THE NEW ZEALAND ACADEMIC PROFESSION IN TRANSITION

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ABSTRACT

In relation to the academic profession in New Zealand, this thesis examines the theory that professional occupations unionize because of a deterioration in their class situation. The class situation of academic staff is defined according to two indices: market situation (including salary levels, promotion prospects and job security) and work situation (including issues of autonomy and collegiality). Factors which supported the privileged class situation of academics, as well historical details about how academics have won organisational advantages are also discussed. The evidence shows that the class situation of academics has clearly deteriorated. Salaries have dropped in absolute terms and in relation to average New Zealand incomes. Promotion prospects also appear to have deteriorated, and tenure or job security appears to be threatened. Since 1982, a secondary labour market of part-time, untenured teaching assistants expanded disproportionately. Organisational advantages have also been eroded. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the State appears to be undermining the control over university life gained by the academic profession in the 1960s and 1970s. This situation, and recent evidence that points to a tighter relationship between the universities and the market in the near future, suggests that the academic profession could lose control over what is taught and researched in the universities. Despite these trends, the academic profession still retains significant economic and organisational advantages. This is born out in a series of in-depth interviews of academic staff at the University of Canterbury where there appears to be general satisfaction with economic and organisational features of work (other N.Z. universities may be different). The prevention of further erosion of conditions appears to be the main rationale for the widespread support of unionism at this university. Other factors which may limit the deterioration of the class situation of professionals are discussed in the final chapter.
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Management is not as clear cut in the university as it is in some enterprises, you know, service or production or manufacturing outside and the result is it isn't clear what the union is, who's in the union, who's out of it and who we are bargaining with. But with this new Act, with the restructuring of the university, it does become clear... It separates management from employees.

University teacher, University of Canterbury, 1990.
CHAPTER I

PROFESSIONALISM AND ITS CONTEXT

(1.1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The rapid growth in unionization of white collar workers and professionals over the last 25 years is a trend that has been noted in the U.S.A. (Oppenheimer, 1985:165), Great Britain (Crompton & Jones, 1984:167) and New Zealand (Roth, 1973:135). As a category of white collar workers, university teachers have been no exception to this trend. The unionization of faculty has been particularly well documented in the U.S.A. (Ladd & Lipset, 1973; Garbarino & Aussieker, 1975; Garbarino et al, 1977). The number of unionized campuses rose rapidly in the U.S.A. from a total of 11 in 1966 to 830 in 1985 (Clark, 1987). And by 1972, the governing body of the American Association of University Professors - a professional association of academic staff - voted overwhelmingly to accept collective bargaining as a major way of pursuing its aims (Garbarino & Aussieker, 1975:86). In Britain, the Association of University Teachers registered as a trade union under the Labour Relations Act 1971 not more than a year after the Act was passed and in New Zealand the organisation representing academics - the Association of University Teachers of New Zealand (A.U.T.N.Z.) - registered under the Labour Relations Act 1987 in 1989.

If one accepts, as Blackburn and Prandy (1965) do,
that engaging in collective bargaining and registering as a trade union go some way to defining an organisation as a trade union, then it is evident that organisations representing university teachers and other well established professions have become more "unionate" despite the fact that, traditionally, members of these occupations have typically been resistant to the ideology of trade unionism. The legal profession in America, for example, historically considered collective bargaining to be contrary to its code of ethics (Rothman, 1984:198). And with regards to university teachers in the U.S.A., Thorstein Veblen in 1918 noted that,

... there is no trades-union among university teachers, and no collective bargaining. There appears to be a feeling prevalent among them that their salaries are not of the nature of wages, and that there would be a species of moral obliquity implied in overtly so dealing with the matter (Veblen, 1918:118).

Similarly, in the New Zealand context, as late as 1950, a contributor to the University Newsletter (1950, May:5) stated that,

An...argument against the "trade union" view of the A.U.T.'s function is that throughout most of their history trade unions have conducted wage negotiations with the weapon of the strike either lying on the table or standing behind the door. The University teachers' sense of public responsibility precludes their use or threat of the strike, which would disrupt the relationship of trust already described as the only possible basis for the free functioning of a State-supported university.

Representation by trade union type organizations therefore appears to represent a complete reversal by the
academic profession. This relatively recent change in orientation by the established professions in general, and by the academic profession in particular, raises some important issues about the nature of professionalism that I hope to address in this thesis.

In this introductory chapter, I start with an assessment of theories of the nature of professionalism. I argue that professionalism can be conceived as an occupational "strategy" designed to enhance both material rewards and autonomy in the work setting. In the second section and third sections of the introduction, I look at the way in which the social context determines the success or failure of attempts by occupational groups to professionalize. And in the final section I show how the theoretical framework I have developed in the previous two sections provides a foundation for the empirical research in the following chapters. This section also contains a statement of the main question taken up in this thesis. In brief, I look critically at the argument (e.g. Crompton & Jones, 1984, Oppenhiemer, 1985) that there are definite links between the "deprofessionalization" or "proletarianization" of white collar workers and their movement towards unionization. Recent, current and impending changes in New Zealand society and the impact of these upon its academic community provide a unique opportunity to explore these links.
(1.2) THE NATURE OF PROFESSIONALISM.

What, then, does it mean to identify an occupation as a profession? Writers on this topic agree that the professions are distinct from other occupations in certain ways. But when it comes to defining an occupation as a "profession", the issue is confused by the fact that there are almost as many definitions of professionalism as there are theorists of it.

According to one of the earlier theorists of professional life - Talcott Parsons - a profession has a number of characteristics (1954:35-49). Professionals in capitalist society, for Parsons, represent something of an anomaly because they are oriented primarily to the pursuit of the "impersonal" values of client welfare or the advancement of science rather than the business ethic of personal profit.

... the business man has been thought of as egoistically pursuing his own self-interest regardless of the interests of others, while the professional man was altruistically serving the interests of others regardless of his own (ibid:36).

This is not to say that capitalism and professionalism, in this view, are mutually incompatible. Like the business man, professionals are guided by the principle of scientific rationality rather than traditionalism. In other words, they are compelled to use the most effective and efficient way of doing things rather than ways which are "time honoured." Unlike the
business man, however, this rationality is employed for the good of society rather than for personal gain (ibid:37).

The authority of a professional is said by Parsons to be based upon technical competence or expertise. People obey doctors, for example, not because of their higher social status, but because the doctor knows more than the client. However, because technical competence has strict boundaries, or in Parson's words, is "functionally specific", the authority of a given professional is correspondingly limited. This feature of professional life is similar to an important aspect of modern bureaucracy. While the authority of the bureaucrat is typically based upon the powers conferred to a particular office rather than expertise, it is, like professional authority, limited to specific areas.

The officer of a concern is condemned or penalised for exceeding his authority in a way similar to that in which a doctor would be for trying to get his patient to do things not justified as a means of maintaining or improving his health (Parsons, 1954:40).

The final major characteristic of professional conduct is "universalism." In this view the conduct of professionals is governed by standards which are independent of any particular social relationship that a patient might bear to them. What governs the conduct of a doctor, for example, is not that the patient is a friend's father but what type of illness she has.

More recent theorists of the professions appear to
emphasise various aspects of Parsons' taxonomy. Toren (1975:325), for example, suggests that the attributes of a profession can be reduced to three: a body of theoretical and technical knowledge, an altruistic service orientation, and autonomous work practice. Oppenheimer (1973:214) lists two factors: Professional work, in this view, involves discretion and judgement on behalf of the worker and requires high levels of training. There are many other trait-type definitions of professionalism (Klegon, 1978:261) but I think most would include some reference to a knowledge base, service orientation and work autonomy (for an exception, see Rothman, 1979).

Researchers have recently drawn attention to certain faults within the trait approach. Klegon (1978:256), for example, argues that trait theorists have accepted the taken for granted view that professionals are worthy of autonomy, status and higher incomes because of their expertise and orientation towards altruistic service (as opposed to profit). Similarly, Johnson (1972:24) argues that there has been little effort made to explore the relationship between the factors said to characterize the professions.

Critics of the trait approach tend to emphasise the temporal dimension in professionalism and therefore see it as a strategy and a process rather than merely a means of distinguishing occupations. Johnson (1972:27), for example, defines professionalization as "... a peculiar institutionalized form of occupational control." In this
view professionalism refers not to an occupation but the manner in which an occupation is controlled by its members. Similarly, Larson (1977:xvi) defines professionalism as "... the process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a market for their expertise." The best succinct definition of professionalization is, I believe, provided by Freidson (1971:22) who states that,

Professionalization might be defined as a process by which an organized occupation, usually but not always by virtue of making a claim to special esoteric competence and to concern for the quality of its work and its benefits to society, obtains the exclusive right to perform a particular kind of work, controls training for and access to it, and controls the right of determining and evaluating the way work is performed.

This definition, like many of the trait approaches, includes the three "core" elements of service, expertise, and autonomy but, at the same time, attempts draw out their relations with each other in a way which Parsons does not do. In essence, knowledge and altruism become resources employed by certain occupations to enhance or justify autonomy and other rewards.

Although knowledge is both a more complex and important issue than the service ethic as a basis for autonomy, something should be said of the latter factor because it lies at the heart of the relationship of the professions to both clients and the public and therefore involves the issue of trust. Trust in professionalism is essential because the unqualified acceptance of professional authority, especially in the "human
services", is largely reliant upon it.

The service orientation upheld by the professions, as we have seen, has been contrasted with the pursuit of self-interest. In fact many of the earlier researchers saw the professions as a stabilising factor essential for the maintenance of order and democracy in society; this function was primarily due to their orientation towards the common good (Johnson, 1972:12-14). This is a view which still persists. Take, for example, Irvine's (1988:5) justification for the autonomy of universities.

Universities, with their commitment to pluralism and the discipline of dissent, are important to the welfare of the general community, are the focus of the intellectual life of a society, and of some part of its cultural traditions, and are at the centre of a nation's capacity to develop.

In the context of this discussion, the most important aspect of the promotion of a service ideology is that it renders the notion of accountability and external interference unnecessary or even harmful. Novitz (1989), for example, in his defence of university autonomy argued that state interference would be "disastrous for it involves dismantling a cornerstone of liberal democracy."

The role of the "professional association" is instrumental in promoting an ideology of altruism because of its prime interest in quality of service to the client and the community. To promote trust and confidence it is common to find that members of professions publicly subscribe to a formal code of ethics sanctioned by their
professional association, which assures the highest standards of conduct, competence and good character. These standards are purportedly enforced by the power of the profession to collectively refuse to recognize practitioners by, for example, refusing to grant credentials or taking credentials away. The promotion of a service ideal, therefore, helps to enhance and maintain autonomy and deference to professional authority because it precludes clients' questioning of professional competence and motives.

However, in cases where lapses in both competence and adherence to ethical standards have had severe implications for the welfare of a significant number of clients, and these lapses have been made public, trust in the profession as a whole is easily undermined. Lawyers diverting and then losing clients' money on a stock exchange gamble and doctors experimenting with dubious therapies on unknowing patients are examples of conduct which has done much to raise questions about the extent to which certain professions should be self-regulating. Furthermore, as a result of such events, the overarching ideology which may have protected members of a profession from the need to be accountable for small indiscretions and minor lapses of competence starts to collapse, leaving the way open for the questioning of professional prerogatives and competence at every turn.

A service ideology, as I have stated, is not the only means of promoting authority and autonomy. The authority to define problem areas and advise clients is
underwritten by claims to superior knowledge. Superior knowledge (or expertise), since it is not a resource readily available to the public, is said to render external interference useless because lay people simply do not have the cognitive skills necessary to make substantive judgments about professional matters. Take, for example Novitz’s (1989) reaction to the proposition that university courses be validated by people other than academics.

Such a motley crew is hardly likely to have the expertise necessary for the job. It seems inevitable that they must lack a knowledge and understanding of other university systems, of comparable standards and comparable courses.

According to this argument, external control is not only unnecessary but impractical.

To recap, the authority held by a profession, according to Parsons (1954:37) is vested in the technical, rational quality of its knowledge base. While this cannot be disputed, the work of Jamous and Peloille (1970) suggests that Parsons emphasises only one aspect of professional expertise. According to these authors, professional competence can be expressed as a "ratio" of indeterminate to technical knowledge.

The essential feature of the technical aspect of professional knowledge is that it can be routinized or codified. As Baer (1987:542-543) suggests, this type of knowledge can be understood as "decision rules for joining knowledge to action." This portion of knowledge consists of well tested solutions to routine problems
which can easily be expressed verbally or in writing. It is an essential aspect of expertise because it is the means by which the professional can deal with the client's problem effectively, efficiently and with certainty. However, the fact that it can be codified and transmitted at the same time threatens the monopoly held by the profession over its knowledge base. Information can be contained in computerized forms which may be publicly accessible and occupational groups can lay claim to practices which once belonged exclusively to another. Furthermore, management can begin to realistically evaluate and direct the work process.

In the universities it is teaching that is associated with the highest potential degree of external control. In terms of content, what gets taught in universities is to some extent a function of student demand and, in times of crisis, the dictates of the State. But a great deal of control can also be exerted over the form that knowledge is conveyed in. Knowledge which can be taught has a high degree of technicality because to be taught it must exist at a level which can be codified. Additionally, since the conditions under which people learn best are fairly well known it is possible, and justifiable, to evaluate and direct the process of teaching so that learning occurs more efficiently and effectively. Furthermore, these principles can easily be used to standardise the way teachers teach and can be deployed in software packages and modular curricula with the effect that teaching time
and staff can be reduced substantially.

The indeterminate aspect of the knowledge base is that which is surrounded by mystery. This form of knowledge is tacit, cannot be set out discursively as rules and involves the individual professional's "art" of judgement. The practice of this aspect of expertise has been said to involve the rejection of well known procedures by individual practitioners on the basis of wisdom or judgement drawn from first-hand experience (Baer, 1987:546). Given this, it is no surprise to find that the autonomy of academic work has been defended precisely on the grounds of its indeterminacy. Take the following passage for example,

... academic staff are engaged in very special work. They are highly individualistic. They are expected to be innovative... [and] the kind of atmosphere and environment that fosters the greatest intellectual achievement are conditions which are not particularly regulated. For instance, you would never set hours of attendance for academics because they can do just as much thinking at home or in bed or anywhere else (Cited in Palmer, 1986:24).

In the academic world, no activity is more indeterminate than scholarship and research. Although collecting data, for example, has been standardized to some extent, it can rarely be applied in new problem areas without some form of "on the spot" modification or adaptation to specific circumstances. Furthermore, given that data are sometimes confusing and ambiguous, their interpretation and explanation often require a great deal of ingenuity and creative thought. In short, teaching can be standardized while research, by its unpredictable
nature, is resistant to this process. Furthermore, since much of scholarship and research takes place "inside the head", it is very difficult for others to judge the rate or intensity of innovative thinking, or, in fact that it is occurring at all.

Thus, it is hardly surprising to find that the practice of research has been associated with higher levels of individual work autonomy. Miller, (1967:757) notes that organizations which have greater dependence upon research will typically manifest lower levels of organizational control. Similarly, Engel (1970:19) found that, "Fewer rules and regulations were imposed upon physicians who were pursuing researching activities."

Drawing on a study of the French university-hospital system, Jamous and Peloille (1970) have noted that the boundary between technical and indeterminate knowledge is flexible and can be controlled to some extent by the profession. This can cause conflict between members who want to rationalize and codify the occupation's activities and those who see this as a threat to their monopoly. However, as Baer (1987:549) argues, professionals may not see the codification of knowledge as a threat as long as new and still tacit expertise is being developed at a rate sufficient to maintain a suitable "distance" between themselves and other groups.

Another important means of occupational control which also involves the regulation of "knowledge" is the restriction placed upon entry to an occupation to those
holding a stated level of qualification or particular credential. Credentials have the effect of enhancing or safe-guarding the market value of qualified individuals by limiting the pool of possible practitioners or applicants for jobs.

Whereas in feudal times, qualifications for professions and skilled trades were controlled almost entirely by the respective guilds, the State and employers now have a significant input in regulating the use of credentials. In the case of employers, it is evident that the level of the qualification they set for entry into an occupation is influenced, within limits, by their perception of the market for qualified people. In times of oversupply of holders of a given credential, employers typically raise the standards required of applicants (Dore, 1976). Thus, where the holders of B.A. (Hons) and Masters degrees were once adequately qualified for positions in New Zealand universities, the worldwide glut of people with doctorates has meant that doctorates are now generally considered to be the minimum. This is because university employers realise that they can attempt to enhance the quality of their service without a corresponding increase in labour costs. Nevertheless, while employers can influence the "job-getting" value of qualifications, the qualifications themselves are issued by the profession or skilled trade.

The restriction of types of work and the issuing of credentials to a given profession or skilled trade can, I believe, be understood as a case of the general concept
of exclusionary "closure." The term "closure" is a Weberian concept which refers to a process whereby, "social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles" (Parkin, 1979:44). To this principle it must be added, however, that while the professions and skilled trades may seek to maximise rewards by restricting opportunities they clearly do not do so under conditions of their own choosing.

(1.3) THE CONTEXT OF PROFESSIONALISM I:
THE STATE AND BUREAUCRACY.

Closure is rarely established by the occupation alone. And in the case of the professions it rests to some considerable extent upon their relationship with the State as well as employers. As Johnson (1984:20) notes, the relationship between the State and professions is one of reciprocity. The rule of the State is underwritten by the professions whose "expert" practices legitimize the classification and treatment of individuals according to certain social definitions, e.g., educational success and failure, criminal and law-abiding, and illness and health. The State, in turn, plays a significant role in professional closure (Murphy, 1988:187). First, it funds a system of higher education whose benefits (the conferment of credentials) have been appropriated largely by children of professional parents (Lauder et al, 1987). Second, it provides many professionals with careers in State bureaucracies. Third, it helps to promote and
maintain exclusive practices through institutional and personal licensing. The relationship between the State and the professions, however, is not necessarily one of complete collusion. The interdependence of the State and the professions is an "uneasy alliance in which professionals are constantly on the alert for signs of state encroachment upon what they regard as professional matters" (Johnson, 1972:21).

Looking at this situation historically, in New Zealand, the numbers of professionals increased most rapidly during the expansion of the Welfare State in the early post-war period (Pearson & Thorns, 1983). The expansion of the education and health systems opened up many more opportunities for professionals as educators, administrators and health workers and the increased spending on education (McLaren, 1974:28-29) helped to fill these new positions with appropriately qualified workers.

For some professions, State sanctioned rights to exclusive practice had come well before this period. The Law Practitioners Act 1908, for example, made it an offence for a person to act as a solicitor or barrister without being enrolled by a registrar of the court (cited in New Zealand Statutes, 1931, No.46), and by 1930 enrollment requirements included the possession of a certificate or degree issued by the University of New Zealand for the successful completion of a course in law (ibid). In 1914 the Medical Practitioners Act made it an offence for anyone not registered under the Act to
practice medicine using a title which implied the possession of a medical degree or qualification (New Zealand Statutes, 1914, No.74).

The monopoly held by university teachers over their practice was sanctioned by the State in 1874 by virtue of The University Act passed that same year. The "licence" to issue credentials, was in this instance held by "power of office" rather than by virtue of registration. However, the holding of office, like registration, is governed by the profession itself. Just as the legal and medical profession decide who is eligible for registration, university teachers collectively decide who holds office; typically those who hold higher university degrees. The difference between lawyers and doctors on one hand and university teachers on the other is probably due to the fact that credentialing has hitherto occurred solely in centralized bureaucracies rather than in spatially differentiated "owner-operated" practices. Thus, in the former case the licence is granted to an institution and in the latter to an individual.

The differences between self-employed professionals and professionals employed in bureaucracies - State and corporate - has prompted much discussion. There is general agreement that professionals are to be increasingly found in bureaucratic settings (Abrahamson, 1967:7; Pavalko, 1971; Hall, 1968) and one might argue, as Oppenheimer (1984:150) and Westoby (1987:140) do, that this trend automatically means a loss of professional autonomy. However, the relationship between
bureaucratization and professional independence is far from straightforward (see, for example, Engel, 1970; Hall, 1968; Wilenski, 1964:147; Toren, 1975:328).

The notion that bureaucratization leads directly to a loss of autonomy can be understood, I believe, as a result of an overly rigid view of bureaucracy. For many writers, a central defining characteristic of bureaucracy is the existence of a monocratically organised hierarchy. It is precisely this latter principle which is most fundamentally in conflict with the autonomous, collegial control of professional occupations (Pavalko, 1971:189; Abrahamson, 1967:8 Hall, 1968:95). Certainly centralized control was, among other things, included as defining a feature of bureaucracy by Max Weber (1978:196-200), a theorist who has had a major impact on the way recent writers have conceptualized bureaucracy. But, for Weber, monocratic rule in bureaucracy could be tempered in certain ways.

