New Challenges for Pacific Security
A Comparative Examination of Illicit Drugs and Insecurity between Pacific and Caribbean States:
An Evolving Parallel?

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury

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Abstract

The primary motivation behind this thesis was to examine how illicit drugs represent a multidimensional threat to the security of Pacific island states and the region as a whole. However, this research was presented with significant challenges before it began, which included the illegality of the subject matter, the confidentiality of law enforcement intelligence and the fact that there was a near total absence of academic research and statistics concerning drugs within the region. In order to overcome these challenges, this thesis blends a synthesis of conflict and security literature, reports from international and non-governmental organisations and the concepts of securitisation developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde in *Security: A Framework for Analysis* (1998). The domestic environment of the states that form the case studies are examined, the negative influences of drugs are presented and the perceptions and responses of the governments are discussed.

Furthermore, the comparative aspect of this thesis, where two case studies are drawn from the Caribbean, Jamaica and Haiti, and two from the Pacific, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, ensures a thorough understanding of the complex challenges posed to state security, and provides a window for examining how states with similar characteristic and weaknesses are threatened by drugs. For example, throughout Papua New Guinea, marijuana has facilitated the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by both criminal groups and villages involved in conflict. In Fiji, there is the potential for the trafficking of drugs to destabilise the state by providing support to criminal groups and those currently involved with transnational criminal activities. This thesis concludes that the cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs present an immediate and long-term threat to the Pacific, and that the security architecture for the region must be enhance to combat this formidable threat.
Acronyms

AFP  Australian Federal Police
AI   Amnesty International
ANCD Australian National Council on Drugs
ATS  Amphetamine Type Substances
BLTS Haitian Counter Narcotics Unit (French acronym)
BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BRF Bougainville Resistance Force
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CIS  Caribbean Island States
COG  Commission on Ganja
COHA Council of Hemispheric Affairs
CSCT Classical Security Complex Theory
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DOS  Department of State
ECP  Enhanced Cooperation Package
FADH Forces Armées d’Haiti (French Acronym)
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FIRCA Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority
FIU  Financial Intelligence Unit
Forum Pacific Islands Forum
FPF  Fiji Police Force
GAP  Grey Area Phenomenon
GOA  Government of Australia
GOH  Government of Haiti
GOJ  Government of Jamaica
GOPNG Government of Papua New Guinea
HCG  Haitian Coast Guard
HHRP Harvard Human Rights Programme
HNP  Haitian National Police
IA   Interim Administration
ICG  International Crisis Group
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
INCS International Narcotics Control Strategy
JCF  Jamaican Constabulary Force
JCG  Jamaican Coast Guard
JDF  Jamaican Defence Force
JLP  Jamaican Labour Party
MINUSTAH UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
NDIC National Drug Intelligence Centre
NDS  National Drug Squad
NFA  New Framework for Analysis
NMP  National Drug Control Abuse Prevention and Control Master Plan for Jamaica
NNB  National Narcotics Bureau
NSAAC National Substance Abuse Advisory Council
NSD  New Security Discourse
NSP  National Security Policy for Jamaica
OAS  Organisation of American States
OCO  Oceania Customs Organisation
OPM  Organisesi Papua Merdeka
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<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>Pacific Island States</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNGCS</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea Customs Service</td>
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<td>PNGDF</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Jamaican People’s National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS&amp;F</td>
<td>People, States and Fear</td>
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<td>PTCCC</td>
<td>Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFMF</td>
<td>Royal Fijian Military Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;P</td>
<td>Regions and Powers</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPNGC</td>
<td>Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Ad-Hoc Select Committee on Drugs, Crime and Prostitution</td>
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<td>TCSA</td>
<td>Transnational Crime Strategic Assessment</td>
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<td>TCU</td>
<td>Transnational Crime Unit</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transnational Crime</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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Thesis Introduction

Thesis Question

Does the cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs throughout the Pacific region represent a threat to the security and stability of Pacific island states, and regional security as a whole? How does the experience of Caribbean states assist with illustrating the potential security threats?

Thesis Rationale

1. There is a tremendous lack of academic investigation and research into drugs and drug-related issues within the Pacific.

2. The information and research that is available does not examine or discuss the associated security issues for PIS or for the region as a whole.

3. Drugs may present a fundamental threat to the region now and in the future, and as such research is therefore required to highlight the potentially negative consequences associated with their cultivation, production, trafficking, and to inform policy initiatives and anti-drug measures.

Methodology

The structure of this thesis and the theoretical framework that is employed is designed to overcome the lack of information and research regarding drugs and drug-related security issues throughout the Pacific. It utilises the concepts developed through the cooperation of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde in Security: A Framework for Analysis (1998) to organise each of the four case studies. Each of the case studies are comprised of one state, and both the historical and contemporary presence of drugs are discussed, as is how they have merged with the particular political, military, societal and economic characteristics of the state. The actions of neighbouring states, powerful regional actors and intergovernmental organisations are also discussed as they often exert a strong influence upon the presence of drugs and the formation of domestic and regional drug-related policies. Furthermore, the anti-drug measures of each government and its perceptions of the drug-related problems present throughout the country are discussed at length in order to overcome this absence of detailed drug-related information.

The Caribbean was chosen as an ideal region in which to compare the Pacific to, as those states share similar features such as their size and capabilities, the ability of foreign actors to exert a strong level of influence upon them and the continuing complexity of their sovereignty arrangements. The Caribbean has experience drug-related insecurity for a considerable period of time, and it was
hoped that they would provide an opportunity to examine potential security threats that could occur in the Pacific in the future. Lastly, the decision was made to examine two states for both regions in order to illustrate the complexity of drug-related security issues, and the range of strategies and governmental commitment to dealing with the threats that they pose. The framework for this thesis is discussed in detail within Chapter Two.

While it is beyond the scope and capabilities of this thesis to measure or estimate the availability of drugs throughout the Pacific, the primary objective of it to investigate how drugs merge with, and exacerbate, contemporary issues and assist with the creation of new sources of insecurity and instability is achievable.

**Drug Definitions**

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<td>Amphetamine/Methamphetamine/Ice</td>
<td>Amphetamines are produced from an oil base but may be found in a number of forms. The most common is for the oil to be converted into a powder. The powder may be made into capsules or tablets. Methamphetamine may appear as rock-like crystals or as a liquid. Methamphetamine, although structurally similar to amphetamine, is more pure and longer lasting. Occasionally a very high purity gel or putty like substance can be produced. Amphetamine is often “cut” with adulterants such as sugar, glucose or ephedrine.</td>
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<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>Cocaine is extracted from the leaves of the coca bush. Cocaine is most commonly available as cocaine hydrochloride, a white powder, although it can found as an alkaloid form for smoking or in the form of small crystals known as “crack”. In its powdered form, cocaine is often “cut” with other substances such as lactose, sucrose and talcum powder to increase volume and reduce purity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>Ecstasy is the street name for a range of drugs including, or similar in chemical structure to MDMA (methylenedioxymethamphetamine). Some of these include MDA, MDEA and PMA. Ecstasy belongs to the family of synthetic drugs known as phenethylamines. Ecstasy tablets may contain varying mixtures of MDMA and related drugs (including amphetamine) as well other substances. Many ecstasy pills are fake and contain little or no MDMA. In its original form, ecstasy is a white, bitter-tasting oil. It is usually available in tablet form and sometimes as capsules. Tablets vary in colour, size and design. Tablets may be crushed to give the appearance of a powde</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>Heroin is an opioid or narcotic analgesic made from a sticky resin secreted by the opium poppy, Papaver somniferum. Produced by a chemical process, it results in a white, brown or pink powder or granules. Street heroin is often “cut” with additives making it difficult to establish the actual contents or purity of a street deal. A crude form of heroin made from codeine is known as “homebake”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana/Cannabis</td>
<td>Cannabis is a drug obtained from the leaves, stems, flowers and seeds of the Cannabis sativa plant. The active psychotropic ingredient in cannabis is THC (delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol). Cannabis is generally found in three forms. Marijuana, a mix of dried leaves and flowers of the cannabis plant, is the most common but least potent form of cannabis. Hashish, dried cannabis resin, has a higher concentration of THC and produces stronger effects. Hashish oil, a thick oily liquid, is the most powerful form of cannabis.</td>
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Chapter One
Literature Review

The Pacific Region and the Paucity of Illicit Drug Research

The increasing seizure of drugs and the disruption of elaborate clandestine operations by both regional police and customs agencies combined with the estimated volume of drug cultivation, production and trafficking occurring throughout the Pacific indicates that there is significant cause for concern. Three pertinent examples demonstrate the extent to which the region has become intimately involved with drugs, these are: the seizure of 502kgs of cocaine trafficked in the yacht Bora Bora II that were off-loaded into a rendezvous yacht, the Ngaire Wha, after multiple PIS had been visited during 2000; operation Logrunner (2000) that intercepted 357kgs of heroin inside a shipping container in Fiji; and finally, operation Outrigger (2004) where a clandestine laboratory with the capacity for the commercial production of methamphetamine was dismantled in Fiji.

However, in spite of the extensive investment of governmental, institutional and private resources into research devoted specifically to contemporary security concerns, very little has been published regarding drug related insecurity in the Pacific. Similarly, academic investigations into the consequences of drugs have frequently cited some of the potential threats, though they have failed to adequately explore them or situate them within an appropriate security discourse. Moreover, while both police and customs agencies throughout the region are explicitly aware of the contemporary drug situation and have published reports outlining their concerns, these have equally failed to generate significant academic investigation. A diminutive amount of literature therefore exists for the region (with the obvious exception of New Zealand and Australia) while many of the important investigation undertaken have been overlooked or have failed to attract an appropriate level of attention. Unfortunately, the negligible amount of literature that is available often focuses upon the associated health aspects and the potential for social harm, though what is available has universally highlighted the need for further research and statistical analysis into the presence of drugs. Lastly, the potential threats posed by drugs in the region are often included under the rubric of transnational crime (TNC), though deplorably, they are frequently discussed without the employment of illustrative case studies or discussion of the specific modus operandi.
of those criminals involved, and as a consequence, little can be extrapolated for comparison elsewhere.

The recent overview article by Devaney et al highlights this sincere dearth of information, they assert that: “Currently, there is no overall regional or country-based illicit drug policy for the Pacific and few treatment programs; limited data exist to aid in understanding illicit drug use and the harms associated with its use in the Pacific.” Increasing apprehension is also auditable over the escalating drug problems present throughout American Pacific territories, and information concerning their presence there is more fully developed than for other PIS. The presence of this situation necessitates an adequate and overarching investigation of drugs, their potential influence upon PIS and an examination of the threats they pose to regional security.

The recent conference paper by Schloenhardt demonstrates the deprived state of academic literature, as disturbingly, this paper represents one of the few publications that devote more than parsimonious attention to regional drug issues. More importantly, Schloenhardt highlights a significant point of contention that exists; that there is neither the demand nor the financial capacity for the establishment of domestic or regional drug markets throughout the Pacific. According to Shaun Evans, former Law Enforcement Advisor for the Pacific Islands Forum, the very low cost of production for amphetamine-type substances (ATS) ensures that local communities would be able to afford drugs that are considered more dangerous than marijuana. Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has asserted that the primary concern in the region was now increasing incidents of trafficking, and that the demand for methamphetamine was growing, which as a consequence would lead to the establishment of local

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production facilities. In contrast, both Schloenhardt and Devaney et al have proposed that the exorbitant costs associated with drugs, with the exception of locally cultivated marijuana, in comparison to local incomes forms a prohibitive barrier to their widespread consumption. The very existence of this debate demonstrates that more research must be undertaken and publicised on the presence of drugs in order to further influence and assist with the development of anti-drug strategies and security policies within PIS and throughout the region.

This thesis challenges the assertion that domestic drug markets are not viable within the Pacific. It will demonstrate that while marijuana may appear to be an innocuous drug, with only individualised health risks, the use of the profits from both the cultivation and sale of it can be employed in a range of activities that include the acquisition of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the provision of financial support for local gangs or even for reinvestment in acquiring harder, more profitable, drugs for supplying local markets. There is significant concern throughout the region that the profits derived from marijuana will be invested in acquiring and producing drugs such as methamphetamine, which could result in potentially devastating social consequences and increased levels of violence and crime. This scenario has, in all likelihood, already occurred in New Zealand and Australia, and it could equally occur within PIS. The development of such a scenario would result in significant insecurity and instability.

At this point, it is important to remember that drugs conform to local market environments and represent a rational, though illegal business opportunity. Within Western states, the price for drugs is determined by the combination of a high level of disposable income and the principles of supply and demand. Such a situation is equally true for developing states, as consumers do not necessarily need to have a high level of disposable income in order to purchase drugs; local market forces determine the price accordingly. Examples of this are readily available, and include the substantial surge in ATS consumption in Thailand and throughout South East Asia.

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5 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific, "Pacific Profile: Pacific Islands", Section II (2003) p.6-7
6 Schloenhardt, 2006, p.6; Devaney et al, 2006, p.388
7 Evans, 2006, p.2-3 no.24-29
Asia, and the high levels of heroin addiction along traditional Middle Eastern and Asian trafficking routes.

The adoption of new security theories and the subsequent recognition of drugs as a pertinent security issue by New Zealand, Australia, the Pacific Islands Forum (Forum) and regional agencies such as the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO) has resulted in the creation of a large body of official documents, briefing papers and communiqués that give credence to the potential threats. These documents are integral for constructing an assessment of the regional response towards drugs. As an example, in 2000 the New Zealand External Assessment Bureau noted that the Pacific region was acquiring an international reputation that was commensurate to that held by the Caribbean. However, the overriding need for some domestic security agencies and organisations to protect their interagency relationships and the required confidentiality of their intelligence—hence unattainable—does not prevent an insightful investigation. This official observation assists with justifying the undertaking of a comparison between the two regions by this thesis. Coincidentally, the OCO has begun to establish closer working relations with customs organisations throughout the Caribbean due to their concerns that pleasure craft are using the Panama Canal to bring drugs into the Pacific, though the development of this relationship is in its infancy.


Fundamental geo-political changes that include both the ending of the Cold War and the current post-September 11th security discourse have assisted with the re-conceptualisation of traditional security paradigms, commonly referred to as realist or neo-realist. As a consequence, new interpretations and conceptions of what constitutes a threat, and indeed, what should be characterised as a threat towards state security and survival, have developed. The New Security Discourse (NSD) recognises the fact that insecurity derives as much from non-military and non-state actors as from interstate rivalry and armed conflict.

The realist discourse emphasises the primacy of the state in international relations, and as such, threats to state security are identified according to a

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10 Interview with Robert Taylor in Fiji, head of the Oceania Customs Organisation, 26 March 2008
restrictive criteria. Overriding emphasis is placed upon external military threats that derive from an identifiable sovereign source. Conflicts and wars between states are considered normal and as a by-product of the competitive and anarchic environment within the international system. Accordingly, Kerr succinctly summarises the discourse: “For traditionalists the referent object is the state, the main threat is other states that have the capability and intention to use force to achieve their goals. The means for countering such threats is military deterrence, and if necessary the use of force if attack seems imminent or actually takes place.”

The pre-eminence of such an approach towards state security is logical and legitimate given the endemic nature of interstate conflict as demonstrated by both World Wars and the Cold War. However, as Jung and Schlichte observe, the theoretical underpinnings of realism have distorted its ability as a paradigm to account for the way that conflict and warfare have evolved, and therefore, the way in which state security is now challenged. The inability to recognise this transformation prevents the state from responding as it required to, and as a consequence, these new issues can ultimately become unmanageable and significantly destabilising.

Security scholarship during the 1980s recognised that definitions of security required a more generalised meaning, as issues that were not necessarily thought of as a threat to the state increasingly transformed to a critical level where the state itself was endangered. According to Ullman: “…defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality.” Furthermore: “…it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers.” The overriding critique of the realist discourse by the NSD is that issues of defence and security are both

15 Ullman, 1983, p.129
16 Ullman, 1983, p.129
subjective and relational, and that theories and frameworks cannot ignore changing real world circumstances in favour of long held assumptions and previously implemented policies. The NSD does not replace the traditional discourse, and it adds an additional dimension for understanding interstate relations and the causes of conflict where non-state actors and processes are involved, which can then be translated into realist policy equations.

The NSD complements the traditional discourse, and in many instances these new issues are intimately connected with more traditional concerns, such as the precipitation of interstate warfare or competitive and combative foreign relations. Moreover, because of their transnational attributes and the fact that they often involve multiple states, new security issues are likely to strongly influence both bilateral and multilateral relations among states, and as a consequence this could also involved more traditional security concerns. For example, Thailand and Myanmar have clashed over the presence of drug production facilities along their mutual border, as those involved are beyond the reach of Thai authorities. The drugs produced directly impact upon both the Thai state and its citizens, and it is likely that a sizable proportion of the profits are used to support armed separatist groups that are present throughout the region. As another example, the incursion of Colombian armed forces into Ecuador during March 2008 in order to attack the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) serves as an example where drugs may not be directly linked to the initial confrontation, though they require recognition as it is widely known that FARC supports itself and its conflict with the Colombia government by its significant involvement with the production and trafficking of cocaine. The position of Colombia as the primary area for cocaine production in South America generates significant regional discussion, difficult bilateral relations and the involvement of external actors such as the United States (US). These two examples clearly demonstrate how the two security discourses are complementary when the subject of drugs is involved.

The NSD has received considerable criticism, and has not enjoyed indifferent or apathetic acceptance despite its widespread employment and

adoption. Significant criticism is devoted by academics to the appropriateness of opening the security discourse to include new issues, as in their opinion this would make the field incoherent and the discourse devoid of any substantive meaning.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, internal criticism from the NSD itself has focused upon how the application of security frameworks upon new issues may militarise the response of the state, resulting in human rights abuses and the achievement of unstated political objectives.

Within a Pacific context, both academics and security practitioners have traditionally regarded the region as devoid of traditional concerns because of the lack, and incomprehensibility, of armed interstate conflict occurring. As a consequence, it has been widely asserted that new security issues have always characterised the most pressing concerns throughout the region. However, armed intrastate conflict has frequently occurred, and enduring issues related to political competition, economic development and resource extraction ensures that there are a considerable number of issues for conflict to occur over. The presence of drug cultivation, production and trafficking will add an additional layer of complexity to these issues. It must be noted here, that while it is extremely unlikely that armed interstate conflict would ever occur over drugs between PIS, the possibility of strained and difficult bilateral relations and the development of domestic conflict where drugs are involved is possible. For example, this could occur between the Solomon Islands, Bougainville and PNG, or along the PNG-West Papua boarder, which could potentially involve the violation of PNG sovereignty as Indonesian authorities attempt to secure the border.

\textbf{Transnational Crime, Weak States and Sovereignty: The Maintenance of an Enabling Environment}

A broad consensus exists within the transnational criminal literature regarding the manner in which enhanced communications technology and increased economic interdependence have further facilitated an environment that is conducive for the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs.\textsuperscript{20} This

contemporary environment has resulted in a situation where drug issues can be re-conceptualised as a significant transsoverign security concern, a threat to state security and an issue where the affects are not limited, or confined, to regions that are geographically proximate. Particular attention is dedicated by the TNC literature to the way in which globalisation has transformed and redefined the principles and practice of sovereignty, and therefore, the amount of control that can be exercised by state governments.

According to Lock, globalisation has also assisted with the development and expansion of illicit parallel economies, resulting in a situation where informal markets and illicit commodities have merged with regular financial markets to cater to the drug demands of Western consumers. The extent of these contemporary developments and the concern surrounding them is demonstrated by the increasing attention given to Illicit International Political Economy. Furthermore, the vast economic dimensions associated with drug activities, TNC, and criminal networks combined with the linkages between these issues and both intrastate and interstate conflict ensure that these will continue to be significant contemporary security threats on their own.

Chalk concisely illustrates the manner in which these new opportunities have created a favourable environment for non-state actors via the concept of Grey Area Phenomena (GAP). According to Chalk, drug activities have moved into those states that are unable to confront, control or monitor those involved. Moreover, the combination of globalisation, the power confirmed upon non-state actors by the profits generated, and the increased access to advanced technology and the revival of ethnic, atavistic and communal identity conflicts have created a more complex conflict and security environment. In Chalk’s opinion, states are no longer primarily consumed by traditional military threats emanating from neighbouring states, they are now caught in a situation where they cannot control their borders, nor can they rely on traditional means of defence or deterrence as an impediment to the challenges posed by non-state actors and transnational threats. Unfortunately, as Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha observe: “this characteristically gives rise to an
‘ooze-factor’ situation whereby the effects of GAP are often ignored or, when recognised, only factored into a viable political policy equation once they have reached a major crisis destabilising stage within the state(s) concerned.”

The continued political and economic integration of states and the relaxing of internal regional border controls will continue to provide an ideal facilitating environment for drug activities.

According to Flynn, weak states are both the primary producers of drugs and the flaw in the approach to combating the international drug trade, as the global enforcement regime is constructed outside of those states where the majority of drug activities occur, while government agencies and political leaders are often corrupt, involved with drug activities. This situation prevents the effective suppression of the problem and allows the unabated production and trafficking of drugs. Goehsing summarises the situation, and asserts that: “Regardless as to whether transnational criminal networks came first to weaken nation-states or whether weak-nation states create a breeding ground for transnational criminal networks, we can conclude that transnational criminal networks and weak nation-states are two factors that mutually reinforce one another.” Additionally, the existence of small or microstates must be added to these concerns, as their power and capacity to act is equally constrained, and is often circumscribed by the availability of resources and the degree of sovereignty that they command.

The complex transformational characteristics, re-organisational aspects and often disordered processes associated with globalisation have, in many respects, modified the degree to which states can effectively exercise sovereignty and claim to be autonomous. Globalisation has blurred the traditional distinctions and divides between domestic and international affairs, opening the state to challenges from political, military, social and economic forces that now transcend their borders.

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25 Chalk, 2000, p.3
26 Flynn, 2000, p.45-48
According to Hughes: “...it is clear that the security order is now pitted against the phenomenon of globalisation, which generates security issues diametrically opposed to and often beyond the limits of sovereign-state authority.” The involvement of outside actors, non-governmental organizations, international private companies, sources of investment capital and intergovernmental organisations have all reduced and transformed the totality of state sovereignty. As a consequence, the decision-making capabilities and the range of policy options available to national governments is open to external influence, while at the same time, domestic disputes, conflicts and crises have been exacerbated by the involvement of these actors. A focus upon regional relations is therefore required in order to understand and account for the strong influences that are often exerted upon governmental anti-drug policies and strategies by external actors.

In the opinion of Ayoob, developing states face inherent internal contradictions that influence and precipitate the development of internal conflict and instability. Accordingly, these states are primarily concerned with the connections between internal security and the facilitation of economic development. In attempting to achieve this security, the state is forced to grapple with the challenges and the contradictions posed by the convergence of both pre and post-colonial actors such as competing authority structures where traditional authorities command both loyalty and legitimacy versus imposed state structures that have weaker legitimacy but stronger coercive powers. This situation has arisen as a consequence of colonial administration and the inclusion of developing states within a globalised political and economic system. Moreover, Ayoob suggests that the fallout and negative consequences associated with international economic processes and the demands of Western states upon developing states have been allowed to continue as it was unlikely that these issues could impinge upon the security of their states. The failed state discourse and the current War on Terror have fundamentally reappraised this situation, and developing states now feature prominently within Western security concerns.

32 Ayoob, 1992, p.66
33 Ayoob, 1992, p.74-75
Within a Pacific context, Hegarty has emphasised the reengagement of security actors with the internal security of PIS.\textsuperscript{34} This development is evident with the return of Australian interventionist paradigms as a consequence of events such as the Bali Bombing, state collapse in the Solomon Islands, the occurrence of multiple coups in Fiji and the presence of armed conflict throughout PNG.

The Contemporary Face of Conflict: Accounting for New Conflict Environments and Conflict Dynamics—Or—Relearning Forgotten Lessons?

The occurrence of conflict between states and the multitude of non-state actors and influences ensure that the characteristics of conflict are not static, and are open to rapid transformation. Contemporary assessments by scholars and security practitioners have only recently begun to recognise the fact that the capabilities of non-state actors—gangs, criminal organisations and armed political groups—have increased significantly in relation to the state, and that the beliefs and organisational structures of other non-state actors—such as ethnic clans or militias—do not necessarily adhere to Westernised conventions for warfare.\textsuperscript{35} According to the research of Eriksson, Wallensteen and Sollenburg, armed intrastate conflict has increasingly characterised warfare around the world since 1946, with 91 out of a total of 116 recorded conflicts between 1989 and 2002 being defined as intrastate.\textsuperscript{36} In many respects, the state represents just one of many actors involved in conflict and warfare, and understanding the potential influence of drugs and their profits are essential for gaining an insight into the precipitation, escalation, continuation or conclusion of armed conflict.

Conflict within many states also derives from ethnic and communal divisions that are present throughout the state, and these are further exacerbated by the political, economic and social policies employed by their governments. This has situation has been commented upon by Ballentine and Nitzschke, and they observe that a pro-state bias has previously dominated conflict analysis with research


favouring rebel or insurgent groups as the primary source of conflict. Furthermore, Cha succinctly summarizes the nature of contemporary conflicts, and asserts that:

Globalisation has ignited identity as a source of conflict. The elevation of regional and ethnic conflict as a top-tier security issue has generally been treated as a function of the end of the Cold War. However, it is also a function of globalisation.

While the vocabulary of conflict in international security traditionally centered on interstate war (e.g. between large set-piece battalions and national armed forces), with globalisation, terms such as global violence and human security become common parlance, where the fight is between irregular substate units such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, cults and religious organizations, organized crime, and terrorists. Increasingly, targets are not exclusively opposing force structures or even cities, but local groups and individuals.

Cha’s observation captures not only the complexity of influences involved, but also vividly demonstrates the challenges posed for states when dealing with non-state actors. Governments must manage both internal and external influences that assist in precipitating conflict and assist in undermining their sovereignty. Furthermore, they must also institute measures to manage these non-state actors that are, by their very nature, non-sovereign, though some may be seeking legitimacy and powers associated with sovereignty, while others may intentionally seek to create an environment of instability. Moreover, the increasing mixture of criminal and financial motives into objectives previously based upon grievance adds additional complexity and prevents an accurate understanding of the motivations of these combatants. This motivational transformation results in a situation in which it is increasingly difficult to dissociate ideological or political motivations, and as a consequence, the potential for the creation of an intractable and detrimental cycle of illicit business and conflict is possible.

Understanding the economic dimensions of conflict is extremely important, as the relationship between drugs and armed conflict adds an additional level of complexity that must be negotiated by the state during its attempts at either combating non-state actors or during negotiations. According to Ballentine and Nitzschke modern domestic conflicts have become self-financing, resulting in a situation where shadow economies and black markets contribute to both the economic dimensions of conflict.

Cha, 2000, p.393-394
collapse of the state and the provision of financial and material assistance to rebel groups.\footnote{Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005, p.17-18} Furthermore, as Fearon observes, domestic conflicts that involve ethnic or political groups who utilise the profits from drugs to fund themselves are very long lasting, with a mean duration of up to 2.6 times longer than conflicts involving other sources of finance.\footnote{Fearon, 2004, p.277 & p.284-286} Moreover, while Cornell finds that based upon the available evidence, there is no link between the initiation of conflict and the production of drugs, though production escalates once conflict has begun.\footnote{Svante E. Cornell, "Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol.30 (2007) p.216} As an example, Sislin has examined the relationship between SALW acquisition and the escalation or de-escalation of conflict within Sri Lanka, and concludes that the acquisition of SALW generally precedes the escalation of conflicts.\footnote{John Sislin, "Arms and Escalation in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Sri Lanka", International Studies Perspectives, No.7 (2006) p.156} This observation is important, as it is widely noted that the Tamil Tigers have utilised drugs as a financial resource.\footnote{Rohan Gunaratna, "Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers", in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed & Grievance, ed. Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman (Boulder: Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) p.208-209; BBC News, “Tigers involved in narcotics’- India” 15 February, 2007; G H Peiris, "Clandestine Transactions of the LTTE and the Secessionist Campaign in Sri Lanka", Ethnic Studies Report Vol.19 No.1 (2001); Nicola Palmer, “Defining a Different War Economy: the Case of Sri Lanka,” Transforming War Economies: Dilemmas and Strategies, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series, ed. Martina Fischer and Beatrix Schmelzle No.3 (2005) p.56-58} The existence of such a relationship poses significant challenges for the state, as governments are likely to respond by devoting additional resources to providing security and to protecting economic development, while this diversion of resources may itself become a focus for internal conflict.

The establishment of a parallel internal state is also highly possible, especially if drugs are used to fund social services, while drugs may become further entrenched if they represent one of the few economic opportunities available.\footnote{Roy Godson and Phil Williams, “Strengthening Cooperation against Transsovereign Crime: A New Security Imperative,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a global agenda, ed Maryann K. Cusimano (Boston, Bedford / St. Martin's, 2000) p.114; Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” Problems of Post-Communism Vol.53 No.4 (2006) p.11-14; Alan Dupont, “Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia,” Asian Survey Vol.39, No.3 (1999) p.447-448; Krasna, 1997} It is highly likely that drugs assist in prolonging conflict, and while Cornell believes that drugs are not linked to conflict initiation this may be a function of his definition of what constitutes conflict, which may ignore the overwhelming presence of urbanised gang warfare and powerful non-state actors who frequently initiate conflict over the issue of drugs. Given the preceding discussion, drugs clearly represent a threat to state security and exert a strong influence upon bilateral and
multilateral relations, and as such, PIS and the region must be examined in order to gain an insight into a potentially significant source of insecurity in the future.
Chapter Two
Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This chapter will begin by broadly discussing the publications that will be consulted throughout this thesis and will then outline the benefits associated with utilising the work of these authors, before providing a detailed overview of the concepts that will be employed. The case studies within chapters three and four shall be structured according to a confluence of the ideas developed by both the individual expertise and mutual collaboration of the authors Buzan, Waever and de Wilde within three of their publications: 1. People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (1991) herein (PS&F); 2. Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) herein (NFA); 3. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (2003) herein (R&P). All three publications share important ideas and theories related to security that include scrutinising the discourse and speech that derives from security actors, opening up the security discourse to include new threats and the importance of examining both domestic and regional relations between states as they are highly interdependent. The consultation of these three publications allows for an integrated understanding of their content and the ideas shared between them, and more importantly, the creation of a superior framework for application that can account for the complexities associated with the examination of drugs as a security issue.

An Enhanced Approach for Examining Drugs as a Security Threat

Consulting PS&F allows this thesis to penetrate the security discourse of actors and to examine the specific state-society relations that characterise the domestic environment of the state that is being studied. Buzan identifies these particular domestic characteristics as being important for understanding the specific security needs of a state, as issues linked to their historical creation or the presence of competition between internal ethnic groups or non-state actors defines the source of insecurity and the responses of the government. Furthermore, Buzan


48 Buzan, 1991, p.69-83
was motivated to illustrate the paradoxes related to security by demonstrating how it is relational, and therefore dependant upon where the actor is located within a ontological hierarchy organised from individual citizen to global actor. Additionally, examining the institutional and historical characteristics of a state is equally important as these domestic characteristics influence the development of drug cultivation, production, trafficking, and the transformation of these activities into potential threats to the state.

The NFA is concerned with both providing a coherent framework for widening the security discourse and facilitating a greater investigation into why certain issues become objects of security. It also seeks to challenge the primacy of the state as an object of security. New security threats within the NFA are normally divided into the categories of military, environmental, societal, economic and political, and then examined according to both their implications for the state and the type of actors that become involved, such the government of a state or oppositional political parties, nongovernmental or intergovernmental actors and organisations. This thesis utilises this category approach—categories can be overlapping and interrelated—though importantly, instead of examining a single issue such as infectious disease within a single category (societal) or armed conflict over natural resources (military and economic), it examines the subject of drugs as a threat to the state according to all of these categories (except for environmental). The categories become ‘drugs as a political threat’ and ‘drugs as a military threat’, and so forth.

With regard to the political category, the case studies focus upon the influence of drugs as a source of corruption and how drug profits can influence national elections or fundamentally undermine state institutions. As a consequence of this situation, military threats can develop as non-state actors are provided with the opportunity to challenge the weakened state, while the financial capacity to do so could be provided by the profits associated with drugs. This example clearly demonstrates how a single security issue can bridge multiple categories at once, all of which require an accurate understanding if the state is to organise an appropriate response to combating the threat that they increasingly present. This illustration becomes more complex when an additional dimension is added, such as when the state is either tacitly or explicitly involved with drug activities, though conversely, it
publicises its strong opposition to them and undertakes extensive and oppressive measures to enforce the law that it is itself breaking.

R&P is specifically concerned with examining both the regional security relations between states and identifying the shared issues that become objects for security. According to Buzan and Waever: “Studies of ‘regional security’ usually take place without any coherent theoretical framework because, other than a few basic notions about balance of power and interdependence borrowed from the system level, none has been available.”49 By utilising their discussion of Regional Security Complexes (RSC) and the interdependence that exist between states, a bridge is created between the polar extremes of the state and the system levels and this facilitates a greater understanding of the motivations and behaviour of states in response to their regional environment. This also provides an ideal platform for comparing and contrasting the negative impact of drugs upon different states and regions, and the subsequent influence upon bilateral and multilateral relations. This is ideally suited for examining the small and microstates of the Caribbean and Pacific regions, which are challenged in a similar manner by drugs and the external influences of more powerful actors.

Justification for Employing the Concepts and Framework Developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde

1. The NFA provides an organised approach and framework for examining the complexity of drugs as a multidimensional security issue.

2. The employment of the NFA and four of its categories results in a deeper and more holistic understanding of one particular issue and its interrelation with other potential threats.

3. The NFA allows this thesis to examine how drugs become an issue for security and the deployment of state resources.

4. The consultation of PS&F and the NFA demonstrates the importance of the domestic environment and historical events associated with statehood, and links these characteristics to its regional behaviour as outlined in R&P.

5. The NFA allows this thesis to evaluate the actions and perceptions of a state towards drugs and to consider the implementation of policies that are designed to combat them. It also facilitates a discussion of the unintended or unstated political objectives, if they exist.

6. In R&P, Buzan and Waever contend that the Pacific region is an unstructured RSC because of the weakness of security independence between them. This thesis will challenge such an assertion.

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49 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.42
7. In both the NFA and R&P, the authors are keen to examine whether new security issues will form into RSC, and this thesis will provide conclusions regarding how the subject of drugs fits within their geographic illustrations of RSC.

Lastly, consulting all three publications assists in overcoming the poor predicative capabilities inherent with a qualitative social science investigation into a subject such as drugs, and it also facilitates a structured comparison of the differences and parallels between the four case studies so that contemporary issues, potential threats or future trends can be identified. This thesis is also confronted by both the lack of and imprecise nature of the available statistics, and the fact that law enforcement agencies are inherently secretive about their operations. The use of the concepts developed by Buzan et al and the NFA allow this thesis to examine the potential threats posed by drugs without having to precisely account for the amount of drugs available. While it is important to illustrate the presence of drugs in each state, such as the estimated quantities involved and identification of important activities, such as whether they are being cultivated, produced or trafficked, establishing the precise volume of drugs is not the primary focus of this thesis. Highlighting specific drug activities is considered more important as these define the responses of the state and the possible intervention of external actors. All subsequent issues that relate to the employment of the concepts developed by Buzan et al will be addressed within chapter five during the conclusions.
# Case Study Layout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>Brief overview of the state and the issues that define it as a suitable case study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit Drug Overview</td>
<td>What is the current drug situation? Is drug cultivation, production or trafficking present? What types or quantities of drugs are available and what kinds of prices are being paid? Are any statistics available? What is the state aware of? What kinds of transformations have occurred within the domestic drug market?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>The political category is focused upon the governance of the state and issues affecting its security and stability, such as competition over the state itself by national leaders, the presence of corruption or the effectiveness of the police or judicial system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>This category is concerned with examining whether there is armed conflict in the state, and the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW), as well as how drugs may be associated with these issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>This category is concerned with the prevailing social attitudes of the government towards its citizens, and especially its identification of those associated with drugs and the threats they are perceived to present to the state. The presence of crime or violence related to drugs and the possible involvement of gangs is also important, as is the deployment of specific counter measures to combat drugs. For example, if the government associates drugs with poor or ghetto areas, then significant issues arise according to the type of counter-measures or strategies that can be legitimately employed there, which could not be implemented elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>This category discusses the economic environment in the state, and highlights issues such as poverty that may encourage and sustain the participation of both ordinary citizens and gangs with drugs as a source of income. It also highlights the impact of drug violence and crime upon the economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Actions</td>
<td>What actors exert an influence upon the state, drug-related policy or counter-measures such as regional forums, international actors or powerful neighbouring states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Actions</td>
<td>How does each state view the presence of drugs? Are they perceived as a security issue? Is the state involved with drugs as a source of funding for itself? Has it enacted measures to combat their presence? According to the terms used by Buzan et al, has the state securitised or politicised drugs as an issue? Is the state attempting to use drug counter-measures to achieve other domestic objectives? How successful has the state been in suppressing drug activities?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary of Terms

Securitisation—is defined as: “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”\(^{50}\) Buzan et al view securitisation as a negative situation and a failure to deal with issues through normal political processes. Furthermore, they believe that there are socially defined limits regarding what can be securitised and who can use security language.

Politication—according to Buzan et al, this refers to the opening (or the appearance of opening) an issue up to discussion, which places it within the realm of public debate. Furthermore, they assert that while politicisation is very similar to securitisation, securitisation is opposed to facilitating debate and analysis of an issue, and this is how the two differ according to their definition.\(^{51}\)

Referent Object—refers to an object defined as requiring the provision of security, or an actor or process that is defined as a threat.

Weak or strong states—refers to the levels of socio-political cohesion and internal political violence. Weak states will have low cohesion and high internal violence, while strong states will have high cohesion and low internal violence.\(^{52}\) An important caveat must be added, the concept of small states, which are characterised by their limited resources, poor economic development and territorial size. Not all small states suffer from the issues associated with weak socio-political cohesion or violence that are present within the definition presented by Buzan et al, though they can be considered as weak.

Regional Security Complex—refers to: “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from another.”\(^{53}\)

Regional power—refers to an actor that influences the structure of a regional security complex.\(^{54}\)

Security constellation—refers to the discourse and actions that are generated through the interaction of security actors upon a specific issue across the levels of domestic, regional, interregional and global.\(^{55}\)

Unstructured security regions—refers to states that cannot project their power beyond their own boundaries, and as a result, the formation of a regional complex does not result because of a lack of security interdependence.\(^{56}\)

\(^{50}\) Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.491; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.23-27. These definitions are directly copied from all three publications.

\(^{51}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.29

\(^{52}\) Buzan, 1991, p.97-100

\(^{53}\) Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.491

\(^{54}\) Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.491


\(^{56}\) Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.492
Security According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde

The NFA presents a re-conceptualisation of security, and challenges the prevailing traditionalist threat orthodoxy by revising and reconsidering the theory and literature concerning the contemporary character of conflict and threats. According to Buzan, security was at one stage an underdeveloped concept and ideas concerning national security were wedged between the dichotomous tensions associated with the realist and idealist paradigms, and as such he rejects the extremes inherent in either formulation of security and instead broaches a centrist platform. As previously asserted, the traditional discourse defined security in strict state-centric and military-political dimensions, and as such, the designation of referent object—an object defined as requiring the provision of security or defence against an actor or process—is, in the majority of cases, limited to the state itself. As a consequence, Buzan et al assert that: “It also requires us to provide a classification of what is and what is not a security issue, to explain how issues become securitized, and to locate the relevant security dynamics of the different types of security on levels ranging from local through regional to global.” New security issues do not, and cannot, replace traditional concerns as the strong possibility of armed intrastate conflict still exists within the international system, and with the exception of a few regional actors, the ability to determine whether a particular object or issue should be designated as requiring security is still limited to sovereign actors. Furthermore, new issues are themselves likely to engender both inter and intrastate conflict as resources are increasingly mobilised and deployed against these new threats to the state, resulting in new conflict arenas and dynamics. Understanding how a state perceives both its security and insecurity is therefore important, as this definition defines its response and the development of specific measures.

57 Buzan, 1991, p.1-13. The paradox of following a Realist paradigm for national security is that the search for security by individual states through power maximisation results in the creation and exacerbation of security dilemmas and the possibility of arms races. Such a paradox is the result of the structure of the self-help anarchic international system, neighbouring states will view such power maximising actions as inherent threats to their national security. Idealist visions of security are equally extreme, where the provision of peace within the system and among states will result in security, though such a belief ignores the reality of sovereign states locked into both political and economic competition, and fundamentally ignores human nature and desire.


59 The North American Treat Organisation (NATO) provides a good example of a regional organisation that can define an object or issue as requiring security, though the consent of its members is still required. The UN provides another example, though in this case, the ability of the UN to act is circumscribed by its members, their competing agendas and the United Nations Security Council. The decision of the UN to become involved in peacekeeping operations in some states, and not others, is characterised by this bargaining process.
According to Buzan, threats to security are heterogeneous in character. For example, many ethnic groups define the state as representing the primary threat to their security as a consequence of its attempts to assert and consolidate sovereign authority over its territory.\textsuperscript{60} This represents an inherent contradiction associated with the concept of national security. The state is a multidimensional actor that is simultaneously involved in the provision of security, the definition and assessment of threats and has benefited from its historical position as the primary referent object requiring security. As a consequence, a paradoxical relationship exists between the state and its citizens, as its power increases so does its ability to threaten their security.

For Buzan et al., artificially restricting the security discourse fails to account for the evolutionary character of conflict, the lack of symmetry among states and the changing organisational dynamics of the international system. Importantly, Buzan et al. also recognise the dangers and possible consequences associated with the application of the security label to a wider array of issues, and as such they observe that:

\begin{quote}
The new framework results from the expansion of the security agenda to include a wider range of sectors than the traditional military and political. Expanding the security agenda is not a simple or a trivial act, nor is it without political consequences. It is not just about tacking the word security onto economic, environmental, and societal. Pursuing the wider security agenda requires giving very careful thought to what is meant by security and applying that understanding to a range of dynamics, some of which are fundamentally different from military-political ones.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

These potentially negative consequences are qualified with reference to Waever’s recommendation that issues be moved out of a state of emergency and ameliorated through normal political processes. This would subject the security issue to both scrutiny and oversight, therefore preventing the obscurity and indeterminateness of the security label from achieving any un-stated political objectives.\textsuperscript{62} Weaver’s assertion also raises the important issue of public versus private securitisation, where a government deliberately places an issue within the public arena for discussion or attempts to prevent an issue from gaining publicity to ensure that it avoids scrutiny. This potential situation is addressed within their definitions and the distinction they make between securitisation and politicisation, though real-world events do not necessarily correspond to their classifications.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{60} Buzan, 1991, p.35-45
\textsuperscript{61} Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.195
\end{flushleft}
As an example of public verses private securitisation, the US provides significant amounts of military aid to Colombia based upon the premise that this is directly allocated towards fighting the cultivation and production of cocaine, as cocaine is directly related to the insecurity present throughout the Caribbean and to domestic US anti-drug objectives. However, in reality this policy could also be related to preventing FARC, a left-wing guerrilla movement, from taking over the state. Furthermore, such assistance could also help justify future US military budgets and influential domestic actors, such as industries that are intimately related to military and political interests. Aspects of such a policy will be publicised or concealed according to US government objectives and the need for the legitimisation of such policies by its citizens. The aspect of combating drugs would be promoted as it fits within an already established domestic security discourse, however, other policy goals such as US strategic objectives for the Caribbean and the need to satisfy political and economic sectional interests would obviously be played down. All governments have multiple objectives associated with their policies, and the successful implementation of them involves creating a balance between providing the public and oppositional political parties (if they exist) with enough information to garner consent, while at the same time obscuring potentially negative consequences.

For Buzan et al, securitisation—the process of identifying an issue as requiring security and the bargaining process that follows—represents an extreme form of politicisation. According to their definition, actors seek to move issues that are defined as threats into emergency mode in order to claim both extraordinary powers and to mobilise state resources to combat the perceived threats. In their opinion, threats must be dramatised and presented to an audience: “They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind.” According to Buzan et al, threat designation is a ‘self-referential practice’ where an issue does not need to be an actual threat, only defined or presented as such. Of further importance is the observation that security assessments entail predictions about future events, the possible dire consequences that will occur if no remedial action is undertaken and the positive situation that will

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64 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.5
result after the issue has been resolved.\(^{66}\) This implies that the definition of threats are open to manipulation, where an appropriate actor can present, manage or stage an issue as presenting an existential threat to a valued object, and this action legitimises counter-measures.

