KOREAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS
UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE 1919-1937:
A STUDY IN NATIONALISM

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Kenneth M. Wells

University of Canterbury
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ABSTRACT

Adherents of Chu Hsi's neo-orthodoxy, Korea's nineteenth-century rulers were seriously challenged by reformists in the 1880's and the Tong-Hak Revolt in 1894. During the course of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, Korea lost her statehood to Japan. Yet in implementing her programme of assimilation, Japan's "safe and sane" policy proved one of the greatest colonial failures of the twentieth century: Korea refused to submit her identity to her "younger brother". Traditional armed resistance faded by 1913, but invoking Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination, the Koreans surprised their masters with two Declarations of Independence in February and March, 1919.

Organised by leaders of the Christian and Ch'onogyo religions, the March Declaration was the first instance of mass-nationalism and a nation-wide civil-disobedience movement in the twentieth century. Failing to influence the Versailles peace deliberations, this Movement nevertheless initiated an energetic independence movement which endured up to and beyond the 1937 Sino-Japanese War.

Failing to maintain the initial solidarity, the post-1919 movement, exiled, splintered into competing factions. Hope of unity was rekindled in 1927 when a legal, national Korean body enjoyed three brief years' activity before dissolution by the Japanese. Koreans in China and Manchuria turned to terrorism, while nationalists at home strove to secure the social and economic welfare of their race. By 1937, all awaited war, their only perceivable hope.

Although internally divided and externally thwarted, Korean nationalists addressed the questions of political ideology, socio-
economic reform and national objectives and identity. A constant obstacle to this quest, the Japanese presence distorted Korean nationalism. Hence continuity and progression were not strong. Nevertheless national consciousness grew, if fitfully, not according to Western models, but to the extent the movement broadened the Koreans' understanding of their own concept of a nationalist: "Aeguk-jisa", one who for love of the country determines to act on its behalf.
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PREFACE

When Japan annexed Korea in August 1910, the indifferent West could scarcely have guessed the consequences. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and eyed north China. In 1932 she exposed Western weakness in Asia by attacking Shanghai in defiance of the International Settlement. Then by late 1941, America found herself pitted against a power stronger than Germany and Italy together. But overshadowed by these, for the West, significant events, Korea itself has been largely forgotten and its intense struggle for independence hardly mentioned. Yet in March 1919, the world was surprised by a nation-wide uprising involving two million Koreans over a period of three months. At the time, an American observer wrote of this March First Movement as the "greatest example in world history of an organised passive resistance for an ideal,"(1) whilst a modern historian recently claimed it was "the first great demonstration of nonviolent resistance in the twentieth century."(2)

In spite of the proportions of the March First Movement and the ensuing struggle, historians have afforded it little attention.(3) Perhaps the most telling factor behind this lack of interest is that the March First and subsequent movements were unsuccessful. Even the "liberation" in 1945 was accomplished by Soviet and United States troops, to be cruelly betrayed by the permanency of the thirty-eight parallel in 1948. Syngman Rhee excepted, there is consequently very little link between


3. Bibliographical and historiographical details are more fully treated in Infra, Bibliographical Notes.
the leadership of the independence movement and the leadership of the two Koreas. The present leader of the South, Park Chung-hee was actually on the wrong side in the 1937 Sino-Japanese War from the nationalists' point of view.\(^4\) As for Comrade Kim Il-sung in the North, "respected and beloved leader of the Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed, brilliant commander,"\(^5\) though he may be, he was practically unknown when he entered Korea under Soviet auspices in 1945.\(^6\)

In concert, the failure of the independence movements and the post-liberation distortions and disregard of the past have produced indifference, not simply among historians, but among the Korean people themselves. Though formerly required to commit to memory the Declaration of Independence (see Appendix 1), students in South Korea today are unexpectedly ignorant of the independence struggle, save that various patriots such as Kim Ku committed such and such anti-Japanese deed. Of the statues in the South, perhaps only that of Syngman Rhee represents any ideology other than anti-Japanism. Names which before 1945 were known in every Korean household are now largely forgotten. The only tangible reminders of Korea's recent past are mistrust of Japan and the national holiday, North and South,

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on March 1; but little is generally known even of this movement.\(^7\)

Thus, for ideological, political and historical reasons a vital period of Korean history has been neglected. Certainly, historians should be interested in "the first great demonstration of non-violent resistance in the twentieth century."

While Korean nationalism may not have attracted many historians, it has provoked interest among political scientists.\(^8\) Consequently, the question of the nature of Korean nationalism has been approached almost exclusively from within political science frameworks, whereby Korea is thought of as a causeway linking Japan with China and Russia, a case-study in Japanese imperialism, or some sort of "political tennis-ball".\(^9\) While each of these facets has its validity, the view one receives of Korean nationalism is thereby unbalanced: Korea's causal position in even her own history is denied and her nationalism is not examined on its own terms. Historical analyses of the internal dynamics of the independence movement are therefore scarce and insufficient. Even where Korean nationalism has been examined internally, a modular approach is employed according to which Korea's national consciousness is evaluated with respect to a transition or development from "traditional" to "modern" nationalism, or from "simple" to "ideological" nationalism.\(^10\)

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7. In South Korea, the reading of the Declaration is re-enacted annually. The writer has stayed with a Korean family on this anniversary on two occasions, but was not even informed of its significance. In North Korea, the real events of this Movement are not taught, since it was essentially a religious movement.

8. *Infra*, Bibliographical Notes.


In brief, according to this approach, Korean national consciousness began, from the mid-nineteenth century, as a traditional patriotic response to the encroachments of other powers, and emerged by 1945 as a consciousness of the need to modernize and "progress". This latter consciousness is founded upon either a communistic or capitalistic ideology, currently "juche" (self-reliance) in the North, and "chaju" (autonomy) in the South, with its present popular version: "Sae ma'il undong" (New Village Movement). It is frequently argued that this transition to "modern" nationalism was prompted and sustained by the Japanese Government-General in Korea.\(^1\) Admittedly, supportive evidence can be found, and the hermeneutic approach of this model is both attractive and fashionable; nevertheless, they suffer from serious weaknesses.

Conceptually useful though models may be, may they not be more accurately descriptive of today's thought-patterns than of the interplay of events and aspirations in Korea between the Wars? When models are used; does one not tend to include the answer in the form of the question asked? If one asks, "Was there a transition from traditional patriotic nationalism to modern nationalism?" it is assumed that if the answer is negative, then there was no significant development of national consciousness, since it has been presupposed that nationalism "develops" along such lines. The possibilities that Korean national consciousness developed along increasingly particularistic lines, or that there was a transition, but in leadership parallel to social transitions rather than in ideology, or that there was a definite advance in national consciousness but without identifiable "transition", are either discounted or not considered.

The writer's doubts have been reinforced by responses to questions put to Korean students and others concerning their understanding of nationalism. A one hundred percent failure was experienced in their ability to distinguish conceptually the two terms, "aeguk jui" (patriotism) and "minjok jui" (nationalism). Any attempt, therefore, to establish one's conclusions by compartmentalising or labelling species of national consciousness in Korea must be treated with caution. Moreover, it was found that the currently favoured word for "nationalism" in South Korea at least is, as in Japan, "minjok jui" (literally race-ism), rather than the more literal "kukka jui" (nation-ism). At a time when, according to the above model, Korea should be moving in earnest from particularist tendencies to the more universal principles of ideologies, the use of a term hardly a step away from racialism in implication suggests that this model may well be wide of the mark.

In view of these findings, the writer intends to examine Korean independence movements between 1919 and 1937 phenomenologically, concentrating on the inspiration, leadership, organisation and impact of the main movements and organisations, with a view to drawing some tentative conclusions on the nature of Korean nationalism in the final chapter.

The period 1919 to 1937 has been chosen in view of its centrality to the independence movement throughout the whole colonial period (1905-1945), and because Japanese colonial policy was most seriously challenged during these years. Although Koreans had expressed their antipathy to Japanese rule before 1919, it was not until the twin declarations of independence in early 1919 that they discovered the value and potential of a united national consciousness. The following years to 1937 witnessed the determination and intense struggle to maintain this stand and attain independence. In 1937, Japan and China were again at war, and the Korean movement soon became allied to the
Kuomintang or Chinese and Russian communist forces as part of the Allied front against Japan, and thus entered a special phase in its struggle. Hence the period 1919 to 1937 is the most representative stage in the Korean independence movement as a whole.

In Chapter I, an attempt is made by way of introduction to restore the balance between the external factors and internal dynamics at work in twentieth-century Korean history, and to demonstrate that Korean nationalism was not simply a byproduct of Japanese rule, but was also nourished by significant legacies from pre-colonial years. However, the role of Japan is nevertheless important as the context and at times catalyst of the independence movement; and indeed, in setting severely restrictive limits to the Korean nationalists' activities, the Japanese presence could not but influence deeply the strategy and direction of the struggle. Since there is relatively little written on Japan's colonialism, as distinct from her expansionism, it was thought advisable to discuss Japan's colonial theory and practice at some length in Chapters II and III, albeit distinctly angled to its reception in Korea.

In such discussion, one necessarily has to tackle the important question, especially from the Korean point of view, of the motives of Japan in annexing and ruling Korea. In the light of Japan's activities in the 1930's, the traditional Korean view prevailed, that Japan treacherously plotted the annexation and deliberately enslaved the nation, until Hilary Conroy published his "no plot" thesis in 1960.\(^{12}\) However, even "in the face of Conroy's careful scholarship, the Korean point of view refuses to subside,"\(^{13}\) and Conroy's

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argument has been qualified by several scholars, most notably J. Crowley. The writer himself has taken issue with Conroy's reasoning that Japanese factionalism precluded the emergence of a consistent national policy concerning Korea, and has attempted to give due attention to the effects of Japanese colonialism on the Korean nation, as a neglected factor in the discussion to date.

With regard to the details of the independence movement itself, the writer was faced with two alternative approaches. One could either adopt the possibly cumbersome method of analysing the movement as it is related, or, perhaps risking some repetition, reserve the analysis for a separate chapter. For convenience, and in view of the fact that there is a large body of new information to relate, the latter alternative has been adopted. The story of the inspiration, organisation and course of the 1919 February Eighth and March First Movements is the highlight of the independence movement, and as such, comprises Chapters IV and V. The post-1919 movement, which was extraordinarily diverse, is examined in Chapter VI. An analysis of the whole period is attempted in Chapter VII, but where practical, duplication has been avoided and fresh evidence introduced.

In approaching this study of Korean nationalism, the writer encountered two difficulties that merit mention. Firstly, a major obstacle, which perhaps partly accounts for the paucity of historical works, is the diffusion of primary sources among at least five languages: Korean, Japanese, English, Chinese and Russian. Limited to the first three languages, the writer is necessarily at a disadvantage in examining the north China military organisation and the communist experiments. Added to this, is the difficulty of

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obtaining, in New Zealand, both primary and secondary material.\(^{(15)}\)

Secondly, the lack of books on this subject and the consequent unfamiliarity of the topic, compared for example, with Japanese nationalism, poses the problem of deciding how much background and narrative is necessary to avoid obscurity. There is, indeed, a story that needs telling, but effort has been made to simplify events and restrict mention of nationalists' names to a minimum.\(^{(16)}\)

Finally, this work is a preliminary study intended as a primary examination and analysis of Korean nationalism. But it is hoped that a move has been made towards understanding modern Korean history on its own terms, that the prominence due the Korean independence struggle in the study of twentieth-century nationalism has been demonstrated, and that a basis has been laid for approaching Korean nationalism free from European models and expectations.

\(^{15}\) Infra, Bibliographical Notes.

\(^{16}\) For the transliteration of Korean names, places, etc., the traditional Wade system has been used. It should be noted that "Yi" and "Lee" are transliterations of the same surname.
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Early in 1919, Kim Kyu-shik, a lone, self-exiled Korean nationalist, travelled a devious route from Shanghai to Versailles on a hopeless mission. His task was to petition the Peace Conference for his country's independence from Japan, on the basis of the principle of national self-determination espoused by President Woodrow Wilson. An American journalist and political author in Shanghai, Thomas Millard, saw "slight chance" of success although "in principle the case of Korea is as much entitled to consideration as the case of Yugoslavia, Poland and Czech-Slavia". (1)

In the course of his campaign at Versailles, Kim was referred to the American, Stephen Bonsal, who sympathised with his "fully justified complaints of the arrogant Japanese supremacy under which [the Koreans] suffer". (2) Yet but a few days later, Bonsal noted in his diary, "Yesterday it was my unpleasant duty to tell Kim, as instructed, that the Korean problem did not come within the purview of the Conference ... My Colonel is sympathetic with my point of view, but he says we must be practical ... One word of comfort he offered and gave permission to pass on to Kim. If we deal out justice in Europe and punish the criminals here it may prove a leaven of righteousness in other fields. Perhaps later the League will be able to curb Japan when it has less pressing matters near at hand to deal with ... He took it very well." (3) Kim Kyu-shik

2. Bonsal, Stephen, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles. (Published Diary), N.Y. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1946, p 220. Stephen Bonsal was the assistant to the American delegate, Colonel House.
himself departed, sighing, "What a strange world it is ... How can anyone in his senses imagine that these swashbucklers will help make the world safe for democracy?" \(^{(4)}\)

However, this small incident was not to be confined to the memories of two men. The same year, on March 1 in Korea, there commenced a nation-wide independence movement mainly organised to support Kim Kyu-shik's efforts by demonstrating to the world that, contrary to the assurances of Japanese politicians, the nearly twenty million Korean people were by no means satisfied and thriving under Japanese rule. Although a failure in terms of its Declaration of Independence, this March First Movement signalled the beginning of an important period in Korean nationalism. Indeed, in its protest against Japan's Asian policies and its involvement of students, the March First Movement was of parallel significance to the Chinese May Fourth Movement shortly afterwards.

It is tempting, as past studies bear witness, to explain this and following nationalist movements simply as responses to the Japanese presence. But sudden and unexpected as the 1919 mass-movement was to spectator nations, the March First Movement was nevertheless not only a logical consequence of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, but was consistent also with developments inside Korea from before that annexation itself. Korean "nationalism" did not begin in 1910, nor was Korea's internal situation wholly determined by Japan and other neighbours. So while there may be truth in the assertion that "Korea, as a result of its focal position between the strong powers surrounding it on all sides, became directly and tragically involved in conflicts which intrinsically were in no sense its concern", \(^{(5)}\) it

\(^4\) Ibid, p 226.

does not do full justice to the dilemma facing Korea from the end of
the nineteenth century. For the surrounding conflicts should have
been her direct concern, and indeed, the imperative demands of a
rapidly changing world-order on the Hermit Kingdom had been fully
grasped and acted upon by a rising, reformist elite within Korean
society by the 1880's. Korean nationalism of the twentieth century
has its roots in this earlier drama, and it is important to substanc-
tiate this, by way of introduction, in order to restore a balance
between the external and domestic factors involved and thereby
combat the notion that Korean nationalism was merely a byproduct
of Japanese colonialism.

The position in which Korea found itself at the end of the nine-
teenth century was in part a consequence of the challenge a
reconstituted Japan posed to the traditional Chinese "tutelage" of
Korea. Japan's adoption of Western criteria for independent state-
hood over against China's uncertain retention of the Confucian world-
order produced considerable friction over the status of Korea. (6)
The Chinese position at its most definite was expressed in 1873 by
the Viceroy of Chihli, Li Hung-chang: "Korea is important to us as
a protective buffer for the Eastern Territory... [a Japanese]
vasion of Korea would constitute a menace to the vital land of
Liao-ching [i.e. Manchuria] ... Korea is a land of the descendents
of our great sages as well as a state of propriety and righteousness.
It is founded by Heaven and should not be disestablished." (7)

6. Kim, C. I. and Kim, H. K. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism,

7. Fung Shiu Kay, Edmund, Chinese Policy in the Sino-Japanese
War, 1894-1895, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong, 1968,
In 1885, Yuan Shih-k'ai was appointed Resident for China in Korea, "to revive the practice of the Yuan dynasty in sending to Korea a supervisor of the King and Queen whose advice must be followed by the royal couple". By 1893, Yuan had so established himself in Korea, that he expressed assurance regarding China's strength in Korea.

Although by comparison with her activities from the mid-1890's Japan was restrained in her reaction to China at this point, she was by no means uninterested in the peninsular kingdom during the 1880's. Korea's dilemma at this stage was illustrated by the experience of a United States trading envoy. "In 1880 Commodore Shufeldt attempted to approach Korea through Japan, but the Japanese endeavoured to manipulate the negotiations so as to make Korea appear to be a Japanese protectorate. Exasperated, Shufeldt then sought the good offices of China to obtain a treaty with Korea, only to find the Chinese, on their part, seeking to show Korea as a Chinese protectorate." Only fifteen years after this almost humorous reflection on the Korean dilemma, the rivalry entered its military phase and the brittle Far Eastern power-balance was cracked.

Events turned out in Japan's favour. The 1894 Tong-Hak Rebellion in Korea, a revolt of disgruntled peasants, anti-foreign and anti-Japan, provided the immediate cause of the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese war on Korean soil. The peace concluded in April 1895,

8. Ibid, p 22.
marks the first concrete landmark in Korea's loss of nationhood, as Japan removed her first rival in the peninsula. Article I of the Treaty of Shimonoseki was explicit on this point: "China recognises definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Corea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Corea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future." Chinese influence was further eliminated from Korean affairs when, in response to Japan's capitulation to the demand to release the Liaotung Peninsula, the Korean Queen Min stepped out of the Chinese into the Russian camp.

When in 1905 Japan won her victory over Russian forces and was accorded in the Treaty of Portsmouth the "direction, protection and supervision" of Korea, Korea's isolation was all but completed. Careful not to oppose Japan on vital interests and in order to secure Japanese recognition of American sovereignty in the Philippines, the United States could offer Korea no firm assurance concerning her independence. Following the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in August 1905, in which the clause on Korean territorial integrity was omitted, Korea formally became a Japanese Protectorate under Resident-General Prince Itō Hirobumi on November 18.

11. The Kang-Hwa Treaty, 1876, may be considered the first landmark, as a treaty concluded against Korea's will. But it was primarily a trading treaty, and as such gave Korea an opportunity to renounce isolationism and take measures in defense of her integrity. In this way, the Kang-Hwa Treaty could well have marked the beginning of Korea's revival, as much as the opposite.


Korea was annexed by Japan on August 28, 1910, ten months after the assassination of Prince Itō by a Korean, Ahn Chung-gũn. As the Residency-General was superseded by the Government-General, the last formal vestiges of independent statehood in Korea disappeared. Japan was again unopposed: Chinese and Russian influence had been effectively removed, while Britain and the United States indifferently withdrew their legations. Indeed, President Roosevelt appears to have considered Japan deserved Korea: "To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. But Korea itself was helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation, with no interests of its own at stake, would do for the Koreans what they were so utterly unable to do for themselves." Later, Syngman Rhee based his campaigns on American self-interest, and it may be pointed out that the United States had certainly displayed interests of her own at the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, particularly in trade. The Treaty was indeed signed partly because Korea was so helpless, and the poverty of Roosevelt's apology can be seen by analogy with the cases of Belgium, Poland and even France, in the two World Wars. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's statement does touch on that neglected aspect of the Korean dilemma, viz: the accountability of Korea's own domestic politics and history.

Korea's causal position in Far Eastern history has been mostly denied, not only in connection with international developments but even with respect to her own national history. Hence the typical

14. There was little difference between the Protectorate and Government-General in this respect. See Millard, T. F., America and the Far Eastern Question. N. Y., Moffat, Yard, 1909, p 128, on the Protectorate.

review of Korean history, that, "It has been Korea's lot to have its destiny determined by others". Such "reviews" of Korean history understandably produce intense melancholia in Koreans today, not least because of the element of truth they contain. But there is a real sense in which Korea contributed to its own destiny - even if this contribution was ultimately detrimental to her welfare - and thereby determined the nature of her "nationalism".

For the frustrations of the aforementioned Commodore Shufeldt also reflected the isolationism adopted in the 1860's by the Korean Regent, Yi Ha-ung, commonly known by his title, the Taewongun. The Taewongun is generally regarded today as a rogue; he was, in fact, a sincere, capable, orthodox Confucian idealist. His great failing, which he pursued with all the strength of his formidable personality, was his misjudgment of the times. Dying without heir in 1864, King Ch'olchong left his country facing a very similar situation to that of Japan, vis-a-vis the challenge of the West. The Dowager Queen Min, more concerned to consolidate the power of her Cho clan against the other traditionally powerful palace clan of the Andong Kims, selected as heir to the throne the obscure, twelve-year-old son of Yi Ha-ung who himself had no affiliation with any palace faction. But as Regent, Yi displayed unexpected strength, quickly consolidated his position, and became ahead of Queen Min the principle obstacle to a Korean "Meiji" revolution.


17. For details on the Taewongun, his succession and policies, see Han Woo-keun, The History of Korea, Honolulu, University Press of Hawaii, 1974, Chapters 24 and 25.
Cognisant of the blatant corruption of the Court and aristocracy, or Yangban class, and dismayed by the severe rural depression, the Taewongün was eager for a conservative revolution along strictly orthodox Confucian lines. Strikingly similar in principles and objectives to the Tung-chih rulers in China (1862-1874), the Taewongün enjoyed some success in his reforms, but ultimately shared the same failure of the Tung-chih Restoration, "because the requirements of a modern state proved to run directly counter to the requirements of the Confucian order."(18) His Confucian rigidity inclined him towards utter rejection of all things foreign. This stance precipitated a clash between the Court and the progressive, empiricist factions, in which the Taewongün was victorious.(19) By 1880, however, a group of young nobles, all of whom had been abroad, had gathered together under Kim Ok-kyun as a Reform Party (Kaehwa-Tang) which briefly challenged the Court conservatism.(20)

The significance of the Reform Party was its tentative, though initially strong connection with Japanese liberals, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi,(21) and its programme of reform in communications, transport, industry and education, by which Korea's independence and dignity were to be preserved. Supported by the Japanese liberals,

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Kim Ok-kyun led the abortive Kapshin Coup in Seoul from December 4 to 8, 1884.\(^{22}\) Although the Japanese Government expressed annoyance at the liberals' patronage of this attempt, Japan nevertheless appeared to many in Korea and elsewhere to be the champion of freedom and progress.

Whilst the "reformists" were engaged in their campaign, another force was forming which was both anti-government and anti-foreign. Founded by Ch'oe Che-u, this organisation, called Tong-Hak, or Eastern Learning, in essence sympathised with the Taewongun's aspirations with its call for agrarian reform, elimination of corruption and preservation of Eastern culture, and its hatred of foreign methods and Catholicism. But the Taewongun had been kidnapped and taken to China in 1882, so that Tong-Hak were directed against the prevailing corruption and reliance on China under Queen Min. Two severe droughts in 1876-1877 and 1888-1889\(^{23}\) psychologically prepared the peasantry for the plans of revolt espoused by Ch'oe Che-u and dissident Yang-ban. As the Rebellion reached formidable proportions in May, 1894, Queen Min prevailed upon the young King Kojong to petition China for troops, and so helped precipitate the Sino-Japanese war.

Quite apart from the fact that after the Tong-Hak movement Koreans could no longer rely on China as a source of security, the role of Japan in the 1884 Kapshin Coup and in the suppression of the highly reactionary and anti-foreign Tong-Hak Rebellion, prompted many Koreans to consider investment in Japanese aid a worthwhile

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22. The Kapshin Coup is so named after the year in which it took place. Kim Ok-kyun fled to China, and was assassinated in Shanghai in 1894.

and justifiable proposition. One of the more important organisations formed at this stage was the Ilchín-Hoe (Japanese: Isshin-Kai), which enjoyed the patronage of Uchida Ryōhei, the founder of the Japanese ultra-nationalist Kokuryūkai Society. The Ilchín-Hoe was initially a continuation of the Tong-Hak movement which by 1900 curiously held that Japanese and Korean ultra-nationalisms were compatible, indeed, served the same end. But the society soon attracted scattered support from the unemployed, lower classes and even some former "reformists". Supporting Baron Itō and the Protectorate policies from 1905, the Ilchín-Hoe went so far as to demand that Japan effect the "merger" of Korea and Japan.(24)

The Ilchín-Hoe was extreme, and as even the Japanese could see, represented only a minority of Koreans. Itō's hopes that this body would turn the masses pro-Japan were unfulfilled; he himself lost his life in 1909 on route to Russia at the hands of a Korean. Several Ilchín-Hoe leaders also were assassinated, while the organisation was roundly condemned in Korean publications. (25) The Ilchín-Hoe barely survived the annexation in 1910, and by World War I, its former strongest protagonists had turned firmly anti-Japanese. Nevertheless, the Ilchín-Hoe reflected the frustration of many non-official, non-aristocratic Koreans with the impotence and corruption of their leaders and society.

A more widely accepted and significant development within Korea after the Sino-Japanese war was the revitalisation of the "reformists" under the able leadership of the former Kapshin Coup accomplice, Sŏ Chae-p'íl. Refusing the offer of a government post on his return

from exile in America, Sŏ determined to instil the concept of independence in Koreans. To this end he established in April, 1896 an Independence Club supported by an Independence Newspaper, which also enjoyed Japanese favour.

Yet these Korean reformers soon found Japanese collaboration at odds with their objective of complete independence. Certainly many Japanese reform proposals were conceived without regard for the Koreans' wishes or for realities. Inevitably, Sŏ Chae-p'il found it necessary to oppose the Japanese as much as the Korean Government, and the brief period of Japanese encouragement drew to a close. Left to the mercy of the Korean Court where both the recalled Taewongun and Queen Min were inimical to the democratic objectives of the Independence Club, Sŏ, who had American citizenship, was deported to the United States while in May, 1898, the Club was forcibly disbanded and its leaders, including Syngman Rhee, arrested.

Despite only two brief years of activity, the Independence Club's influence was far-reaching and left a powerful legacy to Korea under Japan. In prison, Syngman Rhee wrote his extraordinarily forceful and lengthy treatise on independence and the meaning of democracy, a book which permanently established the author as the leading expositor of democracy and which quickly became a classic in numerous Korean households.


28. Known as the Korean "political bible" this book "The Spirit of Independence", consisted of thirty-five chapters when Pak Yong-man smuggled it out from Korea in 1904 and had 1000 copies printed in San Francisco. Rhee subsequently added twelve more chapters, and it was reprinted in 1920. Oliver, R.T., Op. Cit., pp 55-56.
the Independence Club in 1919, So Chae-p'il himself remarked that there were consolations to be derived from it: "[The] seed of democracy was sown in Korea through this movement, and ... the leaders of the present Independence Movement in Korea are mostly members of the old Independence Club ... Six out of the eight cabinet members [i.e. of the Shanghai Provisional Government] elected by the people this year (1919), were the former active members of the Independence Club." (29)

The contemporary significance of the Independence Club lay in its being the final Korean-inspired attempt to challenge the outmoded Confucian legalism of the Court, to face the realities of the outside world, and so save Korea from foreign supervision. The ultimate victory of the conservative elements indicated the failure of Korean intellectuals and officials as a whole to grapple with the international developments which had upset China's world-order and precipitated a fundamental change in the nature of Japanese politics. Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 disrupted and thereafter affected this domestic quarrel, but from 1919, these earlier stirrings were revived, albeit under different conditions and against different foes.

From this brief resume of the external and domestic factors at work from the latter half of the nineteenth century up to Japan's acquisition of Korea at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is evident that, whilst there is some validity in examining Korea as a "political tennis-ball", with regard to the inspiration and course of

Korean national consciousness, attention to Korea's internal history per se is imperative. The Tong-Hak, Ilch'in-Hoe\textsuperscript{(30)} and Independence Club movements all left their legacies to colonial Korea, playing specific roles in the independence movement from 1919 to 1937. But by 1919, Korea had experienced fourteen years of Japanese colonial rule. This rule was the very possibility against which all interested and able Koreans had striven (save some in the Ilch'in-Hoe), and as such, necessarily affected deeply the nature of the later Korean national movements.

\textsuperscript{30} The Ilch'in-Hoe found its counterpart after 1919 in the Home Rule movement, but will not be dealt with below, as it was not a pro-independence movement, but rather, approved Japanese direction of East Asia.
CHAPTER II: SPENCER AND MAHAN IN KIMONOS:

JAPANESE COLONIAL THEORY.

Every age is bound to its own particular mythology, for what is relative over time is often absolute in its own time. Wagner's "Wotan" and Keats' "Hyperion" were but the imaginative forerunners of an optimism which was to manifest itself in historicistic extrapolations from an in itself harmless biological theorem of adaptation, extrapolations whose common denominator was some inexorable march to perfection, whether racial, moral or social and economic. In the midst of present growing disenchantment with such optimism, Japanese colonialism is an interesting case to study. For in its appropriation of such Western "enlightenment", Japan imbibed much of the mythology which had accrued to it in the West. Combining this with her own sense of significance, Japan produced a firm belief in her supreme destiny perhaps surpassing the "white man's burden" or the Internationale: viz, that Japan must, and could, draw the Far East together under its benign supervision and thereby offset Western power in Asia.

In a sense, Japan's colonialism of the early twentieth century was outwardly a copying of and reaction to nineteenth century European activities, and inwardly the reverse side of the coin of Japan's quest for equality. As Japan's Mahanite dream became increasingly dispelled, and her (somewhat hypocritical) demands for emigration were blocked, this inward conception developed by 1930 into an intense East/West dichotomy which became a determinant of the larger part of Japan's policies from the Manchurian Affair to the conclusion of World War II. But the emergence of this world-view
was by no means sudden, and its seeds had been planted in the 1880's and 1890's, nourished by another myth which absorbed so much of Yamagata Aritomo's attention, and which was to be exploded simultaneously: that of Western supremacy in Asia. As we turn from this "mythology" to the particular case of Japan's colonial theory vis-à-vis Korea, it is useful to bear in mind this psychological background, for it aids an understanding of the topic, not only as the context of Japan's colonialism, but more especially as a major factor in the strong Korean antipathy to that colonialism. This latter consideration is the primary subject of this discussion, and it must be stated at the outset that this is, of course, only a part of the much wider question of Japan's world-view and security requirements since the 1880's. (1)

Between 1870 and 1945, Japan's main colonial energies were directed to Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria, with lesser attention afforded Sakhalin, Karafuto and the South Sea Islands. The particular colonial theory which emerged in relation to the larger territories was decidedly one of assimilation. Bearing similarities to nineteenth century Russian policy in Poland and comparable with French colonialism in the Algiers, it was precisely in the application of this principle of assimilation to Korea that Japan's mission in Asia was frustrated. Confronted with immense problems, Japan suffered

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in Korea what was probably the deepest psychological failure in
nineteenth and early twentieth century colonial experience.

Apart from the purely physical obstacles to the assimilation of
Korea into the Japanese Empire, Japan's objectives were greatly
frustrated by the dubious, but basic, assumption on which the
assimilation principle was founded: **viz,** the close political, cultural
and geographic affinity of Japan and Korea. Terauchi Masatake, who
in 1910 was appointed the first Governor-General of Korea, prepared
a summary of the official rationale for the assimilative policy in the
Annual Report of 1910-1911. In this summary, the following four
reasons were established:

1. the geographical proximity of Japan and Korea;
2. the two countries' ethnic and cultural bonds;
3. the great knowledge of Korea and Koreans possessed by
   Japanese scholars; and
4. the inevitability of amalgamation - "It is a natural and
   inevitable course of things that two peoples whose ... interests are identical, and who are bound together with
   brotherly feelings, should amalgamate and form one
   body." (2)

Although the geographical contiguity of the two countries was clear and
indisputable, the remaining three reasons evoked considerable debate.

The ethnic bond was unproven and few Koreans desired to
acknowledge it, while in practice the Japanese settlers and adminis-
trators were less inclined to regard Koreans as other than an inferior

2. Dong, Wonmo, *Japanese Colonial Policy and Practice in Korea,
   1905-1945: A Study in Assimilation,* Georgetown University,
   1965, p 25. (Thesis: PhD.: Political Science.) Hereafter
   Dong, *Colonial Policy.*
brand of Japanese, \(^3\) than the British were prepared to extend to their "brown Babus" full ethnic equality. Culturally, the Japanese had some grounds for their assumption, since Korea and Japan shared a similar debt to China for some literary, philosophical and governmental elements in their cultural make-ups. But this very similarity became a source of bitterness in Koreans for they had been the means of Chinese culture reaching Japan, particularly T'ang Buddhism and fourteenth century neo-Confucianism, and therefore suffered Japanese condescension and patronage impatiently. \(^4\) Moreover, stripped of their Chinese influences, Korean and Japanese indigenous cultures were more dissimilar than the contrary, and compulsory attendance at Shinto shrines and worship of the Sun God were not cultural aspects to which Koreans readily adjusted. \(^5\)

It would be expected that Korea, as the closest neighbour, might indeed be comprehensively understood by Japanese scholars. For historical reasons, this unfortunately was not the case. Apart from periods of piracy raids from the tenth to thirteenth centuries, Japanese contact with Korea had been generally peaceful until the abortive, yet extremely destructive invasion under Hideyoshi in 1592. The Tokugawa successors of Hideyoshi restored peaceful relations.

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4. Koreans also believed, in this connection, that Japan had wilfully abandoned her heritage.

5. Infra, Chapter 6.
in ceasing expansionist activities. However the complement to this policy was Tokugawa isolationism, by reason of which cultural contact with Korea was greatly diminished. This state of affairs was doomed to persist up to the eve of the nineteenth century when Korea, by now the "Hermit Kingdom", was reluctantly awoken by a renewed Japan. In the intervening period Korea had undergone its struggle between the "Sirhak" factions and the "Noron" (Elders' Theory) faction, which latter faction triumphed and hardened into the rigid position which precluded the brand of "enlightenment" urged by Japan. (6) Thus paradoxically, Japanese knowledge and understanding of Formosa was by comparison more exact; not only were Japanese scholars intimately acquainted with the Chinese Ch'ing culture on the island, but exhaustive investigations into Formosan thinking and systems enabled Japan to turn the Ch'ing "pao-chia" unit into a successful auxiliary administrative organ and instrument of local control. (7) Over-confident with regard to Korea, it was not until after the March First Independence Movement of 1919 that Governor-General Saitō recommended similar investigations into the "essence of Korean ... culture according to the Korean people's desire."(8)

Whilst misgivings concerning these points were isolated and mild, significant discussion arose among leading Japanese scholars and politicians over Terauchi's fourth reason for an assimilation policy, that of the inevitable union of mutually agreeable peoples.

6. Supra, Chapter 1.
Aoyonagi Nammei very reasonably pointed out that Japan, quite unable to assimilate the relatively few Koreans who had entered Japan three hundred and even one thousand years ago, could hardly expect to fare better over more than thirteen million Koreans in their native land.\(^9\)

In 1907, Yosaburo Takekoshi had argued that, "From the colonial history of European powers, it is clear that those nations which have considered their colonies as a part and parcel of the home country, have almost always failed in their system of government; while as a rule, those nations have succeeded which have looked upon their colonies as a special body politic quite distinct from the mother country."\(^{10}\) But these and other opposition voices went unheeded in the formulation of colonial policy, and despite the judgment of subsequent event upon it, assimilation as the guiding principle in Korea was never withdrawn.

Following the March First, 1919, uprising which created a short period of administrative panic and diplomatic embarrassment, Japanese conduct in Korea was called into question and debated in the Diet. Among the ensuing reconsiderations on the assimilative theory there became discernible three alternative proposals: (a) repeal of the whole policy; (b) continuation of the policy as it stood; and (c) a more liberal, conciliatory application of assimilation.

As a spokesman for the first alternative, Dr Suehiro Shigeru of Kyoto Imperial University argued that "the failure of the assimilative policy pursued by the Japanese Government in Korea does not cast any reflections on the abilities of the authorities. The fault lies with

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10. Ibid, p 19. Vide also, McKenzie, Op. Cit., pp 145-146, where he cites an interview with "one of the most influential Japanese in Korea", who held a belief opposite to that of Yosaburo Takekoshi: "We will teach them our language, establish our institutions, and make them one with us."
the thing itself. This is especially the case now that the spirit of democracy and the idea of the self-determination of peoples is in such great vogue... The assimilative policy... has ended in complete failure." (11) As radical as his criticism was Dr Suehiro's proposal: a "middle course", as he called it, of self-government granted as an initial step towards full autonomy. (12) Soejima Michimase also favoured some form of home rule, but on grounds shared by many conservative leaders, who feared that, should the Koreans be granted political rights as assimilation logically implied, there was a danger that left-leaning Koreans would be elected to the Diet. (13)

Predominant among those favouring the second option of maintaining the existing system without modification, were the military leaders such as Terauchi Masatake, Tanaka Giichi, Yamagata Aritomo, and the retiring Governor-General of Korea, General Hasegawa. Master of compromise that he was, Premier Hara succeeded in neutralising their strong views initially by submitting to their demand that Baron Saitō, also a former military leader, succeed Hasegawa as the Governor-General. The fact that Baron Saitō's proposed reform programme was essentially innocuous from Japan's point of view, accounts for much of the militarists' willingness at this point to modify their stand and to countenance the anticipated administrative reforms. But their influence remained, and in the process of annexing Manchuria, the military administration of Terauchi and Hasegawa was revived in Korea, and Saitō's "cultural politics" remained only as a dim memory.

