

THE EU-THAILAND POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the changing dynamics in European Union (EU)-Thailand political and military relations within the context of the EU 2004 enlargement and the launch of European/Common Security and Defence Policy (E/CSDP) missions in 2003. The analysis involves a general examination of EU-Thailand relations at bilateral and regional levels through the prism of EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations. More specifically, it explores the nature of political and military relations between the EU and Thailand as well as examines political and security cooperation within ASEAN and between the EU and ASEAN. The period selected to test this research question is limited to within the first decade of the twenty-first century and reflects the period when the EU grew from 15 to 25 and then to 27 Member States.

Using integration theory of multi-level governance (MLG), this thesis investigates how different actors can affect the policy-making process of the EU and the implications for Thailand. Multi-level governance proposes that actors in various levels of political arena (supranational, national, and subnational) each play their role in the policy-making process of the EU, particularly where Member States gradually adapt their sovereignty. This theory is employed to explore the influence of Member States, EU institutions, and other actors in terms of policy-making of the EU. The concepts of actorness and presence are also employed to investigate the EU's role in the international arena and the implications for EU-Thai relations. Values, Images, and Principles concept (VIP) is applied to conceptualise the role played by these factors in shaping EU relations with Thailand. The thesis also utilises Complex Interdependence theory to explore the relationship between Thailand and the EU.

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List of Abbreviations

ABC	ASEAN Brussels Committee
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ADMM	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
ADSOM	ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AEETC	Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre
AEMM	ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting
AFAS	ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AIA	ASEAN Investment Area
ALA	Asia and Latin America
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
AMMTC	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Forum
APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASC	ASEAN Security Committee
ASC	ASEAN Standing Committee
ASCC	ASEAN Socio-cultural Community
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEF	ASEAN Foundation
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CBM	Confidence Building Measures

CDR	Council for Democratic Reform
CEDAW	United Nations Convention on the Elimination on All forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHARM	Coastal Habitat and Resource Management
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPA	Comprehensive Plan of Action
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CRMA	Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
CTIC	Counter Terrorism Intelligence Centre
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DOC	Declaration on Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDA	Excess Defence Article
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPC	European Political Community
EPG	Eminent Person Group
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy

EU	European Union
EUAVSEC	European Union Aviation Security Mission
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUJUST	European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUMAM	European Union Military Advisory Mission
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUPAT	European Union Police Advisory Team
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL	European Union Police
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUSSR	European Union Security Sector Reform
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPOI	Global Peace Operation Initiatives
GSP	General System of Preferences
HPA	Hanoi Plan of Action
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Authority
IAI	Initiatives for ASEAN Integration
IGC	Inter-governmental Conference
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
IMET	International Military Education and Training

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISG	Inter-sessional Support Group
ISIS	Institute of Strategic and International Studies
ISM	Inter-sessional Meeting
JCC	Joint Cooperation Committee
JCLEC	Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation
JSG	Joint Studies Group
JUSMAG	Joint US Military Advisory Group
KEDO	Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MFN	Most-Favoured-Nation
MLG	Multi-level Governance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAD	People's Alliance for Democracy
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PD	Preventive Diplomacy
PICC	Paris International Conference on Cambodia
PMC+1	Post Ministerial Conference Plus One
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
READI	Regional EC ASEAN Dialogue Instrument
ROK	Republic of Korea
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFA	Royal Thai Air Force Academy
RTN	Royal Thai Navy
RTNA	Royal Thai Naval Academy

SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SCCAN	Special Coordination Committee of ASEAN
SCHQ	Supreme Command Headquarters
SEA	Single European Act
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
SEARCCT	Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SOM	Senior Officials' Meeting
SPF	Small Project Facility
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
TREATI	Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative
TRT	Thai Rak Thai Party
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIMISET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
VAP	Vientiane Action Programme
VIP	Values, Images, and Principles
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

Chapter 1: Introduction

The main research question of this thesis focuses on the changing dynamics in EU-Thailand political and military relations within the context of the EU 2004 enlargement and the launch of European/Common Security and Defence Policy (E/CSDP) missions in 2003. The analysis is structured around three themes. First, involves a general examination of EU-Thailand relations at the bilateral and regional levels through the prism of EU-ASEAN relations. While enduring, this relationship has historically been marked by mutual complacency rather than innovation. Consequently this thesis examines the evolution of this relationship and questions the need for its revitalisation. Second, and more specifically, the thesis explores the nature of political and military relations between the EU and Thailand as well as examines political and security cooperation within ASEAN and between the EU and ASEAN. The period selected to test this research question is limited to within the first decade of the twenty-first century and reflects the period when the EU grew from 15 to 25 and then to 27 Member States. And third, the unique example of a joint EU-ASEAN E/CSDP mission is analysed as a measure of the Thai-EU cooperation and a pointer to the future development of relations.

Using integration theory of multi-level governance, this thesis investigates how different actors can affect the policy-making process of the EU and the implications for Thailand. Multi-level governance proposes that actors in various levels of political arena (supranational, national, and subnational) each play their role in the policy-making process of the EU, particularly where Member States gradually adapt their sovereignty. This theory is employed to explore the influence of Member States, EU institutions, and other actors in terms of policy-making of the EU. The concepts of actorness and presence are also employed to investigate the EU's role in the international arena and the implications for EU-Thai relations. A Values, Images, and Principles concept (VIPs) is also applied to conceptualise the role played by these factors in shaping EU relations with Thailand. The research method includes the analysis of both primary (official documents of the EU, the Thai government and ASEAN) and secondary data (academic literatures,

news articles, etc.), access to semi-confidential military data, semi-structured interviews with officials and academics (EU, Thai and ASEAN officials, together with academic staff from various universities), and a case study of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), including interviews with key participants.

Background

Prior to focusing on the political and military dynamics of EU-Thai relations, a brief pre-enlargement context is required. Since the Treaty of Rome, Europe (as expressed through the European Community (EC) and then the EU after the Maastricht Treaty was implemented) has always been very important to Thailand both economically and politically. Firstly, the EU is a major trading partner of Thailand. Using the year 2000 as a typical example and reference point, the EU represented 15% of Thailand's total trade (€129 billion)¹. Thai exports to the EU had doubled in value terms since the mid-1990s and were worth more than €12 billion, whereas Thai imports of EU goods followed a less regular trend and valued somewhat lower at €6.9 billion. This trade imbalance accounted for 72% of Thailand's overall trade surplus and helped to strengthen Thailand's external accounts and assisted in the appreciation of the national currency. The main Thai exports to Europe included machinery, garments, motor vehicles and parts, and electronics. Imports consisted mainly of machinery, electrical items and parts. In terms of investment, by 2001 the EU was the third most important source of foreign direct investment in Thailand (after Japan and the Asian Newly Industrialised Economies). Bilateral trade relations between the EU and Thailand were governed by the EU's General System of Preferences (GSP). The EU adopted a revised GSP regime for 2002-4 which provided more benefits to developing countries in a more clear and predictable framework. Approximately 74% of Thai exports to the EU fell under the GSP while 7% fell under special arrangements, or were exempt from duties.

¹ All of the following trade statistics in this section are taken from The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006.

Significantly, although not uniquely, there is no bilateral co-operation agreement between the EU and Thailand. Consequently, the principal framework for EU co-operation with Thailand is the EC-ASEAN Agreement of 1980: the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) dialogue process provides a supplementary framework for bilateral exchanges covering three pillars - political, economic and financial, and cultural and intellectual issues. The focus of co-operation concerns: regional and global security, trade and investment, socioeconomic issues and regional macro-economic co-operation, consumers' dialogue between regions, and educational exchanges. At the bilateral level, dialogue also takes place in the framework of regular EU-Thai Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM) led by the Commission on the EU side. The comprehensiveness of ASEAN-EU relations is no less than that between Thailand and the EU-cooperation projects covering fields ranging from forestry and agriculture, to science and technology cooperation are managed by the Joint Cooperation Committee on a bloc-to-bloc basis.

By 2010, a significant number of EU-supported projects/programmes had been established in Thailand. Bilaterally, these were in the sectors of energy, public health, environment, rural development, narcotics, NGO co-financing, humanitarian assistance to refugees/displaced persons, (for a total EU grant of €9.3 million), as well as through regional programmes, such as ASEAN co-operation (budget of €2.2 million), Asia co-operation (€66.4 million), and ASEM co-operation (€8.25 million).

At the start of the new millennium, the UK, Germany, Denmark, and Finland were the main EU Member State providers of co-operation assistance to Thailand (UK €2.5 million, Germany €1.3 million, Denmark €8 million, and Finland €1.7 million in 200/2001)(TICA, 2004). The main areas of co-operation assistance were environment, education, and economic reform. Denmark and Finland, (plus Sweden) also funded activities in the Mekong River region, while Dutch development co-operation focused on small activities.

As Europe enlarged from 15 to 25 to 27 and now to 28 creating a larger and more integrated EU, the major concern for Thailand was how to negotiate with this colossus in order to sustain or increase the existing political and economic ties. Historically, the EU has given greater priority to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) and her ex-colonies than to Asian counterparts. Just a decade ago the EU had at least 27 free trade or special customs agreements with countries in different continents while not a single one had been concluded with Asia. On the contrary, the EU has promoted its relations with Asian countries under ASEM, an informal non-binding multilateral negotiation process that has throughout its history been criticized for producing only modest achievements.

Thailand for the EU is of comparatively small significance, in contrast, for Thailand the EU has consistently been a significant partner. However, with the recent emergence of Asian giants like China, Korea and Japan, could Thailand possibly strengthen her presence in the international arena? China has voiced the prospect of a free trade area with ASEAN while ASEAN has formed the ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea) grouping. With these changing geopolitical structures, Thailand has sought to use her position as a channel for an Asian free trade area to multilaterally negotiate (in exchange of special treatment in tariffs and duties as well as other preferential measures) with the EU.

In July 2003, the Commission adopted a Communication on a new partnership with South East Asia which proposed to revitalise the EU's relations with ASEAN and its members. The Commission offered bilateral agreements to ASEAN countries to deepen cooperation in the areas of human rights, good governance, justice and home affairs issues, and the fight against terrorism. The highlight of this communication was the proposal to create a regional trade action plan called the "Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative" (TREATI). TREATI aims to promote closer cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on trade, investment, and regulatory issue. This initiative seeks the establishment of a closer economic relationship between the two regions and was anticipated to be the first step towards the conclusion of Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The creation of the 2015 ASEAN Community will, of course, again change this dynamic and the cautious

developments towards an EU-Thai FTA reflect the complexity of the bilateral and multilateral regional agendas.

Research Questions and Literature Review

This thesis addresses the following questions in analysing the changing dynamic of EU-Thailand political and military relations:

- 1) What is the basis of EU-ASEAN political and security relations?
- 2) What is the nature of EU-Thai relations?
- 3) How robust is the EU-Thai political relationship? What are the developments and future implications?
- 4) How robust is the EU-Thai military relationship? What are the developments and future implications?
- 5) Who are the important actors?

Implications of Enlargement

Ginsberg states that "each enlargement causes a metamorphosis in the EU's relationship with the outside world..... new members adjust to, and mould, the EU's international relation" (Ginsberg, 1998, p. 198). Each enlargement has led the EU to develop closer relations with border regions (the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe) and with countries that have special ties with the new members. New members play their part in shaping foreign policy of the EU to accommodate their own interests and expertise. Ginsberg examined the impact of previous EU enlargement (the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995) and of the then future enlargements (the CEECs and the Mediterranean countries) on the role of the EU in the world and asked three important questions. First, what is the relationship between enlargement and foreign policy? Second, what are the effects of enlargement on EU foreign policy decision-making? Third, what are the effects of

enlargement on the EU's position in Europe and the world? These three questions directly inform this thesis

In his analysis foreign policy refers to "the two related methods of EU foreign policy: the foreign economic, commercial, and diplomatic actions of the EC ... and the political declarations, common positions, and joint actions of the CFSP" (Ginsberg, 1998, p.199). Ginsberg argues that enlargement is both a cause and an effect of foreign policy. When the EU responds to the pressures of other countries to join the EU by accepting them, enlargement is an effect of foreign policy. The enlarged EU thus faces higher demands from outsiders to act as a coherent unit in the international arena which forces the EU to formulate and implement new foreign policies. Apart from discussing the economic benefits of joining the EU for outsiders, the importance of "politics of scale" is stressed: when acting together as a bloc Member States possess more weight in the international arena with lower costs and risks than acting on their own.

Ginsberg concludes that "enlargement has been a catalyst for the creation, or the reform of existing, foreign policy making procedures, mechanisms, meetings, and institutions..." (Ginsberg, 1998, p. 202). He offers the example of UK accession that led to the creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the European Council as well as intensified foreign minister level meetings to accommodate Britain's formidable foreign policy interests and to assist foreign policy cooperation and coordination between Member States outside the original framework of Rome Treaty. Reflecting the Greek accession in 1981, the troika system was introduced, EPC was extended to cover security and crisis management plans and joint action procedures formalised. Similarly, the 1986 enlargement coincided with the Single European Act (SEA) and involved significant implications for EU foreign policy such as linking the EU and EPC under the European Council and committing Member States to coordinate positions more closely on security issues.

In 1993 the TEU was ratified just prior to the 1995 fourth enlargement and explicitly designed to deepen political cooperation by replacing EPC by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and establishing the European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) by incorporating the Western European Union into the EU. These reforms were made in response to increasing demands for the EU to act effectively in the international arena and project greater influence and

power in the post-Soviet context. With the 2004 enlargement to the east, a similar pattern of EU foreign policy decision making reforms was anticipated as further enlargement was not tenable without institutional deepening. This process, however, proved contentious, somewhat elusive and inevitably based on compromise as witnessed by the fate of the Constitutional Treaty and its surrogate, the Lisbon Treaty.

For Ginsberg, "enlargement has created a civilian superpower in international economic, commercial, financial development, and diplomatic terms..." (p. 205). His analysis suggests that previous enlargements have "generated substantial levels of foreign policy activity that would not otherwise have taken place" (p. 206). Consequently, it was hypothesised that any future fifth enlargement would be accompanied by foreign policy decision making reforms similar to those made prior to previous enlargements. Specifically, how the EU's experience with the accession of Greece and the Iberian states in 1980's was examined as a guide how to accommodate the accession of the CEECs. The most obvious difference between the two cases was the number of acceding states. The former governments of Greece and the Iberian states were authoritarian regimes, similar to the communist governments in the CEECs. EU membership led to democratisation processes in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The EU applied the same logic and leverage with the CEECs by creating association dialogues with these countries and using the lure of membership to encourage transitions to democracy. Another similarity between the two was the security aspect of enlargement. The EU needed to stabilize the Mediterranean region so it accepted Greece and Spain. Security issues in Eastern Europe were an even more pressing concern for the EU.

As for the impact on EU foreign policy, Ginsberg hypothesized several outcomes. The accession of Cyprus was optimistically expected to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus while the accession of Malta would provide, it was thought, the EU with a strategic location in the Mediterranean to monitor terrorism and drug trafficking – rather than the first point of entry for mass migration a decade later. From an Eastern perspective, Ginsberg anticipated that the EU and NATO would continue to develop a security framework with Russia and the Commonwealth

of Independent States (CIS) in the hope of avoiding creating division or tension. This perspective gave birth to several new programmes such as the EU-Russian and EU-Ukraine Partnership, NATO's Partnership for Peace, and the Founding Act between NATO and Russia.

While writing contemporaneously with Ginsberg, David Allen (1998) argues that the failure of the EU to produce a coherent foreign policy had little to do with previous enlargement. Rather, for him, the real problems were "more fundamental and apply to the present membership regardless of any future enlargement" (1998, p. 109). He argued that the Maastricht CFSP structure could accommodate more members without having any significant negative effect on EU foreign policy. Indeed, Allen saw enlargement to include the CEECs as potentially strengthening the CFSP through developing a more aggressive foreign policy in military and security aspects to complement the existing diplomatic arrangements. Allen did, however, identify one problem where enlargement could have a seriously negative affect EU – size and the different foreign policy interests between big and small Member States. He saw this problem potentially leading to the stagnation of the CFSP process unless reform of the decision making process could accommodate the larger number of small countries included in the 2004 enlargement. His proposed solutions were the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to the CFSP process, the introduction of constructive abstention, variable veto, and "consensus minus one, two, or three".

Reflecting on past practice and in general agreement with Ginsberg, Allen argues that "enlargement is, and always has been, a diplomatic/security matter, dominated by the collective view of the member states..." (Allen, 1998, p. 112). The UK was allowed to join the EU in 1973 in part because of the aspiration of the original six to act globally. Similarly, the decisions to accept Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 were made on the basis of security concerns. The EU wanted to encourage a transition to democracy and market economies in these three countries to thwart Soviet ambitions. The fourth enlargement of the EU to take on board Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, however, presented one major problem for the Member States - these EFTA countries were neutral and could not easily meet the security obligations of the EU. Allen suggested that the next (2004/7) enlargement of EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) could create a dangerous new division of Europe between the EU and Russia and the CIS. However, to avoid this, Allen alluded to the fact that the EU and NATO had been addressing this concern by associating themselves with these outsiders in many programmes such as the Partnership for Peace Programme and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and the Ukraine.

Allen considered the possible impact of the next enlargement on the CFSP in terms of institutional issues and policy issues. Because the pre-Lisbon CFSP system lacked proper central institutions and resources, the burden of representing the EU fell on the Presidency alone. While this may not have presented problems to the larger Member States, for the smaller states it can be difficult to carry out these tasks effectively. As noted already, the fifth enlargement brings many smaller members into the EU and without proper reforms to the existing system it was presumed that there would be difficulties for these states in coping with the role of the Presidency. Allen was also concerned about the balance between large and small states. In the existing CFSP arrangements every member has the right to veto, suggesting that any future enlargement will present the difficulty of reaching consensus between Member States. Thus, it was argued unless the voting system of the CFSP was modified to accommodate enlargement, there was a risk of larger Member States pursuing their own foreign policy towards issues where consensus could not be reached. However, for Allen, the real problem was not enlargement but the lack of CFSP central institutions.

Since the 1993 Copenhagen Declaration, the foreign policy focus of the EU has become directed towards the CEECs and Russia. This created some concern for Mediterranean states like Greece, Spain, and Portugal fearing the loss of EU financial assistance. In response, these states began to push for a renewed foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region. While post-2004 support from Cyprus and Malta developed, however, their accession also posed problems for EU foreign policy, such as the unresolved Cypriot internal conflict which could import this conflict into the Union. Additionally, Malta's commitment to nonalignment could prove difficult in the face of CFSP obligations. Most of the acceding countries from the CEECs would not hesitate to support

a stronger defence mechanism/framework of the EU. However, these countries cannot contribute much to security and EU defence arrangements because they lack effective military resources and are comparatively poorer than the existing members. The problem that the 2004 enlargement brought into the EU was not the acceding states' unwillingness to cooperate but the reluctance and division of the existing members to develop a more aggressive defence policy.

Christopher Preston argues that the EU's first four enlargements "expanded the range and complexity of political and economic interests..." and consequently "the EC has built up a range of policy instruments to manage its external economic and external relations" (Preston, 1997, p. 157). He noted the four key effects of these enlargements on EU foreign policies were: that new members brought their interests into the EU; the priorities of EU foreign policy were reordered; there was an increase in EU's presence in the world trading system; and the need to improve linkages between economic and political relations increased.

Focusing on this first effect, Preston asserts new Member State interests have reshaped EU foreign policy to a certain degree. The second effect has seen the reordering of the EU's external relations into a pyramid of privileges. At the top are EFTA countries which had FTAs with the EU and were later upgraded to the EEA. The second level of the pyramid is occupied by potential EU members (Association Agreements with potential members such as the CEECs were concluded). The third level comprises the EU's neighbouring countries not eligible for membership in North Africa and the Middle East. The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) linked to the EU by the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement occupy the fourth level (Holland and Doidge, 2012).

Turning to the third effect of EU enlargement, previously there has been an increased level of intra-EU trade as a proportion to world trade with three consequences. Firstly, as the EU enlarges, outsiders will want to negotiate preferential trade agreements to minimize any trade diversionary effects. Secondly, enlargement has encouraged other regions to form trading blocs

such as NAFTA and ASEAN. Thirdly, enlargement raises a debate on whether the EU has a trade protectionist stance or not: many countries have expressed fears of a "fortress Europe" with a high wall of trade barriers. Preston's last effect of enlargement is that enlargement has led "to increase the pressure for linkage between economic and political relations and to strengthen the diplomatic profile of the EU" (1997, p. 162). The EU has to match its economic power by its political power. Thus previous enlargements have necessitated many foreign policy innovations such as the EPC and the CFSP.

A final and influential approach is offered by Marise Cremona (2003): her analysis concerns both trade and economic policy and the CFSP. Her analysis informs and helps shape this thesis's investigation of the impact of enlargement on Thailand. Cremona addresses the impact of enlargement from a legal perspective. As a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU has to comply with the regulations concerning free trade areas and customs unions. Article XXIV of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed to minimize trade diversionary effects of a free trade area or customs union. Enlargement of the EU simply means that customs unions and free trade areas are extended and in the aligning process the tariff level or tariff quotas of new members may alter, but the same regulations still apply. Article XXIV(4) clearly states that "a customs union should facilitate trade within the customs union, but it should not do so in a way that raises barriers to trade with third countries". In this regard, Cremona raises four issues concerning the impact of enlargement on EU trade policy: the overall balance; quotas and support; compensatory adjustments; and, trade defence measures.

The EU institutions have concluded that the likely impact of enlargement will bring net positive effects, that is, trade creation, noting the clear benefits such as a bigger market, lower tariffs in new Member States, and economic development of new Member States. However, Cremona states that a study by the European Parliament in 1999 "failed to identify significant trade-diversionary effects affecting Latin American, South-east Asian, or Mediterranean exports to the EU in favour of the accession states as a result of Europe Agreement-based preferences"

(Cremona, 2003, p.188). The Commission also states in its 1999 Composite Report on progress towards accession that enlargement would benefit third countries in many areas including the benefits of a bigger single market and greater liberalization in world trade. However, the WTO Secretariat Report and other members raise two very important issues: trade diversion and shifts in trade. What they fear would happen is trade diversion from new members to the existing Member States which may harm trade relations between new Member States and their existing trading partners that are not the EU's partners. Another issue is that new members would bring with them "special ties" with certain countries and hence shift trade patterns of the EU to favour these countries at the expense of other third countries.

To a certain extent the claims of the Commission and the Parliament that enlargement would lead to lower tariff and other protective measures such as quotas in the acceding countries ring true. However, in the textile and agricultural industry, the EU trade policy is much more protective than in some of the acceding countries. For example, prior to 2004 Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia did not have quota restrictions on any textile products but after accession they had to adopt the EU textile policy which requires impositions of quotas on textile imports. However, the most controversial issue of enlargement is the CAP. Although the tariff of the acceding states would fall, this positive effect would be absorbed by the increase in agricultural subsidies.

Article XXIV(6) of GATT 1994 allows other WTO members to make compensatory adjustments to their trade policy and measures when an enlargement of a customs union leads to an increase in tariffs in acceding members. The parties involved have to negotiate for a compensatory adjustment or compensation, something which may often prove to be difficult to reach agreement on. However, if the negotiations fail, the parties affected can withdraw equivalent concessions from the acceding members.

Another important issue concerning enlargement is the trade defence measures of the EU and the acceding countries. On accession, new members will have to adopt EU trade measures,

meaning that they will have to terminate their own trade defence measures. The problem is whether the EU can impose defensive measures in these countries or not. The Agreement on Safeguards requires clear evidence of serious injury before the defence measures can be extended to new members. From past experience the automatic extension of trade defence measures to new members has seen third countries raise the issue at the WTO level.

Enlargement should increase transparency and homogeneity within the new Member States' markets thus benefiting trading partners of the EU as the Commission states "enlargement would increase the transparency of trade relations as well as (in most cases) reductions in barriers" (Cremona, 2003, p. 196). This should lead to increase trade and investment flows into the new Member States. However, in the medium term the EU will be less homogeneous in terms of economic development and trade environment. The real problem here is the diversity of interests of the EU-25/27, and reaching an agreement may prove to be to most difficult challenge. The implication of this trend for developing countries is the risk of trade and foreign direct investment diversion to the new Member States and EU's new neighbours.

Crucially for this thesis, Cremona also examines the impact of enlargement on EU foreign policy. Enlargement to the east has been part of the CFSP objectives to achieve security and stability in Europe with consequences for the institutional and policy aspects of the CFSP. The intergovernmental consensus characteristic of CFSP will be affected by an increase in number. The problem of a lack of coherence may worsen with 10/12 more members because the EU has chosen to severely limit the practice of QMV in the CFSP decision-making process. However, the introduction of constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation (since the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice respectively) are designed to tackle this problem and to avoid CFSP stagnation. However, three challenges remain: coherence, coordination, and effective decision-making. Another issue concerns the existing balance between "powerful" members and "small" members in the enlarged EU. This could weaken or strengthen the actorness and presence of the EU in the international scene but the outcome remains uncertain. The challenge for the new

Member States, which directly affects the international identity of the EU, is whether they can manage the role of Presidency – a problem of course that has been partly negated under the provisions of the subsequent Lisbon Treaty.

To summarize, Cremona argues that the direction of CFSP will be influenced by enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean for several reasons. New Member States bring with them their special relationships with other countries in the region which they will want to keep. The objective of the CFSP is to promote peace and stability in Europe, enlargement of the EU redraws the borders of the EU, hence the most important issue for the EU is its relations with new neighbours. The presumption was that with the 2004/7 enlargement the EU would become preoccupied with its new neighbours. The EU has historically had good relations with these countries which can be divided into three groups: the Western Balkans, the eastern states, and the Mediterranean. Security is the major concern for the EU in the region. New Member States would mean a recomposition of the existing security institutions such as the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, leading to a reduced chance of conflict in the region although there were “hot” areas that remain in the Balkans. Clearly, the EU has tried to maintain peace and stability in the region by adopting various frameworks with its neighbours: the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the Western Balkans, the Barcelona Process with the Mediterranean, and Partnership and Cooperation with the eastern states. Consequently, EU foreign policy would likely to be focused on the countries in Europe with the objective to promote and preserve peace and economic prosperity, the EU’s fundamental principles.

Multi-level Governance and Impact of Enlargement

Without pre-empting a fuller discussion of integration theories covered in Chapter 2, multi-level governance needs to be considered in relation to CFSP and enlargement. Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank offer their theory of “multi-level governance” to explain the policy-making process of the EU and, in doing so, they challenge the state-centric view of

intergovernmentalism which proposes that decisions are shaped ultimately by the Member States (Marks; Hooghe; Blank, 1996). Similar to other integration theories, multi-level governance focuses on the issues of competence and sovereignty of the EU institutions and the Member States. The authors argue that "European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government- subnational, national, and supranational" and that "control has slipped away from national governments to supranational institutions" (p. 275).

Multi-level governance has three main hypotheses related to the decision-making process and the political arenas of the EU. The first hypothesis is that "decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state executives" (p. 276). The European Council, Commission, European Parliament and the European Court are all interdependent in the decision-making process and no institution has the sole competence in policy-making. The second hypothesis is that "collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual state executives" (p. 277), while the third is that "political arenas are interconnected rather than nested" (p. 277) within states. The notion of separation of domestic and international politics is rejected by this model, subnational actors are able to move beyond the national boundary to pursue their objectives just like a state and these actors bring with them domestic issues to the European level. Marks, Hooghe, and Blank test their hypotheses by applying them to the different functions of the EU institutions in policy-making process in four ways: policy initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication.

Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty both the Council and the Parliament share competence in policy initiation with the Commission as they can request the Commission to draft a proposal. The Council can also pass "soft law" to limit the power of the Commission by ratifying common opinions, resolutions, agreements, and recommendations. Consequently, the power of policy initiation no longer belongs solely to the Commission, potentially leading to conflicts within the EU. Apart from the EU institutions, interest groups have been trying to exert influence: there

are an unparalleled number of interest groups lobbying the Commission and the Parliament to influence the policy-making process in Brussels. Subnational authorities are also present in Brussels to try to influence the policy-making process. Thus policy initiation power is now shared between the EU institutions which to some degree are influenced by various actors from all levels of political arenas.

Before the SEA the Council of Ministers was the sole legislative body of the EU, with exclusive power at the decision-making stage. In the quarter century since the SEA and the Lisbon Treaty the Council's power has been moderated considerably by the increased legislative power of the European Parliament, the role of the Commission, and the influence of different interest groups in Brussels. The extension of QMV in many policy areas such as agriculture, trade, competition policy, transport after the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty modified the power of the Council in the decision-making stage although some of the vital policy areas such as budget, taxation, and movement of people remain under tight control of the Council. In certain areas the Council seems to have total decision-making power, but in reality a single state maybe outvoted by others. State-centric perspectives, however, argue that the Council still retains the ultimate control of decision-making power through the shadow of the Luxembourg Compromise and a veto culture. The Luxembourg Compromise allows a Member State to veto a decision made under QMV if they consider that their vital national interest is at risk. Between 1966 and 1981 vetoes by Member States under this provision occurred less than a dozen times and it has been used even less frequently since the SEA. Veto culture in the Council allows states to block the practice of QMV by raising serious objections (with hundreds of Commission proposals blocked in the 1970s). This practice of veto declined during the 1980's because of the pressures brought about by both the Parliament and other Member States and states became more cautious in invoking or tolerating vetoes by other members (with Germany being the last country to succeed in invoking the use of the Luxembourg veto to block the decision made by the Council in 1985 on an agricultural matter). Several attempts by states such as Greece and France to use the Luxembourg veto in late 1980s and 1990's were unsuccessfully attempted.

The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty increased the role of both the European Parliament and the Commission in the legislative process which led to the reduction of the Council's decision-making power through the introduction of co-operation and co-decision procedures. The competencies once enjoyed solely by the Council have become increasingly shared with the Parliament and the Commission. The Council needs to have support from either one of the institutions in order to make a legislative decision unless it is unanimous. The Co-operation procedure gives the Commission power to accept or reject the legislature's amendments by the Council or the Parliament, it acts as a middleman between the two institutions. Multi-level governance can be seen clearly in the co-decision procedures through the functions of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The position adopted by the Council or the Parliament must be approved by both institutions while the Parliament has power to an absolute veto. The Commission acts as a broker to draft a compromise between the two institutions if there were any disagreements by setting up and chairing a committee. The compromise needs QMV in the Council and an absolute majority in the Parliament. If the committee does not reach an agreement the Council has to make amendments which must be accepted by the Parliament before the decision can be made. It can be seen from this process that each institution influences the decision-making process in one way or another. The role of the Commission is more than just a broker because the Commission possesses greater expertise and detailed information on various issues so the Council often turns to the Commission for expert advice.

Thus the decision-making process of the EU can be seen as a system of multiple actors involving the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament. Each institution has certain functions which they can influence decision-making in the process. As already mentioned before a decision is adopted each institution is consulted and must agree on the position proposed either with no complication or through negotiations to draft out the compromise - therefore no single institution has sole power over decision-making process.

The Commission has the formal executive power to take decisions in the initiation stage while national governments are responsible for implementation. The Commission has competence to interpret legislation and issue administrative regulations on specific cases, but after the introduction of comitology in the 1980s decisions have been influenced by the Council and national governments. Many regulations have their own committee attached to them with the intention to limit the autonomy of the Commission. Some of these committees have power to prevent the Commission from carrying out certain policies they do not approve by QMV, but in areas where the Commission has full competence, comitology is not effective in controlling the Commission. The composition of comitology suggests that not only are they made up of civil servants, but subnational actors, representatives from interest groups, and members of non-government organizations are also present by virtue of their expertise. This is where these actors from different political arenas can influence the implementation process especially in areas where the competence is shared among the central government and the subnational government. In practice comitology is not just an instrument for the Council and national governments to control the Commission, due to its composition it creates an opportunity for subnational actors to participate at European level.

The increasing role of the Commission at the ground level of policy implementation where national governments used to have sole authority has become very apparent since the SEA which requires the involvement of actors from various levels. These actors are involved in all stages of the policy process selection of priorities, choice of programmes, allocation of funding, monitoring of operations, evaluation and adjustment of programmes. In order to perform these tasks, different levels of committees are created to oversee the implementation process. In these committees the Commission officials are present at every level and in direct contact with actors from different groups such as regional and local authorities and other local actors. This form of partnership shows that these subnational actors are not confined within their national boundary but are also able to play their part at the European level. The implementation stage of EU policy clearly demonstrates the essential elements and perspective of multi-level governance.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is viewed by state-centric models as an instrument of the Member States to monitor each member's compliance to the *aquis* and to resolve any disputes between them. But the ECJ has done far more than suggested by the state-centric model: it has created a supranational legal order with the assistance of the Commission in promoting the integration process. The Treaty of Rome is a case in point: it created legal obligations directly binding on all Member States and citizens. The ECJ through the principle of direct effect and supremacy of European law has the sole power over national courts in legal matters irrespective of any objections from states. It changed the legal system that used to be nationally based to a system of multi-level supervision that is at the national and European levels. The ECJ influences the direction of the EU indirectly by creating opportunities for the supranational institutions, private interests, and national institutions, to influence the policy or increase their power.

In summary, Marks, Hooghe, and Blank's (1996) multi-level governance argues that the EU has been transformed into a multi-level polity with actors from different levels of political arenas (supranational, national, and subnational) interacting to influence the policy-making process of the EU. States no longer exclusively control the connections between domestic and European political arenas. Subnational actors are free to mobilise between diverse political arenas representing their interests at the European level. The model argues that states can no longer act alone to protect their vital national interests or sovereignty. Most of the decision-making in the Council is by QMV and even with the power to invoke a veto, a state cannot do so without the agreement of other Member States. Apart from the constraint by other Member States, the reform in 1989 SEA and Maastricht Treaty has made the Commission and the Parliament more powerful, positions reinforced by the most recent Lisbon Treaty. The Council, representing the interests of states, no longer has full control of the process, the other EU institutions and actors each play their part to influence the policy-making process. The Commission has a hand in virtually everything because of its expertise and access to information, while the Parliament has more competence in decision-making process. The ECJ has created a favourable legal environment for the supranational institutions to interact. The model argues that "the character of the Euro-polity at

any particular point in time is the outcome of a tension between supranational and intergovernmental pressures" (1996, p. 292). These developments have reduced the control of states both at domestic and European levels.

Multi-level governance can be used to investigate the impact of enlargement by looking at its effects on the policy-making process of the EU. The concept stresses the importance of the sharing of competences or power to influence EU policies between different actors from various levels of political arenas. Apart from the EU institutions, actors from national and subnational level all play a part in shaping EU policy outcomes. Enlargement brings more actors into the EU and they bring with them their "interests". This concept can be used as a basis to investigate how and where these actors can influence the direction of EU policies. Enlargement will affect the EU at European level and international level, multi-level governance can be used to study the impact of enlargement at both levels. By focusing on the four stages of policy-making process (policy initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication), the impact of enlargement on the EU can be investigated. Actors from new Member States will try to influence EU policies in these four stages and to a certain degree they may succeed in getting their demands across. These new actors not only affect EU internal policies but also EU foreign policies which affect the EU's roles and identity in the world. It is here that the international relation theories of actorness and presence become useful in analysing the impact of enlargement on the EU's capability to act and the perception of other actors in the international arena towards the EU. The impact of enlargement on the policy-making process will then be investigated for the implications on EU-Thai economic and political relations. Multi-level governance also helps to identify where and how the Thai government and other actors can influence the policy of the EU.

Impact of Enlargement on the EU's Role as a Global Actor

Since the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 a new

international actor has been slowly emerging in the international arena. The following evolutions of the European international organization into the present day EU have seen the development of actorness and presence to some degree, the most profound area being in that of economics. Many political scientists have analysed the EU in terms of its actorness and presence in the international arena. The common objective of their research is to devise a framework to test whether and the extent to which the EU is an actor or not. This section will discuss the works of prominent political scientists on the subject of "actorness and presence" of the EU. Firstly, the concept of actorness is briefly discussed focusing on the early work of Gunnar Sjostedt. Secondly, the concept of presence articulated by Michael Smith and David Allen in 1991 is examined. The third part of this section addresses the work of Christopher Hill to conceptualize the overall picture of the EU actorness and presence in the international scene.

The pioneer of the concept of "actorness" - or capability to act - is Gunnar Sjostedt (1977) who introduced the term in his publication, "The External Role of the European Community". The objective of his work is to define whether the EU is a genuine actor in the international arena or not by measuring the EU against his "international actor" criteria. Sjostedt introduces the prerequisites of international actorness and attempts to measure the extent of the EU's actor capability. According to his conceptual framework, an international actor must be delimited from others and from its environment, must have autonomy in the sense of making its own laws and decisions, must possess certain requirements for action on the international level such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with a third party (Sjostedt, 1977; Hill, 1993). If an entity does not fulfil these criteria, then it is not considered an international actor. His framework has laid the foundation for numerous subsequent studies of EU actorness, while his framework criteria have been transformed by many scholars to accommodate changing structures and international roles of the EU in the contemporary international scene.

Building on Sjostedt, David Allen and Michael Smith first introduced the concept of "presence" in their publication "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International

Arena" in 1991 to avoid the "states as actor" approach. Their work focuses on the status of Western Europe in the world by analysing the impact of European foreign policy, that is, its role in the world. Their central argument is "Western Europe is neither a fully-fledged state-like actor nor a purely dependent phenomenon in the contemporary arena. Rather, it is a variable and multi-dimensional presence, which plays an active role in some areas of international interaction and less active in one another" (Allen and Smith, 1991, p. 96). Presence can be defined as the perceptions of other actors in the international arena of an entity which influences their actions and expectations - hence presence contributes to the environment of the international arena. Presence can be in tangible and intangible forms. Presence is characterized by a combination of these factors "credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act and mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations of other actors" (p. 97). Presence can be divided into the dimensions of tangible/intangible and positive/negative and when combined they produce four forms of presence: initiator, barrier, shaper, and filter. *Initiator* form of presence is tangible and positive therefore provides stimulus to certain courses of action, and is associated with institutions. *Shaper* form of presence is intangible and positive, and it moulds the actions of other actors in the arena. *Barrier* form is tangible and negative, it constitutes disincentives to actions and may impose punishments and costs to other actors. *Filter* form of presence is intangible and negative, it excludes certain actions and expectations.

Allen and Smith discussed the development of the EU's presence throughout the 1970s and 1980s and concluded that "variation and fluctuation are key features of Western Europe's international presence" (p. 104). For them, the EU's presence in the international arena in 1980s can be divided into three spheres for analytical purposes: economics, politics, and military. In the economic sphere, the presence of the EU takes the most tangible form but the effect is rather negative (barrier and filter functions). In the political sphere, EU presence is intangible (shaper and filter functions) informing the expectations and actions of Western European countries and other actors, at the same time filtering out certain actions. In the military sphere, the presence of the EU is again intangible, through the shaping of ideas of European identity although the actual

institutional development was not considered significant.

Christopher Hill blends the concept of actorness and presence to further his conceptual framework in explaining the EU's role in the international scene. Writing, some quarter century ago, Hill attempted to conceptualize the EU's role in the international arena in his 1993 publication "The Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role". Hill discusses the functions that the EC then performed in the international arena and the perception of other actors towards the EU in the international system. He uses the concepts of actorness and presence to test that there is a gap between the capability of the EU to act (actorness) and the expectations of the EU from the other actors in the international arena (presence). Hill proposes that instead of analysing the EU as an international actor, it should be conceptualized as "a system of external relations" (Hill, 1993, p. 322).

Hill outlines four functions that the EU had typically performed prior to the Maastricht Treaty: that of stabilizing the region, management of world trade, the maintenance of relations with the poorer countries, and acting as a second western voice to the US. In terms of stabilizing western Europe, since its first formation in 1951 (the European Coal and Steel Community) the EU has served to prevent war in Europe - the pooling of coal and steel industries of Member States made war impossible. Europe has successfully promoted peace in the region as seen by the domestic transitions of Greece Spain and Portugal. In relation to managing world trade, as the biggest trading bloc Europe has been a crucial actor in the negotiating process in the GATT and has produced numerous trade policies. The EU, along with the US and Japan, has been a major player in world trade politics. The EU has also been the principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South. Because of extensive European development assistance (such as the Lomé Conventions and trade preferences for the South) Europe devised special relations with these developing and least developed countries globally, especially those in Africa. Providing a second western voice in international diplomacy, the EU has played a secondary supporting role as a political actor to the US, and through the creation of EPC, Europe has developed its own foreign

policy positions which may be different from the US and in its functions, especially in mediating conflicts such as those in the Middle East.

Hill also suggested six possible functions that the EU could perform in the future (post-Maastricht from 1993 onwards). Turning to each of these in turn, Hill made the following case (from his 1993 perspective): i) *A replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power*: With its economic strength, Europe could try to fill the position despite lacking the military strength to match the US. ii) *Regional Pacifier*: Faced with the threat of war between neighbouring countries and different ethnic and religious groups, Hill saw the potential role of the EU to act as mediator when conflict occurred. The prospect of membership could also be used to promote peace in the region. iii) *Global intervener*: the EU could intervene in crises on a global basis similar to that of the US and the United Nations (UN) managing them either by military intervention or political and economic instruments. iv) *Mediator of conflicts*: The EU's identity was as a neutral broker. Future conflicts where the EU has existing special relations such as Africa or the Middle East, would allow Europe to use its special ties to bring the conflicting parties together and resolve differences. v) *Bridge between rich and poor*: European States have always been the biggest aid donor in the post-WWII world and had created the ACP framework. vi) *Joint supervisor of the world economy*: where the Member States can act coherently and consistently in international economic negotiations, Hill argued that EU influence should increase giving it leverage to manage world economy with the US and Japan.

These functions which Hill expected the EU to perform pose a serious challenge to EU actorness. A "gap" was apparent between the high expectations of the EU and its actual capability to act in the international arena, a phenomenon that has become known as the "capability-expectation gap". The argument is a simple one: the EU does not have enough resources nor capabilities to perform the various tasks either aspired to by the EU or demanded by third parties. Hill attempts to measure the EU's capability or actorness by describing the features of a single, effective European foreign policy and then comparing this against Europe's record. His framework demonstrates what the EU lacked in order to be considered a full actor on the international scene.

He uses the example of military capability to demonstrate his capability-expectation gap, identifying three causes: absence of mutual obligation, insufficient operational capacity, and the lack of resources. However, he mentions that the EU can become a full actor without needing to achieve military capacity and any capability-expectations gap could be closed by either Europe increasing its capability or if expectations are lowered. However, this concept has been criticised for being static and an insufficient explanation of EU actorness in the long-run. However, as E/CSDP developments have subsequently shown, Hill's analysis remains surprisingly robust some 25 years after the original conceptualisation and can offer an appropriate mechanism for evaluating the case study of the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

Hill proposed that instead of considering the EU as an international actor, it should be conceptualized as "a system of external relations". This concept analysed the EU as a sub-system of the international system, not as an actor. Member States interacted with each other and other actors in this sub-system and this sub-system generated international relations in many areas both individually and collectively. It was decentralized and had three kinds of decision-making: national foreign policies, European Political Cooperation (soon to become CFSP), and external relations of the then EC. It allowed for the analysis of "internal and external aspects, decision-making and the Community's impact on the international system" (Hill, 1993, p. 322). The sub-system also differentiated between actions in different policy areas (political, military, and economic) taken individually or collectively by Member States. Hill concludes that "a truly European presence in the world would involve collective policies in all major issues areas...as well as rationalizing the decision making process" (p. 324).

In summary, the international relations concepts of actorness and presence can be used to investigate the changing dynamics (including the impact of enlargement) on the EU's role in the international arena and hence has implications for EU-Thai and EU-ASEAN relations. As seen in this Chapter, Allen and Smith divide EU presence into three spheres: economic, political, and military. This research addresses the impact of EU enlargement on the EU's presence (particularly

in political and military contexts) and the implications for EU-Thai relations. Hill outlined four roles that the EU had already performed and suggested six additional roles that the EU was expected to perform. He used the idea of a “capability-expectation gap” to measure the difference between the EU’s actorness and presence. This research investigates the impact of enlargement on these roles of the EU to define the capability-expectation gap, to investigate whether enlargement can reduce or widen the gap. From the findings, the implications for EU-Thai-ASEAN political and military relations are analysed identifying opportunities and risks for Thailand.

Methodology

1. Collection and analysis of primary data sources

Primary data sources used include official documents of the EU, EU Member States, the acceding states, the Thai government, ASEAN, the WTO, and the World Bank. By investigating these documents, the thesis attempts to explore the official policies regarding political co-operation, military co-operation, trade statistics, reports on various issues that reflect EU-Thai political and military relations.

This research explores the EU-Thai political and military relations by analysing the policies and official documents of the EU and Thailand. It also explores the relationship between the EU and Thailand through regional co-operation such as ASEM, EU-ASEAN co-operations, and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It involves the analysis of related EU official documents such as foreign policies and security co-operation towards Thailand and ASEAN, the EU Member States’ official documents on related issues, and the acceding states (2004/7) official documents on the related issues. Data collection was conducted in two countries, Belgium and Thailand. In Thailand data was obtained from the EU Delegation to Thailand and the diplomatic missions of

EU Member States and the acceding states. In Belgium, data was collected from the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council as well as from the Thai diplomatic mission in Brussels.

This research also investigates Thai foreign policies towards the EU and EU Member States by examining Thai foreign and security policies that have implications for EU-Thai political and military relations. The sources used are the official documents of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. Apart from analysing the EU and Thai official documents, the research also analyses ASEAN official documents in the area of ASEAN political and security co-operation and ASEAN-EU political and security co-operation. Official documents of other regional forums such as ASEM and ARF are also explored to fully understand the EU-Thai political and military relations.

2. Stakeholder Interviews

Interviews with the key officials of EU institutions and EU Member States were also conducted to ascertain their perceptions of EU-Thai political and military relations. These interviews can be used as a baseline to conduct further research to explore EU-Thai political and military relations. Interviews were held in Belgium and Thailand. On the EU side, the officials who directly dealt with the EU-Thai or EU-ASEAN relations were interviewed at the EU Delegation to Thailand in Bangkok. A common semi-structured interview technique was used. EU institution officials were also consulted, mainly the Commission staffs and the Council staffs in Brussels and interviews were also conducted with the EU Member State diplomatic missions in Thailand to ascertain their views on the EU-Thai political and military relations.

On the Thai government side, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense were interviewed in Thailand and in Europe because these two ministries were responsible for supervising the EU-Thai relations. Officials in the Department of European Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the officials at the Royal Thai Embassy in Brussels were also interviewed. As for officials at the Ministry of Defense, officials

of the Office of Policy and Planning, Directorate of Intelligence (Royal Thai Army), and Defense Attachés in EU Member States were interviewed.

3. Collection and analysis of secondary data sources

This research analyzes academic literature, both conceptual and empirical, on EU-Thai political and military relations. The literature reviewed spans integration, regionalism, international relations, and security/military studies. Additionally, news articles and journals are also analyzed in relation to EU-Thai political and military relations. Apart from using the library resources at the University of Canterbury, I have used resources at the Central Library at Chulalongkorn University and from the Center for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University as both hold significant materials on the EU-Thai relations.

4. Conceptual framework

As noted earlier, this research uses integration theory, primarily multi-level governance, to investigate the impact of EU enlargement on the EU internally and externally by focusing on the effects of new political actors on the policy-making process of the EU and the implications for EU-Thai political and military relations. Multi-level governance attempts to explain the policy-making process of the EU that challenges the state-centric view of intergovernmentalism (which proposes that decisions are shaped ultimately by the Member States). Similar to other integration theories multi-level governance focuses on the issues of competence and sovereignty of the EU institutions and the Member States. They argue that actors in various levels of the political arena (supranational, national and subnational) each play their role in policy-making process of the EU as the Member States gradually find their sovereignty diminished.

It is argued here that multi-level governance can be used to investigate the impact of EU enlargement on the policy-making process of the EU. The concept stresses the importance of sharing of competence or power to influence EU policies between different actors from various

levels of political arenas. Apart from the EU institutions (the Council, Commission, Parliament, and Court), actors from national and subnational level all play a part in shaping EU policies. Enlargement will bring more actors into the EU and they will bring with them their "interests". This concept can be used as a basis to investigate how and where these actors can influence the direction of EU policies. Enlargement will affect the EU at the European level and the international level, and multi-level governance can be used to study the impact of enlargement at both levels. By focusing on the four stages of policy-making process (policy initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication), the impact of enlargement on the EU is investigated. Actors from new Member States will try to influence EU policies at these four stages. These new actors will not only affect EU internal policies but also EU foreign policies which will affect the EU's role and identity in the world. This is when the international relation theories of actorness and presence become useful in analysing the impact of enlargement on the EU's capability to act and the perception of other actors in the international arena towards the EU. The impact of enlargement on the policy-making process is then investigated for the implications for EU-Thai political and military relations. Multi-level governance helps to show where and how the Thai government and other actors can influence the policy of the EU.

This research also employs the international relation concepts of actorness, presence, and capability-expectation gap to analyse the EU's role in the international arena. The international relations concepts of actorness and presence are used to investigate the impact of enlargement on the EU's role in the international arena and hence the implications to the EU-Thai political and military relations and EU-ASEAN relations. Following Allen and Smith's tripartite division (economic, political, and military) this research investigate the impact of EU enlargement on EU's presence in two spheres namely political and military and the implications for EU-Thai relations. Hill uses the concept of a capability-expectation gap to measure the difference between the EU's actorness and presence. This research considers the impact of enlargement on these roles of the EU to define the capability-expectation gap, and to investigate whether enlargement will reduce

or widen the gap. From these findings, the implications for EU-Thai political and military relations can be analysed and the opportunities and risks for Thailand identified.

5. E/CSDP Missions: an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) case-study

Finally, the thesis undertakes an analysis of the EU's early experimentation with E/CSDP Missions - including a case study of the AMM - in order to examine EU-Thailand political and military relations through EU-ASEAN framework. The AMM was the first – and to date only -EU-ASEAN cooperation in the crisis-management field in the five decades of EU-ASEAN relations. It demonstrated the EU's and ASEAN's serious commitment to security cooperation. Thailand, as one of the founding members of ASEAN, collaborated with the EU in crisis-management cooperation that required military participation. The mission was in reality an unarmed semi-military operation because almost half of the personnel involved were military or had a military background and the activities involved necessitated military expertise. Peter Feith, Head of Mission, was previously in the Dutch Marine Corps and had worked for NATO prior to his AMM appointment. Five ASEAN countries sent their top military officers to participate in the mission. Thailand sent 20 military officers under the command of LTG Nipat Thonglek, a personal friend and a classmate of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia. The AMM, apart from successfully ending the conflict in Aceh, had the potential, albeit as yet unrealised, to launch an on-going process to foster closer military relations between the EU and Thailand at the regional level.

Thesis Structure

The thesis Chapters are structured in the following way. This general Introduction has outlined the thesis research question, discussed methodologies and given a theoretical and empirical contextualisation of the topic of EU-Thai political and military relations. Building on this, Chapter 2 engages in an in-depth examination of Integration theories – both traditional functional, intergovernmental and neo-functional approaches as well as the more contemporary perspectives

offered by Multi-Level Governance, Complex Interdependence, Values, Images, and Principles and Actorness. This theoretical focus is necessary to better define what drives EU foreign policy at a macro-level and provide a tableau against which the micro-level case study of the Aceh Monitoring Mission can be placed. It would be inappropriate, as well as ridiculously ambitious, to apply these high-level integration theories directly to such a micro-level of empiricism. But equally, it would be ill-advised to engage in empirical case-study analysis in a complete theoretical vacuum. Thus Integration theory sets the parameters and the expectations within which EU E/CSDP decision-making is located.

The enlarged Chapter 3 brings ASEAN into the discussion. The first section (i) of Chapter 3 focuses on EU-ASEAN political and security relations involving both ASEAN-EU Ministerial meetings as well as a discussion of ASEM. Section (ii) considers EU policy towards ASEAN during the 1994-2008 period and traces the policy evolution witnessed by consecutive Strategy Papers and the introduction of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). (Appendix C provides a history of the key ASEAN political and security meetings and agreements).

Chapters 4 and 5 specifically address EU-Thai political relations and EU-Thai military relations respectively. The history, structure, policies and areas of political cooperation are examined, including the impact on the political level relationship of the 2006 coup d'état. A separate history of Thai-European military relations (with a closer examination of key bilateral relations with EU Member States) is undertaken in Chapter 5 together with an analysis of European weapons-holding by the Thai military. Chapter 6 presents the micro-case study of EU-ASEAN cooperation within the framework of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. This still unique experiment is examined within the broader context of the EU's record of 35 E/CSDP Missions that have been undertaken globally since 2003 and employs original interview data from AMM participants.

