

## **Political Polarization in Taiwan and the United States: A Research Puzzle**

Cal Clark, Auburn University

Alexander C. Tan, National Chengchi University & University of Canterbury

Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas

Prepared for presentation at the Taiwan Institute for Governance and Communication Research (TIGCR) International Conference on “Political Polarization: Perspectives of Governance and Communications, National Chengchi University, Mucha, Taiwan, October 29, 2019.

During the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the major political parties in both Taiwan (the Democratic Progressive Party or DPP and the Kuomintang or KMT) and the United States (Democrats and Republicans) became increasingly polarized in bitter political conflict. In Taiwan, this polarization centered on the strongly inter-linked issues of national identity and cross-Strait relations (Clark and Tan, 2012; Copper, 2016; Fell, 2005, 2018; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Rigger, 2011; Wachman, 1994), while in the U.S. the two major parties became polarized on a wide array of economic, cultural, and security issues (Abramowitz, 2010, 2011; Black and Black, 2007; Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Brownstein, 2007; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003). In both countries, however, the sharp and vicious polarization of the political elites did not seemingly reflect a similar polarization in the electorate. This situation seemingly challenges the prominent Downsian theory that party positions should reflect the distribution of public opinion based on the assumption that the parties will seek to maximize their vote totals (Downs, 1957).

This paper explores this seeming paradox. The first section sketches the basic theoretical model; the second provides an overview of the growing polarization in American and Taiwanese politics; and the third presents survey data from these two countries that cast considerable doubt on whether citizen public opinion is the driving force behind political polarization. The conclusion then seeks to adduce an explanation for why rational politicians would pursue policies that appear to be irrational for their presumed goals of maximizing electoral support and winning office and argues that the observed trends suggest that the “catch-all parties” that evolved during the post World War II era may be now deteriorating under new political conditions.

### **Growing Polarization: A Theoretical Puzzle**

The widely, if not universally, perceived growing partisan polarization in American and Taiwanese politics represents something of a theoretical puzzle because it would be unexpected for two, interrelated reasons. First, the evolution of party systems in the developed world, at least until quite

recently, seemingly made such polarization less, not more, likely. Second, polarization is generally expected to be muted in two-party systems, such as those that exist in the U.S. and essentially in Taiwan.

There are two primary approaches to conceptualizing the nature of party systems. One focuses on the number and identity of major parties (Downs, 1957; Duverger, 1959; Sartori, 1976). From this perspective, once mass suffrage was achieved in the advanced industrialized nations by the 1920s, their party systems became remarkably stable (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997). A second interpretative focus, however, suggests fundamental changes in the nature of political parties over the last 150 years (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997). These changes, in particular, should have reduced the likelihood of extreme polarization.

Richard Katz and Peter Mair have developed a model of the evolution of four fundamentally different types of parties (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997). For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when suffrage was quite restrictive, politics was dominated by *elite* parties of office-holders and notables. Expanding suffrage during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries created the base for *mass* parties which represented distinct social groups and dominated democratic politics through the end of World War II. Because of their close ties with specific groups and classes, mass parties focused their electoral efforts on mobilizing the members of the groups that they represented, rather than reaching out to other groups.

Mass parties came under increasing challenge, however, partially as a result of their very success. The old elite parties could not compete based on the support of just the social groups that they had represented because these constituencies simply were not large enough. Thus, they had to develop broader appeals. More importantly, the mass parties representing new political and social groups were ultimately successful in gaining power and implementing broad reforms that helped their previously socially marginalized and politically excluded constituencies. This lessened the demand for and appeal of this type of party; and the postwar economic boom accelerated the process by creating broad middle-class societies in the developed world. This, in turn, led to declining polarization in the electorate or what Daniel Bell (1960) termed *The End of Ideology*.

Political parties responded by transforming themselves into *catch-all* ones (Kirchheimer, 1966) that appealed to political issue position rather than social identity in general and took moderate positions to appeal to the bulk of the citizenry in particular. In addition, most interest groups expected to work with all of the major parties, rather than regarding one as their exclusive representative. By the 1970s, finally, a new type of *cartel* party began to emerge in a system in which major parties collaborated to share some governmental resources.

This sequence of party development strongly suggests that political polarization should have decreased markedly over time in most developed democracies. The rise of mass parties greatly increased polarization among parties committed to representing social groups and classes with clashing interests. However, catch-all parties emerged when the polarization within the citizenry declined; and their electoral strategies then reduced the political space available for those with extreme positions and views. Finally, cartel parties reduced the potential for polarization even further by discovering collaborative self-interest among electorally competing parties.

As noted above, not just the nature of parties but the number of major parties is important for defining the nature of a party system. From this perspective, there is a widespread consensus that two-party systems should be associated with low levels of polarization. This is because, with only two major parties, their major competition is for the moderate middle of the ideological spectrum. In the words of Giovanni Sartori (1976: 191), "Twopartyism 'works' when the spread of opinion is small and its distribution single peaked." If public opinion substantially departs from this situation, Sartori argues, another type of party system will almost inevitably emerge.

This reflects one approach to explaining the number of parties by the nature of social cleavages in a society (Hsieh, 2009; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Sartori, 1976), even if there is no real theoretical reason to exclude the possibility that a society today could be divided into two polar and hostile groups, as many were during the era of mass parties. There is another theory, though, that the nature of the electoral system has a major impact on the number of parties -- in particular, that single-member districts promote a two-party system, while proportional representation is conducive to a multi-party system (Downs, 1957;

Duverger, 1959; Hsieh, 2009; Rae, 1971). This further suggests that a two-party system may somewhat ameliorate sharp social cleavages given how “sticky” political institutions generally are (March and Olsen, 1989; Riker, 1982).

Sartori (1976) presented a model of the nature of political parties in what he termed “polarized pluralism.” In such party systems, centrifugal social cleavages and forces driving the polity apart are more important than centripetal ones binding it together. This results in the existence of an important anti-system party or parties, “irresponsible” opposition and overpromising, and a highly emotional involvement in politics by “true believers.” Overall, he terms this an “ideological” approach to politics.

The ideological conflict in the era of mass parties from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century through the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was generally based on social class. With the diminishment of class cleavages in the postwar era, there were predictions of “the end of ideology” (Bell, 1960) which presumably would reduce political polarization. Yet, by the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, there was a rise what David Leeege and his colleagues (2002) have termed “cultural issues” which directly reflect the identities of and allegiances to competing social groups:

People who identify with different social groups often have different, deeply held perspectives not only on how they should live but also on the scope of the political community and its purposes. They have a sense of legitimate moral order, and they expect other citizens and their government to further that design. They often dislike and distrust groups with rival perspectives, and they even feel that some groups have no right to participate in democratic politics, much less to have their rivals’ perspectives become binding on society. Parties become anchored in social groups, and political leaders fashion value and interest coalitions for electoral advantage (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002: 5).

They argue that this group basis of social and cultural issues is the key to understanding why they are so emotional and polarizing (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002). Some of these issues (e.g., abortion) involve intense moral questions and, as a consequence, lead to polarization between camps of extremist supporters and opponents. Beyond such effects, these social issues also involve how groups and communities define themselves and view opposing groups who threaten their most cherished and fundamental values:

*Cultural politics is less a set of issues than a style of argumentation that invokes fundamental*

*social values and emphasizes group differences* (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002, 27-28; emphasis in original).

The escalating polarization in both American and Taiwanese politics, to sum, represents a seeming theoretical puzzle for two reasons. First, the evolving nature of political parties in the Katz and Mair model (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997) suggests that sharp political polarization should essentially be a thing of the past in developed democracies with the fading of class cleavages and ideological politics. Second, the two-party systems of Taiwan and the United States should be especially resistant to “polarized pluralism” (Sartori, 1976). Yet, the theory of “cultural politics” (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002) provides an answer to this anomaly since it presumes that “cultural” and “identity” differences can provide sharp ideological divides that are not necessarily related to class cleavages. This suggests that the best strategy to explain considerable polarization in a specific nation is to explicate the basis for its “cultural” divisions. More broadly, the rise of cultural politics also implies that catch-all parties may be coming under increasing challenge because their electoral strategy is based on the assumption of moderate voters who are not exclusively loyal to one party.

