"IMPERIALISM"
IN WOODROW WILSON'S
LATIN AMERICAN POLICY.

Rosemary R. McKenzie

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ABSTRACT

There is a unique quality about the way the people of the United States have viewed their position in regard to other nations. Whereas many dominant civilisations have sought, through force, to impose their cultures onto peoples whom they have regarded as inferior, the American approach has been different. Since the time of the seventeenth century Puritan migrations to New England shores, many Americans have believed that they have a duty to the rest of the world: a duty which entails moral reform rather than the coercive measures used by dominant societies in the past. John Winthrop saw his "city on a hill" as a model community which, in providing a contrast to the evils of Europe, could benefit mankind in general. Likewise, the authors of the Monroe Doctrine were able to convince themselves that in protecting the western hemisphere against the corruption of the Old World, they were performing a moral service to Latin America.

Although much of the altruistic nature of this goal has, at different times being neglected, it has always been present and ready to be rekindled by such idealistic leaders as Woodrow Wilson. However, the conflicts between America's need for leadership, and the desire to liberate the world, led Wilson into difficulties. Often he was forced into the trap of imperialism as he succumbed to the belief that the end justifies the means.

Wilson's presidency represented an effort to revitalise the American dream of world leadership through moral example. It is the combination of moral duty and leadership which forms the character of the American blend of progressivism and imperialism. Latin America was to be the testing-ground of much of Wilson's philosophy, and eventually, under the auspices of the League of Nations, the dream would be extended in an attempt to embrace the world.

The obsession with leading the world to liberty is an intriguing concept, and one which is as relevant for Americans today as it was in past centuries. Woodrow Wilson's career epitomises the complexities of leadership and liberty, and highlights the inescapable conflict presented by the combinations of idealism and practicality, of morality and expediency.

One major purpose of this study is to investigate the seemingly incompatible relationship between the humanitarian domestic reform movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the rise of United States' imperialism which occurred at a similar period in history. Woodrow Wilson's policies form the central part of the study, and I aim to show that it was his administration, rather than those of Theodore Roosevelt or William Taft, which best exemplifies the ambiguous relationship between progressivism and imperialism. Close attention will be given to the problem of rhetoric as opposed to actual occurrences, in order to demonstrate that these two aspects of Wilsonian philosophy, although
often seemingly irreconcilable, can be viewed as an entity. Evidence points to a leader caught in the various webs of liberalism, of a Presbyterian background and of the almost sacrosanct American way of life. Always the actions he took and the paths he wished to pursue had to be explained in terms of morality and benevolence.

As president of the United States, Wilson's efforts to achieve progress in the shortest possible time often entailed a complete reversal of stance from the conservative view of change which he had advocated as an academic historian, and in which he had been an ardent disciple of Edmund Burke. The English influence forms an important basis of his philosophy, especially in the admiration Wilson felt for Burke, his appreciation of William Gladstone as a politician, and the belief that America could learn from the example of British colonialism.

Because of the necessarily concise nature of this study, I shall confine my attention to Mexico, Haiti and Nicaragua: chapters on each of these countries forming the basis of this thesis. Mexico has been chosen because of its position as the largest and most powerful of the Central American states. Nicaragua is a much smaller country, but one which held strategic significance for the United States, and Haiti is an interesting case because it exemplifies the racial prejudice which underlies much of American foreign policy. Despite his strongly religious background and his speeches calling for brotherly love, Woodrow Wilson firmly believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon civilisation.

I am indebted to Arthur S. Link's *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Vols. 1–XXIX), Princeton 1966-79, for the majority of my information on Wilson's personality, his attitudes to life and his outlook on the world. I am also grateful for the cooperation of the librarians at the University of Canterbury, as well as those at the National Archives and the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., where several valuable weeks were spent completing my research. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Brian Wearing of the History Department, University of Canterbury, without whose encouragement and thought-provoking criticism this work would not have been such an enjoyable exercise.

— R. McK.
ABBREVIATIONS

DNA: National Archives, Washington D.C.
EAW: Ellen Axson Wilson.
FR: Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.
FR-LP: Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.
         The Lansing Papers,
RG: Record Group.
RL: Robert Lansing.
SDR: State Department Records.
T: Telegram.
WJB: William Jennings Bryan.
WP: Wilson Papers.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

During the final years of the nineteenth century, the United States found herself as a colonial power with interests in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Such an outcome was in opposition to her liberal and charitable statements on entering war with Spain. What precipitated this change in United States' policy: a change which seemed to be supported by a large section of American society? Can it be explained chiefly in terms of the American sense of mission, or did the openly selfish interests of Social Darwinism play a part? Were economic factors of trade and communication a major consideration, as America sought to make the rest of the world aware of her position as an emerging power? The answers to these questions are not simple and all of these factors were to influence Woodrow Wilson's views. At different times he emphasised one aspect more than another, but he was especially intrigued with Frederick Jackson Turner's research.¹

Turner saw the American West as a vision of hope for unhappy and oppressed peoples and, similarly, Wilson saw imperialistic policies as providing an outlet for dispirited Americans. Wilson gloried in the westward expansion of America, believing that the United States grew to maturity with this experience: "Without the free lands to which every man who chose might go, there would not have been that easy prosperity of life and that high standard of abundance ..."² His hopes for further American expansion were often concerned with maintaining the vitality of the nation whilst emphasising the American role of a chosen people:

Let us resume and keep the vision of that time: know ourselves, our neighbors, our destiny, with lifted and open eyes: see our history truly, in its great proportions: be ourselves liberal as the great principles we profess; and so be a people who might have again the heroic adventures and do again the heroic work of the past. 'Tis thus we shall renew our youth and secure our age against decay.³

Wilson's attitude embraced the missionary view of helping the peoples of underdeveloped nations while asserting America's position as a world power. It provided ample justification for imperialism and was greatly inspired by the English experience:

England sought colonies at the ends of the earth to set her energy free and give vent to her enterprise; we, a like people in every impulse of mastery and achievement, had our own vast continent and were satisfied. There was always space and adventure enough and to spare, to satisfy the feet of our young men.⁴

He also believed that "It is always well to have a frontier on which to turn loose the colts of the race".⁵
Thus, the American West was to the United States what colonies were to the British. But the last decades of the nineteenth century saw the end of western expansion. The Americans must now seek elsewhere the adventure which was an important part of their heritage. The subsequent experiment in imperialism shows that their answer was found in America’s mission to mankind. The United States would come to see its role in the world as one of guiding other nations towards the Anglo-Saxon ideals of democratic government, but the way would be fraught with ambiguities because leaders such as Woodrow Wilson were unable to understand that their good intentions would not always be appreciated by the nations they tried to help.

The example of English imperialism was very important, but the Americans seem to have laid greater emphasis than the British on moral regeneration. Since the time of the early Puritan colonies, Americans have felt the need to justify their policies in moralistic terms. Just as John Winthrop saw his settlement as the light of hope for mankind, so, when the progressives considered their relation to the world, they saw it in similar terms. Wilson could say “America is not merely a body of towns. America is an idea, America is an ideal, America is a vision”.

The doctrines of Liberalism and Calvinism, under which Woodrow Wilson matured, were closely linked. Both philosophies greatly influenced the American way of life. The belief that virtue made its own reward was common to both, and led to a confidence in the value of the individual and in a man’s ability to gain prosperity through his own efforts. Wilson hoped that one day the United States would be blessed with “... some great orator who could go about and make men drunk with this spirit of self-sacrifice...so that America might again have the distinction of showing men the way, the certain way, of achievement and confident hope”. The self-sacrifice of which Wilson spoke was another inheritance from the Puritans which was central to the rhetoric of progressives when discussing foreign policy. The American way would not lie through the paths of self-interest, but through those of benevolent paternalism: such was to be the route to imperialism, and it seems likely that in 1909 when he wrote of his hopes for a great orator, Wilson had dreams of becoming just such a leader.

Both Liberals and Calvinists were convinced of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Colonisation could be justified in terms of spreading Christianity and justice, and Wilson put the United States on the same plane as that of England when he spoke of the Anglo-Saxon race and its fitness to rule the world.

However, in other respects Calvinism and Liberalism could not be fully reconciled. Whilst the liberal beliefs in progress and the perfectability of society were a legacy of the optimism of the Enlightenment, Calvinism was a more conservative creed. Perhaps his Presbyterian background influenced Wilson toward a Burkian philosophy. It would seem that many of this man’s inconsistencies were the result of these two conflicting views: his essentially conservative background which he tried to reconcile to a reform movement that appealed to him because of its humanitarian aspect. Also, the ideas of change and progress lent great strength and colour to
Wilson's speeches, something which was very important to a man who felt immense pride in his oratorical ability.

An example of conflicting liberal and conservative views can be seen in Wilson's attitude toward expansionism. Earlier liberal belief, such as that adopted by Gladstone and the English Liberal Party, contended that colonies were valueless, but in the later nineteenth century emphasis was given to the benefits of colonialism, both to the colonising power and to the colonists themselves. There even seemed a possibility of reducing the threat of socialism through colonisation, and there is evidence that Wilson took this view. If the dissidents of the race could be sent forth as colonists, many of the grievances which paved the way for socialism could be eliminated.

During the early years of the twentieth century, Latin Americans had experienced Theodore Roosevelt's 'big-stick' policy, and resentment was felt at the obvious American belief that the United States was supreme in the western hemisphere. William Taft's 'dollar diplomacy' did little to alleviate the situation, and when Woodrow Wilson was elected in 1912, one might have expected that a change in American policies would follow. Wilson's speeches implied a man of great moral conviction, a believer in a truly balanced and equal relationship between Latin America and the United States. During the early days of his presidency he said: "One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America..." This was a man who spoke of liberty and happiness for mankind. Why then was it that his administration saw a greater interference in the affairs of Latin American republics than ever before? During Wilson's eight years in office armed intervention with its accompanying suspension of constitutions and suppression of civil rights, came to be regarded as acceptable American behaviour. How can this be reconciled to Wilson's views of liberty and justice? Wilson's spoken motives were exalted, but were his words nothing more than those of the orator determined to sway his audience?

Some light can be thrown on these ambiguities when we study the whole of his statement on relations with Latin America, as quoted above. Wilson's aim was not to merely present the United States as one of the 'sister republics'. Indeed, his words contained a very strong warning "... We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition. We are the friends of peace... As friends, therefore, we shall prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honour, who protect private rights and respect the restraints of constitutional provision..." Thus, Wilson was informing Latin Americans that the spirit of friendship would survive only as long as affairs were conducted on lines agreed to by the United States. Herein lay a warning for the southern republics.
Wilson firmly believed in constitutional government and justice for all people, the need to avoid instability in government and the importance of the spread of Christianity; but at the same time he felt concern for America's economic position, the need for markets for American goods and ships to carry them, credit facilities and tariff revision to ensure economic expansion, and for United States' security in the western hemisphere. In the Caribbean, Wilson's administration felt bound to sacrifice rhetoric for the sake of the 'American lake' and the Panama Canal: both of such strategic importance to the United States. In so doing, the administration assumed the guise of helping dependent neighbours whilst extending American supremacy.

Wilson convinced himself that American expansion would contribute to the welfare of underprivileged nations. Therefore, his imperialism was tempered by moral and humanitarian considerations. These two strands of his thought provided him with inconsistencies. Whereas Wilson hoped for the peace and security which would benefit America's position and at the same time, he felt sure, would improve the lot of poorer nations, he always firmly believed in the superiority of the United States.

In his dreams of a cooperative world society, Wilson was greatly influenced by John Fiske. One of Fiske's books was a basic text for the course Wilson conducted as Professor of Jurisprudence and Politics at Princeton University. Fiske was a great believer in the manifest destiny of America, and he saw the United States as an important part of a world tribunal to manage affairs of international interest. The writings of the imperialist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, offered another contribution: Mahan's book was widely read, and encouraged many Americans to see the United States as a colonial power. Theodore Roosevelt was intrigued by Mahan's ideas, and Wilson, in his youth, had also been deeply interested in naval affairs.

The combination of these two books could well have played an important part in the American belief that imperialistic tendencies were acceptable, and even desirable, if they were couched in an humanitarian guise. In their influence on Wilson, Fiske's book could be seen as representing the sense of mission, and Mahan's the practical view of naval strength to ensure commercial and military superiority.

The desire to expand trade increased the United States' influence in Latin America, but probably the fear of European encroachment made the greatest contribution to American expansion at the turn of the century. The Monroe Doctrine had long asserted United States' supremacy in the Western hemisphere, and during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries its content was put to the test as new developments, giving the United States the right of intervention in Latin American disputes if America's interests seemed to be involved, were devised. Puerto Rico was virtually annexed, and because Cuba was viewed as almost a part of the United States, that island's independence was considered undesirable. With expanding
European interests in the Caribbean, the United States became aware of the need to rebuild her navy in order to assert her position in the world.

American security came to be of paramount importance with the opening of the Panama Canal. Because it linked the east and west coasts of the United States, Panama was of vital strategic significance. The construction of the canal added to already existing fears that European powers, especially Germany, would endeavour to seek footholds in the Caribbean. The Platt Amendment gave the United States extensive control over Cuban affairs, and the Roosevelt Corollary extended this power to include the Caribbean as a whole; making America the watchdog over this part of the world. Under Roosevelt there was a great upsurge in American imperialistic policies: Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Panama became virtual protectorates of the United States. During the Taft administration this policy was extended to include Nicaragua. Woodrow Wilson was to continue the attitudes of the two former presidents, but would take a step further with military intervention in Mexico and Haiti.

The associations between democratic politics, nationalism and imperialism were important in America. Nineteenth century isolationist sentiments were rooted in nationalist anti-European ideas, which formed the basis of the Monroe Doctrine. Imperialism had been opposed as another example of European militarism and corruption, and the New World had been founded as a protest against such decadent practices. But the Wilsonian era saw Americans questioning the direction of their nation’s development. The progressive movement marked a largely middle-class reaction to the great industrial expansion of post-Civil War America. The last three decades of the nineteenth century formed the Gilded Age in American development: the years in which the United States rose to take her place as a world power. To many Americans the Jeffersonian dream of an agrarian society in which every individual could hope for success through his own efforts, seemed to be lost. The small farmer was exploited by powerful railroad companies and a restrictive credit system, and was often forced to sell his land to huge commercial farming enterprises. In the towns and cities the small businessmen’s aspirations were thwarted by the monopolies, and the American dream seemed to have faded.

The progressives alleviated their feelings of responsibility for the ills of America by advocating moral regeneration, but this did not seem to be enough, and on the eve of Woodrow Wilson’s administration there was a greater assertion of the need for government intervention to curb the powers of the trusts which were threatening American democracy. Perhaps a parallel can be drawn between this intervention, and the later intervention by the United States into the affairs of Latin America. The American aim to end dictatorships can be seen as a logical extension of progressive thought.

The Progressive Era’s demands for progressive hindered Wilson’s objectivity and his desire to achieve progress conflicted with the basic understanding of political prudence he had learnt from his study of Edmund Burke. Wilson was aware that change must be gradual, that the Anglo-Saxon democratic system was not something which could be imposed on countries;
but when in power he wanted results, and to achieve results he felt things had to be done in a hurry. The Progressive Era demanded action and Wilson fell victim to these demands.

Thus Wilson came to power as a man with a mission; a mission to save America from corruption and excessive materialism, to once more present the United States as the great hope of the world. His presidency came at a time when the United States desired to restore what it saw as the virtue of the past. Such aspirations placed a great strain on Wilson; he felt his mission keenly and was determined that he must not fail the people of America. Woodrow Wilson, unlike Theodore Roosevelt, did not believe in the glory of war. He was a man of peace, a man with a conscience and a strong belief in the disparity between right and wrong, a man with little background in foreign affairs who, shortly before he took up his presidential duties, said “It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs”. It was his sad fate that he came to power at a time when America was in need of a foreign policy, as she was being drawn deeper into the realm of international affairs.
CHAPTER TWO

WOODROW WILSON: THE MAN AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

What was it about Wilson's character that made him regard himself as a man with a mission; a man who could solve the problems, not only of the United States, but of the world in general? A study of his beliefs and convictions reveals a man who, from an early age, felt that he was destined for leadership.

The son of a Presbyterian minister, Woodrow Wilson was born into a strictly religious family. The faith which was instilled in him at an early age was to become probably the most important influence in both his personal and public life. As President of the United States, he always felt it necessary to justify his political decisions, both those affecting domestic and foreign policy, in terms of strong moral convictions. Such a need created complex problems when a man who firmly believed that Christian principles should be supreme, had to reconcile his ideals to the more immediate and material factors of political expediency.

Wilson was an ambitious man with a highly developed sense of duty. He was imbued with a need to perform his duty at all times and to encourage the United States to do hers. For this man the office of President carried enormous responsibilities, and he eventually sacrificed his health to its demands. Ray Stannard Baker (Wilson's official biographer) wrote "He is... utterly different from Mr Roosevelt. He does not have a 'bully time' of it in politics, but takes the Presidency hard, with an often painful sense of the hugeness of his task and the greatness of his responsibility". ¹

Wilson drove himself relentlessly, and certainly seemed to have absorbed more than his share of the Puritan work ethic. An over-commitment to work, and to his duty, placed great stress on the man. His first wife, Ellen Axson Wilson, realised this and felt it was her place to provide a quiet and relaxing atmosphere in the home. In 1897 she wrote a letter to a professor at Columbia University in an attempt to lighten her husband's work-load. Of Wilson she said "...his temperament; — his way of putting his whole self into every lecture, and every written page, really makes it rather important for his physical and mental well-being that I should be constantly at hand, to 'rest' him..." ² She was often concerned that her husband's diligence could affect his health, and indeed, Wilson himself showed a great preoccupation with his physical well-being.

The Wilson family placed a great emphasis on health. In every volume of his papers we find solicitous letters enquiring or reporting on each other's fitness; letters which reveal an unusual degree of concern. Wilson's mother seemed anxious whenever her son mentioned a cough or cold.³ Perhaps this was not so strange in the days of tuberculosis fears, but Wilson's replies contained lengthy details of his current illnesses. He seemed to have a delicate constitution, being especially troubled by indigestion and headaches, and in 1880 he left Virginia University because a severe
cold made it impossible for him to continue his studies.\textsuperscript{4} In later years he resorted to doubtful medical experiments in attempts to alleviate symptoms. In July 1900, Wilson wrote of undergoing electric therapy for a nervous 'tic' accompanied by digestive problems and ringing in the ears,\textsuperscript{5} and on another occasion he investigated the possibility of exercising to increase the amount of blood in his body.\textsuperscript{6}

Whilst teaching at Princeton in 1896, he suffered what seems to have been a mild stroke; an attack which left him, for the next ten months, without the use of his right hand. In May 1906 he sustained his first really severe illness, in which a ruptured blood vessel in his eye caused temporary blindness. Wilson spent several months in convalescence, and a letter written by his wife informs us that the illness was due to hardening of the arteries and high blood pressure.\textsuperscript{7} His headaches increased in severity after 1915, and during the 1919 Peace Conference he suffered a left-sided paralysis. In October of the same year he sustained what was probably his fourth stroke: this time a massive attack which rendered him incapable of further effective leadership.

An interesting study by Edwin A. Weinstein, attempts to link Woodrow Wilson's health and his behaviour.\textsuperscript{8} Weinstein believes that the Calvinist ethic placed great stress on Wilson and made him feel guilty when he did not achieve what he felt to be God's design. Wilson's parents, particularly his father (with whom Wilson had a very close and warm relationship), seemed to have impressed upon him that the maintenance of one's health is an important part of one's responsibility to God. Stress is a major factor in the cerebro-vascular disease which precipitates strokes, and such concern about responsibilities may have added to the man's anxieties. Weinstein notes that each of Wilson's major illnesses brought the behavioural changes common in stroke victims, changes which caused Wilson to display greater irritability and less tolerance than in his former years.

The study is significant, although it cannot be seen as conclusive as not only is it undertaken at a date far removed from the illnesses, but because so many other factors play a part in behavioural patterns. For instance, it was only after 1906 that politics, both at Princeton University and in the wider sphere, came to play an important part in Wilson's life, and it was not until after this date that Wilson was faced with direct opposition to plans which were of great importance to him. The resistance he faced over the Princeton Graduate School and The League of Nations affected him deeply because he believed these plans to be God's will and he was anxious to see them implemented.

Wilson seemed to approach difficult situations in a personal manner, and this was to affect his actions when he met opposition. His background as an historian\textsuperscript{9} made him aware of man's limitations when too closely involved in certain matters: "It is easy to be wise out of books,
but it is infinitely difficult to be wise in the midst of affairs". These words could almost stand as Wilson's epitaph: he understood the problems, but in practice he did not seem to be able to take an objective view.

Woodrow Wilson saw his task as president in terms of performing a moral duty, i.e. doing God's will. His religion, and his faith in democracy, inspired him to believe that God's will could be identified with that of the ordinary American citizen, and thus Wilson often equated his position with the people. The need to do his duty made him aware of his obligation to the masses. In both his governorship and his presidency he felt strongly bound to keep his campaign promises, and it was largely because of this that these periods witnessed an unusual degree of social legislation and reform.

Wilson often spoke of 'right' as if he was the ultimate judge of right and wrong. Such a belief seems attributable to his Calvinist background. Calvinists believe that there is no place for religious discussion or questioning because the answers have already been decided. Their main concern is to apply their doctrine in a practical way to everyday life. As with the early New England Puritans, Wilson was less concerned with theology itself than in the application of his beliefs. He had no doubts that he knew what was right for the world. Once, in an argument with a professor at Princeton, his colleague had said "Well, Dr Wilson, there are two sides to every question". and Wilson had replied "Yes... a right side and a wrong side". During his undergraduate years Wilson wrote a religious essay in which he divided the world into righteousness (Christianity) and evil (Prince of Darkness), and his view of 'truth' reflects the same belief in absolutes. He said that a statesman "should search for truth with the full determination to find it, and in that search he should most earnestly seek aid from God... When he does not actively advocate truth, he advocates error. Those who are not for truth are against it. There is here no neutrality".

In light of such a view it does not seem strange that, when in power, Wilson was more inclined to trust his own judgement rather than the advice of others. Many times he was convinced that his Christian background would show him the only right way, and compromise was an impossibility.

Wilson emphasised his sense of duty when accepting nominations for political positions. To have allowed himself to appear ambitious would have been anathema to his religious upbringing. Humility and modesty are of great importance to Calvinists, and ambition is too close to the sin of Pride. Because he was able to identify his own needs and ambitions with a sense of duty to the country, Wilson seemed able to purge himself of any sense of selfishness in his aspirations. Yet the fact remained that he had long harboured the desire for a political career. Before his first marriage he wrote:

... there is, and has long been, in my mind a 'lurking sense of disappointment and loss, as if I had missed from my life something upon which both my gifts and inclinations gave me a claim'; I do feel a very real regret that I have been shut
out from my heart's first — primary — ambition and purpose, which was, to take an active, if possible a leading, part in public life, and strike out for myself, if I had the ability, a statesman's career . . . I have a strong instinct of leadership, an unmistakably oratorical temperament, and the keenest possible delight in affairs . . .

Thus, the answer to Wilson's dilemma of appearing self-seeking was to turn his ambitions into the old Puritan virtue of community service, and when he accepted the nomination for Governor of New Jersey, Wilson emphasised that this was his duty: "I have all my life been preaching the duty of educated men to accept just such opportunities; and I do not see how I could have done otherwise . . ." 16

Wilson believed that the man of religious principles was the one who was best equipped for public life:

. . . religious principle is the one solid and remaining and abiding foundation . . . Find a man whose conscience is buttressed by that intimate principle and you will find a man into whose hands you can safely entrust your affairs . . . For the man who steers by expediency, the man who trims his course, by what he thinks will be the political consequence, the man who always has his eye upon the weather, is a man whom you cannot trust. 17

However, it could be said that it was his attitude toward religion which often led him astray and affected his judgement, particularly in the field of foreign relations. The need to do his duty to God and his people, tended to cloud Wilson's opinions to the extent of losing touch with reality. A warning for the future could be seen in the following words, written by Wilson in 1911:

. . . there are times in the history of nations when they must take up the crude instruments of bloodshed in order to vindicate spiritual conceptions. For liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare. I will not cry 'Peace' so long as there is sin and wrong in the world. And this great book [The Bible] does not teach any doctrine of peace so long as there is sin to be combated and overcome in one's own heart and in the great moving force of human society. 18

Hence America's mission to the world would be one of combating sin and furthering righteousness: probably the single most important factor in Wilsonian Imperialism, because "America was born a Christian nation. America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture". 19

For Wilson, the less attractive aspects of imperialism could be justified by the fact that this was a holy undertaking. Just as Wilson's need to become president could be accepted as an unselfish act of public service, so must the United States' attitude toward Latin America be one of duty; to lead these republics toward the only right way of living and serving God.

Wilson's speeches derive the majority of their imagery from his religion, and from his admiration of early colonial America and the moral principles of the colonists. Perhaps it was a
His words, whether campaign speeches or addresses to groups long before his political career began, had been colourful and patriotic; imbued with a sense of America's God-given purpose in the world:

The American spirit is something more than the old, the immemorial Saxon spirit of liberty from which it sprang. It has been bred by the conditions attending the great task which we have all the century been carrying forward: the task, at once material and ideal, of subduing the wilderness and covering all the wide stretches of a vast continent with a single free and stable polity. It is, accordingly, above all things, a hopeful and confidence spirit. It is progressive, optimistically progressive, and ambitious of objects of national scope and advantage . . .

The need to realise this American spirit would so many times cause Wilson to lose sight of the ultimate goal, especially in foreign policy. Intellectually, he understood the need for each country's differing views, as evidenced in a newspaper report of an address given in 1902: "Mr Wilson hoped that Americans would grow less intolerant. They are inclined to view as dangerous people that hold views different from theirs . . ." But in reality he found it impossible to follow his own advice.

