

The UK and CSDP: How has the UK moulded CSDP?

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Abstract

This research aimed to take scope of the relationship between the UK and the CSDP. It aimed to touch on how the UK moulded the CSDP into what it is today, and how it contributed through a variety of different ways namely; institutionally, monetarily and personnel. It also concluded that despite the UK leaving the EU, it is likely to still be involved through NATO links and bi-lateral agreements.

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Abbreviations

CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPE	Civilian Power Europe
CSDP/ESDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EPC	European Political Community
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUCAP	European Union Capacity building
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force

EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office
GNI	Gross National Income
HG2010	Headline Goals 2010
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goals
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPE	Normative Power Europe
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
OHQ	Operation Headquarters Facilities
OSCE/CSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WEU	Western European Union

Chapter 1- Introduction and aim of the study

1.1- The Reason for the Thesis

If not for a vote across the Atlantic in November 2016, the June 2016 Brexit vote would have gone down as the most baffling political vote of 2016, if not the 21st Century. Why would a country remove itself from one of the largest trading blocs in world, especially when said trading bloc is right on their doorstep? Despite this, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, and this was formally set after Article 50 (the leaving mechanism) was triggered in March 2017. This means that the UK and the EU have two years from March 2017 to work out the divorce document which will outline what the future relationship between the two will be. Whilst deciding what the future relationship of the two will be, many looked back at the 40-year history of the UK in the EU. Whilst the UK would never be accused of being a Europhile country, the result of the vote still came as a shock to many. Whilst the UK is an important player in many different aspects of the EU, the relationship between the UK and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is of interest. The reason for this interest is because the UK is one of the founding fathers of CSDP along with France and helped to build the institutions and decision-making process of CSDP. So, the withdrawal of the UK could see drastic changes to the CSDP.

The CSDP is the defence policy of the European Union and is an extension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but differs to CFSP in the decision-making process as the CSDP is inter-governmental rather than the community method of CFSP. EU Member States have given the CFSP supranational powers and institutions which allows it to act as the voice of all 28 Member States. CSDP on the other hand is inter-governmental, which means that member states drive the direction and policy and can choose what level of involvement they have with the policy.

Many of my family are either in the military or had previously been in the military so I have always had an interest in defence, so naturally when studying the EU, I was naturally attracted to the CSDP and what it is like between the UK and the CSDP. There is no shortage of studies and research describing how the UK interacts with certain aspects of the CSDP, such as in the creation of the policy instruments or of their contributions to CSDP operations. But these studies have tended to focus on one aspect such as the history of the CSDP or even what the future relationship will look

like. This research will hope to look at the relationship between the UK and CSDP and try explaining how the UK has moulded the CSDP and tried to close the theorized capabilities-expectations gap?

1.2- Structure of Thesis

Chapter 1 Introduction to the Study- This Introduces the Study

Chapter 2 Literature Review- this will be a review of previous literature which tries to explain the previous attempts to explain the EU as a Foreign Policy actor and the role the UK as played with the CSDP. Literature is also sprinkled throughout the other chapters were relevant.

Chapter 3 European Defence Initiatives- This chapter will explain previous European defence and foreign policy initiatives from 1949 until 1998. At each step will describe the role that the UK has played at each step in the process. This will look at these from a variety of different sources, from scholarly articles to official policy documents from both the UK and the EU.

Chapter 4 CSDP and its Key features- The time frame of this Chapter is from the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 until 2018 and describes the relatively rapid development of foreign policy capability through the CSDP. It goes into detail about the funding mechanisms and instruments of CSDP.

Chapter 5 The UK and CSDP- This chapter looks at how the UK specifically contributes to the CSDP, by way of personnel and material. This Chapter also looks at what the future relationship between the UK and the CSDP will look like.

Chapter 2- Literature Review

2.1-Setting the scene- Modern relevance and context

The UK is a member of the EU's so-called 'big three' (Whitman & Wolff, 2012, p. 10) along with France and Germany in terms of economic and population size and as their role as the drivers of EU policy. Importantly, the UK has one of the highest military expenditures in the world, one of the highest largest economies in the world (nominal GDP), holds a permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and is a member of the G8. In other words, the UK is what you would consider a global actor in foreign policy. This one lead to one to assume that they would be using this influence and resources to be at the forefront of expanding the foreign policy capability of the EU.

The June 2016 Brexit vote drew a shock globally as one of the EU's most wealthy and influential members voted to leave the Union. Despite the 'uneasy' membership, the UK, or any member for that matter, was never truly ever expected to leave the EU. With the Brexit vote, the future role that the UK will play with the different EU institutions, and the question must be asked of what role did the UK play in the development of these institutions. This research will focus on one of these institutions, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and what impact the UK had in moulding it.

The UK was not a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC) and did not join the EEC until 1973. The 1973 enlargement was the first enlargement of the EEC and saw Denmark, Ireland and the UK join Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The UK had unsuccessfully tried to join the EC in both 1961 and 1967 but was rejected both times by France but this rejection did not seem to dissuade the UK from trying to join again. Another important milestone in European Integration had happened just before the 1973 enlargement and that was the creation of the European Political Community (EPC) in 1970. In the years preceding the EPC saw no unified EC response to the increasingly public Vietnam War or even in their own backyard with the Prague Spring in 1968. Middle Eastern conflicts and the drop-in oil prices in the 1970's further showed the need for a common position for the EEC members (Hill, 2002).

Throughout the Cold War period, the collective defence of Europe was left to the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which had its strongest European supporter in the UK,

and this strong support for NATO will be expanded in Chapter 3 of this study. There had been attempts for European defence integration through the European Defence Community (EDC) and Western European Union (WEU). The EDC had failed to get off the ground and the WEU, had been largely ineffectual as EC member's prioritised defence through NATO. The UK had been reluctant to increase European security and defence integration outside of NATO, while France wanted to have European defence integration and capability be expanded through the WEU. The end of the 1980's saw the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact which raised questions about the necessity of NATO at a time where the EC was looking at both deepening its institutions and widening for more members to join (Schneider, 2014). With the collapse of the USSR this led to a unipolar world with the USA as the last remaining super and created a vacuum amongst the Eastern European states who had been part of the Warsaw Pact.

While the USSR was collapsing the EC was in negotiations with its members over what would become the Maastricht Treaty, which came into power in 1993. The pillar system of the Maastricht Treaty was to signal closer integration with the consolidation of the existing communities and added capabilities which had been intergovernmental before the Treaty.

The European communities' pillar (1st pillar) consolidated the pre-existing community treaties; Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Union (Treaty of Rome). The two other pillars which were created, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (2nd pillar) which replaced the EPC and the Justice and Home Affairs (3rd pillar) which replaced TREVI, both the EPC and TREVI had been intergovernmental before the Maastricht Treaty.

The Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990's showed that even though the now-named EU had CFSP, it still lacked cohesion, the capacity and a will to agree to action. This inaction and over reliance on diplomatic means would come at the cost of thousands of lives lost and displaced (Ginsberg, 2001). This failure would have two key consequences; it confirmed a continued need for NATO and the US in Europe, and it would finally see the convergence of directions for both France and the UK in terms of defence policy. This defence policy would come to ahead with the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 which was to outline the plan for autonomous EU defence capabilities. This sudden shift in UK defence policy surprised many because of their strong opposition to any policy strengthening defence outside of NATO.

The conflict in Yugoslavia would be the lead up to the Saint-Malo Conference, which is the founding moment and main driver of CSDP legislation. Chapter 3 and 4 will look at the events in more detail which brought the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/CSDP to fruition and will look specifically at UK involvement in these events.

2.2- Literature Review: European Union- What sort of actor?

The terms 'Civilian Power (CPE)', 'Normative Power Europe (NPE)' and even 'soft power' have been used as descriptors by researchers when trying to explain the foreign policy of the EU and its predecessors. Diez in (Diez,2005) quoted in (Rogers, 2009, p. 832)explains how there is a novel notion of the EU has an external power because: "it is said to rely on civilian power rather than military means and to pursue the spread of particular norms, rather than geographical expansion or military superiority." Despite this characterisation of the EU as a 'civilian power' it does not mean that the EU necessarily saw themselves as a Civilian or Normative power as they have continuously tried to increase military capability since WW2¹.

Since integrated EU defence policy is an extension of EU foreign policy, much of the previous literature that has been done on European defence policy has focused on how the EU, and its prior iterations, acted in foreign policy, why they took the actions that they took, and how that has shaped their desire for European defence policy. While there have been numerous studies done on the EU as a foreign policy actor (Laursen, 2009) (Howorth, 2010) (Tank, 1998) (Lucarelli & Menotti, 2006), this research will look at three which have proved to be popular in trying to explain why the EU acts as it does in the foreign policy field and how they could act in the future. The scholars and theories in question are François Duchêne and the civilian power concept, Christopher Hill and the capability-expectations gap and Ian Manners and the normative power concept. After looking at the work of the three, this research will look at a sample of contemporary scholarly work on impact the UK has had in moulding CSDP.

