

Sex: The Real Anxiety

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This paper addresses the topic of anxiety within the context of several key arguments in Alenka Zupančič's *What is Sex?* Beginning with a discussion of the ontologically uncertain character of sex and sexuality, the paper draws from Lacan's *Seminar X* to elaborate the affective dimension of this ontological uncertainty. The paper then considers the relation of sex to anxiety in order to address Zupančič's critique of gender theory. By comparing Zupančič's reading of Joan Riviere's "Womanliness as Masquerade" to the reading of the same text by Judith Butler in *Gender Trouble*, this paper shows that the main difference between Zupančič's approach to the question of sexuality and Butler's theory of gender performativity is best understood in relation to their respective approaches to a "sheer ontological anxiety." The paper concludes with an analogy between the anxiety of sex and the surprise of love.

In an attempt to formulate an answer that is as direct as the question Alenka Zupančič poses in the title of *What is Sex?* one could simply say: Sex is *nothing*. This nothing is not at all a simple nothing. Maybe it is something like a sweet *nothing*. Or, instead, like the nothing that we find in the melodramatic cliché: "It meant *nothing*, I swear!" Or, even more still, it is the nothing we find in a certain Herr K's declaration to a certain young Dora: "My wife is *nothing* to me,"¹ a phrase that earns him a suitably strident slap. In other words, it is a *nothing* that resounds; it is a *nothing* that is certainly *something*, at least insofar as it has its effects.

For Zupančič, "Sex is of ontological relevance: not as an ultimate reality, but as an inherent twist, or stumbling block, of reality."² That's the major premise of this book. It is a premise that Zupančič brings to a number of different discussions

spanning contemporary theory and recent approaches to ontology. One is tempted to say that Zupančič provides here an exercise in poly-theory. As opposed to mono-theory, which would demand utter fidelity to just one discourse, Zupančič's main premise is promiscuously and playfully brought to, and thought with, a number of theoretical and philosophical partners. That's not to say that Zupančič is an advocate of the (theoretical) orgy; this book is certainly no free for all! Rather, Zupančič shows that the question "What is Sex?" as it is posed by psychoanalysis, can be meaningfully and productively paired with the most important and serious questions in philosophy while attending to the singularity of each one individually... or, at least that's the ideal aim. In the end, some partners are given more attention than others and Zupančič is faithful to the Lacanian discourse throughout.

Bringing together ontology, epistemology, and psychoanalysis, Zupančič illustrates that "One of the founding gestures of psychoanalysis was to cut short the discussion of sexuality as a moral question by relating it to an epistemological difficulty, with immanent ontological relevance."³ That is, by posing the question "What is sex?" psychoanalysis exposes an absence, a rupture, a gap that is primarily epistemological but that also offers an obstacle for ontology. Zupančič develops her titular question as one that leads us straight to the heart of an ontological negativity. This ontological negativity is exposed by and implied in the question of sex and sexuality; it is Zupančič's riff on what Lacan called "the Real." The ontological relevance of the question "What is Sex?" is not so much that it gives us the Real as Being, but rather that it exposes "The Real," as "precisely not being but its inherent impasse."⁴ Parodying Heidegger's observation that we live already in an understanding of Being even though its meaning is shrouded in darkness, Zupančič explains that the strange thing about sex is that "Sex is all around but we don't seem to know exactly what it is."⁵ Like Justice Potter Stewart's so-called "obscenity test,"⁶ all we can really say is that, well... "we know it when we see it." What is particular about sex is that it is precisely this impossibility of "*knowing* what it *is*" that constitutes it and that situates it between epistemology and ontology. Even though 'we know it when we see it,' we still can't say pre-figuratively exactly what it is. What compels psychoanalysis to ask the question "What is sex?" is that in spite of this epistemological difficulty, we also know that sex exists. It's just that what sex *is* is determined by this 'not knowing what it is,' knowing it, in a sense, only through its effects. Zupančič writes, "beyond all sexual content and practices the sexual is not a pure form but refers instead to the absence of this form as that which curves and defines the space of the sexual."⁷ In other words sex marks a gap, a rift, a rupture;

and as such, it provides an opening onto the difficult concept of the Real, understood as a “stumbling block of the space of being, [existing] only as the inherent contradiction of (symbolic) being.”⁸ It’s not just that sex, like being, is “said in many ways,” but rather it is difficult to say the way in which sex *is* at all.