Wilson had been aware of many of the difficulties he would encounter during his presidency. He seemed a man of quiet, tolerant wisdom, a man whose background as an historian should have placed him in good stead for a career as a politician, because it should have made him aware of the dangers of simple answers, of overly-idealistic attitudes, and the call for rapid change. When in power, Wilson was happy as long as events proceeded in the direction he desired, e.g. the rapid reform of his first administration. But when problems arose, especially those concerned with foreign policy; his emotional, religious background came to the fore, and he felt an overwhelming need to pursue the paths of righteousness and Americanism.

If religion formed the main source of motivation for the sense of mission which guided Wilsonian Imperialism, the president's passion for reform, for justice for all men, and his respect for the law, can be seen as an extension of his Christian beliefs.

To Wilson, the really great reformer, the leader America needed, was the man who could understand "the common meaning of the common voice", a man who could see "affairs as the people see them, and not as a man of particular classes or the professions sees them". Above all, a leader must be able to interpret public opinion: "the spirit of the progressive is the spirit of common counsel for the common welfare".

He yearned for an idealised past, a less complicated age, when man could be something more than the puppet of industrial society:

What I call progressiveness . . . is a revitalization of the tissues of society, which now are so interlaced that it is almost impossible to untangle them. About twenty-five years ago things were easily explained because things then were simple. They're not simple today.
When Wilson was asked to define a progressive democrat he once explained that republicans believe the government should be a type of trusteeship, with "those who have the biggest material stake in its industrial affairs" as the trustees, but he emphasised that a progressive democrat regards this as selfish, and aims to make changes "which will square the commercial and industrial methods of the country with the general interest."

Wilson believed that it was America's duty to try to achieve reform. He regarded the Declaration of Independence as a progressive document because it had demanded that the people modify institutions when they no longer suit the people living under them. Wilson saw in his age a time when just such change was necessary if America was to keep to her mission:

We have come upon a new age... in which America again shakes herself like a [great] and powerful creature, and says to the whole world, 'We have for a little while gone astray; we had forgotten our destiny in the world; we had forgotten that it was our business to see that men were not ruled but rulers; and we chide ourselves with having forgotten, but the vision has come back to us; it will lead us on. There is no limit to the lands of achievement which we may reach in following it.'

To Wilson, the ideal leader for America was the man of action, and this is what the progressive democrat would be. He said "What the country needs in the present day is the man who does things", not the man who talks of what is wrong with America, but the man who sets out to put the problems right. Such was Wilson's view of his duty.

Reform, for Wilson, was not to be achieved through excessive government interference. Theodore Roosevelt had been unable to succeed in this because of the strength of the business interests. Wilson believed that Americans could prosper only under a system in which a just and well-defined law was the ultimate master:

The only reign under which any self-respecting men can live is the reign, not of authority, but of law - the exact definition alike of his rights and of his obligations; definitions enforced by men whose object and interest are not political but judicial, who determine without administrative bias what is the true and ancient and lasting intent of the law of the land...

He believed the law must be supreme; people could not find freedom until the limits were fully defined. Once again he used the example of England to show America the way:

Look into any constitutional document of the English-speaking race and you shall find the same spirit, the same way of action: its aim is always an arrangement, as if of business: no abstract setting forth of liberties, no pretense of grants of privilege or political rights, but always a formulation of limits and of methods, a regulation of the way governments shall act and individuals be dealt with.
Wilson emphasised the importance of the efforts of individuals, rather than of governments, and saw a need for moral regeneration to persuade people to look to the good of the nation, rather than to their own selfish interests.

Wilson had been educated as a lawyer, but turned to the academic life when he found little satisfaction in practising law. However, he was always guided by the importance of the legal system. Without the law men could not have liberty, because the purpose of the law was to protect all levels of society, to defend democracy, and to permit individual advancement:

Law in a free state should have as its chief object the maintenance of equality of conditions and opportunities. 37

Law is intended in most instances to protect the unprotected classes, the classes that cannot look out for themselves. There is, therefore, a sense ... in which the law is intended for the poor man, and when properly administered, is first of all and chiefly the poor man's friend; it is his buttress and his only buttress against imposition and wrong. 38

It was Woodrow Wilson's contention that the only way to overcome any threat, either that of big business or socialism, was not by giving more power to the government as Roosevelt suggested, but by "proposing a better program" 39. However, Wilson knew that the law had its limitations. The erection of good laws does not, by itself, necessitate the success of a nation. The nation must also have individuals of high calibre and enterprise, and this is where Christianity and its moral teachings have pride of place:

I believe that law is not a dynamic force. Its object is to hold things where they are. It makes fast what has been achieved. True progress must be in the lives and hearts of the people rather than in a slavish dependence upon laws. 40

Thus the law is the outer-casing, the shell of the nation, without which the inner portion cannot be protected and nurtured. Moral regeneration is just as important, and it is this that determines the quality of the society. The place of law is to regulate and to aid the development of a great nation. Theodore Roosevelt had also advocated the moral development of Americans, but he had not formulated such a plan for its development. Perhaps Roosevelt had more faith in the true progressive spirit with its optimistic attitude towards man's capabilities. Roosevelt stood for a return to militaristic and pioneer virtues in the United States. Like Wilson he also criticised the materialism of industrial America, but Woodrow Wilson looked to a regeneration of the old religious values of the colonial days.

Wilson's Calvinist upbringing told him that good institutions were essential for the realisation of man's fullest potential, that the individual needed help to become a good citizen. He used the examples of history to demonstrate that good laws were indispensable for the development of societies:
nowhere has the lawyer played a more prominent part in politics than in England and America, where the rules of law have always been the chief instruments of contest and regulation, of liberty and efficient organisation, and the chief means of lifting society from one stage to the next of its slow development. He believed that, without the good institutions of justice, liberty was not possible.

One of Wilson’s favourite analogies was the comparison between freedom and a yacht at sea. The yacht is controlled by nature, by the wind and the weather, and if it tries to sail contrary to nature’s laws it will not make progress. But once it adjusts itself to accept these laws it can find freedom, just as people can find liberty under suitable institutions. Laws can help people by bringing order to the world; an order which is the pre-requisite of freedom:

... when the boat defies the wind, the wind takes her prisoner; when she goes with the wind, the wind sets her free... her freedom lies in her cooperation with the forces of nature, in her obedience.

In society, the law of man will take the place of nature’s law and will subdue the people, but only in that subjection can they hope to become free. Thus Wilson’s view of freedom was a conservative one and was quite different from that of Jefferson who believed men found the greatest freedom with the minimum amount of government intrusion.

Woodrow Wilson was totally in agreement with Edmund Burke’s contention that it was on the question of freedom that the French Revolution had gone astray. The revolutionaries did not understand the meaning of individual liberty; they did not realise that liberty is best obtained through constitutional government and its accompanying state of order. For similar reasons Wilson was opposed to any kind of revolution:

... Revolution destroys the atmosphere of opinion and purpose which holds institutions to their form and equilibrium, – as the physical atmosphere holds man’s frame together.

One might ask how an American president could be opposed to revolution when that great republic was born in such a manner, but Wilson emphasised a difference between the American War of Independence and the Latin American rebellions he was to condemn. The early colonists had a profound regard for the law, and went to war only to protect existing rights which were being usurped:

They did not fling off from the mother country because they wanted new rights, but because the rights they had... been promised as colonists in a new country with a life of its own had been arbitrarily disregarded and withdrawn...

The Progressive Era was another such age; individual liberties were endangered, but this time it was because the law was not strong enough:
Too much law was too much government; and too much government was too little individual privilege, — as too much individual privilege in its turn was selfish license.46

Thus, there is a need for a balance between individual privilege and governmental control, a need to "walk the median line that lies between the two extremes of capital and government".47 Wilson's progressive philosophy was intended to steer a middle course between the excessive government control he equated with socialism, and the over-indulgence in individual privilege which had brought the age of monopoly. The law was to be the answer to this problem and, when in power, the first Wilson administration managed to drive through Congress an enormous programme of political, economic and social reform. Wilson was seen as a great progressive president; although the First World War was to bring a reaction against what came to be regarded as another example of excessive government interference in the lives of the people.

Because of his attitude toward any kind of instability, Wilson was unable to understand revolutionary tendencies in Latin America. To him, these were rebellions which must be stamped out in order that liberty be maintained. As the United States has had long experience of order and constitutional government, many Americans seem unable to understand countries which have not experienced these advantages.48 There is an inability to recognise that sometimes revolution and struggle are a necessary part of the maturing process of a nation. Such struggles were to have a particularly important effect during Wilson's presidency.
CHAPTER THREE

WOODROW WILSON AND IMPERIALISM

Woodrow Wilson was not always an imperialist. An examination of his correspondence reveals a man who, in his youth, was an ardent anti-expansionist but whose views gradually evolved to a stage where, at the turn of the century, he could openly and proudly declare himself an opponent of anti-imperialist sentiments. His admiration for the English Liberal Party, his belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, the rise of Social Darwinism and the reawakening of America's sense of mission in the world; all contributed to Wilson's developing attitudes.

Wilson was an Anglophile, and this aspect of his character played a large part in his maturing philosophy. During his undergraduate years he was a firm disciple of the Liberal Party leader, William Gladstone. In April 1880 Wilson wrote "I do not know of any one among modern statesmen whose character is worthier of the study and the imitation of the young men of a free country than is Mr Gladstone's."¹

During the 1880's Wilson followed Gladstone's views, emphasising the nuisance value of colonies and agreeing with the Liberal Party's hopes of an early state of independence for Britain's overseas possessions. Wilson approved of the British leader's attitude toward free trade and imperialism, and said Gladstone "has overwhelmed their [Tory] schemes of extended dominion by proving them plans of multiplying the burdens of an already overburdened kingdom".²

Thus, in his formative years Wilson was a committed anti-imperialist. He saw Gladstone as an honest and moral leader, and was a great admirer of his powers of oratory. He was especially sympathetic towards the British problems at the time of the Khartoum crisis, regarding this event as an inevitable outcome of imperialistic policies.

However, Gladstone's ministry was to move away from its earlier stand, in which the conquest of colonies was considered not only morally wrong but an economic drain on the mother country; and as the British attitude changed, so gradually, would Woodrow Wilson's.

There are many factors which could have influenced Wilson's changing views, but widespread acceptance of Social Darwinism must have made an important contribution. During the later nineteenth century much attention was given to the belief that those countries which did not enter the race for colonies would fall behind in the struggle for world power. Books were written which preached the value of colonies, e.g. Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Lord Curzon's *Problems of the Far East* and Alfred Milner's *England in Egypt*. These authors emphasised different aspects of imperialism, among them the belief that no only would the citizens of the colonies benefit from the guidance and wisdom of the mother country, but that the mother country had, as well as an obligation to lesser civilisations, a duty to improve her own power for the benefit of the nation. Colonisation would extend overseas markets and, in
providing an outlet for emigration, might help to reduce those conditions at home which favoured socialism. Wilson's identification with Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis made this latter aspect of expansionism seem particularly valid.

An upsurge of enthusiasm for colonies amongst rival powers in Europe would largely seem to account for the change in the British Liberal Party's attitude towards overseas possessions. Prior to his election Gladstone had spoken of his withdrawal from Egypt, but, in practice, the expected steps toward decolonisation did not take place. Instead, the Liberal ministry widened British power in West Africa and the Pacific. Other European powers, especially Germany, were showing an increasing interest in colonisation, and because of the rising competition Britain seemed reluctant to withdraw. The European enthusiasm for expansionism forced the United States to rethink her own position. America did not wish to be left behind in the race for power, but even more concern was felt at the thought that European nations might again show an interest in the western hemisphere.

The changing attitude toward imperialism must have had an effect on Woodrow Wilson. A newspaper report of November 1898 quotes Wilson as saying that the United States' greatest rivals on earth were Germany and Russia, and that these nations must not be allowed to acquire the Philippines. The United States' annexation of these islands was regarded by Wilson as justifiable because America was the nation of superior virtue: "hers was the light of day, while theirs was the light of darkness". Wilson spoke of welcoming the Philippines situation "as it furnished the necessity of a foreign policy and gave to the executive of the Nation a national character". Therefore, overseas possessions could aid the maturity of America. Wilson saw a need for the United States to become involved in the affairs of the world, and he gloried in the acquisition of a new American frontier.

In an address, given in April 1903, entitled 'The Expansion and Character of the United States', Wilson stated that the recent expansion in the Philippines and Puerto Rico was due to the same adventurous impulse which led to the English colonisation of America. Wilson felt that each century represented a dramatic event in the history of his country. At first there had been a century of colonisation, followed by a century of war aimed at removing the French threat and gaining independence from England, then a century of nation-building; and at the beginning of the twentieth century Wilson believed the United States was to see a new period in which all that had gone before was to be tested and made good. The new expansion was to be the test of the United States' political character and principles. The twentieth century was to show that America was sufficiently powerful and mature to take her place beside Britain as a world power.

As noted previously, Wilson had long been an admirer of England; of her constitution, and of her cabinet method of government which he believed to be more systematic than the American committee organisation. On many occasions he praised the strong personal leadership which the English prime ministers were able to attain because they lead a majority party
in parliament, whereas the United States' president often has to deal with an uncooperative Congress. Wilson spent several holidays cycling through the English countryside and delighting in the traditions of the Old Country. When he and his wife designed their first house it was to be built in an English style, and on one journey through England Wilson wrote to his wife "I am afraid that if there were a place for me here Am. [America] would see me again only to sell the house and fetch you and the children . . ."

Despite these words, as far as other European nations were concerned Wilson was a fiercely nationalistic American. He seemed to see the United States in terms of her British heritage, emphasising the Anglo-Saxon nature of the two countries and the similarity of their particular forms of democracy; a democracy which had evolved gradually, experiencing few of the anarchic tendencies often associated with European democratic development. Even in those areas where the United States experienced disputes with Britain, Wilson could feel strongly for the English position. For instance, after the Venezuelan boundary dispute with British Guiana, in which Grover Cleveland intervended, settling it to the disadvantage of Britain, Wilson commented "only our kinsmen oversea would have yielded anything or sought peace by concession, after such words had been spoken."

In order to understand the development of Wilson's imperialistic views it is necessary to study his attitude towards those people of other than British descent. He often emphasised what he considered to be the higher degree of civilisation of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. These were the only men fit to become the rulers of the world. Unlike the English and Americans, the Russians had little to contribute to world development:

An English or American statesman is better off. He leads a thinking nation, not a race of peasants topped by a class of revolutionists and a caste of nobles and officials. He can explain new things to men able to understand, persuade men willing and accustomed to make independent and intelligent choices of their own.

Wilson's firm belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race affected not only his administration's relationship with other nations, but must surely have been influenced by the position of the American Indian and the Negro in American society. Wilson held a paternalistic attitude toward the black population of the United States; a view which was to be transferred to other coloured peoples. Latin Americans were included in this discriminatory outlook. With the exception of Haiti, they were not held in as lowly regard as the Negro, but they were certainly believed to be inferior to the Anglo-Saxon race, Wilson's papers contain many references to the Negro people as lazy and unintelligent. Wilson saw the Negro problem as not one of colour but of capacity, not a racial but an economic problem; and he applauded the Tuskegee education system, which would keep the black man employed, albeit at the lowest levels of society.
During his campaign for governor of New Jersey, Wilson was asked his views on Negroes, but he was adept at avoiding any definite answers because he realised that a firm commitment could be detrimental to his prospects. However, on many occasions he enjoyed punctuating his speeches with 'darker' tales which tell the reader more about his attitude than any official statement. In these stories the Negro servants are seen as childlike and comical, and illustrate the effect of Wilson's upbringing in the Southern States. As a boy he had had some experience of the Civil War, and one of his earlier books was written with the intention of at least partially vindicating the position of the South during that war.

Despite Wilson's attitude, it would seem that many coloured people did vote for him in the 1910 election. A letter from the National Independent Political League of Colored Voters confirms this.

Wilson's non-committal stand regarding Negroes, was an example of well thought-out political expediency. A letter received before his first presidential campaign voiced disapproval at a rumour that this candidate favoured black and white children attending the same schools. Wilson moved quickly to dispel such a rumour and to let the writer know that he had never advocated integrated education. During the campaign itself, Wilson was again questioned about his attitude toward coloured people, and his reply reflected his caution:

I was born and raised in the South . . . There is no place where it is easier to cement friendship between the two races than there. They understand each other better than elsewhere. You may feel assured of my entire comprehension of the ambitions of the negro race and my willingness and desire to deal with that race fairly and justly.

These words were spoken at a time when the position of the Negro was at its lowest ebb in American history. Wilson was indulging in the political expediency which his speeches had so often condemned, but which, privately, he must have acknowledged as practical politics.

Woodrow Wilson was also aware of the problems of race relations and of Asian peasants competing with native Americans on the job market:

We cannot make a homogeneous population out of people who do not blend with the caucasian race. Their lower standard of living as laborers will crowd out the white agriculturalist and is, in other fields, a most serious industrial menace. The success of free democratic institutions demand of our people education, intelligence, patriotism, and the state should protect them against unjust and impossible competition. Remunerative labour is the basis of contentment. Democracy rests on the equality of the citizen. Oriental coolieism will give us another race problem to solve and surely we have had our lesson.
Only people of Anglo-Saxon origin were worthy to be American citizens. Wilson’s paternalistic attitude toward other races seems of vital importance in understanding his view of America’s mission. He saw Americans as an adventurous and hardy people, and he was proud of the way the country had expanded from the small coastal strip of colonial days to a stage where it embraced the whole continent:

It cannot but be said that it is a credit to have subdued so much of this continent to our own use; a puny race could not have done that. 20

We have sometimes been laughed at by foreigners for boasting of the size of our continent, as if we ourselves had made it; but the boast is not after all ridiculous, for by the size of the continent we are to measure our achievement in taking possession of it . . . and all this we have understood how to possess and how to use for the building of stable states and the expansion of a great common government, single and inseparable in spirit and in achievement . . . The cry is no longer, How far? but, How well? . . . 21

The Anglo-Saxon race was of superior development and not only suited for, but had a duty, to world leadership. Its Christian background and advanced democratic institutions could make a valuable contribution to mankind.

The American Christian mission was easily reconciled to Social Darwinist beliefs, and although Wilson felt uneasy at the failure of the United States to carry out its stated intentions on entering the Spanish War, he was able to convince himself that, because of the virtuous intentions, the American way must be the right way:

. . . It was for us a war begun without calculations, upon an impulse of humane indignation and pity . . .

It may be that we were a trifle too hasty in some of the things that followed . . . But very likely history will judge us leniently in these details, if it finds us sincere in purpose and just in the motives that led us to take up arms . . .

Only those nations shall approve themselves materful and fit to act either for themselves or others in such a time which show themselves capable of thinking on the run and amidst the whirl of events . . . this war was undertaken, not because war is pleasing, but because this particular war was just, and indeed inevitable . . . 22

The need for justice, which is so often emphasised in Wilson’s writings, demonstrates the man’s realisation of the need for a Christian, brotherly feeling for other peoples: an ideal which he preached, but could not attain. Wars were justified only if the cause was a moral one, and this attitude reveals a great difference between Roosevelt and Wilson: the former president regarding wars as justifiable primarily because they would test America’s fighting spirit and provide an experience which would aid the return of the hard, practical virtues of frontier days. Roosevelt
also believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, but he saw America's duty in a different light; to Roosevelt war was pleasing, but the justice which Wilson so ardently sought was only a useful additive to a perfectly legitimate adventure. Perhaps Wilson's attitude can be seen as potentially more dangerous because a 'just' war can involve far wider implications than a war for adventure. His words give more than a hint that this man could fall into the trap of believing that ends may justify means. In his attitude toward Latin America Wilson would often feel that force was justifiable if the result would mean 'liberty' for the Southern republics. Therefore, Wilson believed that because of the great gift that God had bestowed on America, that country had a duty to ensure the gift was not only maintained and nurtured for future generations, but was also used to benefit other nations:

... we ought to think of the long future of America...
I would have reason to be ashamed of having sprung from a great race of Americans if I do not do everything in my power to make the future of America greater than her past. Born of a free people, we, above all other men, are under bonds to prove ourselves worthy of freedom. And not only that, but to hand the freedom on, enhanced, glorified, purified, in order that America may not look back for her credit upon the days of her making and of her birth, but look forward for her credit to the things that she will do in the advancement of the rights of mankind.23

This was to be the cause with which Wilson identified: to ensure the glorious future of the United States through God's service to the rest of the world. But, sadly, the freedom which his administration was to pass on to Latin America was 'enhanced, glorified, purified' to such an extent that it bore little resemblance to freedom at all.

Wilson felt that the United States had reached an era of consolidation; a time when she must look closely at herself, noting the areas in which reform was necessary in order to keep the nation on the path which the founders had intended. He was always very much concerned with the way the body of mankind viewed his country, was convinced that all people saw America as a vision of Utopia; and that the repayment for God's gift must be to spread this ideal type of government throughout the world:

... All mankind deem us the representatives of the moderate and sensible discipline which makes free men good citizens, of enlightened systems of law and temperate justice, of the best experience in the reasonable methods and principles of self-government, of public force made consistent with individual liberty; and we shall not realise these ideals at home, if we suffer them to be hopelessly discredited amongst the peoples who have yet to see liberty and the peaceable days of order and comfortable progress. We should lose heart ourselves, did we suffer the world to lose faith in us as the champions of these things.24
The American mission was seen as a responsibility toward all mankind, but there was a special duty to Latin America:

America has more than once given evidence of the generosity and disinterestedness of its love of liberty. It has been willing to fight for the liberty of others as well as for its own liberty. The world sneered when we set out for the liberation of Cuba, but the world does not sneer any longer. The world now knows what it was then loath to believe, that a nation can sacrifice its own interests and its own blood for the sake of the liberty and happiness of another people. And whether by one process or another, we have made ourselves in some sort the champions of free government and national sovereignty in both continents of this hemisphere.25

The duty to Latin America was more than merely the responsibility of a protection felt by a stronger nation for her weaker neighbours. Wilson saw, in the Monroe Doctrine, evidence that God had entrusted the United States with the special care of the western hemisphere:

... America has done more than care for her own people and think of her own fortunes ... She has said ever since the time of President Monroe that she was the champion of freedom and the separate sovereignty of peoples throughout the western hemisphere. She is the trustee for those ideals, and she is pledged, deeply and permanently pledged, to keep those momentous promises.26

Ideally, he saw in America's destiny a position of leadership in the world: America was to "do the thinking of the world"27, but not to oppress people nor to treat others as inferior as in the English example: "We cannot afford to repeat that fruitless experiment, the experiment of paternalism against which our whole political history has been a brilliant and successful protest".28

America would learn from England's mistakes and would treat her dependencies as partners "where their voice will count with equal weight with the voice of other parts of the country".29

Again, when viewing a situation from a distance Wilson could take a very tolerant and enlightened view. He was able to say "'Live and let live' is a very homely phrase, and yet it is the basis of social existence. I have neighbors whose manner and opinions I would very much like to alter, but I entertain a suspicion that they would in turn very much like to alter mine ...".30

However, these noble and worthy sentiments could be overruled when nationalistic considerations such as America's security and economic progress, came to the fore. Wilson's need to see the United States as a great world power proved greater than his dedication to bring justice to mankind. He saw the security of the Panama Canal as of great importance because the existence of this shipping route represented a huge potential source of power for America. Wilson believed the canal would "switch the route of trade around almost as thoroughly as it was switched when the Turks captured Constantinople and blocked the course of the Mediterranean... at that moment England, which had been at the back of the nations trading
with the East, suddenly swung around and found herself occupying a place at the front of the nations..."31

To Wilson, the Panama Canal represented a huge transformation in United States economic power. He regretted that for many years, because of isolationist policies, Americans had shut themselves away from the world and lost many opportunities:

We went almost deliberately about the destruction of our own merchant marine. We swept our own flag from the seas...

... Now we, practically the greatest Nation in the world, compete with nobody in carrying trade...32

As his imperialistic outlook developed, Wilson became particularly concerned at America's lack of merchant vessels. Although there is little concrete evidence to show that Wilson was an admirer of Mahan, he had certainly adopted that author's views on the economic advantages of a strong merchant navy.33

Long ago we deliberately and stupidly destroyed our merchant marine, not appreciating the fact that the nations that carry the goods can secure the markets of the world... When we were a little nation we dominated the carrying trade of the world on the seas; today we have no foreign carrying trade at all — all through sheer stupidity. We have got to have foreign markets..."34

Wilson was a staunch nationalist, and was aware that unless his country rebuilt her merchant marine, the Canal would benefit only European nations:

... We are pouring out American millions in order that German exporters, English exporters and French exporters may profit by our enterprise...35

He became greatly concerned for America's economic position. The need to secure foreign markets was a priority which was closely tied to the demands for a reduction of the tariff; one of the reform proposals of the progressive movement:

Our domestic markets no longer suffice. We need foreign markets. That is another force that is going to break the tariff down. The tariff was once a bulwark; now it is a dam. For trade is reciprocal; we cannot sell unless we also buy.36

Wilson wanted America to take her rightful place in the world; to leave all isolationist tendencies behind. He knew the United States could become one of the greatest world powers, and was aware of the need for economic development if his country was to realise her potential. To a nation so long used to shutting itself off from the world, Wilson implored "You cannot fight a Spanish war and join the family of nations in international affairs and still keep your gaze directed inward upon yourself, because along with the singular change that came upon us, that notably altered or affected the very character of our government, the nation itself began to be a different thing."37
He was convinced that America's ignorance of the rest of the world had great drawbacks because it had limited the development of the nation and its people:

> We have acquired a false self-confidence, a false self-sufficiency, because we have heeded no successes or failures but our own. 38

Through a strange twist of irony, it was this ignorance of the workings of the larger world which would affect Wilson's own judgement in many of his later plans for world peace and liberty. One could say it was the very sense of "false self-confidence" that he so condemned which would contribute to the overly idealistic visions of Latin American reform and the European Peace Settlement.

