Strategic Narratives: Exploring the Framing of EU policy in Crisis

A Study of Strategic Narratives about the European Union and migration policy projected in Hungarian media.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of European Union Studies in the University of Canterbury

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<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Common European Asylum System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central Eastern European Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EFDD</td>
<td>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy</td>
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<td>ENF</td>
<td>Europe of Nations and Freedom</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People’s Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>Fiatal Democraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HODND</td>
<td>Hungarian Official Daily News Digest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>Magyar Távirati Iroda</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Regional Disembarkation Platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;D</td>
<td>Socialists and Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>V4</td>
<td>Visegrad Four</td>
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Abstract

In response to recent events such as Brexit, and the outcome of the 2016 US election, the European Union (EU) has worked hard to position itself as a global actor in the international system (Novotná 2017, p. 177). In some cases, the EU has been recognised for its achievements in the areas of human rights, and development (for instance, the EU provided €2 billion or 40% of global aid (Zielonka 2008, p. 478). Yet, the EU has also received its fair share of criticism from those that dispute its legitimacy as an actor, described as a “hobbled giant” whose inability to act in times of crisis has often diminished the accomplishments the EU has made and the 2015 migrant crisis was no exception. Several non-governmental organisations have also noted the European Union’s recent willingness to prioritise security over human rights in the Mediterranean (Moreno-Lax 2018, p. 119), and academics have noted the externalisation of border management in lieu of a legitimate, effective migration policy was labelled a ‘relative failure (Niemann & Zaun 2018, p. 8).

Migration into, and within, Europe is regulated by a combination of national law, EU law, the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter and by other international obligations entered into by European states such as the 1951 Geneva Convention. As thousands of migrants made the pilgrimage to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea through Southern Europe, the EU’s institutions aided Greece and Italy who could not adequately support thousands of new daily arrivals. Member states such as Hungary campaigned for a European solution to the crisis and asked for assistance for states in the Western Balkans.

Throughout 2015, Member states could not reach consensus on the best way to support those states shouldering the burden of the influx of migrants, the Hungarian government decided it would seal the Hungarian-Serbian border. The Hungarian government frequently criticised the European Union, claiming the EU had failed to find an appropriate solution to the crisis and that the EU should now respect the sovereignty of Hungary as its people must be protected. These narratives have since become stronger in language as Hungary continues to implement various border management and legislative tools to restrict the eligibility for assistance migrants can receive. The Hungarian government cited the protection of the Hungarian people as justification for these extreme measures.

This research shall explore and compare narratives concerning Hungary and the European Union projected during the during the summers of a) 2015; and b) 2018; by the Hungarian English-language media press about EU migration policy in the context of the migrant crisis. After the analysis of these narratives, this research will also examine the way Hungarian narratives on migration policy may
impact the relationship between the EU and Hungary in the future. Narratives are important because the EU as a normative actor (Manners 2002, p. 238) utilises strategic narratives to inform both domestic and international audiences about their actions and perceptions of the international system (Roselle, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2014, p. 75). These narratives aid in shaping the perceptions of other actors to believe your versions of events to advance your interests and policy outcomes and where you intend to go in the future.

Chapter One - Introduction

Throughout 2015, an unprecedented number of migrants fled their countries of origin and entered European Union territory. 1.2 million people submitted applications for protection (Slominski & Trauner 2018, p. 101) and Hungary received the second-largest number of applications. This crisis peaked in the summer of 2015 when Hungary was experiencing upwards of 1,500 arrivals per day, which is an increase of 447% as per International organisation for Migration statistics (IOM 2015). The situation in Hungary rapidly deteriorated due to a lack of resources for this large-scale humanitarian crisis. Non-governmental human rights organisations reported horrific conditions within migrant detention centres stating the police-run detention centres lacked basic facilities including water, food and medical treatment (HRW 2015). As the European Union repeatedly debated migration policy reform, the Hungarian government gradually lost faith in the European Union institutions ability in solving the crisis. Viktor Orban began using the media to counter the European Union narratives of solidarity and EU values with a campaign that dehumanised refugees and asylum seekers stating that the majority were ‘economic migrants’ while reducing their rights through legislative reform. Orban utilised the growing anti-migrant sentiment and implemented laws punishing those helping migrants in Hungarian territory.

The anti-migrant sentiment has been growing in the European Union (Bocskor 2018, p. 551) – a union that prides itself on promoting human rights, freedom of speech and the democracy. However, there are certain member states that are challenging these values and the EU’s commitment to upholding them. Hungary, an EU member state since the 2004 enlargement, is on the European Commission radar for all the wrong reasons. Since 2010, the Hungarian government has reduced media freedom, permanently closed their border with Serbia (which is not allowed within the Schengen agreement) and implemented an anti-migrant public relations campaign. Bocskor noted in his research before the crisis, migration was not considered an important issue in Hungarian politics (Bocskor 2018, p. 554). What phenomena explains the sharp change in rhetoric relating to migration in Hungary? This research seeks to observe what narratives, whether purposeful or not, were projected about EU
migration policy in relation to the migrant crisis as well as the factors that influence these projected narratives.

1.1 Context

In order to understand the status of Hungary as a European Union member state in 2018, a fundamental understanding of the significant events from the transition from communist regime to its existence as an illiberal democracy within the EU, is essential. This journey is explained in three stages: nationalisation, regression and confrontation. These three periods are connected to this research as the formation of Hungarian national identity, the rise of Viktor Orban and the events of the migrant crisis play a crucial role in understanding the narratives projected by Hungarian media relating to migration.

1.1.1 National Transformation

This research intends to identify the projected narratives in English-language Hungarian media in the summer months of 2015 and 2018. For this research, the time between the first parliamentary elections in 1990 and the accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004 will be referred to as a period of national transformation. After the first democratic parliamentary elections, the country of Hungary began to develop its own national identity after being a satellite state of the Soviet Union for over 40 years. The difficulty in conceptualising a national identity for post-communist states is that these countries have been part of various empires or unions throughout the 20th century. Although the political parties of Hungary all agreed on dissolving the communist regime, this unity does not necessarily culminate in a solidified national identity.

Following the demise of the communist regime, Hungary went through a critical nation-building period where the connection between the nation (people that identify as Hungarian) and the state (government that governs the territory) needed to be established and galvanised. As Hanley et al noted in their study, Hungary was lost and lacked confidence and pride in the Hungarian identity (Hanley et al. 2008, p. 60). As the new millennium approached, an identity crisis began in Hungary where the two diverging ideas contested Hungarian governance: preservation of this new national identity or national progress. The FIDESZ government began to become the party that championed national Hungarian pride. FIDESZ were clear: if these two ideas were to compete, the preservation of national identity would be the immediate priority of the Hungarian state (Hanley et al. 2008, p. 72). In the early 2000s the Hungarian parliament discussed joining the European Union. As Hungary began to
contemplate the EU accession process, the discussion in the parliament took a different direction than most expected. Political discourse within the early stages of the third Hungarian republic were quite different to those of western-style parliaments. Political debate in Hungary falls on a spectrum of non-national versus national (or national versus cosmopolitan) instead of the more common ‘left to right’ spectrum that is found in most Western governments (E. Fox & Vermeersch 2010, p. 330). Debates around EU accession or membership were discussed in an arena that contemplated if joining the EU was in the best interests of Hungary as a nation. The FIDESZ government saw an opportunity and aligned EU accession with its duty of prioritising the interests of the Hungarian state. Therefore, they successfully framed EU accession as a means to unite Hungary with Europe in addition to protecting Hungarians abroad in other European countries (E. Fox & Vermeersch 2010, p. 331). European integration proved to be a dividing factor between Hungarians residing in Hungary and those living in Ukraine or in former Yugoslavia. As Schengen broke down borders within Europe, the EU’s external border between member states it also reinforced the separation between the EU and other European countries who had not yet integrated. The protection of Hungarian minorities abroad as a consequence of European integration, further galvanised Hungarian nationality and identity (E. Fox & Vermeersch 2010, p. 339).

1.1.2 The Rise of Viktor Orban

Viktor Orban has always been present in the setting of Hungarian politics. As the communist regime collapsed in 1989, Orban gave several speeches voicing his support for a transition to democracy and the establishment of a new era for Hungary. Orban - as the leader and founder of the FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats) party – campaigned in the first post-communist elections in 1990 winning 22 seats (Congdon 2018, p. 17 (Bocskor, 2018 #5, p. 555)). Economic hardship due to inflation (Csaba 2000, p. 9) and austerity measures contributed to Orban winning the 1998 parliamentary election and he adjusted FIDESZ’s position in European politics by moving further right on the spectrum (Congdon 2018, p. 18). Unfortunately for Orban, the political dream was short-lived as FIDESZ was an opposition party after losing the 2002 election (Bocskor 2018, p. 556). Joining the EU in 2004 was a positive sign for successful democratic transition of Hungary, leaving its authoritarian regime in the past.

The 2010 election is a critical event in modern Hungarian history because FIDESZ (with just 53% of the vote) gained a super-majority in Hungarian parliament (Deák 2013, p. 145). This unprecedented election result led to Orban implementing the strongest political reforms since the founding of the third Hungarian republic. The “Fundamental Law of Hungary” is the name of the renovated constitution which legislates the founding of Hungary based-on Christian values unlike most European
states that do not mention a specific faith (Congdon 2018, p. 18). In addition to the extreme constitutional changes, the Hungarian government revolutionised the oversight of national media through the establishment of the National Media and Telecommunication Authority (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 70). The Media Council that leads the authority is directly appointed by the Prime Minister and members of the authority are appointed by the ruling government. According to Human Rights watch, the Media Council supervises the media to limit “imbalanced news coverage” and news that violates “public morality” (HRW 2011). The most extreme punishment for these offences in denial of registration. As a direct result of the limits to freedom of expression and the press, Hungary has lost its previous status as a liberal democracy (Mechkova et al. 2017, p. 165).

1.1.3 2015 Refugee Crisis

One of the benefits (and challenges) of being an EU member state, is to be part of the Schengen Agreement that abolishes internal borders in favour of free movement of people across those that are part of the Schengen Area. However, this border arrangement was challenged by an increase in migratory movement across the external borders of EU member states which act as the external borders of the EU. The Schengen II agreement - signed in 1990 - introduced some of the stronger provisions for the asylum application process within the implementation of the Schengen Area. This agreement included the ‘rule of first entry’ which assigned the responsibility of evaluating asylum applications to the member state where the asylum seekers first entered the European Union and this has come to be known as the controversial Dublin Convention.

The summer months of 2015 saw the highest number of migrants and refugees entering the European Union with 613,179 arrivals via the Mediterranean Sea as per data collected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Parliament 2015, p. 13). Migrants are defined as the following:

“…Foreigners granted the permission to stay for a lengthy or unlimited period, who are subject to virtually no limitations regarding the exercise of an economic activity” (Douglas, Cetron & Spiegel 2019, p. 2).

Whereas a refugee is defined as:

“A person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.” (Douglas, Cetron & Spiegel 2019, p. 2).
The differences in these definitions between refugees needing protection and migrants that seek better opportunity and how these people are categorised, has a massive impact on the duty of care provided by member states (McMahon & Sigona 2018, p. 500). The term ‘migrant’ can be associated with illegality and this can influence the policy responses of governments. As noted by McMahon and Sigona noted in their study, the separation between a migrant and a refugee results in the migrants classified as an “other” and therefore less of a priority than refugees who are often more accepted by a local population (McMahon & Sigona 2018, p. 501). The consequences of this “othering” could result in more refugees being classified as migrants therefore reducing the policy response required by member states that prioritise the protection of their local population as a higher importance than protection of migrants or refugees.

As many member states were not prepared for the large-scale migration, this quickly turned into a humanitarian crisis with thousands of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants entering a region without the capacity or processes to process them.

The externalisation of EU borders played a significant role in how the EU institutions and member states responded to the crisis. The Schengen Agreement forms the foundation of the Schengen area where the free movement of goods, services, people and capital occurs due to the abolished internal borders of the European Economic Area (EEA). The Schengen agreement aimed to resolve disputes at
the border by removing internal borders and sharing management of external borders across the members of the Schengen area. But this change to the borders became a double-edged sword: the lack of security at the internal borders placed a larger burden on the external borders. As internal border control and enforcement is strictly limited in the Schengen agreement, this provided a method for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants to successfully enter EU territory not only via the Mediterranean but through migratory paths in the Western Balkans. The ‘Western Balkan’ migration route (as above) is comprised of several EU member states including Bulgarian, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia – all member states that eventually reinstated strict border enforcement and implementation of external border infrastructure (Pastore 2019, p. 19). Hungary was one of the member states to seal its border with Serbia in September 2015. As member states constructed fences it pushed the burden of the problem onto neighbouring states in a domino-effect and the migration paths of those entering Europe adapted to these counter measures as per the above image.

With two major migratory flows entering Europe via both land and sea, the European Union attempted the implementation of migration management policies. The first attempt was the announced reform of the Common European Asylum system announced on 13 May 2015 but the magnitude of the crisis became the central focus for EU institutions. 27 May 2015 the European Commission announced the Emergency Response Mechanism to relocate 40,000 persons in need of protection but unfortunately for Hungary, this mechanism relieves pressure in Italy and Greece (Commission 2015a). On 9 September 2015 the European Commission announced a migration relocation scheme that relocates 54,000 refugees from Hungary (Commission 2015b) and distributed those needed urgent protection across EU member states in a proportional way (Nedergaard 2019, p. 87). However, Interior Minister Sandor Pinter strongly rejected this proposal as it would not reduce the number of migrants already in Hungary in addition to interfering with Hungarian sovereignty (MTI 2015f). While the EU hoped to persuade member states to agree to the quotas, Hungary held a national referendum called the ‘National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism’ between 24 April and 27 July 2015 (Bocskor 2018, p. 559). The referendum included a somewhat biased questionnaire suggesting a link between immigration and terrorism such as “There are some who believe that Brussels’ policy on immigration and terrorism has failed, and that we therefore need a new approach to these questions. Do you agree?” (Bocskor 2018, p. 562). Citizens could respond to this question with either “I fully agree”, “I tend to agree” or “I do not agree”. The framing of this referendum sends a clear message that immigration is a threat to Hungarians and their way of life.
1.2 Research Question

The main research question of this thesis is as follows: 1. What narratives about Hungary and the European Union were projected during the summers of a) 2015; and b) 2018; by the Hungarian English-language media press about EU migration policy in the context of the migrant crisis? 2. In what way can these narratives on migration policy, impact on the relationship between the EU and Hungary in the future?

1.3 Approach and Outcomes

To answer the research question stated in the previous section, this research will conduct an observational, qualitative study of strategic narratives projected by the Hungarian media about the European Union and the migrant crisis.