11. Dong, Colonial Policy, pp 262-263.
12. Ibid, p 263.
Essentially a middle-of-the-road-approach, it was the third alternative of a tempered assimilation policy which attracted most support from a wide political spectrum. Pleading for action consistent with the assimilative principle, the Seiyūkai Opposition urged the granting of full political rights to the as yet unfranchised Koreans. (14) The Premier, Hara Kei, agreed that complete nondifferentiation between Japanese and Koreans was both the means and goal for assimilation, (15) while Baron Saitō himself proposed more care and emphasis be given to cultural assimilation, principally through education, with gradualism in political matters. This point of view prevailing, Saitō took up official duties as Governor-General of Korea in September 1919, determined to embark upon a more conciliatory, benign system of rule.

Thus, despite considerable rethinking and the liberalism of the 1920's, the policy of assimilation remained without fundamental change. Premier Hara continued to cling to Terauchi's illusions of Japanese-Korean affection and similarity, pursuing the "new" policy under the concept of "Nisen Yūwa", the "Harmony of Japan and Korea", (16) on the assumption that "the two peoples are closely related to each other in race, in manners and customs and in sentiments." (17) Yet, in a manner strikingly echoed a decade later by Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, Hara Kei distinguished between principle and circumstance: "To sum up, it may be stated that Korea and Japan proper forming equally integral parts of the same empire, no distinction in principle should be made between them, and it is the

15. Ibid, p 267.
ultimate purpose of Japanese government in due course to treat Korea as in all respects on the same footing with Japan proper." (18)

(Author's italics.)

Despite principles, distinctions were rigidly maintained, and the "ultimate purpose" was never realised (unless in desperation in 1945 when the Koreans were hurriedly enfranchised). This failure is not exceptional, for not only were the premises on which it was grounded awry, but, as Dr Suehiro had endeavoured to point out, the reason for the downfall of the assimilative policy lay in its inner contradictions. This is especially clear with regard to assimilation politically. As an abstract theory, assimilation implies that a colony becomes an integral part of the whole system of empire, with each authority and department of the colony directly responsible to the Ministries. Neither should there be any separate armed forces or central authority, nor a political status inferior to that enjoyed by citizens of the home country. Of these points, Korean independence leaders were well aware. (19) But the problem here entailed is obvious: the granting of Meiji constitutional political rights to Koreans and peoples of other colonies could lead to a situation where, as the empire expanded, Japan proper would increasingly be deprived of a majority voice, with a growing proportion of Diet members being non-Japanese. Naturally, to Japan, the policy of assimilation was


intended to form colonial subjects in her own image, not the reverse. Hence, what was assimilation in theory, turned out to be subjection in practice.

This immediate problem of applying equal political rights to Koreans had been circumvented quite simply when Korea was annexed, when Professor Tomazu maintained that Japan had no such obligation, on the grounds that, "when our constitution was written, it did not anticipate the annexation of Korea."(20) Whilst adopting this recourse to political differentiation, Premier Katsura nevertheless formally announced in December, 1910, that the Meiji Constitution would apply as in Japan proper; Korea was not a Shokuminji (Colony), but a Gaiji (Outer Territory), of which Japan was the Naiji (Inner Territory).(21) Whether this arrangement was for the sake of form, or a diplomatic sop to foreign concern over Japan's Asian activities, is not clear.

Such a colonial theory, however, gave Korea a contradictory political status, which in turn produced an administrative anomaly: whilst Korea was theoretically an integral member of the Japanese empire, administratively she was organised as a separate entity. Some sort of political modus vivendi had to be devised, and the results were the separation of the Government-General from the Diet, and the almost unlimited power of the Governor-General within Korea. (22)

Superficially, this separate arrangement appears to satisfy the


22. Infra, Chapter 3.
The principle observed by Yosaburo Takekoshi cited above. But there was no intention of this distinct administration ever developing into anything akin to self-government. Indeed, concerning Formosa where Japanese rule was supposedly more liberal, Governor-General Den Kenjiro made it clear that such an eventuality was impermissible when he was confronted by a Home Rule Movement in Formosa in the 1920's.\(^{23}\) Premier Wakatsuki Reijiro, despite his greater flexibility, concluded in 1926: "Japan, including Formosa, is one country. There cannot be two legislative bodies."\(^{24}\) In Korea, the Government-General was effectively a legislature separate and distinct from Japan proper, yet the same logic was applied even to pro-Japanese seekers of Home Rule in Korea, whose organisation was ordered to dissolve in 1926. This policy of political differentiation became a direct cause of resentment and retaliation among Koreans, particularly among the educated and former aristocracy, the Yangban.

Political means of assimilation having been discarded, education was elected as the most suitable alternative, on the advice of Mizuno Rentaro, later Director-General of Political Affairs under Governor-General Saito. Education, as the principle tool and key to assimilation, should be introduced, Mizuno advised, benevolantly and with sufficiently encouraging incentives.\(^{25}\) By this means, Korean society and people were to be transformed (though supposedly already practically identical!) into the Japanese image. Unfortunately, while Dr Mizuno's principle was adopted, his recommendations on its

implementation were ignored, so that authority in this area was given solely to Terauchi and Prince Yamagata's adopted son, Yamagata Isaburō. Justifying their policy on Korean racial and intellectual inferiority, Terauchi and Yamagata erected a separate, unequal school system to that of the Japanese in Japan and Korea itself. The explicit purpose of education for Koreans was to inculcate loyalty, "to cultivate such character as befitting the imperial subject through moral development and dissemination of the national [i.e. Japanese] language." (26) Respectful of Confucian learning, one concession was made to the scholarly tradition of Korea, expressed by the Japanese Government in 1911: "The Koreans should be encouraged to pursue their old Confucian ethical teachings ... upon which they have also founded their social considerations. Otherwise the healthy development of their moral character will not be advanced." (27)

As in India, so in Korea, educational endeavour primarily served to increase a natural desire to be independent. The fact that in this very area where Japan placed its greatest hopes for assimilation, Korean antipathy was most manifest, (28) is indicative of the inaptness of the assimilative policy as a whole. Throughout Japan's rule of Korea, this policy was the basic, not subordinate, problem. The dogged adherence to a policy of assimilation totally unacceptable to the majority of Koreans and quite unrealistic in view of Korea's historical, cultural and international position and the growing suspicion of other Eastern powers, was most damaging to Japan's professed motives in the peninsula. Japan had set herself an

28. Infra, Chapter 3.
unusually difficult task in her colonialism, for as one scholar has remarked, other colonial policies "probably contained in neither theory nor practice a policy so radical as this; its effect on an ancient and numerous people of proud traditions could not fail to produce the profoundest sense of humiliation and outrage." (29) Such humiliation and outrage were concretely expressed in the March First and subsequent independence movements which, though to some extent failures themselves, signified an even greater failure, that of the Japanese administration and mission in Korea.

In view of the unambiguous Korean reaction to assimilation, one may well ask why, then, did Japan pursue a policy which was so detrimental to her image, systematically destroyed the hopes of goodwill in Korea, and so slew her own myth of Asian hegemony, harmony, prosperity and might? Of the same genre as that vexed question of Japanese militarism or "ultra-nationalism" of the 1930's, this problem of Japanese motives in Korea has taken central position in recent controversy over the true nature of Japan's objectives in annexing Korea. Evidently, this problem is not only relevant to the study of Japanese political factionalism, but is also very much connected with the point of view of Korean nationalists, to whom Japan's colonialism appeared insidious from its inception. Discussion has recently been focused on the validity of this traditional Korean viewpoint, following the publication of Hilary Conroy's comprehensive treatment of Japan's acquisition of Korea in which he posits three main elements motivating policy: realism, idealism and expansionism. (30) These three concepts provide a helpful

starting-point for a tentative analysis of the reasoning behind Japan’s policy in Korea.

In their appraisal of the strategic implications of an insecure Korea, the realism of the Japanese leaders is clear-cut. As an immediate justification of the annexation of Korea, strategic considerations were tangible and pre-eminent. Described as a "dagger pointed at Japan’s heart, a source of constant irritation and menace to Japan’s security", (31) a weak Korea provided China and Russia a highway to Japan. Since 1860, when Count Muraviev-Amurski established Vladivostok, and the cession of the Chinese Ussuri territories to Russia gave her a twelve-mile frontier with Korea, Japan viewed Russia with fear and regarded her overtures with suspicion. In 1885, it was rumoured that the Russians were about to seize Port Lazarev (Port Hamilton) near Wonsan in north Korea, (32) and in 1891 Crown Prince Nicholas stated the necessity of an ice-free port in south-eastern Korea to serve the Trans-Siberian Railway. When in 1896 the Liaotung Peninsula became a Russian lease, the railway was extended through it. (33)

Against this, to Japan, ominous background, there evolved Japan's "Man-Kan Kōkan" policy, of exchanging influence in Manchuria for special rights in Korea. This policy was, however, precariously balanced on fine-drawn distinctions which broke down and led to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. For example, in the

Nishi-Rōsen Agreement of 1898, while Article I provided for Korea's complete independence and mutual abstinence from interference in her internal affairs, in Article III Japan secured special commercial and industrial interests in Korea. (34) Using these special interests as a bargaining position for political privileges, foreign minister Kōbe was briefed in March, 1901, to "make a declaration to take such action as necessary to maintain the balance of power and, in self-defense, place Korea under control." (35) By June 1903, a more explicit formulation of policy regarding Korea's strategic significance emerged from a meeting including Elder Statesmen Yamagata, Itō and Inoue, Premier Katsura, foreign minister Komura and the army and navy ministers, Terauchi and Yamamoto: "Korea is an important outpost of Japan's line of defense and Japan consequently considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other powers."

It soon became clear to Japan that an independent Korea would not long be preserved, and fearing Western intrusion in the continent, Japan arranged for a Protectorate Treaty with Korea following the defeat of Russia. Signed on November 18, 1905, this Treaty contained the statement that, "The Governments of Japan and Corea, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have with that object in view agreed upon and concluded the following stipulations to serve until the moment arrives

34. Chung, Colonial Administration, p 10.
when it is recognised that Korea has attained national strength.  

Nevertheless, Japan continued to press her plea of vulnerability through the weakness of Korea, so that it was believed increasingly that complete control of Korea by formal incorporation into the Japanese Empire was strategically necessary. Following the assassination of Itō Hirobumi by Koreans in October, 1909, both the public and political parties pressured the Saionji Cabinet for a "decisive policy" and all in all the "promulgation of the Treaty of Annexation on August 29, 1910 was universally proclaimed as a great achievement."  

In Japanese minds, that the assimilation of Korea as an integral part of the empire was a vital defensive and strategic measure, was a valid and realistic assumption.  

Granted that Japan's analysis of her position with regard to her militarily and economically weak neighbour was realistic, the course on which Japan embarked thereupon is not, however, satisfactorily explained in terms of pragmatism alone. Indeed, it is arguable that not only do Japan's actions in Korea, and subsequently in Manchuria and China, become less realistic with time, but also her initial policy in Korea, that of assimilation, based on the alleged "principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires", was fatally unrealistic.  

At this point, a strong and basic current of idealism comes into view, an idealism which failed to harmonize with the Korean reality, and which became the more intensely propounded the less appearances supported it.  

On emerging from their experiences surrounding the Meiji Restoration, Japan's new leaders conceived of their nation as the "Light of Asia"; Japan's policies in Asia were not to be founded

37. Chung, Colonial Administration, p 19.  
38. Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, p 167.
merely on need, but on "the desire to contribute to the cultural fame in the world of all East Asian peoples by helping them to set up and preserve their independence and further their happiness." (39) Leaders such as Ōi Kentarō and Miyazaki Torazo campaigned for active improvement of Asian culture and economy on the grounds that if Japan failed to induce progress elsewhere in Asia, she would lose her claim to Asian leadership. (40) Such idealism with respect to Korea was specified as a mission of enlightenment and renewal. Perhaps the greatest exponent of this line was Prince Itō Hirobumi, who in 1906 maintained that, "If the Japanese government neglects its duties to clean up governmental corruption, reform the laws of Korea, and alleviate the miseries of the poverty-stricken people, this Empire will not only be violating its responsibility as protector of Korea, but will itself also have to suffer." (41) In the fulfilment of this mission, Prince Itō was especially concerned that Japanese colonialism in Korea be conducted humanely and realistically, and conscious of the watching world, advocated a "safe and sane" policy.

In the light of subsequent events, Koreans and many others could only regard Prince Itō's idealism with pronounced scepticism, while the engrossing debate among historians today is, as mentioned above, over the question: What happened to this "safe and sane" policy? Did perhaps Japan's dream of the elevation of Asia to a position of diplomatic respectability, economic prosperity and military prowess under the aegis of a Japan pre-eminently the gentleman among nations, only in practice dissolve into a crude,

40. Ibid, p 41.
41. Nahm, A. C., in Nahm (ed.), Korea, p 32.
literal-Shintoist sense of her own importance, an intellectually barren ideology of self-perpetuation through self-expansion? (42)

To accept this, would be to dichotomize idealism and realism in Japanese policy to an unwarranted degree. For Japan's idealism and her concept of strategic necessity were closely linked, so that her "idealism" was not essentially disinterested nor her "realism" essentially practical.

Interpreting history according to results as we often do and must, coupled with the hindsight now enjoyed concerning the Japanese mentality of this period, it is easy to overlook the facts that not only was this "mentality" an object of guesswork to contemporary foreign observers and diplomats, but also among Japanese leaders themselves, there were divergent opinions, differences in emphases, and sometimes misgivings about the consequences of national and colonial policy as it was formed. The acquisition of Korea was performed in the midst of a dialectic of idealism and realism which, by force of time and place acting on circumstances, emerged as expansionism, charged perhaps with a keen sense of mission and destiny, yet increasingly characterised by aggression rather than idealism or realism. Yet it is from a recognition of the fierce factionalism and flux of influences thus involved, and the lack of any blueprint bearing majority consent, that Hilary Conroy has produced his controversial "no-plot" thesis, according to which Japan's annexation and subsequent nature of rule of Korea were not the result of Japanese planning or will, but rather the result of time and circumstance, which in combination, effectively destroyed the original Meiji idealism. Since, however, one cannot derive from the existence of factions or opposing influences any **prima facie case**

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for such a thesis, and since the testimony of the Korean independence movement does not concur, a brief evaluation of Conroy's view is in order.

As the foremost architect of Japan's "mission" in Korea, Itō Hirobumi is an interesting figure to study, for he manifested the contradictions of Japanese idealism which early poisoned it. It has been pointed out by one Japanese scholar that Japan's conception of her role as the "Light of Asia", was a "theme that lent itself equally well to idealism, opportunism, and chauvinism." (43) This suggestion is perfectly illustrated by Itō taking Uchida Ryōhei to Korea for the express purpose of controlling the Korean Il-chin Hoe ("Progressive Society"). (44) However, genuine Itō's desire to upgrade Asian culture and economy, his vision was limited strictly to the application of Japanese institutions, so that Korean national consciousness and social customs were disregarded or condemned, and native Korean reformists received scant encouragement.

But the contradictions in Itō's "safe and sane" policy are more clearly evident in his handling of the 1905 Protectorate Treaty, which, needless to say, was forced upon an unwilling government and people. On November 17, 1905, Prince Itō and General Hasegawa, accompanied by gendarmes, entered the Korean palace to obtain the approval of Cabinet and Emperor of the protectorate. Premier Han Kyu-sŏl and two other ministers refused. Thereupon Itō seized the Premier, who attempted to see the Emperor, and detained him in a side room whilst the ministers were compelled to sign. (45) That a statesman

44. Ibid, p 128.
of the stature of Prince Itō was prepared to go to such lengths, is an indication of the measure of importance over and above idealistic considerations which the Japanese attached to control of Korea. For Itō especially, it was important that the protectorate appear to be a temporary agreement between two powers on an equal basis, and hence the opening statement of the Treaty cited above. Keeping up this appearance caused no end of difficulty thereafter, for the Koreans immediately expressed intense opposition. Between August, 1907 and June, 1911, the Japanese recorded 2,852 attacks involving 141,815 insurgents, of whom 17,697 were killed and 3,706 wounded. (46) The obviously severe repression this unusually high ratio of killed to wounded implies, once again indicates Japan's determination to overcome any obstacle to her "direction" of Korea. To the Koreans, of course, any claims Japan laid on altruistic motives thereafter were received with anger and derision. (47)

Clearly, the case of Itō underlines the complexity of the Japanese attitude to Korea, in the outward disharmony of idealism, chauvinism and aggression here displayed. Itō's connections with the Kokuryūkai and his reverence for nationalistic and expansionist figures such as Yoshida Shōin (1830-1959) (48) certainly made his mission highly susceptible to ultra-nationalistic devices. But this development is more truly accounted for by an appraisal of Japan's

consistent search for resources necessary for an autonomous national defense, from 1870. In the early 1870's, Soejima Taneomi of the Foreign Office intimated to the British Minister, Harry Parkes, that Japan thought it advisable to seize Korea to support there 100,000 Samurai, and that "Japanese independence required control of Shantung and of North China as well."(49) Anxious over Western imperialism and the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Yamagata Aritomo produced in the 1890's his concepts of the "line of sovereignty" and the "line of advantage", whereby Japan was not only to defend her existing territory, but also to advance it in order to safeguard her (undefined) security.(50) But Yamagata made it clear that the strengthening of Japan's armed forces was not simply a response to Russia or the West: "We must also be prepared to grasp any opportunity which may present advantages."(51) In 1894 the first opportunity came, and as Yamagata had earlier promised Saigō Takamori,(52) troops were sent to Korea to engage the Chinese army. Following Japan's victory over Russia a decade later, continental expansionism became, in line with objectives carried into the Meiji era from late Tokugawa times, "a national commitment which every successive government ... assiduously followed."(53)

In this light, Conroy's interpretation of Japan's seizure of Korea and the policy there pursued as being primarily accidents of time, place and circumstance, is insufficient. There appears to be no

49. Ibid, p 23. Soejima was a supporter of Saigo.
52. Ibid, p 70.
inhherent compulsion in the turn of events alone forcing the annexation upon Korea, still less do they logically connect the annexation to the particular policy of assimilation adopted or that policy itself to the strategic arguments evinced in its support. Such connections existed only in the minds of the Japanese leaders and the public which supported them. The alleged strategic influence of the possession of Korea on Japan and the inferences drawn therefrom concerning colonial policy, can only be considered logical if Japanese aspirations beforehand were of such a nature as to embark Japan on the course she actually did take - i.e. if Japan had premeditated her acquisition of Korea. (54) In addition to the military objectives examined above, Japan's activities following her annexation of Korea support such premeditation. In 1919, Japan claimed that the special rights secured by Japan in China and Manchuria by the 1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement encompassed political rights. (55) At the same time, the very same strategic arguments used in support of Korea's acquisition were resurrected in connection with a chronically weak China. By 1919, Tanaka Gichi, Kita Ikki, Konoe Fumimaro and Ishiwara Kanji all reaffirmed (in different ways) that "continentalism" was basic to Japan's survival. (56)

In his book, "Japanese Policy in a Dilemma", (57) N.M. Bamba has shown how this direction in Japanese foreign policy had by 1929

54. Tatsuji Takeuchi opines that the annexation of Korea was planned from 1895 - War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, p 160.
put Japan in an awkward position. With Korea secure, expansion into Manchuria was physically feasible, and from 1931 to 1933 was made a reality. But in the process of establishing Manchuria, Japan had increased her dilemma: confronted with the ire of the United States and the censure of the League of Nations, Japan was both diplomatically and militarily isolated. Since both Shidehara Kijūrō and Tanaka Giichi wished to avoid such isolation, however plausible the argument may be that Korea was acquired as a realistic response to external circumstances, the case wears rather thin in connection with Manchuria. It appears more valid to argue that both Japan's expansionism and idealistic sense of mission were the cause of interest in Korea, that the influence of the possession of that territory on Japan was the furtherance of national ambitions already born, and finally, that the seizure of Manchuria was the completion of a cycle of contemplated gain, gain, and the need to ensure security and gain some more.

Admittedly, the above evidence and argument do not close the case, for Conroy's analysis of factionalism has been only partially and indirectly met. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Conroy's contention that the existence of diverse and opposing factions precludes there being any intentions regarding Korea which could be truly regarded as consistent, national policy, is made at the expense of sufficient attention to the actual definite pattern which emerged, and the consistent and virulent opposition of the Koreans themselves. It is well to note that in 1962 Conroy reaffirmed this belief: "Internal evidence simply does not support the existence of a political plot to annex Korea. Such a plot would have demanded unanimity within .

the leadership." (59) It is doubtful that a historian could consistently hold to such a principle as evinced in the latter sentence. The reasoning that where factions exist there can be no consistent policy is rather a non-sequitor; nor does it seem necessary to discover the illusive "blueprint". It is fascinating, however, that Conroy would be happy with the idea of a "plot" in the 1930's: "The Meiji leaders were not international criminals [as in the 1930's]; they were realistic captains of the ships of state." (60)

It is true that the advocates of the "Conquer Korea" policy under Saigō Takamori were successfully opposed by other Meiji leaders under Ōkubo, but the opposition "based its objections on faulty timing, not on final objectives." (61) Moreover, Yamagata, who was on Ōkubo's side, wrote to Saigō explaining that Japan's army was not fully prepared, adding, "After one or two years when the foundation of the military system is established, there will probably be no obstacles to sending troops to the continent." (62) Again, the political factions which succeeded the suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion - Toyama's chauvinistic "Genyōsha" and Inukai Ki's "Kaishintō" - were "ideological opposites and yet political allies", (63) because their objectives on the continent were so similar.

59. Conroy, Hilary (Speaker), Summary of Remarks on: Japanese-Korean Relations in the Meiji Era and their later Implications, Columbia University Seminar on Modern East Asia: Japan, Columbia University, December 14, 1962, p 5. (Unpublished article.)

60. Ibid, Loc. Cit. Were there then no factions in the 1930's?


It is also evident that the period 1900 to 1910 was characterised by debate between Katsura Taro and Yamagata on the one hand and Saionji and Itō on the other, that in 1919 Hara Kei was at odds with Hasegawa and Yamagata, and that in the 1930's Shidehara and Wakatsuki were opposed by their army and navy ministers. But in each case a distinct pattern emerged: after initial restraint, the more extreme, more expansionist and militarist viewpoint prevailed, while the role of the dissenters was one of attempting to mellow the application of that viewpoint. Throughout the course of Japan's rule over Korea, whilst idealistic professions continued, the ever-materialising spectre of isolation and the stinging rejection by Korea and China accelerated Japan's course towards an anticipated militarism, so that the discrepancy between policy statements and actual colonial practice became ever more marked. It is in this light that Marius Jansen concluded, "One can learn more of the motives of these men by following their actions than by studying what they said."(64) It is precisely to Japanese colonialism in practice that we now turn.

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64. Ibid, p 44.
CHAPTER III.  KOREA'S REJECTION OF JAPANESE
COLONIAL POLICY IN PRACTICE

Quite apart from the inner contradictions of Japan's colonial theory, it was the Korean nation itself which placed the most formidable obstacles in front of this colonialism in practice. Writing in 1926, Alleyne Ireland was struck with the "rare spectacle of one civilised race ruling another civilised race", (1) which Japan's lordship over Korea presented. Yet it was F.A. McKenzie who, five years earlier, more astutely pointed up the paradoxical nature of the Japanese administration in Korea: "The old, effete administration was cleared away, sound currency maintained, railways were greatly extended, roads improved, afforestation pushed forward on a great scale, agriculture developed, sanitation improved and fresh industries begun ... [Yet] this period ... ranks among the greatest failures of history." (2) Undoubtedly, one contributing factor in this paradox was the pursuance of an assimilative programme based on a supposed Korean racial inferiority. Contributing equally, however, was the important fact that Korea, as a nation possessing the intellectual, religious, historical and cultural heritage of a proud civilisation, consistently refused to surrender her identity to Japan.

In this light, it is intended in this chapter to examine Japan's colonial practice in Korea as the physical context of the Korean

independence struggle, with attention directed to its material and psychological effects on the numerous and civilised Korean people. Administrative details are by no means complete, and are designed to provide a background to the grievances which fuelled the fires of Korean resistance and independence; a comprehensive analysis of the Japanese administration is therefore outside the purview of this chapter. There were four main aspects of the Government-General of Korea particularly arousing Korean opposition: (a) political administration; (b) economic policies; (c) education; and (d) law. These aspects provide convenient divisions for the discussion below.

1. Political Administration

The structure of the central government, the Government-General, from 1910, was essentially a continuation of the Residency-General system of 1905 (see Fig. 1). As already noted, the relationship between the administration in Korea and the Japanese Government was such that, contrary to strict assimilative theory, the Government-General was a separate political entity. Within this arrangement, the Governor-General enjoyed virtually absolute power as the legislator, chief executive, commander-in-chief of army and navy, and highest tribunal. Competent regarding Korea's defense requirements, the Governor-General was also responsible neither to Diet nor Cabinet in the forming of "Serei" (decrees) and "Furei"

(ordinances), receiving practically automatic sanction from the
Emperor which was at no time withheld.\(^{(4)}\) Possessing also power
to appoint and dismiss civil officials of all but the highest rank, the
Governor-General, aided by a Director-General of Political Affairs,
 enjoyed direct authority over the Secretariat, five Departments and
seventeen Affiliated Offices of the Government-General.\(^{(5)}\)

Fig. 1. **Organisation of the Government-General, 1910\(^{(6)}\)**

```
Governor-General
  -------------------
     Director-General of Political Affairs
  -------------------
 Government-General
  Secretariat
  General Affairs Department
  Home Affairs Department
  Finance Department
  Agriculture, Commerce and Industry Department
  Justice Department

  Central Council
  Police Affairs Department
  Courts and Prisons
  Local Government
  Railway Bureau
  Communications Bureau
  Customs Service
  Model Farm
  Printing Bureau
  Monopoly Bureau
  Government Schools Bureau
  Hospital and Medical School
  Ancient Customs Bureau
  Investigation Bureau
  Government Lumber Station
  Government Coal Mine
  Land Survey Bureau
```

Since "strict military rule by a bureaucracy appointed by the
military Governor-General was in their view the basis for orderly
and fast reform and development"\(^{(7)}\) despite eight revisions between
1910 and 1919, no changes were made under Governors-General
Terauchi and Hasegawa to mellow this authoritarian rule.

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5. Ibid, Loc. Cit.

6. This table is composed from details in A. Ireland, *The New Korea*,

General*, p 50.
But following the reconsideration of colonial policy occasioned by the 1919 independence uprising, the Government-General underwent its most extensive structural reorganisation (see Fig. 2). Designed to allay Korean anxieties, the changes were nevertheless effectively limited to structure, since the basic policy remained the same. A modern, official Japanese History accurately summarises their scope thus: "The system which depended on the Governor-General being a military person was done away with, the military police were changed into ordinary police, the publication of literary newspapers was permitted, and the path of political [freedom of] speech was also opened. However, these were reforms of extremely narrow scope and did not satisfy the Korean people." (8) Korean nationalists themselves viewed the "reforms" with suspicion and referred to them with sarcasm; their demand was independence, not reform. (9)

Fig. 2. Reorganisation of the Government-General, 1919 (10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director-General of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated Offices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Central Council
  - Supreme Court and Courts
  - Provincial Government
  - Government High Schools
  - Government Hospital and Asylums
  - Police Training Institute
  - Prisons
  - Bureau of Communications
  - Higher Land Investigation Committee
  - Etc., as in 1910.


Although during this reorganisation provision was made for a civilian Governor-General as in Formosa, the military system was hardly "done away with": in September 1919, a former military commander, Baron Saitō, assumed the Governor-Generalship, and thereafter no civilian ever took this office. The most significant alterations were the creation of an Education Bureau, the abolition of the military police force, and the transference of the police department, hitherto subject to the military police under direct control of the Governor-General, to the Government-General proper as a civilian Bureau. Yet these police reforms evidently involved no reduction in powers or personnel. On the contrary, the military police were re-employed as civilian police, while further reinforcements were recruited from Japan. Whereas before 1919, police stations and substations numbered 151 and 686 respectively, the corresponding figures after 1919 were 251 and 2,495, while the number of patrolmen rose from 6,387 to 20,134. The remarks of Ch'ŏng Hang-Gyŏng (Henry Chung) in 1920, that the "only reforms that have been introduced are the changing of the name of the 'military' administration to that of the 'civil', and the 'gendarmerie' to 'police'", was representative of the Korean view that the reforms were a matter of form and not content.

In terms of the effectiveness of colonial government as well as any moves towards native political participation, local structures and powers are perhaps as important as the central administration. For local government is both the basis of the superstructure and a

training ground for aspirants to the political centre. In this respect, the colonial local government system in Korea displayed both great strength and great weakness. For in accord with the emphasis on direct control, the local administration was highly centralised so that it was efficient as a directive organ, but very ineffective as a means of Korean political assimilation and participation.

Local administration was divided into 13 Provinces, 12 Prefectures, 317 District Magistracies, and 4322 Townships, which were reduced to 2,504 after 1919. All governors of Provinces, Prefecture Chiefs and District heads were appointed by the Governor-General who exercised through them strict supervision of important local affairs. The governors enjoyed some discretionary powers relating to the maintenance of peace and order, including the issue of local administrative ordinances and the mobilisation of police in emergencies. Until 1919, provincial police organs were separate from all other local administrative bodies, being under the direct supervision of the Governor-General and his Director-General. In general, the local administration consistently followed the policies and methods of the central administration, and as a bureaucracy comprising mainly Japanese and some Korean "collaborators", suffered similar opposition from Korean nationalists.

13. Ireland, The New Korea, p 110. For the provinces, see map 1. The Prefectures were municipalities, and the District Magistries sub-divisions of the Provinces. There was also a smaller local unit, the Ri, or Village - vide Chung, Colonial Administration, p 107.


The principal political grievance of the Koreans was the entire lack of meaningful political participation or voice at any level. There being no political rights or representative body for Koreans, bureaucratic recruitment was the only door to political involvement. But since the very raison d'entre of the bureaucracy, which in the Government-General alone comprised 10,433 members, was clearly the implementation of Japan's rule over Korea, such employment bore the stigma of "collaboration". Yet even here Korean participation was discouraged by the unequal policies of the Governor-General. Between 1910 and 1913, 43.9% of Korean Senior Officials including 90% of the Chokunin (highest) rank, and 24.7% of Korean Junior Officials were dismissed, so that the 1910 ratio of seven Korean High Officials to three Japanese High Officials was reversed. This trend continued even under Saitō from 1919, so that by 1930 the number of Korean High Officials increased by only 5%, compared with 60% for Japanese High Officials. Indeed, in view of these figures and the table below (Fig. 3), Korean cynicism towards Saitō's "conciliatory" policy (1919-1931) is understandable.

Fig. 3. Korean Employment Percentages in the Central Bureaucracy, 1919-1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean High Officials</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Junior Officials</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Low-Ranking Officials</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japanese intentions to broaden Korean political participation after 1919 proved shallow-rooted and half-hearted. A scheme for Korean involvement in the central administration conceived by Premier Katō in June 1924, was simply abandoned on the discovery of the First Communist Party of Korea in Seoul in 1925. The Japanese Government produced in 1926 a "New Basic Policy", which would have extended Korean political participation beyond the Government-General to the Japanese Diet itself: "In the future, some Koreans shall be elected for the membership of the Imperial Diet ... It shall be made possible for a selected number of Koreans with character and ability to be elected members of the House of Peers, and it will be advisable also to grant [the Koreans] the right to elect members of the House of Representatives." But such concessions were the fruit of the liberalism of the 1920's, and no Koreans were ever so elected.

The only ostensible Korean presence in the central administration was the Central Council, a non-legislative advisory body chaired by the Director-General. Numbering on average a little over sixty, members of the Central Council were recruited from the old Korean nobility and former officials, whose task was to consider only such matters as were referred to them by the Governor-General. Considering that in the thirty-six years of Japanese rule the Central Council was asked to consider only nine items, and these concerning Korean cultural and ceremonial matters such as funeral rites, one may conclude that no political influence was intended to issue from this august body.

22. Chung, Colonial Administration, p 103.
The outlook in local government after 1919 seemed brighter. The limited decentralisation of 1919 to 1920 related principally to police matters, but it also heralded the only entrance to political involvement of a representative nature the Koreans were ever to obtain. In November 1920, elections were held for membership of new advisory councils in the provinces and prefectures (i.e. municipalities). As the elective system was "quite new" to Koreans, however, elections were held in only specially selected villages. Moreover, since the governors reserved the right to appoint provincial advisory council members, elected candidates remained few.\(^{24}\) Understandably, Korean nationalists were unimpressed with this "espionage system", as they dubbed it, since Korean discussions were presided over by Japanese, and any "offender" was in danger of imprisonment.\(^{25}\)

In 1930, and again in 1933, the principle of local government participation was expanded with the recognition of Provincial Governments as "Public Corporations", and the broadening of the franchise criteria.\(^{26}\) However, these reforms were again largely confined to structure. "Public Corporations" were subject to the Government-General's veto, the financial criterion for franchise was very limiting, and governors and prefecture chiefs could still appoint members. Hence, whilst legally Koreans were given a voice in some local matters such as education, they suffered the same fate of administrative exclusion experienced by the Indians in South Africa, after General Smuts and Gandhi had formulated legally non-differentiating laws, 1905 to 1914.\(^{27}\)

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24. Ireland, The New Korea, p 115ff
Apart from structural changes and promises on paper, it is evident that throughout Japan's rule of Korea, there was no real modification of the official position of 1910, that, "Not only do Koreans lack ability to carry out the self-governing principle in co-operation with the Japanese but also the time for local administration in the [Korean] peninsula to be recognised as autonomous has not yet arrived." (28) At the same time, as will be seen in the following chapters, the attitude of the Korean nationalists and the popular demand for complete independence raises serious doubts whether the Koreans would have ever "co-operated" with the Japanese in the governing of their own country.

2. Economic Policies.

The question of the aims, practice and results of Japan's economic ventures in Korea is one of considerable difficulty and an area of much polemical disputation, especially from the Korean side. However, many issues arising here today are post-World War II ones, inevitably coloured by adherence to particular social and economic ideologies (lest they be charged with irrelevancy). Yet to the majority of Koreans at the time, economic grievances were likely to have been simple, clear and concrete, rather than complex, confused and theoretical. So while reference is made to modern economic historians' analyses, it is only done with some degree of hesitation. In this study, the most valid analysis is that one which bears in mind that in terms of Japan's avowed: strategic interest in Korea, commercial interests ranked high, and that therefore the intended economic benefit was primarily for Japan, rather than Korea.

It is perhaps curious that little detailed Japanese discussion before 1910 on Korea's economic potential has been discovered. But the priority given to economics as a major area of activity for the new Government-General indicates that this side of Japan's strategic interest in Korea was taken for granted, and indeed, commercial clauses are present in all Japan's treaties concerning Korea from 1876 to 1905.\(^{(29)}\) In preference to the Imin Saku, or Immigration Policy, which would have closely tied the Korean and Japanese economics, Terauchi adopted the Kaihatsu Saku, or Exploitation Policy, whereby Korea became fiscally independent of Japan. Hence in the management of the railways, postal and telegraph services and industrial monopolies such as forestry, mining and tobacco, the Government-General was unchallengeably predominant over the Diet.\(^{(30)}\)

Until the operation of the Yen Bloc economy of the 1930's, priority was given to agricultural production. The most intensive agricultural development occurred in the 1920's when the Rice Output Expansion Plans were implemented.\(^{(31)}\) - coinciding with Japan's own rice-crop failures. This agricultural activity was, however, pursued in line with the understanding that Korea was to be a source of food for Japan, rather than on behalf of the Korean. Hence although the rice output almost doubled between 1910 and 1938, export of rice in the same period rose by twenty times, accounting for 40% of Korea's annual yield; the average Korean rice consumption diminished by nearly

29. Supra, Chapter 1.


one half, replaced mainly by millet. (32) Governor-General Ugaki, who admitted to Koreans eating bark and grass, wrote to the Emperor in July 1931, stating his intention to give them "some bread", for "since the annexation, the wealth of Korea has been greatly increased, but in proportion to the increase of Korean wealth as a whole, the lots of Koreans have not improved." (33) For a Governor-General, this is an astonishing admission, but coming at the very time when attention was being withdrawn from agriculture to heavy industry, prompted little other solution than peasant migration north as industrial labour.

