# Thesis Title – Enhancing EU Peacekeeping Capabilities

**Ashley Kate Stuart**

## Contents

### Abbreviations

### Tables and Figures

### Acknowledgements

### Abstract

### Chapter 1: Introduction 6

### Chapter 2: Literature Review 12

### Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology 24

### Chapter 4: Findings 35

### Chapter 5: Discussion 55

### Chapter 6: Conclusion 69

### Bibliography 72
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUGS</td>
<td>European Union Global Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>European Union Capacity Building Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument Contributing to Peace and Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPF</td>
<td>European Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCC</td>
<td>Military Planning and Conduct Capability Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defence Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Coordination Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean and Pacific Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNREC</td>
<td>United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table One – Table of Frequent Terms in 2016 European Union Global Strategy and 2003 European Security Strategy

Figure One – European Union Training Mission Mali Facts and Figures

Figure Two – European Union Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali Facts and Figures

Figure Three – Qualitative and Quantitative Research

Figure Four – Wordle Word Cloud

Figure Five – European Peace Facility Factsheet

Figure Six – European Defence Fund Factsheet

Figure Seven – African-led Peace Operations 2017

---

4 http://www.wordle.net/
6 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/defence_fund_factsheet_0_0.pdf
ABSTRACT

As part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from 2002 until February 2014, the European Union (EU) undertook over thirty overseas operations, using civilian and military instruments, in several countries, spread across three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). Sixteen of these operations are ongoing, with eighteen completed. Peacekeeping missions play a central role to the European Union’s (EU) Development Policy and the 2016 Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy. Using content analysis on the 2016 Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports, this research aims to use the case studies of the EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali and EU Training M Mali missions to analyse whether the 2016 Global Strategy has had an influence on the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali. These missions, initiated by the EU and its Member States, are viewed as essential in addressing key issues in the Sahel region including: extreme poverty, frequent food and nutrition crises, conflict, high population growth rates, institutional weaknesses, irregular migration and related crimes such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling. This thesis uses Chris Hills Capabilities-Expectations Gap to determine whether the gap between what the EU is expected to do by the international community and what the EU is actually able to deliver still exists despite developments in EU foreign policy. This thesis analyses sections of the 2016 EU Global Strategy determined by the frequency of terms and concepts within the Strategy and provides evidence from the Annual CSDP Reports from 2016-2017 to suggest that there is a strong correlation between the release of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 and the two ongoing CSDP Missions in Mali, suggesting influence.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank my primary supervisor Dr. Serena Kelly for her constant guidance and encouragement throughout writing this thesis, also to my secondary supervisor Professor Martin Holland for his sound advice. I extend my gratitude to the National Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury. The Taught Master of European Union Studies incorporated many of the most engaging and challenging courses that I have had the opportunity to enrol in at the University of Canterbury over the past 4 years. I also thank the NCRE for giving me the opportunity to intern at the Asia-Europe Foundation in Singapore as part of my Taught Masters, this was an experience I am most grateful for.

I would also like to thank the New Zealand Treasury for employing me halfway through my Masters programme and giving me the opportunity to begin my career as a policy analyst in the 2019 Graduate Programme.

My penultimate thanks goes to my parents, for everything they have done for me and all they will continue to do.

Finally, I thank my partner for his ongoing support and encouraging me to follow my career ambitions starting in Wellington 2019.
CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory...Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions (Union, 2016 14).

The 2003 European Security Strategy marked the inception of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has conducted over thirty international missions using civilian and military instruments with sixteen missions currently ongoing. These CSDP missions implement a range of tools including conflict prevention, peacebuilding, providing aid and recognising the link between security and development. The European Union External Action Service (EEAS) is responsible for CSDP and some of the other tools at their disposal which include development cooperation, refugee protection and migration, EU enlargement and neighbourhood and their humanitarian and emergency response. CSDP has been regarded as the EU’s most successful tool in addressing complex challenges through using a multidimensional approach (Kmec, 2015 9).

Since the creation of CSDP missions, the EU has become an important global actor in crisis management, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. These missions have been highlighted by Federica Mogherini -- High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy -- as being at the heart of EU foreign policy (EEAS, 2017c 4). In a changing global political, economic and social environment instability outside European borders has, and will continue to have, direct relevance to the daily lives of European citizens: the spread of a terrorist group, or the existence of ungoverned spaces in the EU’s region represents a clear risk for all European citizens (EEAS, 2016a 2). The EU has set a priority for itself as being a stronger global actor (Commission, 2016) addressing complex external issues beyond its borders to promote peace, security and sustainable development. This global actorness is a source of pride for the EU, but it has also created expectations of the EU that has resulted in the need for new policy and initiatives to meet the growing demands of being an international actor.

Part of this role is connected to development. The EU prides itself on being the largest financial contributor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world, in addition, the EU has become one of the most influential superpowers (Rövid, 2012) on the international stage with a declared commitment towards global peace and security as laid out in the 2016
EU Global Strategy (EUGS). This thesis aims to focus on two of the EU’s ongoing missions in Mali to determine whether the 2016 EU Global Strategy has influenced the mandates of these two operations in order to determine their contribution to upholding international peace and security. These two CSDP missions are key examples of the range of multidimensional tools used by the EU as they incorporate initiatives such as judicial training and policing, border management, peacekeeping, disarmament, arms control and the nexus between security and development (Biscop and Anderson, 2007 98). The EU is a unique global actor, it has expanded its domain of activities since the Cold War and now has well-established economic power and capabilities as a security and development provider (Laursen, 2009 24). With the launch of CSDP missions in 2003 the EU has emerged as an important actor in peacebuilding and contributing to upholding international peace and security, complementing the work of the United Nations (UN) in these areas.

Mali is located in the Sahel region of Africa and faces multiple challenges and threats which has resulted in the EU deploying three missions to the region; EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP), EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM) and EUTM Niger. The complex security issues that the EU has aimed to address through these missions were consequences of the conflict erupting in 2011 with the toppling of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. This toppling ultimately caused deteriorations in Libya’s neighbouring countries political, economic and security situations, especially in Mali (Lavallee and Volkel, 2015 159). Ethnic clashes and criminal activity in Mali’s territory led to a military coup in March 2012 and a significant outbreak of violence. The violence in Mali throughout 2012 consequently displaced more than 500,000 people and killed several hundred (Lavallee and Volkel, 2015 161). The conflict in the Sahel region during this time was very complex due to the number of actors and other factors, but the key cause of the coup was the Tuareg rebels who took advantage of the weak security structures in Mali and declared an independent state of Azawad in April 2012 (Snijders, 2015 13).

Following the conflicts in the region during 2012, the European Parliament named the Sahel region “one of the poorest regions in the world” (Tannock, 2013). Mali was also referred to as the world’s most “worsened country” by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index in their Failed States Index for 2013 (Snijders, 2015 161). The question in 2012 was how the EU could best contribute to conflict resolution and consolidate the peace process in the Sahel
region. Historical relations with Europe and France in particular had a major role in the establishment of CSDP missions in Mali, the role of France will be further expanded upon in the discussion, chapter 5.

To address regional challenges such as corruption, terrorism, underdevelopment, weak institutional structures and the illegal arms trade, the EU released their *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel* in March 2011. The implementation of this strategy started in three countries: Mali, Mauritania and Niger because the problems were cross border and interrelated. One of the major themes of the Sahel Strategy is the nexus between security and development, the EEAS used the case of Mali to elaborate on the relationship by commenting that;

> The fragility of governments impacts on the stability of the region and the ability to combat both poverty and security threats, which are on the rise. Poverty creates inherent instability that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows. The security threat from terrorist activity by al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), which has found sanctuary in Northern Mali, is focused on Western targets and has evolved from taking money to taking life, discouraging investment in the region (EEAS, 2011).

The reason the EU acts in fragile countries, as was the case in Mali, is because one of the main objectives of the EU development policy is to reach Global Goals as set out by the UN. The most current Global Goals were set out by all Member States of the UN in 2015 which incorporated 17 goals for all countries to meet by 2030 for a better world. The first set of these goals, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), were laid out in 2000 and were built on in 2015 with the introduction of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) which are the most recent. Fragile countries are the furthest away from reaching these Global Goals and often contribute to international insecurity. Fragile countries are listed as one of the main threats to Europe’s security (Laurens, 2014 3). The EU has become an important actor in fragile countries focusing on peacebuilding and state building by supporting domestic and international actors through long-term engagement (Faria and Sherriff, 2009 4). The start of this long-term engagement in Mali was in February 2013 with the launch of the first CSDP mission, EUTM Mali. EUTM Mali was established to help restore lasting peace in Mali with the long-term aim of ensuring sustainable stability in the Sahel region. At the request of the

---

Malian Government and on the basis of UN resolutions, in particular the UN Security Council Resolution 2085, the Member States of the European Union agreed to establish a mission to train the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF), EUTM Mali (EEAS, 2018f). EUTM Mali is an ongoing mission with a mandate lasting until May 2020.

*Figure One: EUTM Mali Facts and Figures*[^9]

![EUTM Mali Facts and Figures](image)

As can be seen in *Figure One*, EUTM Mali has the support of all EU Member States with 580 personnel currently being contributed to achieve the mandate. This shows the substantial amount of political will towards Mali’s long-term peace and stability given the fact that all CSDP missions are voluntary and require collective resources from Member States of the EU.

The EU continued its commitment to a long-lasting solution in Mali with the introduction of a second mission, EUCAP Sahel Mali. This mission, under the CSDP framework, was launched in January 2015 to “provide assistance and advice to the national police, the national gendarmerie and the national guard in the implementation of the security reform set out by the new government, with a view to:

• Improve their operational efficiency
• Re-establish their respective hierarchical chains
• Reinforce the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions
• Facilitate their redeployment to the north of the country” (EEAS, 2018e)

Figure Two: EUCAP Sahel Mali Facts and Figures

The mandate has recently been renewed until January 2019 and includes “the Accord for Peace & Reconciliation” and a stronger emphasis on coordination of security forces from the G5 Sahel countries (EEAS, 2018e). Although, as can be seen in Figure Two, only 13 Member States contribute to the second CSDP mission, there is close cooperation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) and the African Union whereby all Member States of the EU cooperate and are involved. The willingness to cooperate among multiple actors in the region shows the importance of peace and stability

---

in Mali to the international community and it highlights EU CSDP missions as having a regional and multilateral dimension.

This thesis will begin with a literature review of the relevant key concepts that will be highlighted in this research followed by the theoretical conceptualization that the research will focus on. This research’s theoretical conceptualization is based on Chris Hill’s 1993 Capabilities-Expectations Gap where Hill identified a significant gap between what the EU was expected to do and what it was actually able to deliver. This gap will be considered within the research question to determine whether such a gap still exists or if it has evolved into more of a Consensus-Expectations Gap as Toje (2008) has suggested in his academic works. The next section will outline the methodologies chosen to answer the research question followed by the empirical findings of the research question. The last section will discuss the findings before the concluding remarks with recommendations for enhancing peacekeeping capabilities in the future.

Ultimately this research shall analyse the content of the 2016 European Union Global Strategy and the 2016-2017 Common Security and Defence Policy Annual Reports of the two ongoing missions in Mali; EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. This analysis will evaluate the mission’s progression and determine whether the 2016 EU Global Strategy has had an influence on mandates of the two ongoing missions.

This research aims to answer two sub questions which are key determinants of success in the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali;

1. Has the EU accounted for the security-development nexus in Mali?
2. Has CSDP in Mali contributed to arms control in the region?
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

In the not so distant past the EU was described as “an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm” by the Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens (Whitney, 1991 11). Since then, it has been argued by many scholars (Smith, 2005, Manners, 2006, Faleg, 2016, Tardy, 2018, Pohl, 2013, Bispoc and Coelmont, 2017) that the EU has the capacity to deploy a sizeable expeditionary force to any CSDP mission. 2003 marked an innovative era for the EU as Member States showed a new willingness for collective action in crisis management which has resulted in the deployment of over 30 civilian and military operations globally within the framework of the CSDP (formally known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)) (Nováky, 2011). This review will firstly outline the introduction of peacebuilding policies both within the EU and on the global stage and the EU’s role as a global actor. CSDP is the key focus of this research and incorporates what is internationally known as the peacebuilding process -the nexus between security and development – otherwise understood as the EU’s comprehensive approach and the EU identity as a global security actor. Secondly, focus on how the relevant literature discussed significant challenges faced by CSDP namely the lack of political will and burden-sharing of international crises and the impact of militarisation on the nature of the EU. The argument that European defence transformation remains incomplete will be analysed in this review in addition to the central aspects of CSDP.

Merlingen (2012) has highlighted the EU’s former role as a security receiver evolving into a security provider, now being a “recognised and sought-after security actor”. Merlingen (2012) shows the history of the EU and its Member States during the World Wars as being reliant on outside actors to provide security but portrays the EU’s evolution into becoming an efficient security provider as key to the success of CSDP. Since its inception in 2003, the operations conducted under CSDP have been especially active on the African continent (Merket et al., 2015). Mali is the only country in the world to have two ongoing CSDP missions; EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali. This is a result of the political and social instability in the region which has seen a demand in crisis management operations throughout the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa (Merket et al., 2015).

In order to offer an overview of relevant literature, this chapter will analyse key concepts and challenges that face the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy. Catherine
Ashton, the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy and the first Vice-President of the European Commission stated in 2013,

> We cannot succeed without this comprehensive approach – it is simply not enough to chase and deter pirates, not enough to try and do development when there is no security, not enough to try provide economic support without a stable government (Merket et al., 2015).

This statement incorporates many of the key concepts of CSDP and the desire of the EU to strive towards becoming a more effective global security actor, held accountable for the previous limitations the ESDP faced. This thesis aims to analyse CSDP in Mali to determine whether new and changing policies and strategies released by the EU have an impact on the mission’s mandates and activities on the ground.

### 2.1 Formulating Peacebuilding Policies

Galtung (1975) was the first to introduce the concept of peacebuilding. He emphasised the need to “promote sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflicts and supporting indigenous capabilities for post conflict management” (Galtung et al., 1975 153). This concept was then redefined by former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutrous Ghali (1992) who introduced peacebuilding to the UN in his Agenda for Peace. Article 50 defined peacebuilding as “comprehensive efforts...[and an] action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Ghali, 1992 823)”.