This research is primarily concerned with what narratives are projected in Hungarian national media which as per Roselle et al is a “thick analysis” evaluating the emotion within the narrative projected by journalists to the public (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 43). The data has been gathered from newspaper articles collected from two Hungarian English-language sources: Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI) and the Hungarian Official Daily News Digest (HODND) published between 1 June and 31 July of both 2015 and 2018. The Hungarian Official Daily News Digest is a daily publication consisting of press releases from government ministries. In comparison, MTI is a state-owned media organisation. This research will examine the narrative themes from both sources and see if they differ or are similar. These two news sources were accessible through academic databases on campus. Articles sourced from these two outlets will include and/or mention migration and the European Union in the form of keywords chosen by the researcher. After the sample group is finalised, the articles will be evaluated and coded for the identification of recurring themes and narratives within the media sample.

Media content analysis was chosen as the main data sources for this research because as per Shaw and McCombs, the media has a high degree of influence of what the public considers to be important (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 180). Strategic narratives are a form of political communication that is used to describe pattern of events that has been carefully constructed for the intended audience which Joseph Nye called co-optive power (Nye 1990, p. 166). In addition to acknowledging the influence of the media on public opinion, the content analysis of a large sample group of articles provides an environment for a mixed-methods research approach that provides both qualitative and
quantitative research methodologies. As Roselle et al state, the study of strategic narratives has a lot of potential as multiple methodologies are utilised to understand their influence on the world around us (Roselle, Miskimmon & O'Loughlin 2014, p. 79).

In the next chapter, this thesis will evaluate the historical trends and theories within the fields of communications, media analysis and strategic narratives. The chapter begins with exploring the theoretical approaches to international relations before transitioning to a section detailing the changing media environment. The next section illustrates the symbiotic connection between democracy and the media and why the health of the media is crucial to democracy. Finally, this chapter describes what strategic narratives are and how they fit within the broader idea of ‘soft power’ before detailing how narrative analysis works.

In the subsequent section, the chapter outlines the methods of media content analysis and narrative analysis based on the theoretical framework in the previous literature review. First, the methodology chapter will explain the macro and micro analysis while explaining the use of a quantitative research. Second, the media analysis and narrative analysis is described while referring to the two theories that are the basis of this research. Third, the coding scheme and coding process is detailed in its entirety before finishing with a conclusion.

The findings chapter details the results of the research, beginning with media analysis and the subcategories of: visibility, degree of centrality and emotive charge. The Narrative Analysis section identifies the narrative components within the articles from each year before explaining the difference between each table. The final section pinpoints five narrative trends from each year while describing their significance and purpose. The narrative analysis section compares the identified projected narratives within the media sample and evaluates if these narratives have progressed or changed over time.

After the discussion of findings, the discussion chapter evaluates the research design and suggests some changes that could be made in future. The sub-question of this research regarding the future of the EU-Hungarian relationship is examined and answered while referring to the upcoming European parliament (EP) elections in May. Finally, the thesis will conclude with recommendations for future research in the field of strategic narratives and media analysis including which areas could be studied further.
Chapter Two - Review of the Literature

This chapter will begin to evaluate literature discussing more general theories of international relations, then defining the concept of a Strategic Narrative, narratives and their impact on the international system and finally, how political communication is affected by new media environments. Scholarly resources are used in this review but some sources are from the European Union, NATO and other international institutions.

2.1 Theoretical Approaches to International Relations

Strategic communication is a core part of international relations. Since the Treaty of Westphalia, philosophers, academics and political scientists have attempted to explain how states (and their leaders) interact with one another and interpret their place in the international system. Stephen Walt in his 1998 evaluation of these theories described three distinct theoretical approaches to international relations: realism, liberalism and a modern form of idealism we now interpret at constructivism (Walt 1998, p. 38). Realism studies how states – as rational actors – pursue power and self-interests. In contrast, Liberalism highlights the creation of international institutions and economic interdependence to explain cooperation between states. Constructivism is a completely different theoretical approach to examine international relations through analysis of ideas, norms and institutions. In this field context, identity and culture all affect policy-making -- as humans are affected by the contexts that inform their decisions or actions.

Each theoretical perspective has its core tenets but also gaps that fail to explain certain characteristics of the international system and the actors within. Realism was the prominent theory of international relations throughout the Cold War period as it could explain the battle for power and security within a bipolar system (Walt 1998, p. 31 (Snyder, 2004 #16, p.55)) but in the 21st century, this school of thought fails to explain significant periods of stability, progress and cooperative peace after the fall of communism. Liberalism describes a system built on the importance of economic cooperation and globalisation (interdependence) in addition to the creation of international institutions such as the United Nations. The theoretical gaps are evident in the inability to explain why states consider national security as crucial as economic security (Walt 1998, p. 38). Constructivism is gaining popularity as this school is more of an approach to studying international politics rather than substantive theory but gaps are still present. Constructivism focusses on the role of norms and ideas but the abuse of human rights continues, as many international and regional institutions – like the European Union – dedicate significant attention to the preservation of human rights.
These three theories can explain certain events and circumstances and they all have blind-spots and as Jack Snyder concludes, (Snyder 2004, p. 61) researchers should use components of all three as a method to ‘check-and-balance’ the others. No theory can accurately predict future events – like the end of the Cold War – but it is possible to provide a way to interpret the interactions of states and their policy-makers.

2.2 Changing Media Ecology

Various actors now participate in the field of international relations at different levels of society. Groups including – but not limited to – elites, political leadership, the media, academics and the general public all participate in the communication and reception of messages describing their interpretation of the world and the international system. As the media environment becomes more dynamic in nature, the successful transmission of messages to your intended audience increases in difficulty.

As different forms of media multiply, political leaders are competing with other news topics for the attention of citizens and their message needs to be as clear and concise as possible otherwise it risks getting lost. Blumler and Kavanagh described these changes in their concept of the third age of political communication (Blumler & Kavanagh 1999, p. 213). The concepts defining the third age include increased accessibility to the general public, widespread media penetration, expansion of media platforms and media commercialisation. With media sources multiplying at a rapid rate, polling shows public confidence in journalism and the mainstream media is decreasing (Stephen 2017, p. 3).

In the 1980’s, news media were predominately confined to print and broadcast media (radio and television) where citizens could keep informed of current events with the morning paper or the evening bulletin. Cable news and 24-hour news stations like CNN and Al Jazeera have revolutionised media accessibility and new independent media sources are challenging the dominance of traditional media corporations. With high numbers of both mainstream network and independent outlets competing for the same audience, we can see some worrying trends beginning to emerge within media broadcasting and communication.

Scholarship researching political communication and the role of the media is essential to evaluating the health of a functioning democracy. In the United States, public distrust of the media and hostility towards mainstream outlets has increased (Mourão et al. 2018, p. 1946) and media trust reached a new low in 2016 with only 32% of those polled trusting the media (Mourão et al. 2018, p. 1946). The competitive field of news media have influenced how news stories are framed and appealing to a
specific audience these outlets can garner viewership. Fox news is known for framing issues in a way that appeals to the Republican audience (Holbert, Garrett & Gleason 2010, p. 720). Milner has confirmed in his study that newspaper reading and political knowledge in western nations are linked therefore reinforcing the crucial role of the media in society (Semetko & Scammell 2012, p. 36). Re-establishing media freedom and repairing the connection between the media and citizens is an ongoing problem for any country emerging from an authoritarian regime and Hungary is no exception to this pattern. After the 2010 parliamentary elections granted the FIDESZ party a super-majority, Prime Minister Viktor Orban legislated the creation of a new media entity to monitor private and public media institutions, called the National Media and Telecommunication Authority (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 70). Understandably, this media reform had the European Commission worried and consequentially, the Commission recommended implementing changes to the new laws (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 70). In addition to the creation of a government ‘watchdog’, the media in Hungary were consolidated with four different Hungarian news agencies merging into one entity. Petia Kostadinova noted in her study that the most significant deterioration in media freedom within the European Union has occurred in Bulgaria and Hungary (Kostadinova 2015, p. 455).

2.3 Health of the Media and Democracy

The media has a crucial role to play in public participation in democracies (Mourão et al. 2018, p. 1945). Studies such as the Agenda-Setting theory by McCombs and Shaw (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 180) proved that although the media cannot tell us what to think, they can tell us what we should think about. Numerous studies in political communication show (Entman 2003, p. 416; McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 184) (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 184) that there is a widely-accepted belief that the media is an important part of governance, but as previously mentioned there are significant problems within the media industry and its relationship with government. Commercialisation, privatisation, digitalisation and deregulation have all contributed to the ill-health of media in the 21st century.

Bakir and McStay in their ‘Five features of digital media ecology’ have described five factors that have contributed to the environment in which fake news has flourished:

1. Decline in audience;
2. Information demand;
3. Spread of misinformation;
4. Media polarisation and;
These factors are all closely related and intertwined. Hypothetically, if a specific media source began to only present issues favourable to a certain political ideology or agenda purely to increase their audience, could the general public consider them a trust-worthy source to inform the general population of polarising topics such as economic reform or migration? When a news source successfully captures an audience by framing an issue like migration negatively, it emphasises the ill-health of current media environment where the media is funded based on how many views an article gets.

Not only does this particular funding model fail to cover stories accurately, but it disenfranchises discussion about important political issues. If a story is not based on fact but an agenda, then the media are not informing the public about an issue, they are instructing people about how they should think about a certain issue. The media should be encouraging participation in governance which begins with information followed by discourse.

2.4 Strategic Narratives and Soft Power

International relations theory (as described above) has created different lenses through which to examine the interactions of states. However, the interplay of structure and agency has not been successfully integrated into the theoretical study of international relations. The theory of strategic narratives attempts to fill this gap. These theories fail to describe how states articulate their interests. Narratives are a central component of understanding human interaction by shaping how we see the world and constraining our behaviour in certain situations. In the same way parents tell stories to children, political leaders use narratives to describe their point-of-view on domestic and international politics. A strategic narrative is a method to try to explain how political actors in international politics are trying to frame and respond to problems and this communication tool is utilised by nation states to try and influence other actors to believe their sequence of events. Miskimmon et al define a strategic narrative as a method of story-telling used by political leaders and elites to influence behaviour of other actors:

“Strategic narratives are a tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations and change the discursive environment in which they operate. They are narratives about both states and the system itself, both about who we are and what kind of order we want.” (Miskimmon et al. 2013, p. 2).
The European Union is known for having a strong and inter-connected diplomatic network called the European External Action Service (EEAS) which publishes press releases, public statements and speeches from members of the European Commission such as Federica Mogherini who is the Special Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. These statements and speeches form part of the overall EU narrative. A statement from Federica Mogherini describing the EU’s response to a crisis or conflict will ultimately tell us how the EU perceives itself, possible solutions to the conflict or how the international system functions.

Why are strategic narratives important to examine in the field of international politics? Understanding why leaders communicate is essential to understanding any interaction or policy decision in international relations. Narratives are about connecting the past and the present to where you intend to go in the future. As a form of strategic communication, narratives can describe current conflicts, actions and desirable outcomes and articulate their state’s position in relation to unfolding events. For example, is a certain state a good actor or a victim of the situation? Is your state a supporting actor or purely observing the unfolding events? Strategic narratives are also a way to structure and form a view of the world to influence actors at the international level as a form of soft power. As Nye states in his 1990 article, a state that can incentivise states to believe its ideas will have an easier journey to achieving its desired outcome (Nye 1990, p. 166). With soft power becoming more prominent in the 21st century, the focus of political leadership is influencing other states to act in a way as acceptance of your version of events works to your advantage for your interests (Roselle, Miskimmon & O'Loughlin 2014, p. 74). The short-term goal of a strategic narrative is to influence the response of others regarding developing events and the long-term goal is to project your narratives to shape the interests and perceptions of another actor regarding the international system. As Subotic states, narratives can be a form of power by forcing leaders may to accept a specific version of events (Subotic 2016, p. 615). These narratives communications are a different form of soft power influence except diplomacy, popular culture or universities may not possess the same coercive power.

The importance of strategic political communication is evident as we have seen in previous studies mentioned in this chapter. The factor that separates narratives from other kinds of communication is that narratives can convince an audience to believe something that may be untrue. As Freedman notes, the construction and framing of the information are more influential on opinion than the information itself (Freedman 2006, p. 14). If a person is aware of the functions of the media, then an effective narrative can be constructed and projected to an audience (Freedman 2006, p. 14). However, in the era of ‘Fake News’ and increasing general distrust of media, narratives can fail if there is no
factual basis for the narrative. Those who spread narratives that are proven false can suffer a loss of credibility (Freedman 2006, p. 15) hence the ‘strategic’ use of a narrative.

2.5 Strategic Narrative Analysis

Narratives are formulated through collaboration between state politicians, the media and relevant stakeholders to construct a story that limits opportunity to dispute the framing of the international system (Subotić 2016, p. 615). According to Munroe and Patterson a narrative has four distinct components: agency; recognised facts; sequence of events; and finally, a clear voice (Patterson & Monroe 1998, p. 316). In comparison, the Miskimmon et al definition includes the following factors:

- Character or actors (agent);
- Setting/environment/space (scene);
- Conflict or action (act);
- Tools/behaviour (agency);
- Resolution/or suggested resolution/goal (purpose); (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 7)

The former definition of narrative analysis can be a method used to access information the researcher could not otherwise access via other methods of data collection like interviews or surveys (Patterson & Monroe 1998, p. 330). It is useful in certain cases when analysing the person or group at the centre of the narrative but this is a rather thin form of analysis. The latter definition is more specific in designing a method to research a relationship between components within the constraint of context of time. This allows the research to examine actors, events and setting in-depth rather than focussing purely on framing alone (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 7).

In addition to the components of a strategic narrative, there are three different categories of strategic narrative as per Roselle’s 2017 article: International system narratives describing the structure and function of the international system; Identity narratives stating the story, norms and values of an actor and lastly; Issue narratives communicating paths of action relating to a policy problem (Roselle, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2014, p. 101). Strategic narratives can overlap between different categories or types of narrative. For example, in Bain and Chaban’s study on the EU’s strategic energy narratives, the ‘Sustainable Energy Europe’ is not only a system narrative describing the EU as a global energy actor, it also reflects the EU’s values towards sustainability as part of EU identity (Bain & Chaban 2017, p. 150).

Strategic narratives are a lens through which we can analyse international relations and interaction between states. The changing media environment is forcing states to shift their previously private
diplomatic interaction to a public arena of competing narratives to influence and change behaviour of other actors (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 279). Therefore, Strategic Narratives are a method of power transition analysis that highlights changes both the shaping (change) and influence of the international order.