The thesis is consequently wide-ranging and structured more as a mosaic than a linear examination. A valuable characteristic of this structure is that while each chapter can be read and

understood in isolation, for a fuller understanding of the nature and context of these various aspects of the political and military relations between the EU and Thailand, these different perspectives need to be synthesised. The concluding Chapter seeks to achieve this goal.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

I. Introduction

In its 2004 enlargement, 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean joined the EU. This was by far the largest enlargement in EU history adding over 100 million people to the Union and expanding the number of Member States to 25. What has been the impact of this fundamental shift in the Union's structure on the EU's relationships with its foreign partners, specifically EU-Thai political and military relations? Before this can be addressed, the nature of EU-Thailand political and military relations has to be established. Only by understanding the characteristics of the relationship, can the investigation of the impact of enlargement be realised.

In the Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013, the EU observes that "the nature of Thai-EC relations has fundamentally changed from a traditional donor-recipient relationship towards a veritable partnership for development" (p.3). The EU and Thailand have been negotiating a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) which is amongst the first in ASEAN and it is anticipated that the agreement will eventually be signed albeit delayed by a series of military coups in Thailand over the last decade. Once signed, the agreement will represent the first bilateral co-operation agreement between the EU and Thailand and would strengthen EU-Thai relations. As noted already in Chapter 1, at a regional level, EU-Thailand relations are guided by the 1980 EU-ASEAN Agreement. EU-ASEAN relations have become more dynamic since the Commission issued the "New Partnership with South East Asia" Communication in 2003. New developments such as TREATI (Trans Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative) and READI (Regional EC ASEAN Dialogue Instrument) were created by the EU to strengthen many aspects of the relationship. Further, ASEM, despite the initial Burmese problem, has promoted and given impetus to EU-ASEAN relations and has the potential to continue to do so in the future. The ASEM dialogue process since 2012 has involved a meeting between an expanding range of "Asian" countries (ASEAN members + China, Japan, South Korea, India,

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Russia, Australia and New Zealand), the EU Member States plus Switzerland and Norway every two years, at which members discuss various issues in four areas – economics, politics, cultural relations, and people-to-people links².

In terms of the security dimension, at the regional level, the EU and ASEAN together with another 13 countries discuss security issues at the ARF. The ARF has been remarkably successful, and has led to unprecedented security cooperation between ASEAN, the high point of which was the joint AMM in Indonesia. The mission has typically been considered a notable success and it was hoped that it would herald new opportunities in the area of security cooperation between the two regions. As shown through the comparative examination of other CSDP missions in Chapter 6, this Aceh mission fully achieved its mandate and set a high benchmark for all subsequent EU missions. It remains, however, the only example of EU-ASEAN cooperation within the CSDP framework.

As stated in the opening Chapter, the objective of this thesis is to examine EU-Thailand political and military relations tracing the effects of the EU 2004 enlargement on this relationship. In order to carry out this task, we must understand the integration process and the policy making process of the EU, the role played by values and principles in EU policies toward the rest of the world as well as the characteristics of EU-Thai relations. In this chapter, a broad theoretical context informing the thesis is discussed reflecting integration theory, International Relations theory, and the concept of values, images, and principles to contextualise and conceptualise the impact of EU enlargement on EU-Thai political and military relations.

The theoretical framework presents a combination of three components – the EU policy-making process, the role of values, and the characteristics of the EU-Thailand relationship. Multi-

²More information regarding ASEM can be found at <http://www.aseminfoboard.org/about-asem-menu.html>

level governance theory (as discussed earlier) is utilised to conceptualise EU policy-making process while the concept of values, images, and principles is applied to explain the role of values underpinning EU foreign policies. Complex interdependence theory is employed to conceptualise the nature and characteristics of the relations between the EU and Thailand. Each of these three approaches is briefly outlined and contextualised below.

First, an understanding of the policy-making process of the EU is a necessary prerequisite to any analysis of EU politics and its relationship with the rest of the world. Multi-level governance “presents a depiction of contemporary structures in EU Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies” (Alberts, 2004, p.23). It posits that “European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influences are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, national, and supranational” (Marks et al., 1996a, p.342). Multi-level governance not only argues that actors other than national governments – the most influential being EU supranational institutions - play an important role in determining EU policy agenda but it also posits that different levels of political arenas are interconnected and actors from different levels are able to participate in the EU policy-making process, thus bringing their interests that shape EU politics.

Second, Manners and Lucarelli argue that “the EU’s relations with the wider world are self-evidently informed by a series of values, images, and principles (VIPs) which are not unimportant” (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p.19). The authors identify five European perspectives and nine European values in EU politics and use them to define the EU as a hybrid polity and to construct its co-existing and competing self-images in the international arena. This model helps inform the framework for this thesis by conceptualising the roles that values, images, and principles play in shaping EU-Thailand relations through EU policies.

The third part of the framework examines the characteristics of the relationship between the EU and Thailand – what is the nature of the relationship that exists between the two? Complex

interdependence theory is applied to conceptualise these relations. Complex interdependence theory argues that states are connected through multiple channels. State executives can no longer act as the sole gatekeeper between the international and domestic political arenas, other actors from different levels of society are able to operate beyond national boundaries and become involved in world politics. Complex interdependence theory also posits that there are a range of issues on the international agenda with no clear hierarchy established among them. Military and security issues no longer dominate international politics while the use of military force has become an ineffective means of achieving an actor's objectives.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents a literature review on integration, international relations theories, and the concept of values and principles of the EU. In the second section, the theoretical framework is constructed by combining multi-level governance, complex interdependence, and VIPs to conceptualise EU-Thailand relations. The final section of the chapter summarises the framework and sets out the structure and direction of the remainder of the thesis.

II. Literature Review

I. Integration Theories

Integration theories seek to answer the question of 'who' holds power in the EU policy-making process. Crudely, integration theories can be divided into three groups - intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and the theories that draw on and combine the two concepts. This section examines three prominent integration theories – liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and multi-level governance. Liberal intergovernmentalism, which at its simplest contends that the EU is ultimately driven by the interests of powerful Member States, is discussed and critiqued with respect to the EU decision-making process. Secondly, the concept of neo-functionalism, which is generally seen as antagonistic towards liberal intergovernmentalism, is explored and critiqued. Neo-functionalism stresses the importance of supranational institutions and the "spillover" process

which leads to further integration. Lastly, the concept of multi-level governance, which provides a bridge between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, is examined. In relation to the EU policymaking process it argues that power is not only shared between EU institutions and the Member States, but also other influential actors, such as regional bodies, are involved in the process. These concepts each attempt to provide an explanation for the political process of the EU, which is essential in constructing the theoretical framework to investigate the impact of EU enlargement on EU-Thailand political and military relations. While each conceptual framework has its strengths, this thesis considers multi-level governance the most relevant for conceptualising the EU decision-making process and investigating EU-Thailand relations.

Neofunctionalism

Ernst Haas developed the concept of 'neo-functionalism' in the 1950s to account for and predict the process of integration in Western Europe. The model became highly influential among political scientists in the 1960s and early 1970s. Haas conceptualised the integration process of Western Europe as:

the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national state. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones (1958, p.16).

Haas argued that for political unification to take place there must be certain preconditions between the participating states, aside from the mutual benefits to be gained from unification. He identified these preconditions as "a tradition, however vague, of mutual consultation and of rudimentary value sharing" (1958, p.141) and the existence of common external threats. Haas stressed the role of central institutions as the driving force behind integration process through federal policies. Interest groups, Haas claimed, would unite beyond national boundaries to try to influence policy at the federal level. He argued that integration in one sector of the economy will inevitably 'spill over' to other related sectors of the economy and would unavoidably lead to further integration more generally. Haas believed that this process would continue until a fully integrated political

community would emerge. National governments might initially have conflicts with the central integration institutions, but in the long run, Haas believed they would yield because of the advantages gained.

Leon Lindberg elaborated on Haas's model of neo-functionalism to further dissect the integration process of Western Europe. The focus of his research was the central roles of the key political actors as the impetus for the integration process and the political consequences of economic integration. In contrast to Haas, Lindberg did not envisage the final form of Western Europe to be a "United Europe", which is the ideal federal-type political community. Lindberg, following Haas's work, proposed several essential factors which he felt determined the integration process. The first factor was the presence of central institutions to "represent common interests" and "accommodate conflict of interests" that might occur between participating states. Lindberg claimed that the central institutions could influence the integration process through their ability to reduce and mediate the conflicts between Member States. The power of the central institutions to influence the integration process, however, depended on the roles and competencies given to them. These institutions could then push integration further through their competencies, brokerage skills, and how they influence the behavioural pattern of the system. The second factor identified by Lindberg, was that the tasks given to the central institutions must be vital to the operation and the existence of 'political actors', thus raising their expectations and relocating the political activities to a higher level. Lindberg stressed the important roles of every political actor, not just the governments, because, he argued, if there is political integration there must be "a change in the behavior of the participants" (1963, p.152). The restructuring of the activities of these political actors may then create conditions that require further integration. Lindberg's third factor extended Haas's original idea - the tasks given to central institutions must be 'inherently expansive tasks' which will create a 'spillover' effect. Lindberg defined 'spillover' as "a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and need for a more action, and so forth" (1963, p.153). Neo-functionalism, in this way, argued that the spillover effect would lead

to further economic and political integration. The last factor that Lindberg identified was the commitment of Member States to the principle of the community. The key issues here were how the decisions are made and how conflicts are settled. Lindberg identified three ways conflicts could be resolved - minimum common denominator, splitting the difference, and upgrading common interest.

Neofunctionalism was criticised for failing to provide an explanation for the stagnation and reverse of European integration in the 1960s and 1970s. During these decades, the process of spillover did not appear to take place, the integration process was interrupted by the conflicting national interests of the Member States, and the oil crisis and the recession in the 1970s caused economic crises. Neofunctionalism was heavily criticised by Stanley Hoffmann, one of the early intergovernmentalists, for failing to adequately conceptualise the integration process. Hoffmann (1966) stressed the importance of international politics and the power of governments by arguing that regional politics, including the integration process, are determined by the international environment and by the Member States. Hoffmann asserted that in areas of vital national interests, Member States would maintain tight control because they will not be willing to be compensated for their losses by gains in other areas.

Peterson and Bomberg also critiqued neofunctionalism, arguing that "[its] most glaring weakness is its implicit assumption that the EU is a uniquely efficient solution to a set of functional problems" and that the model "tends to ignore the fundamentally political (as opposed to technocratic) rationality of history-making decisions" (1999, p.15). However, the authors agreed that neofunctionalism is still a useful concept that provides a distinct perspective on the European integration process. The model does stress the important roles of EU institutions and other actors in driving the integration forward by generating a spillover process, but perhaps neofunctionalism places too much importance on spillover. As Holland has asserted, spillover "merely acknowledges the inter-related nature of policy development within the EU – which can have both positive and negative effect" (2002, p.239).

Aside from these critiques, which claim neofunctionalism to be insufficient in explaining the integration process, the model also indirectly implies that EU supranational institutions play a central role in the EU policy making process and therefore have greater influence on EU foreign policies than Member States. This indirectly implies that EU-Thai relations are governed by EU supranational institutions not the Member States. In the EU policy making process, power is shared between EU supranational institutions, the Member States, and various interest groups (non-governmental and government) from different levels of the political arena. Each political actor has a different level of power on different issues, but generally power is shared between supranational institutions, interest groups, and the Member States. Regarding EU-Thailand relations, EU Member States, EU supranational institutions, and interest groups play an important role in shaping the relationship. This argument will be presented in further details by drawing on the assumptions of multi-level governance in a later section of this chapter.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Andrew Moravcsik (1991) proposed the concept of 'intergovernmental institutionalism' to explain the logic behind the negotiation process of the Single European Act (SEA). His approach has had implications for the conceptualisation of the entire integration process of the EU. In contrast to the assumptions of neofunctionalism, Moravcsik argued that the outcome of the SEA was the result of bargaining between the 'big three' Member States – France, Germany, and the UK. Other actors such as interest groups and international organisations were not seen as influential in the bargaining process as had been claimed by neofunctionalists. The SEA negotiation process was, according to Moravcsik, conducted based on a lowest common denominator approach and national sovereignty was under the heavy protection of the Member States. Moravcsik stressed the central importance of power and national interests, with the latter traced back to domestic politics. Ultimately, intergovernmental institutionalism posited that Member States control the outcomes of EU policies and the integration process.

Moravcsik directly challenged the neofunctionalist argument that the integration process, in this case the SEA, was driven by cooperation between the EU institutions and pan-European business interest groups. He instead agreed with the modified structural realist concept that "states are the principal actors in the international system... interstate bargains reflect national interests and relative power" (1991, p.224). The leading principle of liberal intergovernmentalism is the importance of interstate bargaining based on the lowest common denominator and the protection of national sovereignty. The model contends that the integration process was driven by bargaining between key Member States - France, Germany, and the UK - through the European Council and the Council of Ministers. These countries have their own national interests and strive to realise them in the bargaining process. Moravcsik argued that "EC politics is the continuation of domestic policies by other means" (1991, p.223). Thus to understand the position of each Member State in the negotiation process, Moravcsik argued that one must examine each country's domestic politics.

Moravcsik asserted that during the interstate bargaining process, small Member States are not very influential because the leading Member States can offer them side-payment to ensure their agreement with the decisions. However, in the history-making negotiations, Moravcsik claimed that the only factor which could pressure a state into accepting the decisions of others was the threat of exclusion. Moravcsik noted that during the SEA negotiation process, France and Germany used this tactic to get the UK to accept their decisions.

Moravcsik contended that 'domestic politics' determine the Member States' positions in the negotiation process, and that domestic politics is the root of national interests. To understand why the national policy preferences of the Member States converge, one must examine the domestic politics of the Member States. In the SEA negotiation process, the domestic politics of France, Germany, and the UK favoured the reform process. In addition, Moravcsik also identified four factors that caused national policy preferences to converge: the autonomy of political leaders, the role of technocracy, the role of centrist coalitions, and the role of policy failure. The leaders of the three big Member States had considerable autonomy and they supported the integration process

that resulted in the reforms introduced in the SEA. Technocrats also played an important role in domestic politics, Moravcsik believed. They could either encourage or discourage integration through their influence and channels in either the Council or the Member State governments. In this case, the technocrats favoured economic integration so they supported the reform. Another factor that, according to Moravcsik, explains the convergence of national interests is the support of political parties in the Member States. The ruling centrist coalitions in the mid-1980s in France, Germany, and the UK were "ideologically committed to relatively liberal domestic economic policies [and] were also committed...to liberalization of the European market" (1991, p.237).

In 1993, Moravcsik introduced the concept of 'liberal intergovernmentalism' to further explain the process behind historical EU decision-making. The model built on his earlier model, intergovernmental institutionalism, with an integration of international political economy (IPE) theories. Moravcsik posited that "the EC is best seen as an international regime for policy coordination, the substantive and institutional development of which may be explained through the sequential analysis of national preference formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction" (1993, p.480). The model adopted a two-stage approach to explain major EU decisions – the demand and supply stages. The demand stage is when the national preferences of the Member States are influenced by domestic actors under the condition of economic interdependence, whilst the supply stage represents the outcomes of the international bargaining process between Member States. The model then used regime theory to account for the reasons behind Member States delegating power to the EU institutions.

Liberal intergovernmentalism has three essential elements – the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. The model assumes that states act rationally, that is, to serve their own domestic interests which are influenced by many societal actors. This rational action, the model argues, may lead to either cooperation or international conflict between states. The model then employs the concept of national preference formation to conceptualise national preferences

which constitute the interests of an individual state. Economic interdependence is strongly emphasised by the model as a precondition leading to policy coordination between states due to international policy externalities; in particular, 'negative' international policy externalities. National preferences under the conditions of economic interdependence comprise the demand side of the model. Liberal intergovernmentalism applies interstate bargaining theory to elucidate the bargaining process between EU Member States. Moravcsik has asserted that "EC negotiations can be viewed as a co-operative game in which the level of co-operation reflects patterns in the preferences of national governments" (1993, p.499). He identified three factors that would determine the outcome of international negotiations – unilateral policy alternatives, alternative coalitions, and the potential of compromise and linkage.

Moravcsik applied functional regime theory (Keohane, 1984) to clarify the role and power of EU institutions, and argued that strong EU institutions are not "the antithesis of intergovernmentalism", but rather that Member States would support the EU institutions only if they "strengthen, rather than weaken, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable" (Moravcsik, 1993, p.507). Thus, in this view, EU institutions increase the power of national governments by increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining and creating a two-level game structure. To account for day-to-day EU politics, Moravcsik extended conventional regime theory which traditionally only views EU institutions as playing a 'passive role' in assisting in international state bargaining process during 'historical decision-making'. He argued that Member States would only pool or delegate sovereignty to common institutions after careful consideration of three conditions - the potential gain to be had from cooperation, the level of uncertainty regarding the details of the decision, and the level of political risk.

Moravcsik subsequently tested his liberal intergovernmentalism model against five major EU history-making negotiations– the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the customs union and CAP in the 1960s, the European Monetary System between 1978 and 1979, the Single European Act from

1985-86, and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. His central argument was that "a tripartite explanation of integration – economic interest, relative power, credible commitments – accounts for the form, substance and timing of major steps toward European integration" (Moravcsik, 1998, p.4). His work revealed that "national preferences are best explained by economic interests; that the outcome of interstate bargains is best explained by relative power of the states involved; and, finally, that the decision to delegate powers to EU institutions is taken because it is the most effective way of ensuring the credibility of commitments from other Member States" (Cram, 1999, p.64).

Liberal intergovernmentalism then, is effective in explaining the historical decision making in the EU integration process as it was created to serve that very purpose. It is useful in the sense that it stresses the importance of the Member States' preferences through national domestic preferences and interstate bargaining in the EU policy making process. However, in the case of EU-Thailand relations, which are not the result of an historical EU decision-making process, the liberal intergovernmentalist model is not the optimal choice for evaluating the relationship. EU-Thailand relations mainly concern wide-ranging cooperation which involves EU institutions, EU Member States, the Thai government, and various interest groups. Consequently, Liberal intergovernmentalism is therefore insufficient for explaining EU-Thailand relations.

Multi-level Governance

Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank postulated the theory of multi-level governance (MLG) which conceptually challenged the state-centric view of intergovernmentalism. As with other integration theories, multi-level governance focuses on the issues of competence and sovereignty between EU institutions and the Member States. As already quoted in the Introduction to this thesis, the model posits that "European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government - subnational, national, and supranational" where "control has slipped away from national governments to supranational institutions" (1996b, p.275).

MLG has three main hypotheses related to the decision-making process and the political arenas of the EU. The first is that "decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state executives" (Marks et al, 1996a, p.276). The European Council, Commission, European Parliament and the European Court are all interdependent in the decision-making process and no institution has the sole competence in policy-making. The second hypothesis is that "collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual state executive" (p.277), and thirdly, that "political arenas are interconnected rather than nested" (p.277) within states. The intergovernmentalist notion that the domestic and international political arenas are separated is rejected in this model. MLG argues that subnational actors are able to move beyond national boundaries to pursue their objectives, just like states, and that these actors bring domestic issues with them to the European level. Marks, Hooghe, and Blank tested their hypotheses by applying them to the different functions of EU institutions in the policy-making process in four stages: policy initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication. The authors' goal was to investigate "who" determines "what" in the EU policy-making process.

In the policy initiation stage, the Commission has competence to initiate and draft legislation and has the power to amend or withdraw the proposals at any stage of the process. The role of the European Council here is limited to providing general policy guidelines which are broad objectives and are flexible for the Commission to work with. Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty both the Council of Ministers and the Parliament share competence in policy initiation with the Commission and they can request the Commission drafts a proposal. The Council can also pass soft law to limit the power of the Commission by ratifying common opinions, resolutions, agreements, and recommendations. That the power of policy initiation no longer belongs solely to the Commission had led to many conflicts within the Union. Apart from the EU institutions, interest groups and subnational actors have sought to get their demands on the agenda as well. These interest groups are national and regional organisations of various kinds, ranging from European peak organisations to individual companies from across Europe. Subnational authorities

are also present in Brussels, trying to influence the policy-making process. What this whole process implies is that the policy initiation power is now shared between EU institutions and is, to some extent, influenced by various actors from all levels of the political arena.

Prior to the adoption of the SEA, the Council of Ministers was the sole legislative body of the EU. The SEA reduced the Council's power considerably by increasing the legislative power of the European Parliament, the role of the Commission, and the influence of different interest groups in Brussels. The extension of QMV to many policy areas such as agriculture, trade, and competition policy, after the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, moderated the power of the Council in the decision-making stage, however, some of the vital policy areas such as budget, taxation, and movement of people remain under the tight control of the Council.

Intergovernmentalists argue that the Council still retains ultimate control of decision-making power through the shadow of the Luxembourg Compromise and by a veto culture which allows a state to prevent the practice of QMV by raising serious objections. The practice of veto by an individual Member State was reduced during the 1980s because of the disapproval of both the Parliament and other Member States (Marks et al., 1996a, p.284). Now Member States must have support of other members in order to successfully invoke a veto and they can no longer independently decide to block a policy to protect their vital national interests or national sovereignty.

The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty increased the role of both the European Parliament and the Commission in the legislative process which led to a further reduction in the Council's decision-making power through the introduction of the cooperation and co-decision procedures. MLG can be seen clearly in the co-decision procedures of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The position adopted by the Council or the Parliament must be approved by both institutions and the Parliament has power to an absolute veto. The role of the Commission is more than just a broker because it possesses such a level of expertise and information on various issues that the Council often turns to the Commission for expert advice. Additionally, in some areas, the

Commission also performs the role of negotiator. It can be seen from this process that each institution influences the decision-making process in one way or another. The 2004 Constitutional Treaty foreshadowed codecision as the dominant decision-making process in the future, a feature that has been retained and implemented in the Lisbon Treaty.

The Commission has the formal executive powers in the implementation stage of policy while national governments are responsible for the actual implementation; however, in reality the powers are shared between EU institutions and other actors. The Commission has competence to interpret legislation and issue administrative regulations on specific cases but after the creation of comitology in the 1980s the decisions have been influenced by the Council and national governments. The comitology system comprises of civil servants, subnational actors, representatives from interest groups, and members of non-government organisations, all due to their expertise. In practice, comitology is not just an instrument used by the Council and national governments to control the Commission, but rather due to its composition, the system creates opportunities for subnational actors to participate at the European level.

The increasing role of the Commission at the ground level of policy implementation – where national governments used to have sole authority – has been apparent since the SEA which legitimised the involvement of actors from various levels and at all stages of the policy process, selection of priorities, choice of programmes, allocation of funding, monitoring of operations, and the evaluation and adjustment of programmes. In order to perform these tasks, different levels of committees have been created to oversee the implementation process. In these committees Commission officials are present and in direct contact with actors from different groups such as regional and local authorities and other local actors. This form of partnership shows that these subnational actors are not confined within their national boundaries but are able to play their part at the European level.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is viewed by the state-centric model as an instrument of the Member States for monitor each member's compliance to the *aquis* and for ironing out

disputes between Member States. MLG, however, argues that the ECJ has done far more than suggested by the state-centric model. MLG claims that, with the assistance of the Commission, the Court has created a supranational legal order which has promoted the integration process. The ECJ, through the principle of direct effect and supremacy of European law, has sole power over national courts in legal matters despite objections from states. It has changed European legal systems from being nationally based to a multi-level system that is both national and European. The ECJ indirectly influences the direction of the EU by the creation of opportunities for the supranational institutions, private interests, and national institutions, to influence EU policy or increase their power.

In summary, as Holland and Doidge noted in relation to EU Development Policy, the theoretical point is a simple one: "theories that are typically used to explain the internal processes of European integration – and even polity-making decisions – may be used with equal validity and relevance for understanding Europe's external relations." (Holland and Doidge, 2012, p.36) Thus integration theories do offer appropriate conceptual frameworks for thinking about the EU-Thai relations. Decisions, non-decisions, policies and programmes are informed by this wider integration context. However, the purpose of theorizing about European integration should not be limited to finding a single macro-theory, but rather to identify those theories best suited to the nature of the actual empirical case. Consequently, while a range of theories are engaged in this analysis – intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, multi-level governance and so on - on balance MLG presents the greatest insights for understanding EU-Thai relations.

II. International Relations Theories

For decades, International relations (IR) scholars have attempted to solve the mystery of the pattern of interactions among nations in the international system. Various competing theoretical perspectives have been constructed to explain the nature and characteristics of the international system. Different perspectives focus on different actors, issues, and the actual nature of the

international system. In this section three leading IR perspectives - neo-realism, complex interdependence and dependency theory, are explored to develop a clearer picture of the international system. The pertinent question here is which of these perspectives best conceptualises the EU-Thai relationship?

Realism

After the two world wars IR theorists were discontent with the idealistic principles of liberalism, particularly the notion of collective security and "moralistic assumptions about the possibility of peace and progress through human aspiration" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p.22). Early realists like E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau attacked liberal internationalists, calling them 'utopians', and criticising liberalism for being incapable of creating a lasting peace in the international system. In contrast to liberalism, realism or *realpolitik*, "seeks to describe and explain the world of international politics *as it is*" (Burchill, 2001, p.70. Emphasis added).

Carr refuted the principles of liberalism - particularly the doctrine of the harmony of interests - by arguing that they represent the specific interests of the 'satisfied power' or the relevant powerful states during a particular period. He argued that the key to understanding the international system was to accept the notion of the 'realities of power'. It is natural for states to pursue power, sometimes masqueraded as national interests, in order to protect themselves or to dominate other states in the international system. This pursuit of power results in clashes of national interests between states because realism contends that there is no overarching authority to supervise the interactions between states and thus the conflicts between states create the anarchical nature of the international system. In order for the international system to be stable, there must be a 'balance of power' between states "lubricated by fluid alliance systems" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p.24).

Similarly to Carr, in 1948 Morgenthau proposed his version of realism in 'Politics Among Nations' (1948). Morgenthau's work influenced both academics and the foreign policies of the United States in the post-World War II period. He argued that the key to understanding

international politics was "the concept of interests defined in terms of power" and he asserted that international politics was a struggle for power between states, which he believed to be the most important actors in world politics. Realism assumes human nature to be the basis of an analysis of state behaviour. Morgenthau asserted that the behaviour of the state is guided by their rational pursuit of national interests, which is the acquisition of power to influence other states, not by any moral principles as in the beliefs of liberal utopianism. The result of this struggle for power between states is the anarchical characteristic of the international system. Realism stresses the idea of 'self-help'; each state has to rely on itself for protection from aggressors. States may cooperate to achieve their national interests but this cooperation will only last as long as each state benefits from it. Ultimately, the state has to maximise its power in order to survive or retain its status in the international system. To minimise the intensity of conflict in an international system where every state seeks to maximise its power, a balance of power must be achieved. Put simply, realism contends that "the game of international politics revolves around the pursuit of power: acquiring it, increasing it, projecting it, and using it to bend others to one's will" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p.24).

Neo-realism

Neo-realism offers a critique and a modified version of realism which emerged in response to the challenges of interdependency theory. It stresses the importance of power politics and systemic factors in international politics on the eve of the Second Cold War. The pioneer of neo-realism or 'structural realism' was Kenneth Waltz who wrote the seminal text, "Theory of International Politics" in 1979. The key question which Waltz's thesis investigated was why the behaviour of states follows the same pattern regardless of their different political system and political ideologies. Waltz argued that "a good theory of international politics must be systemic, since how relationships among states are organized strongly affects governments' behaviour toward one another" (cited in Keohane, 1986, p.14).

Unlike traditional realism, neo-realism focuses on the systemic forces of the international system, not the nation-states, and argues that these forces shape the behaviour of states and define the structure of the international system. The same pattern of states' behaviour can be expected "whenever a system is characterised by the same conditions – the reality of self-help world in an anarchical environment" (Burchill, 2001, p.89). Neo-realism argues that the international system has a defined structure comprising of three important factors: the ordering principle of the system, the character of the units in the system, and the relative capabilities of the units in the system (Waltz, 1979). Waltz, like traditional realists, believed that the ordering principle of the international system was anarchic because, unlike the domestic system, there is no central international institution to supervise states' behaviour. States must acquire power, which is military power, in order to exist in the 'self-help' system. Because of the anarchic nature of the international system all states, regardless of their political system, are forced to follow the same pattern of behaviour; that is, accumulating as much power as possible to survive in the international system where every state is self-centred. Security is the most important issue determining states' behaviour in international politics. Although states perform similar functions, they possess different capabilities which, according to Waltz, cannot be ignored in an analysis of the international system. They "are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not function" (Waltz, 1979, p.96). Waltz argued that capabilities define a state's position in the anarchical international system and therefore states are "sensitive to their relative position in the distribution of power" (cited in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p.29). The distribution of power in the international system is unequal and continuously changing, defining the structure of the system. To understand international politics one must observe the "changes in the distribution of capabilities across units" (Keohane, 1986, p.15). From these assumptions Waltz argued that the balance of power naturally emerges regardless of whether states seek to achieve a balance or not.

One of many critiques of realism has been the fact that it has become irrelevant to the contemporary international system. Predating Waltz, Rothstein noted that "traditional security is

no longer likely to be the dominant consideration in world politics" (1972, p.396) and that "security will be only one of the issues of world politics, albeit a crucial one, for it will have to share prominence with a range of issues heretofore left to technicians or to the play of domestic politics" (p.396). Rothstein used the issue of interdependence as the basis of this argument. He asserted that the autonomy and sovereignty of states has been eroded by economic, social, and cultural interdependence and as such, states must cooperate in order to effectively manage these interdependences in the international system. He also suggested that even in the field of security, interdependence is becoming visible as witnessed by the various arms-control treaties of the 1970s and general international cooperation on security issues. Rothstein concluded that "[w]ith its overly narrow conception of politics, and with its antiquated notions of sovereignty, Great Power dominance and the autonomy of foreign policy, the Realist response is bound to create conflict and destroy the possibility of working out new forms of cooperation" (p.396).

Writing a quarter century ago, Keohane and Nye similarly noted that realists "find it very difficult accurately to interpret today's multidimensional economic, social, and ecological interdependence" (1989, p.4) where "security, in traditional terms, is not likely to be the principal issue facing governments" (p.8). Governments face issues beyond security and must use other resources to deal with them; therefore the focus on the concept of power alone does not apply to these issues. Keohane and Nye argued that "the assumptions about world politics can be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or *ideal type*" (p.23). They then constructed a model called "complex interdependence" to challenge the principles of realism, arguing that their model more aptly portrayed the reality of world politics. The model argued that there are actors other than states in the international system and these actors come from different levels of society, that security is not the most important issue in world politics, and that military force is not the most effective approach for achieving one's goal. This thesis argues that the complex interdependence view best represents world politics and it is the most suitable model for elaborating on EU-Thai relations.

Hocking and Smith raised several critiques of realism. They argued that the state does not act as a coherent unit as suggested by realism. The growth of national governments in the contemporary international system has produced fragmentation, a loss of control, and internal competition amongst governments. Hocking and Smith noted that states are facing "a fundamental loss of control...both over their actions in the national and international arenas and over the very mechanisms of policy-making themselves" (1990, p.67). According to the two authors, there are other powerful forces emerging in societies that are not under the full control of the state such as interests groups and multinational corporations. These actors have their own objectives and goals which may or may not coincide with those of their governments and therefore the assumption that the state acts as a coherent unit is once again challenged. Hocking and Smith asserted that states do not form the only link between the domestic and the international arena but rather that there are other links at different levels that also connect the two together. These links come through different types of networks and actors: subnational, transnational, governmental, intergovernmental, and supranational networks. Hocking and Smith concluded by suggesting that the models that best represent the contemporary system are the 'mixed-actor system' and 'complex interdependence' where both state and non-state actors coexist, and these actors interact through different levels of networks where the issues have no hierarchy (reflecting many of the assumptions later developed by multi-level governance scholars).

Zacher further argued that the contemporary international system is changing from a system where states are highly autonomous to a system where states are connected through various kinds of interdependencies and regimes. He claimed that "traditional realist theories of international relations cannot account for the changes that are occurring" in the contemporary international system because "they are too tied to the idea that states will not trade-off their autonomy to achieve other values and to the idea that all important changes are rooted in changes in power distributions" (1992, p.98). He identified various factors that he felt had contributed to the changes in the contemporary international system, and these are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

III. Dependency Theory vs. Interdependence

The Politics of Dominance and Dependence

The central theme of dependency theory is that a structural relationship exists between states within the international system. The international system consists of dominant states – or the centre – and the dependent states – or the periphery – in which the former exploits the latter to achieve its economic and political goals while the periphery is dependent upon the centre for capital, technology, finance and trade. The periphery “achieves less autonomy as an actor in world politics, since in many ways it is merely the recruit or the representative of other, more fundamental interests” (Smith et al., 1981, p.18). This concept argues that the centre-periphery relationship is the cause of underdevelopment in the periphery. The model asserts that the structural relationship will continue because “it has been in the interests of dominant capitalist forces to maintain the status quo” (Dent, 1999, p.13). In short, dependency theory attempts to explain the present underdeveloped state of many nations in the world by examining the patterns of interactions between nations and by arguing that inequality among nations is an intrinsic part of those interactions.

Dependency, as defined by dos Santos, constitutes:

a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand only as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development. (1970, p.231).

In a similar fashion, Galtung introduced the concept of imperialism to explain sustained inequality within and between developed and developing countries. His model proposed that the international system consisted of two groups of countries - Centre and Periphery countries and they also have their own centre and periphery within themselves. Centre countries are the rich,

industrialised, developed countries while Periphery countries are the poor, developing or underdeveloped countries. The model argued that sustained inequality in periphery countries is the result of vertical interaction relationship and the feudal interaction structure between centre and periphery countries. The characteristics of the relationship between the centre and periphery create a situation where the latter is 'dependent' on the former.

The model posited three basic assumptions regarding the centre-periphery relationship:

- (1) there is harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in the Periphery nation,
- (2) there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Centre nations,
- (3) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Centre nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation (Galtung, 1971, p.303).

These assumptions have several implications concerning the relationship between and within the centre and periphery countries. First, the model implied that the centre in the Centre nation "has a bridgehead in the Periphery nation... the center in the Periphery nation" (p.303) and that "they are linked so that they go up together and down, even under, together" (p.303). The centre of the Periphery, or the elites of the population, "serves as a transmission belt for value forwarded to the Centre nation" (p.304) and in return for their services, the centre of the Periphery nation receives both economic and political benefits which widen inequality within the Periphery country even further. Galtung called this mechanism "penetration" which, he argued, is a mechanism that sustains the dependency of the Periphery nation (Galtung, 1973).

Secondly, Galtung claimed that there was "more disharmony in the Periphery nation than in the Center nation" (Galtung, 1971, p.303). In the Centre nation, although there is inequality, due to the redistribution system of the state, the effect of this is minimal if compared to the Periphery nation. Thirdly, the periphery of the two countries can never form an alliance because there is a disharmony of interest between them. The periphery of the Centre nation "see themselves more as

the partners of the center of the Center than as the partners of the periphery in the Periphery" (p.304).

For Galtung, imperialism identifies two mechanisms which create and sustain the inequality between Centre and Periphery countries. The first, vertical interaction relations, is the relationship where the Centre nation trades capital-intensive products in exchange for labour-intensive or primary products from the Periphery nation. The important point here is the gap in the processing levels between the products of these countries. The value of capital-intensive products is much higher than the products of Periphery nation, and consequently inequality is created as this relationship continues. This mechanism clearly demonstrates the process of "exploitation" where "the balance of benefits from international processes of exchange is biased towards the centre" (Smith et al., 1981, p.19).

The second mechanism which sustains the inequality between Centre and Periphery nations is the feudal interaction structure. This particular type of structure is the one where the Centre nation has full control of its Periphery nation(s). In this structure, a Periphery nation can only interact with the outside world through its Centre nation, which effectively means that a Periphery nation cannot interact directly with other Centres and Peripheries. This structure also prevents the Centre nation from interacting with other Centre nations' Periphery nations. This structure, the model argues, is what sustains inequality in the international system. Galtung calls this strategy "fragmentation" because it represents "the age-old adage of all empire-builders, *divide et impera*, divide and rule" (1973, p.42).

Galtung identified two implied economic consequences of these two mechanisms: the concentration of trade partners and commodity concentration. The Periphery country can only trade with its Centre country, as can be seen through the high levels of import and export concentration. The Centre nation, on the other hand, is free to trade with any other Centre countries. A Periphery country commonly has one or very few primary or labour-intensive products as a

result of the historical exploitation by its Centre nation. These industries have been developed in the interests of the Centre and therefore although it represents the core industry of the Periphery, it can only be relied on as a national export. Imperialism argues that these consequences create the condition of dependency of the Periphery country on the Centre country as "the Periphery becomes particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in demand and prices" (Galtung, 1971, p.308). The economy of the Periphery nation is thus wholly dependent on the economy of the Centre nation.

Along similar lines to Galtung, Frank earlier attempted to explain the condition of underdevelopment in the Third World by proposing that the world capitalist system consisted of the metropolitan (developed) and satellite (underdeveloped) countries. He argued that "contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries" (1966, p.291) and that this metropolis-satellite relationship is what sustains the world capitalist system. Frank's work focused on the underdevelopment of Latin America; a region that has been a satellite to many metropolitan countries throughout its long history.

Frank asserted that the metropolitan countries exploit their satellites by extracting capital and economic surplus to promote their own development and ruling class status. This exploitative metropolis-satellite relationship, he believed, is also present *within* the underdeveloped countries where cities are the metropolises of the regional and local satellite areas. The metropolises of the satellite countries extract capital and economic surplus from their satellites and transfer some of this to their metropolis at the international level. According to Frank, this whole process, which occurs at the international, national, regional, and local level, is what sustains the expansion of the world capitalist system and is the reason why the satellite countries remain underdeveloped.

O'Connor examined the concept of neo-imperialism which represented efforts by Marxist theorists to conceptualise the roles of the US and ex-colonies in the world capitalist system in the post-colonial era. Neo-colonialism is considered to be a new form of colonialism: without the

"formal" political and economic control of imperialist countries over their satellite countries, it still "prevents the newly independent countries from consolidating their political independence and thus to keep them economically dependent and securely in the world capitalist system" (O'Connor, 1970, p.283).

O'Connor explored the concept of neo-imperialism and its explanatory power of the relationships between industrialised and developing countries in the contemporary international system. He argued that the "neo-colonialist policy is first and foremost designed to prevent the newly independent countries from consolidating their political independence and thus to keep them economically dependent and securely in the world capitalist system" (O'Connor, 1970, p.283). O'Connor regarded the theory of economic imperialism to be the most important branch of neo-colonialism. He defined the theory as "the economic domination of one region or country over another – specifically, the formal or informal control over local economic resources in a manner advantageous to the metropolitan power, at the expense of the local economy" (p.283). The economic domination of imperialist countries included the control over liquid and real economic resources of their satellite countries. Liquid economic resources included "foreign exchange and public and private savings" (p.283) while real economic resources were "agricultural, mineral, transportation, communication, manufacturing and commercial facilities and other assets" (p.284). Neo-imperialism posited that the imperialist state "attempts to substitute informal for formal modes of political control of countries in the backwash of capitalism" (p.286). They implement foreign policies that allow them "informal" control over their satellites, for instance, the use of old economic and political ties such as the Commonwealth ties and the provision of economic aid with conditionality clauses.

However, Gilpin raised what he saw to be two fundamental flaws regarding the assumptions of dependency model, and which suggest that this model is less suitable for conceptualising EU-Thai relations. The first issue raised by Gilpin is the fact that the dependency model "treats the peripheral states... solely as objects of international economics and political

relations" (Gilpin, 1975, p.251). He believed this assumption did not accurately reflect reality because the Periphery states would no longer simply give in to the demands of the Centre states. Many Periphery states have grown in terms of their economic and political strength while the Centre states often have clashes over their common objectives and hence weaken their bargaining strength. The model ignores the fact that Periphery states can form coalitions (such as ASEAN) and increase their bargaining power with the Centre states and it also fails to accept the fact that a Periphery state can experience economic growth and even cross the Centre-Periphery boundary (particularly in times of changing global economics represented by the rise of China and the European decline linked to their sovereign debt crisis, for example).

The second issue raised by Gilpin concerned the assumption that "a quasi-Marxist theory of capitalist capitalism is applicable to the relationship of developed and lesser-developed economies today" (p.251). Gilpin supported his argument by examining the functions of multinational corporations in the Centre-Periphery relationships. He argued that foreign direct investment in the Periphery countries does not always have exploitative impacts on those states. By investing in developing countries, multinational corporations bring technology, capital, and access to world markets to these countries which can provide a strong basis for economic growth and development. Gilpin noted that "foreign direct investment benefits both corporation and the host economy at a cost to other factors of production in the home economy" (p.252) and he concludes that "[w]hether foreign direct investment is exploitative or beneficial depends on the type of investment, its terms, and the policies of the recipient economy itself" (p.252).

The Politics of Interdependence and Transnational Relations

Interdependence and transnational relations offer a more appropriate conceptual tool than the previous two perspectives for exploring EU-Thailand relations. The main theme of this perspective is that states are interdependent because they are connected through a variety of networks. According to the two approaches, there are other actors apart from the state in world politics who

come from different levels of societies and which operate through various networks of relationships. Military and security issues no longer dominate states' agendas in international politics as other issues have captured international concern and must be managed at the international level. Interdependence theory also stresses the role of non-state actors in the agenda formation process.

Keohane and Nye have described the concept of interdependence in the following terms:

In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situation characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. These effects often result from international transactions – flows of money, goods, and messages across international boundaries (1989, p.8).

The two authors believe that international relations in terms of interdependence consist of two extremes; pure dependence and pure interdependence. Keohane and Nye (1989, p.10-11) asserted that interdependence does not always have to reflect the conditions of "evenly balanced mutual dependence" between actors in consideration. They instead used the term "asymmetries in dependence" to conceptualise the relationship between actors where one actor is more dependent on another, and the latter use this advantage as a source of power to dominate the political bargaining process. Keohane and Nye believe that this situation of asymmetrical dependence or asymmetrical interdependence is typically the case in international politics.

The two scholars subsequently explored the relationship between interdependence and power and how actors may use asymmetric interdependence to their advantage in the political bargaining process. The factors that are essential in understanding the relationship between power and interdependence are sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity interdependence "involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?" (p. 12), and actors with lower sensitivity can use this as sources of power. Vulnerability interdependence refers to "the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face" (p. 12), and in this

case the actor with lower vulnerability can change its policies to dominate the other actors. The authors concluded that vulnerability interdependence is a more important factor than sensitivity interdependence in determining which actor has more power. However, Keohane and Nye accepted the fact that "asymmetrical interdependence by itself cannot explain bargaining outcomes...we must also look at the 'translation' in the political bargaining process" (p.18).

The most important aspect of Keohane and Nye's work on interdependence, however, was the "complex interdependence" model. The two authors constructed the model to analyse and to conceptualise the politics of interdependence in contemporary international relations. The complex interdependence model argues that the international system is the system in which "actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and which force is an ineffective instrument of policy" (1977, p.120). Keohane and Nye proposed the model to challenge the view of realism that states, as coherent units, are the only significant actors in world politics and interact in an international system that is dominated by military and security issues where force is an effective means to obtain goals. Instead, Keohane and Nye believed that the conditions of complex interdependence have created unique political processes including linkage strategies, agenda setting, and coalition building in the contemporary international system. Such a perspective lends itself quite naturally to the application of the EU's foreign relations mechanisms and how these, in turn, interact with third countries, such as Thailand.

Complex interdependence has three main assumptions: there are various channels that connect different societies; there is no hierarchy among issues in international politics; and military force has become obsolete in achieving a state's objectives, assumptions that are effectively the antithesis of a realist conception of world politics.

The model argues that various types of networks connect countries in the international system and that these networks can be divided into interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational. Interstate networks are the official method for governmental interaction in the

international system. Transgovernmental networks refer to the interactions of bureaucrats from different governments, while transnational networks refer to the interactions of actors other than states such as multinational companies and interest groups. The interaction of these state and non-state actors from different societies creates a 'complex interdependence' of relationships. Non-state actors, the model argues, can develop their own interests regardless of the state agenda. These actors function as transmission belts making the domestic policies of different countries impinge on one another more and more... foreign economic policies touch more domestic economic activity than in the past, blurring the lines between domestic and foreign policy and increasing the number of issues relevant to foreign policy (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.26).

The complex interdependence model assumes that there is no clear hierarchy established among issues in world politics. The model argues that "the distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes blurred" (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.122) as a growing interdependence between them becomes visible. The issues that were traditionally considered 'domestic' have now become 'foreign' issues; governments are facing a growing number of issues beyond traditional power and security issues which range from trade to environmental issues. Military and security issues no longer dominate the agenda of interstate interaction in the international system, the traditional distinction between the so called 'high' and 'low' politics has become questionable.

The last assumption of complex interdependence is the decline in the use of military force to achieve state objectives in the international system. The model argues that the threat of an attack by other states, especially those that have a complex interdependence relationship, have declined and force is not seen as the best mean of achieving state goals such as economics and trade. Keohane and Nye suggested that "intense relationships of mutual influence exist between these countries, but in most of them force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of policy" (1989, p.27). The use of military force has been increasingly substituted by "new methods of asserting influence, once again reflecting the activities of multiple participants" (Hocking and Smith, 1990, p.79).

The characteristics of complex interdependence have significant implications for the political processes in world politics. The translation of asymmetries in interdependence into power is the key issue here. The model asserts that there are variations in state goals depending on the issues and that these goals are influenced by state actors and non-state as well as subnational authorities. It also argues that political processes and the distribution of power will be different on a variety of issues compared with the conceptions of realism. Keohane and Nye identified three distinctive political processes: linkage strategies; agenda setting; and transnational and transgovernmental relations.

In a complex interdependence world, states are faced with a variety of issues which directly affect the political bargaining process. The model stresses the importance of the distribution of power resources between states as the source of bargaining power, and that this will be the determining factor in the results and characteristics of the political processes. States will, according to this model, find it more difficult to use their strength on one issue to influence the outcome of other issues where they are weak: for example, a militarily powerful state will find it difficult to use its military strength to influence the outcomes of economic issues. The model asserts that because the distribution of power resources are different on different issues the "patterns of outcomes and distinctive political processes are likely to vary from one set of issues to another" (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.30). Furthermore, the linkage strategies will face resistance from domestic, transgovernmental, and transnational actors who might be affected by the strategies. Therefore, the model asserts that use of linkage strategies by states will become less effective in the world of complex interdependence.

Complex interdependence stresses the importance of the politics of agenda formation and control. In the realist view, agenda setting will be influenced by the balance of power in world politics. The assumption of complex interdependence that there is no issue hierarchy implies that different issues, both security and non-security, will be on the agenda at different times. The latter

model focuses on 'how' the issues come to be on the agenda, and argues that the agenda will be "affected by the international and domestic problems created by economic growth and increasing sensitivity interdependence..." (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.128). Keohane and Nye explored several factors that might influence the politics of agenda setting under complex interdependence.

Multiple networks between different societies allow transgovernmental and transnational actors to move freely between the domestic and international political arenas. Transnational actors such as multinational companies and interest groups can form coalitions between those with the same interests in other states and influence the policy-making process across different states to pursue their joint interests. Their actions and interests are likely to be influenced by their coalitions in other states. This situation would make it more difficult for governments to predict and control the outcomes of their policies. Multiple channels of contact also allow *government* agencies in different states to form coalitions on various policy agendas to pursue their shared objectives. Complex interdependence argues that these transgovernmental actors have their own 'interests' that might be different from their leaders' national interests and that these 'interests' are influenced by the transgovernmental policy networks. State leaders will find it increasingly difficult to control their bureaucrats and ensure they act coherently on the same policy because "national interests will be defined differently on different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units" (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.130).

In the complex interdependence world, international organisations play a very influential role and are considered as important actors. Keohane and Nye (1989, p.35) asserted that international organisations "help set the international agenda, and act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as arenas for political initiatives and linkage by weak states". They serve, according to the authors, as political arenas where different actors, both state and non-state, from different types of networks can interact and form coalitions to pursue their interests. International organisations, the model argues, help in promoting cooperation between states because states realise that they have to work together to manage the issues created by interdependence.

As early as 1970, Morse asserted that "foreign policy has been radically transformed by the revolutionary processes of modernization", and that "internationally, modernization is accompanied by increased levels and types of interdependencies among national societies" (p.146). He argued that the process of modernization has led to the development of three conditions in the domestic and international scenes: the traditional distinction between domestic and international affairs has disappeared, there has been an increase in the importance of low politics, and the abilities of states to control domestic and international activities have decreased because of a growing interdependence between states.

Morse argued that the modernization process blurred the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic politics because "both predominantly political and predominantly non-political interactions take place across societies at high levels, and because transnational phenomena are so significant that either territorial and political or jurisdictional boundaries are extremely difficult to define" (p.148). In modernised societies, domestic and foreign politics are linked because of a growing interdependence in the international system, and this condition effectively breaks down the barrier between domestic and foreign politics.

Morse asserted that the modernisation process has shifted the policy goals of governments from the traditional high politics to low politics because of "the increased salience of low policies and the merging of goals of power and goals of plenty" (p.149). Two factors are the causes of this shift, according to the author: the effects of nuclear weapons and rapid domestic economic growth. Nuclear weapons made territorial disputes between nuclear-armed countries virtually unthinkable because of the potential destruction of nuclear weapons. Territorial accretion became too costly for modernised states and thus security issues became less important. The rapid economic growth which accompanies modernisation has shifted policymakers' attention from high policies to the domestic social wellbeing of their citizens. Governments, in the modernised world, increasingly focus on policies that generate wealth and welfare in their societies by encouraging investment, education, and science and technology developments. Morse claimed that this shift also occurs

because of international interdependencies where people as well as governments interact across borders.

Morse argued that the changing nature of foreign policies brought about by modernisation process created a problem of control for governments both domestically and internationally because of a lack of an international governing authority and the presence of interdependencies among modernised states. Interdependence, Morse contended, "...erodes the autonomy of a government to act both externally and internally" (p.154). He also asserted that the increase in nongovernmental interactions among states, particularly by multinational corporations and other non-state actors, is one of the reasons that states lose control of their domestic and international affairs. These actors have considerable autonomy and their goals may be different to those of their governments, thus potentially leading to conflicts of interest.

Hocking and Smith believed that "states and their actions represent only one network – albeit a highly significant one – in the international political scene" and that "there are many other groups, organizations and networks that could also be included in a definition of 'world politics'..." (1990, p.63). They applied the 'mixed actor system' of Young and the concept of 'complex interdependence' to conceptualise the contemporary international system. In order to assess new actors in the international system, Hocking and Smith identified four qualities of international actors: their aims; the extent of actor participation; the structures and resources of actors; and the levels of actor participation. Of particular importance here is the level of actor participation in the international system: the two authors identified five levels of actor participations. The first is the subnational level. Actors operating at subnational level are those that operate only at a domestic level where they are mainly concerned with domestic issues. The second is the transnational level. Actors at this level are those that operate in two countries or more but are not controlled by any state. The third is the governmental level. Governmental actors are those that are staff or agents of national governments and who operate mainly under the supervision of the government. The fourth is the intergovernmental level. Intergovernmental actors are those which operate within

intergovernmental institutions and organisations (such as the United Nations). The last is the supranational level, the level above states. Supranational actors have more power than national governments in supranational organisations and are independent of states' control.

Hocking and Smith (1990) used the identified levels of participation of international actors to propose five corresponding networks of relationships in international relations. These networks are: subnational networks, transnational networks, governmental networks, intergovernmental networks, and supranational networks. Subnational networks represent the activities of subnational or domestic actors that aim to influence domestic affairs either by lobbying their governments or through other means. Their activities will sometimes have an effect on international politics. Transnational networks are the networks of transnational actors which may exist in the forms of organisations or multinational corporations that operate across many states. Specific national governments do not control these networks because they can shift operations to another state if necessary. Governmental networks involve the activities of governmental actors within a government which aim at influencing policies. When these networks represent the relationships *between* government agencies or units of *different* national governments, they are referred to as transgovernmental networks. Transgovernmental networks are the informal links between governments through which government agencies may form coalitions to influence their governments.

Intergovernmental networks represent the formal interstate relationships between national governments, they are the traditional form of interstate relations. States are represented by their leaders or agencies in dealing with different issues in world politics with the ultimate goal of securing their national interests. Supranational networks can best be represented by the relationships between EU institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament. However, it is important to note that these actors do not always operate within their networks, for example, a transnational actor may interact with a subnational actor to pursue common goals (mixed pairings). Another point is that these networks of relationships are dynamic, actors will come and go which

results in a situation where "an awkward, untidy and unpredictable patchwork of actors and their mutual linkages" (Hocking and Smith, 1990, p.76).

Zacher, in his 1992 article, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance" asserted that the international system is changing from the traditional Westphalian system towards a system where states have less autonomy because of the emergence of various international regimes. He argued that states "are becoming increasingly enmeshed in a network of interdependencies and regulatory/collaborative arrangements from which exit is generally not a feasible option" (1992, p.60). His views coincide with liberalism in the sense that international cooperation is determined by factors other than the distribution of power; states are seen to sacrifice their autonomy for their national interests, and anarchy is replaced by interstate cooperation through various international regimes. Regarding the contemporary international system, Zacher wrote that:

what is occurring in the world is not a serious demise of states as the central actors in the system (although certain transnational actors are achieving greater prominence) but rather their acceptance that they have to work together in controlling a variety of interdependencies (p.67).