### **The Bases for Growing Polarization In Taiwan and the United States**

The theoretical discussion in the previous section implies that we should look for sharp cultural divisions in a polity to explain the escalation of polarization in a post-industrial society. In Taiwan, such a division is very easy to discern based on ethnic identification. This is the divide between the so-called Mainlanders (slightly less than 15% of the population) who evacuated to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1940s and the large majority of much longer term residents or Islanders (Brown, 2004; Wachman, 1994). The American cleavage is not so neatly tied to specific social groups. Rather, America’s “culture wars” (Hunter, 1991; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2018) started

out reflecting the sharp debate between the supporters and opponents of “traditional values” on which the citizenry divide much differently than on the class-based “politics of rich and poor.”

Both these “cultural divisions,” in addition, have changed significantly over the last decade. Taiwanese nationalism became increasingly associated with the Minnan majority of about 70% of the population who came to Taiwan from China’s Fujian Province (Lee, 2005) -- in addition to Mainlanders, Taiwan’s population is composed of 15% Hakka and 2% aborigines. For the United States, the political upheaval set off by the Great Recession has led to the emergence of the role of government as a “culture war” issue (Brooks, 2010). More broadly, at least among the political elites, support for different types of issues has become much more unified among both conservatives and liberals (Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010). In somewhat different ways, both of these developments suggest that growing polarization has the potential to become institutionalized. Polarization in Taiwan is seemingly rooted in long-term ethnic identities (Lee, 2005; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005); and the United States appears to be experiencing “conflict extension” to a growing number of emotional issues (Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010).

### **Taiwan: The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the National Identity Issue**

The nature of authoritarian rule on Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War created a bitter legacy of ethnic hostility and tensions that reverberates in the nation’s politics even today. Since the evacuation of the Chiang Kai-shek regime to Taiwan in 1949 at the end of the Chinese Civil War, the island has suffered from a clear ethnic cleavage between the Mainlanders who came with Chiang (a little under 15% of the population) and the long-time residents of Taiwan or Islanders who also were almost all ethnically Han Chinese. The Mainlanders dominated the government and imposed a harsh and repressive rule termed the “White Terror” until the country’s democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More broadly, especially after the initiation of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in 1966, the China-centric regime denigrated and discriminated against local culture and dialects by, for example, treating the Mandarin dialect as the official language of government and education, leading to ongoing

resentments among the Islanders (Cheng, 1994; Lee, 2005; Lynch, 2004; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Mendel, 1970; Phillips, 2003; Wachman, 1994).

Thus, the questions of ethnic justice and national identity, even if repressed by martial law, were clearly important to many Taiwanese. Taiwan's democratization, therefore, was widely expected to unleash Taiwanese nationalism on two interlinked but distinct issues: 1) rejection of the Mainlander-dominated political regime and 2) growing hostility toward and the absolute rejection of China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan which was ironically at least tacitly supported by the Kuomintang's policy of "Mainland Recovery" (Gold, 1986; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Rigger, 1999b, 2001; Tu, 1998; Wachman, 1994).

As the 1990s opened, both the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) seemingly placed opposing bets on how the citizens of Taiwan would respond to this issue. The DPP bet that the end of authoritarian controls would permit Islander resentments to be expressed, winning over voters to the DPP as the champion of Taiwanese nationalism. For example, the DPP added support for Taiwan Independence to its Charter in 1991. Conversely, the KMT bet that the satisfaction of the general population with the prosperity created by Taiwan's "economic miracle" would make them supportive of the political *status quo* both domestically and in cross-Strait relations with China (Clark, 2002).

Political forces soon began to push both parties away from these stark alternatives. In the KMT, Islander Lee Teng-hui, who as Vice-President succeeded Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo as President after his death in 1988, responded to this opportunity with what appeared to be inspired statesmanship on the national identity question. As Lee consolidated his power, he not so subtly pushed the KMT's position on cross-Strait relations in a new direction. Lee, in fact, managed to straddle the national identity issue quite astutely, implicitly portraying himself as a moderate between the pro-Independence DPP and the pro-Unification members of the KMT and (after 1993) the New Party who tended to be Mainlanders. While retaining a commitment to Unification with China in the indefinite future, he aggressively began to pursue the "pragmatic diplomacy" of trying to upgrade Taiwan's

international status. For example, in 1993 he co-opted a popular issue from the DPP by launching a campaign to join the United Nations, which the KMT had strongly opposed up to then (Cabestan, 1998; Chao, 2002; Lasater, 2000; Sutter and Johnson, 1994). Furthermore, the victory of Lee's "Mainstream" faction clearly promoted the "Taiwanization" of the party -- which made it hard to blame it for the repression of the "old" KMT. Consistent with the view that the old *Kuomintang* had been rejected, he formally apologized in 1995 for the massacre of thousands of Taiwanese by Nationalists troops in the Spring of 1947, the "February 28<sup>th</sup> or 2-2-8 Incident" (Chao and Myers, 1998; Hood, 1997).

For its part, the DPP began to moderate its position on Taiwan Independence in the early 1990s after the inclusion of a pro-Independence plank in the party charter apparently cost it significantly at the polls in 1991. In particular, the Chinese military threats during the 1996 presidential elections and the woeful showing of the pro-Independence DPP candidate evidently convinced most of its leaders that Taiwan Independence was simply unfeasible. Consequently, the DPP began to downplay Independence without ever formally renouncing it. For example, some (but far from all) DPP leaders began to argue that Taiwan already was an independent country, so there was no need for a formal declaration of Independence (Rigger, 2001; Wang, 2000). Taiwan's political dynamics in the late 1990s, therefore, suggested that partisan differences over national identity were narrowing and losing their intensity (Clark and Tan, 2012; Fell, 2005).

However, a re-escalation soon erupted following the dramatic victory of the DPP's Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential election, which he won with just under 40% of the vote in a three-way race (plus a couple of inconsequential minor candidates) with the KMT's Lien Chan and with James Soong who ran as an Independent after failing to get on the KMT ticket. Two distinct types of issues were involved in this polarization. The first was an ongoing struggle over the "localization" or *Bentuhua* of the country's politics and especially culture which was consistently pushed by the Chen administration. The second involved cross-Strait relations with the People's Republic of China and was more episodic; and here Chen Shui-bian's policies were far from consistent over time.

Domestically, Chen displayed a strong commitment pursuing *Bentuhua* to create a “Taiwan-centric paradigm” for the nation (Hsiau, 2005; Jacobs, 2005). This, in turn, stimulated substantial opposition and pushback from the old guard KMT (Wang, 2005). The administration used its executive power to promote what it called a “Taiwanese subjectivity” that certainly was aimed at its base constituency. Wei-chin Lee (2005), for example, argues that Chen promoted a Cultural Reconstruction Movement that included such initiatives as changing the name of many agencies and organizations to stress “Taiwan,” promoting Islander dialects in language policy, revising the official policy toward the mass media to reverse the previous KMT domination of outlets (including the encouragement of underground radio stations), and changing the focus from Chinese to Taiwanese history in education policy. Daniel Lynch (2004), for example, concluded that Chen and his “Green” bloc (named for the primary color of the DPP flag) were trying to create a new nation rooted in Taiwanese history and culture.