"On either a traditional or rational basis authority may be limited and controlled by certain means.... It is possible for any type of authority to be deprived of its monocratic character, which binds it to a single person, by the principle of collegiality" (Weber, 1947:392).

What concrete processes, for Weber, were characteristic of collegiality? First of all, collegiality is not an "all or nothing" category: there can be degrees to which centralized or monocratic authority is limited. These may range from the presence of "advisory collegial bodies" which merely "temper" the
exercise of authority, to situations where acts of authority may only be carried out by consultation and voting or where acts can be vetoed by any party. Collegiality may also be present where the principle of "rotation" or voting in of leaders exists (Weber, 1947:392-393). Another principle of collegiality which is not mentioned by Weber, but fits his definition, is that involving the representation of subordinates on governing bodies. (This, as I will show in Chapter 3, has been especially important in the context of the New Zealand university system).

Whatever the case, Weber acknowledged that collegiality and expertise were often linked.

A somewhat different type is found in the case where a collegial body is made up of individuals with specified functions. In such a case the preparation of a subject is assigned to the individual technical expert who is competent in that field or possibly to several experts, each in a different aspect of the field. Decisions, however, are taken by a vote of the body as a whole (Weber, 1947:394).

This link between expertise and collegiality has been taken up more recently by Gouldner who distinguishes "representative" from "punishment centred" bureaucracies (1954:216-217). Unlike punishment centred bureaucracies in which rules are imposed and obedience is valued for its own sake (ibid:473), representative bureaucracies are governed by rules which have been established by mutual participation of all groups within the organisation. Authority in punishment centred bureaucracies is wielded by the "true bureaucrat" while experts typically hold
authority in representative bureaucracies. However, like Weber, Gouldner rerecognises that the authority of experts may be limited to an advisory role only (ibid:225).

Even more recently and specifically with university organisation in mind, Pollitt has drawn a distinction between the "managerial model" and the "professional development" model of organisation (1988:8-9). The managerial model, where "Organisational relationships are predominantly hierarchical [and] authority is wielded by grade" (ibid:8) clearly corresponds to monocratic or punishment centred bureaucracy. In the professional development model, organisational relationships are based on collegiality, collective decision making and mutual trust. Without doubt, this model has its equivalents in the writings of Weber and Gouldner but unlike these writers, Pollitt ties his model explicitly to professionalism: "Authority lies with the professional body or institute at least as much as with the employer" (ibid:9).

The implications of these two main types of bureaucracy for professional autonomy can be discerned in empirical research. Engel (1970:16), for example, found that physicians in a "moderately bureaucratized" setting perceived themselves substantially higher in autonomy than those whose settings were characterised by a highly bureaucratized setting. In the moderately bureaucratized setting described in Engel's (1970) study, the locus of decision-making lay within the institution rather than spatially separated from it. It is likely, therefore,
that this provided conducive conditions for the communication and participation in decision making which is indicative of degrees of collegiality.

More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that those in private practice perceived themselves to be less autonomous than those in moderately bureaucratized settings. This is possibly because professionals in organizations have more freedom to engage in personal research because time and research funding are more likely to be readily available. Another reason could be, as Engel (1970:17) suggests, that those in organisations do not depend directly upon the client for income. And in the case of State provision of services, the professional is not only indirectly dependent upon the client's income but is typically guaranteed a clientele (Johnson, 1972:78) - although I will show that this is changing in New Zealand. Thus the professional does not have to be as responsive to consumer demand as the private practitioner.

Whatever the case, as Abercrombie and Urry (1984:121) note, bureaucracy is "Janus faced." We have already seen how university teachers draw upon the power of office both to issue and to regulate entry of those who wish to issue credentials. But while bureaucracy can, under certain conditions, provide greater opportunities, it is at the same time a system of constraint. For the sake of co-ordination, work within a bureaucracy does require a certain minimum adherence to bureaucratic rules and professionals must subscribe, at least in a broad
sense, to the aims of the organisation.

And even where "collegial" control exists some groups, such as women, may still play a subordinate role in the division of labour within the institution. Furthermore, an ideology of "collegiality" often serves to mask internal power structures (Palmer, 1986:26). As Bachrach and Baratz (1962) note, power may operate through confining collective decision making to "safe issues." They also suggest that decision making which systematically benefits some groups may be influenced on account of the "mobilization of bias" due to the dominant ideology of the institution or society. In the case of the universities, at least, males represent by far the greatest proportion of academics (Wilson, 1986) and hence "democratic" decision making effectively places power in their hands.

(1.4) THE CONTEXT OF PROFESSIONALISM II: PROFESSIONS IN THE CLASS STRUCTURE.

There is very little agreement as to the position of the professions when it comes to vertically situating them within the class structure. In fact, depending upon what framework one uses, professionals can be placed at the top end of the stratification system (Gouldner, 1979, Parkin, 1979), at the lower end (Bedggood, 1980; Edwards, 1979), simultaneously at top and bottom (Carchedi, 1977; Wright, 1979) or in the middle (Abercrombie and Urry, 1983; Goldthorpe, 1982).

Not surprisingly, where professionals fall in the
stratification system depends on the criteria used for classification. Bedggood (1980:47), for example, defines class solely on the basis of production relations. According to this definition there are two main classes in capitalist societies: those who own the means of production (capitalists) and those who do not (workers). This dichotomous view of class is justified on the grounds of the divergent interests of capitalists and workers. It is in the interest of capitalists to reduce the wages of both white collar and blue collar workers. Thus, despite the fact that white collar workers are unproductive and live off the surplus created by blue collar workers, both groups are exploited by capitalists and therefore have objective interests in overthrowing the capitalist class.

While I agree that most productive and non-productive workers must sell their labour power to survive and that the differences between these two categories of workers may have the effect of subverting unified action against the capitalist class, I think that this account of the white collar stratum has important weaknesses both at the level of description and explanation. First, there are important differences between segments of unproductive workers in terms of culture, market and work situation, and skill. But to Bedggood (1980), shop assistants and university professors, for example, are all lumped together into the same category. And while Edwards (1979), who uses similar criteria for identifying classes, acknowledges that
professional workers differ from other elements of the working class in terms of market and work situation, he, like Bedggood (1980), fails to explain these differences adequately. Segmentation of the working class, in their view ultimately rests upon a "divide and rule" strategy employed by capital. This explanation, however, is found wanting because it does not take account of the professionalization strategies employed by occupations and the role of the State in the creation of positions of monopoly.

Can we say, then, that professionals are members of the ruling class? According to Parkin (1979:48) they are. In this view the dominant class consists of those who have engaged in successful closure strategies. For Parkin, there are two forms of closure within capitalist societies. One is based upon restricted access to property and the other involves restriction of access to "key positions in the division of labour" (ibid). In the latter, control of entry is regulated through professional qualifications or credentials. However, both forms of closure have something in common: they are enforced by the State and they are of equal importance when it comes to the exclusion of the subordinate class.

While Gouldner (1979:15) does not go quite as far as Parkin in stating that professionals are members of the ruling class he does see them as possible contenders for this position. The "New Class" as he calls professionals, rises out of efforts by the "old moneyed class" (capital) to rationalize and co-ordinate
production. Rather than being trained within the firm, experts increasingly become products of the university system; a system which is the central institutional basis for the culture, power and reproduction of the New Class (ibid:19).

By stressing "technical and moral superiority", or in our terms, expertise and an altruistic service ideal, the New Class maintains its distance from the working class and tacitly devalues the authority of the old moneyed class who lack credentials and are overtly motivated by self gain. The essential factor which both unifies the New Class and separates it from capital and labour, however, is captured by Gouldner's notion of "culture of critical discourse" (C.C.D.). C.C.D. is a set of rules governing verbal expression. These rules are premised on the notions that no authority exists which is beyond question and that assertions should always established by rational argument (ibid:28-30).

C.C.D. is similar to Bourdieu's (1977) notion of "cultural capital". However, while Bourdieu sees cultural capital as only "relatively autonomous" to moneyed capital and primarily involved in cultural domination, Gouldner (1979) argues that C.C.D. stands alone as a source of power and is directly comparable in its power to moneyed capital (1979:24-27). Evidence of the power of the New Class vis-a-vis moneyed capital comes, according to Gouldner, from two sources: 1/ the fact that the New Class increasingly controls production, through the separation of legal ownership and control (ibid:12-13)
and 2/ the fact that it increasingly controls the reproduction of moneyed capital through the extension of "public ownership" or state control while moneyed capital increasingly controls conditions for the reproduction of the New Class (ibid:45).

Gouldner (1979), however, over-emphasizes both the "radicalism" of the New Class and its powers. The productivity demands generated by the capitalist economy ensure that professionals in the private sector at least, will have interests that correspond directly to those of capitalist owners, i.e., favourable profit margins. And while I agree with Gouldner (1979) and Parkin (1979) that credentialed workers have substantial powers to better their own positions, their powers within capitalist society are limited by certain factors.

Gouldner (1979), for example, does not entertain the possibility that the State might to some extent divest itself of the role it plays in the reproduction of professionals. Additionally, there are very important differences between "credential" capital and moneyed capital. For example, there is always the possibility that certain professional occupations may become "deskilled" through the routinization, fragmentation or mechanization of their knowledge base. As well, the State may no longer sanction their exclusive practices, and the power of professionals may be reduced as a result of organised consumer resistance or their skills becoming irrelevant. Thus, the position of professions in the class structure, I believe, is not as certain or as
powerful as Gouldner (1979) and Parkin (1979) seem to imply.

Because of the somewhat precarious nature of professional standing, some writers (Carchedi, 1977; Wright, 1979) have argued that the professions occupy a "contradictory class location"; they are placed both in capital and labour. One of the more innovative uses of this theory has been by Johnson (1977) who tries to merge Jamous and Pelosi’s ratio of indetermination to technicality with Carchedi’s (1977) framework for identifying social classes. According to Carchedi (1977:4), an understanding of the "new middle class", involves the fact that,

the new middle class performs the global function of capital even without owning the means of production, and that it performs this function in conjunction with the function of collective labourer....

The global function of capital involves the control, surveillance and reproduction of labour power. According to Johnson (1984:106) professionalism is successful only to the extent to which the processes creating and maintaining indeterminacy coincide with the global functions of capital. Doctors, he argues, have won a monopoly of practice by defining, through "official" definitions of health and illness, when and when not workers may legitimately withdraw their labour (ibid).

Members of the contradictory class location fulfil the function of global capital and the collective labour in varying degrees. Thus at one end, an "elite" of white
collar workers, largely the agents of capital, routinize and rationalize the work of subordinates. Subordinates therefore become deskillled or "proletarianized." As their work becomes more technical and takes on more aspects of work performed by the collective labourer, labour power is devalued, autonomy is reduced and the functions of control and surveillance diminish (Carchedi, 1979:9).

This is a powerful analysis which brings together important elements both of the conditions necessary for professional closure, and important criteria for delineating social classes. Professional closure, and its attendant privileges are only successfully attained where professionals act, whether directly or indirectly, in the service of capital.

This framework, however, is not entirely unproblematic. First, indeterminacy and technicality do not necessarily map onto the global functions of capital and the functions of the collective labourer respectively. The work of lower-level accountants, for example, can have a high degree of technicality but still serves capital because it is concerned with the regulation and realization of surplus value (Abercrombie & Urry, 1984:75-79). Additionally, it is difficult to reconcile the conception of a body of people "objectively torn between classes" with the fact that they hold a cultural background in common, effectively the basis of their intergenerational reproduction (Bourdieu, 1977).

Hence it makes sense to speak, as Renner (1978) and more recently Abercrombie and Urry (1983) and
Goldthorpe (1982) do, of the existence of a "service class." The term "service class" is significant precisely because it identifies the role of this class in the division of labour, that is, the service it provides for capital. The service rendered to capital involves as Carchedi (1977) notes, the functions of control and reproduction of labour power, and conceptualization of the labour process.

No doubt many service class positions were opened up as a result of the development of finance capital and, as Gouldner (1979) noted, the need to delegate authority due to the growth in sheer size of businesses. However, there is also evidence to suggest that organised labour has generated places for professionals. The development of the Welfare State, a major educator and employer of professionals, arguably grew out of economistic struggles by the working class during a time of labour strength. As Sutch (1966:177) notes of the development of the Welfare State in New Zealand during the late 1930s, "the achievements of the first years of the Labour administration were a victory for the ideas of the Trades and Labour councils before World War I."

The professions too, were active in filling and creating places for themselves. In a review of empirical research on the financial, engineering, personnel, marketing and other professions, Armstrong (1984:116) has
concluded that the control strategies used by capital are ...

... based on generalizations of the techniques and knowledge possessed by "professional" groups in competition [with each other] for key positions within the global function of capital. The response of capital to its crises (which need not be specifically of control) is mediated by these professions, which are poised to engage on collective mobility projects within the global function of capital in virtue of their possession of techniques which offer responses to these crises.

Often successful professional groups had to overcome opposition not only from other occupations vying for professional status (Abbott, 1988) but also from capital and labour. For example, personnel managers in Britain had to combat "employers' tendency to assume that anyone could do the job [by] persuading them to employ trained welfare workers" (ibid:111). And as Lash and Urry (1987:169-171) have shown, the American engineering trade in its efforts to "deskill" workers and create new management structures, through the introduction of Taylorist work principles, had to overcome opposition from both capital and labour.

It should be added that the service class itself is stratified into upper and lower levels. Occupations in the lower segments of the service class have been referred to as the "semi-professions" (Etzioni, 1969). They are those which have failed to fully professionalize or alternatively are the result of the delegation of routine or technical procedures by the upper levels of a profession (Armstrong, 1984:116). These occupations include, for example, nurses and primary school teachers.
(Abercrombie & Urry, 1983:125). Occupants of the lower levels of the service class, furthermore, have a poorer income and lack a full career structure and are less able to use discretion. The engineering profession in New Zealand provides a prime example of how a service class occupation may be stratified into upper and lower levels. In this instance stratification is based around those who hold university credentials and those holding credentials from polytechnics.

A lecturer in civil engineering at the engineering school in the University of Canterbury describes this situation in the following way:

...there are the people who graduate from the polytechnic and they would have two or three years part-time [study] and they would be well skilled and well versed in the practical aspects of engineering and they would be able to oversee four, five, ten people working on a site or in a factory but they would be incapable of doing any creative work or preparing drawings or supervising a contract, doing the economic and legal sides the way you would expect a professional engineer to do them... university education ... is designed to bring on creative people who can in fact do new things rather than simply do established techniques and practices.

The implications for autonomy are quite clear. While "Polytech" engineers must adhere to tried and tested rules, graduate engineers can, if they wish, initiate new courses of action using their own discretion and judgment. In Jamous and Peloille's (1970) terms of reference, the work of university engineers is clearly more indeterminate while, in comparison, the work of the polytech engineers is more technical or routine.

In terms of income, the salaries or wages of
Polytech engineers are significantly lower than those of graduate engineers. There are differences in career structure too. In private engineering firms, it is common to find that graduate engineers are eligible to fill top positions in the firm. In fact these top positions often involve a "partnership" system, like many law firms, where senior engineers buy into the company becoming "directors" and part owners of the firm. Polytech engineers are usually formally excluded from these positions even at the top ends of their career structure.

Although the service class, at its upper levels, to some extent "fades" into the capitalist class through, as the example above shows, top level employees becoming major share holders, it is distinct from this class because on the whole it does not own the means of production. The boundary between the service class and the working class also mitigates against sharply defined boundaries because of the overlapping of lower level service class workers with those working in skilled trades.

It is easy to see how accountants and managers serve capitalist functions but how might university teachers be implicated in this role? First, the university helps to legitimate inequalities in capitalism by presenting a formal means by which working class members may become upwardly mobile. Second, it provides capitalist societies with expert functionaries or professionals whose credentials legitimate their capacity to categorise groups of people, issue commands,
and to "normalize" deviants. Third, the university is a research site where new technologies, for both production and social control are developed. This second function, however, embodies a dualism because the scientific development of technologies requires both a rational assessment of competing theories and critiques of the existing ways of doing things. The universities, then, are both conservative and subversive because the necessary existence of a "culture of critical discourse" underwrites the power of functionaries but, at the same time, helps to legitimate "enclaves" where critical thought may be turned to social institutions.

Although universities have had to set aside their mediaeval role as the producers of church officials in order to service the capitalist economy, it must also be admitted that the academic profession has been able to maintain some areas of pedagogy which are not directly related to the needs of the capitalist economy. Conditions, however, are not always conducive to these features of university life. During certain periods - the 1930s depression, in New Zealand (De La Mare, 1935) and during the 1950s in the U.S.A., - the persecution of social critics increased significantly. And, as I shall demonstrate in a later chapter, New Zealand universities have recently come under attack for not doing enough to adjust to the needs of the market.

To sum up, I have taken the position that professionals constitute the upper levels of the service class on account of their success in engaging in upward
mobility strategies. Relatively high degrees of autonomy and economic privilege are attained and sustained by the principle of exclusionary closure. The State, employers, mastery of a body of esoteric skills whose importance stems from the service provided to capital, credentials, an ideology of altruistic service, and competition from other professions all provide important conditions which dictate the success or failure of social closure strategies.

(1.5) THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND DEPROFESSIONALIZATION.

Professionalization and unionization have one main factor in common. As Haug and Sussman (1971:525) have argued, "Unionization and professionalization are two processes by which members of an occupation seek to achieve collective upward mobility." Occupations vying for professional status, as we have seen, attempt to convince the State, their employers and clients that they deserve certain advantages due both to their expertise and placing client or public welfare over the practitioner's personal benefit. While professional associations stress the "rewards" for granting and sustaining professional status, through a proclaimed interest in increasing the quality of service to clients, trade unions tend to stress "punishment", in the form of strikes, for not acceding to their demands. This particular difference may explain why unions or union type strategies have traditionally been avoided by
professionals; an altruistic service ideology does not sit well with the overtly self-serving interests of union activity.

Professionalization, I have argued, is a process whereby autonomy and economic privilege have been extended by a process of exclusionary closure. Deprofessionalization or proletarianization (I use these terms synonymously here) is the "inverse" of professionalization and involves a process whereby economic and organisational conditions deteriorate due to the ineffectuality or termination of factors conducive to professionalization. In other words, degrees of autonomy and financial reward become more like those characteristic of working class positions.

Is it possible, then, that academic staff in New Zealand have resorted to unionization as their organisational and economic advantages have degenerated to become more like those characteristic of the working class? To explore the idea that the unionization of academics was a result of deprofessionalization or proletarianization, I have examined the events which led to the unionization of academics. Chapter two deals with changes in the economic or "market" situation of academics, - job security, salary levels and promotion prospects - as well the re-organisation by the State of the way academic staff negotiate their salary structures and conditions of employment. In chapter three I explore the issue of autonomy by looking at the organisation of authority or "work situation" within academic work takes
place. In chapter four, using the University of Canterbury as a "case study", I look at how academic staff view the changes in their market and work situations and whether they see unionism as an appropriate response. In chapter five, the research question is re-examined in the light of the evidence.
CHAPTER II

MARKET SITUATION

(2.1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

Academics, as a whole, are internationally mobile. Vacancies for academic positions are advertised in journals and newsletters which have a world-wide circulation. It is because universities seek and attract staff from virtually any country that the labour market for academics is truly a global one. For example, of the composition of academic staff at Canterbury, Phillips (1973:442) noted,

...by the 1970s the professors, the readers and the lecturers formed the most cosmopolitan group in the province. Of the 338 permanent members of the academic staff in April 1972, for example, 194 were New Zealanders, 91 from the British Isles, 18 Americans and seven Australians. Others were born in 17 different countries from Latvia to Brazil. And nearly half of the New Zealanders had some formal education overseas.

It follows, then, that changes in the academic labour market in countries where a great proportion of academics are employed, such as Great Britain and the United States, will have a significant impact on the market for academics in a small country like New Zealand. In other words, a glut of academics in either of these countries will, other things being equal, automatically increase the numbers of those considering or applying for positions in other English speaking countries. Certainly there is no doubt that, in most fields, there is an over-
supply of academic labour in the world market at the present time (although this may change to some extent in the future because of an "age bulge" in the academic population).

