

**Abridging the Tyranny of Distance:
European Union and New Zealand Security Cultures in
the Asia Pacific Region**

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Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.¹

Max Weber

¹ Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1991), 280.

Abstract

The rise in prominence of transregional security threats has heightened an awareness for an interdependent outlook on security threats, often requiring regional solutions to insure stability. The Asia Pacific security environment is not exempt from these security threats. Strategic challenges such as terrorism, environmental security or nuclear proliferation pervade the region and transcend its countries' borders. Amongst a myriad of regional security institutions and dialogues with a focus on the region, the sub-regional security dialogue between the European Union (EU) and New Zealand administers an effective contribution to stability in South East Asia and the Pacific. This thesis explores the volume of the EU and New Zealand security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. The amount of interaction that takes place and the quality of dialogue produced is analysed through constructivist and regionalist tenants; the security-focused identities of each agency is investigated and compared, in order to elucidate the 'reality' of the security-based consultation. It is argued that continual social and political interaction between the EU and New Zealand will formulate a specific security identity and encourage further stability and peace in the Asia Pacific region. Thus, the research question can be formulated as *what volume and form of cooperation exist between the European Union and New Zealand on security issues pertaining to the Asia Pacific region, and what efforts have been made to maintain, deepen and improve the relationship since 1999?*

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List of Abbreviations

ABC	ASEAN Biodiversity Centre
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AIA	ASEAN Investment Area
AMDA	Anglo-Malayan Defence Alliance
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ANZAC	Australia and New Zealand Army Corps
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand, Malaya
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institutes for Security and International Studies
ASEM	Asia European Meeting
CAEC	Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation
CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CHARM	Customs Heads of Administration Regional Meeting
CHODs	Chiefs of Defence Conference
COASI	Council's Working Group responsible for Asia and Oceania
COREU	CORespondence EUropéenne
CPDC	Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CTTF	Counter Terrorism Task Force
DAC	Development Cooperation Directorate
DFID	Department for International Development (British)
DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations


DSI	Defence Sustainability Initiative
EAS	East Asian Summit
EC	European Community
EEAS	External European Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zones
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPC	European Political Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
EUMP	EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUROPOL	European Law Enforcement Cooperation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
FRANZ	France, Australia and New Zealand
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAI	Initiative ASEAN Integration
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
ISEAS	Institute of South East Asian Studies
IUU	Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported fishing
JCLEC	Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MPIA	Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NICE	National Initiative for Civic Education
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NZ	New Zealand
NZAID	New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency
NZSIS	New Zealand Security Intelligence Service
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
OECD	Overseas Economic Cooperation and Development
PACER	Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations
PIC	Pacific Island Countries
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PILOM	Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting
PIRSTCS	Pacific Islands Regional Security Technical Cooperation Strategy
PRAN	Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru
PRPI	Pacific Regional Policing Initiative
PRIDE	Pacific Regional Initiatives for the Delivery of Basic Education
PSC	Project Steering Committees
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PTCCC	Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
READI	Regional EC ASEAN Dialogue Instrument
RNZAF	New Zealand's Royal Air Force
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEARCCT	South East Asian Regional Center for Counter Terrorism
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organisation
SOM	Senior Official political consultation Meeting
SPC	South Pacific Commission
SPCPC	South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference
STABEX	<i>Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation</i> [†]

[†] This is an acronym for the European Commission's compensatory finance scheme. An initiative designed to stabilize the export earnings of the ACP countries.

STAR	Secure Trade in the APEC Region
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach
TREATI	Trans-regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States (of America)
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Map of the European Union



Map of the Asia Pacific Region



1 Introduction: the New Zealand and the European Union Security Dialogue

Transregional security challenges pervade and threaten the Asia Pacific region, endangering neighbouring countries and distant regions. A number of threats including terrorism, global warming, illegal arms trade or nuclear proliferation, are challenges that transcend borders and infiltrate a majority of governments' threat perceptions. These common security threats warrant the need for regional solutions. Since the end of the Cold War perceptions on security have evolved: higher value has been placed on regional mechanisms to counter transregional threats, and a growing awareness of cultural differences has permeated into official dialogue. A number of initiatives, from a plethora of countries and regions, have been instigated to quell looming crises that threaten the wellbeing of regions, nations and the individual. Some of these schemes include interfaith dialogues, multilateral military exercises, and educational exchanges. Other, more direct dialogue takes place between influential states or regions such as the European Union (EU), China, Russia or the United States (US). These external agents can contribute to peace and stability, or enhance hostilities, depending on their approach and interests in the region. One particular locale of the regional security architecture, that has made considerable efforts to maintain peace in the region, is the sub-regional security dialogue between the EU and New Zealand (NZ). This consultation is characterised by an array of formal and informal diplomatic procedures, development cooperation and implicit military functions. These areas of collaboration are founded upon the 1999 EU-NZ Joint Declaration, which notes a desire "to enhance consultations on bilateral and international issues of mutual interest, including on the increasingly important Asia Pacific region and the growing role of the European Union."² References to security in the Declaration provide the pretext for this thesis: to elucidate what areas of security cooperation exist.

² The Europeans Commission's Delegation to New Zealand, *Joint Declaration on relations between the European Union and New Zealand*, (Strasbourg, 4 May 1999), preamble, <http://www.delaus.ec.europa.eu/nz/agreements.htm>.

As more emphasis is put on diplomatic procedures within a regional system, a major focus of this investigation will look at the socio-political configuration of an actor's identity and how this identity interacts within a regional or sub-regional system. This thesis will take a snapshot of two security identities and assess the interaction that takes place within the context of a specific locality. The European Union and New Zealand security identities will be analysed through a study of their dialogue mechanisms in the Asia Pacific region. Security can not be seen in isolation but is intimately connected with a myriad of variables such as social, economic or historical factors. These interests combine to produce a specific sub-regional identity. The European Union and New Zealand – two entities separated by distance and drawn together by common values – possess a unique relationship that can be reinforced by positive and productive security dialogue.


1.1 Methodology

This study explores the existing volume (independent variable) of regional security dialogue (dependent variable) between the European Union and New Zealand since 1999 in the Asia Pacific region. Although a considerable amount of scholarly work has been published on the EU as a global and normative power,³ little research has been conducted on the EU-NZ security relationship, resulting in this study assuming an acute pioneering characteristic. The research question can be formulated as *what volume and form of cooperation exist between the European Union and New Zealand on security issues pertaining to the Asia Pacific region, and what efforts have been made to maintain, deepen and improve the relationship since 1999?* In other words, the volume of cooperation (the amount of interaction that takes place) and the form of cooperation (the type and quality of interaction that occurs) evident in the EU-NZ security dialogue, will

³Some major authorities with a focus on Asia Pacific include Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, (New York: Routledge, 2006)., George Wiessala, *Re-orienting the Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations* (England: Ashgate Pub., 2006)., Georg Wiessala, *The European Union and Asian Countries* (London; New York: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002)., Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal, and Jusuf Wanandi, *Europe and the Asia Pacific* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 107-34., Jürgen Rüländ "The European Union as an Inter-and Trans regional Actor: Lessons for Global Governance from Europe's Relations with Asia," *The National Europe Centre research paper* no. 13 (2002).

be explored by analysing the security cultures that exist and how they interact. Therefore, in order to effectively answer the research question the separate security cultures of the EU and New Zealand must first be examined. After determining what exists, the similarities and differences inherent in the security cultures can be examined; this will provide an indication as to what the current level (or quality) of security dialogue is and how it can be improved.

The following Figure (1.1) illustrates the logic of the thesis by describing the particular sections of the thesis and how they interrelate. Section 'A' is the primary area of interest, namely the cross-over of EU and New Zealand security cultures in the Asia Pacific region. As the diagram clearly demonstrates, the dependent variable (A) is connected to a number of similar sections that exert a considerable amount of influence over it. Consequently, this thesis will examine the surrounding areas to determine the core question, in particular, areas 'i,' 'ii,' 'B' and 'C' as these sections are most closely linked to section 'A.'



Key

- A: NZ-EU Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific Region
- B: New Zealand Security Culture in the Asia Pacific Region
- C: EU Security Culture in the Asia Pacific Region
- i: Asia Pacific Region
- ii: EU-NZ security cooperation outside of the Asia Pacific region

Figure 1.1: Primary Sections of Interest in the EU-NZ Security Dialogue

A number of primary and secondary sources are examined in order to determine the existing volume of regional security dialogue between the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region. Primary sources include 10 elite interviews, official documents, speeches, and archival material from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). Academic articles, journals and books, including a number of other secondary resources, are used to establish a firm context around which the EU-NZ security dialogue can be properly examined and to acquire a balanced view of the research material. As this study is largely exploratory, there is no need for an exhaustive literature review. In its place, secondary material on Asia Pacific security, and New Zealand and EU security efforts in the Asia Pacific region, is contextualised and made apparent throughout the thesis. It is well understood that biases exist when only a limited number of primary sources are examined. However, by using a variety of different primary and secondary sources the weight of biases is reduced, although never eradicated.

Part of this research is based on qualitative interviews that were conducted with a number of officials directly or indirectly involved with security in the Asia Pacific region. The officials were chosen by their title and vocation. The interviewees principally consisted of European Union officials from the Commission and the Parliament, the Commission's Delegation representatives, European diplomats, New Zealand diplomats, a Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) director, New Zealand politicians connected to Foreign Affairs and personnel from the New Zealand Ministry of Defence. The interviews went from 45 minutes in length to 1 hour and 45 minutes (see Table 1.1); they were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The records of the interviews have also been retained. While the number of officials interviewed was small, limiting the validity of the research, the interviewees provided a valuable and unique source of information. The interviews were 'semi-structured,' which means a set of questions – reviewed and accepted by the University of Canterbury's Ethics Committee⁴ - were prepared as suitable

⁴ Email correspondence with Chair of the Ethics Committee at the University of Canterbury, 21 August 2006.

guidelines for the interviews. The questions were designed to gain an understanding of what security-related consultation processes exist and how culture-based processes influence their decision-making capacity. Due to the nature of the topic, some preferred

Table 1.1: Interview Population

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>On Record</u>
8 November 2006.	*	1 hour	No
20 November 2006	Brussels	1 hour	Yes
8 December 2006.	Brussels	1 hour 10 minutes	Yes
18 April 2007	Wellington	1 hour 45 minutes	Yes**
18 April 2007	Wellington	45 minutes	Yes
16 April 2007	Wellington	1 hour	Yes**
16 April 2007	Wellington	1 hour	Yes
17 April 2007	Wellington	1 hour	Yes
19 April 2007	Wellington	1 hour	No
19 April 2007	Wellington	1 hour	No

* *Location concealed at the request for confidentiality*

** *The interviewee chose to talk informally after the interview process*

to be off-record (see Table 1.1). This provided for greater flexibility and less sensitivity in what was said, but could only be indirectly used in the thesis for contextual purposes. In relation to this, all interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality.⁵ Overall, the interviews were seen as a positive process that provided new and challenging information that could be used to further enhance the EU-NZ relationship and contribute to a more stable environment in the Asia Pacific region.

The researcher has encountered a number of limitations that, for various reasons, have altered the original course of the thesis. Access to New Zealand's MFAT archives that pertained to security in the Asia Pacific region and to the EU-NZ security dialogue was embargoed. Archives that were available and relevant to the research topic consisted of EU-NZ aid related material, which restricted the researcher's ability to properly analyse the EU-NZ security relationship. Other primary documentation relevant to EU and New Zealand security in the Asia Pacific region was also very limited. In addition to

⁵ All interview data is referenced with the date of interview and general location of the interviewee only.

limitations created by the small number of interviews, the ‘quality’ of the participants can be questioned. It could be argued that some practitioners or officials, such as NGO representatives or politicians, are not in a direct decision-making capacity and, consequently, are not suitable to be interviewed. While this is true to a certain extent, the nature of this thesis is exploratory, which aims to discover what exists as its primary objective. From this perspective, the interviews were valuable and while not all officials interviewed were making the decisions, they certainly contribute to the process. This study does not conduct an in-depth analysis of EU Member States’ security initiatives in the Asia Pacific region, nor does this thesis explore the economic aspects of the relationship. The attention of the thesis is primarily focused on regional security relations in South East Asia and the Pacific and not on EU-NZ security relations outside of this region.⁶

It is envisioned that this thesis will produce a viable contribution to a range of academic and governmental sectors. From a theoretical perspective, constructivism will be tested through the use of empirical data and theoretical adoptions (see Chapter 2). Pragmatically, this thesis will contribute to the development of knowledge for decision makers in New Zealand, the EU and other regions. More precisely, it is hoped that the information revealed through this study will aid in positive and concise policy formation. Lastly, it is anticipated that by advancing the field of enquiry in EU-NZ relations, further study of dialogue mechanisms can be encouraged.

1.2 Chapter Outline

In connection to the research question, the chapters are divided into separate areas that reflect the above methodological system (see Figure 1.1). The second chapter (‘Theoretical Framework’) applies constructivist and regionalist theories to the research question. This will help to elucidate the research question and define the parameters of the topic. This section also questions the idea of what security is and how it is

⁶ It should be noted that these areas are analysed in this thesis, but only in how this related to the EU-NZ security relationship.

conceptualised by practitioners and officials who deal with regional security. The third chapter ('Regional Security in the Asia Pacific Region') provides a succinct overview of the current security situation in South East Asia and the Pacific, provides an overview of the main regional security institutions and defines how the region perceives security. This section limits its description to regional security and explores the cultural values that underpin security initiatives and diplomatic practices in the region.⁷ The fourth chapter ('European Union and New Zealand Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific') describes the current EU-NZ security dialogue systems. Both direct and indirect avenues are explored where the EU and New Zealand cooperate on security issues pertaining to the Asia Pacific region. Additionally, chapter 4 illustrates the key socio-political links that form the basis of the dialogue, provides empirical data on how practitioners in the field perceive the importance of the cooperative relationship, outlines what issues are prioritised in the dialogue and what outcomes have resulted from the various consultation processes. While providing a succinct overview of the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region, this chapter does not provide an adequate explanation of the individual security-related perceptions of the EU and New Zealand. Consequently, the following three chapters question the specific security culture of each agency in order to form a more sophisticated analysis of the socio-political construction of the dialogue.⁸ Chapters 5 and 6 ('New Zealand's Security-Identity in the Asia Pacific Region' and 'The European Union's Security-Identity in the Asia Pacific Region') look at the historical perceptions, internal politics, concepts of security, geographical perceptions, normative values, and capabilities of the EU and New Zealand. In other words, the security cultures – made up of a unique selection of socio-political factors – of both parties are analysed.⁹ The seventh chapter ('A Comparative Analysis of the European Union's and New Zealand's Security Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region') looks at the EU and New Zealand security cultures to determine the current volume of security dialogue and how the consultation processes may be enhanced. This is done by examining four areas that affect the dialogue, namely definitions of security, geographic perceptions, normative

⁷ See section (i) in Figure 1.1.

⁸ See section 'A' and (ii) in Figure 1.1.

⁹ See section 'B' and 'C' of Figure 1.1. In regard to the 'unique selection of socio-political factors,' see Figure 2.1.

interests and capabilities.¹⁰ The conclusion outlines the main findings from this thesis and provides some ideas for future initiatives based on the research.

¹⁰ See section 'A' in Figure 1.1

2 Theoretical Framework

Albert Einstein succinctly noted that it “is the theory that decides what can be observed.”¹¹ While theoretical frames limit the course of explorative study, they also help to define and explain a particular subject area. This chapter describes two primary theories, namely constructivism and regionalism. These theoretical approaches will be used to help elucidate and discover reasons for the current state of affairs in the EU-NZ security relationship. In addition, understanding what security means from a theoretical perspective is analysed in order to add depth and further refine the parameters of this thesis.

2.1 A Constructivist and Regionalist Approach

*We construct worlds we know in a world we do not.*¹²

Nicholas Onuf

The theoretical ideas associated with regionalism and constructivism will be used together in order to establish a better understanding of the EU-NZ security dialogue in the context of the Asia Pacific region. Constructivism is intertwined with key concepts, such as reflectivism, social learning and identity building, while regionalism provides adequate parameters within which constructivist tendencies can be sufficiently analysed. A similar approach in the study of international relations has been used by Julie Gilson in her economic analysis of the biennial Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).¹³ Indeed, many of the theoretical foundations used in this paper are attributed to Gilson’s conceptual approach to inter-regionalism. Other influential scholars in the field of either regionalist or constructivist thought include Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Jürgen Rüländ,

¹¹ Thinkexist.com, “Theory Quotes: Albert Einstein,” <http://thinkexist.com/quotations/theory/>.

¹² Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of our making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 38.

¹³ Julie Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe: Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting* (Cheltenham; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Pub., 2002).

Friedrich Kratochwil, and Ralf Roloff.¹⁴ This paper will also contribute to the theoretical field of constructivism and regionalism through the use of new empirical data and succinct analysis, which will strengthen its status as an international relations theory. Obtaining a precise understanding of what constructivism and regionalism are and how they function is imperative to the foundations of this thesis and its theoretical constructs. Consequently, the following sections are split into constructivist and regionalist sections.

Constructivism

The use of constructivism, as the binding theoretical concept for this thesis, will aid in determining why security dialogue between New Zealand and the EU exists, how this discourse might be maintained and possibly improved in the future. These aims can be achieved by examining EU and New Zealand perspectives on security and the volume of socialisation involved by conducting interviews with officials and examining other primary resources. Constructivism provides a succinct frame within which an analysis of dialogue mechanisms can be achieved. Understanding the concepts of constructivism provides the researcher with the appropriate tools, and establishes logical parameters, to make sense of an otherwise complicated set of phenomena.¹⁵

Contra realism, constructivist theory creates an alternative view of international relations by questioning the fundamental principles of mainstream political theory. Concepts such as anarchy, self-help, the balance of power, the interplay between identity and interest and the understanding of power, are all questioned by constructivist thought. The nature

¹⁴ See Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005)., Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Critical Perspectives on World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996)., Heiner Hanggi, Jürgen Rüländ, and Ralf Roloff, *Inter-regionalism and International Relations a Stepping Stone to Global Governance?* (Oxfordshire: Routledge Curzon, 2005)., Jürgen Rüländ, "Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11, no. 1 (2006): 45-63., Jürgen Rüländ, "Inter- and Transregionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda," *National Europe Centre Paper* no. 35 (2002)., J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004)., Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge Studies in International Relations; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999)., Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organisation* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

¹⁵ For a comprehensive discussion on the paradigmatic formulation and application of theory see James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (London, New York: Pinter; Nichols, 1980).

of constructivism is multifaceted; it covers a diverse range of factors including the application of knowledge, identities, culture, ideology, language and discourse.¹⁶ This paper will focus on what are arguably the two most important factors contributing to constructivist theory, namely socialisation and identity formation. Inter-subjectivity and subjective notions are connected with these two factors. The former equates to social interaction between people as opposed to subjectivity, which refers to a cognitive process that is internally manifested. Although specific definitions can vary, this paper will assume that constructivism is a conceptual framework, within which an analysis of the cognitive nature of agencies and their identities formulate an explanation of international processes. In other words, constructivism posits that common ideals, established through social learning, will construct decision makers' ideas and interests.¹⁷ Unlike the realist paradigm – which holds that material forces and nature are the major determinants in defining ideas and interests – constructivism assumes reflectivist tendencies which are involved with understanding the subjective nature of agents.¹⁸ Analysing the EU and New Zealand through a constructivist lens attempts to divert away from the idea of 'actorness' and move closer to viewing the parties in how they are "thought to relate to the world system."¹⁹ Constructivism does not deny all neorealist or neoliberal concepts, but redefines the way these concepts are understood and illuminates factors sidelined by rationalists. By analysing the 'process' rather than the 'structural system' a different conceptual frame is formed.²⁰ Wendt clearly expresses this sentiment as, "we are what we are by how we interact rather than being what we are regardless of how we interact."²¹ This clearly demonstrates the flexible nature of identities and the construction of perceived reality that contribute to a process that constructivism attempts to explain.

¹⁶ Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 177.

¹⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 1.

¹⁸ See John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 242-5.

¹⁹ Ben Rosamond, "The EU Model of Governance in World Politics," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no. 4 (2005): 478. NB: This quote is specifically centred on the EU and not New Zealand.

²⁰ Baylis and Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics : An Introduction to International Relations*, 5.

Also see Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 181.

²¹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 393-4.

The specific identity formula that international actors possess at a given point in time will affect relationships and, consequently, the decisions they make (see Figure 1.1).²² A particular identity formulation is influenced by subjectivity, which explores the concept of how the social theories we create in order to understand the international system actually construct the social world in which we live.²³ This cognitive aspect creates perceptions, which in turn contributes to forming particular identities. Unlike realism, which defines its interest in terms of power balancing, the subjective nature of constructivism argues that states define their interest through what they perceive. In other words, if a state sees itself as contributing toward a ‘balanced paradigm’ – a realist concept – the decisions the corresponding states make will be directly conditioned by their particular understanding of how the international system works. Subsequently, this perception will also shape their identity as an international actor. For example, if New Zealand decision makers accept the so called ‘small state theory,’²⁴ either sub-consciously or consciously the decisions and actions they take will be determined by this perceived reality. This fundamental aspect is explained by Smith as:

[i]dentities and interests that rationalists take as given and which they see as resulting in the international politics we observe are not in fact given but are things we have created. Having created them we could create them otherwise; it would be difficult because we have all internalised the ‘way the world is,’ but we could make it otherwise.²⁵

Consequently, we find that power is not only found in materialism but also in ideas.²⁶ Unlike realism, which brackets the notion that ideas affect foreign policy, this study posits that ideas, norms, values and identities influence actors’ perceived reality, and consequently, the decisions they make.

²² The ‘Socio-Cultural Milieu’ depicted in Figure 2.1 contains a variety of examples that combine to create specific identities at a given point in time. See also Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 187.

²³ Reflectivist theory is a major subjective component to constructivism. Reflexism explores the concept of how the social theories we create in order to understand the international system actually construct the social world in which we live. See Baylis and Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 227.

²⁴ See Richard Kennaway and John T. Henderson, *Beyond New Zealand* (Auckland, New Zealand: Longman Paul, 1991), 3-17.

²⁵ Smith and Baylis, *The Globalisation of World Politics : An Introduction to International Relations*, 244.

²⁶ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 177.

Social learning lies at the heart of constructivist theory; it is through a process of cognitive exchange that common ideas can be forged and stability produced. Gilson argues that the “process of interaction itself has the potential to affect both the nature and constituents of that interaction”,²⁷ which can be both cognitive and physical. However, there are certain limits to the amount of cooperation, which is directly related to the different actors’ identities and past socialisation. Other intervening variables also affect the volume of socialisation such as time constraints, choice of venue, frequency of meetings or influences stemming from the international environment (see ‘Intervening Variables’ Figure 2.1).²⁸ Despite these variables, continual interaction between different states or regions will construct a (sub) regional identity, which in turn creates stability and enhances the prospects for continual dialogue.²⁹ Consequently, it is through social learning that a separate identity is forged, contributing to the deepening of a particular relationship.³⁰

Figure 2.1 illustrates the process of when two agencies, with separate socio-cultural factors, interact with one another and how the process of socialisation can encourage common interests. ‘Agency A’ represents the EU and ‘Agency B’ represents New Zealand. Both of these agencies have a unique identity, made up of a collection of socio-cultural and socio-political identity markers (socio-cultural milieu). The exact nature of these identities, at one point in time, is determined by the weight of importance or priority each individual identity marker has in a particular setting. When these separate identities interact with one another (inter-subjectivity) differences and similarities are exposed. During continual interaction a separate sub-regional identity is created and re-created over time, which can reduce distrust and enhance similarities. As already noted, the separate identities of the EU and New Zealand will be explored in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, while chapter 7 will look at the interaction that takes place during the EU-NZ security dialogue.

²⁷ Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting*, 15.

²⁸ Mario Telò, *Europe, a civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 128.

²⁹ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 188-9.

³⁰ See Figure 2.2, which demonstrate how socialisation contributes to regional identity.




Figure 2.1: Constructivist process to be applied to the European Union and New Zealand sub-regional dialogue

Constructivism analyses the subjective understanding of actors in an inter-subjective environment. Through the construction of identities, socialisation between agencies takes place, which is limited or enhanced by perceptions.³¹ These perceptions create parameters in which the mind operates and creates its own reality; outside of these parameters lies ultimate truth. We, therefore, live in a world of ambiguous and illusory constructs which we endeavour to make sense of, while the ultimate truth continues to be untouched.³² By analysing the perceptions actors have, a theoretical framework can be formed and further strengthened by regionalism.

³¹ Perceptions, in this case, can also be related to what actors prioritise within their ‘socio-cultural milieu:’ see Figure 2.1.

³² This concept can be traced to the works of Plato, who stated in his ‘simile of the cave’ that “the capacity for knowledge is innate in each man’s mind, and that the organ by which he learns is like an eye which cannot be turned from the darkness.” Desmond Lee, trans., *The Republic* (London, England: Penguin Books, 2003), 245.

Regionalism

As a theoretical concept the idea of regionalism, or more accurately ‘new-regionalism,’ questions traditional understandings of international relations theory.³³ Instead of looking at the international spectrum as a system made up of independent states in an atmosphere of anarchy and self-help, regionalism places less emphasis on borders and greater importance on the interdependent nature of states.³⁴ It is expedient to adopt regionalism as a conceptual tool because it provides an avenue of insight and clarity into the complexities involved in international relations. Regionalism simplifies the field of enquiry and establishes firm parameters within which an analysis can be formed. Furthermore, by understanding how regions are formed and how they operate provides a valuable insight into the sub-regional and regional relationships shared by the EU and New Zealand. This thesis will examine the security relationship present in regional fora, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), and sub-regional relationships, such as the biannual high level meetings between the EU Troika and NZ officials. This study will adopt a regionalist perspective, which will help define and elucidate regional and state interaction in the international system.

It is assumed in this thesis that a region exists of “socially created entities that take on meaning and importance because states [usually] perceive themselves as cohabiting a common area and sharing a common future.”³⁵ It should be noted that the above insertion deviates from the original meaning of the quote because the assumption that regional interaction is confined to geographical proximities is invalid. This study supports an understanding that regionalism and globalisation reduces the importance of geo-politics in an international system. For example, a heightened focus on non-conventional security

³³ Rüländ, “Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism,”⁴⁶. Also see Telò, *Europe, a civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order*, 127. NB: ‘New Regionalism’ is associated with the emerging multilateral systems in Asia (the term regionalism and ‘new regionalism’ will be used synonymously throughout this thesis).

³⁴ Hanggi, Rüländ and Roloff, *Inter-regionalism and International Relations a Stepping Stone to Global Governance?* 277.

³⁵ David Lake and Patrick Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 11-12. For a deeper look into the different concepts of a region see William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory,” *International Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1973): 89-117.

issues creates interdependence between countries of no particular geo-political proximity. This is most obvious in an inter-regional security institution known as the ARF, which has Canadian, European and New Zealand membership. Gilson limits her analyses to a ‘region to region’³⁶ basis (inter-regionalism), discounting other variables such as a ‘region to state’ (sub-regional) interaction. This thesis does not discredit Gilson’s theoretical framework, but builds on her approach to inter-regionalism by developing a sub-regional analysis. Regions must also be understood as dynamic entities that change in function or form depending on how actors “view themselves and each other within...the process of interaction”³⁷ amongst a plethora of other international mechanisms that fit outside the regional frame.

Similar to the diverse definitions surrounding regions, understanding the meaning of regionalism can also be puzzling.³⁸ Most scholars have adopted a form of ‘defensive regionalisation,’ which posits region-building as a product of or a reaction to globalisation.³⁹ However, Gilson effectively uses inter-regionalism as a theoretical tool to aid in understanding the relations between the EU and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), albeit from an economic perspective. Gilson surpasses the mainstream assumptions associated with regionalism by analysing the social dimensions within regions as a precondition to region-building. Consequently, a constructivist typology is applied to an inter-regional framework, which adds depth to the field of enquiry. Using constructivist thought, regionalism can be defined as “a way to build and solidify regional collective identities.”⁴⁰

³⁶ Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting*, 19.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 11.

³⁸ NB: This should not be confused with regionalisation, which is a ‘bottom up’ process concerned with non-State actors. For more on the definition of regionalism or regionalisation see: Hanggi, Rüländ and Roloff, *Inter-regionalism and International Relations a Stepping Stone to Global Governance?* 4.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 6-7. Other major authorities who have used inter-regionalism as an international relations theory, with a special focus on the ASEAN-EU dialogue include, Bernhard Dahm and Wolfgang Harbrecht, *ASEAN und die europäische Gemeinschaft: Partner, Probleme, Perspektiven* (Hamburg: Deutsches Übersee-Institut, 1988)., Barbara Dreis-Lampen, *ASEAN und die Europäische Union: Bestandsaufnahme und Neubewertung der inter-regionalism Beziehungen* (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1998)., Christopher M. Dent, *The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship* (London: Routledge 1999)., Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting*.

⁴⁰ Hanggi, Rüländ, and Roloff, *Inter-regionalism and International Relations a Stepping Stone to Global Governance?* 219.

Through social interaction within regional fora it is presumed that a separate, regional identity is formed (see Figure 2.2). Gilson argues that regional “institutions may establish mechanisms for interaction through which participants define and redefine their own identities.”⁴¹ Thus it is through a process of interaction in a confined arena, such as regional institutions, that identities can evolve. However, the amount of interaction is also determined by the weight of importance that is given to the identity formation. For example, if an actor decides to focus on one particular identity marker within a socio-cultural milieu the amount of socialisation and depth of an attainable regional identity may be severely diminished depending on the corresponding agencies’ perceptions.⁴² The manufactured perception(s) or identity of an actor will affect their actions and decisions: if an actor accepts multiple identity markers within the socio-cultural milieu, there is a higher probability that greater connections can be made between the two agencies, increasing the potential for an improved dialogue. Furthermore, identity formation is not limited to interaction within a region but is also formed from past experiences, domestic concerns and history, which also shape and form identities (see Figure 2.1).⁴³ For this reason, this thesis will also examine the formation of identities and the historic pursuit of security relations in order to grasp a deeper understanding of the current perceived identities of each international actor.

Figure 2.2 illustrates the process of continual interaction between New Zealand and the EU. Through socialisation (see box i), identities are conditioned by a process of social learning and knowledge-sharing (see box ii). This can be influenced by external authorities such as epistemic communities or other regional security institutions. These processes contribute to the formation of a sub-regional security-identity (see box iii.a) and will continually evolve as new information and altered individual identities are inserted into the equation. Consequently, the decisions that are made, within the dialogue

⁴¹ Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting*, 17. From Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 17. And Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 4 (1999): 545.

⁴² For more on the positive and negative aspects of multiple identities see Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 175-6. Also see Figure 2.1: an identity marker can be any particular factor, such as language, that helps to define an identity.

⁴³ Smith and Baylis, *The Globalisation of World Politics : An Introduction to International Relations*, 245.

system, will be influenced from the collective interest formed through the sub-regional security-identity (see box iv).




Figure 2.2: Flow Chart of Constructivist processes within a Regional System

This thesis wrestles with the idea of collective interests being formed from a regional identity. The ultimate expression of constructivism would likely entail decisions being made from the formation of collective interests as apposed to self interest. Proving the socio-political impetus behind decision-making is problematic. However, this study attempts to elucidate the connection between inter-subjectivity and collective interests by analysing the identities of the EU and New Zealand within a sub-regional system. This will contribute to a part of the solution, but does not attempt to make a direct link between collective interest and decision making, which is essentially the next theoretical step.

Regionalism not only provides an appropriate lens into the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific, but it is also in itself a theoretical tool, which contributes to understanding the evolving nature of the EU and NZ security relationship. Regional security institutions also act as social forums where political elites can transfer ideas and knowledge, contributing to stable and evolving multilateral fora. Indeed, this is not dissimilar to the theoretical concepts associated with constructivism.

Constructivist and Regionalist Theory

Constructivism combined with regionalism reinforces the notion that interdependent states will cooperate together to form common ideas, which in turn produces stability.⁴⁴ Although constructivism will often portray interdependence in a positive light, it also has the ability to form a negative construct. Depending on the identity formation of a particular agent, the socialisation process can highlight the differences apparent between the two agencies, which can create an environment of distrust and animosity.⁴⁵ Regionalism and inter-subjective dynamics between actors create an environment of interdependence. This can equate to “vulnerability and the risk of being ‘the sucker,’ which, if exploited, will become a source of conflict rather than cooperation.”⁴⁶ However, constructivism combined with regionalism limits the effect of the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ – a hypothetical ‘zero-sum’ game – by advocating that social networks reduce distrust. However, this is dependent on a number of variables. It is vital for the future wellbeing of states to maintain a long-term perspective and collective identity with other states, as this reduces uncertainty. Thus, regional orders not only provide a social forum but also create an atmosphere of insurance against the negative outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma. This concept is reflected in Ted Hopf’s account of constructivism where he mentions that constructivism makes uncertainty a variable to understand, rather than a constant to

⁴⁴ See Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 178. For an in depth discussion on social learning and the relationship between power and knowledge see Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations, Studies in International Political Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 587. Also see Figure 2.2.

⁴⁵ Rüländ, “Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant,” 47.

⁴⁶ Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 416. Also see Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting*, p.15.

assume.⁴⁷ This social construct changes the way a problem is considered, which in some instances can change the problem itself. With this in mind, by combining constructivist notions with regionalism, understanding how a segment of the international system functions becomes more transparent and reduces the vulnerability of being a ‘sucker.’ This paper argues that regional institutions heighten the potential for increased social learning, which reduces the importance of realist notions such as ‘systems’ or geopolitics within the structure of the international system. Furthermore, constructivist theory combined with regionalist ideas also heightens the effect collective cogitation has in determining how regions and inter-regional institutions evolve. Perhaps this is why Hopf boldly stated that “the inter-subjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning.”⁴⁸

2.2 Defining Security

Defining what security threats mean for EU and New Zealand officials and understanding the theoretical nature of security is essential for a succinct analysis to be undertaken. The word ‘security’ is a term so often heard that it has become desensitised and hard to define. When we talk about security, what do we mean? Entering into the scholarly debate about ‘widening’ or ‘narrowing’ creates a conceptual lens through which a transpicuous concept of security can be formed. Traditional theorists adhere to the narrow view, which encompasses a realist understanding of security. The narrow perspective will often place military conflict or political authority as the epicentre of security conceptualisation. Ole Wæver defines traditionalist theory as the “phenomenon of war and...‘the study of threat, use, and control of military force.’”⁴⁹ Major scholarly authorities who adhere to this perspective include Colin Gray, Richard Lebow and John Chipman.⁵⁰ On the other side of the spectrum, scholars such as Barry Buzan, Richard

⁴⁷ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 188.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 175.