Relations with China were much more volatile, despite Chen Shui-bian’s image as a zealot in promoting the declaration of *de jure* Taiwan Independence, which very probably would have resulted in military action by the PRC. Chen’s pushing the envelope on the Independence issue commenced in the summer of 2002 when he proclaimed the theory that “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” existed, provoking significant unhappiness in both Beijing and Washington. After that, he periodically set off contretemps with Beijing and Washington until he left office in 2008, as he challenged China’s “red lines” on Taiwan Independence by, for example, proposing or holding referenda on issues that might affect Taiwan’s international status and by advocating fundamental change to the country’s Constitution. Yet, there were also signs of pragmatism in Chen’s policies toward cross-Strait relations. He was fairly conciliatory toward an unresponsive PRC for his first two years in office and negotiated a “Ten Point Consensus” with the widely perceived pro-China James Soong in early 2005. More broadly, he followed a pattern of being aggressive toward China during electoral campaigns to appeal to the “deep Green” Taiwanese nationalists and then sounding much more conciliatory after the election was over, suggesting that he saw the DPP as a mass party. Indeed, he only became stridently pro-Independence consistently in

2006 when burgeoning scandals deprived him of support from almost everybody except the deep Greens (Clark, 2006; Clark and Tan, 2012).

For their part, the KMT and its “Blue” coalition (named for one of the colors in the KMT flag) returned to a much more “China-centric” stance after Lee Teng-hui left the party following its defeat in the 2000 presidential election. According to the model developed by Yu-shan Wu (2011), this represented a direct response to their electoral situation. During elections, Wu argues that the KMT acts like a catch-all party and appeals to the median voter with centrist policies. Between elections when the party is out of power (as it was from 2000 to 2008 and from 2016 on), in contrast, it focuses its appeals on keeping the support of the pro-China “deep Blues,” while acting in a more pragmatic or “realist” manner when it controls the government.

By the middle of the first decade in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, therefore, a harsh and viciously divisive debate over cross-Strait relations and national identity had come to dominate Taiwan’s politics. The Greens argued that they must “stand up for Taiwan” and accused the Blues of selling Taiwan out to China. In stark contrast, the Blues contended that the Greens were needlessly provocative and that a more accommodating policy could defuse the threat from China. Taken to the extreme (which they often were), these positions implied that one side was the savior and the other the destroyer of Taiwan and its statehood. Unfortunately, both critiques seem to have had some merit. President Chen’s periodic appeals to his pro-Independence “base constituency” for primarily domestic purposes both infuriated China and at times strained relations with the United States, thereby threatening to undermine Taiwan’s position in the Taipei-Beijing-Washington “triangle.” Conversely, the Blue attempts to “do business” with Beijing undermined Chen’s ability to deal with China; and there were even fairly credible rumors that Blue leaders had urged both the PRC and US to “get tough” with the Chen administration which in itself might have created a security threat to Taiwan (Clark, 2006; Hickey, 2006; Rigger, 2005).

The election of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s President in 2008 led to a reduction of tensions with China. In particular, Ma negotiated the “Three Links” of trade, transportation and mail in 2008 and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010. Initially, these were quite

controversial and stimulated massive DPP-led demonstrations, which continued the sharp polarization of the Chen Shui-bian era. However, probably because no readily identifiable disastrous consequences occurred, the sharp polarization over them moderated by the end of Ma's first term. However, they remerged in 2014 with the emergence of the student-led Sunflower Movement which protested Ma's attempt to force the highly controversial Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) through the Legislative Yuan. Subsequently, the DPP won the local elections in 2014 handily and then took control of the government in the 2016 presidential and legislative elections, in which Tsai Ing-wen decisively became President with 56% of the vote and the DPP captured the Legislative Yuan for the first time ever (Clark and Tan, 2012; Copper, 2012, 2016).

Tsai remained quite popular for her first year in office, as she had an approval rate of nearly 70% in May 2017. However, this dropped sharply to just over 40% over the next six months and then plummeted again to around 20% in May of 2018 due to a combination of factors. First, the DPP's dominant political position following the 2016 elections very probably meant that it became the target of some of the resentment directed toward the political establishment. Second, several of the DPP's policies toward pensions and labor relations became quite controversial. Third, while the country's economic performance improved over the late Ma era, it was not perceived as especially good. Finally, the freeze in relations with China that ensued after Tsai refused to endorse the "1992 Consensus" of One China with Separate Interpretations evidently hurt her popularity as well. This resulted in a decisive Kuomintang victory in the 2018 local elections (Bush, 2018; Copper, 2019; Luo and Chen, 2018; Tsai, 2018, 2019).

The KMT had very little time to savor its victory, however, as increasing tensions in cross-Strait relations led to a surge in support for Tsai Ing-wen. Two separate factors were at work here. First, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a very harsh speech demanding unification in January 2018, which undercut the KMT's position on Taiwan's relationship with China; and, second, the escalating protests in Hong Kong greatly increased the sense of a Chinese threat in Taiwan. Tsai's strong response in standing up for Taiwan against these threats from China proved to be quite popular (Copper, 2019; Everington,

2019). Thus, the cultural issue of Taiwan's identity and international status has evidently reemerged as the centerpiece of Taiwan politics.

### **The Rise of Cultural and Identity Politics in the U.S.**

The growing importance of identity politics in the United States can be traced to a fundamental change in the nature of the prominent issues that divide Democrats from Republicans. During most of the so-called New Deal era in U.S. politics (i.e., the 1930s through the 1960s), political life was dominated by economic issues concerning the role of government and the distribution of resources in American society. Beginning in the 1970s, however, a new issue cleavage concerning social and cultural values arose that has become increasingly central to partisan conflict and competition over the last three decades. These new issues are much more directly caught up in the cultural identity of people and groups. Therefore, their growing salience in American politics has resulted in the rise of the highly emotional symbolic politics associated with conflicts over basic identity questions.

For the last several decades, political science research has found that two different major dimensions or types of issues exist in American politics which have been called "economic" and "cultural" issues (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Legee, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Shafer and Claggett, 1995). The first issue dimension has its roots in the Great Depression and focuses upon the *Politics of Rich and Poor* (Phillips, 1990). On this dimension, Republicans generally advocate smaller government and reduced public spending in order to free resources for private utilization which is justified both in terms of individual liberty and in terms of the efficiency of *laissez-faire* economics. In contrast, Democrats advocate expanded government responsibility both to promote the economy and, usually more importantly, to help those on the margins of society. At the time of the Great Depression and into the 1950s, these issues stimulated bitter partisan polarization between the advocates and opponents of Roosevelt's New Deal, as was common during the era of mass parties. Growing prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s gradually weakened their divisiveness, however, as both the Democrats and Republicans became catch-all parties.

The second set of issues is rooted in the social upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s when the “traditional values” of American society came under increasing challenge by insurgent political and social groups trumpeting a “new morality” (Frum, 2000). Here, Democrats and Republicans actually exchange positions on the desirability of freedom and, at least by implication, of governmental activism. Republicans, fearing that America is *Slouching Towards Gomorrah* (Bork, 1996), stress traditional values and maintaining order, while Democrats are more supportive of “secularism” and “permissiveness.” It is these issues, such as abortion, crime, gay marriage, the display of religious symbols, race, immigration, and gun control, which became the heart of America’s polarization and increasing turn toward cultural politics during the 1980s and 1990s. Significant minorities take polar-opposite positions, refuse even to consider compromise, and are constantly on the lookout for new issues. For example, prochoice and prolife groups on abortion became mobilized, respectively, for and against stem cell research (Hunter, 1991; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002).

This results in issues being presented as highly symbolic ones on which compromise is impossible because it would undermine the status and position of a particular group in American politics. To use the terminology of James Hunter (1991), the result has been *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. Initially, the relationships among the supporters and opponents of these cultural issues were at least somewhat limited. The intense minorities who consider their identities to be determined by their positions on most of these issues were fairly small for the most part; and the overlap among them was limited as well, leading to the image of “single-issue partisans.” Yet, when the number of people who feel intensely conservative or liberal on all these issues is added up, the result is a considerable polarization.