The uniqueness of the EC as a Foreign Policy actor has long been documented by scholars in the last 50 years. How to classify this unique has long been a source of debate because it did not properly fit into existing schools of political thought. In a world dominated by two superpowers threatening mutual discussion in the USA and USSR, what was to be the role of a group of states stuck between a rock and a hard place? The role of EC foreign policy has been deconstructed and much of it focused

¹ See Chapter 3

on the fact that the EC is *sui generis* as a foreign policy actor (Holland, 1994; Whitman, 1998; Ginsberg, 2001).

The EC, as explanations go, was *sui generis* because it did not fit the existing explanations on foreign policy actors and their supposed roles in the international systems, realist scholars have stressed the importance of states in the international system over supranational institutions (Waltz, 1979; Feldman, 1999; Reichwein, 2015), with Feldman even suggesting that individual states hold the power in supranational systems. While not completely dismissive of the EC as an international actor, realist scholars focus on the undue effect powerful countries such as France and the UK have on the foreign policy direction of the union.

2.3- The EU as a Civilian and Normative actor

Francois Duchêne coined the term 'civilian power' (Duchêne,1973) when discussing the EC as a foreign policy actor in 1973. The EPC was still in its infancy at this period and the UK had just joined the EC and was in what Duchêne called a 'flux'. Duchene had described the EU as a civilian power which was power outside the traditional understandings of military and economic power.

Duchene predicted this role for Europe because of where it was situated, and the lack of arms it possessed, Europe was at the juncture between the West and East and outside of the UK and France possessed no nuclear capabilities of its own. He theorized that because of these limitations the countries in question were forced to behave differently and would move away from 'quasi-military confrontation' and towards civilian and political processes (Duchêne, 1971a p.69; Duchêne, 1971).

The idea of CPE is similar to the soft power theory pioneered by Joseph Nye in the 1980's in which he described the failing of American hard power i.e. Military and economic means. Since the first theorisation by Duchêne in the 1970's CPE became a popular discourse to explain the unique foreign policy role that the EC played in the cold war period (Rogers, 2009) (Bull, 1982) (Wagner, 2017). Questions began to be asked about the role of CPE after the Saint-Malo conference and the advent of ESDP/CSDP, could the EU still be a civilian power whilst eschewing its own defensive capabilities (Smith, 2000). Smith argued that the EU could still be considered a civilian power because European hard power capabilities lay within the auspices of NATO and not within ESDP(Smith,2000), while some suggested that with the addition of CSDP has muddled the EU's international identity away from a Civilian Power (Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, 2011).

The second theorization of the EU as an international actor has been the work of Ian Manners and his normative power concept. Normative power Europe (NPE) was theorized as the peaceful power of ideas and values, apart from economic and military power (Manners, 2002,2006; Whitman,2011). Manners argued that NPE had been developed over a 50-year period through its actions and that the EU possessed 5 key norms developed through its treaties and actions; Peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights (Manners,2002 p. 242). NPE was related closely to the concept of soft power and was seen by some scholars as being closely related to CPE (Diaz,2005).

2.4- What is the capabilities-expectations gap?

Whilst Duchêne's works shaped much of the early discussion and views on the EPC as a foreign policy actor, the second cluster of work focused on the work of Christopher Hill and his capability-expectations gap concept. The work of Hill came at an important time because it was at the juncture from when the EC was negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, and this was hoped to increase integration in the foreign policy field.

The capability-expectations gap first published in (Hill, 1993) and expanded upon in (Hill, 1997,2002; Holland,1994; Toje,2008) focused on the difference between expectations (both internal & external) of what the EU was expected to achieve or role to play in the international system and what they could achieve with their resources and capabilities.

Hill theorised that the EC would fill the position in the international order of the USSR after the end of the cold war, theorizing four functions that the EC had performed in the international system and six functions which they could perform in the future (see table 1).The capabilities-expectation gap was then expanded upon in (Tsuruoka,2004) in what was described as the expectations deficit-repeated failure in the foreign policy field will then lead to low expectations in the future.

Table 1: Hill's conceptualization of the role the EC had played as an international actor and the possible future role

The role of the EC as an international actor so far:	Possible future functions of the EC
1. The stabilization of Western Europe	1. A replacement for the USSR in the Global balance of power.
2. Managing world trade	2. Regional pacifier
3. Principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South	3. Global intervener
4. Providing a second western voice in international diplomacy	4. Mediator of conflicts
	5. Bridge between rich and poor
	6. Joint supervisor of the world economy

Sourced from: Hill, Christopher. *"The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role."* Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (1993): 312-315.

This conceptualization by Hill would drive debate about the role of EC before the Maastricht Treaty and afterwards with the implementation of CFSP. The possible future role of the EC theorized by Hill in Table 1 was like what the WEU held themselves to in with the creation of the Petersburg tasks in 1992. Despite Maastricht reforms of the EPC into CFSP there was still debate around the effectiveness of the EU as a foreign policy actor.

Much of the literature pointed out the reforms and all though not insignificant, still relied too heavily on inter-governmental solutions and voluntary consensus (Holland, 1997; Hill, 2002), Ginsberg suggesting a gap between what TEU drafters wanted and what transpired, with the result being debate centering around the process rather than the actual decisions (Ginsberg, 1997). Holland did suggest that if consensus could be achieved then this gap could be bridged, and the EU could be an effective actor,

"While accepting Hill's concern that there is real danger in the degree and number of expectations being placed on the EU, the South African experience showed that Europe,

when motivated and in common agreement, possessed the resources and instruments to match current expectations with capabilities"-(Holland, 1995).

Chapter 3 will show that the EU had continuously tried to create further foreign policy instruments such as the CSDP, to combat expectations placed upon them both internally and externally.

2.5- The role of the UK in CSDP

The UK along with France is one of the two 'founding fathers' of CSDP because it was the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 which the course for ESDP/CSDP integration. Previous research has noted that the Saint-Malo declaration was seen as when British and French defensive priorities converged², France had been a supporter of defensive integration through the WEU, while the UK was focused on NATO integration (Guyomarch, et al., 1998; Shearer, 2007; Ricketts, 2017).

Despite the leading role the UK played in the formation of an ESDP/CSDP, recent literature has focused on the role or lack of role the UK has played in developing CSDP in contemporary times. The UK has shifted from 'leader-to laggard' (Whitman, 2016b, p. 45) in terms of support towards the further development of the CSDP since their leading role at St Malo in 1998. Instead of increased CSDP integration and the expansion of common costs the UK has chosen to advance security interests through NATO and bilateral relations with EU member states (Whitman, 2016, 2017; Howorth, 2014; Sundberg & Zetterland, 2013). Howorth expands further in saying that since the early 2000's the UK is more of a 'spoiler' rather than a driver of CSDP and has put breaks on further integration of CSDP since 2005 (Howorth, 2017, 2017a) and that the move towards ESDP integration was nothing more than an attempt to further their own national security interests (Howorth, 2000), (Schaeede, 2018).

CSDP was seen by London as an 'optional extra' rather than an integral part of UK security and defence policy, which saw CSDP as a threat to NATO (Whitman, 2016). Whitman further suggests that the UK had been keen to keep CSDP as inter-governmental with the veto power, rather than go to the community method, because of a loss national foreign policy decision making to the EU. The UK had not only become a laggard but had actively vetoed plans to increase funding and expand integration towards CSDP through the Athena Mechanism for funding CSDP missions. Nováky

² See Chapter 3

(Nováky, 2016) notes the previous research done on the technical issues and complexity of CSDP funding-and the unique and awkward intersection it sits on³.

Scholars have also noted the relationship between NATO and CSDP, while called a so-called defence policy, the CSDP is focussed on conflict prevention while the defence of the European territory is the responsibility of NATO. Many have noted the constant calls by US sources about the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO through increased funding and the assuming of leadership within NATO by EU Member States (Kirchner,2000; Demetriou, 2016; Howorth, 2018). This has been a hot-topic issue recently through the antagonism of the Trump Administration.

³ See Chapter 4.8

Chapter 3- European defence integration before CSDP

3.1- European foreign policy and defence integration- Historical Overview

This chapter of the research provides an historical overview on foreign policy and defence initiatives undertaken in Europe in the aftermath of World War 2 up until the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998. This research will look at both foreign policy and defence initiatives is because defence initiatives fall under the foreign policy umbrella. The following chapter is chronologically ordered to analyse key events in European foreign policy and security integration with a specific look at what role the UK played in each step.

The road towards European foreign policy and Europe's defence integration is a road that has been marked by potholes, dead ends and even unfinished roads, this chequered history with many failed attempts at integration causing it to be somewhat of a 'taboo' subject (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the friction in defence integration lay between the two pre-eminent defence powers, the UK and France and the different paths each wanted EU defence integration to take. This friction is shown throughout the history of integration, much of these and their success are down to the will of the French or British administrations of the time.

