

The Formalization of Impasse

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Abstract: In this response to Alenka Zupančič's *What is Sex?* I consider the logic and topology of the author's central argument, which specifies that sex is an attempt to invent a logic at the point of ontological impasse (the breakdown of signifying consistency). Zupančič's analysis posits that sex is the inherent contradiction of our reality, and makes the case that to understand our impasses of politics, the love relation, and social interactions (on the ontic level), we should take our place within this contradiction of reality (at the ontological level), which would in turn offer us an opening to emancipate ourselves from the very logic dictated by this contradiction. I trace the primary ways that Zupančič's intricate analysis suggests we might do this, and then offer my thoughts on what I take as the declining dimension of the unconscious in our contemporary world and how this relates to Zupančič's articulation of the unconscious as "out there" built into speech and the discursive order that structures our reality.

There is much to both marvel at and respond to in Alenka Zupančič's phenomenal theoretical work *What is Sex?* One of its most impressive features is the way the author treats her theme, meticulously working through it as one would an intricate proof in mathematics or logic; stating

her premises, laying out the formulas, illustrating where others have been diverted, using the discoveries from the old masters (Freud and Lacan), and incorporating her own path-breaking interpretations. The breakthroughs that are presented in this work come through as such because of the care that Zupančič takes in leading us through the labyrinthine metaphysical questions of being and existence by way of the psychoanalysis of sex. At the center of it all is Zupančič's argument that we need to understand sex as a founding negativity, as the placeholder of the missing signifier, as the gap in being and the gap in knowledge (the unconscious) that is inherent to our discursive world. She writes, "sex is messy because it appears at the point of the breaking down of the signifying consistency, or logic (its point of impossibility), not because it is in itself illogical and messy: its messiness is the result of the attempt to invent a logic at the very point of the impasse of such logic."¹

This formulation requires that we come to see how sex is also a persisting contradiction of our reality; or rather it is the inherent twist or stumbling block in our reality. And this pertains to the formalization of the impasse of formalization itself. That is, the impossibility of sex (Lacan's non-sexual relationship) that prevents ontological closure of the symbolic is also what makes symbolization (reality) itself possible. It is the impossibility of sex (the gap of the unconscious) wherein Zupančič configures the impasse as "a hole through which meanings exist as bound together in a given configuration."² Through her careful reading of Freud and Lacan, which illuminates also their significant theoretical shifts, their refinements over time, and the connections and transitions between them, Zupančič is able to make topological links between sex and politics, sex and religion, sex and science, and sex and the love relation, revealing how activity in all spheres is one of negotiating this inherent gap in being that is also our Real. Following Zupančič's argument we find that to confront the impasses (of politics, of the love relation, social interactions, etc.) on the ontic level, we should locate our place within the contradiction of reality on the ontological level, which would then "point us toward our emancipation from the very logic dictated by this contradiction."³ How Zupančič suggests we might do this and to what consequences are the central concerns of my speculative thoughts that follow.

To understand the persisting contradiction of reality we need also to understand how sex (and all things we take as sexual, including what incites sexual desire, what propels the enjoyment of repetition, what needs to be prohibited, how we conceive the sexualized body, how it is equated with love, etc.) are all filtered in their 'out-of-jointness' with the symbolic by way of the unconscious. The unconscious comes into existence by way of a primal repression and enters our horizon as the unconscious of the Other, or as the author puts it, "the gap of the unconscious is out there, 'built into' speech and discourse as structuring our reality."⁴ And so we engage this persisting contradiction of our reality not only in our theorizing but also as a clinician would, "in concrete situations, on the surface of things and in the present."⁵ The unconscious is where the ongoing work of censorship, substitution, condensation, etc. all occurs, and "this work is itself intrinsic to sexuality (desire) and its deadlocks, rather than simply performed in relation to it."⁶ As Zupančič reveals, when we seek to ontologize the negativity of sex, we often end up overriding or covering up the Real with all kinds of positivized knowledge. This happens, for example, in the rise of Gender Studies, which attempts to essentialize sexual identities; in continental philosophy, which privileges the university discourse and instrumental reason; in the behavioral scientist's study of human sexuality through data collection, and in the psychologist's office, where sex is often reduced to sexual practices. All of this activity is revealing of the ways humans repress, disavow, deny, elide, and otherwise put to work the negativity intrinsic to sex.