Buzan contends that threats and security issues are both subjective and constructed, and that powerful reasons exist for maintaining their ambiguity and elusiveness as an undefined concept.\(^{67}\) This provides an insight into why Buzan et al seek to expand the security discourse through categories, as this approach allows for the separation of security issues into manageable segments for conducting analysis and their reunification so that a holistic picture of security relations can be constructed and the interests of specific actors opened up to scrutiny. Buzan et al assert that:

\[ \ldots \text{the sectoral approach reflects what people are actually doing with the language by adding “security” onto sector designators (economic, environmental, and the like). This behaviour is a vital part of the securitisation process despite the fact that in the discourse it often reflects impulsive or superficially tactical moves designed to raise the priority of a given issue in the general political melee. These moves can, if successful, nevertheless generate deeper political consequences. Sectors are distinctive arenas of discourse in which a variety of different values (sovereignty, wealth, identity, sustainability, and so on) can be the focus of power struggles. The rhetoric of sectors generates a need for analytical follow-up to get some handles on how these consequences might unfold.} \(^{68}\) \]

Buzan et al therefore believe that the securitisation of an issue contains an identifiable inner logic that can be explored and extrapolated. In order to examine an example of securitisation, Buzan et al employ discourse analysis to assess the statements, rhetoric and threat presentation of actors involved in the assessment and definition of a threat, which they denote as the speech act. They continue by observing the involvement of all actors with a particular issue, defined by them as a security constellation, and the chain reactions that occur as a result of both the actors involved and those that arise through the invocation of security.\(^{69}\) As an example, within the United Kingdom (UK) recent debate has focused upon the issue of reclassifying marijuana from a class C drug to a class B drug—which would involve harsher penalties and the suspension of a confiscate and warning system instituted by the police—in response to burgeoning concerns over drug availability and the increasing involvement of organised crime. The situation is complex, as demonstrated by Prime Minister, Gordon Brown’s, indicated preference for

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\(^{67}\) Buzan, 1991, p.11; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.29-31  
\(^{68}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.196  
upgrading the classification of marijuana, and there are strong contentions that he has ignored the advice of the government’s own drug experts. Furthermore, in spite of the previous support of police authorities for downgrading the classification of marijuana, due to the overwhelming waste of resources dealing with minor possession activities, they now support its reclassification but with the inclusion of provisions for police discretion.\(^{70}\) This situation could be viewed as an attempt to prevent securitisation, as the Prime Minister clearly views marijuana as a threat to both the state and society, though other actors and organisations with the authority to discuss drug issues contest the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister.

**Securitisation: A Three-Step Process**

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\text{Existential threat} + \text{Emergency action} + \text{Effects on inter-unit actions}\\(\text{Threat Assessment})\ (\text{Mobilisation})\ (\text{Chain reactions})
\]

**Justification for Focusing upon Regions**

Originally, Buzan explored *Classical Security Complex Theory* (CSCT) within PS&F and was concerned with analysing the security dynamics that existed among states, which result in the formation of regional groupings. These regional groupings developed as a consequence of the intense security relations among neighbouring states that are conditioned by an overarching environment of interdependence, patterns of amity or enmity, and the interplay of power imbalances, security dilemmas and arms races.\(^{71}\) Buzan and Waever observe that: “Anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such complexes than between states inside the complex and those outside it.”\(^{72}\) Expanding beyond the artificial preclusion of threats to state security as entailed within the traditional discourse required the development of a framework that was inclusive of new threats and actors. As a consequence, Buzan et al reformulated Buzan’s original presentation of CSCT into Regional Security Complex Theory (RSC), and as such, they observe that:


\(^{71}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.10-15

\(^{72}\) Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.46; For further discussion of RSC please refer to Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.40-50
Security interdependence is markedly more intense among the units inside such complexes than with units outside them. Security complexes are about the relative intensities of security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and relations of amity and enmity. A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are normally generated by the units within it—by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. But they may also arise from collective securitizations of outside pressures arising from the operation of complex metasystems, such as the planetary environment or the global economy.  

This quote reveals the divergence between CSCT and RSC, where the focus is now upon units and not exclusively with states as the primary actor requiring security. However, this thesis will maintain the focus upon the state as the primary security actor as it alone maintains sovereignty and the ability to make domestic policies related to drugs. An important caveat to this is of course the ability of more powerful actors and states to impose their authority, and to coerce weak or small states into conforming to their objectives. Furthermore, retaining the focus upon the state reduces the overall complexity of the case studies and still allows for the tension between the state and the presence of multiple ethnic groups and non-state actors to be examined. This thesis shall explore the presence of the Caribbean within the US RSC in chapter 3.

The Importance of the Pacific to Regional Security Complex Theory

Of significant importance to this thesis is the fact that Buzan et al highlight examples where it is unlikely that a RSC would form, defined by them as an unstructured security region, where security interdependence among neighbouring states is non-existent or weak. This situation could include states with domestically directed security concerns and among states that are unable to project their power beyond their borders. The Pacific is ostensively cited by Buzan et al as a region that best approximates their definition of an unstructured region, though they acknowledge that the Forum binds the region into a lose security community. The prominence of new security issues that are characterised by transnational attributes, combined with the current concern for weak and failed states as incubators for such threats, has at a minimal level challenged this observation, and may have even invalidated it. For example, the trafficking of SALW between Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands or drugs throughout the Pacific region all entail significant consequence for state and regional security. According to

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73 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.201  
74 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.61-64; Buzan, 1991, p.205  
75 Buzan 1998 p.12; Buzan and Waever p.62
contemporary security assessments conducted by New Zealand and Australia, PIS feature prominently because physical isolation by water is no longer considered as a sufficient barrier to the development and expansion of threats. The positioning of the Pacific within the RSC of both Australia and New Zealand shall be addressed within chapter 4.

Levels of Analysis Scheme

In order to locate the source of threat(s), the referent object(s) requiring security, the reactions to instances of securitisation or counter-securitisation and the influencing actors and processes, Buzan et al employ the levels of analysis schema. Critical to the employment of this analytical tool is the caution, as observed by the authors, that this schema only represents an ontological tool that allows the analyst to locate where events or processes take place and their interconnections or interdependence; their location on the scheme are not explanations for their occurrence.76 Buzan et al also acknowledge that the levels of analysis scheme privileges and reinforces state-centric observations. While such a concern is valid, the author’s inclusion of a diversity of actors and processes as threats or referent objects within the NFA and their objective of widening the security discourse counter-act such a privileged position.

Categories within the New Framework for Analysis

Political Security

According to Buzan et al, the political security category is difficult to present as in many respects all security is defined and conceptualised by political actors who attribute objectives, motives and decision-making capabilities to actors or processes perceived by them as adversarial.77 Importantly, Buzan et al emphasise the changing nature of political units, noting both the recent appearance of states as the primary form of political organisation and the presence of formalised equality among all states within international relations.78 Accordingly, states are only one manifestation of political organisation, and as Buzan et al suggest, they have been privileged as the dominant political unit within international relations since 1945.79 In spite of this, Buzan et al recognise the authority and power commanded by many non-state actors and organisations, and additionally observe that many non-state

76 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.5-7
actors are motivated by a desire for independence and statehood. As a consequence, Buzan et al characterise political threats to state sovereignty as those that derive from non-military sources; however, they also recognise the difficulty in circumscribing political security as it forms an essential part of all the other categories they present within the NFA.

Locating the state as the primary referent object within the political security category requires clarification as to what is threatened and what elements constitute the state. Buzan observes that:

*Political threats are aimed at the organisational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organisational ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal targets of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state.*

Threats that derive from domestic and international actors and processes that question the sovereignty and/or legitimacy of the state therefore define political security. These two concepts are fundamentally important for the state in maintaining its position as the primary organisational unit within its territory and as an equal within the international system.

At this point, it is important to recall the distinction between weak and strong states. Strong states are not internally contested and those who can act on its behalf are regulated by formalised rules. In contrast, weak states are open to threats of a political nature as they are internally contested by actors who deliberately attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the government, the state or both. Ultimately, both weak and strong states, will identify threats as those that challenge their sovereignty, Buzan et al therefore assert that: *“Existential threats to a state are those that ultimately involve sovereignty, because sovereignty is what defines the state as a state.”* With regard to the threat presented by drugs, they can assist in undermining the sovereignty of the state by corrupting security agencies such as the police or the functioning of the bureaucracy. Moreover, they can provide non-state actors with the ability to create and maintain an internal parallel state through the provision of social services, therefore challenging the legitimacy of the state by questioning its reason for existing. It is important to remember that all states exist

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80 Buzan, 1991, p.59
81 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.142
83 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.150
with varying levels of political insecurity, and that the ability to securitise an issue is restricted in some states by this very weakness. Furthermore, drugs often reinforce and exacerbate the presence of these political weaknesses. A combined focus upon the domestic political environment and the negative influence of drugs shall be examined within each case study.

**Military Security**

According to Buzan et al, the military security category is not exclusively concerned with security issues, though their conception of the category employs both traditional military concerns of inter and intrastate conflict and blends this with new security concerns.\(^\text{84}\) They observe that the rules governing the securitisation of threats and the employment of military force have become increasingly institutionalised and regulated, especially when the state is the referent object, though again, the distinction between weak or strong states should be recalled.\(^\text{85}\) The state remains as the primary referent object within the military category and the government claims the legitimate right to monopolise the employment of force in both domestic and international situations.\(^\text{86}\) Buzan et al observe that: “In practice, the military security agenda revolves largely around the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but it can also involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against non-military threats to their existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies.”\(^\text{87}\) Moreover, Buzan et al highlight other non-state actors that regularly serve as military referent objects—objects that security measures should be deployed against—these can include ethnic groups, private armies or criminal groups that challenge the governance arrangements of the state, mimicking its functions or services and suborning its regulations, which therefore challenge its sovereignty and legitimacy.\(^\text{88}\) The ability of many non-state actors to act autonomously of the state have been circumscribed through the gradual disarming of their citizens, though such a situation is present within a minority of states and this is inherently difficult to enforce when extensive land or sea boarders are the only barrier to acquiring weapons, with the exception of the financial means.

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\(^{84}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.49-52  
\(^{85}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.49 & 55  
\(^{86}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.49 & 51  
\(^{87}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.50  
\(^{88}\) Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.52-54
Given this observation, activities such as the trafficking of SALW and the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs can become the object of military security because of their direct relationship with domestic and regional conflict, violence and insecurity. Buzan et al observe that:

…the general rule of military relations is that states are worried more about their neighbours than about distant powers. With non-traditional military relations, the distance rule applies more unevenly. It remains largely true for local criminal and inner-city scenarios and failed-state anarchies, but terrorists and mafias may deliver threats with little concern for distance…

Drugs and SALW are intimately linked with non-state actors that challenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state, and therefore represent a significant threat to the security of the state. The security of a state, as previously acknowledged, can be further undermined when neighbouring states define drug activities that are occurring along their borders as a threat to their security, and act accordingly. The relationship between drugs, non-state actors and SALW acquisition will be focused upon within each case study where appropriate.

Societal Security

Buzan et al define cultural identity issues as the main focus of the societal category, and as such, they observe that members of a community perceive security in terms of threats to their identity and survival. In order to emphasise this assessment, Buzan et al employ Benedict Anderson’s definition of an ethnic group as identity-based communities that are imagined and self-constructed, with shared cultural practices, history and religion. The historical and often ad-hoc creation of states, where state and ethnic group boundaries are often incongruent, has resulted in the presence of internal and irredentist societal conflict as a natural characteristic of domestic relations within many states. As Buzan observes within PS&F, domestic relations in the majority of states are also defined by the tension that exists between the creation of the state by the nation, and the creation of the nation by actions of the state. Furthermore, because of the asymmetry among state structures, the societal category is therefore composed of a variety of issues that include migration, vertical or horizontal competition between different ethnic groups, and the attempts by the state at cultural homogenisation or ethnic favouritism, all of

89 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.59
93 Buzan, 1991, p.70-77
which can have a significant impact and destabilising influence upon both domestic and regional security.\textsuperscript{94} Understanding this domestic environment and specific history is essential as it defines the manner in which national security is conceived, how threats are defined and the measures that can be deployed. Furthermore, as only a few states throughout the world are ethnically homogenous, there is considerable scope for internal security issues to directly influence bi-cultural relations, and this situation could itself result in the creation or exacerbation of domestic conflict.

The referent objects within this category are any significant societal groups and can include a combination of clans, tribes, ethnic groups or non-state actors such as gangs or criminal organisations. Furthermore, because of the possible inclusion of multiple societal groupings within a state, a government or state that is dominated by a particular group can also serve as a referent object for minority groups.\textsuperscript{95} The securitising actors include anyone that is authorised to speak on behalf of the ethnic group or state, and political groups or individuals seeking power frequently use references to their ethnic identity to assist with the mobilisation of political support. While Bazan et al employ a specific focus upon intra-societal competition and conflict, this thesis recognises that other significant social consequences which are associated with drugs, such as the development of drug-related crime and violence, and the spread of diseases such as AIDS/HIV through the sharing of needles or prostitution to pay for drugs, are important societal security concerns. Moreover, societal conflict could arise if a specific ethnic group dominates drug activity or is perceived to be associated with such activities, or if the profits from drugs are used to support ethnic groups during conflict, attempts at separatism or rebellion. A combination of these issues will be discussed according to their relevance to each case study.

**Economic Security**

In the economic category Buzan et al discuss the tension that exists between competing visions within the international political economy discourse. As such, they provide a brief overview of the central conflict between the subordination of the state to the market versus state intervention and regulation of the economy to

\textsuperscript{94} Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.121-122  
\textsuperscript{95} Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.123-124. For further discussion of the particular domestic arrangements and the societal threats that can develop as a consequence of identity please review p.126-137
provide for the needs of society. Buzan et al observe that: “Concern about the
global economy might be securitized in its own terms, but it might also be
securitized in terms of a national economy or of groups of individuals within a
national economy (such as displaced worker).” While Buzan et al focus upon
these aspects and the presence of domestic competition between political parties
based upon these differences, this thesis is concerned with what is commonly
classified as the **dark side of capitalism**, as economic freedom has increasingly
facilitated drug and SALW trafficking, the penetration of the state by criminals and
the empowerment of non-state actors.

The multidimensional character of drugs requires that the economic
dimensions receive particular attention as they can be used as a financial resource
during armed conflict, as a source of income for individuals and groups within
economic depressed areas and as a source of income for criminal groups. The
presence of poor financial controls and the presence of money laundering
operations can provide significant assistance to those involved with drug activities.
Furthermore, the development of societal conflict and violence related to drugs can
have a fundamentally detrimental influence upon economic development by
intimidating both potential investors and tourists. This can result in the creation of a
cycle of economic decline that is defined by the resort to drug profits by many
sections of society for income and the subsequent generation of drug-related
conflict that hinders economic development that forces the reallocation of limited
financial resources by the state to ensure additional security arrangements. This
prevents the state for focusing upon important economic priorities. These aspects
shall be discussed throughout each case study.

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97 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.100
Chapter Three
Caribbean Regional Overview

Introduction

The small and microstates that collectively define the Caribbean region are geographically comprised of hundreds of islands that are spread out as a thin archipelago between North and South America. As such, the relatively compact distances between these states and the primary production and consumption areas for cocaine ensure that they are ideally suited for trafficking activities. As this chapter shall demonstrate, drugs have had an extremely detrimental influence upon political, military, social and economic affairs within these states, and they have merged with them to further undermine state agencies and bureaucratic structures, which were already compromised and open to corruption. Of further consequence, is the historical creation of these states through colonialism and their enduring foreign relations with these external powers, which has resulted in a contemporary collage of sovereign entities and complex jurisdictional arrangements. The intimate relationship between these states and trafficking activities ensures that they are required to balance a variety of challenges to their sovereignty. For example, attempts by the US to prevent drug activities combined with the existence of relationships between internal and external criminal groups and gangs all undermine the domestic security and sovereignty of Caribbean Island States (CIS). The Caribbean therefore represents an ideal case study for examining the impact of drugs upon the state, and perfectly illustrates how external actors influence anti-drug policies and strategies. Furthermore, it also demonstrates how the weakness of one state, or collectively shared weaknesses, can influence regional security.
Overview of Drugs and their Impact Throughout the Caribbean

CIS have traditionally been affected by the significant cultivation and trafficking of both marijuana and cocaine, however, within this considerable history, new developments have frequently occurred. These changes have included the appearance of crack-cocaine, which is relatively cheap in comparison to other drugs, and more recently there has been increasing demand for ATS. The increasing seizure of precursor chemicals related to ATS production indicates that demand has begun to stimulate regional manufacture.98 Furthermore, according to Douglas and Hillerbrand, drug abuse among CIS is increasing as a local service market for traffickers has been established and those employed by them have been paid for their services with drugs.99 Abrahams emphasises additional changes, and observes that increasing amounts of heroin were available throughout the Caribbean in 1996, compared to previous periods, as a direct result of their increasing leakage from consignments.100 Unfortunately, a consensus does not exist regarding the presence or magnitude of domestic addiction. For example, during 2006 the INCB asserted that in spite of the primary use of the Caribbean for trafficking activities, there were low levels of abuse and consumption.101 However, it

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101 INCB, 2006, p.44
had previously stated during 2000 that there was noticeable domestic consumption due to their trafficking.\(^\text{102}\) This situation is important, as domestic, regional and international actors require an accurate assessment and overview of the drug environment in order to establish effective counter measures such as rehabilitation and demand reduction services.

Unfortunately, in spite of the magnitude of drugs and their ubiquitous availability, statistics and information concerning the influence of their presence are underdeveloped or non-existent, despite seizures figures that demonstrate trafficking patterns and highlight those states that are primarily affected. According to the INCB: “few of the island states in the Caribbean have undertaken studies to assess the drug situation, even when conducting such studies is included as a priority in their national drug control master plans.”\(^\text{103}\) Furthermore, as Douglas and Hillerband observe, few states collect statistics or employ a standardised methodology, and the lack of technical and financial resources has resulted in the termination of initiatives and regional monitoring systems.\(^\text{104}\) CIS are in a disadvantageous position because of their reliance upon both foreign assistance for maintaining anti-drug activities, and the complexities involved in coordinating national and regional initiatives. This situation is evident by the frequency of regional drug conferences where there is a poor record of the agreed upon measures being implemented, in spite of their ratification.\(^\text{105}\) However, this situation may not be as bad as is frequently portrayed, as some research concerning drug abuse in the region is available, though is not widely publicised.\(^\text{106}\) As a consequence of inadequate or unpublicised research, governments, their law enforcement agencies and regional organisations cannot constructively intervene into cultivation, production or trafficking activities unless they can identify which activities are of primary concern and those structures that provide support to them, such as segments of the population that are addicted or domestic criminal groups that are intimately involved. More importantly, the effectiveness of the strategies that are employed cannot be assessed because of this lack of information.


\(^{103}\) INCB, 2001 p.46; INCB, 2000, p.37

\(^{104}\) Douglas and Hillerband, 2003, p.75 & p.79


\(^{106}\) For example please refer to: First Stakeholders Meeting of the Drug Abuse Epidemiological and Surveillance System Project, “Meeting Highlights” (Regional meeting held in Trinidad at the Cascadia Hotel, 23-25 July, 2001); [http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/default.asp](http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/default.asp)
The share volume of drugs and the wide variety of criminal groups that are involved are fundamentally overwhelming for CIS. For example, one regional multilateral operation during 2005 resulted in the seizure of 26.5 tons of cocaine, USD$86 million and 354 arrests. Additionally, operations organised by the DEA, such as Busted Manatee and Double Talk have collectively resulted in the seizure of 6,589kgs of cocaine, 1,208.8kgs of marijuana, USD$45,929,155 million in currency and assets and 130 arrests. Disturbingly, in spite of this clear demonstration of significant and frequent success, these operations have done little to disrupt trafficking activities for any sustained period, and have they not changed the domestic and regional environment that facilitates drugs activities. These examples further illustrate the extent of the regional trade and the enormous financial incentives that encourage participation. They also assist with accounting for the continued weakness of these transit states, and in spite of their continued investment in law enforcement resources and counter measures, they are unable to adequately secure their borders or prevent the use of their territory for drug-related activities.

The geographic sandwiching of CIS between the US and South America ensures that all available means of personal, maritime and air transportation have been, and are, utilised to traffic drugs. Furthermore, new strategies have developed and previous methods have been alternated between in order to avoid detection as well as in response to successful law enforcement operations and improved security arrangements. For example, tightened airport security within some states has encouraged human couriers to use alternative airports or neighbouring states, and the absence of any credible air defences has effectively facilitated the use of air shipments to clandestine airfields. Issues such as state failure in Haiti have resulted in increasing shipments transiting through it, and the absence of a credible law enforcement presence elsewhere combined with the availability of sparsely populated islands has encouraged activities such as drug stock-pilling. The presence of large immigrant communities throughout multiple states has also

assisted with the establishment of illicit business relations and alternative trafficking routes based upon these social relations. Additionally, the intimate involvement of both commercial and private vessels ensures that traffickers enjoy a considerable comparative advantage over coastguard and customs interdiction operations. For example, the DEA estimates that several hundred go-fast-boats with the capacity for one to two tonne shipments of cocaine operate from Colombia throughout the region. The volume of maritime traffic and the diversity of vessels ensure that law enforcement agencies and operations face a rapidly changing environment that is further complicated by the challenges posed by multiple territorial boundaries, complex jurisdic-tional arrangements and interagency cooperation.

The introduction and spread of new technologies such as internet-banking, satellite and cell phones, global positioning systems and computers all directly enhancing the ability of criminals to organise their activities across the region, and further assists with their ability to avoid detection. The establishment of free trade areas for commercial manufacturing and increasing regional economic integration has also allowed traffickers to disguise their shipments and to take advantage of attempts by CIS to develop their economies. The use of new technology places significant financial and resource burdens upon the state and law enforcement agencies, as they are required to introduce new legislation, acquire advanced computer skills and employ highly skilled personnel that can assist with the introduction of modern investigative techniques for examining financial transactions, instances of money laundering and drug activities.

The large number of states and the existence of asymmetries between them regarding the exercise of sovereignty, differing law enforcement capabilities and institutional structures all influence their ability to adequately provide domestic security and to intervene in drug activities. Furthermore, reoccurring issues such as limited financial, technical and human resources prevent these states from allocating the required resources to ensure the continued functioning of counter measures. As Bernal et al observe, CIS are trapped within a vicious cycle where they are forced by structural adjustment programmes to service their foreign debts, and therefore reduce social spending, and must concomitantly divert essential

funds to combat drug cultivation and trafficking.\textsuperscript{113} The negative by-products associated with drugs, such as the direct costs placed upon both the health service and judicial system further undermines their stability and ability to respond. As a consequence, drugs have fundamentally penetrated CIS, and have corrupted not only members of law enforcement agencies, but also political leaders, local businesses and bureaucratic administrators.\textsuperscript{114} Criminal groups and gangs are able to exploit these visible differences to their advantage, while these governments are unable to appropriately respond due to either their inability to direct and command their agencies, provide them with adequate resources or because there is insufficient political willpower to do so. Furthermore, a paradoxical situation often occurs, where the repositioning of state resources away from social programmes encourages the participation of ordinary citizens in drug activities in order to generate an income, which assists with entrenching drugs throughout the state.

The overwhelming presence of drugs throughout the Caribbean has also resulted in increasing levels of violence and crime associated with criminal rivalry and competition, and the financial support that drugs provide for non-state actors. Furthermore, increasing levels of crime are also related to drug addicts attempting to support their habits, though with regard to this aspect, the type of drugs involved—such as crack-cocaine—may also assist in determining the appearance of violence. According to US Admiral Robert E. Kramek: “\textit{the connection between drugs and violent crime is irrefutable.}”\textsuperscript{115} This link between drugs and violence is further explored by Griffith, who observes that: “\textit{There is an obvious relationship between drugs and crime: drug operations are illegal, and they lead to or require other criminal conduct.}”\textsuperscript{116} Griffith also acknowledges that while there is little empirical evidence that can validate regional casual linkages between drug activities and crime, the areas with progressive increases in homicide, serious


\textsuperscript{114} Griffith, 1997, p.159-173; J. Milford, \textit{DEA Congressional Testimony} (Statement by J. Milford Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, before the House International Relations Committee regarding Haiti, December 9, 1997)

\textsuperscript{115} Admiral Robert E. Kramek, United States Coast Guard, \textit{(Statement on Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, April 3, 1997)}; Douglas and Hillebrand, 2003, p.75

\textsuperscript{116} Griffith, 1997, p.118
assault and theft have occurred in those states that have also served as centres of drug activity within the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{117} This situation requires the state to devote increasing resources to law enforcement agencies in order to establish a safe environment for its citizens and for economic development to continue.

The presence of internal armed conflicts between criminal organisations and gangs over drugs, between these groups and the state, or even the presence of competition among national leaders over the control of the state itself, can also contribute to the presence of drug-related violence, as symbiotic relationships between drugs and SALW frequently develop. For example, criminal groups, gangs and non-state actors can utilise the profits from drugs to acquire SALW, or alternatively, SALW can be trafficked alongside drugs as another illicit business opportunity or the two can be exchanged in a direct trade.\textsuperscript{118} During 2001 the INCB observed that: “There has been a noticeable increase in firearms trafficking along drug trafficking routes, together with an increase in other criminal activities associated with the illicit trade, such as trafficking in persons and motor vehicle theft.”\textsuperscript{119} Furthermore, as Shridath Ramphal, former Foreign minister for Guyana, asserted: “It only takes twelve men in a boat to put some of these governments out of business.”\textsuperscript{120} An additional influence upon the development of violence is the presence of gangs based upon ethnicity with illicit transnational interests and the problems associated with the deportation and reintroduction of hardened criminals back into these small states.\textsuperscript{121}

The presence of a symbiotic relationship between drugs and SALW is extremely concerning for two primary reasons: it undermines the coercive capacity of the state, which could already be insignificant, and it provides criminals and non-state actors with the ability to self-finance, removing them from reliance upon the domestic economy and directly enhances their power. This ensures that if CIS attempted to directly confront those involved there could be considerable violence

\textsuperscript{117} Griffith, 1997, p.119-120
\textsuperscript{119} INCB, 2001, p.45
\textsuperscript{120} Griffith, 1997, p.172
and the potential for human rights abuses committed by both sides, while it also causes significant instability that could overwhelm the government and result in the failure of the state. Another primary concern is the undermining of the legitimacy of CIS as a consequence of these criminal groups utilising a portion of their drug-related profits to provide social services for their local communities.

Estimated Cocaine Flow in Metric Tons From July 1998 through June 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>3rd Quarter/98</th>
<th>4Q/98</th>
<th>1Q/99</th>
<th>2Q/99</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>7.728</td>
<td>17.97</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td>11.941</td>
<td>53.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2.411</td>
<td>1.519</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>16.33</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.047</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>32.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table adapted from DEA Congressional Testimony January 4, 2000 (Statement of William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice Before the House Government Reform Committee.) Figures presented in metric tons.

Selected Marijuana Seizure Figures in the Caribbean 1994-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>4,091</td>
<td>4,134</td>
<td>3,610</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>3,763</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>3,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,948</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td>856</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>11,818</td>
<td>6,621</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>4,063</td>
<td>3,423</td>
<td>3,188</td>
<td>2,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>6,121</td>
<td>8,802</td>
<td>5,559</td>
<td>4,610</td>
<td>6,023</td>
<td>5,369</td>
<td>4,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3,816</td>
<td>2,934</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>246</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>8,860</td>
<td>20,179</td>
<td>52,377</td>
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<tr>
<td>St Vincent &amp; Grenadines</td>
<td>1,962</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>7,180</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>3,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>11,408</td>
<td>1,634</td>
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Selected Cocaine Seizures in the Caribbean 1994-2001

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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
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<td>2,774</td>
<td>1,857</td>
<td>3,347</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>392</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,813</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>2,219</td>
<td>143</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>7,905</td>
<td>372</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>1,307</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>2,337</td>
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<td>639</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>111</td>
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</table>

Estimated Volumes of Trafficked Marijuana, Eastern Caribbean during 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Volume (Kgs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua-Barbuda</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts-Nevis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincent</td>
<td>7,188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Caribbean Regional Actors

The United States

The Caribbean represents a fundamentally important region for US national security. As such, it has been the focus of significant foreign policy and incorporated into domestic security considerations such as the Monroe Doctrine or characterised as a third territorial border. The importance of the region is unmistakable, though its centrality within security considerations has fluctuated, and the frequency with which large-scale interventions have occurred, both before and after the Cold War, such as in Cuba (1904), Grenada (1983) and Haiti (1994 & 2004), demonstrates its continuing strategic value. US concerns surrounding the threat posed by drugs are therefore a mixture of domestic anxieties over drug addiction, which have been expressed via its War on Drugs, and regional security concerns about failed states, the potential for terrorist scenarios and, more importantly, US desires to control the region for its own political, economic and strategic benefit. The threat posed by the use of CIS for the cultivation and trafficking of drugs has merged comfortably with the already established US security discourse for the region, and as a consequence, drugs have undeniably been securitised.122 This situation is clearly evident throughout US policies and actions. For example, an enormous amount of financial, technical and human resources are provided though with the precondition that CIS adequately addressed the presence of drugs, and there are a variety of governmental agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) who have offices established throughout the region.

122 This thesis has not consulted or acknowledged conspiracy theories, though there have been suggestions that the US War on Drugs has not been applied consistently, and agencies such as the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIA) have been accused of using drug profits to fund foreign initiatives and programmes; the Iran-contra Affair has been cited as one such example. For a brief overview of such issues, please refer to Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York, Harper and Row, 1972); Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (New York: Lawrence Hill & Co., 2003)
However, the securitisation of drugs by the US has not significantly reduced the magnitude of their cultivation or trafficking, and its aggressive approach to negotiations with the small and microstates of the region has at times been counter-productive. Furthermore, according to testimony from J Milford, DEA administrator, drug organisations throughout the Caribbean: “are almost immune to conventional law enforcement strategies”, and in his assessment, anti-drug polices and operations must be conducted through a holistic hemispheric approach in order to be effective.123 Though, Payne highlights the complexity of US objectives and observes that: “…one has quickly to move on and away from the easy notion of there ever being a single US state strategy towards anywhere or anything and grapple instead with the many contradictions and variables—the many messy policies—that actually exist.”124 The tensions surrounding the negotiations of bilateral agreements such as Cooperative Maritime Counter-Narcotics Agreements serve as just one example where poor consideration of the concerns expressed by CIS undermines the ability of the US to achieve mutual security objectives. The traditional distain of the US for multilateral cooperation also encumbers negotiations, as CIS have strengthened their connection to regional organisations in order to overcome their shared weaknesses and to maximise their collective political and economic power. Moreover, because the US is such a powerful political and economic actor, and as a consequence of the size of its bureaucracy and the presence of internally competing interests, anti-drug measures and policies from different agencies can, paradoxically, undermine each other. The implementation of alternative strategies or reductions in financial assistance for counter measures in South American states also directly influences the amount of cocaine transiting CIS, and this situation directly influences their level of security. The Caribbean is therefore clearly apart of the US RSC.

Within the US there is strong bi-partisan consensus between both the Republican and Democrat parties regarding the focus of anti-drug strategies, and reducing the supply of drugs rather than suppressing the domestic demand for them is viewed as the best policy approach for achieving success.125 However, this

123 Milford, 1997
consensus is itself problematic, as drugs and national security are themselves highly emotive and politicised issues, and the failure of either party to adequately address them would invite criticism and potentially involve significant domestic repercussions. This situation should be partially viewed as a primary driving force behind US investment in regional anti-drug policies. Lastly, the securitisation of drugs also justifies and legitimises the considerable expenses involved in maintaining its strong presence throughout the region, and the maintenance of security measures designed to enhance both its own security and that of CIS. The provision of significant amounts of financial, technical and human resources to CIS should be viewed as overwhelmingly related to self-interest with additional elements of altruism.

Caribbean and United States Relations

Regional relations between CIS and the US are difficult to characterise, as they are in constant fluctuation between cooperation and open opposition, and contrary to popular observations, they are not unidirectional with the US simply imposing policies upon them.126 According to Payne, CIS have failed to take advantage of the US as they have inadequately inserted themselves into its policy communities, and as a consequence, they have not enhanced their position within this fundamentally important bilateral and multilateral relationship.127 This situation may have characterised previous relations. However, documents such as the National Security Policy for Jamaica: Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation (2007) released by the Jamaican Government clearly outline its intention to utilise bilateral relationships to meet internal security objectives.128 Additionally, according to Knight and Persaud, attempts by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to involve the UN within the region’s anti-drug strategies represents an attempt to counter-balance the overwhelming influence and dominance of the US.129 As another example of the incorporation of foreign actors, the Organization of American States (OAS) has a strong relationship with the European Union for coordinating anti-drug measures, with a focus upon both demand reduction and

127 Payne, 2000, p.79
alternative development strategies. This clearly demonstrates that the CIS are not simply stuck within the dichotomy of weak versus powerful states, and that they are able to overcome the challenges posed by their limited resources and sovereignty to seek alternative sources of assistance. It is also likely that national leaders throughout the Caribbean have at times found it politically expedient to project their appearance of weakness, even though this exists and is visible, in order to attain further US assistance for their own domestic purposes.

CIS do not have a compartmentalised view of drugs within their societies and they view their presence as a function of economic underdevelopment. This relationship between economic development and anti-drug measures has become a source of conflict between CIS and US relations, and during important negotiations. For example, agencies such the DEA cannot discuss economic development priorities that would reduce the reliance of Caribbean citizens upon drug related income, while US trade negotiations, such as those which challenged the preferential treatment of Caribbean export commodities to Europe, such as bananas, do not take account of the manner in which such activities directly undermines CIS economic security and employment opportunities. As such, the weaknesses that create ideal conditions for drug activities remain, and a symbiotic relationship between state weakness, insecurity and drugs frequently develop.

Furthermore, CIS view themselves as sandwiched between the US objectives of reducing their vulnerability to drugs and the ability of them to reach its territory, and the need to balance this challenge to their sovereignty with those posed by armed criminal groups and gangs associated with drugs, who also directly threaten their internal sovereignty and security. The issue of maintaining sovereignty in the presence of this dual challenge has significantly influenced regional relations. For example, as Munroe has observed: “Cooperation with the United States in advancing this self-interest did not develop, however, without serious concern in the Caribbean that mutually beneficial collaboration with the

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132 Griffith, 1997, p.222; Jones, 2002
United States should not be at the expense of the sovereignty of the Caribbean states.” Furthermore, as Lt Commander Bethel suggests, past US unilateral approaches to drug interdiction ignored the sovereignty and legal systems of CIS, and as a consequence, collective security measures have been view with suspicion. The level of CIS concern regarding drugs is clearly evident within CARICOM reports, statements and regional summits. However, despite CIS anxieties over US infringements upon their sovereignty, many have cooperated extensively, and they have also continued to devote significant attention and resources toward combating drugs. Though, it is possible that this cooperation and continued investment is a product of necessity, as without combating the presence of drugs, criminal groups and gangs would destabilise their states, while the US commands extensive political and economic coercive capacity to ensure compliance with anti-drug strategies. This situation ensures the continued maintenance of the sovereignty dilemma for CIS.

North American Regional Security Complex According to Buzan and Waever

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133 Munroe, 2000, p.193
135 See for example: CARICOM, “Regional Task Force on Crime and Security” (September, 2002); CARICOM Secretariat, “Bridgetown Declaration of Principles” (Caribbean/United States Summit Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean, Bridgetown, Barbados, 10 May 1997); Edward Greene Assistant Secretary General, Human and Social Development CARICOM Secretariat, “Introductory Remarks At The Opening Ceremony Of The Fourth Joint Meeting of IGTF On Drugs and Ministers Responsible For National Security” (Statement made in St John’s, Antigua, 13 June 2001); Brana-Shute, 2000, p.99. According to Brana-Shute, 9 out of 17 categories of items for discussion at the US/CARICOM summit in 1997 were directly related to the issue of drugs in the region.
This map by Buzan and Waever accurately depicts the RSC that is in operation between the US, the Caribbean and the wider region. However, with regard to drugs, the concerns of the US and the boundary of the RSC are extended throughout those states in South America that are involved with the cultivation, production and trafficking of cocaine, such as Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{136} Additionally, Venezuela has become increasingly incorporated into this RSC as a consequence of the tense political and economic relations that are driven by the leadership characteristics and policies of Hugo Chavez, which are, in many respects, antithetical to those held by the US. This situation is a by-product of traditional interstate rivalry and ideological differences.
Case Study One
Jamaica

Introduction

Jamaica has endured the ubiquitous presence of both drug cultivation and trafficking, and as such, information concerning the impact of drugs upon state security, as well as upon all aspects of society, are well recognised and documented. Jamaica represents an important case study, as the large body of official documents facilitates an insight into the long history of drug securitisation and the multitude of actors and influences involved. This information also provides an extensive overview of the attempts by the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) at combating drugs. However, this case study is complicated by the fact that this understanding has not resulted in a tangible reduction in their presence. At the heart of this failure are the existence of strong relationships between national leaders and gangs, and the fact that some sections of the bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies and ordinary citizens financially benefited from drugs and the presence of insecurity. This situation has undermined the ability of the government to both eradicate cultivation and prevent the use of the country for trafficking activities, and in spite of frequent large-scale instances of operational success, counter measures have had little overall impact. Furthermore, strong external influences and changing US anti-drug strategies have imposed constraints upon the GOJ, while also restricting the range of policies and measures that have been implemented.

News Coverage of Drugs in Jamaica

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBC News</td>
<td>January 3, 2002</td>
<td>“Jamaican drug mules ‘flooding’ UK”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>January 31, 2002</td>
<td>“Jamaican air transhipment port for Colombian drugs-Narcotics Chief”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>February 6, 2003</td>
<td>“Drug link could corrupt politics”—Phillips says narcotics trade ‘clear and present danger’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>March 28, 2003</td>
<td>“The illicit drug trade and Jamaica”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>September 25, 2003</td>
<td>“Drugs in the mail”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>February 9, 2004</td>
<td>“Big drug bust-Narco agents seize US$15m cocaine in Gimme-Me-Bit”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>March 17, 2006</td>
<td>“Narcotics police make huge dent in illegal drug trade”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>April 9, 2006</td>
<td>“Guns and drugs… the Montego Bay link”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Gleaner</td>
<td>December 24, 2006</td>
<td>“Police officer comes clean”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Observer</td>
<td>March 4, 2007</td>
<td>“Public health risk! Officials theories link between drug-for-gun trade in Haiti and malaria outbreak”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council on Hemispheric Affairs</td>
<td>July 20, 2007</td>
<td>“Jamaica: In the Drug Trade—Big and Getting Bigger”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Information Service</td>
<td>September 24, 2007</td>
<td>“Gov’t to Intensify Fight Against Illicit Drug Trade”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican Information Service</td>
<td>January 20, 2008</td>
<td>“2007 Active Year for Narcotics Division”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overview of Illicit Drugs in Jamaica

Jamaica is both the largest producer and trafficker of marijuana, and one of the primary transshipment points for cocaine destined for the US in the Caribbean. According to Carlton Wilson, Assistance Commissioner of Police and head of the Narcotics Division, during 2007, 32,800kgs of marijuana were seized, a figure that was down from 37,100kgs seized during 2006, while only 98kgs of cocaine were seized in 2007, which was another decrease, on 109kgs being seized during 2006. In his opinion, these decreasing seizure figures were the result of increasing border security initiatives, successful operations and regional cooperation. Though, it is also possible that changing tactics for trafficking or the use of alternative routes has contributed to the presence of fewer drugs in transit or has assisted in preventing their detection. Concerns have also been expressed by the INCB over the reliability of law enforcement statistics, and conducting an examination of UNODC statistics demonstrates increasing seizure figures during the 2000s, any decrease in these figures is worthy of concern and investigation. In spite of the potential issues associated with the reliability of statistics, the presence of drugs in Jamaica can be confidently characterised as a phenomenon of pandemic proportions.

The demand for drugs is firmly established throughout all levels of society. For example, the results of one survey involving students of four high schools revealed that 60 percent of students had tried one or more drugs, including marijuana, while 1.3 percent had used cocaine. Additionally, the consumption of cocaine was cited as the fastest growing drug of choice and problem for the GOJ during the 1990s, and concerns have begun to focus upon the increasing seizure of, and demand for, ATS such as ecstasy. As an example of the volume of drugs present throughout Jamaica, during 2003, 1,586kgs of cocaine, 36,600kgs of marijuana, 1,897kgs of hashish oil and 444.6 hectares of marijuana were seized or

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destroyed, and 6,042 people were arrested on drug charges.¹⁴¹ During 2005, 142.38kgs of cocaine, 17,654kgs of marijuana, 13,070 ecstasy tablets and 391 hectares of marijuana were seized or destroyed, and 6215 people were arrested on drug charges.¹⁴² These figures attest to the magnitude of the problem. These changing drug preferences challenge the ability of the GOJ to provide adequate financial resources for its law enforcement agencies to respond. For example, new legislation is required to control these substances and forensic facilities are required to test them for presentation as evidence during criminal proceedings. Other challenges could include the establishment of domestic production facilities for ATS, and the large costs associated with both the dismantling of these laboratories and the provision of specialised addiction treatment facilities.

 Trafficking occurs through all available means of maritime and air transportation, including deliveries by go-fast boats and light planes to covert landing strips. Issues that include limited or varying levels of financial, technical and human resources have directly impacted upon the volume of marijuana cultivated and the amount of cocaine seized. This situation has been frequently illustrated through the differing levels of manpower employed for the manual eradication of marijuana crops, and the subsequent amount of marijuana destroyed. Additional costs derive from the need to institute specialised programmes for monitoring Jamaican airspace and the provision of sea vessels for preventing the uninhibited use of the coastline for drug transhipment or stockpiling activities. Unfortunately, as successful cooperation between Jamaica and the US have demonstrated, traffickers have frequently changed their modus operandi; successful maritime interdiction has encouraged the use of passengers on commercial flights or the use of covert flights for consignments.

 Other significant transformations have occurred within the domestic drug market, and these changes have increased the challenges posed to seizure and interdiction operations. For example, demand for marijuana in the US during the 1960s and 1970s encouraged the expansion of its cultivation on an industrial scale, while the effectiveness of bilateral operations between the US and Jamaica has encouraged the shift towards the involvement of criminal groups with the trafficking

of cocaine and crack-cocaine.\textsuperscript{143} This situation has facilitated increasing domestic consumption. Furthermore, Colombian groups associated with the trafficking of cocaine have also established cooperative relationships with Jamaica criminal groups and gangs in order to utilise their established business structures that were originally employed for the trafficking of marijuana. The large profits associated with cocaine, in comparison to marijuana, is also likely to have encouraged increased participation and diversification. The GOJ therefore has to deal with the complexities of both domestic production and foreign transhipment, each of which require the investment of extensive resources and different operational strategies that are, at times, not amenable to overlapping application.

The GOJ has repeatedly expressed it concerns over the domestic drug situation, for example the \textit{National Security Policy for Jamaica: Towards a Secure & Prosperous Nation 2007} (NSP) voiced particular concern over the fact that those involved with drug activities were being paid with cocaine for their services.\textsuperscript{144} This situation further helps to stimulate and entrench demand by creating a domestic consumer market. The low price of drugs also helps to stimulate and maintain demand, according to the UNODC the price of a gram of cocaine in Jamaica during 2001 was USD $6, compared with USD $80 in the US and USD $90 in Canada.\textsuperscript{145} Additional concerns have been noted by the INCB; these include the specific targeting of disposable tourist income, the use of light planes for scouting shipping lanes to avoid maritime interdiction efforts and the fact that successful law enforcement operations have encouraged the covert cultivation of marijuana.\textsuperscript{146} This demonstrates the profitability of the trade and assists in explaining why individuals become involved, even if only a small segment of criminals are able to benefit from this potential income. Moreover, it illustrates the fact that a high level of disposable income is not required for drug consumption in developing states, and that criminals employ business strategies in order to maximise their profits and reduce the potential risks.

\textsuperscript{144} Government of Jamaica, 2007, p.11
\textsuperscript{146} INCB, 2000 p.39; INCB, 2004, p.45
### Drug Seizures and Arrests in Jamaica 1994-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana cultivation eradicated (Ha)</td>
<td>444.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine seizures (Metric tonnes)</td>
<td>1.596</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>2.947</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>4.601</td>
<td>1.160</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marijuana seizures (Metric Tonnes)</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>26.63</td>
<td>68.46</td>
<td>55.87</td>
<td>56.22</td>
<td>35.91</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>52.99</td>
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<tr>
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<td>144.05</td>
<td>383.00</td>
<td>263.41</td>
<td>278.00</td>
<td>47.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrests of Jamaican nationals</td>
<td>5,739</td>
<td>7,657</td>
<td>6,023</td>
<td>8,238</td>
<td>6,385</td>
<td>7,093</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests of foreign nationals</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total arrests</td>
<td>6,042</td>
<td>8,104</td>
<td>6,443</td>
<td>8,659</td>
<td>6,385</td>
<td>7,093</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>3,263</td>
<td>3,705</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table copied from United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003*, (March, 2004). Data was obtained from the Narcotics Division of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF), with the exception of the estimated hectares of marijuana cultivation, which was based upon joint figures from the JCF, Jamaican Defence Force and US Drug Enforcement Administration.