3.2- European Foreign Policy and Security Integration (1949-1998)

Table 2: European Foreign Policy and Security Integration (1949-1998)

Year/ period	Treaty/event
1949	Washington Treaty (NATO)
1951	Treaty of Paris (ECSC)
1952-1954	EDC, signing and non-ratification
1954	WEU
1957	Rome Treaty
1964	Fouchet Plan
1970	EPC
1993	Maastricht Treaty
1997	Amsterdam Treaty
1998	Saint-Malo declaration

Sourced from: (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 37).

This research is interest in what has happened previously in security and defence integration, so we can help to understand why the EU and its member states continued to develop in this field. Table 2 outlines key dates and developments in European foreign policy and security integration this chapter will expand on below and give a general overview on each of these events giving a general on what happened at each step and expanding upon the role the UK played at each part of the process. This is unique because the UK played an important role even when it was outside of the EU.

3.3 1949- The Creation of NATO

The signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949 saw the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which was tasked with the defence of Western Europe. The creation of NATO was to counterbalance the possible resurgence of Germany as an aggressive military power (Bibliographies, 2017), and the power of the Soviet Union and later, the Warsaw Pact⁴. The appeal to many of the Western European countries was Article 5, which espoused collective defence; if one country was attack then all allies would consider it an attack on themselves. This collective defence would theoretically allow the militarily weaker members of Western Europe to safeguard themselves against the Soviet Union. Despite NATO not being a solely European defence initiative, it has arguably had the most significant impact on European defence across the Cold War period. This was not the first attempt of the US to restructure Western Europe as the year before the Marshall Plan had been undertaken. The Marshall Plan was the economic rebuilding of Europe after World War 2 and was funded by the USA.

Prior to the creation of the WEU and NATO there had been suggestions by exiled governments in London⁵ about the creation of an international security system. This international security system had been proposed in June 1942 by the exiled governments of Belgium, Norway and Denmark who presented a joint project made up of regional pacts across both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific and would guarantee collective security against parties in the Atlantic and Pacific (Yevgeny, 2011). Despite this proposal failing, it showed that after two devastating wars that there was appetite across both sides of the Atlantic for a new security architecture.

NATO was not just an American brainchild but found strong support in the UK, who has been perhaps the strongest European supporter of the alliance. It was this support of NATO, that had led to

⁴ The Warsaw Pact was not created until West Germany joined NATO in 1955.

⁵ Many exiled Governments were based in London during World War 2

such British scepticism over increased EU integration through other defence initiatives. This strong British support for NATO (as mentioned in the previous chapter) was contrasted strongly with France who had been the strong supporter of European defence integration through institutions such as the WEU. This anti-American flavour was especially present during the Presidency of Charles de Gaulle and peaked with the withdrawal of France from NATO in 1966. This withdrawal from NATO happened before the UK joined the EC in 1973, so when the UK joined the EC it became an important bridge to both organisations. This strong support has not wavered in recent years, with the UK being just one of four EU-NATO members who pay the NATO guideline of 2% defence spending.

While NATO was key in the defence of mainland Europe during the Cold War, in recent times there have been questions over the relevancy of the security architecture. This does not mean that NATO has not been active, as shown through the UN-sanctioned NATO-led airstrikes against regime targets during the civil uprising in Libya in 2011 (Bloed, 2017). Many of the EU members in NATO took active part in either enforcing a no-fly zone or by actual force. While there was uncertainty over the future of the alliance after the Cold War, the different US administrations that have been in power since the fall of the Cold War have been in strong support of the alliance (Bush, 2002).

3.4- 1951- The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community

The first step in European Integration was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Schumann declaration of 9 May 1950 by Robert Schumann, who was the Foreign Minister of France at the time was considered the start of European integration process. It was in this declaration where the joining of the French and German coal and steel communities was formerly proposed. It was thought that if these two and other countries were integrated in this way it would “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (European Union, 2017) as coal and steel were the main ingredients in armament production.

The importance of the Schumann declaration cannot be understated, as 9 May is celebrated today as Europe Day. So, while the Schumann declaration is the ideological start of the ECSC and its following iterations, the Treaty of Paris is the physical start date for the European Coal and Steel community amongst its six-member states; Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands. The rationale behind this community seems to be simple for many of these countries, they had been devastated by conflict twice in the previous 20 years. Duke and Vahoonacker (Duke &

Vanhoonaeker, 2017, p. 26) suggest that it was easier for these countries to liberalise trade to create a political outcome rather than through foreign policy and political integration. Despite this would signal the start of a 'belief in a rules-based international order and multilateralism was born, which has become a constant theme across EU foreign policy attempts (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008).

The UK did not join the ECSC in 1951, and instead of going down the route of supranationalism and multilateralism like the ECSC members, they nationalised their domestic coal and steel industry. The nationalisation of this industry had been a goal of the Labour Government in Britain so joining the ECSC over the nationalisation of this would have been politically difficult. This was coupled their own view of what role the UK played in the Commonwealth and as a bridge between the Europe and the US (Kenealy, 2016).

3.5- EDC: The first French Attempt at a Defence Community

The European Defence Community (EDC) was an attempt to create an integrated defence community amongst the members of Western Europe after World War 2. The EDC was based on a plan by French Prime Minister René Pleven and was called the Pleven Plan and came in response to the possibility of Germany re-arming (Hunter, 2002). Even though 1952 was when the Treaty was signed but had been in negotiation for years before that and it was non-ratified by the French Government in 1954 which effectively killed it. The EDC was to be similar in composition to the ECSC the Treaty announced that the member states would “set up amongst themselves a European Defence Community, supra-national in character, comprising common institutions, common Armed Forces, and a common budget” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 41).

Whilst the ECSC aimed to promote peace through economic integration, the EDC aimed to do the same but through defence integration. The success of the EDC lived and died by the will of the French government. The motivation of the EDC for the French government was because of the devastating World Wars and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. With this conflict in mind that meant that Germany had invaded France 3 times in the previous 80 years which would have been on the mind of the French policy makers as they attempted to further integrate Germany into post War supranational institutions.

Unlike the ECSC which was ratified by the members and would become a model on which could be built, the EDC had failed to get the support of the member states who had fears over ceding sovereignty to the EDC project (Dwan, 2001). The entire EDC timeline from 1950-1954 was a slow process which faced opposition from some of the member states involved and the ruling parties of the countries faced a tough sell to their own national governments (Dwan, 2001). Perhaps most surprisingly was that despite earlier objections towards the EDC, the US and NATO became strong supporters of the EDC after a meeting between Jean Monnet and Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1951, Eisenhower was the supreme commander of NATO at this time. Monnet did not have any interest in the defensive integration of Europe, which is contrasted with his strong support for the ECSC. It was even suggested that the US was the single strongest external force pushing for the EDC, and they held sway with the ECSC members because of the large amount of aid and support that they were providing through the Marshall Plan (Dwan, 2001, p. 156). It was this support which kept the EDC stringing along until its failing as the ECSC member states bowed to domestic pressure. The EDC was ultimately non-ratified after being voted down by the French National Assembly, a pan-European defence force was a bridge too far (Duke & Vanhoonacker, 2017, p. 26).

Despite the failing of the EDC it would not stop successive French Governments from trying to create closer defence and foreign policy integration. While the EDC had failed to come to fruition, some of its aspects were carried over into the next French-led European integration attempt which was the WEU. Like with the ECSC the UK decided to not opt into the EDC and preferred to focus on American and NATO integration.

3.6- The Creation of the WEU in 1954

The WEU was created in 1954, was the third iteration of what was originally the Treaty of Dunkirk. This Treaty was aimed at creating closer co-operation amongst a variety of different areas for the members. The Treaty of Dunkirk was signed in 1947 between France and the UK to counteract any possible aggression by Germany and the Soviet Union. This was expanded in 1948 in the Treaty of Brussels which brought two developments; the name the Western Union, and the admission of the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The WU was quickly passed in relevance by other organisations such as NATO and ECSC which performed much of the same tasks which the WU was originally envisaged to do. In 1954 the Treaty of Brussels was amended in response to these developments and the question over German re-armament, this amendment would incorporate Italy and West Germany into the framework of the now called WEU.

The history of the WEU has seen it go through periods of inactivity and even irrelevance, as the members opted to use other avenues for integration. This is one of the instances where the difference in defence priorities between France and the UK came to the fore. Despite being a member of both NATO and the WEU, the UK pushed for further integration of NATO and only used the WEU sparingly to consult with WEU members. When the UK joined the EEC in 1973 it consigned the WEU to the backseat as it was largely defunct from 1973-1984 (Lanigan, 2015). With the WEU out of the picture it left an awkward situation for France because they were outside of NATO structures and the WEU was defunct from 1973-1984.

