ANZAC PEACEKEEPING:
TRANS-TASMAN RESPONSES TO THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS IN 1997 AND THE SUBSEQUENT EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIA’S AND NEW ZEALAND’S REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury

ROSEMARY BAIRD

UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY
Christchurch, New Zealand, 2008
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements..............................................................................................................................................1

Abbreviations..........................................................................................................................................................2

Abstract....................................................................................................................................................................4

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................................5

1. Historical Themes................................................................................................................................................13

   Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific ..............................................................................................................13

   Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship ..........................................................................................21

   The creation of Anzac ........................................................................................................................................27

2. Historiography......................................................................................................................................................33

   Australian and New Zealand views of the Pacific ...............................................................................................34

   Australian and New Zealand defence thinking .................................................................................................40

   The development of the Anzac legend ..................................................................................................................49

3. The TMG in Bougainville....................................................................................................................................55

   Background to the Bougainville conflict ..............................................................................................................57

   Australian and New Zealand tensions ................................................................................................................62

   Trans-Tasman cooperation in spite of difficulties .............................................................................................69

   New Zealand’s Pacific advantage .......................................................................................................................72

4. Trans-Tasman Peacekeeping after Bougainville ...............................................................................................78

   Background to the East Timor conflict and INTERFET ......................................................................................80

   Lessons learnt from Bougainville ......................................................................................................................82

   The trans-Tasman relationship in East Timor .....................................................................................................83

   Background to Solomon Islands conflict and RAMSI .......................................................................................91

   Lessons learnt from previous peacekeeping missions .......................................................................................94

   The trans-Tasman relationship in the Solomon Islands .....................................................................................95

5. Anzac Peacekeeping.............................................................................................................................................103
List of Maps and Figures

Map i.1: The Pacific Ocean/Oceania as seen from Solomon Islands………………………………………12
Map 3.1: Vicinity of Bougainville Island .........................................................................................56
Figure 3.1: The New Zealand Land Rovers at Buka, March 1998..................................................68
Figure 3.2: The New Zealand Light Tactical Raft, Buka, March 1998..............................................68
Figure 3.3: NZDF Haka at Ruruvu School, central Bougainville, March 1998............................75
Map 4.1: Vicinity of Timor..............................................................................................................79
Map 4.2: The Solomon Islands.......................................................................................................90
Figure 5.1: NZDF Haka at their departure from Loloho, April 1998..............................................109
Figure 5.2: Anzac Day celebrations at Sohano Island, 25 April 1998.............................................109
Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a great number of people for their aid in helping me to complete this thesis.

Many thanks to my supervisors, Professor Peter Hempenstall and Professor Philippa Mein Smith for their encouragement, advice and expertise in the field of trans-Tasman history. Thanks is due to Sheryl Boxall of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) for helping organize my Wellington interviews. Also, thanks to Jim Rolfe for giving me access to his personal research notes on the TMG. Jan Gammage and Dr. Bob Breen in Australia were invaluable in expanding my list of interviewees. Indeed, particular thanks must also go to Dr. Bob Breen for his kindness in sharing with me his extensive knowledge of peacekeeping in Bougainville and commenting on the draft of my third chapter. Thanks to Andrew Rice for allowing me the use of his wonderful photographs of his experiences in Bougainville. I am very appreciative of the financial assistance given me by a MFAT historical research award and BRCSS Masters scholarship. These grants enabled me to visit Canberra and Wellington in order to conduct my interviews. I am also grateful to family members, friends and postgraduate colleagues who tolerantly supported my year-long fascination with peacekeeping and kept me smiling.

And, lastly, my especial thanks to all the men and women who made time in their busy schedules to talk to me about their involvement in peacekeeping missions. This thesis would not have been possible without their generosity and perspicuity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Australian Imperial Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZAC</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand Army Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPI</td>
<td>Australian Strategic Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIG</td>
<td>Bougainville Interim Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Bougainville Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRF</td>
<td>Bougainville Resistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANZ</td>
<td>Canada, Australia, New Zealand group at UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Closer Defence Relations (Australia and New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Centre of Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJFH</td>
<td>Deployable Joint Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSN</td>
<td>Defence Secret Network (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Forças Armadas para a Liberaçã Nacional do Timor Leste (paramilitary wing of FRETILIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Australian Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMNZS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFM</td>
<td>Istabu Freedom Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPMT</td>
<td>International Peace Monitoring Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Malaitan Eagle Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers (in Sinai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZEF</td>
<td>New Zealand Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPRES</td>
<td>Operational and Preparedness Reporting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>Panguna Landowners Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Peace Monitoring Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Peace Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNGDF</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Participating Police Force (in RAMSI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAME</td>
<td>Royal Australian Mechanical Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Royal Australian Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>The Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSIP</td>
<td>Royal Solomon Island Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSL</td>
<td>Returned and Services League of Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSC</td>
<td>Strategic and Defence Studies Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNO</td>
<td>Senior National Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPPKF</td>
<td>South Pacific Peacekeeping Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>Truce Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This thesis investigates the evolution of Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping operations in the Pacific through a trans-Tasman lens. Both Australian and New Zealand sources are used in order to understand the relationship and interaction between the two nations. This study has a particular focus on the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) sent to Bougainville in late 1997. This New Zealand-led operation was the first long-term regional peace initiative of recent times, and set the stage for future regional interventions by Australia and New Zealand. The thesis also considers more broadly the subsequent involvement of Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers in the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and Regional Assisted Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). These two later operations are considered with particular attention to lessons learnt from previous peacekeeping experiences and the changing tenor of trans-Tasman relations.

Since this is a history thesis it sets the argument within a historical and historiographical framework. It seeks to identify long-term trends surrounding Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific, defence connection and Anzac heritage.

A further aim of this thesis is to investigate whether joint Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping in the Pacific revived the Anzac relationship first formed at Gallipoli. By looking at evidence taken from interviews and first-hand accounts with Australian and New Zealand participants in the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI, this thesis argues that hallmarks of the earlier Anzac relationship did re-emerge, though in a slightly different form. The phenomenon of New Zealand’s reputation as having a cultural advantage in the Pacific is explored in some detail as this is an important aspect of the Anzac relationship.
Introduction

In Time Magazine’s 2006 ‘Person of the Year’ issue ‘Anzac Peacekeepers’ were nominated as ‘people who mattered.’\(^1\) The use of the term ‘Anzac’ in this context is interesting. Anzac usually refers to the experience of Australian and New Zealand forces during World War I, or is used as a general synonym for ‘Australia-New Zealand’. The aim of this thesis is to test whether the concept of ‘Anzac peacekeepers’ is an accurate representation of today’s trans-Tasman military operations in the Pacific. This can be done in two ways: firstly by investigating the extent to which recent Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping in the Pacific region became increasingly shared and co-dependent; and secondly by identifying the continuities and changes in the Anzac relationship as experienced by those participating in these regional peacekeeping missions.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s regional peacekeeping missions have been written about fairly extensively, but usually from a nationalist point of view. Celebrating Australia’s and New Zealand’s individual achievements is more important than profiling the trans-Tasman relationship. Political scientists and strategic analysts have written about Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands extensively but their focus has tended to be on short-term issues of national and regional security. The discourse on regional peacekeeping is dominated by Australian authors. In terms of military histories, there are a few good books on East Timor, but very little on Bougainville or the Solomons. This will be rectified on the Australian side shortly by Bob Breen’s volume for the official Australian peacekeeping history on Pacific operations. Also the idea of Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping operations as an Anzac force has not yet been investigated.

This thesis fits within the current historiographical trend of transnational history, which attempts to chart the movement of ideas, goods, technology and people across national borders.\(^2\) The links between Australia and New Zealand are so strong however, that while this thesis fits within the transnational tradition, it does not rely on it. Rather than force interpretations of connectedness this study highlights existing trans-Tasman regionalism in both the past and present. The aim of this thesis throughout is to include New Zealand where it has been previously ignored but also to avoid overt New Zealand nationalism and the

---

\(^2\) ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, American Historical Review (December 2006),1440-1464.
‘Aussie-bashing’ that frequently accompanies it. This study identifies patterns of connections, competitiveness and cooperation between the two Tasman neighbours.

The peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands were regional efforts but this thesis does not include in-depth studies of coalition members apart from Australia and New Zealand because of the trans-Tasman thematic focus. Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and other Pacific nations made important contributions to the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI. Although their numbers were small, their presence legitimised the mission as ‘regional interventions’. Moreover, the Pacific islanders’ language skills and cultural knowledge proved to be invaluable to the operations. It should be stressed that the Anzac peacekeeping described in this thesis need not negate the existence of regional peacekeeping. It is possible for national, trans-Tasman and regional identities to co-exist. For reasons of time and space this thesis cannot do the Pacific Island countries’ contributions full justice but this in no way diminishes their achievements.

The first chapter of this thesis traces long term historical trends in Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship, engagement with the Pacific, and Anzac comradeship. The treatment of these three themes is chronological and wide-ranging. The reason for this is not only to provide a solid historical background for recent regional peacekeeping, but also to make clear that there are recurrent continuities in Australia’s and New Zealand’s perceptions of their regional roles and defence responsibilities. Many recent decisions and actions undertaken by Australia and New Zealand in their region, while seeming ‘new’ in a short-term context, have underlying similarities with past actions. Likewise, the historical development of the Anzac fighting force and legend are outlined in order to demonstrate that the ‘new’ Australian and New Zealand relationship forged during peacekeeping operations is in fact linked to, and part of, the old Anzac bond forged in World War I.

The second chapter is an historiographical overview, once again arranged around the three themes of Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship, engagement with the Pacific, and Anzac connection. A broad trans-Tasman comparison is important to identify differences and similarities between Australian and New Zealand sources. Furthermore, a historiographical overview enables a clear view of Australasian ideas about the Pacific, defence and Anzac. Long established patterns of thought become discernible behind seemingly different responses. Indeed, one of this thesis’ arguments is that recent
peacekeeping cooperation between Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific is part of a longstanding concern about, and shared defence responsibility for, threats to Pacific security. An overview of the recent work on Anzac reveals the need for a more integrated study of the concept which explores its continuing relevance. Moreover, a firm grasp of historiography is important as Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence and Pacific policy is often affected by academic arguments.

Chapter three gives an account of the trans-Tasman planning process of the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG). There have been two books published of personal recollections about the Bougainvillean peace process; one from New Zealand and other Australia. There is also an extensive body of work on the Bougainville conflict and its causes and a few articles on the peacekeeping operation. As of the moment, however, there is no full account of the planning and performance of the peacekeeping operation. This chapter describes the trans-Tasman process of preparing and running the TMG up until early 1998. The narrative is organised around the three main types of Australian and New Zealand interactions experienced. Trans-Tasman relations were characterized by tensions, cooperation and differentiated cultural interactions with local people. Bougainville is often portrayed as a success story of Australasian cooperation. While this is an accurate judgement, this chapter also highlights the serious difficulties faced by Australians and New Zealanders, which needed to be overcome during the preparatory and early stages of the TMG. Bougainville’s significance is that it was the first of a number of regional operations. It provided tactical, logistical and strategic lessons and was the starting point for increased trans-Tasman cooperation.

Chapter four assesses the joint Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping operations in East Timor and Solomon Islands but on a less detailed scale than with Bougainville. Once again, for both missions, the trans-Tasman relationship was marked by tension and cooperation. However, generally, INTERFET and RAMSI were more collaborative than Bougainville. This was due to strengthened government support and Australians’ and New Zealander’s growing experience at working in the Pacific and with each other. The theme of New Zealanders being more culturally sensitive than Australians also continued in both missions.

The final chapter argues that the Anzac experience was renewed by Australians’ and New Zealanders’ recent participation in peacekeeping operations in their region. The idea of a new Anzac relationship in the Pacific is considered at two levels. Firstly, the official
The organizational and operational integration of the Australian and New Zealand forces is outlined by drawing on the trans-Tasman relationship described in chapters three and four. Secondly, the idea of the ‘spirit of Anzac’ is tested by analyzing qualitative data on Anzac experiences. This chapter rests heavily on the recollections of those involved in Pacific peacekeeping operations and their perceptions of the Anzac spirit. The existence of the ‘Anzac spirit’ is investigated through participants’ memories of Anzac celebrations, rivalry between Australians and New Zealanders and the differentiated stereotypes held by Australian and New Zealand personnel. In particular, the chapter examines the widespread idea that New Zealanders are more culturally sensitive in the Pacific than Australians.

The methodology used is two-fold. Firstly the thesis includes a wide-ranging survey and analysis of secondary sources (including both history and strategic studies) on the trans-Tasman defence policy, relationship with the Pacific, and Anzac heritage. This identifies historiographical trends and provides a background within which to identify continuities and changes. Secondly the thesis uses primary sources such as government defence papers, reports, and interviews to examine trans-Tasman involvement in Bougainville and other regional peacekeeping missions. Interviews are also used to assess whether these should be described as Anzac peacekeeping operations. The focus is mainly on the preparatory and initial stages of the missions as this is a neglected area in the historiography and provides necessary parameters on a potentially vast topic. The methodology is also consciously trans-Tasman, relying on both New Zealand and Australian secondary and primary sources. There is a slight tilt towards New Zealand sources for several reasons. Since Australian historiography dominates the field this thesis attempts to compensate for the lack of New Zealand material. Moreover, the Australian-New Zealand relationship is asymmetrical. Australia is more important to New Zealand than vice versa. Therefore, writing on the trans-Tasman relationship tends to be by New Zealanders.

The original intention of this thesis with regards to primary material was to base analysis of trans-Tasman peacekeeping on government reports and accounts of the relevant meetings. Unfortunately, after initial approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to examine these files, the Ministry did not have the capacity to check the relevant papers in the limited time-frame available. This resulted in a shift to oral evidence as the main source of primary material. As a result I interviewed a number of New Zealanders and Australians who
had been involved in peace support operations in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands. The interviewees included diplomats, government officials, academics, members of the New Zealand and Australian defence forces and civilians. A full list of the interviewees and their roles may be found in Appendix 1. I gave participants a list of questions highlighting areas I was interested in; however I did not require them to answer every question. Often interviewees used the questions as a basis on which to gauge my research interests, and then spoke freely about their experiences, including in their narrative key anecdotes or comments which were relevant to my thesis. The list of the questions used can be found in Appendix 2.

I chose to talk to a wide range of participants rather than do a just a few interviews using true oral history methods. The interviews were not recorded or transcribed due to issues of sensitivity, convenience for the participants, and inadequate resources. Recording requires a reliable recorder, microphones and quiet surroundings, which were unavailable during the interview process. Many of the interviews were held, at participants’ requests, in coffee shops, gardens or secure government offices; contexts not conducive to recording. An estimated six to eight hours is needed to transcribe each hour of interview as well as more time to audit-edit the transcripts. Breadth of information and getting both New Zealand and Australian viewpoints was more important to me than absolutely verbatim transcripts. Instead of recording the conversations I took detailed notes, typed these up and then sent them to participants for checking and amendment. Due to my more concise method I was able to conduct in-depth interviews with 29 participants in a relatively short space of time.

Using oral evidence as a primary source results in methodological difficulties. Oral evidence has been vulnerable to criticisms of bias and fallibility. Nostalgia, personal prejudice, the intrusion of popular representations of the past and loss of memory may distort interviewees’ narratives and interviewers’ questions. Moreover, the intonation, volume and rhythms of speech are not reproducible even in the most faithful of transcripts. A major problem faced

---

3 Generally, an interview only becomes oral history once it has been recorded, transcribed, indexed and made available in a library or archive. D. A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History (2nd edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 24.

4 This is a form of audio proofreading in which the recording is played back while simultaneously checking the transcript to check the two are consistent. Ibid., 65.


is how to integrate the evidence of an individual into the wider social context; of moving from the particular to the general. Certainly in my interviews I did come across these problems. Nostalgia for the past and pride in peacekeeping achievements caused interviewees to put a positive cast on their experiences. For individuals still employed in government related jobs, caution due to public service protocol probably often replaced frankness. I would watch people search for the right phrases in which to couch a criticism. There were inconsistencies between different individuals’ recollections of some events. And I was unable to talk to everyone involved, including several key players.

Overcoming these difficulties meant a reliance on corroboration and breadth of sources. This thesis only highlights themes if they are present in a number of interviews and other primary sources. Indeed, my own oral research was often backed up with first-hand recollections found in books, articles and the unpublished work of other academics. I was also fortunate to conduct in-depth interviews with both Australians and New Zealanders. Visiting Canberra was a enormous help in gaining a truly trans-Tasman perspective. Talking with individuals from different spheres of influence also guarded against inadvertent bias of sources. It was important to talk to civilians involved as well as military staff. By asking interviewees the same questions, which often had specific focus on the early stages of the missions and Anzac relations, I was able to gain a good amount of evidence on the areas most pertinent to the thesis.

Moreover, oral evidence also has real strengths. Its subjectivity is often seen by oral historians as an advantage, providing clues about how memory works and the relationship of the past to the present. Oral histories highlight the role of imagination, symbolism and desire in composing memory. Interviews often reveal information that is unobtainable in any other type of historical record. Indeed, the interviewer and interviewee collaboratively create a new historical source. A thoughtful participant is often able to contribute colourful anecdotes, and generate new ideas that a researcher may never before have considered pursuing. I found

---

7 T. Lummis, 'Structure and Validity in Oral Evidence', Ibid., 255.
10 Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 118, 22.
many of these positives to be true in my interviews. While not strictly a psychological history, part of my thesis is concerned with the perception of Australian-New Zealand relations and the idea of Anzac. Answers to this type of subjective topic are found most easily in individual opinions. With limited archival evidence available on peacekeeping operations, much of the information needed could only be found in the recollections of those directly involved. Moreover, many interviewees gave intelligent and reflective responses which pointed towards new insights.

Finally, it is necessary to define some the key words used in the following chapters. ‘Trans-Tasman’, ‘Anzac’ and ‘the Pacific’ are terms which are often used imprecisely, and with differing connotations depending on authors’ individual interpretations and agendas. It is common for ‘trans-Tasman’ to be used as shorthand for ‘Australia and New Zealand’. This thesis avoids this type of usage and instead employs this term in the context of describing a reciprocal relationship between Australia and New Zealand. Anzac is a complex term with layers of meaning. Originating as an acronym for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in World War I, it soon became a colloquial term describing Australian or New Zealand servicemen. Anzac has more recently also become a general adjective for joint Australian and New Zealand ventures; for example, an Anzac rugby match. This thesis uses the term Anzac in two specific ways. Firstly, it is used to denote the official collaboration of Australia and New Zealand in a military situation, and the joint forces, shared logistics and collaborative planning this entails. Secondly, this thesis uses the terms ‘Anzac spirit’ or ‘Anzac tradition’ to refer to a special type of understanding between Australians and New Zealanders based on loyalty, mutual reliance, trust, rivalry and distinctiveness. Although the Anzac spirit was created at Gallipoli, it has endured in Anzac Day celebrations and subsequent Australian-New Zealand operations. This thesis also frequently refers to the Pacific. Explorers, governments and academics have employed many different boundaries to denote this area. The most popular paradigm for discussing the Pacific has traditionally been in terms of a division into Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian islands. This thesis defines the Pacific as the area which Australia and New Zealand treat as their ‘patch’ and includes all the islands south of the Equator in Map i.1. Thus, while East Timor is often grouped as part of Southeast Asia, for the purposes of this study it is included in ‘the Pacific’.

12 These categories have been increasingly criticised for their artificiality. J. Linnekin, ‘Contending Approaches’, in D. Denoon and S. Firth (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8.
1. Historical Themes

Australia’s and New Zealand’s recent regional peacekeeping initiatives are often examined individually and without a developed historical context by political and strategic scientists. Unfortunately, this type of analysis has a rather narrow, present-centred focus. For example, an exclusive focus on ‘failing states’ ignores the Pacific nations which have undergone decolonization peacefully. A wholly contemporary approach can lead one to label regional or international trends as new when in fact they have existed for centuries, although perhaps in a slightly different form. History provides the context for recent events and reveals interpretations that may be missed by current commentators.

This chapter gives a brief summary of Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship and actions under three themes: the Pacific region, defence policy and the formation of the Anzac tradition. The end of each section highlights historical ideas relevant to regional trans-Tasman peacekeeping. The chapter’s purpose is to provide a context for recent events and to highlight the development and continuity of past trends that are relevant to recent regional trans-Tasman peacekeeping.

Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific

From the mid-nineteenth century through to the early twentieth century, some Australian and New Zealand commentators felt that the Pacific should be their colonies’ immediate sphere of influence. This desire manifested itself in two concurrent propositions: some argued for an autonomous Australasian Empire; others pressured Britain to colonize Pacific islands. Even before 1840, various writers and politicians claimed New Zealand had an imperial destiny in the South Seas. After the Treaty of Waitangi was signed some New Zealanders felt that their experience administering Maori gave them a claim to rule over all Polynesian peoples. This led early New Zealand colonists to favour trade and political activities in the Pacific Islands.1 According to Pacific historian Angus Ross, nearly all the leading New Zealand politicians in the period 1870 to 1900 wanted to see their colony play a more active part in the South Pacific. They consistently sought a greater influence for New Zealand in the islands and

bombarded the Colonial Office with petitions and memoranda. The same trend can be found in Australia. One of the motives behind the federal movement in the late nineteenth century was Australian colonists’ desire to exercise greater influence in Pacific affairs. In 1909, Australia’s Prime Minister Alfred Deakin suggested that the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ be extended to the South Pacific and administered from Australia. Plans for an Australasian Pacific Empire were unsuccessful, but Australia and New Zealand persisted in pressuring Britain to guarantee security in the Pacific region.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific in the nineteenth century was also characterized by their concern to exclude foreign powers and exercise control via British imperialism. The Australasian colonies urged Britain from the 1870s onwards to annex Polynesian and Melanesian islands. Australia criticized Britain for allowing France to claim Tahiti in 1844 and New Caledonia in 1853. In July 1870, the Australasian colonies, concerned about the breakdown of law and order in Fiji, recommended that Britain take possession of Fiji. Benjamin Disraeli’s Government assented in 1874. Australia and New Zealand then unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Britain to annex New Guinea and the New Hebrides. In 1883, following a spate of articles in German newspapers advising the seizure of New Guinea, the Queensland colonial government took possession of the eastern half of the island in the name of the British Empire. They then wired Britain for confirmation and offered to help pay costs. When they were turned down, New Zealand and Australian colonial representatives came together to discuss matters at an inter-colonial convention in Sydney. They resolved that ‘further acquisition of dominion in the Pacific, south of the Equator, by any Foreign Power, would be highly detrimental to the safety and well-being of the British possessions of Australasia’. Britain’s compromise in 1884 with Germany to divide colonial responsibility in New Guinea did not impress the Australasian colonies and they set up a Federal Council of Australasia to give advice on relations with the Pacific. Further attempts were made by Australia and New Zealand in the 1890s to persuade a

---

2 Ibid., 7-8.
5 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 57.
7 'Report of the Proceedings of the Inter-Colonial Convention held in Sydney, in November and December, 1883’ in Ibid., 18.
reluctant Britain to acquire the New Hebrides, Samoa and Papua. The sustained pressure put on Imperial Britain by Australia and New Zealand was a significant reason that it ended up with the most Pacific responsibilities of any nation.

Although initially eager to claim Pacific territories in the late nineteenth century and after World War I, Australia’s and New Zealand’s administration of their colonial mandates was generally marked by indifference and inexperience. New Zealand was given responsibility for the Cook Islands and Niue in 1901. For the first 33 years, responsibility for these colonial dependencies was given to the Department of Maori Affairs. The islands were administered under the ‘taihoa’ or ‘go slow’ policy, which was characterised by ‘purposeful inactivity’. Some work was done on improving primary education, health services and infrastructure, especially in the 1930s, but economic development of the islands was poor. Historians agree that New Zealand was ill-prepared for colonial administration. This was due to the lack of a Colonial Service, small budgets, inadequate anthropological and administration training and overconfidence due to experience with Maori culture. By 1920, New Zealand’s colonial enthusiasm had been tempered; it accepted the mandate for German Samoa rather reluctantly and only for strategic reasons. New Zealand’s early administration of Western Samoa was marked by its failure to respond effectively to the influenza epidemic of 1918 and the Mau uprising of 1929.

Australia’s colonial record was also somewhat patchy. Australia was given the care of Papua by Britain in 1906, and its early colonial rule was largely determined by Hubert Murray, who governed from 1908-1940 through a regime of benevolent paternalism. After World War I, Australia was also given the mandate for New Guinea and joint responsibility for Nauru (with Britain and New Zealand). In New Guinea, little was done to develop the economy or infrastructure and it continued to operate as a plantation colony until the late 1930s. Australian administration was initially harsh, with a reputation for being less native-friendly

---

12 M. Boyd, 'The Record in Western Samoa to 1945', in *New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands*, 124.
than in Papua.\textsuperscript{15} One strength of Australian colonial rule in the Pacific was that from 1927 onwards young colonial administrators were taken to New Guinea for a year-long local orientation, and then returned to the University of Sydney for further anthropological training. This program produced administrators with good knowledge of current affairs in the Pacific.

Generally, war increased contact between New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islands. The prospect of war heightened Australia’s and New Zealand’s awareness of the strategic importance of the Pacific. Trans-Tasman policy reflected a concern to safeguard the Pacific region from outside powers.\textsuperscript{16} In World War I, British instructions to occupy Pacific Islands were obeyed speedily by Australia and New Zealand. On 29 August 1914, 1400 New Zealanders occupied German Samoa. Three days after its entry to World War I, Australia received a cable suggesting that Germany’s wireless stations in the Pacific be seized. A naval and military unit of 1500 was hastily put together and occupied German radio stations at Rabul, German New Guinea and Nauru in the following months.\textsuperscript{17} Further links between Pacific Islanders and New Zealand were cemented when Maori, Cook Islanders and Niueans fought with the Pioneer Battalion, under a Pakeha New Zealand commander.\textsuperscript{18} During World War II, Australia in particular, became closely involved with the region through the Pacific War. War conditions partially eroded racial barriers and many Pacific Island people collaborated closely with the Allied armed forces. Papuan and New Guinea infantry battalions were formed in 1944, together making up the Pacific Islands Regiment. Fijians, Tongans and Solomon Islanders fought side by side with Australians in the Solomons. In spite of colonial Australians’ opposition to local personnel, the Australian media sentimentalized Papua New Guinean medical orderlies and messengers as ‘Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angels’.\textsuperscript{19} War brought about a renewed awareness of the importance of good Australian and New Zealand relationships with the Pacific region.

\textsuperscript{15} Campbell, \textit{Worlds Apart}, 235.
\textsuperscript{16} This will be examined in greater detail in the section of Australian and New Zealand defence relations.
After World War II, because of international and domestic expectations, New Zealand and Australia became more involved in administering, and later decolonizing, their Pacific Island mandates. In 1944, Australia and New Zealand signed the Canberra Pact in which they jointly claimed responsibility for leadership, post-war settlements, defence and social welfare in the Pacific. New Zealand in particular took its trustee role in the region seriously. In 1945, Peter Fraser, New Zealand Prime Minister, chaired the UN Trusteeship Committee. New Zealand, eager to enhance its good international reputation, cooperated closely with the UN in its treatment of Western Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. For example, New Zealand began an economic development programme building a fruit-processing industry in the Cook Islands in the mid-1950s and welcomed UN inspections. Australia was slower to attend to its colonial responsibilities in the Pacific. Australia administered Papua and New Guinea together after World War II, but visiting UN missions noted that development was backward. Government remained colonial until the 1950s and there was little attempt at self-government until an elected house of Assembly was created in 1964.

By the 1960s the international emphasis on decolonization meant New Zealand and Australia had to reconsider their Pacific trusteeships. The international community praised New Zealand’s decolonization policies, largely because they were carefully designed to receive that result. UN spectators and missions were regularly invited to New Zealand’s colonies to demonstrate that decolonization was taking place appropriately. New Zealand had been preparing Western Samoa for independence since the 1950s and it became independent in 1962. During the 1960s and 70s New Zealand worked with the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau to tailor individual settlements that would allow them to retain their free association with New Zealand. By contrast, Australia was less eager to decolonize its Pacific territories. Loath to lose its phosphate resources, Australia resisted mounting international pressure to decolonize Nauru. And, it was only in 1972, with the accession of Gough Whitlam’s Labour government in Australia, that plans for Papua New Guinea’s self-government were

---

20 McIntyre, 'Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands', 675-6.
22 S. D. Wilson, 'Cook Islands Development 1946-65', in New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands, 79.
23 McIntyre, 'Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands', 683.
25 McIntyre, 'Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands', 682.
26 New Zealand, who were joint trustees of Nauru also stood to lose their phosphate monopoly but were more concerned with preserving their good international reputation. In 1966 New Zealand unsuccessfully urged Britain and Australia to give Nauru independence. Wesley-Smith, 'Australia and New Zealand', 219.
fast-tracked for implementation in 1975. After their former colonies had become independent, Australia and New Zealand still sought involvement in Pacific Island nations. Australia and New Zealand massively increased their aid donations to the region in order to encourage political stability and discourage reliance on communist powers. They also retained a key role in the South Pacific Forum.

Cold War concerns and nuclear issues were central to Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific during the mid to late twentieth century. The fear of communism greatly affected Australian and New Zealand regional foreign policy. Australia, unnerved by the spectre of Indonesian communism, supported Indonesia’s questionable claims to East Timor in 1975 so as to keep their bilateral relations on good terms. Throughout the early 1980s, Australia and New Zealand operated a policy of strategic denial of Soviet power in the Pacific. Libyan involvement in Vanuatu and New Caledonia was strongly opposed by Australia and New Zealand who partly blamed it on the French. France’s clumsy handling of New Caledonian nationalism encouraged radical sentiments and opened the way for Libya to intervene in the domestic politics of the French Pacific. Australia and New Zealand became particularly concerned about Vanuatu’s non-aligned posture and the Soviets’ offer to do research in Vanuatu and Solomons waters in 1980. Greg Fry argued that this Australasian policy of strategic denial was actually an extension of the Monroe doctrine suggested years earlier in Australia. Throughout the Cold War, Britain, France and America also used the Pacific as a testing ground for their nuclear capabilities. The French nuclear tests, because of their underhand nature, united most of the region in protest. Members of the first South Pacific Forum meetings in 1971 and 1972 objected to French tests and in 1975 agreed to make the Pacific a nuclear free zone. Agitation developed more slowly in Australia than New Zealand partly because Australia exported uranium.

---

27 McIntyre, 'Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands', 683.
28 S. Firth, 'Strategic and Nuclear Issues', in Tides of History, 308.
29 Ibid., 305.
33 Denoon, Mein Smith, and Wyndham, A History of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific, 343, 45.
34 Ibid., 451.
crystallized its role as the leading anti-nuclear regional power when it refused access to the USS Buchanan in 1985 on the grounds of it possibly carrying nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{35} From the mid 1980s onwards Australia’s and New Zealand’s main concern in the Pacific region became internal instability. Decolonization had produced a series of new nations that were prone to economic problems, ethnic tensions and unstable governments. During the late 1980s, two Fijian coups, civil unrest in Bougainville, violence in New Caledonia and turbulence in Vanuatu alerted Australia and New Zealand to the fact that their region was ‘pacific’ no longer.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, the end of the Cold War created an environment in which the Pacific Islands became less insulated from the outside world and more similar to comparable Third World countries.\textsuperscript{37} During the 1990s, Australia and New Zealand sought to resolve these problems while at the same time avoiding criticisms of neo-colonialism.\textsuperscript{38} Regional organizations and aid development projects were used to regulate Pacific Islands’ tendencies towards internal instability.\textsuperscript{39} However, towards the end of the 1990s, Australia and New Zealand became more willing to intervene in internal Pacific conflicts. The Tasman neighbours worked together on peacekeeping operations in Bougainville and East Timor. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, New Zealand, and Australia developed a more hard-line and interventionist ethos in the Pacific region.\textsuperscript{40} After 2002, Australia reconsidered its earlier refusal to provide assistance to Solomon Islands in controlling civil unrest. The result was the Australian-led RAMSI

\textsuperscript{35} Labour Party President Margaret Wilson saw the non-nuclear policy as a test of principle and believed party members wanted New Zealand to withdraw from ANZUS as part of a more independent foreign policy appropriate for a small nation in the Pacific (particularly pushed by Labour women) although Lange later assumed nuclear-free mantle as his own and publicised New Zealand’s action. P. Mein Smith, \textit{A Concise History of New Zealand} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 217-8.