In contrast with the rapid expansion of university systems throughout the Western world in the 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s have seen a sharp contraction in the number of positions available for academics globally (Kidd, 1981; De Francesco & Rhoades, 1987). In Great Britain, large cuts in State spending on universities in the 1980s have meant that many institutions have had to reduce staff by significant numbers (St John-Brooks, 1981:273). According to one source (Hilton, 1988:25), British universities have experienced a net loss of 2300 full time positions in the five years ending in 1987. In the United States, from 1978 to 1983 an estimated 4000 faculty members - of which 1200 were tenured - were made redundant at four year institutions for financial reasons (De Francesco & Rhoades, 1987:474). Evidence suggesting the development of an adverse market situation in the United States can be traced back to the early 1970s. Roemer and Shnitz (1982:515) have noted that the ratio of doctorate holders to university positions in 1967 was a favourable .95 to 1. By 1972, however, there were over five doctorate holders per one university position (ibid:516).

This change was reflected in the average salaries of American academics. Salary increases kept pace with the national average wage until the early 1970s. By 1977,
however, the average national wage had increased 3.5% over the last 10 years while academic salaries had decreased by an average of 5.5% (ibid:516). British and Australian academics have not fared much better. In both these countries academic salaries have fallen by over 15% relative to the average wage during the period 1976 to 1988 (Hilton, 1988:23). Not surprisingly the deterioration of pay coincided with increased numbers of academics opting for collective bargaining during this period. It would be wrong, however, to say that collective bargaining procedures were established merely upon demand.

Research on faculty unionization in the United States has shown that the degree to which academics are organised depends very much upon the prevailing legal climate. In the most supportive legal environment, 78% of institutions were organized while under the least favourable conditions, organization existed in only 4% of institutions (Garbarino & Aussieker, 1975:62). This suggests that the capacity to bargain effectively depends to a considerable degree upon access to the legislative machinery provided by the State. Evidence from Britain (Bain et al, 1973) suggests that this is a major factor in the unionization of white collar workers.

Although the legal environment in the United States is generally more sympathetic towards union activity than it once was, the granting of formal bargaining rights is by no means automatic. Clarke (1981) describes a situation whereby one university administration mounted a
successful supreme court challenge to union coverage. This was done by arguing that faculty were not "employees" but were managers or supervisors and therefore not eligible for bargaining rights under the National Labour Relations Act 1935. Similarly, universities in Victoria, Australia were only granted access to State bargaining machinery in 1984 after an intense legal dispute. Again, the denial of formal bargaining rights was premised upon the ambiguous status of academics as employers and employees (Palmer, 1986:22). In New Zealand, however, there were no such hurdles to the State sanctioned legislation set out under the Labour Relations Act 1987. In fact the A.U.T.N.Z. was left with virtually no option but to register under this Act. This was because of changes in State legislation which dealt with, among other things, the determination of academic pay scales.

From 1974 until December 1989 the academic salary scales in New Zealand were set by the Higher Salaries Commission (H.S.C.). The H.S.C. was established in 1974 in order to make recommendations to Government on pay and conditions for members of parliament, the judiciary and, later, those placed under the jurisdiction of the H.S.C. Act 1977. Recommendations by the H.S.C. are informed by prevailing rates for executive positions in the private sector. The prevailing rates for executive positions in the private sector, however, are merely a guide; the H.S.C. is under no legal obligation to maintain relativities between the private sector and those covered
by the Act.

Additionally, negotiations are entered into with various advisory bodies. For the pay rates of medical doctors, for example, advice is obtained from the Hospital Medical Officers' Advisory Committee. For academic staff, discussion of salary proposals was entered into with the University Grants Committee (U.G.C.) which, in turn, was legally obliged to consult the A.U.T.N.Z. (Reprinted Statutes of New Zealand, Vol. 13: 783).

In December 1989 the determination of academic salary scales was removed from the jurisdiction of the H.S.C. by the State Services Amendment Act No.2 1989. In its place, personnel and industrial relations issues are now dealt with under the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 1987, along with the State Sector Act 1988 and its amendments. Academics are now officially "employed" by the Chief Executive Officer or Vice Chancellor of each university rather than the university councils. And under the new bargaining arrangements, registered agreements for salaries and conditions must now be negotiated with the State Services Commission up until 31 December 1991. While Vice Chancellors can negotiate unregistered salary agreements at the present time (which they did in 1990), their role will become more central in 1992. After this date, Vice Chancellors will formally become the "employer party" but will still be required to consult with the State Services Commission when negotiating with staff. Furthermore, the Commission
holds the right participate directly in negotiations.

The new legal environment most certainly heralds significant changes in the relations of authority between staff and administration on the one hand, and the university and the State on the other (as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter). Although it is still far too early to assess the impact of the introduction of collective bargaining on incomes and terms of employment, it is possible to look at trends in income levels over the last decade in order to see how academics fared under the H.S.C. and the first year of negotiating directly with the Vice Chancellors.

(2.2) INCOME LEVELS

Table 2.1 (see appendix 1) shows the inflation adjusted gross weekly incomes in constant 1978 dollars for academics from 1978 to 1990. The table includes figures for the mean, the lowest level of the assistant lecturers' scale and the highest level for that of professors. For purposes of comparison, inflation adjusted figures from the Quarterly Employment Survey (Q.E.S.) have also been included.
Figure 2.1: Indexed gross weekly income, calculated from academic salary scales and the Q.E.S. (CPI adjusted).
### Table 2.1: Inflation adjusted gross weekly incomes($) for the Q.E.S., the mean, lowest level and highest level for academic staff by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>QES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>147</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>147</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>151</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>158</td>
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<td>151</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>519</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the most striking features of the data is that academic salaries, even at the lowest level, have remained above the average national wage. Equally important, though, is the fact that the average inflation adjusted salary for academics has deteriorated in real terms from $381 per week in 1978 to $330 in 1990. The average New Zealand wage has also deteriorated but to a much lesser extent. So while the average academic salary is now worth only 86% of what it was in 1978, New Zealand average earnings have retained 98% of the buying power they had in 1978. This is most strikingly revealed in Figure 2.1 where both sets of figures have been indexed to a base of 1000 at 1978.

The graph indicates that academics' salaries were most affected by the price freeze imposed by the National government between 1982 to 1984. And while there was a
sharp improvement in 1984, incomes have declined steeply again in 1986 and 1987. The most recent (1990) data show an even further drop, not only in absolute terms but also relative to the New Zealand average weekly wage.

This is not to say, however, that the income of all academics in New Zealand has declined. Some faculties (notably commerce) have had difficulty attracting staff due to the more favourable conditions offered by private sector employers. This situation is reflected in differences in the number of advertised vacancies between departments at the University of Canterbury. In 1989, for example, 12% of the advertised positions in the commerce faculty were unfilled while only 6% of positions were unfilled in arts (see appendix II). To cope with the difficulty of attracting staff to certain departments, "variable supplementary payments" were introduced by the H.S.C. in 1988. Up to 15% of the current salary for a given grade may be offered on grounds of recruiting or retention problems. Additionally, according to one informant, pay rates have also been "fiddled" by hiring hard-to-get staff at grades higher than usual, given the qualifications and experience of the applicant. Income for a minority of academics, then, may have actually increased.

In times of decline in the academic market place, Toren and Nvo-Ingber (1989:462) have noted that "the 'price' which faculty members pay in terms of number of publications for entering and advancing is somewhat higher." Promotions and entry into the profession, in
other words, have become more productivity driven. For promotions at least, this is the case at the University of Canterbury. But leaving the issue of promotions aside for the moment, it appears that increments in income alone have also been tied to performance.

Offering merit pay is a topic of debate in America owing both to its recent introduction (or re-introduction in some areas) and its questionable utility (Miller, 1988). The power to offer merit pay in New Zealand Universities was granted to university councils by the Higher Salaries Commission in 1988. According to this determination up to 10% of the current salary can be paid to individual members of the academic staff in recognition of special achievements in teaching and/or research. Given that the real value of academic salaries has deteriorated by close to this amount over the last ten years, it appears that "recognition" for increased productivity is merely, in effect, a matter of maintaining a pay rate received in any case by academics in the late 1970s.

(2.3) PROMOTION PROSPECTS.

The existence of a career ladder is an important factor which separates professional occupations from the "dead end" jobs characteristic of working class occupations. In the university, advancement has no formal limits; everyone has the opportunity to work their way from assistant lecturer to a full professorship - provided a certain number of years have passed and that
Figure 2.2: % successful of senior lecturers from all universities applying for promotion to reader by year.
their work is of suitable standard. In this section I look at the rates of promotion using data for the years 1970 to 1980 from the U.G.C.'s discussion paper on academic staffing (1981:8) for New Zealand universities as a whole, and data from the registry at the University of Canterbury for promotions at Canterbury for the years 1980 to 1990.

Figure 2.2 (see appendix II) shows the percentage promoted of those applying for positions of reader for the years 1970 to 1980. In 1971 almost half (49%) of those applying for positions as readers were successful. From this year onwards the trend indicates that applications have become dramatically less successful. In fact, by 1980, only 20% of those applying were promoted to reader. Unfortunately, these data lack in a number of respects. First, no comparable figures were provided for promotion rates between lecturer and senior lecturer. The report does note, however, that "promotion from lecturer to senior lecturer is clearly a low hurdle which most academic staff jump without difficulty" (U.G.C., 1981:7). This suggests that promotion prospects to senior lecturer were favourable during that period. Second, the report is somewhat dated. Rates of success may have improved for senior lecturers, or conversely declined for lecturers during the 1980s.

While a clear downward trend for promotion rates from senior lecturer to reader can be identified during the 1970s, the same cannot be said for more recent data for promotion rates at the University of Canterbury (see
Figure 2.3: Number of lecturers promoted to senior lecturer and number of senior lecturers promoted to reader by year.
appendix 11). While Figure 2.3 suggests no overall downward trend for promotions to reader, it appears that the number of those being promoted to senior lecturer has been reduced. The trend should be interpreted with caution, however, because it may be that fewer lecturers have applied for promotion to senior lecturer. But there is other evidence available to suggest that promotions have been made more difficult.

In 1988, "bars" were introduced within senior lecturer and lecturer grade. Whereas, previously movement within an entire grade was largely a question of seniority, it has now become a question of productivity. Just as movement between grades requires recognition of achievement in teaching and research, so does movement across the bars. While a bar existed within the senior lecturer grade until 1984 and was then removed temporarily, the bar recently inserted within the lecturer grade is a new development. Promotion, then, has become more difficult for lecturers and senior lecturers starting at the bottom of their grades because they must now cross two obstacles, rather than one, to get to a higher grade.

Additionally, there are structural limits to the numbers that can achieve promotions to the grade of reader. According to the Higher Salaries Commission, the number of readers "shall not exceed 15% of established academic staff positions in any year" (Letter to A.U.T.N.Z., 29th of Sept., 1989). At the present time 14.1% of the staff at Canterbury are readers which
suggests that this limit has almost been met. Whether this limit will change under the new regulations remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it seems that an increased number of retirements in the next few years may reduce the numbers at reader level.

Whatever happens, the present obstacles are more likely to affect women than men because there are proportionately more women than men in the lower grades. Table 2.2 shows the sex of academic staff distributed according to grade at the University of Canterbury for 1990 (see appendix II).

Table 2.2: Sex of academic by grade at the University of Canterbury.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readers</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Ltr</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures demonstrate that women are very much under-represented in all grades. But they are far more under-represented in the higher grades. So, while 35.4% of those at lecturer grade are women, they make up only 7.7% of senior lecturers. In the professor and reader grades the proportions of women are lower still.

The under-representation of women in the upper ranks is apparently due largely to the dual role of academic women as university staff and mothers (Wilson, 1986; Gibbs et al, 1987:11). Because of the restrictions placed upon them by childbirth and child care, women's careers tend to be interrupted, they qualify later than
men and have difficulty attaining degrees in the more prestigious universities overseas.

The tightening of promotion opportunities comes at a time when the Government is placing pressure upon educational institutions to promote equality within the workplace. The State Sector Amendment Act (1989:6-8) requires chief executives to implement an equal opportunities program. To this end an Equal Opportunities Co-ordinator has been appointed at the University of Canterbury in order to help meet the requirements of the Act. However, even if these disadvantages are countered in the 1990s, it appears that men have had a distinct advantage over women in terms of their careers because many have advanced up the grades before promotions became more difficult to attain.

(2.4) SECURITY OF EMPLOYMENT.

Job security, better known in academia as "tenure", refers to the right of continuous employment until retirement. Within the academic context, tenure is not only significant in an economic sense but also has important "political" ramifications; its establishment and defence is deeply embedded in the discourse of academic freedom. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will ignore the role it plays in the relations of authority within and external to the university and consider it only as an aspect of academics' market situation.
In recent times tenure in universities has been attacked on at least two grounds (Rao & Bostock, 1988:31). According to one argument, security of employment reduces productivity. Removing or postponing tenure will provide a means of eliminating those who have "retired on the job" and supposedly act as a deterrent to those tempted by indolence. The second argument draws attention to the need for staffing "flexibility." Tenure lessens flexibility because it interferes with the deploying of staff from one area to another under tight budgetary conditions. This latter argument is often tied to issues relating to market forces. Staff, in this view, should be hired according to the demand for courses. Should one course suffer a drop in demand, untenured personnel can simply be dismissed in order that resources can be transferred to other areas. The second argument has, in particular, been used to justify the employment of staff on a casual or limited term contract basis (Barlow, 1989:30). But there are other benefits related to employing casual or limited term appointees. Because they are not eligible for superannuation, holiday pay, or study leave, a substantial saving can be made in labour costs.

The increasing incidence of limited term appointments is clearly an international trend (A.U.T.N.Z. Bulletin, June 1983). Data from Australia, for example, show that the number of tenured staff dropped from 79.1% in 1982 to 73.5% in 1986. Lecturers and other junior academic staff appear to have borne the
brunt of this. And because women make up a significant proportion of junior staff, they are also disproportionately affected by this change (Barlow, 1989:31).

Staff hired on limited term appointments have tended in the past to be the exception rather than the rule in New Zealand universities. The exception was Waikato University during the mid 1970s to early 1980s. Like the Australian example, the academics most affected at Waikato were women along, with those at the beginning their careers. The increasing numbers of limited term appointees went almost unnoticed until 1982 when, citing economic constraints, Waikato announced that about 20 staff would probably be shed as their contracts expired. After negotiations between the A.U.T.N.Z. and the university council, the experiment ended in 1983 when those on limited term appointment were given tenure (A.U.T.N.Z. Bulletin, November 1983).

In August 1989, however, a probationary period of "not less than three years" was imposed nationally upon New Zealand Universities by the U.G.C.. The probationary period, it seems, could be as long as individual departments cared to make it because no maximum period was stated. At its end, the academic could be offered a "continuing position" or, alternatively, lose his or her position. With the disestablishment of the U.G.C. in 1990, this requirement is no longer mandatory. However, it is evident that while some universities (e.g., Canterbury) have dropped this requirement others (e.g.,
Lincoln) have retained it.

Legislative changes, which resulted in academic staff coming under the State Sector Act 1988 in 1989, may have caused some concern over job security for those with tenure. According to section 66 of this Act, the chief executive of a State Department has the powers to terminate a person's employment on grounds of redundancy. This section, however, was later repealed by section 16 of the State Sector Amendment Act 1989 No.2. Regardless, there is no clear legal basis for job security in New Zealand universities. If anything, the content of staff contracts seems to provide for the opposite. According to one of the conditions of appointment "The appointment is subject to three months' notice in writing on either side..." (emphasis added). Conditions under which dismissal may legitimately take place have not been codified which suggests that loss of position through redundancy, for example, is not precluded. Despite this, it appears that "continuing appointments" are considered permanent by both administration and staff. However, this may change with the enactment of the Employment Contracts Bill and alleged proposals of the National government to corporatize the universities. These issues will be discussed in the following chapter.
Figure 2.4: Indexed numbers of full-time teaching staff and part-time teaching assistants by year.

Indexed numbers of staff (Thousands)

- Full-time teaching staff
- Part-time teaching assistants

Year

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
(2.5) THE EXPANSION OF A SECONDARY ACADEMIC LABOUR MARKET.

Part time demonstrators, lab instructors or teaching assistants form a category of academic staff without job security. According to their conditions of employment, they are employed on a year by year basis and then only for the academic year. Over the last decade this category of persons has expanded rapidly. While from 1978 to 1989 the number of full-time academic staff grew nationally by only 11%, the numbers of part-time teaching assistants doubled during this same period (see appendix III). This increase in the numbers of part-time teaching assistants nationally has been disproportionate as Figure 2.4 shows. Figures for both categories have been indexed to a base of 1000 at 1970 in order to throw differences of proportion into relief.

From the period 1970 to 1982 the ratio of full-time lecturing staff to part-time teaching assistants generally remained the same. From 1982 to 1987 two things happened simultaneously: the numbers of part-time teaching assistants increased almost exponentially and the numbers of full time staff actually decreased. While the figures for 1987 show a reduction in the number of teaching assistants, levels in 1989 increased again to reach the level obtained in 1986. The numbers of full-time staff increased slightly during this same period.

It seems likely that the disproportionate expansion in numbers of part-time teaching assistants can, at least
to some degree, be attributed to the inability of the university to finance sufficient positions for full-time, tenured staff. Take for instance, the contents of an unpublished report on work loads submitted in September 1989 by the Department of Education to the University of Canterbury Council:

Inadequate staffing levels have eroded the quality of the staff who are involved in some aspects of teaching. Whereas, a decade ago, tutorial classes at Stage 1 and laboratory classes at Stage 2 were taught primarily by academic staff, these classes are now taught almost exclusively by graduate students.

Clearly, then, some lower level tasks in the university are increasingly being performed by those with inferior employment conditions. In the past such circumstances may not have been a significant issue. This is because in the early 1970s the prospects for teaching assistants were quite different. In the words of a senior lecturer, who was a teaching fellow at that time, these positions were like the, "first step in an academic career." Promotion to a full-time lecturing position would proceed fairly automatically, if the applicant desired, following the successful completion of postgraduate study. Today there are very few teaching assistants who expect to be promoted into the ranks of permanent, full-time academic staff. Many, in fact, are graduates not engaged in further study, who treat the position merely as a means of income.

This category of people is not represented by a union and has absolutely no voice in the determination of their pay and conditions. Unlike pay determinations for
other academic staff, the pay of teaching assistants was not set by the H.S.C. (nor is it negotiated by the A.U.T.N.Z.) but is set by the Canterbury University registry who link it to movements in the salary scale for assistant lecturers. The limits that are set by the registry, however, are maximum limits. So while departments cannot pay a teaching assistant with a B.A. honours degree, for example, over $16 an hour they can, if they desire, pay as little as they feel they can get away with.

Because the guide-lines for pay and conditions provided by registry are minimal, large differences in the treatment of teaching assistants are to be found from department to department. For a course in one department within the University of Canterbury, contracts for teaching assistants are set out quite explicitly. The exact number of hours for the year is broken down for teaching, marking (based on the assumption of one essay marked per half hour) and advising students. Total pay is worked out at the prevailing hourly rate, in this instance the maximum provided by the registry.

Other departments have less codified conditions of employment. One department, for example, provides a flat rate of $46.25 per one hour tutorial but this fee includes payment for advising students and for marking an indeterminate number of essays. Still other departments, pay their teaching assistants on a basis akin to salary. Conditions of work include the tasks to be performed over the year, rather than hours to be worked, even though the
maximum hourly rate specified by registry may be included.

Some teaching assistants clearly have more favourable conditions than others. In one department, the teaching assistants were able to approach the head of department for extra pay. In another they were able to negotiate with course co-ordinators on the issue of how many hours they should get paid for each lab. Additionally they were not paid for marking on the basis of a set number of hours decided on unilaterally by course co-ordinators, but were able to submit a chit to the department which included how many hours they actually took to mark scripts and were paid on this basis.

Conditions in another department, however, were not as favourable. In this department four teaching assistants were employed to take tutorials and mark exam scripts for a course. They were told that the department had allotted $5000 (down from $11,000 the previous year) for teaching assistants and that this was to be divided up between them. This budgetary reduction, it seems, was not a result of a drop in student demand: Equivalent full-time student/staff ratios for this department had actually increased. When concern was voiced about rates of pay, the teaching assistants were allegedly told, "if you don't like it, don't take it" because there "are lots of others that will." Not surprisingly, a rough calculation by one of the teaching assistants of hours spent marking and tutoring revealed a pay rate well below
Figure 2.5: Equivalent full-time student to staff ratios at the University of Canterbury by year.
the maximum stipulated by the university administration and well below the rates provided for teaching assistants by some other departments.