The WEU was reactivated after a meeting between the foreign ministers of the member states in 1984. This meeting came at the behest of the Belgian and French Governments, and in this meeting, it set forth a new agenda; this agenda recognised the significance of the US towards European defence and hoped for increased regional military cooperation (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018). The integration preferences for both the UK and France can be seen in this new agenda, the UK's agenda with the recognition of the US and the French agenda with increased regional integration. Despite these different agendas the EU states within the WEU had managed two successful foreign policy actions in its waning years according to DeVore (DeVore, 2009). DeVore suggested that despite an ill-defined mandate and weak institutional structures, it proved more than capable of carrying external action than other organisations. The WEU coordinated the European efforts in clearing naval mines during the Iran-Iraq War (1987-1988) and performed multiple roles during and after the 1991 Gulf War (DeVore, 2009, p. 228).

The role that the WEU should play had long been debated by the two foremost defence powers, France and the UK. This had been an issue in the 1950's and this debate continued well into the 1990's in the Treaty of Maastricht negotiations. This debate centred around not only the WEU's role within the EC but also how the WEU would interact with NATO. The French President, Francois Mitterrand wanted the WEU to be incorporated within EC structures, while British Prime Minister John Major did not want WEU integration to come the expense of American involvement in both NATO and Europe (Wall, 2008b).

Perhaps the greatest legacy of the WEU was the adoption of the Petersberg tasks. The Petersberg tasks were a series of tasks which were adopted by first the WEU and later in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

These tasks included Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008b, p. 177).

3.7 1957- Rome Treaty

The 1957 Treaty of Rome saw the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The addition of the EEC and EURATOM is considered the start of the European Union as understood today. While not adding a foreign policy capability to the original six and with a focus on economic integration it still added political capability through its economic integration. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan note (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008) that the EEC was ‘granted competences in external trade and the conclusions of agreements with third states, so while not explicitly gaining foreign policy competence, it would still allow it to be an international actor.

The UK did not join the EEC as it was still committed to the Commonwealth, but it would try to join in both 1963 and 1967 but were vetoed by Charles de Gaulle both times. It would not be until de Gaulle left the French Presidency in 1969 that the UK would try to join again and eventually join the EC in 1973.

3.8 1964- Fouchet Plan- Another French Initiative

Like with the WEU and EDC, the Fouchet Plan was a French attempt at the creation of an integrated European political union. The Fouchet Plan as the brainchild of Charles de Gaulle and was an attempt to increase political integration and have France be at the head of this political union. De Gaulle had multiple attempts at pushing this plan through firstly with Italy in 1959 and then with Germany in 1960. Jeffrey Vanke (Vanke, 2001) notes that this union would then be able to serve a unique balancing role in the realist sense in Europe; “De Gaulle’s France would assert its independence between America and Russia, by uniting continental Europe under French leadership”.

The UK was not part of the EC at this stage and this was between the EC members, so they had no formal part in the failure of the Fouchet Plan. Because of this they were not a part of the failure of the Fouchet Plan, the major push against the Plan came from the Benelux Countries. These countries were

highly resistant to the plan because of the fear that it would take power away from the EEC. The UK was not part of the EC at this stage they were not involved for the early parts of the Fouchet Plan and according to Vanke (Vanke, 2001, p. 96) the French Government had misgivings over the role of the UK; “Britain had to be excluded, both because its pretensions and prestige still ran too high, and because it was the ‘Trojan Horse’ of American Leadership aspirations in Europe”.

3.9 1970- The Creation of European Political Co-operation

European Political Co-operation (EPC) was the name given to European political integration between the members of the EC. This name was given after the Luxembourg Report was adopted in 1970, which was published after a study done by the 6 members of the EC. The report stated that there was a want amongst the member states to co-ordinate foreign policy with a need to intensify political co-operation, so the world could see that Europe was on a ‘political mission’ (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). This ‘political mission’ was for the EC to act as a first a regional pacifier in Europe and then a global pacifier. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan further suggest that a change in national governments in EC member states helped to create this shift towards political integration and the end of Charles de Gaulle in France was the removal of a major roadblock towards this political integration (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 44).

While the member states expressed a need and want for more coordinated foreign policy between the member states before the publication of the Luxembourg Report, the report also stated in more explicit terms in what they wanted out of increased political cooperation between the EC members. The objectives of this foreign policy mission mentioned above are defined below (Hill & Smith, 2000).

- To ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems
- To strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of their views, the co-ordination of their positions, and, where it appears possible and desirable
- Common action

The objectives above should be taken with a grain of salt, especially with the benefit of hindsight. While they state the intended purpose of the EPC, the inter-governmental approach of the EPC would mean that it was rarely used for its intended purpose. Podt (Podt, 2014) notes that while EPC encouraged member states to take common positions on foreign policy and political issues, it became

more of an occasional exchange of opinions rather than effective political tool. This inter-governmental approach was seemingly preferred by the EC members because it stayed part of the political institutions through the 1970's and 1980's and would only change through the CFSP reforms in the Treaty of Amsterdam, where even though the inter-governmental approach was kept, the addition of the role of the High Representative was created to help consolidate views.

3.10 1973- British accession to EC

The UK finally gained accession and joined the EC in 1973. This was after the two failed attempts in the 1960s which both had been vetoed by France. Wall (Wall, 2008) notes that during the early 1950's the UK had much larger trade within the Commonwealth countries and it was not until the late 1950's where the trade with the EC members was more significant than with the Commonwealth. This economic downturn paired with the political failure in the Suez Crisis in 1956 perhaps shifted British eyes towards the EC.

In 1975 the UK held a referendum over the issue of continued membership in the EC. This referendum was due to a split in the British Labour Party, but EC membership had strong public support and across the political spectrum, so it failed. This split over EC membership is perhaps ironic because in future years the Labour Party would be generally more Europhile while the Conservative Party would be generally more eurosceptic.

Whilst no institutional changes were made or amendments to any treaties the addition of British soft and hard power would have an intangible effect on foreign policy and defence integration of the Union as a whole.

3.12 1993- Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty saw the addition of many aspects to the capability of the now-named EU, but this chapter will focus on the addition of the CFSP as one of the three pillars. The creation of the CFSP was an attempt by the member states to improve upon the EPC, which was an inter-governmental organisation and lacked the will and need to effectively perform there wanted foreign

policy goals. It was at this period where Christopher Hill theorised his capability-expectations gap to help explain deficiencies in EU foreign policy. It would be easy for one to look at this chapter and how the previous foreign policy attempts had failed to create a unified and effective foreign policy and come to the same conclusions that Hill came to. This is that despite its economic power and weight, the EC had failed miserably to create the same unity and effectiveness in their foreign policy.

Like many of the previous foreign policy and security policy attempts, France saw the Maastricht Treaty negotiations as an opportunity to increase their influence as their self-prescribed role as the political head of the EU (Irondelle, 2009). It was not only this aspect of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations which mirrored previous integration attempts as like with past attempts the integration of the newly reunified Germany was at the forefront of the negotiations. Both Habermas (Habermas, 2002) and Tank (Tank, 1998) suggest that it was the political and economic integration of reunified Germany within Eu institutions which played a core part in the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. So far, we have two instances of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations mirroring the negotiations and aims of the previous integration attempts in these fields, the third instance is British hesitancy towards increased integration in these areas. This British hesitancy has been a common theme and will continue to be a central theme over the British membership in the EU.

In researching the British and their political system and environment during the Maastricht negotiations, one could not help but draw comparisons to the British Government of 2018. The similarities are uncanny; a conservative government in where the leader is facing a spilt in their own party and even their own cabinet. While Theresa May is facing tough questions over the leaving of the EU, John Major was facing questions over the proposed integration increase through the Maastricht Treaty. A public spat with the conservative leader of the 1980's Margaret Thatcher, further heaped the pressure on Major who was trying to please both his domestic government and European allies (Wall, 2008a). The UK played an important role during the negotiation and ratification process because they held the Presidency of the Council of the EU during the second half of 1992. The Birmingham Council meeting of 1992 came amongst political difficulties both domestically and with tight ratification battles in both Denmark and France (Wall, 2008a).

It was perhaps ironic that despite the British hesitancy towards upgrading the EPC into the CFSP, they were behind some of the only successful EPC actions in the years it was active. The joint action of the EC members against Argentina during the Falklands War, which banned imports and exports to and from Argentina. This action only lasted a month because foreign ministers could not agree on a

second round of sanctions as debate over the CAP flowed over into other aspects of the EC (Wall, 2008).

The core issue which had hamstrung the EPC had been the inter-governmental nature which allowed to countries to participated as little or much as they wanted. This inevitably led to little engagement between the member states and even less agreement and action on common positions and policy. This issue was then passed onto the first iteration of CFSP as like the EPC, was inter-governmental by nature. This inter-governmental nature of CFSP would plague the EU during the 1990's as they struggled to effectively deal with the prolonged conflict in Yugoslavia. It would be the experience in Yugoslavia which would help shape the CFSP reforms of the Amsterdam Treaty and help to build the path towards CSDP legislation.

