strong, its role would change: it would hold out for as long as possible, buying time for other troops to ready inundations, blow up bridges, and set up obstacles. The army would then retreat into Fortress Holland and reinforce the garrisons stationed there.¹¹⁰ It had to be highly mobile and capable of

¹¹⁰ Snijders, "Nederland’s militaire positie" p. 540.
advancing and retreating quickly and efficiently. It also had to be extremely flexible as it was uncertain where an invasion might occur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>TROOP NUMBERS</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Infantry Regiments</td>
<td>each 3,300</td>
<td>79,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Companies of Cyclists</td>
<td>each 160</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Regiments Cavalry (Cav. Brig. incl. cyclists)</td>
<td>each 650</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Regiments Field Artillery</td>
<td>each 1,300</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Corps Mobile Artillery</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Companies Pioneers</td>
<td>each 170</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total operational strength of the Field Army:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>88,770</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mobility and flexibility were enhanced by the partition of the Field Army into self-sufficient divisions. Each of these was capable of fulfilling strategic directives without support from the others. The four divisions were organised in exactly the same way, although Division II had an additional two sections of mobile artillery attached. The Field Army also contained the Cavalry Brigade, which came into being on 8 August 1914, a few days later than the rest of the army. It took longer to mobilise because of the large numbers of horses that had to be requisitioned and transported to a central location. The brigade constituted almost the entire cavalry strength of the army, consisting of four regiments of horse-riders and, as of 18 August 1914, four squadrons of cyclists. This degree of centralisation ensured a high degree of mobility. As the most mobile grouping, it made sense to keep it separate from the much slower infantry divisions.

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111 Munnekrede, "De mobilisatie van de landmacht" p. 47.
112 See: Appendix 3, p. 452.
Map 7: The afwachtingsopstelling ("waiting position") of the Field Army on mobilisation.
(Source: "Afwachtingsopstelling van het leger 1 Augustus 1914" [Waiting position of the Army, 1 August 1914] in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3)

The 1913 strategic directives specified a verscherpte afwachtingsopstelling ("intensified waiting position") for Field Army deployment: Division I mobilised on the western coast between Ijmuiden and Hoek van Holland, Division II positioned itself from Nijmegen westwards along the Ijssel and Rhine rivers, Division III bunked in North Brabant
with detachments in Zeeland and along the Maas river in Limburg, and Division IV acted as a strategic reserve within the centre of the country around the city of Amersfoort. Map 7 shows where each of the brigades moved on 1 August 1914, to fit as closely to the afwachtingsopstelling as possible. The Cavalry Brigade mobilised in and around Eindhoven, where it remained for the entire war.

Next to the Field Army, the most significant defences on land were the fortified positions. After 1900, strategic use of fortifications underwent a subtle change. Where in the nineteenth century they had been most important - almost the entire army was stationed in them - the increasingly mobile Field Army became primary after the turn of the century. Fortress Holland existed to cover the Field Army’s flanks and to provide a strong retreat position. The type of troops mobilised into the fortifications reflect the shift from rigid to mobile defence. Where in 1914, the Field Army boasted 72 infantry battalions, the fortified positions had less than one-half that. In total, moreover, 23 of its 35 battalions comprised of landweer. In other words, the fortifications supported greater numbers of older soldiers. Fresher, younger, conscripts were used in the Field Army, leaving the less physically demanding jobs for the older landweer.

Table 3 also highlights how significant the New Holland Waterline was to defence plans. It housed most of the battalions. There were three reasons for this predominance. Firstly, the Waterline was the principal retreat location for all troops, including the Field Army. Secondly, it was the first line of inundation. Thirdly, if the line was breached, the troops holding it could retreat into fortifications further back, especially into the fortified position of Amsterdam, the final stronghold of Dutch defence. Amsterdam’s five battalions were adequate to man the fortified positions in and around the city, but they needed the added strength of the retreating troops to withstand a concerted attack.

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115 Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 400, fn. 42.
TABLE 3: BATTALIONS IN THE FORTIFICATIONS, 1914118

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORTIFICATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF BATTALIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Holland Waterline</td>
<td>21 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellevoetsluis</td>
<td>3 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willemstad</td>
<td>2 and 3/4 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Den Helder</td>
<td>3 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>5 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuzen (Terneuzen) and Ellewoutsdijk</td>
<td>1/4 battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total number of battalions:** 35 battalions
(including 23 landweer battalions)

Although in 1914, Fortress Holland had the reputation of being one of the best fortified positions in Europe, it was in fact incomplete and out-of-date. Much of the Waterline contained gun emplacements with extremely limited traverse and inferior range compared to the mobile batteries employed by potential enemies. Furthermore, most of the supposedly “bomb-free” buildings could not withstand firepower from modern howitzers and mortars.119 Artillery in the New Holland Waterline consisted of 12 and 15 cm long-range cannons, 15 cm calibre guns and mortars, 10 cm and 7 cm flank-artillery, almost all old or out-dated, as well as smaller cannons for close-range bombardment, including a few modern 6 cm guns.120 Many artillery pieces not only needed replacing but were also fastened on top of fortification walls, proving especially easy targets for attack.121 An associated concern arose over the effectiveness of the inundations once the range of mobile artillery extended into tens of kilometres. Flooding the countryside in front of the Waterline could not keep the fortifications outside the reach of heavy artillery bombardment.122 Of

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118 “Afwachtingsopstelling van het leger 1 Augustus 1914” in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.
120 Ibid. p. 29.
121 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 105.
122 Geusau, Onze Weermacht p. 25.
course, inundation did make any infantry advance towards the Waterline extremely difficult, and to a degree this offset some of its more marked deficiencies. Comparatively, the fortifications around Amsterdam were in much healthier shape, consisting of smaller, yet stronger, fortified positions with better quality close and long-range artillery than those of the Waterline. But even the effectiveness of the Amsterdam fortifications was diminished by improvements made to the range and firepower of mobile artillery before the war.

While strategists hoped that Fortress Holland (and especially Amsterdam) would hold out against a concerted attack for several months, the relative ease with which German heavy artillery sacked similar fortifications in Belgium, at Liège in August and Antwerp in October 1914, demonstrated that this was highly unlikely. With these Belgian defeats in mind, Snijders would, in October 1918, describe the Netherlands' fortifications of 1914 as "indefensible". The declining strength of fortifications and artillery would become an ongoing issue for High Command throughout the war and reinforced the importance of the Field Army's tasks in front of the fortifications, one reason why garrison troops and certain artillery pieces were moved out of the fortifications into Field Army units or to the borders.

The nature of Dutch defence, based on a fortified centre supplemented by a concentrated mobile force, left much of the country without a ready military presence. The north and north-east of the Netherlands were especially vulnerable to attack. However, these areas were not bereft of soldiers. Local landweer (and later landstorm) troops were stationed there, although fewer in number than elsewhere (see Map 5 above and Table 4 below). They were responsible for protecting important strategic positions such as railway stations and bridges. More importantly, along the borders and coastlines they monitored who and what crossed into and out of the country. Specialist troops also mobilised into

123 Thanks to Hans Andriessen, Syd Wise and Marco Hoveling for helping ascertain the relative strength of Dutch fortifications and inundations in 1914 and 1918, "Artillery Question" posts on the World War One discussion list <1ww@egroups.com>, 15 – 16 November 2000.
124 Geusau, Onze Weermacht pp. 32 - 34.
125 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 105.
126 "Op het oogenblik der mobilisatie van 1 augustus 1914 verkeerde onze linien en stellingen in een toestand van volslagen onverdedigbaarheid" (Commander-in-Chief, "Nota ter beantwoording van de Nota dd. 11 July 1918, door den toenmaligen Minister van Oorlog JHR. DE JONGE gericht aan den Raad van Ministers" [Note in answer to the Note dated 11 July 1918, by the former Minister of War Jhr de Jonge addressed to the cabinet] 3 October 1918, p. 9, in ARA, "Archief van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5).
127 See: Chapter 9, p. 301.
peripheral areas. For example, bridge-building sections (pontonniers) and other engineering troops ensured that river crossings and railway routes were destroyed once an invasion was underway. They also undertook the building of temporary crossings and pontoons over waterways.  

**TABLE 4: POSITION OF LANDWEER BATTALIONS OUTSIDE FORTRESS HOLLAND, 1914**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>LANDWEER BATTALIONS STATIONED AT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friesland-Drenthe-Groningen</td>
<td>Sneek, Delfzijl and Assen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TB in Friesland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel-Gelderland (TB in</td>
<td>Zwolle, Deventer, Hengelo and Zutphen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Brabant-Limburg-Gelderland (TB in North Brabant)</td>
<td>Nijmegen, Venlo, Roermond and Maastricht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeeland (TB in Zeeland)</td>
<td>Middelburg and Vlissingen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GUNS AND ARTILLERY**

All European armies modernised their weaponry during the two decades before the outbreak of war. The Dutch did their utmost to keep up with these developments. With the increase in conscript numbers and the creation of the landweer and landstorm, it was important not only to update available weaponry and improve supplies of rifles, machine-guns and artillery, but also to ensure stocks of ammunition and their safe storage, as well as facilities and parts to repair and maintain weapons on hand. With the shift of strategic focus to the Field Army, supplying its mobile artillery and machine-gun needs were paramount concerns. The not inconsiderable increases in the military budget between 1900 and 1914  

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129 “Afwachtingsopstelling van het leger 1 Augustus 1914” in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.

helped augment stocks of weapons and ammunition, although, as we will see in Chapter 3, only part of the material requirements of the mobilised army were met by August 1914.

On paper, the weaponry available to the Dutch Army compared reasonably well with that used in the armies of the major European powers in 1914. There were enough rifles available for each mobilised soldier (234,000 Männlicher models in total); although revolvers were far from standard issue for every officer. Ammunition stocks were initially low for both weapons, but this was one of the few areas in which the local armaments industry was able to keep up with demand. In 1914 at least, the Netherlands matched the belligerents in machine-gun numbers (a total of 780 mainly Schwarzlose guns), although more than two-thirds of these were older models permanently stationed in the fortified positions. Only 32 machine-guns were mobile and deployed with the Field Army, equating to nearly two guns per battalion. While it may not seem like many, the potential of the machine-gun had not yet been fully realised, and this ratio was common across the combatant armies at the time. Of course, once it became a dominant weapon on the Western Front, the warring states out-produced the Netherlands many times over and the neutral had no chance of attaining any degree of parity, since the local production of most weaponry, notably artillery pieces, machine-guns, and their ammunition, would prove disastrous.

As many in the High Command realised, in terms of artillery might, a discernable difference between the Netherlands and its neighbours was clearly distinguishable in 1914. As noted above, in the fortified positions, especially in the New Holland Waterline, the quality of artillery was well below par. Although 2,000 pieces were made operational during the mobilisation, only 600 were new 6 cm quick-fire guns with limited range. At least two-thirds of the new guns operated outside the fortifications. The Field Army deployed nearly 200 somewhat heavier 7.4 cm calibre field artillery pieces, but it only

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132 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 131.
133 Ibid. p. 32; Schulten, “The Netherlands and its Army” p. 77.
135 See: Chapter 9, pp. 299 - 310.
136 Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 385.
137 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p.32.
had access to ten howitzers and two heavy 10.5 cm calibre cannons. In terms of size, strength, mobility and quality, therefore, available artillery in the Field Army and the fortifications were grossly deficient. The situation would only get worse during the war: an already apparent paucity of shells could not be rectified, while the Army was also unable to improve its stock of artillery pieces. Without outside help, the Dutch could not keep up with the technological advances of the large powers.

**Policing the Force**

One distinct organisation within the Netherlands' armed forces, namely the Koninklijke Marechaussee (military police), warrants discussion because it played a pivotal role in the preservation of neutrality. On the eve of war, the Marechaussee fulfilled a dual function in society, as a police force within the military as well as an élite force responsible for national security. In peacetime, its civilian duties took precedence for the simple reason that not many officers were needed to watch over the annual intake of conscript trainees. Therefore, most Marechaussee officers were stationed in towns and villages around the borders. They made regular checks on people and goods entering or leaving the country, acting as adjuncts to customs officers, as well as undertaking more traditional constabulary work alongside local police. In wartime, their responsibilities increased substantially as the mobilised army and navy required a considerable Marechaussee presence for military law enforcement duties, guarding internment camps, surveillance of suspected spies, and cooperating with intelligence agents of the General Staff.

The military responsibilities of the Marechaussee took up much time and many resources, and held precedence over civilian duties. Several mayors complained bitterly that crime was on the increase in their towns because officers were no longer stationed there. As early as 5 August 1914, one Attorney General requested the return of Marechaussee

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139 See: Chapter 9, pp. 299 - 310.
141 Inspector of the *Koninklijke Marechaussee* to the Commander-in-Chief, 1° August 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 127; Telegram from the Mayor of Finsterwolde to Minister of War, 12 August 1914; Mayor of Raalte to Commander-in-Chief, 7 November 1914, both in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 131.
officers to their pre-war postings in North Brabant and Limburg, due to an influx of Austrian and German refugees fleeing Belgium. During the refugee crisis in October 1914, the Marechaussee was stretched to its limit. Its border responsibilities intensified when smuggling spun out of control through the course of 1915 and 1916.

In many respects, the Marechaussee’s wartime capabilities were seriously overextended. In 1917, high-ranking members of the organisation discussed whether they should relinquish some of their obligations and focus completely on either civilian or military duties. In the end, despite their strong affiliation with the armed forces, they decided to focus on their civilian jurisdictions. No doubt, part of the reasoning behind the decision centred on the amount of public respect enjoyed by the Marechaussee for its police work. Another consideration was the continuity afforded by such work, which did not exist in the military domain. It was highly likely that after the war, military responsibilities would be reduced to a minimum.

As a result, a Korps Politie Troepen (Police Troop Corps) was established in April 1918, to take over the military functions of the Marechaussee. The corps maintained order and discipline among conscripted troops and called arrestees to court martial. Its training was virtually identical to the Marechaussee, although it did not hold any powers of civilian arrest. While the use of police troops was supposed to be a short-term measure, after the 1918 mutinies and revolutionary scares, High Command believed it best to keep

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142 Attorney-General in ‘s Hertogenbosch to Commander-in-Chief, 5 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 131.
143 For Marechaussee involvement with internees, see: Chapter 5, pp. 164 - 184.
144 For the anti-smuggling duties undertaken by the Marechaussee, see: Chapter 6, 207 - 212.
145 Inspector of the Koninklijke Marechaussee to the Commander-in-Chief, 30 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 131.
149 Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis van het Wapen p. 30.
the military units in being in case of future crises. They were also used for guarding buildings left empty after demobilisation. Within time, the Marechaussee lost its military jurisdictions completely and became a purely civilian police force whose primary focus was on border security, while the Police Troop Corps have maintained military law and order in the Netherlands’ armed services until this day.

WHOEVER SAID “NAVY” MEANT “THE INDIES”

So far, most of the attention has been on the Army, principally because it was by far the largest military force in the country during the war, and controlled both the Navy and recently-established Air Branch. Yet historically, the Netherlands had a strong naval tradition. At the height of its Golden Age, its fleet ruled the waves, a true match for the navies of other powers. The warships of the Dutch Republic protected the interests of a burgeoning merchant class, whose mariners crossed the seven seas and established trading posts everywhere from the sugar islands of the Caribbean to the spice islands of Indonesia. The link between the Navy and the Empire remained strong for centuries. Closer to home, Dutch ships achieved impressive victories over Spanish and British fleets in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But French occupation during the Napoleonic wars brought the era of Dutch naval strength to a decisive end. Nonetheless, even after the French withdrew in 1813, its empire and merchant marine remained impressive, the Netherlands’ Navy, however, was much reduced in size, and could no longer match those of its old rivals.

The naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany after 1900 resulted in major advances in technology and warship size and strength. The Dutch recognised that they must try to keep up with such improvements in order not to render their fleet entirely obsolete. Hence, naval budgets increased significantly between 1900 and 1914 and the fleet was modernised where possible. The Naval Staff even participated in their own version of the classic “battleship versus torpedo-boat” debate: should they concentrate on a small

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151 Hoek, _Beknopt overzicht_ pp. 89 - 90.
152 _Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis van het Wapen_ p. 35.
153 “Wie marine zei, zei ‘Indië’” (Fasseur, _Wilhelmina_ p. 442).
torpedo and submarine force, or on larger heavier Dreadnought-type warships? Given the Netherlands's geographic situation and lack of a large industrial base at home, the former made far more sense, while in the colonies the reverse was true. When added together, the coastlines of the East and West Indies stretched further than the circumference of the entire globe. The Navy leadership stressed the advantage of larger warships for patrolling these vast waters, although acknowledging the value of smaller vessels and submarines around the Netherlands itself.

Unlike the Army, which was entirely separate from its colonial equivalent, the Navy had real problems balancing the duality of its defence demands at home and abroad. Its position was further complicated by the auxiliary role it played to the Army in the Netherlands. While the Field Army had shifted its emphasis from static fortification-based defence to mobility in the early 1900s, the Navy had not changed its strategy since the mid-nineteenth century. Effectively, its purpose was to prevent amphibious landings on Dutch soil, provide extra firepower for coastal fortifications and patrol territorial waters. In its operational programme, there was no call for any offensive action and while it remained an independent force, it was almost entirely beholden to the Army.

In almost every matter relating to defence at home, the Navy lost ground to the Army. This was well-illustrated in 1910, when the government tabled funding proposals to increase the size of the Navy and to build fortifications at Vlissingen, thereby improving the defences on the mouth of the Schelde river. The government had a clear reason to do so, namely to ensure that its proposed changes to the military laws (including the Militiewet of 1912) would be accepted. Parliament would be reluctant to accept both a naval and army reorganisation. Consequently, cabinet ministers had little concern about conceding on the naval budget, as long as parliament passed the military legislation unchanged. In the end,

the international debate surrounding the building of the Vlissingen fortification moved
attention away from the Militiewet, which was approved without much controversy, while
the building of the coastal fortifications was continuously postponed due to parliamentary
and diplomatic wrangling.\textsuperscript{159}

Initial improvements to the fleet further highlighted the Navy’s subordinate role to
land forces. In 1908/9, the government approved the acquisition and building of a number
of cruisers, several torpedo boats and a few submarines, which, aside from being much
cheaper than battleships, were deemed more appropriate given the limited strategic
objectives of coastal defence.\textsuperscript{160} Soon, the Navy added minelayers, an essential weapon to
protect water inlets and river mouths.\textsuperscript{161} However, the Navy repeatedly emphasised its
importance in colonial security matters. In 1912, extensive lobbying saw official
recognition of the Navy’s primacy in the East and West Indies over the colonial army.\textsuperscript{162} It
meant that early in 1914, the government passed a Naval Bill authorising the expansion of
the fleet for imperial duty to include four battleships of 21,000 tonnes (with another one in
reserve) and six torpedo cruisers of 1,200 tonnes, along with a number of destroyers,
submarines, torpedo-boats and two minelayers. Construction was to take nine years.\textsuperscript{163} The
outbreak of war interrupted the building programme and of the proposed improvements
only two cruisers were completed in 1916: the Java and Sumatra.\textsuperscript{164} The battleships were
never built.\textsuperscript{165}

In August 1914, the Navy mobilised three cruisers, five submarines, four
minelayers and up to 30 torpedo-boats in and around the Netherlands, while four cruisers
and several support vessels patrolled the seas around Indonesia and the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{166} Most

439 – 460. For further information about the Vlissingen fortifications see: fn 5 above.
\textsuperscript{159} Uijterschout, Beknopt Overzicht p. 441; Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 399.
\textsuperscript{160} Teitler, “The Dutch Colonial Army in transition” p. 77; Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd pp. 321- 322.
\textsuperscript{161} Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 323.
\textsuperscript{162} Teitler, “The Dutch Colonial Army in transition” p. 77.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibd. p. 77.
\textsuperscript{164} H. de Bles, “Modernisering en professionalisering 1874 - 1918” [Modernisation and professionalisation] in G. J.
75.
\textsuperscript{163} Teitler, “The Dutch Colonial Army in transition” p. 79.
\textsuperscript{166} There are considerable discrepancies between available figures for the size of the Netherlands’ Navy on the eve of
war: A. van Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeemacht” [The mobilisation of the Navy] in Brugman (ed.), Nederland
in den oorlogstijd p. 52; Tydeman, “De Koninklijke Nederlandsche Marine” p. 239; Carpentier et. al. “The Effect of
the War upon the Colonies” p. 6; Stuart, De Nederlandse Zeemacht pp. 378 – 379, 382; Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p.
99; Bles, “De Koninklijke Marine mobiliseert” p. 76.
of the Europe-based vessels deployed from the main naval base in Den Helder and took up patrol duties along the coast, especially in front of major ports and inlets. Compared to the 65 battleships and 78 cruisers of the British Royal Navy and 41 battleships and 40 cruisers of the Germany Imperial Navy, the Dutch Navy was minute in size. Its cruisers did not even reach the 9,000 tonne weight of the belligerents' vessels. Nevertheless, the Navy was in reasonable shape to fulfil its assigned tasks, barring the worst-case scenario of a full naval assault by either Germany or Britain. It is not the intention of this study to analyse the role of the Navy or Army in the colonies, but it is significant to note that in terms of defence in Europe, what the Navy could achieve during the war was limited largely by its overseas obligations.

**Orange Dots in the Sky**

In 1914, aerial warfare was an undeveloped part of military operations. By the end of the war, aeroplanes were playing an integral part in the strategic plans of all the belligerents. The Netherlands also saw a considerable development in its air power between 1914 and 1918. The Army recognised early on, thanks in large measure to the Snijders, that aeroplanes had potential. Six privately owned aircraft and two air balloons were used in training exercises in 1911 and 1913, mainly in reconnaissance roles, with the Air Branch established in 1913 as part of the Army. From these humble beginnings, its growth was haphazard and often fraught with difficulties.

On 1 August 1914, the ten officers and 31 administrative and engineering troops of the Air Branch mobilised and prepared four Farman F20 and F22 biplanes for patrol duties. The military budgets of 1913 and 1914 had allocated up to ten aircraft, but only

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169 Bles, "De Koninklijke Marine mobiliseert" p. 86.
four had arrived so far from France. 174 Their role in the first few weeks consisted of flights close to the borders, mainly to check on the progress of the German and Belgian armies further away. To facilitate border flights, two aeroplanes moved from the Air Branch’s headquarters at Soesterberg to a new hangar in Gilze-Rijen. 175 The other two planes flew along the border near Arnhem and Vlissingen. 176

Because of their small numbers and vulnerability to weather conditions, no more than one flight was made per day. 177 The frequency of flights decreased even further in September 1914, when a storm in Zeeland damaged the one aircraft stationed at Vlissingen along with its storage tent. The Commander-in-Chief quickly authorised the building of wooden hangars to prevent further damage. 178 Another potential problem identified early on was the need to distinguish Dutch planes from those bearing the British Union Jack (later roundel) or the German cross. To make sure border troops did not shoot down Dutch aircraft, orange circles were painted on the fuselage and wings. 179

The most pressing problem for the Air Branch was improving and increasing the size of its force. As soon as mobilisation began, the Army sent Henri Wijnmalen, owner of the recently refurbished Trompenburg aeroplane factory, to France (travelling through crisis-torn Belgium) to make sure the delivery of the six overdue aeroplanes was honoured. 180 The aircraft eventually arrived. As with all other forms of military equipment, acquisition of new aeroplanes and components during the war, however, remained difficult. The Trompenburg facilities managed to build nine flyable Farman aircraft in 1915, 181 but this aeroplane was of no great use other than as a training machine. By late that year, the design had been superseded by all the air forces of the belligerent nations. By 1917, the

175 Klinkert, “De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 31.
176 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, Nicolaas Bosboom, 28 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 136.
177 Telegram from Commander of the Air Branch to the Commander-in-Chief, 1 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 136.
178 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 28 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 136.
179 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 28 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 136.
engines of the 1914 Farmans had completely worn down and were no longer usable. The Branch desperately needed modern aircraft.

The Army tried to place orders outside the Netherlands. By the end of 1917, France, Sweden and Germany had supplied 38 complete or partially complete aircraft, including ten Fokker D-11 fighters and several Thulin engines. The most ready source, however, came from the hundred aeroplanes that landed on Dutch territory during the war. As a neutral nation, the Netherlands interned foreign aircraft breaching their air space. Conveniently, the Dutch were able to buy many of these stranded machines from the warring states. This meant that the Air Branch had access to some of the most up-to-date technology from both sides. Its engineers carefully analysed the machines and built replicas of Sopwith and Nieuport types when engines were made available from abroad. Nevertheless, there were considerable problems. The Dutch had to manage without the expertise or resources to maintain the planes, let alone pilots to fly them. Interment was far from ideal; it was random and meant little consistency in structure or organisation could be achieved within the Air Branch. But it was better than nothing, and enabled the Netherlands to keep some parity with technological advances elsewhere. As we will see in Chapter 9, this would not be possible in either the Navy or Army.

The Air Branch saw significant improvements during the war. By the end of 1918, it possessed around 150 planes of various sizes and capabilities. Its staff consisted of 45 officers (mostly pilots) and 461 lower ranks (mostly support troops). From flying only an hour or so a day in 1914, on average nearly 300 hours of flying time were clocked up per month in 1918. Nevertheless, compared to the belligerents, the Netherlands’ dabble in air power remained a small undertaking. Yet the war ensured that air power became a well-

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182 Commander-in-Chief to the cabinet, report, December 1916, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; Helfferich, Nederlandse Koninklijke Luchtmacht p. 12.
185 Commander of the Air Branch to the Director of Supply in The Hague, 23 August 1914, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 136.
186 Graphs of pilots, staff, aeroplanes and flying hours (1920), in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 927.
187 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 61.
188 “ Overzicht van het aantal vlieguren en ongevallen” [Overview of the number of flying hours and accidents] in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 927.
established part of its military services. In a little over four years the Air Branch had its own commander, its own medical staff and technical service. The war saw the advent of three flying schools (at Soesterberg, Schiphol and Gilze-Rijen), a photo-reconnaissance section, a radio service, and a weapons department.\textsuperscript{189} The creation of a marineluchtvaardienst (Naval Air Service) in 1917 with six sea-planes bought from the United States and two flying schools, indicates the Navy realised that air power had a significant role to play in sea operations as well.\textsuperscript{190} By the end of 1918, the East Indies Armies ordered six Fokker aircraft for service in the colonies.\textsuperscript{191} After the war, in 1919, a new aeroplane fleet for the colonial and home fronts was designed and built with mainly Fokker craft, supplied by a newly-built facility in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{192}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Although the Netherlands' Army, Navy and Air Branch were improved and modernised in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Great War, all faced serious problems, which would become only too apparent during the mobilisation in August 1914. Colijn’s army reforms had come too late to be fully effective, many fortifications were incomplete and short of heavy artillery, the Navy was too small to be able to carry out its obligations at home and abroad, and the Air Branch had a mere four aeroplanes to tinker around with. On land, at sea and in the air, the armed forces would come under extreme pressure during the war to fulfil an ever-increasing workload. They could not possibly compete with the improvements and resources available to the armed forces of the warring nations. The Dutch Army and Navy simply did not have the available resources to preserve some form of parity with the belligerents. Above all else, the political will and industrial resources to indefinitely fund the military was lacking. Unlike the populations in warring states, whose survival in the conflict hinged on supplying and maintaining their armed

\textsuperscript{189} Graphic representation of Air Branch (1920), in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 927.


\textsuperscript{192} Bart van der Klauw, “Unexpected windfalls. Accidentally or deliberately, more than 100 aircraft ‘arrived’ in Dutch territory during the Great War” Air Enthusiast. no. 80, March/April 1999, p. 59.
forces so that they would not lose the war, the Dutch did not have the same sense of urgency. Their survival, so the general populace thought, was under no threat as long as neutrality could be upheld. However, few comprehended that the viability of neutrality rested to a large degree on the viability of the Army, Navy and Air Branch. Without strong armed forces willing and able to defend the country, neutrality could not be protected indefinitely.
The whole town gathered in the burning sun, in front of the white pillars of the town hall. The mayor stepped to the front onto the high steps, and started to read out the mobilisation declaration. Such a deadly silence hung around the packed-together crowd, that one could hear the birds chirping in the gardens behind the houses. When it was announced that fifteen military intakes would be called up, a breath of dismay, like a sudden wind surge, spread through the crowd. One woman fell unconscious. Other women started to cry silently, and buzzing and stumbling the crowd parted into the small streets, where their dull footsteps echoed from the walls of the houses, which absorbed an unrest never known before.

P. H. Ritter

On 28 June 1914, while making an official visit to the city of Sarajevo in Bosnia, the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated by a Serbian militant. Rumours of war breaking out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were rife after the assassination, plunging the already unstable Balkan region into turmoil. However, on the other side of Europe, in the Netherlands, the death of Franz Ferdinand caused little dismay. After all, the Balkans had survived crises of similar magnitude before without serious repercussions elsewhere. In what could be seen as a reflection of its lack of concern, the Dutch government gave Snijders three weeks' leave in July to holiday in Denmark and Norway. The Queen Mother, Emma, was also able to visit her family in Germany as she usually did each summer. But all was not well in Europe. On 23 July, Austria-Hungary,

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1 "[H]eel de stad verzameld stond in de brandende zon voor de witte pilaren van het raadhuis. De burgemeester trad naar voren op de hooge stoep, en begon te lezen het besluit der mobilisatie. Er heerschte zulk een doodsche stilte onder de opeengepakte menigte, dat men de vogels kon horen tjilpen in tuinen achter de huizen. Toen er bekend gemaakt werd, dat er vijftien lichtingen zouden worden opgeroepen, ging er een adem van ontzetting als een plotselinge windvlaag door de massa. Een vrouw viel in zwijm. Andere vrouwen stonden stil te snikken, en zoemend en struikelend ging men uiteen, de kleine straten in, waar de doffe stappen weerklonken tegen de wanden der huizen, welke een onrust opnamen, die ze nimmer hadden gekend." (Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 81).

emboldened by German guarantees of support, issued an ultimatum to Serbia demanding retribution for the murders and warranties against future terrorist activities. If the Serbs did not accept these terms, Austria-Hungary would declare war. Serbia was given 48 hours to respond.

The ultimatum stirred the continent into a frenzy. Even before Serbia replied to Austria-Hungary, an anonymous telegram was sent from the Dutch-German Telegraph Company (Deutsch Niederlandisch Telegrafengesellschaft) in the German city of Köln (Cologne), addressed to a family home in The Hague.³ Late in the evening of 25 July 1914, a messenger arrived in the sea-town of Scheveningen. He delivered the telegram to the private residence of Lieutenant-Major M. D. A. Forbes Wels, the Dutch Deputy Chief of Staff. On arriving home, Forbes Wels’ son opened the telegram expecting a congratulatory message for passing his exams; instead, he read two words: api api (Malay for “fire”). He handed the message to his father who informed the Minister of War, Nicolaas Bosboom, of an impending threat of European war. By this time, news of the Serbian rejection of the ultimatum and the mobilisation of its troops had also reached The Hague. Within hours, the government issued the first mobilisation telegram and prepared the country for war. It recalled Snijders from his holiday and Queen Wilhelmina urged her mother to return home.⁴

On 28 July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.⁵ In support of its Slavic neighbour, Russia pre-mobilised in response. The Dutch formally announced their neutrality two days later. Germany, interpreting the Russian moves as threatening, declared war on Russia on 1 August, the same day the Dutch mobilised their armed forces.⁶ Europe was now set on self-destruction, as the German declaration of war on Russia made it all but unavoidable that its ally, France, would join the conflict, followed soon after by their Entente partner, Britain. On 3 August, Germany declared war on France; its armies invaded Luxembourg, and prepared to do the same to Belgium in implementation of the revised

³ Much of the following information regarding the api api telegram is based on extensive research by Hubert P. van Tuyll: “Inside Knowledge: API-API”; “The Dutch Mobilization” pp. 733 - 735; The Netherlands and World War I pp. 58 - 70. See also: A. Wolting, “De eerste jaren van de Militaire Inlichtingendienst (GS III. 1914 - 1917)” [The first years of the Military Intelligence Service (GS III. 1914 - 1917)] Militaire Spectator. 134, 1965, pp. 566 - 571; Engelen, De Militaire Inlichtingendienst pp. 21 - 22.
⁴ Fasseur, Wilhelmina p. 495.
⁵ See: Appendix 4, pp. 453 - 454, for the timetable of events that led Europe into war in August 1914.
⁶ There is considerable debate on the origins of the Great War and the respective parts played by Russia and Germany in it, which is far too detailed and complex to go into in this thesis.
Schlieffen Plan. By this day, the Dutch Field Army was ready in its *afwachtingsopstelling* ("waiting position") to defend against what it believed would be an attack by Germany, although the Germans had publicly guaranteed Dutch neutrality a day earlier. Britain was on the verge of issuing its own ultimatum, insisting that Germany respect Belgian neutrality, which Germany would not do. German troops crossed the Belgian border and assaulted the fortifications at Liège that night. The next day, Britain entered the conflict. The first great war of the twentieth century had begun.

**FIRE FIRE**

The importance of the "api api" telegram should not be underestimated. The coded message arrived at a most opportune time, several days before the developments in western Europe became critical, allowing the Dutch to make preparations for mobilisation and neutrality. Yet the telegram - its origins, timing, and meaning - are steeped in mystery. Very little is known about the circumstances surrounding the message; and the telegram itself might have been lost in 1921 if Colonel G. U. H. Thoden van Velzen, a military administrator in the General Staff, had not rescued it from a pile of papers that were to be destroyed. Van Velzen requested information regarding the telegram's history from Forbes Wels’ son, who explained the manner of delivery.

It is most likely that J. J. Le Roy, the director of the Dutch-German Telegraph Company, sent the message to Forbes Wels. Le Roy, a retired East Indies Army officer, and Forbes Wels had an agreement that he would inform the commander when he anticipated a German mobilisation. How they came to such an arrangement is unknown, although informal information gathering was common practice among the General Staff. The intended meaning of the telegram is also not clear. Van Velzen stated that "api api" referred

7 Apart from the historians mentioned in fn 3, Nicolaas Bosboom referred in his memoirs to a message sent by an unknown sympathiser warning the Netherlands of possible danger (*In Moellijke Onstandigheden* p. 4). Snijders also referred to the telegram in drafts of his mobilisation memoirs ("Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 16") May 1932, and "Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 17" both in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3) and indirectly in an article published in 1932 ("Twee mobilisatien" p. 14).
9 Velzen, "Toelichting op telegram 'Api Api'" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3.
10 Tuyll, *The Netherlands and World War I* p. 60.
to the possibility of war, Snijders suggested the telegram was a warning to keep careful watch on the situation in Germany, and Hubert van Tuyll used another source to claim that “api api” referred to an impending German mobilisation.\(^{12}\)

Again, only speculation is possible regarding the timing and actual meaning of the telegram. It is unknown what triggered le Roy to send the message so early in the July crisis, hours before the Serbian reply was despatched, before any signs of German mobilisation were visible, and before Russia declared its support for Serbia.\(^{13}\) Van Tuyll provided some conceivable scenarios, including the possibility that le Roy witnessed early signs of German pre-mobilisation, that he intercepted sensitive information sent via the telegraph station, or that he was notified by an informant.\(^{14}\) Whatever le Roy discovered, and however he obtained the information, must have been so pressing that he (or his informant) believed that whatever happened in the Balkans, and regardless of Serbia’s answer to Austria-Hungary, there was a strong chance of it turning into a conflict involving Germany. Le Roy would not have sent the message unless he believed the Netherlands could possibly be at risk. “Api api” could not have referred to a localised Balkan conflict and would, almost certainly, have meant some form of German preparation for war because a conflict involving Austria-Hungary in the Balkans presented little direct threat to the Netherlands. The only land-based continental power of serious concern to the neutral was its eastern neighbour. Of course, it is possible that le Roy acted on a hunch, or received a vague but unsettling message.

No doubt, the telegram warned the Netherlands that the situation in Europe was critical. Yet given its very early timing, its author is unlikely to have presaged inevitable conflict, unless he had information on German intentions on exacerbating the crisis. The events that were pivotal to the outbreak of the Great War - namely Serbian rejection of the Austria-Hungarian ultimatum, Russian support of Serbia, and German responses to both these events - did not occur until after le Roy wired “api api” to Forbes Wels. Most likely, the telegram was meant to place the Netherlands on higher alert: the situation in the Balkans was more dangerous than many initially assumed. Apparent confirmation is provided by the

\(^{12}\) Velzen, “Toelichting op telegram ‘Api Api’”; Snijders “Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 16” (both in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3); Tuyll, “Inside Knowledge” no page numbers, fn 17.

\(^{13}\) See: Appendix 4, pp. 453 - 454.

fact that the Netherlands did not call up its conscripts until five days after the telegram was received, indicating that the government was waiting for more definite signs of conflict before committing to general mobilisation. Bosboom, for one, was unwilling to assign millions of guilders to a mobilisation without some certainty that the country could be in serious danger.

Yet Bosboom did act upon “api api” immediately. The five days between the reception of the telegram and the declaration of mobilisation gave him enough time to see that all the necessary preparations were put in place. Timing was essential. Dutch strategic plans were based on three broad defensive actions: stationing troops at border posts, railway connections and bridges, for early warnings and demolition; movement of the Field Army to likely invasion locations; and occupation of fortified positions and readying of inundations to provide permanent lines of defence and enable flooding of territory. It was imperative that each of these requirements be completed before hostilities began, because an invading force (especially from the east) could capture the all-important railway routes running near the Dutch border and thereby hamper the movement of soldiers and equipment. Raising water levels behind sluices, without which inundation could not occur, also took several days.

As an acknowledged neutral, the Netherlands had an advantage over its powerful European colleagues for it did not have to worry about the consequences of mobilising prematurely. Unlike great power mobilisation, Dutch military activities, because of their defensive nature, did not spark responses in other states. It enabled the Netherlands to mobilise as early and as publicly as it wished. A visual show of strength might make intending invaders hesitant and showed that the country was serious about protecting neutrality. Therefore, perhaps any serious warning, regardless of severity, would have prompted a decision to mobilise in the Netherlands on 26 July. By that time, the serious character of the Balkan crisis was clear, Serbia had rejected the ultimatum, at least in the form Austria-Hungary had presented it, and Russia had declared its support for the Serbs.

ON THE EVE OF WAR, 25 - 31 JULY

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16 Schulten, “Van neutralisme naar bondgenootschap” pp. 6 - 7.
17 Tuyll, “Inside Knowledge” no page numbers, section 5.
As soon as Nicolaas Bosboom was informed of "api api" in the early hours of Sunday 26 July, he took it upon himself to issue Telegram A, which set the mobilisation process into motion: defences were prepared, and forces were placed on alert. When copies of Telegram A reached them, engineering troops began the occupation of bridge crossings, railway junctions, coastal defences, and inundations. As previously mentioned, an urgent message was also sent to Snijders, who was already on his way home, having left Denmark after the Austria-Hungarian ultimatum arrived in Serbia on 23 July. When the request to return reached Snijders on the 26th, he was in Hamburg. Bosboom soon informed Queen Wilhelmina, the Minister President (P. W. A. Cort van der Linden) and the entire cabinet of the measures he had taken and of the gravity of the European situation.

With this in mind, the Queen wrote to her mother requesting her return. She did the same in a letter to her husband, Prince Hendrik, who had left on a boat trip to St. Petersburg, Copenhagen and Christiana. The prince arrived home on the 28th.

On Monday 27 July, the day Snijders reached The Hague, Wilhelmina called the entire cabinet to an emergency meeting. It would be the first of many such meetings held over the following days. That Monday they agreed to prepare the country for war. They expected that if the European situation deteriorated at a rapid pace - which was deemed likely given the stand-off between Austria-Hungary and Serbia - that a full Dutch mobilisation would begin on 1 August. The cabinet drafted a preliminary neutrality declaration and made a decision to keep out of war for as long as possible. By Royal Decree, the ministers cancelled the retirement of the landweer intake year 1907 that was to occur on 1 August. Likewise, they revoked indefinitely the transition from regular army to
landweer of the conscript intake year 1906.25 Warnings were also sent to border and coastguards in the Navy, landweer and Koninklijke Marechaussee notifying them of a possible mobilisation,26 and the General Staff placed all on-duty personnel on alert, halting conscript training exercises to occupy military posts.27 The Navy began preparing for mobilisation as well: sailors outfitted the fleet of torpedo-boats, submarines and mine-layers for war service.28

On 28 July, after Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Serbia, Snijders held a meeting with railway directors outlining the procedure for requisitioning all rolling-stock once mobilisation was underway.29 The cabinet passed a law prohibiting all conscripts leaving the country, including those who were to go fishing outside Dutch territorial waters, or who worked across the border in Germany and Belgium.30 The Navy’s cruisers - Gelderland, Noord Brabant, and Zeeland - started patrolling sea-inlets, and submarines were manned and stationed at important ports (Vlissingen, Den Helder and Ijmuiden).31 All officers had their leave cancelled.32

By this time, Netherlanders, like most Europeans, were aware of the strains and stresses of the crisis. The economic situation within the country was perilous. Financial markets plummeted in expectation of war, while merchant ships remained in port as uncertainty reigned regarding access to overseas markets and the safety of the seas. Stock values dropped significantly and even leading securities suffered huge falls.33 By Tuesday night (28 July), business slowed around the country. Drastic intervention was needed, although the Minister of Finance, M. W. F. Treub, rejected calls for a moratorium. To ensure the financial market did not collapse completely, he did agree to close the

26 Snijders to J. J. [Rambonnet, Minister in Charge of the Navy?] 27 July 1914, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 127.
27 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Genobiliseerde Landmacht p. 5; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 3.
29 Klinkert, “De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 25.
30 Provincial Governor to all mayors in the province of South Holland, 28 July 1914, in SAD, “Stadsarchief 1851 - 1980” archive no. 6, inventory no. 5472.
32 Voogt, “In ons land” p. 17.
Amsterdam and Rotterdam stock exchanges on Wednesday until stability returned. In response to the crisis and in anticipation of large-scale closures, Amsterdam bankers formed a guarantee-syndicate. These were to be the first of a series of emergency measures taken by government and financial leaders to protect the domestic war economy.

By Wednesday, newspapers were full of confusion, fear, rumours of war and international tension. The Dutch were worried; their governmental representatives discussed escalating military readiness. Snijders and Bosboom were in minor disagreement over what should be done next. Snijders was adamant that they should call up all border and coastguards for reconnaissance and as an early warning system in case of invasion.

Bosboom agreed in principle, although he did not see the need to mobilise all 105 detachments at once (around 10,000 troops). Snijders eventually persuaded him that it was impossible to mobilise the guards partially, as no military plans existed for that scenario. Bosboom took Snijders’ suggestion to the cabinet meeting on 30 July. At 4 pm that Thursday, the government, fearing all-out war, mobilised all border and coastguards. The Marechaussee were placed on full war alert as well and moved from their peacetime locations to military positions. By late evening, 44 landweer detachments had occupied their predetermined military positions; by 5am the following morning, 78 detachments were ready; and by the end of Friday, 92 per cent of the guards had turned up. Their mobilisation was fast because most lived in the areas where they served. Other precautionary measures were taken as well: the Inspector of Pilotage at Vlissingen was asked to prepare for the removal of all beacons and buoys on the West Schelde, in case

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34 Vissering et. al., “The Effect of the War upon Banking and Industry” p. 5; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 23.
36 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 5.
37 Uijterschout, Beknopt Overzicht p. 442.
39 Staatsblad. 30 July 1914, no. 331.
40 See: mobilisation questionnaires in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 46.
42 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 5.
foreign naval ships attempted to use the river. The Navy also prepared replacement war buoyage for all river mouths and dismantled key lighthouses.

By 29 July, the Netherlands' government was decidedly alarmed about a European war erupting involving both Germany and France. The General Staff was well acquainted with details of the original Schlieffen Plan, and Dutch mobilisation procedures targeted a

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44 Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeevaart” p. 50; Bles, “De Koninklijke Marine mobiliseert” p. 77.
possible German advance through the province of Limburg.\textsuperscript{45} That the Schlieffen plan had been altered in 1908 was unknown in the Netherlands and in Belgium.\textsuperscript{46} The invasion route that Germany would use in August 1914 was an alternative that neither neutral envisaged.\textsuperscript{47} In the dying days of July, both the Netherlands and Belgium expected that if war broke out between France and Germany their neutrality would be violated.\textsuperscript{48} At this point (29 July), the situation looked so grim that the Dutch Foreign Minister, John Loudon, decided to secretly approach the Belgian Minister in The Hague about sharing military information and combining defences as soon as Germany attacked.\textsuperscript{49} Such a request was in direct violation of the neutrality of both countries, although any agreement reached would have only applied once they were already at war. Presumably because the Belgian government did not wish to jeopardise its chances and as long as war seemed avoidable, it did not respond immediately to the Dutch offer. By 2 August, it was too late to do so. Germany publicly guaranteed it would respect Dutch neutrality, without doing the same for its other western neighbour.\textsuperscript{50} The Dutch turned down all subsequent requests for military aid made by Belgium.\textsuperscript{51}

On Thursday 30 July, Russia began mobilising. The Netherlands’ government stepped up its preparations. The cabinet’s foremost decision was to declare neutrality in the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.\textsuperscript{52} It also imposed a situation of “war danger” on the country. This set a series of emergency laws into motion: empowering municipalities to requisition food and accommodation for billeting troops; placing all telephone and telegraph communications under military control; allowing military use of inundations; and, once mobilisation was declared, giving the Army right to take-over railway lines and traffic.\textsuperscript{53} The government issued a temporary warning to all armed personnel regarding the

\textsuperscript{45} See: Map 3, Chapter 1, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{46} Snijders, “Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 17” in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.
\textsuperscript{47} Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 427.
\textsuperscript{50} Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel p. 5; Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 110.
\textsuperscript{51} Koch, “Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog” pp. 98 - 99.
\textsuperscript{52} Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 6.
\textsuperscript{53} Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden pp. 6 - 8; Treub, Oorlogstijd p. 11.
heightened tension and possibility of war, \(^{54}\) and declared the closure of Dutch territorial
waters to foreign warships.\(^{55}\) To enhance security, Bosboom requested that all details
regarding Dutch defences and the danger of war be kept secret from the public by military
commanders.\(^{56}\) The press was given a list of topics which they could not publish, mainly
details of military operations and mobilisation locations.\(^{57}\) All telegraph transmitters were
manned round the clock for surveillance purposes.\(^{58}\)

After Germany posted an ultimatum to Russia on 31 July, the Dutch government
took decisive action. It was now certain that Germany would go to war with France. The
perceived danger for the Netherlands was acute. Another possible threat came from Britain
if it went to war on the side of its *Entente* partners. For Britain, the most geographically
convenient route to Belgium and Germany was across the Netherlands' province of
Zeeland. Therefore, Dutch neutrality as well as security could be at threat from both the east
and the west, although, as with the changes to the Schlieffen Plan, Dutch officials did not
know that British military advisors had shifted their focus further south to the Belgian and
French seaports.\(^{59}\) To supervise traffic within its territorial waters, the government
authorised searches of ships leaving and entering the sea-inlets at Terschelling, Texel,
IJmuiden, Hoek van Holland, and Goeree, and a naval officer was appointed to oversee all
civilian tugboat services in ports and inlets.\(^{60}\)

Friday 31 July was most memorable for the declaration of general mobilisation
signed by Queen Wilhelmina at 1:30pm. The first mobilisation day was to be Saturday 1
August. At the same time as authorising the call up of all conscripts, the government
appointed Snijders as Commander-in-Chief.\(^{61}\) This did not occur, however, without discord,
a precursor of future crises involving Snijders and the government. Snijders only accepted
the post on condition that he would be responsible to the entire cabinet, and not solely to the

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\(^{54}\) *Staatsblad*, no. 334(a), 31 July 1914; Snijders, “Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 16” in SMG/DC,
“Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3; Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 6.

\(^{55}\) Pruntel, “Bereiken wat mogelijk is” p. 182.

\(^{56}\) Minister of War to Chief of General Staff, C. J. Snijders, 30 July 1914, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf”
entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 144.

\(^{57}\) Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 7.

\(^{58}\) Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” pp. 3-4.


\(^{60}\) Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeemacht” p. 51; Bles, “De Koninklijke Marine mobiliseert” p. 78.

\(^{61}\) Koninklijk Besluit 31 July 1914, no. 100, in *Buitengewone Nederlandse Staatscourant*, 1914, no. 178. A copy of
the “Instructie voor den Opperbevelhebber” [Instructions for the Commander-in-Chief] can be found in Bosboom, *In
Moeilijke Omstandigheden* Appendix C, pp. 393 - 395.
Minister of War. This stipulation contravened both the wishes of many in cabinet and the draft of his instructions. Snijders believed that his military authority derived from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which was embodied in the monarch and all her cabinet ministers. This stance followed a precedent outlined in the original plans for appointment, designed when Hendrik Colijn was Minister of War (1911 - 1913). The independence needed to execute defence objectives set by the government could not, according to Snijders and Colijn, be subordinated. Placing the supreme commander directly under supervision of a single cabinet minister would have shifted responsibility to the minister, and would, therefore, have made Snijders' position untenable. As shall be seen, although Cort van Linden's administration eventually agreed and changed Snijders' instructions to incorporate this fundamental point, the issue would be raised again four years later under a new government. It would provide a major source of conflict between Snijders and one of Bosboom's successors, G. A. A. Alting van Geusau.

ALL SOLDIERS MOBILISE WITH SPEED

Once Queen Wilhelmina signed the mobilisation declaration, the country was alerted to the order by public announcement. Posters were pasted on public buildings, shop walls, and billboards in towns, villages and cities declaring, by order of the Minister of War: “all conscripts mobilise with speed”. Church bells rang, trumpets sounded, messengers passed through the streets hailing the news, and mayors arranged public meetings. The everyday normality of Friday afternoon came to a crashing halt. People stopped work and emptied out onto the streets to read the posters or listen to the

64 Snijders to the cabinet, 31 July 1914, in SMG/DC, “Snijders, Cornelis Jacobus 29.9.52” 397/S.
66 See: Chapter 12, pp. 417 - 420.
67 “Alle miliciens met spoed opkomen”, text mobilisation posters, 31 August 1914, examples of which can be found in SMG/DC, “1914” 131/7; and in Geerke et. al., De Oorlog Volume 1, between pp. 106 - 107 and between pp. 112 - 113.
declarations. They gathered with friends and neighbours to discuss the likelihood of war. Many were astonished by the declaration. They had expected Russia to back down after the German ultimatum. Others feared the worst and heeded the announcement with trepidation.

Illustration 5: Mobilisation

A crowd gathers in front of a call-up poster for landweer conscripts.


An atmosphere of concern hung over the crowds. P. H. Ritter described the apprehension of the afternoon in his book De Donkere Poort (The Dark Gate):

Still, the first moment was ominous and fearful. A panic, as had never been known, captured the masses... In front of every shop window, which had bulletins pasted to it, fearful, silent crowds formed, and yet even in this utterly despairing moment people tried to talk courage into each other... Everybody was hoisted from their normal path of life, and saw the fruit of their life’s work

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69 Miep de Zaaijer, diary entry, 31 July 1914, in Haags gemeentemuseum, Den Haag ‘14 - ‘18 p. 5.
disappear, expectations for the future collapsed ... the majority of the population was plunged into dismay.\textsuperscript{70}

Attendance at church and special prayer services, such as one attended by 5,000 Limburgers in Maastricht, increased.\textsuperscript{71} Several people who lived outside the fortified positions fled to railway stations demanding that trains take them to the safety of the New Holland Waterline.\textsuperscript{72} In areas close to inundations, people realised that if war broke out water levels would rise around them, flooding their houses, farms and businesses. They readied themselves for this contingency by packing away valuables, stacking furniture, taking down curtains, and storing food, hay and fodder in attics.\textsuperscript{73}

Holiday makers around the country cut short their vacations.\textsuperscript{74} Popular tourist spots were soon deserted. Train stations and ferry terminals were crowded with impatient sightseers wishing to get home. All train travel, however, was limited as military transports had priority. On 1 August, no trains for civilians ran at all.\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, entertainment events were cancelled. The fair held in Zwolle shut its tents and packed up its acts possibly to protect public safety (to prevent uncouth behaviour and public drunkenness), national security (avoid bringing crowds of people together), and to set the tone of sobriety.\textsuperscript{76} For these same reasons all fairs and carnivals would be outlawed in most parts of the country for the coming war years.

The agitation of the early mobilisation days increased with each declaration of war. Many Netherlanders did not believe Germany or Britain would respect their neutrality, and reassurances for public safety had to be given. The mayor of Hoek, a village in the south of the country, printed and distributed posters on 6 August urging citizens to stop worrying.
about the war. He explained that there was no reason whatsoever to be anxious; rumours of war and invasion were not to be trusted, and if a serious threat arose, he would personally inform them. He urged everybody to stay calm and return to work. He also implored civilian men to work twice as hard to ensure the harvest was collected and business did not fail, as so many of their colleagues were serving the country as soldiers. 77

On finding out about the mobilisation, the men affected by the call-up - nine intakes of regular conscripts and seven intakes of landweer 78 left work early on Friday afternoon, returned home, dug out their uniforms, and set off to their pre-arranged military destinations. Some left immediately, others waited until morning, taking full advantage of a last night at home with family. That the uncertainty evident on Friday had not subsided by Saturday morning was reflected in the sombre mood of soldier farewells. Unlike elsewhere in Europe, there was no elation or euphoria at the thought of war; there were no cheering crowds waving to marching troops. 79 Rather, the atmosphere was subdued and strained. The thought of war scared most Dutch as they watched loved ones disappear to military depots, fortified positions, guard posts and naval ships.

In expectation of the worst, in the days leading up to mobilisation many people had started stock-piling food, hoarding silver coinage and withdrawing life savings from banks. Once mobilisation was declared this panic led to a fury with potentially disastrous economic consequences. People waited in lengthy queues outside banks and shops. Vital goods disappeared quickly from store shelves. In places, the police were called to stop scuffles among customers trying to grab dwindling supplies. 80 To capitalise on high demand, many shopkeepers increased their prices. The government hoped to counter profiteering and stockpiling by extending the powers of the Onteigeningswet (requisitioning

77 Poster, “Aan de Burgerij van Hoek” [To the citizens of Hoek] signed by the mayor, A. Wolftert, 6 August 1914, in Commander of Coastal Battery at Neuzen, D. Putman Cramer, “Dagboek van 5 Augustus 1914 t/m 31 December 1914 omtrent de uitoefening van het Militair Gezag te Neuzen Hoek en Zaamslag” [Diary of 5 August 1914 up to and including 31 December 1914 regarding the exercise of military authority in Neuzen, Hoek and Zaamslag] in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 98.
78 Chart of the different yearly intakes mobilised between 1914 and 1917 in Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden Appendix A.
80 Streefkerk, “Aantekeningen uit de oorlogsjaren 1914 - 1918” p. 86.
law). The law already allowed municipal councils to requisition food, supplies and accommodation for the armed forces; its amendments, put in place on 3 August, enabled them to requisition any goods that were not made available to the public at a reasonable price (the government set maximum prices throughout the war). To monitor the system, each retailer had to post a list of prices in his or her shop windows.81

In time of crisis, citizens lost confidence in paper money and banks’ silver stocks soon dwindled as customers demanded to be paid only in coinage.82 Before the outbreak of war, the Netherlands Reserve Bank had stocks of coinage worth around f8 million, but by early August this had dropped below f3 million.83 Gold was also at a premium and to allay shortages and avoid credit problems, the government imposed an export ban on the precious metal and managed to obtain a shipment of silver from France.84 For most citizens it was silver, as the most common form of currency, rather than gold, that concerned them the most. Soon, banks placed limits on how much money could be changed into silver at each visit.85 The shortages had dire consequences once retailers and restauranteurs refused to accept anything but coinage, or were no longer able to give change for payments made in paper money. In one hotel, beer was bought with f10 notes - an exorbitant amount even in today’s terms - because no change was available for thirsty patrons.86

The government and municipal councils had to take action, printing emergency paper money in small denominations of f1, f2.50, and f5.87 These could be used in place of silver coins, and had to be accepted by recipients. This ersatz money remained in circulation throughout the war.88 Urgency was required in circulation as many businesses did not have enough change available to pay their workers. To ensure that banks could continue to reimburse customers, the government passed an emergency decree allowing the

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81 Staatsblad. no. 351, 3 August 1914.
82 For more on the silver crisis see: Moeyes, Buiten Schot pp. 165 - 168.
83 Treub, Oorlogsstijd p. 196.
86 Miep de Zaaijer, diary entry, 1 August 1914, in Haags gemeentemuseum, Den Haag ’14 - ’18 p. 5.
88 Treub, “De economische toestand” p. 136.
Reserve Bank to lower its stocks of coins and coin materials to one-fifth of all money and credit issued.\textsuperscript{89} Also, on 3 August it gave the State Post Bank a time delay of two weeks to hand out withdrawals of over f25. Fortunately, by 7 August, as the immediate threat of invasion faded, withdrawals returned to pre-war levels (see Table 5) and the Bank rarely used its emergency power.\textsuperscript{90} Because dwindling gold stocks worried the government, it issued an export prohibition on gold on 30 July as well.

\textbf{TABLE 5: WITHDRAWALS MADE FROM THE \textsc{Rijkspostspaarbank} (State Postbank), JULY - AUGUST 1914}\textsuperscript{91}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WITHDRAWALS</th>
<th>TOTAL AMOUNT WITHDRAWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 29</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>f362,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 30</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>f1,035,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 31</td>
<td>6,874</td>
<td>f2,585,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1</td>
<td>13,771</td>
<td>f4,821,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 3</td>
<td>11,228</td>
<td>f3,718,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 4</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>f515,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 5</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>f518,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 6</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>f336,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 7</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>f176,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{SOLDIERS, SOLDIERS EVERYWHERE, 1 - 3 AUGUST}

When Bosboom issued Telegram A on 26 July, he set a highly detailed programme in motion. The mobilisation plan culminated in the activation of the entire military and \textit{landweer}, which was phase two of three outlined in the 1913 Strategic Directives. The third

\textsuperscript{89}\textit{Staatblad} 31 July 1914, no. 334. On 25 July 1914 cover of credit by coinage and coin material issued by the \textit{Nederlandse Bank} stood at 54\%, by 2 August this had decreased to 37\% (Meester, “Overzicht van den economischen toestand van Nederland” p. 36).

\textsuperscript{90}Vissering et. al., “The Effect of the War upon Banking and Industry” p. 9.

\textsuperscript{91}On average 800 withdrawals worth around f200,000 were made daily before August 1914 (Treb, \textit{Oorlogstijd} pp. 203 - 204; Treub, “De economische toestand” p. 146).
phase would be the transfer of the Field Army from its *afwachtingsopstelling* to its war position. Once general mobilisation was declared, it was intended that troops, their horses, equipment and food supplies would be fully war ready within three days. Within this time, garrison troops were also to prepare fortresses and inundations. Speed was essential. The entire mobilisation process was intended to be quick, centralised, flexible and efficient.\(^92\)

By sunrise on the first mobilisation day - Saturday 1 August - the military undertaking was well under way. Men, dressed in uniforms retrieved from drawers, attics and moth cupboards, made their way to local depots or train stations. Soldiers seemed to be present everywhere.\(^93\) Although several *landweer* troops mobilised locally, most soldiers had to travel by rail to get to their depots or *afwachtingsopstelling*. On 30 July, responsibility for rail traffic transferred from the rail companies to the (military) Director of Supply and Traffic, although the individual companies remained responsible for the daily operation of trains, carriages and tracks.\(^94\) In 1912, within the General Staff an Office for Extraordinary Transport had been created to ease the transition from civilian to military control over the railways.\(^95\) The bureau moved all military troops, their goods and horses during mobilisation and fulfilled an important liaison role between the military and rail companies.\(^96\) They ensured that an additional 144 trains were operational on 1 August, and that 241 normal trains were lengthened.\(^97\) That day, around 97,000 soldiers and officers used trains to reach their destinations alongside nearly 2,000 horses, 21 gun and ammunition wagons, and six vehicles. The next day another 72,000 men were transported, this time accompanied by nearly 4,500 horses, 85 gun and ammunition wagons, and 293 vehicles.\(^98\) By the morning of 4 August, the railways had carried 177,500 military personnel, 6,600 horses and 472 vehicles.\(^99\)


\(^{93}\) Schilpevoort, *Uit Kazerne en Kamp* no page number.


\(^{95}\) Klinkert, *Het Vaderland Verdedigd* p. 399.


\(^{97}\) “Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport” in SMG/DC, *Mobilisatieverslag* 91A/3, no page numbers, section “Hoofdstuk II. De mobilisatie. B. Buitengewoon militair vervoer”.

\(^{98}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{99}\) Snijders, “Twee mobilisatiënten” p. 18.
Most troops were able to travel to their destinations without any problems and within good time. Naturally, there were hiccups. Delays were common at most stations, and some soldiers were unsure where they had to report and travelled somewhat aimlessly throughout the country.\textsuperscript{100} Some journeys were arduously slow, although hunger was relieved along the way by gifts from locals and refreshments provided by scouting groups.\textsuperscript{101} The movement of Field Army divisions caused a few difficulties because large concentrations of troops, goods and horses had to be transported to the same place. At some stations there were not enough carriages or tracks available to do this efficiently.\textsuperscript{102} While military traffic ran smoothly, civilian travel was hampered by the mobilisation. When normal civilian travel resumed on 4 August, services functioned according to military demand, the armed forces had priority over seats, and in order to preserve coal stocks, fewer trains ran than in peacetime.\textsuperscript{103}

In comparison to the orderly manner by which soldiers travelled and were organised at railway stations - something facilitated in many places by alcohol bans -\textsuperscript{104} once they arrived at depots efficient organisation was lacking. Depots were responsible for issuing weapons, ammunition, rations, blankets and other equipment to troops as well as co-ordinating soldiers into brigades and finding lodgings for them. The first and most visually jarring problem for depot staff was the abysmal state of soldiers’ uniforms. Rather than stockpiling clothing, the military allowed conscripts to take their military garments home after their initial training period. Unsurprisingly, given that most of the men had almost never worn their uniforms again, the state of their clothing left much to be desired.\textsuperscript{105} Many, especially the older men, had outgrown the uniforms tailored for them

\textsuperscript{100} "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "Het op voet van oorlog brengen van de landweerbataljons"; Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 7.

\textsuperscript{101} Burger, "Fragmenten" p. 350.

\textsuperscript{102} Namely at Woerden, Geertruidenberg, Wierickerschans (Wieringerschans) and Delft ("Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "Bijzondere opmerkingen. 7. Veldpioniers").

\textsuperscript{103} Koninklijke Bibliotheek, \textit{Documenten voor de Economische Crisis} p. 257; Seyffardt, "Ons spoorwegbedrijf en de mobilisatie" p. 476.

\textsuperscript{104} Haags gemeentemuseum, \textit{Den Haag '14 - '18} p. 6; Diary entry, 6 October 1914, in SMG/DC, "Schenking uit nalatenschap. Jh. F. Beelaerts van Blokland" [Gift from the estate of Jh. F. Beelaerts van Blokland] 397/-F.

\textsuperscript{105} See: ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Sta" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 42, 48, 50, 54, 231, for clothing problems as well as other mobilisation shortages. As well: "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3; Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht}; Munneke, "De mobilisatie van de landmacht" pp. 11 - 12; Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} pp. 34 - 35, 162 - 163.
when they were conscripted at age 20. Several uniforms had items missing, while other articles were worn through (this was especially true of boots). Not all soldiers had the camouflage grey uniform that was introduced in 1911, many still wearing the old dark blue raiment. Furthermore, the state of soldiers’ undergarments posed a grave problem as well as a health risk. Military leaders assumed that conscripts would bring their own socks and underwear with them. This was not the case. Many men wore no undergarments whatsoever and others brought only what they were wearing. They had assumed that the Army would provide these items for them.

Either military planners had little foresight or were financially hindered from stockpiling the clothing needs of a fully mobilised force. Clothing reserves, enough to outfit a peacetime contingent (around 23,000 troops) for three months, disappeared within hours of mobilising. As a result, most soldiers remained under-clothed, some wore civilian dress until September, and others stayed in the blue uniforms for many more months. Commanders bought up hundreds of pairs of shoes, thousands of singlets and many more pairs of socks from local stores in the opening days of August, usually at hugely inflated prices. Soon these supplies were also limited. Thankfully, the mobilisation occurred at the height of summer. Through advertisements, the Ministry of War urged civilians to send old undergarments to the Army. It also beseeched women’s groups to knit and sew such items. As incentives, it offered free freight on all underwear parcels and paid contributors for their “gifts”. The response was ample and gave temporary relief to the troops’ clothing needs, but, as we shall see, the problem of outfitting the Army remained throughout the war.

Clothing troops was not the only difficulty encountered at the depots. Much more serious were the shortages of ammunition, pioneer tools and other essential equipment. According to Bosboom, the minimum needs of the Army’s machine-guns were 120 million

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106 Commander of 6 Batt. LWI to Commander-in-Chief, 14 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 50.
107 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 30; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 163.
108 Munnekredes, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” p. 12.
109 “Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport” in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3, no page numbers, section “G. Het op voet van oorlog brengen van het veldleger”.
110 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 63.
111 Ibid. p. 64.
112 Advertisement from Ministry of War in Ochtendblad. 23 August 1914, in “Overzicht van de voornaamste gebeurtenissen in Nederland vanaf 30 Juli 1914. dl I” in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr. 135 (11 delen)” 143.
cartridges; however, only 80 - 85 million cartridges were stockpiled.\textsuperscript{113} Stocks of rifle ammunition and artillery munitions were so low that shooting exercises were limited.\textsuperscript{114} Each artillery battery had 700 rounds available per gun, well below the minimum 1,000 specified by planners.\textsuperscript{115} Other equipment in high demand and short supply included spades, telegraph wire, and bridge-building materials.\textsuperscript{116} Again, the military had underestimated the needs of an operational Army. Unlike clothing manufacturing, however, the Netherlands could not turn to ready alternatives having neither a large arms industry nor the raw materials stockpiled to produce replacement munitions.\textsuperscript{117}

Part of the supply problem was administrative. According to one landweer commander, munitions for his company were delayed not because they were unavailable, but because the location of the warehouse was unknown.\textsuperscript{118} Others reported on packing problems in warehouses, staff shortages, and even ineffective labelling and issuing of receipts.\textsuperscript{119} A contributing factor to the mayhem was that Army restructuring begun in 1913 had not yet been fully implemented and many warehouses had not received the revised regimental structures.\textsuperscript{120} The administrative problem, however, was not only one of supply for it affected even the simple yet fundamentally important task of registering which men had turned up and which had not. One especially pessimistic report noted that among cavalry regiments:

Whole detachments reported to the depots without the necessary administrative documentation, even without a name list; surplus goods arrived, with a few exceptions, without inventory or without labels on the boxes; the

\textsuperscript{113} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 33.
\textsuperscript{114} Inspector of Infantry, Major-General Beijze, to all commanders of infantry regiments, 7 August 1914, ARA, "Archieven van Divisies, Regimenten en andere eenheden van de Infanterie van Koninklijke Landmacht, 1814 - 1940" [Archives of the Divisions, Regiments and other infantry units of the Royal Netherlands' Army, 1814 - 1940] entry no. 2.13.52, inventory no. 515.
\textsuperscript{115} Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 39; Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 34.
\textsuperscript{116} Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 31; Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden}, p. 34;
\textsuperscript{117} For more information on the Dutch armaments industry during the war, see: Chapter 9, pp. 299 - 310.
\textsuperscript{118} Mobilisation questionnaire filled in by Commander 4 Comp. 1 Batt. 3 RLWI, no date [March 1915] in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 42.
\textsuperscript{119} "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "Bijzondere opmerkingen. 6. Bereden Artillerie", section "G. Het op voet van oorlog brengen van het veldleger", Colonel in charge of supplies (Kolonel-Intendance) for the Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 16 November 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 48.
\textsuperscript{120} "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "Het op voet van oorlog brengen van de bezettingstroepen".
[identification] marks on the necks of many horses or on horseshoes were illegible.\(^{121}\) Another reason given for the chaos at depots was the lack of able officers among the administrative ranks.\(^{122}\) This was not an isolated problem. Officer shortages affected all levels of the military and would remain one of the principal stumbling blocks to achieving a well-trained and disciplined armed force.\(^{123}\)

Bedding, blankets and food were also in short supply. Many civilian bakeries and butcheries did not fill contracts they had signed years earlier with the military, some because they could not, others because higher prices could be had selling privately. Some suppliers, who had claimed they could deliver 35,000 rations daily, only supplied 1,000 on 1 August.\(^{124}\) To make matters worse, in several places, emergency rations were not complete or did not arrive from warehouses in the first few days.\(^{125}\) In an alleged incident in Den Briel on 2 August, soldiers from a particularly hungry regiment looted a local bakery for breakfast.\(^{126}\) In order to rectify the food situation, a central supply depot for the Field Army was established in Rotterdam, where food was either produced or stockpiled for distribution to regiments in the south of the country.\(^{127}\) Elsewhere, local bakeries, fishmongers and butchers supplied food under revised contracts, or civilians were paid to house and feed billeted soldiers. Luckily, the food problems were short-lived. As early as 3 August, enough resources were available to bake and butcher for the whole military.\(^{128}\)

\(^{121}\) "Geheele detachementen meldden [sic] zich bij de depots zonder de noodige administratie bescheiden, zelfs zonder een naamlijst; overcomplete goederen kwamen, op enkele uitzonderingen na, zonder inventaris of zonder etiketten op de kisten aan; bij vele paarden waren de merken op de halsvlakte of de hoefnummers onleesbaar." ("Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "Bijzondere Opmerkingen. 5. Cavalerie").

\(^{122}\) Territorial Commander in Friesland to Commander-in-Chief, 31 October 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 50.

\(^{123}\) For more about the impact of officer shortages and lack of training during the war, see: Chapter 10. pp. 337 – 340, 349 - 358.

\(^{124}\) "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "G. Het op voet van oorlog brengen van het veldleger".

\(^{125}\) Commander 6 Batt. LWI to Commander-in-Chief, 14 October 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 50; Kolonel-Intendance for the Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 16 November 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 48; "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "G. Het op voet van oorlog brengen van het veldleger".

\(^{126}\) Altes, De grote oorlog van de kleine man p. 38.

\(^{127}\) Bosboom, In Moeilijke Onomstandigheden p. 160.

\(^{128}\) "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, p. 28.
Many of the supply problems were minor compared to potentially fatal flaws in the fighting ability of soldiers. The amount of training received by many soldiers was gravely inadequate. Several unfit men were unable to complete the shortest of marches, others had forgotten how to load and shoot their weapons, some cavalry troops could not ride horses, and the artillery batteries were short of well-trained gun-layers.\(^{129}\) Compared with French and German troops, who received two years training on average, Dutch soldiers were critically under-skilled.\(^{130}\) At most, an infantry soldier was trained for eight and a half months, but many had received no more than four months. Major-General van Terwisga, the commander of the Field Army's Third Division in 1914, described their inexperience as follows:

> What one meets everywhere is illusory training; the proficiency, if one can call it that, is entirely superficial, and it is even spread so thinly that the lack of training is often clearly visible through [the veneer].\(^{131}\)

The situation was not entirely hopeless. One brigade commander wryly noted in his diary on 8 August: “if I’m given a few more days, then I shall dare to appear with my brigade”.\(^{132}\) It was fortunate that the country was not invaded and that most soldiers had ample time over the following weeks and months to gain necessary military skills.

The mobilisation reports, commissioned by both the government and the General Staff, all had one common criticism of the mobilisation process, namely that there were not enough officers to fill leadership, training and administrative roles. One report described too many “most insufficient, yes, highly defective” officers.\(^{133}\) Many were young, inexperienced, had problems asserting authority and gaining respect from their subordinates. This hampered deployment as well as general troop morale and discipline. The lack of an able cadre core was not a new issue; it had plagued the Dutch armed forces

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\(^{129}\) Ibid. section “Bijzondere opmerkingen. 7. Veldpioniers”; Staatscommissie, _Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde L

\(^{130}\) Klinkert, “De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 27.

\(^{131}\) “Wat men overal aantreft is een schijnopleiding; de geoefendheid, als men die zoo noemen mag, ligt geheel aan de oppervlakte, en zelfs ligt zij er zoo dun op, dat de ongeoefendheid er veelal duidelijk doorheen zichtbaar is” 1914, in Klinkert, “De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 28.

\(^{132}\) “[W]anneer ik nog een paar dagen den tijd mag hebben, durf ik wel met de brigade te voorschijn te komen” (Burger, “Fragmenten” p. 348).

for years. Yet very little was done to ease the problem, because governments did not wish to conscript soldiers into higher ranks and because the financial costs involved were substantial. At any rate, there were few short-term solutions available and during the war the shortage would be accentuated rather than alleviated.

Greater transport and supply problems were encountered by troops in the fortifications, especially in Amsterdam, than by those in the Field Army. Garrison soldiers had no trains available for transport to and from their positions. They had to requisition carts, vehicles and automobiles from locals. Few depots were allocated to them either and many were dispatched immediately into fortifications. This caused some serious problems, as most fortified positions did not have the space available to store food, bedding, weapons or equipment. In an update on 3 August, Buhlman notified Snijders that administrative staff were missing from the Field Army’s Headquarters, that there were not enough weapons for his landweer troops, and that some regiments had no field kitchens.

Nevertheless, the military succeeded in its primary goal: a speedy mobilisation. By 3 August, a force of 196,657 men (including around 9,000 naval conscripts) had been mobilised and these men were, despite some problems, deployable. It was not a

\[\text{134} \text{ Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd pp. 339 - 342.} \]
\[\text{135} \text{ Isselt, “De wijziging van de landweerwet” pp. 202 - 203, 215 - 218; Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 339.} \]
\[\text{136} \text{ “Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport” in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatiesverslag” 91A/3, no page numbers, section “Het op voet van oorlog brengen van de bezettingstroepen”.} \]
\[\text{137} \text{ Kolonel-Intendance for the Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 16 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 48.} \]
\[\text{138} \text{ Commander Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 3 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.} \]
\[\text{139} \text{ Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeehavent” p. 31.} \]
\[\text{140} \text{ This figure is from a note by the Head of Department II of the Ministry of War to the Administrator, Head of Department VII of the Ministry of War, 30 May 1916 (in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatiesverslag” 91A/3) in response to wrongfully quoted absentee figures in “Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport” (in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatiesverslag” 91A/3). This is the earliest non-published source I have found stemming directly from Ministry of War officials that quote a mobilisation number. The numbers cited remain problematic as counts were taken by various regiments at varying times and, as has already been noted, accuracy in some depots was lacking (Commander of Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 30 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 128). It is possible that the number mobilised during the first weeks of August came closer to the 203,657 mark as mentioned by the Minister of War, Nicolaas Bosboom (“Nota omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang der mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting hiervan te verhoogen” [Note regarding what has been done since the start of the mobilisation to increase the fighting strength and equipment of the Army] 16 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705) although in his 1933 memoirs, Bosboom believed the number to have been much lower (180,000) (Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 30). The 203,657 figure was also published in the Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht (p. 85). This later figure was quoted by F. Snapper (“Enige Sterktecijfers Betreffende de Nederlandse Landmacht in de Periode 1840 - 1940” [Some strength-figures for the...
negligible number. The speed and scale of the mobilisation impressed contemporaries, both at home and abroad, especially as the numbers mobilised were exaggerated to around 300,000, out of a total population of six million. The sheer numbers gave an idea of a strong and defensible Netherlands, no doubt of some deterrent value. Absenteeism was also low. On 3 August it stood at 7.2 per cent, with unfitness, residence outside the country, or, much less commonly, desertion all contributing. The absentee rate did vary across regiments: one had all but one-quarter of a per cent of its men turn up, while another had missed 10.32 per cent of troops on the day the regiment left its depot.

To ensure that all men who had to serve actually did so, the government declared an amnesty on 6 August: all missing soldiers could appear by 1 November 1914 without facing desertion charges. The government even agreed to pay for soldiers living abroad to return home and mobilise. It also made preparations to expand the armed forces. On 3 August, the cabinet passed a law calling up all 20-year-old men (intake year 1915, around 25,000 men). A year earlier 23,000 of them would have been conscripted, now only seriously unfit men or those who had brothers already serving missed out. Volunteering for the landstorm (which was not mobilised in August 1914) was also possible. This was

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Netherlands' Army in the period 1840 - 1940] Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis. 4, 1981, p. 87) as well, and may have been the source for the 204,000 Sniijders mentioned in two of his articles ("Nederland's militaire positie" p. 541, "De Nederlandsche landmacht 1898 - 1923" p. 218). Most other secondary sources circle the 200,000 mark: Schulten counted 197,500 (Schulten, "The Netherlands and its Army" p. 76); while Klinkert accounted for 204,000 ("Verdediging van de zuidgrens" p. 214). Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel p. 22. Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 39. While the "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" (in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, p. 3) mentioned a two per cent absentee rate for soldiers with lawful reasons and 3.5 per cent for those with other reasons (total 5.5%), the Head of Department II in the Ministry of War corrected this to 15,202 not mobilised (nearly 7.2% of the 196,657 mobilised on 3 August) in a note to the Administrator, the Head of Department VII in the Ministry of War (in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3). Sniijders backed this with an 8% absentee rate (Sniijders, "De Nederlandsche landmacht 1898 - 1923" p. 218). Mayors were given lists of absentees from their municipality to follow up (see, for example: "Opgaven van niet opgekomen en van verlofgangers die niet op 1 Augustus 1914, doch eerst later zijn aangekomen (20 M. V. Instructie of #30 Landweer Vergoedings-Instructie) [Specification of [soldiers who did] not show up, and of [those on] leave who did not show up on 1 August 1914, but arrived later] in SAD, "Stadsarchief 1851 - 1980" archive no. 6, inventory no. 5472).

42 LWI regiment in the II Infantry Battalion had a turn-out of 99.75% (Table of Field Army Division III (no. M231), 25 August 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 128), while 1 Regiment Infantry of the II Field Army Division had a 10.32% absentee rate (Commander Division II to Commander of the Field Army, 12 August 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 128). Staatsblad. no. 376, 6 August 1914. Staatsblad. no. 479, 10 October 1914. Staatsblad. no. 349, 3 August 1914; Isselt, Snelle Uitvoering p. 7. Staatsblad. no. 349, 3 August 1914.
not a great success: by December only 30 voluntary landstorm sections had been established with fewer than 2,000 members.¹⁵⁰ To lessen some of the officer shortages, some “armed” landstorm officers as well as retired officers (especially those who had seen active service in the East and West Indies) were requested to return to service, and doctors and medical students were also asked to join up and ease a huge medical staff shortage.¹⁵¹

**Horses, Dogs and Houses**

It was impossible for the military to stockpile all that it needed for a successful mobilisation. Much had to be obtained from civilians. This is why the Onteigeningswet was so important. It entitled military authorities to take whatever they required from the population, who were compensated for their losses. Requisition did not go without opposition from residents, who, quite naturally, were far from pleased at being forced to hand over their possessions, even when they could receive hugely inflated prices for them.¹⁵² The mayor of Utrecht must have confronted sufficient resistance to warrant printing a declaration on 3 August outlining the legal rights of the armed forces to commandeering whatever they wished, using force if necessary.¹⁵³

The Army's most pressing need was for horses for cavalry duty and transporting mobile artillery. They were also needed for the more mundane task of shifting goods. Collecting horses from 81 requisitioning districts formed an integral part of the mobilisation timetable. On 31 July, High Command warned municipalities that horse-owners had to make their livestock available for inspection and possible purchase the next day. The military requisitioned a total of 12,178 horses at a cost to the state of £6,756,211.75.¹⁵⁴ Yet the collection did not go completely according to plan, as not enough quality animals were available. By the end of the requisitioning on 1 August the Army was still 2,000 short.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 11 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 33.
¹⁵⁵ Director of Remontewezen (horse supply) to Commander-in-Chief, 4 August 1914, ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 36; Staatscommissie, *Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht* p. 12.
Another requisition was organised at six centres in the following two weeks, which provided an extra 902 horses, yet this was still not enough.\textsuperscript{156} There were other problems as well. Not many soldiers knew how to handle horses properly, nor were there enough stables.\textsuperscript{157} The horse shortage had two important consequences: firstly many depots went without horses for supply duties, and secondly, some artillery sections did not mobilise as quickly as they should have because too few draught animals were available.\textsuperscript{158} The lack of horses also led to the establishment of cyclist sections to replace some of the cavalry units. Three such squadrons, each 150-strong, were created from 18 August onwards.\textsuperscript{159}

The Army also experimented with other animals for transport duty, including large farm dogs. Where horses pulled the larger mobile artillery units, dogs were appropriately sized for machine-gun sections. Before the mobilisation, the Army owned about a dozen dogs, but estimated it needed 900.\textsuperscript{160} A system of requisitioning similar to that of horses was implemented during August 1914, resulting in the acquisition of 240 dogs at a cost of f45 each. Requisitioning continued in November to fill the shortfall.\textsuperscript{161} Early in 1918, dogs were still commandeered for machine-gun duties, and each infantry regiment had a machine-gun platoon attached including 38 dogs.\textsuperscript{162} The dog experiment was not a great success because many dogs could not get used to their pulling duties. Their services became redundant later that year.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{156} In Leiden and The Hague on 4 August, Middeharnis on 7 August, Nijmegen and Haarlemmermeer on 12 August and in Amsterdam on 18 August (Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 12).
\textsuperscript{158} Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 12; Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” p. 27.
\textsuperscript{159} Uijterschout, \textit{Beknopt Overzicht} p. 442.
\textsuperscript{160} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 31.
\textsuperscript{162} Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, “Nota omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang der mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting hiervan te verhoogen” [Note regarding what has been done since the mobilisation of the Army to increase its fighting ability and outfitting] 16 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705.
\textsuperscript{163} Commander-in-Chief, “Leidraad bij antwoording van de vragen, door het Lid der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-Generaal Mr. P. Troelstra tot de Regeering te richten” [Guide in response to the questions asked of the government by the member of the Second Chamber of the Estates General, Mr. P. Troelstra] October 1918, p. 9, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705; Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” p. 20.
Like dogs and horses, the Army also requisitioned all types of vehicles, carts and automobiles from civilians during the mobilisation. The seizure of most of the vehicles had been organised years earlier, when cart, carriage, cycle and barrow owners signed contracts with the military for use of their transportation in time of need.\textsuperscript{164} Many civilians, however, did not honour their contracts on 1 August, causing considerable chaos and necessitating the payment of exorbitant prices.\textsuperscript{165} Although automobiles were in use throughout the Netherlands by 1914, no plans existed for their systematic use within military plans. Nevertheless, during August, over 500 automobiles but only ten trucks and a few motorcycles were commandeered.\textsuperscript{166} From October onwards, all remaining civilian cars and trucks were registered at local municipal offices in case of future military need.\textsuperscript{167} The results of the registration process showed that 200 trucks had been available in August 1914 for requisitioning, if the proper administration had been in place to organise this.\textsuperscript{168} Two volunteer corps - the Voluntary Military Automobile Corps and Voluntary Military Motorcycle Corps - profited most from the requisitioning. Both corps expanded in August 1914 allowing civilians who knew how to drive to join. They would spend much of the war chauffeuring military personnel and delivering goods and messages.\textsuperscript{169} By 1918, the two corps had become quite professional including soldiers with driving experience, experienced mechanics and technicians. The corps acquired new automobiles, mainly from outside the country, including 369 trucks, 62 trailers and 107 cars.\textsuperscript{170}

The recently mobilised forces had much to do before making the country defensible. They had to dig trenches, ready fortifications, remove obstacles, and maximise strategically significant positions. In many places, they had to chop down trees, empty (and, at times, destroy) houses, take over fields as training grounds, and block roads. They

\textsuperscript{164} Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” pp. 12 - 13.
\textsuperscript{165} “Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport” in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3, no page numbers, section “G. Het op voet van oorlog brengen van het veldleger”;
Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” pp 13 - 16.
\textsuperscript{166} Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” p. 21.
\textsuperscript{168} Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 19.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. p. 15; Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” pp. 20, 22; Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 31.
\textsuperscript{170} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 143.
removed families from their homes, made farmers hand over valuable land, while closing access to towns and villages along main arterial routes. For many of these inconveniences the government compensated civilians. In 1916, one farmer even received money when his cows went into early labour because of incessant noise from artillery practices held on a nearby field. Mayors also forced the unemployed to work for the military by digging trenches, moving goods, and performing other menial tasks.

Perhaps the most intrusive aspect of the mobilisation for civilians was the billeting of troops. The Dutch Army did not have the facilities to house 200,000 men in barracks, and in the south of the country (where the Field Army was stationed), it was extremely inconvenient to build such structures as it would limit the mobility of the force. Yet even in the fortified positions there were not enough bunks available. Some tent camps were erected, but as a rule, mayors had to find accommodation for thousands of men. Schools, public buildings, empty warehouses, factories, castles, and even ships were turned into temporary (and sometimes permanent) dormitories. In addition, men were housed in bedrooms, cellars and attics of farms and houses. The state paid for housing and feeding soldiers, and many factory and warehouse owners made substantial profits from this arrangement. Yet billeting would remain one of the most burdensome features of the military presence for civilians.

AN UNDIVIDED POSITIVE IMPRESSION

As planned, by its third day (3 August) and despite problems, the mobilisation was deemed a success. Almost all the troops were in their mobilisation positions, the Field

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171 In a communal letter from the Provincial Governor in South Holland to all mayors in his province, 8 August 1914, he requested that mayors do everything in their power to ease the distress and problems caused by families that had to move out of their homes (in SAD, “Stukken betr. maatregelen i.v.m. oorlog 1914 - 1918” [Pieces regarding regulations dealing with the war 1914 - 1918] archive no. 6 (“Stadsarchief 1851 - 1980”), inventory no. 38/8 Kabinet). A copy of the letter requesting the emptying of a house can be found in Geerke et al., De Oorlog Volume 1, between pp. 139 - 140. See also: ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 78, filled with details of property requisitioned by the military and compensation provided by the state. Het Leven Geïllustreerd, 9, no. 32, Tuesday 11 August 1914, has pictures of a district in Gooi (near Amsterdam) which had to be evacuated (in SMG/DC, [Miscellaneous copies of Het Leven Geïllustreerd 1914 - 1919] 0212/233).
172 Documents in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 122, outline problems encountered by the closure of roads, bridges and shipping routes, and complaints from civilians.
174 For more about the impact of billeting on civilians, see: Chapter 9, pp. 327 - 331.
175 “[E]n onverdeeld gunstigen indruk” (Treub, Oorlogstijd p. 12).
Army was as good as ready to be shifted from its *afwachtingsopstelling*, there was a low absentee rate, the horse requisition although not complete was adequate, the inundations were prepared, and the early food problems had been solved. All the major requirements had been met and, on the surface at least, the mobilisation had gone remarkably well. Commentators reflected on this: Treub described the process rather too optimistically as being “in one word faultless”; a brigade commander applauded it, remarking if “one did not focus on trivialities, one way or another, one must call [it] brilliant”; even an otherwise critical parliamentary report made in 1918 praised the mobilisation of *landweer* and Army troops, which gave “in general, reason for satisfaction”.

Such positive impressions were not isolated and have been echoed by historians as well. Especially when comparing the mobilisations of 1870, 1914 and 1939, they have lauded the organisation and efficiency of the 1914 undertaking. The 1870 mobilisation is renowned for its dismal defence and abominable military preparedness. In comparison, 1914 was indeed splendid. Again, in contrast to 1914, the poor mobilisation of 1939 contributed to the Netherlands utter defeat by Germany in May 1940 and has received severe criticism for the military’s unpreparedness and state of neglect. The historian J. C. H. Blom mentioned, for example, how much more the Dutch government spent on military expenditure before the First World War than before the Second World War. He believed that in that respect alone the 1914 mobilisation was superior. As the previous chapter illustrated, the actions taken to improve the size of the military, modernise its equipment, and streamline its organisation impacted positively on the 1914 mobilisation. In many respects, the Netherlands was even better prepared for war than Belgium. It spent 100 per cent more on defence in the immediate pre-war years, had legislated personal conscription much earlier (Belgium only implemented this change in 1913), and while both

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176 "Zij was in één woord onberispelijk" (Ibid.).
177 "Wanneer men niet wil fitten op kleinigheden, moet men een en ander wel schitterend noemen" (Burger, "Fragmenten" p. 345).
178 "De resultaten gaven over het algemeen reden tot tevredenheid" (Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 6).
179 F. Snapper, “De gevechtswaarde” pp. 16 - 54; Klinkert et. al. (eds.), Mobilisatie in Nederland en België; Schulten, “Van neutralisme naar bondgenootschap” pp. 3 - 16; Schoenmaker, “Clio at arms” pp. 73 - 95.
countries had relatively equal sized armies (200,000 troops strong), the Netherlands mobilised one man in every 30, Belgium managed one in every 40. 183

Yet, ultimately, such comparisons are misleading. That the state of military affairs was more miserable in 1939 or in 1870 cannot take away from the inadequacies of 1914. There were too many fundamental problems clearly visible in the Army and Navy of August 1914. Ammunition stockpiles were woefully short, fighting standards were below par, and the officer shortage that had never been adequately addressed was now blatantly obvious. Material shortages, although not crippling, would take months to fill, and the lack of heavy artillery would prove ominous. The historian, A. M. P. Kleijngeld, was not wrong when he described the “predominant impression given by the Dutch Army in 1914, was one of considerable poverty.” 184 All these problems impeded the Army’s effectiveness. Several reports were commissioned during the war years, highlighting that the war years did not alleviate any of the fundamental problems, in fact others were added, including the inability to replace obsolete weaponry and obtain modern equipment such as gasmasks and steel helmets. 185

Nevertheless, the 1914 mobilisation needs to be analysed within the context of other mobilisations at the time. 186 Many of the combatant nations experienced similar problems and material shortages impeded armies throughout Europe. 187 In Russia, for example, there was an acute shortage of officers, munitions, boots, clothing and underwear. 188 The Dutch did not have to fight in 1914, and this makes it very difficult to know whether their military preparations would have been sufficient had they been invaded. What is significant is that by the end of the war, the comparative value of their military

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184 “De overheersende indruk die het Nederlandse leger in 1914 achterliet, was er een van aanzienlijke armoede” (Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg p. 9).
185 “Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport” in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3; Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht; Snijders issued a series of questionnaires for all Army commanders to fill out late in 1914, many of these can be found in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 231.
186 Tuyll, “On the Edge of the Gunpowder Barrel” no page numbers, section “The Pace Quickens”.
forces (size, technological capability, deterrence worth) had decreased significantly. At the start of the war, some degree of optimism was feasible; by the time of its conclusion in November 1918, pessimism had taken over. The Dutch could not keep up with military developments abroad, and their attempts to do so often ended as dismal failures.