The manner in which these “culture war” issues stimulate political conflict in the United States differ somewhat, though, as sketched in Table 1. Some cleavages, such as those over religion and over race and Civil Rights, involve the direct conflict between the status and socioeconomic position of groups that are defined fairly clearly, although not all members of such groups may view the issue as particularly important. For example, granting Civil Rights to African Americans was seen as threatening by a

substantial number of whites; and America at present is clearly undergoing a major battle between the religious and the secular over Church-state relations. For other social issues, in contrast, the lines of cleavage are more complex and informal. The battle over gun rights involves informal self-defined groups. More complexly, conflicts over patriotism and immigration involve informal and self-defined groups who hold conflicting visions about the essence of America, the political community that forms the United States, and the role that the U.S. should play in world affairs. Similarly, the battles over gay rights and gay marriage do not involve gays' seeking to gain socioeconomic positions currently held by heterosexuals; rather supporters of traditional values believe that gay rights will undermine the existing social structure. The cleavage is even more indirect on crime, where the conflict is not between law-abiding citizens and criminals but between conservatives and liberals over how best to fight crime (punishing criminals vs. ameliorating bad social conditions). Finally, the political debate over gender and feminism is especially complex because it involves both a direct competition between women and men and a challenge to the society opposed by supporters of traditional values among both sexes (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Hunter, 1991; Lege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002).

**Table 1 about here**

The different dynamics of the cultural issues summarized in Table 1 and the image of "single-issue partisans" might suggest a limited polarization in the United States. However, two changes over the several two decades have clearly exacerbated polarization. First, economic issues noticeably increased in saliency and divisiveness (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010). Partisan clashes over economic issues and the role of government then escalated with the onset of the Great Recession, leading Arthur Brooks (2010) to proclaim the eruption of a culture war over *How the Fight between Free Enterprise and Big Government Will Shape America's Future*. Second and more broadly, Geoffrey Layman and his associates conclude that the two major American parties have become polarized on an increasingly large number of issues over in a process that they term "conflict extension" as conservative and liberal activists on different issues align with each other, thereby reducing the phenomenon of "single-issue partisans" (Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman,

2010). This implies that the polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties has become fairly well institutionalized because it rests on a broad multiple-issue foundation. Finally, Donald Trump's upset victory in the 2016 presidential was based on a strong emphasis on cultural issues, leading John Sides and his associates to describe the campaign as an *Identity Crisis: The Battle for the Meaning of America* (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2018).

### **The Disconnect between Party Polarization and the Distribution of Public Opinion**

Based on the seminal work of Anthony Downs' (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, many scholars assume that the activity and nature of political parties in democratic nations are strongly condition by the distribution of public opinion. Public opinion on a specific issue can have numerous possible distributions. Two are particularly relevant for our analysis here. Popular attitudes on many issues have a distribution that is close to what is called "normal." Most of the citizens are concentrated in the middle of the distribution; there are a clearly declining number of cases as one move from the middle toward either extreme; and the distribution is symmetric in that equal numbers are associated with the two extremes of the distribution, creating a "bell curve." In stark contrast, a "polarized" distribution has a substantial number of cases at both the extremes, while there are relatively few in the middle, creating a "U-shaped curve" if the number of cases are plotted. A polarized distribution is also "bimodal" in the sense that there are two modes (i.e., the categories with the largest number of cases in them), one at each of the ideological extremes.

Overall, as summarized in Table 2, political attitudes in combination might form one of five different types of distributions, assuming a polity with two major parties. The first two are easy to understand. If most citizens favored the positions of a specific party (the DPP or KMT in Taiwan or Democrats or Republicans in the United States), then we would have a *partisan public* dominated by that party (A or B). Third, there would be a *polarized public* if a fairly even balance exists between the strong supporters of Party A and B on most issues. A fourth possibility is that the general citizenry is not happy

with either extreme and, rather, takes a position in the middle of the ideological spectrum on most issues. In this case, we would say that the nature of public opinion indicates a *moderate public*. The final possibility is that the public favors Party A on a considerable number of issues, but also supports Party B on many others. Here, there would be a *split public*.

**Table 2 about here**

The strong elite partisan polarization in both Taiwan and the U.S. implies that we should expect polarized distributions of public opinion in both countries. This section, therefore, examines data on how citizens line up on the major issues in the two countries. The evidence from Taiwan is clear-cut. On the two central issues of national identity and cross-Strait relations, the distribution of public opinion is far from polarized. For America, the nature of public opinion is more complex. On some issues, Americans are conservative and pro-Republican; on others they are liberal and pro-Democrat; and on a few they are either moderate or polarized. What is strongly evident, though, is that public opinion in the United States does not follow a pattern of strong and consistent polarization in the public across a broad array of issues. Rather it is clearly split. Consequently, citizen political views are not the primary driving force behind party polarization in either the United States or Taiwan.

**Non-polarized Public Opinion on National Identity and Cross-Strait Relations in Taiwan**

The polarization over national identity and cross-Strait relations in the elite discourse and party competition in Taiwan would strongly suggest that such polarization exists among the general electorate as well for either of two reasons. The elites might have responded to a sharp polarization in public opinion; or the citizenry may have become more polarized once the elite debate brought the issue to the center of Taiwan's politics. If neither of these conditions existed and a majority of Taiwanese was in the "moderate middle," the major parties would have a strong incentive to moderate their policies or risk punishment at the polls (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976).

A variety of public opinion data cast considerable doubt upon the image of a polarized electorate. In particular, many of Taiwan's citizens possess a complex identity that includes both Taiwanese and

Chinese components and are wary about extreme positions on cross-Strait relations (Brown, 2004; Rigger, 1999a; Wachman, 1994). For the last quarter century, public opinion surveys have asked whether people identify themselves as Chinese, Taiwanese, or a combination of both. Table 3 shows that national identity clearly possessed a normal distribution in 1992 as just over half the population (52%) expressed a dual identity, while Chinese identifiers slightly outnumbered Taiwanese ones (28% to 20%). This changed dramatically in just eight years. In 2000, about half the population (47%) still had dual identification, but Taiwanese identifiers outnumbered Chinese ones 39% to 14%. The Chen Shui-bian years continued this trend as Taiwanese identification grew from 39% to 51% between 2000 and 2005, while Chinese identification collapsed further to just 4%. Finally, Taiwanese identifiers continued to increase to 55% of the population in 2010 and 66% in 2016.

**Table 3 about here**

These data certainly show that the “China-centered paradigm” is a thing of the past in Taiwan, as by 2010 or even 2000 the number of purely Chinese identifiers in Taiwan had become minuscule. Wang and Chang (2005) show that this trend was even pronounced among Mainlanders, as evidenced by the data in Table 4. Chinese identifiers among Mainlanders fell by almost a half from 57% to 29% between just 1994 and 2000 and then fell by nearly a half again to 16% in 2004 and 12%. Even before the sharp polarization of the 2000s, therefore, the “deep Blues” were a decided minority of a small minority of the population; and the decline in Chinese identification among Mainlanders continued apace during the first Chen administration despite his escalating appeals to Taiwanese nationalism. Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was surely dead and buried.

**Table 4 about here**

Evaluating the degree of polarization versus moderation concerning the “Taiwan-centric paradigm” is a little more problematic and ambiguous, however. By 2000, the distribution of opinion on national identity was no longer normal, as Taiwanese identifiers greatly outnumbered Chinese ones. Over the next ten years, furthermore, the number of Taiwanese identifiers grew substantially, surpassed those who thought of themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese in 2008, and attained a marked lead over dual

identifiers of 55% to 42% in 2010; and by 2016 the gap had widened to 66% to 31% . These data, however, support two quite different interpretations.