The importance of peacebuilding has been acknowledged in the Brahimi Report as “integral to the success of peacekeeping operations” (Kmec, 2015 2). This acknowledgement has been adopted by the UN Security Council through the Report of the Panel of UN Peace Operations, which highlights the concept of peacebuilding as crucial to international peace and security (Gross, 2013 1). This concept is as significant to the EU as it is within the UN system because of the EU’s commitment to reaching the Global Goals, laid out by the UN, by 2030.

It has been highlighted by many scholars (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006, Atack, 2005, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, Wouters et al., 2010) that peacebuilding has become one of the major elements of the EU’s CSDP missions and operations. Atack (2005) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) define peacebuilding as a form of post-conflict management that addresses the root causes of a conflict with the aim of preventing the relapse into conflict. The
peacebuilding activities undertaken by the EU in their CSDP missions and operations have predominantly been post-conflict in the areas of training, capacity-building, legal advice, rule of law, disarmament and policing (Kmec, 2015 14). The peacebuilding activities mentioned above are especially prevalent in Mali as they aim to have a multidimensional approach in order to have the biggest possible impact to address the regional and national issues Mali faces. CSDP missions and operations are a key tool of the EU for promoting peacebuilding and have shown the EU’s importance in this space through the amount of operations being conducted around the world.

The UN has influenced the EU’s support for peacebuilding through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and the concept of human security (Gross, 2013 1-3). The EU’s CSDP missions and their interpretation of peacebuilding has been complementary to efforts undertaken by UN peacekeeping forces; they have “filled the gap and strengthened the impact of the UN without deploying directly to UN operations” (Juergenliemk et al., 2013 20). The tools most predominantly used by the EU for peacebuilding, such as “facilitating mediation, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation” (Whitman and Wolff, 2012 3), are key for the efficiency of CSDP.

Peacebuilding policies are essential to all CSDP missions. The EU focuses on peacebuilding tools such as facilitating mediation, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation which are key features of CSDP (Whitman and Wolff, 2012). These features are visible in Mali, where the EU has implemented a range of peacebuilding tools to ensure stability is maintained so the Sahel region can subsequently enjoy the lasting stability. Martin and Kaldor (2009) have focused on the impact of CSDP looking at potential ways to enhance human security through the peacebuilding initiatives exercised within CSDP. The recommendation from their study was to ensure the EU was aware that “human security encompasses EU concepts of conflict prevention, crisis management and civil-military coordination” (Martin and Kaldor, 2009 17). They suggested that the EU needs to embed human security training and policies into their CSDP missions, promoting their values of good governance and human rights. By incorporating these measures, the EU would significantly enhance their peacebuilding capabilities and address the causes of conflict and insecurity (Martin and Kaldor, 2009 10-13).
2.2 The EU as a global security actor and the “comprehensive approach”

Many scholars have focused on the EU’s development as an international global security actor (Ulriksen et al., 2004, Gegout, 2005, Čadková, 2012, Germond and Smith, 2009, Smith, 2003, Helly and Galeazzi, 2013, Piccolino, 2010, Simon et al., 2012, Manners, 2002). CSDP missions and operations are well-known today as a result of the development of the EU’s security actorness (Nowak, 2006, Wouters et al., 2010, Tardy, 2017). Scholars have identified the EU’s global security actorness as part of its comprehensive approach, highlighting the EU as a multilateral organisation with a range of resources and tools to support its external action.

Snijders (2015), emphasises the need for the EU to adopt a multidimensional approach by comprehensively utilizing these range of tools. In relation to the EU’s comprehensive approach in the Sahel region, where this research is focused, Snijders noted that;

The EU set up a crisis response strategy consisting of various tools: political dialogue, civilian and military security capacities, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance... Mali’s Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly, spoke of the ‘multi-form assistance’ of the EU (Snijders, 2015 44).

The EU has shown that it can use all tools at its disposal in dealing with international crises to show its global security actorness. The comprehensive approach is just one tool of many to demonstrate this and is one that will be returned to throughout this research paper.

In addition to the comprehensive approach being used as a tool to show global security actorness, the EU also works closely with other international and regional partners to promote effective multilateralism when dealing with crises. The EU recognises the UN Security Council as the most responsible for upholding international peace and security which makes cooperation natural between the EU and UN as they are complementary partners in peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations (Kmec, 2015 11). The 2003 European Council Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was the first formal recognition of this partnership followed by the 2007 Joint Statement for further cooperation in certain areas (Revelas, 2013 78). Cooperation with the UN and other international and regional partners is a central element to EU external action.

One of the most identified scholar’s theories of the EU as a global actor has been Ian Manners theory of Normative Power Europe. Manner’s main argument is that the EU “possesses a normative power that is built on norms such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and
respect for human rights” (Manners, 2002). He discusses the EU as a normative power shaping its international actoriness role through what it actually is and what it aims to promote as highlighted above.

However, Gamble and Lane (2009) and Hughes (2013) are critical of the EU as an effective global actor and portray the EU’s role in a different light to previously mentioned scholars. Asseburg and Kempin (2009) highlight previous critiques of the EU as a global actor and expose the ineffectiveness of CSDP by stating that:

CSDP deployments to date represent little more than symbolic gestures. Only in five out of twenty-three cases has the EU deployed more than one thousand staff. Nine civilian missions even had less than one hundred staff. In 2008 about six thousand military personnel were involved in military operations, representing just 0.4 percent of the operational military capacity of the twenty-seven EU Member States (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009 11).

The EU’s comprehensive approach in the Sahel region has been largely successful thus far due to a range of factors including the significant amount of political will lead by the French. These factors have been highlighted by several scholars (Okemuo, 2013, Tardy, 2016, Merket et al., 2015). The Sahel region is where EU external action is especially visible due to similar interests in the region by some of the EU’s Member States (Okemuo, 2013 236). Helly and Galeazzi (2013 11) have praised the EU’s efforts in the Sahel region saying that the Sahel Strategy is “good practise for the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis”. The EU’s comprehensive approach is still a work in progress. As stressed in Briscoe and Ginkel’s (2013) article about the nexus between security and development, more work needs to be done to improve its effectiveness including formulating stronger cooperation between development and security actions. This nexus will be at the forefront of research on CSDP in Mali as it is essential to any CSDP mission and has had a significant impact on the achievements of the mandate in the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) and EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali.

2.3 The nexus between security and development

Tardy (2015b 1) in his European Union Institute for Security Studies article highlights that there is “a clear link between the security situation of a country on the one hand and the implementation and progress of sustainable development on the other hand”. Several scholars (Merket, 2012, Amer et al., 2012, Carbone, 2013, Furness and Gänzle, 2017, Briscoe and Van Ginkel, 2013) have explained the process where policy-makers have come to realise
that connection between security and development policies is not only inevitable but should inform and guide policy decisions. The EU, and many other international organisations and countries, have committed to integrate development and security policies which has now become known as the security-development nexus.

The security-development nexus has been at the heart of the CSDP missions and operations, especially in the Sahel region. Okemuo (2013) highlights the key strategies and documents of the EU that recognise the security-development nexus, namely the 2011 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. Mali, Mauritania and Niger are the three core Sahel countries where the Strategy focuses. The previous initiatives in the region have led to the creation of the Sahel Strategy following the 2002 Cairo Action Plan and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (Okemuo, 2013 225). The Cotonou Agreement is the principle instrument regulating the EU’s actions with Sub-Saharan Africa which includes Mali. This agreement has security and development cooperation incorporated and commits both the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa to pursuing these objectives (Amer et al., 2012).

Tardy (2015a) and Merket et. al (2015) have portrayed fresh debates in their works to determine the best way to combine security activities and the long-term development of states. CSDP was one of the central factors in this debate and some of the issues associated with security and development have been highlighted in the article. Tardy (2017 35) wrote:

Problematic about the combination of development cooperation and security policies is the fact that both fields are based on different legal bases and therefore are conducted by different actors and decision makers.

CSDP in Mali focuses on capacity-building for security and development (Merket et al., 2015). Extending on the ‘Train and Equip’ concept, the EU’s aims in Mali are to put the country in a position to “prevent and manage crises themselves” (Merket et al., 2015 27). Problematic to this, as Tardy (2017) has quoted above, is the fact that the fields operate under different legal basis. For example, recent experiences with CSDP training missions in Mali have shown that in many cases lasting and effective results are not achieved due to a lack of basic equipment in the partner country. The limited budget for CSDP does not cover lethal equipment and therefore prevents the shortages of footwear, uniforms, vehicles etc, in Mali to be funded through the EU. Without this basic equipment the mission cannot achieve its mandate and has to turn to other external financing instruments such as “the Financial Instrument for
Development Cooperation, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the European Development Fund” (Merket et al., 2015).

The relationship between security and development has been incorporated into several recent EU publications such as the 2007 Council Conclusions on Security and Development (Union, 2007) and the 2011 Agenda for Change (Union, 2011). Despite the strategies and efforts undertaken by the EU to link long-term development and peacebuilding to security, scholars have criticised that efforts being made are not consistent with the promises being made in the above documents (Gaulme, 2014). This thesis aims to look at the 2016 European Union Global Strategy, using Mali as a case study, to determine whether these ambitions laid out in the Global Strategy are being translated into action on the ground. Key scholars (Gaulme, 2014, Briscoe and Van Ginkel, 2013, Merket, 2012) have attributed this shortfall to the fact that;

"Security means different things to different people. Priorities for different actors range from fighting the threat of separatism to curbing the global menace of violent extremism or limiting illegal migration" (Gaulme, 2014). Therefore, although many scholars agree that the EU has recognised the security-development nexus (Amer et al., 2012, Carbone, 2013, Furness and Gänzle, 2017, Briscoe and Van Ginkel, 2013, Merket, 2012) they also highlight the need for the EU to link the development cooperation and security policies within their institution more effectively. Within the Sahel region this focus on development cooperation and security policies is most evident. The *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel* is the foundation upon which EU action in this area is taken.

### 2.4 Challenges faced by CSDP: The concept of burden-sharing and the need for political will

Burden-sharing has been a widely studied subject in the field of International Relations (IR) but there is little research into burden-sharing in the context of CSDP missions and operations (Dorussen et al., 2009). Novaky (2011) is one scholar who has found the lack of studies into burden-sharing and CSDP missions and operations surprising, he has concluded that “EU Member States have participated in CSDP military operations due to a variety of interests and pressures”. The first scholars to focus on burden-sharing as a concept were Forster and Cimbala (2005) with their book *The US, NATO and military burden-sharing*. They define
burden-sharing as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal. The risks may be economic, political, military or other” (Cimbala and Forster, 2005 9). The concept of burden-sharing traces back to the Cold War where the United States and European allies debated over who should contribute what and how much to the Atlantic Alliance.

Forster and Cimbala (2005) discuss the risks of a country not accepting burden-sharing which are relevant to EU Member States and CSDP missions. They state that;

A country which decides not to accept the responsibilities of collective actions risks losing influence over the crisis at hand and may suffer longer-term negative international relations...The risks of failed intervention, in contrast to non-involvement, also are great especially when vital interests are not at stake. Failed intervention may result in damaged international prestige, a decreased willingness and potentially, capability to respond to new threats emerging from regional hegemons who contribute to instabilities (Cimbala and Forster, 2005 155).

Burden-sharing is inevitable for a CSDP mission due to their reliance on Member States contribution to provide economic, political and military resources. As a result, several scholars have begun to look at the factors that influence Member States to undertake a new CSDP mission and the inherited burden that comes with it (Howorth, 2014, Čadková, 2012, Peters, 2010, Knutsen, 2011, Nováky, 2011, Tardy, 2015a, Merlingen, 2012).

Merlingen (2012) focuses on the factors a Member State chooses not to contribute to a mission and highlights political will as the most significant factor. He writes that;

The CSDP relies on the voluntary pooling of national manpower and capabilities and the convergence of national political will. It works well in cases in which EU governments share similar views of security threats and challenges they face and when they agree that the CSDP is the best tool to tackle them. In cases where such cross national convergence of views is absent, the CSDP becomes a paper tiger (Merlingen, 2012 4-5).

Therefore, although CSDP missions and operations are an important tool of external action for the EU, they also show the limits of what the EU and its members are willing to do to make the world more secure (Tardy, 2015a). The political will of Member States differs depending on the CSDP operation or mission, the reasons being are that Member States have limited political will in certain CSDP missions or operations where the missions lack “relevance to their national security” (Mattelaer, 2008, Piccolino, 2010).
In the case of the Sahel region, where this study focuses, political will is not an issue as the EU’s interests are significant for ongoing CSDP missions. Simon, Mattalaer and Hadfield (2012 4) in their article A Coherent Strategy for the Sahel, identify the region as key to EU’s energy security and management of migration flows which helps Europe fight against illegal drugs and trafficking. Van Dorpe (2014 1) explicitly states if the EU wants “stable and secure neighbours, it needs to ensure stability and security in the Sahel region”. This highlights the reasons for Member States to contribute to the missions in the Sahel region and one of the major factors for EU intervention in the Sahel region.

What is missing from many debates surrounding political will and burden-sharing is the post-colonial responsibility often felt by certain Member States. Few scholars address this issue. Coolsaet et al. (2013) was among the first to question France’s interests in EU’s external actions for the Sahel region. The article goes as far to describe European involvement in the region as “a unilateral French, and not EU initiative” (Coolsaet et al., 2013 2). Other scholars such as Matlary (2009) have previously examined the role of France and the concept of national-interest in CSDP missions but very few have specifically focused on the ongoing Sahel missions and operations. This thesis will highlight the significant role of France as an actor in Mali by demonstrating their strategic interests and the power of the Member State to mobilise the entire EU to act.

2.5 Militarisation of CSDP and the impact on the nature of the EU

The European Security and Defence Policy, renamed CSDP under the Lisbon Treaty, was initially created as predominantly a military activity. The Saint-Malo Joint Declaration on European Defence stated that ESDP was “anchored in the progressive framing of a common defence policy, having the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to national crises” (Summit, 1998 3). Although the EU has built its military muscles and has a sizeable expeditionary force there is a growing amount of scholars who criticise the EU in their attempts to deliver practical progress in capability and improvement schemes (Menon, 2009, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006, Faleg, 2016, Nowak, 2006, Tardy, 2018). Faleg (2016) argues that the defence dimension of the CSDP is largely underdeveloped and describes EU characteristics in CSDP missions and
operations as more of a civilian power rather than military. This claim is supported by a number of other scholars who analyse the non-use of the potential power of European forces (Merlingen, 2012, Merket et al., 2015, Tardy, 2018, Andersson, 2016). Merket et al. (2015 81) highlight the fact that the EU Battlegroups and the permanent military rapid-reaction units created in 2007 have not been used despite the potential need for action in crises such as the coup in Mali or civil war in other parts of Africa. Merlingen (2012 177-183) criticises the EU and its Member States for only having “10-20% of European armed forces deployable in stabilization and reconstruction...Europeans still have over 10,000 battle tanks in their armouries”.