By 3 August 1914, the Army and Navy were as good as ready to face an invasion that did not come. From this point onwards, their primary objective became the preservation of neutrality in all its many facets. The government was charged with the same purpose: to undertake everything necessary to prevent the Netherlands entering the war. To this end, it needed the support of parliament. For the first time in many years, parliament, including the usually anti-military socialist bloc, united in its support for the government and its war measures. The Godsvrede (literally “God’s peace”, referring to the easing of religious and ideological differences among the political parties) would not last the entire war, but was strong enough at first to pass emergency laws quickly.\footnote{For the role of the SDAP (Social Democratic Workers’ Party) decision to support the Godsvrede see: B. B. van Dongen, “Troelstra en de natie” [Troelstra and the nation] in Schuursma (ed.), 14 - 18 Volume 2, pp. 363 - 364.} The country’s political representatives were united with a common desire to defend and protect. As the war dragged into 1915 and 1916, however, any support the military may have enjoyed in the opening months disappeared almost completely.
Calm Amidst the Raging Waves: Defending Neutrality

Maintenance of our neutrality and defence against every breach of our territory ... is the first and foremost goal and reason for the existence of our mobilisation.

General C. J. Snijders

In 1918, Queen Wilhelmina’s only child, nine-year-old Crown Princess Juliana, received a Jan van Oort painting as a gift. Inscribed “saevis tranquillus in undis” (calm amidst the raging waves), the watercolour depicted a beautiful urn bobbing in rough breakers. A colourful kingfisher flew around the urn, weaving through the tempestuous waves as if attempting to save the vase from possible doom. According to the historian Cees Fasseur, the painting spoke to the royal family of their country’s precarious plight in the Great War. The use of the kingfisher was significant; it not only referred to the royal House of Orange (a favoured emblem of William the Silent), but in Roman mythology, the bird was also said to possess magical abilities of calming the waves. In other words, Van Oort alluded to the important role played by the Queen and her family in keeping the Netherlands neutral. By association, the painting also referred to other “protectors” of neutrality serving the crown. Of these, the Dutch Army and Navy were most important, assigned with the task of maintaining safety and security (the “calm”) while the calamities of war and the actions of warring states (“the raging waves”) threatened to engulf the nation.

1 “Handhaving onzijdigheid en afweer van elke schending van ons gebied. Dat is trouwens het eerste en voornaamste doel en de reden van bestaan onzer mobilisatie” (Commander-in-Chief to the Cabinet, “Nota ter beantwoording van de Nota dd. 11 Juli 1918, door den toenmalige Minister van Oorlog JHR. DE JONGE gericht aan den Raad van Ministers” 3 October 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5).

The military had two traditional objectives, highlighted in the 1911 and 1913 strategic directives: namely, defence of territory and preservation of neutrality. Meeting defence requirements involved expanding the armed forces to an appropriate size and deploying them in such a manner that they could meet and possibly defeat an invasion. Preserving neutrality entailed the implementation of appropriate security measures for upholding not only international laws, but also the less clearly defined expectations placed on the neutral by belligerents. The military also had a third recognised role: to deter potential invaders and those intending to infringe neutrality from within or outside the country. In other words, it was as much a police as a defence force, in charge of implementing neutrality regulations as well as countering possible security threats.

There was an inherent contradiction in the dual responsibility of defence and neutrality. The needs of concentrated defence - based on the four Field Army divisions meeting an attack speedily, decisively and collectively - were at odds with the requirements of guarding neutrality. To be seen as truly neutral, the Army had to mobilise in every direction from which an intrusion could occur, regardless of the true nature of any such threats or if the nature of those threats changed over the course of the war. Likewise, the Navy had to patrol every water inlet and major port. No apparent bias in military measures should be discernable, in case one or other belligerent perceived it as deliberately "unneutral". While it was advantageous for a neutral to mobilise early, quickly and publicly, it also had to deploy with neutrality in mind.

In August 1914, the Field Army mobilised in concentrated positions in the middle of the country, each facing a particular direction but in close proximity to the others, thereby safeguarding neutrality requirements while retaining a functional defensive purpose. However, its cohesion quickly disintegrated when the aims of its defence and neutrality responsibilities diverged. The country's defence needs were best served by keeping the four divisions as unified entities in centralised positions with adequate cover provided by garrison troops in fortified positions. Neutrality expectations, however, demanded that each Field Army division be located in separate parts of the country, preferably as close to the borders as possible, to deal with violations of territory. A happy medium between the two divergent strategies (concentration and dispersal) would prove hard to find.

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3 Wijnaerts et. al., Militaire Aardrijkskunde van Nederland p. 120; Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd p. 400.
Once the war did not end by Christmas 1914, as many expected and hoped, neutrality began to take precedence over defence. The growing number of neutrality responsibilities assigned to the armed forces resulted not only in the dilution of the Field Army’s military capacities, but also led to the siphoning off of garrison troops from fortified positions to border areas. While it was only natural that neutrality held primary place of importance in military strategy, since its careful preservation ensured that ultimately the armed forces would not need to face invasion by a superior force, the overwhelming emphasis on neutrality came at the expense of the country’s defence capabilities and further devalued the worth of military deterrence.

NEUTRALITY OR DEFENCE?

Within days of mobilising into their *afwachtingsopstelling* (waiting position) in August 1914, High Command moved the four Field Army divisions to meet perceived threats to security and neutrality. After the German invasion of Belgium on 4 August, Field Army headquarters shifted closer to the south from The Hague to ‘s Hertogenbosch, and Division IV, situated in the middle of the country, also moved to North Brabant around the city of Tilburg. The fighting in Belgium led High Command to consider an attack on the Netherlands from that direction, or an accidental crossing of foreign troops into the country, very real possibilities. When the Cavalry Brigade assembled on 8 August, three of its regiments moved southwards as well, joining Division III near Eindhoven. At this time, Snijders officially assigned responsibility for neutrality matters along the southern border to Buhlman, the Commander of the Field Army. Two months later, Snijders and Buhlman reacted to the German siege of Antwerp by shifting much of the Field Army further south-west: headquarters moved to Oosterhout, more troops diverted into Zeeland, and the whole of Brigade X (Division I) left Haarlem for Alkmaar. This weakened Division I’s strength on the coast by one-third, and made the country more vulnerable to an attack from the sea.

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4 See: Map 7, Chapter 2, p. 81.
5 Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Klinkert, “ De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914” p. 31.
7 Commander-in-Chief, “Bijzonder Instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger geldende van 10 Augustus 1914 tot nadere kennisgeving” 10 August 1914, in ARA, “ Archiveven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
8 Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Klinkert, “ Verdediging van de zuidgrens” p. 215.
By diverting the brigade, the October changes saw the first fragmentation of the divisional layout into smaller, less centralised, units. By early 1918, the strategic placement of the Field Army had not changed drastically since October 1914; it remained dispersed along the three frontiers (east, south and west). Nevertheless, it was far from the unified mobile force that mobilised at the start of the war. The divisions were spread over wider areas and often had a number of units deployed in other parts of the country. While the principal focus remained in the south, a clear degree of fragmentation was visible. For example, Division III occupied western areas in North Brabant with headquarters at Oudenbosch. It was not as strong as it had been in 1914: one company of cyclists and a section of field artillery were stationed in Zeeland, and the Commander in Limburg had two companies of infantry temporarily assigned to him. Division IV was more cohesive, situated in middle of North Brabant with divisional headquarters at 's Hertogenbosch. The Cavalry Brigade also remained in central North Brabant with headquarters at Boxtel. Division I remained near the coast between Ijmuiden and Hoek van Holland. This division was missing a number of battalions, however, that were used as support troops elsewhere: two battalions moved to Amsterdam, three others further east (to Bussum and Laren), with a section of mobile field artillery shifting to Soest. Division II was also split up: an infantry battalion, a machine-gun platoon and a section of mobile field artillery billeted in Deventer, another section of mobile artillery was placed in Leiden, while the rest of the division deployed in Gelderland (with headquarters in Arnhem).
Map 9: Position of the Field Army, 4 August 1914
(Source: Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2)
Maps 10 and 11: Position of the Field Army, October 1914 and early 1918

(Source: Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Commander-in-Chief, “Overzicht van de groepeering van de landmacht; voor zoover niet vermeld in den “Algemeen bezettingsstaat” en van de zeemacht” 29 December 1917, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag”, 91A/5)
Like the Army, the Navy also dispersed its available strength from August 1914 onwards, so that it could protect neutrality throughout Dutch territorial waters. This made even a limited amalgamation of naval might impossible. Nevertheless, in September 1914, High Command recognised that the mouths of the Schelde needed extraordinary attention, since the river posed one of the greatest threats to Dutch security. It could not rule out use of the river by British naval vessels, especially prior to the siege of Antwerp in October 1914. Hence, it created a special “Coastal Division” with headquarters in Vlissingen, consisting of the Navy’s three cruisers and six groups of torpedo-boats. Within two months, however, the grouping was disbanded because it lacked operational flexibility and its task – defence against possible naval assault – was far too great for its size.\(^\text{12}\)

There was a fundamental problem in mobilising the Army in all directions and dispersing the country’s naval capacity. It splintered the armed forces and made it virtually impossible to mount effective and concentrated defence. Snijders wrote to the Minister President, P. W. Cort van der Linden, addressing these concerns in February 1915:

> In comparison to the armed masses of the warring parties and even in comparison to their reserves, our armed forces are so limited that it is of considerable interest to us to unifY as great a portion of them in the most strategically significant and favourable direction.\(^\text{13}\) (italics in original)

Snijders further rued the lack of defence options available, and on several occasions criticised the logic of facing all fronts, where, of course, they could easily be isolated and blasted by distant artillery fire. In a note to cabinet in August 1915, he exclaimed:

> if only our armed forces were not so sadly small in relation to the extensiveness of the borders that are to be defended, and [in comparison to] the possible military power we might be facing.\(^\text{14}\)

Snijders was well aware of the need to uphold neutrality, but also worried incessantly about the consequences for defence, declaring in the same note that “dispersion [of the Field

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\(^\text{12}\) Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeemacht” pp. 54 – 55; Bles, “Modernisel’ing en professionalisering” p. 68.

\(^\text{13}\) “Onze strijdkrachten zijn, in vergelijking met de legermassa’s der oorlogvoerende partijen, ook met die welke zij nog in reserve hebben, zóó beperkt, dat het voor ons van overwegend belang is, een zoo groot mogelijk gedeelte daarvan vereenigd in de strategisch gewichtigste en gunstigste richting te kunnen in werking brengen” (italics in original) (Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2).

\(^\text{14}\) “Ware onze strijdmacht niet zoo bedroevend gering, in verhouding tot de uitgebreidheid der te verdedigen fronten en de vermoedelijke macht, welke wij tegenover ons kunnen krijgen” (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, “Nota over de opstelling van het veldleger” 9 August 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2).
Army] is a disadvantage; but not a fault, because it is necessary and unavoidable.” (italics in original) In trying to balance defence needs and neutrality requirements, he realised that neutrality had to come first.

Nevertheless, his insistence on upholding as much defensive credibility as possible caused some strife with the government. At times, the civilian leadership feared that Snijders was too concerned about defence. Nicolaas Bosboom asked him in February 1917:

Does the Commander-in-Chief not lose sight of the only goal for which we called our armed forces together, maintenance of our neutrality, and if necessary defence of our territory? We do not aim for war. (italics added)

Requests from parliament to partially demobilise the Army aggravated the situation, as did governmental acquiescence in lengthening the amount of leave granted to soldiers, with the result that while military responsibilities continually increased, the number of troops available to complete these tasks actually decreased. Not surprisingly, by 1918, Snijders had become highly pessimistic about the chances of withstanding an assault.

There was another critical contributing factor to defence and neutrality difficulties. Because it was not known which of the powers might breach Dutch neutrality nor in what circumstances a violation might occur, Snijders had to plan for the possibility of trying to fight two or more foreign armies simultaneously. It was conceivable, for example, that both Germany and Britain might cross into the Netherlands at the same time or closely after each other. There was no clause in Dutch neutrality regulations that stated if one country invaded, then the Dutch should automatically side with the enemies of that belligerent. Accordingly, they could be faced with two conflicts on two fronts against two powers that were themselves at war with each other. The likelihood of this nightmare occurring only intensified during the war, as both the Entente and Central Powers wanted to stop the other from using the Netherlands for strategic gain. If this happened, Snijders expected disastrous consequences:

15 "Die verspreiding is een nadeel; een fout is zij niet, want zij was noodzakelijk en onvermijdelijk” (italics in original) (Ibid.).
17 For leave issues, see: Chapter 10, pp. 349 - 353.
I do not have to re-emphasise the impossible demand of a conflict on two fronts involving our very limited armed forces and, in comparison, the masses with which the opposition shall overrun us. Without operational room, a "concentric" retreat into a well-defended fortified position shall in practice be a dream scenario for our small, shallow country. We will be scattered within the shortest possible time when attacked by superior strength from two sides; there will not be any talk of a retreat, at best of a complete capitulation jammed as our armed forces will be between two super powers.  

This would become another issue of intense debate between Snijders and the government. Snijders questioned the feasibility of governmental guidelines on armed neutrality on several occasions. He advocated a neutrality policy that allowed alliances once Dutch territory was invaded. This was the policy Switzerland adopted. Snijders’ first request for a change in government policy came early in 1915, once Germany firmly controlled the entire Belgian-Dutch border, potentially threatening the Netherlands on two fronts (in the east and south). Snijders urged the cabinet to make contingency plans if Germany attacked. In January of 1917, he made a similar request. This time, he wanted to know the government’s viewpoint on requesting aid from a belligerent if its enemies went to war with the Netherlands. He wanted some certainty with regard to whom he could turn if one or other belligerent invaded. 

As the war progressed, communications with the government on this point only became more heated. During altercations with the Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, in April and May 1918, Snijders clearly stated that the Army would not be able to protect the Netherlands against Germany without Allied support, but he feared that as current policy stood, neither Britain, France nor the United States would be forthcoming. He had no doubt

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18 “Omtrent den onmogelijken eisch van een strijd op twee fronten met onze zeer geringe strijdkrachten, vergeleken bij de massa’s, waarmede de tegenstanders ons onder den voet zullen loopen, behoeft ik hier niets meer te zeggen. Het in ons klein, ondiep land zonder operatieruimte ‘concentrisch’ terugtrekken op een goede stelling zal in de practijk blijken een droombeeld geweest te zijn. Van twee zijden met overmacht aangevallen, zal men in den kortst mogelijke tijd uiteen geslagen zijn; van een terugtocht zal geen sprake zijn, hoogstens van een capitulatie onzer strijdmen, ingeklemd tussen twee overmachten.” (Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 14 February 1917, p. 10, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4).  
19 Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 30 January 1917, p. 5, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4.  
21 Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 30 January 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4. See also: Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4.
that a Dutch-German conflict would leave large parts of the country in German hands.\footnote{Commander-in-Chief, “Nota over den militairen toestand van Nederland” [Note about the military situation of the Netherlands] 29 May 1918; Commander-in-Chief, “Strategische beschouwingen over de verdediging van Nederland” [Strategic viewpoints about the defence of the Netherlands] 13 June 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.} Not long after, he explained that if Britain attacked, it “would be advisable ... to accept aid from German forces and to arrange possible consultation with each other”.\footnote{“Het zal daarom geraden zijn, indien de Entente-aanval van ernstigen aard is ... de samenwerking met de Duitsche hulpkrachten te aanvaarden en in onderling overleg te regelen.” (Commander-in-Chief, “Strategische bescheiden over de verdediging van Nederland” 10 July 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5).} On neither occasion did he advocate that the country should renege on its neutrality and join one of the warring parties, as some historians have professed.\footnote{For more on Snijders’ German allegiance and problems with the Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, in 1918, see: Chapter 12, pp. 410 - 417.} Snijders wanted what was best for the Netherlands’ continued independence. However, if war became unavoidable, he did seek alternative plans, and hoped the government would agree to join either the Allied or Central Powers’ camps. Otherwise, a war on two fronts “would have the unavoidable consequence of the loss of our country and destruction of our independent existence”.\footnote{“[E]en oorlog naar twee zijden ... zou onvermijdelijk tot het verloren gaan van ons land en vernietiging van ons zelfstandig volksbestaan” (Commander-in-Chief, “Strategische bescheiden over de verdediging van Nederland” 10 July 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5).} But on each occasion, the cabinet’s response was the same: remain neutral and repel every breach of territory with all available military means, regardless of circumstance.\footnote{Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 26 February 1915, ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.} James Porter has ably outlined why the government held steadfastly to this policy of strict military neutrality.\footnote{Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” pp. 119 - 124.} After the fall of Antwerp, there was a discussion among cabinet ministers about what the country should do now that Germany controlled the eastern and southern borders. Some members, including Bosboom and J. J. Rambonnet, the Minister in Charge of the Navy, claimed that the Netherlands should improve its relationship with Britain to counter the threat now posed by Germany on two borders. Other ministers were more inclined to negotiate with Germany. Only a few chose to remain completely impartial, arguing for strict neutrality to avoid angering either power. They did not manage to reach consensus. Because the Commander-in-Chief had to act according to...
the will of the entire cabinet, he had to interpret this disagreement as an argument for the continuance of a policy of strict neutrality.28

The government did not deviate from this position. In March 1917, Cort van der Linden replied to one of Snijders’ requests:

The position of the government remains unchanged that against every one of the belligerents who try to breach our territory ... the full might of our armed forces will be mobilised. A consideration of other interests apart from the interest to immediately repel [an attack] is not an option29

Snijders was immensely frustrated by this stand as it left him without a clear policy to follow and with few feasible options.30 In the margins of one of Cort van den Linden’s letters, he wrote: “What must I do! The government now knows that I will not fight against both parties!” (italics added)31 A month earlier he had already warned the ministers that:

I must earnestly declare that I see this decision [to remain mobilised facing all directions] as being so completely incompatible with the demands of a proper strategy and besides believe it to be so completely futile for attaining a favourable outcome, that I would not be able to accept such an instruction. 32

In the end, the Commander-in-Chief followed governmental guidelines only in part. In instructions to his commanders in January 1918, Snijders proclaimed that if the Netherlands was attacked by one of the major powers (namely Britain or Germany), they should accept help from the other belligerent if it came in the form of artillery fire, air cover or naval intervention. This assistance was to be accepted even if the intervention was undeclared or came unasked. Despite the fact that such actions contravened Dutch neutrality (and governmental directives), Snijders felt that he had to be pragmatic. He was

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29 “Ret standpunt del’ Regeering blijft echter onveranderd dat tegenover ieder der belligerenten die ons grondgebied zou trachten te schenden ... de volle kracht van onze weermacht moet worden aangewend. Van een overweging van andere belangen dan het belang van onmiddellijk verzet is ... geen sprake” (Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 8 March 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4).
30 Koch, “Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog” pp. 103 - 104.
31 “Maar wat moet ik dan doen! De Regeering weet nu, dat ik niet vecht tegen beide partijen!” (italics added) (C. J. Snijders’ handwritten marginal addition to the letter by the Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 8 March 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4).
32 “Ik moet ten ernstigste verklaren, dat ik deze opvatting als zoo volkomen in strijd beschouw met de eischen eener juiste strategie en haar bovendien zoo beslist noodlottig acht voor eeneig uitzicht op een gunstigen uitslag, dat ik eene opdracht in dien zin niet zou kunnen aanvaarden.” (Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 14 February 1917, ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4).
more cautious, however, about accepting land support without first consulting with the cabinet, since it was far more difficult to argue such aid was accidental or to justify the lack of opposition from troops to the breach of territory. Nevertheless, he did order that if land support arrived from either side, the Dutch Army should not oppose it unless they received specific instructions to do so.\textsuperscript{33}

Snijders trod very unsteady ground in ignoring the orders given to him by cabinet ministers, another clear indication that he often acted according to his own criteria and expectations. His strong belief that he was right and, as the ultimate authority in the military, should have free rein when it came to defence matters, caused considerable friction with successive Ministers of War. Such difficulties came to a head in 1918, firstly in a heated discussion with Minister B. C. de Jonge about the viability of Dutch military defence, and finally, in November when Snijders resigned only days before the Armistice was signed.\textsuperscript{34} It is indicative, however, that intense differences in opinion between the Commander and his government had existed well before the 1918 crises.

\textbf{DETERRENCE}

Without well-defined operational defence strategies in place, the deterrence value of the Dutch mobilisation diminished. Deterrence was a negative neutrality policy.\textsuperscript{35} Its purpose was to dissuade warring states from attacking a neutral as the associated costs, whether military, economic, or diplomatic, would be too great. It can be contrasted to more positive neutrality strategies that emphasised the advantages of respecting neutrality, rather than the disadvantages of rejecting neutrality. The benefit of armed deterrence was that it could be implemented in peacetime, as an “anticipatory effect of neutrality”,\textsuperscript{36} and was based on outsiders’ perceptions of a neutral’s military strength. It was, therefore, vitally important for the Netherlands to advertise itself as a strong and prepared nation. The importance of deterrence for the preservation of Dutch non-belligerency is best illustrated

\textsuperscript{33} Commander-in-Chief, “Bijzondere instructie voor den Commandant der Stelling van de Monden der Maas en der Schelde, voor zooveel het Commando Zeeland betreft” [Extraordinary instructions for the Commander of the Fortified Position of the Mouths of the Maas and Schelde Rivers, as far as they apply to the Command of Zeeland] 9 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.

\textsuperscript{34} See: Chapter 12, pp. 419 - 420.

\textsuperscript{35} Karsh, Neutrality and Small States p. 63.

by Helmuth von Moltke's *volte face* in 1909, when he decided that in a future conflict involving Germany and France, German armies would respect the independence and sovereignty of the Netherlands.\(^\text{37}\)

In the 1920s, Snijders wrote about the *afschrikkend* (deterrence) value of mobilising early in the drafts of several commentaries on the war.\(^\text{38}\) He believed that one reason why Germany did not cross through Limburg in August 1914 was because it would have tied up too many German troops in the Netherlands, thereby taking them away from the main thrust through Belgium towards France. Nicolaas Bosboom echoed this thought in his memoirs:

> The possibility of being suspected or accused of having war aims could not stop us [from mobilising]. The power that thought about breaching our territory [Germany] should know and be actually convinced that with any attempt to that end it would find our army on or in its way, that as an almost inevitable consequence it would remove part of its army from its main strategic goal and would cause delay in its advance.\(^\text{39}\)

Both Snijders and Bosboom correctly interpreted part of Germany's motivation for avoiding Limburg. On altering the Schlieffen Plan, von Moltke had given two reasons: to allow a larger thrust through Belgium and to use the Netherlands as a supply route for German industry and trade. It was to provide the *luftröhe* (breathing space) for the German economy when an enemy (most probably Britain) blockaded German ports.\(^\text{40}\)

In August 1914, the German General Staff, headed by von Moltke, deployed its armies according to the revised Schlieffen Plan and avoided marching through Limburg. The deterrent value of the Dutch military, in other words, was a vital concern. But once most of Belgium was conquered, and the combatant armies became bogged down in the trenches of the Western Front during the winter of 1914 - 1915, economic reasons played a greater role in persuading Germany to respect Dutch neutrality. The Allied blockade of Germany was so successful that the Germans relied almost entirely on supplies obtained from neutral countries. The Netherlands as a source of supplies was so important that it

\(^{37}\) See: Chapter 1, pp. 46 - 49.

\(^{38}\) Snijders, ""Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 17"" in SMG/DC, ""Mobilisatieverslag"" 91A/3.

\(^{39}\) ""De mogelijkheid verdacht of beschuldigd te worden van oorlogsbedoelingen mocht ons niet weerhouden. De mogendheid, die aan schending van ons grondgebied mocht denken, moest weten, er daadwerkelijk van overtuigd worden, dat zij bij een poging daartoe ons leger op of naast haar weg zou vinden, dat mitsdien een deel harer strijdmacht aan het strategisch hoofddoel zou worden onttrokken en dat vertraging van den opmarsch daarvan het bijna onvermijdelijk gevolg zou zijn."" (Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 24).

\(^{40}\) Frey, ""Die Niederlande als transatlantischer Vermittler"" pp. 180 - 181.
outweighed any strategic advantages of capturing Dutch territory. In this respect, the advantage of keeping the Dutch neutral was of greater significance for Germany than Dutch deterrence measures. Similarly, it is also important to note that once the economic benefit provided by Dutch neutrality declined (in the course of 1917 and 1918), Germany had fewer qualms about pressuring the Netherlands and threatening it with military intervention. 41

Nevertheless, both Germany and Great Britain upheld the perceived value of Dutch deterrence measures, at least as long as it helped to discourage its respective enemy from invading or capturing the Netherlands. By 1917, in fact, the ability of the Dutch armed forces to withstand an attack from either side had decreased significantly. They could not keep up with the technological advances made by the warring armies, nor did they have the raw materials to manufacture new equipment. The military was becoming increasingly obsolescent by the month. As a consequence, it would have been easier for Britain or Germany to invade the Netherlands in 1917 than it was in 1914, even though the 1914 mobilisation was far from perfect and in 1917 twice as many Dutch troops could be deployed. 42

Both warring sides were well aware of the declining effectiveness of Dutch defences. Although, as Hubert van Tuyll rightly pointed out, the size of the Army increased from 200,000 to over 400,000 troops by 1918, giving an impression of strength, 43 neither Great Britain nor Germany were under any illusions about the capability of Dutch equipment, ammunition, or weaponry to withstand a concerted onslaught. That the Allied and Central Powers both supplied military equipment to the Netherlands during 1917 and 1918, which they had been loathe to do in previous war years, illustrates that they hoped to increase the chances of the country resisting an attack by their enemy.

On occasion, these supplies had more immediate justifications. For example, Germany offered the Netherlands a few anti-aircraft guns in the middle of 1918, after first having expressed their disgust at the lack of action taken against British transgressions of Dutch airspace. At one stage during the discussions, German diplomats suggested that Dutch border troops co-ordinate attempts to shoot down the Allied planes with their

41 For further information on the relationship between Germany and the Netherlands in 1917 and 1918, see: Chapter 6, pp. 224 – 229, and Chapter 11, pp. 367 - 368.
42 This argument is also supported by Snapper, “De gevechtswaarde”.
43 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I pp. 344 - 347.
German equivalents on the other side of the border. Snijders graciously accepted the guns, although he refused any cross-frontier collaboration if it meant his men could not shoot at German aircraft flying above the Netherlands. British officials also believed that it was desirable to supply the Netherlands with anti-aircraft guns, in an effort to encourage the Dutch to shoot down German Zeppelins en route for Britain. In February 1917, they considered sending a shipment of six guns. Like the German offer a year later, the guns were vital for their given role (preventing belligerent aircraft crossing the Netherlands to bomb enemy territory), since the Dutch Army was desperately short of anti-aircraft weaponry and ammunition.

Britain’s interest in strengthening the Netherlands’ armed forces became more of a concern in 1918. The Northern Neutrals’ Committee, a high-level committee responsible for dealing with the Scandinavian neutrals and the Netherlands, seriously considered a request from the Netherlands in late December 1917, for artillery, ammunition, gas shells, machine-guns, box respirators, searchlights and hand-grenades. These supplies formed part of Scheme “S”, a British plan to send reinforcements to the Netherlands in case Germany invaded the Schelde area. In January 1918, the Committee authorised the creation of a brigade stationed permanently in Britain until it was needed for the implementation of Scheme “S”.

The following May, British military attachés arrived in The Hague for a secret meeting with Dutch military representatives. This was not a diplomatic meeting but a military one, and it is possible that except for High Command and the Minister of War, the rest of the government was unaware that it occurred. Cabinet ministers would not allow any official negotiations with belligerents for fear of jeopardising neutrality. In fact, Snijders and the cabinet had rejected calls for similar meetings with German military

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45 (Decyphered) Telegram from Dutch Minister in London to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 February 1917 in FO 371/2973 1917 (war).
47 Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 212; Porter, “Dutch Neutrality”.
48 The meeting and its consequences were ably described by Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” pp. 229 - 231. See also: Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 195.
49 Sanders, “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 264. C. Smit surmises that the rest of the cabinet must have been informed about these meetings (Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel p. 23).
authorities in 1915, 1916 and 1917. However, wanting to give his country even half a chance of holding out against a German onslaught, Snijders believed a contingency plan was required and welcomed the discussions with the Allies, all the more so because Germany was making considerable progress on the Western Front and had threatened the Dutch with war in April 1918.

Secret negotiations with a warring state did not amount to an official violation of neutrality – neutrals could discuss with others what would happen when their neutrality was breached but Germany could perceive such negotiations in a dubious light. In order to avoid giving Germany any reason whatsoever to mistrust Dutch intentions, both parties did not plan any further meetings. Instead, Snijders drew up a strategic directive for his Allied counterparts, which they could implement after Germany had crossed the Netherlands’ frontier. He also sent a request to the Northern Neutrals Committee for a variety of military supplies and suggested in the autumn of 1918 to scrap Scheme “S” and have the Allies send troops to help defend the New Holland Waterline instead. At this stage, the Committee agreed to supply barbed wire, guns, ammunition, gas masks and 6-inch howitzers, and these items were shipped across the Channel between June and September 1918. The Allies believed there was a concerted effort by Germany to keep the Netherlands weak by not filling Dutch orders for guns. Above all, it feared an attack on the neutral and wanted the Dutch to be capable of holding out against Germany while the Allies prepared to come to their aid.

Not all military purchases made abroad by the Netherlands during the war provided an advantage for the supplying power. It was, of course, conceivable that the neutral could employ its purchases against the country of origin (as undoubtedly happened with British anti-aircraft guns). Although the Dutch experienced considerable difficulties procuring military equipment from warring states, they managed to sign artillery contracts

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53 See: correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief and Dutch Military Attaché in London, May 1918, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no.5; Tuyl, The Netherlands and World War I p. 195.
54 Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 212; Sanders, “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 256.
with the German Krupps manufacturing firm, obtained a few machine-guns from Austria-Hungary, and successfully ordered aeroplanes and engines from France and Germany. These purchases reflect some ambition on the part of both sets of belligerents to avoid antiquating the Dutch armed forces completely, if only to prevent the neutral from entering the war.

**EXTERNAL THREATS AND THE NEUTRALITY DECLARATION**

In accordance with international stipulations, the Dutch government issued a neutrality declaration after each of the belligerents’ pronouncements of war. It published the first of these two days after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914. Each neutrality declaration clearly outlined the Netherlands’ neutrality responsibilities and breaches thereof. The regulations were not all-inclusive. They focused almost exclusively on external violations and principally on military matters. The declaration only scantily covered other neutrality concerns, such as censorship and trade in contraband. Internal and economic neutrality violations were less clearly defined because they were harder to safeguard and more ambivalent by definition; they would not necessarily force an international incident bringing the nation to the verge of belligerency, whereas an external military breach almost certainly would.

In the pre-amble to its neutrality declarations, the Dutch government pledged that it would “observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out”. Strict neutrality meant acting according to international laws. Especially important were Conventions V and XIII of the 1907 Hague Conference relating to neutrals’ obligations on land and at sea. The Dutch government ratified these in 1909. Most of the regulations in the neutrality declarations of 1914 iterated international law, although certain conditions were stricter than those outlined in the Hague Conventions. For example, Article 9 of both conventions

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58 See: Appendix 5, p. 457.


61 *Staatsblad*. no. 73, 1910.
stated that a neutral could enact its own legislation ensuring its neutrality was sustainable, as long as it applied the laws impartially.\textsuperscript{62} Hence on 30 July 1914, the Dutch officially closed off their territorial waters to foreign warships, although Convention XIII allowed belligerent warships to use neutral waters for thoroughfare (but not for naval operations).\textsuperscript{63} Of all the neutrals, the Netherlands was the first to deny such access.\textsuperscript{64} The Dutch tried to enforce their neutrality more strictly than was necessary by law, to ensure that claims of prejudice could not be levelled against them.

Aside from the main declarations, the Dutch government also notified belligerents of other security measures. Banning entry to foreign warships was the first of these, followed by an announcement regarding the integrity of Dutch territorial airspace on 3 August 1914, and five days later, another forbidding belligerents to establish or use wireless telegraphy within the country.\textsuperscript{65} Wireless telegraphy regulations had a strong basis in international law.\textsuperscript{66} The aerial regulation, on the other hand, was more controversial. It stipulated that the Netherlands held sovereignty over the sky above the country. No foreign aeroplanes or airships could enter this airspace without being fired upon and interned if the craft and its occupants landed on Dutch soil. This ruling was not based on any established legal principles, although in 1913, Germany and France had entered into an agreement respecting each other’s airspace.\textsuperscript{67} In May 1914, Nicolaas Bosboom expressed his desire to design a similar agreement for the Netherlands and the following July (on the eve of war), Dutch diplomats approached Germany on the matter.\textsuperscript{68} Nothing was formalised before the war broke out. However, most belligerents accepted that the Netherlands could close off its territorial airspace, since access to it would have allowed aerial reconnaissance of Dutch


\textsuperscript{63} Article 10 of “1907 Hague Convention XIII” in Roberts. et. al. (eds.), \textit{Documents on the Laws of War} p. 112; Castrén, \textit{The Present Law of War and Neutrality} pp. 515, 517; Staatsblad. no. 332, 30 July 1914.

\textsuperscript{64} Vandenbosch, \textit{The Neutrality of the Netherlands} p. 100.

\textsuperscript{65} Staatsblad. no. 354, 3 August 1914; Staatscourant no. 185, 8 August 1914.

\textsuperscript{66} Article 3 of “1907 Hague Convention V” and Article 5 of “1907 Hague Convention XIII” in Roberts. et. al. (eds.), \textit{Documents on the Laws of War} pp. 63, 111.

\textsuperscript{67} “Schreiben des Botschafters der Französischen Republik in Berlin an de Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes” 26 July 1913, in ARA, "A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918" archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 591.

\textsuperscript{68} Minister of War to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 May 1914; Dutch Minister in Berlin, W. A. Gevers, to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 July 1914, both in ARA, "A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918" archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 591.
military preparations. At any rate, as foreign aircraft faced internment once they landed in the Netherlands, it was more practical to close off the skies completely.\(^6^9\)

The armed forces were responsible for preventing neutrality violations, undertaken by border guards on land and naval patrols at sea. High Command had some serious concerns about the effectiveness of guarding the territorial boundaries with small groups of soldiers. Although the frontier was marked with posts and flags, the lack of natural features differentiating the Netherlands from Germany and Belgium made careful adherence to national boundaries difficult.\(^7^0\) While troops and ships patrolled the frontier and sea 24 hours a day, there simply were not enough of them to isolate the 900-kilometre border.\(^7^1\) Violations were inevitable.

**LIMBURG: PROTECTING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ON LAND**

On the eve of war, many expected that German armies would cross through Limburg in the Netherlands and into Belgium, even after Germany guaranteed Dutch neutrality on 2 August. On invading Belgium, the possibility that German troops could traverse roads in the far south of Limburg remained a distinct possibility, especially around the town of Vaals. No doubt, preserving the territorial integrity of the border region was difficult, and given that Germany moved a huge number of troops round the “pan-handle” (as Limburg was sometimes described) in the first few days of their invasion, a violation of the frontier could easily occur. Yet the German leadership was genuine in its desire to keep the Netherlands neutral; its High Command explicitly ordered German troops to avoid breaching Dutch territory at all costs.\(^7^2\)

Nevertheless, on 5 August reports reached the Dutch out of Belgium and France that German troops had crossed into Limburg near Vaals during their advance towards Liège. Belgian and French newspapers asserted not only that the Germans had purposely used Dutch roads but also that the Dutch had willingly let them do so. Two French

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\(^7^0\) “Instructie aan de Commandanten van onderdeelen van het Veldleger in het Zuiden des Lands opgesteld” [Instructions to the Commanders of sections of the Field Army situated in the south of the country] 1914, in Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” Appendix III, p. 121.

\(^7^1\) C. van Tuinen, “De militaire handhaving van neutraliteit en gezag” [The military maintenance of neutrality and authority] in Brugman (ed.), *Nederland in den oorlogstijd*. p. 64.

\(^7^2\) Moeyes, *Buiten Schot* pp. 85 - 86.
newspapers, *Le Matin* and *Illustration* even published maps marking the supposed route taken by the Germans. 73 These were serious allegations that had the potential to jeopardise Dutch neutrality, since neither France nor Great Britain had yet recognised the Netherlands’ neutrality (they would do so on 6 August). 74 As a result, even if true, the Dutch had little choice but to deny the claims, for fear that the Allies would use it as a reason to invade. Even an acknowledgement that a few German soldiers had accidentally crossed into Limburg could endanger the image of the Netherlands as a nation able to protect its territorial boundaries.

![Map 12: Limburg](image)

Instead, the Dutch government did everything in its power to not only deny the claims but also prove that they were wrong. Many Dutch newspapers printed articles

73 Treub, *In Oorlogstijd* p. 35; Moeyes, *Buiten Schot* p. 85.
74 See: Appendix 4, p. 453.
denying the event, although some had published eyewitness reports on 5 August.\textsuperscript{75} The general population in Belgium and France, however, remained unconvinced and many of their officials steadfastly held that Germany had traversed Limburg on 4 August, even if the Dutch had not welcomed the transgression.\textsuperscript{76} It seemed, at least to many Allied citizens, to explain how the Germans were able to advance so speedily through Belgium. Few could believe that the Liège fortifications could have succumbed to the German onslaught as quickly as they did. The Limburg explanation was a more believable alternative.

There is much to be said, therefore, for the claim of the historian, Paul Moeyes, that “there can be no doubt” that a patrol of German cavalry crossed through a small part of Limburg on 4 August.\textsuperscript{77} It is likely, however, that the violation was unintentional, and absolutely certain that the Dutch had no foreknowledge about it. The uproar it caused stressed to the Dutch how important patrolling the borders actually was. It is significant, however, that even after the Limburg incident, border guards continued to give individual foreign soldiers the benefit of the doubt if they accidentally stepped onto Dutch soil. Officially, all foreign military personnel had to be interned. It was a clear indication that strict neutrality sometimes gave way to daily practicality.

The Vaals incident did not disappear and continued to trouble Dutch diplomats, especially when their French counterparts claimed, later in 1914, that they had further proof of the neutrality violation. In the notebook of a captured German cavalry officer, the French had found written details of the route taken on 4 August, including the road near Vaals. The Dutch government continued to profess innocence and this time asked the Commander-in-Chief to investigate the matter. An officer in GS III took charge of the enquiry, interviewing border guards, locals, customs officers, and the mayor of Vaals. His report, sent to the Allied governments, asserted that no one had witnessed the event, that the geography of the area did not lend itself to troops (especially cavalry) passing through, and he could not

\textsuperscript{75} Moeyes, \textit{Buiten Schot} p. 84 - 85; According to Paul Moeyes, \textit{De Nieuwe Courant} printed an anonymous eyewitness account on 5 August 1914 (Private correspondence, 22 August 2001).


\textsuperscript{77} Moeyes, \textit{Buiten Schot} p. 85.
understand why, if Germany was so exact about protecting neutrality elsewhere, it would have breached it here.\textsuperscript{78}

The report seemed to satisfy Allied officials, at least for the time being. Yet the question was debated well into the 1930s and caused significant problems for the Dutch diplomatic corps throughout the war. In June 1915, the Dutch Minister in Berlin, W. A. F. Gevers, made quick work of stopping the circulation of a full-colour map of the German advance through Belgium in August 1914, including passage through Limburg, in bookshops throughout the city. While some of the offending maps were sold before Gevers became aware of the problem, extant copies were removed from shop shelves after he demanded that the German government take action in the matter, and the second edition showed careful adherence to Dutch territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{79} Existing documents are unclear whether the Allies found out about the blunder. Nevertheless, after the war, the French official history of the war had no qualms about asserting that the Germans had come through Vaals.\textsuperscript{80} Likewise, the \textit{Telegraaf (Telegraph)} newspaper planned to print sections of Winston Churchill’s war memoirs in 1930, in which he also claimed it happened.\textsuperscript{81} The Netherlands was forced to take up the issue time and time again, especially in 1932, when the military journal \textit{Militaire Spectator (Military Spectator)} published an article by a German officer, asserting that some German troops from the First Army had trekked through Dutch territory in the early stages of the war.\textsuperscript{82} Such reports resulted in the French

\textsuperscript{78}“Rapport betreffende een ingevolge mondelinge opdracht van de Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht door F. J. Quanjer, Kapitein van den Generalen Staf, ingesteld onderzoek naar de in het zakboekje van den in Frankrijk in krijgsgevangenschap geraakte Duitschen officier de Cavalerie Baron Speck von Stemburg” [Report regarding the verbal order from Commander-in-Chief to F. J. Quanjer, Captain in the General Staff, instituted due to the notebook of the German cavalry officer, Baron Speck von Stemburg, made prisoner of war in France] 15 January 1915, in ARA, “Kabinetsarchief e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940 (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Kabinet en Protocol, 1871 - 1940)” [Cabinet archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1871 - 1940 (also known as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet and Protocol, 1871 - 1940)] entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 231 (for a slightly different published version see: Oranjeboek: \textit{Overzicht der voornaamste van Juli 1914 tot October 1915 door het Ministerie van Buitenlandsche Zaken behandele en voor openbaarmaking geschikte aangelegenheden} [Overview of the most important, and publishable matters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from July 1914 to October 1915] publication details missing, 1915, pp. 3 - 10 (SMG/DC 131/7)). See also: documents in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37 for further military investigations.

\textsuperscript{79} Dutch Minister in Berlin, P. Hymans, to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 1915, in ARA, “Kabinetsarchief e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940” entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 231.

\textsuperscript{80} Dutch Minister in Paris to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 November 1930, in \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{81} Dutch Minister in London to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 April 1930 in \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{82} Gen-Maj Klingbeil, “Der Vormarsch der Deutschen I. Armee längs der Holländische-Belgischen Grenze im August 1914” [The march of the German I Army along the Dutch-Belgian border in August 1914] \textit{Militaire Spectator}. 86, 1932 (a copy with English translation can be found in ARA, “Kabinetsarchief e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940” entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 231).
Comité Internationale des Sciences Historiques deciding to look into the incident and find out the truth.\textsuperscript{83} Unfortunately, the Dutch archives are unclear on any results from these investigations.

**THE SCHELDE AND EEMS:**
**PROTECTING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ON WATER**

The Schelde River was an area of immense concern for Dutch neutrality. Historically, the river was the centre of considerable international controversy.\textsuperscript{84} In 1585, the fleet of “Sea Beggars” based in Vlissingen cut off the western entrance to the Schelde. The trade of Antwerp – one of the foremost seaports in the world – transferred to Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{85} Ever since, the maintenance of trade in Amsterdam and Rotterdam became an aim of Dutch foreign policy, a principal reason why they blocked the West Schelde mouth again in 1648. The Schelde was a contentious issue between the northern and southern Low Countries until 1795, when the Dutch declared the river free for commerce.\textsuperscript{86} Nevertheless, in 1914, the possibility that the Dutch would cut Antwerp off remained a threat to Belgium. The Netherlands still held sovereignty over the river mouth. Belgians continued to mistrust the Netherlands’ intentions with regard to the Schelde, a legacy of the 1585 action and 1648 blockade. Because of its significance, it is not surprising that Belgians desired ownership of the river mouth. The Schelde and surrounding territory in the Dutch province of Zeeland would be part of Belgium’s (unsuccessful) territorial claims at the Versailles peace negotiations in 1919.

Throughout the Great War, troops and sailors stationed in Zeeland carefully supervised activities on the river. Of all water areas, the Schelde was most closely monitored, especially after the Netherlands denied entry to foreign ships on 30 July 1914. In the only deviation from this declaration, the Dutch government decided that if Belgium

\textsuperscript{83} Dutch Minister in Paris to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 November 1930, in ARA, “Kabinetsarchief c. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940” entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 231.

\textsuperscript{84} Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. 45; Maria de Waele, “De geest van Munster. De botsende economische en commerciële belangen van België en Nederland en de invloed op de wederzijdse beeldvorming (1830 - 1940)” [The spirit of Munster. The conflicting economic and commercial interests of Belgium and the Netherlands and the influence this had on their perceptions of one another (1830 - 1940)] Bijdragen en Mededelingen Betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden. 115, no. 1, 2000, pp. 33 - 59.

\textsuperscript{85} Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Question of the Scheldt. (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 28) London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. p. 1.
were invaded, it would allow river access to Antwerp for warships of signatories to the decree of Belgian neutrality in 1839. There were conditions placed on the right of entry, however. Firstly, a nation that used it could not be at war itself, nor could it carry any military materials on board its vessels. 87 Above all, Belgium had to request the aid.

Map 13: The Schelde and Eems estuaries

The opportunity only existed until the Netherlands placed war buoyage on the river mouth (5 August 1914). 88 Britain was the only signatory that could have used this chance to come to Belgium’s rescue on 3 or 4 August. It lost the opportunity when it declared war on

88 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 4 August 1914, in Ibid. pp. 17 - 18.
Germany. As of 5 August, the Dutch closed the river to all traffic except for merchant ships, and they could only traverse in daylight. Belgian lightships could no longer operate on the waterway, and all ships entered and left accompanied by Dutch pilot boats.

The Navy monitored ship movements on the Schelde, checking their cargo and eligibility to use the river. Based on Article 10 of the Dutch neutrality declaration, prizes (merchant ships captured by the enemy) could not use the Schelde. When in September 1914, Belgium requested that the 50 Austro-Hungarian and German ships it had seized in Antwerp be allowed to leave the city, the Dutch refused to let them through. On capturing Antwerp, Germany requisitioned these vessels and also asked that they exit Belgium via the Schelde. Again, the Netherlands denied the request. Subsequent attempts by the Germans to smuggle some of the ships through the river mouth were unsuccessful. The Dutch Navy caught and interned them. The Netherlands argued that even though the ships had returned to their original owners, they still remained prizes of war, since they were sequestered by military means. Likewise, a number of Belgian armed vessels tried to flee Antwerp before the German siege in October 1914. On reaching the Dutch section of the Schelde, the Dutch military authorities interned and disarmed the ships as well.

The Dutch had to be strict with regard to the neutrality of the Schelde, because interest in the river mouth was so great. The historian, Amry Vandenbosch, went so far as to proclaim that the issue of the Schelde was one of the major controversies of the Great War, because some belligerents believed that whoever controlled the river controlled the...
outcome of the war.96 The Allies wanted river access to Antwerp (and the Western Front), while Germany could have used the Schelde to send U-boats into the English Channel. The importance of the river for Britain can be easily ascertained from Winston Churchill’s statement in 1911, that Britain:

should be prepared at the proper moment to put extreme pressure on the Dutch to keep the Scheldt open for all purposes. If the Dutch close the Scheldt, we should retaliate by a blockade of the Rhine.97

This was a primary reason why Churchill, with support from others in the British Admiralty, pushed for an Allied assault on the river early in 1915 (as an alternative to the Gallipoli campaign).98 In the end, the possibility that Allied forces would not be successful in capturing the Netherlands after a concerted German counter-offensive, and the perceived advantages of a campaign in the Dardanelles, shifted Allied attention away from the Schelde.99

The river Eems (marking the northern border between the Netherlands and Germany) did not attract the same amount of international controversy as the Schelde, although it remained a continual problem for Dutch-German relations. Officially, the Netherlands and Germany each claimed sovereignty over the river, but effectively, the Dutch were unable to exercise any control over their half. The two neighbours had disputed the others’ right to the Eems for many years.100 Rather than antagonise Germany at the start of the war, the Dutch government decided to let Germany use the river at will. As Cort van der Linden pointed out to Snijders, there was no point in going to war over the Eems.101 There was considerable fear among cabinet members that Germany needed the river so desperately - to move its naval ships into the North Sea - that it would have declared war if the Netherlands tried to challenge this right.102 Since the Dutch did not exercise sovereignty

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99 Sanders, “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 44.
100 For correspondence on the Eems see: ARA, “A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918” archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 368, file no. A162.
101 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 1 August 1914, in SMG/DC, “Snijders, Cornelis Jacobus 29.9.52” 397/S.
over both sides of the waterway, the Eems presented a less obvious neutrality dilemma than the Schelde. Germany even mined the entrance, and, later in the war, refused access to the river mouth for Dutch merchant vessels.\(^\text{103}\) That Britain did not question Dutch behaviour regarding the Eems issue may reflect an acknowledgement that Germany had an accepted claim to the river. At any rate, militarily and economically the Eems was far less important to Britain than the Schelde.

The case of the Eems and Schelde illustrate how the perceptions of the belligerents affected Dutch neutrality. Clearly, such perception equally applied to the Netherlands’ other territorial waters. Because the country did not have a large naval capability, it had trouble ensuring that belligerent warships did not cross into Dutch waters.\(^\text{104}\) The navies of each of the warring parties did so on several occasions, but the Dutch Navy was usually able to warn contravening warships and they would turn back towards international waters.

However, there were some potentially serious transgressions.\(^\text{105}\) For example, in July 1917, British warships fired at German merchant ships travelling through Dutch waters. The Dutch despatched several warships to prevent further attacks and remove the British from the scene, or (as a last resort) to fight against the offenders and thereby declare war. Eventually, the Allied warships ceased their bombardment of the German vessels and returned to international waters.\(^\text{106}\) The Netherlands was able to avoid an international incident and remained neutral. Yet theoretically, the neutrality of the Netherlands had been breached by military means. If they had followed the Hague Conventions strictly, the Dutch should have gone to war with Britain for undertaking military action in their waters. Germany could have forced the issue as they witnessed the inability of the Netherlands to prevent the British attack. That neither Britain nor Germany issued a declaration of war against the Netherlands reflects their lack of desire to see the neutral become a belligerent.

\(^{103}\) Provincial Governor of Groningen to Minister President, 21 November 1916, in ARA, "A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918" archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 368; Snijders, "Nederland’s militaire positie" pp. 538 - 539.

\(^{104}\) Nagelhout, "De toelating en internering" p. 34.

\(^{105}\) Ibid.

The Dutch followed the letter of the law strictly and impartially whenever possible, but when it did not work their only other option was to negotiate with their warring neighbours. If the major powers wanted to keep the Netherlands neutral they would do so. But it came at great cost to the Netherlands. A balance had to be reached between what was acceptable to each combatant state (especially to Britain and Germany) and what was attainable by the Dutch. In case of the naval encounter above, Britain did not wish to antagonise the Netherlands. Therefore, Britain apologised for its transgression.

When it came to the Schelde, a compromise between the belligerents was harder to ensure. Both powers had too great a stake in its status to allow serious breaches of neutrality to occur. Undoubtedly, Germany and Britain would have gone to war over the river if the other had used it for military ends. Therefore, the Dutch military had to be particularly vigilant. As early as August 1914, Snijders ordered the commanding officer in Zeeland to meet all violations of neutrality on the Schelde with immediate military opposition.¹⁰⁷ This contrasts sharply with his instructions to the military commander in Delfzijl on foreign warship movements on the Eems:

You must order not to shoot at passing foreign warships.... My intention is to act strongly only against deliberate landings by foreign soldiers with hostile intentions and [to ensure] that entry into the harbour [of Delfzijl] is prevented.¹⁰⁸

When it was warranted and possible, the government acted strictly within neutrality regulations. For example, it denied entry to Dutch waters for all foreign armed merchant ships.¹⁰⁹ These were classed as warships, because the guns were used to defend against attack, and because military personnel often manned the weapons. The British were decidedly angry about the decision, especially as other neutral countries, such as Norway and Sweden, did not place the same restrictions on armed merchant vessels.¹¹⁰ They argued that the guns had a defensive purpose only (to protect against German U-boat attacks) and

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¹⁰⁷ Telegram from Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Zeeland, 14 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37.
¹⁰⁸ “U moet bevelen dat tegen voorbijstoombende vreemde oorlogsschepen niet wordt geschoten.... Mijn bedoeling is dat alleen tegen het opzettelijk aanschijnen van vreemde oorlogsschepen met vijandige bedoelingen krachtig optreden en het binnendringen in de haven wordt belet.” (Telegram from Commander-in-Chief to Commander of Delfzijl, 6 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37).
¹⁰⁹ Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality p. 519.
¹¹⁰ Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 112.
could not be used in an offensive manner. The Dutch replied that a gun remained a military
weapon, and was, by definition, not allowed to enter the country.

Dutch military personnel applied the rule rigorously. In March 1917, at the height
of Germany’s unrestricted U-boat campaign, a British armed merchant ship, the Princess
Melita, tried to enter the Netherlands on three occasions. The Dutch refused entry, firstly
because the gun was mounted and secondly, after the captain dismantled it, because it
remained aboard, although he was allowed to drop off sick passengers. Only when the crew
completely removed the gun from the vessel (presumably overboard) would the Dutch
allow the Princess Melita to come into port.111 When Britain organised convoys of
merchant ships, those equipped with armament had to remain outside Dutch territorial
waters. France was so disgruntled with the policy that it refused to let its merchants trade
with the Dutch.112

**PROTECTING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE AIR**

The decision to close off Dutch territorial airspace to all belligerent aeroplanes
placed added pressure on the armed forces to keep foreign aircraft out of the skies. As the
aeroplane became a central part of military operations, it would prove extremely difficult
task to fulfil. Hundreds of aeroplanes and dozens of airships flew across the Netherlands
during the war.113 Britain was most prolific in its transgressions, often flying across the
south of the country to Belgium or Germany, although German airships had little
compunction in ignoring Dutch aerial sovereignty on their way to bomb British cities either.
If discovered, it was all too easy to claim that the crossing was accidental, since from the air
it was hard to distinguish the Dutch land border - despite attempts at flying flags from
steeples and rooftops in border towns.114 and at sea it proved even more demanding. Often,

112 Vandenbosch, *The Neutrality of the Netherlands* p. 120.
113 ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37 and 176 are two of many folders at
the *Algemeen Rijksarchief* filled with reports of aeroplanes trangressing Dutch airspace.
114 Commander-in-Chief to Provincial Governors in Groningen, Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland, Limburg, North
Brabant and Zeeland, 2 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37;
Territorial Commander of Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 11 May 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale
Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 176.
it was hard enough keeping Dutch aeroplanes within territorial airspace, let alone alerting others of infringements.\textsuperscript{115}

The Dutch did not have enough anti-aircraft guns or measuring equipment to gauge the distance of contravening planes and shoot them down.\textsuperscript{116} The few that were shot down, Dutch soldiers interned along with the crew, otherwise, they noted the aircraft’s nationality and the government protested against the neutrality violation at the respective embassy.\textsuperscript{117} Despite lessons in aircraft detection, it remained difficult for border guards to distinguish the nationality of aeroplanes. For example, in July 1918, Snijders reported that during the previous month his troop sighted 52 breaches of Dutch territorial airspace. Of these, three were by Allied planes, five aircraft were German, and the nationality of the other 44 was unknown, although they were most probably British.\textsuperscript{118} This made credible complaints against the belligerents problematic and the maintenance of neutrality in the air all but impossible. Occasionally, Britain and Germany protested that the Dutch were acting unneutrally because they were unable to shoot down more of the contravening planes and airships.\textsuperscript{119} As mentioned earlier, this led both belligerents to offer anti-aircraft guns to the Netherlands.

**Neutrality Violations with Deadly Consequences**

Despite their neutrality, the Dutch were not spared the experience of warfare. Not only did fishermen drown at sea after their ships hit mines or were sunk by torpedoes, but some of the aeroplanes that crossed into Dutch airspace dropped bombs on the Netherlands, causing damage, injuring and occasionally killing citizens.\textsuperscript{120} Stray mines stranded on Dutch beaches also caused damage and loss of life. The military played a central role in limiting the damage caused by wayward missiles.

The first bomb attack on the Netherlands occurred early in the war. On 22 September 1914, a British plane crossed the city of Maastricht in Limburg and dropped two

\textsuperscript{115} Commander of Division IV to Brigade-Commander, 8 September 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 168.

\textsuperscript{116} Nagelhout, “De toeleting en internering” p. 37.

\textsuperscript{117} See: Chapters 2, pp. 42 - 43, and Chapter 5, pp. 185 - 187 regarding the internment of aeroplanes during the war.

\textsuperscript{118} Commander-in-Chief to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War and Minister in Charge of the Navy, 12 July 1918, ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.

\textsuperscript{119} Baer, “The Anglo-German antagonism” p. 279.

\textsuperscript{120} See: Ritter, *De Donkere Poort* Volume 2, pp. 214 - 222, for an overview of the bomb attacks.
bombs causing damage to a field and nearby house. Fortunately, no one was injured or killed. No doubt, the pilot mistook Maastricht for a Belgian or German town, many pilots would subsequently make similar mistakes especially in the province of Zeeland, which witnessed two bomb attacks in 1915, and a further nine strikes in 1917. Some places on the border with Belgium became targets on more than one occasion. For example, Sas van Gent was bombed four times within seven months (between November 1917 and June 1918), with no reported casualties. A couple and their son in Zierikzee were not as fortunate, when on 30 April 1917, two British planes dropped six bombs on the seaside town, killing all three and demolishing their home. The Dutch government fervently protested the violation to its British counterpart, which initially denied any responsibility. But when bomb fragments indicated that it had to have been British, it apologised profusely for the “deplorable mistake” and agreed to compensate for damage and loss of life.

German pilots also dropped bombs on the Netherlands, although not as frequently as the Allies. On 26 October 1918, for example, a German aircraft released three bombs above Aardenburg. During the rest of 1918 and well into 1919, the Dutch tried to obtain compensation for the destruction and injury caused. A year earlier, 14 British and German aeroplanes encountered each other above the coastal village of Renesse. In the

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121 For an account of the bombing of Maastricht 22 September 1914, see: Commander-in-Chief, “Rapport betrekkelijk het onderzoek der zake het werpen van een bom uit een vliegtuig boven Maastricht” [Report regarding the investigation into the dropping of a bomb from an aeroplane above Maastricht] 23 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1; Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy,” pp. 83 – 84. Pictures of the damage done by the bombs on Maastricht were published in Het Leven Geillustreerd. 9, 39, 29 September 1914, p. 1203.
123 Ibid.; Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 31 August 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 588; photos of bombing, 8 November 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 590; Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 May 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 590; Nagelhout, “De toelating en internering van belligerente troepen” p. 38; Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 81. For details of Zierikzee bombing see: “Mobilisatieverslag 1917” p. xxv, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696; Commander of the Fortified Position of the Mouths of the Maas and Schelde Rivers to Commander-in-Chief, 30 April 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 590; Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 81. Photos of damage can be found in: NIOD, “Nederland militair 1914 - 1918. 1B: Zeeland/luchtaanval 1917” [The Netherlands militarily 1914 - 1918. 1B: Zeeland/airattack 1917] photo collection 1B, (photos from the Prins archive) photo no. 394, 395, 1084.
124 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 1917; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Commander-in-Chief, 28 June 1917 and 21 July 1917; W. Langley (British Foreign Office) to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 July 1917; Commander-in-Chief to Rotterdam Bank Association, 31 January 1918, all in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 590.
125 See: correspondence in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 590.
ensuing aerial fight, a German aircraft released three bombs on Dutch soil.  

Germany and Britain both apologised and promised to be more careful in future. However, only seven days later, five bombs (of unknown origin) fell on Cadzand, another popular beach resort, which had witnessed a similar attack in 1915.

The increased number of aerial bombings made the south of the country hazardous. Zeeland was an especially popular if unintentional target. Shell fragments from the fighting in Belgium fell in the province on several occasions, as did grenades, and the occasional shot fired into Dutch territory. In October 1917, Snijders warned cabinet ministers that he

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127 "Mobilisatieverslag 1917" p. xxvi, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.  
128 Ibid. See: correspondence on attack on Cadzand (1917) in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 588. For the attack in 1915, see: correspondence in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 178.  
129 "Mobilisatieverslag 1917" p. xxv, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696; Military District Commissioner (Kantonmentscommissaris) to the Commander of West Zeeuwsch Vlaanderen, 23 October 1918, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 845; Vries, "Nederland als non-belligerente natie" p. 86.
could not ensure Queen Wilhelmina's safety if she toured there. Wilhelmina took little note of the warnings and visited anyway, notably taking time out to visit one of her subjects injured by artillery shrapnel.

Map 14: Sites of accidental bomb drops by foreign aircraft

Some of the places were targeted more than once between 1914 and 1918.

Beached mines and those floating in Dutch territorial waters also proved lethal. The first mines washed up on beaches in September 1914. More than 6,000 others followed in the course of the war. Nine naval personnel lost their lives when the mine they were attempting to defuse exploded in the small town of West Kapelle, on 16 November 1914. The minelayer Triton and minesweeper Zeemeeuw would also fall victim to foreign mines. It was easier for the Dutch to receive compensation from the

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130 Commander-in-Chief to the cabinet, 10 October 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4.
132 “Overzicht van de voornaamste gebeurtenissen in Nederland vanaf 30 Juli 1914. dl I” in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr. 135 (11 delen)” 143.
133 Bles, “De Koninklijke Marine mobiliseert” p. 78.
135 Moeyes, Buiten Schot p. 185.
belligerents for wayward bombs than for beached mines, even though neutral countries had clear precedents for wayward mines set by international law. Most mines that found their way onto Dutch territory were British. Nevertheless, there were too many of them to protest against each landing. Furthermore, because the beaching of mines depended on external factors - sea conditions and wind shifts - the Dutch tried to limit their protests to those mine explosions that actually caused damage or killed people. Both Germany and Britain sometimes compensated for mine damage. In general, however, they did very little about sea mines, although Britain did once suggest that it could send two professional mine defusers to the Netherlands (a suggestion that was never followed up). The combatants were not prepared to stop laying mines in the North Sea and countries on this stretch of water had to live with the consequences.

CONCLUSION

While international laws relating to territorial neutrality were clearly defined and generally accepted, and while the Netherlands imposed even harsher regulations than strictly necessary, careful adherence to them was not always possible or useful. Neutral states had to be prepared to bend the rules slightly to avoid entering the war unnecessarily, while belligerents had to be willing to accept certain infringements of neutrality as inevitable. But there were clear limits and on particular issues, such as the Schelde, there was no room to manoeuvre whatsoever. The Dutch government had to be exact in its policy, and the armed forces guarding land and water boundaries had to be equally exacting in their implementation of that policy.

In many respects, of all the different neutrality obligations, territorial neutrality was easiest to uphold, because the belligerents recognised that neutral states had certain fundamental sovereign rights, which included the right to determine what happened within their own territorial boundaries. As we shall see, the respect of warring countries for the sovereignty of neutral nations was nowhere more evident than in their co-operation with the internment policies of the Dutch government. On the other hand, they also expected that the

136 Ibid.
137 Oranjebœk: SMG "Mededeelingen van den Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken aan de Staten-Generaal December 1916" p. 18; Watson, "Britain’s Dutch Policy" p. 82.
138 For compensation demands, see: ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 633.
139 Watson, "Britain’s Dutch Policy" p. 82.
Netherlands would do its utmost to protect that right, a reason why the Dutch armed forces prioritised frontier duty and moved soldiers as close to the borders in the south of the country as possible. This had the inevitable consequence that the other pillar of Dutch military strategy, namely readiness to counter an invasion, suffered, further lessening the deterrence value of the mobilised forces. Without a proper defence strategy in place, the value of Dutch neutrality diminished. Of course, as long as all of the belligerents desired to keep the Netherlands neutral, the loss of deterrence and defensive strength mattered less. The potential for disaster, however, was immense, as Snijders rightly feared.
Chapter 5

Fugitives of War: Internees, Prisoners of War and Refugees

The Netherlands finds itself as a neutral power on an entirely friendly footing with all warring powers. Therefore, it can never be the intention to act with hostility towards persons belonging to warring armies. Taking prisoners of war is incompatible with the concept of neutrality: "internment" can only be spoken of. That the treatment of internees in internment camps corresponds with the treatment of prisoners of war in camps of the warring parties does not take away from the principle.

General C.J. Snijders (1914)

The armed forces assumed responsibility for the internment of foreign soldiers ever since the Netherlands ratified the Hague Conventions in 1907. Article 3 of the Dutch neutrality declaration further reinforced this commitment. Landweer troops mobilised at the borders were in no doubt as to the importance of apprehending any strangers coming across the frontier. However, the Limburg incident on 4 August 1914, when a German cavalry section supposedly used a Dutch road near Vaals, and a report a few days later, when two German officers took a wrong turn in their car and ended up in Maastricht instead of Aachen, gravely concerned the Dutch High Command. Quickly, Snijders introduced stricter regulations, assigning greater responsibility for upholding neutrality, especially

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1 “Nederland verkeert als onzijdige mogendheid op volkomen vriendschappelijken voet met alle oorlogvoerende mogendheden. Het kan dus nimmer in de bedoeling liggen, vijandig op te treden tegen personen, die tot de oorlogvoerende legers behooren. Het maken van krijgsgevangenen is met het begrip van neutraliteit onvereenigbaar; alleen kan van "interneering" gesproken worden. Dat de behandeling van geinterneerden in de interneeringsdepôts overeenkomt met de behandeling van krijgsgevangenen in de depôts bij de oorlogvoerende partijen doet aan het principe niet af.” (Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 7 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 213.70, inventory no. 133).

2 Staatsblad. no. 73, 1910.

3 See: Appendix 5, p. 455.

4 See: Chapter 4, pp. 147 - 151.

5 Susanne Wolf, "International Law and Internment in the Netherlands, August to December 1914" Unpublished paper presented at NIOD WOI workgroup, 6 April 2001, Amsterdam, p. 2. With thanks to Susanne Wolf for letting me have a copy of her paper.
internment, along the southern borders to the Field Army.⁶ Troops shifted closer to the frontier in North Brabant, and Division III reinforced the landweer patrolling the Belgian border.⁷ As many French- and German-speaking Dutch soldiers as possible also moved south, to explain the internment process to foreign troops.⁸

Yet no one envisaged the size and scale of the eventual problem. Alongside associated tasks, such as seizing, stockpiling and registering all military equipment, weaponry, vehicles, ships and horses present in Dutch territory, internment would prove the most time-consuming of the armed forces’ neutrality duties. In time, it would see 2,000 staff allocated to the specially-created Internment Bureau in the General Staff,⁹ thousands of soldiers involved in guarding camps around the country, Marechaussee officers assuming responsibility for detecting and catching escapees, and border guards interning border violators and preventing internees from leaving the country. Their responsibilities were stretched even further when the government agreed to let Great Britain and Germany exchange prisoners of war (POWs) across Dutch territory. Escaped POWs from camps in Germany also found their way to the Dutch border; deserters from the German army fled to the Netherlands; and Belgian and French civilians escaped the fighting on the Western Front and sought refuge among their northern neighbours.

**ALL BUT A PRISONER OF WAR**

Military internees were not prisoners of war, although the Netherlands’ treatment of internees, especially at the start of the war, did not differ appreciably from how the belligerents treated their POWs. This approach followed the Hague Conventions, which allowed neutrals to place interned troops in camps and do whatever else they thought

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⁶ “Instructie aan Commandanten van onderdeelen van het Veldleger in het Zuiden des lands” [Instructions to the Commanders of sections of the Field Army in the south of the country] in Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” Appendix III, p. 121; Commander-in-Chief, “Bijzonder Instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger geldende van 10 Augustus 1914 tot nadere kennisgeving” [Extra-ordinary instructions for the Commander of the Field Army applicable from 10 August 1914 until further notice] 10 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
⁷ Commander-in-Chief to Commander of Division III, 8 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
⁹ Ibid. p. 93.
necessary to keep them from leaving neutral territory.\textsuperscript{10} Yet there were some fundamental
differences between POWs and internees. Internees tended to be treated more humanely;
they were, after all, not “the enemy”, and they were more likely to receive greater
privileges. Interned officers enjoyed the opportunity to live with little supervision outside
the camps, while ordinary soldiers had the chance to work for a wage and live with their
families in specially built sites.\textsuperscript{11} Neutrals were also required to treat their internees on a par
with their own soldiers in terms of allowances and rations.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite deceptively simple rules governing the internment of foreign military
personnel, important gradations existed as to how the neutral should treat them, depending
on the circumstances of entry and what rank or position they held. There were five types of
military personnel that entered the Netherlands during the war: regular soldiers, sailors,
POWs on exchange, escaped POWs, and deserters. The Dutch adopted different
responsibilities for each group. Foot soldiers were by far the most common, crossing the
border, either individually or in small groups, without intending to attack the country. In
most cases, border guards gave soldiers who accidentally stepped across the border the
benefit of the doubt and allowed them to return to the other side. However, if they traversed
the frontier in a group, or in the company of a commanding officer, no choice existed; the
guards were obligated to apprehend the entire group, disarm them and escort them to an
internment camp.\textsuperscript{13} Officially, once interned, a soldier was bound to remain in the country
until the end of the war.

Identifying a soldier as he crossed the border was not always a straightforward
matter. On 6 August 1914, the Minister of Justice, B. Ort, instructed the government’s
attorneys that according to international law, a soldier was classified as someone who was
in the presence of a commanding officer, wore a military uniform, openly carried arms, or
could prove to be enlisted in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{14} The last of these four categories created

\textsuperscript{10} Article 11 of The Hague Convention V, 1907, in Roberts et al. (eds.), \textit{Documents on the Laws of War} p. 65. See
\textsuperscript{11} See: p. 178 below.
\textsuperscript{12} Roodt, \textit{Oorlogsgasten} p. 38.
\textsuperscript{13} Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 7 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry
no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 133.
\textsuperscript{14} “Circular Instructions from the Minister of Justice to the Government Attorneys concerning the Enforcement of
Neutrality Regulations, August 6, 1914” Article 2, in Francis Deak, Philip C. Jessup, \textit{A Collection of Neutrality Laws,
818 - 820.
certain problems. During the refugee crisis in October 1914, a substantial number of Belgian troops - some historians estimate the number at around 7,000 - traversed the Dutch border out of uniform and unarmed, having exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothes to avoid internment. When the Dutch actively encouraged refugees to return to Belgium soon after, a number of the men feared that the German occupation forces would capture them as prisoners of war. They asked to be interned in the Netherlands instead, basing their eligibility on service in the Belgian Army.

Snijders disagreed with his government on how they should treat the asylum seekers. Many cabinet ministers were of the opinion that all foreign soldiers should be interned, regardless of how they made their way into the country. Snijders believed that according to international law, a neutral should intern only those persons who entered neutral territory armed or in uniform. Dismissing the remainder as merely seeking charity, he stressed “an internment camp is not a philanthropic institution”. In the end, Snijders’ opinion prevailed. To avoid future difficulties, the Commander-in-Chief asked border guards to consult with him if they were unsure about the status of any foreigners encountered.

Snijders’ flexible interpretation of the regulations, made it possible for foreign soldiers to visit the Netherlands freely, as long as they were unarmed, in civilian dress, and their visit did not have a belligerent purpose. In fact, several German troops spent their leave in the country between 1914 and 1918: they shopped in Dutch border towns, stayed overnight, and travelled to holiday resorts. Although Allied soldiers could legally have done the same, access to the Netherlands was relatively easier out of Germany than out of the Allied side of the Western Front. However, the Dutch government did impose some time limits on German visits, principally to avoid abuses of neutrality: they had to report to

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15 Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), *Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog* pp. 30 - 31; Kramers, “Interneering in Nederland” p. 23.
16 For discussion between Snijders and the government on the issue of soldiers in civilian dress, see: correspondence in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
17 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Internal Affairs, 15 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.
18 “Een interneeringsdepot is geen filantropische inrichting” (Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Zeeland, 14 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75).
19 Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 7 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 133; Commander-in-Chief to Provincial Governor in South Holland, 22 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
20 Commander of Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 17 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 178; Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” p. 92.
a local military commander when staying overnight; they could not remain in the southern provinces for more than three days; and were prevented from entering fortifications and other military areas.21

The status of naval crews and their eligibility for internment was far more complicated than that of soldiers. If a belligerent warship entered Dutch territorial waters, the Navy was obligated to intern the ship and all its occupants. Sailors rescued in international waters were a different matter altogether. They were classified as “soldiers” only if their entry into the Netherlands occurred within a military capacity. The type of vessel used to transport the sailors into the country was instrumental in distinguishing “soldiers” from “non-soldiers”.22 Hence, the Dutch did not intern sailors picked up by merchant ships but did intern those rescued by a naval vessel (on board a warship the foreigners assumed military status, whereas on a merchant ship they were classified as civilians).23 Hence, when the Dutch steamship Titan rescued 114 men from the British cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, which had all been torpedoed by a German U-boat on 22 September 1914, the sailors received treatment in Dutch hospitals and could return back to Great Britain.24 Interestingly enough, if any merchant ship encountered a belligerent warship en route to a Dutch port, the status of any foreign military personnel on board the former changed. On reaching a neutral haven, the sailors now had to be interned, because the warship could have made them its prisoners of war and the merchant ship its prize of war.25

The Dutch also did not intern military medical staff, since the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906 gave all medics immunity from capture as POWs and internees. Due to the nature of their profession, while they served as part of the armed forces, they were classed not as military personnel but as individuals on a humanitarian mission. Therefore, on entering the Netherlands, they could leave at will, either to travel home or back to the

21 Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 3 April 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 280.
22 Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 7 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 133.
24 Stuart, De Nederlandse Zee macht p. 381.
front. In fact, a number of Belgian medics stayed in the Netherlands to assist sick and wounded Belgian internees.\(^{26}\)

Another group of foreign soldiers present were prisoners of war. In 1915, Germany and Britain agreed to exchange sick and wounded POWs via the Netherlands. In 1917, they also allowed up to 16,000 POWs to be interned by the neutral.\(^{27}\) The Dutch treated the POWs somewhat differently from other internees because their entry into the country was not based on a breach of neutrality and many of them were injured. They were usually housed in private lodgings, hotels or specially-built barracks, rather than the larger impersonal internment facilities, although the Dutch military continued to supervise their comings and goings and limited their movements to particular cities. The British POWs lived mainly in and around Scheveningen, as well as in Leeuwarden and Nijmegen, while the Germans lodged in Rotterdam, Dieren, Wolfheze, Hattem, Arnhem, and Noordwijk.\(^{28}\)

Other prisoners of war also found their way to the Netherlands during the war. Many Allied soldiers escaped from POW camps in Germany and managed to reach the Dutch border.\(^{29}\) While the Dutch could have refused entry, they rarely did so for obvious humanitarian reasons.\(^{30}\) On letting the POWs into the country, they were then obliged to give them right of passage home.\(^{31}\) If the escapees were unable to return home or chose to stay, then the neutral could assign lodgings and, like the exchange POWs mentioned above, limit their movements within certain municipalities.\(^{32}\) These same rules applied to a number of German POWs returning home from imprisonment in Britain, who fled from the official exchange trains while travelling through the Netherlands.\(^{33}\) They did not wish to return home to face, by 1917 at least, severe food shortages and the possibility of serving at the front again.

\(^{26}\) Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” p. 92.
\(^{27}\) Oranjeboek: Mededeelingen van den Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken aan de Staten-Generaal December 1916 - April 1918 [Announcements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Estates-General December 1916 - April 1918] publication details missing, 1918, p. 77 (SMG); Nagelhout, “De toelating en internering van belligerente troepen” p. 24; Roodt, “De uitwisseling en internering” p. 1.
\(^{28}\) Klinkert, “Internering van vreemde militairen” pp. 2455 - 2456; Roodt, “De uitwisseling en internering” p. 9; Roodt, Oorlogsgasten pp. 296 - 298.
\(^{29}\) For more on the escapees, see: pp. 182 – 183 below.
\(^{31}\) Article 13 of “1907 Hague Convention V” in Roberts et. al. (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War p. 65.
\(^{32}\) Nagelhout, “De toelating en internering van belligerente troepen” p. 21.
\(^{33}\) Private correspondence with Susanne Wolf, May 2000.
Likewise, the Netherlands could have stopped foreign deserters (mainly Germans) at the border, but it never did so. Because deserters had severed their ties with the armed forces, they were officially classed as civilian refugees. However, dealing with deserters was a little more difficult than handling civilians. They could not be coerced or persuaded to leave (as they faced arrest and execution for defecting at home), but neither could they be allowed to roam the Netherlands at will. The Dutch could not intern them because they were no longer classed as soldiers, and because the German authorities would not pay for their internment. Yet their military knowledge and training posed a considerable security risk. Often belligerents (especially Britain) targeted the German deserters, eager to recruit them as spies.

FROM A TRICKLE TO A FLOOD

As part of its neutrality obligations, the Dutch military created an internment camp in Alkmaar as soon as the mobilisation was underway. Its first residents were Belgian and German soldiers crossing the Dutch border in and around Limburg. High Command quickly realised that it was inappropriate to force enemies to live together, subsequently transferring the Belgians to another site in Gaasterland. Not much later, Alkmaar was closed down and the Germans moved to a new camp in Bergen. Alkmaar was not large enough to house the anticipated hundreds of internees yet to arrive, although even High Command was unprepared for the thousands eventually received.

By October 1914, the Netherlands housed 129 German and Belgian soldiers, many of whom were seriously injured. As soon as hostilities began on 4 August, Dutch Red Cross medics travelled into Belgium to treat injured civilians and troops. They brought

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35 For more information on deserters, see: pp. 183 – 184 below.
37 Commander of Internment Depot Alkmaar to Commander-in-Chief, 18 August 1914; Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 13 August 1914, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75; Lier, “Internering van vreemde militairen” p. 52.
38 “Overzicht van de voornaamste gebeurtenissen in Nederland vanaf 30 Juli 1914. dl I” in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr. 135 (11 delen)” 143; Lier, “Internering van vreemde militairen” p. 52.
39 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 6 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
40 Lier, “Internering van vreemde militairen” p. 52.
many of the wounded back with them for hospital treatment. Despite the obvious altruism of the medics’ actions, Snijders halted their journeys into Belgium after a few days due to a legal quandary: the medics breached Dutch neutrality by shifting belligerent troops into neutral territory without first asking the permission of the individual soldier and that of the combatants, who might object to a neutral forcibly removing troops from the field of battle. Nevertheless, on 10 August 1914, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands granted the Red Cross access to Belgium for an hour at a time to retrieve casualties from the front.

German and Belgian troops facilitated the compromise by moving their wounded closer to the border, where they were tended by Dutch medics and, if the patients agreed, shifted to Dutch hospitals. After treatment, the Netherlands interned the soldiers. At the same time, any wounded who had not given permission to be moved into the Netherlands were released from internment.

Until early October 1914, the Dutch could ably manage the internee situation. Once the German armies lay siege to Antwerp, however, they faced an unprecedented crisis. On 9 October, a staggering 32,067 Belgian soldiers (nearly one-sixth of the Belgian army) and another 1,568 British troops found themselves stranded on the wrong side of Antwerp after a German advance. The Allies preferred capture in the Netherlands to becoming German prisoners of war. They reached the borders of Zeeland and North Brabant battle-weary and exhausted. At the same time, around a million destitute Antwerpers fled their beleaguered city and headed for the Netherlands, carting as much of their property with them as possible. On their own, the civilian refugees posed a predicament of

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42 Ibid. p. 129; Commander-in-Chief to Commander 13 RI in Maastricht, 8 August 1914, in ARA, “Archiefen van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
44 Telegram to the Nieuwe Koerier, 6 August 1914, in NIOD, “WOI Diversen o.a. ‘Telegram aan de Nieuwe Koerier” archive 618, box 3.
45 Mandere, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis p. 130.
46 Ibid. p. 131.
48 No exact figures are available as it was impossible for proper counts to be taken at the height of the refugee crisis. Nevertheless, from counts taken when refugees returned to Belgium or travelled on to Great Britain and France,
immeasurable proportions (see below), but combined with the military refugees the situation was calamitous.

The pandemonium in the south is best illustrated by some of the telegrams sent to General Headquarters from the province of Zeeland between 9 and 11 October. The Territorial Commander in Zeeland notified Snijders on 9 October that his troops had interned 600 foreign soldiers in the border town of Axel, had housed another 100 nearby in Hulst, while nearly 2,000 others were reported to be marching towards the town. He hoped they could be shifted onto Neuzen (Terneuzen) as soon as possible, but there were not enough train carriages or other forms of transportation available. Between 9 and 11 October, in fact, the small population of Neuzen witnessed around 26,000 internees travel through the streets and onto waiting trains. On 10 October, Snijders received a similar telegram, this time from Vlissingen: 800 Belgian soldiers had arrived by train overnight from Middelburg, there were 1,000 British and 2,000 Belgian soldiers awaiting removal from the port, and an unknown number (at least several thousand) still roaming in the southern foot of the province. The commander in Vlissingen eagerly awaited the arrival of HMS *Friso* to ease the transfer of internees further north.

In these early days, few knew precisely how many internees there were or how many more were coming, and with the flood of the hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees, the situation threatened to escalate even further. No neutral had ever handled so many internees, let alone all at once. The only precedent the Dutch could follow was that of Switzerland, which had interned several hundred French and German soldiers during the Franco-Prussian War. Somehow, the Dutch military had to house, feed, guard and prevent together with registration figures, an approximate figure can be attained. Contemporaries set the figure at anything between 800,000 to 900,000 (Ritter, *De Donkere Poort* Volume 1, p. 127; Treub, *Oorlogstijd* p. 147). Probably the most accurate figures were obtained by the Central Commission, which estimated that during October 1914, 430,000 refugees crossed the border in Zeeland, 100,000 in Limburg, and 506,000 in North Brabant (a total of 1,026,000) (Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” pp. 88, 114, fn 42; Wintermans, *Belgische vluchtelingen in Eindhoven* pp. 11 - 12). Belgian researcher Pierre Tallier also holds to more than a million refugees (Tallier, “De Belgische vluchtelingen” p. 23).

49 Telegram from Territorial Commander in Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 9 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
50 Commander of Coastal Battery near Neuzen, “Dagboek van 5 Augustus 1914 t/m 31 December 1914 omtrent de uitoefening van het Militair Gezag te Neuzen Hoek en Zaamslag” in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 98.
51 Telegraph message from the adjutant to Admiral Colenbrander (Vlissingen) to Commander-in-Chief, 10 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
the internees from escaping, without an existing infrastructure. It seemed an impossible task within an impossible situation. Human traffic clogged all routes into and out of Zeeland and North Brabant. The military requisitioned all available railway carriages, boats, ships, horse-drawn transport, automobiles and trucks to move the internees northwards. But the civilian refugees also had to be moved; there were simply too many of them to leave in the south.

One way or another, the internees found their way out of the chaos into any and all available military barracks, hastily-erected tent sites, public buildings, castles, ships and barges.\footnote{Doeleman et al. (eds.), \textit{Interneeringsdepot Gaasterland} p. 14.} The military made urgent requests for appropriate housing throughout the country.\footnote{For example: Telegram from Commander in Kampen to Commander-in-Chief, 8 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of Cavalry Brigade, 11 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.} Unlike normal refugees, the Dutch were responsible for ensuring that internees were well guarded. Remarkably, the military concentrated particular nationalities in one area: Britons went to Friesland, Germans remained in Bergen, and the Belgians scattered in large numbers around the centre of the country. Overcrowding was inevitable. In Assen, 2,500 internees slept beneath canvas roofs spanned across open courtyards. The Territorial Commander in Friesland told Snijders that this situation was untenable in the long-term, and that there was no more space for any others in the short-term.\footnote{Telegram from Territorial Commander in Friesland to Commander-in-Chief, 11 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.} In Amersfoort, 15,000 men were crammed into an area intended for only 4,000.\footnote{M. P. Wielinga, “Military refugees in the Netherlands 1914 - 1918” The First World War and Refugees in the Netherlands Website <http://www.mecom.nl/~k7/english/vluchtelingen/pag05.htm> [Path: via Home Page <http://www.mecom.nl/~k7/MPW/english/index.htm>] (Accessed March 1999) no page numbers.}

Hundreds, if not thousands, of Dutch soldiers were involved in the initial internment process. These men were taken away from their usual task of manning borders and fortifications. Besides placing an even greater burden on the Dutch rail network, it also deprived southern areas of their much-needed troops. For this reason, the Territorial Commander in Zeeland ordered his forces to accompany internees no farther than Dordrecht. Zeeland needed all available hands for the foreigners still there, as well as for defensive garrisons in case of invasion.\footnote{Telegram from Territorial Commander in Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 10 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.}
Eventually, out of chaos came order. By the middle of 1915, contractors had built permanent camps throughout the country.58 Within General Headquarters, Major-General M. Onnen administered the Internment Bureau, specially created in the aftermath of the October crisis.59 He approached Swiss authorities to discover their procedures for dealing with internees, as foreign troops also arrived at their borders.60 Onnen’s department worked in close co-operation with the Red Cross, which had set up an Information Bureau as an intermediary between the Dutch government, the military, internees, and their respective governments.61 Through the course of 1915, the Information Bureau filed identification cards for all internees and tracked their whereabouts around the country.

Escaping internees presented one of armed forces’ greatest neutrality concerns. Escape attempts were most numerous in the first few months, a time when neither detailed records or well-guarded camps existed. In October 1914, merely 60 Dutch troops guarded the 1,200 internees located in Leeuwarden and a similarly-sized contingent looked after 2,200 internees in Gaasterland.62 By July 1915, an estimated 1,600 internees had escaped the country.63 Some camps were easier to break out of than others. For example, 804 internees managed to break out of the camp at Amersfoort during the twelve months after its construction. Hardewijk was another large camp with a high internee escape total (of 557), with most escapes occuring at the start. Yet the average escape rate was highest in Oldebroek with 66.2 per thousand in 1914 and 1915. Other sites were not as easy to flee from: Gaasterland had 31 breakouts before December 1915, Kampen 34 (all in November 1914) and Leeuwarden only 19.64

59 Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” p. 93.
60 Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 2, p. 207.
61 Staatsblad. no. 546, 27 November 1914.
62 Telegram from the Commander of Internment Camp Leeuwarden to Commander-in-Chief, 12 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75; Susanne Wolf, “Gaasterland” draft section for a chapter in her Ph.D. thesis, May 2000. With grateful thanks for letting me use her work.
63 Nagelhout, “De toelating en internering van belligerente troepen” p. 49; Laporte, “Belgische geïnterneerden in Nederland” Appendix III.
64 Laporte, “Belgische geïnterneerden in Nederland” Appendix III.
Housed in guarded camps, often in dismal conditions, interred troops had every incentive to break free. The camp at Zeist provides a good example. In November 1914, the camp housed about 12,000 Belgians, but conditions there were bleak, especially with the onset of winter.\textsuperscript{65} It was badly-insulated, damp, alive with rats, internees had little to do,

\textsuperscript{65} For a detailed description of the internment camp at Zeist see: Roodt, \textit{Oorlogsgasten} pp. 45 - 55.
and complained of profiteering by the canteen manager. On 3 December 1914 a riot broke out, during which internees smashed windows and threw stones. The camp commander ordered his guards to shoot at the rioting prisoners. In the ensuing violence, eight Belgian soldiers died and another 18 were seriously wounded. Zeist brought international attention to the plight of internees. The government and Dutch military investigated the riots and subsequently made several improvements to the gloomy situation there. After the rebellion, internees everywhere received more privileges. Local and international charities contributed to improving the daily routine of internees as well, by organising concert evenings, craft classes, sport days, and other forms of entertainment. However, as we will see, Dutch soldiers did not experience ideal living conditions either and the authorities could not favour internees over for their own troops.