3.13 1997- Amsterdam Treaty

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 saw amendments to the Treaty of the European Union with this section of the chapter focussing on the amendments made to the CFSP and the build up towards these changes. The Treaty saw the creation of the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs which was filled by Javier Solana. Much of the negotiation in the lead up towards the Treaty focused on the decision-making process of the CFSP with it being overly complicated and the majority voting process being rarely used. Spence and Spence (Spence & Spence, 1998) suggest that the CFSP part of the Maastricht Treaty was deliberately ambiguous in its aim and objectives and this same ambiguity then flowed into the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations.

Even though the inter-governmental approach did not always lead to a strong and coherent policy or action, Edwards (Edwards, 2017) suggests that this was by design and preferable to the member states. This approach would mean that the member states could be free to pursue their own foreign policy and autonomous action if a common approach could not be agreed upon. If common policies or decisions could be made or agreed upon, they tended to be less coherent than that of individual actor states because of the process used to create the policy (Knodt & Princen, 2003). This approach can be seen with both France and the UK, with France pushing for European political integration while pursuing their own foreign policy and the UK being resistant to this integration while pursuing their foreign policy.

3.14 1998- Saint-Malo declaration

The Saint-Malo declaration followed the meeting between Chirac and Blair at the resort town of Saint-Malo and this was the first step towards defence integration and the creation of the ESDP/CSDP. This was significant because this was the first instance where the defence priorities of the France and the UK converged. This chapter has shown that throughout its history the France and UK have been at other ends of the spectrum regarding European defence integration. So, it was somewhat surprising when the two countries finally converged paths on European Defence integration. It was perhaps the Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990's where the largest gap between Capabilities and Expectations was exposed as they utterly failed to stop the conflict because of a lack of political will amongst its members,

Chapter 4- the CSDP and its key features

4.1- Introduction

This chapter of the research will follow on from where the last chapter left off and will look at different aspects of the CSDP. These aspects will include a description of the CSDP and developments it has taken since the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration, looking at where it gains its political legitimacy, CSDP missions, the Athena funding mechanism and look at some shortfalls of the CSDP. This chapter will look at these specific aspects which make up CSDP policy because they are some of the most contentious (funding mechanism) or visible (CSDP missions) aspects of the policy. Focussing on these aspects of the policy will further show the different approaches that the UK and France have taken to the policy. This chapter will be a logical step from the previous chapter because this is, after years of attempts the current state of EU defence integration. Looking at these different aspects of CSDP will then allow us to see how member states can and have contributed to the policy.

While this chapter will have examples of what Member States contribute to the CDSP, more of this analysis will follow in the next chapter where the research will look at specifically what the UK has contributed across a range of areas towards this policy area. Much of the discussion about the UK's contributions and influence will be contrasted with France because of the key role that the two countries played in the formation of the CSDP and as their role as the two largest spending defence powers in the EU. This comparison will then be able to feed into future gazing of the CSDP as a whole because of the uncertainty over the future of the CSDP and what that they mean for France's role.

4.2- CSDP- The last step in the defence puzzle?

This section of the chapter will focus on developments to the CSDP following the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration, with a focus on how the UK moulded and impacted these developments. The role that the UK played at these development points will be touched on in this chapter and then will be expanded upon further in the next chapter. The reason for this is because the CSDP policy as it stands in 2018

did not just spring out of the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 and it was a process in which different capabilities had been built up through various treaties and agreements.

Chapter 2 ended with the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998, signed between France and the UK and saw the start first steps towards CSDP. While this research so far has made much of the fact that the St Malo Declaration was important because it saw the convergence of France and the UK on the issue of European defence initiatives, several scholars have raised questions of whether this was the case. Keukelaire and MacNaughtan (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 174) suggest that this was less the convergence of the opposing viewpoints of EU defence and more a compromise between the two countries. This viewpoint is not just restricted to Keukelaire and MacNaughtan as Howorth (Howorth, 2000, pp. 384-387) suggested that from a British point of view that the Saint-Malo declaration was more of a tactical shift in defensive thinking with an end focus still being on US and NATO involvement in European defence initiatives rather than a complete change of thinking more in line with the French approach to defence integration. Howorth further suggests that the reasons for this 'Atlanticist' attitude boiled down to four reasons; Confidence and closeness to the American Hegemon; lack of confidence in European structures; concerns over discrimination towards European NATO members who were not part of the EC and feared that closer EU relations would jeopardize the Atlantic relationship (Howorth, 2000, p. 378). Interestingly, this feeling was somewhat mutual as the US saw the UK as its traditional transatlantic ally, with newer European members of NATO also having a closer relationship with the US than some of the older members of the agreement (Davison, 2015, p. 259). This closer relationship towards the US could help to explain the divisions and factions that sprung up over the 2003 invasion of Iraq which saw a split in some EU members joining the coalition and others opting not to. Nether the less the Saint-Malo declaration will see France and the UK lay the platform to defence integration, and to help lay out an action plan to develop a framework to overcome the capability gap in this area. While there has been differing views over the motivation for UK involvement and wanted outcomes from the process, they eventually did reach a level of consensus with France over what this defence initiative should be able to achieve.

The next 5 years saw rapid development in different aspects of CSDP policy, policy which was developed with comparative speed and haste with compared with the previously described attempts at defence integration. This is noteworthy when one looks at the previous chapter and the number of previous attempts at defence integration which had seen France and the UK at logger heads over the proposed direction of defence initiatives. Some thought must be given then because if what the scholars in the previous paragraph argued is true, then this development would be a much more drawn out process like previous defence attempts because one of the two founding members of the policy

would be dragging their feet. Rather than a dragging of feet it was only 5 years after the Saint-Malo declaration when the first CSDP mission was launched in the former Yugoslavia. One could then argue that perhaps the UK was a more willing driving force of CSDP and was not just paying it lip service as some of the previous literature suggested.

4.3- Headline Goals- Building operational capacity and capability

The Saint-Malo Declaration was considered the start of ESDP/CSDP, but it did not lay down a concrete or extensive plan over what the policy would do or what it would look like. It would be the Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) which were established after the European Council Summit in Helsinki (Hyde-Price, 2005) in 1999 which would provide the first objectives and goals that the CSDP should fulfil. The CSDP like many different areas of competence are constantly evolving and changing and this can be seen through subsequent Headline Goals. The Headline Goals do go some way to lay the framework for military force projection but did little to address the political concerns and realities on the deployment of these forces.

At the previously mentioned Helsinki summit in 1999 the EU member states defined what the HHG would be: “Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1-year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersburg Tasks” (Quille, 2006, p. 9). The 3 Petersburg Tasks⁶ which had been agreed upon and adopted by the WEU in 1992, these principles were then subsequently adopted by EU for CSDP. The two European defence drivers, the France and UK were highly influential in this first formation period. Firstly, the CSDP was adopting structures from the French-led WEU and much of the decisions undertaken at the EU Council in Helsinki had been drafted by the British Ministry of Defence (Howorth, 2014b, p. 79). The following year at the Nice European Council of December 2001 approved decision-making structures in the form of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). These targets were first given a 5-year time frame for 2004, but perhaps unsurprisingly it was clear to European Leaders that these targets were not going to be met. A catalogue was made in any case, and this catalogue highlighted where the deficiencies were in capability commitments (Schmitt, 2005). These deficiencies were then acted upon by way of the 2001 Laeken European Summit where the EU Council decided to launch the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). This plan was to feature

⁶ The 3 Petersburg Tasks were peace-making, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.

panels of ‘national experts’ who would deliver possible solutions on what capability was needed. These panels were to be overseen by the newly created EUMS.

The ECAP process was to have four guiding principles;

1. The improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of European defence efforts, enhancing cooperation between member states or groups of member states.
2. A ‘bottom up’ approach to European defence cooperation, relying on voluntary national commitments
3. Coordination between EU member states as well as coordination with NATO
4. Public support through ECAP’s transparency and visibility

The above guiding principles (Schmitt, 2005) have a very ‘European’ feel because these principles can be seen in later iterations of similar defence initiatives such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative. With the adoption of the HHG and ECAP these were steps towards filling in the capability-expectations gap, which as previously described had long been a key criticism of the EU in the foreign policy field. Much of this criticism had focused on that the EU had over promised and under delivered on foreign policy competences, and the initial time frame and expected competences for the HHG was highly ambitious.

A new headline goal was adopted after the EU council Meeting in June 2004, which was subsequently called the 2010 Headline Goal (HG 2010). With HG 2010 much of the debate and focus centred not just on force projection of the CSDP, but also the nitty gritty aspects of the policy, most importantly when to use this power projection. Perhaps the biggest issue was that for the HHG to be achieved then it would require a boost in defence spending from the EU in the face of global and regional economic downturns in the late 2000s. HG 2010 was adopted to reflect the new European Security Strategy (ESS) which had been adopted in 2003. As the name suggests, the ESS was to guide CSDP and help create foreign policy coherence amongst member states, so that these new competences which had sprung up since the Saint-Malo declaration could be effectively carried out. The ESS had a focus on ‘effective multilateralism’ and was the brain child of the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs (HR/VP), Javier Solana. As will be expanded upon later in this chapter, the position of the HR/VP had been another clash of ideologies between France and the UK and reflected what each country wanted out of the position. For scholars the adoption of the ESS further muddied the waters over what kind of international actor the EU and whether it had gone from a civilian actor to a military actor (Aggetsam, 2012, p. 467; Howorth, 2017, p.349-350).