2.6 Conclusion

International relations and the current media ecology are both continuously evolving and changing. Foreign policy formulation is changing and traditional schools of thought within the field of international relations are warming to new ideas and models that can explain the interactions between states. Soft power is an evolving tool that many states utilise as ‘bigger army diplomacy’ can only get a state so far. Norms and ideas have power and strategic narrative harness this coercive power for progressing their interests by convincing other states to play along. The following chapter will outline the research design and methodology this research is utilising that is based on some of the theoretical frameworks outlined in this chapter. The concepts of media and narrative analysis will be introduced and described in the context of Hungarian media articles about the migrant crisis and EU migration policy.
Chapter Three - Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological frameworks and research design used to evaluate the narratives projected by the Hungarian media about the European Union in relation to migration policy in the context of the migrant crisis. The macro level of analysis used in this thesis is a case study of Hungary, as a member of the European Union that was - and still is - significantly affected by the migrant crisis. Case study research was chosen as a macro-level analysis because this research is interested in examining the perception of not only the crisis itself but the policy and media responses to the crisis from the Hungarian perspective. This case study gathers information about multiple key stakeholders including the Hungarian government, Hungarian media, EU institutions and other actors that are integral to the decision-making processes of migration policy.

Gaining a comprehensive understanding of the overall Hungarian perspective on this crisis requires an in-depth analysis that is not purely focussed on describing the response but understanding and interpreting the other motives or contributing factors to this response. Woodside advocates case study research as an appropriate method for analysing and explaining phenomena instead of describing phenomena (Woodside 2010, p. 11). Hungary received the largest number of migrants out of all EU Member States in proportion to its population (Bauerová 2018, p. 107) and Hungary continues to patrol its closed border fences. A significant amount of academic literature has analysed the perspectives of the Mediterranean Member States and their management of migration. This research bridges the existing gap between the study of migration framing and the Balkans migration route.

In order to ensure this research methodology is as rigorous as possible, this research utilised a qualitative approach overall with the inclusion of some quantitative aspects for some descriptive statistics. Moravcsik highlights the dominance of qualitative research in political science with approximately 70% of researchers selecting qualitative methods for their studies (Moravcsik 2010, p. 29). Qualitative research is useful for exploring a context and “...people’s actions and the structures that encourage, shape and constrain such actions (Tracy & Ebooks 2013, p. 22). As the main research question evaluates the narratives projected in Hungarian media to an external audience about the ‘migrant crisis’, an inductive method seemed appropriate for this research. The terms ‘migrant crisis’ and ‘refugee crisis’ have been used in academic literature but for the purpose of this research, ‘migrant crisis’ will be defined as the period during the summer of 2015 where hundreds of thousands of people made the journey to Europe for a better life.
According to Cresswell, the study of qualitative and quantitative data helps to mitigate the disadvantages of each type (Creswell 2009, p. 43). As Weaver-Hightower states in his study, “qualitative methods can have difficulty establishing the extent of influence while quantitative methods can have difficulty providing the whys, hows, and so_whats” (Weaver-Hightower 2014, p. 120). Utilising a mix of both research methods ensures a robust, and an-depth analysis of the data as the qualitative method analyses the content of the media articles (the data) and the quantitative analysis provides descriptive statistics.

The micro levels of analysis used in this research are media content and strategic narrative analysis of Hungarian English-language news media published in June-July 2015 and June-July 2018. The information from both forms of analysis will indicate how the Hungarian government wants its citizens to perceive the current situation in their country and how they view the European Union both during the peak of the crisis and three years later in 2018. Hungary was a useful case study for this research because they are not only an outspoken critic of EU migration policy, but Hungary received a significant number of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants during the crisis. This case study will examine internally constructed strategic narratives projected from inside the EU to an external audience as opposed to the projection of externally constructed strategic narratives projected outside the EU.

3.1 Media Analysis

The main form of analysis relies on media content analysis for evaluating Hungarian media narratives European Union migration policy. As per Entman, Framing is defined as “...the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation.” (Entman 2007, p. 164). McQuail mentioned that the field of research on media framing “is based on the premise that the media have significant effects” (McQuail 1994, p. 32). Media influence on large populations began with strategic propaganda in the early 20th century where conflict occurred not only on the battlefield but in the hearts and minds of civilians via counterinsurgency (Scheufele 1999, p. 104). There is a volume of literature examining the connection between mass media and policy formulation such as Media framing, Agenda Setting theory and the CNN effect. One of the more well-known studies is the Agenda Setting theory from McCombs and Shaw who documented that although the mass media cannot tell citizens exactly what to think, it can tell the population what it should be thinking about (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 172). In addition to agenda setting, the mass media also engages in other tools to influence the public. Framing (Entman 2007, p. 164) is the process of constructing a narrative sequence of events through connecting
components of true events in a way to perpetuate a particular perspective. Scheufele noted that researchers should ask more effective questions when researching media framing to properly contribute to the field; for example, instead of asking “why, for instance, ... [do] news items [have] the kind of thematic or schematic structures we want to study?” we should ask “What factors influence the way journalists or other societal groups frame certain issues?” (Scheufele 1999, pp. 108-110). This research is examining what other factors may influence the framing of migration in Hungarian media.

Content analysis was chosen as the primary analysis because of its flexibility as both an inductive and a deductive method in addition to its versatility both quantitatively and qualitatively. Articles are used as units of analysis that contain data on actor visibility (how present the actors are), emotive charge (the overall tone), degree of centrality (how present the EU and Hungary are) and the local resonance (if local actors are present). The data will be entered in a google form created specifically for this research with the output being an excel spreadsheet that will be coded.

3.1.1 Media Sample

The two media publications chosen were: 1. Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI) – or in English ‘Hungarian Telegraphic Office’ – a state-owned news agency and 2. Hungarian Official Daily News Digest (HODND) the official news publisher of the Hungarian state. The HODND is a daily news publication of press releases directly from the Hungarian government ministries such as the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. HODND is a form of press statements, speeches and news updates published by the state government whereas MTI is a state-owned and funded media organisation which retains some autonomy over what articles are published. From 1 July 2015, MTI (along with three other public Hungary media organisations) were absorbed into a new single organisation called Duna Media Service which is a state-owned media organisation. Even after the merger it appears MTI still publishes under their previous name because articles from the Factiva database published after the 1 July 2015 list MTI as the publisher. Therefore, this media source will be referred to throughout this thesis as MTI rather than Duna Media.

The MTI publication was accessed via the Factiva article database where exact copies of published articles and subsequent updates are uploaded. However, HODND articles were accessed via a database trial of the NewsBank database which also published exact copies of state news articles. These were the only two English-language media sources accessible from an official database as the author is not skilled in the Hungarian language in any capacity. Other studies point out that English-
language media analysis is a valid research method as these sources are widely read by many key audiences including elites, expatriates, and students learning English (Ross Smith & Kelly 2013, p. 222).

After the 2010 election, wherein the FIDESZ party obtained 263 seats out of 386 (a 68% supermajority), Viktor Orban began to implement drastic changes to the media landscape by consolidating many different news outlets and agencies into one entity (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 81). Because of this one-party control over the media (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 81), Hungary’s freedom of the press was designated a “partly free” status as per Freedom House 2018 ‘Press Freedom Report (HRW 2018). Press freedom in Hungary has decreased and media reporting overwhelmingly favours the government perspective. Bajomi-Lázár observed statements from the government coalition received more airtime (83% of all news items) throughout a broadcast than opposition voices (19% of news items) (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 83). Orban also removed a legal amendment “preventing media monopolies” (Bairett 2015, p. 1267). This media council appointed by the government, that regulated media entities favouring government voices and destroys press freedom damages democracy and political discourse.

The articles analysed for this study were collected from two specific two month periods of observation: 01 June 2015 – 31 July 2015; and 01 June 2018 – 31 July 2018, totalling 122 days of news coverage for both periods. June and July were selected because migratory flows into Europe peaked in the summer of 2015 and therefore it was an issue high on the European Union’s agenda. The 2018 year was chosen to see if the situation had improved or worsened in Hungary and to discover if the relationship between Hungary and the EU had changed since the peak of the crisis. As the number of migrants travelling to Europe increased and the more news coverage was given to the crisis. The 2018 summer period was also chosen to evaluate and measure if the narrative themes identified in the 2015 articles were the same or had changed over time.

The search terms used in both databases included: ‘European Union’ ‘EU’ ‘European Commission’ ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’. These terms were chosen as these words would highlight the articles mentioning EU migration policy, statements from EU institutions and statements from the Hungarian government. Articles from all sections (world news, economic news, arts and culture etc.) were included in the sample group as migration is a multi-faceted issue impacting many areas of society. The articles that were included in the final sample group had to include one of either ‘migrant’ or ‘migration’ and one of the EU terms.
In total 213 articles were selected from both media outlets from the period of observation. For the June-July 2015 period there were 124 articles from the database search with the appropriate keywords and for the June-July 2018 period there were 89 articles that match the keyword search. Unfortunately, there were some articles that were duplicate articles (updated articles), weekly summaries or articles that did not include both an EU term or a migration/migrant term so they were removed from the sample group. These search terms were chosen because my overall research question is to discover what narratives were projected about EU migration policy in the wider context of the migrant crisis. The final number of analysed articles is 130 – 73 from the 2015 period and 57 from the 2018 period.

3.2 Narrative Analysis

Strategic narratives are a tool constructed by both political leadership and media for several purposes. Some narratives tell the world about national identity, a specific policy or issue or finally, how the international system works and your state’s place within it. Strategic narratives are a type of political communication that is constructed with a purpose in mind. Policy and narratives are connected and utilised during crises primarily for connecting policy that resolves threats while ensuring citizens are calm throughout crises (Subotić 2016, p. 611). Narrative Analysis – according to Pierce – asks the following questions:

- Who is ‘writing’ the story?
- Who is telling the story? How?
- Who is the ‘target audience’?
- What is the story trying to achieve?
- What are its effects? (Pierce 2008, p. 23)

This research will explore which narratives are projected about EU migration policy during the crisis by analysing the narratives using the above criteria. Each article will record the main actors, the setting of the article, what the conflict is or if there is no conflict at all, what objectives are stated and which solution are suggested. Through identifying each of these components, we observe the bigger picture of how Hungary fits into the international system from their perspective. We can expect to find out the preferred action or policy from the Hungarian government and if they support or disagree with EU policy and why.

Strategic Narratives are a constructivist tool used by political actors for communicating their point-of-view about the international system, national identity or an issue requiring a policy response. They are not only about the state but how they see their place within the international system and how the
system works. These narratives describe your place within the world order and are a tool for convincing other states that your version of events is the correct version. The quote below describes the main function of narrative analysis:

“Narrative analysis allows us to identify what individuals understand as the starting point of each conflict, the dilemma or tension at stake in the conflict, the cast of characters who play a role in sustaining or potentially resolving the conflict, and the range of possible resolutions.” (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 322).

As mentioned in the literature review chapter, a strategic narrative is a form of soft power initiated by states that describe their views of events, themselves and the international system. This tool is useful for achieving objectives. If states narrate how they see the international system, the narrative itself can tell researchers a lot about their identity, their preferred policies and solutions to conflict. As an example, the European Union habitually publishes its foreign policy agenda in important documents such as the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 European Union Global Strategy. If both documents were analysed, we could gather data on how the EU perceives itself, why the EU prioritises certain policy areas and what the objectives of the EU are. The field of International relations has embraced strategic narratives as a method of explaining political actions through a constructivist lens which considers other contributing factors other than pure power (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 5). Narratives have the potential for grasping a greater understanding of inter-state relations in the international system.
3.3 Coding scheme

The primary analysis of the news articles in this sample groups were based on theory from leading scholars Robert Entman and Miskimmon et al as shown below. Media framing (Entman 2003, p. 417) is removing or changing events and presenting or reporting the new interpretation in a way thereby shaping and changing the reality of a situation. The components of both theories used for the analysis in this research are displayed in table 1 below.

Table 1 - Media Analysis Coding Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Foundation</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capable Frames</td>
<td>Actor Visibility</td>
<td>Major Secondary Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Entman 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotive Charge</td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive Neutral-Positive Neutral Neutral-Negative Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Resonance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Hook Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Narratives</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Main actors in the article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Miskimmon et al)</td>
<td>Scene</td>
<td>Article setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Tangible objectives or action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Proposed solution or resolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own

**Actor Visibility:** The analysis examines the focus of Hungary and the European Union in each article and evaluates whether the actors are the major, secondary or minor focus of the article.

**Local Resonance:** Examining the presence (or lack of) local actors in the article.

**Emotive charge:** The overall tone used in the language and phrasing of each article was subjectively evaluated and categorised as one of the following options:

- **Positive:** A holistically positive evaluation of the EU and its policy.
- **Neutral-positive:** A slightly less positive view of the EU and its policy but neither completely positive nor neutral.
- **Neutral**: A neutral evaluation of the EU and its policy
- **Neutral-negative**: A slightly less negative view of the EU and its policy but neither completely negative or neutral
- **Negative**: A holistically negative evaluation of the EU and its policy.

The strategic narrative components as per the Miskimmon et al definition are:

- **Agent**: Identification of the main actors in the article.
- **Scene**: Evaluation of the setting, where the action is taking place, how the international system is depicted.
- **Act**: Analysis of the conflict or action and if any reactions follow. Identification of ‘who’ says ‘what’.
- **Agency**: The tangible action to meet the outcomes or objectives mentioned in the article.
- **Purpose**: The proposed resolution or solution to the situation described. *(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 7)*

### 3.4 Coding Process

#### 3.4.1 Step One: creation of the coding form

A google form was created, using questions based on components from both selected theories of strategic narratives and cascading frames. These questions were answered after reading each individual article, ensuring that the responses were correct.

#### 3.4.2 Step Two: testing the coding form

The collected articles were sorted into each year group and a small pilot was completed using 30 of the 2015 articles. After the pilot was complete, the process was reviewed by the supervisors of this project to ensure all the appropriate data was being collected. There were some responses that did not initially identify the correct data but after careful review, the research edited and corrected these responses. The pilot was essential for ensuring a thorough and robust coding process for this research project.

#### 3.4.3 Step Three: coding the dataset

When the Google form template was finalised, the coding process began with each article until the entire sample group was analysed as per the criteria above. Each individual article was read in its
entirety and the Google form completed using the information from each article. Although these articles were separated into each year (2015 and 2018), the articles were not analysed chronologically or in any specific sequence.

3.4.4 Step Four: secondary analysis and coding

After the completing the primary analysis, the Google form produced an excel spreadsheet with all article responses. The spreadsheet was reviewed to ensure that each response matched the keyword criteria and those that did not were removed from the spreadsheet. The total number of responses is 131. The main thematic trends within the article sample group were identified by coding the data one response at a time. Excel was chosen as an analysis tool as the spreadsheet layout allows for easy review and coding of the data in addition to graphing capabilities. To code the responses, this research opted for an open coding process that identified notable themes from the data as per the method described by Taylor et al (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault 2016, p. 173). The broader narrative themes were identified through using the strategic narrative components identified by the Roselle et al definition above. The result of this coding process are two tables (one for each year 2015 and 2018) that highlights all the mentioned narrative sub-components within their categories.

3.5 Limitations

The author of this research does not have any Hungarian language experience nor the resources to employ a translator and this limits the media sources included as part of the sample group. Only two Hungarian English-language sources were available from academic databases. More sources are needed for confirmation of later findings. Analysis of these articles in the native language would provide additional context therefore resulting in a more nuanced examination of the articles from the Hungarian point-of-view.