\textsuperscript{38} In 1987 Australia and New Zealand mobilized army forces to Fiji when the coup broke out in order to evacuate their nationals. It soon became clear that the small Pacific Islands were sensitive to this potential interference and thought Australia and New Zealand had overreacted. S. Henningham, \textit{The Pacific Island States: Security and Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War World} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 139., G. Fry, ‘At the Margin: The South Pacific and Changing World Order’, in R. Learen and J. L. Richardson (eds.), \textit{Charting the Post-Cold War Order} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 240.


mission of 2003. Alongside their continuing aid programmes, Australia and New Zealand also focused on controlling transnational crime, illegal immigration and law and order processes. Australia in particular now saw the Pacific’s ‘failing states’ as potential havens for international terrorist groups and justified preventative action on this basis.

A broad overview of Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific reveals several historical trends. Firstly, Australia and New Zealand have long regarded the Pacific south of the Equator as their patch and resented outside interference. This can be seen in their pressure on Britain to secure Pacific Islands during the nineteenth century, claims of colonial rights, provision of aid to prevent communist powers gaining access to Pacific islands during the Cold War, and fear of terrorism in recent years. The second point is that during times of war or regional instability Australia and New Zealand devoted more time, effort and money to their relationship with their Pacific neighbours. The two world wars, Cold War and War on Terror have all resulted in increased contact with Pacific Island nations and their inhabitants. Indeed a third and related point is that Australia’s and New Zealand’s policies towards the Pacific have often been affected by the international climate. Both Australia and New Zealand complied with international pressure to decolonise their mandates in the 1970s. New Zealand and Australia contributed to peacekeeping missions, especially since the 1990s onwards, in order to retain a good international image. Australia strove to fulfil America’s expectations of a secure Pacific during the Cold War and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. There is a strong historical pattern indicating that Australia’s and New Zealand’s actions in the Pacific are affected by wider global concerns. Fourthly, Australia has always had more resources to initiate and fund projects in the Pacific. The Canberra Pact was an Australian initiated project. Australian colonial officers for the Pacific received more thorough training than their New Zealand counterparts. The peacekeeping interventions of recent years have been largely paid for with Australian dollars. New Zealand has fewer resources than Australia with which to engage the Pacific and thus has approached issues in

---

42 For example, the AFP have recently cooperated with partner organizations in the Pacific to fight against regional transnational crime. The New Zealand government has established national security teams, and a South and West Pacific police liaison post in Suva. A Pacific security fund was set up in 2003 to finance projects in aviation, port and shipping security, customs processes, immigration and counter terrorism. The Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) was established in Suva, June 2004. D. Nibers, 'The ‘War on Terrorism’ and Security Cooperation in the Pacific', in Redefining the Pacific, 72-3.
slightly different ways. Indeed, the last main theme is that New Zealand perceives itself as having a closer and more culturally-sensitive relationship with the Pacific than Australia although its colonial record is not necessarily much better. As a result it has historically been more sensitive to UN criticism of the way it operates in the Pacific and willing to take a stand on contentious issues such as nuclear testing. New Zealand’s regional policies are generally perceived as being more consultative and inclusive of local culture.

**Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship**

Australia’s and New Zealand’s responses to the issue of safeguarding their region from the late nineteenth to early twentieth century demonstrate both cooperation and differences. In the early 1880s, New Zealand and Australia worked together to increase their regional naval power. Aware that Britain opposed expanding its Navy, Australia and New Zealand felt inadequately protected. From the 1880s through to the early 1900s, however, New Zealand also worried about Australia’s decision to create its own navy. In 1908, Australia began a programme to build three destroyers. New Zealand feared that this would cause the British Royal Navy to justify withdrawal from the Pacific. If this happened, New Zealand, even if it cooperated with Australia, would be the junior partner and have less control and capacity for defence. Instead of building a national navy itself New Zealand chose to increase its subsidies to the Royal Navy. In 1909, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Joseph Ward offered a battleship to the Royal British Navy. Trans-Tasman competitiveness reared its head and Australian public opinion persuaded the Australian government to follow New Zealand’s lead and donate their own battleship. In 1914, New Zealand did create its own navy but made sure to emphasize that it was creating a local unit of the Royal Navy rather than an independent force.44

In spite of their different decisions regarding naval defence, the period prior to World War I also saw close Australian and New Zealand defence co-operation. In 1908, the American Grand Fleet visited New Zealand and Australia at the joint invitation of their Prime Ministers.45 In 1914, Colonel Allen, the New Zealand Minister of Defence invited the Australians to send some of their fleet on a visit to New Zealand. Unfortunately, the proposed stopover was forestalled by the outbreak of war. Australia and New Zealand also worked on coordinating their military preparations. Both nations introduced compulsory military training

---

by 1909. Lord Kitchener, who visited the two countries in 1910, recommended uniformity of training and unit organization between the two nations to allow them to fight together. Following Kitchener’s visit, an Australian military college at Duntroon to which New Zealand might also send cadets was established. The training relationship which began at Duntroon was important in bringing the two countries’ forces closer together. The personal contact and shared experiences of officers who often reached high ranks in their respective forces laid the basis for friendly service-level relations.46

World War I is often seen as a high point of Australian and New Zealand defence cooperation because of the Anzac campaign at Gallipoli. The Anzac Force initially came about as an organizational necessity, directed by British war policy.47 Very quickly however, a strong Australia-New Zealand relationship was forged which would have important consequences for the trans-Tasman defence relationship. This issue will be addressed in more detail in the Anzac section of this chapter. In France, from 1916-1918 the New Zealanders served separately from the Australian Forces but relations between the two groups remained close. In Palestine, a composite Australian and New Zealand mounted force fought the Turks. There were also less formal linkages with large numbers of New Zealanders serving in the ranks of the Australian Imperial Force and vice versa.48

The inter-war years were characterized by a lack of co-ordination in Australian and New Zealand defence policies. The absence of danger in the 1920s removed the sense of urgency that had previously pulled the two forces together. At the end of 1921, New Zealand withdrew all its cadets from Duntroon and did not re-enrol more military staff for another thirteen years.49 During the 1930s as concerns mounted about Pacific security both Australia and New Zealand made a few unsuccessful attempts to improve their defence relationship. In 1933, Australia suggested New Zealand participate in Australian defence supply and manufacturing. The New Zealand response was lukewarm. Supporting Australian industry, much of which was in competition with New Zealand or more expensive than other suppliers, did not seem sensible in the midst of a depression. Even British pressure failed to persuade

48 McGibbon, 'Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations', 175.
New Zealand to comply. The New Zealand and Australian defence relationship remained cool and the two nations continued to deal with each other through London. In 1937, it was New Zealand’s turn to propose closer links with Australia. New Zealand Prime Minister, Michael Savage suggested that Britain, Australia and New Zealand meet to discuss the strategic importance of the Pacific region. However, Canberra replied that the issue should be discussed in London, not Wellington, and that their senior officers were too busy. When the Pacific Defence Conference was held in Wellington in 1938 Australia sent only junior officers. The lack of collaboration between Australia and New Zealand is reflected in that there was no official New Zealand representative in Canberra at the outbreak of World War II. However, the lack of defence co-ordination was mostly political. Australasian military forces were actually in useful contact by 1939 through shared intelligence and renewed joint officer training.

During World War II, Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship was characterized in one sense by their dissimilar strategic defence policies. At the beginning of the war, Canberra suggested an ANZAC force, but Wellington turned this offer down as it felt that ‘New Zealand may not wish to be associated automatically with a possible aggressive Australian attitude regarding strategy’. Australian and New Zealand forces did not have the same close links they had experienced during World War I because of their delayed entry into action and lack of composite units. Australia and New Zealand were given separate command areas in the Pacific which reinforced their separateness and meant they were ill-informed about the other’s regional role. The main trans-Tasman disagreement came about in 1942 when Australia recalled most of its troops to the Pacific but New Zealand decided to keep its forces in the Middle East. In April 1943, New Zealand authorities did try to bring some troops back to the Pacific but submitted to pragmatic concerns and heavy pressure from London and Washington to stay in Europe. The Australians’ response was scathing; they

---

51 McMillan, ‘Draft Chapter 9’.
55 For example, Winston Churchill wrote to Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, ‘I feel that the intervention of the New Zealand Division on European soil at the time when the homeland of New Zealand is already so strongly engaged with Japan will constitute a deed of fame to which many generations of New Zealanders will look back with pride.’ Doc 16: PM of UK to PM, 3 May 1943, R. Kay, *The Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944* (Documents on New Zealand External Relations ; V. 1; Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1972), 20-1. Moreover, Fraser knew that direct military threats had passed New Zealand
labelled New Zealanders the ‘curly haired boys of the empire’ and insisted that New Zealand should be independent enough to make its own decisions. Australia’s Prime Minister wrote to his New Zealand counterpart that for every soldier New Zealand kept away from the Pacific, an Australian or American would have to fill his place. While New Zealand did actually contribute to the Pacific War it was, and still is, believed in Australia that New Zealand shirked its responsibilities to regional defence.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s shared responsibility for the Pacific was reinforced towards the end of World War II when they together signed the Canberra Pact. This agreement reconciled and coordinated their defence policies in the Pacific. When the United States had given Australia and New Zealand separate areas of command in the Pacific area, both nations had protested strongly to Washington. The Canberra Pact, signed in 1944, attempted to establish common strategic interests and a regional zone of defence in New Zealand, Australia and through the islands north and northeast of Australia to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands. The Pact laid the foundation for trans-Tasman consultation in defence matters; joint training exercises, staff interchange and shared planning. Moreover, it set the framework for Australia and New Zealand to use their ‘special knowledge’ to contribute to the ‘peace, welfare and good Government of the whole Pacific region’. The Canberra Agreement arose partly out of frustrations with the United States and Britain and did not translate into a close trans-Tasman political relationship. However, it did establish a structure for close consultation and practical collaboration in the Pacific region between Australia and New Zealand, which has been maintained to this day.

The ANZUS treaty, signed in 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and The United States, seemingly signalled close Australasian ties. ANZUS gave Australia and New Zealand a promise of American support in the possibility of invasion and access to high level American
military intelligence and infrastructure. However, even from the first negotiations with the United States, Australia and New Zealand actually had divergent intentions. Australia wanted to lay the foundation for wider regional security in Asia and was happy to exclude the Commonwealth and NATO. By contrast, New Zealand was anxious to retain its support of Britain and was uninterested in a regional security pact. Moreover, different attitudes towards the United States existed in Australia and New Zealand well before the break-up of the treaty. In 1968, New Zealand rejected an American request to host an Omega Navigation facility. At the same time Australia had already accepted the Omega system and had three existing facilities.

The disruption of ANZUS in 1985 reflected Australia’s and New Zealand’s different defence priorities but also somewhat paradoxically drew the two nations closer together in strategic alliance. The Fourth Labour Government of New Zealand, acting on their election promise to make the nation nuclear-free, refused a request from the United States for their destroyer the USS Buchanan to visit. While New Zealanders had not foreseen exclusion from ANZUS, this was the ultimate result. Australian officials maintained that they must stick by America because of wider security interests and were irritated at New Zealand for potentially devaluing their agreement with the US from a multilateral to bilateral one. Nonetheless, after the crisis around ANZUS, Australia decided it was still in its best interests to draw New Zealand close and encourage it to remain a supporter of regional security. The New Zealand government of the time warmly welcomed this approach. So from the 1980s onward both governments emphasised that, excluding nuclear issues, Australia and New Zealand had very similar strategic interests, outlooks and objectives. They worked to make their forces compatible and support each other. In 1991, Australia and New Zealand adopted the policy of Closer Defence Relations (CDR). CDR was not a treaty, but an ‘evolutionary process of examining the practical possibilities of cooperation in aspects of training, doctrine and equipment procurement’.

---

64 McLean, *The Prickly Pair*, 258.
65 White, ‘Living without Illusions’, 130.
At the end of the twentieth century however, New Zealand unsettled the CDR agreement by reneging on some of its promises and jettisoning the combat arm of its air force. From 1997 onwards, Australia became increasingly irritated at the New Zealand government’s perceived lack of commitment to defence. New Zealand’s level of defence funding was described as ‘a troubling aspect of the relationship’. New Zealand’s decision in 1999 to default on their promise to build a third ANZAC frigate further angered Australia. The 2000 Australian Defence White Paper declared ‘We would regret any decision by New Zealand not to maintain at least some air and naval combat capabilities’. There was considerable annoyance in Canberra when the New Zealand Labour government decided in 2001 to drop the air combat wing of the RNZAF, as they had for many years provided close air defence training for Australian Navy. In later years however, the fracas died down and Australia expressed official grateful recognition of New Zealand’s support of Australian peacekeeping operations.

Indeed, it should be emphasised that although there have been periods of resentment and disillusionment about the trans-Tasman defence relationship at a political and policy level, at the operational level Australia and New Zealand have continued to serve together on overseas missions. In Korea, in 1951, the New Zealand regiment supported Australian infantry in the 27 Commonwealth Brigade. In Vietnam, New Zealanders fought together with Australian units. The growing involvement of Australia and New Zealand in peacekeeping operations since the 1980s has provided many opportunities for defence personnel from the two nations to serve together. From 1982 to 1984, Australia and New Zealand operated a joint Anzac helicopter unit in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai. New Zealand Army engineers worked with a 300 strong Australian engineer unit in Namibia. In Cambodia in 1992, 40 New Zealand communications specialists together with a large Australian unit formed the mission’s communications unit. Particularly in recent years, the growing
instability of some Pacific Island nations has led to regional peacekeeping missions. From the mid-1990s till the present, Australian and New Zealand defence forces have jointly planned and carried out operations in Bougainville, Solomon Islands, East Timor and Tonga.

The important theme which emerges from this overview of Australian and New Zealand defence interaction is that it is simultaneously close and divergent. Because of their geographic proximity, shared British heritage, cultural similarity and inter-migration Australia and New Zealand do have broadly complementary views on defence. However, the defence relationship is not always close in the sense of agreement on policy. For example, in World War II, Australia and New Zealand deployed their troops differently. Moreover, while underpinned by a basic understanding of mutual strategic support, the tone of Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship is changeable, responding independently to foreign wars, the international security climate, regional affairs, internal politics and public opinion. Indeed, the two nations have often simultaneously cooperated in one aspects of defence but acted separately in another. Australian and New Zealand cooperation in regional peacekeeping was concurrent with the New Zealand government’s decision to disband the combat section of its Air Force. Generally, however, threats and conflicts do draw the Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces closer together. Joint deployments in Gallipoli, the Western Front, Korea, Vietnam, Sinai and Solomon Islands provided an opportunity for Australian and New Zealand personnel to engage in joint planning, share experiences and form friendships. Another aspect of the trans-Tasman defence relationship is its cooperation on security issues in the Pacific. Because of their mutual interest in regional security and excluding unfriendly foreign intervention, Australia and New Zealand defence forces worked together in the Pacific War and more recently in peacekeeping interventions in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands. Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship is one of siblings, not friends: sometimes clingy and familial, at other times estranged and resentful, but generally united in the face of outside danger.

The creation of Anzac

ANZAC is the acronym for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps which was created in Egypt, December 1914, by grouping the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) together under the command of Lieutenant-General William
Birdwood. ANZAC consisted of the 1st Australian Division, and the New Zealand and Australian Division under Major General Godley. Godley’s division was eventually made up of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the New Zealand Artillery Brigade, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, and the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade. It is generally believed that the term Anzac was first coined by a New Zealand postal clerk, Sergeant K. M. Little, who made a rubber stamp with the corps’ initials to ink and register incoming mail. In spite of the later significance attached to the term ‘Anzac’, the force was a marriage of convenience created by Imperial directives. Indeed, Godley had initially resisted the idea of an Australasian force in September 1914. Throughout their joint service, New Zealand and Australian commanders made sure to retain their independence and direct links to their respective national governments. Later on during the War on the Western Front, Australian and New Zealand troops separated further. On the Western Front, apart from April to May 1916, I ANZAC was a *de facto* Australian Corps, while II ANZAC was made up of the New Zealand division and Monash’s 3rd Australian Division. The New Zealanders also fought as part of the British XV and IV Corps. By 1918, the two ANZAC Corps had ceased to exist. With the exception of the mounted brigade in Palestine, the AIF and NZEF served separately and had their own distinct identities.

Relationships between Australian and New Zealand troops in their Anzac formation were close but suffused by rivalry and national differentiation. During training in Egypt, the New Zealanders became characterised as more reticent, accepting of British discipline and gentlemanly as opposed to the more confident, undisciplined and aggressive Australians. Charles Bean described how in Cairo a coolness developed between the two forces when New Zealand commanders curbed ‘drinking and slovenliness’ and then encouraged their men ‘to have nothing to do with the Australians, but to show by their neat dress and sobriety that there was wide difference between the two forces’. New Zealand military historian,

---

75 The first name suggested was ‘The Australasian Army Corps’ but New Zealanders disagreed with this title they knew it would be assumed the group was made up only of Australians. C. Pugsley, *The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War* (Auckland: Reed, 2004), 19.
76 Ibid., 28.
77 Ibid., 28-9, 305, 08.
Christopher Pugsley found many critical descriptions of Australians in New Zealand soldiers’ letters, diaries and recollections from World War I. However, once they faced the hardships of Gallipoli, Australian and New Zealand soldiers relied on each other and forged a bond out of their shared adversity. Charles Bean highlighted one particular assault where Major Hart and the Wellington Battalion came to the assistance of the severely weakened 2nd Australian Battalion. The two groups fought as one force and from then on ‘such small jealousies as had existed between Australians and New Zealanders in Cairo vanished completely... three days of genuine trial had established a friendship which centuries will not destroy’. The ANZAC mounted division in Sinai and Palestine worked together particularly effectively, firstly under an Australian Commander and then under a New Zealand one. A strong sense of rivalry remained between the Australian and New Zealand troops in spite of their close relationship. This was seen in the fiercely fought Inter-Allied rugby competition for the King’s Cup in 1919, where Australia defeated New Zealand.

The word Anzac quickly came to mean more than an acronym for the Australian and New Zealand forces. There were many other labels for Australian and New Zealand soldiers. The term ‘digger’ became a popular word for both nationalities although in later years it was appropriated by Australia as a nationalistic term. ‘Digger’ was a colloquial sobriquet with connotations of mateship, loyalty, larrikinism and the desire for a ‘fair go’. However, it was ‘Anzac’ which became the most solemn and meaningful name for all Australian and New Zealand soldiers in World War I. The shared deaths at Gallipoli turned a convenient acronym into a sacred word. A shared Australian and New Zealand Anzac archetype developed in opposition to perceptions of the British soldier. Anzacs were physically superior to Britons, loyal to their nation and mates, egalitarian, and endowed with initiative and resourcefulness. However, neither nationality wished to be completely merged into the identity of the other, especially by outsiders who used the term Anzac for convenience’s sake in a type of back-handed colonialism. Anzac did not merely signify a trans-Tasman connection; it was a term of national pride and identity in both Australia and New Zealand.

81 Bean, The Story of Anzac, 510, 16.
82 Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, 33.
84 Inglis, 'Anzac Revisited', 15-16.
Since their inception in 1915, Australia’s and New Zealand’s Anzac ceremonies have been closely linked but marked by different nuances of meaning. The Returned Services Association (RSA) of New Zealand and the Returned Services League (RSL) of Australia frequently sent delegations to each other’s Anzac services. New Zealand followed Australia’s lead in establishing a dawn service ceremony, making Anzac Day a half holiday and more recently in creating a Tomb of an Unknown Warrior and planning a Memorial Park.85 Australia and New Zealand have traditionally used similar commemoration practices in Anzac Day services due to their common cultural background and constant exchange of ideas.86 In both nations, many people regard Anzac Day as their real national day.87 Then again, there are historical differences in the memorialisation of Anzac in each country. Anzac historians Stephen Clarke and Ken Inglis agree that New Zealand’s observance of Anzac Day has had a much stronger Protestant religious content than Australia.88 In Australia, especially in early years, Anzac Day was more of an ex-servicemen’s day than in New Zealand.89 In New Zealand, the Maori population have embraced and been included in Anzac Day more than Australian Aboriginals.90 The biggest difference between Australia and New Zealand is the tone of the Anzac legend. In Australia, Anzac celebrations are celebratory, nationalistic and frequently militaristic.91 In New Zealand, Anzac Days have traditionally been more focused on grief, mourning, remembrance and the repudiation of war.92 The other main divergence is that Australians tend to use the term Anzac as a synonym for ‘Australian’ whereas New Zealanders are always conscious of their larger partner in the Anzac

85 The current New Zealand government plans to create a New Zealand Memorial park which will allow for the construction of memorials, particularly from countries with which New Zealand has a close relationship. This is a very similar concept to Canberra’s Anzac Parade. ‘New Zealand Memorial Park Project’, <http://www.mch.govt.nz/projects/memorials/park.html>, accessed 14-11-07.
87 As opposed to Waitangi Day in New Zealand and Australia Day in Australia.
89 Clarke, ‘The One Day of the Year’, 144.
90 In Australia, Indigenous Australians were excluded from the Australian Armed Forces and thus, until recently from official remembrance in war commemoration. Inglis and Brazier, *Sacred Places*, 444-51.
relationship. The Anzac traditions in Australia and New Zealand have developed in parallel but nonetheless are slightly different.

In the last twenty years Anzac Day has grown in popularity in both Australia and New Zealand. Dawn Services in Australia, New Zealand and Gallipoli have increased in size dramatically. Anzac Day has become more inclusive of Vietnam veterans, descendants of soldiers and different ethnic groups. For the fiftieth anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli in 1965 an official party of 300 veterans and commentators from Australia and New Zealand attended. Only four Australian backpackers were present. Even thirty years ago Anzac Day ceremonies at Gallipoli might only have a dozen or so people attending. But the end of the Vietnam War, the growth of popular books and movies on Gallipoli, desire for a distinctive national heritage, expansion of the tourist industry and popularity of family history renewed interest in Anzac Day celebrations. By 2000 for the 75th anniversary, over 15 000 Australians and New Zealanders crowded onto the narrow beach at Anzac Cove where the first landing took place. Bruce Scates, who did an extensive survey of Australasian visitors to Gallipoli, found that there were commonalities among these modern pilgrims. Whether backpackers or descendants of soldiers, they saw Gallipoli as a sacred landscape and Anzac commemorations as a cathartic spiritual experience. Likewise, back home in Australia and New Zealand, numbers at dawn services continued to grow. The idea of Anzac retains a hold on the Australian and New Zealand popular imagination to the present day.

The main ideas drawn out from the history of Anzac are that it is a relationship forged in adversity which has aspects of both similarity and difference. The Anzac relationship is strongest between Australians and New Zealanders when they serve together overseas, sharing danger and hardship. After early disagreements while training in Cairo, the Anzacs learned to rely on each other when facing the terrors of Gallipoli. Rivalry and national differentiation remain a key part of the Anzac relationship. Australian and New Zealand soldiers have always distinguished themselves from, and compared themselves to, their trans-Tasman counterparts. Australia’s and New Zealand’s commemorations of Anzac Day have also developed in parallel but with significant variations. The idea of Anzac remains strong in

95 K. S. Inglis, 'Return to Gallipoli', in *Anzac Remembered*, 45, 47.
Australia and New Zealand, although it has a more nationalistic tinge in Australia, and has grown in national importance to both nations in recent years.
2. Historiography

This chapter evaluates the Australian and New Zealand historiography related to the three main areas mentioned in chapter one: Australia’s and New Zealand’s association with the Pacific, defence relationship, and Anzac bond. Highlighting the intellectual trends in these areas is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, this chapter traces the genealogy of ideas which are still influential today, such as the notion that New Zealand has a superior cultural ability in the Pacific to Australia. Historiography illuminates how ideas change, evolve or die out. A firm grasp of historiography is also important as Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence and Pacific policy is often affected by academic arguments. Furthermore, a trans-Tasman overview will also be able to identify the relative weighting of writing from each nation. While this may seem obvious, historiography has not been often considered in trans-Tasman sense. This approach reveals that both connections and dissimilarities exist between Australian and New Zealand historiography.

A distinction needs to be made between strategic studies and historical writing when looking at defence and Pacific historiography. Strategic analysis on defence was initially written by politicians or military men. Since the 1960s, with the emergence of defence centres and think-tanks, the scope of this type of academia has greatly expanded. Strategic analysis is now usually done by political scientists or defence specialists. Its purpose is to investigate the current state of a nation or region’s defence situation, predict future patterns and then to make constructive recommendations for the future. It is often written in technical language and addresses those able to implement changes in defence policy. Strategic analysis generally only considers defence history as a brief context within which to place the contemporary issues being examined. It is most valuable as primary source which reveals the current preoccupations of defence thinkers. Historical writing, for the purposes of this chapter, is defined as academic work written by professional historians, which describes, investigates and evaluates past events. Historical writing usually has a less obvious agenda in influencing policy than politically motivated defence analysis. Although, of course, historians’ interpretations of events do vary depending on the time they are working in and their personal biases.
Australian and New Zealand views of the Pacific

Up until the 1960s, Pacific history was written almost exclusively by Westerners and dominated by imperial concerns. Linnekin argues that in this type of Pacific history, all agency was given to the colonisers and the Islanders were merely acted upon. Australasian historians, especially those dealing with international affairs, considered the Pacific only as it related to Australia’s, New Zealand’s or the British Empire’s interests. Indeed, Pacific history was not seen as a separate discipline in Australia until the 1950s. In the aftermath of the Pacific War, Australia recognised that there was a widespread ignorance about the Pacific region. As new Pacific nations began to emerge, Australia and New Zealand gave more prominence to academic study on their region. James Wightman Davidson, generally seen as the father of Pacific history, was appointed to the foundation chair of Pacific History at the Australian National University (ANU) in 1949. Davidson, a New Zealander with a strong sense of Australia’s and New Zealand’s responsibilities as colonial powers, promoted participant history and fieldwork. Interestingly, although the Department of Pacific History in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University remained the dominant institution in the area for the next thirty years, it was staffed mainly by New Zealanders or Britons. This imbalance reflected the greater attention given to Pacific studies in New Zealand and the lingering presence of British colonialism in the region.

From the 1970s onwards, Pacific history fragmented and diversified. There was a trend among some members of the wider historical community at this time to believe that only ‘insiders’ could understand and write about their own peoples’ history. Accordingly, some Pacific historians believed that non-Islanders could not write Pacific history. There was a move to decolonize not only written history, but academic institutions. The development of universities in Fiji and Papua New Guinea widened the boundaries of Pacific study and produced historians of Pacific origin such as Brij V. Lal and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka. Peter Hempenstall, a Pacific historian, argues that in the last 50 years, Pacific history has changed

1 Linnekin, 'Contending Approaches', 20-1.
3 Ibid., 7.
4 Michael Bentley positions the idea that ‘only black people can write the history of black people, and so on’ as part of the postmodern intellectual shift in historical thinking that began during the 1970s and was articulated by the 1980s. M. Bentley, Modern Historiography: An Introduction (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), 140-1, 44.
5 Gunson, 'An Introduction to Pacific History', 9-10.
from a ‘small and cosy field of Western academics plying their trade in ‘Island oriented history’ out of a finite number of scholarly institutions to a vast and complex field of multi-disciplinary analysis practised by historians, anthropologists, linguists, pre-historians, literary and cultural studies critics’.6

The effect of recent historiographical changes is reflected in the literature. Perhaps fearing criticisms of re-colonialism, historians moved away from investigating the relationship between the Pacific and Australia and New Zealand. It is no coincidence that the most detailed study on New Zealand’s relationship with her Pacific territories, New Zealand’s Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, was published as long ago as 1969.7 Recent Pacific historians have tried to divest themselves of a Eurocentric point of view although ironically the majority of Pacific historians are still mainly from Australia or New Zealand.8 The most recent accounts of Pacific-Australasian relationships are to be found in general historical surveys of the region or political science literature by Pacific experts such as Stewart Firth, Greg Fry or Richard Herr.9 Pacific-Australasian relationships are considered when applicable in individual histories of islands, missionaries and conflicts but are not the focus of much individual study. Max Quanchi in his 2003 submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on Australia’s relationship with the South Pacific outlined how Australia was no longer the leader in Pacific research. There was at that point only one university offering a package of Pacific papers.10

There is room for historians to re-examine the Pacific’s relationship with Australia and New Zealand, especially in relation to recent events. Dietmar Rothermund argued in 2006 that there is a worldwide need for more comprehensive social and cultural histories of decolonisation: the narratives of a smooth transfer of power and triumphant nationalism are

---

8 Linnekin, 'Contending Approaches', 25.
now inadequate to explain the connections between metropolitan powers and colonies.\textsuperscript{11} This seems to be true for the Pacific also. It is becoming increasingly apparent the independence settlements of the 1960s and 1970s affect the way the Pacific Island nations function (or do not) today. Pacific coups have forced a few historians to think about the past in the context of current political developments and then engage in moral judgement and debate about the present.\textsuperscript{12} For example, historian, Brij V. Lal, has been involved in commentating on the Fijian coups of the past few decades.\textsuperscript{13} And yet Lal, a historian interested in current Pacific affairs, is in the minority. ‘Participant’ history, as championed by Davidson has become unusual. It is revealing that while the\textit{Journal of Pacific History} issue of September 2007 concentrated on the Solomon Islands and RAMSI, of the six contributors only one was a historian.\textsuperscript{14}

The lack of historical interest in the relationship between Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific is more than compensated for in the area of political science and strategic analysis. Since the late 1980s, the fear of a potentially dangerous region has resulted in a flood of work on the Pacific’s strategic importance, stability and governance. Douglas Ranmuthugala rather cynically suggests that with the end of the Cold War, security organizations now had to find new regional threats to study in order to justify their existence.\textsuperscript{15} These organizations which use Pacific history to explain the present and justify policy recommendations are often closely linked to the Australian government. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), established and funded by the Australian government, has put out several influential papers on Australia’s relationship with Solomon Islands.\textsuperscript{16} The Research School of Pacific Studies at the ANU receives funding from AusAid and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to do specific research on the Pacific. The government departments send their people to the subsequent conferences and make use of the papers produced; even though there is no

\textsuperscript{12} Hempenstall, ‘Introduction’, 2.
\textsuperscript{16} For example, E. Wainwright, \textit{Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands} (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003), E. Wainwright, ‘How Is RAMSI Faring? Progress, Challenges and Lessons Learned.’ \textit{Strategic Insights}, (April 2005).
obligation to support government policies a ‘strong bridging relationship’ exists.\textsuperscript{17} In recent years, Political Science departments in Australia and New Zealand have had a series of books and conference papers published which re-examine the Pacific region.\textsuperscript{18} In Australia in particular there has been a great deal of discussion about the Pacific islands as ‘failing’ states.\textsuperscript{19}

However, some strategic analysts and political scientists have begun to criticise their colleagues’ and governments’ narrow focus on the fraught politics and security of the Pacific in recent years. The first warning came from a 1996 article by Greg Fry in which he pointed out that a new and powerful ‘doomsday’ stereotype of the South Pacific had become prominent in Australia. Bureaucrats, politicians, foreign affairs journalists and academics incorrectly depicted the entire region as economically weak and corrupt, with unstable governance and unsustainable population growth.\textsuperscript{20} In the last few years there has been increasing criticism of the idea of Pacific islands as ‘failing’ states from both Australian and New Zealand Pacific experts. David Hegarty stated that the idea of the Pacific ‘arc of instability’ is too simplistic and over-dramatic.\textsuperscript{21} Graham Fletcher pointed out that there is no evidence of terrorist networks in the South Pacific and that Australia’s national security has never been at risk from so-called ‘failed’ states.\textsuperscript{22} Jonathan Fraenkel and M. Anne Brown have both recently argued that in pre-RAMSI Solomon Islands key elements of national life such as the judiciary, media, central bank, and food suppliers continued to function.\textsuperscript{23} Brown also claimed that commentators should not judge Pacific Island states harshly as they are still in the process of being created and retain traditional sources of cohesion.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{17} D. Hegarty, [interview], Canberra, 8-10-07.
\textsuperscript{19} For further discussion on the origins of the ‘failed state’ concept and its differing applications by America and Australia see R. A. Herr, ‘Implications of the ‘Failed States’ Concept for the Pacific Islands’ Countries in the Post-September 11th World’, in The Eye of the Cyclone.
\textsuperscript{20} Fry, Framing the Islands.
\textsuperscript{21} D. Hegarty, 'Through and Beyond the ‘Arc of Instability”, in The Eye of the Cyclone, 50.
\textsuperscript{22} G. Fletcher, 'Terrorism and Security Issues in the Pacific', Ibid., 13, 17.
\textsuperscript{24} Brown, 'Security and Development', 9-12.
A further key idea found in the historiography is that New Zealand has a special ability in the Pacific because of its supposedly exemplary race-relations record with Maori. This view can be traced back to 19th century New Zealanders who felt they had a right to rule a Pacific empire because of their Polynesian expertise.\textsuperscript{25} The rhetoric of New Zealand’s aptitude in Pacific issues has become common and continues to the present. For example, when introducing a 1978 Foreign Policy Conference, the University of Otago Vice Chancellor, R. O. H. Irvine stated: ‘New Zealand has shown herself to be more in tune with the needs and aspirations of smaller nations in the Pacific. She is a Pacific Island state in a way Australia can never hope to be. The indigenous Polynesian population and a freer immigration policy have ensured that New Zealand will continue to play a leading role in this area. She is better equipped to understand and to think small.’\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, in recent years it has become increasingly common to claim that New Zealand is a Pacific nation itself. The 1990 New Zealand policy review, \textit{Towards a Pacific Island Community}, declared that New Zealand was coming to terms with its place as a Pacific Island nation and was perceived by the Pacific Island Countries as in, and of, the region.\textsuperscript{27} Some authors of recent articles on regional defence and policy relationships assume that New Zealand is part of the Pacific, especially when compared to Australia.\textsuperscript{28} This view is often reinforced by the argument that New Zealand’s large Polynesian population gives New Zealand strong links with Pacific Island nations.\textsuperscript{29} A Wellington columnist, Tapu Misa, argued in 2003 that the New Zealand government promotes New Zealand’s Pacific-ness as the one area in which New Zealand has an edge over Canberra.\textsuperscript{30} The idea of New Zealand as part of the Pacific has become a vital aspect of the New Zealand discourse about national identity.

