THE NGAI TAHU MAORI TRUST BOARD: AN EXAMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC USE OF AUTHORITATIVE RESOURCES IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER

A Thesis submitted to the Sociology Department, University of Canterbury on April 30, 1991 in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of M.A.

by: STEPHANIE MARINA KELLY
In 1946 legislation was passed in the New Zealand parliament which created the body now known as the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board. Its function was to administer compensation from the Crown for land purchased in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1990 the Runanga Iwi Act was passed, devolving the functions and responsibilities formerly in the hands of the Maori Affairs Department to tribally-based groups. These groups are referred to as iwi authorities.

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board made submissions to the Select Committee in 1989 setting out a new tribal structure for Ngai Tahu which could act also as the Ngai Tahu iwi authority.

Anthony Giddens and Michel Foucault supply the theory for this research. An attempt is made to move away from the tendency to view power solely in terms of dialectical relationships with the state. For groups such as the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, power to achieve outcomes does not necessarily emanate from the state. Power in New Zealand society is not superstructural to the state, rather, it underlies all social relations. The state is simply one body which exercises power in relationships of domination with various groups in society.

The research adopts categories of authoritative resources supplied by Giddens and uses these to examine the strategies and local forms of power relied on by the Trust Board at a time when the entire Maori population, like other segments of the New Zealand population, is being asked to take on greater responsibility to manage their own affairs. Observations made it clear very early that the Trust Board has developed strategies to achieve outcomes, independent of the state. The pursuit of mana and rangatiratanga for the Ngai Tahu iwi began long before the decision was made to disband the Department of Maori Affairs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Without the help of several people, this project would not have been possible. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the following individuals: Koa Marshall, for supplying me with much information about the Trust Board and Ngai Tahu culture, and for facilitating access to tribal hui and meetings; Tipene O’Regan, for endorsing the idea and coupling this with enthusiasm; all the members and employees of the Trust Board and other Ngai Tahu who talked with me, answered my questions and offered their cooperation toward the task of gathering data; Ann Parsonson, for her professional advice and guidance in respect to the history of Ngai Tahu and Maori/state relations in general; and of course, Bill Willmott who more than fulfilled his duties as supervisor by being constantly positive and reassuring throughout the whole research process.
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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION
On April 1 1988, the Labour government issued *He Tirohanga Rangapu*. The paper listed philosophies about ways to improve the delivery of government programmes and services to the Maori community. This was followed in November 1988 by *Te Urupare Rangapu*, a policy statement which proposed:

- measures to restore and strengthen the operational base of iwi
- a Ministry of Maori Affairs to provide a Maori perspective in policy-making
- the transfer of the Maori Land Court’s servicing to the Department of Justice
- ways of improving the responsiveness of government agencies
- an Iwi Transition Agency (for a five year period) to help iwi develop their operational base
- an independent review of the Maori Trust Office
- disbanding of the Board of Maori Affairs
- options for Pacific Island communities. [p. 5]

These policies form part of the larger cost-cutting campaign which has characterised this government since the mid-1980's, known as "Rogernomics", in which responsibility for social services in many aspects of life in New Zealand has been devolved to the wider community. Hence, it was decided in the mid-1980's that the Department of Maori Affairs should be devolved. The plan decided on was to restructure the Department into an Iwi Transition Agency [ITA], the task of which would be to assist iwi to develop their operational base and establish separate iwi authorities. These bodies would then carry out responsibilities once
handled by the Department of Maori Affairs. Iwi authorities would also be left to develop in a manner suitable for other government agencies to devolve their functions to. The Iwi Transition Agency would be disbanded after five years, by which time the government has speculated that the need for this agency will cease.

The iwi was defined by the government in Te Urupare Rangapu as "a group descended from a common founding ancestor. An iwi is made up of hapu (sub-tribes). Each hapu consists of related whanau (family) groups. Iwi have an identifiable historical and territorial base. The boundaries are known to the group and - on the whole - were identified by the Maori Land Court in the last century." [1988; p. 9]. Submissions made in reply to He Tirohanga Rangapu maintained that iwi should be left to define their own representation, structures, and geographical boundaries through processes that involve their people.

The role of the iwi in this reorganisation of the state structure was identified in He Tirohanga Rangapu [p. 13] and reiterated in Te Urupare Rangapu:

Maori signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi represented a specific iwi or hapu. The strength of the traditional iwi structure is reflected in their continuing existence today. They are strong, enduring, sophisticated systems of cooperation and community effort and as such it has been advocated that they provide an appropriate means of delivering government programmes to Maori people. [p. 10]
The intended relationship of the iwi to the government is to be a contractual one in which the government has proposed that iwi authorities, on behalf of the iwi they represent, contribute to the design of programmes in partnership with individual government agencies. Iwi authorities will enter into contracts with the government for the implementation and delivery of those programmes, and most importantly, be accountable for the resources allocated to them.

These policy statements were ultimately cemented in 1990 in the Runanga Iwi Act, an Act "to acknowledge the enduring traditional significance and importance of the iwi; and...to provide for the incorporation of runanga [iwi authorities] to represent iwi in accordance with charters prepared by iwi" [preamble].

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board was established by legislation in 1946. Its function then was to administer compensation monies paid out by the Crown in respect of the Kemp Purchase of 1848. Over time it has enlarged its role beyond that of a mere distributory trustee. The Board made a submission to the Select Committee in which it stated that it and Te Runanganui (a structure consisting of one representative from each Ngai Tahu patipu runanga) intended to form jointly a Ngai Tahu Iwi Authority, to be called Te Runanganui o Tahu.

In this structure, subsequently established, Ngai Tahu set up Te Runanganui to be the beneficial owner of the tribe's assets. The existing Ngai Tahu Trust Board would develop as the Trustee manager of those assets and be accountable to the Runanganui which became, in effect, the "Parliament of the tribe". The Ngai Tahu Iwi Authority, both bodies speaking together, has become the authoritative
voice of Ngai Tahu with the capacity to contract and otherwise deal with the
Crown as Treaty partner.

This research will attempt to examine the power (defined as the capacity to
achieve outcomes) of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board and how this is being
affected by the process of devolution. Hence, the focus will be on the period
spanning the latter half of the 1980's.

Before an investigation of power relations is carried out, it will be beneficial to
set out the structures concerned, the relevant elements of each, and the way in
which each of these elements is being affected by the devolution process.

An examination of these structures will begin with the individual Ngai Tahu and
work up to the government structures designed to deal with Maori affairs. The
research will focus on the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board specifically, but the
power of the Trust Board, especially as will pertain to the development of new
structures, lies with the people themselves and the various 'traditional' tribal
structures within which they live and operate. As the chairperson of the Board
points out, this is not the "legal" situation, i.e., the one established by the Maori
Trust Boards Act 1955, but it is the "real" situation which Ngai Tahu are pursuing
and developing [O'Regan; 1991].
THE NgAI TAHU PEOPLE

The rohe potae ('traditional' area) of the Ngai Tahu and Ngati Mamoe (a tribal group which migrated from the North Island before Ngai Tahu and which has intermarried with Ngai Tahu over the years, so that now many Ngai Tahu also claim ancestry to Ngati Mamoe. Few would claim ancestry to Ngati Mamoe solely since culturally, Ngai Tahu became the dominant group of the two [Parsonson; 1990]) and the older tribes which preceded them in occupation of the rohe, is all of Te Waipounamu (South Island) south of a line curving from Te Parinui-o-Whiti (the Vernon Bluffs east of Wairau lagoons) to Kahuraki Point (on the West Coast north of Karamea), and including Rakiura (Stewart Island) and offshore islands - Ruapuke and the Titi Islands [Submissions of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board to the Select Committee on the Runanga Iwi Bill, April 1990; p. 2].

The Ngai Tahu tribal community is divided into 'traditional' runanga, or sub-tribal groups. These are mostly multi-hapu, marae-centred communities. Virtually all contain whakapapa connection to the older, preceding tribes of Waitaha, Te Rapiwai, Kati Hawea and others who collectively form Ngai Tahu whanui [Submissions of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board to the Local Government (No.8) Bill, Jan.1990; p. 2].

Up until 1989 the only form of statistics revealing the numbers and whereabouts of Ngai Tahu people was a roll made by a Maori Land Court Order dated 1925
and revised by the Ngai Tahu Census Committee in 1929. The roll consisted of those who could trace whakapapa back to Ngai Tahu's 'Blue Book' (a list of kaumatua alive in 1848 which now forms the basis of whakapapa proof required by the Trust Board for registration as a beneficiary). These numbers were issued in 1963 and again in 1967 by the Trust Board after it managed to mobilise sufficient power to have the Crown recognize the Ngai Tahu Census Committee numbers with respect to beneficial rights. This request was made on the basis that the Maori Land Court Order of March 12, 1925 was inadequate and incomplete [Ngai Tahu Trust Board Annual Report 1967, p. 7]. As a result, Parliament enacted s.16 of the Maori Purposes Act 1966 which repealed sub-sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of s. 6 of the Maori Trust Boards Amendment Act 1965. This measure allowed for (i) the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board to determine who its beneficiaries would be on the basis of proof of whakapapa back to the original 1848 kaumatua, and (ii) government recognition of the precedence of the Ngai Tahu Census Committee roll over that compiled by the 1925 Maori Land Court.

When an executive officer was seconded to the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board from Maori Affairs, Dunedin in 1989, this was all the statistical knowledge the Board was working with regarding tribal membership. This has been attributed to a lack of staff. Until this secondment in 1989, the Board had no full-time executive officer. The new executive officer, Koa Marshall, set out to develop an administrative base for the Trust Board, and one of the first tasks she set herself was to carry out a census of Ngai Tahu membership (the legislation referred to
above pertained only to Ngai Tahu beneficiaries and not to general tribal membership). This was an arduous task for two reasons: (i) Ngai Tahu's geographical rohe (traditional territory) is larger than that of any other tribe in New Zealand, covering almost the whole of the South Island, with members also scattered around the North Island and the world, and (ii) resources were minimal.

The roll currently stands at 25,000, but it is suggested by the now former executive officer (Koa Marshall having left her position as executive officer in September, 1990) that this is a very conservative estimate and that numbers could be as high as 50,000. However, it is also suggested by members of the Iwi Transition Agency that South Island Ngai Tahu membership is less than what is claimed by the Trust Board. This suggestion has been made on the grounds that many South Island Maori who have the option to affiliate to more than one tribe choose to affiliate with other than Ngai Tahu.

The Trust Board plans to carry out some more work on this census as soon as time and resources permit. It is possible that Ngai Tahu is outnumbered by other tribes in the South Island but Ngai Tahu holds the status of tangata whenua of the South Island and the Board hopes that it can develop a knowledge base of the membership to which it will be answerable. Such a base will help not only in its administration to its members but also in terms of power to deal with the Crown and individual government departments, especially considering Crown records of Ngai Tahu numbers are much more conservative, the 1986 Census count being approximately 8000.
Of the total number of Ngai Tahu, approximately 3000 are currently listed as beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are those members who have demonstrated whakapapa back to the original 1848 Blue Book of kaumatua and, by doing so, are eligible to apply for the grants which the Board administers as its function under legislation of 1946 and 1955. Since 1986, however, all grants to beneficiaries have been put on hold and all available resources put into the land and fishery claims which the Trust Board has presented to the Waitangi Tribunal and in the case of the fishery claims, to the High Court as well.

It is difficult to conjecture why the number of beneficiaries stands at the level it does. Some people firmly believe that the concentration put on the land and fishery claims has brought more Ngai Tahu people out into the open and, as a result, beneficiary numbers will increase dramatically in the very near future. Others have suggested that the Trust Board, in its insistence on such stringent criteria to become a beneficiary, has discouraged many people from doing so. Whatever the case, it will be interesting to observe how these numbers change over the next few years, especially if and when settlement of the Waitangi Tribunal claims is achieved.

The census carried out by the Trust Board has also helped to identify the whereabouts of Ngai Tahu people. Before the census was completed, the Board relied on annual hui for such information. Hence, although it worked for its beneficiaries, direct contact was never made. The former executive officer anticipates that the Board will carry out another census with the intention of
gathering information about Ngai Tahu people which will help to better meet the needs of the people.

Most Ngai Tahu do not speak Maori. Koa Marshall recalls how she and her brothers and sisters were raised by parents who discouraged them from speaking Maori or adopting Maori ways. This is due to a strong feeling amongst Ngai Tahu that they have to try very hard to work within Pakeha structures and that any adherence to Maori ways would put them at a disadvantage. Koa's father even gave his sons Pakeha names, as he thought this would help them to get along better in the New Zealand society of the future [Marshall; 1990].

The loss of Maori and, more specifically, Ngai Tahu culture began in the nineteenth century with the loss of land and continued to "the substantial loss of much of Maori practice and belief which included by the 1960's and the 70's the nearly complete loss of the Maori language in the South" [Dacker, 1988; p. 53]. Before 1840, Ngai Tahu successfully traded with new settlers. At that point they wanted to participate in the new society while maintaining as much control as possible over their own affairs. However, benefits of 'civilisation' did not follow on from European settlement as promised. By the mid-1860's, the tribe was finding it difficult to cope with the transition to a Pakeha-dominated society [The Christchurch Press, Nov. 4, 1989; p. 25].

This happened because the government had breached Treaty obligations in land dealings covering large areas of the South Island, i.e., in purchases by the Crown
of Banks Peninsula, North Canterbury, Kaikoura, Canterbury, Arahura (West Coast), Otakou (Otago), Murihiku (Southland), and Rakiura (Stewart Island). Figures quoted have been $430 million (at current values) for loss of income from fisheries and $377 million for value of lost land [Ibid.].

Earlier, in a Maori-dominated environment, people of mixed blood tended toward their Maori side. By the nineteenth century, in a European-dominated environment, they tended toward their European side. The lack of sufficient land ensured this [Dacker; op.cit.].

The following excerpt further illustrates this chiselling effect on Maori culture:

"Herries Beattie recorded on several occasions, the burning of Maori manuscript papers, letters and books in the possession of families through people turning from their Maori heritage and saying it was a thing of the past. He was also told on several occasions when collecting information from the older generation in the 1920's and 30's that the young were no longer interested or concerned about those things. And many of that same generation themselves discouraged the young who were interested. Boyd Russell of Otakou and Mutu Ellison of Puketiraki both recalled expressing interest when young in learning from their elders the Maori language which was no longer spoken widely by their generation. The reply was that Taha Maori was a thing of the past and that those things would not help them succeed in the world of the Pakeha. Many of the Taua and Poua of today recall similar attitudes in their childhood" [Ibid; p. 60].
It is for this reason that Ngai Tahu sometimes take abuse from other tribes, mostly those located in the North Island. They have been accused of becoming "Pakehafied", of having given up their 'traditions'. According to Koa Marshall, Ngai Tahu people are not too bothered by this - "we are strong in what we are. We're unified" [Marshall; 1990].

It can also be mentioned here that the majority of Ngai Tahu people are of fairer complexion in comparison with other tribes. It is possible that this has had an effect on the degree of 'tradition' to which they decide to adhere, i.e., because of the ease (relative to other tribes) with which Ngai Tahu could assimilate into the Pakeha majority in respect of physical characteristics, assimilation in other respects was made easier and hence favoured by many Ngai Tahu over the alternative of battling against the dominant culture for separate recognition. According to the former executive officer, Maori is a self-ascribed status, and therefore if one feels one is Maori, then one is Maori [Marshall; 1990]. This is now the criteria used by the Census Department to distinguish Maori from Pakeha.

**THE WHANAU**

The literal meaning of the term whanau is the 'extended family'. In Pakeha terminology it refers to the extended family upon which all Maori unity is based. The whanau has always been of utmost importance for Maoridom and will continue even as larger social groupings such as the runanga and iwi alter their
relationship with the Crown. Within Maoridom, it is the most fundamentally important of all social units. Ultimately all social action can be traced back to the primal whanau of Rangi the father and Papa the mother, the sky and the earth respectively [Cleave, 1983; p. 54].

The whanau functions as an independent unit for most social and economic purposes. Unlike the European nuclear family, historically it was self-reliant except in matters affected by village or tribal policy. Often, individuals and families could exclusively appropriate land and resources for their own use (land was communally owned by the hapu and the greater iwi). But only under unusual circumstances were the hapu, whanau or individuals to give way if it was considered that a proposed alienation of this land would be harmful to the tribal interests as a whole [Kwen Fee Lian, 1987; p. 447]. This does not mean, however, that whanau had the option to dispose of land as they saw fit.

According to the anthropologist, Cleave, there are two fundamental principles which underlie all Maori political and social life, whanaungatanga and rangatiratanga, the nature of the extended family and its direction [1983; p. 55], i.e., the kinship base and the authority of this base over resources (natural and otherwise) as maintained through rights of chieftainship. These principles operate in each of the various social groups: the whanau, the hapu, [the runanga], the iwi and the canoe federation. The importance of the whanau to Ngai Tahu is evident in its support of the Maatua Whangai programme - a programme which came out of the 1981 national Hui Whakatauira designed to take young Maori out of Social
Welfare institutions and place them back with their tribal groups, providing the opportunity for the whanau system to deliver alternatives in family care. Koa Marshall is critical of the Crown for attaching its own definition of the extended family to this programme in its attempt to keep the programme within its realm of surveillance and funding [Marshall; 1990].

In the South Island, runanga are still made up of whanau groups. There also exist some Ngai Tahu whanau in the North Island: "If you look at our runanga, you see all our wakawaka [traditional cultivation areas] are basically in terms of whanau" [Feb. 89 tribal hui minutes, p. 12].

The Trust Board's former executive officer is certain that under any new structures being developed the importance of whanau will not change. The strength of whanau will always be important, but again, the Trust Board and its supporters place emphasis on the strength of Ngai Tahu as a tribe. For this reason, it has been said that Ngai Tahu people will never be discriminated against for living outside of their papatipu marae [base for the 'traditional' runanga]. It was suggested by one Ngai Tahu woman that for those who find themselves in such a position, a whanau of Tahu be set up in convenient areas and that new marae must constantly be established [Peggy Peeke; Feb. 1989 tribal hui minutes, p. 11]. But the political strength within Ngai Tahu will continue to rest with the traditional papatipu runanga, as the historical political 'hearts' of the tribe.

THE RUNANGA
According to the chairperson of the Trust Board, the runanga is something which the Trust Board acknowledges as being fundamental to the structure of Ngai Tahu. "We have had a continual battle to try and have our runanga recognised as the traditional centres of the tribe" [O'Regan, 1989; p. 99]. More recently the chairperson stated that "the Ngai Tahu Trust Board has always regarded itself as being accountable to them [runanga] and has never moved in a relevant area without consultation. We have a number of Upoko Runanga [chiefs] who are members of the Trust Board, and that makes for quite a lot of useful overlap" [Ibid.].

The chairperson continued, "We regard the runanga as the heartland of the tribe. The Board has never been legally accountable to the runanga, and all our efforts over the years to have our runanga statutorily recognised have been in vain" [Ibid.]. Now this may be a possibility: "that's something that will change with the new structures. The Iwi Empowerment Bill anticipates these sorts of things" [Ibid.].

The socio-political structure that Ngai Tahu has relied on since the mid-nineteenth century has been the runanga system, which has been adapted to suit Ngai Tahu concepts of how social and political institutions should be structured. Ngai Tahu runanga act as the mangai, or mouth-piece, for the people in the wider community whether that be at a local, regional or national level. They are the basic foundation blocks of the Ngai Tahu iwi. Furthermore, they are accountable to the Ngai Tahu people whom they represent. However, there
are features of the runanga system which are unique to Ngai Tahu and deserve attention.

Ngai Tahu hapu are unlike hapu of North Island tribes because they are not located solely in one region. Ngai Tahu has been characterised by a system of multi-hapu papakainga (traditional bases of Ngai Tahu people which were not separated along hapu lines), and the reason for this is that Ngai Tahu was originally essentially a hunter-gatherer society moving from one region to the next in pursuit of 'traditional' foods. Consequently, Ngai Tahu people rarely identify with only one hapu: "It is enough for Ngai Tahu iwi to state that they are tangata whenua to Te Waipounamu, and they can walk from one end of the island to the other. Ngai Tahu are so interrelated that no simplistic definition of Ngai Tahu social structure will work" [Submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy by the Ngai Tahu Social Policy Task Force, 1988 ; p. 16]. According to the chairperson of the Trust Board, much of this interweaving within Ngai Tahu dates back to political marriages in past centuries. These were the traditional form of settling inter-hapu disputes within the tribe [O'Regan; 1991].

Runanga are primarily based upon genealogical connections to the people of a given area. Cross-referencing by Ngai Tahu people into other runanga is acceptable where it may not be in the North Island. Attending more than one runanga meeting is not uncommon for Ngai Tahu people, and to a large degree it is identified by members as a strength within the tribe. The only factor which hinders some from attending more runanga meetings is distance [Marshall; 1990].
There are nineteen Ngai Tahu runanga: Koukourarata (Port Levy), Kati Waewae (West Coast), Kaikoura, Wairewa (Little River), Waihao (Morven), Rapaki (Lyttleton), Otakou (Dunedin), Puketeraki (Dunedin - Karitane), Oraka (Colac Bay), Waihopai (Invercargill), Tuahuriri (North Canterbury), Moeraki (Waitaki), Arowhenua (Temuka), Taumutu (Lake Ellesmere), Awarua (Bluff), Onuku (Akaroa), Te Koeti Turanga (West Coast), Otautahi (Christchurch), and Hokonui (Gore).

Crown-created regions are frowned upon by the Trust Board and other Ngai Tahu. These are defined by Crown-chosen boundaries and called Maori Councils. These are not determined by historical Ngai Tahu boundaries. However, Ngai Tahu have been admonished in tribal hui that they are all first and foremost Ngai Tahu and the Maori Council boundaries are an imposition:

At the end of the day we want the mana and force to lie with our Runanga but the Board has a duty also, to protect the individual. No person descending from an 1848 kaumatua in the 1925 Blue Book is excluded from a right to vote or to stand. There is a very large number who are not going to be active in the terms of life of the Runanga, but whose right to elect their trustees has to be protected and that is the reason that the Trust Board should continue in its present base and the Runanga elect a body to whom they should be accountable. It means that no person of Ngai Tahu descent is effectively excluded and we can face the Government and the Ministers' criteria of protection of rights square in the eye and at the same time maintain the mana of our Runanga. [Feb. 1989 tribal hui
Many Ngai Tahu, and the Board especially, are aware that the Crown views runanga (i.e., what the Crown refers to as iwi authorities in the Runanga Iwi Act 1990) as a structure to which it can devolve responsibility while at the same time calling it something "Maori". But Ngai Tahu people see runanga as where their roots are. Most are aware that the Crown is simply creating a new partnership structure for its own needs, something which many see as evident in legislation such as the SOE Act and Local Bodies Bill. The Runanga Iwi Act 1990 recognises Ngai Tahu legally (as an iwi, whereas before the Trust Board was the only Ngai Tahu body set out in legislation), thereby creating a body to which it can pay money in order to restructure Maoridom to suit the Crown's own needs. However, many Ngai Tahu do see it as advantageous at least that the tribe will receive such legal status. Others would prefer their runanga to work under constitutions which are in keeping with the Treaty of Waitangi, rather than any bureaucratic structures, be they arms of government or of the Trust Board itself.

The people of Ngai Tahu represented at the various hui I have attended and in the documents examined generally agree that their tribal runanga should be recognised by government in statute. The reasons for this are:

(i) The runanga are essentially bodies which act as representatives for the people. They are structures which arose from papatipu marae in the previous century and are, in fact, the only bodies
which do voice the concerns of their people, because they are accountable to the people and not to any government department. [Submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy by the Ngai Tahu Social Policy Task Force, 1988; pp. 7-8]

(ii) the opportunity to hold trusts and lands, etc., as runanga. [O'Regan; 1991]

At present the people of the runanga must act as both runanga and a Maori Committee because it is the Maori Council which distributes funding to various marae. The people feel that funding for any marae development should go to the traditional marae authority for Ngai Tahu, the runanga [Submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy by the Ngai Tahu Social Policy Task Force, 1988; pp. 7-8].

The Maori Council is a government-created body which was formed out of the 1962 Maori Welfare Act. It was set up specifically for the purpose of providing the Maori population with a mouthpiece to government. It was designed to expand on the earlier Executive/Tribal Committee structure which was established out of the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945 [Hazlehurst, 1991; p. 75].

Maori Committees are a sub-group of the Maori Council, forming the bottom tier of a four-tier structure. The Committees are therefore representative at the local community level (along boundaries established by government, sometimes in
keeping with traditional runanga boundaries, but mostly not). These feed into the Maori Executive Committees, representative at the sub-district level; the Maori District Councils, representative at the regional or district level; and finally, the New Zealand Maori Council, representative at the national level [Ibid; p. 76].

Under the Maori Welfare Act, Maori Committees were given the power to see to the observance of law, to make by-laws, to impose small fines for petty offences, and to see to the upkeep and improvement of community facilities, health and general welfare [Ibid; p. 78]. The principle functions of the New Zealand Maori Council, as defined by the Act, were to promote all aspects of Maori social, economic, cultural, and spiritual welfare and to promote harmonious and friendly relations between members of the Maori race and other members of the community [Ibid; p. 83].

The Crown has tried before to develop structures which it has referred to as Runanga and failed (these will be referred to here as 'Runanga', spelled with a capital 'R' in order to differentiate as Alan Ward does in his book, A Show of Justice, between traditional runanga and Crown-created definitions). In the mid-nineteenth century Runanga were Crown-created meetings by which to devolve at least minimal power, i.e., to handle minor criminal matters and civil disputes between Maori in the nineteenth century, as well as management of native schools, hospitals, jails and local roads throughout their districts and to adjudicate land disputes [Butterworth, 1989; p. 10]. They were proposed by Governor Grey as the basis for an elaborate system of local and regional
government. They were created and elected in acknowledgement by Grey that Maori had to be properly incorporated within the framework of government. His approach was an alternative to his predecessor's (Gore Browne's) promise of having regular conferences of Maori chiefs to discuss government legislation and policies. Maori interest in the structure waned, however, when it became apparent that the government wished to impose its own agenda on Runanga. The Runanga policy was formally abandoned by the government in 1866 [Ibid; p. 10].

One current member of the Trust Board, Rakihiha Tau, offers an explanation of the history of Ngai Tahu's runanga structure. He claims that runanga developed in the South Island in the mid-nineteenth century because of the Crown's refusal to adhere to the Treaty of Waitangi and its obligations to Ngai Tahu regarding land purchases, so that "our people" were limited to small areas called reserves. Thus, in order to compete with the Crown for acknowledgement as a partner to the Treaty, South Island Maori had to develop another social structure. He claims, "we needed people who could speak...for and on behalf of us" [Tau; 1990].

The small reserves that were created represented hapu, sometimes several hapu, and the runanga represented their concerns and negotiated with the Crown as the other partner to the Treaty. One person can now belong to many runanga and marae, depending on ancestry and rights to land.

The Ngai Tahu Task Force therefore made the recommendation that the runanga of Ngai Tahu be recognised by government in statute so that:
1.1 Funding from government may go towards the traditional runanga to enable economic development;

1.2 The runanga are able to hold, own, manage and administer Maori land and reserves;

1.3 The runanga have legal and statutory authority to manage, administer and own various economic resources within their area, such as traditional fishing areas. [Ibid; p. 8]

Suggestions that government recognise the status of runanga were made back in 1979 in the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Annual Report:

65. The Board has formally requested the Minister of Maori Affairs to introduce legislation providing statutory recognition of the traditional structure of runanga within the Ngai Tahu tribal area. Its prime concern in doing so is to regularise its own financial arrangements both in the present and future with its own beneficial runanga within the Ngai Tahu tribal area.

66. The Board...suggests that provision should be made for runanga and/or hapu committees as optional alternatives to Maori Committees in the base structure of the New Zealand Maori Council.

67. It holds to the view that the Council's interests and those of Maoridom generally would be enhanced by a more inclusive
structure at the "grassroots".

68. Further, it does not believe that the strong adhesion to traditional tribal arrangements, such as runanga, which has existed for generations should be in any way derogated but should rather be encouraged and enhanced. [NTMTB Annual Report, 1979; p. 5]

The importance of runanga to the Ngai Tahu power base was emphasised several times again by different Ngai Tahu individuals at its February 1989 tribal hui:

We were reminded that Ngai Tahu have always been in runanga structures. [Ngai Tahu Annual Hui minutes, 1989; p. 10]

At the end of the day we want the mana and force to lie with our runanga. [Ibid; p. 13]

We cannot go past our tupuna before us. They were the guardians of the land, the water ways and now they lie in our urupa within our runanga area and we owe it to them to stay in that concept. [Ibid; p. 14]

With these comments in mind, it is not surprising that the Trust Board has proposed a structure that will acknowledge and rely on the mana of runanga while satisfying government requirements under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990. After much discussion within the tribe, the following structure was decided upon, according
to the chairperson of the Trust Board:

We've suggested a structure. The individual beneficiaries will elect the Board, by region. The runanga themselves will produce a Runanganui, which will be the Parliament of the Iwi, and the Board will be accountable to the Runanganui. We want the Runanganui and the Board together to be the Iwi Authority for the Ngai Tahu. That's what we seek out of the Iwi Empowering Bill. It means some reduction in the authority of the Board, but we think this is appropriate. It does mean we are statutorily responsible to our Runanganui, and that our runanga will have a statutory legal identity. [O'Regan, 1989, p. 100]

In the interim, such a structure has been developed which recognises the mana of the runanga. The Trust Board has combined with one representative from each papatipu runanga and two urban runanga to establish a Ngai Tahu Runanganui o Tahu. The constitution of the Council expressly provides also for the recognition of additional papatipu runanga subject to confirmation by the Annual Ngai Tahu Hui [Ngai Tahu tribal hui minutes, 1989; p. 16].

For the purposes of the Runanga Iwi Act 1990, a runanga means a council of an iwi, or of two or more iwi. One of the purposes of the Act and hence an integral part of the devolution process, is to provide for the incorporation of runanga to represent iwi in accordance with charters prepared by iwi. 'Incorporation' has
occurred once the necessary steps are taken. These include: (i) proposal to incorporate to be considered by a hui [RIA 1990; s.8]; (ii) a charter to be drawn up by those agreed on by the tribe to do so [Ibid; s.9], and; (iii) acceptance of the application by the Select Committee.

However, the Crown’s use of the term 'runanga' in the Runanga Iwi Act has created some confusion. Tribes in the North Island do not have the 'traditional' runanga structures which Ngai Tahu has relied on since the nineteenth century. The term 'runanga' is used to refer to an iwi authority, whereby the Crown is requesting every iwi (or two or more iwi) to incorporate a 'runanga' [iwi authority] to represent those iwi in the same way as the Department of Maori Affairs would have represented them before.

Thus, Ngai Tahu has preferred to use the term 'Runanganui o Tahu' or 'iwi authority' when referring to its incorporated runanga, as the Crown’s requirement to establish and incorporate a runanga bears absolutely no relation to the 'traditional' runanga structures which Ngai Tahu have always had. It has simply been a confusing choice of terminology. Section 7(4) of the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 states that iwi may agree to use the term 'Runanganui' instead of 'runanga'. As well as the criteria set out in s.9 of the Runanga Iwi Act 1990, which provide for the incorporation of iwi authorities, the Ngai Tahu Iwi Authority [Runanganui o Tahu] has developed its own constitution entitled: Rules of Te Runanganui o Tahu Incorporated [Appendix B]. This document sets out the relationship of the Runanganui o Tahu to the iwi and was designed by the Runanganui o Tahu as
something to remain separate from any relationship with the Crown.

THE HAPU

According to many sociologists, historians and anthropologists, as well as Maori themselves, the most significant political and cooperative unit in Maori society historically has been the hapu [Bowden, 1979; p. 51; Kwen Fee Lian, 1987; p. 456; ITA Working Group, 1990]. Kwen Fee Lian credits the importance of the position of the rangatira of a hapu with major significance. Whether or not a tribe is powerful depends on the strength of individual hapu, and particularly the strength of the dominant hapu and the ability of the rangatira to command support from other hapu [Kwen Fee Lian, p. 456]. The rangatira consisted of those who could trace their descent back to the founding ancestor of their hapu. Chiefly leaders were almost always drawn from the rangatira group.

Hapu were the genealogically related and ranked units which comprised the tribe. A hapu tended to come together as a group on many more occasions than the tribe. Most of the members of a hapu lived on hapu territory, thus forming one or two local communities. The community was always identified with a hapu. Size of hapu varied, of course, but most consisted of several hundred members [Bowden, 1979; p. 51].

The fundamental political unit was always the hapu led by its chief, and it was only under special circumstances that hapu were drawn together, for example, at
times of external attack or European encroachment or hakari (special social gatherings). It has even been suggested that it was the constant jockeying for position within and between hapu that formed the major dynamic of Maori tribal society. Parsonson claims that the basis of inter-hapu and inter-tribal relations was competition: "Each hapu was pitted against its neighbour, always poised on the brink of hostility. An insult, trespass, or killing would open an immediate breach...[They were] aggressive, shrewd, suspicious, preoccupied with the acquisition and display of wealth, ever-mindful of their own interests and ever-watchful for an opportunity to damage those of their relatives and opponents..." [Parsonson, 1981; p. 141]. This allowed the colonial authorities deliberately to play off one chief against another.

Many critics have noted that this approach by the Crown has not altered and is truly evident in the latest of its policies. In fact, Kwen Fee Lian argues that in the period before European contact, the tribe was an effective political unit because there were fewer opportunities for internal dissension. After contact, however, potential divisions within the tribe were susceptible to exploitation, and inter-hapu politics therefore changed [Kwen Fee Lian, 1987; p. 454].

The definition of hapu recently offered by the Trust Board's former executive officer is a collection of whanau and runanga based on whakapapa (genealogy), not geographical area. For Ngai Tahu, both hapu and whanau are locally important and are still consulted as much as possible when issues arise [Marshall; 1990].
Ngai Tahu differs from other tribes, however, in that few of its runanga areas identify with one particular hapu, "as we are by just about any definition a multi-hapu people in terms of our organisation" [Feb. 1989 tribal hui minutes, p. 12]. The wakawaka (the land where crops were seasonally grown, historically) of the runanga are basically in terms of whanau, "but if you look at those people they are actually multi-hapu in terms of whakapapa" [Ibid].