Zupančič establishes that the question “What is sex?” is the only proper response to the question “why is psychoanalysis obsessed with sex?” She begins by giving an account of why (Freudian) psychoanalysis has been (rather notoriously) focused on sex and on sexuality as so central to the human psyche and why this has been such a source of anxiety. What is more troubling, according to Zupančič, than the fact that psychoanalysis seems to have only one thing on its mind, so to speak, is that it doesn’t really tell us *what* this one thing *is*.

What was, and still is, disturbing about the Freudian discussion of sexuality is not simply sexuality itself—this kind of resistance, indignant at psychoanalytic “obsession with dirty matters,” was never the strongest one, and was soon marginalized by the progressive liberalism of morals. Much more disturbing was the thesis concerning the always problematic and (ontologically) uncertain character of sexuality itself.⁹

Why, we might ask, would this ontologically uncertain character of sexuality be so disturbing and why would it produce such an anxiety? Would it be the simple fact that we can’t say determinatively what sex *is*? After all, there are perhaps many other things about which we might say the same. For example, (starting with the cheesiest) “What is love?” or “What is happiness?” or “What is truth?” are questions that lead to other ontological uncertainties. However, towards the end of Lacan’s Seminar X, his seminar on Anxiety, Lacan says clearly “anxiety is the truth of sexuality”¹⁰ and this comment gives us a hint. While Zupančič does not provide an explicit analysis of how the Lacanian concept of anxiety is entailed in this disturbance at the psychoanalytic obsession with sex, we can see that the question “What is sex?” bears a striking similarity to the paradigmatic questions of anxiety that Lacan develops in the first lesson of Seminar X: “*Che vuoi? Que veux-tu? Que me veut-il?*” (What wouldst thou? What does the Other want with me? How does he want me? What does he want concerning this place of the ego?)¹¹ These questions introduce the function of anxiety according to Lacan. This function is one of knotting together the concept of desire on the one hand with that of narcissistic identification on the other. That is, anxiety marks the problematic relation to the Other whereby any

access to one's desire for the Other is tied to one's dependence on the Other. Although the question *Que me veut-Il?* doesn't exactly carry the same allure as the question "What is sex?" it too leads us to the ontological uncertainty and negativity that Zupančič delineates in her book. Like these other questions that define anxiety for Lacan, the question "What is sex?" also puts *us* in question, interrogating us at the very level of our being. That is, the question "What is Sex?" implies another question, a question about the root of desire, about the cause of desire. In short, the question confronts us with what Lacan called the *object a* as the object cause of desire, as something that "is most in me [but] lies on the outside."¹² The question of sex asks about that which is at once most intimate – "being intimate" as a common euphemism for sex, after all – and constitutively inaccessible as epistemologically uncertain in a fundamental sense. The paradox of the question of sex propels us head first into the throws of anxiety. Luckily Zupančič is there to remind us that this tumble can land us in a very interesting place.

While much of *What is Sex?* addresses the way in which this absent space of the sexual (as an opening onto the Real) has consequences for ontology, in particular the way it problematizes the endeavor to establish a 'realist' ontology and the proliferation of new ontologies, I want to focus here on the stakes of Zupančič's argument for the underlying ontological commitments within the most predominant theoretical discourses around sex and sexuality of the present: namely, the performative ontology that prevails in contemporary Gender Theory in the legacy of the seminal arguments made in Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble*. Zupančič follows the work of Joan Copjec, who argues that the birth of Gender Theory and Gender Studies in the 1980s and 90s performed an astounding feat in that it removed the sex from sex.¹³ Zupančič's question "What is Sex?" thus demonstrates the return to a forgotten question: not the forgetting of being, as Heidegger would have it, but the forgetting instead of sex. The claim is not, however, that psychoanalysis will "bring the sexual coloring of the universe back into focus again, as if re-enchanting it (sexually),"¹⁴ it is rather that Gender Theory has rendered the problem and the question of sex more difficult to see by treating the concept of gender as if it were an answer to the question of sex. It should be said that the call to 'return to sex' has also been made in Queer Theory in more recent years. Annamarie Jagose's book, *Orgasmology*¹⁵ and Judith Roof's *What Gender Is, What Gender Does*¹⁶ are both examples of such a proposal to return to the question of sex in the face of a predominant commitment to theories of gender performativity that have dominated the discourse over the past 30 years. These texts evidence a discontent in the legacy

of gender theory's performative ontology and would be helpful interlocutors for thinking further about the implications of Zupančič's contribution to contemporary thinking on sex and sexuality. But for now, I will focus on one aspect of this contribution by establishing the stakes of Zupančič's challenge to Butler's performative ontology.