As supervision of camps improved, their administration became more thorough and the standard of living of internees developed, few among them managed or wanted to escape. That Dutch officials became better at catching fugitives contributed to the decline in escapes as well. Throughout the course of 1915, the police (including the Marechaussee) ensured that all internees had their fingerprints taken and were photographed. The government placed all municipalities with internment camps nearby in a staat van beleg ("state of siege"), permitting the Marechaussee virtually unlimited powers to search houses at random. More guards patrolled camp perimeters and took greater care to check on the whereabouts of their charges. In Gaasterland, for example, initially internees could freely move around the township. This stopped once seven internees went missing on 23 October 1914; after that date, a roll-call occurred every day, internees could not own bicycles, and Gaasterland locals were forbidden to help soldiers flee. Troops blocked all the bridges around the town. However, it remained impossible to isolate the township, and the

66 Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), *Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog* p. 49; Roodt, *Oorlogsgasten* pp. 51 - 52.
67 For details of the Zeist rebellion see: Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 348; Vries, "Nederland als non-bellerigente natie" p. 99; Wintermans, *Belgische vluchtelingen in Eindhoven* p. 15; Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), *Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog* pp. 50 - 51; Hendrickx-van der Avert, "De opstand in het Interneringskamp Zeist" pp. 76 - 77; Nagelhout, "De toelating en internering van bellerigente troepen" p. 46; Kramers, "Internering in Nederland 1914 - 1918" p. 24; Roodt, *Oorlogsgasten* pp. 51 - 54.
68 Telegram from Territorial Commander in Overijssel to Commander-in-Chief, 4 December 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
70 See: Chapter 7, pp. 231 – 257, for further information on the staat van oorlog and staat van beleg.
71 Lier, "Internering van vreemde militairen" p. 54.
72 Doeleman et. al. (eds.), *Interneeringsdepot Gaasterland* p. 6.
365 military guards eventually assigned to the 2,200 troops in Gaasterland could not stop the more determined escapees.\textsuperscript{73}

By November 1918, the overall number of Belgian escapees totalled 2,830, not considerably more than the total in December 1915.\textsuperscript{74} Yet the desire to flee remained high among some. In a fictional account based on his time as an interned officer, Charles Morgan described his imprisonment at Wierickerschans castle. He stressed the demoralisation of being a prisoner, even after officers were given the chance to live outside the camp bound, by a “word-of-honour” document:\textsuperscript{75}

Here we are - shut up ... We’ve [sic] given parole; we can’t escape; we can’t help in any way, even as civilians in England can help. We are as much out of the world as if we are dead. What we do or don’t do makes no difference to a living soul. As long as we live, we shall never again be responsible to ourselves alone. And we don’t know how long it will last - years perhaps; or Holland may come into the war next week and we find ourselves in the trenches the week after. It gives me a feeling, as far as the war is concerned, of absolute fatalism.\textsuperscript{76}

Some officers fled the country as soon as they had a chance, even if they gave their word of honour, but Belgium, Britain and Germany effectively sealed this corridor by agreeing to return any escaped officers back to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{77} The system worked so well that the Dutch subsequently allowed some officers to go home for funerals or to visit sick relatives, and even to take their leave allocations outside the country.\textsuperscript{78} France was the only warring nation that did not allow its officers to sign word-of-honour agreements. As a result, the Dutch moved the few French officers held in captivity to a rather bleak camp on the small island of Urk in the middle of the Zuiderzee. Officers from other Allied countries who refused to guarantee they would not escape joined their French counterparts there.\textsuperscript{79}

By late 1915, when the prospect of a speedy end to the war seemed all too unlikely, new solutions had to be found for the internee problem. It was simply not appropriate or healthy to keep thousands of bored and listless men locked up in camps. During 1916, the

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. p. 33; Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), \textit{Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog} p. 32.
\textsuperscript{74} Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” Appendix 5, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{75} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 337. A copy of the “word-of-honour” declaration can be found in Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” Appendix 8, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{77} Roodt, \textit{Oorlogsgasten} p. 99.
\textsuperscript{78} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} pp. 332 - 333; Smit, \textit{Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel} pp. 32 - 33.
\textsuperscript{79} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 329; Smit, \textit{Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel}. p. 35; Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), \textit{Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog} p. 33; Roodt, \textit{Oorlogsgasten} p. 122.
Dutch agreed to let internees go to school - around 6,000 Flemish soldiers learned to read and write, while some attended universities in Delft, Wageningen and Utrecht.\textsuperscript{80} Others worked for normal wages, although there were some limitations on employment: often municipalities would only let internees do work for which there were no Dutch employees available and they definitely could not work in any war industry (for fear of violating neutrality).\textsuperscript{81} Mostly, internees filled labouring positions as coal miners, factory workers, and farm hands.\textsuperscript{82} They could live outside the main camps, although many remained under guard. For example, the owners of a zinc factory in Dorplein built a mini-internment camp, which housed anywhere between 50 and 100 internees at a time.\textsuperscript{83} In Eindhoven, around 350 Belgian internees working in the city stayed in barracks near the railyards in the township of Woensel. The internees had to pay for the privilege of staying at the barracks, but this was compensated by the advantage of earning a regular income. By September 1918, 11,432 internees (nearly 35 per cent of all interned Belgians) worked in small groups outside the main camps and another 3,012 (nine per cent) were employed individually, with the result that some camps closed down completely, including Gaasterland and Oldebroek.\textsuperscript{84} By November 1918, only Hardewijk was still fully operational.\textsuperscript{85}

Most of the workers were Belgians, who had fewer problems with the Dutch language than their British and German counterparts. Their employment opportunities only improved in April 1916, once the Belgian government guaranteed that any escaped internees would be returned to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{86} The declaration also allowed some to send for their families in Belgium and live at private addresses.\textsuperscript{87}

Even with the closing and scaling down of many internment camps, the military commitment to internees remained high. Before 1916, local troops (whether in the \textit{landstorm} or \textit{landweer}) tended to guard internment camps, which were deliberately built away from key strategic points, ensuring that few soldiers in front-line positions or in the

\textsuperscript{80} Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), \textit{Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog} p. 53.
\textsuperscript{81} Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Air Branch, 12 November 1914, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75; Treub, \textit{Oorlogsstijd} p. 170; Ritter, \textit{De Donkere Poort} Volume 1, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{82} Kleingeld, \textit{Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg} p. 29.
\textsuperscript{83} H. Jaspers, “Het interneringskamp in Dorplein” [The internment camp in Dorplein] \textit{Aa Kroniek}. 7, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 224 - 234.
\textsuperscript{84} Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), \textit{Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog} p. 64; Wielinga, “Military refugees in the Netherlands” no page numbers.
\textsuperscript{85} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 344.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid}. p. 331.
\textsuperscript{87} Winternans, \textit{Belgische vluchtelingen in Eindhoven} p. 55.
Field Army had to undertake guard duty. Retired officers usually supervised the camps, again with the hope of lessening the burden on the regular officer corps. Nevertheless, looking after 46,500 troops drained the Army’s resources. Hardewijk camp alone, with a capacity of around 8,000 internees, had nearly 1,000 guards and a number of Marechaussee assigned. With the employment of internees throughout the country, guards moved with them. At least one guard was assigned to groups of five to ten internees. Although it was unlikely that the internees would escape, daily checks still had to be made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>33,105 (incl. 405 officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British (normal)</td>
<td>1,751 (incl. 139 officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British (POW exchange)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (normal)</td>
<td>1,461 (incl. 66 officers and 2 ensigns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (POW exchange)</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8 (incl. 5 officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>4 (all officers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 46,829

The armed forces provided internees with uniforms, food and other supplies. Effectively, they assumed the care of nearly 50,000 men. Outfitting the Belgian troops was particularly taxing, as the Belgian government proved more reluctant to follow the examples of its British and German counterparts in sending uniforms and other provisions

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88 See: Appendix 7, p. 458.
89 See: Table 6, p. 179.
90 Erkens, *Tusschen oorlog en vrede* p. 33.
for their men. At times there was no choice but to clothe Belgians in second-hand Dutch uniforms. The internees placed extra strain upon the already over-extended Marechaussee as well, who were not only assigned to guard duty but were also responsible for hunting down escapees.

The substantial commitment involved in supervising internees begs the questions why the Netherlands accepted POW exchanges between Germany and Britain, and further, why they encouraged the internment of thousands of German and British POWs. Perhaps, as Evelyn de Roodt has suggested, the Dutch government committed itself to internment because it gave bargaining power for supplies from Germany and Britain. Although de Roodt dismissed altruism as a likely reason, the Dutch certainly appreciated the "good press" the internment of POWs gave them in belligerent nations. As Bent Blüdnikow and Carsten Due-Nielsen successfully argued with regard to Denmark, warring states saw neutrals reaping all the benefits from the war, without contributing to the war effort or suffering any of its horrific consequences. By looking after POWs, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, and the Netherlands could make themselves look humanitarian and useful. To a certain degree, POW exchanges justified their neutrality.

The first POW exchanges began in February 1915, when German wounded were transported from Allied ports to the port of Vlissingen and later Hoek van Holland, where they were placed on trains to Germany. At the same time, Allied wounded replaced the German soldiers on the ships, which returned to Britain. In July 1917, Germany and Britain signed an official agreement enabling the continued exchange of POWs across the Channel, an increasingly hazardous task since the declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare by Germany. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs also signed the agreement, confirming his government's co-operation in the exchanges. The agreement of 1917 also allowed several long-term POWs to be moved from their prisoner camps in Germany and Britain to specially-created internment areas in the Netherlands.

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93 Wolf, "International Law and Internment" p. 8.
94 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten p. 39.
95 Lier, "Intermering van vreemde militairen" pp. 54 - 55. See: Appendix 7, p. 458.
96 Roodt, "De uitwisseling en internering" p. 2.
98 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten pp. 274 - 278.
In all, the Dutch interned around 4,500 German and 6,000 British POWs. This was well below the 16,000 set at the British-German conference. One reason why the target was not reached had to do with the perils of sea travel - the war at sea precluded regular hospital ship crossings. More importantly, treacherous seas had a profound impact on food supplies within the Netherlands. Although both Germany and Britain promised to help feed internees, food shipments had trouble getting across the Channel. It was difficult enough for the Dutch to feed themselves, especially during the winter of 1917 and 1918 when rationing for civilians was especially harsh in the cities. The Dutch authorities did not feel they could guarantee the standard of nourishment for internees required by law, and therefore felt it unwarranted to take in more mouths to feed.

Eventually, the Dutch government decided to ration all internees at the same rate as Dutch civilians, including a bread allocation that was cut in April 1918 from 250 to 200 grammes per day. British authorities voiced their concerns and argued that their soldiers (unlike Dutch civilians) had great trouble supplementing their diet because they had little discretionary money. They hoped to settle the situation by sending more grain. The Dutch public already felt unenthusiastic towards the foreigners (because of the burden placed on resources) and for this reason alone, the government felt obligated to keep the internees’ ration on a par with its citizens. Internees in Hardewijk rioted later that year because of the lack of food. As we will see in Chapter 12, the precursors for this riot did not differ much from those of Dutch soldiers at the Harskamp barracks who rioted in October 1918, and who, incidentally, had a much larger ration apportioned to them than civilians and internees.

100 Klinkert, “Internering van vreemde militairen” pp. 2448 - 2449.
101 Oranjeboek: Mededelingen van den Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken aan de Staten-Generaal December 1916 - April 1918 pp. 77 - 78; Roodt, “De uitwisseling en internering” pp. 8 - 10.
102 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten p. 336.
103 For further information on rationing, see: Chapter 9, pp. 310 - 324.
104 Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, F. E. Posthuma, to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 January 1918; Central Bread Office (Centraal Brood Kantoor) to Head of the Service for Interned Prisoners of War, General-Major Onnen, 13 April 1918, both in ARA, “Archief van de Dienst der Geïnterneerde Krijgsgevangenen 1917 - 1919” [Archive of the Service of Interned Prisoners of War 1917 - 1919] entry no. 2.05.42, inventory no. 2.
105 Director of British Prisoners of War Department to Head of the Service for Interned Prisoners of War, 16 January 1918, in ARA, “Archief van de Dienst der Geïnterneerde Krijgsgevangenen 1917 - 1919” entry no. 2.05.42, inventory no. 2.
106 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten pp. 282 - 283.
The POW agreement in 1917 also permitted civilians, imprisoned as aliens in Germany and Britain, to move to the Netherlands. The military did not intern them and most lived like other refugees, looked after by civil authorities. A total of 7,800 wounded German POWs in Britain were also sent back to Germany across Dutch territory from December 1915 onwards, in exchange for 4,700 British soldiers who returned to Great Britain. These exchanges took place under Dutch military supervision, and were paid for by the Dutch government, in contrast to internment costs, which were to be reimbursed by the belligerent governments at the end of the war.

Another major category of POW entering the Netherlands during the war had escaped from camps in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Most of the escapees were British and Belgian, although around 4,000 Russians also found their way to the Dutch border. Generally, the British soldiers travelled home as did a number of Belgians. Dealing with the Russians was not as easy. Despite attempts to persuade them to leave, many Russians had no desire to do so, especially after the revolutions of 1917, nor did they wish to reside in Great Britain. The authorities reluctantly assigned them to municipalities, where locals were far from welcoming to the fugitives whom they saw as placing too great a strain on scarce accommodation, jobs and food. For this reason, from 1917 onwards, many of the ex-POWs were accommodated in empty internment barracks. The Russians lived at Gaasterland and Oldebroek, while a pocket remained in Rotterdam, much to the chagrin of their neighbours there. Other escaped POWs unwilling or unable to return home were also assigned to empty internment barracks: Serbs to Milligen; Portuguese, Polish and French to Amersfoort; and other Allied soldiers to Hardewijk, Nijmegen and Vlasakkers.

110 The Times History of the War Volume 13, 1917, p. 198.
112 Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” p. 92.
113 Roodt, “Vluchtelingen in Rotterdam” p. 201.
In the camps, they were treated like civilian refugees, although military personnel helped with the preparation of food, as well as with general supervision. 115

While the escaped POWs were burdensome, deserters from the German Army were much more troublesome. The historian, Susanne Wolf, has estimated that anything up to 20,000 German soldiers defected and made their way to the Netherlands between 1916 and 1918. 116 Unlike escaped POWs, the Dutch had no obligations to deserters, but they could not force them to return home, nor could they intern them. The military tried to deal with foreign deserters in a similar manner to escaped POWs. They were allocated to municipalities, although they had to pay their own way. Not surprisingly, the government was unwilling to pay the cost incurred in dealing with deserters; it had not asked them to come and only let them stay for humanitarian reasons. 117 While it recognised some responsibility to the deserters, it would not allow their family members into the Netherlands. 118 Yet the military learnt a vast amount about the German armies from deserters and in this respect they were an invaluable source of information. 119 For the same reason, the defectors often sold information to the Allies. To limit their potential as spies and smugglers, military authorities restricted the areas in which deserters could move. 120 By mid-1917, the foreigners posed such a problem that the government set up a special camp

115 For example: Commander of the Field Army to Commanders of Divisions III, IV and Cavalry Brigade and Commander in Limburg, 13 November 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 322.
116 Zanten and Kramers both estimated around 10,000 German deserters lived in the Netherlands during the war (J. H. Zanten, “De zorg voor vluchtelingen uit het buitenland tijdens den oorlog” [Care for refugees from abroad during the war] in Brugman (ed.), Nederland in den oorlogstijd. p. 352; Kramers, “Internering in Nederland 1914 - 1918” p. 23). Susanne Wolf believed the number was double that (Moore et. al., “The Netherlands and Sweden” p. 316). Another source pointed to 15,000 - 20,000 German deserters in the Netherlands by late 1917 (Anonymous, A German Deserter’s War Experience. (translated by J. Koettgen) New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1917, p. 188), while de Roodt suggested anything up to 80,000 deserters (Oorlogsgasten p. 242).
117 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 12 March 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 229.
118 Commander in Limburg to Commander of the Field Army, 20 March 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 330.
119 Information gathering was the responsibility of GS III. See: ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 325 for reports from deserters in 1918.
120 Nagelhout, “De toelating en internering van belligerente troepen” p. 22.
for them in Bergen.\textsuperscript{121} The camp filled so quickly that many had no choice but to reside outside it - causing further consternation among locals.\textsuperscript{122}

Because they received next to no help from the Dutch state or charitable organisations, some deserters lived in atrocious conditions. Van Terwisga uncovered a case of 14 impoverished deserters in Eindhoven in February 1917, who did not even own a change of clothes.\textsuperscript{123} Aside from the establishment of a camp at Bergen, the Dutch did very little for the foreigners. Citizens in Limburg even requested that deserters not be sent to them unless work was guaranteed before they arrived. There was a concern that public safety was at threat if large groups of unemployed strangers roamed the streets.\textsuperscript{124}

During the major advances on the Western Front in 1918, the Dutch expected another large influx of soldiers (internees, deserters and escaped POWs). This time, they were prepared and established two quarantine and processing stations at Venlo and Sittard.\textsuperscript{125} They processed all foreign military personnel, including deserters and escaped POWs at the stations, a procedure that included registration, health checks, quarantine (if necessary) and eventual internment or travel elsewhere in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{126} After a while, Venlo’s quarantine station became responsible solely for German and Austria-Hungarian deserters.\textsuperscript{127} Unlike October 1914, however, another internnee epidemic did not eventuate.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{121} Commander in Limburg to Commander of the Field Army, 10 July 1917; Commander of Koninklijke Marechaussee Division 1 to Commander of the Field Army, 14 February 1917, both in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 229; Nagelhout, “De toelating en internering van belligerente troepen” p. 23.
\textsuperscript{122} Commander in Limburg to Commander of the Field Army, 25 August 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 229.
\textsuperscript{123} Commander in Limburg to Commander of the Field Army, 10 February 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 229.
\textsuperscript{124} Commander Koninklijke Marechaussee Division 2 to Commander of the Field Army, 22 May 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 229.
\textsuperscript{125} Commander in Limburg to Commander of the Field Army, 10 July 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 229; Commander of the Field Army, Report, July 1918, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
\textsuperscript{126} Author unknown, “Voorbereidingsmaatregelen voor de M.G.D. met het oog op een intocht van burgervluchtelingen, deserteurs en te interneren troepen, over de Zuidgrens” [Preparatory measures for the M.G.D. (Military Medical Service) with eye on the arrival across the southern border of civilian refugees, deserters and internable troops] 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 372.
\textsuperscript{127} Commander Division IV, “Verslag ingevolge art. 6 van de Wet van 23 Mei 1899 (staatsblad No 128 betreffende de uitoefening van het Militair Gezag in de provinciën Noord-Brabant, Limburg en Gelderland bezuiden van den Boven- Rijn (voor een deel ook wel “Bijlandsche Kanaal” geheeten) en de Waal, buiten het gebied der Stellingen en afzonderlijke Forten, alsmede in de Gemeente Standdaardbuiten en Zevenbergen en in het gedeelte van de Gemeente Rilland- Bath, gelegen op den Noord-Brabantseel val van de Ooster- en Wester- Schelde” [Report corresponding to Article 6 of the law of 23 May 1899 (Staatsblad no. 128) regarding the exercise of Military Authority in the provinces North Brabant, Limburg and Gelderland south of the Higher Rhine (in part also known as the “Bijlandsche Kanaal”) and the Waal, outside the areas of the fortifications and lone-standing forts, as well as the
INTERNED GOODS

Based on the international principle that a neutral state could not be used to supply a belligerent with war materials, all military equipment belonging to a warring party had to be interned when it reached neutral territory. This meant that alongside interning soldiers, the Dutch armed forces captured and interned all accompanying weaponry and equipment. Likewise, any war materials that somehow found their way into the Netherlands, including warships, aeroplanes, stranded mines, even combatants’ horses, were liable for internment.

Everything had to be catalogued, carefully stored, and, in the case of horses, fed, housed, exercised and watered. The items were stockpiled in military warehouses in Geertruidenberg and Delft. The horses were a little harder to accommodate. Troops looked after most of the animals in large stables in Utrecht and Breda. At the end of the war, the Netherlands was obliged to return the equipment and animals to the nation of origin, although the belligerents were obliged to pay for the upkeep of the goods. Troops also had to carefully guard interned goods, especially aeroplanes, in case of espionage. Germany believed, correctly as it turned out, that the Allies would learn about its aircraft design by spying on interned aeroplanes. Although they proved cumbersome to guard, the captured aircraft did provide a unique opportunity for the fledgling Air Branch. Over a hundred foreign aeroplanes, including bombers and seaplanes landed in Dutch territory municipalities of Standdaardbuiten en Zevenbergen and in part of the municipality Rilland Bath situated on the North-Brabant wall of the East and West Schelde River] 5 May 1920, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708.

Chapter 12, pp. 433 – 436, looks at the crossing of 50,000 German soldiers through Limburg out of Belgium in November 1918, and why the Dutch did not intern the troops.

Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 165.

See: Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” for a long list of Belgian goods interned during the war (Appendix IX, p. 132).

Lieutenant-General Forbes Wels to Commander-in-Chief, 17 October 1914, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75; Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 161.


Article 12 of “1907 Hague Convention V” in Roberts. et. al. (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War p. 64; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister in Charge of the Navy, 13 October 1914, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 39.

during the war,\(^{135}\) enabling the Dutch to learn something about advances in aeroplane construction, aerial warfare, and bombing techniques.

Another advantage of internment was that the Dutch military managed to buy interned goods and animals, including aeroplanes and horses, from the belligerents.\(^ {136}\) Mostly, the cost of the purchases was credited to the belligerents who used the credit to pay for the upkeep of their soldiers in internment camps in the Netherlands.\(^ {137}\) Since the average interned aircraft sold for f2,000, it was a profitable exchange for all concerned.\(^ {138}\) In fact, the purchase of belligerent equipment was contrary to international law, as a neutral could not lend or give money to warring states. Buying equipment that the combatants could no longer use was interpreted as issuing a monetary loan.\(^ {139}\) Presumably, because all the major powers agreed to the sale, and because the Dutch bought from each side, no one objected to the breach of neutrality. In fact, France even offered an aeroplane as a gift to the Dutch in 1915, which they rejected on grounds of neutrality.\(^ {140}\)

Another advantage of internment was that the Dutch could retain the items until the combatants settled all outstanding internment accounts.\(^ {141}\) In 1924, Germany sold most of the weapons, ships and aeroplanes that the Dutch interned during the war, and with this revenue paid for the internment of soldiers.\(^ {142}\) Belgium took much longer to pay its internment accounts, the final payment for internment not being received until 1936.\(^ {143}\) Given the thousands of Belgian soldiers in the Netherlands during the war, it was no small wonder that it took their government so long to settle its debts.

Generally, the internment of soldiers and goods did not cause any problems with the belligerents. They tended to be fully supportive of the neutral’s right to intern. However, occasionally, matters were not so straightforward. The Dutch interned four German U-boats


\(^{137}\) Private correspondence with Susanne Wolf, May 2000.

\(^{138}\) Geldhof, 70 Jaar Marinelauchvaardtienst p. 9.


\(^{140}\) Oranjeboek: Overzicht der voornaamste van Juli 1914 tot Oktober 1915 p. 35.


\(^{142}\) The costs of upkeep of internment camps can be found in ARA, “Archieven van de Koninklijke Landmacht, c. 1850 - c. 1940” [Archives of the Royal Netherlands’ Army, c. 1850 - c. 1940] entry no. 2.13.45, (temporary) inventory no. 1801 (2).

\(^{143}\) Kramers, “Internering in Nederland 1914 - 1918” p. 32.
during the war. In 1917, the Germans fiercely contested the capture of two of the submarines because their entry into Dutch territorial waters was entirely accidental. One U-boat lost its way in the mist, while UB-30 stranded on a beach near Domburg. When the Dutch authorities would not release the submarines, the Germans threatened to extend its warzone into Dutch territorial waters. High Command believed the impasse was serious enough to warrant cancelling leave to soldiers. They only refrained for fear of antagonising Germany. Eventually, an international committee solved the U-boat issue and decided that one of the two submarines should be given back to Germany, while the other should remain in the Netherlands until the end of the war. The two neighbours acquiesced in the decision and another neutrality crisis passed.

AN EVACUATION WITHOUT PRECEDENT

As the German armies advanced into Belgium on 4 August 1914, fearful Belgian residents fled from the onslaught to the nearest safe haven. In the first few weeks, around 100,000 Belgians sought refuge in the Netherlands, crossing the border into Limburg and North Brabant. As the war front moved further west, most of these refugees returned home. In these same weeks, another group of displaced foreigners found their way to the Dutch-Belgian border, namely German and Austro-Hungarian expatriates, forced out of Belgium by the authorities there. Their stay was also short. Most travelled on to Germany and Austria-Hungary as soon as they could. The refugees brought the reality of war home to the Dutch; they also initiated the first large-scale humanitarian responses. However, nothing prepared the Dutch for the masses of refugees that fled Antwerp after 7 October, an

144 Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeemacht” p. 59.
146 Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeemacht” p. 59.
147 Wintermans, Belgische vluchtelingen p. 11.
148 Utrecht en de Oorlogstoestand p. 130; Bos-Rops, “De Commissaris en de vluchtelingen” p. 105; Susanne Wolf estimated the number of German refugees entering the Netherlands in the first few weeks of war at 8,000 (private correspondence, June 1998); Zanten puts the number of German refugees escaping Belgium at around 60,000 to 80,000 of which many, but by no means all, travelled through the Netherlands (“De zorg voor vluchtelingen” p. 325); Evelyn de Roodt has used Zanten’s figures (Oorlogsgasten p. 138).
exodus described by one historian as “an evacuation without precedent in the recent history of western Europe”.\textsuperscript{149}

While they were responsible for the internment of foreign military personnel, the armed forces had no obligations to civilian refugees, regarding them as more of a nuisance than anything else. But since border guards were usually the first Dutchers refugees encountered, it was almost inevitable that they became involved in the refugee problem. Before October 1914, and where possible, the guards moved refugees to the nearest municipality where locals took over their care. During the exodus out of Antwerp, however, they had no choice but to help. In fact, the Dutch government did not hold itself accountable for Belgian refugees either, at least until it was forced to do so by the sheer scale and immensity of the crisis in October.\textsuperscript{150} Even after the crisis, the government helped foreigners in an \textit{ad hoc} manner, only when, and if, support was needed. Provincial and local councils had a similar attitude. They did their utmost to help the newcomers, but did not see it as an inherent responsibility.\textsuperscript{151}

Once in the Netherlands, the mass of evacuees posed a logistical and humanitarian nightmare. The lucky ones managed to find shelter in homes, farms, school buildings, churches and railway carriages; thousands more slept in the open air.\textsuperscript{152} Between 8 and 10 October, 16,000 Bergen op Zoom residents took 50,000 strangers into their homes. Nearby, in Roosendaal, 50,000 Belgians slept crammed into the houses of 17,000 locals. Throughout the south, the populations of towns were doubled and tripled overnight.\textsuperscript{153}

The military with its well-established supply network and personnel, was indispensable in providing primary care to the refugees. Troops shifted refugees, organised food supplies, cooked meals, provided medical care, and set up temporary shelters.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{150} See: Heuvel-Strasser “Vluchtelingenzorg of vreemdelingenbeleid” pp. 184 - 204.
\textsuperscript{151} Bos-Rops, “De Commissaris en de vluchtelingen” p. 108.
\textsuperscript{152} Telegram from Commander-in-Chief to Provincial Governor in ’s Hertogenbosch, 10 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.
\textsuperscript{153} Heuvel-Strasser, “Vluchtelingenzorg of vreemdelingenbeleid” p. 190.
\textsuperscript{154} “Overzicht van hetgeen in het gebied der IIIde Divisie door den Militairen Geneeskundigen Dienst is verricht, in verband met de aanwezigheid van de uit België hier te lande binnengekomen vluchtelingen” [Overview of the services rendered by the Military Medical Service in Division III’s area, in relation to the presence of refugees coming into the country from Belgium] 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1; W. P. Wolffenperger, “Onze Militair-Geneeskundige Dienst en de vluchtelingen” [Our military-medical service and the refugees] \textit{Militair-Geneeskundig Tijdschrift}. 19, 1915, pp. 44 - 51.
Where they were not needed for care of internees, Marechaussee officers travelled to Zeeland and North Brabant to help maintain public order in the overflowing border towns. The military was responsible for the transportation of trains, automobiles, and horse-drawn carriages to cities throughout the country, where mayors allocated refugees into surrounding communities. Within a few days, 719,100 Belgians had found accommodation in 831 municipalities (out of a total of 1,120).

Moving, feeding and housing the refugees was a massive undertaking, requiring complete co-operation between municipalities, the military and government. On 8 October 1914, cabinet ministers appointed Charles J. M. Ruys de Beerenbrouck (future Minister President, 1918 - 1925) as special Commissar for Refugees in Zeeland and North Brabant. The Commissar was to liaise between those needing help (mainly mayors and municipal councils) and those providing help (charitable organisations and the armed forces).

Hundreds more volunteer associations and charities appeared overnight to provide support for the evacuees. All their requests for food, blankets, medicine and other supplies from the military had to be approved by the Commissar first. It was far from an efficient system and delays often ensued when mayors went straight to the local military commander for help, who could do nothing until he received authorisation from Ruys de Beerenbrouck.

Outside Zeeland and North Brabant, provincial governors were responsible for the refugees. Like Ruys de Beerenbrouck, they acted as intermediaries between agencies requiring help and those able to assist. However, unlike North Brabant and Zeeland, the military offered aid to refugees in the rest of the country on a much smaller scale. While in the south, the military involved itself in almost all aspects of refugee care, further north, the

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155 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, 13 October 1914; Telegram Commander Division III to Commander-in-Chief, 9 October 1914; Telegram Territorial Commander in Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 16 October 1914, all in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74; Commander Division III to Commander of the Field Army, 9 October 1914, ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151.
156 Minister of Internal Affairs, P. W. A. Cort van der Linden, to Commander-in-Chief, 19 October 1914, in ARA, “Geheim en Kabinetsarchief van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1814 - 1949” inventory no. 2.04.26.02, entry no. 690.
157 Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, pp. 138 - 140.
160 Ibid.
161 Minister of Internal Affairs to all Provincial Governors, 10 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.
responsibility was almost entirely that of town and city councils.\textsuperscript{162} Outside the epicentre of the crisis, civilians could deal better with the foreigners. They had plenty of warning and received manageable numbers.

In comparison to its commitment to internees, High Command was extremely reluctant for the armed forces to get involved in the refugee situation. Already on 9 October, Snijders decided to limit military involvement in helping the foreigners. He sent a telegram to the Commander of Division III, van Terwisga, that civilians were not a military priority, and to direct mayors wanting help with their refugees to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or provincial governors.\textsuperscript{163} That same day, Bulhman, Commander of the Field Army, ordered that troops should only accompany very large transports of refugees.\textsuperscript{164} Ten days later, the military removed itself even further, when Snijders refused to let troops guard and cook for the Belgians. The Army would still transport food supplies, but nothing else. He exclaimed that it was time for civilians to take over and that the refugees should now be able to help themselves.\textsuperscript{165}

Snijders' apparent lack of compassion was based on very practical strategic grounds. Firstly, the refugees posed a security threat: they clogged transport routes, thereby hindering military movements and making it extremely difficult to evacuate southern areas in the event of invasion. Secondly, assigning soldiers to refugee duties took them away from far more important roles such as manning borders and fortifications. Thirdly, Snijders had to consider the practicalities of feeding so many extra mouths. It placed an added burden on supplies demanding conservation if the country came under attack. Grave supply problems were unavoidable if the Netherlands had to evacuate Belgian exiles as well as Dutch civilians into Fortress Holland.\textsuperscript{166}

The refugees also posed a potential problem for the maintenance of public order. Snijders received reports from around the country about the difficulties caused by the refugees. For example, the Group Commander in Gorinchem wrote that 700 Belgians

\footnotesize{162} Territorial Commander in Overijssel to Commander-in-Chief, 11 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.
\footnotesize{163} Telegram from Commander-in-Chief to Commander of Division III, 9 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.
\footnotesize{164} Commander of the Field Army to all commanders under his authority, 9 October 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151.
\footnotesize{165} Commander-in-Chief to Provincial Governor in South Holland, 19 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.
\footnotesize{166} Utrecht en de Oorlogstoestand p. 133.
billeted with locals in his area were proving irritating. According to the commander, the refugees made it difficult to adequately defend the military position that formed part of the New Holland Waterline, although he did not specify why. He also feared that female refugees were compromising his troops as some desperately poor Belgian women tried to earn by prostitution. Snijders ordered his commanders to prevent their men from seeking out prostitutes. Eventually, the Minister of Internal Affairs urged mayors to send any suspected prostitutes to isolation barracks at Nunspeet refugee camp.

Both Snijders and his government hoped that the refugees would not stay for long. The costs involved in caring for them made all attempts to send them back to Belgium attractive. An opportunity appeared on 10 October 1914, when a correspondent for the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* (*New Rotterdam Paper, NRC*) notified the government that the German commander in Antwerp had made a public proclamation allowing residents to return. On 12 October, Snijders agreed to send a military envoy to Antwerp, which met German commanders that afternoon to co-ordinate the return of refugees. On 13 October, Dutch newspapers published the German proclamation, which guaranteed the safety of Antwerpers. Over the following days, Dutch officers continued to facilitate the return of Antwerp’s residents with the German authorities and the Dutch government agreed to pay for all train travel out of the Netherlands.

Belgians were exceedingly reluctant to go back to Antwerp. The Dutch authorities had to entice and eventually coerce them. Rumours about Germans indiscriminately rounding up young Belgian men were put to rest, as were claims that the Germans were

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167 Group Commander Gorinchem (New Holland Waterline) to Commander-in-Chief, 14 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
170 Minister of Internal Affairs to Commander-in-Chief, 13 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.
171 The timetable for the return of refugees is found in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151. See also: ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1; Munnekredie, “De mobilisatie van de landmacht” p. 38; Heuvel-Strasser, *Vluchtingenzorg of vreemdelingenbeleid* pp. 192 - 194.
172 Commander-in-Chief to Commander Division III, 12 October 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151.
burning villages to the ground.\textsuperscript{174} As of 18 October, civic representatives from Antwerp held meetings with refugees in Breda, Roosendaal, Bergen op Zoom and Hoogerheide to reassure them that the city was safe.\textsuperscript{175} They also gave refugees the opportunity to travel on to Britain, after the British government offered to take many refugees off Dutch hands.\textsuperscript{176} Soon, the government urged mayors to use “\textit{zachte drang}” (mild pressure) to move the foreigners.\textsuperscript{177} Although officially the Netherlands did not force refugees to leave, unofficially mayors exercised “mild pressure” in a variety of ways: some gave refugees an ultimatum, some requested them to leave, while others left refugees no choice when the municipality refused to feed them.\textsuperscript{178}

Refugees began returning to Belgium in large numbers from 16 October 1914 onwards. Those who stayed in the Netherlands fit into three categories: relatively wealthy individuals who could pay their own way; “well-deserving” middle-class persons who lost everything in the war; and poverty-stricken Belgians.\textsuperscript{179} The Dutch government gave the \textit{pauvre honteux} (well-deserving) a small allowance, enough to enable them to stay in the country and live like Dutch citizens. In sharp contrast, it tried to absolve itself of responsibility for penniless refugees. Government policy dictated that dependent persons were not free and should not enjoy the freedoms of self-sufficient individuals.\textsuperscript{180} All “undeserving” refugees were given the option of residing in a refugee camp or returning home. The prospect of living in a dreary camp with little freedom was enough for many to try their luck back in Belgium.\textsuperscript{181} In spite of a declaration of hospitality given by the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{174} Commander-in-Chief to Commander Division III, 12 October 1914; Chief of Division III Staff, “Rapport aan den Divisiecommandant” 15 October 1914; Commander Division III to Commander of the Field Army, 25 October 1914, all in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151.
\item \textsuperscript{175} The timetable for the return of refugees, 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Cahalan, \textit{Belgian Refugee Relief in England} pp. 119 - 120, 123; Wintermans, \textit{Belgische vluchtelingen in Eindhoven} p. 21; Tallier, “De Belgische vluchtelingen” p. 24.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), \textit{Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog} pp. 25 - 26.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Officer of Health, Dr. F. H. Hehewerth, report to the Commander Division III, 27 October 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 372; Hasselt, “Belgische vluchtelingen in Roosendaal” p. 109.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Zanten, “De zorg voor vluchtelingen” pp. 337 - 339; Flier, \textit{War Finances} p. 57; Bos-Rops, “De Commissaris en de vluchtelingen” p. 108.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Bossenbroek et. al. (eds.), \textit{Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog} p. 28.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 29 August 1914; Commander of the Field Army to Commander Cavalry Brigade, 12 September 1914, both in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151; Garrison Commander Maastricht to Commander of the Field Army, 1 September 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 148.
\end{itemize}
government in September 1914, the precedent for forcing refugees out of the country was set around that time. On 4 September 1914, Buhlman had explained to Snijders that any refugees who refused to go to a camp “can, in case they definitely refuse to go there, be sent across the border”.183

Although thousands of refugees returned to Belgium, new groups of refugees continued to enter the Netherlands as well. Between 20 October and 27 December 1914, nearly 250,000 refugees living in North Brabant went back to Belgium. In the same time span, another 30,000 entered the province.184 Often the new refugees were not fleeing fighting areas, but saw greater opportunities in the Netherlands than in Belgium. Snijders asked the cabinet if he could close the border temporarily to stop these Belgians, whom he refused to class as true refugees, from entering the country.185 The government rejected his request.

By January 1915, around 100,000 Belgians still lived in refugee camps at Uden, Ede, Nunspeet, Gouda and Veenhuizen.186 Their numbers remained steady for the rest of the war. From this time on, the military commitment to the refugees was minimal. Koninklijke Marechaussee did guard camps, often helped by half a dozen regular troops.187 At Nunspeet and Roosendaal camps, soldiers guarded the quarantine rooms (for diseased refugees) as well as the quarters for prostitutes.188 At first, the military police and guards were responsible to the local military commander, but this was soon transferred to the Minister of Internal Affairs, who was accountable for the running of the camps.189 The only real commitment the military still had for refugees was at the borders. Between 1915 and

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182 Bossenbroek et al. (eds.), Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog p. 23.
183 “[Z]ullen, in geval zij beslist weigeren derwaarts te gaan, over de grenzen kunnen worden gezet” (Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 4 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74). Minister of War to Provincial Governor in North Brabant, 14 September 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151.
184 Series of daily telegrams from Commander Division III to Commander of the Field Army, 20 October to 27 December 1914, with numbers of refugees entering and leaving the country, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 151.
187 Schaverbeke, “Vluchttoord Nunspeet” p. 3.
188 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Internal Affairs, 28 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1; Heuvel-Strasser, “Vluchtelingenzorg of vreemdelingenbeleid” p. 196; Schaverbeke, “Vluchttoord Nunspeet” p. 4.
189 Treub, Oorlogstijd p. 151.
mid-1918, Belgians sought entry into the Netherlands for reasons other than those of August and October 1914: some wanted to join the Allied armies; others fled fearing expatriation to forced labour camps in Germany; many hoped for better living conditions in the Netherlands; and around 6,500 of them wanted to live near interned family members. Crossings into the Netherlands were greatly hindered when Germany closed the Dutch-Belgian border in November 1914, and became even more perilous after Germany built an electric fence along the frontier in 1915.

Dutch border guards did show an interest in a particular group of “refugees”, namely those Belgian men travelling through the Netherlands to get to Britain. Neutral territory could not be used as a base for recruiting belligerent troops, nor could it be used to transit such troops. German diplomats raised this issue with their Dutch counterparts on a number of occasions, each time claiming that Belgian consulates in the Netherlands were targeting male refugees and paying for their passage to Britain. Newspapers reported similar transgressions. It was difficult for the Netherlands to police the breach of neutrality. In October 1914, refugees had boarded ships to Britain completely unopposed and few controls existed at ports to ensure everybody departing the country was eligible to do so. In November, the government asked municipal councils to keep an eye out for groups of men leaving the country. Two months later, Snijders ordered his subordinates to investigate all male refugees and foreigners leaving for Britain. This was done in cooperation with civilian authorities (mainly customs police). However, only if it could be

191 Telegram Divisional Commander of Koninklijke Marechaussee in ’s Hertogenbosch to Commander-in-Chief, 8 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74; Zanten, “De zorg voor vluchtelingen” p. 348. For more information, see: Chapter 8, pp. 275 - 283.
193 For example: German Minister in The Hague to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 October 1914; Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 2 November 1914; Minister of Internal Affairs to Commander-in-Chief, 26 November 1914, all in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75. See also: ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Navy in Willemsoord, 22 December 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37; Charpentier, “De leniging van de nood der Belgische vluchtelingen” p. 54.
195 Utrecht en de Oorlogstoestand p. 137.
196 Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 15 January 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 279.
proven that the men were recruited were the Dutch able to detain them. As a result, most movements by Belgians to Britain went ahead unhindered.

Map 16: Refugee camps (dark grey) and grensconcentratieplaatsen (light grey)
(Source: Commander of the Field Army to Commanders of Divisions III and IV, Cavalry Brigade, and Limburg, 16 October 1918, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger", entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 372)

In 1918, the General Staff prepared a plan of action in case the war forced another refugee exodus upon the Netherlands. This time, the Dutch would not have adequate supplies of food, blankets, medicine, or fuel to look after and transport the evacuees. In the

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197 Telegram from Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Zeeland, 5 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37.
course of planning, Snijders toyed with the idea of moving refugees straight to Vlissingen where ships could take them to the Allied side of the Western Front. Ultimately, he authorised the establishment of *grensconcentratieplaatsen* (literally “border concentration sites”), which had many of the same functions as the processing posts for foreign soldiers. All refugees were sent to one of the *grensconcentratieplaatsen* for a Red Cross medical check and registration by military personnel, before they travelled on to those municipalities able to feed and house them. He also made plans to use empty internment camps for refugees, although reiterating that Dutch troops would not be responsible for looking after any refugees for more than ten days.

Not until the last few months of war was the Netherlands encumbered with another refugee problem. From September 1918 onwards, around 40,000 French and Belgian civilians fled the war front in Northern France and Belgium as the Allied armies forced a German retreat. The refugees came in small enough numbers to be manageable. Although the Army ran the *grensconcentratieplaatsen* and regulated refugee transports, relief committees and the government provided all food and other supplies. Once the refugees reached their billets - they could not be sent to the cities because food shortages in 1918 were severe - the military involvement ceased and civilians took over. As planned, some of the refugees ended up in unused internment camps. For example, Gaasterland housed 1,000 French men, women and children.

The refugee relief effort came at considerable cost to the Dutch taxpayer. On 9 October 1914, the government made f100,000 available to pay for any expenses incurred by the municipalities. This was supposed to act as a supplement to money donated by

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198 Commander-in-Chief, “Nota betreffende het vluchtenlingen-vraagstuk” [Note regarding the refugee question] 24 October 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
200 Commander-in-Chief to T. G. D. L. [?], 17 October 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlager” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 372.
201 Officially 40,000 French refugees were registered in the Netherlands in 1918 (Zanten, “De zorg voor vluchtelingen” p. 350; Flier, *War Finances* p. 60; Roodt, *Oorlogsgasten* p. 346). According to Evelyn de Roodt, it is very possible that anything up to 20,000 more unregistered refugees could have found their way into the country as well (*Oorlogsgasten* p. 346).
202 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 18 October 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlager” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 372.
203 Commander of the Field Army to Commanders of Division III, IV and Cavalry Brigade, Commander in Limburg, 16 October 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlager” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 372.
204 Roodt, *Oorlogsgasten* p. 45.
charities. On 28 October, the sum was raised to £3 million. By the end of the war, care of refugee civilians cost the state £42 million, a huge sum even in today’s terms. The costs were simply too high for private institutions to cover. Unlike France, which claimed a phenomenal 400 million francs from Belgium for care of refugees during the war, the Dutch never asked Belgium for compensation. However, they did intend to send France a bill for looking after its refugees.

CONCLUSION

In part because it expected the war to be over quickly, the Dutch military underestimated how highly arduous upholding neutrality would be. The human and material resources involved in successfully implementing neutrality regulations, especially with regard to internment, placed a great strain on its capabilities. Combined with ongoing responsibilities for non-military matters, such as civilian refugees and, as we will see, smuggling, the armed forces struggled to keep enough soldiers mobilised for strategic ends. Yet the government kept assigning greater responsibility to the armed forces for maintaining both internal and external neutrality as well as public order. As a result, the Commander-in-Chief could no longer sustain the tenuous balance between defence and neutrality, which tilted overwhelmingly in favour of the latter.

205 Provincial Governor to all mayors in South Holland, 23 October 1914, in SAD, “Commissie voor de aankoop van levensmiddelen voor belgische vluchtelingen 1914 - 1919” [Commission for the acquisition of foodstuffs for Belgian refugees 1914 - 1919] archive no. 144, inventory no. 1; Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Documenten voor de Economische Crisis 1914, p. 261.


207 Kramers, “Internering in Nederland 1914 - 1918” p. 23. This is in sharp contrast to another author who asserts that France did not ask to be compensated for looking after Belgian refugees (Tallier, “De Belgische vluchtelingen” p. 30).

208 Provincial Governor to all mayors in the South Holland, 18 December 1918, in SAD, “Commissie voor de aankoop van levensmiddelen” archive no. 144, inventory no. 2.
Territorial Neutrality is Not Enough: The Military and Economic Neutrality

The neutrality of the Netherlands was not a shield which could ward off all the evil chances of the War. Her importations were greatly hampered by the radical change in the relations between supply and demand. There was no longer any question of world-market, world-production, world-consumption, or any approach to a system of distribution organized by world-commerce.

F. E. Posthuma

According to the historian Nils Örvik, the “essence of the neutral problem can in fact be compressed into one gross oversimplification”, namely the complicated issue of trade. A major reason why the Netherlands and other European states opted for neutrality in the nineteenth century was to enjoy the commercial benefits it provided in wartime. The Declaration of Paris in 1856 was one of the first international laws that recognised the immunity of goods aboard neutral ships. It also legalised the principle of contraband, and thereby restricted neutral trade only in terms of “articles destined for a belligerent state which are useful for the conduct of war and which an opposing belligerent has declared shall not be carried to that belligerent”. Yet a serious deficiency of the Paris Declaration was that it did not specify contraband items. During deliberations in London between 1908 and 1909, representatives of all the major powers (Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia) attempted to rectify this shortcoming by

1 “[I]l ne suffit pas de la neutralité territoriale: il faut aussi la neutralité politique et économique” (A. Gervais, according to the Dutch Minister in Paris, A. L. E. Stuers, writing to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 August 1914, in Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 8).
3 Örvik, The Decline of Neutrality p. 12.
4 Roberts. et. al. (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War p. 23.
creating a list of goods defined as “absolute” and “conditional” contraband. Although most of the nations present in London signed the agreement, many of their governments subsequently did not ratify it, which had serious consequences for neutral commerce during the Great War.

While neutrals wished to maintain peaceful trade relations with warring and non-belligerent states alike, belligerents were concerned with isolating their enemies in every way possible. The aspirations of the belligerents often clashed with those of their non-warring neighbours. Although neutrals could (and did) turn to international law when their economic neutrality was inhibited, compared with the principles of territorial integrity and impartiality, the economic rights and obligations embedded in neutrality were only weakly defined. Consequently, neutrals had to demarcate the boundaries of their economic sovereignty. The Hague Conventions guaranteed that they could use whatever means necessary to guarantee their neutral position. This allowed considerable latitude, but meant that belligerents could exert intensive pressure on them as well. As they tended to be weaker states, neutrals often had little option other than to abide by parameters of economic neutrality set by the warring parties.

The belligerent nations took economic warfare to new heights between 1914 and 1918, grossly compromising the rights of neutrals in the process. In the first year of war, though, the impact of economic warfare was little more than a nuisance. Britain’s “business as usual” policy ensured that blockade measures were gradual and ad hoc, while Germany took every opportunity to trade as freely with neutrals as possible. However, in subsequent years, neutrals lost almost complete control over their own trade. By November 1918, warring states disregarded even the vague contraband definitions set by the Paris Declaration. Instead, they declared all merchant traffic to and from enemy territory illegal and liable for seizure. Neutrals lost their claim to open seas, “continuous journey”, and free markets.

The belligerents were able to interfere so blatantly with economic neutrality because they could impose their will on most neutrals. Often, and this was especially true of the Netherlands, neutral states lacked the commercial and financial resources to place

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corresponding pressure on the warring parties, although there were exceptions. For example, Sweden was a neutral with considerable economic power, at least until the outbreak of the Russian revolutions in 1917. Apart from being one of Europe’s main suppliers of iron ore and coal, its territory presented the only over-land trade route for the Allies to Russia (since Turkey had closed off the Dardanelles). Consequently, Sweden could guarantee its valuable iron ore trade with Germany as long as the Allies required its territory to transit goods to Russia.\textsuperscript{11} If the Allies tried to curb its trade with the Central Powers, Sweden simply refused to let Allied wares through. Of course, once Russia left the war, the Allies stopped being so accommodating and Swedish exports to Germany decreased significantly.

It was doubtful a belligerent would go to war with a neutral for commercial reasons, an explanation for why a warring state could bring a great amount of pressure to bear on a neutral before its enemy retaliated with military force. But, as we will see, there were limits. While the warring states often denied the rights of neutrals to trade, both the Allied and Central Powers set their own contraband rules and expected neutrals to abide by them. To a certain degree, the Netherlands could negotiate and compromise its commercial relationship with each side and had its own bargaining levers. It could embargo exports from its colonies to Germany, the United States and Great Britain, or put a stop to Belgium’s relief effort.\textsuperscript{12} Both the Allies and Central Powers relied on imports of tin, rice, rubber and quinine from the Dutch East Indies. Britain also depended on margarine imports from the Netherlands itself, presenting another negotiation tool for the Dutch.\textsuperscript{13} However, on the whole, the Dutch were limited in their trade negotiations because they relied heavily on supplies of raw materials from Germany (mainly coal, steel and iron) and from overseas (foodstuffs, fertilizers and grain).\textsuperscript{14} Reductions in supply endangered the economic health, agricultural productivity, and industrial capacities of the country.

A declaration of war remained a possible outcome whenever trade negotiations broke down. The Dutch could never be sure that their neutrality was safe if they argued too vigorously for their rights. When mixed with other issues, it could be the final ingredient

\textsuperscript{14} Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” pp. 107 - 108.
transforming a manageable diplomatic situation into a dangerous cocktail, bringing the Netherlands to the brink of war. Hence, the government had little choice but to monitor the commercial activities of its citizens during the war.  

**ENDEAVOURING TO STARVE GERMANY: 16**

**THE NETHERLANDS AND THE ALLIED BLOCKADE**

The Netherlands signed and ratified the London Declaration in 1909, and was willing to implement both “conditional” and “absolute” contraband measures on the eve of war. The neutrality declarations of August 1914 warned all skippers that the state would accept no responsibility if they did not heed contraband regulations. Within a year, however, the Allies and Central Powers had interfered with Dutch trade above and beyond the conditions of the Declaration of London, and merchants were in peril of losing much more than their cargo if they were to breach the new rules.

The Allies blockaded Germany and Austria-Hungary from afar, patrolling entrances to the North Sea, the English Channel and the Mediterranean, searching all intercepted vessels entering these waters for contraband, and preventing those carrying goods to the Central Powers from reaching their destination. A British Order in Council on 20 August 1914 provisionally accepted the London Declaration, although it added a number of other items to the contraband list. On 29 October 1914, another Order in Council required documentation for all neutral shipments, including the ultimate destination for the cargo. In doing so, the Allies transferred the burden of proof, which according to international law was the responsibility of the blockading nation, to the merchant. If merchants did not satisfactorily account for their products, Britain and France would simply not allow them through. At the same time, the two nations extended

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17 See: Appendix 5, p. 455.
the contraband list well beyond what the London Declaration officially allowed. The restrictions did not bode well for neutrals.

In March 1915, Britain further tightened its control over neutral sea-borne trade when it assumed all ships had an enemy destination, unless captains proved otherwise. Merchants had to provide guarantees that their goods would be used for domestic consumption and would not be exported to Germany. Initially, products from the East and West Indies were exempted, but within a few months all colonial imports were restricted to pre-war levels. In September 1915, the Allies also set quotas on imports from other neutral nations. In July 1916, Britain and France withdrew official recognition of the Declaration of London and deemed all cargo as bound for the enemy, unless a neutral government or recognised trade federation guaranteed its domestic consumption.

The Netherlands protested against every blockade measure on the grounds that it interfered with its right to free trade. Not surprisingly, these objections achieved little. Instead, the Dutch had to adjust their trading practices to the wishes of the Allies. As early as September 1914, industry and trade representatives created a Commission for Trade, with the aim of regulating merchant traffic and avoiding the adverse effects of the restrictions. In November 1914, this body developed into the Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij (Netherlands' Overseas Trust Company, or NOT). The NOT was a private company that hoped to negotiate shipping agreements with the belligerents. It had no official links with the government although it enjoyed the cabinet's tacit approval. Ministers did not want to involve themselves in lengthy and potentially damaging discussions with either warring party. It hoped to hide behind the façade of complete economic impartiality and (at least until the end of 1916) left all import negotiations to the

NOT. The only product that the government continued to obtain on behalf of its citizens was grain.27

Thanks largely to the efforts of the British economic delegation in The Hague, headed by Sir Francis Oppenheimer, the Trust managed to gain the confidence of both the British and French governments. Late in December 1914, both Allied powers recognised that goods consigned to the company were guaranteed to remain within the Netherlands: in return, the Trust ensured that it administered all sea-borne imports.28 The relationship was mutually beneficial: the Dutch received goods from its colonies, the United States and European neutrals, while the Allies prevented these imports from reaching the Central Powers.29 The NOT was so successful that other neutrals, including Norway, Denmark and Switzerland, subsequently set up similar trade companies.30

In fact, the NOT established such good terms with the Allies, and especially Great Britain, that on several occasions Germany accused it of being Britain’s puppet.31 Few of the Trust’s decisions favoured the Central Powers, while almost all of them complied with Allied requests. When the Allies compiled “black-lists” of neutral merchants known to trade with the enemy, the NOT prevented these traders from attaining consignment guarantees.32 The trustees even notified High Command of black-listed companies and individuals, in an attempt to ensure compliance with NOT regulations at the borders.33 By mid-1916, when the NOT was at the height of its power, the Dutch government hardly featured at international trade negotiation tables. Both in its relationship with the belligerents and its control over merchants, the NOT acted almost as a “state within the state”, with a staff of several thousand people.34 As a private company, it did not have to comply with the neutrality standards of the government. Therefore, it was able to accept

29 Frey, “Bullying the neutrals” p. 232.
31 Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. 113; Baer, “The Anglo-German antagonism” p. 113.
32 Ibid. p. 121.
33 Secretary of the Netherlands’ Overseas Trust to Lieutenant-Colonel C. van Tuinen (General Staff), 17 August 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf“ entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 581. See also: copies of black-lists in this same folder.
34 Smit, Tien studiën p. 90; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 175.
Allied demands with much greater ease than the government could have done. Nevertheless, because the NOT was accountable for all imports, the government was effectively bound by their agreements. No wonder Germany felt irritated by the NOT’s actions.

Nevertheless, Germany recognised that because of the NOT, the Netherlands could import foodstuffs from abroad, which would free local produce for export. At least until the United States entered the war in April 1917, Dutch exports to Germany were far greater than they had been before the war. The NOT had no control over outgoing trade (except to ensure that imported goods were not re-exported) and the Dutch sold vast amounts of locally-produced goods and pre-war stocks to its eastern neighbour. Prices in Germany were so high that exporting and smuggling were immensely profitable. In fact, economic historians have argued that the Dutch economy thrived in 1915 and 1916 because of the unending demand for produce and goods in Germany. Until the summer of 1916, the Netherlands was the most important foreign supplier of foodstuffs to Germany. Dutch exports of cheese, butter, eggs, potatoes and meat tripled between 1913 and 1915. The NOT also gave the same guarantees of domestic consumption for goods imported from Germany or Austria-Hungary as it did for Allied goods. Therefore, the Central Powers also gained from maintaining a good relationship with the NOT, as it stopped their goods being sold on to their enemies. Still, Britain and France were able to place considerably more pressure on Dutch importers and enforce a much stricter blockade of Germany than Germany was able to do in return.

Widespread smuggling could undermine the credibility of NOT guarantees. Britain was exceedingly concerned about the amount of smuggling taking place and broached the subject with Trust directors and the Dutch government on a number of occasions. The directors also asked the government for help in ensuring that consigned goods stayed in the

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35 Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 17.
37 Frey, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande p. 153.
country. In turn, the government introduced export prohibitions to prevent goods leaving the country, ostensibly to prevent shortages on the domestic market. Not surprisingly, Germany doubted the Dutch government’s official justification for enforcing export prohibitions and charged that the Dutch were merely yielding to Allied demands. This was patently obvious in August 1915, when the cabinet decreed that customs officials could investigate the origin of exports. As a result, NOT contract breakers could be pursued and apprehended at the borders.

By 1917, the Allies regulated neutral commerce so closely that attaining an export surplus was difficult. The situation became even more serious after the United States entered the war in April that year. Because the United States would not deal with private companies (like the NOT), the Dutch government had to take more responsibility for matters of trade. In August, cabinet members authorised the creation of a special import supervisory body (Commissie voor Scheepvaart, Commission for Shipping), which replaced the NOT in its dealings with all belligerents, except Britain. Although the NOT continued to exist, its power diminished considerably. A month later, the ministers took another important step towards centralising government control over other trade issues, by creating an export supervisory body. The Nederlandsche Uitvoer Maatschappij (Netherlands’ Export Company, NUM) operated much like the NOT except that it had full governmental involvement alongside representatives of industry, trade and agriculture.

NUM’s most important responsibility was supervising the agricultural contracts negotiated with Britain and Germany late in 1916. Britain insisted the Netherlands offered a set quota of local produce to the Allies, rather than selling it all to Germany. It forced the Dutch government into an Agricultural Agreement in June 1916. When Dutch exporters

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42 Staatsblad. no. 344, 3 August 1914; Treub, “De economische toestand van Nederland” p. 160; Tuinen, “De militaire handhaving van neutraliteit en gezag” p. 99; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 12.
44 Staatsblad. no. 370, 7 August 1915.
45 Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 18.
46 Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. 114; Smit, Tien studiën p. 95; Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 146.
did not keep to the arrangement - because prices in Germany were much higher and because shipping goods to Britain was precarious - Britain threatened to blockade the Netherlands completely. Unless the Dutch consented to an even more demanding contract, it would stop recognising NOT's import guarantees. The Dutch signed the second Agricultural Agreement in November 1916. A month later, they entered into a similar settlement with Germany, which received first right to any quotas not taken by Britain, and agreed not to sink Dutch ships taking food products across the Channel. Germany conceded the Dutch-Allied demands because it needed all the food it could obtain. The agreements caused the first major decline in Dutch exports to Germany, despite continued German pressure to maintain the same levels of food supplies throughout 1917 and 1918.

The two European powers now regulated and dominated the entire Dutch export market. Exporters of agricultural produce could no longer determine with whom they traded, but had their goods arbitrarily divided to meet the quota requirements of Great Britain and Germany. In its supervisory role, the NUM did not work entirely effectively. It not only had to meet each of the quota limits but also to keep an eye on dwindling local supplies. Cabinet ministers were entirely reluctant to involve themselves in the NUM, and left much of the administration to industry representatives, with the result that the company emphasised external trade above domestic consumption. Major disagreements ensued between the pro-Allied Minister of Finance, M. W. F. Treub, who was responsible for exports, and the Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, F. E. Posthuma, who was in charge of domestic consumption and tended to support Germany. They could not agree on appropriate levels of external trade; they differed with each other on where to send foodstuffs; nor did they see eye-to-eye on appropriate levels of surpluses. These quarrels increased NUM’s inefficiency and adversely affected the viability of agricultural trade.

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55 Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 68.
POLICING ECONOMIC NEUTRALITY

Economic policy was not a military responsibility but a civilian one, designed and implemented by the government as well as trade and industry heads. This did not change during the war. Because the armed forces patrolled the borders, most ports, and waterways, however, they were ideally situated to police economic regulations. As early as November 1914, Snijders recognised the potential value of his troops for economic neutrality matters. He wrote a letter to the Territorial Commander in Overijssel in which he outlined how the military should never be responsible for export prohibitions or other commercial policies, yet could act in accordance with government guidelines, help supervise goods traffic, and thereby secure the economic welfare of the nation. 58

Of major concern to the government, as well as to the boards of the NOT and NUM, was how their trade regulations and export prohibitions could be regulated effectively. 59 For the sake of neutrality after August 1914, customs and Marechaussee officers had to check absolutely everything entering and leaving the country. This wartime task was too great for the relatively small number of civil servants in the Ministry of Finance. Troops stationed at the border and naval ships patrolling waterways were obvious choices to help inspect the flow of goods. 60 The importance of the military role heightened as the list of prohibited goods lengthened and as smuggling became more prolific. However, ultimate responsibility for trade inspection remained with the Minister of Finance. The border guards’ main responsibility was directing cargo to inspection posts. They also kept an eye out for smugglers and apprehended offenders (whom they subsequently handed over to the local police).

Although officially their spheres of control were quite separate, military and civilian border personnel worked closely together and often did the same jobs. Like customs officials, the border guards implemented government directives, although the guards received instructions direct from military commanders, while the civil servants

58 Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Overijssel, 20 October 1914, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 150.
59 Netherlands’ Overseas Trust Company, "De positie van Nederlands handel onder den invloed van den handelsoorlog der groote mogendheden" [The position of Dutch trade under the influence of the trade-war of the major powers] 25 November 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 168.
60 Commander-in-Chief, "Bepalingen betreffende het verkeer in het grensgebied" [Regulations regarding traffic in the border area] October 1914 (draft), in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 127.
obtained theirs straight from the Ministry. At times, the information given to one group
differed from that given to the other, causing confusion and conflict. 61

Using soldiers in work for which they were insufficiently trained created
inevitable problems. The Commander of the Field Army, van Terwisga, investigated the
relationship between military border guards and customs officials early in 1916. 62 He found
that the troops often did not appreciate the importance of the customs officials’ role.
Because most soldiers were conscripts, received little pay and lacked enthusiasm for their
job, they had few incentives to meet the standards expected of them. Lack of clarity as to
who was in charge at the borders aggravated tensions as well. Van Terwisga suggested that
a select group of border guards be specially trained as temporary customs officials
responsible to the Minister of Finance, rather than to military commanders, leaving the rest
of the guards to patrol borders, direct traffic to customs posts, and detain suspected
smugglers.

In the course of 1916, 2,000 border guards trained as temporary customs officers.
By the summer of 1918, their numbers had reached 6,000. 63 As of 1 April 1916, the
government limited direct military involvement in customs matters further, by enforcing a
so-called “first line” (eerste linie – the area directly across the border) where customs
officials held sole responsibility for the movement of goods. 64 Yet border guards continued
to help police illegal trade, as more often than not they encountered smugglers on their
patriols. Ultimately, it was impossible to remove the military from the “first line”. 65 In
recognition of this, after April 1916, the Minister of Finance still sent his directives to his
customs officers and to the Commander-in-Chief. 66 The two spheres never separated
completely and their relationship remained highly ambiguous.

Uncertainty regarding the military’s economic neutrality role was even greater in
municipalities declared in a “state of war” or “siege”. 67 Officially, military commanders

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61 Inspector of the Koninklijke Marechaussee to Commander-in-Chief, 30 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 34; Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” pp. 62 - 64.
63 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 304; Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 69.
64 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 304.
65 Ibid. p. 305.
66 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 11 June 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484.
67 For further details, see: Chapter 7, pp. 231 - 257.
overruled civil authorities in these regions, and accordingly had a considerable say in economic matters. They used this influence to implement their own export prohibitions (applicable only to the locality under their control); to tackle smuggling by removing suspicious individuals out of the municipality; and to monitor food supplies and smugglers by compiling lists of goods stockpiled locally. The new regulations caused further confusion at the borders, although fortunately, commanders only used this power sporadically.68

The armed forces had a specific duty to supervise transit trade passing through the Netherlands. The Rhine Conventions signed in the nineteenth century guaranteed access along the length of the river for all merchant vessels of countries through which it flowed. The Conventions also opened the waterways connecting the Schelde and Rhine to foreign merchants.69 This meant that during the war, the Dutch could not restrict German trade to and from occupied Belgium, as long as it was of a mercantile nature. However, according to Article 2 of the neutrality declaration, the Dutch were obliged to ensure that the warring parties did not use their country for the transport of military materials. Therefore, all German transit trade had to be checked for contraband.

Once Germany occupied all the territory along the Dutch-Belgian border, it became even more imperative for the Dutch to supervise German trade.70 Special rail and river posts were set up on both the frontier with Belgium and with Germany.71 Initially, the supervisory role was relatively simple: to inspect goods and prevent any obvious contraband from getting through.72 However, the task became more complicated when the government decided that all transit materials must have official documentation.

71 Tuinen, “De militaire handhaving van neutraliteit en gezag” pp. 92 - 93.
guaranteeing that the goods would not be used by the German military. In July 1915, Snijders agreed to a German request to allow sealed trains through without inspection (to avoid smuggled goods being added while in transit) as long as the seals were checked on leaving the country, papers were in order, and at the first sign of anything suspicious, cargo could be inspected.

Map 17: Transit trade checkpoints (water and rail)

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73 Commander of the Field Army to Commander Division II Koninklijke Marechaussee, 22 May 1915 and 10 June 1915, both in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484.
74 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 3 July 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 183.
Snijders requested lists of all goods (military or otherwise) that passed through the posts.\textsuperscript{75} These were used to inform the cabinet of the type of goods travelling into and out of occupied Belgium, an important source of information for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. With such lists, he could assure the Allies that Germany did not violate neutrality. High Command also used the lists to identify potentially controversial items. For example, in June 1918, troops stopped all food supplies from Germany passing through to Belgium because the supplies fed German soldiers, rather than Belgian civilians.\textsuperscript{76} They also enforced quotas on goods that had a dual civilian and military purpose (such as construction materials).\textsuperscript{77}

The Navy helped with customs duties at ports, river inlets and waterways, checking for contraband and smuggled items.\textsuperscript{78} At the start of the war, Snijders instructed naval personnel not to hold up merchants unnecessarily and then only seize obvious military materials.\textsuperscript{79} At this time, sailors tended to search those vessels without appropriate permits.\textsuperscript{80} The instruction soon changed as the Navy increased its control over illegal trade. By March 1915, in an attempt to reduce smuggling, ships were required to have their muster roll (inventory of all goods and people on board) signed by the local military authority.\textsuperscript{81} As the lists of NOT regulations and export prohibitions lengthened, the naval inspections became more intrusive and time-consuming. For example, in February 1916, the NOT reported that fishing vessels were smuggling goods and letters out of Vlissingen to

\textsuperscript{75} Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 8 October 1917; Commander-in-Chief to Control-Officer at St. Pieter, 2 May 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484. See also: lists of goods (and people) on trains passing through Budel train station in 1918 and 1919, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1488 and 1489.
\textsuperscript{76} Head of Department G. S. IV, “Instructie Controle-Officieren in werking tredende op 15 Juni 1918” [Instruction for Control Officers to be operational on 15 June 1918] in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484.
\textsuperscript{77} See: orders in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484.
\textsuperscript{78} For shipping matters dealt with by the Navy see: ARA, “Archief van de Chef van de Marinestaf te ’s-Gravenhage 1886 - 1942” entry no. 2.12.18, inventory no. 150 and 197.
\textsuperscript{79} Telegram from Commander-in-Chief to Garrison Commander Rotterdam, 8 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 34.
\textsuperscript{80} Commander-in-Chief, “Instructie voor Commandanten van Marinevaartuigen of van landweerdetachementen, belast met het toezicht op den uitvoer van stoomschepen en stoom- of motorvaartuigen, in verband met de afkondiging van den staat van beleg in verschillende aan zee of aan de rivieren gelegen gemeenten” [Instruction for Commanders of naval vessels or of landweer detachments responsible for the supervision or departure of steamships and steam or motor boats, in relation to the declaration of the “state of siege” in several municipalities bordering the sea or rivers] 7 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 34.
\textsuperscript{81} Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Holland, 6 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 178. See also: Commander of Ijmuiden to Commander-in-Chief, 26 February 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Chef van de Marinestaf te ’s-Gravenhage 1886 - 1942” entry number 2.12.18, inventory number 203.
the Belgian town of Zeebrugge. The Commander in Zeeland used this information to get naval patrols on the Schelde to inspect all vessels, however small, before they left the river mouth. 82

In effect, the Navy undertook the same task at sea as military guards and customs officials did on land, but the Navy’s involvement in checking the movement of cargo was greater because it had the necessary ships to implement the checks. This did not mean that the Navy exercised greater responsibility for maintaining economic neutrality than the Army. Ultimately, the Ministry of Finance remained in charge of economic neutrality, but naval vessels and crews were useful for policing any transgressions of that neutrality. However, like military personnel at transit posts, the Navy was accountable for any contraband found on board. By combining both tasks (policing export prohibitions and checking for military goods), they could kill two birds with one stone.

In many respects, the Netherlands operated a “neutrality blockade” during the war by placing embargoes on goods that threatened Dutch neutrality. Because thousands of troops were posted at the borders and along the coastline, the Army and Navy became inextricably involved in managing the “blockade”. The government could not do without their help. It was another task that drained military resources and shifted the focus from defence to the more immediate concern of preserving neutrality in all its multifarious forms. The involvement of the military in economic neutrality may be a reason why Snijders asked to attend a NOT meeting late in 1915. Bosboom denied his request, explaining that as Commander-in-Chief his presence at a meeting of a private trading company would not be appropriate. 83

WAR CALLS FOR DRASTIC MEANS:
GERMANY’S U-BOAT CAMPAIGNS

Germany did not have the same opportunities to blockade its enemies as Britain. However, this did not stop the Germans from doing their utmost to respond to each Allied economic measure with a corresponding action. They searched ships going into and out of the Baltic Sea and tried to enforce strict contraband controls on German goods traded by

82 Commander in Zeeland to Commander of Naval Forces on the West Schelde River, 17 February 1916; Commander in Zeeland to Chief of Naval Staff, 26 February 1916, in ARA, “Archief van de Chef van de Marinestaf” entry no. 2.12.18, inventory no. 150.
83 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 24 December 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 168.
the neutrals. When the Allies increased their lists of contraband or placed limits on neutral merchants, so did the Germans. Nevertheless, the German Navy did not rule the waves: it could not isolate Britain, let alone France, by conventional methods. Instead, Germany chose to waive the rules. It took drastic steps to ensure that it remained competitive on the economic front by unleashing its U-boats to attack merchant shipping in and around the British Isles, Mediterranean and (after April 1917) the North American coastline.

In November 1914, Britain declared much of the North Sea a military sector. The declaration implied that even for neutral vessels, the North Sea was no longer safe. All ships were at risk of hitting a mine or attracting the attention of warships. Germany followed Britain’s lead, notifying the world in February 1915 that the waters surrounding Britain and Ireland had become a German “war zone”. It would assume all ships discovered in the designated area to be hostile and would, thus, sink them. The German leadership authorised its submarine crews to torpedo every vessel they encountered indiscriminately, forgoing the internationally accepted principle that attacking vessels must identify their targets as enemies before opening fire. In the first year of operations, Germany operated a paltry three to seven submersibles in any one month, and yet they caused the loss of four per cent of British merchant shipping.

It was pressure placed on Germany by the world’s most powerful neutral, the United States that enforced limitations on U-boat activities. The German leadership also feared that if Europe’s neutrals, including the Netherlands and Denmark, saw reason to join the Allies in the wake of the U-boat campaign, it would be faced with a dangerous situation, since it did not have the resources to fight on any more fronts. After the liners Lusitania and Arabic were sunk in May and August 1915, Germany agreed that it would avoid targeting all passenger liners and neutral ships. This did not mean that neutral merchants were no longer at risk, evidenced by the sinking of the Dutch passenger-liner

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84 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 237.
85 See: Gilbert, First World War Atlas pp. 79, 81, 86, for a useful overview of the extent of Germany’s U-boat campaigns.
89 Terraine, Business in Great Waters pp. 9 - 11.
90 Frey, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande p. 74.
Tubantia by a German torpedo on 16 March 1916.\textsuperscript{92} It was in the wake of the Tubantia sinking and of the Sussex that same month (after which the United States brought stern diplomatic pressure to bear on Germany) that Germany officially reverted to the traditional practice of boarding and searching vessels before sinking them.\textsuperscript{93} 

On 1 February 1917, Germany resumed its unrestricted U-boat campaign.\textsuperscript{94} Having built up its fleet in the previous year, this time it deployed 111 submersibles.\textsuperscript{95} Military leaders in Germany believed that they could win the war by ruining the British economy and hampering the shipment of supplies and soldiers to the Western Front. The goal was very nearly achieved, U-boats sinking 500 British ship between May and December 1917.\textsuperscript{96} It brought Britain to the verge of economic collapse. However, the United States saw the U-boat campaign as an unbearable breach of its neutral right to traverse international waters unhindered. It declared war on Germany in April 1917, and, as a result, the capability of Germany to defeat the Allies diminished considerably. United States construction capabilities could replace Allied ships as soon as they were sunk, while improved methods of detection, increasing use of armed merchantmen, and, most importantly, the employment of convoys, enabled the Allies to curtail losses to U-boats.\textsuperscript{97} 

By the end of 1917, Germany’s deadly weapon was incapable of fulfilling its grand design.

U-boat warfare severely strained the relationship between Germany and the Netherlands as well. Events such as the sinking of the Medea, a Dutch freighter, in the English Channel on 25 March 1915,\textsuperscript{98} and the merchant vessel Katwijk a month later, turned public opinion against Germany.\textsuperscript{99} The Dutch government feared the two incidents could bring the country into the war and temporarily cancelled leave for all soldiers in April 1915.\textsuperscript{100} Fortunately, Germany compensated the Dutch for lives lost and damage caused.\textsuperscript{101}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Terraine, Business in Great Waters p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid. attacks never stopped completely; even after March 1916 merchant ships were sunk without warning (Ibid. p. 15).
\item \textsuperscript{95} Ibid. p. 17.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Gilbert, First World War Atlas p. 79.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Terraine, Business in Great Waters pp. 27 - 38, 49 - 56.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Münching, De verliezen van de Nederlandse koopvaardij p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Hoogendijk (ed.), De Nederlandsche Koopvaardij pp. 91 - 93.
\item \textsuperscript{100} Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 172.
\end{itemize}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Vessels</th>
<th>Net Tonnage Cleared</th>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>17,335,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>16,996</td>
<td>18,197,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>12,454</td>
<td>13,540,051</td>
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<td>1915</td>
<td>6,351</td>
<td>6,621,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>5,114</td>
<td>4,681,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>1,858,951</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>1,663,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>7,082</td>
<td>7,097,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>11,114</td>
<td>11,350,436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The U-boat campaigns, naval mines, and the British blockade made any sea-bound journey into and out of the Netherlands potentially life-threatening. As the Allies and Central Powers declared more international waters war zones, the only safe area available was a vaargeul (sea-lane) reaching from the major Dutch ports northwards across Dogger Bank towards the Norwegian coast. Both Germany and Britain guaranteed that the vaargeul would not be mined; nor would submarines operate in this small stretch of sea. The Dutch Navy patrolled the lane up to the northern reaches of Dogger Bank. It manned four light-ships, operated a rescue vessel and swept the vaargeul for mines.103 Naval ships also escorted merchant ships through the lane. Nevertheless, many ships still succumbed to the war at sea, as even territorial waters proved unsafe: between 1914 and 1918, stray mines killed 19 sailors in the waters around the Netherlands.104 Overall, from 1915 until the end of the war, the Vereeniging Zee Risico (the “Association for Sea Risk”, which was responsible for shipping insurance) noted 321 incidents at sea involving merchant and

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103 Bauwens et. al., In Staat van Beleg p. 60.
104 Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeemacht” p. 60.
fishing vessels. A total of 1,189 Dutch sailors and fishermen lost their lives as a result, leaving 666 widows and 1,911 fatherless children behind. In peacetime, the average loss of life at sea was 31 sailors per year.\textsuperscript{105}

The dangers at sea led the Dutch government to warn skippers in February 1917 that international waters were far too perilous. It banned all merchants from leaving the Netherlands without first obtaining government approval, and imposed a similar restriction on fishing vessels two months later.\textsuperscript{106} The increasingly stifling demands placed on ships trying to pass through the Allied blockade also contributed to the decision. From mid-1916, Britain refused passage to neutral ships stoked with German coal, while forcing those wanting to bunker in Britain to allocate 30 per cent of their tonnage to Allied goods.\textsuperscript{107} In April 1917, the Dutch cabinet passed another law, allowing it to commandeer ships at will to pick up necessary goods from abroad.\textsuperscript{108} The responsibility for the cargo transferred to the government.\textsuperscript{109}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8: FOREIGN TRADE OF THE NETHERLANDS, 1914 - 1918\textsuperscript{110}</th>
<th>(in millions of guilders)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YEAR</strong></td>
<td><strong>IMPORTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1,875</td>
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<td>1916</td>
<td>1,715</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By mid-1917, the Netherlands' shipping and trade sectors had declined almost to zero. While there was a 74 per cent reduction in tonnage cleared in Dutch ports between 1913 and 1916, this dropped to a massive 90 per cent by the end of 1918. Between 1914 and 1918, submarines and mines sunk 124 out of 500 merchant ships, with a total carrying

\textsuperscript{102} Gouda, \textit{De Nederlandse ze visserij} pp. 29, 31.
\textsuperscript{106} Monchy, "Commerce and Navigation" p. 127; Smit, \textit{Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel} p. 50; Gouda, \textit{De Nederlandse zeevisserij} pp. 32, 62.
\textsuperscript{107} Colenbrander, \textit{Stud iën en Aantekeningen} pp. 158 - 159.
\textsuperscript{108} Monchy, "Commerce and Navigation" p. 127.
\textsuperscript{109} Posthuma, "Food Supply and Agriculture" p. 287; Monchy, "Commerce and Navigation" pp. 127 - 128.
\textsuperscript{110} Vissering et. al., "The Effect of the War upon Banking and Industry" p. 22.
capacity of 314,463 tonnes, as well as 96 fishing vessels. Only the Scandinavian neutrals suffered more (Norway lost 793 vessels, Denmark 241, and Sweden 185). As a result, Dutch foreign trade suffered huge declines, imports dropping by 78 per cent and exports by 85 per cent between 1914 and 1918.

The trade and shipping problems caused by mines, U-boats and blockades in 1917 and 1918, severely hampered the Netherlands’ international bargaining position. Because few overseas imports reached the Netherlands, the Dutch needed their domestically produced goods for themselves and had fewer surpluses to sell. The Agricultural Agreements signed in 1916 also forced the Dutch to trade more equitably with both sets of belligerents. This diminished trade with Germany and placed grave strains on Dutch-German relations.

The principal reason for Germany’s reluctance to go to war with the Netherlands before 1917, as previously discussed, was the economic benefits provided by the neutral. Initially, Germany hoped to use Dutch rivers and ports to receive goods from overseas. When Britain closed the German luftrohe (“breathing space”) by blockading the country from afar and halting transit goods from reaching neutrals, Germany still relied heavily on the Netherlands for domestically-grown food supplies, raw materials from its colonies, and smuggled goods. Britain was well aware that the bulk of German imports came from the Netherlands. In the month of April 1915, for example, the Allies reported that the port of Rotterdam was the origin of five times more cargo for Germany than the Scandinavian ports. In fact, according to the German Chancellor, Theobold von Bethmann Holweg, if it had not been for Dutch supplies the German economy would have collapsed in 1916. The German Minister in The Hague, R. von Kuhlmann, further reiterated this point when he exclaimed in July 1916 that it was imperative for the Netherlands to supply as much food as possible to German industrial areas. It was no wonder then, that Britons were so determined to limit the supply of goods to the Netherlands. Germany, in turn, did everything it could to attract Dutch trade. At the outbreak of war, the German government

111 Dorp, “Handel en nijverheid” p. 193; Münching, De verliezen van de Nederlandse koopvaardij pp. 7, 9; Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 1 Voorspel p. 41.
112 Münching, De verliezen van de Nederlandse koopvaardij p. 10.
114 Bell, A history of The Blockade p. 279.
even removed all custom duties.\textsuperscript{117} There is some evidence to suggest that it actively encouraged smuggling and made contact with important smuggling groups as well.\textsuperscript{118} The high prices offered in Germany encouraged many Dutch to take up this clandestine activity.

From 1917 onwards, however, it was all too conceivable that Germany would declare war if the Dutch did not comply with its economic demands. The historian Marc Frey has argued that part of the reason why Germany reverted to unrestricted U-boat campaign in 1917 was because it no longer received enough advantage from neutral trade.\textsuperscript{119} The export quotas imposed by the Allies on neutrals ensured that the economic advantages of 1915 and 1916 had disappeared, and the growing submarine fleet gave Germany a real opportunity to strike at Britain. At any rate, it was of minor concern if its U-boat campaigns affected neutral trade, since most of these goods would not reach Germany anyway.

As we have seen, one of the reasons why Germany waited until February 1917 before resuming its unrestricted U-boat campaign was the fear that both the Netherlands and Denmark would declare war. In August 1916, the German leadership postponed a proposed U-boat campaign because there were no extra troops available to protect the country (the campaign in Romania had diverted all Germany’s available reserves) if its northern and western neutral neighbours felt obliged to ally with Britain and France.\textsuperscript{120} As soon as Romania was defeated in December 1916, Germany transferred troops westwards, and built up defences on the Dutch border (especially around Zeeland).\textsuperscript{121} Far from underestimating the potential threat of Dutch aggression, Germany took this possibility well into account and amassed a large force on the border early in 1917 to meet that possibility.\textsuperscript{122} When the German leadership realised the Dutch would not go to war, it reduced the size of the military contingent, which was much better used in actual fighting.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{117} Smidt, “Dutch and Danish Agricultural Exports” p. 143.
\textsuperscript{118} Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 47.
\textsuperscript{119} Frey, “Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands” p. 551; Frey, “Bullying the neutrals” pp. 235 - 236.
\textsuperscript{120} Terraine, Business in Great Waters p. 13; Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I pp. 198 - 199.
\textsuperscript{122} Dutch Minister in Brussels to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 February 1917, in ARA, “Kabinetsarchief e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940” entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 253.
\textsuperscript{123} For more, see: Chapter 12, p. 411.
Illustration 7: Oppressed (In de verduukking)

This Albert Hahn cartoon clearly illustrates the supply difficulties encountered by the Netherlands, crushed between two belligerents. The caption reads: “Holland: the warring sirs do not leave me much room to do my shopping” (“De heeren oorlogvoerenden laten me niet veel ruimte om m’n boodschappen te doen”)

(Source: Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 172)

After February 1917, however, German pressure on the Dutch to supply their economic needs became much greater. While the Allies urged them to comply with the Agricultural Agreements, the Germans forced them to continue exporting foodstuffs and ensured compliance by halting essential supplies to the Netherlands. For every tonne of German coal, steel and timber sold to the Netherlands, the Dutch had to offer a tonne of food.124 It became a question of priorities: food or coal. Both were absolute essentials, and there were not enough local sources of coal (or other fuels) to meet the Netherlands’ domestic needs.125 Therefore, the Dutch had little choice but to continue supplying Germany with food, although its exports (and hence its coal imports) were kept to a

125 See: Chapter 9, p. 316.
minimum. What was even more worrisome, for every shipment of food sent to Germany a
corresponding percentage had to be offered to Britain. Food stocks dwindled; the
population grumbled, then rioted.\footnote{For more on civilian dissatisfaction in 1917 and 1918 see: Chapters 9 - 12.} There was little the government could do. If it exported
exclusively to Germany, Britain would refuse to allow much-needed fertilizers, fodder and
grain through its blockade. If it refused to trade with Germany, the Germans would halt
crucial coal supplies. If not enough food remained in the country, the population would
complain of neglect. Little room for manoeuvre existed.\footnote{Sanders, “The
Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 136.}

\textbf{BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:}
\textbf{THE LAW OF ANGARY}

At the start of 1917, the Dutch faced an uncertain economic future, which became
even more precarious with the entry of the United States into the war in April. With
American co-operation, the Allied blockade was virtually impregnable,\footnote{Anton Offer, “The Blockade of Germany and the Strategy of Starvation, 1914 - 1918” in Chickering et. al. (eds.), \textit{Great War, Total War} p. 173.} and proved
especially burdensome to the Netherlands, which needed American grain, fertilizers and
fodder. Like Britain and France, the United States was entirely reluctant to trade with
neutrals unless it received some advantage in return, namely that the Netherlands decrease
its food exports to Germany.\footnote{Bell, \textit{A history of The Blockade} pp. 641 - 642; Vandenbosch, \textit{The Neutrality of the Netherlands} p. 212.}

In July 1917, the United States made its first major blockade declaration, limiting
the export of foodstuffs, fuels, iron, steel, fertilizers, fodder and munitions to neutrals.\footnote{Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 147.} Late in August 1917, it took more decisive action, blockading all neutrals bordering
Germany as if they were belligerents. This blockade stayed in place until November
1918.\footnote{Smit, \textit{Tien studien} p. 96.} It also offered its associated powers any surpluses before neutrals became eligible
for them.\footnote{Bailey, \textit{The Policy of the United States} pp. 86, 89, 91 - 92.} The United States further inhibited Dutch trade by refusing to free fully-laden
ships out of their harbours unless the Dutch released ships of a similar size to the United
States. A major problem with the demand was that once released to the United States, the
vessels could be used to transport American goods including military materials and troops,
constituting a major breach of Dutch neutrality. Just as the Dutch were strict on German
transit trade, they had to be as exacting when it came the use of their ships.\textsuperscript{133} Germany also warned the Dutch that it would not tolerate any compliance with the American request.\textsuperscript{134}

In November 1917, British officials suggested to their American counterparts that they could use the law of angary to requisition Dutch ships stationed in their harbours instead of forcing the neutral to give up tonnage.\textsuperscript{135} Angary was a virtually obsolete rule of law that allowed warring states to requisition whatever they needed within the borders of their country, regardless of the nationality of the goods. The Dutch had used a similar argument in August 1914, when they seized German grain in transit at Rotterdam. According to the Rhine Conventions, this grain could not be taken by the Dutch, but they argued that the extraordinary circumstances of war necessitated the capture of all grain stocks in the country, including those on foreign vessels.\textsuperscript{136}

In January 1918, the Netherlands agreed to a compromised \textit{modus vivendi}: it allowed the United States to take over 500,000 dead weight tonnes of its shipping, as long as the vessels did not carry military materials or travel through German “war zones”.\textsuperscript{137} In return, the United States released a shipment of food to the Netherlands. As part of the shipping contract, the United States also demanded a re-negotiation of the Agricultural Agreements, but this Germany was entirely unwilling to do.\textsuperscript{138} The Germans responded to the \textit{modus vivendi} by threatening to sink all Dutch ships leaving their territorial waters, preventing the Dutch from fulfilling their part of the settlement.\textsuperscript{139} In response, the Americans again ordered the Dutch to release ships for American supplies, including military materials. Even if they had wanted to, the Dutch could not do so because of German opposition. As a result, on 20 and 21 March 1918, the Allied authorities, using the law of angary as justification, seized 137 Dutch ships anchored in American and British

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} Minister of Foreign Affairs to International Towing Company Rotterdam, 25 November 1914, in ARA, “Archief van de Chef van de Marinestaf” entry no. 2.12.18, inventory no. 150.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Vandenbosch, \textit{Dutch Foreign Policy} p. 298; Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 162.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Bailey, \textit{The Policy of the United States} p. 210; Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 148.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dutch Minister in Berlin, 15 August 1914; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dutch Minister in London, 20 August 1914; \textit{Buitengewoon Nederlandsche Staatscourant}, 21 August 1914, all in Smit (ed.), \textit{Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 - 1919. Vierde Deel 1914 - 1917} pp. 43 – 44, 52, 57; Vandenbosch, \textit{Dutch Foreign Policy} p. 110.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Bailey, \textit{The Policy of the United States} p. 206.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Frey, “Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands” p. 557.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 162.
\end{itemize}
ports. In the words of one historian, it was the “most spectacular single act of force employed by the United States against a neutral” up to that time.

The requisitioning of ships in March 1918 was not the first time Britain had taken extreme action against Dutch ships. In June 1916, its Royal Navy forced the entire Dutch fishing fleet, consisting of 150 vessels stationed in the North Sea, into British harbours. They refused to release the ships, the crews, or the catch until the Netherlands agreed to supply Britain, rather than Germany, with the fish. Because of German expectations, the Dutch could not do this. However, unlike the United States in 1918, in 1916 Britain negotiated a quota that was equally acceptable to Germany.

The Dutch were incensed at the requisitioning of one-third of their merchant fleet in March 1918 and vigorously protested against the breach of sovereignty. The Germans were also furious. They argued that the Allies had caused a major violation of neutrality, and that Germany could not sit idly by and let the Netherlands be abused in this manner. Germany threatened to declare war on the neutral if the Dutch did not give them similar advantage. It demanded transit rights across Dutch territory for military materials and German troops. The demands placed the Dutch in an extremely testing position. In the end, only a compromise between the belligerent parties preserved their neutrality.

In an attempt to temper Dutch anger at the requisitioning, the Allies allowed more food shipments to the Netherlands and became more lenient in their blockade. Nevertheless, the Netherlands’ vulnerability had been exposed. This became even more evident in March 1918, when Germany declared that it would no longer recognise neutral ships, because there was no guarantee that they were carrying neutral goods. German submarines sunk neutral vessels indiscriminately within and outside the “war zone”. On this issue, as in most others, the fate of the Dutch was left open to the whim of the warring states.