⁴⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998), 1-5.

⁵⁰ Colin S. Gray, “New Directions for Strategic Studies: How Can Theory Help Practice?” *Security Studies* 1, no. 4 (1992): 610-635., John Chipman, “The future of strategic Studies: Beyond Grand Strategy,” *Survival* 34, no. 1 (1992): 109-131., Richard N. Lebow, “Interdisciplinary Research and Future of Peace and Security Studies,” *Political Psychology* 9, no. 3 (1988): 507-543. In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 3.

Ullman, Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre or Weaver hold that a wider understanding of security should be conceptualized, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union.⁵¹

The idea of ‘widening’ was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s when economic, environmental and identity issues, coupled with an increase in transnational crime, emphasised the need to redefine security.⁵² A vast number of articles and books were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which held that a wider perspective on security was needed. Indeed, Helene Sjursen stated that “security is something other than, or something in addition to, military force.”⁵³ Traditionalists fought back, arguing that the political and intellectual significance of attaching the word ‘security’ to other policy areas would be damaging by stating that widening “elevates security into a kind of universal good thing”⁵⁴ by diluting its original importance.

This thesis will define security as wide: it accepts that non-conventional security concerns are active in the international arena, while also maintaining that military force has a role to play. In addition to a wide conception of security, a constructivist approach will also be applied. ‘Widening’ weakens the meaning of security because it accepts all phenomena as security, creating a perplexing construct. In order to remedy this problem a concept entitled ‘interchangeable precedence’ will be adopted. This re-conceptualises how one looks at security by positing that while a wide range of issues may be labelled a ‘security problem’, the security issues are, nevertheless, confined to the perception of the political actors within a decision-making body. In other words, security issues will fall and rise in prominence depending on the political situation in a confined timeframe. This means, for example, military force or environmental security are only as important as the

⁵¹ The sudden failure of communism and its repercussions in the international system has been hard for realists to convincingly explain, exposing room for other theories to become more established. Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” *International Security* 8, no. 1 (1983): 129-153., Jahn Egbert, Pierre Lemaitre, and Ole Weaver, “Concepts of Security: Problem of Research on Non-Military Aspects,” *Copenhagen Papers* no. 1 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987). In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 2.

⁵² Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1-5.

⁵³ Frédéric Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no. 4 (2005): 523.

⁵⁴ Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degredation and National Security,” *Millennium* 19, no. 3 (1990): 441-473. In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security : A New Framework for Analysis*, 4.

social or political climate that they exist in. Indeed, this sentiment reflects Jörn Dosch's conceptualisation of security, which states that "[s]ecurity is not the product of any predictable rules, [but] depends on individual threat perceptions, differs greatly according to an actor's status and position within the international system and, most importantly, is subject to interpretation."⁵⁵ It is vital to maintain an approach to the definition of security that recognises security issues as dynamic entities.

Security concerns will change in precedence depending on an assortment of variables, which frequently relate to the application of knowledge and technology. It is widely understood by constructivists that, through the application of knowledge and technology, epistemic communities are able to communicate and influence decision makers in regional fora or states; perspectives change through understanding (see Figure 2.2). Perhaps this is why Hopf stated: "choices are rigorously constrained by the webs of understanding of the practice, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical contexts."⁵⁶ However, the way knowledge is exercised by actors is determined by the application of wisdom.⁵⁷ An example of how security concepts have interchangeable precedence can be observed by analysing the security culture of the Cold War in comparison to contemporary security concerns. The Cold War was characterised by a 'balance of powers,' prioritising military force as a major security concern. However, the current security culture is more complex; globalisation, interdependence and changing perspectives from an increase in 'knowledge' mean economic security, human security or even environmental security will sometimes take precedence over military-focused threat perceptions. This does not mean other security issues are of no concern, only that the political 'opportunity cost' of security issues will determine how actors prioritise and decide on the most pressing security issue in a particular political environment. This line of thought is most closely reflected in Frédéric Charillon's statement: "[i]n a world characterized by interdependence and exchange, the building of a

⁵⁵ Jörn Dosch, "Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-Regionalism," *Asia Europe Journal* 1, no. 4 (2003): 483. This is not dissimilar to Buzan's security conceptualisation, 'conditions of existence.' See Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security", *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991): 433.

⁵⁶ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 177.

⁵⁷ See Peter M. Haas, "When Does Power Listen to Truth? A Constructivist Approach to the Policy Process," *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 4 (2004): 569-92.

secure regional milieu in a safe international system has become more important than the control of new territories and resources.”⁵⁸ Thus, in contemporary security relations, more emphasis is put on non-conventional security concerns, while traditional aspects of security have taken a step back.

Interchangeable precedence is also dependent on actual or perceived capabilities. The old saying, “if the only instrument you have is a hammer all your problems start looking like a nail”⁵⁹ is a relevant analogy for analysing the capability structures of regional or state security. If a region adopts a wide view of security, a greater number of instruments are needed to fulfil the requirements that non-conventional security issues create. This will give international security cultures greater flexibility in assessing security risks and threats. Conversely, the instruments needed may also create a negative response from actors due to limited financial or institutional resources. In other words, a wide view of security fosters complexity and increases the potential of limited civilian or military capabilities, often referred to as the ‘capabilities-expectations gap.’⁶⁰ However, in realising the capabilities-expectations gap and the increasing complexity of non-conventional security, regional groups or states – who share a similar concept of security – will intensify cooperation to manage contemporary security environments. The increasing complexity of transnational security will limit any alternative, other than cooperation, to maintain international stability.

Although a definition of security has been established, identifying the security conceptualisations that regions and nations hold is equally significant. Through establishing a succinct understanding of the nature of security, this study can confidently analyse the various definitions of security other agents have and how their definitions

⁵⁸ Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” 522.

⁵⁹ Steven Everts and Gary Schmitt, “Is military power still the key to international security?” *NATO Review* (Winter 2002): 17.

⁶⁰ See Bretherton and Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 206. See also Jolyon Howorth, “From Security to Defense: The evolution of the CFSP,” in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 179-204.

affect the international process.⁶¹ From a constructivist perspective, how states and regions define security will have implications on the depth of cooperation. For example, the EU and ASEAN held “[c]onflicting views on non-traditional security issues... [which] had been the most serious intervening variable in Europe-East Asia relations throughout the 1990s.”⁶² This illustrates the potency of ideas and how they can enhance or inhibit relations within and between regions and nations.

⁶¹ A personal definition of security means one can analyse other definitions with greater accuracy, while at the same time being aware one’s own bias.

⁶² Dosch, “Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-Regionalism,” 485.

3 Regional Security in the Asia Pacific Region

Drug trafficking, transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, illegal arms trade and immigration are major security concerns threatening the Asia Pacific region.⁶³ These security challenges combined with poor governance, high levels of corruption, inadequate education and low living standards have established an increasingly unstable environment, encouraging serious inter-state conflict and possible terrorist activities. Analysing the Asia Pacific security culture through the lenses of constructivism and regionalism reveals a complex network of perspectives from which a specific security-identity is formed.⁶⁴ The EU and New Zealand participate in a number of security institutions within the Asia Pacific region through formal and informal avenues. The way these regional institutions in the Asia Pacific perceive security must be taken into account if a succinct understanding of their security-identities is to be realised (see Figure 3.1). The norms and values, inextricably tied to the so-called Asian Way, are also critically examined in order to establish a better understanding of how and why Asia Pacific security institutions behave. This provides greater insight into Asia Pacific security culture and reveals the parameters set by the region, within which the EU and New Zealand must operate to effectively promote security. Investigating the identities of predominant Asia Pacific security institutions and observing how they function, contextualises this thesis and clearly defines the current security environment in the region.

⁶³ Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Asia-Pacific Arms Market: Emerging Capabilities, Emerging Concerns," *Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies* 3 no. 2 (2004): 1-4., <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/Asia-PacificArmsMarket.pdf>. The second biggest arms market in the world exists within South East Asia and the Pacific. Europe, Russia, the US and Israel are the major suppliers of arms to the Asia-Pacific region.

⁶⁴ For some major authorities in this field see: Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, *The next stage: preventive diplomacy and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1999)., Dosch, "Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-Regionalism," 483-501., Rüländ, "Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant," 45-63., Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium.*, Michael Leifer, *Selected works on South East Asia*, ed. Chin Kin Wah and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2005).

Figure 3.1 describes the area of analysis for this particular chapter. Focusing on section ‘i’ (Asia Pacific Region) will contextualise the main research aim of this thesis, which is based on exploring the form and volume of the EU-NZ security dialogue. In addition, this section will analyse Asia Pacific security identities, which will elucidate a clearer understanding of the particular decisions Asia Pacific officials make within regional settings.




Figure 3.1: Area of analysis: Asia Pacific Security Culture

3.1 Defining the Concept of Security

If the effectiveness of security discourse is determined by the way actors perceive and conceptualise security, the importance of having a similar understanding of security within a regional setting is essential for the development of productive security dialogue. Accordingly, what Asia Pacific security institutions perceive as viable security challenges (or the interchangeable precedence) will directly affect the volume of dialogue and define part of their security culture. Due to the effects of globalisation and the rise in prominence of transnational security challenges, the Asia Pacific concept of security has become intertwined with non-traditional and human security concerns.⁶⁵ Despite an allied

⁶⁵ Simon S. Tay, “A More Insecure World: conflicting Perspectives for Asia,” *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 3 (2005): 393., also see Christopher W. Hughes, “Conceptualizing the Globalization-Security Nexus in the Asia-Pacific,” *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 4 (2001): 407-421.

definition of security in the region, there has been no real convergence of security cultures.⁶⁶ Indeed, a majority of South East Asian states prefer to deal with security challenges on a national basis: transnational security issues such as separatism (including cross border implications), international migration and environmental degradation are still handled nationally.⁶⁷ In addition, regional approaches to security challenges are often overridden by realist notions such as power balancing, which reduces the amount of trust that can be generated through continual social interaction.⁶⁸

Perspectives can often be underestimated and seen to be insignificant compared to the ‘realities’ that exist in the international environment. However, it is precisely through inter-subjective exchange that helps to determine how institutions such as ASEAN define the security environment. Indeed, governments often “fail to recognize the highly complex nature of these conflicts and the cognitive processes underlying them.”⁶⁹ An example of the different perspectives held by the EU and South East Asia can be seen in the divergent views on the nature of terrorist activities. While actors such as the EU or New Zealand see terrorism as a transnational security threat, a number of Asia Pacific nations view terrorism as a purely domestic issue, often stemming from historic roots.⁷⁰ While both views are accurate and the security challenges remain the same, the concept differs, which creates the possibility for confusion. The underlying conceptual difference limits the effectiveness of the security dialogue when an Asia Pacific country vigorously objects to an external actor interfering with what is seen as an internal security issue. This example highlights the importance of continual dialogue and effective socialisation: through increased cooperation and shared knowledge, miscommunication can be reduced and dialogue deepened.

⁶⁶ Jürgen Rüländ, “The Nature of South East Asian Security Challenges” *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 4 (2005): 545.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 538.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 538. Indeed, this is often reinforced by US ‘realist’ influence in the region.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 558.

⁷⁰ Rüländ, “The Nature of South East Asian Security Challenges,” 553.

Conceptualising Security Threats

The security threats Asia Pacific countries are prioritising as the most prominent challenges for the region continue to widen and are becoming more complex. A survey questioning security analysts' perceptions of security in South East Asia and the Pacific illustrates a considerable widening of security challenges, including environmental and health-orientated security threats.⁷¹ A mixture of traditional and non-traditional threats make up the top five short-term security issues; these include North Korean nuclear weapons, terrorism, violent Islamic extremism, Taiwan Straits tension and conflict in the Korean peninsula. The long-term security challenges were prioritised in order as: Chinese nationalism; competition for resources; Sino-Japanese relations; the Taiwan Straits; and Sino-US relations.⁷² Apart from these concerns, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, nationalism, and territorial disputes have been cited from other sources as credible security challenges for South East Asia.⁷³ In regard to the South Pacific, the major security threat perceived by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is internal disputes.⁷⁴ Other threats as outlined in the PIF Pacific Plan also exist. These include the proliferation of small arms, money laundering, border security, transnational crime, bio-security and natural disasters.⁷⁵ The Pacific perception on terrorism remains dormant and is not prioritised as a leading security challenge.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, it is still seen as a possible threat and has received considerably more attention after the Bali bombings in 2002. There is also some concern that the Pacific will be used as a 'surrogate target' in place of Australia who backed the US-led war on Iraq.⁷⁷ While North Korean nuclear weapons, terrorism and violent Islamic extremism pervades South East Asian security concerns, governance issues will remain the primary focus for the Pacific as this is seen as the

⁷¹ Richard W. Baker, *Asia Pacific Security Survey 2006* (East-West Center; Washington, 2006), 4.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 7-8. The Taiwan and Chinese dispute can also be played out in the South Pacific through 'check book diplomacy.' For example, Taiwan provides funds to Kiribati, which in turn switches diplomatic allegiance from China to Taiwan.

⁷³ See: Sung Chull Kim, "Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective," *Hiroshima Peace Institute* (Hiroshima City University 2006), <http://project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/crep/pdf/rj/r8-4.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Dave Pebbles, *Pacific Regional Order* (Canberra; Australia National University: Asia Pacific Press, 2005), 161.

⁷⁵ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration*, Final Draft: (September 2005), 7., <http://www.pacificplan.org>.

⁷⁶ Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007. Also see Henderson, "Security in Oceania in the Post-9/11 and -Bali Era," in *New Zealand in a Globalizing World*, ed. Ralph Pettman (Victoria University of Wellington, 2005), 78.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 79-80.

major cause of intra and inter-state conflict. Indeed, the Eminent Persons Group preparing the Pacific Plan stated: “[v]ariable standards of governance have produced at their worst instability, violence, corruption and a breakdown of democratic process...poor governance has a direct impact on the lives of Pacific people.”⁷⁸

Scholars have argued that security thinking in the Asia Pacific region is still dominated by military perspectives that are reinforced by a ‘subordination’ of security related planning toward the US. Indeed, it was only recently stated that “Asian-Pacific security architecture is utterly inefficient, fragmented, and excessively militarized.”⁷⁹ While there may be some truth in this, it would be wrong to describe the region as being solely traditional in its security outlook. The conventional military thinking of many Asia Pacific countries is coupled with non-traditional perspectives and other cultural and economic elements. Indeed, Asian nations “have a tendency to think of security not simply in military terms, but as a synthesis of military, economic, technological and social strengths.”⁸⁰ While the alignment of threat perceptions and security challenges is positive, combining security risks with economic and cultural elements will supplant transnational security challenges into a national context, making it harder to quantify regional solutions as an effective means of dealing with various threats that permeate national borders. This highlights the need to encourage a collective regional response to transnational security threats as a precursor for a safer environment in the region. Additionally, South East Asia and the Pacific must be continually aware of wide security challenges and alter their threat perceptions and capabilities inline with new and emerging threats, which would encourage post-conflict solutions in the region.

⁷⁸ Julius Chan, “The eminent Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum,” Statement by the Rt Hon Sir Julius Chan GCMG, KBE, Chair of the Eminent Persons’ Group (April 2004), 12, www.pacificplan.org/tiki-download_file.php/?fileId=41.

⁷⁹ Dirk Nabers, review of the *Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order*, by See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 6, no.1 (2005): 2., <http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/6/1/117>.

⁸⁰ Yoishi Funabashi, “The Asianization of Asia,” *Foreign Affairs* 72 no. 5 (1993): 75-85. In Wiessala, *Re-orienting the Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations*, 99.

3.2 Regional Security Institutions

Regional institutions are valuable instruments that can encourage a sense of continuity, reciprocity, the flow of information and ways to resolve conflicts.⁸¹ A number of regional institutions exist in South East Asia and the South Pacific that are specifically designed to minimize transnational security threats. Within these institutions a number of actors meet who each maintain a specific socio-political milieu or security-identity. These security identities converge, producing an environment where ideas and policies can be formulated resulting in shared interests realised through a process of inter-subjectivity. This constructivist formula is played out within the confines of regional mechanisms creating a unique regional identity. It is proposed that the volume of dialogue possible, within a regional mechanism, is determined by the similarities that exist between the security identities of the participating actors. In an effort to understand the basic structure of the institutions, the following section outlines the parameters within which this particular social interaction can take place. There are over 300 mechanisms dedicated to security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.⁸² These institutions are often divided into two main categories: track-one, which includes official or governmental organisations; and track-two, which consists of unofficial organisations who have links to, or influence, track-one.⁸³ The following provides relevant and contextual information on the prominent regional security institutions in the Asia Pacific region.

⁸¹ Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Longman, 1997), 39.

⁸² According to the Dialogue and Research Monitor for Asia Pacific Security, there were 348 official dialogue mechanisms in 2005. See Japan Center for International Exchange, "dialogue and Research Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security and Community Building," <http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/track1.htm>.

⁸³ See Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, *Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific* (Rowen Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2006), 272-9. There also exists the so-called 'track one and a half' and track three. Track one and a half includes a majority of government officials operating under their official role as well as others from track two. Track three includes those who do not directly affect decision making but are still involved in the security realm.

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

Instigated in 1971 the PIF has become the main political regional body for South Pacific countries.⁸⁴ Although the Forum tends to rely on the United Nations (UN) for major security initiatives such as the regional peacekeeping forces committed to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), or the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN), many security challenges exist that the PIF directly address. Indeed, the PIF is seen as an effective institution that can provide multilateral cover for security initiatives when the UN is unable to offer its resources, effectively acting out the principle of subsidiarity. In an effort to thwart transnational security threats, the Forum has adopted a number of declarations and plans. The Honiara Declaration in 1992, the Aitutaki Declaration in 1997, the Bikatawa Declaration in 2000, the Nasonini Declaration in 2002 and the Pacific Plan adopted in 2006, have all indicated a commitment to strengthening security in the South Pacific. Generating peace-building initiatives and ensuring a secure region are the cornerstones of the PIF. As outlined under the chapter heading ‘regional priorities,’ the Pacific Plan states that its main objective is to “[e]nhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through regionalism.”⁸⁵

Commenting on its security role, the Pacific Plan also outlines a call for the development and implementation of strategies and legislation for maritime and aviation security. In addition to this, the Plan encourages: surveillance development; strengthening regional policing initiatives and law enforcement training; the development of plans to deal with natural disasters; and the implementation of a Pacific Islands Regional Security Technical Cooperation Strategy (PIRSTCS) on border security.⁸⁶ The PIRSTCS is designed to

⁸⁴ Membership includes Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. New Caledonia and French Polynesia (Tahiti) came under its mandate in 1991.

⁸⁵ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration,” Final Draft: (September 2005), 3.

⁸⁶ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration,” 3 and 7. Other Security threats that the Forum outline include money laundering, terrorist recruitment, identity fraud, West African fraud, people smuggling, issuing passports of convenience, electronic crimes, small arms trafficking, illegally trading in endangered wildlife, drug trafficking and organised crime. See Neil Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of

cover transnational crime, bio-security and mentoring for national financial units. The strategy also cooperates on inter-regional and sub-regional levels. For example, the PIF cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).⁸⁷ In conjunction with the above mentioned declarations, diplomatic initiatives and military manoeuvres have also been initiated. For example, an Election Observation Mission (EOM) and a regional intervention force to the Solomon Islands were initiated under the banner of the Bikatawa Declaration. Other diplomatic initiatives have been formed to add to security efforts. These include the Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting (PILOM), the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI), the Customs Heads of Administration Regional Meeting (CHARM), the Eminent Persons Group, and the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC).

Despite the formal efforts of the PIF to confront security challenges in the Pacific, there has been little adherence to these agreements: the regional declarations simply do not meet national realities.⁸⁸ Indeed, while the Honiara Declaration provides the passage for greater cooperation on intelligence sharing and security assistance, little actual progress has been made and no formal security institution or research centre exists with a focus on threats in the Pacific.⁸⁹ While there have been some practical security results in the area of fisheries surveillance, there is still a high level of corruption. In a recent forum, an interviewee noted that approximately 60 per cent of logging and fishing in the South Pacific is corrupt or illegal.⁹⁰ Although the traditional security capabilities of the PIF are seen to be severely limited, the PIF do act under the banner of regionalism, promoting

Transnational Crime in the South Pacific,” *Journal of the South Pacific Law* (2006): 1., http://www.paclii.org/journals/old_JSPL/current/art1/view.html.

⁸⁷ Adjacent to the PIRTCS, regional law enforcement communities aim to strengthen cooperation through: donor collaboration meetings; the working group on Border Management Issues (WGBMI); the Data Collection Working Group; the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination centre (PTCCC); the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI); or the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML).

⁸⁸ Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of Transnational Crime in the South Pacific,” 2-3., Also see Greg Urwin, “Regionalism and the Pacific Plan,” International Labour Organisation Public Lecture (Suva Fiji 15th November 2005), Phg 7 and 18., http://forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/SG%20ILO%20Public%20Lecture%2015Dec051.pdf.

⁸⁹ Pebbles, *Pacific Regional Order*, 162. Also see Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of Transnational Crime in the South Pacific,” 2.

⁹⁰ Interview with the director of a security related NGO, 19 April 2007. This is specifically associated with transportation.

economic development and good governance, with the aim of promoting security and the wellbeing of Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

The East Asian Summit (EAS)

Through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping India, New Zealand and Australia have combined to form the most recent security institution for the Asia Pacific region. At its first meeting, held in December 2005, the EAS was promoted as a forum that could provide potential for strategic dialogue and “advance regional co-operation and integration.”⁹¹ In its first round of talks a number of security issues were raised, such as North Korea, terrorism, maritime security, energy security and a ‘Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response’ was presented.⁹² Whether this institution can establish capabilities beyond dialogue is yet to be determined. However, it does have the potential to be a formative organisation, promoting Confidence Building Measures (CBM), and adding to the Asia Pacific security architecture.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Formed as a regional economic institution in 1976, ASEAN was seen to be a solution to preserving its members’ freedom from external powers: both communist and the neo-colonial.⁹³ ASEAN’s political and security milestones are reflected in its institutional résumé, which include: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration in 1971; the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia in 1976; the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992; the Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, the ASEAN Vision 2020 in 1997; and the Declaration of ASEAN

⁹¹ Helen Clark, “Old Friends, New Challenges: New Zealand and the United States in the Asia-Pacific Century,” Address to Asia Society Luncheon (Fairmont Hotel Washington DC, 21 March 2007), <http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/index.html>. Interestingly, the US is not a member as it is unwilling to accede to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

⁹² Kim, “Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective,” 1. Interestingly, cultural understanding was also featured in the agenda.

⁹³ Members include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darassalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. For more on ASEAN’s beginnings see Amitav Acharya, “Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in South East Asia’s regional order,” *The Pacific Review* 18, no. 1 (2005): 101. See also: Koro Bessho, *Identities and Security in East Asia* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999).

Concord II in 2003. The APT has also been informally instigated, which comprises ASEAN Member States plus China, Japan and South Korea. As of 1994, ASEAN has now referred most of its security mandate to the ARF, but also continues to implicitly promote security in the South East Asian region through economic, political and cultural links between Member States and external observers.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF is the major security constituent of ASEAN and the primary regional security institution for South East Asia. Members include ASEAN Member States, external members, such as the EU or New Zealand, and exclude Taiwan. The ARF was formed in 1994, largely through the impetus of Japan and other Asian states who were concerned about security in the region. The original membership consisted of eighteen countries, which quickly grew into 24.⁹⁴ Although members from outside the region participate, the ARF remains largely Asian-driven, affecting the direction and capabilities of the institution.⁹⁵ A milestone for the ARF was the creation of a ‘Concept Paper’ in 1995 which generally defines the role of the ARF and promotes the three-step process of confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution. The progress of the ARF remains limited: it has advanced in the area of confidence building, touched on preventive diplomacy and only paid lip-service to conflict-resolution.⁹⁶ As a result of the CBMs, driven by the ARF mandate, military academic exchanges, high level visits and training initiatives have been instigated.⁹⁷ However, for all its good intentions the ARF remains limited to a dialogue forum, where ‘social learning’ is seen as the most productive component of the institution. Indeed, the ARF has been criticized as being nothing more than a ‘talk shop’ or a perfunctory dialogue mechanism.⁹⁸ In a recent

⁹⁴ Members include: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States, Vietnam.

⁹⁵ Kim, “Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective,” 4.

⁹⁶ This does not mean that the ARF is ignoring other areas of diplomacy, but rather has focussed its energy and attention towards confidence building first and will develop other areas at a later stage. See: Ayson and Ball, *Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific*, 274-5.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 274. There are also two Intercessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG CBMS) that are conducted through the ARF.

⁹⁸ For example, see Ayson and Ball, *Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific*, 275.

survey on the ARF, security analysts expressed 'lukewarm' support for ARF and other regional security cooperation.⁹⁹ One reason for the ARF's perceived limitations is due to the principles upheld within South East Asia such as 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of other countries. According to Desmond Bell, this limits any potential progress on 'hard-core' security issues or potential conflicts.¹⁰⁰ However, 'talk shops' maintain a credible function and should not be taken for granted. Dominik Heller defines the institutional effectiveness of the ARF as: "member's security is increased by the ARF solely BEFORE armed conflicts by increasing the costs of breaching the norm of renunciation of force among the members and as an area of social learning, in which actors reassess their perceptions and objectives" (original emphasis included).¹⁰¹ Advances are also being made to increase the effectiveness of the institution. For example, the acceptance of the ARF chairman to liaise with the UN and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has increased inter-regional ties and the implementation of an 'ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.'¹⁰² Although it is uncertain whether the ARF is a credible regional security institution, it "remains the only multilateral security framework that even begins to approximate the more well-established region-wide mechanisms of Europe."¹⁰³ From a constructivist perspective, the ARF is seen to be an efficient forum that creates a multitude of CBMs through continual inter-subjective exchange, which also generates a unique and defined security culture.

⁹⁹ Baker, *Asia Pacific Security Survey 2006*, 3.

¹⁰⁰ Ayson and Ball, *Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific*, 275.

¹⁰¹ Dominik Heller, "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia Pacific," *Contemporary South East Asia* 27, no. 1 (2005): 138.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 274. Also see Kim, "Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective," 4. It should be noted that the exclusion of Taiwan as an ARF member could alter the balance and direction of the institution.

¹⁰³ Heller, "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia Pacific," 275.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

In 2002 the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) expanded its mandate to include a functioning political agenda.¹⁰⁴ Through this, the Counter Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) was formed and fully instigated in 2006. The CTTF identifies specific security needs and coordinates capacity building, technical assistance programmes, provides initiatives on food defence, conducts counter-terrorism workshops and secures the flow of goods and people through the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) framework.¹⁰⁵ Through these initiatives, the CTTF is designed to help countries meet UN requirements under the counter-terrorism financing obligations and comply with international standards. The CTTF also participates in other regional groupings such as the ‘total supply chain security’ to protect shipping lanes through the APEC region. While these initiatives appear to be promising, the security arm of APEC is still in its early stages of development, making it hard to determine its importance for the region. Despite this, APEC contributes to the constellation of security initiatives in the Asia Pacific region and remains the only regional institution where heads of government meet.

Track-Two Regional Security Initiatives

Track-two regional security institutions – typically involving semi-governmental think tanks, academics and officials – affect and contribute to regional security in the Asia Pacific region. Although these organisations are more informal than track-one institutions, they do play an important role in creating collective ideas and forming security cultures. This is done by aiding track-one initiatives in forming succinct policy, ideas and initiatives. Track-two institutions also create new ideas for decision makers, shape the climate of opinion in national settings, help build transnational coalitions and create environments where the political elite are able to socialise, creating alternative sets of norms and identities.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Initiated in 1993, APEC membership includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Republic of the Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States of America, and Viet Nam.

¹⁰⁵ Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, “Secure Trade in the APEC Region,” http://www.apec.org/apec/pec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism/secure_trade_in_the.html.

¹⁰⁶ Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, 143.

There are a number of track-two institutions that have a specific focus on security in the Asia Pacific region. These include: the ASEAN Institutes for Security and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS),¹⁰⁷ founded in 1984 and including members from Brunei Darrussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC),¹⁰⁸ founded in 1996 and including members from Australia, Singapore, Sweden and China; the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP),¹⁰⁹ initiated in 1992 and including members from New Zealand, the EU, Russia, China and the US; the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC); and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue, which was initiated in 2002 and involves approximately 200 Defence Ministers, deputy Defence Ministers, civilian and military officials predominately from the Asia Pacific region. It should also be noted that many officials attend track-one and track-two level institutions, thereby creating synergies between the levels and creating links between the institutions.¹¹⁰

External Security Actors: An Independent Variable

External actors – regional institutions or countries not directly associated with South East Asia or the Pacific – play a significant role in security initiatives in the Asia Pacific region. For instance, China, Russia, Taiwan, Australia, India, the US and Japan play a considerable part in forming the regional security climate. Other regional actors such as the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) the UN or the EU contribute to security efforts in the region. An

¹⁰⁷ Membership Includes CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and eight member institutions: Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS), Brunei Darrussalam; Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Cambodia; Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Laos; Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), Philippines; Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore; Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand; and Institute for International Relations (IIR), Vietnam.

¹⁰⁸ Membership Includes representatives from Australia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, China, France, Sweden, UK and Germany

¹⁰⁹ Membership Includes Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, PDR Korea, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papa New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, US, Vietnam.

¹¹⁰ Heller, “The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia Pacific,” 126.

example of external persuasion affecting the Pacific's environmental security can be seen in Japan's diplomatic effort in Fiji and Tonga. Japanese development aid to the Pacific has been seen as an act of conditional diplomacy, whereby votes in the Whaling Commission are essentially brought from PICs to enable the Japanese to catch whales for scientific purposes.¹¹¹ Although external intervention can produce negative outcomes, continual cooperation with external actors will limit distrust and build social and political links. The UN plays a significant role in this aspect and undertakes many valuable functions, including: acting as a 'legitimizing function'; a 'third-party mediator'; assisting regional organisations to adhere to the UN conventions on terrorism; and facilitating security-related treaties.¹¹² However, the actions of the UN in the Asia Pacific region are limited to its set priorities, threat perceptions, institutional dynamics and resources. This being said, cooperation and socialisation limits the possibility of confusion or conflict between international actors.

The PIF, the EAS, the ARF, ASEAN, and APEC are the prominent security-orientated regional institutions for the Asia Pacific region. Although a small amount of overlap in the institutions competencies may exist, each organisation plays a particular role in contributing to peace and development in the region. Other institutions, from the track-two arena or external influences, also act as independent variables in the Asia Pacific regional security architecture, affecting the depth of dialogue within the institutions and the strength of security.

3.3 Norms and Values in the Asia Pacific Region

Values and norms held by countries in the Asia Pacific region influence the security culture and identity of the region, and subsequently affect the relationships forged within regional settings. A large majority of the regional security institutions adhere to the so

¹¹¹ For an example of this see the Greenpeace website, "Japanese vote buying sinks South Pacific whale sanctuary," (24 July 2001), <http://archive.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/oceans/2001jul24.html>.

¹¹² Rosemary Foot, "The UN system's contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture," *The Pacific Review* 16 No. 2 (2003): Abstract. Also see Martin Ortega, "Building the future: the EU's contribution to global governance," *Chaillot Paper* No. 100 (Institute for Security Studies; European Union: Paris, April 2007).

called Asian Way, which is a collection of values and principles that shape the security identities in the Asia Pacific region.¹¹³

The Asia Pacific Way

The Asian or Pacific Way is an important concept to explore if a reliable analysis of the Asia Pacific security culture is to be conducted. The Asian Way provides valuable insights into the identity of South East Asia and the Pacific, providing an explanation as to why certain decisions are made vis à vis security regimes.

The Asian Way is made up of many different political and cultural values that, when combined, generate a collective South East Asian or Pacific security culture. Although the Asian Way constitutes different values and principles, there are two norms that are prominent, namely non-interference and informalism. These two norms are the socio-political pillars – as reflected in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation¹¹⁴ – that unite Asia Pacific states, contributing to regional stability. Due to large variances in culture, language, religion and politics, non-interference is seen as the best way to maintain stability. The notion of informalism is well illustrated by Koro Bessho's statement: "ASEAN's principle of non-interference is crucial to maintaining cohesion... [and thus prefers] creating the conditions for compromise, rather than acting through an official arbitration capacity."¹¹⁵

Another underlying factor that reinforces the Asian Way can be found in recent Asia Pacific historical events which have constructed deep-seated identities.¹¹⁶ It should not be forgotten that many Asian countries have only been sovereign for little over 50 years. Indeed, Jürgen Rüländ recently stated: "national sovereignty is still the most essential

¹¹³ The following section will use the Pacific Way and the Asian Way synonymously, noting that there are subtle differences between the two. The ASEAN Way is another alternative used by scholars in this field. For a fuller definition of the Asian Way see Heller, "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia Pacific," 128.

¹¹⁴ Association of South East Asian Nations, *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia*, (Indonesia, 24 February 1976), <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>.

¹¹⁵ Bessho, *Identities and Security in East Asia*, 41.

¹¹⁶ See Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. And Bessho, *Identities and Security in East Asia*, 42.

value in the South East Asian security discourse.”¹¹⁷ Many political revolutions and conflicts in the region such as the Chinese revolution, the Vietnam War and Timor Leste’s independence, have formed a collective and recent memory of continuing conflict.¹¹⁸ Recent colonial history has constructed images within much of South East Asia and the Pacific, which can affect their actions in regional security fora. This ‘memory’ has meant that many Asia Pacific countries have shared a ‘subconscious assumption’ that they were second-rate.¹¹⁹ The historical memory of conflict and colonialism combined with newly found sovereignty has proven to retard the formalisation of regional security institutions. Indeed, the notion of informalism rejects the Western forms of external relations which are steeped in notions of legalisation.¹²⁰ Consequently, the Asian Way can be seen as frustrating, particularly from a Western perspective, forming barriers between closer security cooperation; however, advantages also exist within this collection of values.

