Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart: 
Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese

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This thesis is the product of five years of intensive research into a subject that is very close to my heart. It first began as a study of finding my own identity as an ethnic Chinese person living in New Zealand. My research then gradually took on a regional focus by examining case studies throughout the Pacific. In the end, it evolved into an overall examination of the ramifications and implications of the connections between the overseas Chinese, China and Taiwan in an international context. Several of the examples cited come from my own firsthand experience in the OC community and my participation in international OC organizations, but I attribute many of my findings to my vast network of family, friends, and colleagues throughout New Zealand and around the world.

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Abstract

Following the violent crackdown on students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, tens of thousands of sympathetic ethnic Chinese and nationals of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from across the globe (hereafter described as the Overseas Chinese or OC\(^\text{1}\)) unified in protest against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While some were too afraid to speak out, others were much more critical and antagonistic by calling for democratic reform on the mainland.\(^\text{2}\) Fearing an escalation of anti-CCP sentiment amongst a diaspora crucial to its national interests, Beijing promptly intensified qiaowu gongzuo (hereafter described as qiaowu or OC work) to deal with the precarious situation. It employed a foreign legion of diplomats, attaches from various government ministries and specialist qiaowu cadres to aggressively manage and control strategic OC communities under a comprehensive set of influential tools and persuasive techniques.\(^\text{3}\) Over the next two decades, the CCP continually developed and improved qiaowu to the extent that it had become more successful with these methods in the current period than any other era – particularly so with new migrants and PRC students. Such prowess became apparent in 2008, when large numbers of the OC again took to the streets in heated protest. This time their response was not in defiance of the regime, but in strong support of China and its leaders.

How has qiaowu been able to influence and manage the OC in this way? Why have qiaowu efforts worked with such success? Why has the CPP become so confident in advancing OC work since the crisis of 1989? This thesis explains the nature and development of qiaowu, details its specific work methods, and analyzes the platforms employed to advance relations with the OC diaspora. By assessing a wide range of Chinese language references, primary source policy documents and internal memoranda, this thesis argues that over decades of counter-efforts from rival political factions, gradual cultural assimilation, changes in OC demographics, technology and the international geo-political climate, qiaowu has served as an accomplished and necessary component of the CCP’s modernized propaganda and thought work system for influencing, managing and unifying a heterogeneous population of OC for Beijing’s national interests.

\(^\text{1}\) This paper uses the term OC in a generic manner to include ethnic Chinese living outside of China (including the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau) and Taiwan, irrespective of citizenship. Where specific types of OC are referred to, the term will be qualified.
\(^\text{3}\) Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 163-164.
Notes on Romanization of Chinese

The content of this thesis spans over a century of OC affairs, overseen by different government regimes, and consequently, different publishing conventions. As such, the romanization of certain Chinese words may be inconsistent, depending on their origin and usage. The majority of personal names, terms and titles used in this thesis follow the commonly accepted PRC phonetic system of *hanyu pinyin*. However, names that are widely recognized under the Wade-Giles system or some variant of it (particularly those connected to Taiwan, such as the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek or Ma Ying-jeou) have not been changed so as not to confuse the reader with different spellings. Finally, the author takes full responsibility for the accuracy of translation from the original Chinese language source materials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATD</td>
<td>Approved Tourist Destination</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>China Central Television</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Central Propaganda/Publicity Department</td>
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<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese Peoples’ Political Consultative Conference</td>
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<td>CSSA</td>
<td>Chinese Student and Scholar Association</td>
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<td>CTS</td>
<td>China Travel Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYC</td>
<td>China Youth Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DVD</td>
<td>Digital Versatile Disc</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FLG</td>
<td>Falun Gong</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GADP</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Democracy and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOCAO</td>
<td>Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSK</td>
<td>Hanyu shuiping kaoshi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>Indonesian Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MOFTEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Trade &amp; Economic Co-operation</td>
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<td>MSN</td>
<td>Microsoft Network</td>
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<td>MSS</td>
<td>Ministry of State Security</td>
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<td>NTDTV</td>
<td>New Tang Dynasty Television</td>
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<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZCA</td>
<td>New Zealand Chinese Association</td>
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<td>OC</td>
<td>Overseas Chinese</td>
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<td>OCAC</td>
<td>Overseas Chinese/Compatriot* Affairs Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAO</td>
<td>Overseas Chinese Affairs Office</td>
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<td>OFP</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Propaganda</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>Peoples Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Peoples Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRCA</td>
<td>Peaceful Reunification of China Association</td>
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<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>TECO</td>
<td>Taipei Economic and Cultural Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFWD</td>
<td>United Front Work Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US/USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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* The first ‘C’ in OCAC changed in official ROC documentation from ‘Chinese’ to ‘Compatriot’ in 2006.
Figure 1:
Relationships Between the Qiaowu Apparatus and the Extended State Bureaucracy
1.00 Introduction

Amongst the various definitions, notions and typology of classical and modern diasporas, a general consensus encompasses the concept of any population that has migrated from its country of origin and settled in a foreign land, but maintains its continuity as a community through maintaining strong sentimental and material links with its home country. Those sharing such links of solidarity have the potential to be politicized and mobilized in order to influence political, economic, diplomatic and military outcomes from the home or host country. For example, during the Second World War, ethnic Japanese doho or dokokujin (Japanese naturalized or born abroad owing first allegiance to Japan and the emperor) were employed for propaganda purposes to demoralize allied forces. To advance Israeli interests abroad, American Jewish and Zionist lobbies in the United States (US) are widely acknowledged to influence Washington’s Middle East policy. Britain, Greece, France and Germany all have government level ministries or representative agencies to project or advance their political and cultural interests throughout the world with help from their overseas populations.

For facilitating domestic economic development, the Israeli government created the Jewish Agency for Israel in 1948 for encouraging Jewish immigration to Israel and other political and cultural interests. Similarly, the governments of Iraq, India, and Germany

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5 Gabriel Sheffer, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, 1-15.
Vietnam and the Philippines actively embrace and attract their diaspora for the same purpose. Mexico has used dual state membership to keep the ties of its expatriates alive for business and election processes. More recently, Russia has attempted to institutionalize identity politics in order to take advantage of its diaspora in the newly independent states following the breakup of the former Soviet Union.

However, these efforts pale in comparison to the CCP’s *huaqiao shiwu* effort (hereafter abbreviated as *qiaowu*). It is a multi-level superstructure – consisting of governmental, diplomatic and non-governmental agencies and organizations catering for a target group of 48 million ethnic Chinese across the globe. Staff numbers are estimated to be in the tens of thousands with over 1000 trade, sports and cultural groups travelling abroad annually to promote China and things Chinese. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) has attachments in PRC embassies, consulates, and representative agencies in almost every country to personally liaise with local OC communities.

The OCAO has developed and implemented *qiaowu* policies with a special consideration of the people-to-people methods typical of the CCP’s dealings with the masses. Under a systematic approach of persuasion, influence and manipulation, the CCP has been successful in guiding and directing many OC communities around the

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world to be supportive of Beijing; and where it cannot do so, to at least seek to change their perceptions so that they are favourable towards China. No other government initiative can match qiaowu’s scale of operation or sophistication, nor profess to reach the level of success that China has enjoyed under a wide variety of specialist programmes and activities.

The only other government able to come close to making a claim of reaching out to so many millions of people is that of Taiwan. In representing the Republic of China (ROC), the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist party sought to continue its historical association with the OC following the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. Through its own qiaowu efforts, Taipei dominated OC communities around the world for decades, dictating the management of OC education and their organizations up until the 1990s. However, after this period, Taiwanization (advanced by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the independence movement) saw Taipei’s focus shift solely to pro-Taiwan OC (Taiqiao), while efforts with traditional OC groups (laoqiao) waned. In this context, China’s rival qiaowu effort took to the fore, and has continuously gained ground to become the leading form of extra-territorial engagement with the OC diaspora in the contemporary period.

1.01 A Comparison: Incorporating the Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Understanding the relationship between governments and diasporic populations entails some theoretical considerations. Combined with modern logistical technology and information flows, a diaspora can be a highly co-ordinated ethno-nationalist force with transnational loyalties. Post-national (liberalist) theory contends that the nation-state has become obsolete and replaced by other formations for allegiance and identity.21 According to Shain and Barth, diasporas can be broadly divided into active or passive elements. Passive members become involved in international relations unwillingly or beyond their control; they act according to the wishes of their leaders, or remain silent or inactive, possibly mobilizing in the event of a crisis.22 Active members organize and mobilize in order to influence the foreign policies of their host governments. In this case, their scope of activities is determined by the resources

22 Shain and Barth, “Diaporas and International Relations Theory,” 449-479.
available to them, the opportunities and support structures of their host country, and their inclinations and motivation to maintain solidarity for exerting group influence. As such, diasporas become the subjects of elimination, control, cultivation, or expansion in terms of the home or host state’s interests.

Sociologist Yasemin Soysal examined how institutions and available resources served as determinants of the incorporation of migrants. She looked at how the patterns of organizational structure and policy discourse constructed an incorporation regime – these included the officially stated policy goals, instruments, administrative structures for policy implementation, the legal frameworks that defined the status and rights of migrants, as well as their participatory schemes. A comparison of her findings concerning Germany’s attempts to incorporate the migrant Turkish community with that of China and the OC assists with explaining the reasons behind the success or failure of alternative diaspora policies. Both exhibit similarities in their institutional structure, yet each has reaped quite different results.

During the 1960s, Turkish immigrant workers were supposed to be a temporary ‘economic’ solution to acute labour shortages in Europe, but few returned to Turkey. Later, in the face of unemployment and policies regulating the presence of foreigners, Turkish guestworkers in Germany faced antagonism from the local population and consequently became marginalized from society. Recognizing a need to provide them with subsidized specialist education programmes and social services, the German government offer Turkish migrants two sets of support structures to draw upon. At the local level, there is a Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs for formulating basic policy for integration and funding, while multiple advisory councils serve as channels for migrants to participate in the consultation process. Although this Commissioner acts as the major sponsor of these measures, there are no federal agencies specifically designed to administer these tasks. Instead, there is a committee within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (with representation from a wide range of government organizations and interest groups) charged with co-ordinating integration programs

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that are run through local authorities and semi-public institutions. To guide policy for
migrants in Germany, the Office of the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs
has advisory status but no formal mechanisms to consult with its subjects, nor a
budget.25

Germany, despite its decentralized administrative structure, features a highly
centralized public sphere of bureaucracies and intermediary groups which retain
strong links to the state as the locus of sovereignty. This arrangement can be
explained by Soysal’s statist model, whereby the state is a bureaucratic administrative
unit that centrally organizes the polity and decision-making processes. The subjects
and their activities are defined as elements of, and subordinate to the state, which
provides, initiates and intervenes in societal function. Under this framework, subjects
are incorporated as individuals and lack intermediary structures linking migrants and
their interests to the state and its administrative organs. The corporatist model
assumes vertical formal avenues for official participation and incorporation in
intermediary ‘group’ structures sponsored by the state. Membership to these
corporate ‘groups’ and their functions allows collective access to rights and protection
with emphasis on standardized services under a centrally organized structure. This
framework closely reflects aspects of the qiaowu administration and its role, which as
a collective action for the OC, takes place according to a centralized state apparatus
under a top-down mode of operation. Moreover, it features a wide range of
intermediary structures for participation. As such, under Soysal’s typology of
membership model, both the German-Turkish diaspora and PRC-OC relationship fall
into the statist-corporatist pattern of action and authority.

Soysal concluded that even without formal citizenship in Germany, the Turkish
diaspora were incorporated into various legal and organizational structures of the host
society. She noted how migrants have forged a transnational status and identity
through organizational activity, campaigning and lobbying their host governments in
a recontextualization of “nationness” whereby the dimensions of territoriality and

25 Ibid, 77-79; see also Jurgen Fijalkowski, “Conditions of Ethnic Mobilization: The German Case” in
Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-Cultural Europe, eds. John Rex and Beatrice Drury (Aldershot: Ashgate
citizenship have become irrelevant. Soysal also raised the issue of postnational identity politics as a means of participation in politics, negotiation of membership, and assertion of identity without a necessary reference to shared nationhood. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, such structural aspects of the PRC’s relationship with the OC share many similarities with Soysal’s findings. However, this is where the commonalities end.

In practice Germany has not achieved a satisfactory outcome with incorporating the Turkish community. German authorities have largely turned over to Turkish religious institutions key educational aspects of the relationship (including other means of transmitting identity back to Turkey) in an attempt to distance Turks from the German state, and to maintain their cultural and political allegiance to Turkey. In other words, the German government, although offering support for Turkish migrants, hope that they will return to their homeland. Similarly, the Turkish attempt to effectively engage with its diaspora is also severely limited. Turkey does not have a single administrative body to oversee such service provision – 36 different government bodies are involved with the diaspora, but lack effective co-ordination; in addition, there is limited or little communication, publicity and information on diaspora issues. Moreover, discontinuity and lack of comprehensiveness and understanding of diaspora policy by successive governments has meant the relationship was never given consistent priority.

In addition, both the home and host governments have failed to articulate a sense of identity and nationhood over the Turkish diaspora. Second and third generation Turks have no formal memory of “home.” Subsequent findings by historian James Helicke illustrate how the Turkish (mis)understanding of “nation” has resulted in migrant Turkish communities not connecting to either their host or homeland, but instead through religious interpretations. As a result, many Turks outside Turkey exist “between” states and result in a large number of fragmented Turkish associations

26 Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, 136-162.
representing different political stances. Ultimately, Turkish migrants remain marginalized in Germany; at the same time, the Turkish government’s failure for achieving integration of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the region has affected its accession process into the European Union.

From this perspective, where both Germany and Turkey have failed to connect with the Turkish diaspora, qiaowu offers numerous policy areas for improvement in terms of co-ordination, organizational structure, communications, and ethnographic reconnection. This raises some important questions: why has China been more successful with obtaining the support of the the OC? Does the type of regime matter? Are policies the determining factor? China’s use of platforms such as ethnic linkages, patriotism, economic opportunity and social mobility are several areas of analysis that can help answer these questions. In an age of transnationalism and mobile identities, other countries may find certain aspects of the study of qiaowu useful for maximizing the untapped potential of their own diasporas.

1.02 Introduction to the Extant Literature

In contrast to predictions that it would fall to democratization, the CCP has successfully reconsolidated itself since the turmoil of 1989. Many of the reasons for this transformation are due to its pragmatic approach to regime institutionalization – based upon Huntington’s theory of adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of state organizations. This development of coherent institutionalization is partly discernable from studying how China has dealt with the OC over the years – including the anthropological, socio-economic and historical aspects of Chinese immigration,

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29 Helicke, “Turks in Germany,” 175-191; Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, 107-111.
31 The literature review offered in this introduction is brief for stylistic reasons. I will engage with and refer to the wider scholarship throughout the thesis by weaving it into the narrative as supporting references where relevant so as not to bog the reader down at the outset with material that may be repeated in depth later.
their integration in host societies, their relationship with China. Amongst the relevant literature pertaining to these concerns is Stephen Fitzgerald’s comprehensive study *China and the Overseas Chinese – A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy 1949-1970*, which focused specifically on the PRC’s influence upon Chinese abroad in a domestic context (rather than external development) during the 1950s and 1960s. Fitzgerald argued that OC policy changed constantly, with their treatment veering from left to right, and alternating between severity and leniency depending on the political environment. Similarly, other academics argued that Beijing’s OC policy was largely dependant upon the domestic and international geo-political situation.

Pingping Zhu described China’s three regimes of OC patriotism; Wang Gungwu identified a four-stage relationship between OC and the Chinese government. Similarly, Frank Pieke suggested Four Models of OC Relations. Although Harold Hinton was incorrect by arguing that Beijing would protect the OC at any cost, David Mozingo and Leo Suryadinata both accurately asserted that national interests would determine Beijing’s actions.

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Pal Nyiri, Hong Liu, Mette Thuno and Elena Barabantseva all argued state-sponsored facilitation of the OC relationship. They noted that the CCP exploit business, cultural and ancestral links for the purpose of imparting PRC state ideology, encouraging dual anchored identity and promoting dual allegiance – all in the hope of influencing their actions and creating politically active citizens under an engagement of “long distance nationalism.” In this manner, Chinese migrants who strongly identify with the motherland can assist China’s external development in a way that does not depend on political structures. This research builds upon their argument of nationalism and patriotism as central to China’s evolution of modern OC policy, and explains how the CCP has achieved such a successful relationship with the OC.

Since economic reforms after 1978, PRC scholarship on OC affairs has also enjoyed increased attention. An enormous amount of interest and research amongst PRC academics in the 1980s indicated the state-driven directive to find out how the OC could fit into assisting China’s plans for modernization, including: methods for mobilizing OC technological expertise and investment; techniques for connecting with and winning over the OC after years of injustices; reclaiming the OC under ethnic and cultural considerations despite their foreign nationalities; and how to write OC history in an accommodative fashion both domestically and abroad without causing controversy. In addition to examining the OC in the context of their

contribution to China from abroad, PRC scholars also assist qiaowu policy development by analyzing their social integration in host countries. 49 These programmes are primarily located at the OC universities at Jinan and Xiamen – complete with special staff, libraries and think tanks dedicated to providing qualitative and quantitative research.

1.03 Aims of this Research

Having located itself in the literature, this thesis analyzes the evolving nature, scope and patterns of the PRC’s qiaowu strategies and policies in order to describe the CCP’s continued and strengthening influence over the OC. The research focuses upon the institutional actors, mechanisms and processes of the qiaowu infrastructure – essentially how and why the PRC’s OC policies and methods have developed since 1949, in particular the period between 1989 and 2008. This study takes place in the context of China’s rivalry with Taiwan’s own efforts of engagement with the OC, and how that has changed as a result of Taipei’s own domestic and international geo-political situation. Moreover, qiaowu policies are very much influenced by both ideology and the wider geo-political concerns of the state. This thesis argues that despite a sometime turbulent relationship with the OC, Beijing’s intention was always to retain their trust and access to their political and economic resources for facilitating its domestic development, extending its foreign policy, challenging political rivals, and boosting its international image.

In addition, this thesis addresses the implications and challenges of managing and dealing with the world’s largest ethnic group. The research describes and analyzes the nature of the CCP’s transnational influence over the OC. It examines the mechanisms for incorporating the OC into advancing China’s national interests,

affirming the CCP’s political legitimacy, improving China’s international image and status, promoting Chinese culture, and for boosting its economic situation. Whether it be securing its territorial borders, economic development and modernization, expanding its soft and hard power spheres of influence, the OC are key links to these aims and interests that legitimize the CCP regime. From this summary, various research questions can be generated:

1. To what extent, if any, are the OC a tool of China’s comprehensive national power?
2. What is the role of the OC in the CCP-led Party-State system?
3. How and why are the OC managed, influenced and mobilized to serve this purpose?
4. How are the OC used as political leverage for Beijing’s interests?
5. How and why are the OC used as public relations devices for China?
6. Why has qiaowu work been strengthened in recent years?
7. What are the limits to China’s influence over the OC?
8. How has Taiwanization affected China’s approach to qiaowu?
9. How has qiaowu policy developed in accordance with modern migration patterns?
10. What are the implications of China’s qiaowu policy for other countries?

These research questions address a different facet of the PRC-OC relationship – the target groups, the specific methods, the reasons and ideology, the constraints, the rivalry with Taiwan and other challengers, and how qiaowu has been affected by the wider geo-strategic environment.

1.04 Importance of Qiaowu Research to International Relations

Following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, the CCP recognized that it had a serious problem with maintaining its legitimacy amongst the OC diaspora. This group provided support for a wide range of China’s economic, political and national interests both domestically and abroad. The CCP quickly put in place a comprehensive strategy to reclaim their hearts and minds. Over the subsequent decades, this strategy has yielded significant results. Although there exists a wealth
of scholarship concerning China’s efforts to connect and benefit from the OC (such as attracting contributions, resources and support through instilling ethnographic or nationalistic sentiment amongst them), there still lacks a comprehensive and systematic examination of *qiaowu* methodology and its wider implications for international and regional relations.

This thesis seeks to fill this gap of knowledge by exhaustively dissecting *qiaowu* down to its core attributes and philosophies on every aspect of the OC relationship in order to make a complete and thorough assessment. It takes an investigative approach that uncovers, describes and links *qiaowu* policies to the OC situation and human interactions under different conditions. Specifically, it examines how *qiaowu* is institutionally structured and how it functions, analyzes the change in goals since the Mao years, and describes the future challenges that it faces. While one is able to glean many of these aspects by examining various case studies, *qiaowu* and its underlying philosophies and inner workings remain shrouded in bureaucracy and secrecy. This thesis seeks to offer a descriptive attempt to understand the existence and importance of this relationship to China and its national interests.

Under the theme of ‘thinking globally, acting locally,’ *qiaowu* has attempted to unify a heterogeneous population of OC in support of the PRC’s interests. In addition to its traditional embrace for the wider diaspora, Beijing has sought to target and co-opt select groups of elite and new migrant OC to raise both its own status as a responsible international power, and the status of the OC themselves. These developments have seen a revitalization of *qiaowu* activity reflected in China’s global rise. The empirical detail which illustrates these aspects of *qiaowu* is very rich, and speaks to larger questions and implications for international relations.

Firstly, do diasporas play a significant role in foreign policy decision making? As China specialists Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross noted, it is not clear what, if any, political and economic preferences the OC can bring to the foreign policy making process.50 Yossi Shain and Ahron Barth suggested that this depends on how permeable the policy process is, and how much control the state can exercise over the

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An analysis of the evolution of qiaowu policies shows that the PRC’s approach to OC affairs has been, and continues to be, constrained by Beijing’s international position. Qiaowu policy has historically and continues to be subordinate and related to China’s foreign policy. China has moved from its cautious and vague policies of the mid-1950s towards active relationships with all ethnic Chinese regardless of their citizenship.

Since 1989, the CCP has placed renewed efforts of using qiaowu as a form of proactive co-optation and incorporation as tools for social control and management of the OC. In the current period, the main thrust of China’s qiaowu policy has not changed; methodology has been modernized in accordance with new demographics, migration patterns and the globalized geo-political environment while policies have evolved in scope, methods and sophistication. Beijing has continued to cite its policy of non-interference, yet expanded and intensified its extra-territorial influence and dominance over the OC populace to incorporate methods for best utilizing old and new OC populations, to promote economic integration, and to deter or quash threats to the CCP. These advances in qiaowu have consolidated warm relationships with new migrant OC and PRC students studying abroad, and consequently achieved a new sense of legitimacy for the CCP regime by increasing its influence over OC communities as a form of soft power foreign policy.

1.05 Political/Social Control

Qiaowu provides a clear demonstration of the methods behind the CCP’s attempt for political control over the OC community, serving as a strategic antidote for anti-CCP behaviour. Qiaowu seeks to gain and secure the loyalty of the OC before others do. History has shown how the OC have influenced China’s domestic politics, and the CCP has made every effort to prevent such challenges from occurring. Strategic groups of the OC can be mobilized as channels for Beijing to pursue its interests and expand an ethnically conscious source of support throughout the world. The CCP has actively asserted its extra-territorial influence upon the OC diaspora through

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51 Shain and Barth, “Diaporas and International Relations Theory,” 449-479.
52 Chuang Hsi-chuan (vice-chairman of the PRC OCAC) in a report to the inaugural All-China Returned Overseas Chinese Association, 17 October 1956, as noted by Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, 25.
sophisticated cultural and nationalistic channels in order to advance its long term interests, while preventing challenges and attacking threats to its legitimacy and hold onto power. Encouraging nationalism and patriotism are central to China’s relationship with the OC.

The OC, composed of autonomous individuals, groups and organizations, create issues, problems and pressures to which qiaowu policy makers must address. While all OC are considered the subject of qiaowu, the OC diaspora itself cannot be described as a single collective – it is a heterogeneous population composed of discrete and interlinking subset communities, each with different agendas. This diversity has increased in recent years – facilitated by modern migration patterns, liberalized immigration and multicultural policies of receiving countries (particularly following trade, cultural and political relations), and the proliferation of illegal migration. In this context, the PRC divides the OC community on sub-national lines, with provincial, professional, commercial, sporting or religious demarcations for the purposes of management.53

While some groups are more easily influenced and guided (such as pro-Beijing associations), other groups present significant difficulties for management. For example, during the Mao years, governments in Southeast Asia regarded any appeals from Beijing towards the OC as suspicious, requiring decades of careful and strategic measures so as to reassure neighbours that the OC problem was resolved; in the contemporary period, illegal migrants to the Pacific, Africa and Eastern Europe have tarnished China’s cultivated national image as a ‘responsible’ power. In response, the Chinese government continues with caution – ensuring that it is not to be perceived by others as interventionist, invasive or exploitative, but as a helpful and co-operative friend and partner bringing ‘win-win’ results for all. This raises the question of whether China is simply adapting to global norms for tactical benefit, or if it is genuinely learning?54 The findings of this thesis show that tactical benefit and the

pursuit of national interests remains Beijing’s foremost consideration for qiaowu policy development.

1.06 Qiaowu for the 21st Century

These issues point to a new understanding of OC affairs in a context that is specific for the 21st century, incorporating themes such as globalization and modern migrational trends. This thesis examines whether the increase in the numbers of the OC settling or working around the world, and their links with China, indicate a specific strategy of using them to advance Beijing’s national interests. How the CCP engages with the OC remains a significant cause of concern and interest, particularly for countries with large OC populations. Although this study does not seek to propagate or sensationalize theories of “yellow peril”, “China threat” or “fifth column” activity as some other observers have alluded to, it does highlight the potential political and social implications of qiaowu for host governments and receiving countries.

As mentioned earlier, academics have addressed the significance of state-sponsored facilitation in the PRC-OC relationship. Moreover, they note how China has become increasingly confident over the past twenty years in dealing with qiaowu affairs with both the OC and the host governments of countries in which they reside. Underscoring this confidence is a sense of revitalized pro-Beijing sentiment amongst the OC that encourages them to participate in China’s re-emergence economically, culturally and politically. The CCP has been successful in cementing amongst China’s domestic population and certain factions of the OC diaspora (mainly new migrants and PRC foreign students) the concept of equating patriotism with love of China and its communist leadership. These groups have likewise consolidated and strengthened their relationship with qiaowu agencies and PRC diplomatic representatives. This implies their willingness to be embraced by China and its


leadership, and hence their political subservience. Moreover, this interaction signifies a move from traditional ethnographically-based associations to quasi-political platforms.

This thesis builds upon and updates the existing scholarship in a modern context, resulting in an original detailed study illustrating precisely how the CCP has strengthened its presence throughout the OC diaspora for China’s long term interests. The future direction of qiaowu points towards key goals: improving China’s international image, China’s domestic and foreign advancement, raising the status of the OC in their places of residence. These objectives face several stumbling blocks, however: a revival of the ‘OC problem’, acculturation, migration, illegal migration, and transnational crime. An analysis of these issues contributes to the understanding of China’s wider relationship with the OC, and also how external actors and opportunities impact upon China’s foreign policy development.

1.07 Problems with Assessing Qiaowu

Can extra-territorial direction and control of the OC be proven? There is no way of measuring the complex attitudes of the Chinese authorities towards the OC; moreover, the PRC-based ascription of citizenship and the unofficial but powerful ethnicity-based perceptions of Chineseness remains vague (this point is discussed in further detail when examining the role of nationalism and patriotism in qiaowu policy development). Similarly, it is difficult to measure the extent to which qiaowu has been successful. As such, this thesis does not lend itself to quantification. While there is no true measure of “effectiveness”, there has been a distinct and significant shift of attitudes amongst OC, amplified by larger numbers of mainland Chinese migrants over the past few decades since 1989. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to show how qiaowu policies have evolved and assisted with this shift, and highlight cases were these measures have yielded significant results.

In addition, this thesis makes no claim to constructing a relevant theoretical description of China’s relationship with the OC diaspora. While relevant theory

might be applied to various qiaowu scenarios throughout the research, it is not the purpose of this thesis to repeat established discourses already covered in the current literature.58 For the purposes of locating the importance of qiaowu in the wider scholarship, this thesis refers to and surveys a variety of disciplines and models from which a relevant theoretical framework could be generated in order to explain the relationship between the CCP and the OC diaspora as a future research project.

1.08 Methodology

Evaluation of ethnographic fieldwork within discourse research is prone to subjectivity – a natural result of the selective process of data gathering. As such, objectivity, validity and reliability of data often come into question. Ethnographic studies seek to reconstruct and understand specific situations, but not to replicate them. Quality of research, therefore, must be evaluated along lines of transparency, suitable case studies, and reliance upon a range of different sources in order to support one’s conclusions.

I have gathered data for this research from a wide range of sources as both a researcher and long serving member of the OC community. I have been an executive member of various OC voluntary community groups in New Zealand (both pro-Beijing, pro-Taipei and neutral organisations). I am a Director of the Overseas Exchange Association of Guangdong Province. I am also a regular participant in activities organized or hosted by the PRC embassy, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) and qiaowu agencies at various levels (including international forums, tours, and youth programmes). With such broad non-partisan affiliations, I have been able to write about my experiences with both Taiwan and China’s qiaowu programmes without political bias.

Moreover, these engagements and positions have provided me with access to crucial resources and contacts, and ultimately a unique insight into how the qiaowu polity, bureaucracy and institutions interact with OC communities and their leaders. In many ways, I have had the opportunity to deal with qiaowu affairs in a broad scope – much

58 For example, see Laurence J.C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier, The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
more so than other OC community members who may be restricted to certain (and localized) aspects of the relationship. Therefore, assumptions about the effects of qiaowu policies on personal matters (such as identity constructions and ethnic affiliations of the OC) throughout the thesis are based upon my own extensive firsthand experiences and observations derived from a broad range of situations and circumstances over different time periods.

My own conclusions have been complemented by the personal views of those directly involved in OC affairs (such as government officials, academics and OC community leaders). My fieldwork was done in the form of open-ended casual discussions and conversations rather than a qualitative interview, questionnaire or survey. These included personal communications with numerous OC leaders and members of OC community groups in the Pacific Islands and New Zealand as well as qiaowu cadres in China. Formal interviews were avoided as they might have raised suspicions about my intentions. For example, cadres in Guangzhou were wary of divulging too much information to me. Content and details from meetings, private conversations, and participation in qiaowu activities were not expressly quoted or referred to due to excessive footnoting, but woven into the narrative as examples, descriptions, analysis and insight of various situations. Other personal comments or situations may have appeared too trivial to reference. In short, for the purposes of managing the huge volume of information, I was selective in largely listing only my traceable written sources (such a ‘guidance’ documents and speeches).

This thesis employs a wide range of Chinese language primary source materials – including government policy documents, internal circulars and memoranda, books accessed firsthand from a dedicated qiaowu library/depository in Beijing (which functioned to monitor, collect, and collate news of OC affairs from China and around the world) and the library for OC research at Jinan University in Guangzhou. In both cases I had full access to classified information and sensitive materials not normally available to the public, such as neibu (internal), jimi (classified) and mimi (secret) qiaowu policy documents deemed too sensitive for open publication. The typology and origin of these empirical data sources confirms existing knowledge or assertions, and also provides a deeper and wider understanding of qiaowu.
For example, the main primary source policy document used throughout this thesis is *Qiaoqing* – a regular internal publication (and therefore marked as classified and/or secret) issued by the State Council concerning anything about *qiaowu*. It is intended for distribution amongst government ministries and high-level *qiaowu* cadres. It is made up of advisory papers, memoranda and reports from all provincial, county, city and town levels of the *qiaowu* bureaucracy, as well as additional input from relevant research bodies (such as universities and think tanks). *Qiaoqing* highlights important findings and statistics, outcomes of policy implementation, as well as policy recommendations. It is therefore the most important document that indicates the internal attitude and position of the State Council towards *qiaowu* during any given period.

I also referred to various compilations of *qiaowu* policy, such as encyclopedias, magazines published by *qiaowu* authorities, and compilations of speeches from high-level CCP and *qiaowu* officials, state media newspaper editorials, historical reports and commentary. One example of the latter is Wang Tang’s *Qiaowu chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn of Overseas Chinese Affairs), which conveniently illustrates the evolution of Beijing’s attitudes towards *qiaowu* policy from 1949 to 1997.59

This thesis also uses a variety of internal handbooks and manuals written by experts at the State Council for OC Affairs (OCAO). They are intended for *qiaowu* cadres and illustrate the specific methodology, techniques and philosophies surrounding *qiaowu* and its implementation. The content of these materials is significant because they highlight exactly how cadres are to deal with the OC in accordance with the relevant policies – and therefore revealing the true nature of *qiaowu* at the frontline.

Many Chinese language secondary sources were used, such as journals, newspapers, newsletters and magazines, discussion and working papers (some scholarly and non-scholarly) which have useful information. Some are published by *qiaowu* agencies, both at the national and provincial level. These manuscripts intended for open publication are first vetted by the CCP United Front (UF) Department, which ensures that the audience receives appropriately worded material; that policies, personalities

and the Party are ‘accurately’ portrayed; and that secret material is not revealed. For example, I referred to a website of the OC Literature and News Centre at Jinan University (whose address is unknown to the general public) and found the internal source *Qiaoqing jianbao* – an electronic compilation of *qiaowu* news items, stories of interest (taken from newspapers both inside and outside of China), policy updates, reports and statistics intended for OC researchers and *qiaowu* cadres. While some of these items may reflect a pro-Beijing stance, they can be regarded as indicative of the type of material used by *qiaowu* analysts in their policy formulation.

There were also large amounts of policy documents and communications taken from the open online sources of *qiaowu* organizations (both national and provincial, and from the PRC and ROC), PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and consular offices/embassies around the world. These sources outlined the public information and policies surrounding *qiaowu*. In addition, to incorporate a sense of the wider geopolitical environment during the Cold War period, I referred to declassified US State Department telex communications to gauge international reaction towards OC affairs.

There were also a large volume of media sources used. Most of these were mainstream publications and are widely accepted as independent and accurate. However, others were the mouthpieces of political movements (such as propaganda materials by both pro-CCP and pro-KMT sources and the Falun Gong (FLG)) and written with intentions to incite fear or distaste for rivals, or support for their own agendas. The challenge of this thesis was to carefully sort through scattered and unsubstantiated evidence that may have led to invalid or inaccurate assessments. For example, I accessed some articles concerning the Olympic Torch rallies from web postings and blogs by participants. While these types of sources are not of a scholarly nature, they clearly demonstrate the methods that students went to mobilize themselves. They also reveal the strong emotions and feelings that PRC students had during this period, and their level of commitment to supporting China and its leaders.

Although some of these sources may have been unreliable for backing my assertions about the *qiaowu* administration itself, they were used only in instances to demonstrate how rival regimes and organizations may have sought to engage with their OC targets. While some sources may appear to be jingoistic in nature, they have
been carefully selected to demonstrate their different points of view concerning OC affairs and their particular intentions with reaching out to strategic groups of the OC diaspora. Overall, the context of the evidence put forward reflects the same attitudes expressed in reliable primary sources issued by policy makers and commentators during each period in China’s modern history.

1.09 Thesis Outline

To answer the research questions in the context of qiaowu’s importance for facilitating China’s economic, political and great-power status aspirations, this thesis is divided into three sections. Each is described and compared in the context of Taiwan’s own rival qiaowu effort, as well as how qiaowu has evolved as a result of modern migration and China’s emerging role on the global stage.

The first section links historical, government and policy documents and other empirical evidence with various real world situations concerning OC affairs to show how and why China’s qiaowu policies and methods have continually evolved since 1949, and in particular between 1989-2008. It details the background and nature of qiaowu: Chapter Two begins with a broad overview of China’s successful management of certain cohorts of the OC since 1989. This sets the scene for Chapter Three, which details the specific nature and applications of qiaowu. This is followed by an analysis of the qiaowu bureaucratic structure in the historical context of OC policy since the late 19th century until the contemporary period; Chapter Four investigates how the OC have been viewed by various governments of China, and the policies that have resulted over different periods as a result of these evolving definitions. The findings from these chapters conclusively demonstrate that the overall goal of Beijing’s qiaowu policies have never really changed, but adapted to the geo-political environment.

The second section analyzes the tools and methodology of qiaowu given the challenges of a diverse OC diaspora: Chapter Five explains how China has reconnected with the OC beyond its geographic borders by employing an articulate reconstruction of common identity, cultural traditions and emotional connection through education; Chapter Six examines how China has successfully influenced
specific OC populations through youth work, media and propaganda; Chapter Seven describes how the OC are managed and mobilized to contain, subvert or eliminate threats to the CCP regime. This section shows how qiaowu cadres attempt to cope with diversity and view the OC diaspora on different lines – thinking globally and acting locally.

The third section examines qiaowu in the context of China’s foreign interests in a 21st century geo-political environment – both in terms of national security and its international relations: Chapter Eight examines the role of consular protection and evacuation as an integral part of Beijing’s overall embrace of all ethnic Chinese; Chapter Nine suggests a new model for qiaowu work, developed from Beijing’s own views on modern migration, and the resulting implications for host countries. It also explains how qiaowu methods have evolved in response to transnational social mobility, and its role in China’s aspirations to become a respected global citizen. From this evidence, this thesis conclusively demonstrates that Beijing views the OC and their resources as a key means to advance China’s national interests, and highlights the potential political and social implications behind its appeals to those OC participating in China’s re-emergence.
2.00 Mobilizing the OC in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century

This chapter explains the CCP’s shift in attitudes and strategy towards the OC by highlighting two important periods of its relationship with them – namely the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay rallies. Driven by a need to reclaim their hearts and minds after the June 4\textsuperscript{th} events, Chinese authorities focused upon a strategy that engaged with the OC through ethnographic, cultural and economic appeals. The CCP has continually developed these methods over the years to incorporate patriotic and nationalistic sentiment, culminating in a set of programmes that encourages support for the CCP regime itself.

By strengthening and managing relationships with a growing population of foreign students and new migrants from the PRC over two decades, the CCP has successfully recruited a friendly pro-Beijing force to ease China’s rise throughout the world, to support its objectives, and to challenge any threats. These qiaowu efforts indicate the extent of the CCP’s influence over the OC community, and expose a darker side to this relationship.

2.01 Capitalizing on the Olympic Spirit

The CCP recognized the Olympic movement as a potent source of national pride for the OC everywhere and sought to use it for drawing them together by the millions.\textsuperscript{60} PRC officials described the successful bid for the 2008 Summer Games as the “joint efforts made by the overseas Chinese throughout the world” and a “tremendous spiritual force pushing the Chinese people forward” for China’s unity, prosperity and rejuvenation.\textsuperscript{61} Giving the OC the opportunity for input into its affairs and development through the Olympics was another way of getting them to identify with China – and they were extremely positive in their response. 330,000 OC from around

\textsuperscript{60} Ya Ming, “Hongyang Aoyun jingshen huhuan shijie heping,” (Enhance the Olympic Spirit, Call Out for World Peace) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 3, 2008, http://qwgzyj.gov.cn/aypd/142/1137.shtml (accessed 7 June 2009); “Nimen de shengli, jiushi women de shengli, geng shi quanqiu huaren de shengli!!” (Your Victory is Our Victory, Moreover is all the World’s OC’s Victory!), Qiaoqing jianbao, 20 September 2004.

the world gave more than 900 million yuan towards the effort. The Olympic hosts welcomed proposals for the construction of venues, with the ‘Watercube’ complex representing the foremost symbol of OC contribution. 62 175,000 tickets were allocated to OC communities around the world, including those from Taiwan. 63 Furthermore, Beijing specifically extended invitations to OC of foreign citizenship to participate as volunteers, with a special program to recruit from abroad. 64 With such a feeling of ‘ownership’ for the Olympics, many of those who identified themselves as Chinese considered anything negative about it as a direct affront not only to China, but also to themselves as well.

This surge of pro-China sentiment (both domestic and abroad) was evident in the months prior to August 2008. Fostering these emotions was a key means to strengthening CCP authority within China, where indignation, frustration and anger resulted following foreign protests against the Olympic Torch relay, racist comments aired on Cable News Network (CNN) and a perception that riots in Tibet were misreported by the Western media. Demonstrators alleged that the French retail chain Carrefour was supporting the Dalai Lama, and held large-scale protests outside its various outlets, as well as the French embassy and the Beijing French school. These rallies legitimized the CCP position on dissidents (such as cracking down on Muslim cells in Xinjiang and jailing human rights activist Hu Jia under the premise of national integrity) without raising criticism.

However, after a couple of days of heated protest, the government issued a front page editorial in the People’s Daily urging citizens to cherish patriotism but expressing it in a “rational” way. It cited the need to maintain focus on economic development by converting “full-hearted patriotic zeal into patriotic action”. 65 Following this line, senior Chinese intellectuals called on the public to “choose a rational way to express

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62 “Guojia youyong zhongxin “Suilifang” huo gangoataiqiao juanzhi jiujiu” (National Aquatic Centre “Watercube” Captures Almost Over 900 Million Yuan from OC Donations) Xinjingbao, 7 November 2007.

63 Remin ribao, 22 September 2007, 6.


their love for the country,” suggesting a better way to win understanding and support worldwide was to introduce the positive side of the country and its people, to show its friendliness, and “win those holding bias” against China.\textsuperscript{66} This reflected a similar government response to the Belgrade embassy bombing in 1999\textsuperscript{67} and the Hainan spy-plane incident in 2001, which saw Beijing briefly allow its nationals to vent nationalistic feeling, but then moving quickly to curb it. While putting an end to over-zealous nationalistic outbursts was aimed to prevent possible protest at the Chinese government itself, this time the purpose was also to restore a peaceful international image of China (in light of the Dafur\textsuperscript{68} and Tibet issues), and to ensure its economic security in a globalized market environment.

The situation overseas, however, was quite different. Pro-Tibetan and FLG movements both presented themselves as potential threats and embarrassments to China’s efforts to successfully host the Olympics. Therefore, nationalism and patriotism amongst the OC was to be managed for China’s interests. Strategic groups of OC in major cities throughout the world mobilized in huge numbers to demonstrate their support for the Beijing games, promote national unity, oppose Tibetan independence, and protest against distorted Western reporting. The majority of these supporters were young and educated. They proudly wore red T-shirts emblazoned “One China, One Family”, sang patriotic songs and chanted “Go Beijing!” Others raised banners with slogans such as “One World, One Dream”.\textsuperscript{69} How was this apparent level of widespread support for Beijing achieved amongst the OC? The answer lies in the CCP’s continuous efforts to guide and manage their perceptions and behaviours – a set of techniques collectively described as \textit{qiaowu}.

\textsuperscript{66} “Zhuanjia, wangmin tan dizhi Jialefu: yi lixing taidu biaoda aiguo qinggan” (Experts and Netizens On the Boycott of Carrefour: Reasons for Attitudes that Express Patriotic Feeling) 17 April 2008, \url{http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-04/17/content_7998084.htm} (accessed 30 April 2008);

\textsuperscript{67} “Experts Say Patriotism Understandable, but Urge People to be Rational,” \textit{Xinhua}, 19 April 2008.

\textsuperscript{68} Beijing was criticised for its involvement in Dafur and refusing to put pressure on the Sudan government to end the humanitarian crisis. See Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvering on the Question of Dafur,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary China} 17, no. 54 (February 2008): 71-84; Jane Macartney, “China Lashes Out Against Dafur Critics in Olympic Row,” \textit{Times Online}, 14 February 2008, \url{www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3367440.ece} (accessed 30 September 2009).

2.02 The 1989 Tiananmen Incident

The Tiananmen Incident of June 4th 1989 sent shockwaves throughout the OC diaspora. Vehement protests against the CCP erupted all across the globe. Most (if not all) of these demonstrations were led and dominated by OC groups. Beijing saw an urgent need to win back their confidence and loyalty and immediately went into damage control. Provincial governments quickly mobilized those with OC family and business connections to make contact with them and explain the situation from Beijing’s perspective. It supplemented these efforts with specially produced propaganda materials.70 For example, they made videos to distribute amongst OC community groups abroad.71 In addition, authorities dispatched special delegations to visit them personally to present their version of the events in an attempt to dispel ill-feeling and “preserve the harmony” (baohe) towards the regime. The purpose of these measures was not only to strengthen relations, but also to continue the flow of OC investment in the face of trade sanctions from the West. After 1989, the CCP would base its legitimacy on both maintaining economic growth and return to a renewed emphasis on the propaganda and thought work methods it had used between the late 1920s to the late 1970s.72

One group deserved special attention. Students were supposed to be the agents of change for China in the context of its scientific and technological modernization.73 However, in the wake of Tiananmen, state-sponsored PRC students abroad became a liability for Beijing. Following the Emergency Immigration Relief Act of 1989 for Chinese Nationals following the June 4th Incident, Washington accorded PRC students in the US special immigration conditions.74 This policy precipitated the

70 Chen Xitong, Report and Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion (Beijing: New Star Publishers, 1989).
71 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 163.
74 Canada, Australia and New Zealand passed similar legislation allowing students to remain as refugees, and later as permanent residents.
potential problem of tens of thousands of China’s elite graduates choosing to remain abroad and not return to participate in China’s modernization, or worse yet, engage in anti-CCP activities. As a key target group for China’s development and mobilization, PRC students overseas became the focus of an intense struggle – not only for reclaiming their talents and skills, but also their political value.\textsuperscript{75}

Thus began a new phase in the development of OC relations, whereby PRC students were the targets of aggressive methods comprising of group management, extra-territorial influence, counter-infiltration and counter-subversion. For example, the PRC consul in Vancouver had identified student leaders and demanded they stop their pro-democracy demonstrations. When they arrived to collect their scholarship cheques, he showed them the ‘official videotape’ of the crackdown and indirectly threatened their relatives by reminding them of their contractual obligations.\textsuperscript{76} In March 1990, the PRC State Education Commission convened a meeting of education counsellors in Chinese embassies and consulates, instructing diplomats to expand their influence over student organizations by strengthening CCP ideology amongst them, winning their support, and isolating or eliminating reactionary factions. In December 1990, senior foreign propaganda official Zhu Muzhi suggested rectifying any negative feelings of PRC students by encouraging the most patriotic students to return to China, while strengthening the patriotism of those choosing to stay abroad.\textsuperscript{77}

To facilitate this, a 1992 order by the State Council Administrative Bureau provided amnesty for those who engaged in acts against the PRC or its interests when returning to China.\textsuperscript{78} The CCP categorized the remainder staying abroad depending upon their loyalty to Beijing, with each group managed under specific measures. For example, it would maintain and strengthen relationships with pro-CCP students; for those less


\textsuperscript{78} Order no. 44. as noted by Qian Ning, \textit{Liuxue Meigu} (Studying in America), (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1996): 285.
patriotic, it used propaganda methods to win them over; finally, those elements deemed dangerous to PRC national interests would be exposed and attacked. These arrangements would ensure that students would remain a controllable asset for the CCP.\textsuperscript{79}

2.03 The CCP’s Ideological Work and Influence on PRC Students

Domestically, Beijing stepped up its recruitment and ideological work on China-based college students after 1989.\textsuperscript{80} The CCP placed importance on boosting the level of domestic nationalism amongst China’s youth by initiating a campaign for national unity. In 1994, the CCP Propaganda Department continued this effort by strengthening patriotic ideas and spirit.\textsuperscript{81} Three concepts arose from this: a traditionalist discourse emphasizing Confucian and Chinese culture in order to maintain political order; a neo-conservative discourse to consolidate power; and finally a populist “Say No” attitude that reflected frustration towards the West.\textsuperscript{82}

Externally, maintaining influence over them after their move abroad has continued to be an important part of \textit{qiaowu} work. In a 1992 State Council ruling, diplomats were to support students abroad, and attempt to raise their patriotism for China.\textsuperscript{83} One of these efforts was ‘guiding’ PRC students abroad through consultation and support. PRC embassies and consulates provided funding, planning, finance, co-ordination and management for various pro-Beijing groups. Although students initially formed their own organizations, since 1989 PRC embassies (through Ministry of Education (MOE) attaches) have been instrumental in establishing branches of the Chinese Student and

\textsuperscript{79} Eftimiades, \textit{Chinese Intelligence Operations}, 117-139.
\textsuperscript{80} Gang Guo, “Party Recruitment of College Students in China,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary China} 14, no. 43 (May 2005): 371-393. For a KMT analysis of political thought work on students in the late 1980s, see Wu Tsai-kuang, \textit{A Study of Communist China’s Intensification of ‘Political Thought Work’ Among University Students} (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, 1987).
Scholar Association (CSSA) on various university campuses around the world as a means of co-ordinating various student groups under one umbrella. Furthermore, the embassy has supported and guided their activities together with other pro-Beijing organizations and business groups for increased influence and exchange of information. For example, at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2008, the local chapter protested against the Dalai Lama and pressured campus officials to prevent him from speaking on political issues. Alternatively, they work to boost positive sentiments for China-related issues, such as fundraising for humanitarian concerns or natural disaster.

Much of this aspect of qiaowu involves building personal relationships with leading figures. Activities include hosting meetings and dinners, or sending embassy representatives to attend student functions. Diplomats use these opportunities to express their concern and care for students while stoking patriotism and enthusiasm for their homeland. They remind students how they could strengthen this relationship in combination with diligent study in order to make their parents’ hopes and dreams a reality – and therefore make the Chinese nation proud of their success. As a result, many of them feel a responsibility to do well in representing their country and are thus ready and willing to act when called upon, or when mobilized with incentives or inducements. Some openly demonstrate their willingness to seek and accept “guidance” from PRC diplomats. They are eager to enhance their political connections for access to benefits, resources, prestige and status. They demonstrate

their support for the regime by organizing and supporting marches, protests and demonstrations under consultation with the embassy.90

Since the 1990s, the PRC authorities have played a leading role in orchestrating various pro-Beijing events outside of China by using a systematic process of micro-management of the OC.91 Embassy attaches (such as those from the MOE, MFA and Ministry of State Security (MSS)) work with qiaowu agencies to ensure a perfect and trouble free welcome by dictating the preparation, specifications and wording of large banners, or in some cases requesting special cultural performances.92 Likewise, dinners and other social functions also follow protocol set down by the visiting delegations. OC business interests determined to forge a closer relationship with Beijing contribute other items that facilitate the welcome, such as distributing Chinese flags. Consequently, pro-Beijing groups always give high-level PRC officials a warm reception.93 In many cases, such mobilization is not only designed for pleasing visiting Chinese officials, but to completely overwhelm any expected opposition. For example, in anticipation of noisy demonstrators during Hu Jintao’s visit to London in October 2005, Chinese officials wearing red armbands directed hundreds of PRC students drafted in from across Britain to challenge anti-China protestors.94

2.04 The 2008 Olympic Torch Rallies

PRC involvement in the 2008 Olympic Torch relay was no different. With a high level of domestic support stemming from years of patriotic education, Li Dongsheng (chair of the Beijing Olympics News Propaganda Work Co-ordinating Group) asserted that there was “basically no chance” of the CCP losing power because of a

93 Li Yongran, “Wen Jiabao fang Xin zhuanti baodao” (Special Report on Wen Jiabao’s Visit to New Zealand), New Zealand Mirror, 7 April 2006, D5.
mass-led democratic transition. These same pro-China feelings have been successfully exported, transplanted and entrenched into xinqiao OC and PRC students abroad through the OC media, the internet and the qiaowu framework.

CCP officials labelled Australia and Japan as ‘relatively dangerous’ destinations for the relay due to the anticipated presence of pro-Tibetan independence and FLG protestors. Internet postings warned that the “weak” number of OC in Canberra would surely be outnumbered by crowds of opponents. The OC in these areas were described as “the last sentry” and organized to prevent a repeat of the embarrassment in London and Paris days earlier. So that PRC students would swamp out their rivals (those groups had been consistently labelled as a ‘minority’ by state media), thousands of supporters were recruited on short notice to ostensibly ‘support the Beijing Olympics, propagate Olympic spirit and promote Sino-foreign friendship.’ A patriotic call to rally descendants of the Yellow Emperor, no matter their nationality or origins, was launched. Chinese language websites used the Olympic spirit to unite all OC both nationally and ethnically, and to stand up and be heard as part of mainstream society. This effort showed that it was Beijing’s intention to gather as many voluntary supporters as possible, rather than attempt indoctrination of the masses.

There were also many incentives offered in order to attract the numbers required. Some in the San Francisco rally were reportedly paid, while other pro-Beijing student groups were ferried to rallies on chartered buses and provided accommodation

– all courtesy of the PRC.\textsuperscript{101} CSSA leader Zhang Rongan confirmed the consulate had offered such facilities for the Canberra rally.\textsuperscript{102} In Japan, co-ordinators charged a 2000 yen flat fee, while the PRC embassy in Tokyo advised the local police to look after the safety and security of the 70 busloads of students travelling to Nagano.\textsuperscript{103} Protest paraphernalia from China (such as thousands of Chinese flags and red T-shirts) was sent to organizers in the form of ‘donations’.\textsuperscript{104} Other gifts for participants included Olympic souvenir items and certificates.\textsuperscript{105} Local OC businesses seeking a closer relationship to Beijing provided or subsidized some of these items.

To ensure the demonstrations proceeded smoothly, 4000 students were vetted fearing anti-China infiltrators amongst them. Records of participants in Japan and Australia were taken using online registration. On signing up, students acknowledged they would abide by certain rules.\textsuperscript{106} This followed previously noted CCP practices whereby participants had signed declarations acknowledging that they would be fined if they caused any unapproved disturbance, would inform officials if contacted by


\textsuperscript{103} “Zai Ri huaren liuxuesheng aoyun shenghuo shengyuan huodong lakai weimu.”

\textsuperscript{104} One attempt to send 2000 flags and 3500 T-shirts failed when Japanese Customs intercepted and held the consignment until after the protests ended. See “Aodaliya huaren shouhao shenghuo ‘zuihou yiban gang’.”

\textsuperscript{105} Organizers also listed bank accounts and direct credit details to encourage donations. Hai Dao, “Gedi liuxuesheng huwei aoyun shenghuo: women de xin ya zuguo xiangyi” (Foreign Students All Over Protect the Olympic Flame: Our Hearts and the Motherland are Interdependant), sohu.com website, 24 April 2008, \url{http://2008.sohu.com/20080424/n256483814.shtml} (accessed 30 April 2008); “Zai Ri huaren liuxuesheng aoyun shenghuo shengyuan huodong lakai weimu”, New Zealand Chinese Students in Support of Olympics, “4.27 jihui xuzhi! Qing wubi zixi yuedu! Yangge zunshou!” (Important Notice for April 27 Rally! Please Be Sure to Read Carefully! Observe Strictly!), baidu.com website, 22 April 2008, \url{http://hi.baidu.com/%CD%B5%B5%C3%B0%EB%C8%D5%CF%D0/blog/item/a27910bf2da8a40f19d81f34.html} (accessed 30 April 2008).

\textsuperscript{106} Lin Li, “Yun huoji weidao Aozhou, huaren shetuan yishi xiaoyan miman” (Before the Torch Reaches Australia, Smoke of OC Group Gunpowder Already Fills the Air), boxun.com website, reposted on cn-view.blogspot.com, 15 April 2008, \url{http://cn-view.blogspot.com/2008/04/g2g_6775.html} (accessed 30 April 2009).
anti-Beijing groups, and would waive all rights to protest with all other groups.\footnote{Ann Lee, “How the Chinese Government Came to Dominate Chinese Language Media in the United States,” \textit{Chinascope} (June 2005): 16.} These strict measures reflected the level of paranoia surrounding high profile China-related events, and demonstrated the obsessive lengths the CCP would go in order to ensure a successful result.

Reports concerning this mobilization effort soon surfaced in the international media. Accusations of the PRC employing ‘rent-a-crowds’ to denounce pro-Tibetan protestors could not be allowed to persist. Beijing was obliged to make a public ‘about face’ on openly supporting the OC. Consequently, \textit{Xinhua} reports emphasized that students had mobilized themselves and established the rallies at their own will.\footnote{“Aodaliya Zhongguo liuxuesheng qidai aoyun huoju chuandi huodong,” (Australian Chinese Foreign Students Look Forward to Olympic Torch Relay) \textit{Xinhuanet}, 22 April 2008, \url{http://2008.qq.com/a/20080422/000420.htm} (accessed 30 April 2008).} Likewise, PRC officials either denied any involvement or deflected questions surrounding the embassies’ provocation of OC nationalism or offering of support to protestors.\footnote{“Aodaliya bufen meiti feinan huaren canyu aoyun huoju chuandi,” (Some Australian Media’s Reproach of Chinese Participation in Olympic Torch Relay) \textit{Xinhua}, 25 April 2008, \url{http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2008-04/25/content_8049791.htm} (accessed 30 April 2008); “NZ Students ‘Enticed by Free Food and Travel’,” \textit{Stuff}, 26 April 2008, \url{www.stuff.co.nz/print/4497123a10.html} (accessed 30 April 2008).} Furthermore, student groups were instructed to deny any links between the rallies and the embassy. They removed previous internet postings and Zhang Rongan retracted his earlier statement, claiming students paid for all expenses themselves.\footnote{“Chinese Students Say Huge Crowds Made for Successful Relay,” \textit{Xinhua}, 24 April 2008, \url{www.chinadaily.com.cn/.../24/content_6642166.htm} (accessed 30 April 2008).}

Despite this cover-up, relations between the embassy and consulates and PRC student groups continued. After the London relay, representatives of the All England Chinese Students and Scholars Federation were among guests invited to an official function at the PRC embassy.\footnote{UKChinese.com, “Zhongguo zhu Ying shiguan juxing qing aoyun huoju chuandi zhaodaihui” (PRC Embassy in England Hosts Olympic Torch Relay Ceremony) April 2008, \url{www.ukchinese.com/www/18/2008-04/590.html} (accessed 30 April 2008).} After the Canberra demonstrations, an embassy statement thanked PRC students for successfully supporting the Olympic spirit and maintaining...
China/Australian relations – it singled out their “exceptional management and organization efforts” as a point of high praise.  