Hapu meetings are still very important to the Ngai Tahu people, who often travel for hours and even days, across the country (by bus and train) to attend meetings on the weekend. As the former executive officer states, hapu meetings are going on all the time, sometimes many on the same weekend [Marshall, 1990; O'Regan, 1991].

Since it will be runanga and papatipu marae which will form the base of Ngai Tahu's proposed new structures, there does not seem to be much fear within the Board or among its supporters that the hapu system will be significantly affected by the policies which attach new significance to the iwi as an important tribal structure. However, there are South Island Maori and members of the Iwi Transition Agency who would possibly attach more importance to the role of hapu in the new structure, and it is possible that this discrepancy could cause tension in the future if the government's iwi-based structures do become a reality.
THE IWĪ

'Iwi' is another concept that links members of a tribe. Iwi refers to a set of interlocking kin groups with a common whakapapa, or genealogy, and a common leadership, rangatiratanga [Cleave, 1983; p. 53; Marshall, 1990]. According to Cleave, a social history and a sense of direction provided by whakapapa and rangatiratanga respectively gave the tribe two of its most fundamental dimensions: the mana (prestige) of the tribe, and the rangatira, embodying the prestigious and spiritual power of his ancestors.

The iwi is composed of hapu, which in turn comprise whanau, and in the case of Ngai Tahu, runanga, at a political level. The purposes of the Runanga Iwi Bill in its first draft were "to acknowledge the enduring, traditional significance and importance of the iwi" [Preamble to Runanga Iwi Bill 1989] and to identify the characteristics by which iwi are to be recognized in order to provide for the incorporation of runanga to represent iwi in accordance with charters prepared by iwi. It was also intended to provide a process for the resolution of conflicts that may arise within an iwi or between incorporated runanga [Ibid.].

Elements of the first draft were found to be unacceptable to the powerful pan-Maori bodies such as the New Zealand Maori Council, the Maori Womens Welfare League, and the Ratana Church. Maoridom, and therefore in the subsequent draft the purpose of identification of characteristics of iwi and the provision for resolution of conflicts were both dropped. In the first draft, the
essential characteristics of an iwi were listed to include the following:

(a) Descent from commonly acknowledged tupuna;
(b) Collective possession of a demonstrable cultural and historical identity, based on a shared body of traditional lore;
(c) A developed political organisation with widely shared aspirations;
(d) A structure of hapu;
(e) A network of functioning marae;
(f) Belonging historically to a clearly delineated rohe;
(g) Continuous existence traditionally and widely acknowledged by other iwi. [Runanga Iwi Bill 1989, s. 4]

Again, these criteria were found to be unacceptable as they were too wide and left open to the possibility of groups other than 'traditional' iwi applying for recognition as iwi. The characteristics listed in the second draft were therefore reduced to the following: Descent from common tupuna; hapu; belonging historically to a takiwa [Ibid.].

In the Runanga Iwi Act 1990, the essential characteristics of iwi are listed as:

(a) descent from tupuna
(b) hapu
(c) marae
(d) belonging historically to a takiwa (territory in which the members are tangata whenua)
(e) an existence traditionally acknowledged by other iwi. [RIA 1990; s.5]

It is recorded in the preamble that the purpose for identification of characteristics of iwi is in order to be recognised for this act. The Act is also designed to provide a process for the resolution of conflicts within or between iwi.

According to some historians and sociologists [for example, Parsonson, Cleave, Kwen Fee Lian] and members of the Maori community, it is the hapu and the whanau (and in Ngai Tahu's case, the runanga structure that is not Crown-created) which form the base of tribal structure for Maoridom, not the iwi. The primacy accorded to the iwi structure in the political process may thus be considered a Crown-created phenomenon. However, the chairperson of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board does not see it this way. He maintains that Ngai Tahu have always argued that the iwi is the Crown's Treaty partner and that it, as a concept, represented the collective rangatiratanga of the runanga [O'Regan; 1991].

**THE NGAI TAHU MAORI TRUST BOARD**

After determined Maori efforts for self-government in the 1890's, the turn of the century saw the government of the day introducing minimal forms of Maori local government.
Williams wrote that,

They [the Maori population] wanted not only to make the laws in their own parliament but also to administer them, through a system of tribal and district committees. As the hope for the recognition of their separate parliament receded in the later 1890's, the Maori leaders depended more and more on these committees as the most practical basis for Maori autonomy. [Ibid; p. 93]

Government recognition of the need for self-government was largely a response to efforts by vocal and determined Maori leaders such as Ngata [Ibid; p. 123]. As a result of his lobbying, the Maori Parliament finally succeeded in getting what it wanted through Parliament in 1900. Seddon introduced and passed the Maori Lands Administration Act and the Maori Councils Act in 1900. The Maori Lands Administration Act diminished the power of the Maori Land Court to determine Maori land title and purchase. It did this by creating Maori Land Councils with three elected Maori representatives out of seven members. The Maori Councils Act gave limited powers of self-government to Maori communities by way of councils organised on a community and tribal basis, but according to government-created boundaries [Ibid; pp. 135-7].

The push by leaders such as Ngata for greater control over the lease and sale of land continued into the twentieth century. In the 1920's, Ngata tried to encourage the government to settle the grievances over loss of land that had occurred in the
nineteenth century. It was the initiatives of Maori leaders, combined with demographic change within Maori society, which convinced the government that measures had to be taken to deal with these grievances.

With World War Two came the Maori War Effort Organisation. This organisation was well received by both the government and the Maori population for the great contribution it made to the war effort. However, after the war many Maori leaders pushed to continue the organisation as a viable (although limited) form of self-government for Maoridom. The government was concerned about the potential for the organisation to undermine the power of the Native Department and so it was abolished when the war ended.

This still left the government with the task of dealing with Maori grievances over lack of autonomy in the political process of New Zealand, as well as longstanding grievances over loss of land in the nineteenth century. This was especially so since the Maori population was increasing at a rate that the government never anticipated before the turn of the century but was now being forced to acknowledge.

So, the loss of the Maori War Effort Organisation was compensated by the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945 which legalised Maori Committees and Tribal Executives in an attempt to give the Maori population limited powers of local government.
The setting up of Trust Boards was another attempt which came out of this legislation, to respond to longstanding Maori grievances over land lost. The idea of Trust Boards was not what was specifically sought by Maori leaders, rather, they were a way for the government to appease the Maori leadership and the wider Maori population without having to make complete compensation.

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, as it at present functions, was first constituted in 1946 (under the Ngai Tahu Trust Board Act of that year) as the Ngai Tahu Trust Board. There had been a Board by the same name for a number of years before, the authority for its appointment being s. 65 of the Native Purposes Act 1931, but the Board was not elected by the beneficiaries in the present manner and it had no Trust Fund to administer. The "settlement" of the Ngai Tahu claim, as enacted by the Ngai Tahu Claim Settlement Act 1944, provided the basis of such a fund, and the 1946 legislation actually established the Ngai Tahu Trust Fund based on that "settlement". In 1955, both the Ngai Tahu Claim Settlement Act 1944 and the Ngai Tahu Trust Board Act 1946 were repealed by the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, which changed the designation of the Ngai Tahu Trust Board to Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board.

The Trust Board is elected by beneficiaries, which by no means includes all Ngai Tahu people. The chairperson of the Board points out however, that those actually voting are few compared with those entitled to vote and be enrolled. By definition those entitled include all people of Ngai Tahu descent, that is, descending from Ngai Tahu alive in 1848. The Board consists of eight members,
some of whom are also Upoko Runanga, and the secretary and the executive officer (who is paid by the Iwi Transition Agency). [Note: Koa Marshall has recently returned to the Trust Board to assist the new executive officer, and therefore, ITA is currently funding two executive officer positions].

The regions represented by the Board members are: Ika a Maui (all those regions outside the South Island), Akaroa (Banks Peninsula and Christchurch), Mahaanui (Kaiapoi and North Canterbury), Kaikoura (Marlborough and Nelson), Tai Poutini (West Coast), Arowhenua (Timaru, Ashburton, North Otago), Araiteuru District (Otago), and Murihiku (Southland).

The function for which the Board was originally legislated into existence, was to aid in the pursuit of land and fishery claims [Marshall; 1990] and to administer grants to beneficiaries for such things as education, training and kaumatua status. Since its inception the Trust Board has added to its repertoire the administration of government programmes such as MANA and MACCESS, Rapu Mahi, Maatua Whangai, and others. It has engaged in projects such as the census carried out in 1989 which will in future give it a broader knowledge base of the Ngai Tahu iwi. The Trust Board has also established a variety of tribally-owned communal companies operating in the areas of fishing, tourism, trading and marketing [O'Regan; 1991].

In 1946-47 it was stipulated that the Trust Board would receive $20,000 every year in perpetuity for all its funding allocation. However, since then the principal
income of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board has been the income derived from its investments rather than from the annual perpetuity payment. Since 1986, funding has been extremely limited due to the fact that many assets were sold off to fund the Waitangi Tribunal claims.

According to the chairperson of the Board, the function of the Board has been changing since he was elected in 1976 and will change again as a result of the devolution process. He claims, "my generation of Trust Board members has seen a major task of the Trust Board as being the continuance of the battle over the claims [against the Crown] that have been running since 1848. Previous Trust Board members have taken that view too, because it is the only pan-Ngai Tahu structure that we have had" [O'Regan, 1990].

In future, the power of the Trust Board may be reduced. This is something Ngai Tahu people and members of the Trust Board itself support. In fact, members of the Board and those who work closely with it have all commented that they must make a special effort in the future to ensure that the Trust Board does not become a centralised authority, as they consider the Department of Maori Affairs was. There seems to be some fear within the tribe that this could happen, and currently the Trust Board is trying to appease these fears and to develop structures that will prevent such a possibility.

As far back as the 1981 Annual Report of the Board, it was made known that the Trust Board was considering developing a structure which would incorporate input
from Ngai Tahu runanga. One of the main aspects of the structure it was considering even then was "the recognition of regional difference and the fact that each of the new runanga would be able to write a constitution for itself which reflected its particular situation" [p. 15].

The introduction of a Runanganui structure for Ngai Tahu has its foundation in the philosophy that the tribe should have an iwi authority and a Runanganui o Tahu structure working quite separately yet simultaneously. As has been stated in tribal hui and reiterated many times, "We do not want the legal personality of Ngai Tahu Whanui to be by way of an administration device for delivering devolution. We want the two to stand clearly identified. One is our mana, the other our relationship with the Crown and they are two different things." [Ngai Tahu Tribal Hui minutes, 1989; p. 3].

The Trust Board has made clear to Ngai Tahu its feelings on this issue: "Iwi Authority is essentially a concept to meet the needs of devolution. It is the Trust Board's view that devolution is a secondary consideration. The primary one is structure which derives from our needs to administer our assets. Our assets are going to be very much greater than what will come from devolution....we should have a model that accommodates devolution, but not one that is dependent on it....that which is ours must be clearly separated and identified and not tangled with that which is the Crown's" [Ibid., pp. 9-10].

There is speculation, however, from both within the tribe and from members of
other tribes that the Trust Board will not be able to keep from becoming a centralised power structure. Some individuals, again from both within the tribe and from other tribes, have gone so far as to suggest that it is the intention of at least some members of the Board, to set the Board up as a centralised structure, and hence, merely a revised form of the Department of Maori Affairs. There is also speculation from these same sources that the structure which the Trust Board has proposed to the Select Committee (as summarised above) will not be accepted because it will give the Board a function for which it was not originally created.

Nevertheless, the proposed structures boil down to a separation of policy issues from management responsibility. The reason Ngai Tahu feels so strongly about the need for such a separation is that it hopes in the very near future to be economically independent of the Crown in all arenas. A large part of this hope is reliant on the outcome of the Waitangi Tribunal claims. The Trust Board is of the opinion that its administration and management skills will form the basis of a structure which will be able to utilise the economic resources it hopes to gain from the Crown, to such levels of efficiency that it will no longer be reliant on the Crown at all. This is all part of the Board's 2030 Development Plan. Tipene O'Regan states that "the Pakeha mind has great difficulty in planning beyond horizons of three to four years" but that "Ngai Tahu has to do it differently"; therefore, "our planning horizon at the moment is the year 2030. Our Iwi Development Plan is well underway and we've worked out our goals" [O'Regan, 1989, pp. 102-103].
THE CROWN

It has been argued by Butterworth [1990; p. 5] that the Department of Maori Affairs began in 1833 with the appointment of James Busby as British Resident to New Zealand. Certainly by the time New Zealand moved to its Crown Colony form of government in 1840, a specific institution, the Protectorate Department, was created (in April 1840). This was headed by George Clarke. This department was considered by the settlers to be highly pro-Maori, arguing for the legal recognition of Maori customs and for separate judicial institutions. Governor Grey abolished the department in 1846 and did not replace it with another organisation. He merely used officials to carry out his land purchase policies.

By the late 1850's, the lack of Maori input into decision-making, combined with policies which were considered by most of the Maori population to be unacceptable, had precipitated a crisis in Maori/Pakeha relations that led to the land wars in Taranaki during 1860 and 1861. The Native Department emerged in the 1860's to administer the government's policy. The main aim of this department (which continued until 1893) was to manage relations with the Maori tribes and in particular, to incorporate them within the European legal and political framework. As Maoridom came increasingly under European law, the government saw less and less need for the department, and in January 1893 it was abolished.
However, the need to communicate with Maori communities and to handle the issue of Maori land was not met by substitutes such as the Maori Councils and Maori Land Councils (set up in 1900) so the Native Department, which had been disbanded in 1892 and 1893, was reconstituted in 1906 under the Liberal government. This department tried to incorporate the Maori desire for control over land and the right to organise their communities with the Pakeha desire for the efficient administration and utilisation of Maori land. There was also the objective of ensuring Maori social and economic development, although land administration and purchasing took precedence over social and economic development.

The period from 1912 to WWI saw unrestricted purchasing of what Maori land was left by the new Reform government. By the 1920's, ministerial initiators (outside of the Native Department) such as Ngata, brought to the attention of government the recovery of the Maori population from the point of near-extinction at the turn of the century. Ngata also made the government aware that there was little Maori land left for this recovering population. The government responded with legislation such as the Native Trustee Act which slowed down land purchases. The Department began to encourage Maori farming and land development [Butterworth, 1990].

Up until 1935, the functions of the Department were mainly focused on the issues of Maori health and land. With the arrival of the Labour government in 1935, the focus on land development was extended even further, and a comprehensive
housing programme was introduced, as well as the provision of trade-training for Maori servicemen.

In 1945 the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act was passed. Under this legislation, Maori Committees and Tribal Executives were established and a Welfare Division developed, which has continued till 1989 [Wetere, 1989; p. 3].

Over the years the Department has adopted various philosophies upon which it has based its policies and programmes. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the stated aim was assimilation of the remaining survivors of the Maori race into Pakeha society and ‘civilisation’ [Spoonley, 1988; p. 73]. The cultural ‘traditions’ of the Maori during this period were subjugated by Crown legislation and policy, and the bulk of the Maori population was excluded from positions of power and status in Pakeha society. The small numbers who had access to power - for example, in the Maori parliamentary seats - worked within the agenda set by the Pakeha-dominated structure. By the 1930's and 1940's, the government began to indicate it was aware of the problems faced by the Maori and set itself the task, under its welfare philosophies, of ensuring that benefits, both social and economic, were equally available to Maori and Pakeha. Hence, the Department of Maori Affairs was reorganised and given the resources to follow this new path. The aim continued to be assimilationist in nature.

The Maori Affairs Act 1953 and the Hunn Report 1960 further encouraged social welfare and increased cooperation of the Maori Affairs Department with other
state departments. Then in 1977, the 'Tu Tangata' philosophy was introduced into the Department, designed to change dramatically the way in which the Department operated. 'Tu Tangata' was introduced at a time when calls within the Maori community for recognition of culture and self-determination were reaching a head. This coincided with economic difficulties for the government and hence, a need for the government to reduce funds paid out to ethnic communities [Spoonley, 1988; p. 80].

The idea behind 'Tu Tangata' was to dispense with an individual casework approach and begin responding to issues identified by the community. It was intended to be a "bottom-up" approach, "with policy and decisions made at a local level" [Ibid; p. 79]. It was out of this philosophy that initiatives such as Kokiri, Kohanga Reo and Maatua Whangai were adopted.

It is difficult to view the 'Tu Tangata' philosophy as other than assimilationist, although perhaps in a slightly reorganised form. "Tu Tangata acknowledges the significance of Maoritanga in a variety of ways, but an important thrust of the new policies revolves around incorporating Maori into capitalism by providing them with the appropriate management and entrepreneurial skills" [Ibid; p. 81].

Right through the 1980's, this move towards community-based programmes continued. The 1983 Annual Report stated:

In opening the Rotorua Conference the Minister of Maori Affairs,
the Honourable Ben Couch, suggested that the time may have arrived for the Boards to become less responsible to the Crown and manage their affairs without having to refer such a wide range of matters for Ministerial approval. He invited the conference to give him a lead on the question and said that he was quite happy to relinquish a large measure of control over our tribal affairs if that was what the Boards wanted. [p. 5]

In 1984, the possibility of devolution of responsibility to tribal authorities was discussed extensively at the Hui Taumata, the Maori segment of the Economic Development Conference. This emphasis was followed up by the Green Paper in 1988, the Yellow Paper in 1989 and finally the Maori Affairs Restructuring Bill 1989, the Runanga Iwi Bill 1989, and the Runanga Iwi Act 1990.

In 1987, cabinet finally agreed to devolve the Department's responsibilities to tribally-based structures which they would call iwi. This led to the devolution of the Maori Affairs Department in 1989, to be replaced by the Iwi Transition Agency, a Ministry of Maori Affairs and the current consideration of iwi authorities to eventually take over the affairs of the Iwi Transition Agency.

The government began to respond to requests by the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board for statutory recognition of runanga as early as 1979. This is indicated in the 1980 Annual Report of the Board: "The Minister replied that he would give considered thought to the Board's request, provided it could be shown that there
was blocked however, by the active opposition of the New Zealand Maori Council which saw the concept undermining its Maori Committees [O'Regan; 1991].

At the time of its devolution, the Maori Affairs Department had adopted such programmes as Rapu Mahi (a programme in which government grants were given to assist the Maori community to find employment for its young people); Kokiri, an employment-oriented venture initiated in 1983 as a joint project between the Department of Maori Affairs, the Maori community and private employers to teach basic skills to Maori youth and to provide training in cultural skills in a 'traditional' Maori setting; Kohanga Reo, the early childhood language centres; and Maatua Whangai, a programme designed to take young Maori out of Social Welfare institutions and place them in the care of their tribal groups. The Department has also continued lending for the purposes of land development, housing and business ventures. As well, it has had the Maori Land Court under its wing [MAD Annual Report, 1986].

Currently the system is in a stage of transition. The Maori Affairs Department has been phased out and replaced by the Iwi Transition Agency, which has taken over its functions with half the staff that the original Department had at its disposal. The Maori Land Court has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the Ministry of Maori Affairs has begun operations.

The new National government has hinted that it will reinstate the Department of Maori Affairs. Although Ngai Tahu people, and the Trust Board specifically, can
Maori Affairs. Although Ngai Tahu people, and the Trust Board specifically, can find many faults in the proposed devolution process, they recognize the benefits which could be gained from transferring programmes from the Department to tribally-based authorities and, hence, the degree of autonomy which would have to be forfeited if the Maori Affairs Department is reintroduced.

**Maori Attitudes Toward the Department of Maori Affairs**

Throughout its history, Maori attitudes toward the Department of Maori Affairs have been varied and changing. Certain tribes, such as those of Taranaki, rejected the influence of government since their land had been dispossessed after the land wars. They found the settler government and the Native Department to be paternalistic and opted to develop their own alternatives to settler government, such as self-sufficient villages, in the case of the Parihaka movement, incorporating all the benefits of European material culture [Williams, 1963; p. 18]. Williams points out that extensive adoption of European cultural traits was common to most tribes, although they varied widely in their political attitudes and in the extent of change in their social organisation [Ibid; pp. 19-20]. The King Movement, under King Tawhiao, was the second Maori organisation to protest against government confiscation of land [Ibid; pp. 33-34]. Both movements outrightly rejected Pakeha law, justice and politics. Both strove to preserve the communal basis of Maori society, thus rejecting the Maori Native Land Court [Ibid.].
southern, eastern, and northern districts of the North Island. These tribes followed neither of these movements during the two decades after the land wars. They accepted European rule and assimilation. They participated in the Pakeha political world by sending Maori representatives to Parliament [Ibid; p. 46].

From about 1888, Maori leaders made efforts to unite in order to obtain from Pakeha government some autonomy. The basis of their unity was that "the Europeans had failed to make good laws" and as Wiremu Kiriwehi put it, "the government therefore should allow the Maoris to try what they can do in that direction, seeing that it is they who are vitally affected by them" [Ibid; p. 49].

In 1892, Kotahitanga began, as a pan-tribal union of tribal chiefs, the majority coming from districts where European settlement had been established for a generation or more. The union was established to grant legislative rights from the Pakeha government [Ibid; p. 53]. The aim was to work with Pakeha government to achieve the powers they wanted for Maoridom. Williams wrote that,

The majority of Maoris, then, respected the law even when they were not satisfied with specific enactments. They saw their main line of redress in persuading Parliament to pass better laws. Alongside this, they inconsistently argued that Parliament had no right to legislate for them, but, recognising its de facto power, they asked for a law returning the power to the Maori Parliament. [1963; p. 89] The followers of both the Parihaka movement and the King Movement refused to join the Kotahitanga [Ibid; p. 64]. Williams sums up the feeling amongst most
Maori by the 1890's toward the Maori Land Court, which was at that time the most important government arm dealing with Maori affairs:

The Maoris, on the other hand, preferred freedom to the government's protection. They charged that the Crown bought at monopoly prices and cited numerous cases in which they had been offered higher prices by private purchasers.... All they asked was that purchasers deal only with the chiefs and not the nobodies of the tribe. [Ibid; p. 79]

By 1897, the Maori Parliament (Kotahitanga) had reversed its position and began to accept that autonomy and governmental protection were not necessarily contradictory. This change of perspective was the result of seeing land continually slipping away and the realisation that something drastic had to be done [Ibid; p. 82].

Maori attempts to have tribal and district committees as a means to administer the laws set out in their own parliament began in the 1890's because the majority of Maori did not feel administration was being carried out adequately by the Native Department [Ibid; p. 93].

Ngata and those members of the Te Aute College Students Association which was founded in 1897, encouraged Maoridom to see Maori Parliament as a positive way for the Maori to achieve their ends. They were definitely considered
way for the Maori to achieve their ends. They were definitely considered pro-government and pro-Native Department, although Ngata found himself lobbying often to have the department recognise the needs of the Maori population: "Like the older leaders he favoured Maori local self-government and opposed individualisation of land titles as too expensive. But he favoured some degree of legal protection for the Maoris" [Ibid.; p. 127].

Opposed to the "pro-government" leaders of that time was the "home rule" party, composed mainly of chiefs of the central and northern tribes [Ibid.]. These leaders distrusted the government because it was dominated by settlers, "They reaffirmed their faith in Maori capabilities and continued to press for a legalised Maori Parliament, and they accused their opponents of deserting the Maori cause" [Ibid.; p. 128]. The King Movement at that time was also much opposed to the Native Land Court.

After the turn of the century, Maoridom tended frequently to exceed the limited powers provided by the Maori Councils Act 1900. This led to much dissension within Maoridom [Ibid; p. 145], but the success of the Council in the area of Maori health and sanitation compensated for this dissension.

Over the next few years movements such as the Kingites resurged and retreated as the policies and legislation coming out of the department changed, but they were never able to secure the support of the entire Maori population, much of which was intent on protest for favourable policies from government in respect of land and social services, rather than any hope of a separate parliament. However, new movements such as the Ratana Movement (1920's) and the
Parliament to achieve outcomes for the Maori population, until he finally left the Labour party in the 1970's.

Government policy from the 1920's through to the 1940's may have seemed more generous to the Maori population in respect of compensation for confiscated land, land development, Maori education and the chance to meet in forums such as Tribal Executives. On reporting on the rise and demise of the Maori War Effort Organisation which began in 1939 and ended when the second World War ended, Claudia Orange states that, for years Maori had an ambivalent relationship with the Native Department, needing what services it afforded, but viewing it, accurately, as a body primarily serving government rather than Maori interests" [1987; p. 163].

She goes on to say that Maori continued to support Labour in the elections during the 1950's despite disappointment over its failure to grasp the degree to which Maori values differed from Pakeha ways [Ibid; p. 171]. The setting up of the present New Zealand Maori Council which came out of the 1962 Maori Welfare Act indicates this. The Council was never set up in keeping with tribal principles, rather, the Council's structure was based on government-defined regions [Ibid; p. 170].

By the 1970's, the Waitangi Tribunal finally was introduced as a forum for Maori grievances over loss of rangatiratanga and Maoridom began to see potential to achieve a degree of autonomy from Pakeha government.
By the time the Department of Maori Affairs devolved in 1989, Maori sentiment toward it was varied. Piripi Whaanga reported in the *New Zealand Listener*.

From the time the kaumatua came to Parliament to hear the paper *Partnership Perspectives*, the government has said the issue is about recognising rangatiratanga. But whatever the explanation, the government has been seen as the one calling the shots, whether it's about Maori Affairs, or other departments, or a new Maori policy ministry. That's what the kaumatua have found has always ailed Maori people since the signing of the Treaty. [July 9, 1988; p. 29]

The article continues,

Wherever the Maori Affairs Minister's group has gone to hear the response of the people, the talk has not supported doing away with the department. Maori people have said they'll never agree to the government's proposal to find a better place for Maori Affairs staff outside of the department. [Ibid.]

Te Kotahi Mahuta of Tainui was recorded in the article as saying that the impoverished state of the Maori people began after the signing of the Treaty and has continued irrespective of who the government was [Ibid.].

Dame Whina Cooper stated that the Maori have three treasures: the Treaty of
Waitangi, Maori Affairs and the four Maori M.P.'s. She stated that Maori Affairs belongs to the people and should not be taken against their will [Ibid.].

The article states that "Te Arawa waka have also come out against the abolishing of the department" [Ibid.].

Whaia McClutchie of Ngati Porou stated that the Maori would never accept losing Maori Affairs, whatever the reason [Ibid.].

"Kahungunu kaumatua were forthright in their condemnation of the proposal" [Ibid.]. They stated that Maori Affairs staff were best able to meet the needs of the Maori people because their department took its operating mana from the Treaty, and that would be lost in other government departments.

The article continues,

Maori see 'their department' as the one arm of government that listens and then fights on their behalf, be it housing or benefit hassles, or land-use disagreements with local authorities. [Ibid., p. 30]

Arapeta Gibson of the Ngati Porou Runanga in Wellington stated that Maori Affairs was always an arm of Pakeha government and never represented mana Maori [Ibid.].
The conclusion that can be drawn from this chronology of Maori perspectives of the Department of Maori Affairs is that opinion has and continues to, differ. This is to be expected considering the tribal differences within the Maori population and hence, the differing political aspirations of a much varied population.

As far as Ngai Tahu is concerned, the statements from people interviewed for this research, combined with the documentation examined, indicate that Ngai Tahu, on the whole, is pleased with the government decision to disband the Department. None are hopeful that rangatiratanga or self-government will be returned to Maoridom as a result, but amongst Ngai Tahu, the Department has been viewed historically as one designed to deal with the interests of North Island Maori solely.

As Rakihia Tau explained, Ngai Tahu was already working in conjunction with other government departments long before the decision to mainstream the functions of the Maori Affairs Department. He explained that this has been the case historically, moreso in the South Island than in the North, because "we have had little to do with the department in the past, except through the Maori Land Court" [Tau; 1990]. Very little funding came from the Department of Maori Affairs to the South Island, as compared with the North Island, so the South Island was forced to mainstream and develop relationships with government departments.

As Piripi Whaanga reports,
But down south, Te Waipounamu put on a different face. The executives of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board were sound in their praise of government plans. However their support seems to stem from the 'anything is better than the service we've been getting from Maori Affairs' point of view. [op.cit., p. 10]

The chairperson of the Trust Board himself stated that,

As far as Ngai Tahu is concerned we think it's an appropriate mechanism for this Island. So long as what is said in Te Urupare Rangapu is honest and honestly meant, then as a model it is more desirable than the dependency model of Maori Affairs. [O'Regan, 1989; p. 99]

The Ngai Tahu Task Force on Social Policy Submission states that,

There is support among Ngai Tahu leadership for devolution. They agree with the idea of acting in partnership with government while responsibility is progressively transferred....There is anxiety among Ngai Tahu people; conflicting statements by M.P.'s have left them feeling vulnerable; past experiences make some feel apprehensive. [1988; p. 7]

However, this apprehension does not arise out of any fear of losing the
Department of Maori Affairs, but rather, out of a fear of what will become of individual and tribal rangatiratanga as a result of the devolution process.

THE TREATY OF WAITANGI

The Treaty of Waitangi is viewed by many Ngai Tahu as the most important document setting out the relationship of Ngai Tahu to the Crown. The Trust Board has relied on the Treaty to remind the Crown of its duties to Ngai Tahu and has seen it as perhaps the best vehicle by which to gain autonomy as a tribe and increase its access to allocative resources. In fact, the very basis for the creation of Trust Boards was as a provision by which the Crown could address Maori grievances over its failure to acknowledge land lost by the Maori in the nineteenth century and hence its failure to adhere to the guarantees of the Treaty.

Since the Treaty of Waitangi is absolutely crucial to the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board's view of the relationship of the iwi to the Crown, a summary of what the Treaty sets out and how the Trust Board is incorporating it into Ngai Tahu structures will be useful.

Claudia Orange identifies the period spanning the 1930's to the 1980's as one characterised by "a continuing and more articulate assertion of their Treaty rights by Maori New Zealanders" [Orange, 1988; p. 2].

The crucial word which has been the focus of much confusion and debate over
the years is "rangatiratanga". As Claudia Orange puts it, "depending on one's understanding of the term, and therefore the guarantees of the Treaty, a case can be made for Maori self-determination, autonomy and devolution of responsibility from mainstream government to Maori bodies, and a case for a stronger Maori presence in government decision-making" [Ibid.; p. 3].

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board has learned not to rely on a stronger presence in government decision-making and therefore has worked on developing the authoritative resources referred to in this research as a way to take the initiative towards maintaining rangatiratanga for Ngai Tahu, quite apart from government requirements. These initiatives will be founded on the tribe's own economic base [O'Regan; 1991].

Paul Temm defines tino rangatiratanga as "the fullest authority over their [Maoridom's] own cultural and physical possessions" [Temm, 1990; p. 86].

The confusion that has been created is due to differing interpretations of what the Maori chiefs actually ceded to the Crown by signing the Treaty. In the Maori text, for example, chiefs ceded not sovereignty but kawanatanga - governorship or governance; as far as they were concerned, their rangatiratanga, or chieftainship, was guaranteed [Orange, 1988; p. 2].

One anonymous Ngai Tahu person describes the confusion in the following manner:
While the Queen was to govern, the Maori were to retain their chieftainship over their lands, estates and prized possessions. What must be understood here is that the Maori were ensured that they would have the right to determine and control what they owned and were promised. Their rangatiratanga or authority over what they owned and were promised was guaranteed [Submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy by the Ngai Tahu Social Policy Task Force. 1988; p. 3].

It is Article Two of the Treaty which guarantees rangatiratanga, while Article One deals with cession of kawanatanga or governorship. Article Three deals with the general rights of citizenship, i.e., social equity for all New Zealanders. Therefore Article One sets out the rights of the Crown, while Article Two guarantees rangatiratanga to the Maori. The problem has been reconciling the two and as a result, many definitions of rangatiratanga have been offered up over the years.

In 1975, in response to increasing Maori protest over loss of land, fisheries and autonomy as guaranteed in Article Two, the government set up the Waitangi Tribunal to hear grievances of this sort and make recommendations to government on their viability. It was the Tribunal that first coined the term "partnership" in respect of the Treaty. The Tribunal wrote in its Manukau Harbour Report that the Treaty created a partnership between the Crown and Maori New Zealanders, i.e., that the Treaty created certain rights specific to Maoridom and distinct from the rights open to every citizen [Temm, 1990; p. 86].
Thus for Maori New Zealanders, the rights of Article Two should be included, as well as those of Article Three, guaranteed to all New Zealanders.

As Temm states, "This idea was novel because it involved a Treaty obligation on the Crown to recognise Maoridom and to deal with it as a Treaty partner" [Ibid.; p. 87].

After this assertion of obligation, the Trust Board began to recognise the potential in bringing a claim for compensation of land lost before the Tribunal. Thus, from the mid-1970's an effort was made to concentrate on building up resources and information to make such a claim possible.

In 1986 the government proposed the State Owned Enterprises Bill. A provision was included in the Bill that no claims pending by Maori New Zealanders concerning Crown land, would be considered after December 18, 1986. The Trust Board thus decided to go ahead with its decision to pursue a claim before the Tribunal in respect of a large part of Te Waipounamu [Temm, 1990; pp. 115-16].

In 1987 the New Zealand Maori Council took proceedings in the High Court seeking a stay of the operation of the State Owned Enterprises Act until the case of the fairness of the cut-off date would be considered. There was disagreement as to the effect of two important sections of the Act. The matter was moved to the Court of Appeal. At issue was the effect upon the statute of s.9 which provided:
the Court of Appeal. At issue was the effect upon the statute of s.9 which provided:

9. Treaty of Waitangi - Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

This provision was in conflict with a later section that provided that the Waitangi Tribunal had no power to transfer claims back to the Crown to comply with the Tribunal’s findings, if such claims were made after December 18, 1986. It was found unanimously that the "principles" of the Treaty override everything else in the State Owned Enterprises Act and that the Crown owes a duty to the Maori as a partner to the Treaty to act "reasonably and with the utmost good faith" [Temm, 1990; pp. 87-90].