(2.6) OTHER RELATED CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.

Promotion prospects, income, and job security are probably the most important factors in the market situation of academics, but other related elements should not be overlooked. The teaching load of academics, for example, is important because every increase in this sphere of activity represents a corresponding decrease in the time available to engage in research. Because promotion is basically determined by time elapsed in a given grade plus the number of articles or books published, the extent to which an academic must devote his or her time to teaching may determine, to some considerable extent, his or her promotion prospects. Work load may also interfere with "perks" such as study or conference leave. It is evident that some academics have turned down the opportunity to take leave because they know that their absence will place greater demands upon their already over-burdened colleagues.

That teaching work loads have increased is, I believe, certain and can be demonstrated by the changing ratio of students to staff (see appendix II). Figure 2.5 shows the number of equivalent full time students per member of staff for the years 1975 to 1990 for the University of Canterbury. From 1975 to 1984 the ratio of students to staff rose steadily, levelling off at 1987.
In the last four years, the ratio of students to staff increased rapidly from about 14.5 to almost 17 to 1, before reducing slightly in 1990. Academics now have an increased contact hours with students and because of the cramped conditions in university lecture halls, the same lecture, in some courses, must be conducted twice instead of once a week. With more students to be assessed, marking loads have also increased significantly.

While marking, tutoring and dealing with students' minor problems can be off-loaded onto teaching assistants, there is a financial limit to how many of these staff can be hired. In a 1989 letter to P.B. Goff (the then Minister of Education), the Vice Chancellor of the University of Canterbury noted that:

A number of departments have not been able to sustain seminar and tutorial support at a level warranted by the needs of the students. In some areas this reflects the workload of the academic staff; in others it stems from financial constraints on hiring graduate students and outside assistants. (29 Nov, 1989)

Additionally, at least one department has been unable to develop new courses and has even been forced to abandon existing ones. The number of courses taught by the Education department, for example, has recently been reduced by five. In this same department one tutorial program was abandoned altogether while another was cut back significantly.

Another way of dealing with the increased work load has involved the limiting of entry into certain courses. Typically, these have been courses in most demand;
commerce is a case in point. Those whose access has been denied to these courses have, however, pursued other areas of study. Not surprisingly, this has led to a "domino effect" where other courses have had to place limits upon the numbers of students they will take. But clearly, in many departments, these restrictions have not been put in place until departmental resources have stretched almost to breaking point.

Another result of financial stringency at the departmental level is a change in the means of assessing students. In the report on work loads by the Department of Education (Sept., 1989), it was noted that,

We have been forced to rely on multiple choice tests for assessment in EDUC 105 even although such tests cannot be used to measure some of the understanding which we are trying to foster.

The introduction of multiple choice examination formats is significant because the marking of these tests can be done rapidly and requires no knowledge of the subject area whatsoever. In this type of exam, students choose an answer from a number of options by placing a numeric or alphabetic mark into an "answer box" on the examination script. In order to grade the script, the marker merely compares the master script containing the correct figures with the script of the student. All need for critical thought or expertise is thereby removed from the task of assessment.

Another condition of work which is likely to be affected by State restructuring plans, and has sparked an
acrimonious debate between the Government and State servants (such as the police and prison officers) is that relating to the Government Superannuation Fund. The Government Superannuation Bill, introduced to Parliament in December 1989 heralded a reduction in the amount of superannuation payable to retiring academic staff members. Those who retire in the next year will not be affected adversely by this. From years 1992 to 2002, however, the pension will progressively drop so that those retiring at the end of this period will receive 25% less than their original entitlement.

(2.7) SUMMARY.

In this chapter, I have endeavoured to examine a number of indicators of "market situation" - indicators which have traditionally distinguished manual from "service class" occupations. First, it is evident that for academics of most disciplines, the supply of skilled labour has not been limited sufficiently to maintain closure. At the same time that supply has increased, the number of vacancies worldwide has stopped expanding. In other words, increased supply has coincided with a decrease in demand.

This provides an essential precondition for successfully reducing the advantages held by academic staff. Fewer jobs in academia and the private sector mean that it is harder for employed academics to "exit" in order to find better conditions. This situation was becoming prevalent as far back as a decade ago when the

This situation may change in the next ten years however (Christchurch Press, 1991, March 5; Anderson, 1991:1). According to these sources, a disproportionate number of scientists, both in Australasia and internationally, will start to retire and this will create a significant shortage of appropriately qualified staff in universities and research institutions. While this may improve the market capacity of academic staff to some extent, there is reason to believe that this improvement may not be dramatic. In the immediate post war period educators were faced with a combination of the rehabilitation of a great number of returned servicemen and new educational policies which extended secondary schooling to many more students, which in turn greatly expanded demand for graduates. Neither condition obtains today. Furthermore, the resources available for hiring and maintaining staff are not as readily available as they were in the post war boom years of the late 1950s and 1960s.

Whatever the case, severe budgetary constraints and the reduction in "market capacity" experienced by academic staff is reflected in present incomes, promotion prospects and threats to tenure. Real income levels have
suffered and, like promotions, have become more productivity-driven. And certainly, for New Zealand universities as a whole, the ratio of temporary teaching assistants to full time academic staff has increased enormously over the last 10 years.

The growth in the numbers of casual or temporary staff in universities has led researchers to argue that a dual labour market is emerging within these institutions (Barlow, 1989 Roemer & Schnitz, 1982). Dual labour markets are characterized by "primary" and "secondary" employment conditions. In secondary sectors, employees have lower pay, less security, poorer working conditions and are typically part-time, seasonal or casual. In primary sectors, employees enjoy full-time, secure employment, with good working conditions and prospects for promotion. According to this framework, the difference between primary and secondary sectors is typically a matter of the different bargaining capacity held by the occupants of these positions, with those in primary sectors having a greater bargaining capacity than those in secondary sectors (Roemer & Schnitz, 1982:516-517). As Barlow (1989) has demonstrated in the case of Australian universities, the primary/secondary distinction also coincides with gender and functional distinctions. Those in the secondary labour market tend to be employed for teaching rather than research and are predominantly women.

Certainly segmented labour market theory has some utility here. But some attempt must be made to fit it
into the wider issues relating to State restructuring and social stratification. From the perspective developed in this thesis, the extent to which secondary labour market positions expand at the expense of the primary labour market clearly represents one aspect of proletarianization. Segmented labour market theorists, additionally, tend to be blind to the fact that those who remain in the so-called primary labour market may experience a degradation or proletarianization of market situation. These positions may certainly be more secure, and carry certain benefits not characteristic of those in the secondary labour market. But, as I have shown, their occupants may experience a reduction in real incomes and find promotions, though not impossible, certainly harder to come by. The biggest weakness associated with segmented labour market theorists is that they tend to down-play the power relations which may exist between those in primary and secondary labour markets, a point which I will take up in the following chapter.
CHAPTER III

WORK SITUATION

(3.1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In this chapter I deal with the governance of the university system in New Zealand and trace the successes and failures of academic staff to offset the power of governing bodies, or in other words, to "professionalize", by attempting to introduce elements of collegial control. The history of university governance can be categorised broadly as passing through three major stages. In the first stage (1870-1961), for the greater part, the university system was governed by a central authority of lay people who dictated much of the academic policy of the affiliated colleges. The second stage (1961-1989), was marked by the devolution of power to academics through the establishment of separate universities and the "University Grants Committee." The third, and present period (1989-), is characterised by a trend towards reducing the autonomy of academics through privatisation and/or centralisation of control in the hands of the State (1989-).
(3.2) THE AFFILIATED COLLEGES: 1870-1961.

The history of university governance in New Zealand is the history of struggles by academics to wrest themselves from ubiquitous lay and, later, State authority. Certainly, in histories of the University of New Zealand (Parton, 1979; Beaglehole, 1937; Gordon, 1946) and the university colleges (Sinclair, 1983; Phillips, 1973; Morrel, 1969) conflicts between academic staff and the lay people which controlled both the University of New Zealand Senate and the university college councils during the establishment of the university system have been given a high profile.

The pervasive role of the State in academic life, however, should not be overlooked. In fact it would be true to say that the regulations which established, sanctioned and circumscribed the authority held by the lay governors of the university system were administered by the State. Certainly, the State heeded advice by independent groups - the Royal Commissions in 1878 and 1925, for example. But this advice was applied selectively by politicians in establishing university regulations, in both instances to the detriment of professorial representation on the governing bodies (New Zealand University Reform Association, 1911:7; Parton, 1979:53). Nevertheless, in other Acts and Amendments, the State has provided greater opportunities for professorial influence. In yet other cases, powers were removed from the governing bodies and assumed by the State itself. In
1947, for example, the State became involved in approving a national salary scale for university staff.

The dominance of the State in academic life is hardly surprising given the origin of the New Zealand university system. The establishment of the New Zealand university system was heralded by the passing of the New Zealand University Act 1870. In this Act provisions were made for the establishment of the governing bodies, the power to conduct examinations, confer degrees and to incorporate colleges (Beaglehole, 1937:29-31). The university colleges at Auckland and Wellington were both established by Acts of Parliament. Otago University and Canterbury University College however, were established by provincial ordinances but began to come under State control as early as the 1890s (Sinclair, 1983:41).

The State during this period, however, was generally content to operate indirectly in academic life by delegating its authority to bodies of lay people. The conflicts over authority between academics and their governors during the pre-U.G.C. period did, more often than not, occur between academic staff and the lay people constituting the governing bodies, while the State was often appealed to by academics as a means to offset the power of their lay governors. This was typically done by petitioning parliament.

Petitioning occurred, for example, in 1910 when, out of dissatisfaction with the prevailing state of affairs, academic staff requested Parliament to establish a Royal Commission charged with looking into the quality
of libraries, research, staff appointments and the
governance of the university system (Beaglehole,
1937:186). The central authority in charge of the
academic affairs of the university colleges in New
Zealand, which lay at the heart of much academic
resentment, had been established under The New Zealand
University Act 1870. This body, the "Senate," consisted
of 24 members initially appointed by the State with
future vacancies filled by the Senate itself and a court
of convocation. Senate control over the academic affairs
of the affiliated university colleges was extensive. It
determined what was taught, conducted examinations,
awarded scholarships and degrees and even set the texts
for specific subjects (Gordon, 1946:272). The Senate, it
should be added, took a very active role in university
affairs and academic staff were given no formal voice at
this level until 1902.

In 1902 positions were provided for one professor
elected by the professorial board from each of the
university colleges (Beaglehole, 1937:161). The number of
members remained the same at 24 but were placed upon
three year tenure (previously Senate members had life
tenure). Four were nominated by the Government and five
were representatives from each of the four colleges: two
elected by the governing body, two by the District Court
of Convocation and one by the professorial board (ibid,
1937:157). While representation upon the Senate was
clearly a step forward for academics, lay people remained
by far in the majority. Moreover, the fact that the
Senate remained active in initiating policy, meant that conflicts between the Senate and academic staff remained commonplace.

Without doubt, the main issue which underlay many of the disputes between academic staff and the governing bodies was the place of academic staff within the organisation of university authority. This is not surprising given the attitude taken by the authorities to academic staff. The governing bodies of this period, according to Beaglehole (1937:188-190), constituted "an autocracy, with leanings towards tyranny" who saw and treated the university teacher as little more than a "... mere employee, and not, on the whole a much-valued employee."

As a continuation of the 1910 campaign, a pamphlet, entitled University Reform in New Zealand, was submitted to Parliament in 1911. Issued by the New Zealand "University Reform Association," a group consisting of university professors, the document stated that,

The distrust of the teacher... has born fruit in various ways. Professors are debarred by statute from taking any part in university administration of the three colleges and they have no share ex-officio in the administration of the university (1911:11).

Clearly, one of the main thrusts of the petition was to curb the "practically unlimited powers of control" (New Zealand University Reform Association, 1911:25) held by lay governors, by improving the influence and representation of academic staff in both the individual university councils and the Senate. Not surprisingly the
rationale for greater professorial influence was couched in the altruistic terms of improving university education (New Zealand University Reform Association, 1911:5-6).

In 1914, following petitions to Parliament from teaching staff in each of the colleges and a report by the Inspector General of Schools, George Hogben, the Reform Association was replaced by the officially recognised "Board of Studies" (Parton, 1979:31). This new body, which, like the Reform Association, consisted entirely of professors, was formally incorporated into the university system by the University Amendment Act 1914. Although the composition and powers of the Senate were not altered by this Act, it gave the Board of Studies formal rights to give advice to the Senate on matters relating to academic policy (Gordon, 1946:272). Before this only the Senate was formally allowed to initiate policy.

The period between the establishment of the Board of Studies and the New Zealand University Amendment Act of 1926 was described by the first historian of the University of New Zealand as a "period of warfare" (Beaglehole, 1937:275), as both parties struggled to attain or maintain control over academic policy. During this same period the university system expanded rapidly. From 1900 to 1925, undergraduate numbers increased from 800 to nearly 4,000, and the numbers of academic staff increased over threefold, from 50 to 170 (Parton, 1979:42). The Association of University Teachers of New Zealand was also founded within this period (1923).
Carrying on the tradition of the University Reform Association, the Board of Studies put forward a number of proposals which can be interpreted as direct attacks upon the Senate. Indeed, it was interpreted this way by the Senate (Beaglehole, 1937:287-308). First, the Board of Studies re-asserted the argument for examinations to be conducted by university colleges. Second, as early as 1918 (and again in 1922) it proposed that the four university colleges be reorganised into four independent universities and submitted this motion to professorial boards from each university college for consideration (ibid:308). Had these proposals been accepted, the Senate would have been stripped of its powers and its reason for existence. Not surprisingly, these proposals were rejected by the Senate who stated that the Board was not authorised by law to deal with such matters (ibid).

Following the Report of the second Royal Commission on the University in 1925, the university system was reorganised under the New Zealand University Amendment Act 1926. Under the new legislation, the number of Government nominees in the Senate remained the same but the number of representatives from the university teaching staff was reduced from five to three in accordance with the recommendations of the Report of the Royal Commission. Without doubt this recommendation struck a welcome chord with politicians. For example, the Minister in charge of education stated that:
We are not saying a word against professorial gentlemen. They have their place and we could not do without them. But it is felt that in the past, the University of New Zealand has had too many professors on the council (Wright, cited in Parton, 1979:53).

The Board of Studies, under the 1926 Act, was renamed the "Academic Board." And while professorial influence was reduced at the level of the Senate, it was increased at this level. Not only did the Academic Board nominate the three professors for positions on the Senate, it could now make recommendations on any matter affecting the university, including areas such as staffing and the curriculum, to the Senate. Moreover, the Senate could delegate any of its powers (except those to make statutes and confer degrees) to the Academic Board as it saw fit and could not change statutes concerning schemes of study and examinations without first considering the recommendations of the Academic Board (New Zealand Statutes, 1926:740).

The gradual increase of professorial influence at a national level was also paralleled at the level of the individual university colleges during this period. During the establishment of the four university colleges, in the latter half of the 19th century, there was considerable resistance by the lay governors in each university college to the idea of having teaching staff share the powers vested in the college councils. The powers of the college councils, it should be added, were not insignificant; councils had jurisdiction over all matters concerning staffing, the power to allocate resources
internally, and could choose which of the courses approved by the Senate they would teach (Beaglehole, 1937:188).

As early as 1879, the first Royal Commission charged with reporting on the New Zealand university system, recommended that four professors be represented on the Auckland University Council (Sinclair, 1983:42). However, the politicians drawing up the Auckland University College Act of 1882 ignored this advice choosing instead to omit altogether positions for teaching staff on the governing body. Similarly, no provisions were made for professorial representation at Canterbury College, Otago University or Victoria during the establishment of these institutions.

The opposition to academic representation on college councils was again buttressed by the idea that a place for academic staff in university management would not be congruent with their status as employees of the councils (Beaglehole, 1937:144). In Auckland it was further argued that the inclusion of teaching staff on the council should be avoided because staff were out of touch with popular feeling and "were not responsible to the public for what they did" (Cited in Sinclair, 1983:42).

Not surprisingly the relations between teaching staff and the councils, like those between staff and Senate, were often marked by mutual antagonism. For example, during the first decades of the establishment of Auckland College and Canterbury College, there existed
disputes between the respective councils and professorial boards over the amount of work performed by university teachers (Gardner, 1973:108; Sinclair, 1983:43-44). This dispute culminated in 1892 when the Auckland College Council put forward a proposal to replace the prevailing six month academic year (consisting of two 14 week terms) with a three term system, a move that would lengthen the teaching year by 47 days. In 1893 the three year term was imposed despite the claim by professors that new regulations required approval by the professorial board. The council reminded the professorial board of its place in no uncertain terms; professors were lectured on their duty to obey council imperatives and, as a show of force it seems, one staff member was dismissed without warning (Sinclair, 1983:46-47).

Pressure by teaching staff for representation on college councils, however, was not altogether unfruitful. Otago professors were granted representation of one staff member on the college council under the Otago University Council Act as early as 1891, despite the fact that this was not the intention of original bill (Morrel, 1969:75). And by 1911 Otago professors could elect two of their members to the council. By this time, Victoria and Canterbury Colleges were allowed one representative with the provision, however, that the nominees were not to be members of the teaching staff (Beaglehole, 1937:189). Auckland was the last of the four existing colleges to receive representation rights on the college council. It was not until 1912 that the constitution of Auckland
College was amended to include two representatives elected from the professorial board (Sinclair, 1983:93).

After the New Zealand University Amendment Act 1926, university governance was not given another major overhaul until after World War II. However, the system of external examination - a source of much resentment among academics (e.g. Wall, 1916) - was abolished during the war because of fears that scripts would be lost on their way to Britain. Additionally, a situation which saw the total absence of non-professorial teaching staff on the academic board was changed in 1944 when provisions were made for two lecturers to be elected to the Academic board.


In 1968 Jencks and Riesman completed a book entitled The Academic Revolution. Given that 1968 was marked by intense student activism, the title seems quite appropriate. However, the revolution referred to in this book did not describe the growing disaffection of students around the world in the post war era. The central figures in Jencks and Riesman's (1968) revolution were American faculty. These writers argued that by 1968,

The faculties of the major public and private universities and of the top flight private liberal arts colleges had triumphed over most sources of outside interference: trustee control, religious control... and control by the predilections of the major foundations and federal agencies (Riesman, 1980:1).
Certainly, as I have demonstrated, the academic revolution in New Zealand had its beginnings in the early 1900s when professors were granted representation on the Senate and the college councils. The post war period, however, saw a further extension of power and autonomy into the hands of academic staff. This extension was accompanied by an unprecedented demand for university teachers. What created this demand?

The most obvious factor is the massive increase in student numbers during the post-war period. Between 1945 to 1948, student numbers increased by almost 50%. Furthermore, between 1945 and 1960, student numbers doubled and then doubled again between 1960 and 1970 (Parton, 1979:173). This massive increase can, in large part, be attributed to policies which initiated and extended the Welfare State. One of the more important policies, as far as higher education was concerned, was to make secondary schooling available to all who chose to go. To this end the examination barrier between intermediate and secondary school was abolished in 1936. In 1944, the school-leaving age was increased from fourteen to fifteen (Sutch, 1969:321) and during the following decade the State provided finance to secondary schools to expand evening programs for the education of adults (Dakin, 1973:37). Moreover, by the end of 1959, children born during the "prolific period" just after the war were entering secondary schools.

This situation produced an unprecedented demand
for graduates which the Government responded to by providing a "financially attractive" (McLaren, 1974:104) Post-Primary Teacher Studentship. Demands for graduates in other areas of the public service, the private sector and the professions increased also (Hughes Parry, 1959:18). To meet these demands, the State provided a "generous", bursary and boarding allowance in 1962. Moreover, the State maintained an open policy which eschewed offering a fixed number of places and made provisions for granting admission to applicants over twenty-one who lacked university entrance qualifications (McLaren, 1974:140).

The increased demand for university teachers in New Zealand coincided with increased demand in other English speaking countries. Of the university teacher shortage in 1959, Parton notes,

The world shortage of university teachers was underlined by predictions made for the next seven years, during which Canada and the United Kingdom expected to require 5,000 new staff each and Australia some 3,000, while U.S. demands were 'astronomical' (1979:180).

By the late 1950s salaries in New Zealand were becoming inadequate to attract and maintain sufficient staff. In a pamphlet titled Crisis in the Universities (January 1959), prepared by the A.U.T.N.Z., it was argued that salaries in New Zealand had failed dismally to keep pace with those in Britain and Australia - New Zealand's main competitors for academic staff - resulting in the loss of staff to more lucrative positions overseas and vacancies in New Zealand universities remaining unfilled.
This "crisis," according to the A.U.T.N.Z. pamphlet, threatened the quality of teaching and research and, of greater political significance, the policy of "open" entry.