\textsuperscript{25} Ross, 'Introduction', 1-2.
\textsuperscript{27} However, the report also warned that New Zealand did not necessarily understand the Pacific and should not presume to take a proprietary or colonial approach to Pacific Island affairs. New Zealand. South Pacific Policy Review Group and J. Henderson, \textit{Towards a Pacific Island Community: Report} (Wellington, 1990), 1, 3-4, 21.
\textsuperscript{28} ‘New Zealand’s involvement is perhaps vital, given its identity as a Pacific country’, R. Ayson, ‘Australasian Security Policy: Old Agenda Divergence, New Agenda Convergence?’ in \textit{Australian Security after 9/11}, 171., ‘We in New Zealand are more of the Pacific. We fear invasion less, we value multilateralism more than Australia and Australians’. C. James, 'Foreign and Family: The Australian Connection - Sensible Sovereignty or Niggling Nationalism?’ in B. Lynch (ed.), \textit{New Zealand and the World: The Major Foreign Policy Issues, 2005-2010} (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Victoria University of Wellington, 2006), 33.
\textsuperscript{29} For an example of this argument see F. L. McCarthy, ‘New Zealand’s Pacific Advantage’, in \textit{Securing a Peaceful Pacific}.
However, some regional experts argue that in reality New Zealand does not live up to its reputation as a Pacific nation. Mary Boyd writing in the late 1970s was dismayed that under Robert Muldoon New Zealand had dramatically reduced the flow of Pacific migrants and was following Australia’s Pacific policies. She saw Australia and New Zealand as having basically similar bilateral relations with the Pacific in spite of their different race-relation records.\(^{31}\) A 1990 government task force charged with reviewing New Zealand’s relationship with the South Pacific cautioned against believing that just because New Zealand shares the same environment, it understands the region ‘through some magical process of osmosis’. The report highlighted that only a small number of New Zealanders have spent time in Pacific nations. Furthermore, the Pacific was still perceived as a second-rate diplomatic posting and did not receive adequate resources. A number of Pacific submissions to the task force expressed concern that New Zealand’s Pacific policy was too heavily influenced by Australia.\(^{32}\) Malcolm McKinnon argued in 1993 that the rhetoric of New Zealand as a Pacific nation was ‘the language of informal empire’. He was sceptical that Pakeha had actually changed their identity in any way or that New Zealand foreign policy had a distinctively Pacific orientation. McKinnon stated, ‘white New Zealanders and Pacific Islanders have different identities, rooted in different historical circumstances and experiences’.\(^{33}\) Jim Rolfe in 2001 agreed that although New Zealand belonged in the South Pacific through its geographic position and social contact with Pacific peoples, the Pacific is not the region from which most New Zealanders derive their ethnic identity.\(^{34}\) In 2006, Ian Frazer and Jenny Bryant-Tokalau pointed out that although New Zealand does have a better reputation than Australia amongst Pacific nations, New Zealand has agreed with Australia in all large Pacific initiatives since 1990.\(^{35}\)

This historical overview on Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific reveals several important trends. Although New Zealand does have a strong interest in the Pacific and helped launch the Department of Pacific History department at the ANU, in recent years Australians have written more on the region than New Zealanders. Another trend


\(^{35}\) Frazer and Bryant-Tokalau, 'Introduction', 21.
is the way Australian and New Zealand Pacific historiography has changed according to international trends. Australians and New Zealanders wrote Pacific history from a Western-centred, ‘insider’, nationalist or post-colonial viewpoint when these approaches were current in the world-wide historical community. Another theme is that the desire to avoid accusations of re-colonial sentiments has discouraged historians from writing about the state of Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific. The majority of recent study on Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific is by political scientists and focuses on security issues. Another tendency in the historiography is New Zealand’s long-standing depiction of itself as more integrated into the Pacific region than Australia. New Zealand highlights its special ability in Pacific affairs even when historical evidence suggests that New Zealand’s record with its surrounding region is patchy at best. This trend is important as it influences New Zealand decision-makers’ view of their nation. New Zealand’s Pacific policy is often affected by expectations of cultural sensitivity.

**Australian and New Zealand defence thinking**

In both Australia and New Zealand, there was a marked lack of historical writing on defence during the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the 1987 source book, *Australians, a Guide to sources* claims that Australian historians and observers published almost no books devoted to defence issues between 1908-1964. According to *Australians*, this gap illustrates ‘the indifference, excusing involvement in the two world wars, towards the defence of the nation at all levels of the community, including politicians, academics and press’ during this period. Coral Bell, an expert in international relations, agreed that strategic enquiry at the top political level was ‘virtually dead’ in Australia for 18 years after the ANZUS treaty was signed. In New Zealand a similar lack of discourse around defence exists. Malcolm McKinnon, a historian of New Zealand foreign policy claimed in 1993 that there was a dearth of New Zealand post-World War II political history.

Australian and New Zealand historians during the mid-twentieth century focused on studying their nation’s contribution to World Wars I and II rather than defence policy. In both nations,

---

38 McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, xii.
government-sponsored historians published comprehensive war histories in the 1940s and 1950s. In the early 1940s, Australia’s official war correspondent, Charles Bean, authored and edited a monumental twelve volume official history of the Australian forces in World War I.  

Australia began an official history of its involvement in the Second World War in 1943 with the appointment of Gavin Long as General Editor. The resulting 22 volumes, written by 14 authors, were published by the Australian War Memorial between 1952 and 1977. In New Zealand, the military hierarchy’s narrow conception of military history and insistence on military authors injured the official history project on World War I. Four volumes of popular history were quickly churned out from 1919 onwards but lacked the rigour and depth of the Australian World War I project. New Zealand’s involvement in World War II was much more extensively covered. A War History Branch was established in April 1945 and the official history project was completed in the 1960s, altogether publishing 48 volumes and 24 short booklets. Ian McGibbon claimed that the production of the New Zealand official World War II series involved just about anyone in the nation capable of writing military history. This sustained research into Australia’s and New Zealand’s efforts in foreign wars seems to have occupied historians so completely it prevented them from studying their nations’ histories with regard to regional concerns and local defence policy.

From the late 1950s onwards however, interest in national defence and strategic policy rather than foreign wars, began to grow among historians in Australia and New Zealand. Historians focused on previously neglected periods before and between the two world wars. A few historians investigated Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence policies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Defence histories were written which argued New Zealand’s and Australia’s foreign policy had been more independent from outside influence than previously thought. This trend was identified in later years by Malcolm McKinnon who claimed that historians stressed New Zealand’s ‘old’ maturity out of nationalist sentiment. An example of connecting past defence decisions with a new nationalist viewpoint is

---


42 With the exception of the volume on the Home Front which was published after the 1960s.

43 McGibbon, ''Something of Them Is Here Recorded'.

44 McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 12.
demonstrated in David McIntyre’s 1988 book, *New Zealand Prepares for War: Defence Policy 1919-39*. McIntyre suggested the moral stance taken against nuclear power by New Zealand’s fourth Labour government in 1985 was the culmination of an earlier Labour government’s attempts in 1936-38 to foster universal collective security in the League of Nations. Prompted by contemporary interest in the region, historians on both sides of the Tasman also rediscovered their nations’ involvement in the Pacific during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in matters of defence. The more nationalistic histories of the 1970s and 80s identified Australia’s and New Zealand’s independent foreign policies as arising out of their role in the Asia Pacific area. It should be noted however, that the general trend in the field of history during the 1970s and 1980s was towards social history. Those who made defence history their field of expertise were a small minority.

In the Australian historiography, from the late 1950s onwards, a few historians began to argue that Australia had possessed a distinctive view of her position in the world. Charles Grimshaw in a 1958 article ‘Australian Nationalism and the Imperial Connection 1900-1914’ argued that Australian defence attitudes in the pre-war period demonstrated the growth of an Australian nationalism separate from Britain. In 1969, Neville Meaney published a somewhat inflammatory article in *Australian Outlook* which argued that the historical narrative of Australia having no foreign policy apart from Britain’s up until World War II was a myth. Meaney accused T. B. Millar of fostering this myth and offered an alternative interpretation of Australia’s defence policy as Pacific-centred. His book, *The Search for Security in the Pacific*, published in 1976, expanded this argument. Meaney asserted that from 1901-1923, even though it was still part of the British Empire, Australia developed an

46 Issues that heightened Australian and New Zealand interest in the region during the 1970s were decolonisation, nuclear issues and growing internal instability. For more on this see chapter one section on Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific.
47 Ian McGibbon claims that ‘a disdain for military history permeates the wider historical profession in New Zealand’. Military history has become marginalized and there is little prospect of this changing unless New Zealand becomes involved in a situation that brings defence issues back to the forefront of public concern. McGibbon, "Something of Them Is Here Recorded".
individual strategic outlook. Australia undertook diplomatic initiatives and in the Asia-Pacific region ‘came to possess the substance of a foreign policy.’

Likewise, in New Zealand, during the 1970s and 1980s, a few history publications argued that New Zealand’s defence policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was more independent than previously realised. In 1971, John Henderson wrote a history of New Zealand defence policy from 1840-1939 which claimed that New Zealand remained loyal to Britain out of realism and consistently tried to influence imperial affairs in its own favour. In 1981, Ian McGibbon, a Senior Historian for the Ministry of Defence, published *Blue Water Rationale*, a history of New Zealand’s naval policy up to the fall of Singapore. In this book McGibbon argued that while New Zealand did not have an independent view of foreign affairs before World War II, it consistently made sure of its own security long before 1935.

New Zealand leaders consciously decided to secure their defence via dependence, not independence. In *The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand 1840-1915*, McGibbon reinforced this interpretation by claiming that New Zealand’s defence policy in the pre-World War I period was firmly centred on the Pacific region. Felicity Caird in her 1987 M.A. thesis, ‘The Strategic Significance of the Pacific Islands in New Zealand’s Defence Policy, 1935-39’, argued that in the four years before WWII, New Zealand increasingly focused on Pacific defence. David McIntyre modified Caird’s argument in his 1988 book, *New Zealand Prepares for War*, by asserting that New Zealand’s influence shifted to the Pacific on behalf of, not in opposition to, the Empire.

The development of political science and strategic studies writing on Australian and New Zealand defence originated in the 1950s. The exception to the lack of defence writing after World War II was in foreign affairs publications. In particular, the series, *Australia in World Affairs*, edited by Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper contained a reasonable amount of

---

53 *The Path to Gallipoli* was published in 1991 but it is included as a book in this period, as McGibbon did most of the work on the book in 1978-79. McGibbon’s interpretation of New Zealand defence policy should not be confused with a James Belich-like recolonization argument. McGibbon argues that New Zealand made an autonomous decision to rely on the British Empire for defence because this was the most secure and cheap option in the circumstances.
55 McIntyre and Spence, *New Zealand Prepares for War*. 
information on Australia’s defence concerns. The first volume, which covers the period 1950-1955, does not separate defence policy out from foreign policy. Defence matters are mentioned in relation to the regional ‘search for security’ and the threat of communism. In the second volume on 1956-1960, defence is given subheading titles in chapters such as ‘Australia and the US’ and ‘Australian Foreign policy in action’. By the third volume, which looks at the period from 1981-1965, there is a separate chapter on Australian defence policy written by T. B. Millar, an Australian defence expert. In the *Journal of Australian Politics and History* and *The Australian Quarterly*, there is little mention of defence issues during the 1950s and 1960s.\(^{56}\)

By the mid-1960s, interest in regional defence policy helped instigate the growth of strategic analysis as an academic discipline in Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, growing controversy over the Vietnam War sparked a new interest in current defence matters. T. B. Millar’s seminal book, *Australia’s Defence*, published in 1965, started with the claim that Vietnam ‘has stimulated considerable public interest in defence in Australia, and a vigorous if not always well informed debate’.\(^{57}\) Millar’s book argued that defence was a subject of public concern which needed to be better understood. Though *Australia’s Defence* had one chapter on Australia’s defence history, Millar’s main concern was to analyse the current strategic and military situation of Australia. More significant than his prolific writing was Millar’s work in helping to establish the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) in 1966 at the Australian National University.

For two decades the SDSC, partly funded by the Australian Department of Defence was the only academic centre in Australia devoted to research on strategic and defence issues.\(^{58}\) The Institute quickly made up for the previous dearth of writing on Australian defence by turning out a never-ending stream of books and working papers on Australian defence. Academics associated with the SDCS soon became influential in Australian defence politics.\(^{59}\) Indeed the

\(^{56}\) A survey of the *Journal of Australian Politics and History*, 1955-1964 reveals there are no articles purely on defence/security although articles on Australian foreign policy sometimes mention issues pertaining to defence such as ANZUS/SEATO operations. In *The Australian Quarterly* surveyed in 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963 there are no articles on defence. The focus is on internal affairs.


\(^{58}\) In 1974 the centre received financial support from the Department of Defence for two Research Fellow/Senior Research Fellow posts. D. Ball, ‘Reflections of a Defence Intellectual’, in B. V. Lal and A. Ley (eds.), *The Coombs: A House of Memories* (Canberra: ANU: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 2006), 151.

\(^{59}\) This was to the disgust of some other ANU academics who accused SDSC members of prostituting themselves. Ibid., p. 158.
Centre’s third head, Paul Dibb, was the driving force behind Australia’s adoption of the policy of military self reliance in 1987.60 By contrast, New Zealand took longer to develop an atmosphere of interest in defence policy. Its equivalent to the SDSC, the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), was only established in 1993.61 Both the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF contribute to the funding of the CSS. The Centre has a handful of permanent staff who are supplemented by visiting scholars from overseas or associates who are primarily employed by other universities.62 It is correspondingly less prolific and influential.

In the post-Cold War environment of the early 1990s, defence policy-writers and experts in Australia and New Zealand became increasingly concerned with the Pacific region. They were apprehensive about the probable withdrawal of the United States from Micronesia, possible internal conflict in small, decolonised Pacific Island nations, the growth of new regional powers and maritime security. The United States’ donations of aid and military presence had helped keep the Pacific stable during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, small Pacific nations understandably doubted the United States’ continuing commitment to the area now that it was less strategically important.63 Strategic analysts also saw the potential of internal conflict in the region. As Stephen Henningham, an expert on the Pacific, pointed out in 1993, after the Cold War Pacific Island countries became less insulated from the outside world and more similar to comparable Third World countries.64 Onlookers saw Pacific nations negatively, as host to separatist ethnic and religious forces, with military groups increasingly involved in politics and vulnerable to authoritarian government.65 Those involved in Strategic Studies were conscious of the growing power of China, Japan and India. The military expansion of these nations attracted the concern of Australian authors in particular.66 There was also a new awareness of maritime security, natural resource issues

60 Dr. Paul Dibb’s idea of self reliant defence was first officially set out in the Defence White Paper of 1987 and remains influential to this day. D. McCraw, 'The Defence Debate in Australia and New Zealand', Defence Studies, 7/1 (March 2007), 91.
62 McGibbon, ''Something of Them Is Here Recorded'.
64 Henningham, 'The Pacific Islands Amid the Waves of Change', 206.
and boundary conflicts. Indeed, there was a general agreement among strategists that in the 1990s the South Pacific region was likely to become more complex and volatile.

Strategic experts also became gradually more interested in Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship from about the late 1960s onwards. In 1968, in response to Britain’s proposed withdrawal from the Suez base and an unstable South East Asia, the SDSC and Political Science department at Victoria University, Wellington, held a joint conference on Australia-New Zealand Defence co-operation. At the conference, the possibility of a joint planning system for the two nations’ defence was suggested. Delegates primarily investigated the economic facets of the defence relationship. The two Otago Foreign Policy schools on the Australia-New Zealand relationship, in 1978 and 1982, barely mentioned defence issues; instead Closer Economic Relations (CER) attracted most of the speakers’ attention. However, after New Zealand’s withdrawal from the US guarantee under the ANZUS treaty in 1985, New Zealand and Australia mutually decided to strengthen their defence relationship. Once again the preoccupations of the present prompted a re-examination of the past. By 1990, the trans-Tasman defence relationship, both in its past and present guises, was increasingly studied, debated and contested. For example, Keith Sinclair’s book, Tasman Relations, published in 1987, contains two chapters on the defence and foreign affairs links between Australia and New Zealand.

Defence historiography in the 1990s has also reflected the changing tone of the trans-Tasman defence relationship. In 1992, a year after the Closer Defence Relations (CDR) agreement was signed between Australia and New Zealand, an Australian conference was held on CDR. Sir Frank Holmes, a senior New Zealand economist, was still emphasising the close mutual understanding of the two nations’ defence forces in 1996. By the start of the twenty-first century, however, perceived differences in defence policy drove a wedge between the two nations’ defence viewpoints. The differences in Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence

---

outlook have been characterised by David McCraw as being between traditionalists and revisionists. Traditionalists, who predominate in Australia, believe a defence force should keep as full a range of capabilities as possible. Revisionists, who control New Zealand defence policy, want a defence force structured for current needs.  By 2001, both Australian and New Zealand defence experts, reflecting the differences in Australian and New Zealand defence policy, began to use the rhetoric of ‘drifting apart’. Hugh White’s seminal address at the 2002 Otago Foreign Policy School claimed that Australia and New Zealand were going separate ways on strategic policy. White emphasized the historic and contemporary differences between Australian and New Zealand defence policy and argued that the two nations needed to stop trying to work together on a shared strategic model.

However, in the last few years New Zealand strategists in particular have come to realise that in the specific context of the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand do have a shared security agenda. In 2001 Derek Quigley identified the current divergence between Australian and New Zealand defence policies. Instead of bemoaning the breakdown of CDR, Quigley suggested that the best option for the future was an Australia-New Zealand relationship that would maximise combined defence capabilities in the interests of regional security. Quigley’s recommendations have proved prescient. Since 2000, the threat of international terrorism and internal unrest in some Pacific islands has caused Australia and New Zealand to increase their cooperative regional security efforts. Consequently, in the last few years, Australian and New Zealand strategists and government officials have endorsed trans-Tasman defence cooperation in the Pacific region. In 2005, the New Zealand Deputy Secretary of Defence, Chris Seed argued that the New Zealand and Australian governments work very closely in regional security issues and continue to have a ‘high degree of cooperation, consultation and co-ordination.’ Colin James, who stresses Australia’s and New Zealand’s differences in defence and international affairs, conceded in 2006 that there is a

---


73 For example see McLean, 'Continental Drift', 22., M. Bradford, 'Why Have New Zealand and Australia Drifted Apart?' in New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going?, 27., James, 'Foreign and Family', 33-4., D. Dickens, 'The Anzac Connection: Does the Australia-New Zealand Strategic Relationship Have a Future?' in New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going?, 49.

74 White, 'Living without Illusions', 129-31.

75 D. Quigley, 'New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going in Defence', in New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going?, 52-3.

growing appreciation of New Zealand’s peacekeeping contributions in the Pacific and the scope for further cooperation in Canberra.\textsuperscript{77} New Zealand-born political scientist, Robert Ayson and New Zealand-based strategic studies expert Stephen Hoadley have both written recent articles which emphasise the cooperation of Australian and New Zealand defence policy in the Pacific region.\textsuperscript{78}

Australian and New Zealand defence historiography has several key features: it is Australian dominated, has developed a Pacific-centred nationalism in the last 40 years, and affects defence policy decisions. Although earlier in the twentieth century, there was a dearth of both Australian and New Zealand defence writing, it is mostly Australians who have authored the plentiful strategic studies publications of recent years. This is because Australia has always been home to more academic defence centres and professional strategists than New Zealand. Moreover, military issues feature more prominently in Australian newspapers and popular politics than in New Zealand. These research centres and strategic analysts have tended to focus on current defence concerns. While authors did include some historical analysis this was often brief and used to highlight long term trends or contemporary issues.\textsuperscript{79} Australasian defence history has generally focused around the traditional military subject of war. But Australia’s and New Zealand’s growing nationalism from the late 1960s onwards encouraged some historical study of past defence relationships and strategies in the Pacific. Likewise, around the same time, a renewed interest in the immediate region’s security led Australian political scientists and defence experts to pay attention to strategic issues in the Pacific. Indeed, defence historiography relating to the Pacific often provokes nationalism or national concern among Australian and New Zealand historians and strategic analysts. Recent Australian and New Zealand defence historiography has also affected national policy decisions, particularly in Australia, where defence think tanks are linked with the government. Hugh White’s claim that Australia and New Zealand were drifting apart helped prevent further divergence by alerting contemporaries to the trend and urging acceptance of differing policies. Likewise, reports on the state of the Pacific in recent years have influenced the Australian government’s decisions to intervene.

\textsuperscript{77} James, 'Foreign and Family', 34.
\textsuperscript{79} The exceptions to this rule are political scientists John Henderson in New Zealand and Stewart Firth in Australia who both had originally trained and worked as historians.
The development of the Anzac legend

In the years immediately after the 1915 landing at Gallipoli historians and journalists created the legend of Anzac as a sacred, nation-defining, uniquely Australasian ideal. Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, the official British war correspondent, wrote a laudatory first account of the landing which set the tone for future commemoration of Anzacs. Charles Bean claimed that Ashmead-Bartlett’s despatch probably influenced the Anzac tradition more than any other accounts written subsequently.  

Philip Schuler’s book on the Anzac troops at Gallipoli, *Australia in Arms* (1916) reinforced the legend. Schuler claimed that ‘ANZAC’ was the ‘worth of a Nation and Dominion proved by five letters’. Gallipoli was a ‘baptism of fire’ that gave Australia the ‘indelible stamp of Nationhood’ and would ‘ever form the front page’ in its history. 

A Child’s History of Anzac, also published in 1916, mythologized the Anzacs as heroic, innovative, gallant heroes who had shown the world the worth of the Australians and New Zealanders. In Australian popular culture (which would have been available in New Zealand also) there were a series of books and movies made about Anzac. Early articulation of the Anzac legend was displayed in C. J. Dennis’s tales of Ginger Mick in *The Songs of a Sentimental Bloke* (1915) and *The Moods of Ginger Mick* (1916), both of which quickly sold 40 000 copies on publication. Another example is *The Anzac Book*, a commemorative collection of work by Anzac men, edited by Bean. By 1916 it sold more than 100 000 copies. It developed a picture of Anzacs as bush dwellers; tough men who endured hardship stoically and stood by their mates till the end. In 1928, Film-maker A. C. Tinsdale produced the movie *Gallipoli*. Other successful war films included, *Ginger Mick* (1920) by Raymond Longford, *Diggers* (1931) by F. W. Thring, *Diggers in Blighty* (1933) by Pat Hanna and *Forty Thousand Horsemen* (1940) by Charles Chauvel. The Anzac legend was well-enshrined in Australian and New Zealand society within a few years of 1915 and this trend continued throughout the early to mid twentieth century.

The most important individual in the early historiography of Anzac is Charles Bean, the official war correspondent and author of the Australian official histories of World War I.

---

Bean envisaged his official war histories as a monument to the Australian soldiers, a literary equivalent to his plans for the Australian War Memorial. In 1938 he said ‘The first question for my fellow historians and myself clearly was: How did the Australian people – and the Australian character, if there is one – come through the universally recognised test of this, their first great war?’

The first volume of Bean’s *The Story of Anzac* came out in 1921 and the second in 1924. Together they were a massive narrative of the Gallipoli campaign as well as a celebration of the Australian character told from the viewpoint of the trenches. For the next 23 years Bean worked on his detailed histories of World War I and in 1946 published a more accessible one volume abridgement, *Anzac to Amiens*, for the ordinary Australian.

New Zealand’s Anzac tradition and historiography has always been less prominent and nationalistic than Australia’s. New Zealand’s official history of World War I consisted of only three volumes, which were ‘short, breezy and not heavily documented’. Indeed, New Zealand had no comparable figure to Bean who could articulate their national Anzac story. The closest equivalent was Malcolm Ross, New Zealand’s World War I correspondent, who did not arrive at Gallipoli until June 1915. Moreover, New Zealand, up until recently, has lacked any war museum equivalent to the Australian War Memorial which plays a key role in purposefully disseminating the mythology of Anzac. The Australian War Memorial puts on exhibitions, funds research, holds conferences and helps publish books that address the role of Australia in war. Moreover, it acts as a sacred place, the temple of the civil religion of Anzac.

In New Zealand there is nothing like so powerful a statement of national remembrance. After World War I there was talk of a New Zealand national war museum but it never eventuated. Even the Auckland War Memorial Museum devotes only a small section to war. New Zealand has always remembered Gallipoli but with less emphasis on mythologizing Anzac as a national achievement.

There was not much published, either for an academic or popular audience on the Anzac legend during the mid twentieth century. Ken Inglis speculated that J. A Hobson’s influential book *Imperialism* impressed post-war scholars with the idea that military history was ‘a

---

86 Ibid., 83, 85, 87, 89.
88 Inglis and Brazier, *Sacred Places*, 333, 459.
ghastly pageant in which the young men of all nations were sacrificed to the squalid designs of capitalists lusting for markets… a subject for angry tears rather than investigation’. Consequently Australian historians ignored Australia’s official military histories during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s, Inglis found nothing in his university career had helped him understand Anzac. World War I did not make it onto the university history syllabus because, as in British universities, history stopped before the twentieth century. Likewise, Bill Gammage, a well-known historian of Australian’s involvement in World War I was disappointed in the early 1960s by the academic neglect of military history. His choice of a World War I topic for his honours thesis was so unusual he had to be given a supervisor from Duntroon. The same was true for New Zealand universities which also followed British universities’ example. On certain Anzac anniversaries celebratory accounts would be published; however, such works were brief, relied on existing material and did not challenge or analyse the subject.

Since the 1960s there has been a growth in Australian historiography which examines not just the Gallipoli campaign but also the creation of the Anzac legend. Because of the central position of the Anzac legend in Australian identity it has been of greater interest to Australian historians than New Zealand historians. The pioneer in the field was Australian historian, Ken Inglis. Inglis was the first to study Charles Bean and his significant role in shaping the Anzac legend. He wrote notable articles over the years which investigated the nature of the Anzacs, the sacredness of Anzac Day, the development of the legend and its memorialisation. During the 1970s, two popular and influential Australian histories of Gallipoli were published; Bill Gammage’s The Broken Years and Patsy Adam-Smith’s The Anzacs. Their work contributed to a growing public awareness of the Anzac legend in Australia. Gammage’s view of Gallipoli particularly attained a wide influence through his work as historical advisor on Peter Weir’s 1981 film Gallipoli. Another influential historical study was that done in the early 1990s by the Australian oral historian, Alistair

---

90 Inglis, 'The Anzac Tradition', 30.
91 K. S. Inglis, 'Remembering Anzac', in Anzac Remembered, 230.
92 Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli, 222.
93 For example, the Wellington Gallipoli Veteran’s Association commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the Anzac landing by publishing a small volume of recollections. L. S. Fanning, Gallipoli Recalled: Spirit of Anzac (Wellington: Wellington Gallipoli Veterans' Association, 1955).
94 For Inglis’ pioneering articles see Anzac Remembered. His extensive work on Anzac Day and memorials is the subject of Inglis's and Brazier's book, Sacred Places.
96 Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli, 223.
Thomson. Thomson interviewed working class Anzacs and analysed how their memories intersected with and contradicted public legends about Anzac. His work demonstrated the ways the Anzac legend has flattened out the nuances of individual experience. Since the 1970s, the Australian War Memorial has become a centre of research as well as a memorial. It has a popular archival centre with searchable databases which are accessible to the public. Indeed, increasingly the role of the Australian War Memorial is also being studied by Australian academics.

Other historians, mainly from Australia, simultaneously widened, revised and re-examined the Anzac legend. Some activist authors examined the legend of Anzac from the perspective of feminism and gender studies in the late 1980s. There have also been books written which revise traditional Australian Anzac narratives in the last ten or so years. Richard Nile re-examined the academic assumption that war had little impact on the Australian literary scene. In 1992, Peter Cochrane’s book, Simpson and Donkey investigated the development of the Anzac legend of Simpson which was taught in Australian schools for much of the twentieth century. In 1993, E.M. Andrews published The Anzac Illusion which pointed out the parochialism, delusions and exaggerations of the legend. Dale Blair critically investigated the chauvinistic depiction of the Australian digger by focusing on civilian links of family and class, and examined the emotional dilemmas facing Australian soldiers in World War I. Issues of ethnicity and transnational influence are some of the more recent Anzac issues to be examined. Australian historian, Jenny Macleod, compared the Australian and British traditions of Gallipoli in her recent book Reconsidering Gallipoli. Two recent books examine the background of Australian Anzacs who came from Russian and German backgrounds. Bruce Scates in his recent book, Return to Gallipoli examines the history of

---

102 Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli, 229.
103 Blair, Dinkum Diggers, 4.
104 E. V. Govor, Russian Anzacs in Australian History (Sydney: UNSW Press in association with the National Archives of Australia, 2005)., J. F. Williams, German Anzacs and the First World War (Kensington, N.S.W.: University of New South Wales Press, 2003).
Australasian pilgrimages to war sites and the recent phenomenon of tourists visiting Anzac Cove as a sacred journey.\textsuperscript{105}

In New Zealand, there has only been a little done on the topic of Anzac in comparison to Australia. Stephen Clarke and Scott Worthy have done some investigation into the development of Anzac Day celebrations.\textsuperscript{106} New Zealand cultural historian Jock Phillips collaborated with Inglis on an article comparing Australian and New Zealand war memorials.\textsuperscript{107} Popular books on Gallipoli continue to be written by both Australian and New Zealand authors. For example, Chris Pugsley published \textit{The Anzac Experience}, in 2004.\textsuperscript{108} Unfortunately, New Zealand is only occasionally mentioned in the new work on Anzac and as yet has not followed suit with comparable studies. This means that New Zealand is underrepresented in recent historiography on the development of Anzac.\textsuperscript{109} Perhaps because of the smallness of the New Zealand historical community, there are no comparable figures to Ken Inglis who are recognised experts on the New Zealand Anzac tradition.\textsuperscript{110}

There are several important themes in Australian and New Zealand Anzac historiography. The Anzac tradition has been far more thoroughly investigated in Australia. The significant critical attention paid by Australian historians to the development of the Anzac legend is unmatched in New Zealand. Australia’s dominance in the historiography is partly due to its larger academic community. But it is also a consequence of the important role that the themes of defence and Anzac play in the development of Australia’s sense of national identity. Australian writing on Anzac mimics historical events in that it often ignores the ‘NZ’ in Anzac. Australian historians usually only explore the Australian Anzac tradition and trans-Tasman studies are rare. The body of New Zealand writing on Anzac is much smaller but it usually includes Australians in its depiction of the Anzac experience. The expansion of Anzac publications, in Australia in particular, has arisen from a nationalist impulse. It mirrors the growing numbers of Australians and New Zealanders eager to honour the Anzac tradition as part of their identity.