### Drugs Seizures in Jamaica 1994-2001

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine (Kgs)</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>2,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana (Kgs)</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>90,737</td>
<td>31,587</td>
<td>24,729</td>
<td>35,911</td>
<td>22,740</td>
<td>55,870</td>
<td>74,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Estimated Area of Marijuana Cultivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated (ha)</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eradication (ha)</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Production (metric ton)</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples of Major Drug Seizures in Jamaica

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation name/Details</th>
<th>Agencies Involved</th>
<th>Illicit Drug</th>
<th>Estimated Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Seizure made in secret concrete bunker</td>
<td>JCF</td>
<td>1620kgs of hashish oil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Kingston</td>
<td>Seized inside mail at Central Sorting Office</td>
<td>Narcotics Division</td>
<td>68.18kgs of marijuana and 1.6kgs of cocaine</td>
<td>JD $1.6 million for marijuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Gimme-Me-Bit, Clarendon</td>
<td>Drugs seized near to local airstrip</td>
<td>JCF and Narcotic Division</td>
<td>484kgs of cocaine</td>
<td>USD $15.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Port Antonio, Portland</td>
<td>American family arrested with drugs in their possession</td>
<td>JCF</td>
<td>454.55kgs of marijuana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Cockpit, Salt River, Clarendon</td>
<td>Joint operation on August 13</td>
<td>JCF and JDF</td>
<td>482.73kgs of marijuana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Old Harbour Bay, St Catherine</td>
<td>Joint operation on August 14-15</td>
<td>JCF and JDF</td>
<td>849.09kgs of marijuana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Jamaica Highway 2000</td>
<td>Woman caught in her car by police</td>
<td>JCF</td>
<td>380.91Kgs of marijuana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political Security Concerns

The state is trapped within a damaging and detrimental cycle. The GOJ is unable to impose or secure its internal and external sovereignty and cannot effectively marshal all of its available resources to combat drugs, while the presence of drugs assists in undermining the ability of it to do so. It can be confidently asserted that the state has been thoroughly penetrated by drugs. This scenario is vividly demonstrated by the damaging actions of some national leaders, who have themselves undermined the stability of the state. Strong historical connections between political parties, community leaders and gangs have been extensively documented, as has the presence of permissive attitudes towards corruption.\(^\text{147}\) As Clarke suggests: “During the 1970s, politicians, using their influence with the police, provided cover for the gun-handling of the gangs, and protection for their non-political activities, notably, the ganja [marijuana] trading of the drug dons.”\(^\text{148}\) Brana-Shute offers a similar opinion, and asserts that: “Politics and cocaine have conflated in Kingston.”\(^\text{149}\) As a consequence of this environment, the GOJ is fundamentally unable to organise itself to combat drugs, as it is likely that some of those who are responsible for both the political and economic governance of the state benefit from their presence and the instability that they cause. Furthermore, it is likely that the profits derived from association are employed to assist with the costs involved with their political positions, patronage arrangements or during election periods.

Additionally, any social or political stigma that may have been attached to the use of

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\(^{148}\) Clarke, 2006, p.433

\(^{149}\) Brana-Shute, 2000, p.102
drug profits may have been eroded, especially if multiple leaders are known to have benefited financially, and this situation would allow lower socio-economic groups to rationally justify their own participation. It is extremely unlikely that this symbiotic relationship between Jamaican leaders and criminals would discontinue of its own accord, as both would benefit from it significantly.

Transparency International (TI) has also broached concerns over the weaknesses present throughout the state; these include the concentration of power within the executive, poor or inadequate governmental oversight mechanisms and the culture of patron-client relationships.\textsuperscript{150} Domestic politics have also been characterised as tribalistic, with the frequent appearance of politically motivated violence, election violence, and the use of coercion and intimidation to force bloc candidate voting. Furthermore, as the Council of Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) observes, the government under Prime Minister Patterson failed to mitigate this environment of violence. During his administration, concerted anti-drug action was stifled through the establishment of national enquiries and committees, though the final conclusions and recommendations presented by these bodies were instituted in a restricted fashion.\textsuperscript{151} These examples are important, as they illustrate that there are few controls within the state to monitor the behaviour of officials and the bureaucracy, and this effectively facilitates corruption. Moreover, the inability and indifference of some GOJ administrations to properly address drugs, combined with their willingness to manipulate domestic politics through the use of violence provides a conducive environment for drug related activities, all of which ensures domestic insecurity and instability.

The Jamaican Constabulary

The actions of Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) have also assisted in facilitating and maintaining an ideal environment for drug activities, and have prevented the achievement of greater levels of operational success. For example, the JCF have frequently employed a militarised and violent approach towards creating a safer domestic environment, this strategy is best demonstrated by the frequency in which extra-judicial killings have occurred.\textsuperscript{152} According to Amnesty International (AI), in spite of overwhelming evidence: “…the Jamaican authorities

\textsuperscript{150} Munroe, 2003

\textsuperscript{151} Shellian Powell, “Ineffective Reponses to Crime in Jamaica”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 7, 2005

have failed to hold the security forces to account; law enforcement officers are able to kill with impunity.” 153 With reference to another case, AI asserts that: “…the DDP [Director of Public Prosecutions] refused to prosecute despite the verdict of a Corner’s Court jury that the police officers concerned should be held criminally responsible.” 154 The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) has also been implicated in the unlawful killing of civilians. 155 The regularity with which citizens have been abused by state security agencies is vividly demonstrated by the fact that an estimated JD$280 million in compensation was paid to victims between 2000 and 2005. 156 The presence of impunity fundamentally undermines the confidence and trust of some segments of Jamaican society, and assists in alienating other segments, when a community-focused strategy would enhance police intelligence, effectiveness and state-society relations. The approach of the JCF further adds to the pervasive environment of drug-related violence, and may encourage the militarisation of criminal groups and drug gangs in order to protect their business interests. Their actions also undoubtedly ensure that those involved with drugs receive a modicum of community protection.

The presence of corruption throughout the JCF and other law enforcement agencies has also prevented successful drug operations, as some of those charged with up holding the law and implementing anti-drug measures have financially benefited from their presence. 157 Anecdotally, according to one anonymous police officer with experience in both the Criminal Investigations Bureau and Narcotics Division, from the beginning of their career, they were paid to ignore or escort drug shipments, tamper with evidence related to drug cases and worked in concert with both local drug dealers and senior officers involved with drug shipments. 158 Considerable evidence is available to illustrate that corruption in the JCF is not limited to a few isolated cases, but is widespread and culturally embedded throughout the force. 159 The confidence of citizens in the JCF has therefore been constantly undermined, while the capacity of the JCF to undertake anti-drug

153 Amnesty International, 2003, p.2
158 Jamaica Gleaner, “Police officer comes clean”, December 24, 2006
operations is directly called into question because of these relationships with criminals. This also calls into question the ability of the GOJ to tackle drugs throughout the country, even if it possessed the resources to act. However, this characterisation of the JCF is also problematic, and may not accurately depict the whole force, as the 2003 INCS Report described the narcotics division of the JCF as both “competent and well respected.”\footnote{INCS Report, 2003} Given the pervasive environment of corruption, instances of judicial impunity and poor oversight capacity, it is questionable whether any branches of the JCF, or other agencies such as customs or the coastguard, could withstand the prospect of significant financial inducements for providing either tacit or explicit assistance to traffickers.

**Military Security Concerns**

**The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Drugs and Insecurity**

The GOJ has adopted national, regional and international legislative measures in order to counter the trafficking of SALW, and has recognised the symbiotic linkages between their availability and the use of drugs as a financial resource for their acquisition.\footnote{Jamaican Government, “National report by Jamaica on the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects” (Not dated); Government of Jamaica, 2007, p.11-12; Jamaican Gleaner, “Guns and Drugs...the Montego Bay Link”, April 9, 2006; Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Jamaica: In the Drug Trade—Big and Getting Bigger”, July 20th, 2007; Jamaican Information Service, “Third Party Countries Should do More to Prevent Guns for Reaching the Caribbean—Patterson”, Kingston JIS, July 3, 2004; Tyrone Reid, “Officials theorise link between drugs-for-gun trade in Haiti and malaria outbreak”, Jamaica Gleaner, March 4, 2007} As an example, in 1988 Heckler and Koch weapons from West Germany were seized while on route to FARC. A sample of the weapons discovered included 1,000 G3A3 automatic assault rifles and 250 HK21 machine guns; all were paid for by cocaine shipments made to Europe.\footnote{Giffith, 1997, p.155} To further reinforce the magnitude of gun availability, in July 2004, 10,132 confiscated guns were destroyed.\footnote{Jamaican Government, “National report by Jamaica on the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects” (Not dated)} Moreover, a significant trade in both guns and drugs is believed to regularly occur between Jamaica and neighbouring Haiti. The availability of SALW directly threatens the security of the state, as it allows criminals and gangs to achieve a level of coercive capacity equal to that enjoyed by the JCF and JDF. Furthermore, it forces the government to continually invest its limited resources in providing additional domestic security arrangements. The government has introduced legislation and has utilised regional mechanisms to control the...
availability of SALW in an effort to shift part of the responsibility for its security onto neighbouring states; this can be characterised as a move towards greater multilateral measures to promote collective security. Jamaica has also begun exploring closer bilateral security ties with Haiti.

The relationship between SALW, drugs and the maintenance of an environment of insecurity is clearly recognised by the GOJ. The Honourable K.D. Knight, former Minister of National Security and Justice, has asserted that: “The linkage between arms and drugs has resulted in a frightening escalation of violence and violent crimes. This has seriously undermined the peace and security of many countries and will increasingly threaten the stability of these States as well as international security.”164 As a consequence, the GOJ has consistently invested in counter measures for more effective border management. For example, security at port facilities has been upgraded, technical capabilities have been enhanced with the acquisition of eight Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems for examining cargo containers, new legislation requires all forms of weapons shipments to gain prior permission and this has been assisted by computer software designed to monitor SALW shipments throughout the Caribbean.165 The institution of these measures represents an attempt to undermine the SALW-drugs relationship by reducing the ability of gangs and criminals to attain a coercive capacity. Moreover, interrupting drug trafficking removes the financial capacity for such acquisition activities. Unfortunately, the presence of state weakness and failure among neighbouring states, such as Haiti, forces the burden of enhanced security measures upon those that are in a better position to act, and the opportunity presented for criminal activities by this failure are likely to strain these enhanced security measures.

Societal Security Concerns

Societal security is significantly affected by the presence of drugs, as political and drug-related violence have increasingly merged, and communities have fortified themselves in response. This environment of violence is vividly demonstrated by the extremely high rate of murder that occurs annually. For example, during 2000, there were a total of 887 murders recorded, of which, 536 (or

164  Honourable K.D. Knight, “Statement by Honourable K.D. Knight, Minister of National Security and Justice of Jamaica” (Statements made at the Twentieth Special Session of the United Nations on the World Drug Problem, June 8, 1998)
165  Jamaican Government, National report by Jamaica on the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Not Dated)
60 percent) were attributed directly to the use of guns.\textsuperscript{166} However, statistics concerning the annual rate of murders in Jamaica do not appear to be accurate. Unfortunately, political leaders have transported issues such as discrimination and class-conflict directly into these poor communities to assist with the achievement of their own objectives. These areas have therefore been politicised, and the presence of patron-client relationships that are expressed in the form of government-sponsored social development have also encouraged the development of conflict.\textsuperscript{167}

Moreover, measures employed by the GOJ and the JCF to combat the presence of drugs have been inserted into this social conflict, and as such, the aggressive strategies that have been instituted are representative of this discrimination. This is evident within even GOJ policy, as poor areas are presented as being both a threat to society and the primary location where drug activities occur. As a consequence, measures which could not be employed elsewhere have been legitimised within these neighbourhoods, and large segments of Jamaican society actively support the use of aggressive and violent tactics that are frequently employed to intervene into drug activities and to reassert the authority of the GOJ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repraisal</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Honourable K.D. Knight et al., \textit{Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence}, June 11, 2002. 887 people were murdered throughout 2000, of which 55 percent were located in the Capital Kingston and near St. Andrew.

Gangs and Insecurity

Individuals who have become wealthy through their drug activities, colloquially referred to as Drug Dons, have increasingly become parallel sources of authority throughout society, and further complicate anti-drug measures. Portions of their drug-related income are often utilised for the benefit of the surrounding community, and this situation partially accounts for the level of community support for them. According to Peter Phillips, Jamaica’s former Minister for National Security, crack-cocaine is an illicit industry worth between USD$3—3.6 billion.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{166} Hon. K.D. Knight et al, \textit{Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence}, June 11, 2002
\textsuperscript{167} Clarke, 2006, p.426-427
\textsuperscript{168} Clarke, 2006 p.433; Originally cited by Peter Phillips in the \textit{Jamaican Observer}, March 30, 2003. The news article is not available.
This equates to 40-50 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country. This ensures that there is a significant amount of money available to individuals, gangs and criminal organisations to utilise to ensure compliant communities, to corrupt officials and to enhance their level of autonomy in relation to the state. In contrast, the level of social service spending by the government fluctuates according to its available revenue and the performance of the domestic economy, a situation that those associated with drugs are not necessarily tied to, and this assists in de-legitimising the state. The GOJ has recognised that drug related income has assisted with the development of these alternative forms of leadership, and that undermining this connection is essential for re-establishing the authority of the state and reinstituting domestic security.

The continued existence of close relationships between political leaders and gangs cannot be accurately accounted for, though it is evident that the formation of them has been extremely detrimental for domestic security. According to Clarke, gangs were originally tied to the political system through patron-client relationships, where political leaders from both the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) utilised gangs to coerce, intimidate and violently confront oppositional supporters and allied gangs to ensure favourable election outcomes during the late 1960s through to the 1980s. The politicisation of elections and the close political association between gangs and national political parties has ensured that a pervasive environment of “orchestrated political violence” has developed. Without this original umbrella of protection, gangs would not have been able to increase their autonomy in relation to the state, and they would not have been shielded from law enforcement prosecution. Furthermore, the availability of SALW and the use of drugs as a financial resource for their acquisition has directly enhanced their coercive capacity, all of which has resulted in a situation where gangs present a significant threat to the state.

The power of these gangs originally derived from their involvement in marijuana and SALW trading, though their patron-client relationships with Jamaican leaders ensured that a modicum of control exist over their activities. However, these patron-client relationships were transformed by the shift away from the cultivation and control of marijuana towards involvement with cocaine and crack-

169 Clarke, 2006, p.412  
170 Clarke, 2006, p.428  
cocaine during the 1980s. As a consequence, the amount of control that political parties and patrons could exert over gangs decreased, as their autonomy and power was increased through the large profits associated with these alternative drugs. Furthermore, as Brana-shute observes, additional changes have occurred within these patron-client relationships, and Drug Dons now actively participate with local political parties during elections. In his opinion, these areas have become: “…mini-states with their own armies which frequently invade each other to capture political and drug-dealing turf.” Successive GOJ administrations and the JCF have been unable to effectively combat gangs, and the presence of corruption further facilitates the weakening of the state while simultaneously opening it up to foreign actors, such as South American criminals that are involved with the trafficking of cocaine. Moreover, the function of politicians and Drug Dons has increasingly merged within the view of the community, and these gangs have transformed beyond a domestic concern, to become both a regional and inter-regional security issue in their own right. There is extremely likely that these relationships will continue, and this ensures that attempts by the JCF to control and undermine them are ultimately unsuccessful, as the environment that facilitates their creation is maintained.

Economic Security Concerns

The adoption of Neoliberal economic restructuring plans advocated by the International Monetary Fund during the 1980s and 1990s significantly impacted upon both the economy and the amount of revenue available to the GOJ. As a consequence of the redistribution of economic resources, it has been estimated that social expenditure by the GOJ declined by 44 percent between 1981 and 1985. The Institute of Jamaica calculated that the poverty level was around 28 percent during 1997, and suggested that nearly one in three Jamaicans were living on JD$37 or just around USD$1 a day. Furthermore, experimental US policies during the late 1990s decreased the provision of bilateral funding for drug eradication operations in an effort to encourage a greater level of responsibility with the GOJ. This situation has, paradoxically, encouraged the development of another detrimental cycle, where economic decline has increased the participation

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172 Clarke, 2006, p.433-434. Clarke also draws a parallel between gangs, drugs, violence and political relationships in Jamaica and Brazil p.437
173 Brana-Shute, 2000, p.102
175 Bernal, Leslie and Lamar, 2000, p.66
176 Jones, 2002, p.128
of citizens with drugs in order to supplement their declining income and the lack of available employment.

The GOJ has therefore been forced to devote diminishing resources towards drug enforcement operations in order to meet US eradication targets, instead of focusing upon economic development priorities. This situation has been recognised, and according to Knight: “Given a choice, many of the farmers involved in drug crop cultivation would cease. Theirs is an involvement exacerbated by a combination of poverty and the negative impact of the international trading system on the traditional agricultural sectors in their countries.”177 The continuing presence of violence, crime and corruption associated with drugs requires the prioritisation of domestic security and anti-drug measures and the continued investment of limited resources. The pervasive environment of violence also inhibits economic development, by creating anxiety among potential investors and intimidating tourists, who currently provide the largest source of foreign income for Jamaica.

United States Anti-Drug Assistance to Jamaica

The US is overwhelmingly concerned by the central involvement of Jamaica in the cultivation of marijuana and the use of the country for the trafficking of cocaine. As such, concerns are fundamentally focused upon protecting US national security interests by enhancing the capacity of Jamaican law enforcement agencies and the ability of the GOJ to intervene into drug activities. As a consequence of these security priorities combined with domestic anti-drug policies, Jamaica is firmly with the US RSC. The US is able to employ significant political and economic power to influence the formation and institution of anti-drug policies, and as a consequence, bilateral relations between the two states have been strained, and cooperation has fluctuated. The intensity, and at times brusque nature, of these bilateral relations is vividly demonstrated by the political disputes that evolved during negotiations over clauses contained within the Maritime Drug Trafficking (Suppression) Act (1998), commonly referred to as the Shiprider Agreement, such as the ability of US security personnel to board vessels in foreign waters and their immunity from prosecution.178 The US was accused of employing aggressive tactics during negotiations, which included the threat of de-certification for inadequate anti-

177 Knight, 1998
drug achievements; this action frequently results in the suspension of economic assistance. Jamaican officials also accused the US of failing to recognise the interdependence between economic development, employment opportunities and the involvement of citizens in supporting drug activities throughout the region.

The GOJ was especially concerned with preserving aspects of its sovereignty, and expressed the desire to cooperate with US objectives to prevent the manipulation of its territorial and sea borders by traffickers. However, the GOJ clearly wished to maintain a degree of control and authority over US actions within its borders, and desired to institute a modicum of reciprocity within the relationship by ensuring that JDF or Jamaican Coast Guard (JCG) vessels could undertake similar actions in US territorial waters. The Act has resulted in significant success in intercepting maritime drug shipments, though as a consequence of these original disagreements, additional clauses relating to the boarding of ships and the sharing of personnel were not included until 2004. Importantly, a framework for managing jurisdictional issues that arise from working within each other’s territorial waters has been established, and this can be characterised as an example of success for the GOJ, as it has maintained a degree of sovereignty over anti-drug measures in the face of strong external pressures.

Operation Buccaneer provides another illustrative example where bilateral relations have affected cooperative anti-drug efforts. Buccaneer commenced in 1974, and involved the US providing extensive technical and financial resources for joint JCF-JDF operation. However, unrelated political disputes resulted in its suspension for 11 years, and cooperation recommenced in 1985, though US budget constraints undermined the programme in 1993. These two examples illustrate how anti-drug issues can become incorporated and subsumed within other competing bilateral policies and issues. Furthermore, the negotiation over the Shiprider clause illustrates the continued importance of sovereignty, and the delicate nature of negotiations when there is a defined power asymmetry between two states. In this instance, the US was unlikely to overcome preconceived perceptions and anxieties over its dominance within bilateral relations, and its actions reinforced these established concerns. This example is applicable throughout the wider Caribbean and beyond, and is especially important when security issues that are certain to engender emotive accusations (such as drug-
related corruption among national leaders) arise. Careful consideration for the position of less powerful states must be taken into account in such circumstances, especially when the primary objective is to obtain mutually beneficial security objective, and not the achievement of one-side goals.

The US has provided significant assistance to the GOJ to combat both drug cultivation and trafficking. Close operational cooperation and support occurs between law enforcement agencies from both states, and both the JDF and JCG are closely involved with US maritime interdiction efforts. Funding has been provided for the provision of specialists to directly assist with the development and training of security personnel, and financial assistance has also been provided for the establishment of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Centre. As a recent example, in 2003 the JDF were given three fast patrol boats at a total estimated cost of USD $1.5 million to assist in enhancing maritime operational success and border security. In 2007, an additional USD$35 million was allocated to assist with enhancing maritime interdiction, port security and law enforcement capacity. Close cooperation has occurred with the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in tracing weapons that have been recovered in Jamaica, resulting in the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The US has also tightened regulations concerning export licences for SALW to Jamaica, in spite of historical opposition, and a shortage in the availability of firearms for sale has resulted; this is in spite of the growing demand for personal protection as a consequence of increasing levels of drug-related violence.

In spite of the asymmetrical power relationship that exists between the two states, and the acquiescence of the GOJ to US-imposed drug eradication targets, this relationship has not been one-sided. This is best demonstrated by the determination of the GOJ to ensure that marijuana crops are manually eradicated, rather than through the use of aerial spraying that has the potential to contaminate other financially important export crops. As this important bilateral relationship demonstrates, an aggressive approach towards drugs may in fact be detrimental to the success of interdiction and seizure strategies, as it promotes conflict between

180 Jamaican Government, National report by Jamaica on the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Not Dated)
181 T.K. White, “Legal gun supplies dry up: Merchants, licensed firearm holders left hanging as State Department tightens control”, The Jamaican Observer, November 24, 2002
states that must enhance their cooperation in order to achieve mutual and sustained success.

**External Influences upon Policy Decisions: The Impossibility of Legalising Marijuana in Jamaica**

There are mixed domestic political attitudes towards the decriminalisation of marijuana, even though it is widely recognised as being culturally and religiously embedded throughout Jamaican society. This scenario represents an important area for assessing the influence of both domestic and foreign actors upon the formation of internal policies. The GOJ has established multiple inquires to assess the potential harms associated with marijuana and to review its criminality, these have included the Joint Select Committee “to consider the criminality, legislation, uses and abuses and possible medicinal properties of ganja and to make appropriate recommendations” (1977), and more recently, the National Commission on Ganja (2000) (COG). Both of these bodies have recommended that marijuana be decriminalised. The COG asserted that: “The Commission is persuaded that that the criminalisation of thousands of people for simple possession [and] for consumption does more harm to the society than could be done by the use of ganja itself. The prosecution of simple possession for personal use and the use itself diverts the justice system from what ought to be a primary goal, namely the suppression of the criminal trafficking in substances, such as crack/cocaine…”182 This illustrates the two primary characteristics of the debate. The concern over the potentially harmful effects upon individual users and the social and financial impact upon the state from its criminal status, versus the more important concern regarding the involvement of criminal groups and their profiteering from drugs, which is considered more detrimental. The COG also expressed its concern that the conviction of individual marijuana uses did more to damage the state through the alienation and abuse of citizens, than secure it through criminal convictions and the exposing of individuals to the judicial system.

However, in spite of these recommendations, domestic support for the decriminalisation of marijuana is mixed. For example, Peter Phillips strongly opposed both the decriminalisation of any drugs and the findings of the COG, and cited the increased level of violence throughout areas with increasing drug activity.

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as proof of why drugs should remain illegal.\textsuperscript{183} Strong pressures from external actors such as the INCB and the US have undoubtedly influenced internal decisions relating to marijuana legislation. The COG itself recognised the internal and external obligations of the GOJ as a consequence of its ratification of UN anti-drug Conventions, and also noted the complex legality associated with decriminalisation, as commitment to other international Conventions and principles need to be considered. The INCB strongly asserted its position on the debate, and stated that: “The Board wishes to stress that cannabis is a harmful drug, requiring strong control under the 1961 Convention. The Board urges the Government of Jamaica to ensure that a clear and correct message is sent to the public regarding the dangers of cannabis abuse.”\textsuperscript{184} Similarly, the US is firmly opposed to any attempts at legalisation or decriminalisation, and can utilise extensive political and economic leverage in the form of threats of de-certification or the imposition of fines for commercial goods or passengers that arrive in the US with drugs to ensure compliance. This imposition of fines has occurred before, and involved significant financial costs for vital industries and enterprises.\textsuperscript{185} Moreover, it is unlikely that the GOJ would be allowed to implement such policies, even if they proved to be beneficial, as this would directly assist in undermining the continuation of strong anti-drug policy objectives of the US, and this action could set a precedent that could influence negotiations between the US and other Caribbean or South American states.

However, US policy is not monolithic, as US-style drug courts have been established in Jamaica. Alternative sentencing measures, a greater focus upon harm reduction and specific court mechanisms designed to deal with drug offenders could provide an option that avoids the complexities and pitfalls associated with legalisation or decriminalisation. Though, in the opinion of Harriot and Jones, drug courts are unlikely to ameliorate drug-related insecurity, as they are designed to manage non-violent offenders with drug dependency, rather than the gangs and organised criminal groups that are directly involved in trafficking and the associated violence.\textsuperscript{186} Furthermore, in one example provided by Harriot and Jones, more drug

\textsuperscript{183} Jamaican Information Service, “Dr. Philips says no to Decriminalisation of Illicit Drugs”, Montego Bay JIS, May 3, 2005
\textsuperscript{184} INCB, 2004, p.44
\textsuperscript{185} Griffith, 1997, p.187-190
offenders were sentenced to prison than diverted, and the achievements of such alternatives are, as yet, inconclusive. Decriminalisation could represent a positive action by the GOJ, as it would free up resources for the JCF to combat the greater threats posed by gangs and criminal groups. Such actions could also ensure that the domestic cultivation and sale of marijuana were economically unviable, though this would further encourage its trafficking to neighbouring states. It is highly unlikely that the GOJ will be able to formally legalise or decriminalise marijuana, though informal arrangements may be possible. Lastly, the ability of the US and the INCB to exert significant influence upon domestic policy raises serious implications regarding Jamaican sovereignty and GOJ state-society relations, given the strong social support for marijuana present throughout the country.

Responses of the Jamaican Government to Drugs

The GOJ is not oblivious to the fundamentally detrimental influence of drugs upon state security and stability. These concerns are clearly demonstrated by its continued investment and allocation of resources for security agencies, the frequency of media statements and government reports, and the centrality of drug issues in domestic and foreign policy. For example, Knight has asserted that: “The pattern and scale of violence that have resulted from the dramatic rise in illicit drug-related activity have unleashed a new level of terror in our societies.” Furthermore, cross-party political consensus is evident between the JLP and the PNP, and as Derrick Smith, the current Minister for National Security, observes: “A change of administration does not in any way mean a change of course in relation to the country’s fight against the narcotics trade. In fact, what it means is full speed ahead against the drug traffickers and all those involved in the drug trade.” The threat posed by drugs to the state has clearly been recognised. Importantly, the GOJ recognises that drugs have a multidimensional character, and as such, the response of the state and its strategies have increasingly reflected this understanding. A holistic, whole-of-government approach is evident throughout its policy documents and actions.

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189 Knight, 1998
190 Jamaican Information Service, “Gov’t to Intensify Fight Against Illicit Drug Trade”, Kingston JIS, September 24, 2007

76
The NSP comprehensively acknowledges the diversity of threats posed to state security by drugs. As such, it provides a master plan for the participation of all state agencies and the utilisation of all state resources for creating a secure domestic environment, with a specific focus upon changing the environment itself.¹⁹¹ The involvement of local communities, the restructuring of law enforcement agencies, the enhancement of mechanisms for governmental oversight and the expansion of judicial capacity represent just a few of the measures and priorities that have been identified. Within the NSP, the presence of drugs, gangs and organised crime combined with the availability of SALW are presented as symbiotic threats. Accordingly, it states that: “Jamaican officials have acknowledged that the drug trade nurtures the violence and lawlessness pervading the society. Left unchecked, the very survival of the State will be at risk.”¹⁹² Furthermore, according to Knight: “…for years we have been the victims of gun smugglers. Since gun smugglers are also drug smugglers and dealers, it is necessary to attack that aspect of the problem simultaneously.”¹⁹³ These statements clearly demonstrate that the presence of drugs throughout the country has been securitised, and the survival of the state has been accorded as the object requiring security. Specific attention is devoted to the promotion of foreign policy priorities and the strengthening of bilateral relations that are in the interests of national security.¹⁹⁴ These include the need to maintain and strengthen a strong lobbying presence within the US, UK and Canada, and the fact that the security interests of Jamaica are intimately tied up with the security perceptions of these states is also recognised as a potential asset for obtaining future assistance.¹⁹⁵

Additionally, in order to reduce the burden upon the judicial system, alternative sentencing mechanisms and restorative justice programmes have been discussed. However, there are also barriers that could prevent the institution of the priorities outlined in the NSP; these include institutional apathy, maladministration, corruption and poor funding. Moreover, the fact that gangs and criminal groups are autonomous and could potentially have strong patronage structures ensure that

¹⁹¹ Government of Jamaica, 2007, p.v-vi
¹⁹² Government of Jamaica, 2007, p.10-11
¹⁹⁴ Government of Jamaica, 2007, p.3
¹⁹⁵ The UK is concerned with Jamaican security as a consequence of its former colonial role, and the fact that strong social and cultural links between Jamaican communities present within both countries has facilitated drug trafficking between the two, and the rise of TNC and transnational gangs.
there could be strong opposition to any attempts at establishing new security arrangements that specifically target their illicit business interests. The implementation of further security strategies aimed at controlling and removing the threat posed by those involved with drugs could also provoke them to employ a counter strategy of heightened violence to ensure the failure of these initiatives.

Strategic Security Goals Outlined in the National Security Policy

1. Reduce violent crime and dismantle organised criminal networks
2. Strengthen the Justice System and promote the respect of rule of law
3. Protect Jamaica from Terrorism
4. Protect and control Jamaican territory
5. Strengthen the integrity of government institutions
6. Increase Jamaica’s contribution to regional and international security
7. Provide an environment for a stable economy and effective social service delivery
8. Protect Jamaica’s natural resources and reduce the risk of disasters

Table adapted from Government of Jamaica, National Security Policy for Jamaica; Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation (2007) p.vi

Specific Security Initiatives Outlined in the National Security Policy

1. Strengthen Jamaica’s National Intelligence System
2. Strategically review and modernise critical National Security Agencies
3. Establish a national task force to strengthen the overall effectiveness of Jamaica’s Justice System and to review and strengthen the laws and law making processes
4. Establish a National Security Council and a National Security Strategy Implementation Unit
5. Enhance programmes to promote community safety and security
6. Promote the use of a National Strategic Communications Programme to facilitate public information, awareness, solidarity, engagement and support for the NSP and National and Human Security

In spite of fluctuating economic circumstances and severe budget constraints, the GOJ has continually invested in enhancing both the capacity of law enforcement agencies and the ability of the state to enforce its sovereignty.196 The 2003 INCS Report acknowledged this fact, noting that foreign debt service required around 60 percent of the annual budget, and that in spite of this, the GOJ continued to provide resources for drug interdiction.197 Financial investments have paralleled this multidimensional understanding of the drug threat, and have focused upon enhancing the technical and human resources of security agencies. For example, the JCG has developed and expanded its multilateral working relationships with both the Colombian Navy and Cuban in order to identify potential shipments as they leave or approach each other’s jurisdiction, and similar cooperation occurs with the US and other Caribbean states. The capabilities of the Marine Police has been enhanced through the provision of 27 new vessels, at a cost of around JD$340 million dollars.198 Furthermore, in 2005, British law enforcement specialists were hired to assist with the modernisation of the JCF, and its ability to operation within a

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196 See for example: National Council on Drug Abuse, 1997, p.29-38
197 INCS Report, 2003
transforming and challenging environment. Lastly, during 2003, USD$21 million was invested to enhance seaport security and for acquiring non-intrusive equipment for inspecting cargo, and laboratory facilities have also been established.199

A strong focus upon improving interagency cooperation is also evident. For example, the sharing of intelligence between the Financial Investigation Division and the Narcotics Division of the JCF resulted in the seizure of an estimated JD$350 million in drug-related income between 2005 and 2007.200 Resources have also been directed towards improving and instituting new domestic legislation, for example, new laws now enable the seizure of criminal assets, while bilateral legislation with the US has received increasing attention, with the institution of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an Extradition Treaty. As these developments demonstrate, the GOJ has committed itself to strengthening its ability to reassert its internal and external sovereignty and to reimposing its authority over criminal groups and gangs that are tacking advantage of, and maintaining, insecurity. The provision of new technical equipment and the implementation of new laws heightens the risks for those involved with drugs, and directly facilitates greater control over Jamaica’s territorial borders.

Impressively, governmental committees, such as the National Committee on Crime and Violence, have acknowledged the previous failures of the GOJ as well as the shortcomings of counter measures. For example, Jamaican citizens and communities were inadequately incorporated into JCF anti-drug strategies, and this key failure resulted in the policing of these communities rather than policing in conjunction with them.201 Furthermore, as a consequence, previous strategies focused upon confronting the appearance of drug-related insecurity and the multitude of actors, rather than the foundational causes that facilitated cultivation and trafficking, which encouraged the involvement of ordinary citizens.

The GOJ has established a National Drug Control Abuse Prevention and Control Master Plan (NMP) that methodically examines the presence of drugs and outlines both current responses and future priorities. The NMP also summarised the threats posed to the state. For example, it asserts that: “An attitude of active or

199 INCS Report, 2003
201 Knight et al, 2002
passive cooperation will create a state of lawlessness which erodes the authority of a nation and its underlying ethical values and beliefs.\textsuperscript{202} This document represents an active policy guideline that aims to coordinate the efforts of the JCF, JDF, JCG and the efforts of other bureaucratic agencies involved in combating drugs. Importantly, the NMP recognises that a dual strategy of demand reduction and interdiction needs to be instituted simultaneously in order to have an effective impact with demonstrable results. Furthermore, it also highlights the sophistry involved in treating different classes of drugs with an uneven attitude, as the income from all drugs assist in sustaining insecurity by maintaining the power of gangs and criminal groups, which ensures the continued weakness of the state.

Operation Kingfish serves as a perfect example where the investment of financial, technical and human resources combined with the inclusion of new policing strategies has resulted in overwhelming success.\textsuperscript{203} Kingfish represents a multi-agency organisation established to coordinate operations and disseminate intelligence, and as such, the organisation is comprised of personnel drawn and vetted from the JCF, JDF and other security agencies. It also relies upon multilateral intelligence obtained from the US, UK and other Caribbean states. It was provided with the mandate of dismantling organised criminal groups and their leadership structures. The high level of success is demonstrated by its involvement in over 2,000 operations, and the seizure of some 300 SALW, over 21,000 rounds of ammunition, 13,000kgs of cocaine, 19,508.2kgs of marijuana and 73 boats.\textsuperscript{204} A strong element of the operation has been the incorporation of ordinary citizens and business people in order to gather community-based intelligence. Preventing the transhipment of drugs via sea vessels represents another primary objective. The number of boats seized so far attests to the centrality of this method of trafficking, and as a consequence of this success, operations have now began to target clandestine airfields, as it is believed that trafficking via aircraft will become more popular in response to the enhanced capacity of the JCG and maritime elements of the JDF. In order for Kingfish to maintain its effectiveness, it will require the continued investment of significant state resources and continued cooperation with other regional agencies to respond to changes within the domestic and regional

\textsuperscript{202} National Council on Drug Abuse, 1997, p.7
\textsuperscript{204} \url{http://www.jamaicapolice.org.jm/kingfish/home.htm} (Accessed online 30/04/08)
drug market. It will also need to avoid the challenges posed by political interference and patron-client relationships that could reduce its effectiveness.

The GOJ has also employed a strategy of politicisation that attempts to partially shift the responsibility for the use of the country for trafficking activities onto the consumption demands present within the US, as well as upon the failures of other regional states, such as Colombia, which have been unable to successfully intervene into their own domestic drug problems. As Phillips observes: “Failure to stem the flow of drugs northward must be of primary importance, not only to us, but to the United States and to all countries in the hemisphere.”\(^{205}\) Comments made by Knight reinforce this assertion: “The Jamaican Government urges the international community to backs its verbal commitment for alternative development with tangible, practical support and innovative programmes.”\(^{206}\) These attempts at diverting attention from Jamaica have two functions. They can be viewed as an attempt to increase the political pressure upon the US and other international contributors in order to obtain further assistance with anti-drug measures, and they can also be characterised as an attempt to relieve some of the political pressure exerted by the US upon the GOJ to achieve imposed eradication and seizure targets.

With regard to Buzan et al, the securisation of drugs has occurred though not strictly according to their definition or their vision of the processes associated with an object receiving the status as a valued and threatened existential object. The state has clearly been accorded by the GOJ as the primary object requiring security, and the location of that threat is defined as that posed by the relationship between drugs, SALW, gangs and criminal groups. This process of securitisation has evolved over a very long period of time, though emergency measures have previously been imposed to reassert the authority of the state during period of civil unrest and drug-related violence. According to Clarke, during 2001 the PNP used a state of emergency during an outbreak of violence to seize the political initiative, and to assist with its deteriorating public image during a pre-election period.\(^{207}\) This action by the PNP would fit precisely within the concepts developed by Buzan et al, though it only provides a parsimonious insight into drug-related insecurity and is specifically confined to one event during a short period of time. Furthermore, while

\(^{206}\) Knight, 1998
\(^{207}\) Clarke, 2006, p.433
Buzan et al are concerned with the attempts by governments to obtain extraordinary powers, aggressive anti-drug counter-measures have traditionally been utilised without the resort to public legitimisation, and it can be asserted with certainty that the level of discrimination against those located in poor communities ensures that these measures would have wide public support.\textsuperscript{208} It is highly likely that aggressive JCF and JDF measures will continue in the future, and that the incorporation of the JDF within activities that are normally reserved for police adds a militarised aspect to counter measures that is likely to result in higher levels of violence.

While the politicisation of drug-related issues has occurred domestically, at this point in time a consensus between the major political parties is observable, and politicisation, as discussed above, is focused internationally at present. Lastly, while Jamaica is firmly located with the US RSC, unlike other weak Caribbean states it has been able to maintain a degree of sovereignty and reciprocity during its negotiations with other more powerful actors, though its ability to do so should not be overstated. The strong level of GOJ commitment to anti-drug measures is clearly illustrated by their actions and available government policy documents, though the presence of corruption, relationships between leaders, the JCF and criminals and the autonomy of gangs and criminal organisation present challenges that will ensure the cultivation and trafficking of drugs continues in the future.

\textsuperscript{208} Clarke, 2006 p.435; For further discussion please refer to: Anthony Harriott, \textit{Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-Colonial Constabularies} (Kingston, University of the West Indies Press, 2000)
Case Study Two
Haiti

Introduction

Though a modicum of security and stability has been enforced throughout Haiti by the presence of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH, this situation remains fragile, and riots have recently occurred over the price and availability of food. It must also be recognised that this situation varies between those areas patrolled by the Haitian National Police (HNP) or UN, and within rural and urban locations. This environment of insecurity was summarised by the Overseas Security Advisory Council during August 2007, when it observed that: “Visitors and residents must remain vigilant due to the absence of an effective police force in much of Haiti, the potential for looting, the presence of intermittent roadblocks set by armed gangs or by the police, and the possibility of random violent crime, including carjacking and assault.” Furthermore, while direct and open challenges to the state from armed groups may have abated, the potential for instability remains strong, as they remain operational and armed.

This case study is important as it vividly demonstrates how the failure of the state derives from a combination of government weakness, the authoritarian manner in which it was previously governed and the ubiquitous trafficking of cocaine. It can be confidently asserted that, in spite of international efforts to reconstruct the state and reimpose its sovereignty, a symbiotic relationship between political instability, armed conflict and drugs has developed, which will ensure continued state weakness in the future.

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News Coverage of Drugs in Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>October 27, 1998</td>
<td>“Haiti Paralysis Brings a Boom in Drug Trade”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
<td>February 29, 2004</td>
<td>“Drug money reportedly funding Haiti fighting”</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Boston Globe</td>
<td>March 1, 2004</td>
<td>“Drug allegation gave U.S. leverage on Aristide”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chronicle Foreign Service</td>
<td>March 4, 2004</td>
<td>“Haiti rebels linked to drug trade: Records show leaders’ ties to Colombians”</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC News</td>
<td>March 19, 2004</td>
<td>“Haiti’s drug money scourge”</td>
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<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>May 16, 2004</td>
<td>“Drug Traffickers Find Haiti a Hospitable Port of Call”</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Miami Herald</td>
<td>July 22, 2005</td>
<td>“Jury: Haitian smuggled drugs”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miami Herald</td>
<td>September 24, 2005</td>
<td>“Star witness names ex-Haitian official in drug case”</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.haiti-news.com">www.haiti-news.com</a></td>
<td>January 9, 2007</td>
<td>“Haiti’s president say U.S. not doing enough to help fight narcotics trade”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>January 10, 2007</td>
<td>“U.S. Defends Anti-Drug Effort in Haiti”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>June 21, 2007</td>
<td>“Interview-Haitian leader says priorities drugs, corruption”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miami Herald</td>
<td>September 6, 2007</td>
<td>“More than 150 arrested in Little Haiti raids”</td>
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Finding news articles concerning Haiti represents a difficult task, and those that are available from outside the country are often limited to websites that are of dubious character, and as such these have been avoided.

Overview of Illicit Drugs in Haiti

The trafficking of cocaine is ubiquitous, and marijuana is also believed to be cultivated, though new concerns have begun to arise that include the increasing availability of crack and ATS. However, there is an overwhelming absence of statistics and research concerning the presence of drugs throughout the state, and both the news media and government press releases are equally devoid of information on seizures. During 2007, the Haitian Counter Narcotics Unit (BLTS) destroyed five hectares of marijuana, though it is believed that local marijuana is of a poor quality, and is only grown to satisfy domestic demand. However, this assessment of the situation may not be accurate, as figures presented by the UNODC for 1997 and 1998 state that a total of 18,255 kgs of marijuana were seized over these two years. This marijuana could have originated in Jamaica, though without forensic testing or detailed information on those involved this cannot be established. Similarly, the INCS Report for 2003 stated that Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) intercepted a boat carrying 18.18 kgs of marijuana. The lack of statistical information represents a fundamental obstacle for the Government of Haiti (GOH) in combating their presence, as it is not definitively known whether the trafficking of cocaine is a more important issue than the domestic cultivation of marijuana, and as a consequence, the GOH cannot accurately allocate its limited resources towards obtaining maximum results.

212 INCS Report, 2003
Disturbingly, only a limited number of other seizure examples are available, and these are primarily related to shipments that have arrived in the US after transiting Haiti. For example, the inspection of five vessels that arrived in Miami during 2003 resulted in the seizure of 551.82kgs of cocaine.\textsuperscript{213} Few domestic seizure examples are available. As an example, during October 2003, a light plane carrying 500kgs of cocaine landed near Cap-Haitien; those involved were only arrested after strong pressure from the DEA forced the Secretary of Public Security to have those involved arrested.\textsuperscript{214} Additionally, during October 2007, the DEA recorded that 914kgs of cocaine and marijuana were seized as a direct consequence of the assistance they provide for airport baggage inspection, and the provision of both air and sea support vessels.\textsuperscript{215} These few examples demonstrate the level of complicity and support that exists for traffickers among even public officials, and the challenges posed for law enforcement agencies. The fact that so few seizures have been recorded (though those that have been depict such large quantities of both marijuana and cocaine) attests to the significance of the trafficking that occurs. These examples also illustrate the overriding importance of foreign assistance that is required for operational success to occur.

The seizure of criminal assets and drug-related profits also illustrates the volume and profitability of drugs. For example, during November 2003, HNP officers confiscated USD$400,000 dollars from the vessel M/V Niklas II, while efforts of the Central Financial Intelligence Unit during 2005 resulted in the freezing of USD$17.1 million in drug assets that belonged to Serge Edouard.\textsuperscript{216} These examples further reveal the complexities of the challenges posed to securing the state from drugs, as highly technical expertise is increasingly required for activities such as asset freezing, and this necessitates the allocation of extensive and potentially limited financial resources to apprehend those involved.

The near-total absence of statistics has been universally acknowledged, and the figures that are quoted often tend to be estimates that are presented as rough percentages of the total regional trade. For example, according to International Crisis Group (ICG): “The volume of cocaine in transit rose from around 5 per cent of annual U.S. imports in the early 1990’s to 13 per cent in 1999, then declined to 8

\textsuperscript{213} INCS Report, 2003
\textsuperscript{214} INCS Report, 2003
\textsuperscript{215} INCS Report, 2008, p.218
\textsuperscript{216} INCS Report, 2003; INCS Report, 2006
per cent in 2000 and remained around that level through 2004.” 217 During 2002, the
INCB estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of cocaine trafficked within the
Caribbean passed through Haiti, while the Board was also concerned that poor
control over the licit drug trade had encouraged the development of a parallel illicit
drug market. 218 Lastly, the United States Institute of Peace (UNIP) estimated that
around 83 metric tons of cocaine was trafficked through either Haiti or the
Dominican Republic during 2006. 219 This situation ensures that there is no objective
way of assessing the level of success for the counter measures that are employed,
moreover, it also prevents the GOH from presenting its situation to neighbouring
states such as the US or regional forums such as CARICOM in an effort to gain
further assistance. Furthermore, from these estimates, it is clearly observable that a
large volume of drugs are available in and transit through Haiti, while additional
issues such as poor control over prescription drugs may assist with the
development of alternative drug preferences.