As Lacan realized, and as Zupančič makes eminently clear in this work, formalizations create their own impasses (paradoxes) and tautologies: "an attempt to articulate the Real is determined in its foundation by the Real it attempts to formulate."⁷ But far from leading to a dead-end, it is by taking a singular perspective of this tautology, by "looking awry" at it that we might be able to take our place within the contradiction and where we are opened to the "space of truth" of how there is an irreducible link between the discursive and the Real.⁸ It is by seeing how the structure folds in upon itself that we are offered a different perspective of both our formalizations and their limits. So, for example, death is not in opposition to life, because sex (as negativity)

makes death inherent to life.⁹ In the question of humans versus animals, we shift to: humans “as the question mark to the very notion of the animal as a consistent entity.”¹⁰ In the dichotomous presentation of nature versus culture, we instead see how humans become the point at which Nature experiences a negative part of itself.¹¹ And, as the author finds in her intricate analysis of Lacan’s conceptualization of the drive and repetition, we shift to seeing being itself as “the circuitous repetition of the non-being at the very heart of being.”¹² As Zupančič reveals in various ways throughout the work, there are two sexes because there is not One; what splits into two is the very nonexistence (the gap) of the One. And here we can see how Lacan’s formulas of sexuation pertain to two ways in which the placeholder (the minus) of the missing signifier is inscribed within this very order itself; that is, what concerns us is not the contradiction between two sexes, but the contradiction inherent to both sexes.

It is this method (this topology) of locating sex as the impasse of formalization that we find also in Zupančič’s consideration of the opening to the political, such that this realm is not to be conceived as a place where various groups compete for power, but rather as the “curved space” shaped by the non-relation itself. Any ontology that arises by way of this curved space must necessarily be “disoriented” (or as Zupančič puts it, we should deploy “an object-disoriented ontology”), which is curved by the appearance of the object *a*, by a materialization of the gap of discursivity itself.¹³ So that operative at the core of the social order is the positivization of this negativity of the non-relation that is the sexual. And with this logic, Zupančič can point to the ways that both liberal democracy and the capitalist economy put this negativity to work, by way of capitalism’s “hand-job” (a term she borrows from Adam Schuster), of the market, or the oppression of women through the designation of sexual (and essentialized) differences.¹⁴ As in the shift from the question of nature versus culture to the question of how humans become the point at which Nature experiences a negative part of itself (the non-relation), here too we get the following shift: “The choice is never that between relation and non-relation, but between different kinds of relations (bonds) that are being formed in the discursive space curved by the non-relation.”¹⁵

What works as a formula to help us detect the contradiction of our reality is equivocity, and here Zupančič recounts a well-known joke to illustrate her point that the punch line can “bore a hole” in our reality, because it “repeats/names the enjoyment that holds (‘glues’) different meanings together in a symptomatic” and “unveils the way negativity functions in our contradictory reality.¹⁶ Since her analysis of this joke is pivotal for our understanding of the role of equivocity in opening up a new perspective (of how the Real is inextricably tied to the discursive order), I’ll reproduce it here in its entirety:

A man comes home after work and plops down in front of the television, ordering his wife to get him a beer “before it starts.” The wife sighs and gets him a beer. Fifteen minutes later, he says: “Get me another beer before it starts.” She looks cross, but fetches another beer and slams it down next to him. He finishes that beer and a few minutes later says: “Quick, get me another beer, it’s going to start any minute.” The wife is furious. She yells at him: “Is that all you’re going to do tonight? Drink beer and sit in front of that TV? You’re nothing but a lazy, drunken, fat slob, and furthermore....” The man sighs, and says: “It’s started.”¹⁷

As Zupančič relates in her analysis of this joke, while the punch line is equivocal, it does not open up to a multiple of meanings, but rather conveys something singular, for it reveals that the main show is the very scene the man plays out with his wife. With his punch line he shifts the focus from a certain meaning (a content) to the form itself, which in turn, “unlocks” as Zupančič specifies, “a certain symptomatic enjoyment invested in the scene of the domestic quarrel and its anticipation.”¹⁸ This “unlocking” is accomplished by the disturbance of linear temporality, and the use of form to shift the focus. Here it is important that we cannot say whether the man causes his wife to behave a certain way or whether he’s predicting her behavior as his punch line serves to disturb (short-circuit) this very logic of causality and linearity. And in this way, it also allows a momentary and contingent formulation of the Real itself.