Because of the rapid growth in student numbers and the attendant problems and strains associated with pressures upon staff, buildings, finance and conditions of study, the Government established a Royal Commission in July 1959 to look into the effects of the new environment upon the New Zealand university system. The resulting report, known as the "Hughes Parry report" described the staffing situation in the universities as a "desperate emergency" and advised that salaries be raised immediately (1959:53). More important, the report succeeded in convincing the State that the university was in dire need of re-organisation; a re-organisation which would considerably increase the representation of professors on the proposed new governing bodies (Hughes Parry, 1959:99-103).

It would not be correct to say, however, that the legislation which followed the Hughes Parry Report in 1961 represented the beginning of the decentralisation of power in the post-war period. In 1958, Canterbury, Auckland and Victoria (were allowed) were allowed to designate themselves as universities rather than university colleges. Of greater significance, perhaps, a "University Grants Committee" was set up in 1948 as a subcommittee of the Senate. Like the U.G.C. established in 1961, the Senate's U.G.C. was established to enquire
into the financial needs of the university colleges and advise the Government. The Senate's U.G.C. was able to negotiate university finance directly with ministers which ended the dependence of university finance on the Department of Education (Carter, 1973:328-329). Once this was accomplished, the Senate's U.G.C. presented a case to the Government to finance the universities on the basis of 5 yearly block grants. This the Government agreed to do, subject to the universities satisfying a number of broad conditions. By the end of the 1950s the University of New Zealand Senate was virtually superfluous as many of its administrative duties had been taken over by the individual universities.

In the ensuing legislation of 1961, provisions were made for the formal establishment of separate universities as degree granting institutions and for the replacement of the University of New Zealand Senate with a body called the "University Grants Committee" (U.G.C.). The main function of the U.G.C. was to advise the State on the financial needs of the universities and negotiate the bulk grants provided to the universities every five years. Under the Universities Act 1961, the U.G.C. was to consist of a Chairperson and seven members. Three places were provided for university teaching staff while the other four places were restricted to those other than university employees. The background of the Chairman was left unstipulated which lead to fears by one member of Parliament that teaching staff would be in control of all the money spent on university education (Parton,
1979:243). These fears were well founded because, for the major part, the post of Chairperson was filled by people with academic backgrounds (Gould, 1986:217).

Although the composition of university councils still maintained a lay majority, they too were altered under the new legislation to strengthen academic representation. On a council of 19 members, three places were guaranteed for members elected by the professorial board and in 1968 a further place was provided for a member of the teaching staff below the rank of professor. Under the legislation of 1961, the powers and rights held by the old Academic Board were transferred to the individual professorial boards. As before, councils were held responsible for employment of academic staff. But councils could also, under the new legislation, confer degrees, diplomas or honorary degrees, prizes and bursaries. Furthermore, councils could make statutes covering enrollment of students, degree structures, and other areas of university administration. All statutes, however, required approval by the Governor General and those statutes covering changes or additions to the curriculum and student entry required approval by the Curriculum Committee (a subcommittee of the U.G.C.) and the universities Entrance Board respectively.

It should be added that there was some controversy over the Curriculum Committee. The Curriculum Committee, which, like the Entrance Board, had a majority of academic staff, was criticised by Government officials for its complete lack of lay representation (Eisemon,
1984:591). On the other hand, according to an Auckland University professor (New Zealand Universities Newsletter, April 1964) the autonomy of the universities was seen to be compromised by the university councils having to seek approval from this central body on matters involving degree regulations and approval from the Entrance Board on matters involving student entry.

On the whole, however, relations between the U.G.C. and the universities satisfied most academics. Disputes, when they did occur generally involved matters other than the organisation of power within the university system (Gould, 1988:55-79). Certainly this was due to the high degree of academic representation on the U.G.C., the Curriculum Committee and Entrance Board. But something should also be said about the unique status of the U.G.C. Although the U.G.C. was responsible to the State, both for a considerable slice of public expenditure and for providing confidential advice to the State, it was not a Government department. The Chairman of the U.G.C., for example, was not appointed by politicians but was appointed by the Governor General in consultation with Chancellors and Vice Chancellors of the universities. Furthermore, the U.G.C. was not funded by the State (or the universities for that matter); it inherited the assets of the University of New Zealand and received revenue both from examination fees and later from its own property investments (Gould, 1988:221-230). Significantly, too, the U.G.C was not set up for systematically reviewing or appraising expenditure and
performance of the individual universities (Eisemon, 1984:593).

At the same time that academics were being granted increased representation on governing bodies, there is ample evidence to suggest that in the post-war period, the university councils relinquished their active role in university administration. As Sinclair (1983:288) notes of the University of Auckland:

...there was a striking change in the day-to-day university government. It was still ultimately ruled by Council, but a very large part of the running of the university was taken over by senior academics, assisted by some lecturers and students. The University was a much more democratic place than the old College...[and] it became rare for Council to interfere or over-rule in academic matters.

This aspect of university life in Auckland was indeed part of a much larger trend and was commented upon even before the implementation of the new legislation in 1961 by the Chancellor of the University of New Zealand Senate. "The teachers," he noted, "have virtually complete authority in strictly academic matters.... The New Zealand practice having the governing body discuss academic curricula and the like is [now] quite unusual" (cited in Parton, 1979:201). The upshot of this situation was a change in the locus of conflict which saw the State rather than lay governors as the prime object of academic frustration (Carter, 1973:326).
(3.4) "LEARNING FOR LIFE": THE SEARCH FOR EFFICIENCY.

Higher education in New Zealand did not undergo significant reform again until the period 1989 - 1990. University reform during this period, however, cannot be understood without looking briefly at the events of the previous 15 years. Perhaps the most significant development has been a steady deterioration of New Zealand's economic performance which has seen it slip in three decades from the third highest living standard in the world to the sixteenth (Collins, 1987:22). This slip is reflected in the almost exponential increase in unemployment from the mid 1970s which was combined, up until recently, with high inflation.

One of the effects of the economic down-turn was that the U.G.C. found it increasingly difficult to find Government support for its financial recommendations. For the block grants from 1975 to 1989, Treasury intervened in negotiations between the U.G.C. and Government with the effect that the U.G.C. had to reduce its bid significantly for each of the three quinquenniums (Gould, 1988:232).

Not surprisingly, the years from 1977 marked an important point of transition for the A.U.T.N.Z. Opposing the professional association ideal were three factors: 1/ Although the A.U.T.N.Z. could submit proposals to the H. S.C., it had no formal right to negotiate pay and conditions for academics; 2/ There was a danger that
unions registered under the Labour Relations Act 1973 would engage in the "poaching" of coverage of university teachers; 3/ Glimpses of the "future" from overseas developments suggested the possibility of redundancies, loss of tenure and the move towards collective bargaining.

In 1977, registering the A.U.T.N.Z. under the Industrial Relations Act 1973 became a matter for serious consideration. But registration under the Act was subsequently rejected — apparently more for technical than ideological reasons (Bulletin of the A.U.T.N.Z., July, 1977). In 1979 the Minister of Education announced that the block grant would be reduced by $3 million (Bulletin of the A.U.T.N.Z., No. 55, Sept 1979) despite big increases in university rolls and the State moved towards making its own review of university expenditure (Bulletin of the A.U.T.N.Z., April 1979). A year later, the A.U.T.N.Z. proposed that individual University Acts be amended to allow formal recognition of the A.U.T.N.Z. as an agent to handle grievance procedures and participate in negotiating collective terms and conditions. However, it was not until 1987 that this proposal was accepted. Two years later, the A.U.T.N.Z. registered under the Labour Relations Act 1987.

At the same time, educators as a whole were becoming targets of blame for the economic down-turn. Disillusionment was reflected not only in Heylon polls conducted over the years, which indicated a successive loss of public confidence in educators, but also in the
attacks on the education system by politicians. Taking the view that universities were not sufficiently aligned with the needs of the economy, the then Associate Minister of Finance stated in 1986 that,

The education system is condemning large numbers of our young people to the dole queus because they do not have the employment skills needed in a modern economy. It is outrageous that employers are actively seeking skilled labour from overseas when there are vacancies in our Technical Institutes to train our young people in those various skills. The situation I described in our Technical Institutes has its parallel in the Universities. (Prebble cited in the A.U.T.N.Z. Bulletin, November, 1986).

The developing economic crisis in New Zealand not only decreased confidence in the education system but also had ramifications for economic theory. The orthodox "Keynesian" approach, which was unable to suggest a way out of the combination of high inflation and high unemployment, was supplanted by a "new" economics which has been variously termed "neoclassical," "New Right" or "monetarist". Without delving into the technicalities of this theory, it is sufficient to say that its adherents stress the virtues of a tight monetary policy to control inflation and a free market where unhindered competition ensures that only those enterprises providing the most efficient and effective services or products will survive. One condition which is seen as essential for the operation of the free market is that consumers must have the information, options and the power to make rational choices as to which enterprise provides the best and cheapest service or product.
Given the "sovereignty" of the consumer within this framework, it is not surprising to find that the "providers" of the services and products have come under attack in recent years. Usually this involves the abolition by the State of the monopolies it had hitherto sanctioned. Recent moves to break monopolies, for example, have ranged from efforts to deregulate the taxi industry and dental care, to abolishing the sole right of Doctors to supervise births and removing the sole right of electricians to wire houses. In the same vein, the removal of import tariffs and restrictions provides consumers with a greater number of often cheaper options, keeping the prices set by New Zealand providers more in line with international market trends through increased international competition.

In the area of education, criticism was directed at the fact that the State monopoly over education made it easy for teachers to unify and protect themselves against the self regulatory and evaluative effects of the market. A succinct expression of this view is provided by the New Zealand Government Treasury, a leading exponent of the extension of market "forces" into the education sector:

A common feature of the state system... is the unified work force. It is a national force with national terms and conditions.... On the cost side it militates against regional and subject differentials in pay and conditions that are necessary if sufficient teachers are to be attracted into regions and subject areas with recruitment and retention problems, and hinders the application of incentives for high performance and sanctions poor performance (The Treasury, 1987:10).
Not surprisingly efforts have been made to curb this monopoly by attempts to widen the options available to the "consumers" of education. Softening the zoning regulations which constrain students to schools in their area has been one option for increasing choice. And in tertiary education, the privileged position held by the universities in the higher education sector has been eroded. Not only have technical institutes moved gradually into specific areas of study, once the sole domain of universities (Dakin, 1973:28), they can now, under the Education Amendment Act 1990, apply to issue degrees for certain courses. In other words, universities have lost their monopoly over the granting of degrees. Furthermore, provisions for the establishment of private institutions have also been included in the Education Amendment Act 1990. Either way, the "providers" of educational services lose what was once a guarantied clientele because they must compete for clients who have a range of viable options.

The logical extension of the application of free market economics to education is to maximise choice, and thereby competition, by placing all tertiary institutions - private or public - on an equal footing. This can be accomplished by allowing full costs to be charged or by establishing a system of vouchers which can be "cashed in" at any educational institution (Snook, 1987). Certainly, costs for tertiary education have recently seen a dramatic increase but full costs or the
introduction of voucher systems seem to be politically unacceptable at present. Since universities are not yet to compete on an equal footing with private institutions it is argued that their administrators will not be forced by the market to provide the best and cheapest service possible. The directive, evaluative and disciplinary functions of the market, it appears, are to be taken over as far as possible by the State. According to the New Zealand Treasury,

> The state, by intervening in education interposes itself or its agents between customer and provider to a greater or lesser extent. The greater the interposition the greater the need for a system of accountability as the direct relation between provider and customer in the market place has been broken and they are no longer accountable to each other.... (The Treasury, 1987:36-41).

Without doubt this type of thinking informed the Report on Postcompulsory Education and Training in New Zealand (1988) and was given expression in the statements of Government intent entitled Learning for Life and Learning for Life II (1989). And certainly, the ensuing legislation (the State Sector Amendment Act 1989 (No.2) and the Education Amendment Act 1990) paved the way for a more direct and evaluative role to be played by the State in academic life.

The U.G.C., typically seen as an institution which insulated universities from direct State interference (Eisemon, 1984), was abolished under the new legislation along with its various subcommittees. Funding now comes directly from a Government Department - the "Ministry of Education" - on a rolling triennial basis rather than
every five years and is based upon an equivalent full-time student formula with supplementary grants determined by the Minister of Education (Education Amendment Act 1990:57-58). Furthermore, university councils must negotiate a Charter with the Ministry of Education, setting out the goals and purposes of the university and submit this to the Ministry of Education for approval by the Minister of Education. It should be added that the Minister reserves the right to propose amendments to Charters (Education Amendment Act, 1990:48).

The functions and powers of the University Entrance Board have now been transferred to a body established by the Education Amendment Act 1990, named the "New Zealand Qualifications Authority." (N.Z.Q.A.). Unlike the University Entrance Board, of which 50% of members were legally required to be university teachers (Universities Act 1961 in Reprinted Statutes, Vol. 13:800), there are no guaranteed places for academic staff on the N.Z.Q.A. The Minister of Education, furthermore, appoints all members of N.Z.Q.A. This body is charged with the appraisal of educational standards and has jurisdiction over, among other things, the setting of educational standards for entry into universities. While the N.Z.Q.A. approves general courses of study for other post-compulsory centres of education, the Vice Chancellors Committee may approve university courses but in doing so must follow the same guidelines as the N.Z.Q.A. (Education Amendment Act 1990:98-104). If the N.Z.Q.A. is not convinced that the Vice Chancellors Committee is
following these guide-lines, then it can direct the Committee to do so. If the Committee does not comply, the N.Z.Q.A. may submit a report to the Minister of Education (Education Amendment Act 1990:105). The Minister then has the final say over whether the university in question can or cannot provide a given course (Education Amendment Act 1990:80).

Adjustments have also been made to the composition of university councils. Where the Government once had three representatives it now has four and where previously academic staff were guarantied four places, they are now only guarantied one place, although councils can have up to three if they wish (Education Amendment Act 1990:38-39). Nevertheless, professorial boards (now academic boards) have retained their traditional place in internal governance (Education Amendment Act 1990:47-48) relating to advice, delegation of powers from, and consultation by councils.

The most significant developments in the new legislation are, perhaps, the unprecedented provisions for evaluation of the universities by external authorities. The N.Z.Q.A., which is charged with monitoring and regularly reviewing standards for qualifications, can demand that universities supply it
with information (Education Amendment Act 1990:100-101). The same applies to another body established under the Education Amendment Act 1990 - the Education Review Office (E.R.O.). This body is charged with reporting to the Minister of Education at least every three years on the extent to which universities have met certain equity objectives, both for staff and students. (Education Amendment Act 1990:86-87).

To facilitate evaluation, universities are required to furnish the Ministry of Education with a detailed list of "performance indicators" which set out targets to be met by the universities (Education Amendment Act 1990:59) under the Public Finance Act 1989. According to a draft report, indicators may include those for assessing the "effectiveness" of the university in terms of, for example, retaining students until the satisfactory completion of courses, and placing students into employment. Indicators may also measure the economic efficiency of the university in terms of staff-student ratios, operating costs by departments, and ratio of teaching area in square metres to the number of equivalent full-time students (New Zealand Vice Chancellors Committee Newsletter, Oct 1989:4-5).

At the level of internal governance, changes in the mechanisms of evaluation have, at present, filtered down to a relatively minor degree only. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the opportunities for the evaluation of staff have increased to some extent by placing more barriers in the promotion ladder. It is also evident that
individual universities have taken staff accountability on board to different degrees. At the University of Canterbury, the machinery for appraisal certainly exists but its use is voluntary. An individual staff member can request that his or her course be evaluated and the resulting information is supplied to that staff member to act on as he or she wishes. At Massey University, however, all staff members are to be subject to a routine annual appraisal. While appraisal is compulsory, however, it is evident that it is little more than a strengthened form of peer review. The staff member compiles his or her own review of activities and submits this to the head of the department. Only the staff member and the head of department are privy to the review document and while recommendations can be made there is no formal system of material rewards or sanctions attached to the outcome of the review (General Conditions of appointment, Massey University 1990:4-8).

Interestingly, the request for compulsory, routine staff appraisal came from academic staff rather than an external body, no doubt as a means to pre-empt any attempt at appraisal by external bodies. Nevertheless, that academic staff at Massey should feel the need to do this, suggests important differences in governance practices between universities.
(3.5) CODIFICATION AND ACADEMIC AUTONOMY.

The *Learning for Life* program was, not surprisingly, hotly contested by academics and students around the country. The universities of Auckland and Canterbury took the Government to court over the lack of consultation, articles and letters by academics were published in the press, and public pledges were extracted from the then National party opposition. At the University of Canterbury graduation ceremonies, the proposed legislation was publicly condemned and a protest was staged in which four university teachers dressed in academic regalia were presented bound and gagged in front of television crews. These public protests, however, generally had one thing in common: the principle of "academic freedom" was at stake despite the fact that for the first time in New Zealand history it was to be protected by law (Education Amendment Bill, 1990:17).

The discourse of academic freedom is significant precisely because it justifies the autonomy gained by academics in their work situation in terms of the benefits brought to the public at large. Very simply stated, this discourse presents the independence of the universities as a "cornerstone" of liberal democracy by depicting universities as a check and balance on the pervasive influence of the State and Capital (Novitz cited in A.U.T.N.Z. Bulletin, March/April 1990). No doubt, the strength of this argument rests upon the nature of the "politics of truth" in western capitalist
societies (Foucault, 1980:131). The set of principles or rules which distinguish "truth" from "falsity" are set out in science and the institutions which develop and apply "scientific" principles. As institutions of science, universities are charged with the expert application of the rules necessary for the production of truth and should not be interfered with in such a way that the impartiality of truth is tainted by vested interests.

Certainly, the public appeals had sufficient weight to elicit lengthy public responses from the ministers involved and, in the end, the Bill passed into legislation in a much modified form. For example, the right of the Minister of Education to dismiss council members was removed, as was the power of entry into the universities by the E.R.O. and the N.Z.Q.A. Most significantly, perhaps, the validation of courses was shifted from the responsibility of N.Z.Q.A. to the Vice Chancellors Committee even though, as I have noted above, the Vice Chancellors Committee is still subject to the same guide-lines as, and some control by, the N.Z.Q.A. And where professorial boards were given no rights whatsoever under the proposed legislation, the bill was changed to include all those which they had traditionally held.

It is possible that other features of the Learning for Life program which indicate tighter controls over the university by the State will be abolished some time after the general election in October 1990. The National
Party's then spokesperson on education (now minister of education) pledged to remove the universities from the jurisdiction of the E.R.O. and the N.Z.Q.A. completely and abolish the right of Ministers to specify the content of university charters (Lockwood Smith, cited in A.U.T.N.Z. Bulletin, June/July 1990). However, the National party appears committed to the idea of applying the principles of privatisation to the university system. Lockwood Smith, for example, stated that students would be provided with funding to attend private institutions. (cited in A.U.T.N.Z. Bulletin, August/Sept 1989).

In 1991 the interest of the new National government in the privatisation of tertiary education appears to be undiminished. According to a confidential document leaked to the press, the Minister of Education is considering a number of proposals connected with the issue of "corporatization" (The Dominion, 24th Feb, 1991). Among them are the ideas that bulk funding payments are to be based on costs for "efficient" institutions and that inefficient institutions should be allowed to fail. A crucial element in this strategy is that tertiary institutions be allowed to determine their own fees. Both these measures are designed to create a more competitive environment where only the "fittest" survive. Included in this alleged policy is also the suggestion that tenure be removed because it interferes with the flow of resources according to student demand. In place of tenure, the document suggested moving staff into a "contract system of employment" where presumably they are employed for
fixed terms. According to press statement by the Vice Chancellor of Lincoln University (The Christchurch Press, March 2, 1991), this scenario has the capability "to destroy a huge chunk of the New Zealand Education sector."

The move from tenure and national awards to individual fixed term contracts will no doubt be made easier by the enactment of the controversial Employment Contracts Bill in May 1991. As well as removing access to the grievance procedures set out under the Labour Relations Act 1987 - grievance procedures themselves must now be negotiated - employees can choose to be covered by an individual or collective contract. Most significantly, employers can choose to recognise or not recognise bargaining agents of employees and can even negotiate for individual contracts.