He identified six conditions that transformed the traditional international system to the present system where states are constrained by international regimes and interdependencies. The first condition is the higher cost of war in the contemporary international system due to the exponential increase in the destructiveness of weaponry (particularly the destructive force of nuclear bombs). The distribution of nuclear weapons among states, both the great powers and lesser powers, acts as mutual deterrent which prevents the actors from going to war against one another. Mearsheimer commented that nuclear weapons "are a powerful force for peace" (1990, p.37) while Waltz noted that "in a nuclear world any state will be deterred by another state's second strike capability" (1990, p.737). Apart from the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, there are other factors which are created by the modernisation process and which contribute to the high cost of war. Zacher claimed that modern societies are more fragile than in the past, and as such, the destructiveness of war would have a more negative impact on the public. The modernisation process has also transformed the

values of people to be anti-war as they are more concerned about their economic wellbeing and moral ethics. Democratisation and economic interdependencies among states also make it more difficult and more costly for state leaders to adopt militarily aggressive policies toward other states. Zacher commented that "in important ways international competition really has shifted from the battle field to the economic front" (1992, p.82). These factors have created a condition where states, both developed and developing, need to establish collective security to protect their common interests.

According to Mathews, "[e]nvironmental strains that transcend national borders are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty" (1989, p.162). An increase in international physical externalities such as pollution, the depleting ozone layer, the global warming problem and the world-wide spread of diseases is the second condition which impacts state autonomy. Environmental damage is seen as the most serious form of externalities, particularly the decrease in the ozone layer and the effects of global warming. These physical externalities have led to the establishment of various international regimes and international organisations such as the Montreal Protocol and the UN Environment Program. This condition is referred to as environmental interdependencies, a situation in which every state is obligated to cooperate in various international regimes to control the environmental damage by "greater coordination of national economic policies and a greater sense of global interconnectedness" (Zacher, 1992, p.78).

The third condition posited by Zacher is the increase in international economic interdependence including trade, foreign investment, and finance between states, together with the growth in the number of various international regimes to regulate these interdependencies. Zacher noted that "[o]ne impact of these trends is that states are losing their degree of autonomy in managing their domestic and international economic policies because of both intensity of the interdependencies and the development of explicit and implicit regimes" (p.81). Cox (1990) also asserted that globalization has reduced the authorities of states because authority is shared by many

international regimes at different levels of international interactions. Increased international trade is one of the key elements that has promoted economic interdependence between states. States accepted the benefits of comparative advantage and have encouraged the practice of free trade which, according to Zacher, led to an increase in the volume of international trade by more than fourfold between 1960 and 1987 (Zacher, 1992). During this period, the levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) were reduced according to the rules of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) although these rules were – and remain – occasionally violated by certain states. Zacher argued that the interstate management of trade and the increasing role of multinational corporations is the key element in the promotion of free trade.

In the financial markets, economic interdependence has increased more than other sectors. This trend can be seen through the absolute and relative increases in the level of foreign lending and the convergence of interest rates in financial markets. For example, the amount of foreign lending by banks increased from \$134.7 billion in 1963 to \$4,821.5 billion in 1988 (Zacher, 1992). Economic interdependence has also increased in foreign investment, particularly in the form of multinational corporations. The international volume of direct investment abroad increased nearly tenfold between 1970 and 1988 while the international volume of portfolio investment abroad increased from SDR 2,646 in 1980 to SDR 156,816 in 1988 (Zacher, 1992). It can be seen from these figures that multinational corporations have emerged as important actors in international politics as a direct result of the huge amount of resources they control across nations, and because of the competition they make for states when protecting those interests. A high volume of foreign investment plays an important role in establishing and sustaining the high levels of economic interdependence between states. States are more concerned and sensitive about each other's wellbeing because they are tied by a high volume of investment. To manage these interdependencies, states have collaborated in various international regimes such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite the growing importance of other actors in international politics such as these mentioned international regimes and multinational

corporations, Zacher believed that states would remain the most important political actors even though they had lost some control of international economic transactions.

The fourth condition is the increase in information flows between states because of advanced communication technology. This factor has several consequences which significantly affect international relations. One of these is that states are less suspicious of other states' military activities, therefore, arguably better communication has promoted international stability and cooperation in many areas. The second consequence is that advanced communication promotes international trade through globalisation. Firms are able to operate in different countries, capital can be transferred easily between different capital markets and demands for products in different countries can more easily be met through better communications. The third impact is that communication has several effects on state autonomy. States penetrated by modern communications are unable to isolate their people from the outside world and at the same time, communications have also facilitated economic interdependencies between states. Yet another impact of communication is cultural diffusion, mainly the diffusion of the Western culture to other parts of the world.

The fifth condition which according to Zacher has transformed the international system is the global spread of democracy in the second half of the 20th century. The increase in the level of democratisation in many regions of the world has had several impacts on the nature of international relations. Firstly, democratic regimes have accepted the principles of liberal capitalism and are, therefore, in favour of free trade which increases the economic interdependence between states. Secondly, democracies promote the free movement of people and information which has led to the creation of international organisations and the further spread of democratic values. Thirdly, democratic regimes value human freedom as their greatest goal; therefore, they support human rights movements in various forms. And lastly it is argued that democratic states do not go to war with each other, but instead prefer to resolve their conflicts through diplomatic means. To go to war with each other would destroy the economic interdependencies and thus the costs would be too high. Democracies thus "are affecting the quality of international interactions and these

changes in interactions that are inspired by transformations in the state are likely to expand in the future" (Zacher, 1992, p.95).

Many authors have supported the view that Western values have been spreading to non-Western states, initiating a process of cultural homogenisation. The economic dependency of developing countries on the 'West' is argued to be one of the chief causes of this process, while the globalisation of production has also been purported by many writers as a major force behind the convergence of cultural values. Cox has claimed that the globalization process "continues a process of cultural homogenization – emanating from the centers of the world power, spread by the world media, and sustained by a convergence in modes of thought and practices among business and political elites" (1990, p.2. *sic.*). Western values have also formed the basis of international law and have influenced the legal systems of non-Western states. This process of cultural homogenisation is one of the causes of economic interdependence and international cooperation in the international system.

Russell asserted that the one of the principal characteristics of international trade and monetary issues is interdependence and that the trend is increasing in contemporary international relations. He described interdependence as a situation in which "economies, societies and governments are affected by events beyond national borders of other countries" and "such effects travel both ways..." (1997, p.47). Interdependence, according to Russell, also refers to the connections between states that include:

economic links of all kinds; the movement of people across borders; cultural linkages; almost all forms of communication; shared international concerns for issues like the environment, human rights, technological advance and health improvement; and the number rapid growth in the number and range of international organizations" (p.46).

Several factors have facilitated the inter-state economic interdependence, including technological advance, the deregulation of financial markets, the promotion of free trade, and the encouragement of investments across states. Interdependence in the contemporary international system has created several important issues worth considering here. The first issue concerns the

nature of interdependence between states, whether it is equally reciprocal or asymmetrical. The second issue concerns the relationship between interdependence and the process of globalisation. The global financial markets have become connected and interdependent through advanced technology and financial deregulations. Leading economies which have a strong impact on other economies in the world have to coordinate their economic policies in order to stabilise their own economies and the global market-place. Another issue created by the process of globalisation is the changing nature of production. This factor mainly concerns the operations of various multinational corporations. Since the end of World War II, large firms have established branches operating in different countries, so as to lower their production costs and to be closer to the foreign markets. A fourth issue concerns the relationship between interdependence and regionalism. Many authors have argued that the growing global interdependence has also been the major motivator of regionalism (Taylor: 1993, Haas: 1975). In order to cope with interdependence, many countries have created regional trading blocs such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and most recently, the proposed 2015 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).

Russell discussed several problems created by interdependence: trade problems, international monetary problems, and global production problems. Interdependence in trade has caused many trade-related problems which include enforcing free trade practices according to the WTO rules, trade disputes between states because of the implementation of trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff), and the protection of sensitive sectors of the economy such as the agricultural sector. Trade conflicts between states have become a regular feature of the contemporary interdependent world. According to Russell, the problems created by international monetary interdependence involve establishing the procedures to manage and regulate the international monetary system and choosing between the conflicting models of floating and fixed exchange rate systems. The problem is to what extent states can manage the international monetary system and who should be responsible for it. The problems created by the globalisation of production involve blurring the borders of firms and the borders of countries. The enormous increase in intra-firm and intra-industry trade makes it very difficult for states to control the level of economic activities within their borders; some authors have even argued that interdependence has created a borderless

world (Dicken, 1992). Russell has added that, “[g]overnments attempting to achieve economic and political objectives (domestically and internationally) have to give more attention to the activities and objectives of other agents: other governments; international organizations; transnational companies; banks; finance houses; and the behaviour of individual aggregated through markets” (1997, p.67).

Gilpin has analysed the “sovereignty-at-bay” model in terms of its explanatory power regarding the conditions of economic interdependence in the contemporary international system. The main argument of this model is that nation states can no longer control economic activities within their national boundaries because of economic interdependence and the technological advances in communication and transportation. Non-state actors such as multinational corporations and international organizations pose serious challenges to national states’ power in controlling their economic affairs. These trends, it has been argued, have seriously affected the independence and sovereignty of nation states in the contemporary international system. However, the important element of the ‘sovereignty-at-bay’ model is the argument that “national economies have become enmeshed in a web of economic interdependence from which they cannot easily escape, and from which they derive great benefits” (Gilpin, 1975, p.239). Nation states are connected through trade, financial markets, and foreign investments which would make it very costly for any individual state to pursue wholly nationalist policies. The model particularly emphasises, in Gilpin’s opinion, the role of multinational corporations as “the embodiment par excellence of the liberal ideal of an interdependent world economy” (p.239). Because of their vast resources and mobility, multinational corporations are able to challenge a state’s control of their activities by shifting operations somewhere else.

Another important argument of the ‘sovereignty-at-bay’ model is the shift in the relationships between developed and developing countries. The redistribution of global production has occurred as multinational corporations shifted their operations from developed countries to developing countries due to various factors such as cheap labour, abundant raw materials, and new

markets. The result of this shift in production has been an increase in the development of the host countries through capital and technology transfer from the developed economies, with the multinational corporations serving as the transmission belt between the two worlds.

This section has reviewed many of the dominant works that attempt to provide a global context to the underlying structure of international relations through the prism of dominance and dependency. Within this useful dichotomy, each theoretical variation has been explored in an attempt to provide a broader canvass on which to locate the case of EU-Thai relations. While these macro-theories are not directly utilised to explain the EU-Thai political and military case-study, they do help inform the international context within which these relations take place: to have ignored their conceptual relevance would detract from the contextual credibility of the thesis. In addition, the macro-level context of these theories do not offer sufficient micro-level utility needed for a focus on EU-Thai military relations.

IV. Values, Images, Principles and European Union Identity

The conceptual approach involving values, images, and principles (VIPs) – briefly introduced already in Chapter 1 - posits that these three elements shape the EU's relations with the rest of the world through its foreign policy. The work of Lucarelli and Manners represents the core of this approach (notwithstanding the contributions from Whitman and others) and their contribution is discussed as a starting point before the approach is then adapted to the thesis's theoretical framework. VIPs are utilized to examine how these elements shape and influence the EU-Thailand relationship.

Writing more than a decade ago, Lucarelli and Manners claimed that:

the EU is increasingly presented as an international actor with a principled behaviour in foreign policy....Furthermore, this image is reinforced by examples of foreign policy that seem to point in the direction of a novel international actor that behaves according to a set of dynamic, yet identifiable values, principles, and images of the world (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p.2).

The authors argued that values, images, and principles determine the EU's role in world politics. Their studies focus on the relationship between European values and EU foreign policy and they have proposed that the analysis of EU foreign policy should not be divided between the different pillars of the EU and between the EU and Member States' foreign policy, but rather it should be conducted in a more holistic approach. In other words, EU foreign policy should be analysed as "the political actions that are regarded by external actors as 'EU' actions and that can be considered the output of the Union's multilevel system of governance in foreign policy – EU FP" (p.9).

The authors defined VIPs in the following ways. *Values* are the:

notions laden with an absolute (i.e. non-instrumental) positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give our world...An understanding of the relationship between different values, the interpretation which is given to them and their actual translation into principles of action, is crucial to the analysis of common identification around a certain set of values (p.10).

Images of the world are:

the pictures we have, based on our experiences and cultural traditions between the physical and social worlds...Images of the world provide the cognitive frame within which values are defined and translated into principles and political action (p.10).

Finally, *principles* are the:

"normative propositions that translate values into general 'constitutional' standards for policy actions...Our focus on principles allows us to understand how constructed EU values are turned into principles of action (p.10).

Lucarelli and Manners posited that values are not directly transformed into principles and then principles directly into policy. The key thing, they stress, is to examine the relationship *between* values, images and principles, and EU foreign policy. They went on to define political identity as "the set of social and political values and principles that Europeans recognise as theirs and give sense to their feeling to the same political identity" (p.13). However, they argued that these values and principles do not by themselves shape identity but must be interpreted by the

framework of culture, history, legal practices and institutions. Importantly, "through EU foreign policy, the existence of an EU political community – with its values and principles – is made clearer to EU citizens and to the rest of the world" (p.13).

Indeed, they have contended that "the EU's relations with the rest of the 'wider world' are self-evidently informed by a series of values, images and principles which are not unimportant" (p.19) and that these values and principles "constitute the EU as 'hybrid polity'" (p.19). They identified five general European perspectives which distinguish Europe from the rest of the world: economic solidarity; social solidarity; sustainable development; sustainable peace; and cosmopolitan supranationality. They asserted that these perspectives have provided the cultural context in which European values and principles can be identified. From these they then proposed nine distinctly European values and principles: sustainable peace, social liberty, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance. The authors, using the values and principles that they had identified, then discussed how different EU images are created and how they constitute the EU as a hybrid polity. However, Lucarelli and Manners warn that "it maybe that any claims to the uniqueness (and potential superiority) of European values run the risk of ending up as a vacuous and meaningless as the 'Asian values' debate" (p.20).

In their article, the two authors argued that 'solidarity' could be viewed in both economic and political terms. Economic solidarity was premised on "the belief in a social market economy characterised by income redistribution, government intervention, and stakeholder capitalism", from which they concluded "Europeans relate their high levels of development to the achievement of economic solidarity; they value their low levels of inequality because they believe them integral to their high levels of development..." (p.21). Social solidarity was reflected in the European social system which has "high level of spending, broad social programmes, and considerable employment protection" as well as "a solidaristic wage policy, detailed social security provisions, and good social investment in human and social infrastructure capital" (p.23). They argued that "this sharing

of beliefs about education, health, and social welfare contributes to Europe seemingly noticeably different to much of the world" (p.23).

Sustainability was also viewed in two ways: environmental and peace. Environmentally, Lucarelli and Manners argued that Europeans are committed to 'sustainable development', which they described as "an attempt to reconcile economic growth with protection of the environments in both the short and long term" (p.24). This process includes for the EU "the mainstreaming of environmental issues into economic, development, and social policies as well as legal commitments to the precautionary principle" (p.24). 'Sustainable peace' characterises the security perspective of the EU and involves "addressing the structural causes of conflict through extensive development aid policies and support for bottom-up, local, development programmes that tackle the roots of inequality such as health, education, and infrastructure" (p.26). However, the EU also spends a considerable amount of its budget on more traditional defence activities such as military research, technology, peace keeping missions through CSDP, UN and NATO activities. The authors contend that:

Europeans believe in contributing to extensive development aid programmes and maintaining relatively high levels of military preparedness at the same time because of historical experiences of addressing the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict; they value participating in UN peace keeping missions as integral to their internationalist commitment (p.28).

Finally, turning to cosmopolitical supranationality - "the belief in multi-layered politics shaped by a vibrant international civil society, more equal rights for women, the pooling of sovereignty, and supranational law" (p.28). The authors asserted that:

Europeans enjoy dense and active international civil societies partially because of their relatively internationalised public spheres; they value higher levels of women's empowerment integral to their higher levels of development...and they believe in actively participating in cosmopolitan international law (p.30).

Having identified these five European perspectives, which according to the authors "constitute the cultural context within which EU relations with the rest of the world are conducted" (p.31),

they then identified nine European values and principles which they argued “are constitutive of the EU as a hybrid polity and as part of its international identity in world politics” (p.32).

Sustainable Peace - The EU has promoted this value by “addressing the roots or causes of the conflict”: EU policies that promote sustainable peace include “interregional cooperation, political dialogue, and enlargement” (p.33) as well as civilian and military peacekeeping missions.

Liberty - This value of “freedom within a social context” is an EU founding principle as “liberty within the EU operates within a distinctive socio-legal context” (p.33), meaning that liberty has to coincide with other European values such as, *inter alia*, human rights and democracy.

Democracy - The EU has always been a strong advocate of democracy and has made it a prerequisite in its external relations, such as conditionality clauses in membership applications and development aid. Such a consensual democracy “is the operating principle within the majority of EU Member States and includes proportional representation electoral systems, coalition governments, and power sharing amongst parties” (p.34).

Human Rights - The importance of human rights for the EU can be seen in a series of international agreements since 1973 and the conditionality clauses on enlargement and development policies. The EU advocates associative human rights which “emphasise the interdependence between individual rights such as freedom of expression and collective rights such as the right of association” (p.35).

Rule of Law - This value underpins “the stability and success of the other liberal-democratic values of liberty, democracy, and human rights” (p. 35). Lucarelli and Manners argued that the “EU interpretation of this value is the principle of supranational rule of law” (p. 35).

Equality – Defined as “the legal prohibition of discrimination together with proactive policies to promote equality” (p.35), Manners and Lucarelli asserted that “the particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of a more inclusive, open ended and uninhibited understanding of which groups are particularly subject to discrimination” (p.36).

Social Solidarity - For Manners and Lucarelli this means “the promotion of social economy, the social partnership, and social justice within the EU, and in relations with the developing world” (p.36).

Sustainable Development - Manners and Lucarelli argued that the EU faces the dual problems of “a balance between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis” (p.37) while at the same time integrating the principle of sustainable development into EU policies. The EU promotes this value to the outside world through its enlargement, development, trade, environment, and foreign policies.

Good Governance – For Lucarelli and Manners this refers to “the provision of open, participatory and democratic governance without creating hierarchical, exclusionary and centralised government” and asserted that the EU promotes “transparency and accountability” (p.37) through the participation of civil society and strengthening of multilateral cooperation.

Of course, these VIP assumptions have not gone unchallenged, largely on the basis that they constitute little more than Euro-centric perspectives. Whether these criticisms are valid or not is not the central concern of this thesis, but rather how these self-identified European attributes influence external relations is. To what extent are they reflected in EU-Thai relations?


III. Applying the Theoretical Framework

From the above discussion, EU-Thai relations can be conceptualised as described in the Figure 2.1 and presented through the elements of the three conceptual perspectives of Multilevel governance

(MLG), complex interdependence (CI) and Values, Images and Principles (VIPs) as outlined in Table 2.1.

In addressing the main objective of this thesis - to investigate the impact of EU 2004/7 enlargement on EU-Thailand political and military relations - in this section, a theoretical framework is constructed by combining three specific models which have been discussed above: multi-level governance, the concept of values, and complex interdependence. Multi-level governance provides an understanding of the policy-making process of the EU and its principle claim is that decision-making power at European level is shared between Member States and EU institutions – the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court – as well as other non-state actors like interest and lobby groups and regional political bodies. The concept of values is utilised in the theoretical framework to explain the roles of values and principles in shaping EU policies, especially its foreign policies. Finally, complex interdependence is applied in the framework to conceptualise the characteristics of EU-Thailand relations. The model posits that states are connected through a number of channels and that various actors from these channels participate in international politics and it also stresses the importance of international organisations in international political arena. This thesis contends that these models represent the essential elements of EU-Thai relations and by examining these elements, the impacts of the Union's 2004 enlargement on the political and military/security relationship can be better identified.

Figure 2.1: Impact of 2004 Enlargement on EU-Thai Relations



EU Policy-Making Process and Multi-level Governance

The framework utilises “multi-level governance” to conceptualise the policy-making process of the EU. The core argument of the model is that “authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, national, and supranational” (Marks et al, 1996a, 342). States lose some degree of authority in the EU policy-making process because of their collective decisions and the independent roles of EU institutions. The practice of the qualified majority voting system over a range of issues in the Council, Marks argues, has led to a loss of the individual state executive’s control in EU decision-making. The independent role of EU institutions – the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court in policy-making is also stressed by the model. The MLG model also argues that political arenas are interconnected, thus allowing actors from different levels of political arenas – subnational, national, and supranational - to participate in EU politics.

Table 2.1: Assumptions of Conceptual Approaches: MLG, CI, VIP

Multilevel Governance MLG	Complex Interdependence CI	Values, Images, Principles VIPs
Assumptions	Assumptions	Assumptions
Decision-making powers are shared by actors at different levels	Multiple channels /actors connect societies (interstate, trans-governmental, and transnational)	<i>European Perspectives:</i> Economic solidarity Social solidarity Sustainable development Sustainable peace Cosmopolitical supranationality
Collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual state executives to EU institutions	Multiple issues on international agendas with no hierarchy; linkage strategies and agenda setting	<i>European Values and Principles:</i> Sustainable peace Social liberty Consensual democracy Associative human rights Supranational rule of law Inclusive equality Social solidarity Sustainable development. Good governance
Political arenas are interconnected rather than nested and actors from different levels are able to operate in both national and supranational arenas	Minor role of military force and role of International organisations	<i>EU Images</i> Cosmopolitan – Solidarist Supranational - Unionist State - Pluralist

The important question here is, assuming that MLG does in fact characterise the EU policy-making process, how then would enlargement affect both that process itself, and the EU's policies toward Thailand? Using the assumptions put forward by the model, enlargement would arguably affect the EU policy-making process by introducing actors from the national and subnational levels from the new Member States. In addition to these additional national governments participating in the Council of Ministers, there are actors from these new members in the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court. Subnational actors such as domestic interest groups from the new members will participate in European politics, attempting to get their demands heard. However, because of the independent role of EU institutions and collective decision-making of the EU, the new Member States will be unlikely to get their interests fully realised in EU politics. Instead it will be a "win some and lose some" situation, a not unfamiliar tendency in interstate bargaining and inter-institutional negotiation. The European Commission plays a very important role in the day-to-day function of the EU, however enlargement would be unlikely to affect the general function of the Commission apart from adding to its ranks additional staff from the new members and perhaps the Commission initiatives towards the new Member States. The MLG model argues that "the growing diversity of issues on the Council's agenda, the sheer number of state executive principals and the mistrust that exists among them, and the increased specialization of policy-making" (Marks et al, 1996a, 342) have made the Commission dominant over the Council (at least prior to the Lisbon Treaty), especially when it comes to agenda setting, making compromises, and supervise compliance between Member States.

MLG examines each stage of the policy-making process of the EU and identifies the actors involved in the four stages. Regarding enlargement, it tells us how and where the new actors from new Member States can participate in the four stages of the EU policy-making process: policy initiation, decision-making, implementation, and adjudication.

In the policy initiation stage, enlargement would bring more actors – subnational, national, and supranational – and more agendas into the process. First, the EU institutions – the European

Council, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament – would have greater numbers of actors/officials, all trying to influence the initiatives and get their demands realised. Similarly, the range of interest groups and subnational government authorities would increase in number after enlargement. These actors would also bring their priorities and demands with them and would try to favourably influence policy initiatives through lobbying. However, MLG effectively asserts that the Commission is the key actor influencing the policy initiation phase, accordingly, the general direction of the EU policy agenda should not be affected by enlargement.

In the decision-making stage, although the Council of Ministers is the main legislative body in the EU, MLG argues that “state executive dominance is eroded in the decision-making process by the legislative power of the European Parliament, the role of the European Commission in overcoming transaction problems, and the efforts of interest groups outcomes in the European arena” (Marks et al, 1996a, 361). The model asserts that the practice of QMV in the Council in many policy areas has significantly reduced state sovereignty, even more so since Lisbon. Collective state control has been compromised by the co-operation and co-decision procedure, where the Commission and the Parliament share decision-making power with the Council. Again the model stresses the important role of the Commission in providing its expertise therefore influencing the outcome of the decision. Enlargement would once again introduce new actors from the new members into EU institutions – there will be more ministers in the Council, more MPs in the Parliament, and more officials in the Commission. MLG tells us that the new ministers in the Council would have reduced control over EU policies because of collective decision making and specifically because of the use of QMV in many policy areas. The new Members States’ authority would be further diluted by the co-operation and co-decision procedures. New MEPs from the new Member States would increase the diversity within the EP and these actors would want to influence EU decision-making to their advantage. There will be more officials from the new members in the Commission but due to the independent role of the Commission, it would be unlikely to affect the objectives of the institution. The overall impact of enlargement on the direction of EU policies should then, according to the model of MLG, be insignificant.

In the implementation stage, MLG argues that the formal executive power of the Commission is shared with national governments and interest groups through the practice of comitology – committees composed of national officials, technical experts from interest groups, and academics. However, the Commission has more power when it comes to areas in which it has formal competencies e.g. “competition policy, state aids, agriculture, commercial policy and the internal market” (Marks et al, 1996a, p.367). The Commission has also been increasingly involved in the day-to-day policy implementation thus increasing its contact with national and subnational actors. Enlargement would inject new actors into implementation stage via comitology. These actors may influence the implementation process to a certain degree.

Multi-level governance is highly insightful in the investigation of the impact of EU enlargement on EU-Thai relations because it identifies the important actors involved in EU policy-making process – national government executives, the Commission, the Parliament, the Court, interest groups, and subnational actors. Above all the model stresses the important role of Member States and EU institutions – especially the Commission and the Parliament – in EU policy-making. It also elucidates the four stages of policy-making and identifies which actors are involved in each stage and how they are involved. To investigate the impact of enlargement on EU-Thai relations the actions of these actors must be examined in greater detail.

European Values and EU Foreign Policy

The theoretical framework of the thesis also applies the concept of values, images, and principles (VIPs) to examine the relationship between European values and EU foreign policies toward Thailand. As discussed above, the VIP concepts elucidate “the way in which the EU is constituted as a political entity by the values, images, and principles which shape the discourse and practice of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world” (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p.1). The work of Lucarelli and Manners is utilised in this thesis to investigate the role that VIPs play in shaping EU-Thailand relations by examining EU foreign policies. VIPs can be useful in the investigation of

the impact of EU enlargement on EU-Thai relations by examining the effect of enlargement on European values and principles and the extent to which this might transform EU foreign policies.

The five European perspectives and nine European values and principles identified by Lucarelli and Manners (2006) are utilised to conceptualise the relationship between EU values and principles and EU foreign policy which have a direct or indirect impact on EU-Thai relations. These perspectives and values provide us with a distinctive picture of the EU, what it believes in, and what it promotes. The EU's relations with Thailand can be better understood when these EU perspectives are taken into account.

When one looks at EU-Thailand relationship, these values and principles are visible throughout the history of EU-Thai relations. For example, the legal framework of the EU's relations with Thailand comprises Article 177 of the Treaty establishing the EC, the EU's Asia and Latin America (ALA) Regulation and the 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement. The objectives for Community development co-operation under Article 177 include the "fostering of sustainable economic and social development, smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy, and fight against poverty" (The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, p.4). The article also states that EU policies should "contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and encouraging the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms" (p.4). The ALA Regulation focuses on "strengthening co-operation framework and on making an effective contribution, through institutional dialogue, economic and financial co-operation, to sustainable development, social and economic stability and democracy" (p.4), while the 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement focuses on three areas of co-operation – commercial, economic, and development co-operation – with the objectives of promoting free trade, investment and technological progress, as well as strong economies and social well-being.

The values and principles of the EU can also be seen in the objectives of the core pillars of the ASEM process which are: "regional and global security, trade and investment, socioeconomic issues and regional macro-economic co-operation, consumers dialogue between regions, and educational exchanges" (p.5).

The focus of EU-Thai co-operation in the Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper (2007-2013, p.3) is as follows:

- deepening EU-Thai relations in various areas of strategic importance and mutual interest to both partners, with a particular focus on economic relations, scientific and technology co-operations as well as higher education and culture exchange;
- addressing specific capacity constraints crucial to advancing Thailand's national development agenda;
- advancing co-operation on a more modern agenda including good governance, justice and home affairs issues, human rights and mine action; and,
- increasing mutual awareness between Europe and Thailand.

The four key themes of the EU-Thailand co-operation demonstrate both directly and indirectly the promotion of EU values and principles – sustainable peace, sustainable development, social solidarity, good governance, rule of law, and human rights. The cross-cutting issues section of the strategy paper also have the objective of promoting gender equality by "increasing the participation of women in economic decision-making at local levels, as well as in regional and international conferences, workshops, and exchange programmes..."(p.19). The paper calls for the strengthening of the "social dimension of globalisation...and the promotion of employment and decent work for all...When promoting trade and investment, due consideration will be given to their impact on employment and social cohesion" (p.19). Environment and natural resources management is also stressed by the EU as another important issue in EU-Thai co-operation which clearly demonstrates the EU principle of "sustainable development". In addition, the paper calls for the improvement of "the understanding and raising awareness of European best practice with regard to good governance and human rights among government officials and decision-makers..."

(p.19). This, once again, clearly demonstrates the articulation and promotion of the principles of good governance and human rights by the EU.

The Strategy Paper also clearly states that the Commission intends to pursue “thematic interventions” in its Thai relations, in the following areas: democracy and human rights, human and social development, migration and asylum, the environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy, and non-state actors development. Regarding the EU’s development policy, the paper insists that EU-Thai development co-operation should focus on “developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (p.21).

The 2003 New Partnership for South East Asia Communication seeks to enhance co-operation with ASEAN member countries by offering a bilateral partnership and co-operation agreement with the objectives of deepening co-operation on “the fight against international organised crime and terrorism, good governance, justice home affairs issues and human rights” (p.21). The EU and Thailand have been negotiating the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement but due to the Thai coup in September 2006, the process was suspended until a new democratically elected government resumed office – an EU action that clearly demonstrates its ardent belief in democracy, social liberty, human rights, good governance, and rule of law.

Thus, it can clearly be seen that values and principles play a vital role in shaping the EU’s policies toward Thailand which, in turn, shape the broader EU-Thai relationship. The EU incorporates its core values and principles into nearly every aspect of its foreign policies, as demonstrated above in the Thai case. Values and principles concept can therefore be useful in the investigation of the impact of the 2004 enlargement on EU-Thai relations by providing a context in which the impact of enlargement on EU values and principles can be carried out. Consequently, this thesis questions how enlargement has affected EU values and principles and the implications of those effects for Thailand.

Characteristics of EU-Thai relations: Complex Interdependence

The final part of this thesis' conceptual framework applies the complex interdependence model to conceptualise the characteristics of EU-Thailand relations because the model provides a useful insight into the relationship in the context of the contemporary international system. As discussed earlier in the chapter, complex interdependence has three main characteristics for the international system: multiple channels connecting societies; an absence of hierarchy among issues; and the minor role of military force. These characteristics have certain implications for the political processes in world politics which include linkage strategies, agenda control, and coalition building.

The assumption of complex interdependence that multiple channels connect societies provides a useful basis for understanding the EU-Thai relations. The EU and Thailand are connected through various networks and in these networks a range of state and non-state actors. As has been seen, based on the work of Hocking and Smith (1990), there are five basic types of networks in world politics: subnational networks; transnational networks; governmental networks; intergovernmental networks; and supranational networks. This thesis demonstrates that these networks operate in the EU-Thai relations and are important in determining the nature of the relationship. The model asserts that actors can form coalitions with other actors from different states thus making them more influential in the global political bargaining process. These actors also function as transmission belts between different states which make states more interdependent on one another.

Complex interdependence asserts that there is no hierarchy of issues in world politics, and that military and security issues no longer dominate the international agenda. Other issues that were traditionally classified as "low politics" such as economic and environmental issues, have become vital to world politics. Again, this characteristic of complex interdependence is clearly visible in EU-Thai relations. The EU-Thailand relationship is dominated by trade and economic issues: the EU is one of Thailand's biggest trading partners together with the USA, ASEAN, and

Japan. Trade with the EU represented 15 % of Thailand's total trade in the year 2000, where 74 % of Thai exports to the EU receive benefits from the GS) scheme. The EU-Thailand Country Strategy Paper noted that "[t]he period of 1994 to 1999 has shown Thailand rapidly evolving from the status of aid recipient to that of economic partner" (2002, p.15). The framework of the EC-Thai co-operation has shifted:

from development aid to economic co-operation, and increasingly to specific sectors such as environment and fisheries, as well as to projects in the areas of social policies, promotion of small and medium sized enterprises and human resource development (p.15).

The third characteristic of complex interdependence is the minor role of military force as an instrument of policy. The model argues that "force is often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important" (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.32). This characteristic of complex interdependence is clearly visible in EU-Thai relations. There is no place for the use of military force between the two parties and other factors in lieu of military power have to be utilised to assert influence in the political bargaining process. However, this approach does not preclude military cooperation as an aspect of the complex relationship and here the AMM joint initiative is particularly illuminating.

Complex interdependence contends that the use of linkage strategies in world politics will become increasingly difficult because the distribution of power, the political processes, and the actors involved are different on different issues. A state that is strong in one issue may be weak in other issues and therefore will find it problematic to use its strength on one issue to control the outcome of the issue in which it is weak. Complex interdependence focuses on the process of agenda formation in international politics and the model argues that this agenda will be "affected by the international and domestic problems created by economic growth and increasing sensitivity interdependence" (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.32). The agenda will be influenced by actors, both state and non-state, from different types of networks both at home and abroad. The implication of this process for the EU-Thai relationship is the fact that both state and non-state actors from

different types of networks will influence the EU-Thai agenda. It also implies that the agenda will reflect the domestic and international issues of both the EU and Thailand.

Another important issue that the complex interdependence model raises is the impact of transnational and transgovernmental relations on international relations. Complex interdependence argues that actors from various networks can form coalitions beyond national boundaries and try to influence the political bargaining process in various political arenas. The relevance of this process to EU-Thai relations is that transnational and transgovernmental relations do influence the nature of the relationship between the EU and Thailand. Transnational and transgovernmental actors of the EU and Thailand may form coalitions and try to influence the policy making process to achieve their common goals. In order to fully understand EU-Thai relations, complex interdependence asserts that different types of networks and actors cannot be neglected.

Finally, complex interdependence also emphasises the important functions of international organisations in international politics. They play many important roles in international relations including promoting international cooperation, assisting in setting international agenda, and serve as political arenas for actors to interact. In particular, it can be argued that EU-Thai relations have been influenced by international organisations such as the WTO and the UN. The Doha Development Agenda has influenced the EC cooperation strategy with Thailand with the focal areas of cooperation including technical assistance and capacities building activities in trade, investment, related areas for sustained cooperation, and public health and health services.

Having established a clear theoretical foundation within which the thesis can be located, the following chapter turns attention to the empirical aspects of the research questions by first examining the broader context of EU-ASEAN relations within which EU-Thailand relations operate.

Chapter 3: The ASEAN Context

In order to fully explore EU-Thailand political and military relations, it is also necessary to understand the broader political and security cooperation with ASEAN. As one of the oldest regional organizations in the world ASEAN has progressively grown in membership and in areas of cooperation. A detailed descriptive account of four decades of ASEAN political and security cooperation building can be found in Appendix C. By way of introduction a short examination is given on the origins of ASEAN in relation to the political and security dimensions before this chapter focuses extensively on the evolution, implications and the prospects for political and security cooperation specifically in EU-ASEAN relations. This review of developments within ASEAN up to the time of the EU E/CSDP mission in Aceh can be viewed as being rich on rhetoric and aspirations, yet perhaps frustratingly modest when it came to effective implementation and the shaping of ASEAN identity. However, this contextualisation is important for the focus of the thesis: in parallel to EU enlargement and the foreign policy innovations found in the Single Act, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, ASEAN was also tentatively building its political and military capacity. These endeavours helped to support the first and to date only EU-ASEAN collaboration, the AMM mission. This optimism was underlined by the 2004 enlargement process which gave support to this innovative EU CSDP approach. Timing is often a crucial factor in explaining policy implementation: 2004 set the perfect scenario for this expansion of EU foreign policy to SE Asia. Both ASEAN and the EU were ripe for experimentation.

On 8 August 1967, Adam Malik (the Foreign Affairs Minister of Indonesia), Narciso R. Ramos (the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines), Tun Abdul Razak (the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia), S. Rajaratnam (the Foreign Affairs Minister of Singapore), and Thanat Khoman (the Foreign Affairs Minister of Thailand) met in Bangkok and signed the ASEAN Declaration (also known as the Bangkok Declaration) which gave birth to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The motivation behind this radical idea was perhaps best captured by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia:

We the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia must get together and form by ourselves a new perspective and a new framework for our region. It is important that individually and jointly we should create a deep awareness that we cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together by ties of friendship and goodwill and imbued with our own ideas and aspirations and determined to shape our own destiny...with the establishment of ASEAN, we have taken a firm and a bold step on that road

Speech given by His Excellency Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, at the inaugural session of ASEAN in Bangkok, Thailand, August 1967.

The Declaration was only two pages long and contained five articles which established the foundations of ASEAN. Article 1 declared the establishment of an "Association for Regional Cooperation" between the countries of Southeast Asia to be known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Articles 2 stipulated the aims and purposes of ASEAN as follows:

- to accelerate economic growth, social progress, cultural development through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership;
- to promote regional peace and stability through the respect of justice, the rule of law and the UN Charter;
- to promote cooperation and assistance in the fields of economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administration;
- to promote cooperation in agriculture and industries, trade expansion, transportation and communication, and the raising of the living standards of their citizens;
- to promote South-East Asian studies; and,
- to maintain and enhance cooperation with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

Article 3 of the ASEAN foundation treaty outlined the machinery to be created in order to carry out the aims and purposes mentioned above and this included: the annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers - the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM – note the unintended confusion with the subsequent acronym for the Aceh Monitoring Mission); a standing committee to carry on the work of ASEAN between AMMs; *ad-hoc* committees and permanent committees of specialists and officials in specific areas; and a National Secretariat in each member country.

Article 4 stipulated that ASEAN was to be “open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region” that believe in the aims and purposes of the Association, while Article 5 stated that ASEAN “represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessing of peace, freedom and prosperity”.

Thanat Khoman, one of the architects of ASEAN, argued that the creation of ASEAN represented “the culmination of the decolonization process that had started after World War II” (1992, p.1). Europeans began their colonisation of Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century to expand their territory and further their strategic and trading interests. The European colonial powers “sought to gain taxes, and to impose legal, educational and local authority structures in line with their national interests” (Gilson, 2002, p.33). The first to engage in the region were Spain and Portugal who were followed by Britain, France and the Netherlands. Britain through the East India Company colonised India, Singapore, Burma, Malaysia and coastal parts of China. The Netherlands, through the Dutch East India Company, gained control over Indonesia while France seized large parts of Indochina including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Philippines was colonised twice; first by Spain and then by the United States. Siam, or Thailand, remained the only independent country in Southeast Asia although it had to bear a considerable loss of land and capital to the British and the French. At the end of the nineteenth century, Japan began its own path of colonisation in Asia by invading China in 1895 and occupying Taiwan (then known as the island of Formosa), and annexing Korea in 1910. However, it was not until 1941 that Japan began to advance its colonial influence into East Asia and the Pacific. After the end of World War II and Japan’s surrender in 1945, the fate of Asian countries was left to the superpowers – China, the US, and the Soviet Union. This period marked the beginning of the Cold War, the ending of European colonialism in Asia, and the beginning of co-operation between Southeast Asian countries.

The decolonisation process in Asia began as soon as World War II came to an end. The Europeans began almost immediately to lose control over their Asian colonies. The Japanese, in their defeat, granted autonomy or independence to the countries in the region that they had invaded, which seriously undermined the attempts by the European powers to retain control over their own colonies. The decolonisation process "advanced at a fast pace and led to the emergence of a number of independent and sovereign nations...this created an entirely novel situation which necessitated new measures and structures" (Khoman, 1992, p.1). At this time, the region needed to promote regional co-operation and Khoman has identified several reasons for this: power vacuum, proximity, political of scale, and common interests. He argued that the most important factor prompting regional cooperation was the emergence of a power vacuum in the region, directly resulting from the decolonisation process. Southeast Asian countries feared that other foreign powers would step in and take advantage of their situation which would leave them in an even weaker position. The proximity of the future members of ASEAN was another reason identified by Khoman. Having learnt from the failure of SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation), the Southeast Asian nations realised that an organisation is more effective and has a greater chance of survival when members are geographically closer to one another and share similar interests. Another reason that facilitated regional cooperation for Khoman was that the Southeast Asian countries wanted to strengthen their positions in the international arena and protect themselves against foreign influence. Finally, Khoman asserted that "it is common knowledge that co-operation and ultimately integration serve the interests of all – something that individual efforts can never achieve" (1992, p.2).

Decolonisation in Southeast Asia also prompted territorial disputes between the countries in the region. When Britain withdrew from its colonies in Southeast Asia in 1962, it granted the jurisdiction of North Borneo (later known as Sabah) and Sarawak to the federation of Malaya which became modern day Malaysia (Khoman, 1992). This event initiated the legacy of the "Sabah Dispute" and *Konfrontasi* between Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Indonesia, under the leadership of President Sukarno, was strongly opposed Malaysia having this territorial power

because he viewed it as a British attempt to sustain its domination in the region through Malaysia, which the President believed would threaten Indonesia's independence (Jones, 2002). In 1963, Sukarno launched *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia which involved sending troops into Sabah and Sarawak. The Philippines, using an historical justification, claimed that Sabah was part of their country and demanded the right to its jurisdiction. The Philippines then broke off all diplomatic relations with Malaysia thus inflaming the already critical situation between the three countries and in the region as a whole. Britain and Australia were drawn into the conflict through a request from Malaysia. The violence spread to the newly independent Singapore and only after a *coup* in Indonesia in 1965 during which President Sukarno was replaced by General Suharto did the *Konfrontasi* campaign end. In August 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace treaty and the conflict between the two states officially ended.

Strong leadership during this period played an important role in driving forward cooperation between the countries that would become ASEAN members. During this period, national leaders "launched a simultaneous, if not consciously, attack on everything that colonialism had represented" (Gilson, 2002, p.38). Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Prime Minister in the early 1970s, began to move away from Britain by forging security ties with other countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. He believed regional cooperation to be the key to lessening external influences in the region. Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Razak's successor, followed the same path by promoting regional cooperation, a treaty of non-aggression, and a non-intervention policy (Gilson, 2002).

Rajaratnam, one of the founding fathers of ASEAN, asserted that "ASEAN was born on 8 August 1967 out of fear rather than idealistic convictions about regionalism" (1992, p.3). Phatharodom argued that "the creation of ASEAN was a political act born out of the desire of the Member States to reduce intra-regional tensions and to demonstrate determination against Communist infiltration, and out of fear of superpower intentions in the region" (1998, p.237). During the 1960s, intra-regional tension in Southeast Asia was heightened due to the spread of

Communism and territorial disputes between countries in the region resulting from decolonisation. After the first Indochina War ended in 1954 and the French had finally left Indochina, independence was granted to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Vietnam was divided into the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and the anti-communist Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) under the control of Ngo Dinh Diem. Unsurprisingly, the situation between the two countries replicated the characteristics of the Cold War in Europe. North Vietnam was backed by China and the Soviet Union while South Vietnam was supported by the USA. In 1956 tensions between the two countries escalated as Ho Chi Minh infiltrated South Vietnam, starting an "armed propaganda" campaign which included kidnappings and terrorist attacks on government officials. In 1960, Ho Chi Minh established the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) with the goal of overthrowing the government of the south. The Vietnam War officially began when the North Vietnamese attacked two US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin on 2 August 1964. The US retaliated with air strikes on North Vietnam and on 8 March 1965, deployed 3500 marines to South Vietnam. The cornerstone of the American intervention in Vietnam was the "domino theory" which claimed that if South Vietnam fell to Communism, the whole of Southeast Asia would follow. This justification led to a decade of US engagement in Vietnam.

It was against this historical and political background that ASEAN was created. Chirativat has argued that:

ASEAN was not designed at its origin to launch any exercises for regional integration among the member countries, it evolved with the process of the Cold War in Southeast Asia...the first major aim of the ASEAN group was then to bring peace and prosperity to the region (1997, p.208).

The culmination of the Cold War was the catalyst for cooperation between ASEAN members to secure peace and democracy against Communism and other outside influences in the region (see Appendix C).

(i) EU-ASEAN Political and Security Relations

“We can be proud of the way the EU-ASEAN relationship has developed in the last twenty five years. Our cooperation is not simply a political or economic arrangement – it has an important human dimension. Last year’s tragic Tsunami served to demonstrate an instinctive feeling of solidarity between our people. Cooperation in the humanitarian and reconstruction work between the EU and ASEAN states as well as in the Aceh peace process shows how much potential this partnership has. In the next 25 years we can much more together.”

(European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 9 December 2007)

“We reiterated that the dynamic and diverse cooperation with our Dialogue Partners have played a crucial role in facilitating our integration efforts and the narrowing of development gaps. We welcomed our Dialogue Partners’ vigorous engagement with ASEAN and encourage them to further deepen and broaden cooperation to achieve a stable, prosperous and outward-looking region.”

(Chairman’s Statement of the 13th ASEAN Summit, Singapore, 20 November 2007, p.4).

Official statements can be reliable indicators of the state of relations: in this context it would appear that the EU-ASEAN partnership has been valued by both sides and expected to continue to deliver effective policy initiatives. This section builds on the ASEAN theme addressed already in this Chapter, but with a narrowed focus: the nature of the specific EU-ASEAN relationship in political and security spheres. The section also considers the historical evolution of EU-ASEAN relations and the contemporary issues vital to both regions.

One of the primary reasons for ASEAN’s establishment of formal relations in the late 1970s with the EU was because of growing trade protectionist policies of the EU. An important milestone in EU-ASEAN relations occurred when the then German Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed to his ASEAN counterpart, Dr Upadit Panchariyangkun establishing a regular ministerial meeting between the EU and ASEAN. This initiative meant that in 1972 Europe became “the first dialogue partner to establish informal relations with ASEAN ... through the Special Coordinating

Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN).” (ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN-European Union Dialogue). By May 1975, an ASEAN-EEC Joint Study Group (JSG) had been formed to explore collaborative endeavours between the two regions and in September 1978 an inaugural ASEAN-EEC Ministerial Meeting was convened in Brussels.

Prior to the 1990s the EU had few formalised relations in Asia; its main focus instead was on the ACP. During the 1950s, Asia was viewed by the EU as a “less appealing partner than Africa or Latin America. It was geographically remote, generally poor, comparatively diverse, and regarded as a less reliable source of supplies for raw materials needed by Europe (if largely because of the Cold-War context of Soviet and Chinese regional influence)” (Holland, 2002, p.59-60). British dominance in the region during this period, through the Commonwealth, was another strong factor that discouraged the EU from including Asia as a major part of its international network. With limited resources and limited scope of foreign policy the EU could really only afford to maintain ties with Africa. By the time of UK membership in 1973, Asia had developed sufficiently to become a competitor to Europe. As a result, no country in the region was allowed to join the Lomé Convention, and “this missed opportunity essentially confined Asian-EU relations to the lowest of priorities for the next two decades” (p.60).

1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement

Building on what had previously been rather haphazard interactions, the EU-ASEAN economic relationship was formalised in 1980 when the two parties signed the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement during the 2nd ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The 1980 agreement:

put an emphasis on commercial co-operation, granting the most-favoured nation treatment to parties on a reciprocal basis and setting out their commitment to overcome trade barriers; economic co-operation, encouraging closer links through investment and technological progress; and development co-operation, contributing to economic resilience and social well-being. (Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, Annex 1, p.21).

The agreement also established a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) to monitor EU-ASEAN cooperation. Despite the relatively strong rhetoric of the Agreement, it has been argued that it in fact brought little change to EU-ASEAN cooperation. It is interesting to note the fact that there was no parallel EU-ASEAN political cooperation established at this stage in relations.

Perhaps this absence was a result of ASEAN lacking the "maturity" in the early years of its inception to function as an organisation, and so consequently, EU-ASEAN relations were not as extensive as they might have been. As the previous chapter noted, ASEAN was formed for political and security reasons, Communism was spreading in the region whilst territorial disputes between neighbouring countries were plaguing Southeast Asia in particular. ASEAN members were preoccupied with solving these problems, and developing relations with the EU – itself still very much only a burgeoning political power – was not viewed as a priority. Regarding trade, ASEAN countries were more dependent on markets in the USA, the UK and Japan than on the common European market (Vimolvan, 1999). Because of these factors, it was argued that ASEAN did not have an official EU policy from 1967-1972 (Vimolvan, 1999). During the same period, the EU was more concerned with the Cold War and the ACP (as discussed above) and saw little urgency to strengthen its ties with ASEAN. The colonial ties between Members States and ASEAN countries were disrupted in the decades following the end of World War II leaving the region largely under the influence of the USA, Russia, and China. However, the entry of the UK into the Community in 1973 saw a beginning of formal EU-ASEAN relations - ASEAN members who were part of the Commonwealth were particularly concerned with the possibility of losing trade preferences and market access to the UK market after its accession. As a result, in 1972 ASEAN created SCCAN to deal with access for ASEAN exports into the EU and to apply for the GSP scheme. The ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) was created by ASEAN to assist SCCAN on EU-ASEAN matters. Although SCCAN and the ABC did not achieve any substantial results, these mechanisms, "...allowed for the beginning of an institutionalized dialogue between ASEAN and the EC and made the EC become ASEAN's first 'dialogue partner'..." (Vimolvan, 1999, p.238).

The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 led to enhanced cooperation among ASEAN members due to a fear of the spread of Communism. ASEAN leaders, during the Kuala Lumpur Summit in 1977, declared that they would increase cooperation in foreign policies and enhance cooperation with foreign partners including the EU (Vimolvan, 1999). ASEAN leaders believed that by enhancing relations with the EU, it would establish ASEAN's status as an international actor and that the EU could become another power in the region to counter balance other actors.

Economic progress in the ASEAN countries has been argued by Vimolvan to be another factor that drove EU-ASEAN relations forward. In the 1970s, ASEAN countries became more industrialised and export-oriented, the European market was attractive and served as an alternative destination to the USA and Japan for ASEAN products. The granting of GSP to ASEAN members encouraged more exports into the EU and further strengthened EU-ASEAN trade relations. More generally, the EU supported the idea of regionalism as manifested in ASEAN, believing that it would end intra-regional conflicts and create economic prosperity in the Asian region. By establishing EU-ASEAN relations, the EU hoped to strengthen cooperation in ASEAN and across Southeast Asia. At the same time, the EU wanted to establish its role as an effective international actor and to increase its presence in the region in order to compete with the USA and Japan.

The EC-ASEAN JSG, comprising Commission and ASEAN government officials, was established in 1975 with the objective of enhancing cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. During the third JSG meeting in Brussels in 1977, both parties agreed to establish regular meetings between COREPER and ABC to enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation. In 1978, the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) was established and its first meeting was held in Brussels in November that year. AEMM is the most senior dialogue process between the EU and ASEAN and is held every 18 months (alternating between Europe and ASEAN venues). In 1979, the first European Commission Delegation in Asia was established in Bangkok, demonstrating the considerable development in EU-ASEAN relations at that time.

Wiessala has argued that ASEAN cooperation has evolved from "political necessity" to "economic prosperity and political dynamism" largely as a result of "the end of Cold War, the Maastricht Treaty, the emerging CFSP and the EC Single Market" (2001, p.61). The EU was thus part of the catalyst for ASEAN's transformation. Historically, most of the ASEAN members, with the exception of Thailand, were European colonies and as such, Europe-Asian ties have a historical heritage. However, in the early stage of the relationship, Asia "was pushed aside because of [its] size and potential financial burdens" (Wiessala, 2002, p.18). Wiessala also correctly asserted that EU-Asia relations were strengthened by the development of the wider external competencies of the EU such as the CFSP, globalisation, and the economic conditions of Asia. Further, and perceptively, Wiessala argued that EU-ASEAN relations have shifted from a donor-recipient paradigm where the EU mainly provided development aid to ASEAN members, to a more equal partnership status focussing on a much wider remit of economic, political, security and cultural cooperation.

Rüland has suggested that "the first initiative for developing ASEAN-EU relations came from ASEAN. It was basically a response to economic changes in Europe and shifts in the Asian power equation." (2001, p.9). Singapore and Malaysia feared that they would lose trade preferences and access to the British market after UK accession and so demanded an official EU-ASEAN dialogue to help counter this. The 1973 accession, together with the collapse of the Bretton Wood system and the two oil crises of the 1970s, resulted in increased protectionism in the EU prompting greater concern from ASEAN members. In addition, as noted already, ASEAN wanted to balance American and Japanese economic presence in the region during this period. ASEAN's economic objectives at the beginning of EU-ASEAN relationship concerned market access, a price stabilisation scheme for agricultural products, European investment in the region, technology transfer, and development aid (Rüland, 2001). Rüland also asserted that security concerns were behind ASEAN's need to establish a relationship with the EU, and these were specifically the withdrawal of American forces from the region after the Vietnam War, as well as the growing security threat of Russia and China in Southeast Asia. ASEAN members needed to gain support

from Western Europe. Rüländ argued that "Europe – though hitherto basically an inward-looking player without much actor capacity in the field of foreign relations – was seen as a pivotal partner in this respect." (p.12).

II. ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMM) 1-16

i) 1978-1992: The Initial Phase of Political and Security Relations

The EU and ASEAN held their first ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on 21 November 1978, a significant milestone for the relationship. At that time ASEAN comprised five members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) while the EU had nine Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK). Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the Foreign Affairs Minister of Germany and the President of the Council. At the end of the meeting, the EU and ASEAN declared their common objectives of achieving "world peace, international cooperation and understanding, economic development and social justice" (Joint Declaration of the First ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, 1978, p.2). The EU saw ASEAN as an organisation that was trying to establish peace and stability in the Asian region while both parties stressed the need to develop an ASEAN-EU relationship on the basis of equality and enhanced cooperation with a view to promoting prosperity, social justice and human rights. It can be seen here that both sides stressed the importance of values in their relations and cooperation. On the EU side, the major motivation for the relationship at this stage was promoting peace and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, on the other hand, the emphasis of the meeting was on trade issues, particularly GSP, trade barriers, and market access. Better market access to the European market, improved and permanent GSP status, and the removal of other, lower barriers to trade were requested by ASEAN. GSP was seen by ASEAN members as crucial to the level of economic development in their countries. European investment in ASEAN countries was encouraged by the ministers and both parties agreed to undertake investment promotion actions such as the establishment of the EU-ASEAN trade and investment forum and the encouragement of joint venture collaboration. It is clear from these actions that ASEAN was

trying to balance the level of FDI in the region between Japan, Europe, and the USA. The EU also agreed to undertake initiatives to promote the transfer of technology to ASEAN through training and educational assistance, and an increase in cooperation in science and technology.

Another important theme of the meeting was that of development cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. As a means of promoting development in the region, the EU promised to increase financial support to individual and regional projects including feasibility studies for future projects. Cultural cooperation in the field of education and information also featured in the meeting and the EU declared its intention to open a European Commission Delegation in Bangkok (a decision which demonstrated the new importance with which the EU now viewed EU-ASEAN relations). The ministers also agreed that a formal cooperation agreement between the EU and ASEAN should be explored and established.

During the 2nd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1980) the first ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement was concluded. The agreement represented a historical step by the two partners that was to lead to the intensification of cooperation and relations. Although the cooperation agreement contained no specific provisions regarding EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation, the agreement was significant because it represented the first step in relations which would eventually lead to cooperation between the EU and ASEAN in the fields of politics and security. The focus of EU-ASEAN cooperation as outlined in the 1980 agreement covered MFN (Most-Favoured-Nation) treatment, commercial cooperation, economic cooperation, and development cooperation. The ministers agreed that:

the signing of the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement marks the beginning of a new stage in cooperation between the two organisations and their member states. In affirming their commitment to the principles and to the concrete measures contained in the documents, they confirmed that the Cooperation Agreement is a strong manifestation of the political will of both sides to intensify ASEAN-EC Cooperation.

(ASEAN-EEC Joint Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1980, p.2).

The Agreement has been, and remains, the foundation of EU-ASEAN cooperation. Table 3.1 summarises the key articles of the Agreement.

Table 3.1: Summary of Key Articles of the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement

Article 1	Granted MFN treatment between the EU and ASEAN under the provisions of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
Article 2	Defined Commercial Cooperation between ASEAN and the EU which aims "to promote the development and diversification of their reciprocal commercial exchanges to the highest possible level..."; demolish various other forms of trade barriers (both non-tariff and quasi tariff); and, to cooperate at the international level and improve market access for manufactured, semi-manufactured and primary products
Article 3	Defined Economic Cooperation objectives as: to promote economic ties through mutual investment; encourage technological and scientific progress; establish new supply and new markets; and create employment opportunities. The areas of cooperation included science and technology, energy, environment, transport and communication, agriculture, fisheries, mining, and forestry
Article 4	Defined Development Cooperation and sought to promote development in ASEAN by helping ASEAN achieve self-reliance, economic resilience, and higher living standards. Increased European support for programmes and projects promoting ASEAN development and regional cooperation including food production and supplies, rural sector development, and education and training facilities were committed. The EU agreed to coordinate the Community development programmes and projects with those of its Member States and at the same time promote financial cooperation between the two regions
Article 5	Established the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) to oversee and promote EU-ASEAN cooperation initiatives in order to achieve the objectives of the agreement
Article 8	Stated that the agreement had an initial period of five years and was to be renewed every two years thereafter

The Joint Declaration of the 2nd AEMM clearly stated that the intention of the EU's cooperation with ASEAN in terms of economic development in the region was "to enhance [ASEAN's] role as a corner stone of political stability in Southeast Asia" (1980, p.3). The inclusion of this statement in the Declaration is clear evidence of the EU using economic and development measures to achieve its political goals - that is to create peace and stability in the region. Until this stage in the relationship, political and security relations between the EU and ASEAN had only involved informal discussions on regional and international political and security issues. After the 2nd AEMM, however, ASEAN and the EU released a *Joint Statement on Political Issues*, which represented the first formal political statement between the two organisations. The statement reflected the political and security context of the period, focussing particularly on conflicts in Cambodia and Afghanistan. The joint statement emphasised the principles and values shared by the EU and ASEAN. The ministers "reaffirmed their commitment to world peace, international cooperation and understanding, economic development, social justice and human rights" (Joint Statement on Political Issues, 8 March 1980, p.1). In addition, they agreed that all states should respect "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of states; non-resort to force or use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states" (p.1). The ministers expressed their concern regarding the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and called for the implementation of UN resolutions which included the total withdrawal of the troops from both countries.

The situation in Cambodia and its impact on the Cambodian people was of particular concern to the EU and ASEAN. Both partners believed that peace, stability and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia rested on a political solution of the conflict including the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the rapid establishment of a neutral government in the country. The ministers also called for the countries involved to prevent any spillover of the conflict to neighbouring countries. The EU and ASEAN made an appeal to the Secretary General of the UN to implement the Resolution on Kampuchea (adopted by the General Assembly on 14 November 1979) which included the holding of an international conference on

the issue. The EU supported ASEAN's calls for an increase in the international and UN presence at the Thai-Cambodian border to contain the conflict and to assist the refugees. While the situation was highly volatile, one positive result that emerged from the Cambodian conflict was increased cooperation among ASEAN countries and increased cooperation between ASEAN and non-ASEAN partners including the EU. The ministers of the EU "reaffirmed the intention of the European Community and of its Member States which have contributed to the international efforts to solve the problem – to pursue further their action towards this goal and appealed to other states and organizations to continue their efforts in that direction" (p.3). ASEAN members requested greater assistance from the international community in dealing with the number of refugees which had grown as a result of the Indo-Chinese conflict. They called for larger quotas and the faster resettlement of refugees and also for the parties in Cambodia to assist the UN and other organizations in providing assistance to the refugees.

The EU "reiterated their belief that the unity of ASEAN, especially the present difficult circumstances, is and continues to be an important element in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region" (p.3). The EU ministers welcomed the establishment of ZOPFAN by ASEAN agreeing that it would contribute to peace and stability in the region. ASEAN in turn expressed its appreciation of the constructive role played by the EU in inducing economic and political stability in the region and Third World countries. Through its active participation in dealing with the conflict, the EU had now established itself as a relevant foreign power in the region and helped to create a balance of power in Southeast Asia and the international community more generally.

After the 3rd AEMM, held in London on 13-14 October 1981, the European Commission and ASEAN foreign ministers released a Joint Statement in Brussels the following day. The Commission announced that the EU would support closer regional economic cooperation between ASEAN members and:

reaffirmed their willingness to work closely with ASEAN by providing all possible assistance and support to supplement ASEAN's cooperative efforts in order to enhance

ASEAN as a corner stone of political stability in Southeast Asia. (Joint Press Statement The ASEAN Ministers and the Commission of the European Community, 15 October 1981, p.1).

The EU and ASEAN declared their commitment to the 1980 Cooperation Agreement and intended to “translate political will into concrete measures in order to intensify ASEAN-EC cooperation” (p.2). ASEAN ministers at the time were concerned with the negative impact of Greece’s accession into the EU and implored the EU to prevent any detrimental effects on the ASEAN economies. It is interesting to note here that each time the EU underwent historical transformations, such as enlargement, the single market, or the Euro, ASEAN has always been concerned by the potential negative impacts those policies might have on its members.

The principal focus of the ministers at the 4th AEMM (held in Bangkok on 25 March 1983) was the familiar regional and international political and security issues (Cambodia and Afghanistan and the refugee problem) and newer developments in the Middle East, EU-ASEAN parliamentary visits, and the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation. The ministers were concerned with the continued occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces and the impact on its people. The EU and ASEAN declared their support of the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea that demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, the right of Cambodians to determine their own destiny through the UN supervised general election, an independent and non-aligned Cambodia, and the commitment by all states to non-intervention in the internal affairs of Cambodia. They viewed the establishment of the coalition of Democratic Kampuchea as an important step in the solution to the Cambodian conflict. The ministers also stated in their common position that they would not provide any assistance to Vietnam.

The refugee problem created by the conflict was also a major topic during the meeting. Despite the resettlement of many refugees and displaced persons to third countries, there were over 160,000 Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians in refugee centres in Thailand and over 300,000 Cambodian refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border (Joint Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN-EC

Ministerial Meeting, 25 March 1983, p.2). ASEAN and the EU requested more assistance from the international community and an increase in international cooperation with UNHCR. They also condemned the attacks by Vietnamese forces against Cambodian refugee camps and facilities on the Thai-Cambodian border. ASEAN expressed its appreciation of EU countries' bilateral assistance to the refugees and the United Nations Humanitarian Programmes for Indochinese Refugees in the ASEAN Countries.

With respect to Afghanistan, the meeting specifically discussed the continued Soviet occupation of the country and the volume of refugees generated by the conflict. The ministers also discussed the problems in the Middle East for the first time and called for a peace settlement between the disputing parties.

A key development at this time regarding EU-ASEAN political cooperation was the visit of an ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization delegation to the European Parliament in November 1982. After the visit, the ministers "expressed their satisfaction at the continuing development of contacts between parliamentarians of the two regions" (p.4). This development was to lead to closer political relations between EU-ASEAN institutions in the future. The ministers also discussed the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation as outlined in the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement and which included science and technology, insurance, trade promotion, training and development cooperation.

During the 5th AEMM held in Dublin in October 1984, the ministers continued to exchange views on the situation in Cambodia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, the refugee problem in Indochina, as well as turned their attention to drug abuse and trafficking. The continuing occupation of Cambodia remained a major concern for both ASEAN and the EU who viewed it as a major threat to peace and security in the region. ASEAN and the EU once again condemned the action and supported UN resolutions that called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia and the restoration of independence and an elected government. They maintained that no assistance would be given to Vietnam until the matter was resolved. The ministers supported

the political solution as outlined in the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea and the Coalition of Democratic Kampuchea under the leadership of Samdech Narodom Sihanouk. The EU praised ASEAN's efforts in trying to find a political solution to the conflict and the ministers jointly condemned Vietnam for attacks on refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border and the incursion of Vietnamese troops into Thailand. The EU and ASEAN called upon Vietnam to cease the attack which they felt would only cause further tension along the border.

The continuing problem of Indochinese refugees was a major topic in the meeting. The EU and ASEAN were concerned with the situation and called for more assistance from the international community as well as the parties involved in the conflict to solve the problem. ASEAN ministers expressed their appreciation of the assistance provided by the EU and its Member States through various refugee relief programmes, while EU ministers noted the efforts of ASEAN countries in providing first refuge for the refugees.

ASEAN and the EU also discussed the situation in Afghanistan and expressed their concern over the occupation of the country by the Soviet Union and the impact on the local people. The ministers called for a solution that would lead to the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the return to independence of Afghanistan, the right of Afghan people to determine their future, and the return of Afghan refugees to their homeland.

ASEAN and the EU discussed relations between the West and the East and agreed that the communication channels between the two sides should remain open and called for "continued progress towards genuine detente on the basis of effective respect for the interests and rights of all states according to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter" (p.4). The ministers also discussed the Middle East including the lack of progress on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli crisis and stressed the need to end this conflict. They also reiterated their support for the return to full sovereignty, unity, and independence of Lebanon. ASEAN and the EU expressed concern about the tension in the Gulf area resulting from the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq and called for both parties to resolve their problem peacefully and in accordance with United National Security

Council resolutions. On balance, when EU-ASEAN political and security relations were addressed, typically this took the form of discussion and the exchange of views, rather than concrete achievements.

The ministers noted that the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement "had fulfilled satisfactorily its role in consolidating, deepening and diversifying the cooperation between their countries" (Joint Declaration, The Fifth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, 15-16 October 1984, p.1). The achievements of the Agreement included an increase in EU-ASEAN trade, an increase in manufactured goods in ASEAN exports to the EU, more EU investment in ASEAN countries, and more development assistance provided by the EU. The ministers decided, noting the agreement would come to an end in October 1985, to extend the agreement and focus on deepening EU-ASEAN cooperation in the area of training, science and technology, and encourage of EU investment in ASEAN countries.

The EU and ASEAN foreign ministers held their 6th AEMM in Jakarta from 20-21 October 1986. They exchanged views on familiar and emerging international political matters - Cambodia, Afghanistan, East-West relations, Southern Africa, Middle East, international terrorism, and the illegal trade in narcotics. The EU and ASEAN called for Vietnam to start negotiations for the withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia. The ministers were concerned with the pace of refugee resettlement in ASEAN countries and along the Thai-Cambodian border. In Afghanistan the ministers agreed on the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces as called for by UN resolutions. They also exchanged views on the developments of East-West relations and both ASEAN and the EU expressed serious, if belated, concern with *apartheid* in South Africa, called for continuing international pressure to abolish racial segregation and showed support for the independence of Namibia.

The ministers also addressed the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq conflict and called for peaceful resolutions between conflicting parties. Views on international terrorism

were exchanged with an agreement to cooperate in combatting terrorism. With respect of illegal narcotics including drug production and trafficking and both declared their intention to again cooperate. By way of gesture, the EU agreed to consider supporting ASEAN's candidacy for the post of President of the International Conference on Abuse of Drugs and Illicit Trafficking.

The 7th AEMM (Dusseldorf, 2-3 May 1988), saw the ministers once again discuss an increasingly familiar range of international political issues. The ministers noted the positive developments in East-West relations. Regarding disarmament and arms control, ASEAN and the EU welcomed the conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the USA and the Soviet Union designed to lead to a reduction of nuclear arsenals. The ASEAN and EU ministers also fully supported the negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The situation in Cambodia was further discussed, the ministers supported Prince Sihanouk's initiative to start peace talks, but continued to insist that Vietnam remove its forces from Cambodia and agreed once again that no assistance would be given to Vietnam. The ongoing problem of Indochinese refugees remained a major concern for the EU and ASEAN. The EU promised to assist refugees and displaced persons in returning to their homeland. The ministers called for Vietnam to cooperate with UNHCR, countries of first asylum, and resettlement countries to find a solution. The EU and ASEAN maintained that they would coordinate their humanitarian assistance for the refugees.

Over Afghanistan, the EU and ASEAN agreed that the solution would necessarily involve the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the country, the return of refugees, and a political settlement involving Afghans. Once again, the ministers condemned *apartheid* in South Africa, called for its abolishment, the lifting of the state emergency, the release of political prisoners, and the unbanning of all political parties. The EU and ASEAN also condemned the oppression by South Africa of its neighbours and called for the independence of Namibia. The ministers again exchanged views on international terrorism and declared that they would cooperate to combat terrorism and find political solutions to the cause of terrorism. The EU and ASEAN agreed to

implement the strategies produced by the first International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in June 1987 and the recommendation adopted by the Commission at the Narcotic Drugs meeting. They also supported the UN Convention on Illicit Trafficking. ASEAN ministers expressed their appreciation to the EU for assisting in EU-ASEAN drug related projects regarding drug prevention and rehabilitation.

From the 16-17 February 1990, EU and ASEAN ministers met in Malaysia for the 8th AEMM. The discussions at this forum reflected the enduring nature of many international political. The ministers discussed developments regarding East-West relations and noted the positive step towards rapprochement between the major powers which had reduced tensions in the region. They also exchanged views on the new post-Berlin Wall reality for Central and Eastern Europe and the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead. The EU and ASEAN discussed the progress in nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament and arms control. Cambodia was still a major topic during the meeting. The two partners agreed that a comprehensive political settlement was still needed and supported the Paris Conference process. The ministers discussed developments including the establishment of a UN interim government in Cambodia until the election, the 16-point Summary of Conclusions adopted at the UN Security Council Meeting, and the establishment of an intra-secretariat taskforce by the UN Secretary General. The EU and ASEAN continued to discuss Indochinese refugees and displaced persons and reaffirmed their support of the CPA adopted at the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in 1989.

The ministers exchanged views on the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and called for the parties concerned to implement the Geneva Agreements in order to achieve a comprehensive political settlement. They also continued discussion of the situation in the Middle East including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue, Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq situation. ASEAN supported EU initiatives outlined in the Madrid and Strasbourg Declarations as solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They called for Iran and Iraq to resume negotiations under the supervision of the UN. The *apartheid* policy in South Africa also remained

a major concern although the ministers did note the positive developments such as the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the lifting of ban on political parties, however until *apartheid* was abolished, they agreed to continue to pressure the South African government for change. ASEAN and the EU also welcomed the independence of Namibia.

The 9th AEMM was held in Luxembourg at the end of May 1991. The ministers considered the positive changes in Central and Eastern Europe and noted the conclusion of the Paris Charter in November 1990 by the 34 CSCE states which promoted peace and cooperation in the region. For the first time ASEAN and EU ministers also exchanged views regarding the political situation in Burma as well as in Vietnam again and they expressed their concern over the issues of human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the Burmese and Vietnamese people. The partners expressed their support for the reconvening of the negotiation process for the PICC and reiterated their condemnation of the genocide from 1975 to 1978. The EU and ASEAN also welcomed the establishment of the Supreme National Council and the draft agreements for the comprehensive political settlement between the UN Security Council and the Co-Chairmen of the PICC in November 1990.

The continual flow of Indochinese refugees remained a major concern for the EU and ASEAN and they noted that the number of Vietnamese asylum seekers in refugee camps had reached the highest levels since 1979. The ministers reaffirmed their support of the implementation of the CPA and stressed the return of non-refugees to their home country as crucial to the effectiveness of the CPA. They discussed the implementation of the first phase of the EU's repatriation and reintegration assistance programme for Vietnamese refugees that had been initiated in July 1990, and called for international assistance for this programme.

At the 9th meeting, the EU and ASEAN ministers also discussed the situation in the Middle East including the sudden invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Lebanon. The ministers exchanged views on the restoration of the government of Kuwait, expressed their support for UN humanitarian assistance and condemned the abuse of the refugees and displaced persons.

In addition, support for the United States' effort in finding a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue was given and the ministers reiterated their support for UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and called for the convening of an international conference to negotiate a settlement. They also expressed their support for the implementation of the Taif agreement in Lebanon.

While welcoming the positive changes which had been introduced by President de Klerk, concern was continued to be expressed over the political instability in South Africa and the ministers agreed to continue to maintain pressure on the South African government to abolish *apartheid*. In terms of international drug issues, the EU and ASEAN expressed their support for the 1988 UN Convention on the Illicit Production and Trafficking of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. They also agreed to enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in combating the illegal drug market by implementing programmes under the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline for Future Activities in Combating Drug Abuse and the UN Global Programme of Action Against Drug Abuse. The ministers expressed their support for the European Plan Against Drugs which had been endorsed in December 1990. They also welcomed the first incoming EU-ASEAN Senior Official Meeting on Drug Matters where officials from both regions would discuss further cooperation in combating drugs. The ministers noted their joint efforts in combating drugs, especially the EU assistance in EU-ASEAN projects including drug prevention, detection, and rehabilitation. For the first time, the ministers discussed the importance of anti-money laundering measures adopted by the International Financial Task Force and during the meeting, the future of EU-ASEAN cooperation was raised and it was agreed that the Cooperation Agreement should be revised in order to cover a broader range of cooperation areas.

The 10th AEMM was held in Manila on 29-30 October 1992. At this meeting, the ministers agreed that "there was a need to consolidate, deepen and diversify ASEAN-EU cooperation to enable it to keep abreast of global changes and to ensure an enduring and mutually beneficial relationship in an increasingly interdependent world" (Joint Declaration of the 10th ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Manila, Philippines, 29-30 October 1992, p.1). Looking to internal EU

developments, the ASEAN ministers welcomed (if prematurely) the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of the Single Market, and future enlargements, with the hope that these developments would enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation. The ministers also exchanged views on political and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the primary focus was on the situation in former Yugoslavia and both partners strongly condemned the violation of human rights and international law and called for the stop of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the return of displaced persons to their homes, and the abolition of detention camps and prisons. They announced their support for Lord Owen and Cyprus Vance in finding a political solution to the situation in Bosnia, and the EU and ASEAN called for the full support of UN Security Council Resolutions No. 770, relating to peacekeeping operation and humanitarian assistance of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and Resolution No. 780 (1992), relating to the establishment of a commission to assist the Secretary General of the UN in prosecuting war crimes.

Regarding the developments in Asia, the EU ministers welcomed the accession of Vietnam and Laos to the TAC of ASEAN. The ministers initiated discussion on the situation in the South China Sea and agreed that sovereignty and jurisdictional issues should be settled peacefully. Consequently, the EU ministers endorsed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea that was issued in July 1992. The ministers reiterated their full support for the peace process in Cambodia and the implementation of the Paris Agreement on schedule. They noted the success of the CPA undertaken by UNHCR and called for international funding. The ministers also called on the UNHCR to accelerate the process of repatriation for refugees in third countries. The EU and ASEAN welcomed the political and economic developments in Vietnam and its closer ties towards ASEAN countries, and they again discussed the situation in Burma which they hoped could be resolved by country-wide economic and political reforms.

The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance the effectiveness of their policies and measures to combat drug supply and trafficking, money laundering, the diversion of trade precursor chemicals, and drug abuse. The ministers discussed the World Conference on Human Rights to be held the

following year and agreed that the conference agenda needed to be finalised. They stressed their commitment to the promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms, development, democracy and social justice. The partners also announced that they would continue their cooperation in promoting these issues. Finally, during the meeting, it was decided to intensify EU-ASEAN cooperation based on the 1980 Cooperation Agreement by establishing a regular dialogue at ministerial and senior official level where ministers would meet at least biennially with senior officials meeting in the intervening years.

ii) 1994-2007: From Karlsruhe to Nuremberg

EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation intensified significantly from 1994 onward. The 11th AEMM, held in Karlsruhe on 22-23 September 1994, began a new chapter in EU-ASEAN political and security relations. The European Commission's communication on a new strategy towards Asia was welcomed and the ministers agreed that "ASEAN should remain a cornerstone of the EU's dialogue with the Asian region" (Joint Declaration of the 11th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, 22-23 September 1994, p.1). The ministers further noted that the EU and ASEAN "have experienced an increase in political and economic weight and contributed to welfare as well as to the maintenance of security and stability in an increasingly interdependent world" (p.1). They agreed to intensify their dialogue and cooperation in the fields of peace and security, the environment and sustainable development, trade and investment, and human rights. The ministers also welcomed the completion of the Single Market and the final ratification and implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.

Regarding EU-ASEAN cooperation on narcotics, the ministers reiterated their commitment to increasing the effectiveness of policies and measures to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, the diversion of trade in the precursor chemicals, and drug abuse. They also restated their support of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the UN Global Plan of Action.

During the meeting, the ministers agreed that "increased EU-ASEAN cooperation is a central element in relations between Europe and Asia-Pacific region" (p.4) and they discussed the future direction of EU-ASEAN cooperation. They established an *ad hoc* informal eminent persons group to investigate measures for strengthening EU-ASEAN relations, particularly in the political and security fields. This was arguably a consequence of the establishment of the ARF in July 1994 where the EU became, and remains, a dialogue partner. The purpose of the ARF was to bring together countries in the region and their dialogue partners to discuss political and security matters in Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN and EU ministers agreed to enhance cooperation between strategic and international studies institutes in Europe and Southeast Asia. They also reiterated their commitment to supporting disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Conference on Disarmament of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The two partners jointly held the view that the UN's capabilities regarding preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and post conflict peace-building needed to be more efficient. They also called for the promotion of confidence and security building measures regionally and globally. The ministers stressed their commitment to promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and expressed their support for the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. They also stressed their commitment to enhance international multilateral cooperation under the auspices of the UN.

Turning again to the political and economic developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the rapprochement strategy and the reform process were examined. The EU encouraged ASEAN to take advantage of the economic opportunities in these countries. However, the situation in the former Yugoslavia remained a major concern and the ministers condemned the practice of ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian-Serb forces in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and called for an immediate halt to such actions. They declared their full support for the peace plan of the Contact Group and for the independence of the Republic of Bosnia-

Herzegovina. In addition, the ministers called for international assistance in rebuilding the country after any peace solution had been agreed.

Regarding developments in Asia, the ministers exchanged views on matters including the Indochinese refugees, the South China Sea, Cambodia, Myanmar and for the first time, on the Korean Peninsula. The admission of Vietnam into ASEAN was welcomed and the EU's interest in becoming a dialogue partner with APEC noted. On the issue of Indochinese refugees, the ministers discussed the recent statement of the 5th Steering Committee of the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees that called for a need to accelerate the return of non-refugees from the countries of first asylum by the end of 1995. An exchange of views regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula took place and a solution to the nuclear problem involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was expressed consistent with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) safeguards agreement.

The situation in the South China Sea was raised and bilateral talks between the parties noted. They congratulated Indonesia's efforts in holding multilateral talks in the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. Instability in Cambodia remained a concern and support for the Cambodian government in reconstructing the country and economy offered. The ministers noted the positive developments in Myanmar and discussed the progress of ASEAN's constructive engagement policy and the EU's efforts in helping to bring about changes in the country. At the conclusion of the meeting, the EU and ASEAN agreed to strengthen cooperation on the basis of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement through EU-ASEAN dialogue mechanisms.

While seeming something of a paradox to some, at the 12th AEMM (Singapore, 13-14 February 1997) ministers repeated the mantra that "ASEAN remains a cornerstone of the EU's dialogue with the Asian region" (Joint Declaration of the Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, 1997, p.1). This was despite these same ministers welcoming the inaugural ASEM which

had been held in Bangkok in March 1996. They also welcomed the participation for the first time of the new members of the EU and ASEAN including Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Vietnam. Among other decisions made at the meeting, the partners signed the Protocol on the Extension of the Cooperation Agreement between the EU and ASEAN to Vietnam.

The 12th AEMM established the outline of EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation for the first time since the start of formal relations. The EU and ASEAN agreed to cooperate in the following areas: to

- share perspectives and information on regional and global political and security issues;
- hold a regular political and security dialogue based on equality and mutual respect;
- continue the EU-ASEAN dialogue and cooperation in order to foster EU-ASEAN relations and cooperation regardless of their differences;
- cooperate in various international fora and to fully support international cooperation under the framework of the UN; and,
- coordinate their efforts in dealing with global challenges including the environment, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, human trafficking, child abuse, narcotics and trafficking, money laundering and diversion of chemical precursors.

The ministers also discussed a full-range of regional and international political and security issues - the ARF, disarmament, human rights, the South China Sea, the situation in Myanmar, the Korean Peninsula, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and narcotics (a list that bears a striking resemblance to the EU-ASEAN concerns some twenty years on). The EU and ASEAN welcomed the success of the ARF as an effective political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific and recognised the two-track approach as "offering opportunities for both formal and informal exchange of views between ARF-participants on a wide range of issues" (p.3). The ministers held a discussion on the issue of disarmament where they welcomed the recent

conclusion of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty in Southeast Asia, the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the conclusion of the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention. In addition, they called for the banning of anti-personnel land-mines (APLs) including their use, stockpile, production, and transfer. On the issue of human rights, the EU and ASEAN declared their full support for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the work of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The ministers discussed the developments on the situation in the South China Sea and noted the progress achieved by the Informal Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. They also exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar. Regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the EU and ASEAN called for the establishment of a peace mechanism and expressed their support for the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the Korean Peninsula Energy Organisation (KEDO). The ministers also called for the resumption of peace talks between the DPRK and South Korea.

Once again the ministers exchanged views on the economic and political reform process in Central and Eastern Europe and the future EU membership for the associated countries. On the situation in former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, they discussed the progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement that was concluded in Paris in December 1995 and the peace process in the former Yugoslavia. They declared their full support for this implementation and the economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and appealed for additional assistance from the international community in reconstructing the country. Regarding the situation in the Middle East, the EU and ASEAN reconfirmed their support for a comprehensive peace settlement and called on all involved parties to implement the agreements and to follow the principles of the Madrid and Oslo Declarations. They also made an appeal to the international community to assist in the development of the Palestinian territories. The ministers noted EU-ASEAN cooperation in fighting narcotics, in particular the progress in the conclusion of bilateral agreements on Drugs Precursor Control.

The new Millennium saw the EU and ASEAN hold the 13th AEMM in Vientiane in December 2000, where Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar participated for the first time since becoming ASEAN members. The EU and Laos and Cambodia agreed to “strengthen [their] relations on a bilateral basis, seeing this as a way to reinforce the dialogue between the EU and ASEAN as a whole” (Vientiane Declaration, the 13th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, 2000, p.1).

The EU ministers discussed recent developments in the EU including the emerging ESDP, EU enlargement perspectives, and the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). Ministers from ASEAN welcomed the EU enlargement process and again stated that it could strengthen EU-ASEAN relations. ASEAN ministers updated the EU on recent ASEAN developments including: the implementation of the HPA; the ASEAN Troika process; the progress of the TAC; the implementation of the SEANWFN; the negotiations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea; and, the results of the fourth ASEAN Informal Summit in November 2000.

The EU and ASEAN reiterated their commitment to promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and declared their support for the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The ministers exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar - including the 16 November 2000 decision of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office - and expressed their support for the mission of the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Mr. Razali Ismail, in encouraging a national reconciliation process. The partners expressed their support for a united and democratic Indonesia and welcomed the Partnership for Good Governance framework adopted by the Indonesian government which sought to find a peaceful solution to its internal conflict through dialogue and a national reconciliation process. The EU and ASEAN expressed their support for the transition to independence of East Timor and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1272. They also declared their full support for the work of UN’s Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in the reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction process and the joint efforts by Indonesia and the international community in providing assistance in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1319 for the East Timorese refugees in the East Nusa Tenggara province.

Regarding developments on the Korean Peninsula, the dialogue between South and North Korea and the June 2000 Summit in Pyongyang were welcomed. The ministers expressed their support for the implementation of the South-North Declaration including humanitarian issues, economic cooperation, military issues, and Confidence Building Measures, and they also implored the DPRK to cooperate with the international community in areas of nuclear and ballistic non-proliferation. The EU and ASEAN welcomed the DPRK's participation at the 7th ARF in Bangkok and promoted its use to further the peace and security dialogue process. The EU and ASEAN exchanged views at the meeting on the recent developments in the Balkans including the democratic progress in Croatia. The ministers stressed the need for non-violent action and reiterated their support for initiatives that promoted peace and stability in the region. The EU and ASEAN also expressed their concerns regarding the resumption of violence in the Middle East and called for the continuation of the peace negotiation process.

On the issue of EU-ASEAN security cooperation, the ministers agreed "to enhance [their] cooperation in regional security...through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which [they] recognised as an important forum for dialogue on peace and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region" (p.2). The partners expressed their support for the intensification of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in order to strengthen the ARF process and called for the conclusion of the principles of preventive diplomacy. The EU offered to share its expertise in these areas. The ministers agreed to intensify their cooperation in narcotics control. They also noted the decision of the Fourth ASEAN Informal Summit regarding the candidacy for participation of Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar in the ASEM process.

The 14th AEMM was held in Brussels on 27-28 January 2003. The ministers stressed that "economic and development co-operation, as well as political dialogue and co-operation, are key aspects driving EU-ASEAN relations" (Joint Co-Chairmen's Statement of the 14th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 2003, p.1). The EU and ASEAN reiterated their commitment "towards peace

and stability and welcomed the current cooperation between ASEAN and the EU in enhancing regional security through bilateral and multilateral channels, including the ASEAN Regional Forum" (p.1). They called for further strengthening of the ARF by enhancing confidence building measures, preventative diplomacy, and practical cooperation on the basis of consensus and an incremental approach. The ministers welcomed the meeting of the first ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Terrorism and Transnational Crime in March 2003 and the 9th ARF in July-August 2002. The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their dialogue on issues of common concern on the basis of partnership and equality, and in particular on their commitment in promoting human rights including fundamental freedoms and the right to development. The ministers decided to intensify their political, economic, and social cooperation at the bilateral, sub-regional, regional, and multilateral levels, and in the latter the European Commission stated that it would issue a communication on a new EU strategy towards Southeast Asia in 2003. They also agreed that future EU-ASEAN cooperation would now cover non-traditional security issues and would create communication channels between the ASEAN Secretariat and its EU counterparts. The ministers discussed key developments in the EU and ASEAN. ASEAN briefed the EU on the results of the 8th ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN +3 Summit, and the ASEAN +1 Summit (with China, India, Japan, and South Korea respectively) held in November 2002. The EU informed ASEAN on the results of the Copenhagen European Council meeting which discussed the issues of enlargement and the recent developments on ESDP.

The partners exchanged views on the issue of terrorism and strongly condemned earlier terrorist attacks. The ministers stressed their commitment in combating terrorism and adopted the *EU-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism*. The Declaration outlines EU and ASEAN commitment to supporting UN anti-terrorism resolutions and conventions, the UN Counter Terrorism Committee and other UN bodies. The EU and ASEAN noted that terrorism and related activities including transnational organised crime, money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and narcotics represented new type of security challenge that had to be dealt with at both the regional and international levels and they stressed the importance of the role of the ARF

in this matter. The ministers noted the overlapping initiatives adopted at the ASEM Copenhagen Cooperation Programme on Fighting Terrorism in November 2002 and declared their intention to support its implementation. The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance further EU-ASEAN cooperation in the following areas: the

- universal implementation of UN Resolutions related to terrorism including resolution 1373 (2001), 1377 (2001), and 1390 (2002);
- universal implementation of UN Conventions and Protocols related to terrorism including encouraging countries to implement measures to prevent and combat terrorism and the financing of terrorism;
- early conclusion and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
- early entry into force of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocol;
- information exchange on strategies in combating terrorism including information on the development of more effective policies and legal, regulatory and administrative frameworks;
- intensification of ties between EU and ASEAN law enforcement agencies including EUROPOL and ASEANPOL in order to foster cooperation on counter terrorism and organized crime; and,
- cooperation to assist ASEAN countries in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and to deal with the effect of terrorism.

The ministers welcomed the conclusion of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the 8th ASEAN Summit in November 2002 and its contribution in promoting peace and stability in the South China Sea. They also exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar, again expressing support for the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. They noted that for the national reconciliation process to be successful, more commitment from those concerned was needed to promote national unity, democracy, and human

rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU and ASEAN discussed the recent developments on the Korean Peninsula and expressed their concern regarding the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT and the cooperation with the IAEA. Most importantly for this thesis, the EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their support for the stability and national unity of Indonesia. The conclusion of the Aceh Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Geneva on 9 December 2002 was welcomed and the decision by ASEAN countries to send observers to monitor the implementation of the agreement and the EU's political and financial assistance supporting the rehabilitation of Aceh was foreshadowed. However, at this stage the parameters of the EU's ESDP mission was not determined.

On the Middle East, the EU and ASEAN condemned the latest attacks and called on those involved to cease the hostilities. The ministers expressed their support for the initiatives including the work of the Middle East Quartet in "contributing to a final, just and comprehensive settlement with two states, Israel and an independent, sovereign, and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security" (p.5). The EU and ASEAN also exchanged views on the serious situation in Iraq and called on Iraq to comply fully with UN Resolutions regarding its disarmament obligations. They reaffirmed their support for the UN process and called on Iraq to cooperate fully with the UN's weapons inspectors.

Looking forward, and perhaps in response to the initial enthusiasm for the parallel track of ASEM, the EU and ASEAN agreed to develop a balanced and comprehensive agenda to inject momentum into EU-ASEAN relations. Regarding political and security cooperation, they agreed to enhance their cooperation in combating transnational crime and terrorism and to promote dialogue on democracy, human rights good governance, and the rule of law.

The 15th AEMM was held in Jakarta on 10 March 2005 and constituted the first region to region meeting after the historic 2004 EU25 enlargement. The meeting focused on developments in EU-ASEAN relations, and the familiar international issues of the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and Myanmar. The ministers noted the *2005-2006 EC-ASEAN Cooperation*

Programme including the fight against terrorism and the success of the 5th ASEM in Hanoi in October 2004. They exchanged views on the issue of terrorism and reaffirmed their commitment and support for UN initiatives and international law in combating terrorism. Progress in the ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism was noted and the intention to further enhance cooperation in this field reaffirmed. They also reiterated their support for ASEAN counter-terrorism agencies including the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC).

The European Commission's *A New Partnership with Southeast Asia* strategy was discussed and it was agreed to encourage policy dialogue in other non-trade areas endorsing the READI concept. They also exchanged views on the trilateral cooperation initiative which was adopted in 2004 involving cooperation between ASEAN countries and the EU in providing development assistance for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam which would contribute to the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). Regarding EU-ASEAN political cooperation, the ministers instructed the ASEAN-EU SOM to promote an EU-ASEAN dialogue on international issues of mutual interest.

The ministers acknowledged recent developments in both the EU and ASEAN. The EU expressed its support for ASEAN initiatives to promote regional integration including the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, the Plans of Action of ASEAN for the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, and the VAP. ASEAN welcomed the latest EU enlargement in May 2004 admitting 10 new members from the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe. The ministers unsurprisingly agreed that "the increasing political and economic integration in the two regions would contribute positively to the strengthening of ties between Europe and Southeast Asia" (Joint Co-Chairmen's Statement of the 15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial meeting, 2005, p.2). They decided to enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in order to intensify the integration process in ASEAN: an area in which the EU was willing to share its experience and provide assistance to ASEAN.

The aftermath of the Asian tsunami disaster became a major issue during the meeting and the partners discussed their cooperation to support countries which had been affected. The ministers noted the results of the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami held in January 2005 including the Ministerial Meeting on regional Cooperation on Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements in January 2005 and ASEAN's initiatives in coping with the impacts of Tsunami. The ministers discussed ASEAN's initiatives including the establishment of a regional early warning system and the endorsement of the ASEAN-initiated General Assembly resolution 59/279 regarding the strengthening of emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention of a tsunami disaster. They also acknowledged the EU and its Member States' assistance in providing rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to the affected countries.

The EU and ASEAN continued to exchange views on the Middle East, focusing on the occupied Palestinian territory and the situation in Iraq. They hoped that the Palestinian presidential election of January 2005 would drive the Middle East peace process forward and expressed their support for the implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit initiatives and called for international support for the Road Map to Peace. The EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their support for the UN Security Council Resolutions and for a solution involving the peaceful co-existence between Israel and Palestine. On the situation in Iraq, the ministers welcomed the return to sovereignty of Iraq in June 2004 and the results of the election in January 2005. They called for the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) and expressed their continuing concern regarding the levels of violence in the country.

The ministers also exchanged views on the recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. They noted the results of the Third Round of Six Party Talks in June 2004 and supported the goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but also expressed concern regarding the DPRK's withdrawal from peace negotiations. Inevitably, the political situation in Myanmar was another

major topic during the meeting. The ASEAN and EU ministers noted the developments in the country including the reconvening of the national convention in February 2005 and called for the lifting of all restrictions and for the full participation of all political and ethnic groups. They also called on Myanmar to cooperate fully with the UN and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. The EU and ASEAN agreed to continue their dialogue to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Myanmar.

The 16th AEMM was held in Nuremberg on the 15 March 2007 marking 40 years of EU-ASEAN relations. The ministers adopted the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership which aimed "to further strengthen and reinvigorate the ASEAN-EU process" (Joint Co-Chairmen's Statement of the 16th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 2007, p.1). In the area of political and security cooperation, the EU and ASEAN reiterated their common commitment to promoting multilateralism in solving international problems, human rights and good governance, disarmament and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass of Destruction (WMD), and the fight against terrorism. During the meeting, the EU and ASEAN also held a discussion on the general progress in EU-ASEAN cooperation, the developments in both regions, and international issues.

The ministers noted the progress made in the area of the *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* being negotiated between the EU and several ASEAN countries which aimed to promote further political and economic cooperation under the new bilateral and regional framework. They reiterated their support for the implementation of READI and tasked the ASEAN-EC Joint Co-operation Committee to follow up this initiative. They also expressed their support for the recommendations of the Report of the ASEAN-EU Vision Group: *Transregional Partnership for Shared and Sustainable Prosperity*. Both the EU and ASEAN noted the success of the AMM - the first EU-ASEAN cooperation in crisis management in Southeast Asia. Perhaps overly optimistic, the mission was seen to have "considerably enhanced the EU-ASEAN relationship and raised the profile of EU-ASEAN policy and security cooperation in the region" (p.2). The ministers exchanged views on trilateral cooperation and agreed to extend their support,

maintaining that it would enhance ASEAN integration by closing the development gap between ASEAN countries.

The EU and ASEAN Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership issued on 15 March 2007 states that the EU and ASEAN are committed to promoting:

universal values of justice, democracy, human rights, good governance, anti-corruption, the rule of law, social equality and caring societies, that are the foundations for lasting peace, stability, progress and prosperity, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and for further strengthening and expanding EU-ASEAN Relations (The Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, 2007, p.1).

The EU and ASEAN agreed to "further enhance EU-ASEAN dialogue and cooperation, including at the highest level" (p.2). They were also committed to:

cooperat[ing] to strengthen ASEAN capacity and institution building processes that will contribute to achieving the goal of the ASEAN Community consisting of ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) through, among other steps, exchange of information and experience between the EU and ASEAN on community building (p.2).

Regarding political and security cooperation specifically, the EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation the following areas: to

- intensify their political dialogue through the ARF, to promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and to reaffirm the primary role of ASEAN in driving this process;
- enhance their cooperation in multilateral frameworks including the UN and the WTO;
- enhance global and regional security which involves political, human, and economic aspect;
- intensify cooperation in combating terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, sea piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber crime, and other related transnational crime in accordance with international law; and,

- intensify their cooperation on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of WMD and reiterated their support for the implementation of existing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, conventions, and instruments.

The EU and ASEAN also agreed to draft a Plan of Action to implement the initiatives of the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced partnership.

During the meeting, ASEAN welcomed the EU's stated intention to accede to the TAC in Southeast Asia and its intention to participate in the East Asia Summit. On EU-ASEAN security cooperation, the ministers noted the progress of the ARF process including the co-chairing of the ARF Inter-sessional group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in 2004/2005 and 2005/2006. Regarding EU-ASEAN cooperation in combating terrorism, the ministers reaffirmed their partnership in this area and noted the recent conclusion of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism and the achievements of ASEAN counter-terrorism agencies. The EU and ASEAN expressed their full support for the conclusion and implementation of the UN Global counter-terrorism Strategy.

The EU and ASEAN outlined developments in their respective regions. ASEAN informed the EU of the results of the January 2007 12th ASEAN Summit including the endorsement of the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter and the establishment of the high level Task Force to draft the ASEAN Charter in time for the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007. The ministers also noted the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015. Members of the Eminent Persons Group and the High Level Task Force visited Brussels, and Berlin as part of the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. The EU reaffirmed its support for the ASEAN regional integration process and ASEAN regional initiatives and sub-regional initiatives. The EU briefed ASEAN on the status of the European Constitutional Treaty and the EU's plan to incorporate its values into its policies. Myanmar continued to pose a problem for both partners. The ministers were concerned with the lack of progress in the transition

towards a democratic government and expressed their support for national reconciliation and the lifting of bans on political parties and the release of political prisoners. They called on Myanmar to maintain its cooperation with ASEAN, the UN, international humanitarian organizations, and NGOs. The EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, conventions, and instruments including WMD and conventional weapons. They also reiterated their support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the upcoming Prepcom in April/May 2007.

Following previous patterns, the EU and ASEAN also discussed developments in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula with the ministers reaffirming their support for the Middle East Quartet and a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine in accordance with UN resolutions and the road map. On the issue of the Korean Peninsula, the EU and ASEAN reiterated their support for the Six-Party-Talks and the implementation of the agreement reached on 13 February 2007. The ministers called on the DPRK to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and the NPT and to address its human rights problems. The EU and ASEAN exchanged views on the situation in Iran and implored the Iranian government to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1696 and 1737 (2006) as well as the recommendations and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors. The ministers also discussed the situation in Iraq and reiterated their support for the Iraqi government and its initiative of organizing a ministerial meeting with its neighbouring countries to foster regional cooperation and peace in Iraq. The EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their support for Afghanistan and its efforts to create peace, stability, and prosperity in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact. They noted the role of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board as the central coordinating agency of the international community with the Afghan government.

The ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit was held in Singapore on 22 November 2007 where EU and ASEAN leaders issued a Joint Declaration affirming that the EU and ASEAN were:

determined to deepen and broaden [their] cooperation, based on mutual trust and respect, with the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership as a strong foundation for

[their] relations and cooperation to ensure peace, stability, progress and prosperity in the region.

(Joint Declaration of the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit, 2007, p.1)

The Declaration outlined their commitment to enhance EU-ASEAN dialogue in the following areas – political and security cooperation, promoting ASEAN regional integration, and human rights.

The EU and ASEAN agreed to continue their cooperation on regional and international issues with a view to preserving peace, security, and prosperity. The leaders declared their commitment to enhancing EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation on promoting regional security, counter-terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, and the Myanmar problem. The partners agreed to intensify their political dialogue especially through the ARF process in order to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN also welcomed the EU's intention to accede to ASEAN's TAC. The leaders declared their full support for the implementation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, the early conclusion of a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, and the implementation of the ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. In the area of disarmament, the EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation of WMDs as well as reiterated their support for the existing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, conventions, and instruments. On the issue of Myanmar, the EU and ASEAN reaffirmed their support for the work of the UN and the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari to promote national reconciliation and the democratic process in Myanmar. They also called for the release of political prisoners, the lifting of bans on political parties and welcomed Myanmar's cooperation with the UN and its dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to providing assistance to Myanmar in the areas of humanitarian and political reform including long-term development assistance.

Regarding ASEAN integration, the EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation in implementing the Vientiane Action Programme, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, and sub-regional initiatives through EU bilateral programmes with ASEAN members. They also agreed to enhance their cooperation in promoting and protecting the rights and welfare of migrant workers.

The leaders also endorsed the Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration. The Plan of Action outlines EU-ASEAN cooperation initiatives between 2007 and 2012. It has the objective of enhancing EU-ASEAN cooperation covering areas as diverse as political and security, economic, energy security and environment, socio-cultural cooperation, and development. It also aims to promote ASEAN integration by implementing the Vientiane Action Programme and the initiatives of ASEAN Concord II (including the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015). In the area of political and security cooperation, the EU and ASEAN agreed to undertake the following initiatives.

i) Deepen political and enhance regional cooperation

The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation in terms of bilateral dialogues including the AEMM, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with the EU (PMC+1), and the SOM to review the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation. They also agreed to enhance their cooperation in multilateral fora including the UN and Asia Europe Meetings as well as strengthening the role of multilateral cooperation in Asia including the accession of the EU to the TAC.

ii) Deepen security cooperation

The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance the role of the ARF in promoting regional cooperation, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They agreed to intensify their cooperation in the ARF process and strengthen its confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. The leaders agreed to promote exchanges of best practice between Track I and Track II of the ARF. They also agreed to enhance cooperation between the ARF and other regional and international organisations such as the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), ASEAN

Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The EU and ASEAN decided to enhance their cooperation and dialogue on crisis management focusing on knowledge transfer and exchange of best practices based on the experience of the AMM, although this was to prove to be somewhat wishful thinking. The leaders also agreed to promote women's participation in conflict prevention in the area of aid operations, relief, and recovery. They also expressed their full commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and the UN Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In the area of human rights, the EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance regional initiatives to protect human rights including the co-hosting of seminars on human right issues and the strengthening of dialogue, exchange, and capacity building. The leaders agreed to promote ASEAN participation in ESDP operations – again something that was to prove an unfulfilled expectation.

iii) Traditional and Non-traditional Security Issues

The Plan of Action outlines EU-ASEAN cooperation in traditional and non-traditional security areas including counter-terrorism, transnational organised crime, human trafficking, narcotics, corruption, disarmament and non-proliferation, and anti-money laundering. Table 3.2 summarises the initiatives to be undertaken under each of these headings.

This review of the series of EU-ASEAN ministerial summits has revealed the intensity of the political and security dialogue built up over a 40 year period. Perhaps reflecting both a European as well as Asian cultural characteristic, this ongoing process was necessary in order to build mutual confidence, respect and establish a firm basis for cooperation and policy innovation. In that sense, this region to region process was fundamental to the decision to undertake a joint political and security initiative in Aceh. That this collaboration remains unique also underlines the difficulties

that such joint action involve. Despite almost universal acclaim of the success of the AMM it has failed to be a springboard to further EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation.

Table 3.2 PoA: Cooperation in Traditional and Non-traditional Security Areas

<i>Counter-Terrorism</i>	The EU and ASEAN agreed to implement the ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and to enhance regional and multilateral counter-terrorism measures through the exchange of experiences and information sharing, capacity building, and greater cooperation between EU and ASEAN governmental agencies and institutions. The PoA also promotes the implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism and international treaties and conventions on terrorism including UN Security Resolutions on terrorism, the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the conclusion of the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
<i>Transnational Organised Crime</i>	The PoA will enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in implementing the protocols of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and ASEAN measures in combating transnational organised crime. The EU and ASEAN also agreed to hold an ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) with EU consultation and workshops, as well as an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) with EU Consultation in order to exchange information and review the progress of EU-ASEAN cooperation on the matter. In addition, the PoA was intended to promote cooperation between EU and ASEAN law enforcement agencies in tackling transnational organised crime.
<i>Human Trafficking</i>	The PoA will enhance EU-ASEAN cooperation in addressing human trafficking problems by promoting the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons particularly Women and Children, the recommendations of SOMTC Work Programme on Trafficking in Persons, the ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters, and the protocols of the Palermo Convention.

<i>Narcotics</i>	The PoA will support ASEAN in achieving the goals of a Drug Free ASEAN 2015 through enhanced law enforcement cooperation and information exchange between the EU and ASEAN. It will also encourage regular dialogues, personnel exchange programmes, information exchange, and activities to combat the trafficking and manufacturing of narcotics.
<i>Corruption</i>	The EU and ASEAN agreed to enhance their cooperation in fighting corruption and promoting joint activities in this area.
<i>Disarmament and Non-Proliferation</i>	The PoA was intended to promote EU-ASEAN cooperation in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It is hoped to promote the implementation of existing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, conventions, and instruments such as UN Security Council Resolutions. It will also encourage EU-ASEAN consultation on disarmament and non-proliferation problems and international cooperation. Under the framework of the agreement, the EU and ASEAN will continue to support international institutions that enforce the obligation of these treaties. The POA will assist ASEAN countries in establishing effective national export control systems through EU export control programmes. The EU and ASEAN will cooperate to control the illegal trade of small arms by adopting the ARF Statement on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The PoA also promotes EU-ASEAN cooperation on implementing the initiatives of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Uses, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mine and on their Destruction.
<i>Money Laundering</i>	The PoA will enhance ASEAN capacities in monitoring and detecting money laundering and terrorist-financing activities in accordance with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

(ii) EU Policies toward ASEAN (1994 – 2008)

This Chapter has already provided a comprehensive historical description of the formal EU-ASEAN meetings. Drawing on this context, this section (ii) considers two complementary EU initiatives towards ASEAN: the Commission's "New Asia Strategy" and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is not considered as it has limited if any impact on the core research question of this thesis. The implications for future of EU-ASEAN political and security relations are then explored and the utility of the thesis's theoretical approach in explaining EU-ASEAN political and security relations evaluated.

The "New Asia Strategy"

i) The 1994 Communication from the Commission: Towards a New Asia Strategy

In 1994, the Commission issued a Communication to the Council entitled "Towards a New Asia Strategy". The Commission stressed that:

the main thrust of the present and future policy in Asia is related to economic matters. However, this major component of the Union policy has to be presented in the framework of the political and security balance of power in the region (European Commission, 1994, p.2).