The Franco-British Summit had an ambition for the EU to move away from its “civilian” and “normative” power status, but it also introduced questions on the impact of militarisation on the nature of the EU (Simón, 2010, Manners, 2006). Despite these questions, scholars continue to argue that the CSDP remains predominantly of a civilian nature (Pohl, 2013, Faleg, 2016, Tardy, 2017). Pohl (2013 310) argues that most Member States are not willing in reality to allow the EU to practice the defence role that was intended for it through previous policy documents and treaties. The defence dimeson of the CSDP is most challenged because of the diverging views of Member States and because Member States are not willing to deploy their military personnel into risky environments (Keukeleire, 2009 57).

However, recent key developments in the EU’s Security and Defence policies have demonstrated a desire to rebalance the EU’s defensive role within CSDP. Tardy (2018 ), in support of Biscop and Coelmont’s (2017) article CSDP and the ‘Ghent Framework’: The Indirect Approach to Permanent Structured Cooperation?, evaluates the development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) launched by the EU in 2017. He describes PESCO as;

A framework aimed at incentivising cooperation among Member States in the field of defence capability development and operations. The PESCO framework includes two components: binding commitments and specific projects. Binding commitments are pledges made by Member States in the field of defence spending, capability development, and availability and deployability of forces (Tardy, 2018 9).

In addition to the launch of PESCO, Tardy (2018 9) also evaluates the “Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) which was established in June 2017 as the permanent strategic-level headquarter for non-executive military missions”. Tardy highlights the key reasons the
MPCC being established as “the identification of a specific need, the momentum generated by the release of the European Union Global Strategy, and the UK’s decision to leave the EU” (Tardy, 2018). New processes and the launch of PESCO and MPCC shown the EU’s renewed interest in ensuring defence is incorporated effectively into CSDP missions. More research needs to be done on the potential militarisation impact on the nature of the EU given these recent developments. Critics of these processes and developments still don’t see the EU’s ability to become a stronger military power in their CSDP missions and operations (Merlingen, 2012, Menon, 2009, Tardy, 2018). But the EU is committing to a stronger role in defence with the release of PESCO and MPCC and monitoring the impact of this on the nature of the EU will be a new field of study for many scholars.

2.6 Gaps in the Literature

After analysing over sixty sources relating to concepts of the CSDP and the challenges the policy faces, there was one particular gap in the literature that was evident. Merket et al. (2015) identified this gap most effectively in their article *The EU as a global security actor in Africa*. The gap is surrounding the EU’s promotion of regionalism in Africa and issues that can potentially impact a CSDP mission when African troops are contributed. Within the UN there already exists an African Standby Force which was created in 2016 (Merket et al., 2015 12). This issue is further expanded upon in the article;

> A political issue identified with this is the fact that African troops are usually deployed in neighbouring countries; this is the case in Somalia, the DRC, Mali and the CAR. This may have advantages, but such a deployment often has additional political and/or economic dimensions in support of national interests. These factors increase a mission’s complexity and undermine its neutrality (Merket et al., 2015 12).

Relations between the EU and Africa has never been without difficulties, but there is a need for increased dialogue to promote and incorporate regionalism in CSDP missions and operations keeping in mind the inherent issues that may come with increased regionalism as mentioned above. Not enough research has been conducted surrounding the African Union’s role in CSDP missions being undertaken in the region, and this is the predominant gap that was found in the literature in this review. Due to limitations this research will not be focusing heavily on the role of the African Union in the two missions in Mali, as more research needs to be completed in this domain.
2.7 Summary

In summary, this review provides an overview of relevant literature about the EU CSDP and its key concepts and challenges. This topic has been analysed by several key scholars in the field (Nováky, 2011, Tardy, 2018, Merket et al., 2015, Manners, 2006, Biscop and Coelmont, 2017, Simón, 2010, Faleg, 2016); have focused on key concepts on the CSDP including the peacebuilding process, the nexus between security and development, the EU’s comprehensive approach and the EU identity as a global actor. These scholars also provide analytical literature surrounding the core challenges that the EU CSDP faces currently and will continue to face in the future which are the lack of political will and burden-sharing of international crises and the impact of militarisation on the nature of the EU.

Since 2003, the EU’s CSDP has made significant progress to achieve objectives but there are still important improvements to be made. The lack of scholarly literature surrounding regionalism and the role of the African Union in ongoing CSDP missions throughout the region has resulted in a significant gap which needs to be addressed before the Union and its Member States can enhance their peacekeeping capabilities.
CHAPTER 3 – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

The theoretical approach used in this thesis is Chris Hill’s Capabilities-Expectations Gap. The reason for choosing this theoretical approach is the criticism of the EU that it does not deliver consistently given the state of its economic system and the resources at its disposal, institutionally and politically. Hill’s theory was intended to be used as a yardstick by which the process of change within EU foreign policy could be monitored. The change in recent policy documents, the release of the EUGS in particular, gives this research the opportunity to determine whether the Capability-Expectations Gap still exists or whether it has narrowed significantly due to the influence of the EUGS on specific CSDP missions.

In 1993, Chris Hill published an influential article defining the gap through three main components; the EU’s ability to agree, its resources and the instruments at its disposal (Hill, 1993). Hill analysed the European Community (EC), now known as the EU, based on its international role and identified a gap between what the EU has been expected to do and what it is actually able to deliver (Hill, 1993). The article’s aim was to “sketch a more realistic picture of what the Community does in the world than that presented either by its more enthusiastic supporters or by the demanders beyond its borders” (Hill, 1993 306).

With this, Hill posed the question: “If the EC is less than a state but more than an IGO, in what ways can it be termed a genuinely independent actor in international relations?” (Hill, 1993 309). The focus of his theory centred around the international role the EU had in 1993 and what it may or may not be expected to perform in the Post-Cold War era (Hill, 2004 726). Two key concepts are presented in the creation of Hill’s theory being actorness and presence. Hill highlights three features of an international actor as being “delimited from others, autonomous as it can make its own laws and decisions and retains some structural prerequisites for action on an international level such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capacity to negotiate with third parties” (Hill, 1993 309). The other concept of presence has been defined as the EU’s “variable and multidimensional presence” (309) on the global stage, which see’s EU norms and values being promoted wherever the EU is present.

In theorising the EU as an international actor, the concept of multilateralism should be engaged with. The EU has committed itself to effective multilateralism through numerous
joint communication and resolutions with the United Nations (UN). In 2003, the EU desired to have;

An active commitment to an effective multilateralism [that] means more than a rhetoric profession of faith. It means taking global rules seriously, whether they concern the preservation of peace or the limitation of carbon emissions; it means helping other countries to implement and abide by these rules; it means engaging actively in multilateral forums, and promoting a forward-looking agenda that is not limited to a narrow defence of national interests (Commission, 2003 2).

This thesis will analyse whether the external action and international actoriness of the EU is influenced by the releasing of new EU policies and strategies. Using the EUGS, this thesis aims to focus on the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali to determine whether the EUGS has had an influence on their activities and mandates.

The Capabilities-Expectations Gap identified in Hill’s works also proposed some of the potential dangers of this gap as being an “excessive risk-taking by supplicant states and/or unrealistic policies on behalf of the EU” (Hill, 1993 315) which possibly produces a “disproportionate degree of disillusion and resentment when hopes were inevitably dashed” (Hill, 1997 8). This thesis argues that these dangers still exist in EU foreign policy today despite the evolvement in policy, institutions and ability to promote actoriness on the global stage.

In his first 1993 article, Hill divided his analysis into two parts; the functions the EU performed to the present and six functions it might be expected to have in the future. The expected future functions were listed as;

1. The EU as a superpower, replacing the USSR in the global balance of power;

2. A regional pacifier;

3. A global intervener;

4. A mediator of conflicts;

5. A bridge between the rich and the poor;

6. Joint supervisor of the world economy (Hill, 1993 310-314)

The above tasks, according to Hill in 1993, posed a serious challenge to what the EC (what the EU was previously known as) was actually capable of delivering due to the three central components to his theory highlighted above. However, the development of the EU overtime
institutionally and policy-wise, has narrowed the Capabilities-Expectations Gap significantly. The EU has made efforts to improve its resource availability, as well as to the instruments at its disposal but it will be argued in this thesis that Chris Hill’s theory of the Capabilities-Expectations Gap still offers great explanatory power despite being first introduced in 1993. This research will specifically focus on whether his claim of the gap continues to exist despite the introduction of the CSDP and institutional strengthening such as the creation of the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), to name a few examples.

The EU has made significant developments since this theory was first introduced in 1993. Despite Hill’s theory being based on a constructivist ontology, he recognises that the reality of EU action is changeable even though the process may be slow. Hill identifies historical developments as being “much slower than impatient and idealists would wish” (Hill, 1993:315). Some of these key developments since Hill’s theory was introduced include the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the foreign policy presence under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which later became known as CSDP under the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the creation of a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, the establishment of the European External Action Service, and the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon.

Hill himself noted in 1993 that the experience of EU foreign policy had “been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its evolution is doomed to fail and that we must fall back on history” (Hill, 1993:307). Therefore, it is important to understand different theorist’s conceptualizations of international actorness of the EU over the years following Hill’s conceptualization. One of the leading ideas of the past decade has been Ian Manner’s theory of normative power Europe. Manner’s argues that the EU “possessed a normative power that is built on norms such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights” (Manners, 2002). Manner’s therefore discusses the EU as a normative power shaping its international actorness role through what it actually is. In his 2002 theoretical conceptualization, Manners points out that;

The EU has a normative power that has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms in the international system (Manners, 2002:252).

It is widely agreed that the EU favours promoting common liberal-democratic principles as
outlined above in Manner’s article. This thesis will focus on what the EU is, as suggested by Manners, and it will go further to look at what the EU actually does, as Karen. E Smith has argued. Smith agrees with Hill and Manners in their theoretical conceptualizes of EU international actorness but goes further by relying not only on what the EU is, but she examines what the EU does (Smith, 2005). Through Smiths argument of looking at actions of the EU, we are naturally led back to Hill’s theory of Capability-Expectations Gap as acting when it comes to international affairs is where the EU is most frequently challenged by the international community.

Toje has been the most recent scholar to analyse Hill’s theory and narrow what is commonly known as Hill’s Capability-Expectations Gap. Toje (2008) argues that the EU, based on Hill’s three components of his theory, does have the resources and instruments to act but still “finds itself unable to deliver the foreign policies expected due to a lack of decision making” (122) and the ability to agree. He believes there is more of a Consensus-Expectations Gap which means there is a gap between what the Member States are expected to agree on in foreign policy and what they can actually consent to. This recent analysis of the gap that exists in EU foreign policy has been argued to result in the EU being unable to engage in effective crisis management and resorting to continuing statements and examples rather than shaping world affairs (Toje, 2008 139).

It should be noted that Hill, in his recent assessments of his theory, has stressed that his Capability-Expectations Gap was never intended as a static theory, but “rather a yardstick by which the process of change in EU foreign policy could be monitored” (Toje, 2008 122). Therefore, this thesis will centralise around Hill’s 1993 Capability-Expectations Gap to determine whether the gap still exists in current CSDP missions or whether it has narrowed into more of a Consensus-Expectations Gap as argued by Toje in 2008. The aim of this thesis is to determine whether the ambitions of future EU external action laid out in the 2016 EUGS have been translated into action in CSDP, using the two ongoing missions in Mali as case studies.
3.1 Methodology Introduction

This section includes the research methodology of this thesis. This section will outline the research methods, the research approach, the selected methods for collecting data, case study selection and the research limitations. To reiterate the research question this thesis aims to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports to determine whether the EUGS has influenced mandates of specific CSDP operations. In order to enhance EU peacekeeping operations in the future it is important to understand if and how new and changing EU strategies can influence CSDP operations.

The timeframe for this research is from the release of the EUGS in June 2016 until June 2018, 2 years post the release of the EUGS. The reason for this choice is to ensure that there has been sufficient time for the EU and its Member States to make progress on the ambitions of the EUGS and to allow for the release of two Annual CSDP Reports to determine whether the mandates have been influenced over the past two years.

Before outlining the rest of this section the distinction between ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ should be made clear. Henn et al (2009) states that “method refers to the range of techniques that are available to us to collect evidence about the social world. Methodology, however, concerns the research strategy as a whole” (3).

3.2 Research method – Qualitative versus Quantitative techniques

A predominantly qualitative approach to this research question was taken in order to meet objectives of the research question. Qualitative research is appropriate for small samples and offers a detailed description of a research subject “without limiting the scope of the research and nature of participant’s responses” (Collis and Hussy, 2003). Qualitative research is defined as “the interpretative study of a specified issue or problem in which the researcher is central to the sense that is made” (Cassell, 1994 2).