This case is considered a landmark for the Maori "partners" to the Treaty and signifies hope for those who have brought claims before the Tribunal, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board included. In 1990, the Waitangi Tribunal found in favour of Ngai Tahu in respect of its claim and has made recommendation to the Crown that compensation be paid in settlement of Ngai Tahu's grievance. The amount has yet to be decided and settlement yet to be awarded but as will be discussed later, the Trust Board has gained in many ways from the pursuit of its claim before the Waitangi Tribunal.
I would think that the prospect of renegotiating the Treaty is something that Maoridom within a generation might be leaping at - particularly as it involves Article One. I think we've got to rely on the due process that's been developed: the Waitangi Tribunal, the move to the courts and the judgment of the Court of Appeal. This country's got two options: it can have a Treaty-driven future, or a demographically-driven one. And I tend to the view that the former is the one we can have some effect on, and the one we should aim for. [O'Regan, 1989 in Martin and Harper, 1989]

However, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board has not relied on the Crown to cede rangatiratanga to Ngai Tahu. What it seeks by the claim is partial compensation and what it expects from the devolution of the Department of Maori Affairs is devolution of responsibility without any real decision-making power. It is for this reason that the Board has developed the Runanganui o Tahu to remain a body separate from the Crown, in order to hold onto, and build upon, Ngai Tahu rangatiratanga and mana.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Power, according to Blalock, is a function of two types of variables: total resources and the degree to which they are mobilised [Blalock, 1967; p. 110]. Resources themselves do not give rise to power unless they are actually utilised [Ibid; p. 113]. Resources may be mobilised in differing degrees as well as with varying efficiency [Ibid; p. 126].

Blalock's treatment of power will not be completely adopted here, because he adheres to what is commonly known as a zero-sum analysis of power, that is, an acceptance that power is limited in any given society so that relationships between minority groups and the state must be seen in terms of struggle over access to resources. The part of his theory which will be referred to in this research will be that which points out the distinction between resources and mobilisation of these resources.

Giddens develops a notion of a 'dialectic of control' in which he claims that subordinates have power to influence their superiors [1981, p. 63; 1982, p. 39; 1984, p. 16]:

By the dialectic of control I mean the capability of the weak, in the regularised relations of autonomy and dependence that constitute social systems, to turn their weakness back against the powerful. My argument is that, just as action is intrinsically related to power, so the dialectic of control is built into the very nature of social systems. [1982; p. 39]
What he is arguing is that power (which is defined as the capacity to achieve outcomes or bring about effects [Giddens, 1984; Shanks and Tilley; 1987; p. 73]), although held in a modern nation-state system mainly by the state, is not held wholly to the detriment of access by minority groups. Thus, power is not limited and dished out according to access to material resources alone. Although the allocative resources in a modern capitalist nation-state tend to be appropriated to a large degree by the state or a group of elite, authoritative resources exist also, and development of these resources on the part of minority groups can help them concentrate society's allocative resources in their hands. According to Giddens, resources are media through which power is exercised, and resources comprise more than the allocative kind. Neither type of resource is fixed - they form the media of the expandable nature of power [1984; p. 258].

Shanks and Tilley develop this theme: "in any social encounter actors inevitably employ, to a greater or lesser extent, different sets of resources, material (technologies, raw materials, control over coercive and non-coercive media) and non-material (knowledge, information, position within the overall field of social relations, competence and skills), which individuals, groups and collectivities draw upon routinely in their day-to-day conduct. Power is dialectically related to these resources. It both draws upon and reproduces them." [1987; p. 73].

Evolutionary theories tend to give priority to allocative resources and how they are employed in 'adaptation' to the environment, but for Giddens, "authoritative resources are every bit as infrastructural as allocative resources" [1984; 258]. So
any strengthening of authoritative resources will lead to increased scope and intensity of power.

Giddens states that, "the augmenting of material resources is fundamental to the expansion of power, but allocative resources cannot be developed without the transmutation of authoritative resources, and the latter are undoubtedly at least as important in providing 'levers' of social change as the former" [Ibid; p. 260]. Allocative resources, for Giddens, consist of the possibility of access to material resources, while the level of concentration of these resources depends primarily upon factors creating authoritative resources. This is similar to Blalock's notion of mobilisation. Groups such as the state, although they may have greater access to allocative resources than other groups, may still be faced with 'powerful' minority groups who have mobilised their access to allocative resources more efficiently by learning how to concentrate unquantifiable authoritative resources. Just as this is possible, so too the state may rely too much on its allocative resources to the point where it proves slack in the area of mobilisation of authoritative resources.

For Giddens, domination depends on the mobilisation of allocative and authoritative resources [1981, p. 50; 1984, p. 33]. He claims that power is not necessarily attached to sectional interests, but the existence of power presumes structures of domination in which power operates in modern society [1984, p. 257; 1985, p. 8]. For Giddens, domination cannot be transcended [1984; p. 32].
It is the nation-state which acts as the container of power in Giddens' analysis. This is the case because the nation-state has developed in conjunction with the elaboration of new forms of information storage. Information storage is the thread which ties together allocative and authoritative resources in structures of domination [1984; p. 262].

Power containers generate power...first and foremost through the concentration of allocative and administrative resources. The generation of allocative resources is, of course, influenced directly by forms of available technology in any society, but the level of their concentration depends primarily upon factors creating authoritative resources. [1985; pp. 13-14]

A nation-state is, therefore, a bordered power-container - as I shall argue, the pre-eminent power-container of the modern era. [Ibid; p. 120]

Giddens has relied on aspects of Foucault in his theory of power. However, Foucault refuses to look at power in terms of a dialectic. Power for Foucault is not inherently repressive [Giddens, 1982; p. 219]. He claims that the interconnections of power relations in society delineate general conditions of domination, organised into a strategic form, but he makes clear that one should not assume a primal condition of domination, i.e., a structure with 'dominators' on one side and 'dominated' on the other. Rather, power manifests itself in a
multi-form production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible of integration into overall strategies [Foucault, 1980; p. 138].

Hence, for Foucault power is not represented solely in terms of relations of domination/repression, so there is no reference to a 'dialectic of control'. There is a tendency, according to Foucault, to think of struggle in terms of contradiction. But Foucault argues that one must try to think struggle and its forms, objectives, means and processes in terms of a logic free of the constraints of the dialectic [Ibid; pp. 143-44].

Foucault also refuses to emphasise the power of the state over the everyday lives of individuals and institutions in the way that Giddens does. Foucault argues that to pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue posing it in terms of sovereignty, i.e., in terms of law. If power is described as dependent on the state, this means seeing it as repressive: the army as a power of death, politics and justice as punitive instances [Foucault, 1980; p. 122].

Foucault does not negate the role of the state in power relations. Rather, he argues that power analysis must extend beyond the state because: (i) the state cannot occupy the whole field of power relations, despite the omnipotence of its apparatuses, (ii) the state can operate only on the basis of other, already existing power relations [Ibid.]. For Foucault, the state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks: body, sexuality, family, kinship, knowledge, technology, etc. Foucault sees power as infrastructural to the state, the state
being merely an organisation which consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations which render its functioning possible, revolution and repression being only two instances [Ibid; pp. 122-23].

For Foucault, power is not localised in the state apparatus and nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the state apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed [1980; p. 60].

Law, which for Foucault is closely tied up with the state apparatus, was an effective instrument for monarchical forms of power in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but for Foucault, it is neither the 'truth' of power nor its alibi. It is an instrument of power. He identifies also a number of non-juridical mechanisms, for example, even within the penal system, prohibition should not be the only focus of analysis. The system makes possible a mode of political and economic management which exploits the difference between legality and illegality. The same applies for sexuality [Ibid; p. 141].

So, for Foucault power is always there but this does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable form of domination or absolute privilege on the side of the law (as an instrument of the state). To say that one can never be outside power does not mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat [Ibid; pp. 141-42]. Foucault claims that "one impoverishes the question of power if one poses it solely in terms of legislation and constitution, in terms solely of the state
and the state apparatus. It is impossible to get the development of productive forces characteristic of capitalism if you do not at the same time have apparatuses of power" [1980; p. 158]. That is to say, power is not the effect of the law, nor of capitalist relations, nor of the state; it exists as part of the infrastructure to these. Foucault's focus is on the techniques of power rather than on the general system of power. He prefers to analyse power in terms not of possession but of the relation between individuals and groups. Thus, he treats domination as something relative rather than absolute [Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 245]. He admits that where there is power there is resistance, but these resistances are diverse in form - heterogeneous, mobile and transitory - and should not be attributed to some unique locus of control, a spirit of resistance [Ibid; p. 242].

Foucault's analysis proceeds under the assumption that there can be no general theory of the connection between power and the state or economic relations; these connections have to be determined through analysis [Smart, p. 1983; p. 84]. Therefore, what Foucault is interested in examining are the mechanisms, techniques and procedures of power adopted and displayed by individuals and groups in society. The role for theory should not be to formulate the global system which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of mechanisms of power, to locate the connections and extensions, to build a strategic knowledge [Foucault, 1980; p. 145]. Such investigation must be carried out step by step on the basis of reflection on given situations.

For Foucault, each offensive from one side serves as leverage for a
counter-offensive from the other. Power is not always victorious for the dominant group. Analysis of power mechanisms is a matter of establishing the positions occupied and modes of action used by each of the forces at work, the possibilities of resistance and counter-attack on either side [Ibid; pp. 163-64]. Foucault therefore shifts from global to local forms of power [Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 239].

Giddens is critical of Foucault's notion of power as infrastructural to all social processes:

Foucault, and those influenced in a more uninhibited way by Nietzsche, are right to insist that power is chronically and inevitably involved in all social processes. To accept this, I think, is to acknowledge that power and freedom are not inimical and that power cannot be identified with either coercion or constraint. But I also think it quite wrong to be thereby seduced by a Nietzschean radicalisation of power, which elevates it to the prime position in action and in discourse. Power then becomes a mysterious phenomenon, that hovers everywhere, and underlies everything. I consider it very important to reject the idea that power has primacy over truth, or that meanings and norms can be explicated as congealed or mystified power. A reductionism of power is as faulty as economic or normative reductionisms are. [1982; pp. 226-27]
Giddens also points out Foucault’s neglect of the state in his analysis:

There is a surprising ‘absence’ at the heart of Foucault’s analyses... an account of the state.... The state is what Foucault describes as the 'calculated technology of subjection' writ large, the disciplinary matrix that oversees the others. [Ibid; pp. 223-24]

This research will acknowledge Foucault’s notion of power as interwoven with other kinds of relations such as kinship. This approach accepts that power is local and does not exist beyond its exercise, hence that it is not dependent on the state, nor is it to be examined in terms of relations of domination/repression. The research will analyse the tactics, strategies and manoeuvres utilised by the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board in its attempts to achieve outcomes for the Ngai Tahu iwi, i.e., to exercise power, especially in light of the 1989 devolution of the Department of Maori Affairs. The methodology will employ Giddens’ five categories of authoritative resources as a way of categorising and analysing these tactics and strategies.

Giddens’ categories of authoritative resources comprise: (1) the possibility of surveillance via accumulation of ‘coded information’ which can be used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered, (2) the possibility of surveillance via direct supervision of the activities of some individuals by others in positions of authority over them, (3) the possibility of assembling, within definite settings, large numbers of individuals who do not spend most of their daily lives involved in direct material production, (4) the
facilitating of the scope and intensity of sanctions, and (5) the creation of conditions that influence the formation of ideology [1985, pp. 14-17].

It is my contention that many actions of the Trust Board are attempts to intensify authoritative resources, thereby exercising power, and not simply reactions to state tactics.

The Trust Board, when it first began, made clear that its role was to remain separate from that of the Crown: "it is not the intention of the Board to undertake the type of assistance already provided for by the state or other institutions" [1957 Annual Report; p. 8]. How this intention is carried out will be examined in this research. At the 1990 Annual Tribal Hui, Tipene O'Regan had the following to say:

we can face the Government and the Ministers' criteria of protection of rights square in the eye and at the same time maintain the mana of our runanga.

It is the Trust Board's view that devolution is a secondary consideration. The primary one is structure which derives from our needs to administer our assets....that which is ours must be clearly separated and identified and not tangled with that which is the Crown's.
...we have always argued that we should be accountable to the Crown for the Crown's own money and accountable to ourselves for what is ours. So the importance of the Runanga Iwi Bill is that it provides the mechanism for accountability to the Crown for what belongs to it....It's not about rangatiratanga, it's about accountability through the Auditor-General to Parliament for Parliament's money.

...we agree to do that on a contractual basis, as an agent properly contracted....Now that's clean, clear and does not make us [servants] of the Crown. Now that's what the Board likes about the Bill because it's clear about that relationship. It's another matter, however, if we are just an extension of the welfare system and our only job is to pump the stuff out on whatever terms the Crown says. And it's our belief, certainly at the Board, that we should always retain the right in due discussion with our iwi, beneficiaries and the Runanganui, for the Board to be able to say to the Crown, "The terms of that contract are not acceptable to us - run it yourself". We should always retain the right to do that.

...if we accept resources from the state to move out to our people, the only argument for doing that is so that our people may get those benefits more effectively. And if you can get them more effectively by sending them down the town drain, because the iwi structure is not efficient, then the people have got a right to say,
we'll have the town drain back. And so always, that relationship with the Crown has got to be very plain, that it's a contracting agent relationship and if the terms the Crown puts on it are not acceptable, then we shouldn't run it. [O'Regan; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

The assertion is that the Trust Board sees its acceptance of government policies as a way to intensify its own mana, which in turn will help it to administer more efficiently the iwi it is vying with smaller factions within the tribe, and with other South Island tribes, to represent under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990. It is these localised forms of power which Foucault claims should be analysed because this is what takes the focus away from centralised forms such as the state [Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 239].

Cleave states that the reality now facing iwi is cooption into Pakeha government. Foucault would concur with Cleave on the importance he places on groups within Maoridom being as comfortable in administrative as in spiritual matters. Cleave identifies the two fundamental principles underlying Maori 'traditional' political and social life as whanaungatanga and rangatiratanga, the nature of the extended family and its direction. In Maoridom, things like spirituality are as important as administrative and economic strength. Therefore, "individuals, like tribes, have specific characteristics which are important in any socio-political development" [1983; pp. 55-56].
The chairperson and other members of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board claim that the Board should adopt the legal identity which the Runanga Iwi Act offers in order to accept funding from the Crown. This will in turn allow for the development of a sound economic base for Ngai Tahu [O'Regan; 1990], at which point the iwi will be able to break free and operate on its own. There are Ngai Tahu who have made it clear at tribal hui that they see the Trust Board setting itself up as another centralised bureaucratic structure, in the image of the Department of Maori Affairs. Indeed, were it not for the Ngai Tahu tribal organisation which the Trust Board has chosen to include in the structures it is currently developing, one might say that this is true. But the 'traditional' kinship base (not just in terms which the Crown has defined for the purposes of the new policies) has always played and continues to play an integral part in the structure of the Ngai Tahu iwi.

As Foucault points out, truth is a social construct. Therefore, by adopting modern forms of bureaucratic organisation and discourse, a group does not have to lose sight of the 'traditional' kinship and tribal structures with which its relations of power are interwoven. For Foucault, a prime effect of power is to identify certain bodies of individuals with gestures, discourses and desires in order to constitute them within groups which can be identified and labelled [1980; pp. 73-4; Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 251]. The Trust Board may well be trying to maintain a balance between different elements of the discourse it has adopted in order to constitute the members of its iwi as a group of New Zealanders, equal with the rest of society, rather than an ethnic minority struggling for recognition in a
Pakeha-dominated society. By doing this, the Trust Board and the iwi will be presented as a group of individuals who not only rely on 'traditional' political and social structures of organisation but also on modern, rational organisational structures.

This ploy would be a way for the Trust Board to develop its own mana and the mana of the iwi in contemporary society (Note: the Trust Board chairperson questions this ploy. He states that it may equally be true that the basis of the Board's accountability to the runanga is to try to provide a structure that can "genuinely achieve the Ngai Tahu dream" [O'Regan; 1991]).

According to Foucault, modernity is characterised by the specific effects of power attached to what is held in our society to be the 'truth' [1980; pp. 131-33; Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 250]. By looking at 'truth' in this way, one could postulate that, since the time of colonisation, the state has adopted a discourse which characterises Pakeha society within a 'will to truth' in which members of that group strive for rationality of life. This 'will to truth' could be likened to a Weberian notion of rationality (without the evolutionary implication which Weber attaches), and therefore it takes the place of the more 'traditional' ritual-based discourses characteristic of oral, hunting and gathering or horticultural cultures such as the Ngai Tahu tribe constituted before the time of colonisation. Foucault has observed that the modern 'will to truth' (search for rationality of life) has replaced one that was characterised by religious spirituality and 'traditional' ritual. The 'will to truth' has, hence, not been obstructed by taboos but has striven to found a science of everything from sexuality to politics [Foucault, 1980; p. 170].
According to Schermerhorn, avoidance of an emphasis on the evolutionary development of societies (from oral, kinship-based to rational, bureaucratically organised) is a strategy to keep an ethnic group strong. He characterises an ethnic group in the following way:

a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these. [1970; p. 12]

In fact, the Trust Board's former executive officer comments that the stereotypes of the fat, jolly Maori who lives within an extended family and spends his/her days playing the guitar and singing are still around and hard to shake [Marshall; 1990]. We can witness similar effects of power everywhere in today's society. Groups such as the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board are hence, trying to shake these stereotypes of Maoridom and by doing so are avoiding the emphasis in modern discourse that modern society has evolved from something 'primitive' and less developed.

As Foucault makes clear, 'truth' is a 'thing of this world'. He is concerned with
the rules according to which true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true [Foucault, 1980; pp. 131-33; Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 250].

Since it began, the Trust Board has made clear its goal of placing all its aims within a modern discourse of aspiring towards rational, scientific organisation and education for Ngai Tahu. It has done this because this form of organisation is acceptable today as the most 'developed' and 'real' form, and therefore the Trust Board can gain the most in negotiations with government and agencies which adhere to such forms.

What is being postulated in this research is that the Trust Board is adopting bureaucratic organisational structures because it recognises that these are the socially created 'truths' through which power can be effected in modern society. The fact that this is the structure by which the state is organised does not mean that the state possesses this power solely. Such tactics were invented and organised from the starting points of local conditions and particular needs. They took place prior to any state strategy designed to weld them together. Foucault's new technology of power does not take its historical origin from an identifiable individual or group who decided to implement it so as to further their interests or facilitate their utilisation of the social body [Foucault, 1980; p. 159]. That is, power, in the form of modern bureaucratic organisation, is not the effect of the state structure; it exists sui generis and is used by the state as one form.
Even before devolution, the Trust Board was developing structures which would see it become the executive arm of a larger policy-making body answerable to the runanga - the people. At the same time, the input from runanga and 'traditional' spiritual and tribal sources is very important to the Trust Board and will be incorporated into the structures it chooses to develop in order to take its iwi into the twenty-first century.

The trick, as Foucault would argue, is to make this attempt at strengthening the mana of the Trust Board appear as legitimate as possible both to the Crown, where government funding is involved, and to the iwi, who do not wish to lose the more 'traditional' power characterised in kinship, hapu, and runanga structures.

The Trust Board recognises the strength of Ngai Tahu’s own 'traditional' tribal organisation and therefore has decided to maintain a balance by developing two structures, with their own structure modified to such a degree that Ngai Tahu does not have to rely on the state at all.

If 'truth' is a social construct, then as societies move through time and space, 'traditional' structures and effects of power do not necessarily lose their strength, but they do have many more obstacles to overcome if the 'truth' which is held dominant by the majority of the population negates their power, i.e., if the modern 'will to truth' has replaced one that is characterised by spirituality, kinship and 'tradition'.
Foucault argues that it is therefore not necessary to examine the 'real' truth that is concealed, since truth is always socially constructed and therefore dynamic, but rather, the social scientist should be concerned with locating the 'will to truth' that serves power and discourses as both object and instrument of their action [Ibid.]. The Trust Board realises that 'truth' in society is dynamic. It realises that it is only with its own people that it can maintain 'traditional' discourse. When dealing with the rest of society, other strategies and manoeuvres have to be used. The strategy which the Trust Board has decided to adopt entails balancing the two groups within discourses which will strengthen its mana and the mana of the iwi. This choice is made as a middle road between the two possible extremes: total assimilation and total separatism.

The chairperson of the Trust Board provides an illustration of this middle-of-the-road approach. For example, he advocated negotiations with the Crown with respect to the 'commemorations' (a term preferred to 'celebrations') held at the beginning of 1990 at Waitangi, because he is of the opinion that protest in the form of demonstrations on the steps of the Beehive has an insignificant effect on the proceedings inside. He prefers to work along with the government and feels this is the duty of Maoridom, as a partner to the Treaty, although in personal discourse with members of Parliament he will let his disapproval of policies be known [O'Regan; 1990].

It is these localised forms of power, claims Foucault, which should be analysed, because this takes the focus away from centralised forms such as the state
[Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 239]. This research will attempt to analyse some of these local forms of power that are available to and mobilised by the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board. This will be done by placing their activities within Giddens’ categories of authoritative resources, with special attention being paid to the effect of the devolution of the Department of Maori Affairs in 1989 on the capacity of the Trust Board to achieve desired outcomes.
CHAPTER THREE:

RATIONALISATION OF TECHNIQUES OF INFORMATION-MANAGEMENT
One measure of an authoritative resource which can be appropriated by an individual or a group in order to achieve a desired outcome (i.e. exert power), is the accumulation, storage and dissemination of coded information which can be used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered [Giddens, 1984; 1987]. This does not necessarily refer to administration for the purposes of repression. Administration of the activities of individuals may be used in other than situations of domination or repression.

This chapter examines the extent to which bureaucratic rules of accumulation, storage and dissemination of information are utilised by the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board. Attention is given especially to the period spanning the second half of the 1980's, since the devolution process was first considered as a viable option by the government in the area of Maori affairs. The focus is on how bureaucratic systems have been developed on the initiative of the Trust Board, not simply as a response to government requirements (specifically the requirements of the process of devolution as set out in government documentation), although such initiatives have been designed partly as strategies to help negotiations with the state as a way to increase access to allocative resources.

A central issue to be considered, and one that is very important to Ngai Tahu people, is how prospective iwi authorities are managing to intensify the degree of bureaucratic organisation of their structures, while continuing to maintain the mana of the tribe.
For Giddens, 'storage' of knowledge and information is of crucial importance to an analysis of power because it acts as a medium of 'binding' time-space involving the knowledgeable management of a projected future and recall of an elapsed past [1984; p. 261]. He is arguing that accumulation and storage of authoritative resources involves the retention and control of information or knowledge whereby social relations are perpetuated across time and space. Storage presumes media of information presentation, modes of information retrieval or recall and, modes of dissemination. All of this depends upon the recall capacities of the human memory as well as upon skills of interpretation that may be more difficult to achieve, as training for such skills depends on availability of allocative resources, and is therefore considered by Giddens as something possessed by only a minority within a given population [Ibid.].

In summary, information storage is "a fundamental phenomenon permitting time-space 'distanciation' and a thread that ties together the various sorts of allocative and authoritative resources in reproduced structures of domination" [Ibid; p. 262].

Giddens perceives control of time as fundamental to the optimum capacity to achieve outcomes [Ibid; p. 152]. He sees control of time as characteristic of bureaucracy. Therefore, what will be identified and examined in this research are devices which 'stack' past events as well as anticipating future ones. Profitability and power depend, among other factors, upon being able to predict events and subject them to calculation.
Giddens identifies bureaucratic rules as another way of doing this. For Giddens, 'storage' of knowledge and information is of crucial He draws on Weber, who asserts that modern bureaucracies could not exist without the collation of documents which are both records of the past and prescriptions for the future - the 'files'.

The files are not only documents of bureaucratic procedure; they exemplify that procedure and make possible the continuous and regular operation upon which bureaucratic discipline depends. [Ibid.]

Shanks and Tilley, in their treatment of the concept of power, also acknowledge information, knowledge, competency and skills as non-material resources capable of mobilisation [1987; p. 73]. The claim they make as archaeologists is that the exercise of strategic power in contemporary Western society relies on new methods of classification, codification, surveillance and disciplinary technology. By means of the compilation of detailed records on individuals, every individual can be known and subjected to a normalising judgment and discourse on power.

It will also be beneficial to keep in mind Foucault's distinction between 'traditional' discourse and the discourse characteristic of modern bureaucratic societies and of the institutions and organisations which operate within such societies. It has already been mentioned that the Trust Board is increasingly faced with the challenge of balancing the support it needs from its iwi, the members of which are organised into 'traditional' tribal structures, with the
material support it can achieve from the Crown by acceptance of the process of devolution.

We do not want the legal personality of Ngai Tahu Whanui to be by way of an administrative device for delivering devolution. We want the two to stand clearly identified. One is our mana, the other our relationship with the Crown and they are two different things. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui, minutes; p. 3]

The primary [consideration] is structure which derives from our needs to administer our assets. Our assets are going to be very much greater than what will come from devolution...we should have a model that accommodates devolution, but not one that is dependent on it. [Ibid; pp. 9-10]

So, is it possible to accept bureaucratic structures which, as Weber points out, are characteristic of modern government organisation, without accepting domination by the state? As was postulated in the theoretical framework, the Crown is simply one group among many in modern society, which has mobilised particular resources to use to its advantage. These resources weigh heavily in the material and military sources. However, one resource which has been developed since the Industrial Revolution by most modern states and organisations has been that of increased rational means of information storage.
Yet as Giddens, Foucault and Shanks and Tilley have all made clear, the Crown is not the sole "possessor" of power even though it utilises these resources. Power is not an entity - something to be possessed. As societies have moved through time and space, what is held by members of the population as 'truth' (as a social construct), has changed and this has been made possible by such things as changes in technology, degree of mobilisation of resources and the strategies adopted by various individuals and groups. It may be the state which has defined more than any other group, what is to be considered 'truth' but this is not because it has created this 'truth', but rather because it has mobilised the proper resources (for example, coercive forms of media, material resources and physical forces) to maintain such a position.

The modern Western legal system, along with widespread bureaucratic institutions and the forms of information storage associated with these, although often identified as state creations, are simply forms of authoritative resource which can be mobilised by any group as a medium through which to achieve strategic outcomes.

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, as one such group, is currently doing just this in order to exercise local power, not simply in terms of a dialectical relationship with the state (more specifically, in response to devolution), but as a way to better organise itself in order to improve the mobilisation skills of its iwi. This, in turn, should improve the opportunities available to the iwi to achieve outcomes in a society where the adoption of specific, modern bureaucratic forms of organisation
seem to be the media through which exercise of power is most socially acceptable.

The whole board is engaged in this process - to try and get a much more rational and organised management structure for the twenty-first century. [O'Regan; 1990]

However, as I shall demonstrate, more 'traditional' forms of information-management have not been abandoned but rather enhanced, because the Trust Board has adopted a balance which it considers will improve tribal mana for both the individuals who comprise the iwi and the Runanganui o Tahu (of which the Trust Board is a part). The Runanganui o Tahu is the Trust Board's proposed new structure to be presented to the government as the iwi authority for the South Island. It will consist of one representative from each of sixteen Ngai Tahu papatipu runanga, who will work together as the policy-making team, as well as the Trust Board, which will remain the executive arm. The Runanganui becomes, in effect, the 'Parliament' of the tribe.

It will be crucial for the Board members to be mindful of the needs and wishes of the iwi and then place these findings within an appropriate discourse so as not to lose the support of the tribe. There are already Ngai Tahu who question the ability and/or the intentions of the Board members to keep the input of the people as top priority. The Board members claim that they are aware of the danger of becoming a centralised structure and have turned this awareness into the raison d'etre for the Runanganui o Tahu structure. It is for this reason that the
Runanganui o Tahu, in theory, will see the Trust Board become the executive arm which will deal with the Crown and execute policies decided on by the elected runanga representatives. The rationale for this structure is that the elected runanga representatives on the Runanganui o Tahu are close enough to their runanga and sufficiently understand the needs of the people to discuss issues with them, bring these findings to the Runanganui o Tahu, and pass them on to the Trust Board. The Trust Board then has the administrative expertise to put the thoughts and policies of the people into a rational, organised mode to take to the Crown or to other agencies in the community with whom Ngai Tahu will work. In fact, the chairperson claims that he gains knowledge about the needs of the iwi from hours of discussion with the elders of each hapu, and now the new policies might make this information more readily available because runanga will have a bigger part to play in the overall structure [O'Regan; 1990]. So, this 'traditional' information, as well as the modes of accumulation, storage and dissemination, will not lose their significance. They will simply be enhanced.

It is important to remember that it is due to the efforts of the Trust Board and the iwi, not due to any emphasis placed on tribal structures in the Runanga Iwi Act 1990, that these 'traditional' forms of information-management as yet have not lost their significance. As the chairperson states,

Devolution...is simply a plumbing system relating to Article Three issues of Social Equity. So if the government turns off the tap-devolution, Article Three and all that - the core relationship of our
people with the Crown, Article Two, will still be there in the structure. [O'Regan; 1989]

Some members of the Board have told me that many Ngai Tahu are aware that the Runanga Iwi Act refers only to the administrative requirements of government, i.e., "to provide acknowledgement and recognition in law of Tribal authorities within their own traditional boundaries", simply to "provide the Government with legal structures and mechanisms with which it can deal appropriately in terms of the Government policy of devolution...and through which there can be proper accounting for assets or income voted by Parliament from public monies" [1988 RIB Submission; p. 3].

According to one Board member, "no government can tell a tribe how to organise itself", so in his view devolution is an imposition. On the positive side, however, he recognises that Ngai Tahu can make devolution work for them because "it has created an atmosphere whereby we have to structure ourselves to meet our particular needs" [Solomon; 1990].

THE TASK OF COMBINING INPUT FROM TRADITIONAL TRIBAL STRUCTURES WITH INPUT FROM MODERN BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES

There are sixteen runanga represented on the Runanganui - fourteen based on 'traditional' papatipu marae and two in the urban centres of Invercargill and
Christchurch. Each of these runanga meets at least once a month to discuss the policy issues facing their people. The Trust Board consists of eight members - some are also Upoko Runanga. The members represent seven regions (clusters of runanga) in the South Island, and Ika-a-Maui (all those Ngai Tahu living outside Te Waipounamu).

Where traditionally the runanga of Ngai Tahu have tried to administer their own business and negotiate individually with the Crown and other bureaucratic agencies, according to the chairperson of the Trust Board, the runanga have not always found it easy to do so. They have not had the material resources or adequate skills to deal with the arms of centralised government [O'Regan; 1991]. Hence, the Trust Board has developed a structure that will widen the scope of its role to act as a mediator between runanga and the Crown, so that it no longer is concerned simply with the administration of grants to beneficiaries. Because of this the Trust Board is trying to rely more than it ever has on accumulation of information from the runanga and marae, while at the same time rationalising its modes of information storage and dissemination in order to deal more efficiently with government departments and agencies and to execute policies decided on by the runanga representatives. Its first step toward doing this has been the development of the Runanganui o Tahu structure - a body which could meet regularly to discuss the issues facing the whole iwi and report these to the Trust Board, while at the same time providing a forum for the Trust Board to report back to the iwi.
This section will examine methods of information accumulation, storage and dissemination (to be referred to inclusively as information-management) which the Trust Board has adopted to characterise the Runanganui o Tahu structure.

ACCUMULATION

Until the mid-1980's, when the Ngai Tahu claims before the Waitangi Tribunal changed the function of the Trust Board, it showed little concern for 'traditional' sources of information-accumulation (Note: the Trust Board chairperson denies this [O'Regan; 1991]). It was left up to the individual runanga to choose what sources of information-management to rely on.

Now, however, the Trust Board is attempting to incorporate a linked, comprehensive runanga-based mode of input into a pan-tribal structure. Because the Treaty of Waitangi was an agreement between the tribes and the Crown, the Trust Board is looking to set up a tribal authority to deal with the settlement that it hopes to achieve from the claims: "The primary [consideration] is structure which derives from our needs to administer our assets" [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 9].

Concern is that a body be there that is properly accountable to our traditional base, which is going to be able to be share holder to manage and handle us all and define policies which will bring benefits and permit us to meet our obligations. [Ibid; p.11]
We were reminded that Ngai Tahu have always been in Runanga structures...Runanga must keep our Manawhenua. [Ibid; p. 10]

They are balancing old forms of information-accumulation with new. The runanga still have their monthly or fortnightly meetings, discussing various issues which directly affect their members. But now the Runanganui o Tahu is made up of one representative from each runanga, the Trust Board will link up with this structure to become the executive arm:

The people on the Runanganui o Tahu should not be the same people as on the Trust Board. These are two completely different jobs - one policy, one is management. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 10]

The function of the runanga will be to carry out the policies decided on by the Runanganui o Tahu. The Trust Board will have two functions: (i) to devolve programmes to the runanga, based on Runanganui policy decisions and (ii) to negotiate with government departments and agencies. However, the chairperson has made it clear that the Board in the future will attempt to pass the latter task on to the employees of the Trust Board:

executives will take over the role of preparing submissions for government, negotiating all sorts of stuff, handling our affairs and
working as full time staff....The day will come when we will be looking to appoint a chief executive....At the moment [the Secretary] is working progressively to hand responsibilities over to our executive, and the intention is that I will pull back and the Board will pull back, and be much more board members - representatives. This is quite important so that you don’t get your policy decisions mixed up with your executive decisions. [O'Regan; 1990]

So just as before, a runanga representative will gather information from runanga meetings and discussions with members of the runanga. This information will then be set out in meeting minutes. The Trust Board as part of the iwi authority will accumulate this information by attending Runanganui o Tahu monthly meetings and annual tribal hui, as well as informally by way of discussions between Board members and the runanga they represent. The following statements give an indication of the importance of annual tribal hui to the processes of information-accumulation, storage and dissemination, even in modern Western society:

early hui was pulled together to get some directions. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 14]

It was pointed out that discussions on our structure were first held in 1987, then December 1988, and now again in February 1989 in
order to find a solution for an Iwi Authority for Ngai Tahu. [Ibid; p. 10]

It was not until 1980 that an Annual Ngai Tahu Hui of the whole iwi was proposed to the Trust Board by two Board members. This proposal was then put to the government's Brown Paper groups. The Board recognised that due to the geographical size of Ngai Tahu, an annual tribal hui would help towards the development of communication, input and understanding of other members "to forge a little stronger the boundaries of whakapapa and history that connect us" [1981 Annual Report; p. 16].