A situation which academics might also find ultimately unsatisfactory is the increasing codification of their conditions of employment where traditionally there has been very little. It has been noted that academic life has "a kind of lawlessness, consisting of vague and incomplete rules and ambiguous and uncodified procedures" (Caplow and McGee cited in Clark, 1987:152). This situation can be contrasted to life in factories where time and effort tend to be very highly codified. The contract entered into by factory workers, for example, typically specifies the time within which work must be performed on a day to day basis. Times of entry into and from the work place are monitored by "clock
card" machines and fixed intervals at specific times of the day are set for coffee and lunch breaks. In addition, exact details and procedures for work activities have, in some factories, been codified through the application of time and motion studies and used to regulate the activities of workers in factory situations to a very high degree. Turning work activities into a set of routine technical procedures, is significant because, as Braverman (1974:112-113) has shown, it is synonymous with "deskilling" and as such provides employers with greater degrees of control over work tasks.

The situation of "lawlessness" outlined in Clark (1987) very much reflects the "indeterminacy" of professional work. Indeterminacy is important because, as Jamous & Peliolle (1970) and others (e.g. Klegon, 1978) have noted, without specified procedures there exists a high degree of freedom, autonomy and individual discretion in the work situation. Time is flexible and the details of how work is performed are left to the individual to decide.

Starkey (1989) has shown that in recent times, however, the "open" contracts which have characterised professional work are becoming increasingly "closed." In other words, there is a recent tendency for responsibilities and obligations that were once unspecified to be codified into contracts. These observations would certainly apply to academic life in New Zealand. The deployment of performance indicators, for example, represents a systematic codification of
responsibilities and obligations at a corporate level. And by registering under the Labour Relations Act 1987, the A.U.T.N.Z. may have gained some new rights and powers but at the cost of relinquishing a great deal of its discretion to the procedures under the Act which govern the nature of balloting, auditing, and the payment of levies and subscriptions, to name but a few.

However, with the impending replacement of the Labour Relations Act by the Employment Contracts Act in 1991, it appears that the A.U.T.N.Z. will remain subject to some of the same constraints associated with registration under Labour Relations Act 1987, such as a "no strike" rules, but without the legislative advantages of, for example, guarantied access to grievance procedures. Correspondingly, academic staff may find themselves without an effective representative to halt or diminish the effect of their employer introducing further codification which will have the effect of rendering more visible what academics do and receive in the way of financial and organisational benefits.

At this stage, however, it is evident that not all universities will codify conditions to the same extent. For example, while staff contracts at Canterbury have been subject to minimal changes, contracts at Massey indicate a significant increase in the codification of day to day academic activities. According to a schedule setting out the general conditions of employment at Massey (1990:5)
Any meaningful staff appraisal must take place against a background of expected performance goals. To establish these requires the definition of responsibilities and expectations appropriate for the staff member concerned. These should be agreed between the Head of Department and the staff member. They need to be laid down so that staff members have a clear idea of what is expected of them (General Conditions of appointment, Massey University 1990:4-8).

While there is clearly more scope for the codification of employment conditions, the extent to which professional work in general can be codified or reduced to a set of discursive rules and procedures should be questioned. First, there is no evidence to suggest that academic work has been or is being "deskilled" through the codification and fragmentation of its knowledge bases. Any fragmentation which has occurred, has reflected the deepening of expertise rather than the loss of it. Furthermore, it seems likely that as long as research is conducted in universities some degree of indeterminacy will always exist. As Clark (1987:101-102) suggests,

"... research drives academic organisations into an opaque maze of professional non-linear forms ...[Research] mystifies the profession, generates its myths, and throws up its heroes."

Most important, though, research activities continually generate new data or new ways of looking at the same data. Just as one set of principles become codified into text books or becomes public knowledge, new theories and research practices are being developed. Thus
while the privileged market position of Lockwood's (1958) "black coated worker" was gradually eroded by a better educated public, it is very unlikely that this will happen in academic life, at least within the foreseeable future.

However, while it seems that academics may maintain a good deal of control over the process of work, it appears possible that they may increasingly lose control over the purpose or goal of their activities. At a corporate level, as I have already indicated, the charters containing the goals and objectives of universities must be approved and can be amended by the Minister. Additionally, the elevation of quantifiable performance indicators, as a central way of setting and measuring the extent to which goals are met, is seen to displace important academic objectives with those which are "managerial" in style. For example, according to Grace (1988:49),

... if we follow the logic of this position what do students become but inputs; what does the educated citizen become - an output; what does the rich and varied experience of education become - a production function. The activity of educational research itself... will become nothing more than an equivalent to the preparation of the company accounts or... species of audit.

The privatization of higher education also signifies a loss of control over the goals or purposes of academic work and will most affect those areas which are not directly related to product or labour markets. In a response by the faculty of arts at Canterbury to the
"more market" approach of the Hawke report, it was argued that important goals involving research and teaching could be subverted (Jennings, 1988).

Firstly, the "education" for which private funds are forthcoming may be quite different from that acknowledged as valuable by the community.... Secondly, privatisation strengthens the tendency to regard education as simply another product. Arts disciplines centre on the cultivation of a critical intelligence; many of the rewards of university study are not measurable in terms of quantitative output.... Thirdly, privatisation has the effect... of facilitating university access for the rich at the expense of making it more difficult for the poor.

Within a framework developed by Levins and Lewontin (1985) this statement is symptomatic of a natural tendency for science in capitalist societies to become "commoditized"; in other words intellectual products increasingly become merchandise to be sold and bought on the market (1984:199). There is evidence to suggest too, that in times of economic decline the rate of commoditization of intellectual life tends to increase as universities have to deal with tighter budgetary constraints (Lekachman, 1983).

Does the loss of control over the purpose or goal of academic work represent a form of proletarianization? According to Derber (1983), it does. Derber (1983) distinguishes between two types of proletarianization: "ideological" and "technical." In technical proletarianization workers are deprived of control over both the means and ends of labour (ibid:313). In other words management assumes control over the goals or products of labour as well as the rhythm, pace and form
of work. Braverman's (1974) "deskilling" thesis, for example, represents a focus upon technical proletarianization. Ideological proletarianization, however, occurs where the worker has lost, or is losing, the right of control over the objectives, goals and organisation of work. In the public sector, ideological proletarianization is reflected in the increasing imposition of goals and objectives by the State. If the privatisation of universities becomes a reality, ideological proletarianization will take the form of research and teaching serving corporate profit-objectives. While it is certain that ideological proletarianization is far from complete in academic life, the evidence suggests that it has been accelerated by the Learning for Life Program and may become accentuated if ties between the universities and the market or State are tightened.

(3.6) COLLEGIAL CONTROL AND THE UNIVERSITY POWER STRUCTURE.

As I have shown above, university life is characterised by elements of collegiality. However, it should not be supposed that collegiality automatically empowers all individuals or all categories of individuals within the university. There are a number of relatively powerless groups within universities: women, temporary/untenured staff and students. If these groups are not party to the same degree of collegiality experienced by
other members of the academic community, this suggests that the withdrawal of collegiality will not affect everyone in the same way. In this section, then, I would like to examine the possible impact on these subordinate groups of the new environment in which universities operate.

In terms of the gender issue, as we have seen in the previous chapter, men out-number women in the university by a huge majority. This means that favourable decisions on matters affecting women must rely almost entirely upon winning the support of significant numbers of men. One major source of disillusionment with the "collegial" work situation has been generated when women have made attempts to make decisions over the content of their work - the curriculum. This appears to be a fairly wide-spread phenomena (Hu-DeHart, 1983:154). For example, at Griffith University in Australia, a paper opposing the establishment of a Gender Studies program contrasted the program unfavourably with the more "factual" disciplines such as socio-biology (Bulbeck, 1987). And at the University of Canterbury, a post-graduate feminist course was described as "unacademic" and like "introducing a tropical disease to students" by members of those committees established to authorise new courses of study (Alton-Lee & Densem, 1989). The new environment within which the universities are operating and may operate, then, may not have the same impact upon female academics since clearly this group has never had much control over their own goals previously. They may even be better off
under the new regime.

The lack of representation of women and ethnic minorities in the higher ranks and governing bodies of New Zealand universities, which is symptomatic of their lack of control in the work situation, is well documented (see Wilson, 1984; Gibbs et al, 1987; Ponter, 1989; Child, 1988) and aspects of the new legislation appear to have taken this fact into account. Under the State Sector Act 1989, as we have seen, universities are required to develop, promote and monitor an equal opportunities program and report on the success (or lack of success) of the program to the Education Review Office. As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, the low turnover, changes in tenure arrangements, and lack of growth in academic staff numbers presents a severe challenge to such programs.

The issue of women's representation on governing bodies has also been dealt with to some extent in the new legal environment. Under the Education Amendment Act (1990:38-39) it is stated that university councils should reflect the ethnic, socio-economic and gender composition of the community served by the institution. However, this appears only as a recommendation and councils are not compelled to ensure this state of affairs. It seems evident also that female academics may find it increasingly difficult to establish new courses that reflect their goals and purposes because of the present, and possibly future, funding difficulties experienced by the universities.
Another relatively powerless group within the university are those employed on a casual, often part-time basis. This group, which has in recent times expanded disproportionately (see previous chapter), is often excluded from the collegial decision making processes that full-time, tenured academics have access to. For example, they are generally excluded from involvement in choice of department heads, membership upon the university senate and its various subcommittees, and from roles in academic management such as Dean. Under the Education Amendment Act (1990:40), however, staff representatives on university councils can be part-time temporaries, so representation of part-timers on the governing body may occur in the future.

Part-time, temporary staff are not generally eligible for representation by the A.U.T.N.Z. This is reflected in the way pay rates are set for part time, temporary staff. For this category of people, as I have indicated in the previous chapter, the maximum rate of pay is set unilaterally by the university administration while individual departments unilaterally set what the part time, temporaries actually get within that limit. Neither the A.U.T.N.Z. nor the staff members concerned enter into negotiations on behalf of part-timers.

As Rajagopal and Farr (1989) have noted, the relationship between full-time tenured academics and part-timers is one of a "managerial versus subordinate" group. Full time, tenured faculty often act as "frontline supervisors" involved in the hiring, firing, direction,
and evaluation of part-time staff. The increasing use of part-time temporaries has been attributed to the need to manage fiscal problems in an environment of decreased university funding. The fact that casual workers can be easily redeployed or terminated, as I have noted, reduces staffing expenditure. But at the same time this situation protects the interests of full time staff by way of providing a "buffer" against threats to their salary levels and continuing employment. At a more sinister level there is evidence that to suggest that a lack of tenure has made it easier to discriminate against politically unorthodox staff (Jones & Stilwell, 1986:33; Dixon, 1976).

In some Canadian universities, the growing sense of exploitation among part-time temporary academic staff has lead to the formation of separate unions for full-time and temporary staff (Rajagopal & Farr, 1989:280). The exclusion and exploitation of certain groups within the academic profession, it should be added, could ultimately be counter-productive for those benefiting from this situation at present. This is because the fragmentation of interests produced may reduce solidarity in the face of increasing encroachments of the State and possibly from individual university administrations.

The academic profession, too, is having to cope with changes in the relationship between themselves and students. The relationship of power between students and staff is reflected in the emphasis in the universities on research rather than teaching. Although it might be
argued that official guide-lines state that teaching ability must be considered when staff apply for promotion, in practice it is research which is most rewarded. This is as true for New Zealand universities (Wilson, 1986:22-23) as it is for those overseas. Clark (1987:98-99), for example, notes that,

The greatest paradox of academic work in modern America is that most professors teach most of the time, and large proportions of them teach all the time, but teaching is not the activity most rewarded by the academic profession and not most valued by the system at large. Trustees and administrators in one sector after another praise teaching and reward research.

Teaching is significant in this context because it brings academic staff into direct contact with their "clients." As students, the clients of the academic profession have a definite interest in the quality of teaching and the amount and type of assessment they are subject to. Research, however, takes academic staff away from the influence of students enabling staff to pursue their own interests and concerns. One of the fears of American academic staff, according to Epstein (1974:200) is of the "...pressure of undergraduates to reduce research commitments generally in favour of classroom and related teaching".

Students, both overseas and in New Zealand, have sought to increase their power in a number of ways. As early as 1938, student representatives were granted a position on the council of Victoria College and by the late 1960s this practice spread to other New Zealand
universities. As well as representation, students have formed organised pressure groups in order to influence academic practice. At the University of Canterbury, the Students Association has established a group called the "Education Team", a body charged with protecting and defending students from unfair treatment by academic staff.

The growing resistance to academic prerogatives by students has taken the form of questioning the profession's twin claims to autonomy: expertise and good will. Expertise has been challenged on grounds of gender and race. Students have become more sensitive to the fact that much of the information they are exposed to in the university is ethnocentric and androcentric. The good will of academic staff has recently been questioned on the grounds that they have been insensitive to the stresses they have placed upon students in terms of workloads. According to a recent paper by the "E-Team" at the University of Canterbury, for example,

... there is at present, far too much on-going or continuous assessment in most departments, which has the effect of burdening students with an unending workload.... The end result of this is that students are less explorative in their work and less willing to enter into controversial issues with their lecturers. More pernicious is the fact that their physical and mental health is being affected by their studies. (University of Canterbury Students Association Education Team, 31 Jan, 1990)

To combat this problem, the University of Canterbury Students Association has recommended that workload requirements for individual courses be placed
into the university calendar. These requirements, for example, would be negotiated between student and departmental representatives and might include details on the number of hours required per week for lectures, lab work and preparation. Similar information has been gathered in previous years by directly surveying students on matters including difficulty levels and workload and has been published in student association handbooks.

Described as "an anathema to many academics" (Manwell & Baker, 1986:292), the aim of course evaluations is to provide students with sufficient details about courses to make informed choices. Essentially, the strategy involves mobilising the disorganised, aggregate power of individual student decisions; courses with high workloads, for example, might attract so few students that they become no longer viable. Not only can students exercise their power as "consumers", if academic staff are involved in setting or estimating course workloads and these estimates diverge widely from those experienced by students, then staff can more easily be held accountable for this.

According to American literature (Garbarino et al, 1977; Ladd & Lipset, 1973) there is evidence to suggest that the unionization of academics has in some universities resulted in intensified conflict between staff and students. According to Garbarino et al, (1977:59) this has happened for two reasons. First, where collective bargaining has covered not only terms and conditions of employment but other aspects of university
operations, students have felt that this transfer of power to a new structure has effectively nullified their influence in the university. Indeed, as Ladd and Lipset (1973:92) have noted, some American academics have viewed unionization favourably for this very reason. In one case, a union opposed student involvement in evaluating teachers because of its increasing use as a tool by university administration for making decisions on promotion or tenure (ibid:92-93). However, there is also evidence to suggest that in some instances, contracts have given students rights to evaluate teaching which they did not have before (Garbarino et al, 1977:61). Second, American students have been concerned that union demands for higher salaries and reduced teaching loads will be met by increases in tuition fees (Garbarino et al, 1977:59). This has lead to predictions that students and the university administration would combine against academic staff (Ladd & Lipset, 1973:88-89). While students in some American universities have successfully requested participation in bargaining, the trend has been for students to be excluded from negotiations involving economic issues (Garbarino et al, 1977:60).
(3.7) SUMMARY

In this chapter I have given an historical account of the academic work situation in New Zealand. During the developmental phase of the university system (1870-1961) there was a gradual change from a "punishment" oriented mode of bureaucratic control to that more characteristic of a representative or collegial mode of control as academics won rights of representation on and consultation by the lay authorities.

The professionalization of academic life at a national level reached its height in the post war period (1961-1989) with the abolition of the University of New Zealand Senate and the establishment of the U.G.C. At a local level, lay people retained their majority in university councils but the representation of academics increased. Furthermore, councils came to take a largely passive role in the university life, preferring to defer to professorial boards.

By 1989/1990, the change in economic philosophy which accompanied the prolonged economic down-turn was translated into a new legal environment for the universities. This new environment reflected a desire to reduce the power and autonomy of academics by reducing aspects of collegiality. The U.G.C., considered to be a "buffer" between the State and the universities, was abolished and attempts were made to reduce the representation of academics on university councils. Power has also been significantly centralised in the hands of
the Minister of Education. The Minister now has the power to direct universities to discontinue courses of study, amend charters, to appoint four persons to council, and to allocate resources within the university for purposes specified by the Minister.

Most significant, perhaps, has been the loss of a certain degree of "indeterminacy" in academic life through codification. At the level of the work place, codification is increasing in a number of ways. The request by students to have academic staff stipulate preparation times for courses is a form of codification which is ultimately aimed at controlling academic staff through consumerism. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the codification of performance, rights, and obligations of staff within employment contracts - although this has happened to different extents in universities. While this form of codification may offer some form of protection it is also likely to reduce areas of discretion and renders the work process more accessible to control from administrators.

Moves towards privatization and a more market approach will inevitably result in a loss of monopoly held by the universities over the granting of degrees. Thus, they will have to compete with other institutions for students. The application of explicit, quantifiable performance goals combined with a more "market oriented" curriculum suggests a reduction in the ambiguity or indeterminacy of educational goals. Not only does the quantification of educational goals allow greater control
by the State, it indicates a displacement of goals which many academics have seen as of primary importance in university education. Connected to this is the overall decline of the representative nature of higher education bureaucracy which makes possible a further displacement of academic goals. While academic work has thus far escaped technical proletarianization, moves towards privatization, the use of explicite performance goals and the decline of collegial control, indicate the loss of control over the goals of academic work. In other words, it appears that academics are being subjected to "ideological" proletarianization.
CHAPTER IV

THE RESPONSE OF ACADEMIC STAFF TO ECONOMIC AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES IN THEIR WORK ENVIRONMENT.

(4.1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

In this chapter I examine the views of academic staff on unionisation and on changes in their economic and organisational situations. This was done in order to see if there were any links between changes in these conditions and support for unionization. The examination of staff members' views on these issues is based on a series of in-depth interviews held at the University of Canterbury (1). The University of Canterbury is situated in Christchurch, New Zealand, and has an academic staff population of about 430. Twenty academic staff were selected across different grades and departments to give as broad a picture as possible. Within this constraint staff were generally selected at "random" by picking names out of the university calendar. They were then contacted by personal visit with a request for an interview. Only two people declined an interview, stating that they had insufficient time. Each interview took between twenty minutes to an hour and during this period the following issues were explored:

(1) In the following analysis, in order to protect the anonymity of academic staff, opinions have been sourced at faculty level rather than departmental level. Thus, an observation from a senior lecturer in physics, for example, will be attributed to a senior lecturer in the science faculty. Where necessary, names of departments in quotes will be replaced with "XXXX" to protect the anonymity informants.
1/ The views of the informant on changes in the "economic" side of working life. This included questions on teaching workloads, promotion prospects, salary, government superannuation and job security.

2/ The views of the informant on changes in the power structure of the university. This included questions on work autonomy, participation in decision making and staff appraisal issues.

3/ The perceptions of the informant on union issues. This included questions on the need for a union, what they saw as an appropriate role for the A.U.T.N.Z. (union or professional association) and who should be covered by the union.

(4.2) STAFF PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF ACADEMIC WORK.

(4.2.1) WORKLOAD.

The informants were asked whether they had noticed any increase in teaching workloads in recent years. Three participants in the study noted that over the last few years, the time taken to perform administrative tasks had increased while over half of the participants stated that their teaching workload had increased. According to a senior lecturer from a science department,
In terms of difficulties I suppose the primary one is that student numbers are increasing constantly and consistently and there is no increase in the resources that we are given to deal with that. I have been here since '85 and all of my classes have doubled in size since I started here... You give the same number of lectures but you do twice as much marking, you deal with twice as many students... there's got to be some point at which that's not going to work any more.

One could not say, however, that teaching workloads were wholly imposed by external means. Teaching workloads are controlled both at departmental, as we have seen, and to a significant extent at an individual level. At a departmental level, according to one source, limitation of entry was determined by the "philosophy" of each department to open or closed entry. Thus workloads have become a problem to the extent that departments have allowed open entry. At an individual level, teaching can be reduced by refusing to accept graduate students and total workload can be regulated simply by refusing to do research. To neglect research, however, is to lessen ones chances of promotion.

Additionally, it is apparent that many academic staff are governed by a strong "internal" work ethic which precludes the limitation of effort to the bare minimum required. According to one respondent,

...people can sit in this university behind that protection and spend the day in the staff club drinking the day away and some do! [but].... there are only a few of those because most of us are work-a-holics. Our main problem is not that we haven't got enough pressure on us but that we are internally driven to work too hard....
This is echoed in the following passage by a arts lecturer.