Figure Three shows the features of qualitative and quantitative research. Most of the outcomes of qualitative research come from the researcher’s personal judgements and interpretations therefore the effectiveness of this method relies on the skills and abilities of the researcher.
A quantitative approach was also used purely to gather term frequency throughout the content analysis of the EUGS and CSDP Annual Reports. This approach was chosen to further show the impact the EUGS has had on the mandates of the two missions in Mali. This quantitative approach was using word clouds generated from a sophisticated site called Wordle\textsuperscript{12}. A word cloud generator such as Wordle takes words from the content the researcher has provided and creates a cloud that is a visual representation of the frequency certain words have in the content provided. Wordle is one of the most popular word cloud generators and creates a clean and well organised cloud that helps conduct a clear visual representation of words (Burch et al., 2013). The predominant reason for choosing Wordle is the promotion of the site from several well-known Non-Governmental Organisations who use

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Qualitative research & Quantitative Research \\
\hline
The aim is a complete, detailed description. & The aim is to classify features, count them, and construct statistical models in an attempt to explain what is observed. \\
\hline
Researcher may only know roughly in advance what he/she is looking for. & Researcher knows clearly in advance what he/she is looking for. \\
\hline
Recommended during earlier phases of research projects. & Recommended during latter phases of research projects. \\
\hline
The design emerges as the study unfolds. & All aspects of the study are carefully designed before data is collected. \\
\hline
Researcher is the data gathering instrument. & Researcher uses tools, such as questionnaires or equipment to collect numerical data. \\
\hline
Data is in the form of words, pictures or objects. & Data is in the form of numbers and statistics. \\
\hline
Subjective – individuals interpretation of events is important, e.g., uses participant observation, in-depth interviews etc. & Objective: seeks precise measurement & analysis of target concepts, e.g., uses surveys, questionnaires etc. \\
\hline
Qualitative data is more 'rich', time consuming, and less able to be generalized. & Quantitative data is more efficient, able to test hypotheses, but may miss contextual detail. \\
\hline
Researcher tends to become subjectively immersed in the subject matter. & Researcher tends to remain objectively separated from the subject matter. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


\textsuperscript{12} \url{http://www.wordle.net/} [Accessed 01 August 2018]
the site on their own websites such as Amnesty International, Oxfam and Human Rights Watch.

Qualitative research was chosen for this research to provide an in-depth explanation of the research question. Qualitative research is primarily exploratory research. In this research it was used to gain an understanding of the context and complexity of the EU’s CSDP structure and focused on the words rather than numbers as is more typical for a quantitative approach. This research has used qualitative content analysis to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports and has tagged key phrases and text segments that correspond to key concepts in the research question.

3.3 Research approach: Inductive or deductive

The research approach that was followed for the purposes of this research was a deductive one. The deductive approach means the researcher starts with theory, applying a chosen theory to something the researcher chooses to study. In doing so, the researcher defines and operationalises variables derived from the theory.

Gulati states that “deductive means reasoning from the particular to the general. If a causal relationship or link seems to be implied by a particular theory or case example, it might be true in many cases. A deductive design might test to see if this relationship or link did obtain on more general circumstances” (Gulati, 2009 42). The objective of a deductive research approach is to test or verify rather than develop the theory, it is grounded in the theory process. This research question best suits the deductive approach. CSDP has had a significant amount of attention from scholars since it was introduced in 2003. This attention has resulted in numerous amounts of academic sources being published on the topic which is the key reason for this research being deductive.

By applying deductive research, this thesis will explore a known theory and test if the theory is valid in given circumstances. The deductive approach “follows the path of logic most closely” (Pellissier, 2008 3), and it has three key advantages;

1. Possibility to explain causal relationships between concepts and variables
2. Possibility to measure concepts quantitatively
3. Possibility to generalize research findings to a certain extent
Therefore, to get the most accurate answer to this theses research question, the deductive approach will be most efficient.

### 3.4 Data collection method and tools

For the purposes of this research, qualitative content analysis and case studies were used as data collection methods. Krippendorff defines content analysis as “analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of communicated material (as a book or film) through classification, tabulation and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable effect” (Krippendorff, 2004 xvii). The method of content analysis has become adaptable to suit the unique needs of the researcher and their research question and can be applied in quantitative, qualitative and sometimes mixed methods research approaches. The range of techniques within content analysis is extensive and it has become one of the most common methods used in the social sciences (White and Marsh, 2006 23).

Krippendorff highlights in four key points how to successfully apply content analysis as a method in research:

1. “Sample text, in the sense of selecting what is relevant;
2. Unitize text, in the sense of distinguishing words or propositions and using quotes and examples;
3. Contextualize what is being read in light of what is known about the circumstances surrounding the text;
4. Have specific research questions in mind” (Krippendorff, 2004 87).

The content analysis used in this research broke down the data, from the EUGS and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports, according to source topic and used a concept-driven deductive strategy which drew on the context of the research question.

In Krippendorff’s (2004) works he states that “content analysis is an empirically grounded method, explanatory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent” (xvii). Content analysis undertaken in this research focused on two key documents and examined the data and focused on the “aboutness” of the content, as suggested in Neundorf’s *Content Analysis Guidebook* (Neuendorf, 2002). For example, this research focused on how often a particular word, phrase or concept was used or not used and the themes and trends in the documents.
The reliability of this method is dependent upon the agreement, or the extent of agreement, that is made among others who have analysed the text (Krippendorff, 2004). The use of content analysis in this research was effective in analysing the presence of certain words or concepts within the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports. This research analysed the presence, meaning and relationships of such words and concepts in order to answer the research question. This research focused on a particular segment within the content and gathered evidence to prove whether this segment has been translated into action on the ground within the CSDP mission.

This research also used case studies as a method. The case study research method can be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1984 23). Case studies have become a more popular method in research because of the limitations of quantitative research in providing in depth explanations of research questions. Case study method allows a researcher to gain an in-depth study closely examining data in a specific context. In most research contexts, a case study method is limited to a small geographic area or number of individuals as the subject of study. Yin (1984), discusses the advantages of using case study method in research as being able to examine data within the context of its use and provide an in-depth study of a single or small number of cases, set in their real world contexts (21).

There are different designs of case study research, the most common being comparing a large number of cases, known as large-n comparison, or comparing a smaller number of cases or a single case, referred to as a small-n approach to research. This research will be a small-n approach as it contrasts two case studies in the same geographical location, Mali. By conducting small-n research on two cases, this research resulted in a deeper understanding of the problem analysed in the research question.

3.5 Case Study selection

Choosing a case study design to answer the research question, two ongoing case studies were selected; EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Selection criteria was based on the EU’s strategic priorities for regions that have ongoing CSDP missions. The Sahel region has often been highlighted as a region of strategic importance to the EU’s wider neighbourhood and the
selection of Mali was decided because it is the only country in the world to have two ongoing CSDP missions. Mali is a country with ongoing security challenges and the EU’s decision to reform and extend EUTM Mali and establish EUCAP Sahel Mali reaffirms the role of the EU as a global actor providing multidimensional initiatives to address the issues Mali and the Sahel region continues to face.

The decision to contrast the two case studies was made because these two missions are both ongoing and in the same geographical location which means they have the exact same EU institutional structures in place as well as the political, economic and social conditions. These missions incorporate a mixture of multidimensional initiatives both civilian and military, short and long term. Because of this multidimensional approach in the region, EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali are strong cases to determine whether the EUGS has had an influence on their mandates since it was released in 2016.

EUTM Mali, as outlined in the introduction, started in February 2013. Initially planned for fifteen months, the mission has been extended until May 2020 and aims to provide expertise and advice to the Malian armed forces. This mission is in line with the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel with a mandate to “support and train the Malian Armed Forces and to help improve its military capacity” (EEAS, 2016a 19). Some of this support includes initiatives such as training on logistics management, human resources management, health service provision to the armed forces, security force organisation, international humanitarian law, and gender-based violence (EEAS, 2016a 19). EUTM, besides the security task of training soldiers, works towards creating a resilient Malian army that is less vulnerable to corruption and can effectively manage security crises through promoting peacebuilding, development and human rights.

EUCAP Sahel Mali compliments EUTM and was established in April 2014 to assist in long term security and development in the Sahel. EUCAP Sahel Mali supports good governance and justice through a mandate to strengthen the internal security sector in Mali which will enable the peaceful and positive reform of the state. Some of the training modules provided by EUCAP Sahel Mali includes operational management, human resources management, professional ethics, border management, public order, intelligence techniques, professional intervention, disarmament, criminal policing, counter-terrorism and human rights and gender (EEAS, 2016a 18).
Both of these missions are of a peacebuilding character, as most CSDP missions are. They focus on a long-term solution for the security challenges in Mali.

### 3.6 Research Limitations

As is the case for every study, this thesis had some limitations. It needs to be noted that CSDP operations in the EU are just one factor related to the external initiatives of the EU. Among others, this area includes the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), foreign trade issues, development policy and the representation of the EU in multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Therefore, this thesis is limited to CSDP and the two missions ongoing in Mali. It will be recognised that France had a significant role in the establishment of the missions, however the involvement of other actors will not be the focus of this thesis as the range of actors in the region is extremely complex. France’s role will be highlighted in chapter 5, however it is to provide context in order to answer the research question.

As this research focuses on just two case studies of CSDP there is a limitation that indicates that the research cannot provide an answer to whether the EUGS has had an influence on all CSDP operations. Therefore, a lack of validity is present.
CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS

In Chapter 2, the literature review outlined key concepts of CSDP and the EU’s identity as a global actor highlighting the comprehensive approach to global issues and the challenges commonly faced by CSDP missions. This section will highlight the findings of content analysis of the 2016 EUGS and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports as described in Chapter 3.

This thesis aims to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports to determine whether the EUGS has influenced mandates of specific CSDP operations. In order to enhance EU peacekeeping operations in the future it is important to understand if and how new and changing EU strategies can influence CSDP operations. Therefore, this chapter will identify and quote core segments of the EUGS that specifically relate to the key words that are most frequently used within the EUGS. The table below (Table one) highlights the frequency of certain concepts or terms used throughout the EUGS in 2016 compared to the same concepts or phrases being used in the 2003 European Security Strategy. This was done using a key word search within content analysis of both documents to identify the most common terms and concepts within both documents.

Table One: Table of frequent terms in 2016 EUGS and 2003 ESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept/Term used</th>
<th>European Global Strategy 2016</th>
<th>European Security Strategy 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Values</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Created by researcher.
Figure four, as shown below, is the word cloud generated by Wordle from the content of the EUGS. Wordle was used because it is one of the most popular word cloud generators as it creates a clean and well organised cloud that helps conduct a clear visual representation of words (Burch et al., 2013). The predominant reason for choosing Wordle is the promotion of the site from several well-known Non-Governmental Organisations who use the site on their own websites such as Amnesty International, Oxfam and Human Rights Watch. The benefit of using a word cloud in content analysis is that it gives a clear visual representation of the frequency certain terms or concepts have in any document.

Figure Four: Wordle Word Cloud

As can be seen from both table one and figure four the frequency of the words peace, security, development, global, multilateralism and disarmament shows the emphasis of the concepts within the EUGS. For example, the word “peace” is significantly larger than other concepts and terms which demonstrates the importance of the word to the EU and its foreign policy especially given that the EU supports the UNs purpose of “upholding international peace and security”. A peaceful environment is a priority for EU external action because it results in less threats to European security within its own borders. The frequency of the term “disarmament” was surprising as it was lower than expected compared to other terms that were more frequent such as “security”. Disarmament was expected to have been a high

14 http://www.wordle.net/
priority for EU external action within the global strategy due to pressure from the UN and anti-nuclear NGOs from recent global meetings. It is clear from the word cloud that although “disarmament” is incorporated into the word cloud, it isn’t as high of a priority as some of the other terms, like “security”. “Security” in this context within the EUGS means preventing conflict erupting and ensuring that borders are secure through preventing trafficking through arms, humans or other such means. Given that the EUGS was the document being analysed for term frequency in this world cloud, it is not surprising that the largest sized term here is the “EU”. The “EU” in this context means the entire Union as well as foreign policy bodies such as the EEAS who are key to delivering many of the ambitions laid out in the EUGS. This word cloud is a visual representation of the frequency certain terms or concepts have in the 2016 EUGS, this section will draw upon the top eight most frequently used concepts in the EUGS and provide evidence from the 2016-2017 Annual CSDP Reports and other relevant sources to conclude that there is a strong correlation between the two ongoing missions in Mali and the release of the EUGS, suggesting influence.

4.1 Peace

In Federica Mogherini’s foreword of the 2016 EUGS she emphasises the significance of building on 70 years of peace that the EU has been an integral part of upholding. The term “peace” was used in the Global Strategy 60 times and emphasised from the beginning with Mogherini’s foreword. The EUGS highlights the priorities of the EU within their external action through ensuring that the EU “will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach” (Union, 2016:9).

The establishment of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in 2014 has been the part of the EU’s new generation of instruments to foster conflict prevention, crisis response and peacebuilding externally (EEAS, 2016b). The IcSP currently manages over 200 projects in over 75 countries in areas such as disarmament, arms control, mediation, reconstruction, rehabilitation and stabilization, with a budget of €2.3 billion for the period 2014-2020. In Mali, the IcSP has funded four projects, with the final project’s duration ending on first of July 2018. These projects were complimentary to the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali with the CSDP missions playing a crucial role in the IcSP projects implementation on the ground.
Although the IcSP isn’t specifically mentioned within the EUGS itself, the projects funded through the IcSP are part of the EU’s priorities outlined in the EUGS in relation to peacebuilding globally. The first project financed under IcSP was “Women Organising to Re-establish Social and Community Cohesion” which had a duration until September 2016. This project resulted in 39 women’s organisations being engaged in peace and security initiatives in Mali, organisations which are still engaging in the peacebuilding process today. In addition to the creation of these organisations, 9 national workshops were conducted on the role of women in the peace process supplemented by 5 advocacy events to promote the role of women in the peace process. This project in particular was funded by the EU to promote the peace process and ensure that gender equality was a priority when doing so.

The second project’s name was “Relaunching the local economy and support collectivities in Northern Mali” which lasted until May 2017. It focused on building peace and stability through relaunching the local economy in Northern Mali. The project supported economic projects and focused on local communities who were affected by the Mali conflict. This project is especially relevant given that the two case study missions are located in Mali and this project complements the work of CSDP in peacebuilding and ensuring the local economy is supported to help facilitate the peace process in Mali.

The third project had a duration of 2 years and was completed in May 2017. The project contributed to peace in Mali through facilitating reconciliation and dialogue between different sections of society. The project created a professional Malian media through training journalists throughout the country. This resulted in access to balanced, independent information which helped reduce the efforts of rumours and propaganda. The EU funded this project to promote their new generation of instruments to foster conflict prevention, crisis response and peacebuilding externally (EEAS, 2016b). The ongoing CSDP missions in Mali have played a crucial role in the IcSP projects implementation on the ground.

The fourth project which was officially concluded on the first of July 2017 was a project that contributed to security sector reform in Mali. The project coordinated information and action by domestic security agencies under the authority of the Minister of Security and contributed to restoring trust between the security forces and Malian citizens. This project was funded through EUTM Mali and was a joint initiative between the EU and MINUSMA.
The EUGS highlights the importance of resilience and the ability for states and societies to reform post conflict (Ejdus and Juncos, 2018 5), the EU is showing their commitment to Security Sector Reform (SSR) and peacebuilding through IcSP projects as outlined above. The integrated approach of IcSP alongside the Mali CSDP operations shows the EU is engaging in a “practical and principled” (Union, 2016 9) way in Mali as noted in the EUGS.