At the last annual tribal hui the deputy chairperson of the Board made the following exhortation to those runanga which have not yet developed their administrative base to its full potential:

It's up to our community to collectively put their efforts together for any development that is required. Identify your resources. Identify your people resources and then we can give assistance for the technical work and research for feasibility studies that will be required. [Tau; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

Minutes and tape recordings are taken at these meetings and hui. Fax machines have also been set up in each marae office to further rationalise and make efficient the accumulation of information.
As well as these methods, there is bound to be a strong informal system of information accumulation as Board members responsible for clusters of runanga in the South Island communicate and overlap with Runanganui o Tahu representatives from the runanga they represent. As the chairperson claims, some of the eight members of the Board are also Upoko Runanga and "that makes for quite a lot of useful overlap" [O'Regan, 1989; p. 98].

STORAGE

Much of the rationale behind incorporating input from runanga representatives into a structure designed to represent the whole tribe and which will concentrate on the building up of assets is to capitalise on the 'traditional' forms of information storage characteristic of runanga-based structures - that of the human memory. The Board hopes the new structure will allow the information which is stored in the minds and personal records of the members of the runanga to be transferred into more rationally organised 'files' which will improve flexibility of the data-retrieval process and, hence, efficiency of administration of executive functions which are now the responsibility of the Board, its employees and the runanga.

Once these 'files' are established, information can be stored for access in the future.
DISSEMINATION

In the past the Board had to disseminate information only to those Ngai Tahu who were beneficiaries, and up until 1980 this was done through printed annual reports and circulars and oral reporting of Board members to any members of their respective runanga who cared to listen.

Since late 1956, it has been the definite aim of the members of the Board to keep beneficiaries acquainted...with Board policy and activities. [1961 Annual Report]

The Board last year [1960] instigated a new departure towards the improvement of the liaison between it and its beneficiaries, when it approved of the Chairman addressing meetings of beneficiaries called by the Board members [in some areas]. [Ibid; p. 3]

These meetings examined the Board's activities and policy decisions and also the history of the Ngai Tahu claim. Many beneficiaries heard for the first time of the Board's activities, and many were very interested.

It was not until 1980, when the Board began to rely on Annual Tribal Hui, that it could report its activities to the whole tribe, or at least to those members of the tribe who attended the hui.
Since the Runanganui o Tahu has been in the consideration process, these annual hui have been valuable forums for the Board to disseminate information to the iwi on its functions, policies and goals for the iwi. Since the new structure will be designed to incorporate the maximum input of runanga into policy-making, there has been a move back to 'traditional' tribal and runanga gatherings as forms of disseminating information to the tribe.

These hui are tape-recorded and minuted, and these minutes are circulated. Now the minutes can be circulated by fax machines and photocopiers to the runanga offices for access by all the tribe. The Board has also made some changes in the process of the hui. It is a workable balance between a social gathering and a formal reporting of business, but it is now the chairperson of the Runanganui o Tahu who chairs the tribal hui rather than the chairperson of the Board: "To correct some of the correspondence that has been circularised, this meeting is not a Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board meeting, it is a Ngai Tahu iwi meeting" [Tau; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]. This measure helps to ease some of the fears of the iwi that the Trust Board is setting itself up to be a centralised power structure.

Having said this, it was definitely the chairperson of the Board who dominated the formal proceedings of the 1990 Tribal Hui - both in terms of time spent disseminating information to those in attendance, and in terms of oratory skills. The Trust Board has now adopted a strategy which combines modern, bureaucratic forms of information dissemination with those forms which are tried and trusted by those Ngai Tahu who advocate the importance of 'traditional'
intra-tribal communication and 'traditional' sources of mana and tapu. The status attributed to runanga structures and the value of their input is illustrated by comments made by Board members and employees about the two urban runanga. Some Ngai Tahu question the mana of these two runanga because they are not based on 'traditional' papatipu marae.

The Trust Board is always careful to rely as much as possible on 'traditional' bodies of power, both for the information they can contribute and in order to ensure that the Board does not become a bureaucratic and centralised structure seen to be struggling against 'traditional' sources of mana and power. An example of the importance which the Trust Board is seen to place on acknowledgement of 'traditional' mana and authority within the papatipu marae is found in the following statement:

Concern was expressed about the Upokorunanga of Otautahi [Christchurch] who does not have a runanga....Otautahi is one of the larger areas of New Zealand and it is an important front for us. Maybe a hui of our Upoko should be held to establish a base and look at a policy to say this is what will happen in Otautahi. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 18]

Often the Trust Board reserves the modern approach for negotiations with the Crown and other bureaucratic institutions. However, in order to disseminate information to the iwi it uses forums like the Runanganui o Tahu meeting (which
is conducted formally and scheduled on a regular basis) to report to the runanga representatives on its affairs. The rationale for this is that the runanga representatives can then take this information and disseminate it to their individual runanga in runanga meetings and informal oral communication and marae gatherings, in a form which is acceptable to the tribe, again minimising any threat of the Board coming across as a centralised bureaucratic structure.

The lines of information dissemination from the Trust Board to the Runanganui o Tahu are formal, (as was mentioned already, their close proximity and the very rate at which issues arise and have to be dealt with means that informal oral communication will often be relied on). Examples of this formality lie in the regular and organised Runanganui o Tahu meetings, the introduction of fax machines and photocopiers on runanga and talk of development of a computer system. Once these formal systems have been developed, the runanga representatives can in turn disseminate information received from the Trust Board in a more acceptable form to its members.

Another modern form of information dissemination which has recently been adopted by some Ngai Tahu and endorsed by the Trust Board has been the use of radio broadcasting. Currently a group of Ngai Tahu young people broadcast for one hour per week on the Christchurch Polytechnic radio station, but by the beginning of 1991, the tribe will have its own station, with a satellite dish set up in the Christchurch area. They are encouraging other Ngai Tahu runanga and marae to set up satellite dishes as well. The broadcasting will cover everything
from news to music, with the hope of renewing the interest of Ngai Tahu people in their 'traditional' culture and language, using a method of information dissemination relied on heavily in contemporary Western society.

**BUREAUCRATIC SKILLS [INCLUDING KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW]**

Calls at Annual Ngai Tahu Tribal Hui for the Trust Board to be legally accountable to its runanga rather than to the Crown illustrate how a modern discourse, which embraces a rational-legal system of organisation, is already trickling into internal tribal relations [1989 Annual Tribal Hui, minutes; p. 3]. The historical knowledge to which the Trust Board has access reveals the importance of the runanga to the iwi structure. With this knowledge, the Trust Board has adopted manoeuvres designed to lobby for legal recognition of its runanga in a modern context [Ibid.]. The devolution process has certainly precipitated this goal of legal recognition of the runanga.

Shanks and Tilley specifically identify modern forms of property, law and contract as strategies designed to exercise power by producing persons with specific rights and claims in a contemporary society [1987; p. 70]. The embracing of a rational-legal mode of organisation of the iwi, even though it is a response to state policy (as part of the process of the devolution of the Maori Affairs Department), is something that the Trust Board has sought for a long time. Acceptance of devolution and the legal recognition it will provide for runanga does not necessarily represent subjecting the members of Ngai Tahu to a
dominant state structure. The Trust Board members have realised that legal recognition of the 'traditional' structures of the iwi would constitute a strategical manoeuvre capable of enhancing the ability of the Trust Board and the iwi to achieve outcomes, and hence intensify the power of the tribe.

The chairperson states that this move will reduce the authority of the Trust Board while developing the authority of the runanga, a risk he claims the Trust Board is willing to take [O'Regan; 1989]. This suggests that legal recognition is seen as a prerequisite for development of the 'traditional' power and authority of the iwi. On the other hand, it could be suggesting that the Trust Board has accepted legal recognition as a strategic manoeuvre to enhance the authority and hence the mana of the iwi without losing sight of historic contributions to this mana. So to reiterate, the Trust Board will have to be careful to maintain a balance between authoritative resources which arise from modern bureaucratic structures such as recognition in law and those resources which arise from the 'traditional' structures of the iwi.

The Trust Board membership does not see itself as selling out. It does not consider its plans to have 'traditional' Maori structures recognised within a modern discourse as jeopardizing 'traditional' power. The chairperson recently said:

We must be driven primarily by what we want and not the needs to get registered, it's not all those other things that matter. At the end
of the day, not by, with all due respect, [ITA’s] timetable or anyone else’s timetable. At the end of the day we’ve got to be driven by the necessity to get it right. What we’re talking about, and we’ve discussed it before, is the structure which takes our iwi into the new century. And if all the government devolution fell off the end of the table tomorrow, we’ve still got to have a structure that’s ours.

[O'Regan; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

In comparing the organisation of its iwi to others in New Zealand, the Trust Board is proud of its ability to adapt to the modern legal-rational methods of operating:

The Runanga Iwi Bill has got a whole lot of defects...but one of the things it does is it say[s] that once you’ve got recognition in this...your iwi body is the body which deals with the Crown in those legal matters and particularly with regard to local government issues. Whether local government takes any notice of you is the other question. But it is a very important bill in terms of identifying the legal personality of the iwi - of the people. On the whole we have said it is better to have a lousy bill than to have no bill at all. [O'Regan; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

The chairperson claims that the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board is experienced in working with the Crown and is therefore comfortable doing this under the new
policies in order to administer programmes for the iwi membership:

Very early we took over the operation of MANA and MACCESS in the whole of the South Island, also for the benefit of non-Ngai Tahu.... We've done that very efficiently and had a good taste of working in an ongoing contractual relationship with the Crown. It is something we can do well across a range of areas. This has swelled the administration: There are the people working MACCESS all over the island, there are clerical staff, vehicles and all sorts of stuff. [O'Regan; 1989]

The manager of the team hired by the Iwi Transition Agency to liaise with Maori groups who have made interim submissions for iwi authority status claims that the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board certainly holds sufficient resources in terms of administrative and management skills, to accept programmes from the Iwi Transition Agency. Going on the past success of the Trust Board regarding the administration of MANA and MACCESS, he is convinced that the Trust Board is well-equipped to take on programmes. He states: "If we walked out, the programmes would not stop. There will be some problems, but that's natural" [Stevens; 1990].

The chairperson feels that the Trust Board has accumulated and stored sufficient information to be able to negotiate in a modern and efficient way with individual government departments in order to administer the activities of Ngai Tahu
members. Thus, he does not see the changes brought on by devolution as having a huge effect on the role of the Board in this respect. If anything, he sees the Trust Board's power increasing because it has stored the requisite knowledge to be able to deal with individual departments (which he recognises other iwi do not have) and will no longer have to waste time dealing with the Department of Maori Affairs.

Thus, the chairperson is wholly in favour of tribalism and scoffs at notions of pan-tribal organisation. This is because he believes some iwi are not sufficiently well organised (in terms of a Giddensian notion of power, this means such groups are not as skilled in modern techniques of information accumulation and coding and therefore not reaching the full potential of power that acceptance of these techniques can offer). The chairperson thinks these groups may bring the powerful ones like Ngai Tahu down [O'Regan; 1990].

It may be that the new policies are helping to increase the effectiveness of the particular authoritative resource (knowledge of the modern legal system and bureaucratic skills) for some groups (like Ngai Tahu) while decreasing it for others, as the effect of the new policies is to keep Maoridom from uniting.

The Maori groups that have learned to operate within this modern discourse and the mode of information accumulation that goes along with it, are the ones which are going to benefit within the new structures. The anthropologist, Cleave, stresses the importance for such groups to be as comfortable in administrative as
in spiritual matters [1983; p. 55]. In a sense, it is adoption of these modern skills of information-management and the rational-legal negotiations which are made possible as a result - which allow tribes to become iwi authorities, because requirements of the submission include definition of area boundaries and membership in order to become legal bodies and receive government funding and be accountable for it [Christchurch Press, 14/3/90].

The Trust Board has accepted over the years legal definitions and contractual relationships characteristic of the Pakeha legal system. This is evident in the Ngai Tahu land claims and the subsequent cross-claims. The following are other examples of the Board's acceptance of bureaucratic techniques of organisation and management:

(i) The Board's submissions to the Commission of Inquiry into Maori Reserved Land bore fruit in that almost all of its suggestions have been incorporated into the recommendations in the Commission's Report. We now anxiously await legislation to implement those recommendations. [1975 Annual Report; Introduction]

(ii) The Board has formally requested the Minister of Maori Affairs to introduce legislation providing statutory recognition of the traditional structure of runanga within the Ngai Tahu tribal area. Its prime concern in doing so is to regularise its own financial
arrangements both in the present and future with its own beneficial runanga within the Ngai Tahu tribal area. [1979 Annual Report; p. 5]

(iii) The Board proposes making submissions this year to the Royal Commission on the Maori courts. These submissions will largely encompass the desirability of the Maori Land Court being not merely maintained but strengthened and raised in both status and authority. [Ibid; p. 11]

(iv) your Board sees no option but to continue to address itself to the drawn out process of review and revision of laws affecting its beneficiaries. It is a time consuming and expensive process but one of the few effective ways in which Maori people in a modern democracy can affect the laws governing them. [1980 Annual Report; p. 12]

(v) [re Fishing Bill]: it seems we are the only tribe with evidence ready to be presented at High Court level [1988 Annual Tribal Hui, minutes; p. 6]

(vi) Even though it's with some difficulty, we have made huge gains in terms of our standing inside the common law and the court system. A lot of decisions are still to come out of the Court of
Appeal decision of 1987. A lot is still left to be worked through, but it's a huge statement of commitment by our legal system to Treaty issues. [O'Regan; 1989]

(vii) The Trust Board's former executive officer indirectly drew attention to a need for Maoridom to understand legislative bills. [Marshall; 1990]

(viii) We are now in the process of completing our policy guidelines for the first ever Ngai Tahu policy resources. What actually does it mean? Having got together our Ngai Tahu policy resources, if it is accepted by a regional authority, then it gives us legal weight in those government areas so much so that if any breach of those policies takes place, Ngai Tahu will then have the opportunity of taking that case before the Tribunal....It gives us the opportunity of taking that case before the Tribunal....It gives us a fishery and a legal document to the future use of those resources through our mahinga kai. [Tau; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

(ix) they're exploring probably one of the roughest areas we're going to have to face in the next couple of decades in the area of rights to our local regions and resources - how we stand in front of planning tribunals and all those things and how that Resource Management law reform is going to work in practise. Because it
took us nearly twenty years to get s.3 put into the Town and Country Planning Act. That hasn't come from the Tribunal, it's come from people slogging their guts out in the courts. It hasn’t come from government. Government has resisted. It hasn’t come from the Department of Maori Affairs. It hasn’t come from anyone else except some iwi taking on the system in the common law and we couldn’t move until we got s.3. [O'Regan; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

(x) The Trust Board threatened the Crown with litigation probably on all areas of land that would come up. There seems to be some agreement that the Crown didn’t want to get into that fight. So, a ministerial agreement was reached between the departments and the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board that satisfies the iwi requirement before the Waitangi Tribunal, Y27. [Howse; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

The chairperson of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board considers that acceptance of Crown devolution requirements and the Crown legislative system is a tactical way to eventually achieve independence for the Ngai Tahu iwi because of the negotiation potential that acceptance of these modes will facilitate:

We say the Boards can have whatever relationship they like, but we want independence. [O'Regan; 1989]
As far as Ngai Tahu is concerned, we think it's an appropriate mechanism for this Island. So long as what is said in Te Urupare Rangapu (the Yellow Paper) is honest and honestly meant, then as a model it is more desirable than the dependency model of Maori Affairs. Having autonomous relationships with other agencies is appropriate to the Treaty Partner. We need a structure to take us into the new century which is based on our Treaty partnership with the Crown, and that really concerns Article 2. [Ibid.]

But that doesn't mean you have to have one system. In some areas, so long as accountability is there, it is completely feasible to have two models. It's the principle of accountability that allows for diversity. [Ibid.]

**ROLE OF WHAKAPAPA**

Whakapapa refers to lineage to common tribal genealogy. It is a fundamental feature of the life of any Ngai Tahu person. The understanding of whakapapa performs an important function for tribal cohesion and organisation - past, present, and no doubt, future. It is knowledge of whakapapa which binds the members of the tribe together, while excluding members of other tribes:

It is their whakapapa that gives them the right to vote....The real importance is the maintenance and right to that connection with the
tribe. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 14]

Employees of the Trust Board have commented on the tribal cohesion which has arisen out of proof of whakapapa, especially since the mid-1980's when the present land claims were advanced and researchers began to investigate the whakapapa and history of Ngai Tahu. One employee remarked that the Waitangi Tribunal claims have been good in terms of creating awareness and cohesion of tribal identity. She says that Ngai Tahu people have brought out a large amount of information that they had hidden away. She identifies this as the type of cohesion which often arises in times of threat. As with most Ngai Tahu people, she is hopeful that their identity with the tribe will continue for these people, even after the claims have been settled [Poharama; 1990].

Attempts by the Trust Board since the 1950's at rational means for the management of whakapapa information provides an example of an authoritative resource which the Board is learning to mobilise in order to help with the "knowledgeable management of a projected future" for the Board itself, as well as for the Runanganui o Tahu and the iwi.

Giddens suggests that getting to know what goes on 'in history' becomes not only an inherent part of what 'history' is but also a means of transforming 'history' [Ibid; p. 237]. Any individual or group which hopes to exercise power successfully in contemporary Western society must first realise that special determinants of organisation reminiscent of a bygone era are not necessarily less developed simply
because they have become marginal in contemporary society.

The modern world, for Giddens, is born out of discontinuity with what went before, rather than continuity with it [Ibid; p. 239]. He writes about how complexity of society is portrayed today to be in direct relation to development from oral to written cultures. But as Foucault and Shanks and Tilley would argue, this is not the case: societies do not 'progress' along some sort of evolutionary scale. As Shanks and Tilley put it, "rather than attempting to formulate positions which would once and for all explain the past in an absolute sense, we should be emphasising that there are no absolutes, no fundamentals" [1987; p. 175].

Awareness of this is crucial to Ngai Tahu, and particularly to the Trust Board as the executive arm of the Runanganui o Tahu, because improved efficiency of accumulation, storage and dissemination of a very important knowledge base provided by whakapapa represents an improved means of energy capture which in turn, improves its capacity to achieve outcomes for its iwi by facilitating greater access to allocative resources.

By examining separately the categories of accumulation, storage, and dissemination of whakapapa knowledge it will be possible to understand further how the Trust Board has since the 1950's, and especially in the latter half of the 1980's, attempted to place the 'traditional' significance of whakapapa and its understanding in a modern rational form. After this, I shall examine what the Trust Board has done and plans to do with this authoritative resource in order to
manage a projected future for itself and for the Ngai Tahu people. Finally, I shall analyse how this authoritative resource is affected by the process of devolution.

**ACCUMULATION**

The Trust Board has accumulated information in written form about whakapapa since the late 1950's, when it made proof of whakapapa a very strict requisite for grant applications. This is abundantly clear from its Annual Reports since 1961; for example:

> Before any application for a grant will be considered it must be supported by documentary proof that the person for whom the grant is sought is a beneficiary. This necessitates supplying whakapapa (or family tree) details and these should go back in all cases at least three generations and should also show, if possible, blood relationship to some other beneficiary, who is receiving or has received a grant. [Annual Report, 1961; Introduction]

Since 1973 the Trust Board has had a person working on the collection and collation of whakapapa. In 1976 a full-time position was created to work on whakapapa. This job then focused on the listing of missing files, the listing of files which had been "gutted" of whakapapa content, the location of missing whakapapa, and at a later date, bringing whakapapa contained on all the files up to date by including later generations [1978 Annual Report; p. 10].
Now in 1990, this employee estimates he is approximately halfway through the process of "checking, recompiling and restructuring" whakapapa files as per the 1848 Blue Book of Kaumatua [Ryan; 1990]. Since the Trust Board hearing before the Waitangi Tribunal two years ago, he has "been truly inundated with letters and phone calls from people throughout New Zealand and over the world too, all interested in their Ngai Tahu heritage" [Ibid.]. He thus encourages more input from Ngai Tahu people.

Since the claims were brought before the Waitangi Tribunal in 1986, the Board has also had the assistance of researchers employed to collect and collate historical information pertaining to the tribe, and this has included whakapapa.

STORAGE

The most important element of storage has been the transference of whakapapa from written family records scattered around the country to a wide and rational collection, gathered together and collated in one central locale - the Trust Board offices. Before there was any pan-Ngai Tahu body such as the Trust Board, the storage of whakapapa knowledge relied on the memory and personal records of Ngai Tahu people. When the Board began to use proof of whakapapa as a requirement for beneficiary status in the 1950's, this marked the transition from reliance on these forms of storage to reliance on documentary proof of whakapapa by members of the tribe.
In 1977, after the Board had employed someone to work full-time on the collection and collation of whakapapa knowledge, it made a request to the Department of Maori Affairs for greater protection of its whakapapa files, many of which had gone missing from the Maori Affairs office over the years. The Minister agreed and arranged also for photocopies of the files to be made available to the Board. When the photocopies were received, it was found that twelve had gone missing. The Board, which had long recognised the importance of having whakapapa files stored within its reach, made a request to its beneficiaries to return these: "They are a priceless general record and properly belong to the tribe as a whole" [Annual Report, 1977; p.10].

Since the claims before the Waitangi Tribunal which began in 1986, the Board has been assisted by historical researchers and has also for the past year been able to employ its own researcher on a full-time basis. He sums up here the significance of the claims for facilitating the development of a documented storage of historical information, including whakapapa:

out of the Ngai Tahu land claims they made a massive amount of documents on the history and all those things that go to make us up as a people. [Howse; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

The former executive officer of the Trust Board has commented that the Trust Board is currently taking steps toward having all files, including whakapapa stored within a computerised system [Marshall; 1990], indicating a willingness to move
toward an even more efficient and rational means of storage than is possible with the written form.

DISSEMINATION

Once again, the most important step towards a more rational mode of dissemination of whakapapa knowledge in the history of the Trust Board was the requirement, starting in the 1950's, of documentary proof of whakapapa in order to apply for grants. The efforts at collection and collation of this proof since 1973 have further intensified this authoritative resource.

Currently, the Trust Board is more concerned with the accumulation and storage of whakapapa knowledge than with its dissemination, and this is probably because it is still in the process of developing these files. Whakapapa information as yet is not disseminated to the Ngai Tahu people nor to anyone else. However, members of the tribe do have access to this information in the Trust Board office. The Trust Board realises the value of these records for the tribe as a whole, and this is the reason it is very careful to have all these records stored within its offices and therefore within its power of surveillance. The Trust Board has been inundated with requests from people throughout New Zealand and all over the world, interested in their Ngai Tahu heritage and every request is filled.

One forum in which the Trust Board has relied on a rational form of dissemination of whakapapa information has been the Pakeha court, as part of
the claims before the Waitangi Tribunal, since the mid-1980's, as well as the counter-claims which took place in the High Court in 1990 between the Trust Board and a union of non-Ngai Tahu groups residing in the South Island. The files which the Trust Board have managed to build up over the years as a result of adoption of rational means of accumulation and storage of whakapapa knowledge, made possible the dissemination of this knowledge in a form considered acceptable in contemporary, bureaucratic society and to the Appellate Court.

A witness for Ngai Tahu, Mr. Tipene O'Regan, cited the whakapapa (genealogy) of the Ngai Tahu people which linked the Waitaha, Ngati Mamoe, and Ngai Tahu as the three elements making up today's Ngai Tahu tribe. [Christchurch Press, 23/6/90]

This citing of whakapapa proof in the Appellate Court would not have been made possible were it not for the building up of rational files over the past forty years. Without the creation and storage of these whakapapa files, the oral communication by Upoko and/or Kaumatua of information recorded in personal and family records, would have been relied upon. This process would have been time-consuming and less acceptable within the New Zealand court system. Rationalisation of the process helps to deal with problems of geographical access to human storehouses of knowledge (i.e. knowledge stored in either the human memory of Ngai Tahu people or in their personal and family records). It is not intended here to infer that such capacities are not valid but the rationalisation of
this system makes possible the perpetuation across time and space of information which perhaps the modes of human memory storage, family records, and oral communication cannot achieve to the same degree of efficiency.

A computer index to the 'files' which the former executive officer anticipates in the very near future for the Trust Board, will also lead to improved efficiency of dissemination of whakapapa information.

**EFFECT OF RATIONALISATION OF ACCUMULATION, STORAGE AND DISSEMINATION OF WHAKAPAPA INFORMATION ON ACCESS TO ALLOCATIVE RESOURCES**

No project in the history of the Trust Board illustrates better the importance of historic knowledge such as whakapapa to the Board's capacity of "knowledgeable management of a projected future" than the claims brought before the Waitangi Tribunal. It is such knowledge that has provided the basis of proof of sovereignty over land necessary to achieve compensation from the Crown. The dissemination of this knowledge in a form acceptable within the Pakeha legal system can be regarded as a strategy which will increase the possibility of the Board receiving compensation from the Crown and hence, the achievement of outcomes for the iwi.

The concentration by the Board on the building up of 'files' of whakapapa and other historical knowledge has increased since the time when it was recognised
that such files could be used as 'proof' for the settlement of rights over land and fisheries as set out in the Treaty of Waitangi. Modes of accumulation and storage had to be developed which would make recall easier and allow for dissemination within the Pakeha court system - before both the Waitangi Tribunal and the High Court.

As far back as the 1969 Annual Report of the Board, emphasis has been placed on efficient collation and storage of information to help the Board's standing in negotiations with the Crown. From 1962/63 the Board felt in a position to "embark more decisively on its scheme to endeavour to obtain a fairer and more equitable deal for the beneficiaries it represents; and it then started to collate the material and evidence it already had to move towards the assembly of more evidence likely to assist its prosecution of a case for a more equitable settlement of the Ngai Tahu claim" [1969 Annual Report; p. 5].

The Board and its counsel early this year reached the conclusion that ample evidence would be available in support of its view that the 1944 settlement had been enacted without real and substantial agreement by the beneficiaries and that steps should therefore be taken to prepare and present a petition to Parliament for a settlement more in accord with the just deserts of the Ngai Tahu people and with New Zealand's tradition of fair dealing...On the basis of the information already gathered, it was possible to select kaumatua from various Board districts, who had knowledge of
events, etc., in the 1944/46 period and earlier, and a meeting of a number of these was held...this year. From that meeting, ample corroboration was obtained of the Board's view of the inaccuracy of the statement in the preamble to the 1944 Act indicating that the settlement had the support of the Ngai Tahu people. [Ibid; p. 10]

One Ngai Tahu person suggested that the success the Trust Board has so far achieved from the land claims has given it the confidence to apply to government to be considered the Ngai Tahu iwi authority for the purposes of the Runanga Iwi Act 1990.

The documentary proof of tribal boundaries made possible by the whakapapa information has been absolutely crucial to any success anticipated from the land claims. It will be crucial once again if the Crown makes iwi distinction the basis of its settlement, as it made this the basis of the decision to devolve the Department of Maori Affairs. The Board is aware that, once it has rationalised its processes of management of whakapapa information, it can use this documentary 'proof' to maintain tribal distinctions and, hence, separate tribal development. This tribal development is something which the chairperson and Board members see as absolutely crucial for the future economic development of the Ngai Tahu iwi [O'Regan; 1990]. With the knowledge of who is and is not Ngai Tahu in both the South and North Islands, the Trust Board can decide whether or not it will administer programmes to non-Ngai Tahu:
Very early we took over the operation of MANA and MACCESS in the whole of the South Island, also for the benefit of non-Ngai Tahu. We don't want to continue that so as soon as they're up and running they can look after themselves. [O'Regan, 1989; p. 99]

This will be even more critical as the government devolves more and more programmes and responsibilities to the Maori community. Tribal groups will have to make clear to the government their boundaries and whakapapa distinctions if they want to minimise the responsibilities being devolved while maximising the efficient use of any allocative resources which may be devolved. In fact, the second draft of the Runanga Iwi Bill lists the following among the essential characteristics of an iwi to be met in order to apply for the status of iwi authority: descent from tupuna, historical association with a takiwa (i.e. the district or districts in which the members of the iwi are tangata whenua), and an existence traditionally and widely acknowledged by other iwi [1990; s.4].

Members of the Trust Board as well as many members of the iwi who attend tribal hui have indicated an understanding of the importance of 'proof' of tribal distinction to negotiate with the Crown and receive allocative resources. They recognise this proof of tribal distinction as fundamental to any economic support the tribe will receive from the Crown, both on the basis of the Treaty of Waitangi [O'Regan; 1990] and out of the Crown-created devolution process.

The model for the Trust Board has been encouraging these other iwi that have
their tribal bonding and units. Then we have groups we can identify and talk
directly to their spokespersons...they are clearly under the kakahu of our
manawhenua [i.e. under the jurisdiction of our mana as tangata whenua]. [1989
Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 17]

The proposal is that representatives of the Trust Board, coordinated by Herewini
[a Ngai Tahu spokesperson] to have formal meetings with the other tribes living
amongst us, talk with them and establish a Kaupapa [policy] as to how we see
their role. We have to negotiate this Kaupapa with them and use the result of
negotiations when we face the Crown....Personally like to see us deal with each
tribal group as separate entities. [Ibid; p. 18]

Improved access to whakapapa and its understanding even facilitates a form of
sociological imagination for those Ngai Tahu members within its understanding:

One human problem is not held by any means by one person. We
have at least 1000 living in Ika Te Maui who tie back to a
particular marae, people who have whakapapa rights, but are not
particularly in communion with the tribe. We cannot deprive these
people of their rights or of human problems. [1989 Annual Tribal
Hui minutes; p. 11].
CONCLUSION

In many respects, it is access to whakapapa knowledge which makes possible a binding together of past and present, allowing for more knowledgeable management of a projected future by way of access to stored and codified information pertaining to the members of the tribe and their distinction from other tribes. If this knowledge of whakapapa is accumulated, stored and disseminated in a clear and rational manner, the possibility of efficient administration of matters concerning the iwi is increased on behalf of their historical rights, duties and claims and also allows for these to be kept separate from the rights and duties of other tribes.

An example of this possibility lies in the Waitangi Tribunal claims which the Trust Board embarked on as a strategic manoeuvre to improve access to allocative resources and hence, efficiency of administration to the Ngai Tahu people. [Note: at this point the Trust Board chairperson points out that it is important to distinguish between allocative resources delivered from the Crown and Ngai Tahu property rights, Article Two rights in land and resources, which Ngai Tahu have been deprived of [O'Regan; 1991]]. The criteria set out by the Crown for iwi to meet under the devolution process, will be a further example of this. The Trust Board has been able to use the 'files' it has collated for the claims, cross-claims and other projects to apply to the Select Committee for status as an iwi authority in order to achieve this power to administer activities for the Ngai Tahu tribe. The confidence gained from past strategic measures has also helped to inspire the
Trust Board's application to the Crown to be Ngai Tahu's iwi authority and hence, achieve outcomes and manage the future of the Ngai Tahu iwi.

THE ROLE OF ARCHIVES

As well as the storage of whakapapa, the Board has recognised the importance of storing all historical information about the tribe and its membership. The archives, now housed between the Trust Board offices and the Canterbury University Library, have been a means of improving efficiency of information storage, enabling more efficient access and hence dissemination, in order to intensify the capacity of the Board to achieve outcomes for its iwi on the basis of the strengths discussed earlier that such understanding of history facilitates.

The decision to establish archives of Ngai Tahu historical information was recorded in the 1977 Annual Report of the Trust Board, long before the process of devolution began. It illustrates another aspect of the Board's activities where it has taken the initiative to mobilise its authoritative resources by adopting modern techniques of storing historical information and hence, helping to perpetuate social relations across time and space, by way of 'stacking' past events so that time can be recorded.

It has long been felt by the Board that authoritative writing on the history of the Ngai Tahu people should be available to the public and to Ngai Tahu in particular. It was therefore most interested
when approached in 1976 by Mr. B.A. Nepia, Head of Department of Maori at Canterbury University, requesting its support in the establishment of a Ngai Tahu Research Fellowship... The Board felt that the need was urgent and that the longer the task was left the more difficult it would become and the more incomplete the final result would be. [1977 Annual Report; p. 10]

As in the case of whakapapa, the goal was to improve the efficiency of storing historical information by placing it within rationalised and systematic 'files'. In both cases the Board has achieved this, but it has also achieved (perhaps inadvertently in both cases) another form of mobilisation of authoritative resources: the cohesion that has occurred within the tribe by Ngai Tahu people wanting to be identified as Ngai Tahu and to know more about their heritage and culture. (Of course members of the Board are aware of the possibility that such interest in tribal identity may be due only to the opportunity people see of benefitting personally from a settlement of the claims. However, everyone I questioned agreed that this does not particularly worry the Board because their rights and identity as Ngai Tahu are what is most important.).

The Board's judgment that the fostering and support of work in the Ngai Tahu tribal histories, etc., was a proper step to take has been widely confirmed by the interest of beneficiaries. In particular, the keen interest and demand within our people for their history and other aspects of our tribal culture has been evinced at several hui
with the Ngai Tahu community over the past year. [1979 Annual Report; p. 10]

Mr. O'Regan has been in heavy demand by various sections of Ngai Tahu over the past three years at tribal wanaka or hui concerned with our history and kawa. Much of the material he has been working on has in this way been available to those of our people seeking it. [1980 Annual Report; p. 14]

The importance of knowledge of tribal history is emphasised in obituaries of Ngai Tahu people. Here is one example:

the Ngai Tahu people lost one of their best known and best loved....His knowledge of the folklore, the legends and the history of our people was outstanding. [1960 Annual Report; p. 3]

Trevor Howse speaks with a tinge of pride about how the Ngai Tahu archives have developed, mostly as a result of the claims and of the value of such archives for the administration of the future of the iwi. The focus on the land claims indicates the recognition of a necessity to mobilise authoritative resources to the highest possible degree in order to improve access to allocative resources and, in turn, to facilitate a knowledgeable management of a projected future. The land claims unavoidably involve negotiations with the Crown, but this does not mean that the Trust Board accepts bureaucratic, rational organisation of its knowledge
base simply as a way of acceding to domination by the Crown.

It's been a huge battle with the courts...but all I can say is that we've still got our own mana intact and we've held ourselves together as an iwi right through that battle. [O'Regan; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

At the 1990 Annual Tribal Hui, Trevor Howse reported on the progress of the archives, on the input from Ngai Tahu families and on the advantages of such input for the whole tribe:

out of the Ngai Tahu land claims they made a massive amount of documents on the history and all those things that go to make us up as a people. We have carefully housed that, indexed it...and generally got it into a form that we can recognise, we now know where it is and get to it with a little bit more ease than we could a year ago. Out of that whole process there has been an ongoing gathering of material from the goodwill of a lot of our families: Photographs and papers and different things which are slowly coming to hand to bolster that archives. One of our primary documents is housed in the Canterbury University archives. It is an arrangement we have to house our primary document at no cost to Ngai Tahu, but it gives us the security and protection that all those documents need.
Now within our archives in the Trust Board building is a very extensive coverage of what we hold of what Ngai Tahu is all about...and it's a primary document, and all the old documents are out at the university. So what we keep within the Trust Board building is basically working material - maps, all those different things...and I have no problem if anyone wants to have a look at anything or read anything....I will make it available.