In spite of the absence of statistics, it is logical to assume that the high
degree of trafficking will ensure the development of a domestic drug consuming
market, and that this market would conform to the economic conditions that are
present. However, this is not uniformly accepted. For example, in the opinion of
UNIP, both low purchasing power and cultural beliefs have ensured a low level of
drug consumption, though, UNIP did recognise the potential for this situation to
change in line with the experiences of other transit states, where the leakage of
drugs in transit has assisted with the creation of a domestic market. 220 In contrast,
the US Department of State (DOS) has observed that: domestic marijuana and
cocaine use, while low, continues to rise. 221 Similarly, the UNODC has recorded the
retail price of a gram of cocaine in 2001 as USD$8, compared with USD$80 in the
US and USD$90 within Canada. 222 The domestic demand for drugs is clearly
present throughout the country, and this situation poses significant challenges to
law enforcement agencies, which already have to cope with the presence of armed
groups and gangs. The occurrence of additional changes with the domestic market

2005) p.4-5
International Narcotics Control for 2002, p.42
219 Robert Perito and Greg Maly, “Haiti’s Drug Problems”, United States Institute of Peace Briefing Paper,
June 2007
220 Perito and Maly, 2007
221 INCS Report, 2003. The DOS has also asserted in other documents that crack and cocaine were readily
available.
are likely to overwhelm these agencies, for example, clandestine laboratories could become established to meet increasing demands for ATS, while the near total absence of treatment facilities ensures that domestic demand is unlikely to decrease in the future.

Dangerous transformations have already been observed within the domestic market. For example, while the role of Haitians was previously confined to that of drug couriers, this situation is believed to have changed, and they are now believed to be involved in all aspects of the trade, from smuggling to transportation and wholesale.\(^\text{223}\) It is also likely that Haitians have been paid for their services directly with drugs, and this assists with establishing and sustaining consumer demand. Furthermore, according to the DEA, significant diversification into heroin has been occurring among Dominican criminal groups, as 63 percent of the heroin seized in the US originated from South America and this could spill over into the domestic market in Haiti.\(^\text{224}\) Additionally, the 2003 INCS Report noted that unsuccessful illegal migrants that had attempted to make their way to the US also intended to smuggle drugs as well.\(^\text{225}\) All of these changes could result in Haiti becoming the primary zone for trafficking operations in the Caribbean, and this would ensure that those involved would continue to have their power and autonomy increased in relation to the state. One positive aspect to this development would be that it would allow the centralisation of regional policing resources within Haiti, though given the fluid nature of trafficking, this situation would rapidly change as greater success was achieved. Lastly, it is likely that illegal migrants have utilised drug-related income, or have attempted to smuggle drugs, to support their endeavours for a considerable period of time, and gangs or criminal groups could also seek to exploit them for their own trafficking activities, if this has not already happened.

Issues that include the near total absence of border controls, poor anti-drug cooperation and coordination between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the failure of the state itself have assisted in creating a favourable environment for traffickers, who can effectively operate with impunity along the borders of both states. With regard to transportation methods, the DEA has continuously noted the high levels of drug flights landing from South America in the border areas between both states. Furthermore, Haiti was cited as an intensive operational area for go-fast

\(^\text{223}\) Milford, 1997
\(^\text{224}\) Milford, 1997
\(^\text{225}\) INCS Report, 2003
boats trafficking between its territorial borders and those of Jamaica and the US. The volume of both commercial and private vessels transiting the country ensures the impossibility of strong interdiction measures and the ability of individuals and non-state actors to quickly adapt their methods, with the option of either single, large shipments or smaller, more frequent ones.

**United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime**

**Drugs Seized in Haiti 1994-2001**

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<td>Cocaine (kgs)</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>436</td>
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<td>Marijuana (kgs)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,255</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>1,750</td>
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**Political Security Concerns**

Challenges to domestic security derive from the relative absence of law and order and the near total failure of the state, which has included the dissipation and usurpation of its sovereignty by both former-state and non-state actors. Disputes over the control of the state represent a fundamental dimension of the armed conflicts that have occurred, as the political culture of the state has not been amenable to cooperation or accommodation. Haitian politics have traditionally been defined by a zero-sum approach to governance and power as demonstrated by the authoritarian control exercised by its national leaders. As Perez observes, Haiti is a prebendary state defined by presidential personality cults and the use of state resources for personal enrichment. Muggah also adroitly characterises the political situation, and asserts that: "Haiti is trapped in a state of chronic political instability. For at least the past two decades, it has faced a combination of social and state collapse from the centre and accruing armed influence at the periphery. Some analysts have observed a tradition of localized—as opposed to national—rule was enforced under President Aristide in the 1990s and again in the years after his landslide election and reinstatement in 2001." Drugs and the insecurity that is created by them have therefore been inserted into a domestic environment that was already characterised by a multitude of powerful actors that preferred to destabilise the state for personal enrichment. As a consequence, drugs and the associated

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profits have accelerated this process, and have formed a symbiotic relationship with these powerful actors, resulting in the creation of a cycle of political violence and the weakening of the state.

The influence of drugs and drug profits upon the state has been disastrous, and they continue to exert a strong influence upon both the GOH and the attempts of international actors at rehabilitating the state. This situation has been widely recognised, and as the INCB observed during 2001: “Drug traffickers have been taking advantage of the unstable political situation in Haiti by routing drugs through that country...”\(^{229}\) Furthermore, in the opinion of the DEA, drug corruption is all encompassing throughout the GOH, and this is evident even among the states leadership, as an example of this impropriety, there are allegations that former President Aristide was himself involved with drug trafficking.\(^{230}\) Lastly, IGC offers a corresponding observation, and asserts that: “Groups linked to criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking and contraband (in Haiti and abroad), are behind much of the current wave of violence. It is plausible that they will attempt to establish (or indeed have already established) ties to political parties, and will offer financing or other kinds of support.”\(^{231}\) The continued presence of political instability has provided an ideal opportunity for drugs to become further entrenched, and this ensures that the internal sovereignty of the state cannot be meaningfully reinstituted without also simultaneously undermining this relationship. The penetration of the GOH and the bureaucracy further ensures that the state is unable to effectively direct its resources, as anti-drug efforts are likely to be internally undermined. It is also likely that all competing political factions utilise drug profits to sustain themselves, and to assist with providing patronage to armed groups or gangs that support them.

**Overview of the Haitian Judicial System**

Before the outbreak of conflict in 2004, judicial institutions were already affected by politicisation, corruption and mismanagement, and they continue to be characterised by dysfunction as a consequence of their antiquated legal practices

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\(^{231}\) International Crisis Group, 2005, p.4
and the near total lack of resources.\textsuperscript{232} Compounding this situation is the fact that judicial infrastructure has been destroyed in many areas, and in spite of the prosecution of members of Fanmi Lavalas, the political party of former-President Aristide, there has been a failure to prosecute those who were involved in committing atrocities under previous dictators.\textsuperscript{233} This has resulted in accusations that the judiciary is open to manipulation and is effectively controlled by partisan influences. According to ICG, a popular perception exists that criminal justice and prosecution are defined by the ability of defendants to bribe judges, while there are also corresponding suggestions of organised collusion and corruption with the HNP.\textsuperscript{234} As an example, Salim Jean Batrony, a well-known trafficker, was arrested during 2002 while in possession of 58kgs of cocaine, however, the presiding judge released him, and he was not subsequently re-arrested despite the judge being dismissed over his decision.\textsuperscript{235}

The judicial system has been provided with significant foreign assistance to facilitate its reform, though as long as the presence of drugs and drug profits remain it cannot combat their presence or remove itself from their influence. Its inability to prosecute even those involved with minor crimes attests to the problems associated with tackling major drug offenders, and it has been estimated that 98 percent of the prison population have not yet been convicted of committing any crime.\textsuperscript{236} Major criminal figures are likely to have access to significant financial resources to ensure acquittal. Additionally, the extensive number of potential criminal cases that involve drug-related offences ensure that the judicial system is completely overwhelmed by the associated costs and required resources. While judicial ineffectiveness and corruption remain, this ensures that impunity presides, and the role of the judiciary as the arbiter of law and governmental accountability is completely unfeasible.

The Haitian National Police Force

In order to successfully combat the presence of drugs throughout the country, Haiti requires an effective police force that can simultaneously maintain law and

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\item \textsuperscript{233} Amnesty International, 2004, p.8
\item \textsuperscript{235} INCS Report, 2003
\item \textsuperscript{236} Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights & Centro de Justica Global, Keeping the Peace in Haiti? (March 2005) p.39
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order, as well as the credibility and capacity to undertake counter-drug operations. However, prior to the outbreak of violence in 2004, it was estimated that there were only between 3,000 and 5,000 police officers nationally for 8.5 million people, though the number of active officers cannot be accurately accounted for, and their ability to maintain internal security was already compromised. The HNP was severely understaffed, and this becomes apparent when the new reform plan is taken into account, as MINUSTAH and the HNP have agreed upon a police force comprising 14,000 officers. This situation ensured that the HNP was not only unable to confront gangs and criminal groups involved with drugs, it was also fundamentally unable to combat the appearance of drug-related crime and violence, and as a consequence, the HNP became both ineffective and corrupted.

The existence of close relationships between members of the HNP, criminals and those associated with drugs was therefore firmly established. According to the DEA, members of the HNP continue to be intimately involved with drug deliveries, and they frequently assist with diverting public vehicle traffic, as well as the offloading of drugs and the provision of security for consignments. Additionally, according to the testimony of one former member of the Medellin cartel before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during the late 1980s Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Michael Francois, the commander of the HNP, had formed the equivalent of a business partnership with criminals that was dedicated to cocaine trafficking. This situation ensures that even if the political will did exist among Haiti’s leadership and the GOH, it would not be able to effectively employ the HNP to counter the presence of drugs. Despite the provision of large amounts of foreign financial and technical assistance for the reform and development of the HNP, this relationship is likely to continue. It is highly unlikely that these relationships would end on their own accord, as those involved with trafficking would be able to easily corrupt officers and offer significant financial incentives for either their direct assistance, or tacit compliance, with drug-related activities. Lastly, the existence of relationships with criminals ensures that a climate of distrust and fear exists, as

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238 INCS Report, 2008, p.217
240 DeEtta Lachelle Gray Barnes, “Drug Trafficking in Haiti” (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2002) p.10
citizens and communities would, in all likelihood, face retaliation if they chose to speak out against either side.

The HNP have been frequently implicated for their involvement in committing serious human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings. For example, in one incident police are reputed to have executed 13 people in a Port-au-Prince neighbourhood, and as a consequence of their involvement local fears of government-sponsored death squads were raised.241 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has commented upon this climate of distrust, and has asserted that: “…a culture of impunity remained pervasive, marked by arbitrary arrest, wrongful detention, inhumane prison conditions, excessive use of force, and extrajudicial executions.”242 There is also a perception that the HNP has a partisan approach towards enforcing the law as a consequence of its forceful strategies employed against pro-Aristide/Fanmi Lavalas gangs, which has not been equally applied to other dangerous groups.243 For ordinary citizens, and especially those living within poor areas, the HNP has increasingly alienated itself through the use of repressive measures, and given this situation, it is unlikely that communities would either trust, or voluntarily assist, with anti-drug operations or the provision of intelligence. The HNP cannot credibly commit to creating a secure domestic environment while they are simultaneously involved with its maintenance, and public perceptions of it have been further undermined by the integration of former military personal (FADH) who have, similarly, been implicated in human rights abuses.

Military Security Concerns

The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The proliferation of SALW represents a significant security concern and an issue of fundamental importance given the number of former-state and non-state actors that have inserted themselves into the political vacuum created by the failure of the state. Grey and black market weapons transfers are common, though analysis of these activity is limited, and weapons have been sourced from a variety of foreign states. It is estimated that there are around 170,000 firearms owned by civilians,

and there is a long history of homemade firearms.\textsuperscript{244} Furthermore, in spite of an embargo placed upon the export of SALW to Haiti by the US, approved deliveries have been shipped to the HNP, while other states have also ignored these sanctions.\textsuperscript{245} The trafficking of marijuana and guns between Haiti and Jamaica is also believed to occur on a regular basis. The availability of SALW ensures that the state is fundamentally unable to reassert its sovereignty, as these weapons directly assist these groups in enhancing their autonomy and coercive capacity in relation to the state. The state is effective only one of many armed actors. While an environment of insecurity is pervasive, it is also unlikely that the demand for SALW among ordinary citizens will decline. The availability of drugs and their use as a financial resource provides a significant, and potentially limitless, source of funding for SALW acquisition, and this effectively allows these actors to support their domestic objectives in spite of international intervention.

The widespread occurrence of armed conflict, violence and crime can be characterised as a low intensity conflict, where conflict is not yet representative of that associated with civil war, though equally, the conflict that is presence has not been brought under control and peace has not been established. The presence of multiple armed actors and the ambiguous attitude displayed by the GOH towards these different armed actors has not assisted with the creation of security. Maggah summarises the complexity of the armed actors involved:

\textit{Human and national security is undermined by a wide variety of non-state armed groups currently operating throughout the country. There are at least a dozen distinct types of armed groups in possession of varying numbers and calibres of small arms and light weapons: Ops, baz armes, zenglendos, ex-army (FADH), former paramilitaries (Revolutionary Armed Forces for the Progress of Haiti—FRAPH), the ex-President Guard, prison escapees, organised criminal groups, self-defence militia, private security companies, civilians and politicians. Each of these groups draws on a rich vein of local support. The alliances among these groups are fluid, and motivations stem from a complex combination of predatory and protective behaviour—itself firmly tied to local interests.}\textsuperscript{246}

This vividly demonstrates the difficulty of the disarmament process and the long duration required to reinstitute the sovereignty and authority of the state. Both the UNSC and AI have expressed concerns surrounding the partisan approach directed towards disarmament, with only members of Fanmi Lavalas being

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{244} Maggah, 2005, p.xxiv-xxv & p.7; For an overview of the SALW available in Haiti please refer to appendix tables 1.1 and 1.2
\item \textsuperscript{245} Muggah, 2005, p.14
\item \textsuperscript{246} Robert Maggah, 2005, p.xxiii; For an overview of the multitude of armed actors present in Haiti please review appendix table 1.3
\end{itemize}
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disarmed. The Harvard Human Rights Programme (HHRP) has also observed that there is a general lack of political will for undertaking proper disarmament, and this is in spite of the means to do so being provided by the presence of MINUSTAH. Given these observations and the clear relationship between SALW acquisition, the maintenance of insecurity and drugs, Haiti will continue to experience instability. The state will remain unable to reassert its control, while its future actions and policies may in fact precipitate an armed response from these actors. Many former-state and non-state actors have little incentive to participate with the rehabilitation of state, as stability is antithetical to both their rational political and economic interests and involvement with drugs.

The Haitian Military

The FADH were historically defined by their employment as an instrument for the maintenance of power against domestic political challengers and competition, than as a force that provided for the external security of the state. This paradox is demonstrated by their frequent involvement with the repression and murder of citizens. Furthermore, in spite of the disbanning of the FADH and the demobilisation of its members, many continue to maintain the belief that they have a legitimate constitutional role within the politics, and disturbingly, they still maintain their SALW. Of critical importance to this thesis is the assertion that under Jean-Claude Duvalier, the FADH were encouraged to pursue private economic enterprise in order to finance itself, and like other government departments, members became involved with trafficking activities during the 1980s. This situation continues to be relevant now, as the UN has observed that both former FADH personnel and armed gangs have formed working relationships with criminal groups tied to both drugs and SALW trafficking. The involvement of the FADH with drugs is significant, as many of its members would have had little reason to maintain the pretence of their domestic duties. Furthermore, the ability of the FADH to self-finance effectively removed it from under the control of the GOH. As a
consequence, the FADH would have quickly deteriorated and they now increasingly resemble the gangs and criminal groups that are involved with trafficking. Unfortunately, they would have continued to maintain a patina of state legitimacy, which would have assisted in shielding them from the judicial system and international sanctions. The contemporary formation of partnerships with criminals is of significant concern, as they could become proxies for achieving criminal objectives.

Anecdotally, it has been suggested that the participation of former FADH personnel in the coup against President Aristide was in response to his efforts to curb the presence of corruption and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{253} It may also be possible, given the suggestions that Aristide financially benefited from the occurrence of trafficking, that he was attempting to use the power of the state to reduce the involvement of other domestic actors involved with drugs for his own financial benefit. This scenario has some credibility, as national leaders have traditionally used the state for their personal enrichment.

Societal Security Concerns

Accurately depicting the negative influence of drugs upon societal security is a daunting proposition, as there is a near total lack of detailed research concerning their influence. A broad spectrum of Haitian society is compliant or explicitly involved with trafficking activities, and this ensures the impossibility of addressing their presence through the institution of prompt measures.\textsuperscript{254} Furthermore, ICG has characterised Haitian society as: “... an atomised agglomeration of contradictory and antagonistic interests, relying on violence as the ultimate way to resolve conflict”, furthermore: “The seeds of Haiti’s violence are in the acute social and economic inequalities which have historically marked the country.”\textsuperscript{255} When this description of Haitian society is combined with the traditional use of violence by both the HNP and FADH, and the fact that these measures have been extensively utilised throughout poor neighbourhoods, then understanding the basis for the instability and conflict that has occurred becomes straightforward. This history of violence, discrimination and socio-economic conflict effectively allows the state to justify and legitimise employing highly aggressive strategies to combat the presence of instability, which is viewed as arising primarily within these poor

\textsuperscript{253} Perez, 2000, p.146
\textsuperscript{254} International Crisis Group, 2005, p.5. Please review IGC footnote no.14 concerning the diversity of individuals extradited to the US based upon their involvement with the trafficking of drugs.
\textsuperscript{255} International Crisis Group, 2005 p.2
communities. When the issue of drugs is combined with this situation, and the perception that drug-related activities are believed to primarily occur within these areas then the state can easily employ violence to reassert its authority with these areas.

The research by Kolbe and Hutson represents one of the few studies that have attempted to examine this extreme environment of violence. They conducted a random survey of households in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince between February 2004 and December 2005, and according to their results, an estimated 8,000 people were murdered, of which, they attribute approximately 21.7 percent to the HNP and other security forces, 13 percent to anti-Lavalas groups and 47.8 percent to criminals. Accordingly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggests that there is a 34.4 percent chance of not surviving past the age of 40 because of these socio-economic conditions.

Understandably, citizens have come to fear the HNP as much as armed non-state actors, gangs and criminals. In other countries, the expansion of domestic drug cultivation and trafficking has resulted in the escalation of violence and crime, and it is likely that situation has occurred in Haiti. For example, gangs and criminal groups involved with drugs may try to eliminate their competition, and they would without doubt use intimidation and violence to ensure a favourable host environment. Individual criminal acts and violence are also likely to increase due to the need to acquire drugs. Lastly, the presence of drugs could become more complex, if it has not already, if those involved with drugs develop or cultivate a role as social service providers or social patrons for local communities. This would effectively mean that the little legitimacy the state currently enjoys in some areas would be completely eroded, if it has not happened already through its frequent resort to violence.

Economic Security Concerns

The extreme conditions of poverty and unemployment throughout the country are fundamentally associated within the insecurity and instability that is present.


According to the UNDP, 50 percent of the adult population is unemployed and 40 percent of households are affected by food insecurity. The UNDP further asserts that the underdevelopment of Haiti ranks alongside that of Sub Saharan Africa, and well below the development of other Latin American and Caribbean states. IGC summarise the economic conditions throughout Haiti, and asserts that: “The economic model is one of the underlying obstacles to political as well as economic progress. Its main goal has been to maintain the power, interests and advantages of a few families that monopolise most of its sectors.” It is within this economic environment that drugs have become a source of income for not only branches of the state and criminal groups, but also for everyday individuals and communities.

Drugs are likely to provide communities with an important source of income that would not otherwise be available to them. Though, paradoxically, this income is directly related to the presence of conflict and insecurity, and the violence associated with drugs prevents economic development and the establishment of industries such as tourism. This insecurity requires the GOH to continually invest its limited financial resources in the provision of security arrangements in order to reassert its sovereignty and to provide security for economic development. The magnitude of drug activities and the potential income ensures the continued corruptibility of state law enforcement agencies and the maintenance of a hospitable trafficking environment. Moreover, it is unlikely that ordinary Haitian citizens will be dissuaded from offering support for anti-drug measures unless there is a fundamental shift in their present economic circumstances. Furthermore, if the political objectives of some of those armed actors that are present transform towards more economic motives then they would become further entrenched. It is likely that this scenario is already occurring.

The Involvement of MINUSTAH in Haiti

The UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH has been inserted into a complex operational environment where the continued trafficking of drugs threatens to not only maintain instability and lawlessness, but also prevent the attainment of its objectives. Importantly, MINUSTAH has undertaken a series of operations aimed at combating armed gangs believed to be associated with trafficking. However, it appears that combating the presence of drugs does not represent an essential

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258 Amnesty International, 2004, p.10
260 International Crisis Group, 2005 p.2
objective, as according to General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, Commander of the mission, drugs are responsible for a considerable amount of violence, though he was unsure as to what degree they were responsible for the overarching environment of insecurity. The failure to identify the role of drugs in maintaining insecurity represents a fundamental flaw within the approach of MINUSTAH to reconstructing the state.

At this point in time, counter drug strategies have primarily focused upon arresting and disbanding gangs and their leadership. Unfortunately, this approach creates a vacuum that is quickly filled by other non-state actors and criminals, and this does not impact upon the overall facilitating environment. Moreover, according to some observers, the presence of a de facto ceasefire between gangs and MINUSTAH has been utilised by these groups to consolidate their position. Between January and March 2007, combined MINUSTAH-HNP anti-gang operations resulted in the arrest of some 400 suspects. However, while these figures demonstrate a high level of success, few resources are available to properly prosecute and investigate these suspects, and it is questionable whether the judicial system can prove their involvement with drug activities. The UN has admitted that it utilised anomous information gathered via telephone hotlines, and as such, allegations of personal involvement are as likely to true, as much as they are a practical form of social retribution against political opponents or a product of discrimination.

It has been suggested that MINUSTAH has not succeeded in its mandated task of reforming the HNP, and it has also been asserted that the UN mission has, tacitly or otherwise, provided cover for further human rights abuses by the HNP during operations. According to the HHRP, the presence of MINUSTAH has encouraged more aggressive and assertive missions by the HNP as a consequence of the increased logistical and firepower support provided by the UN. As such, it asserted that: “The most charitable assessment of MINUSTAH with regard to the police reform portion of its mandate is one of utter ineffectiveness.” Allocations also continue to persist concerning the involvement of MINUSTAH itself

262 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights, 2005 p.45
265 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights, 2005, p.41
in committing human rights abuses. Donais has suggests that international assistance to the HNP has focused too much upon the technical aspects of policing, rather than the environment in which they are policing, ignoring the dynamics that exist between domestic politics, the functions of the police and state-societal relations as a whole. The continued presence of drugs will undermine any future attempts at reforming the HNP.

Compounding this situation, CIVPOL, the policing arm of MINUSTAH, maintained no constitutionally sanctioned policing powers throughout 2005, and around a third of officers at that time could not speak French, this reduced the effectiveness of its law enforcement role. MINUSTAH was equipped with a strong mandate to support constitutional and political reform and public safety. If it is unable to combat, challenge and reduce the presence of drugs throughout Haiti then these objectives will not be accomplished with any lasting significance. Paradoxically, the involvement of MINUSTAH in combating gangs and drug activities may also compromise the mission and provoke further violent conflict by challenging those with vested interests in it, while damaging its reputation in the eyes of the population. More fundamentally, anti-drug operations may require a radical shift in the approach of the UN towards post-conflict reconstruction in Haiti, and during other interventions. This strategy would be subjected to forthright domestic and international debate, and potentially strong opposition as questions regarding sovereignty, the applicability of anti-drug measures and objectives of foreign agendas would arise without doubt.

The Involvement of the United States in Haiti

The involvement of the US in supporting the UN mission and its own provision of significant technical and financial assistance has been predicated upon the overriding principle of national security. The position of the US is articulated by R. Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, who asserted that the deployment of MINUSTAH is fundamental for the security and stability of Haiti,

268 Donais, 2005
269 Though, it must be remembered that the level of assistance to Haiti has been dependant upon the particular administration and their overarching strategy with regards to security, as well as budget constraints and fluctuations in public opinion.
and for preventing the further penetration of criminal and drug trafficking organisations under the cover of political instability.\textsuperscript{270} This observation is further reinforced by concerns expressed by the US Senate in 2005, which asserted that: “the failure to establish a secure and stable environment and to conduct credible and conclusive elections will likely result in Haiti’s complete transition from a failed state to a criminal state.”\textsuperscript{271} The Cornerstone case in Miami serves as an example of the volume of drugs trafficked into the US, where the inspection of just six commercial cargo shipments resulted in the seizure of 25 tons of cocaine over two years.\textsuperscript{272} The US clearly views the expansion of criminal activities in Haiti as a direct threat to its own domestic security.

However, support for intervention and the provision of assistance has not been universally accepted within US domestic political discussions. For example, USIP contends that US interests have: “fluctuated between the extremes of disinterest and armed intervention.”\textsuperscript{273} US security imperatives have clearly influenced support for intervention, and these concerns are likely to parallel current US anti-drug policies throughout the Caribbean. It can also be asserted with confidence that this focus upon drugs has been fundamentally reinforced by the dominance of the post-September 11\textsuperscript{th} security discourse, which regards state failure as a source of insecurity for neighbouring states, and regional security as a whole. Haiti is therefore firmly with the US RSC. Though this raises important and difficult questions regarding the issue of sovereignty and the securitisation of drugs by the US, and this is especially so during the period when Haiti was effectively a failed state and the authority of the GOH was contested. For example, anti-drug measures where required to assist with stabilisation, though consent for the domestic measures employed by both the US and UN were effectively absent.

In spite of the de-certification of Haiti by on the annual Narcotics Certification Report, due to the total failure of the government to comply with even the minimum requirements of controlling drug activities, the US deemed that it was a national security priority to ensure that it did not become further associated with trafficking,

\textsuperscript{270} United States Department of State, “Briefing on the Haiti Core Group Meeting” (Meeting in Washington, DC, February 1, 2007)
\textsuperscript{271} Taft-Morales, 2005, p.13
\textsuperscript{272} Milford, 1997
\textsuperscript{273} Perito, 2007, p.9
and as such, economic assistance was not suspended. Importantly, Undersecretary Burns acknowledged the relationship between drugs and economic underdevelopment, and expressed the desire to expand the mandate of MINUSTAH while it was available as it could provide security for such activities. Congress has recognised the economic dimensions of the conflict, and has provided support by a preferential trade agreement, continuing aid, and has also supported efforts for the relief of Haiti’s international debt. Moreover, the US has emphasised that unless a secure environment can be provided and the sovereignty of the state reasserted then it is unlikely that counter-drug operations could be conducted with even minimal success. However, the complexity and magnitude of the US government ensures that a coherent policy that allows for economic development and anti-drug measures to be instituted may not be possible, and bureaucratic competition between different branches of the state will influence any strategies that are instituted.

Contrasting opinions of the GOH and the complexities and sensitivities associated with foreign relations that involve drug issues are clearly evident within the same US government department. This is best demonstrated by the views expressed by the DOS within the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. For example, in 2003, the DOS described the counter-drug commitment of the GOH as very weak, and cited the direct involvement of both GOH and HNP officials with trafficking activities. Furthermore, in 2006 the DOS asserted that the HNP have not adequately attempted to disarm those gangs that actively supported trafficking, and moreover, it noted that there was little GOH support for combating drugs, and that no drug-related prosecutions were conducted during 2005. These blunt assessments should be contrasted with statements made during 2008, as the anti-drug commitment of the GOH was highly praised, and the anti-drug operations and efforts to reduce corruption were outlined more positively than within previous reports. The DOS explicitly asserted that:

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275 United States Department of State, “Briefing on the Haiti Core Group Meeting” (Meeting in Washington, DC, February 1, 2007)
276 Perito, 2007, p.10
278 INCS Report, 2006
As a matter of policy, the GOH does not encourage or facilitate the shipment of narcotics through Haiti, and does not discourage the investigation or prosecution of such acts. Moreover, the GOH has demonstrated willingness to undertake law enforcement and legal measures to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish public corruption.279

It is obvious that greater levels of funding for both the GOH and the HNP combined with the creation of a more secure environment would result in increased operational success. However, the attitude and impressions of the DOS statements are strikingly different to those previously expressed. This is important, as it is likely that large segments of the bureaucracy, national leadership and the HNP are still significantly involved with trafficking activities and drug profits. These statements may point to greater US sensitivity towards achieving its anti-drug policies throughout the Caribbean, and may also signify a change within its approach away from reliance upon coercive means and aggressive statements, which are counter-productive, towards a more positive engagement with neighbouring states.

The primary focus of US bilateral counter-drug assistance has centred on providing financial and technical resources to the HNP. This has included USD$8.2 million in funding during 2005, as well as the provision of vehicles for transportation, police equipment and experienced personnel.280 There has been a long history of cooperation between US and Haitian law enforcement agencies. For example, a Special Investigations Unit was established during 2007 to examine criminal groups operating between both countries, while cooperation between both coast guard agencies has also occurred, during 1997 this resulted in the seizure of over nine tons of marijuana and 2.1 tons of cocaine.281 Significant assistance has also been provided to the HCG in order to return to operation, and intelligence on suspected drug flights has also been provided.282 Importantly, the US has focused upon building a bilateral relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, as few coordinated anti-drug operations and no border patrols have been undertaken between the two states in spite of their intimate relationship with traffickers.283

279 INCS Report, 2008, p.218
280 INCS Report, 2006; For a further overview of US financial assistance to Haiti please refer to: Taft-Morales, 2005, p.12-16
281 Gray Barnes, 2002, p.36
282 Perito and Maly, 2007; INCS Report, 2006
283 Milford, 1997
Responses of the Haitian Government to Drugs

In spite of the ubiquitous presence of cocaine trafficking throughout the country, successive GOH administrations have consecutively failed to implement credible measures towards combating their presence. Legislative measures have been consistently blocked by political impasses among the country’s competing leadership, and in many respects, the transitional government that has been supported by the international community has brought about greater political polarisation. The GOH has also previously failed to provide the necessary resources to the HNP, HCG and other agencies to enhance their capacity and ability to seize drugs. The absence of credible political commitment towards a holistic process of demobilisation, disarmament and the reintegration of former FADH members and other armed non-state actors throughout Haiti is indicative of the poor attitude and responses towards anti-drug measures by the GOH. The successive failure of GOH administrations to combat drugs can be distilled into several explanations: a total lack of financial resources and the presence of political conflict among competing factions has ensured the weakness of the state while providing an ideal environment for traffickers; the magnitude of the trade itself has ensured the total corruption and involvement of all government agencies, the bureaucracy and citizens; a total lack of commitment to undertake operations by national leaders; and lastly, the development of a symbiotic relationship between armed conflict and the use of drugs as a financial resource has ensured that the state is less powerful than these actors, and cannot intervene into drug activities. However, in spite of the convergence of these factors, some positive progression in anti-drug measures is evident within recent GOH actions.

The ability of the HNP and other domestic agencies to seize drugs and implement counter-drug strategies has fluctuated according to the level of commitment displayed by the GOH, the amount of funding available and the presence of armed conflict throughout the country. Praise was offered by the INCB over increasing cooperation with the US Coast Guard and the return of the HCG to maritime interdiction. However, serious questions are raised concerning its sustainability and capacity to seriously impede the use of the country as a transhipment hub. The return of the HCG is more of a symbolic victory, than a meaningful contribution to border security. During 2005, the HNP expanded the


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number of officers assigned to the BLTS, though operations continue to be limited by the lack of available resources.\textsuperscript{285} Action has been undertaken to prevent money laundering and financial crimes that assist traffickers; the interim government reorganised the Central Financial Intelligence and the Financial Crimes Task Force, though the DOS noted that in spite of some 400 investigations, there had been little success.\textsuperscript{286} The GOH has also cooperated with the US to expel criminals for prosecution, and the DEA has been allowed to establish a Sensitive Investigation Unit in the country.\textsuperscript{287} Attempts at public education have occurred through the use of radio advertisements, though no demand-reduction or rehabilitation programmes are present.\textsuperscript{288} It is evident that there has been an increasing level of commitment to anti-drug measures, though the overall magnitude of the trade ensures that even a strong response by the GOH is not likely to seriously impede trafficking operations.

The GOH has also failed to take advantage of bilateral legal assistance, and its ability to enforce the provisions of current bilateral agreements is weak. For example, in 2002 it became a party to a Maritime Counter Narcotics Agreement with the US, though there is no formal agreement concerning mutual legal assistance between the two states, and requests have traditionally been made on an ad-hoc basis, though these requests have occurred infrequently. The GOH is also party to other international anti-drug agreements such as the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the 1961 UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs, however, it has not ratified other international agreements such as the UN Convention against Organised Crime, the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement. The GOH has clearly failed to employ these agreements for its benefit, as it is likely that it requires substantial assistance to implement them. It is also unlikely that it will be able to enforce them adequately even if they were ratified.

Bilateral relations with other important regional actors such as CARICOM have been difficult, though the head of the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Anti-Drug Commission visited during August 2007 to review the GOH progress with implementing anti-drug measures.\textsuperscript{289} Unfortunately, relations with the Dominican

\textsuperscript{285} INCS Report, 2006  
\textsuperscript{286} INCS Report, 2006  
\textsuperscript{287} INCS Report, 2006  
\textsuperscript{288} INCS Report, 2003; INCS Report, 2006  
Republic have traditionally been both volatile and combative, and the degree to which this animosity can be overcome by either state to enhance their cooperation on anti-drug initiatives is unknown. Contemporary relations with France have also been difficult, though France has continued to provide assistance for judicial training and for social and economic development projects, though direct assistance for anti-drug measures are not observable. However, the existence of drug and SALW trafficking between Haiti and Jamaica has assisted with the strengthening of bilateral ties between both states with a strong focus upon mutual security imperatives. Haiti’s foreign relations have clearly fluctuated according to its domestic political environment and they have also been affected by the personalities of its more recent leaders. As a greater level of stability has been provided, it appears that the GOH has been able to focus more upon bilateral relations, and especially those related to acquiring anti-drug assistance.

Examining the discourse and actions of the GOH provides an opportunity to examine its attitudes toward the threats associated with drugs as outlined by the NFA devised by Buzan et al. However, this is approach is problematic, as there is a complete lack of available official information due to instability and the cycle of failures, and there is also a paucity of working government websites and official publications. Furthermore, as a French speaking country, the nuances of language associated with the use of translated statements may disguise and distort the meaning and context of GOH statements. This represents a significant problem associated with the use of discourse analysis as outlined by the NFA.

From the statements that are available, it appears as if a dual strategy, whether formalised or ad-hoc, is occurring. The GOH has attempted to publicise the failure of foreign assistance, and especially that provided by the US, while the magnitude of domestic trafficking has been played down. For example, in his annual address to parliament during 2007, President Preval presented Haiti as the victim of Western consumer demands. According to a translation of one of his


292 Stevenson Jacobs, “U.S. Defends Anti-Drug Efforts in Haiti”, The Washington Post, January 10, 2007. The US has attempted to counter Haiti claims by citing the fact that over USD$40 million has been contributed towards the reform of the HNP since 2004.
statements, he asserted that: “A lot of crimes happening in the country are connected to drugs. But everybody knows that Haiti doesn’t produce drugs. Haiti isn’t a big consumer of drugs…Haiti is the victim of drug-consuming countries, mainly the United States.”

It is correct to assert that Haiti is a victim of external influences, and while its security cannot be divorced from the influence of US consumer demand for drugs, the historical reliance of the GOH upon violence combined with the corruption of previous national leaders and the bureaucracy bare considerable responsibility for the failure of the state and the entrenchment of drug activities.

The strategies of the GOH are also evident throughout other official statements. For example, Jean Reynald Clerisme, Haiti’s Foreign Minister, has asserted that: “The government, with the police and MINUSTAH, are trying to disband this connection [to armed groups and drug funding] and create the space for security in the country.”

Additionally, according to Ira Kurzban, General Counsel to the GOH and an Adviser to former President Aristide, Haiti did have a problem with trafficking, but this issue was not a major problem, and he suggested that allegations concerning the entrenchment of drugs under President Aristide were part of a smear campaign. The actions of the GOH could be characterised as a deliberate attempt to politicise the issue of foreign aid and assistance to Haiti in order to continue receiving financial support, upon which the state is dependant for its survival. The promotion of recent drug interdiction efforts, however minimal they are, could also be viewed as an attempted to avoid de-certification by the US and the possible loss of aid. Though equally, they could represent the beginnings of a concerted attempt to overcome the insecurity created by drugs. Unfortunately, in the opinion of Barnes, the Haitian government has acknowledged the centrality of Haiti in the trafficking of cocaine, though combating drugs has been prioritised as secondary to the objectives of political stability, law and order, and economic development. This fundamentally ignores the centrality of drugs in undermining the state, and the GOH will be unable to achieve these objectives without simultaneous addressing the presence of drugs; though this is likely to be beyond the capabilities of the GOH. While drug trafficking remains, the state will remain

294 United States Department of State, “Briefing on the Haiti Core Group Meeting” (meeting in Washington, DC, February 1, 2007)
296 Gray Barnes, 2002, p.xiv
insecure and non-state actors will continue to maintain a high level of autonomy and coercive capacity to the detriment of Haiti.

Recent actions such as closer bilateral relations with the OAS and Jamaica demonstrate the recent changes that have occurred in the priorities and commitment of the GOH to combating the presence of drugs, though it is questionable whether the use of Haiti for these activities can be significantly reduced. Furthermore, given the previous discussion regarding the failure to implement credible measures, to support key law enforcement agencies and the pervasiveness of drug-related corruption then it is unlikely that the GOH could deploy significant anti-drug measures, now that some political commitment is evident.

With regard to the definitions of securitisation and politicisation employed by Buzan et al, drug-related insecurity has been securitised to some extent, though this securitisation is problematic. It is has not occurred during an emergency, though the failure of the state clearly represented an emergency situation, and the employment of violent and repressive measures to combat the gangs and non-actors involved with drugs has not required the government to seek formal approval or legitimacy for aggressive measures, as these have traditionally been employed to tackle security threats by the HNP, and it is likely that such strategies will continue.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, because of a lack of information specifically concerning drugs and internal political debate, this thesis cannot realistically discusses the domestic politicisation of drugs that may have occurred between the major and multitude of smaller political parties present throughout Haiti.²⁹⁸

A definitive conclusion regarding why higher security priorities have been attached to other issues cannot be reached. However, it is possible to suggest that the current measures are viewed as those most likely to result in success. Furthermore, national political debate regarding drugs and drug-related insecurity has not happened to the degree that is required for them to gain an elevated priority

and it also possible that other issues have been given a higher priority as a consequence of the influence of external actors. For example, the failure of the MINUSTAH to define drugs as a primary threat could therefore exert an influence upon GOH assessment of their domestic security requirements. Equally, the focus of MINUSTAH and other external actors upon the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of both former FADH personnel and other armed actors would have influenced the lower priority attached to drugs. When dealing with a failed state and the subject of drugs, the ability of state itself to maintain its sovereignty against domestic actors is clearly limited, and this limitation extends to the ability of it to define the most pressing security concerns given the strong influence of external actors.
Chapter Four
Pacific Regional Overview

Introduction

The Pacific encompasses an incredibly diverse region that is dominated by—with the exception of PNG and Australia—small and microstates. It is comprised of three primary ethnic groups, Melanesian, Micronesian and Polynesian, and unlike many other regions throughout the globe (with the exception of the Caribbean) it is still characterised by complex sovereignty arrangements. The political, economic and strategic interests of Australia, New Zealand, France, the US, and the overlay of the competition between China and Taiwan still largely define and influence the domestic and foreign relations of PIS. With regard to security and the appearance of armed conflict, the region has traditionally been perceived as relatively benign. However, recent publications such as *Securing a Peaceful Pacific* (2005) have demonstrated that threats to state security increasingly include violence and rising levels of crime, protracted armed conflicts relating to independence, issues that derive from economic development, poor governance, and the appearance and growth of TNC. The cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs poses a further security threat to the region, though one that is not easily observable. Commercial links between Australia, New Zealand, Asian, Canada, North America and South American all converge on the Pacific, and PIS serve as a bridge between these countries. Given its strategic location, the perception of PIS as relatively weak and the strength of domestic demand for drugs within states that surround the region, they are ideally suit for exploitation by both regionally based and foreign criminal groups.
News Coverage of Drugs in Pacific Regional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PACNEWS/Ioane</td>
<td>March 18, 1998</td>
<td>&quot;Kiribati and Tuvalu Sailors Imprisoned For Drug Trafficking&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Cook Islands/PINA Nius Online</td>
<td>March 25, 2001</td>
<td>&quot;COOK ISLANDS: Drug dog brings quick arrests in Cocks crackdown&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan Observer/PINA Nius Online</td>
<td>February 15, 2002</td>
<td>&quot;Samoan: Judge tells of Samoan drugs worry&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Morning Herald/AP</td>
<td>April 26, 2002</td>
<td>&quot;Pacific Drug Ring Smashed, Say Police&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC News Online</td>
<td>November 27, 2003</td>
<td>&quot;Drugs, Fraud Called Pacific Threat&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio New Zealand International/PINA</td>
<td>April 7, 2004</td>
<td>&quot;REGION: Two Samoans in Major Drug Bust&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>August 27, 2005</td>
<td>&quot;Four arrested in $72m drug bust&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahitipresse</td>
<td>September 8, 2005</td>
<td>&quot;Ten sentenced for Drug Trafficking in Papeete&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Magazine</td>
<td>October 11, 2005</td>
<td>&quot;New Zealand: Record Amounts of Crystal Meth Seized&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC Online</td>
<td>February 7, 2006</td>
<td>&quot;Three arrested in $17.5m drug bust&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa News</td>
<td>June 1, 2006</td>
<td>&quot;American Samoan Reports Target Drug Problems&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahitipresse</td>
<td>August 15, 2006</td>
<td>&quot;French Polynesia: Cocaine Found In Marquesas Islands&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Press</td>
<td>September 11, 2006</td>
<td>&quot;Drugs gangs exploit Pacific&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TODAY Online</td>
<td>December 21, 2006</td>
<td>&quot;Singaporean nabbed in $61m Australian drug bust&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>January 4, 2007</td>
<td>&quot;Cops make $540m drug bust&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The Press                                   | October 23, 2007   | "NZ gangs linked to Asian drug cartels"                                  

Examples of Regional Drugs Seizures 1994-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Origin/Details</th>
<th>Operation Name</th>
<th>Agencies Involved</th>
<th>Illicit Drug</th>
<th>Estimated Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Hervey Bay</td>
<td>Queensland via PNG</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Caribou</td>
<td>AFP &amp; authorities from PNG and Noumea</td>
<td>15,000kgs Hashish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Air passengers from Tonga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2kgs cocaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/1998</td>
<td>Torres Strait</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tibia</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>100kgs Marijuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Attempted importation from India</td>
<td></td>
<td>INCB warning to PNG Govt.</td>
<td></td>
<td>8000kgs Ephedrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Attempted importation from China</td>
<td></td>
<td>INCB warning to PNG Govt.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4000kgs Pseudoephedrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Police operation</td>
<td>Log Runner</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td></td>
<td>357kgs Heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>Police and Transnational Crime Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>101kgs Cocaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150kgs Heroin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Washed ashore at Bikini atoll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30kgs Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Discovered in village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120kgs Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Outrigger</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Meth super laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Woman arrested in possession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20kgs of cocaine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Police raid on criminal syndicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>570 grams of cocaine USD$360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Cultivated in village</td>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,200 marijuana plants, estimated 1000kgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Cultivated in village</td>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated 1000kgs of marijuana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table constructed from news media, police and customs reports.
Overview of Illicit Drugs throughout the Pacific

It must be resolutely reiterated that PIS are not insulated from the domestic demand for drugs, nor are they protected from the negative consequences associated with their cultivation, production and trafficking. Viable domestic drug markets are present throughout all PIS, and their governments have increasing expressed their concerns over the presence of drugs within their societies. However, until recently, the presence of marijuana represented the only significant concern, though evidence from law enforcement agencies and other supporting organizations have emphasised the fact that drug consumption patterns are also transforming. An increasing demand for methamphetamine and ATS has been observed, and large consignments of both cocaine and heroin have been seized on regular occasions. This provides credible evidence to reinforce the assertion that PIS are being utilised for trafficking activities, and are also beginning to display their own emerging, and disturbing, trends.

The drug market throughout the region is dynamic and open to transformation. The INCB has frequently asserted that the PIS are increasingly involved in the transhipment of heroine, cocaine, and crystal methamphetamine, and has also noted increasing levels of methamphetamine addiction. Similarly, the Forum has noted the appearance of contemporary global trends, and has cited the increasing use of ATS. The DEA offers a corresponding observation, and asserted that: “The Pacific Region is becoming a significant transit and consumption area for crystal methamphetamine. China and the Philippines are the major sources for crystal methamphetamine, which transits through, or is consumed in, the region.”