We will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We must enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and jobs in Africa (Union, 2016 36).

Within the EUGS one of the bolded subtitles is “A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa”. The EU has outlined their commitment to invest in African peace and development within the EUGS as shown with the quote above. By doing this the EU is systematically addressing cross-border dynamics in the Sahel as well as North and West Africa which directly impacts Mali, where this research is focused. In order to determine whether the EUGS has influenced CSDP mandates in Mali, evidence from the 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports was used to demonstrate the influence the EUGS has had.

The major development since the release of the EUGS in 2016 was the announcement of a proposed new European Peace Facility (EPF) by High Representative Federica Mogherini on 13 June 2018 which is not related to the current IcSP. The creation of the EPF would be used as an additional funding mechanism outside the current Multiannual Financial Framework (EEAS, 2018i). Mogherini announced the EPF would be worth €10.5 billion over a seven-year period and would build on the African Peace Facility (APF) that currently exists to promote peace and security in Africa. It is intended that the EPF would continue to finance African-led peace support operations such as the G5 Sahel Force, while also contributing to common costs of CSDP missions.
Figure five: European Peace Facility Factsheet

Figure five shows a graphic that highlights the intentions behind creating an EPF. The design would provide “more flexible financial assistance” (EEAS, 2018i) to EU partners in peace support operations. Figure 5 demonstrates the EPF as being an “off budget” initiative which would be used for military or defence projects. The purpose of creating such a facility is the fact that the EU wants to “enhance efforts” in Africa and this facility would allow them to work towards doing so. The establishment of the EPF also directly impacts the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali as it will allow for more effective financing of the current missions.

The APF, established in 2003, is not being replaced by the EPF and will continue to carry out its three core purposes: “funding African-led Peace Support Operations, supporting long-term development and capacity building of the institutions of the ASPA, and funding Early Response Mechanism (ERM), a tool to prevent crises and their escalation, through among others mediation efforts” (Dijkstra et al., 2017 16). The announcement of a new EPF by Mogherini symbolises the EU’s commitment to investing in African peace and development, an investment inspired by the 2016 EUGS. An EPF would enhance the capabilities of CSDP in

---

Africa and would contribute to the continued implementation of mandates in Mali through complementing current initiatives undertaken by the APF.

### 4.2 Security

The EU aims to present itself as a global security provider through its contribution to CSDP missions and operations. Currently 2,600 civilian and 4,000 military staff from all 28 Member States are deployed around the world to uphold international peace and security (EEAS, 2016a 2). In Mali, 571 personnel are on the ground from 29 countries in the EUTM mission and 105 personnel from 13 EU Member States in the EUCAPE Sahel mission. The EUGS highlights the expectations of the EU by its partners to have a major role in the international community “including as a global security provider” (Union, 2016 3).

The term “security” was repeated in the EUGS 150 times, it was the most common term used throughout the document. The EUGS not only incorporates internal security but international security, promoting shared interests with partners to uphold international security.

We will work through development, diplomacy, and CSDP, ensuring that our security sector reform efforts enable and enhance our partners’ capabilities to deliver security within the rule of law. We will cooperate with other international players, coordinating our work on capacity building with the UN and NATO in particular (Union, 2016 26).

In Mali, the EU has made significant progress towards the ambitions of the EUGS. In 2016, EUTM Mali supported the renewal of a training curriculum for police to create sustainable, standardised, high-quality training for both new recruits and seasoned officers. The EU enhanced their Malian partners capabilities through the new Train-the-Trainer initiative whereby Malians took ownership of the training processes learning how to conduct the training activities alongside Mission trainers (EEAS, 2016a 19). In total, 1262 MaAF were trained in 2016, a significant increase to previous years.

EUTM also incorporated advisory sessions on running armed forces for the Malian government to incorporate into their armed forces with sessions such as “logistics management, human resources management, health service provision to the armed forces, security, force organisation, international humanitarian law, and gender-based violence” (EEAS, 2016a 19) which contributed to enhancing Malian capabilities within their armed forces.
In relation to security, the EU consistently highlights the need to become a “more responsive Union” (Union, 2016: 46) which will developed through diplomacy, CSDP and development. The EUGS promotes the ambition of the EU to ensure that CSDP becomes more rapid and effective which aims to give the EU and its partners the ability to respond to crises rapidly and effectively.

A responsive CSDP also requires streamlining our institutional structure. We must strengthen operational planning and conduct structures, and build closer connections between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these may be deployed in the same theatre (Union, 2016: 48).

The missions in Mali have made significant progress in strengthening operational planning and conduct structures due to recent institutional developments such as the MPCC and EPF. The drafting of a new Field Security Handbook in 2016 has resulted in the redefining of guidelines in the organisation and management of all CSDP missions. This handbook outlines and highlights the EUGS as giving a “new momentum to the development of the CSDP” (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2017: 18). Implementation of security and defensive measures have been a priority within the EUGS and developments in this area can be seen through the two ongoing missions in Mali. In 2017, the EEAS handled “1400 calls to their hotline to reduce tensions and conducted 100 interviews conducting local actors on the future shape of CSDP work in the Sahel” (EEAS, 2017a: 7).

In addition to this, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) unit in Brussels drafted operational guidelines on “gender mainstreaming, police-prosecutor cooperation and anti-corruption practices” (EEAS, 2017a: 9) to ensure efficiency in CSDP missions mandates. This directly had a positive impact in Mali as these guidelines were incorporated into the 2017 training modules within EUTM Mali.

The most recent institutional development within the EU was the establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff. Mogherini said “the establishment of the MPCC is a very important operational decision to strengthen European defence. It will contribute to make the non-executive European missions more effective and to improve the training of soldiers of partner countries, to guarantee peace and security. This is important not just for our partners, but also for the European Union’s security” (EEAS, 2018h). This institutional development includes EUTM Mali and has been a...
positive development that has provided better support to the mission from Brussels. The MPCC has been working closely with the existing civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), sharing knowledge and expertise on best practices to address issues relating both to civilian and military missions. These two units work alongside one another in Mali and have provided the two ongoing missions with enhanced support and management from Brussels.

The EU have taken important steps to promote unity of the Union in the past such as the Lisbon Treaty’s creation of the double-hatted High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission and the EEAS. “A Joined-up Union” was consistently emphasised throughout the EUGS to encourage coherence, cooperation and dialogue between all EU Member States in order to have the best possible outcome in addressing international security issues. This emphasis in the EUGS also incorporated the importance of cooperating as a Union on defence.

Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as a norm. The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. A sustainable, innovation and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP (Union, 2016 45).

The EU has introduced two key developments to show its commitment to implementing the priorities of the EUGS. The first development was the launch of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on defence in December 2017 where 25 Member States adopted the decision to establish PESCO in the area of security and defence policy. PESCO was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty however Member States did not unanimously decide to implement all appropriate actions to launch PESCO in 2011; 2017 marked the official launching of PESCO. The renewed interest in Member States working more closely in security and defence will allow the development of joint defence capabilities, investment into shared projects and it will ultimately enhance the operational readiness and contribution of armed forces (EU, 2017a). This development, as highlighted in the 2017 CSDP Annual Report, marks a “historic move to facilitate cooperation” (EEAS, 2017a 5) between Member States of the EU and it will fill some crucial gaps in the capabilities of the EU in security and defence policy.

The other key development inspired by the ambitions of the EUGS was the launching up of a European Defence Fund in June 2017. The 2016 European Defence Action Plan outlined how
a European Defence Fund and other actions can strengthen Member States cooperation and capabilities on security and defence (Commission, 2017b). As shown in figure six, the European Defence Fund is an ambitious initiative that will result in more efficient spending on security and defence with current research projects being conducted on the areas of drones, strategic technology foresight and soldier protection and equipment (Commission, 2017b). The bolded words within figure six show the importance of certain words and phrases to the EU. For example, the European Defence Fund is highlighted in figure six as being valuable as it will “help Member States to spend taxpayer’s money more efficiently and get better value for their investment” (Figure six). By bolding this particular sentence, the EU is attempting to highlight the fact that this new fund will result in more efficient spending of EU funds which will in turn assist CSDP mission’s capacity to fulfil their mandates.

Figure Six: European Defence Fund Factsheet

There are 5 current research projects within the European Defence Fund. The expected budget post 2020 for this fund is €5.5 billion per year for projects on both research and development. Although this fund does not specifically support the CSDP missions in Mali at this stage, it is expected that the benefits of the fund will filter through the overarching CSDP structuring, therefore it will have a positive impact on these missions in Mali in the near future.

16 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/defence_fund_factsheet_0_0.pdf
4.2 Development

Development was mentioned 68 times in the EUGS. The EEAS have consistently attempted to embed development policies into their security policies as they are aware of the link between security and development. The EUGS highlights this link specifically;

We must become more joined up in our security and development policies. CSDP capacity building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law work by the Commission. Our peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from short-term crisis management to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle. Long term work on pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights must be tied to crisis response through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions and diplomacy (Union, 2016 50-51).

In 2016, the EU adopted new measures to enhance security and development cooperation. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for the Sahel and the Counter Terrorism Sahel project both contribute to enhancing security and development in the Sahel region and their projects have assisted EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali with their financial assistance of €280 million towards reducing migration in Northern Mali (Maibaum, 2016 44). In addition to this, the 2016-2020 Sahel Action Plan was the first comprehensive approach including development and security cooperation released by the EU to tackle transnational challenges in the wider European Neighbourhood (Maibaum, 2016 42). This Action Plan involves both EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel to help contribute to achieving the target points. These target points are as follows;

1. “prevention and countering radicalisation;
2. creation of appropriate conditions for youth;
3. migration and mobility
4. border management, the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime” (Maibaum, 2016 197).

The emphasis of ownership and cooperation between all internal and external actors was specifically highlighted in the plan. EUTM Mali’s mandate is contributing to the target point of border management whereas EUCAP Sahel Mali is focusing on target points 1-3.

CSDP in Mali is also contributing to long term pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights. In the 2017 Annual CSDP Report, Mogerhini reported that the EU increased efforts to raise the level of gender and human rights integration across all missions. She highlighted that “all
missions now have a provision for a Gender or Gender and Human Rights Advisor, and six Missions have a fully established gender focal point system” (EEAS, 2017a 30).

The Sahel Strategy is the overarching EU strategy that incorporates the development-security nexus. The three key objectives of the Sahel Strategy are carefully aligned with the CSDP mission mandates in the Sahel;

1) “Reducing insecurity
2) Improving development
3) Strengthening governance and stability” (Koenig, 2014 238).

Despite the Sahel Strategy being introduced in 2011, it is still very relevant to the ongoing missions in Mali. The release of the EUGS has resparked the conversation within the EU of combining security and development initiatives. This conversation is centred around the Cotonou Agreement as this is the partnership that development cooperation has been based upon since 2000. With the Cotonou Agreement ending in 2020 it is necessary for the EU to identify the strengths and weaknesses of this partnership in order to strengthen the agreement post 2020. The current Cotonou Agreement emphasises a more social direction for EU development policy and acknowledges the importance of regional approaches. In line with Cotonou, the EU in 2017 established a civilian-military Regional Coordination Cell (RCC) based within EUCAP Sahel Mali. The RCC establishment has resulted in the organisation of training courses through current ongoing CSDP missions in the Sahel supporting the G5 Sahel countries work together to eradicate threats to the regions peace and security (EU, 2017b).

The Council Conclusions in June 2017 recall the EU’s strong “integrated approach towards achieving stabilisation in the region, including a full range of relevant instruments in the field of diplomacy, long-term development cooperation, support to human rights, stabilisation efforts, resilience building, humanitarian assistance, migration management and security, including CSDP missions” (EU, 2017b). The EUGS has motivated the EU to fulfil its promises in incorporating security and development initiatives in the region however it will be essential to Sahel peace and security that these initiatives are embedded within the post-2020 development partnership between the EU and the African Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP).
4.3 Multilateralism

The EU continues to promote the UN as the core of global order throughout the EUGS. Investing in the UN is seen as crucial to ensuring global norms and values are upheld and the EU has continued to invest in UN peacekeeping as well as their own CSDP missions to complement ongoing UN missions. The EU highlights in the EUGS that they want to commit to transforming “Global Governance for the 21st Century” (Union, 2016 39) rather than preserving the existing system to increase multilateral cooperation and investment into eradicating global issues.

The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors (Union, 2016 10).

Both EU CSDP missions in Mali coordinate and cooperate with the ongoing UN Mission MINUSMA. MINUSMA has conducted and coordinated 61 training courses with EUTM Mali, heavily relying on EUCAP and EUTM Mali’s training quality and content (Dijkstra et al., 2017 28). Both the UN and EU have developed globally coordinated responses since the EUGS was released in 2016, the most recent being the advisory panel on 4 policies in Mali including the National Border Policy and its Action Plan (EEAS, 2017a 20). The EU and UN also cooperated in assisting Malian authorities to draft a National Strategy on Border Security alongside the International Organisation for Migration. Not only is the EU cooperating and coordinating with the UN in Mali, they have stated their ambition in the EUGS to have a multidimensional, multiphased, multi-level and multilateral approach to external crises;

A multidimensional approach through using all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution is essential…A multiphased approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle. We will invest in prevention, resolution and stabilisation, and avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere…A multi-level approach to conflicts acting at the local, national, regional and global levels…A multilateral approach engaging all those players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution (Union, 2016 28-29).

