Politics of Islamic Jihad
Politics of Islamic Jihad

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science at the University of Canterbury

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Politics of Islamic Jihad

Abstract

This thesis argues among other things, that the concept of jihad, which represents a form of striving and endeavour- often misinterpreted in the literature as ‘holy war’- is rooted in the Qur’anic ideals and interpretations (ijtihad). However it can be extremely variable when ‘applied’ to Muslim societies in the course of history. Thus for example, the Greater and Lesser Jihads might be subject to a number of different interpretations when applied to Muslim societies deriving from (a) historical experiences and/or circumstances; (b) theological or philosophical debates; (c) differing religio-political elite formations; and (d) strategic assessments of threats and/or dangers to Islam. We demonstrate the multifaceted and variable characteristics of jihad through the use of a ‘Jihadist Wheel’. In the case of modern jihadist organizations, which we examine, reference to the Qur’an as a source of ideological guidance and inspiration has sometimes given way to what is referred to in the literature as a ‘strategic’ assessment of the realities confronting Islam. Often, as in the case of Iraq, this might lead to excessive violence and accusations of Islamic terrorism.

From an analytical standpoint this thesis argues that ‘jihadism’ and ‘terrorism’ are two different constructs in terms of motivation and goals. However the variability of the
jihadist concept when applied by Muslims under varying conflictual circumstances (i.e. threats and/or response) can sometimes add to confusion surrounding the meaning of the term and of course its identification with ‘holy war’ or ‘terrorism’.

It is hoped that this thesis will at least add some light to the current debate in the literature over the anatomy of jihadism, while seeking to provide an analytical framework for the identification and application of different forms of jihad based on the Qur’anic exegesis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Chapter- One

Introduction

1.1 Islamic Jihad: What Is It?

In the contemporary world Islam is often perceived to be aggressive, dangerous, assertive and/or expansive. These characteristics and many more are often subsumed under the broad but analytically loose definition of jihadism. But what are the dynamics of Islamic jihad and how do they manifest themselves in contemporary Islamic societies, especially in the activities of so-called jihadist organisations?

Jihad is an Arabic word (from JAHADA meaning struggle) that has become familiar to the people in the West. It is also a buzz word in Islamic and Western societies, and plays a vital role in different levels of politics in these societies. There are many Islamic fundamentalist or jihadist groups nowadays who define their struggle against their adversaries as jihad. Jihad is frequently misinterpreted in the Western media as ‘Holy War’. But the original Arabic word jihad means to strive, to exert oneself and to struggle. To struggle in the cause of Allah in a religious context may express a struggle against one’s evil inclinations or an exertion for the sake of Islam. In the Qur’an the word usually means ‘struggle’ against the unbelievers (kafir/ pl. kuffar). Sometimes the ‘jihad of the sword’ (jihad as-sayf) is called the ‘Lesser Jihad’, in contrast to the generally peaceful form named ‘the Greater Jihad’ (Figure 1, The Jihadist Wheel)* [This figure, the jihadist wheel has been developed by advice and proper guidance of my supervisor]. But today jihad is often used without any religious connotation as it has become more or less equivalent to the English word ‘crusade’.
Introduction

Figure -1

Jihadist Wheel
See below for an explanation of how it works

Lesser Jihad
In a conflict situation

Greater Jihad in a peaceful environment

Islamist religio-political activism

Da’awa

Deepening in faith

Pursuit of spiritual rewards

Spiritual Commitment

Spiritual Challenge

Suffocation of external enemies

Suppression of internal enemies

Dar as – Sulh truce with enemies

Suppression of Hypocrites munafiqin

Suppression of unbelievers (kuffar)

Suppression of polytheists

Spiritual awakening fasting & prayer

Lesser Jihad in a Conflict situation

Greater Jihad in a peaceful environment

Martydom

Deepening in faith

Da’awa

Pursuit of spiritual rewards

Spiritual Commitment

Spiritual Challenge

Suffocation of external enemies

Suppression of internal enemies

Dar as – Sulh truce with enemies

Suppression of Hypocrites munafiqin

Suppression of unbelievers (kuffar)

Suppression of polytheists

Spiritual awakening fasting & prayer
**Explanation:**

**How does the Jihadist Wheel work?** It shows, for example, that jihad is an holistic and integrated process involving conflict and/or military and spiritual struggle that can with differing political situations (i.e. peace, conflict and war) be understood to function in different ways with differing behavioural emphases. For example, with the Jihadist Wheel at approximately 11 o’clock it can be seen that martyrdom and self-sacrifice are being utilized in a potentially violent/conflictual situation, perhaps similar to the experiences currently confronting Hamas jihadists in Palestine/Israel. But at the other end of the diagonal (5 o’clock) the emphasis is rooted in the rituals associated with spiritual awakening and pious endeavour. It is, of course, theoretically possible for the jihadist committed to martyrdom to be also fully committed to spiritual awakening, the ideals of the Greater Jihad, which might lead to the goal of a successful jihadist operation. Indeed these two positions, it might be argued, could well interact in different ways in differing environments. For example, in a peaceful environment one might expect the hands on the clock from 1 to 5 to prevail by way of major emphasis. Jihad in this context might tend to reflect the values of the Greater Jihad, whereas in conflictual situations such as Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, the motivation for jihadist activity might reflect the time on the clock between 6 and 11 o’clock, or the ideals of the Lesser Jihad.

The Qur’an frequently mentions jihad (see the ‘sword verses’ in Appendix -1) and fighting against the unbelievers. For example, ‘*Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged—surely God is able to help them—who were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they say “Our lord is God.”*’¹ This verse revealed not long after the Hijra (Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE /1AH) is traditionally considered to be the first verse dealing with the fighting of the unbelievers. Many verses which exhort believers to take part in the fighting ‘with their goods and lives’ promise the reward of paradise to those who are killed through jihad² and threaten those who do not fight with severe punishments in the hereafter³. Lots of other verses deal with practical matters such as exemption from military service⁴, prohibition of fighting during the holy months⁵ and in the holy places⁶, the fate of prisoners of war⁷, safe conduct⁸ and truce⁹. However, it

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is not clear whether the Qur’an allows Muslim to fight the unbelievers only if they have the capacity, or under all circumstances. Sometimes jihad can be interpreted as an individual duty as well (see Figure-2 the Qur’anic pattern of Jihad). For example, this might be the case when the caliph (vicegerent or supreme religious leader) appoints a certain individual to participate in a raiding expedition and/or when someone takes an oath to fight the unbelievers. Moreover, in theory, jihad becomes obligatory for all Muslims capable of fighting in a certain region if that region is attacked by the enemy. In this case jihad might be seen to be a valid defence response to a perceived physical threat to the existence of the community or nation (umma al-Islamiyya).
Figure-2

Conceptual Framework of the Qur’anic Pattern of Jihad

**Greater Jihad**: Peaceful purpose, self improvement, seeking God.

**Lesser Jihad**: Aggressive, Violent.

**Jihad al- Da’awa**: Spreading Islamic Values.

**Jihad an-Nafs**: Jihad against one’s self.

**Jihad ash-Shaitaan**: Jihad against Satan.

**Jihad al-Tarbiya**: Educational Jihad.

**Jihad al- Kuffar**: Jihad against disbeliever.

**Jihad al-Munafiqueen**: Jihad against hypocrites.

**Jihad al-Faasiqeen**: Jihad against corrupt Muslims.

**Jihad al-bi-L-sayf**: Jihad with the sword.

Source: Based on discussion with my supervisor and my research work.
The most important function of the doctrine of jihad is that in theory it mobilizes and motivates Muslim to take part in wars against unbelievers as this is considered to be the fulfilment of a religious duty. Other significant characteristics of jihad are that they could be classified by place, issue and purposes. This motivation is strongly fed by the idea that those who are killed on the battlefield, called martyrs (shaheed), will go directly to paradise. When wars were fought against unbelievers, religious texts would circulates, replete with Qur’anic verses and Hadiths (reported sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) extolling the merits of fighting a jihad and vividly describing the reward waiting in the hereafter for those slain during the fighting.

Another important function of jihad was to enhance the legitimation of a ruler. After the end of the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750) the rift between Shi’ite (lit. the party of Ali, the fourth lawful caliph of Islam) and Sunni (the main orthodox group of Islam) became more vigilant. The Shi’ite demanded the restoration of the rule of Ali’s family (i.e. the caliphate) after his death, and from that demand developed the quest for Shi’ite legitimacy; this was followed by the eventual fragmentation of the Islamic community at the battle of Karbala (680). An acceptable way to acquire greater legitimacy in classical Islam was to wage jihad against unbelievers, and this was one of the main tasks of the lawfully appointed caliph. The doctrine of jihad also provided a set of rules governing relationships with the unbelieving enemies and behaviour during actual warfare, including the range of behavioural options open to the appointed ruler at any one time (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel).

1.2 Islam: Politics of Religion

In the post 9/11 period, a strong wave of anti-Islamic sentiment rolled across the United States and Western Europe. Islam was characterized as an aggressive and belligerent religion. Even more alarmingly, that militancy was on the rise within the Islamic world. However, Western, and especially US attitudes towards ‘terrorism’ were significantly broadened by 9/11 (September 11, 2001). President George W. Bush declared that the war against terrorism encompassed far more than al-Qaeda (The Base): it was a war against international terrorism.
Introduction

**Figure-3**

**Conceptual Framework:**

**Jihad and Conflict**

Source: [www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm) last access, 16/09/2005

Explanation: The concept of jihad is motivated by the religio-political ideas derived from the Qur’anic texts which is non-secular by nature. The only goal of jihad is to establish an Islamic state.

Sources, for example, include more than 100 different definitions of terrorism, a major characteristic of which is the use of violence against innocent third parties for political reasons (see Appendix-3, Definition of Terrorism). It should be noted that the term terrorism is pejorative, normative and highly subjective in value. Terrorism primarily relates to many forms of violence directed against [innocent] civilian third parties for a multiplicity of reasons, including political pressure to conform and/or submit. As an analytical tool it has obvious limitations, especially when related to concepts such as jihadism. In contrast Islamic jihadism is motivated primarily by Qur’anic religious goals and objectives some of which may lead to violence against [innocent] civilians (i.e. Lesser Jihad), while others aspects of jihad (i.e. Greater Jihad), may amount to little more than peaceful religious devotion and/or struggle against the enemies of Satan.
Most political commentators, especially in the United States and the West, really do not understand the religio-political nuances of Islamic jihadism and wrongly (as per President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address, 2001) uncritically equate ‘terrorism’ and ‘jihadism’ as being organically interrelated. Indeed while both concepts might seem to be similar in motivation and end results they are actually rooted in vastly different ideological goals and perceptions (see Appendix-3 Definition of Terrorism).

In his annual State of the Union address, (2001) President Bush stated: ‘Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist groups global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.’\textsuperscript{11} Subsequently, the United States took action against Islamist organizations such as the al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah, (see Table -1, Typology of Islamic Fundamentalist Organizations) all of whom carried out attacks against the West and world-wide Israeli and American interests.

Al-Qaeda makes no secret of its ultimate goal of universal domination in the name of Islam, and in this respect it is utterly uncompromising. In particular it sees itself at war with all Christians and Jews. Its vision is of a world united under the banner of Islam. To achieve the ultimate goal – a universal Islamic community (umma al-Islamiyya) or Dar al-Islam it is committed to revolutionary jihadism against the so-

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<td>Charismatic</td>
<td>Welfare, religio-political militias: sectarian</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
<td>Jihad: Political/Military</td>
<td>Active in Lebanese politics and along frontier with Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood (1928) Sunni</td>
<td>Regional: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Gulf Countries, North Africa</td>
<td>Devout and committed; Civil and religious</td>
<td>Welfare, religio-political cadres</td>
<td>Virtuous society and Islamic State</td>
<td>Primarily through religious education and teaching</td>
<td>Active and clandestine according to circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda (1988) Sunni and Shi‘ite</td>
<td>International: cells reported in over 60 countries</td>
<td>Charismatic</td>
<td>Hierarchical: civil-military cadres</td>
<td>Islamic International Super-State</td>
<td>Jihad: through violent military confrontation</td>
<td>Active in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia</td>
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Source: I would like to thank Dr Ron Macintyre, Political Science Programme, University of Canterbury, for allowing me to use this portion of his research.
called forces of evil, wherein the US is described as the ‘Great Satan’. As Omar ‘Abd ar-Rahman, ‘the blind Egyptian Sheikh’ and member of the radical extremist (takfiri) Gamaa al-Islamiyya said after the first World Trade Centre bombing in New York (1993), which he helped to engineer:

There is no solution for our problems except jihad for the sake of God…. There’s no solution, there’s no treatment, there’s no medicine, there’s no cure except with what was brought by the Islamic method which is jihad for the sake of God…. We welcome being terrorists …. And the Qur’an makes it, terrorism, among the means to perform jihad for the sake of Allah, which is to terrorize the enemies of God who are enemies, too.12

In this speech there is an implied linkage between terrorism and the realisation of jihadist ideals. Indeed from his perspective it might be argued that jihad legitimises the uses of violence in what is perceived to be a just war against the enemies of God. Thus for ‘Abd ar-Rahman jihad was more than prayer and fasting, it entailed bullets and bombs or the seeds of violence against the perceived forces of oppression (see Figures 3 and 4.)

Introduction

Figure - 4

Conceptual Framework of the Political Pattern of Jihad

1) Religious Jihad and Jihad an-nafs: Jihad against one’s self to inner and spiritual development. (Greater Jihad)

2) Social Jihad: Jihad al-Da’wa and Jihad al-Tarbiya- Spreading of Islamic values and educational jihad. (Greater Jihad)

3) Jihad al-Kuffar: Jihad against the disbeliever. (Lesser Jihad)

4) Jihad al-Munafiqueen: Jihad against hypocrities. (Lesser Jihad)

5) Jihad al-Faasiqeen: Jihad against corrupt Muslim. (Lesser Jihad)

6) Jihad bi-L-saif: Jihad with the sword. (Lesser Jihad)

7) Jihad ash-shaitaan: Jihad against the Satan. (Lesser Jihad) [As the United States and Israel are the satans].

Source: Based on my research work.
Islamic jihadists like Omar ‘Abd ar-Rahman or Osama bin Laden have been predicting for years that there would a great apocalypse that would involve the slaughter of infidel collaborationist governments and their ignorant masses. Why do they feel threatened? Maybe they are seeking an ideological pretext for rallying Muslims in a universal crusade against their political adversaries, seen in terms of a threat to Islam. (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Maybe they believe that pro-US or Americanised Muslim governments conspire to deceive and seduce the Muslim world and ride the Christian Crusader (salibiyin) horse against Islam. Maybe the apocalyptic war will lead to the re-conquest of Rome and all of Europe and America by Islam.13

In his fatwa (advisory legal opinion), ‘Declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia]’, Osama bin Laden went beyond threats against America and Israel to also threaten Arab leaders who collaborate with them. The Royal House of Saudi Arabia was singled out for having failed to expel the ‘polytheists’ (mushrikun) from its country.14 After 9/11, bin Laden explained that the events that transpired that day made it clear that ‘the West in general, led by America, bears an unspeakable Crusader grudge against Islam’. He described the actions of the hijackers as messages that resounded throughout the world, and were leading to mass conversions of infidels to Islam in China, Holland and even in America. The plight of the West was just retribution for ‘the tragedy of al-Andalus’, the defeat of the Muslims in Spain by Christian armies in 1492, and the

abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.\textsuperscript{15} Thus in theory bin Laden’s war is directed against the entire Judeo-Christian world and is an attempt to re-establish the caliphate and spread Islam throughout the world. Bin Laden’s campaign recognizes no limits on the methods to be employed in bringing about that Islamic world.

The concept of jihad is philosophically related to Islamic religious ideals that are rooted in the Qur’an, the Sunna (authoritative example of the way in which Muslims should live) and the traditions of classical Islam. These might be said to have impacted upon the daily lives of Muslims in both pragmatic and spiritual ways, historically and in the present. By virtue of its importance in the lives of Muslims jihad might well be regarded as the Sixth Pillar of Islam. Yet in the course of history this concept has evolved in keeping with the changing face and declining fortunes of states and peoples within the Islamic world. Even today it continues to ‘metastasise’ by virtue of its religio-politico-ideological manipulation by jihadist organisations, such as Hamas, the significance of which we will examine in Chapter 4.

From an analytical perspective jihadism is a highly specific ideological concept rooted in (a) the Qur’an and the Sunna; (b) historical and pragmatic experiences of Muslims, and (c) spiritual commitment of individual Muslims as a normal requirement of their faith. However Western and even some Muslim scholars, notwithstanding certain ideological biases, tend to see jihadism often uncritically as simply an ideology related to the needless pursuit of violence, unrest and uncertainty in the lives of Muslim peoples and governments (see literature analysis below). This

often leads to great distortions (especially in the Western media) in which violence per se is often equated with terrorism and lurid aspects of Islamic punishments (hudud). This is often inadequately described as Islamic ‘fundamentalism’. However, it might be argued that the concept of jihadism is a multifaceted process, religiously based in the Qur’an and related to the historical and environmental experiences of Muslims since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, in theory, jihad might be seen to be an extremely variable concept that under certain circumstances might oscillate between peace and conflict in the lives of Muslims depending on the historic circumstances confronting the Islamic community (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). While Qur’anic texts (e.g. the ‘sword verses’) as variously interpreted might provide a framework for struggle or action, the nature of the response at any one time might be determined more by the type of environment and the perceived threat confronting Muslims in the daily lives than a strictly literalist interpretation of Qur’anic texts. Even here the variability of the concept when applied might be determined more by the nature of the ruling religio-political elites and their experiences in the every day life of the people (see Chapter 4).