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141 Thomas A Bailey, in Frey, “Bullying the neutrals” p. 239.
143 Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 166.
145 For further details, see: section “The Notorious Question of Sand and Gravel”, pp. 224 – 229 below.
146 Smit, Tien studien p. 119.
AN UNUSUAL RESPONSE: A NEUTRAL CONVOY

Within the highly-strained atmosphere of March 1918, Queen Wilhelmina saw an opportunity to reclaim some dignity for her country and assert its capacity for independent action. In April 1918, the Minister in Charge of the Navy, J. J. Rambonnet, announced to parliament that the Queen endorsed a plan to send a convoy of ships to the Netherlands’ East Indies. The convoy would consist of merchant vessels carrying government goods and passengers, and would be accompanied by warships. No commercial cargo would be allowed on board, to ensure that none of the belligerents had reason to inspect the vessels. The proposal posed several difficulties. Not only did the convoy have to traverse dangerous stretches of international seas, it also had to pass through the Allied blockade. The Dutch had to get an agreement from all belligerents as well as all countries whose waters the convoy wished to use. A major issue arose over whether sending a military convoy compromised neutrality. While the warships would protect merchant vessels from attack, if a foreign vessel fired at the convoy, it was effectively declaring war on the Netherlands. If the Navy undertook any questionable actions on the journey to the Indies, it could bring the Netherlands into the war. Furthermore, Britain was adamant that neutrals could not send convoys since, by definition, convoy applied only to belligerents.

The ambiguities involved in the convoy issue made many Netherlanders wary of the idea, especially as it strained already tense Anglo-Dutch relations. While Germany and the United States agreed to let the convoy sail, Britain was entirely reluctant to allow the convoy through its blockade. For their part, the Dutch were unwilling to give Britain access to their warships and did not want to be unduly detained in a foreign port. During the negotiations, the Dutch government trod dangerous ground. Britain saw the convoy as a “deliberate attempt to break the blockade”, which, if allowed, would set a dangerous precedent for other continental nations. It believed it could not give up a right of “search and visit”, which it had upheld for centuries, and, therefore, the sailing date was repeatedly delayed.

152 Ibid. p. 36.
delayed. It was not until the Dutch agreed to accept a British veto over the list of goods and passengers that it could sail on 4 July. However, the whole affair left many in the Netherlands doubting the worth of the undertaking. If the intention behind the convoy was to assert autonomy, the exercise was a dismal failure once Britain had power of veto. The impact of the crisis was greatest on Rambonnet. He resigned his cabinet post in June 1918, after voicing his disgust at his colleagues’ acceptance of British demands.

Despite its problematic nature, there was a practical reason for sending the convoy. The war had severely affected the East Indies. Like its “mother country”, the archipelago experienced economic distress in 1917 and 1918. The war at sea hampered trade with Europe, and although new markets opened in America and Japan, it was not enough to offset European losses. More importantly, communication links with the Netherlands were almost entirely broken. At the very least, the arrival of the convoy showed the colonies that the government remained concerned about them and allowed mail to get through. It also brought ships to the colonies to move the millions of tonnes of raw materials left in their ports.

THE NOTORIOUS QUESTION OF SAND AND GRAVEL

Of all the many issues that affected the Dutch in the Great War, the transit of sand and gravel by Germany brought the country closest to inclusion in the war. In November 1915, Snijders informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Loudon, that his troops had been monitoring the transit of sand and gravel from Germany across the Netherlands into Belgium. He was concerned that the German armed forces in Belgium might be using the materials to build fortifications and strengthen trench lines. If this was the case, then the transit constituted a breach of neutrality. Snijders requested that Loudon alert his German counterpart. He also stated that troops at transit check-points would stop all future

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154 Ibid. p. 206.
155 Sanders, “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 156.
156 Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 205.
158 Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 2, p. 120.
shipments and hold the cargo indefinitely, unless they received appropriate documentation guaranteeing the civilian use of the building materials.

On 12 February 1916, the government sent a memorandum to Germany, notifying that transports of sand and gravel could only pass through transit points if Germany gave an official assurance that the materials had a civilian function. Germany obliged.\textsuperscript{161} Despite the German guarantee, the problem continued to plague the Netherlands. Since the start of the war, the amounts of sand and gravel Germany moved into occupied Belgium had quadrupled. Britain, France and Belgium argued that this was far too much for peaceful purposes, and held that most of the materials ended up on the front lines, in pill-boxes (concrete bunkers) and trench reinforcements. They asked the Dutch to investigate the destination of the trade before permitting any further shipments.

Having its own doubts, the Netherlands' government obliged. It approached Germany, suggesting a maximum transit of 75,000 tonnes per month. Germany returned a terse reply; the suggested limit was not nearly enough to meet the needs of rebuilding Belgian towns, bridges and roads demolished by the war. It wanted anywhere between 400,000 to 500,000 tonnes a month. After a lengthy discussion with German representatives in The Hague, the Dutch relented. A maximum of 420,000 tonnes of sand, grit or gravel could be transited through the Netherlands every month, as long as Germany guaranteed its non-military purpose.\textsuperscript{162} In a concession to the Allies, two Dutch engineers went to Belgium to check that the occupation administration used the materials accordingly.\textsuperscript{163} The engineers reported that although the German army had used some of the sand and gravel in the trenches previously, this was no longer the case.

The Allies remained suspicious about the engineers' report.\textsuperscript{164} Samples taken from captured pill-boxes on the Western Front in 1917, suggested that much of the concrete originated from Rhine quarries. It was highly likely that this crossed through the Netherlands on its way to Belgium. The Allies again requested the Netherlands to halt German transit trade in sand and grit. By this stage, Dutch border troops had also calculated that Germany was moving more through the Netherlands than the 1916 agreement

\textsuperscript{161} Vandenbosch, \textit{The Neutrality of the Netherlands} p. 17.
\textsuperscript{163} Vandenbosch, \textit{The Neutrality of the Netherlands} p. 19.
\textsuperscript{164} Smit, \textit{Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel} p. 45.
permitted. In August 1917, the Dutch embargoed the German traffic until March 1918, as Germany had already exceeded its quota for the year.\textsuperscript{165} However, Germany placed intense pressure on the Dutch to let another 370,000 tonnes through in September 1917. The Allies were furious and threatened to close off Dutch access to its telegraph cable, the major communication network linking the Netherlands to the world.\textsuperscript{166}

The Dutch faced a difficult choice: either to refuse the agreed quota with Germany (and the possible consequences thereof) or to face isolation. In the end, the government decided to let 370,000 tonnes of German sand and gravel through, and then closed its borders until March 1918.\textsuperscript{167} It asked Germany twice if it could send officials into Belgium to check on the destination of the materials. Both times, Germany either ignored or rejected the request.\textsuperscript{168} True to its word, Britain closed its telegraph lines to the Dutch for four months, disrupting their commercial dealings and diplomatic communications. The cable embargo also caused a complete cessation of contact with the East and West Indian colonies. Britain re-opened the telegraph network on 7 February 1918, in an attempt to resolve the situation and establish a workable agreement between the Netherlands, Germany and itself.\textsuperscript{169}

A day after Britain lifted the restrictions on telegraph use, the Dutch threatened Germany with an indefinite suspension of sand and gravel transit, unless it allowed Dutch experts to investigate the ultimate destination of the cargo.\textsuperscript{170} Again Germany refused.\textsuperscript{171}

As we have already discussed, on 20 March, Great Britain and the United States exacerbated an already tense situation by requisitioning Dutch ships in their ports. Germany seized the opportunity to reap advantage from the vulnerable position in which the Allied anger had placed the Dutch.

On 21 March, Germany signalled that it wanted unhindered transit to Belgium for military materials and troops.\textsuperscript{172} Ten days later, it issued official compensatory demands.

The Dutch had to open the country to all manner of transit trade, including unlimited access to the Rhine. They had to allow passage through the Schelde for the 36 German merchant

\textsuperscript{165} Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 217.
\textsuperscript{166} Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel p. 45.
\textsuperscript{167} Commander-in-Chief to Control-Officer at Lobith, 11 September 1917, in ARA, “Archief van de Chef van de Marinestaf te ’s-Gravenhage 1886 - 1942” entry number 2,12,18, inventory number 197.
\textsuperscript{168} Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 219.
\textsuperscript{170} Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 219.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel p. 77.
ships in Antwerp that Germany had requisitioned in October 1914. As well, Germany expected the Dutch to increase their agricultural and cattle exports and ease credit arrangements between the two countries. It seemed most probable to the Dutch (and Allies) that Germany was on the verge of declaring war on the Netherlands, if they did not agree to the demands.

Long discussions between Dutch, Allied and German diplomats ensued. The Netherlands was willing to accept many of the demands, as long as Germany did not declare war and as long as the Allies promised not to retaliate. A major issue of contention remained the transit of sand and gravel. On 19 April 1918, Germany reduced its claims: no weaponry would be moved through the Netherlands, but shoes, clothes and food for the German armies in Belgium should not be stopped. Mercantile transit trade should be unlimited (as long as goods were accompanied by guarantees of civilian consumption). In addition, and this was most contentious, Germany wanted 200,000 tonnes of grit and sand transported without an accompanying guarantee of civilian use. Although some progress was made by late April, no concrete reconciliation on the issue of sand and grit had been reached. The Netherlands was also unwilling to allow the 36 German ships in Antwerp out via the Schelde, no doubt because the Schelde was so important to the designs of the Central and Allied Powers.

Ultimately, Germany did not wish to go to war with the Netherlands, although it is almost certain that if the Dutch had not compromised, it would have done so. General Ludendorff, especially, had little compunction about threatening the neutral with war. The Dutch authorities took the possible threat very seriously. On 26 April, one military commander even suggested to Loudon that the Army should prepare to blow railway bridges in case the Germans tried to force its trains through. Snijders was somewhat more circumspect about the military threat Germany posed at that particular time. The Germans had recently launched a massive offensive on the Western Front, absorbing all their military resources. As he explained to the other military commanders on 23 April, there had been no evidence that Germany was building up any forces on the eastern or

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172 Ibid. p. 78.
174 Ibid. p. 169.
175 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I pp. 211 - 212.
176 Commander Hoek van Holland to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 26 April 1918, in ARA, “Kabinetarschven e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940” entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 239.
southern border and that, in fact, the numbers of German troops stationed there had decreased significantly since the start of 1917. Snijders further explained that there was no pressing reason to take any extraordinary military action, although he did ask them to restrict military leave for border troops as much as possible and be prepared for remobilisation.178

Civilian authorities were not as convinced as Snijders, and there is reason to suggest that they were not even aware of Snijders' opinion,179 which, in any case, changed when Germany subsequently moved two army divisions closer to the Dutch border near Ghent. This gave enough impetus for the government to cancel extraordinary leave for all soldiers on 25 April, and troops (intake year 1915) owed indefinite leave were kept in service a few weeks longer.180 Germany again increased pressure by vowing to end all coal exports.181 While coercing the Netherlands to submit, Germany nevertheless reduced the severity of its demands. Transit trade would be limited to mercantile cargo only, no military materials would be transported through the country, and all sand and grit transits would be accompanied by a guarantee of civilian use. In return, the Netherlands must export 250,000 tonnes of sand and gravel to Germany every month.182 Germany was also willing to leave the merchant ships in Antwerp. It was a clear indication that it did not want to declare war and gave the Dutch ample opportunity to sign a credible compromise.

The Dutch government eagerly accepted Germany's latest offer. Britain, France and the United States were not pleased with the forced export of sand and gravel from the Netherlands to Germany. Nevertheless, the Allies did not want to be involved in another area of conflict; they could not afford to fight on another front. German armies had recently made spectacular advances on the Western Front and seemed to be winning the war.183 The British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, declared on 20 April 1918:

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179 The relationship between Snijders and the government is examined in greater detail in Chapter 12, pp. 410 - 417.


182 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel p. 79.

183 Snapper, “De bedreiging van Nederland” p. 8.
if they [the Dutch] really cannot prolong resistance without going to war with Germany, we should not be disposed to regard as unneutral their submission in such circumstances to German demands. Consequently, on 26 April 1918, the Allies agreed to abstain from interfering if the Dutch made conciliatory gestures to Germany, even if these gestures compromised strict neutrality. The next day, the Netherlands accepted Germany’s offer. As of May 1918, transit of sand and gravel from Germany to Belgium resumed unhindered. Dutch border troops were instructed that the materials could be let through unchecked, up to a maximum of 1,600,000 tonnes a year.

**CONCLUSION**

In the end, the most ambiguous of neutrality issues, namely economic neutrality, brought the Netherlands to the brink of war. After years of chipping economic advantage away from the neutral, the belligerents went too far: the Allies by commandeering Dutch ships, the Central Powers by demanding unhindered transit across Dutch territory. The Netherlands lost any bargaining power it may have had, remaining vulnerable and exposed to their powerful neighbours. But the events of early 1918 also highlighted two very important elements of Dutch neutrality: firstly, that neither Great Britain nor Germany wanted the Netherlands to enter the war on the other side; and secondly, that the ability of the armed forces to credibly uphold neutrality (where that was possible) was absolutely essential.

While diplomats and governments could quibble about whether to go to war or how many concessions to permit, without the means to enforce any settlements, a neutral could not survive. By upholding the terms of the Agricultural Agreements, facilitating the convoy to the East Indies, safely conducting ships through the perilous *vaargeul*, and, most importantly, monitoring transit trade, the Dutch Army and Navy showed their importance. In the extraordinary circumstances of the war years, safeguarding economic neutrality had become an essential part of military operations, a role that must not be underestimated given the significance attached to economic warfare by all sides. As we shall see, taking responsibility for economic neutrality was not something that High Command welcomed.

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184 British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, 20 April 1918, as quoted in Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 225.
186 Head Department G. S. IV, “Instructie Controle-Officieren in werking tredende op 15 Juni 1918” in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484.
and it elicited considerable controversy at home as well, especially when the government invoked “state of war” and “siege” laws to prevent smuggling and other forms of illicit trade.
The Oorlogswet (War Law) of 1899 provided that in time of war, or when war threatened, the government could proclaim parts of the country in a staat van oorlog (state of war) or staat van beleg (state of siege). In both the “state of war” and “state of siege”, military authority overruled local civil authority, with the powers given in the “state of siege” decidedly more comprehensive than those granted in the “state of war”. Assigning extraordinary emergency powers to the armed forces in time of great danger, the law allowed them to take almost any action required to safeguard the security of the nation and its people. The jurisdiction provided by the law was such that it could negate a number of constitutionally-recognised civil rights, whenever it was deemed essential. The legislation attributed immense powers to the armed forces and left their scope of action undefined, so that every possible contingency was accounted for.

On 5 August 1914, at Snijders’ request, the government imposed a “state of war” along the entire New Holland Waterline (including the city of Utrecht) as well as other fortified positions, to give the garrisons there added authority to improve the defences and
obtain valuable aid from the local population. Very soon, the government imposed the “state of war” in other areas, followed in quick succession by the far more comprehensive “state of siege”. In fact, by 1 October 1918, the government had declared 814 communities (out of a total of 1,110) to be in a “state of war” or “siege”. This figure included almost the entire southern provinces of Limburg, North Brabant and Zeeland and every settlement within five kilometres of the border. In other words, nearly 75 per cent of towns, villages and cities came under military jurisdiction during the Great War. One commentator at the time asserted that these declarations created “profoundly radical changes” in the running of municipalities and in the general administration of domestic affairs. Taking into account that more than 80 per cent of the 814 affected communities endured the harsher “state of siege”, the armed forces exercised a substantial degree of control over local government and the daily life of civilians.

Not surprisingly, the application of the “state of war” and “siege” and the manner in which the military exercised their authority became objects of much public criticism. While the use of the War Law seemed appropriate in the first crisis-ridden months of war, once the Western Front stabilised and Dutch security seemed less at risk (from late 1914 onwards), many could not understand why the armed forces should continue exercising extraordinary control, or why the government placed yet more municipalities in the “state of siege”. Smuggling did not seem an appropriate enough justification for such drastic action. Yet the government used the “state of siege” for exactly that reason - to curb smuggling and prevent other violations of internal neutrality - a clear indication, in fact, of how detrimental it believed smuggling to be for national welfare.

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3 *Staatsblad*. 5 August 1914, no. 385.
4 J. A. Eigeman, “De practijk der ‘Oorlogswet’ en de Gemeenten” [The practice of the ‘War Law’ and the municipalities] *Militair-Rechtelijk Tijdschrift*. 15, 1919, p. 362. There were 1,121 recognised municipalities in 1909, this number was reduced to 1,110 in 1920, probably through the amalgamation of townships (Petrus Wilhelmus Marie Hasselton, “De wisseling van het opperbevel in februari 1940 getoetst aan de praktijk van de Oorlogswet in de periode 1887 - 1940” [The change of Commander-in-Chief in February 1940 tested against the War Law in the period 1887 - 1940] Profefschrift Doctoraat, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 1995, p. 34).
6 Out of 814 municipalities, 659 had a “state of siege” imposed at some stage during the war (Ibid. p. 362).
7 For details of what the military did to police internal neutrality in the “state of war” and “siege”, especially anti-smuggling measures, see: Chapter 8, pp. 258 - 297.
Inevitably, subordinating the authority of municipal councils and local bodies to the military, an institution without any expertise in, or understanding of, local government, caused concerns. The War Law had only ever been intended as a temporary measure, to handle short-term crises swiftly and restore normal order as quickly as possible. It was an extremely useful tool at the start of the war. But, the legislation could not cope with the strains and stresses of more than four years of neutrality. “State of siege” commanders put in place all manner of regulations ranging from the control of smuggling to the supervision
of spies; from hunting restrictions to the closure of bars; from the imposition of curfews to the supervision of public meetings; from the censorship of newspapers to the removal of persons “disturbing the peace”. While the War Law was a hotly debated subject in parliament and among the general public, the uses and abuses thereof came under increasing scrutiny from the judiciary, which from May 1915 onwards refined and restricted the powers of the military in the “state of siege” considerably. By the time of the signing of the Armistice, the application of the War Law had changed radically, so much so, that the original intention of the law, namely the principle that *nood breekt wet* (“need breaks law”), rarely applied.

**The War Law of 1899**

Article 187 in the Constitution of 1887 legislated the use of the *staat van oorlog* or *staat van beleg*, giving the armed forces extraordinary prerogatives to deal with internal and external threats. However, article 187 did not explain what constituted military authority in a “state of war” or “siege” any further than

the constitutional powers of civil authority, in relation to public order and the police, are completely or partially transferred to military authority; and that civil governments are subordinated to the military. Subsequently, it took a succession of cabinets twelve years to draft the *Oorlogswet*, explaining article 187 in a manner acceptable to both houses of parliament and defining the nature of the *staat van oorlog* and *staat van beleg*. It came into effect on 1 May 1901, but would be used for the first time in August 1914.

The War Law made clear distinctions between the “state of war” and “state of siege”. In the former, military authorities were required to consult with local bodies (the mayor, municipal or provincial councils, as well as the water and peat boards), whereas in the “state of siege”, they did not. Moreover, civil authorities were to obey military orders in

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8 C. van Tuinen, W. J. C. Schuurman, “Het militair gezag gedurende den oorlogstijd” [Military authority in war time] in Meester (ed.), *Gedenkboek van den Europeeschen Oorlog in 1918 - 1919* pp. 272 - 279, provides a useful overview of the legalities of the “state of war” and “siege”.

9 ‘[D]at de grondgewettelijke bevoegdheden van het burgelijk gezag ten opzichte van de openbare orde en de politie geheel of ten deele op het militair gezag overgegaan; en dat de burgelijke overheden aan de militaire ondergeschikt worden.” Article 187 of Constitution 1887, as quoted in Uijterschout, *Beknopt Overzicht* p. 428.


11 See: Appendix 8, p. 459.
the “state of siege” without question. The “state of siege” also gave the armed forces substantially more powers to suspend a number of civil rights. For example, commanders imposed whatever censorship restrictions they wished, restricted the movement of people and goods, and removed persons deemed a danger to public safety out of the region concerned. They also had jurisdiction to cancel all meetings and gatherings (except for religious congregations). In the “state of war”, commanders had fewer powers. They could not restrict meetings and the movement of goods, ban people, or censor publications, except if they contained sensitive military information. Effectively, the “state of siege” existed for circumstances of extreme urgency, while the more moderate “state of war” enabled military preparations to be made or preventative action to be taken without unduly hampering normal administrative processes.\textsuperscript{12}

In January 1904, Abraham Kuyper’s cabinet issued two instructions clarifying the War Law.\textsuperscript{13} The first identified a difference between military authorities within and outside fortified positions, and recognised that, nominally at least, the War Law needed to work within the established military hierarchy.\textsuperscript{14} When a “state of war” or “siege” was declared in an area that formed part of a fortification or fortified position – such as the New Holland Waterline – the fortification commander would automatically exercise authority there in terms of the War Law. For areas outside the fortified positions, the cabinet retained the right to appoint whomever it wished. In the second instruction of 1904, the government drew a distinction between a time of foreign invasion (actual or threatened) and internal disorder.\textsuperscript{15} During domestic upheaval, the cabinet could select authorities regardless of pre-existing military appointments.

The \textit{Oorlogswet} received another important amendment in November 1912, when the Minister of War, Hendrik Colijn, decreed that, where possible, Territorial Commanders

\textsuperscript{12}See: Appendix 8, p. 459.
\textsuperscript{13}Staatsblad. no. 10, 22 January 1904.
\textsuperscript{14}“Instructie voor de Autoriteit, bedoeld in artikel 7 der Wet van 23 Mei 1899 (Staatsblad no. 128), uitoefende in tijden van oorlog of oorlogsgewaar het militair gezag, in eenig gedeelte van het Rijk, gelegen buiten de Stellingen en afzonderlijke Forten” [Instructions for the authority meant in Article 7 of the law of 23 May 1899 (Staatsblad. no. 128), exercising military authority in time of war or war danger, in a part of the state lying outside the fortified positions and separate forts] in Staatsblad. no. 10, 22 January 1904.
\textsuperscript{15}“Instructie voor de Autoriteit, bedoeld in artikel 7 der Wet van 23 Mei 1899 (Staatsblad no. 128), uitoefenende het militair gezag in tijd van vrede in het grondgebied des Rijks of in eenig gedeelte daarvan, in het geval, vermeld in artikel 1 sub 2, dier Wet” [Instruction for the authority meant in Article 7 of the law of 23 May 1899 (Staatsblad. no. 128) exercising military authority in time of peace in the territory of the state or part thereof, in the case mentioned in Article 1 sub 2 of the law] in Ibid.
would be responsible for military authority in *staat van oorlog* or *staat van beleg* regions.\(^\text{16}\)

The decree also assigned specific Territorial Commanders to such areas. For example, in the provinces of Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe, the retired Lieutenant-Colonel H. Meyboom, resident of Amsterdam, would be responsible for military authority. Likewise, for Overijssel, Utrecht and Gelderland (in the area above the Lower Rhine river), Colonel G. A. van der Brugghen would assume responsibility.\(^\text{17}\) However, they would not have any jurisdiction over those parts of their provinces that were part of a fortified position or fortification.

**The "State of War" and "Siege" in August 1914**

As the likelihood of war increased late in July 1914, the government issued a series of emergency laws.\(^\text{18}\) Of these, Queen Wilhelmina’s declaration of “war danger” on 30 July was one of the most important,\(^\text{19}\) since the government could now announce the *staat van oorlog* or *staat van beleg*. As early as 2 August, the recently-appointed Commander-in-Chief urged cabinet ministers to place the entire country in a “state of war”.\(^\text{20}\) At this stage, Germany had not yet begun its invasion of Belgium and Snijders feared that the German armies would use Limburg as a thoroughfare. He also asked that fortified positions - namely the New Holland Waterline, Den Helder and the mouths of the Maas River - be placed in a “state of siege”. Snijders wanted power to prevent newspapers from publishing military information, allow troops to prepare defences properly, and receive help from locals for this task.\(^\text{21}\)

However, the government was reluctant to place the country under military decree until it had a more justifiable reason to feel threatened.\(^\text{22}\) The Minister of War, Nicolaas Bosboom, argued that there were enough emergency powers already in place for the armed forces to meet their mobilisation requirements.\(^\text{23}\) When Germany invaded Belgium and

\(^{16}\) *Staatsblad*. no. 349, 18 November 1912, Article 2.

\(^{17}\) Ibid. Articles 2a and 2b.

\(^{18}\) See: Chapter 3, pp. 102 - 108.

\(^{19}\) *Staatsblad*. no. 334a, 31 July 1914.

\(^{20}\) Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 2 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Commander-in-Chief, cabinet paper, 22 March 1915, pp. 1 – 2, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.

\(^{23}\) Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 301.
avoided Dutch territory on 4 August, the immediate need for proclaiming a *staat van oorlog* throughout the Netherlands passed. Nevertheless, ministers recognised the importance of improving the fortified positions, and for that reason declared all municipalities in or near the Waterline, Den Helder, the mouths of the Maas river and Haringvliet, the lone standing fortifications of Westervoort (Arnhem), Hoofddam and Ellewoutsdijk, and the coastal battery at Neuzen, in a “state of war” on 5 August. 24 As the German armies progressed into Belgium, the possibility of a border violation in the south by Belgian or German troops became more likely, and, as a result, the Field Army moved closer to the border on 4 August. 25 Five days later, Snijders wrote to the cabinet urging it to declare a “state of war” in the southern provinces, so that the Field Army could take extra steps to prepare for a possible invasion or large-scale contravention of neutrality. 26 The ministers agreed, placing the provinces of Zeeland, Limburg, North Brabant, and Gelderland (below the Waal River) in a “state of war” on 10 August, immediately after the German capture of the Liège fortifications. 27

Military security motivated the declarations of 5 and 10 August, which placed the most strategically significant areas – the fortifications and areas in which the Field Army operated – in a “state of war”. Commanders operating in the “state of war” could take important steps to improve the general safety and security of their allotted area. In the small town of Neuzen (Terneuzen), for example, the commander of the coastal battery, Captain D. Putman Cramer, made some important decisions. Putman Cramer kept a diary of the orders he gave during the first few months of his “state of war” command in Neuzen and the nearby settlements of Hoek and Zaamslag, 28 which included restricting access to certain areas for civilians, requisitioning buildings, demolishing particular bridges, and getting locals to help with defensive preparations. Likewise, in Utrecht, the “state of war” let troops requisition goods and buildings, including a public waiting room, a motor-boat, and

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24 *Staatsblad*. no. 375, 5 August 1914; Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 301.
25 See: Chapter 4, p. 131.
26 Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 9 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
28 Commander of Coastal Battery near Neuzen, “Dagboek van 5 Augustus 1914 t/m 31 December 1914 omtrent de uitoefening van het Militair Gezag te Neuzen Hoek en Zaamslag” in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 98.
equipment to cut down trees.\textsuperscript{29} They informed residents living within a kilometre eastwards of the Waterline to prepare themselves for possible evacuation of their houses in case of invasion, which would see the region inundated with water.\textsuperscript{30} The military immediately emptied several houses near the town of Naarden and then destroyed them.\textsuperscript{31}

While the “state of war” declarations in August 1914 had clear strategic purposes, the reasons for announcing the “state of siege” on 29 August 1914 were more ambiguous.\textsuperscript{32} On the 26th, the Commander of the Field Army, Buh1man, had complained to Snijders that the “state of war” gave him insufficient jurisdiction to deal with neutrality transgressions on the Belgian border, as his appointment required him to do.\textsuperscript{33} He cited reports from German officials that Belgian civilians were crossing into the Netherlands after shooting at German soldiers.\textsuperscript{34} If the reports were true, these actions violated Dutch neutrality since a neutral state could not be a base for hostile activities.\textsuperscript{35} Of greater concern for Buhlman was the possibility that Germans might pursue the Belgian franc-tireurs into the Netherlands and cause an even more serious neutrality violation. What also worried the Field Army Commander was that locals owned a vast array of hunting guns, and these might find their way into Belgian hands. The “state of war” did not allow him to take action against the rumoured crossings, nor to remove weapons from locals. Imposing a “state of siege” in the region, however, would achieve both these things.

Snijders passed the commander’s suggestion to the cabinet, and urged it to upgrade the southern frontier from a “state of war” to a “state of siege”.\textsuperscript{36} Buhlman also identified other neutrality problems better addressed by a “state of siege”. For example, the border cut the town of Putte in half. He requested that the street marking the frontier be patrolled

\textsuperscript{29}Utrecht en de Oorlogstoestand p. 20.
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid. p. 30.
\textsuperscript{31}Pictures appeared of evacuated families in Het Leven Geïllustreerd. 9, 32, Tuesday 11 August 1914, p. 1029.
\textsuperscript{32}Staatsblad. no. 435, 29 August 1914.
\textsuperscript{33}Commander-in-Chief, “Bijzonder Instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger, geldende van 10 Augustus 1914 tot nadere kennisgeving” [Extraordinary instructions for the Commander of the Field Army, applicable from 10 August 1914 until further notice] 10 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1; Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 26 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
\textsuperscript{34}Oberst-Lieutenant Galtus to Commander of Maastricht, 22 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
\textsuperscript{35}Article 1 of the neutrality regulations, see: Appendix 5, p. 455.
\textsuperscript{36}Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 27 August 1914; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 27 August 1914, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
around the clock and access to it limited to residents.\textsuperscript{37} He was especially anxious about a series of houses actually built on the border, where the front door opened into the Netherlands and the back door into Belgium. These buildings needed to be carefully guarded to prevent possible abuses of neutrality.\textsuperscript{38}

The government agreed, placing municipalities on or near the southern frontier in a \textit{staat van beleg} on 29 August.\textsuperscript{39} Neutrality rather than defence was a major justification for the decision. Commanders responsible for military authority in the south now had decisive powers to regulate the movement of people, as well as to monitor any “unneutral” activity. They ordered civilians to hand in their pistols and hunting rifles, censored newspapers, restricted access to the border area, and monitored the movement of goods, livestock and foodstuffs. In Putte, the military commander designed specific rules, limiting entry to the road marking the boundary between the Dutch and Belgian parts of the town; and closing and locking all doors, windows and shutters facing southwards along the road at night. Above all, no objects could be thrown across the street. Soldiers, police and customs officers policed the regulations constantly.\textsuperscript{40}

For many troops and civilians, the “state of war” and “siege” declarations were confusing. Undoubtedly, they added to prevailing apprehension, by indicating that although Germany had not invaded, the threat of war still remained. Many people were unsure exactly how the War Law applied to them. After the decrees of 5 and 10 August 1914, one newspaper assured its readers that they need not worry, that the “state of war” applied only to municipalities in fortified positions and the southern provinces, not, as many believed, to the entire country.\textsuperscript{41} Growing uncertainty also reflected ignorance of the War Law’s content. To help clarify the legislation and to inform citizens of their obligations, every municipality in a “state of war” or “siege” pasted posters in prominent places, outlining the

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\textsuperscript{37} Commander of the Cavalry Brigade to Commander of the Field Army, 25 August 1914; Commander of the Field Army to the Commander-in-Chief, 25 August 1914, both in ARA, “Achef van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 148.

\textsuperscript{38} Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 27 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generaal Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.

\textsuperscript{39} For an outline of “state of war” and “siege” declarations, see: Appendix 9, p. 461.


\textsuperscript{41} Ochtendblad. 14 August 1914, in “Overzicht van de voornaamste gebeurtenissen in Nederland vanaf 30 Juli 1914. dl I” in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr. 135 (11 delen)” 143.
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legal requirements. As the military authorities issued ordinances, locals were kept informed by yet more posters.42

On 1 September 1914, the Garrison Commander in Maastricht informed Buhlman (responsible for military authority in the south) of measures he had taken to secure neutrality and public order in Limburg’s capital.43 He circulated posters around the city, informing locals that: a “state of siege” applied; all civilian weapons had to be handed over to the authorities; refugees must be registered;44 all “unnecessary” groupings of people were forbidden; and all cafés must be closed by 10 pm. As an example of some bizarre bureaucratic logic, no ordinance posters could be pasted on or near shop windows as this could create precisely the “unnecessary” grouping of people that the Garrison Commander explicitly outlawed.

To make certain that troops understood their tasks in the “state of war” and “siege”, High Command explained the jurisdiction in the military newspaper.45 The Soldatencourant explained on 1 September 1914 that the “state of siege” had nothing to do with an actual siege, and that the country did not have to be at war for the government to make use of the legislation. Rather, the emergency decree

merely indicates a legal situation, in which [local] government is placed principally in the hands of the military administration, while that administration is given an exceptional power of authority.46 Nothing changed greatly in the daily routine of soldiers situated in a “state of war” or “siege”, except that they could receive orders to police regulations imposed on local residents by their commanders.

THE CONVENIENCE OF THE “STATE OF SIEGE”

The “state of siege” declaration of 29 August 1914 indicates that the government was already committed to giving the armed forces extraordinary powers to prevent potential

42 “State of siege” and “war” posters can be found in: SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr: 39” 93/1; ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 97, 98, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 246; ARA, “Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek” entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 10.43 Garrison Commander in Maastricht to Commander of the Field Army, 1 September 1914, in ARA, “Achief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 148.44 Limburg experienced an influx of Belgian, German and Austro-Hungarian refugees as soon as Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914, for which, see: Chapter 5, pp. 187 - 188.45 “Staat van beleg” Soldatencourant, no. 7, 1 September 1914, p. 4.46 “Zij geeft slechts een rechtstoestand aan, waarbij het bestuur in hoofdzaak in handen van de militaire overheid wordt gelegd, terwijl aan die overheid een exceptionele machtsbevoegdheid wordt verleend” (Ibid.).
violations of neutrality. On 8 September 1914, the cabinet took the application of the law one step further by declaring all municipalities on major waterways and ports in a "state of siege". After the declaration, the Navy could monitor goods leaving the country more efficiently, upholding its neutrality responsibility that the Dutch must not supply military materials to belligerents. Similarly, the Navy also oversaw the sale of ships to warring parties – another neutrality requirement. The "state of siege" gave patrols in the Schelde greater jurisdiction to restrict the movement of vessels into and out of the waterway, and in mid-November, the Territorial Commander in Zeeland used his authority to forbid ships sailing on the river between sunset and sunrise.

The decree of 8 September enabled naval personnel to help customs officers supervise trade leaving and entering the country, and thereby combat smuggling. Despite several export prohibitions on items that the Dutch needed or the armed forces required (including horses, clothing and footwear), the Ministry of Trade proved highly ineffective in preventing the exodus of goods. Instead, the government saw an opportunity to use border guards and naval patrols for smuggling duties. On 25 September, they placed every municipality in or near the Dutch-German border in a "state of siege", with the sole aim of helping customs officers do their job. It set a precedent for future application of the War Law for non-military matters.

Using "state of siege" jurisdiction to counter smuggling had, at this early stage in the war, very little to do with either military security or neutrality. Despite the Allied blockade of the Central Powers had begun, the Netherlands’ Overseas Trust (NOT) had not yet been established, nor had the Dutch any trade agreements in place with either Britain or Germany. Consequently, there were few external pressures on the Netherlands to monitor and restrict smuggling in September 1914. In fact, Germany, as the major benefactor from illegal trade, was only too pleased for it to continue. Contrastingly to the situation in

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47 Staatsblad. no. 448, 8 September 1914.
48 See: Appendix 5, p. 455.
49 Unsigned and undated document, marked "Zeer geheim" [Extremely confidential] 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1; Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Holland, 5 September 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 34.
50 Territorial Commander in Zeeland, poster, 18 November 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 97.
51 Staatsblad. no. 473, 6 October 1914.
52 Minister of Internal Affairs to Commander-in-Chief, 5 October 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 35.
September 1914, in 1915, smuggling was a much-discussed topic between the Netherlands and the belligerents, and, as a consequence, became a central issue for the maintenance of neutrality and security. In the context of late 1915, therefore, using the War Law to monitor illegal trade was wholly justified. In his war memoirs, Nicolaas Bosboom, explained the “state of siege” exactly in this vein - it was necessary, if only to check that NOT goods stayed in the country and that no contraband crossed the frontier.

However, in the context of September 1914, the threat smuggling posed to neutrality was less obvious. At the time, the government recognised that if smuggling became unmanageable, it was conceivable that the belligerents might accuse the Netherlands of acting unscrupulously. The Minister President, P. W. A. Cort van der Linden, explained to Snijders that smuggling brought the country closer to war. What was of far greater concern to both men was the impact of smuggling on stores of food and raw materials. Snijders was particularly anxious to meet the needs of the armed forces, and especially to suspend illegal trade in horses. Using border troops against smugglers seemed a practical step to take, although Snijders hoped that it would be a temporary measure. He did not wish troops to involve themselves too deeply in smuggling matters; they had enough trouble safeguarding territorial integrity, let alone policing what was essentially a civilian concern. Nevertheless, as the war dragged on and smuggling continued unabated, ultimately becoming an issue endangering Dutch neutrality, the military could not be freed from exercising some responsibility over trade matters. Even after the government imposed the *eerste linie* (“first line”), commanders still used their “state of siege” jurisdiction to prevent illegal trade.

The need to monitor the movement of foreigners provided another reason for the implementation of the “state of siege” in certain areas. Espionage was a matter of obvious concern to High Command. Foreigners could violate Dutch neutrality by exploiting the Netherlands non-belligerency to spy on their enemies and as a base to relay information to their governments. Of notable concern to neutrality were regions from which foreign

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53 For example, see: the piles of correspondence on the issue in ARA, “Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ‘A’ dossiers” entry no. 2.05.04, inventory no. 689, 702, 710, 712, 717, 737. Sanders, “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 80; Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 52.
54 Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 304.
55 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 26 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
56 See: Chapter 8, pp. 259 – 272, for a more detailed overview of how the military policed smuggling.
military movements could be observed, particularly the border with Belgium, the Limburg region, the banks of the Eems River, which was used by the German Navy to gain access to the North Sea, and the Friesian islands, from where naval operations in the North Sea could be surveyed. On 10 November 1914, the “state of siege” was imposed on the area around the Eems as well as all the Friesian islands, with the explicit purpose of apprehending any suspicious persons found there.\(^{57}\)

After the refugee and internee exodus from Belgium in October 1914, the many foreigners in the country increased the danger of espionage. In Dutch eyes, every refugee and internee was a potential spy, providing sufficient justification for the military to register refugees, and remove foreigners who could not produce a passport or other legitimate documentation.\(^{58}\) Escaped internees presented a neutrality threat as well, since it was the duty of a neutral to keep internees from returning to the field of battle. Snijders convincingly argued that police and Koninklijke Marechaussee had a greater chance of catching escapees if the government placed communities with internment camps in a “state of siege”\(^{59}\). Cabinet ministers agreed.\(^{60}\) From 19 January 1915, military ordinances in these “state of siege” areas forbade residents to shelter or aid escaping internees, and allowed random police searches of homes.\(^{61}\)

During 1915, the number of “state of siege” declarations increased dramatically, usually for smuggling reasons.\(^{62}\) Using the “state of siege” was convenient. Military authorities could take care of situations that would otherwise have called for complicated and time-consuming policies and laws. They could deal with potentially dangerous situations swiftly and effectively. For example, when workers at the Delft Construction Works went on strike late in August 1916, the government agreed to place the construction sites in a “state of siege”, so that the local commander could force employees back to work, troops could police any violent consequences of the strikes, and, if necessary, find

\(^{57}\) Staatsblad. no. 527, 10 November 1914; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 303.

\(^{58}\) Territorial Commander in Friesland to Commander-in-Chief, 27 December 1914, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74.

\(^{59}\) Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 10 January 1915, and reply, 18 January 1915, both in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 215.

\(^{60}\) Staatsblad. no. 18, 19 January 1915.


\(^{62}\) See: Appendix 8, p. 459, and Map 18, p. 233.
replacement workers. Cabinet ministers justified the decision because the Construction Works were an essential war industry. To lose even one day of production was considered detrimental to defence preparations.\(^63\)

The government consulted High Command before it decided to impose the “state of war” or “siege”. Since the government faced scrutiny from parliament before passing the declarations into law, such decisions were never taken lightly. There were certain areas where the government was extremely reluctant to use the War Law. For example, it refused to place the larger cities - Amsterdam, Rotterdam or The Hague - in a “state of siege”, even when there was adequate justification for it.\(^64\) Not only would the city councils have balked and made the government’s task very difficult - Dutch municipalities had a large amount of autonomy and the larger ones exercised a significant amount of influence\(^65\) the impracticalities involved in enforcing military rule would be considerable. Nevertheless, in November 1915, the government declared the waterways of Amsterdam in a “state of siege”, so that troops could supervise the movement of goods out of the port.\(^66\) Earlier, in January 1915, Snijders had hoped that the ports of Rotterdam would receive similar restrictions.\(^67\) He argued that many internees and Belgian refugees exploited the lack of military supervision there to escape the country, travel to Great Britain, and join the Allied armies. He also stressed that it would make more sense to monitor ships as they loaded their cargo, rather than stopping and searching them at the Hoek van Holland before they left for the open seas. While the cabinet was willing to impose the War Law on the port of Amsterdam (although not on the city itself), because there were no other places nearby

\(^{63}\) Minister President to Queen Wilhelmina, 24 August 1916, in ARA, “Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823 - 1977” entry no. 2.02.05.02, inventory no. 147.

\(^{64}\) Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 310; Treub, *Oorlogstijd* p. 16.


\(^{66}\) *Staatsblad*. no. 473, 16 November 1915; Commandant der Stelling van Amsterdam “Overzicht van hetgeen door het Militair Gezag binnen het gebied van de Stelling van Amsterdam is verricht, krachtens de buitengewone bevoegdheid aan dat Gezag toegestemd door de Wet van 23 May 1899 (Stbl. 128)” [Overview of what had been undertaken in the Fortified Position of Amsterdam by military authority, given the extraordinary powers of the law of 23 May 1899 (*Staatsblad*. no. 128)] 12 November 1919, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708.

\(^{67}\) Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 January 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 215.
where departing ships' contents could be inspected, Rotterdam’s trade could be checked elsewhere, so the request was unequivocally denied. 68

WHO HAS THE JURISDICTION TO DO WHAT?

While the reasons for imposing the “state of siege” varied considerably, a reflection of the different emergency situations facing the nation during the war, the actual powers assigned to the armed forces in the “state of war” and, especially, the “state of siege” were sweeping and remained largely undefined. Because the War Law existed to deal with every possible contingency, it did not explain how the “state of war” or “siege” should be administered or used. In its indeterminate nature lay the roots of substantial problems, since the legislation failed to address any practical consequences that inevitably arose. For example, the law did not define where civilian authority stopped and military authority started, or even if in the “state of siege” local government continued to exist or operate at all. 69 How the two authorities were to consult each other in the “state of war” was not addressed either, let alone what should happen when they disagreed. 70 It was impossible, if not ludicrous, to suspend the normal workings of local government and administration in the “state of war” and “siege” indefinitely, yet how municipal bodies should interact with military authorities remained entirely a mystery. 71

Of course, in the first months of war, the authorities could easily ignore any problems with the War Law. People believed the war would be over by Christmas, and thus a temporary suspension of normality was largely expected. By late 1914, however, they could no longer neglect the excesses and contradictions occurring in the “state of war” and “siege”. Many now recognised that the war had no foreseeable end and that the Netherlands would have to safeguard its neutrality indefinitely. The reasons behind the “state of war” and “siege” declarations still existed, and, during 1915, other neutrality concerns arose that made the use of the “state of siege” even more appropriate. It was imperative, therefore, that

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68 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 5 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
69 See: Article 10 and 22 of the War Law in Appendix 8, p. 459.
70 Tuinen et. al., “Het militair gezag” p. 274.
71 J. A. Eigeman, “De bevoegdheid van het militair gezag in geval van oorlog of andere buitengewone omstandigheden” [The power of military authority in case of war or other extraordinary circumstances] Orgaan van de Koninklijke Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap. 1913 - 1914, p. 121; Hasselton, “De wisseling van het opperbevel” p. 11.
the inherent contradictions in the War Law be resolved, and that, above all, the respective powers of military and civilian authority be clearly delineated and abuses avoided.

Throughout 1915 and 1916, the judiciary and government attempted to regulate military jurisdiction to remove some of the excesses and return the administration of municipalities to normal. High Command, in turn, hoped that the regulations would decrease its paperwork and limit interference by its commanders in local matters, without restricting their power of interference when and where that proved necessary. It was especially concerned that the justification for the War Law, namely that in emergency situations there should be no limits as to what could be done to safeguard the interests of the nation, was not undermined. Yet it also understood that in a period of protracted crisis, where, in fact, emergencies were the norm instead of the exception, it was entirely unfeasible to replace regular administrative processes with new ad hoc military ones.

While the government had the option of entirely redesigning the War Law, or at the very least of issuing instructions regarding how it should be interpreted, both courses of action proved time-consuming. Both Bosboom and de Jonge, in their capacity as Minister of War, tried to comprehensively revamp the legislation. In October 1915, Bosboom appointed a commission of enquiry to this end, which received full co-operation from High Command. Its recommendations helped him make some practical changes to how the armed forces exercised their “state of war” and “siege” authority and how they administered the areas under their control. The recommendations did not, however, elucidate the relationship between the military and local government. De Jonge tabled a law change in parliament in April 1918 taking these matters into account, but the elections a few months later and the Armistice in November of that year, removed its urgency and the law change was never implemented. In fact, in 1929, the revised *Oorlogswet* was removed permanently from the parliamentary agenda without debate in either legislative house.

Because they did not have a set of clear instructions to follow, the relationship between military and civic authorities in the “state of war” and “siege” tended to be fluid

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73 For which see: ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 215.
74 See: section “Causing Havoc in the Chain of Command”, pp. 252 – 256 below.
75 Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 320.
and often confusing. To ease some of the confusion, the Ministry of War set up a special telephone number to give callers advice about the law’s technicalities.\(^{76}\) Commanders often consulted lawyers or troops with legal training.\(^{77}\) In most communities, in fact, the mayor and municipal councils continued to govern as they had in peacetime with minimal involvement by the local commander. Even in the “state of siege”, the daily functioning of municipalities was barely affected by military command.\(^{78}\) In Utrecht, which existed in a “state of war”, the municipal council established a “legal committee” (rechtskundige comité) as an intermediary between itself and the Commander of the New Holland Waterline so they could fulfill the legal requirement of consultation.\(^{79}\) The Provincial Governors also functioned as important points of contact between the armed forces and local authorities.\(^{80}\)

Conflict between the military and municipal bodies was inevitable, however, as were misinterpretations of the law.\(^{81}\) In his memoirs, de Jonge described how “military authority was not always exercised with tact and modesty”.\(^{82}\) This was not surprising given that commanders had no training in local administration. Since the “state of siege” officially gave commanders enormous powers, many believed that civilian authorities should do as they told them to, showing little understanding of the subtleties of local politics.

In an attempt to alleviate some misgivings, Bosboom released a directive in March 1915, explaining how Articles 10 and 22 of the War Law should be interpreted, namely that all public ordinances had to be declared by the military authorities, even if the ordinance originated from within the municipality.\(^{83}\) Nevertheless, commanders could not impose any regulations themselves if there was no clear military need to do so. In other words,

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\(^{78}\) Hasselton, “De wisseling van het opperbevel” p. 55.  
\(^{80}\) Bos-Rops, “De Commissaris en de vluchtelingen” p. 102.  
\(^{81}\) Unfortunately outside the scope of this study, the manner in which the military exercised authority in individual municipalities demands further research.  
\(^{82}\) “[H]et militair gezag werd niet altijd met tact en bescheidenheid uitgeoefend” (Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, in Wal (ed.), *Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge* p. 21).  
municipal councils, mayors and other local bodies had to initiate all non-military decisions. Hence, they continued to play a central part in local administration. Bosboom’s edict did acknowledge that municipalities retained prosecution powers (strafrechtelijke bevoegdheid), except where they explicitly interfered with military regulations. Snijders questioned the validity of the directive and worried about the extra work-load it placed on commanders. He suggested that municipalities could continue to govern as long as they did not interfere with military decisions. Bosboom did not entirely disagree, but in the interest of consistency, urged the Commander-in-Chief to comply with his instruction anyway. In fact, the directive ensured that the armed forces became more involved in the running of municipalities, since they now had to rubber-stamp every decision. This was in sharp contrast to what Cort van der Linden insisted on in September 1914, when he asked Snijders to make sure that “state of siege” commanders abstained from involving themselves in local government, except where necessary for smuggling reasons.

The government did restrict the nature of the “state of siege” in one particular way, by removing the right to establish krijgraden (military courts). As long as the nation was not at war, military courts would not function, and the normal judicial system continued. The distinction between a time of war and peace had two important consequences. Firstly, it ensured that peacetime protocols applied to military courts martial. As a result, sentences handed out to deserting soldiers were not as severe as they would have been if the country joined the war. Secondly, residents arrested for breaking the “state of war” and “siege” regulations were tried in regular courts, by a civilian judiciary rather than a military panel.

As a result, when arrestees faced trial, the courts had the chance to define and interpret the War Law at will. The High Court made several important rulings during the war, which changed the jurisdiction and powers of “state of siege” authorities substantially. The first significant “state of siege” case appeared in front of High Court judges in May 1915, after a Military District Commander (kantonnementscommandant) told local police

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84 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 10 June 1915; Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 1 October 1915, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 179.
85 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 17 August 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174.
86 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 26 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
87 Staatsblad. no. 490, 16 October 1914.
that they could not arrest soldiers for civilian crimes without his prior consent. This was a clear abuse of the boundaries of the *Oorlogswet* and, consequently, the High Court ruled against the *kantonmentscommandant*. \(^{89}\)

In January 1916, the High Court declared that commanders in the "state of war" must consult with whomever normally dealt with the decision they wanted to enforce, in order to prevent inappropriate use of "state of war" jurisdiction. Hence, for municipal matters, they should approach the mayor or local council, and for provincial concerns, the Provincial Governor. \(^{90}\) On 6 March 1916, the court further dictated how commanders applied Articles 10 and 22. A case brought by the town of Vlijmen against a baker who refused to abide by a municipal regulation, had been thrown out by a District Court judge months earlier on the basis that Vlijmen was in a "state of siege", and that, therefore, the armed forces ran the municipality. This ruling agreed entirely with the Minister of War's directive of March 1915. However, on appeal, the High Court overturned the ruling in favour of the municipality. Despite the fact that military authorities had a right to design regulations, the judges decided that civil authorities could also continue to do so, as long as they did not interfere with military decrees. \(^{91}\)

The ruling had several significant results. Bosboom had to retract his directive and civil authorities retained their peacetime responsibilities (as Snijders had suggested all along). \(^{92}\) After the ruling, Snijders issued instructions that commanders should avoid mixing in municipal affairs except when matters of military necessity or public order and safety arose. \(^{93}\) Nevertheless, they also had to remain extra vigilant, in case the local council or mayor issued proclamations that did not reflect the current situation. Less than three months later, the High Court curbed military jurisdiction even further. On 9 June 1916, it declared that the *Oorlogswet* did not give commanders unlimited powers. When they regulated civilian life, they could only act within the jurisdiction normally accorded to local

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\(^{89}\) Eigeman, "De praktijk der 'Oorlogswet'" p. 363.


\(^{92}\) Eigeman, "De praktijk der 'Oorlogswet'" p. 365; Clarenbeek, "De Oorlogswet voor Nederland" fn 18.

\(^{93}\) Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander Overijssel, 18 March 1916, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no 436.
civilians. They had to keep to the boundaries of the Gemeentewet (Municipal Law) and Provincialewet (Provincial Law).

In November 1916, the government also tempered the powers of the “state of siege”, when it amended the jurisdiction of commanders to emergencies only. This decision came after many objections to the powers of the “state of siege” in comparison to those of the “state of war”. After the November decree, local government bodies were held responsible for all local matters, and any decisions made by commanders, which did not deal specifically with defence or neutrality, had to be discussed with the municipal authorities first. In effect, the government tempered the “state of siege” and brought its jurisdiction much closer to that of the “state of war”, where consultation was already mandatory. Nevertheless, for matters concerning defence and neutrality, the powers of the military in the “state of siege” remained all-encompassing.

The “state of war” and “siege” faced further challenges from High Court judges through 1918. On 5 April, for instance, they ruled that the military could not determine what shopkeepers did with their goods, as smuggling and trade policy were the responsibility of central government, not of municipal authorities. Because the “state of siege” did not exist throughout the country, the armed forces could not exercise any authority over national concerns. As a result, the government had to compensate all merchants affected by such regulations up to that date. The ruling came two years after new smuggling legislation had come into effect, which had specifically removed responsibility for trade matters from the armed forces. However, the law of April 1916 did not give enough powers to customs officials to stem smuggling, so the government had kept
the "state of siege" in place for this purpose. The High Court decision in April 1918 clearly signalled that this was inappropriate. A little over two months later, the court also decided that the Commander of the Fortified Position of the Mouths of the Maas River could not improve his fortifications using War Law jurisdiction, because Article 22 only gave him powers over local, and not national, matters. The court re-emphasised an important point: that commanders could not make decisions beyond those normally assigned to local governments, except during a true emergency. As a result, the extraordinary powers the military seemingly enjoyed were severely stifled. Ironically, it was not until after the Armistice was signed, that the new reading of the War Law came into effect. It would not be tested until the next crisis of neutrality in September 1939.

The High Court rulings in 1918 brought the legality of the government's decision to use the War Law for non-military matters into serious doubt. In fact, the two rulings of 1918 caused considerable upheaval, since many smuggling controls depended on "state of siege" declarations. As an intermediary measure, while the cabinet worked on more comprehensive anti-smuggling laws, which would allow the "state of siege" to be revoked, it declared that all "state of siege" regulations that dealt with trade matters would remain in place. Again ironically, parliamentarians accepted the revised anti-smuggling laws in February 1919, after the war had drawn to a close and the "states of war" and "siege" had lost their urgency.

Due to judicial rulings and government decrees, military commanders were more certain about what they could and could not do in the "state of war" and "siege", but the powers that they may have wanted and needed were seriously undermined. It ensured that by late 1918, the perceived purpose of the War Law, namely that "need breaks law", had largely disappeared. The Oorlogswet had gone full circle, from being implemented in

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99 Staatsblad. no. 604, 22 November 1918.
100 Commander Division IV, "Verslag ingevolge art. 6 van de Wet van 23 Mei 1899 (staatsblad No 128 betreffende de uitoefening van het Militair Gezag in de provinciën Noord- Brabant, Limburg en Gelderland bezuiden van den Boven- Rijn (voor een deel ook wel "Bijlandsche Kanaal" geheeten) en de Waal, buiten het gebied der Stellingen en afzonderlijke Forten, alsmede in de Gemeenten Standdaardbuiten en Zevenbergen en in het gedeelte van de Gemeente Rilland- Bath, gelegen op den Noord- Brabantschen wal van de Ooster- en Wester- Schelde" 5 May 1920, p. 10, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708.
101 Commander Fortified Position of Den Helder to Commander-in-Chief, 14 October and 10 December 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 215; Eigeman, "De bevoegdheid van het militair gezag" p. 89; Hasselton, "De wisseling van het opperbevel" p. 40.
1914 to enhance the Netherlands' neutrality and defence, clearly both matters of nation importance, to being useful solely for municipal concerns, which was something that many in parliament and in the armed forces had wanted the armed forces to stay out of as much as possible. Of course, if the Netherlands had been invaded, then the entire country would have been placed in a “state of siege” and the Commander-in-Chief would have obtained ultimate control over national as well as regional affairs.

**CAUSING HAVOC IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND**

While the War Law gave the armed forces extraordinary powers, the government in 1899 had not considered how it would operate within the existing organisation. Like all armed forces, the Dutch Army and Navy operated within a strict chain of command, where rank determined authority. Neither the War Law itself, nor its amendments, recognised that the “state of war” and “siege” interfered with the military hierarchy in a fundamental way, namely by creating an additional “civilian” jurisdiction. In itself, assigning specific responsibilities to particular commanders was not a problem, were it not for the fact that “civilian” authority was not derived from the chain of command but directly from the government. This meant that commanders in the “state of war” and “siege” could order their subordinates in terms of both “civilian” and “military” jurisdiction, but higher-ranked officers, who had no “civilian” powers, could not overrule or make any changes to the “state of war” or “siege”. This applied even if the higher-ranked commander was in charge of defence matters in the region.

During the war, it was not uncommon for a “state of siege” commander to hold a lower rank than another officer posted in the same region. In Overijssel, the Commander of Division II, Major-General J. Burger (in charge of provincial defence) outranked the Territorial Commander, Colonel G. A. van der Brugghen, who was responsible for the “state of siege”. While the Divisional Commander retained control over all troops in the province, the Territorial Commander could commandeer them for “state of siege” matters. Burger could not question van der Brugghen’s actions, or refuse to provide him

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102 Territorial Commander in North Brabant to Commander of the Field Army, 13 September 1914, in ARA, “Achief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 264.
103 Commander-in-Chief to Commander Division II, 4 March 1916; Commander-in-Chief to Commander Division II and Territorial Commander Overijssel, 6 March 1916, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no.
with troops, causing problems when the two issued contradictory orders. The prospect of two commanders exercising “state of siege” jurisdiction in the same area existed as well. For example, in Zeeland, the Territorial Commander officially controlled all “state of siege” matters, except in the fortified positions, where the local fortification commander exercised control. Again, this was problematic when they issued conflicting commands.

Because the Ministers of War and the Navy appointed all “state of war” and “siege” authorities, even Snijders had no say over what happened in the “state of war” and “siege”, except in cases where the government assigned him as ultimate authority. In other words, Snijders could order commanders to do as he pleased for defence reasons, but could not interfere with their decisions in the “state of war” or “siege”. This contradicted his instructions of appointment in August 1914, which clearly stated that the Commander-in-Chief was personally in charge of maintaining neutrality, the principal rationale behind introducing the “state of war” and “siege”. It was also inconsistent with the expectation that if the government declared the whole country to be in a “state of siege”, then Snijders was automatically responsible for exercising that authority.

An associated concern was that commanders could not delegate their powers, since only the government could select who controlled the “state of war” and “siege”. This made Buhlman’s, and subsequently, van Terwisga’s, jobs as Commander of the Field Army extremely taxing. The Commander of the Field Army was in charge of the “state of siege” in most of the south. In September 1914, Buhlman assigned some of the authority to his divisional commanders, to ease his work-load and speed up the implementation of regulations. At the time, Snijders warned him that delegating authority might be illegal,

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104 Commander-in-Chief to Commander Division II, 16 March 1916, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 194.
105 Commander Coastal Battery at Neuzen, “Dagboek van 5 Augustus 1914 t/m 31 December 1914 omtrent de uitoefening van het Militair Gezag te Neuzen Hoek en Zaamslag” 6 August 1914, p. 2, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 98.
106 See also: conflict between the Territorial Commander in North Brabant and the Commander of the Fortified Position of Hollandsch Diep and Volkerak, August 1914, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 96.
107 According to Article 7 of the War Law, see: Appendix 8, p. 459.
109 Article 3, “Instructie voor den Opperbevelhebber”, in Ibid.
110 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 16 September 1914, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
and that he must make his subordinates aware that ultimate responsibility for any of their regulations lay with him. Nevertheless, Snijders did not think it necessary for the commander to reverse his decision. In fact, after the government appointed Snijders in charge of the “state of siege” in and around internment camps in January 1915, he entrusted many of his powers to camp commanders as well. However, on 26 June 1916, the High Court declared that the law did not allow for delegation, and that, as a result, all proclamations made by officers not authorised to do so were invalid. The ruling potentially undermined High Command’s plans and operations, as commanders could not be shifted at will away from their “state of war” and “siege” areas, nor could they be replaced, unless the government appointed others immediately.

In May 1916, the cabinet tabled a law clarification in parliament, to deal specifically with issues of delegation and the respective powers of the military and civil authorities. Members of parliament avidly scrutinised and criticised the proposed changes, before finally accepting amended versions on November 1916. The first decree that month fixed the problems of delegation and Snijder’s untenable position. From this time onwards, Snijders held responsibility for military authority alongside the local commander in the “state of war” and “siege”. The instructions accompanying the decree also detailed that if two or more military authorities exercised control in one territory, then the highest ranked officer had the final say. In other words, in the province of North Brabant, where both the Territorial Commander and van Terwisga (as head of the Field Army) were responsible for military authority, van Terwisga could overrule any decisions made by the Territorial Commander. The decree did not, however, outline what happened when the

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111 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 19 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1, also in ARA, “Achive van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 148.
112 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 18 January 1915, and reply, 19 January 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 215.
113 Hasselton, “De wisseling van het opperbevel” p. 42
114 Ibid. p. 43.
116 Staatsblad. no. 488, 2 November 1916.
117 “Instructie voor de Autoriteiten, overeenkomstig artikel 7 van de, sedert gewijzigde, wet van 23 Mei 1899 (Staatsblad No. 128), aangewezen voor de uitoefening van het militair gezag” [Instructions for the authorities, appointed to military authority regarding the, since then modified, law of 23 May 1899 (Staatsblad. no. 128)] Staatsblad. no. 488, 2 November 1916.
operational commander (without “civilian” jurisdiction) out-ranked the local “state of siege” authority, a matter that was never satisfactorily addressed.

Article 4 of the new instruction also reinstated the right of delegation in all but name. Consequently, Snijders took charge of “state of war” and “siege” matters from November 1916 onwards. On the 10th, he declared that internment camp commanders could make military decisions for their locality and that van Terwisga could appoint subordinates to administer his vast area of control. Not only could authority be delegated, but uniformity could also be imposed across the various “state of siege” regions. This was especially important for tackling smuggling, and Snijders banned known smugglers from all “state of siege” regions nationwide. The instructions enabled local military commanders to take on far more responsibility for the day-to-day running of the “state of war” and “siege” in their area. Of course, as the High Court restricted the actual powers enjoyed in the “state of war” and “siege”, these responsibilities diminished in importance.

CONCLUSION

The High Court rulings on the “state of war” and “siege” reflected general public opinion. Many citizens believed that the *staat van beleg* offered too many inappropriate...
powers to the armed forces. They were also highly critical of the government for using the armed forces to take charge of trade and smuggling offences in the first place. 124 Few could accept that military intervention for neutrality reasons was entirely necessary. After Bosboom's directive in March 1915, commanders' names appeared at the bottom of each municipal ordinance and as a result, military power seemed much greater than it actually was. From a rudimentary analysis of published municipal council records in Dordrecht (placed in a "state of war" in August 1914) and Zwolle (placed in a "state of siege" in December 1916), 125 for example, the impact of military rule on the running of the towns seemed next to negligible. 126 By late 1918, the only official power left to the military in the "state of war" or "siege" pertained to emergencies; all other powers had returned to the municipalities. While the country remained out of war, and the "state of siege" only applied to particular localities, commanders could not impose any regulations that dealt with national issues, including smuggling or export prohibitions. In fact, by 1918, the High Court had rejected many of the objectives for the "state of siege" identified by Snijders in 1915, namely to: control smuggling; support the government and its neutrality measures; ensure the civilian population was well-fed and healthy; protect public order and safety; and regulate export prohibitions in harbours and ports. 127

Nevertheless, that the government felt compelled to use the extraordinary powers of the War Law is indicative of the unique circumstances facing the Netherlands between 1914 and 1918. The country had to deal with the consequences of its neutrality at a time of high uncertainty. Breaches of neutrality quickly moved away from matters of defence,

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125 General Headquarters, "Lijst van alle gemeenten der provinciën, met aanduiding, welke gemeenten, of onderdeelen daarvan, in staat van oorlog of in staat van beleg zijn verklaard en met vermelding van de gezagsgebieden, waartoe zij behooren, alsmede van de Koninklijke besluiten, waarbij het in staat van oorlog of in staat van beleg verklaren plaats vond." 1 September 1917, in SMG/DC, "Handschrift nr: 39" 93/1.
deterrence and border integrity to a variety of internal concerns. The armed forces were ideally placed to look after these additional concerns, although they contributed to many of the administrative and judicial concerns outlined above. Using troops to manage civilian matters at a time when the country was not at war was controversial, but the mere fact that a neutrality problem could result in a violation of security made military involvement in such matters almost inevitable.
Ash-Grey with Neutrality: Safeguarding Neutrality in the State of Siege

From early August 1914, [the Army] was assigned more and more unexpected tasks. Sections of the Army were designated to undertakings for which they were not intended in the first place. 

W. de Vries

Much of what the military did in, or on behalf of, the “state of siege” could be justified in terms of Dutch neutrality. Countering espionage, monitoring the movement of foreigners and goods, and censoring newspapers all had neutrality and security ends at heart. Smuggling controls were especially significant, and illustrate how maintaining neutrality from within a nation could prove controversial both internationally and domestically. Unlike external neutrality concerns, internal neutrality standards had few precedents in international law, apart from the expectation that a neutral should treat every belligerent impartially. Dutch neutrality regulations also did not define breaches of internal neutrality, apart from forbidding its citizens to supply military materials to warring forces.

Due to this lack of clarity, there was plenty of opportunity for misunderstandings to arise between the Dutch and their neighbours, whether the neutrality violations came in the form of smugglers, warmongers, or spies. Yet, like the ambiguities of economic neutrality, the uncertain nature of internal neutrality meant that warring states were less likely to use a violation as a reason to go to war, unless the advantage gained by their enemy or the disadvantage for themselves was too great.

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2 Efraim Karsh has stressed the importance of distinguishing between internal and external neutrality (Neutrality and Small States pp. 22 - 24).
3 See: Appendix 5, p. 455.
4 See: Chapter 6, p. 200.
Unlike most other forms of neutrality maintenance, internal neutrality depended almost entirely upon the neutral government’s ability to keep its population in check. It was a domestic matter, which perhaps explains why upholding internal neutrality was far more controversial among the Dutch than external neutrality. The population was easily alienated when the government, or the military in the “state of war” or “siege”, curbed civic freedoms. Since the link between neutrality regulations, such as censorship restrictions, and an actual threat to national security was difficult to establish and rarely accepted by the Dutch, introducing strict standards of public behaviour was at best a challenge and at worst impossible. While “state of siege” jurisdiction gave the armed forces more powers to enforce neutrality measures than were available to the government, the use of these extraordinary powers was met with considerable resistance.

Through the “state of siege”, the armed forces became heavily involved in policing internal neutrality, a role for which they were unprepared, and in many respects did not wish to undertake. To a certain extent, external and internal neutrality responsibilities could not be separated. Snijders’ instructions to Buhlman on 10 August 1914 illustrate this well: the Commander of the Field Army’s primary obligation was to external neutrality, by interning foreign soldiers and patrolling the borders. His second duty was to maintain peace and order among civilians in Field Army areas, and prevent any breaches of neutrality from inside the country. Ensuring the Field Army could meet an invasion ranked only third among his immediate responsibilities. Already at this early stage, therefore, it was clear that both external and internal neutrality had priority over defence.

THE WAR ON GOODS

Although no official (or, for that matter, consistent) figures are available, the estimates of illicit goods leaving the country between 1914 and 1918 are staggering. Anton Smidt calculated that during two months (June and July 1915) in the small border communities of Putte and Ossendrecht alone, 175,000 kilogrammes of flour and 223,000 kilogrammes of rice crossed the border unlawfully. He also noted that on one night in

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5 Commander-in-Chief, “Bijzonder Instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger, geldende van 10 Augustus 1914 tot nadere kennisgeving” 10 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
6 Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 49.
1915, border guards arrested 150 people trying to reach Belgium to smuggle.\(^7\) Another historian, Marc Frey, looking at goods entering Germany, estimated that after July 1916, 80 per cent of butter exports to Germany were smuggled.\(^8\) It is no wonder then, that Britain was so concerned about the impact of smuggling on the Agricultural Agreements signed in 1916. At the time, the Netherlands’ Overseas Trust (NOT) estimated that military patrols and customs officers only intercepted ten per cent of the total amount of smuggled goods.\(^9\) Subsequently, some historians believed that this NOT approximation was far too high, and that the true figure sat between one and five per cent.\(^10\) Given that thousands of kilogrammes of products were intercepted at the border, even the higher NOT assessment indicates that smuggling was out of control.\(^11\)

One of the major reasons for declaring rivers, ports and border regions to be in a “state of siege” in September 1914, was to combat smuggling, thereby burdening soldiers with anti-smuggling duties.\(^12\) Commanders in charge of the “state of siege” enforced a variety of restrictions on the movement of goods, their sale, storage and consumption.\(^13\) They prohibited access to the area within 500 metres of the border, except for residents or farmers with land there; in some places, this distance increased to 1,000 metres.\(^14\) Military patrols would shoot at individuals found in the restricted zone, especially at night. They received specific orders to refrain from sending warning shots into the air because it gave smugglers time to head for safety on the other side of the border.\(^15\) By the end of 1915, soldiers had shot 62 suspected smugglers.\(^16\) A year later, a local newspaper in Limburg

\(^7\) Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” pp. 87 – 88.
\(^8\) Frey, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande p. 197.
\(^9\) Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 82; Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 51. According to Frey the official NOT figure was seven per cent (Frey, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande p. 195).
\(^10\) Ibid.
\(^11\) See: Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” (p. 50) for a selected list of smuggled goods recovered between 1 January 1915 and 15 November 1915.
\(^12\) See: Chapter 7, p. 241.
\(^13\) Military decrees and posters can be found in: SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr: 39” 93/1; ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 33, 34, 97, 202, 203, 205; ARA, “Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek” entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 7, 10; ARA, “ Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 179; Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Documenten voor de Economische Crisis van Nederland Volumes 1 – 4. See also: Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” for an overview of the role the military played in combating smuggling.
\(^15\) Commander of the 48 LI Batallion, order, 27 June 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484.
\(^16\) Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 86; Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 137.
noted that 300 suspected smugglers had been killed in the province. At other times, smugglers shot back, part of the reason why commanders banned gun ownership in the “state of siege”. Troops also put in place other anti-smuggling measures, including placing barbed wire obstructions along particular stretches of border, prohibiting people from walking their dogs after 10 pm and enforcing other curfews. They also prohibited markets and banned the hawking of goods in an attempt to avoid creating an environment for smugglers to group together and sell their wares.

It was not only a question of capturing offenders as they crossed the frontier but also of preventing supplies from reaching frontier towns. By mid-1915, military authorities specifically targeted goods coming into their region and the government declared municipalities further inland in a “state of siege”, to stop smugglers establishing their base of operations there. All cargo entering and leaving “state of siege” municipalities had to be accompanied by documentation citing origin, destination, and mode of transportation. Troops patrolled roads, canals, and train stations, and seized undocumented cargo. Occasionally, they even closed down factories suspected of supplying smuggling rings.

The measures were far from flawless: they were hard to police and mayors had real trouble ascertaining (beyond a very rough estimation) appropriate quantities of bread, potatoes and petroleum, or verifying that a person (or shop) had stored too much.

Of special concern to High Command was the large number of horses that managed to cross into Germany. The government imposed an export prohibition on horses on 3 August 1914, principally because the Cavalry Brigade did not have enough, and also...
because they were contraband. In January 1915, Buhlman ordered mayors in border towns to register horse ownership. Elsewhere, other “state of siege” commanders followed suit. The regulation achieved little. In June 1915, Buhlman wrote to Snijders that the number of horses smuggled across the border remained extremely high. He explained how, within the space of three days, all sorts of “suspicious” persons in Sittard bought a total of 132 horses. Where before the war, real estate agents, bakers, and mine-workers had no need for a horse, they were now intent on ownership. According to the Field Army Commander, most of the 132 animals would “mysteriously disappear” or be “stolen” in the following weeks. The mayor of another Limburg border town, Brunssum, which normally lodged around 60 horses, registered 329, most of which ended up across the border. In 1913, there were 334,000 horses accounted for in the records, while in 1918 this number had actually increased to 378,300, but these figures merely conceal the problem. It is impossible to guess at the number smuggled. All that is known is that many thousand reached Germany or Belgium.

Buhlman further explained that it was very difficult for the authorities to prove that horses were being systematically transferred across the border, unless smugglers were caught in the act. He did not believe it was possible to do anything to stop the practice either, although he hoped that horse movements would be regulated. In a similar vein, the Commander of the Second Division of Koninklijke Marechaussee complained that mayors helped smugglers by not taking the registration process seriously. He worked out that in the Heerlen area alone, at least 500 horses were supposedly “stolen” within a space of six months. He also believed that stopping horses reaching border provinces might help. Subsequently, Buhlman made the transportation of horses into his “state of siege” areas

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24 Director of Remontewezen (horse supply) to Commander-in-Chief, 9 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 34.
25 Commander of the Second Division Koninklijke Marechaussee to Commander of the Field Army, 16 July 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 183.
26 Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Documenten voor de Economische Crisis van Nederland Volume 2, pp. 121 – 122.
27 Bordewijk, “War Finances in the Netherlands” p. 118.
28 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 19 June 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 170.
29 Commander of the Second Division Koninklijke Marechaussee to Commander of the Field Army, 16 July 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 183.
30 Ibid.
illegal; elsewhere, another commander prohibited farmers from grazing horses within two kilometres of the border.31

High Command also worried about the movement of staple foodstuffs into Belgium, especially bread and grain. German authorities in Belgium did not accept responsibility for feeding locals, and on occupation of the country made it clear that food supplies would have to come from abroad.32 The Committee for the Relief of Belgium, an American organisation that received much support from other neutrals, shipped food to the Netherlands, and the Dutch transported it to Belgium.33 Nevertheless, the supplies were barely sufficient, and often could not reach Europe due to the war at sea. Consequently, bread shortages were common and Belgians would pay twice as much for a loaf of bread than the maximum price set by the government in the Netherlands.34 For Dutch residents in the south, taking loaves to nearby Belgian towns was a rewarding enterprise. Despite requests from municipal councils and commanders, the government did not wish to impose a general export ban on cereals since bread shortages were, at least in the first year of war, contained to border regions.35

Instead, in some “state of siege” areas, commanders imposed their own export prohibitions on bread and grain often in consultation with the local mayor,36 ensuring that no bakery products could be taken across the border without permission. Authority for the prohibition came from article 11 of the Oorlogswet, which allowed authorities to manage the well-being and health of the civilian population, including the regulation of its food

33 See: Chapter 1, pp. 52 - 53.
34 Staatsblad. no. 351, 3 August 1914.
35 Commander III Battalion 16 RI to Commander “Division Group Brabant”, 18 August 1915; “Staat houdende opgaf der uitgevoerde hoeveelheid wittebrood langs het grenskantoor GOIRLE gedurende de maanden Januari tot en met Juli - en van de eersten tot en met zeventiende Augustus 1915” [Report of amount of white bread exported past the border post Goirle during the months January up to and including July - and from the first to seventeenth of August 1915] both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 168.
36 Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Overijssel, 20 October 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 150; Commander of the Field Army to Head Librarian of the Royal Library (Koninklijke Bibliotheek) in The Hague, 25 April 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek” entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 10; Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Documenten voor de Economische Crisis Volume 2, pp. 117 – 118.
supplies. An exception was made for bread destined for Belgian towns near the Dutch border, after the government came to an agreement with the Commission for the Regulation of Living Needs of the Belgian Border Municipalities (Commissie tot regeling der voorziening van noodzakelijke levensbehoeften in Belgische grensgemeenten). As long as sufficient loaves remained in Dutch bakeries, excess stock could be sold in Belgium.

Occasionally, commanders also regulated food consumption. Long before the government rationed bread, the military restricted the production of white bread. For example, in October 1914, during a protracted period of flour shortages in Zeeland, the Territorial Commander ordered that bakers could only bake bread containing 20 per cent white flour. He also instructed that farmers growing rye for cattle feed had to sell it to bakeries. The baking and storage regulations were usually temporary, lasting only until regular grain imports returned to normal. Mid-way through 1916, the government replaced the ad hoc regulations imposed by the military and municipal councils with a comprehensive Distribution Law that applied to the entire nation.

The regulation of bread production and consumption in the “state of siege” was a convenience, affecting neither neutrality nor national security. But military authorities in the south felt entirely within their right to monitor the trade in, and production of, bread because it affected the welfare of residents. Of course, after Bosboom’s directive in March 1915, all municipal regulations had to be officially authorised by commanders, so consumption became an integral part of military responsibilities. Once the Distribution Law came into effect and the powers of commanders in the “state of siege” decreased, their involvement in distribution disappeared almost entirely.

37 See: Appendix 8, p. 459.
38 Commission for the Regulation of Living Needs of Belgian Border Municipalities (Commissie tot regeling der voorziening van noodzakelijke levensbehoeften in Belgische grensgemeenten) to Royal Library Department of Documentation, 11 May 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek” entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 10.
39 Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 4 January 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 167; Territorial Commander in Zeeland, “Overzicht van de maatregelen der militaire overheid t.o.v levensmiddelen in de provincie Zeeland” May 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek” entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 10; Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 178.
41 Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Documenten voor de Economische Crisis van Nederland Volume 2 p. 130.
42 See: Chapter 9, pp. 310 - 324.
In February 1915, Buhlman declared an export restriction on copper coins. Locals moved large amounts of money moved across the border to make ample use of favourable exchange rates in Belgium and Germany. As copper was a prohibited export commodity, Buhlman believed it appropriate to restrict the movement of copper specie. His decision resulted from difficulties experienced in late 1914, when he noted a marked increase in the circulation of German currency in Limburg, most probably caused by the sale of smuggled goods in Germany and exchange of Dutch guilders; some Limburg employers even paid their staff in German currency. For reasons that remain unclear, the government was unwilling to declare the import or export of money illegal. Buhlman had no such compunction, prohibiting the movement of copper coins. Likewise, the Territorial Commander attempted to dissuade smugglers in Friesland by forbidding payments in foreign currency in his “state of siege” communities.

Despite every effort to make them work, the many anti-smuggling measures imposed in the “state of siege” actually did very little to decrease instances of illegal trade. As the regulations became more repressive, smugglers became more cunning. On 3 August 1915, the government passed a law making it compulsory for all merchants to register and document the movement of their goods throughout the country. When widespread shortages made smuggling an issue of national welfare, some military authorities even requested that priests preach against the “sin” of smuggling in their Sunday sermons. If the call to conscience was ever made in Groesbeek, a mostly Catholic village of notorious smugglers, it went unheeded. In February 1916, the local military commander there took the radical step of raising electric streetlights throughout the community so that it was easier to spot people leaving their houses at night.

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43 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 26 February 1915, ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 167.
44 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 14 November 1914; Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Finance, 18 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 96.
45 Territorial Commander in Friesland to military commanders, 10 February 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 202.
46 Staatsblad. no. 532, 3 August 1915.
48 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 20 February 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 293.
The smuggling epidemic placed a great burden on the judicial system. In 1915, the police arrested 37,000 suspected smugglers.\textsuperscript{49} By 1917, the city of Arnhem alone nearly matched this figure, with 25,602 smuggling cases before the local court, a figure replicated in border towns throughout the country.\textsuperscript{50} The courts could not handle the huge increases; it took months for a case to come to trial, and many smugglers never made it to court.\textsuperscript{51} Still, the number of convicted smugglers rose considerably.\textsuperscript{52} There was little prison space to house all the new criminals, a reason why judges preferred to fine rather than jail smugglers. The offenders took advantage of the system, often paying their relatively small fines out of their profits.

| TABLE 9: NUMBERS OF CONVICTED SMUGGLERS, 1914 - 1917\textsuperscript{53} |
|------------------|---|
| 1914             | 29 |
| 1915             | 6,313\textsuperscript{54} |
| 1916             | 10,960 |
| 1917             | 9,758 |
| **Total (1914 – 1917):** | **27,060** |

By July 1915, it was all too apparent that the measures taken so far had not curbed smuggling. From that time onwards, military commanders removed known and suspected offenders from “state of siege” districts,\textsuperscript{55} using article 33 of the Oorlogswet, which authorised the removal of any person deemed to be a danger to public order.\textsuperscript{56} Individual commanders could decide who to banish and who could stay; none faced trial.\textsuperscript{57} The

\textsuperscript{49} Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 50; Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 81.
\textsuperscript{51} Minister of Justice, B. Ort, to Commander-in-Chief, 18 September 1915, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174.
\textsuperscript{52} See: Table 9, p. 266.
\textsuperscript{53} Riedel, “De smokkelarij” p. 209.
\textsuperscript{54} Includes 5,133 smugglers convicted of violating military regulations (Riedel, “De smokkelarij” p. 209).
\textsuperscript{55} For an example of a removal notice see: SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr: 39” 93/1.
\textsuperscript{56} See: Appendix 8, p. 459.
\textsuperscript{57} Commander-in-Chief to military commanders responsible for military authority, 8 September 1915, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174.
removed persons could not return for three months. The period of expulsion doubled if offenders were caught again, and they remained liable for conviction in the civilian courts. 58

By November 1918, the military had banished thousands of suspected and known smugglers out of the “state of siege”. 59 But the measure was not always effective. Above all, it was difficult to police. Although local police, the Koninklijke Marechaussee and troops monitoring traffic had lists of names, descriptions and sometimes photographs, it was extremely difficult to check the movement of people. 60 Likewise, while “state of siege” jurisdiction only applied to particular localities, a smuggler banished from one area, could continue operating in a neighbouring one. 61

Child smugglers also raised considerable concern. Often parents used their children as carriers on the assumption that a child would not be punished as severely as an adult. Because the state could not legally remove dependents from their parents, children were exempted from removal out of the “state of siege” until 1917. 62 Instead, the courts dealt more promptly with juvenile offenders and imposed age-appropriate punishments, including disciplinary school. 63 In 1917, military authorities took the drastic step of expelling an entire family when one of their offspring was caught smuggling on two occasions. Families from North Brabant often ended up in the Belgian refugee camp at Nunspeet for the expulsion period. 64

58 Minister of War to Commander “Division Group Brabant”, 21 September 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174.
59 According to Hasselton the decision to remove individuals from the “state of siege” was rarely used (Hasselton, “De wisseling van het opperbevel” p. 56). In fact, hundreds, if not thousands, of people were removed out of “state of siege” areas. For lists of people and the reasons they were removed from the “state of siege”, see: ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174, 202; ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 290; ARA, “Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek” entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 7, 10; Commander in Zeeland, “Mobilisatieverslag 1917”, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696. See also: Moeyes, Buiten Schot p. 131.
60 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 2 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
61 This no longer applied in 1917, when the Commander-in-Chief could impose restrictions on all “state of siege” areas at once.
63 Minister of Justice to Commander-in-Chief, 18 September 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174.
Despite these harsher rules, smuggling continued virtually unabated. Part of the problem was that there were not enough troops available to patrol the borders constantly. Greater knowledge of local geography, allowed smugglers to employ hidden paths and convenient hiding places. It did not help that many border guards smuggled as well, while others earned a substantial income from accepting bribes. Buhlman estimated that they could earn anything between f50 to f100 for letting a horse pass the border unnoticed. This was a huge sum of money given that the average conscript earned less than f2 a day. Hundreds of troops received court martial summons for smuggling. Most of them ended up at either Fort Crévecoeur or Fort Ellewoutsdijk, two military prisons set up specifically to deal with these cases. Because landweer troops tended to guard the borders of the province in which they lived, it was generally believed that they smuggled more than other troops. Anton Smidt’s research has uncovered, however, that Field Army troops were as likely to get involved in illicit activities as their landweer equivalents, and that the latter tended to be better at stopping smugglers because of their knowledge of the area and people. In fact, of the 127 soldiers prosecuted as smugglers in 1915, only 21 were caught in their area of residence. This notwithstanding, in some places, by replacing an entire regiment the amount of smuggling taking place decreased drastically.

High Command urged the government to give a monetary bonus to troops who caught smugglers. It was thought too much to ask soldiers to be vigilant only through a

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65 Treub, Oorlogstijd p. 18.  
67 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 19 June 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 170.  
68 Staatsblad. no. 650, 31 December 1914; no. 664, 31 December 1914; Flier, War Finances pp. 36 - 37.  
69 See: Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 90.  
70 Commander of the Field Army to Commander of Division III, Commander South Limburg and Commander of X Mixed Brigade, 17 December 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 171; Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 23 June 1917 in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 677; Correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander of the Fortifications of the Mouths of the Maas River and Commander in Zeeland, 31 January 1918, 5 February 1918, 8 February 1918, all in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 817.  
71 Commander of the Field Army “De regeling van de samenwerking met de belasting-ambtenaren” February 1916, pp. 8 – 9, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 204.  
72 Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” p. 81.  
73 Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 65.
sense of duty, especially when the temptation to accept bribes was high. The Minister of Finance agreed and in March 1915 instituted a premium. Every three months, soldiers received a f5 bonus if they showed diligence in apprehending offenders. Some commanders suggested increasing the amount and frequency of the payments. On one occasion, Buhlman suggested to Snijders that instead of a premium, soldiers should receive five per cent of the profits of confiscated goods. Snijders disagreed because it could create a situation where soldiers would negotiate higher payments at the borders depending on the worth of the cargo. It would, in his view, have made smuggling an even more profitable business than it already was for border guards.

The government came under pressure from the general population and the international community to reduce military involvement in smuggling controls after an Anglophile newspaper, the Telegraaf, published a series of articles on the issue in August 1915. A major shareholder of the Telegraaf, H. M. C. Holdert, declared he had set up an "anti-smuggling bureau", causing concern for cabinet ministers, who feared that Holdert’s actions would raise the profile of illegal trade in the eyes of the Dutch and Allied populations. One of the major issues raised by the Telegraaf was that border guards were instigators of the trade. Military commanders undertook thorough investigations to ascertain the truth behind the claim, and found that the newspaper greatly exaggerated matters.

Nevertheless, the British seized on the points made by the Telegraaf and in October 1915,
threatened that if the Dutch did not become more vigilant they would not accept NOT import guarantees as valid. 83

High Command also wanted to wash its hands of its anti-smuggling duties. It tied up too many troops at the borders, and moved attention away from improving the defensive capabilities of the Army and Navy. 84 Facing combined pressure from within and outside the country, the government felt obliged to take more responsibility for dealing with the problem. High Command, in fact, agreed to train 6,000 border guards as “extraordinary customs officers” so that the Ministry of Finance could take over completely at the borders. 85

On 31 December 1915, parliament accepted legislation giving more authority to Ministry of Finance officials to deal with smuggling, thereby officially removing accountability from “state of siege” commanders. 86 The law gave customs officers within the “first line” power to limit the movement of goods into this zone and prevent stockpiling. 87 When the law came into effect on 1 April 1916, it was immediately clear that it did not give enough authority to customs officials. The government quickly imposed a tweede linie (“second line”, the area directly behind the eerste linie), in which “state of siege” authorities retained responsibility for the movement and storage of goods. At the specific request of the Minister of Finance, all the measures taken by the armed forces in 1914 and 1915 remained in place in the “second line”, including the right to remove suspected smugglers. 88 Even within the “first line”, many “state of siege” regulations applied, because customs officers did not have the jurisdiction to impose similar measures.

84 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 2 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
85 Commander of the Field Army “De regeling van de samenwerking met de belasting-ambtenaren” [The regulation of co-operation with tax officials] February 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 204; Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 30 June 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 183.
88 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, April 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 196.
let alone police them. In fact, troops still apprehended suspicious individuals, and continued to be heavily involved in counteracting smuggling. It was justified by the government in terms of neutrality threats: since smuggling had become an issue of international controversy, which could bring the Netherlands to the brink of war, using the armed forces to monitor and prevent smuggling offences was only sensible. It was not until the High Court ruling in April 1918, which declared use of the “state of siege” for national matters (which included smuggling) to be illegal, that the government was forced to devise another smuggling law. It did not come into effect until February 1919. In the meantime, “state of siege” authorities continued their fight against smugglers.

In 1917, the government introduced other regulations to deter citizens from smuggling. In February, it increased prison sentences from one to four years and established special correction centres (veenhuizen) to house offenders. The veenhuizen would ease overcrowding in regular prisons and ensure that small-time smugglers did not associate with serious criminal elements. The military also improved uniformity in trade controls in the tweede linie. As of April 1917, Snijders issued trade regulations that applied to all “state of siege” municipalities, and removed suspects out of the entire “state of siege”, rather than specific localities. Local commanders met with customs officials to streamline regulations in both the civilian-controlled eerste linie and military-controlled tweede linie. Prohibited goods were stamped or labelled “for use within the Netherlands only” or “only for use within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and may not be exported”, with the aim of preventing their sale abroad.

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89 Territorial Commander in Friesland, “Verslag ingevolge artikel 6” 28 May 1920, p. 6, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708.
90 Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel” p. 69.
91 Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, April 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 196.
92 See: Chapter 7, pp. 250 - 252.
93 Staatsblad. no. 225, 22 February 1917. Veenhuizen was a village originally built as a correction centre (with thanks to Dr. Wichert ten Have, University of Amsterdam, for this information).
95 Commander of the Field Army, “Opstelling en beweging van het Veldleger over het tijdvak 1 Januari ’17 – 1 January ’18” [Position and movements of the Field Army in the period 1 January 1917 to 1 January 1918] July 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
96 Commander Division IV, “Verslag ingevolge art. 6” 5 May 1920, p. 6, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708.
97 Section K of scrapbook with miscellaneous articles in alphabetical order, in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr. 135” 143.
By the end of the war, the regulation of smuggling was much improved, yet High Command did not believe that smuggling had decreased significantly.98 Because of widespread shortages in Germany, the danger now also came from German civilians (as well as any Belgians brave enough to navigate the electric fence) sneaking into the Netherlands to buy food and other essentials.99 While the Allied blockade and war at sea ensured that the Netherlands was receiving only a fraction of the supplies it had received in the first two years of war, virtually guaranteeing imported goods were consumed within the Netherlands, large amounts of locally-grown produce still found their way into Germany. Sir Francis Oppenheimer, the British commercial attaché in The Hague, described the state of smuggling in February 1917 as follows: “Not much needs to be said concerning the advantages which the Germans have derived from smuggling. They are great locally, but are of comparative little importance if viewed properly focused.”100 He believed that Allied blockading measures on the Netherlands had successfully limited what could be smuggled to the Central Powers. As a result, Allied pressure on the Dutch to prevent illegal exports declined in 1917 and 1918, although it never disappeared.