We can find this short-circuiting logic in other places outside of comedy, for example, in the 2004 film *Kinsey* (directed by Bill Condon),

there is a shocking scene where the sexologist Alfred Kinsey (Liam Neeson), interviews a subject (Kevin Kean Murphy) with whom he has had a 10-year correspondence. During this time, this middle-aged man has filled volumes with his copious note-taking and recording of the particulars of his every sexual encounter, including the time it takes for him to achieve orgasm after first arousal (10 seconds, which he physically demonstrates during the interview), the number and category of his thousands of sexual partners (including children and animals), and the measurement of every vagina, every penis he's encountered. The man continues to recite his data in a mundane voice as Kinsey himself continues to record, even as his assistant leaves the interview in disgust. While Kinsey concludes the interview by telling the subject that he does not condone the harming of innocent victims in sexual acts, this does not hide the reality that the pervert is exposing the enjoyment that comes not from the sex acts themselves, but in their counting and recording. So, what's also being exposed here is that there's a certain perverse core to the very methods of the scientist himself. If modern science, as Zupančič explains, at once produces and studies its own object; such that "the object of science is not 'mediated' by its formulas but becomes indistinguishable from them,"¹⁹ then we can see how Kinsey's pervert could become the object-instrument of the Other's *jouissance* through libidinizing the counting (the form) of science itself. As in the punch line of the husband's joke described above, we cannot say whether the pervert became a pervert because of the forms and methods of the researcher researching him, or if his enjoyment emerged as a consequence of same. What we get with Kinsey's pervert is not a demarcation of "neutral" scientific research and perverse subjects, but the ability to discern the perverse intrinsic to the scientific research (of mid-twentieth century sexology) itself.

With his massive collection of data on sexual habits culminating in his two masterworks, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (1948) and *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953), Kinsey sought to reveal and explain the enigma of human sexuality through codification, experimentation, and observation, often using himself and his assistants in various combinations of coupling. But it is only from a psychoanalytical perspective that we can detect the limits of his

approach and the naiveté of behavioral science's study of sexuality in general. With Lacan's discovery of the non-existence of the sexual relation we get a shift from positivity (the acquisition of data for example), to negativity and absence. That is, human sexuality requires that we understand not the object in its positive content (not what behavior in the human female is sexual, for example), but rather how the fundamental impasse of being is at work in the sexual relation itself, as Zupančič makes evident throughout *What is Sex?* In contrast to the way behavioral science takes sexuality as ontologically given, as so many various objective permutations or encounters, as tied to biology, Zupančič refers us back to Lacan, who tells us that the sexual is something very different "from the sense-making combinatory game – it is precisely something that disrupts this game and makes it impossible."²⁰ As Zupančič's work ultimately reveals, for psychoanalysis sex and the sexual are understood at the point of ontological inconsistency, which is irreducible.

When we come to an impasse of epistemology, it tells us something not just about our limits of knowledge, but also something about the ontological status of reality itself; that is, our ontology itself must be configured as something incomplete and inconsistent, and this in turn is how Zupančič' formulates a short-circuit between epistemology and ontology in various compelling ways. For example, we follow Zupančič's short-circuiting logic in her consideration of what I'm calling the "mis-fits" of society, people like the Soviet writer Andrei Platanov, (previously analyzed by Aaron Schuster) who during the Russian Cultural Revolution in 1926 wrote the satirical pamphlet "The Anti-Sexus," which promoted a mechanical device to take care of sexual urges, thus freeing social relations from sexual conflict.²¹ What Zupančič does here is to read Platanov's "Anti-Sexus" as a formula of the nonexistent "sexual drive," (as a way to "make one's self masturbated")²² and she ultimately reveals that there is no way to separate enjoyment from the Other as they are intimately related. And it is this same formula that Zupančič uses in her analysis of the theory of British naturalist and devout Christian, Philip Henry Gosse, who in his work *Omphalos* published in 1857 sought to reconcile his belief in the creation story with the discovery of ancient fossils. As Zupančič relates, what he did was to present a scandalous