While strategic narrative analysis provides an insight into the thought process of elites and the decision-making process of government, it is difficult to prove that a narrative has a casual effect without witnessing the decision-making process first-hand. Crilley in his article states the communication environment and media ecology affects how these narratives are communicated, and flow and with what effects (Crilley 2015, p. 331) and while this research will examine how the narratives are communicated, this research has chosen to exclude examination of public opinion and reception of narratives.
3.6 Conclusion

This chapter detailed the research design used to examine the projected narratives within Hungarian media regarding EU migration policy in the context of the migration crisis. Media sources, data collection, data analysis and the content analysis for this research were outlined in detail. The main aim of this research is gaining an understanding of the strategic narrative phenomenon specifically from the perspective of Hungarian media and if these narratives could impact on the future relationship between Hungary and the EU. The following section will describe the results of this study utilising the previously described methodology.
Chapter Four – Media Analysis findings

The findings of this research have been split into two chapters: media analysis findings and the narrative analysis findings. The chapters have been split per the methodology, where each analysis chapter has its own theoretical foundation. Firstly, this chapter highlights some of the quantitative statistics within the general content analysis such as distribution of articles, volume of media coverage and actor visibility. Secondly, the degree of centrality of both the EU and Hungary within the media sample is explored. Finally, the emotive charge and overall and a comparison of emotive charge between the sources is examined. Exploring the emotive charge of media articles in important because as mentioned within the literature review, the media has an influence over what issues the public consider important even though the media cannot tell the public exactly what to think (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 172). The articles that contain strong emotive language which may resonate with a large population can be influential over public thought and perception (Entman 2003, p. 417) of both the crisis, the EU and EU policy.

4.1 Visibility

The media has a significant role to play in democracy and it is responsible for informing the public about political changes and the importance of this role is reinforced by literature that examines the connection between media analysis and public opinion. Although the media cannot tell you exactly what to think, it can arguably change what you think is important (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 180). Media analysis is a method that highlights how elites and politicians influence the public through communicating events in a certain way (Entman 2003, p. 417). Visibility is an important factor for this research as visibility can often be an indicator of effectiveness of the EU as an actor. A study of EU representation in Pacific media found a connection between the degree of visibility of the EU and an understanding of how effective the EU is (Chaban, Kelly & Bain 2012, p. 128). As this research is exploring the framing of EU migration policy in Hungarian media, perceived effectiveness of this policy could be influenced by the actor visibility of the EU.
Figure 2 above shows the distribution of articles per the month of publication. As can be seen, 53% of the sample group was published in 2015 and 47% published in 2018 resulting in an almost even split for each summer. However, the peak of the crisis in summer of 2015 directly contributed to an increase in article volume. This figure shows media coverage peaked during the height of the crisis in June 2015. Coverage tapered off in July 2015 but picked up again in the summer of 2018. This suggests the peak visibility of the EU in Hungarian media occurred within the context of a critical event that challenged the unity of the EU.
From the data shown in figure 3, we observe clear peaks and valleys within the media coverage in summer of 2015. On June 2 six articles are published – five in MTI and one in HODND. This date coincided with the EU announcing the ‘First Implementation Package’. This package included several measures designed to assist member states with the management of the flows of migration. The articles directly mentioned the policies included within package. Contained in these measures was the Resettlement and Relocation plan – otherwise known as the resettlement distribution scheme. The EC triggered this policy using the emergency response clause (Commission 2015c). These policies increased article volume after the announcement as Hungary did not agree with this policy. Multiple government statements were released to state Hungary’s perspective.

However, we can also observe a difference in peaks between the sources such as the MTI peak on 22 June and the HODND peak on 24 June. These two peaks are also connected to the upcoming Council of the EU on 25 and 26 June. Even though there is a difference of two days between the publication date. The headlines published included ‘Hungary is full’, ‘Hungary proposes conference on refugees’ suggest the Hungarian government used two different media to potentially influence the discussion during the European Council summit. Orban implemented tight media regulations for controlling the media which academics call “alarming concentration of political power over the media (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 84). The Hungarian government utilise its control on the media for amplifying government voices to drown out conflicting voices.
As shown in figure 4, we observe several peaks in July 2018 for both sources. June was a quiet month for MTI as per the keyword search. However, there were several large announcements in July that explains the data presented in the graph. On 13 July, the UN released the Compact for Migration: a comprehensive agreement on a global approach to migration. This policy conflicts with the Hungarian perspective on migration with both sources publishing articles after the announcement. An article titled ‘The UN’s migration package is unbalanced and dangerous’ mentioned the UN Compact for Migration and that future consequences are disastrous for Hungary.

The second important event was the EC launching legal action against Hungary. The peaks on the 24th of July for both news sources highlight the high-profile nature of this story. The titles of the articles included ‘Infringement procedure 'attack against Hungary' which suggested a feeling of attack from the EC for their decision to take Hungary to the Court of Justice of the EU. Further to the peaks in the late July section of the graph, the Council of the EU held a summit on 28 – 29 June which also contributed to the increase in coverage in both sources both before the meeting and afterwards. The EU announced the regional disembarkation platform at this meeting. An article titled ‘Culture of illegal immigrants is different from European’ reinforces the Hungarian support of an external EU solution to migration rather than an internal solution.
4.2 Actor Visibility

Actor frequency was varied throughout the article sample group. Various actors represented the Hungarian perspective which was always emphasised in relation to other actors in the articles. Recent changes in media accountability and management of the media explain the prominence of Hungarian government voices in the media. European actors did feature but not to the same degree that Hungarian voices did.

Unsurprisingly Viktor Orban – the Hungarian head of state – was the most prominent voice as a single actor in the news items canvassed. The more generic term, ‘Hungarian government’ featured in numerous articles in the form of ‘government spokesperson’ if commenting on an issue on behalf of a government minister. There were over 80 instances of Hungarian government used for general comments but typically a specific minister or spokesperson on behalf of a minister was the main voice in the article. In addition, several ministers of parliament appeared including: Peter Szijjarto (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Zoltan Kovacs (Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Relations), Sandor Pinter (Minister for the Interior) and Janos Lazar (Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office). Hungarian media – which is controlled by a government-appointed council – is prioritising the
government voice over all other actors within the article analysis. Therefore, this suggests the media is promoting the government narrative as the accepted version of events relating to migration.

The EU was represented typically by the institutions as opposed to a specific person. This would only happen if someone was approached for comment such as Federica Mogherini. This could be to try and diminish the voice of the EU and to limit its power when the EU narrative contests the Hungarian narrative. For instance, an article titled “We are continuously under significant attack” reported the Venice Commission (an advisory body with the Council of Europe) called on Hungary to withdraw legislative changes that would penalise NGOs in Hungary. However, the article criticises other actors and entities that otherwise have nothing to do with the Venice Commission. Federica Mogherini is criticised for a ‘pro-migration’ statement and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reportedly ‘declared war’ on the Hungarian government (HODND 2018o). This suggests the Hungarian government use the EU as a ‘convenient villain’ scapegoat for perspectives that clash with those of the government. It seems that the Hungarian government will criticise the EU for decisions made at the domestic level that the EU does not have any direct control over.

Other actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) made a brief appearance but only when the position of this organisation was being critiqued and debated. Hungary would attack any narrative contesting the views of the government. The HODND published an article called “The UN migration package is unbalanced and dangerous” that heavily criticised the non-binding global compact for its ‘pro migration’ stance. The Hungarian government were convinced the package would be interpreted as an invitation and condemned the proposal (HODND 2018m). Again, the media are utilised to attack anti-government positions that contest the space of the Hungarian government.

4.3 Degree of Centrality

As mentioned in the Methodology chapter, degree of centrality analyses the focus of the EU and Hungary within the articles to determine whether they are a major, minor or secondary focus of the article. Hungary – when it was referenced - always featured as a major actor in all news articles as the central focus for news coverage. This combined with the dominance of Hungarian government voices, again suggests the media gives more attention to the government than anti-government voices. This analysis highlights the primacy of the Hungarian government voice within the media sample. The Hungarian media are promoting the Hungarian government perspective as the important perspective.
The European Union has mixed visibility within the sample group. It was more often featured as a minor or a secondary actor than as a major actor. The variation in degree of centrality would change depending on the articles purpose. If the article was positioning the EU as a major actor, the article would often criticise EU policy strongly. Table 2 below elaborates on some examples of this finding.

Table 2: Examples of varied actor visibility of the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Major Actor</th>
<th>Minor Actor</th>
<th>Secondary Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>“Fidesz for moving EU immigration problem into national competence”</td>
<td>“Szijjarto outlines plan for non-EU countries to host migration screening centres”</td>
<td>“Number of illegal immigrants over 60,000”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Migrants rejected by the EU have no place in Hungary”</td>
<td>“Hungary under “severe migration pressure”, says Asselborn”</td>
<td>“Influx of refugees prompts Macedonia to amend asylum law”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HODND</td>
<td>“Mandatory immigrant quota would be unacceptable”</td>
<td>“Political refugees have always been accepted by Hungary”</td>
<td>“The government is not happy about building fence”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“EU Summit final decision to be made on migration”</td>
<td>“Visegrad countries' stance against migrant quotas successful”</td>
<td>“Those who have responded to the national consultation so far expect more decisive action on immigration matters”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own
In articles where the EU was the major actor, the content would usually reflect a stronger criticism of EU migration policy rather than mentioning a conflict with Hungarian policy. The first MTI article in the major actor column references Hungary’s preference to manage migration at the national level and reiterating strong opposition to the mandatory distribution mechanism initiated by the EC in May of 2015 (MTI 2015d). The same can be said for the second MTI article in the same column in table 2 but the criticism is towards EU member states returning migrants to Hungary using the ‘Rule of First Entry’ (Dublin regulation) as mentioned in the introduction chapter. In this article, Hungary states it will change national legislation by reducing protections for persons classified as ‘economic migrants’ that do not qualify for protection from the EU (MTI 2015j). This legalises the deportation of migrants which directly conflicts with international law, European Convention on Human Rights and EU law. The law also penalises NGOs helping migrants access legal assistance. The Hungarian government will not allow their sovereignty to be directly affected by EU policies they see as detrimental to Hungary. This is important because within Hungarian political discourse issues relating to the EU are discussed on a spectrum that is either national or non-national. The Hungarian government (like some other EU members) nationalise the successes of the EU when it suits them. In turn, the criticise the EU for interference in issues that are of national competence. The EU is used as a convenient scapegoat for everything going wrong within Hungary that has nothing to do with direct EU interference. An article published in June 2018 titled “The constitution needs to be amended because of migration and EU federalisation aspirations” demonstrates Hungary interprets EU regulations as ‘federalist’ interference in Hungarian domestic policy depicting the EU as the ‘villain’ and Hungary as the ‘victim’.

The EU was often referenced as a secondary actor when the article focussed on Hungarian domestic policy that conflicted with EU regulations. One article from HODND in the secondary column of this table, referenced the national consultation on migration. The results of this consultation reiterated the government’s position that much of the public support the government implementing stronger punishments for illegal entry and illegal migration (HODND 2015j). The Hungarian government justified this consultation as proof that Hungarian citizens also demand strong action from the EU and used this referendum as a convenient vehicle for their narrative. The second article example in the secondary column published by the HODND mentions the Hungarian-Serbian border fence (mentioned in the introduction chapter) which again, is a Hungarian domestic policy conflicting with an EU regulation, namely Schengen. Hungary felt that sealing the border was essential to preventing illegal border crossing in Hungary and this fence from that perspective has worked (HODND 2015a). Orban stated in an article “The only successful move in connection with the handling of migration has been to seal the Balkan route.” (MTI 2018f). Statistics from the IOM claim that arrivals had dropped
significantly in Hungary with arrivals per day dropping from 166 arrivals in February to just 10 arrivals per day in December 2017 (IOM 2015). This had a follow-on effect on surrounding states. This border fence pushed the flow of migrants elsewhere into neighbouring countries. The other article in the secondary column in the same table references this effect. Migrants entered Macedonia and their laws and policies were amended because of this migratory movement. The article was used by the government of Hungary as justification for their policies and their conflict with the EU. Again, the Hungarian government are criticising the EU for issues of national competence because it is convenient for their position.

The minor actor visibility of the EU was evident in articles where Hungary was countering an EU statement, policy or proposal such as external screening of asylum seekers or the migrant relocation mechanism. Reduced visibility was also useful for countering criticism of Hungarian legislation regarding the reduction of asylum seeker rights. The articles provided EU comment or policy as context for the Hungarian government’s response to said criticism or policy. In a HODND article about political refugees, the government reiterated that Hungary would help refugees in the spirit of Christianity but those that enter illegally via border crossing or those that apply for asylum and are rejected, cannot stay in Hungary (HODND 2015i). As the Hungarian media already give priority to pro-government voices (as demonstrated by previous evidence in this chapter), the primary function of EU statements, policies and proposals are to solidify the position of the government as the ‘correct’ response and to ensure the Hungarian public are informed of the EU’s criticism of Hungarian policy. This example suggests narrative contestation is happening within Hungarian media but that the media feel the ‘correct’ narrative is that of the Hungarian government. Overall, the Hungarian government appeared to utilise the EU for identifying EU-Hungarian policy conflicts, strongly criticising EU policy solutions or when providing commentary on an EU policy or why the policy would not work from the Hungarian point of view.

4.4 Emotive Charge

The content (words and phrases) of the articles were evaluated on a scale from positive to negative. This determines the overall emotive stance of the articles towards the EU relating to the migrant crisis and migration policy. As per figure seven, overall emotive charge across both news sources is overwhelmingly negative as per the figure below. A total of 100 articles (76%) registered as either slightly negative or completely negative. Nine articles (6.9%) were considered neutral and 21 articles (16%) were either slightly positive or positive.
An article titled ‘Hungary will protect its own, and thereby Europe’s external borders from illegal migrants’ published by the HODND in June 2015 registered a negative tone. The article criticised the lack of action from the EU to manage migration. The article text implies that the EU does not take the migration crisis seriously while reinforcing the need for a cooperative response. The conflict in the article is between the Hungarian government who are adamant that mandatory resettlement of migrants across member states does not solve the overall migrant crisis. The overall theme of the article is that Hungary is protecting the physical border of the EU when the EU is not capable of doing so and that Hungary is acting in solidarity but feels as if it is being punished with forced resettlement the Hungarian government and citizens do not want (HODND 2015c). This is another example of Hungary utilising the EU as a scapegoat for a domestic situation that the EU did not cause.