1.3 Literature Review:

In classical Islam there are two main types of jihad: (a) the Greater Jihad and (b) the Lesser Jihad, with an overlapping relationship between them (see Figure-1, the Jihadist Wheel). While primarily Western scholars have made valuable contributions through research on aspects of international terrorism, the concept of Islamic jihad has not been well understood and /or defined in terms of its basic components. Sometimes in the case of Western scholars the concept of Islamic jihad has been
loosely and uncritically identified with either Islamic terrorism or simply international terrorism. The organic relationship between the two, however, remains somewhat imprecise other than through the vague notion that violence somehow permeates both constructs. In the section below we will briefly examine the methodologies of a selected and limited sample of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars with reference to how they perceive, interpret and apply the concept of jihad in their various studies.

1.3.1.a) Theoretical and Philosophical Concept of Jihad: Islamic School of Thought

Among Muslim scholars we can find huge conceptual differences relating to theoretical definitions of jihad. In his book, Jurisprudence in Muhammad’s Biography (1413AH) the Azhar scholar (Cairo) Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti argues that in Islam jihad is basically an ‘offensive’ war, and does not take into consideration whether it is ‘defensive’. Its only goal is the exaltation of the word of Allah’s Kingdom on earth regardless of the means. By this way he clearly advocates the offensive type of jihad. Egyptian Muslim and jihadist scholar, Sayyid Qutb (d.1966) notes four stages in the development of jihad. In Milestones (1964), he argues that each stage will be replaced by the next stage in this order but the fourth stage will remain permanent because this will be the final stage of universal caliphate. In his other works, Basic Principles of the Islamic World View (Trans.2006), In the Shade of the Qur’an (1954), Islam and Universal Peace (1951), The Religion of Islam (n.d. after 1954), Social Justice in Islam (1949) and World Peace and Islam (1951) he has selected a number of verses from the Qur’an and formulated a theory of offensive jihad or violent struggle. He envisages a revolutionary vanguard (talith) meeting in conflict with the forces of the jahiliyya and through the grace of Allah finally
achieving a universal caliphate under the sovereignty of Allah. We might observe that this is an extreme interpretation of jihad resulting from Qutb’s somewhat paranoid view of the world.

Indian Muslim revivalist Abu’l A la Maududi rejects any distinction between offensive and defensive jihad. For him jihad is part of the overall defence of Islam. His views are broadly similar to those of Qutb. Maududi’s vision of jihad had been influenced by the colonial problems of India. In his book, *Jihad in Islam* (1981) he argues that jihad has been totally misunderstood because ‘Islam requires the earth- not just a portion, but the whole planet’.\(^\text{16}\) To alter the old tyrannical social system and establish a new just order of life by the power of sword is called jihad. His view of jihad was shaped by the nature of his environment and by the historical process (i.e. partition) of the subcontinent in the 20th century. In his other book *Towards Understanding Islam* (3rd ed. 1998) he also argues that, successful jihad, notwithstanding the use of violence against non-Muslims, might lead to the sharia-type state, which was the goal of successful jihad. In his book *Islam and Nationalism* (1984), Ali M. Naqavi argues, according to the Qur’anic dictates, that Muslims have a universal mission, not a national one and jihad is the only way to accomplish that mission. Naqavi’s primary arguments promote the role of nationalism in Islam but apart from that he advocates an offensive type of jihad.

Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) in his treatise on jihad, makes literal use of the Qur’an and hadith to support his philosophy of establishing a universal caliphate. For him jihad is ‘obligatory for every Muslim’

\(^{16}\) Abul A’la Maududi, *Jihad in Islam* (Kuwait: IIFSO) 1981, p.6
Introduction

(farida)\textsuperscript{17} as it contributes to the growth of Islamic consciousness in society, which is a necessary foundation for Islamic government. He also argues that jihad and \textit{qital} (killing) are used interchangeably to mean the use of force. Al-Banna begins his treatise by quoting from Qur’anic sura 2:216 (al-Baqara): ‘Fighting is obligatory to you, much as you dislike it.’ But he does not cite the tolerant verse from Qur’anic sura 109: 6 (al-Kafirun) ‘You have your religion and I have mine.’ He concludes, ‘Allah has obliged Muslim to fight… to secure the pursuit of al-da’wa (spreading of the faith) and thus of peace, while disseminating the great mission which God entrusted to them.’\textsuperscript{18} Ideologically al-Banna favours an activist view of jihad so that any derogation from the ideal of maximum struggle might lead to a lower degree of religio-political commitment in the interests of Islamic government. Thus like Qutb and Maududi political necessities shaped al-Banna’s ideological and philosophical perceptions of jihad.

Contemporary Pakistani Muslim scholar Fazlur Rahman in his work, \textit{Islam} (1979), recognizes the extensive presence of jihad in the Qur’an, and rejects the stand of modern Muslim apologists such as Rudolph Peters who have tried to explain that jihad is purely a defensive term only used by the early Muslims. He emphasizes the belief that Islam’s fundamental assumption of world sovereignty must be in the hands of the Muslims. Majid Khadduri in his work, \textit{War and Peace in the Law of Islam} (1969) argues that ‘Jihad is the peak of religion’. After Islam became supreme in Arabia it embarked on a ceaseless war of conquest in the name of the faith. Furthermore jihad was employed as an instrument for religious conquest and the establishment of an imperial world state. However his study fails to analyse the

\textsuperscript{17} Hasan al-Banna, \textit{Majmu’at rasail al-imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna}, new legal ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Da’wa) 1990, p.275

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p.276
concept of jihad, especially in terms of the nature of the relationship between offensive and defensive jihad. For example, do these terms operate independently or do they have levels of philosophical and ideological interaction, which might determine the nature of religio-political behaviour both of the Islamic state and the individual Muslim?

Assaf Moghadam in his article, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology”\(^{19}\) argues that accurately labelling the nature of Salafi-jihadist doctrine as a religious ideology is not merely an exercise in academic theorizing, but has important policy implications, because confronting Salafi-Jihadists on religious grounds is highly problematic. They draw from the same religious sources, albeit selectively and stubbornly, that influences the lives and practices of over a billion other Muslims. Assaf argues that a closer look at what makes the Salafi Jihad an ideology reveals that a more proper term to describe the Salafi Jihad would be a religious ideology. Ideologies have an explanatory function whereby they attempt to raise awareness among a certain group that a particular problem deserves their attention. Salafi Jihadists attempt to raise political awareness of Muslims (especially in Iraq) that their religion is under threat or on a wane. Salafi Jihadists present a programme of action, namely jihad, which is understood in military terms. Martyrdom is extolled as the ultimate way in which jihad can be waged hence the proliferation of suicide attacks among Salafi Jihadist groups. In The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (2008), he argues that it should be ‘obvious’ that the United States and the West are not facing Islam per se as their main enemy, but an extremist ideology, which employs religious rhetoric and symbols to advance their

cause. In *The Roots of Terrorism* (2006) he provides a broad overview of the root causes of terrorism but because his main emphasis was on terrorism and he views jihad as a religious ideology, thus the nature of jihad and its relationship to ‘terrorism’ was not discussed.

1.3.1.b) Application of Jihad: Islamic View

For more than a decade, militant Islamists have confronted the West but yet the West has failed to understand who or what their adversary is. Fawaz A. Gerges in *Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy* (2006) examines the ways in which jihadist manipulate Qur’anic doctrines and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad for their propaganda machine. His other books *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (2005), *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* (1999) and *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967,* (1994) show why militant Islam has never seemed more relevant given that its protagonists have made it abundantly clear that they now have a far more dangerous agenda than previously faced. These books help us to see jihad solely in terms of a violent response to a specific given situation. But like other theorists Gerges fails to perceive jihad as a holistic process, which includes a totality of philosophical and ideological responses deriving from the nature of the environment: whether it is hostile or friendly; whether Muslims constitute a majority or minority; whether the state is responsive or unresponsive to the ideological commitment of the jihadists and whether the jihadists gain popular approval for their chosen course of action. Ed Husain’s *The Islamist* (2007) is a protest against political Islam. He explains how radical Islam or the concept of jihadism exploits the minds of our young generations. Therefore, what makes them receptive? As we have seen, psycho-jihadism seems to
be a product of a radical Islamist environment such as Iraq, Palestine or Afghanistan. However, through the internet it can quickly spread to less conflict prone regions of the world and metastasise into other areas of social, economic or political struggle. Faisal Devji argues Al-Qaeda and its jihad are only the most visible manifestations of wider changes in the Muslim world. In *Landscapes of the Jihad* (2005) he argues that jihad assumes its universality primarily through the mass media rather than by local traditional schools, lineage or Muslim authority.

1.3.1.c) Jihad: Reformist View

*Orientalism* (1978) by the late Edward Said discusses, among other things, why and how we form differing perceptions of Islam, in the context of Middle East societies. He argues compellingly that inherent [orientalist] biases and prejudices obscure our understanding both of Islam and jihadism and reduce them to meaningless clichés that are often perceived to violently threaten the fabric of Western societies. This so-called gap of perception distorts rather than enhances our perception and is all too-common in terms of the current discourse on Islamic jihadism.

An example of what neo-Orientalists would call an apologetic approach to jihad is Noorani’s book *Islam and Jihad: Prejudice versus Reality* (2002). Noorani has argued that ‘the so-called Islamic fundamentalist is an impostor. He has misused a noble faith as a political weapon. Of course, Islam does have a political vision, but it is far removed from the Islam which very many Muslims and non-Muslims imagine it to be.’  

His argument on jihad is theologically based on the Qur’anic concept of Greater Jihad. His writing reminds us that the majority of Muslims love peace, and

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that ‘terrorist’ actions shock them no less than us. However, Noorani does not tell us why a Muslim minority wish to ‘immolate’ (i.e. sacrifice or martyrdom) themselves by their idea of jihad. He does not argue like other Islamists that self-sacrifice in the way of Allah is necessary for the defence of Islam.

In *Why Muslims Rebel* (2003) Hafez suggests that the political oppression of Muslims has caused their rebellions. But how jihad plays any role in this process or how we can apply the multifaceted nature of jihad was left unanswered. His analysis ends in blaming external repressive and exclusionist factors, but if we wish to understand why these rebels transform Islam into a political ideology of rebellion, we would again be left without an answer.

1.3.2.a) Western Political View of Jihad: Twentieth Century and after 9/11

Scholars like Amin Saikal or John L. Esposito observe that the relations between West and Islam have grown tense, especially since the infamous 9/11 incident. Saikal in his book *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation* (2003), argues that because of the nature of the problem, US military might is not enough to win over the ‘war on terrorism’ as it must be accompanied by a political strategy to address those issues. Esposito argues that Islam like Judaism and Christianity rejects ‘terrorism’, suggesting that some people (whom we might call jihadists) manipulate Islam as a political tool in order to change their society and oppose imperialism. Esposito has written short histories of Islam which, however, have remained rather detached from the rest of his argument. In *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam* (2002), he argues that the mainstream Islamic activists believe that the restoration of Muslim power and prosperity requires a return to Islam (i.e. the spiritual values that derive
from the Qur’an, which were extant in the lives of the companions (sahabah) and followers of the Prophet), a political or social revolution to create more Islamically oriented states or societies. He argues that some Muslim organizations believe jihad will liberate Muslims at home and abroad because jihad is the perceived vehicle for the realisation of the Qur’anic ideals of Islam. In *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, (2002) Esposito discusses the nature of Islamic fundamentalism and its relationship with the West, which he perceives to be offensive. Esposito also discusses the different types of jihad such as Greater Jihad or Lesser Jihad, but the linkage between the two in the context of the modern jihadist discourse needs refinement.

On the other hand, Beverley Milton-Edwards focuses on the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in relation to the colonial past of Islam. In her books, *Islamic Fundamentalism: Since 1945* (2005) and *Conflicts in the Middle East: Since 1945* (2001) [with Peter Hinchcliffe] she argues on the effect of colonialism on Islam and internal problems of the Islamic world such as secularism, violence, globalisation etc. However she is less concerned with an analysis of the anatomy of jihadism than the actual impact of jihadism on contemporary Islamic societies, which she identifies with violent characteristics of a few extremist organisations and states.

In *Understanding Terror Networks* (2004) Marc Sageman summarizes the origins and evolution of what he calls the global Salafi-jihad. He defines the nature of Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations, which he argues are limited to specific jihads seeking to liberate specific lands. Furthermore, the roots of the global jihad are Egyptian, not Saudi or Afghani. Sageman concludes that social bonds play a more important role in
the emergence of global Salafi jihadism. He argues that one of the most popular religious explanations is simply that Muslims have strayed from the righteous path. Recapturing the glory and grandeur of the golden age requires a return to the authentic faith of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, the Salaf. The revivalist versions of Islam advocating such a return are called Salafi. Their strategy is the creation of a pure Islamist state, which would create the conditions for the reestablishment of such a community, he argued.

Gabriele Marranci suggests that is why we need to understand how human beings form their identities, since a Muslim identity is no more than one of the many expressions of human identity. In his book, *Jihad Beyond Islam* (2006) he also argues that jihad is a highly charged word often mistranslated as holy war which has become synonymous with terrorism such as the 9/11 incident. Clearly some Western scholars have failed to understand the religio-political and historical complexities of jihad. The result of this has led to the concept being variously and loosely interpreted in the light of ideological and political biases. Marranci demonstrated that some radical Muslims do not uphold jihadist ideals because they are Muslims but rather they feel Muslim because of their commitment to jihad. Indeed Muslims do not need to know very much about Islam at the theological level to develop their rhetoric of jihad. In *Muslims in the West*, (1997) and *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam*, (2002) Gilles Kepel argues that some Muslims living in the West have already developed a monolithic and ideological representation of the West and by contrast, a self-representation of their identity as monolithically Muslim. Therefore it is not surprising that the concept of jihad has developed an independent life beyond the classical theological Islamic understanding. While the outward characteristics of jihad may
entail some form of violence, the philosophical and ideological underpinnings associated with the concept as perceived in different environments (i.e. peaceful or conflictual) is lacking in this methodology.

In *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (2002) Rohan Gunaratna sheds light on Al Qaeda’s financial infrastructure and how the organisation trains combat soldiers and vanguard fighters for multiple guerrillas, terrorist and semi-conventional campaigns in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus and the Balkans. He also investigates the clandestine Al-Qaeda operational network in the West. But he does not examine interesting theoretical questions relating to the development of Islamic jihadism within the framework of the nation state. He assumes that modern jihadists draw inspiration from the Qur’anic (i.e. ‘sword verses’ – see Appendix-1) which motivates their actions to struggle against the forces of darkness (i.e. US and Israel). But he does not show any organic links between the two forms of jihad (Greater or Lesser) and offers no real explanation how the various categories and oscillations of our Jihadist Wheel (see Figure1) might operate within Islamic societies with differing levels of secularisation, including political and economic development. For example, what might tilt the Jihadist Wheel towards violence and spiritual fulfilment associated with the peaceful resolution of conflict.

1.3.2.b) Western Philosophical View of Jihad: Before 9/11

In *Islam and International Relations* (1965) [Harris Proctor ed.] contributors argued that Islam as a religion per se was an ideologically inconsistent factor in terms of the international relations of Muslim states, especially during the Cold War when some Muslim states were pro-US (Jordan) while others (Egypt for a while and Syria) were
pro-USSR. At that time jihad was not studied systematically as a tool of Muslim state behaviour in international relations. The contributors probably thought that Islam would continue to lessen as a factor in international relations as states became more secular in orientation.

Majid Khadduri in his chapter in Harris Proctor argues that, ‘The Islamic theory of international relations is to be found neither in the Qur’an nor in the Prophet Muhammad’s utterances, although its basic assumptions were derived from these authoritative sources.’\(^{21}\) It was rather the product of Muslim speculation at a time when the Islamic Empire had reached its full development. In this context ‘jihad was accordingly a form of religious propaganda carried out by spiritual as well as by material means’\(^{22}\)

In *Muhammad: A Western Attempt to Understand Islam* (1992), Karen Armstrong attempts to offer a picture of Muhammad which facilitates a profound understanding of Islam and the people who adhere to it so strongly. In dealing with Muhammad’s war policy against Mecca (c.622-630), she asks how far Islam should be considered a religion of the sword. While analysing his major political achievements in uniting the tribes of Arabia she explores the reasons why Muslims regard political activity as a religious duty. At the same time she asks why Muslims tend to see worldly success as a sign of God. This book helps us to understand the religious motivation of jihad. In this context Muhammad was seen to be responding to perceived threats to the umma al-Islamiyya. Jihad was therefore a process which was adapted to meet the needs of


\(^{22}\) *Ibid.*
the Islamic community as it evolved to confront the challenges besetting it. However, little is said about the modern application of jihadism.

1.3.3) Western View: Jihad as Terrorism

In his edited book, *The Just War and Jihad: Violence in Judaism, Christianity & Islam* (2006) R. Joseph Hoffmann argues that religion itself with its conflicting images of the gods and their demands are the primary cause of conflict, war and violence. He asks if violence is an historical condition affecting all religious movements, or are some religions more prone to violence than others. He concludes that it is not a clash of civilizations but a conflict of belief systems that is at the heart of the present crisis. A conflict between those who believe the world is best understood as the work of a divine being who reveals his ‘will’ in sacred writings, and those who believe these writings to be products of human imagination. The book adopts a multidisciplinary approach to the subject of religious violence and its root causes. The contributors simply see jihad as a worst possible violent form of Islam. In *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (2005) Andrew G. Bostom depicts Muslim justification for jihad and its worldwide impact that extended over thirteen centuries of war. The intention of his work was clear from the very first page where he poses three different quotations. (1) ‘…Before Mohammed, there is blackness, slavery, exploitation. After Mohammed, there is light…but did it? (V. S. Naipaul)  
(2) ‘…there is a profound moral difference between the use of force for liberation and the use of force for conquest. (Ronald Reagan)  
(3)…Is the call for jihad …a human rights violation (Dr. John Garang).’ Bostom also argues that

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24 Ibid
25 Ibid
Islam expanded in the eighth or ninth centuries and regarding this expansion, little is said about jihad yet it all happened through war. *The Legacy of Jihad* reveals how jihad was waged against non-Muslims and that those who survived those campaigns became forced tributaries in lieu of being slain. The organic meaning of jihad was still unanswered.