There was further cause for resentment, especially in rural areas, with respect to land policies. In the course of land surveys and development projects, Korean farmers found themselves dispossessed of their land in many instances. In this connection, the Oriental Development Company fast became the object of intense hatred among Koreans. Established in Korea in 1908, the Oriental Development Company between 1909 and 1910 alone, had increased its holdings by 84%, from 10,067 chobu to 18,519 chobu (one chobu = 2.45 acres). (34) Japanese holdings in Korea increased from 3% at the annexation to 60% of arable land by 1930 (35) and even Korean


33. Quoted in Dong, Colonial Policy, p 319.

34. Rew, Government-General, p 93.

landlords were required to have Japanese managers. (36)

Such figures prompt the question: Were Koreans evicted? This question has unfortunately received no detailed treatment to date, but given that the Japanese in Korea accounted for only 3% of the total population, and that most of these were bureaucrats, officials, patrolmen, or troops, it is reasonable to allow some truth in the nationalists' claims that eviction was practised. Land seizure was certainly facilitated by the land surveys: unfamiliar with Japanese ownership criteria and baffled by red tape, Korean peasants forfeited considerable holdings by failing to register land properly or even at all. (37) Henry Chung claimed land was also confiscated, without compensation, originally under the pretext of "military necessity", and subsequently as "eminent domain". (38) This claim was, in fact, supported by Professor Yoshino of Tokyo Imperial University in an article published in the Tokyo Chuo Koron after his stay in Korea in 1916: "Without consideration and mercilessly [the Japanese] have resorted to laws for the expropriation of land, the Koreans concerned being compelled to part with their family property for nothing." (39)

Non-agricultural industry had been increased quantitatively quite steadily from before the annexation. A railway running from the southern port of Pusan across the Yalu River into Manchuria had been

37. Chung, Colonial Administration, p 166.
38. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 110. (Precise meaning of "eminent domain" lacking.)
completed in 1911, and was followed by a network of railways giving wider and cheaper access to markets.\(^1\) From the mid-1920's, the Zaibatsu firms - Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Naguchi - established themselves in Korea to augment beer, paper, flour, cement, magnesium, nitrogen, tungsten and hydro-electric industries, as well as to further development in the existing textile, iron and coal industries.\(^2\) The years 1931 to 1937 witnessed the rapid industrialisation of northern Korea as the Government-General implemented the Yen Bloc economy through its Hokusen Kaitaku Keikaku (North Korea Exploitation Plan). The programme effected considerable social and structural change, brought about by the migration northwards of thousands of former peasants and artisans. Something of the social change occurring can be seen in the decline of the Korean population involved in agriculture from 81.7% in 1920 to 75.1% in 1938.\(^3\) However the structural change was greater, for whereas in 1910 industrial production amounted to 11% of total production, by 1943 it accounted for 38%.\(^4\)

With some exceptions, there appears to be widespread agreement among scholars that though Korean industry was modernised and quantitatively improved and although the hermit economy was to some degree transformed into an open, trading economy, the benefit to the Koreans themselves was minimal. Strengthened by Governor-General Ugaki's own observations, there is an almost prima facie case for this opinion.

\(^1\) Yong Iob Chung, "Japanese Investment in Korea 1904-1945", in Namh (ed.), Korea, p 93.
\(^2\) Chul Won Kang, in Ibid, p 80.
\(^3\) Chul Won Kang, in Ibid, p 84. Whether actual number of Koreans in agriculture fell is not given.
\(^4\) Yong Iob Chung, in Ibid, p 94.
Enterprises were mostly Japanese-owned and staffed with Japanese engineers, technicians, accountants and foremen, while the fact that even in 1940, 80% of the engineers were Japanese, \(^{(44)}\) indicates how little emphasis was placed on training Korean staff. Whilst three-quarters of the total capital formation in Korea was Japanese, \(^{(45)}\) the Government-General gave financial assistance only to large businesses, and offered loans to Koreans at a rate one third higher than to Japanese concerns. \(^{(46)}\) The only large Korean enterprises which succeeded without openly pledging loyalty to Japan were the Kyŏngsŏng Textile Company (Seoul), the Kyŏngnam Bank (Pusan), the Paeksan Trading Company (Pusan), and the Honam Bank (S. W. Korea), of which the latter two were ordered to dissolve or merge in 1927 and 1941 respectively. \(^{(47)}\)

Despite the considerable migration northwards from 1931, participation by Koreans in the "new economy" remained relatively low, as the table below indicates.

---

44. Chul Won Kang, in *Ibid*, p 84.
Fig. 4. Occupational Distribution of Employed Population, 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Koreans</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population in Agriculture</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>5.3% (landlords)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and Professional</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even where Koreans were involved in development schemes and public services, a discriminatory wage system was in force under which Koreans received approximately half the pay of their Japanese counterparts. This unequal system was, in fact, general, applying not only to common employment (see Fig. 5), but also to Korean officials, who received 40% less in salary than Japanese of the same rank. Genuinely concerned about Korean poverty, Ugaki introduced measures in 1933 to redress the wage anomaly, but confronted by an uproar from the Japanese settlers, capitulated.

While admitting that the Government-General's economic policies were primarily operated on behalf of the Japanese, some scholars perceive positive aspects as well. Yong Iob-Chung emphasises stimulus to Korean investment and the "catalytic" function of Japanese enterprises: "Japanese firms were Schumpeterian innovators, followed by a 'cluster'

48. Chul Won Kang, in Nahm (ed.), Korea, p 84.
49. Yong Iob Chung, in Ibid, p 96.
50. Chung, Colonial Administration, p 163.
51. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 319.
### Fig. 5. Wages by Nationality, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seoul</th>
<th>Mokp'o</th>
<th>Pusan</th>
<th>P'yŏngyang</th>
<th>Shinuiju</th>
<th>Sŏnch'ŏn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carpenters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plasterers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.85</td>
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of Korean imitators." (53) The traditional economy did not decline severely, but relatively, as expected in modernisation. Indeed, industry boosted the supply of materials, goods and services so that the traditional sector actually benefited from the "new

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52. Chung, Colonial Administration, p 164.

53. Yong Iob Chung, in Kim, Mortimore (eds), Korea's Response, p 33.
economy". Despite the forcefulness of Chung's pleading, the evidence clearly indicates that few purely Korean industries arose, hampered as they were by prohibitive and discriminatory interest rates and the exclusive government aid to Japanese concerns. Further, the colonial economic dependence of Korea on Japan is illustrated by the fact that by 1931, 95.1% of Korean exports - grain, cotton, silk and minerals - went to Japan, whilst 80% of her imports came from Japan to absorb Zaibatsu over-production. Such figures tend to support the statement that the economic policies "were primarily intended to meet the demand imposed upon Korea by the entire empire and colonial Korea fulfilled the function necessitated by the larger unit even at the expense of her own welfare."

But more important for this discussion are the actual grievances of the contemporary Koreans who clearly felt the burden of the "new economy". In a rather satirical opening to his chapter on economic exploitation, Henry Chung asked, "Has increasing the national debt one hundred and forty-three times [from $368,256.50 in 1905 to $52,461,827.50 in 1918] 'bettered' the economical condition of Korea? ... Is the individual Korean any 'better off economically' because he pays five and one half times as much tax under Japanese rule [i.e. $19,849,128 gross taxes, 1919, compared with $3,561,907.50 in 1905] without independence, freedom and representation ... ?" Especially irksome was the use of Korean taxes to support "the cost of their oppression", that is, to defray military expenses. Roading very often had nothing to do with Korean commerce or utility, but was

54. Yong Iob Chung, in Nahm (ed.), Korea, p 91.
57. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, pp 106-107. (No sources given for his figures.)
plainsly strategic, as American travellers confirmed, while railways were built upon confiscated land by peasants forced to labour without pay, as a corvée tax. As a result of economic pressure, nearly half a million Koreans had already emigrated to Manchuria and Siberia by 1919. The Japanese, Chung complained, encouraged such emigration both to make room for Japanese settlers and to claim "protection" rights in these regions - a prophetic insight.

Besides these grievances there were, as noted, the unequal wage system, the almost exclusive occupancy of commercial executive and administrative posts by Japanese, the deposit of the lion's share of profits into Japanese corporations, and the rice export policy and dispossession of land. Whatever economic theories may be involved, the Koreans felt exploited. The former nobility and officialdom had indeed been corrupt and oppressive, but the exchange of oppressors was less tolerable because the new rulers were foreign, more plentiful and obtrusive, while their hold was more comprehensive and efficient. If in his studies of African colonies Karl Deutsch concluded that, "Colonial governments turn out to be ... far less able to provide development and essential services, than governments based on the consent of the people!", it is only to be expected that the Government-General failed to benefit or satisfy its unwilling subjects with an economic "Exploitation Policy" geared to the service of Japan.

60. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 110.
61. Ibid, p 115.
3. **Education**

The Japanese education system in Korea was intended to be the main tool for assimilating Koreans culturally, socially and politically. In this, the Japanese policy was a signal failure. The Koreans had already shown great eagerness and capacity for modern education in Japan, in U.S.A., and in the Korean Mission schools. The primary source of this failure did not, therefore, lie in Korean unwillingness to learn, but in their opposition to the humiliatingly unequal system Governor-General Terauchi introduced in 1910.

When the Japanese annexed Korea, they found existing two entirely different educational systems. On the one hand there continued the traditional Confucian institutions, while on the other were the schools founded on Western educational principles by missionaries such as Drs Appenzeller and Underwood, and Mrs Scranton. Japanese policy towards Confucian learning was generally one of conciliation and protection. The principal seat of learning in Seoul, the Sŏnggyun-Gwan, perhaps too proud a reminder of Korean scholarship, was replaced in 1911 by a new institution, the Kyŏnghak-Won. In 1916 Confucian schooling and textbooks were placed under official scrutiny, and it was required that children be taught "national morality", as loyal subjects of the Emperor. Overall, the Japanese authorities experienced few problems with Korean Confucianism, perhaps because of their conciliatory stance and the fact that Korean Confucianism under the Yi Dynasty was unaccustomed to finding itself in an anti-Government position.

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64. Wi Jo Kang, in Ibid, p 70.
The private, Christian school system was on the contrary a major headache for the Japanese, who, regarding it with intense suspicion, "looked forward to its rapid elimination and were not inclined to make it easier for these schools to adjust to the new conditions ... Many elementary schools were forced to close down and all schools felt that their existence was precarious." (65) Terauchi suppressed private schools, burnt their textbooks, and most spectacularly, fabricated the 1911 Conspiracy Case which involved several hundred Christian leaders, including foreign teachers and missionaries. (66) Dangerous thoughts "were frequently charged against Christians, and as Dr Underwood pointed out, "no-one knew just what a legally-defined 'dangerous thought' looked like, since at various times texts such as 'Love your enemies', the hymn 'Onward Christian Soldiers' and talks on the evils of tobacco (a government monopoly) had been put in this class by the overzealous police of the day." (67) This policy of interference with and obstruction of Christian education was extremely important in rallying the fast-growing, influential and autonomous Korean Churches against Japan from 1919.

Quite apart from this severe opposition to private schooling, the reduction of the former Ministry of Education to a bureau under the Department of Internal Affairs in 1910 came as a shock to Koreans who attached far greater importance to learning than to military skills and strength. (68) It was therefore all the more galling that the Educational Ordinance of August 1911 provided in Article I for separate education for Koreans and Japanese on the basis of Korean

65. Underwood, H.H., Modern Education in Korea, p 162.
backwardness. Article III further implied Korean inferiority:

"Education in Korea shall be adapted to the need of the times and the condition of the people," while the statement in Article II that the "essential principle of education in Chosen shall be the making of loyal and good subjects...", could only produce profound misgivings among patriotic Koreans.\(^{69}\) Whilst six years elementary education was provided for Japanese children, only three, at most four years were allotted to Koreans.\(^{70}\) Further, only 10 yen per child were set aside for Koreans, compared with a sum of 52 yen for Japanese children, which meant that 40% of the education budget was spent on 3% of the population in Korea.\(^{71}\)

The financial deprivation of Korean schools and the lack of provision for higher education of Koreans was interpreted as a deliberate policy to exclude Koreans from real education. Hugh Cynn (Shin Hùng-u) noted that whereas in 1919 one fifth of the national budget was reserved for the police, only 3.09% was allotted to total educational needs - and of that, 40% went to the Japanese.\(^{72}\) "They must be made into loyal Japanese subjects - an inferior brand of Japanese. They should be given some technical training so that they may serve intelligently as hewers of wood and drawers of water, but anything beyond that is not desirable, but in fact, dangerous," complained Henry Chung, who also noted the absurdity of Japanese primary school teachers buckling on swords in class.\(^{73}\)

A further cause of bitterness was the humiliation of Korean history in an extreme application of Plato's "noble lie". According to Dr Schofield, a missionary physician in Seoul, Korean history books

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70. Ibid, p 193.
72. Cynn, H.H., The Rebirth of Korea, p 100.
73. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 125 and p 136.
and period literature were confiscated and destroyed, while Korean
history as such was omitted from school curricula. (74) Japan was
represented as the "Mother-Country" by claiming that Korea's history
was 2,000, rather than 4,000 years old. An Oriental scholar,
Dr William Griffis, concluded in 1919 that Japanese histories of
Korea were a collection of "nursery tales". (75) In retaliation,
Koreans abroad produced their own historicistic "noble lies", and
Korea's antiquity and achievements were extolled in manifestos and
declarations from 1919 on. (76)

Following the March First Movement, the Government-General
recognised the need for a thorough review of its education policy in
Korea. Remarkling upon the "rapid progress of the times and the
remarkable advance made in the conditions of the people", Governor-
General Saitō and the new Director-General Mizuno Rentarō produced
some educational reforms by 1922. (77) "To grasp the essence of
Korean education ... according to the Korean people's desires", (78)
a Provisional Commission of Investigation was established, an
Imperial University in Seoul (Keijō Imperial University) was
envisaged, and an ambitious school building programme embarked
upon. Dr Mizuno announced that Korean education would be made
identical to that in Japan proper, "to make it fit the times". (79)

74. Ibid, p 126.
75. Ibid, p 137.
76. Vide especially Pak Ŭn-shik, 韓國獨立運動之血史
(The Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement), Vol. 1,
Seoul, 瑞文文庫 , 1975, (1st published c. 1920);
also, Appendix II
78. Saitō, quoted by Kim, Eugene C., "Education in Korea under the
Japanese Colonial Rule", in Nahm (ed.), Korea, p. 139.
The period 1919 to 1927 saw a conciliatory approach, especially to private education, and a mushrooming of public schools with a liberalised curriculum, and greater access for Koreans to secondary education. Between 1920 and 1925 alone, Saitō had built four times as many government schools as had been erected from 1905 to 1919, while public primary and higher schools more than doubled in this period. Private school growth exceeded that of public schools, especially in higher education, and attracted an enrolment three times larger than the public higher schools.

Despite this thaw, much of the more important reform remained on paper. The education system remained unequal, and separate from that of the Japanese. Although in 1925 Japanese school-age children numbered one fiftieth of Korean school-age children, there were 10,180 Japanese middle-school students compared with 6,309 Korean middle-school students. By ratio, seventy-five Japanese children were receiving education above primary level for every one Korean child. Moreover, the taxation set aside for public school education showed that for every 100 yen paid in by Koreans, one child was education, as against thirteen Japanese children for the same amount paid in by the Japanese. Entry to Keijō Imperial University for Koreans was restricted to one third of the total enrolment, and Korean lecturers were excluded except for instruction

80. Ibid, p 212.
82. Dong, Colonial Policy, pp 401-409.
in Chinese and Korean literature and occasionally mathematics.\(^{(84)}\)

After 1927, as emphasis was restored to "moral training" and obeisance at Shinto shrines and salutes to the Emperor were made obligatory in schools,\(^{(85)}\) the conciliatory policy rapidly disappeared.

Though in an administrative sense education in Korea was enlarged, it is instructive to note that it failed in its major objective; few Koreans mastered Japanese, let alone imbibed the Japanese social, cultural and political outlook. Even by 1936, after two generations of instruction, fewer than 5% of Koreans were fluent in Japanese.\(^{(86)}\) Yet the most fervently nationalistic emerged from public schools, as discrimination and lack of opportunities, together with the conviction that Japanese instruction was designed more for Japanese totalitarian rule than for Korean enlightenment, turned many students to anti-Japanese agitation. Designed to facilitate Korean assimilation, the Government-General's education policy in practice only generated the deepest antipathy to that very objective.

4. Law

In the application of civil law to Korea, attention was paid to existing legal custom and family and social structures, and as a result, its operation gave rise to little, if any, ill-feeling. The case was quite the opposite with regard to criminal law. Unlike the earlier Ch'ing legal system, Korean criminal law was neither refined nor merciful, and it had been unwise to press charges against a social

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84. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 410.
85. Infra, Chapter 6, Vide Dong, Wonmo, in Nahm (ed.), Korea, p 159.
86. Dong Wonmo, in Nahm (ed.), Korea, p 159.
superior. Thus, although the criminal law implemented by Japan for Koreans was little more merciful, it was not initially the nature of the system so much as the discrimination involved that caused discontent. For the Japanese, one criminal code applied, for the Koreans another, and the comparative harshness of the latter confirmed in the minds of Koreans conscious of legal systems abroad, their belief that Japan was impeding Korea's social advancement.

The judiciary was not independent of the government. The Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judges and Prosecutors of the Courts of Appeal were appointed and dismissed by the Governor-General with automatic Imperial sanction; others in the Courts of Appeal were appointed without sanction.\(^{87}\) There was no jury system for Koreans as there was for Japanese, and since all legal proceedings were conducted in Japanese and an accused was guilty unless proved otherwise, it was naturally difficult for a Korean to obtain an impartial judgment.\(^{88}\) This disadvantage was accentuated by the fact that no Korean was ever appointed to the Supreme Court or any local or district High Court. Between 1910 and 1913 moreover, 62% of Korean judges were dismissed, the remainder being given lower ranking than Japanese judges.\(^{89}\)

Under Government-General law as applied to Koreans, there was no habeas corpus, no right of counsel, search warrants were not required, torture was widespread, and until 1920, when missionary pressure hastened its abolition, flogging was administered as punishment.\(^{90}\) In 1919, seventy-six cases of gangrene caused by

\(^{87}\) Chung, Colonial Administration, pp 138 and 140.

\(^{88}\) Ibid, p 139.

\(^{89}\) Dong, Colonial Policy, p 223.

\(^{90}\) Ibid, p 146.
flogging during "preliminary examinations" were reported in Severance Hospital, Seoul.\(^{(91)}\) The status of evidence was particularly uncertain, for it "belongs to the authority exclusively of the judges concerned to decide whether in the trials of a criminal case the examination of a given evidence is necessary or not. This authority of the judge is not to be circumscribed at all by the nature, kind or degree of importance of the particular evidence."\(^{(92)}\) The percentage of convictions per case was also extremely high, averaging 96.8\% per year between 1910 and 1923.\(^{(93)}\) In the Annual Report for 1916-1917 it is recorded that, out of 82,121 charged, "30 proved their innocence".\(^{(94)}\)

Press laws were predictably stringent. After 1910 publishers were required to present two copies of manuscripts to the authorities prior to publication or distribution. It was not until January 1920, that the Police Affairs Bureau permitted the publication, along with two pro-Japanese newspapers, of a nationalist Korean newspaper, the "Dong-A Ilbo" (Far Eastern Daily). By March 1924, there were three legal nationalist newspapers. Yet, from 1921 to 1922, police seized thirty-one issues of the "Dong-A Ilbo", and suppressed some thirty-seven issues in the first half of 1924.\(^{(95)}\) In the 1930's, Korean newspapers virtually ceased to exist, as 718 issues were banned in 1935 alone.\(^{(96)}\)

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93. Ireland, *The New Korea*, p 149. Ireland takes a very sanguine view of these figures, attributing them to Japanese expertise in arresting and exposing only the guilty!
96. Ibid, p 335.
The main arms of the law were, of course, the military and civil police forces, the latter subordinate to the former until 1919. Besides these there were "Judiciary Police Officers", who could try, sentence and administer punishment summarily for: (a) offences punishable by minor fines and up to twenty-nine days' detention; (b) gambling; and (c) violation of administrative laws punishable by fines of up to 100 yen and up to three months' detention. (97) To the Korean, the police were everywhere, and indeed, the pervasiveness of the police structure best reflects the intensity of Japan's direction and control of Korea. Marius Jansen rightly observes that, "Korea was one of the most policed parts of the world, with one civilian policeman for each 1,150 Koreans; if military police are added, the figure becomes a startling 400 persons per policeman." (98)

Conclusion

Japanese rule in Korea was characterised by efficiency on the one hand and a damaging discrimination on the other. Apart from a brief moment of uncertainty in 1919, Japanese rule in Korea was never seriously threatened. But in her contradictory and insensitive imposition of the policy of assimilation, Japan registered complete failure, highlighted by her experience in education. By the 1920's, Japan had established a bureaucracy of seventeen

97. Ibid, p 145.
thousand over a population of nearly twenty million, in contrast to Britain's bureaucracy of less than three thousand in India over a population of nearly three hundred million. Yet by comparison with the experience of the Indians, Korean political participation was practically nil, and in this, her experience under Japan is consonant with the findings of Karl Deutsch, that the greater the intensity of colonisation, the smaller the degree of native political involvement. (99)

As both Saitō and Ugaki discovered to their distress, the interests of the Japanese settlers in Korea and the ambitions of the armed forces (100) were imimical to efforts to implement social, economic and political assimilation. This fatal flaw in Japan's policy in practice is well-expressed in the observation that, "If a distinction is made between assimilation as an official policy and assimilation as an informal social process, it is easy to see that there was a direct conflict between the formal and the informal, and that Japanese society sabotaged Japan's own assimilation policy." (101)

But equally important, it was the determined refusal by a civilised people to lose their nation and culture, which exposed the impracticality of the assimilative policy and rendered Japan's easy acquisition of Korea a decidedly Pyrrhic conquest.

100. Discouraged by the recalcitrance of the Japanese settlers and alarmed at the Kwangtung Army fanaticism under Minami Jiro, Ugaki asked unavailingy to resign, in 1936.
CHAPTER IV.  THE FEBRUARY EIGHTH DECLARATION AND
GENESIS OF THE MARCH FIRST MOVEMENT.

Angered by their loss of nationhood and humiliated by Japan's colonial policies, desperate bands of Koreans gathered in the hills under the leadership of Yang-ban and former soldiers. Resistance became characterised by the guerilla raids of these "Righteous Armies", or Ŭibyŏng, until by 1913, heavy losses had withered their spirit. (1) Acknowledging that other forms of resistance were called for, the Koreans produced out of their hopelessness, an unexpectedly vital and enduring movement. Committed to diplomatic pressure based on the new principle of national self-determination, this movement has been cited as the "first great demonstration of nonviolent resistance in the twentieth century," (2) Gandhi's civil-disobedience movements in South Africa had been neither national nor for independence, and the Korean passive resistance movement preceded Gandhi's campaigns in India by a full two years.

This chapter purports to examine the complex process leading to this March First Movement in 1919. Besides the task of analysing a movement whose initiative was shared between Koreans in America, Shanghai, Tokyo and Seoul, the question of the inspiration of the movement involves treatment of several stimuli, including Woodrow Wilson's idealism, the influences exerted by education

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and Christianity on Korean students in Tokyo, and the growing convictions concerning independence prompted by Japan's colonial policies inside Korea. These considerations will be discussed in their relation to the two major landmarks which commence the Korean independence movement of 1919 to 1937: the February Eighth Declaration and the March First Movement. Hence this chapter focuses initially on the activities of overseas Koreans culminating in the February Eighth Declaration, and then proceeds to the remarkable story of the genesis of the March First Movement which, despite the difficulties encountered in a police state, escaped all detection and completely surprised the Japanese.

The February Eighth Declaration

Eclipsed by the March First Movement one month later, the significance of the actions of Korean students in Tokyo has most certainly been understated and neglected. As an initiatory move towards a Korean front for independence, the Tokyo movement possibly ranks in importance with the May Fourth Movement in China the same year. At least one historian has suggested that the Tokyo students' movement stood in closer relationship to the post-1919 movement than the March First Movement itself. (3) Whatever the merits of this suggestion, it is indicative of the new appreciation of the student movement now appearing, and it is to be hoped that with the present increased availability of pertinent source materials, a more

illuminating study will shortly appear. But it is already abundantly clear that the February Eighth Declaration was not an isolated piece of student folly, but was integrally bound up with the independence struggle as a whole.

By the end of 1918, Tokyo had become a thriving centre of Korean "nationalism". Tokyo increasingly attracted the intelligentsia as the East's centre of learning and Western knowledge, and just as the Kuomintang was cradled in Japan, so too Koreans were drawn. As early as 1904, fifty Yangban students had entered Tokyo Government Middle-School, and by 1915 their numbers had swelled to 481 mainly private students, through lack of opportunity in Korea. These students were the cream of Korean society, and as they congregated at the Korean YMCA in Kanda, Tokyo, national sentiment quickly became evident. Societies were formed including the short-lived Hŭng-hak-Hoe, which was dissolved by police allegedly for its opposition to the annexation. Student groups continued, however, and in October 1912, were amalgamated into one body, the Haku-Hoe or Student Fraternal Association, a frankly democratic body which by 1916 encompassed seven branches: five in Tokyo and one each in Kyoto and Osaka. These became the organs of the independence movement in Japan.

The relative freedom enjoyed by these groups was inconceivable under the colonial regime in Korea. Maximising its freedom of

speech, the Haku-Hoe founded debating clubs in high-schools and universities and held speech contests on the "state of affairs", through which it propagated nationalistic views from at least January 1915. (7) In the years following to 1918, these speech contests became more overtly pro-Korean independence. (8) But at this point there arose various influences which quickly emboldened the Korean students to adopt a more radical stance.

From about 1915 in Japan, there arose amongst students, professors, journalists and some politicians, what has been termed the "mass awakening": a movement for Japan's "reconstruction" along liberal democratic lines. Pre-eminent among the leaders of this awakening was Professor Yoshino Sakuzō of Tokyo University, who championed the cause from 1915 to 1916 in articles published in the Chūō Koron. (9) Korean students were greatly inspired by Professor Yoshino's speeches and the publication of his work, Democracy, in 1916, in which was emphasised a fully representative parliament directed to the welfare of all citizens. (10) When the Shinjin-Kai, a student law society in Tokyo enjoying the patronage of the Professor of Law, Minobe Tatsukichi, openly favoured Korean independence in December 1918, the Korean students' movement was injected with even greater confidence. (11)


8. AJMIA, Oriental Development Company, May 13, 1916; October 27-November 10, 1917; December 27, 1917; May 4, 1918. Speeches by Han Kwang-su, Kim Yong-sop, Yun Ch'ang-sŏk and Chang Tŏk-su.


But if it can be said that the Koreans drew much theoretical backing from the independent scholars who formed the Remei-Kai, it was certainly the Japanese students' emphasis on impassioned energy which was reflected in the fervent speeches of the Haku-Hoe. Even so, the Koreans' speeches were strongly marked by an influence quite lacking in the Japanese student movement: Christianity, As a result of the predominance in Korean education of the Protestant Missions, the proportion of Christians among Korean students was extremely high. Indeed, of the eleven-member committee elected in January 1918 to organise the Declaration, all but one were professing Christians. (12) Alongside appeals to democracy, Korea's independence was closely identified with the fortunes of Christianity in Korea. In a speech in November 1917, one student observed that, "The situation in the Korean peninsula is pitiful, bearing close resemblance to that of the Israelites of Judea. And there is no way to save her except through Christianity." (13) The influence of Christianity on the succeeding movement proved vital and pervasive.

As the students' yearnings for independence began crystallising, President Woodrow Wilson's peace proposals presented the Koreans with the opportunity of publicising their cause internationally. President Wilson's statement that, "No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognise and accept the principle that

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13. AJMIA, Oriental Development Company, Zairyū Chōsenjin Gakusei no Gendō, 5.11.1917, Speech by Kim Yong-sŏp. One recalls that Sun Yat-sen saw Christianity as vital to the success of democratic principles in China.
governments derive all their just powers from the governed", (14) perfectly harmonised with Japanese liberalism and the convictions of the Korean students. Misgivings over the scope of the principle of national self-determination were to some extent allayed when the American President extended its application to "not only the peoples actually engaged [in the World War], but many others also, who suffer under the mastery but cannot act; peoples of many races and in every part of the world." (15) (July 4, 1918)

Towards the close of 1918, the Koreans in Tokyo became aware of the similar hopes and more concrete steps of their fellow-countrymen in America. Reading a tiny article on December 1 in the English-language "Japan Advertiser", a Korean student discovered that Syngman Rhee, Henry Chung and Ahn Ch'ang-ho were already preparing to take Korea's case to the Versailles Peace Conference. (16) As a personal friend of Rhee, President Wilson had in fact agreed to take a petition to Paris on November 30, 1918, in which appeared the following:

"Through the President and the Congress of the United States the Korean people venture to appeal to all the civilised nations of the world to consider their cause, and secure for them the same rights of self-determination and of free political existence which has (sic) been promised to the other small nations of the world by the Government of the United States and the Entente Allies in accordance with the declaration of their war aims." (17)

In December, the Korean National Association under Ahn Ch'ang-ho resolved also to send Henry Chung to Versailles, and Rhee to the League of Small Nations active in New York. (18)

17. Baldwin, March First Movement, p 44.
The potential of the peace negotiations was also recognised by
Korean youth in Shanghai, who in November 1918 revealed their
common cause with the Tokyo and American groups under the
direction of a former Haku-Hoe leader, Chang Tŏk-su. Under
the name of the "New Korea Youth Party" (Shin Tae-Han Chŏngnyŏn
Tang), the Shanghai Koreans published a forceful letter in "Millard's
Review", which ended as follows: "In conclusion we declare that
we are not conquered, but merely cheated and destroyed by Japanese
falsehood. This same falsehood and their imperialism is going to
ruin all Asia, not letting the admirable ideas of President Wilson
of peace and democracy get a foothold in Asia... Now, you
Americans once guaranteed... the independence of Korea. Therefore
we appeal to you to help us secure this same independence." (19)

Greatly encouraged, the Tokyo students immediately established
regular communications with Chang Tŏk-su, who could more freely
observe world developments. (20) At the same time, Lee Kwang-su,
an accomplished author and philosophy student of Waseda University,
travelled extensively to inform Korean leaders in Peking, Chita,
Kirin and Siberia, besides conversing at length in Seoul with
Hyŏn Sang-yun, a leader in the March First Movement. (21)

Thus reinforced in their purpose, on January 6, 1919, the
Haku-Hoe opened an "Overseas' Students' Oratorical Meeting" in the
Tokyo YMCA, during which several students declared before an
audience of about two hundred Koreans that the appropriate moment

21. Lee Kwang-su, 나의 과일 (My Confession), in
李光洙全集, 사보, p 243ff.
to demand independence had arrived, and that concrete action should be taken. The following day a meeting was held for this purpose, but when excited cheering greeted speakers' proposals, the already suspicious police broke up the meeting, forbade further meetings, and took twelve students into custody for questioning. Nevertheless, the Haku-Hoe reassembled on January 8, and succeeded in electing a Provisional Independence Committee of eleven before being dispersed. Unable to meet safely, various students crossed to Korea to solicit funds and inform fellow-students of the plans, while the Shanghai Youth Party pressed on with preparations to send Kim Kyu-shik to the Peace Conference.

At this point, Lee Kwang-su came to the fore to take the final steps to the declaration of independence on February 8. Back in Tokyo in late December 1918, Lee helped organise the Korean Youth Independence Association (Chōsen Seinen Dokuritsu Dan) as the political arm of the Haku-Hoe, and immediately returned to the safety of Peking to draft Korean, Japanese and English versions of a "Declaration of Independence", "Resolution" and "Petition". Returning to Tokyo in mid-January, Lee deposited these drafts with the Committee of eleven, one copy each of which was taken to Korea by Song Kye-paek. On January 30 Lee left for Shanghai, from where he was to inform the Tokyo students of the appropriate date to make the declaration.

22. AJMIA, Oriental Development Company, 6.1.1919.
23. AJMIA, Loc. Cit.
26. AJMIA, Top Secret No. 56, 10.2.1919, Chōsen Ryūgakusei Dokuritsu Ūndō ni Kansuru Ken; AJMIA, Chief of Police Affairs Bureau to Chief of Political Affairs Bureau, No. 78, 6.2.1919, Yōshisatsu Chōsenjin ni Kansuru Ken.
printed by the students in the three languages between February 5 and 7. (27)

On February 7, the Japanese police suspected illegal activities and after investigations, detained a committee member for close questioning. Fearing discovery, the Committee posted the Declaration, Petition and Resolution on the morning of February 8 to each Consulate, Government Minister and Member of Parliament, to the Government-General of Korea, to newspaper and magazine publishers and to several scholars. (28) In the afternoon up to four hundred Korean students gathered at the Kanda YMCA where the Declaration of Independence and Resolution were read out. (29) The police arrived amid wild cheering, and arrested thirty demonstrators before the meeting was dispersed; the eleven committee members were taken to the Tokyo District Court to await trial. (30)

The following days in Tokyo were characterised by scattered demonstrations and arrests, (31) but lacking manpower and other resources, the movement was quickly forestalled. However, mass demonstrations had not been intended, nor were they possible. Rather, the February Eighth Declaration of Independence was designed to prompt similar action in Korea, and strengthen the efforts of Kim Kyu-shik, who had been sent to Versailles via America at the beginning of February. (32) Several students returned to Korea to

27. AJMIA, Chief of Police Affairs Bureau to Chief of Political Affairs Bureau, No. 78, 6.2.1919. Yōshisatsu Chōsenjin ni Kansuru Ken.
30. AJMIA, Loc. Cit.
continue the movement there, while copies of the Declaration were sent from Shanghai to Woodrow Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd-George in Paris. On February 10, the American-owned "China Press" published the full text for public consumption, the very day Japan's leaders themselves received the documents in the mail. (33)

On opening their mail, the addressees were presented first with a personal plea appealing to their love of justice and humanity. The Declaration itself opened thus: "As representatives of the twenty million Korean people, the Korean Youth Independence Association declares before those nations of the world which have secured victory for freedom and justice, the realisation of independence." (34)

There followed eleven paragraphs explaining that Korea's independence was deserved and vital for Asian welfare, concluding with the avowal that, should Japan not grant the opportunity of national self-determination, "we shall act according to our own judgment to save our race and secure our country's independence." The Petition was also lengthy, with similar content, but was directed more specifically to the Japanese Government. The Resolution, too, repeated some main themes, but was far more forceful and uncompromising, concluding with a threat: "Should our demands be refused, we shall declare an eternal, bloody war against Japan, and we Koreans will bear no responsibility for any calamities such as may arise from it." (For a fuller account of the Declaration and Resolution, see Appendix 2.)

33. Kim Sŏng-shik, Student Movements, p 50.
34. AJMIA, Tōkyō Gakusei Dokuritsu Undō no Gendō, 10. 2. 1919.

Korean version can be found in (Anti-Japanese Nationalist Declarations), Seoul, 一又文庫 Compiled 1972. No English version extant.
Apart from meting out prison sentences, the Japanese authorities made little response. But liberal professors were sympathetic, and in universities the Korean cause gained increasing support until by July 1919, Professor Yoshino was able to claim confidently that nine-tenths of the student population were in favour of Korea’s independence. (35) In Versailles, Kim Kyu-shik campaigned energetically despite formidable obstacles and Japanese opposition. And in Korea, news of the Declaration was received with gratitude. However the Korean Youth Independence Association in Tokyo lost its vitality through the repeated arrest of its leaders: the new leader, Yi Tal, was arrested on February 12, and a rally held later in the month ended in a further sixteen arrests of prominent students. (36) Nevertheless, the first move had been made, and sufficient example was given to afford a successor.

Genesis of the March First Movement.

The organisation of the March First Movement was a remarkable feat. Not only did it involve close co-operation between two competing religions, Christianity and Ch’ŏndogyo, but it was also pursued under a military despotism meticulous in its security precautions. That thirty-three leaders from all over Korea could evade surveillance for up to three months and more whilst plotting a nationwide demonstration, was so beyond the belief of the Japanese authorities that at first they were convinced it was the work of an outside agency, or more particularly, of the foreign Missions. Yet it was quickly confirmed.

that, with the exception of one man, the four hundred missionaries were as unaware of the planning as the police. It was not until the trial of the thirty-three signatories to the Declaration of Independence held in August the same year, that the story of the organisation began to emerge.