Since the release of the EUGS in 2016, the EU CSDP missions in Mali have enhanced cooperation with relevant actors and invested into upholding peace and security in Mali long-term. In 2017, the EU invested into the prevention, resolution and stabilisation of challenges facing Mali by working with 128 staff (local and international) on “human resource management, the fight against terrorism and organised crime, and border management”
through training initiatives within EUTM Mali and offering local partners the opportunity to gain strategic legal advice on how to enhance capacity building in Mali. In addition, 56 trainings were held on “forensics, counter-terrorism, human rights, operational management and human resources for 1674 people” (EEAS, 2017a 20). These trainings incorporated a multi-level approach acting at the local, national and international level through involving local and international partners. EUCAP Sahel Mali led three introductory legal drafting capacity building workshops for 19 legislative drafters from the National Assembly, the Secretariat General of the Government and several ministers in an attempt to engage relevant actors who will promote sustainable peace and security in Mali. Both CSDP missions in Mali also incorporated the multilateral approach to conflict throughout 2017 by enhancing civil-military cooperation and joint activities between EUTM Mali and UN MINUSMA. This joint cooperation also included the establishment of a Joint Task Force to support the implementation of the Integrated Security Plan for the Central Regions in Mali. This task force conducted several missions in 2017 to remote Segou and Mopti regions working with the Governor, Malian security forces, civil society and MINUSMA (EEAS, 2017a 20). The EUGS encouraged supporting joint cooperation between the EU and its partners as well as specifically highlighting the need for stronger links with its African partners which would have a direct impact on CSDP missions in Mali;

The EU will support cooperation across sub-regions...systematically addressing cross-border dynamics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions through closer links with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western Africa States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel (Union, 2016 35).

As previously mentioned, the EU established a Regional Coordination Cell in 2017 which signalled the EU’s commitment to support the G5 Sahel countries in their effort to reform the security sector. The EU also attended a meeting between the African Union, African Regional Organisations and the UN in July 2017 which discussed initiatives to strengthen peace and security on the African continent. This high level meetings discussions were in the lead up to the 5th AU-EU Summit as well as against the “backdrop of Africa’s determination to silence guns on the continent by the year 2020” (EEAS, 2017b). Enhancing political dialogue between the EU and the AU has been a priority for EU foreign policy and these meetings and Summits highlight the importance of this not only to the EU but to the AU and international community.
The EU has long been collectively the biggest donor to the UN budget (30.38% in 2017 budget) and the biggest donor to UN peacekeeping operations (31.98% in 2017) (Dijkstra et al., 2017). Moreover, the EU’s level of voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes amount to roughly half of all voluntary contributions, investing in peacebuilding, development, humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention. The EUGS prioritises believing in the UN as part of its multilateral cooperation. As quoted within the EUGS “believing in the UN means investing in it, notably in its peacekeeping, mediation, peacebuilding and humanitarian functions” (Union, 2016).

The EU has not only invested financially in the UN but since the release of the EUGS in 2016 it has moved to adopt more frequent strategic partnership documents. There are twice-yearly meetings between the EU and UN regarding the current partnership in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping where the EU and UN have committed to cooperating more frequently on the ground in peacekeeping operations to have the biggest possible impact wherever they are deployed. The EU has shown this commitment with its cooperation in Mali between MINUSMA and EUTM Mali.

4.4 EU Values

As highlighted in the literature review in Chapter 2, the EU shares global values which incorporates norms such as “peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and gender equality” (Manners, 2002). These values alongside development and security policies shape EU action externally which is reflected in the EUGS. The EUGS specifically highlights gender equality and promoting the EU’s internal gender balance as being crucial for strengthening external action;

Promoting the role of women in peace efforts – from implementing UNSC Resolution on Women, Peace and Security to improving the EU’s internal gender balance. It entails having more systematic resource to cultural, inter-faith, scientific and economic diplomacy in conflict settings (Union, 2016).

As previously mentioned, in 2017, the EU incorporated a Gender or Gender and Human Rights Advisor provision for all CSDP missions, with six current missions having a fully established and functioning gender focal point system (EEAS, 2017a). In addition to improving the EU’s internal gender balance, within EUCAP Sahel Mali the first female intervention trainer graduated in Mali. Marshal Awa Kante said she hopes her “female colleagues will join this
effort to reach gender equality” in the 2017 Annual CSDP Report (EEAS, 2017a 20). Gender mainstreaming was approved in 2017 by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability unit which provides guidelines to all CSDP missions. Bert Versmessen, acting Commander of the current ten civilian CSDP missions in Europe, Africa and the Middle East has highlighted that the EU knows that “integrating the gender perspective makes crisis-management and peacebuilding more efficient” (EEAS, 2018c). The development of the guidelines to promote this has strengthened CSDP significantly.

4.5 EU Action

EU Action was mentioned 57 times as shown in Table one. Action refers to anything in the EUGS that is requiring the EU to implement something new on the ground or to improve what is already being done. When the term “action” was used within the EUGS, it predominantly linked itself to what the EU’s ambitions are to make certain changes within their current external action. For example;

The EU will act at all stages of the conflict, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts (Union, 2016 9-10).

This particular quote from the EUGS is committing the EU to ensure it is taking action at all stages of conflict which has not always been consistent within CSDP. However, since the release of the EUGS the extended mandate of EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali has shown the EU’s commitment to long-term stability in the region. EUTM Mali currently has 581 staff and has invested in stabilisation through educating the Malian Armed Forces and offering training and advice to build the capacity in security capabilities within the Armed Forces. The EU has done this most significantly in 2017 through organising training courses for 2295 Malian Armed Forces personnel. The training included subjects on leadership, medical training, small and support arms courses, disarmament, arms control, engineering and logistics (EEAS, 2017a 21). The release of the EUGS has encouraged the EU to continue these trainings and develop new modules that will assist the Malian Armed Forces in future conflict prevention and management.

Another example of the EU committing to action on the ground within the EUGS was the ambition to “redouble efforts on prevention, monitoring root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change” (Union, 2016 29). Following the
release of the EUGS in 2016, the EU added a human rights and gender training module into EUTM Mali. The “train-the-trainer” module existed before 2016 but the addition of the human rights and gender application into the module created a multiplier effect and promoted the role of human rights and gender within all trainings EUTM conducted from 2016 onwards. In 2018, the EU went further to promote human rights and gender equality through supporting an event in Mali with aimed at improving the understanding of the missions of the National Human Rights Commission. 120 persons took part in the event, intended for security and defence forces in Mali, and it was organised and financed by the Human Rights and Gender Unit of EUCAP Sahel Mali (EEAS, 2018d). This event that took place in March 2018 helped develop a culture of human rights in Mali and encourage partnership between civil society and government to promote and uphold human rights and gender equality.

4.6 Global

The term “global” was one of the most frequently used terms within the EUGS which is not surprising given that its intention is to be a Global Strategy looking forward for EU external action. “Global” became relevant for this thesis especially when the EUGS emphasised Africa and their intentions to enhance cooperation and partnerships with African organisations as this thesis focuses on the two CSDP missions in Mali. The EUGS incorporates “global” into many sections of the document however it emphasises the importance of investing in African peace and development as an investment into European security and prosperity (Union, 2016 36) which links to sustainable global development. The EUGS also lays out how the EU will invest into African peace and development;

We will build stronger links between trade, development and security policies in Africa...we will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa, and assist African organisations’ work on conflict prevention, counter-terrorism, migration and border management. We will do so through diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as trust funds to back up regional strategies (Union, 2016 36).

The African Peace Facility has been the EU’s main tool to support peace and security efforts in Africa. The APF was established in 2003 based on the recognition that peace is a necessary precondition for sustainable development (Commission, 2017a 6). Since 2004, the APF has supported 14 African-led Peace Support Operations. In 2017, the most active operations were in the Sahel allocating funding to a combination of immediate short-term funding in the event
of crises and longer-term support for institutional capacity building in African peace and security such is the case in Mali. The peak of funding reached an all-time high in 2017 with €385 million being allocated to the APF (Commission, 2017a 6). In their effort to continue supporting peace and security efforts in Africa, as laid out by the EUGS, the EU adopted a decision in April 2017 on the 2017-2018 Action Programme of the APF. The goal of the action plan was to “contribute to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development” (Commission, 2017a 6) directly aligning with UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 (on peace, justice and strong institutions) and with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 commitment “to silence the guns by 2020” which would result in the reduction of the number of violent conflicts on the continent.

As can be seen in figure seven, the African-led Peace Operations in Mali have been run by the newly established G5 Sahel Force. The EU welcomed the establishment of this force as it was seen as “a clear demonstration of the G5 Sahel countries’ willingness to tackle the deteriorating security environment in the region and to cooperate against transnational threats in a coordinated and structured manner” (Commission, 2017a 18).

Figure Seven: African-led Peace Operations 2017

Given that the Cotonou Agreement, between the 79 ACP countries and the EU, provides the legal framework for the APF, the EUGS outlines the area of peace and security to remain high on the agenda with the proposal of a new Cotonou Partnership Agreement post 2020.

4.7 Disarmament/Arms Control

Despite disarmament only being mentioned 4 times in the EUGS, it is still relevant to this thesis as one of the sub-questions to the research question is determining whether the EU has contributed to arms control in Mali through the two ongoing CSDP missions, EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Disarmament and arms control is a universal term that is promoted through the UN and relevant NGOs, the EU has supported the conversation on disarmament and arms control through incorporating it into the EUGS;

The EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes (Union, 2016 41).

In 2017, EUCAP Sahel Mali put a stronger emphasis on disarmament through mentoring senior officials on Security Sector Reform. The mentoring was not only on SSR but also disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (EEAS, 2017a 7). The EU has recognised illicit weapons as a contributor to terrorism and organised crime within the EU and in the EU’s wider neighbourhood. To address this issue, Federica Mogherini and the European Commission adopted a joint proposal for a comprehensive EU strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons (SALW) in June 2018 (EEAS, 2018a). The Joint Communication signals a step forward to addressing the issue of arms control and disarmament and puts forward objectives and actions against illicit firearms, small weapons, light weapons and their ammunition. Mogherini has said that this EU Strategy will be “closely connected with United Nations Programme of Action against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons” discussed in late June 2018 (EEAS, 2018a).

To conclude, from the findings of content analysis of the EUGS and 2016-2017 Annual CSDP Reports there is a strong correlation between the two ongoing missions in Mali and the release of the EUGS, suggesting influence. The core segments from the EUGS that were highlighted throughout this chapter demonstrate the significance of the most frequent terms and concepts that were found in the EUGS which were peace, security, development, EU Values, global, action, disarmament, arms control and multilateralism. These specific terms
and concepts were shown both visually, in a word cloud by Wordle, and through highlighting core segments of the EUGS followed by evidence that suggests the EUGS has influenced the two ongoing missions in Mali. CSDP is an important tool used by the EU to promote peace, development and sustainable security in the regions they are active in. The EUGS is an ambitious document that promotes the EU as a global security provider, peacebuilder and partner for many other countries and organisations. As outlined in Chapter 3 with the methodologies used for this thesis, Krippendorff is a key scholar who outlines how to conduct successful content analysis. When conducting content analysis the findings in this chapter were a direct result of following Krippendorff’s four key points on how to successfully apply content analysis as a method in research;

1. “Sample text, in the sense of selecting what is relevant;

2. Unitize text, in the sense of distinguishing words or propositions and using quotes and examples;

3. Contextualize what is being read in light of what is known about the circumstances surrounding the text;

4. Have specific research questions in mind” (Krippendorff, 2004 87).

The following chapter will discuss the findings of content analysis in the context of the chosen theory for this thesis and will answer the sub-questions of the research question. The next chapter will also discuss some of the core issues that were uncovered in the analysis of CSDP in Mali which specifically relates to the role of France, militarisation of the EU and the future of the EU as a global actor. The chapter concludes with recommendations to enhance EU peacekeeping capabilities in the future.
CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION

The international community has increasingly seen peace and security as priority issues, especially the European Union. Over 450 million European citizens continue to question what the EU is doing to ensure they can go on enjoying decades of peace, freedom, stability and security as these are no longer a given in an increasingly interdependent world. The release of the EUGS in 2016 has given the EU a strong guide for continued external action and has already achieved more in the last 2 years in the field of peacebuilding, security and defence than in the decade before (Staff, 2017 3). The case studies of the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali not only exposes the EU’s determination of establishing itself as a comprehensive, global security actor but also may reveal the actual achievements and shortcomings of implementing the ambitions of EUGS into current CSDP missions.

This chapter will discuss the influence the EUGS has had on the two ongoing missions in Mali through the findings of content analysis from the previous chapter. This discussion will centre around the theoretical conceptualization of Chris Hills Capabilities-Expectations Gap and whether this has been a relevant factor in the mandates of CSDP, France’s role in the achievements of implementing the EUGS in Mali, the impact of militarisation of the EU and the EU’s future as a global security actor. This chapter will also answer the two sub questions of the research question;

1. Has the EU accounted for the security-development nexus in Mali?
2. Has the EU contributed to arms control in the region?

Finally, this chapter will discuss the possibilities of increased multilateral cooperation before discussing recommendations to enhance peacekeeping capabilities in the future.

5.1 Linking Theory and Evidence: The Capabilities-Expectations Gap in Mali

This thesis argues that the Capabilities-Expectations Gap introduced by Chris Hill still has great explanatory power despite being introduced in 1993. The EU has been criticized for not delivering consistently given the state of its economic system and the resources at its disposal politically and institutionally. Hill’s original argument highlighted three core components of the Capabilities-Expectations Gap as being the EU’s ability to agree, its resource availability and the instruments at its disposal. This thesis argues that the EU has developed since 1993
and Hill’s 1993 Capabilities-Expectations Gap has narrowed significantly due to recent institutional developments and policy changes. The release of the EUGS in 2016 has played a particular role in the narrowing of this gap as can be seen in Chapter 4. This thesis followed Karen E Smith’s view of looking at what the EU actually does, and these actions outlined in Chapter 4 naturally led back to Hill’s Capabilities-Expectations Gap.

5.12 Resource availability

The EU is typically seen as a wealthy international actor (Dijkstra et al., 2017 39). The resources of the EU in the case of Mali is predominantly financial towards the ongoing CSDP missions and projects in the Sahel region under various EU funding initiatives. One issue that CSDP missions have experienced in the past with resource availability is the constraint of inter-pillar competition for funds as well as national budgetary pressures from Member States. Declining defence expenditures has led to declining capabilities within CSDP but has also ignited the idea of pooling and sharing. The current financing mechanisms for CSDP has shown significant differences between funding civilian missions and military operations which has demonstrated that Member States have to commit higher individual contributions for the latter to be launched. This can be seen in Mali with EUTM’s budget being significantly larger than the civilian mission, EUCAP Sahel Mali. Given that CSDP is a voluntary policy, relying on the political will of Member States, missions are often led by a coalition of only a few willing states with other Member States simply free-riding (Hühnerfuß, 2016 20). This issue has not been prevalent in Mali due to the national interests of a large amount of Member States to contribute to both missions. However, it is an issue that has the potential to affect the EU’s capabilities in the future. If Member States are not willing to voluntarily contribute to CSDP missions, the EU will not be able to live up to its ambitious aim of being a leading global security provider.