Disturbingly, authorities in the Northern Marianas are aware of the fact that cocaine has been distributed for free in an attempt to test the viability of their domestic market. Police in New Zealand have expressed similar concerns, and have noted that houses that are traditionally used for the sale of marijuana have offered free samples of methamphetamine in order to establish a new, more

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302 Drug Enforcement Administration, “Drug Intelligence Brief: The Pacific Islands Region August 2004”
303 Haidee V. Eugenio, “Norther Marianas: Cocaine being offered for free, says Marianas Customs”, Marianas Variety/PINA Nius Online, January 10, 2001
profitable, market.\textsuperscript{304} All of these developments are concerning, as the establishment of domestic demand encourages the participation of local criminals, and can conceivably provide opportunities for foreign criminals to exploit these new opportunities.

Unfortunately, as the region represents an ideal bridge between drug cultivation, production and consumption areas, criminal groups are able to disguise the origin of their shipments and to circumvent measures to combat their trafficking. As an example, routes for trafficking have included US to Tahiti, Fiji to Tonga, Tonga to Australia, the US to French Polynesia and Canada to Australia, though because of the extensive links between the Pacific and surrounding regions it is probable that trafficking routes have involved all PIS at some stage, and will unquestionably involve all of them in the future.\textsuperscript{305} According to the UNDCP, large-scale shipments of marijuana from Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines have utilised New Caledonia, the Solomon Islands and PNG.\textsuperscript{306} More disturbingly, according to analysis of trafficking and seizure patterns conducted by the Colombia government and cited by the UNODC, an estimated 60 percent of the cocaine leaving the country transits the Pacific Coast.\textsuperscript{307} The vast majority of cocaine will, in all likelihood, be directed towards the US, though the seizure of several large shipments within French Pacific territories demonstrates that some of this trade is being diverted, and this could be directed towards the Australian market. Alternatively, it could become part of a concerted attempt to evade US law enforcement agencies and security arrangements, which would ensure the entrenchment of trafficking activities throughout PIS located closer to the US or its Pacific territories.

As a further example of the concern over the expansion of drugs throughout the Pacific, the Australian National Council on Drugs (ANCD) has asserted that:

\textsuperscript{304} The Press, “Police Worried ‘tinny houses’ are diversifying”, June 7, 2007
\textsuperscript{306} Nejo, p.13
“The rising use of the Pacific Islands as a transit route for illicit drugs poses a significant threat at a number of levels, including national security (e.g. corruption) and the potential leakage of transited drugs to create a domestic market of drug use.” Furthermore: “The concern for the Pacific region is, if large amounts of illicit drugs are moving through local communities, then seepage of the drugs into local communities will result and the social impacts of drug dependency will be experienced.” Disturbingly, the scenario has already begun to materialise. According to Evans, individuals that were arrested in Tonga for their involvement with the organisation of a large shipment of cocaine destined for Fiji were also paid with it. This represents a significant transformation. While it is likely that locals have been paid for their services with marijuana before, the payment of them with other drugs directly assists with establishing alternative consumption demands, and this could encouraged the participation of foreign criminals to meet this demand. The increasing involvement of foreign criminal groups from South America and Asia has already been observed as a consequence of operational and seizure(s) success. Lastly, Pacific islanders are being arrested in increasing numbers throughout the region and in surrounding countries, including both the US and in South America.

Problems Associated with Statistical Analysis and the Identification of Trends

At present, the ability to assess changing trends, conduct analysis and provide recommendations upon the drug situation is difficult, as publicly available statistics for the region are largely absent. The UNODC has endeavoured to construct an assessment of contemporary drug trends throughout the globe. However, it appears as if the Pacific does not present an area of tangible concern; this is clearly evident throughout UNODC World Drug Reports. Moreover, with the exception of New Zealand, Australia and PNG, other PIS do not feature within the maps presented within the reports, and PNG is often cited for the near total absence of available statistics. When compared to global drug seizure totals, the region is not statistically significant. As an example, cocaine seizure figures for 2006 were

309 Australian National Council on Drugs, 2006, p.83. Disturbingly, less that 22 pages out of 401 in the report specifically dealt with the issue of drugs with Pacific island states (New Zealand and Australia were not focused upon either).
310 Evans, 2006, p.6 no.86
cited as 245kgs and accounted for less than 0.05 percent of global seizures.311 This is a significant amount of cocaine for the region, given the fact that its total population is estimated as 33,569,718 people, and of this, only an estimated 2,703,066 inhabit the islands (not including Australia, New Zealand and PNG) and are not believed to have any significant drug consuming population.312 This data becomes more compelling when seizure figures for cocaine throughout the whole of Asia are given for 2004 as 0.05 percent, or less than 300kgs, of the global total.313 Given the obvious population, size and income differences of both regions, it is extremely unlikely that their seizure figures would be comparable. Furthermore, comparing the Pacific to areas where large seizures are regularly reported, combined with the reliance upon statistics that are overwhelmingly concerned with both New Zealand and Australia, may in fact obscure the importance of the region as a hub for drug activities, and could potentially blind the judgement of international actors to contemporary developments. Lastly, the small number of seizures that have taken place may be an indication of the inability of regional law enforcement agencies to intercept shipments, undertake operations or accurately record incidents, and not a lack of drug activity.

The methodological approach employed by the UNODC does not assist in accurately illustrating drug-related changes, as it utilises a combination of the perceptions of domestic drug experts, self-reporting by states themselves and statistical changes observed by drug treatment facilities.314 Equally concerning is the fact that the UNODC report *Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) and Other Drugs of Abuse in East Asia and the Pacific* (2005) only discusses the situation present in Australia, while the report published by the ANCD *Situational Analysis of the Illicit Drug Issues and Responses in the Asia-Pacific* (2006) provides an incredibly parsimonious and otiose assessment of the Pacific, and focuses attention upon the widely documented problems present throughout Asia. The methodology of the UNODC does not accurately account for the changing situation, as too few treatment centres exist, there is an inadequate ability to monitor developments that occur upon dispersed islands, and informal or ad-hoc reporting

measures both inside of, and between, different law enforcement agencies hinders an accurate examination. Importantly, some PIS have undertaken domestic research to estimate the extent of consumption and the associated issues such as crime. The National Substance Abuse Advisory Council in Fiji (NSAAC) represents just one example, though research such as this has either been overlooked, or is poorly publicised. In order for an accurate assessment of current and future drugs trends to occur, PIS require the capacity to undertake research, collate drug related statistics and publish their findings, and it is clear that organisations such as the UNODC need to refine their methodology in order to account for the difficulties of self-reporting that are commonly experienced by developing states.

Outdated attitudes towards the Pacific are also likely to have prevented an accurate assessment and its potential for occupying a central position within the global drug trade. In 2003, the UNODC asserted that: “Drug production in the Pacific is believed to be very limited, and none of the islands in the region are considered major global drug producers of any drug.” 315 This statement contradicts other UNODC statements that have characterised PNG as having the worst marijuana abuse problems in the world. Furthermore, the UNODC has also asserted that marijuana consumption increased globally during 2006, with the exception of the Pacific, where it believed that some decline had occurred. 316 Given the paucity of available information concerning PIS, the ability of the UNODC to discuss regional marijuana trends is questionable. Importantly, the UNDOC has noted that a large majority of methamphetamine produced in South East Asia was being trafficked to Australia and New Zealand. 317 It may be possible to suggest that drug trafficking has had both a strong presence and long history, and that law enforcement agencies and Pacific governments have only begun to recognise the negative impact of drugs upon their societies, and therefore state security, in the past decade.

New Zealand and Australia: Magnets for Regional Drug Activities

Both New Zealand and Australia are significant drug consuming markets, and the combination of high levels of disposable income and the potential for large profits ensure that both will remain prime targets for domestic and international criminal groups. Increasing seizure figures have been reported by police and customs agencies in both states, and these attest to the significance and importance of their domestic markets to foreign criminals. The perceived vulnerability and weakness of neighbouring PIS and their security arrangements will ensure their continued use as transhipment hubs to these consumer markets.

According to media releases from Customs New Zealand, the country was experiencing a three-pronged assault from drugs. It has become a target market for transnational drug trafficking syndicates supplying domestic demand, as well as a significant tranship point and destination for precursor chemicals used in domestic methamphetamine production for foreign markets.318 Furthermore, according to figures released by Customs Australia, cocaine seizures increased from 78kgs during the 2005-06 period to 610kgs during 2006-07, while seizures of MDMA also rose, increasing from 435kgs during 2005-06 to 812kgs during 2006-07.319 According to the INCB, New Zealand and PIS were being utilised by traffickers targeting Australia. For example, 37 South American drug couriers were arrested between March 1996 and June 1999 in Australia after arriving on Aerolineas Argentinas flights that transited New Zealand.320

Given the seizure figures presented below, Australia clearly has a significant problem concerning the consumption and production of methamphetamine and ATS. At this point in time, it must be noted that Australian criminal groups have had extensive involvement with trafficking activities throughout Asia and the Pacific since the early 1980s, and it is very likely that this situation will continue into the future.321

319 Australian Customs, "Drug Seizures up as illegal foreign fishing falls—Annual Report 2006-07", Customs Media Release, October 23, 2007
321 See for example: Australian Federal Police, “The AFP fight against illicit drug trade”, Fact Sheet, October 2004
### Examples of Recent Drug Seizures in New Zealand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Origin of Shipment/Details</th>
<th>Agencies Involved</th>
<th>Illicit Drug</th>
<th>Estimated Value (NZD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Tauranga</td>
<td>2 Shipping containers organised by a Hong Kong national</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>95Kgs of methamphetamine + Ephedrine with capacity to make 43Kgs of meth</td>
<td>$95 million + $43 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>Bolted to the side of the ships M V Tamper and M V Taronga</td>
<td>New Zealand and Australian Police and Customs</td>
<td>27Kgs of cocaine</td>
<td>$9.45 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Christchurch</td>
<td>Fijian stowaway aboard the ship Captaine Wallis</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,500 pseudoephedrine tablets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>Posted from China</td>
<td>Police and Customs</td>
<td>8,193Kgs of methamphetamine</td>
<td>$8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>Inside bicycles from China</td>
<td>Customs and Police</td>
<td>45Kgs of methamphetamine precursor chemicals</td>
<td>$13 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Container shipment from China</td>
<td>Police and Customs</td>
<td>32 litres of liquid methamphetamine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Drugs hidden inside roofing tiles imported from China</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>127Kgs contactNT pseudoephedrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Welcome Bay,</td>
<td>Plantation</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>990 marijuana plants</td>
<td>$1 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Examples of Recent Drug Seizures in Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Origin of Shipment/Details</th>
<th>Agencies Involved</th>
<th>Illicit Drug</th>
<th>Estimated Value (AUSD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Yacht transfer from the Bora Bora Ω to the Ngaire Wha</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td>502kgs of Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Dulverton Bay</td>
<td>Police operation</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>938kgs of Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Police operation</td>
<td>AFP, NSW police and NSW Crime Commission</td>
<td>235kgs of MDMA</td>
<td>$45 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside statues from Vietnam</td>
<td>AFP and Customs</td>
<td>400kgs of Ephedrine</td>
<td>$72 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside speedboat from Canada</td>
<td>AFP and Customs</td>
<td>46kgs Methamphetamine</td>
<td>$17.5 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Geelong, Australia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Victorian Police</td>
<td>340 Litres Liquid Ecstasy</td>
<td>$51 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Industrial Complex</td>
<td>South-East Asian Crime Squad, Police and AFP</td>
<td>1900 Litres Liquid Ecstasy</td>
<td>$540 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside hot water cylinders from Israel</td>
<td>Customs and AFP</td>
<td>113kgs of MDMA powder</td>
<td>$37 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside flowerpots from Mexico</td>
<td>AFP and Customs</td>
<td>30kgs of Cocaine</td>
<td>$35 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside Vietnamese drug mule</td>
<td>Customs and AFP</td>
<td>200Grams of Heroin</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside candles from Canada</td>
<td>Joint Asian Crime Group (JACG)</td>
<td>20kgs of Crystal Methamphetamine</td>
<td>$8 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sydney and Melbourne</td>
<td>International Criminal Syndicate</td>
<td>JACG, Canadian Agencies and US DEA</td>
<td>28.6kgs of crystal methamphetamine, 23kgs of ecstasy</td>
<td>$13.7 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside Coffee from Cambodia</td>
<td>Customs and AFP</td>
<td>105kgs of ephedrine</td>
<td>$35 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside green tea bags, shipping container</td>
<td>Multi-Agency, Joint Asian Crime Group (JACG)</td>
<td>250kgs of cocaine</td>
<td>$87.5 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Inside imported wooden furniture</td>
<td>AFP, Customs and state Police</td>
<td>28kgs of heroin</td>
<td>$8.4 Million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pacific Territories of the United States

Information concerning the cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of drugs within US Pacific territories is more obtainable and complete than for other states in the region, and as such, consultation of these resources assists in illustrating contemporary developments that have the potential to affect the entire region; if they have not already.322 The negative consequences commonly associated with drugs, such as increasing levels of crime and violence, are visible in these territories. As the National Drug Intelligence Centre (NDIC) summarises: “The Abuse and availability of crystal methamphetamine is likely to continue to increase on Guam, leading to more violent crime. A similar pattern of abuse and violence is now occurring in Hawaii and American Samoa.”323 This situation has the potential to affect neighbouring states and reinforces the fact that PIS are both vulnerable to drugs and represent both potential and viable drug consuming markets. Furthermore, as US territories, these states are not fully sovereign, and as such, their drug policies and legislation are modelled upon those present in the mainland, despite being under the control of their own state legislatures. This is important because these territories would need to convince mainland authorities of the importance of drug related developments, as they could not effectively securitise the presence of drugs without the their assistance. It is also likely that mainland authorities are likely to prioritise the presence of drugs within their external territories according to their own strategic. This is demonstrated by the level of concern over the availability of drugs within Guam, which houses a significant US military facility and personnel, and may account for why authorities in American Samoa, where there are no strategic assets, feel ignored by US anti-drug agencies. Once drugs are trafficked to a US territory it is possible that they could avoid further domestic security arrangements—this situation has been observed in Caribbean—and this would provide incentives for directing drugs shipments to these territories. Unfortunately, the entrenchment of drugs among any of these states is likely to have a detrimental impact upon the security of the Pacific and other neighbouring PIS.

American Samoa

American Samoa is affected by the presence of both marijuana and high quality methamphetamine. According to Customs Officials, over 91.91kgs of

322 Both the US National Drug Intelligence Centre (NDIC) and the territorial governments concerned recognise, the information and statistics available for analysis are deficient in many aspects.
methamphetamine and 4545.45kgs of marijuana were confiscated during fiscal year 2000.\textsuperscript{324} The sheer volume of drugs confiscated demonstrates the seriousness of the situation, and assists in accounting for the passing of strict laws that impose mandatory minimum prison sentences for the possession of even small amounts of drugs. The NDIC has also noted that drug-related statistics were not centralised, that there were no drug testing facilities.\textsuperscript{325} Lastly, it was also asserted that Western Samoa was primarily responsible for the presence of marijuana in American Samoa, and that domestic laboratories for the production of methamphetamine had been established in response to the successful interruption of trafficking operations.\textsuperscript{326} The establishment of local production facilities serves as a warning to other PIS that domestic production will develop to cater to consumption demands.

Guam

Guam is seriously affected by the consumption of high quality methamphetamine, and there is continued demand for marijuana. According to the NDIC, no evidence exists concerning the presence of local methamphetamine production, it is believed that the majority of it is trafficked from the Philippines and other Asian states such as Hong Kong, China and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{327} As a consequence of these high levels of drug consumption, police in Guam have recorded increases in the amount of violence and crime. For example, methamphetamine-related arrests rose from 47 during 1994 to 333 in 1999, and armed robberies rose from 32 during 1990 to 105 in 1998.\textsuperscript{328} Interestingly, besides the involvement of Asian criminal groups, Mexican groups based in both Mexico and California were also cited as a growing concern as a consequence of their involvement in trafficking activities. The NDIC recorded significant price increases for marijuana during the 1990s; they estimated that the price for one pound increased from around USD$2,500 to between $5,000 and $8,000.\textsuperscript{329} This situation proves that the population has an ability to pay for drugs, even when significant price increases occur, and Palau was also cited as the primary source of marijuana supplied to Guam.

\textsuperscript{325} NDIC, 2001, p.iii
\textsuperscript{326} NDIC, 2001, p.3-4
\textsuperscript{327} NDIC, 2003
\textsuperscript{328} NDIC, 2003, p.3
\textsuperscript{329} NDIC, 2003, p.6
Hawaii

The cultivation, production and trafficking of high quality methamphetamine and marijuana present a serious threat to the security and stability of Hawaii, and the availability of heroin and cocaine also represent core concerns for local authorities. The involvement of multiple domestic and internationally connected criminal groups that traffic drugs to, from, and through Hawaii present a dynamic challenge for law enforcement agencies, and the development and implementation of interdiction strategies. Groups that are involved include indigenous Hawaiians, local street gangs, motorcycle gangs, and organised Mexican and Asian criminal groups. According to the NDIC, there were around 140 gangs with an estimated 1,500 members present in Hawaii, and concerns were also expressed regarding the relocation of Hispanic gang members from California to Hawaii.\textsuperscript{330} In regard to the economic cost for Hawaii, an estimated USD$430 million (8.6 percent) from its 1998 annual budget was spent on a range of substance abuse programmes, while an estimated 8,011 people were treated by publicly funded facilities for methamphetamine-related addictions between 1994 and 2000.\textsuperscript{331} This demonstrates the economic costs associated with drug addiction, without taking into account the loss of revenue incurred through increased law enforcement spending or the loss of tourist income through the presence or perceptions of violence and threats to personal safety.

Pacific Regional Actors and the Securitisation of Drugs

The Domestic Concerns of New Zealand and its Influence Upon Regional Drug Strategies

Security assessments concerning the Pacific have traditionally approached the subject from an integrated and holistic position. The South Pacific Policy Review Group in \textit{Towards A Pacific Islands Community} (1990) observed that regional security required a comprehensive approach that included economic, societal, environmental and military issues, and as such, it asserted that: “…\textit{Pacific Island Governments do not view security primarily in military terms}.”\textsuperscript{332} Of specific importance to this thesis is their observation that drugs were a potential security issue for the region as there was widespread marijuana cultivation and increasing

\textsuperscript{330} United States Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Centre, \textit{Hawaii Drug Threat Assessment}, May 2002, p.2
\textsuperscript{331} NDIC, 2002, p.3-4
instances of trafficking. However, the report concluded that drugs were not a major concern at that point in time, as they were being trafficked from Asian countries to more developed ones, and therefore did not represent an immediate security issue. The report asserted that:

*The countries of the region can fairly argue that as illicit drugs are an international problem – and island countries themselves do not have a serious domestic problem of consumption – the resources to combat the problem should come from multilateral sources. It would be inappropriate, in the view of the Review Group, to expect Pacific Island countries to divert presently available resources (such as New Zealand ODA) from economic development in order to control the flow of drugs from Asian countries to the larger developed countries.*

This assessment has changed considerably. There are now serious concerns surrounding the expansion of drugs and the threat they pose to state security, and it is unfortunate that the review did not consider the development of domestic drug consumption as a by-product of trafficking activities at the time. Moreover, as a consequence of the heightened threat presented by drugs and TNC, PIS have been forced to devote and reposition an increasing amount of financial resources to combating their presence, and both New Zealand and Australia continue their extensive investment in these measures.

Despite these changing circumstances and the presence of significant problems related to drug consumption throughout New Zealand, until recently the National party had not sought to use drugs as a political campaign platform against the governing Labour party. Equally, drugs had failed to attract serious political attention during the intervening periods between national elections, with the exception of the legal status of “party pills” and a moderate level of debate concerning the dangers associated methamphetamine. The magnitude of domestic drug consumption is illustrated by Annette King, the Minister for Justice, who reported the estimated value of methamphetamine sales were worth between NZD$750 million to NZD$1.5 billion, while according to Jim Anderton, the Associate Health Minister, the negative social costs associated with drug use were estimated at NZD$1.31 billion. While the social and crime issues related to methamphetamine use have received media attention, according to Ross Bell, Executive Director of the New Zealand Drug Foundation, other drugs such as

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335 Mike Houlanan, “War against billion-dollar P trade being lost-King”, *The New Zealand Herald*, May 1, 2008; *The New Zealand Herald*, “Social costs from illicit drugs use $1.3b in 2006”, May 1, 2008; Newton, 2007; For an overview of the impact of methamphetamine and ATS please refer to Dr Chris Wilkins et al, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Amphetamine Type Stimulants in New Zealand: Final Report”, *Centre for Social and Health Research and Evaluations Massey University*, September 2004
marijuana have received little political attention because they represent an area where public opinion is divided regarding its legal status, and therefore represent an issue where little political advantage can be gained by politicising the issue.\textsuperscript{336} Additionally, while political support for the decriminalisation of marijuana has previously existed, it is likely that the police have shifted their focus away from targeting individual consumers in an effort to focus upon the organised criminal groups that are involved with its cultivation, and the production of methamphetamine.

This situation has recently transformed, and as John Key, leader of the National Party, has asserted: \textit{“Today I’m sending a warning to every single P dealer [methamphetamine], every P manufacturer and every gang involved in the P trade: National will not put up with your criminal activity.”}\textsuperscript{337} This represents a clear indication that National will attempt to securitise the dual threat posed by methamphetamine and the involvement of gangs and organised criminal groups, and their intention to use this as a primary platform within a broader law and order policy package for their election campaign. This decision comes after King unveiled a new government strategy to target organised crime as a consequence of previous admissions that law enforcement agencies were struggling to combat these interrelated criminal issues.\textsuperscript{338} This situation demonstrates that in order for drugs to become a political issue, political parties need to perceive a level of strategic value to justify becoming involved. This also demonstrates that some drugs present a more accessible campaign platform, and are likely to engender greater levels of public support for assertive law enforcement action than others.

Drugs are beginning to emerge as an important election issue and their potential threats to domestic security are clearly recognised. However, this domestic concern and already instituted strategies have not linked the increasing entrenchment of drugs and drug-related activities throughout PIS with their availability throughout New Zealand, and to date, the government has not presented this scenario as a fundamental security threat for the country. Some policy documents have acknowledged their increasing importance, for example the


\textsuperscript{337} The New Zealand Herald, “Key promises crackdown on the drug trade and gangs”, May 12, 2008

\textsuperscript{338} Houlanah, 2008
New Zealand External Assessments Bureau analysed the contemporary security environment in Strategic Assessment 2000, and asserted that: “The Pacific Islands are particularly vulnerable to being exploited for these [drugs, people smuggling and money laundering] purposes. Controlling such trades requires a collective international response.” Moreover: “Despite a major US focus on drugs, they are still a problem in the region [Latin America]. There are risks that the Pacific could become a regular transit point or soft target for drug barons.” The assessment asserted that an increased international response was required to meet these challenges, though the need for a more assertive regional response by the New Zealand government itself was not proposed. This assessment is comparable to the recent National Drug Policy 2007-2012 (2007), which acknowledges the need to control the country’s borders more effectively and the intent to continue with joint international law enforcement operations. However, it did not explicitly state whether the region would become a primary focus for its strategies. Moreover, the primary objectives of the Ministry of Justice that were outlined within its Organised Crime Strategy (2008) focused upon strengthening the response and cooperation of domestic agencies and internal security arrangements, and little attention was focused upon wider engagement with the region within its future initiatives. The development of a fortress approach for creating a barrier to the availability of drugs combined with the enhancing of domestic strategies for combating organised crime are commendable, however, the increasing involvement of PIS will fundamentally undermine these strategies and will place increasing financial and technical burdens upon them.

It appears that only the New Zealand Customs Service and Police have explicitly asserted that greater regional engagement represents a fundamental priority. Customs has continuously outlined its objectives of enhancing the capacity of PIS customs agencies and strengthening their border controls, while it has also focused upon the implementation of regional multilateral strategies and intelligence

339 The New Zealand External Assessments Bureau, Strategic Assessment 2000, 24 March 2000, p.4 & p.9. Brackets inserted by this author. Reports by the EAB are not normally made public, and as such, sensitive information contained within the report will have been removed. Furthermore, the role of the EAB is to inform Defence Policy however, no conclusion or recommendations were made in the report.
340 The New Zealand External Assessments Bureau, 2000, p.34. Brackets inserted by this author.
sharing activities. The Police have established the International Service Group to manage foreign operations, and have officers deployed throughout the region to enhance the capacity of PIS law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, they are actively involved in collaborative anti-drug investigations throughout the region, such as Operation Outrigger. Assistance has also been provided by New Zealand for the establishment of regional agencies such as Oceania Customs Organisation. Unfortunately, it appears that a specific and robust strategy of regional engagement has not been widely instituted, and the consultation of policy documents indicates that while regional security features highly among government discussions, this concern has not been equally translated into concerted action and concrete policies. It is possible that while the New Zealand government clearly recognises the primacy of drugs and new security threats throughout the Pacific, and even though agencies such as Police and Customs have significantly incorporated this discourse into their regional strategies, the historical view that the country is largely protected by physical isolation and a benign strategic environment could remain strong within contemporary policy and decisions.

The Domestic Concerns of Australia and its Influence Upon Regional Drug Strategies

The approach of the Australian government (GOA) and its explicitly stated strategy of greater regional engagement to combat the presence of drugs contrasts starkly with those devised by New Zealand. The GOA is extremely concerned about the domestic availability of drugs, and its apprehension has deepened as the number of exceptionally large shipments and the frequency with which they have been seized increases. Policy documents such as The National Illicit Drug Strategy 1997-2001 clearly outline the objectives of the GOA, and forthrightly assert that: “Australia must take the fight to the source of criminality, not wait passively as easy victims”, moreover: “Australia cannot regard itself as a fortress standing alone against transnational crime. It is important that Australia has a presence in the region in order to share essential intelligence on organised crime.” The objectives of the GOA can be explained by the development of two interrelated

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345 For discussion focusing upon the history of drug legislation in Australia prior to the 1990s please refer to: Desmond Manderson, From Mr. Sin to Mr. Big (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1993)
scenarios; the increasing availability of drugs within PIS and their further entrenchment throughout the region and the negative impact that this will have upon the domestic availability of drugs in Australia. Moreover, domestic anti-drug strategies have become increasingly incorporated into other Australian security paradigms, such as the ‘Arc of Instability’ and the desire for a more proactive role throughout the region.347

As a consequence, the GOA has been instrumental in establishing regional anti-drug measures and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have adopted a highly visible and vigorous regional policing role. The AFP have assisted with the development and establishment of the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC), and the GOA continues to provide significant financial, technical and human resources to strengthen regional law enforcement agencies. Additionally, other programmes such as the Pacific Patrol Boat Programme have been extended, and are projected to continue until 2025. This provides PIS with the direct ability to monitor and control their borders while the establishment of maritime surveillance centres enhances their intelligence capabilities.348 Other GOA measures have included enhancing the domestic legal environment and the rule of law in PIS through the Law Enforcement Cooperation Programme. Furthermore, mobile drug strike teams and liaison offices for gathering regional intelligence and organizing operations have been established, and forensic facilities have been instituted to determine the geographical origins of heroin seizures and assist with AFP operations.349 This demonstrates the strong commitment of the GOA towards enhancing its security against the threats posed by drugs, and it can be confidently asserted that the regionally focused strategies of the GOA have become increasingly inseparable from domestic security arrangements.

The reason for such a strong level of commitment derives from a combination of the highly emotive and politicised domestic drug debates and the merging of these with both traditional and new Australian security concerns. For example, during John Howard’s leadership of the Liberal Party, drugs were unquestionably securitised, and as a consequence they were presented as a direct threat to Australian domestic security. This situation resulted in a number of wide-ranging initiatives that included the institution of a “zero tolerance policy to drugs”, nationwide anti-drug campaigns and the provision of significant financial resources for rehabilitation services, law enforcement agencies and anti-drugs strategies.\textsuperscript{350} Additionally, the ANCD was established to coordinate a centralised government strategy, while during the last year of the Howard government AUSD$150 million was allocated for specifically combating methamphetamine and to enhance the capabilities of both the AFP and the Australian Customs Service.\textsuperscript{351} As a further example of the predominant political attitude towards drug-related issues, during 2002 a drug injecting room was established for addicts in Sydney, which subsequently resulted in domestic political furore.\textsuperscript{352} This example accurately illustrates the overwhelming level of politicisation that drug-related issues receive in Australia, and the occurrence of such political conflict highlights the lack of bipartisan support that exists among the major political parties for alternative drug initiatives, and drugs in general.

The domestic approach of the GOA to drugs has clearly merged with important developments within international security paradigms, such as the post-September 11 security discourse, the War on Terror and the deliberate targeting of both Australian citizens and interests by terrorists as a consequence of its support for US foreign policies. The subsequent actions of the Howard government against drugs and the perceived security threats present throughout the Pacific have been overwhelmingly influenced by the interaction of these two discourses, and they have crystallised into policies that provided greater legitimacy for regional
intervention and a larger regional security role. The institution of Greg Urwin as the Secretary General of the Forum should be viewed as a further example of GOA objectives that are concerned with enhancing its influence throughout the Pacific.

The Concerns of the Pacific Islands Forum

The extent of the Forum’s concern is demonstrated by the sustained acknowledgement of drugs and TNC throughout the Honiara (1992), Aitutaki (1997), Biketawa (2000) and Nasonini (2002) Declarations and within official media statements. The recent report by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat *Transnational Crime Strategic Assessment 2006* (TCSA) further illustrates the depth of its concern. The TCSA asserted that: “Evidence assembled by law enforcement agencies indicate that TNC groups view the FICs [Forum Islands Countries] as desirable locations because of perceived weakness in border management systems, border and domestic legislation and weak in-country governance infrastructure.”

Furthermore: “The transhipment of drugs such as cocaine, heroin and ATS, through Pacific Island countries to Australia, New Zealand and North America has been identified as a significant criminal threat within the Pacific region.” Importantly, the TCSA recognised that the involvement of criminals with drugs has merged with other legal and illegal business enterprises, and that future consequences would include undermining domestic governance through crime, corruption and economic instability. Additional issues included the potential for increasing cooperation between local and foreign criminals, and the possibility that private security agencies could become involved with criminal enterprises.

The TCSA clearly demonstrates that the Forum is conscious of the security threats presented by drugs and the associated TNC, and that it is receptive towards the dynamic characteristics of these threats. This is important, as understanding this diversity assists in the development of comprehensive regional strategies for combating their presence. Furthermore, as a regional organisation, it is highly likely that both Australia and New Zealand have exerted significant influence upon the Forum and PIS to recognise the threat that drugs increasingly pose to state security. However, given that PIS tend to view security as multidimensional, with a strong focus upon economic development, it is also quite possible that PIS are extremely concerned about, and are highly receptive to, the threats posed by drugs themselves, though because of financial, technical and human resource

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353 TCSA, 2006
constraints, they have been unable to act. Lastly, official post-conference communiqués explicitly illustrate the concerns of the Forum, and these have been consistently repeated since 2000, as an example:

The 2000 Forum Communiqué states: *The Forum expressed its concern over the increase in drug trafficking and in local production of illicit drugs in the region and called on the international community to cooperate with the region, particularly with regional law enforcement agencies and the Secretariat to combat the movement of drugs into the region.*  

Transnational Crime Facilitating Characteristics According to the Forum

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<th>1. Official Corruption</th>
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<td>2. Incomplete or weak legislation</td>
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<td>4. Non-transparent financial institutions</td>
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<td>6. Lack of respect for the rule of law in society</td>
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<td>7. Poorly guarded national boundaries</td>
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<td>8. Lack of political will to establish the rule of law</td>
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<td>9. Geographic location (e.g. along arms or illicit drug trafficking routes)</td>
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<td>10. Regional geopolitical issues (e.g. long-standing territorial disputes)</td>
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Southeast Asian Regional Security Complex According to Buzan and Waever

This depiction of the RSC that is in operation throughout the Pacific and Asia is correct in the fact that Australia is highly concerned about neighbouring Indonesia.

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and PNG. However, it does not accurately illustrate the regional drugs concerns of Australia, New Zealand and the Forum. The boundaries of the complex include PNG and the Solomon Islands and extended to the right to include all PIS (Figure 1). Furthermore, in many respects, the drug concerns of the US are beginning to extend into the region as well, beyond its own territories (Figure 2).

The Presence of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The availability of SALW is an issue of significant importance for the region as they present a tangible and highly visible threat to PIS security and stability. At this point in time, the majority of weapons available in the Pacific are located throughout Melanesia, and these have been sourced from domestic stockpiles through a combination of corruption, armoury leakage and theft. Moreover, large-scale illicit arms shipments have been discovered either in or while on transit to both Fiji and New Caledonia, and the occurrence of such activities serves as a disturbing precedent for the future. As a consequence, extensive resources have been devoted to researching their impact and how they are acquired, as well as to projects that are focused upon reducing their availability through initiatives such as improved armoury security and weapons amnesties. Unfortunately, the relationship between drugs and SALW acquisition has not received a similar level of attention, despite the known and extensive use of drugs as a financial resource within conflicts throughout South East Asia. With regard to the Pacific, the UNODC has asserted that: “Locally it is known that firearms are traded for cannabis fuelling domestic drug problems as well as international concern.” Woodman and Bergin reinforce this assertion, with the observe that: “While there is insufficient wealth to make the South Pacific an attractive market for drugs or illegal firearms, a relatively small amount of money or quantity of weapons can have a disproportionate effect.” This relationship requires further investigation, as interrelated issues that include burgeoning TNC, the presence of local and foreign criminals and weak law enforcement capacity characterise parts of the region. Of further concern is the fact

that both non-state actors and criminal groups could potentially achieve a level of coercive capacity that many PIS do not currently possess.

According to research conducted by Capie, the extremes of gun-related violence and weapons trafficking experienced by PIS are not comparable to those experienced by other regions.\textsuperscript{359} Though, it must also be acknowledged that for many PIS, the presence of even a few weapons can cause significant instability, as demonstrated by the Speight Coup in Fiji during 2000. Capie has also asserted that: “\textit{...while legislation in the region is not flawless, even ‘perfect’ laws would not address all the challenges presented by firearms in the Pacific. While law reform is an important and worthwhile objective, major questions remain about the ability of some Pacific states to enforce the laws that are already on their books.}”\textsuperscript{360} This is observation is significant, given the fact that PIS are already challenged by the problems associated with the availability of SALW, then the presence of a situation where drugs are used as a financial resource for their acquisition could easily overwhelm their law enforcement capacity. Furthermore, if current anti-gun legislation is unsuccessful in assisting PIS to enhance their internal sovereignty, then future anti-drug legislation is likely to be equally ineffective, and any attempts to intervene in the connection between the two issues could be futile. If local gangs and criminal groups were able to acquire SALW then the internal sovereignty of PIS could be called into question, and the ability of them to intervene into other illegal activities would be equally severely restricted. There is also a strong possibility that conflicts will spread to neighbouring states, or that the presence of conflict will encourage the recycling of SALW between PIS. Examples of this situation are readily available, and include the trafficking of SALW between PNG, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.

A strong consensus exists within the Pacific SALW literature regarding the impact that the injection of modern weapons has had upon the dynamics of traditional conflict, violence and crime, and the inability of these states to maintain their internal sovereignty.\textsuperscript{361} This consensus is also apparent regarding the low purchasing power of individuals and groups that are intent on acquiring weapons.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Capie, 2003, p.10-14
\item Capie, 2003, p.117
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According to Alpers and Twyford: “none of these recent conflicts appear to have generated sufficient demand to prompt an influx of arms from countries outside the region, or even from other Pacific states. In addition, few combatants have the financial resources to procure a shipment of any size.”\textsuperscript{362} As Capie observes, there is currently little demand and a low financial capacity to afford SALW, though in his opinion, this current situation should not be taken for granted.\textsuperscript{363} This thesis challenges these assertions, and suggests that within the Pacific there is, and will continue to be, sufficient means for acquiring SALW. Given that drugs are utilised for SALW acquisition in the Caribbean and throughout other areas experiencing armed conflict, combined with the fact that marijuana is believed to be ubiquitously present throughout many PIS, then the potential for it to be used as a financial resource or as a tradable commodity represents a credible contemporary and future scenario.

Example of a Recent Weapon Seizure

“The Northern Marianas reported a seizure of 2,300 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and 3000 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition with tracer tips as well as one Glock 19 pistol, one unassembled AR-15 .223 calibre and one other assault weapon with eight 30 round magazines.”

The man had just completed his military service and had stored the weapons in his check-in baggage. He travelled from the US via Japan to the Northern Marianas. This demonstrates how easy it is for SALW to be brought into the region.


Gangs and Criminal Deportees

The increasing appearance of gangs, the deportation of criminals and the spread of US gang culture throughout the Pacific has received increasing attention.\textsuperscript{364} According to Willie Maea, Counties Manukau Police Pacific Coordinator in New Zealand, Pacific island families are sending their young relatives who have been involved in crime back to their home islands to remove them from this negative environment. This situation may assist in exporting individuals and their criminal connections back to places that are unable to manage, or unaware of, the prior activities of these individuals.\textsuperscript{365} There is a strong potential for the development of transnational criminal links between gangs members present in neighbouring PIS, and the use of such connections for drug or other criminal purposes has

\textsuperscript{362} Alpers and Twyford, 2003, p.26
\textsuperscript{363} Capie, 2003, p.12
\textsuperscript{364} A forthcoming report into gangs and repatriated Pacific citizens authored by Matt Leslie, the current Regional Security Advisor for the Pacific Islands Forum, will be published during mid 2008.
\textsuperscript{365} Michael Field, “Urban gangs wreak havoc in islands”, \textit{The Press}, January 27, 2007; Richard Wolfgramm, “Church leaders silent on Tongan gang violence”, Ano Masima News, July 29, 2005; Evan Schwarten, “Police concerned by ‘gang’ rise”, \textit{The Daily Telegraph}, September 12, 2006;
already occurred throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America. Furthermore, according to the TCSA forms of organisation that once demarcated criminal groups, such as affiliation through ethnicity, are decreasing, and groups or organisations that were previously hostile to one another have shown signs of increasing collaboration, this scenario has already occurred within New Zealand as a consequence of the profits associated with the production and sale of methamphetamine. The penetration of the Pacific by Asian, and especially Chinese organised crime, was viewed as the most pressing future security threat by the TCSA.

Involvement of Pacific States in United Nations Anti-Drug Conventions

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+ Indicates Convention Signed; - Indicates that the Convention has not been signed. This table does not indicate whether these measures have been implemented. Source: [http://www.unodc.org/](http://www.unodc.org/)

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Case Study Three
Papua New Guinea

Introduction

The state exists within a complex post-colonial environment within Papua New Guinea. The sovereignty and authority of the government of Papua New Guinea (GOPNG) is accepted, contested and suborned at multiple levels of society, and the apparatus of Western models of political governance and economic development have been grafted upon traditional Melanesian cultural practices. As a consequence, PNG citizens exist between two parallel social organising systems, each entailing their own specific codes of conduct, behaviour and regulation.367 The presence of political instability, official corruption and a poorly functioning bureaucracy both result from, and add to, this domestic environment. According to Richard Sikani, a former member of the PNG National Intelligence Organisation and the current Commissioner for Correctional Services, the domestic situation is one where: “The occurrence of serious crimes, in both the urban and rural communities, is considered as the biggest threat to national security, as well as social, political, and economic development…”368 As this case study will demonstrate, the coercive capacity of the GOPNG has been significantly undermined and is open to armed challengers, while its ability to confront criminals, those involved with the cultivation of marijuana and other drug activities is limited. Understanding how the ubiquitous presence of marijuana has merged with this particular domestic environment, and the negative influence of it upon political, military, social and economic spheres is fundamental for conducting an assessment of the current and future security of PNG.

368 Sikani, 2000, p.37
Overview of Illicit Drugs in Papua New Guinea

The cultivation of marijuana throughout PNG presents the most pressing drug concern at this point in time. However, constructing a picture of the contemporary drug situation throughout the country is an arduous task that is complicated by a combination of poor statistics, poorly resourced law enforcement agencies, inadequate research and conflicting opinions. According to statistics released by the Magisterial Services, 488 criminal cases relating to drugs had gone before the courts between January and September 2006. Furthermore, attempts at importing large volumes of precursor chemicals have previously occurred; for example, there was an attempt at importing 8000kgs of ephedrine and 4000kgs of pseudoephedrine that are used in the production of ATS and methamphetamine during 2000. Concerns over the increasing availability and consumption of methamphetamine have been expressed in local newspapers, and the UNODC has also cited evidence of Filipino and Asian criminal involvement. According to Police Minister Mathias Karani, there is evidence to suggest that harder drugs such as heroin, cocaine and ATS are being trafficked to PNG. If these reports are accurate, then the country will have to deal with potentially significant challenges such as those posed by both the establishment of local ATS production facilities

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369 Alex Rheeney, “A Grass Not Greener: PNG’s Lack of a Drug Policy is Hurting Youth”, Pacific Magazine, September 1, 2006
370 INCB, 2000, p.67
and the use of the country for the trafficking of harder drugs to neighbouring states. This situation could be potentially disastrous, as the GOPNG currently cannot cope with the presence of marijuana consumption, cultivation and the associated consequences such as drugs-related crime.

Significant attention has been focused upon the occurrence of an interstate trade in drugs for guns between PNG and Australia via the Torres Strait. However, in the opinion of the AFP, this situation can be characterised as disorganised-organised crime, as issues that include poor transportation infrastructure between the major cultivation and shipping areas prevents the expansion of the trade and the serious involvement of Australian criminal groups. The Torres Strait should not be considered as the only point for trafficking activities simply because it represents the closest point between the two states. It is likely that illicit activities have shifted to areas that are less patrolled, which creates new challenges for law enforcement agencies attempting to monitor the borders. Moreover, the ever present expression of concern over the trading of drugs for guns should not be the sole focus of investigations, as Australia currency would be equally sough after and more difficult for authorities to trace than the origin of the weapons that have been discovered to date.

The issue of marijuana trafficking from PNG to other states has also been the subject of conflicting opinions and evidence. According to Nerys Evans, Intelligence Coordinator for the State Crime Command Drug Squad of the New South Wales Police, the economic incentives for trafficking from PNG to Australia are not conducive for the continuation of any trade that may have existed, as locally grown, high-quality cannabis is already available for consumption. Similarly, Inguba suggests that the majority of marijuana grown in PNG is for domestic consumption with little coordinated organisation. The 2006 INCB Report reached a similar conclusion, asserting that Australia had become self-sufficient in the cultivation of cannabis for domestic consumption. However, the 2005 INCB Report observed that: “Cannabis originating in Papua New Guinea has been seized in Australia and

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373 Michael Ware, “Savage Harvest”, Time South Pacific, Issue 14, April 9, 2001
376 INCB, 2006, p.82
New Zealand.” Additionally, the 2000 INCB Report has previously asserted that: “The price of the drug [marijuana] in Australia, the key consumer market for cannabis cultivated in Papua New Guinea, decreased in 1999.” The DEA has also noted that the marijuana cultivated in PNG has been discovered in both Europe and the US, though in its assessment, no significant criminal group is involved with its trafficking. This situation clearly demonstrates that both international and regional agencies are unsure of the domestic importance of marijuana, and that they are also unable to account for the role of the country in supplying neighbouring states or the involvement of criminal groups. It is likely that the trafficking of marijuana has been subjected to significant changes over time, and domestic developments such as fluctuating political stability or the presence of armed conflict may have influenced the level of cultivation.

Coordination and cooperation between different domestic law enforcement agencies is critically important for implementing successful anti-drug measures and for overcoming the asymmetrical difficulties associated with gathering criminal intelligence. Unfortunately the INCB noted during a visited during 2003, that its recommendations delivered to the government in 1995 had still not been implemented. The INCB originally observed that there was a need to revise the drug control legislation and that both the National Narcotics Control Board and National Narcotics Bureau were not functioning, while interagency relationships did not appear to exist. Moreover, at this point in time, no national anti-drug strategy exists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation name/Details</th>
<th>Agencies Involved</th>
<th>Illicit Drug</th>
<th>Estimated Value (K)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Shipment from Pakistan</td>
<td>PNG Customs</td>
<td>15,000kgs Hashish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Attempted importation from India</td>
<td>INCB warning to PNG government</td>
<td>8000kgs Ephedrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Attempted importation from India</td>
<td>INCB warning to PNG government</td>
<td>4000kgs Pseudoephedrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Lae</td>
<td>Hidden inside sacks of potatoes</td>
<td>Port security guards</td>
<td>82Kgs of Marijuana</td>
<td>$1 Million Kina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

377 INCB, 2005, p.89
378 INCB, 2000, p.68
380 INCB, 2003, p.81
Political Security Concerns

The internal and external sovereignty of the GOPNG is not universally present throughout the country, and as such it is accepted, rejected and incorporated into the lives of PNG citizens and within traditional political competitions. As Ketan observes: “National politics, for instance, is characterised by parochial struggles, nepotism, and clientelism, while at the same time being concerned—at least in name and law—with the governance of the country as a whole. These are manifestations of a wider process of competing legitimacies, particularly when one set of moral values is superimposed upon another.”