My concern is that I can’t do all I want to do in the time available ... I create my own workload... I am aware that I find it very difficult to put things to one side.

There is evidence to suggest, however, that past a certain level, teaching loads for some individuals may become a burden which results in a degeneration of this ethic. According to a lecturer from the science faculty:

Prior to coming here I used to enjoy teaching enormously..... I [now] have a teaching load which is two and a half times what it is elsewhere and that changes teaching from being a real delight to being a bit of a chore... you don’t have enough time to prepare to feel that when you are teaching you are doing it properly. Always you feel you are short-changing the students.

(4.2.2) PROMOTIONS

Staff concerns over promotion prospects were clearly dependent on the respondents' age, whether they had career ambitions and where they were located on the career ladder. For example, one informant, a senior lecturer in one of the professional schools stated that he was to retire in a few years so he was not concerned over promotions. However, it was evident that many of the younger academics looked upon promotion as a vehicle to recognition and higher pay and as something to be desired. Additionally, promotion provides an important doorway to power: to be eligible for a position as head
of department applicants must be at senior lecturer grade and above.

Significantly, with the exceptions noted above, there was almost unanimous dissatisfaction with promotion prospects. A lecturer from one of the professional schools, for example, stated that,

As I understand it, and this is just looking at my colleagues, how they have advanced over the years..., unless one is an exceptional scholar who publishes quite substantially, one has to spend at least seven to eight years as a lecturer before there is any chance of a promotion above the bar of the lecturers scale or into the senior lecturers scale. It strikes me that this is too long.

In the opinion of a senior lecturer from the science faculty, promotion prospects were so poor that he believed he had "essentially no chance" of getting to the top of the promotion scale at the University of Canterbury before retirement age. To get a professorship, he believed he would have to "switch jobs." Whatever the case, informants generally agreed that promotion rates had slowed during the last five years.

This slowing was attributed by a number of staff to the "age bulge" of people at senior lecturer level and the lack of staff turnover. Speaking of the bar within the senior lecturers scale, a science lecturer stated that,

...at least in the current situation where there are all these old men clogging up the system, your chances of promotion get very much worse.

However, others stressed the need to publish in
order to be promoted and noted the difficulty in doing research given the current teaching and administrative workloads.

On the matter of promotion procedures, concern was raised about the continual changing of the career ladder. According to a senior lecturer from science,

The thing which I find most disturbing is the fact that the structure of academic levels or positions has changed continuously over the last 15 years.

Two others from science noted that the number of steps seemed to be increasing in the last 5 years. According to a science lecturer, "you keep on thinking you are getting to the top [of the lecturers scale] and the top is being put further away."

The most bitter condemnation of the promotions system came from the commerce faculty. All three of the academic staff interviewed from commerce had basically the same complaints. The first involved the perception that commerce staff were being unfairly discriminated against by promotions committees at Canterbury,

[Promotion is]...a pretty arbitrary process from my observations...I can see our people can't get promoted over the bar at the senior lecturer level. Our last good example... couldn't get above the bar at senior lecturer level and was offered a Chair at Auckland, Waikato and Dunedin...so I have very little confidence in the promotion system (commerce lecturer).

A senior lecturer in commerce put this down to an imbalance in the power structure of the university which
saw the sciences "capturing the limited number of readerships." Furthermore, according to the same informant, the university administration had failed to recognize that New Zealand Master of Commerce degrees were equivalent to American commerce doctorates and that this too affected the case that could be made for promoting commerce staff.

One result of the higher teaching and administrative loads, combined with reduced promotion prospects was, according to a senior lecturer in the arts, a change in the social relations in his department.

I think its becoming more and more competitive and I think that it also has an effect on the climate in the department:...more competition and less socialisation. People become less inclined to stop to talk about things they are so busy doing there own work... so there is decreasing staff interaction. (Senior arts lecturer).

(4.2.3) SALARY

The majority of academic staff in the sample were satisfied with their current salary levels. However, this satisfaction was dependent on grade, pay relativities with other countries and sectors, and personal circumstances.

In terms of pay relativities with other countries, a senior lecturer from sciences noted that,

I think that the salary levels are pretty good and I certainly have got no complaints. If you want compare them to the American system then they are greatly deficient; if you want to compare them to the British system they are slightly lower; if you want to compare them to the Australian system they are about on par. So there is no real discrepancy.
Pay relativities with the other sectors of the community were not seen as problematic except where problems were posed by the university competing unsuccessfully for staff with the private sector for recruitment. As with promotions, commerce staff were especially concerned over this issue. According to a senior lecturer in commerce, salary levels were insufficient at the "middle and high levels" to retain and recruit staff from the commercial world.

However, it was acknowledged by two commerce staff, and one staff member from a professional school that university life had certain features that made lower salary levels acceptable. A lecturer from commerce noted, for example, that

I think the salary is fair for the nature of the job that we do. We are a very, very privileged group of people in terms of the freedom we have and the hours of work and the demands and so on. My M.B.A students almost invariably get $10,000 a year more than I do in their first job. But that's ok, they probably work longer hours with less freedom...

Where a certain set of personal circumstances prevailed, however, attitudes towards salary levels were less than favourable. A lecturer from arts stated that,

As my husband is unemployed, life is incredibly difficult,.... we are not extravagant, we have a mortgage and a twelve year old car ....[and] there isn't really much left over once we have paid the for food bills... we are part of the higher paid in New Zealand, I am struggling, how the hell is everyone else coping?
In a similar vein a teaching assistant in arts remarked that,

At the moment I'm very poor so I guess financial topics concern me the most at the moment.

In contrast, a senior lecturer in science noted that his salary adequately supported his life style but put it down to the fact that he had a high earning spouse and no dependents. Friends with a family and spouse to support, he observed, "certainly don't do well at all."

(4.2.4) SUPERANNUATION AND JOB SECURITY.

Those affected by changes in the government superannuation scheme, in general, were concerned - but not strongly - about the lower rates of return. In fact according to a reader in one of the professional schools, the scheme was unsustainable anyway. If anything, there was more concern about how it was changed rather than what was changed.

I think the main problem is for many of us who joined it ten years ago, it was compulsory. At that time we signed a contract for certain benefits, those benefits are now greatly reduced without consultation and the levels at which we contribute have increased (Senior science lecturer).

Almost unanimously, staff considered their job security to be good. In fact, according to a professor from commerce, it is too good.
I think we should not get tenure. We should get appointments of three or five years, something like that and then a serious decision should be made whether people get re-appointed. Currently we are stuck with people who should not be here teaching, they are bad teachers, they have little to offer in terms of research, they are basically parasites on the system...

Some staff appeared to be comforted by expanding university rolls due to unabated high unemployment, and others by a perceived influx of students into commerce and other vocational areas.

Yes I think we are very secure in this area, .... but having said that, in the late 1960s nobody wanted to study XXXX.... you were a kind of capitalist bastard if you wanted to do that sort of thing so it may well change again.... [but] at the moment there is a world wide boom in XXXX education so we are very secure (Commerce lecturer)

and

I've got no concerns personally about job security. I can see some problem with some of the more esoteric departments... but I have always had this perhaps vain hope that XXXX, being an essential commodity, would have plenty of market for it. (Professor from a professional school).

A senior lecturer in arts, however, noted that in the last few years he had observed an increased number of courses, which were related to his field, emerging in polytechnics and other schools and acknowledged that these were a threat to his job security. However he added that,
... we offer a degree whereas other courses offer a certificate which doesn't seem to have as much currency in the market place.

Like salary levels, concern over job security was also, for one informant, linked to personal circumstances. As a solo parent the loss of job raised concerns for this person about caring for dependents. However, this concern diminished as the children reached a point in their lives where they were capable of becoming financially independent.

On a less optimistic note, a reader from one of the professional schools believed that the new powers given to the Vice Chancellor to hire and fire staff, the powers of Ministry of Education to withhold funding and the possibility that the N.Z.Q.A. could at some time close departments in universities, resulted in an environment where "job security is on longer as good as it used to be." A senior lecturer in sciences believed that the situation where staff at lectureship level were given immediate tenure would change in the future.

(4.3) STAFF PERCEPTIONS OF THE ORGANISATIONAL SIDE OF ACADEMIC WORK.

(4.3.1) WORK AUTONOMY

On this issue staff were asked to what degree they were free to determine the content of what they taught and researched. At all grades and faculties the answer was the same: a very high degree of freedom. In fact it
was often given as one of the prime reasons for becoming a university teacher.

Nobody hassles me, I can do what I like which I think is a real strength of the job and so I can develop a pattern of work which I think is to the best advantage of the students. So its very, very free and I really enjoy that and its one of the prime reasons why I work at the university.... (Lecturer in commerce)

Surprisingly, teaching assistants also noted that they had a considerable degree of freedom in the way they conducted their work. According to a lab demonstrator in one of the professional schools,

As far as input into the job, you have quite a bit really.... Generally the lecturers are reasonably open.... Some of the lecturers are very organised and know exactly what they want to do and the tutor is there filling the function - follow the dots - but in other times you can have quite a bit of input with your own ideas.

A professor from sciences, however, noted that although staff in his department had a good deal of autonomy, there were occasions where people had to teach something they didn't want to teach. For a science staff, especially, one other factor which limited work autonomy was access to research funds.

When you are actually requiring resources, when you need to build equipment and so on, your autonomy is severely limited compared to somebody who has a trivial requirement for resources... What you can do in the sciences is limited by what equipment you have....clearly as your requirements for resources increase your autonomy decreases (Science lecturer).
Furthermore,

The only problem I would say was in the acquisition of research funds but that is out of the sphere of influence of this department (Senior science lecturer).

There is also evidence to suggest that work autonomy, in terms of freedom to do research, is being compromised by increasing teaching work loads. On this issue a senior lecturer from arts noted that,

I think that's being compromised by more work to be done, a greater volume of work, more students, more demands, and you can control that to a certain extent but ... [that] usually means cutting out... things that aren't essential, that don't have deadlines put on them. All of those things that are usually enjoyment and interest related, personal research and reading... discretion usually means these days, for me, cutting back on things and putting things off.

It should be added that the present relationship between students and staff did not appear to be affecting staff autonomy to any significant extent. A lecturer from commerce noted, however, that students had got "bolshier" in recent times but added that this was good: students needed to stick up for themselves. A senior lecturer from sciences stated that the tone of staff-student meetings had changed somewhat in recent times:

Whereas before, students would say "this lecturer is terrible," they now say "this lecturer is terrible, what are you going to do about it"?
(4.3.2) INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION MAKING

On this issue staff were asked to what degree they felt that access to decision making channels was satisfactory. A very high proportion of staff appeared satisfied with decision making at departmental level. A senior lecturer in sciences noted, for example, that,

"...certainly in the department we have a head of department who is very open and you can discuss any matter at any time. We have a departmental committee and all major decisions are made by that committee, we have all sorts, things like a work shop committee. So as far as the department is concerned - no problems."

For two of the sample, however, participation in committees was limited by the time available. In one case, an informant revealed a conflict between the time required to participate in committees and the need to find time to do one's own work.

"...if you don't make the decisions yourself the decisions are not always going to be what you like but if you make all the decisions yourself you end up not having any time to do your academic work....its nice to sort of influence the decisions but equally its nice not to have to spend your time in committee meetings (Science lecturer)."

Although most seemed satisfied with access to decision making at a university level, six informants had reservations about the efficacy of their influence at this level. Significantly, staff in the commerce faculty were unanimous in regards to their dissatisfaction with decision making at university level because of promotions policies. One senior lecturer from commerce stated that
the staffing section of the registry should be "sacked because they are a hindrance to the smooth operation of the organisation." This informant also added that financial allocations were based upon tradition rather than need, that committee structures were not mindful of the needs of departments and at any rate lacked the power to do what was necessary. Furthermore, it was added that power actually resided in the Vice Chancellor and certain of the longer serving staff who had "vested interests" in science and engineering.

An arts lecturer describes this situation in the following way.

Decision making involves access to information. My access to information is patchy. I feel I can shape some decisions but I am also aware that there is a large degree of informal decision making.... Power actually resides in unspecified places through the university. If you look at the Vice Chancellor, he holds positions in the academic staffing committee and academic policy committee which control departmental policy and staffing policy.....He also has around him many people who talk to him a great deal, particularly lawyers, engineers, and some scientists, and basically if you look at the flow of money in the university you see that those are the people that get the bulk of the money. In other words there is a kind of skewing which goes on within the university which is not broadly understood.

These sentiments were to some extent echoed by a reader in one of the professional schools who stated that although a policy committee exists, too many policy decisions were made by the Vice Chancellor without consultation.

Inclusion of teaching assistants in departmental decision making generally amounted to being able to sit
in on the less sensitive of departmental meetings. One teaching assistant, however, reported that in his department no involvement in departmental meetings was allowed at all, while another reported that, as graduate students, they had a real input in choosing the head of department. It seems likely that concern over a say in the department is linked to the time likely to be spent working as a teaching assistant. While M.A. students generally take a year to complete a thesis, doctoral usually spend a minimum of three years and therefore have a greater degree of interest in their pay and conditions and what happens in the department.

(4.3.3) STAFF APPRAISAL.

The issue of staff appraisal is placed within the context of work situation because of its implications for use as a mechanism of control. When connected to issues such as tenure, pay or promotions, appraisal systems assume a real importance. They also become a source of concern if accompanied by a centralisation of control or if they are to be conducted by a body external to the university, such as the State Services Commission. To explore this issue, staff were asked how and who should conduct performance appraisals.

Most staff agreed that some form of staff appraisal was necessary. Some staff even argued that existing appraisal practices were insufficient. According to a reader from one of the professional schools,
Appraisal is really only carried out for those people who apply for promotions. The "fault in the system" exists in letting those who do not apply for promotions, and are "slacking off," to slip through the net. Another criticism of the existing system was of an over-emphasis on appraisal through counting publications.

What happens at this university is by and large you are promoted on the basis of your publications and that can create real distortions because it means if you service the needs of students comprehensively, really take time out to do that, the university reinforces that by not promoting you....If you get a performance appraisal system which emphasises publication you get a real rat race mentality and that's the problem with the American system...the American academic world is represented by superficial, methodologically advanced research often on topics which have very little meaning for anybody and it becomes a sort of self-serving universe that they are involved in and I have real concerns about that (Commerce lecturer).

However, when it came to assessing teaching, there was also some debate over how this should be done. According to a lecturer in commerce,

...I think for performance appraisal you could get regular ratings for course teaching from the students...there is nothing wrong with the student association system they have got now.

However, a number of others questioned the efficacy of student appraisals. A senior lecturer from commerce noted that poor teachers could boost their ratings by making themselves popular with students. And according to a professor from one of the professional schools,
...there are some...teachers who work students very hard and they get lovely results but the students don't like it and they are the sorts of teachers that probably get a very bad press from the students whereas the students probably come out of those courses better taught.

Criticisms were also made of other proposed appraisal measures such as citation counts, and other quantitative measures of performance, or having inspectors sit in on lectures. While there seemed to be very little agreement as to how appraisal should be done, most respondents agreed on who should do it. Appraisals should be conducted by bodies or people within the university. The most common option seemed to be a peer review at the level of the department.

I think [appraisal] needs to be done within departments by the people closest to you, in other words peer review. Even then you are going to run into problems about how much somebody knows about a particular topic that you are in but that's the best you can do.

When asked about whether the State Services Commission should conduct appraisals of university staff every informant responded in the negative. For a senior lecturer in sciences, the State Services Commission having jurisdiction over academic staff was seen as inappropriate because the conditions of employment for public servants are so different from conditions of employment for academic staff. Other responses, however, referred to the issues of expertise and control. For a number of staff, such as the one above, external assessors simply would not have the expertise to make
effective judgments about the quality of work. For others the issue of control was most important. An arts lecturer noted that, the introduction of appraisal systems could involve a loss of control. Echoing this point, a senior lecturer in sciences stated that,

I would certainly much rather be assessed from within the university where I felt like I could have some input into that assessment and also be able to make some comments on that assessment process and on the assessments that were made. I think, you know, in terms of protecting yourself you want to be able to have some input and a local assessment would allow greater input potential. So I would certainly support a local assessment.

and

I think it would be absolutely fine that once a year I go to talk with the head of department about plans for what I expect to achieve in the coming year and at the end of the year deciding to what extent I met those goals....then of course you inevitably will have the problem that people don't always approve....but then the head of department rotates every four or five years (Science lecturer).

(4.4) STAFF PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISSUE OF UNIONISM.

(4.4.1) ON NEED FOR A UNION

In this section informants were asked whether or not there was a need for staff to be represented by a trade union type of organisation. All informants stated that there was a need for this sort of representation. Reasons for union representation were generally pragmatic. A senior lecturer in commerce noted that having a union present was like an "insurance policy as a potential safeguard against risks which could go bad." In
a similar vein, a professor in one of the professional schools noted that,

I feel that I would be unhappy without one these days because you don't know what can go wrong, particularly with this increasing centralised control and even with pure autonomy of the universities you can get unreasonable Vice Chancellors and we are very lucky at Canterbury to have a most acceptable Vice Chancellor....[but] who knows who might follow him and I think in this situation we do need the protection of a union. I would not have thought this ten years ago....

and

In the old days when things sort of rolled on peacefully from year to year with a modicum of change, I could understand people not wanting to get involved [in a union]...but not in 1989, 1990 and 1991 (Professor in sciences).

and again

It seems to me the crucial thing is that we have an organisation which will stand behind each of us which we can use as clout and I take that very seriously (Professor in arts).

However, for another, the need for a union was based around the more abstract principle of the general need for a union in any employment situation.

I think unless you have some kind of organisation that is able to represent the individual then obviously the individual is too weak in comparison to the employer. So from that point of view I think there should be a union (Commerce professor).

On the issue of a need for union, the response of teaching assistants was mixed. In a department where the
teaching assistants could engage in an informal type of collective bargaining with their supervisors over their pay, the informant stated that there was no need for union representation. However, he did add that, "it would be nice if there was some sort of rock bottom law that you could fall back on and say "look there are these guidelines." An informant who worked in a department where teaching assistants were given no say in determining payments, emphasised the need for a bargaining representative to "put a dose of reality into what goes on here." It could also be that the perceived need for union representation by teaching assistants is linked, as suggested above, to the length of time spent in the job. However, financial position could be a factor too; some students have more lucrative scholarships than others and therefore see wages levels as relatively unimportant.

(4.4.2) THE ROLE OF THE A.U.T.N.Z.: UNION OR PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION?.

For this concern informants were asked what role the A.U.T.N.Z. should play in university life. Not surprisingly there was general agreement that the A.U.T.N.Z. should be concerned with the protection and monitoring of pay and conditions, including career structures and work autonomy. Two women lecturers, both from arts, noted that the A.U.T.N.Z. also needed to pursue equal opportunities issues, not just to counter gender inequities but also to protect minority groups in
general. However, a significant majority of informants stated that the A.U.T.N.Z. should still maintain its interest in the quality of higher education. Responses ranged from the following in which the informant supported the union role of the A.U.T.N.Z. but saw its primary role as that of a professional association:

Traditionally, most unions would say pay and conditions of work....those as a general area are important but I think the other area is perhaps even more important, the quality of tertiary education (Senior arts lecturer).

To other responses that suggested a move away from professional concerns altogether.

I think it [the A.U.T.N.Z.] needs to confront the university more as a body....I think there is an employer/employee relationship which is understated....I see an increasing need for [a union] given the changes that have taken place....the university is in a competitive environment, things like codification are going to become much more relevant, questions about redundancy are going to raise themselves. The foremost function of the A.U.T. is to protect its members and I see that as being an increasingly important role (Arts lecturer)

A senior lecturer in sciences stated that the A.U.T.N.Z. was a good staff association but was not sufficiently adequate as a union. On the issue of cuts to superannuation and changes in salary structures it was noted,
The A.U.T. has been totally ineffective.... The firemen and the police were in the same [superannuation] scheme had threatened strike action and had their benefits restored - we didn't.... Since I have been here salary structures have just gone round and round as every year leads to greater numbers of steps in the academic scales. I don't really think the union has been very good as far as looking after the overall structure of salaries and the staff themselves...if it wanted to become a union in the traditional sense of a union there are going to have to be some very big changes.

On whether the union should participate directly in academic matters, a professor in arts noted that,

I think the role of the union was to make sure that the university structure was such that we would all have the opportunity to do that [participate in decision making]. I don't think the union needs to get involved in appointments or promotions but I think the union can get us some clout in insisting that there be an academic board and that committees of that board make those decisions or at least have a major input in those decisions rather than the Vice Chancellor himself making those decisions.