Wilson's speeches continually emphasise the idealism and naivety of the man. Yet an admiration for Edmund Burke and English statesmanship had taught that to innovate is not necessarily to reform. He understood that some reformer's ideas were impractical and felt that the prime object of good government should be to establish justice for all people: that order must precede liberty. Wilson, as an academic, had emphasised a conservative approach to change, but once in power this did not seem to satisfy him. He desired security and good government in Latin American countries but was not able to take a gradual approach where the establishment of order was concerned.

Instead of seeing order as something which would come by degrees in Latin America, just as self-government must come gradually, Wilson felt great impatience. This was because the restoration of order became a cause to which he felt a deep commitment: the test of his worth as president. His academic understanding of change could not compete with his emotional and political need to see change occur quickly, and his emotionally detached belief in compromise was one of the first to fall.

Wilson once quoted Burke's words: "All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter..." 39 and Wilson himself could say "Is not compromise the law of society in all things?" 40 But he had another attitude to compromise, one completely divorced from his cool intellectual judgement:

> Nevertheless, leadership does not always wear the harness of compromise. Once and again one of those great Influences which we call a Cause arises in the midst of a nation. Men of strenuous minds and high ideals come forward, with a sort of gentle majesty, as champions of a political or moral principle. They wear no armour; they bestride no chargers; they only speak their thought, in season and out of season. But the attacks they sustain are more cruel than the collision of arms... They stand alone: and often times are made bitter by their isolation... [but eventually] Masses come over to the side of the reform. Resistance is left to the minority, and such as will not be convinced are crushed. 41
Although written many years before embarking on his political career, these words seem to point to the direction in which Wilson's character would lead the man. Wilson had a strong tendency to view those things which he believed to be right as such a cause. In his academic career, the controversy over the Princeton Graduate school; and in the closing years of his life, the League of Nations debate, were both examples of a cause to which he became deeply committed. His view of the United States' mission in Latin America must also be included in this context. Wilson's words show the link between his religious views of his mission to mankind and his conviction that his ways of dealing with difficult situations must be the only ways, the ways of righteousness. He would not be concerned that other people might consider his solutions misguided, because he was convinced that he understood God's will. Thus, his outlook on Latin American affairs was always governed by his religious beliefs and by his understanding of the American mission. The more conservative academic background could be largely cast aside.

Nevertheless, it was Edmund Burke's teaching which guided Wilson's thought on self-government for lesser nations. Wilson approved of Burke's words: "... the general character and situation of a people must determine what sort of government is fit for them". Wilson applauded Burke's sentiments that liberty must be combined with good government: "... liberty is the privilege of maturity, of self-control, of self-mastery and a thoughtful care for righteous dealings, ... some peoples may have it, therefore, and others may not". Wilson agreed with Burke that without discipline and self-control one could not have true liberty. Towards overseas protectorates America had paternalistic responsibilities:

... We must govern as those who learn; and they must obey as those who are in tutelage. They are children and we are men in these deep matters of government and justice. But though children must be foolish, impulsive, headstrong, unreasonable, men may be arbitrary, self-opiniated, impervious, impossible, as the English were in their Oriental colonies until they learned. We should be inexcusable to repeat their blunders and wait as long as they waited to learn how to serve the peoples whom we govern. It is plain we shall have a great deal to learn; it is to be hoped we shall learn it fast.

Thus, intellectually, Wilson understood that the position of an imperialistic power is fraught with difficulties, that the United States must be wary of over-bearing attitudes and one-sided views, but in reality this academic judgment was to be forgotten. Despite his admiration for England and her colonial system, Wilson felt that America could do better. America had been founded with the intention of improving on the ways of the Old World. She must continue to uphold this legacy.

One quotation from Burke with which Wilson identified was "Institutions must be adjusted to human nature; of which reason constitutes a part, but by no means the principle
part\textsuperscript{45}. This is one aspect of conservative thought which retained its importance in Wilson's policies. Although he was a progressive, and as such should have had great faith in human reason, Wilson was never a fully-committed liberal. Always the Calvinist upbringing made him mindful of man's inherent weaknesses, and tempered his dreams of Utopia. Wilson believed that institutions curb man's natural selfishness and provide a better framework for the happiness of the whole society. A good example of this thought is found in a newspaper report of an address he gave in October 1906: "[Woodrow Wilson] said that when a man was married, he was given responsibilities, he was put in a harness from which he could not break at liberty and declared that without harness a man was not pulling anything but himself".\textsuperscript{46} As with the institution of marriage, institutions of good government also harnessed a man for his own benefit. Institutions therefore, were to become the cornerstone of his plans for both domestic and foreign policy programmes. Democracy was to be preserved through the experience of good institutions. In this way order would be established and fears of such threats as European intervention or socialism could be removed from the western hemisphere.

Wilson was well aware of the threat of socialism. He saw socialist policies as an invitation to anarchy and a threat to the whole American way of life. The menace of excessive government control and a disruption of the equilibrium of society, were every bit as important as fears of a working class take-over:

\begin{quote}
... the Socialist programme I honestly believe to be an impracticable programme. I want to proclaim myself... a disciple of Edmund Burke, who was opposed to all ambitious programmes on the principle that no man, no group of men, can take a piece of paper and reconstruct society...
\end{quote}

But perhaps he believed that these words held true only for the United States. Surely what the Wilson administration advocated for Latin America, though wanting to avoid Socialism, was the very reconstruction of society which Burke denounced. Throughout the western hemisphere Wilson was convinced that the Anglo-Saxon system of democratically elected constitutional governments was the only acceptable solution, despite the complete difference in cultural experience between the United States and Latin America. Thus, once again Wilson's more moderate views were swept aside by his need for action.

As a student of political thought, Wilson had spent many hours studying the development of democracies. Many times in the past he had shown that he believed democracy was not something which could be thrust upon societies which were not ready for it:

Democracy is, of course, wrongly conceived when treated as merely a body of doctrine. It is a stage of development. It is not created by aspirations or by new faith; it is built up by slow habit. Its process is experience, its basis old wont, its meaning national organic oneness and effectual life. It comes, like manhood, as the fruit of youth: immature peoples cannot have it, and the maturity
to which it is vouchsafed is the maturity of freedom and self-control, and no other... 48

Whereas, in his earlier years, he had seen order and self-control as the necessary prerequisites of democratic institutions, during his presidency Wilson advocated such institutions in the hope of establishing peace and preserving equilibrium in Latin America. In this way Burke's wisdom was completely modified: Wilson advanced only those elements of Burkian philosophy which would further his plans to obtain results in Latin America.

Wilson did not question whether America's protectorates would benefit from the imperialistic relationship:

Some gentlemen who are violent anti-imperialists, whatever that means, tell us we are damaging our own natures by our treatment of the Filipinos. They don't talk to us about Porto Rico, where everybody appears to be happy... 49

He refused to consider that the American way might not be suitable for other cultures. In an address in which Wilson's purpose was to emphasise man's independent opinions, he said "There are moments when I actually regret being an imperialist, because the anti-imperialists are put down as though they had no right to their opinions; whereas they are entitled to their opinions, even if they are inconsistent". 50 These words seem almost prophetic. Wilson could speak of toleration towards other peoples and nations, but he left one in no doubt that those who did not agree with his views were definitely in the wrong. Such an attitude was to have an enormous effect on his relationship with Latin America: Wilson was convinced that he knew what was right for the good government of the Southern republics and because of this he was unwilling to pay much heed to the Mexican or Haitian point of view.

Despite the fact that he greatly admired the whole English system of government, and could say "The English alone have approached popular institutions through habit. All other races have rushed prematurely into them through mere impatience with habit: have adopted democracy instead of cultivating it", 51 Wilson was to find himself attempting to do the very things he had criticised in others; that is to attempt to persuade others to adopt democracy. Intellectually his views were conservative, but his emotional needs differed. In practice he wanted action, the American people demanded action, and Wilson believed that the people, as the reflection of God's will, must be right.
CHAPTER FOUR

WOODROW WILSON AND MEXICO

The Mexican situation differed from that in most Latin American nations because Mexico was a large and potentially powerful country sharing a common border with the United States. Because of this, Mexico can be described as the testing-ground of Woodrow Wilson's ideals.

William H. Taft's conception of world order had been a simple one. He believed that the stronger powers had a duty to police smaller nations within their sphere of influence, particularly in the matter of unpaid debts. Adhering to the aims of the Roosevelt Corollary, with its intentions of averting European interference in the western hemisphere, Taft emphasised the need for stable government and economic progress: these being regarded as commensurate with the protection of United States citizens and their property in Latin America. Financial inducements were the basis of Taft's 'dollar diplomacy'. Money, rather than the threat of military force implicit in Theodore Roosevelt's 'big stick' policy, was used to get results.

Woodrow Wilson regarded the policies of these two presidents as immoral, and he believed that the dollar diplomacy, especially, was designed to benefit financial interests in the United States. Wilson felt that the capital involved in Latin American investments had developed so much power that it was able to manipulate United States' government decisions for its own selfish ends. In a denunciation of dollar diplomacy, he assured the people of Latin America that "The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the profit and advantage of both and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither". 1

However, despite his words, Wilson's non-recognition policy in Mexico can be seen as another form of monetary inducement, because non-recognition forced financial problems onto Mexico. Its adverse effect on the economy was intended to pressure the Mexican people into adopting policies of which the United States government approved; a similar objective to the former administration's financial inducements.

The policy of non-recognition of Mexico was inherited from Taft. But whereas Taft had probably adopted it as an interim measure, in order to leave negotiations open for the incoming government, Wilson saw the system as a means of pressuring recalcitrant Latin American states into accepting constitutional government. Non-recognition was a device to force the American views of good government onto other nations, but when it did not prove a powerful enough weapon to achieve the desired ends Wilson had to resort to more forcible measures. Although Wilson disapproved of dollar diplomacy, and often expressed his belief that Latin American
nations should be left free to settle their own internal problems, his own struggle to preserve United States' supremacy and to promote American values led to a greater involvement than that of Taft: the most notable example being Mexico, where Wilson's policies, made more formidable because of their underlying moral reasoning, brought the two nations to the verge of war. Mexican liberty came to be regarded as one of the great causes which Wilson believed could make war justifiable. His lifelong reverence for the teachings of Edmund Burke would, in the case of Mexico, be case aside to make way for the liberal ideals of progress and the need to achieve results, which were so important to the progressive movement.

It did not seem evident to Wilson that the Mexicans might not want to adopt American values, and because Wilson's attitude implied that American ways were superior it ignored the fact that Mexicans already had their own values. They were a proud and independent people who would not take kindly to the dictates of another nation.

When Francisco Madero overthrew the dictatorial regime of Porfirio Díaz in 1911 and instituted constitutional government, Wilson believed that Mexico was embarking on the maturing process which would eventually lead to the establishment of true democratic government, a process which he believed to be the mark of a civilised nation:

Democracy is . . . a stage of development . . . it is built up by slow habit. Its process is experience . . . It comes, like manhood, as the fruit of youth: immature peoples cannot have it . . .

The administration of Porfirio Díaz had encouraged foreign investment in Mexico, both American and European, but the Madero government was not popular with foreign business interests because of its stated aims of land reform and social and economic reforms: a programme which would adversely affect such business interests.

In February 1913, Madero was ousted by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta. The coup involved the suspicious death of Madero, and was regarded by Woodrow Wilson as, not only immoral, but a retrograde step in a country which was struggling to achieve democratic government. The American ambassador in Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, was sympathetic to the Huerta regime and to the foreign business interests which had hoped for the downfall of Madero. Ambassador Wilson recommended that the United States recognise Huerta, but Woodrow Wilson sent his personal agents to investigate the Mexican situation. Men such as William Bayard Hale and John Lind were largely ignorant of Mexican affairs, but Wilson knew that they shared his views on morality, and they denounced Huerta in terms of the president's ideals of justice and liberty. Woodrow Wilson's reaction was to attempt to persuade other powers to withdraw recognition of Huerta. He believed that it was the business interests of England and Europe which encouraged their governments to accept the regime. Like Henry Lane Wilson, these people wanted stability in Mexico in order to promote a favourable economic climate.

American business interests might call for the recognition of Huerta, but President Wilson saw the issue in moral terms. The Constitutional Army under the leadership of Venustiano
Carranza, backed by strong generals Álvaro Obregón and Francisco Villa, seemed to provide an alternative to Huerta's authoritarian regime. There was evidence to show that Huerta spoke only for a small minority of Mexicans; something which offended the fiercely democratic values of Woodrow Wilson. Carranza had pledged to restore constitutional government, and Wilson hoped that a continuation of Taft's non-recognition policy would weaken Huerta's leadership and advance the powers of the Constitutionalists. Communications such as that from Southern Mexican leader, Emiliano Zapata, were to have great appeal for Wilson. Zapata wrote "We are not for personal advancement as the object of our effort is the establishment of a government springing from the popular will, as a legitimate command of the people... We will not lay down our arms until we have set up a government which shall insure respect to law and justice, to the morality and liberty of our people for all time..."³ Such leaders revealed the existence of opposition to Huerta, and their stated aims of democratic government reflected the hopes of the United States president. However, Zapata was also careful to ask that Wilson arrange "the manner in which food and munitions of war may be furnished us, also the funds necessary to undertake a formal and decisive advance upon the capital to bring to an end the revolution..."⁴

By comparison, Henry Lane Wilson had written to Bryan that "unless the same type of government" as that of Porfirio Díaz was reestablished in Mexico "new revolutionary movements will break forth and general unrest will be renewed".⁵

President Wilson was completely opposed to such sentiments, and on hearing of the ambassador's report, declared "My passion is for the submerged 85 per cent of the Republic who are now struggling toward liberty".⁶ Such was to be Wilson's stand. He convinced himself that eighty-five per cent of the Mexican people were struggling for a voice in the government of their country and the United States had a duty to help them to gain their rights.

Meanwhile those Americans with business interests in Mexico urged Woodrow Wilson to grant at least de facto recognition to Huerta's government. Their ambitions, of course, were vastly different from those of Wilson, as they aimed only for the stability necessary for a good business climate, whereas Wilson wanted the stability which he believed would eventually lead to constitutional government. But as the pressure for recognition of Huerta increased, Wilson's comment was "I have to pause and remind myself that I am President of the United States, and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico".⁷

In June 1913, Henry Lane Wilson urged Bryan to proceed with recognition of Huerta, and Woodrow Wilson replied "... If the present provisional government of Mexico will give the Government of the United States satisfactory assurances that an early election will be held, free from coercion or restraint, that Huerta will observe his original promise and not be a candidate at that election, and that an absolute amnesty will follow, the Government of the United States will be glad to exercise its good offices to secure a genuine armistice and an
acquiescence of all parties in the program... The interests of the United States are vitally involved with conditions of peace, justice, and recognised authority in Mexico, and the Government of the United States can acquiesce in nothing which does not definitely promise these things..."8

Peter Calvert postulates that Henry Lane Wilson had a drinking problem, was a man who suffered greatly from moods, and Calvert notes evidence which implies that Wilson may have been psychologically disturbed.9 The report of William Bayard Hale (June 18, 1913)10 did not go as far as to accuse the ambassador of alcoholism, but he did regard Henry Lane Wilson as misguided. As the United States' president's special agent, Hale investigated the background to the Mexican problem and reported that Madero had been an idealist who became disillusioned when he was unable to put social and agrarian reforms into practice. Once in power his supporters became self-seeking, and Madero, who believed he had been called to power in order to fulfill a great mission (an attitude which draws some interesting parallels with Woodrow Wilson himself), adopted repressive measures such as press censorship and military rule in order to achieve his objectives. The result was anarchy; providing opportunity for Huerta's conspiracies. Hale felt that Madero's position had been undermined by the attitude of the American ambassador who was a strong advocate of dollar diplomacy. The fate of Henry Lane Wilson as a United States representative in Mexico must surely have been sealed with the concluding words of Hale's report. Woodrow Wilson's intensely nationalistic conscience could not fail to have been moved by the following comment: "It cannot but be a course of grief that what is probably the most dramatic story in which an American diplomatic officer has ever been involved, should be a story of sympathy with treason, perfidy and assassination in an assault on constitutional government".11 There could be no further use for an ambassador who had repudiated the American mission; a man who stood for everything which Woodrow Wilson despised.

Contrary to all that President Wilson's speeches had proclaimed, the American leader was intent on dictating the management of Mexican internal affairs. However, Wilson would not have recognised the ambiguity of the situation because his Calvinist background told him clearly that his way was the way of right. He saw no shades of grey on the subject of 'right' and 'wrong'. One is reminded of the words of his youth: Wilson once wrote that a statesman "... should search for truth with the full determination to find it, and in that search he should most earnestly seek aid from God... When he does not actively advocate truth, he advocates error. Those who are not for truth are against it. There is here no neutrality."12

Persisting in his attempts to make Huerta understand what was right for his country, Wilson next sent John Lind, ex-governor of Minnesota, as his personal emissary to Mexico. Lind was a man with little understanding of the Latin American situation, and yet Wilson hoped he could persuade the Mexican leader to hold free elections in which Huerta, himself, would not be a candidate. The mission held little hope of success because Huerta had already stated: "I have
said publicly . . . that I will accept neither mediation nor intervention of any kind in our internal struggles . . . I have also declared that in no account will I accept compromises with the revolution, and still less if a hint of such involves a flagrant violation of our sovereignty."

Lind's mission succeeded only in intensifying Mexican resentment against the United States. Woodrow Wilson's interference strengthened, rather than weakened Huerta's position, as Mexican national feeling grew. However, Wilson convinced himself that Lind had failed only because the Mexican people did not understand the sincerity of the United States:

... The authorities at Mexico City had been grossly misinformed and misled upon two points. They did not realize the spirit of the American people in this matter, their earnest friendliness and yet sober determination that some just solution be found for the Mexican difficulties; and they did not believe that the present administration spoke through Mr Lind for the people of the United States. The effect of this unfortunate misunderstanding on their part is to leave them singularly isolated and without friends who can effectually aid them . . .

Throughout the Mexican affair Wilson had the ability to persuade himself that he was acting objectively and demonstrating concern only for the Mexican people. Whilst denouncing Huerta he presented himself as impartial toward the Mexican factions, and when demanding immediate action he could speak of the need for patience:

Meanwhile what is it our duty to do? Clearly everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested deliberation. Impatience on our part would be childish, and would be fraught with every risk of wrong and folly . . . We can not in the circumstances be partisans of either party to the contest that now distracts Mexico, or constitute ourselves the virtual umpire between them.

Thus, Wilson could convince himself that he acted in accord with the ideals of Christian charity and brotherly love. His ability to make himself believe that his way was the way of righteousness gave him far stronger protection against criticism from outside than would be enjoyed by another person in his position.

When, in October 1913, Huerta arrested and imprisoned the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and inaugurated a full military dictatorship, Wilson felt it was his moral duty to attempt to force free elections. At an address at Mobile on October 27, 1913, Wilson assured Latin Americans that the United States' intentions were honourable. America would act as a protector and not as an imperialistic power:

... I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity . . .
We have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the United States. Therefore we will now know how to sympathize with those in the rest of America who have to contend with such powers, not only within their borders but from outside their borders also...\textsuperscript{16}

The United States was presented as a country which, in the past, had suffered Mexico's problems; a country which now felt it her duty to help fellow sufferers. "Human liberty and national opportunity" were exalted goals with which Wilson believed no one could argue. "Material interests" were the threat against which the people must fight, and the fact that this threat came from "outside their borders" emphasised the immoral position of foreign investors.

Adopting such a purely moralistic and unselfish tone, Wilson put pressure on the British Foreign Office in an attempt to isolate Huerta. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was concerned mainly with the protection of British investments in Mexico in the event of the Constitutionalists assuming power. Eventually, in order to maintain the friendship of the United States, the British withdrew their recognition of Huerta. Wilson saw the situation in simple terms: he was convinced that the answer to all Mexican problems lay in the ousting of Huerta.

In November 1913, Sir William Tyrrell of the British Foreign Office discussed the Mexican situation with Woodrow Wilson and informed the United States president that Britain would follow American policy in regard to Mexico as long as English life and property could be assured of protection. Wilson's reply was "I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men".\textsuperscript{17} Such was the comment of a man who continued to insist that the Mexicans must solve their internal problems without external interference. Wilson's plans for the removal of Huerta were outlined in a circular letter to the Powers, November 24th 1913:

\begin{quote}
The purpose of the United States is solely and singly to secure peace and order in Central America by seeing to it that the processes of self-government there are not interrupted or set aside. Usurpations like that of General Huerta menace the peace and development of America as nothing else could. They not only render the development of ordered self-government impossible: they also tend to set law entirely aside, to put the lives and fortunes of citizens and foreigners alike in constant jeopardy, to invalidate contracts and concessions in any way the usurper may devise for his own profit, and to impair both the national credit and all the foundations of business, domestic or foreign. It is the purpose of the United States, therefore, to discredit and defeat such usurpations whenever they occur. The present policy of the Government of the United States is to isolate General Huerta entirely; to cut him off from foreign sympathy and aid and from domestic credit, whether moral or material, and so to force him out...\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Not only did Huerta's regime undermine the American values of self-government and justice, but in appealing to the "lives and fortunes of citizens and foreigners alike" Wilson must have conceded that this sector had great influence in the decisions of other nations. The plan to impair Mexico's chances of receiving foreign loans was dollar diplomacy in reverse, but the ultimate aim was similar: to ensure that Latin America obeyed the wishes of the United States.
Wilson's answers to all Latin American problems lay in the domain of self-government and the law. He believed that without these a country was doomed to chaos. There was only one way that Mexico could overcome her problems, and that was the American way.

Wilson had outlined his plans for dealing with the Huerta regime, and although his methods sounded peaceful, the message contained a warning that force was a final resort which could not be ruled out: "... If General Huerta does not retire by force of circumstances, it will become the duty of the United States to use less peaceful means to put him out..." Therefore, almost from the beginning Wilson warned of the possibility of military intervention. Whether he contemplated actual war is not clear. Perhaps he intended only a show of force, but it is obvious that Mexico was to be regarded as one of the causes which could eventually make armed force justifiable. For Wilson believed that "... liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare." Such a peculiarly moral and religious philosophy was to prove a threat to Latin America.

The Mexican people found it difficult to relate Wilson's speeches to his actions. His speeches insisted that America would not interfere and that Mexico must settle her own internal problems. One Mexican newspaper, the Correo de la Tarde, pinpointed the difficulties when commenting on the ambiguities in Wilson's Mobile speech:

> Eloquence, simplicity, and apparent sincerity dwell in Mr Wilson's words, but throughout them is apparent the doctrinaireism with which he is imbued, and which has already cost Mexico and her Brothers in Latin America so dear... It is a pity he belongs to the United States, a rich nation, but one which loves the liberty of all Latin America.

The ironic tone of these words reflected an awareness that Wilson intended to impress American values on the rest of the western hemisphere. The Mexican writer fully understood the ambiguities of a man who preached liberty and brotherhood, but who could not understand that it is a contradiction in terms to believe that liberty can be forced onto a people.

In April 1914, several incidents occurred which were to force a showdown between the Huerta regime and Wilson's administration.

Because of the unrest in Mexico, several United States' naval vessels had been stationed in Mexican waters. Tampico, on the Gulf Coast, was a rich oil area with heavy American investments and on April 9, this was the scene of the first incident. Several United States' sailors were arrested aboard an American vessel flying the American flag. They were quickly released and an official apology was given, but Admiral Mayo demanded, as well as the severe punishment of the offending Mexican officer, an official salute to the United States flag. On April 11th, an American mail courier was detained at Vera Cruz, and at Mexico City there was an unexplained delay in the delivery of an official despatch of the Department of State. General Huerta refused to be dictated to by Admiral Mayo, and Woodrow Wilson regarded the three incidents as part of an
Huerta-inspired conspiracy against the honour of the United States. At a special address to Congress on April 20th, Wilson emphasised the recalcitrance of Huerta in regard to the Tampico offense:

The incident can not be regarded as a trivial one, especially as two of the men arrested were taken from the boat itself — that is to say, from the territory of the United States — but had it stood by itself it might have been attributed to the ignorance or arrogance of a single officer. Unfortunately, it was not an isolated case. A series of incidents have recently occurred which can not but create the impression that the representatives of General Huerta were willing to go out of their way to show disregard for the dignity and rights of this Government and felt perfectly safe in doing what they pleased, making free to show in many ways their irritation and contempt.

It is interesting that Wilson was so profoundly nationalistic that he was determined to go to great lengths to preserve the honour of the flag, but he could not understand that a smaller nation might feel even more patriotic in a confrontation with a superior power. Both sides were determined to uphold their national honour and the incident threatened to precipitate war between the two countries. Mayo was determined on military action if the salute was not given, but despite the gravity of the situation Wilson continued to say: "... The people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely desire to respect their right. The present situation need have none of the grave implications of interference if we deal with it promptly, firmly and wisely."

Because of his doctrinaire outlook, Wilson believed that any attempt to jeopardise the honour of the United States would entail a retrograde step for the pursuit of liberty in the world:

There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement. We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind.

The fact that the honour of Mexico was also at stake seemed of little concern for Wilson. As far as he was concerned the honour of the United States was of far greater importance because of the righteousness of Manifest Destiny. This line of thought was to highlight the contradictions in Wilson's outlook. While he insisted that all states should be free to see to their own internal problems, he also wanted to ensure that they were guided toward the 'right' way of doing things i.e. the American way.