According to the writings of the nationalist leader, Pak Ŭn-shik, of 1920, an Independence Headquarters was established in Seoul in October 1918 by Hyŏn Sang-yun, Ch'oe Rin, Ch'oe Nam-san and Song Chin-u. But of this, no collaborating evidence is found in the testimonies of the above men, who indeed place their initial involvement from December 1918 to January 1919.

What is clear, is that a widespread commitment to the cause of Korean independence had been gathering force since before the Annexation. A vital element was the revival of the Independence Club by its former members in 1904 under a former official and Christian leader, Yun Chi-ho. Along with Syngman Rhee, vice-president Yi Sang-jae, a Confucian scholar of note recently converted to Christianity who later became known as the Tolstoy of Korea, gave vitality to the movement and became very important in terms of Korean morale. During the Protectorate, the Independence Club fostered a "democratic movement", which grew rapidly with newspapers, magazines and the three thousand private schools established by 1910. Although dissolved after 1910, the

37. Pak Ŭn-shik, Independence History, p 141.


40. Han, Woo-keun, The History of Korea, p 457. The bulk of these schools were elementary level, but since education was not compulsory and far from universal, students at primary and "middle" schools were frequently in their youth or adulthood.
Independence Club had sown its seed, and according to a nationalist spokesman, the First World War "hastened the democratic awakening" in Korea.\(^{(41)}\)

The leadership of the revived Independence Club and the post-annexation democratic movement was predominantly Christian, and that Protestant. The chief strength of the Protestants derived from the three Nevius Principles introduced by an early missionary of that name, viz: self-support, self-government and self-propogation,\(^{(42)}\) which enabled the Koreans to build up a virile, indigenous organisation by 1919. Christianity also possessed another strength, inherent in its nature and that was its attractiveness to the oppressed and humiliated, and many joined its ranks as Korean Christians claimed Scriptural support for their aspirations by identifying with Israel under Egypt and Babylon.\(^{(43)}\) Yet in keeping with the principle of separation from the state, no Church body at any time officially supported individual political activities.\(^{(44)}\)

Another strong legacy from pre-annexation years, that of Tong-Hak, had also consolidated its position by 1919 under the leadership of Son Pyŏng-hi, a canny politician who in 1906 had purged Tong-Hak of its recent pro-Japanese elements.\(^{(45)}\) Renamed as Ch'ŏndogyo, or Religion of the Heavenly Way in 1905, the revived

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41. Cynn, H.H., *The Rebirth of Korea*, p 148. This area is clearly one in need of research.


45. Government-General of Korea, *March First Movement Court Records*. (Hereafter referred to as C.R.) Son Pyŏng-hi (i.e. his interrogation).
Korean Provincial Boundaries and Cities
movement founded schools and an anti-Japanese "Manseibo News", claiming a membership of 300,000 by 1910. \(^{46}\) Son Pyŏng-hi directed its political objectives from domestic reform to national independence, so that by 1919 Ch'ŏndogyo was a strong, reformist, patriotic cult. \(^{47}\)

A syncretion of elements of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and Roman Catholicism, with strong appeal among farmers and lower classes, Ch'ŏndogyo was comparable with the Chinese T'ai-p'ing movement, especially as a millenialistic phenomenon. Propounding a programme similar to Japan's "Fūkoku Kyōhei", in the form of "Poguk Anmin" - Protect the Nation and Secure the Well-being of the People \(^{48}\) - Ch'ŏndogyo "contained many of the dynamic qualities essential to a successful nationalist movement dedicated to sweeping domestic reforms or to the restoration of independence ... and gave a needed hope and unity of purpose to a large element of Koreans who had no dynamic religion and whose condition of life had appeared hopeless." \(^{49}\) Divided by 1919 into two arms, the religious and political, the Ch'ŏndogyo movement was well equipped for a major role in the March First Movement.

So it was that from December 1918, three Ch'ŏndogyo colleagues, Ch'oe Ri, Kwon Tong-jin and O Se-ch'ang, considered together the implications of the conclusion of the Great War on Korea's future. Ch'oe and Kwon were convinced that national self-determination applied to Korea \(^{50}\) and though initially sceptical, O Se-ch'ang

\(^{46}\) Han Woo-keun, *The History of Korea*, p 458.
\(^{50}\) C. R. Ch'oe Ri, Kwon Tong-jin
testified that by the end of January he also "ended up in agreement with sending a letter to the United States President with regard to the meeting of the Peace Conference, since as a Korean I opposed the annexation." Such was the limited vision hardly a month before Korea witnessed a euphoric and far-reaching demonstration of her will for independence. That this young shoot should so rapidly grow to fruitful maturity was the result of the co-operation, fortuitous circumstances, and readiness to act and sacrifice which marked the genesis of the March First Movement.

Reports of the Tokyo student movement brought by Song Kye-paek, and rumours of a Christian resistance organisation, prompted the Ch'ŏndogyo trio into action. On January 28 they approached their leader, Son Pyŏng-hi. Aged fifty-eight, the wily Head had been observing world trends and had already decided for his own part that some response was called for. In view of their mutual desire to base their case on the principles of the Peace Conference, the four men agreed from the outset that independence be pursued peacefully. As news of the February Eighth Declaration reached Seoul, Son realised the time for concrete action was ripe, and at a further meeting, approved the trio's new plan of contacting the Christian leaders and requesting the independent author and scholar, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, to draft a Declaration of Independence. Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, who believed that Korean independence was bound to be achieved sooner or later, readily concurred.

52. Baldwin, March First Movement, p 51.
53. C.R., Ch'oe Rin; Son Pyŏng-hi.
54. C.R., Son Pyŏng-hi; Ch'oe Rin.
55. C.R., Ch'oe Nam-sŏn.
Though rumours of a Christian resistance organisation as such were misleading, the Protestants had not been inactive. Sōnu Hyŏk, a former victim of Terauchi's Conspiracy Case of 1911, had visited the Christian strongholds of Sŏnch'ŏn and Chŏngju in North P'yŏngang Province from Shanghai, to sound out the possibility of an independence movement in early February, 1919. In P'yŏngyang, Sōnu secured a promise from a leading Presbyterian minister, Yi Ŭng-hun (alias Yi In-hwan), to support Kim Kyu-shik in Versailles with an independence movement in Korea. So when Yi Ŭng-hun was approached on February 9 by Song Chin-u, a friend of Ch'oe Nam-son and Ch'oe Rin, he willingly consented to join forces with Ch'ŏndogyo.

Co-operation was surprisingly easy and facilitated by the fortunate acquaintance of non-affiliated patriots such as Song Chin-u, Ch'oe Nam-son and Hyŏn Sang-yun, with both Christian and Ch'ŏndogyo leaders. Living in Yi Ŭng-hun's hometown of Chŏngju, Hyŏn Sang-yun also knew Ch'oe Rin, and seeing in the Peace Conference the opportunity to "make amends to an aberation in history", Hyŏn willingly kept both sides informed on each other's progress. Ch'oe Nam-son had known Yi Ŭng-hun for some eight years, and Ch'oe Rin from student days in Japan, and such circumstances as these smoothed the way for the unlikely co-operation of two rival religions.

56. Baldwin, March First Movement, p 37.
57. C.R., Song Chin-u; Yi Ŭng-hun.
58. C.R., Hyŏn Sang-yun; Ch'oe Rin; Song Chin-u.
59. C.R., Ch'oe Nam-son.
Yi Sŏng-hun soon proved crucial to the Christian part in the conspiracy. In Seoul, he recruited another Christian leader, Ham T'ae-yŏng, a former judge whom the Government-General had suspended. (60) Returning north to Sŏnch'ŏn, Yi persuaded a further four Presbyterian ministers to join the movement. Hospitalised in P'yŏngyang through illness, Yi was able to converse with and gain promises from two more colleagues: pastor Kil Sŏn-ju, another victim of the fraudulent Conspiracy Case, and a Methodist minister, Shin Hong-shik. (61)

Discharged from hospital, Yi attended a crucial meeting with Ch'oe Rin and Ch'oe Nam-sŏn in Seoul on February 17. At this meeting, the principle of non-violence or passive resistance was agreed upon, and at Yi's insistence, it was decided to post letters to the Imperial Government and Parliament, the Government-General and the principal delegates at Versailles, as well as a petition to President Woodrow Wilson. (62) At this point, the fragile collusion of Ch'ŏndogyo and Christianity was seriously threatened by misgivings among some of the Christians in Seoul concerning the idea of a Declaration of Independence. A Methodist, Yi Kap-sŏng, in particular considered it harmful to the cause to present the Japanese with a fait accompli, and suggested a petition might be more appropriate. (63) Yi Sŏng-hun and Ham t'ae-yŏng had to spend an anxious five days in consultation with these leaders, but it was finally agreed upon to present both a Declaration and a Petition to the Japanese leaders. (64)

60. C.R., Yi Sŏng-hun; Ham T'ae-yŏng.
61. C.R., Yi Sŏng-hun; Yu Yŏ-tae; Kil Sŏn-ju.
62. C.R., Ch'oe Nam-sŏn; Yi Sŏng-hun; Ch'oe Rin.
63. C.R., Yi Sŏng-hun; Ch'oe Rin; Yi Kap-sŏng.
64. C.R., Yi Kap-sŏng; Yi Sŏng-hun.
But for the fortuitous death of the Korean Emperor Kojong a month earlier, the March First Movement might not have even nearly approached the proportions it enjoyed. Convincing rumours abounded that the Emperor had been poisoned for refusing to sign a document for presentation at Versailles testifying to the satisfaction of Korea with Japanese rule. (65) The esteem of the otherwise mediocre Emperor immediately rose in the Koreans' eyes. Thus when the Government-General fixed the burial ceremonies for March 1 to 3 and granted a free travel pass to all who wished to attend the mourning and burial rites at the Pagoda Palace grounds in Seoul, the questions of date, location and the organisation of a mass-meeting were solved at one stroke. This was, in fact, the first occasion since the Protectorate that Koreans were permitted to gather in large numbers, and it is highly significant therefore that the Korean people so spontaneously seized their first opportunity to voice their desires.

With the time and place for the reading of the Declaration fixed at 2 p.m. on March 1 at Pagoda Palace, (66) arrangements were made meanwhile for simultaneous demonstrations throughout Korea. In P'yŏngyang, Christians promised to hold an independence rally on March 1 after a memorial service for the late Emperor, while one of their company, Ahn Se-hwan, was entrusted with the task of taking copies of the Petition to Japan on February 27. (67) In Shinŭiju in the north-west, the movement was entrusted to a Presbyterian minister, Yu Yŏ-tae, a Methodist school-teacher was put in

65. Pak Ŭn-shik, Independence History, Vol. 1, p 142ff. Although there were no prior symptoms, the Japanese declared Kojong died of apoplexy, but refused a post-mortem.
charge of Kyŏnggi and South Ch'ungch'ŏng provinces, while another
Methodist, Kim Chi-hwan arranged for a simultaneous demonstration
in Kaesŏng, Hwanghae Province. (68) Partly because of the highly
centralised nature of their leadership and partly because the draft-
ing and printing of the Declaration and Petition drew on their time
and resources, the Ch'ŏndogyo participants made little effort to
broaden the movement. (69) According to Ch'oe Nam-sŏn,
Ch'ŏndogyo valued Christian co-operation for its organisational
facility, whereas Ch'ŏndogyo was able to finance the operation. (70)

By February 25, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn had completed the Declaration
of Independence, set the type, and handed it to Ch'oe Rin, who had
21,000 copies printed by February 28 at Ch'ŏndogyo's private_Posong
Printing Company. (71) The bulk of the Declarations were taken in
person to different centres mainly by Christian ministers, (72) and in
some areas school children and women were entrusted with their
distribution. (73)

At the eleventh hour, the Buddhists entered the movement.
Han Yong-un, a monk from the Shinhŭng-sa Monastery, whom
Ch'oe Rin had known in Tokyo, had evidently suggested to Ch'oe at
the end of January that Ch'ŏndogyo lead an independence movement
in Korea. Ch'oe Rin had informed Han on the emerging plans on
February 12, but was unable to contact him again until February 26. (74)
Hence when the fifteen Christian and fifteen Ch'ŏndogyo signatories
came together on February 27, they discovered to their encouragement

68. C.R., Yu Yŏ-tae; Kim Se-hwan; O Hwa-yong; Kim Chi-hwan.
69. C.R., Ch'oe Rin; Ch'oe Nam-sŏn.
70. C.R., Ch'oe Nam-sŏn. Ch'oe Rin gave 5,000 yen to Yi Sŏng-hun
    for travel expenses and support of the families of the signatories:
    C.R., Pak Hi-do; Son Pyŏng-hi.
71. C.R., O Se-Ch'ang; Yi Chong-il; Kim Hong-kyu.
72. C.R., Yi Chong-il; Yu Yŏ-tae.
74. C.R., Han Yong-un.
that two Buddhist monks had agreed to represent their religion and add their seals to the documents. (75) With one non-affiliated signatory, there numbered altogether thirty-three seals placed that historic evening on the Korean Declaration of Independence.

On February 27 also, arrangements for world-wide publicity were acted upon. One, Im Kyu boarded a train in the evening, bound for Tokyo where on March 1 he would print further copies and mail them to ninety Diet Members, twenty scholars, and newspaper companies in Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto. (76) Another, Hyŏn Chun, was commissioned to despatch copies of the Declaration and Petition to Woodrow Wilson and Versailles via Antung and Shanghai. Yi Kap-sŏng, also a signatory, was charged with the task of presenting the Declaration to the Government-General. (77)

Incredibly, the unity of the movement was almost wrecked the following evening, February 28, when all but one of the signatories gathered at the home of Son Pyŏng-hi. Alarmed at a comment from Yi Kap-sŏng that the students would be out in force on the morrow to aid the demonstration, Son predicted violence and bloodshed and urged the cancellation of the meeting! The situation was only saved by the agreement to gather in the Myŏngwŏl-Gwan Restaurant opposite the Pagoda Palace instead of in the Palace grounds themselves. (78)

But after the meeting dispersed, Son wrote to his second-in-command and Head of the religious arm, Pak In-ho, explaining that although he himself would fulfil his duty to Korea, Pak was not to become involved

75. C.R., Lee P'il-ju; Pak Tong-wan.
76. C.R., Im Kyu; Ch'oe Rin.
77. C.R., Ch'oe Rin.
78. C.R., Pak Hi-do; Yi Kap-sŏng; Kwon Tong-jin.
and, further, must restrain Ch'ŏndogyo lay-people from involve-
ment. (79) Should these orders have been effectual, the responsibility
for the March First Movement would have rested unreasonably on
Christian shoulders, and opportunity would have been afforded the
Japanese to proceed with a second, and more authentic, Christian
Conspiracy Case.

This last-minute crisis vividly reflects Son Pyŏng-hi's surprising
unawareness of the details of the planning, the depth of the organisa-
tion and the virtual inevitability of student participation. Considering
the February Eighth Movement, the correspondence between the
leaders in Korea and students abroad, such as Lee Kwang-su,
Song Kye-paek and Sŏnu Hyŏk, and the fact that such prominent
figures as Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, Ch'oe Rin and Yi Sŏng-hun were them-
selves former Tokyo students, the exclusion of students from arrange-
ments was highly improbable. Moreover, from the very beginning it
had been the new class of western-educated students who had most
forcefully expressed their patriotism and preached independence, in
the manner of their counterparts in China. Finally, one of the
characteristics of Christianity in Korea was its educational endeavour,
and since thirty-one of the fifty-five higher and tertiary professional
schools established by 1919 were Christian, it was only natural that
such schools should become focal points in Seoul and P'yŏngyang
during the demonstrations. (80)

Pak Hi-do, the Secretary of the Seoul Central YMCA, had been
discussing the question of independence with students since at least

79. Baldwin, March First Movement, pp 70-71. This was the first
inking Pak In-ho had of the plans! - C.R. Pak In-ho.
80. Vide Kim Sŏng-shik, Student Movements, p 90ff.
January 6. (81) As employees of Seoul Severance Medical College, Yi Kap-sŏng and Ham T'ae-yŏng had also shared their hopes with students, while an English-Canadian doctor at this same college had agreed to act as liaison with the outside world on the students' behalf from February 5. Translating news on developments at Versailles and elsewhere into Korean, this missionary, Dr Schofield, also took the only photographs recorded of the March First Movement, and to many, later became known as the "Thirty-Fourth Participant." (82)

Indeed, it appears that students in Seoul had been planning an independence movement of their own since the beginning of February. Led by Kang Ki-tŏk, Han Wi-kŏn and Kim Wan-pyŏk, Severance College students were ready to arrange the writing and printing of a Declaration of Independence by February 20, when they called a meeting with other students for this end. (83) Cognisant of these developments, Pak Hi-do vainly attempted to persuade the students to join the Christian/Ch'ŏndogyo organisation. But since the average age of the "Thirty-Three" was forty-eight years, the students declined, scornfully dubbing it the "Gentlemen's Party". Pak finally succeeded in convincing them they should at least postpone their demonstration until after March 1, on condition that only middle-school students be encouraged to participate on March 1; Kang and his band would avoid arrest in order to direct their movement at a later date. (84)

81. Ibid, pp 100 and 103.
82. Mortimore, Doretha E., in Kim and Mortimore (eds), Korea's Response, pp 246-248.
83. C.R., Kang Ki-tŏk.
Yi Kap-sŏng, however, prevailed upon Kim Wan-p'yŏk to mobilise students for the distribution around Seoul on March 1 of 1,500 copies of the Declaration. (85)

Removed from the actual practical planning of the movement, which he entrusted to Ch'oe Rin, Kwon Tong-jin and O Se-ch'ang, the Ch'ŏndogyo Head was evidently ignorant of these developments. Nearly sixty years old, Son may naturally have viewed student activity with reservations. Yet on February 9 he had himself, patronisingly it is true, paid tribute to the Tokyo students' initiative: "With children demonstrating thus, how can we sit by idle and watch?" (86) Though their organisation was by no means as thorough and broadly based as that of the "Gentlemen's Party", student participation on and after March First gave the movement a depth and vitality it would otherwise most certainly have lacked. The impact of this movement began to be felt, with euphoria by Koreans and shock by Japanese, at 2 p.m., March 1.

86. Kim Sŏng-shik, Student Movements, p 100. Many of these "children" were married!
CHAPTER V.  THE MARCH FIRST MOVEMENT -
PANDORA'S BOX OPENED.

Six and one half months after the commencement of the March First Movement, the new Governor-General, Baron Saitō, wrote to Foreign Minister Uchida on September 16, that, "after a personal tour of inspection to various parts of Korea, I have come to the conclusion that the public feelings of Koreans in general are much worse than expected and that in spite of the reforms in government organisation there is no sign of relaxation of their feelings."

Saitō indeed had good reason for this evaluation, for as soon as his feet had touched Korean soil at the end of August, city merchants in Korea's main centres had closed their premises whilst school students boycotted classes. Dismal as such a reception by his subjects was, there followed on September 2 an incident incomparably more serious and disconcerting. Entering Seoul city through its southern gates with full escort and ceremony, Baron Saitō, the intended herald and purveyor of the new conciliatory colonial policy, narrowly escaped assassination in a bomb-throwing attempt which injured at least thirty people.

Yet the Korean people, too, had good reason for their antipathy towards their new ruler. Despite the initial non-violence and continued restraint of the unarmed Koreans, the Japanese repression

1. Quoted in Dong, Colonial Policy, p 255.
2. Government-General Police Affairs Bureau (GGPAB), No. 25124, 29.8.1919, Saikin no Minjō to Kyōsei Senjin Shōnin no Heiten; GGPAB, No. 25466, 5.9.1919, Kyōsei Shinai Jūnaru Senshōnin no Shisō.
3. GGPAB, No. 25436, 2.9.1919, Sōtoku ni taisuru Futei Senjin no Kyōkō.
was extreme and indiscriminate, many troops and policemen committing atrocities without provocation. Awakening on the morn of April 6 to find their homes alight, townspeople in Suwon, thirty miles south of Seoul, were shot dead by troops as they emerged in panic from the houses. On April 15 in Che Am Ri, a village seventeen miles further south, men were herded S-S-style into a church and fired upon through the windows, while the building was set on fire; women running to the Church to seek their husbands were simply bayonetted. (4) Official Japanese sources cite 26,713 Koreans arrested by the end of May, (5) while Korean documents record over 7,000 Koreans killed for the same period. (6)

As one delves into this Movement, in which up to two million Koreans took part and in which no region of Korea remained untouched, it becomes increasingly clear that the March First Movement merits far more in the history of nationalisms than its present relative obscurity. In a letter from prison to Indira in 1932, Nehru referred to this Movement as the most significant independence movement of many years. (7) One also comes across reference to a statement by Sun Yat-sen in late 1920 to the effect that Korean

4. Cynn, H.H., The Rebirth of Korea, p 66; Baldwin, F.P., "Missionaries and the March First Movement; Can Moral Men by Neutral?" in Nahm (ed.), Korea, p 202; McKenzie, F.A., Korea’s Fight for Freedom, p 265ff; Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, pp 232 and 353-354. In all, fifteen villages around Suwon were destroyed. The authoress, Pearl Buck, based some scenes in her book, The Living Reed, on these events.


7. Ch’ŏn Kwan-u, 民衆運動2·2·3·1運動, in Yun Pyŏng-sŏk, Shin Yong-ha, Ahn Pyŏng-chik (eds), 韓國近代史論, II. 日帝樫民地時代の民族運動. (Essays in Modern Korean History II, Nationalist Movements of the Japanese Colonial Period), Seoul, 知識產業社 1977, p 114. (Hereafter: Yun, Shin and Ahn (eds), Nationalist Movements)
independence was considered essential to China's own struggle. More exciting still, the example Chinese students of the May Fourth Movement found in the Korean Movement is discovered in the exhortations given during their T'ien An Men (天文門) Conference of May 3, where it was praised as ushering in "a new epoch in the history of the world's revolutions."  

But this movement, which stands first among twentieth-century demonstrations of the power and influence of unarmed, massmovements, had a relatively small beginning. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to trace the developments from the formal Declaration of Independence of the "Thirty-Three", through the popular demonstrations, students' activities, merchants' boycotts and workers' strikes, to the full-scale nation-wide civil-disobedience movement which arose. For this purpose, it is convenient to follow a basically chronological approach where practical, and since a fuller analysis is reserved to a later chapter, any analysis at this stage will be subordinate and incidental to the narrative.

The Declaration of Independence

By late February, 1919, there had arisen rumours concerning the possibility of an independence movement designed to influence the Peace negotiations, rumours which the American Consul in Seoul, Bergholz, had taken seriously enough to have warned the Mission Boards to abstain from involvement in the event such an uprising occurred. However the Japanese police disregarded these rumours,

9. Ch'ŏn Kwan-u, in Yun, Shin and Ahn (eds), Nationalist Movements, p 114.
scornfully believing such action was beyond the organisational capacities of the Koreans. Yet at about three o'clock on the morning of March 1, puzzled police stumbled upon several copies of the Declaration.\(^{10}\) At dawn, Korean government servants found manifestos scattered before their doors, while nationalistic bills were discovered posted in strategic places at Tong Taemun (East Gate), Nam Taemun (South Gate), and outside Sungmyŏng Girls' School.\(^{11}\) Evidently the Japanese authorities still saw little to excite concern in this, the actual prelude to the momentous events of the afternoon.

Indeed, the historic gathering of the "Thirty-Three" at 2.00 p.m. in the Myŏngwol-gwan Restaurant was itself far from sensational. Seated perplexed among the column gathering was one Japanese official who had been sent to represent the several Japanese dignitaries invited that morning to meet with a gathering of Koreans at the restaurant. The calm and order of the proceedings was only once interrupted when the student leader, Kang Ki-tŏk, burst into the dining room and demanded that the Declaration be read at Pagoda Palace as planned, before rushing out furious with what he considered utter pusillanimity.\(^{12}\) Shortly after this incident, the Declaration of Independence was read out, following which the Buddhist representative, Han Yong-un, delivered an impassioned speech exhorting the company to make an all-out effort for Korea's independence. As he concluded his speech with a toast, the "Thirty-Three" rose and

10. Baldwin, March First Movement, p 78.
11. GGPAB, No. 5288, 1.3.1919, Dokuritsu Sengensho Hakken no Ken.
shouted, "Mansei, Hanguk Tongnip Mansei! - long live Korean independence!" They then telephoned the Central Police Station, informed the startled officers of their action, and quietly awaited arrest. (13)

But if such was the quiet within the restaurant, the crowd of about five thousand gathered outside at Pagoda Palace to pay respects to their deceased Emperor was, by contrast, in ferment. Probably persuaded by Han Wi-kŏn, Kang Ki-tŏk had relented, and at risk of arrest college students joined the hundreds of middle-school students in distributing three to four thousand copies of a paper titled the "Independence Newspaper" (Tongnip Shinmun), which bore the tale of the Declaration and even of the arrest of the "Thirty-Three". (14) At this point, the decisive step was taken by Chŏng Chae-yŏng, a school teacher who, like many other nationalist leaders, was a graduate of Kyŏngshin (Christian) School in Seoul. (15) Seizing his opportunity, Chŏng snatched up a Declaration from a student, moved to a raised area and proceeded to read out Korea's Declaration of Independence. Nearby, a large Korean flag was erected, at which the crowd broke into cheers and cries of "Mansei! Long live Korean independence!" (16) The Movement had taken off.

The crowd quickly organised itself and poured out of Pagoda Palace towards the Tae Han Gate at Tŏksu Palace. After a short speech, the excited, chanting crowd divided and marched off in at

13. C.R., Ch'oe Rin, Han Yong-un.
14. GGPAB, No. 5410, 1.3.1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken No. 2.
least three directions: towards the French and United States Consulates, towards the Army Infantry Headquarters, and towards the Government-General buildings in the Japanese quarter of Honmachi.\(^{(17)}\)

As the largest group, of approximately three thousand, marched down the main street towards Honmachi, it coincidentally met with the "Thirty-Three" as they were being escorted to the police station. Wild cheering greeted the heroes as the dismayed police were compelled to edge their cabs through the crowd.\(^{(18)}\) The marchers quickly swelled in numbers, so that when they reached Honmachi, police and military personnel were hard pressed to prevent the albeit unarmed and non-violent throng from entering the Government-General Headquarters.\(^{(19)}\)

The streets of Seoul soon became filled with jubilant Koreans and were not cleared until 7 p.m. after three companies of infantry and one troop of cavalry had been called upon and a curfew imposed.\(^{(20)}\) Even so, a gathering of about one thousand was discovered at a train terminus at 8 p.m., and similar groups had to be dispersed up to 2 o'clock the following morning.\(^{(21)}\) Historic watchfires were lit on Namsan Mountain overlooking the city, and at midnight in its sanctuary on the main street, the Liberty Bell broke its long silence to conclude an extraordinary day.\(^{(22)}\)

A most surprising aspect of March First in Seoul was the almost complete absence of violence on either side, the only incidents being committed by frightened Japanese residents in Honmachi. The temptation to violence was surely considerable for the Koreans,

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17. GGAHQ, No. 102, 3.3.1919; GGPAB, No. 5410, 1.3.1919.
18. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 205; Cynn, H.H., The Rebirth of Korea, Chapter I.
19. GGAHQ, No. 102, 3.3.1919.
20. GGAHQ, Loc. Cit.
21. GGPAB, No. 5439, 2.3.1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken, No. 3.
22. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 209. The Liberty Bell is a relic of the Silla Kingdom (661-935).
since they outnumbered the unsuspecting Japanese by sixty to one; indeed, according to Henry Chung, the suggestion had been made at one time that all Koreans rise up as a body and slaughter every Japanese in Korea.\(^{23}\)

But the peaceful nature of this first day was not accidental. One item of immediate and complete agreement among the Ch'ŏndogyo and Christian parties was that any expression of the desire for independence be made peacefully.\(^{24}\) "In the light of the Korean situation and in response to a world which longs for peace, we thought a peaceful resolution more appropriate," recalled Ch'oe Rin,\(^{25}\) whose sentiments were echoed by the YMCA secretary, Pak Hi-do.\(^{26}\) But apart from this, in a sense pragmatic motive, the non-violent option was chosen in accordance with the signatories' personal convictions. Hence, after the Declaration of Independence (see Appendix I for text), there was added the following:

"Three Items of Agreement.

1. This act of ours today is undertaken at the request of the people on behalf of Justice, Humanity, Life and Honour, in order to make known their spirit of liberty. Let no-one succumb to feelings of enmity towards any other.

2. Let all, to the last person and very end, gladly express the true sentiment of our race.

3. Let all your actions subscribe to the highest discipline and order, so that our attitude and purpose may be seen as fair and just to the very end." \(^{27}\)

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27. GGPAB, No. 5288, 1.3.1919. Dokuritsu Sengensho Hakken no Ken. As the diversions in translation, e.g. in Rhee and Cynn, are wide, the author has made a fairly literal attempt.
After the list of signatories, there were added further instructions specifically for those joining the movement which concluded with the following commands:

"Whatever you do,
Do not insult the Japanese
Do not throw stones
Do not hit with your fists,
For these are the acts of barbarians." (28)

In this manner, the message of non-violence was made explicit to all who heard the Declaration of Independence, and thereby the bloodshed, pillage and destruction which could so easily have accompanied an emotional, mass demonstration of such proportions was avoided. Despite 134 arrests made in addition to the "Thirty-Three", the Japanese reported no acts of violence or resistance among the Koreans. (29)

On March First, simultaneous demonstrations were staged as planned in several places in five provinces: Kyŏnggi (central), Hwanghae (west), North and South P'yŏngan (north-west), and South Hamgyŏng (north-west). (30) In Old Ŭiju on the north China border in North P'yŏngan, the Presbyterian minister Yu Yŏ-tae, held an open-air service at 2.30 p.m. After the service, two hundred copies of the Declaration were distributed among the eight hundred present, Yu read the document aloud, and all rose to cheer and chant "Mansei!"(31) In Kaesŏng, Kyŏnggi, Christians and students

29. GGPAB, No. 5410, 1.3.1919. Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken, No. 2.
30. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
31. C.R., Yu Yŏ-tae; GGPAB, No. 5439, 2.3.1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken No. 3.
held a peaceful demonstration at 2 p.m., while throughout the afternoon and evening, small gatherings appeared in Wonsan, South Hamgyŏng, in Chinnamp'o, South P'yŏngan, and in Hwangju, Hwanghae.

But it was in Sŏnch'ŏn and P'yŏngyang in North and South P'yŏngan that more significant movements commenced. In P'yŏngyang about two thousand Christians, half of whom were students, assembled after a service for a public reading of the Declaration of Independence. Stirring speeches followed the reading whereupon the assembly began to develop the symptoms of riot. Although a company of infantry was mobilised to assist the police, order was not restored until 11 p.m., yet still without violent incident. In Sŏnch'ŏn, however, the rule was broken. From 2 p.m., several hundred students, mainly from Christian Schools, began distributing Declarations, and when a large crowd had gathered, hoisted a Korean flag and descended upon the central police station. A handful of Koreans began stoning the police station, and the platoon of infantry summoned experienced some difficulty in dispersing the mob. As a result of the clash, a number of Koreans were reported injured, being the only casualties of the day.

Despite the essential orderliness of the uprising, the Japanese administration was deeply shocked and uncertain of the actual strength and depth of the movement. Since in the main the demonstrators had been peaceful and offered no resistance to arrest, the Japanese had

32. C.R., Kim Chi-hwan; GGPAB, No. 5410, 1.3.1919.
33. GGAHQ, No. 102, 3.3.1919.
34. GGAHQ, Loc. Cit.; GGPAB, No. 5410, 1.3.1919.
acted with restraint, but as the gatherings were dispersed, a strict

guard and partial martial law was imposed in the main centres of the
provinces.\(^{36}\) However, the Japanese police and armed forces

were relieved of much of their confusion and anxiety by the surprising

failure of the Koreans to press their advantage over the following two
days.

Sunday, March 2 was a quiet day in all the main centres. In
this, the powerful influence of the Christian churches was reflected,
for on Sundays the Christians refrained from political activity. In

Chinnamp'o and Hwangju, Ch'öndogyo adherents organised brief

marches, while in P'yöngyang and surrounding towns and villages,

"official" statements had been forged and displayed to the effect

that "Korea has now achieved independence".\(^{37}\) Otherwise every-

thing appeared normal. Tactically, such inaction was, of course,

disadvantageous, enabling the Japanese to recover their composure

and carry out detailed investigations to check the movement. In

Wonsan alone, fifty leading Koreans were taken into custody that
day.\(^{38}\) The Japanese were able to capitalise further on their

advantage on March 3, since on this day were held the official

funeral ceremonies for the deceased Emperor, out of respect for

whom the Koreans kept their peace. Consequently, when the Koreans

resumed their Movement in earnest on Tuesday, March 4, the authori-

ties were in control and well prepared.

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36. GGAHO, Loc. Cit.
37. GGPAB, No. 5439, 2. 3. 1919.
38. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
It is doubtful, however, that the Japanese expected the intense and prolonged struggle that an unarmed people recommenced on that Tuesday. Without a surviving, charismatic leader, the influence of the "Thirty-Three" could not last, and the violence Son Pyŏng-hi had feared and the others deplored was unleashed; but not, as it turned out, principally from the student involvement, but from among the rank and file outside Seoul. Mourners returning to their hometowns carried back Declarations in their clothing and organised demonstrations, but the peaceful inspiration of the Seoul initiative was lacking. While students boycotted Government Schools, farmers threatened not to plant their crops, and many Korean policemen stripped off their uniforms and joined the marchers; (39) business now was grim.

March 4 was thus a dark day for all concerned, and its unfortunate record became the pattern of events until the middle of May. As the Movement extended to towns and villages in the aforementioned five provinces and spread into South Kyŏngsang and Kangwon provinces, demonstrations which began peacefully concluded in violence and death. In Kaesŏng where thirty-five girls had been arrested after a rally, one thousand assembled before the police station vociferously demanding their release. After sunset the crowd doubled its number and tore down Japanese flags from government premises, stoning the windows. In Anju, South P'yŏngan, two Koreans were killed and five wounded when one thousand men attacked a military police unit to rescue interned offenders. In the same province, thirty Koreans and the military police unit chief were killed when a mob of two hundred bar-and axe-wielding "rescuers" stormed the military police

compound at Sŏngch'ŏn. A further nine Koreans lost their lives and eighteen received severe injuries at Suan, Hwanghae, when a group of Ch'ŏndogyo marchers advanced on a military police squad. As the desire for independence became instinctive, rather than reasoned, peaceful demonstration, arrest, rescue operation and bloodshed, became a not unusual sequence.

The Seoul Students' Demonstration

On March 5, the initiative returned to Seoul, where the students led by the Severance College trio staged their tour de force. As already noted, the students' movement was formally quite unconnected with the efforts of the "gentlemen's party", and had been envisaged since the beginning of February at least. Jealous of the purity of their movement, Kim Wan-pyŏk even denied any significant inspiration was derived from the example of the Tokyo students, claiming that "The idea that the peoples of the world must live their lives for their own sakes had arisen, and since no-one was raising up a movement, we decided to forget our studies and act." 

Reading between the lines of the students' testimonies and the Government-General's records, one gains the impression that the planning of the students' movement was neither so isolated from other influences nor so local as the colleagues, in their zeal to preserve the distinctness and integrity of their own effort, would have us believe. The association of Pak Hi-do, Yi Kap-sŏng,

42. The Government-General was far from attempting to establish a conspiracy of this nature, as will become clear below.
Song Chin-u, and Ch'oe Nam-sŏn with students throughout the entire planning of both movements is incontestable, while Hyŏn Sang-yun and Sŏnu Hyŏk were recent graduates themselves.\(^{43}\) Moreover, some prior contact with Tokyo students is implied in the fact that sixty-three students, including several from Tokyo, gathered on March 5 at the home of a Seoul student involved in this very movement.\(^{44}\) Such was to be expected, since Lee Kwang-su and at least five other students had at different times infiltrated Korea from Tokyo with the express purpose of encouraging students in Seoul and other centres to mobilise for independence.\(^{45}\) It is also very probable that the Seoul students had been in communication with students in P'yŏngyang, for among those arrested on March 5 were several P'yŏngyang students who claimed that they had journeyed to Seoul to "hurry along the Seoul students' movement.\(^{46}\)

Whatever the influences and connections, the student movement began at 9 a.m. on March 5 outside Seoul Railway Station was distinct from and independent of the Declaration of Independence on March 1. The choice of March 5 was certainly strategic. Not only were thousands of mourners returning to their home towns, but the demonstration gave both concrete and psychological support to a languishing resistance daunted by the firm and decisive action of the authorities and the bloodshed already incurred.