On the one hand, there clearly was a massive shift toward Taiwanese identification (Ho and Liu, 2003; Shen and Wu, 2008) which is consistent with the argument that Chen Shui-bian was able to create a new nation rooted in Taiwanese history and culture (Lynch, 2004). This was expressed during the 2004 campaign not just by the supporters of Chen. Rather, it could also be seen in the actions and words of the Pan-Blue leadership. For example, during their final massive campaign rallies the KMT presidential and vice-presidential candidates Lien Chan and James Soong kissed the ground in Taipei and Taichung respectively to demonstrate their devotion and loyalty to Taiwan (Huang, 2004); and Lien Chan was quoted as saying, “There is one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait,” thereby echoing what was seen as a provocative argument by Chen Shui-bian in 2002 (Rawnsley, 2004).

On the other hand, the strong minority who professes a dual identity is inconsistent with the image of the new totally Taiwanese nation that was supposedly created by what Wei-chin Lee (2005) termed Chen’s “Cultural Reconstruction Movement.” This can also be seen in how the public views the best option for Taiwan’s international status: 1) Taiwan Independence, 2) the current *status quo* of an uncertain sovereignty, or 3) Unification with the PRC. Table 5 demonstrates since the early 1990s marked majorities of about 60% have supported the diplomatic *status quo*, ambiguous and even ridiculous as it may be. This distribution is not fully normal, though, because the two extremes are not balanced. In particular, between 1994 and 2016 the relative support for Independence and Unification flip-flopped from 14% - 25% to 32% - 12%. Still, since the Taiwan-centric paradigm advocates Independence, popular opinion does indeed appear to be dominated by the moderate middle.

**Table 5 about here**

This strong and continuing support for the *status quo* in Taiwan’s international status is especially striking because, as Rigger (2004) has noted, growing frustration across the political spectrum with Taiwan’s lack of international status and treatment by the PRC is very easy to discern. Rather, the dangers of the two extreme are so pronounced that the not-particularly-satisfactory current situation is

accepted as tolerable. In short, the “moderate middle” in Taiwan almost certainly does not have any hesitation in affirming “Taiwan, Yes!” -- a slogan in Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 presidential campaign (de Lisle, 2004). However, its Taiwan-centric allegiances fall considerably short of what the Deep Greens consider to be necessary for a Taiwan nation. For example, Shelley Rigger’s (2011) interviews of young people found that even the term “Love Taiwan” was viewed with suspicion because it had become so politicized. Thus, Chen’s Cultural Reconstruction Movement may have over-reached, just as Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement did.

The data on Taiwanese party identification in June 2018 are also inconsistent with the image of a polarized public. Neither of the major parties are very popular, as both receive the support of less than a quarter (23%) of the citizenry; and a third (32%) of the public is nonpartisan. For the two minor parties in the Legislative Yuan, the New Power Party gets 8%, while the PFP receives the support of only 2% of Taiwanese (Chen, 2018; You, 2018). Consequently, there is little sign of a KMT resurgence, but the DPP does not appear to have become a dominant party either.

**Table 6 here**

### **A Split Public in the United States**

As noted in the previous section, there is a basic distinction between economic and cultural issues in American politics, while especially since the September 11<sup>+</sup> terror attack, security issues represent a third dimension in U.S. public opinion (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Legee, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Shafer and Claggett, 1995). In this section, we examine public opinion in the United States at the time of the 2016 elections. The data come from the 2016 American National Election Study that is distributed by the International Consortium for Political and Social Research (2017). We use the version of this study developed by Charles Prysby and Carmine Scavo (2018). Most of these positions are determined by the normal stances of conservatives and liberals. In two cases, however, this division is ambiguous, and we used the actual correlation of the item with conservative ideology. In these instances, conservatives are more likely than liberals to feel that imports

should be limited to create more jobs and that terrorism is a major threat. An ideological advantage is cited when there is a difference of 10 percentage points or more between the conservative and liberal positions. Unfortunately, attitudes about two important Trump policies, a major tax cut and a large infrastructure program, are not included in the Prysby and Scavo (2018) data set.

Table 7 presents the balance between those who favor and oppose specific economic issues. The number of people who want to increase and decrease government spending and services is almost equal (38% to 37%), but huge majorities take the liberal position of advocating increased spending for Social Security (63% to 6%), public schools (70% to 7%), child care (50% to 13%), and, to a somewhat lesser extent, aid to the poor (45% to 17%). Indeed, the public supports spending cuts on only one liberal item included in the table, welfare spending, by a conservative plurality of 46% to 20%. Health care draws somewhat divided opinions. While a liberal plurality of 47% to 26% wants the government to increase its financial assistance for healthcare, the public is almost evenly split on whether to prefer a public to a private health plan (39% to 41%) and whether to approve or disapprove Obamacare (38% to 41%). Turning to other economic issues, a liberal plurality of 47% to 30% wants government to act to reduce income inequality by such popular liberal measures as increasing the minimum wage (65% to 30%) and imposing more taxes on millionaires (67% to 15%). Americans are also quite liberal on government regulation, supporting significant regulation on business (78% to 22%), banks (87% to 13%), and the environment (58% to 23%). They also favor the conservative position of limiting exports by a large majority of 62% to 38%).

**Table 7 about here**

In the realm of cultural issues, Americans take a wide variety of positions, as demonstrated by the data in Table 8. They are clearly conservative on the moral traditionalism scale as 46% are rated as highly traditional versus 29% who have a low score on the issue. Yet, this does not mean that the public is uniformly conservative in this realm. For example, they are fairly evenly divided on the key issue of abortion, as they have been since the 1980s, as 40% are pro-life and 45% pro-choice. Gay marriage, in contrast, is supported by a large liberal majority of 59% to 18%. Americans are split ideologically on

immigration as well. They are strongly conservative on the level of immigration, as only 6% want to increase it while 44% want to decrease it. In contrast, a huge liberal majority of 69% to 17% wants illegal immigrants to be able to stay in the U.S. as opposed to being deported; and a narrow liberal plurality (41% to 31%) opposes eliminating birthright citizenship. In terms of race and gender issues, the public is moderately conservative, as it ranks high rather than low on the sexism scale (50% score high and 35% low) and low rather than high on the African-American support scale (35% to 45%). Finally, opinion about making gun purchases more difficult is fairly even as 54% support and 46% oppose this policy, while a liberal plurality of 45% to 29% supports the legalization of marijuana.

**Table 8 here**

The security issues included in Table 9 include both international and domestic components. Americans are quite conservative on the three international issues included in our analysis. They support increased defense spending (50% to 23%), are willing to use military force (66% to 30%), and have a high fear of terrorism (46% to 25%). They are also quite conservative on law and order issues. In addition to their overwhelming support for increased crime spending (64% to 8%), they also favor the death penalty by the extremely strong margin of 75% to 17%. The only liberal position on a security issue in Table 9 is the plurality of 46% to 33% which opposes the border wall that Trump proposed. Furthermore, Americans are not necessarily knee-jerk conservatives in the realm of international security. In 2008, as shown by Table 10, they overwhelmingly supported the War on Terror by a 60% to 25% margin. In contrast, though, they disapproved of the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by similar huge majorities of 58% to 23% and 63% to 25% respectively (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Shafer and Claggett, 1995).

**Table 9 and 10 here**

Table 11 indicates the distribution of party identification in the United States at the time of the 2016 election differed considerably from the one for 2018 Taiwan. First and most dramatically, only 13.8% of the respondents indicate that they do not have any allegiance to one of the two major parties. Second, the table also allows us to gauge how enthusiastic the followers of the two parties are. For

example, 21.4% of the population consider themselves strong Democrats, while 25.2% are only weak or leaning Democrats. Thus, there is a tendency for Democrats to be clustered at the strong end of the scale; and the same tendency, although less pronounced, exists for Republicans. In all, 63.4% of Americans fall into the four extreme categories, while only 36.5% are in the middle three, indicating a significant polarization of party allegiances.