ESPIONAGE

While the military authorities worried about Dutch citizens crossing the frontier with prohibited goods, they were even more concerned about foreigners doing the same, especially since there was a chance that they also couriered valuable information to their respective governments. At various times, commanders asked mayors to keep an eye on suspicious individuals and restricted access to particular regions, while foreign newspaper correspondents could not enter the country nor roam freely in the “state of siege” at all.101 After October 1914, all foreigners wanting to reside in a “state of siege” municipality had to

98 “Mobilisatieverslag 1917” p. XLIX, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696; General Staff, “Verslag nopens de verrichtingen van het militair gezag, voor zoover dit werd uitgeoefend door den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht; opgemaakt ingevolge het bepaalde in art. 6 der wet van 23 Mei 1899 (St.bl.No.128)” [Report regarding the function of military authority to the extent it was exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, created in response to the specific Article 6 of the law of 23 May 1899] 6 January 1919 [1920] p. 16, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 710 (also in no. 912).
99 Frey, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande p. 199.
100 Sir Francis Oppenheimer, February 1917, in Baer, “The Anglo-German antagonism” p. 179.
101 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 20 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37; Commander of the Field Army to all mayors in the “state of siege” area under his command, 26 March 1917, in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr: 39” 93/1.
have permission from the local commander.\textsuperscript{102} The Territorial Commander in Friesland closed the territory bordering the mouth of the Eems, in case the Allies used it to survey the comings and goings of German warships.\textsuperscript{103} Likewise, the Commander of the Fortified Position of Den Helder declared the Friesian islands off limits, to keep the curious from monitoring naval movements in the North Sea.\textsuperscript{104} His counterparts in the south of the country prohibited sketching or photographing near the borders.\textsuperscript{105} They also tightened border security: no one without identification could enter the country except in cases of obvious humanitarian need (deserters, refugees, internees and escaped POWs).\textsuperscript{106} When caught, dubious individuals found in or near restricted areas were often sent back across the border (into Germany) or faced prosecution and imprisonment.\textsuperscript{107} One historian even has claimed that in a month during 1917, 3,000 German smugglers were caught and removed out of the country.\textsuperscript{108} Overall, there were enough infringements to warrant sending others to emergency prisons for foreigners established in Nijmegen, Venlo, Roermond and Maastricht.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{102} Territorial Commander in Friesland to Commander-in-Chief, 18 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95; Commander of Coastal Battery in Neuzen, “Bekendmaking” [Declaration] poster, 13 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 98.

\textsuperscript{103} Territorial Commander in Friesland to Commander-in-Chief, 27 December 1914, and reply, 30 December 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 74; Territorial Commander in Friesland to Commander-in-Chief, 18 February 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 202.


\textsuperscript{105} Commander of Coastal Battery near Neuzen, “Politieverordening” [Police declaration] poster, 2 November 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 98.

\textsuperscript{106} Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 20 August 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 37; Commander-in-Chief, “Voorschrift, houdende bepalingen op de toelating en het verblijf van vreemdelingen in het staat van beleg verklaarde gebied” [Regulations regarding the entry and stay of foreigners in the “state of siege” areas] 28 December 1916, in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr: 39” 93/1.

\textsuperscript{107} Territorial Commander in Friesland, “Verslag ingevolge artikel 6” 28 May 1920, p. 11, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708; Commander of “Division Group Brabant” to Minister of War, 30 September 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174. For an example of spies caught and removed out of the “state of siege”, see: ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 184; Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkellandel” p. 61. See: information about suspected spies moved out of the “state of siege” in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 184.

\textsuperscript{108} Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 2, pp. 198 - 199.

\textsuperscript{109} Commander Division IV, “Verslag ingevolge art. 6” 5 May 1920, p. 7, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708.
In reality, preventing intelligence agents from operating in the Netherlands, let alone catching them, was extremely difficult. \(^\text{110}\) Nevertheless, the Dutch military intelligence network grew during the war and did its best to prevent espionage and, if that proved too difficult, to spy on the spies, by listening in to the telephone conversations of foreign diplomats, \(^\text{111}\) as well as intercepting their telegraph communications. GS III officers tracked suspected spies, learning a vast deal about the warring parties in the process, while GS IV officers decoded British and German telegraph messages. \(^\text{112}\) They also tried to stop Dutch citizens selling information to the belligerents. \(^\text{113}\)

The belligerents made ample use of the Netherlands' convenient geographic position to obtain information about their enemies. According to one prolific rumour, every café waiter in The Hague was an undercover agent for the Kaiser. \(^\text{114}\) From interviewing deserters, GS III knew that British and French agents infiltrated camps of German deserters to obtain information from them. \(^\text{115}\) The Allies also noted the movement of German trains through and near the Netherlands and acquired technical details of interned German equipment. \(^\text{116}\) A most important source of information for the Allies came via couriers, who smuggled information, letters and people in and out of occupied Belgium. A number of towns on the Belgian side of the border operated as espionage posts for the Allies. \(^\text{117}\)

It is quite possible that the use of the Netherlands for intelligence purposes helped persuade both belligerents that its neutrality was important for them. \(^\text{118}\) Diana Sanders suggested that

\(^{110}\) For counter-espionage undertaken by the Dutch Army and Navy, see: ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 202; ARA, “Archief van de Chef van de Marinestaf te ’s-Gravenhage 1886 - 1942” entry number 2.12.18, inventory number 184.

\(^{111}\) Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 18 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.

\(^{112}\) Dutch diplomat in Brussels to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 October 1916, in ARA, “Kabinetsarchief e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940” entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 239; Engelen, *De Militaire Inlichtingen Dienst* p. 28; Tuyll, *The Netherlands and World War I* p. 164.


\(^{115}\) Engelen, *De Militaire Inlichtingen Dienst* pp. 24, 27.

\(^{116}\) Sanders, “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 119.

\(^{117}\) Alex Vanneste has written an extremely valuable account of Belgian *passeurs* (smugglers) who smuggled information and people across the Dutch border and back again (Vanneste, *Kroniek van een Dorp in Oorlog* Two volumes).

\(^{118}\) Smit, *Tien studiën* p. 11.
Disorganized and even unreliable as the British and Allied intelligence services in Holland [sic] were, the fact remains that without them considerable quantities of information covering a wide range of enemy activities would have been lost to the Allies. Holland, neutral, was of major value to the intelligence network in a way that Holland as a belligerent — on whichever side — could not be.\textsuperscript{119}

Another historian, Christopher Andrew, has described how the Netherlands provided the main base from which the British Intelligence Service and its French equivalent operated during the war, and how it was vital for their understanding of what happened on the German side of the Western Front.\textsuperscript{120} The Germans also benefited from Dutch neutrality by posting intelligence officers in port cities, especially Rotterdam, and monitoring the movement of goods and people.\textsuperscript{121} The German military attaché in The Hague, von Schweinitz, believed that the country was one of the most important sources of information for the German military.\textsuperscript{122} More research needs to be done to discover the relative value of the Netherlands as an intelligence-gathering site during the war.\textsuperscript{123} Undoubtedly, the country’s neutrality was convenient for warring states, especially because it was located so close to the Western Front. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether it had a decisive impact on the belligerents’ appreciation of Dutch neutrality, primarily because both sides gained benefits and Germany was severely disadvantaged by the access it gave the Allies to both Germany and Belgium.

**WIRE OF DEATH: THE ELECTRIC FENCE**

Soon after Germany occupied northern Belgium, it closed the Dutch-Belgian border.\textsuperscript{124} German troops patrolled the Belgian side of the border and, like their Dutch counterparts, shot smugglers and suspected spies on sight. The occupation authorities hoped to close the frontier and prevent Belgian men escaping through the Netherlands to Great Britain or France and joining the Allied armies there. Above all, they wanted to stop information being smuggled out of Belgium to the Allies. They also intended to keep letters, newspapers and magazines from entering Belgium and boosting l’esprit de

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\textsuperscript{119} Sanders, “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning” p. 124.
\textsuperscript{121} Jong, “De Nederlandse neutraliteit” p. 259.
\textsuperscript{122} Smit, *Tien studiën* p. 11.
\textsuperscript{123} Hubert van Tuyll has done some research on this topic (*The Netherlands and World War I* pp. 162 - 163).
\textsuperscript{124} Smidt, “Dutch and Danish Agricultural Exports” p. 144.
resistance of the population there. But, as the Dutch authorities well knew, the border between the two Low Countries proved easy to cross and difficult to patrol effectively. As a result, in April 1915, the German leadership decided to erect a 300-kilometre fence along the frontier, charged with a lethal current, in an attempt to isolate Belgium from the Netherlands. Unfortunately, extant German sources on the fence are difficult to find. Nevertheless, the tremendous effort and huge cost involved in building the structure signals how harmful Germany believed use of the frontier was for its war effort. The existence of the fence also says a great deal about the value Germany placed on keeping the Netherlands neutral while preventing its enemies from enjoying the advantages of that neutrality. It would not have taken such extreme steps, if it had wanted to include the Netherlands in the war.

Map 19: The electric fence (and graphic representation of fence in relation to the Dutch border)


126 Vanneste surmises that the Prussian archives on the electric fence were destroyed during the Second World War (*Kroniek van een Dorp* Volume 1, p. 260). I have been unable to find many sources in the Dutch archives either.
The electric fence had a predecessor. Early in 1915, Germany constructed a barrier between thirteen villages in Alsace and the border with Switzerland, consisting of metal wires charged with an electric current lethal enough to kill any person or animal that touched it. A German officer, D. Schütte, assistant to an intelligence agent in Belgium, believed that it was possible to build the same structure along the Belgian-Dutch border. The Governor-General of Belgium agreed, and in April 1915, German Landsturm troops, aided by paid workers from local towns and forced labour from Russian POWs, worked on the structure at several locations. By August, it stretched from where the Dutch province of Limburg met German and Belgian territory (near Vaals) to where the Schelde crossed the Dutch-Belgian border in Zeeland.

Illustration 8: The electric fence

A journalist poses as a body next to the electric fence along the Dutch-Belgian border

(Source: Brugman, Geschiedenis van den Wereldoorlog between pp. 224 - 225)

127 Vanneste, Kroniek van een Dorp Volume 1, p. 244.
128 Ibid.
129 Bauwens et. al., In Staat van Beleg. pp. 82 - 84; Vanneste, Kroniek van een Dorp Volume 1, p. 259; H. Jaspers, “De Grensversperring in de Eerste Wereldoorlog” [The border barrier in the First World War] De Aa Kroniek. 4, no. 2, July 1985, p. 27; Vanneste, Kroniek van een Dorp Volume 1, p. 313.
Once completed, the fence presented a formidable barrier and made Belgium, according to Sophie de Schaepdrijver, "even more of a large prison" than it already was. The structure consisted of six major sections. The first of these followed the southern Limburg border closely between Vaals and the Belgian town of Eben-Emael. The second sector reached northward meandering along the Maas from Eben-Emael to Heppeneert. From Heppeneert, the third section stretched roughly westwards until it reached Lozen; the fourth worked its way further west to Lommel-Stevensbergen; and the fifth traversed countryside up to Minderhout. Finally, the fence trailed the border until it reached the Schelde. It was impossible for the fence to cross the river, and, for reasons left unexplained in the sources, the southern-most area of the province of Zeeland remained unburdened by a similar structure.

The electric fence varied in construction. In general however, it reached a height of two metres, and consisted of a series of copper wires (between five and ten in total) charged with an electric current. In most places, on either side of the main fence, a shorter barbed wire barrier stopped people and animals accidentally walking into it. The fence was built in straight lines, simply crossing over the top of houses, over canals, and, occasionally, underground as well. In some places, it cut towns in half; at others, it traversed gardens or farms. Electricity came from generators placed in huts, which were themselves supplied with power from local factories. Every 50 metres a high pole distributed current to the fence, enabling guards to shut off specific sections at a time for maintenance, upkeep of grounds and the removal of electrocuted persons and animals. The exact voltage of the fence is unknown, although historians have cited anything between 2,000 and 50,000
volts.\textsuperscript{134} Most definitely, 50,000 volts is too high an estimation, given the relatively primitive generators of the time. A more realistic figure would be anything between 2,000 to 6,000 volts,\textsuperscript{135} which was enough to kill a person, although when properly insulated from the current, people could pass through the fence unharmed.\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{electric_fence.jpg}
\caption{Illustration 9: The electric fence}
\end{figure}

(Source: Brugman, \textit{Geschiedenis van den Wereldoorlog} between pp. 224 - 225)

The first official warning to the Netherlands about the fence came on 6 June 1915, more than a month after work on its construction began. The German Minister in The Hague notified the Dutch government that building was nearly complete along parts of the border and the fence would be charged for the first time the following week. He promised that it would be clearly marked and hoped the Dutch authorities would warn locals about the risk the fence posed to their lives.\textsuperscript{137} The government informed Snijders immediately

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{135} Vanneste, \textit{Kroniek van een Dorp} Volume 1, p. 258.
\bibitem{136} With grateful thanks to Professor Pat Bodger of the Electrical Engineering Department at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, for explaining the intricacies of electric currents to me.
\bibitem{137} German Minister in The Hague to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 170.
\end{thebibliography}
about the German communiqué. In turn, he telephoned Buhlman – responsible for the security of the southern border – to investigate and put in place necessary precautions. The Field Army Commander, in turn, cautioned border troops about the possible dangers and asked them to keep an eye out for any signs of construction. They were also informed of what to do if someone was electrocuted. Posters circulated in border towns close to where the fence stood and large signs placed on or near the actual structure explained the hazard in three languages (Dutch, French and German).

The idea that a wire with an electric current running through it could be lethal was, for most Dutch, unbelievable. Many had to see for themselves, and in the days following the appearance of a new section of fence, curious locals visited the border. The novelty quickly wore off though, especially as the fence stopped them visiting relatives, attending markets, and smuggling in Belgium. Soon enough, as reports filtered through of the accidental electrocution of people and animals, the population viewed the fence with dread. The exact number of deaths caused by the fence is unknown, principally because the German records have not been found, but estimates go as high as 3,000 people. The deadly nature of the fence led it to be given a number of portentous soubriquets, such as “the doomed wire” (de verdoemde draad), “border of death” (dood-grens), and “the devil’s wire” (de Duivels-draad).

Obviously, safety measures were far from effective. One journalist, Jan Feith, toured the Dutch side of the electric fence early in November 1915 and wrote about it in a series of articles. He explained that little had been done to prevent accidental contact with

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138 Telephone message, Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 6 June 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 170.
140 Copies of warning signs can be found in “Van alles wat! (op militair gebied)” [Something of everything in military matters] scrapbook, in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr. 135 (11 delen)” 143C.
141 L. W. Bree (1979) in Vries, “Nederland als non-belligerente natie” p. 86.
142 Erkens, Tussen oorlog en vrede pp. 74 – 75.
143 For reports of Dutch soldiers who died, usually accidentally, see: “Twee Nederlandsche soldaten gedood” [Two Dutch soldiers killed] Soldatencourant, no. 179, 8 October 1915, p. 3; Commander in Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 15 October 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 170; Commander in Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 1 November 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 177; Moeyes, Buiten Schot pp. 127 - 128.
144 Vanneste, Kroniek van een Dorp Volume 1, p. 315. Although a report was filed with the occupation authorities for each death (Ibid p. 276), these documents have not yet been discovered.
145 Jan Feith, “Langs de electrische draadversperring” [Along the electric fence] Soldatencourant. no. 192, 7 November 1915, front page.
the deadly wires: hardly any warning posters existed, and in many places there was no barbed wire safety barrier between passersby and the fence.\textsuperscript{146} He also commented on local residents' ignorance of the actual dangers of electricity, and on the many animals – cattle, horses, cats, dogs, chickens and rodents – that were killed.\textsuperscript{147}

Surviving documents do not allude to any complaints made by the Dutch government to the Germans about the fence. This is not surprising, given that the Germans did the Dutch a favour by blocking the Belgian border, helping the already over-stretched border guards keep illegal traffic from crossing into and out of the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the fence was far from foolproof as smugglers, spies and \textit{passeurs} (guides that helped people and goods cross the border) found ways of circumventing the structure: some dug underneath it, others crawled through by placing a rubber “window” or rubber-lined barrel between the wires.\textsuperscript{148} It was even claimed that people pole-vaulted over the fence, or jumped from rooftop to rooftop.\textsuperscript{149} Goods could be thrown over and collected on the other side. Often, electricity shortages forced all but one of the copper wires to be shut off, considerably decreasing the chance of electrocution.\textsuperscript{150} When rivers and canals came close to their high-water mark, particular sections had to be turned off as well.\textsuperscript{151} Short-circuiting the wires was another option open to those considering climbing through. In other words, the fence made crossing the Dutch-Belgian border harder, but not unduly so. After 1915, at least 32,000 Belgians escaped the occupation zone through the Netherlands and travelled on to either France or Great Britain.\textsuperscript{152} No doubt, thousands more smuggled themselves, goods and information through the wires on a regular basis. The effect of the barrier as a preventative measure against smuggling and spying was further undermined when the German authorities allowed local residents to cross the border on market days, to

\textsuperscript{146} Jan Feith, “Langs de electrische draadversperring (fragmenten)” [Along the electric fence (fragments)] \textit{Soldatencourant}. no. 193, 10 November 1915, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{147} Feith, “Langs de electrische draadversperring” \textit{Soldatencourant}. no. 192, 7 November 1915, front page.
\textsuperscript{149} Jan Feith, “Langs de electrische draadversperring (fragmenten)” \textit{Soldatencourant}. no. 194, 12 November 1915, front page.
\textsuperscript{150} Bauwens et. al., \textit{In Staat van Beleg}. p. 92.
\textsuperscript{151} Vanneste, \textit{Kroniek van een Dorp} Volume 1, p. 265.
attend church on Sundays, or at harvest time. Because the fence did not follow the border exactly, it also remained difficult for Dutch border officials to stop smuggling completely. Often, there was a substantial stretch of Belgian territory on the Dutch side of the fence, as the Germans never built exactly on the border but always a few metres from it.

To improve the fence, the German authorities erected searchlights on their side so that potential absconders could be caught. In 1916, they also increased the height of the structure at several locations (especially along the Limburg border), dug a number of electric wires into the ground, and moved parts of the fence closer to the Dutch border. The occupation administrators registered all Belgian men between the age of 17 and 55, who had to report each month to their municipal council, so that the Germans could monitor the number of men leaving the country. Another concern by 1917, were the thousands of deserters from the German armies trying to escape to neutral territory. At one stage, the authorities suggested moving the fence again, this time 100 metres inland to catch deserters well before they approached the Dutch border. This was not done, but the possibility of shifting the fence into Belgium created unease among military officials in the Netherlands. It would have meant increasing the commitment of Dutch troops on the southern border, as the fence would no longer keep smugglers from reaching Belgium.

Due to the fence, German authorities could monitor border traffic between the Netherlands and Belgium more easily. Nevertheless, it was a costly enterprise, with mixed results at best: while it deterred many, determined individuals continued to make unashamed use of the border. Yet the fence remained fully operational until the signing of the armistice, except for a few weeks in October 1918, when tens of thousands of refugees from northern France and southern Belgium entered the Netherlands. The Germans did not want refugees clogging roads in Belgium and preferred allowing them to reach neutral

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154 See: Map 19 p. 276 above.
155 Bauwens et. al., In Staat van Beleg. p. 85; Vanneste, Kroniek van een Dorp Volume 1, p. 260.
156 Vanneste, Kroniek van een Dorp Volume 2, pp. 456, 480.
157 Schaepdrijver, De Grote Oorlog p. 239.
158 See: Chapter 5, pp. 183 – 184, for more about German deserters.
159 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 10 July 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 229.
160 Ibid.
161 Bauwens et. al., In Staat van Beleg. p. 92.
soil instead.\textsuperscript{162} For the maintenance of Dutch neutrality, the fence had many advantages as well. Despite the hazards involved, it made prevention of smuggling in the south easier and kept spies from crossing the border as often as they might have done otherwise.

**CENSORSHIP AND PUBLIC OPINION**

One of the many ways in which nations during the Great War sustained popular support of the war effort was by policing the information reaching them and censoring any damaging news or opinions. By controlling the information in newspapers and magazines, public perceptions of the war could be altered or maintained and their support of the war could be fostered.\textsuperscript{163} In the combatant nations, censorship was severe. All printed matter relating to the war had to pass through strict censorship controls before publication, although, as Niall Ferguson pointed out, the institutions that existed to undertake censorship were often inefficient.\textsuperscript{164} In the Netherlands, censorship did occur, but involved completely different criteria. Whereas in warring countries, information about the relative strength and positions of armies, details of warfare, accounts of battles, and even reports on food shortages could be purged or altered, in the Netherlands censorship existed to preserve neutrality. Newspapers could easily provide accounts of the operations of foreign armies, but could not pass judgement on the merits of each belligerent’s war cause, or profess favour or disgust at the actions of one side or the other. They had to be impartial. This was true of other neutral states as well. For example, the Swiss government felt obliged to suspend some newspapers during the war and appealed to the public to remain neutral.\textsuperscript{165}

Early in August 1914, Queen Wilhelmina urged her subjects to remain entirely impartial in the war. The government reiterated her plea in posters circulated around the country, declaring that it was the duty of all citizens to preserve neutrality, and refrain from publicly supporting one or other belligerent.\textsuperscript{166} One “state of siege” commander went so far as to demand that residents, including a number of Belgian refugees, refrain from wearing

\textsuperscript{162} Roodt, *Oorlogsgasten* p. 343.
\textsuperscript{164} Ferguson, *The Pity of War* p. 215.
\textsuperscript{165} *The Times History of the War*. Volume 13, p. 223.
\textsuperscript{166} Minister President and the Minister of War to all Provincial Governors, 11 August 1914, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.
anything that indicated allegiance to a belligerent nation.\textsuperscript{167} Enforcing impartiality was far from simple. All Netherlanders had an opinion on the war; many chose sides. For example, in Amsterdam, the majority of people supported the British and French, while, in the rival port of Rotterdam, residents had greater sympathy for Germany.\textsuperscript{168} This had much to do with the focus of their trade: Amsterdam dealt mostly with goods leaving the Netherlands for overseas markets (including Britain and its empire), while Rotterdam profited from Rhine traffic to and from Germany.\textsuperscript{169} Elsewhere in the country, opinions were equally divided.\textsuperscript{170} As each set of belligerents won or lost battles, breached Dutch neutrality, or committed supposed war crimes, the opinion of the population fluctuated. No doubt, individuals waged intense debates on street corners and in cafés, arguing the merits of the war and its participants.\textsuperscript{171}

Although the Dutch had no legal obligations to ensure they remained neutral in their private comments on the war, it was important they professed impartiality in public utterances. Newspaper editorials were an easy medium through which outsiders could gauge the opinions of a broad section of society. The government was aware that it had to prevent too much criticism of the warring sides appearing in the press. In turn, the belligerents, aware of the influence of the press on public opinion, tried harnessing it to sway the Dutch to their cause.\textsuperscript{172} Not only did belligerents actively influence publications, they also published their own magazines, pamphlets and posters, propounding their views on the conflict, circulating them among the population and troops.\textsuperscript{173} Britain even

\textsuperscript{167} Territorial Commander in Zeeland to Commander in Neuzen, 4 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 98.


\textsuperscript{169} Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. 114.

\textsuperscript{170} See: Moeyes, Buiten Schot pp. 208 - 210.

\textsuperscript{171} An in-depth study on public opinion in the Netherlands during the Great War begs to be written.

\textsuperscript{172} Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 75; Ferguson, The Pity of War p. 215.

\textsuperscript{173} For example, see: the Oorlogskroniek [War Chronicle] a monthly magazine published in Dutch with obvious German leanings between February 1917 and July 1918 (copies of the magazine can be found in the Legermuseum in Delft). See also: the folder “Documenten uit den 1ste Wereldoorlog” [reference no. Q194-40, which is filled with...
established a propaganda bureau in the country in 1918, which the Germans suspected was being used to get an Entente-friendly government elected. Whether these propaganda campaigns had any lasting effect on changing public perceptions is highly questionable.

The Dutch government must have thought such campaigns had merit, however, because in 1918 it embarked on its own propaganda drive in the United States, distributing copies of Gustave Jaespers' *The Belgians in Holland* to sway opinion there in favour of neutrality. The Dutch press was censored, but not universally and never consistently. In August 1914, the government requested that all editors of major newspapers to refrain from endangering neutrality by praising or condemning the belligerents. Most abided by the request. In fact, one Belgian author described the tone of the major Dutch newspapers as "ash-grey with so-called neutrality". Yet the government could not censor heavily as it would restrict the right to freedom of the press guaranteed in the constitution. Only the "state of siege" could overrule this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, on occasion, the government took action to curb overly anti-neutral opinions, especially in the *Telegraaf*. The chief editor of the *Telegraaf*, J. D. Schröder, was arrested in November 1915 for writing an editorial that allegedly endangered neutrality, in which he portrayed Germans as "unscrupulous villains" who caused the war, and commended the Allies for protecting Europe and the Netherlands from the German threat. The court acquitted him of any wrong-doing, but Schröder was arrested again less than a month later for another editorial, in which he blamed the government for selling goods to the Germans with which the Central Powers


174 Dutch Minister in Berlin to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 1918, in ARA, "Kabinetsarchief e. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940" entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 239.


176 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dutch Minister in Washington, 29 July 1918, in ARA, "Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 'A' dossiers" entry no. 2.05.04, inventory no. 841; Gustave Jaspaers, *The Belgians in Holland 1914 - 1917*. Amsterdam: Jacob van Campen, 1917.

177 See: Chapter 3, p. 107.

178 Iddekinge, "Tussen Telegraaf en Toekomst" p. 763.

179 "De toon van der grote Hollandse bladen is as-grijs van neutraligheid [sic]" (Stijn Streuvels, diary entry, 19 September 1914, in *In Oorlogstijd* p. 145).

180 Ministry of Justice to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 25 August 1914, in ARA, "A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918" archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 191.

prolonged their “wrongful” war.\textsuperscript{182} After another outpouring of public indignation, the courts again set Schröder free.\textsuperscript{183} Throughout the war, the \textit{Telegraaf} tended to be one of a handful of newspapers that was openly critical of the government and neutrality.\textsuperscript{184} For this reason alone, the military monitored the dealings of \textit{Telegraaf} staff closely and found enough evidence to suggest strong links between correspondents and French diplomatic circles.\textsuperscript{185} The government, the General Staff and “state of siege” commanders kept a close eye on the publications, but did not resort to legal action against its editors again.\textsuperscript{186}

Occasionally, a newspaper would remove an issue from circulation if government authorities found that it breached neutrality. For example, the editors of the \textit{Telegraaf} retracted one of their issues in September 1916 because it contained an advertisement from a German company looking for people to provide them with “information”, by which the authorities assumed it was recruiting spies.\textsuperscript{187} Likewise, in February 1917, the “state of siege” authorities ensured that the \textit{Limburgsche Koerier} (\textit{Limburg Courier}) did not print any more advertisements offering the sale of smuggled goods, after the French legation in The Hague complained about the potential violation of neutrality.\textsuperscript{188} At other times, belligerents complained about bias in the press, and the government reproached publishers.

Of great concern to Germany, for example, were the anti-German drawings, paintings and cartoons of the Dutch artist, Louis Raemaekers. The \textit{Telegraaf} published a number of Raemaekers’ prints, and Raemaeker himself published many others in book

\textsuperscript{182} Iddekinge, “Tussen Telegraaf en Toekomst” p. 765.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.; Smit, \textit{Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel}, pp. 41 – 42. There is some suggestion that the government let the issue slide after the Italian and French legation in The Hague asked them to (Ritter, \textit{De Donkere Poort} Volume 1, pp. 263 – 273, Volume 2, pp. 209 - 211). I have been unable to verify this assertion independently.
\textsuperscript{185} Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 17 July 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823 – 1977” entry no. 2.02.05.02, inventory no. 906.
\textsuperscript{186} For example see: ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 184.
\textsuperscript{187} Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War and Minister of Justice, 29 September 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3.
\textsuperscript{188} Netherlands’ Overseas Trust to Lieutenant-Colonel C. van Tuinen, 17 March 1917; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 14 April 1917, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 407.
form. The prints were readily available throughout the main cities. On several occasions, the German Minister in The Hague urged the Dutch Foreign Minister, John Loudon, to censor Raemaekers' work, as he believed it jeopardised neutrality. Loudon responded by asking Raemaekers and editors of the Telegraaf to temper the content of the cartoons – a request they ignored. He also informed his German colleague that there was little the government could do, even had it wanted to, as the large degree of freedom enjoyed by the press was legally sanctioned. He did assure the diplomat that the Minister of Justice had investigated Raemaekers and was absolutely certain that the Allies did not fund his art.

Nevertheless, German pressure had effect. In September 1915, the municipal council of The Hague ordered that books and prints published by Raemaekers and other cartoonists critical of the war could not appear in shop windows, nor be advertised publicly, if they could be construed as offensive by the governments of belligerent countries. This was a clear concession to the many foreign diplomats and embassies in the Netherlands' capital. For a similar reason, namely to avoid alienating Belgian officials, Bosboom requested that Snijders instruct all officers not to praise Germany in public: apparently some Belgian refugees overheard such praise and complained to a diplomat.

190 Stijn Streuvels diary entry, 7 December 1914 (In Oorlogstijd p. 321).
194 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 13 March 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 178.
Illustration 10: Louis Raemaeker

One Raemaeker print which incensed the German authorities, showing Germany holding Belgium hostage. The caption reads: "Aint I a loveable fellow?"

(Source: Raemaekers, Het Toppunt der Beschaving Volume 3, 1916, no page numbers)

In the "state of siege", military commanders had direct licence (according to article 37 of the Oorlogswet) to censor all printed matter. As a result, it was much easier for them to forbid the publication, sale and circulation of dubious publications than it was for the government. They duly took action against Raemaekers' prints. One commander even refused to let the cartoonist visit his district, citing him as a "threat to security". In

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195 See: Appendix 8, p. 459.
196 For censorship of the press by the military see: ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 90, 228.
197 Territorial Commander in Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 6 May 1915, and reply 10 May 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 228; Territorial Commander in Zeeland to Commander of the Field Army, 12 May 1915, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 184.
198 Letters complaining about this decision can be found in: ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 90.
fact, commanders rarely used their right to remove objectionable publications from sale. They were more likely to warn publishers that certain articles were unacceptable and request rectification, threatening a possible ban if publishers did not comply.\textsuperscript{199} Sometimes, commanders punished newspapers more severely. For example, van Terwisga banned the \textit{Eindhovensch Dagblad} (Eindhoven Daily) for a week in August 1917, because it reproached Germany for its U-boat offensives.\textsuperscript{200} Around the country, people were incensed at van Terwisga’s action, and after four days of correspondence with Snijders and de Jonge, the Field Army Commander sanctioned the resumption of publication on the grounds that newspapers elsewhere in the country reported on the U-boat campaigns in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{201}

The \textit{Eindhovensch Dagblad} incident highlights the lack of consistency in censorship, especially as individual commanders censored according to their own standards. A particular article refused publication in one “state of siege” municipality might be printed in another.\textsuperscript{202} It also demonstrates how public opinion could affect change. Publishers soon learned that civilian authorities rarely censored publications (because they had little authority to do so), and all that the armed forces could do to publications published outside the “state of siege” was to ban circulation within their area of jurisdiction, which seldom happened. Nevertheless, commanders did prevent a number of Belgian newspapers and pamphlets circulating in southern border regions and within internment camps, as they presented strong anti-German attitudes deemed detrimental to neutrality and public order.\textsuperscript{203}

\textsuperscript{199} Commander of Division IV to Commander of the Field Army, 3 July 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 184; District Commander First Division Koninklijke Marechaussee to Commander of the Cavalry Brigade, 22 April 1916; Commander of the Field Army to Editor of Bredasche Courant, 27 April 1916, both in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 293.


\textsuperscript{201} Zoetmulder, “Repressieve pers-censuur in Brabant” pp. 176 - 181.

\textsuperscript{202} Commander Division IV to Commander of the Field Army, 10 March 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 293.

\textsuperscript{203} Commander of the Field Army to military authorities under his command, 24 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 149; Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Zeeland, 27 October 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 89; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of Internment Camp Amersfoort and Army Position Zeist, 4 May 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 228. See also: Belgian Legation in The Hague to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 28 November 1916; Minister of War to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 1917,
Inconsistencies in censorship and circulation within the Netherlands caused concern within High Command. At one stage in 1915, Snijder suggested implementing more universally applicable censorship standards to the government, but cabinet ministers felt this unnecessary, at least until the country joined the war, since there was little chance that the belligerents would interpret an “unneutral” newspaper article as truly threatening. In fact, lack of control over the press provides one reason why the combatants were keen on gleaning as much information about their enemies as possible from Dutch newspapers. It also reveals, as mentioned in the Introduction, the Dutch as one of the best-informed peoples about what was really happening in the war. In warring states, censorship was, so restrictive at times that it was difficult for populations to understand the actual nature of the conflict. The contrast between access to information for citizens of warring and neutral countries is clearly evident from the fact that Dutch newspapers were heavily edited before circulation in Britain, France and Germany. In occupied Belgium, Germany carefully censored all Dutch newspapers, including the generally pro-German Vaderland (Fatherland). When the Germans were doing badly in the war, they removed Dutch newspapers entirely from sale. Even before Germany had occupied most of Belgium, the Belgian government explained to the Dutch government that it had to censor certain newspapers, such as the Nieuw Rotterdamsche Courant, because a number of its articles describing German victories caused anger among its citizens. The Belgians suggested that Dutch newspapers remove objectionable articles from issues intended for sale abroad.

both in ARA, “Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ‘A’ dossiers. A 250. Europese Oorlog 1914 - 1918” entry number 2.05.04, inventory number 751, document number 5649.

201 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Internal Affairs, 25 May 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823 – 1977” entry no. 2.02.05.02, inventory no. 906.


203 Pictures of heavily-censored Dutch newspapers can be found in Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 284.

204 Schaepdrijver, De Groote Oorlog p. 242.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

The military exercised another form of censorship over telephone, telegraph and written communications in “state of siege” districts.209 Officers stationed at telegraph and telephone stations, local post offices, as well as in the main postal centres in Roosendaal and Vlissingen, checked mail leaving and entering the country.210 They had the right to listen to or open any communication that passed through these stations and looked explicitly for any anti-neutral or treasonous information. Despite the fact that very few letters were censored, the public objected strongly to the idea that soldiers could read their private post. As a result, Snijders told his subordinates in November 1914, not to open any mail sent within the Netherlands, and explained, the following January, that they should only open suspicious letters and make sure they stamped all censored communications.211 In December 1916, Snijders reiterated that censorship of mail should only occur if the post entered or left the country, or if it was highly suspicious. In order to avoid agitating public opinion, all internal mail should be left alone.212

In fact, even the volume of post entering and leaving the country was far too great to be dealt with effectively. As a result, in June 1917, the Roosendaal and Vlissingen offices had their operations curtailed. Vlissingen closed down completely, while Roosendaal operated with fewer staff.213 Instead, van Terwisga decided that officers would travel around the various towns and villages in the south and make random checks on mail, again, only opening post sent to or from suspicious individuals. He made no mention of limiting censorship to foreign mail, which seems to imply that by mid-1917 censorship was exercised on letters sent within the Netherlands as well, perhaps to help control smuggling.

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209 Commander-in-Chief to Director-General of the Post and Telegraph Service, 15 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 89.
210 Inspector of the Post and Telegraph Service to Commander Division III, 20 August 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 172. For censorship bureau reports see: ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 370, 371; ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 682, 1486.
211 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 22 January 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 172.
At the same time, the Commander decided that troops would be assigned to postal trains, while the locomotives travelled through the "state of siege", another indication that postal censorship actually increased.\textsuperscript{214}

In direct contrast to mail censorship, military control over telegram and telephone communications did not cause undue public concern, probably because few people owned a telephone or sent telegrams. In the end, the telephone censorship affected businesses more than individuals. As with control over mail, officers listening in to telephone conversations had to do so with extreme discretion, and without divulging any details to others.

Surveillance of telephone communications became a useful way for the armed forces to monitor potential smugglers and suspected spies.\textsuperscript{215} The right to monitor telephone conversations also enabled the military to supervise the movements and actions of journalists. For example, in March 1918, a correspondent of the Telegraaf in Amsterdam had all his telephone conversations from home monitored as well as those he made from a local café.\textsuperscript{216} By this stage, the potential damage of the activities of Telegraaf journalists, given their reputed links with the Allies, was widely appreciated. In March 1918, a time when the country was on the verge of war due to German pressure over the sand and gravel issue, the government believed it essential to know what the newspaper intended to publish and, if possible, persuade them to temper anti-German comments.

Another role of the military was to uncover leaks of militarily sensitive information. Early on in the July crisis of 1914, newspapers were forbidden to publish on the movement and location of Dutch troops.\textsuperscript{217} Private telegraph and radio transmitters were also declared illegal, and the armed forces forcibly shut them down or took them over,\textsuperscript{218} to ensure that none of the combatants used the transmitters, and thereby violated the neutrality
requirement that a neutral not let warring parties use its territory for their own ends. For the same reason, the military forbade telegraph operators to send or receive coded messages.  

**PUBLIC ORDER AND CONTROL**

Alongside defence, combatting smuggling, censorship and tracing the movement of foreigners or spies, military authorities also used their wide-ranging “state of siege” powers to manage public order. Articles 25 and 28 of the *Oorlogswet* gave the military jurisdiction to regulate opening hours for bars and cafés, authorise agendas for public meetings, and decide whether public festivities, such as carnivals, would be held. If the link between “state of siege” and smuggling controls lay on tenuous grounds, the connection between public order and the imposition of the “state of siege” was even less obvious. Few people could comprehend why the armed forces should have the right to interfere in their lives, when such interference seemed to have very little to do with defence, neutrality or, for that matter, smuggling.

More often than not, regulations for maintaining public order arose out of consultation between the military commander and municipal authorities. But there were compelling reasons why commanders should use their “state of siege” authority to monitor and regulate public order, some relating to public safety, and some to military security. For example, limitations on the sale of liquor in the “state of siege” helped keep soldiers from inebriating themselves. Early closure of public establishments also ensured that potential smugglers had no excuse to be out of doors at night. Likewise, during the refugee crisis in October 1914, it was important to keep foreigners sober and avoid clashes with locals, especially in over-crowded southern towns. After October 1914, commanders found other reasons for closing taverns early, such as preventing alcohol abuse by patrons, again with an eye to avoiding brawls and disturbances.

In August 1914, municipal authorities throughout the country cancelled fairs and carnivals, a ban that remained in place almost universally through 1915 by order of a “state of siege” authority. The Commander in Den Helder forbade the annual fair in March 1915,

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219 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 26 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 89.
220 See: Appendix 8, p. 459.
221 Commander Division IV to Commander of the Field Army, 28 October 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 148.
on the grounds of possible trouble among soldiers and sailors stationed in the city.222
During 1917, many fairs and carnivals resumed, except in places within five kilometres of
the border or in towns and cities housing troops, obviously to keep smugglers from
congregating near the frontier and to avoid rioting among troops.223 In the “state of siege”
ear the border, van Terwisga actually forbade locals from wearing fancy dress or masks on
carnival days.224 When, during 1918, many of the powers of decision reverted back to
municipalities, councils continued to cancel certain festivities. For example, early in April
1918, in the midst of the sand and gravel crisis, the Dordrecht city council decided to not
hold a fair that spring since the possibility of war loomed large.225

Military authorities exercised considerable jurisdiction over public meetings and
gatherings. In most “state of siege” communities, every intended congregation – except for
religious services – had to be authorised by the military authorities. Commanders even
decided on the fate of birthday parties, concerts, cinema screenings and theatre shows.226
On the whole, they denied public assemblies only when speakers intended broaching topics
relating to defence, the monarchy, neutrality, anti-militarism, or if they intended to take
strong anarchic or revolutionary stands. Hence in July 1916, a women’s suffrage meeting
went ahead unhindered in Alkmaar (although the local commander had prohibited similar
meetings earlier).227 Two months later, the same commander rejected a proposed parade of
the Socialist Democratic Party (Sociaal-Democratisch Partij, or SDP) in Groningen, on
grounds that the SDP was renowned for its extremist and anti-militaristic opinions.228

High Command was particularly wary of socialist ideologies for fear that they would undermine
the armed forces and threaten the established social order. As a result, when a commander

222 Commander of the Fortified Position of Den Helder to Commander-in-Chief, 23 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 207.
223 Provincial Governor in Limburg to mayors of Limburg, 15 January 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 292.
225 Verslag van den Toestand der Gemeente Dordrecht over het jaar 1918 p. 25.
228 Commander-in-Chief to Miss N. Cards, Secretary of the Women’s Suffrage Association in Alkmaar, 21 July 1916; Commander Internment Depot Groningen to Commander-in-Chief, 4 September 1916, and reply, 6 September 1916, all in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 366.
sanctioned a meeting, he often sent an officer along as a way of guaranteeing that speakers abided by the rules. On several occasions, commanders banned entry to the “state of siege” for particular individuals because of their reputation for anti-militarism or “anti-neutral” behaviour. One preacher, R. de Jong, travelled round North Brabant meeting soldiers and advocating non-violence in August and September 1914. The Commander of Field Army Division III prohibited his presence in “state of siege” regions where troops were billeted, for fear he would infect their minds with pacifist thoughts. In 1915, another preacher in Schoterland was removed out of his “state of siege” parish because he preached on the evils of war and militarism. The military authorities eventually let him return on condition that he did not address such matters again. More dramatically, the Commander of Division Group “Brabant”, removed the mayor of the town of Neerpelt out of the “state of siege” in August 1915, because he supposedly endangered neutrality by spreading false rumours to foreign diplomats about the interaction of Dutch and German soldiers at the border.

Parliamentarians were very concerned about the amount of power the armed forces actually had to prevent speeches and political meetings taking place in the “state of siege”. In 1914 and early 1915, members complained to the Minister of War that they could not address their constituents because commanders would not approve such meetings. Bosboom asked Snijders to ensure his subordinates showed more leniency and prevent public addresses only on grounds of endangering neutrality, the Queen or the armed forces. By 1918, commanders were banning meetings organised by the more radical socialist parties and unions on these grounds. Nevertheless, freedom of speech and

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229 Commander-in-Chief to Garrison Commander Amersfoort, 28 January 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 215.
230 See: correspondence about Ds. A. R. de Jong between the Commander Division III and the Minister of War, August – September 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 263; “Rapport. Rede van Ds. de Jong gehouden te Stratum in het militair tehuis op 2 September 1914” [Report. Speech of Ds. de Jong held in Stratum in the military recreation centre on 2 September 1914]; Commander Division III to Territorial Commander in North Brabant, 3 September 1914, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
232 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 September 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 174.
235 Commander-in-Chief to commanders responsible for military authority, 7 April 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 221.
congregation became contentious again in the lead-up to the general election in 1918. To woo voters, political hopefuls believed it was absolutely necessary to have unlimited access to them. In the end, after considerable discussion with the government, Snijders asked his commanders to allow all political meetings to go ahead unhindered during the campaign, except those that were clearly offensive.236

Occasionally, the military used the “state of siege” to control employment conditions, although always in consultation with the relevant government authority. Article 12 of the War Law let the military amend the Arbeidswet (Work Law), Veiligheidswet (Safety Law) and Hinderwet (Nuisance Law, regulating institutions and industries that could cause harm or nuisance), while article 28 enabled commanders to shut down any factories or warehouses at will.237 In peacetime, the employment laws guaranteed workers’ rights and ensured safe storage and operating codes. In wartime, such strict regulations could hinder war production, a reason why “state of siege” commanders could extend working hours for factories producing war materials, or why the powers of the Veiligheidswet and Hinderwet could be suspended to store weapons or munitions in empty warehouses.238 Naturally, the government loathed interfering with the three laws.239 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade sanctioned suspending the Arbeidswet in certain “state of siege” areas, to let factories operate 24 hours a day, because it would provide employment and keep workers from smuggling or going to work in Germany.240 It also enabled the textile factories to increase their production of Army uniforms.

CONCLUSION

Despite inherent problems with the War Law, most “state of siege” regulations related in some form or other to maintaining neutrality or military security. The “state of

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236 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 16 April 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 777; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 3 April 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 330.

237 See: Appendix 8, p. 459.

238 Commander “Division Group Brabant” to Commander-in-Chief, 21 September 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 203.

239 Minister of War to Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, 24 April 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 212.

240 Director-General of Work (Directeur Generaal van den Arbeid) to Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, 22 November 1915, and reply, 26 November 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 203.
"state of siege" was, in fact, an extremely useful way to exact appropriate standards of behaviour from citizens and present an image of strict neutrality to the outside world. Stijn Streuvels' description "ash-grey with supposed neutrality"\(^{241}\) was exactly the stereotype that a neutral hoped to portray. In reality, the armed forces were unable to keep residents from endangering internal neutrality. Smuggling, an obvious concern in 1915, continued unabated for most of the war; censorship was haphazard and inconsistent; and the country was used for all manner of clandestine information-gathering activities. Attempts at tightening controls over internal neutrality through the “state of siege” was difficult, not only because of the dubious legality of some of the military regulations, but also because the public did not appreciate interference. Because the country was officially “at peace”, reconciling neutrality with extraordinary military jurisdiction did not sit well with civilians, which offers one of the most convincing arguments for why the “state of war” and “siege” had such varied success. Certain actions the Dutch would grudgingly accept from the military authorities, while others they simply would not.

Yet, given that 75 per cent of the country experienced some form of military intervention during the war, the impact of the “state of war” and “siege” was far from negligible. In fact, through the “state of siege” especially, civilians were more restricted in their activities than at any previous peacetime junctures. To varying degrees, the military authorities limited their freedom of speech, movement and assembly. Even when the High Court restricted the jurisdiction in the “state of siege”, commanders exercised extraordinary control over the running of municipalities and the day-to-day affairs of individuals. In this respect, the Netherlands as a neutral society in wartime had more in common with its belligerent equivalents than with its own pre-1914 existence.

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\(^{241}\) See: fn 179 above.
The War for Bread and Guns: The Fate of a Small Nation

What use are the best fortifications, what use are the most beautiful defences, when the army that stands behind them is short of everything?

Anonymous (1918)

A small state ... is unable to contend in war with the great powers on anything like equal terms. Unfortunately for the small states, their relative military strength has progressively declined during the past century, and very sharply since World War I, as only large industrial countries can afford the new types of armaments. Their military weakness made them diplomatically weak.

Amit Vandenbosch

While the belligerents directed all available funds toward the production of war goods, financing technological advances, and supplying their troops, neutral countries were faced with an unenviable situation. How were they going to emulate improvements made in the quality of combatants’ war materials and size of their armies? Most neutrals did not have the industrial capacity, raw materials, or revenue to keep up with developments in warring states. At the same time, the war hampered supplies from abroad reaching neutrals. Therefore, the Great War found the Netherlands severely disadvantaged. Its neutrality depended wholly on the ability to remain outside the war. But without joining in the conflict, the armed forces had great difficulty attaining weapons that were adequate in quality or quantity. Neutrality became less viable as the means employed to protect it became obsolescent and supplies needed to ensure it dwindled.

To a large extent, the problems of supply were outside Dutch control. They were not made any easier, however, by the population’s general lack of enthusiasm for improving

1 “Wat helpen de beste stellingen, wat de prachtigste afscheidingen, indien er een leger achter staat, dat in alles te kort schiet” (Neerland’s Doodsstrijd in 1918 p. 170).
the armed forces, their equipment, fortifications, aeroplanes or ships. As we saw in Chapter 3, during the first few months of war, Netherlanders feared invasion and were willing to do almost anything to protect their country: supporting mobilisation, billeting soldiers in their households, and accepting emergency military budgets in parliament without objection. However, once the Western Front became deadlocked by late 1914, the threat of invasion seemed to pass and many believed it unnecessary to remain fully mobilised. Despite widespread interest in the war, the population did not on the whole understand the intricacies and hazards of neutrality politics, nor did many comprehend why it was necessary to keep soldiers, sailors and airmen active if the country was not directly at risk. Van Terwisga explained the civilian state of mind to the Minister of War, G. A. A. Alting von Geusau, in a mobilisation report of October 1919, exclaiming that “the Dutch Army is only popular as long as the Dutch people are afraid! Otherwise it is vilified.” These perceptions found voice in parliament, where members urged the government to reduce military expenditure.

The Netherlands faced the problem of overburdening its military with increasing numbers of neutrality responsibilities, while at the same time coping with material and human resource shortages. As the government confronted the difficult task of balancing the need to protect neutrality with fewer resources, while the public disagreed about the necessity for mobilisation, the military had to cope with fewer men, often inadequately trained and poorly led, while its responsibilities continued to grow. It was inevitable that the ability to protect Dutch neutrality declined as its great neighbours became fully armed.

**MILITARY SUPPLY**

The armed forces needed to ensure that their stocks of weaponry, ammunition, and equipment matched, even nominally, the technological improvements made by the belligerent forces. As a small nation with a small Army and an even smaller Navy, no match for the military might of Great Britain, France or Germany, the Netherlands’ strategy revolved around maximising its nuisance value. Already in 1914, if it came to a concerted attack by one of its powerful neighbours, the Dutch armed forces had little chance of

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3 "Het Nederlandsche Leger is slechts populair, zoolang het Nederlandsche Volk in den angst zit! Anders wordt het verguisd." (Commander of the Field Army to Minister of War, 20 October 1919, p. 4, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 881).
survival - they simply were not strong enough. Instead, High Command relied on the expectation that a campaign in the Netherlands would be peripheral, and in that case, hoped that improving and enlarging its Army would increase its deterrence value, thereby discouraging potential invaders. To this end, High Command maximised one major advantage of the war situation: the combatants fought on many fronts and could not concentrate all their might in one direction. In the words of one Dutch historian,

the importance of the Dutch armed forces was such in 1914 that, if we had been involved in the conflict, they [the troops] would have accounted for more than the difference in strength \( \text{[krachtsverschil]} \) between the warring great powers\(^4\) (italics in original)

It was the aim of High Command to protect the Netherlands’ situation of upholding the difference in troop strength \( \text{[krachtsverschil]} \) between the two warring sides. But it proved to be an impossible objective. By 1918, the comparative strength of the Dutch Army and Navy in relation to that of the belligerents had fallen well below the 1914 standard.\(^5\)

The quality and quantity of two vital weapons employed on the Western Front, namely the machine-gun and artillery piece, illustrate how rapidly the defensive capabilities of the Dutch Army declined. Of the 780 machine-guns in the Netherlands in August 1914, only 156 met the requirements of a modern land force.\(^6\) Yet, at the outbreak of war, the Army was operating similar numbers per soldier as the belligerents: for example, the one gun to 256 Dutch troops \( (1:256) \) ratio was much better than the 1:625 ratio in the French Army, although nothing like as good as the 1:100 allocation in the British Expeditionary Force.\(^7\) By 1918, Britain was operating four times as many machine-guns per battalion as it had in 1914, while Germany increased its numbers from 24 to 358 per division. France had the most staggering expansion of all, rising from a mere 2,158 in front-line service in September 1914 to 66,000 by the end of the war.\(^8\) By comparison, in 1918, the Netherlands’

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\(^4\)“De beteekenis van de Nederlandsche Weermacht in 1914 was van dien aard, dat, indien wij in het conflict betrokken waren geweest, zelfs meer dan het krachtsverschil tusschen de oorlogvoerende grootmachten zou zijn gebonden.” (italics in original) (Uijterschout, *Beknopt Overzicht* p. 12).

\(^5\) For which, see: Chapter 3, pp. 125 - 128.

\(^6\) Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 32.

\(^7\) Figures obtained by dividing the approximate number of soldiers per French division (15,000) by the number of machine-guns per division (24), and dividing the number of soldiers per British Expeditionary Force battalion (around 1,000) by the number of machine-guns per battalion (around 10), in Haythornthwaite, *The World War One Source Book* pp. 71, 174, 219.

owned 1,101, including outdated 1914 models, to outfit its Army that had doubled in size. If all its troops were recalled from leave (around 400,000 men), it would be operating fewer guns per soldier than it had at the outbreak of the conflict, namely one for every 363 men.

The state of artillery proved even more abysmal. At the start of the war, much of the available artillery already needed replacing, being severely limited in range and mobility. The sacking of Liège and Antwerp by the German armies that year further highlighted the importance of improving fortification artillery. While the belligerents constantly developed the calibre and mobility of their artillery through the course of the war, and increased their numbers significantly, the Dutch only managed to add 16 12 cm howitzers, two 15 cm howitzers and a couple of anti-aircraft guns to their armoury, barely enough to add two light guns to each Field Army howitzer section. By 1918, most Dutch artillery was completely outclassed. High Command did its best, however, by transporting all but the oldest or immovable pieces out of fixed positions, transforming some into mobile weapons and stationing others beside or in front of the fortifications. This process left many forts functioning as infantry positions only. France did something very similar late in 1914. Expecting a highly mobile war, it had few heavy artillery guns; instead, it moved appropriate artillery out of fortifications to trenches on the Western Front.

It was not through lack of trying that the Netherlands was unable to modernise and expand at the rate of its warring neighbours. To facilitate improvements to guns, increase their numbers, as well as maintain ammunition supplies, Snijders urged the government to create a Munitions Bureau, which would increase production and acquisition of weapons and munitions. This was done early in 1915, but did not alleviate many of the basic difficulties in easing shortages. Before the war, most weaponry and the shells, bullets and projectiles fired from them came from abroad. The German Krupps factories supplied most of the artillery and shells, while the Army's preferred machine-guns (Schwarzlose) were

9 Staatscommissie, Verslag Betreffende de Voorziening in de Behoeften aan Geschut p. 11.
10 See: Chapter 2, pp. 85 - 87.
12 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 75; Staatscommissie, Verslag Betreffende de Voorziening in de Behoeften aan Geschut p. 8. See also: Appendix 3, p. 452.
14 Haythornthwaite, The World War One Source Book p. 82.
made in Austria-Hungary. Other materials came regularly from Schneider suppliers in France, Skoda factories in Austria-Hungary, and Armstrong industrial works in Britain. The Munitions Bureau consistently tried to order artillery and machine-guns from these suppliers, but with little luck. Occasionally orders were filled, including a few howitzers from Germany, two anti-aircraft guns from Britain and several machine-guns from Austria-Hungary.

As an alternative, the Bureau looked to other neutral countries for help, setting up a satellite office in New York in February 1915, as well as making regular contact with munitions factories in Denmark and Sweden. It was handicapped in its pursuit of armaments contracts by the relatively small size of its orders. Even when orders were filled, it became increasingly difficult to transport them to the Netherlands as the belligerents seized armaments as contraband. U-boat action in and around the North Sea also made deliveries perilous, with the result that a large amount of useful materials lay idle in foreign ports. Nevertheless, Sweden and Denmark were helpful, providing the Netherlands with some 12 cm howitzers, aeroplane engines, steel and other metals.

The Netherlands did not support a large armaments industry, nor did it have the raw materials that could form the basis of one. Nevertheless, the military production facility at Hembrug (near Amsterdam) made rifles, bullets, cartridges and other equipment. Hembrug’s productivity increased during the war, as its facilities were extended and the number of workers grew. The Hembrug factories manufactured a steady supply of rifles to

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17 See: documents in ARA, "Kabinetsarchief c. a. van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1940" entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 52, for attempts at buying materials from the belligerents and requests to circumvent contraband restrictions.
21 Ibid. pp. 109, 121.
meet the needs of new conscripts and landstorm recruits, producing a total of 155,000 rifles by August 1917, a welcome addition to the 1914 stock of 234,000. Nevertheless, shortages forced adaptations in the process of manufacture. For example, by 1917, much rubber componentry was made from old bicycle tyres and wooden frames from local walnut trees. Unused railway tracks were converted into steel for gun production as well. Although Hembrug maintained a reasonable production capacity of 40 million rifle and machine-gun cartridges per year, it was not quite enough to meet the estimated minimum requirement of 50,000 rounds per machine-gun and 400 rounds per rifle, in addition to 20 to 25 million bullets expended annually in training exercises. Even a small increase in machine-gun numbers demanded a much higher production of suitable ammunition, an extremely difficult task when copper and nickel stocks dwindled in 1917 and 1918. Due to the lack of raw materials, similar problems in maintaining and increasing supplies of artillery shells and the Navy’s sea mines and torpedoes plagued the munitions industry throughout the war.

Fabrication of the larger weapons – machine-guns, artillery and anti-aircraft guns – was a real problem for the Hembrug facilities and associated Artillery Works (Artillerie Inrichtingen) in Delft. Hembrug built a few artillery pieces by 1918 (a total of eight 12cm howitzers) but, in general, its engineers had neither the expertise nor the machinery available to build them from scratch. This situation further highlights how immensely disadvantaged the Dutch armed forces were. Late in 1917, the factory began manufacturing machine-guns, but had only produced 50 by March 1918. While the Delft works had little trouble manufacturing 29,973 bayonets and 261,557 hand-grenades during 1917, it built only one grenade thrower and 22 machine-guns in this same period. In 1918, the Delft

25 Staatscommissie, Verslag Betreffende de Voorziening in de Behoeften aan Geschut pp. 6 – 7. See also: untitled table of rifle production from 1 January to 1 December 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
26 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 120.
27 Staatscommissie, Verslag Betreffende de Voorziening in de Behoeften aan Geschut pp. 7 – 8.
29 Commander-in-Chief to the cabinet, report, December 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3.
30 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 75.
32 Director for the Acquisition and Supply of Artillery Materials, “Overzicht van de voornaamste materieel, dat sedert 1 Januari 1917 bij de Artillerie-Inrichtingen werd aangemaakt of door de zorg der Directie der Artillerie-Inrichtingen werd aangeschaft tot 1 Januari 1918” [Overview of the principal materials produced since 1 January 1917 by the...
works accepted an order for 150 replicas of a Lewis machine-gun attached to one of the
British aeroplanes interned in the country, but it had none in working condition when the
war ended. The major impediments to increasing production were not only a ready supply
of raw materials, but also basic manufacturing components and the fuels necessary to power
factory machinery.

High Command hoped to make considerable improvements to the quality of
fortifications, even though many converted to infantry positions through a lack of artillery.
After the immediate threat of war diminished, so too did the urgency to improve
fortifications. It took months (instead of days or weeks) to clear all the necessary houses
and trees in inundation areas.34 Successive Ministers of War also had difficulty obtaining
adequate funding. On 14 June 1917, the Minister in Charge of the Navy, J. J. Rambolmet,
and Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, asked Snijders to begin work on improving Fortress
Holland to the standard of fortifications in the north of France. Snijders estimated the cost
at around f250 million. The government could not afford anywhere near this sum, but
authorised f9 million immediately for reinforcement work, and budgeted another f33
million for completion of the project. But even these improvements were hindered by a lack
of raw materials and, more importantly, were of little use without modern artillery to defend
them.35 Transferring landweer from the fortifications to the borders, a practice started in
Amsterdam on 4 August 1914 and continued throughout the war,36 weakened the strength
of the fortifications further. By 1918, a government Commission of Inquiry questioned
whether, given the many problems with the fortifications and especially the shortage of
heavy artillery, they had a useful role (apart from functioning as inundation lines) to play in
modern warfare at all.37

The Chiefs of Naval Staff also recognised that there was a great need to maintain
technological parity in the belligerent navies, but, much like the problems in improving

Artillery Plants, or bought by the Directors of the Artillery Plants, until 1 January 1918] 8 July 1918, in ARA,
"Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
33 Staatscommissie, Verslag Betreffende de Voorziening in de Behoeften aan Geschut p. 11.
34 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht pp. 76 - 77.
35 Commander-in-Chief, "Nota ter beantwoording van de Nota dd. 11 July 1918, door den toenmaligen Minister van
Oorlog JHR. DE JONGE gericht aan den Raad van Ministers" [Note in response to the Note of 11 July 1918 by the
then Minister of War Jhr. de Jonge addressed to the cabinet] 3 October 1918, pp. 11 - 17, in ARA, "Archieven van de
Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5
36 Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry
no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
37 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 78.
fortifications, wartime funding was never sufficient. As early as May 1915, Rambonnet and his colleague the Minister of Colonies, Th. B. Pleyte, warned the cabinet that if they did not improve the Navy it would quickly become obsolete.\textsuperscript{38} While the ship-building capabilities of the Dutch nation were considerable, the lack of raw materials and shortage of naval armament ensured that few advances were made in this field. Dockyards managed to assemble four torpedo-boats for service within Dutch waters, and two cruisers, which sailed for the Indies in 1915.\textsuperscript{39} Two of the three cruisers stationed in the Netherlands at the start of the war transferred to colonial ports in 1916 and 1917 as well.\textsuperscript{40} Several submarines, including five newly-constructed vessels, even relocated to the Indies.\textsuperscript{41} As a result, the purchase of two interned submersibles, one British, the other German, was extremely significant.\textsuperscript{42}

By 1918, the majority of the Navy's most important ships were based in or en route to the East and West Indies. At home, the service had become too antiquated for almost every serious defensive role except minelaying, minesweeping, reconnaissance patrols and the search and visit of ships.\textsuperscript{43} As the relative strength of the fortifications decreased, so did the value of the Navy in helping defend land positions. A significant indicator of the continual decline of the Navy's importance was the fact that between 1870 and 1940, a time when population numbers rose considerably and the size of the Army increased as well, the number of naval personnel did not rise substantially above 7,000.\textsuperscript{44}

For the belligerents, the Great War proved a great catalyst for innovation. Trench warfare led to the creation of new weapons, including gas shells and tanks; new ways of using and improving existing weaponry, including heavy artillery, machine-guns and hand-grenades; and new methods of minimising the impact of enemy weaponry. Apart from replacing, improving and adding to existing stockpiles of ammunition, weapons and guns, the Dutch tried to develop these new weapons of warfare and frame countermeasures to

\textsuperscript{38} Minister in Charge of the Navy and Minister of the Colonies, “Nota voor den Raad van Ministers” [Note for the cabinet] May 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823 - 1977, zijn Commissies en Onderraden 1936 - 1973 en de Raad van Ministers van het Koninkrijk 1955 - 1977” entry no. 2.02.05.02, inventory no. 146.
\textsuperscript{39} Stuart, De Nederlandse Zeemacht p. 409; Tydeman, “De Koninklijke Nederlandsche Marine” p. 248.
\textsuperscript{40} Bles, “De Koninklijke Marine mobiliseert” p. 79.
\textsuperscript{41} Commander-in-Chief to the Minister in Charge of the Navy, 30 May 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staff” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; Tydeman, “De Koninklijke Nederlandsche Marine” p. 248.
\textsuperscript{42} Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeemacht” p. 54.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. p. 53; Tydeman, “De Koninklijke Nederlandsche Marine” p. 241.
\textsuperscript{44} Baetens et. al. (eds.), Maritieme geschiedenis der Nederlanden. 4 p. 102; Bles, “Modernisering en professionalisering” pp. 79 – 80; Eekhout, Het Admiralenboek p. 38.
combat them, which proved impossible tasks. For example, the trenches made grenades an essential part of a soldier’s fighting outfit. In 1914, the Netherlands had a small number of hand-grenades in stock (around 195,000, equivalent to about one grenade per soldier). Yet, it was almost three years later, that High Command deemed it feasible for local industry to manufacture grenades. Production began in October and within twelve months, the military possessed 620,000 grenades while awaiting another million from orders placed with foreign suppliers. Nevertheless, when fully mobilised, the Army could only allocate two grenades per soldier and production within the country was so slow as to be insignificant.

Steel helmets, another necessity on the Western Front, caused further problems for Dutch military planners due to a severe shortage of steel. By April 1918, only one steel helmet was available for every 40 soldiers. The Delft factories had managed to produce a paltry 6,000 helmets in twelve months. Likewise, the advent of gas warfare in 1915 made the issue of gasmasks to frontline soldiers urgent. The Dutch had enough difficulties obtaining masks, let alone replacing existing ones to counter the effects of new gasses. By April 1918, eighty soldiers were sharing one mask, although by November of that year, the total available amounted to 50,000 old style and 200,000 new masks. This was enough for troops in the field at the time, but far from sufficient to outfit every soldier if it came to a full mobilisation. The Army also lacked numerous other items required by a modern

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46 Commander-in-Chief, “Leidraad bij antwoording van de vragen, door de Lid der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-Generaal Mr P. Troelstra tot de Regeering te richten” [Guideline for answering the questions of the Member of the Second Chamber of the Estates General, Mr. P. Troelstra, to the government] October 1918, p. 11, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705.
48 Director for the Acquisition and Supply of Artillery Materials, “Overzicht van de voornaamste materieel, dat sedert 1 Januari 1917 bij de Artillerie-Inrichtingen werd aangemaakt of door de zorg der Directie der Artillerie-Inrichtingen werd aangeschaft tot 1 Januari 1918” 8 July 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
49 Head of Munitions Bureau “Maandverslag van het Munitiebureau over de maanden Augustus en September 1917” [Monthly report of the Munitions Bureau for the months August and September 1917] 23 October 1917, in ARA, “Geheim verbaal-archief van het ministerie van Oorlog/Defensie” entry no. 2.13.67, inventory no. 313.
fighting force including telegraph wire, communications equipment, engineering tools and spades.\textsuperscript{52}

Snijders avidly encouraged military designers to experiment with and create their own versions of the latest technology on deadly show at the Western Front.\textsuperscript{53} The government made $400,000 available in May 1916, for the chemical industry to carry out tests for effective military uses of toxic gas.\textsuperscript{54} By late 1918, it had produced 380 tonnes of asphyxiating gasses, and owned 21 receptacles to distribute the deadly poison.\textsuperscript{55} In this area, perhaps more than any other, the Dutch could have found a useful deterrent to attack, if only it could have produced enough masks to protect its own soldiers from the poison.

Engineers carefully studied interned equipment, weapons and aeroplanes and, where possible, tried to replicate them. In keeping with advances in aerial warfare, the Air Branch even tested and manufactured aeroplane bombs, although it did not produce enough to be of use in a wartime situation.\textsuperscript{56} Military designers tried special camouflage tents to reduce visibility from the air.\textsuperscript{57} To other developments, however, the Dutch had few answers. They simply did not have the industrial capacity or resources to build tanks, nor were they able to increase the calibre and range of their artillery significantly.

\textsuperscript{52} Commander of the Field Army to Minister of War, 20 October 1919, p. 10, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 881.

\textsuperscript{53} See: the series of documents on gas production to and from the Commander-in-Chief in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Director of the State Factory for Artillery to Commander-in-Chief, 8 March 1916, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3.

\textsuperscript{54} See: correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief, the Minister of War, and the Directors of the Association of Chemical Factories in May 1916, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3.

\textsuperscript{55} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 143.

\textsuperscript{56} Commander-in-Chief to the cabinet, December 1916, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; Director for the Acquisition and Supply of Artillery Materials, " Overzicht van de voornaamste materieel, dat sedert 1 Januari 1917 bij de Artillerie-Inrichtingen werd aangemaakt of door de zorg der Directie der Artillerie-Inrichtingen werd aangeschaft tot 1 Januari 1918" 8 July 1918, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.

\textsuperscript{57} Director Central Warehouses of Military Clothing and Materials, 14 June 1918, " Beknopt verslag betreffende de Centrale Magazynen van militaire kleding en uitrusting gedurende den mobilisatietoestand (tijdvak 1 Januari 1917 – 1 Januari 1918)" [Abbreviated report regarding the Central Warehouses of military clothing and outfitting during the mobilisation situation (timespan 1 January 1917 – 1 January 1918)] in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.
Illustration 11: The stock of steel helmets

This cartoon, which appeared in De Roskam in June 1916, jests with Bosboom’s statement: “The stock of steel helmets is not yet satisfactory” (“De voorraad van stalen helmen is nog wel niet voldoende”)


The Army bore the brunt of many jokes for its supply inadequacies. Gas mask and steel helmet shortages proved particularly easy targets for cartoonists. Nonetheless, underneath the comedy, there was a fundamentally serious message: the Netherlands, like so many small nations without a strong industrial capacity, could not keep up with the military productivity of the big powers. As a result, its defensibility eroded and the feasibility of its neutrality plummeted accordingly. It warranted a serious warning from Snijders to cabinet ministers in December 1916:

The supply of our army with war material is at present, 29 months after the mobilisation, still largely unsatisfactory and will, if the Netherlands is pulled into the war, lead to great disappointment, yes, almost certainly, to disasters.58

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58 “De voorziening van ons leger met oorlogs материел is thans, 29 maanden na de mobilisatie, nog in hooge mate onvoldoende en zal, wanneer Nederland in den oorlog mocht worden betrokken, tot groote teleurstelling, ja, bijna zeker, tot rampen leiden.” (Commander-in-Chief to the cabinet, December 1916, p. 1, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3).
He realised all too well, that by the mere fact of staying out of the war, the armed forces had lost any chance of staying competitive.

Notwithstanding many difficulties and inadequacies, High Command, and especially Snijders, did their utmost to keep the military properly supplied and equipped. Snijders even asked the government to centralise the supervision of all military production, including the Munitions Bureau, Hembrug and Delft factories, and testing facilities, in a new cabinet portfolio: the Ministry of War Materials. The Ministry could, so Snijders hoped, liaise with private and state-owned industry to ensure military requirements were met and orders filled. One serious failing identified by both Snijders and a cabinet enquiry in 1918 was that little co-operation existed between the various bureaucracies, industries and the armed forces to ensure a direct link between supply and demand. This made an extremely difficult situation even more problematic. Snijders believed a Ministry of War Materials might alleviate many of these problems. However, it was never created, for reasons left unclear by the sources.

High Command also tried to adapt tactics to developments on the war fronts and modernise the Army’s structure and organisation. Throughout the war, small delegations of high-ranking Dutch officers visited the Western Front, as a means of at least observing military developments. In 1915, Germany invited a delegation to visit its front line. In December 1916, France and Britain followed suit and in January 1917, Belgium issued a similar invitation. In June 1916, for the first time, the government appointed military attachés to all the major European capitals, including Bern. Information gathered from the combatants inspired Snijders to experiment with different military formations, including specialist “storm troops” (stormtroepen) who undertook small-scale operations in

59 Commander of the Field Army to Minister of War, 20 October 1919, pp. 3 – 4, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 881.
60 Commander-in-Chief to the cabinet, December 1916, pp. 4 – 7, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3.
63 Head British Legation in The Hague to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 December 1916; Commander-in-Chief to Minister Foreign Affairs, 23 December 1916, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; Minister of War to Commander Division II, 11 January 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4.
64 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of War, 29 June 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; Engelen, De Militaire Inlichtingen Dienst p. 25.
dangerous conditions. The value of properly-supported trenches became a priority as well, resulting in greater emphasis on pioneer troops and imitation of German trenches, the Dutch experimenting with concrete bunkers in an around Utrecht. Developments in aerial warfare also inspired the creation of a luchtafweerafdeling (air defence section) within the Army, which tried to make maximum use of the few anti-aircraft guns available. Likewise, in 1916, the use of new infantry mortar bombs by the combatants, resulted in High Command requesting plans for improving fortification and trench defences against such a threat.

Despite its efforts, the Netherlands was helpless in trying to keep up with war developments. The country did not have the resources, finances and access to expertise available to the warring nations. In this respect, it was truly stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea. The equipment it did receive from the belligerents (especially Great Britain in 1918), while significant for the improvement of the Army, did not appreciably close the widening gap between the neutral armed forces and those of nations they could conceivably be forced to fight.

FOOD, FUELS AND RATIONING

The supply crisis was as much a civilian problem as a military one, especially when it came to such necessities as foodstuffs and fuels. Despite a strong agricultural base, the Netherlands was not self-sufficient and relied on imports of many essentials, including grain and coal. The country was always going to have problems obtaining these necessities from warring states. Yet, at the outbreak of war, and much like Britain's "business as usual" policy, the government did not wish to interfere unduly in the economy. It had never regulated the economy before, and saw no urgent need to do so after August 1914.

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65 For information about the formation of stormtroepen sections in the Netherlands' Army see: ARA, "Archiefen van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 660.
66 Koen, Utrecht Verdedigd p. 25.
69 Bond, War and Society p. 108.
70 Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 251.
Nevertheless, it felt compelled to take some emergency steps to protect consumers and financial markets alike and alleviate some of the most obvious supply concerns.\(^\text{72}\)

In August 1914, recognising the likelihood of grain shortages, the government imported grain, and sold it at a peacetime price to bakers, who were required to sell their goods at normal prices.\(^\text{73}\) Establishing maximum prices for essential goods became standard government practice.\(^\text{74}\) Likewise, the Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, imposed export prohibitions on goods that were in short supply and legislated powers to municipalities to requisition foodstuffs if necessary.\(^\text{75}\) The state also requisitioned stocks of certain materials needed by the military, including steel, iron, cotton and wool. Combating smuggling was another way of keeping goods in the country. Alongside municipal councils, “state of siege” commanders also used their authority to apportion certain goods, issue ration cards to residents and supervise what shopkeepers bought and sold on a weekly basis.\(^\text{76}\)

Until mid-1916, the government left the impact of supply problems largely to private organisations, including the Koninklijke Nationale Steuncomité (Royal National Support Committee).\(^\text{77}\) The Queen established the Support Committee with help from the Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, W. F. Treub, on 10 August 1914, to give financial and material aid to any individual or company adversely affected by the war crisis.\(^\text{78}\) The Committee quickly developed into a massive organisation with affiliated associations all around the country. Initially, most of its financial support came from donations (for example, all Netherlands Overseas’ Trust (NOT) profits were paid out to the royal charity),\(^\text{79}\) although very quickly its responsibilities became so widespread that it relied heavily on state funding, and by 1918 was almost completely dependent on

\(^\text{72}\) See: Chapter 3, pp. 111 - 113.

\(^\text{73}\) Flier, *War Finances* pp. 39 – 40; Posthuma, “Food Supply and Agriculture” p. 224. Moeyes, *Buiten Schot* ably details how some enterprising individuals made massive profits from the grain trade during the war (pp. 284 - 285).


\(^\text{77}\) A history of the Koninklijke Nationale Steuncomité needs to be written. For a good overview of its activities see: Mandere, “Nederland en Nederlanders” pp. 198 – 223; Moeyes, *Buiten Schot* pp. 175 - 178.

\(^\text{78}\) Treub, *Oorlogstijd* p. 123.

\(^\text{79}\) Ritter, *De Donkere Poort* Volume 1, p. 103.
government subsidies. The Committee assigned itself a number of responsibilities ranging from assisting families, to keeping local industry producing goods and providing employment, to ensuring a regular and purposeful distribution of foodstuffs. Its tasks were as diverse as giving money to households whose primary wage-earners were mobilised, guaranteeing incomes to unemployed workers, buying flower bulbs so that hundreds of employees in the local tulip growing industry kept their jobs, or providing extraordinary credit to factories when they ran out of raw materials or were not paid for overseas deliveries. In January 1915, two branches of the Committee formed into separate institutions, in response to the different problems faced by manufacturers and consumers alike: the Committee for Feeding People and Animals (Comité voor de Voeding van Mensch en Dier, CVMD) and the Industry Commission (Nijverheids Commissie).

While in the first year of conflict shortages of specific items arose sporadically, by late 1915, they became more significant, especially grain and coal. Slowly but surely, the shortages impacted on consumption habits. Trains ran less regularly, and grain shortages forced bakers into producing “war bread” (noodbrood, literally “emergency bread”), made partly from wheatmeal and potato flour. When meat shortages loomed, eenheidsworst (literally, “uniform sausage” with the connotation of “boring sausage”, including only a limited amount of pork, beef and spices) became staple fare.

On the whole, the Netherlands was able to cope with the shortages until late 1916. Some historians have even argued that until that time, the country thrived economically because it exported (and smuggled) all manner of goods to the combatant nations, especially Germany. Yet underneath the semblance of wealth and abundance, there were

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81 Treub, Oorlogstijd p. 260.
83 Treub, Oorlogstijd pp. 60, 274 – 275; Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer” pp. 15 – 16.
84 Treub, Oorlogstijd p. 100.
85 Moeyes, Buiten Schot p. 294.
clear signs that the economic boom would not last. By the start of 1917, the country was running out of basics, especially grain and coal, ensuring that the Dutch could not adequately feed themselves, heat their homes, or run their factories. Grain imports fell to one-third of peacetime supply in 1917, and during 1918, almost no foreign grain reached the Netherlands at all.\textsuperscript{87} The war at sea and blockades made it difficult for shipments of colonial goods, including foodstuffs such as rice, sugar, coffee and tea, and raw materials such as oil, quinine, rubber, kapok and cotton, to get through.\textsuperscript{88} By 1918, the amount of colonial products cleared in Dutch ports had slumped to well below 10 per cent of pre-war figures.\textsuperscript{89} At the same time, farmers had to sell locally those food stocks previously intended for foreign markets, although many skirted the issue by supplying the black market and smugglers.\textsuperscript{90} The supply crisis was exacerbated by demands from the Allied and Central Powers to export set quotas of food to them.\textsuperscript{91}

Early in 1916, the government realised it needed to take a more systematic approach to the Netherlands’ supply woes. It designed the Distribution Law (\textit{Distributiewet}), which came into effect on 19 August.\textsuperscript{92} Special government bureaux took charge of monitoring stocks of goods, distributing raw materials to industry and manufacturers and tried to keep account of how much was needed for domestic consumption. They then informed merchants and wholesalers what they could and could not export, the maximum price at which their goods could be sold within the country, and whether the government would requisition them.\textsuperscript{93} For the first time, the state became heavily involved in the running of the economy, as was happening in the belligerent states as well.\textsuperscript{94} A huge bureaucracy sprang up in the wake of the Distribution Law.\textsuperscript{95} Both the

\textsuperscript{87} Moore, \textit{Economic Aspects} p. 18; Flier, \textit{War Finances} p. 106; Smidt, “De regulering van de Nederlandse export” pp. 102 – 133.
\textsuperscript{89} See: Carpentier et. al., “The Effect of the War upon the Colonies” pp. 88, 102.
\textsuperscript{90} Moeyes, \textit{Buiten Schot} p. 274.
\textsuperscript{91} See: Chapter 6, pp. 201 – 207, 212 - 220.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Staatsblad}. no. 416, 19 August 1916.
\textsuperscript{94} Although Anton Smidt has done some excellent research on the Dutch export industry and government control, much more research needs to be done on the “crisis institutions” and their long and short term impact: Smidt, “De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer”; Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel”; Smidt, “De regulering van de Nederlandse export”; Smidt, “Dutch and Danish Agricultural Exports”. See also: Moore, \textit{Economic Aspects}; Treub, “De economische toestand van Nederland gedurende den oorlog”; Koninklijke Bibliothek, \textit{Documenten voor de Economische Crisis} Four Volumes; Posthuma, “Food Supply and Agriculture”; P. G. van Ijsselmuïden,
Industry Commission and CVMD provided invaluable information and advice to the numerous crisis departments. A centralised supervisory body (Central Administration Office for the Distribution of Provisions (Centraal Administratiekantoor voor Levensmiddelen), later the State Distribution Bureau (Rijksdistributiekantoor)) ensured consistency in policy and distribution. It also worked closely with the Royal Support Committee’s two branches, the Netherlands Export Company and NOT.

The Distribution Law created a systematic nationwide rationing regime, although there were some differences in rationing quotas between rural and urban areas. Initially, the government only rationed bread, but soon printed rationing cards for milk, butter and meat as well. Other goods followed in quick succession, including soap, coffee, vegetables, potatoes and cheese. By mid-1918, one had to hand over a ration card for almost anything on sale. The Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, F. E. Posthuma, consistently cut the size and quantity of rations. While in February 1917, adults received 400 grammes of bread per day and whatever meat, milk and potatoes were available, by the last weeks of the war, food rations had decreased to four kilogrammes of potatoes and two pounds of meat per week (mainly eenheidsworst), and 200 grammes of bread and 100 millilitres of milk per day. The bread ration was lower than that of British and French citizens although somewhat higher than in Germany. Dutch tea consumption declined from nearly a kilogramme per person a year in 1914 and 1915 to less than 70 grammes in 1918. At the same time, the government increased its supervision of how much shopkeepers bought and sold. In some centres, supervision came in the form of a complicated coupon system, in which the number of coupons grocers retrieved from customers affected their future

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96 Treub, Oorlogstijd pp. 268 – 269.
98 Ibid. p. 64; Klein, “Krasse tijden” p. 1812.
99 Moore, Economic Aspects p. 55. In June 1918, the German bread ration dropped from 200 grammes a day to 160 grammes (Hagenlucke, “The home front in Germany” p. 65).
supplies. In other areas, customers were assigned to certain shops and shopkeepers received supplies according to customer numbers.\textsuperscript{101}

There was, naturally, a considerable backlash to government interference in the wartime economy. Farmers especially did not take kindly to the regulations, but neither did heads of industry and trade. It helped create a black market, organised by the same people who supplied smugglers.\textsuperscript{102} Farmers faced the most restrictive controls. Government departments regulated their prices and, from the autumn of 1916 onwards, ordered them to grow certain crops, till land previously used for pasture, and limit the amount of foods they could stockpile.\textsuperscript{103} Since July 1915, the state could commandeering all harvests at fixed prices as well.\textsuperscript{104} Farmers’ reacted with hostility rather than compliance: some doused their grain and produce in petrol or used it as fodder; some sold vast quantities on the black market; others simply refused to comply and continued to grow their traditional crops.\textsuperscript{105} Officials travelled around the countryside (often accompanied by a small contingent of soldiers) to check whether farmers abided by the new laws.\textsuperscript{106} They also searched farms, barns and warehouses for illegally stockpiled foodstuffs. Hefty fines and prison sentences were imposed on offenders.\textsuperscript{107} Partially due to widespread non-compliance, but also owing to severe shortages of fertilizers, agricultural production did not improve significantly in 1917 or 1918.\textsuperscript{108} Only a slight rise in harvests was noticeable by late 1918, while there was no significant increase in those crops and cereals the government had specifically wanted farmers to grow.\textsuperscript{109}

The government also tried to increase domestic supplies of another vital item: coal.\textsuperscript{110} Before the war, 70 per cent of Dutch coal supplies came from Germany (20 per cent from Britain and Belgium, 10 per cent from local mines). For this reason above all,

\textsuperscript{101} Pekelharing, ”De gemeente” pp. 32, 52 – 54.
\textsuperscript{102} Treub, Oorlogstijd pp. 101 – 102; Moeyes, Buiten Schot p. 274.
\textsuperscript{104} Posthuma, “Food Supply and Agriculture” p. 256.
\textsuperscript{105} Treub, Herinneringen p. 319; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 294.
\textsuperscript{106} Army Supply Officer, ”Nota aan den Commandant van het Veldleger” [Note to the Commander of the Field Army] 8 March 1917, in ARA, ”Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 251.
\textsuperscript{107} Bückmann, ”Distributiejaren” p. 579.
\textsuperscript{109} Moore, Economic Aspects p. 20.
\textsuperscript{110} For an excellent study of the coal shortages and their effects see: Kamp, ”De kolenvoorziening”.

Germany's influence over the Netherlands throughout the war was very strong.\textsuperscript{111} Although Germany continued to supply the Dutch with coal between 1914 and 1918, shipments were less frequent, could be withheld at will, and because the Germans needed more coal themselves,\textsuperscript{112} there was not nearly enough to supply all the Netherlands' needs. Some coal was mined in Limburg, but it was of inferior quality to German black coal. Nevertheless, improving the output of local mines became a primary goal of the newly-established Coal Commission in January 1915, re-organised as the state-run Coal Bureau in February 1916.\textsuperscript{113} Coal production almost doubled during the war (see Table 10) and several new pits opened.\textsuperscript{114} Unfortunately, productivity was never high enough to make up for the immense decrease in foreign supplies, although it did ensure an employment boom in Limburg, one of the few sectors that bucked the trend of rising unemployment.\textsuperscript{115} In fact, coal shortages became so severe in 1918 that the government tried to force all available skilled mineworkers into the Limburg coalmines, including mobilised soldiers and foreign internees.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{YEAR} & \textbf{IMPORTS} & \textbf{LOCAL PRODUCTION} & \textbf{TOTAL AVAILABLE} \\
\hline
1913 & 8,117,410 & 1,902,414 & 10,019,824 \\
1914 & 7,341,890 & 1,982,702 & 9,324,592 \\
1915 & 7,322,357 & 2,332,244 & 9,654,601 \\
1916 & 6,270,694 & 2,656,087 & 8,926,781 \\
1917 & 2,881,423 & 3,126,012 & 6,007,435 \\
1918 & 1,326,298 & 3,548,447 & 4,874,745 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Coal Supplies, 1913 – 1918\textsuperscript{117}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{111} Moore, Economic Aspects p. 12.
\textsuperscript{112} Strachan, "Economic Mobilization" p. 146.
\textsuperscript{113} Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 248; Kamp, "De kolenvoorziening" pp. 17 – 18.
\textsuperscript{115} Zaalberg, “The Manufacturing Industry” p. 106.
\textsuperscript{116} See: correspondence between Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief, Commander of the Field Army and the Head of Internment on providing extraordinary leave to soldiers and internees with mining experience, January to March 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 788.
\textsuperscript{117} Kamp, “De kolenvoorziening” p. 110.-
Coal was drastically rationed from the winter of 1916 onwards. At this stage, households received coal based on the number of fireplaces they maintained, but by the following winter filling the allotted rations became difficult. Peat, a natural fuel substance found in relative abundance in much of the countryside and a common fuel fifty years earlier, became desirable again, only to be rationed as well. The coal and petroleum shortage meant that electricity, an expensive luxury pre-war, now became an attractive alternative for families who could afford it. In many respects, the war accelerated the modernisation of home life in the Netherlands because it increased electricity use.

Several towns and cities had their street lighting switched from gas (derived from coal) to electricity as well. But since some electricity plants in the Netherlands ran on coal, power shortages were also inevitable. As a result, streetlights often failed, while shops and businesses closed early in the winter months to save on heating and lighting costs. Some schools even closed completely during the coldest weeks. It was much more difficult for factories and industrial plants to reduce their reliance on coal. They had to compete for any surplus not distributed among households, to the military, the railways and to essential industry. Most had to cut back on production and on staff, many closing down completely.

Shortages in raw materials other than coal soon affected employment levels in manufacturing industries as well. Certain non-military industries prospered: for example, the Philips factory in Eindhoven capitalised on the increase in electricity use and lack of international competitors to increase its sales and develop its own low-voltage light bulbs. Yet it still cut staff numbers in 1918, due to the depressed economic situation. Almost all other manufacturing industries, including the metallurgical factories on which

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120 Ibid. p. 33.
125 Pekelharing, “De gemeente” p. 63.
126 See: Zaalberg, “The Manufacturing Industry”.
the armed forces relied for their weapons, suffered in the last two years of war, cutting staff numbers and reducing output.\textsuperscript{129} Ironically enough, during the “boom years” of 1915 and 1916, when the war had not yet wreaked havoc with supply, a major impediment to increasing production for factories filling military orders was finding enough adequately trained staff. As a result, the government used “state of siege” jurisdiction at the borders to force men with certain skills to remain in the country. It meant that as of 18 October 1915, qualified miners, engineers, construction workers, smithies, car mechanics, bicycle repairers, saddlers, bank-tellers, toolmakers, metal workers, shipbuilders and industrial machinists could not receive a passport or leave the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{130} It also helped to keep workers in the country, who might otherwise depart for well-paid work in German war industries. This became enough of a concern to the government that it told the Central Employment Bureau to refuse permission for Dutch persons to work in German and Belgian factories, if they thought the workers would be involved in manufacturing military materials. Likewise, at the borders, military patrols had to apprehend employees of German and Belgian war industries.\textsuperscript{131}

By the winter of 1917/1918, the food and fuel situation in the Netherlands was serious. The Netherlands economy ground slowly down almost to a halt in the last twelve months of war. Although not starving, most people were nevertheless hungry and cold.\textsuperscript{132} The focus of everyday life became keeping warm and finding enough to eat.\textsuperscript{133} People turned their gardens into vegetable plots, learning to cook with little or no fat on a fire made from \textit{brikken} (bricks of pulped burnable materials) rather than wood or coal.\textsuperscript{134} For families without gardens, some city councils allocated small plots of land for the purpose of growing vegetables.\textsuperscript{135} Farmers looked at alternative sources of fertiliser, including “sea manure”

\begin{footnotes}
\item[Ibid. pp. 3 – 111. See: press notices of factory closures in scrapbook of miscellaneous articles, section “B” (1917) in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr. 135 (11 delen)” 143.]
\item[Oranjeboek: \textit{Overzicht der voornaamste van Juli 1914 tot October 1915 door het Ministerie van Buitenlandsche Zaken behandele} p. 38.]
\item[Minister of Foreign Affairs to Commander-in-Chief, 3 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 178.]
\item[Bückmann, “Distributiejaren” p. 580; Treub, \textit{Herinneringen} p. 320.]
\item[For the effects of the shortages, see: extracts from Miep de Zaaijer’s diary in Haags gemeentemuseum, \textit{Den Haag ‘14 – ’18}; Morgan, \textit{The Fountain}; Krüger (ed.), \textit{De jaren 1914 – 1918}.]
\item[Kamp, “De kolenvoorziening” p. 32.]
\item[Verseput, “Gevolgen van de gesloten wapenstilstands- en vredesverdragen, welke een einde aan de eerste wereldoorlog maakten, voor Rotterdam” [Consequences of the armistice and peace treaties, which ended the First World War, for Rotterdam] \textit{Rotterdams jaarboekje}. 8, 1960, p. 228; \textit{The Times History of the War} Volume 13, p. 208.]
\end{footnotes}
(made from seaweed and mussels), while the population was urged to adopt vegetarianism and eat nuts, because they were rich in oils and grew in abundance throughout city parks each autumn. \(^{136}\) Alternatives to traditional foods and fuels became common and, more often than not, were of questionable quality. \(^{137}\) Even the wealthier classes were affected by the shortages: many chose to stay in hotels because it was cheaper than heating their own homes; others tried to avoid rationing by eating in restaurants; most turned to the black market to supplement their staple diet of bland *noodbrood*, a little milk and *eenheidsworst*. \(^{138}\) Theft-related crime rose rapidly during the last two years of war, as some people became desperate to survive. \(^{139}\)

For the armed forces, food and fuel shortages did not become issues of major concern until the start of 1917. Until this time, the government gave priority to military supplies, and the armed forces could forcibly requisition whatever they needed from civilians and municipal councils. \(^{140}\) With the implementation of the Distribution Law, however, they (like everybody else) became part of the central government’s distribution regime. \(^{141}\) The government still gave priority to the needs of the military, but exercised far greater care in balancing them with civilian demands.