Although the Asian Way has been heavily criticized, clear advantages exist that are often mistakenly dismissed. Firstly, agreements made through ASEAN are based on long-term relationships, making it less likely that any Member State will defect.¹²¹ Secondly, the tradition of negotiation within ASEAN places “paramount importance on actors’ reputations.”¹²² This means that ASEAN Member States are even more likely to continue to operate even under adverse conditions for fear of falling out. In other words an ‘insurance policy’ is created by focussing on the future, while at the same time respecting the traditions of the past. Thirdly, indirect discussion and non-binding agreements create a more flexible environment and dynamic agenda.

¹¹⁷ Rüländ, *The Nature of South East Asian Security Challenges*,” 559.

¹¹⁸ Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, *Cornell Studies in Political Economy*, 139. Also see: Greg Urwin, “Regionalism and the Pacific Plan,” Phg 5.

¹¹⁹ Bessho, *Identities and Security in East Asia*, 56.

¹²⁰ Acharya, “Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in South East Asia’s regional order,” 105. Interestingly, it has also been argued that many cultural and political similarities exist between the West and East. Quoting examples from classical Asian authors such as Yat-Sen, Rabindrinath Tagore, or Meng-Tzu, Bessho argues that Asian values are similar to liberal democracy.

¹²¹ Heller, “The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia Pacific,” 128.

¹²² *Ibid.*

Regional institutions that are based primarily on socialisation, communication and common values have been the most positive outcome of ASEAN or the ARF. Referring to the nature of South East Asia's largest regional institution, the former ASEAN Secretary, Rodolfo Severino stated: [t]he general approach is based on dialogue, consultation, cooperation, engagement and interaction [...] there is no other way."¹²³ The continual process of socialisation has created a regional identity that produces a stabilising effect on Member States. For example, Heller describes the ARF as a security community, which is based on a collective identity, contributing to stability. Consequently, it is through the Asian Way that a fundamental aspect of ASEAN's external policy is realised: an institution based on a collective identity as a means of promoting stability. Indeed, a member of the Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) stated that "there is a culture of communication and common values emerging. The main common value is avoiding war and conflict to provide stability for sustaining economic development."¹²⁴ Conversely, the informality of the ARF or ASEAN has not been accepted well by a majority of scholars who criticise it for its lack of institutional power and ability to do anything but talk.¹²⁵ However, due to the political and cultural complexity in the region, the Asian Way is the common thread that ties all nations together. The regional institutions continue to evolve, even if it is seen to be too slow from a Western perspective.

As transnational threats continue to pervade the Asia Pacific region, the principle nature of the Asian Way has become questioned. A paradox exists at the centre of the Asian Way which forces various Asia Pacific regional institutions to favour one value over another. The two norms associated with the Asian Way – non interference and non intervention – can come into conflict with each other as "[t]he organisation may have to become more willing to exert pressure over domestic affairs of some of its members if it is to fend off external intervention."¹²⁶ In other words, a choice needs to be made if

¹²³ Heller, "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia Pacific," 140.

¹²⁴ Ibid, 137.

¹²⁵ Michael Reiter, "Inter-regionalism as a New Diplomatic Tool: The EU and East Asia."

European Foreign Affairs Review 11 no. 2 (2006): 240.

¹²⁶ Bessho, *Identities and Security in East Asia*, 45-6.

ASEAN values are to remain preserved; this will sometimes mean sacrificing one value over another. Although the Asian Way contributes to stability, it also limits and controls its own actions. Whether the Asian Way can evolve to fit into a growing interdependent security environment remains to be seen.

Despite the inherent need to preserve Asia Pacific values, the region's norms are inappropriate and insufficient to cater for modern security threats.¹²⁷ As already discussed, the rise of transnational crime, terrorism and environmental concerns challenge the core principles and security culture of ASEAN. Transnational security risks are arguably best addressed by transnational or regional institutions rather than ASEAN's preference for bilateral negotiation. At the very least, when a security risk threatens more than two states, it would seem logical to address the problem within a regional framework. The norm of non-interference has served ASEAN well in the past. However, the accession of Myanmar, conflict in Timor Leste and the 'Bali bombings' highlight the ineffectiveness of ASEAN and its security constituent, the ARF. Perhaps this is why Acharya recently wrote that "while non-interference once exerted a moral appeal against the threat of neo-colonialism and superpower interventionism, it now stands implicated for sanctioning state repression in Burma."¹²⁸ However, even if these norms are being challenged and ASEAN's identity is evolving, it has not filtered down to actual policy formation or action. Indeed, ASEAN continues to put little emphasis on regional actorness.¹²⁹

The Asian Way is seen by many academics and political elites, particularly from Western-orientated countries, as inappropriate for modern security challenges which are often transnational in nature. The notions of informalism and non-intervention reinforce this perspective as many institutions are seen as purely 'talking shops' with no actual capability or international voice. Despite this, through the notion of informalism and non-

¹²⁷ See Hughes, "Conceptualizing the Globalization-Security Nexus in the Asia-Pacific."

¹²⁸ Acharya, "Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in South East Asia's regional order," 103.

¹²⁹ Amitav Acharya, "Is Anyone Still Not a Constructivist?" *International Relations Asia Pacific* 5, no. 2 (2005): 251-53.

intervention, the Asian Way unites a constellation of languages, cultures, religions and political orientations, creating at least a sense of identity and security.

Conclusion

A heightened awareness, greater interoperability and deeper integration will be needed if Asia Pacific regional security institutions are to evolve into deeper, active and more effective organisations. A multitude of regional security mechanisms have been created throughout the last 50 years, giving rise to an intricate web of cultural and political links within and outside the Asia Pacific region. Many of these institutions have been a source of frustration for a number of Western academics and political elite as the pace of evolution is seen as slow. However, as the Asian Way illustrates, the pace must be set by the Asia Pacific countries, not those outside the region. Greater effort must be made to understand the complex security-identity of the Asia Pacific region. This will enhance security initiatives and contribute to peace in the long-term. Real threats are imminent and must be subdued by effective diplomacy through multilateral and bilateral solutions. Enhancing the interoperability of Asia Pacific countries' capabilities and promoting the advantages of regional solutions will advance the effectiveness of the institutions and promote peace in the region. The ultimate question is whether the regional security institutions can be effective enough before the next security incident emerges.

South East Asian and South Pacific concepts of security help to define the various security cultures that exist within regional institutions. The prominent institutions including the ARF, ASEAN, the PIF, the EAS and APEC provide the structures for continual inter-subjective exchange, building effective dialogue over the long-term. As constructive knowledge-sharing continues, the apparent hurdles represented through the Asian Way may become less of a hindrance in regional security consolation. By examining the various norms, values, concepts of security and regional security institutions, a clear image emerges of the current regional security environment in the Asia Pacific region. These issues contextualise this thesis, enabling a succinct analysis to be undertaken on the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.

4 European Union and New Zealand Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific Region

*The European Union on the one side, and New Zealand on the other*¹³⁰

Joint Declaration on Relations between the EU and NZ

While geographic distance will always separate the European continent from Australasia, common values, perspectives and interests will constantly unite Europe with New Zealand. Built upon strong economic and trade commitments, the EU and New Zealand have enjoyed a buoyant diplomatic relationship over the last 23 years. The focal point and underpinning structure of this relationship can be found in shared values such as democracy and human rights. These factors have created a firm base from which a security dialogue has emerged in the last decade. Although the EU and New Zealand may possess varying interests that they wish to protect in the Asia Pacific region, the approaches and the advantages in cooperating are widely recognised. These concepts, combined with a similar preoccupation with security concepts and a firm commitment in effective multilateralism to counter threats in the Asia Pacific region, has created the need and desire for a substantial EU-NZ security dialogue for the region. From an explorative outlook the types of dialogue that exist, and the alternative avenues within which EU and New Zealand officials are able to cooperate, reflect an EU-NZ security culture in the Asia Pacific region. Analysing the consultative processes also helps to determine the current volume of dialogue. In addition to this, how EU and New Zealand officials perceive the relationship, what subjects are discussed in the agenda and what outcomes the security dialogues have produced, reflect the volume of EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.

The EU-NZ security consultation processes also contain a social and cultural theme, which help to explain and characterise the dialogue: an element seldom analysed and

¹³⁰ The European Commission's Delegation to New Zealand, *Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and New Zealand*.

often overlooked by political scientists. However, as international relations become increasingly interdependent, sensitivity to cultural and normative processes are becoming more acute. This is clearly demonstrated in a recent European Commission Communication on ‘A European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World.’ Explaining the Communication, the Commission’s Delegations to Australia and New Zealand noted: “[t]he EU has a unique role to play in promoting its cultural richness and diversity, both within Europe and worldwide. It has been acknowledged that culture is an indispensable feature to achieve the EU’s strategic objectives of propensity, solidarity and security, while ensuring a stronger presence on the international scene.”¹³¹ Regular social and political contact increases the possibility of creating common ideas and perspectives, while also creating effective confidence building measures. This provides for deeper and more productive cooperation that, when associated with security in the Asia Pacific region, can help to secure a safer and increasingly peaceful environment.

4.1 Foundations of the European Union and New Zealand Security Dialogue

Formal diplomatic relations between the EU and New Zealand have matured over the last two decades, encompassing social, economic and political interaction. Forged through trade and economic interests in 1984, the relationship has developed to include security-related concerns within its regular political consultations. The introduction of a European Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, and its considerable growth over the last 15 years - including a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), an External Action Service, a High Representative, and military and civilian missions - has expanded the EU’s role around the globe. The increasing political and economic strength of the EU in the Asia Pacific has acted as a catalyst by encouraging formal security dialogue and promoting a desire to increase the political consultation between the EU and New Zealand. The establishment of a Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and New Zealand, signed in 1999, and an up-dated Action Plan agreed

¹³¹ Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand, “European agenda for culture in a globalizing world,” News @ EU, <http://www.delaus.ec.europa.eu/news@eu/index.htm>.

upon in 2007, has formalised the relationship, allowing for a larger volume of dialogue including security related issues. A number of formal and informal meetings, summits and forums have developed out of this dialogue, creating an extensive network of relationships involving interaction from the political elite to military personnel.

A mixture of normative, self-interest and altruistic motives has formed a dialogue process between the EU and New Zealand that has now matured to include a substantial security component in the agenda. Most New Zealand and European officials agree that the relationship is based on common values and a similar perspective on the international environment. These values include effective multilateralism, liberal democracy, the rule of law and human rights. While these values underline the relationship and undoubtedly assist in creating a common outlook of security in the Asia Pacific region, they do not represent a viable reason to maintain a close dialogue; they only constitute a reason to form a dialogue process. A number of other themes shared by both parties illustrate the current momentum behind the dialogue process. Firstly, the growing importance of the Asia Pacific region, as a maturing economic region, has strengthened the grounds for a deeper dialogue process on the basis of economic security.¹³² Secondly, the EU and New Zealand share a similar preoccupation with traditional and non-traditional security threats. Nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism, money laundering, environmental security and China and Taiwan rivalry, are issues that are of interest to both the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region.¹³³ Thirdly, from an arguably altruistic perspective, the EU and New Zealand are concerned for the stability and development of the South Pacific.¹³⁴ Further reinforced by close political, economic, historical and cultural ties,¹³⁵

¹³² Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, *Information note on the Political and Economic situation of New Zealand and EU-New Zealand Relations*, Directorate B, Policy Department (16 February 2006), 14., <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs>.

¹³³ European Parliament, *Chairman's Report: Delegation for relations with Australia and New Zealand 12th EP/New Zealand Interparliamentary Meeting*, (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch; 26 February - 5 March 2006), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/cr/610/610287/610287en.pdf.

¹³⁴ Chris Patten, "European Union-New Zealand relation after enlargement" in *The Europa Lectures 2001-2006*, ed. Martin Holland, 45-53, (Christchurch; Canterbury University Press, 2007), 50.

¹³⁵ The Europeans Commission's Delegation to New Zealand, *Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and New Zealand*, 1 Preamble.

cooperation between New Zealand and the European Union on these and other issues is the *raison d'être* of the EU-NZ security dialogue.

Considering New Zealand's economic dependence upon the EU, it is not surprising that the New Zealand's MFAT describes the EU-NZ bilateral dialogue as a 'bedrock relationship.'¹³⁶ The EU is New Zealand's third largest export market and second largest merchandise partner, which accounts for 28 per cent of New Zealand's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).¹³⁷ While this remains highly important, looking at the EU through the lens of agriculture and trade produces a distorted perspective of the actual EU-NZ relationship. The current New Zealand Defence Minister stated that because the common agricultural policy of the EU is effectively set until 2013, the short-term implication of the CFSP will be highly significant.¹³⁸ New Zealand's chief concern with the EU will remain focused on trade and access to the European market; however, the security dialogue continues to play an important role, with official rhetoric on both sides issuing the desire to increase security cooperation. Building on the foundations of the security consultation, and in order to maintain a more precise view of the EU-NZ relationship, the security dialogue must also be examined.

4.2 The European Union and New Zealand Security Agenda

The validity of a dialogue process between two or more political actors is largely determined by the content of the agenda; what is discussed and not discussed will directly affect the volume of dialogue that is achievable. While some European and New Zealand officials place a great deal of importance on the normative aspects of their relationship, the primary objectives of the EU and New Zealand continue to rest heavily on self-

¹³⁶ Terence O'Brien, "Crisis in East Asia? Terence O'Brien argues that the transformation of East Asia is altering the balance of New Zealand's interests in the world," *New Zealand International Review* 30, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 2005): 26.

¹³⁷ Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, *Information note on the Political and Economic situation of New Zealand and EU-New Zealand Relations*, 15.

¹³⁸ Phil Goff, "New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement," in *The Europa Lectures 2001-2006* ed. Martin Holland, 65-75, (Christchurch; Canterbury University Press, 2007), 69.

interest. While this self-interest is not liable to dramatically change, through a process of continual social learning both actors can develop an understanding of what motivates the participating actors to prioritise a particular set of objectives. This will make it easier to accommodate, discuss and create a more efficient dialogue process leading to actions that can be formed from collective interests rather than the original self-interest. The following provides an overview of the current set of objectives the EU and New Zealand have in relation to their security focussed agendas.

Recognising that the agenda will predominately change in form depending on new and emerging security challenges, a number of objectives remain constant. From a New Zealand perspective these include: encouraging the EU to be more active in global affairs; welcoming the EU's efforts in strengthening multilateralism; influencing the EU on issues important to New Zealand; and encouraging the EU in its effective contributions in development aid and peacekeeping activities.¹³⁹ New Zealand also wishes to be regularly informed on current European security thinking in order to remain relevant as a valid security partner. From an EU perspective, the Union is motivated to work with New Zealand in strengthening multilateral institutions, such as the UN, and creating an international environment with effective global governance.¹⁴⁰ Cooperating with New Zealand will also aid EU interests in the Asia Pacific region. Through cooperating on security issues such as environmental development, anti-terrorism, cyber-crime, money laundering, and non-proliferation initiatives, the EU can secure economic interests. For example, keeping critical communication and shipping lines open, as well as maintaining global and environmental security, can affect the European continent.

Under the heading of 'Common Goals' the Joint Declaration outlines eight objectives, of which six are related to traditional and non-traditional security concerns. The main security interests that are prioritised include: international disarmament; arms control; non-proliferation; environmental security; and development assistance.¹⁴¹ Promoting

¹³⁹ Phill Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007.

¹⁴⁰ Patten, "European Union-New Zealand relation after enlargement," 53.

¹⁴¹ The Europeans Commission's Delegation to New Zealand, "Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and New Zealand," 2 Common Goals.

regionalism, supporting the UN, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are also outlined as major priorities for New Zealand and the EU. The updated EU-NZ action plan, agreed upon in 2007, is designed to complement the Joint Declaration by providing a larger number of specific areas to work together. These specific issues include a number of security related initiatives such as development and stability in the Pacific, human rights, the environment, and education.¹⁴² Other issues discussed in the EU-NZ security dialogues include the Middle East, Asia, the Asia Pacific region, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Pacific, the EU's energy action plan, and counter-terrorism issues in the region.¹⁴³

Both New Zealand and the European Union recognise the importance of cultural links and shared values. New Zealand and the Union place a high importance on forging people-to-people contact, working holiday visas and academic links.¹⁴⁴ Creating social networks are increasingly seen as a fundamental to any serious dialogue process. In addition to the joint declarations there are several sectoral agreements that, although not explicitly related to security, solidify the EU-NZ relationship. These agreements – which were the first types of agreements the EU signed with a third country – include the areas of science and technology, agriculture and an agreement on mutual recognition on conformity assessment.¹⁴⁵ These three areas build cultural and political links which underpin the EU-NZ dialogue and generate a sense of validity in continuing the consultation processes. How many EU-NZ security dialogues exist, how they function, and the effectiveness of the various mediums within which the dialogues are played out, must also be explored in achieving a respectable view of the relationship.

¹⁴² New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Foreign Relations: Europe," <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Europe/index.php>.

¹⁴³ See Scoop Independent News, "Peters holds high level talks with EU in Austria," Media Release, (19 April 2006), <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0604/S00294.htm>. See also: Stuff, "Peters in Germany to talk EU-NZ action plan," NZPA (4 May 2007), <http://www.stuff.co.nz/4047937a6160.html>.

¹⁴⁴ The Europeans Commission's Delegation to New Zealand, "Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and New Zealand."

¹⁴⁵ Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, *Information note on the Political and Economic situation of New Zealand and EU-New Zealand Relations*.

4.3 The European Union and New Zealand Security Dialogues

The EU and New Zealand cooperate and meet together on various implicit and explicit fronts. Official ministerial meetings, track-one and track-two regional institutions, and Member States bilateral dialogue are all used as effective mediums in expounding the EU-NZ security dialogue on the Asia Pacific region. A complicated network of formal and informal dialogue exists that can not possibly be covered within this thesis. However, the major institutions and mediums used to effectively encourage and deepen an EU-NZ security dialogue are analysed. While cooperation between the EU and New Zealand is currently based on diplomatic initiatives in the Asia Pacific region, there is much value in meetings, interlocution and knowledge sharing; in an increasingly independent world, states can no longer act alone if they wish to promote a stable and secure environment.

Direct European Union and New Zealand Bilateral Dialogue

A substantial amount of regular contact between New Zealand and the EU subsist in the form of ministerial meetings, high level visits, or through other mediums such as EU permanent Delegation Mission to Australia and New Zealand. Other direct ministerial dialogues such as human rights consultations provide an added value to the overall political and security relationship. This is achieved through direct interlocution on security issues combined with social learning and knowledge sharing: increases in social and political contact improve the possibility of a unified security-identity, which enlarges the likelihood of decisions being made from collective interests.

The most formal and direct EU-NZ security dialogue is conducted through a biannual ministerial consultation process between the EU Troika – the EU Council Presidency, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and the EU Council High Representative – and the New Zealand Foreign Minister. There also exists biennial ministerial consultation between the Commissioner responsible for external relations and New Zealand's Foreign Minister in Wellington. In addition to these ministerial meetings, periodic visits to New

Zealand by Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament (MEP) also act to reinforce a continual process of dialogue between New Zealand and the EU. For example, in the last five years, Commissioner Poul Nielson, Pascal Lamy, Christopher Patten, Mariann Fischer Boel, Ferrero Waldner and the European Parliament delegation for Australia and New Zealand visited New Zealand. These meetings are considerably important for both New Zealand and the EU; however, the ministerial meetings have been criticised as not maintaining an appropriate level of representation as the actual participants are not always at the highest level of representation.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, it has been argued that meeting twice a year is too extensive and that the EU and New Zealand should focus on one annual meeting with a higher representation and with an enlarged, concise agenda.¹⁴⁷ It should also be noted that the dialogue encompasses a security agenda that deals with not only the Asia Pacific region, but also other key interests of concern such as Afghanistan and energy security in Russia. As security in the Asia Pacific will not always be a significant point of concern for the EU and New Zealand, the security dialogue is not as important and effective as it might first appear. Despite these arguments, New Zealand and the EU are fortunate to meet biannually: the process itself is valid in contributing to a higher understanding of each actor, providing the possibilities for deeper dialogue.

Reinforcing the ministerial visits, annual senior official political consultation meetings (SOM) are conducted with the Commission's Directorate General for External Relations and New Zealand officials. The SOM offers New Zealand a substantial amount of exposure to the EU and covers a wide range of topical issues from science, education and visa agreements, to Middle Eastern security concerns.¹⁴⁸ The SOMs are seen as more of a 'working session' where participants are firmly connected with the issues, providing for an effective and valuable dialogue that underpins the ministerial visits.

In addition to the SOMs, ministerial consultation through the EU Troika format on Human Rights reveals another avenue where New Zealand and the EU work together to

¹⁴⁶ Interview with European Union Official, 18 April 2007.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with New Zealand Official, 8 November 2006.

promote security in the Asia Pacific region. While not specifically aligned with security, the dialogue will usually contain a number of security issues.¹⁴⁹ These meetings are seen as valuable as they provide for cultural and political links, and act as sufficient preparatory meetings in anticipation for the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN Third Committee, where the EU is a key player and can expound values similar to New Zealand's interests. It is through these events that a mutual process of influence can take place between New Zealand and the EU, forming a distinctive security culture. This dialogue can be further strengthened by adjacent meetings including post forum dialogues and the positive effects of 'corridor diplomacy.'

Affiliated with New Zealand's MFAT, New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency (NZ AID) also works together with the EU on projects in the South Pacific, encouraging and promoting a deeper EU-NZ security dialogue. An important tool in preventing conflict in the long-term is through effective development aid. One aspect of this aid is the promotion of education in developing countries. Commenting on political aspects of the EU-NZ dialogue, the head of the European Unit for New Zealand's MFAT stated that the "interrelationship between development and security is well established. In particular, we cooperate very closely in the education sector."¹⁵⁰ An example of this is through the education Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). Initiated in 1999, SWAp provides external education funding to developing countries by adopting common approaches and cooperating with and relying on the developing nation's government to disperse the funds. Both the EU and NZ AID have been involved within this framework and plan on cooperating together in the future to enhance education reform in the Asia Pacific region.¹⁵¹ The Pacific Regional Initiatives for the Delivery of basic Education (PRIDE) is another education based framework that is designed to strengthen the Ministries of Education in 15 PICs. The PRIDE project is jointly funded by the EU and New Zealand: through the European Development Fund, the EU has

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Email correspondence between Simon Rae and the Author, 9 March 2006.

¹⁵¹ Under the auspices of the World Bank, Australia, the EU, France and New Zealand have agreed to cooperate together with the Ministry of Education to create an "education Sector-Wide Approach" (SAWp) due to commence in 2008. See: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Europe, "Talking Points for Paris," (5 December, 2006), File No: AID/EUR/DA/1, Vol. 1.

allocated €8 million in the period 2004-2009, while NZAID has donated a total of \$NZ 5 million to the project.¹⁵² The Project Steering Committee (PSC) for PRIDE is comprised of EU, New Zealand, PIC officials and observers from the UN, UK and other aid agencies.¹⁵³ This provides a pertinent example of a separate avenue where EU and New Zealand officials are able to meet and discuss development issues that are related to security.

As one of the largest New Zealand embassies in Europe in terms of staff, the New Zealand Mission to the European Union in Brussels is an area where alliances are formed between the EU and New Zealand. Although economic interests remain of prime importance, security relationships also exist. For example, immediately following the Fijian Coup in 2006, meetings between the EU Commission and New Zealand diplomats took place in order for the EU to issue a qualified statement on the Coup.¹⁵⁴ Besides sporadic events such as the Fijian Coup, other initiatives that help maintain a New Zealand presence in the heart of Europe include: organising events; building contacts with the European Parliament, Commission and Council; facilitating formal visits; and unofficial and official diplomacy. A pertinent example of how New Zealand diplomats cooperate on security issues with the EU can be seen in New Zealand's influence on the European Council's Working Group responsible for Asia and Oceania (COASI). The New Zealand ministerial visits and the New Zealand Mission to the European Union influenced COASI by convincing the working group to provide Commission funds for the RAMSI mission.¹⁵⁵ Of equal importance to the Mission in Brussels, the European Commission's Delegation to New Zealand also coordinates and builds on the EU-NZ relationship.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² The University of the South Pacific, "the PRIDE project," USP Fiji, <http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=pride>.

¹⁵³ The University of the South Pacific, "the PRIDE project."

¹⁵⁴ Personal correspondence between the author and diplomatic staff in Brussels, 4 December 2006.

¹⁵⁵ Phill Goff, "New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement," 71.

¹⁵⁶ New Zealand embassies in Europe also contribute by creating links and establish relationships with individual Member States of the European Union. However, they are also limited in financial and human resources. For example, the Polish embassy has three permanent staff and represents a large section of Eastern Europe.

The following Figure (4.1) depicts the current forms of security-related involvement between the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region. The three primary categories, under which various consultative mechanisms are listed, are ‘bilateral (a),’ ‘regional (b)’ and ‘other(c).’ While ‘a’ and ‘b’ are directly related to the overlap between the EU, New Zealand and Asia Pacific (see area ‘A’ in Figure 1.1), category ‘c’ is an influencing factor on the direct dialogue procedure (see area ‘ii’ in Figure 1.1).




Figure 4.1: Avenues of European Union and New Zealand Security Dialogue on the Asia Pacific Region

Another form of association relevant to the EU-NZ security dialogue is through the European Commission's Delegation to New Zealand. The Delegation was opened in Wellington in 2004 and, while it does not have any direct dialogue with New Zealand on security issues in the Asia Pacific, the Delegation does reflect the EU’s commitment to

maintaining a close relationship with New Zealand. Indeed, commenting on the role of the Commissions Delegations, Wiessala poignantly notes that Delegations are the “prime agents for the translation of CFSP instruments into practice.”¹⁵⁷ This is demonstrated through cooperation on various fronts such as education, trade and politics. The Delegation will regularly communicate with Brussels on developments in New Zealand and assist in promoting and organising bilateral cooperation.¹⁵⁸ Indirectly, the Delegation caters for security under the rubric of development by administering Overseas Development Aid (ODA) to the South Pacific. A recent initiative within the European Commission’s Delegation to Australia has been the appointment of a security officer whose responsibilities cover the South Pacific area including New Zealand. Another security officer for the South East Asia region is due to be appointed in the later stages of 2007. The officer’s do not have any direct security interests in the Asia Pacific region except for ensuring stability, cohesion and the security of European staff.¹⁵⁹ While this may not be directly relevant to prioritised security challenges in the region, the appointment of a security officer does reflect the continual growth of the Delegations and EU’s interest in New Zealand. From a social perspective the physical presence of the staff in Wellington and Canberra supports continual information and knowledge sharing, enhancing the general EU-NZ security relationship. Indeed, informal diplomacy is often taken for granted but can contribute to significant success in the future.

Informal networking and social interaction is the life blood of EU-NZ security dialogue. Unofficial meetings between NZ and the EU on security issues are hard to quantify but do happen on a frequent basis. The last two years has seen a considerable growth in dialogue. An assortment of security related meetings held in the first half of 2007 include: consultation between the New Zealand Defence Minister and the EU High Representative in January, where they discussed a wide range of security issues including

¹⁵⁷ Georg Wiessala, *More than Distant Neighbours: CFSP and Asian Countries.* In *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The first ten years*, edited by Martin Holland, 89-111. London, New York: Continuum, 2004), 91.

¹⁵⁸ The European Commission's Delegation to New Zealand “EU/New Zealand Political Relations,” http://www.delous.ec.europa.eu/newzealand/EU_NZ_relations/politicalrelations.htm.

¹⁵⁹ E-mail correspondence with the EU security officer for the South Pacific and the Author, 19 February 2006.

the South Pacific and South East Asia;¹⁶⁰ a meeting held in June between New Zealand and EU defence officials in Brussels; a New Zealand defence representative has recently finished a tour of Brussels; and the head of the International Defence Relations Branch travelled to Paris in April for talks on defence with France.¹⁶¹ These and other informal meetings in Brussels and Wellington act to strengthen the multifaceted security dialogue between New Zealand and the European Union. New Zealand officials have shown some signs of frustration, noting that it is often hard when new EU Member States or staff do not have any knowledge of the Asia Pacific region. Consequently, sympathy for New Zealand interests can not be expected.¹⁶² This highlights the importance of official and informal dialogue between EU staff in Wellington and Canberra and, perhaps more importantly, those in Brussels.

Regional Security Institutions

Regional security institutions in the Asia Pacific region are useful networks within which security consultation can take place. Both the EU and New Zealand hold membership or observer status in a number of security institutions in the region. These include ASEAN, the ARF and the PIF. Other regional groupings implicitly connected to the EU-NZ security dialogue include track-one and track-two institutions including the FPDA, the UN, CSCAP, the IISS Shangri la Dialogue, and the PSI. These institutions, as outlined in the previous chapter, exist in an effort to maintain peace and promote security. Social interaction within these institutions also helps to build cultural, political and social links outside its formal settings. It is through these indispensable links that the dialogue can become more effective as knowledge sharing and cultural understanding are enhanced. The following section highlights one specific area of the EU and New Zealand dialogue: interaction through regional institutions.

The ARF provides for an effective and constructive security dialogue between the European Union and New Zealand. Officials from the EU and New Zealand place considerable importance on the ARF as a forum for constructive dialogue on political and

¹⁶⁰ Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007.

¹⁶¹ Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007.

¹⁶² Phill Goff, "New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement," 71.

security issues. The ARF not only acts as a medium for consultation, but also acts as a bridge for an EU-NZ security dialogue. Indeed, the current New Zealand Defence Minister stated that “New Zealand’s main vehicle of interaction with the EU on defence and security issues in the Asia Pacific region is through the ASEAN Regional Forum.”¹⁶³ When EU and New Zealand officials were asked about the effectiveness of the ARF, a large number considered the institution to be of significant importance. Although most interviewees mentioned that little concrete action has resulted from the multilateral dialogue process; contra scholarly analysis, the officials did not subscribe to the idea that the institution was merely a talk shop.¹⁶⁴ The head of the International Defence Relations Branch for the New Zealand Ministry of Defence stated that although the ARF can not effectively resolve conflict it has “become a useful forum for discussion on regional security issues and has spawned an amazing web of confidence building measures covering a wide range of security issues.”¹⁶⁵ As the current co-host of the forum, the EU is very active in the ARF. EU officials that were interviewed believe the ARF is progressing well and that many advantages exist in talking.¹⁶⁶ As an institution solely dedicated to regional security in the Asia Pacific region, the ARF provides for the most effective individual dialogue between New Zealand and the European Union, encourages peace and promotes effective multilateralism to deal with regional security in region.

The PIF is regarded as an important security institution for the South Pacific region. However, unlike the ARF, it is not seen as the most appropriate institution to provide a substantial security dialogue for the EU and New Zealand. Similarly, ASEAN does not offer a comprehensive environment for EU-NZ security dialogue. Indeed, as these institutions’ agendas are divided between security, trade and other objectives, the focus on security in the Asia Pacific region can become limited. Despite this, social interaction does take place with these institutions. Even if security does not enter into official or unofficial dialogue, the political and social links created between EU and New Zealand officials should not be underestimated.

¹⁶³ Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007.

¹⁶⁴ See Chapter 2 for a more exhaustive explanation of the ARF.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007.

¹⁶⁶ Interview EU official, 17 April 2007.

Another regional forum that can be often overlooked as a provider of security in the Asia Pacific region is the OECD. The Institutional branch of the OECD, the Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) and the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) offer another avenue for EU-NZ security dialogue to take place.¹⁶⁷ The normative value of the DAC-CPDC can be found in its promotion of a ‘culture of conflict prevention,’ which promotes knowledge sharing and cooperation amongst aid donors and other regional organisations such as the UN and EU.¹⁶⁸ Consequently, the security branch of the OECD provides for security cooperation between European and New Zealand officials, providing both agencies adopt a proactive stance in their relationship.

The UN is of prime importance to both the EU and New Zealand as the global bastion of effective multilateralism, the promoter of liberal democratic values and human rights. As a substantial partner to the UN, the EU works effectively in areas such as conflict prevention, environmental protection and peacekeeping. The UN is an appropriate forum for the New Zealand Mission to the UN to cooperate with and influence the EU on issues important to New Zealand’s interests. However, influence can be limited by the decision-making process of the EU: when 27 Member States have gone through a complicated process of agreeing on a particular piece of legislation, it is hard for any outside voice to be heard. Nevertheless, EU-NZ cooperation within the UN should not be undervalued; building relationships on a political and social level will have long-term effects that, although not quantifiable, may reap substantial rewards.

New Zealand is also involved with certain areas of the ESDP, which “enables New Zealand to remain engaged with European security policy thinking and developments.”¹⁶⁹ Maintaining effective interoperability vis à vis communications and other capabilities reinforces New Zealand’s presence as an effective security partner of the EU.

¹⁶⁷ The “OECD-DAC provide a good reference for [EU-NZ] dialogue.” See: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Pacific Donor Consultations, File No: AID/PAC/9, Vol. 3.

¹⁶⁸ The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD-DAC,” http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649_34567_33800224_1_1_1_1,00.html.

¹⁶⁹ Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007.

Relationships that are forged through cooperation in civilian and military fields can have positive repercussions for the EU-NZ security dialogue in the long-term. Although many of these military operations are played out through New Zealand's involvement with the UN in areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan, the continual interaction between the two parties benefits the overall EU-NZ security relationship, making it easier to discuss security issues in the Asia Pacific region. Similarly, New Zealand's involvement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) offers another possibility for unofficial political and social links to be formed. New Zealand is becoming increasingly aligned with NATO as seen in the 2006 US-UK agenda on the 'Food for Thought' on 'Global Partnerships,' which seeks to include Australia, Japan and New Zealand into a closer alliance with NATO.¹⁷⁰ This development will encourage a greater NZ-NATO relationship, which also means indirect access to EU personnel. Knowledge of operating procedures, compatibility in communications, and complementarity in other civilian and military capabilities will strengthen EU-NZ military relations and provide for a smoother transition if EU-NZ military actions were to eventuate.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) provides another implicit avenue for a European and New Zealand security dialogue. While the EU is currently not involved with PSI, a number of the EU Members States are involved with this security mechanism such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Consequently, the so called desktop activities and 'real world' exercises that have been instigated around the globe – including Singapore, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – provide for military and customs involvement, including political leaders' consultation.¹⁷¹ Other events attached to PSI also act in accommodating closer networks with Europe and New Zealand such as a recent PSI Operational Experts Group meeting held in Auckland in 2007. Reinforcing the notion of building social and political contacts through the PSI, European official

¹⁷⁰ Uzi Arad, Oded Eran, and Tommy Steiner, "Anchoring Israel to the Euroatlantic Community" in *NATO and Global Partners: views from the outside*, ed. Ronald D. Asmus, *Riga Papers* (Riga, Latvia: November 27 – 29, 2006): 13-14.