\textsuperscript{105} Scates, \textit{Return to Gallipoli}.
\textsuperscript{106} Clarke, 'The One Day of the Year', Worthy, 'A Debt of Honour'.
\textsuperscript{107} Inglis and Phillips, 'War Memorials in Australia and New Zealand'.
\textsuperscript{108} Carlyon, \textit{Gallipoli}., Pugsley, \textit{The Anzac Experience}.
\textsuperscript{109} An exception is Frank Glenn’s life of Bowler, the controversial New Zealand staff officer on Birdwood’s staff which is published by the Australian War Memorial.
\textsuperscript{110} Jock Phillips is the closest but a small historical community obliges him to be more generalist. Chris Pugsley is now an expatriate.
Recognising how international trends shape historiography brings an awareness of the limitations of any one publication but also reveals how some ideas and historical interpretations endure over time. For example, the historiography of Australia’s and New Zealand’s role in the Pacific differs according to its context but retains general themes. Nineteenth century politicians advocating a Pacific empire, late-twentieth century nationalist historians arguing that Australia’s and New Zealand’s early autonomous foreign policy originated in the Pacific, and twenty first century political scientists describing RAMSI, all use different vocabularies and focus on different spheres of interest. Nonetheless, in all their work it is assumed that the Pacific is of vital importance to Australia’s and New Zealand’s security and that intervention is justified when conflict emerges. Similar themes, which are expressed in different forms but retain an integral continuity are New Zealand’s superior ability in the Pacific and the importance of Anzac.

Another key pattern is that while the body of Australian historiography is larger than New Zealand’s in all three areas, it is generally national rather than transnational in scope. New Zealand, being the smaller nation, is more aware of Australian influence than vice versa. Furthermore, historiography, especially that by strategists, both reflects and influences popular opinion and governmental policy decisions.
3. The TMG in Bougainville

This chapter’s main focus is the trans-Tasman negotiation and planning of the Bougainville peace process and shared Australian and New Zealand experiences in the early months of the Truce Monitoring Group. There is a large existing body of work on the history of Bougainville and the causes and course of the civil war that began in 1989.¹ Likewise, authors have analysed the role of the Burnham meetings in New Zealand extensively.² Thus, background details to the conflict will be dealt with concisely, and with an emphasis on Australia’s and New Zealand’s involvement. Rather than give a detailed narrative of the entire process, three themes will be addressed in the context of the Australia’s and New Zealand’s efforts to bring peace to Bougainville: firstly, tensions and disagreement; secondly, collaboration, and thirdly, the idea of cultural sensitivity in the Pacific. This thematic approach, although broadly chronological, does not give a complete narrative of the events in each team site or the experiences of individual monitors. Instead it seeks to stress the Anzac theme of Australia’s and New Zealand’s simultaneous conflicts and cooperation in the policy making, planning and early stages of the TMG. Trans-Tasman differences are given special attention as they have often been glossed over in previous writing. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the trend of the emphasis on New Zealand’s special ability in the Pacific in order to lay the ground for a critical examination of this idea in chapter five.


Background to the Bougainville Conflict

Bougainville, (see Map 3.1), named for the French explorer Louis de Bougainville who sighted it in 1768, is a large island, about 200km long and between 60-100 km wide, positioned to the east of Papua New Guinea. The smaller island of Buka at the northern tip is also included as part of Bougainville. When colonial boundaries were drawn up in the late nineteenth century, Bougainville was included as part of German New Guinea even though it was geographically, culturally and ethnically closer to the Solomon Islands chain. Indeed there have historically been close trading and missionary links between Bougainville and Solomon Islands. After World War I, when Australia took over German New Guinea, Bougainville was included as part of the handover. In 1975, in spite of calls for secession, Bougainville became a province of newly independent Papua New Guinea. Bougainville’s population of about 200,000 is ethnically and linguistically diverse. There are about 21 distinct languages on the island. Although Bougainvillean men dominate politics and public life, the matrilineal nature of land custodianship means women have a relatively high status in Bougainvillean society. The capital is Arawa, on the eastern coast.3

The causes for the Bougainville conflict which began in late 1988 were varied and deeply rooted. Although Bougainvillean dissatisfaction about the Panguna gold and copper mine was undoubtedly a major source of disagreement there were other long-standing issues which contributed to the outbreak of violence. Economic, ethnic and social tensions in Bougainville created an environment conducive to civil unrest. Bougainville was generally an egalitarian society without economic disparity between individuals until the 1950s; however, the influx of foreign servicemen during World War II made Bougainvilleans aware of their inferior material wealth compared to industrialised societies. The shift from subsistence gardening to cash crops in the 1950s disrupted traditional cycles of land transferral and placed pressure on land availability. Population growth further increased pressure on the traditional agricultural system.4 There were also pre-existing tensions between different Bougainvillean groups. In the relatively prosperous villages of Buka, integration with Papua New Guinea was favoured

3 McMillan, Briefing on Bougainville, 1., M. S. Murray, 'What It Means to Be in the Gloom of Misery: Reflections from a Group of Bougainvilleans Living in the Solomon Islands Speak of Their Experiences as Refugees', MA Thesis (Palmerston North: Massey University, 1999), 45-6., M. A. Brown, Security and Development in the Pacific Islands, 90-2., Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond.'
whereas other areas of Bougainville advocated independence. Although primary schooling was almost universal in Bougainville by the 1980s, secondary schooling and jobs were limited. By the 1980s there was a large pool of semi educated young men with little opportunity or social status.\(^5\)

Another underlying cause of the Bougainville conflict was the sense of common identity which had developed gradually among Bougainvilleans during the twentieth century. From the 1950s in particular, identity politics focused on grievances arising from colonial neglect. In 1962 Bougainvillean leaders applied to a visiting UN Mission to have administration transferred to the United States. As resentment about the mine grew, Bougainvilleans increasingly blamed the ‘redskin’ Papua New Guinean immigrants for their problems. They believed they deserved special treatment as the original inhabitants of the land. In the years before Papua New Guinea became independent in 1975, there were concerted calls among Western-educated Bougainvillean groups for independence.\(^6\)

The creation of the Panguna mine exacerbated existing tensions and created new ones. Alexander Downer described it as the catalyst and symbol around which old and new grievances accumulated.\(^7\) Surveying and test drilling began in the early 1960s and the gold and copper mine opened in April 1972.\(^8\) The Bougainville Copper Agreement arranged for compensation payments between the Papua New Guinean government and the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA). This agreement became a source of grievance among younger Bougainvilleans who accused the PLA of mismanaging the funds. Furthermore, some tribal groups received more compensation than others. The mine’s payments created significant economic inequalities between and within clan groups. The Australian administration did not understand matrilineal clan lineages and recorded land titles incorrectly. Payments failed to increase with population growth and rifts developed as younger landowners demanded their share.\(^9\) From the beginning of mine operations there was also dissatisfaction at the environmental damage caused by mining. The local river and

---

\(^6\) The long held sense of Bougainvillian distinctiveness climaxed fifteen days before Papua New Guinea gained independence. Bougainvillian leaders declared their own island independent and were only reconciled to Papua New Guinea after a year of negotiation. Downer and Urwin, *The Bougainville Crisis*, 2.
\(^7\) Ibid., 4.
\(^8\) For a full account of the process of the creation of the mine and the Agreement negotiated between Australia, Papua New Guinea and Bougainville see Denoon, *Getting Under the Skin*.
wildlife were poisoned and the mining company removed vast amounts of land only to turn it into thousands of tonnes of tailings. Inequalities between Papua New Guinean mine workers and locals furthered feelings of resentment. Dissatisfied young Nasioi landowners formed the New Panguna Landowners Association under the leadership of former mine employee Francis Ona and began to sabotage mine infrastructure. Persistent sabotage led to the closing of the Panguna mine and the deployment of Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and police contingents in 1989.

After the mine closed, the Papua New Guinean Government declared a state of emergency and suspended Bougainvillean provincial government. In early 1989, Ona and his followers became known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and developed their own ideology which promised to expel outsiders and re-establish traditional Bougainvillean society. The use of excessive force by the police and military against suspected BRA supporters alienated much of the Bougainvillean population. In 1990, PNG put a blockade in place which precipitated social hardship and economic collapse. Francis Ona declared Bougainville the Independent Republic of Me’ekamui and established the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG). Local opposition to the BRA coalesced to become the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF). In September 1990 the BRF invited the PNGDF to return to Bougainville. From 1990-1996 various attempts to resolve the conflict alternated with continued violence and military operations. The Endeavour Accords of August 1990, Honiara Declaration of January 1991, Bougainville Leaders Forum of April 1993, Arawa Peace Conference of October 1994 and Cairns Conference at the end of 1995 all failed to facilitate lasting peace.

In June 1996, Papua New Guinea’s new military offensive on Bougainville ended dismally in the Kangu Beach Massacre. Twelve PNGDF and police personnel were killed and five taken hostage. This catastrophe angered the Papua New Guinean Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan and he entered into secret negotiations with Sandline International to contract a mercenary force to defeat the BRA. When this plan was publically denounced by PNGDF Brigadier General Singirok in March 1997 and criticised by Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific

11 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond.'
12 May, 'The Bougainville Conflict and Its Resolution', 460-1.
Island nations, the Sandline contract was suspended and the stage set again for further peace negotiations.13

Australia and New Zealand had been involved in previous attempts to end the Bougainville conflict. In 1990, New Zealand hosted peace talks on a Royal New Zealand Navy ship, HMNZS Endeavour, off the east coast of Bougainville. The Endeavour Accord was signed but never implemented.14 Australia’s relationship with Bougainville was compromised because of its ownership of the Panguna mine and military aid to the PNGDF during the Bougainville conflict.15 Nonetheless, in 1994, Australia led a peacekeeping operation to secure the site of the PNG-organised Arawa Peace Conference. The South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) consisted of about 400 soldiers from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu, with logistic backing provided by Australia and to a smaller extent New Zealand. The SPPKF attempted to secure the site of the peace conference and several neutral zones where delegates would gather under protection for the duration of the talks. Unfortunately Ona and his close supporters failed to attend when their personal security could not be guaranteed.16 Bob Breen, a prominent Australian military historian who has studied Operation Lagoon, argued that although Australia was guilty of rushed deployment, vague planning and cultural misreading of the Pacific Island troops and Bougainville conflict, failure at Arawa was due to rogue elements of the PNGDF ambushing secessionist leaders on their way to the conference.17

Nonetheless the SPPKF showed the potential of a regional peacekeeping force and hinted at a new consensus emerging among Pacific nations that the Bougainville civil war was a neighbourhood problem.18 In 1995, Australia hosted peace talks in Cairns, but when the returning Bougainvillean delegates were shot at by PNGDF forces, violence re-erupted and

15 The Australian government provided training, equipment and finance to the PNG Defence Force during operations on Bougainville. Australia supplied Papua New Guinea with Pacific Class patrol boats, speedboats, Iroquois helicopters and Nomad aircraft which have all been used to maintain and enforce the blockade on Bougainville. In addition, some Australian advisors directed and advised Papua New Guinea on day-to-day operations during the war. V. John, 'The Australian Role in Bougainville', in Building Peace in Bougainville, 24.
16 B. Breen, Giving Peace a Chance: Operation Lagoon, Bougainville 1994: A Case of Military Action and Diplomacy (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence; No. 142; Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australian National University, 2001), 79-89.
17 Ibid., B. Breen, [personal correspondence], 8-1-08.
18 Downer and Urwin, The Bougainville Crisis, 12.
the peace process was once again derailed.\textsuperscript{19} At the beginning of 1997 all of New Zealand and Australia’s attempts to resolve the Bougainville crisis had failed.

In early 1997, New Zealand, led by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don McKinnon, renewed its efforts to resolve the Bougainville conflict. After the National Government returned to power in 1996, McKinnon, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided he wanted to do something about the problem of Bougainville.\textsuperscript{20} New Zealand representatives contacted the BRA leaders through Martin Miriori of the BIG who was living in The Hague as an exile. Small planning meetings, held in Honiara and Auckland between New Zealand and Bougainvillean representatives, decided that New Zealand would host a peace meeting. Papua New Guinea was not enthusiastic but the Sandline crisis put them in a weak position to intervene.\textsuperscript{21} After some risky transportation of Bougainvillean delegates to New Zealand by the RNZAF, a conference was held at Burnham from 3 to 18 July. Warring Bougainvillean parties agreed to release five Papua New Guinean hostages and signed the Burnham Declaration which committed them to a peace process.\textsuperscript{22} The second round of talks at Burnham began on 1 October 1997 and included government officials from Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.\textsuperscript{23} Burnham II resulted in the Burnham Truce. A month after Burnham II, talks were held in Cairns to arrange the composition and conditions of the Truce Monitoring Group.

The consensus reached at Burnham II called for a neutral regional group to monitor the truce. A formal agreement, signed at Port Moresby on 5 December 1997 by Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu, provided the legal framework for the actions of the truce monitors. The TMG was then deployed in Bougainville on 6 December 1997.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{19} May, 'The Bougainville Conflict and Its Resolution', 462.
\textsuperscript{20} Most sources agree that Don McKinnon was the driving force behind the Bougainville peace process. Roger Mortlock argued that John Hayes saw the opportunity first. However, this does not detract from the fact that it was McKinnon who had the authority and means to move forward the plans for mediation with John Hayes as his right-hand man. R. Mortlock [interview], Wellington, 7-9-07. For first hand account from Don McKinnon see Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville', 46. Bede Corry said McKinnon’s view was ‘there’s this bleeding sore on our doorstep and it behooves us to do something about it.’ B. Corry, [phone interview], Wellington, 2-10-07.
\textsuperscript{21} B. Corry, [phone interview], J. Rolfe [personal communication], Wellington, 5-9-07.
\textsuperscript{22} Bougainville Leaders, 'The Burnham Declaration: By Bougainville Leaders on the Re-Establishment of a Process for Lasting Peace and Justice on Bougainville’; \textless http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_19970718.html\textgreater , accessed 4-5-07.
\textsuperscript{23} McMillan, Briefing on Bougainville, 5-7.
\textsuperscript{24} Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond'.
Australian logistical support group along with 20 Australian civilian monitors in the TMG. New Zealand provided about half the force and there were also small groups of Fijian military and civilian Ni-Vanuatu, making up a total of about 250 personnel.\(^{25}\) NZDF Brigadier Roger Mortlock who was responsible for planning and deploying the force did not follow any doctrinal peacekeeping recipe but instead worked out what was needed from first principles.\(^{26}\) The TMG was divided into four teams, each of about 20 members, who were situated in Arawa, Buka, Buin and Tonu. The teams monitored and reported on the implementation of the Burnham Declaration:

> The monitoring teams patrolled, observed and participated in village social life in their areas. A patrol typically consisted of village stops, presentations to the villagers about the peace process and the TMG, discussions about the truce process and how it was holding out in the village area, and answering questions. The TMG’s aim was to instil trust in the integrity of the peace process and this was best achieved by the monitoring patrols demonstrating benign presence over as wide an area as possible.\(^{27}\)

In January 1998, a Bougainville Leaders’ meeting at Lincoln, Christchurch produced the Lincoln Agreement, which provided for an extension of the truce and TMG until April 1998. In April the TMG was replaced by the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) which operated on similar lines to the TMG. The Bougainville Peace Agreement passed its final vote in 2002 and is based on three pillars: autonomy, the referendum on independence and weapons disposal.\(^{28}\) The PMG finally pulled out of Bougainville in 2003.

**Australian and New Zealand tensions**

First hand accounts and secondary articles often focus on the remarkable success of the TMG and PMG. Tension between Australians and New Zealanders is only mentioned in passing. However, conflict and disharmony between trans-Tasman representatives, in particular the military forces, is the untold story of the Bougainville peace process. Apart from the SPPKF, Australia and New Zealand had little recent experience at working together on relatively large scale peacekeeping operations in the Pacific region.\(^{29}\) Furthermore, this was a New

---

\(^{25}\) P. Londey, *Other People’s Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping* (Crows Nest; NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2004), 220.

\(^{26}\) Mortlock, [interview].

\(^{27}\) Rolfe, ‘Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville’, 49-50.


\(^{29}\) Australia and New Zealand had worked together on a number of occasions for disaster relief and on trans-Tasman exercises, B. Breen, [personal correspondence].
Zealand-led mission. This made the TMG an exception to general military practice where a
coalition is led by the larger and wealthier nation. Some Australian Department of Defence
officials and ADF personnel lacked confidence in the New Zealand leadership of Brigadier
Roger Mortlock. The ADF also felt that the mission would be better served by Australian
commanders who were more experienced in employing Australian assets for force protection.
While the ADF and NZDF collaborated fairly well at a tactical level, there were strong
differences of opinion between the two forces at the strategic level of command.30 Seen from
this perspective it is remarkable that TMG enjoyed the amount of trans-Tasman collaboration
it did.

Even before the Bougainville peace process started moving in mid 1997 there were pre-
extisting differences of approach between the Australian and New Zealand defence forces.
The Australian Defence Department, a large organization, thrived on contested advice which
sometimes slowed down planning processes and led to tensions between civilian and
uniformed personnel. The ADF was much larger than the NZDF, and as such, relied on
extensive networks of committees to ensure thorough planning. The ADF also had better
training programmes and equipment than the NZDF. By comparison, the NZDF was
undersized and under-resourced, but with small cohesive strategic management groups which
encouraged fast decision-making and lateral thinking.31 Moreover, the Australia-New
Zealand defence relationship was tense in 1997. The Australian Department of Defence was
critical of New Zealand’s small defence budget and in a 1997 Australian White Paper on
Defence described New Zealand’s level of funding as ‘a troubling aspect of the
relationship’.32

Australia, because of its geographical proximity and former colonial responsibilities, had
historically been more concerned than New Zealand about Papua New Guinea and
Bougainville. Australia had major security concerns about the fragmentation of Papua New
Guinea and the establishment of small, non-viable states close to Australia.33 Neil Robertson,
the New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner in Port Moresby, recounted his Australian
colleagues' strong unease when John Hayes, a MFAT official working for McKinnon and a

30 Ibid., 8-1-08.
31 R. Mortlock, ‘A Good Thing to Do’, in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 73-4., R. Mortlock,
[interview], B. Breen, [interview], Canberra, 12-10-07., J. O’Reilly [phone interview], Wellington, 10-8-07.,
Breen, [personal correspondence].
32 Australia, Australia’s Strategic Policy, p. 20.
33 McMillan, Briefing on Bougainville, 6. Downer and Urwin, The Bougainville Crisis, 8-9.
known supporter of Bougainvillean separatism, canvassed opinions on a New Zealand-led peace intervention in Bougainville in early 1997.34

Because of these Australian concerns, New Zealand’s early attempts to involve the ADF were rejected. Some senior ADF officers were aware of New Zealand’s attempts to contact BRA members from early on but did not think that these initiatives would amount to much.35 An Australian military analyst, Ewan MacMillan, recalled that while he and his colleagues started to see the possibility of Australia deploying to Bougainville after March 1997, many in the ADF dismissed their predictions as ‘plain out there’.36 NZDF Chief of Operations, Brigadier Roger Mortlock, flew over to Australia after Burnham I to attempt cooperative contingency planning. The Australian Chief of Defence Force, General John Baker, and his senior defence officials were unenthusiastic. They made it clear that the ADF wanted nothing to do with a New Zealand-led operation. Bob Breen, an attendee of a meeting at the operational level in Sydney recollected that Australian officers with peacekeeping experience were more empathetic than their peers without the same experience. Australian Department of Defence civilians were unsupportive and held the policy position that New Zealand should be spending more on defence.37

Even after Burnham II when it became increasingly clear that Australia would be involved in a Bougainville intervention some senior ADF officials continued to create obstacles. A workshop was held in Canberra, on 4 November 1997, to investigate a possible ADF contribution to Bougainville. At this meeting, Major General Jim Connolly, Commander of the Headquarters Australian Theatre, advised unhelpfully, against his staff’s recommendation, that the Bougainville job would require a brigade (2500 soldiers). Bob Breen characterised this unnecessarily large recommendation as evidence of Australian unwillingness to participate in a New Zealand-led operation.38 When Mortlock returned to Australia soon after Burnham II, Australian officers were still divided in their response, particularly with regard to the idea of going in unarmed.39 Major General John Sanderson and

34 N. Robertson, [interview], Wellington, 6-9-07.
37 Breen, [interview].
38 Breen, [interview] and [personal correspondence].
39 Breen recalls that the level of anxiety about the military going in unarmed was ‘extraordinary’ at higher military levels. One day there were 11 briefings to reassure ADF senior officers. Breen, [interview].
Major General Peter Abigail, having headed previous Australian peacekeeping missions, were supportive of the Bougainville operation but others opposed it. Even after it became clear that a peacekeeping mission would be sent to Bougainville in the next few months, some Australians such as Admiral Peter Briggs and Defence civilian Alan Behm continued to argue for a smaller Eminent Persons Group model. When the TMG model was finalised, Australian military analysts were caught off guard by the speed of the preparations and were flooded with questions by concerned colleagues.

New Zealand should not necessarily be characterised as the injured party in Australia-New Zealand disagreements over Bougainville. Some NZDF high-level staff did not support the Bougainville operation. Major General John Denniston-Wood, the New Zealand Chief of General Staff, initially opposed involvement in Bougainville. Neil Robertson, the Deputy New Zealand High Commissioner in Port Moresby, also pointed out that some New Zealanders took unnecessary pleasure in being ‘top dog’ for once. Indeed, Don McKinnon recognised this tendency in a speech to the New Zealand Parliament when he stressed that New Zealand should not see its leadership of the TMG as a coup over Australia and must recognise that ‘Australia will carry the more formidable load of reconstruction of Bougainville’. Breen argues that Australians did not necessarily oppose New Zealand leadership of the TMG because they were anti-New Zealand, but because they wanted accountability for their own assets and people. Some of the Australian senior officers assessed that the NZDF’s planning and style of operation was backward and unprofessional. There was a genuine concern that New Zealand had run down its defence capacity and was incapable of managing the Bougainville operation. Moreover, the New Zealanders moved so quickly in the early stages of negotiation that Australians felt at a disadvantage. Australian Colonel Jeff Wilkinson believes that New Zealand deliberately kept up the planning.

---

40 Sanderson headed up the military component of the UN Cambodian peacekeeping mission in 1992-93 and Abigail headed up Operation Lagoon and the SPPKF to Bougainville in 1994. J. Sanderson, [phone interview], Canberra, 30-10-07., Breen, [interview].
41 An Eminent Persons Model was a group of civilians who would ‘wander around Bougainville and monitor the truce’. Breen, [interview]. For corroboration see, Rolfe, ‘Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville’, 49.
43 Breen, [interview].
44 Robertson, [interview].
46 Breen, [interview].
momentum for the operation leaving Australia with no choice but to participate on New Zealand’s terms.48

Differences in the way the ADF and NZDF operated became clear during the early stages of the TMG. New Zealand’s and Australia’s entry to Bougainville had not been well coordinated. For both nations, pre-deployment training was rudimentary.49 Whereas the NZDF started to arrive on a ‘force flow’ basis from the first day, the ADF reconnaissance party had planned to stay for only six days in order to assess the situation.50 These opposing methods were reflected in a situation that developed after the reconnaissance party, led by New Zealander Colonel Clive Lilley, arrived in Buka. Finding the TMG’s credibility on the line because of its late arrival, Lilley pushed for an immediate crossing to Bougainville on the local boats, which had been organised by New Zealand Defence Attaché in Port Moresby, Athol Forrest. This was opposed by the head of the Australian contingent, Colonel Steve Joske, who wanted more time to reconnoitre and plan the trip to Arawa. Lilley asserted his authority with Joske (whom he had not met previously) and the trip to Arawa went ahead early the next morning. Joske was left to go by road. Concerned about the local response if the first TMG group to arrive at Arawa were not New Zealand-led, Lilley hired a commercial Hevilift helicopter and flew into Arawa.51 Ged Shirley describes the ‘race for Arawa’ as ‘friendly posturing’. In reality the situation was more fraught and did not set a good tone for Lilley and Joske’s relationship in the following weeks.52

Generally, the ADF was more concerned about safety, procedure and equipment than the NZDF. The two military forces had different approaches to risk management. The ADF expected to have reliable 24-hour radio communication and vehicles driven by qualified drivers. The NZDF, probably because of its lack of resources, was content to deploy without

---

48 J. Wilkinson, [interview], Canberra, 9-10-07.
49 Major Angie Fitzsimons to Jim Rolfe: her training in New Zealand was blasé, with only 1 hour of pidgin training, and the program seemed cobbled together. Rolfe, [personal communication]. In Jan Gammage’s Australian preparation there was too much of a military focus and not much was known about the actual circumstances in Bougainville. J. Gammage, [interview], Canberra, 9-10-07. There was only two weeks in between when the ADF engaged the NZDF and deployment. B. Breen, ‘Coordinating Monitoring and Defence Support’, in Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 44.
50 Incidentally the ADF reconnaissance party ended up staying for much longer than six days.
51 Bougainvillean, Joseph Kabui, Vice-President of the BIG, affirms that ‘it was a very good move that the first military personnel with the TMG to arrive in Arawa were Kiwis’. Kabui describes it as a symbolic move that affirmed that New Zealand was leading this thing. J. Kabui, ‘Reconciliation a Priori’, in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 42-3.
52 This narrative is from three sources; Lilley, [interview], A. Forrest, [interview], Wellington, 4-9-07, and G. Shirley, ‘Getting Started’, Ibid., 57-8.
such necessities. The New Zealand military radios and jeeps were untrustworthy and potentially unsafe; a situation which worried Australian communications and transport officers.\(^{53}\) This difference in approach was demonstrated when the Australian-led PMG took over in 1998 and immediately put in place a force which was larger and better equipped than the TMG.\(^{54}\)

Indeed, a major operational problem for the New Zealand and Australian forces in Bougainville was the NZDF’s inadequate provision of equipment, resources and personnel. New Zealand did not have the capacity to provide communications for the TMG; a situation Lilley found very frustrating as it meant all his reports were sent through Canberra.\(^{55}\) The Land Rovers New Zealand sent with the TMG, (see in Figure 3.1) were notoriously dreadful: rusted, dangerous and unroadworthy. According to Wilkinson, the vehicles were assessed by the Royal Australian Mechanical Engineers (RAME) as unsafe.\(^{56}\) Andrew Rice, an Australian civilian monitor from the TMG recalled that when he left Bougainville all four New Zealand Land Rovers had to be pushed onto the landing craft.\(^{57}\) Jan Gammage, another Australian civilian monitor, remembered the New Zealand Major’s irritation with his troops’ lack of skill at manoeuvring their antiquated light tactical raft (see Figure 3.2) into position on arriving at Buka.\(^{58}\) Furthermore, New Zealand withdrew some of its troops and supply responsibilities during the second rotation of the TMG. Wilkinson, the Senior National Officer (SNO) of the Australian contingent at this time, characterised this as a deliberate policy of ‘progressive non-replacement - withdrawal by stealth’. According to Wilkinson and Breen, Colonel Jerry Mateperae came in with secret instructions to cut the New Zealand presence down to only 30 personnel. Thus, without officially consulting the ADF, the NZDF appeared to be defaulting on its logistical obligations. The NZDF also pulled out and planned to not replace Special Forces personnel who were vital to guaranteeing the teams’ security.\(^{59}\) This policy was due to the New Zealand governments’ withdrawal of financial support for the operation. When Jenny Shipley ousted Jim Bolger as Prime Minister in December 1997, she made several budget-saving decisions, one of which was to withdraw New Zealand troops

\(^{53}\) Breen, [personal correspondence].
\(^{55}\) Lilley, [interview].
\(^{56}\) Wilkinson pointed out that if there had been an accident with the Land Rovers the court of inquiry would have showed the NZDF up as criminally negligent. Wilkinson, [interview].
\(^{57}\) A. Rice, [interview], Canberra, 10-10-07.
\(^{58}\) J. Gammage, [interview].
\(^{59}\) Breen, [interview], Wilkinson, [interview].
from Bougainville. Don McKinnon did not want to have to pull out from Bougainville but was ‘crunched by the Treasury’.60 All members of the TMG experienced unnecessary hardship and danger because of the New Zealand government’s decision.

Figure 3.1: The New Zealand Land Rovers at Buka, March 1998, courtesy of Andrew Rice.

Figure 3.2: The antiquated New Zealand Light Tactical Raft, Buka, March 1998, courtesy of Andrew Rice.

60 McKinnon to Jim Rolfe, Rolfe, [personal correspondence].
In spite of these tensions between the two nations, many New Zealanders and Australians chose to focus on the positives rather than the negatives of the TMG. It is perhaps to be expected that Australia’s Foreign Minister, Downer, only mentioned the close collaboration between Australia and New Zealand in the Bougainville peace process in his official publication on Bougainville.61 However, even in individual interviews, New Zealand participants in particular, glossed over trans-Tasman discord.62 Perhaps this occurred because of the popular perception of Bougainville as a successful operation. The TMG has become a story of Australia and New Zealand cooperation in the Pacific and interviewees may have interpreted their experiences through this public narrative of achievement. Moreover, for both Australians and New Zealanders national and personal pride as well as professional discretion may have prevented criticism of policies.