The armed forces was obliged to reduce their reliance on key materials, putting in place an intricate system of production and supply, and establishing its own military bakeries and abattoirs. \(^{142}\) As early as July 1915, scarcity of rubber tyres placed limitations on widespread use of automobiles, \(^{143}\) affecting the recently-established Voluntary Military

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\(^{137}\) Flier, *War Finances* p. 108.

\(^{138}\) For an lucid account of the difficulties experienced by the upper classes in The Hague during the winter of 1917 and 1918, see: D’Overflaquéé, *Uit Een Geheime Dagboek 1918 - 1919*. See also: Pekelharing, “De gemeente” p. 125.


\(^{140}\) Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 5 October 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 308.


\(^{142}\) Inspector of Engineers (Technical Department), “Nota van toelichting behorende bij het ontwerp voor eene nieuwe Militaire Bakkerij te Groningen” [Note of information belonging with the plans for a new military bakery in Groningen] 28 April 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Koninklijke Landmacht, c. 1850 - c. 1940” entry no. 2.13.45, inventory no. 1781 (1); Officer in Charge of Supply for Division I, “Voeding” [Food] report, 12 June 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696.

\(^{143}\) Commander-in-Chief to authorities that form part of the Voluntary Military Automobile Corps and Voluntary Military Motorcycle Corps, 17 July 1915, in Jong (ed.), *De Geschiedenis van het Vrijwillig Militair Automobiel Korp* p. 118.
Automobile Corps and its associated Motorcycle Corps. From March 1917 onwards, petrol shortages forced military cars almost completely off the roads, and Snijders urged a return to horse-powered transport, when extra fodder, another rare commodity, became available.\textsuperscript{144} Ordinary soldiers suffered as well, when their barracks were heated less frequently and for shorter periods of time. Lamp oil was rationed, although officers staying with families who had no available light received extra supplies.\textsuperscript{145} As of September 1917, unless they went on leave for more than three days, soldiers could not travel by train.\textsuperscript{146} The military authorities also tried to grant longer but less frequent periods of leave to troops, easing pressure on the rail network.

After 1917, soldiers' food rations were systematically cut, although never at the extreme rate for civilians, principally because, as the old adage goes, an army, whether fighting or not, marches on its stomach. The Dutch High Command was very aware of the link between supplies and morale, and impressed on the government the need to keep soldiers' rations relatively ample. Nevertheless, in January 1917, the bread ration decreased from 650 to 600 grammes a day. It did not drop any further, although by September 1917, when the civilian ration was cut to 254 grammes a day, military bread consisted of 30 per cent potato meal.\textsuperscript{147} For almost all other food items, soldiers received more than civilians (see Table 11 below). As an example, at least until February 1918, troops continued to drink tea and coffee, if in smaller quantities than before, yet there was virtually none available to civilians. In fact, the NOT complained to High Command about the supply of imported chocolate to military mess-halls, since much of the chocolate ended up being smuggled across the border. Snijders took the matter seriously enough to issue specific instructions to commanders that canteens could not sell more than two or three chocolate

\textsuperscript{144} Supply Inspector (\textit{Etappen Inspecteur}) to Commander of the Field Army, 27 March 1917; Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 11 April 1917 and 28 November 1917, all in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 251; Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 9 January 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367. For fodder shortages, see: Posthuma, “Food Supply and Agriculture” pp. 237 - 238, 259 - 260, 268 - 269.

\textsuperscript{145} Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 10 October 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 251.

\textsuperscript{146} Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 14 September 1917, in ARA, “Archiefen van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 636.

\textsuperscript{147} Officer in Charge of Supply for Division II, “Rapport, bedoeld in schrijven van den Hoofdintendant van 27 Mei 1918, No. 180, Geheim” [Report meant in the writing of the Head Supply Officer on 27 May 1918, No. 180, Secret] 14 June 1918, pp. 1 – 2, in ARA, “Archiefen van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 696; Pekelharing, “De gemeente” p. 64.
bars at a time, and that supplies with export prohibitions should be distributed in small quantities (rather than in bulk) to avoid the temptation of smuggling.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 11: COMPARATIVE WEEKLY RATIONS FOR CIVILIANS AND TROOPS IN THE HAGUE, 25 - 31 OCTOBER 1918</th>
<th>(IN GRAMMES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIVILIANS</strong></td>
<td><strong>MILITARY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potatoes</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bread</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brown beans</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chocolate</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oats</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cheese</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fat (butter)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meat</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But during 1918, even the armed forces suffered. Their diet revolved increasingly around such staples as *eenheidsworst* and *noodbrood* without butter, little cheese, and hardly any other toppings. By the summer, troops ate four and half kilogrammes fewer potatoes per week than they had in 1915 (from 12 kilogrammes to 7.5 kilogrammes), and

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148 Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 11 March 1918; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 2 April 1918; Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 19 September 1918, all in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 368.


150 Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 16 May 1918; Commander of the Field Army to commanders of Divisions III and IV and Cavalry Brigade, 24 September 1914, both in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367.
High Command considered cutting the ration even further. By this stage, they had also stopped regularly receiving tea and coffee, except for an almost undrinkable coffee substitute. Although the quality and quantity of foodstuffs was better than for most ordinary citizens, there is no doubt that the cuts in their food allocations contributed to the widespread lack of discipline and decreased morale among troops through 1918, helping fuel discontent in the Army. An especially critical soldier described his fellow troops in July of 1918 as a group of “underfed, worn-out men”.

High Command did its utmost to find alternatives for essential foods, experimenting with yeast-free bread, coffee and tea substitutes. Keeping soldiers, their uniforms and dishes clean became a serious hygienic concern, when trials to replace soap with an alleged washing powder proved unsuccessful. However, the greatest concern for High Command was that shortages would hamper military readiness. Already in March 1917, it had to postpone and cancel some training exercises due to a lack of petrol, fodder and coal. One of the most alarming impacts of the severe coal and oil shortages affected the Navy. During 1917, warships patrolled the seas less frequently and for shorter distances at a time, directly compromising both Netherlands’ neutrality and security. Emergency stockpiles, especially coal and food, had to be created and maintained in case the country was invaded, but, of course, this was much easier said than done. Snijders did put in place procedures so that if the Netherlands entered the war, it could quickly receive additional supplies of fuels (especially coal) from potential allies.

Food shortages through 1917 and 1918 damaged public confidence in the government and provided impetus for riots and violent disturbances in many of the larger

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151 Commander Division IV to Commander of the Field Army, 28 September 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367.
152 Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 7 February 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367; Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg p. 77.
153 “[O]ndeifed, uitgeputte mannen” (italics in original) (July 1918, Jong, Nottities van een Landstormman p. 212).
154 Inspector of Supply to Head of Supply (Hoofdintendant), 22 July 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 305; Inspector of Supply to Commander of the Field Army, 23 April 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 167.
155 Commander of the Field Army to Commander Division III, 2 June 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 251.
156 Inspector of Supply to Commander of the Field Army, 13 March 1917, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 351; Voorst tot Voorst, “Onze cavalerie” p. 442.
157 Nagelhout, “De toelating en internering” p. 29.
158 Commander-in-Chief, “Leiddraad” October 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705.
Given that 1918 was an election year, ministers' chances of re-election were slim if they did not do something about the shortages. But there was only so much it could ask the armed forces to sacrifice. In fact, High Command tried to be as accommodating as possible in limiting military consumption. However, it did not give in to all the government's demands. For example, when Posthuma asked Snijders to release military stocks of rice for civilians, both Snijders and van Terwisga refused, since hungry troops might revolt or prove unable to fight a long campaign.

Claims on supplies from civilian and military quarters made the demobilisation debate that raged on and off during the war all the more prominent and prolific. The population liberally criticised the Army for overburdening society and called for a partial demobilisation to ease the drain on provisions. It was not uncommon, for example, to have newspaper editorials ask soldiers to refrain from travelling by train while on leave. One important reason why the Dutch were far less willing than the populations of warring nations to let their soldiers eat better food, enjoy the warmth of coal, and consume extras such as coffee and tea, was because they were not at war. Neutral populations did not attach the same idealism to personal sacrifice as warring populations because their country's security was not threatened. This meant that they were far less willing to forfeit their own well-being (food, warmth, luxuries) so that troops could enjoy them instead. For warring nations, the needs of soldiers were paramount. While on the face of it, the supply situations in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, London and Amsterdam may have seemed similar, there was a singularly important distinction: Parisians, Berliners and Londoners were far more

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159 See: Chapter 11, pp. 368 - 374.
160 See: correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief, Commander of the Field Army and Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, February and March 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367.
163 Commander 12 RI to Commander of the Field Army, 11 April 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 536.
willing to live without, as long as they knew their troops were receiving enough, than Amsterdammers, who would undoubtedly have felt more tolerant of shortages if they knew Dutch soldiers were under fire in their defence. This is not to say that the Dutch had no concept of the need to do without, as most understood the necessity of government intervention in the economy. Nevertheless, they were unwilling to accept such an unfair distribution of goods.

One issue that highlights the importance of fair distribution particularly well was the problem of feeding interned soldiers. By international law, they merited similar treatment to soldiers from the country in which they were interned. This meant not only that they received the same monetary subsidies, but also similar food and fuel allowances as Dutch troops.\textsuperscript{165} If food-rationing favouring their own soldiers did not sit well with civilians, feeding foreign soldiers extra rations was unacceptable. The Dutch did not see the justice in giving (uninvited) visitors more to eat than they themselves received. Decreasing the rations of over 45,000 internees on a par with civilians was an ideal way for the government to kill two birds with one stone: it could reduce food supplies to the military (responsible for feeding the internees) and placate its constituents.\textsuperscript{166} Nevertheless, this action risked the ire of the belligerents. Britain entered into a heated discussion with the neutral after the civilian bread ration (and that of internees) was cut from 250 to 200 grammes in April 1918.\textsuperscript{167} But the government stood its ground. On this particular point it felt that the demands of its own citizens, who were taking to the streets in protest, were far more important than the strongly-worded requests of its neighbour.

**MANUFACTURING ENOUGH SHOES, UNIFORMS AND BLANKETS**

The outfitting of troops in August 1914 was far from ideal.\textsuperscript{168} Many were not only missing proper uniforms, their shoes and underwear were in various stages of disrepair as well. Unprepared for the clothing needs of a fully-mobilised force, available stocks of army

\textsuperscript{165} Laporte, “Belgische geïnterneerden in Nederland” p. 61.

\textsuperscript{166} Minister Agriculture, Industry and Trade to Minister Foreign Affairs, 21 January 1918, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Dienst der Geïnterneerde Krijgsgevangenen 1917 - 1919” entry no. 2.05.42, inventory no. 2.

\textsuperscript{167} Central Bread Bureau to Head of Service for Interned Prisoners of War, 13 April 1918, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Dienst der Geïnterneerde Krijgsgevangenen” entry no. 2.05.42, inventory no. 4; Director British Prisoners of War Department to Head of Internment Bureau, 16 January 1918, in ARA, “ Archieven van de Dienst der Geïnterneerde Krijgsgevangenen” entry no. 2.05.42, inventory no. 2.

\textsuperscript{168} See: Chapter 3, pp. 115 - 118.
uniforms quickly disappeared, and there were not enough blankets or straw mattresses. The arrival of more than 30,000 Belgian and British internees in October 1914 placed even greater demands on military stores. Even if all local and foreign troops could be properly outfitted, maintaining adequate reserves for new recruits and replacing those damaged by wear and tear, or lost or stolen, became a significant problem for the Military Supply Service. Unlike the manufacture of weapons and ammunition, however, it proved a lot easier to obtain many of these particular items.

One way the military augmented its supplies was by marshalling charity organisations into knitting socks, jerseys, gloves, scarves and woollen hats. Because of the chronic underwear shortage, it also undertook a nation-wide advertising campaign urging citizens to send any spare undergarments to supply depots, where they would receive payment for each item. The underwear campaign was short-lived, but throughout the war, women’s organisations knitted and darned for the military, the Royal Support Committee paid unemployed women to do the same, while inmates in many of the Netherlands’ prisons were ordered to sew underwear as well. Nevertheless, there continued to be substantial scarcity of outdoor garments, underwear and shoe soles. Military cobblers and tailors experimented with alternative materials, including wooden soles, to remedy some of the shortages. Civilians also had real problems clothing themselves in the last two war years. The government rationed clothing in 1917, and by late 1918, had designed a swapping scheme so that for every item of clothing bought, the customer had to return a similar item, albeit it worn down, to the shop. These could then be repaired and passed on to others. Rubber, wood and canvas replaced leather in civilian shoes.
One inevitable result of economic crisis, especially in wartime, was profiteering. This was as true in belligerent nations as it was in neutral countries. For example, the textile barons situated in and around the city of Tilburg, did very well out of the war. The seven major Tilburg factories doubled peacetime production and even with severe shortages (in raw materials and dyes) managed to keep manufacturing the grey cloth used for army uniforms throughout 1917 and 1918.\textsuperscript{178} Yet the fabric for uniforms was of such low quality (due not only to the scarcity of cotton but also because cotton and wool ratios were kept as low as possible) that it wore out quickly and had to be replaced within a few months, ensuring a steady profit for the factory owners and an unpleasant garment to wear for soldiers.\textsuperscript{179}

In all, between August 1914 and August 1915, 350 farmers, industrialists and entrepreneurs joined the list of Dutch millionaires, a list that had barely risen above 659 members since 1839. By 1920, this number had increased by another 210 people.\textsuperscript{180} The "war profiteer" (oorlogwinstmaker, or OW-er) became as despised an individual among the Dutch, as he or she would have been in any of the warring states.\textsuperscript{181} Whether belligerent or neutral, many felt it unscrupulous that a few were profiting majestically from the misery of the majority. The chief distinction between Netherlanders’ and warring populations’ views on profiteers is that the latter cast the profiteers in a moral light comparing their actions to the sacrifices made by front-line soldiers,\textsuperscript{182} while the Dutch viewed OW-ers not so much with moral distaste as plain dislike because theirs was easy money obtained by making others pay more. In fact, the popular backlash to OW-ers was considerable: they became the focus of severe criticism, demeaned in books and demonised in cartoons.\textsuperscript{183} In many respects, profiteers provided a useful outlet for popular despair and anger. Perhaps as a

\textsuperscript{178} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} pp. 164 – 165.
\textsuperscript{179} Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 19 October 1916, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 195; Kleijngeld, \textit{Gemobiliseerde militaien in Tilburg} p. 71.
\textsuperscript{181} For research on war profiteers in belligerent countries, see: Jean-Louis Robert, "The image of the profiteer" in Winter et. al. (eds.), \textit{Capital cities at war} pp. 104 – 132.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{183} See: Jan Feith, Seigfried Granaat, \textit{Uit Tijden van Oorlogswinst.} [In times of war profit] Amsterdam: Van Holkema & Warendorf, 1918.
means of harnessing these feelings, but also as a way of benefiting from the profiteers’ good fortune, the government introduced a “war profit tax” (oorlogswinstbelasting) in 1916.\textsuperscript{184} This meant that incomes and company profits above the average profit and income in the years 1911, 1912 and 1913 were taxed at a higher percentage.\textsuperscript{185} In all, the government raised \textsterling 780 million in “war profit tax”, which helped pay for the considerable costs involved in maintaining the crisis bureaucracy and mobilisation.\textsuperscript{186}

\textbf{Somewhere to Lay One’s Head}

Of all military needs, the most demanding and most controversial was the housing of soldiers. Because in peacetime, the military never had more than a few thousand troops training at any one time, it lacked the necessary barracks or billets in place to accommodate hundreds of thousands of men once mobilised. During the initial weeks of mobilisation, officers billeted troops with civilians, in public buildings and in tent camps (it was summer after all). However, by late November, as it became clear that the war would last much longer, the onset of winter made many of the temporary shelters highly unsuitable. Around this time, municipal councils requested the return of some of their buildings (especially the schools), and civilians became less enamoured of the strangers they had hosted for several weeks already.\textsuperscript{187} With the pending deadlock on the Western Front, the Field Army would remain concentrated in the south, overburdening the hospitality of southern provinces. At the same time, the thousands of Belgian refugees who remained in the country had to be accommodated, as did the interned foreign soldiers.\textsuperscript{188} That there was an existing general housing shortage in the Netherlands aggravated the problem.\textsuperscript{189}

The government did offer ample compensation to anyone accommodating troops: from 20 cents a day for a soldier to \textsterling 1 for officers (who required rooms by themselves and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{184} Staatsblad. no. 288, 22 June 1916.
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid. Articles 7 and 26; Flier, \textit{War Finances} p. 86.
  \item \textsuperscript{186} Gerbert Scholten, “De belangrijkste gebeurtenissen in het Nederlandsche volk van 1898 - 1923” [The most important events for the Dutch people from 1898 - 1923] in Bas (ed.), \textit{Gedenkboek 1898 – 1923} p. 81, fn 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} For problems housing soldiers, see: series of documents in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 129.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} Inspector of the Infantry to Minister of War, 20 January 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 166.
  \item \textsuperscript{189} H. J. Romeyn, “The Housing Problem” in Greven (ed.), \textit{The Netherlands and the World War} Volume II, pp. 165 - 205.
\end{itemize}
access to heating and light). If meals were provided, the amount of compensation rose. Yet even compensation did not entice civilians to volunteer their homes for billets. The financial rewards involved mainly attracted poorer families or those who could make a substantial profit. Either way, it did not ensure the most ideal living conditions for troops. Because there were never enough volunteers, many towns and villages in the south had soldiers forced upon them for months and even years at a time, much to their disgust.

Very soon, the government also worried about the long-term financial drain posed by housing 200,000 men at the set reimbursement rate. At times, the government paid house owners ten times the amount they would normally receive for renting out a room. In one case, the state paid £1,440 for a four-bedroom house, which tenants paid £150 for a year earlier. In an attempt to cut costs, in October 1914, the government refused reimbursements to proprietors for leave days, even if the soldiers did not vacate their lodgings.

Certain people were only too keen to house troops. Owners of large warehouses, factories, as well as empty barges and ships made huge profits from cramming as many troops into their rooms as possible, receiving the same rate of pay per soldier as a family did for the two or three soldiers it looked after. The warehouses and ships usually lacked even the most basic water and ablution facilities, and often posed severe health risks owing to a lack of light, overwhelming dampness, vermin and overcrowding. Some factory owners made troops pay to have a shower, while others set up canteens with overpriced items. The authorities tried to curb exploitation by enforcing stricter health standards, before signing long-term contracts with owners. The contracts ensured that the cost to the state reduced tremendously as well: for example, Kleijngeld mentioned a case in Tilburg where the state paid out £13,342 in 1915, which reduced to £3,900 in 1916 for exactly the same

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191 See: letters of complaint about billeted soldiers in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 166.
193 Ibid. p. 141
195 Ibid. p. 63.
number of soldiers.\footnote{Ibid.} Yet, hygiene problems would plague military facilities throughout the war.

Although public buildings were a cheaper alternative for housing troops, since the government compensated local and church councils rather than private individuals, this practice was not tenable in the long-term for a number of reasons. Firstly, hygiene standards were extremely difficult to maintain because municipal buildings often lacked adequate washing and toilet amenities. This meant the government paid for soldiers to take a weekly dip in public baths, and even leased swimming pools from local councils.\footnote{Verslag van den Toestand der Gemeente Dordrecht over het jaar 1915. p. 31. See also: correspondence on issue of soldier cleanliness in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 123.} Secondly, most civic buildings had a peacetime purpose that could not be suspended indefinitely. Schools posed a particular problem. During August, most students were on holiday, making schools ideal places to put up troops. With the start of the new academic year in September, however, things became difficult, students often moving to makeshift classrooms and having their classes shortened. During October 1914, even fewer classrooms were available as refugees were housed in every available space.\footnote{Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg pp. 58 - 59.} After October, mayors, locals and Members of Parliament placed immense pressure on the government to move soldiers out of the schools, citing the needs of education above those of mobilised troops.\footnote{Commander-in-Chief to authorities in the Army and Navy, 30 September 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 279; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 154.} High Command tried to meet these demands where possible, but given the accommodation shortages, it was often impossible to remove troops completely.\footnote{Commander-in-Chief to Commander Division I, 14 December 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 308.} Snijders did see to it that at least one school in each area was unaffected by billets and these took in students (and teachers) from occupied buildings.\footnote{Verslag van den Toestand der Gemeente Dordrecht over het jaar 1914 Appendix N, p. 26.} The situation remained far from ideal, and even as late as 1918, complaints reached Snijders’ desk about misuse of the country’s educational institutions.\footnote{For example, see: Minister Internal Affairs to Minister of War, 8 September 1918, and Commander-in-Chief’s response to Minister of War, 30 September 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 308.}

Housing soldiers in camps seemed the most practical solution, not only improving accommodation standards, but also keeping military discipline high (as soldiers’
movements could be constantly monitored). Initially, tent camps appeared ideal, but not in wet weather, or on swampy ground, and they lacked convenient cooking and cleaning facilities. With the onset of winter, tents became extremely impractical. It was an absolute necessity, therefore, to erect more permanent barracks. However, High Command’s first priority was the building of camps for internees, who had to be guarded and kept from escaping abroad. The government’s decision to erect refugee camps also took up vital building materials. Several new barracks did go up during the war, but not as many as desired due to timber shortages. The quality of barracks built in 1915 was generally shoddy, mainly because no one wanted to spend money on buildings that might only be used for a short time. Appropriate sites for camps were also difficult to find, especially for the many troops stationed in built-up cities. Hence, many tent camps remained in use right through the war, and soldiers suffered in them.

Even existing barracks and lodgings within fortified positions left much to be desired. They often lacked adequate ventilation, were infested with rats, and were extremely difficult to heat. Again only minor improvements were made, such as a rat removal service. As a result, many troops remained in inadequate accommodation throughout their mobilisation. On numerous occasions, MPs brought the abysmal state of some soldiers’ accommodation to national attention claiming that even the poorest man and woman in the country lived in better conditions than Dutch soldiers. There is no doubt that these inadequacies contributed to decreasing morale and discipline and helped spread the Spanish influenza pandemic, almost bringing the Army to a standstill in the summer and autumn of 1918.

203 See: discussion about the suitability of tents between the Commander-in-Chief and military commanders, March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 166.
204 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 152.
205 Military Medical Service, Tent Camp Bergen, to Inspector of Medical Service of the Army, 29 September 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 308; Commander of Landweer Coastal Detachment in Kijkduin to Territorial Commander in Holland, 31 March 1915; Commander of the Fortified Position at the Mouths of the Maas River and Haringvliet to Commander-in-Chief, 8 April 1915, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 166.
206 Commander 3 Regiment Fortification Artillery to Minister of War, 9 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 166.
207 Commander of the Field Army to military authorities, 21 February 1918; “Handleiding bij de rattenbestrijding” [Instructions for dealing with rats] 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 374.
The billeting of soldiers among civilians changed, even if only for the war years, the way citizens in the south worked, interacted and thought about other Netherlanders. They had to deal not only with sharing their houses, schools and public amenities with strangers, but also with the inevitable effects of mobilisation: increased alcohol consumption, prostitution, and problems with maintaining public order. Another matter of great concern to southerners at the time, was that many of the billeted troops were not Catholic, but Protestant. How were they to treat persons of a rival faith? The practicalities of the Protestant influx in the Catholic south also worried the military leadership and Protestant authorities. They feared moral degradation and loss of discipline if troops lost contact with their religion, especially because there were few Protestant churches, let alone chaplains or vicars in the south. As a result, the High Command sanctioned the ordaining of military chaplains and priests from all the major religions, who subsequently travelled throughout the countryside giving sermons to soldiers.\(^{210}\)

Dutch society in 1914 was highly stratified, not only according to class but, perhaps more importantly, according to religion and political beliefs. It was rare for Catholics to mingle with Protestants even in day-to-day affairs. Likewise, it was equally uncommon for Protestants or Catholics to mingle with Socialists. The very nature of Dutch society meant that until 1914, socialist movements were concentrated almost exclusively in the big cities. The mobilisation not only forced men with varying backgrounds to live together but also to share (or argue about) their ideas and beliefs. There is no doubt that socialist-inspired concepts spread through the Army during the war - the many soldiers’ mobilisation clubs attest to that.\(^{211}\) No doubt, they would also have affected and challenged the ideas held in even the most fervent of Catholic villages in Limburg, North Brabant and Zeeland. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the social effects of the mobilisation, but they are worthy of far more attention from historians.\(^{212}\)


\(^{211}\) See: Chapter 11, pp. 381 - 396.

\(^{212}\) For a very good overview of how the mobilisation affected soldiers and citizens in the south of the Netherlands see: Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg.
CONCLUSION: THE FATE OF A SMALL NATION

The ongoing shortages and economic crises had several significant consequences for the armed forces during the Great War. Most importantly, the war highlighted an inability to keep up with the technological advances of the belligerents. Their comparative material strength fell sharply during the war, especially after 1916, reducing the viability of the military as a deterrent against invasion and likewise, the value of Dutch neutrality altered significantly. Britain and Germany were sufficiently worried about the technological shortcomings to provide their neutral neighbour with some material support in 1918, lest their enemy find sufficient reason to invade the country.

Throughout the war, members of parliament questioned successive Ministers of War about what was being done to modernise the armed forces. Such questioning came to a head late in October 1918, when the leader of the Socialist Democrat Workers’ Party (SDAP), P. J. Troelstra, criticised the government for not having acquired enough machine-guns and other materials to prepare for war. While this was a somewhat precious line of questioning given the SDAP’s consistent lack of support for military funding before the war, it nevertheless indicated a burgeoning understanding that, unlike most popular perceptions in August 1914, the country was in a helpless position if one of the major powers invaded. Snijders replied to Troelstra’s criticisms by insisting that military factories were doing their utmost to keep the country’s technology on a level footing with the belligerents. In addition, he assured the MP that several orders for machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns and field artillery had been made in Germany and Sweden, which were due for delivery in November 1918. Little did either man know that the war would end before these weapons arrived.

Although Snijders did not agree with Troelstra’s damning critique of the government’s military policies, he knew Troelstra was right when he asserted that the military was unprepared for war in 1918. Snijders had caused a cabinet crisis several

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214 Commander-in-Chief, “Leidraad bij antwoording van de vragen, door de Lid der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-Generaal Mr P. Troelstra tot de Regeering te richten” October 1918, pp. 7 – 8, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705.
215 Snapper, “De gevechtswaarde” pp. 32 - 34, 46.
months earlier when he proclaimed that defence against a full-scale German invasion would be “pointless”, as the Netherlands’ Army did not have the weapons, ammunition, training or size to withstand such an attack. The outburst lost the Commander-in-Chief much respect among government ministers, many of whom censured Snijders’ defeatism and believed him unworthy of the burden of command.

It must be said, however, that the nature of the war crisis made it almost impossible to ensure uniformity in production or regularity in importation of war materials. Despite the restrictions, High Command did its best to ensure production levels remained high. Military factories were exempted from eight-hour days, received priority in coal supplies, and had strikes quashed by armed soldiers. The munitions factories in Delft and Hembrug even had 2,000 troops assigned, organised into a special “workers’ company” (werkliedencompagnie). But, since the nation was in crisis, it was impossible for military production not to be in crisis as well. More could have been done to streamline production and supply processes, but essentially, the problem had more to do with lack of resources than deficiencies in organisation. Hence, maintaining technological parity with the warring states ultimately became an unattainable goal, even if the Netherlands had been the most organised of countries.

Therefore, Amry Vandenbosch’s claim that small states have been decidedly disadvantaged by developments in modern technology ever since the start of the Great War certainly rings true for the Netherlands. It could not afford new armaments, not necessarily because it did not have the financial means to acquire them, but because it did not have the industrial capacity to build, supply, support and develop them. Without industrially powerful allies, a small neutral country could not progress militarily on equal terms with the major powers. Whereas before 1914, the Netherlands’ Army was comparable to the French, German and British armies in composition and weaponry (although on a much smaller scale), by 1918, it was outclassed in strength, size and, most of all, technological capability.

216 Minister of War, “Nota omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang der mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting hiervan te verhoogen” [Note regarding what has been done since the start of the mobilisation to increase the fighting strength and equipment of the Army] 16 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 145.
The Furore over Leave and Demobilisation

You have to be a soldier to realise what it means at such moments to learn that you are not allowed to [go on] leave.

*L. J. Jordaan (1916)*

If only they would see that the Netherlands' army, like the armies of the other small neutral-minded states, guards as the police officer who attempts to prevent the crime, that it is as prepared as the dyke, which may at any time have to withstand the battering of the storm tide. Who would out of repugnance for crime fight the police, who would out of aversion for floods lower or weaken the dykes or even undermine them?

*C. C. Gelder (1918)*

Quite apart from the problems of material supply, another pressing concern for High Command was maintaining adequate numbers of men in the field to protect the country and its neutrality. There were several factors influencing High Command’s numerous requests to the government for increasing the number of mobilised troops. These included the need to keep up (at least proportionately) with the growth of belligerent armies and burgeoning neutrality responsibilities. In February 1915, Snijders warned that the 200,000 soldiers available were stretched to meet all neutrality requirements, and consequently the Field Army would have grave difficulties in successfully withstanding an invasion because it had to be dispersed over such a wide area. The need for men continually increased as the tasks of maintaining border integrity, especially against

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1 "Je moet soldaat wezen, om te weten wat 't betekent op zulk een oogenblik te vernemen dat je niet weg moogt” (L. J. Jordaan, 1916, in Hoogterp, “De geschiedenis van Fort Spijkerboor” p. 26).
3 Commander-in-Chief to Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
smuggling, became more comprehensive; the maintenance of the “state of war” and “siege” became more complicated; and short-term leave entitlements reduced the number of troops actually in service at any one time.

While the High Command pleaded for greater numbers of men in uniform, the government came under considerable pressure from other sectors to substantially decrease its commitments. Again, there were several contributing factors, including the huge financial strain of supporting thousands of soldiers. On top of the huge costs involved in running a crisis economy, this burden increased the Netherlands’ national debt by many millions of guilders. Overall, between August 1914 and August 1919, the crisis economy cost the government 1.9 billion guilders. Its military expenditure nearly equalled that, with 1.2 billion spent in the same period, of which soldiers’ wages alone amounted to more than 160 million. This was nearly nine times the military expenditure in the four years before war broke out. The government encountered severe pressure from parliamentarians and the public to minimise mobilisation costs, to provide soldiers with more leave, and at times, to demobilise completely. Cabinet ministers faced the unenviable task of compromising between the seemingly incompatible demands made by the military for more men and resources, and by the public for fewer soldiers and less funding. The demands illustrate another aspect of the developing gap between what High Command believed to be the absolute minimum military necessities for the maintenance of neutrality and security, and what parliament and the population would accept as maximum military involvement in their lives. Government attempts at resolution and conciliation only left both sides of the mobilisation divide increasingly dissatisfied.

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4 Scholten, “De belangrijkste gebeurtenissen” p. 86.
5 Flier, War Finances pp. 36 - 37.
6 Pruntel, Bereiken wat mogelijk is p. 149.
TOO MANY INDIANS, NOT ENOUGH CHIEFS

A professional soldier in the armed forces was not a desirable career path for most Netherlanders. This meant that the Army and Navy traditionally had problems in attracting enough potential officers in sufficient quantity, let alone quality. Officer shortages beset the armed forces years before the outbreak of the Great War, and were never adequately addressed. During the mobilisation of August 1914, the consequences of this shortfall hit home, especially in the area of Army administration. From an early stage, almost all military circles were affected, from the running of depots to the direction of troops, from the instruction of conscripts to the management and distribution of supplies. As a result, General Headquarters’ staff made it one of their chief priorities to remedy the deficiency. They urged many retired officers to come back, called up Netherlands’ Indies Army reserves, and used the 1913 Landstormwet to oblige ex-officers under the age of 40 to return to service. These measures ensured that by the middle of 1915, the Army was only missing about 280 officers under established strength.

Nevertheless, a fundamental problem remained (which had plagued the country for years) namely: how does one entice able persons into a military career? Throughout the war, the officer problem stayed foremost in the minds of military planners. With the mobilisation of new landstorm sections from late 1915 onwards, as well as the induction of new conscripts (intakes year 1914 onwards), the demand for competent officers began to rise dramatically into the thousands. Not surprisingly, therefore, much of the Army’s 1916 investigation into the mobilisation focused on the officer corps (the rest of the investigation concentrated on clothing and equipment shortages). One report highlighted what was clear to most military observers; not only were there insufficient officers, of those available many

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7 See: Chapter 2, p. 61.
9 See: Chapter 3, pp. 115 - 118.
10 Commander-in-Chief to all mayors, 31 July 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 282; “Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatierapport” [Sketch of mobilisation report to be made public by Department of War] [1916 - 1919] no page numbers, section “Het op voet van oorlog brengen van de bezettingstroepen”, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden pp. 81 – 83.
11 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 84.
12 The archives of the General Staff and Field Army dedicate several files to the investigation (conducted in February 1916) into the state of the mobilisation. For an example of the questions posed, see: ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 195.
were too young, inexperienced and lacking in adequate training to lead men into combat.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, the bulk of the Army’s officers were unprepared to take on a wartime role.

According to the 1916 report, the officer shortfall was especially evident in Field Army infantry units.\textsuperscript{14} There were several areas of concern, but the report was particularly scathing about the instability fostered in the leadership of infantry sections. Because of their small numbers and heavy workload, available officers often had little time to develop command relationships with their troops. It also meant they were replaced or assigned to different units at irregular intervals and that no consistency in leadership was maintained. This made the task of directing and training men especially difficult. As a result, troops often exhibited little respect for their commanders, many of whom did not stay on long enough even to learn their names. Given that seasoned officers invariably accompanied border patrols, their inexperienced colleagues and non-commissioned officers (NCO’s) were left to deal with the decidedly more difficult tasks of maintaining order and discipline in depots, billets and camps.\textsuperscript{15}

What the report found most disturbing, however, were deficiencies in officer training.\textsuperscript{16} In general, officer recruits were poorly prepared for their duties, while the expectations placed on them were not high enough. Their teachers were often unsatisfactorily trained themselves, which was not surprising since the best officers received command (rather than instructional) appointments. This left many newly-trained officers, those usually assigned to work closely with troops, without the necessary experience or background to maintain discipline, let alone enhance morale. Another significant problem was that many of these officers were younger than the men they commanded, something which the Netherlands’ armed forces had in common with belligerent armies, again critically undermining the development of mutual respect.

The more specialised military units, including mobile artillery and cavalry, although not without their own troubles, did not face the same grave difficulties with their officer corps, perhaps because being smaller, better centralised, and better trained, they also

\textsuperscript{13}“Welke zijn Uwe bevindingen omtrent de paraatheid van het onderdeel, onder Uw bevel op dit oogenblik ten opzichte van encadreering” [What are your findings regarding the readiness of the section under your command at this moment, with respect to the officer situation?] report, 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 195.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.
enjoyed more continuity in leadership.\textsuperscript{17} Older \textit{landweer} sections also had fewer problems, at least while they kept their own NCOs. Nevertheless, as existing officers were granted leave, even the specialised units experienced a considerable drop in the quality of their commanders.\textsuperscript{18} Like the infantry, they had to make do with substandard replacements, hurriedly trained, who were usually far too young and inexperienced.

The 1916 investigation was only one of many that stressed the severity of officer inadequacies. A state committee report on the mobilisation published in 1918 also addressed these issues, highlighting the fact that the officer deficiency seriously increased as the war continued.\textsuperscript{19} Leave provisions, the transfer of capable officers to the customs departments (to help stem smuggling) and to guard refugee and internee camps, heavily reduced their numbers. This was as true for the professional officer corps as it was for its non-commissioned support. For example, by February 1917, there was only one lieutenant available to act as adjutant to each of the 80 infantry battalion commanders.\textsuperscript{20} Even more disquieting was the shortage of captains responsible for leading tactical units within a battalion. The Field Army required 320 in all, but in 1917 had only 231 available. The Commander of the Field Army estimated that with many of the officers going on short-term leave, the actual number of captains still needed was 261.\textsuperscript{21} On top of this, by 1917, as older conscripts in the \textit{landweer} and their experienced non-commissioned officers were sent on long-term leave, many battalions operated without adequate numbers of NCOs.\textsuperscript{22}

Unfortunately, there were few short-term solutions available to rectify the shortfalls. Officer training schools, closed down during the mobilisation in August 1914, were reopened in June 1915 to instruct new candidates.\textsuperscript{23} The recruitment of officers became a priority, young men were enticed with better pay and conditions, while promotion through the ranks came quicker than before the war.\textsuperscript{24} The Minister of War used provisions in the 1912 \textit{Militiewet} to compel conscripts into non-commissioned ranks, by training those

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\textsuperscript{17} "Welke zijn Uwe bevindingen omtrent de paraatheid van het onderdeel, onder Uw bevel \textit{op dit oogenblik} ten opzichte van eencadreering" report, 1916, in ARA, "Archieven van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 195; Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} pp. 37 - 38.

\textsuperscript{18} Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 40.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.} (especially) pp. 97 – 104.

\textsuperscript{20} Commander of the Field Army, 28 February 1917, in \textit{Ibid.} p. 97.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.} p. 98.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.} pp. 100 - 102.

\textsuperscript{23} Inspector of the Infantry to the Commander-in-Chief, 28 December 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1474.

\textsuperscript{24} Staatscommissie, \textit{Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht} p. 32.
with secondary school qualifications as sergeants and corporals. He also managed in May 1917 to enact another law allowing High Command to select soldiers for officer training, whether commissioned or not, as long as the country was at war or on a war footing. Although the two laws improved the potential pool from which officers were chosen, promotion of NCOs weakened command at a lower level. High Command also forced many newly-conscripted men into officer training camps, often against their will, which had the dangerous consequence of creating reluctant officers. These policies rarely added quality to the Army’s leadership. Nevertheless, it allowed Snijders to suggest to the Minister of War in 1918, that extraordinary leave quotas for NCOs should be extended beyond the 20 per cent mark set in 1916.

The officer corps doubled in size during the war: there were 3,967 commissioned and 30,177 NCOs mobilised in August 1914; these numbers rose to 8,538 and 63,180 respectively by the end of 1917. The increases were absolutely necessary because the total size of the armed forces also more than doubled – from around 200,000 men in August 1914 to just over 400,000 by the end 1917. Most of the newly-trained officers, however, replaced existing officers, who went on leave alongside their troops, to be called up when their units were remobilised. Instead of augmenting numbers and fixing the inadequacies that existed before mobilisation, the replacement officers only exacerbated the deficiencies since, on the whole, they lacked the necessary skills for the maintenance of discipline and effective command. At no stage during the war, therefore, did supply meet demand.

25 Staatsblad. no. 21, 2 February 1912.
26 Staatsblad. no. 411, 23 May 1917.
27 Commander of the Field Army, 28 February 1917, in Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 100.
28 Jong, Notities van een landstormman pp. 26 – 27.
29 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, May 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 808.
30 Minister of War, “Nota omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang der mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting hiervan te verhoogen” [Note regarding what has been done since the start of the mobilisation to increase the fighting strength and outfitting of the Army] 16 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705. These figures are comparable to ones quoted by F. Snapper (“Enige Sterktecijfers” p. 87) for 14 October 1918: 8,531 commissioned and 68,783 NCO’s.
31 Minister of War, “Nota omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang der mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting hiervan te verhoogen” 16 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705. For the numbers in 1914, see: fn 140, Chapter 3.
32 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 5 June 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 407.
CONSCRIPTION AND RECRUITMENT

One reason why the officer shortage was so pervasive was because High Command believed it necessary to increase the size of the armed forces. There were several factors involved in the push for expansion, including the need to keep numbers high so that the growing responsibilities of the Army and Navy could be met. If the Army and Navy were already stretched in August 1914 to meet their defence and neutrality requirements, they were strained even further when policing smuggling, and “state of war” and “siege” joined their list of tasks. The Navy also faced problems meeting the demands of its coast-guard, mine-recovery, and search-and-visit duties. The last two years of war were especially difficult for troops; they now also had to monitor and police public protests and rioting in the cities as well as guard food transports and government factories from plunderers.

Another significant factor in increasing the size of the armed forces related to leave provisions. As the war dragged into many months, troops inevitably would be sent on short and long-term leave. Replacements were urgently needed, and since the Landstorm law of 1913 had not yet permitted the creation of a significant reserve, the government and High Command required other solutions. Snijders was also concerned about the decline in the deterrence value of his armed forces. While under no illusion that the defensive capabilities of the Netherlands plummeted with each passing month, given the corresponding rises in the technological superiority of the belligerent forces, he nonetheless felt strongly about the need to maintain as many troops as possible, if only as a “psychological” barrier. Snijders was well aware of the fact that while the warring states were engaged on various fronts throughout Europe, they would be unable to engage their full military capabilities against the Netherlands, hence preserving a large military could have significant deterrent value.

During the Great War, all the belligerents enlarged their armies significantly. Most doubled in size between August 1914 and November 1918, even taking into account the thousands of casualties suffered. Often, if legal obligations did not compel men into the

34 For the responsibilities of the armed forces to public order through 1917 and 1918 see: Chapter 11, pp. 368 – 374, and Chapter 12, 424 - 429.
services, moral and social pressures placed upon them by peers and families did. But here, the Netherlands’ Army and Navy faced a much more difficult task in persuading Dutch citizens of the necessity of military service than their counterparts in Britain, France, Germany or Austria-Hungary.

There were many ways in which the government tried to enlarge the size of its armed forces. One method used by the Minister of War was altering conscription criteria. From 1915 onwards, all eligible men who were called to the military commission were conscripted, as long as they were medically fit. In other words, the lottery was entirely abolished until 1919. This allowed another 5,000 men to be called up and raised the yearly intake to 28,000. Exceptions were still made for brother service, kostwinnaarschap (breadwinner’s status), religious employment and for having a criminal record (although men convicted for less than six months remained eligible). Effectively, it imposed general conscription on all but a few twenty-year-old men. There were some problems: the wartime conscripts only trained for four months before moving into infantry units, although soldiers in the specialised units received somewhat more training. Hence, insufficient training affected not only the newest officer recruits but also the conscripts they commanded. Regrettably, many of the military reforms introduced by Colijn in 1912 and 1913 to improve the quality of troops had little effect after mobilisation, because conscripts had to be made war-ready as quickly as possible.

Another way of increasing conscript numbers involved lengthening the period of service. For example, in July 1914, Bosboom ensured the oldest landweer intakes (men born in the year 1879 and due for release from the landweer that same month) stayed in service until the end of the year, thereby postponing the transfer of these 35 and 36-year olds into the landstorm. In mid-December 1914, he requested that parliament extend their service to 31 March 1915. Most MPs were reluctant to agree principally because they did not believe there was any need, as the security position of the Netherlands seemed to have

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36 Staatsblad. no. 349, 3 August 1914; Isselt, Snelle Uitvoering p. 7.
37 Minister of Justice to colleges of prison governors, 27 November 1914, in ARA, “Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek” entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 5.
38 See: Chapter 2, pp. 60, 64 - 65.
39 Staatsblad. no. 330, 27 July 1914.
changed considerably since the uncertain circumstances of July and August 1914.\textsuperscript{40} The Western Front deadlocked and the belligerents were far too preoccupied, so many Netherlanders thought, to be concerned about the Netherlands at all. As a result, Bosboom asked them to allow the \textit{landweer} to stay on only for another month.\textsuperscript{41} During parliamentary discussions later in January 1915, he suggested lengthening the service of the \textit{landweermanen} by another six months, until 31 July 1915. Bosboom's motion met with another storm of protest, especially from the SDAP benches, but this time, after explanations about continued international insecurity and the military's many neutrality responsibilities, parliament passed the law by 61 votes to 15.\textsuperscript{42} Eventually, the 1907 \textit{landweer} intake went on indefinite leave in May 1915.\textsuperscript{43}

Similarly, the transfer from the regular military into the \textit{landweer} was postponed for the intake years 1906-1909 until 1 January 1916, when the 1906 and 1907 conscripts became the first two \textit{landweer} intakes of the year, followed in August by the 1908 and 1909 conscripts.\textsuperscript{44} The postponements were not as controversial as the \textit{landweer} ones cited above, because the conscripts were much younger (between 27 and 30 years of age) and regardless of whether they were in the regular forces or \textit{landweer}, they remained mobilised.\textsuperscript{45}

Another option tested by the High Command was appealing to volunteers for military service. This was entirely unsuccessful: not only did most men decline to join the voluntary \textit{landstorm}; they also found the prospect of paid employment within the officer corps unenticing.\textsuperscript{46} This widespread lack of enthusiasm can largely be attributed to the unpopularity of military service. Nevertheless, here again, a clear distinction must be made

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Staatsblad}. no. 343, 29 July 1915; no. 563, 31 December 1915; no. 349, 29 July 1916; no. 562, 30 December 1916; no. 408, 23 May 1917; no. 698, 15 December 1917; no. 413, 18 June 1918.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Staatsblad}. no. 329, 29 July 1914, no. 350, 3 August 1914, no. 664, 31 December 1914, no. 36, 30 January 1915, no. 342, 29 July 1915; no. 359, 29 July 1916; no. 563, 30 December 1916; no. 409, 23 May 1917; no. 699, 15 December 1917; no. 416, 18 June 1918; Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} Appendix A, between pp. 390 – 391. See: Appendix 10.
\textsuperscript{46} See: Chapter 2, p. 60.
between a society actually at war and one merely facing a distant prospect of war. Warring nations usually have little problem finding volunteers for military service if the threat to their country is believed dire enough. Neutral populations, on the other hand, do not feel directly threatened and as a result feel less compelled to take up arms. However noble the Dutch deemed the cause of neutrality, it was never noble enough to induce them to voluntarily drop everything and join up. Compulsory armed service had never been popular among the Dutch, and this did not change during the Great War. In fact, avoidance of conscription became such a problem by 1917 that the government passed laws and the military imposed strict regulations in the "state of siege". These refused exit permits out of the country for men between the age of 19, when they were written into the military books, and 41, when they were no longer eligible for any form of landstorm service.47

THE LANDSTORM DEBATE

As we saw in Chapter 2, one of the most controversial ways in which the Minister of War tried to expand the size of the Army was by obliging men who avoided conscription to serve in the landstorm. The 1913 Landstormwet had created two categories of potential new conscripts: one "armed", the other "unarmed". As of that year, any ex-soldier or officer under the age of 40 was automatically transferred into an "armed" landstorm section on the day he left the military. Any twenty-year olds who were fortunate, for whatever reason, to miss out before or as a result of the conscript lottery were placed into "unarmed" landstorm units. Both types of landstormers could be mobilised in wartime, but only the "armed" landstorm would actually have to fight.

During the August 1914 mobilisation, there was no perceived need to call up the landstorm, if only because there were not enough men who had as yet become eligible for this service. The law, after all, had only been operational for little over a year. Through the course of 1915, however, the Minister of War and High Command explored the potentials of the landstorm regulations. They suggested to parliament on two separate occasions, in

47 Territorial Commander in Friesland, "Bekendmaking" [Notification] poster, 8 January 1917, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 206; Territorial Commander Friesland, "Handleiding ter gebruikte bij het controleren der "Militiepapieren" over te leggen ingevolge de Verordening van de Territorialen Bevelhebber voornoemd, betreffende dienstplichtige zeevarenden en zeevisschers" [Instructions to be used when checking military papers of seafarers and fishermen, with regard to the orders made by the above-named Territorial Commander] in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 667 (also in ARA, "Archief van de Afdeling Documentatie van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek" entry no. 2.04.53.14, inventory no. 10).
June and July 1915, that the 1913 law should be amended, so that more men could be called up. The most controversial of the two proposed amendments saw all men under the age of forty, who had not served in the armed forces before, suddenly become eligible for conscription into the landstorm. Not only were they conscriptable, the previous distinction between “armed” and “unarmed” was abolished, so that the new conscripts received ordinary military training.

Illustration 12: Conscription

With the caption, “Here, we’d know much better what conscription meant, than them there...” (“Dan weten wij hier toch beter wat de diensplicht beteekent, dan zij daar...”), this cartoon illustrates the virulent debates held in parliament about military service.

(Source: Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 296)

The amendments created heated debate in parliament, especially after 22 prominent business leaders presented a petition to parliament supporting continued mobilisation. They claimed that the country’s safety depended on it, and implied, therefore, that the economic consequences of continued mobilisation were subordinated to

48 See: Chapter 2, pp. 67 - 70.
national security. It was a clear signal of support from the business community for the proposed legislation. The landstorm laws were passed, albeit not in the form in which they were originally proposed. When Bosboom suggested revising the landstormwet in 1915, he hoped to obtain extra troops. Nevertheless, parliament legislated that landstormers were only to be used as replacements for soldiers going on leave, rather than as additional troops to those already mobilised, and that the landstorm should consist of younger men (less than 30 years old) so that older mobilised conscripts could return home.

Between its proposal and acceptance into law, the purpose of the landstorm amendment underwent a fundamental change, an illustration of the growing divide between military and civilian expectations. On the one hand, High Command wished for a considerable increase in military commitment because it wanted to keep the Netherlands as defensible as possible. On the other, many civilians (including MPs) believed that the war situation, as it was in mid-1915, warranted a substantial decrease in the mobilisation commitment, because the threat of invasion seemed to have passed. Where High Command saw the landstorm changes as an opportunity to increase the size of the Army, many MPs saw the laws as superfluous, except if they could guarantee better leave provisions for already mobilised soldiers, most of whom had been in service for nearly a year. The government, stuck between two diverging demands, compromised: while more men could be conscripted into the landstorm, this could only occur if the oldest intakes of mobilised landweer went on indefinite leave. In other words, the new conscripts would act as replacements for, rather than additions to, present troop concentrations.

The compromise created many more problems than it actually solved. Firstly, although the laws gave parliament something that it wanted, it came at the cost of alienating many citizens. Men between the age of 20 and 30, who had happily avoided military service, were now far from pleased at the prospect of conscription. Exceptions for brother service or kostwinnaarschap were not made in the landstorm and after June 1918, the armed forces could recall individuals for military inspections whenever they wished. As the war continued, it became more likely that all men in their twenties would be required to serve. Secondly, having given in to demands for landweer leave, the government came under even more pressure to do the same for the oldest military intakes. This was done in

50 De Landstorm Uitbreiding p. 3.
51 Circular from the Minister of War to all mayors, 7 August 1915, in Ibid. p. 74; Staatsblad. no. 429, 20 June 1918.
July 1916, much to the disgust of Snijders, who feared a further diminution of the Army's fighting quality.\textsuperscript{52}

The demand that younger men served before older men remained so intense that in May 1917 Bosboom resigned after a \textit{débâcle} in parliament concerning the conscription of the 1908 \textit{landstorm} intake (those born in 1888) ahead of the 1918 \textit{landstorm} and military intakes, who were ten years younger (born in 1898). The Second Chamber narrowly accepted a motion brought by one of the SDAP's more vocal representatives, M. P. Marchant, requiring the 1918 intakes to be conscripted first.\textsuperscript{53} Bosboom declared he would go ahead with his original plans regardless, resulting in another parliamentary vote against the Minister. Twice defeated, Bosboom felt he had no option but to resign. However, the call-up of the \textit{landstorm} was already too well advanced to change, so Bosboom's temporary replacement, J. J. Rambonnet (who also held the portfolio of Minister in Charge of the Navy), presented a \textit{fait accompli} to parliament in May 1917, and managed to get the earlier \textit{landstorm} intake legislated.

For High Command, the \textit{landstorm} amendments of 1915 were equally problematic. Snijders had warned Bosboom from the beginning that replacing well-trained men with inadequately-trained \textit{landstormers} weakened the Army. Not only did it decrease its fighting quality, and place undue strain on a young and inexperienced officer corps, it also made a second mobilisation, in case of invasion, an absolute necessity. Snijders wished to avoid a large-scale remobilisation at all costs, because the chances of it going awry were too great.\textsuperscript{54} He had no choice, however, when the government forced his hand by sending thousands of mobilised soldiers on leave. It created the rather absurd situation where the country's reserve force (made up of soldiers on leave) was far more capable of withstanding an invasion than those actually manning the borders and serving in the fortifications.\textsuperscript{55} It would take years to bring the \textit{landstorm} up to the same standard. Snijders did not presume that the country had these years to spare.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Staatsblad.} no. 361, 29 July 1916; Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 30 September 1916, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411.


\textsuperscript{54} See: section "Second Mobilisation" pp. 362 - 364.

\textsuperscript{55} Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 25 June 1915, pp. 9 - 10, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 293.
In fact, instead of keeping all fortifications fully operational, when landweer troops went on leave in 1915 and 1916, High Command placed a skeleton landstorm staff in most of the fortified positions, except the most important ones along the New Holland Waterline. Even in the Waterline, garrison numbers were cut: the focus had to be on the Field Army and the borders. If a second mobilisation occurred, soldiers would move back into the fortifications. In the meantime, the defences were left virtually unprotected. During periods of crisis, such as the Easter scare of 1916, more troops occupied the fortified positions, but never enough to make them secure.\footnote{For fluctuations of troops in the New Holland Waterline during the war see: Koen, \textit{Utrecht Verdedigd} pp. 38 – 40. See also: Hoogterp, "De geschiedenis van Fort Spijkerboor" p. 28.}

Of course, decreasing troop strength in the fortified positions made sense, as the Army did not have heavy artillery to adequately protect them. There was another major problem with replacing soldiers going on leave with younger landstorm conscripts, namely if the war lasted long enough, there would be no younger replacements available. By the end of 1917, in fact, landstorm substitutes were older than troops going on leave. For example, military intake year 1909 (men born in 1889) went on leave in November 1916.\footnote{See: Appendix 10, p. 463.} Four months later, the first intake of 27-year old landstormers (LS 1909) began their military training. When the 1908 landstorm intake was called up later in 1917, its soldiers were older (29 years old in 1917) than the four military intakes that went on leave that year (1911 (26 years old), 1912 (25 years old), 1913 (24 years old), and 1914 (23 years old)). The 30-year threshold for landstorm duty had nearly been reached. If High Command was to allow more troops to go on leave, other sources had to be found. Throughout 1918, instead of calling up older landstorm conscripts, the government recalled to military inspections, those men freed in the first landstorm call-up.\footnote{Staatsblad. no. 257, 20 April 1918.} Snijders also suggested calling up the military intake year 1919 six months early (in the middle of 1918); as a result, the first half of the 1919 intake took up posts in training barracks in August of that year.\footnote{Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 21 February 1918, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.} He floated the idea to recall intake year 1914 from indefinite leave as well.\footnote{Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 23 October 1918, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.}
LEAVE FOR ONE AND ALL

Although on paper, the *landstormwetten* increased the total strength of the military to around 400,000 men, its actual strength was far below that figure. Leave granted to entire conscript intakes ensured that at any one time, fewer than 200,000 were actually mobilised. Among the mobilised troops, short-term and extraordinary leave provisions meant that more were absent than present in their military units. In a letter to the Minister of War in October 1916, Snijders complained that 61 per cent of mobilised soldiers were unavailable for active duty because they were on some form of short-term leave, an abysmal figure for an armed force supposedly on high military alert. 61 He also warned that of the 39 per cent of troops that were available on any day, most were inadequately prepared for war. He feared that it was virtually impossible to mount an effective defence if it became necessary.

Conscripts were entitled to several categories of leave: “indefinite long-term”, “indefinite short-term”, “normal” and “extraordinary”. Indefinite long-term leave was given in peacetime to soldiers after training or demobilisation. It meant they were free to go where they wanted, at least until called up for mobilisation by the government. Indefinite short-term leave was very similar, in that soldiers were freed from service, although they could be recalled during a second mobilisation. This type of leave was usually granted in time of crisis, and its only restriction was that affected soldiers could not move out of the country. Starting in May 1915 with the oldest *landweer* intakes (year 1907, conscripts born in 1879), the entire *landweer*, excepting a few specialist units, went on indefinite short-term leave by December 1916. Two months later, the oldest military intakes (year 1910, conscripts born in 1890) received indefinite leave as well, followed throughout 1917 and 1918 by the next oldest intakes. 62

There were a number of contributing factors as to why so many men could go on indefinite leave. One of the most pervasive in the popular mind was the idea that older men had a greater responsibility to their families, homes, and to the economy than they did to idling in barracks awaiting a military confrontation that may not eventuate. Supporters of granting indefinite leave to older conscripts used moral and economic reasoning to sway

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61 Commander-in-Chief Snijders to Minister of War Bosboom, 11 October 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411.
62 See: Appendix 10, p. 463.
public opinion in their favour. The *landstorm* laws were popular in this respect because they ensured that the oldest soldiers could go home, while younger men, supposedly with fewer family or economic commitments, and without “important” jobs, assumed the mundane occupation of barracks instead.\(^\text{63}\) Of course, among the new *landstormers* and their families, the move was far from appreciated.

Another important factor involved in granting short-term leave was the perception that the *landstorm* laws increased the size of the Army significantly, without increasing pressure on national funds. Troops on leave did not cost the government anything; instead, it could pay *landstormers* to perform the same duties. It was a very cheap way of doubling the available fighting force. Of course, if the country faced invasion, men on leave would be recalled to arms, an expensive enterprise. But in the face of national danger, fiscal responsibility could be abandoned (as it had been in July and August 1914) until the danger passed. In May 1916, Bosboom wrote to Snijders on this point: that although there were no funds put aside for a second mobilisation, that should not hinder Snijders taking whatever steps necessary to protect the country when remobilisation took place, and the costs would be recovered later.\(^\text{64}\) In the meantime, while the country remained out of the conflict, Bosboom asked the Commander-in-Chief to be frugal with available funds.

All mobilised soldiers were entitled to “normal leave”, which in August 1914 amounted to one day’s leave after every ten days’ service (while *landweer* in the fortifications received a day off every week). Often, leave accrued so that soldiers could take several days in a row every so many weeks.\(^\text{65}\) In August 1916, normal leave was extended to one day every week for all troops, as well as an additional day each month.\(^\text{66}\) As its title suggests, soldiers received “extraordinary leave” in special circumstances, usually due to family illness, death or an important occasion. At Easter or Christmas, more troops received a few days off, as did Jewish troops during Hanukkah and New Year.\(^\text{67}\)

\(^{63}\) See: fn 103 and 105 below.

\(^{64}\) Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 23 May 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 306.

\(^{65}\) Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* p. 246.

\(^{66}\) Kleijngeld, *Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg* p. 84.

Furthermore, successive Ministers of War granted extraordinary leave to troops for
occupational reasons. If they held important positions in industry, agriculture or trade,
soldiers could receive authorisation to take leave of absence from anywhere between a week
and three months. Likewise, agricultural workers could be excused for a few weeks at a
time during harvests; miners received leave to work in Limburg’s coal mines; while
teachers, police and customs officers, apprentices and tertiary students also qualified for
extraordinary leave.

A vital consideration for the government when it granted extraordinary leave was
the preservation of the national economy. Never before in the history of the Netherlands had
it interfered so completely in economic matters than during the Great War. Cabinet
ministers recognised that in time of crisis, it was unwise to have too many individuals
unable to fulfil vital jobs. Without skilled managers, workers and administrators, entire
industries could falter. Not surprisingly, those with the greatest economic worth were most
likely to be given leave. Perhaps, because so many soldiers were able to go on extraordinary
leave during the war and because few industries (save coal mining) experienced severe
worker shortages, fewer women were employed to fill the gaps left by mobilised men.

While the Netherlands kept out of the war, its government kept a close eye on its
fiscal responsibilities. The war crisis stretched national funds to their limits, and forced the
government to underwrite several emergency loans. The military took a considerable
portion of the available money, much more than it had in peacetime. Hence, reducing
military expenditure, where possible, became another cabinet priority. In simple terms,
every soldier on leave meant less money was spent feeding, housing, bathing and clothing
him. In fact, the Ministry of War’s Conscription \textit{(Dienstplicht)} Department often granted

\begin{footnotes}

68 P. A. Ravelli, \textit{Regelen, Volgens Welke Bijzondere Verloven aan Gemobiliseerden Worden Verleend.} \textit{[Regulations,
according to which extraordinary leave is given to mobilised soldiers]} The Hague: De Gebroeders van Cleef, 1918.

69 \textit{Ibid;} Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} p. 256.

70 See: Chapter 9, pp. 310 - 324.

71 An in-depth study of women’s roles during the war is definitely needed, which may provide interesting
comparisons with what was happening in belligerent societies during the Great War. For information on women’s
employment during the war see: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, \textit{Documenten voor de Economische Crisis van Nederland
Volume 3}, pp. 265 - 293; Emmy J. Belinfante, “De Nederlandsche vrouw gedurende den oorlog” \textit{[The Dutch woman

72 Bosboom, \textit{In Moeilijke Omstandigheden} pp. 359 - 378.
\end{footnotes}
applications for extraordinary leave only if the soldier did not require any monetary assistance.\textsuperscript{73}

The Conscription Department and its General Headquarter’s equivalent had the combined responsibility of administering extraordinary leave, while the Commander-in-Chief took charge of normal leave provisions.\textsuperscript{74} Chaos must have reigned in the two departments, as they received thousands of requests for extraordinary leave on a weekly basis from soldiers, their employers, trade boards, and community organisations\textsuperscript{75} In 1916, in an attempt to set some precedents and curb abuses of the extraordinary leave option, High Command consulted with the government and set clear quotas. Thirty per cent of a unit could go on extraordinary leave at any one time, and 25 per cent of its professional officer corps, although, due to a NCO shortage, their quota was set at 20 per cent.\textsuperscript{76} The two departments gave priority according to economic requirements. Hence, agricultural workers received preference at harvest time, as did mine-workers after April 1918.\textsuperscript{77} However, as the government often granted extraordinary leave to entire categories of soldiers (such as customs officers in May 1915, mayors in February 1917, teachers in September 1917),\textsuperscript{78} the quota was often exceeded.

By late 1916, 21 per cent of mobilised troops were unavailable for active service on any one day as they were taking their allocation of normal leave. Taken together with the
30 per cent (at least) of others enjoying extraordinary leave, the 61 per cent absentee rate, quoted by Snijders in October of that year, was not exaggerated. When extraordinary leave was mismanaged, as it inevitably was, the figure could escalate further. Of the 200,000 odd soldiers supposedly mobilised, it left around 80,000 to fulfil the many neutrality and defence roles described in previous chapters. Little wonder, Snijders worried that his armed forces were going to waste.

**THE EASTER SCARE, 1916**

Once begun in 1915, parliament continuously urged the government to grant more indefinite and extraordinary leave. Subsequently, cabinet ministers placed pressure on High Command to give in to these demands, although agreeing with Snijders that the country was still in enough danger to restrict leave provisions within the bounds of defence requirements. One reason why High Command did look favourably on granting leave was because it improved troop morale. Maintaining high morale becomes especially imperative when an army is mobilised for long periods at a time with little variation in daily routine. Throughout 1915, several small military riots broke out in the larger cities, fuelled by a mix of boredom and dissatisfaction at the lack of leave; large concentrations of soldiers in one place helped generate discontent. 79

At this stage, Snijders convinced Bosboom that the armed forces should remain fully mobilised. But this became far more difficult to do as the war on the Western Front sank further into stalemate. By late 1915, Bosboom had considerable problems persuading parliament that a full mobilisation was an absolute necessity. In the eyes of many parliamentarians the risk of invasion had decreased significantly.80 The danger seemed to dwindle even further when the first major offensive of the new year – around Verdun in February 1916 – did not create a major breakthrough for the Germans, instead degenerating into a protracted period of slaughter in and around the French salient that neither side could bring to a decisive end. If the Netherlands was seemingly not under threat, so many Dutch commentators argued, why should parliament accept a full mobilisation that was both expensive and unpopular?

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79 See: Chapter 12, pp. 401 – 410, for more information about military riots.

80 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 14 October 1915, in ARA, “Collectie Bosboom” [Collection Bosboom] entry no. 2.21.027, inventory no. 6.
On 30 March 1916, German officials in Berlin informed a Dutch diplomatic representative there that they had reliable information regarding a pending British attack on German-occupied Belgium after an amphibious landing on the banks of the Schelde River. Germany demanded that the Netherlands take necessary military action to prevent an invasion of Zeeland.\(^1\) When this news reached the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and War, they faced a difficult decision. Neither believed the German report was correct - Britain had shown no indication of going to war with the Netherlands in previous months - and both agreed that Germany intended to test the bounds of Dutch neutrality, especially in the wake of the *Tubantia* sinking a fortnight earlier.\(^2\) If the German claim was true, however (which was remotely possible given the Dutch knew about a plan for a full-scale attack on the German lines that had been recently discussed at an inter-Allied conference in Paris), the country would be in dire straits.\(^3\) After consulting with Snijders and the rest of the cabinet, Bosboom told Snijders to cancel all leave as of 31 March until the crisis simmered down or the report proved false.\(^4\) The Commander-in-Chief also delayed the sailing of the newly-built cruiser *Noord Brabant* to the East Indies until further notice.\(^5\)

Although the potential threat was not deemed high enough to remobilise soldiers, the cancellation of leave caused great excitement in the country.\(^6\) At first, wild rumours filled the newspapers about possible dangers, followed within days by stories blaming High Command for forcing the government to cancel leave without good reason. The press quickly cast the General Staff as villains using a ruse to stir the population into a frenzy, so that mobilisation could continue, while criticising the government for not explaining the sudden cancellation of leave.\(^7\) In response to the uproar, which even emanated from the more government-friendly newspapers, the cabinet issued a statement on 4 April, in which

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\(^2\) Tuyll, *The Netherlands and World War I* pp. 159 - 160.

\(^3\) Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” pp. 54 – 55.


it proclaimed, without going into specifics, that the cancellation of leave was essential for the neutrality and safety of the Netherlands. The statement only increased public distrust. The ministers had dug themselves a political hole likely to bury them, since it now proved difficult to reinstate leave without explaining why the country was no longer in danger. Hence, when Bosboom and Snijders urged the cabinet to reinstate leave over the Easter weekend, 21 to 24 April, most cabinet ministers felt that this would raise too many unanswerable questions. Instead, they chose to deny leave for a few more weeks.

Chaos followed. Nearly 5,000 soldiers, already disgruntled at having been deprived of their days off during the previous three weeks, and now facing the prospect of an Easter away from home, simply left their depots and billets and returned home over the weekend anyway. Technically speaking, these troops committed a serious military crime for which they would receive court martial summons and punishment (including prison sentences and on-going leave restrictions). Yet if troops had been properly appraised of the necessity of their presence over Easter, most would not have taken such drastic action. During the crises in March and April 1918, for example, when the Allies requisitioned Dutch ships and the Germans demanded free transit for sand and gravel, or, for that matter, during the influenza pandemic in 1918, when all healthy troops had to be available, there was little disobedience to leave restrictions. But in April 1916, without adequate explanations, no entreaties from commanding officers could satisfy the mobilised men.

In response to the Easter fiasco, one soldier wrote a resolute warning to the government:

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89 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 268.
90 Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 17 April 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 299.
91 Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg p. 86.
92 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 27 April 1916; Commander-in-Chief to military authorities outside the Field Army, 1 May 1916, both in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 299; Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg p. 87.
93 Commander-in-Chief to all authorities in the Army, 1 March 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 636; Commander-in-Chief, “Order voor de Land- en Zeemacht” [Order for the Army and Navy] 6 March 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 808; Inspector of Supply to Commander of the Field Army, 31 July 1918, and reply, 3 August 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
94 Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 17 April 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 299. See also: Soldatencourant. no. 255, 2 April 1916 p. 2; no. 257, 7 April 1916, front page; no. 262, 19 April 1916, p. 3; no. 263, 21 April 1916, p. 3.
We soldiers wish to view the maintenance of the number and length of our allocated leave by higher authorities, as a household pet gauges the volume of its allotted portion of food. And it may be possible that three or four times you can withhold the food bowl from your dog while it merely growls threateningly... a time will come when it shall bite viciously. This not only provides a clear indication of how fragile morale had become by 1916, but also alludes to an atmosphere of growing disobedience. Troops resented their forced conscription, did not wish to be mobilised for months at a time, and were thoroughly bored. Their discipline and morale suffered. As we will see in the next chapter, maintaining discipline and morale would become two of the most difficult tasks of commanders in the final months of war.

The public, like many troops, blamed the General Staff for the Easter scare, and saw it as a desperate attempt to reinforce the need for mobilisation. Many felt High Command was not only uncaring but paranoid, and had bullied the government into acquiescence. They saw the whole scenario as an exercise in military persuasion. It was, in fact, more a crisis of political expediency gone wrong, than one stemming from military pressure, but this could not be publicly explained. For fear of alienating Germany, the government could not, as Bosboom detailed in his memoirs, clarify that the leave situation stemmed from a serious diplomatic incident. At any rate, it had no convincing answer as to why leave was cancelled for so long. In many respects, it let High Command take the blame.

Throughout the Easter fiasco, the government barely managed to save face. It had done what was necessary to avoid an international problem – to persuade Germany that it was serious about its neutrality commitments – but it had also made some glaring mistakes. There was no real need to keep all soldiers available over Easter, three weeks after the release of the German report. As early as 2 April, Germany told the Dutch government that it was happy with the precautionary measures taken and that the report had been false.

95 “Wij, soldaten, wenschen de lengte en het aantal der ons van hooger hand toegestane verloven gehandhaafd te zien, zooals een huisdier het volume van zijn portie voedsel. En het moge u drie, viermaal gelukken, de etensbak van uwen hond weg te nemen, terwijl hij slechts dreigend gromt ... er komt een keer, dat hij grimmig bijten zal.” (Stoke, Van Aardappelmes tot Officiersdegen p. 27).
96 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden pp. 268 – 269.
was there any need to keep alert because of France or Britain. Both these countries had sent several letters making it clear that they had no intentions of breaching Dutch neutrality.\footnote{See: letters in Smit (ed.), \textit{Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 - 1919. Vierde Deel 1914 - 1917} pp. 536 – 544; Smit, \textit{Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel} pp. 115 – 116.}

It took until 1 June 1916, for leave to be fully reinstated. On this day, troops in \textit{landweer} intake year 1913 should have gone on indefinite leave; instead they were kept in service (if only for another month).\footnote{Kleijngeld, \textit{Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg} p. 22.} The two dates deliberately coincided, so that the government had adequate explanations for the recent changes. Whether the Easter leave situation evolved out of a conscious need to show the public that the country could, at any time, be in danger of invasion, and that, therefore, continued mobilisation was not only desirable but also essential, is debatable. No doubt, many at the time, and many historians subsequently, believed this to be the case.\footnote{Ibid.; Troelstra, \textit{Gedenkschriften. Vierde Deel. Storm} p. 85; Ritter, \textit{De Donkere Poort} Volume 2, pp. 15, 24 – 26; Bosmans, \textit{“Neutraal regeren”} pp. 751 - 752.} The length of the leave crisis and the government’s silence lends weight to this explanation. In the end, however, the outcome was the same. After June, the government became far more careful about alienating itself from popular opinion, and far more open to demands for increased leave. Within months, the government granted additional leave to \textit{landweer} troops, allowed military intakes to be replaced by \textit{landstormers}, and extended extraordinary leave provisions substantially. At the same time, the link between leave and morale became paramount, and Snijders was persuaded to improve normal leave allowances.\footnote{See: fn 66 above.}

After June 1916, High Command faced increasing difficulty in persuading the government to maintain a full mobilisation, and in September 1916, the Minister President told Snijders that a systematic reduction in military commitment was to take place over the next few months.\footnote{For a brief overview of the September 1916 decision, see: I. N. Gallhofer, W. E. Saris, \textit{“The decision of the Dutch Council of Ministers and the military Commander-in-Chief relating to the reduction of armed forces in autumn 1916” \textit{Acta Politica.} 14, no. 1, 1979, pp. 95 – 105.} The government listened to its critics and agreed that the country was no longer seriously threatened, a conclusion seemingly backed by events on the Western Front. Like the battles around Verdun, the Allied Somme offensive, begun in July 1916, failed to achieve a decisive result by the end of the year, apart from thousands more
casualties. The deadlock seemed entrenched indefinitely. Yet, unbeknown to all, the war situation was about to drastically change.

The Demobilisation Debate

Snijders warned Bosboom, during their discussions on the proposed downsizing of military commitment in September 1916, that it would complicate the maintenance of neutrality and the country’s relationship with the belligerents. Bosboom replied that the strains placed by the mobilisation on state expenditure, on the economy, and not least on family life, made gradual demobilisation unavoidable. He realised the potentially precarious impact this had on military security, but internal pressures forced the government’s hand. He also felt that neither the Allied nor Central Powers were in any position to consider attacking the Netherlands at this stage. Snijders and the rest of High Command had to follow instructions.

Illustration 13: Bosboom’s military readiness, 1916

Bosboom keeps the “mobilisation” bow taut and ready to fire in this cartoon from the Notenkraker (March 1916), while exclaiming: “I’m not precisely sure why I keep the bow tight. But still I do not want to know about relaxation [I do not wish to have anything to do with relaxation]” (“Waarom ik den boog zoo gespannen houd, weet ik zelf niet precies. Maar van ontspanning wil ik toch niets weten”).

(Source: Amersfoort et. al., Spot op den Landmacht p. 28)

103 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 18 September 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411.
The demobilisation lobby, which had pestered the government for a substantial
decrease in military commitment since October 1914, now enjoyed the upper hand. On
numerous occasions, the public and parliamentarians called for partial demobilisation for a
number of reasons: financial gain, economic necessity and social good. No doubt, the
financial strains of mobilisation were immense. Likewise, it removed thousands of men
from the workforce, contributing to the economic instability created by the crisis situation.
Although a less tangible reason than the economic factors, another key reason why the
demobilisation campaign received so much support was its impact on family life.
Inevitably, removing men from families for considerable periods at a time had many
stressful consequences for relationships, the position of women in households and the
upbringing of children. While the removal of soldiers from their families would have been
accepted if the country was at war, neutrality defence was not deemed important enough to
warrant it for too long.

The demobilisation lobbyists in parliament also used examples of other neutral
countries to argue that the government's stand was extraordinary and inappropriate. Both
Switzerland and Denmark, two neutral countries bordering the belligerents, had cut their
mobilisation commitment after the first few months of war. For example, of the 350,000
Swiss troops placed on alert in August 1914, only 150,000 remained mobilised by the end
of that year. Many parliamentarians asked: if it was possible for these two neutrals to
scale down the security risk, why should the Netherlands keep it so high? The Minister of
War answered these questions by highlighting the differences in the security position of the
two neutral nations and the Netherlands. Neither Denmark nor Switzerland had as close a
proximity to the Western Front. Although it was conceivable that Swiss territory could be in
danger of invasion or a German retreat, given its mountainous terrain, this was highly
unlikely. Dutch territory on the other hand, was far more likely to be crossed during a

104 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 271.
105 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel pp. 26 – 31; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden
pp. 271 – 300.
1915 no. 261, 4, p. 3; Minister of Foreign Affairs to H. P. Marchant (Member of Parliament), 27 October 1915, in
1915 no. 261, 4, p. 3.
108 "Nota naar aanleiding van het voorlopig verslag" [Note regarding the temporary report] 9 January 1915,
retreat (especially through Limburg), for it possessed no geographical barriers to discourage such an action. Most significant, however, was the fact that the Netherlands acted as a buffer zone between the two major belligerents, Germany and Britain. The Schelde alone was of such strategic significance that the two sets of warring parties wished to keep the other from the waterway. Neither Denmark nor Switzerland had anywhere near the same strategic value for Germany, Britain or France. The military organisation in the other two neutral countries was also much more amenable to partial demobilisation than that of the Dutch, which relied on a strong Field Army to meet potential dangers.

The Netherlands’ security obligations propounded by the Minister of War in 1915 remained unchanged by September 1916. But public opinion had shifted increasingly in favour of partial demobilisation. Few people, except for the more radical socialist political parties, wanted complete demobilisation; there was a general recognition that a token military presence was needed at the borders and to maintain the façade of military preparedness. Most believed that if the country was truly in danger, the military could always remobilise. Few comprehended the possible impact of reducing military strength further.

Snijders, however, was very concerned. The government’s proposed cutbacks had the immediate result of decreasing the number of troops in the field far below the 200,000 mark with which the armed forces started in August 1914. In December 1915, the Army was already short 3,800 infantry troops (compared to the number mobilised in August 1914), due to the fact that the landstorm intakes tended to be smaller than the landweer intakes they were replacing. This shortage doubled to 7,200 in October 1916, when landweer year 1916c went on leave without an intake of landstormers being conscripted to take its place. Infantry units in the Field Army were especially affected by the shortages, an anxiety for Snijders as it exhausted troop numbers available for border duties. Thus, Snijders warned Bosboom that granting too much leave too quickly would seriously

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109 See: Chapter 4, pp. 151 - 157.
111 “Aflossing van landweermannen door landstormplichtigen (uitsluitend voor wat de infantrie betreft)” [Replacement of landweer men with landstorm conscripts (solely with regard to the infantry)] author unknown, date unknown [October 1916], in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411. See also: Appendix 10, p. 463.
112 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 11 October 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411.
compromise the safety of certain areas, especially Zeeland and Limburg, leaving those areas vulnerable to attack.\(^\text{113}\) He also felt he should not be held responsible if the decrease in soldiers reduced the viability of Dutch neutrality.\(^\text{114}\)

Snijders’ pessimism about the Netherlands’ security position would prove all too correct. Within three months, the government halted the proposed cutbacks. In December 1916, Germany was on the verge of declaring the resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare, which the Germans feared would bring not only the United States but also other neutrals including the Netherlands and Denmark into the war.\(^\text{115}\) The Germans began building up defences around the Dutch border, especially around Zeeland.\(^\text{116}\) Some interpreted this as a signal of possible future hostility, although Snijders saw it more realistically as a sign that Germany feared an attack on or through the Netherlands by the Allies.\(^\text{117}\) He urged the government to put an end to

> further systematic weakening of our available [armed] force and to the developing dilution of its standards that have for some time reduced the fighting quality of the mobilised Army below the mark that would present acceptable guarantees for the security of the nation.\(^\text{118}\)

The threats to neutrality that had seemed to wane in 1915 and 1916 revived, only to become stronger during 1917 and 1918.\(^\text{119}\) The entry of the United States into the war in April 1917, the Russian revolutions and Russia’s subsequent peace treaty with the Central Powers in March 1918, ensured that the Western Front became the primary focus for belligerents. As a consequence, the possible threats to Dutch security increased sharply. On top of this, economic pressures on the Netherlands increased significantly during 1917 and 1918, as the Allies and Central Powers intensified their blockades, and became less willing to compromise.

\(^{111}\) Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 30 September 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411.

\(^{112}\) Ibid.

\(^{113}\) Snapper, “De gevechtswaarde” p. 32.


\(^{116}\) “[V]erdere stelselmatige verzwakking onzer gereedstaande macht en aan de voortschrijdende verwatering van haar gehalte, welke nu reeds sedert geruimen tijd de gevechtswaarde van het gemobiliseerde leger hebben doen dalen tot beneden het peil, dat aannemelijke waarborgen voor de veiligheid des lands zou kunnen aanbieden.” (Ibid. pp. 7 - 8).

\(^{117}\) Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 299.
Because of the changing strategic situation, the pendulum that had swung public favour strongly towards demobilisation in 1915 and 1916, now drifted slowly back to supporting some form of military preparation. Although mobilisation was never embraced with gusto and remained enormously controversial, the government had fewer problems in obtaining public acceptance of recalling military leave during crises in 1917 and 1918. Nevertheless, people remained dubious about High Command’s position on the war, and the need for mobilisation was eagerly opposed among many rank-and-file conscripts. Eventually, when leave was recalled in October 1918 because a German retreat through the Netherlands appeared imminent, it helped spark the worst case of military rioting during the war.  

**SECOND MOBILISATION**

Regardless of the fact that the cutbacks proposed in September 1916 were never fully implemented, the amount of leave granted to troops guaranteed that if the Netherlands had been invaded in 1917 or 1918, a second mobilisation would have been necessary. The hopes of the government and the Dutch population were pinned on this remobilisation. Since it appeared to have gone well in August 1914, a repeat exercise would not pose too many problems. Few people understood the potential hazards of a second mobilisation. High Command, on the other hand, was all too aware of them.

As soon as the first landweer intakes went on leave in May 1915, the General Staff began planning their remobilisation. As more troops went on indefinite leave in 1915 and 1916, these plans became more complicated, and by late 1916, a second mobilisation was as involved a process as the initial mobilisation had been. It required not only the movement of thousands of troops into a newly-determined *afwachtingsopstelling* (waiting position), but also the distribution of their weaponry, equipment and means of transportation, all in the space of a few days. The whole undertaking would involve the requisitioning of more automobiles, horses and dogs; the closing of training establishments, the movement of military depots; as well as the transfer of internment camps away from possible invasion

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sites (in case the internees decided to join the invaders). It would also require finding adequate lodgings, food supplies and bedding for newly-mobilised men.

Snijders and many other high-ranking officers had reservations about the likely success of a second mobilisation, since it would only be called if the country faced a direct threat of invasion. For this reason, a remobilisation differed significantly from the original mobilisation, when no real threats had been forthcoming and the armed forces had time on their side. Unlike 1914, however, a remobilisation would have to occur much faster; an attacking force would not wait for the Netherlands to prepare. What worried Snijders most was that the second mobilisation would take at least four to five days to complete, enough time for an invader to capture the all-important railway lines, stop the remobilisation in its tracks, and thereby ensure a rapid Dutch defeat.

Alongside time restrictions, material deficiencies imposed on the country by the war, made a possible remobilisation a much more difficult enterprise in 1917 or 1918 than it had been in 1914. Coal and fuel shortages forced trains to run less frequently, removed automobiles from the roads, kept aeroplanes grounded, and stopped naval vessels from patrolling the seas as frequently as before. A dearth of fodder made it difficult to sustain strong and healthy horses. Ever-present concerns for the existing military situation, these would only be intensified during a second mobilisation.

For High Command, the many potential delays and problems of a second mobilisation made it imperative to keep a close eye on possible threats. All neutrality breaches became far more significant in 1917 and 1918, because each could signal a fundamental change in a belligerent’s position toward the neutral. The General Staff was mindful that the value of its armed forces had diminished and with the likelihood of a second mobilisation failing, the Netherlands’ chances of withstanding an invasion were next to none. It should not have surprised cabinet ministers in early 1918, therefore, to learn

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that their Commander-in-Chief was entirely pessimistic about the state of the nation’s defences.

**The Demise of the Dutch Armed Forces**

Effectively without adequate weaponry, technological advances, resources or numbers, Dutch armed forces faced major problems by the start of 1917; problems which only worsened during the rest of the war. Troops in the field were inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and held low morale. One of the ironies of the Great War for the Netherlands, therefore, was that the country was more ready for war in 1914, even given its many shortfalls and inefficiencies, than it was in 1917 with three years of preparation. To a large degree this was inevitable, reflecting the fate of an industrially weak neutral nation during a modern war. However, it is undeniable that if the Dutch had wanted to support the strongest possible Army, Navy and Air Branch, they could have done so.

The historian, Hubert van Tuyll, has argued that the warring sides, especially Germany, saw the size of the Dutch Army as a clear deterrent to invasion, helping to preserve neutrality. While this certainly was the case for the first two years of conflict, a time when Germany in particular was stretched to meet its various military commitments in the east and west, it mattered less in 1917 and 1918. In the last two war years, even with an increase in the size of the Dutch armed forces (at least on paper) from 200,000 to over 400,000, the scarcity of heavy artillery and modern weaponry had gravely reduced the Army’s defensive power. The defeat of Romania late in 1916, and the removal of Russia from the fighting front early in 1918, freed German troops in the east, who could, if necessary, have been used to invade the Netherlands. That the German military leadership had little compunction about threatening the Dutch with war in April 1918 illustrates this point well. Both sets of belligerents must have been aware of Dutch military weakness. That is why the Netherlands sent urgent pleas for equipment to Great Britain in 1918.

While they looked impressive on paper, the vast increases in the size of the armed forces, in fact, hid a dangerous reality. At any one time, after 1916, the official number of mobilised men stood at around the same level as August 1914 (about 200,000 troops); the

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125 For more on the crisis between the Netherlands and Germany in April 1918, see: section “The Notorious Question of Sand and Gravel” in Chapter 6, pp. 224 - 229.

126 See: Chapter 4, pp. 144 - 145.
rest were all on indefinite leave. Of these 200,000 mobilised individuals, more than one-half were away on some form of short-term term leave. About 80,000 troops remained, far from enough to give any concern to either Germany or Great Britain. The Netherlands required a comprehensive second mobilisation if it was to have any chance of meeting an invasion. The tragedy was that if one of its neighbours attacked, it would most likely not have time for such a remobilisation to succeed.

Throughout the last eleven months of the Great War, the country faced an increasingly hostile and unco-operative international arena and a national environment filled with weariness. Although the country stayed out of the conflict, this can be attributed more to the decisions of other states than to the Netherlands' own military resourcefulness. Of course, any discussion about the actual quality of the Netherlands' Army compared to those in the belligerent countries remains highly speculative, since the Dutch Army, Navy or Air Branch were not tested in a combat situation between 1914 and 1918. Yet even though the Dutch did not fight during the Great War, the war significantly altered the quality and worth of their fighting forces.

The 200,000 troops mobilised in 1914 were, despite many inadequacies, comparatively much stronger than the force of 400,000 soldiers available for battle in November 1918. The difference was due to many factors outside Dutch control - industrial weakness and the inability to obtain supplies from 1916 onwards. But the inherent technological disadvantage worsened through the forced dispersal of the Field Army throughout the country, the obsolescence of fortifications, the large number of troops allowed to go on leave, and the lack of extra-governmental political support for military improvements. Part of the problem was that not enough had been done before 1914 to ensure that the necessary processes were in place to be able to improve and augment the armed forces in wartime. A certain amount of responsibility, therefore, must lie with those who resourced and supported the Army, Navy and Air Branch. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that even if the structures and support had been in place before and during the war, the Dutch could have kept up with the warring states. Such was the nature of modern war.

127 F. Snapper reached a similar conclusion ("De gevechtswaarde" pp. 32 – 34, 46).
128 Commander of the Field Army to Minister of War, 20 October 1919, p. 14, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 881; Berg, Cornelis Jacobus Snijders p. 141.
The first eleven months of 1918 marked the pinnacle of the war crisis for the Netherlands and witnessed the culmination of more than three years of neutrality compromises. Between January and May of this year, the Netherlands came closer to becoming a belligerent than at any time previously or subsequently in the world conflict. The requisitioning of Dutch ships by American and British authorities in March, followed by Germany’s uncompromising stand on the transit of sand and gravel through the Netherlands to the Western Front demonstrated that the danger of war was all too real. The exclamation by H. T. Colenbrander in February 1917 rang even more ominously a year later: “all hell has broken loose; none of the devils can protect us against the others, and there we lie”. The sand and gravel crisis also agitated the already strained relationship

1 “Wij strijden voor Oranje,
Voor Koningin en Land,
Van de grens van Germanje
Tot aan het Westerstrand.
Den Duitscher zal 'k niet hoonen,
Den Brit wensch ik geen kwaad,
Mits zij maar steeds verschoonen

2 For both these crises, see: Chapter 6, pp. 220 – 229.

3 “De hel is losgebroken; geen der duivels kan ons beschermen tegen den ander, en daar liggen we”, 24 February 1917 (Colenbrander, Studiën en Aantekeningen p. 252).
between the Commander-in-Chief and the government, and brought the majority of cabinet ministers to the point of resigning in May.\(^4\) Combined with existing dissension within the government over sending an armed convoy to the East Indies,\(^5\) internal disorder of any sort was the last thing the country desired in this *veel bewogen* (literally "much moved") time.