The build-up of that whole archive is now starting to speed up and is very extensive. A lot of people would be really surprised about what I am hoarding in there. But, it is probably the best opportunity that we've had to build or rebuild whatever Ngai Tahu had as a paper history in one particular place. And I think the tribe should be quite proud of that, that the Board has seen fit to allow me to do that. And I think it's one of the strengths that the tribe should be totally aware of is the massive amount of documents which has been allowed to be collected as the background to your heritage. [Howse; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

Tipene O'Regan warns the iwi that access to the Canterbury University archives is restricted on the basis of permission from the Board. This indicates the importance that the Board places on security of stored historical information. He adds,
and we've also now got a fund which will enable us to have a data file...making access easier and that is something which is in the process of being built and we've got some funding...by curious coincidence...the purpose of that fund is to actually fund the programme so that we can get into seven tonne of paper standing 8.5 metres high and we can find our way through it and it is fully indexed. That programme is underway. It will take us awhile to develop it...but that's basically the primary task. [O'Regan; op.cit.]

So, since the initiative to begin a Ngai Tahu archives began in 1977, work on accumulation and storage of such information into rational, accessible 'files' has been progressing at a steady pace, and regardless of the outcome of the devolution process or of the land claims, this work will continue because both the Trust Board and the members of the iwi have recognised the importance of a shared understanding of tribal heritage to improve tribal identity and to manage the future of the iwi, into the next century.

NGAI TAHU MAORI TRUST BOARD CENSUS

Shanks and Tilly write about the tendency in contemporary society to adopt fields of discourse which represent a new mode of existence (as compared to previous eras) in which people become "subjectified" and "reified" as objects of knowledge. This new mode relies on new methods of classification, "hierarchization", 
codification and surveillance [1987; p. 69]. They argue that by means of the compilation of detailed records on individuals, every subject becomes a subject that can be known, subjected to a normalizing judgment and discourses of power. For Giddens, access to devices which ‘stack’ past events as well as anticipating future ones improve the possibility for profitability and power because these devices allow for the predictability of events and subject them to calculation.

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board set out in 1988 to accumulate information about Ngai Tahu tribal membership. This was done for the purpose of strengthening its power to negotiate with the state particularly as a supply of documentary proof to take to the Crown-created legal system in order to argue against settlement for need rather than settlement of right in the Waitangi Tribunal claims. This section will examine the modes of accumulation, storage and dissemination utilised in this particular project in order to analyse the effect it is having on the capacity of the Trust Board to knowledgeably manage the future and thus achieve desired outcomes for the iwi.

**ACCUMULATION**

The Census was an initiative of the Trust Board and more specifically of the former executive officer, Koa Marshall, when she was seconded from the Maori Affairs Department in 1988. Although a greater concentration of allocative resources would certainly have made the task easier, the rationale behind such projects is to improve mobilisation of authoritative resources which will ultimately
improve access to allocative resources. So the task was carried out as well as possible, indicating a high degree of mobilisation of available authoritative resources. It was an arduous task for those involved, spanning two months in which Koa and two young assistants travelled the South Island, talking with people and collecting information about names, occupations, etc., of Ngai Tahu people.

Thus, the method of accumulation relied a great deal on the ability of Ngai Tahu to communicate orally with other Ngai Tahu and to meet physically in order to collect numbers. For this, the Trust Board employees would have relied on the memories of many Ngai Tahu people with whom they were already acquainted, to provide leads and information about other possible Ngai Tahu people:

We propose to hit all our existing records, but in particular shoulder-tapping our people as we see them. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui; p. 4]

STORAGE

Once this information about tribal membership was collected it was collated and filed away in the Trust Board offices. This rational form of keeping 'files' will undoubtedly facilitate improved efficiency of retrieval and hence dissemination in cases where such information will be beneficial to the knowledgeable management of the future of the iwi. Such 'files' are undoubtedly devices which
'stack' past events in order to help anticipate future ones. The Trust Board is planning to have these files transferred to a computer system in the very near future. This will allow for even greater flexibility of collation, retrieval and dissemination of this data.

DISSEMINATION

The Trust Board's former executive officer identifies the aim of the project as facilitating efficient dissemination of information in a form acceptable within the legal system which characterises contemporary society [Marshall; 1990]. It is an example of a strategic attempt by the Trust Board to collate information in a modern, rational way in order to increase bargaining power with the state, in this case for the purposes of compensation for land lost in past generations.

Treasury are now budgeting for settlement of Waitangi cases and, with our case in particular, are doing this on a basis of number. The Crown has told Treasury that we're not large enough in number, and now the issue we are arguing is on a settlement as a basis of right....What we want is a new census....What we want is to say we have conducted a survey and this is the number of Ngai Tahu....This is a task to get our numbers as fast as we can to arm our lawyers to argue against settlement for need rather than settlement of right. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 4]
CONCLUSION

This census acts as yet another example of attempts by the Trust Board to accumulate, store and disseminate information in a way which will increase bargaining power with the state, with the ultimate goal in mind of improving upon its power to manage the future of the iwi. The former executive officer sees the census as a very powerful tool for the Trust Board's own organisation [Marshall; 1990]. She is of the opinion that the function of the Trust Board has changed since this census was carried out so that now the Trust Board is better equipped to react to the needs and wishes of the iwi as it has improved efficiency of access to this valuable information. She identifies the aim of the project as being the accumulation of knowledge for storage by the Trust Board about who are Ngai Tahu people and where they live, in order to improve efficiency of administration to the people.

The former executive officer has talked about plans to carry out another census as soon as time and resources allow. This next census will identify the skills of Ngai Tahu people which can be utilised in programmes and employment to help develop the whole iwi:

We have Ngai Tahu people in all areas of life with skills. At present we are identifying these people in the area of administration, management and directorship. We also have a large number who are currently under-employed, whose skills are
under-used, under-utilised, who need opportunity, and it is those who we have to get behind and educate in terms of skills and management. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 18]

We need to identify our runanga where they are, what skills they have, etc. We can then build a plan around them. What resources do we have? The theme which must run through all this information is to protect the unique identity of Ngai Tahu in everything we do. [Ibid; p. 20]

According to Koa Marshall, before the 1988 census was carried out, the relationship between the Board and the iwi was different. Its grants were available only to beneficiaries [Marshall; 1990]. This census is one indication of the way the Board has taken upon itself the task of changing its role so that it can act for the whole tribe in whatever capacity possible. The initiative behind the census arose out of the land claims and was quite separate from any requirements of the devolution process, but what was gathered has certainly helped to develop the structures which will comprise the iwi authority. The information gathered from the 1988 census and the one to follow will also help to keep the new structures running smoothly in the future.

**TASKFORCE ON SOCIAL POLICY**

The Ngai Tahu Submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy provides
another example of bridging the gap between 'traditional' knowledge and the modern discourse in which most knowledge is couched today. It attempted to put the feelings of members of the tribe into a readable report for reference by the government.

This submission has many partnerships embedded in it. It has been prepared on the initiative of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board with the practical and financial support of the Royal Commission on Social Policy. The detailed work has been done by a Task Force which was convened in November 1987 and travelled and consulted extensively from November 1987 to January 1988. Four members of the Task Force are Ngai Tahu...while the fifth...is from the Centre for Resource Management at Lincoln College. In addition to the resources provided by the Royal Commission and the Trust Board, the Task Force has been given practical assistance and use of facilities by the Department of Maori Affairs, and the Centre for Resource Management at Lincoln College. Most of all, the Task Force has been given time and support, encouragement and hospitality by Ngai Tahu. [Submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy by the Ngai Tahu Social Policy Task Force, 1988; p. 1]

The compilation of the report constituted a mammoth task:

The Task Force spent six weeks visiting Ngai Tahu communities from
from Kaikoura in the north to Awarua and Oraka in the south; from Wairewa in the east to Arahura in the west. Wherever possible two or three days were spent in each place or a second stop was made on the homeward journey: at a first meeting the work of the Royal Commission and the Task Force was explained; later, after an interval of some days, a second meeting was held where the hopes and concerns of the people concerned could be heard in detail. [Ibid.]

The report itself is organised in a very clear, concise manner. It has also provided information with which the Board can work (and has worked) to help rearrange its own administrative structures, i.e., setting up the Runanganui o Tahu, according to what is reported that the people want, although the information is by no means representative of the whole Ngai Tahu iwi.

The information in the report pertains to most issues currently affecting the Ngai Tahu people, including the following: suggestions for development of an economic base; use of minerals, land and fisheries; the Treaty of Waitangi and the issue of rangatiratanga versus social equity (Article Two versus Article Three); social and political structures that have been 'traditional' within Ngai Tahu and the effect of devolution on these structures, for example, the place of the 'traditional' runanga structure in the proposed new organisation and how Maori Councils will fit into this; requirements for future education of Ngai Tahu people; and practical suggestions for improving the health of the Ngai Tahu people.
The report includes charts of the social concerns identified and solutions suggested at Ngai Tahu hui. These concerns relate to women's affairs, housing, unions, the police and justice, unemployment, Department of Social Welfare administration, and child care.

The former executive officer of the Trust Board shared with me her belief that this submission is invaluable to the Trust Board's storage of information because it provides an indication of what Ngai Tahu people want from the Trust Board, from government and from their own resources [Marshall; 1990]. So even if the Crown never acknowledges their submission on Social Policy, it will be of use to the Trust Board and to the Runanganui o Tahu towards the knowledgeable management of Ngai Tahu's future, regardless of assistance from the Crown via the Waitangi Tribunal claims or the devolution process.

THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE

An analysis of development of administrative resources utilised by a minority group must keep in mind the role of access to life chances (referred to here in the Weberian sense of educational and economic opportunities available to different status groups in society) of the members of that group. For Weber and Giddens this is not something which is completely dependent on the material productivity of a given society. For Giddens, "the nature and scale of power generated by authoritative resources depends...on the life chances open to the agents" [1984; p. 261]. One example of this is mass literacy. Giddens argues that "a literate
population can be mobilised, and can mobilise itself, across time and space in ways quite distinct from those pertaining within largely oral cultures" [Ibid.]. In order, therefore, to have intricate modes to store information, a group needs to share a medium for representing, retrieving and disseminating information. This depends to some extent on the capacity of the human memory, but depth and detail are facilitated by developing skills of interpretation, made possible by technological development [Ibid.].

The majority of Ngai Tahu people do not speak Maori, especially the older generation. As Dacker makes clear, with the success of commercial relations with Europeans in the nineteenth century came the realisation that literacy, and hence education, in the European manner was necessary if the Maori was to compete [1988; p. 4].

These attitudes continued into the twentieth century. The Trust Board’s former executive officer commented that her parents and others of their generation tried to integrate their children into the Pakeha system by discouraging interest in the Ngai Tahu culture and language and by giving the males in the family English names, and she believes that this has significantly affected Ngai Tahu of her age group [Marshall; 1990].

As a consequence, even today Ngai Tahu are accused by members of other tribes of becoming "Pakehaified". All runanga meetings, tribal hui (except for greetings and some social contact), Runanganui o Tahu meetings, Board meetings,
negotiations with government agencies and departments, etc., are carried out in English. Most members of the Board speak Maori, but in formal negotiations English is spoken. There is an awareness amongst members of the iwi and of the Board to whom I have spoken that knowledge of English helps as far as negotiations with the Crown and integration into Pakeha society is concerned.

One Board member talks about how his father and others of that generation were taught skills of oratory in the English language in order to aid in negotiation with agencies and government departments. This was especially important historically for Ngai Tahu runanga because most chose to remain separate from Maori Councils and hence were alienated by the Department of Maori Affairs, who refused to acknowledge their boundaries. Knowledge of the English language and oratory skills were important for determining leadership within the runanga. This Board member claims that his father learned every word in the Oxford Dictionary of English [Solomon; 1990]. Even in the days of the Treaty of Waitangi, such skills were crucial for an understanding of the Treaty. If nothing else, those Ngai Tahu questioned do not see the emphasis Ngai Tahu have placed since the nineteenth century on the English language as a hindrance.

There is a potential danger in abandoning 'traditional' modes of communication. Giddens insists that the character of the information medium directly influences the nature of the social relations it helps to organise [1984; p. 262]. Simply by carrying out its administrative business in English, the language most characteristic of modern, bureaucratic structures, including government
departments, it is possible that the Trust Board and the whole iwi could easily lose sight of their 'traditional' social relations, which were once steeped in the oral Maori language. Adoption of the English language, which has characterised Ngai Tahu organisation since the nineteenth century for the purpose of getting along with the sovereign state structure and Pakeha society, could be viewed as no less than a sure step toward what Foucault referred to as "conceptualising the exercise of power in terms of the organisation of the state", something he warns can lead to minority groups constituting themselves in the image of the state in order to seek to accumulate comparable politico-military forces and to adopt hierarchical and bureaucratic forms of organisation [Smart; p. 108].

What saves Ngai Tahu and the Trust Board from this tendency is the renaissance throughout Maoridom of interest in the Maori language in the written form, as well as in culture. At the 1990 Annual Tribal Hui, I observed that many Ngai Tahu members speak the Maori language. They often spoke informally in Maori, but for the purpose of formal report and discussions, English was used because it was the language most were familiar with. Nonetheless, there is a strong movement for maintaining and strengthening the Maori language and teaching it to all Ngai Tahu as a means of maintaining Ngai Tahu 'tradition' and culture.

This renaissance of interest in the Maori language can therefore be seen as another attempt by the iwi and by the Board to strike a balance between the two possible discourses in order to achieve the highest possible degree of power to administer to its own people and to increase the mana of its iwi. Knowledge and
retention of the Maori language helps in completing whakapapa and historic documentation, which in turn helps to bind time-space and recall the past while managing the future. Management of the future is definitely aided by knowledge of the English language.

Knowledge of the Maori language and recording it in the written form also helps to organise social relations of Ngai Tahu iwi and the Board along 'traditional' lines of culture and kinship. This has the added effect of producing cohesion within the iwi, especially since dialects differ so much across tribal boundaries.

The Trust Board has chosen a strategic approach which balances the advantages to be gained from proficiency of its members and of the iwi in both languages.

In conclusion, one very important authoritative resource relied upon in the exercise of power in modern society is the adoption of efficient and rational means of accumulation, storage and dissemination of 'coded information' which can be used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered [Giddens, 1984; 1987]. Even before the devolution process was introduced, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board had set itself a goal of improving this particular authoritative resource. This has been especially evident since the decision by the Board to take its claim to the Waitangi Tribunal. As Hirini Moko Mead of Ngati Awa stated, "trust boards like Ngai Tahu...have been in place long enough and have gathered enough administrative skills to have considerable advantage over
smaller ones..." [New Zealand Listener, 09/07/88; p. 30].

The Trust Board has indicated therefore that it is capable of taking on whatever responsibilities the government devolves to iwi authorities but more importantly, it has indicated that it is capable of organising the Ngai Tahu iwi quite separate from any required relationship with the Crown. This has been its central aim - to improve such authoritative resources in order to improve access to allocative resources and in turn, to assert independence for the tribe.

While doing this the Trust Board has been forced to recognise the importance of the 'traditional' mana of the tribe. Therefore, it has relied on the exercise of rationally organising files about the life and history of the Ngai Tahu people, in order to control time. Control of time is a phenomenon which Giddens has identified as fundamental to the optimum capacity to achieve outcomes [1984; p.152]. The Trust Board has adopted devices which 'stack' past events since the decision by the Board to take its claim to the Waitangi while anticipating future ones.
CHAPTER FOUR:

SURVEILLANCE BY DIRECT SUPERVISION
Surveillance of individuals by those in positions of authority over them is a crucial authoritative resource for the exercise of power, "The concentration of activities within clearly bounded settings greatly enlarges the degree to which those activities can be 'watched over' and thus controlled by superordinates" [Giddens, 1985; p. 14]. If the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board wishes to assume a position of authority over the iwi, regardless of the intentions of the individual Board members, it must have access to a mode of supervision over the members of the iwi in order to have knowledge of Ngai Tahu people and thus a certain degree of control.

Ngai Tahu has never known an indigenous body interested in administering the entire tribe and hence in pursuit of surveillance over the tribe. This has been unnecessary and unacceptable historically, due to the segmentary character of Ngai Tahu society. Any supervision was carried out by the runanga, hapu and whanau leaders over their own groups. As Giddens states about such societies, the possibility of surveillance over an entire nomadic and/or segmentally divided group (like Ngai Tahu), was very limited. Within fairly confined groups such as runanga, however, certain kinds of surveillance are possible, "surveillance in the sense of supervision is only possible in established settings, due to their segmental character; and even then it rarely involves the precise co-ordination of timing and spacing that is found in modern organisations" [Ibid; p. 47]. For Ngai Tahu, these segments comprise kinship units, adding to the possibility for direct surveillance. The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board was initiated by government legislation for the specific purpose of distributing compensation from land purchases to beneficiaries.
in the form of grants. The only surveillance necessary to carry out this task was over the beneficiaries. They number approximately 4,000 out of 26,000 Ngai Tahu, according to the 1988 census carried out by the Trust Board. Surveillance was maintained by the storage of information supplied in grant applications. Surveillance was enhanced by meetings between individual Board members and their respective runanga.

The focus of the Trust Board was altered as a result of confidence gained from the decision to bring a case before the Waitangi Tribunal in the mid-1980’s. This case required the Board to ascertain the actual number of Ngai Tahu and where they live. Once this information was accumulated and stored, the Trust Board did not possess the means to directly survey the tribe as the Board only consists of eight members to deal with some sixteen runanga. Hence, direct contact between the Board and the members of the runanga was limited.

The 1981 Ngai Tahu Annual Report states that the Trust Board planned to assume a much wider range of functions than it was originally established to undertake [p. 106]. The Trust Board was of course aware of the supervisory powers that historically lay with the runanga, so after work on the land claims ended in 1988, work began on the development of a structure which would acknowledge the direct supervisory power of the runanga as well as a more "precise co-ordination of timing and spacing that is found in modern organisations" [Giddens; op.cit.] such as the Trust Board itself. This indicates a separation (hurried along by the requirements of devolution) between the
surveillance by the runanga based on their marae and 'traditional' legitimacy, and that which the Trust Board can perform due to its centralised, bureaucratic nature and collection of 'files' about the population of the iwi.

The Trust Board is really part of what Giddens refers to as "the contemporary world system" in which, for the first time in human history, "absence in space no longer hinders system coordination" [Ibid; p. 185]. There are certain elements of "system coordination" which the Trust Board considers it can take on to aid in the knowledgeable management of the future of Ngai Tahu, but it will leave the realm of 'traditional' practices to the Upoko Runanga ('traditional' runanga leaders) and members of the Runanganui.

Fundamental to Giddens’ analysis of power is the notion that surveillance takes two forms, depending on settings and what they allow:

One is the accumulation of 'coded information', which can be used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered....The other...is...the direct supervision of the activities of some individuals by others in positions of authority over them....In most types of non-modern society, the possibilities of surveillance in this second sense are relatively limited....[However] In modern organisations, either large segments of the daily lives of social actors, or substantial periods of their lives in a more 'total' setting can be subject to more or less continuous surveillance. [1985; pp.
Although there are some differences between Giddens and Foucault, according to Giddens, the latter also identifies the necessity of both types of surveillance: "Disciplinary power' as described by Foucault depends perhaps primarily upon surveillance in the sense of information-keeping, especially in the form of personal records of life histories held by the administrative authorities. But it also involves surveillance in the sense of direct supervision" [Ibid; p. 184].

The type of surveillance the Trust Board can achieve lies in its ability to widen and intensify modes of information-management discussed in Chapter Three. It will be the runanga representatives who will be able to achieve a degree of direct surveillance over the people due to the segmented nature of Ngai Tahu tribal organisation in which the runanga is still the 'traditional' base of administration and organisation. However, the runanga can still benefit from the 'files' of information stored within the Trust Board's offices.

The Runanganui was designed by the Trust Board in 1987 as a way to incorporate these two forms of surveillance, with the hope of intensifying the mana of the iwi. The structure is designed so that one representative from each papatipu runanga, and one from each of two urban runanga, is responsible for direct supervision of his/her runanga and reports to the Trust Board. Meanwhile, the Board will continue to build up its information and administration base.
In fact, the collection of 'files' of 'coded information' by the Trust Board is actually facilitating the form of surveillance undertaken by the runanga. As one Board member claims, projects such as the 1988 census and whakapapa collection by the Trust Board provided information which made runanga members aware of kin relationships that were never before specified [Solomon; 1990]. He adds that people probably knew of many of these relationships, but there was never any proof before. With this documentary proof, Upoko Runanga had more information to help them supervise the activities of Ngai Tahu and to encourage them to the runanga base. Direct supervision was then made possible by the organisation of regular fortnightly runanga meetings, the attendance at which is improving, as access to information about the iwi and kin ties improves.

As Giddens points out, "The two senses of surveillance belong quite closely together, since the collection of information about social activities can, and very often is, directly integrated with styles of supervision - something which again tends to be maximized in modern types of organisation" [1985; p. 15]. The two forms are being separated for the purposes of this analysis because each form is relied on by different aspects of the tribe. The form of direct surveillance which the Trust Board has not been able to exercise due to lack of legitimation by the runanga-based iwi, will be incorporated into the Runanganui o Tahu in order to both gain support and legitimation from the iwi and to intensify the total surveillance of the new administrative body (the Runanganui o Tahu, which includes the Trust Board as the executive arm) over the iwi.
The Trust Board has also recognised the necessity of surveillance for maintenance of tribal distinctions in the South Island, where Ngai Tahu is tangata whenua but not necessarily the majority of the Maori population. Surveillance will become even more important with devolution, because whatever group is chosen to represent the South Island as an iwi authority will be required to administer funds and programmes from government to taure here Maori (Maori in the South Island who are not tangata whenua, i.e., not Ngai Tahu).

The runanga and their marae will undertake the direct supervision of boundaries in order to maintain tribal (and even sub-tribal) distinctions. The necessity for surveillance over boundaries was evident in the 1990 cross-claims, in which the right of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board to claim compensation for loss of land in the nineteenth century was challenged by a group representing non-Ngai Tahu factions in the South Island. The following statements sum up the importance of surveillance of boundaries for the Trust Board:

What started out as an argument over a quarter of our area is now effectively 30% of our total rohe....They invade us and our task is to push them back beyond our boundaries. Peace will be made when they are off the grounds that our Tupuna drove Te Rauparaha from and that they fought for in the early stages of the settlement with the Crown. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 5]
The concern is that [other tribes setting up runanga within the Ngai Tahu rohe] would be recognised by the pakeha authorities...we would lose our mana in our own area because of our own people [i.e., other Maori people]. [Ibid; p. 13]

At the same time, the Trust Board does not want to exclude these people altogether, for as the iwi authority, it will have an obligation to the government to administer certain functions to these people. Besides this, it is possible that the Trust Board would like to be able to maintain surveillance over the actions of other groups in order to anticipate possible threats. "It is not a matter of excluding them, rather we are looking for the devices of including them within the kakahu of the iwi" [Ibid; p. 14].

The mode of collection, storage, and dissemination of 'coded information' adopted by the Trust Board made possible administrative surveillance, and hence the presentation of boundary distinctions in the High Court. However, direct supervision will be necessary once a decision is reached by the courts. There is also a concern that even within Ngai Tahu "little runanga may be set up because of the claim" [Ibid; p. 12], so Ngai Tahu has been encouraged by the Trust Board to support papatipu marae.

However, the Trust Board agreed to the recent establishment of two urban runanga in Invercargill and Christchurch, each of which has a representative on the Runanganui. The Trust Board realised the necessity of these runanga in
urban centres, where population, and hence administrative requirements (due to the complexities involved with functioning in an urban centre), are most heavily concentrated. It also realised the importance for surveillance of having a representative from each of these runanga on the Runanganui and of maintaining sound relations with the Upoko Runanga. Because these are not 'traditional' papatipu runanga, their mana has not been recognised by the rest of the tribe, but the ability of the runanga chairpersons to supervise activities of the runanga has been recognised by the Trust Board. By including these runanga on the Runanganui, the Trust Board has negated the possibility of urban Ngai Tahu setting up their own runanga outside the surveillance capacity of the Trust Board. Since a structure is necessary to deal with devolution and to widen the role of the Trust Board in a form acceptable to the runanga, it will be up to the Runanganui to determine exactly which runanga will carry mana whenua status and, hence, supervisory powers over Ngai Tahu people. At the 1989 annual tribal hui, the question was asked regarding two runanga on the West Coast, "Do we recognise one or both runanga?" The answer was given: "the mana in that question rests with the collective runanga in the Council. It is not for the Trust Board as it now exists as it goes into our own iwi transition to say who should be recognised" [Ibid; p. 16].

Some (both Ngai Tahu and non-Ngai Tahu) have suggested that members of the Trust Board are simply over-confident from their success with the land claims and are thus forcing their proposed structure on the iwi in order to widen their role and become just as centralised as was the Department of Maori Affairs. Another
possibility, however, is that the strategy to develop a Runanganui as well as an iwi authority, lies in the awareness by the Trust Board that tribal societies should not be seen negatively in terms of a failure to keep up with cognitive skills and technical development commonly associated with contemporary societies. This awareness is something which the runanga and their advocates have tried to deliver to the Board. As Giddens argues, "in some respects...it is 'modern' societies that should be defined in negative terms" [Giddens, 1984; p. 194].

Giddens argues that contemporary forms of power have not lost their connection with existential contradiction. He defines existential contradiction as an elemental aspect of human existence in relation to nature or the material world, characteristic of tribal societies. He argues that, even though 'modern' forms may have escaped from 'tradition' in the sense of being able to innovate through the use of consolidated power, they must still continue to yield to 'tradition' because 'traditional' beliefs and practices retain their hold everywhere outside the main bureaucratic centres. This is certainly true in the case of Ngai Tahu, with its emphasis on kinship which has historically rested with the whanau, hapu and runanga groups. These kinship ties bind the iwi together and provide the 'traditional' power bases to survey the iwi in a segmented manner. Any structure which tries to replace or even work alongside this 'traditional' base will have to demonstrate its advantages to the iwi in order to be legitimated because, right from the start, it will lack the power of 'traditional legitimation'.

Giddens argues that even the state has not lost this connection with existential
contradiction. Members of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board are aware that the Board as a bureaucratic organisation cannot lose sight of this basic existential contradiction, and this may be why they have accepted the Runanganui structure with the forms of surveillance it provides. The combining of the Trust Board and the runanga into one structure may work well, as it may achieve the best possible balance of surveillance strategies. Giddens draws attention to the benefits of combining two forms of surveillance:

the garnering of information discloses the patterns of activity of those to whom that information refers, and direct supervision certainly openly keeps such activity under observation in order to control it. [Ibid; p. 127]

In conclusion, the Trust Board is trying to develop a structure which will incorporate the 'traditional' mana of the papatipu runanga with its own contemporary power. This is a strategic way to maximise the authoritative resources of both direct and indirect surveillance over Ngai Tahu and other tribes within its rohe.
CHAPTER FIVE:

POWER TO GATHER WITHIN DEFINITE SETTINGS
Giddens views contexts of co-presence as having the status historically as 'carrying contexts' of interaction, and this is true even of nomadic societies [1984; p. 143]. He claims that 'traditional' societies encompass the smallest of human societies and are marked by the predominance of presence or of very high presence-availability [1981; p. 92]. By this he means the ability to gather the members of the community together into one locale, be that locale fixed or changing. 'Traditional' societies relied more on such forms of gathering for supervisory purposes, because they did not have access to the means of rational information accumulation characteristic of modern societies.

Giddens explains that in such societies the 'society' is based in the locale of the 'community', and hence a 'society' is a 'community' in two ways: in terms of time-space proximity, or high presence-availability; and in terms of cultural homogeneity, which is based in the similarity and continuity of 'traditional' practices and the significance of kinship as a medium of collectivity organisation [Ibid; pp. 100-01]. Giddens states that, "in all kinds of tribal society tradition and kinship relations hold sway as the basic media of societal integration" [1981; p. 160]. In fact, He claims that extension in time in band societies is achieved primarily via two overlapping sets of phenomena: the grounding of legitimation in 'tradition', and the fundamental part played by kinship in societal structuration.

In societies that are dominated by 'tradition', neither 'tradition' nor 'time' tend to be distinguished as separate from the continuity of events which they help to mould [1981; p. 93]. The level of time-space "distanciation" in such societies is
low because they do not have access to the authoritative resource of surveillance via 'coded information' by which to transcend limitations of time and space. Surveillance via direct supervision is possible only in restricted settings due to the segmental character of such settings, but even then such surveillance rarely involves the precise coordination of timing and spacing that is found in modern organisations. Hence, they rely on 'tradition' and kinship ties [Ibid; p. 161].

Ngai Tahu as a tribe has always been geographically scattered across a large area, being tangata whenua of the South Island. The Board’s former executive officer speaks of the remarkable stamina of Ngai Tahu people who travel miles around the country every weekend in order to attend hui, funerals or hapu or runanga meetings [Marshall; 1990]. The fact that Ngai Tahu runanga are multi-hapu in their organisation adds to the time and energy expended on travel.

Before the twentieth-century concept of the Trust Board, Ngai Tahu did not have a centralised body concerned with administering the entire tribe nor in adopting contemporary modes of surveillance to overcome the restrictions of time and space. As Giddens claims, "tribal societies tend to have a heavily segmental form, the village community being overwhelmingly the most important locale within which encounters are constituted and reconstituted in time and space" [1984; p. 142].

Historically, the power of the marae-based runanga and of ties of kinship within Ngai Tahu have made possible the gathering together of large numbers of people,
facilitating surveillance of segments of the tribe. This is true of Ngai Tahu society even today and an element that the Trust Board must acknowledge if it plans to play a large role in the management of the future of the tribe. These 'traditional' modes of presence-availability and gathering maintain themselves in contemporary society alongside attempts by groups to centralise and keep up with modern administrative forms of surveillance.

For Ngai Tahu, the right to attach oneself to a papatipu runanga is given by ownership of local land and ancestral connections to the marae, not by any agencies created by government, Maori Councils, or legislatively created tribal groups. Hence, as Giddens remarks, these rights are based on kinship and 'tradition'.

Runanga is...a voice of the people who belong to that runanga and that marae. [Tau; 4/7/90]

Papatipu marae are the runanga who everyone affiliates and whakapapa back to. [Solomon; 1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 7]

Papatipu marae are to secure the base of our identity so we have a firm foundation from which to relate to the other tribes moving around us. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 12]
As one Ngai Tahu individual has commented, "the basic theme is whanaungatanga and kinship. You can pick your friends but cannot pick your relations" [Ibid; p. 14]. Kinship will always have an unshakeable power to draw its members physically to the marae. Regardless of distance, these ties will always form the basis for potential to gather, which new organisations based on other than kinship could never have.

This is the role of whakapapa knowledge and collation in determining papatipu rights for Ngai Tahu. As Giddens argues, "kin relations are embedded in time, in that they link living individuals to the dead, whether or not this is formalised in lineage systems or ancestor worship" [Ibid.].

Harper also states that "community group cohesion...[is] strongest for family and kinship groups and least strong for groups whose affinity is based only on shared location" [1988; p. 5].

Alongside the power of a kinship base to gather its members, runanga groups can offer leaders with great oratory skills. This skill has allowed the runanga to play a more significant role than whanau and hapu organisation in the Runanganui structure. The exhibition of oratorical proficiency in the English language is a resource which allows the people to place confidence in their leaders, as it is extremely important for the achievement of negotiations with government departments and, hence, intensification of both authoritative and allocative resources. Most Ngai Tahu papatipu runanga have emphasised this particular
skill since the nineteenth century.

As Bowden points out, unlike tapu or ritual authority found in whanau and hapu groups, mana was retained only so long as the person concerned demonstrated that he possessed the kinds of personal qualities that commanded respect [1979; p. 58]. In the case of Ngai Tahu, these personal qualities included oratorical skills and the ability to deal with government agencies in order to remain separate and independent from government-created Maori Council. This was the basis for the introduction of papatipu runanga in the nineteenth century. These were not intended to replace the power of whanau or hapu, but rather to concentrate on particular skills which could draw whanau and hapu groups together and back to the papatipu marae.

As Maurice Grey points out, 'traditional' leadership patterns such as Upoko Runanga need to be preserved as they are chosen by a 'traditional' means, outside of any Crown criteria. Emphasis on 'traditional' leadership patterns is a way to give cognisance to the preservation of the mana of the people of a given runanga. He adds that the problem with government regimes is that they normally call for different styles of leadership, based on criteria which are constructed on economic models of corporate structures. The essential values inherent in these regimes are purely economic ones. The values that underpin 'traditional' tribal mechanisms start from a different base set of values which is indicative of economic skills but these values are not determinants of leadership [Grey; 1990].
The runanga was developed to be the coordinating body for whanau and hapu. As one member of the Trust Board, explains, runanga developed in the nineteenth century because of the Crown's denial of the Treaty of Waitangi so that "our people" were limited to small, scattered areas called reserves. Thus, in order to compete for recognition, an institution which could act as a coordinating body for the people was required: "we needed people who could speak for and on behalf of us" [Tau; 1990]. The small reserves which were created consist of hapu, sometimes multi-hapu, and the runanga represented their concerns, "so runanga is a voice of the people who belong to that runanga and that marae" [Ibid.]. According to another Board member and runanga chairperson, negotiation skills were one of the most important factors to consider in deciding who would take the leadership role in the runanga [Solomon; 1990].

The papatipu marae is the physical locale in Ngai Tahu society which facilitates a "means whereby actors are able to come together" [Giddens, 1984; p. 123], i.e., it provides the context of co-presence. It is able to achieve this because the skills of the Upoko and sense of cohesion offer the people hope that they can determine their own future as a group, under this leadership. Over the past five years, this power to gather has improved and in some areas managed to attract the majority of the runanga members.