**Trans-Tasman cooperation in spite of difficulties**

Disagreements did not occur at every level of Australia-New Zealand interactions during the planning of the Bougainville operation. After some initial strain the Australian and New Zealand Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer and Don McKinnon cooperated closely.63 Australia’s involvement ultimately occurred because it was the political will of Alexander Downer and Australian Prime Minister, John Howard.64 By the time of Burnham II, Australia provided all the air transport for Bougainvillan delegates and Australian and New Zealand diplomats were working well together.65 Athol Forrest described his Australian defence colleagues in Port Moresby as ‘absolutely 100 percent’, ‘cooperative’, ‘professional’ and ‘extraordinarily astute’.66

Furthermore, some ADF staff did work with the NZDF from relatively early on. At an operational level of planning there was a fair amount of competitive cooperation. Major General Frank Hickling, Land Commander of the ADF, employed Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Breen, an operations analyst to begin preparations for deployment to Bougainville while

---

62 For example, Roger Mortlock did not tell me about the early rebuffs he faced from the ADF. Alan Behm, who a number of participants had said would given a frank rendition of disagreements between Australian and New Zealand defence, skirted over the difficulties between the two nations. The extent of New Zealand’s logistical and personnel withdrawal only became clear after the wide range of participants, Bob Breen in particular. The main difference was strategic. Australia disliked New Zealand’s lack of a plan or end point. Corry, [phone interview].
63 The main difference was strategic. Australia disliked New Zealand’s lack of a plan or end point. Corry, [phone interview].
64 Bob Breen knew that Australia would go to Bougainville when he heard via a private source that John Howard had said ‘if the New Zealanders go we must go too.’ Breen, [interview].
65 Breen, [interview].
66 Forrest, [interview].
other Australian defence officials and ADF officers in Canberra were still arguing against involvement in Bougainville. After Burnham II, Hickling sent liaison planners from his staff to sit in on the NZDF’s operational planning at Takapuna and tactical planning at Linton. The Australians reported back to Breen, worked to influence NZDF planning positively and specified what equipment and services the ADF should provide.\textsuperscript{67} During the process of working out the composition of the TMG, NZDF Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cassidy and Hickling’s planning staff were gratified to arrive at a shared assessment that a 250-strong TMG was required.\textsuperscript{68} Bob Breen characterises the separate preparations of supplies and personnel in Sydney and Linton as being informed by a healthy Anzac rivalry that resulted in a high standard of work.\textsuperscript{69} It is important to note that trans-Tasman negotiations over the Bougainville peacekeeping mission varied between different spheres. While there was tension at the higher end strategic level, at the diplomatic, tactical and operational levels there was more awareness of the need for cooperation during planning although methods differed.\textsuperscript{70}

During on-the-ground operations, Australians and New Zealanders almost invariably worked well together. Roger Mortlock praised two Australians, Colonel David Hurley and DFAT official Greg Moriarty, who accompanied him on an exploratory visit to Bougainville. He credits their experience and good sense with creating confidence that an unarmed joint Australian-New Zealand mission was achievable.\textsuperscript{71} In the first rotation of the TMG, although relationships were somewhat strained between Joske and New Zealanders, Richard Cassidy and Clive Lilley, other Australian-New Zealand relationships were good. Lilly found Joske to be the exception to the rule among his Australian colleagues. James Batley, the head civilian among the Australians, was highly appreciated by Mortlock. Correspondingly, Batley described his relationship with the New Zealanders as ‘extremely productive’.\textsuperscript{72} In the second rotation of the TMG, cooperation between New Zealand Commanding Officer, Colonel Jerry Mateparae, Australian Chief of Staff, Colonel Jeff Wilkinson and the Australian civilian

\textsuperscript{67} Breen, [interview], [personal correspondence], Lilley, [interview].  
\textsuperscript{68} At a strategic level, New Zealand was attempting to argue for a 150 model. The Australian delegation in Wellington was locked into this view while the troops prepared however Hickling decided to prepare for the 250 model anyway. Breen, [interview].  
\textsuperscript{69} Breen, [interview].  
\textsuperscript{70} This is confirmed by comments from Mortlock and O’Reilly that the further up the military command chain one goes, the greater the differences between Australian and New Zealanders. Mortlock, [interview], O’Reilly, [interview].  
\textsuperscript{71} Mortlock, ‘A Good Thing to Do’, 74.  
\textsuperscript{72} Mortlock, [interview], J. Batley, [phone interview], Suva, 30-9-07.
Chief Negotiator, Rhys Puddicombe was excellent. Mateparae and Wilkinson separately recalled that their professional relationship was honest and supportive. In spite of sensitivities between Canberra and Wellington at the time of the changeover to the PMG, their good working relationship on Bougainville eased the transition from New Zealand to Australian leadership.\(^{73}\) Jan Gammage and Andrew Rice both remembered their interactions with New Zealand military on their team sites as informal and friendly.\(^{74}\) Ben McDevitt, who worked with the TMG and PMG in 1998 as a member of the Australian Federal Police found it more relaxed and comfortable working under the NZDF than the ADF.\(^{75}\) During the Bougainville peacekeeping operation, it seems that Australian and New Zealand personnel got on well together and formed enduring friendships.

In particular, hardship and the demands of necessity increased cooperation between Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping staff in Bougainville. For example, when Athol Forrest and Rhys Puddicombe visited Bougainville a week before the TMG arrived they utilized some ‘good Anzac spontaneity’ to get around restrictive Australian policy. Puddicombe wanted to fly over the Panguna mine but was forbidden from doing so by Australian regulations. Therefore, Forrest quickly negotiated with his High Commissioner in Port Moresby to change the helicopter flight to a New Zealand charter.\(^{76}\) Another example of cooperation was the Australian provision of a new four-wheel drive vehicle for Richard Cassidy, the TMG’s first Chief Negotiator. Although the Australians wanted to ensure the NZDF fulfilled its logistical commitments they made an exception here because of the importance of a reliable vehicle for this vital role.\(^{77}\) And when New Zealand defaulted on its logistical and personnel commitments during the second rotation of the TMG, young New Zealanders and Australians on the ground were drawn closer together in shared adversity.\(^{78}\) On the team sites, there was an internal blending of cultures. The challenges of communal living, sharing domestic jobs and radio duties, and operating unarmed in remote locations drew team members closer together.\(^{79}\) Roger Mortlock recognised this Australian-New Zealand closeness in the face of a combined task when he said, ‘we rediscovered what my

\(^{73}\) R. Puddicombe, ‘Role of the Chief Negotiator’, in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 141., Rolfe, [personal correspondence], Wilkinson, [interview].

\(^{74}\) J. Gammage, [interview], Rice, [interview].

\(^{75}\) B. McDevitt, [phone interview], Canberra, 25-10-07.

\(^{76}\) Forrest, [interview].

\(^{77}\) Mortlock, ‘A Good Thing to Do’, 79, 82f.

\(^{78}\) Breen, [interview].

\(^{79}\) Breen, ‘Coordinating Monitoring and Defence Support’, 46.
Grandfather said ‘Take a bunch of Australians, a bunch of New Zealanders, give them a hard task and they put their shoulders to the wheel as one entity – Anzacs – and they generate a power beyond their numbers.’ This renewal of the Anzac spirit in Bougainville will be addressed in more detail in chapter five.

**New Zealand’s Pacific advantage**

The third theme which permeates accounts of Bougainville is that of New Zealand’s special ability in the Pacific, particularly in comparison to Australia. Central to this theme are the peace meetings at Burnham, the *modus operandi* of the TMG and the culturally appropriate behaviour of New Zealand personnel. Almost all New Zealanders and most Australians mentioned New Zealand’s cultural sensitivity in these three areas. The prominence of New Zealand’s cultural ability in the writing and memories about the Bougainville peacekeeping operation needs to be investigated.

There is common agreement that Burnham I was extraordinarily successful in reconciling warring Bougainvillean factions largely because of New Zealand’s culturally sensitive approach to the meetings. Even before Burnham, Bougainvillean delegates were impressed by New Zealand’s commitment to the renewed peace process. In particular, John Hayes’ downplaying of the BRA shooting at his helicopter demonstrated that New Zealand could be trusted.

New Zealand in planning for Burnham I conformed to the ‘Pacific Way’ of doing business in that it aimed to be non-prescriptive, flexible, and process rather than results driven. New Zealand diplomats stressed they wanted to facilitate, not dictate an agreement (although in practice New Zealand officials did occasionally attempt to direct proceedings through their personal relationships with the delegates). Furthermore, at Burnham I the NZDF strictly controlled media access and turned down offers of help from Western mediation experts.

---

80 Mortlock, [interview].
83 For example, the Australian lawyers, Leo White and Mark Plunkett (who had previously held a conflict resolution workshop for Bougainvillean leaders) were urged not to attend because it was felt not all delegates would welcome their presence. Gault, ‘The New Zealand Intervention in the Bougainville Conflict’, 5-8, 17, 57.
nature, achieved through the amalgamation of European and Maori military culture in the *Ngati Tumatauenga* doctrine, was projected onto how delegates saw New Zealand as a whole. The use of the *Haka*, *powhiri* and *hongi* in the welcome for Bougainvillean delegates forced them to connect, challenged them about their own lack of cultural harmony, reminded them of their own customary ways of solving problems, and gave them a sense of responsibility to respond to New Zealand’s commitment.\(^{84}\) In the second meeting at Burnham and Lincoln, Maori culture was once again used to encourage breakthroughs. Efforts were also made to foster a feeling of comfort for delegates. Burnham delegates were provided with betel nut and local Bougainvillean food, as well as winter clothes, extra blankets and heating to ward off the cold Canterbury nights.\(^{85}\) Don McKinnon’s and John Hayes’ presence and contributions were also greatly appreciated. Ruth Spriggs, a Bougainvillean delegate at the Lincoln talks, described their concern with gratitude: ‘It was like oil in our hearts and minds – just to walk and chat to us – not bash us with foreign affairs – just to know they cared’.\(^{86}\)

The New Zealand-led TMG, headed up by NZDF Brigadier Roger Mortlock, built on the successes of Burnham and focused on ‘soft power’ and culturally sensitive programs.\(^{87}\) Mortlock, a veteran of the failed UN peacekeeping mission in Angola, held strong views on how the peacekeeping mission in Bougainville should proceed.\(^{88}\) Mortlock instigated a series of programmes that would create an environment in which peace could be built by the Bougainvilleans. The most important decision made was for the TMG to be unarmed. At a vital meeting in the village of Laguai during a planning visit to Bougainville, Mortlock presented the factors for and against an unarmed mission and left members of the BIG and BRA to make their own decision overnight. In the morning a ‘nucleus of a design for the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was there.’\(^{89}\) Other programmes included peacemaking by region, local peace meetings, sports tournaments and the presence of Pacific Island contingents, women and Melanesian priests at the team sites. Mortlock admitted gratefully that he was given an enormous amount of latitude in putting his somewhat unorthodox plans

---

\(^{84}\) Ibid., 61-2, 132-4.

\(^{85}\) Ibid., 60.

\(^{86}\) R. Spriggs, [interview], Canberra, 10-10-07.

\(^{87}\) Soft power in this context means ‘an indirect influence on international relations, based on cultural, economic or ideological means; influence of international relations without coercion or military means’, ‘soft power’, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/soft%20power>, accessed 8-2-08.

\(^{88}\) The most important of these views was that any peacekeeping mission should not happen unless it could guarantee success. Withdrawal without peace was not an option. Mortlock, [interview].

into practice by the Australians and Fijians; to Mortlock it was ‘a very Pacific way of doing business’.  

On the ground, New Zealand soldiers, particularly those of Maori and Polynesian heritage, were perceived as being more approachable and culturally aware than Australians. Bougainvilleans appreciated the knowledge of Maori culture and language displayed by both Pakeha and Maori members of the NZDF. New Zealand soldiers were aware of their reputation and used the haka at every opportunity to defuse tensions or introduce themselves to locals (see Figure 3.3). Athol Forrest recollected how when the TMG reconnaissance team faced an unexpected BRA roadblock during their journey to Arawa, ‘the four Kiwi guys, not a Maori among them, were inspired to launch into a haka’. Jan Gammage, as a civilian monitor noticed that all the New Zealand, Fijian and Ni-Vanuatu men in her truce monitoring team ‘did the haka everywhere’ to the great enjoyment of the locals. Colonel Jerry Mateparae, the second commander of the TMG, consciously drew attention to links between Maori and Bougainvillean culture in his letter to Francis Ona. Both Australian and New Zealand participants in the TMG commented that New Zealand personnel were generally more relaxed and at ease with the Bougainvillean people than Australian soldiers. For example, Rhys Puddicombe observed that the TMG went out of its way to associate itself with Bougainvilleans and make them feel welcome around headquarters more so than the Australian-led PMG. In Bougainville, the NZDF used their familiarity with Maori culture very successfully and their ‘Pacific advantage’ has become a key component of the accepted narrative of the TMG.

---

90 Mortlock, [interview].
91 S. Kauona, 'Freedom from Fear', in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 93-4., F. Semoso, 'We Needed Peace Too', in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 97.
92 Forrest, [interview].
93 J. Gammage, [interview].
94 ‘I am a Colonel in the New Zealand Army. I am a Maori officer from the Ngati Tuwharetoa tribe in the centre of the North Island of New Zealand. I am finding many similarities between the Bougainvillean kastom and my Maori heritage, especially in the way you discuss and then make major decisions.’ M. A. I. R. Plimmer, ‘Extracts from Operation Bel Isi Commander's Diary’, in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 179.
Australia’s greatly improved relationship with Bougainville over the course of the TMG should not be overlooked. Australians were initially handicapped in their relationships with Bougainvillean because of Australia’s connection to the Panguna mine and provision of military equipment to the PNGDF. According to Joseph Kabui, head of the BIG, ‘Australians posed a risk to Bougainvillean, leaving butterflies in our stomachs’. 96 Indeed, Australian civilian monitors knew about their reputation and were careful to not respond to criticism directed at them by anti-Australian Bougainvillean. 97 Australia’s achievement in sending civilian and female monitors was significant. Mortlock said that he was not sure New Zealand could have done the same even after ransacking the public service. 98 Some Australian civilians such as James Batley and Jan Gammage had lived in Melanesia previously and were well acclimatised to the local culture. The successful integration of Australian civilians into the TMG team sites helped reconcile Bougainvillean to Australia,

96 Kabui, ‘Reconciliation a Priori’, 41.
97 ‘There were some significant occasions when I copped it from the Bougainvillean people – thankfully not often. So we had a real legacy that made it difficult. The Australian Government had made the decision to use civilians as they were less confrontational but still Australian and so responsible’, Rice, [interview]. Corroboration from Forrest, [interview], Puddicombe, ‘Role of the Chief Negotiator’, 63.
98 As a result, Australian now has a civil sector with more Melanesian experience than New Zealand. Mortlock, [interview].
As was intended.\textsuperscript{99} As time went on, Australia improved its civilian monitors’ pre-deployment training, making more of an effort to ready them for Bougainvillean culture and society. The changeover from the TMG to the PMG was smooth and the Australians chose good men to lead the PMG. Brigadier Bruce Osborn, the first PMG commander quickly adapted to a slower, more flexible Melanesian approach in spite of occasional protests from Canberra.\textsuperscript{100} Australian personnel in many cases showed themselves to be capable of a sympathetic understanding of Bougainville’s culture.

The largely unquestioning acceptance of New Zealand’s superior ability in the Pacific in both historiography, and the peacekeeping participant interviewees needs to be interrogated. The point is not necessarily to dispute the truth of New Zealand’s success in engaging the Bougainvilleans with Maori culture but rather to investigate the reasons for the concerted emphasis of this trend in primary and secondary sources. As shown, Australia did in fact send civilians to Bougainville who were culturally sensitive and knowledgeable about the Pacific region (the ADF was still inexperienced in the cultural and political dimensions of these sorts of operations at this time).\textsuperscript{101} Yet, in most literature on the Bougainville peace mission Australians are compared unfavourably with New Zealanders in their interactions with Melanesians and Polynesians.\textsuperscript{102} The position of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage within the context of the idea of Anzac will be further explored in chapter five.

The TMG in Bougainville was the first significant post-World War II operation in which ADF and NZDF cooperated closely and for a sustained period in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{103} In many ways it was a risky and unusual peacekeeping mission: unarmed, New Zealand-led, and with civilian and military personnel from several countries serving together in small isolated teams. At a political level, after initial hesitancy on Australia’s part, trans-Tasman cooperation moved forward steadily at an operational level. Because of the political imperative to work together, the ADF and NZDF were forced to cooperate in the planning and deployment of the TMG. This process was a somewhat bumpy one, hampered by differing views in the two forces on how a mission should be conducted. The TMG

\textsuperscript{99} Kabui, ‘Reconciliation a Priori’, 44.
\textsuperscript{100} B. Osborn, ‘Role of the Military Commander’, in Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 52-5.
\textsuperscript{101} Breen, [personal correspondence].
\textsuperscript{102} For example, see accounts in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group.
\textsuperscript{103} Operation Lagoon in 1994 was the first combined peacekeeping mission but was not as significant as the TMG, being smaller, of much shorter duration, and less of a trans-Tasman affair.
illuminated the NZDF’s shortcomings in the area of equipment, logistics and funding; most NZDF personnel had to withdraw after six months. On the positive side, New Zealand’s reputation as having a special ability in the Pacific was reinforced by the TMG. At a personal level, most Australians and New Zealanders got on well together during the planning and early stages of the TMG. After arrival, the hardships faced in Bougainville drew them closer together. Indeed, these new relationships formed the basis of a trans-Tasman community which had experience and knowledge of working in the Pacific and with each other. The significance of the TMG, and later the PMG, was not only its success in helping bring peace to Bougainville; it was also its role as a benchmark and precedent for future regional interventions and trans-Tasman partnerships.
4. Trans-Tasman Peacekeeping after Bougainville

Only a few years after the peacekeeping mission in Bougainville, Australia and New Zealand intervened in conflicts in East Timor and Solomon Islands. INTERFET in East Timor and RAMSI in Solomon Islands were more complex missions than the TMG, with members numbering in the thousands rather than hundreds. There are good secondary accounts based on extensive research for both these operations which cover the details of planning and operations in the various military theatres.\(^1\) Although this chapter outlines the background of these conflicts and the Australian-New Zealand response, the main emphasis is on the changes and continuing patterns in trans-Tasman peacekeeping after Bougainville. As the main focus of the thesis is Bougainville there are less primary material and interviews for INTERFET and RAMSI than for the TMG. East Timor’s and Solomon Islands’ significance for this thesis is to demonstrate how subsequent Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping was affected by the experiences in Bougainville. The aim is not to make outright comparisons or judgements about the success or style of the missions. As David Hegarty points out, conflicts and their resolutions are context specific and it is not always possible to apply lessons from one conflict to another.\(^2\) However, one can identify specific operational processes and ideas used in INTERFET and RAMSI which clearly have their genesis in previous missions. As such, this chapter highlights the lessons learnt from Bougainville onwards as applicable to each mission. As with chapter three on the TMG, the Australian and New Zealand relationship in INTERFET and RAMSI is investigated with particular attention to tensions, cooperation, and claims of cultural sensitivity. This is done in order to analyse how the Australian-New Zealand relationship in the context of regional peacekeeping missions evolved after Bougainville.


Background to the East Timor conflict and INTERFET

The island of Timor, (as seen in Map 4.1) is situated in Southeast Asia, about 650 km northwest of Australia. The Portuguese established themselves on Timor around 1520, with the Dutch following suit in the early 1600s. Conflicts between the Portuguese in the east of the island and the Dutch in the west disrupted the island until the Portuguese formally made territorial concessions in the western half of the island to the Dutch in 1859 and 1893. Timor was occupied by Japanese military during World War II. After Indonesia’s independence in 1949, West Timor became part of the Indonesian province of Nusatenggara. East Timor became a province of Portugal in 1953. After a 1974 coup in Lisbon toppled Portugal’s authoritarian regime, Portugal decolonized its overseas possessions, including East Timor.3

In 1975, two new political parties in East Timor, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), formed an unstable ruling coalition. In July 1975, however, the UDT launched a coup against FRETILIN and East Timor was plunged into civil war. Concurrent with these first steps towards independence the Indonesian military set up a secret intelligence operation to generate unrest in East Timor. The Indonesians invaded soon after the civil war began and continued to attack until December. They were supported by Indonesian migrants and thousands of East Timorese who were reliant on Indonesia for employment and education.4 FALINTIL, FRETILIN’s paramilitary, put up unexpectedly effective opposition against pro-Indonesian forces. This enraged the Indonesian troops causing them to kill civilians indiscriminately. The armed struggle eventually cost the lives of 200 000 East Timorese, (about 30 percent of the population) and 10 000 Indonesian soldiers. On 17 July 1976, East Timor formally became the 27th province of Indonesia. It was governed under military occupation and run as a police state.5

Overturning the annexation of East Timor seemed a lost cause during the 1970s and 1980s, but it developed a higher profile in the 1990s because of international concern about the violation of UN principles and genocide. In January 1999, Indonesian President Suharto bowed to public pressure and stepped down. His successor, B. J. Habibie unexpectedly announced that if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy within Indonesia he would

---

4 Breen, Mission Accomplished, East Timor, 1.
grant them independence. Accordingly, Portugal and the UN agreed to hold a referendum later that year. As expected, the UN-run referendum faced severe opposition. As early as April, reports of killings in East Timorese villages by anti-independence supporters became public. The UN established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in June and voter registration proceeded throughout the following months in spite of agitation against the referendum. The first day of polling was on 30 August 1999. In the face of intimidation a spectacular 95 per cent of registered voters visited the polling booths. The result, announced on 3 September, was overwhelming in favour of independence. The ensuing backlash of violence caused the Indonesian government to accept the need for a multinational peacekeeping force.

The 1999 crisis forced Australia to abandon its previously non-interventionist attitude to East Timor and intervene. In November 1975, FRETILIN had approached the Security Council of the UN and the Australian Foreign Minister for help in resisting Indonesia, but was turned down. Indeed, Australia, always sensitive to the threat of Indonesia, was the only nation in the world to recognise Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. New Zealand, under the leadership of Bill Rowling was willing to respond positively to a UN request for a peacekeeping contribution for East Timor. The Ministry of Defence went as far as preparing a basic outline of a possible New Zealand force contribution. But, when no peacekeeping intervention was forthcoming New Zealand shelved its peacekeeping plans. Events in 1999, however, forced Australia to reassess its dismissal of East Timor’s independence movement. Australia, under the Prime Minister John Howard, committed to creating the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). For the first time Australia took on the role of forming and leading an international coalition peacekeeping force. The peak Australian contribution of 5500 personnel to East Timor was the biggest single deployment by Australian forces since the end of World War II. New Zealand quickly came on board with the Australian planners and committed to providing considerable logistic and troop support in East Timor. At one stage New Zealand had 1100 personnel serving in INTERFET; it was New Zealand’s largest overseas military deployment since the Korean War.

---

6 Ibid.
8 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 15.
10 New Zealand Audit Office, New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East Timor, 10.
INTERFET was a peace-making mission with the authority to use armed force. At its peak there were 23 contributing UN member states and over 11 000 personnel. Australia provided the major contribution of over half the staff.\(^\text{11}\) INTERFET was led by General Peter Cosgrove of the ADF. Cosgrove’s operational campaign for East Timor plan had four phases: firstly, to negotiate with Indonesian Major General Kiki Syahnakri to ensure safe preconditions; secondly, the rapid lodgement of as many combat forces as possible; thirdly, to establish a secure environment in Dili and then throughout East Timor; and lastly, to ensure a smooth transition from INTERFET to a UN peace enforcement operation.\(^\text{12}\) The first troops deployed on 20 September 1999. The advance group of 2000 ADF personnel, supported by small international contingents of troops, ships and aircraft, spent the first ten days securing Dili. After early success the build-up of coalition forces began. During the next few months INTERFET consolidated its presence in East Timor and by mid-December had achieved a state of constant calm. The handover to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) began in the New Year and continued in phases until General Cosgrove handed over security responsibilities on 23 February 2000.\(^\text{13}\)

**Lessons learnt from Bougainville**

The success of Bougainville gave Australia and New Zealand confidence and experience in regional peacekeeping and helped contribute to an atmosphere of support for INTERFET. The TMG’s experience gave New Zealand in particular a good reputation as an honest and impartial conciliator. In both Australia and New Zealand there was nation-wide public support for the members of INTERFET, which was in part due to the pride felt in previous peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia and Bougainville. This popular support encouraged the Australian and New Zealand governments to provide enough funding to commit to sustaining a considerable number of troops for a long period of time.\(^\text{14}\) Furthermore, the TMG and PMG had given members of the Australian and New Zealand government departments and defence forces considerable experience in leading and operating a multinational peacekeeping mission. For example, knowledge gained in Bougainville by


\(^{13}\) Ibid., viii, ix.

logisticians was invaluable in deciding what items of equipment and supplies would be needed in East Timor.\(^\text{15}\)

The New Zealand Defence Force in particular improved on planning and equipment shortcomings identified in Bougainville. They successfully used a new joint planning approach between the Army, Navy and Air Force with the Army’s Land Command centre acting as headquarters for East Timor. The NZDF command gave responsibility for managing operational planning tasks to a Joint Operational Planning Group, which had members from all three services and liaised between strategic and operational planners. This approach was adopted after the NZDF’s observation of the ADF’s joint Headquarters in action during the planning for Bougainville.\(^\text{16}\) The NZDF also benefited from improved equipment. Bougainville had made defence planners aware of the critical deficiencies in New Zealand’s military equipment. So on 10 May 1999, the New Zealand cabinet approved the use of existing defence funds to replace the Army’s elderly and notoriously unreliable Land Rovers.\(^\text{17}\) Well before the government decided to send forces to East Timor, the NZDF’s Operational and Preparedness and Reporting System (OPRES) identified equipment deficiencies and could therefore carry out informed planning. Cabinet was able to be notified early on about the need for equipment upgrades.\(^\text{18}\) Cabinet allocated funds to prepare the Air Force’s helicopters, overhaul the Army’s armoured vehicles and reduce the degree of notice needed by a New Zealand battalion from 60 to 28 days. Although there were still logistic and personnel shortfalls, New Zealand managed to deploy quickly due to farsighted planning.\(^\text{19}\) From its experience leading the TMG, New Zealand was also more confident of its ability to provide and command a large force. The NZDF contributed a battalion to INTERFET, allowing them to retain tactical control of their personnel.\(^\text{20}\)

The trans-Tasman relationship in East Timor

There were a few potential pitfalls for Australian and New Zealand relations during the course of INTERFET, but these were the exception to the rule and usually avoided. The ADF


\(^{17}\) Crawford and Harper, *Operation East Timor*, 25.

\(^{18}\) New Zealand Audit Office., *New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East Timor*, 50.

\(^{19}\) Reid, ‘The Lessons of East Timor’, 4.

and NZDF had not exercised together at Brigade level for over two years before deployment to East Timor which could have made working together in East Timor difficult. Fortunately, both forces had maintained a common doctrinal basis for operations and command and control. During INTERFET, all the New Zealand force elements coordinated fully with Australia’s methods and procedures.\(^{21}\) Australia’s doubts about New Zealand’s ability to deploy a battalion group without assistance proved to be unfounded. Careful planning, innovation and the use of hired equipment largely overcame New Zealand’s logistic shortfalls.\(^{22}\) Because this was a clearly Australian-led mission outside New Zealand’s area of Polynesian expertise, New Zealand did not push for any differing operational styles. On the ground there was a possibility of a conflict between Australian and New Zealand national interest when it came to directing the New Zealand Battalion. Fortunately, however, operations took place without difficulty.\(^{23}\)

Indeed, Australia as the leading nation had more difficulty cooperating with its other alliance partners than with New Zealand. The scope of INTERFET meant there were sizable forces from many other nations who Australia did not regularly exercise with.\(^{24}\) Australia was surprised at the relative lack of control it had over some areas of the operation. A number of countries told Australia what they were sending rather than asking what would be useful.\(^{25}\) The Australians had problems marshalling the diverse coalition groups as all had unique equipment needing special logistics. Self-sufficient force elements were indispensable, and thus New Zealand’s Tanker *Endeavour* and field surgical team were particularly appreciated.\(^{26}\) Australia also found that some of the coalition members, such as the Philippines, did not own a sufficient range of higher level combat equipment. Besides Australia, only New Zealand fronted up with the full range of its capabilities.\(^{27}\) In this context it is easy to see why New Zealand’s interoperability and dedication to INTERFET was so

\(^{21}\) Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', 6.
\(^{22}\) Ibid.
\(^{23}\) The New Zealand Battalion was under the operational control of an Australian Brigadier but also reported to the New Zealand Senior National Officer in Dili who then reported to the Joint Commander at Trentham. Crawford and Harper, *Operation East Timor*, 111.
\(^{25}\) Rolfe, 'Operation East Timor: How Did We Do?' 2.
\(^{26}\) Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', 6.
appreciated by Australia. Australian difficulties with New Zealand were insignificant in comparison to those faced with other less familiar alliance members.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s close working relationship in East Timor began during their shared involvement in planning INTERFET. The NZDF foresaw their potential involvement in East Timor from February 1999. From March 1999, MFAT and the ADF held discussions about developments in East Timor and possibility of the need for a peace support operation. The NZDF established A Joint Operations Planning Group at its headquarters for strategic planning. A key member of the group was Wing Commander Glen Toscan, an Australian exchange officer who had planning experience from his involvement in Somalia and the evacuation of Australians from East Timor in 1975. The NZDF gave the New Zealand Minister of Defence a report about ongoing ADF planning in April. Colonel Martyn Dunne, who headed up the NZDF liaison with Australia, recalled that NZDF and ADF staff were planning and sharing options three to six months before deployment. By August, planners on both sides of the Tasman participated in regular, secure video-conferences to coordinate their work.

In mid-August New Zealand dispatched liaison officers to Australia. For instance, a NZDF officer was sent to the Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) in Sydney, which dealt with such issues as planning for the movement of supplies and maintenance arrangements. The NZDF selected Colonel Martyn Dunne, a recent graduate of the Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies, to lead the New Zealand Forward Planning Group which visited Australia in September because of his good knowledge of the ADF and operational experience. Colonel Dunne and his team were sent to the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) in Brisbane, and had a vital role in finalising the agreement signed between two forces for mutual logistics support in East Timor. The joint planning was intense and close; Dunne remembered, ‘we were planning with them every minute, we were breathing together’.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s close interoperability continued during the early stages of INTERFET. The New Zealand SAS combined with their Australian counterparts and

---

29 M. Dunne, [phone interview], Wellington, 2-11-07.
31 Dunne, [phone interview].
members of the United Kingdom’s Special Boat Service to form the INTERFET Response Force, the first troops sent into East Timor. The 3 Squadron RNZAF helicopters operated under the operational control of Australian 3 Brigade, located at Suai, which was also the New Zealand Battalion’s senior Headquarters. This arrangement worked well. Indeed the Australians greatly appreciated the New Zealand Iroquois helicopters since they were much cheaper to run than their Black Hawks. Another example of good interoperability is the NZDF Victor Company, which was in Dili under the tactical control of 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) commanded by Australian Brigadier Mark Evans. It was arranged that Victor Company’s leader, Major Howard could go directly to the New Zealand Senior National Officer if he felt tasks were too risky or not serving NZ’s national interests. The Victor Company were given its own area of operations and left to decide how to achieve its mission. The New Zealanders liked this and had a comfortable relationship with their Australian commanders. Indeed, both Australian and New Zealand military leaders felt that one of the most important military lessons learnt from East Timor was the growth of trans-Tasman interoperability.

Another feature of Australian-New Zealand cooperation in East Timor was the excellent relations between the Senior National Officers. ADF Brigadier Peter Cosgrove, the commander of INTERFET, got on very well with the New Zealand SNO Martyn Dunne and described him as ‘one of my closest and most trusted colleagues’. Similarly, Martyn Dunne recalled, ‘I had a very good relationship with Cosgrove – not only did we become friends afterwards, we respected each other professionally and I worked well for him’. When Cosgrove decided to establish a separate brigade-sized Headquarters for operations in Dili, he felt that Dunne was the best person to command. Cosgrove negotiated with the New Zealand Chief of General Staff, Major General Maurie Dodson in late September to promote Dunne to Brigadier in order that he could be appointed an INTERFET formation commander. The good relationship between Cosgrove and Dunne was also beneficial to the New Zealand

34 Crawford and Harper, *Operation East Timor*, 72.
35 ‘As General Cosgrove remarked in Dili in November 1999, the ADF and NZDF must engage in more combined exercises, exchange postings and build on the ‘common understanding’ that exists between the two nations. Military cooperation, he said, must occur rather more routinely between our countries’. While the Anzac bonds are strong, they need to be continually invigorated by constant contact.’ Ibid., 169.
37 Dunne, [phone interview].
Army. In spite of there being no brigade headquarters for the New Zealand Battalion, Dunne could easily raise matters of national importance with Cosgrove in conversation.\footnote{Crawford and Harper, \textit{Operation East Timor}, 79.}

Although it is difficult to generalise for the personal relationships between thousands of Australian and New Zealand soldiers, interviewees did indicate that East Timor marked a new high in trans-Tasman relations in the armed forces. Peter Cosgrove felt that in East Timor Australians were able to rely on Kiwis to the same extent as their fellow Australians.\footnote{Cosgrove, \textit{My Story}, 214.} Martyn Dunne pointed out that past joint exercises with Australia meant that it was easy to gain the trust of the ADF commanders.\footnote{Dunne, [phone interview].} New Zealander Greg Moyle who worked as part of the UN mission in East Timor found his Australian colleagues to be very supportive, sometimes even more so than Kiwi colleagues.\footnote{G. Moyle, [phone interview], Auckland, 24-11-07.} DFAT official James Batley argued that East Timor was very important in enhancing personal relationships between Australians and New Zealanders.\footnote{J. Batley, [phone interview], Suva, 30-9-07.} Clive Lilley said that the NZDF purposely put very capable officers into East Timor to make a good impression on the Australians: INTERFET ‘opened the eyes of the Australians to the capabilities and can-do attitudes of New Zealanders’.\footnote{Lilley, [interview].} Australian Trent Scott agreed that the excellent work done in East Timor by the Kiwis influenced all areas of the Australian army and reinforced the ADF’s perception of their capability.\footnote{Trent Scott, [interview], Canberra, 8-10-07.}

Indeed, the theme of New Zealanders impressing Australians should be noted. Both Clive Lilley and Trent Scott saw East Timor as an opportunity for New Zealand to prove its worth as a defence partner to Australia. After the fiasco of inadequate logistics and personnel withdrawal in Bougainville, East Timor was a chance for New Zealand to make things right with the Australians.