The nature of public opinion in the United States, therefore, is quite complex. It definitely is neither moderate nor polarized. Rather, American attitudes are a clearly split mix of conservative and liberal positions, as there is an ideological difference of less than 10 percentage points on only 6 of the 35 issues included in Tables 7 through 10. Clearly, the public in the United States is ideologically split or, some would say, schizophrenic. Unlike the moderate and polarized publics, a split public does not provide a clear incentive system for politicians attempting to maximize their electoral support by appealing to either the moderate median voter or to their ideological base constituencies. It does imply, however, that a mixed ideological message appealing to the different desires of the citizenry should be the most efficacious. Consequently, the current ideologically monolithic positions of the Democrats and Republicans (Black and Black, 2007; Brownstein, 2007) appear to be a little puzzling.

### **A Growing Challenge to Catch-all Parties?**

Downsian theory is based upon two eminently reasonable assumptions. First, politicians want to win office both for the sake of their own careers and to implement their desired policies. Second, they therefore respond to the distribution of public opinion in a polity by tailoring their appeals to maximize their electoral support. From this perspective, the dissonance between public opinion and strong elite party polarization in both Taiwan and the United States creates a theoretical puzzle. Norman Schofield and Gary Miller (2007) present an answer to this seeming paradox with their argument that political leaders must motivate the support of activists who are much more ideological than the general public and balance groups with significantly different political values (e.g., the support of economic and social

conservatives for the Republican party in the U.S.). Moreover, one would presume that many politicians have fairly strong policy preferences as well.

The Schofield-Miller model provides a welcome stride beyond conventional Downsian analysis. It still leaves one question begging, however. Why do not voters punish a party that moves too far away from their preferences or support a new party if none of the existing ones appeal to them? This is especially puzzling if we assume the prevalence of catch-all parties which are not very distinct ideologically and moderate voters (consumers) who flit between them at polls, similarly to their decision to go to McDonalds or Burger King on a particular evening.

Growing party polarization, therefore, raises the question of whether the era of catch-all parties is passing. This could be occurring for several reasons. First, new cultural issues could have created staunch constituencies, such as economic cleavages did during the era of mass parties. Second, the “stickiness” of political institutions (March and Olsen, 1989) might account for the “freezing” of party systems over the last 80 years (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997), making the advent of new parties difficult and giving the existing major parties significant leeway to move away from the median voter. Third, most voters could develop strong enough attachments to a party or strong enough aversions to its rivals to make the risk of defection fairly small.

Taiwan and the U.S. provide good case studies of this challenge to catch-all parties. Both have two-party systems that appear fairly stable (Abramowitz, 2010, 2011; Clark and Tan, 2012), although there are some indications over the last half decade that the nature of the party system may be starting to shift in Taiwan (Clark, Tan, and Ho, 2019). Thus, party leaders have the leeway and perhaps the incentive to transfer their parties back from catch-all to mass parties. Such a process can be seen in both Taiwan and America, although it is by no means completed in either country.

There also is good reason to view cultural issues as important in both nations, albeit in somewhat different forms. The national identity question is certainly a cultural issue that has been quite important, if not central, in recent Taiwanese politics; and it is rooted in a major ethnic division (Clark and Tan, 2012; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Wachman, 1994). In contrast to Taiwan, which has just one central

cultural issue, there are an expanding number of cultural conflicts in America on which the Democrats and Republicans have become similarly polarized (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Hunter, 1991; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010; Legee, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2018). While there is no single defining social division, such as class or ethnicity, Americans' positions on cultural issues are related to specific social groups based on religiosity, region and race (Abramowitz, 2010, 2011; Black and Black, 2007; Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003).

There is certainly the potential, therefore, for party leaders in both states to follow the "mass" strategy of appealing to the strong attitudes of fairly well defined social groups. The United States seems well on its way to a transformation from catch-all to mass parties. The Democrats and Republicans are increasingly polarized on a broad array of cultural issues in a process driven by highly ideological party activists; and, if anything, this polarization and focusing of campaign appeals upon "base constituencies" is intensifying with the presidency of Donald Trump and the "Resistance" to it (Bacon, 2019; Enten, 2019; Kunkle and Natason, 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2018). The situation is somewhat more ambiguous and problematic in Taiwan. Especially during the Chen Shui-bian era, both the DPP and KMT acted as mass parties by focusing their appeals about national identity upon their base constituencies much of the time. Yet, as discussed in the second section, these initiatives (even those by the supposed Independence zealot Chen) appeared strategic in the sense that appeals to Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism were turned on and off depending upon the political situation (Clark and Tan, 2012; Wu, 2011). This pattern continued after Ma Ying-jeou was elected President (Clark, 2011; Copper, 2011; Fell, 2011; Gold, 2010; Rigger, 2010; Tien and Tung, 2011); and Taiwan politics during the Tsai era have followed a rollercoaster of changing party fortunes, leaving the nature of Taiwan's party system still to be determined.

A broader theoretical explanation for this may lie in the conclusion of Katz and Mair (1995) that many party systems are increasingly becoming cartels. While both mass and catch-all parties serve as links between civil society and the state, this role is substantially different in a cartel party system. In the

cartel party stage, parties act as brokers between the state and civil society but at the same time ensure their own survival by enhancing their “capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives” (Katz and Mair, 1995: 16). In the case of the US and Taiwan, this is evidenced by how the dominant parties in these countries “stack the odds” against other challenger parties in both their election systems and legislative operations (Clark and Tan, 2012). This strongly implies that the stickiness of political institutions and the freezing of party alternatives prevent newly mobilized parties from making effective challenges to the existing major parties.

A cartel party system, though, does not mean that electoral competition necessarily ends. If the major parties retain catch-all characteristics, they may use “competing claims to efficient management” to appeal to the voter (Katz and Mair 1995: 19) which is consistent with the normal Downsian logic. Yet, while a cartel party system as envisaged by Katz and Mair (1995) involves collusion between the dominant parties to ensure their own organizational survival and self-interest, this does not necessarily mandate a particular form of party organization. In other words, the existence of cartel party system does not exclude the possibility that political parties are organized like the mass parties of the past where inter-party competition is on the basis of representative capacity by segmenting the “electorate in a series of exclusive constituencies” (Katz and Mair 1995: 19). A primary implication of the parallel existence of mass party organization within a cartel party system is that party competition is undertaken through mobilization of activists by emphasizing “polarized” positions. Voters, on the hand, are left without other alternatives as members of the cartel party system effectively choke off the ability of challenger parties to survive. Following on this logic, then, mass parties in a cartel system have more ability to move away from median voter preferences without costly repercussions because voters do not have any other realistic voting choices and are, therefore, unable to punish them. Unfortunately, this seems to be increasingly the case in both Taiwan and America.

Table 1

## DIFFERING DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL ISSUES IN THE U.S.

ISSUE	FORM OF CONFLICT	GROUPS INVOLVED
RELIGION	Direct Conflict between Clearly Defined Groups	Religious versus Secular
RACE & CIVIL RIGHTS	Direct Conflict between Clearly Defined Groups	African Americans versus whites
GUN RIGHTS	Conflict between more Informal & Self-defined Groups	Those who see guns as individual right vs those who fear them
PATRIOTISM	Conflict between more Informal & Self-defined Groups	Groups with Conflicting Views about what the U.S. Is and Should Do
IMMIGRATION	Conflict between more Informal & Self-defined Groups	Groups with Conflicting Views about what the U.S. Is and Should Do
GAY RIGHTS	Conflict More Indirect: Gays seen as Challenging Traditional Values rather Than Socioeconomic Position of Other Groups	Gays versus Believers in Traditional Values
CRIME	Conflict More Indirect	Conservatives versus Liberals on Crime Policy
GENDER & FEMINISM	1. Direct Conflict between Clearly Defined Groups 2. Conflict More Indirect: Feminism seen as Challenging Traditional Values	Growing Women's Equality Hurts some Men Feminists & Professional Women vs Believers in Traditional Values (Religious Males & Traditional Women)

Table 2

## POSSIBLE STRUCTURES OF PUBLIC OPINION

TYPE	DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC
<b>Partisan, #A</b>	Most people favor Party A on most issues.
<b>Partisan, #B</b>	Most people favor Party B on most issues.
<b>Polarized</b>	A fairly even balance exists between strong supporters of Party A and Party B on most issues.
<b>Moderate</b>	Most people are in the middle of the ideological spectrum on most issues.
<b>Split</b>	A substantial number of Party A's positions are supported by a strong majority, but so are a substantial number of Party B's.