As Dacker has pointed out, the result of the arrival of British settlers in New Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century was the embracing by Ngai Tahu people of Christianity, the English language, and success of commercial relations with the
settlers. This resulted in the continual loss of ties to their own 'tradition': "Every year as the settlement of the country progresses, the Natives are necessarily restricted to narrower and narrower limits, until they no longer possess the freedom adapted to their mode of life." [Dacker, 1988; p. 38]. This process continued until by the 1960's and 70's the Maori culture was almost completely lost to the urbanised Maori, and in dire need to be rediscovered. Thus, Ngai Tahu runanga leaders realised the need to draw people back to the marae. By the mid-1980's, some began to develop projects and offer incentives to make this a possibility.

One Board member and runanga chairperson comments that, "we made a conscious effort to change our whole process of thinking" [Solomon; 1990]. His particular runanga recently set up initiatives designed to free their people from government funding. This entailed an intensive campaign to bring people back to the marae base, offering incentives such as employment.

In the past five years there has occurred a renaissance of interest in the runanga, helped along by the hope provided by the land claims as well as by the intensification of particular authoritative resources which has been the result of emphasis placed by the Trust Board on these claims. The economic development unit introduced by the Trust Board has also contributed to this renaissance.

Until 1946 when the Trust Board began, Ngai Tahu had no overall body to administer or undertake surveillance over the whole tribe. It comes as no
surprise then that many Ngai Tahu groups have found it difficult to support the Trust Board and accept its attempts to carry out tasks on behalf of the entire tribe. This is especially so since the mid-1980's when the Trust Board changed its direction and decided to administer programmes and negotiate for the whole tribe rather than a small group of beneficiaries, as per its original function.

[Note: the Trust Board chairperson dates this change of direction back to the mid-1960's. He argues that the development process and the "confidence" dates from a long string of activity to do with the Maori Reserve Land Act, which led to the Mawhera Land Incorporation, numerous petitions to parliament on the Otago case and the long battle over the Titi Islands in Foveaux Strait [O'Regan; 1991]].

The changes which have occurred since the mid-1980's when the Waitangi Tribunal claims began, coincide with the start of intensive efforts by many of the runanga to draw their people to the marae and encourage runanga-based administration to meet the needs of the people.

Without support from the tribe (the sanction of physical violence is not available to the Trust Board), the Trust Board has little power to assemble large numbers of Ngai Tahu people. Attendance rates at annual tribal hui called by the Trust Board have provided an indication of this. Out of the recent census count of more than 26,000 Ngai Tahu people, only about 200-400 show up at these hui. There can be many explanations for this low attendance, ranging from
geographical access to lack of information delivery, lack of knowledge contained within the Trust Board of who and where the Ngai Tahu population are (until the census) to make circulation of notification possible, lack of awareness by the iwi of what the Trust Board stands for, lack of esteem in Maoridom for being involved with tribal issues as it may be easier to get on in the Pakeha world if the Maori population forgets its heritage, lack of incentive on an individual basis (economic or otherwise). All of these possibilities have been identified or commented on by Ngai Tahu people. The Trust Board chairperson comments that although 26,000 Ngai Tahu are entitled to benefit, the Trust Board has never claimed more than 6,000 as actually in communion with the Board. He states that "generally, we can't accommodate more than about 300 at a Hui-a-Iwi" [O'Regan; 1991].

Whatever the reason for the inability of the Trust Board to gather large numbers of Ngai Tahu people in a particular setting, the whanau, hapu and runanga bases are demonstrating increasing power in this area, and the legitimacy of these groups on the basis of kinship and 'tradition' has a big part to play in this. Giddens explains that the power generated within such societies is usually legitimated through the mechanisms of community, and this is 'traditional legitimation' [1981; p. 101].

'Tradition' as a type of legitimation should be qualified here, as it is by Giddens [1981; p. 93]. The term is not to be understood in the Weberian sense as contrasting with 'rational legitimation' which implies that 'tradition' itself has no
rational basis, i.e., that individuals and groups carry out 'traditional' practices simply because that is the way they have always been done. In the case of Ngai Tahu's adherence to the historical runanga, the people do not generally believe in the significance of the runanga for its own sake. They believe in it not only because it embodies distinctive values and standards, but also because it achieved results in the past.

As the chairperson of the Christchurch urban runanga comments, Ngai Tahu has always seen policy being made at the local level because there is an attachment between these groups and resources and an ability to draw the resources to the group. It is for this reason that the runanga will decide not to legitimate the actions of any Crown-created body [Grey; 1990]. Since the Trust Board was initially created by government legislation and is therefore an Article One body (i.e., it is answerable to the Crown and not to the iwi), the Trust Board may find it difficult in the future to gather Ngai Tahu people who feel strongly about the 'traditional' power of the runanga structure.

The Trust Board chairperson responds to this by saying that the Board has always argued that it is the agent of the people. The difficulty has been to define who, what and where are the "the people". Discussion along such lines, led the Board many years ago, to the identification of the 'traditional' runanga as a core of "the people". This discussion was led by some of the most senior kaumatua some thirty years ago, when the future of the Trust Board and what it should do to advance the cause of the people was being considered, even then [O'Regan;
Maurice Grey states that to establish a central tribal level capable of gathering large numbers of the iwi together assumes considerable agreement on beliefs and values within the tribe. On the contrary, the ability to gather is determined by differences within the tribe, and therefore the locales of gathering have historically been the runanga, not centralised structures [Grey; 1990].

He went on to express an opinion that conflict arises when government-derived mechanisms are created and 'traditional' tribal mechanisms are forced to restructure in order to meet the needs of the criteria for government-imposed regimes. The power that rests in 'traditional' leadership patterns, i.e., Upoko Runanga, also needs to be preserved as these leaders are chosen by a 'traditional' means, outside of any Crown criteria [Grey; 1990].

The Trust Board chairperson has made the point that this person is not looked upon as rangatira or authoritative in tribal forums. He comes through the church and is concerned mainly with capturing Article Three resources from the state. He adds that Otautahi is not a 'traditional' runanga and is not, consequently, seen by the Runanganui (or any Ngai Tahu hui) as having comparable standing other than in Article Three issues. Otautahi is dependent for mana on Ngai Tuahuriri and Ngati Irakehu. It is itself dependent and does not draw on 'tradition' [O'Regan; 1991].
One Board member states that the Trust Board does not have the support of the majority of the tribe. It is not because of poor intentions. He is adamant that when it comes to morals and intentions, no one could fault "them". [It is interesting that he refers to the Trust Board in the third person even though he is a member himself. He considers himself first and foremost a runanga person. In fact, when he comments on the Trust Board moving without the support of the people, he adds, "Tipene would probably disagree with me because I've always been a runanga person" [Solomon; 1990].

The Trust Board chairperson responded that this Board member and his runanga have been a driving force in strengthening the role of the Board and the way in which the Board-runanga relationship has developed. At the request of the Kaikoura runanga, the Board has been used as the financial backstop and shareholder to the development of the runanga in commercial terms. It has also been the banker. If the Board does have a satisfactory relationship with one runanga in terms of the constitution that is being evolved, then it is with Kaikoura [O'Regan; 1991].

In the case of runanga such as Kaikoura, Moeraki and Tuahuriri, the power to gather individuals within their locales is increasing as the runanga leaders have over the past five years made a conscious effort to develop an economic base for the people. This has added to the 'traditional' mana and given the papatipu runanga an extra edge over the Trust Board. A Board member and runanga chairperson states that "now it has been reversed - the runanga have got all the
money and the Trust Board doesn't" [Solomon; 1990]. He is confident that the popularity of the runanga development unit will develop further. The runanga development unit is a sub-committee of the Trust Board set up by the deputy chairperson of the Trust Board and others to provide financial support and advice to runanga interested in developing runanga-based business ventures. In order to achieve this end it uses tribally-owned capital.

The Trust Board chairperson makes the comment at this point that the development of runanga-based enterprises has actually been driven by the Board. He states that many of the runanga have been very weak and quite disorganised and the policies driven by the Board have made a huge contribution to their becoming revivified. One of the roles that the Board has had, is that it has been the consistent prop of these various elements of the tribe, and this has had a part to play in the possibility for the runanga to emerge with the strength which they are manifesting today [O'Regan; 1991].

Another factor contributing to the increased ability of the runanga to gather their members is government settlement of fishery and land claims. This will help Ngai Tahu to move into the twenty-first century with the runanga as the tribal base, able to attract large numbers of Ngai Tahu. This potential has been reinforced by the census information on just who are Ngai Tahu and where they live.

This chairperson of the Kaikoura runanga believes that more people now have contact with their runanga, though not necessarily with the Trust Board. He
attributes this partially to the resources the runanga have been able to offer their people, arising out of the fishing and land claims. In the case of the runanga which he represents, he states that before the mid-1980's there were hardly any runanga members involved, but now the runanga meetings are packed out, and people are excited about the future [Solomon; 1990].

Members of this runanga are proud of the fact that they have managed to pull twenty-five people back to the tribal base for full-time employment in a part of New Zealand which, until recently, has had an exceptionally high rate of Maori unemployment. Now runanga such as this one, which have developed the expertise to set up these employment bases are sharing their knowledge and experience with other runanga who are less well equipped and developed, so that they too will have something beyond 'traditional legitimation' to offer their people as an incentive to return.

This Board member and other Ngai Tahu [Solomon, 1990; Poharama, 1990] claim that they are not concerned with people asserting their Ngai Tahu identity in order to cash in on possible land claims settlement: "I don't care how people come back, as long as they do" [Solomon; 1990]. These people are confident that, generally, those who do return to their runanga will gain an interest in the kinship ties and 'traditional' knowledge that the runanga have to offer [Solomon, 1990; Poharama, 1990].

Tuahuriri is another papatipu runanga which has made much progress in the past
few years to draw its people back. The following statement by the chairperson of the runanga, who is also a member of the Trust Board, sums up both the realisation by the runanga that it should embark on a project to encourage people to return to their runanga base, and the efforts it has made to do so:

In the development area, we have been in that phase for quite some time - similar to Kaikoura and similar to Moeraki. We identified back in the 80's that our people were leaving our community, and the only incentive that we could bring to encourage our people to remain in our community was to provide some form of employment for our people....in 1981 we called a meeting of all of the owners of land at Tuahuriri, which involves the whole of Ngai Tahu, to look at a project and develop that land and provide employment. And therefore in 1984 we started the first [phase] in the horticultural programme - the Tuahuriri Land Development Programme....at the end of the day, what we are really saying is let us work together as a tribe. At the same time, the strength of the tribe is in our runanga areas and in our marae areas. What will evolve in the future is something that we at Tuahuriri are watching very carefully. [ Tau; 1990]

Over the years since the Waitangi Tribunal claims began, members of the Trust Board have become aware of the fears of the iwi, many of whom feel the Board has become too centralised and has left the people behind:
I think at this time it is important for us to look at what has actually been done over the last four years. We have moved at a tremendous pace. We have been responding to governments; we have been responding to government agencies, SOE's, as well as local governments. We have developed relationships with all of these agencies, and at times we've got to look back and say to ourselves, have we moved so far ahead that we have lost sight of our people? [Tau; 1990 Annual Tribal Hui]

We [the Trust Board] built a sort of multinational empire, and we left the people behind. [Solomon; 1990]

While all energies were being put into the land claims and other battles with government, some Trust Board members may have felt that this was the only appropriate way to move. Now that the court battle and the cross-claims to follow are over, however, the Board is left to deal with the continuous murmurings from the iwi. As a result, the decision was made to develop a new structure for the next century which will take advantage of both the 'traditional' power to gather which lies with the runanga and the administrative skills of surveillance which the Trust Board has developed (especially as a result of the claims). This has fit in with requirements of devolution because the Trust Board has made application for this structure to be accepted as the iwi authority for the South Island. The structure was something which had been considered before devolution was introduced in 1988, but the requirements of this policy have
certainly accelerated work on the structure.

If the Trust Board wants to play a larger part in the management of the future of the entire iwi, it must be careful that it does not attempt to replace the 'traditional' power of the runanga with its own power. It must also be careful that it is not seen to be doing so. With the confidence gained from the land and fishery claims, the Trust Board has decided to widen its own role to that of administering the anticipated settlement to the whole iwi. In order to do this, however, it must have its power legitimated by the tribe, which prefers to rely on local and 'traditional' values and power to gather the people. Hence, it has decided to invite one member from each papatipu runanga to be a representative on the Runanganui o Tahu, while keeping the Trust Board as the executive arm to do what it does best - tend to administrative and executive matters. In this way it can once again strategically balance the strengths of 'traditional' organisation with the benefits of contemporary rational organisation, in order to knowledgeably manage the future of the iwi, especially with respect to the settlement to be received from the land and fishery claims.

The Trust Board chairperson has commented that it is important to get clear that the Board members participated in a series of hui, the Board did not invite each papatipu runanga to be a representative on the Runanganui o Tahu. The membership of Te Runanganui o Tahu was decided by the hui. The Board in fact, took somewhat different positions from the ones finally adopted. The hui instructed the Board to proceed with the development, and the Board's only
function was to convene the Runanganui o Tahu. He adds that the Board has been meticulous, respecting where the mana lies in this development, because it recognises that it cannot be properly accountable to something which it controls [O'Regan; 1991].

However, the feelings of many Ngai Tahu at the Arowhenua hui in September, 1990, indicate that there are indeed groups within Ngai Tahu that would like to be included in the Runanganui o Tahu but feel they were impeded from doing so and will therefore suffer when the Trust Board begins to distribute the land claims settlement.

The emphasis that the Trust Board has placed on building up maraes illustrates its acknowledgement of the 'traditional' power and contemporary need of the runanga to gather their people: "We must not stop establishing marae. If Ngai Tahu cannot build new Ngai Tahu marae we have no future" [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 11]. The former executive officer has said that once settlement comes from the claims, approximately $4-5 million will be placed in an ongoing marae fund [Marshall; 1990]. Once maraes are improved and increased, so too will the power of the runanga to gather their people (e.g., Kaikoura), especially if programmes like Kohanga Reo and education centres, radio stations, employment schemes, health representatives and units devoted to economic development are to be developed on papatipu marae.

Members of the Trust Board have been emphatic about their aim to include
papatipu runanga in the overall Runanganui o Tahu and iwi authority. The latest
tribal hui was devoted to finalising plans for the iwi authority structure as
required under s.8 of the Runanga Iwi Act, and to development of the Charter
as required under s.9 of the same Act. At that hui, however, there were more
than a few Ngai Tahu people who voiced their scepticism about the intentions of
the Trust Board. These people indicated their concern that the Board would end
up centralising power in Christchurch.

At this particular hui, the chairpersons of both the Trust Board and the
Runanganui indicated that they were tired of discussions aimed at questioning the
new structure. This is somewhat surprising if the Runanganui is being developed
in response to genuine tribal requirements because it is the people who must be
satisfied with the form such a structure will take. Many of those Ngai Tahu who
attended the hui (c. 200-300) were uneasy about the plans that had been discussed
at previous hui and Runanganui meetings and with the pace at which these plans
were being developed. Many were not ready to accept these plans without further
discussion. In general, there was a feeling of insecurity, indicating a diminution
of trust in the Board.

When the proposed structures for an iwi authority were questioned, both
chairpersons repeatedly told those present that "Ngai Tahu Runanganui is the
policy of the people". If at the hui designed to finalise plans for an iwi authority
structure, the people still have to be convinced that what indeed is being finalised
is their policy, it is difficult to be certain that the new structure will work to the
benefit of the iwi. Statements like, "There's no difficulty with the regions; we've been through all that" [O'Regan; 1990], "surely we're not going to go through all this again; you are the people with the mana and the voice" [Anglem; 1990], and "I thought this was bringing us closer together rather than further dividing us" [Ibid.], could indicate that the Trust Board and the already established Runanganui still need to convince the iwi that this structure will work to the advantage of the iwi. They are confident themselves of the suitability of the Runanganui, but have not yet managed to ease the minds of the people that the proposed structure will work in the best interests of the rangatiratanga of both the individual and the runanga. These statements also indicate an unwillingness on the part of these two bodies to discuss and develop the new structure which the Trust Board chairperson has indicated will be crucial for taking the iwi into the twenty-first century [O'Regan; 1989].

The Trust Board chairperson commented that the unrest witnessed at the Arowhenua Hui came from: (i) a would-be urban runanga, (ii) a papatipu runanga concerned about the former impinging on its mana, and (iii) a bankrupt lawyer from Auckland [O'Regan; 1991].

It is doubtful that the Trust Board's strategy to balance the power of old with new is going to be legitimated by the majority of the iwi. Despite assurances made by members of the Trust Board that it has the support of the majority of the iwi, the attendance and comments at hui raise doubts. In fact, according to an employee for the Iwi Transition Agency, there are seven applications for iwi authority status
in the South Island. The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board is hopeful that it will be chosen as the sole iwi authority for Te Waipounamu, but three of the seven applications are from Ngai Tahu factions - one in Invercargill, one on the West Coast and one from Christchurch (Otautahi runanga) [O'Regan; 1991].

One of the major fears among the runanga is that the Trust Board will centralise power and resources in Christchurch and that those runanga who are not as well organised will lose their access to the resources and their autonomy to draw their people to the runanga, as the Trust Board will have increased resources and power to entice people to its centralised structure. As one Board member and runanga chairperson commented at the Arowhenua hui, "This is the uncertainty that has us concerned at Tuahiriri. Do we lose our rangatiratanga...it's not in here [the Crown-required Charter] and that's what's concerning everyone here. Do we give away our soul?" [Taur; 1990]. Another runanga representative from Murihiku, stated that Murihiku people want to be masters of their own destiny. The problem seems to be that the Trust Board is trying desperately to convince the papatipu runanga that by accepting the Runanganui they will not lose their tino rangatiratanga as individuals or as runanga, that they can maintain a balance between rangatiratanga for the iwi and rangatiratanga for individuals and their runanga. But many runanga (especially those who have not developed as far as Kaikoura or Moeraki) are genuinely afraid that, by accepting the Charter developed by the Runanganui (which sets out policies and guidelines for the Runanganui), they will lose their tino rangatiratanga as individuals and as runanga. In fact, one Ngai Tahu person (the Member of Parliament for Southern
Maori) warned those present, if they wanted to maintain their individual rangatiratanga, to be careful about "what you give away and decide to delegate today...because you can't have both [rangatiratanga as individuals and rangatiratanga as an iwi within the Runanganui o Tahu structure developed by the Trust Board]" [1990]. According to her (and she received much support), the runanga do not need a Runanganui to have their mana and rangatiratanga.

The reply from the Trust Board chairperson was, "We would not be going for this process if it in any way diminished the mana of a particular runanga to deal with an issue" [O'Regan; 1990].

Later, the chairperson commented that this individual did not remain for the whole of the hui and that this was the first such hui which she had attended. He saw her statements as being directly related to political battles she was having on the national front and bore no connection with the debate that had been taking place within Ngai Tahu [O'Regan; 1991].

Another problem which makes it difficult for the Board to legitimate its new-found status is that the Trust Board is limiting representation on the Runanganui to papatipu runanga: "For this purpose when Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board talk of papatipu runanga, they are talking runanga in our 'traditional' centres which are still working" [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 12]. Other groups which call themselves Ngai Tahu runanga are upset because they have not been included and must therefore continue to rely on their own power to gather their people to the runanga. These groups consist of Ngai Tahu who set
themselves up in the past as incorporated societies in order to apply for
government funding, but they were not set up along 'traditional' Ngai Tahu
papatipu boundaries.

The choice is between having a tribal council based on papatipu
runanga ['traditional' Ngai Tahu runanga-based marae] or one
based on regions [to suit Crown requirements]. [Ibid.]

This issue came to a head at the Arowhenua hui, when some Ngai Tahu runanga
questioned the decision reached at earlier hui to exclude them from the
Runanganui. The response from the Trust Board chairperson was that those
excluded were not papatipu runanga, even though they are incorporated societies
and therefore recognised by the Trust Board. They are not part of this particular
kaupapa: "they are not runanga in those terms, and we've gone through this many
times before" [O'Regan; 1990]. Later, when another Board member questioned
the choice of the Board to rely solely on the 1848 list of kaumatua as proof of
papatipu status, the chairperson repeated that "we've been through all that"
[Ibid.].

A representative from another small runanga presently drew the attention of the
chairperson to the fact that its people were never informed about hui to establish
a Ngai Tahu Runanganui, which the chairperson even more passionately denied.
Tipene O'Regan responded that this individual's father and elders had been at all
the hui while he was overseas [O'Regan; 1990, 1991]. This person was afraid,
since his runanga had been excluded, that they would lose control of their land and their rangatiratanga under this new structure. Groups like this will not support the Runanganui structure or the Trust Board and thus will diminish the power of the Trust Board to gather Ngai Tahu people together.

There are other runanga which have decided that the Trust Board has been unresponsive to their needs in the past because it has been too centralised in Christchurch. These runanga have therefore made application to be considered iwi authorities on their own accord. The Trust Board has encountered problems throughout the year regarding this issue, especially with one particular runanga on the West Coast, because it has shown a large degree of dissension from the Trust Board. Finally they agreed to disagree and remain separate because this runanga wants to be able to build up its own marae, gather its own people and remain self-sufficient. This will also diminish the power of the Trust Board to directly survey the entire iwi.

There are other runanga which are included in the Runanganui but still have little trust in the Board because of its centralised nature and potential to become even more so. These runanga will continue to build up their own base in order to intensify their access to authoritative resources to gather their people. However, they have decided to continue to associate with the Trust Board under the Runanganui structure in order to get whatever benefits may come out of that and to offer input which may help the future administration of the whole tribe.
In conclusion, it is clearly the runanga which have access to the possibility of gathering large numbers of Ngai Tahu within definite settings - the marae. This power is based on kinship ties and 'tradition' and is therefore legitimated by the tribe. This power has been intensified even further since the mid-1980's, as the runanga have had access to resources which have made it possible to offer incentives besides the 'traditional' ones in order to attract their people back to the runanga. The requirements of devolution have accelerated this process, but the real impetus has been the land claims. By creating the Runanganui structure with its emphasis on tribal cohesion and tribal mana, the Trust Board has attempted to balance the power of the runanga with its own administrative power. However, it may be that in being too selective and exclusive, the Trust Board has alienated too many Maori - Ngai Tahu and others - thereby strengthening these runanga at the expense of its own power to administer the iwi.
CHAPTER SIX:

AVAILABILITY AND USE OF SANCTIONS
Organisations of all types, according to Giddens, develop legal rules of some sort. All forms of law, in turn, involve sanctions administered in one way or another. This administration is backed, directly or indirectly, by the threat of the use of violence, but in contemporary society, physical punishment as spectacle has been replaced with the discipline of anonymous surveillance. This is sufficient to maintain an indirect threat of violence [Giddens, 1985; p. 16].

Ngai Tahu as a tribe has never relied on outside threats of violence to resolve internal disputes. Traditionally, disputes within the tribe have been resolved by way of meetings of those concerned, with reliance if need be on the 'traditional' status of kaumatua and Upoko. As Giddens states,

In tribal societies there are no separate agencies of either political administration or of legal sanctioning. Whether or not 'political' or 'legal' institutions can be said to exist in such societies has been the subject of much anthropological debate....Matters of dispute are usually dealt with, when of a serious enough kind, within assemblies of the group; sanctions may nonetheless be backed by violence or threat of violence, as where vengeance is pursued by kin groups in the form of blood feuds. [Giddens, 1981; p. 161]

In previous types of society, the regularised acquiescence of the mass of the population had not been sought or required by ruling classes....The maintenance of 'order'...was a matter of a combination
of local community control together with the possibility of armed intervention when necessary. [Giddens, 1985; p. 184]

This community control is still relied on by the runanga, while the disciplinary power of the Trust Board over the iwi depends primarily on surveillance in the sense of stored information, especially in the form of personal life histories (whakapapa) held in the Trust Board offices.

When the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board was first established by legislation in 1946, it was not legally accountable either to the iwi or to the beneficiaries. Its function was defined by a legal agreement between the Trust Board and the Crown. Therefore, the Board had the power to administer the compensation money provided by the government as its members saw fit [Trust Boards Act 1946; s. 12(i)]. This included the power to set any criteria it chose for beneficiary status.

Because the Trust Board was not legally accountable to the beneficiaries or to the iwi, it was able to cut off the payment of grants in 1986 and put all resources towards bringing the Ngai Tahu claim before the Waitangi Tribunal. Of course, a meeting was held between the Trust Board and beneficiaries beforehand in order to explain the Board's plans and gain approval, but had the Board owed a legal duty to the iwi to administer the money in a particular way, its concentration of effort into the claims would have been more difficult.
According to the Act, the Board may from time to time apply moneys out of the Fund towards all or any of the following purposes:

(a) The promotion of health
(b) The promotion of social and economic welfare
(c) The promotion of education and vocational training
(d) Such other or additional purposes as the board from time to time determines. [Ngai Tahu Trust Board Act 1946, s. 12(ii)]

Category (d) allows for a great deal of flexibility for the Board to use the money in whatever way it sees fit.

Therefore, before the requirements of devolution and plans to develop the Runanganui o Tahu, the Board owed no legal duty to the Ngai Tahu iwi and hence had a large degree of power over the iwi, at least as far as access to the allocative resources supplied by the Crown was concerned. Even though, as Giddens argues, the 'traditional' basis of Ngai Tahu organisation would never allow a centralised body to sanction the iwi politically or legally.

The Trust Board acted as the representative of Ngai Tahu for the purposes of the claims before the Waitangi Tribunal beginning in 1986. However, this does not mean that the Trust Board has gained access to power to sanction the iwi, provided it stands by its intentions to administer the settlement of the claims into the hands of the runanga.
The next phase is the negotiation of certain outcomes after the Tribunal has come to its conclusions. We would take any assets as communally owned by the tribe as a whole and operate them in separate units, almost certainly as tribally owned companies in which the Iwi is the Holding Company....What we’re interested in doing is re-capitalising our people, so that they have capital, in a tribally owned sense, to drive back into the economy. We see that capital, which will remain tribal capital, as ‘parenting’ individual and personal enterprise. Its not being cut up into little parcels. [O'Regan; 1989]

At a hui of the whole tribe in 1990, the chairperson, Tipene O'Regan, reiterated that the plan for settlement of the claim is for the Board to act as the manager of the assets of the whole iwi, but that the owner of Ngai Tahu’s communal assets will be the Runanganui. Because the Board will manage these assets, it will be accountable to the runanga rather than to government.

Distribution of the settlement will play a crucial role in the future power of the Board to impose sanctions on the iwi. As far as the runanga are concerned, it is critical that the Trust Board does not lose sight of the fact that the resources of the tribe belong with the people, in their runanga groups. Maurice Grey, chairperson of the Christchurch runanga, sees it as essential that each runanga develops a sustainable economic base to maintain its runanga identity, dignity and prestige. He feels that the outcome of a negotiated settlement of the Waitangi Tribunal recommendations should enable such developments to proceed [Grey; 1990]. He adds that the question of the role of the Trust Board in Ngai Tahu’s
economic development should be determined by the needs of the individual runanga.

Other Ngai Tahu indicated at a tribal hui held at Arowhenua in September, 1990 that they are concerned that the Trust Board's decision to limit the Runanganui to representatives of sixteen runanga is alienating some Ngai Tahu people who do not fit into these sixteen. Hence, these Ngai Tahu will not be able to benefit from the distribution of the claims settlement, even though historically they have relied on these resources. The Trust Board based its criteria for membership of the Runanganui on whakapapa back to the Blue Book, a book published in 1848 listing all Ngai Tahu kaumatua of the time. Others, including one Board member, argue that Ngai Tahu rangatiratanga goes back further than the Blue Book [Tau; 1990].

One runanga in particular sent a representative to the tribal hui held in September 1990 (as required under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990) to argue for its inclusion on the Runanganui as a means of securing a share in the claims settlement. Its representatives claim that this runanga (Manumanu) has existed for more than one hundred years and that it holds the rangatiratanga for that area: "We've come to say that we don't approve of this structure because our lands are going out of our control." They believe that under the Runanga Iwi Act their runanga is to be swallowed up by the larger neighbouring Kaikoura Runanga. "We have made representation to the Trust Board with no reply...We feel we have a right to membership on the Runanganui, but we didn't hear about
it till a month ago."

It remains to be seen what settlement will come out of the claims. Whatever group takes hold of the responsibility of distributing the settlement will also have access to a considerable degree of sanctioning power over the rest of the iwi, because the settlement will be the only asset to which the tribe will have sole access, communally or otherwise.

After the confidence gained from the claims, the Board began to consider widening its functions. The possibility of being chosen as iwi authority for the South Island as required by devolution, certainly sped up these considerations, changing also the relationship of the Board to the iwi.

As far as the runanga are concerned, the Trust Board has no right to claim the responsibility of deciding on membership to the Runanganui, nor has the Board the right to decide on distribution of the claims settlement. The Trust Board chairperson has made the point that it was the Trust Board which originally made clear to the runanga that it had no such rights over the runanga [O'Regan; 1991]. But as a safeguard, many are relying more and more on their own resources, business ventures and negotiations with government departments in order to secure an economic base for their people. Some Ngai Tahu warned the tribe at the 1990 Arowhenua hui to be careful of what they give away to the Trust Board's proposed Runanganui if they want to maintain their individual rangatiratanga. Some are afraid that they will not be able to have both - individual and tribal
rangatiratanga. One Ngai Tahu woman made this quite clear at this hui, "We don't need a Runanganui to have our mana and rangatiratanga." The Trust Board chairperson has assured the iwi however that "we would not be going for this process if it in any way diminished the mana of a particular runanga to deal with an issue" [O'Regan; 1990].

THE CHARTER [APPENDIX A]

In the ensuing section an examination will be made of the sanctioning power afforded by the Crown-required Charter [Runanga Iwi Act 1990, s. 9]. As this Charter is required to be developed by all iwi authorities, the responsibilities, rights and duties it provides for the iwi authority (of which the Trust Board is a part) can be considered as the real and direct result of the devolution process. This power of sanction will be investigated with respect to three groups: (i) the Ngai Tahu iwi, (ii) non-Ngai Tahu Maori, and (iii) the Crown.

(i) Ngai Tahu iwi

The guiding principles of the Charter (s. 6) indicate that the Trust Board will have little sanctioning power over the iwi. The Trust Board will comprise only one arm of the Runanganui o Tahu (although the centralisation of headquarters in the Trust Board offices adds to the possibility of centralisation of power). The guiding principles indicate that the Trust Board is to be guided by 'traditional' principles such as (i) tino rangatiratanga and (ii) the Treaty of Waitangi. These
principles historically see the resources resting with the runanga. Once again, however, there are Ngai Tahu who are sceptical that the Trust Board will indeed distribute resources fairly amongst the runanga. There are others who believe that the job of distribution of resources should not lie with the Trust Board at all. Once again, the Trust Board chairperson has commented that the Board agrees that it should not have distribution rights, such responsibility should be with the Runanganui [O'Regan; 1991].

The third principle set out in s.6 of the Charter guarantees accountability of the Runanganui o Tahu to the Ngai Tahu iwi. This would seem to allow the Trust Board little independence to act without the consent of the runanga. Unfortunately, there are Ngai Tahu groups who see the Trust Board as a body which has unilaterally decided which Ngai Tahu will comprise the Runanganui and, therefore, to which runanga it will be accountable. The Trust Board chairperson responded by saying that this is not a valid point. He argues that demand for membership came from Ngai Tahu hui [O'Regan; 1991].

The aims and objects of the Runanganui o Tahu are listed under s.7 of the Charter. One of the three aims is "to act as the legal tribal entity for Ngai Tahu for the purposes of the Runanga Iwi Act". Thus the Trust Board and the Runanganui have set themselves up to administer and distribute only those rights and responsibilities which arise out of devolution. Therefore, they have little power to sanction the iwi in areas outside of the devolution of government programmes. The tribe must now survey the Trust Board in order to ensure that
it does not try to set itself up as a pan-Ngai Tahu body capable of exerting sanctioning power over the iwi in other areas such as distribution of the claims settlement and other resources. As long as the Trust Board carries out its function as an iwi authority, it will be required to continue acting for the iwi and will have little power of sanction over the iwi.

This is especially so if the third aim in s.7 is adhered to: "to protect, advance, develop and to unify the interests of Ngai Tahu in the spirit of Tino Rangatiratanga implicit in the Treaty of Waitangi". Thus, the Trust Board will have to recognise that the resources referred to as part of Ngai Tahu's rangatiratanga and in the Treaty lie with the people and their runanga. It will be up to the runanga to ensure that the Trust Board acts accordingly.

Unilateral sanctioning power by the Trust Board is safeguarded to an extent by s. 17 of the Charter, which provides that any provisions of the Charter may be amended if supported by a 75% resolution of the members of the Runanganui o Tahu at a special meeting. As well, s. 16 provides that any resolution at any meeting must be passed by a majority of 75%.

The iwi authority will also be required to hold an annual tribal hui to consult with and listen to members of the iwi. These meetings are to be chaired by the Runanganui o Tahu chairperson, rather than the Trust Board chairperson. Conflicts between members of the iwi and the iwi authority are to be resolved at the annual tribal hui if they cannot be resolved beforehand. This is in keeping
with 'traditional' modes of conflict resolution. However, it must be remembered that many Ngai Tahu do not attend tribal hui (for any number of reasons, as listed in Chapter Three).

The powers of the Ngai Tahu iwi authority are laid out in s.19 of the Charter. This section grants the iwi authority power to:

(i) Enter into contracts,
(ii) Buy or sell any interest in land or other property,
(iii) Employ persons,
(iv) Hold property on trust,
(v) Receive donations,
(vi) Conduct litigation on behalf of the iwi,
(vii) Borrow funds,
(viii) Do any other thing necessary to carry out the purposes of the Runanganui o Tahu.

It must be remembered again that the Trust Board comprises only one part of the Runanganui o Tahu. The crucial power in the near future will be that laid out in s.19(ii), to buy or sell any interest in land or other property. This will be especially sensitive in light of the anticipated settlement of the claims brought by the Ngai Tahu Trust Board before the Waitangi Tribunal. The runanga must watch the Trust Board and the Runanganui closely to see who will have access to this settlement.
(ii) Non-Ngai Tahu

The chairperson of the Trust Board and other Trust Board employees have indicated that only for the requirements of the Crown will the Board or the Runanganui accept any obligations to administer non-Ngai Tahu living in the South Island. For all other matters, the Board will utilise any sanction available - 'traditional' or modern - to ensure that resources within the Ngai Tahu rohe remain in Ngai Tahu hands, solely for the benefit of Ngai Tahu.