The United States Cabinet was firmly behind Wilson's decision to uphold Mayo's ultimatum. The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs was particularly supportive on the hard-line policy: William E. Chilton said "I'd make them salute the flag if we had to blow up the whole place" whilst isolationist, William E. Borah warned "If our flag is ever run up in
Mexico it will never come down." Josephus Daniels quotes Borah as saying "This is the beginning of the march of the United States to the Panama Canal." 26

Woodrow Wilson had described himself as an imperialist in 1906, 27 but his idealistic view of imperialism had not given a place to the aggressive appropriation of territory. Many Republican members of the Senate, such as Henry Cabot Lodge and William F. Buckley, also desired intervention but they were considering the protection of American lives and property in Mexico whereas Woodrow Wilson thought of the honour of the American mission.

Josephus Daniels reports a White House conference in April 1914, which included the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. He notes the difference of opinion between the Wilsonian idealists and those whose concern was for such material interests as the Tampico oil wells:

I think some wanted later to annex all the country to Panama to the domain of the United States. John Lind thought a serious show of force was the only thing that would bring Huerta to his senses. Once he advised taking all the sea-coast places on the Gulf. Wilson, Bryan and I wished to get rid of Huerta without war, so that Mexicans, freed from the old feudalism, could work out the destiny of their country with their own chosen leaders. There was agreement that a strong Naval force should guard the eastern coast of Mexico, ready for any emergency . . . 28

Therefore, there was divided opinion about the course to be taken in Mexico, but Wilson and Bryan never questioned their often professed resolve about non-interference in Mexican domestic matters. They could not understand that Mexicans found such statements to be in conflict with the accepted policy of retaining United States vessels in Mexican waters.

Wilson decided to inform Huerta that 6 p.m. April 19, was the deadline for Mexico to carry out Mayo’s instructions: if Huerta did not comply Wilson informed him he would put the matter before Congress on the following day “with a view to taking such action as may be necessary to enforce the respect due to the national flag.” 29

The whole United States attitude reeked of an air of superiority. The honour of the American flag was out of proportion to the gravity of the situation. Once again Wilson accepted plans for the possible use of force whilst insisting that this could never happen. In Congress, on April 20, 1914; approval was voted to “the use of armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such extent as may be necessary to enforce its demands.” 30 But, (according to Daniels) in addressing Congress, Wilson had said “There can be no thought of aggression”, and he reiterated that “the people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way” 31. Finally, despite the elaborate plans and eloquent speeches, Huerta continued to demonstrate his independence, and the salute never eventuated.

Each side felt that the preservation of its honour was of greatest importance, Huerta knew that if he had to bow down before the United States, thus demeaning Mexico’s position, his
chances of attracting a majority of Mexican support for his government would be seriously affected. He knew that if he could survive the affair with the honour of his nation intact, the resultant surge of national feeling could well bolster his position. However, Wilson refused to compromise, despite his often avowed belief in the importance of seeing all sides to a question whilst pursuing toleration and equality amongst neighbours.

When the German vessel Ypiranga, was known to be approaching Veracruz in direct violation of the American-imposed arms embargo, Wilson and Bryan were again able to take refuge behind the politics of morality. Interference was regarded as justifiable when it was intended to defend American righteousness. In Daniel's words, he told the President that "if the munitions reached Huerta it would strengthen his hands, add to the loss of lives in Mexico, and the very arms nearing Mexico might be turned against American soldiers if Huerta's power were increased".

Hence, this was seen as legitimate intervention because of the fear for American and Mexican lives. To Wilson, there seemed to be no conflict between the morally correct stand and his assertions about non-interference in Mexican affairs. Wilson's closest advisers shared this outlook. Indeed, the president seemed to intentionally surround himself with men who followed his own views. It was as if a dissenting opinion would have constituted a threat: a sad indictment on a man who had once said "I love, more deeply than I love anything else, the right of other men to hold opinions different from my own". Daniels and Bryan both believed that if the Mexicans could understand that American intentions were motivated by concern for the Latin American people, they would realise that Woodrow Wilson's decisions were the right ones. Colonel House said "... If Mexico understood that our motives were unselfish, she should not object to our helping adjust her unruly household".

Thus, Wilson gave orders for the United States navy to take the Veracruz customs house. Daniels quotes Private Secretary Joseph Tumulty's discussion with Wilson about the effect such a decision had on the president, who was opposed to war, but who realised the necessity of resorting to war in morally justifiable circumstances. Wilson said "we could not allow that cargo to land. The Huertistas intend to use these guns on our own boys. It is hard to take action of this kind. I have tried my utmost to keep us out of this mess, but we seem to be now on the brink of war, and there is no alternative". Daniels wrote "I knew we were concerned only to help Mexicans escape from the Huerta attempt to perpetuate the Diaz rule of feudalism", therefore emphasising that the Huerta government was regarded as a backward step in Mexico. Such a regression was anathema to the ideals of the progressive movement, and it was the duty of America to reinstate Mexico on the path of progress.

Walter H. Page, the American ambassador in London, and a personal friend of Woodrow Wilson, also believed that Wilson's administration was bringing progress to Mexico. He found that Englishmen with property investments in Mexico were often asking him about the outcome of
their investments in view of the unrest in Mexico. When an English banker who was a director of the Tehuantepec Railway asked Page what advice he should give to his shareholders, Page replied “Tell them... that Mexico is a country where disorder has reigned for about 175 years out of 200, and that you failed to acquaint yourself with the history of the country in which you asked them to invest, and that, thanks to the United States, there is a chance that orderly government of a permanent sort may be set up as soon as possible and revolutions will be discouraged.” The progressive need for morality and social progress inspired many of Wilson's advisers to praise the president's efforts in Latin America.

Wilson, Bryan and Daniels expected that United States intervention in Veracruz could occur without bloodshed, and when Wilson heard of the casualties “He was positively shaken.” But it is most interesting that Wilson's concern was overwhelmingly in favour of the American soldiers who fell during the action. Daniel's memoirs make no mention of the far greater number of Mexicans who were killed and wounded. He reports “The tragedy of the killings weighed heavily on Wilson." The president's attitude toward people of non-Anglo-Saxon backgrounds is relevant in this regard. Wilson saw the deaths of nineteen Americans at Veracruz as a far greater sacrifice than those of the two hundred Mexicans who died while trying to thwart foreign intervention. Wilson remained convinced that the moral ascendancy lay with the United States because of America's special mission to mankind.

The American president received much public criticism from within his country during the Veracruz occupation. Americans were aroused by the loss of United States' lives, and many of those who had called for a firmer stand against Huerta began to receive greater support. Always sensitive to public opinion, Wilson was concerned at the criticism of his “watchful waiting” policy and he expressed this during a speech he made to commemorate those who had fallen at Veracruz:

I never went into battle; I never was under fire; but I fancy that there are some things just as hard to do as to go under fire. I fancy it is just as hard to do your duty when men are sneering at you as when they are shooting at you. When they shoot at you, they can take your natural life; when they sneer at you, they can wound your living heart.

Wilson used his oratory to create public sympathy for his position. He was always in his element when raising issues to lofty heights and he stressed the virtue of the deaths, because these men had died performing their duty, partaking in the American mission:

... we will always see their names shine, not because they called upon us to admire them, but because they served us, without asking any questions and in the performance of a duty which is laid upon us as well as upon them.

To Wilson, there could have been no greater tribute than that these men died in the line of duty. Duty, and especially one's duty to the nation and to righteousness, was one of Wilson's most sacred ideals. Perhaps the underlying tragedy of the Wilsonian philosophy can be seen in
the following words:

We have gone down to Mexico to serve mankind if we can
find out the way. We do not want to fight the Mexicans.
We want to serve the Mexicans if we can.43

Thus, the mission was not intended to serve Mexicans alone, but the Mexican situation would
be used “to serve mankind”. Wilson’s oratory stressed that if sacrifices had to be made, they would
be made in terms of an honourable cause. Americans would endeavour to serve the best interests
of Mexico, but if the Mexicans could not understand this, it might become necessary to use force
in order to help them to understand.

During the United States’ occupation of Veracruz in the summer of 1914, the American
troops undertook many projects in cleaning up the port, improving sanitation, and reducing the
incidence of disease. Such an obsession with cleanliness was alien to the Mexican way of life, and
was another example of the United States forcing its values onto the Latin Americans. The
occupation, instead of enabling the Mexicans to observe how far the Wilson administration was
prepared to go to achieve their liberation, only increased national feeling and hardened resentment
against American interference. Both Villa and Carranza, instead of viewing the situation in the
way Washington had hoped — as a show of good intentions and determination to help the
Constitutionalist cause — were united in their denunciations. Carranza wrote to Wilson to advise
him of the Constitutionalist attitude:

... In the face of this violation of the naval [national] sovereignty, which
the Constitutionalist Government did not expect from a Government
which had reiterated its desire to maintain peace with the Mexican
people, I comply with a duty of elevated patriotism in directing this
note to you, with a view of exhausting all honorable means before
two friendly nations sever the pacific relations that still unite them . . .

The individual acts of Victoriano Huerta will never be sufficient
to involve the Mexican nation in a disastrous war with the United States,
because there is no solidarity whatsoever between the so-called Government
of Victoriano Huerta and the Mexican nation for the fundamental reason
that he is not the legitimate organ of our national sovereignty.
... I interpret the sentiment of the great majority of the Mexican
people which is so jealous of its rights, and respectful of foreign
rights, and invite you solely to suspend the hostile acts already
initiated, ordering your forces to evacuate all places which they hold
in their power in the Port of VeraCruz . . . 44

Villa, who regarded Huerta as the “the usurper” who “tried to divert our attention and
energies into a war with the United States” warned Washington “... If the United States should
attack us, duty would require us to die as good Mexicans; if the United States should invade
Mexico, duty would force us to unite with Huerta and take action together. But, in my opinion,
the United States only wants to teach a lesson to a man who has committed offenses against them,
and perhaps to help us in our war against the same man . . .”45 Villa’s words reveal his view of
Obregón’s stand on United States’ interference: “To declare war on the United States, as Obregón
wishes, is an act of insanity. To threaten them, as Carranza does, if they do not leave Veracruz,
is good as a formula, but bad if we should attempt to carry out the threat." 46

Villa was obviously taking care to leave good pathways of communication open between his camp and Washington. His denunciations were not as strong as the other Constitutionalist leaders, but he was certainly relieved when he wrote to Wilson after the evacuation of Veracruz:

With the greatest of pleasure I receive the report that the American troops now have orders to leave our port of VeraCruz. I offer you, Senor, congratulations in my name and that of the people of Mexico. Your action shows your respect for our dignity as Mexican patriots and we recognize the good attitude of your government toward our country . . . 47

Josephus Daniels noted the ambiguities and the precariousness of the United States' position in Veracruz during the occupation: "The situation at Vera Cruz has no precedent. Heretofore when sailors or marines have taken a city, it was regarded as an act of war, and it was held as a base for military operations. The President has said that we have no intention of waging a war against Mexico . . ." 48 Veracruz was in a unique situation because the government of the occupying army insisted it was in neutral position, that it was acting as a protector of the rights of the people whose lands it had occupied. It is not surprising that the Mexicans found it difficult to understand the whole affair.

During the occupation, an offer of mediation was made by the Washington representatives of the ABC powers. 49 Wilson gave the impression that he welcomed their aid and would value their views, but in reality he was so convinced of the justice of his position as far as Mexico was concerned, that he limited their role to one of finding a satisfactory alternative government to take over from Huerta's regime. 50 Despite this, Daniels said that the help of the ABC powers was welcomed at a time "when unlimited patience was required because of Carranza's lack of appreciation of the inestimable support Wilson had given to enable Mexico to build on better foundations after Huerta's expulsion; when cooperation of some in Mexico was lacking and hostility was felt at home in the difficult situations that were to recur during his whole term of office; and when Congressmen and others and the imperialists in the United States were demanding that we take every foot of territory from the Rio Grande to the Panama Canal . . ." 51

With the resignation of Huerta on July 15, 1914, an end to the occupation was predicted. But new problems arose when a rift developed in the Constitutionalist Army, between the First Chief Carranza, and Villa. Wilson must surely have realised that with this new contest for leadership, his prescription which was supposed to have cured all the ills of the Mexican nation, had not proved to be the ultimate answer. Wilson's mistake was in always seeing a situation in simple and direct terms. He had had no experience of the vagaries of foreign affairs, and because of his progressive philosophy he believed that the development of a nation could be directed. Wilson did not understand the innumerable and conflicting problems which are inherent in any struggle for power. He was not aware that there can be no single and absolutely right action to take, and that there can be little certainty in predicting the outcome of any situation.
The rift between Villa and Carranza brought a new problem, and at first the Washington administration tried to settle the differences between the two leaders. Villa's biographer reports a letter from Secretary of State Bryan:

> It will be an act of patriotism, Sr General Villa, to devote your good intentions to the prevention of a break in the Constitutionalist forces. The cause of a people must not be crippled by personal jealousies, rivalries, and quarrels. You have won the battles of the war. Do not darken the triumph. Now that Victoriano Huerta is gone, the changes in your country must be made without further suffering. Be assured, Sr General, that Mexico's future is a glorious one, and desiring this, Pres. Wilson is anxious that there be no delay in realizing the reforms for justice and the welfare of the people. Since you, Sr General, are responsible for the victories, our President trusts that you will work to maintain utmost harmony among all the Revolutionary armies.

However, Carranza's forces proved stronger than those of Villa, particularly so when Obregon united with Carranza against Villa. Because of the stronger position of the Carrancistas in the Veracruz area, United States evacuation forces had to concede the port to the First Chief. Evacuation was completed in November and the city became Carranza's new headquarters for his struggle against Villa and Emiliano Zapata. Wilson's simple remedy had failed, Huerta had been removed but there was to be no peaceful democratic government in Mexico. The position was far more complex than the United States president had envisaged. The paternalistic treatment of Mexico was doomed to failure because the Mexican people were fiercely independent, and an awareness of the superior attitude of the United States only hardened their resolve against dictatorial treatment from the great northern power.

Civil war was to continue for three years after Huerta's abdication. The Revolutionary Convention which was intended, in October 1914, to secure the Constitutionalist government in power, turned into a struggle for superiority between the forces of Carranza and Obregon on one side, and Villa and Zapata on the other.

The continuing struggle brought more and more criticism for the Wilson administration, and in January 1915, Henry Cabot Lodge spoke for the interventionist lobby. He accused the government of being inept and misguided in its attitude to Mexico. Lodge said that it would have been proper for the United States to refuse recognition of Huerta's regime on grounds of an inability to maintain international relations, because it lacked the backing of large areas of Mexico, or because of an inability to secure overseas loans, but Lodge disapproved of the grounds on which the regime was denounced:

> ... The ground on which recognition of Huerta was refused was what was called a moral ground; that he was a man of bad character, who had reached the highest position in Mexico by treacherous and murderous methods. I think it highly probable that such were his methods. That is the way supreme power has generally been acquired in Mexico ...

The President, who disapproved of his [Huerta's] methods ... added
to his feelings a personal resentment because General Huerta had not obeyed the President's demand for his abdication. The President is a man accustomed to obedience, and I can quite understand that he should feel a natural resentment at General Huerta's seeming indifference to his request.

But Mr President, an animosity is not a policy. The policy of the United States in regard to Mexico, speaking from the international point of view, was to secure as soon as possible the pacification of the country, the reestablishment of order...

... look at Mexico today. It is a chaos of fighting factions, the prey of banditi... The social organisation has collapsed, and anarchy is a polite word to apply to the condition of things.

Mr President, I fear that it is now too late to adopt any policy which would be effective there except a complete military occupation of the country at great cost...

Cabot Lodge was particularly concerned for the security of the United States' property in Mexico, and he denounced Wilson's attitude toward the business interests:

... I was informed by gentlemen with property interests in Mexico, who came here representing many Americans employed and large American capital invested, that they were told substantially at the State Department, 'We are not concerned about American property in Mexico; Americans who invest in property in foreign countries must not look to this Government to protect them.' That was a new doctrine in international law to me ... I cling to the old notion that American property on the high seas and in foreign countries, when the owners of that property live in accordance with the laws of the countries in which the property is placed, is entitled to our regard and to the active protection of this Government...

As the chaos in Mexico continued, the Wilson administration placed its hopes in Pancho Villa. As Arthur S. Link has noted, Villa was clever enough to present arguments which he knew would appeal to Woodrow Wilson. Carranza's leadership did not inspire enthusiasm in Washington because the First Chief had made it clear that he was determined to pursue a policy in Mexico which would be independent of United States' interests. In comparison, Villa reported favourable communications from Wilson and Bryan. His memoirs mention a letter from Washington in which the Americans informed him that the behaviour of the Mexican revolutionaries would determine their eventual recognition. Wilson and Bryan advised protection of foreign citizens in Mexico, payment of debts contracted by Huerta's government, merciful treatment of military and political enemies, and respect for the Roman Catholic church. The alleged letter concludes "We say then, Sr General Villa, that all that you propose to do and all that your associates propose to do will succeed or fail according to your attitude toward these questions. Do nothing in the spirit of anger and proceed with deliberation. Be careful to do nothing that can prevent the recognition of your government of ours, which never recognised the government of Huerta because it did not deserve recognition. As friends, it is our duty to state these things clearly and firmly. In the same spirit, Sr General, we sent you other messages motivated by our sympathy and also our responsibility to Mexico, ourselves, and the world around us."
Villa encouraged Wilson's approval and he noted with satisfaction Wilson's message to the commanding officer after the evacuation of Veracruz: "Senor, carry out the evacuation without implying recognition of Venustiano Carranza or any other chief". Villa believed that this determination not to recognise Carranza, despite the fact that he was the leader of the army which was taking control of Veracruz, implied that Wilson looked to Villa to form the future government of Mexico. John Lind saw Villa as the future leader of Mexico, and in December 1913, he wrote of the revolutionists in the north: "In Villa they have an intrepid and resourceful general. He is the highest type of physical, moral and mental efficiency that the conditions and the environment could be reasonably expected to produce". Lind saw Villa as the focus of American hopes in Mexico, whereas he dismissed Carranza as "set in his views almost to the point of pigheadedness". Villa was careful to encourage the Americans into believing that he would honour the position of the United States as the leading nation in the western hemisphere.

Despite the agreement between Villa and Washington, one example of the communications between the two reveals, besides the vicissitudes of Villa's character, the great gulf between the ideological attitudes of the two nationalities. Villa reported a letter from Bryan and Wilson regretting the number of executions performed by the revolutionaries:

Senores, we are disappointed in these deeds. Do not kill political prisoners; exile them from your territory in order to keep them harmless. We urge this in no tone of censure, for these are acts not definitely understood at this great distance, but with the desire to give you our counsel, advising you that if you respect the lives of political prisoners, you will win the good will of the great civilized nations, a thing of advantage to your government in avoiding obstacles in the future settlement of international affairs.

Villa found it impossible to understand this attitude. He wrote "Mr Bryan and Mr Wilson were warning us, and, thinking over their words, I said to myself, 'Senor, I do not know what such struggles may have been like in other times and countries but here in Mexico politicians must lose their lives for the people.' " Villa also saw the situation in simple terms but he had no experience of a philosophy such as Wilson's. To Villa, the simple answer was that in times of struggle, some people would inevitably, die.

Despite the obvious inadequacy of his programme in Mexico, such difficult situations made Wilson more determined, and even more than before he seemed able to convince himself that he was not interfering in Mexican internal affairs. He continued to make the speeches which emphasised the liberal and moral perspective of his administration. His oratory became even more persuasive and filled with ideals of morality and humanitarianism.

As Carranza's strength grew, and it became obvious that Washington had made an error in supporting Villa, two more special agents (John R. Silliman and Duval West), were sent by the State Department to attempt to come to terms with Carranza and to report on Mexico's problems. But the position in Mexico City worsened, and American business interests increased
their demands for United States' intervention. The city was in a state of siege as the forces of Villa and Zapata contested with Carranza and Obregón. Great fears were held for the safety of American citizens and property in the area.

Woodrow Wilson continued to turn a deaf ear on the appeals for intervention and the New York Times, January 9, 1915 reports his Jackson Day speech:

Now there is one thing I have got a great enthusiasm about, I might almost say a reckless enthusiasm, and that is human liberty . . . I hold it as a fundamental principle, and so do you, that every people has the right to determine its own form of government, and until this recent revolution in Mexico, until the end of the Diaz regime, 80 per cent of the people of Mexico never had a 'look-in' in determining who should be their Governors, or what their Government should be. Now, I am for the 80 per cent. It is none of my business, and it is none of your business how long they take in determining it . . . The country is theirs. The Government is theirs. The liberty, if they can get it, and God speed them in getting it, is theirs. And so far as my influence goes, While I am President nobody shall interfere with them.  

However, Wilson's policy of non-interference could remain in force only as long as events proceeded in the direction he desired. Mexico was to be allowed to solve her own affairs in her own way, but only as long as the direction she took was that of which Wilson approved. Whenever it became obvious that Mexico was veering away from the ideals he held dear, Wilson found it necessary to help to steer the country back to what he so fervently believed to be the right course. Because war was not actually invoked, the American president could continue to delude himself that his administration was not interfering in Mexico.

In March 1915, Washington sent communications to Villa and Carranza complaining about the chaos in Mexico. Villa noted a warning in the wording: "... the injuries must cease, and you will understand that if the governments of Mexico do not correct them the American government will do so by means of military action". 63 Such a message constituted a direct threat to Mexico, as did the message to Carranza concerning the blockading of the port of Progreso: a blockade which had a serious effect on American economic life. On March 13, a telegram from Bryan was sent to Special Agent Silliman in Mexico:

You will please call upon General Carranza and present a request that he recall his order blockading the port of Progreso. If the request, respectfully and earnestly presented, is not sufficient to induce him to recall the order, you may say to him that in case the order is not recalled, the President will feel constrained to instruct our naval affairs at Progreso to prevent any interference with our commerce to and from the port". 64

And to Silliman, himself, Bryan requested that the United States' agent conduct negotiations with tact and with assurances that the United States has "no wish or intention to interfere with the internal affairs of Mexico". However, Bryan also added "You may, upon your own initiative and not as if under direction from us, remind him that when Huerta attempted to blockade
Tampico this Government informed Huerta that it could not allow the interruption of commerce at Tampico." Carranza's reply, via Silliman, stated "that in his opinion a request from the British Government to the American Government during our Civil War to discontinue its blockading of New Orleans because British manufacturers needed the cotton would be an appropriate comparison." However, this subtle reply was lost on Wilson who continued to see only the American side of the problem.

Villa asserted that it was Carranza and Obregón who were to blame for the situation in Mexico City. He insisted that these leaders were trying to ruin commerce and starve the citizens. Arthur S. Link regards Villa as a bloodthirsty leader who was concerned only with his own ambitions. By comparison, Pancho's memoirs depict Carranza as plotting against Villa, while the latter insists that he tried to keep the peace with the other revolutionary leaders for the good of Mexico.

With worsening conditions in Mexico, Wilson's plan was to attempt to use United States' influence to force conciliation between the revolutionary leaders. Peace, and the establishment of a steady government, were regarded as of paramount importance. In June 1915 Wilson warned that if such unity was not found shortly "this Government will be constrained to decide what means should be employed by the United States in order to help Mexico to save herself and her people." Later in the same month Wilson turned to the idea of recognising Carranza. But he informed Lansing that Carranza "need not expect us to consider that course seriously unless he went the full length of conciliation and conference with all factions with a view to the accomodation upon which the opinion of the whole world now insists."

However, Carranza replied that he would not attempt conciliation with Villa, and his attitude, reported by John Silliman, once again emphasises the ideological differences between Woodrow Wilson's brand of liberalism and the Latin American cultural heritage. Silliman noted that Carranza found it difficult to understand the United States' need for such conciliation "since any revolutionary Government established upon such theories would inevitably and necessarily soon be found to be disappointing, ineffective and fruitless."

Perhaps the special agent's report, with its regard to the needs of revolutionary government, had an effect on Wilson, because soon after the commencement of the Pan American Conference in August 1915 (a conference which spoke of the removal of Carranza and the formation of a coalition government in Mexico), Wilson seemed to pay more than mere lip-service to the necessity for Mexico to solve her own domestic problems. Whereas formerly he had given the impression that the establishment of constitutional government was the immediate answer, in August 1915 he seemed to give greater thought to the aims of the revolution itself:

... the first and most essential step in settling affairs of Mexico is not to call general elections. It seems to me necessary that a provisional government essentially revolutionary in character should take action to institute reforms by decree before the full forms of the constitution are resumed. This was the original program
of the revolution and seems to me probably an essential part of it.\textsuperscript{73}

Such an attitude (as Arthur S. Link points out), represents a change in emphasis on
Wilson's part.\textsuperscript{74} Perhaps, with the European war situation, Wilson felt it necessary for the
United States to withdraw a little from Mexico, to avoid the threat of hostilities with a neighbour;
or maybe the attitude of the Pan American conference made him aware of the unrealistic nature
of interference in the domestic affairs of another nation. For a time it seemed that Wilson might
have become aware of his mistakes in Mexico: he wrote 'Carranza will somehow have to be
digested into the scheme and, above all, the object of the revolution will have to be in any event
conserved.'\textsuperscript{75}

Carranza made his position quite clear in his reply to the recommendations of the
conference:

Under no consideration would I permit interference in the internal
affairs of Mexico, as no nation has the right to interfere in the
internal affairs of any country . . . Any doing so must expect to
meet resistance, which naturally could not be overcome except by
overwhelming force.\textsuperscript{76}

Pressure from Lansing, who made the delegates aware of Wilson's change of heart, brought
the following recommendations from the conference: "The conference, after careful consideration
of the facts, have found that the Carranza party is the only party possessing the essentials for
recognition as the de facto government of Mexico, and they have so reported to their respective
Governments."\textsuperscript{77} Recognition of the de facto regime of Carranza was granted on October 19,
1915.