account of God (as duplicitous), a God who at the moment of creation also placed the fossils in it for future scientists to discover. Zupančič finds here a structural parallel between Gosse's theory of God and Quentin Mellaissoux's argument in *After Finitude*, that is, his dilemma of accounting for arch-fossils by way of contemporary discursive creations. Referring to Lacan, Zupančič again reveals that the question of whether science studies only something which we have ourselves constituted as such (as external to us), is an elision of the Real at the core of the discursive system itself. "Objective reality" as she relates, becomes such "only at the very moment of its discursive 'creation'"; and arch-fossils "are not correlates of our thinking, but are instead objective correlates of the emergence of a break in reality as a homogenous continuum."²³ It is the dialectical materialism of Lacan that allows us to see that the break of modern science is co-determinate with the break of the emergence of the signifier. That is, the subject as internally excluded from its object marks a radical discontinuity, which establishes the absolute status of its objects.²⁴

It is this "internal exclusion" this stumbling block in reality wherein the subject finds pathways for a repetitive experience (enjoyment) of the gap of non-being in the drive, and most interesting here is Zupancic's consideration of Joan Copjec's articulation of the death drive as an "ontological fatigue," or "objective affect of life."²⁵ In the move from sexuation to sexuality there is a further step in which the minus, the negativity involved in sexuality and sexual reproduction, "gets a positive existence in partial objects as involved in the topology of the drive."²⁶ Not only does the drive pertain to surplus satisfaction, it also repeats the gap, the negativity in being; the death drive itself reverses causality and denotes also a way to break out of the "fatigue of life," in a paradoxical twist.²⁷ Here we can see how Zupančič's meticulous explication of the death drive as both surplus enjoyment and as caught up in the repetition of negativity (a repetition within repetition) informs Slavoj Žižek's depiction of a certain enjoyment in the perverse economy of capitalism. That is, capitalism generates both repetitions of aimless enjoyment (through commands of the superego), and according to the repetitions of encirclement around the negativity of being. As Žižek argues, the denial of castration and the permissive-hedonistic capitalism we live in is a

perverse order with two formulations of extreme enjoyment; that of a calculating pleasure and that of the excess of enjoyment (for example as occurs among drug addicts and alcoholics). Capitalism finds ever new ways to incorporate this “un(ac) countable excess in the field of (ac)counting.”²⁸ In this system, we enjoy through semblance, (think decaffeinated coffee or alcohol-free beer) as enjoyment is increasingly deprived of its excessive dimension.

Using the logic (of the inconsistency of ontology) of sex, of enjoyment taking place in the experience of repeating the gap of being, Zupančič points to how we might confront our current impasses by “looking awry” at ourselves. I think, for example, of how we might see the hoarder, not merely enjoying the accumulation of her things, but things-as-trash; that is, the enjoyment of hoarders is indeed found in accumulation, but in that they live among their things which become indistinguishable from their waste, this can also cast a different light on how our consumption as non-hoarders can be configured also as garbage consumed; the hoarder radicalizes and short-circuits the logic of consumption that capitalism perpetually generates. Similarly, as Zupančič finds in the case of misers, the objects of their passions don't really matter. The miser never enjoys his treasure (or its value), keeping it out of circulation and this illustrates that there's a certain “degree of de-realization or detachment” involved in the objects themselves. It is this very de-realization that “constitutes the very basis of the encounter and of the relationship with a concrete, ‘real’ person.”²⁹ And this is also the logic of the would-be revolutionary whose passion relies on infinitely delaying the act of revolution itself, through constant planning. This brings to mind a mis-fit like Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, who, having suffered a number of psychic traumas in his young life and having undergone abusive interrogations in the experiments of Harvard psychologist Henry Murray, was utterly unable to confront the enigma of others, and in particular women.³⁰ Instead, he resorted to a systematic elimination of the spectral enemy of “the technological society” and its minions, the anonymous names and figures he selected at random to bomb and destroy. Now in a super-max prison at the age of 75, he continues to plan the revolution, publishing books like *Anti-Tech Revolution: Why and How* (2016). If Kinsey's pervert found enjoyment through disavowing the