In East Timor, both Australian and New Zealand defence forces made a concerted effort to perform their duties in culturally appropriate ways. Australian planners from the Information Operations cell tested their leaflets on local people before distributing them to ensure they were suitable. The Information Operations cell also produced a weekly local newspaper and a radio show. An appeal in Australia resulted in a donation of over 300 radios for the people of East Timor so that communities could listen to the INTERFET programme. There was little
use of loudspeakers as INTERFET was aware that this form of public announcement had been used during the Indonesian occupation. All troops exercised remarkable restraint and there were very few casualties. The New Zealand Battalions also worked hard to combat rumours and facilitate community dialogue. New Zealand troops did a number of small-scale community projects such as building classrooms, medical clinics, notice boards and water systems, running a district football competition, and printing a newspaper with locally trained staff. The New Zealanders encouraged voluntary involvement by East Timorese whenever possible. By all accounts the community appreciated these efforts and in return passed on high quality information to the New Zealanders about the Indonesian militia. One development initiated by the New Zealand Battalion 2, and further refined by following New Zealand Battalions, was detachments of four NZDF staff led by a corporal living in local villages alongside the people for the duration of their deployment. This program won the trust of locals, and granted the NZDF accurate intelligence of conditions. The Australian Sector West Commander, Brigadier Ken Gillespie, was impressed with the initiative and urged the Australian Battalion in the north to adopt similar measures.

But regardless of all the ADF’s efforts, the traditional perception of New Zealanders as being more understanding and culturally attuned to local conditions prevailed in East Timor. Part of this was due to INTERFET’s dominant Australian culture. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Wheeler, a New Zealander, commented that while ‘ninety per cent of the time I think that you’ve done marvellously well,…ten per cent of the time I’ve got really frustrated with the Australian-centric view… the Australian flavour overrides anything else where it needn’t have.’ Australian peacekeeping historian, Peter Londey, agreed that ‘Interfet headquarters was heavily dominated by Australians, with the result that other national contingents could feel left out.’ Londey also found that other military personnel and locals perceived Australian soldiers as overly aggressive-looking because of their obvious weapons and dark glasses.

The NZDF initiative of living in villages was particularly given as proof of a difference

50 Londey, *Other People's Wars*, 255.
between Australians and New Zealanders. ADF member Trent Scott particularly praised the tactical method of placing Maori in villages to build up confidence among locals.\textsuperscript{51}

Less than three years after INTERFET, Australia found itself leading a peacekeeping and nation building mission to Solomon Islands. The Australian Howard government had refused previous requests to mediate, but in 2002, motivated by fears of terrorism and increased confidence in their peacekeeping ability, Australia agreed to the Solomon Islands’ government’s request for aid. New Zealand, once again made a significant contribution. Unlike East Timor though, this was an entirely regional effort. Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, took on the major burden of funding and equipping the intervening force.

\textsuperscript{51} Scott, [interview].
gallery/14.html>, accessed 10-2-08.
Background to Solomon Islands conflict and RAMSI

Solomon Islands, a chain of over 900 islands (see Map 4.2) lies to the northeast of Australia, and is flanked by Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. Solomon Islands was a British dependency until 1978 when it gained independence. Its colonial experience was uneven and its economy based on national resource exploitation (cocoa, copra, palm oil, and logging) and subsistence farming. It has a largely youthful population of half a million who have great linguistic diversity (about 87 distinct languages). The two main islands are Malaita and Guadalcanal. Malaita has historically been overpopulated, with limited land available for cultivation and underdeveloped infrastructure. Thus, Malaitans have traditionally worked as labourers in other parts of the Solomon Islands. After independence was granted in 1978, Malaitans increasingly migrated in large numbers to Guadalcanal and intermarried with Guadalcanal families, disrupting their traditional land inheritance patterns. Greg Watson argues that other contributing causes to the Solomon Islands conflict were the unsuitability of a Westminster-style government system, economic inequalities, the lack of nationalism and the overflow of refugees and arms from the Bougainville conflict.

Unrest and social pressure reached a peak in 1998. A catalyst for conflict occurred when the Premier of Guadalcanal province, Ezekial Alebua, demanded that the national government pay compensation to the relatives of 25 Guadalcanal people murdered by Malaitans in the last 20 years and return lands occupied by Malaitans. Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu complied but at the expense of grants intended for Guadalcanal. In this tense environment, Guadalcanal people interpreted Alebua’s demands as a mandate to harass Malaitans. In late 1998, Guadalcanal men formed the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and initiated a violent movement against settlers from other islands, in particular Malaitans, around Honiara. From 1998 to 2000, around 20,000 settlers fled Honiara. Over 250 people were killed and numerous human rights abuses occurred. Malaitans responded by forming the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF). In June 2000 the MEF seized Honiara, broke into the national armoury, forced the resignation of the Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu and plunged Solomon Islands

52 M. G. Morgan and A. McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour? Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60/3 (September 2006), 415.
55 Ibid., 403.
into a downwards economic and social spiral. In their troubles, Solomon Islands requested outside help from Australia.

In 2000, Australia and New Zealand sponsored conciliatory talks between the MEF and IFM and provided the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) to monitor the subsequent peace accord. A ceasefire agreement signed in August on the HMAS Tobruk collapsed after less than 24 hours when a MEF member was killed. Nonetheless, negotiations continued and the Townsville Peace Agreement was signed in October. The agreement outlined a package of steps to rehabilitate the Solomons: demilitarization of warring factions, reconciliation, greater political autonomy for Malaita and Guadalcanal, and help for displaced Solomon Islanders. The IPMT, made up of Australians and New Zealanders, with a few Pacific Islanders, attempted to enforce this mandate. The six team sites established patrolled Guadalcanal and Malaita. IPMT personnel also worked with indigenous Peace Monitoring Council (PMC) teams, engaging with community groups, facilitating meetings, contacting militants and assisting reconciliation. The process worked reasonably well for six months or so and was partially successful in disposing of weapons, halting open warfare and mobilising elements of civil society. However, many senior political figures, militant leaders and police refused to turn in their guns or support the mission. As David Hegarty, the second Australian head of the IPMT, pointed out, not enough time had been given to the peace process and the IMPT lacked powers of enforcement. As a result there was little local buy-in or dedication to peace by the rebels. By 2002, attempts at resolution had failed, the IPMT had been withdrawn and the Solomons conflict was at an impasse.

The Solomon Islands Government asked for Australian intervention twice before John Howard acceded to a third request in 2003. During the height of civil unrest in 2000 and 2001 Solomon Island Prime Ministers Bartholomew Ulufa’alu and Manasseh Sogavare both appealed to Australia and New Zealand for assistance in vain. Even as late as January 2003, Alexander Downer said that ‘sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands

---

57 Morgan and McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?', 286.
60 Hegarty, [interview].
would be folly in the extreme’. 61 There is a considerable amount of writing on the subject of why and how Australia changed its position on intervention in the Solomon Islands, so the reasons for Australian intervention in the Solomon Islands will only be outlined briefly. 62 The international context of the ‘War on Terror’ and America’s desire that Australia patrol its own backyard encouraged intervention. There was a widespread belief in Canberra that Solomon Islands was on the verge of collapse and could easily become fertile territory for terrorism. The rhetoric of failed states increasingly used among policy analysts and academics undoubtedly contributed to this fear of Solomon Islands imploding. 63

In particular, Elsina Wainwright’s paper for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a government-funded think tank, on the Solomon Islands in June 2003 was very influential. The report identified Solomon Islands as a ‘failing state’ with the potential to turn into a ‘post-modern badlands’ and advised Australian intervention. 64 New Zealand’s participation arose from similar regional concerns and a desire to support Australia.

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in Honiara in late July 2003. RAMSI was an interagency operation headed up by an Australian civilian from DFAT, Nick Warner. Tactically, the mission was directed by the Participating Police Force (PPF) which at its height had 335 members. The PPF was made up of officers from ten Pacific nations but the large majority were seconded from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Australian State forces. The PPF was headed by AFP officer Ben McDevitt. The PPF was given logistic support by a military contingent from Australia and New Zealand of about 1800 personnel, which was commanded by ADF Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen. 65

RAMSI’s plan was made up of three phases: commencement, consolidation and sustainability. Commencement focused on re-establishing law and order via disarmament, capturing militant leaders and strengthening the police force. This segment of the mission was particularly successful. Order was quickly restored, corrupt individuals were prosecuted, and by late 2003, 3700 weapons had been destroyed. Consolidation began in January 2004.

---

and focused on eliminating corruption, training officials and reforming institutions, in particular the Royal Solomon Island Police (RSIP). The third phase of RAMSI, promoting sustainability, self reliance and the solidification of reforms, started in January 2005 and is ongoing.66

**Lessons learnt from previous peacekeeping missions**

Coming soon after Australian-New Zealand peacekeeping interventions in Bougainville, East Timor and the earlier IPMT in Solomon Islands, those involved in planning RAMSI implemented some of the knowledge and lessons learnt in previous missions. Firstly the value of merely being on the ground, calming fears, conveying reliable information and building confidence, was reaffirmed in Solomon Islands. Furthermore, RAMSI’s planners realised that the ineffectiveness of Operation Lagoon and the IPMT was partly due to their limited and unclear mandates, so RAMSI was given a much more impressive military presence and clearer rules of engagement.67 In East Timor, Australia had been criticised for its overly complicated and top heavy military leadership. For RAMSI, the Australian CDF, Peter Cosgrove, set limits on the number of senior officers and made command structure clearer.68

In East Timor, there was also no clear overarching framework and some of the individual sectors’ activities were piecemeal and poorly coordinated. So when it came to RAMSI, planners took care to create an integrated mission with clear civilian coordination.69 An additional tactical lesson picked up from INTERFET was the use of a naval presence to demonstrate competence. Australian observers had noted the significant impact of the USS *Belleau Wood* on the Indonesian Army when it was stationed off the coast of East Timor. So, the Australians deliberately made sure the HMAS *Manoora* appeared off the Guadalcanal coast on the morning of July 24, 2003 to coincide with the arrival of the first Australian Air Force Hercules. RAMSI also operated on the idea used in the TMG that nations should not be separated off into their own areas of responsibility. Instead, different nationalities, in particular the Pacific Islanders, were integrated together in teams in order to ensure unity of coalition goals.70 Another technique learnt from the TMG experience was to destroy collected weapons in front of the people instead of confiscating them.71

---

66 Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, xii.
67 Hegarty, ‘Peace Interventions in the South Pacific’, 7., Batley, [phone interview].
68 O’Reilly, [phone interview].
70 Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, 9, 23, 98.
71 ‘We had learned from Bougainville never to have weapons turned in and take them away. The people think you are taking them and giving them to their enemies. So we cut them up in front of them. We let people come
unarmed TMG also helped New Zealand police persuade the AFP to agree to go to Solomon Islands unarmed.\textsuperscript{72}

On a more informal level, individual experience gained in the TMG, PMG, INTERFET and IPMT helped RAMSI personnel. There were a few occasions where soldiers and police were entitled to use force under the rules of engagement but held back because of their familiarity with Melanesian culture and combat situations.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, most respondents who were involved in RAMSI stressed the usefulness of knowledge of local conditions. ADF Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott agreed that the previous success of New Zealanders’ extended village stays in East Timor set a precedent for Australia to facilitate similar operations in Solomon Islands.\textsuperscript{74} Ben McDevitt recalled that his experiences in the Bougainville operation had highlighted the prevalence of rumour-spreading in Melanesian culture. Accordingly, in his role as head of the PPF in RAMSI, McDevitt held press conferences every day for the first two months as well as doing frequent radio interviews to combat rumours.\textsuperscript{75} Although the IPMT had not been particularly successful in enforcing law and order, RAMSI participants benefited from the experience gained by military, police and diplomatic representatives who had worked for the IPMT. For example, the IPMT security team were able to provide a huge amount of information on local conditions in Solomon Islands. Likewise, arrangements made with local police to keep records of corruption after the Townsville Peace Agreement proved invaluable to the PPF in making prosecutions.\textsuperscript{76}

**The trans-Tasman relationship in Solomon Islands**

The main trans-Tasman friction around RAMSI occurred in the very early stages when New Zealand was unsure about Australia’s proposed intervention. Rebecca Lineham in her masters thesis on RAMSI found that when the possibility of an assistance mission to Solomon Islands was first raised with New Zealand Ministers in May 2003 it was deemed to be ‘against the grain’ of New Zealand’s traditional approach in the region. Indeed, New Zealand was initially concerned about the Australian-led mission’s aggressive military footprint and lack of pre-deployment conciliation. New Zealand documents, mindful of protecting their good

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{72} V. McBride, [interview], Wellington, 6-9-07., T. Annandale, [phone interview], Wellington, 2-10-07.
\textsuperscript{73} Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, 27.
\textsuperscript{74} Scott, [interview].
\textsuperscript{75} McDevitt, [phone interview].
\textsuperscript{76} Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, 19, 33, 104.}
relationship with the Pacific, consciously did not use the terms ‘failed state’ and ‘terrorism’ often found in Australian strategic analysis.\(^77\) New Zealand MFAT official, Vince McBride, recalled that during the pre-operation planning there was some ‘creative tension’ between him and his Australian counterparts. McBride often had to soften the Australian approach to Solomon Islanders in order to make the process seem more consultative.\(^78\) Australian Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott recalls that on the military side there were occasional differing expectations during planning but that these frictions were easily overcome.\(^79\) During RAMSI there were also a few times when Australia and New Zealand faced issues that frustrated cooperation. There was the potential for a conflict of national interest with New Zealand troops due to unclear operation control directives; however this issue was resolved after the problem was recognised. Another problem resulted from Australia’s concern to preserve its intelligence-exchange relationship with the United States. New Zealand officers were denied access to the Australian Defence Secret Network (DSN) which they found very frustrating.\(^80\) For example, imagery of Solomon Islands landing zones was not released to New Zealand personnel, despite it being unclassified, because it was posted on the DSN. The matter was resolved when a limited number of New Zealanders were given access to the DSN after high-level negotiations between the two nations.\(^81\) Generally, Australia’s and New Zealand’s operational disagreements were minor, occurred during the early stages of the mission, and were quickly rectified.

Indeed, for RAMSI, a major challenge was not the relationship between Australia and New Zealand, but that among different organizations, in particular the military and police. Because RAMSI was an interagency operation, personnel from the Australian and New Zealand defence forces, aid organizations, police forces and government had to work together. In spite of a largely successful effort from top officials to present a united front, unfamiliarity with each other led different organizations to ignore or misunderstand each other inadvertently. While the ADF and NZDF were by now well acquainted with working together in


\(^{78}\) McBride, [interview].

\(^{79}\) Scott attributes these differences to the NZDF’s expectation the military would as usual play the leading role in the mission. However, this mindset was due to the NZDF’s lack of briefing due to hurried planning and a limited time frame. Scott, [interview].

\(^{80}\) ‘There was one particular meeting that I found out about that I wasn’t initially invited to. It was a high level an intelligence briefing – I got myself invited but asked myself the question ‘Am I part of this team or not?’’, Annandale, [phone interview].

peacekeeping operations, RAMSI was the first major overseas operation for the Australian and New Zealand police. As a result Australian and New Zealand police faced a steep learning curve, both on how to work with the military and in the austere conditions of the Pacific.\footnote{P. Ash, [interview], Wellington, 5-9-07.} For example, AFP officer Ben McDevitt found that in a planning exercise held a few weeks before deployment the military had not included any civilian police representatives.\footnote{Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, 61-2.} Ben McDevitt was luckier than most in that he had previous experience in Bougainville and working with the ADF.\footnote{McDevitt, [phone interview].} New Zealand police officer Tony Annandale found that police and military had very dissimilar operative styles: the military worked on a more hierarchical, maximum force doctrine whereas the police were used to a minimum force doctrine with more autonomy given to junior staff.\footnote{Annandale, [phone interview].}

Because it was their first experience of a substantial contribution to a peacekeeping mission the Australian and New Zealand police also encountered some difficulties in working together. The Australian police officers from the AFP were mainly experienced in monitoring federal offences such as terrorism and internet security. Moreover, because of the large numbers required, many of the first AFP officers sent to Solomon Islands were young and inexperienced. By contrast New Zealand sent older officers with considerable experience of working on the street and in communities.\footnote{New Zealand sent officers with an average of 10-15 years experience who were better able to provide mentoring to Solomon Islands police. McBride, [interview].} Australia’s and New Zealand’s differing policing backgrounds led to some initial miscommunication. Tony McLeod recalled ‘I continually raised the issue that RAMSI needed a community policing policy. The Australian Federal Police said of course and I was under the impression that we were talking about the same thing but we weren’t. The AFP don’t actually carry out ordinary policing duties except in Canberra’.\footnote{T. McLeod, [phone interview], Wellington, 1-10-07.} Togimanu Annandale argued that because New Zealand and Pacific Island police were used to attending domestics, assaults and traffic incidents they were able to bring a community policing model to RAMSI more confidently than the AFP.\footnote{Annandale, [phone interview].} New Zealand police officers, because of the integration of Maori and Pacific Islanders in the police force were also more aware of involving Pacific Island police than their Australian counterparts. Annandale, a New Zealander of Samoan heritage, realised from early on that the Pacific

\footnote{\textcopyright{} The University of New South Wales 2012.}
Island contingents were not being utilised to best effect. He discussed this with the rest of the policing executive and subsequently took on a liaison role with Pacific Island officers. African officers did learn from their Kiwi counterparts. In later deployments Australia sent police from the state forces who were more experienced in community policing.

As a rule, however, Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship during the planning and operation of RAMSI was close, mutual and effective. The extremely short lead time made cooperation essential, especially as the force was put together on an ad hoc basis. During the six to seven weeks of planning, New Zealand government officials, police officers and defence force personnel flew to Canberra and then on to Honiara with their Australian counterparts. A RAMSI Principles Group brought together Australian and New Zealand heads of the various involved agencies to form a joint planning team. While New Zealand personnel often started out a little behind the Australian planning process they worked hard to catch up and soon became heavily involved. For example, Annandale, a New Zealand police officer involved in pre-operation planning, visited Canberra and found the Australians’ thinking on the operation to be highly developed. He rang back to New Zealand with this information and the New Zealand Police Commissioner was on the plane in the next couple of days to discuss the operation with his AFP counterpart. New Zealand was also heavily involved in military operational planning from the beginning through the Australian strategic command division’s reports to the NZDF Joint Headquarters at Trenthem. Once on the ground Australians informed the New Zealand national command element of all upcoming operations and included them in tactical planning. According to Trent Scott, because of their familiarity with each other and shared experience in East Timor ‘both partner forces combined well together and worked extremely closely and collaboratively.’

The good working relationship of Australian and New Zealand personnel was in large part due to their shared experiences in Bougainville and East Timor. When Russell Glenn interviewed participants of RAMSI he overwhelmingly found that the relationships formed in Bougainville and East Timor had a positive effect on the mission: ‘a generation of Australian, Pacific Islander and New Zealand police, diplomats and military personnel gained experience

---

89 Annandale, [phone interview].
90 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 22.
91 McBride, [interview], McDevitt, [phone interview].
92 Annandale, [phone interview].
93 Scott, [interview].
and built relationships that would serve them well when they once again found themselves working together. Many of the same individuals would be in senior leadership positions by the time RAMSI occurred, providing a well-established basis for close interagency cooperation. Most of the RAMSI participants interviewed corroborated this argument. Australian James Batley, the second Special Coordinator of RAMSI mentioned the importance of personal links and cooperation between different agencies established in Bougainville. Vince McBride from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt that a ‘bank of personal relationships’ had been formed in East Timor which stood trans-Tasman cooperation in good stead. And John O’Reilly from the NZDF believed that New Zealand’s cooperation with Australia in the IPMT gave them joint experience in contributing together in the Solomon Islands.

Furthermore, from the interviews conducted it is clear that Australians and New Zealanders in leadership positions enjoyed working together. Ben McDevitt found his Kiwi colleagues to be ‘extraordinarily professional’ and having worked under New Zealand leadership in Bougainville, preferred their relaxed tempo over the Australians’ more militaristic approach. James Batley’s relationship with his kiwi deputy in RAMSI ‘couldn’t have been better or closer’. Likewise, Paul Ash, a New Zealand deputy Special Coordinator ‘loved’ working with his Australian colleagues and pointed out that the Australians were often ruder to each other than to New Zealanders. In spite of their occasional differences, Australians and New Zealanders working together in RAMSI generally had harmonious personal relationships.

The Australian led-mission did attempt to be culturally sensitive and implement lessons learnt in previous operations. Right from the first planning stages, Australia recognised the importance of involving South Pacific nations in RAMSI to show regional unity and assisted in training the smaller nations for duty. RAMSI’s initial publicity named the mission Helpem Fren, which means to help the government and people to help themselves. Subsequent publicity used similar Pijin English phrases. As mentioned previously, there were concerted attempts to quell rumour-mongering. The AusAID-funded talkback radio programme, ‘Talking Truth’ travelled over Solomon Islands and gave locals the chance to question senior RAMSI officials and Solomon Islands politicians on air. The Special Coordinators worked

94 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 6.
95 Batley, [phone interview], McBride, [interview], O’Reilly, [phone interview].
96 McDevitt, [phone interview], Batley, [phone interview], Ash, [interview].
without bodyguards, flags of office or other official paraphernalia and most of the police operated unarmed.\textsuperscript{98} Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen of the ADF put in place rules to minimise the impact of the armed forces on Solomon Islands society. Soldiers were not allowed to shop in the Solomons, carry guns in their free time or drink liquor. To combat rumours RAMSI held a public capability demonstration only ten days after arriving. Soldiers painted kids’ faces with camouflage paint, displayed equipment and demonstrated mine detectors and dogs locating weapon caches.\textsuperscript{99} In many ways RAMSI planners made great efforts to operate the mission in a style cognisant of and non-disruptive to Solomon Islands society.

In spite of these efforts, RAMSI members, in particular the Australian personnel, have faced criticism for a lack of cultural tact. Although the general population is still highly supportive of RAMSI, commentators have censured the behaviour of some RAMSI staff. Some members of the PPF, not bound by the military’s strict code of conduct, have been found smoking marijuana, drinking home brewed alcohol and involving themselves with local women. Clive Moore, an expert on Solomon Islands history and society, has criticised the RAMSI staff as a new transitory elite who make little effort to learn \textit{Pijin} and interact with locals only at work. Moore suggests that extensive cultural orientation be made compulsory and language learning inducements introduced. After the April 2006 riots, RAMSI began to pay more attention to basic linguistic and cultural skills, but according to Moore, this emphasis should have been there from the beginning.\textsuperscript{100} Australians, Michael Morgan and Abbey McLeod in a recent article on RAMSI agree that unless the current practice of PPF personnel living apart from the community is changed, anti-RAMSI sentiment will continue to grow.\textsuperscript{101} Australian PPF officers were also accused of using excessive force and treating their Pacific Island workmates dismissively.\textsuperscript{102} John Roughan, an expatriate American who has long been involved in Solomon Islands civil society organizations criticised Australia’s inability to acknowledge its mistakes and involve Solomon Islanders in its work.\textsuperscript{103} And Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare increasingly challenged RAMSI’s

\textsuperscript{100} Interestingly, Moore suggests that a modern equivalent to the Australian School of Pacific Administration (1947-1972) be established Moore, ‘Helpem Fren: The Solomon Islands, 2003-2007’, 147-8.
\textsuperscript{101} Morgan and McLeod, ‘Have We Failed Our Neighbour?’ 421, 19.
\textsuperscript{102} Lineham, ‘The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Democratic Accountability’, 77, 99.
\textsuperscript{103} J. Roughan, [interview], Christchurch, 16-9-07.
authority and questioned Australia’s involvement in local government before his loss of power in late 2007.

Indeed, as with Bougainville, once again New Zealand’s personnel were compared favourably with their Australian counterparts when it came to matters of cultural understanding. New Zealander Paul Ash thought that the Australian members of RAMSI generally had a greater level of Pacific experience than the New Zealanders. But although many Australians did get involved in local communities, starting Aussie Rules football teams and doing construction work, New Zealanders continued to be perceived as more approachable and culturally sensitive, both by Solomon Islanders and Australians and New Zealanders. Ash recalled that Solomon Islanders often requested New Zealand troops.\textsuperscript{104} Vince McBride described an occasion when New Zealanders, Australians and Fijians flew into a school in North Malaita. The Kiwis and Fijians chatted with the locals whereas the Australians huddled together. McBride took this as indicative of Australians’ uneasiness with cultures different from their own.\textsuperscript{105} Australian Trent Scott agreed that because of the heavy Maori and Pacific presence in New Zealand patrols, locals did tend to warm to them faster than the predominantly Caucasian Australians.\textsuperscript{106} New Zealand police officers Togimanu Annandale and Tony McLeod found their Australian colleagues more abrupt, less in touch with Pacific Island culture and disinclined to include Solomon Island locals or Pacific Island partners in their decision making processes.\textsuperscript{107} It is hard to make generalizations from only a few interviews and articles; however, it would seem that the trend of perceiving New Zealanders as more culturally sensitive due to their familiarity with Maori culture continued on in RAMSI.

Although INTERFET and RAMSI were in some ways very different operations from each other and the TMG, there are some clear trends across all three peacekeeping missions. Firstly, Australia and New Zealand learnt lessons from previous peacekeeping missions and applied these missions to INTERFET and RAMSI. For New Zealand, a major lesson was the need for reliable equipment and increased defence funding. More generally, the Australian and New Zealand defence forces applied specific knowledge gained in previous missions to

\textsuperscript{104} Ash, [interview].
\textsuperscript{105} McBride, [interview].
\textsuperscript{106} Scott, [interview].
\textsuperscript{107} Tony Annandale realised early on in the mission that the Pacific Island police contingents were not being heard at an executive level. He discussed this with the rest of the executive level and took on a liaison role with the PIC contingents. Annandale, [phone interview], T. McLeod, [phone interview].
improve their planning processes, troop deployment, mission structure and interaction with Melanesian culture. Furthermore, having a number of regional peacekeeping missions so close together in time gave individual personnel invaluable experience. A pool of Australians and New Zealanders gained an understanding of working in the Pacific and made connections with their trans-Tasman counterparts.

Each new mission did provide fresh challenges. In East Timor, Australia had to grapple with leading a large multinational force. In Solomon Islands, the inclusion of police unused to peacekeeping or Pacific operations raised new coordination issues. In spite of these obstacles, Australia’s and New Zealand’s pre-deployment planning became more cooperative and effective over the course of the IPMT, INTERFET and RAMSI. After the logistical difficulties faced in Bougainville, New Zealand made a concerted effort in the preparations for East Timor to make a significant contribution to the Australian-led mission. New Zealand equipment and personnel were reliable, did exemplary work and were highly appreciated by the Australians in INTERFET. Likewise, in the preparations for RAMSI, trans-Tasman collaboration was frequent and close. In both East Timor and Solomon Islands, Australian and New Zealand leaders enjoyed excellent relationships, which in turn improved interactions between the two national forces. Lastly, the trend of commentators and participants perceiving New Zealanders as more culturally sensitive peacekeepers than Australians continued in both INTERFET and RAMSI. In spite of successful Australian efforts to use operational methods that suited Melanesian society, it was New Zealand who continued to receive the kudos for perceptive interaction with locals.
5. Anzac Peacekeeping

This chapter will argue that during regional peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands participating Australians and New Zealanders experienced an revived Anzac relationship. The old Anzac connection forged during World War I was renewed and revitalised in recent joint deployments. There are two facets to the Anzac tradition to examine. Firstly, there is the official Anzac tradition signified by joint training exercises, Australian and New Zealand defence treaties and agreements, shared decisions about military operations and trans-Tasman defence policy. This aspect of Anzac is conducted by government officials, politicians and defence personnel. The second facet of Anzac is its use as an adjective to describe the significance and meaning that surrounds the relationship between Australia and New Zealand. Its most enduring legacies are the annual Anzac Day celebrations and remembrance ceremonies performed in both nations. ‘Anzac spirit’ has connotations of trust, loyalty, distinctiveness and rivalry. The term Anzac signifies the special relationship existing between the two nations.

Official Anzac connections

The first aspect of the Anzac tradition will be dealt with only briefly, as chapters three and four have already demonstrated the high degree of cooperation between Australian and New Zealand personnel in recent peacekeeping operations. The second aspect of Anzac is more nebulous and as such has not yet been explored in this study, which is why the majority of this chapter is devoted to investigating the ‘Anzac spirit’.

Official Anzac links for recent regional peacekeeping missions have been frequent and close. Moreover, they have grown in frequency and ease of interoperability. For TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI, from early in the planning stages, Australian and New Zealand diplomats, government officials and defence personnel participated in joint meetings and conferences. For all three missions Australia and New Zealand both contributed equipment and staff. Although in Bougainville New Zealand’s logistic capabilities were inadequate this problem had been largely corrected by the time they deployed to East Timor and Solomon Islands. In all three missions New Zealand was able to do good work with its Iroquois helicopters. Australia in turn filled in logistic gaps for New Zealand, offering communications and intelligence. In East Timor, Australian and New Zealand defence forces received their
supplies through a joint logistics agreement. One of the most important Anzac links was through teams of Australians and New Zealanders operating together. In Bougainville, the Teams Sites were largely made up of NZDF personnel and Australian civilians. In East Timor, although the national forces had their own particular areas of operation, some smaller teams such as the intelligence gathering group and Dili Command Headquarters were staffed by Australians and New Zealanders working together. Likewise in RAMSI, Australian and New Zealand civilians, defence staff and police officers worked closely together on various assignments. The TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI were examples of Anzac collaboration even closer than that of Gallipoli.

This close trans-Tasman relationship during peacekeeping missions was possible because of the regular contact between Australian and New Zealand governments and defence forces. The practice of holding annual inter-governmental and defence-force meetings between Australians and New Zealanders meant that there was familiarity with each other’s systems and capabilities. Australian defence official, Alan Behm credits the tradition of New Zealand Army officers training at Duntroon for the closeness between the ADF and NZDF. During shared training strong friendships between Australian and New Zealand Army Officers are often formed. Likewise, joint exercises encourage familiarity between the different services. Indeed, a lesson learnt from East Timor by both Australians and New Zealanders was the importance of continuing and expanding trans-Tasman combined exercises, exchange postings and contingency planning. Anzac cooperation was able to occur in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands because of the network of connections already existing between Australian and New Zealand government and defence establishments.

The Anzac Spirit: celebration, rivalry and differentiation

Australian and New Zealand cooperation and joint planning do not necessarily entail a revival of the Anzac spirit. Australia and New Zealand also cooperated with other nations, especially in East Timor. The superior coordination of logistics and force integration after

---

1 Lilley, [interview].
2 For example, at Gallipoli, Australians and New Zealanders at first cooperated only at a brigade scale. Their smaller units were based on national provinces (i.e. Canterbury). In Bougainville in particular, the TMG groups were made up of about 20 Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Island individuals. Smaller mixed groups meant greater trans-Tasman interaction. For Gallipoli, planning was handed down from the British, as opposed to the constant cooperation between Australians and New Zealanders found in recent peacekeeping missions.
3 For New Zealand view see Reid, ‘The Lessons of East Timor’, 7. For Australian view see General Cosgrove’s remark reported in Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 169.
Bougainville could merely be the product of improved procedures rather than a result of a closer Anzac relationship. And the term Anzac did not necessarily seem to have much overt significance in day-to-day operations for personnel.