¹⁷¹ Phill Goff, "Cooperating for Non-Proliferation," Opening address of the Proliferation Security Initiative Operational Experts Group meeting (Auckland, 26th March 2007), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=28786>.

noted that the PSI's main achievement is to have "managed to create a community of people working on security issues in the partners countries...the Americans, the British, the New Zealanders, the Australian's – they know each other: they can e-mail each other when they have a problem, they can decide to do a supplementary meeting between a few countries if they want."¹⁷² Emphasising the significance of social interaction, the official went on to describe these connections as being just as important as signing a treaty. Consequently, PSI provides an opportunity to increase social and political ties between the operating countries.

Other track-one and track-two institutions also provide opportunities for EU and New Zealand officials to meet. Although the calibre of people who meet may not be in a direct position to make decisions or enhance the EU-NZ security dialogue, forging links with EU and New Zealand practitioners may be beneficial in the long-term, if they enter into a decision-making capacity in the future. Furthermore, cooperating and learning from each other will influence and build the security culture of the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region. Examples of institutions that represent the EU, its Member States or New Zealand include: the IISS Shangri La Dialogue; the FPDA; CSCAP; or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO).¹⁷³ It is interesting to note that the IISS Shangri La Dialogue 2007 agenda provides for one and a half days of informal bilateral meetings between Defence Ministers and officials.¹⁷⁴ This example illustrates the rising importance and value seen in promoting informal networks to provide closer cooperation between states and regions.

Regional institutions can quantify the EU-NZ relationship by providing a meeting place for both parties to discuss security-related issues on the Asia Pacific region. It is an efficient and cost-effective avenue for New Zealand officials to expand and deepen relations that can produce a greater volume of dialogue in the future. The ARF, as a specific security institution, offers the best avenue for New Zealand security consultation

¹⁷² Interview with European official, 17 April 2007.

¹⁷³ NB: this organisation is now effectively moribund as the main project, the Light Water Reactor Project (LWRP), has been cancelled.

¹⁷⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue," <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue>.

with the EU. The other institutions mentioned, while not all specific to security in the Asia Pacific region or directly relevant to the EU-NZ security dialogue, do offer the value of establishing vital links by encouraging social and political interaction. This will certainly enhance the security culture amongst EU and New Zealand officials in the Asia Pacific region.

EU Member State's Bilateral Dialogue

Three influential Member States of the EU – France, Germany and Britain – have security-related interests and dialogue with New Zealand on the Asia Pacific region. Portugal also maintains some interest in the region, which is mainly limited to East Timor for historical reasons. Although these interests are not directly involved with the EU, Member States do influence the decisions made within EU's institutions. The limited interests of Member States can also act as a precursor for greater EU-led involvement in the region.

British involvement continues to be substantial vis à vis its diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region. Britain is no longer a significant trading partner with the Asia Pacific region; however, it does share a solid loyalty with the region, which is reflected in its provision of 15 per cent of the EU's development funds to the Pacific.¹⁷⁵ Several factors lodge Britain's interests firmly in the Asia Pacific, these include: its three 'Realms' – Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu – in the South Pacific; deep historical roots; and the fact that Britain wishes to maintain influence over PICs connected to the Commonwealth as they make up more than 10 votes in the UN. Due to the above mentioned factors, maintaining formal dialogue with the South Pacific would seem an obvious vocation for Britain. It comes as some surprise then, that Britain has recently closed down diplomatic missions in Tonga, Kiribati, Vanuatu and East Timor, and has ended bilateral aid through the British Department for International Development (DFID). Commenting on this, British officials noted that "this has created an impression of UK withdraw from the Pacific...this perception has weakened our ability to influence

¹⁷⁵ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Europe, "FCO Strategy for the Pacific 2007-2009," Executive summary (October 2006), File no. AID/EUR/DA/1, Vol. 1.

developments in the region and possibly cost votes in the UN.”¹⁷⁶ However, Britain aims to change this image by cooperating more closely with PICs through bilateral and regional dialogues with New Zealand and Australia in general and with the EU in particular.¹⁷⁷ Concern over its image, and its resolve in amending the negative effects of its actions, will encourage Britain to promote the EU-NZ security dialogue as an “effective multiplier of the UK position”¹⁷⁸ and act as an alternative means of maintaining an interest and influence in the Pacific. Consequently, it can be expected that a certain amount of British lobbying for a deeper EU-NZ dialogue will eventuate.

France is currently the largest European influence in the Asia Pacific region. Indeed, its dependencies – New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Funtana – account for its significant diplomatic and military presence in the region. New Zealand enjoys close security relations with France, which are founded on two primary agreements: the Joint Declaration on Maritime Surveillance and Combating Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, signed in 2006; and the ‘FRANZ’ agreement on disaster relief between France, Australia and New Zealand, signed in 1993. The disaster relief efforts by France, such as the recent Tsunami in the Solomon Islands, have been heralded by New Zealand officials as complimentary and effective.¹⁷⁹ In regard to fishing surveillance, the agreement signed in 2006 attempts to avoid duplication by providing close communication and intelligence. In addition to the joint collaboration on surveillance, the New Zealand Army cooperate with New Caledonian troops. There is currently a good level of complementarity between the forces as they participate in regular exercise programmes, fisheries surveillance and disaster relief programmes.¹⁸⁰ French embassy staff also meets with New Zealand’s MFAT staff approximately every three or four months to discuss matters of interest including security in the Asia Pacific region. The

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Europe, “FCO Strategy for the Pacific 2007-2009.” Also see “The Christchurch Press, “EU ambitions emerge” (June 3, 2006).

¹⁷⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Europe, “FCO Strategy for the Pacific 2007-2009.” For an example of UK aid development in the Pacific see Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific, British High Commission, Joint Statement: “Pitcairn to benefit from improved communication links, Wellington, New Zealand.

¹⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Europe, “Where we are now HMG Strategic Priorities in the Pacific,” Executive summary (October 2006), File no. AID/EUR/DA/1, Vol. 1.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

withdraw of the British in the Pacific and limited efforts of the US, combined with increasing Japanese and Chinese involvement has, arguably, increased New Zealand's relationship with France and possibly enhanced the EU-NZ security dialogue.¹⁸¹ Constant interaction between New Zealand and France through a number of effective avenues, pertaining to security in the Asia Pacific region, encourages closer cooperation and provides French officials with a higher understanding of New Zealand culture, its values, crisis management, customs processes and diplomatic procedures. France is currently the only EU Member State that cooperates on a military basis and continues to be the most active European security partner with New Zealand. Security relations between France and New Zealand contribute to security efforts in the Asia Pacific region and will continue to prove to be a viable and implicit means of increasing the EU-NZ security relationship in the Asia Pacific region.

Germany's focus on security is not as strong as French or British influences in the Asia Pacific region. However, it often consults with New Zealand's MFAT, maintains trilateral political planning staff meetings between Australia and New Zealand, and supports regional integration through diplomatic efforts.¹⁸² Germany is also involved with track-one and two regional security institutions and seminars. For example, Germany co-sponsored the ARF Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in 2005.¹⁸³ Historical links with the South Pacific may keep Germany's interests in the Pacific, but it currently remains limited as an effective avenue for EU-NZ security relations.

Visits by EU Member States to New Zealand have functioned as a catalyst by enhancing the EU-NZ dialogue. A medium-term objective of New Zealand's MFAT, as outlined in its annual report, is to "strengthen New Zealand's engagement with Europe."¹⁸⁴ This has

¹⁸¹ Interview European official, 17 April 2007.

¹⁸² Joerg Zimmerman, "New Zealand's Role in German Foreign Policy" Address at the National Centre for Research on Europe, Round Table Seminar, 25 March 2006.

¹⁸³ Japan Centre for International Exchange, "Dialogue and Research Monitor: Community Building in East Asia," <http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/track1.html>.

¹⁸⁴ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Annual Report 2005/06, for the year ended 30 June 2006*, MFAT, Wellington, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/mediaandpublications/annualreport0506.pdf>.

been done by hosting a number of European officials. In 2006 visits included: the Belgium, British, Ireland and Malta Prime Ministers; Ministers from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and the Ukraine; Governor-General to Ireland and Greece; the President of Lithuania; the French Minister for Overseas Territories; and senior members of the European and French Parliaments and the Spanish Senate. According to MFAT, these visits have increased engagement with the EU and key members over a full range of New Zealand interests...[culminating in] closer EU/NZ cooperation.”¹⁸⁵

4.4 The Importance of the EU-NZ Security Dialogue

How officials and practitioners perceive the importance of the EU-NZ security dialogue for the Asia Pacific region will affect the decisions and actions they make. Thus, from a constructivist perspective, exploring the perceptions of EU and New Zealand officials involved with security or international affairs in the Asia Pacific region will help elucidate why the current volume of dialogue exists and how it might develop. The following outlines the responses of 10 interviews conducted in Brussels and Wellington in 2006 and 2007.

While official rhetoric trumpets the significance of the EU-NZ security dialogue,¹⁸⁶ there was a mixed response from EU and New Zealand officials when questioned on the importance of the security consultations in regard to the Asia Pacific region. Over half of the interviewees considered the EU-NZ security dialogue to be ‘important’ to ‘very important’ for the Asia Pacific region. However, the interviewees either had alternative ideas about what the security relationship constituted or possessed little understanding of what actually exists: for example, the biannual ministerial consultation between the EU Troika and the New Zealand Foreign Minister was barely mentioned or alluded to. The

¹⁸⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Annual Report 2005/06, for the year ended 30 June 2006*, 60.

¹⁸⁶ See Helen Clark, “Facing a complex future: Prime Minister Helen Clark congratulates the NZIIA on reaching another significant milestone and outlines her government’s approach to foreign affairs in the new millennium.” *New Zealand International Review* 29, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 2004): 3.

minority who did have a coherent understanding of the relationship were more cautious in their analysis, noting the importance of the dialogue as ‘not greatly significant.’ However, they did not underestimate its growing significance, predicting a closer relationship with the EU in the future.¹⁸⁷ The increasing role of the EU in the Asia Pacific region was seen as the major incentive to deepen dialogue as there would be more security issues to discuss and cooperate on. Indeed, it has only been in the last few years that the Asia Pacific region has come into the agenda.¹⁸⁸ Lastly, one participant concluded that the relationship was of limited importance, branding New Zealand as a limited player too far removed from the EU to be effective.

The amount of resources available to the EU and New Zealand directly affects the volume of dialogue possible. For example, the French would like to step up the involvement of exercise programmes with French troops but New Zealand has declined due to its limited resources. Indeed, a number of EU and New Zealand official’s noted that limited human resources were the primary reason for not having a deeper dialogue.¹⁸⁹ The lack of resources also illustrates the importance of the dialogue for the EU and New Zealand. If the dialogue was prioritised more highly, and if it was accepted that increasing the volume of dialogue would be beneficial for the EU and New Zealand, human and financial resources would become less of a hurdle. While accepting that the volume of dialogue can be heavily influenced by human and financial resources, the capacity of the EU-NZ security dialogue can increase with careful planning and effective preparation.

While resources will always be limited, how officials perceive the EU will have a dramatic effect on the future volume of EU-NZ security dialogue. As it stands, the relationship is seen as important but not overly significant. New Zealand and the EU both have interests in the Asia Pacific region and certainly understand the positive

¹⁸⁷ Two interviews conducted with New Zealand politicians, 16 April 2007

¹⁸⁸ Interview with a New Zealand politician, 16 April 2007.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with a New Zealand politician, 16 April 2007, interview with EU Commission official: “The EU will not institutionalise the relationship because of its limited human resources.”

implications of cooperation. However, until the EU increases its political profile in the Asia Pacific region, the volume of dialogue will not substantially increase.

4.5 Results of the European Union and New Zealand Security Dialogue

Looking at the results of the EU-NZ security dialogue provides an appropriate method to determine the effectiveness and value of the relationship. However, this is largely determined by how success is defined. In line with the theoretical constructs of this thesis, a constructivist approach would place high value in the quality and quantity of social interaction. In this regard, increasing political ties and social interaction on security issues in the Asia Pacific region – which is further reinforced by recent diplomatic manoeuvres, international developments, and the evolving nature of the EU's political role in the world – can be viewed as successful. While it is difficult to quantify the effect of informal dialogue and link social interaction and learning to political actions and decisions, continual formal and informal bilateral dialogue between New Zealand and the EU will increase the likelihood of closer security cooperation. Through knowledge and information sharing greater coordination and complementarity can be developed, promoting a better regional security environment for the Asia Pacific region in the future. Apart from forming closer links, the dialogue has also resulted in the signing of an updated Action Plan in May 2007, enhanced cooperation in environmental and development assistance, and an EU-NZ joint support for the policing system in Bougainville.¹⁹⁰ Through a constructivist lens, the measurement of success will be dependent on the long-term outcomes of the dialogue; however, it would appear that the developing dialogue is certainly positive.

¹⁹⁰ Christopher Patten, "EU-New Zealand relations after enlargement: Chris Patten comments on the implications of the major expansion of the European Union underway at present," *New Zealand International Review* 28 no. 4 (2003).

Conclusion

Perceptions matter in international relations. The choices actors make are determined by a number of intervening and independent variables; social interaction and cultural perceptions are variables seldom analysed in political science, yet are an essential aspect of the international environment. As international actors continue to pay more attention to the effects of social and cultural links in global politics, the appropriateness of a constructive approach seems warranted. A complex network of EU and New Zealand dialogue systems exist with an implicit or explicit association to security in the Asia Pacific region. The most effective form of dialogue is found through the ARF as this provides a defined and appropriate forum to discuss issues explicitly pertaining to the Asia Pacific region. All areas of dialogue – from ministerial consultation meetings to EU Member State activities in the PSI – form a conglomerate matrix within which the EU-NZ security dialogue can be defined. While the importance of social and cultural themes in the dialogue are paramount in achieving a complete understanding of the consultation processes, the link between self-interest and the collective-interest warrants further examination to support a viable constructivist approach. Bound together by common values and interests and supported by a plethora of economic, political and cultural links, EU-NZ security cooperation is seen as largely significant. The increasing interdependence, the rise in regional security issues and a growing EU presence in the Asia Pacific region certainly provide fertile grounds for the growth of security dialogue. However, the limits of the dialogue are set by the perceptions of EU institutions, the New Zealand government and the associated political actors: the security dialogue will only develop according to the attention it receives from EU and New Zealand officials.

5 New Zealand's Security-Identity in the Asia Pacific Region

Security and defence policies are largely determined by the existing perceptions of the ruling elite. These perceptions will help determine the effectiveness and form of bilateral or multilateral relationships forged between countries or regions. By analysing New Zealand's approach towards its security and defence policies and investigating what affects officials' perceptions, a specific security-identity can be observed. Reviewing a selection of factors within the socio-milieu will help to determine New Zealand's security identity in the Asia Pacific region and, subsequently, determine the depth and volume of the EU-NZ security relationship (see Figure 2.1). When New Zealand representatives participate in bilateral, multilateral or (sub) regional settings, the various identity formations will react with each other, through the process of socialisation, contributing towards possible increases in discourse volume.¹⁹¹ Not all socio-cultural or socio-political factors can be analysed; however, certain elements that are seen to be vital to the EU-NZ security dialogue are examined. These include: the influence of historical perceptions; New Zealand's Asia Pacific connection; the impact of geography and size of New Zealand; its perceived threats; and capabilities. How New Zealand officials comprehend and prioritise their security environment, and define security, is also analysed in this section. These factors are analysed through the lens of the Labour government's values and principles which provides the impetus and reveals the direction of New Zealand's current foreign policy. New Zealand's security-identity formation will be later analysed, compared and contrasted against an EU security-identity, resulting in a concise understanding of the EU-NZ security relationship.

Political rhetoric, echoed through certified documents, interviews and speeches, are used to explore the official position of New Zealand's security and defence policies in the Asia Pacific region. It is recognised that political rhetoric may not match political reality:

¹⁹¹ See Figure 2.1. The factors that contribute to the security identity of New Zealand and the European Union, while not complete, have been chosen due to their socio-political tenants, accessibility of data and diverse characteristics.

values and norms can be compromised in order to achieve a particular agenda or to manoeuvre around diplomatic barriers. However, from a constructivist perspective, political rhetoric serves a purpose in illustrating intent and revealing the various facets that contribute to the formation of a security-identity. Furthermore, the content of political rhetoric remains useful as it is connected to and affects stereotypes and shapes perspectives.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the area of analysis that this section will focus on. In order to establish a clear understanding of ‘A’ (NZ-EU Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific Region), area ‘B’ (New Zealand Security Culture in the Asia Pacific Region) will be analysed in this chapter.




Figure 5.1: Area of analysis: New Zealand’s security culture in the Asia Pacific region

5.1 Historical Perceptions

*The alternation of forgetting and remembering
etches the path of power.*¹⁹²

Matha Minow

New Zealand's security and defence involvement in the Asia Pacific region has laid the social and political foundations upon which current New Zealand foreign policy is built. This section will determine what elements of the past – from the Second World War to the present – contribute to the outlook of current New Zealand foreign policy on the Asia Pacific region. In the last 62 years New Zealand has built strong social, cultural and economic networks in South East Asia and the Pacific. This, combined with past diplomatic and military endeavours, may prove valuable for the EU-NZ security dialogue. By providing appropriate socio-political information to EU officials, a culture-focused aspect of the dialogue can develop. Recognising the various aspects within the formation of New Zealand's security-identity will enable a succinct comparative study to take place between the EU and New Zealand. A number of themes run through the last 60 years of New Zealand's security relationship with Asia Pacific. These factors include collective security, effective multilateralism, an evolving independent foreign policy and a shared history, producing intimate diplomatic relations.

New Zealand's defence planning was moulded around its unquenchable loyalty to Britain in the first half of the 19th century, as its primary security provider. However, during and after the Second World War New Zealand began to change its approach. This did not mean a departure from its defence relations with Britain but rather marked the start of a collective security approach: a search for appropriate allies that could ensure security. Although weapons continued to be procured from Britain, and English military traditions were maintained after the Second World War, New Zealand acquired a stronger security

¹⁹² Matha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 119. In Jan-Werner Müller, "Introduction: the power of memory, the memory of power and the power over memory," in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge; United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 30.

partnership with Australia – under the Canberra Pact – and with the US.¹⁹³ A strong commitment to multilateralism through the UN, combined with British, Australian and US security cooperation, set the foundations of New Zealand’s foreign policy for the first three decades after the War. The 1970s marked a period of change for New Zealand foreign policy. British entry in to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 and New Zealand’s firm stance against nuclear weapons diminished the US and British security dialogue. This meant that closer defence and security alliances were forged with Australia and support for regional security mechanisms grew. Recent efforts involving New Zealand personnel in Cambodia in the early 1990s, the deployment of troops to the Solomon Islands under the auspices of RAMSI in 2003, and to Timor Leste in 1999, reflect a continuum of regional support and adherence to collective security in New Zealand foreign policy. This, and occasionally sounding an independent voice in the international arena – such as Labour’s stand against Nuclear weapons in the 1980s – continue as major themes in New Zealand foreign policy.

The Pacific Island Countries (PICs)

In the post colonial period of New Zealand’s security involvement in the Pacific, diplomatic and cultural ties were deepened. New Zealand’s colonial heritage created firm links with the Pacific, which provided a firm base for continual contact. This was often in the form of development aid, diplomatic assistance and military interventions.

The first key regional initiative directly aimed at the Pacific, after the Second World War, was the creation of the SPC (South Pacific Commission) in 1947. During the 1950s and 1960s New Zealand’s approach towards the Pacific was bound in idealism and optimism.¹⁹⁴ Open immigration policies and diplomatic assistance increased socio-political and cultural links between the Pacific and New Zealand. The 1970s saw a marked change in New Zealand’s external policies. Diplomatic perspectives looked past

¹⁹³ Peter Greener, “New Zealand and the Push for Peace: Developing an independent Foreign Policy” in *Push for Peace, Commemorating the Past, Reflecting on the Present, Resolving Conflict in the Future*, ed. Peter Greener (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2005), 51.

¹⁹⁴ Stephen Hoadley, *Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand & Australia: Towards a New Paradigm* (Wellington, New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005), 6.

their colonial responsibilities towards a greater recognition of the strategic importance of the Asia Pacific region.¹⁹⁵ Fraudulence and corruption, mixed with environmental disasters, created a heightened awareness of the various problems associated with the Pacific. This resulted in a redirection and expansion of New Zealand's aid programme to maintain stability.¹⁹⁶ Greater alliance systems also developed, including a movement towards regionalism as a vehicle for dialogue, such as the South Pacific Forum¹⁹⁷ and the Forum Fisheries Agency, established in 1971 and 1977 respectively.¹⁹⁸ Diplomatic thought also stressed the so-called Pacific Way; a notion coined by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, which stresses ideals of non-intervention and tolerance. This diplomatic approach has certainly influenced Pacific leaders, resulting in intimate bilateral and regional dialogue. The philosophic introduction of the 'failed state' concept in the 1990s also saw a growth in the New Zealand and Australian management of Pacific affairs to ensure stability. This could often be in the form of development aid or military interaction. Through the Biketawa Declaration, under the auspices of the PIF, regional security manoeuvres could be authorised, such as military involvement in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, Nauru and Tonga. Maintaining peace and stability through development aid, diplomatic manoeuvres and military interventions, as well as promoting New Zealand values, has characterised New Zealand's involvement in the Pacific. The colonial zeitgeist may influence the current strategy in the Pacific; however, the primary motivation for a peaceful Pacific has been the security of New Zealand.

South East Asia

Despite a continual and earnest presence in the Pacific during the second half of the 19th century, South East Asia was a primary focus for New Zealand's strategic interests. During the first two decades after the Second World War, New Zealand's main approach

¹⁹⁵ Ken Ross, *Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-century 1970-1995* (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Research School of Pacific Studies; Australia National University, 1993), 60-1.

¹⁹⁶ Richard Kennaway, "Change and New Zealand Foreign Policy" in *Beyond New Zealand II, Foreign Policy into the 1990s*, ed. Richard Kennaway and John Henderson (Auckland, New Zealand: Longman Paul, 1991), 240.

¹⁹⁷ The South Pacific Forum would be later renamed the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2000.

¹⁹⁸ Kennaway, "Change and New Zealand Foreign Policy," 239-40.

in the region was defence and development.¹⁹⁹ During the Cold War struggling regimes in South East Asia, coupled with a perceived threat of communism, provided the impetus to promote regional stability.²⁰⁰ Thus, the ‘forward defence’ strategy was implemented to preserve physical, ideological and economic interests. Apart from keeping the communists at a distance, the second objective of the ‘forward defence’ was to retain the capabilities and presence key allies – Australia, Britain and the United States – in South East Asia.

Although collective security and development aid continued, New Zealand’s philosophy began to alter. In the 1970s, the Kirk government chose to eliminate ‘forward defence’ in favour of a ‘moral’ foreign policy.²⁰¹ During the following decades, New Zealand improved its diplomatic and economic relations with South East Asia, including the recognition of China in 1972. The bilateral contacts based on defence and aid slowly changed to a multilateral approach based on trade and aid development. Although New Zealand may have lost some diplomatic intimacy with the narrowing of its bilateral dialogue, other social, economic and military links were maintained, such as exchanges, increases in trade links, and the decision to keep New Zealand forces in Singapore until 1989.²⁰² The forward defence strategy has long been out of use, however, one aspect remains: a reliance on the capabilities and presence of allies. Due to a limited budget and defence capabilities, New Zealand’s dependence on Australia, America and Britain has been a constant theme for New Zealand foreign policy. Indeed, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister noted, “[w]e need the United States, as well as Australia, to be intimately engaged in the Pacific if we are to be successful in our own endeavours.”²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ Jim Rolfe, “Coming to terms with the Regional Identity” in *South East Asia and New Zealand, A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies; Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in association with Victoria University Press, 2005), 33-4.

²⁰⁰ Smith, “The Defence Dimension” in *South East Asia and New Zealand, A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, 2.

²⁰¹ Incidentally, it would be another 25 years before the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, would introduce his ‘ethical’ foreign policy.

²⁰² Ibid, 26. Also see Russell Marshall, “South East Asia and New Zealand,” *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 38, no. 3 (1988): 17.

²⁰³ Winston Peters, “Putting New Zealand Values to Work in the Pacific,” New Year Address (31 January 2007), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=28256>.

Collective Security

New Zealand's commitment to collective security has developed from its inauguration into the UN in 1945 to paramountcy in current foreign policy perspectives.²⁰⁴ New Zealand's regional security efforts in the Asia Pacific region have been active for over half a century. The political, diplomatic, social and economic networks established during this time have provided New Zealand with an intimate knowledge of the region and an awareness of regional security institutions. In an effort to counter the spread of communism, the Colombo Plan was established in 1950, which was designed to alleviate poverty through development assistance and aid.²⁰⁵ Other regional defence and security institutions were also created, such as ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) in the 1950s, the AMDA (Anglo-Malayan Defence Alliance) in 1957, the PIF, and the FPDA, which took over the AMDA in 1971. Apart from these regional efforts, New Zealand also committed troops to the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, participated in SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) and formed an official dialogue process based on defence cooperation with ASEAN in 1975.²⁰⁶ Although the PIF, the FPDA and ASEAN are the only surviving institutions, the network of regional and bilateral relations New Zealand supported in the Asia Pacific region introduced New Zealand to Asia and deepened bonds in the Pacific. The Colombo Plan instigated exchanges between South East Asia and New Zealand, technical staff were provided to assist in administrative duties and even the, now moribund, SEATO proved to "increase New Zealand's awareness of South East Asia and of issues related to regional security, defence and development."²⁰⁷ Civil-society networks were also established and economic links grew in reaction to the narrowing of the British market. Other institutional 'spin-offs' developed along side ASEAN, such as post-ministerial conferences, the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ARF.

New Zealand's long history in regional groupings has created an intimate knowledge of regional processes and strong contacts, which creates a socio-political advantage in its

²⁰⁴ For more on the evolution of New Zealand's adherence to regionalism and collective security see Greener, "Developing an Independent Foreign Policy," 50-54.

²⁰⁵ Rolfe, "Coming to terms with the Regional Identity," 34.

²⁰⁶ Marshall, "South East Asia and New Zealand," 18.

²⁰⁷ Rolfe, "Coming to terms with the Regional Identity," 37.

relations with South East Asia. Although officials have been cautious in joining regional bodies, often questioning ‘value for money,’²⁰⁸ there remains little opportunity to secure peace other than through regional dialogue mechanisms.

The legacy of New Zealand’s current foreign policy approach, steeped in morality and chosen out of necessity, has formed a unique and somewhat predictable security-identity. Traits from the past continue to add to the formation of a specific security-identity, such as reliance upon regional structures and allies, an independent voice in external relations, close cultural and economic ties, and successful diplomatic prowess. The historical approach to foreign policy has evolved to become more assertive, while maintaining an air of impartiality. The direction of the continually evolving foreign policy will be guided by the policies inherent in national politics.

5.2 National Politics

Labour and National approaches to Foreign Policy

A marked difference exists between Labour and National approaches to foreign policy. Although there are exceptions to the rule, it is generally recognised that the current Labour-led government pursues a more active, yet idealistic, perspective toward its foreign policy. It takes on a broader definition of security, limiting its military efforts primarily to the South Pacific and multilateral endeavours, such as NATO or the UN.²⁰⁹ Conversely, the National Party maintains a traditional and more inward approach to foreign policy, concerned with homeland security and trade.²¹⁰ National’s focus is primarily directed towards establishing close relationships with large powers that can offer a security umbrella for New Zealand, essentially “configuring its defence force to fit

²⁰⁸ Rolfe, “Coming to terms with the Regional Identity,” 33.

²⁰⁹ Dick Gentles, “New Zealand defence policy: has it been transformed? Dick Gentles finds some new developments that seem to represent a transformation of New Zealand’s approach to defence,” *New Zealand International Review* 30, no. 4 (2005): par 13., <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-134575409.html>.

²¹⁰ David McCraw, “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy Under National and Labour Governments: Variations on the “small state” theme?” *Pacific Affairs* 67, no.1 (1994): 7. Unlike National, Labour predominately focuses on promoting social justice/humanitarian concerns, a social justice, anti-militarist approach and is sympathetic to developing countries. Also see Robert Ayson, “New Zealand and Asia Pacific Security: New Rationales for Engagement?” *Contemporary South East Asia* 22, no. 2 (August 2000): 396.

in with alliance requirements.”²¹¹ When Labour took over government in 1999, one of its key priorities mentioned in its manifesto was to create a new approach to defence.²¹² The following analysis primarily focuses on Labour’s ‘new’ perspective on New Zealand’s foreign and security policies.

5.3 New Zealand’s Concept of Security

Defining Security

The structure of New Zealand’s security and defence policies is conditioned by how state actors define the concept of security. It unequivocally affects how the government approaches international relations, such as the EU-NZ security dialogue. If New Zealand maintains an alternative or dissimilar concept of security to the EU, the volume of dialogue can become limited. Thus, it is vital to explore the security conceptualisations inherent in New Zealand foreign policy. The current Labour government’s conceptualisation of security can be seen in its Defence Policy Framework, produced in June 2000: “[d]efence policy and foreign policy are a partnership aimed at securing New Zealand’s physical, economic, social and cultural well being, and meeting our regional and global responsibilities.”²¹³ More specifically, New Zealand’s current definition of security holds a non-traditional outlook. In a recent speech made by the current New Zealand Defence Minister, the Hon Phil Goff stated:

Our strategic perspective is that while New Zealand at present is not threatened militarily by another state, we face non-traditional security threats in areas such as biosecurity, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-national crime and terrorism. We have other concerns about the destabilisation of our region from the availability of black

²¹¹ Gentles, “New Zealand defence policy: has it been transformed?” 242.

²¹² Greener, “New Zealand and the Push for Peace: Developing an independent Foreign Policy,” 58.

²¹³ New Zealand’s Ministry of Defence, *The Government’s Defence Policy Framework*, 2000, (Wellington, 2000), 1-4., <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz>. NB: This section also acknowledges the notion an ‘interchangeable precedence’ on security threats. In other words, definitions of security are liable to alter over time.

market military weapons, natural disasters, and state fragility and failure in the Pacific and beyond.²¹⁴

Echoing Labour's perspectives on security, Goff depicts a wide view of security, which encompasses the idea of 'human security' and accepts traditional and non-traditional security issues.²¹⁵ In contrast to New Zealand's understanding of security during the Cold War, it is now understood that security encompasses areas not aligned with traditional concepts of security, such as military and state-to-state conflict.²¹⁶ The impact of globalisation and technology has created an environment of transnational security threats, highlighting the need for increased multilateral cooperation. Some critics are concerned that a wide view of security will militarise or securitize previously non-traditional activities.²¹⁷ However, New Zealand's need to prioritise security challenges according to officials' perspectives and capabilities reduces the disadvantages of a wide outlook on security. How New Zealand officials perceive threats also helps to further define a clear concept of New Zealand's strategic outlook.

Perceived Security Threats to New Zealand

New Zealand has a unique strategic perspective as a country that does not see itself as a threat, nor believes that there are any immediate security threats against its national sovereignty or well-being. Former Prime Minister, David Lange, once wrote that "New Zealand is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica."²¹⁸ Although the nature of security has changed considerably from the time Lange talked about images of security, New Zealand officials continue to see themselves as non-threatening and consider real security

²¹⁴ Phil Goff, "Transformation of the New Zealand Defence Forces," Address to the National Defence University (Washington, 24 April 2006), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=25536>.

²¹⁵ Human security can be defined as the 'freedom from fear and want.' Interestingly, the idea of wide security has been percolating in New Zealand's political consciences for some time, see: Ken Paddington and Witi Ihimaera, "Environment, Security and Identity," *New Zealand International Review* 9, no. 5 (1984): 12-16.

²¹⁶ A prominent New Zealand diplomat categorises global, human, regional, neighbourhood, cyber, economic and social aspects as legitimate security concerns. See Terence O'Brian, "Risk and Conflict: Challenges for New Zealand," in *Push for Peace, Commemorating the Past, Reflecting on the Present, Resolving Conflict in the Future*, ed. Greener, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2005), 116.

²¹⁷ Beth K. Greener-Barcham, "Combating terrorism: Beth Greener-Barcham discusses the problems New Zealand faces in defining terrorism." *New Zealand International Review* 29 no. 3 (2004): 11.

²¹⁸ Goff, "Transformation of the New Zealand Defence Forces."

threats to New Zealand to be severely limited. Despite this, there are security challenges that, while not affecting New Zealand security directly or in the traditional sense, could impinge on the well-being of New Zealand. From a constructivist point of view, what a nation defines as a security threat will generally be the major security issue at one point in time. Thus, as stated by two leading security officials in the current government, the perceived security challenges that New Zealand recognises for the Asia Pacific region include: terrorism; transnational crime; disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the environment; HIV/AIDS; and the illegal movement of people, drugs and weapons.²¹⁹ The security challenges outlined are all important to New Zealand's strategic environment, however, what state actors prioritise as the major issues will have an effect on the final security-identity formation.

New Zealand officials prioritise terrorism as the current largest, transnational security challenge. Political rhetoric portrays concern that terrorism could threaten the "rule of law, and freedoms that are inseparable from our way of life."²²⁰ Both the government's Communication Assessments Bureau report and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service report for the year ending 2005 stated that counter-terrorism continues to be the main focus for their departments.²²¹ Although terrorism is currently prioritised as the leading security challenge, other threats also remain in New Zealand's security consciousness.