Arthur S. Link writes "The recognition of Carranza signified that the leaders in Washington
had finally admitted the futility of their own hopes and plans to lead the Mexican people into
the paths of peace and self-government."\textsuperscript{78} But was Wilson's seemingly enlightened attitude
really motivated by an understanding of his errors? Did he learn from the mistakes of Mexico,
or was his new attitude one of expediency because of the complex European situation?
Another possibility is that the forthcoming presidential elections presented a need for his
administration to quieten its critics by showing that it was finally making progress in the Mexican
relationship. Certainly the subsequent errors of judgement in the European peace settlement
would imply that Wilson had learnt little from the affair. His recommendations for the
reorganisation of European frontiers and his unflinching faith in the ideals of the League of
Nations showed that he continued to believe that the United States could lead other peoples
towards world peace and democracy.

The recognition of Carranza, and the subsequent removal of the ban on arms shipments to
the regime, brought reprisals from Villa. Raids on American citizens and property brought an
outcry from the United States public, an anger which was heightened by the enmity of American
Roman Catholics at their government's recognition of a regime which was hostile to the position
of the Catholic Church in Mexico. Therefore, with the object of capturing Villa, United States'
48

troops under General John Pershing were stationed on the Mexican border.

Carranza did not give formal permission for Pershing's troops to pursue bandits across the Mexican border.79 Both he and Wilson were hoping to maintain a good relationship between the two countries, Wilson and his advisers being especially careful to emphasise the caution under which United States troops must work:

Care is to be taken to have in a state of readiness at all times the means of rapid communication from the front to the headquarters of the General commanding the Department, and, through him, to the War Department in Washington; and any evidence of misunderstanding on the part of officials, military or civil, of the de facto Government of Mexico as to the objects, purposes, character or acts of the expedition of the United States, are to be reported to the Department with the utmost expedition, with a view to having them take up directly with the Government of Mexico through the Department of State.80

Thus, at this stage Wilson's paramount aim was for complete cooperation with Carranza. He was aware of Carranza's hostility toward anything which could be regarded as an attack on the sovereignty of Mexico. Wilson realised that Pershing's position would be difficult to control and in April 1916, an increase in the number of incidents involving Mexican citizens and American troops eventually moved Carranza to insist on United States withdrawal. The interference of Pershing's troops increased Mexican nationalistic fervour and further aroused anti-American reactions in northern Mexico. In a letter from Carranza to Arrendondo telling him to inform the American Secretary of State that American troops had acted illegally in entering Parral, Carranza wrote: "Impress the Secretary of State with the impossibility of any longer keeping American forces in our territory, since there may be even more serious results therefrom that the present one, which we should prevent at all hazards. Present such reasons as you may deem expedient to bring to an end the situation created by the presence of forces in our territory."81

In June, the Carrizal incident, in which United States prisoners were taken by Mexicans, seemed to provide the flashpoint which could bring the two nations to war. Wilson's speech to Congress hinted at the possibility of force; "the de facto government will neither use its own forces in any effectual way to protect the people of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona nor permit us to take the steps absolutely necessary to protect them... An end must be put to an intolerable situation, and we are left to put an end to it alone."82

The release of the prisoners considerably eased the situation, and once again Wilson explained his attitude in terms of the American mission. He insisted that America "should be ready in every point of policy and of action to vindicate at whatever cost the principles of liberty, of justice, and of humanity to which we have been devoted from the first... you have not only got to be just to your fellow men, but as a nation you have got to be just to other nations."83 The principles which Wilson had always preached would continue to be the basis of oratory, but in these words he seems to have recognised Mexico as another nation, the
sovereignty of which must not be violated. Whereas in the past, especially in the case of Huerta, the principles of liberty and justice knew no boundaries, and Latin America was seen as an extension of humanity in general, Mexico was now referred to as a nation in its own right. Perhaps Wilson was beginning to understand that nationalistic tendencies were genuine and strong, and must be respected. In the past he had always believed that patriotic sentiments must be esteemed where the patriotism was that of the United States, but he had paid little attention to such needs of other nations.

The difficulties between the two countries reached stalemate position with the formation of a Joint High Commission in September 1916. Attempts at conciliation threatened to be thwarted because the United States delegation insisted that internal chaos in Mexico must be resolved before the withdrawal of border troops, whilst Mexico made the condition that the withdrawal take place before discussion on any other aspect of the situation could begin. Woodrow Wilson, well aware of the impending American presidential campaign, was particularly careful to take no action which could jeopardise his position. The American Roman Catholic lobby presented problems, as because Wilson could not take a hard line with Carranza, they were committed to ensuring that he was not returned to power.

After the successful election, Wilson was again free to turn his attention to the Mexican problem. Continuing internal disorder and frequent border raids could no longer be ignored. Special Agent Franklin K. Lane conveyed a warning to Carranza:

I must inform you, in all solemnity, that the President's patience is at an end, and that he regards present conditions in Mexico as intolerable. . . . We do not wish to do anything that will either hurt your pride or diminish your sovereignty. We have no designs on the integrity of your territory or your freedom of action in the determination of your national policy, but we are deeply and vitally interested in the fulfilment of your obligations to protect the lives and property of foreigners who have cast their lot with you. . . . If, however, you have reached the conclusion that you do not desire the cooperation of the United States, if you feel that you want to cut yourselves off completely, it is well for us to know this as soon as possible, as it will vitally affect our policy with reference to Mexico.84

There is a certain peevish tone in this message, which indicates that Wilson's patience had worn thin. However, the fear of war with Germany made it absolutely essential for the United States to avoid a confrontation with her southern neighbour, and as a result, arrangements were made to begin the withdrawal of Pershing's troops. Several months later the affair of the Zimmerman note showed that Mexico had been indulging in negotiations with Germany. The degree of threat presented by this document is uncertain, but the United States could not afford to take a German/Mexican threat lightly.
Of particular economic concern to the United States was the Carranza administration's attitude to American business interests in Mexico. Decrees that the Bank of Mexico redeem its own bills in Mexican silver had an adverse effect on American business interests. Lansing noted that banks suffer during revolutionary conditions and warned "... If drastic action is to be employed against banks, without allowing ample time to recover their equilibrium, this Government fears that chaos will result in Mexico; that the good will of the foreign governments whose subjects are interested will, in a great measure, be alienated, and that the doors of financial institutions the world over will be closed to all propositions emanating from Mexico: thus making the rehabilitation of that country one of extreme difficulty, if not altogether impossible." 85

During the same month similar pressure was applied to American mining interests in Mexico. The Carranza government issued a decree stating that all mining taxes in arrears must be paid within one month from January 1916, "it being understood that after the expiration of such time, the titles to all mining property on which the taxes have not been paid, will be forfeited." 86

The openly nationalistic orientation of Carranza's regime was evident in the new Mexican constitution. The United States business interests were opposed to any suggestions for according full diplomatic relations to Mexico because of the anti-American stance of the constitution. The new government took only the steps which should have been expected when ensuring its sovereignty. Mexico had long been exploited by foreign businessmen, and now new safeguards would make certain that Mexican resources were used for the benefit of Mexican people. Article 27 stated that land ownership did not carry an automatic right to the mineral resources of that land. Such resources were to become the property of the state, to be mined only with special permission. In future only Mexicans were to be allowed to acquire land or to be able to obtain mineral concessions. Although aliens would be allowed similar privileges if they undertook not to seek diplomatic protection from their own countries, lands in border or coastal areas were not to be made available to people of foreign nationalities. 87 Such laws were perfectly understandable in view of the problems Mexicans had encountered from foreign investors who had for so many years demanded a say in Mexican matters.

Wilson had long emphasised his lack of sympathy for foreign investors. In June 1916 he again had dismissed the clamour of businessmen for intervention in Mexico:

... I have constantly to remind myself that I am not the servant of those who wish to enhance the value of their Mexican investments, that I am the servant of the rank and file of the people of the United States. 88

American property-holders denounced Woodrow Wilson's administration because they knew that it gave little importance to the protection of property belonging to United States citizens in foreign lands. Those who demanded intervention in Mexico (e.g. Senators B. Fall, William F. Buckley and Henry Cabot Lodge), heightened their attempt to sway American public opinion after the decrees of the new constitution. During Wilson's period of illness in late 1919, they renewed their efforts to try to engineer the downfall of Carranza. An article by Clifford W.
Trow in the *Journal of American History*, describes the Senate Subcommittee on Mexican Affairs as often serving those vested interests which demanded intervention. Many of the members had been calling for United States military intervention since the Veracruz affair.

Trow points out that Fall had appealed to the American public in 1916, accusing Wilson of allowing disorder in Mexico, in an attempt to prevent Wilson's re-election. He notes that, in 1919, there was a close relationship between Fall and the Association of Oil Producers in Mexico, a body which was committed to Carranza's downfall in order to protect their properties. Trow states that Robert Lansing, Frank Polk and Henry P. Fletcher (the ambassador to Mexico) were sympathetic towards the problems of the business interests and felt Woodrow Wilson should take a stronger line against Carranza. Wilson continued to ignore the appeals of the oil interests and to regard them as motivated by self-interest, whereas his own concern was for the people of Mexico.

A desperate move was the engineered kidnapping of American Consular Agent Jenkins, aimed at arousing United States' public opinion against Carranza and so forcing Wilson's hand. The Mexican authorities arrested Jenkins because of his part in the plot, and in the subsequent outcry Senator Fall insisted that diplomatic relations with Mexico should be severed. However, Wilson refused to be pressured. He reiterated his conviction that foreign affairs were the special preserve of the president:

> ... I am convinced that I am supported by every competent constitutional authority in the statement that the initiative in directing the relations of our Government with foreign Governments is assigned by the Constitution to the Executive, and to the Executive only.

Thus, Wilson was adamant that he would not cooperate with the Republican-dominated Senate. The Senate Sub-Committee had managed to gain the sympathy of the State Department, but it reckoned without Wilson's recovery from illness and his determination to keep to a policy which he regarded as morally right. Despite Lansing's appeals for a firmer line with Carranza, Wilson remained resolute, and indeed Lansing's sympathy for the interests was to be his undoing: his resignation was accepted in February 1920. Woodrow Wilson could not tolerate a man who did not agree with his conception of the American mission to occupy such a high position in his cabinet.

Wilson refused to go to war with Mexico despite the heavy pressures from within his country. He insisted that ordinary American people, with whom God's will was identified, were always opposed to Mexican intervention. The most that can be said for Wilson's Mexican policy was that it avoided an actual confrontation. In spite of this, Mexican-American relations were placed under great strain as the Mexican people became deeply resentful of the paternalistic attitude of their northern neighbour.

The president's prescription for the establishment of moral government had proved impracticable. Wilson did not seem to understand that his plans for a democratic government
would necessarily entail a degree of anti-Americanism. A constitutionally-elected leader could not avoid being drawn into a nationalistic position in Mexico. The country had suffered much humiliation at the hands of her powerful neighbour, and a strong need to assert independence had developed. The interference of the United States business interests and the American paternalistic outlook were contradictory to the proud spirit of an emerging nation. America could aim only to maintain good relations with such a government, and this could not be achieved while a fiercely moralistic president insisted that his view of the perfect society was the only possible hope for Latin America. Wilson did not seem to understand that a smaller nation, in particular, must feel free to assert itself and cannot survive when it is made to regard itself as a second-rate country. Mexican leaders such as Carranza and Villa, had no experience of Wilson’s Anglo-Saxon, Puritan background and were therefore unable to understand the president’s intentions. Latin American ways of deciding leadership were quite different from the democratic tradition of the United States.

Many Americans tend to feel that their political system is the ideal for all peoples, and Woodrow Wilson was one of the foremost exponents of this view. Such people feel uneasy about Latin America and are drawn by a need to change the Latin American way of life. Wilson had often said that the American political system was the result of the years of growth and maturity of the Anglo-Saxon race. He firmly believed that all countries must aim for this ideal, but in his earlier years he had seen preparation for democracy as a developing process, not as something which could be suddenly thrust onto a society. Wilson once said that government “is an institute of habit, bound together by innumerable threads of association, scarcely one of which has been deliberately placed.”91 But this view seemed to be forgotten in his determination to get results in Mexico. His admiration for Edmund Burke’s words “All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter...”92 was no longer evident. The Mexican people had to be taught to “elect good men” and it was imperative that they learn the lesson quickly.

Thus, despite Wilson’s seeming avowal of compromise and consensus, he refused to listen to the advice of others and was interested only in the Anglo-Saxon version of freedom. He was greatly limited because he could not understand that there is no definite form into which a nation must fit, no one ideal society toward which all must aspire. He could not see that each culture has its own dignity and that this must be acknowledged in order to achieve cooperation.

The Mexican people came to see Wilson as a hypocrite, and this is not surprising when we consider his innumerable speeches promising that Latin America, alone, should be responsible for her domestic problems. Wilson’s lack of understanding of foreign affairs, coupled with the often conflicting divisions between foreign and domestic relations, were to lead him into difficulties.
Wilson used the non-recognition policy to attempt to make Latin American regimes conform to the United States' ideal. He applied his Anglo-Saxon test to regimes which had achieved power through non-democratic means. Despite this, he continued to insist that the United States was not interfering in Mexican affairs, and encased himself in a shell of moral protection by declaring his sympathy for the neglected eighty per cent of Mexican people who were entitled to a say in the running of their country. He no longer considered that these people may not have reached the necessary stage of maturity upon which his liberal idea of progress had formerly insisted.

The American president had often spoken of his belief in progress, but in his dealings with Mexico he made no secret of his dislike of revolution. Here again we see contradictions, as revealed in his words of 1915. At times Wilson really did seem to want Mexico to solve her own problems, but he could not allow this to happen if such a course of action ran counter to the best interests of the United States. A policy which does not allow revolution must also be one which protects the status quo, and in preserving the status quo there can be little opportunity for the democratic advances which Wilson had long regarded as essential for world progress. Wilson's problem was that whereas he wanted liberty for Mexico, he also insisted on stability and order, and he could not understand that these can often be irreconcilable beliefs.

In the past, when Wilson had applauded the United States' emergence as an imperialistic power, he had regarded the British Empire with admiration. But he had also spoken of learning from Britain's mistakes:

> We cannot afford to repeat that fruitless experiment, the experiment of paternalism against which our whole political history has been a brilliant and successful protest.

But when the opportunity came for him to put his words into practice he repeated the old mistakes and fell into the same traps. In many ways he compounded the errors of Britain because of the doctrinaire nature of his religious and moral attitude.

This president saw foreign affairs in the simplistic terms of 'right' and 'wrong': something which impeded his policies. Words he had once used to criticise other Americans came, sadly, to be especially applicable to his own experiment in foreign affairs:

> . . . Absorbed in our own development, we had fallen into a singular ignorance of the rest of the world . . . And so we have looked upon nothing but our own ways of living, and have been formed in isolation . . . We have, like provincials, too habitually confined our view to the range of our own experiences . . .

His lack of experience in dealing with foreign affairs, and a belief in the virtue of a world-wide adoption of American values gave him both a false self-confidence and an air of pretentiousness toward other nations.
WOODROW WILSON AND HAITI

The next two chapters will investigate Woodrow Wilson's policies in both a Central American state and a Caribbean island, in order to determine whether there was a great divergence between the Wilson administration's attitude toward the smaller nations as compared with that shown to Mexico.

All three countries presented problems in the early months of Wilson's presidency. The Mexican situation was an inherited difficulty which demanded a decision concerning recognition, whilst Nicaragua was a more obvious legacy of the Taft 'dollar diplomacy', in which a pro-United States government with minority support was being maintained by American finance. Mexico could not be ignored because of her size, the extensive United States' economic interests in the country, and her strategic potential as a powerful neighbour sharing a common border with the United States. Nicaragua also was of strategic importance because of the possibility of an isthmian canal, and because a strong British interest in this state was a threat to United States hegemony in Central America. The country was almost bankrupt and, if a conservative, American-orientated government was to be retained, some urgent thought had to be given to financial reform. Haiti, however, was the more interesting case because it cannot be said that Wilson's administration was thrust into precipitate decision-making. The island was of minor interest economically; American investment in Haiti in 1913 being only four million dollars compared with $800 million in Mexico.1

Haiti had a long history of political and economic instability: something which was abhorrent to Woodrow Wilson's Calvinist background. But the fact that it was the only Latin American state which could be described as a 'black man's nation' was most important. The vast majority of the population were descendents of African slaves who, after a successful revolt against their French masters, had been independent for over one hundred years. The large plantations had been divided into small lots during the nineteenth century and the majority of the population were involved in peasant farming, whilst a small, French-educated mulatto elite looked to the government, and to commerce, to maintain their standard of living. Despite independence, racism still existed in Haiti, with the lighter-skinned classes regarding themselves as definitely superior to their black neighbours. One important legacy of independence was that, unlike most Latin American states, foreigners were not allowed to own Haitian land. As sons of former slaves, the islanders were extremely wary of any intrusion on their independence. Haiti was the first of the southern republics to gain independence but, because of the slavery background, her status was not recognised by the United States for almost sixty years. When recognition did come it was during the American Civil War, and was a result of the northern states' ascendancy over southern opinion.2

During the nineteenth century France continued to dominate the economic life of Haiti. Until the reorganisation in 1911 which gave the United States and Germany an interest, France
had owned and controlled the Haitian National Bank, and during the First World War the island remained heavily indebted to its former mother country. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany merchants and financiers had made steady encroachments. It was not unusual for Germans to marry natives and therefore to gain control of land in Haiti.\(^3\)

The United States had come to regard Germany as its chief opponent in the race for power in the Caribbean, and alarm was felt in Washington when, in 1914, Roger L. Farnham, vice-president of the Haitian National Bank, estimated that ninety per cent of Haitian economic life was controlled by Germans.\(^4\) This alarm was strengthened by reports that German merchants and bankers played an important part in financing the frequent Haitian revolutionary movements which resulted in a continually changing government leadership.\(^5\)

The strong European link was regarded as a particular threat to the United States, especially as Haiti was economically unstable, and thus the possibility of European intervention to recover debts was always present. The threat of European dominance in the Caribbean had long been of concern to American presidents. Employing his 'big stick' approach, Theodore Roosevelt had considered intervention to supervise the stability of Haiti:

> Now in Haiti what we need is something that will show our people that this Government, in the name of humanity, morality, and civilisation, ought to exercise some kind of supervision over the island; but this should be done as a part of our general scheme of dealing with the countries around the Caribbean . . . I would have interfered . . . in Haiti already, simply in the interest of civilisation, if I could have waked up our people so that they would back a reasonable and intelligent foreign policy which should put a stop to crying disorders at our very doors. Such a policy would be a little in our own interest, but much more in the interest of the peoples in whose affairs we interfered.\(^6\)

Roosevelt's attitude toward the Haitians was from the standpoint of a superior civilisation which had a duty to promote order. Such an outlook was to continue under the Taft and Wilson administrations, with Taft emphasising economic interdependence and Wilson placing more stress on America's mission in the New World.

The Haitian bank reorganisation in 1911 was a result of Taft's dollar diplomacy. It was believed that the European threat could be removed if United States' investments replaced those of Germany and France. Thus, in the future, any intervention to recover debts would come only from America. Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, was particularly concerned at the threat to the Panama Canal presented by Haitian instability, and in 1912 he informed the islanders in a speech at Port au Prince:

> At a time when the obligation which my country has assumed as the agent of the interest of all America and of the world in creating a highway for international commerce is about to be realised, we are impressed with the conviction that the
fullest success of our work is, to a notable degree, dependent on the peace and stability of our neighbors and on their enjoying the prosperity and material welfare which flow from orderly self-government. A community liable to be torn by internal dissension or checked in its progress by the consequences of non-fulfilment of international obligations is not in a good position to deserve and reap the benefits accruing from enlarged commercial opportunities, such as are certain to come about with the opening of the canal. It may indeed become an obstruction to the general enjoyment of those opportunities.

Taft and Knox believed that dollar diplomacy would provide the necessary financial aid to stabilize political conditions, thus raising the standard of living and encouraging public support of governments. They believed economic interdependence between the United States and Latin America would eventually remove the fear of European intervention. To the Taft administration, this would represent progress in the Caribbean. Wilson and Bryan denounced dollar diplomacy as a blatantly imperialistic policy which worked to the advantage of American investors whilst exploiting defenceless nations, but, contrary to their idealised image of America's purpose in the world, they did much more than the two former administrations to stress the military and economic role of the United States in foreign policy.

Despite its frequent assertions that the days of dollar diplomacy were over, the Wilson administration continued to see its duty in the Caribbean in much the same light as its predecessors. William Jennings Bryan may have hoped for United States' government aid in the Caribbean, but he had to admit that private American investment was much more favourable than the European business presence.

The commencement of the First World War gave Washington an additional security problem. The fears of German and French intervention in Haiti seem groundless when we consider the involvement of these two nations in the European war. However, Washington was studying the situation from the viewpoint of her own security, and there were real fears of a victorious Germany gaining a foothold in the Caribbean: perhaps by the acquisition of the Haitian port, Mole St Nicolas. Arthur S. Link believes that neither Wilson nor Robert Lansing were particularly concerned about the threat of military intervention by European powers because none of the correspondence of the time reflects such a fear. Link says "Such fears did not exist for the obvious reason that France and Germany, the only two European powers with any important interests in Haiti, were not in any position in 1915 to send a military expedition to the New World even had they been prepared thus to antagonize the American government and people". But a study of the correspondence of the time does reveal that Wilson and Bryan felt great concern at the European threat as far as the prospect of France or Germany gaining a base in the Caribbean was concerned.

Fear of a German threat led Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan to reopen negotiations for control of the Mole St Nicolas, a deep water harbour which had interested the
United States as a possible naval base before the establishment of Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The United States no longer needed a base in Haiti, but Washington was particularly concerned that Germany should not gain a foothold there. In June 1913, Bryan wrote to Wilson “I have been looking at the charts and find that the Mole St Nicolas, which we discussed, is a very desirable harbor . . . I am satisfied that it will be of great value to us and even if it were not valuable to us it is worthwhile to take it out of the market so that no other nation will attempt to secure a foothold there . . .”

Bryan then proceeded to suggest a plan whereby the United States should negotiate for the control of a twenty-mile strip of land surrounding the harbour. Wilson did not reply immediately to Bryan’s suggestions, but after a prompting letter from the Secretary of State, Wilson replied that he agreed with Bryan’s plans:

I fully concur in the three suggestions you make: first, that the size of the concession that we should ask should be a strip of land twenty miles wide, measured from the center of the mouth of the harbor, the strip to run back to a point ten miles beyond the eastern limit of the harbor; second, that we assure the Haitian government that those desiring to remain on this strip should become American citizens and that those not desiring to remain upon the strip could sell their property to this government at its market value.

It was fear for United States’ security, as much as imperialistic ambitions, which led Wilson’s administration into greater intervention in Haiti than was envisaged by previous American presidents. In both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, armed intervention was introduced to impose United States’ control of finances and to reorganise the islands’ administrations. The United States supported a puppet-president in Haiti in order to provide a semblance of continuing constitutional government, but in reality the United States’ forces were in control. Great care was taken to stress the American moral duty to give aid to small countries which were unable to maintain order and economic stability. The United States needed to convince herself that her intervention would benefit Latin American nations. At first Wilson and Bryan stressed the need for constitutional government “because in no other way [could] our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty.”

Despite his frequent assertions of every nation’s right to self-determination and liberty, Woodrow Wilson also believed in the importance of United States’ security and the sanctity of the Monroe Doctrine, and if these ideals were to come into conflict, it was security, in the guise of America’s mission, which would be given paramount attention. Wilson was always able to justify the United States’ actions in terms of helping backward peoples in the progress toward a better society; but in so doing the society concerned was made to feel inferior, and (as has been noted in Mexico), its relationship with the United States deteriorated.
At the time of Wilson's first election to the presidency, the Haitian government had reason for grievances against the United States. The reorganisation of the national bank had stipulated that foreign debts must be serviced before any money was passed to the government for administrative purposes. As there was often very little surplus available after servicing the debts, the governments were frequently weakened because of lack of finance. Haitians also felt grievances about the handling of the construction of their railroads. After several ill-fated ventures in the nineteenth century, an American company obtained the railroad concession in 1910, but by 1914 only three unconnected segments had been constructed and the company was demanding higher payments than the Haitian government had expected. The bank and railroad situations provide excellent examples of the type of exploitative dollar diplomacy of which Woodrow Wilson disapproved.

Roger L. Farnham, vice-president of the Haitian National Bank, and after 1913 president of the National Railroad of Haiti, had a strong influence on Washington during Bryan's period of office. Generally speaking, Bryan and Wilson had little knowledge of the situation in the Caribbean and Central America, and most of the diplomatic posts in these areas were given to supporters and friends who also had very little understanding of the problems of the region. Roger Farnham was able to exploit the ignorance of Washington whilst furthering his own interests. He was intent on encouraging United States' intervention in Haiti because of the possibility that this would give his bank (National City Bank of New York), control of the Haitian National Bank at the expense of the French and German interests. Therefore he played upon Bryan's fears of German and French designs on Haiti. Farnham knew that continuing instability could force United States intervention, and he attempted to restrict the Haitian government's income in order to force the government into defaulting on the French debt. Such a situation would force the Haitians into borrowing heavily from German merchants, and this could lead to action from Washington. Early in the Wilson administration in the State Department came to consider the prospect of a customs receivership in Haiti, similar to that imposed on the Dominican Republic under Theodore Roosevelt, and it seems to have been Farnham who most actively promoted such a scheme.