In spite of these counter arguments, when talking with Australian and New Zealand members of the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI it became clear that even if it wasn’t always explicit, the spirit of Anzac was part of these peacekeeping missions. Of course, opinions about, and experiences of Anzac differ according to an individual’s temperament, background and character. An Anzac Day may be moving for one individual and less meaningful for another because of unique circumstances such as the loss of a colleague. Nonetheless in the interviews conducted for this thesis, clear patterns emerged. The first trend in interviewees’ experiences of Anzac was a subtle feeling of greater than normal closeness while on deployment. This Anzac spirit was often grounded in recognition of shared historical experience. While usually implicit, during Anzac celebrations the ‘Anzac spirit’ emerged to create emotionally charged experiences for those involved. Secondly, the main way the Anzac relationship manifested itself in day-to-day operations was through competitiveness, particularly in the discharge of duties and sporting events. Related to this competitiveness is the third trend: a strong desire on the part of New Zealanders to differentiate themselves from Australia by claiming a special ability in Pacific peacekeeping. While these second two trends may not seem ‘Anzac’ in nature it is important to remember that the original Anzac tradition also involved these two elements. As related in chapter one of the thesis, competitiveness and the smaller partner’s desire for uniqueness were both part of the original relationship between Australian and New Zealand forces.

There was a mixed response among interview respondents as to whether they were aware of an ‘Anzac spirit’ while on deployment. Some were unsure as to whether there was an explicit awareness of Anzac feeling. The word Anzac was not at the front of people’s minds according to New Zealander Vince McBride. Or as Trent Scott put it, ‘It’s not an explicit thing – we don’t go around saying ‘Come on Anzacs’’. Jan Gammage, although conscious of the Anzac feeling, couldn’t remember talking about it to the other TMG members. Neil Robertson knew Australians and New Zealanders had a close relationship especially when in a third country but wasn’t sure if this was an Anzac or general trans-Tasman link. Some interviewees wanted to make caveats to the idea of Anzac. Jeff Wilkinson cautioned that although Australia’s and New Zealand’s involvement in peacekeeping operations were
consistent with the Anzac spirit, it was politics and international affairs that drove their intervention. John O’Reilly said that the Anzac myth was more ingrained in Australian culture than in New Zealand’s. Then again, other participants such as James Batley, Roger Mortlock and Tony McLeod felt there was undoubtedly a strong awareness of the Anzac spirit. With such mixed responses a test was needed to determine whether there really was a widespread feeling of closeness between Australian and New Zealand members of the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI.

The test used was to ask respondents if they had celebrated Anzac Day while on deployment. The response overwhelmingly confirmed that the Anzac spirit, while usually an implicit undercurrent, materialized with strength on the traditional day dedicated to its celebration. Other important ceremonial moments such as the arrival and departure of troops or remembrance days also prompted feelings of Anzac solidarity. Almost every single interviewee had emotive memories of the Anzac ceremonies they celebrated while on deployment. The following excerpts from the interviews describe such Anzac moments:

We now come to Anzac Day. I’d spent five Anzac Days away in the previous years. They discovered a WWII memorial – a Fijian memorial. They literally went down – it was made out of classic plinths – and lovingly and as a common thing, cleaned it up. People driving up and down on the road had seen this thing – discovered that it was a WWII memorial – found out locations of battles. The Regimental Sergeant Major was there [responsible for military ceremonies]. It turned out that this would be an Anzac Day when the majority of people due to leave and PMG due to come – they turned out on the day at dawn – 250 people on parade. Down at this memorial which had been lovingly cleared away – awaiting Anzac Day – a shared project. There was an enormous sense of solidarity in that they were there at a WWII battlefield, New Zealanders had been there with Fijians who had fought in Bougainville in a battalion in WWII - where there had been casualties – here gathered again in cause of peace, New Zealanders, Fijians, Australians and Ni-Vanuatu, and a beautiful dawn it was too and I think at that ceremony – it marked a sort of moment of unity in what had been a troubled operation – a sentimental view but no doubt that it was a glowing day – a big lunch, cricket match – an Anzac Day celebrated. You could have argued that they would have had separate celebrations but there was never any doubt – everyone wanted a joint one.

Bob Breen, on Anzac Day in Bougainville, 1998

---

4 McBride, [interview], Scott, [interview], J. Gammage, [interview], Robertson, [interview], Wilkinson, [interview], O’Reilly, [phone interview], Batley, [phone interview], Mortlock, [interview] and T. McLeod, [phone interview].
I’ve been to four Anzac Days overseas. One in Cyprus, one in Bougainville, and two in Solomon Islands. They were the best Anzac days ever of any - just incredible. The one in Bougainville – we went to a Japanese war memorial where we had Anzac Day – a really really moving experience. There was a big contingent of New Zealand military, some Australian military and other players from right across the spectrum – really moving tributes to the Anzacs. In Solomon Islands there were great big functions all day: dawn service, then a gunfire breakfast. They really embraced it as a significant day.

**Ben McDevitt**

When the Kiwis were leaving in late April 1998, they did a mass final haka - it was pretty funny because the Maoris up the front were going for it but other New Zealanders and Maoris at the back were all out of time. When the PMG arrived, the Aussies lined up in military formation after they arrived. The Kiwis all lined up and did a mass haka. The Group’s Major made a speech in Maori – about Anzac tradition – ‘we’re brothers and sisters’ – a pretty sad day.

**Andrew Rice**

In Bougainville I was living on a little island, Sohano Island. There was a memorial there – maybe just an Australian one – can’t remember. On Anzac Day I dressed up in my police uniform and attended a dawn service. As Peace Monitoring Group was still operating (Combined military from NZ/AUS/Fiji/Vanuatu) the Australians brought over some bandsmen from Australia. It was wonderful experience commemorating Anzac day in this remote part of the world.

**Togimanu Annandale**

Must have been 28th September, Police Remembrance Day- we held a police remembrance day in Honiara – quite a big service. I distinctly remember - I was the senior New Zealand Police representative – marching out of church beside the AFP commissioner, I felt that Anzac relationship very strongly. And with the IPMT it was predominantly just Australians and New Zealanders when I was there and RAMSI was predominantly Anzac with small contingents from the Pacific. Every time you saw Australia and New Zealand flag flying next to each other – saw it quite a bit in Honiara – very conscious of that. I went to an Anzac Dawn Service in the IPMT. It’s very much there even 90 years after.

**Tony McLeod**

The Australians strongly value Anzac Day and the New Zealand part is not forgotten about by them. Whenever I speak about Anzac I mention Australians too. The Anzac spirit shows through on that particular day. I don’t know if it’s as strong on the other 364 days. They [Australia] recognise it and talk up our success.

**Clive Lilley**

We seniors might argue among ourselves but on the ground a Kiwi and Australian just get on. I know we cleared an old Anzac memorial just to the
south of Arawa. There was a club on the beach and overgrown by jungle was a little memorial. We cleared it for Anzac Day but I was home by then. A lot of my young fellows’ grandfathers had served in Bougainville in WWII. The Japanese Grand Admiral Yamamoto was killed in Bougainville – it has history and people were aware of that – absolutely.

**Roger Mortlock**

I missed the first Anzac Day in Solomon Islands because I was sick. The second one was the most moving one I’d ever been to. It was held in the GBR camp, after the riots, there was still a curfew in Honiara. It was a private ceremony for military, defence officials and civilians. It was a large ceremony because 600+ military were there, 1000+ were present. The helicopters in the theatre, as the sun went down they flew over – quite something. It brought a tear to my eye. There were wounded police officers present who had been wounded in the riots a week before. There was an awareness of a close relationship. Anzac has changed over the years – been appropriated. We all come to these operations with shared memories. I’m very proud to have served with Australia and New Zealand. We went through a very difficult period – in 8 days we worked 120 hours over the riots as we struggled to contain a violent situation. The distinctions between New Zealanders and Australians blurred – working to a common goal. It was nothing like the actual Anzacs but it was a little taste.

**Paul Ash**

It is clear that for many interviewees the official Anzac events attended while on deployment were the most meaningful they had ever attended. They were the moment when the Anzac spirit of solidarity and unity became actualised. Andrew Rice recalled feelings of brotherhood at the departure of the New Zealand TMG troops in early 1998 (see Figure 5.1). Anzac rituals often encouraged emotion; sentiments of loss, sadness at the departure of fellow Anzacs or feelings of pride and achievement. These accounts reveal why Anzac celebrations during peacekeeping operations heightened feelings of Australian and New Zealand closeness. The experience of danger and being far from home drew Australians and New Zealanders closer together. The Anzac Day in the Solomon Islands after the May 2006 riots was particularly poignant because of the presence of wounded police. At such events the special Anzac relationship forged in adversity became real and the experience of the original Anzacs was made all the more poignant.
Figure 5.1: NZDF Haka at their departure from Loloho, April 1998, courtesy of Andrew Rice.

Figure 5.2: Anzac Day celebrations at Sohano Island, 25 April 1998. Note the war memorial in the background and local attendee in a Scout’s uniform, second from left in the front row, courtesy of Andrew Rice.
Anzac Day was particularly moving because it was grounded in an awareness of the sacrifice of previous Australian and New Zealand soldiers in the Pacific. Trent Scott reflected that traditions are important to the military: uniforms, drills and ceremonies are all based on historical precedent.\(^5\) Thus, when serving in the Pacific, Anzac personnel were very aware of the men and women who had served and died during the Pacific War in the 1940s. Indeed, the recurrent and spontaneous occurrence of holding services at World War II memorials reflected a respect for past Anzacs (see Figure 5.2). Peacekeepers cleaned up and restored the old memorials out of reverence for the Anzac past and a desire to do things properly. Even in a foreign environment the old traditions of a dawn service, gunfire breakfast and army parades were adhered to when possible. Other less noble customs were also followed: heated sports matches played an important role in Anzac Day celebrations as part of the Anzac tradition of mateship and friendly rivalry.

The Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers’ awareness of the historical past was reinforced by Pacific Islanders’ general knowledge of their participation in the region during World War II. While Pacific Islanders did not consider themselves part of the Anzac tradition many were aware of Australia’s and New Zealand’s historical contribution to their region in the Pacific War.\(^6\) Fijian, Ni-Vanuatu and Cook Island personnel were easily included in Anzac celebrations as their ancestors had fought with Australian and New Zealand troops in the Pacific War. Quite often locals attended the peacekeepers’ Anzac Day ceremonies. In Bougainville, when Andrew Rice’s Truce Monitoring Team decided to hold their commemorative service at an old memorial on Sohano Island they found that the villagers already held an Anzac Day ceremony there every year (see Figure 5.2).\(^7\)

The second aspect of the Anzac spirit experienced by Australians and New Zealanders while on peacekeeping missions was competition, particularly in operational ability and sporting events. Members of the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI often felt that this was how the Anzac relationship was expressed in everyday life. Because of the closeness of the trans-Tasman relationship Australians and New Zealanders are able to take liberties with each other that would be inappropriate with other alliance partners. For example, Ben McDevitt recalled how ‘healthy competition’ between the Aussies and Kiwis was a marker of their connection.

\(^5\) Scott, [interview].
\(^6\) There was consensus on this view among interviewees who considered this issue: Ash, [interview], O’Reilly, [phone interview], Batley, [phone interview], Lilley, [interview].
\(^7\) Rice, [interview].
Joking putdowns actually indicated a close relationship. Ben had been to a number of overseas forums for his counter terrorism work. At one in Indonesia, ‘at the end some people came up and asked, ‘Don’t the New Zealanders and Australians like each other?’ For McDevitt however this was actually a positive experience: ‘it was all friendly – great and healthy rivalry. The Anzac spirit is alive and well – there’s no doubt about that’.8 Roger Mortlock said ‘watching New Zealand and Australian soldiers together is a joy – it’s funny. They hassle each other but it doesn’t have a barb in it’.9 James Batley also remembered ‘a healthy spirit of competitiveness’ in the early days of the TMG between Australia and New Zealand.10 National rivalry was not seen negatively by interviewees. It was a natural outcome of a strong relationship between two close yet separate countries.

There was some indication that this Anzac rivalry was used to improve Australians’ and New Zealanders’ performances. Peter Cosgrove in his autobiography My Story gives an example of this in action at an Anzac Day ceremony in Gallipoli. Cosgrove told Australians at their ceremony at Lone Pine that he thought the ‘Kiwis had out-sung us on the national anthems…and that we should really let it rip on Advance Australia Fair at the end of the service.’ The Australian crowd responded by singing ‘the birds out of the trees’.11 Jeff Wilkinson felt that Australians and New Zealanders worked very well together because they were driven by a shared heritage and ‘extremely friendly rivalry’. Trent Scott also found that trans-Tasman rivalry was used to good effect on peacekeeping missions:

The whole Anzac thing – it’s there and it’s drawn upon implicitly to, I guess, almost to create internal competition between the two armies when on operations to excel in their job. It’s not an explicit thing – we don’t go around saying ‘Come on Anzacs’ or ‘Come on, you’re an Anzac’. There is a degree of competitiveness between the two forces. If Kiwis do something well operationally the Aussies will try to reciprocate and if they do something bad there’ll be talk of ‘Those fucking Kiwis/Aussies’. It does foster esprit de corps, esprit de Anzac – but definitely an underlying theme rather than overt campaign.

Trent Scott

Thus, during planning and operations, the desire to better each other could be used positively to encourage good work from Australian and New Zealand troops. Bob Breen described how

---

8 McDevitt, [phone interview].
9 Mortlock, [interview].
10 Batley, [phone interview].
11 Cosgrove, My Story, 436.
during the preparations for Bougainville there was constructive competition between the Australians in Sydney and the New Zealanders at Trentham. According to Breen, this was the Anzac spirit: ‘a rivalry that produces a good standard performance to better the other’ for the common good.\(^\text{12}\)

Understandably, one of the main ways this trans-Tasman rivalry was clearly expressed on operations was through sport. Australia and New Zealand have traditionally been fierce opponents in sporting events. National self esteem, particularly for New Zealand, can hinge on the outcome of a trans-Tasman rugby match. This competitive relationship is heightened in the military where sport is a central part of NZDF and ADF culture. As mentioned previously, sports matches were also an intrinsic part of Anzac Day celebrations. Peter Cosgrove gives an amusing example of the interplay of Anzac sporting rivalry from INTERFET:

> The Australians in INTERFET had sent a message of support to the 1999 World Cup Wallabies. ‘I was extraordinarily thrilled when the Australian Rugby Union offered to send the World Cup, escorted by several Wallabies, for a quick visit to East Timor to show off the Cup to the Australian men and women of the force – an offer I accepted with alacrity. The Cup did the rounds down into the border areas and back to Dili, wherever there were large groupings of Australians. It must have been agony for the many Kiwis and fewer French men and women to watch the Cup triumphantly borne aloft, but everybody likes to exercise their boasting rights from time to time…Years later when my own retirement from the Army was imminent, my good friend, Air Vice Marshal Bruce Ferguson, the New Zealand Chief of the Defence Force, sent me a videotaped message in which he said very warm and welcome things about the military-to-military relationship between Australia and New Zealand as well as our own friendship. I noticed he was recorded standing next to the Bledisloe Cup, the ultimate prize in Australia and New Zealand rugby competition, and the Tri-Nations Cup. During an address of several minutes he never once referred to either of these trophies, but from time to time would pat one or the other like a favourite family pet. I got the message.\(^\text{13}\)

Cosgrove’s recollection shows the way sporting rivalry was used to reference the wisecracking competitiveness between Anzac neighbours. Indeed, Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping personnel would often make sports allusions and jokes with each other about

\(^{12}\) Breen, [interview].

\(^{13}\) Cosgrove, *My Story*, 297.
their national teams’ prowess. Sporting references allowed participants to acknowledge the close Anzac relationship while also expressing their unique national identity.

Australians’ and New Zealanders’ shared interest in sport was also used constructively to forge relationships with the locals. In Bougainville, Roger Mortlock organised a pan-Bougainville sports tournament in boxing and soccer. A mixed TMG team entered. The point was not to win (and indeed they did not) but to create a situation of trust and hope in the peacekeeping process. Likewise, in East Timor and Solomon Islands, Australians and New Zealanders played sport with locals in order to restore normality and engender confidence. Thus, the shared Australian and New Zealand interest in sport has a practical use in peacekeeping apart from cementing Anzac links.

The third example of Anzac spirit in trans-Tasman peacekeeping that emerged from the participants’ accounts was the idea that New Zealanders had a better cultural understanding of the Pacific region. Almost every single respondent, whether from Australia or New Zealand reinforced this idea without any prompting. New Zealand’s Pacific advantage was obviously a deep rooted, and with the exception of a few thoughtful Australians and New Zealanders, uncontested belief. The following section outlines the main points of the argument of New Zealand’s superior cultural sensitivity, critically investigates the reasons for its prevalence and argues why its existence is another proof of an Anzac relationship between Australian and New Zealand forces.

The main reasons given for New Zealand’s superior cultural sensitivity were that it is less guilty of re-colonising impulses and racism than Australia, and is familiar with Pacific culture due to its high population percentage of Maori and Polynesians. In Bougainville, New Zealand did not suffer from the taint of having helped Papua New Guinea fight against the Bougainvilleans, as Australia did. Bougainvillean Ruth Spriggs pointed out that ‘we’ve had a colonial relationship with Australia and our experience was tarnished to some extent’. In Solomon Islands also, New Zealand’s smaller force made it a less threatening presence. Many respondents identified New Zealand’s superior race-relations history as the reason for their Pacific advantage. John Roughan felt that Pakeha New Zealanders had far more frequent

---

14 Hegarty, [interview].
15 Mortlock, [interview].
16 Spriggs, [interview].
contact with Maori and Polynesians than European Australians did with Aboriginal Australians and as a result were less racist. Vince McBride stated that Australians do not interact with Indigenous Australians at the same level as New Zealanders do with Maori.\textsuperscript{17} And Clive Lilley and Ruth Spriggs both suggested that Australia’s greater distance from the Pacific was due to its unresolved mistreatment of the Australian Aboriginal people.\textsuperscript{18} Interviewees also identified New Zealand’s familiarity with Maori culture as the reason for their success with Pacific Islanders. For example, Vince McBride and Tony McLeod related stories of New Zealanders interacting with locals while Australians stood off to the side, talking only to each other.\textsuperscript{19} Australian Trent Scott was impressed by New Zealand Maori serving in East Timor who lived in local villages.\textsuperscript{20} New Zealand policemen, Tony McLeod and Togimanu Annandale both felt that New Zealand saw itself as part of the Pacific in a way that Australia did not.\textsuperscript{21} All interviewees mentioned some of these arguments as to why New Zealanders had better relationships with Pacific Islanders than Australians during peacekeeping missions.

In reality, the depiction of Australians as culturally insensitive and New Zealanders as having a Pacific advantage is a flawed stereotype. The Australian-led missions in East Timor and Solomon Islands did put in place strategies to encourage cultural sensitivity. Many Australian individuals, such as James Batley, were highly knowledgeable about Melanesian culture and society. Although they may have been the exception to the general Australian population, long stints serving in the Pacific have given some Australian diplomats, aid workers and defence staff a comprehensive understanding of the area. Likewise some New Zealanders were just as racist and guilty of inappropriate behaviour as Australians.\textsuperscript{22} In spite of public arguments to the contrary, New Zealand is not free from xenophobia or ignorance of multiculturalism. The generally unquestioning acceptance of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage needs to be investigated. The question needs be asked, why did New Zealanders continue to receive the majority of praise for sensitive conduct towards locals?

\textsuperscript{17} Roughan, [interview], McBride, [interview].  
\textsuperscript{18} Lilley, [interview], Spriggs, [interview].  
\textsuperscript{19} McBride, [interview], T. McLeod, [phone interview].  
\textsuperscript{20} Scott, [interview].  
\textsuperscript{21} T. McLeod, [phone interview], Annandale, [phone interview].  
\textsuperscript{22} ‘A bit was made of the fact that Australian military were racist, and yeah they were but some of the guys from New Zealand gave as good as the Aussies would have.’ Rice, [interview].
The first reason for New Zealand’s perceived cultural sensitivity is its routine inclusion of Maori protocol in the government’s and NZDF’s official duties. It is expected for New Zealand officials, diplomats and politicians to use Te Reo Maori in their speeches and be conversant with Maori culture. For example, during the IPMT a visiting delegation of New Zealand politicians and election officials performed a haka for their Australian colleagues and Solomon Island hosts.23 The NZDF also holds Maori customs as an integral part of its internal culture. In 1994 the concept of Tu, the Maori War God, was officially introduced into New Zealand Army policy when the army was renamed Ngati Tumatauenga (‘Tribe of War’). Accompanying the name change was the incorporation of traditional Maori elements of warfare and culture such as the haka, the Taiaha (Maori spear) and powhiri (welcome ceremony) into army doctrine. The concept of Ngati Tumatauenga has since been extended to the New Zealand Navy and Air Force.24 Thus, when on deployment in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands all NZDF personnel, whether Pakeha or Maori, participated in Maori ceremonies. New Zealanders performed the haka frequently and spontaneously. As Jan Gammage recalled from Bougainville ‘they [the New Zealanders] came in with their guitars and did the haka everywhere – people loved it – it was one way of giving something to the people. It left Australians rather flat-footed. We didn’t have anything so fun – only three bloody cheers’.25 In fact interviewees gave several accounts of Australians not joining in concerts while on operation because of their lack of a cultural contribution.26 A major reason New Zealand is seen as more sensitive than Australia is its use of Maori culture to form connections with Pacific Islanders. Australia has not included indigenous Australian culture in its defence force or government to the same extent and is unable to do so.

A paradox of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage is that its good reputation is often a result of its lack of strategic intelligence and funding. Because it operates on a far smaller budget, New Zealand has less information available on the Pacific region than Australia. With Bougainville in particular, this contributed to New Zealand’s intervention. Bede Corry, a New Zealand MFAT official involved in New Zealand’s early negotiations with the BRA, reflected that New Zealanders’ familiarity with certain Bougainvillean individuals showed a degree of naivety. The New Zealanders did not realise the calibre of the people they were dealing with and their past crimes and thus took considerable risks. By comparison, the well-}

23 J. Gammage, [interview].
25 J. Gammage, [interview].
26 Mortlock, [interview], Ash, [interview].
informed Australians were far more suspicious, concerned and cautious about security.\footnote{Corry, [phone interview].}
Fortunately, the naive approach worked to New Zealand’s advantage in Bougainville; it was perceived by Bougainvilleans as trust and a commitment to the peace process. Similarly, New Zealand prides itself on adaptability and innovation. While commendable, these virtues often arise out of necessity. A lack of funding forces personnel to find alternative solutions. In the Solomon Islands not much government direction was given to the New Zealand contingent. This however, allowed on-the-ground staff to modify plans for local conditions and needs.\footnote{T. McLeod, [phone interview].} New Zealand’s lack of resources often works in its favour, especially in the Pacific region, where personal relationships and flexibility are valued over highly detailed strategic tactics.

Pacific Islanders partly contribute to New Zealand’s reputation by praising New Zealanders as more culturally sensitive than Australians. Often their response is sincere; however at other times it arises out of self-interest. Lance Beath believes that the Pacific Islanders know New Zealanders want to be praised for their ability in the Pacific and feed this back to them.\footnote{L. Beath, [phone interview], Wellington, 28-11-07.} Paul Ash pointed out that sometimes locals request New Zealanders because they see them as ‘an easier ride than the Aussies’. In James Batley’s experience, the depiction of New Zealand as more sensitive and Australia as more crude is a political commonplace rather than an objective judgement.\footnote{Batley, [phone interview].} And Togimanu Annandale found that Pacific Islanders could change their opinions according to the situation: ‘one day…they say they love the New Zealanders. The next day they say to an Australian they love Australians. They know don’t bite the hand that feeds you.’\footnote{Annandale, [phone interview].} It is important to remember that Pacific Islanders’ comparative judgments of Australia and New Zealand may arise out of political expediency.

The theme of New Zealand’s special ability in the Pacific is also partly due to self-congratulation on New Zealand’s part. Lance Beath pointed out that New Zealand is not really as well informed on the Pacific as Australia. Nonetheless, New Zealand deludes itself that it has a superior understanding of the region: ‘it’s impossible for a visit of a New Zealand Foreign Minister to be described as anything but an outstanding success- in reality they are often ill-prepared and create great offence. But our reporting never reflects that. The system
goes into self-congratulatory mode’. Sometimes New Zealanders pat themselves on the back for ‘cultural sensitivity’ when in reality the opposite is true. Maori customs while similar to Polynesian culture can be different from Melanesian culture. There is a risk of New Zealanders using Maori culture inappropriately in Melanesia. James Batley recalled that during the TMG a Kiwi commander introduced himself to a village as a Maori warrior, which ‘freaked out’ the locals. Togimanu Annandale felt that New Zealanders can have too high an opinion of themselves and need to remember that Australians are learning from their peacekeeping experiences. Indeed, among the interviewees the most enthusiastic descriptions of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage came from New Zealanders.

Stressed differentiation between Australians and New Zealanders is a long-standing aspect of the trans-Tasman relationship. Back in Egypt, Gallipoli and on the Western Front, New Zealanders characterised themselves as more gentlemanly than the Australians. The original Anzacs’ relationship was suffused by rivalry and national differentiation. In recent peacekeeping operations, New Zealanders have also sought to distinguish themselves from their Australian counterparts. The TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI have provided ‘proof’ for the argument that New Zealanders understand the Pacific better than Australians. New Zealanders feel they have shown themselves to be more culturally attuned to the Pacific; less brash and interfering than Australians. New Zealand’s Pacific advantage does have a basis in reality. Maori customs are an integral part of NZDF doctrine and New Zealand personnel have used this to their advantage in the Pacific. However, the less admirable reasons for New Zealand’s good reputation in the Pacific are generally ignored. New Zealanders stress their superior Pacific ability in order to make themselves look good, especially in comparison to Australians. Significantly, Australia is always the implicit point of reference for New Zealanders to judge their own conduct by. Cultural sensitivity is one area in which New Zealand seems to outperform Australia. So this aspect is stressed as part of the implicit rivalry between the two nations. Cultural sensitivity is New Zealand’s claim to uniqueness within the Anzac relationship.

---

32Beath, [phone interview].
33 Batley, [phone interview].
34 Annandale, [phone interview].
The wider implications of Anzac peacekeeping

The Anzac relationships formed since Bougainville had an impact on wider trans-Tasman relations. The cooperation around these three peacekeeping missions caused an acknowledgement of the close ties that bind Australia and New Zealand at a political level. This is demonstrated in the transcripts from joint press conferences between the Australian and New Zealand Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The majority of the conferences have been between Alexander Downer from Australia and Phil Goff from New Zealand but the last few were between Winston Peters and Alexander Downer. In these transcripts there is a strong appreciation of the special relationship between Australia and New Zealand that has arisen out of their cooperation in regional peacekeeping. Interestingly, several of the Anzac trends that emerged from participants’ interviews are also present in the transcripts. Phil Goff tended to be more inclusive of the Pacific and less overtly nationalistic than Alexander Downer. The tenor of the conversation is jovial and bantering with frequent references to the sporting rivalry between the two nations. This suggests that the Anzac spirit is not contained to peacekeeping participants.

In the press interviews Downer often stressed Australia’s contribution whereas Goff was more inclusive of the Pacific. Goff also sometimes also ameliorated Downer’s more stridently nationalistic comments. When talking to the press about the RAMSI intervention, Downer emphasised Australia’s lead role. On 29 June 2003 Downer stated that the intervention was ‘inevitably led by Australia, because of the size of Australia, Australia’s Defence Force, and economy and so on.’ On 30 June, Downer repeated that Australia would ‘inevitably’ head up the operation. When mentioning risks, Downer also tended to focus exclusively on Australia. On 29 June 2003 he said ‘if we’re going to make any of these sorts of deployments, we have to be very cautious about protecting Australian lives. We’re

36 This analysis is based on the full transcripts of fourteen joint press conferences listed on the Australian Foreign Minister’s website, from 2000-2007. Nine interviews are reports on bilateral meetings of the Ministers, one is on the occasion of an Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum and four interviews are concerned with Australia’s and New Zealand’s intervention in Solomon Islands in 2003. <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/>, accessed 8-8-07.
not taking chances with Australian lives’. Goff backed up Downer but softened his exclusive Australian nationalism and militaristic approach. For example, in the August 2003 article, after Downer had talked about the necessity of a strong Australian military presence, Goff emphasised the warm welcome given to the RAMSI force from Solomon Islanders: ‘the atmosphere was like Christmas Day. It was an atmosphere of celebration, of enjoyment, of welcoming. There is no shock and awe as far as the community is concerned’. At other times, when Downer focused on military and governance solutions, Goff would talk about improving the social and economic conditions of Solomon Islands. Goff also occasionally mentioned the Pacific Island Forum, UN and Commonwealth approval for RAMSI.

In the press conferences, the two ministers often begin and finish by making jovial banter about the relationship between Australia and New Zealand. This sort of conversation often revolves around sport, humorous put-downs and friendly one-upmanship. An example of this is found in a 2006 exchange between Downer and Peters:

**JOURNALIST:** Talking about differences, there's a significant sporting match on this evening. Will you have an opportunity in your discussions to break to watch the rugby league test?

**MR PETERS:** Well Alexander is an Australian Rules man and we play the manly game of rugby here more than we play league, but I think we've got a good chance tonight.

**MR DOWNER:** Personally I think Australia will win.

**JOURNALIST:** But you know, taking it through the lens of this test, who has done better out of twenty years of CER…?

**MR DOWNER:** Economically? Or sport?

**JOURNALIST:** No from the players on the field tonight…

**MR PETERS:** I tell you what's happened here, you've got our guy as your fullback for Australia and we've got your guy as fullback for New Zealand…

**JOURNALIST:** We've got five Australians…

**MR DOWNER:** Well it just shows how well we get on with each other…

---

39 Downer and Goff, ‘29 June 2003’.
41 Ibid.
42 For example, 29 June 2003, Downer talks about regional intervention force and Goff follows by talking about the importance of additional economic development, education and health care for the Solomon Islands. Downer and Goff, ‘29 June 2003’.
43 Ibid.
MR PETERS: And we've got an excuse if we lose....

This friendly banter reveals the similar cultural background of the two nations. The trans-Tasman nature of the Australian and New Zealand league teams is proof of close connections, but also provides an opportunity to harass their opponents. In most of the interviews, Downer, Goff and Peters had a shared understanding of the enduring rivalry between Australia and New Zealand, particularly in sport.