2.05 Another Evolution in Qiaowu

In the weeks following the Olympic Torch rallies, Beijing was well aware of the negative fallout surrounding the noisy and aggressive protests. If such elements were to strengthen and proliferate amongst the OC, their efforts could easily backfire in the face of public opinion. Following the outbursts that characterized the rallies both inside and outside of China, the resulting embarrassment pointed towards a new development in how they could manage the patriotic zeal amongst PRC students abroad. During the 2009 Melbourne Film Festival, initial efforts to prevent the screening of pro-Uygher documentary “The Ten Conditions of Love” included flag waving and demonstrations, resulting in scuffles between rival groups. From these high profile protests, a more mature attitude began to emerge. CSSA leaders in Canberra realized that the more they protested, the more attention their opponents would enjoy. Their new stance was to remain collectively inactive, and move towards more dialogue and communication as the primary tool for promoting a new perspective on the ‘real China’. This strategy achieved a positive response in France, where the French National Assembly invited PRC students to present reports and their views on Sino-French relations in an effort to “influence the influential opinion leaders.” Efforts to promote a less aggressive image, yet tempered with the same level of security and crowd management techniques were again evident during Li Keqiang’s visit to Christchurch in November 2009. In this instance, the PRC embassy had selectively notified key pro-Beijing groups to form a welcome party outside the hotel where the vice premier and his entourage would be staying. Reflecting the CCP’s

constant fear of being attacked by protest groups, the specific details of his visit were kept secret to avoid potential embarrassment from FLG protestors. As a result, the participants waited for over two hours. In anticipation of this delay, organizers had earlier prepared refreshments. With the expectation for crowd control, the leader of the local branch of the Peaceful Reunification Society used a loudhailer to keep excited participants in line. Similarly, minders from pro-Beijing organizations circulated amongst rowdy PRC supporters and quietly reminded them not to engage in any embarrassing activity. They also requested police support for blocking the activities of the eight FLG practitioners who were holding a silent protest right alongside the official welcome party.

2.05 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted two important periods of *qiaowu*: as a crisis point for the CCP, the 1989 Tiananmen Incident served as the catalyst for reviewing and revising the methods for managing the OC diaspora for China’s interests. Through *qiaowu*, the CCP increased its efforts to consolidate the OC diaspora (particularly the new migrant and student groups) through directly and indirectly organizing, co-ordinating and guiding their activities in the context of its own discourse.

The CCP remains wary of anti-China elements that threaten to damage or embarrass it. By keeping a tight control over OC activities, the CCP has attempted to prevent anything that might question or challenge its leadership. The Olympic Torch rallies and subsequent protests highlight the existence of the CCP’s continuously evolving strategy to deal with the OC – at the heart of which seeks to guide, manage and ultimately control their perceptions and behaviour.

*Qiaowu* demonstrates Beijing’s ability to mobilize tens of thousands of OC for its interests – a dramatic and significant breakthrough for the CCP since 1989. The last twenty years has seen an increase in the level of sophistication and scope of activity appealing to modern demographics, migration patterns and new levels of Chinese nationalism. To maintain control, the CCP has taken a structured and systematic approach to regulate the behaviour of participants so that they reflect their desired image of China and the Chinese overseas.
Having illustrated some of the most successful aspects of qiaowu during 2008, the remainder of this thesis examines the reasons, techniques and philosophies underscoring China’s relationship with the OC in a historical, contemporary and future context. The CCP, in classic totalitarian fashion, attempts to impose a wide extension of social order upon them both inside and outside of China, involving the absorption or destruction of social groups that obstruct its complete control. Qiaowu methodology (in particular the micro-management techniques of controlling various aspects of OC behaviour) indicates the CCP’s desire for manipulation and influence over its targets, as well as its obsession to eliminate any potential threats amongst them. This chapter explains why qiaowu is a necessary component of China’s international affairs, and how it has evolved according to China’s geopolitical and economic situation.

3.01 The Role of the OC for the CCP-led Party-State

While the stereotypical image of the OC is often introverted and passive, they have always been useful “envoys of communication” for implementing China’s international strategy. The OC have been a significant source of support for various governments of China by serving to extend its foreign policy abroad and by being politically active for Chinese interests through boycotts, protests, sabotage and direct political intervention. The movements that shaped China in the modern historical period (such as Ming loyalists, the Fujian Incident in the 1930s, and Sun Yatsen’s Republican movement) all found their roots and strength from beyond its geographical borders. Those OC facing discrimination and exclusion in their adopted

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countries were also active in building a strong China. They believed that in doing so, it would lead to better treatment for themselves and their motherland.

For the CCP, the OC played a significant role in its early years of development. Firstly, the CCP was forged by various OC communities around the world. These included groups of seafarers, migrants, students and workers in France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the US, who widely identified with political causes for internationalism. The OC have since been a source of support for protecting and maintaining the CCP’s dominance within the Chinese state system. Although the OC were viewed with suspicion during the the Mao years, their financial and political relationship with China was always valued. The CCP viewed the contribution of the OC towards the development of the PRC as necessary and co-opted them through their representation in the Chinese political system, albeit sometimes in an ambiguous, symbolic or indirect manner. For example, the OC have assisted with China’s modernization through participation in its political system as guiqiao (returned OC) representatives. The CCP is fully aware of their role as part of China’s development strategy and foreign policy, and has continuously raised qiaowu to the highest levels of national importance.

To promote better integration of OC work within government, at the 1954 National Peoples’ Congress qiaowu official He Xiangning first acknowledged that all agencies should play a co-ordinated role in OC affairs. These views continue in the contemporary period, whereby OC officials emphasize the common responsibility of government (and hence the Party) to take advantage of OC resources. For example, in 2001, Vice Premier Qian Qichen called for progress in “bringing into full play the advantages of OC under the leadership of the CCP Central Committee with President

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122 “Qiaowu gongzuo ‘shehuihua’ de zhiyi” (Query into OC Work and Socialization) in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 73-74.
Jiang Zemin as the core." Hence, qiaowu is not only a ministerial and provincial level matter, but one for the wider state and party level to address.

3.02 Political Mobilization

The OC are an important soft power tool in China’s grand strategy. They take a special place in the political, economic and great nation aspirations of the PRC. Although they account for only about 2.5 percent of China’s own total population, the OC remain indispensable to China’s national interests. As such, qiaowu analysts describe them as a “vital treasure trove of human resources.” This is because the OC are part of China’s comprehensive national power and are intimately related to its development and to the international environment. They feature strongly in three of China’s grand goals (sange dayou zuowei): as a diplomatic vanguard for promoting China’s integration with the world (tuishou), as a lobby group opposing Taiwanese independence, and as a vehicle for people-to-people promotion of Chinese pride, culture and confidence. Moreover, the OC have a purpose for bringing about political, economic and societal change around the world.

At the Eighth National Congress on Return Overseas Chinese in 2009, politburo member Wang Zhaoguo urged the OC to unite closely with the CCP in advancing China’s national interests under the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, Deng Xiaoping thought and Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”; they were also told to “struggle with one mind” and build a well-off society (xiaokang shehui) and revitalize...

130 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun (Outline of Overseas Chinese Work) (Beijing: Guowuyuan qiaoban qiaowu ganbu xuexiao, October 1993), 2-7.
the Chinese nation. In short, the OC can assist China by creating a friendly environment in which Beijing can pursue its national interests, moderate anti-CCP activity and promote pro-CCP goals.

In terms of China’s international relations, the OC are “a unique advantage” that can be used as a key bridge for promoting mutual understanding. They serve to improve foreign perspectives of things Chinese as their social status and community clout improves. For example, the OC act as economic, cultural and political intermediaries with ASEAN nations to strengthen China’s regional relationships.

In these contexts, the OC are complimentary to China’s other platforms of international relations (such as hard power, aid and financial assistance) and cannot be separated from the broader spectrum of foreign affairs work (waijiao shiwu or waishi).

Waishi is different from traditional foreign affairs work because it encompasses issues beyond matters of diplomacy – it extends to anything related to things foreign to China or overseas. As such, diplomats regularly call upon local OC communities to support the PRC (such as confronting FLG, promoting reunification and opposing Tibetan independence). They issue them with pro-Beijing material (such as DVDs and literature) on these subjects in the hope they will transmit their contents amongst themselves and to the wider public.

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133 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 2-7.
135 Qiaolian official, interview by author, Beijing, 9 November 2007.
In particular, PRC officials contend that ‘new’ migrant OC (xinqiao) are the “backbone of forces friendly to us in America and some other developed Western countries.”

They have Western education, work experience, values, culture and mindsets. They are knowledgeable of foreign political systems, and understand how to make best use of them for their purposes. OC associations, lobby groups, and media serve as conscious or unconscious fronts for China’s public “multi-track diplomacy” for winning the trust of or influencing the policy and opinions of other governments. As such, Beijing has used strategic groups of the OC to intervene in foreign politics. Media reports cited examples alleging that Beijing offered members of the American OC community unofficial protection from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for their business interests in exchange for channeling Beijing money into US Democrat election campaigns; similarly, their access to military technology resulted in the Donor gate scandal between 1992 and 1996. In addition US authorities identified other key fundraisers as Chinese spies, or found that they reported directly to Beijing.

Since the 2000s, qiaowu specialists have suggested a broader approach for political mobilization. According to an internal 2004 report entitled “Chinese Political Participatory Strength in American Election Revealed,” cultivation of an ethnic Chinese voting bloc and ethnic Chinese candidates for public office was an area cited

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for further development. As populations of OC increase and become integrated in local society as an economic and consumer force, more of them will be aware and active in political participation. The OC needed to be encouraged about this in order to raise their status and position in society. To this end, the PRC conducted an investigation on OC voting habits, patterns, and demographics. It found that they tended to vote for personalities, and not specific parties; that they did vote for OC candidates; that voters could be mobilized if sufficient organizational work was done (such as the “80/20” movement); and that the OC media played an important part in facilitating them with voting and the success of ethnic Chinese candidates.

However, the research also concluded that there was still much work to do. For example, the standard of education amongst the OC was low (35 percent had no high school education and 23 percent were unskilled). Furthermore, many of them were not engaged in the Western democratic system and did not think that it affected them as a minority group. Finally, language difficulties, self-reliance and a reluctance to deal with local government made it difficult to mobilize the OC in a single direction. These issues pose significant difficulties for a quick mobilization of the OC as a pro-Beijing voting bloc. The purpose of qiawu in addressing these challenges is to slowly guide the OC as a part of China’s long term effort to amplify its influence abroad.

3.03 Espionage

As such, it is important that the qiawu administration maintains a benevolent public face, and therefore concentrates on “inclusive” forms of co-optation and “transformation work” which involve influence and persuasion over the long term to seek their sentimentality, loyalty and support (see later chapters). While qiawu

147 “Meiguo dasuan huaren canzheng liliang zhanlou” (Chinese Political Participatory Strength in American Election Revealed), Qiaoqing, no. 51 (1 December 2004): 1.
148 “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing” (Penetrate Chinese Society, Investigate Overseas Chinese Affairs), Qiaoqing, no. 27 (5 August 2005): 3-4; Wu, “Qiawu gongzuoju zhanluxeing qianzhanxing.”
149 The 80/20 Initiative encourages Asian Pacific Americans to form a voting bloc and thus signal to major political parties their political influence and demand for equal opportunities. See 80/20 website www.80-20initiative.net/about/organization.asp (accessed 30 September 2009).
151 “Meiguo dasuan huaren canzheng liliang zhanlou,” 1-5.
includes intelligence gathering on the OC and their activities, the boundaries between
the *qiaowu* administration and the state become blurred when mobilizing the OC for
national interests that go beyond the mandate of the *qiaowu* administration itself. In
these cases the *qiaowu* administration prefers to leave aggressive and coercive
practices for other authorities to handle.

One such area of mobilizing the OC that is not necessarily a part of *qiaowu* includes
espionage or stealing commercial secrets.\(^{152}\) Various companies have caught some of
their OC employees disclosing confidential company trade information to PRC buyers
or facilitating the export of sensitive technology.\(^{153}\) The Cox Report alleged that the
PRC actively identified and enlisted OC scientists, businessmen and others with
access to sensitive information.\(^{154}\) For example, Royal Dutch Shell uncovered a
group of Chinese nationals meeting socially after work – these meetings were in fact a
PRC-sponsored recruiting front for obtaining confidential pricing information.\(^{155}\)
Between 2004 and 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) arrested a total of
twenty-five Chinese nationals or Chinese Americans for industrial espionage.

Information is usually gathered through monitoring or infiltration of labour
movements, trade unions and student associations or seemingly legitimate front-
organizations.\(^{156}\) US intelligence officials suspect that amongst the thousands of
legitimate visitors, students and business people around the world operating trading
companies, manufacturers, banks and other enterprises, recruits act as intelligence
gathering stations under a special decree of the Politburo.\(^{157}\) An unclassified PRC
government handbook for would-be spies provided some guidance: using open source
information, official publications, direct contact and exchange with government


\(^{154}\) House Report 105-851, “Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, submitted by Mr. Cox of


\(^{156}\) Huang Tai-lin, “Lu Warns Women’s Groups to Beware ‘United Front’ Ploy,” *Taipei Times*, 10 June

\(^{157}\) Paul Moore (former FBI Chief Analyst for Chinese Intelligence) “Biased Prosecution?” interview
by Jim Lehrer, *News Hour*, Public Broadcasting System, 14 December 1999,
agencies, research offices, corporate enterprises, academic institutions, libraries and information offices. As China’s ‘Thousand Grains of Sand’ (shali yuanli), PRC nationals and those of Chinese descent abroad are encouraged to provide information or technology for China’s development in the form of de-centralized micro-espionage. Targets are often unaware that they are the subject of such manipulation. Many respond positively and voluntarily, while others may require more persuasion, incentive or corrective tools to ensure obedience.

How are certain OC mobilized to act in this way? The answer lies in the specific techniques and methodologies used for recruitment. The first is to appeal to their ethnic pride and sympathies in “helping the motherland advance.” PLA and MSS units recruit potential candidates for intelligence gathering before they leave China or offer favours for their co-operation. Money does not always change hands – rather, experts suggest that they are not necessarily asked to spy illegally, but simply invited to share information. Once abroad, handlers with links to these units cultivate relations with them through Chinese friendship and cultural groups.

The second method employs carrots and sticks. Recruiters may offer targets a job and housing upon their return, and provide stipends while abroad. If they refuse to assist, they might be threatened. In one case, MSS authorities told a Japanese national of Chinese ancestry that he was subject to Chinese law as a Chinese citizen despite his foreign passport. They threatened him with jail or execution and told him that his son


would never leave China if he did not co-operate. Similarly, the Canadian *Globe and Mail* reported that PRC authorities pressured Chinese students to be “sleeper” agents by using threats concerning their relatives in China, visa issuance and future job prospects.\(^{163}\) Attaches from the MOE deal with OC schools or liaise with PRC student organizations as part of their scope of work; MSS and MFA play a key role in determining the outcome of visa and passport applications pending orders from their political leaders, who also dispatch MSS officers to check on the progress of consular staff.

The CCP uses such aggressive or clandestine methods of mobilizing those OC identified as potential sources for information for espionage and fifth column activity only in specific situations and circumstances where the aim is to enhance China’s security, scientific, technological or commercial interests. Most successes have been with first generation OC, foreign students or new migrant OC who still hold strong cultural and sentimental affinity with China. They have been less successful with gaining the support of the second and third generation of OC who have mostly identified with their host countries.\(^{164}\) Thus for the vast majority of the OC, *qiaowu* is executed in the context of cultural and economic development, and as such, appears completely benign.

### 3.04 Unveiling Qiaowu

The literal translation of *huaqiao shiwu*, or its shortened equivalent *qiaowu* is “OC affairs/matters.” Therefore, *qiaowu* is ostensibly a comprehensive effort that seeks to maintain, protect and enhance OC rights and interests. Tasks include propagating OC policy, promoting OC affairs, researching their needs, and resolving their problems.\(^{165}\) It seeks to attract OC talent and contributions to satisfy domestic needs within China, as well as encourage them to facilitate external efforts for international exchange,

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integrate with other OC, and lead them towards a better lifestyle and development abroad.\textsuperscript{166}

In practice, however, \textit{qiaowu} has two aims: firstly to attract the OC back into the fold of the Chinese nation state, and secondly to convey and project to them the nation state agenda.\textsuperscript{167} This consists of various policies and programmes to manage OC communities vital to China’s economic, scientific and technological development; and moreover, to promote its national interests, global image, and soft power across the globe.\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{Qiaowu} policy is divided into two categories: policy for the OC in China (including \textit{guiqiao} (returned \textit{huaqiao}) and \textit{qiaojuan} (relatives and dependents of \textit{huaqiao} resident in China)); and secondly, policy for the external Chinese diaspora (\textit{huaqiao} (PRC nationals abroad) and \textit{huaren} (ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality)).\textsuperscript{169} For the former group, \textit{qiaowu} policies offer various rewards and privileges in order to maintain their economic, scientific and technical contribution to China. For the latter group, cadres tailor specific methods of management for each subset of the OC, depending upon their level of loyalty to the regime and cultural connection with the motherland.

\textit{Qiaowu} is essentially a pro-active effort to take advantage of the economic, political and cultural opportunities between China and the OC. There are six tasks that \textit{qiaowu} is charged with. These include strengthening Chineseness and ethnic affinity amongst the OC; strengthening \textit{qiaowu} propaganda, cultural exchange and activities; continually strengthening economic relations both in and outside of China; encouraging the OC to support peaceful reunification and oppose independence; protecting the rights and interests of returned OC; and finally, to protect the rights and interests of the OC in their countries of residence and integrating them into local

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Qiaowu gongzuo gailun}, 66, 109-110.
\end{itemize}
Implicit in these goals is the elimination of potential threats and rival discourses that may challenge the CCP and its hold on power. As such, qiaowu can be described as a massive operation involving incorporation and co-optation of the OC at every level of society, and managing their behaviour and perceptions through incentive or disincentive to suit the situation and structural circumstances that the CCP desires. This issue is given special attention in Chapter Seven.

3.05 Service for the OC: Qiaowu Cadres and Their Duties

One of qiaowu’s core responsibilities is “service” for the OC. The methodology is essentially a form of people-to-people diplomacy, based upon emotional exchange and integration according to basic human sensibilities, needs and desires. It is a continuous effort employing social and psychological tools that seeks to influence the choices, direction and emotions of the OC by dispelling their negative suspicions and misunderstandings concerning China, and replacing those with a positive understanding instead. In this context, elements of qiaowu fall into the CCP’s wider external propaganda effort towards the OC.

Qiaowu is based upon Marxist-Leninist mass line tactics, techniques and strategies. Cadres have honed their methods over various stages of evolution, drawn from the long experience of CCP propaganda techniques of dealing with people and their perceptions. The PRC’s qiaowu effort has its roots in the Third Office of the UF Work Department (UFWD). Work is generally conducted through the “Three Pillars” of qiaowu: OC associations, OC media, and OC schools. As a co-ordinated effort for all levels of class, society, government, party and organizations both inside and

170 “Li Haifeng: Shenru guanche luoshi kexue fazhanguan” (Li Haifeng: Views to Deepening Practical Implementation and Scientific Development) Qiaoqing jianbao, 27 September 2007, 2.
172 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 9.
173 “Guanyu qiaowu gongzuo xingzhi wenti de tantao” (Enquiry Into Quality of OC Work) 1986 in Qiaowu chunqiu, 63-64.
174 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 12, 157, 162.
outside of China, UF work aims to win over non-CCP community leaders, neutralize Party critics, build temporary alliances of convenience, and systematically shut down adversaries.177

Historically, from the 1950s through to the 1980s, various techniques to liaise with the OC were employed: such as establishing front-organizations and schools to stage industrial campaigns, providing language and education for indoctrination, aiding the poor, showing movies, and holding sports and cultural activities for youth and student movements. Up to the early 1990s, qiaowu content continued to be interspersed with socialist rhetoric;178 since that time, however, cadres have increasingly embraced pragmatic methods by actively influencing individuals and their organizations, promoting exchange and co-operation, and maintaining OC rights and interests under a service philosophy of “more action, less talk.”179

This reflects the one essential factor that has consistently underscored the success of qiaowu – the understanding of human behaviour and the adept use of people-to-people skills. As such, qiaowu cadres are likely to have other frontline roles (such as in the peaceful reunification effort, OC education, and youth work). They have a variety of experiences and hence able to deal with OC affairs in a meaningful way.

By the 1990s, strict protocols set the tone of qiaowu, with handbooks outlining its basic manner and conduct. For example, it sought to contact and liaise with the OC; promote and give impetus to them and their interests; and ultimately, guide them under a continuous precondition of merging and unity.180 These objectives were qualified by a “Three Dos and Don’ts” attitude (san er bu) that sought to co-ordinate and assist OC activities from a distance without them being aware of it: ‘support but don’t depend upon’ (retain sufficient independence from OC groups), ‘penetrate but don’t intervene’ (understand their inner workings), ‘to guide but don’t lead’ (simply

178 “Zai yici yewu zuotanhui shang de fayan” (Statement from a Vocational Forum) 1983 in Qiaowu chunqiu, 118.
179 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 31.
180 Ibid., 2, 4-5, 10-17, 29-31.
During a period in which suspicions of Tiananmen remained fresh amongst the OC, these principles strengthened qiaowu as an effective tool for intensive behavioural control and manipulation yet appearing benevolent and helpful. These methods have not changed in the 21st century. According to top OC affairs official Li Haifeng, pragmatic and scientific methodology was the key to developing and deepening qiaowu.182

Internal qiaowu handbooks describe the specific methods, manner and protocol by which to liaise with them (including personal presentation, deportment and etiquette) – a complete guide detailing the appropriate methodology for receiving, welcoming and introducing guests by written correspondence or face-to-face contact. Cadres are instructed to use sincerity and substance to win the trust of the OC (yong zhenxin yindele xinren, zhazha shishi wei huaqiao huaren fuwu). To facilitate a solid connection with its target, qiaowu remains full of warmth (qinqing qiaowu), without which it cannot penetrate OC hearts and minds.183 This methodology is backed by a philosophy of serving the OC on a large scale (da qiaowu guan).184 They spend considerable time and effort studying step-by-step instructions designed for every conceivable scenario concerning the OC.

As part of their instruction, cadres maintain a sense of flexibility and efficiency with their time and resources, taking full advantage of opportunities while reducing inconvenience and personal cost to the target.185 The OC should feel as if they are treated with genuine interest. For example, methods include regular contact in the form of letters, e-mails and greeting cards in order to ensure warm sentiments continue long after their face-to-face meetings.186 The goal is to form strong long-lasting bonds of friendship based upon mutual exchange in which they can appreciate the motherland’s warmth, develop a sense of patriotism, and foster a desire to

181 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 2, 6.
182 “Li Haifeng: Shenru guanche luoshi kexue fazhanguan,” 2.
184 “Qiaowu gongzuohe yao yi ‘da qiaowu guan’ tongling qiaowu gongzuo” (OC Cadres Must Work by Following the Philosophy of OC Work on a Large Scale), Qiaoqing jianbao, 26 April 2007, 13.
185 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 2, 4-5, 13-15, 218-219.
186 Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 79-116.
contribute to China. In short, OC must feel as if they are receiving a ‘service’ in order to achieve a ‘win-win’ result.

To enlarge the scope of qiaowu and therefore best harness OC of various backgrounds, origins, and levels of society, cadres conduct continuous investigation into their local circumstances all across the globe. Qiaowu officials pay attention to variations in their attributes and tailor work to suit accordingly. For example, cadres make note of their targets’ regional peculiarities and the appropriate topics of conversation in order to prevent embarrassment or offense. Any action should take care to respect and maintain their rights and interests, focus upon appealing to and exploiting their sentimentality towards China, and to encourage patriotic feelings and their ‘understanding’ of China.

To build a strong knowledge base, the PRC regularly send out fact-finding delegations at the state, provincial and local level. OC associations serve as useful points of contact for gathering information and recruitment for transnational networking. Cadres survey the opinion of community members, and ascertain their position on various China-related issues. For example, Overseas Exchange Association officials determine the attitudes, feelings and needs of the OC. They engage them on multiple levels, aspects and issues and do not restrict themselves to the traditional channels and groups. OC who return to China are also encouraged to make reports to authorities.

187 “Guanyu qiaowu gongzuo xingzhi wenti de tantao,” 63-64.
188 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 3.
190 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 46-47.
192 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 2-3; “Shenri shehui, tanjia qiaoqing,” 6.
3.06 The CCP’s Guiding Hand

However, as the OC are not under any jurisdiction or obligation to follow such CCP directives, other means of influence are required. There is no formal instruction from the qiaowu apparatus itself, but a ‘guiding hand’ serves to maintain a loose, yet still powerful, means of social control. Behaviour under ‘guided’ relationships is also desirable because activity and responses still follow implicit protocols – moreover, behaviour is voluntary and consenting, rather than compelled. OC groups (particularly the pro-Beijing organizations) are well aware of the limits and scope of behaviour under which they are able to deal with Chinese issues and authorities. They are also aware of their role for protecting and advancing China’s interests. For example, during the early 2000s, PRC diplomats perceived those OC attending Double Ten National Day celebrations with TECO as political supporters of Chen Shui-bian’s regime. The PRC embassy would indicate its disapproval and give those groups the cold shoulder by withholding invitations to official functions or other benefits to signal that such behaviour was unacceptable. Consequently, OC groups carefully avoid taboo subjects, or refuse to co-operate with other OC groups not aligned with Beijing for fear of retribution or denial of services, cultural resources or access to the embassy.

Other forms of the ‘guiding hand’ can be more direct – comprising of gentle reminders from diplomats or qiaowu cadres, personal communications, e-mails, telephone calls, or speeches at OC forums. For general matters, diplomatic staff liaise with OC leaders on a regular basis. Specific attaches are responsible for those matters under their portfolio, while the ambassador and higher level consular staff work to build up personal connections. In other cases, qiaowu agencies are responsible for logistical advice, and offer suggestions directly to the association leaders for implementation. In the case of visiting delegations from the PRC, the OCAO will advise when their provincial and lower tier cadres visit, while embassy staff will advise when government officials visit.

These techniques are a very private part of OC policy. Qiaowu is inherently part of a discourse that is concealed from the wider public. OC organizations and individuals are denied access to knowledge that may affect the unity and success of OC work.
The true purpose of OC affairs cannot be revealed for fear of damaging the imagined ‘service’ that is the public face of qiaowu. To this end, embassies and consulates are instructed to protect the secrecy of OC information, and prevent classified documents and policy from outside scrutiny.\(^{193}\) Instead, special qiaowu policy advisors selectively impart onto the OC only what they need to know.\(^{194}\)

### 3.07 A Brief History of Qiaowu Organizational Structure

The PRC qiaowu administration evolved from infrastructure established by previous Chinese governments in the latter half of the 19\(^{th}\) century. Traditionally, Qing dynasty law prohibited migration from China. Authorities considered those who moved abroad as outcasts and denied them any recognition or assistance when in trouble.\(^{195}\) However, their role for China’s political and economic interest was apparent in an emerging age of globalized trade.\(^{196}\) Efforts to develop an official relationship with the OC began in 1858, when the Qing government established bureaus in Guangdong, Xiamen, Tianjin and Ningbo to deal with ‘British Chinese’ following the opening of Treaty Ports after the Opium War.\(^{197}\) Emigration policies were gradually relaxed after 1868, and Qing diplomats began actively courting the OC with the prime objective of securing their loyalty to the Chinese empire.\(^{198}\) Delegations were sent abroad to conduct extensive research of OC communities.\(^{199}\) It was during this period that the term huaqiao emerged to describe the OC and their

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\(^{194}\) “Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan” (State Council OCAO Trust-building Delegation Go to Four Nations for Research), Qiaoqing, no. 54 (5 December 2005): 5.


\(^{196}\) Harley Farnsworth McNair, *The Chinese Abroad: Their Position and Protection – A Study in International Law and Relations* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1924).


connection with China – appearing in an 1883 letter addressed to court official Li Hongzhang.\textsuperscript{200}

To formalize the embrace of ethnic Chinese overseas for the first time, the 1909 Law of Nationality acknowledged the OC as a special grouping.\textsuperscript{201} It defined anyone born to a Chinese father (or mother) as a Chinese citizen under the principle of \textit{jus sanguinis} (the right of blood, or the right of a person to have the nationality of ones’ parents). The Law also granted dual nationality to all Chinese and their descendants living in foreign countries. This broad definition of “Chinese” gave the Qing court the capacity to claim those with foreign citizenship as its own nationals, and implied that they could exercise extra-territorial rule over any OC. In this context, OC communities could be considered as de facto colonies of China, and hence subject to its jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{202} As such, the Qing used the term \textit{huaqiao} to encourage OC sojourners who would reside temporarily away from home to identify with China and its civilization.

Following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the Republican Beiyang government headed by Yuan Shikai retained the 1909 principle of \textit{jus sanguinis} and subsequently passed an amendment in 1912 that added that those born in China, as well as those born with at least one parent who held Chinese nationality, could claim Chinese nationality.\textsuperscript{203} Anyone wishing to revoke this status had to apply to the relevant authorities; otherwise, the Chinese government deemed them to remain as Chinese citizens.\textsuperscript{204} In other words, the OC remained a prized asset, and not to be forsaken under any means.

\textsuperscript{204} Lin, “Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality,” 995-996.
Institutionalization of OC affairs began in 1917. Premier Duan Qirui was an advocate for China to enter the First World War, and hoped that sending labourers to Europe would demonstrate sincerity to the Allies. Laws to protect them had been in discussion since 1916 between the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Commerce. Consequently, the State Council of the Beijing government (headed by Duan) set up the Bureau of Overseas Chinese Workers. This Bureau continued until December 1921, when it was dissolved and re-organized by the Beiyang government in January 1922 as the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau to accommodate a broader scope of OC matters.

In the following year Sun Yatsen established his revolutionary government in Guangzhou and also set up the first OCAO under his direction. This demonstrates the different agendas between the rival governments of Beijing and Guangzhou – protection of the rights of OC workers in Europe in the context of China’s international relations versus the protection and care of returnee sojourners. The latter reflected Sun’s attempt to mobilize and control OC loyalties and resources for his political ambitions.

In 1925, the Second Nationalist Party Conference announced its first policy to encourage the OC to invest in China, provide facilities for OC youth wishing to study in China, as well as protecting the OC against discriminatory laws abroad. These policies would set in motion the guiding principles of qiaowu. The ROC Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) was established in October 1926 and continued under similar polices to its predecessor; in 1932 (at the urge of returned OC) it was made subordinate to the Nationalist government under the Executive Yuan as a cabinet level unit. With these developments, qiaowu gradually evolved into a

207 Philip Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 267.
209 Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, 7.
comprehensive set of regulations, laws and policies overseen by a framework of
government and non-governmental bodies, organs and offices.

The OCAC served as the government arm of ROC OC affairs – however, it was the
No. 3 Section of the KMT Central Committee (later known as the Overseas Work
Committee after 1972) that influenced all qiaowu activity. In fact, between 1952 and
1958, the same person headed both the OCAC and the No. 3 Section.\textsuperscript{211} As such,
anti-communist KMT ideology and nationalist sentiment dominated OCAC
activities.\textsuperscript{212} No. 3 Section activities with the OC were later downscaled so as not to
make the OCAC appear as a direct instrument of the KMT. However, the MFA
continued to have a limited but important role in formulating and executing OC policy
by working to promote exchange and contact through diplomatic organs, pro-KMT
organizations, media and schools. Under this structure, the ROC would continue to
influence OC communities throughout the world for the next several decades. This
successful model for co-ordinating OC affairs also served as the basic framework for
the PRC’s own rival effort to manage and influence the OC after 1949.

3.08 Origins of the PRC OC Qiaowu Bureaucracy

Although the CCP had maintained relations with sympathetic OC groups since the
1920s, it did not establish specific organs to liaise with the wider OC populace until
some time later. The first, in September 1940, was the Association of OC National
Salvationists (Tingan huaqiao jiuguo lianhehui), later renamed as the China
Liberation Association of Returned OC (Zhongguo jiefangqu guiquo huaqiao
lianhehui). In 1942, the CCP set up an “Overseas Affairs Committee” to implement
communist missions amongst the OC.

\textsuperscript{211} OCAC work in the 1950s was implemented under guidelines set down by Zheng Yanfen (a long
time KMT loyalist and OCAC Chairman). See Chen San-Ching, “Scholar, Official and Politician: The
\textsuperscript{212} Wing Chung Ng, “Taiwan’s Overseas Chinese Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s,” in \textit{East Asia
Enquiry; Selected Articles from the Annual Conferences of the Canadian Asian Studies Association
After its founding in 1949, the PRC’s own qiaowu policy was somewhat incoherent due to inactivity and a lack of long term planning. It was further hampered by the CCP’s commitment to class struggle and proletarian revolution in ex-colonial countries, as well as the emerging nationalism amongst the elites of newly-independent Southeast Asian governments. At the same time, the CCP was in direct competition with the KMT for winning sympathy and support from the OC.213

Despite making a declaration that all KMT reactionary laws were to be abolished and that its own OC policy were distinct from that of its rival, the CCP retained the KMT’s qiaowu policy and the 1929 Nationality law. The CCP still considered the OC to be an extension of the PRC under the principle of jus sanguinis. The 1953 census showed that 11.5 million OC were included as part of China’s population. Furthermore, Article 58 of the Common Programme adopted by the Chinese Peoples’ Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1949 iterated the PRC’s intention to “protect the proper rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad.” Beijing also accepted all OC wishing to return to China, and allowed their election to the National People’s Congress.214

The PRC established its own version of the OCAC in October 1949 (later re-named as the PRC OCAC in 1954) as a high-level unit with direct access to Premier Zhou Enlai. This body was charged with all matters relating to external huaqiao development and consisted of four departments: International Liaison, Foreign Affairs, Propaganda and UF Work. The other major agency for qiaowu dealt with the domestic issues of returned OC. The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (qiaolian) was established in June 1956 to oversee and influence a variety of domestic and returned OC constituencies, such as women, youth, workers, scientists, writers, artists and cultural workers. This agency helped to integrate and unite returned OC and OC abroad with the CCP by assisting with patriotic national reconstruction through education and welfare policies.

Like its ROC counterpart, the PRC qiaowu system was also a complex web of interlinked organizations. As a result, many of the leading qiaolian officials were also PRC OCAC officials. Consequently, co-ordination and duties in the two administrative organs were almost identical. For example, both bodies served routine frontline affairs. These included policy development and UF activities, resettlement of OC returnees and their families, procurement of OC investment, promotion of education and attracting OC to return to China for study, establishment of a front for patriotic unification, and expansion of New China’s international influence by reforming the beliefs and practices of OC to fit the CCP’s socialist ideology.

3.09 The OC “Problem”

Washington’s containment policy to isolate China from Southeast Asia meant that by the mid-1950s Beijing had to change its foreign policy direction from spreading socialism to identifying with the third world. However, because it did not distinguish between PRC nationals and ethnic Chinese, this ambiguity caused concerns for countries with large OC populations. Governments of these nations feared that their OC residents might become a source for communist infiltration. Thus the question of OC loyalty and its implications for China’s international relations (described as the OC “problem”) would determine Beijing’s policies towards ethnic Chinese for the next 50 years. Moreover, Beijing could not assume that the OC would respond positively to its qiaowu efforts.

In 1955, Beijing appeared to have temporarily brushed the OC aside in an effort to address the issue of dual nationality. In April that year, both China and Indonesia

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215 Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, 29-32, 197.
217 Cheng Xi, Qiaowu yu waijiao guanxi yanjiu: Zhongguo fangqi “shuangchong guoji” de huigu yu fansi (Overseas Chinese Affairs and Diplomatic Relations: Retrospect on China’s Abandoning of its Policy of “Dual Nationality”) (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2005).
218 “Zai Yafei huiyi quanti huiyi shang de buchong fayan” (Additional Remarks from the Plenary Session of the Asia-Africa Conference) 19 April 1955; “Zai Wanlong jiejian Xizhaowa qiaoling de jianghua” (Speech from the Interview with West Javan Overseas Chinese Leader at Bandung) 19 April 1955, in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 3-5.
signed the Bandung Dual Nationality Treaty, introducing concepts of the modern nation state and doing away with the principles of dual nationality and *jus sanguinis*. Beijing encouraged the OC to take local citizenship and give up their PRC citizenship voluntarily – in other words, to become *huaren* (foreigners of Chinese descent). If they chose to take this option, they were no longer considered to be under the jurisdiction or responsibility of the PRC and were instructed to clearly distinguish themselves by not joining *huaqiao* groups; however, if any country denied that person local citizenship, equal rights or expel them, China reserved the right to their repatriation. Beijing instructed the minority of the OC who chose to remain as Chinese citizens abroad not to interfere in local politics, not to persist in patriotic activity, and not to promote political issues. Instead, Beijing expected these *huaqiao* to assist in improving relations and unity between other OC and locals by abiding to local laws and customs, using the local language, and serve as good citizens for promoting a stable livelihood. If *huaqiao* wished to organize CCP groupings and activities, they were to do so only back in China. Effective implementation of the Bandung Treaty, however, was fraught with difficulty. Internal rival factions within the Indonesian government and military meant ratification did not take place until 1960; and ultimately repealed altogether in 1969. Nevertheless, the Treaty provided Beijing with legal and tactical disengagement from the OC problem by establishing China’s credentials as an independent nation, and fostering goodwill with its neighbours.

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219 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he yindunixiya gongheguo guanyu shuangchong guoji wenti de tiaoyue” (Dual Nationality Treaty Between PRC and Indonesia) reprinted in *Qiaowu zhengce wenji* (Collection of OC Policy) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957), 20-25.


222 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui He Xiangning zhuren guanyu shuangchong guoji wenti de tiaoyue de tanhua” (PRC OC Affairs Commission Director He Xiangning’s Speech about the Dual Nationality Treaty) 26 April 1955 in *Qiaowu zhengce wenji* (Collection of OC Policy) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957), 34-38.

223 Where the PRC had not signed dual nationality agreements, ethnic Chinese in that country were still considered PRC citizens. Beijing referred to those of Chinese descent with dual nationality as *Zhongguo xuetong* (those with Chinese bloodlines). See Suryadinata, *China and the ASEAN States*, 2-4. At the time, the PRC had no specific term to describe ethnic Chinese who were foreign nationals. See Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese*, x.
Although the Treaty served to allay suspicions of external interference, Beijing’s real intention was to sever only the political relationship – internally, it wished to maintain a strong connection with the OC. Thus Zhou Enlai was quite clear that China would not abandon huaren in Southeast Asia, but rather they would still remain close as family relatives (as sons or daughters) abroad, and would continue to be ethnically and culturally linked with China. This was because the OC were still needed for China’s development. As a communist state, the PRC found that foreign exchange and overseas investment from OC sources had decreased substantially as a result of US economic sanctions. Any foreign money going into ‘Red China’ was deemed a criminal offence under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Beijing had to ensure that the financial relationship continued by providing guarantees of return for investors and maintaining standards of living for dependants – thus making foreign investment a purely material or business connection without any patriotic, family or political commitment. Remittances made through clan and hometown association channels were the most significant form of overseas income during this period.

Secondly, the OC remained a frontline force for China’s interests abroad. While it claimed non-interference in local affairs, in practice Beijing quietly continued to provide indirect assistance for the purposes of maintaining OC as a resource for communist revolution, economic development and technical advancement. They were expected to unite and be patriotic, oppose the KMT and not allow their activities to damage the CCP position with sensitive Southeast Asian countries (such as Indonesia). The PRC continued to persuade regional governments that it had disassociated itself from the OC. To demonstrate this, Beijing embarked on a process of “decolonization” of the external OC after 1957.

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224 “Zai Miandian huaqiao huanyinghui shang de jianghua” (Speech at the Burma Huaqiao Welcome Party) 18 December 1956 in Wang, Qiaowu chunjiu, 27.
228 “Yu Yinni Xiya waijiaobu Meizhouzi sizhang Monoumutu de tanhua” (Conversation with Indonesian Foreign Affairs Director Mononutu) 2 October 1957 in Wang, Qiaowu chunjiu, 12, 29.
schools to teach youth the local language, history and geography, and respect the culture of the countries of residence, and to abandon Chinese language and culture.

3.10 Domestic Returned OC Work and Internal Chaos

Between 1949 and 1956, the focus of qiaowu was attracting the OC to participate in China’s modernization. In general, most OC in Western countries were careful to stay away from the political rivalry and kept their heads down. Some maintained a staunch anti-communist attitude and supported the KMT. For example, OC leaders in the US worked with US and ROC government officials in order to suppress their pro-Beijing opponents. However, other OC were disillusioned at the corruption and ineptitude of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, and changed sides. The CCP enjoyed support amongst those who identified with socialism and regarded Mao Zedong as an impressive nationalist hero. Moreover, ethnic Chinese tended to dominate the membership of communist parties in Southeast Asia. Most of their members were educated students attracted towards an internationalist movement that transcended local racial and political issues. For this group, the PRC represented an alternative attraction to bourgeois Western civilization. CCP relations with these OC blossomed, making use of their leaders and representatives by persuading them to accept their training. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the PRC supported them as political revolutionaries.

The OC who returned were initially welcomed as guiqiao (returned OC). Despite its “leftist” leanings, the qiaolian was quite successful in facilitating foreign investment, attracting OC to return to study, and gaining the support of returned OC and their

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families. Chinese authorities resettled about 200,000 guiqiao on specially established OC farms. Nevertheless, Beijing viewed these returned OC with suspicion. Resettlement (rather than integration with the local community) was an effort to better manage them in isolation, and transform them into working people living off their own labour.

The main problem with dealing with returned OC was contending with their political ideology. During this period, officials stated that qiaowu policy should comply not only with the needs of the domestic class struggle, but also with the needs of international class struggle under an eight-character principle yishi tongren, shidang zhaogu (treat equally with appropriate preferential treatment). According to the CCP, the OC were seen to be mainly of working class peasant origin and they were to be accorded special privileges and exemptions as an incentive to encourage their role in socialist reconstruction, and at the same time present China in a favourable light abroad so as to attract more remittances.

Beginning in 1950, Land Reform was supposed to remove the feudal exploitation of landlords. However, its implementation was marred by ideological confusion and contradiction over what the OC represented to socialist China, and how both conformity and privilege could be simultaneously promoted. Swept up in a tide of radicalism, local cadres failed to distinguish between landlords and qiaojuan (relatives of OC) households renting out their land while their men were overseas. Some early methods included extortion, blackmail and ‘taxes’. In acknowledgement of the mistakes made during Land Reform, in 1954 and 1955 OC landlords were given new class status, granting them protection and immunity from socialist transformation, guaranteed protection of remittances, and investment

236 Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 49-50.
privileges aimed to mobilize OC financial resources for China’s development. In 1957, Beijing established a Special Commission for Handling Outstanding Problems of OC Houses to resolve disputes. However, these measures were only a temporary reprieve – much more aggressive forms of treatment towards the OC were yet to come.

Throughout the late 1950s, the CCP continued to view guiqiao with suspicion. Their connections abroad and entrepreneurial nature meant that they became the target of discrimination and oppression. A 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign targeted anyone with foreign contacts as class enemies or agents of imperialism. Discrimination against the OC became widespread. Local authorities labeled them as “bourgeois” and undesirable given their capitalist tendencies. Worse yet, they were branded as “imperialists”, “spies” and “counter-revolutionaries.” Intense pressure included extortion and wholesale removal of benefits and programmes that the OC had previously enjoyed.

During the Cultural Revolution, OC affairs suffered numerous attacks from radical elements. Red Guards stormed the OCAC, qiaolian and UFWD offices in Shanghai in 1966; domestic OC publications and traditional announcements were suspended; references to special treatment for OC were removed from buildings and restaurants. The PRC abandoned its policy of attracting the OC, and qiaowu organizations ceased to function. The OCAC had neither responsibility nor power, and OC properties were confiscated and their relatives persecuted. In such chaotic and violent circumstances, many of the OC had to contemplate settling permanently abroad and adopting foreign citizenship. Not surprisingly, about 400,000 OC left China between 1967 and 1972. The OCAC itself dissolved in 1968 and became defunct in 1970.

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241 “Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce” (A Number of Policies Regarding Internal OC Work) 8 June 1956 in Qiaowu zhengce wenji (Collection of OC Policy) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957).
244 After 1973, the PRC liberally issued exit permits for returned OC wishing to leave, facilitated those wishing to emigrate to Canada and Australia, but cut down on entry visas to OC as a means of relieving themselves of a liability. This suggested that an influx of OC “posed too great a risk for internal
3.11 The OC and Their Role in UF Work Abroad

Despite the situation at home, the OC always had an equally important role to play in Beijing’s UF operations abroad. As mentioned earlier, the vague line between UF work and qiaowu meant that they were often the same thing. As a part of this effort, prominent OC in local communist parties and the business sector abroad were given “Three Unities” to accomplish: promoting patriotic unity; developing economy, culture and a spirit of internationalism in their localities; and serving as a diplomatic front for China. By setting up UF-guided associations in major cities all over the world to host public relations campaigns, global conferences, forums and special briefings, these associations sought to advance friendship and pro-China sentiment amongst the OC and to wear down support for the ROC.

One example was New Zealand (NZ) resident Young Tong-Shing (Yang Tangcheng) who supported the CCP government during the early 1950s by distributing newsletters, showing propaganda films and asking for trade with China be channeled through his business concern.\(^{246}\) The ROC Consul-General viewed Young’s activities as a political issue and prompted an investigation.\(^{247}\) Police subsequently identified Young’s business as a contact point between the NZ Communist Party and the local Chinese community. While on a visit to Hong Kong in 1951, authorities informed Young that he and his family would not be welcome back in NZ. He resettled in China where he was initially welcomed as a returned OC, and consequently acquired many official connections with the CCP.\(^{248}\) The Party often appointed prominent

\(^{245}\) Wang, \textit{Qiaowu zhishi shouce}, 49.

\(^{246}\) While he made strong efforts to fundraise for the war effort against Japanese aggression, Young was pre-occupied with his business ambitions and attracting investment from his peers. He established the Jian Hua Trading Company in 1946 with branches in Australia and Hong Kong, and later moved to China in 1950 after seeking considerable investment from local Chinese in Dunedin and Napier. See also Brady, \"The War That Never Was,\" 11-12.

\(^{247}\) Local OC found themselves in a hostile environment if they were in any way supportive of the PRC. New Zealand Chinese Association (NZCA) (Otago/Southland) member, personal communication with author, Wellington, 18 June 2006.

\(^{248}\) See Young’s own accounts in Yang Tangcheng, \textit{Xinxilan huaqiao shi} (History of New Zealand Chinese), ed. Ding Shenzun (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2001), 110-111.
returned OC as special consultants to advise it on OC affairs and regional matters.\textsuperscript{249} However, during the Cultural Revolution he became a target, and only after years of oppression was finally able to leave China under revised policy (\textit{laiqu ziyou} – freedom to come and go).\textsuperscript{250}

With the domestic situation being increasingly chaotic during the late 1960s, Beijing shifted the focus of \textit{qiaowu} onto external UF work. The CCP made a brief attempt to export the proletarian revolution abroad. For example, in 1967 the PRC embassy in Rangoon issued Mao badges to OC students in Burma, and followed this with a mass demonstration.\textsuperscript{251} By 1970, the CCP began efforts to break its isolation from the global community by repositioning its UF strategy from Southeast Asia to Japan and the US, with Hong Kong and Macau acting as a relay station. Because of its geographical proximity, China chose Canada as a base to infiltrate the US – especially before diplomatic relations with Washington began. To further its exposure on the West coast, Beijing sought approval for the establishment of a consulate in Vancouver (which hosted a large population of OC).\textsuperscript{252} Attempts to connect with them were cautious not to portray Beijing as directly interfering in local activities or causing overt hostility amongst the Canadian OC community.

The main objective of the UFWD was to use propaganda and other activities to confuse the OC and discredit the KMT. This was done by currying favour and expanding influence amongst target groups.\textsuperscript{253} In pursuing the ‘Three Unities’, OC were instructed not to directly confront pro-KMT organizations, but to take control of them through their elective processes; moreover, in order to maintain secrecy, they were to only contact diplomats by writing or by telephone, rather than making personal visits. According to KMT propaganda of the time, these attempts to manipulate the broader OC community were largely unsuccessful, as few cared for

\textsuperscript{249} Fitzgerald, \textit{China and the Overseas Chinese}, 34.
\textsuperscript{250} Young stayed in China for 26 years. Upon his return to Napier, the local Chinese community did not forget his lofty aspirations for elitist officialdom in China. Some NZCA members were wary of his children’s intentions of joining their Association. On a visit to Guangzhou in 1984, one member was able to collect on his investment by presenting a share certificate to the Bank of China. Those who did not see a return were less forgiving. Young passed away in 2000. Personal communication with various NZCA members, Christchurch and Wellington, May/June 2006.
\textsuperscript{252} US Consulate Hong Kong, “Beijing and the Overseas Chinese.”
\textsuperscript{253} Wang, \textit{Qiaowu zhishi shouce}, 60-61.
political involvement, or kept quiet out of fear for the safety of their relatives still in China.254

During this period, Mao’s guiding principle of “internally tightening, externally loosening and root-taking” subjected guiqiao to further scrutiny and surveillance, while diplomats were instructed to act more cordially and amiable towards OC abroad. For example, they had priority to visit China over non-ethnic Chinese.255 However, these efforts were often contradictory to the geo-political circumstances of the time. Beijing still believed that the Soviet Union, US and Japan all posed an imperialist threat. In 1973 Zhou remarked to Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam, that it was “a matter of basic principle” that the PRC would support peoples’ revolutions.”256 Thus, foreign governments remained skeptical of where OC loyalties laid.257 At a reception later that same year, CCP leaders encouraged the OC to advance revolutionary pro-communist activity abroad and continue building relations between China and the world; and while they were welcomed back for short trips, they were actually discouraged from returning to China for long periods. In light of the domestic upheaval and a pre-occupation with preventing unwanted influences from taking root, Deng was reluctant to accept any more OC returnees. He pointed out that they might not be accustomed to China’s lower living standards, and that they could “produce greater results working in foreign lands.”258

255 The embassy in Ottawa and liaison office in Washington both had staff set aside for offering free visa applications and priority service to the OC. See Jan Wong, Red China Blues (New York: Anchor Books, 1996).
258 “Huijian Taiwan tongzhao, luRi luMei huaqiao, Meiji huaren de tanhua” (Meeting with Taiwanese Compatriots, Japanese and America Tourists, American OC) 6 October 1972 in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 46; US Consulate Hong Kong, “Teng Hsiao-Ping’s October Meeting with Overseas Chinese,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974HONGK13174, 6 December 1974.
3.12 Post-Revolution Qiaowu Policy

Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, the need for OC contributions to continue China’s modernization was paramount. Deng’s meeting with OC delegates during the 1977 National Day celebrations and making OC affairs part of the official agenda indicated the CCP had renewed its focus on qiaowu. In December 1977, Beijing hosted an “All Nation Overseas Chinese Conference” to dispel OC suspicions, resulting in calls for the revival and reinforcement of qiaowu under the slogan “all patriots are one family.” The meeting saw the Gang of Four blamed as the cause of the failure of OC programs and previous criticism of guiqiao as bourgeoisie, reactionary or foreign spies redressed in various policy changes.

Widespread party-state support for OC affairs was evident from a Renmin Ribao editorial (4 January 1978) that argued that more attention should be paid to qiaowu. It noted that the OC were “part of the Chinese people” and served as vital links in developing foreign relations and contributing to the PRC’s modernization. This sought to change the previous view of the OC by contending that they were mostly labourers oppressed by imperialists and capitalists. The Beijing Review supported this opinion by translating Zhongguo minzu as “Chinese nation”, thus indicating Beijing viewed the OC as part of its own. At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 1978, Deng emphasized the importance of OC. Furthermore, OCAC chairman Liao Chengzhi commended the positive role of the OC, and brought their persecution to an end.

The CCP then promptly reinstated pre-Cultural Revolution qiaowu policy and re-established the OCAC as the OCAO of the State Council (OCAO or qiaoban) in January 1978, and the Federation of OC Returnees (Zhongguo quanguo huiguo...
huaxiao lianhehui or qiaolian) resumed in April that same year. From these meetings, the OC no longer served China’s international revolutionary struggle. Instead, bourgeois OC became “workers for socialism” and the National UF Work Conference declared patriotism would unite and harness the talents and skills of transformed classes to support the motherland in a new UF of social modernization and economic construction.

Methods to attract OC resources targeted those traveling to China as tourists or visiting relatives, short-term study and exchange, and investors. Through qiaowu, they would serve China’s “Four Modernizations,” national reunification, and advance CCP interests. Moreover, qiaowu cadres called upon guiqiao to fulfill “Four Expectations.” These included contributing towards China’s modernization, its reunification, promotion of Chinese culture, and the development of international friendship. To facilitate this, guonei qiaozheng gongzuo (domestic OC administrative work) sought to educate them in order to unite, organize and develop a connection between their place of origin and their outside links for the purposes of China’s modernization and development under socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The first step was to regain their trust and restore confidence. This involved reforming policies that would rectify past abuses in the form of re-establishing official linkages. Domestic OC work was conducted according to a revised sixteen-character UF principle of yishi tongren, bude qishi, genju tedian, shidang zhaogu (treating everyone the same without discrimination, pay attention and care according to particularities) announced in December 1978. Under this policy, despite their overseas connections and foreign habits/customs, guiqiao were no different from...
other PRC citizens with the same rights.\(^{272}\) Over the next ten years, the PRC government issued various policies and undertook a number of programmes to attract the OC back to China.

Politically, the CCP reinstated *qiaowu* policy and expanded patriotic UF work. Those who had previously participated in communist movements abroad (such as in Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam or India) were given special attention. Domestic *qiaowu* united all these target groups under “Long term Co-existence, Mutual Supervision, Treat with Sincerity, Share the Good Times and the Bad.” It also promoted “One Country, Two Systems” with regard to the Taiwan issue. In addition, Beijing made explicit that the intelligentsia were both part of the working class and together with workers and farmers were the strength of Chinese socialism; rectified “leftist” wrongs and concepts of ethnicity as a class problem; and managed religious activity.\(^{273}\) Without these measures, its target audience might otherwise dismiss OC work and policy as ‘false propaganda.’\(^{274}\)

Economically, on the state-run OC farm projects, *guiqiao* workers received special tax breaks. Various propaganda programs were designed to inform returnees of OC law, co-ordinating them with various government agencies to develop “village-related” work and methods for gathering more contributions and donations.\(^{275}\) Authorities accorded those OC adversely affected during the Cultural Revolution or land reforms special measures for the return of confiscated property.\(^{276}\) When farmers complained, officials justified the reversal by describing the decision as a ‘historical right.’\(^{277}\)

In March 1983, the CCP announced various policies providing benefits and privileges for housing and education for the OC and their children.\(^{278}\) This heralded a string of

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\(^{272}\) “Guojia dui guonei qiaowu gongzuo de 16 zi fangzhen” (The State’s 16 Character Principle for Domestic OC Work) in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 147.


\(^{274}\) “Zai yici yewu zuotanhui shang de fayan”, 121-122.

\(^{275}\) *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 12, 132-156.


\(^{277}\) “Yao heqing heli jiejue lishi yiliu de huaqiao fangwu wenti” (Must Fairly Resolve the Historical Problem of OC Property) 1983 in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 126-131.

policies aimed to attract the OC back to China. At the same time, however, thousands of students were leaving to study abroad. The next few years saw a period of loosening and tightening for those departing, with particular attention to counter the ‘brain drain.’ After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and subsequent sanctions by the West, *qiaowu* policy focused upon preserving links with the OC in order to continue the inflow of foreign investment. These aspects are examined in detail in later chapters.