Perceived Security Threats to the Asia Pacific Region

The strategic environment within the Asia Pacific region remains a crucial security challenge for New Zealand. Officials are aware that poverty and weak governance

²¹⁹ See Goff, "Transformation of the New Zealand Defence Forces." And Marian Hobbs, "Securing Peace: New Zealand's Role" in *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, ed. John Henderson and Greg Watson (Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury University Press, 2006), 21.

²²⁰ Winston Peters, "Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World," Address to the Centre for Strategic Studies Conference: 'The Asia Pacific: Future Strategic Perspectives' (13 December 2006), www.beehive.govt.nz.

²²¹ New Zealand's Security Intelligence Service, *Report of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service: Report to the House of Representatives*, 2005 (Wellington, 30 June 2005), 6., <http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/publications/>. Also see New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau, *The Government's Communications Security Bureau Annual Report*, (Wellington, 30 June 2005), 5., <http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/publications/annualreports/2005/>.

contribute to potential security threats. Transnational crime, HIV/AIDS, the illegal movement of people, drugs and weapons, environmental issues – such as competition for marine resources and global warming – are real security challenges that can occur as a result of political and social instability.²²² New Zealand highly values contacts in the Asia Pacific, including trade, economic, political and defence ties and other linkages through migration, education, cultural and private sectors. These factors create a complicated network that can be jeopardised by conflict or internal insecurity.²²³ New Zealand's Foreign Minister recently stated that there is currently a growing anxiety amongst New Zealand officials in assuring the general stability of the Asia Pacific region.²²⁴ Apart from key interests in the Pacific, areas of concern in the wider geo-strategic area include the Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula and South Asia.²²⁵ Other strategic flashpoints, such as the Spratly Islands or protecting key sea lanes are also recognised as possible security challenges. Competition between Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the US and China for fishing access in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Pacific Islands also generates considerable concern amongst New Zealand officials.²²⁶ However, the general attitude amongst top New Zealand diplomats is that actual conflict is unlikely, as this could affect critical Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and dependent economic needs in South East Asia.²²⁷ For many New Zealand officials who were interviewed, the primary security concern in the Pacific region is the fragility of PICs, which is connected to transnational crime and poor governance issues. In South East Asia, terrorism and nuclear non proliferation were mentioned as the dominant security challenges. Other security threats that continue to plague the minds of New Zealand officials were China-Taiwan rivalry, Sino-Japanese relations, transport issues, climate change, population and health issues.

²²² See Hobbs, "Securing Peace: New Zealand's Role," 21-23.

²²³ New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Statement of Intent 2006-2009, Intermediate Outcome III: A Rules-based International System that Supports Our Security and Prosperity Goals and Promotes Our Values*, (2006), <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Publications/Statement-of-intent/0-outcome3.php>.

²²⁴ Peters, "Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World."

²²⁵ *Ibid.*

²²⁶ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *External Assessments Bureau Strategic Assessment 2000*, (Wellington, 24 March 2000), 10., www.executive.govt.nz/MINISTER/burton/defence/strategic/eab-strategic-assessment.doc.

²²⁷ Auckland diplomatic meeting with New Zealand ambassadors who are currently stationed in ASEAN countries. Personal Notes taken at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Seminar with Business Community (Auckland, 17 March 2006).

Another transnational issue is New Zealand's strong conviction against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and supporting disarmament initiatives. This has long been a security concern for New Zealand that is deeply woven into the fabric of New Zealand society. The New Zealand government firmly believes in a collective approach to the global ratification of an all-inclusive Nuclear Test Ban treaty.²²⁸

Looking at security through a wide or non-traditional lens, the current Labour-led government considers its administration to be in a privileged position as a country that has no direct security threats. Specific security challenges that are predominantly transnational in nature continue to direct New Zealand's foreign and security policy. Understanding how New Zealand conceptualises security and what the explicit security challenges are, will mean that a comparative analysis can be performed against EU conceptualisation to ascertain where divergences and convergences lie.

5.4 'The Book End of Asia:' Geographical Perceptions of New Zealand in the Asia Pacific Region

Defining the Asia Pacific Region

How New Zealand officials perceive their immediate and peripheral security environment has a considerable affect on the security relationships that are forged within the Asia Pacific region and beyond. The volume of EU-NZ security dialogue can also be affected by how state actors define the Asia Pacific region. Even though "perceiving Asia is but an indispensable national experience of New Zealand in confronting its Asian destiny,"²²⁹ little scholarly work has been undertaken on New Zealand's perceptions of Asia. For these reasons it is necessary to identify how New Zealand understands and perceives its geographic location and the Asia Pacific region. Indeed, this sentiment is reflected in the

²²⁸ Hobbs, "Securing Peace: New Zealand's Role," 20.

²²⁹ Hartdegen, "Perceiving Asia 1945-1998," 26. Please also note that the above mentioned phrase in the title was originally coined by Dr Sanjaya Baru, who described India and New Zealand as the 'book ends of Asia.'

New Zealand's Foreign Ministers own words: "It is the nation in the mirror that shapes how we look in and how we look out in the Pacific."²³⁰

It is generally understood that New Zealand officials see South East Asia and the Pacific as two separate entities. Three major reasons for this have been accredited to trade, geography and culture. The difference in trade relations between the South Pacific and South East Asia has been substantial, which reinforces an imaginary demarcation line between the Pacific and South East Asia.²³¹ New Zealand's position and its commitments in the South Pacific, such as its responsibilities for the security and defence of Tokelau, the Cook Islands and Niue, creates an environment in which New Zealand is compelled to prioritise its diplomatic and security efforts towards the South Pacific.²³² Although South East Asia and the Pacific are generally separated, political rhetoric will often combine the two as Asia Pacific. New Zealand's MFAT defines Asia Pacific as the "[c]ountries of Asia from China South to Indonesia, with Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands."²³³ Despite this, New Zealand foreign policy clearly defines South East Asia and the Pacific separately. The economic, cultural and security needs of the two regions clearly provide the impetus for this policy trend.²³⁴ Indeed, the physical location of New Zealand also influences its understanding of the region.

Conceptualising the Geographical Position and Size of New Zealand

Geographical isolation combined with the small size of New Zealand's population, land area and economy have created fixed perceptions on how foreign and security policies are made.²³⁵ The alleged images of New Zealand's economy, demography, and

²³⁰ Peters, "Putting New Zealand Values to work in the Pacific."

²³¹ Ayson, "New Zealand and Asia Pacific Security," 397.

²³² Considerable attention is also administered to South East Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. See Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *External Assessments Bureau Strategic Assessment 2000*.

²³³ New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges, 2000*, (Wellington, 2000), 3., <http://www.executive.govt.nz/minister/burton/defence/mfat/issues-sovereignty.htm>.

²³⁴ Timor Leste is the exception to the rule, which sits on the demarcation line of Asia and the Pacific and maintains both Pacific and Asian elements within its culture, politics and economy. Personal Notes taken at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Seminar with Business Community.

²³⁵ New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*, 9.

geography affect how state actors view themselves and perceive their own security environment.

New Zealand's geographical position has created a feeling of security and a non-threatening environment.²³⁶ However, there have been some critics of this position, who argue that technology and globalisation have "collapsed distance and abridged the tyranny of New Zealand's remoteness."²³⁷ Indeed, terrorist activities in the Asia Pacific region, such as the Bali bombings, draw New Zealand closer to international security concerns.²³⁸ New Zealand's tendency to promote multilateral dialogue and its advocacy for regional forums, such as the PIF or the ARF, also dilutes the potency of New Zealand's geographical reality. Don McKinnon stated, "while all of the economic, political, cultural and people-to-people linkages between New Zealand and the rest of the Asia Pacific may be encouraging a sense of New Zealand's regional identity, these have not been sufficient to completely undermine the sense of distance in security terms."²³⁹ The transnational nature of New Zealand's security challenges seemingly creates a closer connection with the world. Nevertheless, as is often the case in politics, perceptions can override reality. The future may entail a change in outlook; however, New Zealand's perception of itself remains primarily as a geographically isolated country. The principle outcome of this perception is a firm belief that the likelihood of any direct threat on New Zealand is very small.²⁴⁰ This has provided New Zealand with an ability to focus more on international relationships and regional peacekeeping missions.

The size of New Zealand has created attitudes and stereotypes of how officials see New Zealand, which affects foreign policy outcomes. New Zealand's small and export-

²³⁶ John Henderson, "Security in Oceania in the Post-9/11 and –Bali Era," 77. For further references on New Zealand's geopolitical isolation see Ayson, "New Zealand and Asia Pacific Security," 389., Marian Hobbs, "Securing Peace: New Zealand's Role," 20-1., O'Brien, "Crisis in East Asia?", 26. See also Terence O'Brien, "Facing the world the New Zealand way: Terence O'Brian discusses some of the considerations underlying New Zealand's foreign and defence policy." *New Zealand International Review* 30. 1 (Jan-Feb 2005): 25.

²³⁷ O'Brien, "Facing the world the New Zealand way," 25.

²³⁸ Henderson, "Security in Oceania in the Post-9/11 and –Bali Era," 73.

²³⁹ Don McKinnon, "New Zealand: An Engaging Country," Address to the Cabinet Club (Dunedin, 9 May 1997), 7-8. In Ayson, "New Zealand and Asia Pacific Security," 395.

²⁴⁰ New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*, 9.

orientated economy, its population of approximately four million, and its land mass of only 268,680 km² contributes to a perception of New Zealand as a small nation. New Zealand's MFAT states that the size of New Zealand "limits its military and diplomatic capabilities."²⁴¹ Indeed, some officials believe that New Zealand as a small and distant country creates vulnerability.²⁴² The current New Zealand Foreign Minister stated that "it is axiomatic that remoteness no longer ensures security."²⁴³ Furthermore, a New Zealand official interviewed noted that "our biggest limitation is our place, we are so far away from anywhere...even if money was no object we would be hard placed to defend ourselves simply because of our location and our coastline." However, in defence of these shortfalls, the advantages inherent in soft-power have been promoted.²⁴⁴ New Zealand's diplomatic approach to security challenges will often be through negotiation and promoting its own values. The advocacy for multilateral or regional dialogue has, thus, been favoured to reduce the disadvantages seen in being a small country. Terrence O'Brien argues that New Zealand favours a balance of interests over a balance of power: the "absence of critical mass diminishes NZ negotiating leverage in bilateral dealings. It is active, therefore, in multilateral diplomacy."²⁴⁵ However, this does not mean that multilateral settings are perceived to be better than bilateral dialogue, rather they should be viewed as complementary.

5.5 Normative Values

A Good Global Citizen

Under the rubric of the Labour-led government, supporting the ideas and values that reinforce international legal norms remains a substantial aspect for New Zealand foreign policy. The principles contained within the UN charter and Western-orientated values are

²⁴¹ Ibid, 9.

²⁴² See O'Brien, "Facing the world the New Zealand way," 25.

²⁴³ Peters, "Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World."

²⁴⁴ See New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*, 9.

²⁴⁵ O'Brien, "Facing the world the New Zealand way," 25.

the primary foundations of New Zealand's security and foreign policies.²⁴⁶ Due to its emphasis on soft power, New Zealand pursues an active and zealous policy in promoting impartiality, justice, nation-building, peace and security. Indeed, New Zealand has been ranked forth in the world for its quality in development and peacekeeping efforts.²⁴⁷ The foreign policy of New Zealand has created an identity of a 'good global citizen.' MFAT's Statement of Intent identifies that "the main rationale for our [security] involvement may be values-based or motivated by good international citizen considerations."²⁴⁸ Perhaps the impetus behind this rationale can be found in New Zealand's perception of itself as a small country with limited capabilities that feels compelled to 'punch above its weight' in order to gain recognition in the international system. Complying with international standards, such as the Legal Counter-terrorism Framework and the UN Conventions on Terrorism reflects a standard approach of New Zealand's foreign policy.²⁴⁹

Cultural Values: New Zealand's Pacific Connection and South East Asian Ties

New Zealand's unique affinity with the South Pacific and growing connection with South East Asia has a significant affect on its security policies in the region, and is reinforced by its cultural and geographic identity. New Zealand has adopted a Pacific identity,²⁵⁰ which places its security policies in a more fixed position and adds to the formation of a security-identity.

²⁴⁶ See New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*, 3. Also see McCraw, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy Under National and Labour Governments," 20-23.

²⁴⁷ This is the prestigious Carnegie Endowment award. See O'Brien, "Facing the world the New Zealand way," 25.

²⁴⁸ New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Statement of Intent 2006-2009, Intermediate Outcome III: A Rules-based International System that Supports Our Security and Prosperity Goals and Promotes Our Values*.

²⁴⁹ Higgin. "Approaches to Terrorism" in *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, 103.

²⁵⁰ Bruce Vaughn, "New Zealand, A Small Nation's Perspective" in *Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment*, ed. William M. Carpenter and David G Wiencek (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 205. Also see Stephen Hoadley, "New Zealand's Pacific Island Security Policies" in *Security in Oceania In the 21st Century* ed. Eric Shibuya and Jim Rolfe (Honolulu, Hawaii.: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003), 124.

The demography of New Zealand illustrates a considerable and increasing amount of immigration by Asian and Pacific Island peoples; 6.9 per cent of New Zealand's population are from the Pacific Islands, while the proportion of Asian people living in New Zealand is 9.2 per cent. The combined Asia Pacific population of New Zealand is 16.1 per cent, which is higher than the current Māori population of 14.6 per cent.²⁵¹ Thus, the Asia Pacific element portrayed in New Zealand's population, including Māori, is 30.7 per cent, a figure approaching a third of the total population in New Zealand. This large proportion of the population firmly establishes New Zealand with an Asia Pacific identity. Culturally, this grounds New Zealand in the Pacific and provides an added advantage for New Zealand security policies and practices in the wider Asia Pacific region.

Apart from Asia Pacific demographics, geography and past cultural linkages influence New Zealand's security policies, which seemingly place a larger emphasis on the Pacific as opposed to South East Asia. Economic dependence on Asia, coupled with the rising power of China and India, focuses New Zealand's attention increasingly towards South East Asia. The establishment of a ministerial task force to Asia and the launch of the 'Seriously Asia' programme is evidence of increasing ties with the wider Asia Pacific area.²⁵² From a trade and security perspective, South East Asia commands a great deal of attention. However, for a number of cultural, social and historical reasons, New Zealand's affinity with the Pacific remains strong and arguably paramount in importance. Indeed, the perception Asian countries have of New Zealand's identity also determines how New Zealand perceives itself. The Chinese Foreign Secretary, in 2002, noted that New Zealand will not be voted into ASEM by China under the pretence that New Zealand and Australia are not Asian countries.²⁵³

²⁵¹ Statistics New Zealand, "Ethnic Groups in New Zealand, 2006 Census," 2006., <http://www.stats.govt.nz/census/2006-census-data>.

²⁵² Clark, "Facing a complex future: Prime Minister Helen Clark congratulates the NZIIA on reaching another significant milestone and outlines her government's approach to foreign affairs in the new millennium," par 34. Also see Hartdegen, "Perceiving Asia 1945-1998," 18.

²⁵³ Wiessala, *The European Union and Asian Countries*, 155.

An example of New Zealand's socio-political links in the Pacific is well illustrated by the effective links forged through the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs (MPIA). Fuimaono Les McCarthy, the Chief Executive of MPIA, argues that substantial Pacific Island networks within New Zealand contribute to peace building.²⁵⁴ This is New Zealand's added advantage when approaching security issues in the South Pacific. The MPIA acts as a liaison between the government and Pacific communities. Indeed, Les McCarthy hints at the idea that there may be a correlation between the Pacific representation in New Zealand and peace between those countries.²⁵⁵ New Zealand's past involvement and its relaxed style is well regarded in the Pacific.²⁵⁶ This provides a viable justification to deepen bonds, contributes to the well being of PICs, and gives New Zealand a unique advantage over other international actors who have an interest in the Pacific. New Zealand's Pacific connection also creates opportunities to impact PICs in ways that other international actors cannot. For example, the EU can be perceived as a neo-colonial power, whereas New Zealand may be perceived as more of a diplomatically close neighbour.

It is interesting to note that while New Zealand tends to be comfortable with its diplomatic and cultural position in the Pacific, it remains at times 'uncertain' of its position in South East Asia. Referring to this, a New Zealand official noted that "we are just not quite sure how far we want to go and that creates a sense... [that] we are seen as being a little stand offish."²⁵⁷ In other words, how New Zealand presents itself and how it perceives itself in the region will determine the quality of dialogue. The official went on to mention that confusion over New Zealand's membership status vis à vis security forums in the Asia Pacific region, can also compromise its ability to be effective. New Zealand must understand and assert its identity in the international environment; this will help other actors know where New Zealand stands, thereby creating a stable platform for security dialogue. Despite this identity-related confusion New Zealand increasingly sees

²⁵⁴ Fuimaono Les McCarthy, "New Zealand's Pacific Advantage" in *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, ed. John Henderson and Greg Watson (Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury University Press, 2006), 43.

²⁵⁵ McCarthy, "New Zealand's Pacific Advantage," 48.

²⁵⁶ Henderson, "Security in Oceania in the Post-9/11 and -Bali Era," 77.

²⁵⁷ Interview with New Zealand official, 16 April 2007.

itself as a part of the Asia Pacific region, which has a major significance both politically and strategically.²⁵⁸

New Zealand's focus on the Pacific, as opposed to spreading its security capabilities over a wider area, will mean that New Zealand's security policy will be less dependent on the fluctuations prevalent in the international community. This will have the effect of creating a strong relational bond with Pacific countries, enabling New Zealand to strengthen its strategically committed goal as a mature mediator and security player in the South Pacific. This does not mean that New Zealand's security interests are limited to the Pacific, but it must balance its primary concern in the Pacific with regional and multilateral efforts outside of the region.

Ensuring a Consent Environment

Establishing a consent environment – warranting internationally accepted intervention in another nation's sovereignty through informal and formal permission - is closely aligned with New Zealand's commitment to international norms and values. Referring to its foreign and security policy, the Prime Minister of New Zealand stated that values and diplomacy are synonymous in importance and that establishing a consent environment is the hallmark of its diplomacy.²⁵⁹ This echoes a contentious dilemma seen in international relations theory: the ethics of intervention. As stated in an official MFAT document, New Zealand recognises the rising tension “between the need to maintain international peace and security and the UN principle of respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of Member States.”²⁶⁰ Although official documentation may hint at ethical frustrations, New Zealand continues to adhere to international norms. New Zealand's sensitivity in abiding by international norms and values creates a specific security-identity that will react negatively or positively in international dialogue. Security and defence capabilities also influence the unique security-identity formation of New Zealand.

²⁵⁸ Hartdegen, “Perceiving Asia 1945-1998,” 19-21.

²⁵⁹ Peters, “Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World.”

²⁶⁰ New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*, 13.

5.6 Capabilities: New Zealand's Contributions to Security in the Asia Pacific Region

The security tools that the New Zealand administration possesses can affect the perceptions decision makers have on the security environment in the Asia Pacific region. Understanding what capabilities New Zealand has provides insight into the nature of its foreign policy and allows a comparison to be made with the EU security culture. New Zealand has a multi-pronged approach to security challenges in the region. Development assistance, military initiatives, and diplomacy are the three primary capabilities analysed in this section. New Zealand's involvement with institutional initiatives and regional security are also explored in order to understand the effectiveness of its security relations in the Asia Pacific region. As stated by the current Foreign Minister, using all of these capabilities together, the New Zealand government can effectively tackle security issues.²⁶¹

Institutional Assistance

A heightened awareness of global terrorism has had a considerable effect on the capabilities of New Zealand defence. Internal security services have enlarged the budget of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), which increased after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.²⁶² New Zealand has accepted all 12 UN Conventions on Terrorism and is involved with the OECD finance operating team. Under the Defence Sustainability Initiative (DSI) the current government also plans to inject NZ \$4.6 billion into defence over the next 10 years.²⁶³ However, the overall defence budget has dropped since 9/11, from 1.83 per cent of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1988 to 0.88 per cent in 2003-2004.²⁶⁴ Despite this, New Zealand's security institutions remain adamant in their

²⁶¹ Peters, "Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World."

²⁶² Vaughn, "New Zealand, A Small Nation's Perspective," 207-8. In Jan 2002, the New Zealand Government announced its intention to increase security services (mainly internally as a result of heightened awareness of terrorism) and also passed a Terrorism Suppression Act

²⁶³ The Labour Party of New Zealand, *2005 Defence Policy, Labour's Vision*, (2005),

http://labour.org.nz/policy/foreign_affairs_and_defense/2005policy/Pol05-defence/index.html.

²⁶⁴ Vaughn, "New Zealand, A Small Nation's Perspective," 210.

commitment to the security of New Zealand and the wider region, as represented in their political rhetoric and emerging initiatives.

Development Assistance

Aid can be used as a form of conflict prevention and can promote anti-terrorism measures by promoting good governance and sustainability in developing countries.²⁶⁵ The security-orientated rationale for promoting good governance is that ‘failed states’ can provide breeding grounds for terrorism. Indeed the current New Zealand Minister of Defence stated that failed or failing states act as magnets for terrorist groups.²⁶⁶ Military personnel and aid workers are becoming more involved with post reconstruction, such as rebuilding the Timorese public sector and assisting in the reconstruction of the local Police Force and leadership systems in the Solomon Islands. Education is another area that is seen as a valuable tool in promoting security. Disadvantaged youths, high unemployment, bad living conditions and ethnic tension culminate to produce fertile grounds for corruption and possible terrorist activities. Providing the infrastructure and financial support for education, such as NZAID’s contribution in the Solomon Islands,²⁶⁷ is seen as a long-term solution to limiting the level of corruption in the Asia Pacific region. Indeed, the primary focus is about conflict prevention rather than intervention. NZAID also assists in areas of law and justice, economic development, capacity building, civil society and financial management. For example, in 2004-2005, NZAID provided funds for the statistics office, technical assistance and training to customs, and assistance to the department of fisheries in Solomon Islands.²⁶⁸ Overall, in 2006-2007, NZAID contributed NZ \$166.6 million to the Pacific. Despite these aid initiatives, New Zealand’s ODA accounts for only 0.23 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP, which is a far cry from the UN indicator for ODA at 0.7 per cent. Although New Zealand’s distribution of aid

²⁶⁵ New Zealand development assistance is primarily directed towards the South Pacific. Constitutional, historical, cultural and family links provide the impetus for the policy approach, see Clark, “Old Friends, New Challenges: New Zealand and the United States in the Asia Pacific Century,” 2.

²⁶⁶ Henderson, “Security in Oceania in the Post-9/11 and –Bali Era,” 80.

²⁶⁷ NZAID have established a goal to provide every child with primary education by 2015. See Hobbs, “Securing Peace: New Zealand’s Role,” 25.

²⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Pacific Donor Consultations, “AusAID and NZAID High Level Consultations,” Canberra (19 March 2005), File No: AID/PAC/9, Vol. 3.

remains relatively low, New Zealand is making real efforts to use economic and cultural initiatives to promote security.

Military Initiatives

New Zealand military capabilities remain a fundamental tool for New Zealand security policies. Phil Goff stated that “[i]t is the Army that has had the greatest utility for us in the past and this is likely to remain so in the immediate future.”²⁶⁹ Labour’s approach to security and its defence capabilities are based around the need to “focus on the intense operational demands of the present”²⁷⁰ instead of maintaining traditional capabilities against a possible major threat. The New Zealand Defence Forces have become more streamlined and focused. Small, deployable peacekeeping units are favoured to assist in regional security efforts. New Zealand is also well recognised for its contribution to logistical support and long-range communications. With an aim of restoring peace or preventing conflict, New Zealand has deployed military units to areas such as the Papua New Guinea island of Bougainville, East Timor, Tonga and the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).²⁷¹ Another area of cooperation often underestimated in the security domain is customs. New Zealand custom officials work closely with PICs in order to bolster the islands’ security. In 2002, under the Defence Long-term Development Plan, the government approved more than NZ \$3 billion dollars to update and improve essential military equipment such as re-winging the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s (RNZAF) Orions.²⁷² Continued concentration on interoperable capabilities combined with funding and a dedicated component of the New Zealand’s Police Force, are areas that must be maintained and strengthened if New Zealand wishes to play a constructive role in the international arena.²⁷³ New Zealand’s contributions are significant; however, its capabilities remain limited leading towards a noticeable reliance on Australian military capabilities and assistance.

²⁶⁹ Goff, “Transformation of the New Zealand Defence Forces.”

²⁷⁰ Ayson and Ball, *Strategy and security in the Asia Pacific*, 249-50. Also see McCraw, “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy Under National and Labour Governments,” 12.

²⁷¹ “There is something of a domestic expectation that the NZDF should be involved in peace support missions.” Ayson, “New Zealand and Asia Pacific Security,” 396.

²⁷² Goff, “Transformation of the New Zealand Defence Forces.”

²⁷³ O’Brian, “Risk and Conflict: Challenges for New Zealand,” 120.

Cooperation within the Pacific continues, allowing for constant interaction which promotes interoperability and provides an awareness of different procedures, standards and equipment. Although Bruce Vaughn argues that insufficient defence funding will mean that the New Zealand Defence Force capabilities will be limited and its policy objectives may not be attainable,²⁷⁴ through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, security can be better assured. New Zealand's involvement with various forums – such as the Chiefs of Defence Conference (CHODs), the Pacific Air Chiefs' Conference, or the Pacific Armies Chiefs' Conference as well as mutual assistance programmes²⁷⁵ with PICs, Australia and France – increases vital socio-political links in the region. These programmes cultivate important cultural knowledge and may enhance the effectiveness of regional assistance missions in the future. Furthermore, these missions provide New Zealand with an increasing knowledge of the socio-political and security intricacies apparent in various corners of the Pacific. Knowing ones neighbour can reduce distrust and increase stability in the region. New Zealand military capabilities may not be strong, but this can be countered by active participation in regional missions.

How New Zealand Defence Forces are perceived is crucial to the outcome of a particular mission. Although the unique, bicultural element in New Zealand's military is often overlooked, the considerable percentage of Māori personnel has created an image of harmony amongst races. From Afghanistan to Timor Leste, this image has had a “powerful demonstrational effect that shouldn't be underestimated.”²⁷⁶ This added cultural benefit not only impacts the perceptions of foreign observers but also continues as an increasingly important feature in a world dominated by sensitivity from race and religion.

²⁷⁴ Vaughn, “New Zealand, A Small Nation's Perspective,” 211.

²⁷⁵ Hoadley, “New Zealand's Pacific Island Security Policies,” 129-32. PIC in this context refers to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa, and the Cook Islands.

²⁷⁶ Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007.

Diplomatic Initiatives

The use of diplomacy in order to maintain a stable environment in the Asia Pacific is a valuable and primary security tool. New Zealand has chosen a logical, multi-pronged approach: choosing to operate through regional, multilateral and bilateral contacts in order to contribute to and maintain a secure region. Due to New Zealand's limited capacity to operate militarily, its adherence to international norms and New Zealand's perception of itself as a small country, diplomatic solutions to international security threats are often favoured.

In terms of actual capabilities, the budget and number of diplomatic postings to the Asia Pacific region have recently increased.²⁷⁷ Based on the number of permanent New Zealand diplomatic staff stationed at postings around the globe, currently one quarter of all New Zealand diplomatic posts are situated in South East Asia and the Pacific.²⁷⁸ The diplomatic missions endeavour to monitor possible security threats and manage crises. The missions also attempt to encourage Pacific and Asian countries to promote intelligence sharing, adopt internationally recognised legal frameworks, such as the UN Conventions against Terrorism, look at ways to enhance security cooperation and limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and illegal arms. For example, diplomats mediated a peaceful settlement in Bougainville and give constitutional advice to Fiji and the Solomon Islands upon request. New Zealand also maintains valued bilateral defence arrangements with key countries in the Asia Pacific region. From a cultural and historical point of view, New Zealand must also maintain its diplomatic support and commitments to the Cook Islands and Niue upon request. The Treaty of Friendship with Samoa also loosely obligates New Zealand to cooperate on defence with Western Samoa.²⁷⁹ This, combined with the 1975 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, aligns New Zealand closely with the Pacific, and increasingly Asia, as the primary diplomatic partners in security.

²⁷⁷ Derek McDougall, "Australia, New Zealand and Regional Intervention" in *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, 134.

²⁷⁸ This result was worked out through the number of staff represented in each post. From approximately 450-500 staff in external posts, 109 New Zealand diplomats are in Asia Pacific countries. See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "New Zealand Embassies, High Commissions and Representative Offices Overseas," <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Embassies/1-NZ-Embassies/index.php#b>.

²⁷⁹ Hoadley, "New Zealand's Pacific Island Security Policies," 124.

Closer ties have also been made in South East Asia to ensure effective security dialogue, such as the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism with ASEAN and the establishment of a new Asia Security Fund. Officials are increasingly becoming aware that long-term approaches to stopping terrorism through cultural and social avenues are important. New Zealand's involvement in regional interfaith dialogues is evidence of a wider approach to security in the Asia Pacific. Exchanges and nurturing future state actors has also been a long-term diplomatic approach in ensuring stability. Continuing along the same rubric as the Colombo Plan, set out in the 1950s, the Mekong Institute continues to provide training for private and public sector recruits, which maintains educational links to South East Asia.²⁸⁰ However, there is still a need to cultivate future personnel for 'international agency positions'²⁸¹ if New Zealand plan on continuing its presence in the Asia Pacific region.

Both EU and New Zealand officials that were interviewed noted that informal contacts are an essential element of diplomacy. Indeed, the current New Zealand Defence Minister noted that "there is no substitute for well developed people-to-people contacts to underpin political relationships."²⁸² It is through these links that common ideas and perceptions can be forged, expanding the content and capability of dialogues. An example of informal networking is best described through an account of former US-New Zealand relations. Unofficially, Richard Nixon was the most favourable US president to New Zealand: if New Zealand had a request, the White House would be often more than willing to accommodate. The reason behind Nixon's generosity was not vested in official declarations nor was it the result of technical diplomacy. Social links and memories formed during Nixon's military post in the Pacific, with a New Zealand battalion in the Second World War, left a great impression that accounted for close relations in the future.²⁸³ While more could be done to enhance informal links, initiatives such as academic exchanges, supporting EU-based research centres and instigating working-

²⁸⁰ Rolfe, "Coming to terms with the Regional Identity," 34-5.

²⁸¹ O'Brian, "Risk and Conflict: Challenges for New Zealand," 120.

²⁸² Goff, "New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement," 74.

²⁸³ Interview with New Zealand politician, 16 April, 2007.

holiday schemes have certainly encouraged greater people-to-people links. Although informalism is difficult to quantify, it is a valuable diplomatic tool that should never be underestimated.

Although New Zealand's defence capabilities have proven to be successful, such as RAMSI, New Zealand is also a consumer of security rather than a provider, which is also becoming increasingly true in South East Asia.²⁸⁴ Australia's strong presence in the Asia Pacific and America's influence in the region also has an effect on New Zealand's capabilities. It has been argued that Australia's assertive role in the Asia Pacific may restrict New Zealand to having lead roles only in Polynesia.²⁸⁵ This consumption of security and possible regulation of security roles from Australia will have a considerable effect on the New Zealand security-identity in the Asia Pacific. Within a regional context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that "military capabilities are not particularly important...except as a supplement to those of Australia."²⁸⁶ New Zealand's Foreign Minister also stated that US "strategic presence in the Asia Pacific region helps underpin regional security diplomacy."²⁸⁷ Despite some improvements to the security structure over the last five years, New Zealand's military capabilities remain limited. New Zealand continues to rely on other nations for a collective approach to security in the Asia Pacific. Living under Australia's perceived shadow for strategic support emphasises New Zealand's impartial and soft approach to security threats, which has left a positive mark on its diplomatic record and created a sense of respect in the South Pacific.²⁸⁸ This reliance will also provide the impetus for a wide ranging network of security dialogue with partners to ensure the stability of the Asia Pacific and New Zealand's needs and values.

Admitting that New Zealand is reliant upon Australia in a number of security-related areas, and the diplomatic approach Australia takes, particularly in the Pacific, further

²⁸⁴ Vaughn, "New Zealand, A Small Nation's Perspective," 204. See also Ayson and Bell, *Strategy and security in the Asia Pacific*, 249.

²⁸⁵ Henderson, "Security in Oceania in the Post-9/11 and -Bali Era", 76-7.

²⁸⁶ New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*, 5.

²⁸⁷ Peters, "Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World."

²⁸⁸ For example, New Zealand's participation in resolving the Bougainville crisis.

defines New Zealand's security-identity in the Asia Pacific region. Australia's diplomatic style, which is often perceived to be condescending, in the Pacific has been seen by some observers as being counter productive in its security actions.²⁸⁹ Primarily driven by Australian politicians, foreign policy actions have often generated hostility as Australia is often very direct with PICs. The goals of Australian foreign policy are not wrong, however, the methods used to achieve them leave much to be desired from a constructivist point of view.

Regional Security

New Zealand foreign and security policy is largely determined by its promotion of regional security mechanisms. Indeed, the current Labour-led government favours the multilateral security dialogue style of the ARF.²⁹⁰ New Zealand's Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that "regional co-operation reinforces our collective sense of security."²⁹¹ Consequently, it is through regional linkages that New Zealand security is guaranteed. MFAT plans to improve its security goals by positioning "New Zealand in the evolving architecture in Asia and reinvigorate links with key Asian partners."²⁹² In order to achieve this goal, New Zealand participates in the EAS, the ARF, APEC, the PIF, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the FPDA, NATO, the UN (such as, INTERFET, UNTAET or UNPROFOR), the OECD and maintains a formal dialogue process with ASEAN. In addition to these linkages, New Zealand also participates in regional security exercises, such as PSI or RAMSI. As a strategic partner, New Zealand also works with NATO members on a number of different fronts. While this may not be specific to Asia Pacific security, maintaining security links and keeping up to date on current operational thinking may be valuable for New Zealand in the future. Regionalism is a tool used to provide and guarantee security as it reduces distrust and fear. If distrust is proliferated in the international environment, the possibility of coercive pre-emption and conflict is

²⁸⁹ Interview with the director of a security related NGO. It was also mentioned that there is a level of racial prejudice that comes through in negotiations reinforcing a disjointed relationship.