The Australian Foreign Minister took particular care to stress the closeness of the trans-Tasman relationship. Alexander Downer was effusively positive about Australia’s relationship with New Zealand in almost every press interview. In 2000 he claimed that the bilateral connection between Australia and New Zealand had ‘never been in better shape’ and stressed the ‘extremely close and enormously successful’ cooperation between the two nations.\(^{45}\) In 2002, Downer stated that the Australian-New Zealand diplomatic relationship ‘is constantly underrated and underestimated.’\(^{46}\) In 2006, Downer continued to rhapsodize about the trans-Tasman relationship to Winston Peters, saying ‘Australia I think for our part, appreciates so much what New Zealand does to support the things we stand for. New Zealand has been a tremendous friend of Australia in recent times’.\(^{47}\) Goff and Peters did mention the close Australia-New Zealand relationship but at a more pragmatic level without such extravagant praise.\(^{48}\) Downer’s praise of New Zealand countered the common perception Australia and New Zealand were drifting apart. In 2005 he said, ‘I know the popular view is

---


\(^{48}\) An example of the more pragmatic view of the relationship can be seen in this quote from Winston Peters: ‘Well, we've got a window of our commensurate [inaudible], comparative [inaudible], and the reality is that we need to work with Australia, we need to work with others as well, but in conflating with others in the Pacific who [inaudible] we're going to get a better result for our money, we're going to have a far more - how shall I put it - influential regional result as a context of working with Australia. And [inaudible] is what we have sought to do in recent years, the policies may rise, and we would seek to expand upon them, but also to [inaudible] as well. These are international problems and Australia is more than pulling its weight, and we intend to do just that ourselves.’ A. Downer and W. Peters, '22 July 2006, Joint Press Conference with the Hon Winston Peters, New Zealand Minister for Foreign Affairs - Adelaide', [transcript], <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2006/060722_joint_press_conference.html>, accessed 31-7-07.
that Australia and New Zealand are supposed to be drifting apart, and different perspectives of America, and those kinds of things [sic]. There's some truth in that, of course, but the big point I'd make is that there is still tremendous co-operation between Australia and New Zealand’. 49

Indeed, it is particularly with regard to the Pacific that Downer and his New Zealand counterpart stressed Australia’s and New Zealand’s close working relationship. Almost all the joint press conferences dwelt in depth on current Pacific issues. In 2000 at a joint press conference, Goff stated that Australia and New Zealand are both Pacific nations with a deep concern for what is happening in the neighbouring nations. 50 During 2003, Downer and Goff held multiple joint interviews in which they stressed their cooperation with regards to RAMSI. In the last few years the joint Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping operations in Bougainville and Solomon Islands have become the rhetorical keystones in the trans-Tasman relationship. Goff referred to Bougainville in 2002 as ‘a success story for New Zealand/Australian relations’. 51 In 2004, Goff, citing Bougainville and RAMSI as examples, argued that by working together Australia and New Zealand achieved more than they would have done separately. 52 The following quote from Downer, made in February 2006, celebrated Australian and New Zealand teamwork in the Pacific to an even greater extent:

As far as Australia is concerned, we very much appreciated what New Zealand has been doing. I mean I have been the Foreign Minister for 10 years, in that 10 years I would pick up two or three things in our foreign policy which have been particular highlights, for example the Bougainville peace process. Now who was one of the key players in the Bougainville peace process? It was New Zealand and I actually don't think that that peace process, which we played a central role in as well, would have happened in the way it did if it hadn't been for New Zealand's contribution. Fast forward to 1998 – 99 and East Timor and who was there shoulder to shoulder with Australia and East Timor? It was New Zealand. Fast forward to the crisis in the Solomon Islands and the creation of RAMSI, the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands which was kind of hard to put together and we had to build a Pacific consensus for it, and who was shoulder to shoulder with Australia? New Zealand. So I can tell you, I have found great

50 Downer and Goff, ‘23 June 2000’.
51 Downer and Goff, ‘7 June 2002’.
friendship with New Zealand, and great support from New Zealand over the years.\textsuperscript{53}

For both Australia and New Zealand Ministers of Foreign Affairs, it was important to stress their nations’ exceptional cooperation in the Pacific. Although they are separate nations, in regional affairs they act in tandem, with a ‘no surprises’ policy.\textsuperscript{54}

The final point to note is that Goff and Downer both referred to Anzac in the context of the Australia-New Zealand relationship. In 2004, Downer, speaking in the context of the war against terror and RAMSI, stated that ‘the ANZAC spirit is very much alive and well.’\textsuperscript{55} In 2005, Goff reinforced this interpretation and described the current Anzac tradition as being particularly important in the Pacific region. Goff affirmed that there is a ‘long ANZAC tradition of our two countries working alongside each other, and I’m very proud of the way in which both of us have been able to contribute to that tradition and work together, particularly in the Pacific’.\textsuperscript{56} Anzac is a term still in current use to describe the unique close relationship between Australia and New Zealand.

Bougainville and the following peacekeeping missions in East Timor and Solomon Islands were Anzac peacekeeping operations. At the official level of joint organization, planning and force integration, Australian and New Zealand cooperation grew progressively closer and more harmonious following lessons learnt in the TMG. Interview participants’ memories of their time in trans-Tasman peacekeeping missions also revealed the existence of an Anzac spirit between Aussies and Kiwis. Just as at Gallipoli, the enforced closeness and shared hardships of peacekeeping missions created a strong connection between Australians and New Zealanders. Shared celebrations and rivalries renewed the Anzac bond. Even New Zealand’s desire to differentiate itself from Australians through claims of greater cultural sensitivity is a reaction to the close sibling-like relationship. A renewal of the Anzac spirit affected the general trans-Tasman relationship positively as seen in the transcripts between the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers.

\textsuperscript{53} Downer and Peters, '23 February 2006'.
\textsuperscript{54} Downer and Goff, '29 April 2005'.
Conclusion

Recent experiences of Anzac peacekeeping in the Pacific region fit into longstanding historical trends. Strategic experts’ and political advisors’ emphasis on the present and future means that the long term historical context of Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence policies and involvement in the Pacific has often been forgotten. Although contemporary commentators described Australia’s and New Zealand’s involvement in recent peacekeeping missions as ‘new interventionism’, from a historical perspective these operations fit into a pattern of long-term regional concern. Australia and New Zealand have played, and continue to play, a leading role in the Pacific through their colonial administration, military interventions, foreign aid, diplomacy, and peacekeeping missions.

Since colonial times, Australia and New Zealand have been concerned about their relationship to the Pacific and regional security. Whether pressuring Britain to take on new imperial responsibilities, fighting against Axis forces in World War I and II, or discouraging communist encroachment, Australia and New Zealand have worked together to control external and internal threats in the Pacific. The peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands are a continuation of this tradition. Increased internal conflict in Pacific Island countries since the end of the Cold War has once again involved Australian and New Zealand governments in the region. After the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 and the Bali bombings in 2002 Australian and New Zealand governments feared that the Pacific could become a hotbed of international crime and terrorism. Their recent intervention in internal conflicts, particularly in Solomon Islands, is due to the old fear of outside interference by unfriendly powers.

A second longstanding historical precedent is New Zealanders’ belief that their cultural sensitivity in the Pacific is superior to Australia’s. It has been argued since the nineteenth century that New Zealanders’ relatively successful settlement with the Maori entitled them to a special role with other Polynesian and Melanesian peoples. By comparison, New Zealand commentators saw Australia’s mistreatment of Indigenous Australians as proof of their lack of sympathy with Pacific culture. Even though New Zealand’s colonial record with its Pacific Island mandates was not always good and sometimes even inferior to Australia’s, New Zealand commentators continued to praise their nation’s cultural sensitivity. In the
TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI, New Zealand personnel did generally interact well with local peoples. But, New Zealand’s achievements were lauded so frequently and uncritically that it became clear the same self-congratulatory mode was in place. Favourable comparison with Australia remained a key part of the discourse. For many New Zealanders, cultural correctness remained an important area in which New Zealand could outdo their Anzac rivals, Australia.

Indeed, the third continuing historical theme is the significance of the Anzac tradition to Australians and New Zealanders. Early commentators created the mythology of the courageous, hardy, innovative and loyal Anzac soldier. Although this mythology has faced revisionist arguments since then there is still a general agreement on the importance of the meaning of Anzac to Australian and New Zealand national identity. Particularly in Australia, where the idea of Anzac as an element of the national character is strong, there has been much recent interest in this topic. By highlighting the revival of ‘Anzac spirit’ as part of Pacific peacekeeping, this thesis contributes to this historiographical tradition, but instead of taking a nationalist approach, adopts a trans-Tasman viewpoint.

An overview of relevant literature also reveals historiographical continuities from the past into the present. The factors of who is writing, their reasons for doing so, and the mode used may change over the years but often certain assumptions remain constant. For example, the idea that the Pacific south of the Equator is Australia’s and New Zealand’s sphere of security and responsibility has endured. While types of intervention may alter over time, authors continue to accept the idea that Australia and New Zealand have a right to act in the Pacific region. Likewise, suppositions that New Zealand has a better cultural understanding of the Pacific than Australia, and that unfriendly foreign nations must be denied access to the region are found throughout the historiography.

The historiographical overview in chapter two also highlights Australia’s lengthier historiography on the region and the lack of transnational history. Australian historical writing, especially on defence and Anzac-related topics, is far more extensive than its New Zealand equivalent. While this is partly due to Australia’s larger academic community, it is also due to the greater prominence of these two themes in Australian life. From the colonial period onwards, Australia has been more preoccupied with the possibility of invasion, more
concerned with defence topics and more nationalistic about its Anzac forces than New Zealand.

Australian and New Zealand historiographies have each generally been written with a ‘national history’ focus that this thesis aims to revise on by adopting a trans-Tasman viewpoint. After the 1960s in particular, finding a ‘national identity’ became important to both Australia and New Zealand. Accounts of the past described the unique situations and histories of Australia and New Zealand rather than focusing on the exchange of information and culture within the region. Even political scientists and defence analysts on both sides of the Tasman often ignored their neighbour and focused on individual threat perceptions. Perhaps because the strong Australia-New Zealand relationship was taken for granted, little in-depth investigation was made of the close links between the trans-Tasman neighbours in defence, Pacific affairs, and even the Anzac tradition. Thus, part of the reason for examining Australia’s and New Zealand’s joint participation in regional peacekeeping is to illuminate wider aspects of the trans-Tasman defence relationship.

Over the years, the trans-Tasman defence relationship has at times been weakened under conditions of inaction, differing goals or a perceived lack of mutual support. For example, in the interwar years with no shared combat operations Australian and New Zealand defence relations slackened off. In World War II, New Zealand’s decision to leave its troops in Europe frustrated the Australians who felt the Pacific should be the main area of concern. The crisis around ANZUS in 1985, while not weakening the Australian and New Zealand defence relationship, did reveal differences between the two nation’s defence priorities. Likewise, the New Zealand government’s decision in 2000 to disband the combat arm of the New Zealand Air Force (which had previously exercised with the Australian Navy) upset Australian defence officials and prompted claims of ‘drifting apart’. Moreover, Australia and New Zealand are not each other’s only, or even most high profile, defence allies. Certainly, New Zealand’s most important defence partner is Australia. On the other hand, Australia still prioritises its connections with other nations over New Zealand. In recent Australian Defence White Papers and reports, the United States, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Middle Eastern countries are given more attention than New Zealand. This however, is either because these nations pose a greater risk to Australian security, or are higher maintenance allies.
In the Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand mutually realise the importance of close cooperation in diplomacy, military operations and aid policies. In regional operations, a joint Australian-New Zealand response is expected. Part of the value of New Zealand’s and Australia’s defence relationship is that it is understood and sustained without overt fuss. The legacy of the Anzac past has left an underlying knowledge of each other’s reliability as a defence ally.

Shared trans-Tasman peacekeeping has considerably ameliorated defence ‘drift’, especially on an operational level. In Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands, Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship was active, largely supportive and working towards the same goals. Part of the reason for the importance of Australia’s and New Zealand’s participation in regional peacekeeping missions is the consequential strengthening of trans-Tasman defence relations. Since the Bougainville peace meetings at Burnham in mid-1997, Australia and New Zealand have increasingly collaborated in order to prevent internal instability in the Pacific. INTERFET in 1999 and RAMSI in 2003 built on previous contacts and greatly increased trans-Tasman cooperation. The missions in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands were relatively large and long-term, requiring significant funding and periodic planning meetings from Australia and New Zealand. The result of this frequent contact is that Australian and New Zealand diplomats, politicians, defence and police personnel and aid workers gained more experience at working with each other.

This thesis emphasises Bougainville because the TMG was the first regional peacekeeping mission and as such set important precedents for the Australian and New Zealand defence relationship. In the initial stages of the TMG there were conflicts between Australia and New Zealand. The unarmed style of operation and the NZDF’s somewhat makeshift planning troubled the safety-conscious ADF. There were fraught relations between some Australian and New Zealand personnel. New Zealand’s faulty equipment and logistic inadequacies caused frustrations. But, these problems highlighted the areas in which the NZDF needed improvement and encouraged the New Zealand government Cabinet to approve future capability acquisitions. Moreover, in Bougainville, New Zealanders and Australians were drawn together on the ground because of their shared responsibilities and hardships. Close relationships formed between Australians and New Zealanders. The positive outcome of the Bougainville peace process and the operational lessons learnt gave Australia and New
Zealand the experience and confidence to plan larger, more ambitious missions in East Timor and Solomon Islands.

Indeed, recent Pacific peacekeeping missions revived the Anzac bond between Australia and New Zealand. The TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI brought about a renewal of the Anzac relationship on an official operational level. Joint planning meetings, integrated capabilities and mixed teams of Australian-New Zealand personnel functioned increasingly smoothly after Bougainville. Government officials, diplomats, civilians, defence personnel, police officers and aid workers all met to discuss contributions. Because of their shared national interest in preventing the spread of violence and internal disorder in the Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand were willing to contribute significant time, money and resources to these operations. Indeed, in comparison with Gallipoli, the links were tighter and more widespread.

Moreover, interviews with participants from the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI revealed that the Anzac spirit was revived between Australians and New Zealanders serving in these peacekeeping missions. Although Pacific peacekeeping missions largely lacked the sacred themes of sacrifice and death found at Gallipoli, they were still stressful, tiring and potentially explosive. During Anzac celebrations in the field, Australians and New Zealanders not only remembered the sacrifices of past Anzacs, but also felt a bond, forged through their shared hardships, with their trans-Tasman colleagues. In day-to-day activities this Anzac spirit was played out through competitiveness. Australians and New Zealanders vied to better the other in sporting events and the carrying out of duties. A less obvious expression of the Anzac spirit was New Zealanders’ desire to differentiate themselves from Australians. They did this through emphasising their superior aptitude for cultural sensitivity in the Pacific region. Just as New Zealand soldiers perceived themselves to be more gentlemanly than the Australia larrikins while training in Cairo in 1914, so New Zealand peacekeepers felt they were more in tune with Pacific peoples than the ‘brash Aussies’ while on operation in Bougainville in 1997. The last ten years have seen the emergence of a new Anzac peacekeeping force.

There are, however several qualifications to this new Anzac peacekeeping relationship. Firstly, Anzac peacekeeping was forged out of Australia’s and New Zealand’s separate national interests. Because it was in the Pacific, it suited both nations’ separate security
agendas to intervene. Australia and New Zealand, however, are not bound to act similarly on all international defence issues. New Zealand declined to join the invasion of Iraq, whereas Australia made a significant contribution to the American-led force. Regional instability drew Australia and New Zealand together because national self-interest justified the expense of joint planning and force integration. One would hope that the Anzac relationship could be sustained in peaceful circumstances. The reality is that it is shared threats which have always united the trans-Tasman neighbours.

Secondly, New Zealand’s good Pacific reputation is subject to caveats. Its creativity and flexibility are the result of a narrow resource base that forces New Zealanders to be innovative and adaptable. Sometimes New Zealand’s boldness in Pacific peacekeeping has been due to lack of intelligence about the region and political naivety. New Zealand was also extremely fortunate that Maori culture had been integrated into government and NZDF protocol before the Burnham peace talks in 1997. The use of Maori culture was often routine rather than carefully planned, and its positive impact realised only after the event. Moreover, the predominance of the view of New Zealand’s superior cultural sensitivity and its lack of critical attention has revealed the strength of New Zealand’s desire for uniqueness in comparison to Australia.

So what of the future of Anzac peacekeeping and lessons learnt? Every peacekeeping mission in the Pacific has required a unique type of intervention so far. It is difficult to foresee which existing tensions in the Pacific will simmer over into situations prompting peacekeeping interventions. Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands provide clues as to what works in the Pacific but are not infallible models. Accordingly, Australia and New Zealand will need to keep intelligence on, and relationships with, the Pacific region a high priority. The Pacific may be small in population, but its significance to Australia and New Zealand in terms of national security, the environment, and international reputation is great. Throughout history, Australia and New Zealand have marked the Pacific region as their ‘patch’ and this remains true today. Although the Anzac relationship is important it must continue to be compatible with Australia’s and New Zealand’s responsibilities to the wider Pacific region.

Moreover, too much emphasis on New Zealand’s uniqueness in Pacific peacekeeping is unhelpful. There is a fine line between Anzac differentiation and arrogance. While New
Zealand’s strengths are extremely valuable in Anzac peacekeeping, commentators should not accept them unreservedly or dismiss Australian efforts. In many cases, Australians have worked successfully to adapt their procedures to local culture. Moreover, New Zealanders also need to be careful to avoid complacency about their cultural ability. There is always more to learn and New Zealand personnel are not innocent of cultural insensitivity. New Zealand is fortunate with its integration of Maori culture into official protocol but should not take it for granted. Moreover, it is important to remember that New Zealand could not operate without Australia’s financial backing, logistical support and information-gathering skills in most joint operations. New Zealand’s cultural sensitivity in Pacific peacekeeping operations has been largely enabled by Australia.

Anzac peacekeeping relies on a continued close interaction between Australian and New Zealand personnel. At the moment, there are groups of Australians and New Zealanders, though significantly reduced in number, serving in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands. If these existing missions finish and there are no Australian and New Zealand joint peacekeeping missions for some time undoubtedly these Anzac connections will fade. Individual officer exchanges will continue but not on the same scale as during operations where hundreds of soldiers, police and government officials work with their trans-Tasman equivalents. Interoperability between Australia and New Zealand should be fostered as much as possible, but without regular deployments this will be more difficult.

However, the recent Pacific peacekeeping missions have created a pool of Anzac resources that can be drawn upon. This was demonstrated in the New Zealand-led, trans-Tasman response to the Tongan crisis in 2006. A joint force of NZDF and ADF personnel were able to deploy extremely quickly due to their familiarity with each other and the region. Even if Australia and New Zealand do experience a hiatus in joint operations, their cultural similarities, and historical links will provide a base on which to build yet another Anzac force. Whether the next Anzac force will be a continuation of the existing peacekeeping tradition or a reincarnation into something new will depend on the circumstances. Whatever happens, the Anzac relationship will continue as long as Australians and New Zealanders work together towards a common purpose.

## Appendix 1: Table of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Time and place of Interview</th>
<th>Interviewee’s involvement in Bougainville/East Timor/ Solomon Islands peacekeeping operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Captain John O’Reilly (NZDF)      | 10 August, 2007 (phone call to Wellington) | -Involved in Operation Lagoon, 1994, debriefed NZ personnel  
- Assisted with peace talks at Burnham in 1997  
- Member of first rotation of TMG, 1997, in intelligence role  
- Senior NZDF role in RAMSI, July 2004 – November 2004 |
| John Roughan                      | 16 August, 2007, Christchurch | - Long-time civil society advocate in Solomon Islands  
- Secretary to Solomon Island’s past Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare |
| James Batley (DFAT)               | 30 August, 2007, (phone call to Suva, Fiji) | - In Bougainville during Operation Lagoon, 1994  
- Senior Australian, Leader of Civilian Contingent and Deputy Leader to Roger Mortlock in first rotation of TMG, 1997-1998  
- Chief Negotiator (essentially the same role) in PMG, 1998  
- Australian High Commissioner to Solomon Islands – 1997-1999  
- Second Special Coordinator of RAMSI, August 2004 -2006  
- Currently, Australian High Commissioner to Fiji |
- Visited Solomon Islands in 2000 in work for MFAT  
- Coordinated and recorded eyewitness account for Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group |
| Major General Clive Lilley (NZDF, retired) | 5 September, 2007, Wellington | - Chief of Staff at NZDF Headquarters Land Force Command, Takapuna. Involved in planning TMG mission  
- Commander of reconnaissance force for TMG, 1997 |
<p>| Paul Ash (MFAT)                   | 5 September, 2007, Wellington | - Deputy Special Coordinator of RAMSI, 2005-2006 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Contact Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neil Robertson (MFAT)</td>
<td>6 September, 2007, Wellington</td>
<td>Did article on TMG in 1999 for which he conducted interviews with Don McKinnon, Major A. Fitzsimons, Bede Corry, Colonel Jerry Mateparae, Brigadier Roger Mortlock and Don McKinnon (to which I was given access)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier Roger Mortlock (NZDF, retired)</td>
<td>7 September, 2007, Wellington</td>
<td>Member of Pacific Division, MFAT, for 28 years, during which time he was Deputy Head from 2000-2004. Current Director of Pacific Cooperation Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Togimanu (Tony) Annandale (NZP)</td>
<td>2 October, 2007, Wellington</td>
<td>Team Leader of Bougainville Community Policing Project, 1999. Involved in project design of Solomon Islands Policy project, pre-RAMSI. Assistant Commissioner of Royal Solomon Islands Police, Chief of Operation Support and Commander of New Zealand Police contingent for RAMSI, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bede Corry (MFAT)</td>
<td>2 October, 2007, Wellington</td>
<td>Private Secretary to Don McKinnon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, from 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott (ADF)</td>
<td>8 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Worked in East Timor as part of UN advance force to set up UN Headquarters in 1999 and served again in 2002. Involved in planning of RAMSI and served as J3, the Operations Officer of Force in first rotation of RAMSI, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Hegarty (formerly DFAT)</td>
<td>8 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Leader of IPMT, January to July, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Gammage (formerly AusAid)</td>
<td>9 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Australian civilian truce monitor on Buka team site during first rotation of TMG, 1997-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Rice</td>
<td>10 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Australian civilian truce monitor on Buka team site during second rotation of TMG, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Spriggs</td>
<td>10 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Member of Bougainville Tech Negotiation Team that worked with PNG, for two years. Delegate at Lincoln meeting, 1998. Member of Inter-Church Forum and Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Henningham (DFAT)</td>
<td>10 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Chief Negotiator on Bougainville, December 2000-March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart Firth</td>
<td>10 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>ANU academic specializing in Australia’s foreign affairs and pacific relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Behm</td>
<td>11 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Head of Strategic International Policy Division in Australian Defence, at the time of TMG, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Breen</td>
<td>12 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Contracted by ADF Land Headquarters to provide operational advice for TMG. Currently working on volume on Bougainville and Solomon Islands for Official Australian Peacekeeping History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Feakes (DFAT)</td>
<td>12 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Current Head of Solomon Islands Division in DFAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt (AFP)</td>
<td>25 October, 2007, Canberra</td>
<td>Member of TMG and Law Enforcement Advisor in Bougainville, 1998. Commander of Participating Police Force (PPF) and Deputy Commissioner of Royal Solomon Islands Police in RAMSI, for 12 months, 2003-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyn Dunne (NZDF)</td>
<td>2 November 2007, Wellington</td>
<td>Attended Australian Defence College in 1998 and subsequently appointed head of NZDF planning team for INTERFET in Brisbane. Senior National Officer for New Zealand in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Lance Beath | 28 November 2007 (phone call to Wellington) | INTERFET.  
-Appointed Brigade Commander of Dili Command Headquarters  
-Head of Strategic and International Policy in MFAT in 1997.  
-Previously, in early 1990s, head of Australian Division of MFAT |
Appendix 2: Interview Questions

Interview Questions

I have three main areas of interest when interviewing: personal involvement, the Australian/New Zealand connection and perceptions of ANZAC links. I have included a number of questions under each heading for your prior interest. However, I understand that you are undoubtedly very busy and do not have time to answer all these questions. Indeed some of the questions may be irrelevant to your experience. What I would really appreciate is if you could consider the three themes and then reflect on some kind of appropriate response. I may bring up some of the questions if I feel they are particularly relevant, however, hopefully the conversation can be an opportunity for you to talk, tell some stories and share your reflections on the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI.

Your personal involvement

1. Could you tell me a bit about yourself, what your role in preparing and working in the Bougainville/ East Timor/ Solomon Islands peacekeeping operations was?
2. What responsibilities and actions did this role require of you?
3. Do you feel that as a New Zealander/Australian you bought any unique special qualities to the planning and if so what were these qualities?
4. I’m also interested in whether there was any type of policy changes in trans-Tasman peacekeeping from the 1997 TMG in Bougainville in 1997 to RAMSI in 2003. What aspects of the operation you were involved in, do you feel could have been improved on? What particular lessons were learnt from Bougainville/East Timor/Solomons?
5. To what extent was pre operation planning and policy carried out in on-the-ground operations?
6. What is your opinion about the success or otherwise of the operation?

Relationship with Australian colleagues and the Australian Defence Force

1. I’m really interested in the tenor of the Australian and New Zealand working relationship in these peacekeeping missions. How would you characterise your relationship with your Australian/New Zealand colleagues; both on a personal and policy-making level?
2. How frequently did you meet with your Australian/New Zealand counterparts in the planning process? When and where were these meetings?
3. To what extent were there differences between the New Zealand and Australian approaches to the operation?

4. How were these differences reflected in the decision-making process?

5. Bougainville was a New Zealand-led process, and RAMSI an Australian-led one. To what extent do you think this meant that there were differences or parallels between the two operations?

6. Were there any differences or similarities between the New Zealand and Australian relationships with local residents during the operation and if so, why do you think these occurred?

7. To what extent do you think the national defence styles of New Zealand and Australia are complimentary or opposite?

8. How would you define New Zealand and Australia’s general defence relationship (subordinate, partnership, important, etc.)?

Anzac questions

1. Could you please explain whether you felt any awareness of an ANZAC relationship or ANZAC spirit throughout your involvement in the operation? If so, or if not, why do you think this was?

2. What are the perceptions of Pacific Islanders in Bougainville/East Timor/Solomon Islands regarding ANZAC?

3. How do you think Pacific Island militaries in these deployments have seen themselves regarding the concept of ANZAC?

4. To what extent do Pacific countries celebrate Anzac Day? Did the operation you were involved in celebrate Anzac Day while on deployment and if so how?
References

Primary Sources

ANNANDALE, TOGIMANU (TONY), [phone interview with Rosemary Baird], Christchurch to Wellington, 2 October 2007.
AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, *Australia's Strategic Policy* (Canberra: Australian Department of Defence, 1997)
BATLEY, JAMES, [phone interview with Rosemary Baird], Christchurch to Suva, 30 August 2007.
---, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 12 October 2007.
---, [personal correspondence via email], subject: Comments from Bob Breen, 8 January 2008.
---, '30 June 2003, Joint Press Conference Following Pacific Island Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting, Sydney', [transcript],


FORREST, ATHOL, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Wellington, 4 September 2007.

GAMMAGE, JAN, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 9 October 2007.

HEGARTY, DAVID, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 8 October 2007.

HENNINGHAM, STEVEN, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 10 October 2007.

JOHN, VIKKI, 'The Australian Role in Bougainville', in Geoff T. Harris, Nāihuwo Ahai, and Rebecca Spence (eds.), Building Peace in Bougainville (Armidale, N.S.W.: Centre for Peace Studies University of New England, 1999), 24-27.


KAY, ROBIN, The Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944 (Documents on New Zealand external relations ; v. 1; Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1972)


MCLEOD, TONY (TOGIMANU), [phone interview with Rosemary Baird], Christchurch to Wellington, 1 October 2007.


MOYLE, GREG, [phone interview with Rosemary Baird], Christchurch to Auckland, 24 October 2007.

NEW ZEALAND SOUTH PACIFIC POLICY REVIEW GROUP and HENDERSON, JOHN T., Towards a Pacific Island Community: Report (Wellington, 1990)

O’REILLEY, JOHN, [phone interview with Rosemary Baird], Christchurch to Wellington, 10 August 2007.


RICE, ANDREW, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 10 October 2007.


---, 'Haka at Ruruvu School', [photograph], Central Bougainville, March 1998.

---, 'Kiwi Departure', [photography], Buka, April 1998.

---, 'Light Tactical Raft', [photograph], Buka, March 1998.

---, 'New Zealand Landrovers', [photograph], Buka, March 1998.


ROUGHAN, JOHN, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Christchurch, 16 August 2007.

SANDERSON, JOHN, [phone interview with Rosemary Baird], Christchurch to Canberra, 30 October 2007.

SCOTT, TRENT, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 8 October 2007.


SPRIGGS, RUTH, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 10 October 2007.


WILKINSON, JEFF, [interview with Rosemary Baird], Canberra, 9 October 2007.

Secondary Sources


BEAN, C. E. W., The Story of Anzac: From the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915 (St. Lucia, [Qld.]: University of Queensland Press in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1981)

BELL, CORAL, 'Australians and Strategic Enquiry', in Coral Bell and T. B. Millar (eds.), Nation, Region and Context: Studies in Peace and War in Honour of Professor T.B. Millar (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies Australian National University, 1995), 49-72.


BLAIR, DALE, Dinkum Diggers: An Australian Battalion at War (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2001)


---, New Zealand and Decolonisation in the South Pacific (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1987)


---, Giving Peace a Chance: Operation Lagoon, Bougainville 1994: A Case of Military Action and Diplomacy (Canberra papers on strategy and defence; no. 142; Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australian National University, 2001)

BROWN, M. ANNE, Security and Development in the Pacific Islands: Social Resilience in Emerging States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2007)

BRYANT-TOKALAU, JENNY and FRAZER, IAN, Redefining the Pacific?: Regionalism Past, Present and Future (The international political economy of new regionalisms series; Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006)


CARLYON, LES, Gallipoli (Sydney: Macmillan, 2001)


CONNELL, JOHN, 'The Panguna Mine Impact', in Peter Polomka (ed.), Bougainville: Perspectives on a Crisis (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Research School of Pacific Studies Australian National University, 1990), 43-53.


---, Getting Under the Skin: The Bougainville Copper Agreement and the Creation of the Panguna Mine (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2000)


DIBBB, PAUL, Essays on Australian Defence (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australian National University, 2006)


---, 'The ANZAC Connection: Does the Australia-New Zealand Strategic Relationship Have a Future?' in Bruce Brown (ed.), New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going?: Papers Presented at the Seminar Arranged by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Victoria University, Wellington on 4 July 2001 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 38-51.


DOWNER, ALEXANDER and URWIN, GREG, The Bougainville Crisis: An Australian Perspective (Canberra: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001)

FANNING, L. S., Gallipoli Recalled: Spirit of Anzac (Wellington: Wellington Gallipoli Veterans' Association, 1955)


---, Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy (St Leonards, N. S. W: Allen & Unwin, 1999)


---, Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of the South Pacific'(Canberra: Dept. of International Relations Australian National University, 1996)
---, 'The 'War Against Terror' and Australia's New Interventionism in the Pacific', paper given at Foreign Policy, Governance and Development: Challenges for Papua New Guinea and Pacific Islands, Madang, 22-23 March 2004.


GAMMAGE, WILLIAM LEONARD, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974)


GLENN, RUSSELL W., Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (RAND Corporation, 2007)

GOVOR, E. V., Russian Anzacs in Australian History (Sydney: UNSW Press in association with the National Archives of Australia, 2005)


HALL, ROBERT A., Australia-New Zealand: Closer Defence Relationships (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993)

HARRIS, GEOFF T., AHAI, NAHIUWO, and SPENCE, REBECCA, Building Peace in Bougainville (Armidale; N. S. W.: Centre for Peace Studies University of New England ;National Research Institute, 1999)


HENDERSON, JOHN T. and WATSON, GREG, Securing a Peaceful Pacific (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005)

HENNINGHAM, STÉPHEN, France and the South Pacific: A Contemporary History (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992)


HOADLEY, STEVE, Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand & Australia: Towards a New Paradigm (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies Victoria University of Wellington, 2005)


KABUTAULAKA, TARCIUS TARA, 'Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in the Solomon Islands', *Contemporary Pacific*, 17/2 (2005), 283-308.


MAY, RONALD JAMES and SPRIGGS, MATTHEW, *The Bougainville Crisis* (Bathurst, N.S.W.: Crawford House Press, 1990)


McGhie, Gerald, Brown, Bruce, and New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, *New Zealand and the Pacific: Diplomacy, Defence, Development: Papers Presented at a Seminar Arranged by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 2002* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Victoria University of Wellington, 2002)


---, The ANZAC Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War (Auckland: Reed, 2004)

QUIGLEY, DEREK, 'New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going in Defence', in Bruce Brown (ed.), New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going?: Papers Presented at the Seminar Arranged by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Victoria University, Wellington on 4 July 2001 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 52-58.


ROLFE, JIM and GRIMES, ARTHUR, 'Australia-New Zealand Defence Cooperation: Some Considerations', Agenda, 9/1 (2002), 47-64.


---, 'Operation East Timor: How Did We Do?' New Zealand Defence Quarterly, 29 (Winter 2000), 2-4.


ROSANOWSKI, THEA PANIA, 'Resolving the Bougainville Conflict: Readiness and Third Party Intervention in Civil War', MA Thesis (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 2001)


---, New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (Auckland: Longman Paul for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1969)


RYAN, ALAN, 'Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks': Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor (Canberra: Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre, November 2000)


WAINWRIGHT, ELSINA, *Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003)

---, 'How is RAMSI Faring? Progress, Challenges and Lessons Learned.' *Strategic Insights*, (April 2005), 1-11.