The efforts to attract the OC had to appear genuine. Thus the rights and interests of OC investors and talent became legally protected, and processes for redress speedily facilitated through specially established special consultative committees.\(^{279}\) The 1990 “Law of Protecting Rights and Interests of Overseas Chinese and their Relatives” guaranteed that they would be treated ‘adequately’ by the state.\(^{280}\) Over the next decade, various provincial governments also passed their own provincial legislation spelling out the additional policies, benefits and privileges for the OC.\(^{281}\)

In 2000, Beijing made several amendments to the 1990 Law.\(^{282}\) These included: protection of their remittances, farms, houses and property; guidance and support of their donations, investments and contributions; clauses welcoming their return to China and for settlement; encouragement for them to participate in China’s modernization; facilitation of their employment; encouragement for youth to study and the elderly to settle down in China; and also simplification of their entry/exit by ensuring speedy approval and a warm reception.\(^{283}\) In later years, other benefits and incentives included exemption from the one-child policy,\(^{284}\) retirement,\(^{285}\) burial,\(^{286}\) and foreign property ownership,\(^{287}\) amongst others.\(^{288}\)

\(^{279}\) *Qiaowu gongzuo gai lun*, 109-110.


\(^{281}\) Ibid., 700-834.

\(^{282}\) Ibid., 236-238.

\(^{283}\) Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 70, 143-145; *Qiaowu zhengce wenda*, 3-4.


\(^{286}\) *Qiaoqingjianbao*, no. 4, 2004, 12.
How are the OC affairs authorities integrated into the Chinese political system in the contemporary period? A clarification of the relative role of various state administrations and key nodes of the qiaowu system as a transparent and explicit apparatus provides a structuring format for the analysis of events. As the accompanying chart (see Figure 1) shows, the vast qiaowu bureaucracy incorporates the OC into China’s national interests through a complex web of ministries, agencies and organizations that share vast inter and intralevel connections.

The PRC’s power structure is composed of three systems (namely the CCP, the government, and the military) which operate vertically with central, provincial, prefecture, county and township levels. Across these systems are six sectors (military, legal, administrative, propaganda, UF, and mass-organization affairs) each again sectorally divided and supervised by a committee or non-standing organ, such as a Central Leading Group headed by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Although these groups are not decision making bodies as such, their policy preferences and recommendations carry significant weight in the final decision. Leading groups and committees do not have permanent staff, and therefore rely on executive bodies to implement and co-ordinate policy. This system allows centralized control over the entire political system and its policy making process, with a high level of power concentrated within the CCP.

Qiaowu is no different and shares many similarities with China’s other xitong bureaucratic frameworks, whereby all organizations in the system follow centrally established policies, while specialized bureaus handle particular aspects. The CCP and the State Council share leadership for the key co-ordinating functions – instructing and guiding the entire qiaowu apparatus by formulating relevant policy and ideological direction. Subordinate units attend to the practical aspects by co-

287 National People’s Congress Standing Committee, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guiqiao qiaojuan guanyi baohufa,” 236-238.
operating and co-ordinating with each other to implement these policies. Overall, there are five major qiaowu organizations that work together closely at all administrative levels to achieve this.  

The first of these major organizations is the OCAO or qiaoban, a unit directly under the State Council. In 1978 it re-emerged as the leading OC affairs organ for the PRC, and is known to cadres as the niangjiaren (family home) of OC affairs. It serves as the national level government body devoted to the co-ordination and implementation of OC policy through provincial and county level representation. The OCAO of the State Council is currently directed by Li Haifeng, and assisted by four deputy directors.

According to its website, the OCAO is responsible for several strategic and administrative tasks: firstly, drafting qiaowu policy and planning, drafting interrelated laws and regulations, drafting, supervising, inspecting, implement affairs. Secondly, it has a role for intelligence gathering and dissemination: performing research on domestic and external OC affairs, and delivering this information to the CCP and the State Council; it also compiles OC policy with theory and research findings, and is responsible for circulating analysis to other relevant divisions of government. Thirdly, the OCAO has a co-ordinating role throughout the qiaowu xitong super structure (see more below) by assisting the State Council executive in handling OC matters, overall planning and co-ordination of OC work with other relevant government divisions and social organizations, guiding them about OC work, and co-operating with the MFA by guiding consular offices and embassies with OC work. This latter aspect will also be discussed in further detail below.

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290 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 209-213.
In terms of its frontline work, the OCAO works to support the OC with domestic matters by guiding *guiqiao* (returned OC) and *qiaojuan* (relatives of OC) work by organizing and co-ordinating them with other OC and ethnic Chinese for upholding their legitimate domestic rights and privileges; it also co-ordinates with relevant government divisions to participate and supervise OC contributions, and assists relevant divisions with human resource management with *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* representatives. The OCAO is responsible for external matters as well: guiding and developing friendly relations and service work with OC, ethnic Chinese and their organizations abroad, developing relations with compatriot OC in Hong Kong and Macau, and working with relevant divisions for advancing Taiwan (anti-independence) work. It works to procure their talents and resources for China’s benefit – such as guiding and promoting OC economic, scientific, technological co-operation and exchanges.

The OCAO also has a clear soft power agenda by promoting guidance, co-ordination, solidarity and friendship with the OC mass media, cultural societies and schools to carry out cultural communications. 294 This includes promoting OC propaganda, facilitating cultural exchange and Chinese language education work. The OCAO assumes that many of the OC are unfamiliar with it and its policies, and works to resolve this concern by providing information, contact, gifts and resources to making more of them knowledgeable about China. 295

To carry out these tasks, the OCAO is divided into eight sections:

1) Secretariat  
2) Policy, Laws and Regulations  
3) Domestic Affairs  
4) External Affairs (HK, Macau, Taiwan)  
5) Economic, Science and Technology  
6) Propaganda  
7) Culture  
8) Organization and Human Resources

294 "Shenri qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 10-11.  
295 “Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan,” 1.
Each division has close relations to the relevant CCP Central Committee Departments and various government ministries and agencies. These links of the OCAO are extensive, and filter down provincial and city/town OCAO levels. Local OCAO offices work with other local level organs of the Foreign Affairs Office (which operate under the MFA), Foreign Economic and Trade Commission (responsible for managing, attracting and supervising foreign, investment and enterprises), the UFWD and the Propaganda Department. Offices exist in every province (except Tibet), city or town. While lower level agencies may not be expressly delegated authority for policy formulation, they enjoy sufficient space to move within the broad framework set out by the central government. Motivated primarily by economic considerations, these subordinate agencies exploit new opportunities and maximise their interests. For example, in recent years the provincial level OCAOs have enjoyed both increased influence over qiaowu policy development as well as the authority to set their own agendas. In Guangdong, the importance of OC affairs is so great that the number of its office staff exceed that of the Foreign Affairs Office. The delegation of power to provincial level OCAO offices has a significant role to play in explaining the Chinese political arrangement and is discussed in further detail below.

The second major qiaowu organization is the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese Association (qiaolian). This body is ostensibly a national non-governmental organization under the CCP leadership for rallying and uniting all of the OC for China’s national interests – whether they be Chinese nationals residing abroad, foreign citizens of Chinese descent, or returned overseas Chinese (guiqiao) and their dependents. In the same spirit before its dissolution in 1968, the qiaolian seeks to protect the legitimate rights and interests of guiqiao, their family members, ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality and compatriots by implementing policies and laws formulated by the state following investigation into their affairs. It is also charged with managing OC donations and remittances, resettling them in China, directing their education abroad, receiving and sending delegations for visits, trade and sightseeing,

maintaining and fostering patriotic spirit amongst them, encouraging contribution to China’s modernization, national reunification, and international influence.298

Connecting guiqiao and the OC down each level of the qiaolian and qiaoban network are various provincial and city/town associations, chambers, conventions, companies and mass organizations responsible for frontline activities. These comprise of commercial, friendship, education, investment, tourism and scientific and technological exchanges that operate through a variety of mechanisms to ensure the widest outreach: OC banks, stores, China Travel Service CTS (Holdings) Corporation of China (originally established as the Overseas Chinese Travel Service),299 OC universities and specific research facilities (such as the Institute of Overseas Chinese Study at Jinan University, the Research School of Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen University, and the Centre for Overseas Chinese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing) for making strategic assessments and policy recommendations, OC schools (see section on OC education), guiqiao farms, and the OC Investment Company.300 In short, the qiaoban, qiaolian and their affiliates share the general responsibility of representing the public face of qiaowu both inside and outside of China – advancing various aspects of OC affairs, managing the framework, formulating technique and policy, and implementing those designs.

3.14 CCP Influence over Qiaowu Affairs

The real guiding power over qiaowu (as with all other aspects concerning China’s national interests) lies with the CCP, which acts in an ideological and advisory capacity to set its direction. The CCP Central Committee oversees five Departments – four of which deal with qiaowu affairs. Firstly, to manage communications with the OC, the CCP Central Propaganda/Publicity Department (CPD) works through the State Council Information Office and the Office of Foreign Propaganda. These offices provide the appropriate content for the Xinhua News Agency and other state-controlled media to disseminate amongst the OC, including articles that foster pride and sentimentality for the homeland, and to ‘clarify’ any negative opinions they may

300 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 213-216.
have. Efforts are bolstered by pro-Beijing OC newspapers and other OC media platforms seeking to strengthen allegiances with Chinese authorities and diplomats, and look to the PRC embassy for guidance and prestige. This aspect will be accorded further analysis in Chapter Six.

The second is the International Department, whose responsibilities include developing relations with other communist organizations and local political parties around the world, facilitating UF work, and advancing external propaganda work concerning Taiwan and China’s international image. Although difficult to substantiate, it works closely with the MSS for assisting PRC diplomatic attaches with intelligence gathering on foreign political matters and agent recruitment. This work includes assessment, monitoring and addressing threats and challenges amongst the OC. While the International Department is different and independent of government institutions with related agendas, it is not responsible for their policies in general, but works with them through PRC embassies and consular offices.

The third is the Organization Department (which deals with human resource, personnel control and social issues of the state) and helps determine the policies for recruitment of OC talent, and particularly addressing the concerns of returned OC and allocating them to suitable positions of employment. As such, it works with the relevant government ministries and OCAO to achieve its objectives.

The last of the four Departments responsible for qiaowu under the CCP Central Committee is the UFWD. The UFWD is central to ensuring that qiaowu is implemented according to the wishes of the CCP. Its leaders are mostly selected by the CCP or are themselves CCP members. It has been instrumental in bringing together powerful pro-Beijing OC organizations and business elite seeking to maximise their relations with China by forming a “Chinese people’s patriotic” UF

organization. For example, one such ‘front’ organization for maintaining external relations is the Chinese National Association for Overseas Liaisons.

However, it is with domestic relations with the returned OC that the UFWD holds most influence through guiding two other major qiaowu organizations – both of which share similar goals. One of its most important achievements was the re-establishment of the CPPCC – an organ for the development of multi-party co-operation, political consultation, and a forum for promoting socialist democracy in the Chinese political system under the leadership of the CCP. To engage and co-opt the OC, the advisory level zhengxie qiaowei (Overseas Chinese Committee of the CPPCC) was established in 1983 as the third major qiaowu organization for political consultations concerning state policies and issues with other member parties, organizations and representatives.

The mechanism for linking the OC with this Committee is its subordinate China Overseas Friendship Association, which together with the OCAO works to consolidate contacts between people of various sectors in the mainland and others living in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, as well as those of Chinese origin living abroad. The major tasks of the Association are to enhance contacts, increase understanding, development and friendship, and develop UF work by publicizing CCP policies, promoting socialist achievements and China’s modernization, and seeking consensus with the OC concerning reunification with Taiwan and the ‘one China’ principle.

The UFWD is also responsible for the fourth major qiaowu organization – the Zhigong Party (China Party for Public Interest), which seeks to influence, guide and manage its members (mostly returned OC and their relatives, experts, scholars and those with overseas relations). As a member of the CPPCC, it is one of the eight legally recognized political parties in China and follows the direction of the CCP.

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306 The CPPCC also established a Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (zhengxie tai ao gang qiaowei) for similar purposes. See Barabantseva, “Trans-Nationalising Chineseness,” 11.
The Zhigong Party, with its political connections, is another unit that assists the OCAO and the China Overseas Friendship Association with their shared goals.307

The fifth major qiaowu organization is the legislative level renda qiaowei (Overseas Chinese Committee of the National People’s Congress), currently chaired by Gao Siren, along with nine other vice-chairpersons. This Committee is one of nine special committees working under the direction of the National People’s Congress, or under its Standing Committee when it is not in session. Its role is to review bills and proposals concerning OC affairs for deliberation by the Standing Committee. While it may appear that this special OC committee enjoys a high level of importance with the Chinese government, it has no real power as its activities are confined to discussions and approval of measures that are decided upon elsewhere.

Qiaowu is not given as much top tier focus and importance as in previous periods mentioned earlier. In the current era, qiaowu is relatively decentralized and its activities more widespread. For example, a feature common to crucial xitong structures in CCP work is the ‘double-hatting’ of leading CCP personalities in multiple roles. In the area of propaganda and mass communication, Liu Yunshan holds titles including Politburo Member, Director of the CPD, Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Propaganda (Publicity) and Ideological Work, Vice Chairperson of the Central Guidance Committee on Ethnical and Cultural Construction (Civilization Steering Committee), Member of the Central Group for Constitutional Amendment, Deputy Head of the State Leading Group for Informationalization Work, and Head of the National Anti-Pornography and Anti-Illlegal Publications Work Group). As noted by China analyst Anne-Marie Brady, by “holding everything in one hand” the CCP is able to enforce its influence over multiple sectors under the control of one person.308

By comparison, such concentration of power under one individual is not evident in qiaowu affairs. For example, there are no Politburo members in any of the leading

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308 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 23.
Neither Gao nor Li hold other significant titles—however there are three other high ranking qiaowu officials that hold multiple titles: Ge Zhenfeng (Vice-Chairperson of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, Central Committee Member, and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff); Wan Gang (Chairperson of the Zhigong Party Central Committee, Minister of Science and Technology, and Standing Committee member of the 10th and 11th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference). The third, Yang Bangjie, holds two positions of which both are directly related to qiaowu (Vice-Chairperson of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress and Vice-Chairperson of the Zhigong Party). The significance of their role in advisory bodies indicates that qiaowu policy is not necessarily controlled, but does operate under the overarching influence of the CCP.

Of the three, Wan has the highest level of overall influence, with a diverse range of responsibility at the top tiers of the hierarchy; Ge also shares a broad portfolio, but at age 65, he is due for retirement from his military post. Yang is able to directly influence qiaowu affairs from strategic positions—both at the policy recommendation stage, as well as with its implementation. Wan and Yang’s links to the Zhigong Party are of particular significance—while the Zhigong Party is ostensibly non-governmental in nature, both officials illustrate the direct relationship between the state and qiaowu affairs. Links to the Zhigong Party also mean connections to the UFWD, OC publications and other frontline apparatus geared towards the OC. There are also aspects of qiaowu that are closely related with the propaganda xitong (such as influence over OC media)—hence, important aspects of communication with the OC remain under the CCP’s guiding hand.

3.15 Qiaowu and the Xitong Bureaucracy

The qiaowu administration enjoys significant professional autonomy that evolves and responds systematically and opportunistically to various challenges. As such, the qiaowu bureaucracy develops its own internal logic, assumes new tasks, and maneuvers for position in the leadership organs. However, as part of the state authority, the qiaowu administration remains subject to leadership ideology and its
political discourse. Because qiaowu falls under the scope of China’s external work, the qiaowu administration’s activities and objectives often become intertwined with the policy objectives of other government bodies. As such, personnel from various authorities take on shared duties and responsibilities for matters related to the OC. As mentioned earlier, China’s relationship with the OC goes beyond the parameters of the qiaowu administration itself. Various agencies have specific objectives to achieve – involving, engaging and mobilizing the OC for their own ends.

The MFA (through PRC embassies and consular offices) serves as the frontline conduit for co-ordinating various ministerial attaches in implementing their external policies – for example, the Ministry of Culture (MOC) promotes propaganda and information about China and responds to anti-China/CCP forces; the MOE liaises with PRC students, prescribes textbooks and learning materials for OC schools, and works with Confucius Institutes (see Chapter Five). Similarly, Finance, Public Security, State Security, Personnel, Commerce and Science and Technology each have a stake in ensuring that they can derive the necessary talents, skills and financial resources from guiqiao and other OC. These ministries produce jointly developed policy documents and regulations for these purposes. While these ministries are not part of the qiaowu administration per se, their scope of activity clearly includes qiaowu issues and affairs because they are dealing with the OC as part of their broader mandate.

However, each ministry operates with different agendas, responsibility and perspectives. The complex intra-relationships and lines between qiaowu matters and the qiaowu administration become blurred despite separate career paths and command structures. Different xitong superstructures have different operating systems, logic, ideological training, and management skills. Training takes place in special universities, while intelligence gathering and policy development are performed at special research facilities. Internal administrative matters, such as the recruitment of cadres, budgeting and implementing specific programmes are their own concerns. They also have affiliated companies with semi-commercial objectives (such as publishing services) and quasi-governmental and non-governmental associations for people-to-people activity. This arrangement tends to encourage different xitong to pursue their own interests – resulting in systemic horizontal and vertical conflict
between the administrative organs of the central state and the subordinate local government level agencies.

Conflict and interaction within the Chinese political system can be analyzed through interest group theory, which examines how power has been decentralized, with the central government converting the ‘demands’ of interest groups into policy. 309 Although interest group theory may be useful for defining groups and their interests, it is the organizational structures they belong to, how they operate, the decision making processes, and the manner in which policies are implemented that explain the Chinese socio-political system. While it is the Politburo and State Council that make decisions on which issues are pursued, subordinate bodies also have significant input into policy and decision making. For this analysis, the complex bureaucracies model assumes that political leaders from different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy bargain and negotiate with each other to reach a consensus that is translated into policy. The process sees various xitong and the central bureaucracy defining their position, bargaining with local level bureaucracies, and competing or consolidating with each other to preserve its interests while expanding its political and economic capital and influence. As such, this process may not necessarily fall in line with the central government’s grand strategy. However, behaviour is moderated by shared values, set practices and frameworks as conflicting interests are weighed out against each other. This model is useful for understanding the formal networks of power and how they work, but lacks a representation of the actual and informal political processes.310

Because the Chinese leadership as a whole is in agreement with the basic assumptions of OC policy, competing political and bureaucratic interests that may result in intra-level conflict in a consensus-orientated policy making process have not affected the fundamental direction of OC policy. As mentioned earlier, qiaowu has the ability to integrate with these other state and party administrations, both centrally and locally. This integration is particularly evident with the ‘emergency response mechanism’, where the qiaowu administration co-operates with MFA, local provincial government officials, with the backing of top tier leaders (examined in detail in Chapter Eight).

Conflicts of interest between different xitongs and different hierarchical levels over a given policy area may require intervention (in the form of committees and leading groups) to create balance and ensure that, over all, central policy and strategy is maintained. With qiaowu, the OC Affairs Committee under the NPC (although not having real power as such) has a role to reconcile subordinate agencies and ensure that policy implementation follows grand strategy.

While the state maintains centralized control over subordinate government ministries through leadership (lingdao) relationships (which can be interpreted as direct intervention, governance and control), many other links in the qiaowu apparatus (particularly those connecting ‘non-government’ affiliated groups) operate under ‘guided’ (zhidao) relationships. In these circumstances, broadstroke ideology is set by the CCP Central Committee and its Departments, with the OC Affairs Committee of the NPC determining policy planning and direction. Co-ordinated with the State Council, instructions from these leading bodies are issued through guiding documents (such as Qiaoqing and Qiaoqing jianbao) that provide the latest developments, regulations, important speeches, suggestions, recommendations and warnings that qiaowu cadres should be aware of. Guidance can also take place through qiaowu schools, which provide cadres with the appropriate ideological and management training. As such, the potential for intra-bureaucratic conflict is minimalized due to a shared ideology advanced from the highest levels.

3.16 Decentralization of Power to Provincial Level Qiaowu Operations

As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and open door policies after 1978, economic power and international interaction have passed from the central level down to the provincial level. This has increased the assertiveness of provincial authorities and created a new dynamic in central-provincial relations for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. For example, the number of actors involved in its formulation and implementation has increased significantly since 1978, resulting in
more complex and consultative processes. At the same time, except for grand strategy decisions (which remain the preserve of top leaders), power has moved down to subordinate agencies, and from Beijing to the provinces.311

Similar patterns of decentralization have also occurred with qiaowu affairs. Provincial involvement in qiaowu affairs is influenced by geographic location, central government policy, and provincial development strategies. Guangdong and Fujian were early recipients of preferential central government policies after 1979, given that they are both important points of origin and return for the OC, and also directly connected to Beijing’s objectives with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Coastal development of the 1980s gradually moved to other regions in the 1990s. In the contemporary period, provinces all over China compete for OC investment, skills and resources as an integral part of their domestic development strategies.312

Provincial level qiaowu efforts have gone from strength to strength in recent years as a result of increased migration abroad and the intense effort to attract OC investment in a competitive environment.313 Delegations visit, exchange gifts, and encourage closer relationships with OC communities. Their role is to showcase China’s modern developments, particularly to those who have resided outside of China for extended periods and unaware of changes over recent years. Meetings between leading OC community members and visiting PRC officials are a common part of official state visits, comprising both a social and economic agenda.

With a significant number of OC originating from its shores, the Guangdong OCAO (GOCAO) is one of the leading provincial level units.314 Its efforts provide the State Council with new and original concepts and proposals for qiaowu policy development;

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312 Cheung and Tang, “The External Relations of China’s Provinces,” 91-120.
313 As OC origins become more diverse, offices have expanded to provinces outside the traditional regions of Guangdong and Fujian. For example, the Guizhou Province Foreign Affairs Office has responsibility for OC from its jurisdiction. See its website, www.gzgov.gov.cn/enggov/pages/government-44.htm (accessed 30 September 2009).
in turn, other provincial offices have adopted many of the GOCAO’s programmes and strategies as part of their *qiaowu* activities. Initiatives include The Guangdong Returned Overseas Chinese Association, Guangdong International Overseas Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Youth Overseas Chinese Association, and the Guangzhou Convention of OC Scholars in Science and Technology.\textsuperscript{315}

An important and direct means of connection with the OC is achieved through provincial Overseas Exchange Associations (*haiwai jiaoliu xiehui*). These Associations have special economic, science and technology divisions to facilitate exchanges with OC scientists and technical experts, and to gather intelligence on them for strategic purposes. They also have a key mobilization role – Associations appoint and co-opt Directors from leading OC organizations to liaise and advance *qiaowu* influence abroad. Without formal diplomatic representation, provincial authorities rely on these semi-official channels for establishing and maintaining links overseas. Directors act as quasi-diplomats for China, charged with furthering the Chinese connection with local governments and raising China’s soft power and influence at the people-to-people level.

The KMT had its own system of managing OC communities by appointing commissioners (*qiaoyu weiyuan*) to promote its interests overseas before 1949.\textsuperscript{316} Under *jus sanguinis*, commissioners were responsible not only for the legal protection of all OC, but also legal control over them as well.\textsuperscript{317} In contrast, the PRC does not seek jurisdiction over its diaspora, but simply confers honorary positions. Various provinces have their own programmes.\textsuperscript{318} For example, since 1992 the GOCAO has had a global network of directors of the Overseas Exchange Association of Guangdong Province. Their selection is based on education, talent and age – with a preference for younger skilled OC with connections in local government or organizations, and not necessarily those with economic prowess. While most

\textsuperscript{316} Chen Jie, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia*, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002), 178. Commissioners are still appointed in the contemporary period, but act in a liaison capacity between *Taiqiao* and Taipei.
\textsuperscript{317} McNair, *The Chinese Abroad*, 27.
\textsuperscript{318} Nyiri, “From Class Enemies to Patriots,” 217, 227.
originates from larger countries, the hope is to increase this pool to include those from less-represented areas in order to form a truly global network.319

Directors are mobilized at four levels: small groups for specific tasks, regional groups for larger projects at the national/regional level, industrial/occupational groups for specialist knowledge tasks, and an internal China group for facilitating more exchange with other overseas directors.320 To keep them energized and loyal, the Association holds regular activities to maintain their interest. Directors are encouraged to organize functions and report back to Guangdong authorities. Cadres reward their work with five star treatment during return visits, and lavish praise on them at conferences and in newsletter articles. As such, these elite OC are eager to serve closely with qiaowu and state authorities.

Their role is important for frontline qiaowu operations as they themselves lead strategic OC organizations. Directors are influential in directing how their communities behave and respond to cues. In many cases, their constituency may be unaware that the directives they receive are actually from the OCAO itself. By passing on responsibilities down the chain, the OCAO relieves itself of the work, costs and resources that would otherwise be required at the grassroots level.

3.17 Conclusion

The OC have always been an important resource for Beijing to draw upon. While they were welcomed for their contribution to China’s development, radical elements within the CCP meant that the relationship was often troubled. This chapter has demonstrated that following years of contradictory and confused policy, qiaowu has successfully evolved into a systematic and coherent apparatus of persuasion and influence. Moreover, it enjoys an institutionalized workforce comprised of cadres who are expert in developing person-to-person relationships. Since the early 1950s,


320 Ibid.
the PRC has moved from cautious activity to conspicuous and active support for OC communities in the 2000s. This is the result of a renewed sense of confidence on the part of both Beijing and its intended targets.321

The key to qiaowu’s success is its set of specific psychological tools for managing the OC. By seeding pro-Beijing sentiment amongst them, the CCP seeks to pre-empt any challenge to its power. Various techniques developed over the years demonstrate that China prefers to have the OC voluntarily support Beijing by encouraging positive feelings for it. By emphasizing care and sincerity as the core of qiaowu work, support for China (and hence the CCP) has resonated strongly amongst various cohorts of the OC diaspora. These modern qiaowu methods are conducted using effective and efficient platforms. The infrastructure is co-ordinated and well resourced, and is capable of engaging with the majority of OC. Indicators show that China’s economic, cultural and political strength is set to continue, and there is no reason why its relationship with the OC will not follow suit. Cadres receive regular instructions to improve their work; state, provincial and local authorities are heavily engaged in building links with the OC; and the OC themselves are increasingly eager to further their access to educational and cultural resources, as well as economic opportunity. As such, aided by an ever-growing infrastructure and a favourable environment, qiaowu has, and will continue to, deepen in scope and penetration.

4.00 Targets and Subjects of Qiaowu

Given the importance of the OC for China’s national interests, this chapter examines exactly how the Chinese diaspora is comprised and defined. Broadly speaking, this thesis uses the term ‘OC’ as a generic term to describe all ethnic Chinese people residing abroad. Others may have a different opinion on this issue. Some use the term ‘OC’ as casual shorthand to describe both Chinese nationals living outside of

China, as well as ethnic Chinese of foreign citizenship. Such ambiguity has led to disagreement amongst academics, given the patriotic and nationalistic connotations that the term may carry. In addition, Beijing and Taipei’s definition of the OC has developed over different periods. While Taiwan has moved away from its traditional position of embracing all OC to focusing only upon Taiqiao in the DPP period, the PRC has become more confident in embracing all ethnic Chinese – no matter what their origins. This chapter shows how China has successfully targeted various cohorts of the OC by adapting to the changes in the geo-political environment, responding quickly and effectively to their concerns, and by capitalizing on Taipei’s weaknesses and mistakes with its own qiaowu policies.

4.01 ROC Definition of the OC

Under the principle of jus sangunis, the ROC criteria for classification as an OC (from 1911 until the late 1990s) was largely based on ethnicity, and included all people of Chinese descent regardless of their citizenship. This definition came into question in the 1970s when Vietnamese refugees claimed that they were ROC nationals based on the fact that they were ethnic Chinese. Until 1990, the ROC automatically granted citizenship to all ethnic Chinese upon their “return” to Taiwan as part of the great Chinese diaspora. Even into the early 1990s, Taipei continued to define the OC as “any person of Chinese descent living outside the borders of the Republic of China,” and accommodated them in its OC policy as it felt a “historical debt of gratitude” and sought to serve their interests in “whatever ways deemed appropriate

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322 Those of Cantonese origin (particularly the older generation) use the term huaqiao loosely to include all ethnic Chinese of any nationality but perhaps adding their country of residence. See Wang, *China and the Chinese Overseas*, 257; Low, “The Overseas Chinese Connection,” 96.
and feasible.”

However, Taipei’s answer for separating ROC nationality from living in Taiwan lay in The Domocile Act of 1973. Under this Act, there is no automatic right for ROC nationals who live overseas to enter or reside on the island. Such legislation spared Taipei from having to deal with a massive influx of refugees seeking to enter Taiwan based on their ethnic origins, yet allowed it to maintain jurisdiction over those OC considered as important to its interests.

As OC demographics changed following the relaxation of ROC migration policy in 1989, Taiwanese migrants (imbued with a growing distinct Taiwanese consciousness) were not content with being grouped together with *huaqiao*. They demanded a more accurate form of terminology to describe themselves, and hence preferred the term *Taiqiao*. This implied that they supported Taiwan, while *huaqiao* suggested only Chinese roots.

Since 2002, the Overseas Compatriot Identity Certification Act has precisely articulated the modern definition of ROC citizenship. OC are defined not as an ‘Overseas Chinese,’ but an ‘Overseas Compatriot’ – that is, a ROC national without registered permanent residence in Taiwan but holding a valid ROC passport and overseas resident status; or was born abroad or has been living overseas for more than four years and has acquired permanent residency abroad; or a former PRC national but living overseas for more than four years and has permanent residency or citizenship of that country and a valid ROC passport.

In other words, the current ROC definition of an OC is someone with Taiwanese connections, and not simply someone of ethnic Chinese descent. Thus in all of its contemporary announcements and policy, the OCAC is careful to avoid the term *hua* in order to clearly differentiate Taiwanese *qiaomin* (meaning *Taiqiao*) from ethnic Chinese (referred to as *huaren*).

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329 *Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 189-190.


Such terminology clearly signifies how Taipei views the OC and their relationship with Taiwan, and how it intended to distance itself from the ethnic Chinese altogether.

4.02 *Taiwanization of ROC Qiaowu*

Following the CCP victory in 1949, the KMT was in a battle for political and diplomatic survival. It sought legitimacy and international support by presenting itself as a staunch defender against communism. Because the KMT saw future reunification with the mainland as its primary aim, it placed emphasis on promoting Chinese commonalities (with Taiwanese as part of being Chinese) with the OC. Although the ROC could not claim Taiwan to be their ancestral homeland, it acted instead as the “protectors and orthodox bearers” of Chinese tradition and values, and sought to persuade the OC that the Communists had abandoned them. To maintain loyalty and support for the KMT regime, it took on the role of guardian of Chinese high culture in order to legitimize itself as the true government of China – or at least to perpetuate the myth and concept of a political and cultural “Great China on Taiwan”.

However, a longing amongst some Taiwanese (especially those with an inclination for pro-independence) to project their distinct identity eventually took hold amongst Taiwan’s domestic political environment. These sentiments were likewise manifested in Taiwan’s OC affairs. As early as the late 1970s, ROC *qiaowu* had already begun focusing on pro-ROC/KMT organizations that made explicit affiliation with Taiwan and Taiwanese affairs. Upon his re-election by the National Assembly in 1990, President Lee Teng-hui finally abandoned the claim for Taiwan to represent all of China. In his inaugural address, he implicitly recognized the PRC by calling for full exchanges in all areas across the Strait. Lee’s pro-independence movement brought into focus an assertion of Taiwanese ethnic consciousness in its government policies.

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The political direction of the ROC changed profoundly as it embraced a post-nationalist identity in a process of Taiwanization (sometimes referred to as localization or bentuhua). Rather than a rediscovery of its indigenous consciousness as its name might suggest, Taiwanization evolved from a political movement against KMT hegemony and antiquated values. Moreover, indigenous Taiwanese had entered into the ranks of the KMT power structure, local government offices and the Legislative Yuan.

In this environment, the ROC’s qiaowu effort was torn between KMT and DPP ideologies, faced declining support from traditional laoqiao (old and established OC) and attracted increasing frustration from Taiqiao. Hence, its direction was often unclear and contradictory due to differences between the governing powers and the agency implementing the policy – the OCAC. From the KMT perspective, it historically cherished laoqiao connections in the context of jus sanguinis, even into the second or third generation abroad. Throughout the early 1990s, the OCAC continued to proclaim: “overseas Chinese, no matter how long they live overseas, are considered as one.” Lee also described the relationship with the OC as “unbreakable.” The importance of the OC to maintaining Taiwan’s legitimacy, irrespective of their origins, was clear to the KMT.

This view endured constant opposition from the DPP, and the OCAC faced intense pressure from pro-independence forces both domestically and abroad. Throughout the 1990s, various legislators sought to push different policies for those of Chinese descent and Taiqiao, or to abolish the OCAC altogether. This was because groups representing native-born Taiwanese viewed the OCAC as a KMT preserve, and that it

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335 Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, 155.
338 Tseng Kwang-shun (OCAC Chairman) as quoted in “The Historic Track of Overseas Chinese Affairs,” 60-62.
only served Cantonese (the majority of the *laoqiao* population).\textsuperscript{341} They complained that many beneficiaries had little or no relationship with Taiwan at all and did not contribute anything back (such as taxes or national service).\textsuperscript{342} Influential *Taiqiao* associations were equally opposed to the OCAC’s anti-independence policy and how it was obliterating Taiwanese identity.\textsuperscript{343} As one of his pre-election platforms, DPP leader Chen Shui-bian appealed to these groups by advocating combining the OCAC with the MFA into a Ministry of External Affairs, and making *qiaowu* an integral part of Taiwan’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{344} To remain in favour, the OCAC stepped up relations with *Taiqiao* and pro-Taiwan OC, whereby OC investors were encouraged to share in the Taiwanese identity.\textsuperscript{345}

Although many DPP members were ambivalent to the OC issue and could not accept the relationship between Taiwan and non-Taiwanese *huaren*, those links had to continue – because no matter what their origins, the millions of OC (particularly in strategic countries such as the US and Japan) remained an important political asset for Taipei. Thus, prior to the 2000 elections, DPP officials toured around the world in order to solicit support from these *laoqiao* communities. They vowed to them that they would not close down the OCAC (as voiced by some senior members) but strengthen services for them.\textsuperscript{346} As such, the director general of the TECO in Los Angeles referred to his organization as a “surrogate consulate” for over a million ethnic Chinese in the region.\textsuperscript{347} As the KMT had long recognized, the DPP also had to acknowledge and respect the importance of the OC diaspora.

4.03 The ROC’s Redefinition of Huaqiao

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{343}{Maubo Cheng, “Would-Be Head of OCAC Vows to Serve Pro-ROC Overseas Chinese,” *Central News Agency*, 4 May 2000.}
\footnotetext{345}{Tseng, “From “Us” to “Them”,” 383-404.}
\end{footnotes}
Such efforts to maintain support from the OC began to waiver as the independence movement in Taiwan’s domestic politics took hold. The appearance of the DPP in 1986, the Taiwanization of politics and society, and the changes in the governing party were all significant reasons for causing a significant deterioration in the OC relationship.\(^{348}\) The most controversial changes occurred after the handover of power to the DPP in 2000, when the newly appointed ROC OCAC chairwoman Chang Fumei announced that its target groups were those who identified and loved Taiwan—irrespective of their political affiliation or ethnic grouping.\(^{349}\) Moreover, Chang remarked that the OCAC should provide services according to a priority system based on “three classifications.”\(^{350}\) This new effort would maintain ties with those who shared an interest, supported or paid tax to the ROC.\(^{351}\)

As a result, qiaowu was subsequently dispensed in a Taiqiao-centric fashion, whereby budgets and resources for activities varied for different groups and regions depending on their size and level of political importance.\(^{352}\) In 2002, of the 9294 OC associations registered with the OCAC, only 45 percent (mainly comprising of Taiqiao) received guidance and close contact.\(^{353}\) While more powerful pro-independence Taiwanese in California received comparatively more resources,\(^{354}\) Taiwan looked upon other ethnic Chinese (mostly laoqiao communities) around the world with an “open view,” and accorded them only limited support; pro-Beijing groups that did not actively support Taiwan were not included at all.\(^{355}\)

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\(^{348}\) Wu Yu-Shan (Director of Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica) interview by author, Taipei, 24 October 2005.


\(^{351}\) Cheng, “Would-Be Head of OCAC Vows to Serve Pro-ROC Overseas Chinese.”


\(^{355}\) Article 4 of “*Haiwai huaqiao tuanti lianxi dengji zuoye yaodian*” (Main Points on Overseas Chinese Association Liaison and Registration) from Government Information Office, “Foreign Relations:
Politically, the OCAC would foster relations with both individuals and organizations to promote OC “citizen diplomacy.” This included encouraging elite OC to participate in local politics and spread awareness of Taiwan’s situation abroad. It emphasized Taiwan’s democratic environment and criticized the moral violations in China. The OCAC would manage them and their associations for helping to resolve the cross-strait issue, and to persuade the global community to accept Taiwan into international organizations. The mechanisms to achieve this included registration, planning, preparation and co-ordination policy according to two guidelines: the “Measures on Providing Guidance to Overseas Chinese Associations” and the “Main Points on Overseas Chinese Association Liaison and Registration.”

Culturally, qiaowu would enhance the understanding of Taiwan’s situation and distinct culture amongst those OC unfamiliar with things Taiwanese (such as the second and third generation). ROC education services centres would promote Taiwanese activities (such as youth tours and going to Taiwan for higher study), and provide communication on Taiqiao matters through propaganda, television, and the internet. Economically, the OCAC would assist the OC to invest in Taiwan and promote its exports. In this context, qiaowu services gravitated towards assisting Taiwanese to emigrate abroad (such as providing advice and seminars for prospective migrants) and integrating business interests between old and new migrants.

Chang’s announcement drew strong criticism from laoqiao communities (particularly in the US) to the extent that some large associations threatened to boycott or withdraw


359 “Minjindang zhizheng houtai “qiaoweihui” de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang” (Essential Development and Direction Behind the Scenes of Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission Following DPP Ascent to Power), Qiaoqing, no. 29 (15 August 2000): 4-11.
from OCAC affairs and functions. Those who had previously supported the ROC and the KMT as an alternative to communism consequently felt alienated, angry and frustrated with Taipei’s move to cut traditional ties. Others simply found a DPP government too difficult to accept. They argued that the “three classifications” was an attempt to discriminate against mainland born and KMT-affiliated ethnic Chinese – accusations that Chang flatly countered as necessary due to “limited resources.”

These comments would set the tone of OC relations for the next eight years, most of which were fraught with animosity.

The manner in which the ROC OCAC functioned during the DPP period clearly reflected the effects of Taiwanization. It worked to assist the OC in elevating their social status through acceptance in overseas societies with the aim of getting them to reciprocate through political involvement and influence in order to assist Taiwan’s political situation, international status and security. Operating upon principles of “reform, innovation, foresight and pragmatism,” the OCAC appealed to its target audience by presenting a progressive Taiwan that held democracy, freedom and human rights as its core values. These were values that many OC and Taiqiao who favoured independence (particularly strategic populations in the US) could identify with. Thus it was clear that the OC, albeit a more selective cohort, remained very important to the DPP.

4.04 Damage Control

However, the DPP still acknowledged the need to maintain ties with laoqiao groups even if they were not Taiwanese. In the context of its rivalry with Beijing for

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362 John Chen (TECO representative), personal communication with Anne-Marie Brady, 1 May 2007.
international recognition, Taipei needed all the support it could muster, and the *laoqiao* remained a stronghold of political support. The OCAC continued to emphasize that its top priority was to boost unity amongst the OC populace through promoting traditional Chinese family and educational values, and the resolution of Taiwan’s relationship with China.

The problem with Taiwan’s OC affairs during the DPP era was that policies were implemented through an organization entrenched in KMT values. While it was resistant to accepting certain DPP directives, the OCAC had no choice but to bend to the demands of its political master. DPP legislators continued to undermine the OCAC and its KMT supporters by questioning the legality of OCAC-controlled assets and KMT-affiliated activities, and accused it of subsidizing non-patriotic activity. The future of the OCAC appeared bleak.

The OCAC thus began a delicate balancing act of satisfying the pro-independence movement while trying not to upset decades of hard work with *laoqiao* by saying one thing while doing another. Consequently, Taiwan’s *qiaowu* effort with these groups was often on the back foot. For example, in response to her “three classifications” remark, top-level officials (including the vice chairman of the OCAC and vice president of the Legislative Yuan who condemned Chang’s comments as “inappropriate” and “misguided”) personally delivered a letter from Chang asking for forgiveness from OC leaders. However, she later argued that left-wing OC groups had exploited her remarks as an opportunity to sow discord amongst the community. Chang consequently apologized again, citing her previous comments as a “misunderstanding.” The OCAC made continued efforts to assure *laoqiao* that they were still important to Taiwan. Diplomats maintained they would never give up on

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372 Lu and Wang, “OCAC Chairwoman Asks for Forgiveness from Overseas Chinese.”

373 Tseng and Wang, “OCAC Head Apologises Again for Inappropriate Rhetoric.”
the OC\textsuperscript{374} because they were their “own flesh and blood.”\textsuperscript{375} Chang personally visited communities in the US to remind them of their importance by saying that anything to do with Taiwan’s future “will include overseas Chinese input.”\textsuperscript{376}

Likewise, the OCAC denied any major change or difference in their relationship with the OC. Diplomats contended that there were neither budget cuts nor reduction of facilities and services to the OC, irrespective of their political or ethnic alignment.\textsuperscript{377} However, Taiwan’s \textit{qiaowu} effort had clearly narrowed to serving only \textit{Taiqiao}, attracting their youth to study in Taiwan, while relinquishing attention over \textit{laoqiao} groups.\textsuperscript{378} For example, it either discontinued or did not sufficiently publicize activities for non-Taiwanese and second/third generation OC (such as conferences/forums/trips for \textit{laoqiao} youth, scientists or business people).\textsuperscript{379} When questioned on these developments, OCAC representatives avoided criticism by arguing that \textit{laoqiao} tended to be less active than their \textit{Taiqiao} counterparts in pursuing these programmes.\textsuperscript{380}

Furthermore, it was clear that Taipei was only interested in supporting those OC who were loyal to Taiwan. In addition to gathering \textit{Taiqiao} statistics from around the world, the OCAC stepped up its collection of data on the wider ethnic Chinese communities (particularly in the US and other Western countries).\textsuperscript{381} This indicated a willingness to maintain and deepen links, as well as better understanding the nature and direction of various groups so that they could better identify those of interest and

\textsuperscript{374} David Hu (ROC Ambassador to Panama) and Alex Chiang (KMT representative to South America) as quoted by Vanessa Hua, “Playing the Panama Card – The China-Taiwan Connection,” International Reporting Project, 30 June 2002, \url{http://www.internationalreportingproject.org/stories/detail/658/} (accessed 1 October 2009).
\textsuperscript{378} “Taiwan dasuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang” (Effect of Taiwanese Elections on Our Overseas Chinese and Taiwan Work), \textit{Qiaoqing}, no. 28 (23 June 2004): 4-6, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{380} OCAC official, interview by author, Taipei, 27 October 2005.
value to Taiwan. In line with the “three classifications”, those laoqiao actively seeking friendly links with Taipei continued to receive invitations to dinners, support for cultural activities, and opportunities for economic and technological development in an effort to dispel any suspicion of political bias.382

4.05 Name Changes

Another example of the OCAC’s reluctance to accept DPP directives was the difficulty and delays surrounding the alteration of its name. Changing the title of the OCAC had been under discussion since 2002, following concerns that some sections of the public were incorrectly perceiving it as a unit that served PRC citizens.383 While it was prepared to distinguish itself from the PRC, the OCAC did not wish to go as far as declaring a separate Taiwan identity for fear of offending laoqiao organizations. For example, the suggestion of changing the ‘C’ for “Chinese” to “Taiwanese” was rejected by Chang Fu-mei who suggested the many OC who did not view themselves as Taiwanese would “spark an outcry.”384 She also remarked that most laoqiao would not shift their allegiance to China as long as Taiwan maintained the ROC name.385 Others feared the change of title might provoke China, or that Taiwanese citizens residing abroad might feel they owed a duty to Taiwan, which was not the case.386

In the end, Taipei decided on a compromise – the acronym would remain unaffected, but the second word “Chinese” became “Compatriot”.387 The OCAC did not

382 Cheng, “Would-Be Head of OCAC Vows to Serve Pro-ROC Overseas Chinese.”
387 Using the term “Compatriot” accommodated the fact that many Taiwanese may not see themselves as “Chinese”; secondly, “Compatriot” referred to more that just “Chinese”. The argument was that although the ministerial body had changed its name, doing so did not affect its dispensation of resources – the term “Compatriot” meant that the OCAC was able to offer its services to a broader
substitute qiao in its Chinese title with the more literal translation of tongbao, however. Tongbao remains a patriotic term used by the PRC for uniting OC and those living in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Instead, it makes clear its independent stance by having Taiwan clearly emphasized in its title (Zhonghua minguo (Taiwan) qiaowu weiyuanhui).

Moreover, while other ministries were co-operative with making name changes to reflect new government policy, the OCAC and other frontline OC organs stood in defiance. A proposal to change the “T” in TECO to “Taiwanese” failed, as did a plan to include “Taiwan” in re-naming its Service Centres abroad. Correcting this took action from the highest level of the DPP regime – in December 2004 Chen Shui-bian pledged to change the names of all government agencies to include “Taiwan” within two years. The Taiwanization effort was in full swing – all overseas missions were obligated to highlight their “Taiwanese” identity in official engagements, while mission chiefs were to identify themselves as “ambassadors from Taiwan” in order to defend their “national sovereignty and dignity as well as to distinguish themselves” from their PRC counterparts.

It was not until mid-2006 that authorities finally (and very quietly) revised internet web pages, letterheads and other official documentation for the OCAC. Other ROC government agencies had their official titles amended to include the word “Taiwan” in both Chinese and English in official documents. Moreover, reference to the ‘ROC’ has been increasingly relaxed, as long as its status as an independent entity is

range of people. John Chen (TECO Representative to New Zealand), address to NZCA, Wellington, 17 June 2007.

392 For example, the 2007 TECO calendar gifted to OC communities was the first to clearly note “Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission ROC (Taiwan)”, with the Chinese characters remaining the same (Zhonghua minguo (Taiwan) qiaowu weiyuanhui). The calendar made a note of emphasizing Taiwanese culture and its distinction from “those of other ethnic Chinese”.


recognized.\textsuperscript{393} For example, current Taiwanese literature for the OC (while still worded with terms such as “compatriot” and “motherland” in order to appeal to ethnic Chinese sensitivities) emphasizes the name “Taiwan.”\textsuperscript{394} The DPP had achieved its goal of redefining the image and role of the OCAC to suit its objective of serving only those OC prepared to contribute to Taiwan’s interests.

4.06 ROC OC Organs in the Contemporary Period

In the current period, the ROC OCAC comprises of a general Planning Section to assess and manage OC intelligence, co-ordinate the OC for cross-strait relations, consolidate and plan events/projects of OC associations. Three regional Sections (American, European-African and Asian-Pacific) perform specific research for policies and local laws pertaining to the OC, assist and guide OC activities, culture and education, mediate disputes, provide welfare, and reward patriotic OC for their contribution to OC and Taiwanese affairs.\textsuperscript{395}

The OCAC has a staff of over 350 in Taiwan, with another 60 based elsewhere in the world.\textsuperscript{396} In addition, numerous volunteers assist with domestic OCAC activities. There are also 180 OCAC commissioners (mostly one per country) around the world to assist overseas Taiwanese groups and promoting Taiwanese matters amongst the community.\textsuperscript{397} Unlike their role before 1949, today they act only as channels of communication between the ROC government and their OC constituencies. Their appointment reflects their loyalty to the regime and their status in the local Taiqiao community.

\textsuperscript{393} Tuan Y. Cheng, “The ROC’s Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in \textit{Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s}, ed. Gary Klintworth (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University, 1994), 68.

\textsuperscript{394} Chang Fu-mei, introduction to \textit{Spring Hope: 2005 Lunar New Year Goodwill Mission of Taiwan, Oceania Group Program} (Taipei: Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, 2005); OCAC official, interview by author, Taipei, 27 October 2005;


\textsuperscript{396} The OCAC Organic Statute was revised in 1981 in which personnel was increased to 354 staff. See OCAC, “History.”

\textsuperscript{397} Their acceptance of appointment is voluntary, with no payment provided. Many activities they do are at the Commissioner’s own cost, with limited access to funding from the OCAC.
Where an embassy is not accredited, the ROC MFA operates out of a TECO that “represents the Republic of China on Taiwan.” It has the same function as an embassy except in name, serving and protecting the interests and welfare of Taiwanese in foreign countries. It also promotes economic, trade, cultural, educational, scientific, financial, and other exchanges and co-operation between Taiwan and other countries. TECO also provides cultural and educational resources for OC groups.

In addition, special OC Culture and Education Services Centres serve Chinese communities around the world (particularly those with large Taiqiao populations). They are attractive to those wishing to learn more about Taiwan without having an overt political connection. In the past, Centres promoted ROC interests (such as the Double Ten (October 10th) anniversary of the founding of the ROC) and ROC Youth Day) and used posters and artwork to highlight historic events of nationalist importance and bolster ethnic solidarity. Today, 31 Centres (staffed mainly by volunteers) provide “contemporary overseas Chinese affairs work” around the world with emphasis on Taiwanese affairs.

Taiwan’s level of qiaowu infrastructure, financial support and manpower are all clearly much less than what the PRC enjoys. Furthermore, the OCAC works under constant threat of budget cuts. Despite this, it campaigns as the underdog and trumpets success not withstanding its economic constraints. Nevertheless, Taiwan finds itself in a severely weakened position when attempting to reach out to the OC. Not only does it lack the resources required to engage with a massive target audience,

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399 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 178.
401 *Taiwan Yearbook* 2002.
403 Hsu, “OCAC Tries to Combat China’s Propaganda.”
the DPP approach towards OC affairs had left many laoqiao quite bitter towards Taiwan. Groups once friendly with Taipei and the KMT vented their frustrations by turning to Beijing, and pro-Beijing groups became even more closely aligned with the regime by supporting the anti-independence movement. This emerging chasm signified fresh opportunities for the CCP to exploit.

4.07 Rebuilding Links

While the DPP was once ambivalent towards the OC, it later found them useful for its own purposes. However, no matter how Taipei viewed the ethnic Chinese in their definition of OC, its relationship with them was constantly under threat. For example, these frustrations came to a peak in 2006 when Taiwanese diplomats were slow to react to OC affected during riots in Honiara (a detailed analysis appears in Chapter Eight). Taipei had no choice but to salvage what it had left of its relationship with these OC. It was not an easy task. The ROC embassy’s offer of US$100,000 to the Solomon Islands Chinese Association was initially rejected. Money was later accepted only after emphasizing that the funding was not compensation, but for the “clean up exercise.” To rebuild relations, diplomats actively helped to facilitate the Chinatown reconstruction process by working together with the local council and OC representatives. The embassy also offered local OC representatives a sponsored trip to Taiwan.

Despite such attempts to patch up relations, it was clear that the future of Taiwan’s qiaowu effort amongst laoqiao communities under the DPP was in jeopardy. The KMT offered some hope for improvement. During the eight years it was not in power, the KMT maintained that there was, and never would be, any change in its policy towards the OC. In the spirit of jus sanguinis, the KMT promised that it would continue its traditional connection with all ethnic Chinese and reinstate the old OC policies that the DPP had removed. However, they did acknowledge that while laoqiao groups could look forward to improved links with a KMT-led Taiwan, they could not be assured of enjoying a full restoration of pre-2000 policy. They conceded

that while it would endeavour to do its best to assist the OC, the KMT could not take care of them as well as before. This reflected the modern geo-political and economic situation of the OC, who no longer relied on support from the KMT due to their own improving economic situation; it also reflected the limited resources that Taiwan had available for them.406

Since the KMT was re-elected to government in 2008, Taiwanese diplomats have moved away from the previously politically motivated relationship of the DPP years. Instead, they returned to the KMT style of supporting the long term prosperity of the OC and encouraging building pragmatic relations with them. Although these changes may have signalled some improvements with laoqiao, it is clear that Taiwan can never return to the level of relationship of times past. After the KMT re-took power and despite its promises, Taiwan’s qiaowu effort was still very much influenced by its domestic political situation. Reports that Ma Ying-jeou’s administration intended to scrap the OCAC soon surfaced. Not long after, Ma announced that the OCAC (served through sixteen offices) would merge with Taiwan’s MFA in order to provide “better services to overseas Chinese” through its larger network of 121 offices.407 The OCAC itself was hesitant for such a merger, given it would alienate Taiwan from many old (predominantly non-Taiqiao) supporters, and create practical limitations for both OCAC and diplomatic personnel.408

In the same way that they reacted to the DPP’s ‘three classifications,’ laoqiao groups around the world again sent petitions of protest and threatened to boycott Taiwanese exchanges and visits if the merger was to go ahead. The KMT was well aware of the potential damage that could arise from losing the support of these OC groups.409 Finally in April 2009, Ma made a last minute change to the proposal, and the OCAC was able to continue with its functions fully intact.410 The constantly looming threat

406 The KMT views all Chinese, no matter what their origin, as the same. Interview with KMT official, Taipei, 25 October 2005 and 19 April 2008.
409 “Merger of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission Opposed.”
410 Shih, “OCAC Escapes Inclusion in Foreign Ministry.”
of Beijing’s *qiaowu* efforts to reclaim the OC was clearly a major factor in Taipei’s decision making process.

In the contemporary period, Taiwan simply does not have the resources or the political support to deal with such a large and diverse community; nor does it possess a sufficiently robust or attractive enough platform that ethnic Chinese can readily identify with – particularly after a long period of Taiwanization. Taiwan’s appeal is mostly limited to *Taiqiao* and OC with historical links to Taipei. Beijing’s rival *qiaowu* efforts, however, have received a much more favourable response from a significantly wider and growing audience.

4.08 **PRC Definition of the OC**

The modern PRC definition of the OC includes those Chinese nationals of the PRC (including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau without the right of abode elsewhere) living overseas and sojourners intending to return to China (*huaqiao*),

411 Chinese naturalized abroad (*huaren*) and those born abroad of Chinese descent (*huayi*). The first group can be further distinguished as *tongbao* ‘compatriots’ – those natural born Chinese eligible for citizenship but living in Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan (*Gangao tongbao* and *Taiwan tongbao* respectively). *Huaren* describes ethnic Chinese in general, and may be further qualified as *waiji huaren* (used for foreign nationals of Chinese descent and those former PRC citizens who have taken foreign citizenship) and their descendants. The terms *huaren* and *huayi* also include *huabao* and *qiaobao* (ethnic Chinese compatriots living outside of China, Hong Kong or Macau).

412 The country in which they reside is often added for clarity.413 However, while stipulating foreign nationality, these terms retained an ambiguous racial and cultural link to the mainland.414

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411 Article 2 of “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohufa,” 236-238.
412 An ill-defined External China (*waihua zhengce*) policy in the mid-1980s raised complex issues concerning not only those Chinese nationals outside the PRC, but also those related to them inside China. This necessitated new policy to describe returned OC as *guiqiao* (returned OC for permanent settlement) and *qiaojuan* (OC dependants and relatives of *huaqiao* and *guiqiao*). See Wang, “External China as a New Policy Area,” 28-43.
Consequently, American diplomats noted that Southeast Asian countries remained skeptical of the ‘OC problem,’ which was a major consideration in resuming diplomatic relations throughout the 1960s and 70s.\(^\text{415}\) Beijing had to take careful steps to advance its national interests with regional powers while ensuring that it could preserve its relationship with the diaspora. This required a two-pronged approach: in the public arena, Beijing had to clearly define the relationship, yet in practice when dealing with the OC, the definition remained quite vague. This ambiguity continued until the late 1990s and precipitated racial tensions in Southeast Asia. Beijing had to make some hard decisions concerning who it could and could not assist given the geo-political climate.

\section*{4.09 Distinguishing Huaqiao from Huaren}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Huaqiao (as PRC nationals) remained representatives of China and things Chinese overseas. Beijing expected them to demonstrate patriotism and participate in its modernization and reunification, and mobilized them on several fronts to unite the OC for self-development. These included promoting OC unity, strengthening OC intellectual work, and treating returned OC with special care and warmth.\(^\text{416}\) However, in the late 1970s, huaqiao totaled only five percent of the global OC population. If China was to reach out to the wider OC populace, it needed to widen its scope to accommodate both Chinese nationals and foreign ethnic Chinese (tongbao and huaren) as sources of capital and expertise.