In contrast, the positive articles generally reported events such as laws being passed by the parliament or positive reports relating to Hungary. An article published in June 2015 titled ‘Hungary "net beneficiary" of European subsidies’ reported Hungary will receive extra funding for migration management (MTI 2015e). The article had a positive emotive charge as it mentioned that Hungary receives more funding from the EU than what Hungary contributes. The funding will be used for managing migrants and refugees in Hungary. The EU seemed to only be highlighted in a positive way when Hungary benefitted directly from the situation or from coverage of the situation as is the case in the article. This adds to the evidence that Hungarian media (although it’s a rare occurrence) may publish articles with a positive tone when there are EU benefits but the articles present the situation
in a way where the Hungarian government can benefit from the positive coverage. The Hungarian government like to nationalise EU-provided successes in Hungary and claim the credit.

Figure 8 - Comparison of emotive charge between media sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HODND</th>
<th>MTI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral-Positive</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral-Negative</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own

News coverage of the migrant crisis in both news sources was overwhelmingly negative with 75.1% of the Hungarian Official Daily News Digest articles containing a negative tone and 71% of MTI also containing a negative tone. MTI was slightly more neutral and positive in comparison to the Hungarian Official Daily News Digest but in terms of strongly positive coverage, the HODND had a larger number of articles reflecting a positive tone towards the EU regarding migration policy. However, without context this statistic is misleading. Several of the articles with a positive outlook, although they referenced the EU, were often not purely about EU policy. For instance, an article titled “Several European countries are following the politics of the V4” describes the unified position of V4 countries against the EU regarding border enforcement and security (HODND 2018). Articles that had a positive tone were used to challenge EU narrative with a Hungarian narrative but framed in a positive way. The media is a useful tool for the Hungarian government to use when contesting EU narratives that conflict with its own.

4.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter found two key findings within the media analysis. The first finding was that media coverage peaked in June of each year and within those peaks the Hungarian media attempted to influence the policy agenda of the Council of the EU. These summits occurred in June 2015 and June 2018 and they influenced the agenda by increasing the volume of published articles. Both sources also increased coverage in response to migration policy that conflicted with the position of the Hungarian
government. This finding is important because we know that the FIDESZ government has strong influence over media regulation in Hungary. This was reinforced by the domination of Hungarian actors appearing in media articles in comparison to opposing voices from the EU.

The second finding was related to the emotive charge and degree of centrality of the EU as an actor within the media articles. The centrality of the EU as an actor was dependent on the purpose of the article. Articles where the EU featured as a major actor often included a stronger criticism of EU policy where the EU was featured as a convenient scapegoat for conditions experienced in Hungary that the EU cannot control. However, when the EU was a minor actor, the purpose of the article was to minimise criticism of Hungary from the EU. This suggests Hungary nationalises and claims EU successes whilst criticising EU responsibility for domestic situations that the EU cannot influence or control. The article coverage was overwhelmingly negative when mentioning EU migration policy which adds further evidence to this finding.

The following chapter will examine the findings from the narrative analysis by identifying components from the projected narratives published in 2015 and 2018. The main narratives themes for each year will be identified and explained in the context of the migrant crisis. Lastly, the chapter will evaluate all the findings to then assess the relationship of Hungary with the EU and will explain how these findings may impact on the future of the Brussels-Budapest relationship in the context of the upcoming European Parliament elections.
Chapter Five - Narrative Analysis findings

This chapter examines the results of the narrative analysis of this research. As previously defined in the literature review and methodology, the function of a strategic narrative is to influence the behaviour of actors by constructing a shared interpretation of events occurring in international politics (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 88). Examining the components of the strategic narratives within media articles can tell researchers a lot about how the actors interpret the international system, an event (or events) and how they perceive themselves. This chapter aims to explain the common narrative themes identified about the migrant crisis, the EU and EU migration policy. The narrative components from each year (2015 and 2018) are identified as per the theoretical foundation mentioned in the methodology. Secondly, the main overarching narrative themes are identified and explained. The layout of this section is based on another strategic narrative study by Van Nort (Van Noort 2017, p. 124).

5.1 Narrative Components - 2015

The tables in this section detail the identified narrative components found within the articles in the sample group as per the strategic narrative definition mentioned in the literature review and methodology chapters. These components not only define a strategic narrative but in analysing these components, researchers can understand how the actors perceive the international system, identify political objectives and how the actors intend to achieve these objectives. Below, table 3, identifies the components of projected strategic narratives within the articles published in 2015.
### Table 3: Narrative components from 2015 articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative Component</th>
<th>Thematic groups and description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Setting</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>Domestic setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>EU-27 setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Regional European setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad 4</td>
<td>Visegrad states setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>A non-EU member state setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU v EU</td>
<td>Conflict between Hungary and the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU v MS</td>
<td>Conflict between Hungary and an EU MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int v Govt</td>
<td>Conflict between an internal group and the Hungarian government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU v State</td>
<td>Conflict between Hungary and a non-EU member state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tools</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law/Reg</td>
<td>Law or regulation submitted to or passed in parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Public-relations campaign initiated by the Hungarian government or referendum</td>
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<td>Summit either multilateral or bilateral meeting between Hungary and EU members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infra</td>
<td>Infrastructure to reinforce the border including border management, fences and patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solution</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortress HU</td>
<td>Enforcement of borders around Hungary and describing the separation of Hungary from the rest of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortress EU</td>
<td>Enforcement of borders around the EU member states and emphasis on cooperative solutions</td>
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<td>RTS HU</td>
<td>Return of ineligible migrants or refugees to their home state and keeping migrants outside of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoO HU</td>
<td>Focussing on the economic and political causes of migration in the Country of Origin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategic narratives - per the Mskimmon et al definition - (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 7) contain five specific components (displayed in the far-left column of table 3). Strategic narratives (as mentioned in the literature review) are utilised by political leadership for describing how a state frames and responds to problems. The above table displays the coded narrative components from the article sample dataset that display the specific settings, conflicts, tools and solutions the Hungarian government mentioned about EU migration policy. Coding these components allows researchers to build a picture of how the government perceives the current situation or event and how they want to solve the problem.

The components found within the analyses were varied. The setting, or space, of the narratives ranged from the domestic setting (either in Hungary or in a single, non-EU member state like Serbia), the sub-regional Visegrad 4, the European Union member states and finally the European region. This was interesting because other states formed part of the migration solution from the perspective of the Hungarian government. Conflict occurred at four different levels: between Hungary and the EU, Hungary and another EU member state, an internal group and the government and finally between...
Hungary and a non-EU member state. Although the EU appeared as the main villain in the media sample, criticism was directed towards Member States that Hungary felt were contributing to the problem. For example, when Member States decided to return migrants or refugees to Hungary as per the ‘Rule of First Entry’ (Dublin Regulation), Hungary would heavily criticise the decision as was the case in the article called “Hungary is seeking Europe’s help” criticised the decision of Member States who deported 16,000 non-EU nationals to Hungary when the country does not have the resources to host these nationals (HODND 2015b).

The narrative solutions mentioned in the articles also varied. A core function of a strategic narrative is giving meaning to events for achieving political objectives (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 5) and solutions detail how these objectives will be met. The solutions mentioned included: Fortress Hungary, Fortress European Union, Return-To-Sender Hungary and Country of Origin Hungary. Fortress Hungary is a somewhat negative isolationist, protectionist and nationalist solution to enforce the border around Hungary to reduce migration. Fortress EU however, is a more regional and a cooperative solution to protect the whole EU. This solution featured both as a positive and as a negative solution both in terms of acting in solidarity and cooperation while also stating that the EU needs an EU solution for all Member States. RTS Hungary is focussed on deportation or return of those that Hungary deems ineligible for protection under Hungarian, EU and international law even though deportations are illegal under multiple EU treaties. CoO Hungary seems to be the most positive (and most normative/soft power) solution that examines the prevention of migration and supports allocating funds to those areas experiencing mass-exodus of citizens.
5.2 Narrative Components - 2018

This table below identifies the components of strategic narratives published in articles from 2018. However, this table also identifies the progression or changes in strategic narratives that can be observed between the 2015 narratives and 2018 narratives. There are new instances of certain components that did not appear previously within the 2015 article sample group. The identification of new components confirms if the narratives have changed between 2015 and 2018.

Table 4: Narrative components from 2018 articles

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
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<td>Regional European setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>Visegrad states setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>A non-EU member state setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU + MS</td>
<td>Setting in Hungary and one other EU member state</td>
</tr>
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<td>Conflict</td>
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<td>Conflict between an internal group and the Hungarian government</td>
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<td>Conflict between Hungary and a non-EU, European state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU v MS</td>
<td>Conflict between the EU and a member state other than Hungary</td>
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<td>Summit</td>
<td>Summit either multilateral or bilateral meeting between Hungary and EU members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infra</td>
<td>Infrastructure to reinforce the border including border management, fences and patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>Cooperation with non-EU third countries in maritime security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds</td>
<td>Allocation of funding to a strategic partner country to enforce border outside of EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortress HU</td>
<td>Enforcement of borders around Hungary and describing the separation of Hungary from the rest of the EU</td>
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<td>CoO Hu</td>
<td>Focussing on the economic and political causes of migration in the Country of Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong CEEC</td>
<td>Accession and integration of EU candidate countries that assist in protecting EU borders in CEEC. Regional cooperation of CEECs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As we can see from table 4, the narratives in the June-July period of 2018 become more complex in nature and have more components. This could suggest that these more complex narratives are utilised for changing and influencing the direction of EU migration policy in 2018 compared to the solutions, settings and conflicts mentioned in the 2015 narrative component table 3. The settings analysis in section of table 4 identified a new narrative setting where articles mentioned situations or conditions in Hungary and another EU Member State. For example, a few articles referenced bilateral cooperation with other Member States such as Italy in the article “Orban welcomes Italy migration policy in letter to Conte” and the Czech Republic in the article “Hungarian-Czech consensus concerning the most important issues on the EU agenda” (HODND 2018d) (MTI 2018e). The Hungarian government would seek bilateral cooperation with other Member States when challenging EU migration policy because they feel the EU is heading in the wrong direction. This is an example of the long-term goal of strategic narratives which is to convince others that your version of events in the correct one. This goal aides in achieving the goals or objectives of the entity creating and projecting the narrative.

Some of the alternative directions for EU policy appear in the Agency category. The analysis of the identified agency components within the article sample group found another two options in the Maritime and Fund categories. Maritime describes cooperation with a strategic, non-EU third country in maritime security a mentioned in the “Hungary is still firmly against the mandatory migrant distribution mechanism” article published in June 2018 (HODND 2018f). This solution references previous and current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions that operated in the Mediterranean to reduce human trafficking and illegal entry of EU territory. The funding option details plans for allocating funding to strategic partners to aid in border enforcement for the EU. This is not a new phenomenon as the EU deal with Turkey negotiated in 2015 is a similar solution that it seems the Hungarian government want to replicate in other third countries. Another solution has been added with the Strong CEEC. This solution would place emphasis on increased (or accelerated) European integration and successful accession of other non-EU countries that aid in protecting the external borders of the European Union. The Hungarian government while criticising the EU on several different policies, believes that integration is necessary for border protection. Again, the addition of these options suggest that the Hungarian government is influencing or changing the policy direction of the EU within these articles with contesting narratives.

The next section of the analysis will highlight the wider narratives themes discovered in the coding process. Five narratives from each period of analysis will be highlighted and elaborated upon in the
context of EU migration policy. The narrative will be categories into one of three narrative types: system, policy/issue or national narrative as per the Roselle et all narrative types as mentioned in the literature review.

5.3 Projected narratives

5.3.1 Narrative Themes - 2015

This research completed a secondary coding process after identifying the components, discussed above, which identified the common narrative themes from the responses from media articles (also above_ entered in the google form. The analysis in the previous chapter identified single components (like puzzle pieces) of narratives, whereas the analysis presented here identifies the common narrative themes (i.e. the whole puzzle picture) from the identified narrative components. Five projected narratives within the media analysis from each period of observation in 2015 and 2018 and the narratives were identified as prominent and are explained within the migration context using examples and quotes from the articles in the sample group. This analysis was inspired by Van Noort’s study of BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) Strategic Narratives -- where the common themes were identified, described and explained in a similar way (Van Noort 2017, p. 124). As shall be seen, the narratives between the two timeframes changed substantially which may indicate changes in the relationship between Hungary and the EU. For example, the narratives have shown changes in emotive language and perceptions of the EU as well as increased complexity with the types of narratives identified in 2018 compared to 2015. These changes in narratives may have negative consequences in the future relationship between Hungary and the EU.

The identified narratives will fall into one of three categories: system narrative, policy narrative and national identity narrative. System narratives detail the perception of the international system and your state’s position within it (e.g. the War on Terror). Policy narratives describe the policies or action needed to solve a crisis (e.g. migration) and why that preferred action is the best solution. Whereas national identity narratives detail how an actor is depicted but is not limited to your own identity (EU as an economic giant but a political dwarf). These types of narratives will now be explained in the context of the migration crisis and will include examples from the evaluated articles.
“Migration as a threat to Europe and to Hungary and its People.” – 2015 Policy narrative

Mentioned in 41% of articles.

“...We must defend Hungary and we must defend the Hungarian people.” (HODND 2015d).
“Hungary will protect its own ... external borders from illegal migrants.” (HODND 2015c).
“While we are protecting Hungary, we are also protecting the European Union.” (MTI 2015l).
“Illegal migration towards Europe has become a threat to the continent.” (MTI 2015a).