The communication outlined general EU objectives and policy priorities in order to enhance Europe's economic and political presence in Asia. In the area of political and security relations, the communication explored a "new political approach towards Asia" and outlined those political and security issues that EU-Asia cooperation should focus on.

The Commission stated the general objectives of the new Asia strategy as follows:

- strengthening the EU's economic presence in Asia;
- contributing to regional stability in Asia by promoting international cooperation and understanding;

- promoting economic development in less developed countries in the region; and
- promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Asia.

With regard to its political and security objectives, the Communication outlined policy priorities including:

- enhancing the EU's bilateral relations with countries and regions in Asia;
- improving the EU's profile in Asia;
- encouraging regional and sub-regional cooperation in Asia in order to promote peace and security in the region;
- enhancing the EU's relations with regional organisations in Asia;
- encouraging Asia's involvement in managing international affairs especially in the area of maintaining peace and security; and,
- encouraging Asia's participation in international organisations and enhancing EU-Asia cooperation in multinational fora.

The communication outlined the "new political approach towards Asia". It identified the basic objective of EU policies towards Asia as increasing the EU's profile and presence in Asia and demonstrating to Asian countries the EU's commitment "to mak[ing] a positive contribution to the peaceful development and stability in the region" (p.9). The communication suggested that the EU should establish a political dialogue with Asian countries that are ready to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. It also suggested that the political dialogue should focus on specific topics with follow-up mechanisms. In addition, the communication suggested that the EU-Asia political dialogue should be developed at an expert level with the objective of deepening the political dialogue and making it more operational. Regarding the ARF, the communication stated that the EU should continue its involvement in the process and contribute to ARF activities.

The communication identified three areas in which the EU should focus its political dialogue with Asia – arms control including non-proliferation, human rights, and drugs. In the area of arms control and non-proliferation, the Communication argued that the EU should focus on the following initiatives:

- encouraging Asian countries to adopt the UN Conventional Arms Register;
- promoting the prohibition of the use of certain types of conventional weapons that create excessive injuries such as anti-personnel landmines;
- promoting the extension of the NPT;
- strengthening the IAEA's Safeguards System;
- controlling the export of sensitive goods and technologies including chemical, ballistic, biological, and nuclear;
- promoting the adoption of 1993 Convention Prohibiting Chemical Weapons as well as strengthening the terms of the 1972 Convention Prohibiting Chemical Weapons; and,
- promoting a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In the area of human rights, the communication stated that the EU should promote the adoption and the full implementation of international standards and instruments on human rights as guided by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights. The EU should apply, according to the Communication, the concept of the interrelationship between human rights, democracy and development in its dialogue with Asia. In addition, the EU should encourage legislative and institutional reform including technical training, providing scholarships, visits, and seminars on this issue.

The communication stated that "drug trafficking, drug production and drug consumption also presents a problem to Asian regions and has significant repercussions on the European economies and EU security and stability" (p.11). Regarding this issue, the political dialogue between the EU and Asia should focus on improving the capacity and willingness of Asian countries to combat drugs and should encourage Asian countries to ratify the three UN Conventions on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

ii) The 1996 Communication from the Commission: Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations

The 1996 Communication from the Commission entitled "Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations" updated the EU strategy for dealing specifically with its ASEAN relationship (the previous EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement having been signed in 1980). The revised strategy was a response to the Karlsruhe Ministerial Meeting in 1994 which called for "a strengthening of [EU-ASEAN] ties in a spirit of greater equality and partnership" (p.4) and to ASEAN's debate on the "Future Direction of EU-ASEAN relations". The Communication was drafted on the basis of the 1994 "Towards New Asia Strategy" (discussed above) and the recommendations made by the informal Eminent Persons' Group Report released in June 1996. The Commission stated that "launching a new dynamic in [EU] relations with ASEAN can make a considerable contribution to the strengthening of the European Union in Asia" (p.4). It recognised that EU-ASEAN relations had evolved from the donor-recipient relationship which it had been when the EU and ASEAN concluded their first Cooperation Agreement in 1980, to one that demonstrated "balanced trade, the development of investment and greater economic cooperation" (p.8). However, the negotiation process towards a new agreement was hampered by the human rights situation in East Timor.

The 1996 Communication had four objectives:

- stimulate political dialogue;
- promote the liberalisation of regional market and strengthen the links between two regions through various programmes;
- facilitate and liberalise trade and investment; and,
- adjust cooperation framework in economic, development, environment, cultural, crime prevention, and science and technology areas.

The Communication stated that the EU should focus its political dialogue with Asia through ASEAN because ASEAN plays a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The Communication outlined several initiatives that would strengthen and deepen the EU-ASEAN political dialogue. Firstly, the EU should encourage an annual meeting between the relevant directors of the Commission, EU Member States, and ASEAN Member States to discuss specific issues such as maritime security, denuclearisation in Southeast Asia, drugs, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Secondly, the EU-ASEAN political dialogue should discuss ways of coordinating a common position and enhanced cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on international issues of mutual interest such as the reform of the UN, disarmament and non-proliferation, and peacekeeping operations. Thirdly, the EU should incorporate human rights and the consolidation of democracy in its political dialogue with ASEAN. The EU should adopt programmes that promote respect for human rights and democracy. Fourthly, the EU should enhance parliamentary links between the EU and ASEAN members to establish “coordinated views concerning overall ASEAN-EU political issues” (p.12) and promote inter-societal exchanges and people-to-people contacts. Finally, the Communication stressed the importance of establishing informal and personal relations at EU-ASEAN meetings.

On the issue of crime prevention, including the fight against organised crime and related money-laundering activities, the Communication suggested that the issue should be dealt with through a stronger coordinated bilateral cooperation framework and multilateral bodies. It also suggested that specific collaboration methods should be established with individual ASEAN members when demanded. Regarding drugs, drug trafficking was the focus of the Communication and it suggested that the EU should enhance cooperation between customs administration in both regions. The Communication also stressed the need to fight against illegal immigration including human trafficking.

Two options were proposed for launching a new dynamic in EU-ASEAN relations – a formal agreement and an active partnership. The idea was to “choose a model corresponding to the

specific situation of the country or countries concerned " (p.23). The proposed options "mark[ed] the transition to a new era in [EU-ASEAN] relations and [the need] to embark together on a new dynamic entailing concrete action " (p.24).

The first option proposed the completion of the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement to incorporate the objectives of the Communication. The goal of the agreement was "to complete [EU-ASEAN] ties in all those aspects for which the present agreement does not provide the necessary framework " (p.25). However, this option was constrained by the immature state of ASEAN integration and lack of unity between members at the time

The second option proposed the establishment of an active partnership that entailed "the adoption of a common declaration of Ministers, or even Head of State, defining the general objectives for which they charge a group of high-level experts to produce a draft programme of concrete actions " (p.27) within the existing framework of the Cooperation Agreement. These objectives included the original objectives set out in the Cooperation Agreement as well as new objectives identified at the ministerial level. This option was seen to offer greater flexibility for ASEAN countries as an individual country could choose to accept certain initiatives or not. It also provided immediate responses to issues that required urgent action. The Communication also suggested that bilateral agreements with individual ASEAN countries were another option if the level of progress between ASEAN countries is varied.

The Commission recommended the second option to enhance EU-ASEAN relations and indicated that the first step towards implementing this would be to adopt the declaration of the next AEMM in 1997. The declaration would contain initiatives that would strengthen EU-ASEAN relations and an Action Plan for achieving these initiatives. The Commission also suggested that the EU should enhance its relationship with ASEAN within the framework of ASEM in order to strengthen ASEM process.

iii) The 2001 Communication from the Commission - "Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership"

The Commission released the Communication entitled "Europe and Asia: a Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership" in July 2001. The Communication sought,

to review and update [EU] approach to Asia, to provide a new strategic framework which will address the changes since 1994, and to establish a coherent, comprehensive and balanced strategic approach for [EU] relations with Asia in the coming decade. (p.5)

The core objective of the Strategic Framework was "strengthening the EU's political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU" (p.3). The Strategic Framework covered South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Australasia.

The Strategic Framework included the following goals:

- contribute to peace and security in the region and the world;
- continue to strengthen trade and investment between the EU and Asia;
- promote development and reduce poverty in developing countries in the region;
- contribute to the adoption of democracy, good governance and the rule of law;
- create a partnership with Asian countries in various international fora to address the opportunities and challenges created by globalization and to enhance EU-Asia cooperation in dealing with environment and security issues; and,
- enhance the awareness of the EU in Asia.

In order to contribute to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, the Strategic Framework stated that the EU should strengthen its engagement on regional and global security issues; strengthen its dialogue and cooperation on conflict prevention; and intensify cooperation on justice and home affairs issues. First, the EU should enhance its engagement with Asia on old and new security issues through bilateral, regional, multilateral frameworks. In particular, the

Union should play a more active role in the ARF and ASEM process. Secondly, the EU should support conflict prevention initiatives and promote the sharing of experience between the EU and Asia on long-term confidence-building measures. This action would be guided by the Communication on conflict prevention focusing on “preventive action in a framework of international cooperation and coordination, and mobilizing all Community instruments more effectively” (p.16). Thirdly, the EU should enhance its dialogue and cooperation with Asia in the area of justice and home affairs. The focus would be on immigration issues and transnational crime including drugs and human trafficking, arms control, money laundering, the exploitation of migrants, and combating corruption.

Regarding the objective of contributing to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, the Strategic Framework stated that the EU should strengthen its bilateral, regional, and multilateral dialogue with Asia in promoting the universality and indivisibility of human rights. The Union should also encourage Asian countries to adopt international human rights instruments. Second, the EU should encourage the strengthening of civil society in Asia and promote a dialogue between civil societies in the two regions. Thirdly, the EU should also mainstream human rights and good governance issues in its cooperation with Asia. These issues should be kept in mind when the thesis turns to the AMM case study.

On the issue of building a global partnership with Asian countries, the Strategic Framework outlined areas in which the EU should strengthen EU-Asia cooperation. These included enhanced cooperation in the UN and with its related activities; enhanced cooperation with Asian partners in the WTO; working with Asian partners in dealing with environmental challenges; enhanced EU-Asia cooperation and dialogue to handle global challenges; and intensified cooperation in the areas of science and technology.

According to the Framework, the EU should strengthen its cooperation with its Asian partners in the UN in the following areas:

- through the early ratification of international instruments including the CTBT, the conventions on small arms and anti-personnel land-mines, and future anti-corruption instrument;
- The promotion non-proliferation and the control of WMD;
- Reforming the UN system including the Security Council;
- Strengthening UN peacekeeping initiatives by promoting the implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report; and,
- Encouraging full payment by all UN members to improve the functioning of the UN system.

Regarding global challenges, the Framework claimed that the EU should enhance its dialogue and cooperation with Asia in dealing with transnational crime, terrorism, corruption, xenophobia, racism, and epidemic diseases. In addition, the EU should help developing countries to take advantage of global opportunities.

The last objective of the Strategic Framework concerned increasing the awareness of the EU in Asia. To achieve this objective, the EU should strengthen and expand its delegation network across Asia as well as enhance coordination and information efforts. The Commission proposed to open new delegations in Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal. Secondly, Framework stated that the EU should enhance educational, scientific and cultural exchanges with Asia including promoting cooperation and networking between higher education institutions, research and student exchanges between Europe and Asia. Finally, the EU should promote the development of civil society partnerships between the two regions (such as parliamentarians and NGOs) and enhance intellectual cooperation between Europe and Asia.

The Strategic Framework also outlined action plans for individual sub-regions in Asia-Pacific: South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Australasia. This section will only discuss the action plan pertaining to Southeast Asia. The Strategic Framework stated that "ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum will continue to be the *major focus* of [EU] political and security

dialogue with Southeast Asia, and it will be important for the EU to play a *pro-active role* in the ARF" (author's emphasis, p.21). The main focus of the EU's dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN, according to the Framework, should be on global security issues including drugs and transnational crime; conflict prevention within the region; civil society involvement in promoting good governance, transparency, and the rule of law; and promoting human rights issues. The Strategic Framework stressed that "the further strengthening of [EU] long-standing partnership with ASEAN will be a key priority in the coming years" (p.22), through "a strengthened and comprehensive dialogue with ASEAN as a whole, and in the enhancement of [EU] bilateral relations with key ASEAN partners" (p.22). The EU should also assist ASEAN with its regional integration because of mutual solidarity within the organization. The Strategic Framework stressed the importance of developments in Indonesia and indicated that the EU would ensure the full implementation of strategy outlined in the Communication on Indonesia. A direct involvement in peace building in Indonesia was foreshadowed soon after the turn of the new millennium and prior to both the 2004 enlargement and the implementation of the first E/CSDP mission.

Regarding regional fora, the focus of the Strategic Framework was the ASEM process, raising for some the question of inconsistency vis-à-vis the "major focus" on ASEAN by the EU. The document stated, "the ASEM process has offered an excellent example of inter-regional cooperation, and we will continue to work to ensure that it can make progress in each of its three pillars" (p.25). The Strategic Framework suggested that the EU should use ASEM to promote increased understanding and cooperation as well as objectives outlined in the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework. Secondly, the EU should encourage civil society involvement in the ASEM process. Thirdly, the EU should promote enlargement of ASEM to include countries from sub-regions such as Australia and New Zealand to enhance the value of ASEM. In addition, the EU should follow developments in other regional fora such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN +3, and the West Pacific Forum.

To ensure the effectiveness of the Strategic Framework, the Communication suggested that the Commission should incorporate the objectives and action points of the Strategic Framework into all aspects of its relations with Asia to achieve policy coherence. It was suggested that the progress of the Strategic Framework should be reviewed every five or six years to evaluate achievements.

iv) The 2003 Communication: "A New Partnership with Southeast Asia "

Two years later, the Commission issued a Communication entitled "A New Partnership with Southeast Asia" with the objective of "revitalising the EU's relations with ASEAN and the countries of Southeast Asia" (p.3). The Communication provided three reasons for the need to enhance EU-ASEAN relations: economic advantages, the broadened EU policy agenda, and the sharing of values between Europe and Asia. It also identified the strategic priorities of the new EU strategy towards ASEAN and countries in Southeast Asia as follows:

- promoting regional stability and combat terrorism;
- promoting human rights, democracy, and good governance;
- mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues;
- promoting regional trade and investment relations;
- promoting development in less prosperous countries in the region; and,
- enhancing dialogue and cooperation in specific policy areas.

In order to promote regional stability and counter-terrorism, the Communication stated that "the EU must continue to support the stability and territorial integrity of all countries in the region" (p.12). EU-ASEAN cooperation and dialogue should focus on contributing to conflict prevention, peace and stability, as well as regional counter terrorism initiatives.

To reach this objective, the Communication proposed that the EU should continue to conduct its political dialogue with Southeast Asian countries in multilateral for a, however, bilateral dialogue with individual countries was also seen as applicable if necessary. The Communication stated that "a strong ASEAN is probably the best guarantee for peace and stability

in the region " (p.12) and the EU should out of necessity support ASEAN's integration process by sharing its own experience as well as providing the required technical assistance to ASEAN institutions. By conducting a political dialogue through ASEAN, regionalism in the region could be stimulated. Regarding the EU's relations with ASEAN the Communication claimed that, "political dialogue should, to the extent possible, concentrate on region to region subjects of interest and concern, leaving global issues to ASEM" (p.13), an interesting if difficult dichotomy to maintain in practice. The Communication noted that the challenges for the ASEM process would be enlargement of both parties in 2004 and the Myanmar issue. Regarding the ARF process, the EU should enhance, according to the Communication, its role by co-chairing Intersessional Group meetings and increasing its military presence.

In the fight against terrorism, the EU is committed to fully supporting the ASEAN countries with the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and related UN conventions. The objective of the EU, as outlined by the Communication, was to deal with the root causes of terrorism by implementing a "comprehensive strategy" that combined political, economic, social, and financial governance aspects. Consequently, counter-terrorism initiatives should be incorporated into EU development strategy with its ASEAN partners. The EU should also ensure that these countries respect human rights in combating terrorism.

The Communication reiterated the EU's non-negotiable conditionality that "the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constitute core objectives in external relations of the European Union and its development co-operation with third countries" (p.14). In order to promote consistency in human rights and democratic principles, the Communication stated that an "essential clause" stipulating the respect for fundamental human rights and democratic principles according to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights be included in all future bilateral agreements with ASEAN countries. The EU should also incorporate this condition into its political and development dialogue with ASEAN countries. Secondly, the EU may conclude a bilateral dialogue specifically on human rights with individual ASEAN

countries in order to promote cooperation regarding human rights issues (such as the ratification and implementation of human rights instruments or the abolition of death penalty) in these countries and in multinational fora such as the UN. Third, the bilateral dialogue should also support:

the functioning of democratic structures (including through giving support to electoral processes), building the capacity of institutions, improving the rule of law and governance, strengthening civil society, facilitating the accession to the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court, and addressing the issues of trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children and women, and indigenous people's rights (p.15).

The Communication stressed that good governance (including the strengthening of institutional and regulatory framework and anti-corruption) should be integrated into EU policy dialogue and development cooperation with ASEAN countries by specific cooperation programmes and by mainstreaming the promotion of good governance in EU regional and bilateral dialogue with ASEAN and its members.

Regarding the objective of mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues, it was stated that the EU should integrate these issues into its regional and bilateral dialogues with ASEAN and its members. The issues included migration and asylum, human trafficking, money laundering, piracy and counterfeiting, organised crime, drugs, and maritime security. The Communication also proposed to intensify dialogue and cooperation in specific sectors with ASEAN. The menu included economic and trade, Justice and Home Affairs, environment, science and technology, energy, transport, and information society. The Communication also provided a list of cooperation activities for each sector. The EU and ASEAN could choose to cooperate at regional or bilateral level in each sector at an agreed pace. The dialogue was to be developed through four stages – exchange of information on legislation and policy, regulatory cooperation and approximation, conclusion of protocols within Cooperation Agreement framework, and technical assistance and cooperation.

The Common Position of the EU regarding the Myanmar issue had been preventing the renegotiation of the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement and therefore the EU and ASEAN had to continue to cooperate under the existing framework and through the declarations adopted at the EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. For this reason, the Communication proposed to launch consultations on new bilateral agreements with interested ASEAN countries in order to reinvigorate EU-ASEAN relations. The new bilateral agreements would “provide the needed reference frameworks, strengthen the link between policy dialogue and co-operation and raise the prospects of timely and effective delivery of development cooperation activities in each of the countries concerned” (p.23). The Communication also launched a new visibility strategy in Southeast Asia aimed at increasing mutual awareness between Europe and Southeast Asia. The strategy aimed to promote the awareness of the EU and its role in the world as well as the new EU-ASEAN relations. To achieve this objective, the Commission was to launch a communication initiative aimed at promoting and improving the perception of the EU and EU-ASEAN relations by targeting opinion makers, governments, academic, media, business circles, and ordinary citizens.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF was created to preserve peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region with ASEAN as the primary driving force. ASEAN leaders, during the 4th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in 1992, decided to intensify ASEAN’s external dialogues in political and security matters, which led to the ARF’s establishment in 1993. The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 and at it, ASEAN foreign ministers, ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners, ASEAN’s Consultative Partners, and ASEAN’s Observers discussed political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The official ARF perspective “had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern” (Chairman’s Statement of the First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, 1994, p.1). The main objective of the ARF has been to promote confidence building and

preventive diplomacy in the region. The ministers agreed to adopt the principles of the TAC as a code of conduct in guiding the ARF process to promote confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.

In 1994 the ARF had 18 participants including ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), ASEAN's Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the USA), ASEAN's Consultative Partners (China and Russia), and ASEAN's Observers (Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam). Throughout the following 14-year period, the ARF has increased in both size and agenda. The following section explores the various ARF themes and activities, as well as EU-ASEAN political and security cooperation within the ARF framework.

ARF Meetings and Issues

Since the 1st ARF Meeting the issues brought to the discussion table have grown quite considerably in both number and dimension. The main objective of the ARF process is to promote peace and security in the Asia-Pacific and to foster cooperation in the political and security area among ARF participants. Since 1994, there have been fifteen ARF meetings held in various ASEAN capital cities where ministers discussed issues related to political and security matters both within the Asia-Pacific region and globally. This section explores the issues that were discussed over the 1994-2008 period as well as the achievements of the forum within the context of the direct relevance to the EU and its Member States. The issues are grouped into eleven categories – i) regional security issues, ii) international security issues, iii) non-proliferation and disarmament, iv) maritime security, v) terrorism, vi) transnational crime, vii) disaster relief, viii) avian influenza, ix) financial crisis, x) economic security and xi) energy security. Just the first of these are specifically relevant to this thesis and are discussed in detail in the following section.

Regional Security Issues

The discussion of regional security issues is perhaps the most important element of the ARF process because it represents the core objective of the Forum, that is, to promote peace and security in the region. By bringing these issues to the meetings, the participants are able to discuss problems and seek solutions together without the use of force. Throughout the years, many regional security issues have been discussed at ARF meetings including the political situation of the countries in the region, bilateral disputes between countries in the region, the development of security cooperation within ASEAN, and the relations between major powers and its impact on security in the region. The EU has become increasingly engaged in this broad agenda.

Ever since the first meeting the Korean Peninsula issue has been one of the most frequent major concerns for ARF participants. The issue has “a direct bearing on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific” because it involves the dispute between the DPRK (Democratic People’s republic of Korea) and the ROK (Republic of Korea), and at the same time, poses a nuclear threat within the region. The ARF has supported the US-DPRK negotiations on denuclearization and urged the DPRK to fully implement the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994. The ARF participants have asserted their support for the continuation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement until a new peace agreement is concluded. The Forum noted the actions of the DPRK that could undermine security in region such as the payload launch and other missile-related activities in 1998, the naval clash in the Yellow Sea and West Sea, the test firing of missiles in 2006.

This context underwent modification when the DPRK joined the ARF in 2000, participating for the first time at the 7th ARF Meeting held in Bangkok. During this meeting, the participants welcomed the positive developments on the Korean Peninsula including the historic Summit between the DPRK and the ROK and the signing of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration. The ministers agreed that confidence-building measures must be promoted to prevent further tensions between the two parties. During the 10th ARF Meeting in 2003, the ARF participants urged the DPRK to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The ministers also welcomed the talks between China, the DPRK, and the USA that were held in Beijing in April

2003. They noted the outcome of the Six Party Talks held in Beijing in 2004 and hoped that this would lead to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. During the 13th ARF Meeting in 2006, the ARF participants expressed their support for the Joint Statement on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula adopted at the Six -Party Talks in September 2005. In 2006, the ARF participants urged the DPRK to stop its missile -testing programme after test firing in July 2006. The ministers noted the report of the IAEA on the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear plant in 2007 and welcomed the decision at that time of the DPRK to disclose all nuclear related information and to shut down all of its nuclear facilities. While not directly party to these security issues, the EU has maintained a watchful interest from a global and regional security perspective.

Cambodia has also featured prominently on the ARF agenda since first appearing at the 2nd ARF Meeting in 1995. The ARF participants have followed the developments in Cambodia with concern while expressing support for the Cambodian government and ASEAN's initiatives in attaining peace, national stability, and economic recovery in the country. During the 5th ARF Meeting in 1998, the ministers declared their full support for the ASEAN and the "Friends of Cambodia" group in promoting peace and political stability in the country. They welcomed the national election on 26 July 1998 and noted the efforts of the UN monitoring team. The ARF participants were finally able to welcome Cambodia as a new participant of the ARF during the 6th ARF Meeting in 1999.

The overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, and the ASEAN countries of Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam, has been another major concern for ASEAN and the ARF participants, with multilateral implications for the EU and its Member States. ARF participants first discussed the situation in the South China Sea in 1995 and the issue has remained on the ARF agenda ever since. The ministers urged the parties concerned to exercise self-restraint and adhere to ASEAN's 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea and the relevant international law and conventions, in particular, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The importance of the freedom of navigation in the area was underlined. During the 10th ARF Meeting in 2003, the ARF participants welcomed the conclusion of the Declaration on

Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) by China and ASEAN, as well as expressed their support for the full implementation of the declaration. These initiatives sought to create favourable conditions for the parties concerned to cooperate and settle their dispute

The political and human rights situation in Myanmar have also been a subject of concern for ARF participants. Although Myanmar joined the ARF in 1996, the situation in the country was only first discussed during the 7th ARF Meeting in 2000; the ARF have consistently called for national reconciliation, a transition to democracy, and the respect for human rights. They supported the efforts of ASEAN, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar, and the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General in trying to promote the national reconciliation process and improve the human rights situation in Myanmar. The ARF participants called for the release of all political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi and the involvement of every group in the society in the National Convention. During the 14th ARF Meeting, the ministers exchanged views on the Roadmap to Democracy and hoped that the completion of the National Convention process would lead to the next stages of the Roadmap. The ministers noted the adoption of the State Constitution of 2008 by referendum and called on Myanmar to work towards the holding of general elections in 2010. During the 15th ARF Meeting in 2008, participants reiterated their commitment to assisting Myanmar as part of the ASEAN Community building process and urged the government of Myanmar to give its full cooperation to the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, and Tomas Ojea Quintana, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.

The political and security situation in Indonesia was another issue discussed at several ARF Meetings in the early 2000s. During the 7th ARF meeting, the ministers stressed that "a united democratic and economically prosperous Indonesia was fundamental to the maintenance of regional security" (Chairman's Statement, the 7th ARF Meeting, 2000, p.3). Importantly, they expressed their support for Indonesia's territorial integrity. During the 10th ARF Meeting in 2003, the ministers held a discussion on the situation in Aceh and expressed their support for the Indonesian government's efforts in trying to resolve the conflict through a dialogue process -

something that was to eventually see the EU become directly involved. They welcomed the assistance from Thailand and the Philippines in providing monitoring teams to Indonesia as well as expressed their commitment to preventing arms smuggling into the hands of the separatists in Aceh. Thus the seeds for the subsequent EU-ASEAN AMM were sown.

Although East Timor (Timor Leste) joined the ARF in 2005, the developments in the newly independent country have been on the agenda of the ARF since the start of the millennium. During the 7th ARF Meeting discussions were held on the progress of East Timor's transition to independence. The cooperation between Indonesia and the UNTAET was reviewed and the death of a UN Peacekeeper "deplored". The ministers expressed their commitment to promoting peace and stability as well as supporting the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and nation building in East Timor. They also called on the international community to assist the country in these matters. During the 2001 ARF meeting, the ministers expressed their support for the efforts in handling the problem of East Timorese refugees and for the activities of the United Nations Missions in East Timor (UNMISET). During the 13th ARF Meeting five years later, the ministers discussed the recent deployment of security forces from Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal to East Timor. They also exchanged views on the appointment of the new prime minister and the cabinet as well as the results of the general elections. Finally, in 2008, the ministers expressed their support for the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship and noted the final report produced by the commission.

The ARF participants have followed the situation in South Asia with concern since the 7th ARF Meeting, with the dispute between India and Pakistan at the centre of discussions. During the 9th ARF Meeting in 2002, the ministers called for the immediate end to terrorist activities in the region and urged Pakistan to implement counter-terrorism initiatives. In 2004, Pakistan was admitted as the 24th participant of the ARF. During the 2006 Meeting the ministers condemned the 11 July 2006 terrorist attack in Mumbai. The second issue of concern in the sub-region was the conflict between Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The ARF participants

expressed their support for the efforts of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in finding a peaceful resolution satisfactory to both sides. During the 2003 ARF Meeting, the ministers exchanged views on the peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE hosted by Thailand and on the outcome of the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka held earlier that year. Sri Lanka became 27th ARF participant in 2007.

Since 2000, the political and security situation in the ACP countries of the South Pacific also began to feature on ARF agenda. The ministers have specifically discussed the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea, as well as have exchanged views on the security challenges faced by the Pacific Island countries in general and agreed that the international community has an important role in assisting these countries in promoting political stability and socio-economic development. During the 7th ARF Meeting, a focus was on the new government of the Solomon Islands efforts in establishing a cease-fire between the conflicting parties in order to restore law and order in the country. They also noted the efforts of the International Peace Monitoring Team in the country. At the Meeting, the ministers also exchanged views on the release of hostages in Fiji and called for the early return to democratic government. Two years later at the 9th ARF, the ministers welcomed the restoration of a democratic government following the previous year's elections. The 2002 Meeting also considered the situation in Papua New Guinea; the ARF ministers expressed their support for the conclusion of the Bougainville Peace Agreement of 31 August 2001 and the efforts to establish peace in Bougainville by the government of Papua New Guinea. Importantly, these developments all occurred against the backdrop of the launch of the EU's Cotonou Agreement for the Pacific islands.

The political situation in Thailand that resulted from the coup d'état on 19 September 2006 created concerns among ARF participants. During the 14th ARF Meeting in 2007, the Thai Foreign Minister gave a briefing on the political developments in Thailand including the drafting process of the new constitution and the referendum on the constitution scheduled for 19 August 2007. The ARF participants expressed their support for the general election scheduled for December 2007. During the 15th ARF Meeting in 2008, the ministers held a discussion on the dispute between

Thailand and Cambodia regarding the Temple of Preah Vihear. They urged both parties to exercise restraint and resolve the issue by peaceful means.

Since the beginning of the ARF process, ASEAN's TAC has represented a key regional instrument for strengthening security, cooperation and friendship within Southeast Asia and between ASEAN and ARF participants. At the very first ARF Meeting, the participants agreed to "endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation" (Chairman's Statement, 1st ARF Meeting, 1994, p.1.). The ARF Concept Paper stated that in order to promote confidence-building measures, one of the complementary approaches would be to apply ASEAN's experience in the ARF process. This could be achieved by encouraging ARF participants to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

During the 5th ARF Meeting in 1998, the ministers noted the conclusion of the Second Protocol to the TAC by the High Contracting Parties at the 31st AMM in Manila on 25 July 1998. They also agreed to consider the request of the TAC High Contracting Parties for non-Southeast Asian States, including the major powers, to accede to the TAC after the Second Protocol entered into force. This action would "contribute positively to the evolution of a region-wide code of conduct" (Chairman's Statement, the 6th ARF Meeting, 1999, p.2.). During the 8th ARF meeting in 2001, the ARF participants noted the adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the High Council of TAC at the 34th AMM in July 2001. At the 11th Meeting in 2004, the accession of China, India, Japan and Pakistan to the TAC was welcomed. Subsequently, the ROK and Russia acceded to the TAC during the 10th ASEAN Summit in 2004. New Zealand, Australia and Mongolia joined in 2005, and the accession of France, Timor Leste, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh took place in 2007. To complement this bilateral activity, the ARF ministers expressed their hope for the early accession of the EU to the TAC.

The development of the ASEAN Security Community has been another important issue at ARF meetings since the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) at the 9th ASEAN Summit. During the 2004 ARF Meeting, support was expressed for the establishment of the ASC as part of the ASEAN Community and its Plan of Action, believing that it would “strengthen ASEAN as it leads the ARF towards a more secure and stable region” (Chairman’s Statement, the 11th ARF Meeting, 2004, p.2). During the 2006 ARF Meeting, views were exchanged on progress made towards the implementation of the ASC Plan of Action under the Vientiane Action Programme and noted the first convening of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in May of that year. The ARF participants reiterated “the need to intensify security cooperation to preserve and further advance the region towards peace, stability, democracy, and stability” (Chairman’s Statement, the 14th ARF Meeting, 2007, p.2).

The ARF participants have stressed the importance of maintaining positive relations among major powers – China, Japan, Russia, the EU and the USA - in the Asia-Pacific region because of the direct and obvious consequences on security and stability. Consequently, the ministers have expressed their support for the development of a constructive strategic relationship between the major powers through dialogue and cooperation, including regular meetings and exchange of visits. They also encouraged bilateral dialogues between ARF countries and the major powers to promote stability and economic development in the region.

In summary, these policy papers were characterized by comprehensiveness (covering a wide-range of policy fields), a strong EU preference for a region-to-region dialogue, the belated importance given to Asia as well as a strategic use of the ASEM framework. Consequently, this survey of the key EU and ASEAN policy initiatives during the 1994-2008 period serves to set the context against which the Aceh mission can be evaluated. Was it an unexpected experimental reaction to a crisis or was there a longer gestation period spanning several years? Whilst the statements as well as the policy documents that emerged from this intensification of EU-ASEAN relations may seem somewhat repetitive – even trite – they do serve an essential function. Individually and

collectively, they provide the structure upon which policy responses can be launched. Without this history of institution building and the sharing of political and security knowledge, the appropriate conducive conditions for a joint mission would have been absent. It might be concluded that a stereotypical “Asian” way has shaped the relationship: an evolving process that favours familiarity over immediate results; mutual respect even where values may not coincide; and the need to seek a balance with other interests. Despite the EU’s early engagement with ASEAN the relationship was characteristically formal and only belated given priority in the twenty-first century.

So far, the thesis has focused primarily on official documentation as well as academic theory. Both are necessary for contextualization, but not sufficient: empirical data relating to Thailand, the joint mission and the wider E/CSDP process is required and it is to this that the following chapters now turn.

Chapter 4: EU-Thailand Political Relationship

I. Introduction

The Thailand-EC Strategy Paper for the period 2007 – 2013 described the nature of EU-Thailand relations in the following terms:

Over the past decade, Thailand has shown an impressive improvement of its socio-economic development indicators. Consequently, the nature of Thai-EC relations has fundamentally changed from a traditional donor-recipient relationship towards a veritable partnership for development. In 2003, the Thai government announced that it will stop accepting foreign development aid while proposing to donor countries to redirect all their resources towards Thailand's poorer neighbouring countries.

In line with these developments, the EC no longer sees its role as a donor of development assistance but rather as a facilitator of knowledge sharing and a partner for substantive policy dialogue on key sectoral issues. The future Thai-EC partnership will concentrate on co-operation in a wide range of areas of mutual interests as agreed under the draft Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) by drawing on both partners' expertise.

(European External Action Service, Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013, p.3)

Thus the focus of this chapter is on this important change in the EU-Thailand relationship (with this early twenty-first century period) and the shifting of Thailand's position from a development assistance recipient country to a new position of a more equal cooperation partner of the EU. The chapter investigates EU-Thailand political relations by looking at EU policies toward Thailand as well as examining the structure of EU-Thailand political cooperation mechanisms. The Chapter concludes by investigating the impact of the 2006 coup d'état in Thailand on EU-Thailand political relations. The data used is drawn from official documents as well as interviews with officials from both the EU and Thailand to explore and analyse EU-Thailand political relations.

The EU-Thai political relationship can be conceptualised as multi-level governance at various levels involving different actors in various political arenas. Most usefully, the relationship can be expressed through four levels – inter-regional (EU-ASEAN), bilateral (EU-Thailand), between individual EU Member States and Thailand, and sub-national (NGOs and private organizations). Historically, the EU has been known to advocate inter-regional relations with other regional groups such as the ACP, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA. Consequently, as described already, EU-Thailand relations have occurred mainly through the EU-ASEAN institutional framework and ASEM dialogue process. An important impetus to the relationship took place when the EU issued the 2003 “New Partnership with Southeast Asia Communication” (as discussed previously). Thailand was among the first countries with whom the EU chose to start negotiations on a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. As of late 2011 a draft had been completed although only after a very long delay caused by political instability in Thailand. However, it was unable to be finalised due to several sensitive issues and political instability in Thailand during 2006-2007.

II. Overview

The European Perspective on EU-Thailand Political Relations

Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger, the former EU Ambassador and Head of the EC Delegation to Thailand, regarded EU-Thai relations as one that had intensified because of economic interests on both sides, however, after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 the relationship evolved to include stronger political co-operation between the two parties. He described the nature of EU-Thailand relations as follows:

In general, when the EU concluded the co-operation agreement with ASEAN in 1980, at the time ASEAN countries were already emerging tigers so I think the co-operation was motivated by economic interests of the EU. The relationship with Thailand was based on this region-to-region agreement. The relationship was relatively friction free. Thai interest was mainly in the GSP system and I would say it was based on economic interests on both sides. No highlights of particular importance. I think the relationship moved up an edge with

the financial crisis because then Europeans realised that this region is very important with regards to globalisation and capital movement. We paid much more attention to political systems in ASEAN countries with regards to democratic principles and good governance. Not so much because we are noble around the world and we want everybody to behave properly but because we think that a lack of respect for these principles may put political stability and economic stability into question. So from 1997 on we have followed, from the European side, developments mainly in political field much closer.

(Interview with Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger, EU Ambassador and Head of EC Delegation to Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 21 April 2006)

Thomas Gnocchi, Desk Officer for Thailand and Cambodia, EC Delegation to Thailand, commented that the EU promoted relations with Thailand because of Thailand's role in ASEAN and the formal bilateral relationship is grounded in the 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement. Gnocchi stressed that the focus of the EU is at the regional level – EU-ASEAN relations and that there are many aspects of the relationship. He stated that the commercial aspect has been prominent whereas a political relationship between the EU and Thailand has developed significantly since 1980. The EU and Thailand have discussed a range of issues where there were some disagreements. The Myanmar issue was a concern for the EU. The negotiation of the PCA reflected the maturity of the relationship as it entailed broader sectors of co-operation. Gnocchi also mentioned that the PCA would normally be negotiated in parallel with the FTA and would enhance EU-Thai relations in many sectors.

The Thai Perspective on EU-Thailand Political Relations

From the Thai government perspective, Kulkumut Singhara Na Ayudhaya, Director of European Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, described the EU-Thai relationship as follows:

At present the development level of Thailand has increased. In the past, when we dealt with the EU, most of the time we were in the position of a recipient, that is, we asked the EU for assistance and support. But now, due to the level of Thailand's economic development, the EU sees us as a strategic partner. Our policies are more equal, that is, the EU sees us as a partner instead of a country that still needs their assistance. The EU views Thailand with interest. The EU values its involvement with Thailand in promoting development in a third country or trilateral relations which helps reducing the gap between Thailand and our neighbours. Therefore, the EU views Thailand as a country that can help itself and they are

happy to co-operate with us in promoting development in our neighbouring countries that have lower capabilities than Thailand.³

(Interview with Kulkumut Singhara Na Ayudhaya, Bangkok, 5 July 2006)

Piyapak Sricharoen, First Secretary of the Royal Thai Embassy in Belgium which also functions as the Mission of Thailand to the European Union, stressed that the main focus of EU foreign policy towards Thailand is stability and security. He stated that other areas of EU foreign policy include developing trade co-operation, academic exchanges and funding, and strengthening co-operation in the areas that have an impact on stability and security in the region, for example education, minorities, and refugees. Sricharoen considered that "the EU sees Thailand as the key member of ASEAN because Thailand is a country that has a democratic governing system and has the goal of good governance. Thailand also has capabilities in economic, trade, investment and serves as a door to the less developed neighbours"⁴ (Interview with Piyapak Sricharoen, First Secretary, Royal Thai Embassy in Belgium, Mission of Thailand to the European Union, Brussels,

³“ในขณะที่นี้ด้วยที่ว่าความพัฒนาของไทยเรามันก้าวสูงขึ้นไปจากที่ผ่านมาเพราะแต่เดิมเมื่อเวลาเราคบกับอียู ส่วนใหญ่เราจะอยู่ในลักษณะเป็น recipient คือขอความช่วยเหลือสนับสนุนจากอียู แต่ในขณะนี้ ระดับการพัฒนาทางเศรษฐกิจของไทยก็ดี เพราะฉะนั้นอียูจึงมองไทยเหมือนเป็น strategic partner คือในขณะนั้นนโยบายของเรากับอียูจะอยู่ในลักษณะที่มีความเท่าเทียมกันขึ้น คือเขามองเราว่าเป็น partner แทนที่จะมองเราว่าเป็นประเทศที่ยังต้องขอความช่วยเหลือจากเขาอยู่ อียูมองไทยในลักษณะให้ความสนใจ ให้ความสำคัญในการเข้ามาร่วมมือกับไทยในการพัฒนาประเทศที่สามที่เราเรียกว่า trilateral relations คือช่วยลดช่องว่างความแตกต่างระหว่างประเทศไทยกับประเทศเพื่อนบ้าน เพราะฉะนั้นอียูมองไทยเป็นประเทศที่ช่วยเหลือตัวเองได้ และเขายินดีที่จะร่วมมือกับเราในการพัฒนาประเทศเพื่อนบ้านซึ่งมีขีดความสามารถต่ำกว่าไทย”

4

“อียูถือว่าไทยเป็นประเทศเป็นประเทศหลักของอาเซียนด้วยเหตุผลว่าไทยมีระบบการปกครองที่เป็นประชาธิปไตย มีเป้าหมายในการบริหารรัฐที่เป็นธรรมาภิบาล และมีศักยภาพทางเศรษฐกิจ การค้า การลงทุน เป็นประตูเพื่อนบ้านที่มีการพัฒนาต่ำกว่าด้วย”

5 August 2006). The EU promotes regional integration within ASEAN especially in the area of economics in order to promote economic development by using the EU as a model. In the area of trade, the EU wants its position and the position of Thailand to be complementary in the WTO. The only conflict between the EU and Thailand in the area of trade concerned Thai agricultural products in the European market.

With regards to EU-Thailand political and security relations, Srirachoen believed that the EU was very interested in the ARF process especially in the areas of counter-terrorism co-operation and nuclear proliferation. The EU has been seeking co-operation on these matters where Thailand has provided co-operation in these areas through the UN framework and other international forums. Throughout the history of EU-Thai relations, the political relationship has improved and been positive. Overall, the EU has sought to strengthen relations with Thailand across nearly every aspect, if only because Thailand is in a region in which the EU has a high geo-strategic interest.

Thailand's EU Strategy

In general, Thailand's foreign policy specifically towards the EU is similar to the country's foreign policy towards individual EU Member States. Thailand has two main objectives when dealing with the EU. First and most importantly, to utilise the EU's expertise in the economic field to strengthen Thailand's economic capability. The focus of the policy is economic co-operation including investment and trade promotion. In addition, Thailand needs to access better technology in various areas in order to improve its international competitiveness. The strategic areas where Thailand seeks to co-operate with the EU are competitiveness, innovation, and energy. In addition, Thailand seeks to coordinate its position with that of the EU on the world stage, in particular at the WTO (for trade) and the UN regarding security matters such as terrorism.

The Thai Government has set out five objectives/goals in dealing with the EU:

- become an important EU partner in Asia;

- become the centre for the EU in Asia in industry, trade, public health, technology, biology, SME, research, and development;
- reduce economic and trade difficulties in the European market and increase market shares for Thai products;
- promote EU-Thai relations through people-to-people initiatives, society, the media, and academic contacts; and,
- strengthen co-operation with the EU in developing and reforming international organisations and co-ordinate common positions on world stage.

An official in the Europe Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand commented on EU-Thailand relations in the following terms:

The EU wanted to use Thailand as its base in conducting foreign relations in the region because the EU set up EC Delegation in Thailand as its first delegation in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the EU saw the importance of Thailand as a diplomatic base. On the other hand, the EU is interested in the trade aspect of Thailand because Thailand is the trade centre in Southeast Asia. This can be seen in the action of the EU as illustrated in the Country Strategy Paper. The EU focuses on trade, investment, sustainable co-operation and public health. The EU established Thailand-EU Business Forum and investment promotion.⁵

(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005)

Another official from the same department commented further that:

Before this period, EU-Thai relationship is a growing process therefore the image of the relationship is not as clear as bilateral relationship between Thailand and other countries...the image is not clear what kind of relationship it is. But the one thing that you can see is the

⁵“อียูต้องการใช้เราเป็นฐานในด้านการต่างประเทศเพราะว่าอียูมาเปิดสำนักงานผู้แทนสหภาพยุโรปในประเทศไทยเป็นที่แรกในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้

เพราะฉะนั้นอียูก็ต้องเห็นความสำคัญของเราในระดับหนึ่งว่าสามารถเป็นฐานด้านการทูตให้เขาได้

ส่วนในด้านอื่นอียูคงสนใจด้านการค้าเพราะว่าไทยเป็นศูนย์กลางในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ มันสะท้อนออกมาในสิ่งที่อียูทำใน CSP คำจะเน้นในด้าน trade investment sustainable co-operation และ public health อียูตั้ง Thailand-EU Business Forum และ investment promotion”.

donor-recipient relationship. In the past, the EU provided a lot of development assistance to Thailand. But if you look at the CSP, it can be seen that the EU focuses more on their benefits...there is more focus on economics which is another form of assistance but the EU also benefits from it, for example, the Small Project Facilities. Many aspects have shown that the characteristics of the relationship are changing. There is more equality in the relationship. In the Small Project Facilities Thailand provided some of the budget. Thailand is now a donor country.⁶

(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005)

The same official also made a very interesting observation regarding EU-Thailand political relations:

Since I have been assigned to the EU desk, the political aspect of EU-Thai relations has not been very exciting. The image of EU-Thai political relations is not very clear when compared to the political relationship between Thailand and EU Member States. Before Prime Minister Thaksin, the only Thai leader that made an official visit to the EU was Prime Minister Chatchai over ten years ago. Until Prime Minister Thaksin made two official visits to the EU in June 2002 and in October 2005. And the EU leaders have never come here. We will meet them in the framework of international fora like ASEM.⁷

⁶“ก่อนหน้านี้ความสัมพันธ์ไทยอียูเป็นกระบวนการที่เติบโตขึ้นมาเรื่อยๆเพราะฉะนั้นภาพความสัมพันธ์มันจะไม่ค่อยชัดเท่ากับไทยกับทวีภาคี...ภาพมันจะไม่เด่น ไม่ออกมาชัดว่าเป็นความสัมพันธ์ลักษณะไหน แต่ที่มองเห็นอันหนึ่งคือระหว่างไทยกับอียูคือเป็นลักษณะประเทศผู้ให้และผู้รับ สมัยก่อนอียูให้ความช่วยเหลือในด้านการพัฒนากับไทยค่อนข้างมาก แต่หลังจากดู CSP จะเห็นว่ามันจะไปเน้นผลประโยชน์ของเขามากขึ้น มันจะเปลี่ยนจากการพัฒนาไปเน้นในทางเศรษฐกิจ ซึ่งมันก็คือการช่วยเหลืออย่างหนึ่งแต่อียูก็ได้รับประโยชน์ด้วยอย่างเช่นโครงการ SPF หลายๆอย่างทำให้เห็นว่ารูปแบบความสัมพันธ์เริ่มเปลี่ยนแปลง มีความเท่าเทียมกันมากขึ้น ในโครงการ SPF ไทยก็ออกด้วยส่วนหนึ่ง ซึ่งตอนนี้ไทยก็เป็นประเทศผู้ให้”.

⁷“ตั้งแต่ผมมารับดูแลในส่วนของอียู ความสัมพันธ์ในด้านการเมืองระหว่างไทยกับอียูมันก็ไม่มีอะไรหรือหา ภาพไทยอียูไม่ชัดเจนเหมือนกับภาพไทยกับประเทศสมาชิก ก่อนสมัยนายกฯทักษิณ ผู้นำไทยก็ไปเยือนอียูครั้งเดียวคือนายกฯชาติชายเมื่อสิบกว่าปีก่อน จนมาสมัยนายกฯทักษิณซึ่งไปเยือนสองครั้งแล้วคือ มิถุนายน 45 ตุลาคม 48

(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005)

The MFA official made a very interesting observation about the level of the EU-Thai political relationship as of 2005: "if we look at the overall picture, EU-Thai political relations have reached its target. I cannot think of what to improve. It is good as it is. Maybe we have to look into each specific area"⁸.

(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005)

Actors in EU-Thailand Political Relations

An official in Europe Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand commented on the important actors in EU-Thailand political relations as follows:

The image of Thai-EU relations is not as clear as bilateral relationship that is the relationship between Thailand and EU Member States. The image of the relationship is one of a relationship with an organisation that is run by the European Council therefore the actors when we deal with the EU are the Commission, the Thai Embassy in Brussels. Other actors are depending on the issues. Other important actors are the NGOs because the EU grants high level of assistance to them in the area of development, border assistance, and development of our neighbouring countries."⁹

และอียูก็ไม่เคยมาที่นี่ จะไปเจอกันในกรอบของการประชุมระหว่างประเทศมากกว่าเช่น ASEM".

⁸"ถ้ามองในภาพรวม ความสัมพันธ์ไทยกับยุโรปมันอึดตัวแล้ว มันไม่รู้จะทำอะไรเพิ่มเติม มันดีอยู่แล้ว อาจจะต้องเจาะเป็นรายสาขามากขึ้น".

⁹"ภาพความสัมพันธ์ไทยอียูมันไม่ชัดเท่ากับความสัมพันธ์ทวิภาคี ความสัมพันธ์ไทยกับประเทศสมาชิกภาพมันคือความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างไทยกับองค์กรหนึ่งซึ่งคนที่บริหารก็คือคณะกรรมการยุโรป เพราะฉะนั้นภาพที่ออกมาตัวแสดงหลักๆคือ เวลาที่เราติดต่ออียูคือติดต่อผ่าน Commission หรือติดต่อสถานทูตเราที่ Brussels ตัวแสดงอื่นๆก็ขึ้นอยู่กับหัวข้อ อีกอันหนึ่งคือ NGO เพราะอียูจะให้ความสนับสนุน NGO เยอะโดยให้เงินสนับสนุนเพื่อการพัฒนา เรื่องตามชายแดน พัฒนาประเทศเพื่อนบ้าน".

(Interview with an official in Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 November 2005.

Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger identified the actors or the “prime movers” of EU-Thai relations as follows:

We have an ongoing negotiation [PCA]. The chief negotiator on the Thai side is the Thai Ambassador in Brussels and on our side is our Geographical Director for Asia. They are the prime movers of the relationship. The negotiations are almost concluded. Other actors are the Thai Foreign Minister, our Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. They meet in regional meetings and bilateral meetings. There was a prime ministerial visit in Brussels in 2003 when this bilateral agreement was proposed. It was actually a Thai initiative but we were interested just as much because we do not have a bilateral agreement. Our relationship up until now is based on this old 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement so we want this bilateral agreement. So we immediately reacted positively to this situation with Prime Minister Thaksin. Other prime movers in trade are Thai Trade Minister, on our side EU Commissioner on Trade. They meet quite frequently not only in the WTO context but in ASEAN context. So I would call the Foreign Minister and Trade Minister the prime movers. Besides this, you have the [EU] Member States who move the relationship. There are quite a number of ministerial visits from [EU] Member States to Thailand. The third axis of mover is on regional basis in the Counter-Terrorism Action Code of the G8 in which the EU is a very active participant...we sit together with Americans, Canadians, Australians, and Russians. It is G8 Plus. In this, Thai-EU relationship comes to the floor purely because Thailand has its own interest in being close and having a good relationship with the European Union.

(Interview with Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Hamburger, EU Ambassador and Head of EC Delegation to Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 21 April 2006)

EU Relations with Thailand

The EU and Thailand relationship has been governed by the principles of Article 177 of Treaty Establishing the European Community, the EU’s ALA Regulation, and the 1980 EU-ASEAN Agreement. Article 177 advocates development co-operation with developing countries to promote sustainable economic and social development, integration of developing countries into the world economy, and to fight against poverty in these countries. It also stipulates that co-operation should promote the fundamental values of the EU – democracy, rule of law, respect for

human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ALA Regulation is the EU's development co-operation policy with Asia and Latin America with the objectives of strengthening the co-operation framework as well as promoting sustainable social and economic stability and democracy through institutional dialogue. However, the most important co-operation agreement that governs the EU's relationship with Thailand has always been the 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement (see, Council Regulation 1440/80 of 30 May 1980, OJ L 144, 10.06.1980). The agreement focuses on trade co-operation, economic co-operation, and development co-operation. In the area of trade co-operation, the GSP is granted to Thai exports entering the EU's market which can benefit Thai products enormously. However, there have been some conflicts in this area that resulted from the removal of GSP for some Thai exports due to their increased competitiveness which caused Thai producers and the Thai government to protest against the unilateral decisions made by the EU.

The EU's April 2000 "Communication on Development Policy" set out six main areas for EU development co-operation activities: trade and development; regional integration and co-operation; support to macroeconomic policies with a link to poverty reduction, in particular in social areas (health and education); transport; food security and rural development; and institutional capacity-building, good governance and the rule of law (COM (2000a) 212 final, The European Community's Development Policy, 26 April 2000). Also in April 2000, the EU issued a working document aimed at boosting the ASEM process by strengthening co-operation in regional and global security, trade and investment, socioeconomic issues and regional macro-economic co-operation, consumer dialogue between regions, and educational exchanges (COM (2000b) 241 final, "Perspectives and priorities for the ASEM process into the new decade", 18 April 2000). Then in September 2001, the European Commission issued a Communication outlining the EU's strategies toward Asia with the main objective of strengthening the EU's presence in Asia as part of its ambitious goal of becoming a major player in the international arena. The Communication also stated the EU's intention to enhance its relations with Southeast Asia by strengthening its relations with ASEAN, enhancing relations with key ASEAN member states, as well as supporting integration within ASEAN.