Zupančič understands Butler's performative ontology as an account of the "actions that create, so to speak, the essences that they express,"¹⁷ thereby allowing "sociosymbolic constructions, by dint of repetition and reiteration [to] become nature"¹⁸ and thus to turn "the dialectics of nature and culture [into] the internal dialectics of culture."¹⁹ This depiction of Butler's account seems compatible with several key aspects of Lacanian theory: as Zupančič points out, it agrees with a Lacanian emphasis on the creationist dimension of the Symbolic, with the Lacanian claim that language is constitutive of reality, and with Lacan's emphasis on the materiality of the signifier. And while Zupančič acknowledges both the radicality of Butler's theory of performativity and the considerable compatibility between this theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis,²⁰ she ultimately identifies the dimension of the Real as something that renders the Lacanian position irreducibly different from Butler's performative ontology. There are two questions I'd like to address here: First, what exactly is this irreducible difference? And second, what difference does this difference make for Butler's performative ontology?

In short, the disagreement between Zupančič and Butler seems to be around what is made of a certain gap, negativity, or limit that Zupančič thinks through the concept of the Real. In the past, when Butler has responded to questions regarding the status of the Real in her work, she has agreed in large part with some of the central aspects of the notion of the Real, qualifying it to mean "the invariable incompleteness of the subject," or "the point where self-representation founders and fails," or "the inability of the social category to capture the mobility and complexity of persons."²¹ In short, Butler seems to basically agree with the notion that there are limitations of what can be represented conceptually, with the idea that there are confines to what is accessible within what Lacan called the Symbolic Order, what Butler thinks in terms of "the structures that govern symbolizability".²² Ultimately, however, Butler has rejected the concept of the Real. As she has written elsewhere in response to a question posed by Slavoj Žižek:

We can agree that there is a limit to conceptualization and to any given formulation of sociality, and that we encounter this limit at various

liminal and spectral moments in experience. But why are we then compelled to give a technical name to this limit, 'the Real', and to make the further claim that the subject is constituted by this foreclosure?²³

I suggest that the key argument in *What is Sex?* is a response to this very question. While Butler takes issue primarily with the nomenclature of 'the Real,' and characterizes it as unhelpful jargon, the real question that she poses is: why would we think of "the limits of conceptualization," as she puts it (or, alternatively, of "the ruptures within the Symbolic" or "the Real" as both Žižek and Zupančič would maintain) as being so central to the subject? What is frustrating about Butler's response here is that by casting the disagreement in terms of a question about the name of the limit in question, she obscures what is at the heart of the disagreement. The whole point of calling this "limit of conceptualization," or "rupture," or "gap," "the Real" is to lay claim to the fact that psychoanalysis has something to say not only about the constitution and conditions of the subject but about reality and about Being. Zupančič's claim in *What is Sex?* not only insists that the rupture and the limit that goes by the name of the Real is indeed constitutive of the subject but further that this rupture has consequences for thinking Being as such. Doubling down on the notion of the rupture in the Symbolic and the fundamental negativity elaborated in the Lacanian notion of the Real, Zupančič situates the importance of psychoanalysis not only for thinking the constitution of the subject but also for thinking the question of Being and the field of ontology.

Zupančič's elaboration of the ontological dimension of sex has implications that go both ways. On the one hand, sex (as a stumbling block or gap) poses a problem for ontology and on the other hand ontology, or the question of being, poses a problem for how we think and have thought about sex and sexuality. In particular, it poses a problem for the thinking Butler's performative ontology, the core of which Butler explains in the following claim: "that the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality."²⁴ Butler's theory of performativity is an ontology insofar as it renders performativity "responsible for both the *logos* and the *being* of things"²⁵ but it also avoids any strong ontological claim and evades the very question that Zupančič poses by linking sex and ontology through the Real. Zupančič elaborates the Real as something that is produced on top of and in addition to the symbolic articulations that are aligned with the space of performativity as articulated by Butler.