\item Therefore, huaren have also been a significant target for OC work. While they were clearly distinguished from huaqiao as foreign nationals, Beijing never had any intention to forsake them or their resources.\(^\text{417}\) Apart from the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution, huaren were very much a part of China, and warmly welcomed into its embrace.\(^\text{418}\) Huaren were also growing in numbers throughout the world.
\end{enumerate}

\begin{footnotes}
\item\(^\text{416}\) Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 70-71; Qiaowu zhengce wenda, 2-4; Gu, Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao zhengce wenda, 3; Shang, Gu and Li, Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce, 519-520.
\item\(^\text{417}\) Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 2, 11.
\item\(^\text{418}\) “Buyao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian” (Do Not Confuse The Notions of Huaqiao and Huaren) 1995, in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 90-95.
\end{footnotes}
They comprised of the millions in Southeast Asia who had been established there for centuries, those who had gone elsewhere and were emerging into their second and third generations, and other recent migrants who had adopted foreign nationality. Qiaowu analysts noted that these OC had become an important and powerful pool of resources for China. Many of them had achieved status in society and participated in local politics, and therefore could be tapped as a trade network and export market for Chinese-made products.  

Thus China’s OC policy after 1978 was no longer based upon promoting revolutionary ideology, but for advancing economic development with huaren upon the premise of ethnographic connection — in particular, targeting those from the surrounding ‘little dragon’ economies. There is a large volume of academic study concerning the role of the OC in making foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. Their technical knowledge, managerial skills and global network is widely understood to have contributed greatly to China’s ‘economic revolution’. CCP leaders acknowledge that China’s progress with general economic reform is “inseparable” from the role of OC support.

419 “Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua” (Changes in the Structure of OC Society) 1982 in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 84-89.
421 Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas, 240; Kim, “The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia.”
422 “Overseas Chinese Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century.”
In 1980, Beijing authorities announced The Nationality Law of the PRC. The significance of this legislation was that while it clearly defined the nature and conditions of PRC nationality (and hence the difference between *huaren* and *huaqiao*), it underscored the importance of respecting *huaren* ethnic sentimentality. Although they existed outside the legal jurisdiction of the PRC and had their own set of loyalties and values, *huaren* were not to be regarded or treated the same as *yiban waiguoren* (ordinary foreigners). *Huaren* maintain Chinese bloodlines, language, culture, traditions, and friends and family in China. They have ethnic affinity for China and share the same hope that it can become strong and prosperous. These attributes and feelings do not diminish just because they hold a different passport. Thus in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping remarked that anyone of Chinese descent was a “big advantage” for China’s growth.

At a 1984 provincial conference on OC in Beijing, officials noted that efforts and responsibilities for *huaren* did not go far enough. The scope of OC work failed to accommodate them at the local level, nor was there enough research into their needs and requirements. As a result, OC associations, schools and media were becoming localized and less connected with China both culturally and ideologically. *Qiaowu* had to resolve this problem, with policies addressing these concerns in the context of reconnection, cultural unity and rivalry with Taiwan’s own *qiaowu* effort – which at the time was far superior and dominant in comparison. While recognizing the rights of foreign nationals, the PRC continued to encourage their sentiments of cultural, political, emotional or ethnic attachments towards China. A May 1989 State Council OC work conference expanded policy for co-operation and exchanges between OC, *qiaowu* offices and those OC of foreign nationality. This basic strategy was a deliberate and calculated effort to reconnect with all OC, and it continues unchanged.

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425 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 10-11.
426 Wu, “Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo.”
428 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 9.
into the 21st century (see later chapters). Hence, the terms “foreign nationals of Chinese descent”, “foreigners of Chinese origin” and “people of Chinese origin residing abroad” are often used together with “Chinese nationals” when referring to OC work.430

However, efforts to encourage emotional and cultural connection for the purposes of reaching out to OC resources conflicted with issues of citizenship and loyalty.431 Western commentators criticized PRC pronouncements concerning the OC as “deliberately vague” when they did not distinguish between various kinds of Chinese abroad, but to call all of them ‘Overseas Chinese’ and declaring them as “part of the Chinese nation.”432 Southeast Asian governments again became concerned.433 For example, in the 1980s the Singapore government sought to disempower ethnic Chinese elite and their links with China by preserving only the politically inoffensive cultural aspects of various OC clan associations. In the early 1990s, both Lee Kuan Yew (the senior minister of Singapore) and his predecessor Goh Chok Tong expressed their fear of potential racial discord in the region should OC respond to PRC’s line of a common Chinese culture.434

To placate these suspicions, Beijing reverted to its stance at Bandung, maintaining that ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality were different to its own nationals abroad. For example, qiaowu officials commented in March 1992 that grouping huaren, Hong Kong and Macau compatriots as qiaobao was not appropriate at a qiaobao festival in which OC delegates of all classifications would be represented.435 Similarly, in 1993, Qian Qichen (the PRC foreign minister) publicly denied that a ‘Greater China’ existed, even to the extent of remarking ethnic Chinese in the region were different to those in

430 “Overseas Chinese Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century.”
435 “Dui ‘Zhongguo qiaobaojie’ yian de yidian yijian” (A comment concerning the proposed China Overseas Compatriots Festival), 1992 in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 93-94.
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thus huaqiao work during this period again aimed to dispel the ‘OC problem’: opposing dual citizenship, opposing forceful change of citizenship, encouraging huaqiao to voluntarily take local citizenship; protecting their rights and interests and demanding local authorities do the same; and educating them to respect local laws and customs in order to promote bilateral development and friendship. As such, a distinct sense of non-responsibility for huaren prevailed throughout the 1990s. OC officials warned that an emotional relationship could not replace specific huaqiao policy – huaqiao work was strictly for huaqiao, and huaren work was strictly for huaren.

However, the entire OC diaspora was needed for helping realize China’s national interests. Thus OC officials advised cadres that ‘some things’ (referring to connecting with huaren) could only be “acted upon but could not be spoken about.” Therefore, internally at least, both huaren and huaqiao were the same. Qiaowu had to ensure that work for both groups appeared distinct from each other through tactical disengagement and propaganda. By remaining unclear when referring to its treatment of huaren yet explicit in its policy for its own nationals residing abroad, Beijing attempted to disguise its pre-occupation with the OC, minimize other countries’ sensitivities about OC loyalty, and ensure huaren a safe livelihood abroad.

4.10 Xinqiao – Leading the Change in OC Demographics

Following relaxation of immigration policies between sending and receiving countries during the final decades of the 20th century, xinqiao migrants (mostly from the PRC) changed the traditional demography of the OC diaspora. After establishing diplomatic relations with Washington in 1979, Beijing had to review its policies for

436 Xie Yining, “Qian Qichen jieshou benbao zhuanfang changlun Zhong-Mei guanxi,” (Qian Qichen Receives a Visit from this Paper to Discuss Chinese-American Relations) Qiaobao (New York), 17 November 1993 as quoted by Bolt, China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese, 115.
437 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 10.
438 “Bu yao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian” (Do Not Confuse the Concept of Huaqiao and Huaren) 1995 in Wang, Qiaowu chunsqiu, 90-92.
439 Document no. 11, 2002 as quoted in “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhau de xinsikao”; “Zhuanjia xixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance,” 10; Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 8-9.
441 ‘Old’ Chinese include those who migrated from China to non-traditional receiving countries prior to their relaxation of immigration policies, and Hong Kong and Taiwan between 1950 and the late 1980s. See Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism,” 292-293.


As in the 1950s, while the Chinese government encouraged new migrant \textit{huaqiao} to accept foreign citizenship, they remained as “kinsfolk and friends” and thus ethnically and emotionally still a part of China’s family.\footnote{“Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua,” 84.}

This generation of OC would usher in a new era of \textit{qiaowu}.

OC academics estimate that over four million Chinese have (legally) migrated from the mainland since 1978.\footnote{Zhuang, “China’s Relations with Ethnic Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia,” 23; Pieke et al, \textit{Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe}.}

As \textit{xinqiao}, they are most likely to be either born, brought up or educated in China (particularly from urban centres). They tend to be younger and maintain close links with family, friends and business contacts there. In addition, they strongly maintain their Chinese language, values and culture, and have a tendency to live in metropolitan areas. Consequently, they do not view themselves as a minority outside of China, but rather as a part of it overseas. Moreover, they have an emotional and psychological need to participate in activities associated with their ancestral homeland.\footnote{Gao, “Transnationality of Settled Migrants”; Nyiri, \textit{New Chinese Migrants in Europe}; Lintner, “In Changing Times, the New Face of Chinese Emigrants.”}

The connections between new migrants and Chinese authorities have never been broken. \textit{Xinqiao} continue to use and expand their networks with them for business

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnote{“Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua,” 84.}
\end{thebibliography}
and social development. With the availability of Chinese language newspapers, television, radio and the internet, many share a deeper interest in, or wish to be involved with Chinese affairs, policies, standards and opportunities, than previous generations. As such, ‘new’ OC organizations offer transnational networking opportunities with China for business, career, cultural, educational and social advancement in a PRC context. The emergence of these new OC groups provided the ideal environment for Beijing to push forward with its qiaowu strategy of identifying, targeting and reclaiming them for China’s national interests.

4.11 Elite OC

Skilled migrant *xinqiao* (as opposed to uneducated labourer class migrants) are representative of a new mobilized Chinese diaspora throughout the world.\(^\text{449}\) They possess high-level skills and capability in science and technology, investment and capital, and more importantly, a new sense of OC nationalism.\(^\text{450}\) In 2005, Hu Jintao looked to the tens of millions of ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals living abroad who were “talented, have sound economic power and a special affiliation with China” and “uniting these people to contribute to the building of a moderately affluent society, curbing the Taiwan independence attempts and enhancing friendly exchanges.”\(^\text{451}\) As quintessentially skilled and talented OC elites (*jingying*), they are the ones ideally suited to develop and integrate other OC into mainstream society, and thereby raise the status of China and their community.

*Jingying* comprise of four groups: the first are the high profile leaders of well-established, dynamic representatives of influential OC organizations. They tend to be in touch with what is going on in China – either through frequent visits there, or through participation in various OC forums. Many have the potential to become persons of influence, prestige and power in their home countries.

The second group is made up of the millions of OC youth, particularly those from the second, third and fourth generation of *laoqiao*. The CCP places great importance upon this group, as the fruits of working with them can be passed down their generations, thus making OC work easier to do in future.\(^\text{452}\) These include those of ethnic Chinese descent who have grown up outside of China, as well as ethnic

\(^\text{449}\) Mobilized diasporas are defined as ethnic groups that enjoy material and cultural advantages compared with other multiethnic polities. John A. Armstrong, “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 2 (June 1976): 393-408.


Chinese children adopted overseas. The CCP acknowledge that these *huaren* youth have a strong sense of identification with their country of residence, are unable to speak Chinese, and may not share “familiarity with the motherland.” They are therefore all targets for general reconnection. This includes strengthening their ethnic pride through immersion in Chinese culture, stories, legends and other forms of propaganda disseminated in a variety of languages. Various programmes (such as camps, tours and cultural and language classes) encourage willingness to contribute back to their homeland in the form of remittances and donations. Furthermore, the CCP invites them to network with their mainland counterparts (often those who hold high connections within the CCP, such as youth party secretaries or student body officials nominated by the All China Youth Federation). An examination of these methods follows in Chapter Six.

The third group of elite OC are those PRC students encouraged to gain knowledge and experiences abroad before returning to China and help with its development using their newly acquired business acumen, scientific and management skills. Commonly referred to as *haigui* (a homonym for sea turtle, but literally translated as “return from overseas”) this transnational group is the subject of a relatively new policy area of the PRC. The term *haigui* first appeared in internet discussions during the late 1990s, later in everyday usage, and finally became an official category of OC in 2002.

The *haigui* phenomenon deserves some historical explanation. In 1978, as part of its efforts to speed modernization, the CCP sent 480 state-funded students abroad for study. Numbers increased significantly over the following years (4000 between 1979-
1980, and 10,000 in 1981-1982). As early as October 1980, at the Meeting on the Work of Returned Students, some quarters had described the situation as a ‘brain drain’ (rencai wailiu), but the CCP decided to continue to send students. Children of high-level officials benefited from a prestigious foreign education and gathering skills for China’s modernization was paramount. However, by the end of 1982 there were over 1000 cases of PRC students seeking political asylum in the US; by 1983, of the 18,500 state-funded students, only 7000 returned. Numbers traveling to study abroad dropped down to 3000 in 1983 following concerns of the high cost of student education, lack of suitable facilities for them upon their return, and poor performance. However, numbers picked up again after 1984, when Beijing decentralized the allocation of foreign exchanges to individual universities and relaxed policies for self-funded students, fanning a trend of studying abroad in the mid to late 1980s.

Following new legislation in 1983 and State Council provisions in March 1985, Beijing began intensive efforts to attract the pool of OC intellectual talent and their investment resources back to China. These comprised of using newspaper and print advertising, television spots in the OC media, establishing OC liaison offices and OC conferences. By 1987, the topic of sending students abroad received mixed views at the top level of the CCP. General Secretary Zhao Ziyang viewed the thousands settling abroad as a potentially beneficial case of “storing brainpower overseas.” Others, such as political rival Vice Premier Li Peng, argued otherwise. Consequently, Beijing officials tightened policies for going abroad as more students preferred not to return. Beijing appealed to the US government to encourage students to return, but these measures had little impact. The events of June 4th 1989 only worsened the situation, and Beijing continued to make efforts to limit the numbers leaving after

459 Another 7000 self-funded students also failed to return, but they were of less interest to the PRC. Wang Shao-nan, “Why the CCP Decreases Its Students Abroad,” Asian Outlook, July 1984, 27-30.
460 “Guowayuan guanyu yinjin guowai rencai gongzuo de zanzxing guiding” (State Council Provisional Regulations Concerning Work for Attracting Overseas Talent), in Jiang, Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu, 158-159.
463 David Zweig and Chen Changgui, China’s Brain Drain to the United States: Views of Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in the 1990s (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1995), 17.
Washington and other Western countries accorded them special immigration conditions (such as the *Emergency Immigration Relief Act of 1989 for Chinese Nationals*).\(^{464}\) As mentioned in Chapter Two, this was a sensitive period for PRC students abroad.

In 1992, authorities announced a new policy featuring incentives, improved services and support for returnees. It placed emphasis on welcoming all students – no matter what their past political attitudes were, as long as they renounced their links to anti-governmental groups and their activities.\(^{465}\) Other efforts to attract returnees continued with flexible measures for where they could work and provincial level authorities issued their own set of regulations.\(^{466}\) Another change in policy occurred in 1993, when the PRC supported self-funded study abroad, encouraged them to return, and gave them freedom to come or go as they pleased.\(^{467}\) Most students preferred to stay overseas. By 1994, under the 1992 “Chinese Student Protection Act,” US authorities approved 49,000 applications for US green card residency.\(^{468}\) Given this development, in 1996 the notion of ‘returning and serve the motherland’ changed to simply ‘serve the motherland’. Rather than encouraging them to come back permanently, officials felt that students could still contribute to China’s development from abroad under a flexible relationship of transnational mobility (*rouxing liudong*).\(^{469}\) In this context, those with suitable skills and resources could enjoy the convenience of coming and going while the CCP could extract benefit


\(^{466}\) “*Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zaiwai liuxue renyuan youguan wenti de guiding*,” 151.


without formal relationships. 470 In short, these measures served to rework the ‘brain drain’ so that the OC could contribute to China from abroad. 471

Faced with the reality that tens of thousands of its students remained overseas meant an alternative strategy was required. In the late 1990s, state media acknowledged that bringing OC scientific talents into full play was vital to promoting China’s exchanges with foreign countries. A localization strategy of hiring former PRC students and Chinese specialists with foreign citizenship in order to advance the interests of Chinese transnational firms received support in a December 1997 Kexue xue yu Kexue Jishu Guanli (Science of Science and Management of Science and Technology) article. 472 In the face of regionalism and globalism, government departments created the necessary conditions to ensure continued knowledge transfer and collaboration. 473

This included offering them support, 474 funding for study abroad, 475 and encouraging co-operative efforts between students, Chinese institutions and government (such as joint research, exchange visits and international conferences.) 476 In addition, universities spent billions of dollars to lure top foreign-educated and overseas-born Chinese as academic staff. 477

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472 “Jianli haiwai liuxue renyuan ‘liang ge jidi’ moshi de tantao” (Enquiry Into Establishing an Overseas Students ‘Two Bases’ Model), Kexue xue yu kexue jishu guanli (Science of Science and Management of Science and Technology), December 1997 in Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “China: Media Report Continuing Efforts to Recruit Overseas Scientists.”
475 Wu, “Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzu.”
Such policies continue today. China offers preferential policies to ethnic Chinese, no matter where their place of birth.\textsuperscript{478} Different provinces and cities compete in attracting \textit{haigui} OC experts and investment by offering different incentives. For example, Beijing and Shenzhen offer more lucrative policies than those at the national level in an effort to secure the best talent.\textsuperscript{479} Elite OC may be invited to China and offered high-level positions at prestigious institutions with the freedom to come and go from their permanent job back home, as well as other privileges designed to attract them to stay in China for a longer period (such as free education for their children). Other local governments offer cheaper rent, lower taxes, cash grants, office space, reduced staff costs, and special hi-tech parks.\textsuperscript{480} Some have taken a pro-active approach. In 2003 Shandong provincial officials appointed 100 “business soliciting agents” to seek out influential OC.\textsuperscript{481}

Given these developments, the PRC is eager to promote their \textit{qiaowu} policies as a success. A survey conducted by the China Zhigong Party and the Beijing Science and Technology Committee in 2000 showed that 81 percent of PRC students abroad were ready to return to China for work. 50 percent were motivated by “a sense of responsibility to contribute to the motherland,” and 45 percent because of kinship ties.\textsuperscript{482} Since the 2000s, the growth of China’s economy and the relative decline in the West has seen more and more PRC students wishing to return.\textsuperscript{483} In 2008, there were 179,800 students overseas – 69,300 of whom returned after their studies. The global economic crisis during that period saw a 55.95 percent increase in the number

www peopledaily com cn/200206/28/eng20020628 98732.shtml (accessed 6 April 2007); Yin and Lan, “Why Do They Give?”
of returnees over the previous year. This was a result of difficulty in finding employment overseas, and the offer of special funds to support research in China.484

4.12 Dual Nationality and the OC

The fourth target group of jingying are former PRC students who have taken foreign citizenship and other talented huaren OC who wish to live and work in China. However, China’s laws have prevented them from doing so on a permanent basis. Article 3 of the PRC’s 1980 Nationality Law of the PRC clearly states that China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national. An increase in the number of OC wishing to work, invest or live in China under long term residency visas, and those reconsidering their choice of nationality485 prompted calls for Beijing to revise its legislation.486

While the State Council has expressed interest in doing further research to resolve this issue, it is well aware of the implications and suspicions that it might raise with other countries and is therefore reluctant to act. OCAO director Chen Yujie remarked that not recognizing dual nationality was for the sake of protecting OC interests.487 Qiaowu specialists recommend that cadres take pragmatic measures: such as emphasizing that authorities should not reprint, sensationalize or propagate the internal position, and must only explain dual citizenship from Beijing’s official perspective.488 This stance reflects the long-held concerns for the CCP in wishing to minimize suspicions regarding OC loyalty in host countries.

To address this situation, Beijing has allowed exceptions to facilitate the residency of those OC who do not possess PRC citizenship. Initially, residency for foreigners was only provided for a maximum of five years, and rarely granted. Since 1986, various cities have conferred the title of ‘emeritus citizen’ (rongyu shimin) to hundreds of OC

485 Yang, “Zhongguori shi jaiwai huaren mianlin guoji shenfen xuanze.”
488 “Zhuanjia xixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance,” 12.
in acknowledgment of their contributions. For example, the GOCAO offers such tokens in the hope that doing so will invigorate a sense of nationalist identity for the recipient, resulting in them making more contributions to China. While this method achieved its aim of identifying, rewarding and holding onto the loyalty of a select few, attracting a much wider scope of the OC was required.

After 2001, authorities developed a reformed permanent residence system to allow those with the desired skills and resources to maintain their foreign nationality while working and living in China. In 2003, they issued residence permits (valid for two to five years with multiple entries and exits) to investors, qualified workers, academics and their families. In 2004, PRC authorities launched the most significant development for permanent residency – a “green card” that provided skilled OC with the same benefits as locals (such as subsidized education, investment and obtaining jobs).

This was Beijing’s solution for allowing the OC long term residency and by-passing the problem of dual nationality. It is what qiaowu specialists termed as a “way out” (chulu) of the debate. Every year, thousands of OC have applied under this scheme, and numbers are set to rise as more provinces follow suit by giving OC (particularly those from Taiwan) “convenience”. Moreover, in 2006, the OCAO indicated its desire to attract even more OC into China by articulating its desire for

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492 “Qianian qianyu haigui shenling Beijing luka,” (Over 1000 OC Returnees Apply for Beijing Green Card) Qiaoqing jianbao, March 10, 2005.

relevant agencies to relax thresholds for obtaining a ‘green card’. As the labour market globalizes and a transnational lifestyle becomes increasingly common, China can be expected to continue developing measures to attract and secure more talent while minimizing regional concerns. This shows that China is prepared to engage directly with talented OC, provide them with the necessary incentives for their development and mutual benefit, and hence reclaim them in a context that is acceptable to CCP objectives.

Recognizing that the OC are mobile and can contribute to China no matter where they are has contributed to the most significant change to modern qiaowu policy. Beijing understands that fostering strong OC populations in foreign countries can be more efficient than having them return. The CCP considers those who stay overseas as ‘patriotic.’ By contributing to China from abroad because of certain innate Chinese moral qualities and loyalty to China, migrants represent a new quintessential mobile modernity of Chineseness. For the purpose of encouraging co-operation within and amongst various OC groups for the purposes of more efficiently distributing resources and talent, qiaowu has served to raise a core army of xinqiao migrants and PRC students capable of developing China’s interests abroad.

4.13 Conclusion

Taiwan’s historical relationship with the OC and the effects of the independence movement is central to how China’s rival qiaowu operation has developed over the past twenty years. Similarly, the scope of China’s efforts has changed according to the evolution of the OC diaspora. Initial attempts that reached out to laoqiao migrants and sojourners capitalized upon similar dialectical and provincial origin. After the Second World War, with changes in citizenship laws, qiaowu had to broaden its reach to connect with all ethnic Chinese. As these populations assimilated into local society, the emergence of a new migrant population saw yet another change of focus, but retaining its overall emphasis on connecting with all OC. Furthermore, geo-political

497 Wu, “Zhangwo xinfangfa, katuo Guangdong qiaowu xinjumian.”
concerns, differences in ideology, and fears of a brain drain have all affected how the CCP has implemented and handled *qiaowu*.

This chapter has demonstrated how the PRC has taken advantage of the failures of Taiwan to connect effectively with the wider OC populace. The formation of a distinct Taiwanese identity and Taipei’s revised definition of the OC, as well as Beijing’s own internal and external sensitivities, have all contributed towards China’s modern *qiaowu* approach. In order to achieve the most promising results, China has actively sought to target and attract specific groups of skilled and talented OC for its development by offering incentives, privileges and market opportunities. Although China has official definitions regarding who can be considered a *huaqiao* (in order to satisfy the concerns of some governments, and to protect its own interests in the event of a legal challenge) Beijing continues to view all of the OC as part of its family – just as it has always done. In this context, the question of how Beijing chooses to officially define an OC makes no difference at all; as long as they are ethnically Chinese and willing to contribute to its development, China will find a way to embrace them. In guiding their behaviour into the 21st century, *qiaowu* has never enjoyed a more fertile audience throughout the world.
5.00 Cultural Work: Reconstructing ‘Chineseness’

Both the PRC and ROC governments, at some time or another, have had a “primary preoccupation, if not the sole obsession” in seeking to produce their own version of Chinese cultural identity for the OC in an effort to win their political and economic loyalty.498 The next two chapters illustrate the CCP’s construction and projection of its own ideal version of OC identity in order to secure the support of the OC diaspora, and examine how the OC have responded to these efforts. The CCP’s articulation of OC identity has mostly centred around the concept of national unity. However, modern OC demographics hinder the promotion and acceptance of this concept.499 Globalization, regionalization, and most importantly, diversity of socio-economic background, origin, language and talent have increased the complexity of addressing, planning and co-ordinating qiaowu policy.500 Political scientist Hong Liu argued that because of the deterritorialized nature of migration flows, capital and ideas, it was unlikely that the OC could unite into a major Chinese nationalist movement.501 A primary goal of qiaowu is to challenge this argument by attempting to encourage unity under two major themes.

Firstly, qiaowu seeks to substitute and prevent alternative ideologies and loyalties from taking root amongst the OC by building up and exporting a singular mindset of unified ‘Chineseness.’ 502 This is a CCP interpretation incorporating idealistic elements of history and civilization, tradition, culture and common biological traits.

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499 “Overseas Chinese Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century.”

500 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 55.


linking ethnicity with nationalism. As such, qiaowu exploits sentimentality for home and village, economic opportunity and cultural needs.

The second theme of qiaowu work encourages the OC to contribute and benefit from a transnational relationship with a modernized China. Tasks include improving their understanding of China’s political and economic situation, its liberalization, its views and position on the global community, and socialism with Chinese characteristics. CCP leaders call on all OC to advance China’s interests, with the assumption that they share in these goals as a part of the Chinese family. The OC are reminded of their cultural or ancestral advantage in making China strong. Over the past two decades, increasing numbers of the OC have responded positively to this invitation.

This chapter examines these two themes by highlighting the breakthroughs that China has achieved through exploiting fundamental aspects of OC culture and identity in Chinese education, religious work, and sentimental appeal. The historical background to this development demonstrates how the CCP has taken advantage of changes in the geo-political environment and delivered a version of ‘Chineseness’ that appeals to a broad audience.

5.01 Theories of Ethnic Belonging - Chineseness

For mobilizing collective political action, members must retain their sense of belonging to a group. This ‘belonging’ can be broken down into concepts of national identity and ethnic identity – both of which are open to various interpretations and challenges, with push and pull factors between the individual and the nation state.

504 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 38-41, 84-85.
505 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 6.
509 Shang, Gu and Li, Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce, 531-532.
being the major factors for ascription. Many of the OC may not agree with the CCP’s ideals and values for material and pragmatic reasons. For these groups, and for further strengthening bonds with those OC already loyal to it, the CCP has promoted its own version of ethnic nationalism and belonging – essentially an attempt to articulate its hegemony. Socio-linguistics specialist Norman Fairclough defined hegemony as “leadership as well as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society. Such power over society is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, and thus exists in a state of ‘unstable equilibrium’.” Secondly, hegemony is about “constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating sub-ordinate classes, though concessions or through ideological means to win their consent.”

A large part of this “hegemonic struggle” for the hearts and minds of the OC can be illustrated using theoretical frameworks of incorporation and co-optation – both of which employ national and ethnic identity as core platforms for their operation.

National identity, according to political economist Max Weber, refers to the nation state and its differentiation from other states, its claim to a "monopoly on the legitimate use of violence," and how its subjects are expected to demonstrate political loyalty to it. Normally this would apply to citizens loyal to their country of birth or residence. Minority groups, however, may not necessarily feel a sense of loyalty to the state in which they reside. For example, one Muslim organization suggested that while they should live within the local laws in Britain, British Muslims should give their first loyalty to Islam. In the case of the OC, because of their numbers and diverse political affiliations, this issue has been historically contentious and problematic, particularly for second and third generation members of the diaspora, and especially for those in Southeast Asia. For example, some ethnic Chinese may not consider themselves as Chinese first and foremost (such as those living in Singapore). As such, political scientist Flemming Christiansen argues that although
the OC share common origins of a ‘community’ based upon their race, history, economic situation, culture, personalities and social behaviours, boundaries marking the distinction of belonging to the group are ambiguous, and hence make formalistic ascription of the OC difficult.

Theoretical frameworks for understanding ethnic identity have generally adopted an instrumentalist approach, which perceives it as a dynamic set of shared conventions and rituals defined and understood through studying the ascription and behaviour of groups and their membership. As an ethnic identity, Chineseness is open to transmutation and manipulation. It undergoes continual flux across geographical and political boundaries – a perpetually fluid reconfiguration and rearticulated sense of identity that cannot be defined in a singular and fixed racial or ethnic context. Chineseness therefore serves as the ideal emulsion by which to unify, mobilize, or influence the OC.

As the “supreme political loyalty to the nation-state and a strong sense of cultural belonging to the real and/or imagined homeland,” notions pertaining to territory, history and ethnic affinity can exist beyond fixed geography. As such, nationalism can be generated from outside the actual nation concerned. Amongst the most influential scholars on this concept, Benedict Anderson argued that “long distance nationalism” explained the political loyalties of migrants regardless of the state, place or period in which they resided. National identity was an artificial or social construct, and that the convergence of print technology and capitalism created a deep horizontal comradeship linked by fraternity, power and time – described as the ‘imagined community.’

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While most minority groups will recognize that they have an obligation of demonstrating loyalty to their host country (or at least their affinity with their homeland/religion without leading to acts of treason) there remains a sense of ethnic identity that serves as a resource of ‘tactical necessity’ for defending and pursuing their interests.\(^{521}\) Anthropologist Fredrik Barth argued that this was the most decisive characteristic for self-ascription to a group.\(^{522}\) Similarly, according to sociologist Beatrice Drury, a heightened sense of identity/group consciousness towards a situation perceived to be of significance to its concerns/existence (such as being denied equal opportunities, access to resources, or social/economic mobility) is the key factor for ethnic mobilization.\(^{523}\) Migrant communities tend to connect to their homelands and strengthen ethnic affinity with their kinspeople. Contrary to conventional Marxist and liberal theories that suggest a gradual substitution of ethno-national identity through class affiliation and engagement with a host country over time, displacement from their homeland can generate “powerful attachments to ideas of homeland that seem more deeply territorial than ever”.\(^{524}\)

_Qiaowu_ demonstrates how various Chinese governments have created rival political discourses that transcend their territorially defined borders. While the KMT promoted its own version of ‘Chineseness’ in the latter half of the 20\(^{th}\) century in an effort to empower itself, assert its rule and to subordinate certain indigenous groups to the nationalist nation state,\(^{525}\) the CCP also took advantage of ethnocentrism and successfully reconstructed its own global Chinese national identity for the OC for its own purposes.\(^{526}\) Although the CCP once rejected traditional Chinese concepts during the Cultural Revolution, it now uses China’s cultural and archeological treasures as sources for bolstering its own political legitimacy. Moreover, the CPP


\(^{522}\) Barth, _Ethnic Groups and Boundaries_, 14.


has promoted a common ethnic consciousness based upon biological attributes, cultural and religious values/icons, traditions, rituals, myths (as descendents of the dragon, or sons of the Yellow Emperor), historical humiliation (such as foreign aggression) and anti-Chinese racism in seeking to deepen its attachment with the OC. In this context, advancing a nationalist discourse and identity as constructed by the CCP was the response of the power elite to maintain their power inside and outside of China. As such, qiaowu articulates official nationalism within a system of centralized and standardized interlocking agencies that can embrace the OC as part of this ‘community’.

Supporting China’s cause in an economic or political manner during periods of weakness therefore defined OC loyalty throughout its modern history. Revolutionary elements used both nationality and common ethnic and racial identity to enhance patriotism and unity. The late 19th century saw the emergence of nationhood amongst Chinese. Monarchist reformer Kang Youwei (1858-1927) stressed common ancestry and race as his discourse of Chineseness. His disciple, influential scholar-official Liang Qichao (1873-1929) developed the ideology of a nation-state by emphasizing common historical identity rather than traditional allegiance to the emperor, allowing a new kind of patriotism in which the OC could participate.

Republican revolutionaries exploited the 1909 Law of Nationality and its principle of jus sanguinis to promote a range of nationalist activity – encouraging Chinese identity, formation of OC organizations, and education of Chinese language. Sun Yatsen’s principle of racial nationalism (one of “Three Principles of the People”) became a part of KMT official policy. By postulating Han Chinese as a pure race, with common

527 Christiansen, Chinatown, Europe, 9-12.
529 Yen, Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, 137.
530 For a general discussion about nationalism and political legitimacy, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983).
blood from a single direct mythological ancestor, Sun claimed that only nationalism would forestall racial extinction. Thus patriotic OC described themselves as huaqiao, as it brought to them a sense of political awakening and cultural connection to their motherland.

Both the KMT and the CCP actively sought to win OC support by using nationalism as a unifying force. The May 4th Movement of 1919 saw the adoption of Mandarin as the official language in China, and an escalation of anti-Japanese and anti-Western feeling. The KMT continued to encourage Chinese consciousness and Nationalist sympathy. These efforts resulted in OC contributions towards the May 30th Movement of 1925 and the Northern Expedition of 1926-27. The concept of ‘great patriotic unity’ (aiguo da tuanjie) sought to promote China’s revolutionary diplomacy abroad, using the OC to make “outstanding contributions to China’s revolution and construction.” Nationalism also served to unify the two factions. The Sino-Japanese war provided an opportunity for a fractured KMT to reunite against a common enemy, bringing both the OC and those in China together in a plan for future security.

The CCP victory in 1949 provided a significant change in the way the OC viewed their political loyalties. While some looked favourably towards China for internationalist inspiration (as described earlier), many other OC groups in the West shunned the PRC as a backward nation and were unsupportive of a communist regime in a Cold War environment. Those in sensitive regions of Southeast Asia

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533 Sun Yatsen, Sanminzhuyi (The Three Principles) (Shanghai, Shangwu yinshuguan, 1927): 4-5 as noted by Frank Dikotter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992): 123-125.
534 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, 176.
536 Yen, Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, 135-156.
537 Elegant, The Dragons’ Seed, 6.
540 Yin and Lan, “Why Do They Give?”
were also careful in describing themselves as OC for fear of offending their host
government.\(^{543}\) Others refocused their interest away from China and began to identify
with their country of residence.\(^{544}\) While certain groups of Chinese maintained their
values, culture and mores,\(^{545}\) most of them assimilated into local society.\(^{546}\) Sojourners, their families and descendants became ethnic Chinese living abroad
\((\text{huaren})\). Some academics argued this phenomenon signaled the end of OC
nationalism.\(^{547}\) Thus the CCP required another method of connection with the OC –
especially in the context of dispelling suspicions of political interference. While it
sought to sever their Chinese ethnicity from Chinese citizenship under the 1955
Bandung Agreement, the OC would retain a symbolic attachment to the PRC through
deterritorialized nationalism.\(^{548}\) As such, Chinese culture was something that could
be shared and maintained without necessarily having to be a Chinese nationalist.\(^{549}\)

5.02 Promoting Cultural Unity

However, the CCP faced stiff competition from its rival. For most of the latter half of
the 20\(^{th}\) century, the ROC (aided by the US\(^{550}\)) dominated cultural and educational
work amongst the OC diaspora as its key channel for political socialization. Taipei’s
prime objective was to make the ROC the corridor of OC sinicization \((\text{zhongguohua})\)

\(^{543}\) Laoqiao in Singapore and Malaysia advised Deng Xiaoping during a regional visit in 1978
that they preferred not to be referred to as \textit{huaqiao}, but as \textit{huaren, huayi or huazu}. Surjit Mansingh, “Beijing


\(^{545}\) David Yen-ho Wu, “The Chinese in Papua New Guinea: Diaspora Culture of the Late 20\(^{th}\) Century,”

\(^{546}\) Ng Bickleen Fong, \textit{The Chinese in New Zealand} (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1959),
62-63; Manying Ip, “Chinese,” Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand website, updated 4 March
October 2009).

\(^{547}\) Yen, \textit{Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History}, 149.

\(^{548}\) Kim, “The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia.”

\(^{549}\) Chua Beng Huat, “Gossips About Stars: Newspaper and Pop Culture China,” Asia Research
Institute Working Paper Series no. 29, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore,

\(^{550}\) Washington provided financial aid to encourage OC to study in “Free China”. See Williams, \textit{The
Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia}, 55; Coral Lee, “An Invisible Bridge: Malaysian
with the OC youth as the main target. Moreover, regional governments associated with the US (such as the Philippines) encouraged this work as an effort to promote anti-communist beliefs amongst their OC populations.

Using education as a means of managing OC communities was done at two levels: attracting students to study in Taiwan, and controlling OC schools abroad. In regards to the former, since the 1950s Taiwan had successfully recruited a large number of qiaosheng (made up mainly of students from KMT-supportive families, or those with some relationship with Taiwan). They constituted a strong and well-organized alumni for Taipei. In its effort to secure their loyalty, qiaosheng initially had to accept ROC citizenship, do military training and take an oath of allegiance. The KMT gradually abandoned these requirements during the 1960s and 1970s following fears of political interference. However, even up until the mid-1980s, the co-ordination and direction of qiaosheng activity continued through handbooks issued to students upon their arrival. After returning home, Taipei expected that qiaosheng graduates voice support for Taiwan by assisting its public diplomacy and business development.

For OC communities abroad, the KMT promoted full formal Chinese education after 1961. Cantonese was initially one of the languages taught, but as a result of acculturation the programme was reduced to Mandarin and Chinese arts after the late 1960s. Activities included patriotic rituals (such as flag raising and singing of the ROC national anthem), and a nationalistic curriculum (encouraging them to be good

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551 Liang Ziheng, “Sanmin zhuyi ‘qiaoxue’ shilun” (A Preliminary Discussion on ‘OC Study’ under the Three People’s Principles) in Qiaozheng lunwen xuanji as quoted by Ng, “Taiwan’s Overseas Chinese Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s,” 270, 274.
552 “Huaqiaochi tongzhi” (General Gazetteer of the OC) (Taipei: Huaqiaochi Editorial Committee, 1956), 530 as quoted by Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, 8.
554 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, 179, 213-215, 217.
555 Alexander, Silent Invasion, 189.
560 Ng, “Taiwan’s Overseas Chinese Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s,” 270, 274.
citizens for China) that emphasized cultural chauvinism through the teaching of Chinese heritage and civilization. These efforts remained static for decades. Even up until the early 1990s, ROC textbooks promoted Chinese scientific achievements and examples of historical patriotism. The ROC continued as the dominant education provider amongst laoqiao up until this period, and remains so in staunchly pro-ROC communities or countries officially recognizing Taipei.

5.03 Taiwanization of ROC Cultural Work

Taiwanization changed the manner of Taiwan’s cultural work with the OC. In the early 1990s, the OCAC and the MOE (through its The Overseas Compatriot Educational Committee) had continued to assist OC youth to study in Taiwan and encourage them to strengthen their Chinese identity. Taipei sent specialists all over the world to administer examinations and provide advice about privileges and subsidies. However, authorities cut these provisions following complaints of favouritism from the pro-independence lobby. As such, after 2000, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy for the OC became more “service-oriented” in a “systematic and transparent manner.” This reflected a Taiwanized approach that emphasized its own distinct culture over traditional ROC ‘Chineseness.’ For example, TECO dance teachers offer indigenous mountain dancing as well as the traditional Chinese styles; similarly, examples of aboriginal dress are included with costumes lent out to OC groups wishing to showcase Chinese fashion. TECO also promote numerous arts and cultural festivals (such as Taiwan Week and Asian Tradition Month) so as to enhance its unique image abroad.

561 Such rituals continue in countries where Taiwan is officially recognized, such as Guatemala and Panama.
563 Hua, “Playing the Panama Card – The China-Taiwan Connection.”
565 Chen and Liang, “Overseas Chinese Policy to be More Service-Oriented.”
566 Taiwan Yearbook 2002.
With education, Taiwan competes with China by offering scholarships, opportunities to work part time, and emphasizing a free and open environment.\textsuperscript{567} For example, Taiwanese universities claim to have a higher standard of teaching than in the mainland, and offer English tuition at some colleges. Overseas, the OCAC sponsors and subsidizes more than 200 schools and organizes workshops for teachers\textsuperscript{568} through an Overseas Chinese Culture and Education Foundation. In 2005, there were 17,000 students enrolled in Mandarin language and vocational training through the Chung Hwa Correspondence School, Global Chinese/Taiwanese Language and Culture Online Centre, which facilitate correspondence and computer-aided instruction for Mandarin, Taiwanese and Hakka language. TECO assisted by providing books and other educational material for OC community libraries, language, art and dance teachers, teacher training, and public relations materials. Due to Taiwanization during the DPP era, these resources mostly found their way to \textit{Taiqiao} and pro-Taipei OC communities.

In the contemporary period, Taiwan intends to reassert itself as a leading provider of Chinese education for the OC. The main themes for Taiwan’s 2009 Overseas Compatriot Chinese Education strategy included the evaluation of teaching materials, strengthening the relationship between the OC and the mainstream community, the use of digital technology in education, and innovation and revitalization of OC youth work.\textsuperscript{569} In addition, Ma Ying-jeou’s administration sought to revitalize its educational efforts for the wider community by competing with the PRC’s Confucius Institutes (see below). He announced the establishment of two Taiwan Academies (also known as ‘Institutes of Taiwan’) in the US (and ultimately a total of 34 around the world) to showcase Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics. The choice of basing both Academies in the US was no coincidence. The OC in North America are


\textsuperscript{568} OCAC, “Through Culture, Taiwan Academy Will Communicate with the World,” OCAC Website, 5 August 2009, \url{www.ocac.gov.tw/english/unit/unit_pop.asp?no=1423&unit_type=1} (accessed 1 November 2009).
the strongest base of OC in the world; and for Taipei, it is home to most of its Taiqiao community.

Taipei wishes to reconnect, strengthen or rebuild damaged political and cultural links following the DPP years. With a reinvigorated agenda, the KMT has implemented a global strategy to make up for lost ground. However, learning traditional Chinese language in Taiwan faces increasingly limited appeal from the OC given the standardized and simplified Chinese that is promoted by Beijing. Thus, Taipei sought to reach out to the wider OC populace by printing booklets in simplified script. Ma also proposed that OC schools and mainland scholars be encouraged to recognize traditional characters while writing simplified forms, advocating compilation of a ‘grand Chinese dictionary’ displaying both systems.

However, these initiatives have come much too late. Taiwan’s pre-occupation with Taiwanization during the DPP period caused major setbacks for its educational outreach. As such, China’s efforts have eclipsed Taiwan’s status as the leader of Chinese education amongst OC communities. While it may still attract some support from Taiqiao, laoqiao, and other students wishing to study traditional Chinese, Taiwanese education of Mandarin and traditional culture has largely suffered a decline in popularity due to Taiwan’s weaker international status and the aggressive advancements of China’s education work abroad.

5.04 PRC Education Work

PRC education work for the OC has undergone significant developments over the past fifty years and emerged as the dominant provider of Chinese language education in the contemporary period. In the same manner as the ROC, the PRC has promoted Chinese study both at home and abroad. In regards to attracting the OC to study in China, authorities offered special admission criteria, allowances, and set up special

schools and universities for them during the 1950s.\textsuperscript{572} Like Land Reform, while the CCP acknowledged that returned OC should have given better care,\textsuperscript{573} there were logistical and practical difficulties in accommodating their ‘bourgeoisie’ lifestyle. In 1957, although not opposing any students who wanted to return, \textit{qiaowu} officials suggested that the OC should stay in their own countries for study.\textsuperscript{574} Those who did go to China found themselves participating in a “rectification campaign” and the subject of envy or disdain from locals.\textsuperscript{575}

The Cultural Revolution resulted in both major OC universities closing between 1970 and 1978. However, China still required scientists and technicians for its development and the OC youth were suitable recruits. In late 1971, all ethnic Chinese, no matter what their nationality, were publicly welcomed to study in China without discrimination. Taiwanese, American and Japanese students were specially targeted and offered freedom to come and go as they pleased.\textsuperscript{576} In reality however, little had changed from previous policy. For example, authorities announced generous scholarships as a ploy to attract students – recipients still had to pay for their tuition and lodging. In addition, the selection process favoured those majoring in certain disciplines of benefit to China.\textsuperscript{577}

Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, it was clear to PRC officials that demand for study in China remained very limited. Thus the emphasis during this period was on external policies – to promote and improve Chineseness amongst the OC by raising the level of propaganda concerning ancestral connections and improving the standard of Chinese education, teachers and materials.\textsuperscript{578} This strategy did not change until the early 1980s, when OC students were again encouraged to

\textsuperscript{572} Elegant, \textit{The Dragons’ Seed}, 33-35.
\textsuperscript{573} “Dui jiedai anzhi huiguo huaqiao zhishi” (Instructions for Receiving and Accomodating Returned Huaqiao) 2 February 1960 in Wang, \textit{Qiaowu chunqiu}, 43.
\textsuperscript{574} “Zai guanguo renda changweihui dibashijiuci huiyi shang de jianghua” (Address from the 89th Session of the National People’s Executive Conference) 30 December 1957, ibid., 42-43.
\textsuperscript{575} “Tong Miandian Naiwen de tanhua” (Conversation with Burma’s Ne Win) 11 August 1971, ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{576} “Huijian Taiwan tongbao, luri lumi huaqiao, mijji huaren de tanhua” (Conversation about Taiwan Compatriots, Overseas Chinese students in Japan and America, American Ethnic Chinese) 6 October 1972 in Wang, \textit{Qiaowu chunqiu}, 44, 46.
\textsuperscript{577} Wong, \textit{Red China Blues}.
study in China by offering them incentives. For example, they were able to enter the high school of their choice, and enrol at the re-opened OC universities. Following graduation, they were offered special provisions for work, study or were free to return home. Returned OC, however, still faced certain limitations if they wanted to continue study overseas (depending on their age and field of acceptable study). Such talent was required to remain in China for its modernization.

After the 1990s and into the contemporary period, Chinese schools and universities actively wooed the OC student market. In addition to offering scholarships, other benefits (such as admission to higher level academic institutions) were provided to returned OC and their families. This was in line with calls from the national and provincial level government for strengthening the promotion of Chinese language education for OC youth. In addition, the MOE instructed institutions to make special provision for children of returned scholars, as well as offering language coaching for those with Mandarin as a second language. Since 2005, children of guiqiao (and even those of foreign citizenship) no longer have to pay extra fees for attending government-funded schools. Some institutions automatically award OC applicants extra points to their university entrance examination grades. These methods, coupled with the popularity of learning Mandarin, has seen a trend of increasing numbers of ethnic Chinese going to China for study.

The OCAO oversees several institutions for this purpose: the Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College (specializing in Chinese language and culture for OC,

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579 Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 155, Qiaowu zhengce wenda, 17.
580 Shang, Gu and Li, Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce, 549-550.
581 Qiaowu zhengce wenda, 19.
582 For example, Wuyi University in Guangdong has a special Foreign Affairs Office that co-ordinates and receives OC students and attracts donations. See its website, www.wyu.edu.cn/fao/index6_en/gjian.htm (accessed 19 December 2007).
584 GOCAO, “Guangzhou shi qiaowu gongzuo shiyiwu’ guihua.”
585 Qiaowu changyong falu fagui xuanbian, 239-243.
as well as holding special training courses for overseas teachers) and Huaqiao University (designated for the educational needs of the OC and the children of returned OC, and marketed as China’s major base for overseas Chinese language and culture education). The board of trustees for the latter is composed of celebrities and professionals of OC origin, Hong Kong, Macau and returned OC. In 2000 the OCAO approved Nanjing Normal University as another base for Chinese language education for the OC.\textsuperscript{589}

Students from Hong Kong, Macau, and waiji huaren are special targets for qiaowu and Chinese education. The CCP believes that OC studying and living in China establishes valuable networks amongst classmates and locals, raises their awareness, sensitivity and appreciation about Chinese society, culture, history and politics. As a result, they provide not only a source of valuable foreign exchange but also act as an instrument of statecraft. As the next generation of OC intellectual, technical and political elites, the CCP hope that their experience in China will make them more accommodating of Beijing’s demands.\textsuperscript{590}

To deepen their sense of appreciation and (hopefully) patriotism for China, qiaowu officials suggest that OC students should be given more support and care during their stay.\textsuperscript{591} In addition, they should be seeded with pro-China ideology so that they can act as a friendly force upon returning home – where they should be placed under continued efforts of management and co-ordination.\textsuperscript{592} The significance of targeting OC youth for experience in China demonstrates the importance that the CCP is placing on younger targets for qiaowu. Influencing them from an early age has become more and more evident in recent years. This aspect of will be examined in detail throughout the remainder of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{591} \textit{Qiaoqing jianbao}, no. 1-2, 2004, 23.
\textsuperscript{592} “Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuohuang haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian” (Do Well with Work on OC Student Groups Studying in China, Unceasingly Open Up Areas of OC Work) \textit{Qiaoqing}, no. 51 (14 November 2005): 14-16.
5.05 PRC External OC Education

From 1949 until the 1970s, the CCP’s purpose for promoting OC education outside of China was not simply to foster OC scientific and technological resources for China’s modernization, but for them to serve as a wider UF strategy for advancing China’s revolutionary interests overseas.\(^{593}\) Chinese authorities were careful not to overtly run OC schools themselves, but placed them under their guidance and manipulation. Methods included subsidizing or buying them out, and getting influential pro-Beijing OC figures to run them using CCP approved textbooks and activities. It was no surprise that governments (such as India and Indonesia) feared interference and banned such schools in the 1950s. In response, Beijing played down its links with OC schools, suggesting local authorities should manage and co-ordinate them instead.\(^{594}\) Furthermore, it began an effort to encourage assimilation and learning of local languages in the hope of improving bilateral relations with Southeast Asian countries.\(^{595}\) In the 1980s and 1990s Beijing continued to use cultural work to encourage positive feelings, instill an accurate socialist image, dispel the effects of foreign propaganda about China amongst the OC, and promote the CCP goal of peaceful reunification.\(^{596}\)

In the contemporary period, qiaowu officials acknowledge culture as one of mankind’s basic spiritual needs, and seeks to exploit it as part of a strategy for managing the current and future generations of the OC.\(^{597}\) In accordance with the work set out in the MOC’s 12\(^{th}\) Five-Year Plan for Cultural Construction, promoting Chinese language and culture through exchange and co-operation with foreign countries is paramount for the CCP’s aim to extend Chinese influence around the world. This goal has support from a wealth of policies and infrastructure, capital resources, staff training and assistance from national and provincial level government agencies, embassies and consulates.\(^{598}\)

\(^{593}\) Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese*, chapters 3 and 7.
\(^{594}\) “Yu Yinni Xiya wajiaobu Meizhouzi sizhang Monuomutu de tanhua,” 40.
\(^{595}\) “Fang Jianpuzhai huitan shi de tanhua (Conversation Regarding Kampuchean Talks)” 22 November 1956, ibid., 39.
\(^{596}\) *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 80-81.
\(^{597}\) “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 10.
5.06 Confucius Institutes

The foremost example of China’s public diplomacy and cultural outreach effort is a global strategy of establishing Confucius Institutes around the world. Following the establishment of a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in March 2004, the first one opened in Seoul, Korea in November 2004. Over 280 Institutes have opened since, specifically in cities where populations of ethnic Chinese reside. While a large component of their student bodies may be non-Chinese, the OC are the prime target.\(^{599}\)

Promoting Chinese language and culture is one means of creating a positive climate of public opinion for the CCP. Teaching Chinese language is instrumental to re-sinicizing the OC so that once educated in Mandarin, they can understand officially promoted versions of Chinese history and participate effectively in patriotic activities. The objective is to gather a wide spectrum of support for China in order to influence the development of host country foreign policy so that it is favourable to Beijing.\(^{600}\)

In addition to holding language and cultural classes, Institutes serve as gathering points for a wide range of OC activities (such as hosting dance and drama performances, celebrating festivities and exchanges, and as venues for Chinese government officials, diplomats and consular staff to meet with members of the OC community). Institutes have also taken a leading role as mouthpieces for the PRC government to promote OC policies, opportunities, incentives and procedures, as well as propagate CCP objectives through seminars and press releases.\(^{601}\) As a result, Institutes threaten to replace (or at least marginalize) traditional OC associations by acting as the PRC-sanctioned authority for OC cultural affairs given their direct links to the National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (Hanban), the

\(^{599}\) In February 2009, Li Changchun commented that those countries with larger numbers of OC would be ideal strengthening China’s global cultural outreach strategy. Ibid.


MOE and other government departments. Secondly, Confucius Institutes actively promote *putonghua* Mandarin, and therefore sideline other dialects (such as Cantonese) and certainly challenge traditional Chinese (as used in Taiwan, Hong Kong and *laoqiao* communities) with its system of simplified characters and *pinyin* pronunciation methods.

The rapid establishment of Confucius Institutes all over the world demonstrates the PRC’s active and aggressive outreach to OC communities. By partnering with local institutions, they have the resources and clout to challenge or subsume rival educators of Chinese. Institutes also have the potential to become the leading providers of learning materials and teachers for OC organizations. In the contemporary period, it is too early to say whether Confucius Institutes have had this effect on Chinese education. However, it is clear that policies designed to achieve such a goal are already in place.

### 5.07 Problems Regarding PRC OC Education

According to internal reports, *qiaowu* officials recognize three fundamental problems regarding Chinese education amongst OC: lack of teachers, poor quality and limited teaching materials, and finally, lack of funding. Educationists realize these concerns cannot be addressed by simply providing resources, but they should be providing the ‘right’ resources. Therefore, the aim is to allocate more efficiently and matching particular needs rather than offering a blanket solution.\(^\text{602}\) To address the lack of teachers, OC officials suggest increasing the level of professional guidance, improving relations with current teachers, and seeking new teachers for the short term or for training purposes.\(^\text{603}\) China uses a “Welcome In, Going Out” strategy\(^\text{604}\) whereby professional artisans and performers train locals – either by sending out coaches, or inviting them to China for workshops and camps specializing in OC

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\(^\text{604}\) “*Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang*” (The Situation of OC Work Towards Taiwan in Recent Years), *Qiaoqing*, no. 31 (October 23, 2007): 6-9.
cultural development. For example, after strict screening, experienced teachers are sent to assist local teachers with materials and techniques and standardize Chinese language teaching.

The strategy of “Welcome In, Going Out” has major two benefits for China: firstly, to replace a formerly Taiwanese-dominated system with a PRC version that emphasizes modern China and modern Chinese concepts. By “Going Out”, cadres co-ordinate with various agencies to organize more festivals, trade shows and exhibitions for propaganda products, and thereby penetrate deeper into foreign arts exchange circles. These serve various purposes: to enhance relations between pro-Beijing groups, the embassy and OC work efforts; to provide a tangible benefit for OC communities and deepening their understanding and appreciation of OC work; to develop OC organizational capacity by active participation, co-operation and exchange; and to infuse a PRC-friendly version of Chineseness. Secondly, the strategy improves bilateral relations at the state level. For example, after decades of an Indonesian government-imposed ban on Chinese language and culture, since 2005, the Indonesian MOE and Guangdong OCAO have worked together to develop cultural resources in a PRC context.

On the second issue concerning teaching materials, OC experts suggest practical methods to dispel childrens’ fear of learning Chinese characters, raise their understanding of textbooks, improve their aural comprehension, and improve their motivation for learning Chinese culture. For example, in 2000, efforts began with projects such as the “Overseas/Ethnic Chinese China ABC.” Its purpose was to promote Chinese language, life, history and geography under a set of “China ABC

608 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 101.
609 “Qinqing de guanhuai zui neng dadong qiaobao de xinling” (Close Care is the Best for Moving the Hearts of Compatricks), Qiaoqing, no. 34 (12 September 2005): 1- 7.
Popularization Standards” formulated specifically to “carry forward traditional Chinese culture and promoting unity” amongst the OC. The programme includes tours to China and scholarships. In recent years, alternative non-traditional methods of teaching have also become popular – such as encouraging self-learning through song and other interactive techniques. For example, in 2005, cartoons were suggested to promote Chinese culture and language amongst OC youth. In keeping with tailoring solutions, modern teaching materials (such as DVDs) are continually improved and their use increased, taking note of geographical location and age of students in order to gain best results.

With regards to funding, these solutions are initiated at the state level, and either trickle down to pro-Beijing schools and foundations, or directly down to state-controlled institutions. For example, since 2006, Beijing has ensured a direct channel of control over the management of funding for Confucius Institutes. The External Propaganda Department of the CCP Propaganda Department sends money through to the MOE for Institute activities. Other examples for funding include the China Overseas Chinese Language Education Foundation, or the Kong Linghe Scholarship (established by a direct descendant of Confucius himself) which work to encourage OC youth to learn and better understand Chinese culture; in addition, the China Chinese Cultural Education Foundation promotes Chinese education as a matter of “personal responsibility for each and every OC.” At the frontline, commercialization is seen as the key. For example, the Zhigong Party (through its

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616 “Kongzi xueyuan zhongfang zijin guanli banfa (zanxing) chutai” (Provisional State Management of Funding for Confucius Institute Announced), Qiaoqing jianbao, 23 November 2006, 10.
619 “Tuidong haiwai huawen xue Zhongwen” (Promoting OC Youth to Study Chinese) Qiaobao (USA) 30 September 2007.
620 “Qiaobao daibiao yu zhichi huajiao” (Compatriot Representatives Call for Support of Chinese Education) Nanmei qiaobao (Brazil), 3 October 2007.
qiaowu cadres and education attaches) has a central role in promoting Chinese language and culture through a variety of marketable products to the OC community.\footnote{Zhigongdang yu jiasu Zhonghua wenhua chanpin shuchu tuidong shijie huawen jiaoyu} The PRC embassy and consulates regularly offer grants and donations to OC schools for books and buildings.