The important boost to EU-Thai relations came when the Commission released its Communication on a New Partnership for South East Asia in July 2003. The Communication listed those areas in which the EU and ASEAN could strengthen their co-operation, and for the first time in the history of EU-ASEAN relations, the EU offered to negotiate a bilateral PCA with key ASEAN members, one of which was Thailand. An announcement of the intention to launch negotiations with Thailand was made in Hanoi in October 2004, at the margins of the ASEM Summit, by the then President Prodi and former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin. The PCA covers the following areas: the fight against international organized crime and terrorism, good governance, justice and home affair issues, and human rights.

The EU and Thailand started the negotiations with the objective of “strengthening the diversification of economic and commercial relations and the promotion of co-operation and dialogue in all areas of mutual interest” (Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013, p.22). During the negotiations, the EU and Thailand agreed to enhance co-operation in the following areas: trade and investment; environment; agriculture; transport; energy; industrial policy and SMEs; science and technology; employment and social policy; education and culture; statistics; information society; migration; combating illicit drugs; and money laundering. With regards to political relations, the PCA is intended to enhance co-operation in the security area including NPT (Interview with Piyapak Sricharoen¹). Initially, it was due to be signed by both parties in 2006 but in the wake of the coup d’état that took place on 19 September 2006 in Thailand and the political instability that followed, the EU decided to hold off until a democratic government was reinstated. However, after the election of a new government in 2007, the PCA remained unsigned due to several sensitive factors on which the EU and Thailand still could not find common ground.

III. Structure/Mechanisms

Political Framework: Ministers, Commissioner, Head of State and Government

At the highest level of political relations, EU Commissioners, Ministers, and Heads of Government conduct political dialogue in various meetings and international forums which help shape the overall direction of the EU-Thailand relationship and co-operation. High level visits from both the EU and Thailand serve as an important channel to intensify bilateral relations. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the former EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy visited Thailand on 25 May 2009 where she had a meeting with the then Prime Minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva. During the meeting, the two leaders held a discussion on the negotiation of the PCA and the possibility of starting discussions on a Thai-EU FTA. In July 2009, Carl Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, representing the then EU Presidency and Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy visited Thailand during the 16th ARF and the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conferences held in Phuket. Interestingly, Thailand has benefited from a comparatively high number of such senior visits despite a decade of political and democratic uncertainty, perhaps underlining again the importance of the longer-term relationship for both sides.

These direct interactions were of course complemented by parallel meetings that took place over a number of years in the EU-ASEAN context (as described in Chapter 4) as well as through ASEM (although this dialogue mechanism carries less weight given its emphasis on informality and unpredictable attendance of the EU's Prime Ministers and Presidents).

Institutional Framework

Again, a previous Chapter has already examined the broader regional institutional mechanisms that help underpin EU-Thai relations: in particular, the ARF, ASEM as well as the SOM were identified. This lower level dialogue is often where the most productive work is done. By way of example, at the November 1999 SOM it was agreed that EU financial support would be directed to the institutional reform process, in particular towards health and the management of environmental protection in coastal areas. At the March 2001 SOM it was decided that EU-Thai co-operation would evolve from a project based approach to an inclusive process, based on a wider policy dialogue. Project financing would be used to facilitate the implementation of co-operation

issues agreed under that dialogue. At the 7th EU-Thailand SOM, held in Bangkok on 28/29 March 2001, the two parties reviewed the state-of-play of the bilateral relationship, notably the ongoing EU cooperation programmes, and agreed on a number of co-operation areas and activities. They also decided on a new institutional arrangement to support the implementation of the work plan, as follows:

- The SOM was to be upgraded to the level of Permanent Secretary (Thailand MFA) and Deputy Director-General (Commission – External Relations DG);
- Regular political contacts between the Commission and the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs will be organised in the margins of multilateral meetings (ASEM, ARF etc.), on an annual basis if necessary, to review bilateral and regional/ multilateral issues (Council Regulation 1440/80 of 30 May 1980, OJ L 144, 10.06.1980).
- A co-ordination mechanism, with 3- monthly meetings, is established to monitor ongoing co-operation at project level and to oversee the follow-up of new project proposals as well as to assess the overall co-operation.

It was also agreed at the SOM that EU-Thai co-operation would be part of an inclusive process whereby project financing is to be used to facilitate the implementation of co-operation issues agreed under a wider policy dialogue

Legal Framework

The 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement is regarded as the most important co-operation agreement that governs the EU's relationship with Thailand. The agreement focuses on trade co-operation, economic co-operation, and development co-operation. In the area of trade co-operation, the GSP is granted to Thai exports entering the EU's market which potentially benefits Thai products enormously. However, as already noted, there have been some conflicts in this area resulting from the removal of GSP for some Thai exports due to their increased competitiveness which has caused Thai producers and the Thai government to protest against the decisions made by the EU on the matter.

EU-Thailand Co-operation

The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2002-2006, 2007-2013

Since 2002, the EU has issued two CSPs, the first released in 2002 for the period 2002-2006 and the second in 2007 for the period 2007-2013. The CSP is a very significant document because it outlines the EU's Thailand strategy and EU co-operation with Thailand. In a sense it tries to give a glimpse into future policy choices and direction. The CSP contains EU co-operation objectives, a country analysis of Thailand, a general co-operation framework, and a future EU co-operation strategy. It outlines an overview of past and ongoing EU-Thailand co-operation programmes including the results and the lessons learnt, bilateral co-operation programmes of EU Member States with Thailand, and co-operation programmes with other parties. The CSP also illustrates in detail the future of EU co-operation strategy with Thailand and identifies priority areas for future co-operation, distinguishing between grouping focal and non-focal areas (cross-cutting issues). The CSP examines how these future co-operation programmes can be made coherent with existing EU policies and how they can complement other EU programmes and co-operation programmes of other parties. It also describes related regional and thematic programmes.

i) CSP for 2002-2006

General EU-Thailand Co-operation Framework

EU-Thailand co-operation began with the Tapioca Agreement to help crop diversification in Thailand and to assist Thai agricultural products gain access to European markets. The EU provided almost €200 million for crop diversification and water irrigation projects in North-eastern part of Thailand in the 1970s and 1980s (EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, p.15). Later, the characteristics of co-operation shifted from development assistance to economic co-operation including on the environment and fisheries, social policies, promotion of small and medium enterprises, and human resource development.

During the 1990s, EU co-operation with Thailand focused on providing technical assistance in the area of social infrastructure, human resource development, poverty, and the environment. The EU introduced numerous multi-level actors into EU-Thailand co-operation including EU business associations, NGOs, universities, and trade associations. The EU has supported the increasing role of NGOs in Thailand in the area of strengthening civil society, refugee assistance, rural area development, and environment. After the Asian Economic Crisis in 1998, the EU shifted the focus of co-operation to assist the Thai government's recovery from the economic and social impact of the crisis including financial reform technical assistance, employment creation, human resources development, social cushioning of the impacts, and rural communities stabilisation programmes. As of June 2005, Thailand was allocated 18 % of the budget of the ASEM Trust Fund (€5.62 million) to support the implementation of 13 projects in the social and financial sectors (EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p.12)¹⁰. Coastal environmental projects were also launched by the EU to assist Thailand in coping with environmental challenges such as the Coastal Habitat and Resource Management (CHARM) and the Sustainable Management of Phu Khieo Wildlife Sanctuary initiatives.

Thailand has participated in EU-ASEAN regional programmes in the area of energy, environment, transport, education and communication technology, as well as ASEM projects. In addition, it is associated with EU-Asia horizontal co-operation programmes such as Asia-Invest Asia-Urbs, Asia IT&C and Asia Ecobest. The EU also provided technical assistance in health care reform to the Ministry of Health of Thailand.

In the area of humanitarian assistance, the EU has provided €8.2 million, with the highest shares allocated under the budget lines for refugees and displaced persons (€2.2 million), HIV/AIDS prevention (€10.4 million) and drugs (€4.8 million) with just €500,000 allocated for human rights protection. However, there have been a significant number of other EU-supported

¹⁰ Note that all of the following figures are also sourced from these two CSPs.

projects/ programmes in Thailand, both bilaterally (in the sectors of energy, public health, environment, narcotics, NGO co- financing, humanitarian assistance, worth a total of €9.3 million), and in the context of regional programmes, such as ASEAN co-operation (€2.2 million), ASIA Co-operation (€66.4 million), and ASEM co-operation (€8.25 million).

Co-operation with EU Member States

Historically, six EU member states have provided co-operation assistance to Thailand - the UK, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The UK's assistance to Thailand has included co-operation in the area of education, human rights, good governance, HIV/AIDS, peacekeeping, health, refugees, and landmines. For example, the funding for 2000/2001, including Thailand's share of the Department for International Development (DFDI) regional programmes, was approximately €2.5 million with ongoing assistance likely to remain at this level, the global financial crisis notwithstanding. Germany has provided co-operation on economic reform and development of a market economy to strengthen the competitiveness of Thai SMEs. Funding programmes have included Private-Public Partnerships, advisory services for the industry, co-operation with the German political foundations and scholarships. The commitment amounted to approximately €1.3 million for 2001 and 2002.

Denmark has provided development assistance through DANIDA to the Mekong River Commission and the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT). These two programmes amount to about € million annually, for a total of five years. For Finland, cooperation is mostly on a regional basis with a focus on poverty alleviation and improvement of the environment in the Mekong River Region, including financial support to the Asia Europe Environmental Technology Centre (AEETC) and the AIT. Additional co-operation assistance goes to small-scale projects run by local NGOs and industrial joint ventures in Thailand through Finnfund.

Sweden has provided financial assistance to Burmese refugees in Thailand of €2.2 million annually. Sweden is also the second biggest foreign donor to the AIT and also contributes

substantially to the Mekong River Commission and to the UNEP environmental programme for Thailand. In technical co-operation, soft loans are awarded and some 50 Thais to participate annually in advanced training courses in Sweden.

The Netherlands has provided financial support to the Burmese Border Consortium and acts as coordinator of aid to Burmese refugees in Thailand. Assistance was provided through the Dutch NGO ZOA which amounted to US\$1.2 million in 2001. Assistance in the area of primary, secondary and vocational education to Burmese refugees in the period 2000-2002 was US\$0.9 million. The Netherlands also financed a programme for the promotion of private investments by Dutch companies that have positive developmental and environmental effects in Thailand, amounting to €4.5 million.

The 2002-2006 CSP also outlined the EU's future strategy regarding political and external relations which defined EU-Thailand political relations in the following period. The CSP stated that:

In the area of political and external relations issues, the Commission should see to it that the EC-Thailand dialogue be strengthened to include (1) co-operation in international organisations (United Nations, EC-ASEAN dialogue including the ARF process, ASEM); (2) co-operation and exchange of views as regards political developments in the region (Philippines, Indonesia, Burma/Myanmar, South-China Sea); and (3) co-operation on trans-national issues (illegal migration, piracy, trafficking in human beings etc.). (EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, p.20)

These conditions laid down the foundation for EU-Thailand political co-operation in this five-year period. The CSP stresses the importance of economic co-operation with mutual benefits over development co-operation expressed in the following terms:

Also, given Thailand's economic recovery over the last three years and present socioeconomic indicators, and the increasing importance of economic relations between the EU and Thailand, the main focus of EC assistance should be economic co-operation in the mutual interest. Development co-operation projects should be considered only on an

exceptional basis, and address key national development priorities where the EC could provide a real added value. (p.20)

The resources for EU-Thailand co-operation were allocated from the existing thematic and regional programmes including the ASEAN, ASEM and Asia programmes. For the period of 2002-2006 the EU allocated €13.2 million for bilateral projects with Thailand in the area of economic development. The EU focused on technical assistance and capacity-building activities in the sectors of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-operation. In addition, assistance to public health and health services sector to continue the Health Reform process initiative was provided. Initiatives in other areas covered by the CSP are briefly described below.

Trade, investment and related areas for sustained co-operation: the focus was to provide trade and investment related technical assistance and capacity building to Thailand in the areas outlined in the Doha Ministerial Declaration with particular emphasis on promoting economic reforms, international competitiveness, and implementing the Doha work programme. The EU also committed to assisting Thailand in adapting to developments in EU legislation that might affect EU-Thai trade. In addition, EU-Thai co-operation sought to promote EU investment in Thailand by improving conditions for EU investors through enhancing dialogues between EU and Thai authorities. The EU would also help to promote sustainable long term trade and investment with Thailand.

Public Health System and Health Services Reform: The EU agreed to provide technical assistance for the Thai public health reform process by focusing on increasing efficiency, equity, equality, and social accountability of the system. The EU also provided assistance in the fight against three communicable diseases – HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.

Other areas of EU co-operation that received less attention (the non-focal areas) included science and technology, education and human resources development, environment, energy, social

policy related issues¹¹, refugees and displaced persons, knowledge-based economy and culture. These issues were handled through thematic and regional (ASEAN, ASEM, Asia) co-operation programmes.

Science and Technology: The CSP looked to promote the participation of Thai research institutions in EU research and development programmes for mutual benefit as well as promote researcher exchanges through the EU RTD Framework Programme, the Asia IT&C Programme and the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme.

Education and Human Resources Development: Here, participation under Asia-Link programme was encouraged to strengthen co-operation between EU and Thai universities. The main EU instrument supporting these activities were horizontal programmes - the Asia-Link programme or the ASEAN University Network funded under the budget line for political, economic and cultural co-operation.

Environment: Assistance was offered to Thailand to participate in programmes under the environment and tropical forest budget lines and Asia Ecobest, with an emphasis on disaster preparedness and prevention.

Energy: The CSP sought to promote energy efficiency and conservation through ASEAN-EU Energy Facility and COGEN III Programme.

Social Policy Related Issues¹²: There are four main issues in this area. *Fight Against Drug Production and Trafficking*: The CSP focused on reducing demand to complement the activities

¹¹ The social policy related issues mentioned in the CSP were fight against drugs, good governance, fight against trafficking of persons, and death penalty.

¹² The budget lines on drugs, co-financing of NGOs, democracy, and human rights will finance these programmes.

carried out in the context of EC-ASEAN (Co-operation on Precursor Control) and the ASEM dialogue process. *Good Governance*: providing technical assistance focused on respect for human rights (NGOs and the National Human Rights Commission). *Fight Against Trafficking of Persons*: to assist Thailand on this issue, particularly the of women and children. □*Death Penalty*: to initiate co-operation with governmental bodies and civil societies on this issue.

Refugees and Displaced Persons: the CSP was to strengthen co-operation with Thai governmental bodies and international bodies (ECHO and UNHCR) in providing humanitarian aid to refugees in refugee camps and villages in border areas especially the Thai-Burmese border with a focus on Karen, Karenni, and Shan people. Assistance was to focus on protecting the refugees from military clashes along the borders.

Knowledge-based Economy and Culture: A bilateral dialogue to establish connections between e-ASEAN Framework Agreement and e-Europe in order to assist Thailand in ITC development field was proposed as was co-operation through the EC's RTD Framework Programme.

The CSP also outlined the EU's intention to promote trilateral co-operation between Thailand and the EU to provide assistance to its neighbouring countries through EU-ASEAN dialogue. Sub-regional co-operation was also to be considered with a view to promoting regional integration in ASEAN.

Bilateral assistance to Thailand from 2002-2006 amounted to €13.2 million (with €10 million allocated under the 2002-2004 National Indicative Programme (NIP) with an additional €3.2 million allocated under the 2004-2006 NIP). The 2002-2004 NIP provided financial support for technical assistance for the reform of the Thai public health service (a total of €5 million) and the establishment of an EC-Thailand Small Projects Facility (SPF) to support trade and

investment-related projects (also €5 million). In 2005, 19 projects out of 60 proposals received funding totaling almost €3 million under the SPF programme. In 2006, 10 projects were selected for SPF funding (worth €1 million). The SPF programme also allowed the EC Delegation to Thailand to manage 10 percent of SPF funding designed to provide technical assistance to the Thai government on trade-related issues. The 2004-2006 NIP allocated an additional €3.2 million for scholarships for Thai graduate students in the "Thailand Window" of the Erasmus Mundus programme of the EU.

ii) CSP for 2007-2013

The 2007-2013 CSP proclaimed that the "the future Thai-EC partnership will concentrate on co-operation in a wide range of areas of mutual interest as agreed under the draft Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) by drawing on both partners' expertise" (Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p.3). For this 2007-2013 7-year period, the CSP defined the focal areas of EU-Thailand co-operation as follows:

- deepening the Thai-EC relationship in various areas of strategic importance and mutual interest to both partners, with a particular focus on economic relations, scientific and technology co-operation as well as higher education and culture
- addressing specific capacity constraints crucial to advancing Thailand's national development agenda
- advancing co-operation on a more modern agenda including good governance, justice and home affairs issues, human rights and mine action
- increasing mutual awareness between Europe and Thailand (p.3)

Informed by these priorities, a series of EU projects and programmes with Thailand were initiated including the following:

- Bilateral co-operation: 3 projects in the sectors of public health, environment/ natural resources, and economic co-operation (a total of €18 million).
- ASEAN co-operation: 24 projects in the sectors of higher education, IPR and standards, energy, environment, economic co-operation (€8.31 million).
- Asia co-operation: 51 projects in the sectors of higher education, trade and investment, environment, IT&C (€13.67 million).
- ASEM co-operation: 2 projects in the sector of financial and social sector reform (€6.23 million).
- Horizontal (NGO) budget-lines/ programmes: 5 projects in the sectors of health and the environment (€4.23 million).
- Support to uprooted populations (budget line for aid to uprooted people) and Humanitarian assistance (ECHO): 14 projects (€19.26 million). (p.13)

Co-operation with EU Member States

Co-operation with individual EU Member States has focused on providing policy advice, technical assistance, and capacity building. Direct financial assistance was reduced significantly. Areas of co-operation include enterprise competitiveness, environmental management, higher education, and research collaboration. The EU Delegation in Bangkok played the role of co-ordinator between EU Member States' Development Co-operation Counsellors to ensure policy coherence. EU Member States' co-operation with Thailand certainly decreased when compared with the 2002-2006 period and the 2007-13 CSP only mentioned three main donors – Germany, France, and Denmark – as opposed to six donors previously (the UK, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands). The emergence of France as a key Member State in this area was, however, notable.

Germany's co-operation programme focused on strengthening the competitiveness of SMEs in the agro-industry sector by improving business development services. The programme

provided yearly financial resources of €3.5 million until 2007. France's co-operation programme concentrated on higher education, research collaboration, capacity building and human resource development across a wide range of areas. France also sought to explore the possibility of trilateral co-operation activities with Thailand in its neighbouring countries. Denmark's co-operation concentrated on Natural Resource management, urban environmental management, sustainable energy and the Clean Development Mechanism with the Partnership Facility Programme promoting the involvement of the private sector in environmental activities.

The EU's Priorities for Co-operation

The CSP proposed the creation of a Thailand-EC Co-operation Facility which is an instrument, inspired by the earlier SPF to enable technical assistance in all sectors of mutual interests as referred to in the PCA.... The advantage of a more comprehensive Thailand-EC Co-operation Facility lies in the increased flexibility to leverage meaningful and highly visible interventions as needed and to respond to the dynamics and fast changing challenges and opportunities arising in an evolving relationship with Thailand. (Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p.18)

The Thailand-EC Co-operation Facility's main focus was economic co-operation in areas of mutual interest. The Co-operation Facility sought to support Thailand's economic reforms and international competitiveness. Technical assistance and capacity building in trade-related and investment-related areas was foreshadowed including: customs co-operation and those outlined in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, issues related to EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations, regional economic integration, and adaptation to developments in EU regulations, mandatory and voluntary market requirements¹³.

The Co-operation Facility also promoted the facilitation of knowledge flows and collaboration in science, technology, higher education and research. Thailand was encouraged to

¹³ These include food safety, core labour rights and standards, environmental regulations, industrial standards, consumer protection, customs co-operation, air and marine transport, IPRs, GMOs, labelling, CSR and etc..

participate in the EU's 7th Research Framework Programme which could provide co-operation in these fields. The activities promoted under the Co-operation Facility included:

- exchange of information, know-how and best practices in science and technology;
 - sustainable co-operation between universities and the scientific communities of the EU and Thailand such as facilitation of joint research projects, exchange of professors and scientists, etc;
 - human resource development and capacity building (training courses, seminars and conferences);
- and,
- activities in the area of employment and social policy and environment.

In addition, the Co-operation Facility was also designed to support activities that could foster EU-Thai co-operation in areas such as good governance, human rights, and mine removal. The Co-operation Facility complemented the TREATI and READI initiatives on EU-ASEAN co-operation.

Cross-cutting Issues

Unsurprisingly, the EU was committed to incorporating gender equality issues into EU-Thailand co-operation in order to promote female participation in economic-decision making at local levels, regional and international conferences, workshops, and exchange programmes. In addition, the EU aimed to strengthen the social dimension of globalisation including matters related to the international management and governance of globalisation, and the promotion of decent work for all. The impact on employment and social cohesion were to be considered under the trade and investment co-operation heading with Thailand as were improved working and social conditions in Thailand. Another issue under the Co-operation Facility concerned environment and natural resources management where co-operation was to concentrate on strengthening technical expertise and the planning capacity of Thai institutions regarding this issue. Lastly, the activities under the Co-operation Facility had explicit conditionality in the form of promoting the best practice of European good governance and human rights for Thai government officials as well as providing technical assistance in monitoring the respect of human rights by NGOs and other bodies.

Regional and Thematic Programmes

The EU also expressed their intention to pursue thematic co-operation in the following areas: democracy and human rights, human and social development, migration and asylum, environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy, non-state actor development, and higher education (mobility). Funding for these activities was to come from the MIP, Asia-wide programmes, ASEAN programmes, the Instrument for Stability, Aid for Uprooted People, and ECHO.

IV. Coup d'état and the Impact on EU-Thailand Political Relations

The Coup d'état on 19th September 2006

On 19th September 2006, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army along with the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Royal Thai Navy, the Royal Thai Air Force staged a successful, bloodless coup d'état against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his caretaker government on the charges of "corruption/conflict of interest, abuse of power, infringing on the ethics and moral integrity of the country's leader, interference in the system of checks and balances, policy flaws that lead to human rights violations and creating rifts and destroying unity of the public and instigating confrontation" (*The Nation*, 21st September 2006, no author). The timing was well calculated as Prime Minister Thaksin was in New York City for a UN General Assembly meeting and thus was unable to salvage the situation. Other key members of the Cabinet were also at international conferences outside the country and could not actively resist the military take-over. The September 2006 coup d'état was the seventeenth such coup the country had seen since 1932. To understand why the military seized power from Prime Minister Thaksin, the political turmoil in the country as well as internal conflicts within the Thai Army must be examined. Only then can the reaction from the EU and the impact of the coup d'état on EU-Thailand political relationship be properly considered.

Political Situation Prior to the Coup

In 2006, Prime Minister Thaksin was under enormous pressure from the "Yellow Shirts" or the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), led by Sondhi Limthongkul and Major General Chamlong Srimuang, which accused him of corruption and conflict of interest, among other charges. The PAD, which was composed of mostly upper and middle class citizens, organised rallies and protests with the goal of forcing Prime Minister Thaksin to resign his position. PAD was formed after Prime Minister Thaksin's family sold their shares of Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings of Singapore for 73 billion Baht or approximately US\$1.88 billion. The PAD accused Prime Minister Thaksin of amending the law to allow higher foreign ownership in telecommunication companies just prior to the sale of his company¹⁴, avoided paying tax on the capital gains of the sale, and selling a national security-related company to a foreign company.

Apart from pressure from the PAD, Prime Minister Thaksin and his government had been in a critical political situation ever since he called for a house dissolution on 24 February 2006. The subsequent election was held on 2 April 2006 which the Democrat Party refused to contest. The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party ended up winning 462 out of the 500 seats. However, the ratio of voters to no-voters was 16:10 causing the result of the election to be heavily criticised by the public. By-elections were also needed for 38 TRT candidates who had won with less than 20% of the votes cast¹⁵. On 8 May 2006, the Constitutional Court ruled that the April election was invalidated on the grounds that "the ballot booths were placed in a way to compromise voting privacy despite the fact that the constitution stipulates that the voting has to be direct and secret"¹⁶. The Court then set a new election date to be held on 15 October 2006.

¹⁴ The Thai Telecommunication Act (2006) became effective on 23 January 2006, raising the limit on foreign holdings in telecom companies to 49% which replaced the Telecom Business Law (2001), that put the foreign investment cap at 25%.

¹⁵ The Nation, "Election Result: 38 One-Horse Candidates Failed", 4 April 2006, http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/04/03/headlines/headlines_30000858.php

¹⁶ The Nation, "[Constitution Court invalidate the April election and order new election](http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/05/08/headlines/headlines_30003512.php)", 9 April 2006, http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/05/08/headlines/headlines_30003512.php

Surin Pitsuwan, the then Secretary General of ASEAN Secretariat, in an interview during an "Asian Voices in Europe" lecture gave his support for the coup due to the following reasons:

Over the last six years, democracy in Thailand had been centralised around one person, and one clique. Civil liberties had been contained, the media intimidated and the government bureaucracy politicised. The system of checks and balances had disappeared as the constitutional body was filled with people who toed the line, so by 19 September 2006, little democracy was left in the country. Unfortunately, Thailand had taken the path of other emerging democracies such as Venezuela, Nicaragua or Russia, where the population felt under pressure from globalisation and believed that strong leadership would protect them and their livelihoods. Thaksin's government had played on this fear, using a strong dose of nationalism, and populism, sustaining its support through corruption and taking a very authoritarian line, stamping out opposition in parliament, sidelining environmentalists and silencing journalists.

(Asian Voices in Europe, 2007, p.30)

Thaksin's leadership had reached such a great level of power that it soon began to expose its weaknesses through deep corruption, conflict of interests, controversial deals and the failure of its unsustainable populist programmes and schemes. Institutions and norms had been subverted to the extent that they challenged the very traditional values and institutions of society.

(p.34)

Surin concluded that to the outside world, it might seem that Thailand was lost in transition, but from the Thai perspective, it was a necessary and corrective coup. He believed that there had been "no other way to stop the train running at high speed that was going to wreck everything". (p.31)

Internal Conflict within the Thai Army

One of the catalysts of the 2006 coup d'état was the internal conflict within the Royal Thai Army that was caused by interventions of Prime Minister Thaksin. Thaksin used his authority to promote his cousin, General Chaiyasit Shinawatra, to Commander-in-Chief in 2003. His promotion was extremely controversial in the Thai Army because General Chaiyasit was an Engineers corps officer and traditionally Engineers corps officers have never been promoted to commander-in-chief of the Army. General Chaiyasit was also not in the direct command line to become the commander-in-chief of the Army. He had been transferred from the Army to an advisor position

in the Supreme Command Headquarters in 2001. When Prime Minister Thaksin came into power so did General Chaiyasit. He gradually rose to power with the Prime Minister's help and was eventually appointed the commander-in-chief of the Army, a promotion that caused a rift in the Army. Many high ranking officers began to dislike the Prime Minister for his intervention in the appointment of the commander-in-chief. However, General Chaiyasit was Commander-in-Chief for only one year before being transferred to the position of Commander of Supreme Command Headquarters.

Prime Minister Thaksin graduated from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (AFAPS), and therefore, he had many friends in the Armed Forces. Through his interventions his classmates were promoted to high ranking positions during his time as Prime Minister. Seniority, which represents the tradition of the Thai Army, was ignored by the Prime Minister. His friends were promoted to influential positions over their senior officers causing internal conflicts within the Army. As a result, the Army was divided into three factions: a pro-Thaksin group, a neutral group, and an anti-Thaksin group.

Two important army figures were responsible for planning and staging the 2006 coup d'état – General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and General Anupong Paochinda. Prior to the coup d'état, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and General Anupong Paochinda was the Commander of 1st Army Area. The conflict between Prime Minister Thaksin and General Anupong originated from Prime Minister Thaksin's plan to appoint General Pornchai Kranlert to be the next commander-in-chief of the Army. Both General Anupong and General Pornchai were classmates of the Prime Minister but due to personal reasons General Pornchai was chosen by Prime Minister Thaksin even though he was not in the direct line of command to be the commander-in-chief. At that time, General Pornchai Kranlert was promoted to the Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army, waiting to replace General Sonthi. This decision meant that General Anupong would be over-looked for the position even though he was in the direct line of promotion. Prime Minister Thaksin's classmates in the Army were divided between two groups –

those supporting General Pornchai and those behind General Anupong. There was silent conflict between them. This incident led to General Anupong's decision to stage the coup d'état against Prime Minister Thaksin on 19 September 2006.

General Sonthi, although appointed by Prime Minister Thaksin, knew that he would soon be replaced by General Pornchai as the commander-in-chief. Not wanting to let go of his position, General Sonthi together with General Anupong decided to stage a coup d'état against Prime Minister Thaksin just as Prime Minister Thaksin's popularity was declining and under heavy attack by the PAD.

In the evening of 19 September 2006, Thailand yet again witnessed a coup d'état after fifteen years of uninterrupted democracy. General Sonthi deployed troops from the Special Forces Headquarters from Lopburi province into Bangkok to control key government buildings and key areas while General Anupong ordered his troops in Bangkok and nearby provinces to control the city. The troops were met with no resistance from the government. Key members of the Cabinet were detained or were ordered to report to the Army Headquarters. Some ministers fled the country or went underground. Prime Minister Thaksin, stuck in New York City, tried to salvage the situation by broadcasting from New York City. His statement contained the reassignment order of General Sonthi from Commander-in-Chief to a position in the Prime Minister's Office among other messages. Unsurprisingly, no one followed his orders as by then the Army had full control of Bangkok and the country. The interesting aftermath was that the people of Bangkok clearly welcomed the coup as indicated when they greeted the troops with flowers, food and refreshments. No single person was injured or killed during the 2006 coup d'état.

After General Sonthi and other chiefs of the Armed Forces, who now called themselves the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), had taken full control of the country, they immediately dissolved both houses of the parliament, the Cabinet, the Constitutional Court, and suspended the Constitution. Martial Law was imposed throughout the country banning political activities and

freedom of the media. On 1 October 2006, the CDR then appointed an interim government to govern the country until the next general election which was set to be held in October 2007. The person chosen to be the new prime minister for the interim government was General Surayud Chulanont, the Privy Councilor to King Bhumibol Adulyadej and an ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The CDR then transformed itself into the Council of National Security to oversee the interim government and the security of the country. Thaksin, unable to return to Thailand, had to first take refuge in the UK (and elsewhere subsequently) and since then has been running his political party and plotting strategies to return to power from outside Thailand.

Reaction of the EU to the Coup d'état

After the coup d'état took place on 19 September 2006, the EU Finnish Presidency immediately released an official statement which stated the EU's position regarding the coup d'état which had important implications for the coup leaders:

The Presidency of the European Union condemns the take-over of power from the democratic government of Thailand by the Thai military forces. The Presidency demands that the military forces stand back and give way to the democratically elected political government. Thailand has been living several years without major political turmoil. The Presidency wishes that Thailand will soon be able to return to democratic order.
(EU Presidency, 20 September 2006)

Consequential actions taken by the EU against the interim government headed by General Surayud demonstrated the EU's disapproval of the situation which contradicted the core values of the EU – democracy and the rule of law. All high level meetings and official visits were suspended immediately.

Thus, the EU-Thailand PCA that was under negotiation in 2006 and about to be concluded had to be put on hold because of the coup. As was stated in the CSP (2007-2013): "The PCA is still being negotiated and will only be initialed and signed once a democratically elected government is in place in Thailand" (p.4). As late as 2012, the PCA still had not been concluded and obviously one of the main reasons for this was the aftermath of the coup. Consequently, the

2006 coup has had a detrimental and profound impact on EU-Thailand political relations. On the other hand, Thailand had a general election in 2007 where Thaksin's party again won the election and replaced the interim government. Samak Sundaravej became the new prime minister and it appeared that Thailand was back on track again. However, the PCA still was not concluded. According to Dusit Meksingvee, the business information officer at the EU Delegation to Thailand, there were other sensitive issues that had yet to be agreed by both parties that were primarily responsible for the new delay. There were a number of differing views expressed towards the coup by European policy officials.

Thomas Gnocchi, (Desk Officer for the Thailand, Cambodia and Uprooted People in Asia, South East Asia Unit, DG External Relations, European Commission) stated in an interview that "his department had been monitoring developments closely since the coup and hoped that the period of transition would be used to correct some of the deficiencies in the previous system" (Asian Voices in Europe, 2007, p.31). This demonstrated the fact that even the EU accepted that the previous regime under Thaksin was flawed. However, as David Fouquet, Director of the Asia-Europe Project, noted, the EU does not tolerate military governments and believed that the problem in Thailand should be solved by the people (p.31). He argued that the 2006 coup set a bad example for other countries in the region that are going through a transition process such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Fouquet even mentioned that Burmese leaders used Thailand as an example of the evolution of government processes in the region. He also expressed his disapproval of the defence budget increase of 30% after the coup by the interim Thai Government. Fouquet said he would be following the developments regarding the drafting of the new constitution and institutional relationship because they could have an impact on the political development in other countries in the region. His conclusion was that there were many lessons to be learnt from the 2006 coup.

This Chapter has provided a detailed overview of the formal policy documents underpinning Thai-EU relations during the 1994-2008 period. Their scope and intensity certainly suggested that a

PCA was both an immanent and logical progression in relations. This institutionalization, however, was derailed by an all too familiar political event in Thai domestic affairs – its seventeenth coup d'état – with relations remaining frozen up until and beyond the eighteenth coup d'état in May 2014. This political context stands in stark relief with the closer military and security relations that grew between Thailand and the EU over the same period – symbolized perhaps most dramatically in the joint EU-ASEAN AMM that had full Thai participation. It is to these military and security ties that the next Chapter turns.

Chapter 5: EU-Thailand Bilateral and Regional Military Cooperation

Introduction

The new millennium has witnessed a significant evolution in the EU's long-standing ambition of becoming an effective global actor. One manifestation of this has been in 2003 the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy mechanism (ESDP – latterly renamed CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty) and the subsequent execution of EU-driven military and civilian missions across three continents. Geographically, the EU has extended its historical territorial priorities (the near abroad and the ACP and has reconnected with Asia through the ASEM process. In both of these areas, however, the EU is confronted by the reality of American competition, status and military authority. Research drawing on empirical case-studies that address this new phenomenon is rare, while bilateral examples may only provide a limited capacity for more general conclusions, this chapter explores EU relations with Thailand from the perspective of this emerging EU military and security agenda.

Although Thailand was never colonised by a European power, undeniably Europe has been playing an important role in shaping the Thai military throughout its history. Thailand has had an interest in Western military developments since the sixteenth century and the Thai military first began using Western fire-arms in the early 1800s. Battye has noted that

[a]t least since the Crawford negotiations of 1824, in which fire-arms were the favourite Siamese subject of discussion, men like Captain Hunter ("Sir Good Weapon") and Monsieur Joseph (the Armenian) had trafficked in fire-arms, perhaps the most sought after Western trade item.

(1974, p.56)

King Vajiravudh (King Rama VI, 1910-1925) was the first Thai monarch to be educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK, while the first naval instructor of the Royal Thai Navy in 1893 was a European, as recalled by Admiral Prida Karasuddhi, the former Deputy

Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces: "Thailand has long-standing relations with Denmark, the first naval instructor of the Royal Thai Navy was Danish. When French gunboats attacked Phra Chulachomklao Fortress, our instructor was Danish".¹⁷ (Interview with Admiral Prida Karasuddhi, former Deputy Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces, 28 February 200). Since the reign of King Chulalongkorn (King Rama V, 1868-1910), Thailand has also sent cadets to military academies in Germany.¹⁸

After World War II, Western Europe began to lose its former strategic influence in Southeast Asia. The USA, China, and Russia emerged as important strategic actors in the region during Cold War era and have remained so until the present day. Since 1950, the USA has been Thailand's major strategic partner and has provided significant levels of assistance to the Thai military. This context characterises and colours Thailand's current military relations with the EU and its Member States. Consequently, this chapter examines both the contemporary EU-Thai military relations at bilateral and regional levels, as well as US-Thai military relations to illustrate, for comparative purposes, the significant role played by America in this area. The chapter also examines bilateral military relations between Thailand and three key EU Member States – France, Germany and Italy and investigates the level of EU manufactured military equipment in the Thai armed forces. The chapter concludes by focusing on EU-Thai military cooperation at the regional level by examining the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) that was deployed in 2005 and evaluates the potential for future military cooperation between the EU and Thailand.

Much of the military data presented here is unavailable elsewhere and this analysis has benefited greatly from access to Thai military sources and personal interviews with key military personnel. For security reasons, limited information was available in the analysis. Key documents

¹⁷ Original version of the interview in Thai “ประเทศไทยมีความสัมพันธ์เก่าแก่กับเดนมาร์ก

ครูทหารเรือคนแรกของกองทัพเรือเป็นคนเดนมาร์ก ตอนที่เรือรบฝรั่งเศสมาบุกป้อมพระจุลฯ ครูของเราคือเดนมาร์ก”.

¹⁸ German-Thai military information has been provided by Captain Chaiyapruk Didyasarin (the Air Attaché, Berlin, Germany) and the Directorate of Intelligence (Royal Thai Army) and the Directorate of Operations (Royal Thai Army).

and reports were provided by Thai Defence Attachés (France and Germany), the Thai Ministry of Defence, the Directorate of Intelligence (Royal Thai Army), and the Directorate of Operations (Royal Thai Army). Interviews were conducted with military officials, both European and Thai, in Bangkok, Thailand during the course of 2006 to 2008.

In the American Shadow: US-Thailand Security Relations

For Thailand the United States emerged after World War II as the principal guarantor of the country's independence against hostile regional powers. For the United States, Thailand became an important regional ally, a 'front-line state' in an area threatened both by overt Communist Chinese and Vietnamese expansionist policies and by domestic insurgencies aligned with revolutionary Communist regimes (Muscat, 1990, p.18)

The 1954 Manila Pact of the since dissolved Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué represent the foundations of the long-established Thai-US security relations (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). Article IV(1) of the Manila Pact stipulates that "in the event of armed attack in the treaty area, each member would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process" (US State Department, 2015). The Thanat-Rusk communiqué in 1962 stated that the US "regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interests of the United States" (Muscat, 1990, p.22) and "the United States would act even without consensus to do so on the part of the other SEATO member" (p.22). In October 2003, Thailand was given the status of a major non-NATO ally by US President George W. Bush. This special status has provided the country with further access to US foreign aid and military assistance.

During the Cold War era, Thai-US security relations grew significantly because Thailand was a major US ally in fighting against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. When the Korean War erupted in 1950, the Thai government sent more than 6,500 soldiers to participate in the UN-led mission. This action led to the signing of the US-Thai military assistance agreement later that

same year. This agreement established the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) which functions as a US military mission overseeing Thai-US military cooperation in Thailand and which continues to operate up to the present day.

Since 1950, the US has provided a significant amount of military aid and development to Thailand. Between 1955 and 1963, the US provided funding worth US\$18 million for military aid projects that included airfield upgrades, the installation of a military communication network between Bangkok and North-eastern provinces, and the construction of military facilities at Sattahip naval base on the eastern coast of the country (Muscat, 1990). The US Navy Seabee units together with the Thai Army have built roads connecting important strategic locations to increase military mobility in event of invasion by China or North Vietnam.

The USA began stationing American troops in Thailand when the civil war in Laos broke out in 1961. However, the major deployment of US forces in Thailand only took place after 1966 when America became heavily involved in the Vietnam War. At its peak there were up to 50,000 American soldiers in Thailand and the US operated bombing raids and rescue missions from its military bases in the country (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). The Thai government also sent Thai soldiers to assist the US in Laos and Vietnam. During the same period, the US assisted Thailand in fighting domestic Communist insurgencies that were started in 1965 by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and were backed by China and North Vietnam. More recently, during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, the USA was authorised by the Thai government to use Thai ports and airfields to transport troops, military equipment and logistics to the Middle East. The US Department of Defense has adopted a plan to transform and realign US troops around the world to establish a more mobile and capability-based force. In Southeast Asia, the US plans to use military facilities in host countries on a temporary basis to conduct US military operations and training in order to decrease the costs of maintaining a permanent base. The US refers to this practice as "cooperative security location" (CSL); a concept in which the USA provides military aid in return for the use of military facilities in host countries.

Since the September 11 attacks in America in 2001, Thailand has supported US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq through troop deployments. The Thai government sent 130 soldiers to Afghanistan to assist American troops in the reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. In 2003, 450 Thai soldiers were deployed to Karbala in southern Iraq to assist with reconstruction of the city and to provide medical assistance for Iraqis. The troops remained in Iraq until September 2004. During that time there were two Thai military casualties as a result of a car bomb attack. In addition to participating in these military operations, it has been reported - though not confirmed – that the CIA used Thailand as a black site to secretly hold and interrogate suspected terrorists.

Bilateral security cooperation between the USA and Thailand can be divided into six categories: security assistance, military exercises, training, intelligence, law enforcement, and counter narcotics (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). The US has provided Thailand with funding for the purchase of military weapons and equipment through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme. In 2006, it was estimated that the USA granted US\$1.485 million under FMF to the Thai military (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). In addition to the FMF programme, Thailand also receives used US military weapons and equipment through the Excess Defense Article (EDA) programme, thanks to the country's major non-NATO ally status. Since 1950 the USA has provided training for Thai military officers under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme: by 1997, more than 20,000 Thai military officers had received training under this scheme (Chanlett-Avery, 2006). In 2006, it was estimated that Thailand received US\$2.376 million in funding under the IMET programme (one of the highest recipients in the world). Thailand also enjoys peacekeeper training by the US military under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Recently, the Thai government sent 800 peacekeepers to Sudan under the UN-led peacekeeping mission.

The USA and Thailand participate in over 40 joint military exercises each year. Cobra Gold is the largest annual joint military exercise. Cobra Gold 2008, held in Thailand, marked the 27th anniversary of this regional joint military exercise and saw the USA, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan participate in the event. Cobra Gold training exercises cover computer simulated staff exercises, field training exercises, and humanitarian/civic assistance projects (USPACOM).

In the area of intelligence, Thailand and the US have strengthened their intelligence cooperation since the September 11 attacks. The Counter Terrorism Intelligence Centre (CTIC) was created in Thailand in 2001 as a joint Thai-US effort to combat terrorism by sharing facilities and information. CTIC activities resulted in the capture of Jemaah Islamiyah leader, Hambali near Bangkok in August 2003. Thailand and the USA also coordinate intelligence cooperation on drug trafficking and military intelligence.

Additionally, and since 1998, the USA has been involved with providing legal training for law enforcement officers from countries in Southeast Asia at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok. The main goal of ILEA is to strengthen the efficiency of law enforcement officials to combat transnational crime and to enhance intra-regional cooperation. The US agencies involved are the Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal Revenue Service. The USA and Thailand have also been cooperating in counter-narcotics activities. The US Drug Enforcement Agency together with the Thai law enforcement agencies coordinate their resources to arrest international drug traffickers.

The Thai coup d'état in September 2006 caused US-Thai relations to be put on hold and American military cooperation was suspended for eighteen months. However, a return to normal relations was signalled by Admiral Timothy J. Keating, US Navy, Commander of US Pacific Command, in a statement on 12 March 2008 confirming that the "December 2007 elections and certification of

a democratically-elected government has allowed us to move forward - at an appropriate pace – with restoration of our military relations with Thailand, a major regional ally”.¹⁹

EU Member States-Thailand Military Relations

The EU, at the European level, does not have military relations with Thailand. Relations are more on a nation-to-nation basis. France, Germany, Spain, and the UK maintain strong military ties with the Royal Thai Armed Forces... [The EU] are lacking a lot in terms of political agreements and military agreements. Even though the European Corps is already established and their missions and responsibilities are stated, there is no strong commitment on the missions that this corps would be used in the future...we are lacking way behind economic and political process in the military agreement and military influence in the rest of the world or military relationship with single country like would be the case with Thailand. (Captain Jose Manuel Verdugo Paez²⁰, the Spanish Defence Attaché to Thailand.)

The EU and Thailand do not have a specific bilateral military cooperation agreement. The EU-Thai security relationship is instead conducted under the framework of EU-ASEAN security cooperation. The ASEAN Regional Forum is the stage on which the EU and ASEAN members – including Thailand – discuss and cooperate on security matters. In the area of EU-Thai military relations, the principal relationships are between individual EU Member States and Thailand. The Royal Thai Armed Forces have eight defence attachés stationed in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. This section examines bilateral military relations between Thailand and three key EU Member States – France, Germany and Italy²¹.

i) France²²

¹⁹ Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy (Commander of U.S. Pacific Command) before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture on 12 March 2008.

²⁰ Interview with Captain Jose Manuel Verdugo Paez, 10 March 2008, Defence Attaché, Defence Office, Embassy of Spain in Bangkok, Thailand.

²¹ Due to the sensitive nature of the information, access to comparable data on the UK and Spain was not available.

²² French-Thai military information has been provided by Colonel Raksak Rojpimpun (Defense Attaché, Royal Thai Embassy, Paris), Captain Chatchai Thongsaard (Naval Attaché, Royal Thai Embassy, Paris), and the Thai Defence Ministry.

Thailand and France have a long established military relationship. King Prajadhipok (King Rama VII, 1925-1935) attended the *École Supérieure de Guerre* in France with General Charles de Gaulle which led to the strengthening of political, diplomatic, and military relations between France and Thailand during the inter-war period. Thai Field Marshal Phibun was educated at the prestigious *Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan* (Saint-Cyr) and between 1921-1923 there were six Thai cadets studying at the French military academy (Bumroongsook, 1991). In 1948, Thailand and France officially exchanged defence attachés in order to develop and strengthen their bilateral military cooperation.

Military Agreements - The signing of the "Agreement on Military Logistics Cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the French Republic" on 26 April 2000 represented a significant step in enhancing military relations between France and Thailand. This agreement established the Joint Franco-Thai Logistics Committee with the objective of enhancing military relations and logistics cooperation between military logistics organisations in both countries. The Joint Committee has convened annually since 2001: France and Thailand alternate as hosts of the meeting. During the 5th Joint Franco-Thai Logistics Meeting held in Bangkok (18-21 July 2006), committee members from both sides discussed the results of military logistics cooperation in 2005, including the exchange of military equipment and weapons procurement information between the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the French government.

During an official visit to Thailand, President Jacques Chirac and Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra issued a "Joint Declaration in the Field of Defence between France and Thailand" on 18 February 2006. This declaration has significantly bolstered the Franco-Thai military relationship. The objective of the declaration is to enhance defence cooperation between the Ministries of Defence and the armed forces under a bilateral framework. In addition, the declaration established the Franco-Thai Defence Committee to oversee and promote military cooperation between the two countries. Consequently, on 24 February 2006, the French Defence Ministry proposed a draft "Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) on Defence Cooperation between

the Ministry of Defence of France and the Ministry of Defence of Thailand "to the Thai Defence Ministry. This draft MoA focuses on the following:

1. Cooperation areas were to include: strategic analysis; high level official meetings; military equipment; personnel exchanges in various fields; education; official visits to ports, airports, and military bases; command headquarters and field operation training.
2. Establishment of the Franco-Thai Defence Committee. The committee would be responsible for initiating, coordinating, and promoting cooperation activities. It also was required to investigate new cooperation initiatives and supervise the implementation of security and defence cooperation initiatives mandated in the Franco-Thai Action Plan.
3. An Agreement on the Status of Force.
4. An Intelligence Security Agreement.

The Thai Defence Ministry subsequently consulted with the Supreme Command Headquarters, Royal Thai Army, Royal Thai Air Force, and the Royal Thai Navy. The draft MoA was returned to the French Defence Ministry in December 2006 after some amendments were made on the Thai side. The French Defence Ministry reviewed the revised draft and made some additional minor adjustments: however, as a consequence of the Thai coup in September 2006, the French Defence Ministry postponed the signing of the MoA until an elected government returned to office. In February 2008, after Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and the coalition government resumed office, the French Defence Ministry proceeded with the signing of MoA. The French Defence Ministry also proposed an additional MoA on education exchanges for officers and cadets. The Thai Defence Ministry reviewed the MoA and recommended that the signing of this MoA was essential to further enhancing Franco-Thai military cooperation and would lead to a stronger relationship.

Education - The French Armed Forces have provided scholarships and funding for Thai cadets and military officers to attend military institutions in France since the early 1900s. The Royal Thai Navy sent its first naval cadet to attend the *École Navale* in 1956. The current education exchange programmes provided on an annual basis by the French military include:

1. Joint Staff Course: 1 scholarship to attend *Collège Interarmées de Défense* (CID) for a period of 18 months. The scholarship is rotated between the Royal Thai Army, the Royal Thai Navy, and the Royal Thai Air Force.
2. Army Officer Course: 1 scholarship to attend the *Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan*. An army cadet of Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy (CRMA) is eligible for a 6-year scholarship to undertake a Masters Degree. There are currently 10 CRMA cadets studying at Saint-Cyr.
3. Army Officer Course: 1 scholarship to attend the *Lycée Militaire Aix-en-Provence*. An army cadet of CRMA is eligible for a scholarship to study the course designed by the French Army and DCMD.
4. French Language Course: Scholarships are given to language instructors, military cadets, and Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (AFAPS) cadets to learn the French language and to visit France.
5. Information visits to the *Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan*: CRMA instructors and cadets may visit the French military academy for one week.

To reciprocate, the Royal Thai Armed Forces provide one scholarship for a French army officer to study the Staff Course at the Thai Army Staff College for a period of one year. A French cadet from the *Écoles De Saint-Cyr Coëtguidan* is eligible for a scholarship to attend CRMA for a period of three months.

High and mid-level visits and observation missions between the French and Thai armed forces play an essential role in strengthening the military relationship and are regularly undertaken by both sides. From the 5-6 September 2007, an envoy from the Office of the Naval Comptroller of the Royal Thai Navy, visited the French Defence Ministry to observe the French military financial management system. The French armed forces organise seminars annually and provide funding for Thai officers to participate in the events. French Navy battleships in the Indian Ocean sail to Thailand two to three times a year and Thai Navy battleships sail to France on a regular basis during training exercises.

Procurement - One of the consequences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis was that - due to budget constraints - for a decade the Thai armed forces were not in a position to purchase major military equipment from France. Nonetheless, the French government continued to promote the sale of

French military equipment to the Thai government and on 12 September 2005, the Thai Defence Minister approved the purchase of six CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems from the French arms producers Nexter Systems (formerly GIAT) and Lohr Industrie. The purchase came with technical manuals, maintenance and training parts, and two training courses (maintenance and operation). The total amount of the purchase was €25.8 million and the CAESAR system was to be delivered to the Thai armed forces at the end of 2008. Over the last 30-years the Royal Thai Navy has purchased MM-38 Exocet missiles (tactical air-to-air missile) and in the last decade, a Sadral short range anti-air self-defence system from MBDA. In 2007 the Thai Navy purchased the Samahe Helicopter Handling System from DCNS, a French contractor. The French government has always invited high ranking Thai armed forces officers to attend EUROSATORY, the world's premier military equipment exhibition organised by the French Ministry of Defence, the French Procurement Agency (DGA), the French Army, the French Land Defence Manufacturers Association (GICAT), and the General Commission for Exhibition and Events (COGES).

ii) Germany

Formal relations between Germany and Thailand started in 1862 when the "Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation" was signed by the Kingdom of Siam and the German Customs Union on 7th February (von Stechow, 2001). During the reign of King Chulachomkiao (King Rama V) political ties grew stronger as the monarch visited Germany twice (in 1897 and again in 1910) (Sangchai, 2006). In the military field, Battye (1974) has noted the use of German fire-arms (Dreyse and Krupp guns) by the Thai military during the reign of King Mongkut (King Rama IV, 1851-1868). Military contacts commenced during the reign of King Chulalongkorn when Thai princes were sent to study at German military academies as part of the King's military modernisation initiative.

Military Agreements - Although Germany and Thailand have 146 years of established diplomatic relations, prior to 2006 there was no official military cooperation agreement between the two

countries. In April 2005, the Thai Defence Ministry hosted “Fact Finding Mission Talks” with the German Defence Ministry in Bangkok regarding German-Thai security cooperation, the German representatives requested that the two parties hold Staff Talks and Expert Talks on German-Thai security cooperation. In June 2006, the German Defence Ministry proposed German-Thai military cooperation initiatives for consideration by the Thai Defence Ministry (in 2006, Thailand was ranked second in Southeast Asia, after Vietnam, in terms of military assistance from Germany).

The initiatives included:

- Staff talks on military policy to be held in Berlin during April-May 2006;
- Expert talks on military restructuring, personnel planning, military law, education, and proliferation;
- Naval expert talks on education, joint training exercises, and exchange of official visits;
- Air Force expert talks on flight safety conduct, air traffic control, aviation medicine, and military restructuring; and,
- Military training assistance.

After reviewing the proposal, the Thai Defence Ministry made two recommendations regarding the structure of bilateral level meetings and military training assistance. The Thai Defence Ministry suggested that the bilateral-level meetings should follow the format of the Chinese-Thai and Australian-Thai meetings in the sense that there should be three types of meeting: policy level; coordination committee; and working group level. Regarding military training assistance programmes offered by the Germany, Table 5.1 lists those elements that the Thai Defence Ministry was most interested in pursuing.