Steven Emerson in his book, *American Jihad: The Terrorist Living Among Us* (2002) argues that the true nature of Islam and the roots of the militant tradition are inseparable. With Islam there is no separation of church and state. Because in Islam the sacred and the secular are one, the battle of who rules society is far more intense and is fought as an all or nothing affair. In addition the word jihad has a special meaning every time it is mentioned in the Qur’an. It means fighting only, fighting with the sword. This seems to be a somewhat myopic view of the concept, as we will argue jihad was a social necessity for the Muslims over the period. In *Inside Terrorism* (1999) Bruce Hoffman has provided us with an analysis of the essentials of international terrorism and its global practice since World War Two. Hoffman’s observation of jihad was very loose and uncritical because he put more emphasis on the definition of terrorism and its political and ideological linkage. His vision of jihad has been mixed up with either Islamic terrorism or simply international terrorism. In contrast our thesis argues that jihadism reflects a critical interaction between offensive and defensive forms deriving from Qur’anic interpretation.

In her study, Louise Richardson investigates *What Terrorists Want: Understanding The Terrorist Threat* (2006) delves into the minds of terrorists and demonstrates that they are not crazed criminals but rational, ideological actors willing to exploit their
own weaknesses to maximum effect. Her study helps to understand some philosophical dilemmas of a terrorist and of a jihadist mind. For example: jihadists are often thinking creative individuals (both men and women) whose devotion to Islam has been politicised by the nature of the struggle in which they find themselves in contemporary society. There is a certain distinction with a non-religious terrorist in terms of motivation and, of course, ultimate rewards, which the jihadist naturally seeks in paradise. We will examine the implications of this motivation with reference to Hamas in chapter 4.

In, *The Age of Terrorism* (1987), Walter Laqueur discusses the concept of terrorism, including a study of national and international violence. He defines terrorism as a political tool and provides a systematic global survey of the major terrorist groups, their motives and ideologies, modes of operations and aims. This is an interesting study that enables us to conceptualise patterns of terrorism and their relationship with forms of Islamic jihadism, which he defines as Islamic terrorism. He assumes that all Muslims are violent and jihad is simply a pretext for violence. It contains certain inherent biases by uncritically identifying Islam with terrorism and the ongoing struggle against Israel and the US. In this context all Muslims are potential jihadists. To some extent he is technically right in the sense that all Muslims are committed to struggle in various ways though mostly peaceful. But the reality is quite different because jihad has been used by Muslims over the period for their various needs and we will discuss this issue more fully in Chapters 3 and 4.

In *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Control, (1990)* editor Charles W. Kegley, Jr. argues that there is a common tendency amongst Western scholars to
unsophistically equate jihadism with terrorism in general, as if they were different sides of the same coin. However it is our argument that jihadism can be both variables in terms of its application and in terms of its objectives which it might seek to achieve within the course of history. Thus if violence does occur it might be motivated by religious inclinations and operate within certain clearly defined religious parameters. Terrorism is often linked politically to secular nationalist goals and objectives. This, it could be argued is the basic philosophical distinction between national terrorism and jihadism which a number of authors fail to identify.

*Terrorism How the West can Win (1986)*, edited by Benjamin Netanyahu. This book (by a pro-Zionist author – also previous Israel prime minister whose objectivity is suspect from the first page) offers a comprehensive, reasoned analysis of terrorism as a phenomenon, a startling dissection of the West’s weakness towards terrorism, and a practical, *sober* strategy for meeting terrorism’s challenge. He observes that Islamic terrorism and jihadism are part and parcel of the same hostile package directed against Israel and the US who are perceived by the author as the paragons of virtue in a sea of darkness. This approach tends to obscure rather than enlighten and explain the processes associated with the activities of Islamic jihadism.

In *All The Troubles Terrorism, War and The World After 9/11 (2004)*, Simon Adams discusses global politics and our world of terrorism and war after 9/11. As the one remaining world superpower, US foreign policy towards different Muslim countries inevitably occupies a central role in this analysis. But discussion about the basic philosophy or root causes of jihad was again studiously neglected. The reason is not hard to fathom. Most pro-Israeli or pro-US scholars would tend to see terrorism and
jihadism as being different sides of the same coin, epitomised by al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah etc.

In *Al Qaeda: and What it Means to be Modern* (2003) John Gray seriously questions the view that the human condition can be remade by science and political engineering. He argues that Al Qaeda is a product of modernity and of globalisation and it will not be the last group to use the products of the modern world in its own monstrous way. This is a good book to examine the anatomy of terrorism in a hi-tech era but it fails to draw any basic distinction (i.e. philosophical and political) between terrorism and jihadism in modern world politics. Violence, whatever its application, in whatever situation is uncritically assumed to have potentially terroristic objectives. And given the pejorative nature of terrorism when applied, the linkage to jihadism must inevitably lead to the assumption that jihadism is a particularly violent process to be denounced. The logic of course requires a good deal of correction which we address in this thesis.

The collapse of communism and the rise of militant Islamic movements in the Middle East have raised the spectre of a future dominated by a conflict between Islam and the West. (e.g. Huntington) In his book *Islam & the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (1996), Fred Halliday sets out to reject such interpretations. He provides a critical but cautious reassessment through a consideration of the sources of Islamic militancy and an analysis of the confrontational rhetoric of both Islamic and anti-Muslim demagogues. However Halliday fails to provide us with a conceptual framework of jihad and its root causes because his study fails to differentiate the philosophical and political differences
between terrorism and jihadism. In, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (1999) Rabbi Firestone discusses the Qur’anic text of jihad with reference to the early period of Islam when the landscape of jihad was completely different. However his approach to prove the violent nature of jihad was uni-dimensional.

In his books *Militant Islam Reaches America* (2002), or *Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System* (1981), and *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (1983) Daniel Pipes tries to focus on militant Islam and its ideological definition, and by doing so he also raises some interesting questions. For example: (1) Is Islam a threat? (2) Does poverty cause militancy? (3) Do moderate Islamist exist? By attempting to find the answers to these questions he observes that, ‘about one in every eight Muslims worldwide supports militant Islam. Militant Islam distinguishes itself from any other contemporary political movement in the magnitude of its ambitions.’ He argues that, terrorism, in other words, is just one dimension of a war but militant Islam has many fronts and takes many forms. Violence is an important symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. Finally he asserts that the enemy in this war is not terrorism but militant Islam. Clearly he fails to differentiate between militant Islam and jihadism. Bernard Lewis, in *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (2003), and *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (2002) argues that Western inability to understand the culture and civilization of the Middle East leads the anger and mistrust for both parties. Both of his studies deal with a mainly historical perspective of the Middle East problem and provide us with some theoretical components of the concept of civilizational clash. Again, his concept of jihad is highly biased by the Western thought of Islamic terrorism. In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World*
Order (1996), Samuel P. Huntington provides us with a framework for a future war of civilisations between Islam and the West but does not appear to ask the critical question about the role of jihad in the unfolding drama. He believes that the inevitability of civilisational clash is directly related to the aggressive nature of the Western and Islamic civilizations which is rooted in their religious heritages. No doubt his theory injects more fuel in jihadism as because Islam believes the constant battle between Dar-al Islam and Dar al- Harb. Huntington seems to believe that one of the major axioms of Islam is jihadism, referred to in a totally unsophisticated way as militancy along the ‘fault lines’. But he fails to highlight the nuances of the concept as might be applied in the context of Islamic history. Indeed his research in this area leads one to question his ability to predict such far reaching conflict. While Islamic jihad certainly has offensive and defensive characteristics as our research has shown, it would be wrong to assume uniformity of understanding within the Dar al-Islam on this issue, far less its application in the form of civilisational war.

Matthew Levitt dissects Hamas’ international support network in his study Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (2006). He demonstrates that the charitable and social components of Hamas are inseparable from what he assumes to be its true ‘terrorist’ nature. But as we have argued, depending on circumstances jihad might be utilised as a separate social and humanitarian requirement in the lives of the Palestinian people. This form of jihad has been adapted by Muslims throughout history to meet differing needs. In Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement (2007) Zaki Chehab shows how Hamas developed with the implicit encouragement of the Israelis, who wanted to weaken Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement. Like Hizbollah in neighbouring Lebanon, Hamas built a formidable
social base in Palestine through its jihadist welfare programme. He also explains why the people of Palestine are receptive to Hamas’ policy of armed struggle (including the preparation of martyrs) because jihadism can assume differing images which imply a degree of interaction deriving from the process of religious commitment. In our discussion about Hamas (chapter 4) I dispute the fact that he fully understands Hamas’ commitment to jihadist process. He does not see jihad as a process reflecting the needs of the Palestinian people at any particular time and that recourse to violence, while it may be one part of the jihadist response, is related to the nature of environmental challenges besetting Hamas rather than the direct by-product of its violent interpretation of jihad.

The late twentieth century saw the emergence of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979; the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca 1979 and 9/11 [2001], the event that shook the world. The roots of 9/11 can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century, being manifested in the rise of Islamic [political] fundamentalism from the 1970s. Jihadism might be seen as a religio-political ideology closely associated with heightened Islamic re-assertiveness in the modern world. Muhammad Ayoob’s (ed.), Politics of Islamic Reassertion (1981) was an early attempt to follow the history and spread of this new political-religious phenomenon described as Islamic fundamentalism. The activist nature of Islamic societies was clearly identified but this was seen to derive from differing social, economic and political experiences confronting Islamic societies. In a sense jihad was interpreted as a form of Islamic ‘reassertiveness’ deriving from differing and unique historic and pragmatic circumstances confronting Islamic societies. As an
applied ideology rooted in Qur’anic ideals, jihad took many and different forms when applied politically to diverse situations confronting Muslims.

The aim of this thesis is to examine theoretically and empirically the concept of Islamic jihad as a means of understanding the underlying motivation of Islamic militancy and political extremism in the contemporary world. We believe that the literature surveyed has not adequately addressed this problem because of its less than rigorous interpretation of jihad. The thesis will also attempt to examine, (a) the origins of jihad; (b) historical interpretations of jihad; (c) an application of the politics of jihad in the modern Islamic state with particular reference to Hamas.

Therefore in our plan of the study, chapter two will examine the theoretical framework of jihad, chapter three will deal with origin and historical approach of jihad, chapter four will examine our case study of Hamas and chapter five will be conclusion.
Chapter –Two

Framework for Understanding:
Theoretical Concept of Jihad in Islam

2.1 Definition and Evolution of Jihad in Islam

As we have seen, the core concept of Islamic belief system is based on patterns of Dar al-Islam or realm of Islam and Dar al-Harb or realm of war. Islamic fundamentalism (or Islamism) divides the world into realms of absolute good and absolute evil, and claims exclusive possession of divine truth. It is the religious obligation of all Muslims to wage war, literally, until the whole world has been brought under Islamic rule (Dar al-Islam). In theory, they (Islamists) oppose any kind of secularism (based on material science), which they perceive to be responsible for the totally unacceptable ideas of pluralism, both religious and nonreligious. This chapter examines the meaning and purpose of Jihad in Islam.

The word jihad comes from the Arabic verb jahada, which as Lane in his Arabic-English Lexicon points out, means ‘He strove, laboured, or toiled; exerted himself or his power or efforts or endeavours or ability’¹ Jihad, Lane continues ‘properly signifies using or exerting, one’s utmost power, efforts, endeavours, or ability, in contending with an object of disapprobation, and this of three kinds, namely, a visible enemy, the devil, and one’s

¹E.W.Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, (Beirut, 1968), Vol.2 p.473
self. All of which are included in the Qur’an sura (chapter) 22:78. In the course of history jihad came to be used somewhat imprecisely by Muslims to emphasize behavioral concepts such as ‘he fought, warred, or waged war, against unbelievers and the like.’

Some Muslim scholars classify jihad more precisely into different categories such as: 1) Jihad-an-nafs or Jihad against one’s self; 2) Jihad ash-shaitaan or Jihad against Satan; 3) Jihad al-kuffar or jihad against the unbelievers; 4) Jihad al-munafiqueen or Jihad against hypocrites; 5) Jihad al-faasiqeen or Jihad against corrupt Muslims; 6) Jihad al-tarbiya or educational Jihad; 7) Jihad al-da’wa or spreading of Islamic values; and 8) al-Jihad bi-as-sayf or Jihad with the sword (see Figures 2 and 4). In every language certain words may have a number of different meanings depending on their usage. We shall examine the meaning of jihad in the context of a) Islamic history, b) Qur’anic and Hadith references and c) scholarly interpretations of it.

2.2 Historical Meaning of Jihad

Jihad as Islamic holy war is probably either a Western or ill-informed perception of jihad in the course of Islamic history. Practically the concept has varied with differing historical epochs (i.e. no consistency) depending on the strength and commitment of Muslim empires, states and latterly jihadist organizations (e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon at the moment etc). Thus there has been no consistency in terms of the application of the concept (i.e. Lesser Jihad) in the course of Islamic history.

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Theoretically, Jihad means wars against non-Muslims (*Dar al-Harb*) since Muslims are forbidden to fight each other. Of course it may also apply to hypocrites who could be Islamic. (E.g. today Osama bin Laden and the view that Saudi Arabia equates to Americanized Islam i.e. hypocrites). Early Islamic civilization spread in the Arabian Peninsula by a series of battles and was primarily offensive in nature. As many as 78 historic battles were fought by the Prophet Muhammad himself, and only one (the Battle of the Ditch) battle was a truly ‘defensive’ war. By implication the rest were simply ‘offensive’ by nature. For example, Muslim soldiers in Syria, Spain, North and Western Africa, Persia, Egypt and India (c.8th century) became part of a victorious religious crusade committed to the spread of Islam through peaceful struggle and more frequently military conquest. Thus defensive and offensive interaction with subject peoples became an integral part of the process of conquest or jihad. Islam also spread peacefully through conversion of subject peoples. Indeed there was an underlying process which included the continuing interaction of both the Greater and Lesser Jihads. Jihadism therefore might be said to have represented a process of religious conquest by the sword (saif) as well as through prayer (salat) and spiritual commitment (see Figure -1 the Jihadist Wheel). The interaction of these differing emphases of the faith was often dependent upon (a) the capacity of the Islamic community and (b) the response of the subject peoples to the imposition of the Dar al-Islam.

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Thus in the early days of Islam, Muslims initiated a series of offensive wars against Arab pagans, Jews and Christians to spread and impose Islam by ‘force’ (but only if they resisted) and to seize the resources of these lands. After the Prophet Muhammad built up his forces in Medina (c.622-32), the tradition evolved of sending an invitation to various Arab tribes to enforce the authority of the umma al-Islamiyya (Islamic community). Pagans were invited to accept Islam, with war being waged against those who refused. A typical invitation to the ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitab) (i.e. Jews and Christian) was: ‘Embrace Islam, or pay the poll-tax (jizya), or fight to death.’ Undoubtedly, the concept of an offensive war to spread the faith of Islam was a genuine Islamic concept: Jihad for the sake of God. The Prophet Muhammad was seriously injured in one of those wars he so relentlessly fought. Muhammad finally overcame the Quraysh, the ruling tribe in Mecca as a result of (a) superior military power (b) diplomatic skills and (c) spiritual (or ideological) commitment of his followers reflected in their pilgrimage (hajj) to the city in 629 and the prophet’s religio-political occupation the following year. It might be argued that in the mind of the prophet there was a clear interaction between the offensive and peaceful aspects of jihad, the application of which was dependent upon the response of the enemy or perhaps the subject people (see Figure -1 the Jihadist Wheel)

**2.3 Jihad: References from the Qur’an**

_And you did not kill them (qatiluna), but it was Allah who killed them…(Q 8:17)._ 

Jihad was mentioned most frequently in the Qur’an as meaning ‘warfare’, often coupled with ‘fisabil Allah’ (in the way of Allah). While the Prophet Muhammad resided in
Mecca (c.610-622), he did not have many supporters and was not as powerful as the Arab pagan tribes. It was then that Muhammad received a series of revelations or Meccan suras (chapters) (610-22) which are contained in the Qur’an. (These tend to avoid direct mention of jihad in the sense of outward military struggle against superior forces of the Quraysh while the emphasis on spiritual or ideological commitment of his followers was crucial by way of membership recruitment during this period.) In contrast, in Medina (c.622-32) following the Hijra (flight from Mecca), Muhammad quickly assumed religious and political power and leadership over the highly divisive and diverse (i.e. Jews and pagans) local community. It was at that time he received revelations (i.e. Medinan suras) which incited his followers (muhajirun) to organize and fight internally and externally in the name of Allah. In the Qur’an there are a number of verses (ayats) which sanction fighting against non-Muslim infidels under particular circumstances. Let us examine and analyze some of these so-called ‘sword verses’ with reference to jihad which are relevant to this thesis. In the Qur’an there are 18 suras (chapters) with 100 verses (see Appendix 1) which directly describe the motives, objectives and goals of jihad.
### Table-2.1: Sanctions for Jihad in the Qur’an

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Groups</th>
<th>Type-1 Offensive</th>
<th>Type-2 Defensive</th>
<th>Type-3 Reactionary/Provocative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killing Polytheists</td>
<td>9:5-7, 12-16;</td>
<td>9:8;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbelievers</td>
<td>66:9;</td>
<td>5:41,51,54;</td>
<td>8:55,57,58; 59:2-7;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypocrites</td>
<td>9:68,73; 66:9;</td>
<td>5:41,51,54;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedouins</td>
<td>8:39;</td>
<td>8:33;</td>
<td>49:14;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meccan Quraysh</td>
<td>8:39; 57:10;</td>
<td>8:33;</td>
<td>8:33; 8:41; 48:22-24;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the Qur’an and developed by my research work.