\(^{43}\) Vide e.g. C.R., Pak Hi-do, Yi Kap-sŏng, Song Chin-u, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, and Supra, Chapter IV.

\(^{44}\) GGPAB, No. 5971, 6.3.1919, Dokuritsu Undô ni Kansuru Ken No. 7.

\(^{45}\) Vide Supra, Chapter IV.

\(^{46}\) GGPAB, No. 5884, 5.3.1919. Vide also GGPAB, No. 5725, 4.3.1919.
Wearing red arm-bands, hundreds of students mingled with a crowd of about five thousand waiting to board their trains and distributed independence and anti-Japanese literature. As Kang Ki-tŏk and Kim Wan-pyŏk arrived by rickshaw, students hoisted a large Korean flag above them. (49) Breaking through a police cordon, the crowd separated into two groups, one marching towards "downtown", the other advancing through South Gate down the main street to regroup in front of the Liberty Bell. At this point aid arrived from Honmachi, and the crowd was dispersed with many injuries and arrests. (50) Among the literature distributed to home-goers were a large number of copies of a message especially directed to Dr Moffett of P'yŏngyang, G. S. McCune of Sŏnch'ŏn, and four other missionaries in different centres. Printed under the name, "Korea Newspaper Bureau", the message read, "The Liberty Bell has broken its ten years of silence and tolls for Korean independence. This marks the beginning of the Korean people's 'New Life'; moreover, the spreading abroad to all the earth of the Korean's glad new spirit has commenced. They desire that this printed message be distributed among all the foreigners." (51)

Whether or not this message ever reached the missionaries, the Japanese authorities became increasingly conscious of the sympathy expressed towards the Koreans by the foreign community and suspected their collusion. Clearly very sensitive about foreign opinion, the Japanese authorities even became anxious about the United States Consul:

49. C.R., Kim Wan-pyŏk; GGPAB, No. 5884, 5.3.1919.
50. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.; GGPAB, No. 5971, 6.3.1919.
51. GGPAB, No. 5971, 6.3.1919. (From Japanese version.)
"We have information that the U.S. Consul-General in Seoul (Bergholz), with regard to interviews with Koreans during which they stated that the official publication of the Koreans' own opinions and the advocacy of self-determination are the prerogative of mankind, did not give ear to their claims saying it was impossible to exert such pressure without first receiving authority to do so. Concerning missionaries, he said that if it were the case that the police were infringing on their rights, they could contact the higher authorities and sufficient protection should then be provided. But on the occasion of the investigation of the premises and rooms within the Central YMCA in connection with the [student] incident, this same Consul-General sent an inquiry and protest in which he demanded that there be shown any basic application of an article of law whereby the entering of the YMCA, as U.S. citizens' property, conforms with any legal regulation."

As time went by, the Consul-General did, in fact, become more and more sympathetic, and reported details of the movement, including the brutality, to Washington. (53)

As the students' movement spread and the agitation intensified, the Japanese became openly suspicious of the foreign missionaries. That practically all the schools involved in demonstrations were affiliated to Churches or directed by mission societies, (54) while Churches were used as rallying points and depôts for flags and Declarations, only served to confirm these suspicions. The Japanese Press immediately published several articles accusing the missionaries, especially Dr Moffett, of inciting the Koreans to rebellion. (55)

52. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
53. Bergholz had delivered reports to Washington from March 1. Vide Infra.
54. Prominent were Sundōk Presbyterian, Sungshil Middle and Professional Schools in P'yŏngyang, and Yŏnhi, Severance, and Iwha Women's Middle and Professional Schools in Seoul.
As such accusations became more serious and pointed, the Presbyterian and Methodist Mission Boards were compelled to clear themselves. In a report prepared for the United States Consulate the Boards recognised that it "was but natural that the charge should at once be made in the Japanese press that missionaries were the instigators of the uprising." Yet, they continued, "this may be categorically denied. It arose without their knowledge. Their advice as to the inception and direction of the movement had not been sought."\(^{(56)}\) Strongly supported by the United States Consulate, the Mission Boards successfully pressed the Government-General to repudiate publicly the accusations levelled against missionaries.\(^{(57)}\)

This desire of the Japanese to impute responsibility for the uprising to a foreign conspiracy was, in fact, quickly discredited by the rapid and spontaneous expansion of the Movement to all areas and among all classes. By the evening of March 5, the Movement had already spread into North Chōlla Province, the students being joined by labourers, office employees and school-teachers.\(^{(58)}\) As the students continued to issue the "Independence Newspaper", praising the people's spirit, threatening Korean police and government employees, and endeavouring to precipitate demonstrations continually,\(^{(59)}\) the agitation spread into all provinces by March 9. By this stage even the Confucian literati became involved while, against all tradition, women openly joined the public demonstrations.

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58. GGPAB, NO. 5971, 6.3.1919.
59. GGPAB, No. 6050, 7.3.1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken No. 8.
In this respect, the considerable gamble of the "Thirty-Three" witnessed its vindication; yet the jubilation was marred by the increase in violence, which by March 16 had claimed the lives of one hundred and one Koreans and ten Japanese, and left one hundred and thirty-five demonstrators seriously injured. (60)

The Merchants' Pledge, Labour Strikes and Confucian Petition.

It would be misleading to infer from the above figures that the principle of passive resistance had been widely abandoned. For on March 9, a new dimension had been added which infused the Movement with considerable strength, and significantly developed civil-disobedience activities. This contribution to the struggle came in the form of a merchants' strike and boycott of Japanese goods. Korean shop-owners had been closing their premises individually in Seoul, P'yŏngyang and Sŏnch'ŏn at least from very early on, (61) but on March 9 there appeared in Seoul a "Merchants' Pledge" which coordinated this form of resistance and encouraged similar action throughout the nation. On the evening of March 8, all major merchants in the inner city were delivered the following notice:

"Public Pledge of all Seoul Merchants
1. On March 9, all shops will close.
2. Join the independence agitation, but refrain from acts of violence.
3. Any who break this pledge will be dealt with severely.
4252nd Year, 3rd Month and 8th Day of Tangun.
The Representatives of the Seoul Merchants."

In view of the similarities with the contemporaneous Chinese boycotts, it is reasonable to suspect some link, perhaps through

60. Governor-General to Prime Minister, 16.3.1919.
61. GGPAB, No. 5884, 5.3.1919.
62. GGPAB, No. 6335, 9.3.1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken No. 10.
Shanghai, but the writer has failed to unearth any supportive
evidence. However no outside inspiration was required, for trad-
tionally, such action was of tremendous significance in Korea.
After the censure of the Grand Censors and the referendum of
literati and nobles, a three-day merchant-guild strike signified
that the displeasure of the people had reached such proportions
that the King should abdicate. (63) Accordingly, all Korean shops
were closed on March 9 and Japanese premises were boycotted for
temporary. The Government-General thereupon summoned sixty
leading Seoul merchants and advised that they remain open there-
after. Asked for the reason for their action, the merchants
replied that, although they bore no malice against the Government-
General, the confinement of students and girls and the use of
unnecessary force was beyond the limit. Shops would remain open,
they added, provided this was conveyed to high level government
departments in Korea and Japan. (64)

Receiving no favourable assurances, shop-keepers in Seoul for
the most part maintained their strike. Apart from the adverse
economic influence of the boycott, which struck at Japan's consumer
goods industry, the Japanese became concerned by the "sense of
unease and false rumours" this action spread among the people (i.e.
the traditional import of the strike). Proprietors were requested
to reopen "for the sake of public peace" and threatened with arrest,"but in spite of the many reasons produced to make them comply,"
complained the Police Chief, "they pretend they are being threatened,

63. Cynn, H.H., The Rebirth of Korea, p 49.
64. GGPAB, No. 7266, 15. 3. 1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken
No. 16.
and on the contrary, they insist on the release of those arrested and still refuse to open."(65) The public indeed became so restive and the authorities so embarrassed, that on April 1, the sixty leaders once more were summoned, this time by the Head of the Police Department himself. After a stern warning, he served a written order on them and sent them away. This same written order was also delivered to the owners of other shops, so that from April 2 in Seoul, shops gradually began to reopen. (66) The strike and boycott had spread to other main centres as well, and remained a continual aspect of the Movement even after April.

Simultaneously with the " Merchants' Pledge", several other developments were revealed which further belied the persistent efforts of the authorities to convince the public that the Movement was the work of foreigners or misguided Koreans abroad. One of the most effective among these developments was the outbreak of labour strikes, begun on March 8 when thirty night-shift workers at the Government-General's Yongsan Printing factory in Seoul gathered in the cafeteria to chant "Mansel", refusing police orders to return to work. The thirty were joined by two hundred morning-shift employees, at which point the Yongsan Army Squadron commander was called upon and nineteen men were arrested. On March 9, railway employees and tram conductors and drivers went on strike, so that by afternoon parked trams were scattered about the streets of the Capital. At midday, labourers, including children, walked out of the Government Monopoly Tong-A Tobacco Company's factory. (67)

65. GGPAB, No. 9808, 2.4.1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken No. 35.
66. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
67. GGPAB, No. 6335, 9.3.1919.
On the same day labourers struck in Taegu and Kyōngju in North Kyōngsang Province, while strikes spread to South Ch'ungch'ŏng, South Chŏlla, North Hamgyŏng and Kangwon provinces on March 10 and to Pusan in South Kyōngsang Province on March 11.\(^{(68)}\) In Kaesŏng, Kyŏnggi Province, the police noted with unease the widespread "change of heart" among the Koreans, and reported that disenchantment was evident and growing even within the traditionally apolitical farming sector.\(^{(69)}\)

At this point the hitherto quiescent traditional mainstay of Korean society, the Confucian literati, briefly joined the Movement. This Confucian involvement was initiated by the gesture of two elderly scholars, Kim Yun-shik and Lee Yong-chik, who had been made Viscounts by the Japanese in 1910. Composing a Petition in true Confucian literary style, the two Viscounts claimed that the desire for independence was natural and basic to all Koreans:

"Every man has written in his soul the word 'Independence', and those who in the quiet of their rooms shout for it are beyond possibility of numbering. Will you arrest and kill them all?"\(^{(70)}\) Although Kim Yun-shik was eighty-five years old, the two former Korean Cabinet Ministers paid dearly for breaking the silence of their colleagues, being unceremoniously arrested, tried and sentenced.\(^{(71)}\)

Thereupon one hundred and thirty-seven literati proclaimed their solidarity with the Viscounts, and calling for the withdrawal of

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68. Baldwin, March First Movement, p 99.
69. GGPAB, No. 6335, 9.3.1919.
70. Quoted in Cynn, H. H., The Rebirth of Korea, p 58.
Japanese troops and the restoration of independence, translated the Petition and arranged for its transmission along with another document to the Peace Conference. (72)

Unfortunately, this bold initiative of the elderly scholars was not sustained or extended, for Confucianism was in severe decline. Yet it must be remembered that a large proportion of the more gifted Confucian leaders had become Christians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of these, Yi Sang-jae, became known as the "Tolstoy of Korea", (73) whilst his friend, Syngman Rhee, became the first President of South Korea.

Developments such as these unequivocally demonstrated to Korean and Japanese alike the truly national proportions of the independence uprising. Moreover, reports soon reached the Japanese police of mass demonstrations involving groups of up to seven thousand people in Vladivostok, Nicholsk, Kirin, Chientao, Mukden, and Shanghai. (74) Surprise at the extent and intensity of Korean opposition to their rule, and fear occasioned by the stamina and resources of the Movement, account to a large degree for the extraordinary brutality and inhumanity employed by the Japanese in their suppression of the uprising. As will become clear, the Japanese over-reaction worked directly against their object of assimilation and greatly aided the publicity of the Korean cause among the other nations.

Missionary Involvement and the Failure at Versailles

From March 11, there was a noticeable, but extremely deceptive lull in active independence agitation throughout Korea. Yet but a week later, there commenced a period of unforeseen bloodshed which continued almost unabated to the end of April. In North Kyōngsang Province, students resumed on March 18 demonstrations which quickly spread to the main centres and from there to the smallest villages throughout Korea. Surprised and annoyed, the Japanese reacted with force and determination. Over thirty Koreans were killed and more than two hundred and fifty arrested between March 21 and 23 after concentrated demonstrations by large crowds of up to ten thousand people.¹⁷⁵ Worse violence occurred from April 2, the very day the merchants had reopened under duress. Demonstrations began in protest in all provinces and ended in death and injury, so that in four days the army authorities estimated over two hundred and seventy Koreans were wounded and slightly more than one hundred killed.¹⁷⁶

Despite the casualties and severe repression, the Koreans continued to demonstrate and riot. In response, the Governor-General obtained from Japan on April 8 six infantry batallions, four hundred military police and three hundred quartermaster troops - a total of 3,700 - to supplement the two divisions of troops, 5,400 police and greater number of military police already in Korea.¹⁷⁷ Further,

75. GGPAB, No. 7901, 19.3.1919; No. 8306, 22.3.1919; No. 8468, 24.3.1919 - Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken, Nos 20, 23, 25.
76. GGAHQ, No. 119, 10.4.1919, Dokuritsu Undō no tame Chōsenjin Fuon no Undō ni Kansuru Jōkyō.
77. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 240. Vide Supra, Chapter III.
on April 15, Hasegawa promulgated a decree of which Article I stated: "Those who create or wish to create or institute others to create social disorder for the purpose of political change are subject to a maximum of ten years' imprisonment." (78) (Author's italics)

The Governor-General also gave the police forces and army a "free hand" to root out and destroy the leadership of the movement. (79)

The practical effect of this show of strength by the Government-General was two-fold. Firstly, among Koreans it increased the hatred of their overlords and brought many otherwise quiet citizens into the Movement. "Every man who has been arrested without being guilty of any part in the movement," observed Henry Chung, "immediately becomes part of it." (80) It quickly became evident that the police and army considered their "free hand" implied repression of Christianity in general: stopped in the streets, townsfolk were asked whether they were Christians, and if the reply was affirmative, were beaten and often arrested without further intelligence (81) being sought. Rather than check the spread of Christianity, such treatment enhanced the standing of Christians and strengthened the people's opposition.

A spate of particularly savage acts of slaughter in and around Suwon, south of Seoul, referred to above, produced the second effect of the Government-General's show of strength: the emergence of a missionary conscience expressed in the slogan, "No Neutrality For Brutality". On hearing rumours of the bloodshed and destruction,

80. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 306.
the missionary and educator, Dr Horace Underwood, accompanied
the United States Vice-Consul Curtis to Suwon to question the
survivors, while Dr Schofield proceeded to Che Am Ri and documen-
ted the massacre.\(^{(82)}\) Subsequently Dr Underwood gathered a
delegation of missionaries and visited Governor-General Hasegawa,
who was morally compelled to admit publicly the massacres and
institute relief for the victims.\(^{(83)}\)

Recalling this episode two years later, Dr Underwood commented
that, "All realised that [the Movement] would be suppressed, but
no one dreamed that the gendarmerie and troops would go to the
lengths of severity and savagery which were shown.\(^{(84)}\) On their
own admission, it was for the sake of human need and to fight
cruelty, not to take sides in the independence struggle, that the
missionaries became actively involved.\(^{(85)}\) Yet this change in
attitude came at an opportune moment for the Korean cause. Worn
out by nearly two months of intense struggle at great cost, the
Suwon and Che Am Ri and associated massacres had convinced the
majority of Koreans of the futility of open resistance. Although the
resolve for independence was thereby sharpened, by the end of
April demonstrations necessarily abated through the death or
incarceration of the majority of their leaders. Under these
circumstances, the action of the missionaries in publicising the
details of the Movement did much, as an independent testimony, to
keep the Korean issue alive overseas.

82. Mortimore, in Kim and Mortimore (eds), Korea's Response, p 249.
84. Underwood, H.H., Modern Education in Korea, p 209.
85. Vide Baldwin, in Nahm (ed.), Korea; Mortimore, in Kim and
Mortimore (eds), Korea's Response, pp 256-257. Dr Schofield
was the exception, deported in March, 1920.
The Japanese soon had good cause to fear this new role of the missionaries. In late April, as a result of visits to Japan by missionaries from Korea, the Japanese Church itself condemned the actions of the Government-General and petitioned the Premier, Hara Kei, and other influential Japanese on the Koreans' behalf. Missionaries visited jails to question the imprisoned, delivering reports to newspapers in China, England and America. The British journalist and Christian, F.R. McKenzie, wrote his book, "Korea's Fight for Freedom", while American missionaries sent documents to President Wilson informing him of the true nature of the independence agitation as opposed to the Japanese version. By the end of June, the indignation of the American public reached such a pitch that the Japanese Consul-General in New York urgently cabled Hara on July 1:

"AGITATION REGARDING CHOSEN ABUSES INCREASINGLY SERIOUS AND ENDANGERING GOODWILL CANNOT WITHOLD FACTS URGENTLY IMPORTANT YOU PUBLISH OFFICIAL STATEMENT THAT ABUSES HAVE CEASED REASONABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS PROCEEDING CAN YOU CABLE THIS EFFECT".

When Hara replied four days later, he was too late: the Federated Churches of Christ in America had a few days earlier published a frank, detailed and documented book, titled, "The Situation in Korea.

In view of the original purpose of the March First Movement as conceived by the "Thirty-Three", this favourable publicity abroad during the peace negotiations was a fitting reward of their sacrifice.

88. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 244.
and, to them, preferable to the costly resistance within Korea itself. Despite his failure to gain admission as a Korean delegate, Kim Kyu-shik determinedly campaigned among the individual delegates, presenting them with an unemotive petition based on internationally accepted legal standards. In brief, this petition included the following reasons for independence. (89)

1. The Treaty of Annexation was concluded in bad faith;

2. The Korean people have constantly denied the right of their Emperor to dispose of Korea by treaty;

3. The Annexation violates the obligations of Japan's own treaties, most notably: (a) February 26, 1876 Kang Hwa Treaty which stipulates that "Chosen, being an independent country, enjoys the same rights of sovereignty as Japan";
   (b) April 17, 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki: Japan insisted on China's recognising Korea's complete independence and autonomy;
   (c) April 25, 1898 Russo-Japanese Protocol, in Article I of which both countries recognised Korea's entire sovereignty and agreed not to interfere in her internal affairs;
   (d) January 30, 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in which both affirmed and guaranteed substantially Korea's independence; and
   (e) April 23, 1904 Japanese-Korean Protocol, in which Japan guaranteed the independence and integrity of Korea.

Legally and logically, the Petition was impeccable, for "ces traités affirment et confirment, non seulement l'existence absolue de la Corée comme un Etat pleinement souverain, mais ils établissent nettement l'indépendance coréenne sur les bases et sanctions du droit international qu'aucune puissance ne peut violer sans être obligée de soumettre son acte à l'avis des autres puissances." (90)

89. These points are condensed from Hu, Hung-lick, Le Problème Coréen, p 68.

90. Ibid, p 69.
However the Peace Conference was principally concerned with European questions and although Stephen Bonsal may have been far-sighted enough to recognise the real possibility of a major conflagration in the Far East resulting from Japan's Asian policy, as in the case of the Chinese May Fourth protest, its Euro-centrism remained unshaken, if surprised, by the reports of the March First Movement. America was possibly the only nation able to assist Korea's aspirations, but Hornbeck proved to be the only influential American prepared to give Korea's case any consideration. The United States had been committed to the "maintenance of the status quo" in Asia since 1908, and President Wilson had not conceived of the extension of national self-determination to Korea, irrespective of his oratory. Most important, Japan was one of the victorious nations at the Conference, and a very powerful one; her desire for "Lebensraum" was not yet viewed with the dismay it evoked in the 1930's. On May 10, Kim Kyu-shik presented a final petition and returned disappointed and frustrated with diplomatic impotency to Shanghai.

Evidently, only a minority of the organisers of the March First Movement had entertained any definite hope that the Movement would so influence the delegates to the Peace Conference that Kim Kyu-shik's mission would be at once accomplished. Hyŏn Sang-yun spoke for the majority when he recalled that, "At this time we did not believe that the Korean independence would be immediately realised ...

92. Vide Supra, Chapter I, and Pratt, J. W., A History of United States Foreign Policy.
93. GGPAB External Reports, Dokuritsu Undō ni Kansuru Ken No. 70, 14.5.1919; No. 71, 16.5.1919.
because World War I had not been extended into Korea and also because Japan was on the side of the Allies. But we seriously felt that we must express the desires of the people before the world, as a beginning stage of the independence movement."(94) Nevertheless, even the most sceptical could not but have been disappointed with the total failure to influence any concrete political move on Korea's behalf, a factor largely contributing to the radicalisation of the Movement after 1919.

The failure at Versailles did not plunge Korean nationalists into despair. The course of events within Korea had indicated graphically that the desire for independence knew no boundaries of class, age-group, religion, or sex. Indeed, the breakdown of the 19,525 arrested by the end of April, into age, religion, occupation and area, given in the tables below, prompts the question: Was there any area of Korean society not affected by the March First Movement? Surely it is immensely significant that at 10,864, the number of farmers arrested (Table 4) exceeded those of all other occupations: the March First Movement was clearly not merely an urban phenomenon. Increasingly, one becomes aware that here, in this little-studied Korean civil disobedience movement of 1919, is evident a national demonstration unparalleled for its depth and breadth in previous known history.

94. Quoted in Lee Chong-sik, Politics, p 119.
### Table 1. Age Level of the Arrested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age, in years</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 18</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>3,272</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>4,479</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>2,492</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 70</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>19,054</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>19,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Religious Affiliation of the Arrested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ŏndogyo</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shich'ŏngyo</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucianist</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregational</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestants</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religious affiliation</td>
<td>9,255</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>19,054</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>19,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95. Tables from Ibid, pp 115-117.
Table 3. Number of Arrested, by Province or Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province or region</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyŏnggi</td>
<td>3,349</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(City of Seoul - 1,337 men, 128 women)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Chungch'ŏng</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Chungch'ŏng</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kyŏngsang</td>
<td>2,103</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kyŏngsang</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Chŏlla</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Chŏlla</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>2,495</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Pyŏngan</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pyŏngan</td>
<td>1,541</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hamgyŏng</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Hamgyŏng</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia and Manchuria</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Total                              | 19,054 | 471    |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-school teachers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private schools</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary-school teachers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private schools</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College students:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private schools</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-school students:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private schools</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary-school students;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private schools</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of local governments (myon and ri)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myon office clerks</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government or corporation employees</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical doctors</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical service</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monks (Buddhist)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian workers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelists and teachers</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ondogyo workers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of districts</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelists and teachers</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other officers</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>10,823</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineworkers and mine operators</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoneworkers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metalworkers</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine and took makers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weavers, dyers</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper producers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and rubber workers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and bamboo workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food-products workers</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing workers, costume makers</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction, civil engineering</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing, photography</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbers</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain merchants</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug merchants</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry-goods merchants</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-hand merchants</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse operators</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inn and restaurant operators</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen and women</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation business</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants, daily hire, etc.</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General labourers</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,054</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>19,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In view of the number involved and the drastic measures adopted by the Japanese, it is a mark of the Koreans' restraint that, according to military police records, 516 of the 848 incidents up to April 30 were completely non-violent, while many of the remainder began peacefully. (96) But the cost had been high. Official figures cite 26,713 arrests, 553 deaths and 1,409 Koreans injured by the end of May. (97) Henry Chung and another nationalist, Kim Pyŏng-cho, claimed higher casualties, (98) while Pak Ŭn-shik, including Chientao in his statistics, recorded 7,509 deaths, 15,961 injuries and 46,948 arrests, besides 47 churches, 2 schools and 715 houses destroyed. (99) Somewhere between this latter claim and the official records no doubt lies a truer figure. Suffice it to say that, alongside the encouragement Koreans derived from the remarkable proportions of the March First Movement, there also hardened a conviction among many that thereafter, Koreans must engage Japan in the "eternal, bloody war" of the February Eighth Resolution.

Far from modifying their resolve, the experience of the March First Movement strengthened the Koreans' conviction that complete independence was the only realistic goal for their race. "The Korean," pointed out Henry Chung, "will not be satisfied even if genuine reforms are introduced in Korea. His cry is complete independence." (100)

96. Ibid, p 114.
100. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 284.
Thus, to his dismay, Saitō was welcomed into Seoul by a bomb, and despite his original good intentions, soon employed a greater number of police and troops than his militarist predecessors, Terauchi and Hasegawa. (101)

Shocked by this attempted assassination of Saitō on September 2, 1919, the police immediately conducted a survey of attitudes to the attempt, the results of which revealed the influence the Movement had exerted throughout Korea. The merchants considered independence inevitable and clearly only a matter of time; Christians deplored the attempt but claimed it would strengthen Korea's case at the Autumn League Conference; Ch'ŏndogyo leaders acknowledged the action was out of step with the original non-violent movement based on "Justice and Humanity", but explained that although Saitō was introducing reforms, the bombing was an extreme reminder that only independence was acceptable; foreigners and missionaries decried the act, but pointed out that any colonial people would hate their rulers, and that since no real change was forthcoming in government organisation, such incidents were inevitable. But it was the students who most frankly and prophetically expressed the radical nature of the Korean demand: "Since this is the first time Koreans have been seen to do this kind of thing," they observed, "the shock is understandable. But it will in time become something happily speculated upon in tea-rooms." (102)


102. GGPAB, No. 26153, 12.9.1919, Kyōkō Jiken ni taisuru Kansō.
CHAPTER VI: KOREAN NATIONALIST FACTIONS 1919-1937.

All the king's horses and all the king's men
Could not put Humpty together again.

Against the background of a nation hitherto distinctly divided socially and politically, the March First Movement was a remarkable achievement. As Koreans from all classes, occupations, faiths and levels of education joined the Movement, the "Thirty-Three" rapidly became two million. (1) Despite varied reactions amongst Korean nationalists, such a demonstration of national solidarity nourished in all a keen hope of an enduring, but above all, united spirit of independence.

But in spite of such promise, the independence struggle thereafter fell short of expectations. The brief unity was quickly undermined by intensified Japanese surveillance and a growing divergence over means, ends and principle. Distinct groups formed, reformed and split continually; operations shifted base regionally. Despite efforts to repeat the March First solidarity in 1926 and 1927-1931, the various elements remained essentially disparate, so that by the end of 1922, the Government-General reported the existence of over 3,000 known resistance organisations. (2)

Clearly, the above figure reflects also the tremendous energy and complexity of the post-March First Movement, which presents the researcher with no little difficulty. In sifting and classifying the

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(1) While Government-General records give only one million and Pak Ên-shik more than two million (Independence History, Vol. 1, p 114ff), modern historians such as Lee Chong-sik (Politics, p 114) and Marius Jansen (Japan and China from War to Peace, p 241) accept two million as reasonable.

(2) Chen I-te, Japanese Colonialism, p 293.
myriad organisations into valid and meaningful categories, one is
in effect confronted with a maze of physically unconnected incidents
and groups. However, this apparent confusion holds within itself
a key to understanding this period, for it is suggestive of the acute
problem of leadership experienced after March 1919. The difficulty
of directing a national movement when operations were scattered,
when all travel and correspondence underwent rigorous scrutiny, when
many spent long years of exile abroad isolated from Korea, and
when torture or even death attended discovery, hardly demands
elaboration. The awakened vision of independence beckoned
nationalists like the voice of a Siren, and all at some point foundered
on this jagged rock of leadership.

If the problem of directing the independence movement is under-
stood to be the unifying theme of the period 1919 to 1937, the struggle
may be examined through the histories of the main bodies involved,
particularly relating to organisation, participation and ideology. Four
main streams are detectable: (a) the Provisional Government in
Shanghai; (b) the "diplomatists" based in America; (c) the military
organisations based in north China, Manchuria and the USSR; and
(d) the nationalist-communist parties inside Korea. Because of their
common ground, the experiences of the Provisional Government and
the "diplomatists" will be examined together. Also, the main
streams at times intermingled inside Korea, and will be examined
separately.

The Provisional Government and the Diplomatists

According to Henry Chung, the idea of a Provisional Government
was derived simply from precedent. In response to criticism, he
cited in 1920 the isolated 1776 Continental Congress, the expatriot
Belgian Government in the Great War and the National Council of
Czechoslovakia, none of whose members was in Czechoslovakia when the United States recognised it in 1918. Moreover, in comparison with Belgium and Armenia, Chung claimed, Korea deserved independence more, with its civilisation "as great as China's in many ways and greater than Japan's in most." Hence in line with the objectives of the March First Movement and the diplomatic efforts pursued by Chung, Rhee, Kim Kyu-shik and others based in America, the primary purpose of the Korean Provisional Government was to woo recognition from the powers, particularly from League Members.

The organisation of the Provisional Government, begun simultaneously in Seoul and Shanghai, highlighted the problem of communications. Between March 16 and April 2, 1919, in Seoul, representatives of Christianity, Ch'ŏndogyo, Buddhism, Confucianism and non-religious bodies from all thirteen provinces met to organise what was named the Hānsŏng Provisional Government. Syngman Rhee was elected President and Yi Tong-hwi Premier, while other ministers who quickly became prominent included Ahn Ch'ang-ho, Pak Ŭn-shik and Shin Ch'ae-ho. Unknown, but parallel developments occurred in Shanghai. After a preliminary meeting on March 12 when fifty Koreans met from Siberia, Manchuria, China, Japan and Korea in the French Concession, a Cabinet was elected on April 10, the very day on which an envoy arrived from the Hansŏng Cabinet.

(3) Henry Chung, *The Case of Korea*, pp 11-12 and p 212.
Thus, the Korean nationalists were embarrassed by two coinciding Provisional Governments. Happily, both groups acknowledged the absolute necessity of unity before the world, and in fact, the Shanghai group had also elected Syngman Rhee and Yi Tong-hwi for the top positions. However, differences of opinion and slow communications delayed the merging of the Cabinets until August, and this gave sufficient opportunity for serious divergences within the leadership which within a few years tragically obscured the original purpose of the Provisional Government.

By May, the Provisional Government hovered between three strategic courses: diplomatic activity in America and Europe; direct, military action against Japan; and a gradualist policy of self-strengthening within Korea. Behind these options lurked differences of principle and ideology, but it was perhaps equally parochialism and personality conflicts which impeded compromise and splintered policy. Initially, however, the "gradualists" and "diplomats" recognised their common ground, and under the promising leadership of Ahn Ch'ang-ho, together directed Provisional Government policy and procedure from the beginning of June.

Since the military leader, Yi Tong-hwi, was heavily involved in recruitment projects in Kirin Province, Ahn Ch'ang-ho was appointed Acting Prime Minister at the end of May. Epitomising the "gradualist" camp, Ahn doubted independence could be achieved in his own life-time and ably defended the self-strengthening policy.

8. GGAHQ No. 162, 6.4.1919. Shanghai Hōmen no Jōkyō.
Yet at the same time, he willingly admitted the "diplomatists'" role: "If the question is put, 'What was the outcome of the past Movement', it was not the expectation that the enemy would be driven out by the noise of 'Mansei', nor was it the hope that we could easily expel the foe with a few local, armed struggles. No, it was that, through brightly publicising the spirit of freedom and will for independence of our race, we would firstly inform the world of the united will of the nation and obtain promise of a further, larger movement, and secondly, bring to the attention of the League of Nations the determination and courage of our people." Meanwhile, the responsibility of the Koreans was to substantiate their capacity to pursue this expression of their will.\(^{(10)}\)

Ahn Ch'ang-ho quickly organised the preliminary machinery of the Provisional Government. In view of its relative freedom, convenience of communications and access to the 800,000 Koreans in Chientao and Siberia,\(^{(11)}\) the cosmopolitan trading port of Shanghai was confirmed as the seat of the Government. Preparations for a liaison system with nationalists inside Korea were begun immediately and on July 10, the Provisional Government issued its First Cabinet Order: the Yŏnt'ong-je, or United Communications System. From Communications Bureaus established where possible in Provinces and Prefectures, appointed officers were charged with the duty of submitting reports to Shanghai via Antung every five days.\(^{(12)}\) Ahn also arranged the participation of the Shanghai Koreans in the Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts,\(^{(13)}\) and maintained close contact with


\(^{11}\) Lee Chong-sik, *Politics*, p 129.

\(^{12}\) GGAHQ No. 162, 6. 4. 1919; No. 165, 12. 4. 1919, Shanghai Kikan no Hō; No. 171, 17. 4. 1919, Shanghai yori no Hō; TMS, p 240.

\(^{13}\) GGAHQ, No. 169, 17. 4. 1919, Shanghai Hōmen no Jōkyō.
Kim Kyu-shik in Paris. On receipt of an urgent telegram from Kim on June 18, Ahn sent to Korea ten nationalists to renew agitation. (14) As attendances at public and technical schools fell sharply, with agitation directed from schools in South Hamgyŏng and Kyŏnggi Provinces, the public mood by June 24 was, according to Japanese officers, "degenerating". (15)

Meanwhile, funds were urgently raised from Koreans in Hawaii, America, China and as far north as Siberia. (16) Moreover, by August forays were being conducted into Korea itself. (17) The transfer of funds from Korea to Shanghai was tackled in at least two ways. Nationalists in Taegu, North Kyŏngsang Province, confessed to using as couriers American missionaries, (18) but the general method was to transfer money through shops especially established for this purpose in Antung, where also counterfeit notes were prepared for use in Shanghai. Both methods however were severely disrupted in late October by police detection and arrests. (19)

The direct influence of Ahn Ch'ang-ho and the "gradualists" was effectively terminated when Yi Tong-hwi assumed his duties as Prime Minister and Rhee was confirmed as President, after the reorganisation of the Provisional Government to incorporate the "Hansŏng Constitution" was completed in September, 1919. But even during Ahn's reign, the "gradualists"' lead had been far from

14. GGAHQ, No. 175, 20.4.1919. Shanghai Kikan no Hō.
15. GGAHQ to Army Minister, No. 180, 24.4.1919.
16. GGAHQ, No. 192, 2.7.1919, Shanghai Hōmen no Hō.
secure. Before going to Paris, Kim Kyu-shik had been working amongst revolutionaries in North China, and while in France, continued to direct armed groups in Manchuria. (20) In June, Kim informed Ahn of plans to train Korean volunteers for an anticipated American-Japanese war. This indeed marked the beginning of his defection from the "diplomatists" to Yi's "direct action" camp. (21) Yi was already urging that the Army Ministry be transferred to Manchuria, "with at least ten regiments in readiness for combat before the end of the year."(22) Ahn also dissented from Syngman Rhee's insistence on acting as president before this was confirmed, which brought about a bitter rupture between the two leaders that never healed. (23) Poor, distant communications and the effects of the delay in merging the Shanghai and Hansōng Cabinets account perhaps even more than ideologies at this stage for divisions within the leadership.

Once confirmed as President, Rhee and the "diplomatists" in America directed and dominated proceedings into 1921. By June, 1919, three main organisations had been formed in the U.S.A.; the Korean Commission in Washington; the Korean Information Bureau in Philadelphia; and the Korean National Association in San Francisco, with a branch in Honolulu. Led by Rhee, So Chae-p' il, Henry Chung, and Pak Yong-man, the campaign was initially directed to the State Department. However, attention was shifted to Congress after the Senate had passed a resolution supporting Irish independence in June. (24)

20. GGAHQ, No. 169, 17.4.1919. Shanghai Hōmen no Hō.
23. Ibid, p 133.
The diplomatic campaign was not without success. Senators Spencer, Norris and France spoke against Japan's rule of Korea on June 30, July 15 and October 9 respectively, while from mid-May, the Chicago Presbyterian and Methodist Churches approved aid to Korea and petitioned the Senate. (25)

Possibly in rivalry with Ahn Ch'ang-ho, Syngman Rhee attempted on August 25 to unify the American and Paris campaigns under a Europe-America Commission (Ku-Mi Wiwon Bu), as the official branch of the Provisional Government in the United States. Unfortunately, this autocratic act was immediately divisive, provoking hot dispute and censure in Shanghai and criticism from residents in America. (26) Pak Yong-man angrily left Honolulu to devote his energies to revolutionary activities in Peking, and Rhee found himself deeply at odds also with the "direct action" faction over a campaign begun with Henry Chung in July.

Assuming that a United States League of Nations mandate over Korea would most directly promote full independence, Rhee and Chung had prepared a series of lectures and an address to the American nation to this end. (27) Impatient Korean patriots in Kirin and Manchuria regarded this as treason. Bitter over Woodrow Wilson's refusal to open Korea's case at Versailles, Yi Tong-hwi, backed by his volunteers, strongly expressed his distress and opposition to the mandate plan. (28) Although failing to clear up this serious misunderstanding, Rhee and Chung nevertheless pressed on with their project in October, and suspicions deepened.