Furthermore, the enforcement of national legislation is primarily limited to major urban areas. As a consequence, PNG is trapped in a cycle of instability that derives, in part, from a combination of culturally sanctioned behaviour and the importation of foreign governance norms. The GOPNG is clearly not in a position to assert its sovereignty within domestic affairs, and this situation allows both villages and clans to maintain both political and economic autonomy. It is likely that the cultivation of marijuana is involved, to some extent, in facilitating this independence, while the appearance of drug-related crime and the potential for other developments, such as increased incidents of trafficking, are likely to impact upon the stability of the political system in the future.

A combination of official and bureaucratic corruption facilitates a hospitable environment for drugs, and this ensures that the GOPNG is unable to intervene to combat the sources of its weakness, as it cannot effectively employ its resources or direct its law enforcement agencies. According to the 2007 Corruption Perception Index employed by AI, corruption is rampant throughout PNG, and the state ranks at 162nd place out of a total of 179 states. Incidents have regularly occurred that illustrate the divergence between cultural identity and national duty, and as Ketan illustrates, members of parliament are viewed as patrons, and their role is to distribute state resources back to their political base as a precondition of their election.

382 Ketan, 2004, p.20
383 Weiner, McLeod and Yala, 2002, p.9
384 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 (Accessed online 07/02/08)
385 Ketan, 2004, p.20 & p.240-241
country is an organised thing, even with some politicians—especially those from marijuana-growing areas."  Stealing from the state is therefore an accepted and expected duty of political representatives, and the presence of official corruption undermines the stability of the state and the capacity of the GOPNG to meet the challenges of providing domestic security and economic development.

The presence of bureaucratic corruption has resulted in the poor allocation and diversion of GOPNG limited financial resources, and as a consequence, essential government agencies that include the Royal Papua New Guinean Constabulary (RPNGC) are unable to function effectively. According to a recent report by the Auditor General, government employees stole an estimated USD$ 318.5 million from development funds every year, and insufficient legislation was available for the prosecution of these individuals. The presence of corruption among some of the political leadership of the country has clearly facilitated an environment that is conducive to the cultivation of marijuana. Furthermore, the institution of measures to combat the presence of drugs are unlikely to be successful, if they can be implemented at all, as strong incentives for their failure exist among those responsible for instituting and monitoring them. The GOPNG is already unable to intervene into controlling the presence of marijuana, and the appearance of additional issues such as drug trafficking and the occurrence of associated TNC will result in additional challenges that are potentially beyond its capabilities. There are few mechanisms for oversight, though this may be changing with the presence of Australian administrational assistance to the GOPNG.

The Royal Papua New Guinean Constabulary

The presence of corruption and increasing suspicions over the development of criminal links between senior officers and Asian criminal groups has received considerable recent attention. According to Barry Turner, Commander of the Australian Police detachment present in PNG, Asian organised crime represented a significant and growing threat throughout the country. This situation is not helped by the presence of negative public perceptions of the RPNGC as a consequence of

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386 Ware, 2001; Alpers, 2005, p.24 & p.34-35; Capie, 2003, p.92-93; Singirok, 2005, p.3
their excessive displays of force, combined with both increasing levels of crime and the implementation of ineffective policing strategies.\textsuperscript{390} Additionally, the police riot squads have a historical reputation for violence and human rights abuses due to their involvement within the conflicts in both the Central Highlands and while in Bougainville.\textsuperscript{391} A review commissioned during 2005 by Bire Kimisopa, former Minister for Internal Security, concluded that not only did the RPNGC lack leadership and resources; it also had systemic problems that threatened its viability.\textsuperscript{392} This combination of issues raises serious concerns regarding the effectiveness of the RPNGC in maintaining law and order, as well as the ability of the state to intervene into security issues with the potential for significant escalation. Furthermore, if relationships between members of the RPNGC and Asian criminals are developing, then the appearance of other drug activities may not only be beyond the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, but these relationships would undermine the effectiveness of any attempts at intervention. This situation also ensures that the GOPNG would be effectively unable to marshal its agencies in response to future developments associated with drugs and drug-related crime.

\textbf{Military Security Concerns}

\textbf{The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Marijuana and Insecurity}

At this point in time, the majority of SALW have been sourced from domestic stocks through theft and inappropriate sale, and additionally, there are a considerable number of homemade firearms in circulation. Instances of poor discipline and corruption among members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and the RPNGC combined with poor armoury administration and insecurity have also assisted with their availability.\textsuperscript{393} According to Strathern, intense local political competitions and a tripartite relationship between


\textsuperscript{392} Australian Federal Police, “22nd Australia and Papua New Guinea Business Forum”, May 16, 2006

\textsuperscript{393} Sikani, 2000, p.43; PNG Post-Courier, “Six PNG Soldiers Held in Gun Smuggling”, March 31, 2004; Capie, 2003, p.97-109
businessmen, raskol gangs and tribes have assisted with the accelerated introduction of SALW into local warfare. In order to demonstrate how the cultivation of marijuana represents a fundamental threat to the security and stability of the state, it is important to illustrate the impact of SALW in a society where conflict is viewed as an integral part of social relations.

As a consequence of the introduction of SALW, traditional conflict strategies have undergone significant transformation, which include the hiring of mercenaries and individual weapons, as well as the relocation of rural tribal conflicts into urban areas. Of significant concern is the observation that social norms and traditional rules are weakening as tactics transform away from those of display and intimidation towards an emphasis upon killing. Ketan provides a similar observation, and asserts that tactics such as raiding, ambush and indiscriminate killing, which had not previously been a feature of warfare in the Mount Hagen region, have become increasingly common. Major General (Rtd) Jerry Singirok reinforces this changing reality, and suggests that former soldiers have returned to their traditional communities equipped with their military training. This situation has coincided with the prevalence of SALW, resulting in the introduction of military-style tactics into traditional warfare. The GOPNG has increasingly become a bystander to tribal conflicts. The presence of SALW represents a clear threat to the security and stability, as these weapons ensure that domestic actors are able to employ a level of coercion similar to that of the state, while the ability of individuals and gangs to commit crime is directly enhanced. Moreover, in the future, conflicts may not be amendable to traditional forms of resolution and amelioration, and as a consequence, they could become more violent, widespread and ultimately, more destabilising than at present.

Political changes have also resulted from the introduction of SALW. They have been employed in an increasing number of instances to coerce and intimidate
voters and election candidates during national and local elections. The demand for SALW is unlikely to decrease, as the presence of conflict and the absence of credible deterrents to armed conflict, such as the internal weakness of the GOPNG, are likely to remain. SALW acquisition represents a logical and rational reaction by groups locked into competitive, localised conflicts. The presence of this situation also raises serious concerns regarding the legitimacy of the GOPNG. For example, in the event that candidate(s) or political party(s) are, or are perceived to have been, elected through coercive means, then this could encourage armed conflict in response to election results. The inability of the GOPNG to prevent armed domestic conflict ensures that its sovereignty is undermined, while the inability of law enforcement agencies to secure the borders of the country guarantees that there are no credible deterrents to prevent acquisition activities from foreign markets, with the exception of the need for the financial resources to do so.

The recycling of weapons between domestic conflicts present throughout PNG, West Papua, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands is well known, and represents a fundamental threat to regional security. Discussion concerning the trafficking of SALW appears to be widespread throughout PNG society. Anecdotally, students that attended a public lecture in West New Britain expressed concern that SALW were being trafficked to the island so that they could be used in the event that conflict erupted between new settlers and traditional landowners. The INCB has also noted the occurrence of a coastal trade, and observed that: “There have been reports of barter trade involving the exchange of illicit drugs for arms in the coastal cities of Lae, Madang, Wewak and Port Moresby…” Both logging and fishing vessels are frequently cited as the primary method in which these weapons are transported, and the weak capabilities of the Papua New Guinea Customs Service (PNGCS) and other customs agencies in the region ensures that there are few barriers to prevent trafficking. As a large island positioned between Asia and the Pacific, PNG is ideally located close to both areas already experiencing armed conflict and established trafficking routes. Lastly, as efforts are increased to secure domestic sources of SALW—such as PNGDF and RPNGC armouries—foreign illicit markets may become the focus of demand and acquisition activities.

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400 Singirok p.2; Capie, 2003, p.94-95;
401 Singirok, 2005, p.8; Capie, 2003, p.81-83; Alpers and Twyford, 2003, p.26-27. Please refer to appendix 2.3 and 2.4
403 INCB, 2006, p.84
The Availability of Small Arms and Weapons in Papua New Guinea According to Contemporary Research

Alpers observes that: In the volatile Southern Highlands Province (SHP) of Papua New Guinea (PNG) approximately 2,450 factory-made firearms are held by private owners. These include between 500 and 1,040 high-powered weapons, most of which are assault rifles. Very few of the guns in SHP were smuggled from foreign countries. Instead, police and soldiers within PNG supplied the most destructive firearms used in crime and conflict.

Furthermore: An August 2004 audit of remaining PNGDF small arms showed that 16 per cent, or 1,501, ‘unaccounted for’. This was five times higher than any previous estimate of military losses, and included 907 assault rifles and 102 machine guns.


According to Capie, weapons that feature within tribal conflicts include: M60 machine guns, M16, SLR and AR15 rifles, M203 grenade launchers, World War II rifles, and pump-action and single-shot shotguns...


LeBrun and Muggah assert that: In a Wogia village, a similar exercise identified tribal fighters, defence and army personnel, politicians and criminals as the most-armed individuals, and M16s, SLRs, AR15s, AK-47s, and pump-action shotguns and the most common weapons.

Moreover: Exercises conducted in Pokapa indicated that that ex-combatants had access to the following small arms and light weapons: home-made guns, M16s, SLRs, sub-machine guns, .303s, pistols, hand grenades, and AR15s. M16s and home-made guns were highlighted as the most common arms.


The Estimated Price of SALW and Ammunition in Papua New Guinea

According to Alpers: In two differing reports, PNGDF sources later quoted the price paid for the six SLRs, pistol, and ammunition as being between PNG 90,000 and 200,00 (USD 30,000-67,000). This puts the price of a single SLR, with 150 rounds of ammunition at PGK 15,000-33,000 (USD 5,000-11,000).


Muggah asserts that: There is, however, a considerable diversity of weapons available and prices range from the equivalent of K2,000 (USD630) for pistol to K24,000 (USD 7,550) for an M60. Common semi-automatic assault rifles are valued at some K5,000-8,000 (USD1,575-USD2,520), though prices appear to vary considerably.


The Estimated Cost of Cartridges According to Ketan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1 Shot</th>
<th>5 Shots</th>
<th>10 Shots</th>
<th>20 Shots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Day</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Week (7 Days)</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>8,750</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Month (30 Days)</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Year (365)</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>456,250</td>
<td>912,000</td>
<td>1,825,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table copied from Joseph Ketan, The Name Must Not Go Down: Political Competition and State-Society Relations in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea (Fiji, Institute of Pacific Studies; University of the South Pacific, 2004) p.185. Prices are given in PNG Kina (K). Ketan bases his estimate of the cost of ammunition used during intertribal conflict on the possession of 50 guns per clan (c.5,000 people) and a constant black market price of K5.00 per cartridge.
Marijuana as a Financial Resource for SALW Acquisition

While the ramifications associated with the spread of SALW are fundamentally important, the ability to acquire them is equally significant. The research of Alpers, Muggah and Ketan clearly illustrate the excessive financial costs associated with the acquisition of SALW, the initiation of conflict and the impact of these weapons upon domestic security and stability. Furthermore, the prices paid for these weapons are clearly beyond the capabilities of clans and villages that are still reliant, in many instances, upon subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods. Ketan provides the answer to this problem, and asserts that: “Eventually, many people resorted to the cultivation and sale of marijuana.” This observation has been noted elsewhere. According to former Mendi Police Inspector Mark Yangen, there is a close relationship between drugs and guns that is openly acknowledged among the population within the Southern Highlands. In the opinion of Herman Ambai, a villager from Waigar in Chimbu province, the diffusion of weapons has been facilitated by the use of marijuana. The cultivation of marijuana clearly represents an activity of fundamental concern for the domestic security of PNG, as the profits that are generated are reinvested in the provision of both individual and clan security, and this assists in providing the economic support necessary for the initiation, extension and continuation of armed conflict.

The extension of GOPNG sovereignty and the maintenance of a secure domestic environment are challenged by this fundamental security predicament. Unfortunately, as a consequence of its weakness, the GOPNG is, and will continue to be, unable to tackle either the proliferation of weapons or the ability to acquire them unless a coordinated and multifaceted programme of coercive and remunerative means is simultaneously instituted. This approach requires an extensive level of administration and organisation that is potentially above its current capabilities, as any programme that was not instituted to combat both the presence of SALW and the cultivation of marijuana is likely to be unsuccessful. For example, during 2006 a State of Emergency was instituted by the GOPNG to remove the presence of SALW and reinstitute its sovereignty throughout the Highlands region. However, given the overriding presence of localised conflict, it is unlikely that a substantial amount of weapons, beyond homemade ones, will be

405 For an overview of SALW prices please refer to appendix 2.1 and 2.2
406 Ketan, 2004, p.186
407 Alpers, 2005, p.68
408 Ware, 2001
surrendered. Furthermore, as the briefing paper prepared for Mac Grace, the New Zealand Defence Attaché in Port Moresby, illustrates, the local population were reluctant to surrender their weapons in spite of an amnesty and the presence of both the PNGDF and RPNGC that provided a secure environment. Only an estimated two percent of locally held weapons were recovered.\textsuperscript{409} The use of marijuana as a financial resource could provide villages and clans with a potentially limitless source of income, and even if the GOPNG was able to remove the majority of SALW then marijuana could provide domestic actors with the financial resources to access regional weapons trafficking routes. More disturbingly, the further development of drug trafficking activities through PNG could introduce alternative drugs, such as cheaply made ATS, where potentially higher profits could be employed for SALW acquisition.

**Societal Security Concerns**

Although qualitative and quantitative research is not available concerning the manner in which PNG society is being transformed by the presence of marijuana, a number of individuals have commented upon its increasingly negative impact. According to Sikani: \textit{“Drug abuse is rapidly becoming more widespread in Papua New Guinea: it is fast becoming a serious problem as it is beginning to destroy the very social fabric of Papua New Guinean society.”}\textsuperscript{410} Additional issues that include increasing urbanisation and the growth of shantytowns, widespread poverty, increasing rates of serious crime and cultural transformation could collective assist with, or account for, greater levels of marijuana consumption and become future sources of instability.

PNG is already characterised as an extremely dangerous country. For example, the Australia Department of Foreign Affairs has asserted that: \textit{“Crime is random and particularly prevalent in urban areas such as Port Moresby, Lae and Mt Hagen. Settlement areas of towns and cities are particularly dangerous. Violence and use of ‘bush knives’ (machetes) and firearms are often used in assault and theft attempts. Carjackings, assaults (including sexual assaults), bag snatching and robberies are common.”}\textsuperscript{411} The development of drug-related violence or

\textsuperscript{410} Sikani, 2000, p.45
competitive conflicts between gangs over the control of the domestic drug market would add to this pervasive environment of violence. The presence of alternative drugs, such as methamphetamine and ATS, and any subsequent change in consumer preferences also represent a credible future scenario as a by-product of any trafficking activities that occur.

The introduction of alternative drugs would place an additional burden upon health and social services throughout the country, and would challenge the ability of the GOPNG to fund any new initiatives. There is an absolute absence of drug treatment facilities, and the health system already faces considerable burdens, with an estimated 275 doctors to attend to the needs of a population consisting of around 5.13 million people that are geographically dispersed.\textsuperscript{412} The appearance and growth of drug addiction, as well as possible changes in social behaviour such as an increase in prostitution to fund drug habits, adds to the already overwhelmed position of services that will have to manage with increasing rates of HIV/AIDS infection in the future. Concerns surrounding the involvement and abuse of marijuana by young people have also been increasingly expressed.\textsuperscript{413} Furthermore, according to Yala, conflict has occurred over the provision of state social services and health centres. In some areas health centres have been destroyed as local clans and villages have viewed the allocation of services as a zero-sum competition, and an act of GOPNG favouritism.\textsuperscript{414} The development of demand among young people and the absence of rehabilitation services directly assists with the entrenchment of marijuana throughout PNG, if this has not already occurred, and this situation could also encourage alternative drugs to become available because of this demand.

The Harris Prediction: Gangs, Crime and Marijuana

The presence of \textit{Raskol} gangs throughout PNG is a serious cause for concern, as they are believed to be responsible for committing the majority of serious and organised crimes that occur. During the late 1980s, Harris predicted that these gangs would increasingly present a significant challenge for the GOPNG, as their criminal activities would become more organised, while their position within society could result in them becoming de facto political instruments utilised by

\textsuperscript{412} Miranda Darling Tobias, "The HIV/AIDS Crisis in Papua New Guinea", \textit{The Centre for Independent Studies}, No.81, February 2007 p.7
\textsuperscript{413} Elizabeth Vuvu, “Marijuana Dealing in Rise in PNG’s Rabaul”, \textit{The National}, October 9, 2007
\textsuperscript{414} Weiner, McLeod and Yala, 2002, p.8
political parties to manipulate domestic politics. In many respects, these predictions have materialised through the involvement of gangs with the domestic sale of marijuana, and the possible trafficking of it to neighbouring states. The widespread availability of SALW further assists with the empowerment of gangs, as it directly enhances their coercive capacity in relation to that of the GOPNG and the RPNGC.

Harris originally observed that gangs and gang culture had undergone significant development since their inception within urban areas. According to his research, they had transformed from being unorganised and involved in opportunistic burglaries towards more organised hierarchical groups that were equipped with both leadership structures and the ability to self-finance. Furthermore, Harris suggested that an ineffectual and militarised response by law enforcement agencies, where less than 3 percent of crimes committed during the 1980s resulted in arrest, provided raskol gangs with a carte blanche for committing crime. This situation is likely to have directly encouraged the development of new tactics. The ability of the RPNGC to combat raskol gangs has also been affected by their position within society. According to Kilick, there is significant support for them among rural villages, as they are viewed as akin to traditional big men and enforcers of traditional values against the encroachment of business interests, and the authority of both the RPNGC and the GOPNG. The social legitimacy commanded by these gangs is a source of power in itself, and when this is combined with a weak GOPNG and its inability to provide social services across the country, then there is a strong potential for them to develop into a parallel source of authority, which will further weaken the internal sovereignty and legitimacy exercised by the GOPNG.

Disturbingly, raskol gangs had already organised an illicit business model for the distribution and sale of stolen property by the time of Harris’s observations. This established business model would provide an ideal organisational structure that could be employed for the distribution of marijuana, though the degree of

417 Harris, 1988, p.21 & pp.14-18; Dinnen (A), 2000, p.93. As Dinnen suggests, according to a rational-choice model, the costs of being involved in crime are significantly less than the potential benefits.
418 Kulick, 1993; Dinnen (A), 2000, p.76-79
419 Harris, 1988, p.45
organisation and the extent that previous business linkages are employed by gangs to distribute marijuana is impossible to ascertain. In the opinion of Nibbrig, raskol gangs have increasingly evolved from groups based on mutual benefit through association, towards organizations that are more concerned with commercial goals.420 Sikani offers a similar observation, and asserts that: “It [marijuana] is no longer a business involving ordinary Papua New Guinean subsistence farmers. It is run by other groups who are well-organised and capable when it comes to drug dealing.”421 Considerable evidence therefore exists to demonstrate that gangs are involved with the sale and cultivation of marijuana. The lucrative profits generated by their involvement represents a serious cause for concern, as this would directly enhance their autonomy, capabilities and ability to acquire SALW, and would provide gangs with the ability to self-finance. This represents a dangerous development in the evolution of these gangs, especially when the ability of the government to finance the RPNGC and other important agencies such as the PNGCS is restricted. The forging of international criminal linkages, the establishment of relations with increasing numbers of illegal Chinese migrants and their traffickers, and the utilisation of corruption as a business strategy would further assist with the development of a scenario where gangs command a similar or greater level of coercive capacity and legitimacy than the GOPNG; this may already be in progress.

The use of gangs for political purposes and the development of a political-crime nexus could present another significant threat, which has already materialised to some extent. Harris suggested that forms of accommodation between politicians and raskols had begun to occur, and that the distribution of marijuana represented an ideal commodity for this relationship to base itself upon.422 According to Kulick, this scenario was in progress during the early 1990s.423 Dinnen makes a similar observation, and suggests that politicians have realised that gangs are ideal for mobilising political support among poor communities. He highlights an incident were former Prime Minister Bill Skate boasted of his use of criminal connections to commit murder.424 Harris observed that: “It is a process I have seen occur in several other venues in which I have

420 Nibbrig, 1992, p.199
421 Sikani, 2000, p.44
422 Harris, 1988, p.49
423 Kulick, 1993, p.12
studied; in its most extreme form in the inner city of Kingston, Jamaica.\textsuperscript{425} This form of accommodation is extremely detrimental, as it is likely to result in the use of gangs for the achievement of political objectives and an increase in the level of crime and violence throughout communities. Further instability could arise if poor communities become politicised, if drug activities are perceived to be primarily located within these communities or if gangs are utilised to mobilise and coerce voters during election periods. Lastly, if these patronage structures weaken, then the power that gangs potentially obtain from drugs would further enhance their autonomy and the threat that they pose to the state, as they would be effectively uncontrollable. The potential for gangs to become proxies for foreign criminals also represents a credible scenario.

**Economic Security Concerns**

PNG has experienced fluctuating economic circumstances since independence, and those that have migrated into urban areas have experienced this changing economic climate directly with high rates of unemployment. In the opinion of Marshall, economic decline and low primary commodity prices during the 1980s more than likely encouraged the development of marijuana cultivation because of the high profits available and its role as a replacement cash crop for daily subsistence requirements.\textsuperscript{426} Inguba offers a similar opinion, and states that: “…it is obvious that many local coffee, tea, and vegetable growers are more interested in growing cannabis because of the income potential, and the large amount of money involved. In some areas, cannabis is used as a form of currency, which is exchanged for food and other essential items.”\textsuperscript{427} Though the cultivation of marijuana may not be subject to significant organisation, it clearly provides a substantial source of income, and is important during times of economic hardship. Furthermore, the economic security of PNG is clearly undermined by the cultivation of marijuana, as it assists with the maintenance of a pervasive environment of conflict and crime that discourages foreign investment, inhibits the expansion of tourism and undermines the ability of the GOPNG to generate income.

\textsuperscript{425} Harris, 1988, p.48


Throughout PNG, issues such as economic development, resource extraction, modernisation and the expansion of the state are not viewed as benign acts; they entail significant and tangible consequences. This aspect of PNG society becomes apparent when external actors, such as those involved in resource extraction and mining, are inserted into rural areas. Fluid social relations, open clan composition and weak corporate identity are elements that engender conflict and dispute when foreign economic opportunities are introduced, which distort local economic patterns. As a consequence conflict both among and within clans or villages often occurs. The GOPNG is therefore forced to continually invest in security arrangements and in law enforcement agencies in order for economic development to occur, draining its limited revenue that would otherwise be directed towards other more important priorities.

Bougainville: Lessons for Understanding Future Conflict Dynamics

The conflict that developed within Bougainville was the result of several complex and interrelated issues that included grievances related to the environmental, economic and social impact of the Panguna copper mine, and previous ethno-nationalistic desires for succession. As a popular case study, Bougainville has been extensively examined from two perspectives; those concerned with the origins of the conflict and those that deal with the long and innovate attempts at its resolution. Additionally, Regan has also examined the conflict from the perspective of the greed versus grievance discourse in order to uncover the motives of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). He observes that: “Although grievances about distribution of mine revenue were central to the origins of the conflict, the conflict was not primarily about rebel access to the wealth of the mine, nor did that wealth provide the funding needed to make the rebellion more viable and thereby contribute to its persistence.” Understanding this last aspect, the financing of the conflict, is essential, though it has been inadequately focused upon. Attempting to examine how the BRA acquired SALW and funded its participation throughout the duration of the conflict (1988-1998) is important for illustrating how future Melanesian conflicts may be sustained. However, there are

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428 Weiner, McLeod and Yala 2002 p.4-6 Weiner highlights the resentment of neighbouring clans that are not fortunate enough to have mineral deposits such as oil on their land; Ketan, 2004, p.16
430 Regan, 2003, p.134
two major problems associated with such questions; firstly, the fact that, as with the rest of Melanesia, the majority of people rely on subsistence farming for their livelihoods; and secondly, the conflict was complicated by the complexity of the actors involved. Armed conflict occurred between the BRA and PNGDF, while conflict between local villages, the BRA and the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) also occurred. Examining Bougainville is important, as marijuana could have played a minor role in sustaining the conflict, and this would have significant implications for the initiation or continuation of future conflicts.

While there is agreement concerning the relatively few number of combatants, with suggestions that the BRA comprised an estimated 2000 semi-autonomous men and the BRF with around 1,500 that were supplied with SALW by the PNGDF, the same consensus is not present regarding the manner in which SALW were acquired by the BRA. According to Regan, the BRA were initially able to fund themselves through a combination of subsistence farming and the looting of the Panguna mine, though in his opinion, very little financial support was provided by the diaspora community. Regan also asserts that SALW were primarily sourced from domestic sources, and weapons were purchased, acquired through raids or from dead PNGDF personnel. The BRA also became increasingly adept at manufacturing homemade guns and reconditioning weapons left over from World War Two. Importantly, Regan asserts that few weapons were sourced from outside the islands, as a result of the imposition of a naval blockade, and that the victories of the BRA over both the PNGDF and BRF were due to superior guerrilla warfare tactics and the presence of a large support base among the population. Sam Kauona Sirivi, a commander within the BRA, has expressed a similar opinion: “In the first stages of the fighting patrols from the PNG forces were ambushed and the Bougainvilleans captured weapons of a high standard – M16s, SLRs, M79 Grenade Launcher, and ammunition. This became the means of the BRA acquiring arms and re-suppling its men. The BRA never imported or bought any arms from abroad.” However, given the decentralised nature of the BRA and the internal conflict that developed among BRA supporters, it cannot be stated with certainty that members did not acquire weapons from outside the island.

432 Regan, 2003, p.148-149
433 Regan, 2003, p.148
434 Regan, 2003, p.147-148
In contrast to Regan and Sirivi, Capie suggests that the BRA sourced weapons from the Solomon Islands and that individuals linked to the BRA were frequently involved in armed disturbances there.\textsuperscript{436} Capie also provides a breakdown of the SALW that were surrendered during 2002.\textsuperscript{437} These figures demonstrate that homemade weapons were more numerous than military, though it is possible that homemade weapons were surrendered more frequently as they may have been valued less than military ones. Additionally, perceptions of insecurity are likely to have remained for a substantial period of time following the conflict, and this could have encouraged the stockpiling of SALW for future needs. There have also been suggestions that Solomon leaders and citizens provided assistance to the BRA. This represents a credible scenario given the shared cultural and ethnic ties, and this is evidenced by the fact that the Bougainville government renamed itself the North Solomon Provincial Government during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{438} Incursions by the PNGDF into Solomon territory may have also encouraged both official and unofficial support.\textsuperscript{439} It is also highly unlikely that the naval blockade of Bougainville was successful in stopping all border traffic, as this would require the involvement of a significant number of vessels. As an example, Ben Bohane, an Australian journalist, was able to cross the blockade in 1994, and spent two months documenting the actions of the BRA.\textsuperscript{440} These examples all serve to reinforce the assertion that SALW could have been sourced from outside of Bougainville.

With regard to the financing of the BRA, the research that is available does not discuss this aspect in any significant depth. Income derived from employment at the mine may have supported the initial beginnings of the conflict and the purchasing of SALW, though it is unlikely that this income featured prominently as the conflict progressed. According to estimates by Regan, less than 50 percent of the mineworkers were local residents.\textsuperscript{441} Furthermore, the local economy was ruined as a consequence of the closure of the mine, the destruction of local plantations and the interruption of localised agriculture by the pervasive environment of violence and forced dislocation. The BRA would have found it

\begin{itemize}
\item Capie, 2003, p.82-83 & p.136
\item Capie, 2003, p.138; Alpers and Twyford, 2003, p.84-85
\item Regan, 2003, p.142; Breen, 2001, p.8
\item NZine, “Conflict in Bougainville-Part 3: Successes of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army”, June 30, 2000 http://www.nzine.co.nz/features/bville.html (Accessed online 16/4/08);
\item Regan, 2003, p.139
\end{itemize}
increasingly difficult to purchase SALW and ammunition as the conflict continued and as unsupportive villages or opponents sought to arm themselves as well. The internal conflict that developed would have also alienated the BRA from parts of its support network. SALW appropriated or purchased from the PNGDF would have provided an ideal solution to this situation, though it cannot be definitively asserted that this was the only means by which SALW were acquired.

In contrast to Regan’s opinion that gold from the mine represented an unlootable resource, it has been asserted that members of the BRA utilised the presence of alluvial gold deposits as a source of income, and according to Bohane, the BRA sent this gold to Chinese merchants in the Solomon Islands.442 This represents a fundamentally important financial resource, and if this observation is accurate, then the BRA would have had a substantial source of income to support itself and to acquire SALW. It is also possible that former members of the BRA and the multitude of other armed actors present in Bougainville have not publicised this aspect, as it could still be an important source of income now, and in the future. Unfortunately, this thesis has not been unable to substantiate whether marijuana was used as a financial resource by the BRA or other combatants. However, it has been cultivated on Bougainville and could represent an important source of finance for future conflicts.443

As a consequence of the availability of SALW combined with the contemporary use of marijuana as a financial resource for their acquisition, intractable conflicts similar to that experienced in Bougainville could become more frequent throughout PNG and the Solomon Islands. Furthermore, Bougainville is relevant to this thesis as supporting the PNGDF for the duration of the conflict was extremely costly and the economic impact of the mine closure was enormous, the GOPNG was forced to request International Monetary Fund assistance. The contracting of mercenaries to end the conflict, commonly referred to as the Sandline Affair, created extensive domestic political difficulties for the GOPNG and for civil-military relations. Bougainville also effectively endangered the economic security of the entire state, and its capacity to effectively fund both law enforcement and

442 Personal correspondence with Ben Bohane
443 Correspondence with AFP Officer Marcus Tawton. Tawton cited the arrest of a local man in Alta, Central Bougainville, by the RPNGC with 5kgs of marijuana during October 2007, and the arrest of the captain of a ship by RPNGC in Kimbe, for smuggling marijuana from Bougainville. According to correspondence with AFP National Media Chief of Staff Adele Astley, the AFP was aware of marijuana being cultivated on Bougainville as per available media reports.
essential social and development services. Lastly, the potential for conflict between competing clans, as well as between the state and these clans will always exist within PNG as long as the state remains weak, these groups remain autonomous and resource extraction continues. For example, inter-clan conflict has also occurred over the revenue generated by Kutubu oil project.444

Weapons Surrendered to the United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (UNOMB) by September 2002

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Australian Involvement in Papua New Guinea

The extensive engagement of Australia with PNG is overwhelmingly defined by concerns for its national security and the impact that PNG’s weakness could have upon regional security. According to historical and contemporary Australian assessments, the potential for the development of both traditional and new security threats are considerable, and the most recent manifestations of these concerns have appeared in the *arch of instability* discourse.445 As early as 1997, the Honourable Alexander Downer, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, asserted that both foreign relations and events within PNG had not been given the attention that they deserved, and that new issues such as drug trafficking and TNC required the investment of additional resources and the expansion of the security architecture for the region.446 The primacy of these concerns are evident in recent policies and operations, such as the RAMSI mission to the Solomon Islands, which emphasised the overwhelming importance of Australian reengagement with regional security.

Bilateral relations between both states are strong, and important examples include the Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum and the institution of the

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446 Honourable Alexander Downer, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Address to the Joint Services Staff College, Canberra, Australia, March 26, 1997)
Enhanced Cooperation Package (EPC). However, these relations are open to significant fluctuation; events such as the searching of Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare at Brisbane Airport and the assistance provided to Julian Moti to escape to the Solomon Islands have caused significant strains and difficulties within this important bilateral relationship.\textsuperscript{447} Australia remains the most important bilateral relationship for the GOPNG.

As a consequence of Australian concerns and both the development and security assistance that the GOPNG requires, PNG is firmly entrenched within Australia’s RSC. The extent of Australia’s involvement, influence and, at times aggressive approach has raised GOPNG concerns regarding the impact of these actions upon its sovereignty. With regard to drugs, it appears as if the Australian strategy for assisting the GOPNG to combat their presence has been subsumed within its overall approach to strengthening governance and law and order, which form the core of current policies. In the event of a potentially serious situation, the AFP would be available to assist RPNGC and a permanent office has existed in Port Moresby since 1994.

Security issues feature highly within the bilateral discourse. One such example is the possibility that significant trafficking of SALW for marijuana occurs via the Torres Strait. However, in spite of the investment of significant research and resources into determining the extent of any trade, a conclusive answer has not been reached. This uncertainty is evident in statements made by Mick Keelty, current Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, within one publication. Keelty has asserted that: “To this point in time, PNG has been a source country only for cannabis. But even in the case of cannabis, the problem of the Torres Strait border can best be described as being a low threat.”\textsuperscript{448} Furthermore: “Seizure figures show an increase in the quantities detected. In one detection, reliable information was received that a syndicate operating in the Torres Strait has, over a period of time, shipped over 1000 kilograms of cannabis to Australia in quantities of


two kilograms to fifty kilograms at a time.” Lastly: “The possibility of PNG being used as a transit point for the shipment of drugs to Australia cannot be ruled out particularly with large Asian populations in the country.” Changing drug and criminal intelligence assessments combined with the shifting domestic security discourse in Australia undoubtedly account for the varying characterisation of the threat posed by criminal activities within the Torres Strait. This security discourse is likely to remain the focus of attention in the future, and will continue to be influenced by Australian political and cultural perceptions of the GOPNG and the domestic security environment.

As a consequence of this history of concern, an estimated AUSD $15.5 billion in assistance and aid has been provided, and current assistance is directed through the ECP. According to Keelty, authorities in both Australia and PNG have viewed the prospect of increasing cross-border crime between the two states seriously. This relationship is best viewed through the level of cooperation exerted in the establishment of joint intelligence groups, ad-hoc personnel training initiatives and assistance to the RPNGC to enhance its performance in law enforcement. Assistance has also been provided by Australia through joint maritime patrols, the provision of AFP liaison officers and assistance with the establishment of the National Drug Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Unit. Importantly, the ECP has resulted in the drafting of new extradition, mutual assistance and proceeds of crime legislation. Unfortunately, in spite of significant cooperation, the GOPNG is still unable to control its land and sea borders, according to Buku, PNGCS officers stopped boarding ships to inspect their cargo in 2005, though this situation may have changed.

The enormous amount of aid and technical assistance provided by Australia will be of little consequence unless the GOPNG can reassert both its internal and

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449 Keelty, 2000, p.81-82. Keelty’s statement was made prior to his appointment as commissioner of the AFP.
450 Keelty, 2000, p.82
external sovereignty. The presence of marijuana and its relationship to armed conflict, political and social instability will undermine Australian efforts at rehabilitating the GOPNG, and will assists in maintaining an environment of instability. Moreover, the provision of economic assistance and the development of improved infrastructure will, paradoxically, open up the country. This could facilitate a more organised approach towards drugs and criminal activity in the future, as the sovereignty of the GOPNG and its ability to enforce the rule of law throughout both rural and urban areas is unlikely to expand to the degree required. However, given the overwhelming concerns present in Australian over drugs, TNC and terrorism, it is highly unlikely that the GOPNG would be allowed to regresses back towards state failure. Unfortunately, this thesis was unable to uncover any specific instances where Australia had attempted to influence GOPNG policies regarding the presence of drugs, though undoubtedly, as the consumption of alternative drugs such as methamphetamine increases and the relationship between marijuana and SALW acquisition gains more publicity Australia will become more assertive and provide greater assistance to the GOPNG in order to control this issue.

Responses of the Papua New Guinean Government to Drugs

The ability of the GOPNG to undertake anti-drug operations and to improve domestic security faces significant challenges. These include re-occurring issues of limited financial, technical and human resources, the pervasive presence of tribal conflict and high levels of crime and corruption. Unfortunately, information from the GOPNG regarding its perception of drugs as a security threat is not available, and as such, any concerns must be obtained by examining other resources: this presents a problem for employing the concepts developed by Buzan et al. The GOPNG views the presence of armed conflict and the impact of this upon economic development as the primary threat to national security, and as far as can be ascertained, the ubiquitous presence of marijuana and the potential for alternative drugs in the immediate future are not yet a significant concern. Furthermore, the presence of SALW throughout the country has been securitised, though the relationship between marijuana and SALW acquisition, or marijuana and the maintenance of domestic insecurity has received equal attention.

However, the GOPNG is not ignorant of the presence of domestic instability, and as a consequence a considerable proportion of its resources have been devoted towards combating crime and violence. For example, 1996 was dedicated
as the Year of Law Enforcement. However, these measures have consistently failed to institute an environment where security prevails. A range of answers may account for the failure of the government to combat drugs and provide security; it may be possible that relationship between the presence of marijuana, tribal conflict and crime are poorly understood; that the government is well aware of this relationship, but is unable to act effectively; that this relationship is ignored or given a low priority because of more pressing concerns; or, that some political and community leaders benefit from an environment of insecurity and the profits derived from marijuana. It is likely that a combination of all of these reasons prevents the government from undertaking decisive action against drugs.

Importantly, personnel from some law enforcement agencies recognise that drugs are an issue for the state. According to Gerry Kella, a RPNGC drug expert, the establishment of a domestic market for harder drugs was viewed as a real possibility. According to Gerry Kella, a RPNGC drug expert, the establishment of a domestic market for harder drugs was viewed as a real possibility.454 Both Police Minister Mathias Karani and Marku Maruse, Director of Drug Education for the National Narcotics Bureau (NNB), recognised that ordinary citizens were becoming involved because of the potential profits.455 The GOPNG is fundamentally unable to institute nationwide measures to control its borders, or to seize and disrupt the cultivation, sale and trafficking of marijuana on a meaningful scale.

A rapid situational assessment of drugs was conducted between 1998-1999 after discussions between the NNB and the UNODC. Importantly, the assessment interviewed and questioned citizens regarding the presence of drugs. However, the employment of other techniques, such as the utilisation of government statistics and domestic research, was not possible because these are almost entirely non-existent.456 According to McDonald, the NNB has been totally unsuccessful in convincing successive governments of the need to update domestic drug legislation, though the presence of a few community drug education initiatives was noted.457 The assessment was unable to make any definitive conclusions, as no information was available, while the lack of GOPNG resources and the funding of

454 Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, “PNG Drug Abuse Rating Ahead of Fiji and Samoa, Highest in Pacific Islands Region”, October 12, 1999
457 McDonald, 2005, p.81. McDonald also noted that administrative, financial and staff challenges hampered the functioning of the NNB.
priorities considered more important ensured that any recommendations that were made have not been instituted. This situation demonstrates the difficulties facing the government and its inability to tackle drugs, and accounts for the focus of foreign research upon more visible concerns such as the availability of SALW.

The National Drug Squad (NDS) has undertaken operations to intercept marijuana travelling from the Highlands to other provinces for the specific purpose of SALW acquisition. In the opinion of the NDS, marijuana is trafficked from coastal regions to other neighbouring states, though as NDS staff indicated, the strength and sustainability of their interception operations were dependant upon the availability of financial and human resources.\(^\text{458}\) The NDS is trying to monitor and close the routes used for internal trafficking, though the lack of infrastructure and the traditional use of bush pathways ensures that the trade is widely dispersed, and not amenable to easy disruption. Some operational success is evident, for example, intelligence supplied by the Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) resulted in an undercover operation that successfully tracked and seized an 8kg shipment of marijuana at Daru airport.\(^\text{459}\) The detectives involved suggested that the drugs could have been linked to a trafficking ring that operates between PNG, Indonesia and Australia. The NNB has also recently implemented the first ever anti-drug awareness programme, “kick drugs out of PNG”, in conjunction with a local martial arts gym.\(^\text{460}\)

The ability of the government to sustain anti-drug counter measures, such as border patrols, is questionable. It has been widely noted that the border with West Papua is not patrolled, and it is believed that members of the Free West Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) have been able to freely source SALW in PNG. Additionally, both the air and naval elements of the PNGDF have been unable to conduct continuous operations due to the lack of funding.\(^\text{461}\) Furthermore, bilateral relations with Indonesia have traditionally focused upon issues relating to their respective borders and the potential for strong domestic support for the OPM within PNG. Several incursions into the territorial borders of PNG by Indonesian security agencies have occurred, and it is likely that difficulties

\(^\text{458}\) Papua New Guinea Post-Courier/Pacnews, “Western Province—the capital of drugs, arms deals”, August 20, 2007
\(^\text{459}\) Marianas Variety, “PNG drug bust could unravel Pacific ring”, August 10, 2007
\(^\text{461}\) Singirok, 2005, p.8-9; Alpers and Twyford, 2003, p.22
between the two states could directly increase as a result of drugs, and especially if production facilities for ATS or methamphetamine become established or as a consequence of the use of marijuana by the OPM for acquiring SALW. Drugs have been securitised by Indonesia, and any anti-drug measures undertaken by Indonesian authorities that involve the violation of PNG sovereignty in the future will undoubtedly result in raising Australian security concerns. In the future, the GOPNG could seek to securitise its borders due to the occurrence of both drug and SALW trafficking and the inability of neighbouring such as the Solomon Islands to control their own borders, though it is unlikely that it would possess the resources to do so.

Joint sea patrols that include personnel from the PNGDF, RPNGC, PNGCS, Immigration and the TCU have been undertaken recently in order to reassert control over the borders and enhance interagency cooperation, though the sustainability of such operations is unpredictable. Issues such as corruption will present a further challenge to these agencies, as it is likely that gangs and criminal groups will attempt to undermine their operational capacity, while the ability of the GOPNG to internally monitor personnel is limited.

Of critical importance to this thesis are the perceptions and responses of the GOPNG to drugs and other interrelated security issues. Unfortunately, as Roscoe observes, the government considers the appearance of violent crime and tribal conflict as two distinct phenomena, and as a consequence, they are dealt with by different legal codes and actions to suppress, ameliorate and penalise their occurrence. Roscoe asserts that: “under traditional schema, raskolism is warfare just as much as are the pitched battles of the highlands; just as do contemporary Highland warriors, raskols usually target victims beyond their clan or village, people who, under traditional schema, constitute legitimate enemies.” Roscoe contends that while the state treats these as separate actions, due in part to the inheritance of Western legal principles and definitions, violent crime and tribal conflicts have converged, and are virtually indistinguishable. Nonggorr reinforces this observation, and asserts that legislation designed to respond to tribal conflicts, such as the Inter-Group Fighting Act 1997, were unworkable because tribal fighters could not be individually identified by the RPNGC and were required to prove their

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463 Roscoe, 2004, p.69
innocence, and as such, it was ruled as unconstitutional.\footnote{John Nonggor, “The Sandline Affair: A Papua New Guinean Perspective”, in \textit{Australia and Papua New Guinea: Crime and the Bilateral Relationship}, ed. Beno Boeza and John McFarlane (University of New South Wales Press, 2000) p.266} This inconsistency in policy exerts a considerable influence upon the presence of marijuana throughout the state and the environment of insecurity and instability. Measures that combat gangs, \textit{but fail} to intervene in the appearance of tribal conflict will not significantly reduce the presence of marijuana, and paradoxically, failure to combat both simultaneously will allow them to sustain their political, economic and social autonomy as either will take advantage of the reduction in GOPNG security measures and decreasing internal sovereignty.

The GOPNG is, as a consequence, trapped into combating gangs in urban areas, which is potentially beyond the capacity of the RPNGC at this point in time, while other policies, such as the State of Emergency in the Southern Highlands has ultimately only focused upon one element of the conflict equation. Removing access to SALW will bring significant benefits to the state, though the failure to combat the presence of marijuana, and the potential involvement of other drugs in the future, will not remove the capacity for SALW acquisition. Unfortunately, the state is unable to reduce the presence of both drugs and SALW, and as a consequence, an increasing focus upon drugs could potentially overwhelm the judicial system, and will place additional burdens upon already limited social services. In spite of the clear threat posed by marijuana, the GOPNG is clearly forced to intervene to manage and control issues considered more serious and important because of its limited resources. While drugs present a clear threat to PNG, the presence of SALW is more visible, and as such, it is unlikely that drugs will be, \textit{or could be}, securitised by the government.

With regard to the securitisation and politicisation of drugs according to the concepts developed by Buzan et al, the lack of information regarding domestic political discussion hinders a thorough assessment. However, the employment of the NFA has allowed this thesis to examine how drugs present a significant threat to the state by their merging with SALW acquisition activities, and by the support that marijuana provides for the autonomy of gangs and villages. Examining the GOPNG has revealed that it views the insecurity and instability created by SALW as fundamentally important, and this aspect has been securitised, though it reveals the flaws in the approach of the GOPNG by ignoring the relationship with marijuana. Furthermore, the potential involvement of national and community leaders ensures
that there is unlikely to be strong support for instituting anti-drug measures. Lastly, given the importance of the conflict that occurred in Bougainville to the overall security of PNG, the relationship between marijuana and SALW acquisition will be extremely important for the future security of PNG.
Introduction

Fiji is currently under the control of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) commanded by Commodore Frank Bainimarama, and an Interim Administration (IA) has been established. The 2006 coup has been attributed to the leniency displayed by the Laisenia Qarase government towards those connected with the 2000 Coup, and as Watson observed before the coup, the RFMF already occupied an ambiguous position within domestic politics, and had merged its professional role with a domestic political agenda. This transformation has therefore encouraged the promotion and institutionalisation of itself as a source of domestic security and stability. As a consequence of the coup, government officials have been removed from their positions, while both oppositional political leaders and journalists have been harassed, and significant steps have been undertaken to institutionalise RFMF personnel throughout the government.