5.13 Ability to Agree

The CSDP decision-making process has been regarded as reflecting a “high degree of legitimacy” (Hühnerfuß, 2016 20), but the mechanism that requires all Member States to agree unanimously before a mission can be launched has severely damaged the EU’s ability to respond in a rapid and flexible manner in external crises. Additionally, the issue of decision-makers being constrained by domestically embedded norms has had an impact on the action
undertaken in Mali. Implementation of the comprehensive approach has been a challenge for EU decision-makers because, unless a direct threat to European security has been perceived and a key Member State (or States) has taken the lead in mobilising the rest of the EU to agree, the comprehensive approach has fallen short of expectations (Furness and Olsen, 2016: 106). In Mali, the EU failed to agree and respond efficiently to the crises which led to France’s unilateral intervention with Operation Serval in 2013. Since France’s influence and mobilisation of EU Member States, the ability to agree within the decision-making process for action in Mali has significantly increased.

5.14 Instruments at the EU’s Disposal

Since Hill conceptualized the Capabilities-Expectations Gap in 1993, the instruments at the EU’s disposal has developed the most. For example, the launch of the new European Peace Facility, European Defence Fund, Military Planning Conduct Capability Unit, Regional Coordination Cell and PESCO have all been developed since the release of the EUGS in 2016. The release of the EU GS in 2016 played a significant role in the development of the above instruments to deliver EU capabilities within CSDP.

Therefore, this thesis agrees with Toje (2008) in his argument that the EU possesses the necessary capabilities and institutions, but still “finds itself unable to deliver the foreign policies expected owing to a lack of decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent” (122). Toje refers to this as a Consensus-Expectations Gap rather than Hills conceptualization of a Capabilities-Expectations Gap. The Consensus-Expectations Gap is a gap between what the Member States are expected to agree on and what they are actually able to consent to. If this gap is to be narrowed, European foreign policy and external action must be grounded in demonstrated behaviour rather than potential and aspirations. The 2016 EU GS has motivated the EU to act and engage in effective crisis management, demonstrating their ability to shape world affairs rather than making statements and setting examples in press releases and policy documents.

5.2 France in Mali: The Crucial Actor

When researching Mali, one simply cannot look past France’s strategic and post-colonial interests in West Africa which has had a significant influence in shaping EU action in the region. One of the most striking features of the EU’s response in Mali was the strong influence
exerted by France (Oluwadare, 2014 116). Mali is an example of one Member State being successful in turning national preferences and policy models into an EU common policy.

France unilaterally intervened in Mali on two occasions with Operation Serval and Barkhane. The decision to unilaterally intervene has certainly impacted the EU’s credibility in responding quickly and effectively to external crises and has opened up criticism that the EU is incapable or unwilling (or both) to provide rapid military relief in a region that has been regarded to be of high strategic importance to the EU (Hühnerfuß, 2016 63). When conducting its own missions France did not make any reference to the EU;

The terrorists should know that France will always be there, not when its fundamental interests are involved, but when the rights of a population – the Malian people who want to live in a free and democratic country – are concerned (Republic, 11 January 2013).

France’s strong diplomatic presence has been instrumental in ensuring deployment of both UN peacekeeping missions and EU civilian and military missions. France was very successful in multilateralising European efforts in Mali, especially with the deployment of EUTM Mali in 2013. The French were first to deploy troops to EUTM Mali before CSDP experts entered the country. The amount of French personnel in both CSDP missions in Mali highlights their significant interest in the region; France provides 207 personnel to EUTM Mali with a total of 465 EU personnel and 13 personnel to EUCAP Sahel Mali which has a total of 31 EU personnel being contributed.

None of the current missions in Mali are militarized, MINUSMA, EUTM and EUCAP missions do not have the capabilities to oppose rebel groups. France is the only country with a military force on the ground capable of opposing rebel groups, because of this some representatives in civil society see the crisis in Northern Mali as a French intervention, not an EU or UN initiative (Moussa Djiré, 2017 33). France remains one of the most important actors in the region because of their influence and capabilities on the ground.

Overall, while the EU continues to demonstrate their global actorness through CSDP missions, the role of France has contributed to the successes achieved within EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. France, as a former colonial power in the region, has been instrumental in both EU and UN missions which shows how the mobilisation of the EU by one Member State can affect the political will of the entire EU.
5.3 Militarisation of the EU

Since 2003, the EU has developed its military capabilities and now has a sizeable expeditionary force. Despite this, there is still criticism of the EU that the defence dimension of CSDP is largely underdeveloped. Since the release of the EUGS in 2016, and the launching of PESCO in addition to creating the European Defence Fund and Military Planning and Conduct Capability unit, the EU has shown a renewed interest in ensuring defence is incorporated into CSDP missions.

Budget pressures have forced EU Member States to rethink their approaches to pooling and sharing resources to collaborate on defence matters (Giegerich, 2010 97). The case of Mali has been a strong example whereby Member States have realised economic and military logic has been calling for more collaboration. The multinational nature of deployments has also had a role in the shift towards increased defence cooperation among Member States. However, the concerns about the loss of national autonomy is still an issue standing in the way of further cooperation and collaboration in the defence field.

The EU battlegroups have never been launched for arguably the same reasons why military operations are often more problematic to launch. If an EU battlegroup was to be launched, Member States would be required to cover the financial costs of the forces they contribute to the mission in addition to the mission needing a unanimous vote from all participating Member States. As is the case in Mali, Member States who bear the higher costs will only agree to the mission if their interests are at stake (Hühnerfuß, 2016 15). This is where the Consensus-Expectations Gap could become problematic in future CSDP missions. Mali has been a positive case of where the EU has not suffered from a Consensus-Expectations Gap due to pressure from France and the importance of the Sahel region to European and international security.

This thesis will not draw any conclusions to the impact of militarisation on the EU however monitoring the impact of this would be an interesting new field of study for scholars. The EUGS has had a role in the renewed interest of defence for the EU but it is still too soon to examine exactly what impact this will have on CSDP and the EU in general.
5.4 The EU’s Future as a Global Actor

The EU’s ambition to become a “global security actor” (Hühnerfuß, 2016 65) has been met by the multidimensional approach of the EU to make use of its versatile toolbox in crisis management missions beyond European borders. In the case of Mali, where this thesis is focused, addressing the conflict has meant combining military assistance with development aid, state-building efforts, training and capacity building of Malian authorities, peacebuilding, arms control, and security sector reforms. The EU launched the two ongoing missions in Mali to apply a truly comprehensive approach and has proven its capabilities with action on the ground.

The release of the EUGS in 2016 reflects a renewed aim to strengthen and adapt to the changing political and economic global environment. Much of the EU’s actorness on the global stage stems from its normative role as a significant diplomatic actor which is reflected within the EUGS (Cross, 2016 404). The EUGS has developed a greater potential for the EU to continue its role as a global actor, however the Consensus-Expectations Gap continues to prohibit the EU from successfully implementing common EU policies. The decision-making rules and sovereignty issues within the EU continues to affect the role of the EU as a global actor, until the Consensus-Expectations Gap is narrowed from actions on the ground, the EU will continue to face significant challenges in being able to promote itself as a successful and effective global actor.

The contested nature of the EU’s actorness is likely to continue (Kyris and Maltby, 2011 4), and the instruments at the EU’s disposal as well as its resource availability is set to continue to evolve. The timeliness of the release of the EUGS, in light of the Brexit referendum, shows the strategy itself as an exercise in diplomacy in its own right, an assurance to international partners and the international community as a whole, the commitment the EU will continue to make to uphold international peace and security. The EU remains at the forefront of global action and multilateral cooperation, the continued action in Mali and the developments since the release of the EUGS have placed the EU in a strong position to continue promoting its role as a global security provider.
5.5 Sub question 1: Has the EU accounted for the Security-Development Nexus in Mali?

The Security-Development Nexus is especially important given that there “is a clear link between the security situation of a country on the one hand and the implementation and progress of sustainable development on the other hand” (Tardy, 2015b) according to several well-known scholars in the field. The recognition of this link has been at the heart of EU CSDP missions, especially in the Sahel region where this research is focused. The EU began incorporating security and development measures simultaneously in 2011 with the release of the 2011 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. This strategy influenced the 2011 Agenda for Change whereby Mali was a key recipient of security-development initiatives. The Security and Development Strategy in the Sahel has been the key overarching strategy that incorporates and accounts for the security-development nexus. The first theme of this strategy is that “security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and that helping these countries achieve security is integral to enabling their economies to grow and poverty to be reduced” (EEAS, 2011).

The 2015-2020 Sahel Region Action Plan has been the driver of implementation for the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. The Action Plan has shown the EU’s commitment of engagement in the Sahel region, particularly Mali with the two ongoing CSDP missions, and its support to sustainable and inclusive political and socio-economic development, the strengthening of human rights, democratic governance and the rule of law as well as resilience (EEAS, 2015a).

Mali has been a key recipient of initiatives accounting for the security-development nexus through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Counter Terrorism Sahel fund. The EUGS has led to continued commitment in incorporating the security-development nexus in Mali through the two ongoing CSDP missions and the Cotonou Agreement which is set to expire in 2020. It will be essential for Mali’s stability and security that the post-2020 development partnership between the EU and ACP countries incorporates this nexus at the heart of the agreement.

---

18 EU has contributed €280 million towards security and development initiatives in Mali.
5.6 Sub question 2: Has CSDP in Mali contributed to arms control?

The issue of arms in Mali has been ongoing and an issue the EU has specifically focused on within EUTM Mali’s mandate. CSDP in Mali has contributed to arms control in Mali but predominantly through the multilateral approach and working with partners such as the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

It takes an international effort to reduce the availability of small arms and light weapons, the EU is working towards a durable solution with the UN to promote arms control in Mali because of the weapons devastating effects on people’s livelihoods and on communities abilities to build peace and develop sustainably (Mugumya, 2016). The EU and UN have favoured a weapon collection programme in Mali as a means of addressing the cross-border transnational security challenges the region faces. From 2014-2016, the UNREC, alongside the EU, conducted a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration exercise in Mali whereby many small arms and light weapons were confiscated, but more remain at large. One of the major challenges of this project was the incentives being offered to those who handed over their weapons. From the projects experience, “when the incentives started to be offered, priority was given to those who handed over the largest number of weapons – this led to complaints from those who handed in fewer guns” (Mugumya, 2016 38). The EU has highlighted the short-term success of this project with the intention to conduct a similar one in the near future in their June 2018 Council Conclusions on Sahel/Mali (EEAS, 2018g).

According to the report by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research the situation in Mali with arms control has improved but it still has a long way to go for people to move freely without fear of terrorist attacks.

In addition to the weapons collection project conducted by the UN and EU, the UNREC held a workshop in Bamako Mali in September 2017 under an EU financed project to improve stockpile management in the Sahel. The workshop was organised in collaboration with the Mali National Commission on Small Arms and hosted 40 senior national officials. EUTM Mali was a key partner in this project.

As can be seen through the current projects in arms control, the EU is making a significant effort in contributing to arms control in Mali through CSDP and international partnerships.
However, the illegal arms trade and trafficking in Mali remains to be a major issue for the Sahel region. A larger focus on arms control training within EUTM Mali could contribute to further developments in this area.

5.7 Increased multilateral cooperation: Delivering international peace and security?

The central lesson that has been learnt from experiences of conflict management and peacebuilding in the 21st century is that no institution or actor can manage these global challenges alone. The norm has become partnership peacekeeping operations – where operations involve collaboration between one or more institutions – as in the case of Mali where the UN and EU both operate. Although the peacekeeping missions are separately mandated, they complement each other and have jointly made a significant impact to eradicate conflict and focus on peacebuilding and state building in Mali. The EUGS made multilateral cooperation a priority which has been acted upon in Mali as was discussed in the findings chapter of this thesis. Having evidence of the coordination is relevant for the purposes of answering the research question in this thesis, however it is also important to examine how the EU and its partners can genuinely work together to achieve a unity of effort and have the biggest possible impact on the issues Mali faces.

UN-EU cooperation on peacekeeping operations began in 2003 with the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management. Germany and Italy continued formalizing the cooperation with the “EU-UN Partnerships Initiative” in 2014 when the EU Plan of Action for CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping was coming to an end. This Partnerships Initiative has developed UN-EU cooperation significantly and has identified and debated four crucial areas for UN-EU cooperation on peace operations: coherence in mandates and planning, training, military-capabilities, and justice and security sector reform (Hummel and Pietz, 2015 1).

The EU and UN in Mali have exchanged resources extensively including personnel, training equipment, logistics and planning. This resource exchange has historically been limited to financial and diplomatic resources but more recently we have seen more ambitious resource exchanges, especially in Mali (Dijkstra et al., 2017 4). The joint trainings between EUTM Mali and MINUSMA goes beyond the traditional financial or diplomatic exchange and represents a new era of multilateral cooperation between the UN and EU.
There was initial concern within the UN when CSDP was introduced that it would distract potential European contributors to UN peacekeeping\(^{19}\) and that both organisations would compete with each other to make the biggest impact in external crises, however, this concern has not proven correct. The EU has become a reliable burden-sharing partner in peacekeeping for the UN and the EU has stated their commitment to the UN on numerous occasions. Former High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, stated in front of the UN Security Council in 2010 that “a core objective of EU foreign policy is the development of an effective multilateral system with a strong UN at the centre” (Ashton, 4 May 2010). Today, the EU and UN are more and more intertwined, CSDP missions are deployed where the UN is also engaging, and, in some cases, missions are complementing each other and collaborating to have the biggest possible impact in the country or region. UN-EU cooperation is arguably the most advanced cooperation between the UN and a regional group; the current cooperation covers a range of crisis management including peacebuilding, development, humanitarian relief, political cooperation and disarmament.

The most recent development in cooperation between the UN and EU was a joint workshop that brought together members of the EEAS, the UN and EU Member States to work on the priorities for the UN-EU Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management 2019-2022. This workshop was held in March 2018 and co-hosted by the EEAS Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security and the EU Institute for Security Studies. This theses timeline is until July 2018 which means it will be unable to answer whether the 2019-2022 priorities resulted in increased cooperation, this would be an important evaluation to make in future research.