In the Charter, provisions are made for dealing with these other groups:

The interests of ruranga [by the definition provided in the Runanga Iwi Act 1990, a Maori who is for the time being resident within the rohe of an iwi and who is not a member of that iwi] are to be recognised and protected by the Runanga [iwi authority] in the following ways: (i) The Runanga will recognise the right of other Incorporated Runanga [iwi authority] to establish taure here for ruranga residing in the takiwa of the Runanga. (ii) The Runanga will make provision for ruranga in addition to providing for Ngai Tahu. [s.8]

However, as the chairperson of the Trust Board has made abundantly clear,
Also there's been the devolution process. Very early we took over the operation of MANA and MACCESS in the whole of the South Island, also for the benefit of non-Ngai Tahu. We don't want to continue that, so as soon as they're up and running they can look after themselves. [O'Regan; 1989]

We face the prospect of government funding into non-Ngai Tahu groups. This is seen as part of the tribal development exercise. Increasingly we are in competition with them...The government will say to us, what about all the other tribes? We can say they are living under the kakahu of our manawhenua. We owe them a duty in the area of equity and fairness but it is us that distributes. This is already happening in MACCESS and MANA....so that in areas of local and regional government relationship, social services administration we have to have a model in which we are fair to those people and give them a voice but they are clearly under the kakahu of our manawhenua. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 17]

We have a heavy representation of other tribes in the decision-making process on MANA and MACCESS. We intend to extend that considerably, right across the whole social equity sector. But what we are utterly opposed to is having two iwi authorities or other iwi authorities on our patch. [O'Regan; 1989]
The cross-claim which took place in the High Court in 1990 provides an indication of the sanctioning power the Board is trying to engage in order to keep Ngai Tahu resources and power separate from those of other Maori in the South Island:

They invade us and our task is to push them back beyond our boundaries. Peace will be made when they are off the grounds that our Tupuna drove Te Rauparaha from. [1989 Annual Tribal Hui minutes; p. 5]

The Trust Board has made it clear that apart from government requirements, where funds will be provided for the administration of programmes to all Maori in the South Island, all possible sanctioning powers will be utilised by the Board and the Runanganui to keep non-Ngai Tahu from benefiting from Ngai Tahu resources. So far, it has used the New Zealand court system to try to impose sanctions against both Ngai Tahu and non-Ngai Tahu groups who have threatened Ngai Tahu boundaries and access to resources.

It has already been established in Chapters Four and Five what other steps the Trust Board has taken to ensure such distinctions. The setting of particular criteria for acceptance into the Runanganui, for example, has been one form of sanctioning power used by the Trust Board to keep unwanted groups out of Ngai Tahu’s future decision-making structures.
Members of the Trust Board are aware that there are limits to the sanctioning power of the Board where non-Ngai Tahu are concerned. The Trust Board must be careful about how it treats non-Ngai Tahu due to the fact that in the North Island, it is Ngai Tahu people who are considered taure here [Maori living outside their tribal rohe] within the manawhenua of other tribes.

Just like taure here groups do here, we would expect other iwi authorities in the North Island to offer the same principles of equity in decision-making and distribution that we propose for those living amongst us. [O'Regan; 1989]

The Crown

For quite some time the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board has made it clear that it will take whatever steps possible to impose sanctions against the Crown where it feels the Crown has treated Ngai Tahu people without fairness or equity. The use of sanctions here refers not to punishing the Crown, but taking whatever measures possible with the resources available to achieve from the Crown what it believes the Ngai Tahu people are entitled to as members of the New Zealand population and partners to the Treaty of Waitangi.

The battle before the Waitangi Tribunal for land and fisheries provides an example of attempts by the Trust Board to sanction the Crown. Back in the mid-1980's, the Trust Board determined that adherence to the Treaty and its
assurances of partnership would be the best approach to achieve autonomy over Ngai Tahu resources. It also decided that working within the New Zealand court system would be the best strategy to achieve this goal. The Board had some skills which helped in this battle, and it utilised whatever resources it could acquire to follow through this chosen strategy of sanction against the Crown.

Within the requirements of devolution, however, including the construction of a Charter by the Runanganui o Tahu as iwi authority, the power of sanction against the Crown is very limited. Basically, what the Crown requires under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 is for the Trust Board (more precisely, the Runanganui o Tahu) to act as the legal tribal entity so that programmes and responsibilities once in the hands of the Department of Maori Affairs can be channelled. This is with no guarantee of funding. The iwi authority still has power to conduct litigation on behalf of the iwi, but as in the past, this will always be at the expense of Ngai Tahu. However, the Trust Board has gained confidence in its ability to understand legislation and therefore to pursue issues in the court system, and hence, plans to continue to rely on these resources in the future.

The Runanga Iwi Act 1990 affords the Trust Board no more power to facilitate sanctions against the Crown than it has had before, and the Charter simply reflects this. The Trust Board has therefore put resources and energy into developing the Runanganui structure, designed to be independent of government requirements. Ngai Tahu are tired of the dependency model inherent in its relationship with the Maori Affairs Department and which they believe is still at
the heart of the devolution policy. Therefore, in order to be able to facilitate sanctions against the Crown and assert independence, the Trust Board is developing a structure alongside the iwi authority which will be answerable only to the iwi and which will concentrate its energies on building up Ngai Tahu people and resources in order to be self-sufficient and independent from government.

THE CONSTITUTION [APPENDIX B]

There is no power of sanction provided for the Trust Board by way of its Constitution, which sets out only the relationship of the Runanganui to the iwi. Section 5(iii) provides that no member of the Trust Board shall be a member of the Runanganui.

This Constitution is not required by the Crown and hence holds no significance as a legal document within the New Zealand legal system. The rationale behind developing the Constitution was to set out clearly the relationship (rights, duties and responsibilities) which is to exist between the newly formed Runanganui and the Ngai Tahu iwi. It is to remain as something quite separate from the Charter, as it refers to Ngai Tahu matters and not to Crown matters, such as devolution. For the Trust Board and the Runanganui, this is the basis of its importance - it is a document which refers to Ngai Tahu structures and resources alone.

However, the Constitution affords the Runanganui many of the same powers as
the Charter affords the Trust Board. The power of sanction ascribed to the Runanganui by the Constitution will be discussed with respect to three groups: (i) the Ngai Tahu iwi, (ii) non-Ngai Tahu Maori, and; (iii) the Crown.

(i) Ngai Tahu iwi

The guiding principles of the Runanganui, set out in the Constitution, are exactly the same as those of the iwi authority as set out in the Charter.

One of the objects listed in the Charter, "To protect, advance, develop and to unify the interests of Ngai Tahu in the spirit of Tino Rangatiratanga implicit in the Treaty of Waitangi" [s. 7(i)] is also listed in the Constitution [s. 4(iii)].

It was suggested by both Ngai Tahu and one representative from the Iwi Transition Agency at the 1990 Arowhenua Hui, that in the future there could be clashes between the runanga and the Trust Board over whom the rangatiratanga implicit in the Treaty rests with. If this should happen, the Runanganui will be placed in the position of having to choose whether it will support the 'traditional' runanga claim of rangatiratanga or that of the Trust Board.

If both the Runanganui and the Trust Board are committed to the Treaty and there is a discrepancy over which elements of the tribe own certain resources, it will be up to the runanga and their representatives on the Runanganui to ensure that the Trust Board does not use the power to sanction which the Charter may
provide. This will possibly become an issue when distribution of the claims settlement by the Runanganui o Tahu begins.

Under s. 4(iv) of the Constitution, the Runanganui has the power to do anything necessary to ensure that the aims of rangatiratanga implicit in the Treaty are adhered to. However, if a clash should occur, the power of sanction will ultimately be determined according to which group (the Trust Board or the runanga) can best utilise the various alternative authoritative and/or allocative resources at their disposal. The Charter as a document will carry with it a greater degree of sanctioning power than the Constitution within the New Zealand legal system, but the 'traditional' organisation of Ngai Tahu carries with it its own power to sanction non-Ngai Tahu if the need should arise.

The powers of the Runanganui listed under s. 18 of the Constitution are the same as those of the iwi authority listed under s. 19 of the Charter (as set out in the section above on the Charter). If both the Trust Board and the Runanganui are endowed with the same powers by way of these separate documents and both purport to be acting on behalf of the iwi, there will once again be potential for clashes. It would seem that both groups have been given equal power of sanction over the iwi. What remains to be seen is whether the existence of the Runanganui and its Constitution will serve to reduce the power of the Trust Board.

(ii) Non-Ngai Tahu
The Constitution provides no power of sanction over taure here groups in the South Island. It is a document which sets out only the rules of the Runanganui, which, in turn, is concerned only with incorporating representatives from each of the fourteen papatipu runanga and two urban runanga, in order to organise structures designed to deal solely with Ngai Tahu issues and resources.

(iii) The Crown

There is little in this document which refers to the Crown, and no power of sanction over the Crown afforded by it. The objects of the Charter included setting up a body to act as the legal tribal entity for Ngai Tahu for the purposes of the Runanga Iwi Act 1990, thereby providing for administration to taure here groups as well. The objects of the Constitution on the other hand, which refer to the Crown, include the assistance in the incorporation of a Runanga [iwi authority] under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 to represent Ngai Tahu and "to assist and support the Runanga [iwi authority] to be incorporated under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 to represent Ngai Tahu in the performance of its functions in accordance with its Charter" [s. 4(ii)].

The Runanganui is afforded no power of sanction over the Crown by the Constitution because it is simply one arm of the iwi authority. Hence, the Runanganui has no power to deal with the Crown without the other arm of the iwi authority - the Trust Board. However, the Runanganui still forms a significant part of the iwi authority, so whatever powers of sanction are ascribed to the Trust
Board by the Charter are also ascribed to the Runanganui members, who outnumber the Trust Board members by 16 to 8 on the iwi authority.

In conclusion, the Trust Board, as a modern bureaucratic organisation, has developed rules for how it is to deal with the Ngai Tahu iwi, non-Ngai Tahu Maori, and the Crown. These rules are set out in the Charter and are backed by the power to sanction through the New Zealand legal system. As long as the Trust Board can maintain surveillance over the Ngai Tahu iwi, non-Ngai Tahu Maori and the Crown, it can ensure that the rules set for its new role are adhered to.

However, the 'traditional' Ngai Tahu runanga have never relied on an outside body to set rules for their behaviour, nor to survey them to ensure that such rules are followed. The runanga prefer to settle disputes within the tribe and, more particularly, within their individual runanga. If they are to gain the benefits which the Trust Board has said will come from forming a united tribal front, the runanga must compromise some of their 'traditional' autonomy. Hence, the Runanganui will act as the union of the runanga in the future. It will be the Runanganui which will represent the interests of the runanga. So, the Trust Board must be careful to accept the interpretations of Ngai Tahu rangatiratanga presented by the Runanganui and incorporate this into its plans to administer assets (such as the distribution of the claims settlement and possible government funding to result from devolution) to the tribe.
The iwi authority has the power of sanction provided by the Charter to help it carry out its functions, but the Runanganui forms part of the iwi authority and, hence, will be able to keep the Trust Board aware of runanga wishes. If it cannot do this, there will be clashes in the future. However, even though the Runanganui Constitution is not a Crown-created document, it still allows for the Runanganui to take measures within the court system, to ensure that tribal rangatiratanga is fulfilled. The first mode of dispute resolution preferred by the runanga is the 'traditional' way of dealing with such matters within assemblies of the runanga, or between runanga assemblies. It is the hope of both the Trust Board and the Runanganui that this approach will continue to be used in the future.
CHAPTER SEVEN:

DISCOURSE, IDEOLOGY AND POWER
For Giddens, the development of states, or in the case of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, administrative bodies organised in a bureaucratic manner, is convergent with the formation of modes of discourse which shape what state power is [1985; p. 209].

Foucault also postulated that power relations are accompanied by discourses, programmes, etc., which furnish those power relations with a rationality of their own [Cousins and Hussain, 1984; pp. 247-8]. Foucault, however, does not like to refer to these discourses as formations of ideology because, to him, the notion of ideology implies that there is a 'truth' to which it stands in opposition. He prefers to examine how groups historically produce effects of 'truth' by development of discourses which themselves are neither true nor false [Foucault, 1980; p. 118].

However, it is difficult to distinguish Foucault's notion of 'effects of truth' from Giddens' notion of ideology. Foucault refers to 'truth' as "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements" [Ibid; p. 133]. He sees 'truth' as linked circularly with the system of power which produces and sustains it.

Giddens argues that in 'traditional' tribal societies (like Ngai Tahu), the discursive articulation of administrative power is relatively limited, by and large not reaching the mass of the population. System integration of 'traditional' societies and organisations did not depend significantly, therefore, upon the acceptance of particular symbolic orders by the majority of the members. What mattered was
the hegemony achieved through acceptance by the members of the dominant group [Giddens, 1985; p. 16]. Once a particular ideology had been created by the leadership, subjects within the wider group were left to accept.

In the case of Ngai Tahu, however, its segmented character has made it impossible historically for any such administrative body to exist. The hapu and runanga have always preserved a high degree of autonomy over their own community life, their labour and most other behaviour, including in relations with other hapu, runanga or tribes.

Traditional societies (tribal organisation) differ from states (or organisations such as the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board), according to Giddens, in the following way:

It is in the nature of agrarian states that the discursive articulation of administrative power is relatively limited, by and large not reaching the mass of the population. Distinctive of the modern state, however, is a very considerable expansion of the reflexive monitoring of state activity... The expansion of state sovereignty means that those subject to it are in some sense... aware of their membership in a political community and of the rights and obligations such membership confers. [Ibid; p. 210]

Giddens does not imply that oral cultures lack the 'means of mental production'. However, the lack of a discursive mode (for example, the written form of
information-management characteristic of modern bureaucratic organisation) for the articulation of policies and collation of information is something which 'traditional' groups such as hapu and runanga were without, and hence they lacked the power of formation of ideology that such a discursive mode can facilitate.

He continues,

Some of the main dimensions of ideology in modern states are to be discovered in the nature and scope of discursive articulation of information available in the 'public' domain. In the context of the modern state, the capacity of different groupings to discursively formulate policies or programmes that express their interests and to make space in the public domain for printing them, are vital.

[Ibid; p. 211]

Referring back to Chapter Three, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, since it was established in 1946, has built up a considerable scope of discursive articulation of information, which no Ngai Tahu body before has ever matched. The Trust Board has certainly indicated a capacity to use rational methods of information-management in order to "discursively formulate policies or programmes" and to present these publicly.

Giddens adds that as well as the degree and nature of the discursive formulation
of interests, the following three substantive aspects also influence the formation of ideology in modern organisations:

1. The definition of what is to count as 'political' and, therefore, in principle open to intervention or control on the part of the state.

2. The definition of practices, programmes and policies that are in the 'general interest', as opposed to those that favour the sectional interests of groups or classes. The more the state becomes administratively unified, the greater the degree to which government must appeal to the 'general interest'...in order to sustain a basis for its rule.

3. The articulation of 'historicity' in relation to planned or actual trends of social change. The reflexive monitoring of all states involves the invention of 'history' in some sense or another - the documented interpretation of the past that provides an anchorage for anticipated developments in the future. [Ibid; pp. 211-2]

As part of its strategy to intensify its access to both authoritative and allocative resources, the Trust Board has made every attempt to create an ideology which will leave the Crown, the public and the entire tribe with the impression that it is sufficiently well organised (indeed, better organised than any other group) to administer the activities of the Ngai Tahu iwi.
In order to do this, the Board has developed an impressive scope of discursive articulation of information available to the Crown, the iwi and the general public. Its ability to do this has been examined extensively in Chapter Three.

As well, the Board has developed the three aspects of its discursive formulations (as listed above, according to Giddens) in order to create further conditions capable of influencing the formation of ideology.

**Category One:** The definition by the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board of what is to count as 'political' and, therefore, in principle open to intervention or control on the part of the Trust Board

The Trust Board has indicated that it will take on the responsibilities devolved from the Department of Maori Affairs, as these have always been defined as 'political' (by the Crown). The Trust Board has made an effort over the years to discursively formulate its policies and publicise them so that now it can present itself to the tribe and to the Crown as the body most capable of taking on the devolved responsibilities and hence, most capable of intervening in the lives of the Ngai Tahu people.

The second area that the Trust Board is attempting to define as 'political' is the distribution of the land claims settlement, which will form the basis of economic development policies for the entire tribe in the future. The strategy is to take the settlement from the claims and distribute it to runanga who have developed ideas for business ventures (with the help of the Trust Board's economic development
unit) so that the settlement will be communally owned (by the runanga represented on the Runanganui).

We want a structure by which the Trust Board is accountable to the iwi....That will largely come from the Ngai Tahu claim, and it involves land, money and areas of shared control....The next phase is the negotiation of certain outcomes after the Tribunal has come to its conclusions. We would take any assets as communally owned by the tribe as a whole and operate them in separate units, almost certainly as tribally owned companies in which the Iwi [Runanganui o Tahu] is the Holding Company....What we’re interested in doing is re-capitalising our people, so that they have capital, in a tribally owned sense, to drive back into the economy. [O’Regan, 1989]

It is this wish to politicise the economic development of Ngai Tahu which forms the rationale behind the newly developed Runanganui structure:

We want a structure by which the Trust Board is accountable to the Iwi for what belongs to the Iwi....The runanga themselves will produce a Runanganui, which will be the Parliament of the Iwi, and the Board will be accountable to the Runanganui. [Ibid.]

Closely linked to this are the attempts by the Board to indicate to the tribe the necessity of having a central body to administer and organise the activities of the entire tribe, both in the light of forthcoming settlement of the claims and in the
light of devolution requirements, as well as for the future of Ngai Tahu generally. The formation of this ideology will help the Trust Board set itself up as the representative body for the entire tribe.

Concern is that a body be there...which is going to be able to be the shareholder to manage and handle us all and define policies which will benefit obligations. [Annual Tribal Hui 1989 minutes; p. 11]

The Act or not, we need a structure that will take us into the new century and will deal with the claims settlement. [O'Regan; 1990]

It is the Trust Board's view that devolution is a secondary consideration. The primary one is structure which derives from our needs to administer our assets. [Annual Tribal Hui 1989 minutes; p. 11]

We have in fact been attempting to develop a unit. That has now been formed and is called our Iwi Economic Development Unit. It is very important to the future of Ngai Tahu....In addition to that we have a Ngai Tahu trading company. Now, that trading company in time to come is going to play a major role in the development of Ngai Tahu....So we are putting these structures into place to aid in the overall economic development of our iwi...it will be another generation of commitment by our people to be successful. [Tau;
Following on from this are attempts by the Board to indicate its capacity to formulate policies and programmes and hence, to indicate that it is the best organised body for administration to the tribe. Once again, the level of skills in the area of information-management (as discussed in Chapter Three) is very important for the formation of this ideology, the emphasis being on modern, rational management of information.

The production and distribution of very professional and business-like Annual Reports since 1956 serves as one indication of the image the Board has tried from the start to create for itself. Right from the first of these reports the Board engaged in a particular discourse, stating that its aims were to conduct its affairs as "efficiently" and "expeditiously" as possible [1957 Annual Report; p. 8].

Present policy aims at keeping administration costs as low as possible, while still maintaining efficiency. [1960 Annual Report; p. 5]

With the ideology of efficiency and administrative skills which the Board has formed over the years, it gained the confidence to engage in the Waitangi Tribunal claims in 1986 on behalf of the whole tribe. As well, it made the following statement in 1981, in response to the government's proposed Brown Paper:
It is proposed that this Board would comprise the Runanga for the Ngai Tahu tribal area and that it would assume responsibility for a much wider range of functions that at present. Those would include many of those currently in the hands of the Maori Affairs Department which would become primarily a servicing department. [1981 Annual Report; p. 15]

The submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy by the Ngai Tahu Social Policy Taskforce [January 1988] was prepared on the initiative of the Trust Board with the financial support of the Royal Commission. In this report, a blanket statement was made:

Ngai Tahu see themselves as the single tribal authority from Te Paranuio Whiti across the South Island to Kahurangi Point and South to Rakiura (Stewart Island) and beyond. For this region the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board is seen as the only tribal authority and all other tribal groups that are set up are incorporated within the Ngai Tahu Trust Board. [pp. 14-15]

The Ngai Tahu Taskforce thus recommended that:

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board be the tribal authority for Ngai Tahu - Te Waipounamu - and that the Department of Maori Affairs devolve its work here into the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust
Board, and that there be a partnership between the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board and the Government in regards to the devolution process to allow a progressive change of responsibilities from the Department of Maori Affairs. [p. 7]

Even the Iwi Transition Agency is aware how administratively well equipped the Trust Board is: "If we walked out, the programmes would not stop. There would be some problems, that's natural" [Stevans, Iwi Transition Agency; 1990].

The ideology that the Trust Board has tried to form amongst its members and for the Crown is summed up in the following statement by the chairperson:

My generation of Trust Board members has seen a major task of the Trust Board as being the continuance of the battle over the claims that have been running since 1848. Previous Trust Board members have taken that view too, because it is the only pan-Ngai Tahu structure that we have had. [O'Regan; 1989]

The pride of the Trust Board members and staff in the accomplishments of the Board is fierce. This was one of the very first observations to strike me and a theme which has been strong and recurrent through the research. Their pride is mostly in the administrative and executive skills and accomplishments of the Board over the years, especially since the claims began. As a result, the Trust Board is steadfast in its conviction that it is the best possible iwi authority for the
South Island and must also remain a central part of the Runanganui o Tahu. Regardless of what the rest of the Ngai Tahu population believes, this ideology has kept the Trust Board going from strength to strength.

I think our leadership at the moment is probably the best thing we’ve had. They have pushed a lot of issues. [Marshall 1990]

I always advocated the Trust Board was the best choice [for iwi authority] because of their administrative and executive skills and experience. [Solomon; 1990]

I think the tribe has a better administration on a wider base than it has ever had. [Ashton; 1990]

the elected political and administrative leadership of our tribe as a whole in the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board... [Tau; 1990]

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board currently administers Government programmes, and takes some pride in the quality of its administration. [Ibid.]

The Trust Board has been marked by careful and prudent administration. It has parented the resources which were an outcome of the 1946-47 negotiations, though they’ve been declining
against inflation, and it has managed to build up an asset base.
[O'Regan; 1989]

Very early we took over the operation of MANA and MACCESS in the whole of the South Island....We've done that very efficiently and had a good taste of working in an ongoing contractual relationship with the Crown. It is something we can do well across a range of areas. This has swelled the administration. [Ibid.]

**Category Two:** The definition of practices, programmes and policies that are in the 'general interest' as opposed to those that favour the sectional interests of runanga or hapu. The more the Trust Board and the Runanganui o Tahu become administratively unified, the greater the degree to which this body must appeal to the 'general interest' in order to sustain a basis for its rule.

There exists a degree of overlap here with the second issue listed in category one - i.e., that the settlement of the Ngai Tahu claim will be tribally owned and distributed so that runanga ventures will benefit.

Behind the emphasis of the Trust Board on structures designed to administer Ngai Tahu individuals (i.e., the iwi authority and the Runanganui o Tahu) lies a huge emphasis by the Board on unity and tribalism. The Board is forming an ideology that Ngai Tahu is unified and strong as a tribe and should remain so. Members of the Board, in particular its chairperson, attempt to display a united
front to the Crown and to the public, especially regarding the Waitangi Tribunal claims. According to the chairperson, the Treaty formed a partnership between the tribes and the Crown; if tribalism falls apart, so too does the partnership. Hence, an ideology has been developed which puts Ngai Tahu as a tribe first. The following statements are examples of this process.

There's a number of critical things in the Iwi Empowering Bill. One is that the tribe will have its legal personality, which was taken away in 1863, re-established. The tribe will exist....The legal personality of the tribe is a fundamental Treaty issue of enormous importance. [O'Regan; 1989]

Our tupuna within a traditional way was always inclusive, we are all Ngai Tahu. [Annual Tribal Hui 1989, minutes; p. 11]

We've got to move as a tribe, and I mean that, especially with what's happening today. We are not a whole lot of tribes within one tribe; we are one tribe. [Croft, Runanganui representative; 1990]

in moving our iwi forward, we must go with unity because that's where our strengths lie....So we divide up into regions - what happens? Instead of having one strong united voice, we have dozens of voices. [Anglem, Runanganui chairperson; 1990]
Tribal iwi is number one. [Langsbury; 1989]

The important thing of all this is that we have mana as an iwi, as a Treaty partner, for the first time since 1863. [O'Regan; 1990]

According to Giddens, with the coming of the nation-state, states (and administrative bodies such as the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board) have an administrative and territorially ordered unity which they did not have before. He adds that this unity cannot remain purely administrative because the coordination of activities presumes elements of cultural homogeneity (such as tribalism provides) [1985; p. 219]. The extension of communication cannot occur without the involvement of the whole community.

The ideology of unification and tribalism stands in opposition to what some members of the wider Ngai Tahu community want. Many Ngai Tahu feel that hapu and runanga should remain the basis of organisation within the tribe, as this is how it has been historically. Some envisage conflict arising out of the Trust Board's efforts to take on such roles as Ngai Tahu representative for the Waitangi claims or iwi authority for the South Island. This conflict arises out of the fact that these roles will clash with the Trust Board's original function as laid out in the 1946 Trust Boards Act [Grey; 1990].

The response of the Trust Board chairperson is that this issue has been clearly
discussed in tribal hui and the outcome was a decision to wind up the Board and reestablish it under a separate structure [O'Regan; 1991].

A central problem which the Trust Board is faced with is the feeling amongst some Ngai Tahu that by emphasising tribal unity, the tribal status quo will be upset. Policy has always been made at the local level because these are the people who are closest to the resources and are hence the repository of knowledge because there is a traditional attachment between them and the resources. The Trust Board chairperson sees a problem with this. He claims that there has been no policy-making because there have been no resources for over one hundred years [O'Regan; 1991].

According to Maurice Grey, local differences have to be compromised when tribalism and unity are stressed. He sees a fundamental problem with groups, even tribal groups, trying to create a state out of Maoridom, "How can you nail down that which can't be nailed down, which is dynamic and always changing?" The autonomy of Ngai Tahu people has always been at local level. To establish a central tribal level assumes there is the basic agreement on beliefs and values within the tribe. Grey does not believe there is enough agreement to make this process legitimate.

Grey observes that all runanga already negotiate with government departments and always have. Therefore, what must always be considered is mana, which cannot be surrendered to anybody else outside of runanga. He states,
We are only the Kaitiaki (guardians) of the mana that rests with the runanga. It must still be there long after this generation has perished so that the next generations may continue to build the future for the generations to come. Mana is always handed on and derives its meaning from the ancestors and from the tipuna who helped shape the very foundations from our distant past. To be stripped of one's mana is the act of being stripped of one's identity, dignity and prestige. All developments that are tribally-based should be towards enhancing, recovering and restoring the aforementioned at every runanga level. The individual parts then become the sum total of mana Ngai Tahu.

The Treaty of Waitangi was not signed by one person as the representative for the whole of the Ngai Tahu tribal region. It was signed by rangatira located around the boundaries of Ngai Tahu....unity...is devoid of any notion that there is one voice for all, but rather that there is a chorus of many voices, that is indicative and reflects the individual parts. [Grey; 1990]

Similar comments were made at the 1990 Arowhenua Tribal Hui:

We want to be masters of our own destiny at Murihiku.

We’ve [members of the Manumanu runanga in Kaikoura] come to
say that we don't approve of this structure because our lands are going out of our control.

We don't need a Runanganui to have our mana and rangatiratanga.

Giddens states that if programmes of reform on the part of subordinate or minority groups (such as the Ngai Tahu runanga) are to succeed, they will have to appear in 'the national interest'. But the dominant group has much less difficulty representing its own policies as in 'the national interest', since it has more influence over the style and form of what can be discursively articulated [1985; p. 221].

**Category Three:** The articulation of 'historicity' in relation to planned or actual trends of social change. The reflexive monitoring of all states (and administrative bodies such as the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board) involves the invention of 'history' in some sense or another - the documented interpretation of the past that provides an anchorage for anticipated developments in the future.

The importance of the articulation of 'historicity' for the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board in terms of establishing itself as the administrative body for Ngai Tahu was discussed in Chapter Three under the headings: Role of Whakapapa and Role of Archives.
During the course of the 1980’s, the Trust Board was made aware of the benefits which could be gained by adopting a strategy which included the 'traditional' base of Ngai Tahu. That is, there would be benefits in terms of input from runanga and in terms of being seen to be a decentralised body. As one runanga chairperson and Board member states, "despite themselves, they've [Trust Board members] really come to terms with [the importance of runanga in the overall structure]" [Solomon; 1990].

Now the Trust Board is making an effort to create an ideology within its ranks that it will be only a part of the overall structure designed to take the iwi into the next century. The rest of this structure will be a Runanganui made up of representatives from each of sixteen runanga, who will contribute in the area of making policy and reporting back to the runanga.

Concern is that a body be there that is properly accountable to our traditional base, which is going to be able to be the shareholder to manage and handle us and define policies. [Annual Tribal Hui 1989, minutes; p. 11]

The Ngai Tahu Trust Board has always regarded itself as being accountable to [the runanga] and has never moved in a relevant area without consultation....We regard the runanga as the heartland of the tribe....We've suggested a structure. The individual beneficiaries will elect the Board, by region. The runanga
themselves will produce a Runanganui, which will be the Parliament of the Iwi, and the Board will be accountable to the Runanganui. We want the Runanganui and the Board together to be the Iwi Authority for the Ngai Tahu. That's what we seek out of the Iwi Empowering Bill. It means some reduction in the authority of the Board, but we think this is appropriate. [O'Regan; 1989]

As was discussed in Chapter Five, not all of Ngai Tahu are happy with the Board's efforts, as not all are convinced that the Board will step back and let the runanga exercise real power. The power of ideology is so strong within the Trust Board ranks that some Ngai Tahu feel its members are beyond receiving advice from anyone. However, as Giddens makes clear, unless those opposing the Trust Board and its actions appear to act in the interest of the entire tribe and can influence the style and form of discursive articulation of its sentiments to a greater extent that the Trust Board, any programmes of reform will fail [1985; p. 221]. The Trust Board is in the dominant position because it is the body which has managed to utilise the skills of writing and information-management characteristic of bureaucratic organisations in order to discursively articulate its policies and programmes and hence create certain conditions that lead to the formation of ideologies that will sustain its power.
CHAPTER EIGHT:

CONCLUSION
This research has examined the use of authoritative resources which have facilitated an exercise of power by the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board. Special attention has been directed to the period covering the latter half of the 1980's, when devolution was first introduced as a viable option for dealing with Maori affairs in New Zealand. The analysis has focused on the techniques, tactics and manoeuvres upon which the Trust Board has relied in order to organise the Ngai Tahu iwi, keeping in mind Foucault's point that there is nothing more to power relations beyond their exercise [Cousins and Hussain, 1984; p. 229].

Resources are media through which power is exercised [Giddens, 1984; p. 258]. Resources are of two kinds: allocative (which consist of the possibility of access to material resources) and authoritative (those other than the material kind and which determine the level of concentration of allocative resources) [Ibid.].

The first of the categories of authoritative resource examined was that of the possibility of surveillance via accumulation of 'coded information' which can be used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered. The findings indicate that, since the Board began in 1946, it has endeavoured to achieve a rational mode of information-management in order to improve the efficiency with which it could survey its beneficiaries and, from the mid-1980's onward, the entire tribe. The turning point for strengthening this particular resource was the confidence and skills gained from the decision of the Board in the mid-1980's to diligently pursue a case before the Waitangi Tribunal for the recovery of land and fisheries lost in the nineteenth century. The actual
devolution of responsibility from the Department of Maori Affairs to the Trust Board (as one applicant for iwi authority in Te Waipounamu) has had little effect on this resource. The initiative to strengthen this resource came entirely from the Trust Board and its supporters.

The second category examined was the possibility of surveillance via direct supervision of the activities of some individuals by others impositions of authority over them. The findings indicate that this is a resource which the Trust Board can continue to strengthen. The Board has neither sufficient access to the entire iwi, nor does it possess complete legitimation by the iwi to make direct supervision of the tribe possible. Therefore, the Board has relied a great deal on the ability of the runanga and their leaders and representatives on the Runanganui to directly supervise the activities of their people and report back to the Board by way of Board meetings, annual tribal hui and, now, Runanganui o Tahu meetings.

Regardless of this, all reports indicate that moves (such as the introduction of the Runanganui) to make direct supervision of the iwi a possibility began in spite of the requirements of the devolution process. The Board decided, with the encouragement of the iwi, that its power could be strengthened by such moves and that these moves would also help to keep the tribe unified.

The possibility of assembling large numbers of individuals within definite settings is the next authoritative resource examined. The findings indicate that the Trust
Board has been less than successful with this particular resource in the past but is trying to overcome this lack of success by relying more and more on the ability of the runanga to draw people to the marae and to the runanga meetings. Once again, sheer geographical distance plays a large part in the inability of Ngai Tahu people to gather regularly at hui called by the Board. Also, a lack of legitimation by the iwi of the mana of the Trust Board to administer to the iwi has kept many from attending hui called by the Board. Hence, power in this area is being delegated to the individual runanga. This is not the result of devolution requirements to administer to the iwi. The establishment of the Runanganui and the success of runanga in gathering their people back to the marae are phenomena which have occurred for a period of approximately three years, on the initiative of the runanga and the Trust Board. Both have realised the necessity of building a strong base for Ngai Tahu people which will keep them close to their 'traditional' base as well as independent of government funding.

The fourth form of authoritative resource examined was the imposition of sanctions. In the past, the Trust Board has had little power (either legally or 'traditionally') to facilitate sanctions against the iwi, and my research shows that this is not changing. However, with the imminent settlement of the land claims, the Trust Board will have the responsibility of distributing material resources to the iwi and hence may be provided with power to sanction particular Ngai Tahu groups as well as non-Ngai Tahu, by exclusion.

For some Ngai Tahu, this has taken the form of exclusion from the Runanganui.
Devolution has not provided the Trust Board with any power to sanction either the iwi or the Crown. However, it has left the Trust Board with the option to exclude non-Ngai Tahu Maori from the use of resources which are solely Ngai Tahu, while compelling the Board to administer any functions previously within the realm of the Maori Affairs Department to non-Ngai Tahu Maori living in Te Waipounamu.