During the first German-Thai Staff Talks (held in Berlin in May 2006) the issues discussed were varied and included EU and NATO security, ASEAN security cooperation and counter-terrorism, UN missions, German military restructuring, conventional arms control as well as other bilateral issues. Discussions were also held, on German prompting, on the insurgency situation in the southern part of Thailand.

Table 5.1 Thai Preferences for German Military Training Assistance Programmes

Military Restructuring	Secondary Function Press Officer - Practical Training	Missile Production Course
Personnel Management	Public Relations Course	Space Training
Civil Affairs	Intelligence Analysis Course	Flight Course
International Law	LT and MAJ Course - Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineer	Urban Warfare
VIP Security Protection	Staff Course (2 seats)	Jungle Warfare
Detection Technology	Company Basic Training Course	Strategic Designation
UN Military Observer Course	Submarine Course	Arms and Explosives Manufacturing
Logistics Procedures, Division Level	UAV Course	Leather Processing
Finance Management Course	Aviation Medicine Course	Bullet-Proof Vest Production

Military Cooperation - In 2008, there were sixteen active projects under German-Thai military cooperation initiatives (seven projects for the Thai Defence Ministry, four projects for the Thai Army, one for the Thai Navy, and four for the Thai Air Force). These projects were grouped into five categories – military policy, logistics, air defence, medical service, and training. There were two projects under military policy: the German and Thai Defence Ministries planned to hold staff talks on military policy in Bangkok; the Thai Supreme Command Headquarters (SCHQ) and the German military also agreed to have technical/expert talks in Berlin concerning consultation on bilateral annual programmes. In the logistics field, an information visit by the representatives of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) to the German Army was to be organised. In air defence cooperation, a technical/expert talk was scheduled for Köln on air defence between representatives of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) and the German Air Force. In the field of medical service, Thai medical officers from the SCHQ planned to have information visits to Koblenz. The largest category of 2008 projects were for training (eleven projects: three general training, four army training, three air force training, and one navy training project). Thai officers from SCHQ undertook an information visit on general training to Rheinbach. There were a further two technical/expert talks

on general training between the SCHQ and the German military held in Bonn and Thailand. The Royal Thai and the German armies planned to hold four technical/expert talks on general training to be held in Bonn and Köln, while the Royal Thai and the German air forces planned to hold three technical/expert talks on air force training in Kaufbeuren. The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) and the German Navy planned to hold one technical/expert talk on navy training.

Education - The Thai military has been sending cadets to German military academies for more than a century, since the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). Since 1967, the German government has provided scholarships for Thai military officers and cadets to attend German military institutions, such as the *Universität der Bundeswehr München* or the *Helmut-Schmidt-Universität (Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg)*. In general, the German Defence Ministry provides the following dedicated scholarships for the Thai military:

1. *Staff Officer Courses* –Three scholarships annually to Thai military officers to study the Staff Course at *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* in Hamburg for a period of nine months (including a German language course at *Bundessprachenamt Hürt* for a period between 6-12 months).
2. *Army, Air Force, Naval Officer Courses* - Two scholarships for Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy (CRMA) cadets, one scholarship for a Royal Thai Navy Academy (RTNA) cadet, and two scholarships for Royal Thai Air Force Academy (RTAFA) cadets. The scholarship covers enrolment in a German language course at *Bundessprachenamt Hürt* (nine months); internship, military studies, and army/navy/air force preparatory academy (two years); military university (Bachelor and Masters Degree) for a period of four years.
3. *Air Force Aviation Medicine Internship* – One scholarship for a RTAF medical officer. The course includes German language course (as before) and a medical internship at a German Air Force facility.
4. *United Nations Military Observer Course (UNMOC)*: Two scholarships for Thai military officers (Second Lieutenant-Captain) from RTA, RTN, and RTAF. The course is for one-month and is taught in English.

5. *United Nations Staff Officers Course (UNSOC)*: Two scholarships for Thai military officers (Major-Colonel) from RTA, RTN, and RTAF. The course is also for four weeks and again taught in English.

In 2008, there were 51 military officers and cadets studying in German military institutions: four officers studying Staff Officer Course (1 Army, 1 Navy, and 2 Air Force) at *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* in Hamburg; 15 CRMA cadets, 7 RTNA cadets, and 24 RTAFA cadets studying Officer Course at *Universität der Bundeswehr München* and *Helmut-Schmidt-Universität*. In addition, there is one RTAF medical officer under Aviation Medicine Internship in Germany.

iii) Italy²³

Similar to its relationship with Germany, Thailand and Italy have had a long-standing relationship since the signing of the “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ” in 1868 (Sunthoraphan, 2006).

Military Agreement - The Thai and Italian Defence Ministries have an established relationship that has led to the development of military cooperation across various fields, from the exchange of visits by military officials to military procurement from Italian manufacturers. On 24 February 2005, Italy’s Defence Ministry and its Thai counterpart began a negotiation process for a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation. The draft MoU contained provisions concerning bilateral military cooperation, military procurement, and extraterritorial law. The Thai Defence Ministry and the Italian Defence Ministry agreed to create a general framework for military cooperation and decided to establish subcommittees to determine the details for different types of military cooperation. In the military procurement field, Thai officials

²³ Italian-Thai military information has been provided by the Thai Defense Ministry, the Directorate of Intelligence (Royal Thai Army), and the Directorate of Operations (Royal Thai Army).

requested that the clause on military procurement cooperation between the two countries be removed from the draft MoU because the Thai Defence Ministry already had a committee handling this issue. The Ministry stated that this provision could be added later when there was progress in other areas of cooperation. The last provision concerned the extraterritorial law. The Thai Ministry requested that the clause that permitted the extraterritoriality of Italian troops in Thailand be amended so that Italian troops who broke Thai law should be tried in Thailand. At the time of writing, the draft MoU was still being reviewed by the Italian Defence Ministry and had not been concluded, again as a result of the Thai coup in 2006, although negotiations are expected to eventually proceed.

In 2006, the Italian Defence Ministry proposed an additional draft MoU: “Between the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Ministry of Defence of the Italian Republic on Defence Cooperation in Aerospace Technology”. The objective of this draft was to enhance cooperation on satellite imagery training and techniques of signal receiving stations for defence and security purposes. The Italian Defence Ministry offered to provide the following assistance to Thailand:

- techniques of installing the satellite imagery receiving station;
- satellite imagery data;
- technical advisers on aerospace technology;
- aerospace technology education and training programmes;
- data and documents on aerospace technology; and.
- other assistance agreed by both parties.

After reviewing the draft MoU with related agencies (including the Defence Information and Space Technology Department), it was resubmitted to the Italian Defence Ministry for further consideration, but once again, as a result of the Thai coup, this MoU was delayed.

EU Military Equipment in the Royal Thai Armed Forces

As already noted in this thesis, since the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties the EU has increasingly attempted to define its international role and capabilities. One aspect of this has been the emergence of the European/ Common Security and Defence Policy - an area of activity of which involves the European Defence Agency (EDA) established in 2004. In part, this initiative was an attempt at increasing European competitiveness with other major arms producers such as the USA and Russia, as well as to increase intra-EU cooperation in the defence sector and to eradicate duplication where possible. This section reflects on this changing EU dynamic, switching the focus of analysis from key bilateral Member State relations to the military equipment acquired by the Royal Thai Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) supplied by EU Member States. In 2006, the European Commission reported that EU arms exports to Thailand were worth €46 million (European Commission, TDC XIX Ch.93).

According to a US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations”, in 2007 the major EU arms producers were France, the UK, Germany, and Italy who “serve as alternative sources of armaments that the United States choose not to supply for policy reasons” (Grimmett, 2007, p.12). Asia is considered to be the second biggest arms market in the developing world. From 2003-2006, arms transfers to Asia totalled US\$38.8 billion representing 38.7% of the total value of transfer agreements with developing countries. Collectively, EU Member States ranked third in terms of arms agreements with Asian developing countries (at 19.3%) while Russia (37.1%) and the USA (24.4%) ranked first and second respectively. Between 2003-2006, the UK (US\$10.1 billion) and France (US\$8.7 billion) were ranked third and fourth in terms of the value of arms transfer agreements to developing countries, while the US (US\$32.4 billion), Russia (US\$24.6 billion), and China (US\$4.5 billion) were ranked first, second, and fifth respectively. Israel (US\$3.5 billion), Germany (US\$2.7 billion), Spain (US\$2 billion), Italy (US\$1.7 billion), the Netherlands (US\$1.4 billion), and Sweden (US\$1.2 billion) were ranked sixth to eleventh.

The level of military expenditure by Thailand declined markedly after the Asian economic crisis of 1997, and prior to 2007 there were no major military procurements made by the Thai government. However, the September 2006 coup, which removed the Thaksin Shinawatra administration, saw an interim government appointed by the military to govern Thailand. During this period, the military “awarded themselves substantial funding increments in the 2007 and 2008 budgets, which respectively saw 34% and 28 % increases in the allocation to the military” (Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p.365). In 2007, the Thai military also proposed a ten-year modernisation programme worth US\$9.8 billion which would see an increase in the defence budget from 1.58% to 2% of GDP by 2014 (Bitzinger and Mahari, 2008).

Major procurement items from 2007-2008 included 96 Ukrainian BTR-3E1 armoured vehicles, 15,000 TAR-21 assault rifles from Israel, C-802 surface-to-surface missiles and launch systems from China, and new avionics for six C-130H aircraft (Matthews and Maharani, 2008). A recent major arms deal with an EU Member State was in 2007 with the purchase of twelve JAS 39 Gripen Fighters (US\$1 billion), one Saab 340 Erieye AEW aircraft, and one Erieye AEW command-and-control system from Sweden’s Saab. Saab has also agreed to the technology transfer for Gripen by releasing source code data for the aircraft and the weaponry to the Royal Thai Air Force. In addition, the Gripen Package included one year training courses for RTAF pilots, training courses for RTAF mechanics, spare parts for an initial two years, and air-launched missiles (*The Nation*, 17 October 2007).

In October 2002, the Thai government and BAE Systems (representing the British government) signed the “Economic Compensation Agreement”. The objective of this agreement was to upgrade the military equipment of the Royal Thai Armed Forces and generate social development and sustainable economy. The Thai government approved the purchase of twenty-two L119 105mm Light Guns under this agreement. With this purchase, the British government and BAE Systems provided the following: technology transfer for the assembly, integration and

testing of L119 Light Guns; assistance in overhauling one Scorpion CVR (T) Light Tank; and the licensing of the design data package for the 76mm L23 Gun.

The data released by CRS to a large degree portrays the characteristics of the military equipment of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Major arms suppliers to Thailand include the USA, China, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, and Israel. Since the end of World War II, the USA has been the biggest military equipment supplier for Thailand. American military equipment has either been given at no cost or purchased as part of the military assistance given to the Royal Thai Armed Forces, especially during the Cold War era. In 2006, the USA provided US\$1.48 million to Thailand for the purchase of military equipment through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme. And as noted above, Thailand also receives used US military equipment under the Excess Defence Article (EDA) programme, thanks to Thailand's major non-NATO ally status.

However, during the early part of this century EU Member States have been the second biggest suppliers of arms to Thailand. Table 5.2 illustrates EU military equipment in the Royal Thai Army as of 2008. As can be seen, the UK was a major supplier of light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. France was a major supplier of artillery, while Germany supplied armoured personnel carriers and land radar systems. Spain supplied aircraft with Italy and Sweden supplying surface-to-air missiles and towed-guns respectively.

Table 5.2 EU Military Equipment Supplied to the Royal Thai Army²⁴

<u>EQUIPMENT by TYPE</u>	<u>COUNTRY of ORIGIN</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
LIGHT TANK (LT TK)		
Scorpions	UK	127
RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE (RECCE)		
Shorland S52 Mk3	UK	32

²⁴ Army military equipment data compiled from the Institute for Strategic Studies *The Military Balance 2008*, the Thai Defense Attaché to Paris, and the Thai Defense Ministry.

ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER (APC)		
Condor	Germany	18
ARTILLERY (ARTY)		
GIAT LG1 Mk2 (TOWED 105mm)	France	24
L119 105mm	UK	22
AIRCRAFT		
CASA 212 Aviocar (TRANSPORT)	Spain	2
Short 330UTT (TRANSPORT)	UK	2
AIR DEFENCE (AD) AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM)		
Aspide (STATIC)	Italy	N/K
Bofors L/70 40mm (TOWED GUNS)	Sweden	48
RADAR (LAND)		
RASIT (vehicle and artillery)	Germany	N/K

Table 5.3 provides a similar outline for EU military equipment in the Royal Thai Navy. Arguably, the most famous procurement from the EU was the Spanish *Chakri Naruebet* aircraft carrier (US\$175 million) in the 1990s. Italy has been a major supplier of patrol and combatant craft, mine warfare and mine counter-measures vessels, guns, and missiles. The UK has supplied a frigate, guns, torpedoes, aircraft (fighter and training), and helicopters to the navy. Germany has supplied mine warfare and mine counter-measures vessels, and aircraft (maritime patrol and transport). France has supplied amphibious ships, missiles, and helicopter handling systems, while Sweden has been a significant supplier of guns to the navy.

Table 5.3 EU Military Equipment Supplied to the Royal Thai Navy²⁵

<u>EQUIPMENT BY TYPE</u>		<u>QUANTITY</u>
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANT		
Chakri Naruebet (Aircraft Carrier and Helicopter)	Spain	1
Makut Rajakumarn (Frigate)	UK	1
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANT		
Ratcharit (patrol craft with surface-to-surface missile)	Italy	3
Chonburi (fast patrol craft coastal)	Italy	3
MINE WARFARE AND COUNTERMEASURES		

²⁵ Navy military equipment data compiled from the Institute for Strategic Studies *The Military Balance 2008*, interview with Admiral Prida Karasuddhi, and the Naval Attaché to Paris.

Bang Rachan (mine countermeasure coastal)	Germany	2
Lat Ya (mine countermeasure vessel)	Italy	2
AMPHIBIOUS		
Sichang (landing ship tank)	France	2
GUNS		
OTO Melara 76mm/62	Italy	18
Mk 8 4.5 inches	UK	2
Bofors 57mm/70	Sweden	3
OTO Melara 30mm	Italy	N/K
OTO Melara 20mm	Italy	N/K
Oerlikon GAM-BO1 20mm/85	UK	N/K
Breda 40mm/61	Italy	3
Bofors 40mm/70	Sweden	10
TORPEDO		
Sting Ray	UK	N/K
MISSILE		
MM-38 Exocet (tactical surface-to-surface missile)	France	12
Albatros and Aspide (Surface-to-Air Missile)	Italy	2
Sadral (short range anti-air self-defense system)	France	1
NAVAL AVIATION		
AIRCRAFT		
AV-8A Harrier (fighter ground attack)	UK	7
DO-228-212 (maritime patrol)	Germany	5
F-27 MK 200 MPA (maritime patrol)	Germany	3
F-27 400M Troopship (transport)	Germany	2
TAV-8A Harrier (training)	UK	2
HELICOPTER		
Lynx SRS 300 Super Lynx (anti-surface unit warfare)	UK	2
Super Lynx (utility)	UK	2
Samahe DCNS (helicopter handling system)	France	N/K

Table 5.4 illustrates EU military equipment in the Royal Thai Air Force as of 2008. In 2007, the Royal Thai Air Force announced the purchase of twelve JAS-39/CD Gripen fighters (US\$1 billion) from Sweden, the first six of which were delivered in 2009. Historically, the Czech Republic has been a major supplier of training aircraft; the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain supply transport aircraft; and France and Germany also supply training Alpha Jets to the Royal Thai Air Force.

Table 5.4 EU Military Equipment Supplied to the Royal Thai Air Force²⁶

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

JAS-39/CD Gripen (fighter)	Sweden	6
A-310-324 (transport)	UK/France/Germany/Spain	1
A-319 (transport)	UK/France/Germany/Spain	1
Bae-748 (transport)	UK	6
Basler Turbo-67 (transport)	UK	9
G-222 (transport)	Italy	3
Alpha Jet (training)	France/Germany	10
L-39ZA/MP Albatros (training)	Czech	46

HELICOPTER

AS-332L Super Puma (support)	France/Germany	3
AS-532A2 Cougar MkII (support)	France/Germany	3

Thailand’s Future Military Relations – China, Europe, or the USA?

The USA remains Thailand’s most important strategic partner because of its enduring involvement in Southeast Asia. The US constitutes the largest donor of foreign military assistance to Thailand and has a strong influence on the Thai military. Currently, the EU plays a less important role in military affairs in comparison with the USA. Out of twenty-eight EU members, only six (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and UK) have significant military relations with Thailand. And post-Brexit the EU military influence seems destined inevitably to shrink. In an interview with Colonel Somnuek Anakwat, Director of Academic Division at the Royal Thai Army Intelligence School, he reflected that:

The US-Thai military relationship is long established. In principle, the Thai military has always relied on the USA. US-Thai military relations are stronger than our relationship with the EU. The USA has given Thailand the status of a major non-NATO ally. In the Thai armed

²⁶ Air Force military equipment data compiled from the Institute for Strategic Studies *The Military Balance 2008*.

forces, most of our military equipment came from the USA...we have joint training exercises with the USA every year but we do not have any with the EU.²⁷

However, Colonel Somnuek Anakwat also raised an interesting development concerning the possible future direction of Thai military policy. He noted that, “[t]he Thai military is concerned that its current over reliance on the USA has given them monopoly status and has limited our independent military capacity so we are beginning to develop relations with other allies”²⁸. In view of this, the EU may be in a position to take advantage of this situation by presenting itself as an alternative military ally for Thailand – at least position itself to take advantage of this immediately if democracy returns to Thailand as anticipated in 2019. There is a precedent supporting this possibility, in 2007, Sweden signed a MoU with Thailand on the transfer of twelve Gripen fighters after the USA refused to sell F-16 fighters to Thailand (because the country was run by a military appointed government after the September 2006 coup). Such increased pragmatism may well shape the future EU-Thai relationship.

Regarding EU-Thai military cooperation, the EU and Thailand can enhance their military cooperation in crisis management or peacekeeping. The EU is equipped with the expertise and resources while Thailand has been involved in peacekeeping missions all over the world. However, it is crucial to stress the dominant military role of China in Asia. Thailand has developed a strong military relationship with China since the Cold War era and China is Thailand’s second most

²⁷ Interview with an army officer, 17 June, 2008, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army. Original interview in Thai “ความสัมพันธ์ทางการทหารระหว่างไทยกับสหรัฐฯ นั้นมีมานานแล้ว โดยหลักการ กองทัพอไทยจะพึ่งพาสหรัฐฯ มาโดยตลอด ความสัมพันธ์ทางการทหารระหว่างไทยกับสหรัฐฯ นั้นแน่นแฟ้นมากกว่ายุโรป สหรัฐฯ ให้ไทยเป็นเมเจอร์พาร์ตเนอร์นั้นน่าพอใจมาก ในกองทัพไทยอาวุธยุทโธปกรณ์ส่วนใหญ่มาจากสหรัฐฯ...เรามีการฝึกร่วมกันทุกปีแต่เราไม่มีการฝึกร่วมกับยุโรปเลย”.

²⁸ Original interview in Thai

“กองทัพไทยวิตกว่าการพึ่งพาสหรัฐฯ มากเกินไปจะทำให้เกิดการผูกขาดและทำให้เราถูกจำกัดในด้านประสิทธิภาพทางทหารโดยตัวของเราเองเพราะฉะนั้นเราเลยเริ่มที่จะสร้างความสัมพันธ์กับมิตรประเทศอื่นๆ”.

important strategic partner after the USA. China has also become a major arms supplier to Thailand.

An important factor that determines the types of military equipment that a country needs is the type of equipment that their neighbours are looking to purchase or have already acquired. Malaysia has purchased Polish tanks, Russian Su-30 fighters, British frigates, submarines from France, corvettes from Germany and multiple rocket launchers from Brazil. Indonesia is buying Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, submarines, attack helicopters, corvettes, and land systems (Bitzinger and Maharani, 2008). Singapore has ordered Apache gunship helicopters, F-15 Eagles fighters, and La Fayette frigates. The Thai army purchased ninety-six APCs while the Thai air force purchased six Gripen fighters in 2007. The Thai navy was less successful in this period: the government rejected their request to purchase a submarine and two frigates. However, the navy continues to lobby for their purchase: EU leading arms producers are among the best manufacturers of submarines and frigates in the world so Thailand may well choose to purchase them from the EU at some future point.

While clearly impacting on Thailand's relationship with the USA, the September 2006 coup had only a limited impact on EU-Thai military relations. The major actions taken by the EU were to cancel high-level visits and suspend military cooperation agreements and programmes until an elected government resumed power in February 2008. However, with the seemingly continuing political unrest in Thailand, there were rumours regarding another coup – a reality that eventually transpired within a few years. This certainly can have a more seriously negative impact on EU-Thai relations as the EU would be more likely to respond with meaningful sanctions and suspend bilateral political relations, including possibly disrupting arms sales, as well as again halting military cooperation until a democratically elected government is returned to office.

The often claimed success of the ESDP AMM has given a new role to the EU – that of a crisis management operator – and provides an interesting bridge between past EU-Thai military

relations and areas for potential future engagement. Through this mission, the EU gained in reputation and credibility with its ASEAN counterpart suggesting that in the future, if similar situations arise, the EU could become the external partner of choice. As the Joint Action of the Council on AMM adopted on 9 September 2005 stated: "The EU is committed to promote a lasting peaceful settlement to the conflict in Aceh (Indonesia) and to increase stability throughout South East Asia, including progress in the economic, legal, political and security reforms". The AMM has also enhanced the relationship between ASEAN and EU in general, not to mention the personal friendship between ASEAN military officers and EU monitors. Southeast Asia, undeniably, still faces internal conflicts. There are separatist movements in many countries including Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand. The EU could perform a similar function with the cooperation of ASEAN in monitoring any stabilisation processes. However, before any monitoring mission can begin, the conflicting parties must first agree to settle their conflict. The most challenging aspect is to mediate the peace negotiations between the parties involved. If the EU is capable of achieving this, future monitoring processes could well follow the successful example of the AMM. In the case of Burma, high levels of human rights violations have been seen, yet the international community has been largely unable to persuade the Burmese government to stop the oppression of their people. Unless Burma is invaded by military troops as in the case of Iraq, the Burmese government seems extremely unlikely to allow interference from the EU. In the case of Thailand, with a much more favourable political environment than that of Burma, the EU has potentially a greater chance of being invited. However, as an earlier Thai incident regarding an EU election monitoring proposal made in 2007 has shown, Thailand is similarly sensitive to foreign interference in their domestic affairs and any intrusive EU effort could have a negative impact on EU-Thai relations. Lieutenant General Nipat's response to the idea of EU involvement in the southern part of Thailand provides a fitting context on which to draw this analysis of EU-Thai military relations to a close.

I discussed this matter with my superior and we agreed that EU mission is not suitable for the southern part of Thailand. It is not the right place at the right time. The EU approached me and informed me that when the mission in Aceh

is completed, the EU is ready to shift to the southern part of Thailand...I had to announce that now is not the right time and I always confirmed that it was under different conditions. And the most important thing is that the Thai government has always stated that we will fix the problems ourselves because it is a domestic matter which I believe is correct...I agree with using peaceful negotiation to solve the problems but it is different from Aceh.²⁹

²⁹ Original interview in Thai “ผมได้กลับมาคุยกับผู้บังคับบัญชา เราก็มีความเห็นเหมือนกันว่าภารกิจของอียูไม่เหมาะสมกับภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย ไม่ใช่อะไรที่ถูกที่ถูกเวลา อียูมีความตั้งใจทาบตามผ่านผมว่าเมื่อเสร็จภารกิจอจาจะห้แล้วนี่อียูพร้อมที่จะย้ายมาสู่ภาคใต้ของไทยตลอดเวลา...จนผมต้องประกาศว่าไม่ใช่ตอนนี้ แล้วก็ยืนยันตลอดว่าคนละเงื่อนไข และข้อสำคัญที่สูตรรัฐบาลไทยก็ได้พูดอยู่ตลอดเวลาเราจะจัดการปัญหาตนเองเพราะว่าเป็นปัญหาภายใน ตรงนี้ผมคิดว่าเป็นการถูกต้อง...แล้วเห็นด้วยในการใช้ความนุ่มนวลในการเจรจาในการแก้ปัญหาแต่ไม่ใช่ลักษณะเดียวกับอจาจะห้”.

Chapter 6: Perspectives on the Aceh Monitoring Mission

Building on the military focus of Chapter 5 and the initial discussion of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), this Chapter provides an overview of this unique EU-ASEAN joint mission and draws on original interview material provided by two informed senior players: one from the EU – Andreas List, formerly the Indonesian Desk Officer in DG External Relations (and subsequently Deputy Head of Delegation, Commission (and latterly EU) Delegation in Bangkok); the other from the Thai military - Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Head of Mission, Aceh Monitoring Mission. There have been a number of academic accounts of this “successful” E/CSDP mission and it is not the purpose of this chapter to extensively regurgitate this history³⁰. Rather the interview material is presented here to draw out the individual EU and Thai perceptions of the joint activity and offer a unique insight into this first - and so far only - military collaboration between the EU and Asia within the ASEAN region. However, the Chapter does have to begin with a brief overview of the range of ESDP/CSDP missions that have been taken since first being launched in 2003. The Chapter then offers a compressed summation of this ESDP AMM mission before turning to the qualitative interview data.

Scope and Focus of E/CSDP Missions since 2003

The first years of the twenty-first century were heady ones for European integration. Enlargement from 15 to 25, the initial euphoria surrounding a putative EU Constitution and the clear acceleration in foreign policy coordination through the then ESDP mechanism. This was the context within which AMM was conceived and implemented (despite the soon to be reality check of the French and Dutch referenda rejecting the Constitutional Treaty). Given that after May 2004 enlargement EU foreign policy decisions were to be based on the consensus of 25, it is quite

³⁰ For an overview, see: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/civilian-csdp-compact-%E2%80%93-success-story-eu%E2%80%99s-crisis-management-cinderella>.

remarkable that so many ESDP missions were undertaken. For the newer Member States economic rather than political integration was the priority.

Since being launched in 2003, over the next 15 years of E/CSDP some 35 missions were undertaken: over half have been completed (including AMM) while 16 remained ongoing as of late 2018. These missions and their respective webpages are listed in the Appendix A. Table 6.1 provides a descriptive overview emphasizing the diversity of mission (both between and within those that were military and those that were civilian in nature), geographical focus as well as an indicative timeline suggesting when the EU was more willing to respond – or when a consensus of the 15, 25, 27 or 28 was feasible. The type of missions are classified as follows. For the military:

- Ground force deployment (EUFOR)
- Naval force deployment (EUNAVFOR)
- Training (EUTM)

For the civilian missions:

- Policing (EUPOL, EUPM, EUPAT)
- Capacity building (EUCAP)
- Border assistance (EUBAM)
- Rule of Law (EULEX, EUJUST)
- Monitoring (EUMM)
- Security Sector Reform (EUSSR, EUSEC)
- Aviation security (EUAVSEC)
- Advisory (EUMAM)

Table 6.1 lists these ESDP/CSDP missions by type (military or civilian), geography and year. For a fuller description of the mandate for each mission, see Appendix B.

Table 6.1 ESDP/ CSDP Missions 2003 -2018³¹

³¹ Table compiled by the author. Sources: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20civilian%20missions%20and%20operations](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20civilian%20missions%20and%20operations;),; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union; <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/EFPUpdfs/EU-Civilian-and-Military-Missions-since-2003.pdf>

Type	Mission	Location	Date
		1. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	(2003)
		2. Democratic Republic of the Congo	(2003)
	(EUFOR)	3. Bosnia and Herzegovina	(2004 – present)
		4. Democratic Republic of the Congo	(2006)
Military		5. Chad and the Central African Republic	(2008 – 2009)
		6. Central African Republic	(2014 – 2015)
	(EUNAVFOR)	7. Somalia	(2008 – present)
		8. Mediterranean	(2015 – present)
		9. Mali	(2013 – present)
	(EUTM)	10. Central African Republic	(2016 – present)
		11. Somalia	(2010 – present)
		1. Kinshasa	(2005 – 2007)
		2. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	(2003 – 2005)
	(EUPOL) (EUPM)	3. Afghanistan	(2007-2016)
		4. RD Congo	(2007 – 2014)
Civilian		5. Bosnia and Herzegovina	(2003 – 2012)
		6. Palestinian Territories	(2006 – present)
	(EUPAT)	7. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	(2005 – 2006)
		8. Sahel Mali	(2014 – present)
	(EUCAP)	9. Sahel Niger	(2012 – present)
		10. Somalia	(2012 – present)
		11. Moldova and Ukraine	(2005 – present)
	(EUBAM)	12. Libya	(2013 – present)
		13. Rafah	(2005 – present)
	(EULEX)	14. Kosovo	(2008 – present)
	(EUJUST)	15. Iraq	(2015 – 2013)

		16. Georgia	(2004 – 2005)
		17. Aceh	(2005 – 2006)
	(EUMM)	18. Georgia	(2008 – present)
	(EUSSR)	19. Guinea-Bissau	(2008 – 2010)
	(EUSEC)	20. RD Congo	(2005 – 2016)
	(EUAVSEC)	21. South Sudan	(2013 – 2014)
	(EUMAM)	22. RCA	(2015 – 2016)
		23. Ukraine	(2014 – present)
	(EUAM)	24. Iraq	(2017 – present)

Certain general broad patterns can be ascertained. From 2003 to 2006 (the period during which the AMM took place) the EU instigated 11 civilian missions and 4 military. This number represents a sizeable percentage of all E/CSDP missions undertaken in the last fifteen years (out of a total of 35). Geographically the scope of these missions was expansive: 5 in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, a further 5 in Africa, 2 in the Middle-East yet just 1 in South East Asia – Aceh. Furthermore, looking at the 11 civilian missions in the 2003-6 period, just under half were Policing Missions, and another two were Border Assistance Missions. Thus Aceh was unique in both its peacekeeping mandate as well as geography.

Indeed, policing missions seem to have become the preferred mission format for the EU. Since 2003 there have been 6 such interventions all of which have involved significant commitments in time and finances (see Appendix B). For example, the EU’s only other Asian mission – EUPOL Afghanistan – ran for 11 years and was consistently among the costliest E/CSDP missions (for example, in 2016 – its final year of operation - the budget was €43.7m and involved 269 staff and 22 Member States)³². The mandate was “to contribute significantly to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective policing arrangements... to

³² Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf
About EUPOL| EUPOL Afghanistan. (n.d.). Retrieved June 10, 2016, from <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/37>

support reformation process towards a trusted and efficient police service” (Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP, 30 May 2007). Similarly long-term (launched in 2005) and ongoing, if less costly, is – EUPOL COPPS – which has a mandate to establish “sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership” (Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005). The budget for 2017 was €10.32 million to support 114 staff drawn from 21 Member States. In comparison, as the following section demonstrates, AMM can be described as more modest, of limited duration and somewhat frugal.

Thus it would appear that the EU’s decision to become involved in Aceh was not a predictable formulaic response but one that required a precise mandate fit for the peculiar specifics of the Aceh conflict. The AMM cannot be criticized as a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Indeed, prior to 2005 there had only been 6 other ESDP missions implemented, the majority of which were within the Former Yugoslavia presenting fewer logistical hurdles to confront. There were no precedents to help shape the EU’s response to Aceh. What, then, was the mandate given to the AMM? Was it an undisputed success? And if so, why is it still a rare example of EU engagement with South East Asia and of a peacekeeping initiative.

Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)³³

In August 2005, Indonesia’s (and one of Asia’s) long-standing conflicts was finally resolved with the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM)) in Helsinki, Finland. It was on this basis that an ESDP Joint Action (the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)) was launched representing

³³ The data used in this section, unless otherwise stated, is primarily drawn from www.aceh-mm.org and EU Council Secretariat. “EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia)” at www.consilium.europa.eu/aceh

an untried and ambitious intervention for the first time in Asia and involving two regional organisations – the EU and ASEAN. This brief summary and chronology of the conflict and the EU's role draws heavily from Schulze (2007).

AMM focused primarily on restoring the peace and stability in Aceh with the monitoring of the implementation of MoU regulations agreed by the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement. GAM was established in 1976 with the objective of achieving an independent Islamic Sharia state and to redress grievances over the use of the area's natural resources. Three historic phases of violence have been identified: 1976-9; 1989-91; 1999-2002. In 2003 Aceh was declared a military operations area or *dearah operasi militer* (DOM) by the Indonesian Government and given the status of "military emergency". The conflict had lasted for nearly 30 years with the loss of almost 15 000 lives and the displacement of tens of thousands people in Aceh, and consequently heavily impacting the economy and political status of Indonesia (Schulze, 2007).

On the 26 December 2004, an earthquake induced tsunami wreaked widespread destruction and resulted in 100,000s of deaths in Aceh. This natural disaster was the prime motivation for the two sides to conclude a peace agreement leading to the signing of an MoU in Helsinki in August 2005 under the chairmanship of Martti Ahtisaari, the former President of Finland. The MoU's guiding principles were: governance; Human Rights; amnesty and social reintegration; security arrangements; and the establishment of an Aceh Monitoring Mission and dispute settlement process. As noted previously, the AMM was an untested foreign policy innovation and required the collaboration of two regional organisations – the EU and ASEAN. The formal legal purpose of AMM was to monitor the implementation of the MoU, especially the demobilisation of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons, the redeployment of non-organic forces and police together with any additional mandates given to the mission by the EU.

From the EU's perspective, the AMM was established as a civilian mission under the then European Security and Defence Policy and was just the second such monitoring mission mandated under ESDP (albeit the first mission conducted in Asia). The legal basis was the Council Joint

Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh. The EU mandate primarily focused on monitoring the implementation of the MoU by Indonesia and GAM. Specifically, the Joint Action mandate limited the EU's role to:

- monitoring the demobilisation of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons;
- monitoring the redeployment of non-organic forces and the police;
- monitoring the reintegration of GAM and the human-rights situation;
- rule on disputed amnesty cases; and,
- investigating violations of the MoU.

The initial mandate only covered a 6-month period commencing 15 September 2005: however, this was extended for a further nine months till 15 December 2006. The Mission drew its personnel from EU Member States, ASEAN members (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Singapore), and third countries - Norway and Switzerland. A pre-AMM civilian and military technical assessment mission visited Jakarta and Aceh and subsequently the provincial capital of Banda Aceh was chosen as the AMM headquarters and Dutch senior diplomat Pieter Feith appointed as Head of Mission.

Initially (from 15 September to 31 December 2005) there were 125 EU and 93 ASEAN monitors deployed, but by the end of the Mission there were only 29 EU and 7 ASEAN monitors left on the ground. For the EU, the AMM constituted a civilian mission: personnel were never armed. However, this designation is somewhat of a grey area as some personnel were required to have military backgrounds in order to undertake the Mission's technical tasks.

Impressively, the AMM's objectives and tasks were largely achieved on schedule. The decommissioning of GAM weapons and the redeployment of Indonesian army and police forces were completed on 5 January 2006. GAM surrendered 840 weapons for decommissioning and officially disbanded its military wing. The amnesty under the MoU saw some 2,000 GAM prisoners released, and this served as an important confidence-building measure. Ultimately, there were no unresolved amnesty cases and a decree on the new governance of Aceh was signed by the President of Indonesia on 1 August 2006. Overall there was consensus that both the Indonesian

Government and GAM fully complied with the MoU leading to a restoration of peace and stability in Aceh. Table 6.1 summarises the formal content of the AMM.

Table 6.2 Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia)³⁴

LEGAL BASIS

- Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005

*MANDATE*³⁵

- To monitor the demobilization of GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and monitor and assist the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons;
- To monitor the redeployment of non-organic Indonesian military (TNI) and police;
- To monitor the reintegration of active GAM members into society;
- To monitor the human rights situation in the context of the tasks above;
- To monitor the process of legislation change in Aceh;
- To rule on disputed amnesty cases;
- To investigate and rule on violations of the MOU;
- To establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties

BUDGET

- €5.3 million (€3 million: CFSP budget; €6 million from the Member States)

DURATION

- 15 September 2005 – 15 December 2006 (15 months)

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

- 125 EU personnel and 93 ASEAN personnel

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION

- 12 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and 2 third countries (Norway and Switzerland) and 5 ASEAN states: (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and the Philippines)

The decommissioning of the GAM weapons was in four stages (to be completed by the end of December 2005) under the supervision of decommissioning teams led by a Finnish Colonel,

³⁴ Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*. Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

³⁵ European Union External Action (2006). EU Council Secretariat [Factsheet]. Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/pdf/07092006_factsheet_aceh-amm_en.pdf

Kalle Liesinen. The first round took place in Banda Aceh (in September 2005) where a total of 279 weapons were surrendered. The last round of decommissioning took place by the December 2005 deadline with the final weapon cutting ceremony held in Banda Aceh. The redeployment of Indonesian troops mirrored this schedule with 25,890 army and 5,791 police withdrawn from Aceh over the three-months.

After the decommissioning and redeployment were completed, the Law on the Governance of Aceh (LoGA), comprising of 40 chapters and 278 articles was promulgated and based on Islamic or Shariah law (which represents Islamic jurisprudence in relation to all aspects of life). With respect to AMM's mandate to monitor human rights in Aceh, Head of Mission Pieter Feith, apparently concluded that "Sharia is the business of the people of Aceh" (Schutz, 2007). AMM was mandated to monitor the issues pertaining to human rights rather than to interrupt the judicial administration of Aceh.

Certainly the EU likes to profile the AMM as a clear success and indeed the transition to peace and autonomy was broadly achieved. However, such a conclusion has to be tempered by some inadequacies even if these were as much a result of the novelty and untested nature of this EU initiative as they were to policy errors. As a Joint Action, it was to be expected that the AMM had a dedicated budget and the backing of the Member States. But consensus was not easily achieved. Initially only Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden and UK called for an ESDP Joint Action, the remaining majority arguing EU foreign policy priorities and budgets should focus closer to home, suggesting an early indication of the impact of the 2004 enlargement on future EU foreign policy priorities. At this point in its evolution, ESDP funding mechanisms were still a work in progress and somewhat unusually the Commission's External Relations Directorate-General proposed using the Rapid Reacting Mechanism (€3 million) and the Asia and Latin America programme (although it seemed doubtful that these two programmes could legally finance a CFSP operation). It transpired that the CFSP mechanism funded €9 million with the balance covered by the participating Member States, Norway and Switzerland (see Table 6.2).

Because of such short notice of the mission, training and selection of monitors were perfunctory. Typically, the training of monitors in relation to the AMM only lasted for three days and consisted of a background briefing of the mission and a summary of the conflict and the function of the Indonesian military. Language too posed as a challenge in conducting AMM with few speakers of Indonesian Bahasa much less the Acehnese language widely spoken in the field. Critics have noted that the selection of monitors did not take into full consideration the importance language played in communicating with other monitors.

However, despite any or all of these shortcomings, Aceh is an important example of EU collective foreign policy and uniquely the only one that has involved cooperation with ASEAN. Success for whom is a crucial question, so what were the perspectives of the two sides – the EU and ASEAN? It is to this that this chapter now turns.

An EU Perspective

In his May 2006 interview for this doctoral thesis, Andreas List³⁶ noted that the then relations with Indonesia were often described in rather modest terms, as simply technical projects related to the immediate needs of the tsunami, avian influenza, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission peace process. As such, all three represented the concrete results of the EU's regional cooperation co-operation. But this perspective is rather shortsighted, at least from the EU point of view: in all three cases an overarching picture is needed to understand and fully appreciate that the three EU programmes were the crystallisation of wider interests and contexts.

According to List, the Aceh case had a "more political angle". Early Indonesian attempts to address the Aceh conflict had predated the actual mission. Initially these were made under the Suharto regime which viewed Aceh as an insurgent province, the answer to which was to be through military means rather than diplomacy and dialogue. But after Suharto's downfall the

³⁶ All the information in this section is taken from an interview with Andreas List.

Indonesian perspective changed and President Megawati undertook some attempts to resolve the conflict. As early as 2001 there was a military pause that failed because the lack of monitoring, followed by other attempts in 2002 and 2003 which similarly failed. List stated that there was monitoring "but it was not appropriately done because the conflicting parties were not part of monitoring". Only the national Indonesian authorities were engaged in the monitoring which raised the question of trust. It was the Yudhoyono Government that was the first to undertake serious efforts at conflict resolution and on assuming office he immediately launched a peace process. Consequently, the EU was fully aware that the peace process originally had nothing to do with the tsunami because it was launched earlier - in November 2004. But, as List observed, of course the tsunami facilitated greatly urgency and cooperation. The international community, had become suddenly more alert and engaged with Aceh.

Consequently, the greatest contribution made by the tsunami was not to launch the peace process but to lending transparency to it. Again, according to List, any military solution previously envisaged by Yudhoyono became not only unpopular but was rendered impossible or at least more unlikely by this increased transparency. The Indonesian government then accepted the international assistance and almost instantaneously NGOs, the ASEAN community as well as the UN were keen to be involved, while the EU – through the personal connection of Ahtisaari - was invited to help facilitate the peace process. Through ASEAN, and for similar reasons, Thailand was prepared to be involved; the relationship with Indonesia was strategically important. To quote List:

Because Indonesia is a member of ASEAN, we have an overarching strategic interest in seeing ASEAN progress, seeing ASEAN develop, flourish and integrate. Therefore we thought that Aceh could be a case in point that we could lend a constructive support. It was critical because we had no economic interest in Aceh. So for Indonesia we were a credible mediator.

For the EU, this perception of neutrality made its involvement both credible and trustworthy. It also allowed the EU to put on show the efficacy of its values and norms as well as

profile its model of regional integration within the ASEAN context. Thus, it was in part international humanitarian concerns, and in part a reflection of its own self-image that saw the EU accept the invitation to lend its support to the peace process. In a practical sense, the EU did this by supporting the mediator, Finland's former President Ahtisaari, and by having the democracy support package ready, authorized and implemented by a Council cross pillar action involving a monitoring mission, support package, and mediation. The local ownership of the process was recognized and respected by the EU: the peace process was not a European process. The EU's role was to provide support as needed, mediate and to work in cooperation with ASEAN and Indonesia. From the EU perspective, the EU played a constructive, supportive mediating role and did not seek to impose a specific solution. A post-conflict reconstruction role was also part of the EU's engagement, including the reintegration of former fighters and preparations for subsequent democratic elections. By way of summary, List commented:

So if you ask me how do we measure the results? Is it positive on the relationship, the clear answer is yes. The last president of Indonesia came in January this year to Brussels to thank us. We do not have visibility there. We do not need to have a sticker on each house that it was financed by the EU. It is enough for us that the political leaders of Indonesia are aware of it. And the official visit of the last President confirmed it. So for us it was a positive development.

The EU's rhetoric on its international identity often uses the AMM as an example of efficacy as well as a model for further E/CSDP cooperation with ASEAN. A decade or so ago, optimism remained high that this initial joint initiative would be the forerunner to further foreign policy coordination and joint missions. That, of course, has been an unfulfilled aspiration to date. Nonetheless, the AMM has offered a rare insight into the EU's own foreign policy motivations with Asia. What, then, of a Thai perspective of the same joint cooperative activity?

A Thai Perspective³⁷

In contrast with the List interview –a relevant EU official but not someone directly involved on the ground in Aceh - the interview with Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek, conveys the Thai perspective of the most senior military figure who was directly involved in Aceh (in his capacity as the Deputy Head of Mission of the Aceh Monitoring Mission). A series of questions were asked and the response candid and revealing. The questions were:

- What was the main role of AMM?
- What was the role of Thailand?
- What military branch were the Thai staff recruited from?
- What was Thonglek's main role at AMM?
- What was the Thai government's policy regarding the operation of AMM?
- How did AMM affect EU-Thai relations?
- Did EU-Thai relations intensify after the co-operation in AMM?
- Were there any problems working with the EU?

What defined the AMM's role? The term "monitoring" was intentionally chosen on the encouragement of the EU and agreement of Indonesia. According to Thonglek, the term monitoring was chosen "because it has deeper meaning, not just observing but it means managing and administering the process instead of the term observer". Thus the AMM was intentionally proactive. The MoU was established to supervise the ceasefire and launch peace negotiations – a process that had a history of failure having been tried on five previous occasions. This time it was only made possible thanks to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issuing a statement that a peaceful measure would be adopted to solve the Aceh civil war insurgency.

³⁷ The information and quotations in this section are all based on the interview with Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Head of Mission, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) that took place on 14 October 2006, in Bangkok.

Although the AMM is usually described as an EU-ASEAN collaboration, only five ASEAN member countries participated with Thailand taking the lead on the Asian side. The choice of the EU as the key mediator was unexpected (the UN would have provided a more traditional option) – mediators in the previous five failed peace attempts were disregarded in favour of this innovation. As the Thai Deputy Head of AMM stated:

In the end, after considering everything...historical background, the decision was the EU. On the EU side, Javier Solana has a lot of experience and decided that it was not wise for the EU to act on this alone so the EU invited ASEAN to work together. So ASEAN had an urgent meeting to consider the offer made by the EU. As a result, only five ASEAN members agreed to participate in this mission.

Through diplomatic channels Indonesia signaled that Thailand would be its preference as the core ASEAN country (although Malaysia also proposed one of its senior military officials as the ASEAN Deputy Head). While it was diplomatically difficult and somewhat sensitive it was eventually accepted by all participants that the EU would head the AMM with Thailand acting as deputy. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted the name of Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek to the Indonesian government for their approval. Here, personalities and politics may have come into play, at least if we accept the validity of the Thai perspective.

One of the reasons was Peter Feith, Head of Mission of AMM, who looked at my rank and my resume and thought we could work together so he recommended me for the position of Principal Deputy Head of Mission (PDHoD). The truth is there are historical reasons, there is a difference in being a Thai and being a Malaysian regarding the role and the operation of this mission.

A typical misperception of the AMM is that it was a military ESDP mission; while it involved the demobilization of GAM fighters and the decommissioning of weapons, from the EU's legal perspective it was classified as a civilian mission. However, as noted above, there was some necessary ambiguity, particularly with respect to ASEAN (specifically Thai) involvement. As noted by Lieutenant General ThongLek:

The work at AMM, it is true that everybody said that it is not a military mission, but everyone including Peter Feith told me that he discovered that the personnel he needed for this mission are those with military background.

Consequently, it was not inappropriate for the Thai contribution to the Mission to be in the form of military personnel. The Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters had already created a Peace Operations Division some three years prior to this mission and had established a track-record of humanitarian assistance in peacekeeping operations worldwide, both within and outside the UN framework. This contribution helped bolster AMM's operational capacity and relevant expertise.

Once the mission began, administration and management were all related to military issues with military officers from the EU and ASEAN handling the core business of AMM. The EU and ASEAN agreed to send military officers to AMM, but they were not required to wear military uniforms. While civilians were also involved in the AMM they operated under this military structured system. And importantly, the AMM had to work effectively with the Indonesian military and, according to Thonglek, the mutual respect between the Thai, Indonesian and EU military participants was key to the successful conclusion of the mission. For ASEAN, as neighbouring countries, it was important to take a long-term perspective based on confidence-building and future collaboration. In addition to Thailand, the other four ASEAN countries also sent military officers and overall the whole AMM experience had positive repercussions with ASEAN.

Perhaps surprisingly, for Thailand there was a high degree of local decision-making devolution with just a very light policy touch from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (through the offices of the Military Attaché) largely for reasons of pragmatism and geography – the Thai embassy being 2000 kilometres away in Jakarta. Again, when a purely EU focus is recalibrated to consider the role of the AMM from the perspectives of the other participants, new rationales for involvement emerge. As the AMM Deputy Head, Thonglek was also aware of his duty to update and advise the Thai embassy on any course of action that would be beneficial to Thailand. In this regard Aceh was viewed as a pertinent to Thailand's own domestic conflicts. As Thonglek stated:

I always informed 20 Thai subordinates that, firstly, we are working for Indonesia and the EU. Secondly, we must look at the benefits deriving from Thai-Indonesian bilateral relations, especially, the solution to the situation in the three southern provinces of Thailand.

As a series of EU Perceptions studies in Thailand have all confirmed, the EU was not well-known in Thailand (or in any other ASEAN member country either) (Holland et. al., 2007; 2009, Chaban and Holland, 2008). At best the EU was viewed as exclusively a trading partner with no, or very limited, political or foreign policy capacity. It was hoped that this first EU-ASEAN collaboration would help to raise Europe's identity in a positive multifaceted way as well as boost the relevance of regional cooperation (using the EU as an example for ASEAN to emulate). Consequently, the AMM provided a unique opportunity for the ASEAN public to see the EU acting in a peacekeeping role. And it also provided the EU with a learning opportunity through this first practical engagement with ASEAN. Both the EU and ASEAN were to benefit. High Representative Javier Solana's post-mission invitation to Lieutenant General Thonglek to address the Council in Brussels in January 2006 was both symbolic and strategically nuanced – reputedly no Asian official or military personnel had ever been afforded this opportunity before. A consequence was – at least in Thailand – an enhanced appreciation and attention towards the EU as a potential peacekeeping regional actor. The issue of opening a Thai Defense Attaché Office in Brussels was raised for the first time. In addition, a visit at the highest level (Supreme Commander) to learn more about the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, structures and missions, was mooted. With provocative and perhaps prescient insight, Thonglek commented "We must seize this opportunity. In terms of military training, now we only focus on the US. I think we should have other alternatives in case the US cannot assist us."

More practically, the AMM profiled the EU (for ASEAN) as an effective and efficient organization with a high level of experience related to mission financing. Thonglek complimented the EU in the following terms:

Financial support was very efficient, there were no complex regulations which facilitated the mission and led to its success. I must praise the EU. When we arrived, the EU prepared everything for us...from computers, cameras, other equipment, vehicles, and airplanes. Everything was ready for operation. I give full credit to the EU, I think the EU is highly efficient.

Despite this positive assessment, given this was the first-ever EU-ASEAN collaboration some problems and difficulties were to be expected – and these were not just between Thai and EU staff but also between the different national ASEAN staff. As the Deputy Head of Mission explained:

Of course there were problems regarding different approaches, concepts, and management because we came from different countries, different doctrines. Many staff had worked in Africa with many combat experiences. Some had been to Kosovo. Sometimes they worked very fast and were not very flexible but after a while we learned from each other.

A mechanism used to bridge these differences in approaches and experiences, EU and ASEAN staff were intentionally integrated rather than structured to operate in nationally discreet units. The AMM comprised 11 District Offices located throughout Aceh province. It was determined that ASEAN would lead 6 of these and the EU the other 5: where an ASEAN staff was the head of a District Office, an EU staff would be second in command and vice versa in order to create a fully integrated operation requiring everyone to adjust to each other. This approach was a key element in the successful execution of AMM.

For ASEAN, AMM was an unqualified success as born witness by the response of the Indonesian Government. Peace was achieved after decades of conflict based on the widespread acceptance of the process by the Acehnese. For the EU AMM was also recognised as a success. The ceasefire was a historical event. Key actors (Ahtisaari and the Indonesian President) were nominated, albeit unsuccessfully, for the Nobel Prize, giving the EU confidence that it could handle other future peace-building operations.

Finally, at the conclusion of the mission, the question of whether the Aceh experience could act as a template for other EU interventions was raised in relation to the conflict in southern Thailand. With an ironic sense of timing, as peace was restored in Aceh by December 2006, conflict heightened in Pattani. The EU's appetite for such peace-building initiatives had grown (thanks largely to the successful outcome and absence of any deaths) and according to Thonglek "The EU made a proposal through me that they were ready to shift their operation to the southern

part of Thailand. I had to tell them that now is not the right time because of different conditions.” This position was subsequently underlined by the Thai Government announcement that the conflict in southern Thailand was a domestic matter and would be handled internally (in keeping with ASEAN’s norm of non-interference). Consequently, the AMM remains – 12 years later - the only example of EU-ASEAN cooperation as well as the EU’s sole foreign policy action in South-East Asia.

The richness provided by these high-level interviews provides this thesis with original insights as well as unique empirical evidence. As noted in the methods section, working in both Thai and English was essential and interview access - particularly on the Thai side - was unprecedented. While typically lauded as an E/CSDP success, perhaps other considerations offer a more sanguine perspective. Any EU third country mission requires the willingness of the host country to permit EU involvement, a condition that may severely curtail the scope of such initiatives. Additionally, the EU’s stated multilateral preference may limit such joint collaborations and the Aceh ASEAN example might prove to be the exception rather than the rule. Undoubtedly, however, the level of cooperation at the senior mission level between EU and Thai officers made a positive contribution to closer bilateral ties and this early experience of cooperation helped to balance the disequilibrium created in the relationship by the successive coups that were soon to follow in Thailand. Lastly, a sense of scale is also warranted: for the EU, the Aceh deployment was quite modest and (at least formally) underlined the preference for civilian over military initiatives. For Thailand involvement was more demanding politically given the non-interference norms within ASEAN, but it also indicated Thailand’s aspiration for a leadership role within the group. The wider implications of Aceh were more significant than just an internal peace process.

Chapter 7: The EU's Asian Mosaic – fragmented or coherent?