Protection of the border (and the people) was emphasised in a number articles from the sample. The central theme of this analysis highlights that migration was often portrayed as a threat and something the Hungarian people should be protected from. Hungary was inundated with arrivals during the Summer of 2015 experiencing tens of thousands of arrivals each day with 53,000 arrivals in early 2015 alone (HODND 2015h). During the radical constitutional reforms of 2011, Hungary legislated that as a country, it was founded on Christianity and its values. Anyone who does not meet these criteria is categorised as an ‘other’ and therefore not Hungarian. The ethnic homogeneity may be tied to Hungarian national identity. Protecting the ethnic homogeneity is therefore protecting Hungarians and their culture from the threat of the ‘other’. In addition, the Hungarian government emphasises in several articles that by protecting Hungary’s borders, it was protecting the borders of the EU and therefore acting in solidarity in accordance with Schengen, EU principles and EU law. The Hungarian government appears to connect the protection of the Hungarian people to the protection of Europeans more generally which makes it very difficult for the EU to critique -- as the EU depends on this protection of the external border. The methods of protection mentioned within these responses involved measures including border closure, border enforcement, construction of camps for the detention or deportation of migrants and law changes reducing rights of migrants in Hungary. However, some of these methods (border closure and detention or deportation) conflict with European Union law and international treaties highlighting that the Hungarian government will do whatever it believes necessary to protect its people and its identity. The framing of migration as a ‘threat’ within not only the articles but also the national consultation suggest that the Hungarian government may want the public to share the same perception of migration as a threat to Hungarian culture. The framing of this problem as a threat may justify the strong response from the Hungarian government regarding their management of migration.
EU cooperation, solidarity and emphasis on the union were found in many of the articles analysed. The projected narrative from Hungary is that this crisis should be taken seriously and that a pan-European response is required. The migration crisis was a large-scale Humanitarian event with thousands of migrants attempting the perilous journey to Europe. As migrants entered EU territory through several different migratory routes, the Hungarian government held firm in their belief that a Pan-European response was required to manage the situation. This is reflected in the media analysed. The media also demonstrated that Hungary alone could not provide necessary accommodation, essential services and facilities required for the tens of thousands of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants entering the country. As per the Dublin regulation, the member state through which a potential asylum-seeker enters, is the member state that must process their application and Hungary did not have the resources to temporarily house, assess and process those that needed protection. 53,000 illegal arrivals were recorded in Hungary as per the “Opposition parties create scaremongering campaign out of grave problem” article published in June 2015 (HODND 2015g). The Hungarian government were adamant that a collective response to the ‘flood’ of migration would be the best way to protect the European people even if the solution found fell short of the typical EU consensus. Hungarian ministers encouraged further EU integration and for a hastened negotiation process with countries like Serbia and Montenegro. This solution would expand responsibility for protecting the external Balkans border of the EU to other states and could alleviate pressure felt in Hungary. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, there were two major migration paths through the Balkans: from Turkey through Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary to Central Europe; and from Greece or Turkey through Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia to Central Europe. Hungary consistently felt that the Mediterranean received more attention than the Balkan states as stated in the “Hungary under pressure to resolve immigration issue” articulated published in 2015 (MTI 2015g). The suggestion that a European response is required may show that the government believes that cooperation is the best solution even if it is hard to find consensus and that working together will benefit all Member states.
“Incompetent EU and Importance of Hungarian Sovereignty.” – 2015 System narrative

Mentioned in 56% of articles.

“Closure of the border was not conceived as a means of amusing ourselves; Hungary cannot wait.” (HODND 2015a).

“Hungary would be in full favour of being given full freedom in issues concerning the policing of its borders.” (HODND 2015e).

“...the government would not exclude any option until the European Commission comes up with a viable solution...” (MTI 2015c).

“Hungary wants to pass its own decisions concerning border control and determine whether illegal entrants should be detained or not...” (MTI 2015f)

The next narrative theme identified within the analysis described the EU as ‘incompetent’. Although Hungary stated a European solution to the crisis is essential, Member States pressured the EU for an effective solution for months but the ‘silver bullet’ solution did not materialise. Hungary justified the closure of the border as a last resort as the European Union had not offered an acceptable alternative. Closing the border is a direct violation of the Schengen agreement and if an EU member state needed to close the border, the member state is required to apply to the European Commission first before the closure would be approved. The Orban government justified further legal changes that directly conflicted with EU regulations (such as border patrol, prosecution for illegal entry and restricting eligibility for assistance for migrants and asylum-seekers) as the exercise of ‘Hungarian Sovereignty’ because from their perspective, some EU regulations restrict effective solutions. For example, Articles 78 and 79 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union is the basis for regulations for the protection of migrants but the text itself does not specify those standards. It only states that a common policy should be developed to offer appropriate status to those requiring protection. For the specific regulations, we must look at the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (implemented in 1997) which incorporates several agreements and treaties. The CEAS includes Schengen agreements, Dublin regulations, Receptions Conditions directive and the Qualification directive. Prior to the migrant crisis, the European Commission published the Agenda for Migration that included necessary reformation of the CEAS policies but the migrant crisis prevented the review. The second point that reinforces the Hungarian argument is that there is no legal pathway for asylum seekers to gain protection. Within EU law, there is no legal process for asylum applications outside of EU territory. Those that require protection are often from countries that require permission to enter the EU in the form of a visa. When there is no legal route for asylum seekers, they are forced to enter EU territory. There are a few reasons for a lack of legal pathway but the most obvious is that it’s incredibly difficult for a union of various countries to align and agree on a common policy and some member states (Hungary included) do not want EU policy attracting a mass influx of people into EU territory.
“Illegal Entrants Are Economic Migrants” – 2015 System narrative

Mentioned in 45% of articles.

“Fidesz opposes the idea raised by the EU to distribute “economic migrants” on the basic of population and GDP among member states.” (MTI 2015d).

“Those who come to Europe for economic reasons, in the hope of a better life, should be kept outside European in their homelands.” (MTI 2015m).

“...refugees must be helped in the spirit of Christian mercy, but against those who come here out of economic considerations...we must defend Hungary and ... the Hungarian people.” (HODND 2015d).

“Economic migrants belong to another category...Hungary has been urging for a long time to find a solution to the issue outside the EU” (HODND 2015i).

The Hungarian government (and its spokespeople) were very specific about the terms used in news articles. The term ‘economic migrant’ was used as an umbrella term for persons that did not qualify for legal protections such as asylum and therefore were categorised as illegal entrants and this has been found in other academic research (Bocskor 2018, p. 558). The use of the term ‘migrant’ could be strategic in the sense that labelling someone a ‘migrant’ instead of a ‘refugee' changes the eligibility of certain assistance in Hungary – especially after recent legal changes. The first piece of legislation was a new law passed in July 2015 that legalised the Hungarian-Serbian border fence and the detention of migrants which is illegal within EU and international law but often done by member states in practice despite the illegal status of these methods. This law also limits access to legal appeals processes for those that are denied asylum status which was heavily criticised by human rights organisations and the UN. Non-governmental organisations face strict legal consequences for assisting migrants within Hungary as the Hungarian government have made it abundantly clear that those persons that do not qualify for asylum or refugee status are not welcome in Hungary. The use of the term ‘illegal’ was often paired with the term ‘migrant’. The number of illegal border crossings were often reported and in early 2015 there were 53,000 illegal crossings (HODND 2015g). Hungary’s point-of-view is that those that enter the country illegally are abusing the protections that EU provides those applying for protection. The protections that the EU give to those with asylum status are more than adequate thanks to the various EU and international treaties but Hungary are convinced that many of those leaving their countries of origin are economic migrants, not refugees. To try and combat the illegal entries Hungary has implemented several significant legal changes. The national consultation initiated by the Hungarian government framed migration and terrorism as connected issues. This framing of migration as a ‘threat’ could be used to change the public perception of migrants in a negative way. If the public sees migrants as a threat, this could justify the strong policy response from the Hungarian government towards migrants in Hungary.
“Targeted Development Policy Needed to Prevent Migration” – 2015 Policy narrative

Mentioned in 19% of articles.

“An understanding must be reached with the country these refugees set out from...these states receive large sums of aid” (HODND 2015i).

“The first step of EU institutions should be to contact countries which are the sources for migration...and offer significant development funding” (MTI 2015n)

“...foreign ministers were in agreement that the solution to this problem should be found not inside the EU but outside.” (MTI 2015o).

“...a positive outcome of the conference would be if these countries agreed to host EU stations responsible for screening migrants for eligibility...on their territory” (MTI 2015n)

The last broader narrative in the 2015 analysis is centred around development policy as a preventative measure to manage migration flows before they mobilise. The mention of targeted development policy did surprise the researcher as Hungary had strongly emphasised the incompatibility of migrants with Hungarian culture. While the Hungarian government prioritised many reactionary solutions to migration (detention, border controls and law enforcement) it also noted the need for preventative measures that can ensure economic development and prosperity for improved living conditions. This surprise quickly morphed into scepticism. The EU is the world’s largest development aid donor but it is also known for forming strategic partnerships with third countries for specific reasons. The Hungarian government called for creating asylum processing centres located outside EU territory so those persons applying for protection are assessed before entering EU territory. But this focus on the country of origin does not necessarily come from a place of compassion for these people. A significant part of this policy is the Hungarian belief that many asylum seekers are actually ‘economic migrants’ that do not qualify for protection in the EU. The somewhat strategic usage of the term ‘economic migrant’ is used as a method of dehumanisation as justification for the harsh treatment of migrants in detention centres across Hungary. In many of articles evaluated, unless the article was specifically about refugees, the term ‘illegal migrant’ was used instead. Articles such as “Hungary will protect its own, and thereby Europe’s external borders from illegal migrants” “Visegrad countries' against migrant quotas successful” and “LMP urges European solution for illegal migration problems” highlight how common the occurrence of the term ‘migrant’ was (HODND 2015c) (HODND 2015k) (MTI 2015i) .

The Hungarian government feel strongly that these people are not compatible with Hungarian culture and that multiculturalism would bring “irreversible change” to Europe (HODND 2015f). Hungary is not alone in pursuing strategic cooperation to manage migration. Member states have signed bilateral agreements with strategically positioned countries like Libya Tunisia and Turkey as a method of border externalisation. EU institutions themselves are beginning to follow this same direction. In June of 2018, the regional disembarkation platform was announced and this initiative (in cooperation with
third countries) will assess eligibility for asylum resulting in resettlement or deportation. This narrative although it sounds genuine, comes from a place of strategy and self-preservation and now the EU is following similar policy, it seems that this Hungarian narrative might have influenced the change in policy direction.

5.3.2 Narrative Themes - 2018

This section of this chapter aims to present the five broader narrative themes identified from the evaluated 2018 articles. There are several differences between the narrative from 2018 and those from 2018. Firstly, the narratives from 2018 seem to feature stronger emotive language. The Hungarian government have used stronger language throughout the articles from 2018. For example, in 2015 the narrative themes evaluated the EU as being ‘incompetent’ but in 2018 the narrative theme states the EU has ‘failed’ to formulate migration policy. This may suggest that the Hungarian government does not like the previous migration policies proposed by the EU. The second change that this research noted is that the 2015 narratives fell into the system narrative and policy narrative category but in 2018 there are national identity narratives. This suggests the narratives may have increased in complexity as all three types of strategic narrative are present within the analysis. The last notable change is the perception of the EU within the narrative themes. In 2015 the narratives stated that a pan-European response was required but now the narrative themes in 2018 state that EU policy directly conflicts with Hungary migration management. This change in language may show tension between Hungary and the EU regarding migration management. The potential consequences for the stronger language, the increased complexity and the perception of the EU in these narratives may give the impression that the Hungary-EU relationship has worsened since the peak of the crisis in 2015.
“EU’s Failure to Formulate Migration Policy” – 2018 System and Policy narrative

Mentioned in 49% of articles.

“...in some countries the issue of secondary migration has led to internal political disturbances. We aren’t counting on reaching a compromise at this week’s EU summit...” (HODND 2018j).

“...following the last meeting of the European Council we must expect more political struggles, and the battle against illegal immigration ... must continue to be fought...” (HODND 2018a).

“The European Union’s seven-year budget draft is a cause for concern ... Instead of border defense, the EU speaks about border management, which could mean ... permanent immigration, he added.” (MTI 2018a)

“Szijjarto said “it is the same game as they played with the quotas in the EU...they made it seem as if the quotas would be voluntary and they turned out to be mandatory” (MTI 2018j).

The analysis of news articles found a consistent theme of Hungarian government critique regarding the lacklustre EU policy response to migration. Hungary strongly condemned and rejected the proposal from the European Commission to distribute large numbers of people across member states. Viktor Orban and his ministers stated very clearly that if member states wanted to resettle migrants within their territory, then it should be voluntary not mandatory. The mandatory resettlement scheme directly conflicts with the Hungarian prioritisation of sovereignty and that EU policy should not interfere with decisions made at the domestic level. Hungary viewed comments and condemnation from the EU regarding certain legislation as a direct attack on the fundamental law of Hungary (the Hungarian constitution). Budapest interprets the EU being in favour of migration as the two positions are in direct conflict. Hungary has acted in solidarity while - from their point of view –Brussels does not consider protection of the border a top priority of the EU. Protecting the external border of the EU became an unintended consequence of the Schengen agreement as the security burden shifted from the internal border to the external border but Hungary views this protection as an obligation of Schengen members. The EU is facing serious security challenges and the Hungarian government is doubtful that a meaningful conversation is possible. Hungary further reinforces the fact that the EU has a unified asylum-seeker protection policy, not a unified migration policy. This continued pressure has occurred since 2015 and the EU Member states still cannot agree on a comprehensive policy. The most recent policy announcement was the Regional Disembarkation Platform (RDP) that hosts EU asylum screening centres outside the EU in partnership with third countries. This policy was announced after the Council of the EU in June 2018 however; the proposal has not been finalised. Hungary feels the only reason the EU is forcing the distribution mechanism on member states is because they are out of ideas. With a large possibility that consensus on this issue may not be reached, the EU (through the eyes of the Hungarian government) may have to change its approach if it is to avoid potential damage to its relationship with Hungary.
“Appropriate Migration Management Funding Required” – 2018 Policy narrative

*Mentioned in 52% of articles.*

“Serbia, just like Montenegro, "belonged" to central Europe … Hungary must do everything possible to ensure they can join the European Union as soon as possible.” (MTI 2018i).

“…the EU would spend between 6-7 billion euros on … migration in the next cycle, adding that the grand total would include assistance for regions outside the community…” (MTI 2018b).

“Hungary is … calling for the European Union to provide financial assistance to countries that are caring from hundreds of thousands of refugees.” (HODND 2018e).

“Until Europe regains full control over its external borders, the negative aspects of the migration crisis will continue to be part of our lives.” (HODND 2018k).

Another theme became apparent during this narrative analysis. Hungary is supportive of the next multi-annual financial framework (MFF) containing appropriate funding for migration management, development initiatives and strategic cooperation with third countries. Future-proofing of policy is critical with the implications of future problems exacerbating conditions for migration like climate change. Water management and scarcity are two issues that Hungary are a priority. Cooperation with third countries with migration management is the status quo for certain EU member states. The V4 sending funding to states like Libya and this area needs further funding in the next EU budget. The Council of the EU published its Regional Disembarkation Platform (RDP) in June 2018 that explained how these external reception centres would function. However, this policy relies on the cooperation of third countries who would host these centres where migrants need processing. The RDP would assess whether a person is entitled to protection and results in one of two options: resettlement or deportation. The EU thinks this is a better policy than to reform the CEAS. However, reform of the CEAS would be more difficult now in 2018 because perspectives have changed. The Turkey agreement – while controversial – has reduced the movement of people through Turkey to the EU. The Hungarian government feels this agreement is more productive compared to other initiatives the EU had previously proposed. Hungary will reject any payment from the EU for resettling migrants it does not want settled. Hungary would much rather that funding is allocated to development policy initiatives to help migrants within their country of origin as a preventative measure. The EU has increased migration funding in the next cycle by 6-7 billion which Hungary approves. Lastly, Hungary believes that other European countries are also responsible for border protection in Europe, not only the EU countries. Serbia and Montenegro are seen (by Hungary) as part of Europe and their accession process should be accelerated so they can complete the integration process and become part of the EU.
“Hungary will Protect its national Identity from Interference.” – 2018 National narrative

Mentioned in 36% of articles.

“...Hungary will continue ... to ensure that European migration policy begins with the protection of eternal borders and every country is free to decide for itself who it admits...”. (HODND 2018a).