In a conversation with Bryan in January 1914, Farnham suggested that stable government in Haiti would aid the development of the island's resources; and the banker's closest friend, Boaz W. Long of the Latin American Affairs Division, knew how to appeal to the sympathy of Bryan who had always considered himself a man of the people. Long wrote to the Secretary of State:

The political system which obtains throughout the country ... constitutes a certain form of slavery for the masses, and no helping hand has been stretched out to the common people in an effort to improve their condition.
Bryan was easily persuaded that a customs receivership would be the just and moral answer for Haiti, and he was eager to convey his views to Wilson.

The worsening financial situation in 1914, together with Farnham's ambitions led to the bank's refusal to continue to pay government funds on a monthly basis. This placed great stress on the government, and the American minister to Haiti, Madison R. Smith, reported to Bryan:

> It is just this condition that the bank desires, for it is the belief of the bank that the Government when confronted by such a crisis, would be forced to ask the assistance of the United States in adjusting its financial tangle and that American supervision of the customs would result. 17

On June 25, 1914, Wilson agreed with Bryan's plans for persuading the Haitian government to accept United States' customs control similar to that experienced by the Dominion Republic:

> The general administrative arrangement is no doubt such as we could enter into with Haiti. I suggest that with the aid of memoranda from our representatives in Haiti we attempt a similar statement of the circumstances and have a convention tentatively drawn up along the same lines. 18

However, the Haitian leaders were not readily convinced of the merit of such a scheme. They knew that any evidence of their involvement in plans which might impair the island's sovereignty could mean the loss of an already insecure public support.

In August 1914, the Haitian government was in such a poor financial position that it was forced to default the interest on the National Railroad bonds, and announced its intention of seizing the railroad. 19 Communications from France and Germany expressed opposition to any possible United States intervention on the island, as because of their financial interests, the two European nations felt that they should have a share in the possible customs control. 20 Wilson's reply stated that "neither foreign mercantile influences and interests, nor any other foreign influence or interest proceeding from outside the American hemisphere, could with the consent of the United States be so broadened or extended as to constitute a control, either wholly or in part, of the government or administration of any independent American state." 21

Wilson believed that such intervention on the part of the United States was completely just, and indeed desirable, because of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. Whereas European intervention "might issue in results which the Government of the United States has always regarded it as its duty to guard against as the nearest friend and natural champion of those states whenever they should need a friend or champion". Wilson informed Germany that any American aid in Haiti "would be done without intending to serve the interest of any citizen of the United States or the interest of the Government of the United States in preference to the interest of the citizens or government of any other country". 22

Therefore, the Haitian intervention was not to be mistaken for imperialism, but was to be undertaken in the guise of the American mission. As a large and prosperous neighbour, America would perform her duty in the name of liberty against the corrupt and selfish nations.
of the Old World. Wilson was always careful to keep to the sentiments of his 1913 Mobile speech because he wanted to assure the world that the United States would not intervene to acquire territory. However, imperialism does not have to refer only to the acquisition of property, and what the United States was attempting was cultural imperialism: the imposition of American values on weaker nations which did not have the economic or military strength to resist. American imposition on the sovereignty of the Haitian nation was to be almost as complete as if the United States had forcibly taken the island as a possession.

In November 1914, Davilmar Theodore was pronounced the new president of Haiti, and Bryan announced that if a commission be formed to give favourable attention to American control of customs, the United States would confer recognition. Violent outbursts in Haiti at the mention of such an arrangement left the new president in no doubt about the unpopularity of this threat to the island’s independence. Theodore’s answer was to seek United States’ recognition by means of an offer of economic concessions to American citizens, but Bryan regarded this as bribery of the dollar diplomacy type and Woodrow Wilson was fully in agreement with the reply sent to the United States minister at Haiti:

Please say to the Government that this nation has no desire to assume responsibilities in regard to Haiti’s fiscal system except in accordance with the wishes of the Government. In expressing a willingness to do in Haiti what we are doing in Santo Domingo, this Government was actuated wholly by a disinterested desire to render assistance. If for any reason the Government thinks it best not to consider this proposition further you will not press the matter.

Bryan and Wilson did not seem to realise that in Haitian eyes their own proposals were merely another type of bribery; a more dangerous type because Haitian sovereignty would be seriously threatened if control of the customs was relinquished. Bryan stated the viewpoint of the Wilson administration in a reply to the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

While we desire to encourage in every proper way American investments in Haiti, we believe that this can be better done by contributing to stability and order than by favouring special concessions to Americans . . . American capital will gladly avail itself of business opportunities in Haiti when assured of the peace and quiet necessary for profitable production . . . If the United States can, as a neighbor and friend, assist the Government and people of Haiti as it has assisted the Government and people of Santo Domingo, it will gladly do so provided that assistance is desired; but . . . this Government does not care to assume these responsibilities except on request of the Haitian Government. The Government of the United States does not deem it proper to enter into such arrangements as those outlined in the proposition just submitted . . . Our obligation to the American people requires that we shall give all legitimate assistance to American investors in Haiti, but we are under obligations just as binding to protect Haiti, as far as our influence goes, from injustice or exploitation at the hands of Americans.
However, the Haitian legislature realised that "the request of the Haitian Government" meant the decision of the islanders to submit to the United States' terms, and it would do all it could to avoid American "assistance" of the type rendered to the Dominican Republic.

Thus, Bryan and Wilson took a strongly moralistic standpoint which, they believed, set them apart from the despised dollar diplomacy. In reality the moralising was little more than rhetoric, and what did occur in Haiti was to have a far more adverse effect on the island's autonomy than the policies of William Taft.

Unrest continued with yet another leader, Guillaume Sam, plotting against the government and presenting himself as a new president, whilst Theodore's regime faced bankruptcy. Washington became fearful that Theodore might attempt to seize funds from the National Bank in order to become sufficiently strong to oppose Sam. Therefore, on December 17, 1914, United States marines were instructed to remove gold to the value of $500,000 from the Haitian National Bank and deposit it, with the aid of an American gunboat, in the National City Bank, New York. Protests that the funds were not the property of the bank but of the Haitian state, were countered by the State Department:

It is hardly necessary to state that if it had happened that the gold had been taken from the bank by revolutionary authorities, or by irresponsible rioters, the bank, through its negligence to place the gold in safety, might have become liable later on to some duly established government of Haiti for any losses of the specie in its safekeeping.27

Woodrow Wilson viewed the Haitian developments with concern, and in a letter to Bryan in January 1915, he reiterated the plans for a customs receivership:

The more I think about that [Haitian] situation . . . the more I am convinced that it is our duty to take immediate action there such as we took in San Domingo. I mean to send commissioners there who will . . . say to them as firmly and definitely as is consistent with courtesy and kindness that the United States cannot consent to stand by and permit revolutionary conditions constantly to exist there. They ought, as in San Domingo, to insist upon an agreement for a popular election under our supervision and to be told that the result of the election would be upheld by the United States to the utmost.28

On Wilson's advice the two former commissioners to the Dominican Republic, John Franklin Fort and Charles Cogswell Smith, were sent to Haiti to ascertain whether President Sam was in a position to agree to United States' demands and to be recognised as the president, with the support of America.29 The commissioners were to persuade the Haitians to accept the United States' requirements of a customs convention, the settlement of railroad and national bank claims, full protection of foreign interests, and a guarantee that the Mole St Nicolas be protected from alienation to a power other than the United States.30
However, Sam's reaction was a refusal to discuss the situation until the regime was recognised.

Meanwhile, the American bankers stepped up their demands for American customs control. In April 1915, Bryan wrote to Wilson "The American interests are willing to remain there, with a view of purchasing a controlling interest and making the bank a branch of the American bank — they are willing to do this provided this Government takes the steps necessary to protect them and their idea seems to be that no protection will be sufficient that does not include a control of the Customs House".31 Farnham had been quick to draw Washington's attention to the fact that the Italian, German and French governments had recognised President Sam, and the vice-president of the Haitian bank emphasised that French interests were trying to force control of the Haitian bank. Wilson reacted with a letter to Bryan:

... it is evident we shall have to take a very decided stand with the government of Haiti, and demand certain things as a condition precedent of recognition.32

Wilson was becoming impatient, and in the following month he wrote "the sooner we get our plans going in Haiti for a stable arrangement that will preclude anxieties such as we have recently felt the better".33

Fear that the French might curb the United States' plans for financial control in Haiti now led the pacifistic Washington administration to contemplate force on the island. Bryan advised Wilson that although force should always be the last resort, the time might have arrived in which the United States was left no alternative. The Secretary of State referred to Wilson's Mobile speech, but warned that "we have as much reason to object to the control of a Latin American government by foreign financiers as by a foreign government, and there is no doubt that the foreign financiers have been a controlling interest in the politics of Haiti."34

Despite the failure of the previous American representatives, another commissioner, Paul Fuller, was despatched to Haiti to investigate the situation with particular reference to the customs receivership. In June 1915, he could report only that the Haitians were very cautious about guarding their national sovereignty, but his advice to Washington emphasised the developing attitude of Wilson and Bryan: Fuller recommended that armed intervention in the island was the only alternative for the United States.35

Paul Fuller's report prompted Wilson to write to the new Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, "Action is evidently necessary and no doubt it would be a mistake to postpone it long".36

The 'action' was to come later that month when the revolutionary forces under Rosalvo Bobo, who had long denounced the United States' encroachment on Haitian sovereignty, forced the overthrow of Guillaume Sam. This, in itself, was nothing new, as revolutionary uprisings were the usual method of leadership change on the island, but because the resultant disorder reached the level of mob violence, the United States was given the excuse it needed,
and Rear-Admiral William B. Caperton was advised to land at Port au Prince to help regain order. 37

Caperton was not certain of the extent of his mission in Haiti, and on August 3, Lansing wrote to Wilson that the situation was “distressing and very perplexing. I am not at all sure what we ought to do or what we can legally do”. 38 Unlike Vera Cruz there was no excuse of threatened reprisals against American citizens, although Lansing did consider the possibility of basing the United States' intervention on the grounds of relieving the suffering caused by anarchy on the island. Wilson agreed with Lansing:

I fear we have not the legal authority to do what we apparently ought to do; and that if we did do what is necessary it would constitute a case very much like that of Mr Roosevelt’s action in Santo Domingo, and have very much the same issue.

I suppose there is nothing for it but to take the bull by the horns and restore order. 39

Woodrow Wilson had long preached the importance of law and of obedience to constitutions. However, in Haiti it seemed necessary for a way to be found around legal barriers. Here the Wilsonian respect for the law conflicted with what the president believed to be right for the island. The moral issue was to be confined to the end of revolution, and the American duty to guide the Haitians along the path to civilisation was to prove superior to Wilson’s regard for the law.

Wilson made the following recommendations for action in Haiti:

1. We must send to Port au Prince a force sufficient to absolutely control the city not only but also the country immediately about it from which it draws its food . . .
2. We must let the present [Haitian] Congress know that we will protect it but that we will not recognise any action on its part which does not put men in charge of affairs whom we can trust to handle and put an end to revolution.
3. We must give all who now have authority there or desire to have it or think they have it . . . to understand that we shall take steps to prevent the payment of debts contracted to finances revolution: in other words, that we consider it our duty to insist on constitutional government there and will, if necessary (that is, if they force us to it as the only way) take charge of elections and see that a real government is erected which we can support . . .

In reference to his first proposition, Wilson noted “This will probably involve making the city authorities virtually subordinate to our commanders. They may hand the city government over to us voluntarily”. 41

Thus, revolution was to be stamped out so that Haitians could be guided on the way to an American type of constitutional government, and, if the islanders were not acquiescent, the United States was prepared to force good government onto them. Wilson did not seem to realise that his plans for America to “take charge of elections and see that a real government is
elected" were contradictory to everything he had ever admired in democratic development. Where now was the detached academic who once said "America has democracy because she is free; she is not free because she has democracy"? The answer would seem to be that Wilson saw one form of development for the United States and another for backward countries. Words which he wrote in 1900 seem particularly relevant to the Haitian situation:

"The Consent of the Governed" is a part of constitutional theory which has, so far, been developed only or chiefly with regard to the adjustment or amendment of established systems of government. Its treatment with regard to the affairs of politically underdeveloped races, which have not yet learned the rudiments of order and self-control, has, I believe, received next to no attention. The 'consent' of the Filipinos and the 'consent' of the American colonists to government, for example, are two radically different things, — not in theory, perhaps, but in practice ...

Therefore, in practice the Haitians were to be taught order and self-control. The United States' supervision of elections would serve two purposes: that of observing the law as far as elections were concerned and of ensuring that a suitable government would be obtained. The imposition of constitutional government would not necessarily be to ensure the freedom of Haitians, because as yet these people were considered too backward to enjoy liberty in the American sense. However, Wilson believed he could teach them to follow the paths of civilisation until eventually they would reach a stage of development in which the islanders would be ready for true democratic development.

Wilson's decisions on the course of American action in Haiti were sent through Lansing as instructions to Caperton:

First. Let [the Haitian] Congress understand that the Government of the United States intends to uphold it, but that it cannot recognize action which does not establish in charge of Haitian affairs those whose abilities and dispositions give assurances of putting an end to factional disorders.

Second. In order that no misunderstanding can possibly occur after election, it should be made perfectly clear to candidates as soon as possible and in advance of their election, that the United States expects to be entrusted with the practical control of the customs, and such financial control over the affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United States may deem necessary for an efficient administration.

The Wilson administration intervened in Haiti with the intention of remaining on the island until its mission was accomplished. The American public did not seem to realise the extent of the intended involvement, and even the New York Times believed that the marines under Caperton's command would merely restore order in Haiti until such time as a new president could be elected. But the States Department's directives concerning customs control left little doubt that the United States' influence was not intended as a temporary arrangement. Wilson's words of March 1913 were shown to be no more than useful rhetoric.
He had said "Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force". But what constitutes "arbitrary or irregular force"? Obviously Wilson would have felt that mob violence, such as was seen in Haiti in July 1915, could be described in this way, but perhaps he did not foresee that the projected involvement in Haiti could be an example of the United States using "arbitrary or irregular force" upon a small and defenceless state.

Hans Schmidt believes that Wilson's administration used the outbreak of mob violence in Haiti as an excuse for involvement in the island. Schmidt denounces Wilson and Lansing's opinions of the islanders as a backward people, and he produces statistics to show that frequent change of government cannot, in itself, be seen as a criterion for describing a people as 'backward'. Schmidt notes that France had eleven changes of government in the period 1909-1914, and between the years 1862-1915 both the United States and Haiti saw three presidents assassinated. Thus, two eminently 'civilised' Western nations had political records which, in some ways, could be said to be barely an advance on that of Haiti.

Washington let it be known that it would support Phillippe Sudre Dartiguenave's nomination for Haitian president at the forthcoming elections. The Haitian Congress usually elected the man with the greatest strength at the time of the election, and on this occasion United States' backing made Dartiguenave the suitable candidate. Rosalva Bobo was not favoured by Washington because of his frequently asserted anti-American views. It was felt that Dartiguenave would be the man most likely to capitulate to United States' demands. Once again the decision to support this candidate shows that when it came to the point, Wilson's cabinet did not believe implicitly in the self-determination which it so often preached. The Haitian situation is an excellent example of Wilson's policy of teaching Latin Americans 'to elect good men'. Washington approved intervention in Haiti because it believed that the country was backward; its instability not only having an adverse effect on a developing country, but also on American security.

The racist view of Haiti seems to have been a widely-held one among the American public. A Minneapolis Journal editorial referred to the Haitians as 'half-civilised blacks' who lived in a country in which the United States bore 'A White Man's Burden of no inconsiderable weight'. An editorial in World's Work remarked that 'It has taken the United States a very long time to intervene in Haiti. To find an example in recent history of greater forbearance, greater patience, would be difficult'. Most important of all, the United States' advisers to the Caribbean had little sympathy or understanding for the island's problems: Boaz W. Long saw in Haiti "the failure of an inferior people to maintain the degree of civilisation left them by the French, or to develop any capacity of self-government entitling them to international respect or confidence", and he believed that the United States had every right to act in order to protect her security.
Members of Wilson's cabinet made openly racist statements concerning the Haitian situation: statements which reflect Wilson's own view on negroes.\textsuperscript{52} Josephus Daniels wrote to Wilson advising of the guerilla forces which were in action against the United States' intervention, cutting off food supplies to the major cities. The question of American aid to relieve the sufferings of some of the urban dwellers was raised, but Daniels said "It is very dangerous to begin to supply provisions because the Haitians are like negroes in the South after the war and would quit work entirely, deserting plantations if our Government undertakes to feed them".\textsuperscript{53} Daniel's words were quite openly racist and bear very little relation to reality because there was no question of Haitians leaving plantations. The large plantations had been divided into small peasant holdings in the nineteenth century, and thus there was no basis for such a view. Many years later Josephus Daniels was to assert his doubts about the morality of the Haitian intervention. In 1930 he wrote to Franklin D. Roosevelt "You know that the things we were forced to do in Haiti was a bitter pill for me, for I have always hated any foreign policy that even hinted of imperialistic control".\textsuperscript{54} But Daniel's sentiments are questionable in view of his words and actions at the time. Perhaps he was made aware of the unfashionable element of his part in the proceedings when the Republican administration of the 1920's heaped criticism on Wilsonian Imperialism.

The continuation of anti-American feeling in the island led to the declaration of martial law in September 1915, and American pressure on Haitians for a treaty to legalise the situation, was increased. The action of the United States in taking control of the customs houses had left the island's government without regular revenue, and it seemed that financial difficulties would force an acceptance of the treaty.

The reluctance of the Dartiguenave administration to agree to such a treaty led to threats of withdrawal of money until it capitulated. Lansing wrote to Wilson "I do not see why it would not be as easy to control a government with a president as it is to control the Haitian Congress and administrative officers", and Wilson's reply showed that he agreed with Lansing's words.\textsuperscript{55} However, Lansing did have some qualms of conscience about the American methods and, although he believed in the importance of gaining order on the island, to the United States' president he mentioned that the negotiation of such a treaty "with our marines policing the Haytian Capital, is high handed. It does not meet my sense of a nation's sovereign rights and is more or less an exercise of force and an invasion of Haytian independence".\textsuperscript{56} Despite this, Lansing believed that the departure from the stated ideals of the Wilson administration was justified because "From a practical standpoint . . . I cannot but feel it is the only thing to do if we intend to cure the anarchy and disorder which prevails in that Republic".\textsuperscript{57}

Lansing felt strongly about the security of the Caribbean, and in 1914 he had written a paper stating his fears of European influence in this region. After the United States' intervention in Haiti he sent a copy of the 1914 paper to Wilson, and enclosed a note:
The Monroe Doctrine is based on the theory that any extension by a European power of political control, beyond that which exists over any territory in this hemisphere, is a menace to the national safety of the United States. The means of extending political control, thus far recognized, has been by occupation of unattached territory, by conquest and by cession . . . Recently the financing of revolutions and corruption of governments of the smaller republics by European capitalists have frequently thrown the control of these governments into the hands of a European power.

To avoid this danger . . . which may be as great a menace to the national safety of this country as occupation or cession, the only method seems to be to establish a stable and honest government and to prevent the revenues of the republic from becoming the prize of revolution and of the foreigners who finance it . . .

The possession of the Panama Canal and its defence have . . . given to the territories in and about the Caribbean Sea a new importance from the standpoint of our national safety. It is vital to the interests of this country that European political domination should in no way be extended over these regions. As it happens within this area lie the small republics of America which have been and to an extent still are the prey of revolutionists, of corrupt governments, and of predatory foreigners.

Lansing was quite open in his support for the national interests of the United States when he wrote to Wilson:

... the argument based on humanitarian purpose does not appeal to me, even though it might be justly urged, because too many international crimes have been committed in the name of Humanity.

It seems to me that the ground of national safety, the conservation of national interests, is the one which should be advanced in support of this policy. It is reasonable, practical, and in full accord with the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

In considering this policy it should be borne in mind what has been done already in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Haiti . . .

Wilson's reply reflected his agreement with Lansing's memorandum: "The argument in this paper seems to be unanswerable, and I thank you for setting it out so explicitly and fully".

David Healey notes that some sections of the United States' public which previously had seemed sympathetic to the occupation, gradually began to take a closer look at events in Haiti. The Literary Digest of August 14, 1915, contained an article entitled "Strait-Jacketing Haiti", which stated that "The short and abrupt manner of the Wilson Administration toward the Republic of Haiti" gives the authors the impression that "small-boy Haiti is evidently going to receive, if not corporal punishment, at least the strictest sort of discipline". But, in general, the American public believed in the need to curb revolution and anarchy in Latin America. The progressive mind, with its extreme concern for efficiency, found instability abhorrent.
Haitian agreement to the treaty conditions was obtained on September 16th: after Capterton had let it be known that military government would be established unless the Haitians acceded to United States' demands. Some difficulty was experienced in persuading the island's legislature to ratify the treaty, but this was accomplished in November 1915, and ratification in the American Senate was obtained in February 1916.

The exchange of ratification May 3, 1916, meant that United States' aid was to be available for Haiti's agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and for financial reform; the American president was to nominate a general receiver to control customs and a financial adviser to reform Haiti's finances. Under the terms of the treaty, strong curbs were placed on the island's sovereignty:

The General Receiver shall make monthly reports of all collections, receipts and disbursements to the appropriate officer of the Republic of Haiti and to the Department of State of the United States, which reports shall be open to inspection and verification at all times by the appropriate authorities of each of the said Governments. The Republic of Haiti shall not increase its public debt except by previous agreement with the President of the United States, and shall not contract any debt or assume any financial obligation unless the ordinary revenue of the Republic available for that purpose, after defraying the expenses of the Government, shall be adequate to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such debt.  

The treaty also provided for the creation of "an efficient constabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians". Such a police force was to be "organised and officered by Americans, appointed by the President of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the United States", with the stipulation that gradually, as the Haitians became better qualified to assume such positions, the officers would be replaced by native personnel. Haitians also agreed "not to surrender any of the territory of the Republic of Haiti by sale, lease or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory, to any foreign government or power, nor to enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign power or powers that will impair or tend to impair the independence of Haiti".  

It was agreed that the United States would assist in the settlement of all claims against Haiti made by foreign companies and citizens, and the treaty was to take effect for ten years, with provision for extension for a further decade if the purpose of the treaty was not attained. Article XIV attempted to place a veneer of self-determination onto an otherwise autocratic document by stating "should the necessity occur, the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian Independence and the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty".  

The United States' plans of Americanising Haiti, of imposing the Anglo-Saxon standards of stable political and economic values on the island, led to something which the islanders had feared since the time of slavery status: that is, a lessening of their highly-valued independence.
Perhaps the primary motivation of the Wilson administration was a desire to be protective and helpful toward America's weaker neighbours, and the administration was led astray by long-held convictions of the superiority of white Anglo-Saxon civilisation. Woodrow Wilson's foremost intention was to instil order, which would not only benefit the Haitians themselves, but would protect American security and investments against European encroachment, whilst providing a foundation for democratic development. However, the security threat was magnified out of all proportion as there is little evidence of serious German intention to acquire the Mole St Nicolas. Accusations of American economic imperialism do not seem as serious in Haiti when we consider the limited nature of the markets and raw materials on the island. The most likely explanation of many of Washington's actions would seem to be that Wilson saw in Haitian instability an example of a backward people who might never be able to govern themselves efficiently without United States' tutelage.

Haiti also represents an example of American cultural imperialism: the island was to be taught and prepared for the benefits of civilisation. This did not mean that the United States' system of constitutional government could be transferred immediately, but that these inferior people would first have to be raised to a level at which they would be ready to adopt the advantages of a true democracy. Woodrow Wilson's words referring to underdeveloped peoples, and written in 1900, seem particularly relevant to the situation, while at the same time emphasising his regard for England and the English colonial system as a guide for United States' foreign policy:

...It is our peculiar duty, as it is also England's... to impart
...our own principles of self-help; teach them order and self-control in the midst of change; impart to them... the drill and habit of law and obedience which we long ago got out of the strenuous processes of English history; secure for them when we may, the free intercourse and the natural development which shall make them at least equal members of the family of nations... This we shall do, not by giving them out of hand our codes of political morality or our methods of political action... for these things are not blessings, but a curse, to undeveloped peoples, still in the childhood of their political growth; but by giving them, in the spirit of service, a government and rule which shall moralize them by being itself moral, elevate and steady them by being itself pure and steadfast, inducting into them the rudiments of justice and freedom. In other words, it is the aid of our character they need, and not the premature aid of our institutions. Our institutions must come after the ground of character and habit has been made ready for them... the remedy for oppressive government in general is, not a constitution, but justice and enlightenment...65

Thus, the American task was to take on a role of benevolent paternalism, but the developments Wilson envisaged could be obtained only if the Americans who administered them were also of "pure and steadfast" character with a firm belief in "justice and enlightenment". Once again Wilson's idealised vision would experience many practical
difficulties.

The advances toward ‘civilisation’ imposed by the United States, caused many problems within the island republic, because the majority of upper-class Haitians had long looked to government patronage to achieve and maintain a position in society. The United States' intervention meant that they were no longer able to do so. Pensions and pay-offs were greatly reduced, customs personnel severely cut-back, and the economic upsurge which many elite Haitians who had not resisted the American programme had long hoped for, did not eventuate. Not surprisingly, the government of President Dartiguenave bore the brunt of much of the criticism of the islanders.

Despite his policies in Haiti, Wilson continued to speak of self-determination during his 1916 election campaign. He felt that Latin America should understand the good intentions of the United States:

The suspicion of our southern neighbors, their uneasiness as to our growing power, their jealousy that we should assume to play Big Brother to them without their invitation to do so, has constantly stood in the way of the amicable and happy relations we wished to establish with them... every nation, every people, has the right to order its own institutions as it will. 67

The suspicion of Latin America is not surprising, when Wilson could speak of every nation’s right “to order its own institutions as it will” whilst the United States quite blatantly proceeded to subject Haitian institutions to the will of America.