What does this Table 1 show? The majority of Qur’anic texts clearly identify jihad in terms of a series of conflictual relationships – offensive and defensive – between believers (umma al-Islamiyya) and unbelievers (kuffar) as the Islamic way of establishing the Kingdom of Allah on earth (Dar al-Islam). Likewise, from the Hadith and the earliest biographies of Prophet Muhammad (e. 8th century), the early Muslim caliphate (e.g. Umayyad, 661-750)) may have understood these Qur’anic texts to be interpreted as a form of struggle (jihad) to set up the Dar al-Islam. This would have been doubly confirmed as a result of successful conquest in the early centuries of the Islamic era. Historically, therefore, from the time of Prophet Muhammad onwards, jihad as physical warfare in support of the message of Islam has been an evolving reality for the Muslim
community. Hence, it comes as no surprise in the contemporary Islamic world when jihadist appeals to Islam’s glorious [military] past to justify their commitment to jihad.

2.4 Jihad: References from the Hadiths

Qur’anic ayats (verses) and numerous Sahi Hadiths7 of some kind were instrumental for Muslims to dedicate their strength and mind to the cause of Islam. ‘Fighting for the cause of Allah’ (jihad) was sanctioned widely in the Sahi Hadiths. Almost one-third of the fourth volume of Sahi Bukhari Sharif, Islam’s principal collection of Hadith, focused on jihad as physical war. There are thousands of Sahi Hadiths that simply talk about jihad—war in Islam (see Appendix 2). We will examine some of these in this chapter.

Table-2.2: Prescriptions of Jihad by the Hadiths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hadiths</th>
<th>Jihad as Warfare</th>
<th>Jihad for Self Development</th>
<th>Rewards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mishkat al-Masabih</td>
<td>Vol. 1:807;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vol. 1:807;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahih Muslim:Book-198</td>
<td>No. 4292,4293,4294,4311,43219,4366;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith Encyclopedia12</td>
<td>1-20;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-20;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the above Hadith literature and developed by my research work.

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7 Sahi Bukhari Sharif, Sahih Muslim.
9 The Prophet Muhammad’s comments on killing women and children.
10 The Prophet Muhammad said, “I will expel the Jews and Christian from the Arabian Peninsula and will not leave any but Muslim.
12 http://www.islamonline.net Last access 14/09/2007
How might we interpret Table 2.2? Clearly it seems to support a relatively high level of military conflict or fighting (qitl) as an elemental part of jihadism. Of course one might expect this during periods of instability associated with rapid imperial expansion, including conversion for pecuniary reasons and religious conversion. In the face of military setbacks or schismatic divisions (e.g. Sunni/Shiite), it might be argued that interpretation and application of these Hadiths could be quite variable. Indeed the nature and complexity of the local environment and the level of external and/or internal threats might well determine the nature of the jihadist response at any particular period. Thus while there might be outward constancy in Qur’anic textual interpretation (see Table 2.2 above) the pragmatic application of these texts might be quite variable over time (see Figure -1, the Jihadist Wheel).

Miskat al-Masabih (vol 1: 807) provides us with a hadith which highlights the multifaceted nature of jihad: Abu ‘Abs reported God’s messenger as saying,

The martyr receives six good things from God: he is forgiven at the first shedding of his blood; he is shown his abode in paradise; he is preserved from the punishment in the grave; he is kept safe from the greatest terror; he has placed on his head the crown of honour a ruby which is better than the world and what it contains; he is married to seventy-two wives or the maidens with large dark eyes, and is made intercessor for seventy of his relatives.13

From the Table above it might be argued that that the aim of jihadist hadiths was the support of physical struggle which was frequently associated with offensive warfare within an imperial edifice that was generally expanding without serious impediment in the early centuries of Islam (c.7th-11th).

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13 Ibid, p.223
2.5 Jihad in Islamic scholarship

In his book, ‘Jurisprudence in Muhammad’s Biography,’ the Cairo Azhar scholar, Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti wrote the following: ‘The Holy War (Islamic Jihad), as it was known in Islamic Jurisprudence, was basically an offensive war. It was the duty of Muslims in every age to respond to the call for jihad. Thus the apostle of God said: I was commanded to fight the people until they believe in Allah and his messages…’

In 629 the Prophet Muhammad sent out ten military detachments from among his followers to the scattered tribes in the Arabian Peninsula with the call (da’wa) to accept Islam, otherwise they would be killed. Buti quoted the Prophet Muhammad as saying: ‘Fight Jews and Christians because they violated the origin of their faith and they do not believe in the religion of the truth (Islam), which abrogated all other religions. Fight them until they pay the poll-tax (jizya) with submission and humiliation.’

Buti also observes,

[T]he concept of Holy War (Jihad) in Islam does not take into consideration whether it is a defensive or an offensive war. Its goal is the exaltation of the Word of Allah and the construction of Islamic society and the establishment of Allah’s Kingdom on Earth regardless of the means…it is legal to carry on a Holy War to erase all other religions from the soil of the Arab Peninsula.

We can see this in its modern purist form in Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, which does not allow any non-Muslim religion to exist in this country.

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15 Ibid, p.263.
16 Ibid, p.252.
17 Ibid, p.269.
The well-known Egyptian Islamist scholar, Sayyid Qutb (d.1966), notes four pragmatic stages in the development of jihad:

1. While the earliest Muslims remained in Mecca before fleeing to Medina, God did not allow them to fight (clearly they lacked the military capability to use force);

2. Permission was given to Muslims [in Medina] to fight against their oppressors (prudence determined this to be the most practical way to survive);

3. God commands Muslims to fight those who fight them (this equated to the best method of survival);

4. God commands the Muslims to fight against all polytheists (this was necessary for survival and proselytisation)

Sayyid Qutb views each stage to be replaced by the next stage in this order, the fourth stage to remain permanent. To justify the universal and permanent dimensions of jihad he cites the following Qur’anic passages: Q.4:74-78 (‘fight in the cause of Allah’); Q.8:38-40 (‘fight them until there is no fitna’); Q.9:29-32 (‘fight those who do not believe in Allah’). Qutb also believes that, the West is incapable of ascertaining the true nature of Islam and that the Islam has a right to take the initiative, by force if necessary, in the interests of human liberty and freedom. Thus wherever an Islamic community exists which is a concrete example of the divinely-ordained system of life, it has a God-given right to step forward and to take control of the political authority so that it may establish God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya) on earth. Sayyid Qutb, however, pours scorn upon those who view jihad as solely defensive (as the jihadist must be one-step ahead of his adversary). Likewise, the popular Indian Muslim revivalist Abu’l Ala Mawdudi rejects
any distinction between offensive and defensive jihad. At first, as in the case of the Indian modernists of the later half of the nineteenth century (Aligarh cf. Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan) the defense against the unfavourable image of Islam was only timidly voiced. Convinced of the superiority of the West and Western culture as they were, they tried to show that Islam was a respectable religion that fostered the same values as Christendom and Western civilization in general. Later, many Muslim thinkers came to see these accusations as a functional part of the European colonial policy towards the Islamic world. Since Islam, in their view, was the ideological stronghold against Western penetration, they regarded these Western accusations as attempts to weaken Islam so as to be able to subjugate the entire Islamic world. Thus their tone in refuting these Western allegations against Islam became bolder and more aggressive. They pointed at the political implications and violently denounced the evil designs and cunning methods of the Western powers. The Western accusations with regard to the doctrine of jihad were, in their view, to be placed in this political context. Many of them (the Western orientalists) have written on certain aspects of it (jihad), on the basis of what their fanaticism, their whims and their repulsion have dictated with the aim of attacking Islam in its scientific and intellectual origin.

This is the very reason why ‘orientalism’ (cf. Edward Said) came into being and why orientalists began launching their attacks against the Islamic East by assailing its nationalism, its language and its religion. Their main interest was jihad as this is the principle that forms the foremost rank for protecting Islam. Therefore, they made it the object of a large scale attack in order to weaken the morale of the Muslims and to make
them feel that *they* were the oppressors of other peoples. They (orientalists) still depict the Muslims as ferocious animals, lying in wait to hurl themselves upon the world in order to destroy all traces of civilization and culture (cf. Daniel Pipes). This will make non-Muslim people averse to accepting Islam in this form and will diminish the alleged danger of the Muslims for the Christians. However, it is well known that the opposite is true. Orientalism\(^1\) paved the way for colonial domination by spreading skepticism about the fundamental values of the Arabs and the Muslims.\(^2\)

A typical feature of these apologetic writings can be seen in other areas like a comparison between Western and Christian practice on one hand and Islamic ideals on the other. Specific types of apologetic literatures on jihad, which are entirely instructive in character and lack any mobilizing aspects, are those writings that expound the theory of jihad as a form of international law. This is seen as the emphasis on the basically peaceful character of the relationship between the Islamic world and the other states and in the demonstration that Islam has been capable of constructing a detailed, just and merciful system of international law.

In modern Islamist literature on jihad we often find sources extolling the virtues of jihad and the bliss of the martyrs in the Hereafter supported with numerous quotations from the Qur’an (see Table- 2.1 above). A typical example is a booklet published by the Azhar

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University on the occasion of the June war of 1967 under the title of *Jihad in Islam*\(^{20}\) which contains the following chapter: ‘Jihad in the Holy Koran’. It is an enumeration of Qur’anic verses with regard to jihad. Jews are vilified as ‘the worst enemies of humanity’. The title of the last chapter – *Marvelous Islamic images of sacrifice*, emphasizes Muslim heroism and contempt for death from the days of Muhammad to the Palestine war of 1948.

On the other hand, many *fatwas* were published clarifying specific points of the law with regards to jihad. *Fatwas* concerning jihad have been published in great numbers in recent years. Generally they have been to the effect that jihad had become an individual obligation (*fard’ayn*), because the enemy had invaded Islamic territory. It is obvious that the contents of these *fatwas* is to a large extent political as the application of the *shari’a* in a given situation, depends on the political evaluation of that situation and may give rise to different answers.

The notion of *jihad at-tarbiya* (educational jihad), which means the spreading of the Islamic values in Muslim society, may be compared with the idea of *jihad ad-da’wa*, spreading Islam amongst the unbelievers by peaceful means, such as argumentation and demonstration (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). Some modern authors hold that this is the most important current form of jihad.\(^{21}\) They believe that nowadays intensive communication is possible without having recourse to military expeditions. Therefore, fighting as a means of propagation of Islam has become obsolete and must now be


replaced by the concept of *jihad ad-da’wa*. Some of those writers fear that the emphasis on the peaceful side of jihadism may divert the Muslims from the necessary struggle (i.e. the Lesser Jihad). They often interpret these forms of spiritual and moral jihad as a prerequisite for ‘fighting’ in the way of Allah:

Jihad begins with jihad against oneself by purifying one’s soul from [bad] inclinations and passions and with its orientation towards God, [for one ought] not [to struggle] out of love for fame, or desire for pleasure or in hope of worldly matters. Whoever fights to show his courage and to acquire fame and money, cannot be regarded a *mujahid*, for a *mujahid* fights only to please God, to obtain what He has in store for him, to raise the truth and to make God’s word the highest.

Islamists, for example, put emphasis on the militant aspect of jihad, including the concept of *al-jihad bi-l-nafs* (partaking in jihad by putting one’s life at stake), through *al-jihad bi-l-sayf* (jihad with the sword). This has become the most important emphasis in contemporary jihadist literature, which often includes discussion about strategic issues (especially in Iraq) confronting Muslim societies. Not surprisingly, jihadist literature, which abounds in internet websites (e.g. Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)), receives most attention from the Western media, notwithstanding the extensive coverage of Middle East news networks such as al-Jazeera.

Mawdudi rejects any distinction between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ forms of jihad. So also the distinguished contemporary Pakistani scholar, Fazlur Rahman, while recognizing the extensive presence of jihad in the Qur’an, rejects the stand of modern Muslim apologists who have tried to explain the jihad of the early (Muslim) community in purely

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defensive terms.  

Rudolph Peters argues that the ‘ultimate aim of jihad is ‘the subjugation of the unbelievers’ and the extirpation of unbelief’.  

All of these Islamic authorities simply echo the belief that Islam’s fundamental assumption of world sovereignty must be in the hands of the Muslims. As the Qur’an says (Q.16: 101): ‘And when We substitute a verse in place of a verse – and Allah is most knowing of what He sends down—they say, “ you, [O Muhammad], are but an inventor [of lies]. But most of them do not know.”  

On the basis of these verses there arose within the Muslim community the principle of Qur’anic interpretation, called naskh (abrogation). This stipulated that earlier peaceful verses could be abrogated by later militant verses (i.e., in the case of jihad the Meccan verses were abrogated by the Medinan verses). What it has signified in the past and signifies at present for many Muslims is well summarized in a statement by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Islam’s great historian, sociologist and philosopher:

In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the (Muslim) mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. Therefore, caliphate and royal authority are united in (Islam), so that the person in charge can devote the available strength to both of them at the same.  

However it is important to argue that the classical concept of jihad which upholds the Qur’anic ideal of ‘fighting’ in the name of God simply reflects one view or tradition of this otherwise highly complex process relating to the foundation of Muslim religio-political behaviour. As we have seen, jihadism is a multifaceted concept which might

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under certain environmental circumstances include the need for ‘offensive’ or ‘defensive’ struggle, including the need for violence (i.e. local wars against non-Muslims or deviant Islamic elites), while at other times it might have entirely peaceful non-political struggle (i.e. an increase in religious piety and proselytism (see Figure-1, the Jihadist Wheel) as its major goal. But the interaction of these two elemental aspects or faces of jihad might depend more on the nature of the historical process and on the specific environment in which the jihadist organization and individual (mujahid) exists than on immutable Qur’anic injunctions associated with the belief in divine guidance.

Thus the Jihadist Wheel (see Chapter 1) shows that it is at least theoretically possible for jihadist behaviour to oscillate rapidly or slowly between the Greater and Lesser Jihads as a result of specific environmental factors impacting upon the local Muslim community at any given time. Notwithstanding the Qur’anic injunction to ‘fight’ in the name of God, the nature of the impending struggle would depend on many other subjective and objective criteria impacting upon the lives of the political elite as well as the grass root members of jihadist organizations responding to the traditional call (da’wa) to respond as committed Muslims. In the next chapter we will examine the historical approach and origin of the Islamic jihad.
3.1 Rise of Islam: Early Era

Islam represented a military threat to the very physical existence of Christendom. This, and Islam’s achievement in scientific and intellectual fields during its heyday in the Middle Ages, caused a reaction in the West that epitomized Islam as cruel, evil, and uncivilized - images no doubt reinforced as a result of the Crusades between the 11th and 13th centuries. It is interesting that Muslims formed similar images of the ‘crusaders’, which still haunt them to the present day. The medieval notion of overwhelming the crusaders (salibiyin) can be found in the writings of Sayyid Qutb (i.e. Milestones) and serves as the justification for jihad as-sayf (jihad of the sword) and of course, martyrdom (istishad).

We have seen in Chapter 2 that the Islamic concept of jihad evolved in response to certain historical circumstances reflecting a series of perceived divine interactions between God and the Prophet Muhammad. During the eighth and ninth centuries, the concept of jihadism evolved and was accepted by the schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madhhab) as the ideological tool for the realization of the Dar al-Islam.¹ However, other sources suggest that the early Muslim community was far from unanimous in its views

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about jihad.² They pointed out that various factions within the Muslim community competed for influence over the direction early Islam followed in its views of war. The Qur’an and early traditional literature tell us that some early Muslims were quite militant, while others refused to go to war. Some wished to promote Islam with the sword, (sayf) while others were willing to do so with peace (salaam). Some were ready to initiate war in order to advance the cause of Allah (jihad), while others were only willing to fight in defense of the newly born Islamic community (umma).

The aim of this chapter is to examine how the Islamic community (umma) developed its theory of jihad or war (harb) in the earliest period of its history and how this influenced subsequent developments of jihadism.

Islam consists of a complex system of values and rituals, theology, folklore, law, faith and spiritual rewards (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). It contains within it the deep and simple, the sublime and cruel, the exalted and the ignoble. Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is multifaceted and offers a variety of responses to the questions and perplexities of the human condition. It is impossible to force it into a single box. Not only are there differences between Shiites (Heterodox), Sunnis (Orthodox), and Sufis (Mystics) of which the West may be generally familiar, within each of these and other Muslim groups may be found an abundance of subgroups expressing differing views and trends.