Many OC schools (particularly those that are under-funded and relying heavily on voluntary assistance) are very much dependent on China for providing teachers, materials and funding. In a sense, these schools and the OC associations that run them, often look to the PRC for their continued survival. While schools could continue using Taiwanese materials aided by local teachers (who may be limited in experience or unavailable in smaller communities), the general trend and popularity is for teaching simplified Chinese. Turning to China and its obliging qiaowu agencies is the most convenient and accessible resource for maintaining OC education abroad.

5.08 Challenging Alternative Forms of Chineseness

Cultural and education work operate in an environment full of rival alternative discourses. For the PRC to achieve ethnic and cultural unity, the CCP believes that it is necessary to embrace only one language and one culture.\footnote{Huawen jiaoyu de bianhua yu fazhan; Zhuanguizhong de Huawen jiaoyu} Cultural work had to be exclusively mainland PRC Chinese – clearly distinct from that of Taiwan or Hong Kong.\footnote{Qiaowu gongzuo gailun} For the OC of Cantonese origin, the commercialized values of the then-British administered colony of Hong Kong defined what was “Chinese” (popular culture, language, music, mannerisms and attitudes) for many OC communities after 1949, and even up until the 1990s. As an arch-rival, PRC cultural and education work had to challenge Taiwan as the guardian of Chinese ‘high’ culture and conducted it as part of the overall ‘service’ to the OC by exporting its own resources, materials, support and content.\footnote{Wu, “Zhangwo xinfangfa, katuo Guangdong qiaowu xinjunian”; Live, “The Sinwa of Reunion,” 234-253.}
Although China capitalized immensely from ‘Taiwanization’ during the 2000s (in which many former pro-Taiwan OC groups drifted towards Beijing for cultural and educational support) qiaowu cadres maintained that Taiwan’s cultural efforts were still much more advanced than its own. PRC educationists acknowledged that their methods were simplistic and monolithic in comparison. They suggested better and more attractive tools to compete – such as offering privilege, incentive, entertainment, scholarships, funding, education and culture to foster positive feelings for China amongst OC youth and their desire to study in China. They added that they had to do more work with high level, influential OC and groups in order to establish and work through permanent cultural centres, libraries and depositories.

The long term goal is to put Chinese language education under Beijing’s complete domination. In situations where it cannot exclusively do so, China reluctantly accepts a compromise. For example, Beijing acknowledges that embracing simplified Chinese characters requires the support of all the OC, and hence it must respect their wishes to be successful. In the early 1990s, notices directed towards strategic groups of the OC were still issued in traditional script so as not to upset them. This policy continues in the contemporary period. For example, in 2005, China announced its willingness to teach Chinese as a second language with experts in Taiwan “as long as they do not intend to split the country.” Likewise, the US-based Advanced Placement programme uses both traditional and simplified characters. This strategy ensures that by entering into dialogue with Taiwan, the PRC has another mechanism for influence into previously Taiwanese-dominated activity. The Yatsen School in Fiji provides the most distinct and unique example of this rivalry – the secondary school is managed by the PRC using simplified characters, PRC texts and mainland teachers; yet the primary

626 “Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai ‘fandu cutong’” (Do Good Work with Groups Close to Taiwan, Promote Overseas Anti-Independence and Promote Reunification), Qiaoqing, no. 38 (8 October 2005): 10-11.
school remains funded and co-ordinated by Taiwan using traditional script with Taiwanese teachers and texts. PRC diplomats explained the unusual situation by saying that Taiwan is a part of China.

However, such accommodation is only intended as a temporary measure. Qiaowu officials concede that persuading pro-Taiwan schools to turn towards China is a difficult process. A 2005 report noted Taipei spared no effort to control pro-Taiwan schools, organizations and people. For example, South Korean OC schools were under the influence of Taiwanese authorities until 1992, but many still used Taiwanese resources in traditional script; moreover, simplified PRC textbooks were hardly used and put into storage. Therefore the key task of PRC education work seeks to extricate OC schools from rival ROC methodology, influence and teaching materials. For example, OC in the Philippines (also known as Chinoy or Tsinoy) and in particular the laoqiao historically aligned to the KMT, are mostly versed in the traditional script. Efforts to introduce newspapers using simplified characters in the 2000s were unsuccessful. Consequently, two Confucius Institutes were established in an effort to change this situation. In Fiji (where laoqiao remain staunchly pro-Taiwan) local OC educationists were very wary of any attempts for China to establish an Institute at the University of the South Pacific.

In these situations, China’s strategy is to patiently and gently change their view of China without being overtly forceful (which might create sympathy for Taiwan).

Evolving from discrete efforts such as guidance and manipulation in the 1950s, its


631 The PRC embassy described the situation as acceptable because it sees Taiwan as part of China and therefore it is a situation of co-operation rather than rivalry. PRC diplomat, interview with author, Suva, September 2007.

632 Some Korean OC children maintain ROC passports in order to facilitate their study in Taiwan.

633 “Xinlao qiaotuan lianghao hezuo, huawen jiaoyu zaixian shengji (Good Cooperation Between New and Old OC Groups, Produce New Opportunities for Chinese Education), Qiaoqing, no. 34 (2 August 2004): 7.

634 “Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai ‘fandu cutong’,” 5; “Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhangtuan chenggong laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 11-17.
modern methods reflect an assertive stance that attempt to place China as the leading authority of Chineseness. MOE cadres liaise with pro-Taiwan OC and laoqiao and meet with teachers to discuss issues and identify areas for work. The next stage seeks to persuade education committees and school teachers to change entirely to the PRC system, such as using simplified characters and pinyin over traditional script and Taiwanese pronunciation methods, and promoting Beijing’s Hanyu shuiping kaoshi (HSK) test as a recognized standard with support from local government education ministries. In 2007, Fijian OC claimed that the PRC embassy was attempting to influence the Fiji-based Chinese Education Research Group and getting pro-Beijing xinqiao onto the Yatsen School board of trustees. This strong and steady approach demonstrates Beijing’s growing confidence in achieving dominance over OC education.

5.09 Promoting ‘Love’ for China: OC Church Work

In addition to its attempts to dominate OC education, the CCP attempts to instill positive feelings for China through covert methods of targeting and infiltrating key groups – in particular, religious organizations. According to internal studies, the State Council estimates that more than half of all OC are religious in some way or another. Moreover, many well-known dissidents who fled China after 1989

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636 “Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshou yanxiutuan' laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 6-7; “Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhangtuan chenggong laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 11-17; “Shehui qiaoshe, tuozhuan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 4-5.
638 Laoqiao OC believed the embassy was using pro-Beijing xinqiao to ‘infiltrate’ the board of trustees. Fijian OC academic, interview by author, Suva, September 2007; “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo” (Increase Strength on Developing All Fronts of OC Taiwan Work), Qiaoqing, no. 15 (6 June 2007): 8, 11-12.
converted to Christianity.\textsuperscript{641} Because the CCP officially promotes atheism in China,\textsuperscript{642} qiaowu cadres initially overlooked churches as a target for OC work. There was limited contact towards them and work methods tended to be passive. However, after the 1980s, the PRC took a stronger interest in them. Qiaowu specialists now view churches not as a place for religious gathering, but as another target for OC work and exploiting those with quintessential talent and skills.

OC cadres believe that religion provides many potential channels for effectively dispensing qiaowu. Few OC organizations can match the size, scope and resources of OC churches.\textsuperscript{643} Churches are different to ordinary OC organizations because their membership tends to share a much deeper level of involvement in their activities, beliefs and outlooks. As such, these OC have more likelihood of being effectively guided. The church network is an ideal medium for influencing OC behaviour, managing their morals and ethics, and hence the way in which they integrate and participate in local society. Church activities often encourage co-operation with non-Chinese groups and the media, serving as a very useful platform for spreading China’s soft power efforts to a wider audience.

According to State Council reports, the objective for qiaowu cadres is to actively infiltrate, investigate and “sinify” (huarenhua) OC church groups, by seeking to attract, influence and mobilize them through spreading the CCP’s interpretation of “Chineseness” and “spiritual love”.\textsuperscript{644} These strategies build on the existing and historically social networks of Chinese communities that are focused around the church.\textsuperscript{645} Specifically, qiaowu church work includes encouraging the OC into non-denominational units (rather than split them into Catholic or Anglican, for example).


\textsuperscript{642} Since 1949 and throughout the Mao years, the CCP viewed religion as a class enemy and suppressed it during the Cultural Revolution. Although greater freedoms were permitted under Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy in the 1980s, all activities were conducted within a limited spectrum. Since this time, the CCP has controlled five recognized religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism and Taoism). The Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council allocate resources to eight national organizations for monitoring purposes, and ensures that all recognized religious movements operate strictly according to CCP regulations. See Beatrice Leung, “China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the Modern Era,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary China} 11, no. 33 (2002): 773.

\textsuperscript{643} “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang huanti de shehui gongneng,” 11, 15.


\textsuperscript{645} Fong, \textit{The Chinese in New Zealand}, 53-55.
Further strategies use them for promoting social exchange and diversity of influence (such as extra activities, meals or cultural celebration after the service), and spreading Chinese culture (adding Chinese language, art, dance music classes for youth). The goal is to accommodate all types of demographics and occupations (such as holding special services for restaurant workers, elderly and after-school care).

In sum, the CCP has sought to take advantage of the trust and faith that religious OC place in their churches for their family and social development. Given that these OC believe that “children who grow up in the church don’t turn out to be bad,” the CCP has attempted to usurp these channels for making significant inroads into determining their feelings towards China and what it means to be Chinese.646 Under the guise of religion and cultural connection, the CCP has sought to achieve direct engagement with important OC by satisfying their social and psychological needs, and accordingly, instill its political messages. For example, OC church websites feature anti-independence rhetoric interspersed with religious references.647

5.10 Encouraging ‘Love’ for China: Earthquake Diplomacy

Fostering and capitalizing on this concept of ‘love’ for China has been a significant development of qiaowu policy in recent years. Many qiaowu projects now incorporate ‘love’ as its central premise (qiaoai gongcheng). For example, the Zhigong Party has a central role in organizing conferences, courses, co-operative ventures, and root seeking programs for OC youth.648 The aim of these activities is to encourage a positive view and embrace for China, and hence often themed as ‘Love for Country and Homeland activities’ (aiguo aixiang huodong).649 These efforts began in 1994, when OC officials in Sichuan launched the “OC Heart Project”

646 “Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi,” 6-7; “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng,” 14.
(qiaoxin gongcheng) raising large sums of donations to ‘OC Heart Schools’ for primary education in China. This has since developed into a larger (and very successful) voluntary effort for other development programmes.650

During the DPP years, much of this work was aimed at opposing independence and promoting reunification. ‘Love China’ was an ideal platform for resolving cross-strait relations, as Taiwanese could put aside their pro-independence feeling and become compatriots.651 Qiaowu officials capitalized on a burst of OC patriotism and sentimentality with ‘earthquake diplomacy’ following the Sichuan disaster in April 2008. This event sparked a massive mobilization effort amongst OC communities in sending money and help to China under the ‘OC Love Project – Fighting the Earthquake Disaster with Warmth’ (qiaoai gongcheng – kangzhen jiuzai wenjuan xingdong).652 Qiaowu cadres sustained momentum for over a year through continuous activities such as the ‘OC Love for Homeland’ project (qiaoai jiayuan)653 and support from the OC media.

When the political drive for Taiwanese independence faded after the KMT re-took power in the 2008 elections, the ‘Love China’ effort moved to oppose other threats to the CCP, such as the Tibetan independence movement and other anti-China forces. This was evident in the ‘Red Heart’ internet campaign leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics (examined in detail in the next chapter). Beijing’s goal of inspiring nationalist activity and unity amongst pro-Beijing xinqiao and PRC students through the internet has reaped successful results for the CCP. Coupled with years of patriotic education at home, and sustained externally through Chinese language media, modern communications and traditional rituals, haigui specialist David Zweig found that PRC

650 “300 yi ‘qiaojuan’ zhutui Zhongguo jiaoyu” (30 billion of OC Donations Assist Education in China), Qiaoqing jianbao, 14 May 2005.
653 “Sichuan dizhen zaiku ‘qiaoai jiayuan’ benyuedi jiangzai Qingchuan jiancheng” (Sichuan Earthquake Disaster Zone ‘OC Love Homeland’ Will be Established in Qingchuan at the End of This Month), Qiaoqing jianbao, 28 April 2009.
students who returned from study overseas were “no less jingoistic than those who have never gone abroad.”

5.11 Evaluation of Nationalism and the OC

Measuring the effectiveness of qiaowu in spreading CCP-inspired nationalism amongst the OC can be given more attention as a future quantitative research project. One area for further analysis is to survey the extent of evolving relationships between the OC and the PRC so that responses and behaviours can be better understood. This thesis takes some steps towards this objective by offering general observations from personal experience of the day-to-day operations of various OC groups. Although there are difficulties in evaluating various types of qiaowu efforts against each other, general themes do arise.

Overall, the OC of the 21st century show much less bias than their Cold War predecessors, and less antagonism towards the CCP than in the past. As this thesis has argued, such positive feelings for the CCP amongst many of these OC are not manifested by heavy-handed indoctrination; instead, qiaowu efforts focus upon racial, cultural, economic or political forms of attraction and guidance in order for the OC to reconnect with China, and ultimately elicit actions of their own volition.

The events of 2008 showed that strategic groups in the OC community were willing to proudly defend the CCP. Mostly xinqiao and PRC students, these groups demonstrated the effect of years of qiaowu relations in spectacular fashion. Having been continuously exposed to this ideology, these OC are particularly proud of China’s re-emergence. They wish for China to take its rightful place on the world stage, and they defend this view vigorously. Such pro-Beijing sentiments have developed in the context of several major changes to both the geo-political environment and OC demographic landscape since 1989. While the change in general attitude amongst the OC to show support for China and the CCP can most likely be attributed to China’s improved global position, there are explanations and events that

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illustrate how developments in the articulation and implementation of qiaowu policies have affected the way in which the OC may view their connections with Taiwan and China.

Firstly, the OC no longer feel ashamed of China as the poor and sick man of Asia, but actively draw upon China as a great source of pride, respect, self-confidence and strength for all the OC, regardless of the regime. Feelings of discrimination and frustration with language barriers and cultural shock in their host country dissipate when the OC participate in activities familiar to them. Cultural events (often facilitated with support from qiaowu cadres in the form of decorations, promotional materials, and funding) such as Chinese National Day and Lunar New Year celebrations restore a sense of pride and dignity. Moreover, many welcome the opportunity to participate economically and politically in China’s re-emergence. Various events facilitated these feelings: China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, the 2008 Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai World Exposition, and China’s space programme. These examples reflect Anderson’s argument of language and ritual as an important component of the ‘imagined community’.

As such, the cultural and social stigma attached to favouring the PRC has largely disappeared. OC groups now openly demonstrate public acceptance of qiaowu. They respond positively to qiaowu delegations and state/provincial leaders making “friendship visits.” Xinqiao are more likely to look to the PRC embassy for prestige, status and as a resource for their cultural activities and extended political networks. In order to demonstrate this affiliation and strength of the relationship, they invite the OC media to help promote these bonds in newspaper articles (with pictures of toasting with officials, joining welcome parties and taking part in workshops/tours). Building on these warm sentiments, visiting qiaoban cadres and government officials appeal for “powerful backing” from their OC audience for creating a strong China and active participation in its reunification.

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656 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 40-49.
Mainland Chinese and students also appear to respond positively to cultural performances organized and funded by provincial government and qiaoban authorities. These shows portray a very ‘CCP’ side of Chinese culture – particularly nationalistic songs, to which the audience sing and clap along in time. PRC officials also encourage the ritual of flag raising ceremonies amongst OC organizations in order to invigorate their sense of national pride and unity. The CCP uses the PRC flag as a key symbol to isolate and oppose Taiwanese independence and any other perceived threats to the CCP regime.\textsuperscript{658} Such methods of social and cultural outreach are a means of keeping Chinese nationalism strong in the mind of the OC.

There have also been significant demographic and socio-economic developments that have led to the CCP gaining more support in recent years. The first is the decline of the KMT’s grip over OC communities. The ROC no longer enjoys the monopoly and the advantages that it once held over the OC between the 1950s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{659} By the 1990s, Taiwan had entered a “competing stage” in rivalry for their support.\textsuperscript{660} Taipei’s attitude towards the OC during the DPP period did nothing to prevent strategic laoqiao groups leaning towards Beijing. Many laoqiao OC communities have since either accepted or shifted their support towards Beijing in return for access to benefits offered by the mainland. Furthermore, the OC are no longer reliant on Taiwan for financial or political support; they are increasingly urbanized and distributed amongst the general population, and more importantly, they are now removed from the Chinatowns once dominated by a pro-KMT merchant elite; others could not reconcile their pro-KMT beliefs with a DPP ideology, or were alienated and frustrated because of Taiwanization.\textsuperscript{661} China has also taken advantage of Taiwan’s


\textsuperscript{660} Chiao Jen-ho (Minister of OCAC) as quoted by Wang, “OCAC Head Urges Increased International Publicity.”

relatively poor economic performance and political uncertainty. State Council reports show that Beijing is confident that this trend for the OC to turn away from Taiwan is increasing, and has seized upon this opportunity by focusing much of its qiaowu work around persuading OC to embrace the PRC.662

There were also specific events that provoked outrage and frustration both inside and outside of China after 1989. These included the 1993 Yinhe Incident,663 Beijing losing its bid to host the 2000 Olympics, Lee Tenghui’s 1995 visit to Cornell,664 the Belgrade bombing in 1999, and the Hainan spy plane incident in 2001. The perception that Western media was biased only inflamed these feelings. In 1996, various groups of the OC protested against NBC for its anti-China remarks as the PRC contingent marched during the opening ceremony of the summer Olympics. The PRC MFA sought an official apology, and the OC media fanned anti-US sentiment.665 These feelings were again evident during Western coverage of the Olympic Torch rallies in 2008.

The most important aspect of all, however, has been Beijing’s exploitation of the ethnographic connection and how that is linked to China’s rise. By drawing upon the ideology of loyalty to one’s ancestral homeland, and by virtue of its size, history, culture, and rising influence, China has and will continue to have a profound influence over the formation of OC identity.666 For those apprehensive about accepting CCP notions of nationalism, qiaowu focuses on China as a potential place for work, culture and business. Thus OC youth work highlight a modern China and rich Chinese tradition upon which to reconnect with. These aspects appear attractive to many OC youth all around the world, with popular uptake of state-sponsored youth

662 “Taiwan dasuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang,” 2-3; “Beimei qiaomeng xin bianhua,” 1.
664 In May 1995, the PRC condemned the US Congress for urging the Clinton administration to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa to make a ‘private’ visit to Cornell University. See Taiwan Communiqué, no. 66 (June 1995), www.taiwande.org/twcem/66-no1.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).
tours and programmes. In accordance with its economic development over the past decade, China became increasingly confident in dealing with OC affairs and the OC themselves. For example, when members of the New Zealand Chinese Association (NZCA) visited the PRC embassy in Wellington in 2009, ambassador Zhang Limin enthusiastically greeted his laoqiao audience with “Welcome home!”

5.12 Conclusion

The scope for building support for the CCP through qiaowu reconnection efforts is continually being enlarged to accommodate a larger target audience. By focusing on religious, emotional and psychological platforms that transcend the traditional cultural channels, qiaowu has successfully reached out to important strategic groups. Qiaowu encourages the OC to identify with their imagined national communities through active maintenance and celebration of Chinese culture. In turn, these methods have brought more of the OC into China’s embrace by facilitating nationalistic and patriotic feeling. The CCP has reconstructed and popularized a singular PRC-directed discourse of Chineseness based upon economic, political, historical and cultural factors that are attractive and acceptable to the OC. The result has produced attitudes amongst them that are supportive and defensive of China (and hence its leadership).

Taiwan’s once-dominant relationship with the OC has since faltered, and continues to lose ground against a well-resourced and attractive PRC qiaowu effort. Increasing numbers of OC are active in securing access to China for these benefits and as a result are not shy to align themselves with Beijing. In short, overall OC identification with Chineseness has become deeper and more pronounced than during any other period in the CCP’s history.

667 Zhang Limin (PRC Ambassador to New Zealand), address to NZCA, Wellington, 20 June 2009.
6.00 Cultural Work: Reconnection

In addition to OC education, the PRC uses various other strategies of engagement to reconnect with the OC. Most of these methods place importance on the notion of *luoye guigen* (literally ‘falling leaves return to their roots’). Encouraging affinity with the motherland has been an extremely successful method of building patriotism and sentiment amongst the OC – particularly in light of China’s rise as a global economic, cultural and political power.

While the platforms have remained consistent, the target groups and methodology have changed over time. This chapter tracks the development of two specific areas of *qiaowu*: specially organized programmes that maximize firsthand participatory experience in China itself; and where direct interaction is not possible, the growth of OC media and telecommunications. Both play a significant role in propagating the CCP’s version of Chineseness amongst the OC, and seek to build support for the regime. The phenomenal growth of these two areas of *qiaowu* highlights the acceleration of efforts with key target groups – OC youth, *xinqiao*, and PRC students.

6.01 Active Reconnection: Tours and Root Seeking

Both Beijing and Taipei have used personal tours and visits as key methods for reconnection with the OC. Taiwan’s efforts sought to attract the OC for opposing communism, promoting foreign investment, and advancing substantive relations. It was most successful with attracting participants during the height of the KMT years, but numbers waned with the onset of Taiwanization. China, however, has gone from strength to strength, by targeting a wider range of OC and providing specific groups (*huaren* and *xinqiao*, as well as non-Han minorities) with specially tailored activities. Although more than 50 years have passed since Beijing first invited select groups of the OC to the PRC as visitors, the basic premise has not changed significantly. The core aspects and purpose of tours as tools of investigation and influence remain the same, as do the themes. They continue to emphasize

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670 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 101; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de “luse tongdao”.”
cultural and economic opportunity, ethnographic connections, and to challenge potential threats to the CCP and China’s national integrity.

Tours to China began on a small scale and have gradually expanded in scope and size over the decades. In the early 1950s, the OC were warmly welcomed back to China, either as returned OC or as visitors to see the “superiority of socialism.” Tours were an effort to improve their sense of patriotism and unity, engage in socialist participation, and to rally against the KMT.671 Their qiaoban minders gave them handbooks that outlined how they could embrace and contribute to this effort.672 This theme of modernizing China in a socialist context would set the tone of activities for the next thirty years.

During and immediately after the Cultural Revolution, restrictions on movement meant that OC tourism was limited. A few OC were approved at the highest levels of the CCP to travel and study in China.673 Most other OC wishing to travel to China had to be invited by the OCAO directly through official connections; it was also possible for invitations to be issued by OC front agencies. For example, the Overseas Chinese Travel Service (later re-named the China Travel Service CTS (Holdings) Corporation of China) was solely responsible for OC tourism.674 Another front agency was the OC Bank in Hong Kong, whereby staff with OCAO affiliations would ask OC if they were interested in going to the mainland for a visit (sometimes for up to a month or more). A brief interview took place (with questions such as their length of time in the host country, field of occupation, and salary to vet their potential for contributing to China) before issuing them with the necessary travel documents.

The OC on these early tours were made to feel very important throughout the trip, meeting with provincial officials and attending state functions. However, activities were carefully orchestrated, visiting only specific places of importance (such as Mao’s birthplace, historic or scenic spots), those that showcased China’s scientific achievements, and viewing spectacular cultural shows. Participants would not

671 “Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce,” 47-65.
672 Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui, Guiqiao shouce (Handbook for Returned OC) (Guangzhou: Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui, 1955).
673 Wong, Red China Blues.
experience aspects of China that might cause embarrassment, nor were they allowed
to make private visitations, or conduct one-to-one meetings with locals.\textsuperscript{675} Visits to
the ancestral village were also managed. To ensure this, visitors were accompanied
and monitored by OCAO cadres (fluent in Cantonese – the dialect of the majority of
visitors). Their job was to investigate the OC situation by asking about life abroad,
exchanging information of cultural interest, and soliciting donations for local
education, welfare and other charitable causes.\textsuperscript{676} There was no effort to pressure
participants with CCP ideology or make undue requests. Rather, if participants
appeared bored or complained, they were taken aside, asked why, and the situation
then remedied. Participants were to return home with only happy and positive
memories of New China.

In the late 1970s, OC tourism was managed in the context of the PRC’s rivalry with
Taiwan. For example, strategic groups of OC (such as Japanese OC who held ROC
passports) were encouraged to visit the mainland. In the early 1980s, China looked to
cultural tourism as both a platform for reopening to the outside world, and as part of
the propaganda machine to cement the socialist reconstruction of China in OC minds.
As one visitor recalled, officials said “You are an Overseas Chinese. You have come
such a long way. We welcome you back. Besides, your parents must really love
Chairman Mao and have faith in China to let you come all this way alone.”\textsuperscript{677} In 1986
Deng Xiaoping noted that “Chinese living abroad and persons of Chinese descent are
welcome to come back for a visit. For one thing, they will be able to understand our
country better. For another, they will see what projects they can participate in and
how they can contribute. I believe they will enthusiastically support our efforts to
build the country.”\textsuperscript{678}

\textsuperscript{675} 1973 tour participant, personal communication with author, Christchurch, 15 August 2005.
\textsuperscript{676} Zhuang, “The Factor of Chinese Ethnicity in China-ASEAN Relations.”
\textsuperscript{677} Wong, \textit{Red China Blues}, 25.
\textsuperscript{678} Deng Xiaoping, “For the Great Unity of the Entire Chinese Nation,” excerpt from a talk to members
of the Visiting Rong family delegation to China, \textit{People’s Daily}, 18 June 1986,
6.02 Xungen – Falling Leaves Return to Their Roots

For many years, thousands of OC root-seekers have made their way to Guangzhou or Fujian for cultural reconnection.\textsuperscript{679} In exceeding the context of conventional tourism, root-seeking (xungen) tours serve to complete one’s identity by providing an authentic and fulfilling experience.\textsuperscript{680} Tours are historically and personally significant in that the participants actually engage in ritualistic exchange. Activities include visiting the qiaoxiang villages and houses in which their forefathers came from, rebuilding ancestral halls, restoring graves, and re-establishing bonds with local government authorities (such as receiving honorary positions). Museums, textbooks and publications seek to re-educate the OC with a PRC interpretation of China’s national history.\textsuperscript{681} China is promoted as one of the great human civilizations with an extensive contribution to global history and tradition, and the OC are invited to participate in continuing this legacy.\textsuperscript{682} Propaganda emphasizes common blood and strong feelings of family with China. Participants are likely to receive comments about their Chinese attributes – such as their “yellow skin, black hair and common blood of the dragon.”\textsuperscript{683}

Most of this work is pursued for economic reasons. After 1978, advancing development was at the forefront of the CCP’s agenda.\textsuperscript{684} Therefore, qiaowu worked to provide information on investment policy and encourage the OC to contribute either financially or technically in China. At the heart of this effort was to use the ancestral village as a platform for building better links with the OC.\textsuperscript{685} Therefore,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{680} Andrea Louie, “When You Are Related to the “Other”**: (Re)locating the Chinese Homeland in Asian American Politics Through Cultural Tourism,” \textit{Positions} 11, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 735-763.
  \item \textsuperscript{682} Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 87; Mo Hong’e, “Overseas Chinese Youth Urged to Promote Communication Between China and World,” \textit{Xinhua}, 13 July 2006, \url{http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t262882.htm} (accessed 6 April 2007).
  \item \textsuperscript{683} Rosanna Wong (Director of Dragon Foundation and Executive Director of the Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups), presentation to the Dragon 100 Forum, Hong Kong, 22 August 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{684} Zhuang, “The Factor of Chinese Ethnicity in China-ASEAN Relations.”
  \item \textsuperscript{685} “Liebian, chongzu, xinshen, ronghe,” 9, 12-15; “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 1-12; Wu, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluxing qianzhanxing”; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de “luse tongdao”.”
\end{itemize}
dedicated offices at the provincial government and university level worked to satisfy OC visitors’ and students’ interest in rediscovering their heritage. In 1980 the CPPCC proposed that “Special Economic Zones” near qiaoxiang areas be established on the eastern coastline to encourage FDI from OC. From discussions with Shantou officials in Guangdong province in 1991, senior propaganda official Zhu Muzhi noted the importance of using the geographic, cultural and historical features of the ancestral village to appeal to OC. In seeking donations for building infrastructure, the OC were not made to feel as if they were being exploited, but to believe that their contributions to the village would ultimately bring them benefit too. In the 1990s, authorities began to increase their scope and targeted those beyond the traditional areas of emigration, and established fifteen OC business organizations for those originating from other provinces and cities. By 2006, under the direction of the qiaolian, over 14000 organizations had emerged to embrace the OC.

This work continues into the contemporary period. The 2004 Blue Book of Research Results Concerning China’s United Front Theory listed the key issue that cadres should focus upon: enhancing the cohesion of Chinese nationality, cultural identity, and hometown sentimentality in order to bring about patriotism and socialism for China amongst the OC – with strengthening the attractiveness of the CPP at the heart of this effort. Moreover, methods have become much more efficient. For example, qiaowu officials carefully monitor the movement of migrants by polling villages, researching special directories maintained by OC groups abroad, and inviting business

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and community leaders to assist. The OCAO, together with local government authorities under the guidance of relevant CCP Central Committee Departments, work together in promoting the flow of economic benefit to the villages and towns through better information exchange, personal networks and good relationships. Cadres attract OC to invest, initiate and set up public welfare causes, as well as co-ordinating them to meet domestic capabilities and requirements. In this manner, root-seeking has turned into a successful platform for driving local economies.

6.03 Building Links

In addition to the economic benefits of reconnecting OC, the core objective of visits to China is to promote unity and challenge threats. In this regard, activities seek to either strengthen support for the CCP, or otherwise attempt to change their opposing views through various soft power techniques. Qiaowu agencies work actively to reinforce pro-China feeling by organizing activities tailored to specific OC groups. These can take the form of forums or conferences, and can attract hundreds of participants. For example, the 2001 New Century OC Associations’ Forum attracted over 200 leading OC representatives from 60 countries. Participants took this opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity and loyalty to the CCP and its objectives.

Where the OC may not be so politically inclined, other events seek to embrace them through sympathy for China in the face of historical foreign aggression. For example, a festival marked both the centennial of a famous anti-Japanese composer’s birth and the 60th anniversary of the end of the war against Japan in 1945. A similar event

696 CCTV, “Haiwai huaqiao huaren gonghui fachang dari.”
held in Hong Kong in 2005 attracted over 1000 representatives from 100 OC organizations. In 2002 the Huanghuagang 72 Martyrs Cemetery was renamed and designated a “China Overseas Chinese Federation Patriotic Education Centre” to commemorate those OC who had returned to China and sacrificed their lives for the Revolution. Qiaowu activities seek to infuse and romanticize these sentiments in order to deepen the nationalistic impact.

Where an overt political connection is not desirable, qiaowu employs indirect and seemingly benign contexts for reconnection. For example, ethnographic connection uses various sub-themes, such as promoting culture, business or economic interest and exchange. For example, in 2007 hundreds of well-known artists and experts attended a special “Artists Forum” that ostensibly sought to raise cultural standards amongst the OC and propagate the “culture of the motherland.” It was a UF effort to unify OC artists known for producing dissident art.

In the same manner, another development for such xungen events is attracting non-Han OC. As part of building national unity, representatives from these ethnic minorities are regularly invited to showcase their unique regional music, song, dance and art through international arts festivals celebrating the diversity within Chinese culture. Alternatively, special delegations from the PRC are encouraged to ‘go out’ as performance troupes or hold exhibitions to show OC minorities that China is benevolent, accommodating and supportive of all its peoples (see Chapter Seven).

Another attempt to reconnect with the OC is through a tangible means of linking personal histories with China as the ancestral homeland. In the late 1990s, the GOCAO first proposed the establishment of an OC Museum to be open by 2009 –

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deliberately coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the PRC.\textsuperscript{702} In April 2009, shortly before the grand opening, the GOACO sent OC associations around the world a letter detailing the purpose of the museum, and called on them to promote this project to the wider community. The second purpose was to invite OC associations to contribute writings, photographs, models, and other artifacts of historical interest for inclusion in its exhibitions. The letter reaffirmed the important connections between the OCAO and OC organizations, and the significant role that OC played. Qiaowu officials were clear that the main purpose of this museum was to invigorate ethnic spirit and enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{703} The museum was effectively a platform for showcasing to the OC their role and development in the CPP context of ‘Chineseness’.

The wide scope of activity shows that the CCP is very clear in its intent to unite the OC, no matter their origins or political sentiments. The development of themes for tours and interactive projects has moved beyond demonstrating the positive aspects of China and its leaders through history and sightseeing. They have since incorporated important aspects of OC lifestyle and interests that can assist with successfully grounding a set of emotions and sentiments desired by the CCP.

6.04 OC Youth Work

One of the most important targets for reconnection work is the second and third generation youth.\textsuperscript{704} As mentioned earlier, PRC OC officials acknowledge that managing the youth today will ease qiaowu efforts for the next generation of the OC.\textsuperscript{705} Both the PRC and ROC have made special efforts to work with them for this reason. However, they have only enjoyed mixed results in appealing to them, and authorities from both governments have adjusted their methodology accordingly.

The ROC began its efforts through a specially established unit, The China Youth Corps (CYC) or Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuguotuan (China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps) in 1952. It was a KMT propaganda arm to

\textsuperscript{702} GOCAO, “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuwo shiyiwu guihua.”
\textsuperscript{703} GOCAO, “Guanyu xiezhu zhengji huaqiao huaren lishi shiwu ziliao de han” (Letter Concerning Assisting Collection of OC Historical Materials and Information) 16 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{704} “Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao” (Thoughts on Strengthening Xinjiang OC Work In Light of a New Situation), Qiaoqing, no. 14 (6 June 2007): 1-6.
\textsuperscript{705} “Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhangtuan chenggong laihua yanxu jiaoliu,” 17.
uphold anti-communist doctrine through mobilizing young people into organized military training camps. The KMT directly sponsored the CYC until 1989. With cooperation from the OCAC and university student bodies, the CYC organized regular Overseas Chinese Youth Study Tours beginning in the mid-1950s for the purpose of strengthening ties with OC from a young age. Tours ranged from twenty days to six weeks. Various government agencies (including the MOE, the OCAC, the Mainland Affairs Council and the MFA) supported and almost completely subsidized youth work over this period. Ministerial officials would personally address participants and emphasize their common cultural traits. For example, during the 1990s, US participants (because of their political importance to Taiwan) were told “welcome back to your homeland”, despite many of them having no connection at all with Taiwan, apart from being OC.

Activities included cultural immersion in Chinese language, arts and sporting activities at a dedicated training facility. However, the primary objective of the Study Tour (up until 2000 at least) was to bolster support for the KMT regime. Thus visits to pro-KMT tourist landmarks (such as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the National Palace Museum) promoted the ROC as protector of traditional Chinese high culture and arts. This aspect of the Study Tour was largely successful in awakening the Chinese identity within OC youth. To foster political support (particularly important after the ROC lost its United Nations (UN) membership in 1971), participants were addressed with overt messages calling for support of Taiwan’s anti-communist stance and reunification with the mainland, while patriotic activities included flag-raising and singing the ROC national anthem. However, participants mostly dismissed these attempts as propaganda, and the KMT’s efforts to instill nationalist spirit amongst them failed to take root.

Furthermore, like all of Taiwan’s qiaowu efforts during the 2000s, Taiwanization took its toll upon ROC Youth Study Tours. After the DPP took power, the CYC became increasingly independent from the KMT, rejecting KMT-approved candidates for leadership positions.\textsuperscript{709} In 2001, it changed its Chinese name to reflect Taipei’s new objectives.\textsuperscript{710} Up to 2008, its strategy was not to educate youth about the old ideology of “One China”, but to encourage learning about Taiwan’s achievements, promotion of international co-operation, exchange and interaction between local and OC youth.\textsuperscript{711} Thus while traditional Chinese culture still plays a minor role, the emphasis is on raising awareness and interest in understanding Taiwanese native folk culture, history, tradition and language – and of course its emergence as a democracy.\textsuperscript{712}

Another consequence of Taiwanization was that laoqiao were no longer the target group. Local politicians criticized the cost of subsidizing the program for foreigners, arguing that the money would be better spent on domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{713} While there was a US$15 million endowment for the Overseas Chinese Culture and Education Foundation that allows 3000 OC youth to go to Taiwan to attend language and cultural seminars,\textsuperscript{714} the focus was on Taiqiao children. Through an OCAC sponsored Local and Overseas Taiwanese Youth Action Forum, Taiwan mobilized them as part of its international engagement, considering them a key to facilitate direct dialogue and exchange, and therefore encourage youth activity in Taiwan’s public affairs.\textsuperscript{715} Because of these moves, laoqiao and huaren youth had little choice but to turn to China instead for cultural reconnection during the DPP period.

\textsuperscript{709} Hsu, “KMT Youth Corps Given ‘Unfair Break.’”
\textsuperscript{710} Before 2001, the CYC’s Chinese name was Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuguotuan (Chinese Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps). After 31 October 2001, it was changed to the China Youth National Salvation Corps or Zhongguo qingnian jiuguotuan – dropping the reference to anti-communism and its militaristic past. See “China Youth Corps Set to Visit Chinese Universities for First Time in 50 Years,” \textit{Taipei Times}, 27 December 2001, \url{www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/12/27/117489} (accessed 1 October 2009).
\textsuperscript{711} CYC website, \url{www.cyc.org.tw} (accessed 1 October 2009).
\textsuperscript{712} “Minjindang zhizheng houtai “qiaoweihui” de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang,” 5-6; Application Form for 2006 Overseas Compatriot Youth Summer Formosa Study Tour to Taiwan, \url{www.occroc.org/occ/ApplicationForms/2006_FormosaAct.pdf} (accessed 1 October 2009).
\textsuperscript{713} Chung and Wang, “Overseas Chinese Policy Unchanged: OCAC Official.”
\textsuperscript{714} \textit{Taiwan Yearbook 2002}.
PRC root-seeking camps for youth first began in 1980 and attracted 158 participants. By 1986, this had grown to 5753 from 32 countries. In the contemporary period, tens of thousands of OC youth participate in various xungen activities. Often being state-funded programmes, they are not designed to extract profit, but to influence the OC using persuasive techniques known as youjiao jiehe, yujiao yuyou (integrate play and education). The trend of China’s public diplomacy and outreach efforts is to foster an image of China as a sincere and responsible country that is committed to reform and opening up, that is unified and dynamic, and that upholds equality and friendship. This format has not changed since the earliest tours. Participants are encouraged to learn about China’s opportunities in the hope they will promote its interests and strengthen filial relations amongst themselves and with China.

Goals listed in the Retrospective of Guangdong Province’s Summer Camps for Youths of Chinese Descent included:

1. Propagate Chinese culture and strengthen the national consciousness.
2. Deepen knowledge of the motherland and strengthen national recognition.
3. Foster participants’ attachment to their native village and arouse their nostalgic emotions.
4. Intensify co-operation and exchange between Chinese and foreign youths and enhance solidarity and friendship.
5. Advance OC affairs.

Camp organizers employ a work philosophy embracing yiqing dongren, yili furen (persuasion through kindness and sound argument), whereby they study the differences of their targets (such as demographics, situation, habits and interests) and

717 State-organized events are almost always partially or fully subsidized. These differ to privately run forums, which have no official connection with the state, nor can they be considered qiaowu. While government leaders may be present at these private forums, they are only invited as guests to lend credibility to the event; furthermore, private forums demand participants paying their own way entirely – suggesting a purely profit-driven agenda.
719 Louie, “Re-territorializing Transnationalism,” 651.
provide activities and locations that evoke feelings of cultural affinity and common cultural heritage while minimizing feelings of distance with China. Given that OC youth are not expected to be proficient in Mandarin, the focus is not so much on classroom learning, but to expose them to firsthand activity and observation in an effort to facilitate accelerated absorption of Chineseness. For example, martial arts training involve the learning of wushu values and skill through intensive practice, movement of body and mental discipline. Campers perform in a cultural show attended by OC officials, who inspect the fruits of their investment. Participants also visit military and scientific facilities. After spending many days together in this environment, these youth enjoy a sense of united Chineseness.

6.06 Comparison of Youth Work

Both the ROC and PRC efforts to influence young OC have achieved only mixed success. Most participate with an apolitical mindset dominated by social priorities – as such, camps are often viewed as subsidized vacations and an opportunity to find one’s future spouse. These issues frustrated Taiwan’s efforts to mobilize OC youth en masse for direct political activism. Camp activities sometimes did not meet participants’ expectations. For example, instead of learning about their ancestral history, they sat through a seminar on local economic development or viewing the remains of a spaceship. In addition, China’s attempt to reconstruct OC youth identity was often hampered by conflict with laoqiao beliefs and assumptions, as well as participants’ inability to speak Mandarin. In short, OC youth (particularly those of the second and third generation) hold firmly to their foreign nation-state identities with little patriotic PRC sentiment, unlike the portable transnational identities of new

720 “Zuohao xinyimin shehui gongzuo zhongzai guli he yindao” (Succeed in New Migrant Society Work Through Encouragement and Guidance), Qiaoqing, no. 15 (29 April 2005): 6-11; “Huayi qingshaonian xia (dong) ling ying,” 110-111; Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 70.
722 Camps are subsidized by the local provincial OCAO or by a national entity such as the State Council OCAO and the China Association for Overseas Exchanges.
723 Louie, “Re-territorializing Transnationalism,” 651.
725 The OCAO expected participants to be fluent in Chinese and to specialize in some particular area of culture during the camp. David Tai (NZCA National President), Annual President’s Report 2004, presented at the NZCA Conference (19-20 June 2004), 76.
Chinese migrants. As a result, the use of biological, cultural and nostalgic links as the basis of forming a PRC-conscious identity was often a failed ritual.\footnote{Louie, \textit{Chineseness Across Borders}; Louie, “Re-territorializing Transnationalism,” 645-669.}

Over the years, both Chinese and Taiwanese youth strategies focused upon promoting ideologically based content. Both versions sought to reconnect youth with a distinct version of Chineseness. For the ROC during the DPP years, it was about promoting Taiwan’s indigenous culture, goals for international status and technical achievements abroad in an effort to distinguish itself from China. For the PRC, camps seek to advance their trust of China, educate them about the ‘special characteristics’ of CCP leadership and OC policies by dispelling any negative imagery, to guide and influence their behaviour, and to raise their patriotic spirit and enthusiasm.\footnote{“Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye” (Mutual Action for Development, Helping OC Developing Industry), \textit{Qiaoqing}, no. 10 (5 April 2005): 2-3.} They can then be mobilized, networked and guided along lines of Chinese ethnicity and culture for China’s national interests.\footnote{“Fahui qiaojie qingnian zuoyong, licu liangan heping yu fazhan” (Make Best Use of OC Youth for Urging Cross-Strait Peace and Development) \textit{Qiaoqing jianbao}, 26 April 2007, 13.} With a better ‘understanding’ of China, OC youth could promote progress with national reunification, disseminate Chinese culture, and serve as a friendly bridge between China and the world.\footnote{\textit{Qiaowu gongzuo gailun}, 70.}

As such, \textit{Taiqiao} and pro-Taiwan OC youth are specially targeted and invited to rival PRC camps in order for them to formulate an ‘objective’ view of China, while ‘reducing misunderstandings’ owing to their ‘limited’ Taiwanese (or other foreign) perspective. This ‘Welcome In’ approach seeks to challenge foreign propaganda and turn them towards Beijing.\footnote{“Meiguoxi zhongwen jiaoshou yanxiutuan’ laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 4-7; “‘Nanfei huayi xiaojie Fanghuatuan’ Fanghua xiaoguo hao” (Good Results for Miss South African Chinese Delegation to China), \textit{Qiaoqing}, no. 41 (19 October 2005): 10-11.} For \textit{xinqiao} youth, the work has reinforced patriotic feelings for China and its leadership; for others who may be more sceptical, camps seek to change their perceptions and feelings of alienation from China.\footnote{“Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan baogao” (Investigative Report of the Situation Concerning Integration of French, Dutch and English OC in Mainstream Society), \textit{Qiaoqing}, no. 24 (5 September 2007): 14-15.} No matter where they were born, OC youth are made to feel as if they have ‘returned home’ as
‘children of the dragon’.\textsuperscript{732} In many cases, this is never a problem – for many OC youth, camps and tours are life-changing experiences.\textsuperscript{733}

6.07 Development of Youth Work

In response to these issues, the PRC has returned to the top-down, centralized proactive approach over the last decade, reflecting the desire to better manage the activities in a context that is free of anything that might detract from CCP objectives. OC tours now emphasize activities that have a tangible pay-off either in terms of knowledge gathering or profitable enterprise.\textsuperscript{734} Camps formerly run by OC organizations with financial and logistical assistance from GOCAO had their funding withdrawn or reduced under a ‘user pays’ scheme. OC officials argue that this not only relieves financial pressure on Chinese authorities, but by paying their own way, they expect that participants have more enthusiasm to learn.\textsuperscript{735}

The proliferation of camps targeted at different types of OC youth shows that there is an effort to succeed with youth work. However, there are some contradictions to this effort. For example, organizers of most state-sponsored events in China now often assume that these youth are able to speak, read and write Chinese.\textsuperscript{736} While \textit{laoqiao} are invited to attend, all promotional material is in Chinese, indicating these camps are aimed at \textit{xinqiao} youth who are more likely to deliver the results expected.

The second approach is to target certain groups who are receptive to embracing a PRC-friendly identity, such as elite OC youth, or those interested in arts and culture. For example, root-seeking tours for OC adoptees living with Western parents (and therefore limited exposure to Chineseness) have the theme “Seeking Roots Through Culture, Learning Through Travel” emphasizing daily family life, practical Chinese arts and crafts.\textsuperscript{737}

\textsuperscript{732} “Nanfei huayi xiaojie fanghuatuan’ fanghua xiaoguo hao,” 8-9.
\textsuperscript{733} Zhao, \textit{Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu}, 302.
\textsuperscript{734} Biao, “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks,” 63-63.
\textsuperscript{735} “Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaxing,” 5-7.
\textsuperscript{736} At a 2006 OC Associations Centenary Celebration of 240 delegates from 26 countries, all the proceedings and speech notes were in Mandarin (with some Cantonese) without English translation. Kai Luey (NZCA President), personal communication with author, 13 December 2006.
\textsuperscript{737} “Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaxing,” 5-7.
In another attempt to reconnect with OC youth, their career ambitions, opportunities for personal development and interest in foreign languages serve as an attractive platform.\(^7^{38}\) Qiaoban cadres persuade them to view their ethnicity as an advantage during China’s re-emergence.\(^7^{39}\) For the laoqiao and huaren groups, building positive feelings for China in terms of economic, cultural and scientific advancement has been successful. OC youth are interested in going to China for work or study. For example, Vice Premier Qian Qichen remarked that “foreigners of Chinese origin” were welcome to share in opportunities brought about by China’s globalization and modernization.\(^7^{40}\)

A significant development is the deliberate focus on younger OC. For example, after the early 2000s, the PRC launched a new initiative – targeting those sixteen years and under. This is a pre-emptive attempt to influence OC youth before they have the opportunity to participate in rival tours. These camps remain completely under the control of GOCAO, and consist of a selection of pre-arranged tours that include specific activities based on cultural, education or sightseeing themes. Participants must follow these schedules without deviation and often without parental supervision.

These methods show the direct hand of the CCP in influencing the development of OC communities through their youth. By targeting specific groups at a younger age, their hope is to secure pro-CCP feelings early on, and to foster these sentiments throughout their lifetime. After several years of achieving only limited results, the CCP has taken such steps to ensure that future reconnection provides the desired outcome. This move to a centralized approach is also evident in China’s other outreach efforts – in particular its efforts to dominate the OC media.

\(^7^{38}\) “Jiangmenshi qiaowu gongzuo qiuxin qiubian ‘sanshin renshi’ cheng zhongdian” (Jiangmen City OC Work Strive for New Change for ‘Three New Personages’ as Focal Point) Qiaqfeng jianbao, 21 March 2008, 12.
\(^7^{39}\) “Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuohuang haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian,” 14-16.
Where firsthand participation is not possible, the next best way to reconnect with the OC is through the media and other virtual platforms for interaction. For decades, the CCP has used propaganda to influence the perceptions and behaviours of the OC. Media work is crucial as a direct method of communicating with target groups, seeking to defy the hegemony of host country national culture while attempting to re-sinicize its audience. Beijing’s main objective with the OC media is to encourage reunification, encourage nationalist pride and to oppose anti-CCP movements.

In the 1950s, CCP propaganda techniques included uniting and enlisting OC support for the PRC, exposing and opposing the KMT, protecting the OC, expanding relations with OC through education and cultural activity, and promoting CCP and Maoist ideology through Chinese language publications. Content was not so much pro-communist, but pro-China and respectful of sub-regional culture. Propaganda received by OC groups included official statements in print and radio, or featured in magazines such as People’s Pictorials and China Construction. As mentioned earlier, the activities of Young Tong Shing served in this capacity. Receiving such information was initially popular, but over time, news from mainland Chinese relatives informed them of the harsh realities – such as the heavy taxation and capital levies imposed upon them, various invasions of freedom (such as forced confession and expounding of the Party line) and having to perform demeaning tasks. Thus, although pro-PRC literature was available and accepted by some, it was not widely

743 The Indonesian Communist Party was comprised mostly of OC, leading to President Suharto’s banning of Chinese-language schools and publications in 1965 – not lifted until 1999 by President Wahid. See Cheung, “Involuntary Migrants,” 57, 61-64.
accepted amongst those communities that tended to prefer staying out of politics, or those who wished to be perceived as anti-communist during the Cold War period.\textsuperscript{745}

For most of the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, mainstream OC media operations were based mainly in Taiwan and Hong Kong (such as the \textit{Independence Daily} and \textit{Sing Tao} newspapers). In this period, Beijing’s attempts to forge links with the OC were constrained by the ROC’s dominant position. While there were a few exceptions,\textsuperscript{746} the KMT sponsored the majority of OC newspapers in an effort to promote its interests and influence among strategic OC communities.\textsuperscript{747} However, in the wake of increased \textit{xinqiao} migration after the mid-1980s, the emergence of the internet, and polarization of the community due to localization of Taiwanese politics, PRC state-run media concerns were able to break into the market. These companies not only revitalized a stagnant industry, but quickly dominated the key sources of news and information by catering to a new generation of migrants, PRC students abroad and \textit{laoqiao} educated in the Chinese language. The absence of local government interference allowed the OC media to develop their own identity.\textsuperscript{748} Although this resulted in a plethora of minor papers catering to local audiences with specific content,\textsuperscript{749} since the late 1990s, free advertorial newspapers distributed by scores of PRC-friendly media companies have virtually eliminated Taiwanese and Hong Kong backed OC newspapers.\textsuperscript{750}

Research by the Jamestown Foundation in 2001 found that the PRC either directly or indirectly controlled three of the four major Chinese language newspapers published in the US (\textit{Sing Tao Daily}, \textit{The China Press} and \textit{Ming Pao Daily}). The fourth (the \textit{World Journal}) had Taiwanese connections that had increasingly given in to mainland

\textsuperscript{745} In Thailand, PRC support came from leftist newspapers, but members of the OC mercantile community denied any connection; in Vietnam, there were no communist papers due to the strict authoritarian control over the press, while in Malaya the communist terrorist campaign complicated the attitude of OC toward the PRC.


\textsuperscript{748} Manying Ip, “Chinese Media in New Zealand,” in Sun, \textit{Media and the Chinese Diaspora}, 198.

\textsuperscript{749} Min Zhou, Wenhong Chen and Guoxian Cai, “Chinese-language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada,” in Sun, \textit{Media and the Chinese Diaspora}.

Elsewhere around the world, the sole Taiwanese funded newspaper *Independence Daily* ceased operations in 2005. By 2008, the only notable exception in print media able to communicate with OC on a global scale was the FLG-backed *Epoch Times*. However, this paper lacks credibility and objectivity in the eyes of some China-watchers. The same situation occurs in television media. While New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) (also funded by the FLG and during the DPP years by Taiwanese government agencies) and Taiwan’s Macroview Television remain independent from PRC influence, their broadcast reaches only limited sections of the OC diaspora and cannot compete with the wider distribution channels that China Central Television (CCTV) and other pro-Beijing OC media enjoys.

6.09 Borrowing Ships to Go to Sea

Beijing’s overwhelming dominance over the OC media occurred because of intensive *qiaowu* efforts that have successfully encouraged the OC media to accept PRC influence and cultivate a standard discourse that encourages pro-China sentiment or demonizes groups that challenge the regime. ‘Co-operation’ with the OC media is one of *qiaowu*’s core goals. Following a meeting of propaganda officials in 1992, provincial authorities called upon PRC media companies to establish partnerships abroad for exporting more “cultural products” from China. This method is known...
as ‘borrowing ships to go to sea’ (jiechuan chuhai) – to take advantage of established channels to disseminate the CCP’s messages.\textsuperscript{757}

The first strategy was for PRC companies to publish special overseas editions. For example, the \textit{China Daily} has a special edition printed and distributed in North America;\textsuperscript{758} the \textit{Fujian OC Newspaper} (Fujian qiaobao) in New York is an off-shoot of its parent publication in China (Zhongguo qiaosheng).\textsuperscript{759} The second was for OC companies to join with their PRC counterparts through joint ventures, both in China and abroad. For example, at the Second World Chinese Language Media Forum held in Changsha in 2003, OCAO vice president Liu Zepeng encouraged OC media to take advantage of the growing market opportunities in China – thus both growing their own operations while extending the reach of PRC media throughout the world.\textsuperscript{760}

OC media companies were also encouraged to join state-controlled international media groups (such as the World Chinese Language Press Institute, World Chinese Media Forum and the World Chinese Newspaper Association).\textsuperscript{761} As members, they are obliged to carry officially approved content from the CCP Office of Foreign Propaganda (OFP or duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi) or simply reproduce pro-CCP content directly from mainland mouthpieces such as China News Agency (Zhonghua xinwenxie) and \textit{Xinhua} News Service. In 2007 during the 60th anniversary of the establishment of \textit{Xinhua}’s foreign bureaus, CPD director Liu Yunshan praised it for the special role it played in disseminating propaganda overseas.\textsuperscript{762}

\textsuperscript{757} Zhao, \textit{Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu}, 304.
\textsuperscript{759} “Fujian qiaobao shikanhao faxing” (Fujian OC Newspaper Journal Published) \textit{Qiaobao}, 2 October 2007.
\textsuperscript{761} In 2001, Global China Group (owner of \textit{Sing Tao} group) entered partnerships with \textit{Xinhua} News Agency and the People’s Daily. See also Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach,” 23.
Since 1989, the CCP has acknowledged that heavy doses of outdated indoctrination are not productive – rather, its propaganda methods have sought to promote patriotism over politics. Therefore, feelings of nationalism and pride for China are encouraged as part of a larger external (duiwai) propaganda effort overseen by the OFP and implemented by provincial level offices. For example, the GOCAO specifically advises that it should use OC media to enlarge the scope of its own propaganda and influence through co-operation and exchange. As a result, qiaowu officials instruct the OC media to emphasize China-related issues such as traditional festivals, geography, village sentimentality, and particularly China’s international relations with larger countries.

This work is not overtly directed by the CPD as with China’s own domestic propaganda methods, but like all qiaowu, is euphemistically described as “guided by service.” In practice, the CPD manipulates them using techniques that fund, influence and manage friendly Chinese media outlets, or using methods that make things difficult for dissenters. Furthermore, PRC officials work to promote OC media companies as part of China’s wider family. For example, diplomats personally visit OC newspapers, meet their editors, pose for photos and praise them for their co-operation. Officials advise their targets to strengthen their relations with the embassy, and consequently, many papers become public relations devices for reducing the distance between the PRC and the local community. These include publishing biographic details of consular personalities, news of upcoming embassy activities, travel advice and frequently asked questions (such as visa application processes). As the diplomatic face for qiaowu activities, ambassadors and consular

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764 GOCAO, “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuowen yu shiyi gaihua.”
765 Zhongguo jizhe (China Reporter). “Tigao waisuan youxiaoxing de wudian kianyi.”
766 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 83, 88-89.
staff continually seek to raise their profile amongst OC communities.\textsuperscript{770} As one of their first tasks after their posting, ambassadors and consular staff quickly cultivate relationships with local media and pro-China organizations by assisting with anniversary and traditional celebrations or recognizing members’ achievements.