27. GGAHQ, No. 204, 24. 7. 1919. Shanghai Kikan no Hō; GGAHQ to Army Minister, No. 194, 4. 7. 1919.
28. GGAHQ, No. 200, 16. 7. 1919.
Aware of its danger, the divided Government attempted a
synthesis early in 1920 when the three factions agreed upon three
official basic aims:

1. Unite the Korean people under the Provisional Government.
2. Prepare the people - militarily and otherwise.
3. Continue propaganda for foreign sympathy.  

For the realisation of the first aim, the Second Cabinet Order, the
Kŏryŭmin Tanje, was issued on March 16, 1920, calling for the
establishment of Korean Residents' Associations in foreign lands to
act as intermediaries between the Government and Koreans abroad.

In line with the objectives of the second aim, Ahn Ch'ang-ho sent
Lee Kwang-su into Korea, while Yi Tong-hwi continued to direct
military organisations in Chientao and Kirin. Finally, the third
basic aim was honoured by sending a mission under Cho So-ang to
Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, London, Rome and Geneva, so that
by the Geneva League Conference of June 1921, the Korean problem
was well-known among delegates.

Not surprisingly, this compromise was short-lived. In December
1920, Rhee was urgently summoned by his Cabinet to Shanghai, where
he was taken to task over the mandate plan by Yi Tong-hwi and
Shin Ch'ae-ho. The President's proverbial charisma failed him,
and no workable solution was reached. There followed in January
1921, a spate of resignations including Yi, Shin, Ahn and Kim Kyu-shik.
Feelings mounted so high that on April 19, fifty-four leading Koreans
under Shin Ch'ae-ho drew up a list of criticisms of Rhee and Henry Chung,

30. Yi Kang-hun, Provisional Government, pp 64-67; Lee Chong-sik,
    Politics, p 138.
31. Lee Kwang-su, "My Confession", in 李光洙全集, p 264. (Hereafter: My Confession.)
whilst unaffiliated groups in Hawaii, Manchuria and Siberia under Pak Yong-man called for the Government's dissolution. (34) Rhee, however, was not without support, for in response to Shin, forty-five influential Koreans resident in Shanghai declared their loyalty under a Mutual Assistance Society (Hyŏpsŏng-Hoe). (35)

But within the Provisional Government, the damage incurred was severe. On June 6 1921, Shin Ch'ae-ho, Kim Kyu-shik, Pak Ŭn-shik and Ahn Ch'ang-ho organised a National Delegates' Conference (Kungmin Taep'yo-Hoe) with the aim of gaining unassailable control of the Provisional Government. (36) After a protracted struggle, the National Delegates' Conference successfully toppled the "diplomatists", and on March 25, 1925, impeached Syngman Rhee whose presidency was assumed by the eighty-year-old veteran, Pak Ŭn-shik. (37) Yet the victory was an exceedingly Pyrrhic one, for the legacy of the National Delegates' Conference was the insurmountable disarray of the Government: despite determined attempts to restore unity by Pak, Kim Kyu-shik and Kim Ku, the Provisional Government remained ineffective until the United States granted recognition during World War II.

As an organ representing the aspirations of Korea's nationalist leaders in the wake of the March First Movement, the Korean Provisional Government was a useful focal point only up to 1921.

35. Ibid, p 118.
37. Ibid, pp 144-146. The Korean Commission in U. S. A. declared Pak's Cabinet illegal, and the impeachment was not recognised outside Shanghai. Lee Chong-sik, Politics, p 166.
Thereafter decline was rapid as its standing among Korean patriots abroad fell sharply. Observers at the time blamed the demise of the Government after 1921 on parochialism and the failure of the three foundation members Ahn Ch'ang-ho, Yi Tong-hwi and Syngman Rhee, to work together. (38) In America, Hugh Cynn maintained that the "lack of a sense of compromise was a main cause," while in December 1926, Prime Minister Kim Ku blamed the lack of finance. (39) Yet as a constitutional body courting world recognition, the fate of the Provisional Government appears to have followed that of the "diplomatists". When America resolved her differences with Japan at the 1921-1922 Washington Conference, expediently treading under foot Korea's hopes, the "diplomatists" heard their death-knell, and with them, the Provisional Government.

The decline of the Provisional Government did not signify a collapse or slackening of the independence movement. Rather, attention was now shifted to the host of military organisations in northern China, Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia, and to proto-communist societies within and without Korea.

Military Organisations

Korea's guerilla resistance was intense and deserves to be better known. In late 1919 in north Manchuria, armed Koreans killed up to one thousand Japanese soldiers in one engagement, (40) while in 1922 alone Japanese retaliation forces killed an estimated 3,469 Koreans

40. Ibid, p 158.
in north China, Manchuria and Siberia. Indeed, since the 1876 Tong-Hak Rebellion, armed bands remained a permanent feature in the struggle against Japan, and although military groups were compelled by 1912 to operate outside Korea, such resistance enjoyed greater continuity throughout the colonial period than the other forms of resistance.

Before 1919, several organised military groups in what was called West and North Kando had been campaigning under such leaders as Yi Tong-hwi, Sŏ Il and Hong Pŏn-do, drawing officers from the Namsang Academy and Shinhŭng and Myŏngdong Military Colleges established in that region.

After the March First Movement, a number of circumstances in concert rapidly reinforced this tactical option. As already noted, Yi Tong-hwi among many others, looked forward to an American-Japanese war in view of the two nations' tense relations, while Soviet weakness against Japan further convinced many that they should arm and train their own forces. But above all, embittered by Japan's ruthlessness and intransigence and deeply disappointed with the failure at Versailles, a great many nationalists resorted to


42. "Kando" is a Korean term, used also in Government-General reports, for a loosely defined area north of Korea. North Kando signifies the area across the Tumen R., the N.E. Boundary, including north Kirin, Heilungkiang and the Russian Maritime Provinces. West Kando refers to south Kirin and Liaoning Provinces across the Yalu R., the N.W. boundary. East and South Kando are occasionally referred to, and "Kando" often simply means Chientao. (Japanese: Kantō)

the psychologically more satisfying military option. Accordingly, over 1919 and 1920, military organisations sprang to being from Nanking in China to Khabarovsk in Siberia and from Pusan in southernmost Korea to Tomsk, Chita and Irkutsk in Central Asia.

As these armed bands proliferated, unity, an elusive prize among military groups at the best of times, became ever more remote. Scattered over vast tracts of land, these bands found individual commanders far easier to follow than abstract strategic ideals. But in the first years and at various later stages, determined efforts at unity were made which, when successful, caused the Japanese considerable discomfort. Nevertheless, the history of the military organisations is as much a story of their endeavour to achieve unity from diversity as of their fortunes against the Japanese forces.

The quest for a united front against Japan began early. From March 25 to 27, 1919, at least 140 leaders including Yi Tong-hwi, Pak Ün-shik, Hong Pŏm-do, Kim Rip and Mun Ch'ang-bŏm, formed in Vladivostok, a Noin Tongmaeng-Dan, or Elders' Alliance, with branches in Nicholsk and Pu-ch'ao.\(^{44}\) Hong Pŏm-do immediately merged his Taehan Tongnip-Dan (Korea Independence Corps) with the Hun Ch'un Korean National Society, thereby commanding 3,000 volunteers in eighty branches.\(^{45}\) Hong then organised his forces in co-operation with Yi Tong-hwi in Nicholsk-Ussuriisk, and in conjunction with Kwak Chong-sŏk's Independence Corps, conducted a number of ingenious forays across the Tumen River into Korea during December 1919.\(^{46}\) The following January, Hong established his

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44. GGPAB External Reports, 5.4.1919, Dokuritsu Undō ni kansuru Ken No. 22.


Headquarters in Manchuria and renamed his expanded troops as the Korea Independence Army (Taehan Tongnip-Gun). (47)

Yi Tong-hwi, Kim Rip and Mun Ch'ang-hông meanwhile dedicated themselves to the reorganisation and enlargement of the Korean National Assembly (Taehan Kungmin Ŭihoe), which had commenced in Siberia in March 1919 under Mun Ch'ang-bôm. In view of the considerable trouble caused by the largely peaceful and unarmed March First demonstrators, Mun considered that an equal number, if armed, could possibly liberate Korea, (48) a point of view which was, of course, favourably received by Yi Tong-hwi.

From its inception, the National Assembly had been seriously hampered by three factions: the North Kando Faction; the P'yo'ngan Faction; and the Seoul Faction. Yi, who as a native of South Hanyang Province stood outside these parochial factions, was appointed Commander-in-Chief in May in the hope that thereby unity would be maintained. (49) Yi succeeded in building up the Assembly into an organisation of such strength that the Japanese earnestly sought his arrest. For in June, the co-operation of the Hun-ch'un volunteers was secured, (50) while through Yi close ties existed with the Provisional Government. Since the P'yo'ngan Faction was predominantly Christian, the National Assembly also enjoyed contact with American groups and the support of Kim Kyu-shik. Moreover, many of the North Kando Faction such as Innakencheyevich Kim were Bolshevik sympathisers trained under Russians and familiar with the Russian language. (51)

49. AJMIA, Oriental Development Company, 5.5.1919. Rôryô Dokuritsu Undô ni kansuru Ken.
51. AJMIA, Oriental Development Company, 5.5.1919. Rôryô Dokuritsu Undô ni kansuru Ken.
The precarious nature of the National Assembly's unity was soon manifest. When Ahn Chŏng-gŭn arrived in Manchuria to normalise relations with the Provisional Government Army Ministry, he met total opposition from the North Kando Faction under Mun Ch'ang-bŏm. A serious clash followed between Mun and Yi Tong-hwi's Second-in-Command, Kim Rip, in July 1919. Conspiring with Kim Kyu-myŏn, the leader of a Christian organisation claiming 200,000 members, Kim Rip formed a breakaway group, the Korean New Citizens' Corps (Taehan Shinmin-Dan). Thereafter, strife between the two leaders seriously detracted from their effectiveness.

Attempts to unify forces continued throughout 1920. Ku Ch'un-sŏn, Commander of the Yen-chi District Branch of the National Assembly, had approached Sŏ Il in Wang-ch'ing on November 20, 1919, laying the basis for co-operation with Sŏ Il's North Kando-Russian Military Command (Pukno Kunjŏng-Sŏ). Provision for further co-operation was made when on May 3, 1920, when six military organisations including forces led by Kim Rip, Hong Pŏm-do, Sŏ Il and the Provisional Government, signed a charter of eighteen resolutions emphasising joint manoeuvres, discipline and a bi-monthly delegates' conference. During the same month, Mun Ch'ang-bŏm and Ko Ch'ang-il of the National Assembly negotiated with Pak Yong-man and Shin Ch'ae-ho of Peking concerning the preparation of troops between Irkutsk and Tomsk.

52. AJMIA, Oriental Development Company, 25.7.1919. Senjin no Kŏdŏ ni kansuru Ken.
From early June 1920, steps were taken towards a more comprehensive unification. The North Kando-Russia Military Command successfully pursued an agreement whereby North, West and East Kando organisations pledged their allegiance to the Provisional Government, arranged for the registration of all soldiers and for cooperation in army discipline, training and acquisition of weapons, and provided for mutual assistance in times of military and other threat. At a second meeting on June 18, a liaison was formed with Bolshevik forces in Khabarovsk and the unification of all Kando groups under one head was envisaged. At a third meeting for unification on July 20, it was agreed after endless complications and qualifications to establish an executive body, the Korea Citizens’ Corps (Taehan Mindan) under Ku Ch’un-sŏn, and a military authority divided into two commands, the East Provinces Military Command (Tongdo Kunjŏng-Sŏ) and the Independence Army Command (Tongnip Kun-Sŏ), under Sŏ Il and Hong Pŏm-do respectively. The Provisional Government Military Advisor, Ahn Chŏng-gŭn, thereupon despatched 300 men to collect 4,000 small arms negotiated from the Bolsheviks in Heilung-ch’ou by Yi Tong-hwi. At the same time, Ahn arranged commissions in the Kando regions for several hundred graduates of Heilung-ch’ou Yangsŏng Revolutionary College.

This bold union was no sooner effected, with Headquarters established in Yen-chi, than leadership problems shook its hard-earned unity. In August, dissension arose between Sŏ Il and

57. Governor-General to Foreign Minister, 10.6.1920. Tŏ, Sei Kantō Gunseishō Renraku ni kansuru Ken.
Hong Pŏm-do, and as rivalries quickly emerged elsewhere, Hong moved to Yen-chi where he persuaded Ku Ch'un-sŏn and Ahn Chŏng-gŭn to move Headquarters to Wang-ch'ing in North Kando in November.\(^{60}\) In so doing, these leaders reasserted the former predominance of the North Kando Faction and destroyed the balance so vital to the unification. The divisive effect of both leadership rivalries and particularistic loyalties coupled with distance and Japanese counter-maneuvers, is reflected in Governor-General Saitō's notification at the end of 1920 that there existed 985 known resistance organisations. By 1922, this figure rose to over 3,000.\(^{61}\)

It would however be unreasonable to conclude from these figures that the military organisations were disorganised, weak and ineffective. Indeed, the great number or organisations in itself bears witness to the extraordinary energy of the resistance, the abundance of volunteers and the determination to act. Irrespective of parochialism and factionalism, it was impossible to support a large number of soldiers in one locality or move an army across foreign soil. Given also the vast territories and the threat of mass-extermination by Japanese, and later Chinese forces, the organisation of relatively small, self-contained guerilla bands was no doubt the most practical course, and not ineffective.

From mid-1919, military loyalties had gradually stabilised within their polarisations around the prestigious leaders, so that the period July 1919 to September 1920 was the heyday of military initiatives

\(^{60}\) GG Kantŏ Bureau to Saitō, 28.8.1920, Taikan Hokurō Tokugunfu no Naiko ni Kansuru Ken; 29.8.1920, Hokurō Tokugunfu to Kokuminkai to no Kattō Shi Ken; Government-General Archives, Kanjo, No. 65, 15.11.1920, Hong Pŏm-do-Ra no Butai Rashikŏ Hōmen Idŏ ni Kansuru Ken.

against Japanese troops. In one engagement in Ch'ungshai-li late 1919, Korean volunteers reportedly wiped out a Japanese force of one thousand men. (62) The Provisional Government recorded that Hong Pŏn-do crossed the Tumen River thirty-two times between March and June 1920, destroying Japanese installations and equipment besides engaging Japanese troops successfully on thirty-four occasions. (63) Forays across both Yalu and Tumen Rivers were frequently reported to Seoul, whilst fund-raising and volunteer recruitment were carried out continually inside Korea. (64) A significant factor in the manoeuvrability and success of guerilla bands at this point was undoubtedly the favourable attitude of the Chinese authorities.

The continual damage incurred by guerilla forays and the disturbing possibility of a comprehensive unification from Shanghai to Khabarovsky, prompted the Government-General in September 1920 to launch an intensive "clean-up" campaign in North Kando. Called the "Hun-ch'un Incident", this campaign was executed with thoroughness and considerable ferocity and destruction from September to December, encompassing Hun-ch'un, Wang-ch'ing, Yen-chi and as far south as Kuantien in Liaoning. The Japanese forces reported 522 Korean soldiers killed and 534 homes, churches and schools destroyed, of an estimated value of 66,850 Yen. (65) However, in a far more detailed list covering all Kando districts from October 9 to November 30, the

64. Vide, e.g. GGAHQ, No. 166, 13. 6. 1919; GGPAB, No. 25177, 31. 8. 1919; No. 28168, 4. 9. 1919; No. 29517, 18. 9. 1919; No. 33600, 2. 12. 1919.
65. 19th Divisional Headquarters, Kantō, 25. 2. 1921. Kantō Jiken Sen-Shijin Shisōsha Chō; 1. 3. 1921, Kantō Jiken Sen-Shijin Shōkyaku Kashitsu Chō.
Provisional Government claimed a total of 3,469 Koreans killed and 3,209 homes, 36 schools and 14 churches destroyed. (66)

The Hun-ch'un Incident also marked the beginning of Chinese-Japanese co-operation against Korean guerillas. Despite their sympathy, it became diplomatically impractical for the Chinese to countenance Korean anti-Japanese activities. The Mitsuya Agreement signed by Chang Tso-lin for China in June 1925, severely restricted the freedom of Korean groups in West Chientao who, for geographical reasons, had escaped the brunt of the Japanese offensive. (67) From April 1927, Japanese policy in the Kando regions became even more stringent with Tanaka Giichi leading the Seiyūkai Party. When Japan increased her influence in Manchuria from 1929, several military leaders, such as Yi T'ak of the Liberation Army (Kwangbok Kun), capitulated to the lure of Japan's "Kyōwa-Kai" (literally: Harmony Society), "discarding Korea like a pair of old shoes." (68) By 1931, Japan's might appeared invincible to the most stalwart of military leaders, and in the ensuing despair, Kim Ku steered the struggle in a new direction: terrorism.

Kim Ku, Provisional Government Prime Minister in 1926, belonged to a military organisation called the Ūiyŏl-Dan (Heroic Corps). Founded in Kirin on November 9, 1919, under Kim Won-bong, the Ūiyŏl-Dan condemned the move of some to "cultural" as opposed to "revolutionary" means to independence. (69) Until the realisation of independence, this

66. Provisional Government, Kando Communications Bureau, 17.12.1920, Sŏ, Puk Kando Tongp'o Chi Ch'amsang Hyŏlbo.
68. Ibid, pp 168-172.
69. TMS, p 120.
group announced, "acts of destruction against the enemy were to be considered justice; acts of slaughter, humanity." By 1925, when the Headquarters were established in Shanghai, its mentors included Shin Ch'ae-ho and Kim Kyu-shik. Active throughout the 1920's the Úiyŏl-Dan carried out a series of terrorist acts including the assassination of the Chief of Pusan Police in October 1920, and the attempted assassination of Tanaka Giichi in Shanghai on March 28, 1922. Hence when in 1931 Kim Ku formed from within the ranks of the Úiyŏl-Dan his Hanin Aeguk-Dan (Korean Patriotic Corps), a large number of Korean nationalists were emotionally inclined towards the anarchistic activities which followed.

For Kim Ku, the Patriotic Corps' assassination and sabotage programme was purposed to regain publicity for a depressed movement and to amend the unfavourable policies of the Chinese. His first act was a bold one. In mid-December he sent to Tokyo a Korean, Lee Bong-ch'ang, to seek an opportunity to assassinate the Japanese Emperor. Early in January, Lee sent Kim Ku a telegram: "WILL CERTAINLY SELL GOODS JANUARY 8 DO NOT WORRY." As the Japanese Emperor and Crown Prince were moving in procession through the Sakurada Gate in Tokyo, Lee hurled two grenades in their midst. Several guards were seriously wounded, but the Emperor and Prince escaped unscathed. Yet if the attempt itself failed, Chinese goodwill was certainly secured: on January 9 several Chinese

70. Yi Kang-hun, Military Movements, p 165.
71. TMS, pp 120-121. There were at least 5 other terrorist acts between 1920 and 1926.
72. The Patriotic Corps was actually a fictitious body, on paper, designed to avert responsibility for terrorism from the Provisional Government.
73. Yi Kang-hun, Provisional Government, p 177.
newspapers carried the headline, "Assassination of Japanese Emperor by Korean Lee Bong Ch'ang unfortunately failed (韓人李奉昌
狙擊日皇不幸不中)." (74) As letters of support and promises of aid reached Kim Ku, he and Yun Bong-kil prepared themselves for a further act of terrorism.

A Shanghai vegetable merchant, Yun Bong-kil had earlier approached Kim Ku concerning a function to be held in celebration of the Emperor's birthday at Hang-k'ou Park in Shanghai on April 29, 1932. (75) Seated on a platform on this occasion were the Consul-General Murai Kuramatsu, General Shirakawa Yoshinori (Commander of Japanese forces in Shanghai), Kawaba Teiji (Chairman of the Shanghai Japanese Residents' Association), Shigemitsu Mamoru (Minister Plenipotentiary to China), Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō, and Major-General Ueda Kenkichi. During speeches, Yun and Kim threw several grenades on to the platform, killing General Shirakawa and Kawaba Teiji and seriously wounding the others. (76) The following year witnessed two more significant though abortive assassination attempts directed against Honjō Shigeru, Commander of the Kwantung Army, and participants at a Chinese-Japanese conference concerning the suppression of Korean guerillas.

Kim Ku's terrorism was instrumental in obtaining only brief benefit for the independence movement abroad. Chiang Kai-shek offered the Ūiyŏl-Dan leader, Kim Won-bong, the use of training facilities and instructors, whilst by 1934 the Kuomintang provided the organisation

75. Ibid, p 188.
with a grant of 3,000 Yuan per month. Encouraged, the Ŭi'yŏl-Dan and four other major military organisations unified as the People's Revolutionary Party (Minjok Hyŏngmyŏng Tang) in July 1935. But as Kim Won-bong became firmly communist, he forfeited Chiang Kai-shek's patronage and caused a division within the Revolutionary Party. The Party suffered further decline when, shortly after its formation, the Ho-Umetsu Agreement was signed to terminate Chinese support of Korean revolutionaries.

Following the 1935 Ho-Umetsu Agreement, Japanese forces were firmly in control in Manchuria and northern China. Espionage, sabotage and assassination once more appeared the only course of action open to military organisations. However by this stage, Korean military leaders and their forces had gained considerable experience in guerilla warfare and evasive tactics. By 1936, these men eagerly awaited a full-scale war, a war which broke out perhaps sooner than they expected the following year.

Nationalist-Communist Experiments

The use of the term "communist" in application to various Korean groups and individuals between 1919 and 1937 warrants some care and discernment. By the nature of their situation, Korean nationalists were opportunistic in their relationships with non-Korean powers and systems. Consequently, non-communist organisations readily appealed to the USSR for support, professing communists frequently identified with "nationalistic" ideals and goals, and communist parties at times demonstrated a willingness to erect "common fronts" that drew

77. Ibid, pp 190 and 195.
78. Ibid, p 197.
rebuffs from Lenin. In general, up to 1937 at least, communism among Koreans may have been more an "influence" than a motivating ideology, more a means to independence than an historical movement towards an end. For it was in the context of the failure of self-determination and the cold shoulder of the Washington Conference that many turned with renewed hope to their Russian neighbours.

During the Russian Revolution of 1917, Koreans abroad for the most part were either insufficiently informed to take sides or were neutral by choice. But within a year their interest was attracted. Forced to flee to Khabarovsk because of his involvement in the 1911 Christian Conspiracy Case, Yi Tong-hwi founded in June 1918 the Hanin Sahoe Tang, or Korean Socialist Party. Although disillusioned by August 1919 with Bolshevik exclusivism, Yi nevertheless continued to profess socialism and sent his secretary, Pak Chin-sun, to Moscow to collect funds. Pak was intercepted on his return and relieved of a large proportion of the 400,000 Rubles allegedly received in Moscow, by the All-Russian Korean Communist Party established in Irkutsk as a branch of the Inkutsk Communist Party. Thus even before any attempt was made to introduce communism into Korea, considerable friction arose between what hardened into the Irkutsk and Shanghai Factions.

Since by March 1919 Pak Chin-sun became regarded by the Comintern as the most forthright and productive of the Korean communists, Yi's group was initially considered the official Korean Communist Party. Thereupon Yi established in April-May 1920 the Koryø


Communist Party, named after a classical Korean Kingdom, and
proclaimed the liberation of Korea, the elimination of capitalism and
the formation of a Korean Soviet Government as his Party's platform.
As Head of the Translation Department, Yŏ Un-hyŏng immediately
translated for distribution in the Kando districts the "Communist
Manifesto". (82)

But at the Third (Asian) International during July-August 1920,
conflict arose over whether Pak Chin-sun or Han Hyŏng-gwon of
Irkutsk was the official delegate. Strife over the destination of two
million roubles received from Lenin further intensified bitterness, (83)
and matters came to a head violently in June 1921 in the "Free City
Incident" at Alexeyev. Surrounding Yi's volunteers as they were
preparing an offensive against the Japanese, the Irkutsk Faction killed
600 and captured a further 917 men in what was undoubtedly the most
tragic example of leadership rivalry in the whole period. Yi immediately
appealed to the Comintern, which condemned the action and demanded the
release of the prisoners. But as Boris Shumiatsky, the Head of the
USSR Far Eastern Bureau supervised the Irkutsk Faction, the Shanghai
Faction steadily lost favour until by April 1922, Yi devoted his con-
siderable energy more exclusively to military activity. (84) By this
stage, a third communist faction based in Chita had arisen. The
Comintern impatiently dissolved all three factions in February 1923
to form a Korean Bureau under Voitinsky and Katayama Sen in
Vladivostok. (85) This Bureau survived barely more than a year.

1960, p 16.
83. Ibid, p 17; Yi Kang-hun, Provisional Government, p 93.
84. Suh Dae-sook, Communist Movement, pp 31-34.
85. Ibid, pp 41-44.
Despite the disarray among communists abroad, a Korean Communist Party was formed in Seoul on four occasions under very difficult circumstances. Well-known inside Korea, Yi Tong-hwi maintained contact with the "Dong-A Daily" editor, Song Chin-u, while the reports of Korean delegates at the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow and Petrograd in early 1922 allayed the suspicions of nationalists concerning Russian designs. Yŏ Un-hyŏng confessed on his return, "I met Lenin in Moscow. Until I met him, I was worried Russia might order the propagation of communism, just as it stood, in Korea, but having met, my doubts have to some extent been dispelled ..." Also a delegate, Kim Kyu-shik expressed the contrast between the 1921 Washington Conference and Lenin's support: "Even the great republic of America, which has made so much ado about its 'altruistic' pretences and its world-wide 'democratic' principles, threw off its mask at the Washington Conference ... The First Congress gave expression to the need of a 'get-together' on the part of the peoples of Eastern Asia ... Korean independence must be achieved with the assistance of Russia."

Consequently, several communist societies were formed inside Korea between 1921 and 1925, aligned with their counterparts in Siberia, Shanghai and Tokyo. Under Shanghai auspices, a Seoul Youth League was founded in 1921. The Irkutsk Faction sent Kim Chae-bong and Cho Pong-am (who later ran for presidency against Syngman Rhee) into Korea in 1923, and by November 1924 established the Tuesday Society (Hwayo-Hoe) as its official arm in Korea. Tokyo students

88. Suh Dae-sook, Communist Movement, pp 39-40. Some Asians at the Congress were also shocked at the deprivations suffered by commoners in the "workers' paradise".
89. Dong, Colonial Policy, pp 283-284.
Korea and the "Kando" Provinces
at the same time organised in Seoul the North Wind Society (Pukp'ung-Hoe), so that by the end of 1924, there were three competing factions in Seoul. Although there was a noticeable swing to the Left among youth especially, the influence of Lee Kwang-su's "self-strengthening" programme was broader, and the communists comprised only a minority.

Following two successful conferences in Seoul in April 1924 involving labour groups, plans were laid for a Korean Communist Party. From February 1925, Yŏ Un-hyŏng corresponded through the Provisional Government communications network with Pak Hŏn-yŏng in Seoul with regard to organising a unified communist movement in Korea. Under cover of an All-Korea News Reporters' Conference, Pak formed the First Korean Communist Party on April 15, 1925. The three factions were included in a seven-member Central Executive Committee chaired by Kim Chae-bong, while Cho Pong-am headed a three-member Central Inspection Committee.

The existence of a Communist Party in Korea was discovered with alarm by Japanese police in November 1925 after a foolish flag-waving demonstration in Shinŭiju, South P'yŏngan. In this Shinŭiju Incident, thirty prominent communist leaders were arrested, including Kim Chae-bong who, fearing capture, had already briefed Kang Tal-yang as his successor. Outraged by this betrayal, the Seoul Youth Faction

90. Suh Dae-sook, Communist Movement, Loc. Cit.
93. GGPAB, August 1926. Chŏsen Kyŏsantō Jiken no Kenkyo Temmatsu.
95. GGPAB, August 1926. Chŏson Kyŏsantō Jiken no Kenkyo Temmatsu.
withdrew to form its own party, the Ch'jun Kyŏngwon Party. Kang thereupon formed the Second Korean Communist Party in February 1926, but only added to the disunity by expelling all North Wind Society members from leading positions. (96)

Meanwhile, Cho Pong-am petitioned the Comintern for recognition of the Korean Communist Party. On March 3, 1926, the Comintern intimated the possibility of such, whereupon Kim Ch'an and Kim Tan-ya were sent to Moscow. In May recognition was granted and a budget prepared. Yŏ Un-hyŏng sent Pak Ung-ch'il into Korea as official liaison, communications being directed through Shinŭiju and Antung. (97)

On learning from Pak Ung-ch'il the situation inside Korea, the Comintern sent a directive through Shanghai to reunify and organise a nation-wide movement to coincide with Emperor Sunjong's funeral on June 10, "to test the revolutionary potential of the masses." (98) Kwon O-sŏl, head of the Youth League, met Kim Tan-ya from Shanghai in Antung, where details of this proposed repeat of the March First Movement were hurriedly planned. But only a few days before the State Funeral, the whole project was exposed and forestalled. Kwon himself was arrested in Seoul on June 6 while 5,000 pamphlets mailed by Kim Tan-ya, together with 50,000 copies of the Declaration printed in Seoul, were confiscated the next day. (99) Hence although over 400,000 attended the State Funeral and spontaneous, student-led demonstrations were held, the police were well-prepared with over 8,000 infantry, cavalry and artillery alerted in all main centres. (100)

96. Suh Dae-sook, Communist Movement, pp 77-80.
97. GGPAB, August 1926; Seoul High Court Investigation Bureau, Thought Department, Shisō Geppo Vol. 2, No. 7, November 1932; Vol. 2, No. 8, December 1932.
98. GGPAB, August 1926.
99. GGPAB, August 1926.
100. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 289.
As a result of this abortive movement, known as the Six-Ten Incident, the ranks of the Communist Party were decimated and the Irkutsk-sponsored Tuesday Society was permanently weakened. A fight begun by drunk Youth League members led to further investigations. Kang Tal-yang disclosed under torture the links with Kim Tan-ya, Kim Ch'an, Yŏ Un-hyŏng, Yi Tong-hwi and the Comintern, besides the names of Korean communists in Japan and the location of seventeen Party branches in Korea.\(^{(101)}\) In Japan, Korean communist students viewed the downfall of the Second Party with concern, and after the dissolution of their own organisation by police at the close of 1925,\(^{(102)}\) a wave of students returned to Korea to form a third party.

Members of the January Society (Ilwol-Hoe), these students immediately merged with their protégé, the North Wind Society. Amidst dissension and opposition from the Seoul Faction, January Society leaders propounded the theory of a nationalist insurrection as an initial step towards a full communist revolution.\(^{(103)}\) Thus there arose a Leninist Faction composed mainly of January and North Wind Society members who by February 1927 succeeded in organising the Third Korean Communist Party in a united front with the nationalists under a new organ: The Shingan-Hoe. Whilst the hegemony of the Shingan-Hoe was to be guarded under the "one country, one party" principle, both the Communist Party and the Seoul Youth League formed cells within Shingan-Hoe departments and branches to disseminate Marxist teaching on class inequality and labour and agrarian economics.\(^{(104)}\)

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101. GGPAB, August 1926.
104. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
Gaining no headway against the nationalists in this united front, the Third Communist Party was disrupted in November 1927, when rivalry between the Leninist and Seoul Factions became so intense as to become publicly noticeable. "Leninists" were constantly exposed to arrest thereafter, and after the discovery of subversive material in a suitcase of a leading exponent in June 1928, their influence dwindled. (105) With the support of the Comintern, Han Wi-kŏn and Ch'ă Kŏm-bong of Shanghai stepped in to organise the Fourth Korean Communist Party in conjunction with the Seoul Youth League in March 1928.

Han Wi-kŏn, the former student leader during the March First Movement, redirected Party policy towards the intended end of the united front, that of extending communist influence, yet with no more success. (106) Arrested early in October 1928, the Youth League leader, Kim Chae-myŏng, confessed to documents hidden in an acacia grove behind Severance Hospital. These contained directives to each provincial leader, with names attached, so that by October 5, 175 communist leaders were arrested. (107)

In view of this repeated failure, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern outlined the mistakes of each Party in its 1928 "December Theses" and placed heavy emphasis on the error of "capitulating" to the nationalists in the united front movement. (108) In January 1929, Korean communists in Manchuria unanimously, but uncritically, accepted these Theses, but subsequent attempts by Kim Tan-ya (1929), Kim Ch'ŏl-su (1930) and Han Wi-Kŏn (1931-1932) to establish parties inside Korea were complete failures. (109)

105. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
106. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
107. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
It is clear that Lenin and the Comintern failed to appreciate the extreme difficulties communists faced in Korea. Even when acting in co-operation with nationalists in the Shingan-Hoe from 1927, communists lacked support and opportunity. The nationalists retained the loyalty of the rural community, while the fact that the majority of the 175 arrested in October 1928 were students may well indicate the lack of grass-roots involvement of the communist movement as a whole. (110) These circumstances were not considered in the tasks set the Korean communists by Safarov in January 1926:

"While fully realising that this movement is a bourgeois democratic movement, we are nevertheless supporting it, as we support every nationalist movement for emancipation because it is directed against imperialism ... There it is Japan which is the imperialist power which has destroyed the Korean aristocracy. Therefore, it is right to speak there of the united national front, but, at the same time, one must expose, in the most determined fashion, every attempt to achieve the emancipation of the country by compromise and pacifism." (111)

Without compromise, the Korean communists were weak and unable to act; and unless pacifist, they were immediately imprisoned under the special measures Japan had enacted against communism. Hence, quite unreasonably, the Comintern condemned the Koreans as "right-wing opportunists" if they worked in popular fronts, and "left-wing extremists" if their strict communism destroyed popular fronts. (112)

Korean communism in the colonial period also suffered from continual defection to the nationalist ranks. Yŏ Un-hyŏng, a Christian, could not reconcile himself to the atheistic tone of communism and later withdrew altogether. (113) Many who toyed with communism in the early 1920's later became disenchanted, including Kim Kyu-shik and Pak Ŭn-shik. Even confirmed Party members such as Kim Ch'ŏl,

110. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
112. Ibid, p 164.
Kim Tu-bong and Cho Pong-am left their colleagues, whilst Yi Tong-hwi epitomises the nationalistically minded patriot who became disillusioned with Russianised "purists". The communists did, however, make a positive mark on the independence movement in its formation of KAPF (Korea Artiste Preletarienne Federation) in July 1925, out of which there emerged for the first time constructive debates between the various schools of thought on political, social and economic method and end. (114)

The Taedong-Dan, Shingan-Hoe and Religious Movements

Despite the extreme difficulty of operating a nationalist movement within Korea after 1919, there were some who looked askance at the "emptying" of Korea of nationalist leaders by emigration. This stance was assumed particularly by Christians and Ch'ŏndogyo adherents who felt constrained to work amongst their own people rather than enjoy the freer and ostensibly more rewarding movement abroad. Yet as the communist experience demonstrated, nationalists inside Korea were forced to moderate their activities in order to survive, and for this reason, were often regarded by their counterparts abroad as less than patriotic. This opinion survives today and is no doubt partly responsible for the neglect or unsympathetic treatment of the nationalist movement inside Korea after 1919. (115) Yet the history of this resistance should share equal significance with the struggle abroad and demands to be redeemed from an unfavourable historical perspective.

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115. For example Suh Dae-sook (Communist Movement, p 209) puts Lee Kwang-su in the category of "collaborator", while a modern commentary on Lee Kwang-su's "My Confession" suggests Lee was not a true patriot. Vide Infra, Chapter 7.
1. The Taedong-Dan.

Witnessing the severe repression of the March First Movement, a number of members of the pro-Japanese Ch'in-II P'a, the revived Ilchín-Hoe, (116) became disillusioned. One such was Chŏn Hyŏp, a noble and former Central Council member. Together with another of Yang-ban nobility, Ch'oe Ik-hwan, Chŏn Hyŏp organised in August 1919 his Taedong-Dan, or Unity Corps, which quickly won members from all strata, and secretly printed the "Taedong Newspaper". (117) Then in November, Chŏn Hyŏp contrived an incident which caused the Japanese considerable alarm.