The term jihad or holy war suggests many things to different people. (see Figure-1) However, little has been done to study the formation and evolution of the notion of

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divinely sanctioned war (jihad) in Islam. The concept of jihad quickly became a powerful motivator on the expansion and extent of Islamic empires. This included political and religious policy, international economics and law, and the self-perception of individual Muslims and the universal Muslim community. The concept of jihad in early Islam is highly interesting when we see that pre-Islamic Arabia apparently was not concerned with either ideological or religiously sanctioned war.³

3.2 Role of War in Pre-Islamic Arabian Society

The study of war is a vast field comprising historical, tactical, and psychological approaches along with those in the fields of economics, political science, history and so on. Therefore, because of the great variety of interests and approaches even the definition of war itself finds no universal acceptance. However, in most general terms, war may be defined as an organized, purposeful activity directed by one established group against a rival group that involves actual or potential application of lethal force.⁴ War does not always mean physical combat. It may be a state of condition (e.g., long-term grievances over territory) between human groups even when warfare is not actually being conducted. The Cold War, (1945-91), for example, represented a state of affairs in which actual and direct combat between the principal parties never took place. The doctrine of jihad in Islam likewise purports to define a state of relationship between the Islamic world (Dar

al-Islam) and the non-Islamic world (Dar al-Harb). However, the term ‘holy war’ is primarily a European convention and derives from the study of war in its own [European] contexts. Although holy war is defined most broadly as religious justification for engaging in war, it does not necessarily presume a connection of military activity to religious purposes. Some expression of holy war exists in virtually all religious traditions and is certainly the most common and persistent expression of ideological war. All, however, can be said to represent divinely justified engagement in war. This particular expression of holy war found in the Islamic world tends to be referred to in the West as jihad (see Figure -1 the Jihadist Wheel). Therefore, jihad cannot simply be equated with holy war, for its meaning is much broader. It includes, for example, many activities (see Figure-1) unrelated to warfare and is determined in part by legal criteria that parallel the concept of the just-war (justum bellum) in the West. However, it would not be inaccurate to suggest a definition of the subcategory of ‘jihad of the sword’ as any act of warring authorized by legitimate Muslim authorities (i.e.ulama) on behalf of the religious community and contributing to the greater good of Islam. Moreover, Islam does not limit religiously authorized war to the term jihad. The terms qital (fighting) and harb (war) found in the Qur’an and in post-Qur’anic religious literature also deal with fighting. Harb is a generic term for war and refers usually to wars that are not necessarily legitimized by religious authority, while qital in the way of Allah (fi sabil Allah) is virtually synonymous with jihad when it is understood as war in the way of God.6


6 Qital is highly specific in its meaning of fighting. For qital in the way of God, we can see Suras 2:190,244, 246; 3:13, 167; 4:74-76, 84; 9:111; 21:4; 73:20. As well as Harb is also common in the Qur’an.
In pre-Islamic Arabia war was a normal part of life. However, there is no evidence to suggest that religious restrictions had any significant effect on this aspect of traditional pre-Islamic Arabian life. In central Arabia, however, raiding and intertribal aggression remained non-ideological. It was not associated in any way with the range of fighting defined as ‘holy war’. Martyrdom has little meaning in such a social system for no transcendent meaning was applied to the act of war, nor was reward in an afterlife a part of the indigenous Arabian worldview. The economic and social benefits of war were strong reason to engage in the act of war. Neither religion nor what we today would call ‘moral consciousness’ within this social system had any impact on war in general. This entire system changed significantly but not easily with the coming of Islam. This typical Islamic attitude toward pre-Islamic days had its very own clear mission and most of this process of violence was renamed in the Qur’an as qital or jihad.

3.3 The Qur’an: Constitution of Jihad

The Qur’an is the earliest and most important document in Islam but there is considerable controversy over its provenance and dating. The traditional Muslim view holds that the Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad over a twenty-three year period of his mission from approximately 610 AD to his death in 632 AD. According to Islamic tradition all these revelations were never committed systematically to writing during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, but it was known in the community (umma al-Islamiyya) almost entirely in oral form until his death. A written text was apparently

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7 Reuven Firestone, Ibid.
established and edited some eighteen years later under the caliphate of Uthman (644-56 AD). It is believed that the Uthmanic text is faithful scripture, true to the revelations received by the Prophet, and is clearly dated to his lifetime. However, huge repetition, contradiction and possible dislocation within the Qur’an create significant challenges for scholars. Therefore seemingly unrelated verses (Meccan and Medinan periods) frequently sit side by side. The problem of organization is of great importance because the relationship of verses to one another strongly affects both the meaning of individual verses and especially with reference to jihad. (see Figure -1)

As the transition marker from the pre-Islamic to the Islamic period, the Qur’an expresses a worldview significantly different from what we know of pre-Islamic Arabian culture. Some examples of the major changes reflected in the Qur’an include the view that life was governed by God (Allah) and that human kind and dependence on God are emphasized in place of living the good life on earth and enjoying simple material well-being. On the other hand, the Qur’an naturally incorporates many ancient Arabian attitudes and beliefs as well as preserving many aspects of pre-Islamic worldviews, even in its condemnation or adjustment of certain of the old ways.

The Qur’an refers to war in sura 2:216 as follows: ‘Warfare is ordained for you’, The message seems to imply that God understands [all] things that men do not. Some

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8 Adam C. Coogle, Verses of Fighting in The Qur’an (Florida: Florida State University, 2005) pp.8-44.
9 Ibid.
11 Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p.20
modern interpretation of the Qur’an suggest that ‘War is a social necessity.’\textsuperscript{12} The most often cited verses express a highly ideological approach to war (harb). They are understood by some sources to command ‘unlimited’ war against non-Muslims, to enjoin the killing of idolaters, and to refuse to offer peace (salaam) until Islam is the hegemonic religion.\textsuperscript{13} The Qur’anic message on war, however, is highly inconsistent. The verses on jihad (lit. to exert or struggle) or qital (killing) are spread out over more than a dozen chapters (suras). With reference to hostility towards the Jewish people some Muslims now quote the passages in the Qur’an that refer to Muhammad’s struggle with the Jewish tribes to justify their belief. Decontextually, these verses could be seen to distort both the message of the Qur’an and the attitude of the Prophet, who himself never felt such hatred of Judaism\textsuperscript{14}. It is always very difficult to understand whether a verse is supposed to be read in relation to the verses among which it is currently situated or whether it may be read independently.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, it is likely given the huge collection of unrelated verses on jihad and qital in suras 2, 3, 8 and 9. The insertion of such verses often confuses the meaning and relationship of the verses into which they had been inserted, some Qur’anic statements may or may not even refer to war.\textsuperscript{16} The sentiments, ideologies, concepts and attitudes expressed by the many verses cover a wide range of positions.

As we know, pre-Islamic Arabia was a violent society and the newly born umma had to fight its way to survive. The Qur’an teaches that war is such a catastrophe that Muslims

\textsuperscript{13} Reuven Firestone, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
must use every method in the way of Allah.\textsuperscript{17} After the Battle of the Trench, Muhammad felt that it was the time to abandon the \textit{jihad} and begin a peace offensive. Jihad as presented in the Qur’an, particularly involves change in one’s self and mentality (see Figure-1). It may concern the sacrifice of material property, social class or heritage and even emotional comfort solely for the Salvation and Worship of Allah. As a result, one who practices jihad will gain tremendously in the Hereafter.\textsuperscript{18} The Qur’an always emphasized life after death and afterlife is more important to Muslims. Since these verses show that Allah accepts only \textit{justice}, so fighting in the name of Allah is fighting in the name of justice.\textsuperscript{19}

Only after the Emigration (Hijra) of the Muslim community to Medina in 622 were Muhammad and the believers given divine authority (i.e. had the military capabilities) to engage in war, and then only in self-defense.\textsuperscript{20} However, the Muslim community continued to grow in numbers and strength in Medina, further revelations widened with conditions which narrowed the restrictions under which war could be waged,\textsuperscript{21} until it was concluded that war against non-Muslims could be waged at any time, and in any place.\textsuperscript{22} (see Figures 2 and 3). Therefore it is clear that even at the time of the Prophet Muhammad jihad became subjected to the political situation confronting the umma al-Islamiyya.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{The Qur’an}, 8: 16-17.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{The Qur’an}, 93:4.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{The Qur’an}, 4:65, 124, 135.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{The Qur’an}, 2:191, 217.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{The Qur’an}, 2:216; 9:5, 29. Sura 9:5
As we see in Sura 2:190 ‘Fight in the path of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, for God does not love transgressors.’\textsuperscript{23} According to the tradition, Sura 2:190 was revealed in 628 or just after the truce of al-Hudaybiyya.\textsuperscript{24} Muhammad’s decision to enter into a pact with the enemy based on their own [political] terms was so controversial that Umar (2nd Caliph, 632-644) publicly opposed it. The revelation of 2:190 at this occasion may be seen as providing justification for Muhammad’s controversial [political] compromise. It is interesting to note that the good (\textit{khayr}) or bad (\textit{sharr}) of war is also measured in these sources according to material rather than ideological standards. Fighting is good ‘because following the fighting is victory and triumph over the enemy and the capture of their towns, wealth, progeny and children.’\textsuperscript{25} Thus the meaning of religion according to the tradition is not just simply generic monotheism but, rather, the particular monotheism of Islam as known by ‘worship and obedience to Allah according to His command and prohibition’.\textsuperscript{26} Islam, therefore, must be the religion of dominion. We can easily demonstrate these different phases of jihad by this table below.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{The Qur’an}
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{Tafsir Muqatil}, (Dhaka: The Islamic Foundation of Bangladesh) 1979, vol. 5 p.79.
\item \textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid}, p.184.
\item \textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid}, p. 194.
\end{itemize}
### Table- 3.1: Evolution of Islamic Jihad or Transitional form of Jihad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Type of Jihad</th>
<th>Supportive Verses</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Type of Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City State (622-661 AD)</td>
<td>Offensive, Aggressive, Expansive</td>
<td>Sword Verses</td>
<td>Dar al-Islam</td>
<td>Islamic Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empire: (661-1258) Dar al-Islam</td>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>Sword Verses</td>
<td>Dar al-Islam</td>
<td>Defence of Islamic empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar al-Sulh; Reconciliation (c.16th)</td>
<td>Reactionary/Defensive/Peace Loving</td>
<td>Freedom, Peace Verses</td>
<td>Da’wah, Cooperation with local people</td>
<td>Deadlock with enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation; 1453-1918 Ottoman; Persian; Mughal</td>
<td>Offensive; Defensive</td>
<td>Jihad verses</td>
<td>War against enemies</td>
<td>Islam in retreat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation State Phase 1918</td>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>Greater Jihad</td>
<td>Freedom from colonial powers</td>
<td>Fragmentation and loss of identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revivalism; S. Qutb, Osama bin Laden</td>
<td>Offensive; Aggressive; Expansive</td>
<td>Sword Verses</td>
<td>Dar al-Islam</td>
<td>Seek universal caliphate and rejuvenation of Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Harris Proctor, *Islam and International Relations*, (London: Pall Mall, 1965)

We can see very clearly that historically jihad displays its own various religio-political forms. Muslims empires and states used this Qur’anic concept as a political tool to fulfill their political agenda. Jihad has been adopted or interpreted to meet different historical situations confronting Muslims. The transition from the mundane or materially driven fighting of pre-Islamic Arabia to the sacred and divinely sanctioned jihad of Islam under the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Righteous Caliphs occurred within a very short period. Pre-Islamic [jahiliyya] fighting was seemingly non-ideological and was conducted either for material gain (booty) or simply to retaliate. Fighting in the fully
developed Islamic system, on the other hand, became a highly religio-political or ideological issue despite the added benefit of material gain in the form of spoils and also a responsibility of religious commitment. In theory this suggests a transition from random internecine conflict to holy war. In theory religious affiliation replaced kinship affiliation as the religious community replaced the tribe. This transition was difficult and, as will be noted below, never entirely successful. Schismatic and revivalist movements in the course of history (i.e. Kharijites, Zaidis, Shiites, Ismailis and Sufi brotherhoods etc.) were often influenced by the need to ensure the sanctity and purity of the faith.

Thus Jihad put under the microscope of a political scientist might be seen as a tool for reinforcing ideological commitment (both spiritual, political and if necessary military). Failure of course to uphold these commitments might well lead to the demise of the community. So in the early Qur’anic period jihad was certainly a tool designed for political and military survival. (see Figures 2 and 4) The reward of paradise might make its commitment more appealing to the community and of course to potential converts (see Figure-1). The ideological motivation for the current jihadist organisation might be said to be based on the classical notions of jihad with fitting adaptations to meet contingencies associated with the post-Cold War period. We address these and other questions in the next chapter.

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Chapter- Four

Case Study: Hamas and Politics of Jihad

4.1 Hamas: A Synthesis of Religion and Nationalism

In our previous chapters we have analyzed the theory of jihad and its process of evolution since the times of the Prophet Muhammad. In this chapter our aim is to analyze the concept as a religio-political tool of Hamas (a Sunni Muslim jihadist organisation) committed to the setting up of an Islamic state in Palestine. The ideology of Hamas (f.1988) is based on pan-Arab Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism. Hamas emphasizes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, in reality, a struggle between Islam and Zionism (i.e. the upbuilding of the Jewish national homeland in Palestine). It is along these lines that Article15 of the Hamas Charter states:

When our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims. In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of jihad. This would require the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels. We must spread the spirit of Jihad among the [Islamic] Umma, clash with the enemies and join the ranks of the jihadist fighters.¹

This view was reinforced in a booklet distributed by Hamas in early 1990 which stated: ‘Our struggle with the Jews is a struggle between truth and emptiness—between Islam and Judaism’.2

Despite its emphasis upon the Islamic pan-Arab ideal, Hamas simultaneously stresses that it is a very authentic Palestinian movement with the primary goal of solving the ‘Palestinian problem.’ In Article 12 of its charter, Hamas attempts to reconcile the contradiction between its pan-Islamic character and its specifically Palestinian national aspirations: ‘Hamas regards nationalism (Wataniyya) as part and parcel of the religious faith,’ which indicates that Hamas is committed to religious nationalism. As well as, according to Hamas (see Table-4.1), nothing is loftier or deeper in nationalism than waging jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the Muslims. This becomes an individual duty binding on every Muslim man and woman to participate in the jihad. Hamas’ charter is even more specific on this point when we see this extreme statement recalling classical Islam: ‘A woman must go out and fight the enemy even without her husband’s authorization, and a slave without his master’s permission.’3

We have seen previously jihad in its classical form—now to what extent is this reflected in the way in which Hamas addresses the problem of jihad? Hamas has emerged from the turmoil of the unresolved conflict between Israel and the Palestinian, including two intifadas. Unlike the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) it has a charter that was

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2 Hamas Leaflet # 69 (November 1990)
3 The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), p.6
committed to the setting up of a religious state in Palestine. On religious and national grounds it was opposed to any major political concessions to Israel, and in principle sought the demise of the Zionist state. Of necessity jihad as an ideology would therefore have to be determined by the ability of the organization to sustain an ongoing conflict against a superior military force with nuclear weapons and close military and political ties to the United States (or ‘Great Satan’). The offensive nature of any struggle would have to be tempered by the military and political consequences of any massive retaliation by the enemy, on the one hand, and the reaction of secular elements of the Palestinian community (Fatah/PLO) committed to the peace process, on the other.

Table 4.1: Typology of Nationalism: Characteristics of Hamas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Hamas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Nationalism</td>
<td>Strong religio-political elite base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Nationalism</td>
<td>Strong Arab identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist Nationalism</td>
<td>Revolutionary commitment within Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Nationalism</td>
<td>Primarily Palestinian national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World Nationalism</td>
<td>Strong Reaction to colonial military occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Nationalism</td>
<td>Limited in first phase to Palestinian Occupied Territories (OPTS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Nationalism</td>
<td>Primarily Arab-Islamic religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism and Nationalism</td>
<td>Islamic-Jihadist in nature: commitment to shari’a state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.fresno.k12.ca.us](http://www.fresno.k12.ca.us) also in [http://www.fordham.edu](http://www.fordham.edu) last Accessed 15/04/2006 (Adopted and developed by discussion with my supervisor)
Hamas is a religio-political organization committed to the realization of a religious-based Islamic state in Palestine. Outwardly it has clear theocratic objectives (see Table 4.1 above). While other forms of secular nationalisms consist of material, human and territorial considerations, the nationality of Hamas also relates to religious considerations, which give substance and form to its political goals.

Hamas (1988) is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (1929) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), or as defined in the second and fifth articles of the Hamas Charter: Hamas- the Islamic Resistance Movement- is a division of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. For example, ‘The Moslem Brotherhood is international and the largest of the Islamic movements in the modern era…The Islamic Resistance Movement is a specifically Palestinian movement. Its loyalty is to Allah and its commitment is to Islam as a way of life’. The Muslim Brotherhood in the OPTs was formed during the years 1967-1977, when the Islamic-religious forces joined ranks under the aegis of similar groups in Arab countries, mainly Egypt and Jordan, to form a single movement. In 1978 the movement led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin registered as a non-profit organization called the jam’iya (religious community). During the years 1967-1975 the role of the Islamic-movement was characterized by the building of mosques, bringing the younger generation into the fold, providing them with guidance and strengthening their ideology. To this end the movement utilized all means at its disposal. Ideology and religion were preached at clubs, schools and universities and even mosques. An entire generation was encouraged to open its eyes and discover Jewish (Zionist) plots against the Palestinian nation.

\[4\] Ibid, pp.2-5.
4.2 The origin of Hamas

Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Hassan Yassin was born in 1938. He was forced to study at home because of his ill health where he read widely, especially on philosophical matters and on religion, politics, sociology and economics. This ability enabled Yassin to become totally involved in the lives of the Palestinians as a charismatic leader. His worldly understanding, his followers believe, made him one of the best speakers in the Gaza Strip, drawing large crowds at Friday prayers when he delivered his weekly sermon as a prayer leader (Imam).  

Sheikh Yassin’s contribution to the growth of the Islamic movement in Palestine emerged out of his conviction that students must have an Islamic education and understand the meaning of jihad. After the Egyptian revolution and the subsequent mass arrests of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser’s regime extended its crackdown on the outlawed organizations to the Gaza Strip, which at that time was under Egyptian control (c.1948-67) Large numbers of Palestinian activists were arrested in 1966 and anyone engaged in Islamic politics was immediately under suspicion of planning to subvert the state.

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin had been active in Islamic politics in the Gaza Strip since the 1970s. Like many of Hamas’ early members he was influenced by the revolutionary ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood- Ikhwan al-Muslimin . The Brotherhood was created as an Islamic revivalist movement following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1918) and

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what they saw as the creeping secularism and westernization of Egypt. Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a religious scholar, the Brotherhood became a political group in Egypt in 1936 when it took up the cause of Palestinian Arabs against the Zionists and British rule. Al-Banna known as the ‘Supreme Guide’, dispatched his Brothers as missionaries to preach the word and perform social, charitable, educational and religious work in towns and countryside alike (see Da’awa, in Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel).

Following the ideas and teachings of the Brotherhood, Sheikh Yassin set up an Islamic Society in 1976. By 1978, it was felt that a bigger and better-organized institution was needed to promote Islamic values in Palestinian society, which for the Islamist was intimately bound up with resistance to Israel. That year he helped to set up another organization called the Islamic Compound. It was very interesting to see that the Israeli authorities gave permission to Yassin for his organization of the Islamic Compound in Tel Aviv as it was an indicator of what might become official Israeli policy. The Israeli government perceived its major enemy to be the nationalist and secular PLO (1964). By allowing Islamist rivals to flourish, Israel security believed that opposing Palestinian groups would do its work on the ground in a way that did not necessitate active Israeli involvement.