4.4- Berlin-Plus Agreement

The Berlin Plus Agreement was first mooted in the 1990's and the idea was for co-operation between NATO and the WEU, specifically the use of NATO resources in emergency situations. This was a long-drawn-out process with total negotiation time lasting from 1996 until 2002. The Berlin-Plus Agreement highlights two things; the importance of the US and NATO to EU defence capabilities and the importance of France and UK to EU defence capabilities. Since there will be less reliance on 'conventional' pitched battles (Lugar, 2000, p. 27), states will need capability to be able to deploy rapidly overseas via strategic airlift. Only France and the UK have the capability within the EU to undertake strategic airlift, so it shows the importance of not just the UK to EU defence but also the importance of NATO. It was not just the material infrastructure which would be of great use to EU foreign policy action, but also access to NATO planning structures which had been used effectively on the Balkans in the 1990's (Lucarelli & Menotti, 2006, p. 150). Perhaps more importantly the Berlin-Plus Agreement provided a defence link to EU member states who were not part of NATO such as Austria.

4.5- The Lisbon Treaty- Tangible defence steps

The Lisbon Treaty which was signed in 2007 and came into power in 2009 was important to the CSDP and CFSP for a multitude of reasons. Firstly, this was the first Treaty since important developments such as the EDA came into power and enshrined these into European treaties. This is noted by Laursen (Laursen, 2009, p. 353) where the CSDP was given more emphasis on operational capacity in both civilian and military assets. More CSDP tasks were added alongside with the Petersberg Tasks which had been adopted by the WEU in 1992 and then later adopted as the basis for the CSDP, these tasks included;" joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilisation as well as to "fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories" (Laursen, 2009, p. 353). The Lisbon Treaty introduced further additions to CSDP with PESCO and along with the EDA was aimed at improving and increasing efficiency in CSDP. The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) which was released in 2016 as a successor to the ESS further aimed to increase capability in this area with the introduction of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) which called for greater 'synchronization and integration' (Agency, 2018). This is perhaps ironic because the EUGS was released on 28 June 2016 which was 5 days after the UK had voted on Brexit.

The additions to the CFSP also aimed to make the EU a more coherent foreign policy actor. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was aimed creating a foreign policy department akin to the FCO in the UK or MFAT in New Zealand. This also saw the appointment of a second HR/VP after Javier Solana who had come into power with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, this appointment was not until 1999 and was the subject of two years of political wrangling.

Unsurprisingly this political wrangling over the position of the HR/VP was between France and the UK, the differing points of view reflected the points of view which France and the UK had always presented to EU defence integration. Howorth (Howorth, 2014, p. 38) notes that France wanted a 'high-profile heavyweight' while the UK wanted a mid-career civil servant. Javier Solana, the first HR/VP was more in the mould of the French ideal as he was a former Spanish foreign minister and NATO Secretary General. The Second HR/VP Catherine Ashton was lamented as inexperienced and uncharismatic and more in line with the British view of the HR/VP (Howorth, 2014, p. 39).

Catherine Ashton was followed by Federica Mogherini in 2014, Mogherini was much more in the Solana mould than the Ashton one and was in charge when the EUGS was released in 2016 and which promised 'principled pragmatism' (European External Action Service , 2016). The EUGS came amongst unprecedented external challenges facing the EU and the EUGS would provide a blueprint on how the EU would act with the world around them. The EUGS promoted closer defence integration and like all previous defence attempts the additions proposed in the EUGS relies on multilateralism amongst the members of the EU and there lies its weakness. The EUGS requires closer integration, but nothing 'forcing' the issue so more Eurosceptic countries may not consent or drag their feet to proposed changes. The loss of the UK will not see just a loss of important military hardware and infrastructure but also of a critical voice to push back against French dominance of this sector.

4.6- Where does the CSDP gain its legitimacy?

CSDP is the latest step in the EU defence process, a process that is aiming to give the EU defence legitimacy which can go hand and hand with foreign policy legitimacy. This need for legitimacy has been mentioned multiple times, and the EU looks for legitimacy through CSDP missions which can be either civilian or military by nature and happen after multilateral agreements with its member states. CSDP missions and operations are the show of external force of the CSDP and are usually done in conjunction and offer a similar role to UN peacekeeping missions. CSDP missions therefore

are not restricted to just EU member states, but done in conjunction with third-party countries, New Zealand has partaken in several CSDP missions in the past.

Like most of the institutions in the EU, CSDP gains its legitimacy through the collective actions of the member states as they decide where to act and what forces and resources to commit. The CSDP is inter-governmental by nature so decision whether to engage in missions and specific areas of co-operation. This inter-governmental nature allows to member states to decide firstly whether to engage in a CSDP operation and secondly what level of involvement and funding they give to the mission. This is a double-edge sword for CSDP because even if a mission can be agreed upon, the mandate is not always overly ambitious because of the trouble in getting member states to agree. Relating these missions back to the capability-expectations gap, it is case of the EU promising or aiming to fulfil a role in the international system but lacking political will amongst its members to carry out these missions. It is due to this that CSDP missions aim to work in conjunction with other organisations and partner countries. This drive for legitimacy has been long been entrenched in the policy documents and treaties which focus on CSDP, with CSDP relevant information being in Chapters 41-47 of the TEU. Chapter 41 is perhaps the most 'relevant' and contentious because in not only lays out the rules for CSDP missions but also concerns itself with the funding of CSDP missions and the funding of the CFSP. The issue of funding remains a contentious point of the policy with France and the UK once again on opposite sides of the issue, which will be explored further on in this chapter. The EU plans their CSDP action to be done in conjunction with UN ideals (Eriksen, 2006) (Legrand, 2017), but does not require an explicit UN mandate when undertaking CSDP missions but is 'highly desirable' (Matlary, 2009) to obtain one. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political and military control over CSDP operations as outlined in Chapter 41.

4.7- CSDP Operations- The manifestation of legitimacy abroad?

CSDP operations and missions tend to be the most public and 'visible' aspects of CSDP and therefore tend to be how CSDP and the EU is viewed (Tardy, 2015, p. 36). These operations come in the form of the deployment of military or civilian resources to countries to fulfil a variety of role and objectives. These operations come in all shapes and sizes and do not come in a one size fits all policy. This could be the physical embodiment of the aforementioned 'principled pragmatism' which was adopted in the EUGS. These missions are a tool for both the EU and its member states to fulfil foreign policy action and provide legitimacy to both the EU and its member states. These missions can vary from capacity building and military training missions such as the different missions which have been

operating in Mali since 2013 or the anti-piracy mission which has been operating off the coast of Somalia since 2008 (Skeppstrom, 2015). These two missions provide contrasting examples of how EU member states can interact with CSDP operations. Furthermore, these two operations are of interest because of the role that France and the UK have played historically in these operations and what Brexit means for their future.

After decades of religious and civil unrest, armed conflict erupted in Northern Mali in early 2012 between terrorists and the democratically elected Government. While Mali had never been particularly peaceful there had never been such conflict that it threatened a civil war and this understandably worried European leaders as it came amongst the Arab Spring which was erupting through the region. This conflict and region would have been of interest to French leadership for a variety of reasons; the colonial links of the two countries, a common language and concern over the conflict from spiralling over into neighbouring regions as the Libyan Conflict had done. A year after the conflict started France launched armed action in the country (Operation Serval) after a request for aid from the Malian Government and after a UNSC resolution.

Operation Serval was followed by CSDP action in the form of capacity building missions (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali) which was done in conjunction with 21 EU countries, 3rd party countries and local inter-governmental organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and Operation Serval links back to realist theory described earlier that despite giving up some sovereignty to the EU through CSDP and CFSP, it allows member states to pursue foreign policy agenda through both national and multi-lateral fields as France did (Reichwein, 2015, pp. 109-120). The action in Mali also provides an effective case study in how CSDP operations and actions are decided upon in the form of UNSC mandates, a plea for assistance and through working with third party countries and organisations. This operation also is interesting because it has what I would call a low ‘buy-in’, which can be completed by most of the armed forces of the member states as they require technical and drilling which could be completed by nearly all member states. Contrast this to EUNAVOR Atalanta which by nature is a maritime operation so it leans heavily on member states who have the national capacity to perform such tasks. EUNAVOR Atalanta will be explored further in the next chapter as a case study because of the role the UK plays in that operation.

4.8- Athena Mechanism- How is the CSDP funded?