Table 3

## ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF TAIWAN'S CITIZENS

	Taiwanese	Both	Chinese
1992	20%	52%	28%
1996	24%	56%	20%
2000	39%	47%	14%
2004	43%	51%	6%
2008	51%	45%	4%
2010	55%	42%	3%
2016	66%	31%	3%

Source:

Election Study Center, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2016

**Table 4****ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF MAINLANDERS**

	Taiwanese	Both	Chinese
1994	5%	38%	57%
1996	8%	49%	43%
2000	11%	60%	29%
2004	15%	69%	16%
2016	30%	54%	16%

Source: Wang and Chang, 2005, 49; Election Study Center, 2016

**Table 5****PREFERENCE FOR TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS**

	Independence	<i>Status Quo</i>	Unification
1994	14%	61%	25%
1996	17%	56%	27%
2000	18%	59%	23%
2004	24%	61%	15%
2008	26%	63%	11%
2010	24%	64%	12%
2016*	32%	56%	12%

Source: Election Study Center, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2016.

**Table 6****Taiwanese Party Identification, June 2018**

DPP	23%
KMT	23%
NPP	8%
PPF	4%
Nonpartisan	32%

Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation Poll

SOURCE: You. 2018.

Table 7

## Americans' Positions On Economic Issues

POLITICAL ATTITUDE	FAVOR	IDEOLOGY ADVANTAGE
More Govt Spending & Services	38% to 37%	Even
More Social Security Spending	63% to 6%	Liberal
More Public School Spending	70% to 7%	Liberal
More Child Care Spending	50% to 13%	Liberal
More Poor Spending	45% to 17%	Liberal
More Welfare Spending	20% to 46%	Conservative
Minimum Wage Increase	65% to 35%	Liberal
Tax on Millionaires	67% to 15%	Liberal
Govt Reduce Income Inequality	47% to 30%	Liberal
More Government Financial Assistance for Healthcare	47% to 26%	Liberal
Government Health Plan	39% to 41%	Even
Obamacare	38% to 41%	Even
Business Regulation	78% to 22%	Liberal
Bank Regulation	87% to 13%	Liberal
Govt Environmental Regulation	58% to 23%	Liberal
Limit Imports	62% to 38%	Conservative

\*Most of these items include neutral categories which are not included in these comparisons.

SOURCE:

Calculated from Prysby and Scavo. 2018.

**Table 8****Americans' Positions On Cultural Issues**

POLITICAL ATTITUDE	FAVOR	IDEOLOGY ADVANTAGE
High on Moral Traditionalism	46% to 29%	Conservative
Pro-Life on Abortion	40% to 45%	Even
Gay Marriage	59% to 18%	Liberal
Raise Immigration Level	6% to 44%	Conservative
Illegal Immigrants: Deport/Remain	17% to 69%	Liberal
Eliminate Birthright Citizenship	31% to 41%	Liberal
African-American Support Score	35% to 45%	Conservative
Sexism Scale	50% to 35%	Conservative
Make Guns Purchases More Difficult	54% to 46%	Even
Legalize Marijuana	45% to 29%	Liberal

\*Most of these items include neutral categories which are not included in these comparisons.

SOURCE:

Calculated from Prysby and Scavo. 2018.

**Table 9****Americans' Positions On Security Issues**

More Defense Spending	50% to 23%	Conservative
Willing to Use Military Force	66% to 30%	Conservative
High Fear of Terrorism	46% to 25%	Conservative
Crime Spending	64% to 8%	Conservative
Death Penalty	75% to 17%	Conservative
Border Wall	33% to 46%	Liberal

\*Most of these items include neutral categories which are not included in these comparisons.

SOURCE:

Calculated from Prysby and Scavo. 2018.

**Table 10****Support for Wars, 2008**

	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE
War on Terror	60%	25%
Iraq War	25%	63%
Afghanistan War	23%	58%

## SOURCE:

Calculated from Prysby and Scavo, 2009.

**Table 11****American Party Identification, 2016**

Strong Democrat	21.4%
Weak Democrat	14.0%
Leans Democrat	11.2%
Independent	13.8%
Leans Republican	11.5%
Weak Republican	12.0%
Strong Republican	<u>16.0%</u>
TOTAL	99.9%

Calculated from Prysby and Scavo. 2018.

## References

- Abramowitz, A.I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Abramowitz, A.I. 2011. *The Polarized Public: Why American Government is so Dysfunctional*. New York: Pearson.
- American National Election Study for 2004. 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
- Bacon, P. Jr. 2019. "Is Trump's Use of Identity Politics Strategic?" *Fivethirtyeight*. July 25, [www.fivethirtyeight.com](http://www.fivethirtyeight.com).
- Begala, P. 2011. "Republicans Box Themselves In." *Newsweek*, June 19, [www.newsweek.com](http://www.newsweek.com).
- Bell, D. 1960. *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Black, E. and M. Black. 2007. *Divided America*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Brewer, M.D. and J.M. Stonecash. 2006. *Class and Cultural Divides in American Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Bork, R.H. 1996. *Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline*. New York: ReganBooks.
- Brooks, A.C. 2010. *The Battle: How the Fight between Free Enterprise and Big Government Will Shape America's Future*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brown, M.J. 2004. *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Brownstein, R. 2007. *The Second Civil War*. New York: Penguin.
- Bush, R.C. 2018. "Taiwan's Local Elections: Explained. *Brookings Reports*. December 5, [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu).
- Cabestan, J.P. 1998. "Taiwan's Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; Reunification, Later," pp. 216-239 in D. Shambaugh (Ed.), *Contemporary Taiwan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Chao, C.M. 2002. "The Republic of China's Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-hui: A Balance Sheet," pp. 177-203 in B.J. Dickson and C.M. Chao (Eds.), *Assessing Lee Teng-hui's Legacy in Taiwan's Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Chao, L. and R.H. Myers. 1998. *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China*. Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press.
- Cheng, R.L. 1994. "Language Unification in Taiwan: Present and Future," pp. 357-391 in M.A. Rubinstein (Ed.), *The Other Taiwan, 1945 to the Present*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Clark, C. 2002. "Democratization and the Evolving Nature of Parties, Issues, and Constituencies in the ROC," pp. 135-159 in P.C.Y. Chow (Ed.), *Taiwan's Modernization in Global Perspective*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Clark, C. 2006. "Taiwan Enters Troubled Waters: The Elective Presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian," pp. 496-535 in M. Rubinstein (Ed.), *Taiwan: A New History*, Revised Ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Clark, C. 2011. "The Ma and Tsai Proposals for Cross-Strait Relations," Program on "Taiwan in a Shifting International Landscape," Sigur Center, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
- Clark, C. and A.C. Tan. 2012. *Taiwan's Political Economy: Meeting Challenges, Pursuing Progress*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Clark, C., A.C. Tan, and K. Ho. 2019. "Was 2016 a Realigning Election in Taiwan." Seattle: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, University of Washington.
- Copper, J.F. 2011. *Taiwan's 2011 Metropolitan City Elections: An Assessment of Taiwan's Politics and a Prediction of Future Elections*. Baltimore: University of Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies.