The domination of Chinese language programming is also the result of funding or provision of resources from China. For example, OC radio stations receive re-transmission fees for broadcasting content.\textsuperscript{771} Other incentives include subsidies, paid advertising, and access to free content. To remain economically viable, OC newspapers have little choice but to place a good relationship with China over the quality of their editorial content and choice of employees and managers. In return for their co-operation, newspapers expect prestige in being associated with diplomatic figures and the opportunity to tap into the lucrative mainland market.\textsuperscript{772} For example, local government and OCAO officials treat OC media representatives to entertainment and lavish hosting by when they visit China.\textsuperscript{773} Such successful events symbolically reaffirm the strength of relationship between the PRC and the OC media.\textsuperscript{774}

Those OC media companies choosing to remain independent or publish non-approved content become the targets of an aggressive campaign of elimination or control. For example, in 2000, the consul general of the PRC consulate in Melbourne invited media leaders to a dinner during which he repeatedly warned them not to carry FLG content, or else have it first vetted by the consulate for approval.\textsuperscript{775} PRC diplomats regularly issue warnings or make threats to advertisers and distributors if they support

\textsuperscript{770} “Beimei qiaqing xin bianhua,” 8; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de “luse tongdao””; “Zhongguo qiaolian huashanghui’ jiang gengming wei ‘Zhongguo qiaoshang lianyihui’.”
the *Epoch Times* in any way (see also Chapter Seven). Likewise, they instruct performers, guests and satellite providers not to co-operate with NTDTV. PRC authorities blacklist and shut out their reporters from covering pro-PRC functions (such as diplomatic events and state visits). Otherwise, the PRC stages rival functions designed to confuse participants – sometimes at the same venue, but only days or even hours apart. The CCP has also resorted to using militant methods against the *Epoch Times* and other FLG practitioners. Staff have allegedly been attacked, newspapers stolen, and key equipment destroyed. These efforts aim to send a tough message to other OC media about the consequences of acting outside the boundaries of what is acceptable to the PRC authorities. Although *qiaowu* memoranda do not allude to resorting to illegal and violent methods to attack the non-PRC inclined OC media, they do prescribe using ‘intense pressure’ as the key to stifle independent OC media. In this oppressive environment, most OC media operations conduct self-censorship, constrained by the fear of retaliation if they behave otherwise.

### 6.10 Managing OC Reporters

As well as influencing the way OC media operates, the CCP also seeks to control news production. In this regard, PRC authorities carefully manage OC reporters

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781 “*Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo*,” 9-10, 16.

visiting China – particularly those perceived as a threat. Those working independently and wishing to cover sensitive issues are required to get authorization for every reporting trip made outside of Beijing, and if caught without clearance, may be subject to detention or expulsion. Ethnic Chinese reporters can be targeted or dealt with more severely than their non-Chinese counterparts. For example, security personnel attacked photographer Ng Han Guan after taking a picture of a colleague being man-handled by police in 2004. BBC producer Bessie Du and her assistant were strip-searched after visiting a riot in Dingzhou in 2006. Others may be barred from entering China altogether. Despite their ethnicity, those OC reporters considered dangerous are treated without sympathy and no different to other reporters that threaten to expose issues that may embarrass China.

For those journalists working in China under the supervision of qiaowu minders, a more direct but subtle approach is used – mostly by providing regular training and guidance. Under these methods, cadres treat OC journalists with pragmatism by ensuring their “safety and satisfaction.” For example, in the early 1990s, cadres accompanying their targets were instructed to answer any questions by explaining circumstances from a third-party perspective, with essential information delivered in a succinct manner free of strong propaganda overtones. Moreover, minders were to avoid false and boastful statements, regurgitate from script, use excessive pleasantries, or appear cold. Such demands have not changed in the contemporary period. Qiaowu cadres continue to deliver information to their interlocutors in a warm-hearted and friendly manner.

787 Lu, “San ge jianchi’ quanmian tuoazhan qiaowu gongzuo.”
788 Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 103-109.
790 “Chuangxin waixuan celue, chuanbo guojia xingxiang;” 10-11.
The other method to influence OC journalists so that they present a CCP-approved version of China is to invite them to participate in international media conferences, symposiums and tours that showcase the historical grandeur and economic progress of a post-revolutionary ‘New China’. Following the 1989 crackdown, there was an emphasis to update foreign and OC perceptions of contemporary China, as opposed to dwelling on cultural history. Their reports were to dispel old conventions, old methods, continuously explore and address the needs of the OC. Since the 1990s, the role of the OC media and journalists has been to foster patriotism and united spirit amongst the OC by propagating a modern perspective of China, the friendly intentions of China and its leaders, issue commentary on global issues, and educate the OC about Taiwan policy.

In the contemporary period, OC propaganda continues to promote this positive image of China. Provincial foreign affairs officers tailor activities and locations specifically to the different political and environmental perspectives, desires and interests of participants. Journalists are encouraged to write positive, fair and objective articles about China in order to improve compatriot connections with China, and inform and guide the OC to make more contributions. For example, minders invited reporters to cover preparations for the 2008 Olympics in an effort to portray China as “clean” and “civilized” – especially after Beijing’s response to the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak that consequently damaged China’s international reputation.

Qiaowu therefore manages the manner in which reporters receive information and produce content through the selective exposure to only the attractive aspects of China. By guiding these processes under supervision and influence, the CCP has controlled the most vital stage of the CCP’s outreach to OC communities. With such influence

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791 “Lianhuo goutong haiwai huawen meiti, yingzao lianghao guoji yulun huanjing” (Contact Overseas Chinese Media, Create a Good International Media Environment), Qiaoqing, no. 44/1 (2005): 5.
792 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 157, 160, 166.
795 “Yaoqing haiwai huawen meiti xuanchuan Beijing aoyun” (Invite OC Media to Propagate Beijing Olympics), Qiaoqing, no. 23 (23 August 2007): 1.
over the dissemination of mainstream OC news, the CCP has no problem in promoting its desired message to a wide audience. This has certainly been the case with its domination of print media. In order to appeal to the widest possible audience, the CCP has also invested heavily in alternative forms of media, in particular new technologies such as audio, video and the internet.

6.11 New Technology: Television and Radio

In the past, information had to be relayed through personal oral and written networks and the print media. Now anyone can acquire and transmit information swiftly and directly. New multi-media and electronic platforms have advantages of broader and more effective delivery than traditional platforms – particularly for ethnic Chinese and second or third generation OC. Thus Beijing has sought to produce a “multi-faceted cultural product” to reach as many of the OC as possible. According to State Council reports, since the early 2000s, the goal has been to develop the OC media into a ‘New Chinatown’ – a comprehensive ‘supermarket’ of Chineseness and OC work, which is then used to the full extent (including advertisements and articles) in conducting and promoting qiaowu. It uses both indirect methods (such as exhibitions on China’s development) and direct methods (such as news media). OC media companies supplement these efforts by tailoring content to suit the tastes of local audiences. Lastly, qiaowu also attempts to guide these OC media companies to connect with and to influence their mainstream foreign counterparts in order to improve foreign perceptions of China.

Qiaowu specialists believe that audio-visual propaganda has been particularly effective in reaching out to their audiences. For example, China Radio International specifically targets OC audiences by broadcasting in 38 languages, as

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796 “Chuangxin waixuan celue, chuanbo guojia xingxiang,” 15; Wu, “Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo.”
797 “Lian Song fangwen Dalu dui haiwai qiaoshe de yinxiang ji wo gongzuo duice” (Effects on Overseas Chinese from the Lian Song Visits to China and Our Countermeasures), Qiaoqing, no. 19 (27 June 2005): 9-10.
798 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 6.
801 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 87-89; Gao, “Transnationality of Settled Migrants,” 18.
well as Mandarin and four other Chinese dialects.\textsuperscript{802} Similarly, CCTV began a global growth plan aimed specifically at the OC in 1992. A dedicated channel, CCTV-4, is broadcast to 98 percent of the world twenty-four hours a day, through satellite and cable technology on un-coded frequencies.\textsuperscript{803} While exact audience numbers are difficult to gauge, in 2006 CCTV-4 had over 15 million subscribers (approximately one third of the world’s OC population).\textsuperscript{804} To reach those without subscriptions, CCTV purchases time or broadcasts free of charge on local public/private stations, and contributes to various US university campus stations.\textsuperscript{805} An initiative in 2006 between CCTV, the local embassies/consulates and OC media companies resulted in a special television service targeted at OC specifically. The \textit{Zhonghuaqing} media service (featuring news (both locally and Chinese) as well as arts and culture) is aimed at OC and foreign students.\textsuperscript{806}

The CCP’s reach extends beyond its own state broadcasting company. Phoenix TV (a private television company that has a large following amongst both OC and domestic elites) gave a ten percent stake to CCTV as a symbolic gesture to show it would not oppose the CCP.\textsuperscript{807} Consequently, while it has a reputation as a more ‘truthful’ and ‘objective’ alternative to the state broadcaster, it refrains from sensitive stories, criticism of party leaders and support for independence or democratic reform, for fear of being shut down by censors.

Despite these comprehensive propaganda efforts, qiaowu specialists believe that only a minority of the OC actually ‘understand’ China – these mostly being \textit{xinqiao} migrants who have yet to assimilate with mainstream society. \textit{Xinqiao} tend to be more vulnerable and responsive to nationalist propaganda and ethnic chauvinism than

\begin{footnotesize}
\bibitem{803} Gao Wei, “\textit{CCTV-4 fugai 98\% diqiu}” (CCTV-4 Covers 98\% of the World), Huaren shijie website, 2007, \url{http://qkzz.net/magazine/1671-2536/2007/06/1073785.htm} (accessed 1 October 2009).
\bibitem{804} PRC State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, “\textit{Woguo guangbo yingshi zhouchuqu jinru quannian fazhan de xin jieduan}” (Entering a New Phase in the Overall Development of ‘Going Out’ in Our Nation’s Television Broadcasting), 3 November 2006, \url{www.sarft.gov.cn/article.do?articleId=20070910174338600875} (accessed 1 October 2009).
\bibitem{806} Xu Jigang, “\textit{You Zhongguoren de difang jiu you Zhonghuaqing},” (Where there are Chinese, there is \textit{Zhonghuaqing}), \textit{New Zealand Mirror}, 15 September 2006, 1, C5.
\end{footnotesize}
established *laoqiao*. This latter group (particularly third and fourth generation OC) are understood to have doubts and misgivings about China owing to Western perspectives and philosophies. Special propaganda work is therefore necessary for them, given that many may not necessarily have a strong grasp of the CCP version of the Chinese situation. The emerging popularity of the internet in the late 1990s facilitated these ambitions.

6.12 *Qiaowu and the Internet*

The medium most effective for managing, mobilizing and sustaining a nationalist spirit amongst a diverse population of OC has been the internet. It provides an undiscriminating platform for “deterioritralized transnational interaction” whereby all OC are able to share knowledge freely. They are also able to assert, maintain and demonstrate cultural and political identification, and hence unified for various causes under a sense of virtual Chineseness. For example, news of protests outside Indonesian consulates and embassies after the riots in 1998 were spread quickly throughout cyberspace; in 2005, millions of mainland and OC supported an online petition launched by several OC websites that opposed Japan’s bid for joining the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the internet allows for effective communication despite diversity of dialect, culture and interests amongst OC groups and minorities by using a variety of local languages and images.

The PRC has taken advantage of these benefits for much of its modern *qiaowu* communication and mobilization efforts. For example, *xingqiao* websites disseminate general information, policy, and recruitment details. Content tends to focus upon the strategic issues of OC affairs and development of international relations. *Laoqiao*

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808 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 81-83, 85.
812 “Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaren gongzuo de sikao,” 1-6.
websites promote ethnic, historical, religious, nostalgic qiaoxiang ancestral issues and investment opportunities. They include English translations in order to reach a larger audience. For example, the GOCAO website provides information concerning its services, conducts surveys and has interactive features that welcome views, comments, and ideas. These websites are, in effect, the modern virtual renditions of the Special Economic Zones that appealed to Guangdong and Fujian migrants who wished to engage more with China during the early 1980s.

PRC portals and Chinese-language websites (such as Guangdong qiaowang) have become the leading sources of mainland and OC news and information amongst the OC. Some of these websites are linked directly to state-controlled mouthpieces, which promote PRC government initiatives, policy and news. In this manner Beijing can pool and co-ordinate various materials onto a centralized server before distribution as a standard narrative to the world’s OC for consumption.

Although the global information age was supposed to have encouraged democracy, transparency and freedom of speech, this has not been the case in China. The CCP is able to police and combat threats to its regime by controlling all online content. There, the internet remains tightly controlled under a highly resourced apparatus that is supported by laws and regulations, surveillance measures and new technological advances so that only the positive benefits of disseminating information is achieved, while any negative impacts are minimized.

The OC, however, are not bound by such state censorship or policing of their online activity. They have the potential to spread democratic change in China. Nevertheless,

818 Nyiri, “Expatrating is Patriotic?” 635-653.
the same benefits achieved in China have been successfully exported abroad, and
accepted by many OC – in particular PRC student and xinqiao groups. Beijing’s goal
is to create a “Global Chinese Village” in the hope of unifying the OC as a single
virtual entity through the internet. The ‘red heart’ campaign demonstrated how this
could be achieved. The concept of adding a ‘red heart’ next to one’s avatar
(symbolizing one’s love for China) was initiated by users themselves and later
adopted as a branding strategy for MSN China. Xinhua was fully supportive of the
effort, calling for netizens to maintain an “open mind against anti-China propaganda
while keeping patriotic.”

Many OC responded by adding pro-China and anti-Western media comments alongside their ‘heart’, and shared videos or songs
criticising CNN and BBC, such as the “2008 China Stand Up!” video (which first
circulated domestically on Sina.com and later globally on Youtube) as an effort to
defend China’s honour. Soon after, the most extreme form of online nationalism
evolved – “human flesh search engines” that tracked down OC ‘traitors’ (those who
were perceived to support pro-Tibetan or anti-China efforts) in a virtual witch-hunt,
ultimately resulting in physical attacks.

These OC netizens have assisted the CCP regime with promoting its political agenda,
image and objectives throughout the world, and consequently strengthened these
elements amongst their own communities. For example, it was through these methods
that Chinese language websites, blogs and chatrooms provided the detailed
instructions that were used to rally participants for the 2008 rallies. They were
specifically told when and where to meet, how to dress, what to bring, and what to do
so as to present the Chinese protestors as civilized, friendly and peaceful. Similarly,
PRC students in New Zealand featured postings discussing and organizing protests

820 **“Minjindang zhizheng houtai “qiaoweihui” de zhuyao gongzuojin fazhan fazhxiang.”** 6-7, 10.
821 **“Red Heart China’ Appears in Netizens’ MSN Signatures,” Xinhua, 18 April 2008,  
822 **Zhang Yuke, “’Hongxin China’ xijuan MSN women guizhenyang biaoda aiguo reqing,”** (**‘Red Heart
China’ Sweeps Across MSN, How Should We Express our Patriotic Zeal?” Xinhua, 17 April 2008,  
825 **“Fed: Evidence Emerges of Well-Organized Chinese Campaign,” AAP General News Wire,
Document no. 1467531751, 24 April 2008; New Zealand Chinese Students in Support of Olympics,
“4.27 jihui xuzhi! Qing wubi zixi yuedu! Yangze zunshou!”**
against Rebiya Kadeer’s visit to Auckland University in 2009.826 In this manner, the CCP has been successful in controlling behaviour and influencing perceptions both in reality and in virtual cyberspace.

6.13 Conclusion

The aim of qiaowu is to gather support for China and its leaders by getting the OC to identify positively with their motherland. OC reconnection work, whether it involves guiding the OC media, through propaganda efforts, or through xungen tours, seeks to penetrate and influence OC communities and individuals and instill nationalistic, patriotic, or in the least, encourage ethnographic sentiment. While OC may have unrestricted access to news when outside of China, their choice of OC newspapers remains very much influenced by pro-Beijing sources. Moreover, the CCP’s methods of reconnection with the OC have become much more sophisticated, utilizing modern technologies, adapted for their cultural and economic developments. The internet has been a key platform for not only linking them with China, but also spreading and sustaining nationalism abroad. As a result, domination of these channels means that news and perceptions of China are likely to pass through CCP filters before reaching their intended audience.

With reconnection activity, while the overall policy suggests that there should be a broader reach out to all OC, the actual focus of resources falls on specific groups. The reasons are both economic and political. Root-seeking tours, for example, are hosted at huge expense, but may not produce the desired results. Thus in recent years, subsidies have been gradually removed for laoqiao groups. As well as reducing the cost for the host organization, it is hoped that by doing so, participants actually engage in a deeper and more meaningful way. For specific groups that hold promise of producing positive results for the CCP, they may enjoy fully subsidized activity. These measures also reflect the intensified efforts for centralized control following conflicting agendas amongst participants in previous years.

This chapter demonstrates that although certain segments of the OC diaspora do not respond to *qiaowu* in the way the CCP may desire, reconnection methods will continue to develop as the OC become increasingly diverse and localized. As such, more resources will be required to deal with their larger numbers – necessitating more funding and active planning from *qiaowu* officials. At the same, there is no shortage of eager OC media companies willing to align themselves with Beijing, or OC groups wishing to reconnect with their ancestral homeland – allowing Beijing an even firmer foothold into the heart of OC communities.
7.00 External Work: Threats & Challenges

The OC are a vast network of powerful interest groups and important political actors. Some writers describe the OC diaspora as a “Chinese commonwealth,”827 the “Chinese Business Sphere,”828 or simply as part of Greater China.829 The OC play a role in shaping the future of China (either culturally or politically) from abroad.830 They can act as bridges between East and West, as resources for China to draw upon in order to strengthen itself, or as defenders of Western or Chinese ideals.831 They can also transmit certain values back to their place of origin – as such, their role in the Chinese political system (while often only symbolic) offers a channel for influencing the construction of OC identity.832 Ultimately, the OC are challengers or supporters to homeland policies from abroad.833

In describing long-distance nationalism, political scientist Benedict Anderson argued that values and information flowed from the outside to the inside.834 As they become increasingly articulate in society, the OC are able to use international relations, technology and legislation to maximize, exploit and manage their relationship with China for their own welfare, protection and economic advancement. They are therefore a potentially influential force to promote liberal and democratic values, as well as freedom of thought and speech within China.835 Could the OC usher in democratic reform in China as some commentators have predicted?

832 Christiansen, Chinatown, Europe, 12.
In 1989, American scholar Francis Fukuyama argued that Western-educated PRC students would return to change China. However, his prediction of democratic reform never materialized. Returned OC are mostly technocrats who lack commitment towards democratic transition. At most, they serve only to transmit Western political values in an indirect manner in their roles as advisors or administrators outside the key political and propaganda system. Fukuyama later argued that nationalism would decline as liberalism and free markets rendered national differences irrelevant. By extension, economic liberalization and the influence of the OC would lead to democratic freedom in China. The events of 2008 proved yet again, that Fukuyama was wrong in his prediction.

Despite its monolithic appearance, claims of homogeneity, and domination of the principal means of social control over the OC, the CCP regime is not immune to conflict with interstate, trans-governmental and transnational groups. As examined in previous chapters, the CCP has to contend with rival discourses in its various fields of operation. This section specifically examines those OC groups that challenge and oppose the CCP. As the most important group for China’s growth and development, any dissent amongst the OC could be catastrophic for the regime. Groups requiring particular attention include the OC pro-democracy movement, Tibetan Buddhism, the Taiwanese independence movement, the Xinjiang independence movement, and the FLG movement.

This chapter examines how qiaowu has sought to prevent OC groups from eroding the CCP’s grip on power. It describes the various threats to the CCP and the measures it uses to oppose them. While the CCP prefers using enticement and nationalism to gain co-operation and control of the general OC population, it also employs divisive methods. For the CPP, this is a long term psychological battle, and focuses on

838 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man.
840 Callick, “Defector Opens Door on Chinese Australia.”
methods of inclusion, persuasion, isolation or elimination – in short, this chapter highlights the most extreme forms of qiaowu and describes its implications for OC society in the contemporary period.

7.01 Co-optation

In comparison with policies for Turkish migrants in Germany, why has China been successful with incorporation of the OC? One aspect is that the OC are embraced and invited to participate in strategic state-sponsored platforms through active co-optation. According to Gamson, co-optation can be classified as non-selective (which refers to attempts to absorb dissident elements into a common organization) or selective (which refers to inducements given to certain individuals or groups in an effort to ‘divide-and-rule’). In turn, both can employ coercive or consensual techniques, advancing either goals of homogeneity or pluralism. Coercive methods might include genocide, expulsion, population transfer, forced assimilation, exclusion or subordination; consensual methods include induced assimilation, power sharing, coalition or inclusionist methods. Of these methods, the consensual approach of both selective and non-selective co-optation of the OC within and outside of China has enabled the CCP to enjoy high levels of acceptance over the past two decades. In these cases, qiaowu has sought to bring in, influence and subsume targeted groups of OC for particular outcomes – mostly to avert threats to its stability and existence.

The manner in which the CCP implements the co-optation of OC groups or individuals takes three forms: firstly, ideological (such as the hegemonic Marxist, neo-Marxist perspectives that involve co-opting diverse groups into a common belief system as proposed by Gramsci, Therbon, Laclau and Mouffe); psychological (the creation, maintenance and encouragement of common patterns of thought via

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language and ritual as proposed by Michels and Edelman); and finally institutional (such as functionalist approaches whereby private individuals, groups or representatives are formally incorporated into state decision making as advisors, informants or colleagues as proposed by Selznick).

Qiaowu mechanisms conduct these forms of co-optation through two platforms: formal (such as the OCAO, which exists to establish the legitimacy of authority and administrative accessibility for the relevant audience); or informal (such as bestowing honorary titles on elite OC in order to adjust to the pressures of power within the community to suit the CCP). To support these mechanisms, the CCP has established various ‘front’ organizations to create public solidarity and to legitimize their representation of government. These state-sponsored specialist organizations seek to promote and defend linguistic, cultural, religious and economic interests in both host and home countries. As described in Chapter One, these agencies fall into Soysal’s statist-corporatist model of action and authority.

The crux of co-optation is that the sharing of power is not substantive. While it may appear that the OC enjoy a high level of prestige with links to the highest echelons of power, such status is only symbolic. Actors from the OC community play only an advisory role in the policy making process. As mentioned earlier, functional power is retained within the State Council, its ministries, and the CCP. This aspect of corporate pluralization gives the OC community the feeling that their interests are being taken into account, while the elite decision makers receive a greater diversity of views. Co-opted elements must remain under control so as not to encroach upon the actual arena of decision making. In this capacity, the CCP has been largely successful with formal, informal, selective and non-selective co-optation both within and outside China. As this chapter demonstrates, the CCP’s relationship with the OC varies at two extremes – warm and inviting to those it wishes to strengthen and maintain relationships with, and aggressive towards those it perceives as threats. Various

847 Sheffer, “Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” 1-15.
academics have identified such engagement as “extending ethnic chauvinism,” or the “projection of an authoritarian regime’s influence beyond its borders.”

While China may attempt to persuade *guiqiao* that they are returning to a country that warmly welcomes them, the many incentives and privileges offered to attract them target only those who can contribute in the ways specified by the CCP. Given that *guiqiao* are mostly back in China for career, family, education and business reasons, it is unlikely that they would wish to sabotage future opportunities for their advancement by engaging in sensitive activities.

Domestically, the CCP has taken measures to ensure that *guiqiao* and OC investors serve only to advance China’s economic policy, but not its political reform. To prevent them from inciting any undesirable behaviour once back within China, authorities seek to manage them by organizing various gatherings. *Qiaowu* cadres design activities to promote pro-CCP, pro-China and pro-socialist ideals in order to ‘satisfy their political needs’ while stifling undesirable ‘outside influences’ and spreading liberal views. Various *qiaowu* agencies promote benefits and policies to returned OC through ‘OC Laws Propaganda Months’ (*qiaofa xuanchuan yue*). Other economic and social organizations (such as the Chamber of Commerce of the Western Returned Scholars Association, Chinese Merchants Association, China Association for the Returned Overseas Chinese and Association for Chinese Students Returning from Abroad) function to draw returned OC together under semi-official groupings monitored and regulated by the Party-State. These are inclusive methods to strengthen a CCP-friendly attitude amongst the *guiqiao* population.

Co-optive approaches have worked somewhat differently for *huaren* OC outside of China. Overt support for China and its leaders is limited to those groups or

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849 He, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” 5-29.
852 He, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” 5-29; Wang, Wong and Sun, “Haigui: A New Area in China’s Policy Toward the Chinese Diaspora?” 300-301.
individuals wishing to curry favour for personal prestige and status, seek self-interest and ingratiate themselves with diplomats. For example, to deepen their links with PRC officialdom, several OC groups in NZ preferred to give their Sichuan earthquake donations directly to the PRC embassy itself, rather than to the charitable organizations doing the actual work. Similarly, OC businesses wishing to develop market opportunities in China seek favour with the CCP by contributing materials or funding for various OC activities. Such relationships only serve to enhance personal favouritism towards a select group of OC and boost only their individual egos, rather than facilitating outright political influence amongst entire OC communities.

As noted in Chapter Three, mobilizing the OC for political involvement is largely hindered by a lack of interest. The laoqiao OC in the Pacific region are a good example of this. Historically, although there were pockets of strong support amongst some OC for the KMT, others were mostly indifferent towards the cross-strait rivalry between China and Taiwan. The majority preferred to integrate with the local lifestyle free of interference. Rather than being manipulated, the majority of OC actively use their ethnicity and heritage for their own political and economic gain. Sir Thomas Chan and son Laurie Chan of the Solomon Islands, Sir Julius Chan of Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Jim Ah Koy of Fiji have all used their Chineseness to benefit their political careers. While their ethnicity might work to facilitate their government’s relationship with China and/or Taiwan, they themselves are clearly not political pawns.

The central tenet of co-optive strategies is the existence of sufficient common interests and opinion amongst potential allies. The aligning factor is often economic or business interest. For example, while guiqiao may respond positively to certain policies and activities, patriotism and ethnographic connections are not the sole reasons for OC wishing to return to China. Research by Zweig, Chen and Rosen in 2004 found that it was economic opportunity that mostly attracted haigui –

853 Greif, “Political Attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Fiji,” 977.
the desire to contribute to China played only a limited role. Similarly, an All China Youth Federation survey in 2005 showed that the decision of returning to China after study abroad was based more upon practical considerations. Respondents cited preferential policies, a growing economy, familiar culture and reuniting with family as attractions. Another study in 2006 found that 88 percent of OC surveyed wanted to return to China, but 40 percent of those would only do so if they could earn at least 10,000 yuan a month (five times Beijing’s average income). Returned OC either found it difficult to find a satisfactory job, or refrained from doing so because of their excessive expectations. As such, huaqiao keep their options open by treating their PRC nationality as a tool of economic convenience. As noted earlier, some OC prefer to be naturalized abroad but insist on keeping their PRC citizenship in order to maintain the benefits it accords. Others have returned to China and renounced their foreign nationalities to be able to work there.

Therefore, demonstrating political support for the CCP (either through involvement or identification with Chinese authorities) occurs as a pursuit of business opportunity, rather than a conviction to Chineseness or assumed Han chauvinism. Ong and Nonini described this phenomenon as a Third Culture of mobile and varied Chineseness that formed an ‘ungrounded empire’ evasive of any manipulative state power. This mobile identity does not depend on loyalty to Beijing, or any other nation-state or civilization-state, but rather the continual desire to seek economic opportunity in other various locales. In these cases, Beijing’s co-optive approach with these groups of OC, while succeeding with achieving economic objectives, largely fails with gaining the political loyalty of the majority.

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7.02 Coercion of the OC

For those OC posing a threat to China and the CCP, coercive approaches may be required to ensure control both domestically and externally. While their ethnicity may provide them convenient access into and throughout China, OC visitors to China do not necessarily receive protection if they come into conflict with state interests. Those OC acting outside parameters defined by the CCP may find themselves the subjects of scrutiny. Their ethnic origins, irrespective of their nationality, mean that their activities could be perceived as treacherous or traitorous behaviour, and therefore subject to even harsher treatment than their non-Chinese counterparts. In these cases national security officials take over from qiaowu cadres, and use aggressive management techniques in an attempt to prevent any undesirable activity. Those accused of crimes undergo “returnee interviews” and warned about how they should behave (and threatened with consequences to their family in China should they not oblige).863

Over the past few years, there have been numerous examples of visiting OC academics, journalists, writers and businessmen involved with matters considered as ‘sensitive.’ MSS officials accused them of spying by and dealt with them under China’s strict rules and procedures.864 For example, authorities charged David Wei Dong and Zhao Yan of leaking state secrets during their trips to China.865 Journalist Ching Cheong was arrested when trying to obtain the memoirs of former pro-reform leader Zhao Ziyang. Authorities argued that he had set up a spy network and sold military secrets to Taiwan. He was eventually given a five-year jail sentence for espionage.866 NZ reporter Sun Gang (representing a pro-democracy group called the China Federation Party) was accused of intending to “commit violent and terrorist

acts” by exploding a hot air balloon over Tiananmen Square and scattering pro-
democracy leaflets. In 2004, Wang Bingzhang (an American advocate of labour
rights in China) was kidnapped during a visit to Vietnam and forcibly transported to
China, detained by PRC authorities, who charged him with terrorist activities.

Chinese authorities have arrested or imprisoned hundreds of other OC for economic
crimes (such as tax evasion or bribery) – often as retaliation for business deals that
have caused embarrassment for the State. For example, under the direction of MSS
officials who accused him of embezzlement following a dispute with a state-owned
company (linked to the niece of Deng Xiaoping), triads kidnapped Australian James
Peng Jiandong in Macau and spirited him to the mainland in 1993. Despite
insufficient evidence, the Chinese court sentenced Peng to eighteen years in jail but
eventually freed him six years later. Unfortunately, the plight of these OC is hardly
given any media attention, and victims suffer in silence. Since April 2001, the US
State Department has issued a travel advisory to China-born American citizens and
green card holders to take care if they had Taiwanese links, or engaged in activities
critical of Chinese policies.

In short, these OC are not necessarily the beneficiaries of a warm embrace as widely
promoted by the state. Instead, they are considered as suspicious threats, and
sometimes used as convenient scapegoats. The CCP rewards those OC who play by
the rules for their co-operation and silence, while those who fall outside of favour face
severe consequences.

7.03 The OC Pro-Democracy Movement

After the Tiananen Incident, the CCP sought to aggressively eradicate, prevent or pre-
empt subversive discourses amongst the OC diaspora that challenged its objectives –

the foremost at the time being the OC pro-democracy movement. Many student dissidents either escaped or were sent into exile. They ended up in different universities all over the world and formed a variety of organizations. Despite being outside China, these OC still constituted a potential threat to the CCP and were closely monitored. The MSS dispatched agents as students, faculty members or business people to check their behaviour and correspondence, report on their activities, and directly warned or threatened with retaliation by pressuring their families in China.\footnote{Bill Gertz, “Beijing Devoted to Weakening ‘Enemy’ U.S., Defector Says,” \textit{Washington Times}, 27 June 2005, www.washtimes.com/national/20050627-010217-7779r.htm; Craig S. Smith, “Reaching Overseas, China Tries to Tether Its Own,” \textit{New York Times}, 3 August 2001.} While there are some OC academics who are not intimidated by these actions, many practice self-censorship or at least demonstrate conservatism in order to maintain access to fieldwork in China and to avoid retribution, banishment or detention.\footnote{Perry Link, “The Anaconda in the Chandelier: Chinese Censorship in China Today,” (paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 24 October 2001; originally entitled “Scholars Under Seige? Academic and Media Freedom in China”\textendash{}\textit{www.gov.textonly/txlink.htm} (accessed 2 November 2009); Ross Terrill, “China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations,” (testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 30 April 2009, \textit{www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/hr09_04_30.php} (accessed 1 November 2009).}

The attempt by exiled Chinese student dissidents to establish a unified democratic movement abroad failed due to infighting, rivalry and recrimination between the leading antagonists. By actively isolating their leadership and preventing individual organizations from consolidating, Beijing had implemented a successful ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. Eventually, many activists lost their influence or lacked the capacity to lead – either because of the conditions of their release, or because they no longer felt an interest to promote their former political ideals. Ultimately, without a charismatic leader, the democratic movement suffered. Despite efforts to re-organize in the late 1990s (such as the Wei Jingsheng Foundation and Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition), the movement remained fragmented and polarized due to individual personalities and rivalry for financial resources. Dissidents accused each other of self-aggrandizement and self-interest. Amongst the wider diaspora, many OC had grown dubious and disheartened of their ability to lead a successful campaign.\footnote{Simon Beck, “Dissent in Dissidents Circles,” \textit{Standard}, 31 January 1999, \textit{www.thestandard.com.hk/archive_news_detail.asp?pp_cat=&art_id=23158&sid=&con_type=1&archive_d_str=19990131} (accessed 3 February 2006).}
Some of those who were once critical of the CCP during the 1990s have since fallen back into the embrace of ‘new’ China – reflecting the success of various co-optive strategies described above. While some OC remain critical of the CCP over its human rights record and attitude towards religious freedom, most prefer a “constructive engagement” with China for commercial and political interests.\(^{875}\) Moreover, the memories of the older generation who experienced firsthand the wrath of communism have faded, preferring to see stability and economic development in China rather than bloodshed.\(^{876}\) Since 1989, many former activists are finding ways to use their overseas skills in China.\(^{877}\) Beijing has offered them material wealth and status, diluting their criticism for the regime and ideals for democracy.\(^{878}\)

### 7.04 Grand Unification Nationalism

In addition, Taipei’s efforts to spread democracy amongst the wider OC community were largely unsuccessful due to a limited target audience, a lack of frontline diplomatic resources, and a much stronger PRC *qiaowu* effort. The state of Taiwan’s own domestic political situation had weakened and was polarized as a result of Taiwanization. Although it actively supported some activists, scholars and students who sought asylum abroad, in many cases the DPP funded only those dissidents making pro-independence demands. Similarly, while the OCAC sought to extend its *qiaowu* to *xinqiao* and their associations following increased migration from mainland China,\(^{879}\) it only provided them with service if they were willing to support and recognize Taiwan. Other attempts to influence OC academics and students abroad through the Mainland Affairs Council were quite limited, given most OC students had PRC links and Taiwan student numbers were extremely conservative in comparison.

The students themselves were critical of the lack of formal relations with TECO officials.\textsuperscript{880} Taiwanization had left Taipei without the flexibility and resources required for dealing with these OC and sustaining a meaningful democratic movement.

Even Western liberalist ideology failed to unseat many OC from their nationalistic support for China’s leaders. In 2003, the ROC OCAC dispatched representatives to North America in an effort to raise awareness of democracy amongst the OC by promoting Fukuyama’s theories mentioned earlier. However, the majority of pro-Beijing OC refused to accept Taiwan’s right to self-determination as they staunchly supported the CCP discourse that argued sovereignty and economic development were more important than democratization. This was the result of years of previous counter-subversion efforts by the CCP. In response to the DPP and its calls for Taiwanese independence, \textit{qiaowu} cadres had been particularly active since the early 2000s by sending their own delegations to liaise with OC communities to promote peaceful reunification.\textsuperscript{881} Beijing’s \textit{qiaowu} effort with these \textit{xinqiao} and PRC student groups were extremely successful in sowing seeds of “grand unification nationalism” amongst the OC.\textsuperscript{882}

7.05 \textbf{Challenging Taiwanese Independence}

While dealing with pro-Beijing groups is never a problem for China, attempting to persuade rival movements to accept and embrace the CPP is another matter. Such a task focuses resources on a long term battle employing sophisticated psychological tools implemented using varying degrees of aggressiveness. The leading example of such techniques can be found in China’s anti-independence efforts amongst \textit{Taiqiao} and pro-Taiwan OC. Of these, peaceful reunification has been the core focus of \textit{qiaowu}. The Taiwan issue is fundamentally linked to the CCP’s legitimacy and survival and therefore elevated to the highest level as a nationalist project.\textsuperscript{883} While the CCP argue this issue remains an internal concern, with sufficient support of the

\textsuperscript{880} Rawnsley, \textit{Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda}, 92.
\textsuperscript{881} Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism,” 303.
OC, China can claim their loyalty and legitimacy over Taiwan. Qiaowu officials consider the OC as an external key to influencing Taiwan’s domestic political direction. According to CCP leaders, reunification is the “strong aspiration of the entire Chinese people and a firm will of all Chinese at home and overseas.” Irrespective of their origins or political orientation, as “sons and daughters of the Dragon,” the CCP calls upon all ethnic Chinese to support the principle of peaceful reunification, to oppose Taiwanese independence, and to accept Beijing’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy.

The PRC’s ‘grand unification nationalism’ strategy comprises of three main themes: convincing the OC that they are family, winning over the moderates, and converting the hardened ones to accept reunification. The CCP established various pro-Beijing and pro-unification organizations amongst OC communities around the world for the purpose of opposing and challenging Taiwanese independence movements. For example, there are 170 branches of The Peaceful Reunification of China Association (PRCA) in over 80 countries. All of them are actively funded and resourced by the PRC in co-ordination with qiaowu agencies, including the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification, OCAO, and an army of diplomatic staff. Embassies encourage the OC media to report on PRCA activities and distribute these statements to foreign government agencies and media outlets.

Groups such as the PRCA seek to convince Taiqiao that the PRC embraces them as their own friends and compatriots and that there should be more friendly

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885 Wu, “Zhangwo xinfangfa, katuo Guangdong qiaowu xinjumian.”
888 “Shenri qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 1-4; Embassy of the PRC in the USA, “ Overseas Chinese Key Force in Nation’s Revival.”
890 “Jinnian lai qiaowu dai Tai gongzuo qingkuang,” 3.
exchanges. Furthermore, another major theme of this work is to propagate Chinese culture, friendship, sentimentality, blood links, and village connections in the face of Taiwanization. For example, organizations such as the China Mazu Cultural Exchange Association work to improve relations between Taiwan and China as part of religious exchange and building links with the ‘homeland’. Qiaowu seeks to encourage the OC to “advance the PRC/CCP stance and thinking, and reducing mutual misunderstanding” and spur emotional nationalistic patriotism based on common ancestry. By strengthening exchange and mutual understanding, Beijing hopes that the world’s OC can come together “hand-in-hand, heart-to-heart”.

7.06 Winning Over the Middle Elements

During the DPP years between 2000 and 2008, China viewed Taiwan’s own qiaowu effort as promoting an alternative discourse that directly threatened China’s national integrity. PRC analysts correctly noted that as long as Chen Shui-bian was in power, the quest for Taiwanization would continue. They argued that the ROC would retain the OCAC only for ‘grassroots’ and ‘Track 2’ diplomacy that promoted Taiwanese independence and a pro-Taiwanese spirit. Furthermore, cultural centres, propaganda, influential OC and political bodies promoting independence would receive more resources and actively mobilized for these purposes.

One of the political bodies given official support was the Global Alliance for Democracy and Peace (GADP). Although they initially rejected challenging groups such as the PRCA, DPP officials had initiated plans for an (albeit controversial)
anti-communist movement after taking power in 2000. The GADP was eventually established in 2002 as an OCAC-sponsored off-shoot organization to promote Taiwan’s pursuit of freedom, democracy, and human rights in major cities around the world. GADP members were mostly pro-DPP Taiqiao and those seeking closer relations with the Taiwanese government. It received financial and administrative support for 99 branches of the Alliance in 49 countries. The GADP was effectively another diplomatic voice for a DPP-led Taiwan, and an overt political challenge to the CCP. As such, the GADP lent support to the FLG movement, and enjoyed friendly relations with other anti-CCP groups, such as Chinese democratic and Taiwanese independence movements.

In the face of these pro-independence developments, Beijing quickly began intensive ‘pro-unification’ work through a wide range of programmes under the co-ordination of PRC consulates and embassies. They encouraged OC groups to increase their participation in embassy activities and cultural events. In addition, through various cross-strait cultural, trade and technological exchanges (such as forums, demonstrations, exhibitions and tours), the CPP attempted to cultivate warm feeling for China amongst Taiqiao experts, academics, youth and business people as fellow compatriots.

In response to the middle elements (that is, pro-reunification pan-Blue laoqiao and Taiqiao qiaowu) work sought to change their interpretation of “One China” from that of ‘Republic Of China’ to ‘People’s Republic of China.’ Efforts to promote the PRC had to be gentle, without raising feelings that might be supportive of Taiwan. Techniques included mobilizing groups to issue press releases, hand out pamphlets, and engaging local media to reveal the ‘truth’ surrounding Western-dominated society,

899 Lu and Chen, “Fierce Debates Expected at First OCAC Meeting Under New Government.”
903 “Taiwan dasuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang,” 4-6, 8-9.
904 “Zuohao qinTai qiaoqutuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai fandu cutong ,” 5.
and explain and justify the CCP perspective. These methods were complemented with efforts to foster patriotism amongst the OC community (such as PRC national flag raising or glorifying the Beijing Olympics) while actively isolating or extinguishing Taiwanese ‘independence’ by rousing dissatisfaction for a DPP-led Taipei (such as criticizing the “Three Classifications” announcement or arguing Taipei cares only for Taiqiao and not other OC). Some of the PRC’s more aggressive efforts to persuade the OC to turn to Beijing included weakening or eliminating Taiwanese diplomacy abroad. These included propaganda measures to actively and publicly attack Taiwan and to sabotage its ‘plot’ for independence. For example, the PRC claimed that “international anti-China forces” seeking to threaten peace and stability in the region and damage OC interests were amongst those supporting Taiwan.

Another part of Beijing’s Taiwan policy was to fight efforts to internationalize its situation by emphasizing that it was a domestic matter. By breaking down Taiwanese consciousness both in Taiwan and abroad, China moves closer to achieving its goal of reunification. For example, state-controlled media coverage of KMT visits to Beijing in 2005 served as ice-breakers for promoting closer cross-strait relations and party-to-party exchange, compatriotism, and a “new face of Taiwanese leadership and wisdom at the highest level.” Such reports attempted to persuade the OC of Taiwan’s “official change” in position towards China.

In addition, Beijing also attempted to persuade Taiwanese and Taiqiao of China’s concern and warmth for them and their livelihoods. PRC statements and media reminded Taiwanese compatriots that they were entitled to the same protection

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906 “Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai ‘fandu cutong,’” 1, 6-7; “Jiada lidu, quanfangli katzhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,” 6-16.
offered to all Chinese nationals. Examples commonly cited by officials include evacuating ethnic Chinese out of Kuwait in 1990, extending sympathies to Taiwanese affected by the Hanshin earthquake that hit Japan in 1995, and assisting Taiwanese during the civil war in Cambodia. Pro-PRC media followed these propaganda lines closely in order to persuade pan-green (pro-independence) Taiqiao of China’s benevolent intentions. In 2009 the PRC actively supported and encouraged OC efforts to help Taiwan on humanitarian matters, such as typhoon Morakot. For example, it approved and encouraged OC communities to fundraise for victims and had its embassies set up bank accounts for lodging funds (despite TECO already having its own facilities in place).

7.07 Transformation Work

Despite all of its efforts to win the support of Taiwanese compatriots and Taiqiao, Beijing believed that the ‘independence’ movement still remained strong amongst certain OC groups. Amongst the largest of these pressure groups are the World United Formosans for Independence, Formosan Association for Public Affairs, and the World Taiwanese Congress. Their primary goal is to advance a non-Chinese identity amongst Taiwanese state-owned corporations, overseas representative offices and within government itself. They were particularly active in the US in the late 1990s and 2000s, where they lobbied to boost arms sales to Taiwan and campaigned for high-level government officials to visit the US.

In response to these groups, qiaowu cadres considered that most of their work was targeted too narrowly and having effect on only a few; furthermore, efforts to influence those inside Taiwan and to win Taiqiao hearts were neither direct nor overt

911 “Lin Zhaoshu hui jian Taiwan nanbu xiangqin Jinghu fangtuan jiwang zuguo tongyi” (Lin Zhaoshu To See Southern Taiwan Villagers Delegation in Beijing and Shanghai, Hope for Reunification) Zhonghua qiaowang, 7 November 2007.
enough – there needed to be more diverse and deeper work at the mainstream level. In situations where these OC could not be welcomed or persuaded to side with Beijing, they were to be ‘transformed.’ Transformation work (zhuanbian) aims to ‘liberate the thinking’ of hardened pro-Taiwan laoqiao, pan-Green Taiqiao, and Taiqiao communities with robust connections to ROC investments, politics and industry by propagating the “One China” policy, persuading them to “advance the PRC/CCP stance, and reducing mutual misunderstanding.” It is a global campaign to siphon off sources of traditional support for Taiwan, by using intensive propaganda programs and generous financial incentives to entice them to switch allegiance.

‘Transformation’ work began in the 1970s as ‘Welcome In’ strategies for Taiqiao following the Diaoyutai Island protests in which thousands of OC students (mainly Taiwanese in the US) rallied against Japan over the disputed territory. The CCP seized on this opportunity to utilize OC with ROC links as intermediaries to spread “peace talk” about Taiwan. Beijing offered US Taiwanese incentives to study in China, while using ping-pong diplomacy to attract Japanese Taiwanese to Beijing. At that time, Chinese officials openly promoted the idea for Taiqiao and OC to go to the PRC in order to better understand mainland China and its ways of life. This also served as a method to investigate these groups following their return and to improve work methods with them. In 1973, China encouraged 50,000 stateless OC in Japan to adopt PRC citizenship as an effort to improve relations with the large Taiwanese community there.

913 “Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang,” 11-12.
914 “Taiwan dasuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang,” 2-9; “Beimei qiaoqing xin bianhua,” 1.
915 “Lian Song fangwen Dalu dui haiwai qiaoshe de yinxiang ji wo gongzuo duice,” 9.
916 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, 188.
919 “Huijian Taiwan luMei xuesheng ‘baodiao’ yundong diqu fuzeren de tanhua” (Talks from the Meeting with Taiwanese Foreign Student in America and Diaoyutai Protest Leader) 17 November 1971 in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 44.
920 “Huijian Taiwan tongbao, luRi luMei huaqiao, Meiji huaren de tanhua,” 38.
921 US Consulate Hong Kong, “Beijing and the Overseas Chinese.”
Those OC with strong links to pro-Taiwan organizations have leading roles in this effort. Qiaowu delegations travel to strategic areas such as the US and Japan, and encourage pro-unification Taiqiao groups to contact with the mainland and lobby their government for speedy reunification. For example, Malaysian OC who studied in Taiwan tend to maintain strong relations with TECO and Taiwan. By capitalizing on good relationships with them, the aim is to build a consensus of ‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘anti-independence’ amongst these OC, and then to mobilize them externally in order to promote these goals internally within Taiwan.

Like other forms of qiaowu, ‘transformation’ work is an intensive psychological effort that involves smooth, quiet, subtle and imperceptible methods for challenging Taiwan’s own qiaowu efforts and promoting positive feelings about the PRC. Cadres seek to gain and consolidate trust amongst their targets, actively manage them, and supervise their behaviour under the ‘Three Dos and Don’ts’ principle mentioned earlier. For example, tactics at cultural events include actively engaging with pro-independence OC and reducing their sense of distance with China, and encouraging intensive mutual exchange while accommodating and respecting their political attitude. Such efforts seek to persuade and influence them into doing things supportive of China without actually realizing it. These tactics are essentially a bombardment of small soft power efforts to reduce Taiwan’s scope of activity and influence.

Transformation methods have been very successful. By integrating methods of co-optation and coercion, the CPP has managed to attract support, isolate, or threaten various interest groups concerned with the Taiwan issue. In 2005, one of Chen Shui-bian’s strongest corporate supporters switched over to Beijing, praised its anti-
secession law and backed the one-China policy. Other Taiwanese business associations also looked to China as their future and criticized plans for independence. Where transformation has not been so fruitful, the PRC has attempted to spread negative sentiments and sabotage Taiwan-organized events. For example, it was successful in putting pressure on preventing pro-independence activity and shutting down a local independent newspaper in Fiji.

7.08 A Conditional Relationship

After Ma Ying-jeou won the ROC presidential election in 2008, the threat of Taiwanese independence eased significantly. Ma demonstrated his willingness to concede to Beijing’s demands by changing the ROC’s nomenclature in return for observer membership in international bodies (such as the World Health Organization and Asian Development Bank), preventing the display of symbols demonstrating Taiwanese nationhood during a visit by PRC officials, and refusing to meet with pro-democracy activists. Furthermore, although it had previously enjoyed a close relationship with anti-CCP OC groups (such as the Free China Society), TECO and the OCAC have since reassessed its position with such groups. For example, the newly appointed OCAC minister Wu Ying-yih was clear that his Commission would cease giving an annual subsidy of US$100,000 to the GADP for its political activities; similarly, TECO indicated that it would no longer support the FLG and pro-Tibet movement despite their repeated requests for assistance.

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930 “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,” 6-16.
935 TECO official, personal communication with author, Wellington, 5 July 2009.
These warmer sentiments towards the PRC at the state level have also been encouraged at the grassroots level. In May 2009, Ma called for the confrontation between rival OC groups to end by saying that “we won’t oppose OC groups, which support us, to engage with China.” Consequently, the first steps towards improving relations took place in the form of an agreement between Taipei and Beijing based returned OC that suggested a series of forums, visits and other forms of co-operation. This apparent détente between the two Chinas resulted in diplomats from both sides considering organizing joint celebrations for traditional festivals. However, these developments do not suggest that qiaowu efforts to isolate Taiwan are no longer required – China’s ultimate goal is still to secure as many pro-Beijing OC as possible, no matter where they reside. The agreement for a truce was a declaration between private organizations and not at the state level; nor did it reflect the views of the wider OC community. While some are supportive of Ma’s policy for closer ties with China, others are very angry. Taiqiao and OC communities remain split over support for KMT and DPP.

Ultimately, the ‘truce’ between the two Chinas is conditional upon Taiwan’s eventual reunification on terms acceptable to Beijing. While Ma has demonstrated that he is willing to work with mainland officials by improving economic and cultural links with China, he is careful in dealing with the political ramifications of the warming relationship. Sooner or later, Taiwan will have to address the issue of reunification. Pressure from Taiwan’s domestic constituency and the OC are key drivers for when this might happen. In the meantime, however, given Taiwan’s apparent change of direction to put politics aside, China’s formerly vehement effort to oppose Taiwanese independence has since been overshadowed by stronger efforts to prevent other

political threats from gaining ground, such as the Tibetan independence movement, the Uygher movement, and the FLG.\footnote{Baijia huawen meiti ping shida Zhongguo xinwen he haiwai huaren shequ xinwen” (One Hundred Chinese Media Comment on the Top Ten News Items from China and Overseas Chinese Communities), Qiaoqing jianbao, 29 December 2008.}

7.09 Falun Gong (FLG)

Originally supported by the Chinese authorities as a means to improve the spiritual condition amongst China’s population, FLG was registered in 1992 under the umbrella of the China Society for Research on Qigong Science. With a widespread following (including senior CCP members and military officials attracted to its health benefits) and spread over many branches throughout China and over 200 contact points around the world, FLG eventually became a major opposition force and irritant to the CCP. In 1997 it was de-registered following a CPD ban on all publications written by founder Li Hongzhi. In 1999, the PRC passed a law to suppress heterodox religion (\textit{xiejiao}) and legitimized the CCP crackdown on the FLG movement as an evil cult.\footnote{Leung, “China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the Modern Era,” 761-784.} Suppression of the FLG and other pro-independent movements became a human rights issue in the early 2000s, gathering supporters in the OC community who pressured Beijing through their local politicians. The FLG showed itself to be very capable of mobilizing quickly and effectively to threaten CCP interests.

FLG uses a variety of methods to promote its anti-CCP cause. These include writing letters to major newspapers, holding demonstrations outside PRC embassies and consulates, protesting against visiting CCP leaders, practicing exercises in public parks, and making use of modern communications technology and the internet to mobilize practitioners. They also hold regular ‘Withdraw from the CCP Service Centres’ that facilitate CCP members, PLA or other CCP-sponsored groups to quit from the Party. They also provide FLG and anti-CCP material, such as DVDs and free copies of the \textit{Epoch Times}. Those seeking further information can participate in ‘bible study’-style meetings, dinners and casual seminars on the \textit{Nine Commentaries}.\footnote{The \textit{Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party} (\textit{Jiuping gongchandang}) written by dissident Zheng Pei Chuan in 2004, is an expose and criticism of the CCP.}
7.10 The CCP’s Iron Fist

Although the CCP has been ruthless in its attempt to shut them down entirely within China, FLG continues to practice abroad freely as an extreme anti-CCP movement outside the control of the Religious Affairs Bureau. Subtle methods of persuasion and ‘transformation’ work are ineffective in dealing with the FLG. Instead, PRC authorities resort to direct interference in its activities by harassing and ‘blacklisting’ practitioners.942 Such work goes beyond the scope of the qiaowu administration, and is implemented by other government agencies such as the MFA and MSS. For example, indicating the importance of cracking down on FLG, the CCP Central Committee created a special “610 Office” to deal with them. According to FLG sources, all CCP agencies are co-ordinated in this effort. PRC consular policy stipulates that the passports of Chinese nationals known to be FLG practitioners be confiscated, or their visa extensions refused.943 In 2006, Ottawa refused to renew PRC diplomat Wang Pengfei’s diplomatic visa following reports he was gathering information on Canadian practitioners.944

To convince the public of the potential threat that FLG posed, the CCP stepped up its propaganda campaign. PRC diplomats regularly issue anti-FLG proclamations, actively suppress their activities and public statements, stop media coverage of their events, and urge local government, community leaders and media organizations not to support the movement as a matter of policy.945 For example, Chinese ambassador to Fiji Zhang Junsai made an appearance on local television speaking against FLG distributing pamphlets and banners in Suva in 2003. He mobilized local pro-Beijing OC groups to provide information and organized a protest at the police station.946

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946 “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzu,” 6-16.
Fijian officials promptly arrested the practitioners and ordered them to leave. In July 2002, the Chinese embassy in Wellington and consulate in Auckland pressured Auckland International Airport to remove a pre-paid contracted billboard advertisement promoting FLG principles.

The CCP’s efforts on other OC and their opinion of FLG have also been persistent. According to a FLG report, consular attaches from the MOE organize PRC students to watch anti-FLG videos or attend seminars that put direct pressure on Chinese student associations to act against FLG, or even manipulate elections to prevent practitioners from becoming leaders of OC associations. During co-ordinated exchanges with OC groups, consular attaches from the MOC, MOE and MFA hand out anti-FLG material, or insert them into Chinese language school learning materials. Fearing that their relations with the embassy might be compromised, OC leaders often co-operate with PRC diplomats on these activities.

In many cases, the CCP’s aggressive campaign has worked. FLG members seeking to challenge the CCP through legal avenues have been unsuccessful. NZ prime minister Helen Clark said she would not consider a request by the FLG to refuse entry to a Chinese official. Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer issued certificates prohibiting fixed banners and amplified noise after China complained about protests outside its embassy in Canberra. Australian immigration officials were also careful regarding granting political asylum to defector Chen Yonglin. Furthermore, FLG has lost significant support because of the changing political environment in Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, TECO have withdrawn their subsidies

or funding. Desire to maintain friendly state-to-state political and economic relations take priority on both sides of the Strait.

Overall, the CCP’s concentration of resources to undermine the FLG has mostly been successful. Its primary mouthpiece (the *Epoch Times*) lacks credibility; its members have been forced underground due to fear of retaliation; and public support for them is weak. However, despite its weakened state, the FLG still remains a viable threat, and receives support from private business interests and hardcore members. As such, the CCP is adamant that it must eliminate them. As mentioned earlier, to prevent embarrassment to visiting CCP leaders, the PRC embassy keeps details of their itinerary secret. It mobilizes pro-Beijing OC organizations to do their utmost to prevent the FLG from making an appearance, or at least attempt to restrict their activities. This demonstrates the CCP’s continued paranoia towards subversive groups (no matter how big or small they may be) in harming its carefully crafted image as a capable regime.

### 7.11 Independence Movements

This classification refers to other pro-independence elements amongst OC groups, such as the Free Tibet or Xinjiang separatist movements. Some of these are active amongst the non-Han minority OC (which number approximately 7 million around the world). Beijing views non-Han OC as part of the wider OC population, but treats them with caution. Throughout China’s modern history, minority groups have been directly linked to China’s national defence of its border regions. The growing influence of Islamic states and religious affiliation in these areas raise concerns that minorities might support claims for independence.