The previous section noted that the funding for CSDP operations was entrenched in Chapter 41 of the TEU following the Lisbon Treaty, but this is only partly true. Chapter 41 only focuses on the funding of CSDP civilian missions but not the military missions, so after the first CSDP operation in the former Yugoslavia which was funded on an ad-hoc basis a new mechanism was needed to help fund future missions.

This process for funding CSDP missions is called the Athena mechanism, the funding falls under two broad categories; common costs and national borne 'where they fall' costs. The Athena mechanism has been in force since February 2004 meaning that the first two CSDP missions were financed in 'ad hoc' arrangements which were funded by the MS according to their gross national income (GNI), these ad-hoc arrangements were overly bureaucratic and helped the push towards a proper funding mechanism (Nováky, 2016, pp. 216-219). Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides the framework for the funding of civilian CSDP missions (Council, 2014) while military missions would be funded through the Athena mechanism (Council, 2015, p. 9).

Funding for CSDP military missions is unique in the fact that it falls outside of the EU budget because operations which have defence or military implications cannot be financed from the Union budget and the common costs for these military operations are funded through the Athena mechanism (Council, 2014). Since common costs make up 5-15% of any CSDP mission budget (Nováky, 2016, p. 217) (Terpan, 2014, p. 221), the majority of CSDP mission costs are funded through the nation borne or 'where they fall' costs. This means that wealthier countries such as France and the UK would bare a larger amount of the common costs, and then for more complex missions were needing to provide material which less-wealthy countries may not have access to. Perhaps unsurprisingly the Athena mechanism has long been a point of contention between France and the UK, because France wants to expand common costs while the UK wants to keep the status quo and has vetoed suggestions that these costs should be increased.

4.9- Shortfalls of CSDP?

Throughout this study many different areas of contention have been raised about how the CSDP operates and issues it faces. Perhaps one that is obvious by now is the multilateralism that lies at the heart of the decision-making process, while inclusive is somewhat unwieldy (Dari, et al., 2012). This is by no means the only issue facing the CSDP, many others such as undecisive mandates, lack of

suitable equipment and funding also plague these missions. But the lack of political will shown by member states to agree to operations is the biggest hamstring.

While it is perhaps unfair to call the CSDP a failure, there is undoubtedly shortfalls to the policy which have been raised in early sections and these issues that are not unique to CSDP and tend to act as a driver for future improvements in policy areas (Glaurdic, 2011). While these shortfalls are nothing on the scale compared to the lack of action or political will in Yugoslavia in the 1990's similar issues still plague the decision-making process of the CSDP. Since decisions and operations require unanimity by the involved parties, the mandates tend to be 'bland' or uninventive because of the need for so many partners to agree to the same decision.

Despite the delegation of some powers to the EU, the member states are still at the heart of the CSDP policymaking process, so they cannot lay the blame at the floor of the EU for lack of action or CSDP operations.

Chapter 5- The UK and CSDP

5.1- Introduction

This chapter of the study will focus on the materialistic relationship between the UK and the CSDP. While previous chapters of research have focused on the quantitative impact of the UK on CSDP, this chapter will focus more on the qualitative impact that the UK has had. Material in this case refers to manpower, monetary funding and the use of strategic planning and equipment. This chapter will look at what amount of funding the UK gives to CSDP and how that compares with other Countries, look at manpower given to CSDP missions with reference to a specific operation and then will look towards the future of the UK-CSDP relationship. The Previous chapters have focused on the UK's impact on the decision-making process of the CSDP and of the build-up of foreign policy capability for EU institutions, the reason for this is because up until contemporary times the CSDP has been about wrangling over the creation of foreign policy institutions and little about demonstrably effective foreign policy action. These chapters have shown the long and arduous process of trying to create EU autonomous capability and the seeming handbrake role which the UK has played.

By reviewing a mixture of official EU and UK documents and scholarly articles we can gain a further understanding of the impact and what the potential loss of the UK could be. This impact is a challenge to measure for researchers because of the funding system in place. The previously described Athena mechanism funds between 5-15% of military CSDP operations and the rest of the funding is shouldered by participating member states, dependent on the amount of support that the member state decides to give to an operation. The information on cost/expenditure put towards CSDP operations comes in the form of personnel or equipment supplied, so it becomes hard to evaluate the total cost of what member states contribute outside the common costs.

Wealthier and more militarily capable countries are being asked to contribute more through common costs and then the using of equipment/materials that only some countries have access to. Denmark who is the only country in the EU who has an CSDP opt out so does not pay towards the common costs funded via GNI and does participate in military CSDP operations so do not pay towards this at all. Compare this with the UK who would be paying higher amounts of the common costs due to higher GNI whilst supplying high cost equipment such as naval vessels and patrol aircraft which not all member states have access to.

5.2- How much does the UK contribute financially towards the CSDP?

In previous chapters this study has tried to argue the qualitative impact the UK has had on CSDP, this section we will be looking at funding charts from the UK and the EU to see what qualitative impact the UK has had on CSDP. This study has previously mentioned the different funding process for both civilian and military CSDP operations, with civilian missions being funded through CFSP funding and military missions being paid through the Athena mechanism and the “lie where they fall” costs.

The CFSP civilian operation budget for 2018 is €327.6 million (Union, 2018, p. L57/1309) with the UK currently funding 15% of this budget (Parliament, 2018). The 2018 budget is up €1 million from 2017 and over €100 million from 2016, but this number seems to rise and fall dependent on what missions are being carried out. For 2018, the UK is funding €49,140,000 of the €327.6 million budget put aside for civilian CSDP⁷ operations making the UK one of the three biggest funders alongside Germany and France. This means that when the UK leaves the EU, the CFSP budget for civilian CSDP operations will be 15% less doubled with a loss of UK staff working on CSDP operations (see Figure 1). So, in post-Brexit CFSP operations we could see either see a drop in the number of Civilian CSDP operations or remaining member states will have to make-up the UK’s part of the budget.

The funding mechanisms for military CSDP operations makes it difficult in trying to research how much each state gives as common costs only account for 5-15% of an operation budget. Nováky in (Nováky, 2016, p. 221) came up with a influence ratio of the Athena process which is used as a tool to roughly predict influence within the CSDP by combining GNI with how much a member state has contributed to CSDP operations through personnel and equipment numbers. Germany had the highest ratio at 1.00 because of its high GNI and its large amount of personnel within CSDP operations, while France and the UK were both at 0.82 because of their comparatively high GNI and their deployment of personnel and equipment. Nováky noted that even through the UK had contributed only a small percentage of total personnel the amount of planes and naval vessels deployed to operations in the Mediterranean and Somalia offset this. This is interesting because even though Germany is the largest financial contributor its political influence pales in comparison to the French-British ‘engine’ of European security integration (Faleg, 2016, p. 2). This does raise interesting questions about the future of military CSDP operations because even through they will lose funding and capability with the

⁷ All ten Civilian CSDP operations are either crisis management or non-proliferation operations.

loss of the UK, they have long vetoed closer integration in this area so a German-French engine may see an expansion of CSDP operations without the UK pulling the handbrake.

5.3- How many personnel does the UK contribute to both Military and Civilian CSDP operations?

This section of the study will look at the amount of UK personnel deployed to CSDP operations in 2018, this data was gathered from policy documents provided to the House of Lords looking at the CSDP policy. I would have preferred to be able to get staffing levels for the previous 5 years to show the increase or decrease overtime and see if there was increase or decrease from the 2015 British General Election until after the Brexit vote in June 2016. Operation deployment levels are done on a case by case basis and these are not always published so makes it nearly impossible to get a year on year of UK staffing levels. Instead by looking at the 2018 staff levels we can see the contemporary levels of contribution by the UK and it can show what CSDP will be losing from operations when the UK leaves the EU.

Despite being a core political driver of the CSDP the UK has consistently ranked lowly in the number of personnel that it has deployed in CSDP operations, with only 4% of total personnel deployed being from the UK which is on par with Greece (Faleg, 2016, p. 1) (Lords, 2018, p. 38). They are ranked 5th in personnel to military operations and 7th in civilian operations, which is a surprise when it is one of the few NATO members who are spending 2% of their GDP on defence. These comparatively low rankings make the massive spike in personnel to EUAVFOR Atalanta more intriguing because it is such an outlier.

Table 3: UK staff on civilian CSDP operations (2018)

Civilian CSDP operation	UK personnel deployed
EUAM Ukraine	6
EUMM Georgia	8
EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)	1
EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories)	0
EUAM Iraq	0
EUBAM Libya	0
EUCAP Sahel Mali	0
EUCAP Sahel Niger	0
EUCAP Somalia	2
EULEX Kosovo	8

Total:	25
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Sourced from: UK Parliament – European Union Committee: *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations*. (Parliament, 2018)

Figure 1 shows the amount of personnel deployed by the UK in civilian CSDP missions in 2018, this number ranks 7th amongst member states with Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, France and Finland or providing more personnel towards civilian CSDP operations. This number is surprisingly low considering the resources that are available to the UK and their role as the driver of CSDP. There are several possible reasons for these low participation rates in both civilian and military CSDP operations (see table 4) the most popular being that the low participation showing the disapproval or dissatisfaction or even simply not caring of the CSDP by the UK. Looking at the low numbers of Figures 1 and 2 make the numbers attributed to EUNAVFOR Somalia stick out even more, a possible explanation being that this is the time where a CSDP operation lined up and co-ordinated with national self-interest of the UK and perhaps the UK would have been here without CSDP. This is an interesting parallel to note with the French involvement in Mali which included both autonomous foreign policy action followed by joint European action in the area. This also highlights some of the shortfalls of the CSDP policy and other inter-governmental organisations; getting so many different countries to all exercise political will can be challenging.