“...the [UN] package ‘does not deal at all with the existing fundamental human rights of people who want to live in secure and peaceful conditions in their own homelands.” (HODND 2018h).

“The legislation targets groups that would give asylum to immigrants who have no right to claim refugee status. The government considers the ... infringement procedure ...as pressure from Brussels.’ (MTI 2018a)

“the proposal yet again proves” that Brussels is working on ways to take in and distribute migrants among member states instead of stopping migration and bolstering border controls.” (MTI 2018c).

It is not surprising to see a narrative theme centred around national identity of Hungary as this government – under Viktor Orban – have worked tirelessly connecting migration to the corruption and destruction of national identity and the Hungarian way of life. The Hungarian government feel that the UN is also attacking Hungarian law in the same way with their Global Compact for Migration released in 2018. Sovereignty and self-identity are incredibly important to Hungary and they reject any interferences where it is not welcome. The government rejected the forced migration approach of the compact and does not agree with the idea of treating migration as a human rights issue instead of a security issue. Hungary will protect its national identity and sovereignty from any interference from the EU, migrants, NGOs and the UN. Migration is still a national competency under EU law. The constitutional law in Hungary is a tool of Orban’s government that reinforces protection of sovereignty. The government states it was elected to represent the people and will do everything in its power to ensure the right to decide if potential persons are allowed resettlement in Hungary. Government ministers are adamant that the infringement process against Hungary at the Court of Justice of the EU is a direct attack against Hungary whereas those member states that accept migration are rewarded. The government also iterated that reinstating border controls is essential for protecting Europe in the long term which could be problematic. The Schengen agreement has transferred the security responsibility from inside the EU to those Member states on the external border. If the EU cannot find a way to adequately protect the external border in a way that shifts this burden off those Member states on the border, this could cause tension in the future. The next EU budget has increased the funding allocated to the border defence but this may not be a ‘silver bullet’ solution. Hungary feels the only way to manage migration in the long term is to close the border while helping other countries to enforce theirs. This presents an interesting problem that could test the strength of the EU-Hungary relationship as this solution is in direct conflict with EU agreements such as the Schengen agreement.
“The EU is No Longer United and Brussels Needs to Change Its Position.” – 2018 System Narrative

Mentioned in 40% of articles.

“However much Brussels wants to pay to bribe member states, as long as there is a national government in Hungary, our homeland won’t be turned into an immigration country.” (MTI 2018c)
“...the idea to give the money to migrants [is] a dangerous line of thought ... the future EC should not punish countries that protect the EU’s borders.” (MTI 2018g).
“The people want two things: ... robust border protection, to prevent the entry of any more migrants...[and] to transport back those migrants who are already here.’ (HODND 2018p)
“...the defence and foreign ministers agreed that joint EU security and defence policy cooperation must be tightened ... within the fields of illegal migration and the fight against terrorism.” (HODND 2018i)

According this to this narrative, the Hungarian government believes the EU is no longer united due to recent election results in Italy, Germany and the Netherlands in addition to the outcome of Brexit. The “The EU should consider the political changes in Europe” article explains that results of the election in Italy (and other Member States) reflect negative feelings towards migration policy and that Brussels should listen to citizens (HODND 2018b). The Hungarian government in the “Hungary must be protected from illegal migration” article state that Hungarian had their say in the 2015 consultation on migration as this proved Hungarian citizens wanted tougher penalties on migration (HODND 2018g). These events (and potentially the upcoming MEP (member of European Parliament) elections) show the consensus of the EU is under threat from domestic political change across Europe and Brussels needs to change its position to align with its citizens. This change in Europe is justification for increasing the funding for migration in next EU budget instead of pushing quotas the EU member states do not agree with. Hungary believes that conversations around migration within the EU institutions and the Council of the EU should focus on cooperative solutions instead of the confrontational. Hungary supports the expansion of European security and defence cooperation in the areas of terrorism and illegal migration. Further to suggesting the EU focus on cooperative solutions, the Hungarian government state emphatically state that reform of the CEAS is not an appropriate solution because 16 out of the 27+1 disagree with reforming the EU asylum policy including the Dublin regulation. Instead, the point-of-view from Hungary is to focus on border protection rather than the EU institutions pressuring member states to share the burden of migrants across the member states. Hungary warn the EU that the citizens will have their say in May during the next MEP elections. This suggests that Hungary has lost faith in the EU’s decision-making processes and that the relationship between Brussels and Budapest has deteriorated significantly. Orban states that the EC’s days are “numbered” stating their mandate is set to expire as a new EC will be appointed
after the elections in May 2019. Lastly, Hungary suggests the policy that the EU does have (CEAS and Agenda for Migration) sends a conflicting message to those outside the EU. The positions the EU has are contradictory as the generous protections the EU offer could potentially act as a magnet. Hungarian government think that mass migration is the consequence of this policy and that the EU may have indirectly contributed to the crisis conditions.
“Hungarian Migration Management Conflicts with EU Policy” – 2018 National Narrative

*Mentioned in 45% of articles.*

“Mr. Orbán also said that Europe must be capable of achieving a situation in which ... the Member States of the European Union are essentially cooperative rather than confrontational.” (HODND 2018c)

“...the Hungarian Government has introduced measures that react to the ... changing conditions ... which handle the situation affecting the country, irrespective of the migration crisis” (HODND 2018n)

“Establishing a migration policy should not be a common matter for the EU as a bloc; it should remain a national competence for each individual member state, he said.” (MTI 2018h).

“It is clear that Brussels and the commission still pursued pro-migration policies. The commission’s opinion on this matter does not reflect the opinion of governments of European Union member states.” (MTI 2018d).

The final narrative found within this analysis is a national narrative describing the Hungarian position on migration that directly conflicts with the EU. Hungary is managing the migration issue nationally and in cooperation with other like-minded member states like the V4 other strategic partners to protect its borders. The V4 believe they represent the position of common sense and have done throughout negotiations. Hungary considers the mandatory quotas completely unacceptable and as proof that the EU has federal aspirations for controlling member states and restricting sovereignty.

The fact that other member states are now aligned with Hungary’s stance gives the government confidence they can change the EU position and influence the policy direction. The countries of the V4 all believe that migration should be stopped and Brussels facilitates an environment in which it will continue until the correct emphasis on border security, border management and development assistance is placed. The positions of member states have changed with recent election results and these results are challenging the pro-immigration stance of multiple EU member states. Hungary repeats the same message throughout the articles: Brussels needs to change its position or it will experience permanent consequences. Hungary – in the interests of national security and preserving national identity – have done everything it can to secure the border and expects that this pressure will continue for the foreseeable future. The Hungarian government believe the sovereign decisions of member states matter and that the EU policy should have three focus areas: external border defence, external assistance and national judgement on resettlement for each person. The government of Hungary are only interested in negotiations focussed on keeping out illegal immigrants out of Hungary.

Orban is adamant that each document and decision made by international organisations is at odds with Europe’s security interests. Hungary is interested in the EU being built on strong member states but democracy is threatened if EU leaders continue ignoring the people and want they want from them. In the meantime, however, the Hungarian government is to protect the country and its people.
5.4 Impact on future Budapest-Brussels relationship

The sole sub-question of this research asked: In what way do these narratives impact on the future relationship between the EU and Hungary? This question will be answered in the context of the upcoming EP elections in May 2019. The narratives projected in this research suggest the relationship between Hungary and the EU has deteriorated. Trust has been lost with Hungary continuously asking for help from the EU only to be met with by Brussels until the problem effected neighbouring member states. When a solution did come in the form of the migrant resettlement mechanism, Hungary was understandably agitated because this solution does not relieve the burden on Hungary, it would resettle more people.

Despite the disagreement over migration management, Hungary sees itself as part of Europe. Hungary is a significant beneficiary of EU finding and receives more than it contributes (MTI 2015e) but this funding is threatened because of decisions made by the Hungarian government. From the 2011 election that granted a supermajority, Viktor Orban implemented critical constitutional reforms bringing the press under direct government control. This transition to illiberal democracy is a worry for the EU who promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In 2018, Orban was granted another supermajority and he wields significant power over the Hungarian parliament. The EU may initiate further infringement procedures against Hungary if more legislative changes are made that conflict with the EU treaties. Populism is a threat to democracy because populist leaders claim to fight the ‘enemy’ of the people. But for Hungary, this enemy is the free press, the constitution, sometimes the EU institutions and of course, migrants. But even if disagreements and infringements continue, Orban was elected by the people of Hungary in a democratic election which creates a unique paradox: a democratically elected leader may be transitioning the country to an illiberal democracy. This puts the EU in a precarious situation where any action would be incredibly controversial and potentially damaging to its legitimacy.

Aside from the democracy paradox, Hungary benefits from being part of Europe and the Hungarian people benefit from being EU citizens. In fact, a recent Eurobarometer found that 61% of Hungarians support further EU integration compared with 44% support across the EU (Commission 2018, p. 3). Overall, Hungarians are more supportive of EU integration than the average EU citizen. The Hungarian government called on the EU to speed-up the accession process of some Balkan states like Serbia and Montenegro as they are part of Europe. Hungary would itself benefit from more allies in the EU especially around migration policy. President of the EC Jean Claude Juncker stated the next EC would
consider expansion of European integration but this is a work-in-progress until the next Commission are appointed after the European elections in May.

Figure 9 - MEP Election Polling in Hungary

The EP election in May could be pivotal for the future of Europe. The rise of populism and Euroscepticism are alarming for those that have faith in the European project. If we examine recent polling in Hungary for the upcoming election from the figure above, we see that the FIDESZ party has overwhelming support (54%) from Hungarian citizens. After all, this is the current governing party in the Hungarian parliament and it would naturally have a lot of support. The FIDESZ party is affiliated with the EPP (European People’s Party) party which is classified as ‘Centre-right’ and ‘Pro-EU’. This affiliation is built on the shared ideology of Christian democracy but FIDESZ is sometimes described as ‘Nationalist’ and ‘Soft Eurosceptic’ (de Quant 2019, p. 113). FIDESZ is an interesting party that connects the success of Europe with the national identity of Hungary. Europe is good for Hungarian prosperity and is therefore, good for Hungary. As previously mentioned in this research, political discourse on Hungary is shaped around the national interest. The political spectrum is national to non-national and FIDESZ have framed FIDESZ as the party that fights for Hungary. However, FIDESZ (like other European parties) sees the EU as a convenient villain in its own narrative. Orban nationalises
the success of the EU and in turn criticises the EU for issues of national competence. Unfortunately, this is not only common in Hungary, but across the whole of the EU.

How would this result impact on the election? Polling information from Politico generates the seat distribution based on recent political polling. As per their 3 April data, if current polls were the result in Hungary, the EPP would receive two more seats than the previous election while the Greens-EFA will lose their two seats. FIDESZ winning in Hungary does not shift power to the Euro-sceptic parties which is a good sign but Hungary is only one country participating in these elections.

Figure 10 - European Elections Seat Projection as per May 12 polling

Figure 10 above predicts the distribution of seats in the next EP. Unfortunately, the news is not great for the EU. Right-wing populism is increasing in other EU countries such as Italy, France, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden where recent election results have given these parties legitimacy by increasing their audience through criticising the EU. This may result in euro-sceptic parties gaining seats in the elections in May. The Euro-sceptic parties are the big winners in this prediction with ENF gaining more than double the seats they had in the last parliament while EPP and S&D losing a significant number of seats. The gain for the euro-sceptics parties is at the expense of traditional parties like EPP and S&D which could lead to increased democratic stalemate in the EP. Other academic studies have referenced predictions that could see a 50% increase in euro-sceptic seats (de Quant 2019, p. 114) which causes headaches for the parliament but it is not enough to beat the pro-EU parties in numbers.
Not all euro-sceptic parties are like the EFDD who campaigns on leaving the EU. The majority are soft euro-sceptic who want reform of certain EU processes and policies like migration or economic policy which is understandable. The two most important issues for European citizens before the elections were immigration and terrorism: one issue that the EU cannot necessarily see or predict and the other is an issue the EU has a horrible track record of managing. According to the Public Opinion Eurobarometer published last year, more people across the EU 28 distrust the EU (48%) than trust it (42%) (Commission 2018, p. 2). Arguably, EU institutions may be losing the trust of the public due to a lack of action during the migrant crisis long after the peak of arrivals in 2015. If the euro-sceptic parties gain momentum, the criticism will increase.
5.5 Conclusion

This section explored the findings of the narrative analysis. The research identified very different types of narrative components including conflicts, solutions, settings and tools that had changed or evolved between 2015 and 2018. The change in solutions and actions suggests the Hungarian media attempted to influence and change the direction of EU policy in both years as the solutions or policies offered by the EU were not compatible with those of the Hungarian government.

The second section examined the broader projected narratives within the articles published in 2015 and 2018. The framing of migration as a threat to Hungary (and its people) and a preference of Hungarian sovereignty were common themes throughout the analysis. These Hungarian narratives in 2015 were competing with EU narratives regarding migration policy but in 2018 the narrative themes become more confrontational. Instead of describing the EU as ‘incompetent’ the 2018 narrative calls this a ‘failure’.

Lastly, this chapter examined the future of the relationship between Hungary and the EU within the context of the MEP elections happening in late May. The evaluation of the projected narratives in 2018 suggest the relationship between Brussels and Budapest is strained and potentially fragile due to several factors including: the EU institutions losing the trust of the public, the rise of populism and populist policies and the problematic situation of illiberal democracy. The MEP election could tip the balance of power in the EP from the centrist parties to those on the far right.

The next chapter will highlight what these findings mean and why these findings are important to the fields of strategic narratives and media frames and how this research fits in the wider field. Also, the next chapter will evaluate if this research was successful and if there are any areas for improvement with this method.
Chapter Six - Discussion

The final chapter of this thesis presents the final discussion of the key findings found in the previous chapter: through content analysis, media analysis and strategic narrative analysis. These findings will be utilised in answering the sub-questions of this research: 1. What narratives about Hungary and the European Union were projected during the summers of a) 2015; and b) 2018; by the Hungarian English-language media press about EU migration policy in the context of the migrant crisis? 2. What factors have shaped these narratives? 3. In what way can these narratives on migration policy, impact on the relationship between the EU and Hungary in the future? Limitations for this research (and their implications) will also be discussed while considering areas for further research and other factors that could contribute to the field of political communication.

6.1 Discussion of Findings

This research has examined English-language Hungarian media to identify projected narratives about EU policy in the context of the migrant crisis. In the process of answering this research question, this study noted a preference of the Hungarian narrative over the EU narrative within the media analysis. Previous academic research has noted the influence of the media over the public (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 185) and Entman stated the following about the role of the media and this phenomenon:

“If the media really are stunningly successful in telling people what to think about, they must also exert significant influence over what they think.” (Entman 2007, p. 165).