Sheikh Yassin, envisaged the development of Hamas under four clearly defined stages. The first phase was to build its institutions, charities and social committees, which would open their doors to the young and old and anyone who could play a role in resisting the occupier. This was a prelude to their confrontation with the Israeli enemy in the first
Intifada (1987-93), which according to Sheikh Yassin was instigated single-handedly by Hamas and without the involvement of other Palestinian factions. The PLO leadership was exiled in Tunis and not directly involved in the day to day running of events in the OPT. However, it later became involved in the Intifada. The second phase worked on strengthening the roots of the resistance within every household in the West Bank and Gaza and increasing its political credibility. The third stage developed its military capabilities from throwing Molotov cocktails to using guns, and other explosives (including suicide bombing). The final stage was to see Hamas moving beyond the Palestinian dimension, establishing a dialogue with its Arab and Islamic neighbours.

Hamas, the political organization, began life as the Islamic Resistance Movement, which was abbreviated to the acronym HMS from the original Arabic name Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya. It was finally proposed that HMS should become Hamas, an Arabic word meaning ‘zeal’, which embodies the virtues of the Muslim Brotherhood slogan: ‘Rights! Force! Freedom!’, all of which implied the essence of struggle or jihad.

4.3 The Charter of Allah: A Brief Analysis

In its early years Hamas was led primarily by religio-political elites identified with the Muslim Brotherhood. In the course of both Intifadas (1988-93 and 2001-2006), Hamas gained momentum, expanding its activity also in the West Bank to become the dominant Islamic fundamentalist organization in Palestine (as evidenced by its election as government of the Palestinian Authority in 2006). Hamas defined its highest priority as offensive jihad for the defence of the Palestinian people; the liberation of Palestine and
the establishment of an Islamic Palestine ‘from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River’ (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). As we have seen, ‘offensive’ jihad is both rooted in Qur’anic texts (i.e. sword verses; see Appendix-1), Muslim historic experience and the practical necessity of liberating a Muslim people from alien domination.

The basic structure of the Islamic Resistance Movement consists of Muslims who are devoted to Allah and worship Him: ‘I have created Man and Devil for the purpose of their worship’ [of Allah]. Those Muslims are cognizant of their duty towards themselves, their families and country and they have been relying on Allah for all that. They have raised the banner of jihad in the face of the oppressors in order to extricate the country and the people from the [oppressors’] desecration, filth and evil: ‘Nay, but we hurl the true against the false; and it does break its head and lo! It vanishes’ Now what is the ideological purpose this text? As we have seen, Hamas recruits Muslims (see Appendix-4, the Islamic Spectrum) who are deeply committed to Islam and are prepared to struggle to achieve their religio-political ideals and the creation of an Islamic state in the whole of Palestine.

Hamas welcomes all Muslims who share its beliefs and commit themselves to its course of action, keep its secrets and aspire to join its ranks in order to carry out their duty. Its ultimate goal is an idealized form of Islamic shari’ā state, with the Prophet as its model and the Qur’an as its Constitution. The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct Palestinian movement which owes its loyalty to Allah, derives from Islam its way of life

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6 *The Charter of Allah*, p. 3
7 *The Qur’an*, (Riyadh: Saheeh International, 1997), 21:18
and strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine. Thus in theory only under Islam could the members of all regions coexist in safety and security for their lives, properties and rights. By virtue of the distribution of Muslims, who pursue the cause of Hamas all over the globe, who strive for its victory, the reinforcement of its positions and for the encouragement of its jihad, the movement is a universal one.

Hamas perceives itself as one of the links in the Chain of Jihad in its confrontation with Israel. For example, it has links to: (1) the Martyr Izz a-din al-Qassam and the Muslim Brotherhood who fought the ‘Holy War’ against British occupation and Jewish settlement in Palestine in 1936; (2) the Palestinian jihad and the jihadist of the Muslim Brothers during the 1948 war; and (3), the jihadist operations of the Muslim Brothers in 1968 and thereafter. 8 It believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf (endowment) throughout the generations and, until the Day of Resurrections, no one can renounce it or any part of it, or abandon it.

8 *The Charter of Allah*, p.4
### Table- 4.2: Typology of Nationalism and Jihad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Elements of Jihad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>Ethnic conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist nationalism</td>
<td>Radical ideology, patriotic sentiments, religious elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural nationalism</td>
<td>Basic cultural elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World nationalism</td>
<td>Poverty, lack of education, absence of democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State nationalism</td>
<td>Concept of Islamic umma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious nationalism</td>
<td>Religious identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism and nationalism</td>
<td>Religion, political, social, and economic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.fordham.edu](http://www.fordham.edu) and [http://www.fresno.k12.ca.us](http://www.fresno.k12.ca.us) Last accessed 14/04/2006. (Adopted and developed by discussion with my supervisor)

This Table helps us to understand the intra-relationship between the elements of jihad and differing forms of nationalism. As we have seen, Hamas regards religious nationalism (wataniyya) as part and parcel of its religious commitment. Unlike secular state nationalism, in theory it permits no clear distinction between the sacred and secular forms of the state. Nothing is loftier or deeper in terms of religious nationalism than waging jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the Muslims, or threatens Muslims from afar. In theory, secular nationalism consists of material, human and territorial considerations as elements of state building. While the religious nationalism of Hamas carries [in addition to all those] the all important religious factor, which serves as the focal point of its religio-political agenda.
The problem of the liberation of Palestine might be described in terms of three interacting circles: the Palestinian, the Arabs and the Islamic world.

**Figure: 5 Interacting Circles of Palestinian Problem**

Each of these circles has a role to play in the struggle against Zionism. ‘Palestine’ was predominantly an Islamic land from the seventh century, including an Islamic waqf (endowment). It is believed to be sacred to all Muslims hence from a religious perspective it cannot be traded, sold or divided to accommodate the interests of non-Muslims (i.e. Israel). In consequence of this state of affairs, Hamas believes that the liberation of that land is an individual duty binding of all Muslims everywhere: ‘When our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, Jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims.’

In order to confront the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, Muslims, according to Hamas, have no ‘escape’ from raising the banner of jihad. This would require the propagation (mobilization) of ideological awareness among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels (see Table-4.2). Hamas believes that it must spread the spirit of jihad

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10 *The Charter of Allah*, p.7
among the [Islamic] umma, clash with its enemies and join the ranks of the jihad fighters.\(^{11}\) Here it is clearly seen that Hamas is facing the fragmented stage of jihad. In Tables Table-3.1 and 4.2 we can see that there is a certain organic inter-relationship between nationalism and jihad as well as an element of variability in the concept of jihad. For example, the nationalism to which Hamas adheres contains a unique blend of religious ideals, embodied in the shari’a, and manifested by the nature of its jihadist commitment (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). Thus the level of jihadist commitment in an offensive sense might be related to the level of violence perpetrated by Israel’s security forces upon the Palestinian Islamic community (i.e. force with force). For example, this might equate to either 10 or 11 o’clock on the Jihadist Wheel (Figure 1). Thus the prescription for religious behaviour is provided with a pragmatic framework within which the strategic action and/or retaliatory response might take place.

Hamas’ charter reflects the historic experiences of the people of Palestine who in the 20\(^{th}\) century have witnessed their historic homeland partitioned by the UN (1947) to accommodate the Jews of the Diaspora. The Charter expresses the mobilizing belief that Allah calls upon all his people to struggle (jihad) to overcome foreign occupation of a land that was previously designated as Islamic waqf or land that must not be sold or divided among aliens. Israel’s occupation and colonization of the greater part of Palestine has served as the catalyst for the emergence of a reinvigorated Hamas ideology, rooted in Qur’anic beliefs while finding practical expression in what at times resembles an anti-colonial struggle against alien forces, which might also be described as jihadism.

\(^{11}\) *Ibid*, p.8
As we have seen, Hamas believes that the liberation of the land of Palestine and especially the Holy City of Jerusalem (al-Quds) is an individual obligation binding on all Muslims everywhere. This might take the form of military struggle while at other times politicized spiritual commitment may be the ideal. Theoretically various oscillations of the Jihadist Wheel might lead to differing permutations of jihad in terms of response and commitment. The ideology and nationalism of Hamas reflect the level of faith or religious commitment of its adherents or cadres (i.e. guerrilla units, martyrs and political elites) towards the liberation of Palestine. Hamas cadres believe that, “A person is willing to die for his cause if it’s a question of its very existence.”\textsuperscript{12} This is typically accepted concept of martyrdom of Hamas.\textsuperscript{13} The highly structured and egalitarian social side of the community (jami’a), which is typical of other broadly based Islamist or jihadist organizations, educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they engage in their jihad. The Charter serves as a tool not only for membership recruitment and religious instruction but also as a mechanism for the initiation of jihad and the elaboration of the ultimate goal of the organisation – an Islamic shari’a state in the whole of Palestine (see Table 4.2 above). The emphasis on these ideals might vary according to the differing oscillations of the Jihadist Wheel. It is therefore important to recognize that the concept of jihad, as understood by Hamas, is an all-encompassing ideology drawing from jihadist notions of the Qur’an (see Figure-2) and classical Islam, while embodying the day to day ‘defensive’ or peaceful [spiritual] aspirations of the Palestinian people and their ‘offensive’ struggle for national self-determination.


\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}
4.4 Foreign Policy of Hamas: Politics of Jihad and Realpolitik

Since the late 1980s Hamas has viewed the world primarily in terms of an hostile reaction to the hegemonic policies advanced by the forces of U.S. ‘imperialism’ and ‘Zionism’. In jihadist rhetoric they pose a major threat to the legitimacy and identity of the Islamic world (Dar al-Islam). The idea that emerged from this bipolar image of the world was that of a civilizational struggle between the U.S- led imperialist and Zionist alliance and the world of Islam. Thus Hamas defined the nature of the problem with Israel and the US (West) as essentially a religious conflict against crusading forces (salibiyun). In theory it was in effect a zero sum conflict without accommodation or peaceful resolution. The conflict was between Islam and its enemies. Islam was therefore the cause and the solution.\(^{14}\) Thus Hamas views the contemporary world in terms of a two dimensional struggle between the forces of \textit{good}, which it represents, and the forces of \textit{evil}, represented by Israel and the US. As we have seen, this reflects Islamic classical notions of jihad (i.e. Dar al-Islam versus Dar al-Harb). The US and Israel in Islamic cosmology - the spiritual equivalent of the Greater and Lesser Satan - are believed to be working against the interests of Islamic nations.

What is the organic relationship between Islam and its philosophical commitment to violence? As we have seen in Chapters 3, in Islam there is no clear separation between religion and politics. Thus according to classical notions of Islam, the ideal society should be a theocracy in which Allah himself is the monarch, reigning on earth (hakimiyya) through subordinates or vicegerents (khalifiyya). Therefore, in theory Islam

is not only a religion, but a political ideology and set of immortal ideals reflected in Qur’anic revelations: in fact a total way of life.  

Hamas’ ability to survive as a quasi-state government (2006-08) and develop socially, economically and politically has been dependent on the actions of other states (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and Jordan), which at various points have seen the Islamist organization as an irritant, an enemy, a burden and an opportunity to be exploited. Prior to the 1987 Palestinian Intifada (uprising), a military agenda was rarely part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy. As Hamas gained support during the years of the first Intifada, it added a foreign affairs department to its political structure.

Hamas’ most significant foreign relationships in 2007-08 have been with Syria, Iran and Jordan. The Iranian relationship is very interesting for the fact that Iran has traditionally supported Shiite groups, and Hamas’ membership is primarily Gaza-based and Sunni Muslim. Nonetheless, the Iranian connection is real and long-standing. It began shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Hamas in 1994, admitted the flourishing relations between Tehran and Hamas and also Iranian financial support to Hamas. According to their source, the budget allocated in 1991 by Iran to support the Palestinian Intifada was used to finance political campaigns and the activities of the Martyrs Foundation. Despite the allegation that Iran was funding ‘terrorist’ organizations in the

15 Ibid  
16 Ibid.
West, it became clear that the many shipments of weapons successfully reached Hamas.

However Syria’s relationship with Hamas derives from the early 1990s, when the first Intifada was developing in terms of conflict intensity. In concert with Iran, disagreement over Arafat’s support for the Oslo Accords’ (1993) land for peace deal with Israel further cemented their bond. Political relations between Iran, Syria, Hamas and Islamic Jihad strengthened after each suicide bombing or military attack attributed to these groups. As support for Hamas grew inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip the relations between Hamas and Syria strengthened. Overall its membership seemed to be more committed and dedicated and prepared to commit suicide in the cause of the liberation of Palestine.

Hamas relies heavily on fundraising by wealthy Arabs, mainly from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region (see Figure-5, Hamas Funding), who finance charitable organizations associated with the disbursement of zakat (charity), one of the five pillars of Islam. Access to zakat and other charitable funds from wealthy residents of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, including Iran, enabled Hamas to acquire greater economic and military capabilities in the deepening struggle (jihad) against Israel and the West.
Figure-6

Hamas Funding

Terrorists and their families

Table 4.3: Financial Aid to Hamas (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf States</td>
<td>$ 12 Million a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$ 12-14 Million a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$ 20-30 Million a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable associations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs)</td>
<td>$ 4.5 Million a year*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable associations overseas</td>
<td>$ 6 Million a year*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising abroad and in the OPTs</td>
<td>$ 10 Million a year*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hawala etc.)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Source: [www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-funds.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-funds.htm)

In the 1990s, the US began to oppose these sources of aid, calling on governments especially Gulf States to establish procedures to ensure only the genuinely impoverished received aid. It also emphasized the danger of financing the violent activities of al-Qaeda, Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. When Hamas was added to the terrorist list by the US State Department on 24 January 1995, Washington used its diplomatic channels to ask the Gulf States to take punitive action against all those in the oil-rich countries who had donated money to the discredited organization. In Jordan, the Islamic Action Front (IFA) (closely related to Hamas) was increasingly restricted in terms of its electoral access to parliament through a series of Draconian laws (c.2001-2007) which

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seriously undermined its organizational capabilities.\textsuperscript{18} Jordan is deeply concerned that Hamas might seek to expand its activities on the East Bank of the Jordan especially in the refugee camps in association with its close ally the IAF. Not only would this undermine Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel (1994) but would potentially threaten the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, the tradition amongst Palestinians of joining global jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda was not new. Amongst the most notable Palestinians to do just that was Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, who became Osama bin Laden’s spiritual mentors in the 1980s. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, mentor and spiritual advisor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Anas al-Shami are the most extreme Palestinians within international jihadist circles.\textsuperscript{20} In this phase of Hamas politics we can see the revivalist stage of jihad (see Table 3.1) under the banner of the Palestinian liberation movement.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Palestinian Authority (PA) Elections 2006}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Party & Seats & \% \\
\hline
Hamas & 74 & 56 \\
\hline
Fatah & 45 & 34 \\
\hline
Others & 13 & 10 \\
\hline
Total & 132 & 100 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid} \\
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid}
After the general election in January 2006 (see Table-4.4) Hamas announced its intention to form a national unity government comprising the whole political spectrum of Palestinian political organizations with a Hamas majority. As we have seen, Hamas’ decision to maintain its jihad against Israel is undermining its political credibility with the European Union (EU), which prefers not to antagonize the US, Israel’s close ally. Hamas with a comfortable parliamentary majority (see Table – 4.4) wishes to preserve its autonomy to reinforce its ideological commitment towards an Islamic shari’a-type state. Its military struggle therefore represents the nature of its jihadist struggle and its unwillingness to lose the fighting capabilities of its forces (mujahidin) by integrating them with Fatah (i.e. al- Aqsa brigade) forces. A parallel might be seen in the way in which the Prophet Muhammad emphasized the loyalty and commitment of his forces engaged in the struggle against the Quraysh (Battle of Badr, 624), including the subsequent killing of members of a Jewish tribe for betraying him to the Meccans.

Although in theory Hamas has approved the continuation of the ‘struggle’ (e.g. jihad or qitl) against the Jewish state the al-Qassam military wing has remained inactive since the 2006 election. So how might we explain the near civil war conditions in the Gaza Strip since the general election in January 2006? Surely there has been much military activity against so-called secularists (PA/Fatah) between 2006 and 2008. It has been virtually impossible to set up a government of national unity due to ideological differences notwithstanding the fact that Hamas has decided to apply Islamist policies in the Gaza Strip regardless of the consequences.
Although the Hamas leadership prepared the ground for its election success, most did not anticipate the landslide victory which forced Hamas to form the majority government. It was inexperienced politically and had no experience in both administrative and technical areas. From day one of its inauguration Hamas refused to accept the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people because it was prepared to negotiate with Israel and trade parts of Palestine for peace. It was also committed to a non-Islamic (i.e. shari’a state). Hence Hamas for practical reasons has invited Fatah and other factions within the PLO to join the government, not for the sake of unity and stability as Hamas leaders have indicated, but because Hamas is really unable to govern alone. Despite its electoral victory and ability to form its own government, Hamas still requires a transition period before it can secure the reins of power and launch its revolutionary struggle (jihad) for the creation of an Islamic state. However, from as strategic standpoint Hamas believes it would benefit from strengthening ties with Arab countries, particularly neighbouring Jordan and Egypt, which maintain good relations with the West. This would further reinforce its legitimacy. Saudi Arabia and Iran also vital elements in Hamas’ politics on both a financial and ideological level. The Arab Gulf States, in particular Qatar, which tolerates the Muslim Brotherhood and the TV network al-Jazeera, also provide moral and political support for Hamas. Its success in these manoeuvres will be determined by Hamas’ leadership ability to moderate to some extent its more unachievable targets in the arena of ideology as opposed to realpolitik. Of course be necessary for Hamas to coordinate its finances with the above states and Europe, but in return Hamas might have to make important concessions which limit its jihadist policy ideals (i.e. shari’a-type
But is there any indication of this? Is Hamas so blinded by its jihadist policies that it remains totally insensitive to the nuances of regional politics? Whilst it has aggressive policies towards Israel it is not likely to be top of the aid listing within the Middle East and beyond. Indeed jihadist ideology commits Hamas theoretically to a war based on ‘righteousness’, which may be said to be inconsistent with PLO secular policies for a dual state solution to the Palestine problem, including special provisions for Jerusalem.