The final authoritative resource examined was the creation of certain conditions that influence the formation of ideology. I found that the Trust Board, by establishing a range of rational forms of information-management over the years since it began, has succeeded in presenting to the public a discourse of competency and efficiency (by way of its ability to articulate policies and collate information) which has enabled the formation of an ideology of competent leadership. It has been the Trust Board, once again, especially since work on the land claims began, which has defined what is to count as political for the tribe. Of course, it has had to include in this definition government requirements that have come out of devolution, but this has played only a small part and was by no means the impetus for the Trust Board setting definitions for the entire tribe.

Unfortunately, this authoritative resource has not been as wide as the Trust Board would like, and this is due to the fact that the Board has failed to convince the whole iwi that it must unite as a tribe. According to Giddens, one of the three substantive aspects which influence the formation of ideology in modern organisations is the definition of practices and policies that are in the 'general
interest' as opposed to those that favour the sectional interests of groups such as, in this case, runanga or hapu. For some Ngai Tahu this is problematic, but some see it as intrinsic to the organisation of Ngai Tahu society historically, that runanga interests come before tribal interests. The Board has attempted to deal with this problem by establishing the Runanganui o Tahu. The Runanganui o Tahu has also helped influence the formation of ideology which the Board has chosen to present by enabling an articulation of 'historicity' - i.e., by allowing for the interpretation and inclusion of Ngai Tahu's historical forms of organisation necessary to achieve specific outcomes for the tribe in the future.

Hence, regardless of devolution, the Trust Board has been working on developing its ability to form an ideology of efficiency of administration and information-management characteristic of modern bureaucratic organisations in order to achieve the best possible outcomes in modern society for the iwi it wishes to represent. At the same time, the Board has tried to incorporate elements of Ngai Tahu's historic and accepted forms of organisation in order to have this particular authoritative resource legitimated by the entire iwi.

The widening of the scope and intensity of each of these authoritative resources has taken place on the initiative of the Trust Board, with the help and support of the Ngai Tahu people. There has been a realisation amongst Ngai Tahu that all power in society does not have to be seen in terms of a dialectical relationship with the Crown. Strategies which can achieve outcomes for the iwi in contemporary society often involve acceptance of rational and bureaucratic forms
of organisation, and information-management, but adoption of such forms of organisation and the discourse that goes along with them, must be seen as manoeuvres designed to intensify power; they are not to be seen in terms of acceptance of state-domination simply because they entail acceptance of structures characteristic of the modern nation-state.

For the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, adoption of rational modes of information-management and their attendant discourses has not entailed the denial of 'traditional' Ngai Tahu strengths of organisation and forms of gathering and surveillance. Part of the strategy to increase the power of the Board and the iwi has been the inclusion of tried and true 'traditional' mana. Of course, the Board has not always been the initiator of these inclusions; sometimes persuasion by the runanga has been necessary, but the Board is always aware of the danger of overriding 'traditional' mana and, ultimately, of losing the support and unity of the tribe. So, in everything a balance must be maintained between the 'traditional' modes of Ngai Tahu organisation and administration and the discourse that supports these modes, on the one hand, and the modes characteristic of modern bureaucratic organisations on the other. This balance in itself is to be seen as a strategy designed to strengthen authoritative resources, and hence power, for the Board and the Ngai Tahu people. As Giddens points out, all 'primitive societies' have very complex modes of kinship organisation [1981; p. 90] and therefore are not to be viewed as somehow less developed than modern societies.
The intent of this research was to examine the strategies utilised by the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board to strengthen authoritative resources and, hence, power, i.e., to achieve outcomes for the iwi. This topic was chosen at a time when great changes in the organisation of the entire Maori community in New Zealand were forecast. The Department of Maori Affairs, which had dealt with government administration of Maoridom off and on since 1840, was disbanded in November, 1989. It was to be replaced by a series of iwi authorities - tribally-based organisations which would equip themselves to take over the responsibilities and functions once carried out by the Department.

This researcher chose to examine how the ability of one prospective iwi authority to achieve outcomes for a particular tribe - Ngai Tahu - would be affected by this government policy. What was discovered was that, long before the Department of Maori Affairs was devolved, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board had begun work on the strategies outlined above in order to improve its access to allocative resource and thereby increase its power and the power of the Ngai Tahu iwi. Since its inception, the Trust Board has never chosen to rely on government policies or funding to ensure the well-being of its people and hence has continuously looked for ways to improve upon it authoritative resources. The decision to put most of its time and material resources into the pursuit of the Waitangi Tribunal claims since the mid-1980's has had a greater effect on changing Ngai Tahu organisation and structure of power than has the devolution of the Department of Maori Affairs.
The Trust Board has indicated that it will accept whatever is required from the
government as a result of the devolution process, but this will happen alongside
its other and more longstanding projects, most of which have sought to bring Ngai
Tahu people back to their runanga by providing incentives such as runanga-based
employment and training. By no means has the ability to achieve outcomes for
Ngai Tahu developed as a response to the government policy of devolution. In
fact, the Trust Board has sought to strengthen its own authoritative resources and
those of the iwi so that government policies such as the 1989 devolution process
will have little real effect on them.

This research sets the scene for further studies of a similar kind. Foucault states
that there is nothing to power relations beyond their exercise [Cousins and
Hussain, 1984; p. 229]. Therefore, what we must examine are specific instances
of strategies and manoeuvres which alter the power of groups in society to
achieve outcomes. We must avoid examining power in terms of relationships of
minority groups to the state. From here, there is room to carry out a similar
analysis of other tribal groups within Maoridom to see just how well organised
they are, independent of the policy of devolution, but at a time when such a
policy has made it convenient to investigate the power capacities of tribal groups
in New Zealand. This is based on the premise that because power is local in its
forms, not all tribal groups will be organised with an equal degree rationality.
Further research like this will allow for comparisons to be made across tribal
boundaries.
The effect of the 1990 change in government in New Zealand has also made it timely to examine the organisation and power of tribal groups, given that the National Party government has indicated that the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 will soon be repealed and the Maori Affairs Department possibly reinstated. The response of the Ngai Tahu Runanganui to the abolition of the Runanga Iwi Act would warrant further investigation. According to the Trust Board chairperson, the Board, at the request of the Runanganui, has already established a number of trusts into which assets can be placed and the whole tribal structure removed or distanced from the Crown. The earlier notion of dissolution of the Board, or at least maintaining the capacity to dissolve, has been reactivated. The chairperson is reasonably confident that should the Board dissolve, the central management and commercial holding company function will simply transfer to the "private" sector and the tribal structure, which has been developed will continue [O'Regan; 1991].

Another aspect which deserves further attention is the relationship between the Runanganui and the Trust Board. Since the Runanganui began only in 1990, more time than was possible within the limitations of this piece of research should be devoted to an analysis of how the Trust Board manages to integrate the input from the 'traditional' runanga bases with its own input, considering that the Board is organised along more modern and bureaucratic lines. This could be carried out in order to see if indeed it is possible to incorporate 'traditional' with modern forms of organisation in order to achieve better outcomes for the iwi. Further research aimed at this particular theme would be especially timely now that the
Iwi Transition Agency has chosen not one, but eight iwi authorities for the South Island, six of these being Ngai Tahu groups - the Otautahi (Christchurch urban) runanga, the Tuhuru (West Coast) runanga, the Waitaha runanga, the Akaroa runanga, the Ngai Tahu Runanganui o Tahu, Kati Mamoe - and two non-Ngai Tahu groups. This may lead to conflict within the tribe over which groups will have the mana to achieve outcomes for its people.

Hence, there are possibilities for further research so that more can be learned about the potential for Maoridom to achieve outcomes for its people in the future, with or without assistance from the Crown. Perhaps further understanding of the possibilities and potential will lead to a move away from dependence on the fluctuating policies of the state and hence a change in the discourse which surrounds Maori/Pakeha relations in New Zealand.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
The methods used for this research were essentially of a qualitative nature. Data was gathered by the examination of documentation; structured and unstructured interviews with various members of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, other Ngai Tahu, and employees of the Iwi Transition Agency; and attendance at tribal hui and runanga meetings. Field notes were taken, and the data from both these and the documents supplied by the Iwi Transition Agency and the Trust Board were analysed and collated according to Giddens' five categories of authoritative resources. These categories then formed the structure for the analysis.

As a Pakeha (and indeed a non-New Zealander), I was concerned about the degree of acceptance I would obtain from the group I set out to observe. At the initial meeting with the chairperson of the Board in which I explained the intentions and the parameters of the research, I was acutely aware that my knowledge of Ngai Tahu history, culture and language was minimal. Yet I came away from this meeting encouraged and inspired by the enthusiasm and support shown by the chairperson for the proposal. From that meeting I also gained a list of references for reading material that would broaden my knowledge, not only of Ngai Tahu, but also of the mechanics of government policy-making and the history that led up to the final devolution of the Department of Maori Affairs in 1989. I analysed journal articles, documents from the vast Ngai Tahu archives situated in the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board offices, and newspaper clippings spanning the years from 1988 to 1990 (the period over which the disbanding of the Maori Affairs Department took place).
During the fieldwork, I met regularly with the Board's executive officer of the time, Koa Marshall. Koa became my primary contact and informant. She provided me with many hours of interviews herself and facilitated access to documentation, tribal hui, runanga meetings and interviews with the Board members and other Ngai Tahu.

I was aware from the beginning of the cultural differences between my informants and myself as the researcher. Koa never drew attention explicitly to these differences, but I continued to sense that there are basic barriers that any non-Maori will face in attempting to observe and participate in the activities of Maori groups for the purpose of social research.

After having carried out a few interviews with Koa and members of the Iwi Transition Agency, I asked for permission to attend Ngai Tahu tribal hui to act as a silent participant-observer. In order to attend such events, I had to be invited on to the marae by a Ngai Tahu person, and preferably one in a position of some authority. Koa took my request to the chairperson of the Board, and permission was granted. There was some curiosity over my presence at these events, but on the whole, those who approached me to question my presence seemed genuinely interested in what I was doing and offered whatever information they could provide. Some also requested to see the finished piece of research.

I was once asked if I thought that I had the right as non-Ngai Tahu and
non-Maori to carry out such research without the subjective understanding of Ngai Tahu life that only comes from being Ngai Tahu. It was a question that I was expecting to have to face, yet one which I found I was still not prepared for: the request to justify what I was doing to one of the group that was the focus of my research. My reply was simply that what I recorded will be the observations and analysis of a non-Maori of the organisation of a group of Maori designed to administer to a larger group of Maori. It will then be up to Ngai Tahu, and the Trust Board more specifically, to use this information as it sees fit. This particular person was satisfied with this reply and added that he would like a copy of the completed research. He explained that he asked the question only because he knew that one day someone would, and therefore I would have to explain my intentions at some time or other during the course of the research.

The other concern that I had about the research is one which is quite separate from the cultural barrier, that is, whether or not it would be possible to apply Giddens' theory, using his five categories of authoritative resources, to the situation which I chose to observe. The question that I had to ask was whether or not Giddens' theory would apply in the real-life research situation - which entailed a relationship between a minority ethnic group and the state and, hence, one with which Giddens himself never explicitly dealt.

Some who read this will no doubt believe that such a task cannot be achieved. However, I viewed Giddens' categories as the best choice for a post-modernist examination of how power is exercised by way of local and independent
techniques and strategies within the context of current Maori/Crown relations in New Zealand. His categories have been interpreted by the researcher in order to apply to the situation at hand, but once again, because Giddens has not dealt with a similar situation, I do not know whether or not he would have applied these categories in the same fashion.

Out of this analysis I have gained experience as a researcher in not the easiest of positions, i.e., one trying to gain access to a section of an ethnic minority of which I am not a part. Thus, the task of meeting Ngai Tahu people and gaining the information I was seeking was never less than challenging. However, I am grateful for the opportunity presented by those who chose to accept me and provide information and other forms of assistance. Out of this success and acceptance, and the small amount of knowledge of Ngai Tahu culture and language which I have gained, has come also a desire to pursue this understanding (especially that of the language) further.

I learned that if a researcher wishes to communicate with and/or observe the activities of those members of a minority ethnic group (and in this particular case, a subordinate ethnic group in terms of its relationship with the dominant Pakeha culture), then a basic knowledge of the language and a willingness to learn are both desirable, if not necessary, attributes. I found at times, that there were expressions used in conversation which I did not understand. When this happened, I either asked the person to translate, or I went away to look up the particular expression in question. This limited my capacity as researcher to guide the
interview. A better understanding of the language would have facilitated more opportunity to direct questions and, hence, would have allowed for the collection of richer data.

Had I been working with a section of the Maori population in which Maori was the prevalent language, a sound knowledge of the language would have been a necessity. However, among Ngai Tahu, English remains the prevalent language, and therefore a knowledge of the Maori language, was not absolutely necessary for the data-gathering process, although it would have been helpful in terms of improving rapport. This is especially so in light of the power attributed to access to control over modes of discourse to which both Giddens [1985; p. 209] and Foucault [Foucault, 1980; p. 118; Cousins and Hussain, 1985; p. 209] draw attention.

It is my hope that Ngai Tahu will in some small way gain from the findings supplied in this research, as I have gained from Ngai Tahu by doing this research.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Original Beneficiaries as listed in Maori Land Court Order dated 12th March, 1925 Issued by Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, July, 1963

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Ngai Tahu Social Policy Task Force, 1988, "Submission to the Royal Commission on Social Policy"
O'Regan, T., 1989, "Ngai Tahu - Into the Twenty-First Century - The Vision of Tipene O'Regan", Race, Gender, Class, Nos. 9/10: pp. 97-104.


Rules of Te Runanganui o Tahu Incorporated 1990

Runanga Iwi Bill 1989

Runanga Iwi Act 1990


Submissions of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board to the Select Committee on the Runanga Iwi Bill April 24, 1990

Submissions by the Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga Inc to the Local Government (No. 8) Bill January 29, 1990

Te Urupare Rangapu/Partnership Response, Department of Maori Affairs, November, 1988

Auckland.


APPENDICES
CHARTER OF NGAI TAHU RUNANGA IWI AUTHORITY

1) INTERPRETATION:
The words "Iwi", "Runanga", "Ruranga", "Takiwa" and "Taura Here" shall have the same definition as in the Runanga Iwi Act 1990. "Runanganui" in this Charter means Te Runanganui O Tahu Incorporated, unless the context otherwise requires. "Runanga" in this Charter means Ngai Tahu Runanga Iwi Authority, unless the context otherwise requires.

2) NAME:
The name of the Runanga shall be –
"NGAI TAHU RUNANGA IWI AUTHORITY"

3) REGISTERED OFFICE:
The Registered Office of the Runanga shall be 127 Armagh Street, Christchurch, or at such other place for the time being as shall be decided by the Runanga.

4) TAKIWA:
The Takiwa of the Runanga comprises all the land and islands south of a line from White Bluffs (Parinui O Whiti) south-westwards to Lake Tennyson and from there north-westwards to Kahurangi Point as shown in the plan attached to this Charter. Parinui O Whiti Tai noa Rakiura Hurinoa, Ki a Kahuraki.

5) IWI:
The Runanga is incorporated by Ngai Tahu which is the Iwi for the Runanga.

6) GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
The Runanga will be guided in the conduct of its affairs by the following principles:

(i) Tino Rangatiratanga;
(ii) The Treaty of Waitangi;
(iii) Accountability to Ngai Tahu Whanui;
(iv) Public accountability in respect of administration of finances and property; and
(v) The provisions of this Charter.

7) **AIMS AND OBJECTS**
   (i) To protect, advance, develop and to unify the interests of Ngai Tahu in the spirit of Tino Rangatiratanga implicit in the Treaty of Waitangi.
   (ii) To make fair and equitable provisions for Ruranga within the Tikiwa of the Runanga.
   (iii) To act as the legal tribal entity for Ngai Tahu for the purposes of the Runanga Iwi Act 1990.

8) **RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF RURANGA:**
   The interests of Ruranga are to be recognised and protected by the Runanga in the following ways:
   (i) The Runanga will recognise the right of other Incorporated Runanga to establish Taure Here for Ruranga residing in the Tikiwa of the Runanga.
   (ii) The Runanga will make provision for Ruranga in addition to providing for Ngai Tahu.

9) **TAURE HERE:**
   Taure Here will be established for Ngai Tahu residing in the Tikiwa of other Iwi. The representative of any Taure Here group who is a member of Te Runanganui O Tahu Incorporated shall be permitted to attend meetings of the Runanga.

10) **AGE AND GENDER EQUITY:**
    Equity between the members of the Iwi in all matters including age, gender and health will be protected by the Runanga according to the principles of each Runanga.
11) **APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS:**

The Members of the Runanga shall comprise all the members for the time being of Te Runanganui O Tahu Incorporated and all the elected members for the time being of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board.

12) **OFFICE HOLDERS:**

The officers of the Runanga shall be the Chairperson and the Secretary. The first Chairperson and the first Secretary shall be elected at the first meeting of the Runanga and shall hold office until the annual general meeting next following such election. All subsequent chairpersons and secretaries shall be appointed at the annual general meeting of the Runanga and shall hold office until the following annual general meeting.

13) **TERMS OF MEMBERSHIP:**

Members of the Runanga will automatically cease to be a member of the Runanga when they cease to be members of the Te Runanganui O Tahu Incorporated or the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board.

14) **ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING:**

The Runanga shall hold an annual general meeting between the day of ___ and the day of ___ in each year.

15) **MEETINGS:**

In addition to holding the Annual General Meeting the Runanga shall meet at such times and on such occasions as is necessary in order to conduct the affairs of the Ngai Tahu Iwi Authority. The quorum necessary for any meeting shall be 75 per cent of the members of the Runanga. In the absence of the Chairman those present may elect any member to act as Chairman of that meeting.

16) **VOTING:**

Any resolution at any meeting, including the Annual General Meeting, must be passed by a majority of 75 per cent. Any member may appoint another person to act as a proxy for the
purpose of voting. For the purpose of establishing a quorum the number of persons present at the meeting shall be deemed to include those members actually present plus those who are represented by proxy.

17) AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER:
This Charter or any provisions of it may be altered or amended by a 75 per cent resolution of all members at a Special General Meeting called for the purpose and advertised to members at least one month before the date of the meeting.

18) ANNUAL TRIBAL HUI:
The Runanga shall hold an annual Tribal Hui to consult with and listen to members of the Ngai Tahu Iwi. Such meeting shall be chaired by the Chairperson of the Runanga.

19) POWERS OF THE NGAI TAHU IWI AUTHORITY:
Runanga shall have the power to:

(i) Enter into contracts;
(ii) Buy or sell any interest in land or other property;
(iii) Employ persons;
(iv) Hold property on trust;
(v) Receive donations;
(vi) Conduct litigation on behalf of the Iwi;
(vii) Borrow funds;
(viii) Do any other thing necessary to carry out the purposes of the Runanga.

20) CONFLICTS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF IWI AND RUNANGA:
Conflicts between members of the Iwi and the Runanga are to be brought before and resolved at the annual Tribal Hui to be held in accordance with paragraph 18 hereof.

21) COMMON SEAL:
The Runanga shall have a common seal and the Secretary shall be responsible for the safe custody thereof. The
Common Seal shall only be affixed to documents in pursuance of a resolution of the Runanga at a meeting duly called and constituted and the affixing of the same shall be attested by the signatures of the Chairperson and any one other member of the Runanga thereby authorised to affix the seal.
RULES OF TE RUNANGANUI O TAHU INCORPORATED

1. NAME
The name of the Society shall be:-

"TE RUNANGANUI O TAHU INCORPORATED"

2. REGISTERED OFFICE
The registered office of the Society shall be 127 Armagh Street, Christchurch, or at such other place for the time being as shall be decided by the Society.

3. GUIDING PRINCIPALS
The Society will be guided by the following principles:

(i) Tino Rangatiratanga;
(ii) The Treaty of Waitangi;
(iii) Accountability to Ngai Tahu Whanui;
(iv) Public accountability in respect of administration of finances and property; and
(v) The provisions of these rules.

4. OBJECTS
The objects for which the Society is established are:

(i) To assist in the incorporation of a Runanga under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 to represent Ngai Tahu;

(ii) To assist and support the Runanga to be incorporated under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 to represent Ngai Tahu in the performance of its functions in accordance with its Charter;

(iii) To protect, advance, develop and to unify the interests of Ngai Tahu in the spirit of Tino Rangatiratanga implicit in the Treaty of Waitangi.

(iv) To do or cause to be done all such other things as the Society shall consider necessary or expedient for the attainment of all or any of the objects of the Society and to apply its funds for any of these purposes.

5. MEMBERS
The Members of the Society shall comprise:

(i) One representative appointed by each of the district Runanga referred to hereunder;

Koukourarata - (Port Levy)
Kati Waewae - (West Coast)
Kaikoura
Wairewa - (Little River)
Waihao - (Morven)
Rapaki - (Lyttleton)
Otakou - (Dunedin)
Puketeraki - (Dunedin) - Karitane
Oraka - (Colac Bay)
Waihopai - (Invercargill)
Tuahuriri - (North Canterbury)
Moeraki - (Waitaki)
Arowhenua - (Temuka)
Taumutu - (Lake Ellesmere)
Awarua - (Bluff)
Onuku - (Akaroa)
Te Koeti Turanga - (West Coast)
Otautahi - (Christchurch)
Hokonui - (Gore)

(ii) One representative appointed by any further district Runanga established after the date of the incorporation of the Society and recognised by the Society after taking into consideration the recommendation of the neighbouring district Runanga:

(iii) Provided that no member of the Society shall be a member of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board at the same time and each district Runanga shall have only one member representing it at any one time.

6. INITIAL MEMBERS
The following persons are hereby appointed as the initial members of the Society:

Charlie Crofts
61 Gainsborough Street
Christchurch 2
Taxi Driver

James Mason Russell
119 Hoffman Street
Hokitika
Retired

Trevor Howse
18 Kingrove Street
Christchurch
Researcher

Mrs Wicketoria Martin
2/91 St John Street
Christchurch 6
Regional Liaison Officer
Ministry Consumer Affairs

Kelvin Timothy Armstrong
Davis Te Maire (Kelly Davis)
27a Clyde Street
Oamaru
MAF Fisheries Consultant

Mrs June Swindell
R D
Rapaki
Home Executive

Representing Kourourarata
Representing Kati Waewae
Representing Kaikoura
Representing Wairewa
Representing Waiho
Waha Stirling
30 King Street
Christchurch
Retired

Mrs Rena Fowler
R D 1 Waipahi
Gore
Community Administrator

7. TERM OF MEMBERSHIP

(i) Subject to subparagraph (ii) hereof, a member of the Society shall hold membership until the next triennial general meeting following the date of his or her appointment.

(ii) A district Runanga shall have the power at any time and from time to time to remove the representative appointed by it as a member of the Society.

(iii) Any member who may desire to resign from membership of the Society shall leave written notice to that effect at the registered office of the Society before the date of the Society’s Annual General Meeting, in default of which notice the member shall be liable for the subscription for the ensuing year.

(iv) A district Runanga shall have the power at any time and from time to time to appoint any person to be a member of the Society as its representative either to replace any member removed by that Runanga under subparagraph (ii) hereof or to fill a casual vacancy.

(v) The removal or replacement of a member pursuant to subparagraph (ii) or (iv) hereof is to be effected by the district Runanga leaving at the registered office of the Society notice in writing of such removal or appointment.

8. OFFICERS

(i) The Officer of the Society shall be Upoko Runanga and Kaiwhakahaere. The first officers shall be:

Upoko Runanga - Robert Whaitiri
Kaiwhakahaere - Kelvin Anglem

who shall hold office until the first Triennial General Meeting.

(ii) The Officers of the Society shall be elected at each Triennial General Meeting and shall hold office until the next Triennial General Meeting.

(iii) The members shall have the power at any time and from time to time to fill any vacancy that may occur in the offices of the Society, such appointment only to ensue until the next succeeding Triennial General Meeting.
Tatane Wesley
R D 1 Otakou
Dunedin
Farmer

Mrs Mahana Walsh
15 Thomas Street
Waikouaiti
Retired

Wiremu Davis (Bill)
11 Margery Street
Riverton
Fisher

George Te Au
3 Wagner Street
Invercargill
Retired

Mrs Ruahine Crofts
146b Broomfield Terrace
Christchurch
Assistant Director
Cultural Development (D.S.W)

Mrs Marama Leonard-Higgins
Moeraki
R D 2 Palmerston
Otago
Teacher

Kelvin Anglem (Kelly)
Waipopo Road
R D 3
Timaru
Retired

Catherine Elizabeth Brown
O'Donnell Street
Southbridge
Retired Lecturer

Robert Whaitiri (Bob)
P O Box 38
Bluff
Retired

Henry Robinson
Onuku
R D 1
Akaroa
Farmer

Mrs Helen Rasmussen
Haast
Fisher

Representing Otakou
Representing Puketeraki
Representing Oraka
Representing Waihopai
Representing Tuahiriri
Representing Moeraki
Representing Arowhenua
Representing Taumutu
Representing Awarua
Representing Onuku
Representing Te Koeti
Turanga
(iv) Only financial members of the Society shall be eligible for election or appointment as an officer of the Society.

9. **ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS**
The Annual General Meeting shall be held no earlier than the 1st day of July and no later than the 31st day of December in every year for the following purposes:

(i) The consideration of and, if thought fit, the adoption of the Annual Report of the Society and the Audited Statement of Income and Expenditure and Balance Sheet for the previous financial year.

(ii) To appoint an auditor for the ensuing year.

(iii) To decide on any resolution which may be duly submitted to the meeting.

10. **TRIENNIAL GENERAL MEETINGS**

(i) For the purposes of these rules the annual general meeting to be held in the year 1992 shall also be the first triennial general meeting and each annual general meeting to be held every third year thereafter shall also be a triennial general meeting.

(ii) At the first triennial general meeting and every subsequent triennial general meeting, in addition to the business described in paragraph 9 hereof, the following business shall be conducted:

(a) The election of officers of the Society;
(b) The acceptance of the appointment of members of the Society by the district Runanga as provided for in paragraph 5 hereof.

11. **SPECIAL GENERAL MEETINGS**
The Kaiwhakahaere or in his absence or inability, any other member of the Society may at any time for any special purpose call a special general meeting and shall do so forthwith upon the requisition in writing of any ten members of the Society stating the purpose for which the meeting is required.

12. **NOTICE OF BUSINESS**

(i) Seven clear days before a special general meeting and twenty one clear days before the annual general meeting a notice thereof and of the business to be transacted thereof together with a copy of the report and the Audited Statement of Income and Expenditure and Balance Sheet in the case of the annual general meeting shall be sent to every member and in the case of a special general meeting no business other than that of which notice has been so given shall be brought forward at such meeting.

(ii) Every notice required to be given to the members or any of them shall be deemed to have been duly delivered if posted to him in a prepaid letter addressed to him at his last known place of business or residence and shall be deemed to have been received two days after such letter was posted.
(iv) Only financial members of the Society shall be eligible for election or appointment as an officer of the Society.

9. **ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS**
The Annual General Meeting shall be held no earlier than the 1st day of July and no later than the 31st day of December in every year for the following purposes:

(i) The consideration of and, if thought fit, the adoption of the Annual Report of the Society and the Audited Statement of Income and Expenditure and Balance Sheet for the previous financial year.

(ii) To appoint an auditor for the ensuing year.

(iii) To decide on any resolution which may be duly submitted to the meeting.

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(b) The acceptance of the appointment of members of the Society by the district Runanga as provided for in paragraph 5 hereof.

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(i) Seven clear days before a special general meeting and twenty one clear days before the annual general meeting a notice thereof and of the business to be transacted thereof together with a copy of the report and the Audited Statement of Income and Expenditure and Balance Sheet in the case of the annual general meeting shall be sent to every member and in the case of a special general meeting no business other than that of which notice has been so given shall be brought forward at such meeting.

(ii) Every notice required to be given to the members or any of them shall be deemed to have been duly delivered if posted to him in a prepaid letter addressed to him at his last known place of business or residence and shall be deemed to have been received two days after such letter was posted.
13. **PROCEDURE AT MEETING**

(i) At all general meetings the Kaiwhakahaere and in his absence any other member elected by the meeting shall act as chairman.

(ii) Any member may appoint another member to act as a proxy for the purpose of voting and on every motion each member shall be entitled to one vote exercised in person or by proxy in writing. The appointment of a proxy in writing signed by the person appointing the proxy must be left at the registered office of the Society no later than 5 pm on the day before the meeting.

(iii) At the general meetings three-quarters of the members shall constitute a quorum.

(iv) Any motion at any meeting must be passed by a majority of three-quarters of the votes cast either in person or by proxy.

(v) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained even if a quorum of members is not present the meeting may continue with the conduct of its business. Any motion which is put before the meeting shall be voted on by those members present in person or by proxy and the voting counted and communicated to the members present before the meeting is closed. Notice of the motion shall then be given in writing to each member not present at the meeting in person or by proxy by posting in a prepaid letter addressed to him at his last known place of business or residence within seven days of the date of the meeting and those members not so present shall be entitled to send notice in writing or by facsimile transmission of their vote on the motion to the registered office of the Society within four days of the notice of motion having been posted. If three-quarters of the total votes cast at the meeting or subsequently notified in accordance with the provisions of the subparagraph are in favour of the motion then the motion shall be deemed to have been passed.

14. **FINANCIAL YEAR**

The financial year of the Society shall close on the 30th day of June in each year.

15. **ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION AND LEVIES**

(i) Subscriptions shall be payable to the Society by all members by such date in each year and of such amount as shall from time to time be fixed by the Society in general meeting.

(ii) Every member shall in addition to subscriptions pay to the Society all and every sum or sums of money which shall at any time and from time to time by resolution in general meeting be levied upon him as a member and which the Society shall consider recovery or expedient for the purpose of furthering the interests of the Society and its members.
(iii) No member who has failed to pay a subscription or levy by the date it is due shall be entitled to vote at any meeting of the Society until such subscription or levy has been paid.

16. ALTERATIONS OF RULES
(i) These rules may be altered, added to, rescinded or otherwise amended by a resolution passed by a three-quarters majority of those members present either in person or by proxy at a general meeting of which thirty days notice has been given.

(ii) Every such notice shall set forth the purport of the proposed alteration, addition, rescission or other amendment and shall be posted to each member in a prepaid letter addressed to him at his last known place of business or residence and shall be deemed to have been received by each member two days after the date of posting.

17. COMMON SEAL
The Society shall have a common seal which shall only be affixed to documents in pursuance of a resolution of the Society at a meeting duly called and constituted and the affixing of the same shall be attested by the signatures of the Kaiwhakahaere and any one other member of the Society thereby authorised to affix the seal.

18. POWERS OF THE SOCIETY
The Society shall have the following powers:

(i) To buy or acquire any interest in land or other property and to sell or otherwise dispose of the same.

(ii) To employ persons.

(iii) To hold property of any kind on trust.

(iv) To receive donations.

(v) To enter into all such negotiations, contracts and agreements in the name and on behalf of the Society as it may consider expedient for the purposes of the Society and in conformity with the Rules of the Society.

(vi) To sue or be sued.

(vii) To borrow or raise money upon the security of the real or personal property of the Society, or any part or parts thereof or upon the security of debentures or mortgage debentures of the Society, and to issue such debentures charging the whole or any part of the assets of the Society, and to execute such mortgages, debentures or mortgage debentures or to borrow money from Banks or other persons with or without security, but the powers of so borrowing or raising money shall not be exercised except pursuant to a resolution of the Society passed in general meeting.
(viii) To invest and reinvest any of the property, assets and income of the Society in a manner which would be an authorised trustee investment under the law of New Zealand.

(ix) To establish committees and subcommittees of the Society and to delegate to them such powers or business as the Society shall from time to time deem fit and from time to time by resolution in general meeting make amend or rescind regulations not inconsistent with these Rules governing procedures for and at the meetings of such committees and subcommittees.

(x) To generally do such other things as the Society deems necessary to carry out the purposes of the Society.

19. WINDING UP
In the event of the Society being wound up the surplus assets after payment of the Society's liabilities and the expenses of the winding-up shall be divided equally among all the district Runanga which at the date of winding up are entitled to appoint members of the Society in accordance with these Rules.

APPLICATION FOR INCORPORATION

We the several persons whose names are respectively subscribed hereto being the members of the above named Society hereby make application for the incorporation of the Society under the foregoing rules in accordance with the Incorporated Societies Act 1908.

DATED this 5th day of October 1990.

NAME                  OCCUPATION          ADDRESS                        SIGNATURE
Charlie Crofts       Taxi Driver          61 Gainsborough St, Christchurch   
James Mason Russell  Retired             119 Hoffman St, Hokitika            J. Russell
Trevor Howse         Researcher           18 Kingrove St, Christchurch       T. H. Howse
Mrs-Wikitoria        Regional Liaison     2/91 St John St, Christchurch      
Martin                Office, Ministry,    -Consumer-Affairs
Kelvin Timothy       MAF Fisheries        27a Clyde Street, Oamaru            Armstrong
Armstrong            Consultant           
Mrs June Swindell    Home Executive       R D, Rapaki                        
Tatane Wesley        Farmer              R D 1 Otakou, Dunedin               

Mrs Mahana Walsh  Retired  15 Thomas Street
Wiremu Davis (Bill) Fisher  11 Margery Street
George Te Au  Retired  Riverton
Mrs Ruahine Crofts  Assistant Director  3 Wagner Street
Cultural Development (DSW)  St. Kevins
Mrs Marama Leonard-Higgins  Teacher  146b Broomfield Top
Kelvin Anglem  Retired  Christchurch
(Kelly)  Mrs. Crofts
Catherine Elizabeth Retired Lecturer  R D 2 Palmerston
Brown  Otago
Robert Whaitiri  Retired  Waipopo Road, R D 3,
(Bob)  Timaru
Henry Robinson  Farmer  O'Donnell Street -
Mrs Helen  Southbridge
Rasmussen
Waha Stirling  Retired  P O Box 38
Mrs Rena Fowler  Community  Bluff
Administrator  Akaroa

WITNESS to the signatures of all the abovenamed members.

SIGNATURE    YOUR ENGLAND

OCCUPATION  JOURNALIST

ADDRESS  CHRISTCHURCH