²⁹⁰ Ayson, "New Zealand and Asia Pacific Security: New Rationales for Engagement?" 403.

²⁹¹ Hobbs, "Securing Peace: New Zealand's Role," 21.

²⁹² New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Statement of Intent 2006-2009, Intermediate Outcome III: A Rules-based International System that Supports Our Security and Prosperity Goals and Promotes Our Values*.

more likely.²⁹³ Furthermore, the ‘Pacific flavour’ inherent in regional missions such as RAMSI legitimises New Zealand’s commitment in the Pacific and deflects any negative images of New Zealand as a ‘big brother.’ It has been argued that regionalism is the saviour of ‘failed states’ in the Pacific.²⁹⁴ However, it is also the saviour of New Zealand’s security and defence policy in guaranteeing a peaceful Asia Pacific region.

Conclusion

A fervent promotion of New Zealand values and international legal norms, the influence of historical phenomenon, national politics, how state actors define security and perceive threats, capabilities and the Asia Pacific region, all contribute to the formation of a specific security-identity. The effect of cultural links to the South Pacific or specific defence capabilities – militarily or diplomatic – will affect how New Zealand officials approach security threats in the Asia Pacific region. The volume of EU-NZ security dialogue will be directly influenced by the distinct character of New Zealand’s security-identity. Although it is well recognised that identities are dynamic and continue to change form, it is still possible to analyse the variances apparent between the EU and New Zealand security identities within a specific timeframe. This section demonstrated the diversity apparent within a particular identity and how that identity is formed. Knowing that it is impossible to represent all intervening variables within an identity, the factors chosen will aid in discovering the effect socialisation has within a regional context when the New Zealand security-identity is contrasted against the EU security-identity.

²⁹³ O’Brian, “Risk and Conflict: Challenges for New Zealand” in *Push for Peace*, 119.

²⁹⁴ Richard Herr, “The Concept of the ‘Failed State:’ A Brobdingnagian View from Lilliput” in *New Zealand in a globalizing world*, ed. Ralph Pettman (Victoria University of Wellington, 2005), 99-110.

6 The European Union's Security-Identity in the Asia Pacific Region

One dimension of the European Union's external policy is a commitment to promoting peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. The Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX) in the European Commission devised a Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships with Asia in 2001. Within this document, the Commission stated: “[i]n contributing to **peace and security** in the region and globally, the EU should work in particular to strengthen our engagement with Asia in relation to old and new **global and regional security issues**, both in our bilateral and regional relations, and in the UN framework”²⁹⁵ (original emphasis included). In the last six years, the EU has strengthened its ties with the Asia Pacific region, with a particular focus on effective multilateralism, regionalism and the promotion of democratic governance. Although the Union's institutions may be resolute in facilitating effective coherency and complementarity, the EU does participate through intricate webs of multilateral and bilateral relations, advancing their agenda and promoting peace at the antipodes of Europe.

Analysing aspects of the Union's security involvement in the Asia Pacific region illuminates the external identity of the European Union (see Figure 6.1). The volume of security dialogue between New Zealand and the European Union is conditioned by the divergent or convergent interests associated with the identities of state and regional actors. Greater converging interests – made more likely through a process of continual interaction – will create a better environment to encourage closer security dialogue. The demonstrational value of regionalism, cooperation with security-orientated mechanisms, the use of effective multilateralism and promoting human rights in the Asia Pacific region, reflect some of the issues that culminate to form a collective external identity.²⁹⁶ Historical perceptions, institutional frameworks, capabilities, conceptualisations of the

²⁹⁵ European Commission, *Europe and Asia: A strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, Communication from the Commission (Brussels, 4 September 2001), 15, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asia/doc/com01_469_en.pdf. See also Wiessala, “More than Distant Neighbours: CFSP and Asian Countries,” 96.

²⁹⁶ See Figure 2.1.

Asia Pacific region and how the Union defines security, are also questioned throughout this chapter, revealing a distinctive and unique regional actor and security-identity.

Figure 6.1 depicts the area of analysis for the particular section, namely the EU security culture in the Asia Pacific region. As areas ‘B’ and ‘i’ have been analysed in chapters 3 and 5 respectively, exploring area ‘C’ will provide for a balanced analyses of the EU-NZ security dialogue as well as providing relevant contextual information for this thesis.




Figure 6.1: Area of analysis: The European Union’s security culture in the Asia Pacific region

6.1 Historical Perceptions

European history in the Asia Pacific involves a constellation of various activities, forming unique and varied perceptions that continue to affect the disposition of the EU-Asia Pacific dialogue. Although European countries share long and complex histories in the region, the EEC/EU relations with South East Asia and the Pacific are a lot less profound. Nonetheless, looking at the EEC/EU past involvement with the region does help to explain the nature of current EU-Asia Pacific security discourse. History or memory “is not a vessel of truth or a mirror of interests, but a process of constructing

meaning.”²⁹⁷ This section explores the memory of past EU and Asia Pacific relations and how this constructs an image of each entity in the present.

Regionalism

The diplomatic history of the EEC/EU in South East Asia since 1945 has centred on regional initiatives. Relations between the EEC and ASEAN began on an unofficial note in 1972. Increasing its involvement with the ASEAN-EC biennial Foreign Ministers meeting in 1978, the EEC relations with South East Asia evolved into the Cooperation Agreement with ASEAN in 1980. Although this institutional milestone is significant, it has been only in the last decade that the EU has paid considerable attention to the region. Focus on EU enlargement, the Middle East and the African continent, combined with British predominance in the South East Asia region, fashioned a distanced or even ‘neglected’ EU-ASEAN relationship.²⁹⁸ To be sure, the EEC did contribute to humanitarian efforts through the European Political Community (EPC), but only through limited constitutional and diplomatic links.²⁹⁹ Despite some auguring of an even more limited relationship after 1989, due to the expired anti-communist strategic agenda, the EU increased its position in South East Asia. The EEC/EU enhanced its contacts with ASEAN, primarily through economic schemes. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), the Initiative ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Bali Concord II Programme were instigated in an effort to diversify and build economic links.³⁰⁰ The political economy in the 1990s did not develop at the same rate as the financial initiatives. Differences in perspectives became more acute after 1989, such as the alternative approaches of the EU and ASEAN in their outlook on environmental sustainability or human rights.³⁰¹ Despite this, political relations have continued with

²⁹⁷ Müller, “Introduction: the power of memory, the memory of power and the power over memory,” 30.

²⁹⁸ Indeed, “[t]he less than sanguine relations with South East Asia were compounded by the decision to reject Asian Commonwealth members from the Lomé Convention and harsh economic barriers created against the threat of the economic prowess of South East Asian burgeoning economies.” See Bretherton and Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 129. Also see: Maull, Segal and Wanandi, *Europe and the Asia Pacific*, 124-5.

²⁹⁹ Ero Palmujoki, *Regionalism and Globalism in South East Asia* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 102.

³⁰⁰ European Commission Website, “External Relations,” (November 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asia/reg/sea.htm.

³⁰¹ Palmujoki, *Regionalism and Globalism in South East Asia*, 102.

signs of greater toleration from both sides in regard to the respective values and principles of each agency. Increasing awareness of the effects of globalisation and UN-backed promotion of ‘security task sharing’ provided the impetus for greater security-orientated regional building initiatives in the Asia Pacific region.³⁰² Security crises in South East Asia, such as the Bali Bombings in 2000, the attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003, or the arrests of the *Jemaah Islamiah* members in Indonesia, have also steered and developed the EU’s relationship with the region.³⁰³ The ARF, APEC and the APT were either created or injected with a security element in the 1990s. Other security relationships have also recently been built such as EU and NATO cooperation with the South East Asian region through ASEM.³⁰⁴ Economic links, juxtaposed with greater strategic and humanitarian involvement in the wake of 9/11 and the Tsunami, have created greater EU-ASEAN intensity in political dialogue; however, there is still room for improvement.

The first EEC contact with the Pacific was through the Lomé Convention in 1975, which included the PICs of Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. Through the Convention, and other regional financial instruments such as the Regional Indicative Programme, the EU administered a total of €165 million from the period 1975-2002.³⁰⁵ Major initiatives for the Pacific have been in the field of regional transport, energy, tourism, sustainable development and natural resources.³⁰⁶ Alongside continued development assistance, regionalism has been promoted by the EU, particularly in the 1990s, with the EU as a ‘dialogue partner’ in the PIF. Economic initiatives have also been launched, creating stronger economic ties such as the European Union’s Pacific Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) or the Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations (PACER). Apart from continual economic and development aid links, the EU must also face a Pacific that maintains a memory of the colonial past.

³⁰² Louise Fawcett, “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism,” *International Affairs* 80 no. 3 (2004): 438.

³⁰³ Georg Wiessala, “A Holistic Re-Invigoration - The EU’s New Partnership with South East Asia,” *EURAsia Bulletin* Vol. 7, (Brussels: European Institute for Asian Studies, EIAS: September 2003), 5.

³⁰⁴ Fawcett, “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism,” 441.

³⁰⁵ The European Commission’s Delegation for the Pacific, “The European Union and the Pacific Region – Regional Partnership,” http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_country/regional_partnership.htm.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

The legacy of Colonialism

The aftermath of the Second World War left the Asia Pacific region in disarray. Although many European countries released their colonial ties during the next two decades, the memory of the colonial past remains with many Pacific and South East Asian countries. This memory contributes to part of Asia Pacific countries' identities and consequently their actions. This rationale can be explained as: "national historical memory...can have concrete political consequences. How states and societies engage their pasts effects how they develop."³⁰⁷ The past experiences in the Asia Pacific region under colonial rule means that many PICs have only experienced being a sovereign nation state for three or four decades. This has presented problems for EU-Pacific relations, when the EU's preference to promote regional structures is, at times, coolly received by many Pacific people who do not wish to cede any of their newly required sovereignty.³⁰⁸ The Asian and Pacific Way – a norm related to non-intervention and informalism – is also reinforced by the legacy of colonial rule. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, believed that the norm of informalism was "a bulwark against colonialism and great power interventionism."³⁰⁹ Although this notion is certainly beginning to change, as Amataav Acharya argues,³¹⁰ colonial memory can reinforce negative images, making it harder to deepen regional initiatives. The spectre of colonialism continues to haunt EU Member States in the Asia Pacific region. French interest through its dependencies remains dominant, while Britain, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands maintain links through implicit avenues. While not positing that Member States suffer from a bad conscience inherited from a colonial past, the contact these countries had and maintain with the Asia Pacific region continues to affect their policies. Despite historically-built perceptions of Europe that may involve pessimistic images, regional initiatives and

³⁰⁷ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2006), 143. Also see Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory."

³⁰⁸ Malakai Kolamatangi, "Regionalism and Prevention: EU and Pacific Perspectives" in *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, edited by John Henderson and Greg Watson (Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury University Press, 2006), 189.

³⁰⁹ Acharya, "Is Anyone Still Not a Constructivist?" 251.

³¹⁰ See Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in South East Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

contacts, primarily through economic and development links, continue to flourish firmly placing the EU inside the Pacific region.

Under the regional umbrella, economic and political initiatives have slowly evolved from early contacts made by the EEC – through the Lomé Convention and ASEAN links – to a deeper and more complex relationship involving up-dated agreements and an assortment of regional fora. The revised Cotonou agreement of 2005, the ARF, the APT and ASEM have created the institutional framework for a closer partnership that is envisaged to deepen.

6.2 Internal Politics

The efficiency of EU institutions is impaired by defective coordination and coherence, which can lead to ineffective and slow decision making, particularly in the Union's foreign policy capacity. This can reduce dynamism in the Union's external relations and implicitly affect the EU's security dialogue with other partners. Indeed, George Wiessala notes that "internal affairs have an external dimension; problems and change on the inside alter perceptions and ultimately influence actions and priorities of the EU on the outside."³¹¹ EU security competencies in the Asia Pacific region cut across all three pillars of the EU institutional framework, creating unnecessary complications. The first pillar deals with trade, development assistance and external relations, the second with the CFSP and the third with police and judicial cooperation. These institutional divides can create horizontal challenges in policy making and implementation. Indeed, coordination, complementarity and coherence are often limited by cross pillar confusion, reducing the ability of the EU to act as a distinct global actor.³¹² Any pillar two decisions are usually made by consensus in a formal setting. This can produce the lowest common

³¹¹ George Wiessala, "The Global Reach of the European Union," in *New Europe in Transition*, ed. Peter J. Anderson, Georg Wiessala and Christopher Williams (London, New York: Continuum, 2000), 44.

³¹² Martin Holland, "When is foreign Policy not Foreign Policy? Cotonou, CFSP and External Relations with the Developing World," *National Europe Centre Paper* no. 28 (Australian National University, July, 2002), 3. See also Simon Duke and Sophie Vanhooncker, "Managing Europe's Foreign Policy: The Record and Prospects," *EIPASCOPE 25th Anniversary Special Issue*, 2006, 68., Catriona Gourlay, "Civil-Civil Coordination in EU crisis management" in *Civilian crisis management: the EU way*, ed. Agnieszka Nowak, *Chaillot Paper* no. 90, (Institute for Security Studies, June 2006): 103-122.

denominator and encourage watered down texts with little substance. In an attempt to promote greater coordination a collection of Directorate Generals in the Commission have joined loosely under the banner of *Famille RELEX*³¹³; however, greater coordination is still largely determined by the current President of the Commission.³¹⁴ EU institutions can also act as a catalyst by enhancing the efforts of the EU in the Asia Pacific region. For example, the European Parliament has proven to increase the profile of Asia and significantly influence the course of CFSP in the region.³¹⁵ Despite this and other attempts to create greater coherence, such as institutional changes depicted in the proposed Constitution, institutional inconsistency continues to pervade effective decision-making in the Union's external relations. Other independent variables such as the future direction of the EU Constitution, the effects of enlargement and other internal factors, such as the legitimacy crises of the Union, can also affect the external policies of the EU.

In addition, a similar lack of coherence can be found in Member States' willingness to concede national sovereignty. The Union's external ambitions remain a sensitive topic for Member States, who jealously guard their foreign policy as the "ultimate expression of national sovereignty."³¹⁶ This has created considerable challenges for the effective integration of foreign policy, as Member States are unwilling to entrust their foreign policy to a supranational body. The limited sovereignty that Member States have entrusted to the second pillar/CFSP has to be organised around 27 divergent identities, typically limiting foreign policy decisions to intergovernmentalism and unanimity.³¹⁷ Indeed, this raises the question of whether the EU can justify the 'C' in CFSP.³¹⁸ Although sub-systemic coherence and new institutional initiatives, such as the External

³¹³ Such as the European Commission's Directorate General for Trade, Development, Enlargement, EUROAID, ECHO and aspects of Economic and financial offices.

³¹⁴ Duke and Vanhooncker, *Managing Europe's Foreign Policy*, 70.

³¹⁵ For more on the influence of the Parliament on CFSP, and a useful analysis of CFSP in the context of Asia see Georg Wiessala, *Re-orienting the Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations* (England; Ashgate Pub., 2006), 96-8.

³¹⁶ John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, *Decision-Making in the European Union* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), 235. For more on the institutional incoherence of CFSP see Wiessala, "The Global Reach of the European Union."

³¹⁷ *Ibid*, 228.

³¹⁸ Wiessala, "The Global Reach of the European Union," 55.

European Action Service (EEAS), may streamline and make decision-making more effective, the CFSP's institutional capacity remains limited. This is particularly apparent in the static nature of the decision-making process. For example, the institutional character of CFSP assumes a 'linear path of decision-making,' which complicates the process of amending decisions.³¹⁹ In addition, the challenge of maintaining a division of labour amongst Member States vis à vis EU foreign affairs, is another area that can lead to internal stagnation and limited external capabilities.³²⁰ Although decisions are often formed around non-contentious issues and despite the apparent incoherence in its institutional design, decisions and strategies are devised and endorsed. Indeed, through the impetus and support of COASI and COREspodence Européenne (COREU), an eastern chapter of CFSP is slowly developing.³²¹ Common elements, such as human rights, security and stability are found within the evolutionary character of Europe's CFSP, helping to frame the EU as an incipient political power on the world stage.

6.3 The European Union's Concept of Security

Defining Security

How state or regional actors understand the concept of security and what they prioritise as credible threats shape the external identity of a region and subsequently reflect the differences that exist in (sub) regional dialogue. Conceptual frames built around security challenges are dynamic in nature and can shift in precedence. This is not dissimilar to Barry Buzan's 'conditions of existence,'³²² which, as an independent variable, has an

³¹⁹ Erwin Van Veen, "Order in World Politics: An Inquiry into the concept, change and the EU's Contribution," *UNU-CRUS Occasional Papers* no. 17 (2006), 40. However, the EU also attempts to "strengthen national responses through EU synergies" whereby the notion of subsidiarity can be employed: Jocelyn Mawdsley and Gerrard Quille, *The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP and Equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force* (Brussels: International Security Information Service, Europe, 2003), 12-13.

³²⁰ For this example and other internal and external determinants on EU foreign Policy see Ortega, "Building the future: the EU's contribution to global governance," 95-97.

³²¹ Wiessala, *Re-orienting the Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations*, 98. See also Wiessala, "More than Distant Neighbours: CFSP and Asian Countries," 89-90.

³²² Bob S. Hadiwinata, "Securitizing Poverty: the Role of NGOs in the Protection of Human Security in Indonesia," University of Parahyangan, Indonesia (Paper presented at the Institute of Defense and Security

ability to affect how actors perceive security. With this in mind, present security perspectives – both endogenous and exogenous – are analysed in this section providing socio-political insight into why the EU participate in security ventures in the Asia Pacific region and how this corresponds to the EU-NZ security dialogue setting.

In the last two decades, a ‘definitional sleight of hand’ has changed how state actors view security.³²³ Concepts of security have evolved from dogmatic perceptions steeped in traditional security ideals during the Cold War to non-traditional and humanitarian-focused security. The EU has not been exempt from this conceptual movement; with its strong adherence to UN norms, the Union has developed non-traditional frames, such as human security, alongside more traditional concepts. Reflecting this notion, the current European Commissioner for External Relations clearly states that “[t]he Commission is a strong supporter of the concept of human security - putting individuals at the heart of security concerns.”³²⁴ The institutional and legal framework of the Union clearly reflects this wide concept of security. Stemming from the institutional milestones of Europe’s CFSP, namely the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, five primary objectives have been laid out. Two of these objectives deal specifically with the wellbeing of the Union, while the other three focus on the preservation of peace outside Europe’s borders. The two endogenous aspects are: to strengthen security and to safeguard the fundamental interests and independence of the Union. The three exogenous objectives deal with preserving peace and strengthening international security; promoting international cooperation; and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.³²⁵

Studies, Nanyang University-Ford Foundation workshop on “The Dynamics of Securitization in Asia”, Singapore, 3-5 September 2004), 1., <http://www.rsis-ntsasia.org/publications/PDF/Bob%20Hadiwinata.pdf>.

³²³ Stephanie Lawson, *The new agenda for global security: cooperating for peace and beyond* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University, 1995), 33-35.

³²⁴ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Conflict Prevention Partnership dialogue on ‘Five years after Göteborg: the European Union and its conflict prevention potential’,” Brussels, 12 September 2006, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/513&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. Also see Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” 530.

³²⁵ The European Commission’s Delegation to the Pacific, “The European Union: A Global Player, Defence and security - keeping the peace,” http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_global_player/6.htm.

Endogenous Perspectives

Björn Hettne, a scholar specialising in regional theory succinctly noted: “EU external actions are determined by its endogenous preconditions.”³²⁶ In other words, specific security threats that affect Europe are important to recognise if an analysis of its external threats is to be considered. Commenting on the European Security Strategy, Javier Solana outlined two specific security challenges for the EU: the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism.³²⁷ Other traditional security threats also continue to be of concern, such as the on-going Israeli-Palestine dispute and territorial disagreements within or at the fringes of Europe.³²⁸

It has been argued that European security – the safeguarding of values such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights – is significantly dissimilar to Member State security, the latter being more bound to territorial integrity and citizen protection.³²⁹ While there is some truth to this, the Union attempts to combine Member State security needs with a much broader European focus that is committed to values and principles. This is clearly stated in Javier Solana’s definition of foreign policy which “is in essence about managing change, about safeguarding our people, [and] about promoting our values and interests.”³³⁰ The safeguarding of European principles as a security measure is also used as a means of stemming threats outside its borders; an intriguing transition from protection to promotion.

Apart from the conservation of European values as a security challenge, four major threats facing Europe’s homeland security transcend the borders of Europe as transnational security concerns. The New Defence Agenda notes that due to the restructuring of international relations, largely as a result of globalisation, new threats

³²⁶ Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum. “Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as Global Actor and the Role of Inter-regionalism,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 no. 4 (2005): 549.

³²⁷ Javier Solana, “Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy,” Speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Brussels, 24 January 2005. in “EU Security and Defence: Core documents 2005” *Chaillot Paper* 6, no. 87 (2006): 19. See also Benjamin Kienzle, “The EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMDs: An Interim Assessment” *CFSP Forum* 4 no. 4, (2006): 2. Also see Mawdsley and Quille, *The EU Security Strategy*, 12.

³²⁸ Such as Basque separatists, or Greek-Turkish territorial conflict in Cyprus.

³²⁹ See Herald Müller, “Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment,” *Chaillot Papers* no.58 (March 2003): 19-20.

³³⁰ Solana, “Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy,” 18.

must be taken into account. The threats listed include terrorism, international crime, collision between fundamentalists, and cyber-terrorists.³³¹ All of these issues can be regarded as encompassing a wide view of security; a theme that continues in the Union's exogenous threat perceptions.

Exogenous Perspectives

EU threat perception in the Asia Pacific region is varied. Conditioned by regional perspectives, economic environments, altruistic or normative motivations, the Union prioritises security threats that are seen to be most relevant. Despite these and other independent variables, themes do emerge. For example, the EU recognises that political, social and economic governance is vital in ensuring security; consequently, the Union focuses on development-orientated threats in the emerging democratic PICs. Other issues such as terrorism, illegal arms trade, environmental security, non-proliferation, fundamentalist Islam and border security are also recognised, particularly in South East Asia, as security concerns.

The EU's focus on security threats in the Pacific is somewhat divergent from the Union's threat perception of South East Asia. Specific security-related priorities in the Pacific include arms proliferation, drug trafficking, fisheries, HIV/AIDS, food security, improving education, infrastructure and institution building.³³² More specifically, the Cotonou agreement defines security threats as: "arms trade, excessive military expenditure, drugs and organised crime, or ethnic, religious or racial discrimination."³³³ In the same context the agreement also includes the provision for a "regular assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance."³³⁴ Liberal values and a commitment to humanitarian

³³¹ Javier Solana, "Europe's growing role in World Security" in *Fresh Perspective on Europe's Security*, ed. Giles Merritt, *The New Defence Agenda* Discussion Paper, Real Instituto Elcano (Winter 2004): 47.

³³² Roberto Ridolfi, "Europe Day Speech," The Europeans Commission's Delegation to the Pacific (9 May 2006), http://www.delfji.cec.eu.int/en/about_us/html-print/EU%20Day%20speech.htm. On food security see: European Commission, *The Cotonou Agreement*, Directorate General for Development, 1 March 2000, Article 54., http://dgdev_europa/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf.

³³³ European Commission, *The Cotonou Agreement*, Title II, Article 8.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

aid are consolidated with more traditional security aspects, confirming a wide view of security.

China is another growing concern for the EU in the Pacific. As a region with substantial natural resources, competition amongst external actors, including Japan, Taiwan, China and the US, is likely to produce strained relations. Augustin Oyowe, the European Commission's International Relations Officer for the Pacific, noted that China, as a competing donor, was seen as the greatest threat to the Pacific and global security: "if China contributed to the deforestation of Pacific islands, this may one day lead to climate change in the northern hemisphere. If the money China pumps into the region goes to corrupt officials or arms purchases then it's a security concern for the EU."³³⁵ In addition, competition between China and Taiwan for 'recognition,' through investments and development aid, can implicitly encourage corruption and destabilise the sometimes fragile governments of Pacific countries.³³⁶

The 2003 European Commission's paper, entitled 'New Partnership with South-East Asia,' outlines six major priorities of the Union in South East Asia. Out of the six points, five priority issues are directly or indirectly related to security.³³⁷ Defining its threat perception in South East Asia the Union outlines 'harder' or traditional security concerns. DG RELEX defines the following as security threats for South East Asia: border management, maritime security, immigration control, organised crime, human trafficking, piracy and money laundering/combating terrorism financing.³³⁸ The Union

³³⁵ The Christchurch Press, "EU ambitions emerge." Another motivation for external influence in the Pacific is the votes individual countries have in the UN.

³³⁶ New Zealand Herald, "Europe's south seas strategy," (3 June 2006).

³³⁷ The six issues are: supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; promoting human rights, democratic principles and good governance; mainstreaming justice and home affairs issues; injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations; continuing to support the development of less prosperous countries; intensifying dialogue and cooperation in specific policy areas. See European Commission, *A New Partnership with South-East Asia*, Communication from the Commission (2003), Directorate General for External Relations, 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/library/publications/09_sea_en.pdf. For a succinct review on this agreement see Georg Wiessala, "A Holistic Re-Invigoration - The EU's New Partnership with South East Asia," *EURAsia Bulletin* Vol. 7, (Brussels: European Institute for Asian Studies, EIAS: September 2003).

³³⁸ European Commission, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, Directorate General for External Relations, 2004, 15., http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asean/intro/index.htm. Also see

also defines Islamic fundamentalist movements as a possible security threats on EU values and its strategic economic position in the Asia Pacific region.³³⁹

Collectively, unstable political regimes in the Pacific and South East Asia are also seen as credible threats to the Union's economic and normative interests. A strong belief exists within EU decision-making bodies that promoting human rights and democracy will encourage stability. The philosophy behind this idea is that democracies will generally not go to war with each other and that human rights violations can create unstable environments, increasing the likelihood of conflict.³⁴⁰ Consequently, the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are intertwined in legal and institutional strategies, agreements and declarations: Article 11 of the EU Treaty, the European Security Strategy, the Copenhagen Criteria and the Cotonou agreement all contain explicit references to the promotion of EU values outside its own borders.³⁴¹

Reviewing the endogenous and exogenous security perceptions of the EU in the Asia Pacific region illustrate two major themes. The distinctive threat perceptions of the EU in South East Asia and the Pacific, both entail, to a varied extent, a wide view of security and the preservation and promotion of liberal values. These perspectives will influence the policies directed towards the two regions and represents part of the EU's security-identity formation.

6.4 Geographical perceptions

European socio-political perceptions of the Asia Pacific region affect the volume of interaction and dialogue in (sub) regional settings. Julie Gilson clearly defines this

European Commission, *A New Partnership with South-East Asia*, 16. An example of a recognised territorial dispute is the South China Sea.

³³⁹ European Commission, *A new partnership for South East Asia*, 12.

³⁴⁰ Marise Cremona, "The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity," *Common Market Law Review* 41 no. 2 (2004): 558-9. Also see Benita Ferrero-Waldner, *Indonesia and the European Union: building on common ground*, Speech delivered at the EU-Indonesia Day: 'Pluralism and Democracy: Indonesian Perspectives' Brussels, 7 December 2006.

³⁴¹ Michael Meyer-Resende, "Exporting Legitimacy: The Record of EU Election Observation in the Context of EU Democracy Support," *Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document* no. 241 (Brussels, March 2006), 2. www.ceps.be.

rationale: “[w]hat is understood by 'region' in the context of Asia-Europe relations will depend to a large extent upon how Asian and European participants view themselves and each other within, and a result of, the process of interaction.”³⁴² Exploring how the Union defines the Asia Pacific region will reflect a part of the EU’s security-identity formation.

Defining the Asia Pacific Region

How Europeans perceive the Asia Pacific region influences the policies they formulate and determines the possible depth of sub-regional and regional dialogue. Expressing an underlying concept of EU perceptions on Asia, the former External Relations Minister for the European Commission, Christopher Patten, remarked: “[g]iven the sprawling variety of Asia it is absurd to think of a monolithic EU-Asia relationship.”³⁴³ Asia has been carved into different regions, corresponding to varied policies and approaches, and determined by the perceptions of the European Union’s institutional bodies.

The EU has divided the Asian region into five separate regional divisions: South Asia, South East Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia and Australasia, while the Pacific region is defined separately as one of the three African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions.³⁴⁴ Consequently, the Asia Pacific region is quite clearly split into two regions with two different approaches. The South East Asian region has been made distinct from the rest of Asia, as well as the Pacific, due to its level of development, aid-based relationships and different legal basis.³⁴⁵ The perceived cultural, political and economic diversity, that manufactures imagined regional borders within Asia, affects how security policies are formulated and helps to define the identity of the Union’s external policy.

³⁴² Gilson, *Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting*, 11.

³⁴³ Julie Gilson, “New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia,” *European Integration* 27, no.3 (2005): 307.

³⁴⁴ European Commission, *The EU’s Relations with Asia: the Regions of Asia*, Directorate General for External Relations, 23 January 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asia/reg/index.htm.

³⁴⁵ Gilson, “New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia,” 319. For example, the European Development Fund (EDF) is an economic instrument used for the Pacific, while the Asia Latin America budget-line is used to administer funds in South East Asia. This institutionally and psychologically splits the Pacific with South East Asia. See interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006.

Asia Pacific countries are rising in economic and political significance affecting the way European officials view the region. European bureaucrats provide varied responses when asked what images come to mind when the Asia Pacific region is mentioned. While accepting that a majority of Europeans think about tropical paradises,³⁴⁶ others understand that security threats exist, albeit from a geographical context; North Korea, China, the Solomon Islands, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea were mentioned in particular. Another official predominantly talked of China, India and Japan: three countries that are technically not part of the region. Although, economic and development frameworks divide the Pacific apart from South East Asia, some European still tends to see the South Pacific region as Asia. It was also mentioned that despite the long distance, European economic importance in the region, combined with a global responsibility, meant that the EU feels that it has a role to play. Indeed, the Regional Indicative Programme for South East Asia states that the major motivation for increasing ties with the region can be contributed to the rise in the political and economic prowess of China and the economic growth of South East Asia. This has turned the region into “one of the most dynamic growth engines for the world economy... [that the] EU cannot afford to neglect.”³⁴⁷ As stated by a high level official from New Zealand: “the distance from Europe to New Zealand is greater than from New Zealand to Europe.”³⁴⁸ This geographically-defined perception has certainly affected European officials; however, the distance may become more equal as South East Asia continues to grow in prominence.

6.5 Normative Values

EU relations with South East Asia are characterised by a web of multilateral and bilateral arrangements. These relationships are instigated and legitimised through common interests and values, such as a dedication to peace and stability. Cultural awareness is making considerable progress as a recognised tool in advancing regional security dialogue. Indeed, the European Commission’s Delegation to Australia notes: “[t]he EU has a unique role to play in promoting richness and diversity, both within Europe and

³⁴⁶ New Zealand Herald, “Europe’s south seas strategy.”

³⁴⁷ Directorate General for External Relations, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, 3.

³⁴⁸ Interview with New Zealand Official, 8 November 2006.

worldwide. It has been acknowledged that culture is an indispensable feature to achieve the EU's strategic objectives of prosperity, solidarity and security, while ensuring a stronger presence on the international scene."³⁴⁹ The EU also exports values that are perceived to be in the interest of Asia Pacific countries, such as the promotion of regionalism and democracy. Indeed, it has been argued that the EU has a particular need to "spread these norms around the world."³⁵⁰ It should be noted that to perceive the EU as just a normative power would be naïve. Self-interest undoubtedly plays a role in the Union's association with the Asia Pacific region. The control of potential resources, communication lines or UN votes, amongst others motivations, would certainly have a significant impact on the EU's objectives in the region. The prevention of money laundering, internet and cyber-crime and maintaining a strategic position are also areas of interest that could override philanthropic tendencies. With this in mind, this section's analysis of the common values shared by the EU and the Asia Pacific will aid in determining the EU's external identity as an international actor.

Normative or cultural values are seen as a starting point in developing security dialogue with the Asia Pacific region. In a statement by the Council of the European Union, "[t]he Ministers reiterated that the ASEAN-EU relationship is based on shared historical and cultural, economic, scientific and educational ties, and commitment to the promotion of peace, stability and development in the two regions."³⁵¹ This is essentially the rhetorical glue that creates the pretext for dialogue: common values builds trust and encourages cooperation. Another, somewhat paradoxical value that unites the Asia Pacific region with EU is the notion of diversity. The EU claims that diversity is central to the EU-ASEAN dialogue, as a common value of both regions.³⁵² Indeed, both Indonesia and the EU share the same motto: *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* or Unity in Diversity. It would seem that common and diverse values unite the two regions.

³⁴⁹ Delegation of the European Union to Australia and New Zealand, "European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World," EU-news (11 May 2007), delegation-australia@ec.europa.eu.

³⁵⁰ Hettne and Söderbaum, "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as Global Actor and the Role of Inter-regionalism," 546.

³⁵¹ Council of the European Union, "15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting Joint Co-Chairman's Statement, Jakarta, 10 March 2005, 2. <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st07/st07020.en05.pdf>.

³⁵² European Commission, *A new partnership with South East Asia*, 11.

In close association with the values enshrined in the UN charter, the external policy of the EU is inextricably entwined with the rule of law, democratic principles, respect for human rights and principles of liberty, combined with a strong emphasis on effective multilateralism.³⁵³ Title 17 of the Treaty of the Maastricht Treaty reflects a deep adherence to these values and illustrates the strategic aim of the European Community in defending European values, ensuring peace and strengthening international security.³⁵⁴ Reflecting this sentiment the High Representative, Javier Solana, commented: the EU must “face up to its responsibility for global security and contribute rigorously to extending the scope of international law, to strengthening the institutions of world governance and to developing closer regional cooperation.”³⁵⁵ These normative values, legitimized through the UN, are exported to other nation-states through dialogue mechanisms and upheld with legal structures. Regionalism and effective multilateralism are seen as the most appropriate vehicle to present these values, while simultaneously representing the significance of regionalism itself.