In October, Chŏn had informed Prince Yi (who under the dynastic title of Sunjong had succeeded Emperor Kojong in January 1919) of the Provisional Government and confided his plan to send leading Koreans to Shanghai. The new Emperor agreed to attempt his own escape to Shanghai along with Kim Ka-jin, a former Minister of Justice. (118) The latter reached Shanghai early November, while Prince Yi boarded a third-class carriage at Seoul Station on November 9. (119) But as the Emperor was changing trains in Antung two days later, a step from freedom, he was discovered and arrested. (120)

Nevertheless, a "state address" prepared by Prince Yi reached Shanghai and to the consternation of the Japanese, was immediately published. Consisting of four points, the last was most important:

"I too, am simply one Korean among others. I do not wish to live as a royal personnage under amalgamation with Japan, but rather consider it preferable to live as an ordinary citizen in an independent Korea. Thus I have resolved to go out and join hand and heart with those in the Provisional Government

116. Supra, Chapter 1.
117. GGPAB, No. 33431, 24.11.1919, Ri Kŏ Kŏ Jiken; TMS, p 151.
118. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
120. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
and exert myself for our liberation, in life or death, so that even though just one among ten thousand, I may share in the pains and efforts of my brothers." (121)

Surprising for its dismissal of Korea's long-standing monarchism, this address inspired many to join the Taedong-Dan. But after the large number arrested in the wake of this incident, the futility of peaceful efforts was again felt, and from Shanghai, Kim Ka-jin exhorted sacrifice: Koreans must fight, for "this fighting is the final means, and in this fighting lies the final outcome." (122) Thereupon, a wave of Taedong-Dan members left Korea to join the Provisional Government forces.

2. The Shingan-Hoe.

The removal abroad of the Taedong-Dan headquarters was a great loss to the movement within Korea, but between 1919 and 1927 there were formed a number of (non-communist) societies of note. Significant in the earlier years were the activities of the commercial sector which continued its shop-shutting and boycotting with greater organisation. After a meeting of South Cholla businessmen in October 1919, a business co-operative was formed, through which they campaigned with some success for the recovery of Koreans' economic rights. (123) Eventually, in December 1922, a Self-Production Society (Chajak-Hoe) was established with the following charter:

"The Korean people must unite to use Korean commodities only, rejecting all imported goods.

The Korean people must urgently produce all necessary goods for themselves.

The Korean people must not mortgage or sell land, but rather strive to purchase it." (124)

122. TMS, 6.3.1920, p 152.
Among women and youth and religious, labour and farmers' organisations, boycott leagues were formed, while by February 1923, a Society for the Encouragement of Native Products (Mulsan Changnyŏ-Hoe) established in P'yŏngyang in August 1920, had formed branches in nearly every village, to the intense vexation of the Japanese. Reinforced by the efforts of Lee Kwang-su and other Tokyo students who organised "circuit lectures" on rural self-help and improvement from 1922, such leagues and societies continued into the 1930's. Other ad hoc bodies also arose, such as the Korean Affairs Research Society and the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of a People's University under Yi Sang-jae and Yi Sŏng-hun in 1924. But in 1927, the nationalists came together in a formidable, and legal, coalition: the Shingan-Hoe.

Composed of leaders of press, religion, labour and, as examined above, communism, the Shingan-Hoe was until disbanded in 1931, a truly national body, possible only because of the temporary thaw on Saito's return in 1927 for a second term as Governor-General. Among its presidents were recognised and proven nationalist leaders such as the Christian, Yi Sang-jae, the Ch'ŏndogyo March First veteran, Kwon Tong-jin, and the Buddhist member of the "Thirty-Three", Han Yong-un.

After meetings late in 1926 between Song Chin-u, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, Han Yong-un and Kwon Tong-jin, the Japanese authorities were approached through an official, Shin sŏk-u. On receiving official approval, the Shingan-Hoe was formally opened as a representative body, on February 2, 1927, with Yi Sang-jae its first President. In May, a sister-body, the Kŭn-U-Hoe was organised, dominated by

125. TMS, Chosen Mulsan Changnyŏ-Hoe, August 1920.
126. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 283; Chen I-te, Japanese Colonialism, p 300.
Christians under Kim Hwal-Lan. (127) The Shingan-Hoe grew rapidly, and by 1927 boasted 138 branches and a membership of approximately 37,000. While consistently lobbying the Government-General on its colonial policies, emphasising economic reform and freedom of speech, assembly, politics and scientific research, the Shingan-Hoe also concerned itself with the education and improvement of the Korean people. (128) (For programme and policy, see Appendix 4.)

A major contribution of the Shingan-Hoe to the independence movement was its clandestine sponsorship and development of the November 1929 Kwangju student demonstration into a national movement by 1930. The eruption of November 3, 1929, in which over 400 Korean students in Kwangju, South Cholla, marched through the city bearing makeshift weapons, (129) was essentially a protest against the discriminatory education policy. (130) Students had staged walk-outs, sometimes with violence, on several occasions since 1919. After a boycott of Seoul First Public High School and a protracted struggle in Sungmyo Girls' High School (Seoul) in 1927-1928, a nation-wide students' association, the Chonguk Haksaeng Hyongho Tongmaeng, had been formed with the slogan: "Down with colonial education!" (131) By 1929, students throughout Korea were ready for a movement par excellence.

127. GGPAB, No. 8036, 27.10.1928.
130. Vide Supra, Chapter 3.
131. Kim Song-shik, Student Movements, p 188ff.
The Kwangju Student Movement had been well organised. From September 1928, several students began to meet twice-monthly to discuss economic and educational inequalities from a Marxist standpoint. In June 1929, a former Kwangju student, Chang Chae-sŏng, returned from studies in Tokyo and counselled student leaders of the two Korean High Schools and an Agricultural College to combine. A Reading Society (Toksŏ-Hoe) was duly formed in early September, funds were collected, literature prepared, and the South Chŏlla Shingan-Hoe Branch notified by November. \(132\) After the conflagration on November 3, the Central Shingan-Hoe office in Seoul sent observers to Kwangju, who recommended on their return a nation-wide movement. \(133\)

On December 10, President Kwon-Tong-jin contacted Song Chin-u and Han Yong-un to arrange a speech meeting in Seoul, the distribution of pamphlets, and notification of students and Shingan-Hoe branches in other provinces. Although on December 13 the police arrested the heads of the main Shingan-Hoe departments, the speeches were held and simultaneous demonstrations occurred in other areas. \(134\)

Spreading rapidly, the movement was not quelled until March 1930, by which time an estimated 30,000 Koreans had participated. \(135\) The uprising involved 194 schools totalling 54,000 pupils, of whom 582 were expelled and 2,330 suspended. \(136\) In all, 1,642 Koreans were arrested, and of the 335 sentenced to imprisonment, 232 were students and 14 were teachers. \(137\)

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132. Kwangju District Court Criminal Records Bureau, Vol. 5, No. 46, 8, 10, 1930.
134. GGPAB, Loc. Cit.
135. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 290.
137. Seoul High Court Investigation Bureau, Thought Department, Shisŏ Geppo No. 6, September 1931.
The organisation of this nation-wide protest proved to be the Shingan-Hoe's undoing; as far as the Japanese were concerned, this "legal" body had overstepped its mark. When the Shingan-Hoe applied for permission to hold its Third National Assembly in February, 1930, the Government-General had naturally refused. (138) The Shingan-Hoe strove to maintain its viability, but after the arrest and consequent weakening of the communists during the uprising, communists actively sought its dissolution. Outlawed, the nationalists' efforts to reorganise failed, and the Shingan-Hoe was dissolved in May, 1931. (139)

3. Religious Groups

As an indigenous religion with a history of xenophobia, Ch'o'ndogyo continued after 1919 to confine its activities to Korea, with notable exceptions. In 1920 a Ch'o'ndogyo Youth League was founded, which by 1923 developed into a fully-fledged political party called the Ch'ongu-Tang, dedicated to the Establishment of Heaven on Earth (Chisang Ch'onguk Kǒnsǒl). At the end of 1923, the Ch'ongu-Tang claimed a membership of 30,000 in 120 branches. (140) But by 1925, a serious split occurred in the leadership when Kwon Tong-jin withdrew his Old Faction (Ku P'a) from the main body under Ch'oe Rin known as the New Faction (Shin P'a). (141) For following Son Pyong-hi's death in 1922, Pak In-ho was unable to hold the movement together, especially as Ch'oe Rin began to espouse socialism.

After visiting Tokyo and south-east Russia from April 1927 to February 1928, Ch'oe Rin returned to Korea to establish the Chosŏn Nongmin Sa, or Peasants' League, as a distinct socialist alternative

138. Suh Dae-sook, Communist Movement, p 129.
139. Ibid, p 130.
140. Weems, B. B., Reform, Rebellion and the Heavenly Way, pp 83-84.
141. Ibid, p 82.
to communism. For his part, Kwon Tong-jin organised within the Shingan-Hoe the New Korea Party (Shinnhan-Tang). The Chŏngu-Tang itself concentrated on the cultural and economic welfare of Koreans until several leaders were arrested in April 1931, on discovery by police of plans for a major drive for 1935-1936, when a political crisis was anticipated in Japan. By 1934, hundreds of Ch'ŏndogyo members were imprisoned and, without external aid, the Ch'ŏndogyo political endeavour came to a virtual standstill.

The Christian community initially fared better, because of its support abroad, organisational strength, and the diffusion of its leaders among practically all the existing nationalist organisations. The Christian Church was the strongest, most influential single organisation in Korea, and an early missionary, Dr W. Blair, wrote that had the Church as a body declared itself against Japan even in 1907, "thousands would have welcomed her leadership and flocked to her banner... Korea, like the Roman Empire, would have adopted Christianity in a day..." Yet on principle, the Church refused, as an institution, to become a political organ or party. Hence, regardless of the activities of individual Christians and churches in the Singan-Hoe, "circuit lectures" or education and social improvement schemes, the Church as a whole opposed the authorities only on matters touching its belief.

When in 1925, the "Chosen Shrine" was opened in Seoul and schools were ordered to make obeisance before the Shintō monument, the Christian Church became embroiled in a conflict that at source was apolitical but which had political repercussions. Christian schools

142. GGPAB, No. 8036, 27.10.1928.
simply refused compliance on grounds of conscience. Baron Saitō vainly "clarified" the order as "simply and purely venerating ancestors", a political, not a religious ceremony. (145) Korean Christians were not yet accustomed to the secular/sacred dichotomy popular in the West, and in view of the explicit Protestant rejection of all forms of idol worship, could not compare obeisance at Shinto shrines with laying wreaths on the tomb of an "unknown soldier!" The Church's resistance continued successfully to 1931.

Succeeding Saitō as Governor-General in 1931, Ugaki renewed the "Jinja Sampei" (Shrine obeisance) order to all schools. Dr George McCune, an American missionary and president of P'yo'ngyang Sungshil College, was ordered personally by the provincial governor to perform the rite at the P'yo'ngyang Shrine. Strongly advised by twenty-six Korean Presbyterian ministers in P'yo'ngyang to make no compromise, Dr McCune was forced to leave Korea within three months. In Ch'ŏngju, Southern P'yo'ngan, two missionaries, Otto de Camp and Dr D. Cane were imprisoned. (146) Pressure against Koreans was naturally far more intense, and as threats, imprisonments, torture, death and economic sanctions confronted them, the issue became one of survival, and many Christians submitted. (147)

The political ramifications of the Church's opposition were thrown into even sharper relief when on 29 January 1937, the Government-General invited Church leaders to hear the official position. Watanabe, the Chief of the Education Bureau, explained that, "The education system has the object of training loyal subjects as well as giving

146. Ibid, pp 165-167.
knowledge. Therefore, school teachers and pupils must make obeisance at the Shrine. "(148) The Methodist Church accepted the official explanation at face-value and freed her members. But the Presbyterian Church continued to resist at great cost, principally in South Kyŏngsang and the P'yŏngan Provinces and northern Manchuria. A P'yŏngyang minister, Pak Kwan-chun, visited Ugaki on three occasions to plead for the repeal of the Jinja edict in 1937. (149) But Christian objections ran completely counter to the Shintō concept of Hakko Ichiu - All the World Under One Roof - which Foreign Minister Matsuoka later stated to be the spiritual basis of the Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere. (150) Short of death, resistance became impracticable.

Confronted by an increasingly militarist Japan, the Korean independence movement by the outbreak of the 1937 Sino-Japanese War was to all appearances losing ground on all fronts. Retreating inland, the Provisional Government was barely functioning; the "diplomats" were exhausted and unrewarded; military organisations were divided and caught between Chinese and Japanese forces; communists were decimated by arrest, wracked with factionalism, and losing favour with the Comintern. Inside Korea, the mainstays of the movement - the Ch'ŏndogyo and Christian organisations - were divided or severely persecuted. Many nationalists and communists awaited, the majority hoped for, a war between Japan and Russia or America, their only perceivable hope.

CHAPTER VII. ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISM

Variations in the interpretation and evaluation of nationalism are legion, and possibly there is reflected here an intimate connection with the problem of imposing models and paradigms on whatever subject matter is in question. Certainly this is demonstrable in the case of Korea under Japanese rule, particularly in relation to its central experience of March, 1919. Of this, Baldwin was moved to write, "The March First Movement was a milestone in the growth of Korean nationalism and resistance to Japanese rule. The movement sustained Korean morale after 1920 and has encouraged patriotism to this day."¹ Yet Suh Dae-sook passed a radically critical judgement on the whole movement: "This was perhaps the largest mass movement of the Korean people, but it was only great in the number of casualties, for it did not achieve anything substantial in relation to the magnitude of the disaster. Nor was it influenced by the October Revolution, but rather, if the uprising may be attributed to anything, it was Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination which inspired not the politicians but the religious leaders ... who led the people to a political disaster."²

Such diversity of verdicts invites comment. Suh's antithetical relationship between religious and political leaders ignores the fact that any Koreans in 1919 qualifying for the title "politician", were employees of the Japanese, and as such, collaborators. Moreover, the succeeding leadership, whether nationalist, "Communist", of Provisional Government, military organisations or Shingan-Hoe,

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¹ Baldwin, March First Movement, p 5.
² Quoted in Ibid, p 9.
remained predominantly Christian, Ch'ŏndogyo and Buddhist.\(^3\)
Likewise Baldwin, when arguing that the "example of the 1919 demon-
strations continues to sustain and uplift Koreans struggling to build a
viable country \[and\] continues to be central to the historical and
emotional experience of Korea,\(^4\) glosses over the facts that in
North Korea the "March First Movement" has little factual connection
with the historical movement, that the national holiday in South Korea
on March 1 bears little more cultural weight than, for example,
ANZAC Day in New Zealand, and that recently scholars in the South
concluded that the direct progeny of the Movement, the Provisional
Government, "can by no means be considered the precursor or basis
of the Republic of Korea."\(^5\) Thus any summary rejection or approval
of the March First Movement as a significant landmark in Korean
nationalism appears too easy.

This weakness in the evaluation of the March First, and subsequent
movements, is, in the writer's opinion, resultant of a neglect of the
subjective and often deeply emotional constraints motivating the Korean
leaders, combined with a perhaps unwitting, in any case uncritical,
adoption of contemporary frameworks. Hence the interpretation of the
March First Movement according to a desired outcome, and hence also,
the crediting to the Movement weaknesses or significance which its
own history denies. Over against this, Joohan Huizinga cautioned:

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3. Vide, e.g. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 340. A military police survey on
Korean attitudes in 1936 revealed that whereas public officials were
the least active, 46.4\% of religious leaders questioned indicated they
were actively seeking independence - and this in reply to police
questionnaires! Next highest at 24.7\% were the "intellectuals".
5. This statement was made in November 1977 at a Symposium on
"Minjok Sa ū Iyŏm" (Concepts of National History), 8 years after
Baldwin completed his thesis. However, the significant shift in
attitude to the March First Movement since 1963 is unaccounted for
in Baldwin's evaluation.
"The historian... must always maintain towards his subject an indeterminist point of view. He must constantly put himself at a point in the past at which the known factors still seem to permit different outcomes." (6) An important principle in connection with any historical study, there is a very real demand for a responsible primary analysis of the Korean independence movement on its own terms, before taking proper advantage of the overview and relative distance enjoyed by the historian today.

As argued in the preface, there has been a disproportionate emphasis on external factors, especially on the role Japan played in Korean nationalism. Thus Chen I-te argues that, whilst Korean nationalism was not created by Japan, the transformation from xenophobia (i.e. "traditional" nationalism) to "modern" nationalism was. (7) Yet linguistic evidence indicates that for the Korean, regardless of the question of transition, xenophobia and "modern" nationalism are not antithetical, and further, that in the Korean mind, patriotism and nationalism are not distinctive concepts let alone denotations of "stages" in national consciousness. There is evident, therefore, a pressing need to attend to the internal dynamics of the Korean struggle, with a view to discovering concepts of patriotism and nationalism which are equal to the task of addressing the problems of continuity and progression in a non-Western setting.

Whilst much of the difficulty involved in such an attempt is, as seen, the scattered and apparently fragmented nature of the independence movement whose participants directed their loyalties to individual leaders and regions, vagueness regarding the term "patriotism" and

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"nationalism" in their application to Korea causes perhaps the greater difficulty. In the earlier quotation from Baldwin, "patriotism" and "nationalism" appear synonymous. Suh Dae-sook distinguishes the terms in claiming that Korean independence movements were "more a patriotic resistance than a function of nationalism," yet exactly what "function" one should ascribe to Korean nationalism and why, is unexplained. Huizinga has defined patriotism as the "will to maintain and defend what is one's own and cherished;" as distinct from the "powerful drive to dominate, the urge to have one's own nation... assert itself above, over, and at the cost of others," which he classifies as nationalism. But since it is claimed that "patriotism" and "nationalism" are phenomena relatively recent to Europe and by no means commonplaces in history, are these definitions, or even the terms themselves, meaningful for this analysis? Does the rejection of Confucianism and the Chinese World-Order necessarily imply an adoption of "modern" nationalism?

To the degree they conformed to Confucian ideals and culture, China's neighbours were considered civilized, and Korea enjoyed a reputation for being a model Confucian vassal within the Chinese world-order. As such, Korea was certainly not nationalistic in Huizinga's, or perhaps any, sense. Within the system she was patriotic: she was


9. Huizinga, Johan, Men and Ideas, N. Y. Meridan Books Inc., 1959, pp 97-99. It is not suggested that these definitions are the best, but they are representative.

proud of her scholarship and culture, and resisted Japanese invasion. With the collapse of the Chinese world-order from the mid-nineteenth century, the traditional mutual security existing between China and Korea was eroded. From this point one can detect a growing consciousness among the leading class of the need to assert Korea's independence, but certainly not "above, over, and at the cost of others." Both the Tong-Hak and "progressive" leaders recognised the urgency of reorganisation of the nation, and most of the latter were amenable to Japanese sponsorship of their designs.

At the turn of the century, Korean reformism appeared willing to embark on a course similar to that of Meiji Japan. But with Japan's seeming betrayal of her ideals in the 1910 annexation of Korea, under which the "progressivists" fared badly and the former, corrupt officials were granted "Japanese peerage," reformist energies were diverted from their original purpose and directed almost exclusively against Japan. This pre-occupation was given concrete expression in the March First Movement. In this and following movements, whilst Huizinga's sense of patriotism is evident, his definition of nationalism is difficult to apply; so too, is Hans Kohn's, "Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind."(12)

Fortunately, the Koreans themselves have left us in their more reflective writings during this period a term which helps explain their own conception of their task. Besides the terms already given for nationalist - Minjok Juija and Kukka Juija - two other words are used in this connection: "Aejuk-ja," one who loves the country; and "Jisa," a man of noble will and public spirit. In the writings of Lee Kwang-su,

a term appears which is a combination of these, as "Aeguk-jisa". Thus meaning, "one who for love of country determines to act on its behalf," this term neatly encompasses patriotism and a flexible definition of nationalism. As already demonstrated, to the Korean, these two concepts are sides of the same coin, and the pursuit of distinct definitions, even in theory, only leads to a cul-de-sac. The object of this analysis then, is to discover the relationship between the thought and actions of the principal leaders at the different stages, with their self-understanding as "Aeguk-jisa".

The February Eighth and March First Movements

As a national movement, the March First Movement must certainly share equal importance with the mass movements of Banerjea, Tilak or Gandhi in India. Yet in example, inspiration and organisation, this Movement owed a great debt to the less well-known Tokyo Students' Declaration less than a month earlier. Not only did this entrance of students on to the stage of Korean political history indicate the change Korean society was undergoing, but, as a process of several years gestation, their movement also encompassed those questions which became burning issues in the post-1919 independence struggle. Nor was their political involvement without reason, for the students bore the brunt of one of the major sources of discontent among Koreans: the Government-General's discriminatory education policy. (13)

Beginning in earnest with the formation of the Haku-Hoe in October 1912, the student movement in Tokyo has been preserved in its essence in the speeches of its leaders. Initially, simple love of the country prevailed, in the limited vision of Kukkwon Hoebok (Recovery of

13. Vide Supra, Chapter 3.
National Rights), (14) but from mid-1917 the speeches evinced concern for the future organisation of Korea. Characterised by Christian thought and a realistic appraisal of Korea's position, student speeches recognised the fact that, as in the cases of America and India, independence would not be gained simply by asking for it. (15) Already in 1918, the options of complete independence and self-government were discussed, and at the close of the year, the students' realism and caution were embodied in the speech of Sŏ Ch'un, an influential leader. Sŏ argued that, "The annexation of the weak by the strong is an inescapable principle of life ... As individuals we must surely demand, on an equal footing, Justice, Freedom and Equality; but unless as a nation, as a body, we have actual power and ability, what profit can possibly result?" (16) Thus by 1918, the Tokyo students had covered the whole spectrum, bar violence, of the independence movement up to 1937: Christian involvement; an appeal to universal, liberal principles; self-government versus immediate independence; and self-strengthening.

Yet with extraordinary rapidity, this consensus, whereby students had admitted the validity of a wide range of activity on behalf of their race, was transformed into the narrow, uncompromising stance of the February Eighth Movement of 1919. Complete, unqualified independence was demanded: "Should our demands be refused, we will declare an eternal, bloody war against Japan, and we Koreans will bear no responsibility for any calamities such as may arise from it." (17)

17. AJMIA, Documents of the Tokyo Students' Independence Movement, 10.2.1919.
In spite of the varied influences we have noticed were acting on the Tokyo students since the annexation, (18) did this simply signify the triumph of the "traditional" attitude and spirit of the "Righteous Armies" of a decade earlier?

It is important to note that, unlike earlier resistance, the leaders of the independence movement by 1919 were in communication with each other, and consequently viewed their respective activities as contributions to the whole. As we have seen, the Tokyo students were in contact with fellow Koreans in America, with the Shanghai New Korea Youth Party, with Hyŏn Sang-yun in Korea, and with organisations in Peking - Chita - North Kando through Lee Kwang-su. When it is remembered also, that at this point all Korean leaders in these areas saw in the Versailles deliberations under Woodrow Wilson a promising vehicle of independence, the February Declaration with its goal of complete, immediate liberation, appears less incongruous with the preceding Tokyo student movement. Nevertheless it is clear that, regardless of any recognition of the need for Korea's social and economic improvement, the desire to be free from Japanese dominion was pre-eminent, and strong enough to invoke an uncompromising challenge when opportunity permitted. After 1919, the violence threatened in this challenge was adopted in earnest by large numbers, as disillusionment with America's democratic principles grew.

The March First Movement, which effectively divided nationalists thereafter into those for and against "constitutional" means, was both similar and dissimilar to the preceding February Eighth Movement. Evidence of a close connection between the two movements through the

18. Vide Supra, Chapter 4.
activities of such men as Lee Kwang-su, Hyŏn Sang-yun, Yi Kap-sŏng and Pak Hi-do, is abundant and conclusive. So also, the similarity between the Declarations composed by Lee Kwang-su and Ch'oe Nam-sŏn is manifest in their declaration of independence, their reference to the harmful effects on Korean progress of foreign domination and the forced "amalgamation", and their strong appeal for Korean independence as the road to peace in Asia. (19) Moreover, both Movements were designed to give substance and urgency to the claims being pressed by Kim Kyu-shik at Versailles.

The distinctive features whereby the March First Movement overshadowed the Tokyo Movement, were its leadership, organisational strength, location in Korea itself, and the outstanding mass participation. The surprising and vital characteristic of the leadership was the conspiratorial co-operation of the two most influential organisations among the Koreans - Ch'ŏndogyo and Christianity. (20) It was this temporary alliance which gave such depth and organisational backing to the March First Movement, for through Ch'ŏndogyo were obtained funds and long experience under inimical regimes, while with its foreign contacts and following among all classes, men and women, Christianity provided the human resources necessary for a truly national movement. Hence, unlike the February Eighth Movement which was limited to Tokyo students and suppressed immediately, the later Movement involved within two months one in every six able-bodied men. (21)

19. For all references in text to the two Declarations, see Appendices 1 and 2.
20. Confucianism was discredited, and Buddhism at a low ebb.
21. This is Baldwin's estimate: March First Movement, p 208.
But the outstanding dissimilarity of the March First Movement with the student Movement was its tone of non-violence, clearly written into the Declaration itself in its "Three Items of Agreement". After the suppression of this Movement, such strategy was denounced by many Korean activists, and has since been dubbed by many a mistake, indeed, a "political disaster". This recourse to peaceful methods can no doubt be attributed in part to the nature of the leadership, whose average age was forty-eight, compared with that of twenty-six for the eleven signatories to the February Eighth Declaration. (22) But although some, such as Yi Sang-jae and Son Pyŏng-hi, considered non-violence an absolute principle whose justification lay outside the realm of historical results, the organisers mainly indicated pragmatic reasons for their non-violent tactics. Inside Korea, armed assault was suicidal and impracticable, while outside, the world was discussing the basis for lasting peace. Yi Sŏng-hun had explained his position to the student leader, Sŏ Ch'un, even before the Tokyo Movement. "We cannot at present fight the enemy with guns and swords. We are neither prepared for that, nor is the time appropriate." (23) Ch'oe Rin later added his agreement: "In the light of the Korean situation and in response to a world which longs for peace, we thought a peaceful resolution more appropriate." (24)

The principal organisers appear to have realised the Movement would be suppressed. Son Pyŏng-hi himself entertained no illusions

22. Kim Sŏng-shik, Student Movements, p 59. That the "Thirty-Three" were religious men cannot be considered the overriding reason for their pacifism, for of the eleven signatories to the student Declaration, all but one were Christians.
24. Baldwin, March First Movement, p 76.
concerning the immediate outcome: "We shall not become independent at once simply by shouting 'Manseli!' But in order to awaken the spirit of independence in the breasts of our people, we must surely grasp this opportunity and shout - 'Manseli!'".\(^{(25)}\) The possibility of bloodshed was also recognised, but beyond this was envisaged a nation united under a common cause. "Japan may, if circumstances so demand, resolve to break up our peaceful non-resistance movement with firearms and swords," warned Yi Sŏng-hun. "But if twenty million join, faithful even in death, and proclaim a united will, even though independence will not arrive immediately, there will be seed sown and the day when we shall gather the fruit will surely come."\(^{(26)}\)

Thus, the March First Movement was planned, not to obtain independence by itself, but to initiate movement to that end, and in this instance, to influence the Versailles deliberations on Korea's behalf. Hence the Third Item of Agreement was quite explicit: "Let all your actions subscribe to the highest discipline and order, so that our attitude and purpose may be seen to be fair and just to the very end." The cost of the experiment was, indeed, phenomenal; but in view of the caution and inoffensiveness of the Declaration\(^{(27)}\) and the initial discipline of the demonstrators, responsibility for the extreme reaction lies, not with the religious leaders, but with Japan herself.

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27. Compared with the February Eighth Declaration, the March First wording was very mild. The former mentioned the racial homogeneity of Korea 44 times, Korea itself 22 times, and Japan 26 times, whereas the latter referred to Korea and Japan only 4 times each, and renounced violence. Vide Kim Sŏng-shik, \textit{Student Movements}, p 55ff, \textit{CR Ch'oe Nam-sŏn}, and Appendix 1.
More important than the issue of non-violence is the question of the existence of any political programme, for the whole endeavour is remarkable for the seeming absence of any such basis for the future Korea. Whether the monarchy was to be restored, or a Western alternative employed, or a peculiarly Korean synthesis formed, was not discussed. When Lee Kwang-su sought to contact the "Thirty-Three" in prison in order to ascertain what they had in mind, he discovered they had no future plan whatsoever and could only assume that some sort of democracy was intended. (28) From this, one can understand the effect the Japanese presence had on Korean nationalists. Suffering under Japan's determined programme of assimilation and yet enduring an inconsistent discrimination in all administrative matters as well as education, (29) Korean nationalists who before the annexation took example from Japan, could now only identify Japan with all that impeded Korea's advancement among the other nations. Deliverance from Japan was regarded as the sine qua non of any political programme, and it was vital that the fragile co-operation of Ch'ŏndogyo and Christianity not be jeopardised by disputes over future possibilities. Indeed, their primary object of a united, independent Korea still awaits its consummation.

The Divided Movement: 1919-1927.

Korean reaction to the March First Movement was diverse. Hugh Cynn (Shin Hŏng-u), writing in America in 1920 exclaimed, "[Korea] was reborn - never again to die ... already the contagion of her new life is influencing the spirit and changing the policies of the

29. Vide Supra, Chapters 2 and 3.
whole Orient."  

Others in U. S. A., such as Rhee and Henry Chung, held more sober views, but the euphoria Cynn expressed was widely shared in America, Hawaii and Shanghai. A quite opposite emotion was felt by many in the northern provinces of Korea and beyond in the Kando regions, of which a characterisation is found in the reflections of a young revolutionary, Chang Chi-rak: "I hated Korea when I ran away that autumn day in 1919, vowing never to return until the weeping was changed to fighting slogans. She wanted peace, and peace she got - after the 'peaceful demonstrations' had been dispersed in helpless blood. She was a foolish old woman naively mouthing feminine please to the great powers for 'international justice' and a promise of 'self-determination'."

Between these two extremes are evident various shades of opinion, which developed into the incompatible stances comprising the post-1919 movement: the "diplomatist", "gradualist" and "direct action" factions.

Initially, the Provisional Government strove to maintain the March First unity. If not the brainchild of the "Thirty-Three" themselves, the Provisional Government was nonetheless the most immediate and direct offspring of their Movement. Democracy was explicitly stated in the Hansŏng "short-list" to be the guiding principle of Taehan Minguk - the Republic of Korea. Even before the Seoul Hansŏng draft was known, Korean groups in Siberia, Shanghai and America had also composed representative, republican constitutions. It is also noteworthy that in unanimously electing Syngman Rhee to the position of highest authority, these groups underscored their assumption of

32. See Appendix 3.
democracy, since Rhee was considered the foremost interpreter of democratic theory to the Korean people through his writings in prison. The inclusion of a Labour Bureau in the Provisional Government further suggests a concern to keep abreast of world developments. But the most significant contribution of the Provisional Government to Korean national consciousness was undoubtedly its rejection of the age-old Confucian social and political dogma and its correlative involvement in a changed world. This reorientation was so decisive that no monarchy was ever again mooted, but in fact dismissed even by Emperor Sunjong himself.

Despite its ideals and promise, the Provisional Government was reduced within two and one half years to a faction-ridden, virtually defunct institution. Lee Kwang-su described the period up to the completion of the Hapdông-Shanghai merger in September 1919 as a "political war", and aggravated by the distance separating Government members, differences were never resolved. But it is clear that the major controversy of the period - the "direct action" group's opposition to the "diplomatists" mandate scheme - was not merely a misunderstanding but a real disagreement on means. For Rhee had earlier held up military preparations against Japan to ridicule, while Henry Chung argued that, the "saner element of the Korean people saw from the beginning the hopelessness of their cause on the field of military combat with Japan ..."

34. Vide Supra, Chapter 1.
36. Lée Kwang-su, My Confession, p 259.
37. Oliver, R. T., Syngman Rhee; The Man Behind the Myth, p 128. Rhee was by no means a pacifist; Vide Rhee, Syngman, Japan Inside Out, p 198ff.
38. Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, p 190.
The "diplomatists" shared much in aim and means with the "gradualists" under Ahn Ch'ang-ho. However, besides Ahn's estrangement from Rhee over the presidency question, there was an important difference in the two approaches which drew them apart. In principle, the "diplomatists" concurred with Ahn's policy of self-strengthening, but in practice they placed heavy emphasis on Western aid, thought and institutions. (39) Ahn, on the contrary, had received no Western education and warned that Korean independence achieved by the power or through the systems of foreign lands, would be misunderstood by Koreans in general, poorly operated, and open to abuse. (40)

Thus already in 1920, the Korean leaders held to three distinct definitions of the nature of an "Aeguk-jisa". Of the three, the view of the "gradualists" appears the most balanced, in its realistic appraisal of Japan's strength and its advocacy of the Korean's welfare regardless of who ruled. The "diplomatist" movement was the most removed from Korea and, in its platform, least "Korean"; yet it had a clear objective for an independent Korea, in its espousal of Western democracy, together with many of the Provisional Government. But the "direct action" alternative was the most instinctive, and as the other avenues remained ineffective, became dominant in the struggle up to 1937 at least.

Military organisations up to 1927 were on the whole more directly linked with the pre-1919 resistance, less affected by Western thought, and more limited to the immediate object of independence than any other organisations. Themes in the speeches of military leaders in

39. Vide Ibid, Loc. Cit., on Chung's belief in Korea's dependence on the "enlightened West".
40. Lee Kwang-su, My Confession, p 258.
the early years generally hinged on three arguments: Korea's 4,000 years of glorious history; the evils of Japan in both action and intention; and the impossibility of Korean/Japanese harmony and the consequent certainty of the Korean cause. References to imperialism or to Russian ideological, as distinct from financial or military support, are found only in speeches of Russianized Koreans who experienced little of the loss of their homeland.

But after Japan had secured the co-operation of both USSR and China against Korean guerilla bands in 1921 and 1925 respectively, military leaders either placed themselves at the disposal of Chinese and Russian communists, or, as in the case of Shin Ch'ae-ho and Kim Ku, turned to anarchistic activities.

The move towards anarchism and militarism was not altogether surprising. The independence movement had suffered serious setbacks in all its fronts and phases, and the tone of Korean drama, novels, poetry and songs was predominantly one of despair; by 1924 morale


43. After the 1921 Free City Incident (Supra, Chapter 6), the Bolsheviks guaranteed safety only to Koreans serving in the Red Army. Vide Chen I-te, Japanese Colonialism, p 256ff. On Koreans in the Chinese Communist Party, vide Suh Dae-sook, Communist Movement, p 213ff and, with care, Kim San and Nym Wales, Song of Ariran, pp 67-82.

44. A study of the literature of this period may shed valuable light on the mind of Korean nationalists. Works available are essays by D. P. Mealer and Changbok Chee in Nahm (ed.), Korea, essays by Seok Choong Song, Andrew Nahm and Oh Kon Cho in Kim and Mortimore (eds), Korea's Response, and above all, Cho Yong-man (ed.) 日帝下에 文化運動史 (History of the Cultural Movement under Imperial Japan), Seoul, 民衆書館. 1970. Also extant is a collection of 33 literary works banned by the Government-General published by the "Dong-A Daily" Company in January 1977: 日政下에 禁書 33 巻, 新東亞.
was low and the promise of March First a dimmed flame. Hence the terrorist movement enjoyed popularity and many volunteered because of the catharsis anticipated in channelling their despair and bitterness into acts of violence. The basis for this anarchism had been laid in 1923 by Shin Ch'ae-ho: "[Our destruction] is not destruction for the sake of destruction, but for the sake of construction ... Construction and destruction are only distinct from the point of view of form, but from the point of view of spirit, destruction soon is, in fact, construction ..."(45) But as conditions deteriorated after 1925, the tone became one of nihilism: "We of this present world have neither hope nor goal nor future nor anything at all ... How gratifying is the self-immolation of this utterly meaningless, valueless and wretched life for the sake of the masses!"(46)

So with the disarray of the independence movement by the end of 1926, there had occurred a complete reversal of the hope and idealism of March First. With eight major acts of terrorism by December 1926, the movement appeared to have entered the "eternal, bloody war" threatened in the February Eight Declaration. Yet the majority of those who were anarchistic in method, rejected anarchy as a long-term ideology; in 1925 the Ŭiyŏl-Dan published a twenty-point charter which was mainly constructive.(47) Accordingly, when the Shingan-Hoe was established as a legal, national Korean party in February 1927, terrorism was suspended and hope in a united movement rekindled.