(4.4.3) UNION COVERAGE.

On this issue informants were asked who should be covered by the A.U.T.N.Z. Responses generally fell into two categories and while there was a general consensus about the need for the A.U.T.N.Z. to protect conditions of employment, there was no agreement on who should be protected. Roughly two thirds of the respondents declared that only teaching staff should be covered, with the rest stating that coverage should be broader. Those who opted for coverage of the "craft" only, argued this on the grounds that other occupational groups did not have
quite the same interests as university teachers. Asked whether the university technicians should come under A.U.T.N.Z. coverage, a senior lecturer in sciences noted that,

"...delegates from technicians union... are very concerned about conditions of employment, safety, peoples health and so which I think is good. But the A.U.T. I think deals more with wide ranging things such as tertiary education in New Zealand, whether we are getting value for dollar or whether we are getting enough dollars and so on and the technicians union does not deal with anything in those categories - it is a union and I think that by merging with the technicians union the A.U.T. is changing its character...It means that the technicians union will have to be dragged along and will have to accept that is part of the new scheme. But for me, I would prefer to keep them separate.

For one respondent the merging of the technicians and academic staff would create difficulties because of the quasi employer - employee relationship that exists between these two groups.

That's again why I would see a difficulty in uniting the A.U.T. with the technicians union. ...the interest is somewhat different. I think the academics in a sense have an interest in having technicians work a hundred hours a week ...and the technicians union has an interest in trying to say at 5 o'clock we can go home thank you very much (Science lecturer).

Those who supported a site rather than craft union did so on the basis that universities had to maintain a sense of community.
Well I've always been committed to the idea that the university is a community and therefore I've always been in favour of an association not making distinctions between librarians and technicians and so on. I must confess I haven't thought through the problems with that because obviously there are different interests...(Professor from arts).

Noting the possibility that bargaining would at some stage be conducted locally, a reader from one of the professional schools suggested that different unions all competing for a piece of the bulk grant would create animosity between different factions. On the other hand, site agreements would make for a "more cohesive and happy unit on campus." A senior lecturer from commerce stated the sense of unity created by a site union would make it easier to maintain an "awareness of collective responsibility to the community."

(4.5) SUMMARY

In this chapter I have attempted to explore links between support for unionisation and dissatisfaction with features of the authority environment and certain economic aspects of academic working life. Despite having some control over work loads, more than half of the informants stated that their teaching work loads had increased and a number noted that this had interfered with their research. The most dissatisfaction appeared to be over issues related to promotions. All informants stated that promotions had slowed in recent years and promotions procedures were condemned unanimously by informants in the commerce field. No concern was raised
over current salary levels except by commerce staff concerned by recruitment problems and by an informant at lecturer grade who had a dependent spouse. No real concern was raised over immediate job security nor, generally, was there strong concern over changes to superannuation.

On the issue of the social organisation of work, all respondents stated that the degree of freedom they had over their day to day working life was very high. However, some stated that the autonomy or freedom to do research was being compromised by problems with research funding and by higher teaching loads. On the issue of departmental decision making, every informant, except for one, stated they had an adequate input. Most were satisfied with decision making processes at the level of the university, however some noted that decisions on resource allocation appeared to be biased towards the sciences and the engineering school. The relationship staff had with students did not appear to be problematic although two staff noted that students were getting more assertive. Some criticisms were made of current appraisal measures but there was general agreement that appraisal was necessary and should be conducted by the university itself (which it is at present), preferably at the level of the department. On the issue of appraising individual academic staff by an external body, such as the State Services Commission, a significant number of respondents noted that it would be impractical or impossible to give fair assessments given the level of expertise that this
sort of body could muster. A number also raised concerns related to the possible loss of control associated with such a move.

With the exception of promotions, the overall picture I received was one of general satisfaction with conditions as they were at the time the interviews were conducted. Yet despite this, there was unanimous agreement that the A.U.T.N.Z. should engage in union type activities and many stressed the increased need for this type of activity given the circumstances of the present and recent past. This appears to fly in the face of some of the research which has been conducted on academic support for unionisation. In the U.S.A., for example, researchers have found that dissatisfaction with administrative (Hammer & Berman, 1981) or economic factors (Allen & Keaveny, 1981) has lead directly to greater pro-union sentiments. Similarly, Feuille and Blandin, (1974:690) have argued that an alleged void in union support in the more "prestigious" American universities was due to the fact that staff in these institutions tend to receive higher salaries, have a great deal of job autonomy, and work within a collegial governance system.

The present research appears to present anomalous evidence until one looks at the broader picture. In a survey of 123 American institutions, Garbarino and Aussieker (1975:70) found that unionized institutions generally had higher than average degrees of participation in governance and higher than average
salaries than non unionized institutions (ibid:79). This counter intuitive trend led Garbarino and Aussieker to state that "Neither salary levels nor the degree of faculty participation in governance are related to unionisation in any simple direct way" (ibid). This statement, it seems, is borne out in the present study.

Why, therefore, should there be such strong support for unionism in this type of situation? According to Garbarino & Aussieker, (1975:79-80) a possible explanation of this phenomena is that "uncertainty about future levels of salary and governance participation rather than the current situation may be the force leading to unionisation." Given the context of New Zealand universities in the 1990s this explanation certainly seems the most likely. In recent years, as I have noted in the previous chapter, academics in New Zealand have been faced with attacks in the form of funding cuts, the Hawke report, the Learning for Life proposals and the Education Amendment Act 1990. Now they are faced with threats in the form the Employment Contracts Bill 1990, government announcements that public servants will receive no salary increase this year and the possibility of corporatization and its implications for working conditions.
CHAPTER V

DEPROFESSIONALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS

(5.1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the first chapter of this thesis I looked at why the professions in general, and the academic profession in particular, experienced high degrees of autonomy and economic privilege. To explain these features of professional life I argued that the professions were occupational groups which, by holding and claiming high levels of expertise and a concern for quality of service, gained autonomy and exclusive rights over certain practices.

The success of this strategy depends on a number of things, including the following: the outcome of competition with other occupations, the willingness of the State to legally sanction rights to exclusive practice, a relationship of trust between client and practitioner; and some relevance to the needs of the capitalist economy. In this latter respect, the professions can be said to "serve" the interests of capital and are therefore part of the service class.

The professions have traditionally been represented by professional associations rather than trade unions. Professionals (and often their professional associations) and trade unions (especially craft unions) are similar insofar as they generally try to regulate the entry of labour into occupations. Although they have similar ends, such as increasing or protecting salaries and conditions
of work, their means are different. Unions favour strategies of collective bargaining, registration as "unions" under labour relations acts, and the strike. Professional associations prefer to stress relations of trust, through codes of ethics and an interest in the quality of service to customers, clients or the community.

Thus, the central question addressed in this thesis was: When a professional association becomes more "unionate" (e.g., opting for collective bargaining and registering as a trade union), does this signify a deterioration of the class situation of this profession?

(5.2) A SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE.

It must first be noted that the A.U.T.N.Z. was to some degree compelled to register under the Labour Relations Act 1987, as a result of the State removing academic staff from the jurisdiction of the Higher Salaries Commission. In this sense, the registration of the A.U.T.N.Z., as a trade union, was not directly related to proletarianization of the profession it represented. However, it must also be said that the A.U.T.N.Z. seriously considered registration under the Labour Relations Act 1973 in 1977, and in 1980 initiated moves to have individual University Acts amended in order to be formally recognized as a bargaining agent for academic staff. These rights were granted in 1987. The A.U.T.N.Z., therefore, had made substantial progress towards union type activities and rights before it was
compelled to register in 1989. And certainly there very little, if any, protest over the registration of the A.U.T.N.Z. at this time.

By 1980, a number of things had happened that posed a threat both to the academic profession and its association. From the perspective of the survival of the A.U.T.N.Z., there was the threat of losing its members to a registered union which was looking to expand its membership. As well, from 1975, the U.G.C. was having more difficulties in getting what its members thought was sufficient funding for the universities. And in 1979, the grant to the universities was reduced by three million dollars, with the State threatening to make its own review of university expenditure. Furthermore, it was becoming evident that working conditions of academics in Britain and America were coming increasingly under attack.

From the mid 1970s, the working conditions of academic staff in New Zealand were being eroded too. Promotion from senior lecturer to reader had slowed dramatically during the 1970s, and between 1978 and 1990 salaries had dropped in real terms by over 10% Promotions in the late 1980s had slowed and, with the introduction of bars, had become more productivity driven.

There was evidence, also, to suggest that tenure was coming under attack. From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Waikato University experimented with appointing staff on fixed term contracts until the intervention of the A.U.T.N.Z. In the late 1980s, the U.G.C. ruled that
all universities would place new appointees on a three year fixed term contract, with tenure to be considered at the end of this period. With the demise of the U.G.C., the University of Canterbury dropped this requirement while Lincoln University retained it. Evidence also suggests that from 1982, a "secondary" labour market of non-tenured, non-unionized staff has expanded, very possibly at the expense of full time, tenured employment. Tenure, for those enjoying it at present, may come under new threats if the Employment Contracts Bill 1990 and the corporatization plan allegedly being considered by the present National government are implemented.

In terms of the organisation of authority within which academic work takes place, academic staff are still certainly better off now compared to the days of the affiliated university colleges where the lay-people of the University of New Zealand Senate and the college councils ruled supreme. However, the evidence suggests that the autonomy experienced by the academic profession during the 1960s and 1970s is being eroded. Certainly, control of the university system has become more centralised. The Minister of Education can, under the Education Amendment Act 1990, direct universities to discontinue courses of study, specify charters, appoint four members to university councils and can allocate resources within the university for his or her own purposes. Aspects of collegial control have also been reduced by virtue, for example, of the abolition the U.G.C. and the reduction of guarantied places for staff.
on university councils.

Furthermore, under the new legislation, mechanisms were developed for the systemic appraisal and evaluation of universities. In fact it would be true to say that at no other time in history has the university system been subject to as much systematic scrutiny from external bodies. Under the Education Amendment Act 1990, three bodies were established whose functions include those of monitoring and reviewing universities. The N.Z.Q.A., the E.R.O. and the Ministry of Education will all be involved in monitoring and regularly reviewing various aspects of university performance. The effective review of performance or output, according to the current administrative philosophy, requires a reduction of the hitherto vague or ambiguous goals (i.e., the "well rounded, responsible person") to those which are explicit and quantifiable. This may undermine goals of higher education which many academics have seen as important. The ambiguity and indeterminacy characteristic of much professional work, may also be reduced by such means as the making explicit of expectations, responsibilities and performance goals as is to be done for regular reviews of individual staff members at Massey University.

Prior to the 1990 election, the then spokes-person for the National party on education stated that universities, under a National government, would no longer come under the jurisdiction of the E.R.O. or the N.Z.Q.A. and also stated that the right for ministers to specify university charters would be abolished. However,
the universities may ultimately be worse off under the present National government.

Hints that the establishment of private institutions would be encouraged were made before the election, and considerations on the privatization of the university system appear to be occurring at present. These alleged considerations are said to involve the idea that sufficient funding would be made available for "efficient" universities, and that institutions that were not efficient should be allowed to fail. Under this new system, moreover, universities would set their own fees.

This last feature, in addition to allowing institutions other than the present universities to issue credentials, will break the monopoly held by the present universities over degree credentialing and thereby allow institutions to compete for students. Universities will have to become much more responsive to consumer demand, and tight funding may mean that staff will have to be placed on limited term contracts so that resources can be free to flow according to the ebb and flow of the market.

The "commodification" or privatisation of education will also have important implications for the goals of a university education that many academic staff hold paramount. This is because only research that has direct, immediate pay-offs for the private sector may be funded. Thus, while staff may still retain high degrees of day to day control over how they teach and research, what gets taught and researched may change substantially. This last possibility will obviously affect disciplines
in different ways. Certainly, the potential exists for the demise of certain disciplines under this new regime. But it may also encourage others. For example, while university administrators have often shown resistance to establishing courses on feminism or women's studies, they may, if student demand for such courses is high, view them with a more sympathetic eye.

Although, economic factors such as diminished salary levels and promotion prospects are currently being experienced by staff, it is evident that not much has changed at Canterbury University that has had a direct impact at a day to day level. This may well be different in other universities. Certainly, as noted above, Massey is introducing new staff appraisal measures and management structures are being reviewed at Lincoln University.

The fact that many of the changes under the Learning for Life program have not yet been truly established, and that under the new National government even more changes may be expected, places a significant limitation on the research. A second, more serious limitation, is the fact that interviews were limited to staff at the University of Canterbury. With more time and money, a broader, more accurate picture of the views of the New Zealand academic profession to changes in their work environment could be obtained.

The results that have been obtained suggest that, despite the fact that a significant number of staff were dissatisfied with promotions and teaching loads, most of
those interviewed appeared satisfied with the other economic aspects of their working lives (salaries and job security). Furthermore, most appeared to be satisfied with their ability to participate in departmental and university decision making. However, every informant stated that the A.U.T.N.Z. should engage in union type activities of protecting and negotiating pay and work conditions and many noted that this function was made all the more necessary in recent times. Support for union-type activities appeared to be a response both to recent, and the possibility of future, attacks by the State on economic and organisational conditions in the universities.

(5.3) CONCLUSION

The evidence suggests that although the degree to which the class situation of the academic profession has deteriorated is minor, it is nevertheless significant. Furthermore, there is the potential for it to deteriorate a great deal further. The A.U.T.N.Z. and its members have generally supported a trade union type response mainly, it appears, to arrest further downward movement. Certainly, it could hardly be argued that academic staff are now part of the working class. The salaries, promotion prospects, and degree of job security and work autonomy of academic staff, with the possible exception of those in the secondary labour market, are still well above average. To repeat the words of an informant, academic staff "are a very, very privileged group of
people." Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the academic profession will ever become part of the working class.

There are two reasons for believing that this will not occur. First, unless capitalism collapses completely, there will always be competition, not only between enterprises but also between countries, for certain fields of highly specialised, expert labour; the competitiveness of enterprises in the production of highly sophisticated goods and services demands this. Thus, it is likely that this may limit, for certain professional groups at least, any downward slide of economic conditions.

Furthermore, if academics and other professionals are free to maintain high degrees of expertise and to develop new knowledge through scholarship and research, then it is doubtful that their activities can ever be reduced to sets of routine operations which lend themselves to being evaluated, directed and monitored by management. This will place limits upon the deterioration of day to day organisational advantages enjoyed at present. The most that can happen is that academics may lose control over the objectives and direction of their work: what gets taught and what gets researched. According to Derber (1983), this situation reflects a type of proletarianization only experienced by professionals. While industrial workers lose control over what things get done and how they get done, professionals only lose control over what gets done.

The retention of high levels of expertise by the
academic profession may, I believe, have implications for the way in which academics, and the professions in general, are represented by their organisations. It is not likely that the A.U.T.N.Z. will totally dispense with its role as a professional association. Furthermore, it seems that many of its members would not want it to. This is because expertise confers authority and discretion. As long as this situation exists, the A.U.T.N.Z. will have good grounds for arguing that imposing too many restraints on professional autonomy will only do harm to its members' ability to serve.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.


N.Z.Q.A. - New Zealand Qualifications Authority.

C.C.D. - Culture of critical discourse.
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In the process of producing this thesis I have depended on help and advice from a number of people. I am grateful to Richard Porter, the assistant staffing registrar from the University of Canterbury, for providing data on promotions, student/staff ratios, and salaries. I would also like to thank Andie Fong Toy (of the A.U.T.N.Z.) for information on women in New Zealand universities; David Peters for help with the analysis of salary levels and the full-time/part-time composition of university staff; Bryan Peters, for valuable information on the civil engineering profession; James Reveley for his expeditious reading of the thesis in its final stages, the staff at Canterbury and Lincoln Universities for their frank discussions of university life and last, but not least, my supervisors: John Freeman-Moir, Michael A. Peters and Terry Austrin. Responsibility for the end product is, of course, mine.
APPENDIX I.

Salary levels for academic staff, for the years 1978 to 1990, were provided by the assistant staffing registrar of the University of Canterbury. In Table 2.1, the figures in the column below the subtitle "Low" refer to the lowest salary level in the assistant lecturers' scale. In the same table, the figures in the column below the subtitle "High" refer to the highest level in the professors' scale. The "Mean" is the product of the "Low" plus the "High" divided by two.

The figures for the average New Zealand weekly earnings were drawn from the New Zealand Official Yearbook (1988:449) for the years 1985 to 1986. For the years 1978 to 1985, figures were used from Wages and Earnings (1984-85). Although these data were published by the New Zealand Department of Statistics, the source in both instances was the Quarterly Employment Survey (QES) undertaken by the New Zealand Department of Labour. Criteria for the type of establishments surveyed are available in the New Zealand Official Year-book (1988:449). Figures on earnings for the years 1987 to 1989 were taken from the QES in Hot off the Press, (1989a) and figures for 1990 were taken from Key Statistics (Jan/Feb 1991). Because these most recent QES data have been calculated by the Department of Statistics using criteria slightly different to that of the Department of Labour, differences in Figure and Table 2.1 between 1986 and 1987 should be interpreted cautiously.
Figures for the consumer price index (CPI) were taken from Muldoon (1985:167) for the years 1978 and 1979. The CPI for the years 1980 to 1990 was taken from the Reserve Bank Bulletin, (1985a), (1985b), (1989) and (1990). Figures from Muldoon (1985) are for the years ending in December while the Reserve Bank figures are calculated for the year ending in March. Because each CPI from the Reserve Bank Bulletin is actually more representative of the year previous to that stated in the Bulletin, and in order that it be more compatible with Muldoon's (1985) data, each one has been interpreted as the CPI for the previous year. For example, according to the Reserve Bank, the CPI for the year ended March 1986 was 15.2%. This figure was interpreted as the CPI for 1985. (See Table 1 for raw data and conversion).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lowest level in assistant lecturers' scale</th>
<th>Average academic salary</th>
<th>Highest level in professors' scale</th>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Average New Zealand weekly earnings</td>
<td>Consumer price index</td>
<td>Conversion formula for CPI adjusting weekly earnings</td>
<td>CPI adjusted lowest level in asst. lectrs' scale</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>0.785</td>
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Table 1: Cont.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>CPI adjusted highest level in professors' scale</th>
<th>CPI adjusted N.Z. average weekly earnings</th>
<th>Indexed CPI adjusted lowest level in asst. lect. scale</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$340</td>
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<td>$144</td>
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<td>$330</td>
<td>$507</td>
<td>$144</td>
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**Table 1: Cont.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indexed CPI adjusted average</th>
<th>Indexed CPI adjusted highest level in professors' scale</th>
<th>Indexed CPI adjusted N.Z. average weekly wage</th>
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<tr>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1074</td>
<td>1071</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1086</td>
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<td>1128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>941</td>
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<td>1116</td>
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<tr>
<td>815</td>
<td>803</td>
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<td>1001</td>
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<td>1016</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1018</td>
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<td>930</td>
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<tr>
<td>881</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>981</td>
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<tr>
<td>866</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>981</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II.

The raw data for the University of Canterbury for staff vacancies, staff student ratios (Table 2), promotions of staff to senior lecturer and reader for the years 1980 to 1990 (Table 3), and the break down of staff by sex were supplied by the staffing registry of the University of Canterbury. (Caution must taken in interpreting trends in staff-student ratios between 1982 and 1983 because of a change at this time in the calculation of equivalent full-time students). The raw data for all universities for promotions from senior lecturer to reader were taken from the U.G.C. (1981) report on staffing (Table 4).
Table 2: Equivalent full-time student to staff ratio by year at the University of Canterbury.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Equivalent full-time student to staff ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>14.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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</table>
Table 3: Raw data for the number of those promoted from lecturer to senior lecturer and from senior lecturer to reader at the University of Canterbury by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Promotions from lecturer to senior lecturer</th>
<th>Promotions from senior lecturer to reader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: % successful of those senior lecturers applying for promotion to reader for all N.Z. universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% promoted from senior lecturer to reader</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX III.

All data are drawn from Education Statistics of New Zealand, (Vols. 1979-1989) and from Education Statistics of New Zealand (1990). (See Table 5 for raw data and conversion).
Table 5: Raw data for number of full-time teaching staff and part-time teaching assistants (with indexing.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Full-time teaching staff</th>
<th>Part-time teaching assistants</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>2129</td>
<td>541</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2278</td>
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<td>Indexed number of full-time teaching staff</td>
<td>Indexed number of part-time teaching staff</td>
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