Another foreign policy goal of the European Union is to “develop and consolidate democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”³⁵⁶ This burgeoning and politically-orientated conditionality, produced through multilateral and bilateral arrangements between the EU and Asia Pacific countries, reflects the Union’s commitment to its values and perspectives on security. Explaining the connection between democracy and security, Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated: “[i]t has long been recognised that democracies are less likely to engage in conflicts than non-democratic regimes. Similarly, at the national level, democracies provide a political

³⁵³ Emphasising EU adherence to the UN, Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated: “[w]e strongly agree on the need to support the UN consistently with our policy of effective multilateralism.” Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The External Dimension of the Fight Against International Terrorism,” Statement to the EP plenary session (Strasbourg, 14 February 2007), <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/81&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.

³⁵⁴ The Maastricht Treaty, *Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community with a view to establishing the European Community*, Title XVII, Article 13.2 (7 February 1992), www.eurotreaties.com.

³⁵⁵ Solana, “Europe’s growing role in World Security,” 51.

³⁵⁶ See Reiter, “Inter-regionalism as a New Diplomatic Tool: The EU and East Asia.” Also see: European Commission, *The Cotonou Agreement*, Chapter 1; Article 1.

channel for tensions and disputes which might otherwise end up in conflict.”³⁵⁷ This rationale is a driving force in EU external policy; however, normative values, such as human rights and democracy can be brushed to the side in favour of more urgent security priorities. The current Foreign Minister of Denmark, Per Stig Møller, stated that in order to curtail terrorism “we have no choice but to accept deeper involvement with governments having less than perfect records on human rights and democracy, but willing to progress in the right direction.”³⁵⁸ In a similar vein, a British MEP recently questioned the ethical nature behind the Union’s exportation of values: “we put great store by democracy but does the whole world want our sort of democracy?”³⁵⁹ Indeed, the EU is not always a unified proponent of normative values. Despite these deflections from EU norms, the Union continues in its propensity to promote normative concepts in dialogue with other regions and nations. A European Commission communication stated that assistance and cooperation initiatives should support functional democratic structures and fundamental human rights, including the abolition of the death penalty.³⁶⁰ This is primarily achieved through ‘essential element’ clauses that are to be included in all future bilateral agreements with South East Asian countries.

European Union rhetoric on values and norms can be detrimental to the Union’s image as a global actor. An example of this can be seen in the Union’s approach to Fiji. As part of its 12 strategic priorities listed in the European Commission joint annual report on Fiji, the EU aims to enhance security, law and order. This will be achieved by promoting national reconciliation and unity, alleviating poverty, strengthening good governance, reviewing the constitution to achieve political stability, and resolving the land issue.³⁶¹ From a liberal democratic perspective, these are noble values; however, the EU risks a

³⁵⁷ Ferrero-Waldner, “Indonesia and the European Union: building on common ground,” 7.

³⁵⁸ Per Stig Møller “A Common EU foreign policy in Asia,” *Viewpoint*, January 2003. Another example of the Union’s questionable role as a normative player can be seen in: European Voice, “EU could ditch human rights to secure Central Asian energy,” *European Voice* 13, no. 4 (1-4 February 2007).

³⁵⁹ Neil Parish MEP quoted in The Christchurch Press, “EU ambitions emerge.”

³⁶⁰ European Commission, *A new partnership for South East Asia*, Communication from the Commission 15. For a pertinent example of EU action against Burma vis à vis human rights, see Wiessala, *Re-orienting the Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations*, 99-105.

³⁶¹ The Europeans Commission’s Delegation to the Pacific, *The Republic of Fiji, European Commission Joint Annual Report 2004*, Country reports (Fiji, 2000), 13-14., <http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu/en/achievements/country%20reports.htm>.

potential values-based expectations-capability deficit if these goals are not met. For example, promoting national reconciliation requires efforts that must affect society, the identity of Fiji and its political orientation.³⁶² If the EU is serious about promoting national reconciliation in Fiji it must examine the ethics involved in development intervention and its periphery image as a neo-colonialist. Political rhetoric without valid action will reduce the EU's burgeoning image as a global political player.

'Regionalist ideology' inherent in EU foreign policy illustrates a particular normative value that the EU fervently promotes outside its borders.³⁶³ This ideology also contributes to the EU security-identity, affecting inter-subjective exchange within regional fora. Through various regional institutions, such as the PIF or ASEM, the EU export regionalism to the Asia Pacific region (such as the Vientiane Plan adopted at the 10th ASEAN summit which fosters greater regional integration and development). The Union's promotion of regionalism is believed to encourage reciprocity, socialisation and identity-building. Indeed, the Commission stated that "The EU's regional strategy will focus on a single priority: support for ASEAN Integration and region-to-region dialogue ... [which is intended to have a] multiplier effect, whereby information, ideas and best practices can be exchanged across the region."³⁶⁴ Furthermore, a recent Commission report on the Pacific prioritised regionalism as one of its three main priorities. The EU claims that regional integration has the "clearest manifestation of the common interests" of the Union and the countries of South East Asia. The 'New Partnership for South East Asia' claims that both sides have realised that creating a regional entity will result in economic development, which reinforces security.³⁶⁵ Yet, within South East Asia and parts of the Pacific, an observed frustration between EU values and Asian principles can be observed.

³⁶² See Malakai Kolamatangi and Simon Hollis, "The Security of a Nation: Fijian identities in political flux and the dilemma of a Nation-State," *Journal of Pacific Studies* Forthcoming Article (USB: Suva, Fiji, 2007).

³⁶³ Hettne and Söderbaum. "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as Global Actor and the Role of Inter-regionalism," 545. Also see Mawdsley and Quille, *The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP and Equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force*, 12-13.

³⁶⁴ Directorate General for External Relations, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, 7-11.

³⁶⁵ European Commission, *A new partnership for South East Asia*, 11.

Scholars, such as Georg Wiessala, Julie Gilson, Björn Hettne, Hanns Maull, Jürgen Rüländ and Axel Berkofsky, mention or allude to a frustration in EU and Asian values, which can limit the effectiveness of security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.³⁶⁶ Some scholars have even gone so far as to contrast the ‘orient wisdom’ against the occident value of the rule of law.³⁶⁷ Berkofsky subtly refers to this as a “contradiction in terms of perspective.”³⁶⁸ The Asian Way – which shares conspicuous similarities with the ‘Pacific Way’ – can come into conflict against the “OSCE practice of ‘interference’.”³⁶⁹ The Asia Pacific adherence to these norms is seen as vital in maintaining an informal sense of cohesion between the diverse range of political, social and cultural environments that exist in South East Asia and the Pacific. Thus, the tendency to create formal structures within inter-regional dialogue mechanisms or other multilateral arrangements goes against the Asia Pacific concepts of stability – informalism and non-interference – limiting the potential depth of multilateral or bilateral dialogue. Reinforcing these differences, the Union’s agenda on human rights and democracy in the Asia Pacific have also created tensions.³⁷⁰

Despite the apparent frustrations resulting from the divergent values between the EU and Asia Pacific, the Union does acknowledge the ‘contradiction in terms of perspective’ (at least in political rhetoric). The Union’s Regional Indicative Programme for 2005-2006, and the Commission’s strategy for the Pacific Islands, stated that the EU’s relationship with ASEAN is primarily based on shared values, such as respect for diversity in culture and mutual awareness.³⁷¹ Plans adopted through the ‘New Partnership with South East

³⁶⁶ See Axel Berkofsky, “Can the EU play a meaningful role in Asian security through the ASEAN Regional Forum?” *ELIAS Policy Brief* 3 no.1 (November 2003):1-4., Hettne and Söderbaum. “Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as Global Actor and the Role of Inter-regionalism,” Rüländ, “Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to keep the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant,” 45-62. And: Maull, Segal and Wanandi, *Europe and the Asia Pacific*. Wiessala, *The European Union and Asian Countries*.

³⁶⁷ Maull, Segal and Wanandi, *Europe and the Asia Pacific*, 129.

³⁶⁸ Berkofsky, “Can the EU play a meaningful role in Asian security through the ASEAN Regional Forum?” 2.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ Bretherton and Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 129.

³⁷¹ Directorate General for External Relations, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, 3. See also: European Commission, *EU relations with the Pacific Islands – A strategy for a strengthened partnership*, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the

Asia' communication contain a 'two-way value added test' which is to be applied before EC regional projects can be initiated. This test has been designed "to identify priority areas from an ASEAN point of view where the EU can provide particular added value."³⁷² This official rhetoric is also reinforced by an interview with an EU official in the Commission who stated that the EU must be careful not to be patronising and is slowly changing its negotiating style to accommodate positive perceptions. Perhaps the European's have finally taken note from one of their own scholars, Jürgen Habermas, who comments: "[i]t now appears as if Europe as a whole is being given a second chance...[by using] a non imperial process of reaching understanding with, and learning from, other cultures."³⁷³ This is Europe's culturally-orientated intellectual challenge.

6.7 Capabilities

The various security capabilities that the Union has at its disposal will implicitly condition the approach EU officials will take in the Union's multilateral and bilateral discourse. The main objective of the EU in the Asia Pacific is to "contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, through a broadening of our engagement with the region."³⁷⁴ In other words, the major tool used from the EU external relations tool box is dialogue. It is believed that through promoting similar values and information exchange through inter-regional or sub-regional dialogue, a peaceful environment can be assured. However, other emerging capabilities are also being added to the EU foreign policy tool kit. These include civilian, police and military crisis management bodies, along side more traditional capabilities connected with development assistance and the promotion of regionalism and effective multilateralism. In close guidance with UN principles, the EU

European Economic and Social Committee, 248 final (Brussels, 29 May 2006),

http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/RegionsCountries/EUPacific_en.cfm.

³⁷² Directorate General for External Relations, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, 4.

³⁷³ Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some reflections on the Future of Europe, in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 271. Also see: Maull, Segal and Wanandi, *Europe and the Asia Pacific*, 129. The most important aspect needed for cooperation is the acceptance of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of the Asia Pacific community.

³⁷⁴ European Commission, *Europe and Asia: A strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, 15.

assists and shares experiences in the Asia Pacific region through working agreements, declarations, legal and financial support.³⁷⁵

Diplomatic and Political Initiatives

Soft power capabilities such as norms, diplomatic assistance, dialogue, and institutional or legal initiatives, have grown substantially in South East Asia in the last seven years. Commenting on these capabilities Frédéric Charillon succinctly noted that if “we consider security as a matter of dialogue, exchange, trust building and civilian action more than military superiority, then the EU has a role to play.”³⁷⁶ Major security issues for the EU, such as terrorism and non-proliferation of WMD are dealt within a myriad of security-orientated programmes and multilateral and bilateral agreements.

The European Union has contributed to a vast amount of legal agreements and emerging institutional structures related to security in the South East Asian region. These include: the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism at the 14th EU-ASEAN meeting, which saw the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism;³⁷⁷ judicial support in the fight against financing terrorism in Indonesia; assistance to the Philippines border management and money laundering under the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism; support of a counter terrorism centre in Malaysia; and legal support for the ASEAN Biodiversity Centre (ABC), which promotes environmental protection.³⁷⁸ With a specific terrorist prevention focus, the Union also supports the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, the South East Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang.³⁷⁹ Further institutional initiatives related to the security of South East Asia also include the adoption of the Copenhagen Cooperation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism at the fourth ASEM summit. This has provided a

³⁷⁵ See Council of the European Union, *Presidency Report on ESDP Missions*, (Brussels, 12 June 2006), 2., www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=162.

³⁷⁶ Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” 523.

³⁷⁷ Directorate General for External Relations, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, 3.

³⁷⁸ European Commission, *A new partnership for South East Asia*, 14. Also see: Council of the European Union, *15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting Joint Co-Chairman’s Statement*, 3.

³⁷⁹ Council of the European Union, *15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting Joint Co-Chairman’s Statement*, 3.

framework for participating countries to work more closely on security issues at a UN level, such as anti-money laundering, counter terrorism, and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.³⁸⁰ The EU also wish to strengthen the South East Asian-EU dialogue in areas such as visa agreements, asylum, energy security immigration and other policies related to the free movement of people.³⁸¹ Apart from specific security-related initiatives, other events associated with ‘wide security’ include: Interfaith Dialogues; immigration meetings; and workshops on HIV/AIDS and Avian Influenza Control.³⁸² While many of these initiatives have in the past been the cause of ‘over-institutionalisation’ and ‘forum fatigue’ the EU has been making efforts to clarify and strengthen its competencies in the region.³⁸³ These agreements and initiatives, combined with other economic and cultural links, build connections and develop an awareness of South East Asia. By constructing these substantive contacts, greater cooperation and understanding of the two regions can be made possible, which reduces distrust and enhances cooperative measures.

The Union’s growing concern for non-proliferation issues offers an example of its political, institutional and diplomatic capabilities. The European Union has made significant steps in promoting this agenda in the Asia Pacific region. The Council established a fully fledged ‘EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD’ in 2003. This was the first comprehensive strategy paper from the Council. The EU relies on diplomatic and political preventive channels, which are cross pillar in nature and involve both Community and CFSP elements.³⁸⁴ Dialogue with strategic partners in multilateral and bilateral settings combined with effective multilateralism provides the context to utilise

³⁸⁰ WorldSource Online, “Roundup: ASEM beefs up overall Asia-Europe relations (part one)” Lanham: 6 (October, 2004), 6. <http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/pqdweb?index=9&did=712741491>.

³⁸¹ European Commission, *Europe and Asia: A strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*. Also see: European Commission, *Calendar of ASEM events 2006-2008*, (Helsinki, September 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_summits/ asem6/ asem6_calendar.pdf. Other economic and cultural links are reflected in the €80 million budget for the EC-ASEAN cooperation agreement for the period 2000-2005 which was distributed to five major areas including, trade, energy, environment, capacity building and higher education. For more on EU-Asian education links and exchanges see Wiessala, *Re-orienting the Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations*, 119-135.

³⁸² European Commission, *Calendar of ASEM events 2006-2008*.

³⁸³ Wiessala, “A Holistic Re-Invigoration - The EU’s New Partnership with South East Asia,” 6.

³⁸⁴ Kienzle, “The EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMDs: An Interim Assessment,” 2.

these tools. Conditionality is also used as the EU's 'harder' power to extend these interests. Indeed, all new agreements with third countries have specific clauses such as, non-proliferation of WMD or actively supporting the Security Council resolution 1540.³⁸⁵

Promoting international legal norms and improving officials' cultural perceptions of nations or regions are two strong themes directed toward the Asia Pacific region and driven by EU diplomacy. Under the New Partnership Communication 2005-2006 – designed to create greater cooperation – 26 different policy areas have been created.³⁸⁶ Within the institutional makeup of the New Partnership two frameworks have been designed to govern EU-ASEAN dialogue. TREATI (Trans-regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative) is dedicated to trade and investment, while the other, READI (Regional EC ASEAN Dialogue Instrument), provides a framework for all other specific dialogue areas, such as security. There are three main dialogues under READI that are either implicitly or explicitly related to security. The EU plan to maintain further ASEAN integration by supporting: the fight against terrorism; the ASEAN secretariat, through APRIS II; the creation of the 'New Partnership' Information and Communication Programme.³⁸⁷ The specific objective of the latter is to "improve South East Asian countries' perception of the EU,"³⁸⁸ which is a novel addition to the Union's external relations. In supporting ASEAN with anti-terrorist measures, the EU endeavours to provide assistance in implementing all UN Security Council resolutions. The EU has also prioritised border management and is working closely with willing members of ASEAN. For example, RELEX envisages a minimum of five regional or sub-regional conferences with 20 participants on border management in the future.³⁸⁹ This detailed framework, facilitating deeper security dialogue with South East Asia, illustrates not only a growing awareness of the ASEAN states, as viable security partners, but also demonstrates an underlying constructivist approach to external relations. Growing concern in how security partners' cultures and values affect political dialogue, and generating initiatives to increase the volume of dialogue possible through a greater appreciation of the 'other,' is

³⁸⁵ Kienzle, "The EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMDs: An Interim Assessment," 2.

³⁸⁶ Note that not all ASEAN members are part of the Regional Indicative Programme.

³⁸⁷ Directorate General for External Relations, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, 20.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

certainly a novel position to take in an international system that has long been dominated by realist ideology.

Development Assistance

The European Security strategy stresses the need to address root ‘causes of poverty’ and ‘weak governance’ to ensure stability.³⁹⁰ The preamble of the Cotonou agreement expands this foreign policy rationale stating that “a political environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and good governance is part and parcel of long-term development.”³⁹¹ Development assistance is, thus, a significant apparatus in the EU security tool box. Although the Union is the second biggest donor to the Pacific after Australia, the EU contributes just three per cent of its total aid to the Pacific and plans are underway to narrow this budget line.³⁹² This clearly illustrates a preference for EU development assistance with a focus on African states within the ACP grouping. Indeed, a report published by the European Commission in April 2005 on HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, did not even mention the Pacific, despite HIV/AIDS being a growing concern in the Pacific.³⁹³ Irrespective of any preferential treatment to African countries, the EU facilitates and funds development projects in the Pacific, with current initiatives focused on education, institution building and good governance.³⁹⁴ The prime example of EU development aid in the South Pacific is the sugar subsidies in Fiji, which have largely kept the Fijian economy stable. Other EU projects contribute to the development of PICs,

³⁹⁰ Mawdsley and Quille, *The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP and Equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force*, 12-13. This is also expressed in an interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006: “the immense economic power of the EU means that we have a responsibility for development.”

³⁹¹ European Commission, *The Cotonou Agreement*, preamble.

³⁹² NZ Herald, “Europe’s south seas strategy.” It is also argued that the EU is, in fact, the largest aid donor, as specific Australian funds to PNG distorts actual figures.

³⁹³ European Commission, *A European Programme for Action to Confront HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis through External Action (2007-2011)*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 179 final (Brussels, 27 April 2005), <http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga>. Indeed, The Commission report in the Pacific states that apart from its natural resources, state fragility, conflicts and HIV/AIDS provide the conditions for EU engagement with the Pacific. See European Commission, *EU relations with the Pacific Islands – A strategy for a strengthened partnership*, 3-4.

³⁹⁴ The European Commission Delegation for the Pacific, “Grant financing – present portfolio of active co-operation,” in *What We Do: Pacific Region*, http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu/en/achievements/pacific_region.htm. Also see Möller, “A Common EU foreign policy in Asia.”

for instance: providing funds for the Transparency International chapter in Fiji; the jointly-funded, recent opening of the Rewa Bridge in Nausari, Fiji; and the large involvement of the EU Delegation to the Pacific vis à vis good governance in Fiji and article 96 of the Cotonou agreement. Jointly funded projects do provide the EU with the ability to build trust and deepen relationships, which may include and encourage security dialogue in the long-term.

From an economic perspective, the EU is currently facilitating EPAs, which will replace the initial trade and development agreements from the 2000 Cotonou agreement, due to run out in 2008.³⁹⁵ Created in accordance to World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards, the EPAs are envisaged to protect developing countries from the negative effects of globalisation, while integrating their economies into the world market.³⁹⁶ An example of this would be the EPAs ‘everything but arms’ initiative or the sugar subsidies in Fiji. These initiatives are an attempt to support and encourage the economies of developing countries by targeting tariff preferences and subsidising primary exports. Thus, development assistance to the Pacific, through trade agreements, contributes to the overall wellbeing of PICs and promotes security. In this context, the EU will have an added benefit in its international relations if it maximises its perceived role as a “neutral but influential broker that is not involved with narrow issues and perceived national agendas.”³⁹⁷

Education has become a major area of development assistance in the Asia Pacific region. During the period 2001-2007, the EU supplied \$US 28 million to education reform in Cambodia under the SWAp scheme. Apart from this, the EU has also assisted other Asia Pacific regions such as Vanuatu.³⁹⁸ EU education support to the Solomon Islands is also

³⁹⁵ The European Commission’s Delegation to the Pacific, *The European Union and the Pacific Region*, EU and ACP countries meet to push forward Economic Partnership Agreements (Brussels 1 March 2007), <http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu/en/index.htm>.

³⁹⁶ Ridolfi, “Europe Day Speech.”

³⁹⁷ Mike Ratcliffe and Murray Macrae, “Sector Wide Approaches to Education – A Strategic Analysis,” *Education Research Paper* No. 32 (Europe-East Asia Think Tank Dialogue, 1999), 67., <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/secappedpaper32.pdf>.

³⁹⁸ Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDR), *Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDM)*, http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/practices_chapter6.htm.

substantial. Through the EDF and the *Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation* (STABEX) funds, the EU currently provides €83.3 million towards education, rural development and NGO support. The revised STABEX 99 also accommodates for post-conflict areas of the Solomon Islands, providing substantial economic recovery.³⁹⁹ The EU has also established a National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE), which is a financing initiative valued at €800,000 for civic and voter education in Fiji.⁴⁰⁰

The promotion of democratic governance through political dialogue, and often reinforced through conditionality, is another strong tool used by the Union to prevent conflict in the Asia Pacific region. Formal agreements are often used as a pretext for this dialogue, which also create boundaries around the extent to which conditionality can be used.⁴⁰¹ For example, the Cotonou Agreement – the legal gateway for the EU to promote security in PICs – promotes democratic governance and provides development assistance. Article eight of the agreement specifically acknowledges that through “dialogue, the Parties shall contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment.”⁴⁰² However, in countries where democratic governance fails, such as in Fiji after the 2000 coup, conditionality was used as a means of promoting democratic governance by disqualifying development aid. Indeed, the latest coup in 2006 has led to a considerable amount of diplomatic pressure by the EU on Fiji to hold elections in 2009.⁴⁰³

³⁹⁹ Solomon Islands Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Speech for Honourable Fred Fono – Europe Day, 9th May,” 2005, <http://www.pmc.gov.sb/?q=node/9>.

⁴⁰⁰ See EVD internationaal ondernemen en samenwerken, “Fiji: National Initiative for Civic Education,” <http://www.evd.nl/business/zoeken/ShowBouwsteen.asp?bstnum=174292>.

⁴⁰¹ Van Veen, “Order in world Politics: an inquiry into the concept, change and the EU’s Contribution,” 42.

⁴⁰² European Commission, *The Cotonou Agreement*, Title II, Article 8.

⁴⁰³ Carlos Santiso, “The Reform of EU Development Policy, Improving Strategies for Conflict Prevention, Democratic Promotion and Governance Conditionality,” *CEPS Working Document* no. 182 (Brussels, March 2002), 43-6. Also see Michael Green, “Further pressure on Fiji to hold elections within 2 years,” *Radio New Zealand International* (25 April 2007), <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=31744>., *The Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific, Programming of the 10th European development Fund (EDF 10); Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) European Commission (EC) and Non State Actors (NSAs); Consultation Forum, Report* (Suva, Fiji. 22 August 2006), <http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu>.

Military Support

In line with the ‘St Petersburg tasks’ – involving humanitarian, peacekeeping and combat forces in crisis management – the ESDP has become an inextricable aspect of the Union’s external policy. In addition to Europe’s soft power, the Union has facilitated civilian, police and military crisis management bodies under the framework of ESDP. Although a majority of ESDP civilian and military orientated missions have been within a close geographic proximity to Europe, the Union has expanded its missions mandate to the South East Asian region, demonstrating an emerging notion of the Union as a political power in a globalised context. Instigated in only 1999 through the Amsterdam Treaty, the ESDP already demonstrates an impressive track record, with six completed missions and 11 ongoing missions to date.⁴⁰⁴ It should also be noted that the Union has no illusions regarding the strength of its hard power. Indeed, the Union’s lack of military capability is highlighted as a major weakness in the EU’s Crisis Management/Conflict Prevention toolbox.⁴⁰⁵ Despite this, initiatives to strengthen the military capacity of the Union continue. For example, the new EU Headline Goal for 2010 has created projects such as the operational battle groups and the European Defence Agency.

The EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia provides a useful example in illustrating the extent of EU involvement in South East Asia. On request of the Indonesian government, the EU was seen as the most appropriate external actor to lead a multinational monitoring group to oversee the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).⁴⁰⁶ Under the framework of the ESDP, the Union allocated a total of €9 million specifically for the civilian mission. The ASEAN nations of Brunei Darrussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand participated in the AMM, creating numerous cultural and political links between the South East Asian region and Europe. Commenting on the successful end of the mission in December 2006, the Finnish Secretary of State noted: “[i]t has proven an opportunity to strengthen EU ties with the

⁴⁰⁴ European Voice, “EU’s long-term defence vision,” *European Voice* 13, no. 22 (7-13 June 2007), 27.

⁴⁰⁵ Mawdsley and Quille, *The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP and Equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force*, 12-13.

⁴⁰⁶ Council of the European Union, *Presidency Report on ESDP*, 10. See also: *Council Joint Action on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia)*, (Brussels 9 September 2005), in “EU Security and defence: Core documents 2005,” *Chaillot Paper* 6 no. 87 (March 2006): 251.

government of Indonesia and has also led to a successful cooperation with ASEAN countries who participated in the mission.”⁴⁰⁷ In a wider context, the EU has also supplied a €260 million package to the region in humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts after the 2004 Tsunami. Of this €260 million, €25 million has been channelled towards sustaining peace. The main instruments used in support of peace have been economic recovery, promoting the rule of law, human rights and democracy.⁴⁰⁸ More specifically, the support package has involved the organisation of the local elections, reforming or improving the police, justice system, local government and public administration.⁴⁰⁹ Continual support from other EU institutions, such as the European Parliament has also contributed to the ongoing peace process. For example, Glyn Ford MEP led an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Aceh in December 2006.

EOMs offer another avenue for EU security involvement in the Asia Pacific region. The Union is the major, and only, regional player that conduct EOMs in the Asia Pacific, which in the last six years has sent EOMs to Indonesia, Cambodia, East-Timor and Fiji, spending a total of €77 million since 2000.⁴¹⁰ These missions help to promote development assistance, conflict prevention and support the establishment of legitimate governance in both the Pacific and in South East Asia.⁴¹¹ This has fostered regional links between the Asia Pacific region and Europe, deepening political and cultural bonds.

Regional Security

The Union’s tendency to favour regionalism as its preferred mode of dialogue is well illustrated in the Asia Pacific region and is used as a tool to advance the Union’s agenda. European officials are often quick to point out that no war has been fought on European soil since the Common Coal and Steel Community facilitated the Franco-German

⁴⁰⁷ Pertti Torstila, “Address by Mr Pertti Torstila, Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Representing the EU Finnish Presidency,” Speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union (Paris, 18 December 2006), Phg.16., <http://formin.finland.fi/public/Default.aspx?culture=en-US&contentlan=2>.

⁴⁰⁸ Ferrero-Waldner, *Indonesia and the European Union: building on common ground*.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ EU Observer, “Official missions for Asia and Africa,” (2 March 2006), <http://euobserver.com/9/21057>. Also see Meyer-Resende, “Exporting Legitimacy: The Record of EU Election Observation in the Context of EU Democracy Support,” 4.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

rapprochement. Consequently, the success of regionalism is deemed appropriate to spread across the world. The EU, as a model of regionalism, is used to stimulate regionalism in the Pacific and South East Asia.⁴¹² It is believed that by promoting regional integration and effective multilateralism, peace will be ensured. Indeed, as stated by a Brussels policy analyst: a “strong ASEAN is probably the best guarantee for peace and stability in the region.”⁴¹³

Regional mechanisms can also be used to deepen bilateral contacts. This has been the case in current negotiations with Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.⁴¹⁴ Despite the Union’s preference for effective multilateralism and regional structures, it is not quixotic. The principle of subsidiarity is clearly reflected in that the EU will favour bilateral arrangements with South East Asian states unless a regional approach is deemed more suitable.⁴¹⁵ The rationale for this lies in lessons learnt. Past ASEAN-EU dialogue has taught the Union that South East Asian regionalism does not function in the same way as EU regional integration. The EU has found that regional “cooperation has proven to be more complex than bilateral cooperation.”⁴¹⁶ This quite clearly demonstrates the constructivist principle of socialisation, where continual cooperation has resulted in a better understanding of the ‘other,’ culminating in closer and deeper dialogue.

Cooperation with other international actors and regional security institutions also reflect a strong aspect of the EU’s commitment to security and multilateralism. In its Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership with Asia, the EU stated that it “should in particular play a pro-active role in regional cooperation fora such as the ARF, and in inter-regional dialogues such as ASEM”⁴¹⁷ in order to promote shared experiences and create long-term confidence building measures. Even though direct security dialogue is severely limited within ASEM, it would be wrong to discount it from the EU agenda.

⁴¹² For example, the EU Ambassador to the Pacific, Roberto Ridolfi, explained in a speech that the EU is an example of regional integration and has been used to nurture Pacific regional integration. See Ridolfi, “Europe Day Speech.”

⁴¹³ European Commission, *A new partnership for South East Asia*, 12.

⁴¹⁴ See Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand, “EU increases engagement with South East Asia,” News@EU (16 March 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.htm.

⁴¹⁵ European Commission, *Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN*, 5.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴¹⁷ European Commission, *Europe and Asia: A strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, 15-16.

Indeed, the latest report on ASEM 6 from the Commission states that “security and anti-terrorism co-operation...has become a priority for ASEM.”⁴¹⁸ Cooperation with other regional actors include: NATO, under the NATO-EU Declaration on the ESDP and the Berlin plus agreement; the UN, such as participation in the RAMSI and East Timor;⁴¹⁹ the OECD; the ARF; the PIF; and ASEAN. Scholars have argued that EU security presence in the Asia Pacific region is limited by the unilateral preferences and political strength of the US and other credible international players such as China, Japan and Russia.⁴²⁰ However, waning military interest by the US in the region,⁴²¹ combined with the Union’s unique regional approach, is providing room for the EU to establish security relationships with Asia Pacific countries. Regionalism is seen as a value to export while at the same time offers opportunities for the EU to deepen its security relations through its own regional identity and emphasis on institutional and legal structures within inter-regional mechanisms.

Conclusion

The identity of the EU as an external power consists of a number of important features that react against a process of socialisation, contributing to convergent or divergent views. The perceptions of individual regional actors influence the depth of dialogue possible in an inter-subjective environment implicitly contributing to security policies and initiatives. This chapter has outlined a number of important themes that culminate in forming a unique European security-identity in the Asia Pacific region. For example, the EU definition of wide security combined with a preference to promote liberal values such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights, has lead the EU to focus on particular security issues in a particular manner. The capabilities available to the Union and its

⁴¹⁸ European Commission, *10 Years of ASEM: Global Challenges – Joint Responses*, (September 2006), 11., http://www.asem6.fi/news_and_documents/en. See also: European Commission, *Europe and Asia: A strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*.” The main aim of the Framework is to ‘promote peace and security in Asia, pursue poverty alleviation, and promote Human Rights and democratic awareness.’

⁴¹⁹ European Commission, *EU relations with the Pacific Islands – A strategy for a strengthened partnership*, 4. See also Wiessala, *The European Union and Asian Countries*, 9.

⁴²⁰ See Maull, Segal and Wanandi, *Europe and the Asia Pacific*, 127.

⁴²¹ Peter W. Preston and Julie Gilson, *The European Union and East Asia: inter-regional linkages in a changing global system* (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2001), 120.

historical memory have also contributed to and shaped its external identity. Identities are not static, but change freely depending on a variety of intervening variables. The current external identity, mapped out in the chapter, will enable a comparative analysis between the New Zealand and EU external identities, resulting in a formative evaluation of the current EU-NZ security dialogue.

7 A Comparative Analysis of the European Union's and New Zealand's Security Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region

As a loyal ally of Britain, New Zealand's former Prime Minister, Richard Seddon, looked upon New Zealand as the main authority and primary representative of Britain's interests in the South Pacific.⁴²² Similarly, the European Union currently sees New Zealand as a close and respected partner in the Asia Pacific region. While this relationship is not envisaged to change significantly, the depth of dialogue may alter depending on how closely EU and New Zealand social and political interests are aligned. The apparent similarities and subtle differences observed in EU-NZ concepts of security in the Asia Pacific region provide a base upon which productive and pragmatic cooperation can be advanced. Similarly, how New Zealand and the EU perceive the Asia Pacific region, in relation to their own geographical proximity, contribute to the effectiveness of the security relationship. Diplomatic methods, military endeavours and the size of a country's economy, amongst a number of other factors, combine to produce a definite image of a country or region that will either strengthen or weaken bilateral and multilateral relations. The psychological impact of these factors affects how New Zealand and the EU perceive each other and will, consequently, determine the depth of the security dialogue.

When the separate EU and New Zealand identities interact within a sub-regional security setting, a unique security-identity emerges that is solidified through inter-subjective exchanges and a high frequency of repeated interaction. During EU-NZ security consultations, similarities and differences become apparent through a process of knowledge and information sharing. Understanding cultural and diplomatic customs of the 'other' may enhance the possibility of a more efficient dialogue process by reducing misunderstandings. The evolving security-identity can also increase the possibility of

⁴²² Hoadley, "New Zealand's Pacific Island Security Policies," 123.

decisions and actions being made through common-interest, as opposed to purely self-interest motivations. The previous two sections outlined the separate EU and New Zealand security identities in regard to the Asia Pacific region. This chapter looks at the overlap between the two identities to determine why the current level of dialogue exists and how it might increase.

Figure 7.1 illustrates the process of EU and New Zealand security-identities in the Asia Pacific region. Chapters 5 and 6 analysed specific socio-political aspects that make up the security-identity of the EU and New Zealand. This chapter focuses on the interaction that takes place between the two agencies. Through the dynamics of inter-subjective exchange similarities and differences become apparent, highlighting areas of interest that overlap. This results in a specific sub-regional identity formation.




Figure 7.1: Sub-regional process of the European Union and New Zealand security identities within the context of the Asia Pacific region

7.1 Defining the Concept of Security

A majority of officials from the Asia Pacific region, the European Union and New Zealand share a similar preoccupation with the concept of modern security threats. The idea of human security and the notion of widening strategic interests have been accepted as a growing norm vis-à-vis security concepts in the international environment. Primary security threats that are prioritised by the Asia Pacific region, New Zealand and the EU include: terrorism; China-Taiwan rivalry; transnational crime; fundamentalism; nuclear proliferation; illegal arms trade; and environmental security.⁴²³ The three primary security concerns that both the EU and New Zealand prioritise are state fragility, terrorism and transnational crime. While attention to particular security concerns will differ between EU and New Zealand interests – such as the current EU preoccupation with securing the movement of energy supplies – the three primary strategic challenges remain a stable platform from which the EU-NZ security dialogue can develop. These common perceptions on security provide possibilities of working together on a wide range of strategic issues. This increases the likelihood of developing social and political links, which enhance a common knowledge of diplomatic and cultural procedures, resulting in a more efficient and deeper dialogue process. Although focusing on the similarities is essential for effective security discourse, the differences must also be examined and acknowledged for a more balanced view of the relationship.