As noted in the Introduction, the period of analysis, as well as the gestation period needed to produce the thesis – present important limitations. The empirical analysis focuses on the 1998-2006 period (although subsequent references to events up until the 2018 ASEM meeting are occasionally made). Consequently, the Aceh case-study and broader EU military relations are discussed within that zeitgeist. Again, it is necessary to underline the energetic policy environment and initial optimism of that time. The first handful of E/CSDP missions were launched with great expectations, the 2004 enlargement was viewed as a significant and progressive steps towards deeper integration and the wave of challenges that were to characterise the following decade (Treaty referendum defeats, Brexit, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis) remained unanticipated. The decade long gestation from a thesis idea into a finished product unavoidably causes certain historical complications, not least the successive military coups in Thailand. While unavoidable, it is argued that the analysis remains valid and an insightful examination of what still constitutes a unique EU role and relationship with Asia.

This thesis has presented a mosaic of policy realms, both political and military in nature - EU-Asia, EU-Thai, and EU-ASEAN relations - all interlinked under the umbrella of the theme of the EU's growing actorness (despite the comparatively modest EU Asian policy coherence). During this period the fragmented nature of the EU's engagement with Asia was in striking contrast with its much more comprehensive and historically consistent approach to the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, for example. The thesis raises the question of whether such a policy mosaic can be coherent or is it inevitably flawed by such fragmentation?

This concluding chapter seeks to achieve several objectives. First, the conceptual link between EU relations with ASEAN and the experience of the E/CSDP AMM and the process of European integration raised in Chapter 1, is revisited. Second, the AMM's contribution to the EU's foreign policy profile is explored. Was it a typical intervention or more *sui generis*? Third, and

irrespective of any such conclusion, does this experience shed any light on the possible future directions of EU-ASEAN or EU-Thai relations? Fourth, the underreported but strategically important military connectivity between key EU member States and Thailand is considered. And fifth, reflections on the methodology of the thesis are considered.

The extensive explication of Integration theory undertaken in Chapter 2 set the necessary theoretical basis for understanding EU foreign policy. How the integration process is conceived, what motivates the diverse actors and how this is then reflected in a common policy is the starting point for empirical case-study analysis. Only within such a context could the Aceh Monitoring Mission and the nature of EU-ASEAN Thai relations be properly understood. This linkage of integration theory to external policies follows the work of Holland and Doidge (2012) who were the first to explicitly advocate this theoretical approach (in their case, in relation specifically to EU Development Policy). They argued that "while atheoretical examinations of EU politics can still be found, increasingly the importance of integration theory has come to be recognized as the essential starting point for discussions of any EU activity" (p.27). To understand motivations and rationales as well as the chosen policy mechanisms – a theoretical framework is necessitated. For Holland and Doidge this is best found "in the wider debates concerning the kind of integration process envisaged" and "simply, which of the competing approaches to integration can best explain EU... policy?" (p.28). Again mirroring Holland and Doidge, it was suggested that a range of concepts rather than a single theoretical framework offers the more insightful perspective. In the EU's broad relations with Asia there has been intergovernmental evidence on display (with key Member States driving policy preferences), neo-functional spill-over occurring (connecting political, economic and military spheres) as well as multilevel governance players helping to shape different levels of decision-making underpinned by values and norms – all of which combined to shape the nature of the early phase of EU E/CSDP policy coordination and implementation. Consequently, this thesis agrees that "Such policy diversity demands conceptual complementarity and not a single theoretical lens" (p.35).

Considering the second objective, what has been the AMM's contribution to the EU's foreign policy profile? Was Aceh a typical intervention or a one-off flirtation with peace-keeping? A basic examination of the subsequent E/CSDP missions would seem to suggest that Aceh was indeed *sui generis*. However, this may well be a rather narrow definition as the mandates of other missions have broached peace-keeping processes although none have been actively involved in disarmament. State sector reform can often involve the integration of organic and non-organic troops, for example, and border missions typically are designed to bolster mutual confidence and security. Clearly, EU missions can only respond to the on-the-ground situations that are presented and the tsunami and ethnic-religious conflict that characterised Aceh was temporally unique. However, Aceh while perhaps somewhat of an outlier, could be seen as not untypical of the EU's peace-making interventions undertaken in different formats elsewhere. The AMM – at a minimum – presents an evidence-based analysis of where E/CSDP offers added value beyond bilateral or UN orchestrated initiatives.

Undoubtedly Aceh has been seen – and promoted as such by the EEAS – as an unqualified success in EU foreign policy. It had a defined mandate, budget and duration, it brought together a previously untried collaboration effectively, and participants from all sides concluded the mission was effective and an essential contribution to resolving an 18-year conflict. As one of the earliest E/CSDP missions, the AMM enhanced the perception of the capacity for the EU to be an international actor in civilian/ military realms. The EU's foreign policy "presence" was enhanced. Furthermore, Aceh has provided a good empirical test of the actorness capability-expectation gap as articulated by Hill. The AMM offers a rare example of where this gap can indeed be adequately bridged. It is therefore somewhat paradoxical – and for other theses to consider – why Aceh is perhaps a high point in E/CSDP engagement particularly given the Lisbon Treaty reforms that were in part designed to give the EU a clearer and more authoritative foreign policy voice through a more robust High Representative role. The lesson here seems to be that treaties matter less than timing and individuals in developing policy impact.

Turning to the third objective of this conclusion, can this study of the AMM tell us anything about the future of the EU's Asian policy? Mimicking the words used by Holland and Doidge to describe EU Development Policy, will future EU-ASEAN relations witness "more" Europe, "less" Europe, or perhaps a more effective Europe? If we fast forward to the October 2018 ASEM summit in Brussels it would seem that aspiration still remains the defining characteristic of the relationship. This 12th Asia-Europe Meeting was chaired by the European Council President, Donald Tusk, and brought together the leaders, or their representatives, from 51 Asian and European countries, the President of the European Commission and the ASEAN Secretary-General. The theme "Global Partners for Global Challenges" set expectations high at a time of global disruption and an erosion of international norms with the concluding Chairman's statement calling for ASEM to become the "building block for effective multilateralism and the rules-based international order" (ASEM12, para 3.). The joint communique commented on contemporary security questions – ranging from the Korean peninsula to Iran to Syria and beyond – as well as called for greater European engagement with "the region through all ASEAN-led processes" (para. 14). But no specific cooperation mechanisms were outlined illustrating the continuing gap between rhetoric and action that – Aceh notwithstanding – has consistently characterised EU-Asia relations. As noted earlier in this thesis, and despite the fact that the bilateral treaty with ASEAN was the first such regional agreement ever to be signed by the EU, Europe seems only belatedly to have comprehended the importance of Asia and sought to build a series of complementary policy platforms to enhance relations. In that regard, the policy mosaic described in this thesis is more consistent with the perception of flawed fragmentation than coherence. The striking absence of innovative policy initiatives tends to suggest that these two mega-regions lack a prime motivation for deeper cooperation beyond the informality characterised best by the ASEM process.

Fourth, the under-researched but strategically important military connectivity between key EU Member States and Thailand has been explored using both sensitive intelligence as well as informative interview data from key military players. With specific respect to Thailand, the two coups in the past 15 years has slowed any deeper military cooperation, although this informal

freeze has begun to thaw more recently. In this regard the Member States have largely been in step with the US, deferring new commitments until the restoration of democracy is achieved rather than just promised. Intriguingly, one of the myriad of unknown Brexit outcomes will be how the UK wishes to redefine its global military linkages – including arms sales – once it is no longer bound by any common EU policies. Intra-European competition over arms exports may provide Thailand and ASEAN with new opportunities to diversify from the current American and increasingly Chinese reliance.

And fifth, how successful was the chosen methodology for examining the thesis question? A mixed-methods approach was adopted. Primary documents served as the bedrock in defining the scope and nature of the various EU-Asian relationships. This underlined the importance of a rule-based approach favoured by the EU when circumscribing relations with other international actors. Such documentation, of course, has its limitations but they do give an accurate representation of the level of coordination and agreement that existed at a specific time. To complement this, the thesis is rich with interview data. Key participants drawn from the most senior levels cooperated and provided frank and revealing information that is nowhere else available. This often sensitive commentary has, however, necessitated a brief embargo. Nonetheless, this thesis meets the “new knowledge” empirical measure for a doctoral thesis. The interview data is strengthened by the use of original language (for Thai), subsequently translated into English for comparative purposes. The final methodological element was the use of a case-study approach: secondary literature was used for the descriptive aspects of the AMM, supplemented as noted above by interview commentary. These three elements – primary sources, interviews and case-study – were informed by the theoretical framework outlined in Chapters 1 and 2.

To conclude, some broader themes deserve recognition and comment. First, EU-Asian relations remain an under-researched aspect of EU political, foreign or military policy. Similar to the plight of EU Development Policy as described by Holland and Doidge (2012), academic

fashion has only given spasmodic attention to Asia in general: the contrast with many other EU policy areas is striking and perhaps best explained by the fragmented and fluid nature of the EU's interaction with Asia in a policy sense. What framework takes precedence - with ASEAN? Through ASEM? With the four Asian EU Strategic Partners (India, China, Japan and Korea)? Or via bilateral FTAs (as with Singapore, Japan, Korea and potentially Australasia)? Such structural diversity is not a substitute for focus or coherence.

A second broad observation is that the EU's Asian engagement "should be understood within the broader intention to establish a single foreign policy international "presence" (Holland and Doidge, 2012, p.38) Since the 2004 enlargement, the EU has armed itself with sufficient institutional decision-making authority but seems reluctant to apply these post-Lisbon tools to its approach towards Asia. Some twenty-five years since first being proposed, it still seems to be the case of an expectations-capabilities gap (Hill, 1993), where the missing capacity is political will and strategic interest. As the analysis of the EU arms trade highlighted, this was a policy area that remained exclusively bilateral (and indeed competitive between the Member States) rather than common. – a situation that remains unchanged despite the best efforts of the European Defence Agency over the last 15 years.

Similarly, a third observation has been the limited impact of the 2004 enlargement at least on the immediate implementation of the 2005 AMM. This conclusion is consistent with the multi-level governance perspective as outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Despite a seeming disinterest in a distant continent, the newer Member States – at this time – did not use the opportunity to prevent a foreign policy consensus from emerging among the EU15. Indeed one (Lithuania), was a contributing Member State to the mission. The AMM appears to contradict Ginsberg's early conclusion that "new members adjust to, and mould, the EU's international relation" (Ginsberg, 1998, p. 198). However, the case-study does support his assertion that the 2004 new Member States did not add any geographically different global connections to the EU unlike previous

enlargements. This thesis does not confirm Allen's (1998) argument that institutional reform related to CSFP decision-making and procedures would be necessitated by the 2004 enlargement. The findings from this study are more compatible with Nugent's recognition that "attitudinal changes amongst decision-makers have also been important ... decision-making flexibility is vital if the EU is to be able to function in a reasonably efficient manner" (2016, p.439). Behavioural adaptation trumps institutional reform. The mandate for AMM was determined according to pre-existing foreign policy mechanisms and procedures. However, this lack of involvement or indifference of the newer Member States resulted in leaving the mission's implementation to those Member States with a stronger foreign policy perspective. Only one of the EU10 committed personnel to the AMM. Finally, the expectations raised by Cremona (2003) of a rebalancing of foreign policy concerns to the immediate EU neighbourhood can be considered as consistent with the evidence of the AMM. After this out-of-area intervention, subsequent E/CSDP missions have never gone beyond Africa, the Middle- East or the Eastern neighbourhood.

Prediction through hindsight is usually an easier task. Looking forward, it remains to be seen whether the EU will regain its appetite for engaging in foreign policy initiatives in Asia. Potential issues abound – in Myanmar, Korea and even Thailand – where an EU role could be explored based on the experience of 35 past or present E/CSDP missions. And the 2016 EU Global Strategy provides a policy base to move beyond Europe's near abroad. However, at this stage some 25-years after the Maastricht Treaty created CFSP, there seems to be no clear EU-Asian foreign policy perspective and the AMM looks likely to remain the only example of EU-ASEAN foreign policy cooperation.

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
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- ASEAN Singapore Declaration 1992. Retrieved from: http://asean.org/?static_post=singapore-declaration-of-1992-singapore-28-january-1992.
- SEANWFZ- 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone. Retrieved from:<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1995/1995-treaty-on-the-southeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-signed-on-15-december-1995-in-Bangkok-thailand-by-the-heads-of-stategovernment/>

- Single European Act. Signed in Luxembourg on 17th February 1986. Accessed on 27th November, 2003:
<http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre509.html>.
- The Asia-Pacific Non-Governmental Organizations' Bangkok Statement and Response to the Bangkok Declaration. Issued in Bangkok on 29th March 1993. Reproduced in Tang (Ed.) 1995
- Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Signed in Denpasar on 24th February, 1976. Accessed on 27th November, 2003: <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>.
- Treaty on European Union (Consolidated). Signed in Maastricht on the 7th February 1992. Official Journal of the European Communities, vol.C340, 10/11/1997, pp.145-172.
- ZOPFAN - Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration. Signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27th November, 1971. Accessed on 27th November, 2003: <http://www.aseansec.org/1215.htm>.

APPENDIX A

ESDP/CSDP Current EU Missions



https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35285/eu-strengthens-cooperation-security-and-defence_en

1. ALTHEA/BiH

<http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php>

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/pdf/factsheet_eufor_althea_en.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUFOR_Althea

http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/images/pdfs/EUFOR_ALTHEA_Information_Booklet_Dec_2017.pdf



http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/pdf/factsheet_eufor_althea_en.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EUFORBiH/>

<https://www.youtube.com/user/EUFORBiH>

2. EUAM Iraq

https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/euam-iraq_en

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_euam_iraq.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EUAMIRAQ/>



3. EUAM Ukraine

<http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/>

<http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Factsheet-Eng.pdf>

<https://www.facebook.com/euamukraine/>

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQ136zIRJ7s6mdAR7GtwU5w>



4. EUBAM Libya

https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya_en

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eubam_libya_september_libya_en.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/eubamlibya.eu/>

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL2mEJ6MoJNi_a9uRf_0UXpfs1vDyzzwL



5. EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (This Mission is not managed by CSDP structures)

<http://eubam.org/>



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Border_Assistance_Mission_to_Moldova_and_Ukraine

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/moldova-and-ukraine-border-mission/pdf/factsheet_eubam_moldova_ukraine_en.pdf

<https://www.youtube.com/user/TheEUBAM>

6. EUBAM Rafah

<http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Border_Assistance_Mission_Rafah

<http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/sites/default/files/newsletters/20160920%20EUBAM%20Rafah%20FACTSHEET.pdf>



7. EUCAP Somalia

<https://www.eucap-som.eu/>

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUCAP_Somalia

<https://www.eucap-som.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/EUCAP-Somalia-Factsheet.pdf>

<https://www.facebook.com/eucapsom/>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T49rO5HJKIA>



8. EUCAP Sahel Mali

<https://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUCAP_Sahel_Mali

https://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/documents/EUCAP_Sahel_Mali_Facsheet_2017_en.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EUCAPSahelMali/>

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCsaXLQ7FqH0L8O6b_bFGyqQ



9. EUCAP Sahel Niger

https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eucap-sahel-niger_en



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUCAP_Sahel_Niger

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eucap_sahel_niger_factsheet.pdf

https://www.facebook.com/eucap.sahelniger.31?hc_ref=ARQF4nCJ5kxCcpUelpPHw7xEAUUnzwr4UQgbRxvfiWKawc3Vosid_3AyISCVGg

<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL2mEJ6MoJNi9zzXSyuL3RYi43Fth7-w-O>

10. EULEX Kosovo

<http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Rule_of_Law_Mission_in_Kosovo

http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/20161209_EULEX-FactSheet.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EULEX.KOSOVO/>

<https://www.youtube.com/user/eulexkosovo>



11. EUMM Georgia

<https://eumm.eu/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Monitoring_Mission

https://www.eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202018%20JAN.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EUMM.GEO>

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCzzcRnQbH_rk3qp4cPG9aw/videos



12. EUNAVFOR MED

https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia_en

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EU_Navfor_Med

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/march_2018-factsheet_on_eunavfor_med_mission_english.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EunavforMed/>

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCc60otOH-31rmQzD8FY15hg>



13. EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories



<http://eupolcopps.eu/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Police_Mission_for_the_Palestinian_Territories

http://eupolcopps.eu/sites/default/files/newsletters/20170717%20EUPOL%20COPPS_en.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EUPOLCOPPS/>

<https://www.youtube.com/user/EupolCoppss>

14. EUTM RCA

https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eutm-rca_en

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUFOR_RCA

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/180124_mission_factsheet_eutm_rca_jan18.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/EUTMRCA/>

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4kUt9RuiND3SaLYfpivZ6w>



15. EUTM Somalia

<https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Training_Mission_Somalia

<https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/documents/> (Factsheet)

<https://www.facebook.com/EUTMSomalia/>

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UComuMwyFQC5PGo_tY2UNLFg



16. EUTM-Mali

<http://eutmmali.eu/en/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUTM_Mali

http://eutmmali.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/EUTM_Mission_Factsheet_FEB18_EN.pdf

<https://www.facebook.com/eutmmali/>



<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCW9PWHsW9k4j2uIXLuGI1Hw>

Completed ESDP/ CSDP Missions

1. EUPM/BiH



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/pdf/25062012_factsheet_eupm-bih_en.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Police_Mission_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwKjjL5poTM>



2. CONCORDIA/FYROM

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/concordia/index_en.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUFOR_Concordia

3. EUPOL Afghanistan



<http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afg/index.html>

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afg/sites/default/files/EUPOL%20Afghanistan_Factsheet_December_2016.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUPOL_Afghanistan

<https://www.facebook.com/EUPOLAFG/>

<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL1DEAE2D92C3D721D>



4. EUPOL PROXIMA/FYROM

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/proxima-fyrom/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operatons/proxima-fyrom/pdf/15122003_factsheet_proxima-fyrom_en.pdf



5. EUPAT

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupat/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupat/pdf/01122005_factsheet_eupat_en.pdf



6. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau/pdf/01102010_factsheet_eu-ssr-guinea-bissau_en.pdf



7. EUFOR Tchad/RCA

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/pdf/01032009_factsheet_eufor-tchad-rca_en.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUFOR_Tchad/RCA



8. EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eujust-themis-georgia/index_en.htm

9. EUJUST LEX-Iraq



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eujust-lex-iraq/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eujust-lex-iraq/pdf/facsheet_eujust-lex_iraq_en.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUJUST_LEX

10. EUAVSEC South Sudan



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/euavsec-south-sudan/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/euavsec-south-sudan/pdf/factsheet_euavsec_south-sudan_en.pdf

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUAVSEC_South_Sudan

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/EUAVSEC/328838860594906>



11. EUMAM RCA

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eumam-rca/index_en.htm

12. ARTEMIS/DRC



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/artemis-drc/index_en.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Artemis

13. EUPOL RD CONGO



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-rd-congo/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-rd-congo/pdf/factsheet_eupol_rd_congo_en.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUFOR_RD_Congo

<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL667B24514D171D33>

14. EUSEC RD CONGO



http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/index_en.htm

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/pdf/factsheet_eusec_rd_congo_en.pdf

15. EUPOL KINSHASA (DRC)



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-kinshasa/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-kinshasa/pdf/01102006_factsheet_eupol-kinshasa_en.pdf

16. EUFOR RD Congo



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rd-congo/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rd-congo/pdf/01012007_1_factsheet_eufor-rd-congo_en.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUFOR_RD_Congo

17. EUFOR RCA



http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rca/index_en.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUFOR_RCA

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL2mEJ6MoJNi_ituiA7Z2yxzExBaQv9LfY

18. Aceh Monitoring Mission - AMM

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/pdf/07092006_factsheet_aceh-amm_en.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aceh_Monitoring_Mission



19. EUNAVFOR Atalanta Somalia

<http://eunavfor.eu/>; <http://eunavfor.eu/?s=atalanta>

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Atalanta

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2SIXKM20dY>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hZKuA-UTlw>

<https://vimeo.com/57378838>

APPENDIX B

EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSIONS (EUPM/EUPOL)

EUPM BiH (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA)³⁸

LEGAL BASIS

- Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002

MANDATE

- Mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, to establish in BiH a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service operating in accordance with European and international standards; Assisting local authorities in planning and conducting major and organized crime investigations, overall improving the whole criminal justice system in general and enhancing police-prosecutor relations in particular; Together with the EC (European Commission) in assisting BiH authorities to identify remaining police development needs where EC is able to address

*BUDGET*³⁹

- €2.94 million in total from 2002 until 2012

DURATION

- 1 January 2003 – 30 June 2012 (9 years and 6 months)

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

- 34 international staff and 47 national staff nearing the end of mission

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION

- 27 Member States and 6 third states (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine)

³⁸ Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

³⁹ European Union External Action (2012). *Common Security and Defence Policy: European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)* [Factsheet]. Retrieved from http://www.eas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/pdf/25062012_factsheet_eupm-bih_en.pdf

EUPOL PROXIMA FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)⁴⁰

LEGAL BASIS

- Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 23 September 2003

MANDATE

- Monitoring, mentoring and advising on the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organised crime; Practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior; Operational transition and creation of a border police; Building confidence between the local police and the population; Enhanced cooperation with neighbouring states in policing

BUDGET

- Proxima I: €15 million; Proxima II: €15.95 million

DURATION

- Proxima I: 15 Dec 2003 – 15 Dec 2004; Proxima II: 15 Dec 2004 – 15 Dec 2005 (Total of 2 years)

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

- Proxima I: 186 international police officers; Proxima II: 169 international staff (138 international police officers, three civilian seconded personnel and 28 international experts)

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION

- Proxima I: 22 Member States and 4 third countries (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine); Proxima II: 24 Member States and 4 third countries (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine)

EUPOL KINSHASA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO⁴¹

LEGAL BASIS

- Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004

⁴⁰ Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

⁴¹ Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

MANDATE

- To monitor, mentor and advise the setting up and initial running of Integrated Police Unit (IPU). Supporting IPU covering activities on monitoring, supervision and role as advisor; Training activity in Kasangulu centre with partnership of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); Reform and reorganization of the Congolese National Police (CNP); Establishment of an element of coordination of the Congolese forces maintaining order during the election period

*BUDGET*⁴²

- €4.3 million in total

DURATION

- 12 April 2005 – June 2007 (26 months)

*DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL*⁴³

- 23 international staff, headed by Superintendent Adilio Custodio

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION

- Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden

EUPOL COPPS (EU COORDINATION OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT)⁴⁴

LEGAL BASIS

- Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005

MANDATE

- To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the Community's institution building programmes and other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform.

⁴² Pauwels, N. (2005). *EUPOL Kinshasa': Testing EU co-ordination, coherence and commitment to Africe*. European Security Review. ISIS Europe

⁴³ EUPOL Kinshasa. (2006). EUPOL-KINSHASA: The First European Police Mission in Africa [Factsheet]. Retrieved from: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-kinshasa/pdf/01102006_factsheet_eupol-kinshasa_en.pdf

⁴⁴ Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

Assist Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) in implementation of the Police Development Programme by advising and closely mentoring PCP senior officials at District, Headquarters and Ministerial level; Coordinate and facilitate EU and Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to PCP; Advice, programme planning and project facilitation for the Palestinian Criminal Justice elements

*BUDGET*⁴⁵

- 2005 until 2014: Annually €8.97 million; 1 July – 30 June 2017: €10.32 million

DURATION

- 1 January 2006 – 30 June 2017* (latest extension)

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

- 69 international staff and 45 local staff led by Rodolphe Mauget

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION

- 21 Member States and 3 third countries (Canada, Norway and Turkey)

EUPOL RD CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO)⁴⁶

Mission succeeded from EUPOL-KINSHASA

LEGAL BASIS

- Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP of 12 June 2007

MANDATE

- To provide assistance and advice on police reform; To improve coordination between the police and criminal justice system;
To ensure consistency of all Security Sector Reform efforts; Creation of General Directorate of Schools and Training within the Congolese Police and the construction of

⁴⁵ European Union External Action (2016). *EUPOL COPPS – Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories*. Retrieved from

http://eupolcopps.eu/sites/default/files/newsletters/20160711%20EUPOL%20COPPS_en.pdf

⁴⁶ Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009). Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

a national Police Academy, with the plan of restructuring and modernizing the national police training system.⁴⁷

BUDGET

- 1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009: €6.92 million; 1 October 2013 – 30 September 2014: €8.5 million

DURATION

- 1 July 2007 – 30 September 2014 (7 years and 2 months)

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

- 31 international staff led by Commissaire Divisionnaire Jean-Paul RIKIR

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION

- 7 Member States

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN⁴⁸

LEGAL BASIS

- Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007

MANDATE

- To contribute significantly to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective policing arrangements, ensuring appropriate interaction with wider criminal justice system; To support reformation process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights.

Advancing the Ministry of Interior (MoI) institutional capacity; further professionalization and efficiency of the Afghan National Police (ANP) as a civilian police service.⁴⁹

BUDGET

- Annual budget 2016: €43.7 million

⁴⁷ European Union External Action. (2014). *EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD CONGO)*. Retrieved from: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-rd-congo/pdf/factsheet_eupol_rd_congo_en.pdf

⁴⁸ Grevi, G, Helly, D and Keohane, D.(2009) *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*. Retrieved from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

⁴⁹ About EUPOL| EUPOL Afghanistan. (n.d.). Retrieved June 10, 2016, from <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/37>

DURATION

- 15 June 2007 to date (Extended mandate until 31 December 2016)

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

- 127 international and 142 local staff (March 2016) headed by Pia Stjernvall

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION

- 22 Member States and 4 third states

APPENDIX C

Timeline of ASEAN Political and Security Developments

i) Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 1971

In 1971, the members of ASEAN decided to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The action was an attempt to isolate Southeast Asia from outside influences – both from the West and Communism – in order to create peace and economic prosperity in the region (Gilson, 2002). Chalermphanupap has argued that “one underlying belief in ASEAN then – which remains valid until now - was that security of each ASEAN member could best be maintained through national resilience and national development efforts free from external interference in any form or manifestation” (2002, p.195). The aims and objectives of ZOPFAN were drawn from the United Nations’ principles “of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in affairs of states” (ZOPFAN Declaration, 1971, p.1). The ZOPFAN Declaration stresses that “the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization” (p.1). Article 1 of the Declaration states that ASEAN members will co-operate to “secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers”. Article 2 simply states that ASEAN members will enhance their co-operation in order to improve their “strength, solidarity, and closer relationship”.

ii) Bali Summit: Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Treaty of Amity and Concord 1976

Khoman has identified three developments in the Southeast Asian region caused by the Cold War that forced ASEAN members to enhance their co-operation in the area of security: “the defeat and withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam and even from the mainland of Asia; the growing Vietnamese ambitions nurtured by the heady wine of victory; and the threat of Ho Chi Minh’s

testament enjoining generations of Vietnamese to take over the rest of French Indochina in addition to the northern provinces of Thailand" (1992, p.3). After 1975 and the American withdrawal, Communism began to spread from Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia. It is important to note that the break between China and the Soviet Union in 1956 over different paths of Communism had a major impact on politics and security in the region throughout the Cold War. The triumph of the Khmer Rouge, backed by China, over Prince Sihanouk's regime in Cambodia increased instability in the already shaky Southeast Asian region.

Gilson has argued that the "fears of Communism uprisings in Malaysia and Thailand led to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and Treaty of Amity and Concord at the Bali summit in 1976" (2002, p.42). The Bali Summit marked an historical event as it was the first ASEAN Summit since its conception in 1967. Not only did ASEAN leaders sign the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Concord, they also agreed to the establishment of an ASEAN Secretariat.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed on 24 February 1976 by the leaders of five ASEAN member countries. The Declaration built on the earlier 1967 Bangkok Declaration to enhance "the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, and political fields" (ASEAN Concord, 1976, p.1). The following objectives and principles to establish political stability in the region were adopted in the Declaration: it was agreed that member countries shall:

- increase their effort to realise the early creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality;
- enhance their cooperation in economic and social development to eradicate poverty, disease, and illiteracy and improve the living standard of their people;
- aid one another should natural disaster occurred;
- resolve intra-regional disputes peacefully; and,

- establish regional awareness and create a strong ASEAN community "in accordance with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations" (p.2).

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord represented a framework of regional cooperation among ASEAN member countries in six areas – political, economic, social, cultural and information, security, and an improvement of ASEAN instruments. Only EU-ASEAN *political* and *security* relations are not discussed here. The important elements of the political cooperation between ASEAN members included the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation by creating the ASEAN Secretariat, and "strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions" (p.2). In terms of security cooperation, the Declaration failed to produce any substantial element and opted instead for a "continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests" (p.4).

The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) declared its purpose to be "to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship" (Article 1, TAC, 1976, p.1). Article 2 stipulated that member countries should "respect the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations" and stressed the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of one another. It also called for peaceful resolution to disputes between member countries by refraining from the use of force and encouraging effective cooperation between the members. The Treaty also promotes cooperation in economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields and in issues that constitute regional stability and security. It established a High Council comprising ministers from member countries to mediate and find common solutions to any disputes between members which might otherwise lead to

regional conflict. Article 18 mentioned that the TAC is open for accession by other countries in Southeast Asia.

iii) ASEAN-Indochinese Conflict (Post Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia) 1978-1991

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, tensions in Southeast Asia intensified enormously. The region was divided into two rival blocs – ASEAN and Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) – representing the on-going hostilities between China and Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, and between the USA and the Soviet Union (Archaya, 1993). ASEAN member countries, especially Thailand, viewed the Indochinese countries led by Vietnam as the imminent threat to their security and stability in the region, while Vietnam viewed ASEAN as a defence organisation representing American influence in Southeast Asia.

Archaya has argued that “the ASEAN-Indochinese divide was unquestionably the chief obstacle to ASEAN’s concept of regional order based on its professed norms of non-intervention... and non-interference” (1993, p.8). The fear of domestic Communist insurgencies in ASEAN member countries after the victory of Vietnam in 1978 had led to an increase in ASEAN cooperation, but at the same time contributed to the polarisation of the region. For ASEAN member countries, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia represented a violation of the core principle of its 1976 TAC – non-interference. They asserted that the Cambodian Conflict was a result of Vietnamese expansionism and could only be resolved by the withdrawal of the Vietnamese from Cambodia. ASEAN members also feared that Vietnam wanted to dominate the whole region and overthrow the current regimes.

One important factor that led to the end of ASEAN-Indochinese conflict was the improvement in the relationship between Thailand and Vietnam due to changes in the domestic politics of both countries (Archaya, 1993). The situation began to improve in the late 1980s when Vietnam adopted a *doi moi* or “renovation” policy with the goal of reforming the Vietnamese economy. The Vietnamese leaders by this stage had realised that the cost of occupying Cambodia

was very high and they could no longer sustain the costs. The leaders wanted to improve the Vietnamese economy by creating a market mechanism economy which could only be achieved through foreign investment and trade, and therefore they needed to improve Vietnam's relations with ASEAN and the rest of the world. Thailand, under the new Chatchai government in 1988, saw the *doi moi* policy as an economic and political opportunity for Thailand and seized on it by improving ties with Vietnam despite the concerns of other ASEAN members that this could undermine ASEAN's common position towards Vietnam. The other ASEAN members felt that this action would ease pressure on Vietnam to leave Cambodia and would therefore result in an increase in Vietnamese aggression. However, the end of the Cambodian conflict began when, on 5 April 1989, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia by September that year. This announcement caused differing reactions within ASEAN. Malaysia and Indonesia wanted to accept Vietnam into the association immediately, regardless of the Vietnamese political system, while Singapore argued that Vietnam should change its political and economic system before entering ASEAN. This division was visible throughout the 1990s with Singapore being the main opposition.

Another factor that promoted a change in Vietnamese foreign policy was the transformation of relations between the Soviet Union and China. The reconciliation between the two superpowers left Vietnam isolated in its territorial disputes with China. Only through ASEAN could it find allies in the international arena against the major players, especially China. ASEAN could also serve as a connection to the West. With the Soviet Union now out of the picture, Vietnam had to find ways of improving its relations with the rest of the world. Finally, in September 1991, Vietnam expressed its intention to sign the TAC, thus formally demonstrating its commitment to regional cooperation and stability.

Archya has argued that "in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN needed, and had the opportunity, to extend its role to extramural conflicts" (1993, p.11). ASEAN tried to resolve the conflict by organising a UN-sponsored International Conference on

Kampuchea in 1981 and Indonesia was involved in facilitating talks between the Khmer factions in two Jakarta Informal Meetings (1988 and 1989). The efforts by ASEAN to sustain the peace process eventually led to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia on 23 October 1991. The Agreement could arguably be seen as an ASEAN success in bringing an end to the Cambodian Conflict. Although the Paris Agreement marked the end of external influences in Cambodia – Vietnam (backed by the Soviet Union) and China – internal conflicts between the Khmer factions persisted in the country until 1993. Perhaps, the most influential action that ASEAN took during this time was always presenting Vietnam and the Indochina states with the opportunity part of becoming ASEAN members and forming part of the regional order of Southeast Asia.

During the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore (1992), ASEAN members declared that “ASEAN shall forge a closer relationship based on friendship and cooperation with the Indochinese countries, following the settlement on Cambodia” (Singapore Declaration, 1992, p.1). The Singapore Declaration also welcomed all countries in Southeast Asia to accede to the TAC and announced its support for the Cambodian National Council in sustaining the peace process with the assistance of the UN. In addition, ASEAN promised to provide international programmes for the reconstruction of the Indochinese countries. This declaration, led by Vietnam and ASEAN, marked the end of the rivalry between the Indochinese countries and the relations between the two groups improved significantly after the summit. Later that year, during the Manila ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Laos and Vietnam signed the TAC, thus marking a new chapter in ASEAN-Indochinese relations.

iv) 1990s: ASEAN Regional Forum, Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and ASEAN Enlargement

In the 1990s, ASEAN adopted three initiatives which had a significant impact on regional peace and security: the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the signing of the Treaty

on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995, and the enlargement of ASEAN to include Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999).

As one of the initiatives of the Singapore Declaration in 1992 which states that "ASEAN shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity" (p.1), the ARF was created during the 1994 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) "to serve as a vehicle for promoting political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region" (ASEAN Annual Report, 1993-1994, p.1). The ARF was composed of the six ASEAN members, seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the USA), two Consultative Partners (China and Russia), and three Observers (Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam). The first ARF meeting took place in July 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand (the developments of the ARF are discussed further below).

During the 5th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in 1995, the leaders of ten Southeast Asian countries signed the Treaty on the SEANWFZ. The Treaty determines "to take concrete action which will contribute to the progress towards general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, and to the promotion of international peace and security" and "to protect the region from environmental pollution and the hazards posed by radioactive wastes and other radioactive material" (SEANWFZ, 1995, p.1) As an essential element for the realisation of the ZOPFAN, the Treaty calls for the prohibition of the development or possession of nuclear weapons, their stationing, transportation, testing or use of nuclear weapons, and the disposal of nuclear waste in the nuclear free zone (which covered the whole of Southeast Asia) by the Treaty signatories. Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of this Treaty was the participation of ASEAN's long standing rivals – Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia – something which helped pave the way for the future membership of these Indochinese countries.

The resolution of the Cambodian Conflict in the early 1990s led to the improvement in relations between ASEAN and Indochinese countries, headed by Vietnam which had already

shown interest in joining ASEAN both to improve its relations with ASEAN members and the West, and in order to fend off the involvement of China. Thus at the 1995 5th ASEAN Summit, it was announced that Vietnam had obtained membership status while Laos and Cambodia had been offered observer status. At the end of the summit, ASEAN leaders declared that:

ASEAN is committed to the establishment of an ASEAN comprising all countries in Southeast Asia which will be guided by the spirit and principles underlying the TAC and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. Co-operative peace and shared prosperity shall be the fundamental goals of ASEAN (Bangkok Summit Declaration, 1995, p.2).

From the Declaration, it is clearly apparent that even at this stage the goal of ASEAN was expansive. During the 1st Informal ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting (held in Jakarta in 1996) ASEAN agreed that Cambodia and Laos, as well as Myanmar be admitted into ASEAN simultaneously. While this symmetry was not fully achieved, Laos and Myanmar were admitted into ASEAN in July 1997, with Cambodia's admission delayed until 1999 because of the on-going political turmoil in the country during that period.

v) Two Decades: ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997) to the ASEAN Charter (2007)

ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997)

During the 2nd ASEAN Informal Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the ASEAN Vision 2020 and established an ASEAN Foundation to promote cooperation between member countries. ASEAN Vision 2020 advocates that ASEAN in 2020 to be "a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in community of caring societies", a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (p.1, ASEAN Vision 2020). In this Vision, conflicts in the region would be resolved through the justice system and the rule of law, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation becomes the governing code of conduct among governments and their people. The leaders also envisioned ASEAN as a nuclear weapons free zone and free of other weapons of mass destruction. According to the Vision, the ARF will serve as the key mechanism in preventive

diplomacy and conflict resolution, with ASEAN playing an international role in promoting peace, justice and moderation.

Through the Vision, ASEAN leaders saw a “Partnership in Dynamic Development” among members. The objective of this was to achieve economic integration and sustainable and equitable growth by enhancing economic cooperation within ASEAN. The members pledged to create an “ASEAN Economic Region” where “there is a free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities” (p.2, ASEAN Vision 2020). By 2010, the leaders planned to achieve and fully implement the ASEAN Free Trade Area, including the liberalisation of trade in services, the establishment of an ASEAN Investment Area, the liberalisation of the financial sector, accelerated development of science and technology, increased cooperation in the energy sector, improved communication systems (transportation and IT), and enhanced human resource development through better education and training.,

Hanoi Plan of Action (1998)

After the economic crisis that hit Asia in 1998, ASEAN leaders held a 6th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi (December 1998) and adopted the Hanoi Action Plan (HPA) to support the goals of ASEAN Vision 2020 for the period 1999-2004. The main objectives of the plan were to “hasten economic recovery and address the social impact of the global economic and financial crisis” (HPA, 1998, p.1) and to promote regional integration while strengthening the economies of member countries.

The HPA outlined the following measures to achieve this: to

- strengthen macroeconomic and financial cooperation;
- enhance greater economic integration;
- promote science and technology development and develop information technology infrastructure;
- promote social development and address the social impact of the financial and economic crisis;
- promote human resource development;
- protect the environment and promote sustainable development;

- strengthen regional peace and security;
- enhance ASEAN's role as an effective force for peace, justice, and moderation in the Asia-Pacific and in the world;
- promote ASEAN awareness and its standing in the international community; and,
- improve ASEAN's structures and mechanisms.

Drawing from these, four objectives focused specifically on the political and security fields: to

- strengthen regional peace and security;
- enhance ASEAN's role as an effective force for peace, justice, and moderation in the Asia-Pacific and in the world;
- promote ASEAN awareness and its standing in the international community; and,
- improve ASEAN's structures and mechanisms.

The HPA aimed to strengthen regional peace and security by increasing cooperation and regional assistance to establish ASEAN as a ZOPFAN. Bilateral and regional cooperation programmes and technical assistance were encouraged to assist member countries to integrate into the organisation. The HPA called for the ratification of the Second Protocol of the TAC and encouraged the accession of non-member countries to the TAC. ASEAN leaders wanted to promote the TAC as the standard governing principles of ASEAN's relations with other countries and there was also support for drafting the rules of procedure for the operations of the High Council as described in the TAC. The HPA called for disputes between members to be settled through negotiations, not by force. It also sought to enhance cooperation on border-related issues. The SEANWFZ was further promoted in the HPA in order to achieve a nuclear weapon free zone in the region and the plan called for the SEANWFZ Commission to supervise the implementation of the treaty. In addition, the HPA called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the South China Sea as stated in the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, and ASEAN leaders agreed to enhance intra-ASEAN security cooperation.

The HPA sought to enhance ASEAN's role as "an effective force for peace, justice, and moderation in the Asia-Pacific and in the world" (p.14). The plan stressed the key function of the ARF process and the leading role of ASEAN in conducting ARF activities. The HPA called for the ARF process to evolve its focus from confidence building to promoting preventive diplomacy.

ASEAN leaders intended to strengthen the ARF process by promoting cooperation between defence and foreign affairs officials in ARF activities and by promoting public awareness of the importance of the ARF process. They also called for the creation of basic governing principles based on TAC to enhance cooperation in promoting peace in the Asia-Pacific region: the ASEAN leaders also decided to increase consultation and coordination on ASEAN common positions at international fora and the HPA sought to strengthen ASEAN relations with its dialogue partners based on equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.

To achieve the HPA aims to "promote ASEAN awareness and its standing in the international community" (p.14), the ASEAN leadership have sought to promote the awareness of ASEAN among its citizens. The HPA also sought to enhance cooperation with mass media and foster the release of information on ASEAN and to develop an ASEAN Multi-Media Centre (by 2001). Furthermore, it aims to "improve ASEAN's structures and mechanisms" (p.15, HPA) by enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. It also seeks to improve ASEAN's external relations mechanisms with its dialogue partners and other regional and international organisations. The leaders planned to improve the role, functions and capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat in order to carry out the implementation of the HPA.

During the 3rd ASEAN Informal Summit (Manila, November 1999), ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the proposal made by Thai Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai, to establish the ASEAN Troika which would constitute an *ad hoc* ministerial level body. The purpose of the ASEAN Troika is "to enable ASEAN to address in a timely manner urgent and important regional political and security issues and situations of common concern likely to disturb regional peace and harmony" (Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Troika, p.1). The Troika would only be established when the situation demanded and would operate in accordance with ASEAN treaties and agreements founding principles of consensus and non-interference. The ASEAN Troika was to be comprised of the Foreign Ministers of the past, present, and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing

Committee (ASC) and its function was to assist the ASEAN foreign ministers by making recommendations and mandates. The Troika did not, however, have any decision making power.

As a regional response to the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11th September 2001, ASEAN leaders issued the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism during the 7th ASEAN Summit (held in Bandar Seri Begawan in November 2001). The leaders agreed that ASEAN

faces its biggest, if not the biggest, challenge since ASEAN was founded in 1967... the two fold challenge of addressing a severe world economic slowdown while contributing to international effort to combat terrorism is without precedent. (p.1)

They declared that "ASEAN is committed to countering, preventing and suppressing all terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, especially taking into account all relevant UN resolutions" (p.1). In response, the ASEAN leaders created a regional framework to handle transnational crime and adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action. They also approved the initiatives of the 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) that focused on dealing with terrorism. The ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the following measures: to

- strengthen national mechanisms to fight terrorism;
- support early accession to the anti-terrorist conventions;
- enhance cooperation between ASEAN members' law enforcement agencies;
- integrate international conventions on terrorism to ASEAN mechanisms;
- enhance cooperation on information and intelligence exchange between ASEAN members;
- enhance cooperation between AMMTC and relevant ASEAN agencies;
- establish regional programme to improve the efficiency of member countries in fighting terrorism; and,
- increase ASEAN's cooperation with other countries in combating terrorism through bilateral, regional and international cooperation.

Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (2003)

In October 2003, ASEAN leaders held the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali and adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (also known as the Bali Concord II). ASEAN pledged to "continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its member states and among their

peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity" (Bali Concord II, 2003, p.2). It can be argued that this declaration was a by-product of the ASEAN Vision 2020 which had as one of its main objectives, the creation of an ASEAN Community by 2020. According to the Declaration, the ASEAN Community would have three pillars – an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and an ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC).

The objective of the ASC is to enhance political and security cooperation between member countries to ensure peaceful resolutions to intra-regional conflicts. The Bali Concord II states that:

the ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN's principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes (p.3).

The ASC was also to be guided by the principles of ASEAN treaties and declarations such as the TAC, the ZOPFAN, and the SEANWFZ. The High Council of the TAC was to play a central role in the ASC. The new security community was to enhance the national and regional capabilities to combat transnational crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The ASC would also be involved in promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN leaders agreed that the ARF should remain the central forum in discussing security issues and that it remained open to ASEAN's Dialogue Partners and other countries to cooperate in preserving peace and security.

The objective of the second pillar of the ASEAN Community, the AEC, was to establish an economic community in the region through economic integration involving the free flow of goods, services, investment and more liberalised capital markets to promote ASEAN competitiveness and a better investment environment. It was also committed to achieving equitable economic development and a reduction in poverty as envisioned in ASEAN Vision 2020. The leaders agreed to adopt new measures which included an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), an ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA).

The third pillar, the ASCC, had the goal of creating a community of "caring" societies as described in the ASEAN Vision 2020. The adopted measures were designed to enhance cooperation in social development with the goal of improving the standard of living and reducing poverty. The Community was to be committed to enhancing human resource development through more investment in education, training, science and technology and the leaders agreed to enhance cooperation in public health to reduce diseases and provide adequate health services. Other areas of cooperation included academia, culture, disaster management, whilst at the same time (and somewhat ambitiously) addressing problems caused by pollution, unemployment, and population growth.

Vientiane Action Programme (2004)

During the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane in November 2004, the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) was adopted and built on the earlier Hanoi Plan of Action to achieve the goals of ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II. The VAP covered the 2004-2010 period and has two dimensions – "the broader integration of the ten Member Countries into one cohesive ASEAN Community" and "the identification of new strategies for narrowing the development gap to quicken the pace of integration ..." (VAP, 2004, p.5). Three main themes were covered: goals and strategies towards achieving the ASEAN Community; goals and strategies for narrowing the development gap; and, the implementation mechanism.

The leading theme of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) is "[e]nhancing peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region through comprehensive political and security cooperation" (p.6). The VAP stresses that the main concept of ASEAN security is "comprehensive security"; that is, the notion that politics, economics, and social life are interconnected in the region. Externally, ASC will serve as an actor that promotes peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and will promote ASEAN's leading role in the ARF. The VAP adopted strategies in five

areas to realise the ASC: political development; the shaping and sharing of norms; conflict prevention; conflict resolution; and post-conflict peace-building.

The following year's 11th ASEAN Summit in December 2005, ASEAN leaders signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter. They established the Eminent Person Group (EPG) which was composed of elites from different fields of the society to study and provide recommendations on elements of the ASEAN Charter and on the future of ASEAN. The leaders also created a High Level Task Force to draft the ASEAN Charter following the recommendations of the EPG. The progress of the ASC was furthered through the establishment of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy and the reactivation of the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief under the ARF. In addition, ASEAN created the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Specifically relevant to this thesis, the leaders praised the accomplishments of the joint ASEAN-EU Aceh Monitoring Mission and viewed this operation to be the model for ASEAN regional conflict resolution efforts and an instructive example for inter-regional cooperation for future conflict resolution missions. It is this aspiration and assumption that this thesis examines in great detail in the context of the EU's innovative use of CSDP missions since 2003.

During the 12th ASEAN Summit convened in Cebu in January 2007, ASEAN leaders focused on the drafting process of ASEAN Charter and the realisation of the objectives of ASEAN Vision 2020. They adopted the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter after receiving a report from the EPG. The leaders agreed to fast-track the establishment of the ASEAN Community to 2015 and signed the Cebu Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015 – targets that at least were formally met on schedule. In terms of the progress in establishing the ASC, the First ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting was convened and there was progress in the activities of the ARF and the Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (2006)

In the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action adopted in the 10th ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) was established as recommended by the Working Group on Security Cooperation of the ASEAN Special Senior Officials' Meeting (Special SOM). The 1st ADMM was convened in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006 where the Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting was adopted. ADMM is "the highest ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN" (Concept Paper, 2006, p.2). The objectives of ADMM include: to promote regional peace and security through defence and dialogue and cooperation; to give guidance in the area of security and defence; to promote mutual trust and confidence; and to contribute to and promote the creation of ASC. The agenda of the ADMM includes: discussion on regional and international defence and security issues; voluntary briefings on defence and security policies; discussion on related activities outside ASEAN process; promotion of security and defence cooperation with Dialogue Partners; and the review of ASEAN defence cooperation. The ADMM has a rotating chairmanship and host that corresponds to the chairmanship of ASEAN Standing Committee. The leaders also established the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) and the ADSOM Working Group to assist the ADMM and implement its directives.

During the 2nd ADMM in Singapore (14 November 2007), ASEAN leaders adopted the Protocol to the Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ADMM, a Three-Year ADMM Work Programme, and the ADMM-Plus Concept Paper. The Protocol to the Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ADMM defines the institutional framework: the ADMM is under the ASEAN Summit framework and its main coordinating mechanism in defence and military activities is the ADSOM. ADSOM supervises the ADSOM Working Group and the Task Groups and has to prepare an ADMM Annual Indicative Calendar of Activities for the ADMM and an ADMM Three-Year Work Programme. The Protocol stresses the importance of incorporating the principle of "comprehensive security" into defence and military cooperation in ADMM. In addition, ADMM

is tasked with organising Track Two activities (academic conferences, workshops, and seminars on defence and military issues) to enhance cooperation between the public sector and other stakeholders in ASEAN societies. ADMM is also responsible for promoting defence and military cooperation between ASEAN's Friends and Dialogue Partners through ADMM-Plus process.

ADSOM drafted an ADMM Three-Year Work Programme with the theme of "Building the foundation and setting the direction for defence dialogues and cooperation". The Programme outlines five areas of ADMM initiatives:

- promoting regional defence and security cooperation
- shaping and sharing of norms
- conflict prevention
- conflict resolution
- post-conflict peace building

Promoting regional defence and security cooperation: The ADMM aims to develop an understanding of defence and security policies, structures, systems and developments by enhancing transparency through voluntary disclosure of these elements between ASEAN members including their defence institutions, universities, and think tanks. In addition, Track Two activities will be encouraged by ADMM through conferences and seminars on defence and security issues. The ADMM will promote existing and future defence and military dialogue and cooperation between ASEAN members and enhance defence and security cooperation with ASEAN friends and Dialogue Partners through the ADMM Plus process.

Shaping and Sharing of Norms: The ADMM aims to support the development, implementation, and adoption of ASEAN security agreements (ASEAN Charter, TAC, Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea Declaration, the South East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism) to promote peace and security. In addition, ADMM will establish norms to promote cooperation on non-traditional security issues and ASEAN maritime security cooperation.

Conflict Prevention: The ADMM aims to promote mutual trust and confidence between ASEAN members through an exchange of views and the sharing of information on regional and international defence and security issues. It also aims to provide input on the development of an ASEAN early warning system to prevent the occurrence and escalation of conflict in the region. The ADMM aims to strengthen confidence-building measures by promoting transparency through regional exchanges between ASEAN military officials, observers in military exercises and by sharing information of the UN Arms Register. In addition, ADMM will promote cooperation on disaster relief and emergency operations for humanitarian purposes including the development of a coordinating mechanism for military cooperation and joint training on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operation. It also aims to enhance cooperation on non-traditional security issues.

Conflict Resolution: The ADMM aims to promote the development of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes and to develop regional cooperation for maintenance of peace and stability by establishing a network between peacekeeping centres in the region in order to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping operations between ASEAN members and to establish an ASEAN Arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability.

Post-Conflict Peace Building: The ADMM aims to enhance cooperation in military participation in humanitarian crisis management and assistance and post-conflict resolution and rehabilitation.

ASEAN Charter (2007)

On the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN and the 20th of the ASEAN Vision 2020, the leaders held their 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007 and signed the ASEAN Charter: "a historic milestone for ASEAN, representing our common vision and commitment to the development of an ASEAN Community as a region of lasting peace, stability, sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and progress" (Chairman's Statement of the 13th ASEAN Summit, 2007, p.1). The Charter outlines anew the purposes and principles of ASEAN. Article 3

of the ASEAN Charter provides ASEAN with a legal personality as an intergovernmental organisation. It also established the ASEAN Coordinating Council, comprised of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, to prepare the meetings of the ASEAN Summit and coordinate the implementation of the policies adopted at the Summit.

In addition, the Charter created the ASEAN Community Council which is composed of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, the ASEAN Economic Community Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council. The tasks of the ASEAN Community Council include: ensuring the implementation of the decisions taken at the ASEAN Summit; coordinating different sectors of the Community; and making reports and recommendations to the ASEAN Summit. The Charter instituted the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (to be based in Jakarta) comprised of one representative from every ASEAN member country. The function of the Committee is to support and cooperate with ASEAN bodies and external partners. ASEAN members agreed to create ASEAN National Secretariats in their respective countries to coordinate and promote ASEAN decisions at national level and they also decided to establish the ASEAN Human Rights Body to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Charter stipulates that decision-making in ASEAN is to be based on consultation and consensus and in a case where consensus cannot be reached, the ASEAN Summit will decide. On the issue of ASEAN identity, the Charter states the ASEAN motto is to be, "One Vision, One Identity, One Community" and introduced the ASEAN flag and emblem. ASEAN will also have an anthem and celebrate the 8th of August as ASEAN Day, reflecting for some a series of symbols that mimic those of the European Union's earlier attempts at identity-building.

During the Summit, ASEAN leaders also adopted the Singaporean Declaration on the ASEAN Charter and commended the cooperation in defence and security by Defence Ministers and military officials in ASEAN forums such as AMM, AMMTC, and the ARF. The leaders also assigned the task of drafting a Blueprint for the APSC.