Historically, the manner in which the CCP has dealt with Tibetan and Xinjiang OC shared many similarities with *qiaowu* for returned OC following the Land Reform years. Domestically, between 1950 and 1959, the CCP attempted ‘social reform’ in accordance with the “Agreement on Measures for Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” through a systematic division and weakening of local rule. In addition to military occupation, the CCP worked to cultivate the elite classes of Tibetan society and groomed the younger generations to accept the CCP. These efforts failed, and an
uprising in March 1959 culminated in violence. Over these years, over 110,000 Tibetans had fled to India, Bhutan and Nepal – amongst them the Dalai Lama. In exile, many of them joined resistance movements to rally the masses in the homeland against the CCP, such as the Tibetan Relief Association. Similarly, in 1962, about 50,000 Kazakhs and Xinjiang Uyghers moved to the Soviet Union following PRC efforts to introduce communes and alter nomadic habits. In the late 1960s, because of questions surrounding their loyalty, minority groups in border areas were seen as potentially subversive to Beijing’s interests.  

At the same time, however, non-Han OC possessed attributes that were useful to Chinese authorities – such as their economic, cultural and political advantages. After the US normalized relations with the PRC in 1979, the CCP sought to entice Tibetans to return. A special committee was established, promising to guarantee their religious rights and mobility. They were also offered preferential treatment (such as settlement, financial assistance, and property protection) not unlike the redress offered to other guiqiao of the period. These co-optive efforts were viewed with suspicion and not readily taken up. To Beijing’s chagrin, the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan OC continued to appeal to the UN, elicit sympathy and support for the right to self-determination.

In the contemporary period, the CCP continues to view Tibetan OC and other non-Han OC minority groups (such as the World Uyghur Congress) as a significant threat to China’s national integrity. As in the past, the CCP attempts to manage them by using inclusionist tactics that offer a sense of belonging to the official CCP discourse. This qiaowu effort consists of three main objectives: preventing independent spirit, attacking Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces, and defeating the
Xinjiang independence movement.\textsuperscript{960} In addition, \textit{qiaowu} seeks to prevent separatism and internationalism of these issues by attempting to unite the Uyghur OC for the motherland, and opposing foreign (that is, US) pressure to weaken China.\textsuperscript{961}

7.12 \textbf{Chinese Unity and the Minority OC}

One method is reconnection. The CCP targets minority OC for friendly exchange to raise their ethnic pride and love for China – mostly in the form of sightseeing tours to the mainland that are aimed to evoke a sense of appreciation that China is doing as much for them and their culture as possible.\textsuperscript{962} However, while China showcases cultural diversity amongst the minority OC, it does so in the context of China’s political unity. \textit{Qiaowu} seeks to convert those OC who may not share the same ideology or political direction of Beijing. As mentioned earlier, the leading targets for this kind of conversion are the second and third generation, and in particular, the youth.

Control of language and culture is another strategy to achieve this. For example, \textit{qiaowu} specialists suggest that helping all OC youth to develop facilities in Chinese language is an important part for developing interest in Chinese culture and thereby maintaining unity amongst the diaspora.\textsuperscript{963} While special classes are provided for ethnic minority OC youth to study their own language, OC officials emphasize to them that Mandarin is the key tool of communication in China – particularly in an age of economic growth.\textsuperscript{964} As another example, PRC diplomats stipulate that contestants in the Miss China Global Competition must speak Mandarin instead of other dialects. They have intervened by obstructing entrants of Tibetan and Taiwanese-origin from participation to ensure a clear definition of what they wish to promote as the ideal

\textsuperscript{960} Zhao, \textit{Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu}, 315-323.
\textsuperscript{961} “Dashi pinpai huodong, zengjin shaosu minzu qiaobao dui Zhongguo de liaojie” (Hitting the Right Brand of Activity, Promote Understanding of Ethnic Minority OC Towards China), \textit{Qiaojing}, no. 22 (14 August 2007): 1-9.
\textsuperscript{962} “Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao,” 1-6.
\textsuperscript{964} “Dashi pinpai huodong, zengjin shaosu minzu qiaobao dui Zhongguo de liaojie,” 1-9; “Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao,” 1-6.
interpretation of Chineseness. In short, although their differences are celebrated as part of the PRC cultural fabric, minority OC are to be gradually assimilated into the dominant culture. This strategy follows the same discourse of the Maoist period, in which the Han were representative of the dominant ethnic group to lead China towards economic and cultural development.

This reflects the CCP’s policy of “unity of the nationalities” (minzu tuanjie) amongst the OC. At the Eighth National Congress of Returned OC and their Relatives in July 2009, senior CCP official Wang Zhaoguo called upon delegates to have a “broad understanding of the truth that national unity is a blessing and national separatism a disaster.” Delegates were informed that the violent riots that killed over 200 in Urumqi were caused by outside separatists rather than internal conflict. However, what these OC were told was different from what was actually happening. The CCP treat their Uygher population as being potentially disloyal and hence incite chauvinist sentiment amongst the majority Han Chinese. To fuel these beliefs, the CCP constricts the flow of accurate information and alienates those with grievances.

7.13 Cracking Down on ‘Terrorists’

Where it has been unable to overpower or break down dissident elements, the PRC has resorted to diplomatic pressure by painting Uygher groups abroad as terrorists. In April 2006, Beijing urged the US to “properly handle” Chinese nationals accused of terrorist activity held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba by dealing with suspects in a “prudent, responsible and proper manner.” It advised US authorities to take into consideration Beijing’s “international anti-terrorism co-operation and China-US relations and abide by international law.” While this may have appeared to

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966 Frank Dikotter, “Race in China,” in Nyiri and Breidenbach, China Inside Out, 177-204.

967 “Senior Official Speaks at Congress of Returned Overseas Chinese.”

969 John Garnaut, “Rally Around Flag, China Tells Diaspora.”

demonstrate China’s respect for the international judicial system, it was a veiled attempt to legitimize its crackdown on East Turkistan Islamic Movement terrorists. Following the closing down of the prison camp, Beijing has pressured foreign governments to extradite Uyghers accused of terrorism back to China for trial. In claiming them as part of the Chinese population, Uyghers are to be tried under PRC law. In response to those governments refusing to co-operate (such as Albania for accepting five Uyghers from Guantanamo in 2006) Beijing hit them with diplomatic and economic retaliation.\textsuperscript{971}

As with other potentially subversive OC groups, the CCP has been active in challenging them from the grass roots to the highest levels of government. Efforts work from both inside and outside these movements, and feature co-optive and coercive methods implemented by both the qiaowu administration and other relevant ministries. Intelligence reports cited that MSS authorities were active in inciting dissension amongst Uygher OC in an effort to break down their movement from within.\textsuperscript{972} In the public arena, the CCP has attempted to isolate the Uygher cause. The Olympic Torch rallies of 2008 showed how masses of pro-Beijing OC could successfully shout down its rivals. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, various efforts sought to prevent the screening of a documentary highlighting the movement at the 2009 Melbourne Film Festival. The CCP’s efforts to influence public opinion have mostly been criticized for obstructing freedom of speech – but in many cases, it has certainly managed to influence those concerned about damaging its relationship with Beijing. For example, the University of Auckland (a Confucius Institute partner) initially cancelled a visit by Uygher leader Rebiyah Kadeer citing security concerns.\textsuperscript{973}

### 7.14 Conclusion

Beijing has been largely successful with containing threats to the CCP. By 2008, the pro-democratic and Taiwanese pro-independence amongst the OC had been largely subverted or discredited, and remained only a simmering cause of concern. Patriotic

re-education and peaceful reunification efforts since 1989 had ensured that many xingqiao and PRC students were supportive of the CCP regime. Moreover, the KMT demonstrated a conciliatory approach towards Beijing by ending its support for anti-China and other independence movements.

However, there were other OC groups that remained a threat, such as the FLG, the Tibetan and Xinjiang independence movements. In many cases they had widespread public support, or at least the potential to cause significant embarrassment to the CCP. At a critical period for China’s re-emergence on the international stage, the 2008 Olympic hosts were basing their image and legitimacy upon national unity amongst its people. A variety of inclusive, persuasive, or aggressive efforts were stepped up in order to make this claim. In most cases, the CCP were unsuccessful with these methods, and resorted instead to mobilizing thousands of young supporters in an overwhelming show of patriotism.

Despite these pockets of resistance amongst the OC, there is no single co-ordinated effort that can effectively challenge the CCP. There is no doubt that this is a result of the surge in OC nationalism, feelings of ethnographic unity, and positive feelings for a rising China – all facilitated by intensive qiaowu efforts over the years. Constant monitoring of the situation is still required. By seeking to align OC with the CCP discourse through persuasion and influence while respecting their beliefs, qiaowu methods have become well-established within these targeted populations. For others less willing to do so, attempts to cultivate them for China’s interests continue to expand and strengthen, but face significant obstacles that cannot be resolved by carrots and sticks alone.
8.00 External Work: Diplomatic Assistance

Having explained the methodology and reasoning behind how the CCP has dealt with various OC groups and the challenges it faces, this next section investigates *qiaowu* as a developing and expanding process for dealing with the mass movement of new OC groups. Beijing’s relationship and policies with the OC has expanded in accordance with OC migration over recent decades. According to the Migration Policy Institute, there were 12.7 million OC in the 1960s, 22 million in 1985, and by early 2000 there were 33 million.\(^{974}\) ROC OCAC statistics from 2005 revealed a total in excess of 38 million.\(^{975}\) A 2008 report by the China News Agency showed that the global population of ethnic Chinese and PRC nationals living outside of China totaled 48 million.\(^{976}\) According to analysts, another 30 million Chinese citizens travel or work abroad each year – and this figure is expected to increase to 100 million by 2020.\(^{977}\)

This chapter examines the developments and breakthroughs for China’s consular affairs, and demonstrates how and why the CCP has enlarged its embrace and protection of the OC. While it has achieved various successes in protecting the OC, Beijing accords consular assistance only on a selective basis. This chapter shows that the CCP carefully balances regional concerns and promoting its desired international image against advancing its relationship with the OC, and explains how it has dealt with this predicament.

8.01 The PRC and Its Protection of the OC

*Qiaowu* is constantly subject to diplomatic rivalry with Taipei, China’s national interests and regional suspicions. Throughout the latter half of the 20\(^{th}\) century, Beijing appeared to put the interests of the OC behind its desire for international recognition. This was a strategic move to relieve itself of the OC “problem.” OC affairs were publicly downgraded as part of its détente efforts with Southeast Asia and

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\(^{975}\) The OCAC maintains accurate statistics based on decades of regularly updated research, empirical surveys, quantitative data from official census results, and reports from diplomatic staff. Government Information Office of ROC, *Taiwan Year Book 2004*; de Vienne, “For a Tentative Modelization of the Economic Weight of Overseas Chinese at the Beginning of the 3rd Millenium.”

\(^{976}\) “2008 huayi baogao.”

\(^{977}\) “Protect Our Compatriots,” *China Daily*, 26 April 2007, 10.
the OC were encouraged to assimilate and co-operate locally – indicating to the world that they had shed their political links with the mainland. Measures included recommending local investment and co-operation with local business instead of emphasizing remittance and foreign investment; and refraining from holding elections amongst OC as representatives in the National People’s Congress. See Skinner, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,” 136-147, 298.

Geo-political circumstances have always played a major role in influencing Beijing’s treatment of the OC. For example, in 1959, anti-Chinese/anti-communist feeling spurred the Indonesian government to pass anti-alien legislation so that ethnic Chinese and their property were open to seizure. Nearly 100,000 OC fled to China to escape the violence. Beijing did not directly criticize Jakarta, as it was a leftist ally at the time. Instead, it attempted to resolve the situation through quiet diplomacy, urging thousands to return to China where they could participate in “socialist reconstruction.” The PRC OCAC supported the decision to receive all returned overseas Chinese, no matter how many there were. Beijing sent naval vessels to repatriate them.

When the new anti-Beijing Suharto regime moved to destroy the ethnic Chinese-dominated Indonesian Communist Party (ICP) in 1965, Beijing again decided to use the OC issue to send political signals. It wasted no time in demanding Jakarta protect the OC and again dispatched ships to collect them. This action caused Southeast Asian nations to believe that China was still championing the cause of the OC – despite the 1955 Bandung agreement. Only 10,000 ethnic Chinese chose to leave on this occasion, as most preferred to stay as Indonesian-Chinese. Relations between Beijing and Jakarta continued to deteriorate. In 1966, Beijing closed down the three main consulates in Indonesia, recalled its ambassador, and cancelled

978 Measures included recommending local investment and co-operation with local business instead of emphasizing remittance and foreign investment; and refraining from holding elections amongst OC as representatives in the National People’s Congress. See Skinner, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,” 136-147, 298.


economic aid; moreover, it reversed all previous foreign policy. In 1967 when
Beijing endorsed the Maoist line of the ICP, it suspended diplomatic ties altogether.

The Bandung Treaty was repealed in 1969, leaving the status of millions of
Indonesian ethnic Chinese in question. Countries in the region had developed their
own citizenship laws and the OC were under pressure from host governments to
formalize their citizenship.\textsuperscript{983} China’s priority was to advance normalization, and
hence it continued to play down its ties with the OC and publicly encouraged their
integration. During this period, Beijing made it clear that it considered ethnic Chinese
without PRC nationality to be outside the jurisdiction of PRC policy, and not its
responsibility.\textsuperscript{984} Only those OC who were registered with China as legitimate
\textit{huaqiao} would receive protection by PRC embassies.\textsuperscript{985}

In 1973 Beijing announced that it had abolished its special bureau for OC activities
and explained to the OC that they should be loyal to their country of residence.\textsuperscript{986}
Zhou Enlai repeated that the PRC would continue to oppose the KMT policy of dual
nationality, would encourage agreements on the nationality of OC, and would
promulgate a law that gave OC of foreign citizenship no claim to PRC nationality.\textsuperscript{987}
Likewise, during a National Day celebration that year, Deng Xiaoping added that he
“approved” of the decision for the OC to acquire foreign citizenship.\textsuperscript{988}

Eager to restore relations with Jakarta in 1973, China chose not to intervene during
anti-Chinese rioting in Bandung, with \textit{Xinhua} issuing only one late report without
criticism of the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{989} Beijing made it clear that it had severed
all ties to the OC. A 1974 \textit{South China Morning Post} editorial reaffirmed that Beijing
had set itself apart from ethnic Chinese communities and renounced guerilla

\textsuperscript{983} Mansingh, “Beijing and the Overseas Chinese,” 318-319, 321.
\textsuperscript{984} "Tong Miandian Naiwen de tanhua,” 44; “Yu Malaixiya zongli tebie guwen Mohaer de tanhua”
(Conversation with Special Advisor to the Malaysian Prime Minister Mohaer) 19 November 1972 in
\textsuperscript{985} “Huijian Maerjashen waijiaohuzhang Laqilaka de tanhua (Conversation from Meeting with
Madagascan Foreign Minister Ratsiraka)” 6 November 1972, ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{986} US Embassy Jakarta, “Foreign Minister Malik’s Weekly Press Conference,” State Department cable
\textsuperscript{987} Wang, \textit{Qiaowu chunqiu}, 18-22.
\textsuperscript{988} US Consulate Hong Kong, “Beijing on Overseas Chinese Taiwan,” State Department cable to US
\textsuperscript{989} US Consulate Hong Kong, “Beijing and the Overseas Chinese.”
organizations that operated under PRC support. Beijing signed agreements not to recognize dual citizenship with Malaysia in 1974 and the Philippines and Thailand in 1975.\textsuperscript{990} However, as always, Beijing did not cut humanitarian links by adding it could not be expected to eschew comment or unclassified action through international channels in cases where Chinese minorities were subjected to unreasonable or discriminatory measures.\textsuperscript{991}

During the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing continued to act according to political sensitivities or logistical practicality, and not for the protection of the OC. For example, it was reluctant to involve itself in the deportation of ethnic Chinese Vietnamese from Hong Kong in 1974.\textsuperscript{992} Similarly, when the Pol Pot regime persecuted and killed hundreds of thousands of OC in Kampuchea (Cambodia), it offered little acknowledgement. Beijing preferred to seek the support of the Khmer Rouge instead of an increasingly hostile pro-Moscow Hanoi.\textsuperscript{993}

In 1976, Hanoi again attempted to register the OC as Vietnamese or else subject them to discriminative measures if they retained their ROC citizenship.\textsuperscript{994} The PRC claimed that Hanoi had unilaterally violated a 1955 agreement between the CCP and the Vietnamese Workers’ Party.\textsuperscript{995} Following anti-ethnic Chinese activity in 1978,\textsuperscript{996} Beijing argued that “the Vietnamese authorities have now returned evil for good by using despicable means to persecute Chinese and evict them en masse.”\textsuperscript{997} It dispatched ships with capacity for 5000 evacuees, but this time, almost quarter of a

\textsuperscript{990} Chen, Gongmin shouce.

\textsuperscript{991} US Consulate Hong Kong, “Media Reaction – China’s Relations with her Neighbours,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974HONGK06255, 4 June 1974.


\textsuperscript{994} When Vietnam sought to forcibly naturalize OC in 1955 and 1956, Taipei protested this move as a violation of the UN Charter. However, both the UN and US were not supportive of Taiwan’s demand that these OC be given right of free choice to determine their nationality. In 1957 Taipei declared that all Vietnamese OC unwilling to accept local citizenship were eligible to resettle in Taiwan. Over 52,000 registered, but only 3000 were able to leave because of Hanoi’s unco-operative attitude.


\textsuperscript{996} Chang, “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy,” 291-296, 301; Lamont, “China’s Emerging Overseas Chinese Policy in the Late 1970s.”

\textsuperscript{997} “Beijing Uses Overseas Chinese for Political Aims,” 1-4.
million OC wanted to leave. However, Beijing could not agree on the terms of repatriation. As a result, the vessels were moored outside Vietnamese territorial waters for several weeks, and ultimately recalled. Moreover, China declined to respond to the matter of 26,000 OC refugees who had escaped from Cambodia. In July 1978, Beijing closed the borders to Yunnan and Guangxi to Vietnamese refugees. China did accept boatpeople on Hainan Island and in Guangdong, housing them in special camps. However, because of its weak economic and political position in the late 1970s, Beijing could offer no more than lip service and rhetoric, having little practical capability to halt abuses against the ethnic Chinese.

Throughout the 1980s, renewed anti-Chinese activity in Indonesia, Mongolia and Rangoon all met with a weak response from Beijing. OC affairs appeared to have been put aside. It was not until 1990 that relations between Beijing and Jakarta resumed. In a series of meetings in 1992 to determine the status of 300,000 ethnic Chinese (which included those who had resided in Indonesia for decades, illegal migrants, and others who wanted to leave during the 1960s but could not due to insufficient space on the ships sent to repatriate them) the PRC offered to provide them with Chinese passports. At the same time, Indonesian minister of justice Ismael Saleh allowed those who had lived in Indonesia to become naturalized citizens.

Despite this breakthrough, qiaowu remained unsteady throughout an extended period of ethnic tension throughout Southeast Asia. It was clear that Beijing wanted to clearly separate huaqiao from huaren affairs, but its behaviour often ended up in contradictory circumstances. For example, in April 1994, Beijing demanded Jakarta take appropriate steps to protect those OC caught up in riots in Medan. However, only months later, Jiang Zemin promised Indonesian authorities that China would never use the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia for its own political or economic

998 Vietnam did not oppose the ships being sent, but only permitted Hoa (those Vietnamese of Chinese origin or ethnic Chinese of Vietnamese nationality) listed by Vietnamese authorities to leave.
1001 Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu.
gain. Then in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis in February 1998, observers noted that locals placed blame on the OC for an increase in basic commodity prices. The Indonesian government did not condone the popular resentment, nor did it condemn it. Beijing was also silent, preferring not to jeopardize its warming relationship with Jakarta.

As part of its official duty, Beijing is responsible only for the safety of PRC citizens. Under Articles 50, 70, 89 of the current PRC Constitution, its embassies are responsible for protecting the legitimate rights of Chinese nationals residing abroad, and the rights and interests of returned OC. In other words, Beijing officially extends diplomatic protection only to huaqiao (that is, those carrying Chinese passports, and compatriots from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.) While reports noted that the PRC embassy was quietly assisting its nationals on a case-by-case basis, Beijing publicly declared that the violence in Indonesia was a domestic issue and would not intervene. China maintained that governments should treat ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality as citizens of their domicile – any action that would suggest otherwise might provoke suspicions of interference in the region.

8.02 1998 Indonesian Riots: A Turning Point in OC Affairs

In May 1998, 1200 OC were killed, dozens of OC women raped, and properties torched as the Suharto regime ended. Beijing was slow to react, and by making only a brief mention in the state controlled media, it did not have to address it as a matter of

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1002 “Jiang on Overseas Chinese,” Xinhua, 18 November 1994 as noted by Bolt, China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese, 124.
foreign policy. Those who tried to protest were rendered silent, and any news coverage quickly suppressed. Beijing referred to ethnic Chinese as “members of the Indonesian family,” whom it had no obligation to protect. China had to distance its sentimental and ethnic connection with the huaren diaspora, and show that it stood by its policy to separate them from huaqiao. As King and Melvin have argued, identity politics more often than not concerned politics rather than identity. Competing visions of policy direction and domestic power struggles trumped any putative duty that Beijing might have felt towards those foreigners with shared language and culture.

This inaction resulted in a massive public outcry amongst the world’s OC. Both domestic Chinese and the OC elsewhere felt that China (or Taiwan in some cases) had to take responsibility over the issue. Demonstrations outside PRC embassies and Taiwanese representative offices indicated that the OC wanted these governments to intervene on their behalf. Finally on 3 August 1998, PRC foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan indicated the PRC’s official concern by saying that China was closely monitoring the actions of Indonesian authorities, demanding that they make investigation, and take effective measures for the protection and safety of ethnic Chinese and their interests. This was only a cautious response, given that the majority

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1008 The CCP did not allow protests, resulting in the expulsion of three Beijing University students who demonstrated outside the Indonesian embassy; posters of the only newspaper that published a story on the riots were torn down. Beijing was “unnaturally silent during this period.” Anne-Marie Brady, personal communication with author, Christchurch, 14 April 2007. See also Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 52.
1009 Beijing stated it would not protest or arrange evacuation because “there is no good reason to do so as the majority of the Chinese in Indonesia are Indonesian citizens.” The Chinese ambassador to Indonesia added “it was the responsibility of the Indonesian Government to protect its own citizens, including the citizens of Chinese descent.” Chen Shiqiu quoted from “Dubes RRC Sesalkan Terjadinya Perkosaan Saat Kerusuhan,” (PRC’s Ambassador Deplores Raping During Riots) Suara Pembaruan, 7 July 1998 as noted by Leo Suryadinata, “China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development,” in ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects, eds. Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun and China Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 361-362; Ruan Ci Shan, “Zhongguo zai Yinni luanjuzhong jintui liangnan,” (China is in a Dilemma in Turbulent Indonesia), Lianhe zaobao, 25 February 1998.
1013 Vatikiotis, Forney and Dolven, “Compatriot Games,” 23.
of the OC had Indonesian citizenship. Soon after, an editorial in the *People’s Daily* called for Jakarta to punish those responsible and protect the safety and property of Chinese. Other papers followed with similar reports, and non-government organizations and student groups were finally able to voice their opinion. While China was now comfortable with making the Indonesian riots a public issue, the extent of the concern remained vocal. There was no effort to send vessels, arrange evacuation or demonstrate direct diplomacy with Jakarta – ethnic Chinese had to fend for themselves. While this strategy worked to persuade Indonesian leaders that Beijing was becoming more pragmatic and non-interventionist, the OC remained frustrated that they had received no assistance or support at all. How would Beijing maintain sentimental connections with its diaspora in this antagonistic environment?

As pressure mounted from around the globe, a significant turning point in *qiaowu* policy took place. Since the debacle following the Indonesian riots of 1998, Beijing has demonstrated a surge of confidence in bringing all ethnic Chinese directly into the fold of PRC affairs, with an “international moral obligation to try and protect Chinese people overseas.” The early 2000s saw a comprehensive reassessment of how Beijing would respond to the OC when caught in trouble. During this period, China’s economic situation was increasingly sound, and it was gaining confidence in the international arena as a regional power.

As such, Beijing does not necessarily abandon OC of foreign nationality in times of distress. On several occasions during 2006, diplomatic assistance was extended to non-PRC citizens as a matter of humanitarian aid. Diplomats maintained that although it would prefer not to see instability around the world, China had a “responsibility” to assist the “sons and daughters of the yellow emperor” as part of the “motherland.” More importantly, the DPP’s rise to power in 2000 meant Taipei

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1018 Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive*, 123.
1019 Zhang Yunling (academic at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) as quoted by Vatikiotis, Forney and Dolven, *Compatriot Games*, 23.
1020 Zhang Yuanyuan (PRC Ambassador to New Zealand), address to NZCA, 16 June 2007, Wellington.
had revised its attitudes towards the OC to favour Taiqiao. In this context of political rivalry, Beijing recognized and seized another vital opportunity to reach out to the OC.

8.03 ROC Protection for OC

The ROC once openly extended diplomatic assistance to anyone of ethnic Chinese descent under the principle of *jus sanguinis*. For example, it helped OC in Korea in 1950, transported 40,000 OC from North to South Vietnam in 1954-55, and repatriated 3000 Vietnamese OC in 1957. This policy shifted in the 1960s and early 1970s when the ROC’s increasingly weakened diplomatic position rendered it powerless to offer any practical assistance. In Malaysia, South Vietnam and the Philippines (where Taipei placed priority on preserving friendly relations) the ROC failed to protect OC interests altogether – in particular the issue of repatriation. Taipei had also recognized the OC “problem”, and insisted to Southeast Asian nations that its policy of continued ties with the OC was a “mistake.” Taipei noted that the PRC was gaining favour amongst these nations by encouraging OC allegiance to their host country, and therefore it should do the same."1021 This was evident when Vietnamese refugees sought to enter Taiwan during the late 1970s and early 1980s."1022

At the same time, Taipei was in heated rivalry with Beijing for support from the OC for its political survival. In late 1979, a propaganda magazine announced that the ROC had accepted and resettled more than 11,000 refugees, and donated over 30,000 tonnes of rice."1023 In October 1982, an OCAC meeting resolved to make closer and frequent contact with Vietnamese OC."1024 While there was a prerogative for Taipei to protect legal ROC nationals abroad, there was also a humanitarian obligation to assist

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1021 Of the 1.6 million non-resident Chinese in Indonesia, only 66 held ROC passports; the remainder were either stateless or held PRC passports. US Embassy Jakarta, “ROC and Indonesia,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974JAKART06903, 6 June 1974; Suryadinata, *China and the ASEAN States*, 63.
overseas huaren, huaqiao and laoqiao communities. In such cases, the ROC OCAC has donated money and offered credit loans to the OC victims of natural disaster and rioting.

However, between 2000 and 2008, DPP concerns dictated Taiwan’s OC policy. During that period, Taiwanese government channels asserted that it offered humanitarian aid regardless of political background and there was no official instruction to differentiate between OC of Taiwanese origin and others. This was in contradiction to what was actually happening. Diplomatic support would be extended to Taiqiao or those OC with strong Taiwan connections, while other ethnic Chinese were assisted only in times of extreme crisis, and then only at the discretion of local representatives. With diplomatic appointments granted on pro-DPP affiliations, diplomats were hesitant in taking unpopular action that showed them to be anything else but distinctly Taiwanese. For example, while it had assisted “so-called ethnic Chinese” during the 2000 SI riots, priority was given to ROC nationals. During that event, Taipei was careful not to overstate the situation and did not acknowledge the need to assist – only to “stand by” in the event of a more serious incident. It denied an evacuation was necessary, and only acted to register and move some OC to a temporary refuge. The ROC OCAC claimed otherwise, saying that it was willing to help PRC citizens find emergency shelter, and enlisted the help of Taiwan’s naval fleet (coincidentally docked in Honiara on a friendship visit) for emergency

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1025 The ROC Constitution mandates the protection of the rights and interests of its citizens residing abroad, including economic, cultural and educational undertakings. Government Information Office of ROC, Taiwan Year Book 2004.
1027 “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons.”
1028 John Chen (TECO representative to New Zealand) communication with Anne-Marie Brady, 1 May 2007.
1029 OCAC commissioner, personal communication with author, Christchurch, June 2007.
1030 In June 2000, SI Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu was taken hostage by rebel forces and key installations seized during an attempted coup. Riots quickly ensued. A Taiwanese official commented that while Beijing and Taipei should not be at odds over OC affairs, there was little likelihood of diplomatic co-operation due to poor cross-strait relations. Chen Jung-chieh (Former Deputy Secretary of the Straits Exchange Foundation) as quoted in “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons.”
evacuation out of humanitarian concern.\footnote{1033} This highlighted the conflicting attitudes held by the OCAC and DPP government towards the OC.

In that instance, the vessels left promptly on 8 June 2000 with only seven ROC nationals aboard. This was not because the evacuation had been suspended, but because the naval squadron was asked to leave by SI opposition, arguing the visit might be perceived as military and moral support for the standing government.\footnote{1034} Again, politics took precedence over assisting the OC in times of trouble. Following Taipei’s line, the navy downplayed the crisis, noting that the situation was not as tense as reported.\footnote{1035} Taiwanese authorities explained that things had calmed down, and about 50 expatriates and 600 ethnic Chinese “wanted to stay.”\footnote{1036} A similar situation occurred in 2006, which will be examined in detail below. The DPP stance towards consular assistance towards non-Taiwanese was apparent, and further damaged the estranged relationship with the OC.

It would be unfair to say that the embassy was unwilling to offer any help at all, as concerned individuals from Taiwan’s consular staff visited victims of the 2006 Honiara riots.\footnote{1037} They were not as heartless as made out by the PRC media (see below), but their demonstration of sympathy was too little too late. For the majority of OC, not only did they feel neglected, they felt ROC consular staff had acted arrogantly towards them.\footnote{1038}

There were several explanations for such treatment. Firstly, Taiwan lacked the necessary capacity to assist. ROC officials explained there were limitations to what Taipei could do for PRC nationals, given its isolation from the wider diplomatic

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\item \footnote{1033} “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons.”
\item \footnote{1034} “Oppo – Taiwan,” SI Broadcasting Corporation, 8 June 2000.
\item \footnote{1037} ROC embassy staff often assisted non-ROC OC in a private capacity, such as donating towards medical costs of victims. OC residents, personal communication with author, Honiara, 9 September 2007.
\item \footnote{1038} While the relationship with the ROC embassy was good (with financial support for Double Ten celebrations) since the 1990s, this declined significantly during the DPP years. Some complained that they had difficulty getting multiple entry visas to Taiwan and had a cool relationship with the ROC embassy. Local OC leaders, personal communication with author, Honiara, 9 September 2007. See also “Jewelry Dealer Felt ‘Neglected’,” \textit{Solomon Star}, 2 May 2006.
\end{itemize}
community and the mainland itself. Even Taiwanese nationals have been known to seek help from the PRC embassy instead of Taiwan’s representative office when it was unable to provide assistance. In other cases, diplomats may be unwilling or unable to assist Taiqiao. Furthermore, under the DPP, PRC refugees could not be taken to Taiwan nor airlifted directly to the mainland under travel restrictions at the time. Even if they were relocated to Taiwan, diplomats had no idea what to do with them, or for how long before they could be sent back. If they chose to offer assistance, it would set a precedent. Countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan tend to be poor and administered by unstable governments, and there could be expectations that such assistance be rendered time and time again. Thus when the ROC embassy in Honiara was advised of the arrival of PRC diplomats coming to help in April 2006, it raised no objection.

Secondly, ROC diplomats have mostly offered to help the OC when there was political value in doing so. For example, in 2003, the ROC ambassador in the Marshall Islands gave PRC dissident Xu Bo a work permit and employment from a Taiwanese company. During the 2000 Fijian coup, it was Taiwan that first offered to evacuate Chinese nationals. Yet in April 2006 Taiwan quickly distanced itself from the ethnic Chinese connection and any political interference in the SI, claiming that there were only two Taiwanese businesses and both were unaffected by the rioting. Rather than expressing humanitarian concern, its official press release focused on the fear that SI politicians might switch to Beijing. The statement came over a week after the incident, and only after pro-Taipei prime minister Snyder

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1040 Several Taiwanese OC made an official protest to the embassy for lack of assistance. Local OC leaders, personal conversation with author, Honiara, 9 September 2007.
Rini stepped down and rival Manasseh Sogavare threatened to shift ties if he was elected.\textsuperscript{1047} Taiwan was in the Pacific region to challenge China for zero-sum diplomatic survival; hence its foreign policy interests took precedence ahead of any OC concerns. In light of the DPP’s ambivalent response towards the OC, the CCP promptly stepped in to pursue its strategy to capture their hearts and minds.

\textbf{8.04 Modern PRC Diplomatic Protection}

Following the lessons learnt in 1998, Beijing revised its policy from non-interference to one of active assistance and protection of the OC. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, it recognized the public relations value of providing diplomatic assistance to the OC, and seized upon the first of many opportunities when riots broke out in the SI in 2000. In that instance, Chinese authorities arranged to take 116 PRC nationals to Guangzhou, while others were airlifted with Australian and NZ assistance.\textsuperscript{1048} Beijing wasted no time in proclaiming that this evacuation “fully demonstrated the care from the Party and the government to the overseas Chinese compatriots.”\textsuperscript{1049} Similarly, riots in Central Kalimantan and Riau in Indonesia during 2001 sparked an immediate response.\textsuperscript{1050} In every case, Beijing has demanded local governments ensure the life, property and safety of “OC and foreign citizens of Chinese origin” during times of crisis.\textsuperscript{1051} Where it was once cautious not to cause suspicions, these developments reflected Beijing’s growing sense of confidence in the international arena.

In 2004, attacks on Chinese workers in Afghanistan provided the impetus for China to protect its nationals working overseas as a “new subject for the Chinese government

\textsuperscript{1049} Yang Jiechi (PRC Vice Foreign Minister) as quoted in “Efforts in Evacuating Chinese Nationals in Solomons Praised,” \textit{People’s Daily}, 7 January 2001,
\textsuperscript{1050} Zhang Qiyue (PRC MFA spokeswoman) as quoted in “China Hopes Indonesia to Protect Ethnic Chinese from Riots,” \textit{Xinhua}, 27 February 2001,
and its foreign policy.” Since then, China’s diplomatic work has moved from “purely handling affairs between governments to enhancing the maintenance of overseas Chinese people’s interests.” For example, it increased security spending and international co-operation to protect the OC from kidnapping, terrorist threats and natural disaster. In addition, diplomatic staff received special training on effective planning, communication, co-ordination and international information exchange regarding the OC. Beijing accelerated relevant legislative processes by ratifying the Convention on the Safety of United Nationals and Associated Personnel. It followed this by establishing a special Department of External Security Affairs, consisting of 140 staff in Beijing and over 600 consular officials overseas. It is now the biggest department in the PRC MFA and is responsible for making, co-ordinating and managing policy recommendations and implementation, guiding the operations of PRC diplomatic missions and managing the activities of foreign non-government organizations in China.

To handle the affairs of a steadily increasing number of OC traveling abroad and requiring assistance, the MFA established a Division of Consular Protection in 2006 (and later upgraded it to a Consular Protection Centre in 2007). In addition, a special ‘emergency response office’ was also set up to deal with urgent OC issues. With such infrastructure in place, the PRC has the capability to monitor OC affairs all throughout the world – in particular matters concerning anti-Chinese sentiment or...
natural disaster. Moreover, the PRC is prepared to go “all out” to protect the OC from racism, harassment and damage to property.\textsuperscript{1059}

In April 2006, the PRC put these measures into action.\textsuperscript{1060} Hundreds of ethnic Chinese (including SI citizens, old and new migrants) had fled to Honiara’s Rove Police station for protection as angry rioters torched their homes and businesses. When the ROC embassy was unwilling to offer assistance, an OC leader made a direct telephone call to GOCAO director Lu Weixiong, and briefed him on the situation.\textsuperscript{1061} Beijing authorized a launch of the “emergency response mechanism” (a co-ordinated system comprising of direct diplomatic aid from various regional governments and agencies).\textsuperscript{1062} PRC diplomats went to investigate and provide further assistance.\textsuperscript{1063} Local OC greeted them with large red banners proclaiming “PRC Ambassador, You Have Finally Come!” and “Welcome Our Heroes to Save Us!!”\textsuperscript{1064} – clearly indicating their sincere support for the PRC and venting their frustrations towards Taiwan. The OC then promptly announced they wanted China to send a plane to pick them up.\textsuperscript{1065} Despite more half of them being SI citizens,\textsuperscript{1066} a diplomat said their livelihoods were “finished” and so they “had to go.”\textsuperscript{1067} The Guangdong government gladly responded. In addition to Chinese nationals and Hong

\textsuperscript{1059} “Guard Citizens Overseas,” 4.  
\textsuperscript{1060} For a complete commentary of the SI events from the qiaowu perspective, see the special edition of Qiaoqing jianbao (Overseas Chinese Affairs Bulletin) 29 May 2006.  
Kong citizens, foreign-born OC and foreign citizens of Chinese descent, and “any Chinese people on the islands who want to come back” all received help under clear instructions from officials. This demonstrated convincingly that Beijing was prepared to assist all ethnic Chinese, no matter what their nationality.

Once back in China, evacuees were welcomed by a special workgroup comprising of MFA officials, Ministry of Public Security, OCAO, and Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. According to SI OC, evacuees were accommodated in hotels, given their own mobile phone with $RMB1000 of free calling, and medical checks. Those repatriated to Hong Kong were given additional $HK8000 and offers of accommodation at a resort. Additional privileges included access to local education for the children of evacuees, while those without travel documents were allowed exit back to the SI at any time to rebuild their lives. In addition, Guangdong authorities gave visa extensions and assistance with finding work to those OC with SI passports.

In November 2006, the same process occurred again following riots aimed at OC in Nuku’alofa, Tonga. 37 OC holding Tongan passports initially sought help from the PRC embassy, but were told it could only help its own nationals. They then moved onto the NZ High Commission residency. Staff members there were reluctant to help, stating that they could assist only Samoan, British and NZ, but not Tongan nationals. Salvation Army officers subsequently arranged their escape to an outlying village. Finally, the PRC ambassador later had a change of mind, and agreed to

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1072 Michael McBryde (NZ High Commissioner to Tonga), interview by author, Nuku’alofa, 28 August 2007.
take them in. Embassy officials later reaffirmed that while diplomatic assistance was normally only extended to its own nationals, ethnic Chinese remained tongbao (compatriots) and therefore part of the Chinese ‘family’. In both these instances, China’s consular assistance was a full-scale effort to embrace and reclaim all the OC both physically and emotionally. The amount of resources put into achieving this result was unprecedented, and demonstrates a significant push to raise China’s consular protection to a whole new level. When compared with its response to the Indonesian riots of 1998, this abrupt turn in China’s qiaowu policy reflected the desire to restore a tangible bond with the OC. Beijing wanted to demonstrate that it could and would assist the OC; to ensure their gratitude, loyalty and support for the CCP; and more importantly, to quash any remnants of support for Taipei’s independence effort that may have existed amongst them.

These efforts were not limited to those being evacuated, but extended to OC all around the world. For example, in the SI case, the OC Chinese language media was fully mobilized to spur on nationalism and patriotism by detailing China’s prowess, capability and benevolence as a responsible “people first” (waijiao weimin) power while criticizing Taipei’s failure to respond. Pro-Beijing media attacked Taipei for its reluctance to send help, accusing it of “selfishness and cold-bloodedness” in drawing political boundaries by offering aid to Taiwanese but not other ethnic Chinese. Another paper suggested that Taiwan had a hand in directing the rioting towards rival PRC Chinese as a means of political warfare. A PRC publication

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distributed amongst SI OC criticized Taiwan for its weak diplomatic response, and how this resulted in widespread denouncement from OC all over the world.\textsuperscript{1079} To boost its own image, OC newspapers published photographs of busy PRC embassy staff exercising “the state power for the benefit of the people”\textsuperscript{1080} together with orchestrated pictures of smiling evacuees holding pre-arranged colourful banners, waving red flags and flowers.\textsuperscript{1081} Chinese sources openly acknowledged these measures were to “prop up the “national pride and dignity of those who have been assisted.”\textsuperscript{1082}

At the height of chequebook rivalry in the Pacific region, Beijing went to great lengths to demonize the DPP government while elevating itself in the eyes of the OC. This was particularly important in the SI, which held official relations with Taipei. In this case, the OC community provided a strategic source of support for a switch in recognition. Moreover, a growing OC community in the Pacific (and accordingly a rise in ethnic tensions in the region) meant that Beijing had to pay increased attention to the OC and manage their affairs in its best interests. In these examples, qiaowu had moved beyond offering humanitarian assistance, and advanced inherent political and psychological objectives as well.

From the aftermath of ethnic rioting during 2006, the CCP had learnt many new lessons for consular protection. First was the realization that the OC were actively looking towards Beijing for assistance in times of trouble. Secondly, as China’s presence grew around the world, and as the OC population increased and diversified, China’s consular work would be increasingly focused upon OC affairs. In these contexts, qiaowu specialists recommended that PRC diplomats to increase their co-ordination with qiaowu agencies.\textsuperscript{1083} For example, diplomats were instructed to advise OC and companies in trouble to develop closer contacts with the Chinese

\textsuperscript{1079} GOCAO, \textit{Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi}…(From Speaking of the Burning of Chinatown…) (Guangzhou: Guangdong qiaoban, 2006), 24.
\textsuperscript{1080} Li Yongran, “Shenye, jinji che qiao jinxingzhong…”(In the Middle of the Night, Emergency Evacuation of Overseas Chinese Takes Place…), \textit{New Zealand Mirror}, 21 April 2006.
embassy and consulates, and unite for better self-protection. In doing so, it was clear that Beijing intended to assert itself as the leading force for OC protection – not the local authorities, police, or their own OC associations. Evacuation and consular assistance served as another important platform for the CCP in winning the hearts and minds of the OC.

8.05 The Limits of PRC Consular Assistance

Despite the success of generating support from the OC, there were major ramifications for qiaowu if such rescue efforts were to occur again. Months after the 2006 Honiara riots, one diplomat publicly praised China’s evacuation of OC as a “successful practice” and that the PRC was “better prepared as time goes by.” His words were an attempt to place a positive spin on what was viewed quite differently back in Beijing. Qiaowu officials maintained that the “emergency response mechanism” was only a stop-gap measure, and something China would rather not activate. They were concerned that locals would view the OC as outsiders if they continued to receive help from China. In turn, these ethnic tensions would hinder China’s own state-to-state relations.

Secondly, these qiaowu officials argued that consular protection took up extensive resources, manpower and co-ordination, and also set into motion a culture of expectation for diplomatic assistance amongst the OC in times of trouble. Moreover, it was a costly exercise, and sometimes abused. Some “refugees” from the Honiara riots stayed at the Rove Police Shelter purely for show – ensuring that their plight was covered by the media, then packing up and going to their friend’s house for the evening, rather than endure the crowded conditions. Others simply abused the hospitality that was offered. Similar events occurred in Nuku’alofa where the PRC embassy was overflowing with OC riot victims.

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1086 GOCAO, Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi…., 17-30.
1087 Various OC residents, interviews by author, Honiara and Nuku’alofa, September 2007.
Another aspect surrounding consular assistance was how Beijing could dispense it without attracting criticism or suspicion. Since 2000, PRC evacuation efforts have been on a relatively small scale of less than 500 persons, and from small isolated countries lacking adequate resources. These factors reduced logistical concerns over transport, resettling and international scrutiny. A large-scale operation elsewhere might have met a different response. For example, China would be hesitant to offer evacuation in a developed Western country, or countries with large numbers of OC – both legal and illegal. For example, there are reportedly up to 30,000 ethnic Chinese in Fiji and thousands living in PNG. In June 2009, the OC were the targets of riots in Port Moresby. In that instance, the PRC embassy decided that an evacuation was not necessary. Diplomats explained that the local government had the necessary capability for containing the unrest and to protect those at risk. An evacuation had the potential to expose China’s illegal migration problem. In other cases where the extraction of large populations might be required, dispatching PLA naval vessels would send uncomfortable signals of battleship diplomacy into the region and therefore compromise China’s attempt to promote a friendly and benevolent image.

This indicates the limits to Beijing’s stance on consular assistance. Although the PRC has a duty to protect its nationals abroad, and despite its eagerness to reclaim the OC as its own, China still remains selective on how it responds to those in trouble, and then only on a case-by-case basis. For example, PRC officials are unwilling to offer help to those OC perceived as a liability – particularly those involved in labour disputes or embarrassing criminal behaviour. While they admit some “bad eggs” turn up amongst the two million Chinese overseas travellers each year, diplomats either refuse to co-operate or delay the process of repatriation for deported PRC nationals by

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1088 Evacuation of OC is provided only after careful consideration of the local geo-political situation. Qiaolian official, personal communication with author, Beijing, 9 November 2007.
1091 PRC diplomat, personal communication with author, Wellington, 20 June 2009.
citing bureaucratic red tape. For example, the PRC embassy will take action only if notified within four days of an arrest, and “if proven to be Chinese nationals.” Without travel documents, criminals are not allowed to re-enter China, even as deportees.\textsuperscript{1093} When criminals are confirmed as PRC nationals, diplomats contend that they are not responsible for their activities. As internal domestic issues of a foreign government, “the embassy can only grant limited assistance because it is not our country.”\textsuperscript{1094} PRC diplomats in Suva referred to the arrest of 41 Chinese allegedly involved in illegal gambling and prostitution as “the responsibility of the immigration department and police.”\textsuperscript{1095}

Where it has no official representation, Beijing may choose to distance itself from OC problems altogether. Even though there are large numbers of PRC nationals working in Saipan, Beijing has yet to establish a consulate on the island state.\textsuperscript{1096} Thus Chinese garment workers based in northern Pacific sweatshops have no avenue for resolving their grievances.\textsuperscript{1097} Similarly, Chinese nationals jailed in the pro-Taipei Marshall Islands have also failed to receive assistance.\textsuperscript{1098} In other cases, China has also argued it could not be responsible for accepting deportees from non-Approved Tourist Destination (ATD) destinations (this term will be explained in the following chapter).\textsuperscript{1099}

China’s lack of a response towards those OC viewed as a liability demonstrates that it has focused its efforts on cases where embarrassment is minimized and public relations value is maximized. Therefore consular assistance and \textit{qiaowu} methods for

\textsuperscript{1097} “Chinese Garment Workers on Hunger Strike,” \textit{Agence France Presse}, 7 March 2000.
\textsuperscript{1099} Micaller, “Another Chinese Immigrant Boat Diverted to Tinian.”
the 21st century focus upon monitoring developments and investigating methods of preventing a recurrence rather than placing efforts on actual rescue.\textsuperscript{1100} Qiaowu experts propose that qiaowu should seek to minimize their internal differences, strengthen OC society as a whole, and thereby reduce reliance on Beijing in times of trouble.\textsuperscript{1101} This is indicative of a new evolution in OC policy that seeks to upgrade the migrant in order to fit China’s desired international image. As the future of qiaowu, this subject is the topic of the final chapter.

8.06 OC Protection and China’s International Relations

The presence of OC throughout the world places China in an interesting situation. How Beijing chooses to respond to matters concerning those populations will affect its bilateral relations with foreign governments. There are various contexts to how these relationships might unfold. As Chinese investment abroad grows, Beijing might consider naval diplomacy or military protection to oversee assets under OC control or intervene when OC are in trouble.\textsuperscript{1102} For example, it has advocated dispatching PRC police officers to assist the investigations of foreign law enforcement agencies following attacks on OC; similarly it has considered the possibility of sending China’s own security personnel for protection.\textsuperscript{1103} In the meantime, however, China desires acceptance in the international community and refrains from demonstrating what may be perceived as aggressive behaviour. For example, it has been hesitant to send in uniformed assistance, chartered commercial aeroplanes instead of sending military aircraft, and dispatched good-will naval visits. Any demonstration of hard power has been approved under the UN (such as in the form of peace-keeping forces in Sudan.)\textsuperscript{1104} Beijing prefers to play a co-operative leadership role (such as co-ordinating humanitarian efforts, sending medical supplies, and asking for assistance

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1100] Lu Weixiong and Zheng Jianmin, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo” (Who is the Unfortunate Victim of Anti-Chinese Incidents?) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 2 (2007): 23; GOCAO, Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi…
\item[1103] Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston, “How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?”
\end{footnotes}
from third parties). In this manner, China could be “rated as the region’s most trustworthy and responsible friend in time of need.”

To improve bilateral relations, regional governments may be called upon for assistance where China is unable (or unwilling) to act alone. China expects and demands that countries protect its nationals (and by implication, huaren) in trouble. For example, Beijing thanked Syria, Greece and Cyprus for their efforts in evacuating 143 Chinese from Lebanon in 2006. In the Pacific, Australia, NZ and PNG were praised for their role in the SI and Tonga. In this context, some experts suggested that NZ and Australia might have served as unwitting proxies for China’s interests in the region.

In contrast, China may berate or criticize local inadequacies concerning the treatment of OC in trouble. For example, it had nothing to lose by criticizing the pro-Taipei SI government after the 2006 riots. Moreover, in late 2005, four ethnic Chinese women detained at Kuala Lumpur Airport as suspected prostitutes resulted in their unlawful detainment, assault and humiliation. Before the authorities had even confirmed whether the complainants were Chinese or Malaysian nationals, Beijing reacted strongly. The PRC vice foreign minister Wu Dawei summoned the Malaysian ambassador to lodge a protest, demanding that his government immediately investigate and punish those responsible. Newspapers in China printed negative stories about the incident contributing to a 49 percent drop in Chinese tourism.

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response, the Malaysian government tried to resolve the situation by sending interior minister Azmi Khalid to Beijing for damage control.1112

Similarly, other governments have placed OC affairs as an important part of their bilateral relationship with Beijing. After a spate of murders and crimes against PRC nationals in South Africa in 2006 resulted in negative publicity and a 14.9 percent decline in Chinese tourists, the South African ambassador to Beijing Vusi Koloane quickly reassured that there was “no organized effort” against Chinese, and that his government was doing everything possible to “completely eliminate” crimes. He stated “We want zero Chinese people to be killed in South Africa forever.”1113 When Zambian opposition presidential candidate Michael Sata threatened to evict OC companies out of the country (but more importantly recognizing Taiwan) in 2006, the PRC embassy threatened to sever ties with the African nation if he won.1114 In 2007, the PRC embassy called on Pakistan to offer better protection for OC after seven Chinese hostages accused of prostitution were abducted from an acupuncture clinic in Islamabad. They were later released in the interests of maintaining friendly relations.1115

In all these cases, the treatment of OC has served as a barometer for the strength of Sino-foreign relations. As mentioned previously, qiaowu is effectively a core part of China’s foreign affairs. Just as it did with Vietnam and Indonesia during the 1960s, Beijing has continued to use the OC as convenient bargaining chips in its international relations. As demonstrated above, the manner and timing in which qiaowu is implemented depends entirely on Beijing’s strategic interests. Like Taiwan, China is only prepared to act on behalf of the OC if the issues have enough political importance or public relations value for its international image.

### Conclusion

Handling the affairs of the OC has been a historical cause of concern for both Beijing and Taipei. The logistical, financial and human resources put into consular protection for ethnic Chinese have often come into conflict with regional suspicions, domestic opposition and national interests. Between the 1960s to late 1990s, China’s stance was extremely cautious – responding to OC affairs as contentious issues that threatened to undermine regional political relationships. Similarly, Taiwan’s relationship with the OC had deteriorated to the extent that it enacted legislation to ensure that it only had limited responsibility towards them; the rise of Taiwanization meant that consular assistance focused only upon Taiqiao. For much of the mid to late 1990s, OC caught in ethnic tension or trouble had no-one to turn to at all.

Following the lessons of 1998, Beijing attempted to reclaim trust and respect of the OC by boosting its consular protection efforts. The 2000s saw a massive implementation of new legislation and infrastructure designed to show that China was capable of protecting its nationals. To maintain its emotional and ethnographic connection with the rest of the OC, it was obligated to demonstrate that it could also offer humanitarian assistance to them as well. Beijing’s conduct of evacuations and the way in which they are reported both point towards a strategic and conscientious effort to bring as many of the OC as possible under its embrace. This was particularly evident during the DPP years when pro-independence efforts were at their apex.

Despite these developments, political and national interests continue to take priority over those of the OC. Beijing remains in the predicament of finding a balance between securing loyalty of the OC against maintaining its international relations. The latter is dependent on external concerns and whether there is any benefit for China. This chapter has demonstrated that qiaowu is dictated and limited by the scope and robustness of China’s international relations. Where it is dominant and not perceived as a threat, Beijing is quite confident of extending its hand; otherwise, it is much more hesitant to inflame the situation or invite embarrassment. For the meantime, Beijing is careful not to over-extend itself. Managing the large numbers of OC is, and will continue to be, a critical factor in maintaining stability and security throughout the world, and an important factor in Beijing’s foreign policy.
9.00 The Future of Qiaowu

Each of the preceding chapters has illustrated a specific aspect of qiaowu and examined its development in both a historical and contemporary context. This chapter examines the future direction of qiaowu, the thoughts and ideologies behind its strategy, and projects how it will develop. Policies concerning the spread of xinqiao OC reflect the rationale behind a new model of OC affairs that recognizes that OC society is constantly evolving, and that the CCP wishes to be a core part of this development. Moreover, qiaowu seeks to capitalize on the upwardly mobile social trends amongst certain groups of elite OC, and using them as part of ‘branding’ the public face of China abroad. The ultimate objective, however, is to guide their behaviours towards a CCP-friendly outlook.

As this thesis has shown, the goals of qiaowu remained largely consistent up until the mid-1980s: realizing the long term development of the OC; promoting ethnic unity for political stability and economic modernization and development; fostering Sino-foreign friendship; and mobilizing revolutionary liberation. The immediate years after 1978 through to 1989 saw qiaowu efforts focused upon repairing the damaged relationship with returned OC and providing incentives or building links with the OC to attract investment. After 1989, the CCP had to revise this strategy and concentrate on better management of the OC diaspora for maintaining its political legitimacy. In the 2000s, China’s qiaowu strategy looked at the OC from a wider perspective – not only as a source of economical, cultural and political support, but also for improving China’s soft power and international image in the modern era.

Contemporary qiaowu policy thrives in a context of transnationalism and globalization. In this context, China mobilizes both ‘old’ and ‘new’ OC communities at the forefront of efforts promoting economic and cultural development, as well as political integration with a growing China. To reassert itself as a global economic power, China has actively promoted tourism, trade and enterprise amongst the OC as a key aspect of its “Going Out” strategy. Since the late 1990s, China has used

1116 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 16.
1117 “Zhuanjia xixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance,” 11.
migration as a tool to further its national interests by engaging with and cultivating the OC through dedicated bureaucratic structures.

This chapter will bring all of these key factors together in describing China’s OC affairs for the 21st century – specifically for two quickly emerging groups at opposite ends of the OC spectrum: contract labourers/working class OC and new elite migrants. The increase in these types of OC has, and will have, profound implications upon the political, economic, cultural and social relationships between receiving governments and Beijing. As such, qiaowu methods are continually adapted to address these concerns.

9.01 Export of Labour

There are several causes for the spread of ethnic Chinese communities throughout the world. As previous chapters have shown, immigration, education and trade have facilitated OC movement abroad for many decades. China’s own development and security strategies also provide an explanation. Beijing’s emphasis on promoting migration and export of contractual labour is consistent with its foreign policy of forging stronger links with countries rich in resources. An international forum of OC in 2001 sought to establish transnational entities and investment overseas for securing access to essential resources and increasing exports of Chinese-manufactured goods.1118 For example, Chinese companies have set up 28 Baoding villages (each housing up to 2000 Chinese workers) in various parts of Africa.1119 Similarly, free movement of labour is always an important component of China’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations.1120 ‘Going Out’ and migration from China carry not so much an intention of global expansionism or colonialism, but the prime objective of improving China’s situation from abroad.

China’s foreign investment, reconstruction, contract projects and foreign aid in recent years have resulted in a proportionate increase in the number of PRC nationals going abroad. Over the past thirty years, the PRC has become a major competitor in the global labour market. Shortages of skilled manpower for the completion of official aid projects have seen hundreds of thousands of workers sent overseas since the 1970s.1121 Prior to the 1980s, exporting labour was part of China’s foreign aid contribution to developing countries.1122 In the mid-1980s, Beijing redeveloped it as a ‘win-win’ business arrangement, facilitated by assistance from international development agencies as a poverty reduction strategy.1123 An outdated system of unified labour allocation during the 1990s saw responsibility for contract labourers passed from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) onto private agencies (such as labour exporters, travel agents, foreign employers or private corporations). These companies are accredited with the authority to recruit workers in an open market. By 2004, 1400 Chinese companies were licensed to contract workers to foreign markets, providing over 500,000 labourers to work legally in foreign construction and textile industries.1124 Given these trends, China will continue to be a major source of migration as international markets accept (and in some cases depend upon) foreign labour as part of the globalized economy.1125

China’s foreign policy of ‘Going Out’ was supposed to promote an environment conducive to its continued growth and development by projecting a non-threatening image.1126 However, in many cases, this has not been the case. The increase in the number of Chinese workers and investors abroad has been controversial, and as such, raised ethnic tensions. For example, conditions and benefits for Chinese staff tend to

1121 The number of workers sent abroad in 2005 was 560,000 (or 1% of the global labour market), increasing to 670,000 in 2006. Vladimir Portyakov, “Russian Vector in the Global Chinese Migration,” *Far Eastern Affairs* 34, Issue 1 (Jan-March 2006): 47-62.
be better than their African counterparts, causing jealousy.\textsuperscript{1127} Zambian locals blame OC businessmen for ignoring safety concerns, underpaying workers and driving out local businesses with cheap imported goods and labour.\textsuperscript{1128} Politicians alleged China was “dumping their people here to take up shops meant for our people.”\textsuperscript{1129} These concerns are shared throughout the world where the PRC has encouraged large numbers of Chinese to invest, trade or settle.