The media – and the influence it has – can be a useful tool for political leadership in communicating policy, informing the public about significant events and describing a specific point-of-view. Without featuring many opposing views within the article sample, it could be said that there is a preference for the government version of events – or narrative when in direct contestation with an EU narrative. This phenomenon is called framing where a specifically constructed version of events is promoted within the media (Entman 2007, p. 164). Hungarian government voices featured prominently within the content of the articles compared to both opposition voices and EU voices suggesting that the Hungarian narrative of events its presented as the preferred interpretation of the crisis and the EU.

Strategic narratives are constructed to communicate how actors frame and response to problems (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 7). Throughout the crisis, the media projected narratives that framed the EU in a specific way. The framing of the EU as an entity was typically negative in its response to the crisis as well as its proposed policies. One of the common narrative themes identified
in this research described the EU as ‘incompetent’ when formulating policies or proposals for solving the migrant crisis as the EU Member states found achieving consensus difficult. This narrative of inaction or delay is not necessary a new narrative for the EU considering the 2009 Eurozone crisis occurred less than 10 years ago. However, this framing of the EU within this research may be a symptom of an existing problem. The EU has always struggled with its identity as an actor within the international system. According to Miskimmon, the EU has always failed to communicate a consistent identity narrative to the world (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 86). Without an existing, consistent identity narrative, it may be difficult to counter competing narratives such as those projected in Hungarian media. If the EU can decide on what kind of actor it identifies as, it may have a better chance in communicating and contesting other narratives both internally and externally.

Strategic narratives were also used to frame the events of the 2015 migrant crisis. The Hungarian government has been recognised for having a negative attitude to migrants (Bocskor 2018, p. 551) and the government framed this a ‘migrant’ crisis throughout the media analysis. Many of the titles and content of the evaluated articles used the word ‘migrant’ compared to ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum’. The articles often paired the word ‘illegal’ with migrant which often changed the tone of the article from neutral to negative (MTI 2015k). Narratives that include specific use of terms can have an impact on the perception of the issue. If an article used the term ‘migrant’ more often than ‘refugee’ while being paired with the term ‘illegal’, this can have a negative impact on the public perception of migrants. As stated in the introduction, the use of the word ‘migrant’ in policy discourse can reduce the policy response (or obligations) of a government towards these people (McMahon & Sigona 2018, p. 501). The Orban government implemented several crucial legal changes that either reduced the rights of migrants or asylum seekers in addition to criminalising people that gave assistance to migrants (MTI 2018d). In addition to implementing policy, the government held a national referendum that asked the public various questions about migration which was depicted in the consultation as a ‘threat’ (Bocskor 2018, p. 560). If the government can influence how the public thinks about migration (as a threat) and migrants (as criminals) this framing and priming could be used for justifying immediate action via strong legislative changes and building infrastructure (such as border fences).

Multiple academic studies of the media in Hungary have also noted the effect of the tight media regulations on the media implemented by the Orban government. Bosckor noted the influence of pro-government elites contributing to the bias of private media outlets (Bocskor 2018, p. 557) whereas Deak noted the new Media Council (that has former FIDESZ MPs as members) has a clear conflict of interest (Deák 2013, p. 156). The media have a crucial role to play within democracy: they have a duty
to connect policymakers with the public while facilitating healthy debate on policy. Unfortunately for Hungary, the media is under strict government control (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 81; Institute 2018) and a potential consequence of this is a clear media bias within media reporting. Dahlgren notes in his research that the flow of ideas, political discourse and discussion is critical if the public sphere is to function (Dahlgren et al. 2005, p. 148). If the media is not functioning correctly, what is the impact on democracy? In the context of Hungary, it appears the government are transitioning to a form of illiberal democracy. In a study conducted by Mechkova et al, Hungary is no longer classified as a democracy by Freedom House (Mechkova et al. 2017, p. 165) in part due to the tight controls on the press by the government. It could be suggested that democracy could be weakening in Hungary because of the tight media controls implemented by the government where the prominent narratives in the media are projected by the pro-government, elite-owned media companies.

Figure 12 - Issues considered 'Most Important' to EU citizens

A recent public opinion Eurobarometer published in 2018 asked citizens "What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?". As seen from figure 12 above, immigration and terrorism were the two most important issues from the perspective of Hungarians. Within the two periods of observation within this research, it was noted that the volume of published articles increased around the time of crucial events such as the Council of the EU. This may suggest the Hungarian government could be priming the Hungarian public to think about migration more often around important events ensuring the issue remains in the public eye around critical times. This is called priming (Entman 2007, p. 164).
The Hungarian government by implementing tight controls on the media, have affected the media in a negative way as pro-government voices featured prominently within the narratives projected within the media coverage which often framed migration as a threat. These factors combined with constant coverage of the migrant crisis (and the continuing effects of this crisis in the present) may have contributed to a feeling of urgency and fear. This environment of fear could be used by the government to justify their urgent (and at times drastic) action or response to the migrant crisis. The Hungarian government response in the media suggested the proposals from the EU were either perceived as inadequate or incompatible with the position of the Hungarian government.

This research is important because this research was a case study of Hungary as a member state of the EU that identified externally-projected narratives (for an international audience) about the EU from within it compared to externally-produced narratives about the EU from an external state perspective. The strategic narrative research the author has read has examined perceptions or narratives about the EU predominately from external perspectives compared to an internal perspective. Secondly, a mixture of issue/policy, national identity and system narratives were identified within this research when research trends within the field typically focus on one kind of strategic narrative instead of examining the relationship and interplay between different types of strategic narratives.

As soft power becomes a critical tool of states as actors in the international system, the primacy of political communication increases. Soft power will become increasingly relevant as ‘bigger army diplomacy’ can only get a state so far in international relations. Balance-of-power politics are becoming a thing of the past especially with entities like the EU using their norms and values as the foundation of their policy. As Joseph Nye stated in his article strategies adapt to changes in the international system especially where power is concerned (Nye 1990, p. 158). Strategic Narratives are a method that attempts to explain how political actors in international politics are framing and responding to problems and situations. Narratives are constructed for a specific purpose and political leaders produce them for a variety of reasons. In the case of Hungary, they reinforced the domestic position within the EU narrative, they critiqued and criticised EU policies for migration management and they justified changes in domestic policy. This research identified that narratives are not purely about the state themselves, they are a story about the entire international system that has two main goals: in the short-term, they directly influence the response of others in a situation and in the long-term the projection of your narrative shapes another audience and their perception or interpretation about the international system and how it works.
6.2 Summary of findings

This research evaluated and analysed 130 media articles from two different English-language Hungarian news sources published in June and July 2015 and in June and July 2018 to identify what narratives about EU migration policy were projected. Descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis formed the foundation of the methodology of this research. Theoretically, this research utilised a media framing theory in conjunction with a theory defining a strategic narrative as a form of soft power. These two theories were chosen not only because of their prominence in their relative fields but because they are effective when applied within this specific research.

Data from general content analysis including, visibility, actor frequency and emotive charge were produced. Various statistics and graphs were made using an excel spreadsheet of data from news articles produced by a Google form. The coding process aided in identification of prominent components from projected narratives in 2015 and 2018. The broader narratives from the Hungarian point-of-view were constructed from the coded data and the overall broader themes from the narratives were identified.

6.2.1 Key findings of the Media Analysis

Visibility

The first major finding of this research is that both Hungarian media sources published a larger number of articles when the EU released a migration policy or initiative that the Hungarian position conflicted with directly. This is not particularly surprising as one of the core functions of the media is informing the public about policies. However, the media does have influence over what issues the public consider to be important (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 180). If the media publishes a high volume of articles about one specific issue, the high level of coverage may increase the visibility of the issue for the public while convincing them that this issue is important.

News coverage from both sources also increased close to significant summits such as the Council of the EU thereby influencing the public perception of the summit. The increased coverage may influence the policy direction of the EU, but it is difficult to determine exactly what degree the position was directly influenced by this media coverage. As the Orban government have used its power for
implementing strict controls on the media (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 84), it is suggested that the Hungarian government utilise this power for amplifying the government position to the public.

**Actor Visibility**

This research noted a local figure was always present when the domestic perspective on an EU policy was required. The Hungarian position on policy frequently came either directly from Prime Minister Viktor Orban, one of his ministers, or from the Hungarian government. The Hungarian government featured prominently in over 80 articles and Viktor Orban was named in 30. The EU, however, was rarely represented by a specific person. Federica Mogherini featured in two articles but Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk did not feature at all. The EU as an entity appeared in 16 articles, the European Commission in 10 and European Parliament was included in one. This would suggest the primacy of the EU was reduced to diminish the power of the EU in the overall Hungarian narrative to prioritise the Hungarian voice.

The visibility of the EU as an actor was dependent on the position of Hungary regarding the issue mentioned. EU visibility in migration matters changed based on the purpose of the article. If the position of the article was to highlight conflict between the Hungary and the EU in terms of migration policy, the actor visibility of the EU would be secondary in comparison to the major visibility of Hungary. Whereas if the EU featured as a major actor, the purpose of the article was intense, negative criticism on EU migration policy. If the proposed policy was interpreted in a way that is detrimental to Hungary, the EU would be the ‘big bad wolf’ equivalent within the article.

**Emotive charge**

But the overall emotive charge across both media sources used was overwhelmingly negative when evaluating EU migration policy. 58.7% of articles published by HODND were negative and 17.4% were neutral to negative adding to a total of 76.1% from the HODND. MTI had similar results with 35% considered negative and another 36% registered as neutral-negative adding to 71%. The high number of negative articles suggest the EU was used as a scapegoat for domestic conditions that the EU was not necessarily responsible for such as the migrant crisis.

6.2.2 Key findings of the Narrative Analysis
The narrative analysis found the narrative components of those articles published in 2015 contained different components to those published in 2018. Strategic narratives are utilised by political leaders for framing problems and their possible solutions (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & Roselle 2017, p. 7). In 2015 the proposed solutions for the migrant crisis featured enforcement of the border around Hungary or the EU, returning migrants back to their country of origin or focussing on the political and economic causes of mass exodus within countries of origin. These solutions all frame migration as something external and outside of Hungary (and the EU’s) borders.

Comparing the projected narratives between 2015 and 2018, narratives get progressively more complex. The overall narratives contain different types of conflict between Hungary and the EU, Hungary and other EU member states, internal groups versus the government and even Hungary conflicting with non-EU states like Serbia. Over time, more tools and policies were implemented such as border patrols, funding instruments, strategic bilateral partnerships, maritime patrols, legislative changes and deportation and reception facilities. As narratives gain complexity, the likelihood of the message fragmenting increases. It becomes less clear who the ‘victim’ and the ‘villain’ are. Is the EU the villain for implementing an unpopular policy or is Hungary at fault for pressuring the EU for another solution and being punished? A follow-up study on reception of these strategic narratives would shed light on some of these pressing questions.

6.3 Limitations

This research would benefit from a couple of changes. One change that would strengthen the findings is to analyse published articles in the Hungarian language known as Magyar. Content analysis in a native language produces a nuanced analysis that this researcher cannot produce. However, as previously stated, there is a strong academic argument for examining English-language sources as English media is often read by elites, international students who learn English and expatriates (Ross Smith & Kelly 2013, p. 222). It may benefit future research to compare the results of media content analysis performed in English language sources versus those published in native Hungarian.

The second change includes analysing images published with the text as image analysis would provide another layer of empirical findings. Images and visual assets amplifies the message within an article and adding another dimension to this research would complement potential findings. Miskimmon et al have welcomed this idea in previous literature as images can provide more information about the general narrative meanings that purely the content itself (Crilley 2015, p. 332). As social media posts are commonly used by diplomatic posts and international organisations like the EU and the UN,
analysing the images or videos paired or published with news media would increase the validity of this research. In the case of Hungary, it might be useful to analyse television as a media source. In the Reuters Institute 2018 Survey over 70% of Hungarians use TV as a source of news (Institute 2018).

Lastly, adding another English-language media source would ensure the findings are robust especially during periods with fewer articles from either source. The strengths of this research lie in the research design: there is a clear research question containing a strong theoretical foundation that compliments the overall qualitative methodology. The usage of descriptive statistics aided in identification of unique findings within the empirical data. The data collection and analysis was clear and produced interesting findings overall.

6.4 Areas for future research

There are several interesting and new places that strategic narrative research could go. As the media ecology adapts to new technologies, platforms, communication methods and societal changes, the interaction between states and citizens will evolve. The age of social media is revolutionising how citizens participate within democracy and it is altering traditional methods of political discourse and feedback. Citizens can access a wider range of information, news and media faster than ever before. Evaluating the projection and reception of strategic narratives across different social media platforms has potential for examining how effective each type of strategic narratives is when broadcast to a very large audience. Social media platforms contain feedback tools such as comments and replies where citizens can instantly provide feedback on the message they received.

A second area for research is examination of how similar narratives (from the same state) are projected across different media (news, social media, statements etc.) and if the reception is different based on the type of media the narratives were received on. The challenge of political communication in the age of new media is ensuring your message is clear, understandable and relatable. Although political elites dominate the political communication area, social media and new independent media are challenging this traditional elite stronghold in the modern era.

The third area that would benefit from further research is the connection between strategic narratives and dissolution in the EU. We have many existing theories explaining European integration but the field lack theories explaining the dissolution or disintegration of the EU (Öniş & Kutlay 2019, p. 227). The rise of populism and euro-scepticism is evident across Europe. Several election results across the
EU in Sweden, Germany, France and the Netherlands further proved that euro-sceptic parties are gaining momentum in Europe at the expense of the EU. Researching the formation, projection and reception of strategic narratives utilised by these parties may provide methods for countering these narratives.
6.5 Thesis Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis aimed at identifying what narratives were projected by the English-language Hungarian media in the summers of 2015 and 2018 in the context of the migrant crisis about EU migration policy. Hungary was chosen as a case study because they were significant – and still are – affected by the thousands of arrivals in Hungary since the summer of 2015. In addition, the Western Balkans migration route appeared to suffer neglect from the EU as the Mediterranean route was a core focus at the peak of the crisis.

The research focussed on evaluating the content of articles published in the summers of both 2015 and 2018 to identify common themes, trends and to gain a wider understanding of how the Hungarian government (and the media) perceived the situation in Hungary. With a good theoretical foundation from the field of media and communication studies, the visibility, emotive charge, volume of media coverage and the degree of centrality of both the EU and Hungary were identified in the media sample and it was assumed that the centrality of the EU as an actor was connected to the level of criticism aimed at the EU.

The narrative analysis revealed the overall trends within narratives projected by the media supported by theoretical literature in the field of political communication. The narrative analysis showed the narrative projected between 2015 and 2018 gained complexity and evolved over time. This development of Hungarian narratives was recognised as a potential attempt from the Hungarian government to influence the direction of EU migration policy.

This research is an example of how media analysis of the EU could be conducted as a method of examining strategic narratives. Future research in this field may focus on strategic narratives projected or received on social media, exploring projected narratives across various media sources (TV, print and social media) or examining the impact of narratives and if this has influenced dissolution in the EU.
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