4.5 Hamas’ Post-Election Strategy

Hamas’ victory in recent Palestinian elections presents in theory a substantial threat to the future of the Middle East peace process. The concern over this threat can be seen in the urgent summit on 30 January, 2006 in London, where member states of the Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russia) discussed how to deal with the new and unexpected situation. The focus of the concerns was that an Islamic ‘terrorist’ organization had won democratically the right to rule Palestine (OPTs), while still refusing to recognize the state of Israel and/or abandon its armed struggle or renew the peace process.

In his victory speech on 28 January 2006 in Damascus, Khaled Mash’al stressed that Hamas will not succumb to international pressures to recognize Israel: ‘We are adhering to the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem, the right of return, the evacuation of settlements and the option of armed resistance,’ he said. Addressing Israeli voters ahead of the March 2006 Knesset elections, Mash’al said: ‘there will be no peace or security amid the Israeli occupation.’

Nevertheless, Mash’al mentioned that Hamas is a pragmatic organisation, and is aware that the PA is based on the foundation of the Oslo Accords (1993). According to him, Hamas is willing to fulfill all accords signed by the PA, so long as this does not contradict its principles and does not violate the Palestinians’ rights to national self-determination. He argued that every agreement that is in favor of the Palestinian people and does not harm its rights will be acceptable by Hamas. In addition ‘non-recognition of Israel does not mean that no steps will be implemented that will consider the existing situation and the circumstances of this level… non-recognition of the occupation does not mean that I want to destroy Israel in a flash.’

He also noted that Hamas does not intend to alter its charter and that the armed struggle against Israel is what brought victory in the 2006 election. In contrast to the non-recognition of Israel, Mash’al noted that Hamas will be willing to negotiate with the US and the EU, however only on the provision that no preconditions will be imposed on it. Clearly his position does look like the strategy of the Prophet Muhammad at the Truce of Hudaybiyya (c 628): that is jihad could be strategically utilized to achieve maximum political concessions. (see Figure-1, the Jihadist Wheel)

In spite of this refusal to recognize Israel, Hamas expressed willingness to the signing of a temporary long term peace treaty or Hudna. This is very similar to the Treaty of Hudaybiyya a temporary treaty (sulh) lasting up to ten years in 628 between the Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh(6 years after the Hijra). From the strategic point, this treaty was extremely important for the Prophet Muhammad’s prophetic mission. In retrospect,
The *Hudaybiyya treaty*\(^{24}\) allowed Muhammad and the Muslims to strengthen their ranks without needing to worry about a confrontation with the Quraysh.\(^ {25}\) This agreement has since been exploited several times by jihadist Muslim organizations that seek to justify the annulment of agreements signed with those characterized as ‘enemies.’ (see Figure 1, the Jihadist Wheel.

Therefore Hamas’ call for the ‘Hudna’ with Israel is almost an old historic practice commonly used by some fundamentalist and militant Islamic organizations to justify some of their actions to re-establish and strengthen their power. It helps them without being exposed to danger from their adversaries. The ‘Hudna’ is intended to serve the step-by-step programme that Hamas advocates for the liberation of all of Palestine. This is evident in Mash’al’s own words: ‘We believe in operating in steps, gradually, and realistically. We can achieve our rights step by step and establish our state, on the condition that there will be sovereignty.’\(^ {26}\) By implementing ‘Hudna’ Hamas will try to justify its position in the international community as well as its philosophical standpoint on Islamic jihad.

We have seen the difficulties encountered by Hamas in terms of commitment to its Charter and its day-to-day ‘pragmatic’ relations with Israel, Fatah, the US and its Arab neighbours. But at what level do they conform to jihadist ideals? Jihadist ideals operate at


\(^{25}\) Ibid

\(^{26}\) [www.aljazeera.com](http://www.aljazeera.com) Last accessed 30/01/2006
several levels. Most noticeably in issues relating to security and defence of the community, leadership response to external and internal pressures, and on matters pertaining to the future of the peace process. The nature of the religious response, as we have seen, might be variable in terms of (a) the nature of the ‘struggle’ and (b) the strength and/or resilience of the opposition’s external and internal forces.

Thus the application of the politics of jihad as either the policies of the quasi-state of Palestine or jihadist organization might be expected to evolve or metamorphose according to specific empirical (i.e. social, political or economic) circumstances. Thus within an hypothetical scenario in which Hamas is currently the weaker party (i.e. conflict with Israel over the Gaza Strip), the ideology of jihad is likely to be predictably more ad hoc ‘reactionary’ than the outcome of a carefully orchestrated policy of clearly defined jihadist goals and objectives towards the realization of a shari’a state.

Hamas is ideologically engaged in a ‘war of righteousness’ (jihad) - which it describes as a ‘just war’ - with the ultimate goal of an Islamic state in Palestine, identified symbolically with a wider universal Islamic state. It has managed to survive in the face of internal unrest (Fatah/PLO) and pressure from Israel because its jihadist ideology has enabled it to adopt flexible options and responses, which have the ability to inspire and provide military and humanitarian commitment, sustain suffering and privation and provide meaningful futuristic goals for its adherents, if not on earth, then hopefully in heaven as a reward for its martyrs who have died in the cause of Palestine. It has demonstrated the strength and resilience of its jihadist ideology, like Hizbollah in
Lebanon, in the face of massive assaults from its political adversaries which it perceives as the ‘forces of evil’.

But yet when it seems that a zero sum option impacts negatively on Hamas’ ideology, critical variations of the Jihadist Wheel or even back to a phase influenced by the sentiments of Greater Jihad where prayer, fasting, individual sacrifice, Da’awa, spiritual struggle etc. become the driving force of its ideology. Indeed it might be argued that an increasing threat to Hamas’ perceived legitimacy and identity might trigger oscillations of the Jihadist Wheel towards the Greater and Lesser Jihads within a micro and macro framework.

Thus the killing of a religious leader (Sheikh Yassin) might trigger off a wave of martyrdom associated with suicide bombings and attacks along the borders with Israel that might be followed by more intensive religious indoctrination in the mosques and schools and universities, which might be followed with more outward commitment to socio-economic and humanitarian concerns and considerations in pursuit of aid donors for survival but without loss of pride as we have demonstrated. Thus the oscillations of the Jihadist Wheel might move from ‘defensive’ to ‘offensive’ orientations as a result of external stimuli (an Israeli attack) or a surfeit of internal religiosity deriving from the level of ideological motivation of the captive Islamic community. Hamas’ response to jihad derives from Quranic and classical concepts of the process, but they have also metamorphosed within a conflictual environment in which strategic necessities have required the adoptions of pragmatic politics which fail to draw a clear distinction over the
justification (i.e. defensive/offensive) for the type of military response to Israeli military incursions and/or the nature of Hamas’ military response. In many respects Hamas’ approach to jihad mirrors the jihadist response in Iraq to the US military presence since 2003. In effect the ideological commitment to strategic liberation of territory serves in place of a clearly articulated doctrinaire response to Quranic jihad. In effect it is the environment which shapes the nature of jihadist response (see Figure 1, the Jihadist Wheel).
Chapter – Five

Conclusion

Throughout Islamic history, jihad has been considered to be the core concept of the Islamic perspective in relations between Islam and the rest of the world. The concept stimulated different interpretations in classical and modern Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as well as the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. The term jihad has been used to specify different types of external Islamic interstate and socio-cultural relations. The changing circumstances surrounding the Muslim world deeply affected the dominant interpretations as well as the use of the term to justify political and military actions. Why did the concept jihad invade the current political discourse? How can one contribute to that debate concerning the meaning of jihad and its consequences for the image of Islam and Muslims, as well as their actual situation in the international system?

Defining jihad in an apologetic way that stresses only the dimension of individual self-discipline as a meaning of the word rooted in Islamic moral teaching does not solve the problem nor does it necessarily improve the image of Islam and Muslims. (See Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). It has been the aim of this thesis to demonstrate how the concept of jihad has had different interpretations and different uses in the history of Muslim thought and politics. The Jihadist Wheel has attempted to demonstrate that jihad can assume differing forms and orientations, both macro and micro associated with particular circumstances confronting the Islamic state or world historically, at present, and in the
future. Rather than differentiating between offensive and defensive forms of jihad, we have shown that the jihadist concept can assume multi-various forms deriving from differing Qur’anic interpretation within particular traditions and societies.

As we have seen, it was during the dominance of Islamic Civilization and Islamic power, the concept of jihad revealed ‘positive’ meaning and was the motive for achieving ‘noble’ ends and objectives. During the contemporary period of Islamic decadence (see Chapter 3 Table 3.1) the concept of jihad has gained a very bad reputation since it has become intermingled in Western minds with terrorism and is seen as coming from a militant Muslim world that is considered the main threat to Western Civilization. Yet the Islamic world is far from being monolithic and in terms of the application of jihad might be expected to interpret the nature of struggle (jihad) with the West (or non-Muslim Asia and Africa) in a multiplicity of ways, reflecting differing Islamic traditions (Sunni-Shiite) and nation states of which there are 56 in the Islamic Conference Organization.

In other words, if jihad is an historical concept and process it might be understood in light of its historical memory, significance and context. This memory reveals the paradoxes of the difference between the doctrine and its application in real life. It also helps to explain how the image of Islam and Muslims has been distorted, not only by Western understanding, but also by the Muslims themselves.

As we have argued, jihadism theoretically requires that Muslims should fulfill their duties to promote the cause of Islam – without limitation (i.e. state borders) or restriction.
(oppressive government). It is not only an outward act but also an inward one to strengthen one’s own self and correct one’s own mistakes. Clearly the exertion of the self in all directions—in every effort and act, personal and collective, internal and external—is the essence of jihad in the ‘positive’ Islamic sense. This conceptual explanation illustrates that jihad is a multi-various concept which does not necessarily involve waging a war, but might be associated with intensive religious experience or even simple commitment to the basic requirements of Islam. (See Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel) The important point of our argument is that jihad as a religious concept might explode as a result of circumstance into varying forms, some of which might be conflictual, others passive, but rooted in the Qur’anic belief that ‘struggle’ in the name of God is the essence of what it takes to be a committed or fundamentalist Muslim.

Jihad runs through all aspects of a Muslim life, as it is his other duty in the world to do well and prevent harm and evil in every possible way. This can, of course, lead to the use of force when peaceful means are not successful. But to equate jihad exclusively with waging war is totally fallacious and grossly distorts the application of the concept during the classical period of Islamic history and the contemporary Islamic world. In the Arabian pre-empire phase (c.622-661) jihad in its military form was rarely applied (at least in an offensive way) because of the need to avoid civil war. But with the expansion of empire under the Umayyads and Abbasids it was understandable for classical Muslim jurists to think of Muslims as a powerful, established society able to wage war against the sources of threat to the Dar al-Islam. Equally so, during the phase of decline, jihad in its offensive
military form could not be realistically applied against the technogically superior powers of Europe. Islamic revival and reassertiveness since the 1980s, including the rise of Islamist organizations, has seen a reactivation of the offensive forms of jihad reflected in organizations such as Hamas, Hizbollah and al-Qaeda. But their jihad is highly specific, ideologically motivated and linked to guerilla style operations influenced by the need for revolutionary struggle against forces deemed to be evil and potentially threatening to all Muslims. In the West these organizations are often considered to be terrorist.

In Muslim thought, interpretations of jihad are related to other terms such as *Dar al-Islam* (Domain of Islam) or *Dar al-Harb* (Domain of War). These terms pertain to the classical Islamic vision of the nature of international relations. So, the Islamic schools of thought and international law differed according to the divergence concerning the basis of Muslim external relations with non-Muslims, whether it is a condition of war or peace. This divergence could be explained in terms of differences in methodology.

The usual meaning of *Islam* in Arabic is not “peace” but “submission”. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Islam is not necessarily a religion of peace: indeed it is a multifaceted process, linked to divine revelation, involving religion, culture and politics. (See Table 4.2). To understand the connection between Islam and violence, we must understand certain facets of the Islamic worldview. One of the most significant facts is that, according to Islamic political philosophy, there is no separation between religion and state. It shows that jihad in its classical form, while influenced by religious considerations (salvation, paradise), was also subject to pragmatic political and historical forces which
determined its actual application in the lives of Muslims. (See Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). Thus the ideal classical Islamic state was theocratic in function and organization while its foreign policy was shaped by -

- its religious perceptions;
- the balance of forces operating against it at any one time;
- the general process of fragmentation.

The belief that Islam is a theocracy has enormous ramifications and there is no clear separation between religion and politics. Islam is not only a religion it is also a political ideology. If in theory the government of the Islamic community is simply Allah’s government (i.e. sharia state), then no other governments can be legitimate. However in the scheme of things this would be totally impractical and of necessity Islamic governments have been obliged to make concessions to non-Muslim governments and peoples. (See Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). The legacy of these divisions still impact upon the lives of Muslims today and in areas of militancy stimulate violent responses to non-Muslims, such as we have seen in the conflict between Hamas and Israel.

Second, Muslims believe themselves to have a ‘manifest destiny’ (i.e. a set of divinely inspired religio-political ideals or ideology). In theory the Dar al-Harb must be brought under Muslim control by any means and made part of the Dar al-Islam. It is clear that those who indulge in religious language strive for ‘effect’ rather than ‘substance’ in terms of the politics that might be associated with the setting up of a sharia state. Third, in theory the Dar al-Harb by its nature is believed to be at war, which is both spiritual and
military. (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel, which demonstrates a constant interaction between the two concepts). Because of the need to expand God’s dominion by wars of conquest or religious proselytisation (Da’awa), Islam’s ideology in theory imposes on Muslims the duty to ‘fight’ but in different ways (i.e. offensively or defensively, by physical means or by prayer and spiritual devotions, see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). Although, in theory, jihad is binding on all Muslims it has been particularly incumbent on those on the ‘frontiers’ of the Muslim world, where there was no room for expansion. This duty is sanctioned by the Qur’an, and this Qur’anic linkage is the main motivational factor for all Muslims. Responses to jihad might also be influenced by socio-economic, cultural and political situations. As eminent French sociologist Jacques Ellul notes, ‘Jihad is a religious obligation. It forms part of the duties that the believer must fulfill; it is Islam’s normal path to expansion.’

The fourth and final consequence of Islam’s view of itself as a theocracy is that in theory all Muslims should not only form one religious community but should be subject to one government as well—Allah’s government (hakimiyya), a kind of Islamic super-state or universal caliphate. Of course, the cynic might observe that such a belief dwells more in the realm of faith or fantasy than of reality.

The fact that Muslims are not united under a single government is due to a variety of ‘real’ factors including ethno-religious differences, political divisions, economic disparities and the process of secularization associated with rapid state modernization. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Islam as a religion evolved within a tribal environment that

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was subject to instability and violent rivalry, including challenges to existing authority. Sectarian schisms were often the result. Even in the late classical period the Ottomans (Sunnis) and the Persians (Shiites), maintained tense and violent relations for centuries. And in the age of nation statehood similar divisions continue to plague the Muslim world.

European domination of the Muslim world was relatively short-lived, ending in the 1960s with the de-colonization that followed World War II. Despite the end of colonialism Western and Soviet influence survived in a number of Muslim states (especially Soviet Central Asia). This had an enormous effect on the Muslim psyche, which was exacerbated by the Cold War (c.1945-91) and the tense balance of power between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War matters changed. At first some hailed the event but others pointed to new dangers in the world such as the rise of Islamic terrorism leading as some imagined to a ‘clash of civilizations’.  But statistical evidence suggests only an increase in tension and conflict between jihadist organizations and Western European (especially the US) states since 1990. As we have argued, Islamic ‘struggle’ (jihad) has frequently derived from a perceived threat to Islamic interests or survival (see Table 3.1). Hamas represents a good example of such a response, as it has inherited the legacy of the Palestine problem (see Chapter-4). Hamas utilized jihad as the core of its religio-political struggle against Israel. Its para-military activities have included conventional-style warfare (rockets and guns), suicide bombing, acts of violence on Israel’s civilian population and monumental humanitarian initiatives among destitute Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip. But this

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has also had the adverse consequence of (a) nullifying diplomatic relations with Israel and (b) dividing the Palestinian community in terms of a sacred–secular rift, exacerbated as a result of political democracy. As we have seen, jihad has stimulated a heightened sense of religio-political awakenings among Palestinians while fracturing the political unity of the Palestinian people in their quest for independence and statehood. In theory peace with Israel, an unbeliever (kafir) state violates the sentiment of jihad both religiously and in terms of history. Indeed the most that might be contemplated from a theoretical standpoint may be a short-term ‘truce’ (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel) followed by a struggle for jihadist domination of the land, including the holy City of Jerusalem (al-Quds), bequeathed to Muslims as *wakf* (charitable endowment) by the Caliph Omar (c.632-44).

Two groups of contemporary Muslims have articulated doctrines of peaceful jihad (see Figures 2 and 4). Fazlur Rahman, argued that jihad had to exist to accomplish Islam’s social and political agenda: ‘There is no doubt that the Qur’an wanted Muslims to establish a political order on earth for the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-social order. Jihad is the instrument for doing so.’³ Habib Bourguiba described jihad as the struggle for economic development in Tunisia, in much the same way as US president Lyndon Johnson spoke of a ‘War on Poverty’. In this context, jihad implies peaceful action and contains no more ‘violence’ than does the concept of ‘crusade’ in today’s English language.⁴

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In certain Islamic communities, as we have seen, the Sufi mystical doctrine of Greater Jihad still remains alive. Though less influential than Islamism in the political realm, it may have more impact on the spiritual life of Muslims. The concept of jihad as a moral struggle touches the daily lives of many Muslims. In some cases, like the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt (1981), jihad as warfare has had enormous consequences but it has never mobilized Muslims en masse or transcended the ethnic and political divisions within the Muslim world. Maybe a few Muslim governments and a few Muslim scholars (Banna, Qutb, Maududi) have acted in accordance with its doctrine but that did not produce anything significant. The doctrine of jihad as warfare in defense of the Dar al-Islam did not produce pan-Islamic resistance to Western imperialism during World War I. The many movements that arose to resist European expansion (e.g. India, Iraq, and Egypt) or occupation were regional or local, tied to a specific leader, regime or other specific circumstances. At no time did a jihadist movement arise which united Muslims across geographic, sectarian or political differences. Meanwhile jihad against colonialism formed part of a programme of religious reform and renewal which, in some areas, had a very significant role in producing virulent inter-communal and intra-Muslim relations (e.g. India).