Although cooperation in Mali has been shown through MINUSMA and EUTM Mali, it cannot be denied that the UN and EU have different political agendas, objectives and institutional procedures which has resulted in situations where cooperation on the ground has had limitations. As Tardy pointed out, “the UN-EU relationship in crisis management remains constrained by political, structural and cultural obstacles that can only be overcome to a certain extent” (Tardy, 2009 52). The EUGS has highlighted the importance of increased

---

\(^{19}\) In July 2001, Austria and Ireland made statements saying that their commitment to ESDP could hamper them in contributing to UN peacekeeping. The Austrians then withdrew their personnel from UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
multilateral cooperation and evidence of this has been seen in Mali however, in other cases, cooperation has come second for institutions, like the EU, that are struggling for their own comparative advantages, visibility and identity. The EUGS emphasises that in a changing global environment, conflicts have deepened, and new dangers have emerged requiring the EU and UN to step up as indispensable partners to deliver peace and security. It is important moving forward that both institutions planning bodies incorporate the planned “inter-institutional coordination” to any mandate to ensure consistency in future peacekeeping operations.

5.8 Enhancing EU Peacekeeping Capabilities

CSDP missions, together with the EU’s diplomatic and development initiatives, are the most visible initiatives of EU external action. The complexity of current ongoing crises and the EU’s engagement in these areas requires ongoing assessment of the EU as an international actor and an evaluation of the impact that current conflict prevention and management initiatives are having on the country and region in order to improve action in future missions.

CSDP experiences in the past have largely been a self-discovery process for the EU, where the EU has developed its character as an international actor in order to contribute to upholding international peace and security. The aim of this section is to offer recommendations that will enhance EU peacekeeping capabilities for future missions.

Firstly, the EU should create a CSDP database. Through this research process it has become apparent that there is a lack of a centralized source of information regarding CSDP missions that are credible and comprehensive. Many of the sources used for this research were fragmented across a range of different websites, journals, blogs etc. Therefore, the suggestion to create a CSDP database would make research CSDP much easier and less time consuming for researchers, especially those looking at more than one CSDP mission. Despite the continued efforts by EU institutions to increase transparency and provide information about current and previous missions, basic information on CSDP missions still remains difficult to access. To research a particular mission, often the researcher has to find data which is fragmented across a range of sources including journal articles, press releases, official websites, newspapers and other publications. Therefore, the existing knowledge base on CSDP lacks a single, centralized source with credible and comprehensive data. It would be
useful to have a centralized source that reports basic information regarding a CSDP mission like the year of deployment, which Member States contribute to the mission, budget etc. This database would be an accurate source of information for researchers and fill many of the gaps that existing sources have while minimalizing the time it would take for a researcher to gather the relevant information to analyse CSDP.

Another recommendation, which has derived from lessons in Mali, is to involve local and international partners in the planning phase of establishing a CSDP mission. Because planning is multi-faceted and involves politics, strategy, logistics, collaboration and implementation, it is important to have a core planning team which consists of those most active in the CSDP operation. Currently the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures, which is the central guideline for EU engagement in external crises, is outdated and needs adapting to the current global environment which is promoting multilateralism at the forefront. The EUGS has made it clear the EU is increasingly becoming one of the most important foreign and security players on the global stage and enhancing partnerships and promoting multilateralism has been one of the main objectives moving forward. By involving local and international partners, the EU would be showing their commitment to long term engagement from the grassroots level. This would significantly enhance the legitimacy of CSDP missions and promote local ownership of missions which has been a criticism of CSDP in the past.

Gender balance must be a key priority for achieving mandates in CSDP missions given that the importance of CSDP missions is likely to increase in the near future. The EUGS has resulted in an upgrade for the EU in the field of security and defence taking a more integrated approach to crises, one that includes gender as one of the dimensions of conflict. Several studies have shown that gender balance increases the operational success of missions (Chen, 2016, Hunt et al., 2014, Hoogendoorn et al., 2013), diverse teams have become the new norm. Asquith (2016) and Miller and Segal (2016) have both provided evidence in their works that police forces and military forces have performed better when the teams are more diverse and gender balanced. Ensuring women’s participation in CSDP missions is important to “sustain the EU’s credibility, to improve effectiveness, to promote equality at home and abroad, to increase the talent pool for personnel, and to make the best use of our financial resources” according to a report published by the European Parliament (Policies, 2017). As most personnel on CSDP missions are contributed by Member States, the promotion of gender
balance within CSDP begins at the national level with Member States fulfilling the promises to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Women bring a different perspective and skill set to CSDP missions. For example, when a mission is deployed to a country where women are culturally not allowed to talk to men outside their families the female staff could liaise with these women and have access to certain parts of society where men do not. NATO has set up Female Engagement Teams, Cultural Support Teams and Foreign Area Specialists in Afghanistan to ensure the mission can gain a better understanding of society and engage efficiently with the female population (Lackenbauer and Langlais, 2013). Haring (2015) emphasises the need institutions, like the EU, to ensure that their mandates reflect the society they are intended to protect. Mali being 98% Muslim, it would enhance the mission further to have similar initiatives to NATO, so the EU can have the ability to engage further with the female population.

CSDP in Mali has already demonstrated its commitment to training female trainers as shown in chapter 4, however, to enhance this further the EU should engage more female staff in training efforts. The 2016 CSDP Annual Report reported 9,000 people trained in civilian CSDP missions in 2600 with at least 1,300 being women (EEAS, 2016a 4). If the EU was to include more female trainers it could lead to more female personnel being trained and therefore raise the awareness about the importance of equality between men and women on CSDP missions. Currently, within the EEAS, three women are serving as Heads of Missions while seven are mean. Kenneth Deane, in his position as EU Civilian Operations Commander and also Director of the CPCC, has openly highlighted his determination to get this 50/50 representation back especially given gender equality is one of the core values embedded into the Lisbon Treaty (EEAS, 2018b). The UN has already set targets to meet gender equality within its system by setting the target of 50% by 2021 for parity of female police officers with the aim to have 50% parity throughout all UN positions by 2028 (EEAS, 2018b). Not only does having female staff increase the promotion of gender equality, it also contributes to the mission’s acceptance by the local population. In an article in European View, Women in the CSDP: Strengthening the EU’s Effectiveness as an International Player, the idea that female personnel can reach out to both men and women in the host nations was seen as an important factor influencing the acceptance of a mission by the local population (D’Almeida et al., 2017 313). The EU should
continue to promote the importance of gender equality in CSDP missions and encourage Member States to nominate more women. By doing this, the EU will hold itself accountable for its own standards on gender parity in employment and will demonstrate that its compliance leads to real change on the ground.

Some of the prejudices that lead to a negative working environment for women working in the peacekeeping field are the negative perceptions that female colleagues do not have the physical ability to physically and psychologically achieve tasks. Women are leading, or have led, some of the EU’s toughest CSDP missions, in Afghanistan, in Mali and in Niger which contradicts the misconceptions that women do not have the capabilities to take on challenging roles or that they are less capable than men in this area. EU institutions still have a way to go in tackling these prejudices and appreciate the diversity, this will be done through the continued promotion of diversity within CSDP (Policies, 2017 25).

In order to enhance EU peacekeeping capabilities, the EU must lead by example to drive change where CSDP operates. Behind the mandates and technical details of a particular CSDP mission, the EU’s aim is to develop sustainable solutions for the security issues faced by the host nation (Policies, 2017 22). It is important that the EU shows action on the ground to show its commitment to past statements and strategies. The EUGS has been used in this thesis to show that the EU is acting upon the ambitions laid out in the document, whereby we have seen substantial action in Mali to demonstrate how they are implementing these ambitions.
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

This thesis demonstrated the multidimensional nature of CSDP missions as they implement a range of tools including conflict prevention, peacebuilding, providing aid, disarmament and arms control. The two ongoing missions in Mali, EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali, were chosen as case studies for this research to determine whether the EUGS, released in 2016, has had an influence on their activities and mandates. These two missions demonstrated their multidimensional nature through incorporating judicial training and policing, border management, peacekeeping, arms control and the nexus between security and development in their mandates. Throughout this thesis, it has become clear that the EU aims to show its international actorness by using all tools at its disposal to address international conflict and crises. The release of the EUGS in 2016 created an opportunity for the EU to develop its international actorness and demonstrate its ability to act within ongoing crises.

In the first chapter of this thesis, it was highlighted that the EU has set a priority for itself as being a stronger global actor (Commission, 2016). This introductory chapter laid out the context of the conflict in Mali and the two ongoing missions mandates. Chapter 2 provided an overview of the relevant literature in the field by highlighting the importance of peacebuilding policies and the nexus between security and development for CSDP missions. The analytical literature also covered some of the key challenges facing CSDP today and in the future including the issue of political will and burden sharing as well as the impact of militarisation on the nature of the EU. Chapter 3 outlined the theoretical approach for this thesis, identifying Chris Hills 1993 Capabilities-Expectations Gap. The EU has been criticized for not having delivered consistently given the state of its economic system and the resources at its disposal, institutionally and politically. This chapter showed the relevance of Hill’s conceptualization of the Capabilities-Expectations Gap today, despite it being introduced in 1993 and introduced Toje’s modern conceptualization of a Consensus-Expectations Gap. From this chapter, it was concluded that the Capabilities-Expectations Gap was never intended as a static theory, but rather as a yardstick by which policy within the EU could be monitored. This thesis does exactly that; monitors the changes influenced by the EUGS to determine whether the Capabilities-Expectations Gap still exists or whether it has narrowed to more of a Consensus-Expectations Gap. This chapter also outlined the methodology chosen for the research as being predominantly qualitative content analysis and case studies of the two
ongoing missions in Mali, EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Chapter 5 outlined the findings of content analysis by taking core segments from the EUGS and providing evidence to suggest the EU may have translated these aspirations into action on the ground in Mali. The 8 most frequent terms within the EUGS were used to demonstrate EU action, these were peace, security, development, multilateralism, EU values, EU action, global and disarmament/arms control. Finally, chapter 6 is a discussion of the findings linking theory with the evidence. This chapter highlights France’s role in shaping EU action in Mali and discusses the EU’s future as a global security actor. France, being the former colonial power in the region, has contributed significantly to the successes achieved within EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. France’s role in Mali, as outlined in chapter 5, shows how the mobilisation of the EU by one Member State can affect the political will of the entire EU. The two sub-questions of the research question are answered in this chapter followed by recommendations for enhancing EU peacekeeping capabilities in the future.

The research question aimed to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports to determine whether the EUGS has influenced mandates of specific CSDP operations. In order to enhance EU peacekeeping operations in the future it is important to understand if and how new and changing EU strategies can influence CSDP operations. We can see from this thesis that there is a strong correlation between the two ongoing missions in Mali and the release of the EUGS, suggesting influence. Despite the EUGS only being two years old, much has been done to translate the ambitions within the strategy into action. Monitoring the EUGS should be a priority for researchers in the field of EU studies for the foreseeable future as it will demonstrate the reality of EU external action.

What this research has also shown is that CSDP is especially active on the African continent. Mali, being the only country to have two ongoing CSDP missions, has demonstrated that conflicts are often not confined to national borders but are transnational in nature. The EU has realised this and are tackling the crises in the region through a regional and comprehensive approach (EEAS, 2015a). Given Africa’s geographical proximity to Europe and the potential for spillover effects of terrorism, migration and organised crime, Africa is likely to remain the region hosting the most CSDP operations in the future (Merket et al., 2015 31). Therefore, this thesis would like to conclude with the recommendation to increase dialogue and incorporate regionalism into the future CSDP missions in order for missions to be more
transparent, effective, and equal. This is an area for further research and due to time limitations, this thesis could not incorporate this dimension into the study. As mentioned in chapter 4, the impact of militarisation of the EU would be an interesting field of study for scholars. The EUGS has had a role in the renewed interest of defence for the EU but it is still too soon to examine exactly what impact this will have on CSDP and the EU in general.

Brexit is also casting a shadow over many upcoming financial processes the EU and its Member States need to face. The EU has started discussion around the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 and the future relations with the countries of the African Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) following the end of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 (Henokl, 2017) which will directly impact Mali. The future of the cooperation with the ACP countries is uncertain proceeding the Cotonou Agreement, however it is unlikely the UK will participate in any new partnership because of Brexit despite 42 of the 53 Commonwealth countries being included in ACP. The EU prides itself on being the world’s largest donor to development aid; the Brexit process may mean a substantial loss for the EU as a global donor given that the UK contributes around 15% of the EU’s aid budget (McAvan, 2016). The future of the development budget will be left extremely vulnerable post 2020 if other Member States do not step up and fill the financial gaps left by the UK’s previous aid contributions, this ‘Brexit gap’ has been estimated at between €10 and €11 billion (net) per year (Rubio, 2017). EU capabilities throughout the world will be significantly impacted by this loss of budget if the UK decides to undertake a “hard Brexit” whereby they would set up their own international alliances and keep these funds (Parliament, 2017), this particular scenario would impact CSDP missions and potentially limit capacity to renew mandates in Mali in the near future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


COMMISSION, E. 2017b. A European Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe’s defence capabilities. Online: European Commission.


EEAS 2018g. Mali and the Sahel: Council adopts conclusions. Online: EEAS.


HELLY, D. & GALEAZZI, G. 2013. Avant la lettre? The EU’s comprehensive approach (to crises) in the Sahel.


HILL, C. 1997. Closing the capability-expectations gap?


HÜHNERFUß, A. 2016. To Intervene or Not to Intervene?: A Theoretical Account of European Crisis Management in Mali.


KEUKELEIRE, S. 2009. European Security and Defence Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy?


LAURENS, V. D. 2014. The EU’s Comprehensive Approach: Looking for a balance within the EU Sahel Strategy University of Ghent.


MAIBAUM, M. 2016. The EU as a Global Actor in Good Governance and Counter-Terrorism in the Sahel Region. Univeristy of Twente.


Moussa Djiré, D. S., Kissima Gakou, Bakary Camara. 2017. *Assessing the EU’s conflict prevention and Peacebuilding interventions in Mali* Universite des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako


Republic, P. O. T. 11 January 2013. Statement made by the President of the Republic. *Situation in Mali*.