Table 4:UK Staff on military CSDP operations (2018)

Military CSDP Operation	UK Personnel deployed
EUFOR (Operation) Althea	8
EUNAVFOR Med (Operation Sophia)	6
EUTM Mali	8
EUTM RCA	0
EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)	56 + Operation Commander
EUTM Somalia	4
Total:	82

Sourced from: UK Parliament – European Union Committee: *Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations*. (Parliament, 2018)

Table 4 shows the UK personnel which have been deployed to military CSDP operations in 2018, apart from EUNAVFOR Atalanta these numbers are relatively light and ranks 5th most in contributions after France, Italy, Germany and Spain (Faleg, 2016, p. 1).

5.4- EUNAVFOR Atalanta

The UK contribute a large % of the common costs for military CSDP operations and have contributed to 11 CSDP military operations of which they have varying levels of involvement in. This will take a specific look at EUNAVFOR Atalanta which is a CSDP anti-piracy operation based off the Coast of Somalia. There are several reasons to take a closer look at this operation:

- The Operational Headquarters Facilities (OHQ) for EUNAVFOR Atalanta are based in Northwood in the UK which also houses the NATO naval command (Newson, 2016, p. 18).
- 60% of the OHQ staff are from the UK and the Operation Commander is from the UK ⁸.
- By and far the largest deployment of UK troops towards a CSDP operation, larger than the rest of the other operations combined.
- New Zealand Relevance- NZ has provided maritime reconnaissance aircraft and taken part in EUNAVFOR Atalanta and is one of two CSDP missions in which NZ has taken part in. Shows how third-party countries can interact with the CSDP and how the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) interacts with international organisations overseas (NZDF, 2011) (Somalia, 2014).
- Provides contrast with CSDP operations in Mali and how France has interacted with the CSDP.
- Done in conjunction with UN and other international operations in the area.
- Third party countries cannot run OHQ nor can the Operation Commander be from a third country- meaning that there will be a change in both the OHQ and the Operation Commander for EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the OHQ is being moved to Rota in Spain by March 29, 2019 (Web, 2018).

As has been talked about previously and from what can be seen in Figure 2 the UK has contributed extensively towards EUNAVFOR Atalanta in terms of personnel whilst also providing OHQ and the Operation Commander. Like most CSDP operations EUNAVFOR Atalanta's legal basis is based on UN resolutions and it had an extensive mandate to combat piracy in the area:

- *Protect World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) shipping.*

⁸ Appointed in 2017

- *Deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalia Coast*
- *Protect vulnerable shipping off the Somali Coast on a case by case basis*
- *In addition, the EUNAVFOR also contributes to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.*

(Somalia, 2014)

EUNAVFOR Atalanta is done in conjunction with EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia. Over 20 EU states have contributed to EUNAVFOR in various ways, either through patrol aircraft, maritime vessels or through Staff officers at the OHQ. This operation has been going since 2008 and has a mandate until 2020, it has been credited with reducing piracy in the area. Whilst this operation may have been effective in reducing piracy numbers it still comes across fundamental problems in which many of these CSDP operations come across; many member states don't have the capability to contribute. This means that the UK, France, Spain and Italy would have to via the common costs and then pay the "costs where they fall", which in this case is expensive operational equipment. This burden on the wealthier contributors will only increase when the UK leaves because that is one less supplier of maritime vessels and patrol aircraft. On the other hand, since the UK has contributed so much to this operation compared to other CSDP operations they may continue to contribute as a third-party member.

In conclusion the amount of support given to CSDP operations by the UK is surprisingly low given their key role in the creation of the CSDP and the massive amount of capability that they possess as a country. But then again by looking through the previous chapters we can see that they have often been a handbrake to the further development of initiatives such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and even earlier than that when they preferred to look at European defence and security integration through NATO and bilateral channels rather than EU channels.

5.5- Future Gazing- what does the post-Brexit relationship look like?

This section of the chapter will be gazing into the future and trying to predict what the future of the UK-CSDP relationship will look like. This is hard to predict as we will not know what the final divorce paper between the UK and the EU will look like. No matter what the divorce bill will be, it is unlikely that it will be a complete separation of the UK and CSDP, because of links through bi-lateral

agreements and through organisations such as NATO. The link between NATO and the Berlin-Plus agreement means that there will still be contact and co-operation between the UK and CSDP.

The French-UK relationship has been described as the engine which drives CSDP and European defence integration. A more apt metaphor for this would be that it is a French engine and steering with German wheels and a UK handbrake. While the car starts, they start to decide which direction to go they apply power to the wheels before being stopped in its tracks by the brakes. So, this raises the question of who takes over the brakes when the UK leaves does it leave France as the main driver or do Germany take a more active role. If Germany were to take a more active or leadership roll it may see a large increase in the Community method of decision making and even more institutionalisation of the CSDP. One topic of discussion will be the creation of a central OHQ for CSDP missions rather than the current process of borrowing off

Much has been made of what the future relationship between the UK and the CSDP will be, there have been reports and policy documents produced by the UK, the EU and think tanks. Many of these focus on the loss of EU capability and overall global footprint with Brexit, but also the loss of CSDP agenda setting capability by the UK (Faleg, 2016, p. 2), (Newson, 2016, p. 18), (Miller, 2016, pp. 164-173) (Black, et al., 2016, pp. 68-70). The EU may still be able to contribute to CSDP, but it is unlikely that it would be given decision making or agenda setting power. That raises questions over whether a country like the UK would be involved in CSDP operations if they had no say on the agenda. While others focused on how the UK could still contribute to many of the different aspects of CSDP through a variety of models which stress different levels of partnership and participation (Whitman, 2016b, pp. 43-50). Perhaps the biggest change will be the possible increase in European defence integration amongst the member states. EDA, CARD and PESCO are all on horizon all aiming to increase efficiencies and integration amongst the member states.

Perhaps the most interesting relationship will be between the NATO, the UK and remaining EU NATO members. Even if there had been a freezing in the relationship between EU NATO members and different American administrations, this would be a drop in the bucket between compared to the relationship between these countries and the Trump administration. While his Defence Secretary Mattis has been supportive of NATO, Trump has long been critical of NATO (Stewart & Emmott, 2018). The disdain that Trump shows towards the alliance hinges on his assertion that the European allies owe sums of money to the United States, this view can be traced back to ads that Trump ran in the 1980's which were critical of NATO (D'Antonio, 2015). This point of view must be troubling

towards the UK and the other European NATO members because even though members of the administration such as Mattis are supportive of NATO, Trump has shown he does not always take his foreign policy advisors' advice (Stewart & Emmott, 2018).

Chapter 6- Conclusion

The UK has often been described as an uneasy member of the EU and this could easily describe the role that they have played in CSDP and defence integration. Going back to the 1950's they refused to join European led initiatives and preferred to pursue defence integration through closer relationships with the USA. This hesitancy and uneasiness did not disappear overtime, even after joining European initiatives such as the WEU and the EPC they still pursued the NATO relationship over all else. These organisations were largely ineffective, yet aspects were carried over and adopted by EU institutions. Throughout many of these processes the UK has played the role of a manager and advisory role rather than taking the French model and trying to be at the forefront and leading of the decision-making process. This does not mean that they were not an agenda setter, but successive British Governments took a far more cautious role and view of CSDP compared to their French and German counterparts.

This hesitancy was not unique to just the UK though, as the inter-governmental organisational structure in many of the early defence integration attempts showed the apparent lack of political will amongst the member states unless it was of a national interest. It was not until the Yugoslav failures of the 1990's which finally forced the hand of France and the UK. It was here that the first proper steps towards an integrated European foreign policy capability were introduced. It oversaw the first CSDP operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bih) and contributed heavily towards these operations in terms of financing and the supply of personnel and material. Contributions to CSDP operations may have waned in recent years but does not take away from the important role the UK plays as the engine of the CSDP. While CSDP has not fulfilled all the possible functions first theorized by Christopher Hill, the UK has helped to fund and develop foreign policy capability which can be used in conjunction and compliment other organisations and regional groups.

Despite the UK leaving the EU, there will still be strong defence ties through bi-lateral agreement between many of the major powers in Germany and the UK. The Trump Government may also be an

effective tool to convince the UK to continue to work as a third country in CSDP operations and through initiatives such as the EDA.

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