More recent declarations of jihad have been equally ineffective. Frequent calls for jihad against Israel by Hamas and Al Qaeda against America have not overcome division among Israel’s opponents or produced an effective mobilization of their capability against Israel. Saddam Hussein’s call for a jihad against the United States, as part of an

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overall effort to Islamize the image of his secular regime in the decade prior to the US invasion of Iraq (2003), may have ‘resonated’ among Islamists but did not affect the outcome of the crisis. We can apply the same outcome to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatullah ‘Ali Khamane’is similar designation of war against U.S. forces as jihad. Neither pronouncement had significant political or military results because jihad was used as a tool for a vague ideological appeal to all Muslims and as an expression of a particular form of religio-political state nationalism. The latter may have had the effect of undermining the credibility of the former.

The concept of jihad did not unite Afghan resistance, which remained divided by social, political, ethnic and ideological differences. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989) and the establishment of a new government, jihadists (i.e. mujahidin) continued to fight each other until the Taliban seized power (1996). Thus while contemporary jihadism might have the appeal to mobilize people on specific issues (borders, territory, resources) it generally lacks the ideological appeal to unify and sustain commitment across ethno-religious and national borders or in terms of setting up a universal caliphate. The simple fact is that Islam contains many different faces that are a product of historical and religious evolution and diversification, which perceive the application of jihad, other than in its most basic appeal, in ways which are highly specific and related to their (jihadist) ideological goals and objectives. Thus it is theoretically possible for an al-Qaeda jihadist to target for execution the leader of Hamas because the latter initiated a truce with Israel since coming to power in January 2006.

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Muslim’s today can interpret jihad in many different ways (see Appendix-4 the Islamic Spectrum) - physical violence generally being at the lower end of preferences. There are, however, exceptions which include conflict areas such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. The disagreement among Muslims over the interpretation of jihad is genuine and deeply rooted in the diversity of Islamic thought. The unmistakable predominance of jihad as warfare in Shari’a writing does not necessarily mean that Muslims today must view jihad as the jurists did a millennium ago. Classical texts speak only to, and not for, contemporary Muslims. A non-Muslim cannot assert that jihad always means violence or that all Muslims believe in jihad as warfare. Conversely, the discord over the meaning of jihad permits deliberate deception. A Muslim can honestly dismiss jihad as warfare, but he cannot deny the existence of this concept. As the editor of the “Diary of a Mujahid” writes, ‘some deny it, while others explain it away, yet others frown on it to hide their own weakness.’

The term jihad should cause little confusion, for context almost always indicates what a speaker intends. The variant interpretations are so deeply embedded in Islamic intellectual traditions that the usages of jihad are to be ambiguous. An advocate of jihad as warfare indicates so through his goals. A Sufi uses the term mujahada (fight or battle) to specify the Greater Jihad. The late Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba did not advocate violence to improve education and development in Tunisia but described his actions as jihad. He declared jihad against poverty and to improve his country’s education system. In the case of Arafat’s statement about a ‘jihad for Jerusalem’, he intended his

Muslim audience to hear a call to arms while falling back on the peaceful definition to allay concerns in Israel and the West.

Therefore jihad can be used in many different ways by many different people, to achieve many different goals and objectives as befitting Muslims of many different nationalities and political perspectives (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel).

As we have seen, initially Hamas was not considered to pose a security threat to Israel notwithstanding Israel attempts to manipulate moderate Palestinians (Islamists) against the PLO. Hamas emerged as an important movement in the Gaza Strip following Israel’s harsh repressive security policies during the first intifada (1987-93), which totally debased the Palestinian people. Jihad was therefore an expression of Palestinian anger rooted in religious traditions and fortified by an increasingly violent anti-colonial struggle against an oppressor state.

Again Syria and Iran have encouraged Hamas’ struggle against Israel, Hamas serving the role of regional surrogate in the unfolding conflict. Tehran and Damascus have also manipulated Hizbollah in Lebanon as part of the wider regional struggle. Jihad therefore might be utilized as an ideological ‘process’ through which major Islamic states direct their external struggle against perceived enemies. Similarly, as we have seen, Hamas, might also attempt to manipulate major actors (i.e. neighbouring Arab states) and local allies (fellow mujahidin organizations) to facilitate its daily struggle against Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip. In this respect, jihad can be a highly
manipulable religio-political process for the transmission of (a) ideological objectives and (b) pragmatic political goals and objectives.

As we have argued jihadist terminology has been reinterpreted and manipulated in the course of over fourteen centuries to meet the needs of Muslim empires, states and individual Muslims. The process is continuing to evolve and might take many and varied forms, under a myriad of different names emphasizing to a greater or lesser degree virtues of conflict and struggle in the name of God. Some Muslim leaders use the term jihad in specific critical situations, others more loosely, but mostly in modern times it has been used to describe Arab wars against Israel, or against US forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. In Bosnia and Kosova jihad might be coloured by anti-Serbian rhetoric while in Chechniya anti-Russian feeling would be uppermost. As we have seen, wars within the Muslim world (Ottoman and Persia) were also labeled as jihadist. Even internal opposition movements that were called jihadist were simply reflections of local power politics. As an analytical point of view we have to notice the fine distinction between jihad per se and power politics. Sometimes the nature of the overlap of those processes is far from being clear, although hypothetically we might assume some form of interrelationship.

Finally, as we have seen, jihad might be described as an all-encompassing term which is both religious and political; it might serve as liberation ideology or theology, and/or as a force for spiritual transformation. It might serve to motivate the individual Muslim in prayer as it might serve to motivate the Muslim state in war; it is a multifunctional
religio-political process which, as we have seen, might be employed to influence regional and international actors in terms of conflict and peace. Above all, it is rooted in Qur’anic texts, in the lifestyle and example of the Prophet Muhammad, and has been interpreted by generations of Muslims to suit their needs in the course of Islamic history. And, as our case study of Hamas has illustrated, jihad can be utilized as an ideological political process responsive to the pragmatic needs of a society under occupation, while it might also give free and open expression to Islamic states and empires in the full flush of political revolution and conquest.
Appendix-1

References from the Qur’an

In the Qur’an, there are 18 Suras (Chapters) with 100 verses which directly describe the motives, necessities, objectives and goals of jihad. These chapters and verses are:

4:71-77, 4:84, 4:95, 4:104; 5:35, 5:54;
8:15-16, 8:39-41, 8:45-46, 8:55-57, 8:60-62, 8:74-74;

A number of verses (Ayats) which sanctions jihad and qitl literally mean fighting and killing. Here are some of those verses from the Qur’an.

Qur’an-(9:5): ‘And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakat, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful’.¹

Qur’an-(8:65): ‘O Prophet, urge the believers to battle. If there are among you twenty [who are] steadfast, they will overcome two hundred. And if there are among you one hundred [who are] steadfast, they will overcome a thousand of those who have disbelieved because they are a people who do not understand’.²

² Ibid.
Qur’an-(2:216): Fighting has been enjoined [prescribed] upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah knows, while you know not.  

Qur’an-(2:191): And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of disbelievers.  

Qur’an-(2:193): Fight them until there is no [more] fitnah and [until] religion [i.e., worship] is [acknowledged to be] for Allah….  

Qur’an-(2:194): ... So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you. ...  

Qur’an-(9:29): Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth [i.e., Islam] from those who were given the scripture-[fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.  

Qur’an-(48:16): Say to those who remained behind of the Bedouins, “You will be called to [face] a people of great military might; you may fight them, or they will submit. So if you obey, Allah will give you a good reward; but if you turn away as you turned away before, He will punish you with a painful punishment.”  

Qur’an-(48:20): Allah has promised you much booty that you will take [in the future] and has hastened for you this [victory] and withheld the hands of people from you – that it may be a sign for the believers and [that] He may guide you to a straight path.  

Qur’an-(8:12): ... I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieved, so strike [them] upon the necks and strike from them every fingertip.  

Qur’an-(8:15): O you who have believed, when you meet those who disbelieve advancing [for battle], do not turn to them your backs [in fight].  

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3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.
Qur’an-(8:16): And whoever turns his back to them on such a day, unless swerving [as a strategy] for war or joining [another] company, has certainly returned with anger [upon him] from Allah, and his refuge is Hell- and wretched is the destination.12

Qur’an-(8:17): And you did not kill them, but it was Allah Who killed them…13

Qur’an-(8:39): And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion [i.e., worship], all of it, is for Allah. …14

Qur’an-(9:73): O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination.15

Qur’an-(9:111): Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed . [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur’an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the great attainment.16

Qur’an-(9:123): O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let them find in you harshness. And know that Allah is with the righteous [duty] (unto Him)17

Qur’an-(4:95): Not equal are those believers remaining [at home] – other than the disabled – and the mujahideen, [who strive and fight] in the cause of Allah with their wealth and their lives. Allah has preferred the mujahideen through their wealth and their lives over those who remain [behind], by degrees. And to all [i.e., both] Allah has promised the best [reward]. But Allah has preferred the mujahideen over those who remain [behind] with a great reward—18

Qur’an-(4:74): So let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter. And he who fights in the cause of Allah and is killed or achieves victory – We will bestow upon him a great reward.19

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
Appendix-2

Jihad: References from the Hadiths

Qur’anic Ayats [Suras (Chapters and Verses)] and numerous Sahi Hadiths of some kind were instrumental for Muslims to dedicate their strength and mind to the cause of Islam. Fighting for the cause of Allah (Jihad) was sanctioned widely in the Sahi Hadiths. Almost one-third of the fourth of nine volumes of Sahi Bukhari Sharif, Islam’s principal collection of Hadith, focused on jihad as physical war. There are thousands of Sahi Hadiths that simply talk about jihad—the war of Islam. We will examine some of those below.

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number:35): Prophet Muhammad (sa) narrated, “He who is out at war Allah becomes the protector for him. Because, he only joins the fight when he puts his solid belief upon Allah and His Apostle. Allah provides wealth and much booty (Maal-e-goni-maat) with which he returns home. Or, place him in the paradise by making him a Shaheed (martyr).”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number:46): Narrated Abu Huraira: I heard Allah’s Apostle saying, “The example of a Mujahid in Allah’s Cause—and Allah knows better who really strives in His Cause ---is like a person who fast and prays continuously. Allah guarantees that He will admit the Mujahid in His Cause into Paradise if he is killed, otherwise He will return him to his home safely with rewards and war booty (Maal-e-gani-maat).”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number:53): Narrated Anas bin Malik: The Prophet said, “Nobody who dies and finds good from Allah (in the Hereafter) would wish to come back to this world even if he were given the whole world and whatever is in it, except the martyr who, on seeing the superiority of martyrdom, would like to come back to the world and get killed again (in Allah’s Cause).”

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 48): Narrated Anas: The Prophet said, “A single endeavor (of fighting) in Allah’s Cause in the afternoon or in the forenoon is better than all the world and whatever is in it. A place in paradise as small as the bow or lash of one of you is better than all the world and whatever is in it. And if a Houri from Paradise appeared to the people of earth, she would fill the space between Heaven and the Earth with the light and pleasant scent and her head cover is better than the world and whatever is in it.”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 44): Narrated Abu Huraira: A man came to Allah’s Apostle and said, “Instruct me as to such a deed as equals Jihad (in reward).” He replied, “I do not find such a deed.” Then He added, “Can you, while the Muslim fighter is in the battle-field, enter your mosque to perform prayers without cease and fast and never break your fast?” The man said, “But who can do that?” Abu-Huraira added, “The Mujahid (i.e. Muslim fighter) is rewarded even for the footsteps of his horse while it wanders about (for grazing) tied to a long rope.”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 49): Narrated Samura: The Prophet said, “Last night two men came to me (in a dream) and made me ascend a tree and then admitted me into a better and superior house, better of which I have never seen. One of them said, “This house is the house of martyrs.”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 50): Narrated Anas bin Malik: The Prophet said, “A single endeavor (of fighting) in Allah’s Cause in the forenoon or in the afternoon is better than the world and whatever is in it.”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 42): Narrated Ibn ‘Abbas: Allah’s Apostle said, “There is no Hijra (i.e. migration) from Mecca to Medina after the Conquest of Mecca, but Jihad and good intention remain; and if you are called (by the Muslim ruler) for fighting, go forth immediately.”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 54): Narrated Abu Huraira: The Prophet said, “By Him in Whose Hands my life is! Were it not for some men amongst the believers who dislike to be left behind me and whom I cannot provide with means of conveyance, I would certainly never remain behind any Sariya’ (army-unit) setting out in Allah’s Cause. By Him in Whose Hands my life is! I would love to be martyred in Allah’s

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4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
Cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and then get martyred and then get resurrected again and then get martyred.  

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 61): Narrated Anas: My uncle Anas bin An-Nadir was absent from the Battle of Badr. He said, “O Allah’s Apostle! I was absent from the first battle you fought against the pagans. (By Allah) if Allah gives me a chance to fight the pagans, no doubt. Allah will see how (bravely) I will fight.” On the day of Uhud when the Muslims turned their backs and fled, he said, “O Allah! I apologize to You for what these (i.e. his companions) have done, and I denounce what these (i.e. pagans) have done.” Then he advanced and Sad bin Muadh met him. He said “O Sad bin Muadh! By the Lord of An-Nadir, Paradise! I am Smelling its aroma coming from before (the mountain of) Uhud, “Later on Sad said, “O Allah’s Apostle! I cannot achieve or do what he (i.e. Anas bin An-Nadir) did. We found more than eighty wounds by swords and arrows on his body. We found him dead and his was mutilated so badly that none except his sister could recognize him by his fingers.”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 63): Narrated Al-Bara: A man whose face was covered with an iron mask (i.e. clad in armor) came to the Prophet and said, “O Allah’s Apostle! Shall I fight or embrace Islam first?” The Prophet said, “Embrace Islam first and then fight.” So he embraced Islam, and was martyred. Allah’s Apostle said, A Little work, but a great reward. “[He did very little (after embracing Islam), but he will be rewarded in abundance]”

Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 64): Narrated Anas bin Malik : Um Ar-Rubai’bint Al-Bara’, the mother of Hartha bin Suraqa came to the Prophet and said, “O Allah’s Prophet! Will you tell me about Hartha?” Hartha has been killed (i.e. martyred) on the day of Badr with an arrow thrown by an unidentified person. She added, “If he is in Paradise, I will be patient; otherwise, I will weep bitterly for him.” He said, “O mother of Hartha! There are gardens in Paradise and your son got the Firdausal-ala (i.e. the best place in Paradise).”

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9 Ibid
10 Ibid
11 Ibid
12 Ibid
Scholars all over the world including academics, politicians and security experts, all use a variety of definitions of terrorism. In their book *Political Terrorism*, Schmidt and Youngman cited 109 different definitions of terrorism. From these definitions, the authors isolated the following recurring elements, in order of their statistical appearance in the definitions: Violence, force (appeared in 83.5% of the definitions); political (65%); fear, emphasis on terror (51%); threats (47%); psychological effects and anticipated reactions (42.5%); discrepancy between the targets and the victims (37.5%); intentional, planned, systematic, organized action (32%); methods of combat, strategy, tactics (30.5%).

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The question is whether it is at all possible to arrive at an exhaustive and objective definition of terrorism, which could constitute an accepted and agreed upon foundation for academic research, as well as facilitating operations on an international scale against the perpetrators of terrorist activities. So the definition of terrorism states that, ‘terrorism is the international use of or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.’ This definition is based on three important elements:

1. The essence of the activity – the use of, or threat to use, violence.
2. The aim of the activity is always political in power- mainly, the goal is to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing the social or economic policies etc. Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism.
3. The targets of terrorism are always civilians. Thus terrorism is distinguished from the other form of political violence such as guerrilla warfare or civil insurrection.

This definition also shows the laws of war and the existing principles of conventional warfare between countries and non-conventional warfare between organization and state. Therefore, this diagram clearly shows that terrorism is easily distinguishable from any type of military struggle.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}Ibid, p. 14}\]
Appendix- 4

The Islamic Spectrum

Ordinary Muslims: Represent the majority of the population who practice Islam with varying degrees of regularity. While not immune to revivalist influences, they favour some type of secular government.

Populist Islamists: Represent a form of revivalist folk Islam evidence by regular and conspicuous observance of Islamic rules and practices. This area might serve as a recruitment source for mainstream and radical Islamist groups.

Social and Spiritual Revivalists: This includes mystic Sufis, many benevolent societies and Qur’anic groups. Represent the transformation of popular religious expression into organized religious activity in response to existing crisis milieu.

Political Gradualists: Represent the first level of political Islamism, exemplified in the Muslim Brotherhood and some conservative ulama whose goal is to establish Islamic
order through conversion and political action. They reject political violence in favour of working within the political system.

**Political Activists:** Represent the confrontationist segment of the Islamist movement, often centered on colleges, universities, madrasas and some mosques. They feel a greater urgency than the gradualists about the need to establish Islamic order hence their compulsion to challenge the state through demonstrations and other acts of public defiance.

**Revolutionary Jihadists:** Represent the radical core of the Islamic movement committed to the overthrow of the regime; they also include smaller underground jihadist organizations which have suffered the brunt of state repression.

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