9.02 Qiaowu in the Pacific

As the previous chapter demonstrated, recent attention surrounding evacuations of the OC in the Pacific have led to definitive and significant changes concerning the implementation of consular assistance. The following section also uses specific examples from the Pacific to describe regional concerns, and then describes how China has responded to them. Qiaowu policies in this geographic context are representative of its wider policies towards labourer-class OC elsewhere in the world (such as Africa or Eastern Europe); furthermore, these examples are especially important for indicating the emerging trends for its future policy development.

In 2006, following years of denying any strategic interest in the region, Beijing finally revealed its active stance for economic development in the Pacific by establishing a comprehensive set of measures to promote OC trade and tourism there.\textsuperscript{1130} These included a special fund and the designation of seven pro-Beijing nations as ATDs for PRC citizens.\textsuperscript{1131} Such a status allows tour groups of five or more to make visits

organized through approved Chinese travel agents. Without ATD accreditation, visitors require special visas to visit those countries. ATD status also encourages hosts to gear marketing and infrastructure specifically towards Chinese visitors. A PRC ambassador hoped that Pacific nations would welcome “thousands” of them. This sentiment is shared by impoverished island nations looking towards China as a source of income.

Forecasts show that the number of visitors from China to the Pacific is to rise significantly, eventually making them the largest tourism market in the world. Tourism and migration paves the way for a wider scope of Chinese influence. The OC are already involved in enterprises ranging from multi-million dollar mining ventures to small shops and restaurants, and have quickly asserted dominance. Similarly, PRC state-owned or OC investment has established and upgraded accommodation, cuisine, news media, education, finance and other services for Chinese visitors. Taiwanese OC own larger retail facilities or have fishing interests and control prominent industries. Malaysian OC are involved in much of the region’s logging and mineral extraction business.
As an initiative to send more contract labour abroad as part of its ‘Going Out’ strategy, Beijing has encouraged efforts to make destinations more favourable for workers. For example, to improve their safety, one state-owned company suggested basing contract labourers and their families in regions of relative political stability, and operating a ‘fly-in fly-out’ system.\footnote{“Chinese Miners to Live in Australia, Work in PNG,” \textit{Papua New Guinea Post Courier}, 7 June 2006, \url{http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D07%2D16.htm} (accessed 2 October 2009).} Another sought to make the Fijian garment industry more competitive through loans, equipment and training.\footnote{Fiji Government, “News Briefs,” 3 August 2005, \url{www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_5090.shtml} (accessed 2 October 2009).} In 2007, the Ministry of Commerce and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission mulled over programmes to insure OC workers for specific risks normally exempted by regular policies. In an industry where immigration problems and ethnic tensions with Chinese workers are already rife, increasing their numbers would only serve to complicate matters. Nevertheless, Beijing is adamant to push forward with its objectives.

China’s aim to increase and advance investments and its presence throughout the Pacific has significant implications for regional security. By highlighting areas for investment in ‘Going Out’, PRC migrants are attracted to the new opportunities that may arise. Unfortunately, these OC workers, tourists and investors provide another channel for the expansion of other undesirable groups of OC – particularly those involved in transnational criminal activities. It is these groups that have caused significant concern for both the PRC and regional authorities. Problems include illegal migration, drug trafficking and prostitution. All three are inter-linked, with mass movement of the OC being the common factor.\footnote{Jennifer Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a Commodity,” \textit{Asian Affairs, an American Review} (Fall 1995); Michael Field, “Currency of Persuasion,” \textit{Listener} 198, no. 3391, 7 –13 May 2005, \url{www.listener.co.nz/issue/3391/features/3950/currency_of_persuasion_2.html?jsessionid=185F35BFD774DA2CD41E47234608B224} (accessed 2 October 2009).}

\section*{9.03 Illegal Migration in the Pacific}

Due to its clandestine nature, accurate statistics on the scale of people smuggling and illegal migration from the PRC are elusive and often unreliable due to the political nature of the topic. Data comes mostly from estimates based on reports of arrests, court proceedings and deportations. However, there are some widely accepted estimates representative of the broader situation.\textsuperscript{1143} China appears at the top of the list as the source for illegal migration and unauthorized arrivals in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{1144} The problem is so big that Fijian authorities have lost track of controlling them.\textsuperscript{1145} Island nations with poor immigration controls are commonly used as back doors to enter more developed countries.\textsuperscript{1146} They are flown in, dropped off by fishing boats, or arrive under the guise of tourists. Some of them become local residents after receiving coaching on how to evade immigration controls.\textsuperscript{1147} Such large influxes of illegal migration and people smuggling are a frustrating issue for border management agencies of the receiving country. It also puts stress on local infrastructure, and raises bilateral problems with China.\textsuperscript{1148} For example, during the late 1990s, hundreds of PRC migrants were housed temporarily in fenced compounds in Guam, raising health, hygiene and security concerns.\textsuperscript{1149}

Human trafficking is predominantly co-ordinated through internationally organized triad crime rings. Immigrants going through these channels end up indentured to pay for their legal bills, smugglers’ fees and their transportation costs associated with


leaving China – and as a result, they resort to working illegally.\textsuperscript{1150} Hence, prostitution is a widespread problem throughout the Pacific. In the Northern Marianas, 90 percent of the 1500 prostitutes in Saipan are Chinese.\textsuperscript{1151} Some arrive on valid papers for employment in garment factories, but end up overstaying and working without permits (as hostesses in nightclubs, bars and restaurants) to repay their recruitment fees and living expenses. At least forty “Chinese only” brothels exist in Suva, staffed by Chinese on visitor or student visas working on the side while trying to gain entry into Australia.\textsuperscript{1152} A similar situation occurs in Samoa.\textsuperscript{1153}

OC migration also facilitates the illegal trafficking of drugs and other contraband. For example, foreign students and PRC nationals on short-term visas comprise a significant proportion of carriers used in the pseudoephedrine trade.\textsuperscript{1154} The Pacific is a popular transhipment destination with relatively lax legal structures, impotent monitoring systems, and ineffective punitive measures; moreover, the possibility of a short jail sentence or extradition is a small price to pay for the potentially lucrative gains resulting from illegal activity. Illicit goods are smuggled unchecked, often aided by customs, immigration and police officers with a “good relationship” with Chinese business people. Moreover, many wharves and marinas have poor border security, with authorities relying solely on the captain’s declarations of cargo and number of people on board.\textsuperscript{1155} There are also reports of mothership vessels loaded with contraband by their company supply vessels while at sea.\textsuperscript{1156} Payment to crewmen for smuggling is arranged by way of radio communication to China.\textsuperscript{1157} In response to the high number of incidents concerning undeclared goods in 2005, the


\textsuperscript{1151} From a survey conducted by Northern Marianas College. \textit{Hawaii Public Radio} website, 6 December 2006, \url{www.hawaiipublicradio.org/hulsen/pacific.htm} (accessed 19 February 2007).


\textsuperscript{1156} “Taiwanese Man’s Trial Transferred to ENB,” \textit{Solomon Star}, 3 August 2006, 10.

Fijian Customs Department imposed a 100 percent search on all containers imported by Chinese nationals, deeming them as “high risk.”

Transnational criminal activity is a sophisticated operation, backed by powerful multinational elements. Furthermore, there are big ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors concerning illegal immigration that are beyond the control of Chinese and local authorities. Coupled with insufficient monitoring and enforcement at both the origin and destination, the situation requires a significant amount of resources and management that is unavailable due to economic constraints and other priorities. Governments in the Pacific lack the infrastructure to deal effectively with this problem, and Beijing does not demonstrate an urgent need to resolve it either. The next section reveals why the PRC has not considered illegal immigration an important issue to address. The answer lies at the very core of China’s long term strategy for the OC.

9.04 Passing On Responsibility for Migrant Behaviour and Illegal Migration

The increase in illegal OC is a long-standing problem, and Chinese authorities are aware of the implications. An internal State Council migration and population report noted that the number of illegal migrants from China exceeds that of legal ones. For its part, China has made some efforts to combat illegal migration. Laws and regulations prohibiting this practice include Articles 176 and 177 of the 1979 Criminal Law. In 1985, PRC authorities passed legislation regarding migration, passport and border control. In 1992, the OCAO and other government ministries issued their first document outlining illegal migration from China, describing the situation and addressing how it could damage China’s national interests. In 1993, Beijing authorities issued a second document to curb illegal migration along the southern coastal regions.

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provincial level) to co-operate with international and regional bodies (such as the International Organization for Migration) and immigration authorities through the issuance of official statements.\textsuperscript{1162} It also holds discussions between concerned parties.\textsuperscript{1163} Domestically, counter-measures include fines and imprisonment for smugglers, investigating and rescuing women and children coerced into prostitution, and holding prevention campaigns using education materials.

However, these measures are mostly ineffective and penalties are not a deterrent.\textsuperscript{1164} The main problem is that ambivalent local officials hardly care to enforce directives from Beijing.\textsuperscript{1165} From their perspective, illegal migration helps solve unemployment concerns, and money sent back assists with constructing infrastructure.\textsuperscript{1166} Consequently, they usually “keep one eye open and close the other.”\textsuperscript{1167} As for transnational crime perpetrated by illegal PRC migrants, the reaction of PRC officials is equally mixed. China absolves itself of any responsibility and blames the situation on macro-economic disparity, criminal gangs, and the immigration policies of receiving countries.\textsuperscript{1168} Furthermore, PRC officials argue that the numbers of illegal immigrants are an exaggeration, and instead promote the positive aspects of xinyimin migration and contract labour to the local economy.\textsuperscript{1169}

Because of Beijing’s failure to effectively address and combat people smuggling and transnational crime, some observers argue that there is official support, or at least tacit recognition, from PRC authorities.\textsuperscript{1170} The historical link between Chinese criminal

\textsuperscript{1165} Chin, “Trends and Government Policies.
\textsuperscript{1169} Edwards, “Time Travels,” 276, 283.
gangs, the CCP, and *qiaowu* can be traced back over several decades. In 1984, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that not all triads were bad, and some were good and patriotic.¹¹⁷¹ In 1993, the PRC minister for public security Tao Siju commented that as long as triads were patriotic and concerned about the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, the CCP should join forces with them because “the more people we unite the better.”¹¹⁷² In this regard, the CCP worked with such groups in bringing stability leading up to the 1997 handover by dominating OC communities throughout North America.¹¹⁷³ Similarly, the OCAO has worked with criminal gangs in order to maintain OC affairs in Southeast Asia. In 2000, Guo Dongpo (director of the Beijing office of the OCAO) met Teng Bunma (a leader of the Cambodian Chinese community and suspected drug dealer) to ask for his assistance in controlling unruly mainland gang activity in the region.¹¹⁷⁴

Furthermore, PRC government officials, law enforcement authorities and military personnel face accusations of helping gather illegal migrants, procuring travel documents and facilitating their transit.¹¹⁷⁵ They allegedly collaborate with consular officials and triad snakeheads in forging documents for illegal immigration, trafficking and other criminal activity in order to fund PRC foreign intelligence operations.¹¹⁷⁶ There are suspicions that PRC diplomats cultivate criminals to spy, corrupt and infiltrate.¹¹⁷⁷ An increase of OC migrants is suspected to be part of a deliberate expansionist effort, or as a fifth column tool mobilized by Beijing.¹¹⁷⁸ Of course, Beijing vehemently denies such allegations.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 11.
¹¹⁷⁶ Lintner, *Blood Brothers*.
¹¹⁷⁸ Nyiri, “From Class Enemies to Patriots,” 230.
¹¹⁷⁹ China researcher Amanda Darling Tobias argued that China used non-state actors such as triads and piracy to keep regional governments irritated and occupied in the Pacific in a war of “utter deniability”—. “Economic Growth Sees Rise of Crime Syndicates,” interview by Graeme Dobell,
Beijing seeks to manage migration in the context of its own internal situation and for serving China’s development. Encouraging migration (whether it be legal or illegal) has advantages for China. In addition to the benefits mentioned above, it relieves domestic population and environmental pressures, and provides a channel to promote Chinese interests abroad. For Beijing, while illegal migration frustrates international relations, it does not consider it as an important issue to address. As long as there is no major negative impact upon its own interests, Beijing does not care about illegal migration from its shores. For example, an internal report cited that the majority of Americans felt that “black work” performed by illegal migrants was acceptable as long as they did not encroach on the livelihoods of locals. Similar research found that while there was opposition towards illegal migrants in some countries, others were mostly sympathetic to them. Given these opinions, Chinese authorities maintain a lax attitude towards policing the issue. For them, this contradiction between official policy and the demand for cheap labour abroad, coupled with the economic benefits, make illegal migration an acceptable practice.

The PRC government is well-versed about illegal migration. It is aware of how migrants evade authorities, their diversity of origin, destinations, and even the numbers involved. State Council reports reveal that rather than seeking resolution, China assumes that illegal migration from its shores is inevitable. Beijing views migration and globalization of ethnic Chinese as a natural phenomenon of human societal development whereby OC society and organizations are constantly

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9.05 PRC Views on Illegal Migration

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Australian Broadcasting Corporation website website, n.d.
1180 “Zhongguo guoji yimin qushi tantao” (Inquiry into Chinese International Migration Trends), Qiaoqing, no. 54 (5 December 2005): 7-16.
1184 “Haiwai Zhongguo feifa yimin diaocha” (Investigation into Illegal Chinese Migrants Abroad), Qiaoqing jianbao, 23 November 2006, 6.
1186 “Woguo Dalu renkou guoji qianyi de xianzhuang, qushi ji xiangguan duice jianyi,” 16-17, 19.
internationalizing and regionalizing. From a human resources perspective, their integration and development in global society has profound implications for the unity of groupings, division of labour, exchange and competition. Therefore, OC cadres suggest that policies should emphasize how to better accommodate illegal migrants in OC work in ten or twenty years time when they have become established as part of the general OC population. OCAO cadres conduct empirical research about illegal migration not for putting an end to it, but for accurately forecasting and mapping changes in demographics and labour movements in order to guide future qiaowu policy development.

9.06 ‘Unqualified’ Chinese

Although it chooses not to adequately address the problem of illegal migration, the residual implications remain a significant irritant to Beijing’s interests. One area of migration that has received recent attention is the phenomenon of lower-class, uneducated migrants who have left China for economic reasons. As mentioned previously, their movement is poorly regulated, and they tend to be the most visible component of Chinese abroad – particularly in Africa and the Pacific. Migrants to these (mostly) less-developed parts of the world often do not possess academic or technical expertise. Furthermore, their behaviour is sometimes selfish and insular, causing difficulties or conflicts with locals. Some qiaowu specialists are extremely critical of these ‘new’ migrants, saying that they lack not only education, but also ethics and values. Their presence serves only to add to a low-end economy rather than to strategic economic and social development. For China, they are another liability for its desired international image, and hence described as “unqualified Chinese.” In other words, this group has become the modern iteration of Beijing’s “OC problem.”

1187 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 2-7.
1188 "Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo gongxianji xiance" (Specialist Advisory Committee Offer Suggestions for OC Work), Qiaowu, no. 8 (15 March 2005): 12.
1191 GOCAO, Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi…, 17-30.
“Unqualified Chinese” are problematic for the PRC because they hinder its aspirations to become a respected global citizen. Much of how the world perceives China depends on the image of the ethnic Chinese. China cannot reach its goal of becoming a “responsible great nation” or winning the world’s trust if certain groups of the OC continue to act undesirably. Qiaowu seeks to alleviate these concerns by actively presenting a benevolent face – emphasizing co-operation and friendship by promoting the benefits of Chinese aid projects and making local residents feel it is sincere in helping them. The task is to operate pragmatically and flexibly without upsetting bilateral relations.

The PRC response is that these issues should not be politicized, but dealt with using a long term approach of “upgrading the software of migrants.” From the perspective of some qiaowu officials, migrants are simply another type of export commodity – and like any other product, there should be standards put in place. Therefore, the interests of lower class OC must receive attention. ‘New’ OC must take responsibility for their own actions and raise their ‘quality.’ These include improving their attributes and behaviour, such as manners, hygiene, discipline, education, morals and lifestyle.

Although love for the ancestral homeland is widely encouraged by qiaowu officials, they understand it is too one-sided. Qiaowu should not be ethnographically focused on solely promoting the premise of “I am Chinese” or “Chineseness” – this would only reinforce chauvinistic thinking amongst the OC. Instead, the Chinese government promotes the notion that the OC should act as a member of the “world’s family.” For example, induction efforts attempt to manage migrants before they depart – teaching them local customs, laws and policies in order to “prepare the

1192 Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston, “How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?”
1194 “Daansu hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 19.
1195 Lu and Zheng, “Yuanqiao” shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23.
1197 Lu and Zheng, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23.
migrant.”1198 Upon completion of training by approved agencies, migrants receive a certificate to prove that they meet the requirements.1199

These efforts are supposed to improve integration between OC and local populations. Diplomats claim that export labourers are checked for security clearance to avoid “unfortunate incidents”. They are expected to show good behaviour, and face consequences if they fail to do so.1200 However, about 10,000 workers remain uncertified by China’s only authorized employment verification agency, the Chinese Economic Development Association.1201 Many labourers (particularly those from rural areas with low education and low skills) continue to be recruited through unauthorized brokers.1202 Moreover, since 2002, all contracted labourers were issued private (rather than ordinary public) passports to facilitate ease of monitoring their movement. However, whereas public passports are held by their employers and provide more control over their activities, private passports are held by the employees themselves and offer more mobility, but with the potential for abuse.1203

Despite attempts for state regulation, there remain many informal and semi-official operators competing with registered agencies.1204 Although MOFTEC provided rules and instructions to labour-exporting agencies that were supposed to implement training and screening prior to their departure, these systems for governing migrant worker behaviour lack sufficient monitoring, let alone enforcement.1205 In addition, such training is subject to a charge (and therefore often avoided); furthermore, not all migrants go through these official channels (many prefer less bureaucracy and security checks); finally, these brief and superficial efforts may not be effective in truly grounding ethnic sensitivities.

1202 Li, “Labour Brokerage in China Today.”
1203 Xiang Biao, “Emigration from China,” 27.
9.07 Raising China’s Image: Getting Along Together

China also works at the destination countries by seeking to integrate migrants and locals in a way that promotes a positive image of China and Chinese abroad. However, ethnic tensions ensure that achieving this goal remains problematic. Historically, locals often accused the OC mercantile (particularly those in Southeast Asia) for having pro-Beijing allegiances. They therefore became a target for discrimination whenever regional tensions arose.\(^{1206}\) From Beijing’s perspective, in competing for limited resources or market share, conflict and ethnic tensions are inevitable and expected to continue.\(^{1207}\)

While consular protection for OC was an issue that was subject to the geo-political environment, one goal of \textit{qiaowu} has always been consistent. \textit{Qiaowu} seeks not to make ethnic divisions nor cause suspicion, but to improve mutual trust and affinity with the objective of integration and co-operation.\(^{1208}\) As early as 1951, the PRC MFA instructed its ambassadors to emphasize commonality and promotion of China’s successes – and the OC were the leading vehicle to achieve this.\(^{1209}\) In the 2000s, these policies have not changed. The duties of consular offices and embassies include protecting the interests and well-being of ethnic Chinese, raising their quality of life, promoting their long term existence, and integrating them into local society by reducing perceptions of China and the OC as exploitive.\(^{1210}\) At the grassroots level, for example, a co-operative effort between the OC, the PRC embassy and local government and law enforcement agencies in South Africa saw the establishment of “Police-Citizen Co-operation Centres” as a visible contribution to society.\(^{1211}\) At official functions, PRC diplomats praise the long history of Chinese involvement in

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\(^{1207}\) \textit{Qiaoqing}, 2007/1, January 8, 2007, p.22.

\(^{1208}\) \textit{Qiaowu gongzuo gailun}, 80-81, 93-95, 99; Wang, \textit{Qiaowu zhishi shouce}, 70-72; Chen, \textit{Gongmin shouce}, 362; Gu, Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao zhengce wenda, 2.

\(^{1209}\) PRC MFA, “Waijiaobu jiu Dongnanya huaqiao guoqing qingchu huodong xiang youguan shiguan zhishi” (MFA Instruction to Concerned Embassies on OC National Day Celebrations in Southeast Asia) Archive File no. 117-00081-08, 1951.


local development and friendly exchanges between peoples. Community gatherings serve to remind the OC of their obligations by making friendly efforts towards locals, earning their money through honest labour, abiding by the laws of the land, and respecting their local colleagues.

In this context, as a long term effort to integrate and raise the image of the OC in local society, qiaowu officials call for mutual co-operation and development amongst the OC mercantile community in order to improve the “made in China” image by way of media, training and exchange. Firstly, the OC media is the key to changing the perceptions of foreign media (particularly in the West, Africa and the Pacific), which often label the OC as a problem. Propaganda efforts seek to reduce jealousy or fears of economic or political domination amongst locals by emphasizing China’s liberalization and economic development while downplaying or avoiding sensitive historical problems (such as mobilizing OC for local politics, propagation of socialism, the concern of Chinese goods conflicting with local products, and China’s growing sphere of influence). Thus, the state-controlled OC media prohibit public disclosure of the amount of OC investment or their contributions to China’s economic development. Similarly, the PRC tones down any news of successful OC economic development in the foreign media. Rather, Chinese media receives guidance to promote OC investment or assistance in local industries not as a one-way injection, but as a ‘win-win’ co-operative result that goes beyond monetary terms. For example, China encourages OC relations through mutually beneficial platforms and legitimate regional frameworks such as the China-ASEAN FTA. To reduce ethnic divisions, the OC media advise their audience that they should not refer to

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1217 Kim, “The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia.”
1218 “Kaizhan dui huaren wenti mingan guojia de qiaowu gongzuo xu jiji, shenshen,” 1-12.
1219 “Dasuan hou de Yinnen huaren ji wo dui Yinnen qiaowu gongzuo,” 19.
locals as “those Indonesians” in order to avoid an ‘us versus them’ mentality. In the same vein, qiaowu cadres make sure to refer to the OC as huazu (ethnic Chinese) rather than huaqiao in order to avoid connotations of a political relationship.

In the same way as ‘upgrading their software,’ OC should be educated about local legislation, policies, as well as the availability of public funding and state support in order to maintain their rights, interests and organizational activities. These measures have gained importance in recent years following ethnic tensions between the OC and local populations. Over the last few decades, many governments have adopted liberal policies of “ethnic cultural preservation.” Qiaowu officials advise OC groups to take advantage of these policies and use them to build enthusiasm for China and Chinese cultural products amongst non-Chinese audiences. They encourage OC groups to act as initiators and organizers of bilateral exchange as part of the integration process. For example, cadres suggest that the OC use celebration of traditional festivals to engage with local politicians and to interact and co-operate with authorities and law enforcement agencies. These events all work to dispel anti-Chinese feelings amongst the wider population.

Such efforts are co-ordinated with help from the PRC embassy, cultural and education attaches, and Beijing-friendly organizations. In this manner, Chinese authorities relieve themselves of the logistical effort of doing the actual work themselves; and more importantly, they are not seen as the ones directly pushing outreach or cultural diplomacy, and thus diluting any sensitivity towards qiaowu. For the OC, they enjoy a sense of achievement and first-hand appreciation of culture through co-

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1221 Huazu is a term more acceptable to locals than huaqiao, which connotes a political connection. See “Dasuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dit Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 15, 18-19.
1222 “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 5-6, 12; “Liebian, chongzu, xinsheng, ronghe,” 14-15; Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 66.
1223 “Zhongguo qiaolian chengli haiwai lushituan jiaqiang weihu haiwai qiaobao quanli” (Qiaolian Establishes Overseas Lawyers Group to Strengthen Defense of OC Rights and Interests) Qiaoqing jianbao, 30 November 2008.
1225 “Jiaqiang qiaowu wenhua gongzuo, xuanchuan hongyang Zhonghua wenhua,” 3-5.
1226 “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 3-4, 11-12.
1227 “Xuanwei haiwai qiaobao, hongyang Zhonghua wenhua” (Encourage Overseas Compatriots, Advance Chinese Culture), Qiaoqing, no. 37 (8 October 2005): 6-12.
1228 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 95.
operative experience. By way of such training, OC groups have become experts in facilitating Beijing’s soft power objectives abroad.

9.08 Consolidation of the OC

According to a GOCAO report concerning the modern development of qiaowu, there are three new strategic aspects (sanxin gongcheng) for policy development aimed at the entire OC diaspora: strengthening root-seeking and ethnic affinity with jingying; encouraging co-operation and exchange with these groups; and finally, capacity building and training for youth and middle aged OC.1229 Earlier chapters addressed root seeking and building ethnic affinity, which sets the foundation and friendly pro-China mindset upon which to advance qiaowu. This section examines the latter two aspects by analyzing how and why the CCP promotes the co-ordination, consolidation and capacity building of diverse OC groups in order to benefit from their combined attributes.

Qiaowu cadres suggest that OC associations should be the channels for co-ordinating the improvement of their image, status and social awareness by reducing the impact of negative examples and events concerning their members.1230 While China may not always directly initiate or orchestrate their behaviour, it actively assists in establishing, maintaining and enhancing links with them through guidance and funding.1231

Historically, laoqiao associations existed to look after their fellow countrymen, maintaining a sense of responsibility to those who possessed the requisite origins. They were based on clan/kinship, regional/county or quasi-political ties steeped in parochial traditions, values and principles.1232 Associations were established to provide leadership and cohesiveness for their members, mostly described as the ‘Three Knives’: lowly-educated market gardeners, restauranteurs and

1229 “Jiefang sixiang tuidong Guangdong qiaowu gongzuo kexue fazhan” (Liberate Thinking, Promote Scientific Development of Guangdong OC Work) Qiaoqing jianbao, 21 March 2008, 2.
1232 Liu, “Old Linkages, New Networks,” 585; Fong, The Chinese in New Zealand, 61, 94.
clothiers/cobblers. Their goals were internally focused to determine their survival, providing social and financial services, education and cultural maintenance in the face of discrimination, oppression and hardship throughout the late 19th to mid-20th century. More importantly, many of these laoqiao groups had strong ties to the KMT. By the 1980s, ‘old’ associations were mostly in a state of stagnation unless they could replenish their membership. Young laoqiao tended not to subscribe to traditional cultural themes and contributed little to organizational growth. While cadres acknowledge that ‘old’ migrants and their descendants had entered mainstream society and raised their social status from modest beginnings, they criticize laoqiao for not engaging in co-operative activity and a poor distribution of human resources due to their insular social structure. In this new demographic context, laoqiao organizations do not reflect the image of the OC desired by the CCP.

Instead, the PRC encourages a construction of “new migrant” culture by actively avoiding the laoqiao ‘Three Knives’ image and thereby shedding the “stain of boorishness inherent in its rural Southern origins.” In 2007, OC specialists called for looking beyond the ‘Three Knives’ and ‘Chinatowns’ to targeting the “Three News”: ‘new’ migrants of PRC nationality and ethnic Chinese, ‘new’ OC organizations, and the ‘new’ generation of elite OC and youth of ethnic Chinese descent. These target groupings are encouraged to feel as if they have moved on from being a labourer class, or even a professional class, to become an important force of global technological and scientific development.

Various elements of the wider qiaowu super structure support this objective by promoting the jingying concept amongst the wider OC community. In the extant literature, qiaowu academics describe modern OC as the ‘Six Masters’ (lawyers,
The OC media plays a major role in showcasing examples of these successful migrants in order to “promote China’s national vitality and spread Chinese culture.” Newspapers have sections advising readers on modern daily life, information on important local issues, regulations and laws to facilitate their advancement abroad. In turn, xinqiao OC view this connection with China as another form of patriotism. As Benedict Anderson predicted, the mass media has certainly enabled long distance nationalism amongst the OC diaspora.

Although they are no longer the sole representation of OC, laoqiao remain an important group for China’s soft power efforts. For example, when meeting with them, diplomats often express praise for their contribution to society, their native language ability and how they relate easily with locals. One important aspect of qiaowu is uniting old laoqiao with new xinqiao. The former possess years of accumulated experience and kudos in their host society, yet are deeply acculturated and entrenched in local values and outlooks; the latter (particularly xinqiao jingying groups) are skilled, dynamic and more importantly, responsive to political and emotional cues from Beijing. Together, both laoqiao and xinqiao can be a powerful force for advancing CCP interests. Qiaowu officials acknowledge and embrace all OC under the premise “old friends are not to be forgotten, while relations with new friends are to be expanded.’

1243 “Haiwai Huaren ye shi yizhong guojia liyi,” (Overseas Chinese Are Also a Benefit to the Nation), Nanfang Baoye reprinted in New Zealand Mirror, 21 April 2006.
1244 Anderson, Imagined Communities.
1246 “Xinlao qiaotuan lianghao hezuo, huawen jiaoyu zaixian shengji,” 4.
capacity. As such, qiaowu seeks to address these concerns by working closely with these groups and encouraging more participation.\textsuperscript{1247}

This is because ‘new’ OC also have their weaknesses. Qiaowu analysts note that xinqiao organizations tend to have limited resources, finances, and scope of activity. Many new groups lack assets or even a permanent physical address; nor do they have substantial institutional experience and skills. Often they are nothing more than ‘shells’ – having plenty of vigour to begin with, but fizzling out soon after due to diminished capacity and low enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{1248} Groups tend to be insular and think of themselves first without thought for co-operation with others. An investigative report by the State Council found that many xinqiao organizations are weak and unstable – internal rivalry and management problems are common.\textsuperscript{1249} Small sub-groups have conflicting agendas, causing splits in the wider OC community.\textsuperscript{1250} Such complications prevent the formation of the unified OC society that Beijing strives for.\textsuperscript{1251}

Therefore, qiaowu cadres encourage xinqiao associations to draw leading laoqiao into their ranks and to co-operate with them for mutual benefit and development.\textsuperscript{1252} As such, new OC groups bestow honorary membership, organize attractive activities, and fundraise for causes relevant to laoqiao. Various platforms (such as ‘study groups’ or ‘networking conferences’) are used to facilitate more co-operation, and act as cultural and ethnic platforms for eventual unity.\textsuperscript{1253} For example, traditional celebrations, such as Chinese New Year serve as a platform for bringing distinct groups together.

Bringing ‘new’ and ‘old’ together involves avoiding conflict and contradiction and promoting mediation, guidance, co-ordination and co-operation. Smaller groups are

\textsuperscript{1247} Lu, “‘San ge jianchi’ quanmian tuo zhan qiaowu gongzuo.”
\textsuperscript{1248} “Yindu qiaomin zhengce yanjiu,” 19.
\textsuperscript{1250} “Shenri shehui, tanjju qiaqoqing,” 1-12; Wu, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing.”
\textsuperscript{1251} “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,” 7.
\textsuperscript{1252} Qiaowu gongzuoju gailun, 66.
\textsuperscript{1253} “Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren shetuan lianhehui di 13 jie nianhui ji Aierlan, Fenlan qiaoqing” (13th European Overseas Chinese Federation and Ireland and Finland Overseas Chinese Affairs), Qiaoqing, no. 33 (12 September 2005): 10; Nyiri, Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia, 114.
encouraged to join or form alliances. Making the OC diaspora aware of the opportunities and benefits provided through joining these associations is an important strategic concern for the PRC. This works towards consolidating resources and power under a multi-faceted federation of wide-ranging membership and talents that could represent modern OC society. Xinqiao inject a considerable amount of cultural knowledge and experience into a previously geographically and politically isolated laoqiao society – thereby reviving enthusiasm for Chineseness. ‘New’ migrants can also influence ‘old’ OC by enhancing their sentimentality and reducing their suspicions about China. This effort seeks to dispel internal political differences, participate in assisting their own and their children’s education, and ultimately increase community spirit and unification.

In addition to bringing groups of OC together, modern qiaowu policy has sought to institutionalize its own designs upon OC organizations so as to fuse a single spirit within the wider organization. In a 2004 internal report, officials suggested using the hierarchical structure of modern organizations, with a democratically elected core executive to handle day-to-day activities. Such groupings had to reflect the increasing trend of hi-tech OC to be internationally mobile (both geographically and industrially), and have sister branch groups all over the world to facilitate networking, support and advice through a large and varied membership. To support these associations, modern groups have the backing and patronage of influential and respected figures (such as diplomats or leading CCP officials), and as a result are able to make the connections required for sourcing funding and support. They have a permanent secretariat to co-ordinate large-scale activities and arrange functions and forums.

For the OC organizations themselves, such a unified structure is attractive because it can improve the efficiency of running their affairs, as well as being recognized as a

1254 Social and political situations may be conducive to co-operation, such as responding to anti-Asian sentiment. See Ip, “Immigrants and Transnationals in New Zealand,” 350-351.
1255 “Liebian, chongza, xinsheng, ronghe,” 9, 12-16; “Shenri shehui, tianjiu qiaoqing,” 1-12; Wu, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing;”
1257 He, “Shilun Sun Zhongshan qiaowu sixiang de xianshi yiyi.”
1258 “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng;” 15.
1260 “Guigu diqu xin huaqiaohuaren qunti ji qi shetuan qingkuang fenxi;” 10-12.
leading and representative OC organization (both to local authorities and those in China). For Beijing, the main benefit is ease of mobilization. Qiaowu cadres guide these associations with a common vision of service and contribution under a PRC-friendly political discourse that reflect the policies and propaganda of the CCP. These developments indicate the emergence of stronger, more robust organizations amongst the OC, with the potential for global inter-connectedness.

With unity however, comes a loss of individual identity. OC groups are re-educated with CCP-friendly modes of operation and behaviours that qiaowu officials expect to see demonstrated at every opportunity. For example, groups normally using dialects make an effort to communicate in Mandarin with qiaowu and CCP officials as a show of deference (even if they can speak the dialects as well). Likewise, protocol and other unique aspects of their organizational culture also become subject to specific guidelines set down by Beijing. The methods and values of traditional OC organizations face possible extinction if these trends are to continue.

9.09 Capacity Building

In addition to providing the appropriate structures to better manage the OC, the CCP also offers them the necessary tools to further their relationship with China. Modern qiaowu policies for the OC find their roots in China’s domestic situation. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has sought to raise its “socialist spiritual and material civilization” and “population quality” for achieving a “well-off society” (xiaokang shehui) in recognition of China’s post-Mao modernity. In 1996, Jiang Zemin launched the first nationwide spiritual civilization construction movement (jingshen wenming jianshe), which achieved further traction following the 2002 16th CCP Congress. As a form of mass social education, the spiritual civilization project sought to construct a new set of values that reflected China’s modern economic situation and infrastructure. CCP leaders included xinqiao as part of this government agenda. Qiaowu officials saw a need to acknowledge the modern face of

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1262 Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic?” 635-653.
Chinese around the world and to break down old concepts tied to Chineseness. OC societies had evolved into modern and mobile bodies – in accordance, qiaowu cadres argued that their work should not be stuck in post-revolutionary ways.1265

For the 21st century, OC affairs officials assume that the majority of the OC will remain in their host countries for the long term – from luoye guigen (falling leaves return to their roots) to luodi shenggen (growing roots after settling down).1266 This view is substantiated by evidence that qiaowu is increasingly used to encourage the OC to help themselves by raising their own status in local government and society. For example, qiaowu cadres pay more attention to providing assistance to the development and subsistence of the OC, serving them well through protecting their legitimate rights, and promoting unity, co-operation and exchange.1267

To reach the heart of OC communities and directly influence them on a global scale, qiaowu officials target leaders of pro-Beijing organizations and selected individuals of influence for fully subsidized organizational development work and capacity building in China.1268 Qualified candidates (such as top academic, youth, community and business leaders of high calibre, suitable age and experience) are made aware of their China connection1269 by attending programmes that promote networking, management and team-building under PRC methods.1270 Embassies and the OCAO act as gatekeepers by extending invitations to selected individuals and then vetting applicants in order to prevent undesirable consequences.1271

These efforts have received greater attention in recent years. Specific measures include direct connections with Overseas Exchange Association Directors to receive

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1265 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 3, 6.
1267 “Overseas Chinese Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century.”
1269 “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sangguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan baogao,” 14-15.
1270 Lu Weixiong (GOCANO director), letter to OC leaders, June 26, 2008; “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoping,” 11.
1271 “Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan,” 5; Biao, “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks,” 55.
regular guidance through international forums, workshops, surveys and activities. In addition, the Developing Motherland and Benefiting Assisting OC plan (xingguo liqiao zhuqiao) aims to promote interaction amongst old and new OC and China through its website, trade fairs and university courses. Both hosts and participants perceive these kinds of events as leading prestigious platforms for managing global OC affairs.

Such programmes directly influence the development of OC communities so that they are confident and capable of working with Beijing. This is achieved by educating their future leaders about how to manage their associations and how to build capacity in the context of the qiaowu infrastructure and philosophy. Like other state-sponsored visits to China, these events have similar goals: firstly, to improve networking and unity with other OC groups, and to link them with mainland cultural, industrial, commercial or political counterparts for mutual benefit. In this regard, cadres advise participants of the latest qiaowu economic policies – summarized under themes of xingguo liqiao (building China for their benefit), hudong fazhan (mutual action for development) and zhuqiao xingye (helping them develop industry). These events seek to support OC businesses both in China and abroad as an attractive and co-ordinated product of business development, service and networking for a win-win result. Chinese industry can develop and modernize, while the OC can continue to develop their own industrial talent, benefit financially from their investment, gain trust and understanding of China, and raise their status and integration abroad.

The ultimate goal of these programmes is to lift OC status and skills in order to enhance foreign perceptions of things Chinese. Upgrading OC business practices

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1274 “Shenri qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 3-4.
1275 “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui fangzhan de diaoyan baogao;” 14; “Guangzhoushi rongyu shimin he qingnian caijun fangweishu fangzhan” (Guangdong Honorary Citizens and Talented Youth Delegation Visit), Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 October 2006, 11.
1276 “Beimei qiaowu xin bianhua;” 5.
1277 “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye;” 1, 6-7, 12, 22.
1278 OCAO of the State Council, “Yiqiao yinqiao, yiqiao yinwai: Zhejiang qiaowu gongzuo zai kaituwzhong qianjin” (Use OC to Attract OC, Use OC to Attract Foreigners: Zhejiang OC Work Moves
is one example of such capacity building. State Council delegations sent to Europe in 2004 and 2005 noted the falling standard of Chinese cuisine in an under-developed and fiercely competitive industry. Moreover, chefs were sub-standard, and many restaurant owners were unwilling to invest for the long term.\textsuperscript{1279} This situation further deteriorated after French television aired a show about poor hygiene in certain Chinese restaurants. Confusion over which restaurants were good or bad led to a poor image for the entire industry. As a result, overall turnover dropped up to 60 percent, causing some eateries to close down or be sold off. In turn, other unrelated OC businesses were also affected. The State Council acknowledged that the behaviour and practices of new migrants was often to blame.\textsuperscript{1280}

To rectify this perception, qiaowu cadres suggested holding conferences to consolidate the talents and skills of industrial representatives and elite OC business people in dispelling the ‘Chinese Economic Threat’.\textsuperscript{1281} For example in 2007, OC officials suggested that OC associations, guided by the PRC and its embassies, could develop standards and norms of behaviour within the industry.\textsuperscript{1282} They proposed ideas such as training chefs to improve culinary skills through special events and performances, actively propagating and magnifying the influence of Chinese cuisine culture and its uniqueness, and generally raising the level and standing of Chinese restaurants.\textsuperscript{1283} In 2009, the establishment of such an association in Europe sought to reignite acknowledgement and understanding for China – not only for locals, but also amongst the OC themselves who had become localized in their outlook.\textsuperscript{1284}

This example shows that qiaowu has successfully encouraged and institutionalized certain aspects of the OC relationship in accordance with Beijing’s expectations.

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\textsuperscript{1280} “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 5-6, 12.

\textsuperscript{1281} “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye,” 6-7, 12.

\textsuperscript{1282} “Gianyu Fa, He, Ying sangao huaqiaotu huaren ronggai zheliu shehui qingkuan de diaoyan baogao,” 12-13.

\textsuperscript{1283} “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 12; “Zhou chu qu” fuwu haiwai qiaobao, tigao Zhongcanye shuizhun,” 10-14.

\textsuperscript{1284} “Aodili huaren canyin fuwu lianhe zongzhui chengli” (Austrian Chinese Food and Drink Service Central Association Established), \textit{Qiaoqing jianbao}, 30 March 2009.
China’s effort to re-define the OC and their image is an on-going effort. By working step-by-step at various levels of organization, the CCP aims to draw together a diverse grouping of OC. With an obliging target amongst xinqiao and PRC students, these efforts may find fruition quicker than expected; however, there are still other OC groupings that prefer sticking to their old ways and therefore require continued attention.

9.10 Conclusion

The policies and methodology highlighted in this chapter shows that China’s qiaowu administration has the infrastructure, programs, resources and most importantly, the ambition, will and desire to further links and relations with the OC in a PRC-friendly context. These measures forge both personal and institutional connections with key sections of the OC diaspora, guiding them directly into the extended qiaowu xitong structure in the appropriate hierarchical context.

After a period of concentrating on attracting the OC for assisting the development of China’s economy and infrastructure between the late 1970s and 1990s, contemporary qiaowu policies for the OC have moved to focusing on both huaren and huaqiao development with a win-win objective in mind – to improve China’s international image by enhancing the status and lifestyle of the OC abroad. To achieve this, their livelihoods must remain stable and prosperous.

This goal remains distant and confounded by complications. For example, in the Pacific, ethnic tensions continue to threaten stability. Over two years had passed since riots in Honiara and Nukua’lofa, when violence broke out in PNG in June 2009. This indicates that illegal migration, illegal activity, and other problems associated with ‘unqualified’ migration proliferate despite measures outlined at the state level. Unfortunately, PRC officials do not consider efforts to ‘upgrade’ the migrant a priority. In addition, OC agencies implement measures poorly, and target the wrong groups. To rectify this particular problem, there needs to be much work done over the long term, and supplemented with the appropriate resources. Given these difficulties in achieving a successful outcome, China has looked to groups of OC who offer the promise of concrete results.
The projection of *qiaowu* policies for the 21st century looks towards soft power methods for shaping public opinion. Two aspects of this are evident: improving the status of the OC and China by improving their relationship with local authorities and taking advantage of ‘politically correct’ liberal government policies for promoting multiculturalism; secondly, to improve the sustainability and management of strategic OC groups through active capacity building and soothing inter-group tensions. By fostering the consolidation of OC societies for ease of management and encouraging them to forge a closer relationship with China through its embassies and other government links, China has sought to re-institutionalize contacts between the new generation of OC and the PRC. By thinking globally and acting locally, *qiaowu* has tailored efforts to develop the OC through their associations, led by an elite generation. Trained and guided according to PRC methods, this group has the potential to act together with embassies and other OC agencies to direct their local communities to act in support of Beijing. The Olympic Torch relay protests demonstrated how such strategies might play out. The success with this latter effort has highlighted to the CCP the appropriate areas of *qiaowu* to focus upon.
10.00 Conclusion

Qiaowu is the CCP’s most effective tool for dealing with the world’s largest ethnic grouping. While it faces both challenges and opportunities, the CCP has shown it is capable of retaining a significant level of control and influence over specific targets. This thesis has exhaustively dissected qiaowu down to its core attributes and philosophies concerning every aspect of China’s relationship with the OC in order to make a complete and thorough assessment of how they form an integral part of China’s comprehensive national power. As the OC population increases throughout the world, their presence and influence naturally change the demographic, social, economic, cultural and ultimately, political context of their host countries. They serve as a financial and skilled resource, and increasingly, as a ready supply of soft power to advance or support Beijing’s agenda throughout the world.

Although this thesis does not attempt to design an overarching theoretical explanation per se, the examples raised throughout this thesis shows that the CCP has consistently used inducement and punishment as tools for the management, elimination and isolation of OC challenges and threats as a means of extending China’s foreign policy objectives. To locate itself in the literature, this thesis has surveyed and linked qiaowu to various theoretical frameworks concerning diaspora, nationalism and international relations to demonstrate the use of extra-territorial influence in supporting national interests. It has also made comparisons with other patterns of incorporation regimes and highlighted the reasons why the CCP has made significant advances with its efforts.

The primary goal of this research was to take the social phenomenon of qiaowu and examine how and why OC policy has evolved over time. As mentioned earlier, Wang and Pieke both identified a four-stage relationship between the OC and the Chinese government spanning three centuries. They observed an initial period of neglect and isolation as a political threat during the Qing dynasty; a second period embracing the OC through nationalism and jus sanguinis during the early half of the 20th century; another period of neglect during the Cultural Revolution; and finally another embrace for China’s development. While both were correct in illustrating these apparent
changes in policy, they failed to account for the underlying premise that has pervaded qiaowu all throughout China’s modern history.

This thesis has shown that the main thrust of Beijing’s OC policy has never really changed. Despite some periods of chaotic and contradictory behaviour, it was always Beijing’s intention to retain the support of the OC, and more importantly, to co-opt and secure access to their political and economic resources in the context of its national interests and geo-political situation. Therefore, although there was a turbulent relationship with ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia during the Cold War years (with Beijing continuously making public reassurances and demonstrations of non-interference in local affairs), the OC remained the ‘sons and daughters’ of China’s extended family. Similarly, although domestic qiaowu activity was seriously impaired during 1966 to 1970, external UF efforts with strategic OC communities in the West continued. During the late 1990s, Beijing was careful not to get involved with ethnic Chinese tensions in Indonesia, yet it was determined to use selected OC for influencing elections in the US. Into the 21st century, Beijing has continued to actively rally the OC in support of the CCP, boost Chinese pride, challenge threats to its national integrity, and quietly mobilize some others for covert missions. The findings from this thesis have clearly demonstrated how Beijing has continued to expand and intensify its extra-territorial influence and dominance over the OC populace for these purposes.

10.01 From Strength to Strength: The Evolution of Qiaowu

As such, qiaowu’s true objectives are shrouded in secrecy, preferring to show a benevolent public face. Efforts have worked with such success because of the continued improvement of its techniques, activities and themes over many years. Embracing the common themes of Chinese unity and modernity, and implemented under techniques of articulate persuasion and systematic management, qiaowu has enjoyed considerable success with strategic groups of the OC. As this thesis has shown, these efforts may be overt and active with some, or subtle and suggestive with others.
Through a set of comprehensive programmes, activities, responses and policies, the CCP has gradually built up a positive public image of how qiaowu can serve the OC. Since 1989, there has been a stream of steady advances, such as significant increases in resources for consular protection, capacity building and reconnection efforts with the OC. In addition, qiaowu authorities have closely examined areas requiring improvement and dealt with those challenges by upgrading or taking a more centralized approach to its management and organization. Whether it provides educational materials or evacuation, Beijing has demonstrated that it is capable of taking care of its people. Qiaowu has become a comprehensive set of programmes and policies that ensures that anyone of ethnic Chinese descent has unprecedented access to cultural, economic and political development in a PRC-friendly context. In many cases, OC organizations and schools depend on qiaowu as a matter of survival.

In the contemporary period, the methods of control and influence over the OC have expanded significantly according to the changes in OC demographics, transnational migration patterns, technological innovation, economic developments, and even popular trends in culture. A new generation of OC policy for a new generation of transnational OC has given rise to a new model for OC affairs. As such, qiaowu has evolved and strengthened over the last twenty years to the extent that it has become a major influence for determining the future direction of the OC diaspora – with equally significant implications for the host and receiving countries, and of course, the OC themselves.

10.02 Consolidating Power and Eliminating Rivals

Since the Tiananmen crisis, the CPP has become increasingly confident with advancing OC affairs as a result of a broader acceptance for China and its leaders amongst the OC. The regime has tightened its grip on guiqiao and OC investors by ensuring that they serve only to further China’s economic policy, but not its political reform. For the OC outside of China, despite counter-efforts from rival political factions, alternative ideologies and gradual assimilation into local society, qiaowu has been largely successful in deterring potential threats, and unifying a heterogeneous population of the OC in support of Beijing’s interests.
As the only serious contender in challenging China’s relationship with the OC in recent years, Taiwan failed to connect with the wider OC diaspora by focusing only on Taqiao and the pro-Taiwan cohort. The PRC took advantage of this and has been successful with grounding “grand unification nationalism” sentiment amongst OC communities around the world. As a result, the majority of pro-Beijing OC refuse to accept Taiwan’s right to self-determination, and embrace the CCP discourse that places sovereignty and economic development above democratization. At the same time, laoqiao and pro-unification OC leaned even closer to Beijing as a result of Taiwanization. After the KMT retook power in 2008, the independence movement lost traction as cross-strait relations warmed.

Other rivals have been mostly rendered impotent in challenging China’s better-resourced, more attractive and generously subsidized qiaowu efforts. FLG has been largely isolated, weakened and dismissed as a cult by the CCP, while separatist movements have either been subdued or shouted down. In short, China’s qiaowu effort simply has no effective alternative. Qiaowu works to capture the hearts and minds of the OC in a pre-emptive effort to challenge rival groups, and has become the dominant force for prescribing the behaviour and direction of strategic OC groupings.

10.03 The Rise of China and the OC

Qiaowu is also a strategic investment for the CCP. This thesis has shown that with minority and rival OC groups the return has been poor; for laoqiao groups, the results quite mixed; but with xinqiao and PRC students, the CCP has made significant advancements in securing their loyalty and support. Disjuncture amongst the OC due to their place and manner of upbringing means that while some have actively sided with Beijing and are eager to forge a closer relationship with CCP leaders, many others find it difficult to reconcile aspects of PRC-defined “Chineseness” with their Westernized identity.

As such, Beijing’s new strategy targets specific cohorts of the OC community – particularly the younger, talented and ambitious OC and their associations (the ‘Three News’). Although they may not totally identify with CCP-sanctioned ideals and values because of materialism and pragmatism, PRC students and xinqiao tend to
retain patriotism and sentimentality for their homeland despite many years away. Raised under the influence of CCP rhetoric, values and nationalism, they have at least a better ‘understanding’ of modern China over laoqiao and other ethnic Chinese overseas and have the potential to align closer to China. Consequently, such individuals, groups or businesses no longer require specific instruction on how to behave, but act upon their own initiative given the appropriate opportunity and guidance.

Other OC groups still view the CCP with distrust. In targeting these groups, Beijing seeks not to indoctrinate, but to expose their membership to a ‘fresh’ perception of China in the hope that they might look towards it with renewed interest. As a result, igniting sentimental love and pride for China has attempted to cast aside (or at least dilute) any suspicions amongst them. The remaining groups of staunchly anti-CCP OC are much more difficult to deal with – thus techniques of inclusion, co-optation or coercion continue to work steadily against their interests. As the numbers of pro-Beijing OC increase as a natural consequence of migration and intensified qiaowu efforts, they have the potential to eventually dominate those groups preferring independent thought.

10.04 Implications for the World

The relationship between Beijing and the OC has implications for the rest of the world. In a globalized world of transnationalism and export labour, qiaowu serves as a useful resource for human resource planning and strategy. Many countries are experiencing ‘brain drains’ and struggle to harness the lost potential of their diasporas. This thesis provides many illustrations of how they could learn from qiaowu’s success.

Secondly, given Beijing’s policy of encouraging the OC to stay abroad for the long term, host countries should seek to better manage and engage with their migrant populations, and actively find ways of improving their integration and dealing with their related concerns (such as transnational crime and ethnic tension). Beijing remains adamant in ‘Going Out’ – preferring to promote integration through fostering friendship with locals. However, such efforts to raise the status of ‘unqualified’ OC arrivals have suffered due to lax attitudes of PRC officials towards the problem, and
often resulted in violence at the grass root s level. Unfortunately, these consequences are outweighed by the positive benefits that migration brings to China. Regional frameworks will be left with the task of putting pressure on China to contribute to ethnic stability. For example, they could take note of China’s own efforts to ‘upgrade the migrant’ to reduce the possibility for conflict. Government responses might include sponsoring induction programs in China that encourage local civic culture; alternatively, they could advance multicultural programmes amongst their own populations.

Thirdly, qiaowu shows that diasporas can play a significant role in foreign policy decision making. The OC play a role many aspects of China’s objectives abroad – whether it be a direct or indirect soft power role to improve its situation. As regional and international interests with the OC become more interwoven and complex through trade, migration and social developments, qiaowu policy also becomes more complex. The making and implementation of qiaowu policy therefore requires a cost-benefit analysis of opportunities and constraints in the international arena.

Finally, to what extent are the OC influenced by the CCP? Ultimately, the limits to the CCP’s influence over the OC lie in their own personal feelings towards China and their willingness to offer voluntary support for the regime. While the CCP would like to see OC contribution to China’s economic, social and political affairs as a demonstration of nationalistic loyalty (and hence support for the regime), the evidence shows that such participation cannot be confused with their desire to identify as being Chinese.

While many pro-Beijing groups will have no hesitation in aligning themselves with China and its leaders, other OC organizations have reached a crossroad. They can rely on internal strength to continue for as long as they can; seek support from alternative sources, such as Taiwan; or alternatively, they can attempt a stronger independent approach and simply choose aspects of Chineseness that it wishes to maintain and preserve. However, given that qiaowu is continually growing in strength, such groupings will eventually find themselves against a dominant pro-CCP effort that seeks to subsume its activities altogether. Qiaowu does not necessarily broaden the scope of OC activity and knowledge, but restricts their behaviours,
outlook and identities by promoting only aspects acceptable to the CCP. The OC have to recognize the issues and implications at hand, and make some serious decisions concerning their future aspirations. For their own sake, if the OC wish to demonstrate loyalty to their place of residence, they should continually seek to improve their reputation in society, raise their capabilities and resources on their own merits. They should not rely on, or at least selectively limit their acceptance of *qiaowu* as a primary resource for their personal and organizational development.

While co-option of the OC does not necessarily enhance the CCP’s own legitimacy, Beijing’s actions reflect upon ethnic Chinese everywhere. No matter whether they are *huaren, huaqiao, laoqiao* or *xinqiao*, their ambiguous relationship with China means that all OC are potential targets for *qiaowu*. Therefore, they may find themselves in an awkward situation of attempting to balance their allegiance between China and their host country. Historically, fears of fifth column activity surrounded OC communities during the Cold War. To maintain relations with them, Beijing welcomed the OC under conflated and blurred definitions of *huaqiao* and *huaren* so as not to officially breach the principles set down at Bandung. To a lesser degree, these suspicions have continued into the contemporary period with threats of espionage and spying for China reported regularly in the media. Beijing’s continued refusal to recognize dual nationality coupled with its issuance of ‘green cards’ for permanent residence illustrates this deliberately vague interpretation of China’s embrace for the entire OC diaspora. The OC have an obligation to ensure that fears surrounding them and their loyalty do not materialize, or else they could face a discriminatory response from their host country. Commentators have long sought to disconnect the ethnic Chinese from China and its leaders for this precise reason.

10.05 Conclusion

In attempting to harness the collective power of the OC, *qiaowu* is not merely an opportunistic attempt to take advantage of their resources. Rather, it is a strategic and pro-active approach to guiding, fostering, manipulating and influencing their behaviour for constructing an international environment friendly to China’s interests. *Qiaowu* actively creates, fosters, maintains and develops relations so that both OC and China can benefit economically, culturally and politically. Nor is *qiaowu* simply a
means of encouraging domestic development, but a tool for promoting Chinese nationalism and identity. Ultimately, qiaowu is a key component for advancing China’s strategic foreign policy.

Confidence has led to Beijing’s growing assertive stance with the OC. *Qiaowu* efforts will only continue to grow in line with China’s own re-emergence and national pride. By raising the capacity of selected elite and new migrant OC, Beijing seeks to improve China’s image in the eyes of the world as a responsible global citizen and partner. By taking advantage of its growing economy, geo-political might and its long history, a stronger PRC has prompted the OC to acknowledge the importance of being Chinese, and encouraged them to advance China’s development as part of its extended Chinese “family.” *Qiaowu*, as a pragmatic and attractive means of ‘service to the OC’ has been, and will continue to be, a significant frontline strategy for advancing China’s relationship with not only the Chinese diaspora, but also the rest of the world.
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