Admiral Caperton seems to have been largely sympathetic and tactful in his dealings with Haitians,68 but his problems were magnified by the fact that Washington was often engaged with more pressing problems elsewhere. The European war and United States involvement in Mexico required constant attention, and difficulties in a small state such as Haiti, were easy to overlook. There seems to have been little thought given to the pressing problems of day-to-day administration on the island, and Caperton often had to make decisions which, in a more politically or economically important republic, might have been referred to Washington. Therefore, the man in charge of operations came to have an increasingly important role in Haiti: an effect which did not seem particularly distressing during Caperton’s term of office, but which was to have extremely serious results with his successor.

As with Woodrow Wilson, Admiral Caperton’s attitude toward the Haitian people was one of benevolent paternalism. Although not openly racist, he did often refer to the lazy or comic natures of the islanders in much the same manner as Wilson’s view of Southern negroes.69 Of the Caco leader, General Rameaux, the admiral said “How childishly foolish and how like an infant of nature was this man. And how like many others who had preceded him down the pages of history in his own land, where comic opera occasions grew up like mushrooms, overnight, with a rapidity startling and withal amusing”.70
Caperton’s successor in Haiti in 1916, Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller, was openly racially prejudiced and regarded the Dartiguenave system of patronage as corrupt. With his second-in-command, Major Smedley Butler, Waller incurred the enmity of the Haitian people, Waller and Butler reserved the greatest of their contempt for the Haitian elite, whom they regarded as especially parasitic because of their pretensions of being equal to white men. Of them, Waller once remarked “they are real nigs beneath the surface”. Relations between the Haitian government and the United States’ marines deteriorated rapidly as Waller openly made known his preference for full American military government in Haiti.

The customs of the Haitian elite were abhorrent to the philosophy of progressivism. American progressives were firmly convinced of the morality of their reforming drives against inefficient business practices and patronage in politics. Anything which resembled protectionism or monopoly was frowned upon, whilst the idealised American virtues of honesty, economy and hard work were praised. Although these American virtues were culturally alien to the Haitians, the United States regarded the islanders’ methods of determining government appointments as not only inefficient, but corrupt. The American missionary outlook insisted that the money which formerly went to the elite must be used for the benefit of the ordinary Haitian public, and there was little questioning concerning the morality of the public works programme, which was put into practice under the auspices of the United States marines. The American attitude seemed to be that if the long-term goal was an admirable one the methods used to attain it must be regarded in the light of expediency.

The methods used to achieve United States’ goals in Haiti were inexcusable. The Americans believed that sanitation improvement, public works, and road building were important because they imposed the veneer of civilisation which the Anglo-Saxon background believed to be so important. However, the imposition of enforced road-building programmes in 1918, did nothing to promote the American type of civilisation on the island. An 1864 Haitian law provided for a *corvée*, or feudal service by Haitian peasants, and this was reinstated during Wilson’s administration to give a legal basis to the road-building programme. A letter from Major Butler to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Assistant Secretary to the Navy) shows that the programme was ruthlessly enforced. Butler wrote “it would not do to ask too many questions as to how we accomplish this work”.

The Haitians were especially resentful at the implications of slavery in the road-building scheme, and although the *corvée* was abolished in 1918, it continued illegally in some parts of central Haiti. During 1919 there were fierce uprisings against the United States’ control, and there was evidence of severe reprisals against the *cacos* bands as the marines attempted to crush the opposition in the interior.
The establishment of the Haitian constabulary, as stipulated in the treaty, caused further
resentment, and there were few Haitian officer-trainees recruited because the islanders were
reluctant to enlist.

In 1917 the United States devised a new constitution for Haiti in order to put a stamp of
legality on the whole affair, but the National Assembly refused to agree to the provisions of
this alien document and proceeded to draft its own anti-American constitution. Major Smedley
Butler retaliated by persuading Dartiguenave to sign a proclamation dissolving the legislature,
and after a plebiscite was held (supervised by the newly-established constabulary), a suspiciously
overwhelming victory signified the acceptance of the American-inspired constitution. 73

An important provision of the new constitution was that it allowed foreigners to own
Haitian property. Obviously only American citizens were to be given such an opportunity,
because the May 1916 treaty forbade the interest of any other power. 74

With the conclusion of World War I, the Paris Peace Conference publicized Wilson's ideals
of self-determination and making the world safe for democracy, and many Haitians believed that
the time had come to make the world aware of their plight. Because Haiti had declared war on
Germany in 1918, she was represented at the Peace Conference, and the Dartiguenave
government instructed the Haitian minister to discuss the island's position with Wilson in an
effort to bring attention to the injustices.75

Such incidents caused Wilson much embarrassment, but he was to be guilty of a great folly
in his attempts to persuade the United States of the need for the ratification of the League of
Nations Covenant. During the period of the League controversy in the United States, Franklin
D. Roosevelt is reported to have boasted that America's voting strength in the League would not
be confined to one vote only, but could be as many as twelve. The Nation quotes Wilson as
saying that "the votes of Haiti, and Santo Domingo, Panama, Cuba, and Central American
countries" were also votes belonging to the United States. The Nation referred to the "rape of
Santo Domingo" and said Wilson had "certainly succeeded in putting over the most complete
sabotage of our ideals and traditions that this republic has suffered in one hundred and forty-four
years of its national existence".76

After the European War, and the fall of the Wilson administration, the United States moved
back into its position of isolation from world affairs. Republicans capitalised on, and contributed
to, a reaction against Wilsonian foreign policy, and in 1921 conducted Senate Hearings to
investigate the Haitian occupation. Evidence was produced which publicised the often brutal
measures employed by the marines in their efforts to subdue the islanders.77 In later years,
Josephus Daniels wrote that "There were unquestionably some things done by the gendarmerie
and some of the marines which deserved punishment and nobody could have been more distressed
than President Wilson and myself".78
Such atrocities were possible because of the ignorance of Washington concerning the problems of the islanders, and the fact that the United States advisers on Haitian affairs were so poorly equipped for their tasks. Preconceptions about the islanders were often tainted with racial prejudice, and in this, the secretaries of state were some of the worst offenders. In 1912 William Jennings Bryan asked for information on Haiti, and his comment was "Dear me, think of it! Niggers speaking French". Robert Lansing's ideas of the capabilities of the Haitians to solve their own problems must have coloured his views:

The experience of Liberia and Haiti show that the African race are devoid of any capacity for political organisation and lack genius for government. Unquestionably there is in them an inherent tendency to revert to savagery and to cast aside the shackles of civilisation which are irksome to their physical nature. Of course there are many exceptions to this racial weakness but it is true of the mass, as we know from experience in this country. It is that which makes the negro problem practically unsolvable.

Despite Wilson's embarrassment concerning the Haitian position at the close of the war, he felt there was little he could do to relieve the situation. A wholesale removal of United States troops could have led to widespread revolt against the Dartiguenave government, and Wilson did not wish to be responsible for such chaos. Josephus Daniels did his best to justify his own position, and that of Wilson, by placing the blame for problems in the Caribbean firmly on Lansing's shoulders:

In vain I urged, when the Armistice was signed, that our forces should be withdrawn from both Haiti and Santo Domingo and their independence recognised. The Navy had done its job, even carrying out some repugnant policies. The World War was over, and the fear ended that these islands would fall into the possession of some European government, with quiet restored, I could find no justification for further imposing our will upon the people of these islands. But Lansing's State Department, more or less imperialistic, did not agree, and Wilson was completely engrossed with fighting to secure the ratification of the League of Nations. I rejoiced later when a commission led the way to doing in Harding's administration what I urged should be done before the end of the Wilson administration.

The United States' intervention in Haiti, and the subsequent treatment of the citizens of the island republic, would seem to emphasise that Woodrow Wilson's often-stated views of liberty, justice and self-government were applicable only to people of Anglo-Saxon origin. Those persons whom his administration was to regard as backward or uncivilised would have to accept arbitrary rule at the hands of United States' marines, whilst America showed them the benefits of good government.
Despite Wilson's hopes for the advancement of Haitian development, Washington's ignorance of Haitian problems, and the lack of coordination between the United States' government and American commanders in Haiti, were to bring only distress to the islanders during the Wilson administration. Woodrow Wilson's ideals of a steady maturing process toward constitutional democracy bore little relevance in a country where revolution and arbitrary rule had been the customary practices for generations.
CHAPTER SIX

WOODROW WILSON AND NICARAGUA

Nicaragua represents an example of the paternalistic attitude of the Wilson administration toward a small Latin American state. It could be said that the Wilson crusade for an improved democracy at home and for the development of self-government overseas was compromised and indeed, denied, by the United States' attitude toward such nations as Nicaragua. The strategic position of the country in relation to the Panama Canal was of major consideration to the United States. It was believed that European intervention could be avoided by keeping Nicaragua dependent on the northern republic. Despite Wilson's often-stated views on Pan Americanism, such countries were to be allowed little say in the settlement of their own destinies. Nicaragua provides a good example of the progression from the Platt Amendment policies, to William Taft's economic intervention and Woodrow Wilson's search for stability and order.

For many years the United States' government had debated the possibility of a Nicaraguan canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty, signed by the United States and Britain in 1850, had stated that neither nation would attempt to control an isthmian canal. However, the 1850 agreement was abrogated by the Hay-Paunceforte treaty in 1901, and as a result Britain withdrew her warships from the Gulf, thus recognizing United States supremacy in the area.

Because a French concern had held the Panama concession in the nineteenth century, Americans had long considered Nicaragua as the ideal site for a United States-controlled canal. However, the French company failed in 1897, and later a United States commission decided that, because of the labour availability and the cost factor, Panama was a more suitable site. 1

José Santos Zelaya, dictator of Nicaragua 1893-1910, had harboured pretensions of a role as supreme ruler in Central America. Because of his propensity for the arbitrary cancellation of foreign concessions, 2 Zelaya was not regarded with favour by the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft. The United States remained neutral during a revolt against Zelaya in 1910, but diplomatic relations were broken after Zelaya's forces executed two American citizens. 3

Zelaya was succeeded by José Madriz, another liberal party leader whom the United States refused to recognise as Nicaraguan president because Washington wanted assurance that his regime was not to be merely a continuation of that of his predecessor. The country was strongly divided into liberal and conservative camps, and American warships were retained in Nicaraguan waters as a reminder of the United States' concern for order and for the protection of American citizens.

Madriz' regime was overthrown in August 1912, and he was succeeded by General Juan Estrada, whom Washington refused to recognise unless he agreed to such terms as free elections and the contract of a loan secured by Nicaraguan customs receipts. 4 The suggestion of a
United States-controlled customs collectorship aroused great antipathy among Nicaraguans, and Estrada's administration was short-lived. In May 1911, Adolfo Díaz became the new Nicaraguan president. Díaz, a moderate conservative, saw advantages in a close relationship with the United States, and he signed an agreement for responsibility of all existing loans held by Americans, and accepted the establishment of a customs receivership.

Washington was determined to ensure the continuation of a pro-American regime, and in August 1912 United States' troops intervened in Nicaragua to protect the Díaz administration against a revolt led by the minister of war, Luis Mena. Although American warships had often appeared during troubled times in the past, this represented the first time United States' forces had intervened, militarily, to suppress a revolution in Latin America. After the rebellion, one hundred United States marines were retained at Managua as a legation guard whose presence would remind Nicaraguans of the United States' disapproval of hostilities against the Díaz government. The guard was to remain in Nicaragua until 1925 and, as in Haiti, its presence had the effect of ensuring stability through a maintenance of the status quo.

During the Roosevelt and Taft administrations, American bankers had opportunities for large investments in Nicaragua and, as security, they gradually assumed control of both the national railroad and the national bank. In order to put Nicaraguan finances on a more stable foundation, the United States investigated ways of adjusting such arrangements. However, the Knox-Castrillo agreement, signed in 1911 and authorising a customs receivership in Nicaragua, met opposition in the United States Senate. In a move which emphasised the fact that the American president's policies can often be hamstrung by the United States' democratic process, ratification was not obtained because the terms were viewed as imperialistic. The country's financial position worsened, and the American bankers were able to increase their hold on Nicaragua.

In February, 1913, the Wetzel-Chamorro Treaty was also refused approval by the Senate because of an interventionist, military support clause. The Taft administration had hoped that the clause would make the agreement more palatable to American investors. Also included in the treaty were provisions for a thirty-year option for the United States to build an isthmian canal, and for United States naval bases in the Gulf of Fonseca and the Corn Islands at an annual rental of three million dollars.

At the time of Wilson's ascent to the presidency in the United States, Nicaragua was experiencing severe financial difficulties. Government employees were threatening strike action unless their salaries were paid, foreign debts had accumulated, and stop-gap loans from bankers to the government seemed the only solution.

Although he expressed opposition to dollar diplomacy, William Jennings Bryan felt that the Díaz government was the only acceptable arrangement in Nicaragua. Bryan was impressed
with the Weitzel-Chamorro Treaty and he believed that its provisions would encourage American bankers to loan without demanding the conditions which had been previously forced onto Nicaragua. However, Bryan and Wilson went one step further than the Taft administration when, in their revised draft, they added a clause which gave the United States a legal right to intervene in Nicaragua in order to maintain stability. The Taft administration had asserted a need for stability, in order to improve the economy of Nicaragua, and the Wilson government intended to ensure equilibrium even to the extent of direct United States intervention. However, the Senate made it quite clear that it would not countenance the prospect of such interference in Latin America.

The difficulties experienced in obtaining Congress support on the question of Nicaraguan treaties emphasises that we must use caution in referring to the policies of American presidents. Often decisions had to be made on the basis of compromise unless the president had a majority support in the House and Senate. Bryan's words reveal the dilemma, and the need to overcome it:

We have struck a snag in the matter of the Nicaraguan treaty. I have been before the Committee twice, and they have had a separate meeting for considering the matter, but there is quite a determined opposition on the part of the minority of the Committee against the Platt amendment idea . . . I write, therefore, to ask you whether it might not be wise to separate the two and put the treaty through now providing for the purchase of the canal site and the naval base and then, at the regular session, try to secure a treaty extending our authority along the lines of the Platt amendment? . . .

When the failure of the treaty became evident, Bryan tried to persuade Wilson of the advantages of a United States' government loan to Nicaragua, but Wilson disagreed because he realised that such a scheme, involving the government in the private investment field, "would strike the whole country . . . as a novel and radical proposal". 8

Bryan believed that dollar diplomacy had benefited only the American bankers who had invested so extensively in Nicaragua, whilst demanding exhorbitant concessions. He was cautious about agreeing to further private loans but he felt that the banker, Samuel Jarvis, seemed less likely to exploit the Nicaraguan situation. However Jarvis wanted, as a condition of his loan, to be granted the position of financial commissioner in Nicaragua, and the United States could not agree to this. Diaz was prepared to accede to Jarvis' terms, but during the negotiations the situation in Nicaragua became so desperate that finally, a new contract was arranged with Brown and Seligman, 9 which, among other securities, gave the bankers an option on the remaining forty-nine percent of the Nicaraguan railroad stock. 10 Thus, whilst the Wilson administration denounced dollar diplomacy, many of the policies of Taft and Knox were allowed to continue because of Wilson's determination to retain stability despite Nicaragua's precarious financial position.
Other Central American nations voiced strong opposition at the prospect of a treaty between Nicaragua and the United States. The validity of Nicaragua's right to allow United States' bases in the Gulf of Fonseca was questioned, and Costa Rica referred to a prior arrangement which stated that no canal agreements with a foreign power could be made without her consent. Wilson was concerned at these grievances, but Bryan insisted that the Central American protests had no legal basis. President Díaz was eager to have the treaty ratified by the United States, and he cabled Wilson:

The effect of the Platt Amendment on Cuba has been so satisfactory that, since your government is considering a canal convention with Nicaragua, I respectfully request that said convention be made to embody the substance of the Platt Amendment, so that my countrymen may see Nicaragua's credit improved, her natural resources developed, and peace assured throughout the land. I believe that revolutions will cease if your Government can see its way clear to grant the addition of the Amendment as requested.

Such sentiments were certain to appeal to the Wilson administration, and Bryan wrote to Wilson “It must be remembered that Nicaragua has gone farther than any other Central American country in asking us to take part in her affairs, and by so doing she has not only cut herself off from European aid but has aroused some antagonism among her neighbors. We owe it to her, therefore, to render any assistance we can”.

By May 1914, the Díaz government was suffering dire financial circumstances. Wilson was greatly concerned and wrote to Bryan: “I am ashamed of myself that I have not been able to think out a satisfactory solution. My thought is a great deal upon the subject.”

Emiliano Chamorro, the Nicaraguan minister in Washington, was determined that the treaty must be accepted, and he let Bryan know that Germany was willing to pay more for the canal rights than the United States. Despite some doubt as to the validity of Chamorro’s claims, the prospect of a threat to American security hastened the Wilson administration into action, and in August 1914 the treaty was signed after the interventionist clause had been removed. However, ratification was not obtained until February 1916, by which time provision had been made for compensation to be paid to the Central American states.

In opposing the treaty, Senator Elihu Root caused great embarrassment to Wilson and Bryan when he noted that the Díaz government had only minority support in Nicaragua, and thus the Senate was being asked to ratify a treaty which would support a puppet government.

Woodrow Wilson had exerted pressure for the ratification of the treaty because of Nicaragua’s severe financial problems. However, disputes over the use of the treaty fund caused delays and Nicaragua’s economy worsened. Controversy over the three million dollars centred around Nicaragua’s obligations to pay claims which the country had recognised in 1912. Her previously precarious economic position became more acute with the trade disruption caused by the European war. The American minister in Nicaragua outlined the
country's problems in a telegram to Bryan:

Government employees unpaid, failure of crops, shortage in customs receipts, lack of funds for moving coffee crop, importunate creditors . . . 19

To which Bryan replied:

We are greatly distressed at the situation in Nicaragua and regret exceedingly that it has been impossible to get action on the treaty. The Senate has been in constant session for a year and a half, something never known before. We are in the midst of a campaign in which nearly a third of the Senators are candidates for reelection. Under the circumstances it has been impossible to make progress. The President is very anxious to secure ratification of the treaty. If we can find any means of hastening action we shall employ it. 20

This provided an instance of the way in which American foreign policy could so often be affected by the internal conditions of the country, and reveals, once again, that caution must be used when referring to the policies of an administration.

The question of a successor to Adolfo Díaz was Washington’s next problem. Díaz’s conservative government had been able to stay in office only because of the presence of the United States guard, and in July 1915 the liberal leader, Julian Iriáṣ, formerly Zelaya’s second-in-command, hoped that American support could be transferred to his party. Irias requested American approval for his candidacy, and promised cooperation with the United States on such matters as the canal option treaty, intervention provisions, and the establishment of an American-appointed financial adviser and head of constabulary on similar lines to the arrangement the United States was considering in Haiti. 21 However, the United States was not convinced of the reliability of the liberal party, and therefore Washington put its support behind the conservative, Emiliano Chamorro, as the next Nicaraguan president.

Chamorro won an overwhelming victory at the September 1916 elections, and, unlike Díaz, was in a strong position as president. His first problem was the settlement of the $3,000,000 treaty fund, of which the majority was claimed by the bankers and British bond-holders. A joint commission, organised by the United States, was set up to judge the claims in an attempt to reduce Nicaragua’s debts. Chamorro, aware of his strong position, was determined to assert himself and show his independence of America. He refused to agree to a financial adviser for Nicaragua, and at one time threatened to seize the customs houses. 22 However, in June 1917 Nicaragua finally agreed to the United States' financial arrangements, the treaty fund was disbursed, and a High Commission was formed to settle foreign claims.

Emiliano Chamorro was well aware of the vulnerable condition of his country. His message to the National Congress in December 1917 emphasised his concern, but he was also careful to preserve the goodwill of the United States:
This floating and unliquidated debt has meant also a political danger, since Nicaragua has often been exposed to a forcible collection of her debts, it being enough to say that of the so-called internal debt which has been placed under the direction of the Public Credit Commission 43% belongs to foreigners who have continually demanded immediate payment.

No person or nation considers its dignity and sovereignty lessened when for the solution of its problems it agrees that any arising difficulty should be settled by arbiters. This is precisely what has been done in creating the High Commission. In our case all contingencies are once and for all solved, with the maintenance of the High Commission in whose organisation the American Government intervenes. The moral force of the Great Republic extends over our contracts its powerful protection which, if it is a guaranty for the exact fulfilment of the assumed obligations, also means that our weak country shall no longer be a victim of any class of demands.

Until the advent of the Post-War depression a period of peace and prosperity was experienced by Nicaragua. Great advances in the economic position of the country led to the gradual reduction of most debts, and in 1919, Chamorro's administration was able to make plans to repurchase the national railroad and to construct a railroad to the Atlantic coast.

It could be said that a continuation of dollar diplomacy under the Wilson administration was highly successful in Nicaragua. However, because of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty and, subsequently, the United States' apparent disregard for the demise of the Central American Court of Justice, relations with Central America deteriorated greatly. In 1917 the Court decided against the United States in the matter of the naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca:

... the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, of August 1914, by the concession which grants a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, threatens the national safety of El Salvador and violates their rights of joint ownership in the waters of the said Gulf...

When Nicaragua declared war on Germany in 1918 other Central American states remained neutral because of their antipathy towards the United States, and representatives of El Salvador and Honduras caused much embarrassment to Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference when they sought to have the Monroe Doctrine limited through its incorporation into the Versailles treaty.

The Wilson administration seemed to lack a definite policy toward Nicaragua, and thus much of the decision-making was left to Bryan and Lansing. As in Haiti, financial stability and the maintenance of security were closely linked. The United States regarded its interference as necessary because of that republic's special duty in Central America. In 1918, when they declared war on Germany, both Nicaragua and Haiti could almost be described as protectorated of the United States. Chamorro realised this and sought to justify his position in regard to the United States:
If the obtaining of victory has required sacrifices animated by most enthusiastic patriotic sentiments, the complicated peace arrangements will require still greater ones, since this peace must be durable and therefore just. A clear vision of this great truth and complete devotion to the abstract principles which must be its foundation have been shown by the United States during their intervention in the war . . . The champion of those ideals is the Government of the United States, a nation with which Nicaragua has continued to have the most frank and sincere relationship, our interests and theirs following parallel paths.  

Thus, in these two countries we see a continuation, and an advancement, on dollar diplomacy despite the stated philosophy of the New Freedom. Wilson's administration did not seem able to escape the policies of its predecessors. Roosevelt and Taft had encouraged private American investment in Nicaragua in order to consolidate United States control over this strategically important state, and, apart from Bryan's attempts to persuade his president to agree to United States government loans, the Wilson administration felt it had to continue with existing policies in order to prop up a pro-American government. Intervention in the Caribbean, despite the campaign rhetoric of the democratic party, was to continue in the form of a United States' legation guard at Managua, and was consolidated in Bryan's endorsement of Platt Amendment provisions when attempting to make a treaty with Nicaragua.
CONCLUSION

In Mexico, Nicaragua and Haiti it seemed that the need for stability was to mean a sacrifice of Wilsonian ideals. But was self-government in Latin America Wilson's real aim for this region? Certainly it was his stated aim in his 1913 speeches, but Wilson was often guilty of letting his joy in oratory encroach upon his detached academic views. He often seemed intoxicated by the moment, by the crowd’s reaction and the tenor of his words. Perhaps a more balanced view of his beliefs can be found in his writings during the years before the need for campaign speeches and political expedients. These writings reveal that, although many historians have believed otherwise, there was not a radical difference between Wilson’s ideals and his practical policies.

To Wilson, America’s mission in the world was more important than a haphazard belief in democratic government for all nations. His governmental philosophy was not merely a hastily conceived programme for use during his term as president. Wilson had, since his earliest years, been extremely interested in the functioning of government, particularly in the development of constitutional rule. In a treatise entitled “The Modern Democratic State” written in 1885, while teaching political science at Bryn Mawr college, Wilson examined the character and development of democracy and revealed the extent of the influence of England:

Why has democracy been a cordial and a tonic to little Switzerland and big America, while it has been as yet only a quick intoxicant or a slow poison to France and Spain, a mere maddening draught to the South American states? Why has England approached democratic institutions by slow and steady stages of deliberate and peaceful development, while so many other states have panted toward democracy through constant revolution? Why has democracy existed in America; and in Australia virtually from the first while other new states have utterly failed in their efforts to establish it? What is democracy that it should be possible to some, impossible as yet to others? Answers to such questions as these will serve to show the only truly significant thing now to be discovered concerning democracy; its place and office, namely, in the process of political development. What is its relative function? its position and power in politics viewed as a whole? ¹

Wilson then proceeded to answer his own questions, and to reveal why the establishment of order and stability within Latin American nations was so important to his administration:

Democracy is, of course, wrongly conceived when treated as merely a body of doctrine. It is a stage of development. It is not created by aspirations or by new faith; it is built up by slow habit. Its process is experience, its basis old wont; its meaning national organic oneness and effectual life. It comes, like manhood, as the fruit of youth: immature peoples cannot have it, and the maturity
to which it is vouchsafed is the maturity of freedom and self-control, and no other. It is conduct, and its only stable foundation is character.\textsuperscript{2}

Thus, Wilson believed that Mexico, Haiti and Nicaragua must first be placed on a stable foundation. These were 'immature' countries and Wilson saw his purpose as to teach them to develop the pre-conditions essential for democratic development. It was never his aim to grant them immediate self-determination. He would have regarded such an act as irresponsible, and contrary to America's duty toward her weaker neighbours.