Instability at the top and widespread public criticism about the way individual cabinet ministers handled successive war crises, especially economic ones, reduced the chances of reappointment after the election held in July 1918.\(^6\) Furthermore, in January 1918, the Bolshevik government in Russia annulled its foreign debts, causing a financial crisis throughout the western world, including the Netherlands, which had many small and large investors in Russian industry and property as well as creditors to the old-tsarist state.\(^7\) Combined with the harmful effects of the Spanish Influenza, the civilian population was far from content by the autumn of 1918. Nor were soldiers at ease. After years of mobilisation, commanders had immense difficulty in maintaining a reasonable standard of discipline among troops, who grew increasingly disillusioned about the mobilisation in general and their living circumstances in particular.

**UNREST**

While the international crises facing the country came to a head in the first few months of 1918, internally, Netherlanders had to cope with a particularly harsh winter and the impact of prolonged shortages. In the previous two years, many had taken to the streets in protest and frustration at the lack of foodstuffs and fuels. It is only natural for social tension to increase when shortages and price rises affect quality of life, regardless of whether a society is at war or not.\(^8\) The Netherlands was no exception; in fact, there were few ethical restraints here to limit such protests, in stark contrast to civilians in warring societies, who were more willing to accept scarcity, albeit to a certain point. In Germany, the population reacted against shortages and unfair distribution of available goods as soon as they became serious during the course of 1916. More than 50 food-related riots erupted

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\(^4\) For which, see: Chapter 12, pp. 410 - 421.
\(^5\) For which, see: Chapter 6, pp. 423 - 424.
\(^6\) Often, Dutch cabinets consisted of extra-parliamentary members.
\(^8\) Bonzon et. al., "Feeding the cities" pp. 328 - 333.
in the German nation that year, only increasing in intensity and frequency throughout 1917 and 1918, helping to fuel a revolutionary atmosphere. 9

The Dutch public also began protesting against shortages, price rises and rationing policies in 1916. Initially, the protests were limited to marches organised by interest groups, including local women's organisations, radical socialist parties and trade unions. While most of these actions tended to be small-scale, they caused enough concern for municipal councils in the provinces of North and South Holland to request a military presence in several towns. 10 Such protests had the potential to threaten public order and none of the mayors were willing to take any chances. For example, in June 1916, the Revolutionary Socialist Women's Organisation (Revolutionaire Socialistische Vrouwencomité) called for mass protests against distribution policies and inflation. Between 4 and 19 June, several marches were held in Amsterdam, The Hague and Dordrecht, attracting considerable crowds. 11

On 5 February 1917, after a winter with little coal and few potatoes, the urban populations in the larger cities, especially in the working-class districts, took to the streets. Again, the impetus for the protest lay with the socialist organisations. This time, 20,000 Amsterdammers joined the demonstration. A group of women among them plundered a coal barge, and further looting occurred in a nearby shopping district. In altercations with police, two protestors were seriously wounded. The unrest did not die down for several days and similar demonstrations spread to Rotterdam, The Hague, Haarlem, Zandvoort, Hengelo, and Eindhoven. 12 Mayors requested military help in containing the protests and, as a result, a permanent troop of 100 men was posted in The Hague in March. 13 While potato stocks remained dangerously low from March to May, 14 dissatisfaction simmered on and off.

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10 Territorial Commander in Holland to Commander-in-Chief, 26 February 1916; “Overzicht der detachementen uitgesteld tot herverleenen van militairen bijstand in het gebied van den Territorialen Bevelhebber in Holland enz.” [Overview of detachments delayed to again give military support in the areas of the Territorial Commander in Holland etc.] 2 March 1916, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 434.
12 Territorial Commander in Holland to Commander-in-Chief, 17 February 1917 and 21 March 1917, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 550; Burger, Linke frontvorming p. 82 - 84.
13 Territorial Commander in Holland to Commander-in-Chief, 17 February 1917 and 21 March 1917, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 550.
spreading, in the last month, to smaller centres, including Weesp, Kampen, Zaandam, Hilversum and Hengelo.\textsuperscript{15}

In June, an ample harvest of new potatoes became available. At this crucial point, the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, F. E. Posthuma, made a huge mistake: rather than keeping control over the distribution of stocks and simply increasing the ration, he allowed potatoes to be sold on the free market. This meant cities received potatoes unevenly and without guarantees of price and quantity, an especial problem in larger cities, including Amsterdam. Irregular supplies meant that not everybody was able to buy potatoes at the same time, increasing unrest and tension. On the 28th, a group of men and women stormed and plundered a barge filled with potatoes docked in one of Amsterdam’s canals.\textsuperscript{16} Five days later, a large angry crowd gathered in the city centre and looted numerous shops and ships laden with potatoes (some of which were to be exported to Great Britain in accordance with the Agricultural Agreements). For four days, rebellious mobs caused havoc in the city centre. Police and armed troops tried keep order with limited success.\textsuperscript{17} On 5 July, the last night of rioting, troops shot at the legs of protesters, killing five of them and wounding many more.\textsuperscript{18} Stray bullets had already killed three others earlier in the week when warning shots into the air ricocheted off the buildings in Amsterdam’s narrow streets. The loss of so many lives stunned the nation, and the riots died down on 6 July, but not without first sparking a series of strikes through the region, including among workers in the Hembrug artillery factories.\textsuperscript{19} Similar outbursts of violence and rioting as occurred in

\textsuperscript{15} Burger, \textit{Linkse frontvorming} p. 86.
\textsuperscript{16} Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, “Rapport omtrent de jongste in Amsterdam plaats gehad hebbende ongeregeldheden, opgemaakt ingevolge de Missive van de Minister van Staat, Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken van den 16 Juli 1917, No. 5839, Afdeeling B.B.” [Report regarding the latest public disorders in Amsterdam, made up in accordance with the Instructions of the Minister of State, Minister of Internal Affairs of 16 July 1917...] p. 1, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549.
\textsuperscript{17} For details of the Amsterdam potato riots see: \textit{Ibid.}; Legal report of the Municipal lawyer to Mayor of Amsterdam, 3 January 1918, in ARA, “Diverse Commissie-Archieven van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken .01 Staatscommissie tot Herziening der Gemeenteewet (K.B. 6 december 1918, nr. 7)” [Diverse Commission archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs .01 State Commission for review of the Municipal Law (K.B. 6 December 1918, nr. 7)] entry no. 2.04.40.01, inventory no. 6; Salomon Rodrigues de Miranda, \textit{Het Amsterdamsche Aardappelenoproer. In opdracht van den Amsterdamschen Bestuurdersbond, de Federatie Amsterdam van de S.D.A.P. en de Alg. Arbeiders-Coöperatie “De Dageraad”}. [Amsterdam’s potato riot. Commissioned by Amsterdam’s Bond of Directors, the SDAP Federation of Amsterdam, and the General Workers-Cooperation “De Dageraad”] Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1917; Burger, \textit{Linkse frontvorming} p. 88.
\textsuperscript{18} Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, “Rapport omtrent de jongste in Amsterdam plaats gehad hebbende ongeregeldheden” pp. 28 - 30, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549.
\textsuperscript{19} Wal (ed.), \textit{Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge} p. 32.-
Amsterdam also spread in Rotterdam, Enschede, Hengelo, Amelo, Velsen, Utrecht, Arnhem, The Hague and Zutphen during July, although in all these places they were less confrontational.  

The deaths and violence during the potato riots made international headlines. The government came under severe criticism within parliament for mismanaging the distribution of the potato harvest. More immediately, the importance of a strong military presence to maintain order had become obvious. More than 2,000 troops (two entire Field Army battalions) were sent to Amsterdam during the riots. If not holding off or trying to disperse mobs, soldiers guarded shops, warehouses, ships, and important areas, such as the vegetable market. They also accompanied bakers on their delivery rounds, and protected the coming and going of food transports. Already in late 1915, the government asked Snijders for troops to guard warehouses and bottling factories throughout the country. After the July 1917 riots, such guard duties became more marked, especially in the major centres.

Probably owing to a combination of factors, among which must be counted the distress caused by the deaths in July and better food provisions through the summer, there were few major disturbances until the winter of 1917/1918, when coal and potatoes were again in very short supply. In the meantime, the authorities remained extremely fearful. Municipal authorities of towns and cities alike requested that troops be stationed nearby.

20 Territorial Commander in Holland to Commander-in-Chief, 6 July 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 550; Parliamentary speech by Heer van Tempel, 6 July 1917, in Handelingen der Staten-Generaal. Tweede Kamer 1917, p. 26; Burger, Linkse frontvorming p. 88.
22 Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, “Rapport omtrent de jongste in Amsterdam plaats gehad hebbende ongeregeldheden” p. 8, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549.
23 Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 23 July 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549.
25 State Commission for Supervision of the Associated Vegetable Central (Rijkscommissaris van toezicht op de Vereeniging Groeten-Centrale) to Commander-in-Chief, 7 October 1916, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 434; Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commanders in Friesland, Holland and Overijssel, Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, Commander of the New Holland Waterline, Inspector Koninklijke Marechaussee, Commander Division II, 3 October 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549; Commander-in-Chief to Commanders of Divisions II and III, Cavalry Brigade, Commander of the New Holland Waterline, Inspector of the Koninklijke Marechaussee, Territorial Commander in Overijssel, 3 September 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 348; Commander-in-Chief to Commanders of Division I, Fortified Position of Amsterdam, Division II, and Cavalry Brigade, 1 October 1918; Commander-in-Chief to military commanders, 2 October 1918, both in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 352.
26 See: documentation in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 667.
The mayor of Amsterdam was especially insistent on keeping two battalions at hand. Quite naturally, neither the Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam nor Snijders thought this was appropriate because it decreased the number of troops available for neutrality and defensive measures and dispersed the Field Army even further. But, according to the Gemeentewet (Municipal Law), mayors could call for military assistance in times of civil disorder and had some say over their deployment.\(^{27}\) The law, however, made no provision for civil disorder in time of mobilisation. So, Amsterdam’s mayor told the military he was keeping the two battalions in the city well after the riots had stopped, while both the fortification commander and Snijders wanted (and tried) to reduce the number of troops there. The argument soon involved the Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, and after some angry correspondence between the military and civilian authorities, they reached a compromise, although it took until October to do so.\(^{28}\) A contingent of troops would remain in Amsterdam permanently - it was more than the two commanders wanted and less than the mayor expected.

Other cities also requested a permanent military presence. The mayor of The Hague, for example, asked for an extra 100 troops, because the 100 soldiers stationed in the suburb of Voorburg since March 1917 were also responsible for maintaining order in Rotterdam and this was, he feared, far from enough. During the protests in the city in July 1917, 600 infantry and 100 cavalry had been needed in his city alone.\(^{29}\) While this request was met, some of the other mayors’ demands were not.\(^{30}\) When refusing a particular request for aid, Snijders often used the argument that while there was no visible sign of disorder, municipalities could not have any say over troop deployments.\(^{31}\)

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\(^{27}\) Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 15 August 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4.

\(^{28}\) See: correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief, Minister of War, Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam and the Mayor of Amsterdam in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4, 549.

\(^{29}\) Territorial Commander in Holland to Commander-in-Chief, 6 July 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 550.

\(^{30}\) Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 18 October 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549.

\(^{31}\) Commander-in-Chief to Territorial Commander in Holland, 13 July 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549.
siege” ultimate responsibility for any unrest already lay with the military authorities, who could move troops at will.\(^{32}\)

In January 1918, the effect of the war on available supplies of coal, grain and potatoes began to have a serious impact. The number of meetings organised by disgruntled groups increased, and Groningen municipal workers and Amsterdam concrete workers organised strikes during the month to express unhappiness at their working conditions. On 4 February, many socialist trade unions in Amsterdam, The Hague, Haarlem and Rotterdam called for a general strike to protest against rationing measures. But the strike did not receive universal support; several unions told their members not to involve themselves for fear of military reprisals and deaths.\(^{33}\)

With the reduction of the bread ration to 200 grammes per person per day in April, public tolerance reached breaking point.\(^{34}\) On 5 April 1918, crowds again amassed in Amsterdam’s streets, some forcing bakeries to sell them bread while refusing to hand in ration cards, others simply taking bread without paying. Soon, looting and plundering broke out in several areas. This time troops and police were more careful in handling rioters. No one was shot. The population was not as lucky in the country’s administrative capital. Inspired by the revolts in Amsterdam, residents in The Hague also took to the streets, rioted, and plundered shops. Soldiers here set up barricades and tried to break up the crowds. Eventually, they opened fire, and, although the available records give conflicting information, it seems that during the riots between 11 and 15 April, two people died.\(^{35}\) Public protests erupted in other cities as well, fortunately without the same tragic result, and for the first time the farming centres in the provinces voiced their united disgust.\(^{36}\) Those who had been able to profit significantly from the supply crisis until this stage, namely farmers, smugglers and shopkeepers, were no longer immune from its effects.

The April 1918 riots occurred at the most inopportune time, and certainly the tension caused by the international situation - caused by the Allied requisitioning of Dutch ships - heightened the sense of nationwide unrest. Yet within days, the disturbances were

\(^{32}\) Territorial Commander in Overijssel to mayors, 21 September 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 667.

\(^{33}\) Burger, *Linkse frontvorming* pp. 97 - 98.

\(^{34}\) D’Overflacquée, *Uit Een Geheim Dagboek* p. 55.


quelled through a mix of military intervention and the promise of more food. The re-instatement of food shipments by the Allies in no small way helped ease fears, although the bread ration did not rise until after November. The government also placed an export prohibition on all potatoes, even though it risked alienating Germany. From May 1918 until the signing of the Armistice, public frustration did not reach the scale or intensity of the July 1917 and April 1918 outbreaks; in part, this can be attributed to the two waves of influenza that spread through the Netherlands after July 1918. Nevertheless, occasional mass protests and plundering still occurred, especially in the larger cities, until the end of the war.

THE PLAGUE OF THE SPANISH LADY

Apart from domestic rumblings, international pressures, neutrality woes and economic problems, the Netherlands in 1918 also could not escape the clutches of the worst pandemic the world had ever seen. The Spanish Influenza would, in due course, kill more people around the globe than the Black Death had done in the Middle Ages. It spread in three nasty waves in 1918 and early 1919. From the Arctic to the Sahara, from the Pacific to the Atlantic, no population was left untouched by the deadly outbreaks. In their wake, two billion people suffered from the virus, and anywhere between two and four million of the victims subsequently died.

The first wave of the Spanish Flu hit the Netherlands in July 1918 and reached its peak the next month. The second struck the following October and was at its deadliest in the last week of that month and the first two weeks of November, while the third developed in the aftermath of the Armistice as thousands of soldiers returned home from the battlefields in Europe early in 1919. Few people died in the Netherlands from the first visit of the “Spanish Lady”, yet the flu debilitated hundreds of thousands of people, kept

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37 For which, see: pp. 374 - 377 below.
38 Burger, Linkse frontvorming pp. 109, 113.
them from their jobs, and out of general circulation. It placed severe strains on the economy, on hospitals, on medicine stocks and health workers.

For the military, the summer outbreak had some potentially serious consequences. What was most disturbing about the influenza was that it principally affected young men and women, especially those between the ages of 20 and 45. In other words, mobilised men were most susceptible because they were of the right physiological build but also because they lived in conditions amenable to the spread of disease. Despite precautions taken by Head Command, the virus took its toll. Up to the end of August, 22,424 Field Army troops (out of a total strength of 90,000) had come down with the illness. In the space of a little over two months, nearly one-quarter of the Field Army were unavailable for any type of service between three and five days, and after recovering most could not undertake any strenuous tasks for another week or so. In this same period, 53 soldiers in the Field Army died from related diseases, especially pneumonia. Figures for the rest of the armed forces are hard to find, but are likely to have been similar.

Not only did the outbreak sap the strength of soldiers, it also endangered the smooth supply of foodstuffs and other necessities, because many men in the Supply Service were sick. Extra soldiers had to be moved into the Service and leave was recalled for all members of the Automobile Corps to ensure enough were available to make deliveries. For healthy troops, the flu outbreak provided an unexpected holiday from the dreary monotony of marching, tramping and exercises. With the cancellation of non-essential activities, there was nothing much left to do for those men not on patrol, working in the Supply Service, or administration. In fact, the military slowed down to a halt over the summer. High Command even postponed the arrival of the new intake of conscripts (year

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43 Including isolating affected soldiers, banning training exercises, preventing groups of men to congregate (Head Army Doctor [Directeur Officier van Gezondheid] “Kort voorlopig algemeen overzicht van de spaansche-griep-epidemie bij het veldleger, samengesteld in opdracht van den Commandant Veldleger” [Short interim general overview of the Spanish Flu epidemic in the Field Army, as requested by the Commander of the Field Army] 26 August 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5; Garrison Commander in Amersfoort to Commander-in-Chief, 24 July 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 839).
44 Head Army Doctor “Kort voorlopig algemeen overzicht van de spaansche-griep-epidemie bij het veldleger, samengesteld in opdracht van den Commandant Veldleger” 26 August 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
45 Inspector of Supply to Commander of the Field Army, 31 July 1918; Commander of the Field Army to Minister of War, 3 August 1918 and 3 September 1918, all in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
1919) for a month (from July to August) because their barracks could not be disinfected in time.\footnote{Inspector of the Medical Service to Commander-in-Chief, 24 July 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 839.}

In October 1918, the second wave of the influenza struck. This time, the virus had mutated into its most deadly form. Although correct figures are impossible to determine, the official records state that throughout 1918, 17,734 people died from the flu and another 27,423 passed away from pneumonia-related diseases.\footnote{Ministry of Health, \textit{Report on the Pandemic of Influenza} pp. 221 - 222.} Most of these deaths occurred during the second wave. It is very likely that a more realistic representation of actual deaths would double the official statistics, since deaths often went unreported or were attributed to factors unrelated to the flu.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} p. 222.} At any rate, even if correct, the figures were four times higher than the number of deaths from respiratory causes in the Netherlands in previous years.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} p. 225.}

Again, sources are scarce, but the military was severely affected by the second outbreak. Using the above estimate of general deaths in the population, which stood roughly at 0.5 per cent, it would be expected that around 1,000 soldiers and naval personnel lost their lives to the influenza in 1918.\footnote{Taking 200,000 as a rough estimation of the size of the mobilised Army at the time, and 6,700,000 as a rough estimate of the Dutch population.} Undoubtedly, the numbers were high because, despite what many thought at the time, those who had suffered from the first strain were not immune to the second, succumbing as readily, if not more so, as many of those who had remained unaffected in the summer months. It also meant that movement of soldiers was severely restricted and troops virtually became prisoners in their barracks and camps. Except for entirely necessary tasks, such as border patrols and supply services, all other activities were put on hold, ensuring that most mobilised men had very little to do from July through to November 1918.

In fact, the timing of the flu could not have been worse as troop morale was already at an all time low, due mostly to mobilisation lethargy but also to the lack of proper food and heating. That the worst weeks of influenza coincided with the mutiny at Harskamp and with the turbulent days before the signing of the Armistice is merely fortuitous. While the flu cannot be held even remotely responsible for either event, the pandemic marked the mood in the Netherlands at the end of the Great War. The lack of enthusiasm and generally
poor morale in both the civilian and military populations must be seen within the light of this public health disaster. Everybody knew of someone who had succumbed to the wiles of the Spanish Lady and most blamed the effects of four long years of war for its highly infectious and lethal nature. Whether there was truth in this claim or not, there is little doubt that under-nourishment caused by the lack of foodstuffs aggravated the effects of the virus. Poignantly, while the Dutch were utterly sick of the war, it seemed that the war in turn had made them sick.

**NO MORE WAR!**

War weariness had set in the Netherlands as it had in most belligerent nations by the start of 1918. After years of conflict, shortages and difficulties, the Dutch were tired of war. A universal desire for peace enveloped the population. Of course, it was only natural for a neutral country to promote peace, and many Dutch had been ardent supporters of the concept of international peace well before the outbreak of war. In fact, most saw it as their duty as neutral citizens to foster international concord. After all, their country had hosted the two Peace Conferences (in 1899 and 1907) and was home to the Peace Palace. During the war and unlike many belligerent societies, there were no social restrictions inhibiting the Dutch from calling for an end to hostilities. In fact, one of the few topics on which all Dutch newspapers were relatively consistent was their belief in the need to encourage the cause of peace.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find the government trying to initiate peace negotiations between the warring states on several occasions, albeit each time entirely unsuccessfully. Such efforts had two very practical neutrality aims. Most immediately, an end to the conflict would end threats to neutrality and return stability to the economy. More subtly, if a neutral could facilitate some form of negotiation between the warring parties,

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51 Crosby, *Epidemic and Peace* p. 217, is highly skeptical about the role the war played in the outbreak and spread of the pandemic.


then it was more likely that its neutrality would receive greater recognition, thereby
decreasing the chance of one of the belligerents forcing it to take part in the hostilities. It
would provide the neutral with an international voice, which many neutrals feared would be
lost to them in a post-war world dominated by the interests of the victors. For these reasons,
the Netherlands was not the only neutral state that tried its hand at liaising between the two
warring sides. The Scandinavian neutrals, Switzerland and even the Vatican City did the
same, although with little success. 55

Among the general population, the desire for peace found a variety of expressions,
which were closely associated with underlying assumptions about neutrality, the
Netherlands’ position in the world, and the value of the military and its mobilisation. From
August 1914 onwards, the most obvious display of the “peace cause” came in the form of
peace movements, which were either already in existence or created in response to the
outbreak of war. Membership of these movements increased significantly between 1914 and
1918 and they played a prominent role in supporting and furthering public opinion. It is not
the intention here to study the development of such movements, nor of the role played by
the Netherlands in easing an armistice dialogue. 56 What is important is the role these
movements played in heightening anti-military attitudes among civilians and conscripts
alike.

There were two distinct types of peace movement. Some, like the Internationale
Vrouwenbond voor den Duurzamen Vrede (International Women’s Bond for Long-term
Peace, IVDV), the Vrede door Recht (Peace through Law) movement, and the
Nederlandsch Anti-Oorlog Raad (Dutch Anti-War Council, NAOR, a conglomeration of
several smaller peace movements), were concerned first and foremost with a cessation of
hostilities and creating a condition of permanent peace. 57 They received widespread support

Buitenlandse Zaken ‘A’ dossiers” entry no. 2.05.04, inventory no. 841, about negotiations between the Netherlands
and other neutrals on gaining an international voice, protecting neutrality, and suing for peace.
56 More work needs to be done on the role played by the Netherlands in fostering peace. See: Smit, Nederland in de
Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel pp. 112 - 119.
neutral states] in Meester (ed.), Gedenkboek van den Europeeschen Oorlog in 1918 - 1919 pp. 209 - 212;
Nederlandse Anti-Oorlog Raad, Wat de Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad Doet en Gedaan Heeft. [What the
Netherlands’ Anti-War Council does and has done] The Hague: publisher unknown, 1918; Anna Polak, “De
vrouwenbeweging in Nederland” [The women’s movement in the Netherlands] and J. de Louter, “De vredesbeweging
in Nederland” [The peace-movement in the Netherlands], both in Bas (ed.), Gedenkboek 1898 – 1923 pp. 140 - 151,
177 - 187; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, pp. 237 - 240, Volume 2, pp. 70 - 84; Heijmans et. al. De I.A.M.V.
among the population. Between 1915 and 1918, for example, the membership of the NAOR and its affiliates rose from 8,500 to nearly 39,000 people. The council used this support as a mandate to petition the government to promote peace and to urge foreign governments to start arbitration, while the IVDV (along with the International Women’s Organisation) held an international congress for women in The Hague in 1915 with similar aims. Few of these organisations had any real political motive, although there were some politically-inspired attempts at brokering peace. For example, the SDAP leader tried to organise a meeting of Scandinavian and Dutch socialists with this purpose in mind during 1917.

At the other end of the spectrum, organisations such as the International Anti-Militarism Association (Internationaal Anti-Militaristische Vereeniging, IAMV) sought not only to put an end to the war but also an end to the use of military power. They were often politically-oriented, and used more overt and pro-active forms of lobbying. For example, the IAMV was a member of the Samenwerkende Arbeidersverenigingen (Associations of Organised Workers, SAV). The SAV was set up in August 1914 to organise the various radical socialist and anarchist unions and political parties, including the SDP (Sociaaldemocratische Partij, SDP), under one umbrella with the motto “war against the war”.

Established in 1904 with a radical socialist agenda, the IAMV had always been active in decrying militarism as the scourge of capitalist and imperialist regimes. What concerned military authorities during the war years, was that the organisation urged soldiers to lay down their arms.

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58 Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, Wat de Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad Doet p. 5.
59 For example, see: the NAOR’s “Oproep aan het Nederlandsche Volk” [Call to the Dutch people!] October 1914, in ARA, “Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823 – 1977” entry no. 2.02.05.02, inventory no. 146. See also: NAOR propaganda distributed in Germany in 1917 and 1918 in ARA, “A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918” entry no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 175; and peace and arbitration requests sent by the NAOR to the Dutch and foreign governments, in ARA, “A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918” archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 178; Louter, “De vredesbeweging” p. 144; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 241.
61 For a very good history of the IAMV, see: Heijmans et. al., De I.A.M.V. See also: Gernot Jochheim, “Nederland als centrum van de internationale anti-militaristische beweging, 1900 - 1940” [The Netherlands as centre of the international anti-militarism movement, 1900 - 1940] Transaktie. 6, July 1977, pp. 88 - 105.
62 The SAV became the Revolutionair Socialistisch Komité (Revolutionary Socialist Committee) in 1916 (Burger, Linkse frontvorming p. 57).
down their arms and refuse to serve. The IAMV also spread anti-military propaganda and tried to subvert soldiers into reneging on their duties.

While the civilian and military authorities tended not to have any problems with peace movements as such, they were concerned about the possible ramifications of the strong anti-militaristic tones of organisations such as the IAMV and SAV. The government worried that public support would translate into political support for the revolutionary parties, which was, of course, one of the SAV’s primary *raisons d’être*. High Command, meanwhile, feared that support among conscripts might lead to widespread military dissension. Any movement that expressed opposition to the mobilisation, was, in their eyes, not only undesirable but also highly dangerous. As a result, High Command did everything possible to quell the movements. It denied entry to anarchist and revolutionary speakers in “state of siege” areas and banned the distribution of their newspapers and pamphlets among soldiers. Intelligence agents even took note of the coming and goings of prominent “revolutionaries” and tapped their telephone conversations.64

Such fears were not completely unfounded. Initially, the radical nature of the IAMV and like-minded groups did not have a significant impact. In fact, if the war had not broken out it is conceivable that the IAMV might have disappeared altogether, since support for the cause was so low in 1912 and 1913, its annual congress was cancelled.65 However, their popularity grew in response to general dissatisfaction with the war situation and some highly successful publicity campaigns.66 Membership of the IAMV reached a peak of 3,200 in 1918, where in 1913 it counted only a few hundred, while circulation of its

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64 For examples, see: correspondence between military and civil authorities regarding the movements and removal of the Christian-Socialist preacher, A. R. de Jong in September 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 263, and in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1; Correspondence between military and civil authorities about how to deal with the writers of the anarchist publication *Soldaten-Tribune* (Soldiers’ Tribune) and with associated mobilisation clubs in October 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5; Head of Police (Leiden) to Director of Police (The Hague), 16 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Territorial Commander in Zeeland to Commander-in-Chief, 16 July 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 203; Minister of Justice to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 1915, in ARA, "A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918" archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 191; Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 20 May 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 280; Commander-in-Chief to Army authorities, 1 December 1916 in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; correspondence between Commander of the Internment Depot Groningen and Commander-in-Chief, February 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 779.

65 Heijmans et. al. *De I.A.M.V.* p. 51.

monthly magazine *De Wapens Neder (Down Weapons)* grew from 70,000 copies in 1913 to 290,000 by the time of the Armistice. As we shall see, conscientious objection rose from 1915 onwards, partially in response to the publicity generated by anti-military groups; while mobilisation clubs with radical agendas seemed to be sprouting up like noxious fungi throughout the armed forces.

**LIKE THE PEOPLE, SO THE ARMY**

By 1918 soldiers were wholeheartedly tired of the war. In fact, low morale and general sluggishness among troops had set in quite quickly after the initial excitement of mobilisation subsided in 1914. By April 1915, commanders had real problems convincing their men of the necessity for continued mobilisation. While troops understood that neutrality required some form of military preparation, they, like many civilians, did not feel it required a full-scale mobilisation. Requests for more leave and better living conditions became the rallying cries of disgruntled men. The Easter leave *debacle* in 1916 highlights how fragile morale actually was, and defined clear limits of soldier co-operation with military authorities.

Hence, one of the most pressing issues for High Command was improving conditions for soldiers to such a degree that their universal dislike of military service was not intensified beyond manageable levels and did not interfere with their willingness to follow orders. Better leave provisions in 1915 and 1916 did a great deal to alleviate many of the complaints. A number of charitable and military organisations tried improving the quality of soldiers’ free time. They arranged entertainment for the troops, set up places for relaxation outside barracks and camps, co-ordinated lesson plans for furthering education, and provided opportunities for interested soldiers to learn new skills and participate in handicraft activities. High Command used incentives such as sports days and craft shows

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68 "Tel peuple, telle armée" (Freycinet about the French Army in the Franco-Prussian war 1870 - 1871, as quoted in W. E. van Dam van Isselt, "De geest in het leger en de burgerwachten" [The morale in the Army and the civilian guards] Militaire Spectator. 88, 1919, p. 158 fn 2).
69 For which, see: Chapter 10, pp. 353 - 358.
70 For which, see: correspondence in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 309; P. Kleinrooms, "Overzicht nopens de verrichtingen van de Afdeeling van het Algemeen Hoofdkwartier van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht 'Ontwikkeling en Ontspanning van de Gemobiliseerde Troepen'" [Overview of the functions of the department of the General Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy 'Education and Relaxation of the Mobilised Troops'] in Hamel et. al. (eds.), *Onze Weermacht - van 1914*
to entice soldiers into extracurricular activities. It also published a newspaper, the *Soldaten Courant*, with the two-fold purpose of keeping soldiers informed and to provide a means of disseminating ideas and military propaganda. Aside from this, High Command did as much as possible to keep soldier grievances at bay. It deliberately kept food rations ample for as long as this was possible, and luxury items, such as tea, coffee and sugar, remained part of the military diet long after these goods disappeared from civilian shelves.

But with the passing war years, dreary tasks, widespread boredom, unsatisfactory and often unhygienic living conditions, and reductions in military rations all seriously affected morale. The year 1918 tested the resolve of conscripts more than any other, especially as the standard of food declined rapidly. Their families also suffered. Considerable price rises through the course of 1917 and 1918, outstripped soldiers’ allowances, making it very difficult for troops to live off their income let alone to support a family. This was one more reason, among many, why they disliked their conscription intensely. Moreover, the international crises of 1918 and the Spanish flu restricted leave and limited the movement of troops.

One of the most worrying side effects of low morale for military commanders was a corresponding decline in discipline. Discipline was identified as a key element for obedience to the military hierarchy. Dutch officers often quoted Von Moltke, the ex-German Chief of Staff, on this point: “An army without discipline is a costly, in time of war...

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71 K. F. L. Bosch, “Sportwestrijden voor het geheele leger” [Sport competitions for the entire Army] *Militaire Spectator*. 84, 1915, pp. 532 - 535. See also: correspondence on such activities in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 241 and 297; Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 19 February 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 309.

72 *Soldaten Courant*. Thursday 20 August 1914, p. 1; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, 4 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 88.

73 Flier, *War Finances* p. 37.

74 For two very good discussions on the importance of morale and discipline, see: David Englander, “Discipline and morale in the British army, 1917 - 1918” in Horne (ed.), *State, society and mobilization* pp. 125 - 143; David Englander, “Mutinies and Military Morale” in Strachan (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War* pp. 191 - 203.

useless, and in time of peace dangerous institution". \(^{76}\) Quite realistically, therefore, High Command feared that defensive capabilities of troops had declined and that, more immediately, soldiers would refuse to help in curbing public disorder in towns and cities. How could it get soldiers to act decisively against a hostile crowd if most were sympathetic to the cause of the protesters? How could it remove the civilian out of the conscript? Although there were meetings where soldiers urged their comrades to refuse to shoot at civilians, \(^{77}\) there was only ever one reported case of supposed insubordination when during the July 1917 potato riots, a small band of troops refused to use their rifles against a group of demonstrators. Subsequent investigations showed it had not been a case of defiance but more of inadequate command and panic arising from a highly chaotic situation. \(^{78}\) In fact, even though morale was low, in general, conscripts carried out assigned tasks and duties unfailingy, albeit begrudgingly. Nevertheless, High Command's concern that soldiers were no longer trustworthy because of declining morale was so real, that the Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam suggested replacing troops stationed in the city with others who had not witnessed the July riots. \(^{79}\) The strength of this fear must be kept in mind when considering the official reaction to the establishment of socialist mobilisation clubs, the distribution of anti-military and pacifist literature, and the Harskamp mutiny.

The military authorities had enough precedents to justify their worries. Even before thousands of men left their barracks at Easter in 1916, conscripts had expressed dissatisfaction at certain aspects of their service. As early as September 1914, the Commander-in-Chief told officers to take decisive action against soldiers who were purposively disrupting train schedules by sitting in first class, smoking in non-smoking


\(^{77}\) For examples, see: Inspector of Police (Leiden) to Commissioner of Police, 5 February 1918, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 817; military reports and *Telegraaf* article, 5 February 1918, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 817.

\(^{78}\) Commander of the Fortified Position of Amsterdam, "Rapport omtrent de jongste in Amsterdam plaats gehad hebbende ongeregeldheden" pp. 10 - 19, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 549; Wal (ed.), *Herinneringen van Jonr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge* pp. 30 - 31; Jong, *Notities van een landstormman* p. 28.

\(^{79}\) Commander Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 29 August 1917, in ARA, " Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 677.
carriages, causing unrest at railway stations, and refusing to pay for tickets.⁸⁰ High incidences of theft, falsification of leave papers, destruction of goods, smuggling, public drunkenness, faking illness, and refusals to abide by military conventions, such as saluting, all indicated undercurrents of discontent.⁸¹

The number of cases before the military courts for misdemeanours increased significantly during the war and extra military prisons had to be built to meet demand.⁸² At times there were not enough arrest rooms and prison cells available to house all the miscreants.⁸³ It must be noted that a considerable discrepancy existed between the Navy and Army here. Cases before the military court involving the Navy were comparable to pre-war numbers, principally because it was a much smaller force made up of mostly experienced professionals with no more than 9,000 conscripts attached at any one time.⁸⁴ In the Army, the number of cases not only increased with the mobilisation, which was to be expected, but also rose more than 400 per cent between 1914 and 1918.⁸⁵

During 1915, conscript dissatisfaction heightened. In the spring, troops in Utrecht (principal position of the New Holland Waterline) were involved in a series of violent incidents and riots.⁸⁶ On 2 March, around 100 soldiers revolted after a much-disliked officer arrested one of their comrades. Further disquiet erupted eleven days later, when troops freed the detainee by brandishing their rifles at the officer in charge. On Sunday the

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⁸⁰ Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 9 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 147 (also in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 264); Commander-in-Chief to Commanders of 1 RI, 5 RI, 9 RI, 12 RI, 4 CW, 4 Batallion LWI, and 9 Batallion LWI, 26 September 1914 in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 262. See also: Jan Willem van Borselen, Aanslag op het Spoor. Rotterdamse spoorwegen in twee wereldoorlogen. [Capture of the rails. Rotterdam’s railways in two world wars] Rosmalen: Stichting Rail Publicaties, 1995, p. 23.

⁸¹ Inspector of Mobile Artillery to Minister of War, 31 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 817; Snijders, “De Nederlandsche landmacht” p. 225; Bosboom, In Mooiërlijke Omstandigheden p. 183.

⁸² Hoogterp, “De geschiedenis van Fort Spijkerboor” pp. 3 - 62.

⁸³ Commander of the Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 15 May 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 310.

⁸⁴ Table in “Statistische gegevens betreffende klachtzaken” [Statistical facts regarding cases of complaints] Militair-Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, 12, 1916, p. 199.

⁸⁵ The table in “Militaire-rechtelijk Statistiek” (Ibid. 13, 1917, p. 405) indicates an increase of 367 per cent in the number of cases before the military court between 1915 and 1917; Hoogterp claims a 300 per cent increase for the war years (“De geschiedenis van Fort Spijkerboor” pp. 30 - 32), while Kooiman’s figures indicates a 455 per cent increase between 1914 and 1918 (De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht p. 257).

⁸⁶ For which, see: Commander-in-Chief, “Rapport aan Zyne Excellentie den Minister van Oorlog, aangaande de ongereldheden te Utrecht in Maart 1915” [Report to his excellency the Minister of War regarding the disturbances in Utrecht in March 1915] No. 703, 12 June 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Bonebakker, Twee verdienstelijke officieren pp. 46 - 47.
21st, further trouble spread into the centre of Utrecht. On Saturday nights during the previous winter, soldiers managed to sneak out and catch the last train out of town, returning in time for the Sunday afternoon roll-call. This particular Saturday, however, the nightly roll-call was postponed until 11pm, preventing them from taking the train. Many still did so early the next morning. When their commanders discovered this and decided to confront the men at the station, 400 to 500 soldiers angrily protested in support of their returning colleagues. The station commander and officers, according to the military report on the incident, maintained order and identified the soldiers that had gone AWOL for the day.87 That night, one of the men arrested at the station was imprisoned, causing further riots in the city. The upheaval died down in the early hours of the next day.

But unrest and disquiet continued to simmer. In the evening of 23 March, soldiers gathered in the centre of Utrecht, disgruntled and on edge. A large crowd of civilians rallied round the troops. For the first time, the police and Marechaussee joined with military officers to disperse the crowd. After some serious altercations, most of the soldiers returned to their barracks, although locals continued to cause mayhem well into the next day. This time, High Command took serious steps to stop further riotous outbreaks. It moved the entire 34 Landweer Infantry Brigade (LWI) and 36 LWI stationed in Utrecht to barracks in Harshkamp and Milligen, two camps situated in the middle of the Veluwe heaths.88 Intended as a temporary punishment, it became a permanent residence for the landweer men, until they were sent on long-term leave several months later. As for the remaining soldiers in Utrecht and the new brigades sent to replace 34 and 36 LWI, the Commander of the Waterline ordered that they could not be seen in public in groups of more than five men at a time, nor could they involve themselves in civilian gatherings.89

Restoring discipline swiftly and decisively was an important element of the authorities’ response to the Utrecht disturbances, as was punishing the offenders. But High Command also took the causes of unrest seriously. It launched a thorough investigation into

87 Commander-in-Chief, “Rapport aan Zyne Excellentie den Minister van Oorlog, aangaande de ongereldheden te Utrecht in Maart 1915” No. 703, 12 June 1915, pp. 18 - 20 (mispagination) in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
88 Commander-in-Chief to Commander Division II, 24 March 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 162.
89 Commander of the New Holland Waterline, decree, 5 April 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
The commission of enquiry found that soldiers were unhappy with their leave provisions and the unfair distribution of days off (soldiers who lived far off received half a day more leave as a travel allowance). They were also unhappy with the state of their barracks, especially the rats and other vermin, unhygienic mattresses, and inferior quality of food. High Command tried rectifying some of these concerns: it increased the bread ration, and found ways to eradicate some of the vermin and clean the mattresses.

Yet it placed far greater emphasis on the inadequacies of Utrecht’s military leadership to deal with the crisis, than it did on the fundamental concerns of the rioting soldiers. The report stressed the lack of officers and their youth and inexperience. It also asserted that the general *tuchtlosheid* (lack of discipline) in the Dutch national character was partially to blame, something which was hard to fix, although officers would have to do their best to install military pride among their men. A non-military national character was often cited as an explanation for all manner of problems in the armed forces, a convenient way of assigning blame without having to look for useful solutions.

Nevertheless, when troops in Apeldoorn, Arnhem, Boskoop, Tilburg and Vlissingen also rioted in the next four months, citing leave and living conditions as reasons for their frustration, their concerns could not be as easily downplayed. Combined with growing parliamentary pressure to lessen the mobilisation commitment, the riots no doubt contributed to the acceptance of the *landstorm* laws and helped ease short and long-term leave conditions in 1915 and 1916. High Command also tried to improve soldier accommodation. For example, in Tilburg, it moved troops out of the large warehouses with

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90 Commander-in-Chief, “Rapport aan Zyne Excellentie den Minister van Oorlog, aangaande de ongereldheden te Utrecht in Maart 1915” No. 703, 12 June 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
91 Ibid.
extremely cramped and often unhygienic conditions.\textsuperscript{94} When this was not possible, it forced warehouse owners to improve conditions. As well, it billeted troops more widely throughout the provinces in an attempt to avoid crowding too many men into one city or town.

The measures seemed to work. After one minor disturbance among Friesian troops in Maastricht in January 1916, who complained about lack of leave and the huge distances they had to travel to get home,\textsuperscript{95} and the Easter crisis in 1916, no major disturbances plagued the armed forces until May 1918, when a group of 200 soldiers in the Kromhout barracks in Utrecht rioted, threw stones, and injured several officers. This time their main complaint was lack of food.\textsuperscript{96} It was the first omen of deep-seated discontent at inadequate provisioning and coming as it did a month after the April civilian riots, was an ominous sign for the military authorities. Unfortunately, there was very little they could do to alleviate the cause of the problems; the supply crisis was largely out of military control.

Army leaders also feared that if news spread about particular instances of disobedience, it would inspire other soldiers to follow suit. As a result, High Command tried to stifle all reports about rioting. Not surprisingly, the \textit{Soldaten Courant} did not comment on any of the 1915 riots or the Easter 1916 leave fiasco, although it would report on the Harskamp mutiny in October 1918.\textsuperscript{97} High Command asked newspapers to refrain from reporting on these events as well, a request that was often, but not always, heeded.\textsuperscript{98} It ensured that very little accurate information about military disturbances reached the public, which guaranteed when a story did come out, it was often highly exaggerated and fantastical. For example, many in The Hague seriously believed that 70 people had died as a result of the Tilburg riots in August 1915, when no one had.\textsuperscript{99} Preventing accurate reporting

\textsuperscript{94} Commander Division IV to Commander-in-Chief, 14 August 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 282.

\textsuperscript{95} Commander X Mixed Brigade to Commander of the Field Army, 6 February 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 297.

\textsuperscript{96} Hoog Militair Gerechtshof (High Military Court), sentence 6 June 1919, in \textit{Militair-Rechtelijk Tijdschrift}. vol 15, 1919, pp. 104 - 109.

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Soldaten Courant}. no. 658, 30 October 1918, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{98} Board of the \textit{Nederlandsche Journalistenkring} (Dutch Journalist Circle) to Commander-in-Chief, 8 April 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale StaT” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 228; Commander Division IV to Commander of the Field Army, 21 April 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 293;

\textsuperscript{99} Burger, “Fragmenten uit het dagboek” p. 509.
in the newspapers only made rumours more believable, and may have promoted misconceptions about the actual state of soldiers' morale and dependability.

The rumours and stories provided ready fuel for anti-military and revolutionary-socialist propaganda. Military heads were extremely concerned about the infiltration of socialist ideas among soldiers, not surprisingly because, more often than not, socialist thought opposed militarism. When socialist groups, much like denominational and charity organisations, began organising clubrooms to provide places for troops to go in their free time, High Command took immediate notice and action, banning soldiers from affiliating with the more extreme organisations. There was a huge difference between the activities of SDAP affiliations and those of organisations such as the SDP. Although at times, the SDAP welcomed speakers on topics such as pacifism and anti-militarism, it did not seek an end to the mobilisation and did not incite its members to military disobedience. The SDAP leadership was quick to lobby the military and government on this point. Consequently, the military authorities, although they remained cautious and prevented them from spreading propaganda literature, were more lenient with SDAP soldiers and their clubs than they were with the SDP and IAMV. In 1917, the Minister in Charge of the Navy, J. J. Rambonnet, even allowed sailors to join a SDAP organisation that he had banned before the war. There was, in fact, little love lost between the two socialist camps and the SDAP discouraged its members from associating with the SDP.

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100 For which, see: Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg pp. 167 - 175.
102 Commander Division III to Head Committee of Sociaal-Democratisch Mobilisatieclub in Division III, 11 October 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 292.
103 Commander-in-Chief to Commander in Zeeland, 22 September 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Internment Camp in Hardewijk, 24 April 1917, ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 677; Troelstra, Gedenkschriften. Vierde Deel. Storm pp. 171 - 172; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden pp. 235 - 236.
104 Troelstra, Gedenkschriften. Vierde Deel. Storm p. 66.
105 Commander Division II to Commander-in-Chief, 24 March 1915, pp. 7 - 8; First Lieutenant J. Varnier to Garrison Commander in Leiden, 7 April 1915, both in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
Concern about radical “mobilisation clubs” spread quickly among commanders early in 1915. By April, High Command had received reports of such organisations throughout the country: Leiden, Tilburg, Aalsmeer, Beverwijk, Den Helder, Roosendaal, Zaandijk, Utrecht, Zaltbommel, Bergen op Zoom, Naarden, Durrerdam, The Hague, Breda, Abonde, Eindhoven, Delft, Schiedam, Amsterdam and Woerden. Although a far from negligible presence, most of the clubs were very small: their core membership rarely exceeded 20 members (both civilian and soldiers), although one club in Tilburg boasted 60

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106 “Verslag van de Commissie van onderzoek, benoemd door den Garnizoenscommandant op 17 Maart 1915, naar aanleiding van een anti-militaristische beweging onder gemobiliseerden te Leiden” [Report of the commission of enquiry appointed by the Garrison Commander on 17 March 1915 to look into the anti-military movement among mobilised troops in Leiden] 25 March 1915; First Lieutenant J. Varnier to Garrison Commander in Leiden, 7 April 1915; Garrison Commander Rotterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 24 April 1915, all in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Commander-in-Chief to Commander Cavalry Brigade, 31 March 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 310; Commander Division I to Commander of the Field Army, 28 April 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 280; Decision of the High Military Court, 1 October 1915, in Militair-Rechtelijke Tijdschrift. 11, 1915/1916, pp. 412 - 470.
It was not the size of the clubs that worried the authorities but more the impact of their activities on the mind-set of other conscripts. To this end, most of the clubs disseminated a variety of socialist and anti-military propaganda, invited well-known socialists and anarchists to speak to conscripts, including F. Domela Nieuwenhuis, B. Lansink Senior and D. Wijnkoop. However, the clubs did not differ greatly from Catholic and Protestant organisations and SDAP affiliations, providing a support-base for soldiers and helping relieve boredom, except that their messages were more controversial and the potential for harm, in the eyes of the authorities at least, was immense.

The military hierarchy did everything in its power to put an end to the radical mobilisation clubs, declaring the possession and distribution of anti-military, revolutionary and anarchist newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and other forms of propaganda illegal; banning meetings; forcing speakers out of “state of siege” areas; and breaking up clubs by moving committee members into different regiments. Officers attended club meetings undercover and identified leaders, who were subsequently arrested for undermining krijgstucht (military discipline). One commander even suggested extending the “state of siege” throughout the country so that the military could deal with anti-military propaganda.

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107 First Lieutenant J. Varnier to Garrison Commander in Leiden, 7 April 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
108 Further research needs to be done on the importance of the various military clubs and organisations and their impact on political ideas among troops and among civilians in the areas in which troops were billeted. For a good general description of the activities and workings of mobilisation clubs, see: Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg pp. 122 - 146.
109 First Lieutenant J. Varnier to Garrison Commander in Leiden, 7 April 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
110 Commander-in-Chief to commanding officers in the Army, 19 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 13 April 1915, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 280; Commander-in-Chief “Order voor de Landmacht” 1 December 1916, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; Commander-in-Chief, “Order voor de Landmacht” 8 July 1918, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 779 (also in inventory no. 5 and in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 348); Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, pp. 192 - 193.
111 Commander Division I to Commander-in-Chief, 10 April 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2 (also in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 280).
112 Commissioner of Police (Leiden) to Director of Police (The Hague), 16 March 1915, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2; Commander First Division Koninklijke Marechaussee to Commander Division IV, 9 April 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 280.
113 Commander-in-Chief to commanding officers, 19 March 1915 and 13 April 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
more decisively, a suggestion that was not taken up by the Commander-in-Chief.\textsuperscript{114} What perturbed Snijders and his colleagues most was that the appearance of these radical mobilisation clubs would contribute to the outbreak of general disorder. It seemed too much of a coincidence, for example, that the emergence of clubs concurred with the military riots in 1915. While in one or two instances, the organisations may have been involved in disturbances, there is no evidence to suggest that their activities were a root cause of the riots. In fact, in most cases, no evidence of possible involvement could be found at all.\textsuperscript{115} What is more likely, is that rather than being the catalyst for agitation and unrest, the mobilisation clubs were another symptom and signal of widespread frustration among troops.

The actions of the authorities against the clubs were relatively unsuccessful. While ensuring the temporary disintegration of certain groups, socialist mobilisation clubs continued to exist in one form or another right up until the end of the war. They became more clandestine in their activities, and shrewd in propagating information among soldiers. They also became better organised. In 1916, the SDAP clubs in the provinces of North and South Holland, Utrecht and Gelderland merged together to form the \textit{Vereeniging van Sociaal-Democratische Mobilisatieclubs} (Association of Social-Democratic Mobilisation Clubs), which would be joined in 1917 by similar organisations in the southern provinces.\textsuperscript{116} It is only in 1918, that the radical clubs reappear in the documents of the General Staff. This time, a distinct split can be discerned within the radical movement between those who supported the SDP, the \textit{Soldaten-Raden} (Soldier Councils, SR), and the even more secretive \textit{Raden van Arbeiders en Soldaten} (Councils of Workers and Soldiers, SAR), whose leadership resided in Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{117} The SR and SAR operated independently of each other, although they had parallel ends, namely revolution and the overthrow of the constitution by undermining the military as an instrument of state. The difference between

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\textsuperscript{114} Commander Depot Battalion 9 IB, 30 September 1914, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 147.
\textsuperscript{115} Except in Tilburg, where a radical mobilisation club (not involving the SDAP affiliation) petitioned the Commander-in-Chief about their conditions a week before the August riots (see: Head of Commission, Major G. C. A. Fabius, “Rapport der Commissie tot instellen van een onderzoek naar de oorzaken der ongeregeldheden te Tilburg op 1 en 2 Augustus 1915” 11 August 1918, pp. 6 - 7 and Appendix, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 282). Yet even here there is little evidence to suggest that the petition or action by the club sparked the riots.
\textsuperscript{116} Kleijnjeld, \textit{Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg} pp. 122 - 123.
\textsuperscript{117} Attorney General, Director of the Police to the Minister of Justice, 28 October 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
the two was defined by their proposed means to the revolutionary end: the SR wanted to work together with the SDP and trade unions and refused to use violence, while the SAR urged its members to obtain weapons and force a revolution any way possible. The SAR indicated a dramatic departure from the anti-military activities organised and supported in 1915, and harked back to the creation of military councils (sovjets) in the Russian armed forces at the time. It illustrates how the clubs had become far more radical, distancing themselves even further from the SDAP's moderate programme. Not surprisingly, the SR and SAR caused grave concern among military and civil authorities, which made concerted efforts to terminate them.118

In the end, though, few troops were involved in the radical mobilisation clubs, even in their most revolutionary forms. Their impact on the majority of their colleagues, although not non-existent, may not have warranted the amount of effort expended by the authorities to suppress them. At no stage did the clubs enjoy widespread support. While many conscripts may have sympathised with particular aspects of the anti-military message, they were not inspired en masse to become revolutionaries. Significantly enough, there is no evidence to suggest that the extremely revolutionary Dutch sovjets tried to involve themselves in the aborted revolution in November 1918.119

Yet there was an undeniable link between the propaganda drives of anti-military organisations, such as the IAMV and mobilisation clubs, and the strength of the demobilisation debate within the country. The most successful of their campaigns was the dienstweigeringsmanifesto (literally, "refusal to serve" or conscientious-objection manifesto) signed in May 1915 by a group of revolutionary anarchists and Christian socialists, including the Revolutionair Socialistisch Verbond (Revolutionary Socialist League) headed by Henriëtte Roland Holst, in denunciation of militarism and the mobilisation.120 The manifesto came in response to a petition from 22 prominent businessmen to the government in April in support of the mobilisation and landstorm laws.121 Nearly 180 people signed the first dienstweigerings manifesto, which was

118 Commander 17 RI to Commander Division III, 30 August 1918; Commander Division IV to Commander of the Field Army, 11 Sept 1918, both in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 348.
119 Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg p. 146.
120 Heijmans et. al. De I.A.M.V. p. 97.
121 Ibid. p. 96.
published and circulated in large numbers around the country in September.\textsuperscript{122} By the summer of 1916, around 1,000 people had signed.\textsuperscript{123} At this stage, its wording was improved and the manifesto inspired similar movements in other countries.\textsuperscript{124} The strength of the petition was not in the number of people who signed it, a definite minority, but more in the fact that it was distributed in the tens of thousands of copies and encouraged widespread discussion. The general populace knew of its existence and it pushed the issue of conscientious objection into popular debate. The military authorities took decisive action against any soldiers who signed the manifesto and hunted down copies in the “state of siege” areas. The petition worried civilian authorities too, who used the law against opruiming (rioting, causing public disturbances) to arrest most of the original signatories, many of whom were jailed or fined.\textsuperscript{125} The government warned civil servants, whose names appeared on the manifesto, that if they did not retract their support they would lose their jobs, resulting in the withdrawal of 183 signatures in December 1915.\textsuperscript{126} Interestingly enough, the SDAP wholeheartedly stood with the government, condemning the petition.\textsuperscript{127}

There are a number of different meanings associated with the Dutch word dienstweigering (refusal to serve). It can have the connotation of conscientious objection, where for personal, religious or political reasons a person cannot be placed in a position where they might kill another. It can also have more extreme ideological connotations associated with anti-militarism, where the entire concept of an armed force is deemed immoral or politically incorrect. But, dienstweigering is also used in more particular cases to describe soldiers who refuse to follow particular orders. Here a soldier may not have any ideological reasons for disobeying his superiors, yet, nonetheless he does.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. p. 100. For copies of the manifesto, see: Ibid. pp. 97 - 98; ARA, "A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918" archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 178; ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 3; ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 280.

\textsuperscript{123} Heijmans et. al. De I.A.M.V. p. 101.


\textsuperscript{126} Heijmans et. al. De I.A.M.V. p. 100.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid. p. 98; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 262.
The different meanings make it quite difficult to decipher available statistics of *dienstweigeren* during the Great War. In official sources, all soldiers who refused to serve were classed together. Discovering how many acted for anti-militarist or pacifist ideals has proven very difficult. What is significant, however, is that after the publication of the first conscientious objection manifesto in September 1915, the reported cases of *dienstweigeren* increased considerably: in the first five months of war, the number of cases before the Army’s three military courts stood at 47; in the whole year 1915, 213 cases were heard there; followed by 191 cases in the first six months of 1916.\(^{128}\) It was one of the most common offences handled by the courts, after desertion, theft and insubordination. In fact, twelve per cent of cases before one of the three military courts during 1916 dealt with *dienstweigeren*, while 28 per cent related to desertion. It must be remembered, that the desertion figures were somewhat skewed as a result of the Easter leave crisis, when many soldiers left their barracks inspired by their colleagues’ example. Nevertheless, of the 488 desertion cases, more than 60 per cent involved re-offenders.\(^{129}\)

No doubt there was a close connection between conscientious objection and desertion. The Easter situation itself indicates the prominence of desertion as a way for soldiers to vent their frustration, perhaps in a far more decisive way than rioting or violence.\(^{130}\) One infantry regiment in The Hague must have thought this as well, when two weeks before the Easter leave fiasco, soldiers in two sections refused to follow orders all day, many tried to desert, while others declared themselves sick.\(^{131}\) It was a spontaneous protest against the burden of military service and lack of leave and occurred only among conscripts in one building. Eventually, around 50 soldiers were arrested and brought before a court martial on grounds of *dienstweigeren*.

According to the IAMV, in total 460 soldiers were inspired to *dienstweigeren* by ideological motives during the war. Of these, 238 received monetary aid and moral support

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\(^{128}\) “Overzicht van het aantal behandelde zaken (strafzaken en klachtzaken) door de drie krijgraden bij de landmacht gedurende het tijdvak 1 August 1914 tot 1 Augustus 1916” [Overview of the number of cases dealt with (criminal and complaints) by the three military courts of the Army during the period 1 August 1914 to 1 August 1916] in *Militair-Rechtelijk Tijdschrift*. 12, 1916, foldout chart, no page number.


\(^{130}\) Occasionally, deserters escaped the country (see, for example: Commander 5 RI III Battalion to Commander-in-Chief, 15 December 1915, in ARA, “Archief van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 170).

\(^{131}\) Commander 4th IB to Commander Division I (subsequently sent on to Commander of the Field Army), 11 April 1916, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 297.
from organisations such as the IAMV and pacifist Christian-Socialist groups, who turned
the objectors into martyrs for their respective causes.¹³² They tried to inspire other soldiers
to do the same and widely publicised the fact that after a maximum of 12 months in jail for
dienstweigering, troops would be dismissed from military service.¹³³ Since the Netherlands
was not at war, neither desertion nor refusal to serve were punishable by death.¹³⁴

Conscientious objection caused considerable logistical problems for military
authorities. They were not prepared for the numbers of objectors and did not have enough
cells and disciplinary classes to house them all.¹³⁵ In the end, they turned Fort Spijkerboor,
one of the fortifications around Amsterdam, into a special prison for the objectors, to
separate them from other military prisoners and prevent the spread of pacifist
propaganda.¹³⁶ Prison wardens kept the date and times of prisoner transfers secret and even
isolated them in separate railway carriages, so that the IAMV could not use this information
to organise rallies and publicity drives.¹³⁷ But there were also attempts to deal with soldiers’
options. Late in 1917, the Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, gave conscientious objectors
the option to bring their case to his attention.¹³⁸ This developed further in 1918, when he
reached agreement with Snijders allowing soldiers with serious ideological concerns to
volunteer for non-combative roles. Suggested options were medics, administrative
personnel and telegraph and telephone operators.¹³⁹ The number who took up this
opportunity is unknown; in any case, troops inspired by anti-militarism would not have

¹³³ Commander Disciplinary Classes to Inspector of Infantry, 18 September 1917, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 677.
¹³⁵ For example, see: Commander Disciplinary Classes to Inspector of Infantry, 18 September 1917; Inspector of Infantry to Commander-in-Chief, 22 October 1917, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 677.
¹³⁶ Wal (ed.), Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge p. 33; Hoogterp, “De geschiedenis van Fort Spijkerboor” pp. 31 - 34.
¹³⁷ Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 15 April 1918; Commander-in-Chief to military authorities, 24 April 1918; Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 7 June 1918, all in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlegers” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 352.
¹³⁸ Minister of War decision, 9 November 1917, in Militair-Rechtelijk Tijdschrift. 13, 1917, pp. 13 - 14.
¹³⁹ Correspondence between the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief, 19 April, 1 May and 31 May 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 854.
done so. Nevertheless, in the end, this regulation brought some form of acceptance of ideological objection within the armed forces and brought the country one step closer to recognising it in national law.  

The conscientious objection and pacifist campaigns cannot be seen outside the sphere of the demobilisation debate discussed in Chapter 10. The socialist motto “no man and no money for the mobilisation”, much brandished during the war, is itself a clear indication of this. The campaigns were also very much part of the general non-military attitude of the Dutch people. It is worth noting, therefore, that the conscientious objection manifesto appeared at the height of the demobilisation, leave and landstorm debates in 1915 and 1916. It is also meaningful that in 1917 and 1918, the emphasis on all these issues lessened. Newspapers become more concerned with the possibility of Dutch involvement in the war and the impact of shortages on domestic consumption. As mentioned earlier, while the military was still far from popular, the mobilisation became more accepted. This does not take away from the fact, however, that cases of conscientious objection remained steady and the activities of the IAMV did not stop. Yet there also seemed to be a begrudging acceptance of the need for some military presence. The exact nature of this presence, however, remained entirely controversial.

TO SALUTE OR NOT?

The manner in which the military handled itself continued to be a prominent point of public discussion, well illustrated by the debate surrounding the appropriateness of saluting in the armed forces. Right from the start of the war, conscripts openly questioned the use of saluting everyone of higher rank. As early as October 1914, the Commander-in-Chief instructed all officers to enforce saluting among troops as the practice had become so infrequent and little punished as to need drastic change. For troops, saluting was not only a nuisance but seemed pointless, a vestige of an outdated military era. For High Command, on the other hand, saluting formed an essential part of the way discipline and

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140 In 1923, the first law recognising conscientious objection was passed by the Dutch parliament (Boomen, **Honderd Jaar Vredesbeweging** p. 202).
141 “Geen man en geen cent voor het militarisme” (Stoke, **Van Aardappelmies tot Officiersdegen** p. 27).
142 Commander-in-Chief to Commanders of Army Corps, 2 October 1914, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 263.
143 For more on the saluting debate, see: Moeyes, **Buiten Schot** pp. 147 - 148.
respect was maintained. In fact, during the riots in 1915, officers looked at the frequency of saluting as a way of gauging morale, recognising that a refusal to salute was one of the simplest forms of disobedience and most common forms of dienstweigering.\(^{144}\)

**Illustration 15: The salute stays!**

This newspaper cartoon with the caption “Je Maintiendrai”, which appeared after the motion to abandon saluting failed in February 1918, illustrates how absurd many Dutch found the practice.

(Source: ARA, “Papieren van Jhr mr B. C. de Jonge” entry no. 2.21.095, inventory no. 49)

It is not entirely clear how conscripts’ distaste for saluting turned into a public debate, but throughout 1917, pamphlets, articles and newspapers devoted a considerable amount of attention to the issue. Ranging from serious discussions by those for and against the practice, to mirthful comments and quasi-farcical cartoons in a range of newspapers,

saluting was either promoted as an extremely necessary part of the military institution or as the inane enforcement of respect by a power-hungry military hierarchy. Socialist newspapers proclaimed saluting was anti-democratic and reinforced class differences, while supporters of saluting stressed its use for maintaining order, discipline and camaraderie. The issue reached the parliamentary level in May 1917, when one member, J. E. W. Duys, tabled a motion to do away with saluting altogether. Due to the fiasco surrounding the Minister of War, Nicolaas Bosboom, the motion did not come to order at that time. Bosboom’s resignation took precedence. But the motion was re-issued in February 1918, when it was voted out by a majority of 41 to 31. In November, the governmental enquiry into the Harskamp mutiny also investigated whether saluting had become superfluous or not. That something seemingly so fundamental to military order could be subject to parliamentary debate and a ministerial investigation, clearly indicates the widening chasm of misunderstanding between civilians and the military. It is unlikely that in the militarised societies of France, Germany or Great Britain, a similar public debate could have occurred.

A vital qualifier must be added at this point. It would be completely erroneous to assume that in 1918, Dutch conscripts were close to widespread insubordination. The average soldier, despite his low morale, dissatisfaction and ready criticism of military authority, continued to do his duty. He served at the borders, participated in exercises, trained, followed orders and even saluted (when necessary). The riots in 1915 and 1918, even the Harskamp uprising, usually involved a minority of troops in a clearly defined area who were severely disgruntled about a particular aspect of their military service. There was no revolutionary spirit in the Dutch armed forces, nor were they at the point of internal collapse. Yet having said this, there was a culture underlying the mobilisation that was increasingly negative towards military service. This negativity found expression in a variety of ways. It gave the impression of an atmosphere of widespread dissension, which was

146 Commander-in-Chief, “Nota over den militaire groet” ARA, Archieven van de Generale Staf entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4.
147 Wal (ed.), Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge p. 38.
exaggerated by bad press and prolific rumours. When news of the Harskamp rioting and disorders elsewhere spread late in October 1918, many Dutch saw it as a signal of the armed forces’ descent into disorder and revolution. Trust in the military had reached a wartime low.
Not a Day Too Late: Revolution, Armistice and Demobilisation

The great moral achievement of the Dutch armed forces during four full years of standing on the brink in order to maintain our neutrality against possible breaches ... [was that] in general the fighting forces remained fight-worthy and held good morale

I. L. Uijterschoot (1935)

By September 1918, the situation on the Western Front had changed so much that a German victory was highly unlikely, if not entirely improbable. The Allied forces, now supported by American troops, made a series of important breakthroughs, obliging the German armies to retreat through Belgium towards Germany. General Ludendorff, one of Germany’s two Commanders-in-Chief, admitted the likelihood of defeat on 28 September, when he told Kaiser Wilhelm II that the country needed to seek an armistice. As a result, Germany took initial steps towards accepting a concord based on Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points of peace.

In the Netherlands, military and civilian authorities acknowledged the changing war situation. They deemed the chances of entering the war to have diminished significantly. Interestingly enough, and unbeknownst to the Dutch, Great Britain now came closer than at any time earlier to involving the neutral in the conflict. Given that Germany no longer held ascendancy, some British military leaders claimed in a meeting of the Northern Neutrals Committee in October, it was unable to prevent an Allied invasion of the Netherlands. In other words, for the first time, the Allies could reap the strategic advantages of invading the neutral without worrying about the response of their enemy. These advantages were not negligible: easy water access to Belgium and Germany through the

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1 "[D]e groote moreele prestatie van de Nederlandse weermacht om gedurende vier volle jaren op de bres te staan voor de handhaving van onze neutraliteit tegen mogelijke schending .... over 't geheel genomen zijn de strijdmachten gevechtswaardig gebleven, met behoud van goed moreel." (Uijterschout, Beknopt Overzicht p. 446).


Maas and Rhine; ready bases for aerial patrols over German territory; and an additional 200 miles of largely undefended frontline, allowing the Allies to overrun the German Reich quickly.\(^4\) In the end, only the dissenting voices of Royal Navy representatives, who did not wish to patrol more coastlines and did not see any particular benefit for the Navy, prevented the proposal from being pursued further.\(^5\)

At first, the Dutch authorities saw the possibility of German defeat in a positive light. Neutrality could be assured if an armistice was signed. Yet the movement on the fighting front in Belgium brought renewed neutrality anxieties. The country might still enter the conflict due to the mismanagement of its own security measures. The possibility of another internment crisis loomed large. It was all too probable that the Germans would enter Dutch territory, especially in Limburg, in order to reach home soil, since the Belgian-German border was not wide enough to handle a large-scale German retreat. The retreating soldiers would have to be interned. Another key concern was the growing likelihood of the Allies following the retreating Germans into Limburg.\(^6\) Given that, throughout October, tens of thousands of French and Belgian refugees sought refuge in the Netherlands, the Army was always going to be stretched. The possible recapture of Antwerp by the Allies posed potential problems as well, especially if the Allies sailed shipments of war materials on the Schelde.\(^7\) Vigilance on the borders and in the ports had to be raised.

**Harskamp**

On 8 October, High Command told troops in Zeeland that their leave was suspended due to the proximity of fighting on the Western Front. For the same reason, within a fortnight, it removed leave for soldiers in Limburg and North Brabant. On 23 October, the government decided to cancel leave for all military personnel. Everything possible had to be done to keep the Netherlands entirely neutral. In fact, on 22 October, Snijders told van Terwisga that Field Army involvement in helping refugees - officially a civilian responsibility - had to be kept at a minimum since a second mobilisation could be

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\(^5\) Watson, “Britain’s Dutch Policy” p. 213.


called any day. Both men feared the possible repercussions of a German retreat through Dutch territory.

The decision to remove all leave was one step too many for some conscripts. Ever since soldiers had rioted in Utrecht in May 1918 on the grounds of inadequate rations, other food-related complaints and instances of unrest had erupted in barracks throughout the country. It would be no exaggeration to say that conscripts were entirely fed up with the war, the mobilisation and their particular situation. Their frustrations combined into an explosive mix after the recall of leave. On 24 October, in separate and unrelated incidents in Zwolle, 's Hertogenbosch and Middelburg, soldiers complained to their superiors. Most of the complaints were made peacefully, and the officers in charge dealt with them sensibly. On all three occasions, order was restored relatively easily and quickly.

However, for one regiment stuck in Harskamp's isolated barracks, the largest of its kind in the country, a combination of factors, among which foodstuffs and leave were extremely important, resulted in a violent outburst on Friday 25 October. Around dinnertime, a group of soldiers began singing boisterously, throwing stones and threatening officers. Commanders of particular battalions tried calling their troops to order, with little success, principally because their efforts were unco-ordinated, which, in turn, helped to fuel an already flammable situation. One officer even fired his revolver in the air, but this only led to further violence and plundering by the conscripts. Within a couple of hours, the disquiet settled. While the camp commander posted extra guards that evening, he did not take any other action to either punish or arrest offenders, nor did he try uncover the reasons for their frustration.

8 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 22 October 1918, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 372.
9 See: Chapter 11, pp. 381 - 396.
10 SMG/DC, "Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919" 91A/-, pp. 9 - 12; Territorial Commander in Overijssel to Commander-in-Chief, 30 October 1918; Commander of the Fortified Position of the Mouths of the Maas River and the Schelde, 6 November 1918, both in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784.
11 The following details of the Harskamp mutiny are based on: "Rapport van de Commissie tot onderzoek van de ongeregeldheden in de Legerplaats bij Harskamp, ingesteld ingevolge aanschrijving van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht van 27 October 1918, Afd. G. S. No. 20827 Geheim" [Report of the commission of enquiry into the disturbances in the Army position near Harskamp, instituted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy on 27 October 1918] 2 November 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5; SMG/DC, "Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919" [Report of the Commission of investigation into the dissatisfaction in the Army] 91A/-; correspondence in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784. See also: Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg p. 144.
The next morning, the Brigade Commander told his superiors he did not need any extra guards since the crisis had passed. Yet even before he finished addressing troops that afternoon, the barely noticeable unrest that had bubbled for a half a day boiled over again. Officers did very little to stop the rioting. In fact, during a crisis meeting, they decided to avoid repressive measures for as long as possible. This time, troops looted alcohol and accidentally set their mess-hall ablaze. Fire quickly spread to other parts of the camp, causing many troops to flee the scene. As the fire ate away at buildings, ammunition stored within exploded, and electricity was cut off. In the darkness, officers emptied the remaining buildings, threatening force and using their pistols where necessary.

Extra guards, officers and troops closed in on Harskamp later that night to isolate the camp. By this stage, hundreds of troops had taken flight into the surrounding countryside. Local authorities eventually picked them up, returning them to Harskamp over the following two days.\textsuperscript{12} While the fire had destroyed part of the camp, on the whole, it remained habitable. By the first week of November, troops were subdued, and according to one report, even apprehensive.\textsuperscript{13} Some of the men involved were arrested, while the rest, although far from fight-worthy, were no longer rebelling either. They did, however, present a petition to Snijders on 1 November raising several questions about their situation: Why are there soldiers isolated in camps in the heaths, while internees can roam around in the cities? Why can another regiment not replace us for a while as some of the soldiers have been in Harskamp for more than two years?\textsuperscript{14}

The Harskamp riots presented a serious case of widespread insubordination and violence. No doubt the situation was inflamed by the start of the fire and by the inactivity of the camp’s officers. It was a mutiny of sorts and one that the authorities took very seriously, but it looked far worse to outsiders than was warranted in reality. Newspapers grabbed hold of the story, exaggerated it with tales of gunfights and deaths, and drew a picture of an army

\textsuperscript{12} Inspector of Transport in Apeldoorn to Garrison Commander in Amersfoort, 26 October 1918; Territorial Commander in Overijssel to Commander-in-Chief, 28 October 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784.
\textsuperscript{13} “Rapport van de Commissie tot onderzoek van de ongeregeldheden in de Legerplaats bij Harskamp, ingesteld ingevolge aanschrijving van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht van 27 October 1918, Afd. G. S. No. 20827 Geheim” 2 November 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{14} Petition by several soldiers in Harskamp to his Excellency the General [Commander-in-Chief], 1 November 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784.
in disarray. The potential impact of events only increased as news of the Kiel mutiny (29 October - 3 November) and other revolutionary incidents in Germany reached the Netherlands. Harskamp could, so many thought, cause similar chaos in their country

Map 20: Location of military riots and disturbances, 25 October - 31 October 1918

A general military revolt was seen as distinctly probable given the spate of protests that erupted in other barracks and military positions throughout the country after 26 October. As news of the Harskamp mutiny filtered through the network of gossip and rumour that exists in every large institution, other troops protested as well. On 28 October, soldiers in Vlissingen and nearby in Sousburg demanded better food. A march through town by 400 soldiers attracted ample attention, but the local *Koninklijke Marechaussee* easily

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dispersed the protesters.\textsuperscript{16} In Zwolle that same day, a group of drunken soldiers also incited a rebellion among troops and civilians.\textsuperscript{17} On 29 October, in Zaltbommel, officers had problems keeping their men in check as they assembled an artillery munitions train. Yet again, order was quickly imposed.\textsuperscript{18} In Vlasakkers, near Amersfoort, 50 conscripts threatened desertion if leave was not reinstated. The authorities again acted without delay and arrested most of the men.\textsuperscript{19} On 30 October, a riot broke out in the Geertruidenberg barracks,\textsuperscript{20} while further complaints about food were heard in The Hague, as well as in Waalwijk and Deventer.\textsuperscript{21} Alongside a spontaneous outburst of violence in Hellevoetsluis on 31 October when officers refused to let an anarchist socialist speak to troops,\textsuperscript{22} minor complaints and unrest occurred before the end of the month in Haarlem, Hardewijk, Laren, Milligen, Oldebroek, Utrecht, Waalsdorp and Willemstad.\textsuperscript{23} On each occasion, decisive intervention by the military leadership prevented any of the protests getting out of hand.

To civilians looking at these events through a haze of inaccurate and unclear reporting, it seemed that Harskamp had ignited a series of mutinies, that the Netherlands’ Army as a whole was no longer trustworthy, and that perhaps it had been infiltrated with revolutionary ideas. In reality, except for the incident in Hellevoetsluis, itself more a backlash to the actions of officers than an all-out revolt, none of the incidents described

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” p. 12, 91A/-; Commander of the Fortified Position of the Mouts of the Maas River and the Schelde, 6 November 1918; Commander 7-3 Regiment Field Artillery, “Rapport” [Report] 31 October, 7 November 1918, all in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784.
\item SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” pp. 9 - 10, 91A/-; Territorial Commander in Overijssel to Commander-in-Chief, 30 October 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784.
\item SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” p. 12, 91A/-.
\item \textit{Ibid.} p. 10; Garrison Commander Amersfoort to Commander of the New Holland Waterline, the Commander-in-Chief, and Minister of War, 30 October 1918; Garrison Commander Amersfoort to Commander-in-Chief, 31 October 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784; Commander II-5 RI to Commander 3 RI, 31 October 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 351.
\item SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” p. 11, 91A/-; Commander II-5 RI to Commander-in-Chief, 1 November 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784.
\item SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” pp. 11 - 12, 91A/-; Commander Regiment Field Artillery, “Rapport” 31 October 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784; Commander VII IB to Commander Division IV, 1 November 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 351.
\item SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” p. 11, 91A/-.
\item \textit{Ibid.} p. 12.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
above involved revolutionary intentions. Soldiers everywhere were fed up with the mobilisation, tired of inadequate provisioning, and annoyed at the further reduction of their freedoms. As A. M. de Jong, a conscript who published controversial newspaper columns about his mobilisation experiences, explained:

All bottled-up suffering, all uncommunicated grievances, all indignities, all humiliation broke lose all of a sudden in places where they had flourished ... Those who knew no better believed that the Dutch army stood at the point of immediate revolution. It was not so, but the military authorities were nonetheless pale from shock of this unexpected, mass resistance.24

The entire Army was not on the point of chaos and disarray, most of the incidents were isolated and unrelated, and many thousands of conscripts throughout the country did not revolt, mutiny or even complain.

In many respects, what happened at Harskamp in 1918 can be likened to the Utrecht riots in 1915.25 On both occasions, troops used violence as a means of demonstrating their displeasure. They had reached the end of their tether. In the end, High Command dealt with the two incidents similarly. Like 34 and 36 LWI, which moved out of Utrecht (poignantly enough to Harskamp) in 1915, 1 Regiment Infantry (RI), stationed in Harskamp and responsible for most of the disturbances on 25 and 26 October 1918, swapped residence with 9 RI in Ede.26 Ede was situated close to the border, where troop morale was generally better than further inland. Perhaps patrols, apprehending smugglers and guarding against other neutrality infringements heightened a sense of duty and self-worth among soldiers. At any rate, High Command hoped the move would ease some of the problems in 1 RI, especially since they had requested the transfer in the first place.

Even the grievances in 1915 and 1918 were similar. However, the problems were easier to rectify during the first outbursts than the second. The major complaint in 1918 - lack of provisions - was difficult to remedy, since little could be done until supplies of foodstuffs improved, an unlikely prospect while the war continued. Nevertheless, High

24 "Alle opgekropt leed, alle verbeten grieven, alle smaad, alle onrecht, alle vernederings braken plotseling naar buiten op plaatsen waar ze het wellicht gewoekerd hadden.... Wie niet beter wist, meende dat het Nederlandse leger plotseling op het punt stond een regelrechte revolutie te beginnen. Zo was het niet, maar de militaire bevelhebbers werden niettemin bleek van schrik bij het onbekende, massale verzet" (Jong, Frank van Wezels Roemruchte Jaren (1928) p. 415).

25 For which, see: Chapter 11, pp. 384 - 386.

26 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 27 October 1918; Commander of the Field Army to Commanders of Divisions II and III, 30 October 1918, both in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784; Berg, Cornelis Jacobus Snijders p. 112.
Command increased rations where possible. De Jonge described what happened in his battalion in the aftermath of Harskamp:

the commanding major came to check the spuds himself ... he spent a whole day in the kitchen leering at everything ... we've never had such a fine meal as that day

He also described how the “new course” fared in the armed forces, based on consultation rather than blind orders, everything in fact to avoid further problems with discipline and morale. At the same time, while leave conditions could be improved in 1915 through the landstorm laws and extraordinary leave provisions, this was not so easy in October 1918. Nevertheless, the government was keen to reinstate ordinary leave as soon as possible, although, as we shall see, Snijders was more reluctant.

While soldiers’ grievances may have been similar in 1915 and 1918, the atmosphere in which they were aired differed entirely. In 1915, people feared neither social anarchy nor all-out revolt. The war had not yet impacted greatly on the country. In fact, the riots, when they were reported, seemed to reinforce general public opinion about the inappropriateness of a full-scale mobilisation. The military was seen as a burdensome evil. By 1918, not only had Russia succumbed to a violent revolution - the news of Tsar Nicholas’ assassination reached the world in July - but other bastions of military power and monarchical rule were on the verge of crumbling to similar pressures. In this context, rebellions in the Dutch Army took on entirely new meanings, and were seen all too readily as signals of revolution. The military now was not only a burdensome evil, but a dangerous one at that.

It is not surprising that both the High Command and government were desperate to uncover the causes of the riots and ways to avoid further outbreaks. The drive for explanations and solutions resulted in two instances of rising tension and conflict between

[28] “Bij ons bateljon kwam de grootmajoor zelf de piepers bekijken ... is-t-ie een hele dag in de keuken geweest om alles af te loeren .... We hadden nog nooit zo'n fijne pottazie [sic] as that day” (Jong, Notities van een landstormman p. 268).
[29] Ibid. pp. 278, 300 - 301.
the cabinet and Snijders. The first related to the issue of leave. Snijders was far from keen to reinstate normal leave so quickly after having removed it on 23 October. He thought conscripts would interpret it as giving in to their demands, and thereby legitimising future riots. Yet on 31 October, he nonetheless conceded, granting leave to all regiments except those involved in any of the riotous outbreaks, and rationalising the move in terms of the likelihood of an armistice being signed before long.\textsuperscript{31} Politicians, especially from the SDAP benches, widely criticised his decision to deny leave to regiments involved in the riots.

Continued pressure from the government to punish only the instigators of the troublesome events, forced Snijders to capitulate again on 5 November.\textsuperscript{32}

The second area of conflict involved the scope of investigations into the riots. Already on 27 October, Snijders decided to send investigators to Harskamp,\textsuperscript{33} who reported back six days later.\textsuperscript{34} The government was not content to leave the matter to the military (which it had done in previous cases) and launched its own commission of enquiry, to discover whether “our troops are sufficiently trustworthy and in control of their commanders, … [and able] … to co-operate in the defence of our territory and the maintenance of neutrality”.\textsuperscript{35} Snijders was not unduly concerned about the decision, but was annoyed to find out about it through the newspapers, and decidedly livid about the appointment of former Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, as chief commissioner.\textsuperscript{36} De Jonge had been at the heart of Snijders’ problems with the previous cabinet in April 1918, and there was little love lost between the two men.\textsuperscript{37} He felt that the new government must have little respect for his position, let alone for his public persona, if it was willing to attract

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{31}] Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 30 October 1918, Commander-in-Chief to all Army and Navy authorities, 31 October 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 698.
\item[\textsuperscript{32}] Commander-in-Chief to all Army authorities, 5 November 1918, ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 698. For further details of the leave situation in the wake of Harskamp see: Berg, \textit{Corinellis Jacobus Snijders} pp. 112 - 114.
\item[\textsuperscript{33}] Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 27 October 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 325.
\item[\textsuperscript{34}] “Rapport van de Commissie tot onderzoek van de ongeregeldheden in de Legerplaats bij Harskamp, ingesteld ingevolge aanschrijving van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht van 27 October 1918, Afd. G. S. No. 20827 Geheim” 2 November 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
\item[\textsuperscript{35}] “[O]f onze troepen nog wel voldoende betrouwbaar en in de hand hunner aanvoerders zijn, … [en bereid zijn] … tot verdediging van ons grondgebied en tot handhaving der neutraliteit” (Minister of War, 4 November 1918, in SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” p. 2, 91A/–).
\item[\textsuperscript{36}] Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 4 November 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
\item[\textsuperscript{37}] See: pp. 410 – 421 below.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
attention to his relationship with de Jonge again. In the end, the urgency behind the
government report was removed by the Armistice. What the reinstatement of leave and
the de Jonge discussions did do was raise the level of mistrust between cabinet ministers
and Snijders at a time when good relations were absolutely essential.

Ultimately, both military and civilian reports on Harskamp highlighted similar
reasons for why the mutiny started: namely, that conscripts were sick of their living
conditions, their isolation in the heaths of the Veluwe, the declining quality of their food,
profiteering by the canteen manager, and the recall of leave. There was also a sense that
they were being punished for the misconduct of previous battalions. Both the Utrecht and
Apeldoorn rioters had been sent to Harskamp in 1915, and one report claimed the camp had
the reputation and “character of a penal colony” to which High Command sent troublesome
conscripts and officers. The majority of soldiers, therefore, did not appreciate having to
stay there when they had done nothing wrong. Both reports reinforced that there was no
ideological inspiration behind the Harskamp mutiny, nor behind any of the others, although
the commissioners of the government report qualified this by saying that they “nonetheless
considered the infection of bolshevik ideas in the army as a true danger”. The reports also
seriously questioned the handling of the unrest by Harskamp’s officers, including the
Brigade Commander and his deputy. If they had taken more decisive and united action early
on, events might not have escalated beyond their control. Officers’ lack of training,
experience and an inadequate respect fostered among troops were stressed as important
contributing factors. The government report further uncovered highly inadequate and at
times extremely unhygienic living arrangements in barracks throughout the country
and recommended drastic improvements.

38 SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij,
1919” p. 4, 91A/.
39 “Rapport van de Commissie tot onderzoek van de ongeregeldheden in de Legerplaats bij Harskamp, ingesteld
ingevolge aanschrijving van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht van 27 October 1918, Afd. G. S. No.
20827 Geheim” 2 November 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 213.70, inventory no. 5;
SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij,
1919” 91A/.
40 “[K]arakter van een strafkolonie” (in SMG/DC, “Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid
in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij, 1919” p. 18, 91A/).
41 “[N]iettemin besmetting met bolshewistische denkbeelden voor het leger wel degelijk een gevaar acht” (in Ibid. p.
29).
42 Ibid. Appendices 1 - 10, pp. 45 - 61.
The Harskamp mutiny started for seemingly innocuous reasons, but its consequences went far beyond the wildest imaginings of troops involved. It contributed to the resignation of the Commander-in-Chief on 9 November; intensified the anticipation of an outright revolution; raised the hopes for such a revolution in the eyes of even moderate-socialists, such as the SDAP leader, P. J. Troelstra; and reinforced the outright fear of internal anarchy among even the most stalwart members of the Netherlands' conservative ruling elite. Events in Germany and throughout Europe undoubtedly added to this trepidation, until the potential for revolution was seen as a serious possibility. The fact that soldiers in other neutral armies had rebelled after long years of mobilisation may have been lost on the majority of Dutch, and even if they were noticed, it probably would only have deepened the sense of impending crisis.

**Snijders' Resignation**

Throughout the war, the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and the government was ambiguous. Some unflatteringly described Snijders as the Dutch Ludendorff, the German general renowned for his hard-line decisions and using whatever means necessary to achieve military objectives. In dealing with defence and neutrality matters, Snijders was extremely able and knowledgeable, in fact. No problem was too insignificant or small for him. He would involve himself whenever and wherever possible, whether his opinion was requested or not. No aspect of military operations escaped his attention. Perhaps because he was entirely absorbed in the task at hand, he had no time or patience for the dealings of politicians, or qualms about vehemently criticising government policies, especially when he felt they would result in military suicide. He did not appreciate governmental interference in military matters and seemed at times to forget that the cabinet, rather than himself, decided on military policy. His realism and uncompromising approach irked successive Ministers of War, but none more so than B. C. de Jonge in April 1918.

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On 22 April, in the midst of the “sand and gravel” crisis and with the threat of a German declaration of war looming, cabinet ministers met to discuss what approach they should take with regard to Germany.\textsuperscript{45} They requested Snijders’ presence to explain the military implications of a possible German declaration of hostilities. At the meeting, Snijders left the ministers in no doubt that going to war with their neighbour would be disastrous. He explained that the country would be defeated within a few days given that a second mobilisation could not be implemented quickly enough; that Allied help would take too long to arrive; and that through sheer weight of troop numbers and modern equipment the advantage was all on the side of the Germans. Snijders’ pessimism worried some of the ministers, but most viewed his outburst with some understanding given that the general’s wife had recently passed away and he was still in mourning.\textsuperscript{46} They subsequently decided not to accept Germany’s demands in the form they were presented.\textsuperscript{47} Interestingly enough, however, the following day, Snijders discussed the matter with his military commanders and declared that it was highly unlikely that Germany would invade given that there were no signs of troop build-ups on the borders. This situation quickly changed; within 48 hours, Germany moved two army divisions in Ghent closer to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{48}

On 26 April, after the government received word from the Allies that they would agree to a Dutch compromise with Germany, but before the Netherlands communicated this fact to Germany, de Jonge requested Snijders presence to discuss any precautionary measures in case of a German reprisal. During this meeting, the discussion became heated and the Commander-in-Chief told de Jonge that it would be \textit{doelloos} (pointless) to mount resistance against a German invasion, as the Dutch Army would not be able to hold out for long. De Jonge left the meeting stunned, shocked and angry. He felt Snijders was too

\textsuperscript{45} Details of the De Jonge-Snijders crisis were obtained from: Commander-in-Chief, “Nota over den militairen toestand van Nederland” 29 May 1918, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3 (also in ARA, “Geheim verbaal-archief van het ministerie van Oorlog/Defensie” entry no. 2.13.67, inventory no. 328); “Overzicht van het gebeurde in zake de crisis in het defensiebeleid April - Juli 1918” [Overview of what happened with the crisis in defence policy, April - July 1918] in ARA, “Geheim verbaal-archief van het ministerie van Oorlog/Defensie” entry no. 2.13.67, inventory no. 328 (also in ARA, “Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823 – 1977” entry no. 2.02.05.02, inventory no. 906); ARA, “Papieren van jhr mr B. C. de Jonge” [The papers of jhr mr B. C. de Jonge] entry no. 2.21.095, inventory no. 47; Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel pp. 18 - 21; Wal (ed.), Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge pp. 40 - 48.


\textsuperscript{47} For more on the sand and gravel crisis, see: Chapter 6, pp. 224 - 229.

\textsuperscript{48} For which, see: Chapter 6, p. 228.
defeatist, and feared that Snijders' known pro-German attitude influenced how he saw the situation. De Jonge decided he could not work with the Commander-in-Chief if the latter continued to have diverging ideas about the value and necessity of defence from himself. The next day the so-called "sand and gravel crisis" was effectively solved when Germany accepted the Netherlands' compromise. But de Jonge could not let Snijders' comments lie.

In the following days, de Jonge talked the matter over with other high-ranking military officials. Of the six officers, only Lieutenant-General Pop shared Snijders' pessimism regarding a possible military altercation with Germany. The others were more circumspect, while only Colonel van der Voort Maarschalk and General-Major Burger expressed some optimism about Dutch defensive capabilities. From these responses, de Jonge drew the conclusion that Burger would be an appropriate replacement for Snijders and one he could work with. He subsequently presented a report to his colleagues on 8 May, explaining why he had lost confidence in the present Commander-in-Chief. On 13 May, seven of the eight cabinet members supported de Jonge and declared that Snijders had to go or else they would resign. Only the Prime Minister, Cort van der Linden, disagreed. That most of the ministers rallied behind de Jonge was not surprising given the problems between Snijders and the government in the past. There was little love lost between the two camps. What is extraordinary is that at this stage no one considered obtaining Snijders' point of view on the meeting of 26 April. Instead, Cort van der Linden asked his colleagues to reconsider their position as both the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief or their own resignations were politically untenable less than two months out from an election.