As this case study will demonstrate, the presence of domestic political competition and conflict, the imposition of economic sanctions combined with policies implemented by the IA itself may sustain a favourable environment for the further entrenchment of drugs, and additional TNC, to the detriment of the state and the wider region. Though, importantly, statistics and information concerning drug abuse and criminal convictions are better developed in comparison to other PIS, though they are still limited, and official concerns regarding the increasing presence of drugs has been expressed frequently.

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466 Stephen Hoadley, “Republic in turmoil with future unclear”, The New Zealand Herald, March 5, 2008; Stephen Hoadley, “‘Gently does it’ policy best way to lead Fiji down the road to reform”, The New Zealand Herald, March 6, 2008
Overview of Illicit Drugs in Fiji

The cultivation of marijuana throughout Fiji is believed to be ubiquitous. Commercial-size plantations have been discovered on a regular basis, though as a consequence of successful operations conducted by the Fiji Police Force (FPF), it is believed that these operations have been relocated to less accessible areas. While the number of people convicted for drug offences has actually declined according to official statistics, the FPF has asserted that marijuana-related activity throughout the state is “grossly under-reported”. In the view of the government, the Navosa region appeared to be the most prominent region for cultivation, though other parts of the country are also thought to be substantial cultivation areas.

The size of plantations that have been discovered has resulted in speculation that marijuana is being trafficked to other neighbouring states, as the domestic market could not possibly consume the quantities available. Further transformations have included the increasing involvement of unemployed women with marijuana cultivation. This presents a significant burden and creates additional challenges for the provision of social services and for the functioning of the justice system. According to Evans, concerns have been expressed over the

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467 Mensah Adinkrah, *Crime, Deviance & Delinquency in Fiji* (Suva, Fiji: Fiji Council of Social Services in association with Asia Crime Prevention Foundation Department of Sociology, the University of the South Pacific Fiji Prisons Service, 1995) p.60
469 The Senate (A), 2006, p.17
470 Jillian Hicks, “Jobless Fiji women jailed for growing marijuana”, *The Fiji Sun*, February 20, 2004

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increasing organisation of marijuana cultivation, and more importantly, the potential threat that this concentrated income will pose for the IA if criminal groups invest this income in other illicit commodities or in the acquisition of SALW. The occurrence of any additional transformations will significantly jeopardise the ability of the IA to intervene in the cultivation of marijuana, which already presents a dynamic challenge in itself. Further changes would require the increasing provision of additional resources to law enforcement agencies that are already attempting to manage and institute multiple strategies to combat activities, which have included the local production of methamphetamine and the trafficking of both cocaine and heroin.

In addition to marijuana, high-profile and large-quantity seizures of both heroin and precursor chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine have occurred. All forms of concealment used for trafficking have been observed in the country, including the use of human couriers, containerised freight, the hiding of drugs inside other objects, and transportation via private yachts. It is also believed that drugs were being stockpiled in Fiji in anticipation for supplying criminals that intended on capitalising upon the presence of the Olympic games in Australia. However, according to Evans, the cost associated with harder drugs such as cocaine and heroin make them unaffordable for domestic consumption, though this is not true for cheaply made ATS. If ATS were to become widely available throughout the country, their presence would accelerate the social problems that are already being experienced, and could potentially assist in increasing the presence of crime and violence. Very few treatment and rehabilitation facilities are available for those with marijuana-related health issues; addiction to ATS would also place an overwhelming burden upon these limited health and social services.

A number of international organisations and prominent agencies have commented upon the presence of drugs in Fiji. In 2004, the DEA recorded the increasing presence of marijuana and its sale, and cited the Western Islands of Viti Levu as the primary cultivation area. The INCB has made similar observations, and asserted that the ubiquitous cultivation of marijuana throughout the country had

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471 Evans, 2006, p.2 no.21 & 24
473 Evans, 2006, p.3 no.35
474 Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Intelligence Brief: The Pacific Islands Region August 2004, DEA-04012.
resulted in its widespread abuse, and that criminal groups had utilised Fiji as a transit point for the trafficking of cocaine and heroin destined for both New Zealand and Australia.\textsuperscript{475} However, as Prem Adip, Acting Assistance Superintendent of Police, observed, no Fijian citizen has ever been charged with the use of any drug with the exception of marijuana.\textsuperscript{476} Concerns have also been expressed over the presence of South American individuals who have been linked to drugs.\textsuperscript{477} The failure to arrest Fijians associated with drugs other than marijuana could indicate that foreign citizens are primary involved at this point in time, meaning that the government can do little beyond internal measures to deter potential trafficking groups or organisations. It could also indicate that the FPF has so far been unable to devote enough resources, or has not adopted adequate strategies to investigate the occurrence of drug-related crimes and those involved with drugs domestically.

Of critical importance is the fact that the INCB observed in 2003 that law enforcement agencies and regulatory controls were well functioning. However, the increasing need for the development of both a drug control master plan and an assessment of the current levels of drug abuse was noted, as these were required for the institution of effective counter measures and rehabilitation services.\textsuperscript{478} The establishment of the National Substance Abuse Advisory Council (NSAAC) and the Senate Ad-Hoc Select Committee on Drugs, Crime and Prostitution (SASC) represent a strong commitment towards fulfilling these requirements.

### Examples of Drug Seizures in Fiji

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Operation Name/Details</th>
<th>Agencies Involved</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Illicit Drug</th>
<th>Estimated Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>'Log Runner'; inside shipping container</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td></td>
<td>357Kgs of Heroin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2001</td>
<td>Inside computer disk</td>
<td>Fijian and Australia Police, U.S Customs and DEA</td>
<td>Suva</td>
<td>30 Grams of Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2001</td>
<td>Police and Army</td>
<td>Keiyasa, Navosa Highlands</td>
<td>Marijuana plantation</td>
<td>FDS$1.7 Million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>'Out Rigger'; Methamphetamine super laboratory</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td>Lauca Beach</td>
<td>Methamphetamine and precursor chemicals</td>
<td>NZDS$870 Million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{475} INCB, 2000, p.68; INCB, 2001, p.81; INCB, 2002, p.75
\textsuperscript{476} Fiji Times Online, “Drug Probe finds Trends”, September 18, 2007
\textsuperscript{478} INCB, 2003, p.81
Marijuana Leaves & Plants Seized 1990-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dried Leaves Grams</th>
<th>Dried Leaves % Variable</th>
<th>Plants Grams</th>
<th>Plants % Variable</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2900</td>
<td></td>
<td>821</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>-433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6300</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4100</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>3900</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>16900</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2239</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6869</td>
<td>-142</td>
<td>5388</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17442</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8588</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>30038.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1091</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>45617.8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3841</td>
<td>252</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25051.2</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>183811</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11179.5</td>
<td>-94</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>44327.02</td>
<td>296.5</td>
<td>129626</td>
<td>6349.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Senate, Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Select Committee Established to look into the Escalating use of Drugs and Related Crimes Including Sexual Crimes and Prostitution, Vol.1, Parliamentary Paper No.22 (Suva: Fiji, Department of Legislature, 2006); Fiji Police Force, National Police Crime Statistics

Precursor Chemicals Seized During Operation Out Rigger, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemical</th>
<th>Amount Seized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chloroephedrine</td>
<td>1300Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ephedrine</td>
<td>450Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chloroform</td>
<td>135 x 200 Litre drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barium Sulphate</td>
<td>20Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acetic acid</td>
<td>10 x 20 Litre drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodium Hydroxide</td>
<td>15 x 25Kg sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrochloric acid</td>
<td>20 Litres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste water</td>
<td>15 x 200 litre drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen</td>
<td>180 Bottles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqueous reaction mixture</td>
<td>500 Litres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palladium 2 Chloride</td>
<td>180 x 100 gram</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oceania Customs Organisation, *The Quarterly News*, No.18, September 2004

Selection of Criminal Offences in Fiji 2001-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crime &amp; Offences</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery with Violence</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Offences</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political Security Concerns
The Presence of Political Conflict

The reoccurrence of coups and contemporary political conflict are, in many respects, directly linked to the legacies of colonialism and colonial policy. Instability arises from among a range of complex issues that include competition between regionally organised political groupings, the creation of quasi-cultural forms of governance such as the Great Council of Chiefs (Bise Levu Vakaturaga) and the repeated intervention and power-brokerage position of the RFMF. The presence of indigenous and Indo-Fijian political and economic conflict and the promotion of ethno-nationalism by successive governments has also encouraged instability, and these grievances have provided part of the motivation behind the coups that have occurred. As Finin and Wesley-Smith illustrate, while the three coups have received the largest amount of attention from New Zealand, Australia and regional media organisations, the presence of indigenous competition and conflict is, in fact, more prevalent, and the coups are an expression of the contestation of a shared national identity. This history of political instability has assisted with facilitating a conducive environment for drugs and TNC through the weakness of the state and its distraction with internal political competition. In the future, further destabilisation could derive from the increasing entrenchment of criminal groups that take advantage of this instability. There is also a possibility that internally competing actors from among Fiji’s confederacies could utilise the profits associated with marijuana in order to achieve their domestic political objectives, such as funding national election campaigns or for providing social services to their constituents.

The Interim Administration

The presence of the IA and its stated goals of reducing corruption, removing racial discrimination from the constitution and encouraging economic development are, paradoxically, being undermined by its own actions. RFMF personnel have been appointed to the judiciary, calling into question the independence of the court.


480 Finin and Wesley-Smith, 2000, p.6
system, and disturbingly, they have also been granted immunity from both criminal and civil prosecution. The ability of the bureaucracy to function is under serious threat, as previous policies of indigenisation have excluded experienced Indo-Fijian civil servants, while RFMF personal have now replaced those excluded on the basis of their political connections and those that have professionally distanced themselves from the coup. Additionally, the local media has come under significant pressure for their criticism of the IA and RFMF, and the freedom of the media has been severely curtailed. These issues raise serious concerns regarding governmental accountability and transparency, while the institution of the military throughout the bureaucracy removes any sense of neutrality. As a consequence, the RFMF may gain an enhanced capacity for oversight of the bureaucracy, though any internal issues present throughout the military will be expressed in policy making, and other potential issues such as corruption or competing loyalties will be dispersed directly into the governance apparatus of the state.

The ability of the FPF and bureaucracy to effectively combat the security and governance-related challenges posed by drugs will become increasingly strained as government revenue decreases. Additional issues, such as human rights abuses committed by the FPF and RFMF against people detained in their custody have been raised, and could potentially influence their ability to obtain drug-related intelligence and cooperation from the population. Constraints upon both financial and technical resources throughout the FPF have also been noted. According to Senior Superintendent Berenado Daveta, Chief of Staff Operations, the FPF requires an additional 80 vehicles and 2450 radio handsets to enhance their effectiveness. Moreover, instances of corruption and collusion with criminals have also been raised. There have been allegations concerning the fact that the former Police Commission, Isikia Savua, may have been aware of the Speight coup in

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482 Lal, 2007, p.8 & p.14
2000 before it happened, and failed to act accordingly. These issues raise concerns regarding the effectiveness of the FPF and its ability to combat rising levels of crime, and assists in account for the increasing presence of community watch groups throughout the country. The recent arrest of an individual involved in making and selling fake visas for entry into New Zealand and Australia demonstrates that the FPF continues to be operationally successful in spite of resource limitations. This example also illustrates the increasing sophistication of criminals and the need for continued investment in police training and resources. Moreover, it is likely that activities such as these directly assist those involved with drug-related activities, by allowing them to forge documents or disguise their identity. Lastly, a popular perception exists that the presence of the RFMF directly after the coup was beneficial in reducing crime, and this aspect could assist them in attaining a greater level of legitimacy for the coup and any future plans for their permanent institutionalisation.

Military Security Concerns
The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Attempts at trafficking SALW into Fiji have previously occurred, for example, in 1988 used Czechoslovakian small arms that were reported to have been organised by a Fijian national were seized in Sydney en route from North Yemen. Concerns have also been raised regarding the return of RFMF personnel from UN peacekeeping operations and instances where they have not been properly disarmed. The amount of SALW present within, and recycled throughout, PNG and the Solomon Islands provides a potential market for criminal groups and non-state actors to obtain weapons, while the profits associated with marijuana cultivation and involvement with other TNC could ensure that the financial capacity for acquisition exists. These examples demonstrate that both geography and financial capacity do not present a sufficient barrier to the introduction of SALW into conflicts already present in Fiji or for employment in criminal activities.

The potential for even a few weapons to have a disproportionate impact upon the security and stability of Fiji is illustrated by the Speight coup. This situation has been elaborated upon by Alpers and Twyford who observe that: “The numbers

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488 Capie, 2003, p.84-86
489 Capie, 2003, p.85
of firearms used in Suva was small—only seven gunmen executed the coup, and Speight later provided arms to another 100 young rebels—yet it was sufficient to unseat a democratically elected government.”  

The ability of the RFMF to prevent SALW from being employed in domestic disputes will require the further investment in security agencies such as the Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority (FIRCA), and it is highly unlikely that the military would allow competing spheres of authority to become armed, though its ability to do so is grounded in its capacity to control national borders. However, this objective represents a challenge in its own right given the strong commercial and transportation links between Fiji, the Pacific and the rest of the world. A possibility exists that criminals will attempt to arms themselves in the future to protect their operations from potential rivals or attempts by the RFMF and the FPF to intervene into their clandestine activities.

The Military as a Source of Insecurity

During the Speight coup, supporting members of the Counter Revolutionary Warfare unit were able to return to their army barracks to obtain additional weaponry. This raises serious misgivings regarding both the security of local armouries and the presence of politicisation and internal divisions throughout the RFMF. The presence of divided loyalties throughout the RFMF and the potential for external actors to exercise influence upon military personnel heightens the possibility for the internal leakage and the supply of SALW to domestic actors in the future. Though importantly, the Australia Defence Force has assisted with the construction of a new armoury at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks. The discovery of Fijian mercenaries in Bougainville during 2005 demonstrates how dangerous the availability of military knowledge and former RFMF personnel could be for security in the region, especially if these individuals became embroiled in domestic disputes or associated with local criminal groups and their activities. Lastly, according to Watson, the RFMF has adopted and implemented the new security discourse as a guide its actions and future policy, and it has subsequently redefined its

490 Alpers and Twyford, 2003, p.26
governance role in the state. This situation is disturbing, as it could result in a militarised approach towards combating drugs and those associated, as well as against any other domestic issues that are perceived, or constructed, as sources of insecurity. A militarised response to drugs by the RFMF could result in human rights abuses and the potential for internal conflict if specific areas or political groupings are identified as being involved with the cultivation of marijuana or other drugs.

Societal Security Concerns

Fijian society has and continues to experience significant social transformation, such as increasing urbanisation, the presence of squatter settlements, high rates of youth unemployment and the associated breakdown of traditional cultural practices. These issues have been cited as contributing factors for the increasing consumption of drugs among young people. As such, community leaders have increasing expressed their concerns over drugs in Fiji, for example, Nadi Chief Ratu Meli Saukuru the Taukei Navo asserted that: “I call upon the interim Government and authorities involved to take these things seriously and be careful because we do not want to attract the kind of publicity and elements that are usually associated with drugs.” Disturbingly, NSAAC has reported that both primary and high school students have become increasingly involved with marijuana; according to research conducted during 2004 an estimated 13 percent of secondary school students (9,179 of 70,607) had consumed the drug. Additionally, hospitals have also noted the increasing admission of patients for marijuana related medical problems, for example, first time admissions to St. Giles Hospital increased from 186 people in 1995 to 319 during 2003.

495 Pacific Magazine, “YOUTH: Fiji marijuana trade’s impact on young worries NGO”, April 18th, 2001;
496 Robert Matau, “Drug Probe finds trends”, Fiji Times Online, September 18, 2007 (Accessed online 11/2/08)
498 The Senate (A), 2006, p.16
Drug Offences in Primary Schools According to NSAAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Offences (Marijuana)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Age of Persons Arrested for Marijuana-Related Offences in Fiji, 1987-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Under 17</th>
<th>17-24</th>
<th>25 Years and Over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>137</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>121</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table copied from Mensah Adinkrah, *Crime, Deviance & Delinquency in Fiji* (Suva, Fiji: Fiji Council of Social Services in association with Asia Crime Prevention Foundation Department of Sociology, the University of the South Pacific Fiji Prisons Service, 1995) p.57

In spite of the lack of statistics, the few that are available demonstrate that there is domestic drug consumption, and that this is present throughout the school system. The number of adults that consume drugs can only be estimated, though given the percentage of young people currently involved, combined with the access of adults to superior financial resources, these figures could be high. The presence of domestic demand for marijuana could transform towards harder drugs, this represents a credible scenario given the use of Fiji for trafficking activities. Any additional changes such as the increasing involvement of locals with these shipments and the potential for them to be paid in drugs could stimulate demand for harder drugs such as ATS, cocaine or heroin. It is also likely that increasing social and cultural links, such as increased Asian migration, could assist with encouraging the introduction and consumption of alternative drugs.

**Economic Security Concerns**

Fiji has experienced significant economic instability as a by-product of the coups. A combination of economic sanctions and the suspension of development aid, the suspension of preferential trade agreements for sugar with the European Union and fluctuations in tourism-related income have impacted heavily upon the economy, resulting in increasing levels of unemployment and poverty. As Fraenkel illustrates, the willingness of villagers to seize assets during the Speight

coup vividly demonstrates the level of poverty and economic exclusion experienced by some segments of the population.\footnote{Fraenkel, 2000, p.308} Sriskandarajah elaborates upon this situation, and suggests that income inequality is more prevalent intra-ethically rather than inter-ethnically.\footnote{Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “inequality and conflict in Fiji: From Purgatory to hell?”, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol.44, No.3 (2003)} The presence of the RFMF does not engender investor confidence, while the presence of conflict over land ownership, land leases, and the division of labour and capital between indigenous and Indo-Fijians negatively influences economic development. These issues directly undermine the amount of government revenue available, and its ability to adequately fund law enforcement agencies and provide social services.

Given this economic environment, the cultivation of marijuana represents an ideal source of income for urban individuals and rural villages. The traditional reliance of the population upon subsistence farming combined with the divergence in economic development present throughout the country may encourage further participation.\footnote{Mensah Adinkrah, Crime, Deviance & Delinquency in Fiji (Suva, Fiji: Fiji Council of Social Services in association with Asia Crime Prevention Foundation Department of Sociology, the University of the South Pacific Fiji Prisons Service, 1995) p.59; Fiji Police Force, “Inviting the Vanua to Join the Fight Against Drugs”, June 30, 2006} According to Viliame Rakai, District Officer for Navosa, local villages have resorted to cultivating marijuana as a consequence of economic underdevelopment and the expenses involved in transporting produce to local markets.\footnote{Pacific Magazine, “Fiji: Marijuana farming blamed on lack of development”, May 20, 2004} Disturbingly, Adinkrah has observed the trend of using marijuana to cross-subsidise the income generated from sugar cane farming.\footnote{Adinkrah, 1995, p.61} It is possible that cultivation has been entrenched throughout Fiji for a considerable period of time, and given this, eradicating it could present significant problems for the FPF and the IA if it is engrained within the local economy. It is likely that local communities will attempt to protect their livelihoods should the IA attempt to intervene in the future.

The tourism industry represents Fiji’s primary source of income and biggest source of foreign exchange, earning over an estimated FD$500 million per year; it has been equally affected by the history of coups.\footnote{Paresh Kumar Narayan, “Economic Impact of tourism on Fiji’s economy: empirical evidence from the computable general equilibrium model”, Tourism Economics, Vol. 10 No.4 (2004); The Fiji Times, “GDP ‘depends on tourism’”, March 25, 2008} It is likely that demand for drugs among certain sections of visiting tourists, such as backpackers, has assisted in maintaining the level of marijuana cultivation and demand in Fiji. While marijuana...
may provide an important source of additional income, its economic benefits are paradoxical, as they could encourage the trafficking of harder, more lucrative drugs and the involvement of gangs or foreign criminal groups. If drug-related violence developed, this would negatively impact upon tourism and the economy, and could further encourage the cultivation of marijuana, or involvement with other drugs, to offset this loss of income. Furthermore, these potential developments would place a significant drain upon the resources of the IA, as it would need to respond by increasing the amount of resources devoted to anti-drug measures and the negative social effects, diverting important income away from economic development priorities.

The Involvement of Regional Actors

The Response of New Zealand and Australia to the Coup and the Implications for the Presence of Drugs

The coup has received widespread condemnation, and as a consequence of sanctions, the ability of the IA to sustain operations against the cultivation and trafficking of drugs, and the further entrenchment of additional TNC, has been undermined through the withdrawal and repositioning of development assistance. Fiji’s most important bilateral relations with New Zealand and Australia are in a state of fluctuation, and this poses serious difficulties regarding its need to enhance its internal and external sovereignty against those associated with drugs and drug-related activities. Diplomatic relations with New Zealand are particularly difficult, as the High Commissioner, Michael Green, was declared persona non grata and a range of sanctions have been enacted in areas such as immigration, defence and governmental developmental assistance.  
506 Foreign relations with Australia are similarly strained, and some of the assistance provided for public sector, police and legal reforms has been removed, though AUSD$50 million allocated for the health and education sectors will continue, and this may assist, to some extent, with the promotion of drug awareness education.  
507 China has continued to support Fiji, and has provided a FD$170 Million loan to the IA, which, according to reports, will be allocated towards the upgrading of rural roads throughout the country.  
508 Though such a loan is also likely to allow the IA to maintain its governing position to the detriment of the state.

506 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Fiji Islands Country Information Paper (Accessed online 6/4/08)  
507 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Fiji Islands Country Brief (Accessed online 6/4/08)  
508 The Fiji Times, “$170m loan for rural roads”, March 24, 2008
The coup has undoubtedly had an impact upon both the operating capacity of the FPF and other domestic agencies responsible for law enforcement activities. Additionally, Fiji’s membership within the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police has been suspended and the headquarters of the PTCCC has been shifted to Samoa as a consequence of fears over political interference.\(^{509}\) However, given the previously close working relationship between Fijian authorities, the AFP, New Zealand Police and other regional agencies in operations such as Logrunner and Outtrigger, it is extremely unlikely that either Australia or New Zealand would be willing to jeopardise their extensive investments in regional security by allowing drug activities to become further entrenched.\(^{510}\) However, the presence of political disputes between related to the RFMF usurpation of power create additional complexities within these security objectives that must be negotiated.

While Fiji can be diplomatically isolated and measures such as sanctions can be employed to encourage the RFMF and the IA to relinquish control, the country cannot be isolated from the RSC of New Zealand, Australia, and other PIS because of the transnational characteristics of drugs. Attempts at punishing Fiji through the suspension of legal and law enforcement cooperation will directly enhance the opportunities for drug trafficking, and this would directly impact upon the availability of drugs throughout the Pacific. Lastly, Fijian concerns over the erosion of their sovereignty during cooperative anti-drug operations have not been auditable, though they are likely to exist, and it is quite possible that their concerns over the presence of drugs outweigh those that could arise from such sensitive bilateral and multilateral investigations.

Responses of the Fijian Government to Drugs

Previous Fijian government administrations have been significantly concerned about the presence of drugs and their negative influence upon the state; this is evident through official anxiety over increasing levels of crime and the enactment of legislation to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. Senior officials have expressed their concerns, for example, Viliame Naupoto, the Commander of the Fijian Navy, stated during 2002 that the Navy was unable to


secure the borders of the country against both drug traffickers and people smugglers, and could not prevent the landing of vessels upon the 300 islands that comprise the country. The IA and RFMF appear to be equally concerned about the presence of drugs, though the extent of their concerns could not be ascertained. However, recent RFMF actions indicate that an assertive stance is being directed against those involved with marijuana, and it is likely that this will apply to all drug activities. Within Fiji, we can therefore observe the beginning of the securitisation process through the actions and the provision of additional resources by both previous governments and the IA. The state is considered the referent object requiring security, and the location of the threat has been identified as drugs and associated TNC.

Increasing cooperation between governmental and non-governmental agencies is visible, and the establishment of new agencies has resulted in considerable success. Attempts at overcoming institutional isolation and the development of stronger interagency partnerships are also evident. For example, the FPF and Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) have signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to promote a closer working relationship. This facilitates the sharing of intelligence related to crimes involving financial transactions and criminal assets, allowing for greater effectiveness; an FPF officer has also been seconded to the FIU. Further MOAs have been signed between the FIU, immigration officials and FIRCA, and more are in progress between the ministry of justice and other government agencies.

As an example of success directly related to increasing cooperation, the Fijian Transnational Crime Unit conducted a probe into the criminal activities of local residents during 2002 that resulted in Operation Outrigger (2004). The operation involved FPF and FIRCA personnel within the TCU with strong support drawn from a multinational force that comprised the AFP, the New Zealand Police, the Hong Kong Police and the Royal Malaysian Police. As a consequence of this cooperation, a factory-sized clandestine laboratory preparing for the production of methamphetamine in commercial quantities that had been established by an Asian organised crime group was dismantled. Unfortunately, as Evans observes, those arrested in connection with the laboratory are only facing a maximum prison sentence.

511 Radio Australia, “Navy Concerned Fiji will become a Haven for People Smugglers”, August 30, 2002
513 Oceania Customs Organisation, The Quarterly News, Number 18, September 2004, p.4
sentence of 8 years because drug-related criminal legislation had not been amended at that time. The success of both Outrigger and Operation Logrunner (2000), in which 357kgs of heroin was seized, directly impacted upon the perceptions of the government. Both cases vividly demonstrated that Fiji was not immune to drugs, nor could it distance itself from the negative influences of globalisation.

The intensity of this official concern culminated in the establishment of the Senate Ad-hoc Select Committee on Drugs, Crime and Prostitution (SASC). SASC was provisioned with a mandate to examine the presence of drugs and to investigate potential measures. Of specific concern was examining the relationship, if any, that marijuana had with the committing of crime or the use of violence. As a consequence of its investigations, SASC asserted that: “The illicit cultivation, supply and distribution of marijuana in the Fiji Islands continues to be a problem in rural areas around the country, which by its very nature i.e. its financial rewards often attracts criminal elements to this activity or will lure others facing extreme hardship to engage in it making it more accessible to the public with serious consequences arising from its use and abuse.” This represents significant progress, as the government could not begin to tackle drugs and drug-related crime unless it was both aware of the contemporary situation and prepared to examine it in a forthright manner. SASC acknowledged previous shortcomings in areas such as legislation, FPF capacity and the history of political instability, while also noting additional negative influences such as the presence of TNC and organised crime. SASC was particularly concerned about the potential linkages between drug consumption, crime and violence, and while the FPF expressed the opinion that the two were linked, SASC concluded that although marijuana was not linked to violence, crimes such as robbery were linked to the need to finance the purchase of marijuana.

In order to gain this accurate understanding of the drug situation, extensive consultation with both public and private stakeholders was undertaken. SASC asserted that: “There are sufficient indicators to suggest that substance abuse and prostitution are major problems that have the potential to escalate into a national crisis given its numerous links to the many social ills that effect the Fiji islands today and it is imperative that substance abuse be given the national attention it

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514 Evans, 2006, p.3 no.46
515 The Senate (A), 2006, p.2
516 The Senate (A), 2006, p.35 & p.33-40
This statement clearly demonstrates the beginning of the securitisation process, as SASC argues for the deployment of additional state resources and highlights the potential for the development of a national crisis if drugs and the associated social effects, such as crime, are not brought under control. It must be noted that before SASC, drugs were only viewed according to the associated health aspects and the specific burden placed upon the national health system. This report has expanded the perceptions of the IA to include the potential threats posed to the state by the creation of instability through crime and corruption, as well as the weakening of modern and traditional governance structures. Moreover, it has demonstrated that there will be an increasing financial burden created through the allocation of additional, and potentially scarce, resources for law enforcement agencies, the judicial system and social service providers, which may affect future government policies and restrain its ability to concentrate upon economic development priorities.

SASC has also acknowledged the financial motives that encouraged the participation of citizens with the cultivation and sale of marijuana, and that issues such as poverty in both rural and urban areas were primary influences. Though distressingly, it was also noted that attempts at introducing alternative development into some areas had failed because of the poor profitability of these crops in comparison to that generated by marijuana. According to Ms Viniana McGoon, Secretary to the Senate, continued investment in, and assistance with, alternative development programmes were viewed by the IA as the primary approach for discouraging cultivation by rural communities. Submissions to SASC reinforced this belief, and suggested that more profitable and diversified crops were required by communities to support themselves, and this would therefore counter the need to become involved in the cultivation of marijuana. Among the range of recommendations outlined by SASC, are the need for a national awareness campaigns and the overwhelming desire for the establishment of rehabilitation services. The need to investigate alternative sentencing mechanisms, such as diversion for young offenders was also noted. A holistic approach to combating drugs is therefore evident, and the recommendations of SASC recognise that a

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517 The Senate (A), 2006, p.7-8
518 The Senate (A), 2006, p.3, p.20 & p.35
519 Discussion with Ms Viniana McGoon at her parliament office in Fiji, 26 March 2008.
strategy based upon both supply and demand reduction combined with the provision of appropriate health facilities is required.

Importantly, SASC has asserted that it did not support requests by farmers in the Navosa Hills region to allow the cultivation of marijuana as a source of income, and in addition to this denial, it has called upon the government to introduce tougher penalties to deter participation. 521 According to Adinkrah, increasing rates of drug consumption in Fiji during the 1990s resulted in the imposition of mandatory prison sentences for use, possession, and cultivation, though unfortunately, according to the FPF, the imposition of these harsher penalties failed to influence drug consumption and related activities. 522 SASC recognised the transformational characteristics of drugs, and acknowledged that local demand for harder drugs could become established as a by-product of trafficking activities through Fiji, and that supply for this domestic demand would develop through market forces. 523 This is significant, as not only does it recognise that drugs are a business that involve both villages and criminal organisations, creating the potential for countermeasures based upon market principles, but that a strategy based upon structural change represents the best option, as criminal financing and important individuals are targeted, rather than unimportant peripheral traffickers or individual street sellers.

From the available evidence, it can be asserted that a whole of government approach was in the process of being implemented under the pre-coup government. This is evident in the actions of the FPF, FIRCA, the judicial system and other government agencies such as the Ministry of Education. However, in spite of prominent success and dedication, issues such as human, technical and financial capacity are still likely to restrict the ability of these agencies to achieve maximum results. Moreover, the potential for political interference with the functioning and direction of these agencies by the IA combined with issues such as RFMF immunity from prosecution represents a significant concern, as RFMF personnel could be targeted by criminals to provide assistance to their drug-related activities.

522 Adinkrah, 1995, p.55
523 The Senate (A), 2006, p.28
Previous governments and the IA have instituted a range of measures to enhance the capabilities of the state and to strengthen it against the threat posed by drugs. For example, new legal powers have been granted to the FPF to undertake electronic surveillance, though this has resulted in the creation of new challenges such as need for specialised electronic equipment, and a Criminal Intelligence Unit was established during 2005 to specifically cater to new policing demands and requirements.\textsuperscript{524} A Computer Based Training Centre has also been established at the Fijian Police Academy to provide important information technology skills that are essential for combating increasingly sophisticated criminal groups. Unfortunately, expanded policing powers and the focus upon drugs has revealed the increasing need for forensic facilities; this was noted in submissions to SASC. FIRCA has also purchased sophisticated Ion scan machines at a cost of FD$110,000, and has implemented risk management strategies that are utilised for profiling both suspicious individuals and cargo.

Significant legislative measures have been enacted to combat drugs and the associated TNC. These include the Proceeds of Crime and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1997, the Extradition Act 2003, the Illicit Drugs Control Act 2004, and the Financial Transactions Reporting Act 2005. Furthermore, in an effort to prevent potential issues such as corruption developing in the Immigration Department, fees can no longer be paid in cash.\textsuperscript{525} Other initiatives have included the founding of NSAAC. The objectives of NSAAC are to facilitate a comprehensive approach towards drug prevention education, to promote the foundation of rehabilitation services, to conduct national research and to provide recommendations to the government.\textsuperscript{526} Though, the ability of the office to carry out this extensive mandate is limited by capacity constraints and its responsibility for the entire country.

Civil society groups and the public have also become directly involved with combating marijuana; they have been incorporated, either officially or unofficially, into community policing strategies. For example, in Tukavesi, Cakaudrove, the community was directly involved in FPF operations to clear cultivated areas and

\textsuperscript{524} The Senate (A), 2006, p.62. This technology may have been obtained by the FPF since this report was published.

\textsuperscript{525} Kent Atkinson, “Triads spinning murderous web”, The New Zealand Herald, October 25, 2005

\textsuperscript{526} National Substance Abuse Advisory Council, Fiji Ministry of Education, “Overview”, www.education.gov.fj/htm/Finance/nsaac.htm (Accessed online 06/03/08). NSAAC was visited during the course of this research.
apprehend growers. The Fiji Community Education Association provides another example, it has undertaken research to estimate the scale of abuse, and has established drug awareness workshops throughout Fiji, and has also developed working relationships with government agencies. Given the overriding importance of Christianity and the social position of churches throughout the country, these could play a significant future role in providing rehabilitation services, alternative development programmes and anti-drug education.

There is evidence to suggest that the IA and RFMF view drugs as a threat to the state, though the degree to which the recommendations of SASC have been acknowledged and implemented cannot be accurately accounted for. There is however, increasing evidence of anti-drug operations. For example, in January 2007, the RFMF conducted anti-drug operations, and used the army to conduct raids throughout Suva. These operations have continued with the most recent involving the cooperation of the RFMF and FPF in Nadroga throughout March 2008. Unfortunately, according to AI, recent RFMF operations have reportedly resulted in the abuse of those detained in custody. Additional measures have included limiting the length of stay for foreign yachts as they have been identified as one of the primary sources of drugs entering the country, though this decision has been recently reversed. Furthermore, in order to ease the burden of drugs upon the judicial system, the High Court has directed that lower courts be given the ability to preside over cases where less than 0.5 grams of marijuana are involved. NSAAC has also been expanded from originally only incorporating a director, Mr Driubalavu Misaele, to include two additional support staff, as well as additional volunteers. The IA has also continued to invest resources in the FPF and RFMF, with a primary focus upon expanding their capabilities and mobility.

528 The Senate (B), Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Select Committee Established to look into the Escalating use of Drugs and Related Crimes Including Sexual Crimes and Prostitution, Vol.2, Parliamentary Paper No.22 (Suva: Fiji, Department of Legislature, 2006)
533 The Fiji Times, “New Wheels to fight crime”, March 26, 2008

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However, falling government revenue will ultimately impact upon capacity building projects and the financial resources available for social services and anti-drug measures. Though this situation may be open to change. If drugs are prioritised as a primary threat to state security and stability in the future, then the IA and RFMF would continue to invest in anti-drug operations, and would provide the FPF and other organizations with the required funding. Of serious concern is the fact that the National Security Council and the Fiji Intelligence Services have been restored by the IA to respond to perceived domestic and international threats.

According to Ratu Epeli Nailatikua, the Interim Minister for Foreign Affairs: “Given the unpredictable future national security landscape, the NCS is to be revived as soon as possible, to better safeguard Fiji’s national security matters in the medium to long term.” The potential threat posed by drugs could be used to justify the RFMF maintaining power, and this represents a credible scenario given its stated objectives of overcoming the history of poor governance, alleged instances of corruption and attempts by the pre-coup government to introduce legislation viewed by the RFMF as divisive.

It is also possible that the IA and RFMR could use the threat posed by drugs and TNC to establish greater legitimacy for the 2006 coup. Furthermore, drug-related crime could be securitised and used an internal political tool to overcome individuals and organisations opposed to the objectives of the RFMF. This potential scenario would fit neatly within the securitisation concepts developed by Buzan et al. The Fijian media already have a tendency to heighten public fears over the levels of crime occurring in the country; drugs could be easily incorporated into this discourse. Additionally, The manipulation of ethnic identity by political and social leaders has a long history in Fiji. A popular perception already exists throughout the country that many Asian immigrants are involved in criminal activities and drugs. It is plausible that the potential involvement of Asians or Indians with drugs, and the associated crime, could be manipulated and incorporated into the security discourse of the IA and RFMF. The potential for the IA and RFMF to resort to criminal sources of finance also represents a potential scenario given the

535 Commodore Frank Bainimarama, Commander RFMF Public Declaration of Military Takeover, December 5, 2006; Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama, Statement of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Fiji Islands to the 62nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 28th, 2007
weakening economy, though it would be extremely difficult, and politically explosive, to validate and raise such concerns.

Recent IA policies that have included the relaxing of immigration controls for Chinese nationals represent a cause for concern, as those involved with drugs and TNC activities may seek to exploit these relaxed border controls and disguise their activities with legitimate business ventures. The FPF have previously attributed rising crime levels throughout the country to the presence of illegal migrants, though many of these immigrants may no longer be classed as illegal, and this effectively hinders their detection.

It remains to be seen how the RFMF will approach the potential threats posed by drugs, and it is difficult to accurately assess their current and future actions against those involved. The RFMF could: maintain the focus of previous governments and continue institutional strengthening and cooperation with regional agencies; ignore any drug developments or changes; initiate a repressive stance that entails the potential for human rights violations; allow itself to become coopted by domestic and foreign criminals in an effort to replace decreasing revenue due; or, the occurrence of all four scenarios is possible. Furthermore, while aspects of sovereignty have not previously figured as an overriding concern during cooperative anti-drugs operations, given the current political situation within Fiji, it is highly likely that the RFMF would be very cautious regarding future criminal investigations that involved the participation of New Zealand and Australia. Both states have overwhelmingly rejected the justifications for the recent coup, and the RFMF could view the occurrence of criminal investigations as a potential threat to their domestic legitimacy. The RFMF will be especially sensitive to any issues regarding sovereignty and legitimacy, and discussion concerning drug activities or increased drug-related crime in Fiji by New Zealand and Australia are likely to be meet with strong rebuttals.

With regard to the concepts of securitisation and politicisation as defined by Buzan et al, the securitisation of drugs has clearly occurred though as of yet, this

has not entailed a state of emergency or an attempt to gain extraordinary powers, though the RFMF coup during 2006 and the institution of the IA could be examined according to the criteria established by Buzan et al. There is a strong possibility that the threat posed by drugs could become incorporated into the discourse of the RFMF, and the occurrence of this is encouraged by its adoption of the new security discourse as a policy guideline for its own domestic actions. While the domestic politicisation of the subject of drugs between the major political parties was not able to be ascertained, it is credible to suggest that this could occur in the future, though any political party or national leader that chose to highlight the failures of the IA and the RFMF could face significant personal consequences given the total degree of control exercised by them at this point in time.

It is also possible that the RFMF could attempt to domestically publicise any perceived failures of Australia and New Zealand to provide law enforcement assistance to it for combating the presence of drugs. It is highly unlikely that drug activities will decrease of their own accord, and in spite of the potential dangers for criminals given the unrestricted power of the RFMF for dealing with potential domestic threats, the future use of the country for trafficking activities is likely to continue, as is any regional trade in marijuana cultivated throughout Fiji.
Chapter Five
Conclusions
Conclusions for the Caribbean

The case studies of Jamaica and Haiti clearly demonstrate that drugs are a primary threat to state security, and one where the division between the traditional and new security discourse has increasingly dissipated. These two case studies must serve as an example to PIS, Pacific security practitioners and policy makers of the dangers and the dynamic characteristics associated with drugs. They frequently merge with the domestic environment present throughout the state and form symbiotic relationships with other sources of insecurity, such as gangs, non-state actors and assist with the acquisition of SALW. Moreover, they profoundly influence the governance arrangements of the state by corrupting its leaders and bureaucracy, while they also weaken its internal and external sovereignty, and assist in allowing alternative actors to insert themselves into the vacuum created by the reduction of the authority and legitimacy of the state and its diminished ability to provide for its citizens.

The weakness of the government and the totality of the state are further ensured through the rise of criminal groups and non-state actors that enjoy a strong level of coercive capacity and the ability to self-finance. This guarantees that cycles of weakness and armed conflict can develop, and that the increasing employment of violence by a government is required in order to restore its sovereignty and re-establish a secure domestic environment. Once ordinary citizens become involved, it is virtually impossible to undermine their participation, and branches of the state such as the judicial system or law enforcement agencies can become easily corrupted and overwhelmed. The number of arrests that have occurred in Jamaica as a result of the possession of marijuana should serve as an example where alternatives to criminal conviction for minor offences are required, as are alternative development projects.

With regard to Haiti it is possible that drugs have so thoroughly penetrated the state and corrupted its national leaders that even with international assistance they will remain as an overwhelmingly detrimental influence. This could potentially require further intervention in the future to ensure the security of the Caribbean and to re-establish a secure domestic environment. Disturbingly, the UN intervention
into Haiti and the reinstitution of the GOH could encourage those associated with
drugs to shift to neighbouring states where the government is equally weak and the
state is internally challenged, and the ability of external actors to assist with the
provision of security is absent. The complexities associated with state sovereignty
will continue to provide areas of opportunity where criminal groups and non-state
actors can manipulate themselves between jurisdictional asymmetries to their
advantage. The overwhelming level of violence and instability throughout Haiti is a
product of the contestation of the governance arrangements of the state by internal
actors, and it is within this environment that cocaine traffickers, and potentially those
involved with the cultivation of marijuana, have chosen to exploit the powerlessness
of the GOH, for their own economic advantaged. As long as gangs, criminal groups,
and non-state actors continue to financially benefit from their involvement with drug
activities, the GOH will be unable to effectively reinstitute itself and the
implementation of anti-drug measures will ultimately be unsuccessful. This
demonstrates the importance of strong and transparent governance for PIS security.

With regard to Jamaica, it is clear that its own political leaders have assisted
with the development and expansion of gangs as they were ideally suited for
achieving their domestic political objectives, and this patronage combined with the
use of the profits associated with drugs has facilitated their autonomy. However, in
spite of this situation, the GOJ has continually invested in the provision of financial,
technical and human resources for its law enforcement agencies to combat the
presence of drugs, which are directly linked to the high levels of violence, crime and
murder that occur. Furthermore, the GOJ has also recognised the multidimensional
characteristic of drugs, its own previous failings and has sough to institute a
comprehensive national security policy and a national anti-drug policy with high
expectations that this coordinated approach will assist with reinstituting both its
internal and external sovereignty. Jamaica, like Haiti, is trapped between the drug
demands of the US and the weaknesses present in South America that result in the
use of their states for drug production. The situation throughout Jamaica
demonstrates that governments can successful intervene into their drug-related
insecurity, however, the implementation of such policies are extremely costly.

However, unlike Haiti, the state has not previously failed, and its leaders
have attempted to utilise bilateral and multilateral relationships to assist with
enhancing its security, and bipartisan support for anti-drug strategies is evident.
One unequivocal similarity that the two states share is the resort to violence by law enforcement agencies and the implementation of highly aggressive strategies within poor and marginalised communities. These actions often result in human rights abuses, and it appears that these respective governments are able to avoid the processes associated with legitimising such actions, though states of emergency have previously been imposed, that would be required in Western states. This situation can be partially accounted for by their historical creation through the processes of colonialism, and the fact that their law enforcement agencies were previously structured according to a constabulary model of policing, with the objective of enforcing the state and not serving its citizens. This situation is also evident in PNG. Both the HNP and the JCF have, and are in the process of, undergoing extensive reform. Lastly, the fact that gangs, criminal groups and non-state actors are well financed and have acquired a strong coercive capacity also assists in accounting for the highly aggressive strategies employed by the GOJ and the GOH in order to maintain their control and authority.

Of significant concern, is the fact that even with the provision of extensive bilateral and multilateral assistance by the US and its securitisation of all drug activities throughout the Caribbean for the past four decades, this has not concomitantly resulted in the long-term reduction of the cultivation, production or trafficking of drugs, nor has it reduced the insecurity experienced by these small and weak states. In spite of repeated and sustained operational success against drugs, those involved have simply transformed their operations. This must serve as a warning to New Zealand, Australia and the Forum, that the costs of prevention are far more economical than for attempting to intervene into entrenched drug activities. For example, Mexico is now a major area for trafficking operations, where CIS previously served as the primary area for drug activities. Part of the responsibility for this derives from US policies that focus on supply over demand reduction, and the economic policies that the US pursues throughout the region, which encourage economic instability and restrict economic opportunities. The US therefore represents both part of the solution and part of the problem. As a regional actor its policies directly influence the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs, its counter measures encourage transformation and innovation among those involved and the strength of its domestic demand ensures potentially significant profits for those prepared to participate.
Moreover, US domestic political competition and policies such as the War on Drugs combined with its foreign policy objectives exert an enormous influence upon drug activities throughout the hemisphere. The US has undoubtedly been forced by competing priorities, such as the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the desire to increase mainland security, to divert resources and agencies such as their Coast Guard away from their previous duties of intercepting drugs within the Caribbean. As a direct consequence, the region will again present an ideal area for drug activities, and recent transformations such as the localised production of ATS could ensure a more insecure and unstable region in the future. The increasing reallocation of financial resources to the US mainland border with Mexico, due to domestic political concerns regarding drug trafficking and illegal migrants, represents another important, though distracting, priority. It is also highly likely that budgetary constraints that have developed as a result of its foreign policy decisions and miscalculations combined with the sub-prime mortgage crisis will influence the financial, technical and human resources available for combating drugs throughout the Caribbean in the immediate future. This situation could also have implications for the Pacific, especially if border security with Mexico is enhanced.