Although there is a marked harmonisation of EU and New Zealand definitions of security, the motivations behind these security concepts tend to differ. The EU promotes security in the Asia Pacific region in order to maintain economic stability and safeguard its values of liberal democracy, human rights, effective multilateralism and the rule of law. However, New Zealand's conceptualisation of security is bound in more pragmatic motives. For example, economic, political or environmental destabilisation in the South

⁴²³ European Parliament, *Delegation for relations with Australia and New Zealand 12th EP/New Zealand Interparliamentary Meeting*.

Pacific could encourage immigration, generate displaced people and foster terrorism, which would directly affect New Zealand and only implicitly disturb the EU. The Union remains far more limited with regard to the direct effects of security degradation due to its geographical placement. Although the security priorities are similar, when the underlying motivations are compared, the results become nuanced. Consequently, it can be envisaged that when the EU and New Zealand security-identities interact with one another, within the confines of regionalism, the volume will reach a point where subtle differences appear, limiting the effectiveness of the dialogue. While disparities are apparent between the EU and New Zealand, divergent views on security also exist between a common EU-NZ outlook on the one side and a dissimilar Asia Pacific perspective on the other.

Another limiting factor for the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region is the South East Asian and Pacific security culture. The EU and New Zealand share a similar security culture in promoting effective multilateralism as the best method to minimize transnational security threats. However, many countries in South East Asia and the South Pacific do not share this view, preferring to deal with security challenges on a national basis. The EU and New Zealand must be sensitive in their multilateral approaches to specific security concerns in the region, such as terrorism, in order to minimize the risk of interfering in the sovereignty of another country. This does not reject regional approaches to security, but encourages the need to maintain sensitivity and a close relationship with Asia Pacific countries to avoid cultural or diplomatic confusion. The best methods to overcome this hurdle are through continual dialogue, cultural exchanges and information sharing; enhancing inter-subjectivity, cultural links and political dialogue will increase trust and reduce the scope for misunderstandings.

7.2 Geographic Perceptions

The EU and New Zealand share similar geographical perceptions of the Asia Pacific region. Both see South East Asia and the South Pacific as two separate entities and, consequently, have generated specific policy frameworks for the two areas. The apparent

harmonisation in how New Zealand and the EU see the region undoubtedly contributes to a greater volume of security dialogue. However, the EU has a tendency to treat the Pacific as a single region and, at times, view the South Pacific as part of Asia.⁴²⁴ This perspective could create inefficiencies in development aid distribution if, for example, Timorese culture is treated the same as Fijian culture. Despite possible confusion, continual fellowship with New Zealand will provide the EU with an increasing knowledge of the region and the most suitable diplomatic approach to take.

Due to the expanding economy in South East Asia, and China's immense economic and political growth over the last decade, the EU tends to prioritise the APT region over the South Pacific from a security point of view.⁴²⁵ New Zealand, on the other hand, prioritises the South Pacific as their main security concern due to their constitutional, historical and geographical connections. Thus, while the geographical perceptions match, the importance given to each region can vary. The difference in priorities may limit the depth of the EU-NZ security dialogue as the inherent interests are differentiated. However, the disparities in interest are not excessive: both New Zealand and the EU have a significant interest in both regions. Indeed, the disparities that do exist can positively reinforce the relationship by providing alternative perceptions of the regions; through sharing information the EU and New Zealand can develop an enhanced awareness of each other, which may reduce any possible confusion in the future.

There will always be a disparity of interest due to the difference in size of the economies in the EU and New Zealand. Resources are more limited in New Zealand, which may affect the dialogue process. Indeed New Zealand's MFAT notes: "we do not have the resources to bolster significantly the breadth and depth of our engagement...so we often remain of marginal or occasional interest."⁴²⁶ Even if human or financial resources do not play a significant role, the image of the EU as a dominant economic superpower and New Zealand's economic dependence upon it can affect EU and New Zealand actors, from a

⁴²⁴ A number of interviews with New Zealand officials, 19 April 2007 and 8 November 2006.

⁴²⁵ NB: This statement is based on a more traditional understanding of security and does not fully take into account development aid as a security concern.

⁴²⁶ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Relations; Europe, European Union Enlargement."

psychological point of view. While this may not explicitly affect the depth of the EU-NZ security dialogue, it can implicitly determine the approach both actors assume and, to a certain extent, dictate the topics of discussion in sub-regional consultations.

Due to the lack of geographical proximity of the EU and New Zealand, it has been argued that perceptions, actions and interests will always be separate. A New Zealand politician connected to security issues believes that even with the speed of communication, it is distance that will always differentiate EU and New Zealand perceptions. While acknowledging the importance of the EU-NZ dialogue, the parliamentarian noted: “You can never get a New Zealander to... [achieve] a sufficiently clear and subtle understanding of the EU worldview because we are not Europeans and the same applies in reverse....We are never going to be perfect because we have just got different interests and outlooks.”⁴²⁷ While this is true, focusing on the remarkable number of similarities that exist, New Zealand, if situated in Europe, would undoubtedly be an EU Member State.⁴²⁸

7.3 Normative Values and Images

As good global citizens the EU and New Zealand share and foster similar values. Expounding democratic values, promoting human rights and adhering to the international rule of law have created similar policy reflexes within both governing institutions. Indeed, the current New Zealand Defence Minister noted that the normative features of the EU as a global actor are seen to be positive in the eyes of New Zealand.⁴²⁹ Providing a substantial foundation to develop EU-NZ security relations, these common values solidify the relationship. Other normative features of the dialogue, such as the promotion of regionalism in the Asia Pacific region, also cultivate a strong relationship. However, subtle differences in how values are promoted can limit the volume of dialogue. The depth of the future EU-NZ security dialogue will be determined by the amount of

⁴²⁷ Interview with New Zealand politician, 16 April 2007.

⁴²⁸ Interview with European Parliament official, 8 December 2006.

⁴²⁹ Goff, “New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement,” 69.

interaction with Asia Pacific countries: understanding the specific cultural and political customs in South East Asia and the Pacific will undoubtedly provide for a more secure and safer region.

Promoting regionalism as an effective security mechanism to ensure stability in the Asia Pacific region is firmly supported by the EU and New Zealand. This is done through supporting and encouraging South East Asian and Pacific security institutions in the region such as the PIF or the ARF. Promoting regionalism through cooperative methods, such as Europe-New Zealand aid harmonisation, is clearly in EU and New Zealand's best interests. While this clear overlap in interest encourages a greater volume of dialogue, the way in which the Union and New Zealand wish to promote regionalism contain subtle differences. For example, the EU "tend to trumpet themselves as a model for the ARF"⁴³⁰ which, from a New Zealand perspective, is seen as unconstructive. Commenting on the EU and regionalism, a New Zealand official stated that the EU needs to be aware of the different animosities that have been long held in South East Asia: "I don't think the EU is a model necessarily at all for the ARF. I think each region has to find its own model based on the culture...I don't think we should try and mirror or replicate the EU's model for the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Pacific Islands Forum."⁴³¹ While economic integration has been the key for European political stability, it may not be an appropriate model for the Asia Pacific region. This does not mean regionalism should be rejected, rather, specific regional approaches based on distinct Asia Pacific cultural and political protocols must be built up from an internal impetus. Although the means may be divergent, the primary goal remains the same: promoting peace through regionalism. As the EU-NZ dialogue continues to develop, common approaches will emerge, limiting the disparities and encouraging a further deepening of a security-focused dialogue for the Asia Pacific region.

The unique diplomatic and cultural traditions of the Asia Pacific region will determine the representatives' actions in the international environment. Continual interaction with

⁴³⁰ Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

Asia Pacific countries will provide valuable insight into the apparent diversity between the countries, build trust and reduce misunderstandings. This will enable New Zealand and the EU to acknowledge and accommodate the respective cultural settings. If aspects of the political culture are not understood – the Asian Way being a relevant example – the possibility of an effective and significant dialogue will be limited. One reason for problems emerging in regional dialogues has been credited to the European Union’s misunderstandings of Asian culture.⁴³² Furthermore, the number of officials from the Union who have a specific knowledge of Asia Pacific culture is substantially limited. From a New Zealand perspective it is only “foreign ministry officials [who] have wider international experience and little of that in the Asia/Pacific region.”⁴³³ Despite this, there is a growing understanding amongst EU officials that culture matters. Indeed, the importance of understanding cultural differences in other nations and regions is mentioned by a European Commission official, who states that understanding culture is fundamentally important and finds that the largest mistakes at the international level are made by a lack of appreciation for cultural differences.⁴³⁴ This example reflects a developing understanding of how cultural differences can affect consultation procedures. The EU must be willing to listen and acquire a succinct view of cultural practices in the Asia Pacific region. Dialogue with New Zealand offers an efficient means for achieving this goal.

The unique multicultural makeup of New Zealand, as a country expounding European values with strong Pacific and increasing Asian connections and cultural practices, places New Zealand in a positive and advantageous position concerning its security relationship with the EU. The Union recognises that New Zealand can offer a unique perspective due to its particular location in the Asia Pacific region and its principle associations with regional institutions.⁴³⁵ Even if New Zealand is on the periphery of Asia, it is still firmly

⁴³² The official mentioned that a problem with ASEM was that the EU is not good at understanding Asian culture: Interview with New Zealand Official, 8 November 2006.

⁴³³ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Relations; Europe, European Union Enlargement.”

⁴³⁴ Interview with EU Commission official and New Zealand official, 20 November 2006 and 8 December 2006 respectively.

⁴³⁵ Helen Clark, “PM addresses European Policy Centre,” address to the European Policy Centre (Brussels, 29 November 2005), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz>. Also see Bruno Julien, “Address to the New Zealand-

connected to the region. Common economic, social and political linkages have been formed throughout an extensive historical record of New Zealand in the South Pacific and South East Asia. These historical ties have provided New Zealand with specific area-knowledge, such as diplomatic and cultural customs, that shape a unique and effective approach to the region. These culturally influenced diplomatic methods are related to the EU through the various consultation mechanisms. Commenting on the culture and the EU-NZ security relationship, a New Zealand official stated: “we certainly talk to them about our approach and why we think the way we do”⁴³⁶ in an effort to aid EU officials’ approach in the Asia Pacific region. Although New Zealand’s interests, diplomatic expertise and military experience in the South Pacific do not match its relationship with South East Asia, New Zealand’s experience in the Asia Pacific region holds a significant advantage that the EU must realise and make use of during EU-NZ security consultations.

The normative interests of the EU and New Zealand are entirely compatible and create a stable platform for the developing EU-NZ security relationship. While there remain some inconsistencies, such as varying methods in the promotion of regionalism, the goal in promoting common values remains the same. Through continual interaction with New Zealand officials, EU representatives will acquire a greater culture-based knowledge vis-à-vis diplomatic approaches in the Asia Pacific region. As the EU and New Zealand adhere to similar values, it is natural that cooperation should emerge in an effort to promote these values: thus, capabilities must also be analysed.

7.4 Capabilities

The security capabilities of the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region provide a substantial area where cooperation can reap considerable benefits. By focusing on complementarity and coordination in development assistance, diplomatic programmes, or military initiatives, various sectors of EU-NZ security collaboration are revealed, that can be maintained and developed. The images and perceptions each agency has will also

Europe Business Council,” the European Commission's Delegation to Australia (13 February 2006), http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/pressandinformation/speeches/Julien_Feb2006_NZ.htm.

⁴³⁶ Interview New Zealand official, 19 April 2007.

contribute to the potential depth of interaction, which is inextricably linked to EU and New Zealand diplomatic endeavours.

Diplomatic initiatives that promote stability in the Asia Pacific region offer a specific area of EU-NZ security cooperation that can strengthen and provide possibilities for future development. The Union and New Zealand are currently involved in a myriad of projects that attempt to provide a safer environment in the region. For example, encouraging Asia Pacific states to adopt the UN 12 Conventions on Terrorism, or supporting regional military missions, are security concerns that both actors have a strong interest in developing. Further encouragement of cultivating cultural awareness is an area that deserves attention on the EU-NZ agenda. A European diplomat interviewed mentioned that one “must take into account the culture of countries in bilateral or multilateral [settings]...when I act in Asia Pacific meetings...you clearly see that not only do they have different expectations and different problems but also different ways of talking and negotiating and working.”⁴³⁷ This certainly highlights the importance of cultural awareness and the need to develop cultural learning amongst decision makers and officials.

Development assistance is an area of cooperation where the EU and New Zealand can effectively work together in promoting security and a stable environment in the Asia Pacific region. Working together on development projects, such as education in the Solomon Islands, will foster a greater amount of cultural and political understanding amongst officials. Joint initiatives will also encourage future development projects, help to solidify the EU-NZ relationship and reduce the possibility of aid duplication through specific cooperation. Despite the strong connection formed through development assistance, – the EU being one of the largest suppliers of aid to the Pacific – Europe has voiced concerns that their humanitarian efforts in the Pacific are not being fully realised. As the EU’s aid priority – reflected in its aid distribution – is firmly planted in the African continent, the EU has faced some doubt from New Zealand officials concerning the Unions development efforts in the Asia Pacific region. A European Parliament report

⁴³⁷ Interview with European Official, 17 April 2007.

noted that: “New Zealanders do not always appreciate how much development aid is currently provided by the EU to the South Pacific, and there are unfounded fears that the EU is turning its attention away from the region. The EU is, in fact, the second largest donor to the South Pacific”⁴³⁸ Whether this will directly or implicitly affect the depth of EU-NZ security dialogue remains difficult to determine. If EU development aid to the Pacific is not appreciated by New Zealand, the level of dialogue and trust may decrease. As images can define perceptions, it is important that New Zealand and the EU remain sensitive to how they are perceived.

The links between perceptions, values and diplomacy are well illustrated through New Zealand’s and the EU’s diplomatic approaches in the Asia Pacific region. Australia and New Zealand are seen by the EU as reliable security partners in the Asia Pacific region. The unique cultural makeup and geographical position of Australia and New Zealand generates a favourable stance for consultations with the European Union. However, Australian relations with the Asia Pacific have created an image that could increase the EU-NZ security dialogue. While not alluding to a strained EU-Australian security relationship, the perception of Australian diplomacy as forceful and, at times, condescending – in the eyes of PICs, New Zealand and the EU – could affect EU officials’ relationship with Australia. From a socio-political perspective, the EU may prefer to interact with more likeminded actors such as New Zealand. Commenting on his observations on a tour of Australia and New Zealand in 2004, the Union’s Development Commissioner “was critical of Australia’s ‘muscular’ and ‘too American’ approach in the Pacific. Recent Australian actions in Papua New Guinea following on from the RAMSI mission looked to Nielson like neo-colonialism in the absence of a multilateral framework.”⁴³⁹ Many European and New Zealand officials who were interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the diplomatic style of Australia in the Asia Pacific region. The Commission’s Desk Officer for Australia and New Zealand stated that the EU and New Zealand share the same values and see “eye-to-eye on more international issues than

⁴³⁸ European Parliament, “*Delegation for relations with Australia and New Zealand 12th EP/New Zealand Interparliamentary Meeting 26 February – 5 March 2006.*”

⁴³⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Pacific Donor Consultations, File No: AID/PAC/9, Vol. 3.

Australia.”⁴⁴⁰ As New Zealand shares values more inline with EU norms, and is a firm supporter of soft-power, cooperating with a more likeminded partner on security issues in the Pacific would seem logical. If Australia’s diplomacy continues to be seen unfavourably in the eyes of EU officials, New Zealand will most likely be favoured as a closer partner, from a normative perspective.

While military endeavours are non existent between the EU and New Zealand, cooperation with EU Member States through bilateral initiatives – such as joint French-NZ military exercises – or multilateral exercises played out through the PSI, implicitly connect the EU with New Zealand. Continual military operations will also help maintain an effective amount of interoperability and will avoid the risk of duplication. If EU Battle Groups are deployed in the Asia Pacific and cooperate with New Zealand forces in the future, similar capabilities will be essential for effective operations. This is the added advantage of cooperation with ESDP and NATO in areas outside of the Asia Pacific region such as Afghanistan: an ability to keep up to date with European military ‘thinking’ will be highly beneficial for any future activities. Besides long-term planning, the EU is able to assist in current military initiatives in the Asia Pacific region through financial flanking measures or direct input. An example of such efforts can be seen in the EU financial backing of the RAMSI mission. In this way, the EU can remain relevant as a direct security partner in the region.

Conclusion

Identities can be forged by a process of continual inter-subjective exchange, creating an environment of solidarity and reducing mistrust amongst cooperative agencies. Seen as the cornerstone of regular consultation, common interests are aligned and differences acknowledged as the volume of dialogue matures. The limits of the dialogue are arguably set by the differences that exist within the individual socio-cultural milieux that represent the actors’ individual identity. However, differences can at times enhance understanding between actors; through information sharing and social learning, alternative perceptions

⁴⁴⁰ Interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006.

can be understood and, periodically taken on. Continual cooperation will reduce the possibilities of not realising differences, culminating in a deeper dialogue.

Exploring the overlap between EU and New Zealand security identities in the Asia Pacific region has helped to elucidate the level of the EU-NZ security dialogue. Similar perceptions are encountered in how the European Union and New Zealand geographically perceive the Asia Pacific region, understand the concept of security, think and operate from a military point of view, and adhere to international law and liberal democratic values. These areas solidify the relationship and generate a general impetus to increase the security dialogue. However, there are nuanced views in how to achieve their joint goal of promoting stability in the Asia Pacific region. Different motivations behind common goals, such as how to extend the value of regionalism in the Asia Pacific region, limit the depth of dialogue. There will always be different and subtle diplomatic or cultural practices that disunite actors. However, through a process of continual inter-subjective exchange, differences can be acknowledged and accepted as the EU-NZ security dialogue evolves. Furthermore, if the apparent advantage of New Zealand's culture-based knowledge of the Asia Pacific is utilized by the EU, the possibility for a stronger dialogue would be enhanced.

8 Conclusion

A multitude of security related forums, security exercises and initiatives can be found in the Asia Pacific region. Amongst this myriad of security mechanisms, EU and New Zealand security dialogues exist. The primary aim of this thesis was to explore the volume of security dialogue between the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region. A number of informal and formal diplomatic channels, development cooperation, military exercises, cultural ties and educational links have been uncovered. This reflects a multidimensional dialogue that encompasses a wide range of competencies, personnel and practices. While this thesis started with one question, it ends with many more. This is not seen as a limitation, but rather recognises that the EU-NZ security dialogue is an area that deserves considerably more attention, particularly within the context of a constructivist agenda. The following section sketches out possible initiatives for government officials, future research proposals and a commentary on the vices and virtues of constructivism, in relation to this research. The second section deals with some final conclusions that this thesis has formulated.

8.1 Future Initiatives

If the European Union and New Zealand choose to be proactive and recognise the importance of the EU-NZ security dialogue, a number of possibilities await the consultation processes. In connection with the results of this thesis, a number of initiatives are recommended that are envisaged to deepen the security relationship. These include: increasing the awareness of the dialogue; enhancing security information sharing; encouraging the EU's security role in the Pacific; promoting informal political and cultural links; and applying appropriate action to knowledge, vis à vis images and perceptions of the self and other. From an academic perspective, a number of possible long-term research areas are also recommended.

Policy Proposals and Initiatives

To ensure a deeper consultative process in the future, a greater effort must be made to increase the internal awareness of the EU-NZ security dialogue. A number of EU and New Zealand officials, both in Brussels and Wellington, possess a limited knowledge of the security dialogue processes. While this indicates the perceived level of importance of the dialogue, it may also point towards a lack of information sharing between governing institutions. Indeed, a European official from the Commission mentioned that “EU Member States do not realise or understand how good a relationship the EU has with New Zealand.”⁴⁴¹ Developing the internal profile of the dialogue may increase the total amount of input and ideas produced by a number of actors, such as diplomats, NGOs, interested EU Member States, EU institutions or New Zealand politicians. This would culminate in a deeper and more proficient dialogue process. Increasing the importance and available knowledge of the dialogue can be achieved by: encouraging continual interaction between New Zealand and EU officials, promoting the cultural and diplomatic advantage of New Zealand’s relationship in the Pacific; focusing on similar concepts of security; and forging new initiatives for future cooperation. With a proactive spirit, the EU and New Zealand can reap the benefits of a deeper dialogue.

An increase in security information sharing is one particular area that would benefit the EU-NZ security dialogue. If New Zealand and the EU instigate a contract similar to the official agreement on information trading between the European Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) and Australia, stronger EU-NZ security links could develop and cooperation increase. The agreement stipulates that both parties will “exchange strategic and operational information to combat serious international crime and terrorism.”⁴⁴² While the EU and New Zealand do exchange strategic information through various mediums such as the ARF or ministerial consultations, an official agreement would obligate both parties to continually exchange information as opposed to the current ad hoc process. In connection to EUROPOL, enhancing information sharing on the ESDP Police missions – such as the Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) or Palestinian territory

⁴⁴¹ Interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006.

⁴⁴² European Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), “Australia and Europe join forces to combat international crime,” <http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=home&language=en>.

(EUPOL COPPS) operations – and New Zealand Police missions in the Pacific, would undoubtedly contribute to forming better operational practices and encourage any collaborative future ESDP missions in the Asia Pacific region.

EU security involvement in the Pacific will be a noteworthy determinant in how the EU-NZ security relationship will develop. The current New Zealand Defence Minister noted that the EU-NZ security dialogue is currently at a ‘good level’ and will be expected to grow as the “EU continues to increase its ‘out of area’ peace support and disaster relief activities, establishes itself as a truly global actor,”⁴⁴³ and participates on security challenges that matter to New Zealand. Consequently, New Zealand officials seem to be interested in strengthening the security relationship only when the EU enhances its security profile in the Asia Pacific region. This does not necessarily reflect a disinterested New Zealand position, but rather a pragmatic approach in which the value of the security dialogue for the region will remain limited until the EU increases its security role. Thus, the future dialogue will be highly dependent upon the EU’s evolutionary role in the Asia Pacific region in general, and the South Pacific in particular.

A noteworthy New Zealand parliamentarian stated that “informalism is immeasurable in terms of value...[it is] very very powerful.”⁴⁴⁴ Although informal dialogue is difficult to measure, recognition of the importance of unofficial consultation continues to grow. Informalism generates important links that can help future policy implementation and augment the knowledge of other diplomatic practices. It will also provide an environment where officials are able to consult more freely; not being bound by a restrictive agenda will undoubtedly encourage greater cooperation. This is an important area that must be further exploited to promote and support the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. In addition, the inflexible nature of EU decision-making reinforces the argument that New Zealand must influence the right people at the right time. Phil Goff reiterates this idea by stating that to influence the EU foreign policy one would have to establish dialogue with all Member States, the High Representative and a number of

⁴⁴³ Phil Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with New Zealand politician, 16 April 2007. Also see Goff, “New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement,” 71.

Commissioners, which is beyond any reasonable limit.⁴⁴⁵ If informal structures are set in place, it will be easier to promote New Zealand's interests in the EU. Although gauging and encouraging informal links can be highly problematic, there are a number of initiatives that will enhance greater EU-NZ informal dialogue. Promoting greater military, sport, academic, or bureaucratic exchanges; adding to the working-holiday agreements between New Zealand and a number of European countries; and promoting the value of informal networks to practitioners and participants in the field, are three areas that, if properly developed, could produce valuable people-to-people links and encourage unofficial dialogue in the future. Furthermore, instigating a formal security institution or research centre with a specific focus on threats in the Pacific would encourage greater links and promote long-term stability in the region.

Image and perception determines a significant amount of action and decisions made in the international environment. Not generally perceived as a priority in security orientated dialogue, how countries or regions are perceived is an area where the EU and New Zealand can work together. There appears to be a nuanced understanding of Asia Pacific self-perception and how the EU and New Zealand perceive the region. The EU and New Zealand, to a greater or lesser extent, face an unfortunate neo-colonial image in the region. Whether this is at all substantive is secondary to the perceptions Asia Pacific countries have of the EU and New Zealand. Perhaps due to the EU's large development aid or its geographical position, the Union tends to portray an image of an external actor that will, at times, obstinately apply conditionality through its provision of aid. Furthermore, the attitude of some EU officials in the Pacific, which is often reinforced by its own administrative structure, also produces an image that hints of neo-colonialism. Although subtle, the attitudes of officials do not always reflect EU policy; this directly contributes to forming perceptions and images that could be detrimental to the EU's objectives in the Asia Pacific region. While both the EU and New Zealand often see neo-colonial branding as a vent of frustration rather than the actual reality, it has raised a level of sensitivity in New Zealand in its diplomatic approach to the Pacific.⁴⁴⁶ It is

⁴⁴⁵ Goff, "New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement," 71.

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006.

recommended that the EU adopt a similar position. Not only must the Union become more sensitive to how it is perceived in the Asia Pacific region, but it must also alter its diplomatic methods to accommodate the level of tensions that can accumulate vis à vis perceptions in the region. For example, the Union should nurture and support regionalism in the Pacific and must be careful not to directly control its evolution.⁴⁴⁷ Both the EU and New Zealand must also be aware of the negative images that can be created when capability-expectation gaps develop vis à vis policy implementation in the region. While the European Commission does finance research initiatives to learn how they are perceived – such as the commendable perception studies research at the National Centre for Research on Europe⁴⁴⁸ – concrete actions and results must come from the EU, and be encouraged by New Zealand, if greater cooperation and more effective security-related initiatives are to eventuate in the future.

Future Research Areas and Theoretical Reflections

A number of specific areas of future research have surfaced while analysing security-focused dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. A continual exploration of areas related to the dialogue processes and political philosophy will undoubtedly provide greater insight into the EU-NZ security dialogue, constructivist theory and the complexities of regionalism.

As outlined in chapter 2, two primary tenants of constructivism were adopted as the main theoretical focus of this study, namely socialisation and identity formation. Through this, a constructivist model was created in order to explain the reflectivist tendencies of EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region (see Figure 2.2). The following (Figure 8.1) is a reconstruction of Figure 2.2: the alterations are principally based on the text, which has been replaced with specific information and ideas developed throughout the thesis that supported the original model. This study firmly demonstrates the connection between inter-subjective exchange and deeper dialogue, which Figure 8.1 attempts to

⁴⁴⁷ An interesting parallel can be observed in regard to US diplomatic and financial support of European integration in the 1950's.

⁴⁴⁸ See Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban, "The EU through the Eyes of the Asia-Pacific, Public perceptions and media representations," *NCRE Research Series* No. 4, (2005).

demonstrate. It has been argued that, upon the foundation of common images and values, cooperation can be advanced and solidified (see Figure 8.1, section i.). Within this cooperation, the separate security-identities of each agency – as analysed in chapters 5, 6 and 7 – was analysed in order to determine the overlap of specific socio-political interests (see Figure 8.1, section ii.). These factors not only determine the possible depth of dialogue, but also create a specific sub-regional security culture (see Figure 8.1, section iii). However, this thesis has not sufficiently demonstrated that self-interest can become secondary to collective-interest in a decision-making capacity; rather, it is assumed (see Figure 8.1, section iv). Exploring the link between collective-interests and decision making within a regional setting is certainly an area of research that would advance the theory of constructivism.




Figure 8.1: Constructivist model of the European Union and New Zealand sub-regional security consultation process

In connection to the above argument, a focus on what particular information and knowledge political actors have access to and decide to use, would be a worthy tangent to explore. The source of specific data that state actors use is a determining factor in how decisions are influenced. Analysing this specific area would illuminate yet another research avenue of how decision makers act and what motivates them within a sub-regional locality.

Particularly within the field of international relations, constructivist theory remains situated on the periphery of political philosophy. Indeed, if this study were analysed through the lens of a neorealist or a liberal theorist, the results would be notably different. For example, it could be supposed that a realist would see little value in the EU-NZ security relationship, as only a few, diminutive material results have emerged from the

security consultation. Realism places little value on the effects of socialisation and the formation of informal people-to-people links. Indeed, the notion and importance of values, images and norms are often sidelined by mainstream theorists, who prefer to analyse a variant set of traditional indicators. Constructivism does not directly adhere to realist notions such as anarchy, self-help, or power balancing, but chooses to analyse how state actors perceive these ideas: effectively taking a theoretical step back. In contrast to the theoretical approach of this study assuming reflectivist tendencies, a focus on material forces and nature would yield an alternative analysis vis à vis how ideas and interests can be defined. Therefore, a realist examination of the EU-NZ security relationship would be encouraged to gain an alternative perspective on the relationship.

While this thesis set out the basic tenants of constructivism and its possible uses in its analysis of sub-regional dialogue, it does not look at the specific nature and consequences of the individuals who participate in the security-related Asia Pacific dialogue mechanisms. Analysing the correlation between those who directly interact with Asia Pacific nations and those who attend regional security meetings, would help in understanding the effectiveness of the dialogue process; continual interaction with the same people will enhance the relationship. However, if officials based in Europe attend high level security fora, and embassy staff located in the vicinity of the Asia Pacific region to not attend, the possibility of a deeper dialogue will remain limited. Additionally, the turn-over of diplomatic posts and other vocational positions will have an affect on the volume of dialogue. Common ideas and values, including the formation of social and political links, create an enhanced sub-regional setting that is highly determined by whether the same participants attend the same consultative process over a certain period of time. Who attends, the level of representation that exists, and the designated time of a particular posting will affect the volume of dialogue. Tracking the long-term associations of political actors involved with the EU-NZ security dialogue would provide an appropriate avenue for future research.

In connection to who attends, the values that participants hold are directly relevant to the theoretical approach of this study. As discussed in the thesis, the regional security

outlook of New Zealand is determined by the leading political party: a change in power may mean an alteration in its values and approach to foreign affairs. For example, if the National party wins the next election, greater attention may be focussed on more traditional security elements, such as homeland security. Furthermore, as the values and norms that New Zealand officials adhere to are not set in any binding constitution, their values and norms could change over time, reducing or enhancing future security-related dialogue. EU values are less dynamic, as they are bound to official treaties that specifically reflect European values and norms. This being said, Member States' influence over EU foreign affairs – particularly the larger states such as France, Germany or Britain – can have a significant affect on EU's role in the Asia Pacific region. For example, bilateral negotiations with a particular South East Asian country may produce results that are estranged from an EU foreign policy objective. Increased transparency between Member States and EU institutions must continue for an effective CFSP in the Asia Pacific region for the future.

8.2 Final Conclusions

As transnational security challenges continue to infiltrate the Asia Pacific region and its actors' consciousness, the need for regional solutions continues to be stressed by its allies. As noted in Chapter 3, over 300 security mechanisms exist within the Asia Pacific region which has generated a vast network of social and political links. The values inherent in many South East Asian and Pacific countries has, to a certain extent, prohibited effective regional responses to threats prioritised by the EU and New Zealand, such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, fundamentalism or corruption. Largely from a Western perspective, the slow evolution and pace of some of these mechanisms, for instance the ARF, has lead to a sense of frustration. However, it must be emphasised – particularly due to the colonial history of the region, enhancing the risk of a neo-colonial image – that the evolution of regional security institutions within the Asia Pacific region, must come from an internal impetus with merely external diplomatic support. The intricate network of political links generated through inter-subjective exchange will certainly encourage a greater cultural understanding and limit these nuanced frustrations.

Within this context, the EU and New Zealand have forged an array of dialogue mechanisms, forming a matrix that defines the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. This dialogue has contributed to a more stable, prosperous and safer environment in the region, achieved through: the promotion of values and norms, including liberal democracy, good governance, the rule of law and the positive effects of regionalism; the provision of substantial development aid to underdeveloped countries; supporting educational infrastructure and exchanges; and the financial and logistical support of regional security missions and EOMs. The effectiveness of regional security mechanisms such as the ARF – perceived as one of the most effective forms of security dialogue for New Zealand – and other more direct consultation methods, is limited or enhanced by perceptions. The value the EU and New Zealand place on dialogue mechanisms will determine the possible volume of interaction. With an understanding of the various facets of the EU-NZ security consultation, this research has explored the separate security-identity formulations of each actor in order to fully appreciate and uncover the realities of the dialogue processes.

This thesis has demonstrated that the volume of dialogue is determined by how closely aligned security cultures are when they interact with each other in a regional setting. A number of factors including historic dynamics, definitions of security, conceptualisations of the Asia Pacific region, normative values, and capabilities, make up a unique socio-cultural milieu. This collection of factors forms a specific security-identity for both the EU and New Zealand. Analysing the EU-NZ security relationship through this particular lens has revealed a considerable number of similarities and subtle differences. A strong bond has been built through a collective understanding of common norms and values, which has been manifested in a myriad of joint activities. Other areas of cooperation such as the promotion of regionalism can distort the effectiveness of the security consultations. While these differences limit the volume of dialogue, it can also provide the context for discussion and social-learning, whereby a greater volume of dialogue can be formed. However, this is determined by the willingness of each actor to listen and acknowledge the importance of cultural values. For example, if the EU can take advantage of New

Zealand's culture-based knowledge of the Asia Pacific region, the possibility for greater cooperation can be enhanced.

The volume of dialogue will continue to be affected by a number of variables including capabilities, domestic politics or the amount of financial and logistical resources accredited towards the consultative process. However, through a continual process of regular dialogue, ranging from high level ministerial visits to informal dialogue between military personnel within the PSI, a greater appreciation for the other's culture can be achieved and a more stable sub-regional identity can emerge. A constellation of factors will continue to alter perceptions, resulting in ever-changing and evolving security identities. This unavoidable dynamism stresses the importance of continual inter-subjectivity within sub-regional dialogue mechanisms. Through the various consultative measures, the evolving identities can be understood and complement the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. The intricate and complex regional security architecture within South East Asia and the Pacific continues to promote peace and stability in the region. With this system, the burgeoning security consultation of the European Union and New Zealand – forged out of common perceptions and similar interests – continues to abridge the tyranny of distance.

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