The Minister President discussed the matter with the Queen soon thereafter. Wilhelmina made it clear that she stood behind Snijders, in whom she saw an able military leader who did what was necessary rather than what was expected, and she would not accept his dismissal or resignation. If this meant that seven cabinet members had to resign, so be it. Never one to mince words and using a favourite Dutch expression, she gleefully declared that "journeying men should not be held up". Wilhelmina had become decidedly frustrated with the lacklustre performance of her ministers and was especially critical of

49 Including the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Pop, Second Chief of Staff, General-Major Burger, Commander of the New Holland Waterline, Colonel van der Voort Maarschalk, Commander of the Naarden Group, Colonel Fabius, and the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant-General van Terwisga.
50 "[D]at men reizende heeren niet moest ophouden" (according to B. C. de Jonge, in Wal (ed.), Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge p. 44).
their response to the Allied requisitioning of Dutch ships and the lack of progress on the convoy issue. She repeated her position on Snijders to de Jonge himself two days later. This placed the cabinet in an extremely awkward position as Wilhelmina’s unconstitutional stance could only result in the resignation of seven ministers. In the end, they decided to ask for a report from Snijders before making the crisis public.

It took until 29 May for Snijders to respond to de Jonge’s claims, and only then after a polite reminder from Cort van der Linden.\(^{51}\) The 32 pages of Snijders’ report were thorough.\(^{52}\) He explained that he used the word *doelloos* not in the sense that there was no point in defying a German attack, but rather that *doelloos* had to be understood in the sense of *vruchteloos* (fruitless): “In no case can I have meant that the institution of our national defence was ‘pointless’”.\(^{53}\) He again stressed that resistance would be ineffectual in the long term for purely logistical reasons: the Netherlands did not have the troop numbers to counter what Germany could muster; it was not well-equipped and could not cope with a possible invasion from the east and south. Its dilemma was one of a small nation facing the might of a large and ever-modernising military state. To have any chance of success, it would need serious material assistance from the Allies, and Snijders believed it extremely unlikely that this would arrive in time. Interestingly enough, as Paul Moeyes has pointed out, accepting foreign help as part of its defence strategy actually deviated from official government policy at the time.\(^{54}\) In this sense, Snijders advocated something that was highly controversial. It was not, however, alien to Snijders, who had previously instructed his commanders in January 1918 that if outsiders offered help in a conflict involving the Dutch, then it was to be accepted unless he ordered otherwise.\(^{55}\) Officially, of course, any military transgressions by foreigners were to be forcefully rejected. While a noble neutrality ideal, Snijders understood that in practical terms, fighting without material support from other states would be impossible.

\(^{51}\) P. W. A. Cort van der Linden to Commander-in-Chief, 28 May 1918, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3 (also in ARA, “Geheim verbaal-archief van het ministerie van Oorlog/Defensie” entry no. 2.13.67, inventory no. 328).

\(^{52}\) Commander-in-Chief, “Nota over den militairen toestand van Nederland”, 29 May 1918, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3. All Snijders’ commentary that follows comes out of this report.

\(^{53}\) “In geen geval kan ik hebben bedoeld het instituut onzer landsverdediging ‘doelloos’ te noemen.” (Ibid. p. 19).

\(^{54}\) Moeyes, Buiten Schot p. 321.

\(^{55}\) Commander-in-Chief, “‘Bijzondere instructie voor den Commandant der Stelling van de Monden der Maas en der Schelde, voor zooveel het Commando Zeeland betreft’ [Extraordinary instructions for the Commander of the Fortified Position of the Mouths of the Maas and Schelde Rivers, as far as they apply to the Command of Zeeland] 9 January 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
Snijder's report of 29 May also explicated that unlike a war with Germany, entering into a conflict against the Allies would be far more likely to succeed, again for purely logistical reasons. The Allies could only come from one direction and from the sea at that. They would have grave difficulty in maintaining supply, while the Netherlands could get aid quickly overland from Germany. That entering a war against the Allies was militarily-speaking more advantageous, did not mean that Snijders wanted his government to join Germany, to prevent it from joining the Allies, or even to dissuade it from entering into a war with Germany. His task was not to influence decisions of that magnitude; in fact, he understood that sometimes such decisions had to be taken regardless of the likely consequences. Rather, his role was to make sure the government understood the possible military outcomes and implications of its decisions, whether they were positive or negative. He had to be realistic and give them the full picture. This is what he tried to do in both the cabinet meeting on 22 April and the subsequent meeting with the Minister of War four days later.

Snijders further qualified his opinion with statements of support from Lieutenant-Generals Pop and van Terwisga, two of the high-ranking military officers with whom de Jonge had conferred. He also quoted documents from the Dutch military attache in Berlin, who thought Germany would defeat the Netherlands quickly, if it had a chance to do so, and that the Allies would be unable to send help. While many in The Hague assumed the attache had developed pro-German sympathies, the latter stressed this was not the case and that he too was only trying to warn them of likely scenarios. It was a clear rebuke to claims, which must have been doing the rounds within government circles, that Snijders had forsaken strict neutrality for support of the German camp.

A little over a week after Snijders' report, de Jonge sent another note to his cabinet colleagues, explaining that while he appreciated Snijders explanations, it did not change his position on the Commander-in-Chief, nor did it convince him that Snijders' position in April had been anything other than defeatist. Nevertheless, given the difficult political circumstances, de Jonge would not resign as Minister of War even though it would be burdensome having to deal with a commander who saw defence of the country as

56 Commander-in-Chief, “Nota over den militairen toestand van Nederland”, 29 May 1918, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3. All Snijders’ commentary that follows comes out of this report.
57 Ibid.
pointless. Snijders now handed in his own resignation. Wilhelmina personally asked the Commander-in-Chief to retract his resignation since she would not accept it. He subsequently did so. De Jonge and Snijders worked together, albeit begrudgingly and with only outward cordiality, until the next cabinet and a new Minister of War were sworn in on 9 September.

What happened during the meeting of 26 April must be seen within the highly tense situation the country faced at the time and as part of the series of war crises in the preceding years. The threat of war was real as both Snijders and de Jonge knew all too well. Snijders’ outburst that day would have been forceful, overwhelming, and in parts incongruous with the official position of the military, namely to maintain neutrality and defend against violations until the last soldier. It would have been the last thing de Jonge wanted and expected to hear. Certainly, de Jonge and other ministers believed Snijders was adopting a pro-German stance, so much so, in fact, that the next Minister of War, G. A. A. Alting von Geusau, referred to this possibility in a later analysis of the situation. No doubt de Jonge feared that Snijders’ pessimism would force a change in the Netherlands’ official neutrality position. Perhaps this is why de Jonge latched onto the word doelloos and used it to launch a crusade against the Commander-in-Chief. At one stage, he even claimed that he was perplexed because Snijders had not given him any previous indication of his gloomy outlook. Yet this was not entirely the case. Snijders never made a secret of the fact that the armed forces were not ready to win a war or even hold out for long when invaded. As early as June 1915, he told Bosboom: “Nobody will dispute that our army is too weak for a

58 Minister of War, “Nota aan den Ministerraad” [Note to the cabinet] 8 June 1918, in ARA, “Geheim verbaal-archief van het ministerie van Oorlog/Defensie” entry no. 2.13.67, inventory no. 328 (also in SMG/DC, “Afschrift stamboek officieren” SJ - SII, 397/SII).
59 Fasseur, Wilhelmina p. 525.
60 For which, see: Chapter 6, pp. 224 - 229.
61 “Beschouwingen van den Minister van Oorlog Jhr Alting von Geusau aan den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht ter hand gesteld op 26 September 1918” [Views of the Minister of War, Jhr Alting von Geusau given to the Commander-in-Chief on 26 September 1918] in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.
63 “Nota, door den Minister van Oorlog Jhr de Jonge achtergelaten bij zijn aftreden” [Note left behind by the Minister of War Jhr de Jonge at the end of his period in office] 11 July 1918, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3 (also in ARA, “Geheim verbaal-archief van het ministerie van Oorlog/Defensie en daarbij gedeponeerde bescheiden 1813 - 1844, 1905 - 1945” entry no. 2.13.67, inventory no. 328, and in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5).
powerful and long-lasting defence against a serious attack".\textsuperscript{64} Even in a note to de Jonge in March 1918, a little over a month before the meeting in question, Snijders had warned that "in present circumstances, our armed force is unable to offer resistance to an attack of any significance" and that "during an unexpected entry of a serious incident, through which our neutrality is actually breached, I will not be able ... to generate sufficient strength."\textsuperscript{65}

Snijders was not defeatist, but he was a realist. At no stage did he ever abandon defence, neutrality or his troops. He did everything necessary to ensure his country was as secure as possible, a duty he took very seriously. The mere fact that Snijders was so outspoken about the problems of the Army and Navy highlights how aware he was of inadequacies and how urgently they needed to be rectified. That de Jonge and other ministers overlooked this probably says more about their strained relationship with Snijders than anything else. They had genuine problems with him: he did not always follow instructions, acted as autonomously as possible, and was blunt and resolute in expressing opinions. Nevertheless, during the exchange with de Jonge on 26 April, Snijders did not say anything new. What he said was certainly expressed more forcefully than usual, perhaps too forcefully, but essentially it did not deviate from previous communications.

It must not be forgotten, that everything in March, April and early May pointed to a German victory on the Western Front, and this would have been in the forefront of Snijders’ mind. That the Allies had to focus all their resources there underlay Snijders’ assertion that they would take much longer to come to the Netherlands’ aid if that proved necessary. It was also true that any support could only come from overseas, which would be an arduous, difficult and time-consuming process. Yet Snijders’ analysis had one major flaw: like the Allies, Germany was also overstretched in its fighting commitments. Despite Snijders’ assertions that Germany could easily spare between 20 to 25 divisions for a

\textsuperscript{64} "Het zal wel door niemand worden betwist, dat onze landmacht te zwak is voor eene krachtige en langdurige verdediging tegen een ernstigen aanval." (Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 25 June 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 293).

campaign on its north-western border, this simply was not the case.\textsuperscript{66} If Germany had been able to invade the Netherlands, it would have moved more than two divisions towards the Dutch border, as it did in late April. With the benefit of hindsight, historians can now see that the spring offensives were Germany’s last gasp.\textsuperscript{67} It flung everything it had against the front in Belgium and Northern France. It did not have any resources to divert elsewhere and, in the end, what it had was far from enough to ensure a decisive breakthrough. But for Snijders this was not evident; all he saw was that if Germany went to war with the Netherlands and freed up enough resources, which in theory it could, then the Dutch would lose. In this context, there is much to be said for Hubert van Tuyll’s interpretation of Snijders’ outbursts in 1918:

> What did apparently overstress him [Snijders] by 1918 was the realization that his job was impossible. He had a weak army and could form no alliances, yet had to be ready to wage war against a great power.\textsuperscript{68}  

The conflict between de Jonge and Snijders was not the only resignation crisis to face the government in the wake of international pressures. On 26 June, Rambonnet tendered his own, in disgust at the lack of progress on the convoy issue.\textsuperscript{69} He was frustrated with his cabinet colleagues who accepted British bully and delay tactics, which stalled the sailing of the convoy week by week. Like she had done for Snijders, the Queen stood by Rambonnet and was reluctant to allow him to quit. Nevertheless, she made her feelings known by promptly appointing Rambonnet as her personal adjutant and informing the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, John Loudon, that she thought him spineless and cowardly. This incident, like that involving with Snijders, only indicated how stressed and strung-out cabinet ministers were and how the strains of war had taken their toll. Perhaps it was fortuitous that a new government was elected a few weeks later.\textsuperscript{70}  

Even after a new cabinet came to power in September 1918, the legacy of the conflict between de Jonge and Snijders festered. De Jonge left a full report of his lack of

\textsuperscript{66} Commander-in-Chief, “Nota over den militairen toestand van Nederland”, 29 May 1918, p. 10, fn 1, in SMG/DC, “Mobilisatieverslag” 91A/3.  
\textsuperscript{68} Tuyll, \textit{The Netherlands and World War I} p. 114.  
\textsuperscript{69} J. Bosmans, “De kroon aan het werk. De overgang van het kabinet-Cort van der Linden naar het kabinet-Ruys de Beerenbrouck (Maart - November 1918)” [The crown at work. The transfer from Cort van der Linden's cabinet to Ruys de Beerenbrouck's cabinet (March - November 1918)] in Schuursma (ed.), \textit{14 - 18 Volume 10}, pp. 1807 - 1808; Fasseur, \textit{Wilhelmina} p. 527.  
\textsuperscript{70} In July 1918. For more on the election, see: Bosmans, “De kroon aan het werk”.  
confidence in the Commander-in-Chief for his successor, Alting von Geusau, in which he not only revisited the April affair but also highlighted other areas of concern. 71 While Alting von Geusau was more judicious in his opinions of Snijders, he was not exactly supportive of him either. The correspondence in September and early October strained the relationship between High Command and the new government further. When Snijders found out about and then read de Jonge's allegations, he was enraged. He approached Alting von Geusau on the matter early in October 1918, expressing contempt at the devious manner in which de Jonge handled the matter. 72 He also emphasised that the former Minister of War never discussed any of his accusations with him personally, and that many were based on untruths. He systematically addressed each allegation, offered his opinion, and hoped that Alting von Geusau and the rest of the cabinet would make their own minds up about the affair.

The high level of indignation Snijder expressed after the appointment of de Jonge as head of the commission of enquiry into the Harskamp mutiny is, therefore, not surprising. 73 For Snijders, it was another incident of unwelcome interference by Ruys de Beerenbrouck's government. Earlier conflicts arose when Alting von Geusau suggested overhauling the Commander-in-Chief's instructions of office. The problems between Snijders and the crown could be solved more easily, so the minister argued, if the Commander-in-Chief was responsible only to him and the Minister in Charge of the Navy. Snijders did not agree, citing similar reasons as in 1914, including that his responsibility was to the entire state and not to one civilian minister, that his position would in fact become superfluous, and that the Minister of War would become the de facto Commander-in-Chief. 74 Perhaps, this was exactly what the government wanted, namely to remove the

71 "Nota, door den Minister van Oorlog Jhr de Jonge achtergelaten bij zijn aftreden" 11 July 1918, in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3.
72 See: "Beschouwingen van den Minister van Oorlog Jhr Alting van Geusau aan den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht ter hand gesteld op 26 September 1918"; Commander-in-Chief, "Nota ter beantwoording van de Nota dd. 11 Juli 1918, door den toenmaligen Minister van Oorlog Jhr. de Jonge gericht aan den Raad van Ministers" [Note in response to the note of 11 July 1918 by the then Minister of War Jhr de Jonge to the cabinet] 3 October 1918, both in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3. Snijders thought de Jonge had addressed his note to the cabinet; in fact, it was addressed only to the new Minister of War (Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 21 October 1918, in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3).
73 See: above.
74 Commander-in-Chief reply to "Bespreking met den Opperbevelhebber", 26 September 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
autonomy enjoyed by Snijders. The issue was not resolved while Snijders held office but would also feature in the enquiry of the de Jonge team.  

The circumstances surrounding Snijders resignation are sketchy. What is known is that on 5 November, Troelstra, in his speech to parliament, demanded that the Commander-in-Chief be dismissed since he had lost the faith of his troops and his country. In his reply to Troelstra, Alting von Geusau supported Snijders wholeheartedly. The next day, however, the Minister of War declared that the government did not believe Snijders was the right person to lead the armed forces in its “new direction”, a term he left undefined. It seemed that the concerns raised by Troelstra, mixed with the fear of heightened unrest among troops, convinced the Minister of War that Snijders was a liability. Later, Troelstra would claim that his parliamentary speech had been the deciding blow for Snijders. 78 It is more likely, however, that Alting von Geusau’s many conflicts with the Commander-in-Chief in previous weeks, especially over how to handle the Harskamp situation, had decisive effect. He felt safe in making the declaration on 6 November since Snijders had offered to resign earlier that day during a heated altercation about de Jonge’s appointment. But Alting von Geusau had not conferred with the rest of the cabinet. In fact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, H. A. van Karnebeek, criticised the Minister of War when the issue finally came up for discussion on 8 November. He disapproved of the lack of consultation and believed the decision was not even binding, since it was not up to the Minister of War whether Snijders was allowed to resign or not. In the end, nothing much could be done. Alting von Geusau forced the government’s hand by announcing Snijders’ departure in parliament.

Faced with Snijders’ resignation for the second time that year, the Queen now had little choice but to accept it, however unwillingly. After a request from Alting von Geusau, Lieutenant-General van Terwisga, the Commander of the Field Army, also handed in his resignation, which came into effect on 16 December 1918. On 11 November, as the

77 Ibid. pp. 128 - 129.
78 Troelstra, Gedenkschriften. Vierde Deel.Storm p. 177.
79 Commander-in-Chief to Queen Wilhelmina, 6 November 1918, in SMG/DC, “Afschrift stamboek officieren” SJ - SII, 397/SII; Scheffer, November 1918 p. 22.
80 Royal Decree, no. 10, 9 November 1918, in SMG/DC, “Afschrift stamboek officieren” SJ - SII, 397/SII.
81 Berg, Cornelis Jacobus Snijders p. 118; Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 249.
belligerent powers signed the armistice bringing the Great War to a close, the cabinet appointed Lieutenant-General W. F. Pop as acting Commander-in-Chief.\textsuperscript{82} Ironically enough, Pop had been as critical of his country’s chances of withstanding a German invasion as Snijders, but this was of little concern now that this neutrality threat had passed.

Snijders was, without doubt, one of the most able military leaders in modern Dutch history. He played a pivotal role in setting up the Netherlands’ first military air service in 1913 and in modernising the Army. He continued to be actively involved in military affairs after his resignation. The nation’s newspapers paid a considerable amount of attention to his death in May 1939, and the Queen even laid a wreath at the monument in Scheveningen acknowledging Snijders for all his wartime work.\textsuperscript{83} But Snijders’ later career was not without controversy. His involvement in far-right nationalist politics in the 1930s raised many eyebrows and further reinforced his pro-German reputation in historical accounts of the war period. His own historical writings on the origins of the war, written during the interbellum, definitely supported Germany’s case.\textsuperscript{84}

Yet there is very little evidence to suggest that a pro-German bias affected Snijders’ work as Commander-in-Chief. He respected German military traditions, spent much time in Germany before the war, and is known to have met with a German military attaché in 1915, at which time he expressed his admiration for Germany’s position. The attaché described Snijders as follows:

\begin{quote}
He showed to me again how German-friendly in heart this man is, in spite of all the reserve that he, as a good Dutch person in such a priority position, initially creates.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, as this quote also suggests, Snijders was nothing but professional in discharging his role as head of the armed forces. In considering neutrality issues, he was not

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\textsuperscript{83} See: Het Vaderland. Sunday 28 May 1939, front page, and also other newspaper clippings in SMG/DC, “Snijders, Cornelis Jacobus 29.9.52” 397/S.

\textsuperscript{84} Olthof, “Contemporaine geschiedbeoefening in Nederland” pp. 373 - 375.

\textsuperscript{85} “Sie zeigte mir wiederom, wie deutschfreundlich im Herzen dieser Mann ist trotz aller Zurückhaltung, die er sich als guter Holländer in so hervorrangender Stellung anfänglich auferlegt” (German military attaché in The Hague, Martin Renner, “Holländischer Bericht” 11 December 1915, in ARA, ”Fotokopieen van stukken betreffende Nederland uit archieven van het Duitse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1866 - 1919” [Photocopies of pieces regarding the Netherlands from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1866 - 1919] archive no. 2.05.16, inventory no. 5).
predisposed towards any one warring side. He was extremely realistic in his estimation of the possible threats to the country and did everything possible within his power to ensure the armed forces were ready to face an invasion, whether it was to come from the east, the west or the south.

KAISER WILHELM SEEKS A NEW HOME

On 9 November, the same day that Snijders departed as “all-highest” military commander in the Netherlands, the advisors of Germany’s “All Highest”, Kaiser Wilhelm II, persuaded him to abdicate and flee to the relative safety of neutral territory. Although entirely reluctant to take this advice, which he had been receiving for several weeks, the Kaiser had little choice; he faced a hopeless situation. His people were in uproar. After the Kiel mutiny he could no longer rely on the loyalty of his navy personnel, and the army, which was still fighting the Allied onslaught in Belgium, was on the point of internal collapse. 86 Travelling by train from the Belgian town of Spa, where the royal entourage had stationed themselves for the last few weeks, Wilhelm II travelled towards the Dutch border post of Eijsden in the early hours of 10 November. Around 7 o’clock in the morning, the royal convoy arrived at Eijsden where a bemused border guard refused them entry into the country, phoned his superior in Maastricht and awaited further instructions. Once the Commander of Maastricht reached Eijsden he allowed the Kaiser entry to the station and thereby into the country.

News of the Kaiser’s arrival created havoc in The Hague. Historians are divided about whether some high-ranking individuals, such as the Queen and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, van Karnebeek, knew of the Kaiser’s coming well before he reached the border. 87 The reasons behind a visit by one of Wilhelmina’s adjutants, J. B. Heutsz, to Spa on 8 and 9 November, for example, have never been adequately explained, although the visit had been planned many months earlier and the aide-de camp involved claimed

87 For claims and arguments that van Karnebeek and Wilhelmina must have known about the Kaiser’s coming see: Scheffer, November 1918 pp. 6 - 7, 267 - 272; Ashton et. al., “‘Hang the Kaiser!’” pp. 75 - 76 (especially fn 2); Hazewinkel, “De Keizer vlucht” pp. 1654 - 1655. For claims and arguments to the contrary see: Sally Marks, “‘My Name is Ozymandias’” pp. 122 - 124; Fasseur, Wilhelmina pp. 552 - 554. For details of the Kaiser’s flight, subsequent stay in the Netherlands and problems caused for the Netherlands, see; the excellent study by Sally Marks, (“‘My Name is Ozymandias’”). See also: Palmer, The Kaiser pp. 208 - 227; Giles MacDonogh, The Last Kaiser. William the Impetuous. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000, pp. 414 - 445; Roodt, Oorlogsgasten pp. 353 - 369; Weekendstroo, “De internering van Keizer” pp. 22 - 23.
complete innocence afterwards. Likewise, van Heutsz’s call on the Dutch Minister in Brussels, M. W. R. van Vollenhoven, early on 9 November is also suggestive. Later that night, on receiving official word of the Kaiser’s decision to seek sanctuary in the Netherlands from the German delegation, van Vollenhoven contacted The Hague and military authorities in Eijsden, instructing the latter to let the German visitors into the country. All three messages arrived after the Kaiser had reached the border, but what remains questionable is whether van Vollenhoven could have told the Eijsden authorities to let the Kaiser through without authorisation from The Hague. It seems to indicate some degree of foreknowledge or prior agreement by his government, or at the very least, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet no documentation exists to verify this interpretation and other historians, quite rightly, have pointed out many reasons why neither van Karnebeek nor Wilhelmina could have known. For one, the Kaiser himself did not make a final decision until late afternoon on 9 November, so whatever plans could have been made in the Netherlands were never going to be definite. Secondly, as Cees Fasseur suggested, the Queen saw the duty of monarchs to stand and fall beside their people and viewed abdication with abhorrence; Wilhelm II’s flight was not something she could have wished for, prepared for, or wanted.

At any rate, whether Wilhelmina or van Karnebeek knew in advance was irrelevant once the Kaiser crossed the border. The head of government, Ruys van Beerenbrouck, and most cabinet ministers certainly had no foreknowledge of his arrival, and they were responsible for deciding what to do with their highly-ranked guest. There were no established precedents to follow. In the end, the Kaiser was admitted as a private citizen with the same rights as any other refugee. The government found him lodgings in Amerongen with a family of noble blood who had links with both Germany and Great Britain. The Crown Prince of Prussia, however, was not as fortunate as his father when he arrived in the Netherlands two days later. As a military commander, Dutch neutrality

89 Marks, “My Name is Ozymandias” pp. 123 - 124.
90 Fasseur, Wilhelmina pp. 553 - 554.
regulations stipulated he had to be interned. Ultimately, he remained under military guard on the almost deserted island of Wielingen for five years. Yet it seems a little incongruous to intern one member of the imperial family but not the other. After all, Wilhelm II had only abdicated as Kaiser of the German realm. He held steadfastly on to his title as King of Prussia (until 28 November when he reneged any claims to that throne as well) and remained, at least officially, the Supreme Commander of Germany’s armed forces.

Troelstra did not exaggerate when he recalled in his memoirs that: “No other event made such a huge impact in our country” as the arrival of the Kaiser. Thousands of people lined the railway route from Eijsden to Amerongen on 12 November as the imperial train passed. Throughout the south, the Kaiser was booed and jeered and many in Amerongen were not pleased with his presence. On the whole, the population had little sympathy for the man they held responsible for the horrors of war in nearby Belgium. Elsewhere in the country, the abdication was seen with ominous overtones, signalling the end of monarchical rule in Germany and the success of a socialist revolution there. Many feared and others hoped that it would not take long for the Netherlands to follow a similar path. The Kaiser made the storms of revolt thundering in eastern and central Europe approach uncomfortably close.

For the Dutch government, the Kaiser’s presence created numerous problems. Now that the war was all but over, it had to take into account the wishes of the victors. The Allies repeatedly demanded the Netherlands hand over the Kaiser to face trial for his role in the outbreak of war and for alleged crimes against humanity committed by German troops. Time after time, the Dutch government refused. It genuinely feared Allied retribution for the refusals, which made its negotiation position extremely difficult at Versailles when the issue of the transfer of two Dutch provinces (Zeeland and Limburg) to Belgium arose. On

93 “Geen andere gebeurtenis heeft in ons land een zoo grooten indruk gemaakt” (Troelstra, Gedenkschriften. Vierde Deel. Storm p. 187). Along with the Armistice and Snijders’ resignation, the arrival of the Kaiser made front-page news. A whole issue of the illustrated magazine Het Leven Geillustreerd was dedicated to the event (vol. 13, no. 47, Tuesday 19 November 1918).
95 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands pp. 184 - 185.
96 Bossenbroek et. al., Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 71.
several occasions between November 1918 and February 1920, the government requested that the Kaiser find an alternative home and his retinue made elaborate plans to escape overseas or back to Germany. In the end, Allied pressure subsided, to some degree because of Dutch refusals to free him but also because of more pressing issues stemming from the Treaty of Versailles. Wilhelm II lived out his days in the Netherlands, rarely left the house he bought in 1919 at Doorn, and died there in 1941.  

A MISGUIDED ATTEMPT AT REVOLUTION  

Among the tension and strife created by the Harskamp uprising, Snijders’ resignation, the Kaiser’s arrival and rumours of revolution, the Armistice agreement, signed on 11 November 1918, came none too soon for the Netherlands. Amidst all these other emotive events, however, the Armistice declaration lost much of its possible impact. On the whole, the Dutch did not greet the news with elation or celebration. Times were too uncertain, although muted festivities were held that afternoon in Groningen, Deventer, Zutphen, Maastricht, Gouda and The Hague. People were definitely pleased the war had come to an end, but they believed that the cessation of hostilities had come too late. They feared that Europe and, more importantly, the Netherlands, would be changed ineradicably by internal strife developing out of wartime problems. Many of their anxieties, at least for the future of the nation, would prove unfounded. The population was not on the point of revolution as Troelstra expected; in fact, the “revolutionary days” could be better described as a victory for anti-revolutionary forces. But this must not detract from the pandemonium reigning during November 1918, and the general expectation (in and outside the Netherlands) of the imminent overthrow of established order there.

On Tuesday 12 November, Troelstra made a damning hour-long speech in parliament. It was clear, he argued, that the time had come for the Netherlands to do away

98 Scheffer, November 1918 p. 88.
with the old vestiges of monarchy, capitalism and hierarchical rule; that the working classes should seize control, if need be by violent means; that the Netherlands was ready to follow the path of Germany and Russia; that revolution was nigh. The leader of the SDAP had good reason to grab hold of this opportunity. To him all the signs for revolution were visible: the army had mutinied, like those in Kiel and Petrograd before the German and Russian revolutions; the people were dissatisfied; Snijders had resigned after Troelstra’s criticism of him; the Kaiser had fled; and Europe was in disarray. Equally important, Troelstra was not alone in thinking the Netherlands would fall victim to the revolutionary spirit. The mayor of Rotterdam, A. R. Zimmermann, offered the keys to the city to Troelstra’s supporters on 9 November. Shortly after, the SDAP and its affiliations articulated their demands in a manifesto of 15 points, which called, among other things, for complete demobilisation, universal women’s suffrage, removal of the Upper House of parliament, an end to the housing shortage, state control over the distribution of goods, state pensions, unemployment benefits, eight-hour work days and increased pay rates.101

Although the timing of Troelstra’s revolutionary declaration on 12 November was a surprise to many, his message was not. In fact, as early as 8 November, the government decided to transfer one-half of all stockpiled military supplies for distribution among civilians, increasing the bread ration from 200 to 280 grammes, which was higher than it had been for over a year. 102 It also announced the partial demobilisation of several regiments.103 Both decisions were possible because an armistice was expected, but they were also necessary to placate troops and civilians. After Troelstra’s speech, the government also requested help from Great Britain, who promised to send food to the Netherlands, on the condition it remained a stable state; otherwise, it threatened to extend its blockade of the neutral nation if radical groups succeeded in overthrowing the
government. It was Britain’s way of helping prevent a revolution, which even there, many deemed a likely possibility. The Dutch cabinet also published a proclamation on 13 November, requesting the support of all citizens and explaining the measures it had put in place to relieve some of the stresses on the economy.

Anti-revolutionary movements also began preparing on 8 November for what they saw as an inevitable confrontation. The denominational political parties urged their followers to form guard groups and protect their communities when revolution came. From these humble beginnings, a Bijzondere Vrijwillige Landstorm (Extraordinary Voluntary Landstorm, BV) formed, with government approval, on 13 November. Its membership rose remarkably to tens of thousands of members by the end of November. The military supplied the BV with guns and other weaponry. Army officers were moved from their regular duties to help prepare the units for military tasks. The units set themselves up in important civic buildings, including post offices, telegraph exchanges and city halls, and urged others to join them. Other anti-revolutionaries wrote and distributed all manner of propaganda in the form of leaflets, posters and newspaper articles supporting the monarchy and stability.

The military command took action as well. Most of the population had little faith in the armed forces, a reason why some troops were kept in their barracks and were disarmed from 12 November onwards. Much of the weaponry on the Navy’s ships anchored in Den Helder was removed as well. Commanders hoped to avoid a mutiny on the size and scale of Kiel. Despite widespread lack of confidence in soldiers, there are hardly any

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105 "Regeerings-Proclamatie” [Government Declaration] no date [13 November 1918] in ARA, “Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823 – 1977” entry no. 2.02.05.02, inventory no. 147.

106 Not to be mistaken with the vrijwillige landstorm (voluntary landstorm), see: Chapter 2, fn 67. Oosterhoff, Dagverhaal pp. 13 - 14; Scheffer, November 1918 p. ix.

107 Tuyll (The Netherlands and World War I pp. 252 - 253) and Porter (“Dutch Neutrality” p. 165) quoted a figure of 46,000 BV volunteers by the end of November 1918. K. van Lennep estimated the number of volunteers as high as 110,000 (“De vrijwillige burgerwacht” [The volunteer home guard] in Bas (ed.), Gedenkboek 1898 – 1923 p. 268. H. Tomas (De Bijzondere Vrijwillige Landstorm. [The Extraordinary Voluntary Landstorm] Liemer: Bestuur Liemers Museum, 1991) claimed that the numbers of volunteers did not reach 40,000 until January 1920. It stood at 16,181 in March 1919 (p. 20). Tomas is probably the most reliable source.

108 For examples, see: As, November-alarm pp. 105 - 126.

sources available that show conscripts were actually inspired to join the revolution. No doubt there was some support for an uprising within the military, but it was a definite minority. For example, the historian, Jan Erik Burger, claimed that 200 soldiers turned up to a revolutionary meeting in Amsterdam on 13 November and marched a red flag into the centre of the city. That evening 400 soldiers turned up to another meeting elsewhere in the city and called for a demonstration in nearby barracks. In the ensuing encounter with police, four people were wounded, one fatally. In what seems to have been an isolated incident, a red flag was also hoisted on one of the Navy’s warships on 14 November, but the ship’s officers quickly took the flag down and arrested the lone sailor responsible. Other rumours about insurrections and plans to capture important military sites by rebellious soldiers were rife, but none eventuated.

On the whole, support for the crown was much higher among soldiers than support for the revolutionaries, although as Louis de Jong has pointed out, the majority of troops were ambivalent, caring neither whether the revolution succeeded or was suppressed, hoping only for an end to their own mobilisation misery. Yet there were several contingents of soldiers who offered their loyalty to the crown, most of whom were moved to the major cities to subdue unrest there. They joined other so-called “trustworthy” troops sent by High Command to potential trouble spots. The vrijwillige landstorm that had been existence since August 1914 was also called up on 12 November to do their duty in protecting communities and, for the first time, they were placed under the command of the Commander-in-Chief. Troops on leave were given the opportunity to serve in the

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110 Burger, Linkse frontvorming p. 117.
112 Commander of the Fortified Position of Den Helder to Commander-in-Chief, 2 December 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 784.
113 For the rumoured take-over of the Hembrug munitions factory, see: Commander New Holland Waterline to Commander-in-Chief, 14 November 1918, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 813.
114 Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 1 p. 49.
115 Letter from newly-established Bond van Regeeringstrouwen (Bond of Government Loyalists) to Commander of the Field Army, 13 November 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 348. See also: telegrams and telephone calls from mayors requesting military aid and movements of troops and material from 12 November onwards, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 813; Verspeput, “Gevolgen van de gesloten wapenstilstands- en vredesverdragen” p. 230.
117 Inspector of the Landstorm, “Overzicht van de uitkomsten, die met den vrijwilligen Landstorm zyn verkregen, alsmede de ter zake opgedane erwaringen, gevraagd by schrijven van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht dd. 24 May 1918, O.V.I 122980 (G.S. NO. 4960) 4e Gedeelte: Het jaar 1918” 27 January 1919, pp. 22 - 23, in ARA,
landstorm on a voluntary basis for as long as the revolution crisis continued (until 19 November). They were paid extra for this service. The sources are unclear about how many took up this option, although according to one source, the “revolution” finally made the voluntary landstorm popular.

The revolution was, in fact, a dismal failure right from the start. After Troelstra’s inflammatory parliamentary speech on 12 November, unrest and riots did break out in many places and many workers throughout the country went on strike, but nowhere did the uprisings or strikes involve a majority of residents. In fact, among the various socialist groups, even within the SDAP, there was little consensus about the appropriateness of revolution. Many correctly recognised that the Netherlands was not ripe for an uprising.

Regard for the monarchy remained high among the general populace, illustrated most poignantly on 18 November by the thousands who turned up to a rally in The Hague as a sign of respect for Queen Wilhelmina. The Queen, her husband, Hendrik, and daughter, Juliana, met with thunderous cheers and shouts of approval in the fields of Malieveld. As early as 14 November, two days after his call to revolution, Troelstra as good as admitted he had made a mistake. He withdrew from the political scene after collapsing on 15 November from stress and illness, and left his supporters to deal with the consequences of their failed attempt. Yet Troelstra’s “mistake” did have some effect: the cabinet decided on 13 November to give women the franchise sooner than planned and changes to labour laws were accelerated as well.

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120 Dongen, “De SDAP, de Eerste Wereldoorlog en de vredesbeweging” p. 351; Burger, Linkse frontvorming pp. 113 - 115.

121 Colenbrander, Studiën en Aantekeningen p. 326.

122 Scheffer, November 1918 p. x.

123 Ibid. pp. ix, 279.
That the Netherlands' was not on the point of a socialist overthrow must not hide the fear of revolution. The size and strength of the anti-revolutionary response illustrates this well. In fact, the BV would remain in being many more years and its membership only increased during the early 1920s.\textsuperscript{124} Communism and all that was associated with it would remain a feared and hated enemy for many Dutch through the interbellum, the Second World War and beyond. The attempted revolution, however misguided it may have been, only reinforced this apprehension.

\textsuperscript{124} Tomas, \textit{De Bijzondere Vrijwillige Landstorm} p. 20.
DEMOBILISATION

The attempted revolution and Armistice spurred the government into hastening its demobilisation plans. The cessation of hostilities decreased the possible threats to security and neutrality substantially, while the revolution indicated the potential dangers of keeping disgruntled men in service without good reason. Three days before the Armistice, the government signalled its intentions by announcing a little over 13 per cent of troops would be sent on long-term leave as soon as possible. At the time, it caused serious concerns among military commanders, especially at the borders, where guards were stretched to meet the demands of incoming refugees and internees, and in the major cities, where troops kept an eye on public unrest. After 11 November, however, many hoped for an urgent return to peace conditions.

The “revolution” complicated the demobilisation process, yet also intensified it so that all military intakes from year 1916 and earlier (including landstorm and landweer intakes from that year and earlier) went on indefinite leave between 14 and 19 November, except for a skeleton staff retained for necessary duties. Extensive plans existed for a carefully organised demobilisation process, but in the chaos many regulations were not implemented. Much of the early demobilisation was haphazard: many troops demobilised, others were sent to the cities for counter-revolutionary tasks, while the rest remained at the borders and in administrative posts. In early December, the return of troops, their equipment and the dismantling of camp sites could begin in earnest, although it continued to cause problems as the initial administrative steps were neglected.

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125 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 9 November 1918; Commander Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 9 November 1918, both in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 808.
126 Commander of the Field Army to military authorities, 12 November 1918; Commander Cavalry Brigade, “Verslag van de demobilisatie van de Cavalerie-Brigade” [Report of the demobilisation of the cavalry brigade] no date, both in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312; Uijterschout, Beknopt Overzicht p. 450.
128 Commander Division III, “Verslag van de demobilisatie bedoeld in no. 43 ‘Regeling van de demobilisatie’” [Report of the demobilisation meant in no. 43 ‘Demobilisation regulations’] 14 January 1920; Commander 2 Regiment Hussars to Commander Division III, 24 November 1919, both in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312.
129 Commander 13 RI to Commander II - IB, 25 November 1919, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312.
Yet the armed forces could not demobilise completely: the Armistice may have signalled the end of the war, but it was not a peace treaty. Hostilities could resume at any time, and between November 1918 and June 1919, when Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, an armed presence was necessary in case of unexpected neutrality violations or military threats. Nevertheless, neutrality breaches were scaled down in magnitude. For example, rather than shooting at foreign aeroplanes entering Dutch air space, troops raised warning flags instead. Anything and everything was done to avoid a messy international incident at such a late stage. To smoothen the course of the demobilisation without interrupting necessary military responsibilities, Pop assigned specific tasks to each of the Field Army divisions: Division I became responsible for maintaining public order in the cities; Division II guarded the borders in Drenthe, Groningen, Overijssel and Gelderland; while the other two divisions took charge of the borders in Limburg, North Brabant and Zeeland.

After demobilising troops between 14 and 19 November 1918, High Command sent the rest of the landstorm, landweer and military conscripts on indefinite leave at regular intervals. The next major departure came in February 1919 when the entire military and landstorm intake year 1917 left, followed by the intakes from year 1918 two months later. By late May 1919, only the conscripts in training and any volunteers remained in service. Within the space of seven months, the entire armed forces moved from a war footing to a peace setting.

The demobilisation process involved a huge organisational and administrative effort. Soldiers going on leave took their clothing, bedding, weaponry and other equipment to peace garrisons from where certain items, such as clothing and bedding, were distributed to pre-assigned military warehouses and the rest, including weapons, lighting equipment and automobiles, found their way to so-called “demobilisation parks.”

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130 Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General W. F. Pop, to military authorities, 14 November 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 323.
131 Commander-in-Chief to Field Army commanders, 11 December 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312.
132 Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 29 January 1919, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312; Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 18 March 1919, in ARA, “Archieven van Divisies, Regimenten en andere eenheden van de Infanterie van Koninklijke Landmacht, 1814 - 1940” entry no. 2.13.52, inventory no. 454 (also in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312).
133 See: the plethora of documents in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312.
Horses owned by the state ended up at one of three depots in Utrecht, Groningen and Venlo. Eventually, any requisitioned items and animals were returned to their owners or sold on, while remaining equipment was catalogued and stored in warehouses. Fortifications, inundation points, barracks and garrisons around the country gradually closed. Water levels along the New Holland Waterline returned to normal under careful supervision by Army engineers. High Command moved troops out of private accommodation, schools and other public buildings in an attempt both to avoid unnecessary costs and to limit fraternisation between the civilian and military populations (in case of further unrest). The cost of returning real estate to its pre-war state was borne by the government.

While it tried to send as many troops on indefinite leave as possible, High Command needed to keep some behind to organise the demobilisation of goods and animals as well as to guard the borders. Hence, it gave conscripts the option to volunteer for such service, successfully enticing a small number of troops with more pay. Troops in the 13 Regiment Infantry, due to go on long-term leave on 7 December 1918, presented a typical example of volunteering: 22 NCO’s and 24 ordinary soldiers (a little over one per cent) took up a multitude of demobilisation duties rather than go home. Yet even with fewer soldiers mobilised, some major problems with morale remained. Much of it revolved around the bad quality of barracks. For example, in Assen, on the night of 16 January 1919, 70 soldiers boisterously complained about profiteering in their mess hall. The military police were sent in to settle the situation, resulting in a fracas that ended when one conscript was shot in the shoulder.
Between November 1918 and June 1919, the government feared that the Allies might yet invade the Netherlands or punish it in some way. Its neutral image had been tarnished by a number of events in November 1918. Its position was not helped when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, van Karnebeek, allowed 70,300 German troops stuck in northern Belgium to cross through Limburg into Germany on 13 November. Only a day earlier, van Karnebeek had denied requests for troop passage, except for wounded men. Why he changed his mind remains unclear, although, as we will see, if he had not done so, the Netherlands could have been faced with an internment crisis even more debilitating than that of October 1914.

The Allies met the news of German passage through Limburg with an uproar of indignation. The situation was not helped by the fact that a Belgian newspaper, the Miroir, published photos claiming that the Germans had not even been disarmed. While reporters had photographed armed troops entering Limburg, the newspaper wrongly identified the location of the soldiers. The Dutch Army, in fact, had a huge task on its hands disarming the foreigners where they crossed the border near Maeseyk - extra troops travelled to the province expressly for this purpose. Of course, convincing the international press was far from easy and decidedly hampered by van Karnebeek's untrue claims that he had received permission from the Allies before letting the Germans through.

143 For the photos and claims made in the Miroir, see: correspondence in ARA, “Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 'A' dossiers” entry number 2.05.04, inventory number 837. In the end, the newspaper retracted the claims.
144 Chief of Staff Division IV to Commander-in-Chief, 12 December 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 312.
The Allies, in fact, asserted the passage was a major breach of neutrality since officially German soldiers should have been interned. They did not agree with the Dutch argument that there was no point in interning since repatriating of existing internees had already started. The Allies responded that since they had not yet released German POWs, the German soldiers in Belgium remained an Allied war responsibility. The Netherlands, in other words, was interfering with Allied military operations. The situation was complicated even further on 14 November, when in another departure from its neutrality declaration, the Netherlands agreed that German U-boats could pass through Dutch territorial waters unopposed. Although it granted the same right to the Allies, it was a German request that led the Dutch to accede. In all, it made the Netherlands look decidedly pro-German, a

Illustration 17: German soldiers disarming near Maesyc, 13 November 1918
(Source: ARA, “Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ‘A’ dossiers” entry no. 2.05.04, inventory no. 837)

146 A. A. H. Struycken, “Nota betreffende het rechts karakter van de overeenkomst op 11 November 1918 tusschen de Geassocieerde Mogendheden en Duitschland gesloten” [Note regarding the legal character of the agreement signed by the Associated Powers and Germany on 11 November 1918] 5 February 1919, in ARA, “Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ‘A’ dossiers” entry number 2.05.04, inventory number 837.

position which caused major problems at the Treaty of Versailles negotiations and would complicate Dutch-Belgian relations well into the 1920s.¹⁴⁸

The practicalities, of course, were such that the Netherlands did not have the resources available, or the inclination, to intern so many foreign troops. More than twice the numbers of Gennans were awaiting internment in November 1918 than had arrived during the siege of Antwerp in October 1914. It was a task far beyond the capability of the armed forces. It would have delayed the demobilisation by several weeks, created immense administrative and resource problems, and, given that it occurred at the height of the “revolution”, it could not have come at a worse time. Disarming, cataloguing and storing all the equipment, horses and weaponry that came with the German troops was already a huge undertaking.¹⁴⁹


¹⁴⁹ For a list of weapons and other weaponry removed from the Germans see: Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Réponses des Ministres aux questions écrites” in Journal Officiel 15 April 1920, in ARA, “Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ‘A’ dossiers” entry number 2.05.04, inventory number 837; De Doormarsch Door Limburg p. 10.
In the aftermath of the Limburg affair, as a way of placating the Allies and because there was little Germany could do in retaliation, the Dutch government compromised on other neutrality matters to the advantage of Great Britain and the United States. It allowed American ships to travel through the Rhine and Schelde with military materials, as long as they travelled under a merchant guise.\(^{150}\) This was something expressly forbidden to Germany in November 1918, when it had made a similar request.\(^{151}\) The official reason given was to smoothen the course of continental peace, and to allow the Allies necessary access to German territory. The Dutch also allowed British POWs in Germany to use the Netherlands as a route home, looking after them in camps at Vlasakkers and Oldebroek while they awaited ships across the Channel.\(^{152}\) It did not do so for French, Italian or Belgian soldiers, who were asked to travel across the German-Belgian border instead, except for any who arrived on the Limburg border; they, like the Germans who had arrived on 13 November, were given right of passage.\(^{153}\) As well, in February 1919, the Netherlands let demobilised British troops stationed in Belgium and Germany use the country as thoroughfare.\(^{154}\)

In November and December 1918, human traffic across both the southern and eastern border was immense. Not only tens of thousands of POWs set free in Germany and Austria-Hungary made their way home via the Netherlands, but also German deserters and

\(^{150}\) See: Office of the Dutch Liaison Officer in Rotterdam, “Conditions under which the American military authorities will be allowed to transport military supplies from Antwerp, through the Netherlands, via the Rhine, into Germany”, March 1919, in ARA, “Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ‘A’ dossiers” entry number 2.05.04, inventory number 837; Commander-in-Chief, “Regulations for American Ammunition-Transports by Water from the Occupied Rhine-Territory through the Netherlands to Antwerp” 25 June 1919, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 918. See also: the correspondence between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and American Minister in The Hague, January - March 1919, in Oranjeboek: Mededelingen van den Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken aan de Staten-Generaal April 1918 - Juni 1919 [Announcements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the States General April 1918 - June 1919] publication details unknown (in SMG), pp. 14 - 15.


\(^{152}\) Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 14 November 1918, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlager” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 322.


\(^{154}\) Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 15 February 1919, in ARA, “Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlager” entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 350. See also: correspondence between Minister of Foreign Affairs and British Representative in The Hague, January - February 1919, in Oranjeboek: Mededelingen van den Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken aan de Staten-Generaal April 1918 - Juni 1919 pp. 18 - 19.
refugees of all nationalities streamed into the country. At the same time, refugees and internees who had resided in the Netherlands during the war began returning home. A military presence to supervise this flow of border traffic was absolutely essential, if only to keep any undesirables out. Explicit orders existed to try prevent Russian POWs and "communist elements" entering and as much as possible was done to persuade those already in the Netherlands to leave again. On 7 December 1918, the Commander-in-Chief even reminded the Commander of the Field Army that his troops should be extra vigilant on the borders as there were rumours of Lenin and Trotsky escaping Russia (if Allied troops were successful in their military campaigns against the Bolsheviks). Both exiles were to be denied entry, as there were already far too many influential "refugees" in the Netherlands.

Smuggling and illegal trade across the borders remained a security concern as well. Since the Allied blockade continued to be in force until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the Dutch government had to prevent its citizens smuggling. Again, this ensured that many of the extraordinary customs officers appointed from military ranks during the war remained on the borders for a few more months. While the government had managed to renegotiate its trade agreements with several belligerents in the weeks preceding the Armistice, and obtained greater leniency in importing goods, its trading situation remained precarious.

Although the government intended to dispense with the "state of war" and "state of siege" as soon as possible, the practicalities of smuggling, refugees, internees and other neutrality matters after November 1918 made this rather difficult. The *staat van oorlog* and *beleg* declared in so many areas during the war, therefore, remained in place for several more months, although the measures in effect there were alleviated considerably.

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155 Borselen claims that 120,000 POWs in Germany and Austria-Hungary used the Netherlands to get home, including British, French, American, Italian, Portuguese, Belgian and Serbian troops (*Aanslag op het Spoor* p. 46). For more information on the movement of POWs through the Netherlands in November and December 1918, see: ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 322.
156 Nagelhout, "De toelating en internering van belligerente troepen" p. 57.
157 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 14 November 1918, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldlger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 322.
158 Commander-in-Chief to Commander of the Field Army, 7 December 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 1484.
159 Frey, "Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands" p. 561.
160 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 20 November 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 708.
161 Commander-in-Chief, "Regeling betreffende de uitoefening van het militair gezag in verband met uitgebroken of dreigende binnelandse onlusten" [Regulations regarding the exercise of military authority in relation to existing or
that the threat of war had all but passed, military authority no longer held any urgency. Through the course of 1919, more and more municipalities returned to normal and on 1 May 1920, the government renounced the last “state of siege” and “state of war” declarations. A period of extraordinary municipal administration had come to an end.

Around this time, rations increased and the economy improved, although the situation was far from rosy; little wonder when the rest of the continent also had to recover from the war. It took time for world trade to return to anything like its pre-war equivalent. The most immediate effect for Netherlanders was that it took until May 1920 for the government-imposed bread ration to be abolished. The Dutch economy, in fact, could not recover properly while Germany remained in the economic doldrums. With the influx of thousands of recently-demobilised men into the workforce, unemployment remained a pressing problem. Special aid organisations were made responsible for finding work and providing financial support for ex-conscripts and their families. Nevertheless, the economic situation looked more promising than it had done in 1917 and 1918, so much so that many government crisis institutions and other war organisations, including the Netherlands’ Overseas Trust, Netherlands’ Export Bureau and Royal Support Committee, were all dismantled during the course of 1919. The flow of goods, information and people between the East and West Indies and the Netherlands also resumed, as shipping routes and sea-lanes in and out of Europe were cleared of mines and the Allied blockade weakened.

The anti-war movements that had been so vocal, including the NAOR and IAMV, declined in membership and became less militant during the immediate post-war years.

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Hasselton, “De wisseling van het opperbevel” p. 66.


Rooy, Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding p. 27.

Membership of the IAMV dropped to 1,200 by 1922 (Heijmans et. al., De I.A.M.V. p. 111).
Yet the cry “Nooit meer oorlog!” (“never again war!”) resounded through the country as it did in a multitude of different tongues throughout Europe’s nations, new and old. In the interbellum age of demilitarisation, the League of Nations and collective security, it further reinforced the under-valued nature of the Dutch armed forces in the national consciousness, ensuring it would be poorly resourced for many more years.

In May 1919, the last of the mobilised conscripts were sent on long-term leave. The only conscripts still occupying any military barracks were the latest intake of trainees (year 1919). The government dismissed W. F. Pop as Commander-in-Chief on 15 November 1919, once the demobilisation was complete. Volunteers were also released from service at this time. The Navy, unlike the Army, did not officially demobilise although its conscripts were sent home along with their army equivalents. It dismantled gun emplacements on the coast early in 1919, cleared mines from harbour entrances, removed war buoyage, and reconverted those ships that had been turned into minelayers during the war. Even the electric fence, the wire of death that had separated Belgium from the Netherlands for more than three years, disappeared within the space of a few months. Its wires could now be seen fencing paddocks and farm yards on both sides of the border. The country slowly returned to normal and counted its blessings.

In a world that would never be the same, the Netherlands had escaped almost unscathed. It entered the interbellum period without the damage and despair of the nations that fought the war or experienced invasion, yet it was far from certain about its future. The end of the war signalled that, like the rest of the world, the Netherlands had to reassess its position, find security and re-organise its international relationships. Most importantly, it had to find a place for neutrality. While neutrality had been attractive as a foreign policy option for the Netherlands in the century that preceded the outbreak of the Great War, by the end of this conflict, its foundations were severely undermined. After 1919, the Dutch faced an unenviable prospect: to give up neutrality and build its security on some other basis within or outside the League of Nations, or revive neutrality and hope that it would

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168 General Staff, “Verslag nopens de verrichtingen van het militair gezag, voor zoover dit werd uitgeefd door den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeevaart; opgemaakt ingevolge het bepaalde in art. 6 der wet van 23 Mei 1899 (St.bl.No.128)” 6 January 1919 [1920] p. 21, in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 710 (also in no. 912).
169 Hengel, “De mobilisatie van de zeevaart” p. 60.
170 Vanneste, Kroniek van een Dorp Volume 2, pp. 620 – 623.
survive through future storms and tempests. Neither choice seemed to greatly enhance security or independence. How they dealt with these choices is a chapter of Dutch history left for others to write.\textsuperscript{171} Needless to say, they affected how the Netherlands fared in a subsequent world conflict, one that would, in the end, shake and dramatically break the last vestiges of neutrality’s allure.

\textsuperscript{171} For example, see: Beunders, “De buitenlandse politiek”; Diepen, \textit{Voor Volkenbond en vrede}. 
Caught Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Paradox of Neutrality

The desire for neutrality cannot be superior to the interests of the nation.

*Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (1942)*

Between 1914 and 1918, although the Netherlands remained neutral, it could not escape unscathed from the war waged on its very doorstep. The Great War affected the concerns which neutrality was supposed to safeguard for the Dutch, including their economic stability, independence and security. In 1917 and 1918, the domestic economy slowed down, trade decreased, links with the colonies were cut, and the population dealt with shortages of many essential goods. In these last two years of war, the government came under considerable pressure from both belligerent sides to accept their demands, which encroached increasingly on the neutral’s international rights and ability to assert its independence. Neutrality stopped being the vibrant and attractive foreign policy it seemed before the outbreak of war. Moreover, the ability of the nation and especially its armed forces to uphold neutrality and security virtually disappeared.

The Allied seizure of Dutch ships in March 1918, followed by Germany’s insistence on unlimited transit trade access in April, brought the Netherlands to the verge of war. If Germany had invaded in 1918, there was little the neutral could have done. It did not have the armed might to withstand a concerted attack by its neighbour. The Allies were also in no shape to come to the Netherlands’ rescue. In fact, it was the express desire of the Allies not to have Germany in control of the country that enabled them to reach a credible compromise, which defused the situation. Yet, at the same time, it clearly indicated how much the warring sides had interfered with the supposed inviolability of Dutch neutrality.

*1 Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, 25 June 1942, as quoted in Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe* p. 189.*
and sovereignty. After April 1918, the Netherlands lost the ability to effect major changes in its relationships with the belligerents. Alongside its capacity to steer a middle course between their conflicting demands, the goodwill of its neighbours remained essential if it was to stay out of the war.

One major asset of Dutch neutrality that did not deteriorate was its geo-strategic value. Its position between Germany, Belgium, the Channel and North Sea, as well as sovereignty over the mouths of the Rhine, Maas and Schelde rivers, ensured that, unless they could be sure of victory, both the Allies and Central Powers thought twice about invading. This remained the only consistent reason for respecting Dutch neutrality during the war. In August 1914, the 200,000 troops in the Netherlands’ Army were important deterrents for Germany. It could not afford to defeat so many soldiers in a peripheral area of conflict if it was to speedily conquer France. Furthermore, the trade and credit Germany received from the Netherlands also had a major part to play in its support of neutrality, especially in 1915 and 1916. By 1917, however, these economic advantages almost entirely disappeared, and the Dutch military was not strong enough to withstand a concerted onslaught or act as a significant deterrent to attack. Consequently, Germany had few qualms about insisting on more concessions from its neutral neighbour, even when they interfered with neutrality, since it did not believe the Netherlands would go to war of its own accord. The two restraining influences on Germany were the fear that the Allies might open another military front in and around the Schelde, and the knowledge that it could not divert more resources to another area of conflict.

In the opening months of war, the Allies respected Dutch neutrality because they could not afford the resulting negative publicity if they invaded in the name of protecting neutral Belgium. Above all, however, they did not believe it was possible to defeat the Dutch and take over territory before their enemies intervened. At all costs, they had to prevent a German invasion of the Netherlands, the principal motivation for respecting the territorial integrity throughout this period, although it did not stop the Allies from exacting as many compromises as possible, in an attempt to limit German advantage. When these demands reached their height during the requisitioning crisis in 1918, the Allies conceded ground to the Central Powers, to avoid the Netherlands’ entry into the war. After the crisis, in fact, Great Britain made an effort to help the Dutch in their defensive preparations.
Because the stakes in the conflict were so high, the warring sides had few reservations about interfering with the rights of neutrals. Both the Allied and Central Powers rejected international laws and other legal recourses open to neutrals before 1914, when and where it suited them. Here, the Great War set a dangerous precedent for future abuse of the principles of neutrality, which came to the fore during the Second World War, when Hitler rejected international law completely and exacted entirely “unneutral” behaviour from supposedly neutral states. Nils Örvik’s claims that the Great War spelled the end of neutrality as a credible foreign policy bore out all too well for the Netherlands. In his words:

By using all their economic and military bargaining power, the neutrals might have succeeded in staying out of war [World War One], but in doing so they had to submit to severe limitations of their sovereignty. On the other hand, the belligerents had to modify their demands to the minimum which was necessary to keep the neutral from joining the enemy.²

Declining respect for international law meant that the Netherlands sought out other sources to protect its non-belligerency. Its ability to negotiate and compromise with the warring parties was one of the most important. As the pressure placed on the country by the belligerents increased, Dutch diplomatic skills became paramount. The importance of individuals, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Loudon, in protecting neutrality cannot be underestimated, as the historian Hubert van Tuyll correctly surmised.³

Aside from diplomatic skill, it was also essential that the Dutch acted in a strictly neutral manner, displaying a determination to the world to remain out of the war and retain as much sovereignty as possible. By adhering as closely as possible to legal standards, the Netherlands forced any mistakes and violations onto others, and hoped thereby to be beyond reproach. To this end, the Dutch carefully discharged key neutrality responsibilities, including interning foreign troops and military materials and refusing entry to armed merchantmen. With regard to most territorial matters, with perhaps the exception of aerial integrity, they could enforce compliance of the belligerents. When violations were unavoidable, as they inevitably were, the skill was to chart a middle course by means of compromise and negotiation, even if it interfered with neutrality and independence, and thereby avoid being dragged into the war. As Werner Rings stated:

² Örvik, The Decline of Neutrality p. 39.
³ Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 354.
To ensure the cherished peace and its survival, the small state has no other option but to make concessions. It cannot afford to, indeed must not overstep the mark. The highest principle of its foreign policy must be to avoid, to defuse, and to get rid of conflicts in as generous a manner as possible. The neutral’s ultimate purpose was staying out of the war. In the end, the loss of sovereignty, independence and economic security - three things that the Dutch had hoped to achieve by staying neutral - were the price to pay for fulfilment of the aim.

In enforcing compliance with international law and the agreements reached between the Netherlands and warring states, neutrality could be made or broken. Without credible means of ensuring they kept their promises, Dutch neutrality was worthless. In this respect, the armed forces played an essential role, acting as the “police force” that protected neutrality and prevented violations occurring from within and outside the kingdom. By patrolling territorial waters and borders, administering decrees in the “state of war” and “siege”, checking cargo leaving and entering the country, interning foreigners and their war materials, and shooting at foreign aeroplanes, the military helped to maintain the credibility of neutrality.

Undoubtedly, the General Staff underestimated the time-consuming and resource-draining nature of maintaining neutrality as well as the sudden escalation of military involvement in all manner of neutrality concerns. In fact, it was entirely overwhelmed by the many neutrality tasks, so much so that within months of mobilising, the military’s capability to resist a possible invasion had diminished significantly. The manifold requirements of neutrality, whether at the borders, at sea or in the “state of siege”, took priority over defence. To this end, between August 1914 and November 1918, the Field Army scattered, the fortifications emptied and the Navy dispersed. The objectives of successful defence identified by the General Staff before 1914, namely concentration of Field Army might and strongly fortified positions, were no longer feasible during the war, a reflection of the fundamental contradiction that existed between trying to maintain an armed force for defence purposes and meeting neutrality requirements at the same time. Nevertheless, defence had to lose out to neutrality because if neutrality worked, then there would be no need for such armed might. Without proper defence measures in place, however, not only did the deterrence value of neutrality disappear, if neutrality failed, the

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4 Werner Rings, 1997, as quoted in Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe* p. 16.
nation was left to the whim of more powerful states. Fortunately for the Netherlands, neutrality did not fail during the Great War.

Other states were more likely to respect neutrality if the neutral could show that it was able to protect itself from violations of its territorial integrity. When a neutral was situated as closely to the Western Front as the Netherlands between 1914 and 1918, then its ability to mount a credible defence became imperative. But the war years indicated, above all, that a small state with a weak industrial capacity could not keep up. The Netherlands did not have the human and material resources to match the improvements made in the belligerent armies. While the size of its Army increased significantly, at least on paper, the weaponry, ammunition and other material requirements of a modern fighting force did not exist and could not be produced. Even maintaining the krachtsverschil (difference in strength) between the warring sides, which represented a key principle of Dutch military deterrence in 1914, became too difficult. The irony of the Netherlands’ position was that, if it had fought in the war, its allies would have provided all the equipment it needed and thereby the Army would not have become obsolete. As a neutral, however, the country remained aloof from the world and could not obtain necessary equipment from the major industrial powers. In other words, by virtue of remaining neutral, the quality of its neutrality declined.

Furthermore, although the urgency for improving the military existed within High Command, it did not permeate throughout society. When Germany did not invade in August 1914, many Dutch believed they were safe from future harm and that the belligerents were too preoccupied on the Western Front to be a threat. Neutrality acted as a security blanket for the population, shielding them from the possibility that they could be in danger. As a result, the government had considerable trouble persuading parliament to accept extraordinary military expenditure, let alone unlimited funding for the improvement of outdated fortifications. Its one attempt at removing public complacency, namely by recalling leave during Easter of April 1916, turned into a major disaster. Thus, while the government devoted increased funding to the mobilisation and modernisation of the armed forces than it had in the years before the outbreak of war, it did not wish to and, in many respects could not, justify large wartime deficits. In this, the neutral differed greatly from its belligerent counterparts, which did everything in their power to improve their armed forces, regardless of cost, in order to emerge victorious in the war.
In a similar vein, the condition of neutrality affected the willingness of the population to accept continued mobilisation, let alone a situation of military alert. Because the country was not at war, few understood that keeping hundreds of thousands of men on active service was absolutely necessary. The push for demobilisation was strongest in 1915 and 1916 when threats to the Netherlands seemed negligible. Even after February 1917, when the possibility of war became more evident, the will to stay fully mobilised did not. As a result, the government and High Command came under more pressure from parliament either to partially demobilise or send more troops on long-term leave. In the end, they acquiesced in many of the leave requests. At any one time, during the last two years of war, less than one-half the number of troops mobilised in August 1914 were on active duty, despite the fact that the size of the Army had doubled and their responsibilities had increased many times over. Of all the military issues publicly debated, that of leave best illustrates the clear separation between what High Command believed the armed forces needed for the protection of the country, and what the nation was willing to accept.

Due largely to the amount of leave granted to soldiers as well as the dispersion of troops around the country, a second mobilisation became a necessity by the start of 1917, if the country was to have any chance of withstanding an attack. Snijders and the rest of High Command, however, were well aware that it was highly unlikely there would be enough time for a second mobilisation to succeed. It would take four to five days before all soldiers could be remobilised, inundations readied, and units organised. In that time, an invading force could easily capture the all-important railway routes and lay siege to the fortified centre of the country. Given the serious deficiencies in artillery strength and machine-gun concentration, let alone shortages of ammunition, hand-grenades, gas masks and steel helmets, the Dutch were gravely disadvantaged. Whether the civilian leadership wanted to hear it or not, Snijders’ exclamations in April 1918, that going to war with Germany would be catastrophic for the Netherlands, were all too correct.

The disadvantages facing the armed forces during the war were only heightened by the impact of the war at sea and the blockade policies of the belligerents. The Netherlands could not obtain enough essential goods in 1917 and 1918, and much of what they could obtain was smuggled out again. The Army was seriously short of petrol needed to keep vehicles mobile and aeroplanes flying; coal to keep trains running and warships going; fodder to keep horses fed; food to keep soldiers happy; and soap to keep their clothes
washed and wearable. The absence of such day-to-day essentials not only undermined troop morale, and, as a result, their fighting ability, but also made a speedy second mobilisation highly unlikely.

While neutrality theoretically indicated a time of peace, in reality, the Netherlands could be likened more closely to a nation at war, but one that did not actually participate in combat. It had to meet many of the same standards of military preparedness as the belligerents, in case its neutrality failed, but lacked the urgency that being at war fostered in the populations and governments of warring states. A belligerent had no choice but to do its utmost to defend and protect itself since its national existence was at stake. A neutral, on the other hand, could hide behind its neutrality and put off preparing for war, since the possibility was not yet a reality. To a certain degree, this is what happened in the Netherlands. Yet that the government used the extensive powers of the War Law and imposed military control over three-quarters of all municipalities, clearly demonstrates that it was only too well aware that extraordinary times required extraordinary measures, and that the country's best chance of remaining a non-combatant was to protect its neutrality exhaustively.

The impact of the war on the domestic economy and the extent of the smuggling crisis resulted in extensive involvement by the state and the military in the affairs of citizens. The government imposed the "state of siege" ostensibly to maintain neutrality and security, stretched its purpose to handle smuggling matters, and ended up committing military commanders to a variety of municipal concerns. Because the War Law was vague and largely undefined, its application was limited (it pertained neither to the entire nation nor to a situation of war), and because it was used for many years and for many different purposes, it was almost inevitable that judicial concerns arose. From May 1915 onwards, the High Court made several rulings that changed the use of the "state of war" and "siege" considerably. The judiciary consistently diluted the principle that *nood breekt wet* ("need breaks law"), so that in 1918, commanders had no powers other than those normally allocated to municipal authorities. All the reasons for imposing the "state of war" and "siege" in the first place, namely protecting neutrality, policing smuggling and improving defences, were undermined by the judges' decisions. The restrictions placed on the War Law signalled the ultimate paradox of neutrality: a neutral had a much greater chance of keeping that status if it had the urgency of a nation at war. If the Netherlands had been at
war, military authority would not face any limitations, as the "state of siege" would apply to the entire country, and the Commander-in-Chief would have unlimited powers to impose whatever measures he saw fit to protect the defences, security and welfare of the nation. In the "state of siege" present during the Great War, however, based on local jurisdiction rather than national concerns, such prerogatives did not exist.

The inability to reconcile the fact that the nation was not at war with the need for extraordinary military involvement in domestic affairs hampered the government’s ability to exact necessary standards of neutral behaviour from its citizenry. Widespread opposition to the powers of the armed forces in the "state of siege" contributed to the failure of commanders to properly enforce strict neutrality standards in the printed press. "State of siege" authorities only ever imposed censorship restrictions haphazardly. Likewise, even though the government declared the "state of siege" solely for the purpose of combating smuggling, smuggling continued virtually unabated during the war. No doubt, most Dutch were aware that smuggling impacted on their country’s neutrality and economic well-being, since the Allies made no secret of denouncing the trade and threatened to impede the supply of goods to the Netherlands if it continued. Yet this knowledge did not persuade many to stop selling their wares in Germany and Belgium.

Non-belligerency tempered not only the willingness of the Dutch to accept emergency measures, but also affected how much they were prepared to sacrifice personally for the sake of national welfare. Even warring populations had limits to what they would accept as reasonable levels of rationing and food supply, clearly illustrated by the rioting that helped fuel the revolutionary movement in Germany in 1918, but the threshold of that acceptance was much lower in the Netherlands. Again, this reflected the fact that Dutch national security was not immediately at threat, and people simply could not accept unequal distribution of available goods, especially when it favoured soldiers who, after all, were not fighting. Combined with war lethargy, these feelings contributed to widespread unrest during 1917 and 1918. By October 1918, most troops had reached the end of their tether as well. Four years of mobilisation took their toll and when High Command denied all leave at the end of the month, for fear of an exodus of foreign troops across the border in Belgium, many showed their dissent by rioting. The Harskamp disturbances especially worried the nation, and many feared, in the end needlessly, that they were heading down the same path of revolution as Germany, Russia and many central European states.
The Armistice came none too soon for the Netherlands. Through 1918, the Dutch reached the limits of their tolerance: they were sick of war, mobilisation and shortages of many kinds. They faced the severest test of neutrality during this year, which brought them to the brink of conflict. Their Army and Navy could not withstand a concerted attack if it had come. But the belligerents were also war weary, underfed, ravaged by the Spanish influenza pandemic, and ultimately unwilling to drag the neutral into the conflict at such a late stage, even though it was on the agenda for both (Germany in April and Great Britain in October). In the end, neither the “devil” nor the rulers of the “deep blue sea” wished to take on the other in the Netherlands. The military capabilities of the neutral, so prominent in the opening months of war, now featured much less as a factor in their calculations. Instead, the neutral managed to maintain a precarious equilibrium between the demands of both sides. The juggler may have successfully traversed the tightrope of neutrality, but dropped the balls in play at regular intervals until, nearing the end, personal survival remained the only option.
### DUTCH ARMY RANKS AND THEIR BRITISH EQUIVALENTS (WWI)

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\[1\] With grateful thanks to Dr. Wim Klinkert, Koninklijke Militaire Academie, Breda.
### IMPORTANT MILITARY LAWS, 1827 - 1922

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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LAW</th>
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<td>1827</td>
<td><em>Schutterijwet</em></td>
<td>• <em>actieve schutterij</em> (active militia) for communities with 2,500 people or more, and <em>rustende schutterij</em> (resting militia) for the rest</td>
<td>• <em>actieve schutters</em> served for 5 years, then 5 years in reserves, <em>rustende schutters</em> existed only on paper</td>
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<td>1861</td>
<td><em>Militiewet</em></td>
<td>• 11,000 conscripted per year (600 to Navy)</td>
<td>• conscripted for 5 years, infantry: 1 year training, cavalry/artillery: 1.5 years training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td><em>Militiewet</em></td>
<td>• legislated personal service for all conscripts</td>
<td>• conscripts could not pay someone to do their service for them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td><em>Militiewet</em></td>
<td>• yearly conscript intake raised to 17,500</td>
<td>• conscripts enlisted for 8 years (12,300 fully trained, 5,200 received 4 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td><em>Landweerwet</em></td>
<td>• reserve army of 80,000, abolition of <em>schutterijen</em>, stationed in municipality where resided (48 districts)</td>
<td>• after 8 years as military conscripts transferred to the <em>landweer</em> for 7 more years (of which 2 weeks training, rest on call)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td><em>Tweeploegen-stelsel</em> [Two-squad-system]</td>
<td>• increased yearly conscript intake to 23,000</td>
<td>• split military conscript intake into two squads, 2 months active service for each (additional to their training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td><em>Militiewet</em></td>
<td>• increased yearly conscript intake to 23,000</td>
<td>• decreased length military service, longer training for specialised units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td><em>Landweerwet</em></td>
<td>• maximum strength 84,000 <em>landweer</em> conscripts</td>
<td>• decreased length <em>landweer</em> service from 7 to 5 years, fewer training sessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td><em>Landstormwet</em></td>
<td>• creation of <em>landstorm</em> (militia, second reserves), maximum strength 160,000</td>
<td>• included volunteers, all who freed from service, all who not picked by lottery, and all who had served in military at some stage (until the age of 40), only called-up in case of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td><em>Landstormwet</em></td>
<td>• men freed from conscription and under the age of 30 (in 1916) liable for <em>landstorm</em> service, also men who had served in the military and left between 1911 and 1913 automatic transferal to <em>landstorm</em> (until age 40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td><em>Militiewet</em></td>
<td>• <em>landweer</em> abolished, reserve force created</td>
<td>• yearly conscript intake reduced from 23,000 to 19,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3

**THE FIELD ARMY, 1914**

*additions made during the war are given in italics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>• Commander of the Field Army and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Divisions (I, II, III, IV) each with</td>
<td>• Divisional Commander and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Three infantry brigades of two regiments infantry each (a regiment had three battalions, a battalion had four companies) and one machine-gun platoon (six guns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• One company of cyclists <em>(one company added)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• One squadron of cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• One regiment field artillery with three sections (a section had four batteries with three guns each) <em>(additional section added)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• One company pioneers <em>(one company added)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Two light howitzer sections</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• One divisional train (munitions, supply, telegraph, medical staff and bridge-builders) <em>(lighting section added)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• One of the four divisions had two batteries of mobile artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Brigade</td>
<td>• Brigade Commander and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Four regiments cavalry (each consisting of three squadrons cavalry and one machine-gun section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Two batteries mobile artillery (three pieces each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Four squadrons of cyclists</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Separate cavalry munitions and artillery munitions trains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply and Inspection</td>
<td>• Inspector of the Field Army and staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 Munnekrede, “De mobilisatie van de leunacht” pp. 46 - 47.
## Appendix 4

### The Netherlands’ Mobilisation, June - August 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>World Event</th>
<th>Netherlands' Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun 28</td>
<td>Archduke Franz Ferdinand assassinated, Serbia blamed by Austria-Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 6</td>
<td>Germany unconditional support for Austria-Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 23</td>
<td>Austria-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 25</td>
<td>Serbian rejection of ultimatum</td>
<td>Forbes Wels received “Api Api” telegram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbian mobilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian decision to support Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 26</td>
<td>Bridges, railways, and inundations readied</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Snijders requested to return from holiday</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military attachés sent to Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 27</td>
<td>Kaiser Wilhelm II returned to Germany from holiday</td>
<td>Pre-mobilisation of Royal (Dutch) Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leave cancelled for coast and border guards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retirement cancelled for conscripts and landweer (years 1906 and 1907)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Snijders returned to Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 28</td>
<td>Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia</td>
<td>Military meeting with rail authorities to finalise mobilisation plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All conscripts forbidden to leave country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy patrolling sea-inlets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stock exchange closed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>WORLD EVENT</th>
<th>NETHERLANDS’ EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 30</td>
<td>Full Russian mobilisation declared</td>
<td>Formal declaration of neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oorloggevaar (war danger) declared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rail and rolling stock requisitioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 31</td>
<td>Germany declaration “Threatening Danger of War”</td>
<td>General mobilisation declared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 12 hour ultimatum to Russia</td>
<td>Search and visit instituted for ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium full mobilisation declared</td>
<td>Military coast and border guards mobilised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German full mobilisation declared and declaration of war on Russia</td>
<td>Snijders appointed Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French full mobilisation declared</td>
<td>First day of mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1</td>
<td>German demand right of passage through Belgium (refused)</td>
<td>Second day of mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German invasion of Luxembourg</td>
<td>Germany guaranteed Dutch neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2</td>
<td>German declaration of war on France</td>
<td>Third day of mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War credit authorised (f50,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 4</td>
<td>German invasion of Belgium begun</td>
<td>Oorlogsbetonning (war buoyage sea-inlets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British ultimatum to Germany (declaration of war on Germany)</td>
<td>Limited rail travel allowed to civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 6</td>
<td>Serbia declared war on Germany</td>
<td>Britain and France guaranteed Dutch neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria-Hungaria declared war on Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 11</td>
<td>France declared war on Austria-Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 17</td>
<td>Japan guaranteed Dutch East Indies’ neutrality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OVERVIEW OF THE NETHERLANDS' NEUTRALITY DECLARATION

| Article 1 | • No hostilities may occur in the Netherlands nor can the country be used as a base from which hostilities are conducted. |
| Article 2 | • Belligerent military forces cannot occupy any of the Netherlands, nor use it for the transit of troops or military goods, nor may warships cross through Dutch territorial waters. |
| Article 3 | • All belligerent troops entering Dutch territory will be disarmed and interned until the end of war. Warships will not be allowed to leave the Netherlands until the end of war. |
| Article 4 | • Warships cannot access Dutch territorial waters. |
| Article 5 | • Article 4 does not apply to ships that are damaged, need fuel or food, or have a religious, scientific or humanitarian mission. |
| Article 6 | • Repairs to warships may only be made to make them seaworthy. |
| Article 7 | • Warships in the Netherlands at the time of this declaration must leave within 24 hours. |
| Article 8 | • If two enemy warships are in the same port, they must leave 24 hours after each other. |
| Article 9 | • Warships can only be provisioned with enough food and fuel to last them to the nearest friendly port. |
| Article 10 | • A prize (ship seized by one’s enemy) may only enter the Netherlands if it is in distress or short of fuel or foodstuffs. |
| Article 11 | • It is forbidden to form a group of combatants or recruit combatants in the Netherlands. |
| Article 12 | • It is forbidden to take service on board belligerent warships in the Netherlands. |
| Article 13 | • One cannot arm, equip or man belligerent vessels to improve their military capabilities. |
| Article 14 | • One cannot supply arms or ammunition to any belligerent vessels. |
| Article 15 | • One must seek authorisation before repairing or supplying any belligerent warship. |
| Article 16 | • One cannot dismantle or repair prizes, except to make them seaworthy. One cannot buy or trade prizes in the Netherlands. |
| Article 17 | • State territory includes coastal waters up to three nautical miles from Dutch land. |

### OVERVIEW OF THE NETHERLANDS’ NEUTRALITY DECLARATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 18</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Commanding officers, owners and charterers of ships are asked to take note of belligerent blockades and contraband regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Any person guilty of breaching articles 1 - 17 will not be able to obtain any protection from the Netherlands’ government.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix 6

## Internment Camps in The Netherlands, 1914 - 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Max. Number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alkmaar</td>
<td>Aug 1914</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germans and Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amersfoort and Zeist</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Sept 1918</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assen</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Feb 1915</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen</td>
<td>Aug 1914 - Nov 1918</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaasterland</td>
<td>Aug 1914 to Dec 1916</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Nov 1918</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardewijk</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Dec 1918</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heerlen</td>
<td>Aug 1915 to Dec 1918</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>Belgian and British (mineworkers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampen</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Jan 1915</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeuwarden</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Feb 1915</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Belgian and British (one week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loosduinen</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Dec 1918</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunspeet</td>
<td>Feb to Apr 1915</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Belgian officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldebroek</td>
<td>Feb 1915 to Aug 1916</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urk</td>
<td>Dec 1914 to Mar 1917</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>Allied officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlissingen</td>
<td>Apr 1915 to Dec 1918</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>Belgian and British (penal facility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wierickerschans</td>
<td>Jan 1915 to May 1917</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>British and French officers (until Jan 1916) then German officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwolle</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Jan 1915</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwolle</td>
<td>Oct 1914 to Dec 1918</td>
<td>up to 50</td>
<td>Belgian officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 7

### Military Guards for Internment Camps, 1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Guard Detachments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amersfoort</td>
<td>Staff and 2C Regiment (Reg.) Army Depot Battalion C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assen</td>
<td>1 Reg. 8 Landweer Infantry Battalion (LWI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Koninklijke Marechaussee</em> Detachment from Assen and Zuidhoorn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen</td>
<td>Detachment from Depot of VIII Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaasterland</td>
<td>3 Reg. 1 LWI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Koninklijke Marechaussee</em> Detachment from Gorredijk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>4 Reg. 6 LWI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Koninklijke Marechaussee</em> Detachment from Groningen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardewijk</td>
<td>Staff and 1, 2, 3, and 5 Reg. Army Depot Battalion B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampen</td>
<td>4 Reg. Army Depot Battalion B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeuwarden</td>
<td>2 Reg. 1 LWI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Koninklijke Marechaussee</em> Detachment from Leeuwarden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldebroek</td>
<td>2C Reg. Army Depot Battalion C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urk</td>
<td>Mixed detachment (of locals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeist</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, and 4 Reg. Army Depot Battalion E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwolle</td>
<td>10 LWI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on a similar table entitled “Interneringsdepots” [Internment camps], date unknown [most probably 1915], in ARA, “Archieven van de Generale Staf” entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 75.
### Overview of the OorlogsWet (War Law) 1899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 1</td>
<td>Any area of the Netherlands can be declared in a <em>staat van oorlog</em> (state of war) or <em>staat van beleg</em> (state of siege) when the country is in danger of war, or internal disorder threatens the internal or external security of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 2</td>
<td>If, through war or internal disorder, parts of the country are separated from central government, the highest military authority in the cut-off area can declare a &quot;state of siege&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 3</td>
<td>Government is responsible for declaring and removing the &quot;state of war&quot; and &quot;siege&quot; by Royal Decree (<em>Koninklijk Besluit</em>), except in the case of article 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5</td>
<td>Except during a foreign invasion, parliament determines whether to allow the continuation of the &quot;state of war&quot; or &quot;siege&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 7</td>
<td>The cabinet or Minister of War appoints military commanders to exercise military authority in the &quot;state of war&quot; or &quot;siege&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In the Staat van Oorlog (State of War):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 9</td>
<td>Councils and staff who work in the service of provinces, municipalities, <em>waterschappen</em> (district water boards), <em>veenschappen</em> (district peat boards) and <em>veenpolders</em> (peat polders) must provide information requested of them by the military authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 10</td>
<td>After consultation with civil authorities (in article 9), the military authority can issue new police regulations and regulations regarding peat and water boards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 11 | After consultation with civil authorities, the military authority can issue regulations for the upkeep of residents and troops.  
  - The military authority can, without prior approval from the owner, enter any private establishment, as long as a written mandate is shown to the owner. A report must be filed for all searches of private property. |
| Article 12 | After consultation with civil authorities, the military authority can force civilians to help prepare defences.  
  - The military authority can suspend particular regulations of the *Arbeidswet* (Work Law), *Veiligheidswet* (Safety Law) and *Hinderwet* (Nuisance Law). |
| Article 13 | After consultation with civil authorities, the military authority can regulate the police and fire service, and can appoint secret police to monitor suspicious activities. |
| Article 15 | The military authority can remove objects or buildings that hinder proper military defence. |

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1 *Staatsblad*. no. 128, 23 May 1899.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 16</td>
<td>The military can occupy any building, and requisition any goods necessary for defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 18</td>
<td>The military can forbid the publication (or dissemination in other ways) of reports regarding military matters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In the Staat van Beleg (State of Siege):**

| Article 19 | Articles 9 to 18 also apply, except if stated differently below. |
| Article 21 | The civilian authorities [in article 9] must obey the orders of the military authority. |
| Article 22 | The military authority can establish new police regulations and regulations for water and peat boards. |
| Article 23 | The military authority can regulate movements into and out of the “state of siege” area. |
| Article 25 | Except for religious congregation, no meetings, gatherings or marches (in public or private) may be held without written approval of the military authority. |
| Article 28 | The military authority can, in the interest of public safety, close theatres, societies, cafés, bars and other rooms used for entertainment, as well as factories and work places. |
| Article 29 | The military authority can regulate the ownership and use of weapons by civilians. |
| Article 30 | The military authority can regulate the manner in which corpses are buried. |
| Article 31 | The military authority can determine how births and deaths are registered. |
| Article 32 | In “state of siege” areas with no access to central government, wills can be approved by a civil servant or military officer above the rank of lieutenant. |
| Article 33 | The military authority can remove any persons from the “state of siege” area who endanger public order and safety, or, if removal is not practical, imprison them. |
| Article 34 | The military authority can refuse entry for civilians to any defensive or military area. |
| Article 35 | The military authority can forbid any person from leaving the “state of siege” area, whose skills are useful for defence, likewise it can forbid the removal of any animals or goods. |
| Article 36 | In the interest of defence, the military authority can force any non-military persons to join the armed forces and help prepare defences. |
| Article 37 | The military authority can limit or prevent completely the publication and circulation of any written or printed materials. |
| Article 38 | The military authority can exercise censorship on post and telegraph communications. |
| Article 40 | The military authority can set up temporary krijgsraden (war courts). In wartime, civilians can be sentenced by the war court. |
### Appendix 9

**STATE OF WAR AND SIEGE, 1914 – 1917**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State of War</th>
<th>State of Siege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Aug 1914</td>
<td>• New Holland Waterline</td>
<td>• Fortification of Den Helder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fortifications on the Mouths of the Maas River and Haringvliet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug 1914</td>
<td>• North Brabant, Limburg, Zeeland and Gelderland (below the Waal River)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug 1914</td>
<td>• border municipalities in Zeeland, North Brabant and Limburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sep 1914</td>
<td>• municipalities along rivers and waterways in North Brabant, Gelderland, South Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Groningen and Limburg</td>
<td>• Fortification of Den Helder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sep 1914</td>
<td>• municipalities bordering Germany in Gelderland, Overijssel, Groningen, Drenthe, Limburg</td>
<td>• municipalities in Friesland including the island of Schiermonnikoog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov 1914</td>
<td>• municipalities along the Eems River and the Friesian islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 1915</td>
<td>• municipalities containing internment camps</td>
<td>• municipalities in North Brabant, Gelderland and South Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Feb 1915</td>
<td>• Fortification Hollandsch Diep and 't Bergen (internment camp)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 "Staatsblad." no. 375, 5 August 1914; no. 406, 10 August 1914; no. 435, 29 August 1914; no. 448, 8 September 1914; no. 463, 25 September 1914; no. 527, 10 November 1914; no. 18, 19 January 1915; no. 81, 11 February 1915; no. 308, 8 July 1915; no. 375, 20 August 1915; no. 393, 13 September 1915; no. 437, 23 October 1915; no. 473, 16 November 1915; no. 487, 3 December 1915; no. 56, 22 January 1916; no. 527, 13 December 1916; no. 228, 26 February 1917; no. 242, 22 March 1917; no. 448, 30 May 1917; General Headquarters, “Lijst van alle gemeenten der provinciën, met aanduiding, welke gemeenten, of onderdeelen daarvan, in staat van oorlog of in staat van beleg zijn verklaard en met vermelding van de gezagsgebieden, waartoe zij behooren, alsmede van de Koninklijke besluiten, waarbij het in staat van oorlog of in staat van beleg verklaren plaats vond.” 1 September 1917, in SMG/DC, “Handschrift nr: 39” 93/1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State of War</th>
<th>State of Siege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Jul 1915</td>
<td>Volkerak</td>
<td>• the province of Zeeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 1915</td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in Gelderland, Groningen and Drenthe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sep 1915</td>
<td></td>
<td>• port of Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct 1915</td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in North Brabant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nov 1915</td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in Drenthe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Nov 1915</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Delft Construction Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Dec 1915</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Amsterdam harbour and waterways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan 1916</td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in Gelderland, Overijssel, Groningen and Drenthe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec 1916</td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in North Brabant, Gelderland and Overijssel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb 1917</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Arnhem railway station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Mar 1917</td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in Gelderland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May 1917</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Fort Nieuw Andries, Geertruidenberg and Crèvecoeur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in North Brabant and Gelderland,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• municipalities in Groningen and Drenthe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 10

#### Mobilisation and Leave for Military, *Landweer* and *Landstorm*¹

(Month mobilised in italics, month sent on leave in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intake Year</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LW 1908 (born 1879)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td><em>May</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW 1909 (born 1880)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>November</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW 1910 (born 1881)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>December</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW 1911 (born 1882)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>January (part)</em></td>
<td><em>March (rest)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW 1912 (born 1883)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW 1913 (born 1885)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1906 (born 1886)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1907 (born 1887)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1908 (born 1888)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1909 (born 1889)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1910 (born 1890)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>December</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1911 (born 1891)</td>
<td><em>August</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>May</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Based on a similar diagram in Bosboom, *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden* Appendix A, between pp. 390 – 391; Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 11 October 1916, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411; Commander-in-Chief to all military authorities, 16 April 1918, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger", entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 325; Minister of War, "Nota omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang der mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting hiervan te verhoogen" 16 January 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705; Staatscommissie, *Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht* Appendix V, p. 127. This chart does not take into account specialist units, which may have been mobilised longer.
### Mobilisation and Leave for Military, Landweer and Landstorm

(Month mobilised in italics, month sent on leave in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intake Year</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1912 (born 1892)</td>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1913 (born 1893)</td>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1914 (born 1894)</td>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1915 (born 1895)</td>
<td>December (part)</td>
<td>February (part), April (rest)</td>
<td></td>
<td>June (part)</td>
<td>July (rest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1915 (born 1895)</td>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td>October (part)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1914 (born 1894)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1913 (born 1893)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1916 (born 1896)</td>
<td>December (part)</td>
<td>May (part), October (rest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1912 (born 1892)</td>
<td></td>
<td>February (part), March (rest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1911 (born 1891)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June (part), July (part), November (rest)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1916 (born 1896)</td>
<td></td>
<td>August (part), November (rest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1910 (born 1890)</td>
<td></td>
<td>August (part), October (part), November (rest)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1917 (born 1897)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>January (part), February (part), March (rest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1917 (born 1897)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1909 (born 1889)</td>
<td></td>
<td>March (part), April (rest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1918 (born 1898)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1908 (born 1888)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Summer/Autumn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Mobilisation and Leave for Military, Landweer and Landstorm**

(Month mobilised in italics, month sent on leave in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intake Year</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mil 1919 (born 1899)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>August</strong></td>
<td><em>(part)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS 1918 (born 1898)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Borg, Alan

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