Considerable responsibility must be also be reserved for those CIS where cultivation, production and trafficking activities occur, as their national leaders and the governments of these states have instituted policies that directly assist with enhancing the environment for drugs, such as relaxed financial controls upon the banking sector, or they have tolerated official corruption. Alternatively, they have ignored drug developments within their state or have been unable to marshal the resources to combat their presence. Leaders within these states have also found it politically expedient to allow segments of their population, or even their own bureaucracy, to become associated with drug activities and such accommodation often results in the creation of future sources of insecurity and the empowerment of gangs, criminal groups and non-state actors. CIS already have a strong focus upon regionalism in order to overcome their collective weaknesses, and in order to further ensure their future security additional multilateral political, economic and law enforcements measures are required, as is a strong commitment to those that have already been established. Moreover, a sustainable level of funding is required for these initiatives to be maintained, and external actors that have strong historical relationships and the presence of domestic demand for drugs such as the US, UK,
France and the European Union must continue to assist these states in securing themselves and the Caribbean region.

**Conclusions for the Pacific**

The continued cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs and the expansion of these activities in the future will, without doubt, result in the establishment of a permanent domestic drug consuming market throughout PIS, and will further embed the region as an area exploited by external criminal groups and organisations. Once such activities become entrenched it is highly unlikely that they will be amenable to effective management or control, and the region does not currently possess the high level of resources required to successfully intervene into such activities on a sustained basis. PIS are already challenged by issues related to economic development and increasing urbanisation, and the inclusion of such a multifaceted issue as drugs is likely to overwhelm their already limited resources. Unfortunately, the lack of economic opportunities are also likely to encourage the participation of ordinary Melanesia, Micronesian and Polynesian citizens with drugs in order to provide for themselves, and the paradoxes relating to the occurrence of this situation have previously been highlighted. Furthermore, the presence and entrenchment of these activities directly threatens the objectives of economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and enhanced regional security as outlined in the Pacific Plan. It can be confidently asserted that without the significant investment of financial, technical and human resources, including extensive bilateral and multilateral assistance and the further enhancement of law enforcement capacity building programmes, then the continued security and stability of the Pacific cannot be guaranteed. Drugs are a contemporary threat that will increasingly materialise to the detriment of PIS and regional security.

Adequate examples of conflict and instability are readily available throughout the Pacific, and while drugs are extremely unlikely to be the cause for armed conflict—unless gang warfare related to drugs develops within urban areas—the profits associated with drugs could sustain villages, clans and non-state actors locked into domestic conflict, and assist with their SALW acquisition activities. Furthermore, while it has been frequently asserted that SALW have been overwhelmingly sourced from domestic stocks, it is possible that drug profits could be invested in acquiring them from outside the region in the future, and initiatives such increased armoury security that restrict the domestic supply could encourage this to occur. The evolution and development of a conflict scenario were domestic
actors trade drugs or use the associated profits to acquire SALW has already occurred throughout PNG. This may have already occurred throughout the Solomon Islands, or equally, it could occur in Bougainville in the future. This situation will entail very real consequences for any future peacekeeping and peace-restoration operations, as the motivations of those groups involved in conflict could transform away from those based upon grievance and towards more financial objectives. This change is likely to prevent the easy amelioration of these conflicts, and it is also likely to sustain their duration. Lastly, if drug related violence and crime developed beyond a small scale then this will negatively impact upon the viability and expansion of the tourism industry, which represents a fundamental source of income for PIS, resulting in future instability. Regional security actors and agencies cannot afford to be complacent.

Of further concern, is the development of a scenario where gangs present through PIS could become proxies for external criminal groups or organisations. For example, this could happen if they become middlemen for Asia, South American, New Zealand or Australian criminal groups, and this would eventually result in the development of indigenous PIS criminal groups that profit from their involvement in drugs. Such a scenario occurred within Haiti. This proxy scenario could become more destabilising if gangs and criminal groups developed relationships with local and national political leaders or parties, and the history of Jamaica demonstrates the challenges posed by criminals that enjoy a modicum of political patronage and protection. Moreover, successful anti-drug and organised crime strategies within New Zealand or Australia could encourage these activities to shift to more vulnerable PIS. If this were to occur, then the ability of either state to pursue these criminals would be greatly reduced, and it would require the investment of significant resources to intervene. Complexities regarding PIS sovereignty could also arise, and this would further hinder attempts at combating drugs, while also creating difficulties within key bilateral and multilateral relationships. The history of the Caribbean vividly illustrates how the tacit or explicit acceptance of corruption and crime assists with the entrenchment of criminal groups associated with drugs, and if this were to occur, then the governance capacity and both the internal and external sovereignty of PIS would be undermined. This situation is credible, given the concerns that have already been raised about accountability, transparency and corruption within many PIS.
Other equally concerning transformations could include the reinvestment of the profits derived from marijuana into ATS or methamphetamine production, or for attaining alternative drugs such as cocaine or heroin. For example, recent discussion has focused upon the availability of methamphetamine in PNG, and given its open borders and close proximity to Indonesia and the rest of South East Asia, it could be possible for the demand for low cost ATS to be stimulated within the country, or alternatively, local production facilities could become established. The trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the production of ATS and methamphetamine has already been observed in PNG. This trade throughout the Pacific could have occurred for a long period of time without official recognition of what the chemicals were being used for, and the volume of chemicals seized during operation Outrigger assists in reinforcing this scenario. There is also a strong likelihood that drugs profits will be used to provide assistance to other TNC enterprises such as migrant smuggling. Further developments could include the increasing utilisation and exploitation of cruise ship tourism for trafficking drugs, as few controls are imposed upon them. It is highly unlikely that go-fast-boats that are used for trafficking within the Caribbean will become established in the Pacific due to the large distances between PIS. Lastly, given the limited sovereignty and power that PIS currently command, it is credible to suggest that the expansion of criminal activities associated with drugs could be potentially overwhelming, and the 2006 Tongan riots vividly demonstrate this fact.

Unfortunately, the anti-drug discourse promoted by Australia, New Zealand and the Forum is not universally accepted, and as a consequence, asymmetries exist among PIS in terms of their drug legislation, their attitudes to the potential threats and facilitating conditions for their cultivation, production and trafficking. For example, Donna Browny, a member of the Vanuatu Parliament, asserted that families should have the right to cultivate marijuana given the low prices that are being paid for copra.\footnote{Pacific Islands Report, “Leave Vanuatu marijuana growers alone”, Commentary section, November, 2006} This situation is likely to be present throughout the region. There is no way to account for whether local law enforcement agencies or community leaders passively ignore the presence of marijuana cultivation in response to poor economic opportunities. There is also the strong potential for social and community values to differ throughout the region given the diversity of European and Pacific cultures. This situation results in an uneven, and potentially flawed, regional approach towards combating the presence of drugs.
The continued viability of both New Zealand and Australia as drug consuming markets combined with the strategic geographic location of PIS between the major producing and consuming markets will ensure that they are extensively used for drug activities in the future. Robert Taylor, Head of the Oceania Customs Organisation, has asserted that: “the Pacific has been used, is being used and will continue to be used for drug trafficking in the future.” As a consequence of this situation, measures that are solely directed against interception and seizure are unlikely to result in lasting success, and this is vividly demonstrated by the enormous success of Caribbean bilateral and multilateral operations that have done little to disrupt the overall continuation of drug activities. Additionally, the prohibitive financial costs associated with undertaking such regular operations raise significant questions regarding their appropriateness and sustainability, given their overall ineffectiveness and the fact that these resources could be deployed towards more effective anti-drug strategies.

A multifaceted approach is therefore required, and importantly, the recommendations of SASC in Fiji demonstrate that PIS have begun to demonstrate a sound understanding of the challenges they currently face. This understanding is also apparent within observations made by FPF and RPNGC personnel. Unfortunately, as a consequence of their limited resources, PIS may face the additional challenge of convincing New Zealand, Australia and other regional actors such as the US of the need to extensively fund their domestic initiatives. This is likely to be met with resistance, and could potentially raise questions regarding the responsibility of PIS for their own domestic security arrangements. This situation also raises questions regarding the power asymmetry of PIS in relation to regional security actors. While New Zealand and Australian have securitised drugs and TNC in the region, they may not be amenable to PIS solutions, and they could in fact seek to influence domestic drug policy in line with their own requirements. It would be highly unlikely that marijuana could be legalised or decriminalised by any PIS, even if this course of action relieved the pressure upon PIS governments and judicial systems, as this could potentially influence the availability of it in other states. Moreover, the decriminalisation and legalisation of marijuana in some PIS would directly assist with the development of the threats consistently outlined throughout this thesis.

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539 Interview with Robert Taylor in Fiji, head of the Oceania Customs Organisation, 26 March 2008
The Pacific region is firmly established within the RSC of New Zealand and Australia. Neither the political parties nor the constituents of either state would be willing to tolerate the development of drug-related security threats within PIS, and there is a strong potential for such failures to become domestically politicised. The increasing involvement of the US throughout the region and the extension of its bilateral relationships with PIS states are also likely to result in the creation of additional pressures upon their domestic drug policies. Although there is significant power asymmetry within the bilateral and multilateral relationships between PIS, New Zealand and Australia, these should not be considered as unidirectional. However, in the future, PIS will need to enhance their lobbying strategies within these states to ensure that their future anti-drug resource needs are meet. It is also possible that PIS could attempt to insert themselves further into the regional security discourse in order to maximise the potential level of assistance that they receive. Though, as the reports by the ANCD demonstrate, PIS drug issues are still largely unpublicised and inadequately addressed.

Increasing cooperation between police, customs and immigration agencies has occurred, and the establishment of new organisations such as Financial Investigation Units and Transnational Crime Units have resulted in significant regional success in seizing drug shipments, dismantling production facilities and in disrupting criminal enterprises. However, PIS require the continued expansion of the capacity of their law enforcement agencies in order to undertake sustained operations. This raises concerns regarding future sustainability, and the direct need for New Zealand and Australia to continue with expanding their presence and anti-drug measures throughout the region. Unfortunately, New Zealand appears reluctant to commit to an expanded presence throughout the region as advocated and initiated by Australia.540 In the opinion of Ranmuthugala, PIS are already unable to deal with routine law enforcement activities such as violent crime or fraud, and further responsibility for drug activities, TNC and organised crime are potentially beyond their current level of expertise.541 Similarly, Naidu has described the security forces of many PIS as _oxymoronic_ due to their reoccurring involvement in criminal activities.

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in coups and their instigation of violence.\textsuperscript{542} Significant attention will need to be focused upon not only measures to increase the professionalism and capabilities of Pacific law enforcement agencies, but also the environment that they will be policing within. This situation is clearly demonstrated by the behaviour of police personnel within Jamaica and Haiti. Attention to this last aspect is especially relevant if police are working within an environment that becomes characterised by the availability of drugs, corruption or is defined by the dominance of custom and traditional authorities.

The region has witnessed the fundamental expansion of security measures during the past few years. The AFP has become indispensable for conducting regional anti-drug operations. Moreover, they have been instrumental in establishing agencies such as the PTCCC and the provision of extensive training opportunities for law enforcement personnel via the Law Enforcement Cooperation Program. The OCO has also established the Asia-Pacific Enforcement Report System that ensures secure communications for disseminating information relating to drugs and the modus operandi of criminal groups. Joint naval operations have occurred with the objective of enhancing civil maritime surveillance techniques, such as operation Kurukuru, have involved the participation of Australia, New Zealand, France, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Fiji. Additionally, the implementation of security measures such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (2004), as a consequence of US desires to extend the burden for its territorial security, could have potentially positive benefits for PIS by enhancing their port security and this would assist in deterring their use by criminals.

However, the volume of maritime cargo and pleasure craft that transit the region will ensure that any states that fail to adopt new measures are likely to become primary targets, while the financial costs associated with these new security measures will place an additional burden upon the small, weak and microstates that characterise the region.\textsuperscript{543} Taylor also expressed strong concerns that pleasure craft involved with trafficking activities were utilising the Panama Canal to avoid US anti-drug measures in the Caribbean, and to supply other markets such as Australia.\textsuperscript{544} Given this situation and the observation by the


\textsuperscript{543} For an overview of the challenges facing customs agencies and the management of state borders in the Pacific please refer to: Michael Moriarty, Border Management in the Pacific Region (Forth coming report; 2007)

\textsuperscript{544} Interview with Robert Taylor in Fiji, head of the Oceania Customs Organisation, 26 March 2008
Colombian government that the Pacific coast was now overwhelmingly important for the trafficking of cocaine, it is credible to suggest that these activities will increasingly involve the use of PIS.

Previous attempts at introducing regional legislation have faced a situation where issues of applicability, legal capacity and a lack of monitoring have undermined their overall functioning and the original objectives associated with shared legal codes. This also does not take into account whether the laws were adopted or implemented at all. Moreover, policies and legislation that aimed at enhancing regional security through legislation, such as those identified by the Honiara Declaration, occurred at a time when the widespread visibility of drugs and TNC was low, and the threat from such criminal activities were only considered as a potential scenario. This is likely to have reduced the allocation of resources and political commitment. The lack of shared legislation throughout the Pacific directly impacts upon the ability of law enforcement agencies to cooperate, intercept and dismantle criminal activities. The absence of even minor laws that permit activities such as the monitoring of phone calls can hinder investigations and prevent the gathering of intelligence. Additionally, the failure to update criminal penalties has allowed individuals that were arrested during operation Outrigger to escape with short prison sentences. This clearly needs to be addressed.

Adherence to UN anti-drug conventions by PIS is low, and as Boister observes, these conventions are not comprehensive; they require close cooperation among member states to implement additional bilateral and multilateral legislation to make them effective.\textsuperscript{545} These legislative concerns have been commented upon frequently. For example, the 2002 Forum Communiqué asserted that: \textit{“Leaders expressed concern about the inability of current illicit drugs legislation within the region to provide a common base for law enforcement agencies to operate from both the national and regional basis.”}\textsuperscript{546} The absence of a shared anti-drug strategy for the region has been recognised, as has the lack of a regional legal response towards shared legal codes and the legislation necessary to facilitate complex anti-drug operations. The FRSC has recognised this, and the draft \textit{Illicit Drugs Control Bill} (2002) has resulted from extensive consultation

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{545}] Neil Boister, \textit{“New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of Transnational Crime in the South Pacific”}, \textit{Journal of South Pacific Law}, Vol.9, Issue 2, 2005
\item[\textsuperscript{546}] Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, \textit{‘Thirty-Third Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué’}, in \textit{PIFS (02) 8}, Suva, Fiji Islands 15-17 August 2002; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, \textit{‘Thirty-Fifth Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué’}, in \textit{Press Statement 56-04}, Apia Samoa 5-7 August 2004
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
between the Forum, OCO and the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference. The bill has been used as the basis for legislation introduced by Tonga, Fiji, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

The examination of Forum documents clearly demonstrates that the presence of drugs throughout the Pacific has been securitised, however, with regard to Buzan this regional securitisation is different to the securitisation of drugs by a state. The Forum commands little authority and few coercive measures, and it continues to face financial difficulties. Furthermore, established norms such as the Pacific way and the preference of regional actors like New Zealand to defer to international authorities such as the UN before undertaking interventionist actions ensures that securitisation at the regional level is directed largely by a mixture of benevolence and compassionate self-interest, even if Forum policy is overwhelmingly influenced by both Australia and New Zealand. This is in contrast to state securitisation, where unstated objectives are often behind attempts to gain extraordinary powers. Moreover, as Boxall notes, the political nature of the Forum reduces the overall ability of its leaders to respond to crises and conflicts.

If PIS view the potential threats posed by drugs as an externally imposed security agenda that is unrelated to their own concerns, then this situation could prevent their future acceptance of additional measures such as legislation for the extradition of criminals. More importantly, significant concern over the possible need to surrender elements of their sovereignty for the collective objective of enhancing regional security could conceivably occur, and the potential for such sensitivities has already been demonstrated during US-Caribbean negotiations over the Ship-rider Agreements. Indeed, concerns over protecting sovereignty are likely to become issues that result in significant delays. For example, the current political situation in Fiji could potentially prevent regional assistance with future anti-drug operations. The issue of sovereignty throughout the Pacific is a particularly difficult issue, and shares many similarities with the Caribbean, as the sheer number of jurisdictions and the complexity of sovereignty arrangements hinder quick cooperation. France and the US also have considerable interests throughout the Pacific, and it is likely that these powerful actors will need to provide both their consent and to allocate additional resources to these territories in order to proceed.

547 Australian National Council on Drugs, 2006, p.308-309
548 Australian National Council on Drugs, 2006, p.309
for them to comply with anti-drug measures. Lastly, PIS are not homogenous, and as such, any current political or economic conflicts between them could become subsumed within bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and could prevent their adoption of new measures.

New Zealand, Australia, the Forum and PIS must be willing to examine the previous success and failures of the Caribbean in order to avoid becoming trapped within the same cycles of crime, violence, and instability. For this to happen a regional strategy that is multifaceted, which combines a credible focus and balance between seizure objectives, demand reduction, alternative development and sentencing, must be developed. Importantly, an increased desire for political and economic regionalism over and above what has already occurred is evident throughout the Pacific. Moreover, the politicisation, political bargaining and antagonism that are traditionally associated with the discussion of drug issues must be overcome by political accommodation and bi-partisan support. Furthermore, while it can be easily asserted that PIS are frequently subjected to the imposition of foreign political agendas, which raise questions regarding relevance and appropriateness, such as post-September 11 security measures and anti-Terror legislation, the same cannot be said for regional anti-drug measures. Drug-related threats and insecurity have already begun to materialise, and will directly influence both bilateral and multilateral relations throughout the region in the foreseeable future. Additionally, future regional strategies must explicitly include the US, and must aim to incorporate their efforts as much as possible within the strategies developed by the Forum.

However, though this approach is likely to bring significant benefits to PIS in the form of increased financial, technical and human resource assistance, the power of the US and its own objectives could equally dominate the objectives of the Forum. The assertiveness of the US within the development of anti-drug policy could lead to measures that are either out of touch with Pacific cultures or antithetical to the interests of New Zealand and Australia. For example, the preference for law enforcement measures and supply over demand reduction by the US could place additional burdens upon PIS and their judicial systems. Lastly, the US has already begun the process of negotiating Shiprider Agreements with PIS, both Palau and the Cook Islands have already agreed to these legislative measures, and while the Forum should not intervene to stop these bilateral agreements, it should seek to pressure the US to organise them on a more holistic
regional level with the Forum at the centre of negotiations so that the whole region may benefit. The cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of drugs will not stop of their own accord, and as such a robust regional response is required for the future security of the Pacific.

Potential Future Policy Initiatives for the Pacific

1. The establishment of a Regional Drug Master Plan
2. The undertaking of a regional survey of high school students to estimate the extent of drug consumption and availability as a barometer for the wider community
3. The establishment of a regional fund for anti-drug operations
4. The establishment of a regional training school for drug councillors
5. The institution of a regional training programme for drug detection dogs
6. Increased cooperation between the Pacific Maritime Patrol Boat Programme, customs, police, immigration agencies, and both the Australian and New Zealand Navy in regional monitoring.
7. Increased monitoring of private vessels transiting the region
8. Increased cooperation with Caribbean intelligence, customs and police agencies, and other regional organisations involved with combating drugs.
9. Increased cooperation with US Pacific agencies such as the DEA or Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).
10. Increased cooperation with Asia and South American police and customs agencies.
11. Alternative economic development projects

Barriers to Regional Success in Combating Illicit Drugs

1. Domestic armed conflict and SALW acquisition activities
2. State and government weakness
3. The presence of corruption
4. A lack of domestic political support and institutional apathy
5. A lack of financial, technical and human resources
6. Poor support from New Zealand and Australia
7. The presence of political accommodation between national leaders and criminals
8. The entrenchment of drugs through the involvement of ordinary citizens
9. A lack of economic incentives to discourage participation by ordinary citizens
10. A lack of coercive measures to discourage criminal participation
11. The geographic dispersal of PIS and an inability to assist all states
12. The development of criminal relationships between Pacific gangs and criminal groups, and Asian, South American, New Zealand and Australian counterparts.
13. The potential for significant profits above what the formal economy can provide
14. Poor regional cooperation
15. Bilateral and multilateral tension or difficulties

Conclusions for the Employment of the Concepts Developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde

The Securitisation of New Threats and the Potential for Human Right Abuses

Significant criticism has been directed against the opening up of both the referent object and the location of the threat. According to this disapproval, such an action would make the field of conflict and security studies incoherent, and the concept of security devoid of any substantive meaning. More dangerously, a situation could result where security could be invoked for any event defined as a threat, and as long as those holding power were in a strong position, with weak domestic political opposition, then the citizens of such a state would, undeniably, be at the caprice of those in power. While Buzan et al have asserted that there are socially defined limits to what can be securitised, these limits are to an extent meaningless as long as those in power address their legitimating audience in terms that are appropriate and in concert with prevailing social beliefs. This is clearly demonstrated by the actions of the Jamaican and Haitian governments and their
law enforcement agencies, and this also exists to an extent within PNG. It is questionable whether such aggressive methods bring about a higher level of safety and lower rates of crime, though without a doubt human rights abuses occur on a large scale because of these tactics. While it is important to recognise the significance of new security threats, the adoption of the discourse can itself lead to the commission of acts or the development of policies that were once indefensible or unthinkable.

The strong possibility of such scenarios occurring requires a further example to reinforce the seriousness of the implications. According to Emmers, drugs were securitised as a threat to the national security of Thailand during Thakin Shinawatra term as Prime Minister, and all categories of the NSF with the exception of the environment were included within his discourse that legitimated the aggressive actions of the state.551 As a consequence of police actions, an estimated 2,000 people were killed, 52,000 were arrested and 40 million ATS pills were seized between February and April 2003 when the first official anti-drug campaign ended.552 A census of Thai citizens revealed strong support for these anti-drug measures and oppositional parties accused Shinawatra of using the securitisation of drugs for political gain.553 Muna reinforces the negative consequences of securitisation, and cites the established practice of securitisating non-traditional issues and virtually everything within Indonesia as a mechanism for domestic control during the Presidency of Suharto (1966-1998).554 Similarly, the GOJ has instituted states of emergency for such purposes, and in the future the RFMF could equally use the securitisation of drugs and crime to maintain its control and to enhance its legitimacy. The immediate effectiveness of such anti-drug campaigns should not be downplayed. However, the focus upon supply reduction and the avoidance of demand reduction that is characteristic with the securitisation of drugs are highly unlikely to result in any tangible benefits as the environment that facilitates drug activities remains intact.

The application of the NSD frequently results in a militarised response by governments for purposes and priorities that are clearly more political than defence related, even though drugs are intimately involved with tangible threats. These

551 Emmers (A), 2004, p.14
552 Emmers (B), 2004, p.12; Emmers (A), 2004, p.16-18
553 Emmers (A), 2004, p.15 & p.17
observations assist in reinforcing the conclusion that unless securitisation is undertaken with a state where political transparency is valued and a system of checks and balances upon the actions of both the state and its agencies are in place, then it is likely that securitisation will result in human rights abuses. The employment of securitisation in weak and failing states, non-Western states and those that are internally challenged with low levels of legitimacy such as former colonial states, often results in the abuse of their citizens. The political character of the state must therefore be taken into account with the adoption of the NSD, though given the domestic objectives of political, security and defence actors, it is highly unlikely that they would be self-reflective and question their own employment of such a discourse if it was successful for achieving their goals. As a consequence, the securitisation of new issues is likely to be directly associated with the maintenance of state power and its measures to combat threats to its authority, and it represents an ideal mechanism for non-democratic states to legitimise their actions to the international community.

Securitisation Versus Criminalisation

The relationship between repression and the use of securitisation is linked to other important discussions, such as whether issues should be handled by measures that are already available versus the mobilisation of additional state resources. For example, with regard to Indonesia, SALW have remained criminalized while the trafficking of drugs has been securitised, and a war on drugs has been instituted.\textsuperscript{555} In Fiji, the beginnings of the securitisation process are visible, though as of yet this has not resulted in a war on drugs, and the motivation for the provision of additional state resources has come from a combination of the research undertaken by the SASC and the magnitude of the drug seizures that have occurred. In Jamaica a combination of securitisation and criminalisation is visible, with the continued allocation of resources to law enforcement agencies and aggressive anti-drug strategies, while alternative sentencing mechanisms are also being implemented. Clearly, there is a need to raise the priority of an important security issue so that it can obtain the necessary resources before it becomes a potentially destabilising crisis, though it is questionable whether securitisation represents the best course of action for all states and all issues. Often the politicisation of an issue within the media is enough to ensure the allocation of additional resources.

\textsuperscript{555} Muna, 2006, p.108
Applicability of the PS&F, NFA, and R&P

The NFA has been criticised as too euro-centric in character, and therefore only applicable within certain states. Buzan and Weaver have attempted to address these euro-centric criticisms by asserting that the original concepts were devised with developing states in mind.\footnote{Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.42} However, in spite of considerable efforts devoted by them to understand and highlight the security issues that are intimately associated with former colonial and developing states, in reality the application of the NFA raises significant problems. Firstly, when examining developing, weak or failed states the ability to obtain accurate and up-to-date information represents a significant challenge, as information concerning the actions and policies of the government are frequently unobtainable from the bureaucracy, or it may not even exist, and this was demonstrated by the investigation into Haiti and PNG. Furthermore, in more authoritarian states transparency is not valued as a priority, and information detailing their decisions are therefore not available. Decisions could be made on a more ad-hoc basis if a state does not base the legitimacy of its actions upon support derived from its citizens.

The sheer volume and specific nature of the information required to conduct informed analysis of a particular state raises an additional concern, as when examining a potential threat or example of securitisation multiple categories of the NFA must be employed to gain a holistic understanding. For example, information concerning the presence of drugs and their influence upon Haiti, PNG and Fiji are not well developed, and this requires considerable background research. Importantly, the NFA has allowed this thesis to avoid some of the issues associated with the lack of detailed information and statistics concerning the presence of drugs, and examining the actions of the state assists with assessing whether their respective governments view drugs as a security threat. The NFA has also allowed this thesis to employ an organised approach for examining the threat posed by drugs throughout the four case studies. Furthermore, consulting PS&F has allowed this thesis to examine the importance of non-state actors and gangs, and to highlight their interdependent relationship with their host state, while also providing an overview of the contemporary and historical challenges facing the state.

The consultation of R&P has demonstrated the importance of powerful states, such as the US or Australia, and regional or global actors, such as the INCB or the
Forum, for defining the domestic drug policies of the case studies. R&P has also illustrated the importance of their historical and contemporary bilateral and multilateral relationships, and how these can influence the domestic decisions made by governments. However, because of the volume of information that is required to make important decisions, it is quite possible that arbitrary conclusions or poor insights into future their actions could result, and as a consequence analysis of important current events could be limited to post-factum situations. This is unhelpful for informing current or immediate policy decisions.

The definitions employed by Buzan et al, and especially the difference between securitisation and politicisation are somewhat arbitrary and it is clear that a mixture of both are in operation when a government is attempting to gain legitimacy for its actions or future policies. These definitions must also be placed under the caveat of public versus private securitisation, as clearly publicising a security issue is beneficial for a government attempting to either shape its presentation within the media, to confuse other actors attempting to gain an insight into their future intentions or can merely assist with presenting the façade of public consultation.

Buzan et al have been overwhelming motivated by the desire to examine the process of securitisation and the claiming extraordinary powers by governments during a state of emergency, the securitisation of some issues, and this is especially relevant for drugs, often occur over a long period of time. Moreover, within this long time period, individual events can involve the attempt to gain extraordinary powers during the invocation of a state of emergency, as the discussion of Jamaica demonstrates. This highlights a problem with the employment of securitisation as described by Buzan et al: the timing and occurrence of events. Securitisation should be conceived of as existing along a spectrum, and does not necessarily involve an attempt to gain extraordinary powers during an emergency situation. The example of the US government and its invocation of emergency powers immediately after the attacks upon the World Trade Towers represents one end of the spectrum and fits the definitions developed by Buzan et al. The other end of this spectrum is provided by Jamaica and its long history of attaching a high priority to drug-related insecurity, which has at times involved emergency measures, though it has traditionally involved the overwhelming allocation of resources for anti-drug measures. Furthermore, since drugs represent a multidimensional threat that is at times difficult to define, aspects of security that are associated with drugs, such as organised crime, urban gangs or specific drug-related activities or types of drugs, can be, and
are often securitised individually. Lastly, more attention must be focused by Buzan et al, if it this has not already occurred, to the complexity of sovereignty arrangements, where states may be unable to act upon an issue because of their weakness, or could be influenced towards making specific policy decisions because of external actors.
## Appendix

### 1.1 Small Arms and Light Weapons Availability in Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estimated numbers</th>
<th>Multiplier</th>
<th>Est. weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-state military</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Front of the North</td>
<td>500-1,000</td>
<td>0.5-1</td>
<td>250-1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-USGPN (Presidential Guard)</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-FADH/FRAPH</td>
<td>1,500-2,000</td>
<td>0.5-1</td>
<td>750-2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPL** including vigilance brigades</td>
<td>2,000 (10-50 members per OP)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-opposition groups</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defence bourgeois militia</td>
<td>200-300</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>300-450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state criminal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baz amis (criminal gangs)</td>
<td>2,000 (10-30 per baz)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized criminal gangs (including drug traffickers)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zengledos (petty criminals)*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison escapees</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-state other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security company personnel</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,000--13,150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estimated numbers</th>
<th>Multiplier</th>
<th>Est. weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeois, middle class, slum dwellers</td>
<td>8,500,000 (1.7m households)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>170,000†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MINUSTAH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5,000†</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (2 BTN, 5 COY)</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (1 BTN, 2 COY)†</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (MP, 1 COY)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan (1 BTN, 4 COY)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (1 BTN, 4 COY)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (1 COY)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain/Morocco (1 BTN, 2 COY)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State sub-total</strong></td>
<td>26,610--27,110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estimated numbers</th>
<th>Multiplier</th>
<th>Est. weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HNP†</td>
<td>5,000†</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilized FADH and IPS†</td>
<td>5,482 (1994–96)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbanded Mil/PONUH†</td>
<td>285 (2000)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy (coast guard)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbanded air force</td>
<td>1,104 (1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissed HNP†</td>
<td>500–1,000 (2003–04)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500–1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State sub-total</strong></td>
<td>26,610–27,110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estimated numbers</th>
<th>Multiplier</th>
<th>Est. weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>207,610–210,160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*a: Government militia—colloquially known as chimires—are composed of members of the baz arms, the armed OPs, and the USGPN.

*b: Zengledos tend to be armed primarily with creole weapons.

c: The HNP registered 20,379 weapons held by civilians in 2001.

d: 1 AV LINUT (28) and 1 HCR LEV II (175)

e: 1 AV LINUT (93) and 1 LINUK (130)

f: The HNP reported 6,130 police officers in November 2004, though most OAS and MINUSTAH officials agree that it is unlikely that the number rises above 3,000.
1.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers to Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Estimated number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>15–20 SIG-saur 9 mm pistols for HNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-98</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Military equipment and training for HNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Covert</td>
<td>5,000–10,000 .38 revolvers, 9 mm automatic rifles, M-3 grease-guns, Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sub-machine guns, Smith &amp; Wesson .38 revolvers, and fragmentation grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>US (Florida)</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>260 firearms, 15,000 rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>US (Florida)</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>At least 12 .45 handguns, ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>US (Florida)</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>78 M16 assault rifles, 9,000 rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>187 shotguns, 20 pistols, 86,000 rounds of ammunition, USD 2,000 of pistols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>USD 36,977 of shotguns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>US (Florida)</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>5–10 .38 and .45 handguns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–04</td>
<td>US, Dominican</td>
<td>Covert</td>
<td>M16s, ammunition, and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>150 shotguns, 20 pistols, 33,000 rounds of ammunition, USD 31,199 of bombs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>grenades, and ammunition, USD 3,800 of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>155 sport rifles, 1 pistol, 36,000 rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Covert</td>
<td>150 R1 rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, grenades, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>1,916 .38 revolvers, 493 9mm pistols, 23 .45 pistols, 204 training revolvers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 machine guns, 13 M14 rifles, and ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>3,000 .38 revolvers, 500 9mm pistols, 500 12-gauge shotguns, 200 mini-M14 rifles,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100 MS carbines and other equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Assorted media reports, UN (2005), and NSAT (2004)
### 1.3 Armed Groups Present Throughout Haiti

#### Annexe 1: Typology of Armed Elements in Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Primary Motivations</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular Organizations (OPs)</td>
<td>Political, socio-economic, and predatory; linked to material gain and subsistence</td>
<td>OPs are community-based organizations that traditionally enjoy a tight relationship with political leaders, wielding resources, voter bases, and electoral influence. They are the most well-known and most influential groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baz armes (youth gangs)</td>
<td>Socio-economic and predatory, though used by political groups such as OPs</td>
<td>Usually composed of unemployed and unskilled youth often connected directly by OP leadership to undertake acts of violence and intimidation. Many of these groups join the 'Tegides' mentioned above, while others operate autonomously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Criminals</td>
<td>Extractive and illegal rents, both international and national</td>
<td>These groups are generally involved in narcotics and weapons trafficking and organize youth gangs for defensive and commercial purposes. &quot;Deral Mackmit&quot; was the leader of such a group in Cité de Dieu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance from (military and civil)</td>
<td>Political opposition groups, seeking a combination of state control and illegal rents</td>
<td>These include former soldiers, ex-police, and former leaders, as well as individuals, deputies, and OP members in the cases of the &quot;Revolutions Front of the North&quot; and the &quot;Arms of 1990&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Pre-Opposition Groups

- Politically affiliated with opposition groups and in pursuit of illegal rents
  - These groups are anti-Lavalas and are often affiliated with and supported by ex-FADH, FRAP, or political opposition groups such as Democratic Convergence or the Forum of 184. An example is RNAP LD in St. Marc.

- Ex-FRAPP (Presidential Guard)
  - Hand-selected group created to protect Aristide individuals with limited police training who specialize in state protection. The majority are partisans of Aristide, recruited on the basis of political loyalty to former President Aristide in the 1980s and beyond.

- Ex-FADH
  - Consists primarily of former combatants demobilized between 1994 and 1996 or members of the paramilitary group FAHIN.

- Paramilitary Death Squads
  - FAHIN
  - Politically aligned military paramilitary groups operating in urban and rural areas.

- Zongfilet (party criminals)
  - Predatory and illegal rents in urban and rural areas.

- Prison escapes
  - Predatory and illegal rents in urban and rural areas.

- Armed children
  - Victims of forced recruitment, though also active participants in some cases.

**Zero Tolerance** groups (exactions)

- Predatory activities linked to political groups
  - These are not members of the police force, nor officially trained at the police academy. Rather, they act as special units made up of armed civilians thugs and operate in police stations in large urban areas. They also often provide special security functions for key political figures.

**Self-defence militias**

- Self-defence in wealthy urban environments
  - These are common in well-off neighborhoods and commercial areas where residents and retailers have organized themselves in self-defense.

**Private security companies (PSCs)**

- Socio-economic, though also associated with the trafficking of weapons
  - PSCs are not practically registered and the permissive regulatory firearms environment has allowed many to be heavily armed. PSCs were legalized in 1997 and 1998 by presidential decree.

**HNP associated with criminal groups**

- Predatory and illegal rents, as well as linkages with political factions
  - The HNP was formally reconstituted by presidential decree in 1994, following the demobilization of the FADH. It is notoriously corrupt and regularly accused of human rights violations and politicization.
2.1 Black Market Small Arms and Light Weapons Prices in Papua New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/Model</th>
<th>Lowest PGK (USD)</th>
<th>Highest PGK (USD)</th>
<th>Average PGK (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-powered rifles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td>4,000 (1,330)</td>
<td>16,000 (5,330)</td>
<td>9,500 (3,170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR15</td>
<td>4,000 (1,330)</td>
<td>15,000 (5,000)</td>
<td>9,000 (3,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLR</td>
<td>8,000 (2,660)</td>
<td>25,000 (8,330)</td>
<td>12,150 (4,050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>8,500 (2,830)</td>
<td>12,000 (4,000)</td>
<td>10,250 (3,420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>5,000 (1,670)</td>
<td>8,000 (2,860)</td>
<td>6,500 (2,170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JH1</td>
<td>4,500 (1,590)</td>
<td>10,000 (3,330)</td>
<td>6,400 (2,130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>20,000 (6,660)</td>
<td>45,000 (15,000)</td>
<td>32,000 (10,670)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimax</td>
<td>15,000 (5,000)</td>
<td>40,000 (13,330)</td>
<td>25,800 (8,510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-916</td>
<td>15,000 (5,000)</td>
<td>40,000 (13,330)</td>
<td>23,750 (7,920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-machine guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,000 (7,330)</td>
<td>30,000 (10,000)</td>
<td>21,700 (7,230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump-action shotguns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,000 (1,670)</td>
<td>15,000 (5,000)</td>
<td>8,200 (2,730)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handguns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolver</td>
<td>500 (165)</td>
<td>5,000 (1,670)</td>
<td>2,850 (950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automatic pistol</td>
<td>2,000 (670)</td>
<td>15,000 (5,000)</td>
<td>6,600 (2,220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-made guns</td>
<td>120 (40)</td>
<td>230 (80)</td>
<td>160 (60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alpers (2004)
* Amounts paid and asked for black-market firearms were reported in each community meeting, and in all interviews with firearm users and other informants (Alpers, 2004). Gun prices were also quoted in various newspaper reports.
** These averages are calculated from all the low and high prices collected, not just from the single lowest and highest prices cited in columns 2 and 3.

2.2 Black Market Ammunition Prices in Papua New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Lowest PGK (USD)</th>
<th>Highest PGK (USD)</th>
<th>Average PGK (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.56 x 45 mm NATO</td>
<td>M16, AR15, SIG S40, SIG S5, SAR-8, SA-60, SA-80, FAMAS, Steyr, Ultimax, Minimi</td>
<td>5 (1.70)</td>
<td>25 (8.30)</td>
<td>12 (4.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.308 mm NATO</td>
<td>SLR, G-3, MAG-58, M-60, Bren</td>
<td>5 (1.70)</td>
<td>25 (8.30)</td>
<td>15 (5.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.303 British</td>
<td>AK-47, AKM, Type 68 and many other variants, SKS</td>
<td>12 (4.00)</td>
<td>23 (8.30)</td>
<td>19 (6.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 mm Parabellum</td>
<td>Pistols and sub-machine guns, most models</td>
<td>2 (0.70)</td>
<td>10 (3.30)</td>
<td>6 (2.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.38 Special</td>
<td>RPNGC S&amp;W revolvers</td>
<td>1 (0.30)</td>
<td>8 (2.70)</td>
<td>5 (1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 gauge shotgun shell</td>
<td>RPNGC &amp; PNGDF issue</td>
<td>5 (1.70)</td>
<td>8 (3.00)</td>
<td>12 (4.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alpers (2004)
* Amounts paid and asked for black-market ammunition were reported in each community meeting, and in all interviews with firearm users and other informants (Alpers, 2004).
** These averages are calculated from the many low and high prices quoted in all interviews, not from the single lowest and highest prices cited in columns 3 and 4.
### 2.3 Unaccounted for Small Arms and Light Weapons in Papua New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Calibre</th>
<th>Number unaccounted for</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automatic rifle</td>
<td>LR</td>
<td>Semi-automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>M16A1</td>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>M16A2</td>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>M16A2</td>
<td>Automatic rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>Bushmaster M16</td>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automatic rifle</td>
<td>Colt AR15</td>
<td>Semi-automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>SR-88</td>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR-88A</td>
<td>Automatic rifle (collapsible butt)</td>
<td>Automatic rifle (collapsible butt)</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>SR-88A</td>
<td>Automatic rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enfield Sterling</td>
<td>SA-80</td>
<td>Automatic rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMAS F-1</td>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMAS G-2</td>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>Automatic rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;K H&amp;K 33E + H&amp;K 79</td>
<td>Automatic rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>Automatic rifle (carbine)</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galil</td>
<td>Snipe rifle</td>
<td>Galil rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolt-action rifle</td>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-machine gun</td>
<td>P-90</td>
<td>Sub-machine gun</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-machine gun</td>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>Sub-machine gun</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump-action shotgun</td>
<td>Mossberg</td>
<td>Pump-action shotgun</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump-action shotgun</td>
<td>Ross</td>
<td>Pump-action shotgun</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotguns</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Shotguns</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>.308 mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.4 Unaccounted for Small Arms and Light Weapons in Papua New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Calibre</th>
<th>Number unaccounted for</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assorted home-made</td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>12 ga</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Browning High-Power</td>
<td>L9A1/1935</td>
<td>Semi-automatic pistol</td>
<td>9 mm</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colt</td>
<td>Semi-automatic pistol</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG Sauer</td>
<td>Semi-automatic pistol</td>
<td>9 mm</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG Sauer</td>
<td>Semi-automatic pistol</td>
<td>9 mm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG Sauer</td>
<td>Semi-automatic pistol</td>
<td>9 mm</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cectedo</td>
<td>Boot pistol</td>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren</td>
<td>Light machine gun</td>
<td>7.62 mm NATO</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ular-max-100</td>
<td>Machine gun</td>
<td>7.62 mm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Machine gun</td>
<td>7.62 mm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Type M16</td>
<td>General-purpose machine gun</td>
<td>7.62 mm NATO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-60</td>
<td>General-purpose machine gun</td>
<td>7.62 mm NATO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun .50 cal</td>
<td>Heavy-mounted machine gun</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oerlikon</td>
<td>Heavy-deck-mounted machine gun</td>
<td>20 mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M203</td>
<td>Under-barrel grenade launcher</td>
<td>40 mm</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M79</td>
<td>Grenade launcher</td>
<td>40 mm</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7</td>
<td>Rocket-propelled grenade launcher</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-2</td>
<td>Mortar tube</td>
<td>81 mm</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For more accurate weapon descriptions, and to fill gaps in this information, see Alesca (2004).*
2.5 Tribal Conflict and Casualties in Papua New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Reported casualties</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Eastern Highlands</td>
<td>60 killed</td>
<td>Hand grenades, a rocket launcher and high-powered rifles used; &gt;5000 combatants reported involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Western Highlands</td>
<td>47 killed</td>
<td>Land dispute between Kolo Kongo clan and 4 others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Southern Highlands</td>
<td>&lt; 100 killed</td>
<td>Conflict has simmered for 10 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–02</td>
<td>Southern Highlands</td>
<td>'Several hundred' killed</td>
<td>Between the Unjansap and Wega peoples. Fighting took place in provincial capital Mendi, which was left a 'ghost town.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Chimbu</td>
<td>8 killed</td>
<td>Conflict between several warring tribes in the Kundawas/Girgagol and Kamanuku districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Morobe</td>
<td>3 killed, over 5,000 families displaced</td>
<td>Clashes between Western Highlanders and local Menyanya clan in Lae city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Enga</td>
<td>17 killed</td>
<td>Clashes involved &gt;1,000 combatants of the Magin and Irel clans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Port Moresby</td>
<td>9 killed</td>
<td>Victims all from the Goilala clan from Central Province. Also called the 'Tete massacre' in media reports. Perpetrators were originally from Tari in the Southern Highlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Enga</td>
<td>501 killed</td>
<td>Conflict between Guapin and Kandnautin clans, fuelled by leaders 'pursuing their own fame and greed.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Enga</td>
<td>15 killed</td>
<td>Fighting between the Lipin and Sundak clans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Eastern Highlands</td>
<td>&lt;100 killed</td>
<td>Ceasefire agreement signed between various clans to end on/off fighting begun in 1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Western Highlands</td>
<td>4 killed</td>
<td>Conflict between the Enga Rami and Enga Maip Kambil clans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 1 continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Reported casualties</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Eastern Highlands</td>
<td>10 killed</td>
<td>Conflict between Lieme and Baeita clans (both of the Hofaga tribe).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Morobe</td>
<td>3 killed</td>
<td>Conflict between Watut clan and workers in town of Wai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Chimbu</td>
<td>5 killed</td>
<td>Clashes in Chiaze and Kerowagi districts related to provincial by-elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Enga</td>
<td>10 killed, several thousand displaced</td>
<td>Conflict between Kamain and Yapalarut peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Chimbu</td>
<td>&lt; 1 killed, around 5,000 displaced</td>
<td>Clashes involving people from Western Province and Enga Province near Wagi River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Western Highlands</td>
<td>&lt; 60 killed, 50 missing</td>
<td>Clashes involving people from Western Province and Enga Province near Wagi River.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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