The signifier does not only produce a new, symbolic reality (including its own materiality, causality, and laws); it also “produces” the dimension that Lacan calls the Real, which is related to the points of structural impossibility/contradiction of symbolic reality itself.²⁶

Zupančič identifies the Real with a gap within the very system of signifying structures that Butler’s theory of performativity delineates and presupposes. What Butler’s theory of performativity covers over is precisely the ontological dimension of sex as situated at this very limit of Symbolic exchange, that is to say, at the internal limit of language. What is missing in Butler’s articulation of the “limits of conceptualization” is that these limits are not limits that mark something outside of language but instead mark an inaccessible inside. Zupančič explains this internal limit, this rupture within the Symbolic, or inaccessible inside through the notion of a “constitutively missing signifier.” She writes:

Sexuality is not some being that exists beyond the symbolic; it “exists” solely as the contradiction of the symbolic space that appears because of the constitutively missing signifier, and of what appears at its place (enjoyment). It would thus be wrong to say that the signifier of the sexual is missing; the sexual is not some extradiscursive object lacking a signifier; rather, it is a direct consequence (“extension”) of the missing of a signifier, that is, of the gap with which the signifying order emerges.²⁷

Aligning the missing signifier with the Real, Zupančič is here suggesting that the Real is not something outside of the Symbolic system, the very system that renders performativity intelligible, but is instead something that is internal to that system and constitutive of it as an internal limit. In other words, the Real abides by the logic of what Lacan called the “extimate,” an internal externality, some alien element at the very core of the subject. As Mladen Dolar has described it, the extimate, “points neither to the interior nor to the exterior, but is located there where the most intimate interiority coincides with the exterior and becomes threatening, provoking horror and anxiety.”²⁸ The disagreement with Butler about the adequacy of performative ontology for thinking about sex returns then to the relation of sexuality to anxiety. Anxiety, we might say is the signal of the ontological negativity of sex, a point that would be missed if one focuses only on the performative nature of gender and of sexuality.

One possible reading (and potential resolution) of the debate between Butler and Zupančič, as I have characterized it here, would be to draw a distinction between sex on the one hand and sexuality on the other and to claim that Butler's performative ontology is concerned with sexuality and gender (and their manifestations in the Symbolic) while Zupančič is drawing our attention to sex as the rupture within the Symbolic that opens onto the Real. To say, in short, that there is not so much a disagreement between Butler's performative ontology and Zupančič's articulation of the ontological negativity of sex as there is a diverging focus of their respective projects. While Zupančič articulates sex as a gap, a rupture, or a stumbling block in reality, Butler describes the processes whereby performances of gender and sexuality cover over this rupture in our experience of reality. Such a reading would seem to cohere with some of Zupančič's formulations. For example, she writes, "Sexuality is not ravaged by, or disturbed, because of a gap cutting deep into its "tissue," it is, rather, the messy sewing up of this gap."²⁹ If sex is the gap, in other words, then sexuality is the attempt to deal with it. We might resolve the debate by saying that Zupančič describes one and Butler describes the other. I'm afraid, however, that such a reading would be too easy. And it would miss the real ontological import of Zupančič's project: that we can't think the Symbolic dimensions of sexuality as separable from the ontological negativity of sex.

In order to illustrate what I take to be the key difference between Zupančič and Butler on the question of ontology, we can compare their respective readings of a key text that situates their arguments on the ontological status of sex, sexuality, and gender performativity: Joan Riviere's 1929 text "Womanliness as a Masquerade." Riviere's essay takes up the case of a young woman who suffered great anxiety every time she would present her work in public. In this particular case the young woman's anxiety would manifest itself in a very strange way. After every public presentation of her work, she would engage compulsively in "flirting and coqueting" with the colleagues to whom she had just presented her work, men who seemed to be very clear "father figures" for the analysand. Riviere reads this behavior as "an attempt to ward off the anxiety which would ensue on account of the reprisals she anticipated from the father-figures after her intellectual performance. The exhibition in public of her intellectual proficiency, which was in itself carried through successfully, signified an exhibition of herself in possession of the father's penis, having castrated him."³⁰ The young woman's flirting is thus read as an attempt to perform a "womanliness" in order to disguise herself as not having the phallus, "to hide the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was