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45. TMS, Shin Ch'ae-ho ūi Chosŏn Hyŏngmyŏng Sŏn'nŏn, 1923.
46. TMS, Hŏmu-Tang, 1.1.1926.
47. TMS, Chosŏn ūi Ŭiyŏl-Dan. Chesamch'a Chŏnguk Taep'yo Taehoe Sŏn'nŏn, 1925.
1927-1937: The Shigan-Hoe and Further Decline

Established against a background of rigorous polemical debate through "Literary" magazines, the Shigan-Hoe was an attempt to bury differences and unite Koreans under a comprehensive political organ directed to the amelioration of Korean society and the realisation of independence. Recognising that communist/nationalist rivalry fell easy prey to Japanese exploitation, it was agreed that "nationalists and communists will postpone their debate till after independence is restored, since in view of the present position of Korea, unless our independence is first grasped, both ideologies will come to nothing." (48)

But dominating the Shigan-Hoe, the nationalist camp itself leaned towards socialistic principles and thereby secured itself a wider following. Thus although in 1931, 27, 556 of the 39,410 Shigan-Hoe members were farmers and labourers, the majority were loyal to the nationalist leaders. (49)

Paradoxically, this strength of the nationalists proved to be the Achilles Heel of the Shigan-Hoe movement. For unable to gain leadership, communists such as Han Wi-kŏn strove to propagate communism within the Shigan-Hoe, contrary to the spirit in which it was formed. Since after the extensive arrests of communists following the Kwangju Student Movement of 1929-1931 nationalists occupied all leading positions, the Comintern directed the communists to withdraw from the common front. But as their clandestine operations under cover of the Shigan-Hoe were exposed, the whole movement had to be dissolved in 1931.

49. Ibid, p 447.
But although the communists' actions jeopardised the unity and effectiveness of the struggle inside Korea, it is clear that they held a concept of "Aeguk-jisa" that went beyond securing independence to "the establishment of a haven for the workers and peasants under a proletarian dictatorship."\(^{(50)}\) However, this was very much a millenialistic projection and its only appeal above Christian and Ch'ŏndogyo visions was its newness. Thus, when Ahn Ch'ang-ho took the wind out of the communist sails from 1927 in leading nationalists into increased social and economic activity,\(^{(51)}\) many important communist leaders such as Yŏ Un-hyŏng defected to the nationalist ranks.\(^{(52)}\)

The communist experience in the Shingan-Hoe is most instructive concerning its dilemma as a nascent movement in Korea. Should it utilise nationalism to further its aims, or promote communism as the ideology which could prescribe the successful tactics and course of a revolutionary nationalism? This conflict was present throughout 1927 to 1931 and gave rise to the extremes discussed in Chapter Six.

Besides the Japanese hatred of communism, two factors encouraged this tendency to swing between extremes: the lack of precise definition of the difference between communism and nationalism, and the fact that many who claimed to be communists were attempting, like Yi Tong-hwi, to make communism serve nationalistic ends. The former factor was aggravated by the contradiction between theory and reality of Leninism and the Comintern's ignorance of Korean conditions. The latter factor, whereby Leninism was simply turned on its head, was a further example of Korean opportunism, exchanging Washington for Moscow as a path to independence.

52. Suh Dae-sook, *Communist Movement*, p 332. Communism "never got to the grass roots."
The dissolution of the Shingan-Hoe coincided with the termination of Saitō's "cultural policy". As the development of heavy industry, transport and power schemes increasingly involved Koreans in non-agricultural labour, Ugaki succeeded in effecting intense social and structural change in five years without the normal associated upheaval. Under his rigorous police state, political offences decreased from over 400 in 1931 to approximately 100 in 1936. (53) During this period, many nationalists in Korea became convinced that the only course of cultivating national awareness lay in legal activities. Foremost in this area were Ahn Ch'ang-ho, Lee Kwang-su and Ch'oe Nam-sŏn.

As early as 1921, Lee Kwang-su had expressed concern over the emphasis on politics, force and emotional appeals to national spirit at the expense of training personnel and cultivating concrete national qualities. (54) "Looking at the Indian independence movement," he later wrote, "beginning with Gandhi, all worked inside their country, and since within the country, largely within the law. In this way many participated legally so that it was possible to seize their opportunity and rise together. But in our country, most of the independence agitators went overseas... It is not right to wait upon luck, or to expect others' help." (55) Supporting the move for the development of Korean native industry, Song Chin-u also acknowledged the "gradualists'" debt to the Indian example in an editorial in his newspaper, the "Dong-A Daily", in November 1922. (56) In the same vein, Ahn Ch'ang-ho founded the Suyang Tongmaeng-Hoe (Culture Advancement League) in 1931, to promote self-reliance in industry and rural education in modern economics and the social sciences. (57)

53. Dong, Colonial Policy, p 335. Ugaki increased his police force by 500 men in 1932.
55. Lee Kwang-su, My Confession, p 264.
57. In 1934, the Japanese Diet expressed concern over the "nationalistic and insurgent tones" of the "circuit lectures." Ibid, p 242.
Thus, by 1931 at least, the concept of "Aeguk-jisa" had returned to the 1917-1918 Tokyo students' evaluation, and before that, the reformism of the 1896 Independence Club. But not for all: many nationalists, especially those abroad, regarded Ahn and Lee as "collaborators". This is at first sight curious, for Sŏ Chae-p'īl's Independence Club enjoyed immense popularity while working within the legal boundaries of a corrupt and hated government. However, the Suyang Tongmaeng-Hoe operated within the legal limits imposed by a non-Korean government, while during periods of pessimism only acts of violence were considered worthy. Indeed, the popularity of forward-looking, reformist movements coincided with the periods of optimism - 1894-1898, 1919-1921, 1927-1931 - whereas during the periods of harshest rule in Korea and unfavourable conditions abroad, anarchistic, 'even nihilistic, acts were the requisites of a true "Aeguk-jisa". Further, it must be noted that the Indian independence movement worked under much freer conditions with recourse to constitutional means; Gandhi's statement that he was really concerned that the British Empire be "founded not on material but spiritual foundations,"(58) was unthinkable for Koreans whose intention was that the Japanese Empire collapse.

Nevertheless, a full enquiry into the "self-strengthening" movement may well contribute to our understanding of both Koreas since 1945. The Japanese certainly discovered no willingness to collaborate, imprisoning Ahn from 1933 to late 1936 and Lee in July 1937. Being illiterate, and therefore for our purposes inarticulate, peasants' and villagers' attitudes to the "gradualists" can only be surmised from their willing co-operation with development programmes, whether

Criticism was harshest from nationalists in exile, and this lack of contact with Korean conditions by these nationalists may go far in explaining why the first South Korean government under Rhee to a large degree neglected needed social and economic reforms.

The complexity of the independence movement from 1919 to 1937 renders a firm conclusion hazardous, but from the broad pattern emerging in the above analysis, we have a basis on which to consider the question: Is there displayed here any real continuity or progression? There is evident a definite continuity in terms of inspiration, objectives and to some extent leadership, between the February Eighth, March First and Provisional Government movements. But as a result of the failure of the Provisional Government to establish itself as the official representative organ of the Korean people, or more accurately, of the Korean nationalists, the independence movement thereafter became essentially disparate in form. Even within the main streams of the divided movement - the "diplomatists", "gradualists", "direct actionists" and communists - continuity was weak, as each acquired or lost influence according to the relative degree of freedom and success of the movement as a whole. Nevertheless, throughout the whole period, nationalists at no stage reconsidered a monarchy or Confucian social or political system; despite factions, nationalists were united in this: a new order was called for.

Likewise, one detects a definite progression from the February Eighth Movement through to the Provisional Government up to 1921;

from the initial appeal for independence to the drafting of a democratic, republican constitution. But again, the movement thereafter failed to build upon this position. Even the later landmarks - the 1926 Six-Ten Incident, the Shingan-Hoe, and the nation-wide demonstrations beginning in Kwangju in November 1929 - all looked back to the March First example rather than moving forward from it. Truly, the Tokyo students touched upon the major concerns of the post-1919 movement, for if the militancy of the February Eighth Resolution set the tone for the "direct action" stream from 1921, the student movement of 1912-1918 found its later counterparts in the communist programme and the self-strengthening policies of the "gradualists". Yet progression is found only in the latter area, in that concrete steps were taken towards a goal that transcended, though clearly also included, the expulsion of Japan.

In the form of Woodrow Wilson's idealism and Marxist-Leninism, two major influences bore temporarily upon the independence movement,\(^{60}\) for the most part viewed not on their merits, but for their potential support for Korean independence. Considering the concrete steps already taken in the final years of the nineteenth century towards a responsible, reformed, democratic Korea, this characteristic of opportunism may be attributed to the distorting effect of Japan's presence. Pursued within this prohibitive context of Japanese colonialism, the Korean independence movement failed to thrust up a leader who could survive long enough to win recognition from the majority of nationalists. Without such, their self-conception

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\(^{60}\) Marxist-Leninism is called temporary on the grounds that there is a vast difference between the "old" communists of this period and the "new" communists under Kim Il-sung. See final chapters of Suh Dae-sook, *Communist Movement*. 
as "Aeguk-jisa" only oscillated between reformism and xenophobic patriotism. The awakening of the late nineteenth century was interrupted by the 1910 annexation and diverted repeatedly thereafter, so that, far from "transforming" or "developing" Korean nationalism, Japanese rule in practice thwarted and distorted it.
CONCLUSION

The history of the Korean independence movement is an uncommon story. The period 1919 to 1937 contains all aspects and phases of the movement throughout the colonial period except one: the close association of Korean militarists with the Kuomintang during World War II. But the peculiarity of the movement lies in its disjunction at both ends from the rest of Korean history. The break-down of centuries of Confucian thought was begun in 1876 with the forced Kang-Hwa Treaty, and out of the ruins of the 1894 Tong-Hak Rebellion and Sino-Japanese War, there emerged the reforming zeal of the Independence Club in response to a changing world. This was interrupted by an expanding Japan, which, professing reasons of strategy, Asian solidarity and benevolent aid, erected a colonial regime so discriminating and severe, that Korean national consciousness found its centre in the desire to be rid of Japan.

The colonisation of Korea, a homogeneous civilisation of proud culture and several thousand years standing, by Japan, a younger nation owing no small cultural debt to Korea, was itself a rare historical phenomenon. This is the crucial dissimilarity with Japan's colonisation of Formosa, an island of few inhabitants already under foreign rule. The impracticability of the intended assimilation of Korea as an integral part of the Japanese Empire, only contributed to Japan's course of militarism and unrealism so damaging to her espoused aim of Asian harmony and solidarity. The very leaders who had previously looked to Japan for just laws, universal education, economic modernisation and protection against Russian and Western imperialism, became the most forthright of Japan's critics in Korea. As early as 1919, but especially by 1931, Chinese nationalists echoed the same sentiments. Japan's empire decayed as it expanded.
As the Righteous Armies fought, and others preached or wrote, biding their time, students abroad imbibed liberalism and democracy while the seeds of a universalistic ethic were planted in Korean society by Christian churches, schools and hospitals. The fleeting opportunity which came at the end of World War I was seized immediately in Tokyo, quickly followed by the March First Movement in Korea. All classes, religions, occupations and regions were touched, as political and national issues entered the domain of the rank and file. The twentieth-century weapon, the written word, was employed as the "Independence Newspaper" appeared every day from March 1 to the end of May, printed "in caves, in fishermen's junks, in an artificially made grave at the churchyard."(1) Hand-bills, posters, manifestos continually appeared, while the banned writings of Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, Lee Kwang-su and Syngman Rhee were treasured in patriotic households.

As merchants closed shops and labourers struck, the Movement was severely suppressed, for Korean independence would necessitate a reversal of Japan's foreign policy. But the Movement had its desired effect on the Korean mind - "Aeguk", love for the country - while publicising itself throughout the world. On April 6, 1919, Gandhi proclaimed his principle of "Satyagraha", Truth-Force, as the basis of Indian nationalism, immediately followed by industrial strikes. One month later, the Chinese students held their May Fourth protest rally against Japanese expansionism. The Koreans appeared to be on the right side of history: Japan's position in Korea was an impossible one.

But the March First Movement proved to be unrepeatable, illustrated by the attempt in June 1926 on the occasion of Emperor Sunjong's funeral. The movement after 1919 was plagued by the parochialisms

and leadership rivalries which had characterised Korean politics during the preceding Koryŏ and Yi Dynasties. The independence struggle became determined by the abilities and adopted ideologies of a series of leaders in different regions; where conditions were hopeless, fanaticism made up the deficit.

Thus, the period 1921 to 1937 concerns competing nationalist streams, whose leaders were, to an unusual degree, individually responsible for the direction, nature and method of the independence struggle. This was particularly true of those leaders, i.e. the majority, who campaigned abroad. Whilst Japan strengthened its determined submission of Korea, these leaders played out their parts on a stage all but removed from the world theatre, their only real scripts being those evolved out of acute frustration. Yet in the seeming invincibility of Japan's military might and the rebuffs of the "friendly" nations - America, China and Russia - the boundaries of their stage were real enough: every man's hand was against them. Their democracy was not really connected with Europe and America nor their communism with the USSR. The West refused recognition of the Republic of Korea, and Lenin's doctrine of simultaneously supporting and opposing nationalism was simultaneously supported and rejected. Ameri-

Under these circumstances, the movement abroad understandably suffered from an air of unreality, so that many such as Ahn Ch'ang-ho, Yŏ Un-hyŏng and Lee Kwang-su took up work inside Korea of more immediate and obvious benefit to Korean society at large. Others, including Shin Ch'ae-ho and Kim Ku, sought relief and meaning in

violence, now a common-place in minority group resistance strategy. Hence, whereas the 1919 Movements had been co-ordinated and all parts complementary, the later movement was splintered, and no single ideology pervaded the struggle in any depth.

In view of the diverse and irregular nature of the post-1919 movement, it is easier to approximate any progression or continuity to the individual biographies of the major leaders and their organs, than to any phases in Korean national consciousness in general. But the writer has attempted to measure the various divisions and phases of the struggle according to a concept of nationalism applicable to a study of Korean history: "Aeguk-jisa" - one who, for the love of the country, determines to act on its behalf. It was discovered that this concept was usually applied, especially in difficult times, to leaders and groups whose actions were most specifically anti-Japanese, whereas the intellectual and spiritual descendents of the late nineteenth-century reformers enjoyed little popularity after 1931 at least. It was suggested that the reason for this setting aside of a more positive expression of "Aeguk -jisa" was the presence of Japan and the nature of her policy and practice outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.

With the accomplishment of Korean independence in 1945 by Allied Powers in fulfilment of such promise in the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the imposition of the partition of the nation at the thirty-eight parallel, and the organisation of two governments along conflicting, foreign ideological lines, the disjunction of the independence movement at both ends was completed. The possibility of the struggle moving towards its consummation, or perhaps annihilation, was precluded. More than any other factor, the realisation of the primary object of independence from Japan by foreign powers accounts for the surprising weakness of identification with the independence movement among Koreans today.
The American Declaration of Independence succeeded; the Korean Declaration failed. But the commitment and cost involved was no less in the Koreans' struggle, and the modern Koreans have not forgotten its lessons. The imperative need for modernisation and responsible international standing for the retention of national integrity was immensely reinforced. Perhaps the major contribution of the colonial movement to the two Koreas is that it has taught them to interlock firmly its two main principles: intense love for one's country and the determined advancement of the nation as a strong, active member of the world.

The nature of the new Korea that might have emerged had Koreans achieved their own independence can only be a matter of speculation, as is the connected question: What course would the earlier reformist movement have taken if Japan had respected Korea's independence? But there do exist avenues of research which will surely yield a more definitive analysis of the nature of Korean nationalism under Japanese rule. Among horizons sighted in this study are the influence and continuity of Christianity, the social change occurring in connection with the advent of students on to the stage of Korean history, the question of the status of the self-strengthening movement inside Korea, and the potential contribution of a comprehensive study of the literature of this period. It is hoped, however, that future studies on Korean nationalism will employ a more critical stance to contemporary models of nationalism than has been the case in the past.
APPENDIX 1.

THE DECLARATION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE

We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people. We tell it to the world in witness of the equality of all nations and we pass it on to our posterity as their inherent right.

We make this proclamation, having back of us, 5,000 years of history, and 20,000,000 of a united loyal people. We take this step to insure to our children for all time to come, personal liberty in accord with the awakening consciousness of this new era. This is the clear leading of God, the moving principle of the present age, the whole human race's just claim. It is something that cannot be stamped out, or stifled, or gagged, or suppressed by any means.

Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder ruled, we have come after these long thousands of years to experience the agony of ten years of foreign oppression, with every loss to the right to live, every restriction of the freedom of thought, every damage done to the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the intelligent advance of the age in which we live.

Assuredly, if the defects of the past are to be rectified, if the agony of the present is to be unloosed, if the future oppression is to be avoided, if thought is to be set free, if right of action is to be given a place, if we are to attain to any way of progress, if we are to deliver our children from the painful, shameful heritage, if we are to leave blessing and happiness intact for those who succeed us, the first of all
necessary things is the clearcut independence of our people. What cannot our twenty millions do, every man with sword in heart, in this day when human nature and conscience are making a stand for truth and right? What barrier can we not break, what purpose can we not accomplish?

We have no desire to accuse Japan of breaking many solemn treaties since 1636, nor to single out specially the teachers in the schools or government officials who treat the heritage of our ancestors as a colony of their own, and our people and their civilization as a nation of savages, finding delight only in beating us down and bringing us under their heel.

We have no wish to find special fault with Japan's lack of fairness or her contempt of our civilization and the principles on which her state rests; we, who have greater cause to reprimand ourselves, need not spend precious time in finding fault with others; neither need we, who require so urgently to build for the future, spend useless hours over what is past and gone. Our urgent need to-day is the setting up of this house of ours and not a discussion of who has broken it down, or what has caused its ruin. Our work is to clear the future of defects in accord with the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not be filled with bitterness or resentment over past agonies or past occasions for anger.

Our part is to influence the Japanese government, dominated as it is by the old idea of brute force which thinks to run counter to reason and universal law, so that it will change, act honestly and in accord with the principles of right and truth.

The result of annexation, brought about without any conference with the Korean people, is that the Japanese, indifferent to us, use every kind of partiality for their own, and by a false set of figures show a profit and loss account between us two peoples most untrue, digging a trench of everlasting resentment deeper and deeper the farther they go.
Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct the evils of the past by ways that are sincere, and by true sympathy and friendly feeling make a new world in which the two peoples will be equally blessed?

To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will mean not only loss of peace forever for this part of the Far East, but also will increase the ever-growing suspicion of four hundred millions of Chinese - upon whom depends the danger or safety of the Far East - besides strengthening the hatred of Japan. From this all the rest of the East will suffer. To-day Korean independence will mean not only daily life and happiness for us, but also it would mean Japan's departure from an evil way and exaltation to the place of true protector of the East, so that China, too, even in her dreams, would put all fear of Japan aside. This thought comes from no minor resentment, but from a large hope for the future welfare and blessing of mankind.

A new era wakes before our eyes, the old world of force is gone, and the new world of righteousness and truth is here. Out of the experience and travail of the old world arises this light on life's affairs. The insects stifled by the foe and snow of winter awake at this same time with the breezes of spring and the soft light of the sun upon them.

It is the day of the restoration of all things on the full tide of which we set forth, without delay or fear. We desire a full measure of satisfaction in the way of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and an opportunity to develop what is in us for the glory of our people.

We awake now from the old world with its darkened conditions in full determination and one heart and one mind, with right on our side, along with the forces of nature, to a new life. May all the ancestors to the thousands and ten thousand generations aid us from within and all the force of the world aid us from without, and let the day we take hold be the day of our attainment. In this hope we go forward.
Three Items of Agreement

1. This work of ours is in behalf of truth, religion and life, undertaken at the request of our people, in order to make known their desire for liberty. Let no violence be done to any one.

2. Let those who follow us, every man, all the time, every hour, show forth with gladness this same mind.

3. Let all things be done decently and in order, so that our behaviour to the very end may be honourable and upright.

The 4252nd year of the Kingdom of Korea 3d Month.

Representatives of the people.

Son Pyŏng-hi Kil Sŏn-ju Lee P'il-ju Paek Yong-sŏng
Kim Pyŏng-cho Kim Wan-kyu Kim Ch'ang-jun Kwon Tong-jin
Kwon Pyŏng-tŏk Na In-hyŏp Yang Chŏn-paek Na Yong-hwan
Yang Han-muk Yu Yŏ-tae Yi Kap-sŏng Lee Myŏng-yong
Yi Sŏng-hun Lee Chong-hun Lee Chong-il Im Rye-hwan
Pak Chun-sŭng Pak Hi-do Pak Dong-wan Shin Hong-shik
Shin Sŏk-ku O Se-ch'ang O Han-yong Chong Ch'un-su
Ch'oe Sŏng-mo Ch'oe Rin Han Yong-un Hong Pyŏng-gi
Hong Ki-cho
APPENDIX 2.

THE FEBRUARY EIGHTH DECLARATION
AND RESOLUTION

Addressees were first presented with a short plea.

Your Honour,

The final instance of misery since mankind began has ter-
minated, and the European war has concluded. Since the world now
intends to establish an eternal peace founded upon Justice and Hum-
anity, we herewith this day open the Conference of the below-named
Association, and, as representatives of the will of the twenty million
Korean people, we shall proclaim our demands to all the earth with
a view to appealing to the impartial world public opinion. Thus we
present you with our Declaration, Resolution and Appeal, and trust
that on considering these, you who indeed love Justice and Humanity,
will express sympathy and extend to us your great assistance.

February 8, 1919.


The Declaration opened with the words:

"As representatives of the twenty million Korean people, the
Korean Youth Independence Association declares before those nations
of the world which have secured the victory of Freedom and Justice,
the realisation of our independence."

There follow eleven paragraphs giving reasons for Korean indepen-
dence, of which a summary follows.
Korea's history and culture are ancient, and Korea has never been under foreign domination: tribute missions to China were only a form of diplomatic relations. The Treaties of 1894 and 1905 affirmed her independence and integrity, which Britain, U.S.A., Japan and Russia then stated to be the basis for East Asian security.

The Protectorate was clearly stated to be temporary, lasting only until Korea was sufficiently independent to handle foreign affairs, but Japan used troops and police to rob Korea of that chance. Against the opposition of the Emperor, Ministers of State, and the people, the Japanese accomplished the Annexation by falsity, force and in secret. Thus, Korea was a victim of imperialism.

During the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty, 1910 Annexation and following decade, Koreans resisted as far as their resources allowed, regardless of tens of thousands killed and innumerable homes burned. Considering present world developments - i.e. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, etc. - Korea is fully entitled to inform the world of the facts concerning the Annexation and Japan's cruelty. Contrary to human rights, Japan has taken away Koreans' freedoms - political, speech, press, religion, possession and assembly. Discrimination in education is designed to make Koreans the eternal slaves of Japan, while Korea's sacred history and dignity are destroyed. Degrading Korean intelligence and social position, Japan has deprived us of experience in administration and important work. The settlement of Japanese in Korea, far from being helpful, is facilitated by eviction of farmers, while Korean wealth is exported to Japan.

Japan's avowed motive for the Annexation - a defensive buffer against Russia and China - is no longer valid, since Russia has renounced its imperialism, and China is committed to the League of Nations. Indeed, Asian peace rests upon Korean independence now, and if the
League fails, we shall carry on the struggle to the last man. If Korea is permitted to reconstruct itself, considering her past history and culture, she cannot but contribute to world Justice, Democracy, Freedom and man's civilisation.

"The Korean people herewith demand that Japan and each nation of the world grant us the opportunity of national self-determination, and we declare that should this fail to be proffered, we shall surely act freely to save our race and secure our country's independence."

The Resolution

1. The Association proposes independence on the grounds that the Annexation not only failed to ensue from the free will of our people, but is also a threat to the existence and development of our race, and will cause the disruption of peace in the East.

2. The Association demands that the Parliament and Government of Japan convoke a meeting of Korean citizens and grant us the opportunity to decide upon our own fate according to the resolutions of that meeting.

3. The Association will request the Peace Conference to apply the principle of self-determination to our race also, and will, for the attainment of that object, request each Consul resident in Japan to communicate our views to their governments, and will at the same time send two delegates to the Conference to join in the efforts of the Koreans already sent.

4. Should our demands be refused, we will declare an eternal, bloody war against Japan, and we Koreans will bear no responsibility for any calamities such as may arise from it."
Lee Kwang-su  Ch'oe P'al-yong  Yun Ch'ang-sŏk
Kim To-yŏn   Yi Chong-gŭn   Song Kye-paek
Kim Ch'ŏl-su  Ch'oe Kŭn-u   Paek Kwan-su
Kim Sang-tŏk  Paek In-su   Sŏ Ch'un
Ch'oe Kŭn-u

Sources: Korean:  Taeil Minjok Sŏnŏn, Chosŏn Ch'ŏngnyŏn
                Tongnip-Dan, 2.8. Sŏnŏn.

Japanese:  AJMIA, Documents of the Tokyo Students'
           Independence Movement, 10.2.1919.
HANSÔNG PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Short-list:

Article I: The National Constitution will be democratic.

II: The Government system will be representative.

III: The Provisional Government has the following powers:
    a. All internal administration
    b. All foreign intercourse

IV: Korean citizens have the following responsibilities:
    a. Taxation
    b. Armed service

V: The National policy is to respect freedoms and rights of citizens and to promote the enjoyment of world peace.

VI: The above short-list, convening a formal National Conference, will apply until the publication of the constitution.

From: Taeil Minjok Sŏnŏn: Hansŏng Imshi Chŏngbu Sŏnŏn-Sŏ.
APPENDIX 4.


Programme:

1. The realisation of the political and economic liberation of our race.
2. The development and extension of this representative body of Korea, encompassing all the talents and capacities of the whole race.
3. Resistance to the Japanese form of reformism, fighting instead for the real common profit of all people.

Policy:

1. Freedom of speech, publication, assembly and society
2. The abolition of Japanese laws suppressing the Korean people
3. The abolition of torture and the unconditional opening of trials to the public
4. Opposition to Japanese immigration
5. Opposition to excessive, unreasonable tax
6. A Korean-centred commercial policy
7. The abolition of the Oriental Development Company
8. Establishment of the right of union, strike, and contracts
9. Establishment of the right to cultivate freely
10. The fixing of a maximum rent on land
11. The abolition of slave-like forced labour under landlords
12. The prohibition of night-shift, underground, and dangerous occupations for women
13. An eight-hour working day
14. The establishment of a minimum wage and salary
15. Improvement of factory, mining and seamen's (safety) regulations
16. Repeal of the system whereby citizens must obtain permission for education from the Education Bureau

17. A Korean-centred school system

18. Student autonomy and freedom of research

19. Use of Korean in all schools as the language of instruction

20. Elimination of distinctions, legal and social, concerning women

21. Prohibition of female slave-trade

22. Removal of all limits on female education and employment

23. Opposition to discrimination against servants and members of the Society for Legal and Social Equity (Hyong pyong-Sa)

24. Improvement of working conditions, freedom of reading and correspondence in prison.

Yi Sang-jae, Kwon Tong-jin, Shin Sŏk-u, and 27 others.
From: Taeil Minjok Sŏnŏn, Shingan-hoe.

Kŭn-u-Hoe (Shingan-Hoe Sister Body)
Platform:

1. The organisation of an official Korean Women's Union.

2. The development and improvement of the status of Korean Women.

Prospectus:

1. Abolition of all social and legal distinctions concerning females

2. Break-down of all feudal traditions and superstitions.

3. Freedom of marriage and prevention of early marriages

4. Abolition of female slavery and licensed prostitution

5. Safeguard the economic profit of women in farming villages

6. Abolition of wage inequality for female labourers, and institution of payment over childbirth period

7. Abolition of night work and dangerous labour for women and girls.

From: Taeil Minjok Sŏnŏn: Kŭn-U-hoe.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

In the book, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, Edwin O. Reischauer begins his bibliography of Japanese sources with the observation that, "In the past few years there has been a deluge of excellent books on Modern Japan". Concerning Korea, however, his recommended books are by contrast few, and if limited to works on the colonial period, total merely one book: Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (1963). The bibliographical guides by Shannon McCune (N. Y., International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950) and B. S. Silberman (University of Arizona Press, 1962), while noting a number of books on the period 1876-1910 and post-World War II Korea, can cite very few English language historical studies on the period 1910-1945.

Thus there is a considerable gap in Korean historiography. There are at least two main factors responsible for this situation. Firstly, in contrast to Japan, whose ultra-nationalism of the 1930's, involvement in World War II and tremendous economic growth and influence have attracted numerous scholars, Korea from 1910 to 1945 was a colony, poor and of little international importance. But since South Korea is now a serious economic competitor of Japan, and the activities and relationship of the two Koreas are of major import in the Far East today, it is probable that historians among others will pay closer attention to the legacy of the colonial period. Secondly, and equally important, there is the difficulty of access to source materials and their diffusion among five languages: Korean, Japanese, Russian, Chinese and English. To the writer's knowledge none has been translated into English. But the difficulties here

* To avoid tedious repetition, full bibliographic details have been omitted when citing materials listed in the following Bibliography.
encountered are best dealt with in connection with a review of the literature used in this thesis.

Primary Sources

Japanese

Students of the Korean independence movement are indebted to a Tokyo publishing firm for their compilation of Japanese official documents relating to Korean independence activities between 1915 and 1945, published in six weighty volumes (of very small print) in 1966. Research has been facilitated inestimably thereby, and F. P. Baldwin was probably the first to make use of these volumes for his Doctoral Dissertation: The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response (1969).

These volumes are published as: 現代史料: 朝鮮 (Modern History Source Materials: Chōsen) 1-6, Tokyo, 1966. Information on the Tokyo Student Movement was found in the Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs, particularly among the records of the Oriental Development Company under the Colonial Bureau ( 拓殖局). But the main source for the whole movement was the Government-General of Korea Archives. Among these, the Seoul High Court Interrogation Reports were vital on the organisation of the March First Movement, while the March-September 1919 daily and monthly reports of the Police Affairs Bureau and Army Headquarters supplied valuable information on the course of that Movement. For the later movements, Army, Police, and Kwangju District Court and Seoul High Court records were used. Material cited in the thesis can be readily found by reference to the explanations at the beginning of each volume.
Primary sources in Korean are virtually an unknown quantity to Western students and are difficult to locate. This is no doubt partly attributable to the diversity of the independence movement and the fact that documents were lost, destroyed, or only survived in Japanese translation. But it is probable that there was not a great deal in Korean originally, for the various divisions of the movement tended to use the language of their respective areas: English in the U.S.A., Russian if in North Kando-Siberia, and Chinese if in Shanghai, Peking or Manchuria. For example, a compilation of valuable Korean Provisional Government and other documents in five volumes is all in Chinese: Ch' u Hôn-su (compiler), 資料: 韓國獨立運動史 (Source Materials: Korean Independence Movement History) 1-5, Seoul, Yônsei University Press, 1971.

I am greatly indebted to my brother-in-law, Cho Young-su, for obtaining for me a collection of Anti-Japanese Nationalist Declarations (對日民族宣言, 1972). From these documents, which apparently have not been used hitherto, the writer gained important insights into the inspiration and aspirations of the various independence groups after 1919. I am also grateful for his securing Lee Kwang-su's 내의사례 (My Confession). Written about 1947 by the author of the student February Eighth Declaration, who also became involved in almost all phases of the later movement, this book presents the inside story of the struggle by and between nationalist factions to maintain a viable independence movement up to 1945.

The other Korean materials, the books by Kim Pyŏng-cho (c. 1920), and Pak Ŭn-shik (c. 1921), are hybrids of primary and secondary material, in that they are propagandist histories of the independence struggle written during the movement by leaders of the movement.
Kim was an organiser of the March First Movement who escaped to Shanghai where, according to Lee Kwang-su, the Provisional Government commissioned him to collect and collate information on the movement, on which he and Pak based their books. Thus while they are valuable for their reflection of the mind of the nationalists and are useful on the foundation, programme, objectives and leadership of the organisations, much of the information regarding Japan must be treated with caution. It is interesting however, that Lee Chong-sik, Marius Jansen and F.P. Baldwin prefer Pak's statistical estimates ahead of official Japanese figures (see Chapter VI, note 1).

English

The books of Henry Chung (1921), Hugh Cynn (1920) and Syngman Rhee (c. 1941) reflect the Korean attitude and response to Japan's colonialism in both theory and practice. Henry Chung is especially informative on the Korean view of Japan's "new economy", and together with Hugh Cynn also comments in detail on Korean political, educational and legal grievances; Rhee deals more with Japan's nationalism and militarism, and American responsibilities.

As a contrast to these "diplomatist" writings, there is one English-language book, Kim San and Nym Wales, Song of Ariran (1941), which provides an insight into the more militant, proto-Communist movement based in Manchuria, north China and Siberia. But the book is essentially an interview of Chang Chi-rak (alias Kim San) by Nym Wales, and Suh Dae-sook in The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1948, cautions against taking the contents at face value.

The two books by the English Journalist F.A. McKenzie - The Tragedy of Korea (1908) and Korea's Fight for Freedom (1920) - are based on his own observations while in Korea and on interviews with Koreans, mostly of the "diplomatist" camp. Thomas Millard's

None of these books are readily available, and the writer obtained them through interloan, photocopy and purchase from Korea. Also extant are the English-language Government-General Annual Reports. But apart from their inaccessibility in New Zealand, they were designed for foreign perusal and according to Dr H.G. Underwood, Dean of the Library of Yonsei University in Seoul, are mainly statistical and provide very little clue as to the Korean response or aspirations. References to Korea in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East are purely incidental, and thinly scattered through the 308 volumes.

Secondary Sources

Korean

Korean secondary sources are also difficult to obtain, and the writer procured some while in Korea and the remainder were posted by his brother-in-law. Kim Song-shik's study of the Student Movements (日帝下韓國學生獨立運動史, 1974), is the only work to date dealing with this important aspect of the independence struggle, while Cho Yong-man's work, as editor, on the literary-cultural movements
（日本近代文化運動史，1970）is also unique and very comprehensive. Both these are clearly areas which promise a good yield if explored.

Yi Kang-hun's books on the military organisations (武裝獨立運動史，1977) and the Provisional Government (大韓民國臨時政府史，1975) also provide otherwise scarce information on the more complex streams of the post-1919 movement. Himself a former military leader in Manchuria, Yi has a first-hand understanding of his subject. The Essays on Modern Korean History (韓國近代史論Ⅱ日本殖民地時代の民族運動，1977) edited by Yun, Shin and Ahn, are an exciting collection and auger well for Korean scholarship in this area. The approach is objective, and besides dealing with the hitherto almost totally neglected "Shinga-Hoe" movement, the essayists have addressed themselves to the question of the basis and implications of the unusual mass-participation of the March First Movement and its policy of passive, civil disobedience.

**English**

With the publication in 1960 of Conroy's book, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910, in which he questioned the traditional view that Japan had plotted Korea's annexation and that her colonialism was deliberately oppressive, debate was opened up on the whole question of Japan's colonialism in Asia. Conroy has, of course, been challenged by Korean scholars, most notably Professors Lee Soon-won and Doo Soo Suh of Washington University and Dr Chon Dong, Director of the Korean Research Centre in Seoul (see the Review Article in J. A. S. Vol. 22, No. 4, August 1963). Conroy admitted in 1960 that his study was based on "Japanese sources which, of course, reflect Japanese views ... abundantly, and Chinese, Russian, and Korean sources but little." (Conroy, Op. Cit., p 7). Further, in 1962, Conroy gave
more credit to the Korean point of view (Conroy (Speaker), Summary of Remarks, 1962, p 7).

Since Conroy, at least four Doctoral Dissertations have appeared dealing with this problem of Japanese colonial theory and practice: those of Dong, Wonmo (1965), Chen I-te (1968), Chung Joong-gun (1971) and Rew Joung-yole (1962). If these efforts were built upon and a definitive study published, a gap in our knowledge of Japanese imperialism and Korean nationalism would be filled.

However, historical works on the Korean independence movement itself remain scarce. The general histories of Han Woo-keun, Sohn Pow-key (ed.) and George McCune naturally involve little discussion, while those of J. Longford and W. Henthorn do not go beyond 1910. The specialised studies of Suh Dae-sook (Op. Cit.), Gregory Henderson (Korea: The Politics of the Vortex), Chen I-te (Ph. D.) and, to a lesser degree, Lee Chong-sik (The Politics of Korean Nationalism), seem to be hampered by political science models which, as argued in the Preface and Chapter VII, tend to steer Korean nationalism in a preconceived direction. F. P. Baldwin (Op. Cit.), though every inch an historian, also reflects this dilemma.

Following two Conferences in Kalamazoo, Michigan, the Centre for Korean Studies of the Michigan University has published the participants' papers in two books, edited by Andrew C. Nahm (1974) and C. I. Eugene Kim and Doretha E. Mortimore (1977). Relating to both the Japanese administration and Korean resistance and other movements, these books point the way to a more comprehensive treatment of the colonial period. However, the comparative "greenness" of this area in Korean historiography impressed itself upon the writer when he discovered, to his surprise, one contributor to the 1977 publication treating as two different people, one of the principal
organisers of the March First Movement, namely Yi Sung-hun, alias Yi In Hwan.

The writer is conscious too, of his inexperience and the lack of signposts. However, he is also conscious he has some new material in the Anti-Japanese Nationalist Declarations, and looks forward to a greater interest among historians in the history of the Korean independence movement in its own right.
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