Woodrow Wilson has often been accused of being an impractical idealist and probably, to a degree, he was. He believed that to a large extent, men could guide history, and he did not seem to understand the lack of steady progress in much of human development. He believed, implicitly, that the maturing process of democracy could be experienced by other nations, and never questioned that this was anything other than the ideal course for all peoples. However, it cannot be said that he was impractical in his views of democratic development within each state. He denounced as overly-idealistic those Americans who believed that self-government could be experienced without struggle. American democracy was seen by Wilson as successful because it was a practical, rather than a theoretical development. It had experienced struggle in order to achieve its aims:

\begin{quote}
It is not a democracy which has been thought out, but a democracy which has been lived out to its present development. It has been wrought by struggle rather than by meditation.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

American democracy was a continuation of English constitutional history, and therefore it had a slow development and a well-grounded base, whereas Latin American nations had had no similar experience. Wilson's views were expounded in 1899, when studying the question of self-government for the Philippines: of the people who advocated self-government for the islanders he said "It were easy enough to give them independence, if by independence you mean only disconnection with any government outside the islands, the independence of a rudderless boat adrift. But self government? How is that given? Can it be given? It is not gained, earned, graduated into from the school of life?"\textsuperscript{4}

Wilson believed that it was necessary for Americans to understand that "a democracy without order leads only to anarchy"\textsuperscript{5}, and he gave a description of how this could occur in a country which did not have the necessary experience for constitutional government:

\begin{quote}
Again how are institutions spread? They are not spread by manuscripts. If we sent to the Philippines our institutions in manuscript they would suffer the same fate which befell a dress suit once captured by the savages. The coat was appropriated and worn by one
savage, the vest by another, and the trousers by a third. Each savage had part of the suit and all were somewhat unconventional. Institutions are only spread by the people who have them. Where they go they carry the institutions. 

Edmund Burke had the greatest influence on Wilson's thought concerning democratic development. Burke believed that order and justice were the prerequisites of liberty, and Wilson came to adopt this view as his own concept of progress. To Wilson, the ultimate aim of his particular type of progressivism would be the development of a suitable atmosphere for democratic progress throughout the world. Plans for peace and stability in Latin America were later to be extended into stability and order for the whole world through the vehicle of the League of Nations.

Wilson used the example of the French Revolution to show what can happen when liberty is taken to be an end in itself. He said "we know order to be the fragile vessel which contains liberty", and agreed with Burke that the French Revolution went astray because it believed that "the object of government is liberty, whereas the true object of government is justice". Such an attitude had led to anarchy in France, and Wilson always believed that it could have a similar result in Latin America. It was America's duty to prevent this and to show her southern neighbours that the English constitutional system was the best because it incorporated "an ideal of cautious and orderly change". Thus, freedom for all men was not to be an immediate state of affairs; it could only be achieved slowly and carefully: "Liberty, among us, is not a sentiment, indeed, but a product of experience; its derivation is not rationalistic, but practical."

Wilson had long believed that America's special purpose in the world would be to teach and guide backward nations in order that, eventually, other peoples could experience the higher principles of the American constitutional system:

Liberty is not itself government. In the wrong hands, in hands unpracticed, undisciplined, — it is incompatible with government. Discipline must precede it, — if necessary, the discipline of being under masters... 

Therefore, in Nicaragua, and especially Haiti, the United States assumed the role of temporary master with the aim of teaching the natives the value of discipline. The resultant order and stability would then allow for further advances towards democracy. Wilson believed that if two 'backward' nations such as Nicaragua and Haiti, were allowed to follow their own destinies the result could be only increased instability.

Whilst Wilson could see a place for struggle in his theories on democratic development, revolution was regarded as the enemy of progress:
... in Burke's phrase we can't use force first and reconciliation afterward. People must get used to differences of opinion, and not get nervous about struggles since these are constituent progress.

But such struggles did not include revolution because "Revolution destroys the atmosphere of opinion and purpose which holds institutions to their form and equilibrium, — as the physical atmosphere holds man's frame together". Thus, nations could experience struggle in their quest for progress, but revolution was regarded as the antithesis of progress because revolution was equated with the anarchy and disorder which formed the funeral pyre of true liberty.

The American Revolution was not seen by Wilson as anything other than a war for independence. In 1776 America had already understood disciplined self government and despite the war, her institutions were not fundamentally changed. The experience was regarded as America's great struggle rather than a true revolution.

Wilson was a great believer in Burke's doctrine of expediency: "The doctrine of doing the wisest thing under the circumstances". This policy was to have a pronounced effect in the Caribbean and Central American areas. Wilson once quoted "'It was my aim' said Burke 'to give to the people the substance of what I knew they desired, and what I thought was right, whether they desired it or not'". The president was greatly impressed with these words because he commented "this must ever be the best maxim of statesmanship amongst a free people".

Such a maxim was particularly appealing to a man of Wilson's religious background, a man who was easily convinced that he thoroughly understood the difference between right and wrong. Wilson had once said "You are weak only when you are in the wrong; you are weak only when you are afraid to do the right; you are weak only when you doubt your cause and the majesty of a nation's might asserted". It was such a man who never questioned that democratic development was the right aim for all peoples.

Therefore, it is understandable that, amongst all Latin American nations, the Mexican situation should have provoked Wilson's most active interest. Woodrow Wilson saw, in Francisco Madero's regime, something which he believed to be the beginnings of a gradual development toward constitutional government, and he regarded the downfall of this president as a severe blow to the liberal concept of progress. Huerta's overthrow of Madero, and the ensuing disorder, presented a reversal of everything Wilson's progressivism held dear. Progress was being denied in Mexico, and Wilson believed that the United States must help the nation to once again find the correct path.

Non-recognition of Huerta's regime was a practical means of dealing with the matter. America had a mission toward these nations because of her own experiences: "We are a sort
of pure air blowing in world politics, destroying illusions and cleaning places". 18

Likewise, in Nicaragua and Haiti America must be practical. In Nicaragua money was
needed and, although dollar diplomacy was despised, it was expedient for it to continue. In
Haiti the immediate need was for order, and thus a practical solution must be found. Such
occasions did not require lofty speculation but sensible action: Wilson believed “Speculative
politics treats men and situations as they are supposed to be; practical politics treats them . .
as they are found to be at the moment of actual contact”. 19 Such a realistic outlook was an
important cornerstone of the progressive movement: “Progressivism is the adaptation of the
business of each day to the circumstances of the day as they differ from the circumstances of
the day that went before”. 20

At the turn of the century Wilson rejoiced in the fact that America was drawn from
isolation into a concern with the affairs of the world. His words show what he believed could
be America’s future contribution:

>We are now dealing with the world which expresses its opinions regardless of how they affect our sensibilities, and this will do us good. Let our government be open and free and I believe it will be a success in our dependencies . . . If you enable the people of our dependencies to speak of us as of ourselves, they will ultimately get the self-possession of experienced critics. We must have a polity in our islands led by men who will take to them not impossible ideals, but the practical, hard-headed experience of the race. 21

But, in dealing with Latin America, the men who represented “the practical-hard
headed experience of the race” were completely opposed to any criticism of the United
States. Far from regarding the opinions of Mexicans, Nicaraguans and Haitians as another
step in the development toward maturity, the Wilson administration came to see such views as examples of lesser nations who were trying to spurn the American spirit of progress. In these countries the Wilson administration continued to support those leaders who agreed with, and were subservient to, the United States.

Wilson had not realised that many Latin Americans would not be able to agree with
Washington’s views of progress. He was so certain that the American way was the best way — the only right way — that he could not understand it might not be welcomed by other peoples. Wilson was certain that if these nations could understand America’s good intentions they would be grateful for her help.

Wilson did see shortcomings within the United States however, and he once warned that
the spirit of progressivism must be utilised to improve, and make more efficient, America’s
own government in order that the United States’ experiences could benefit others. In so doing the United States would be granting herself a service whilst understanding the development necessary for lesser nations:
It is the more imperative that we should see and do it promptly, because it is our present and immediate task to extend self-government to Porto Rico and the Philippines if they be fit to receive it, — so soon as they can be made fit. If there is to be preparation, we must know of what kind it should be, and how it ought to be conducted. Although we have forgot our own preparatory discipline in that kind, these new tasks will undoubtedly teach us that some discipline — it may be prolonged and tedious — must precede self government and prepare the way for it; that one kind of self government is suitable for one sort of community, one stage of development, another for another; that there is no universal form or method either of preparation or of practice in the matter; that character and the moralizing effect of law are conditions precedent, obscure and difficult, but absolutely indispensable...22

Therefore, one of the aims of progressivism must be to first set the United States' own house in order, that the rest of the world could benefit from the American experience. Whilst studying the development and character of self government, the United States would be doing herself a service, because Wilson believed the long, self-imposed isolation from the world had adversely affected the American outlook:

...Misled by our own splendid initial advantage in the matter of self-government, we have suffered ourselves to misunderstand self-government itself, when the question was whether it could be put into practice amidst conditions totally unlike those with which, and with which alone, we have been familiar... They [the people of America] have forgotten how many generations were once in tutelage in order that the generations which discovered and settled the coasts of America might be mature and free.23

Wilson felt that Americans must awaken themselves for this service to mankind. He insisted that the United States urgently needed “the man who does things”24, rather than the man who is content to air grievances and speculate on the problems of the world: “The destiny of America and the leadership of America is that she shall do the thinking of the world”.25

Therefore, the use of force in an effort to make Haitians accept American demands was not the complete reversal of everything Wilson had ever asserted concerning the development of societies. The occupation of Haiti put the United States in the position of master, with the aim of achieving the essentials of order and stability.

If Wilson can be accused of anything, it must be that he thought his aim to teach Latin Americans “to elect good men” could be achieved with relative simplicity. This man was guilty of believing the American ideal of civilisation to be the only right goal for all nations. In the past when he had urged Americans to understand other peoples and had revered the words of Burke “the general character and situation of a people must determine what sort of government is fit for them”26, Wilson had been referring to countries in which the
preconditions of order and stability had already been achieved. He believed that chaos must be overcome at the outset, and his references to differences in government would seem to apply only to relatively minor differences once the processes of civilisation had been completed.

Thus, the real tyrant was the American mission: a mission never questioned because its followers were so convinced of its value.

Wilsonian democracy was to be the end product of a steadily progressing system of maturity. During his presidency, Wilson did not depart from the philosophy he had developed during the years before his political career began. Even his campaign speeches did not ever proclaim a haphazard bestowal of self-government:

I believe, for one, that you cannot tear up ancient rootages and safely plant the tree of liberty in soil which is not native to it. I believe that the ancient traditions of a people are its ballast; you cannot make a tabula rasa upon which to write a political programme... You must knit the new into the old...27

The end-product was always seen to be democratic government because Wilson so firmly believed that this was the only right and moral type of rule, but the development must be gradual, and above all cautious, and some countries would not be fully prepared for many years.

What then was the nature of Wilsonian Imperialism? The progressive mind demanded peace, but peace was possible only with financial stability. Internal reforms were to follow but Latin American nations were always judged from the United States' point of view.

Wilson desired self-government for these regions, but he also wanted to avoid revolution at all costs. The American leader was well-meaning but he made blunders which could not be excused. Despite the obvious drawbacks of sending untrained and inexperienced diplomatic representatives to Latin American countries, Wilson continued to do so throughout his presidency. Perhaps if revolution had not been so abhorrent to Wilson those countries may have been able to settle their problems in their own ways, without the humiliating experience of military control and foreign direction of affairs. Thus, Wilson's major mistake was his absolute belief in the Anglo-Saxon cultural heritage and the American mission. He was unable to view the situation from the vantage point of Latin America, and in the end the combination of progressivism and imperialism was every bit as demeaning as any European exploitive imperialism. The countries in which the United States interfered were made to feel inferior, and the unequal relationship, together with a lack of understanding between the United States and Latin America, emphasised the latter's subordinate position.

Because of Wilson's inconsistencies many writers have come to regard the man as hypocritical and even unbalanced, others see him as a hopelessly unrealistic idealist, and yet
others as an unyielding and uninformed imperialist. But if such accusations can be
levelled at Woodrow Wilson, surely similar could be said of many later American politicians.
America has not learned from her mistakes in Latin America, and even today we see the
missionary zeal of a people who believe their political system to be the only correct one, and
who assume a superior air in trying to help the 'backward' people of these republics.

No study of Woodrow Wilson which aims to give the man a definite label; be it
'hypocrite', 'idealist', 'imperialist', or 'warmonger', can be fully balanced view of the man.
Wilson was a complex character, and in him we find elements of the idealist who found that
in practical politics expediency is of great importance; of the imperialist who, while believing
the United States and the Anglo-Saxon race were superior in the world, also wished to provide
a better life for less privileged peoples; of the true politician who used rhetoric to gain a
following and who was well aware that the moral and humanitarian argument would bring
him to power through an appeal to the spirit of the times.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The most useful volumes in the study of Woodrow Wilson are the papers compiled by Arthur S. Link and his staff, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, (Vols 1–XXIX). These give a full and detailed coverage of Wilson's speeches and correspondence, together with newspaper reports, extracts from diaries, and valuable editorial notes. However, as yet this work covers the period until 1914 only, and therefore little primary material is available in New Zealand to assist with the greater part of Wilson's presidency.

In order to overcome this problem a short visit to Washington D.C. during October and November 1979 made possible a perusal of *State Department Papers* in the National Archives, the *Wilson Collection* in the Library of Congress, together with a limited survey of such lesser material as the *Lansing Papers* and copies of the New York *Times*. Research undergone during this period provided valuable information for the chapters discussing Wilson's policies in Mexico, Haiti and Nicaragua. The vast amount of material available for a study of Mexico underlines the importance of that country in the foreign policy of the United States.

Useful documents available at the University of Canterbury were found in Henry Steele Commager's *Documents Of American History* and John Braeman (ed) *Wilson:*, both of which were particularly helpful in regard to the Mexican situation. Woodrow Wilson's *The New Freedom*, a collection of speeches written to appeal to the United States' public during the 1916 election campaign, gives an insight into the author's view of the American mission at the height of his power.

*The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* remains the most valuable source however, as my thesis rests heavily on Wilson's philosophy. Wilson's ideals were formed during his earlier years, the period of the presidency serving only to underline his thoughts and apply them to practical problems: as I have emphasised, a test which was to have mixed success.

Much useful information was gained from the works and correspondence of Wilson's contemporaries. However, caution must be exercised in studying these works, as there is often an underlying reason for their publication. Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era 1910-1917*, reports many conversations with Wilson, and Daniels repeats Wilson's views on the problems of the times, but although never hostile toward Wilson, he does perhaps, place too much blame on other cabinet members, and often seems to be writing to vindicate his own position. The same could be said of the *Diary of Colonel House* on which the A.L. and J.L. George study, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*, is based; whilst the S. Freud and W.C. Bullitt volume, *Wilson: A Psychological Study*, is openly hostile toward Wilson. Bullitt had been overruled by Wilson on the question of the Russian Revolution and, as a result, came to harbour a deep resentment. Colonel House, likewise, fell from favour as Wilson's
closest confidant and he desired to justify his position. Such works must be viewed in terms of these undercurrents.

*Memoirs of Pancho Villa*, compiled by Martin Luis Guzman, is valuable for studying the Mexican problem from Villa's viewpoint. But once again there are propaganda reasons for the writings, and a lack of documentation, together with Guzman's own admission that he changed much of the writing attributed to Villa to make the style more reminiscent of Villa's speech, makes the work a somewhat less than dependable publication.

The secondary information must be headed by the many volumes of Arthur S. Link, a selection of which is noted in my bibliography. Link has made a life's work of the study of Wilson, and his conclusions on the man remain the most unbiased and well-documented in a very wide field.

Many authors have been impressed with different aspects of Wilson's career, his influence and attitude regarding America and the world in general. Most of these views must be considered and evaluated to obtain a good overall impression of Woodrow Wilson. N. Gordon Levin Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics*, is impressed with the idea of economic expansion when studying Wilson's attitude to the American mission, but Levin does not seem to fully appreciate Wilson's desire to serve mankind, a factor which must be emphasised in any study of the man. Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honour: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of VeraCruz*, emphasises Wilson's idealism and exalted aims, but this author feels that these were only a veneer which Wilson employed to disguise the use of armed intervention during his administration. Above all, Quirk denounces America's air of superiority toward Latin America, and stresses Wilson's dictatorial role toward Mexico. Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti 1915-1934*, stresses Wilson's ambitions for America as a world power and, like Quirk, he regards Wilson's speeches in terms of political expediency.

Dana G. Munro's important work, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921*, places greatest emphasis on United States' security in the western hemisphere, but Munro is also intrigued by the paradox of a high-minded statesman such as Woodrow Wilson feeling compelled to order military occupation in the Caribbean. He believes that the years 1900-1921 reveal a gradually evolving "interventionist" policy in the United States, with no change from this path despite the elections of new presidents and the ascendancy of either political party. Likewise, George W. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson's Administration in Central America*, stresses security and sees Wilsonian diplomacy as reflecting a transition from the president's idealism to the realism of power politics, at a time when the Caribbean seemed threatened by European intervention.
Robert H. Ferrell in *America as a World Power 1872-1945*, emphasises the connection between Wilson's desire to make the world safe for democracy, American imperialistic tendencies, and the need for United States' security in the western hemisphere. Richard Hofstadter's books also take a broad overall view. In *The Age of Reform* this author points out the problems which progressives faced in separating reality from the idealistic aims of the United States reform tradition. Hofstadter believes that the downfall of the progressives was inevitable because of the impossibly high standards they set for themselves.

The sections on racism in my thesis were strengthened by the evidence in Rubin Francis Weston's *Racism in U.S. Imperialism*, as well as by the early correspondence of Wilson from the Arthur S. Link volumes.

Finally, a good overall view of the problems facing Wilson are outlined in the William J. Kilgore article "One America – Two Cultures", *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. VII, no. 1, 1965. Whilst not dealing specifically with Woodrow Wilson, the article gives an excellent summary of United States cultural imperialism, and emphasises the problems which arise when one nation attempts to impose its standards on another: something which was of particular relevance to Woodrow Wilson and Latin America.
Chapter One:


3. Ibid, 274.


9. Ibid,


Chapter Two:


2. EAW to John Bates Clark, 3 Jun 1897, WP DLC. Link, Papers Vol X, 260.


7. EAW to Florence Stevens Hoyt, 27 Jun 1906. Letter in possession of William D. Hoyt jr. Ibid Vol XVI, 430. (The presence of such symptoms could indicate that this was also a stroke.)


11. Also, of course, these reforms owed much to the spirit of the times.


15. WW to Ellen Louise Axson, 24 Feb 1885. Ibid Vol IV, 287.


17. An address in Jersey City N.J., 5 Jan 1911. Printed in the Jersey Journal, 6 Jan 1911. Ibid Vol XXII, 305


31. Ibid.
46. Ibid, 254.
48. For a discussion of this see L. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955. Hartz would not agree that a country which has not experienced strife is a country with advantages.
Chapter Three:


2. Ibid, 634.

3. See chapter 1, p 1 above.


22. A memorandum "What Ought We to Do", c.1 Aug 1898, WP DLC. Ibid Vol X 574-75.


32. Ibid 33-34.

33. Wilson's papers reveal little interest in Mahan's writings, but in 1902 Wilson was elected a member of the Round Table Club, of which Mahan was also a member. It was after this date that his naval opinions became more pronounced. See Link, Papers, Vol XIV, 305-06, 26 Dec 1902.


35. An address to the General Assembly of Virginia and the City Council of Richmond, 1 Feb 1912, WP DLC, Ibid, 107.


41. Ibid.


43. Ibid, 218.

44. Ibid, 223.


Chapter Four:

3. Emiliano Zapata to WW, written 15 Dec 1913 and received by the Latin American Affairs Division 10 Apr 1914. WP DLC.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid, 182.
8. WW to Henry Lane Wilson, 14 Jun 1913. White House Office Files, RG 130, DNA. Link, Papers, Vol XXVII, 518.
11. Ibid, 552.
15. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
21. Review of Reviews, XLIX, 1914, 600. Quoted in Stuart and Tigner, 266.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Daniels, 190.
26. Ibid.
28. Daniels, 192.
29. Ibid, 190.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. At this time it was not realised that the arms shipment was despatched by an American firm, using a German ship to disguise the fact.
33. Daniels, 193.
35. The Diary of Colonel House, 15 Apr 1914. Quoted in Quirk, 77.
36. Daniels, 195.
37. Ibid, 196.
39. Quotation from a correspondent's report, Daniels, 196.
40. Ibid, 198.
41. A tribute to the Americans who were killed in the VeraCruz landing, New York, n.d. Daniels, 198.
42. Ibid, 199.
43. Ibid.
44. Enclosed in a telegram, George C. Carothers to WJB, 22 Apr 1914, WP DLC. In Link, Papers Vol XXIX, 483-85.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid, 316.
49. Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Foreign Relations, 1914, 488-89, 25 Apr 1914, File no. 812.00/16525.
50. Correspondence regarding commissioners and mediators, Foreign Relations 1914, 501-59.
51. Daniels, 203-04.
52. Guzmán, 276. (Guzmán's book is written with reference to Villa's diary, manuscripts and service records: each of which were recorded by different people, and the author concedes that he has altered excerpts to make them read as Villa would have spoken).
54. Ibid.
56. Guzmán, 277-78.
57. Ibid, 364.
58. John Lind to WJB, VeraCruz, 5 Dec 1913, WP DLC. Link, Papers, Vol XXIX, 14.
59. Ibid.
60. Guzmán, 391.
61. Ibid.
63. Guzmán, 403.
64. WJB to Agent Silliman, 13 Mar 1915, 612-1123/63a, FR 1915, 822.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid, 16 Mar 1915, 612-1123/12a, 824.
67. Guzmán, 443.
68. Link, Wilson: The Struggle ... 264.
69. Guzmán, 277-78.
72. Special Agent Silliman to the Secretary of State ad interim, 22 Jun 1915. FR, 1915, 718-19.
74. Ibid, 490-91.
78. Ibid 644.
79. Agreement for policing the border was gained only indirectly from Carranza, who asked for cooperation in exterminating outlaws in Chihuahua State without mentioning the crossing of borders by troops of either country. 812.00/17102, 19 Jan 1916, 312.115 C 96/88, 29 Jan 1916, FR 1916, 466-67.
81. 12 Apr 1916. 812.00/17866 FR 1916, 514.
85. Secretary of State to Mr Parker, representing American interests (telegram). 28 Dec 1915, 812.516/114a, FR 1916.
86. Enclosure (dated 29 Dec 1915) in Mr Parker to Secretary of State, 26 Jan 1916, 812.512/1017. Ibid.
87. G. Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin America, New York, Wiley, 1974, 147: “under no circumstances could they acquire ownership of lands or waters within a zone extending one hundred kilometres from Mexico’s frontiers or within fifty kilometres from her coasts ...”
92. Ibid, 337.
93. See P. 44-45 above, notes 62 and 63.
Chapter Five:


3. Ibid, 34.


10. WJB to WW, 20 Jun 1913, WP DLC. Ibid 553.


19. Munro, 340.


21. From the account in *FR 1914, 1915,*

22. Ibid.


24. WJB to Minister Blanchard, 12 Nov 1914; 838.00/1020. FR 1914, 359.


28. WW to WJB, 13 Jan 1915, Decimal Files, Haiti Internal, SDR; WJB to WW 15 Jan 1915; WW to WJB, 16 Jan 1915, SDR, DNA.


30. WJB to Blanchard, 12 Nov 1914, 838.00/1020, FR 1914, 359.

31. WJB to WW, 3 Apr 1915, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, DNA. In Schmidt, 53-54.


33. WW to WJB, 6 Apr 1915. Ibid.

34. Munro, 349.

36. WW to RL, 2 Jul 1915, 838.00/1197. In Munro, 351.
37. Ibid, 352.
38. RL to WW, 838.00/1418, FR 1916. Ibid, 353.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
43. WW to Allen Wickham Corwin, 10 Sep 1900, Wilson Collection, Princeton Univ. Ibid Vol 11, 573.
44. RL to Chargé Davis, 10 Aug 1915, 838.00/1246a, FR 1915, 479.
45. The Times, New York, 28-29 July 1915.
47. Schmidt, 64-66.
53. J. Daniels to WW, 2 Aug 1915, Daniels-Wilson Correspondence DNA. In Schmidt, 69.
55. RL to WW, 9 Aug 1915, T, 838.00/1275a, FR-LP 11, 1914-1920, 524.
57. Ibid.
58. RL to WW, 24 Nov 1915, 710.11/188¾. Ibid, 466-70.
60. WW to RL, 29 Nov 1915, 710.11/189¾. Ibid, 470.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
66. For a discussion of this point, see Healy', 200-01.
68. Ibid, 78-79.
69. See footnote 52 above.
71. Waller to Lejeune, 16 Aug 1915, 1 Jul 1916. Lejeune MSS, Container 4, DNA. In Schmidt, 79.
73. Schmidt, 99.
75. Schmidt, 115.
77. Schmidt, pp 103-07, 117-20. (For details of the oppression).
78. Daniels to W. A. White, 18 Feb 1930, Daniels MSS, Container 642, DNA. In Ibid 105-06.
81. Daniels, 179.
Chapter Six:

1. Munro, 39-40.
2. Ibid, 167-68. Reference is made to the Emery claims etc.
3. Ibid, 175-76.
10. Munro, 395.
14. WW to WJB, 20 May 1914, WP DLC. In Baker, 352.
17. Baker, 369. After ratification little action was taken on the Central American claims.
18. Munro, 401.
21. J. R. Clark to RL, 10 Jun 1916, 817.00/2545. Also a memorandum by Leland Harrison of the Latin American Division, 5 Sep 1915, 817.00/2536. In Munro, 407.
Chapter Seven:

1. Link, Papers, Vol V, 63.
2. Ibid.
10. Ibid, 374.
16. Ibid.
18. An address, 10 Jan 1904. Link, Papers, Vol XV, 143.
29. e.g. President Carter's attitude toward Brazil.
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