found to possess it.”³¹ Riviere’s account identifies this case as one of “a type of homosexual woman whose aim is to obtain ‘recognition from men.’”³² Ultimately, Riviere uses this case to illustrate not that some women use womanliness as a mask but rather that this case illustrates something about “womanliness,” as such. Riviere writes, “The reader may now ask how I define womanliness or where I draw the line between genuine womanliness and the ‘masquerade’. My suggestion is not, however, that there is any such difference; whether radical or superficial, they are the same thing.”³³ With a sense of Riviere’s central thesis in tow, let us now take a quick look at Butler’s and Zupančič’s respective readings of Riviere’s text.

Butler’s reading of Riviere’s essay focuses primarily on the problematic way in which “Riviere begins with set notions about what it is to display characteristics of one’s sex, and how it is that those plain characteristics are understood to express or reflect an ostensible sexual orientation.”³⁴ Butler’s reading of this text provides a thorough analysis of Riviere’s assumptions about the homosexuality of the analysand in question. Ultimately, for Butler, “If Riviere’s analysand is a homosexual without homosexuality, that may be because that option is already refused her.”³⁵ On Butler’s reading of the case “What is hidden is not sexuality but rage”³⁶ and Riviere misses this because of the normative heterosexuality that her theoretical framework (psychoanalysis) presupposes. Taking issue with the hetero-normative assumptions in Riviere’s analysis, Butler reads this case as illustrating “the predicament produced by a matrix that accounts for all desire for women by subjects of whatever sex or gender as originating in a masculine, heterosexual position.”³⁷ Butler’s reading accurately describes the cultural existence of the prohibitions within the case as it is articulated by Riviere in 1929 and further, her critique of Riviere rightly asks us to consider exactly what kind of sexuality psychoanalysis authorizes and presupposes. For Zupančič, on the other hand, in spite of these problematic aspects of Riviere’s analysis, it illustrates something else, something on top of and in addition to the problematic social and historical conditions of the case:

...at stake here is not simply the dread of being punished for stealing the father’s property, but also, more fundamentally, the anxiety of literally being nothing: if her intellectual performance was attributable to stolen property, then who, or what, or where, is “she”? In other words, the really troubling question here is: What if I am not really anything, what if there is no “me” in any of this? This ontological anxiety doesn’t stop at “Am I that name?,” rather, it revolves around “Do I exist at all?” All that I have

left at this point is a pretense, a mask. The subject hinges on this mask, and not perhaps the other way around. Under the mask there is nothing but sheer ontological anxiety.³⁸

So by now, I have identified three different ways in which anxiety has cropped up as the underlying aspect of the ontological negativity implied in the question of sex. First, in comparing the question “What is Sex?” to the paradigmatic questions of anxiety in Seminar X, chiefly “What does the Other want concerning this place of the ego?” Second, in showing how the extimate structure of the Real is situated at the epicenter of the debate between Butler’s performative ontology and the ontological negativity that Zupančič elaborates. And finally, Butler’s and Zupančič’s respective readings of Joan Riviere’s text “On Womanliness as Masquerade” suggest that the important difference between Butler and Zupančič is in their relations to a “sheer ontological anxiety” behind the question of sex.

If the first answer I gave in response to the question “What is sex?” was “it’s nothing,” we might now say instead “Sex is anxiety.” But in the final sections of *What is Sex?* Zupančič turns from the question of sex to the question of love. And here another possibility emerges. If the question of sex teaches us about the structure of the absent signifier, or gap within the symbolic, then there is something else which the turn to love will address. Love does something else with this gap, this ontological negativity: it holds open a space for the creation of a new signifier. Drawing on Badiou’s concept of the Event and what might come after it, Zupančič puts forward the following possibility:

A love (encounter) is not simply about everything falling into its rightful place. A love encounter is not simply about a contingent match between two different pathologies, about two individuals being lucky enough to encounter in each other what “works for them.” Rather, love is what makes it work. Love does something to us. It makes, or allows for, the cause of our desire to condescend to, to coincide with, our lover. And the affect of this is surprise.³⁹

Zupančič offers that the formulation of love is not “you are it! Your predicates are all the ones I’ve been looking for!” but rather “how surprising that you are you!” I’d like to conclude by suggesting that Zupančič’s concluding chapter

reveals a very interesting and important shift that we might identify as her response to an existentialist ontology characterized by the theme of anxiety: while I've tried to show that the question of sex produces anxiety, love, on the other hand, produces surprise. In short, the ontological negativity that sex *is* (and the anxiety that this entails) makes possible the surprise that love *can be*. Zupančič's final chapter brings us back to ontology in this way: love discloses something, not something about ourselves, nor something about the beloved, but love discloses being, and the affect of this disclosure is not at all anxiety but is instead surprise.

¹ In Freud's *Dora—An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* Freud recounts a significant episode in the Dora case. He writes, "I asked Dora to describe the scene to me in detail. At first she produced little that was new. Herr K.'s exordium had been somewhat serious; but she had not let him finish what he had to say. No sooner had she grasped the purport of his words than she had slapped him in the face and hurried away. I inquired what his actual words had been. Dora could only remember one of his pleas: "You know I get *nothing* out of my wife." Sigmund Freud *Dora—An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1997, 90.

² Alenka Zupančič, *What is Sex?*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2017, 3.

³ Zupančič, 35.

⁴ Zupančič, 22.

⁵ Zupančič, 23.

⁶ In a famous decision in the 1964 Supreme Court Case *Jacobellis v. Ohio* in which the state of Ohio wanted to ban Louis Malle's film *The Lovers (Les Amants)* from being shown anywhere in Ohio, Justice Potter Stewart coined this now popular phrase, writing "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description "hard-core pornography", and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)

⁷ Zupančič, 22.

⁸ Zupančič, 43.

⁹ Zupančič, 7.

¹⁰ Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book X, Anxiety*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by A.R. Price. Cambridge: Polity, 2014. 269.

¹¹ Lacan, 6

¹² Lacan, 223.

¹³ Copjec writes "Gender theory not only thrust the term *sexual difference* out of the limelight but also it removed the sex even from sex. For while gender theorists continued to speak of sexual *practices*, they ceased to question what sex is..."¹³ Joan Copjec, "The Sexual Compact." 2012. *Angelaki* 17, 31.

¹⁴ Zupančič, 39.

¹⁵ Annamarie Jagose, *Orgasmology*. Duke University Press, 2013.

¹⁶ Judith Roof, *What Gender Is, What Gender Does*. University of Minnesota Press, 2016.

¹⁷ Zupančič, 40.

¹⁸ Zupančič, 40.

¹⁹ Zupančič, 40.

²⁰ Zupančič writes, "To a great extent, Lacanian psychoanalysis seems compatible with [Butler's] account, and it is often presented as such. The primacy of the signifier and the field of the Other, language as constitutive of reality and of the unconscious (including the dialectics of desire), the creationist aspect of the symbolic and its dialectics (with notions such as symbolic causality, symbolic efficiency, materiality of the signifier)... all of these claims notwithstanding, Lacan's position is irreducibly different from [Butler's] performative ontology" 40.

²¹ Judith Butler, et al. *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. Verso, 2011., 30

²² Judith Butler, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. 2011, 144.

²³ Judith Butler, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. 2011, 152.

²⁴ Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Routledge, 1990.

²⁵ Zupančič, 40.

²⁶ Zupančič, 41.

²⁷ Zupančič, 42.

²⁸ Mladen Dolar, "I shall be with you on your wedding-night: Lacan and the Uncanny" *October* 58 (Fall 1991). 5-23.

²⁹ Zupančič, 43.

³⁰ Joan Riviere "Womanliness as Masquerade" *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 1929, vol. 10, pp. 303-313.305.

³¹ Riviere, 306.

³² Riviere, 306.

³³ Riviere, 306.

³⁴ Zupančič, 64.

³⁵ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 68.

³⁶ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 67.

³⁷ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 68

³⁸ Zupančič, 56.

³⁹ Zupančič, 135.

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