- Copper, J.F. 2016. *Taiwan's 2016 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Elections: Reflections on the Nature of Taiwan's Politics and Shifts Therein*. Baltimore: Maryland Series in Contemporary Asia Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland.
- Copper, J.F. 2019. "Taiwan's 2020 Elections: Is the DPP's Primary Fair?" *IPP Review*. August 29, [www.ippreview.com](http://www.ippreview.com).
- DeLisle, J. 2004 "The Aftermath of Taiwan's Presidential Election: A Symposium Report." Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, [www.fpri.org](http://www.fpri.org).
- Downs, A. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy* New York: HarperCollins.
- Duverger, M. 1959. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Translated by B. North and R. North.
- Election Study Center. 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2016. Mucha, Taiwan: Election Study Center, National Cheng Chi University, Results from Election Surveys.
- Enten, H. 2019. "How Trump's Reelection Strategy Could Work -- But Probably Won't." *CNN*. July 20, [www.cnn.com](http://www.cnn.com).
- Everington, K. 2019. "Latest Poll Has Tsai Leading Han by 20% in Taiwan Presidential Race." *Taiwan News*. August 9, [www.taiwannews.com](http://www.taiwannews.com).
- Fell, D. 2005. *Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 1991-2004*. London: Routledge.
- Fell, D. 2011. "How the Elections May Affect Taiwan-U.S. Relations," Seminar on "Taiwan: Elections 2012," Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.
- Frum, D. 2000. *How We Got Here: The 1970s, the Decade that Brought You Modern Life (for Better or Worse)*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gold, T.B. 1986. *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Gold, T.B. 2010. "Taiwan in 2009: Eroding Landslide." *Asian Survey* 50: 65-75.
- Hickey, D.V.V. 2006. "Complicating the Complicated: The Role of Societal Actors in Taiwan's External Relations." Columbia, SC: Paper presented at the Conference on Taiwan Issues, University of South Carolina.
- Ho, S.Y. and I.C. Liu. 2003. "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People in the 1990s," pp. 149-183 in W.C. Lee and T.Y. Wang (Eds.), *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Hood, S.J. 1997. *The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Hsiau, A.C. 2005. "Bentuhua: An Endeavor for Normalizing a Would-be Nation-State?" pp. 261-276 in J. Makeham and A.C. Hsiau (Eds.), *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hsieh, J.F.S. 2009. "The Origins and Consequences of Electoral Reform in Taiwan." *Issues & Studies* 45,2: 1-22.
- Huang, T.L. 2004. "Saturday's Massive March Fills Pan-Blue Sails." *Taipei Times*. March 15. p. 1.
- Hunter, J.D. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Jacobs, J.B. 2005. "'Taiwanization' in Taiwan Politics," pp. 17-54 in J. Makeham and A.C. Hsiau (Eds.), *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Katz, R. and P. Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1: 5-28.
- Kirchheimer, O. 1966. "'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," pp. 277-200 in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (Eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lasater, M.L. 2000. *The Taiwan Conundrum in U.S. China Policy*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000.
- Layman, G.C., T.M. Carsey, J.C. Green, R. Herrera, and R. Cooperman. 2010. "Activists and Conflict Extension in American Politics." *American Political Science Review* 104: 324-346.

- Lee, W.C. 2005. "Taiwan's Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics and Collective Action since 2000." *Issues & Studies* 41,1: 1-51.
- Legee, D.C., K.D. Wald, B.S. Krueger, and P.D. Mueller. 2002. *The Politics of Cultural Differences: Social Change and Voter Mobilization in the Post-New Deal Period*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lipset, S.M. and S. Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," pp. 1-64 in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (Eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- Luo, K. and F.Y. Chen. 2018. "Four Key Takeaways from Taiwan's Recent Election Surprises." *Washington Post*. December 17, [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com).
- Lynch, D.C. 2004. "Taiwan's Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project." *Asian Survey* 44: 513-533.
- Mair, P. 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Makeham, J. and A.C. Hsiau. Eds. 2005. *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- March, J.G. and J. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Mendel, D. 1970. *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Miller, G. and N. Schofield. 2003. "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 97: 245-260.
- Pew Research Center. 2011. *Beyond Red and Blue: The Political Typology*. Philadelphia and Washington, DC: The Pew Foundation, [www.pew.org](http://www.pew.org).
- Phillips, K. 1990. *The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath*. New York: Random House.
- Phillips, S.E. 2003. *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-1950*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Prysbly, C. and C. Scavo. 2009. *SETUPS: Voting Behavior: The 2008 Election*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research and American Political Science Association.
- Prysbly, C. and C. Scavo. 2018. *SETUPS: Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research and American Political Science Association.
- Rae, D.W. 1971. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Reich, R. 2010. *Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Rawnsley, G. 2004. "The Day after the Night Before: Thoughts on the 2004 Presidential Election." Nottingham, UK: Institute for National Policy Research, *Taiwan Perspective e-Paper*, [www.tp.org.tw](http://www.tp.org.tw).
- Rigger, S. 1999a. "Is Taiwan Independence *Passé*? Public Opinion, Party Platforms, and National Identity in Taiwan," pp. 47-70 in C.M. Chao and C. Clark (Eds.), *The ROC on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A Paradigm Reexamined*. Baltimore: School of Law's Series in Contemporary Asian Studies.
- Rigger, S. 1999b. *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Rigger, S. 2001. *From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Rigger, S. 2004. "Taiwan in 2003: Plenty of Clouds, Few Silver Linings." *Asian Survey* 44: 182-187.
- Rigger, S. 2005. "The Unfinished Business of Taiwan's Democratization," pp. 16-42 in N.B. Tucker (Ed.), *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-China-Taiwan Crisis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Rigger, S. 2010. "Ma's Puzzling Midterm Malaise." *Brookings Northeast Asian Commentary* 37. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu).
- Rigger, S. 2011a. "Strawberry Jam: National Identity, Cross-Strait Relations, and Taiwan's Youth," pp. 78-95 in C. Clark (Ed.), *The Changing Dynamics of Relations Among China, Taiwan, and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Rigger, Shelley. 2011. *Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Riker, W.H. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
- Sartori, G. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schofield, N. and G. Miller. 2007. "Elections and Activist Coalitions in the United States." *American Journal of Political Science* 51: 518-531.
- Shafer, B.E. and W.J.M. Claggett. 1995. *The Two Majorities: The Issue Context of Modern American Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Shen, S.C. and N.T. Wu. 2008. "Ethnic and Civil Nationalisms: Two Roads Toward the Formation of a Taiwanese Nation," pp. 117-143 in P.C.Y. Chow (Ed.), *The "One China" Dilemma*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sides, J., M. Tesler, and L. Vavreck. 2018. *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stonecash, J.M., M.D. Brewer, and M.D. Mariani. 2003. *Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Sutter, R.G. and W.R. Johnson. 1994. Eds. *Taiwan in World Affairs*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Tien, H.M. and C.Y. Tung. 2011. "Taiwan in 2011: Mapping for a New Political Landscape and Economic Outlook." *Asian Survey* 51: 76-84.
- Tsai, C.M. 2018. "Taiwan in 2017: The End of a Honeymoon." *Asian Survey* 58: 73-79.
- Tsai, C.M. 2019. "Taiwan in 2018: A Bitter Campaign and an Uncertain Future." *Asian Survey* 59: 77-84.
- Tu, W.M. 1998. "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan," pp. 71-96 in D. Shambaugh (Ed.), *Contemporary Taiwan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wachman, A.M. 1994. *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Wang, F.C. 2005. "Why Bother About School Textbooks?: An Analysis of the Origin of the Disputes over *Renshi Taiwan* Textbooks in 1997," pp. 55-99 in J. Makeham and A.C. Hsiau (Eds.), *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wang, T.Y. 2000. "One China, One Taiwan: An Analysis of the Democratic Progressive Party's China Policy," pp. 159-182 in W.C. Lee (Ed.), *Taiwan in Perspective*. Leiden: Brill.
- Wang, T.Y. and G.A. Chang. 2005. "Ethnicity and Politics in Taiwan: An Analysis of Mainlanders' Identity and Policy Preferences." *Issues & Studies* 41,4: 35-66.
- Wu, Y.S. 2011. "Strategic Triangle, Change of Guard, and Ma's New Course," pp. 30-61 in C. Clark (Ed.), *The Changing Dynamics of Relations Among China, Taiwan, and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.