Other, that is, through libidinizing the counting and the form of behavioral science's study of sex, then we can see how Kaczyński, as obsessive, puts to work a technical reasoning and hyper-formalism that paradoxically creates an enjoyment at the very heart of the bonds with the Other he's trying to destroy. There's something about Kaczyński's circular logic of enjoyment that mirrors back to us a certain ineradicable "fatigue of life," an impasse at work in the repetition of the drives that mark our era of modern science and its technological applications under capitalism.

Zupančič ends her stunning theoretical work on sex as the ontological impasse of our reality by returning to considerations of love and Lacan's *Seminar XX*. As she did in her prior work on love, Zupančič makes a pivotal turn when she replaces Lacan's ultimate "drama of love,"³¹ (that is, the displacement of negation that occurs with the movement from contingency to necessity) with the comedy of love, thus also opening up the possibility that the passion of contingency can be sustained in its experience even after the contingent moment of the surprise of love recedes. Here in her final chapter Zupančič further considers the "event" of a new signifier that simultaneously names and creates a new reality, which can happen both among lovers (in, say, a nick-name they create that names a certain disjunction of themselves as love objects), or in terms of our larger world, where terms such as "class struggle" name the disjunction between the necessary and the Real (as impossible). The author suggests that we are losing the capacity of naming and the ability to come up with words that give us a completely new access to reality, a Master Signifier that would reveal a hitherto invisible dimension of it.³²

This loss of our ability to come up with the "right" words is related to what I see as our "discursive dissipation," the increasing disappearance of language and the dimension of the unconscious itself. To explain what I mean, I refer to Žižek's "dialogue" with *What is Sex?* in the first half of his *Incontinence of the Void*; that is, specifically, his observation that even our most basic philosophical problems today are increasingly becoming scientific ones; that there is a "gradual disintegration of our most basic sense of reality" with the impact of virtual reality, and most crucial of all, an attempt "to overcome the sexual in its

most radical ontological dimension,” meaning “not just sexuality as a specific sphere of human existence, but the Sexual as an antagonism, the bar of an impossibility, constitutive of being-human in its finitude,” which is what we find in the argument for the inclusion of all kinds of sexualities (including asexuality) in the additive and extending list LGBTQA+, all in an attempt to overcome binaries of normative heterosexuality.³³ In our passage to a trans-or post-human existence, what we end up with is the loss of the dimension of the gap, the unknown, or the unconscious, which is where, as Zupančič specifies, sex as the ontological impasse manifests and is filtered. So that what we also detect here is not only the inability to find “the right signifier” to create a new reality, but a closure of the dimension of the unconscious as Freud and Lacan conceived it.

What I mean by this can be presented in the following analogy: new realisms are to philosophy what magic realism is to narrative film. In magic realist films such as *Pan's Labyrinth* directed by Guillermo Del Toro, and director Benh Zeitlin's *Beasts of the Southern Wild* we see the brute intrusion of a “materialized” imagination that no longer requires a dream, hallucination or other form for its mediation. The Real in a sense is added to the symbolic (narrative) and as mythos is added to logos we, the viewer, are forced to engage this as a moment of “magic”; the “message” is not derived obliquely as a (surprising) symptom of the unconscious, but is instead engaged directly. There is a blending of realism with fable in an effort to erase the lines between reality and an imaginary world, but in the process, something (a negativity) has dropped out of the picture with magic realism, the Real as constitutive of the gap where discourses and languages themselves slip and leak. The phenomenon of these added materializations can be taken as markers of the subtraction of the dimension of the unconscious, and reveal a misdirected sense of the Real in certain object-oriented ontologies as well. For example, in response to Levi Bryant's claim that in an object-oriented ontology, “there's a material unconscious which is in addition to something like Lacan's unconscious structured like a language,” Žižek asks: “in what precise sense is this ‘material unconscious’ unconscious?” “The unconscious is the very structure of the enigma...it is the very illusion that there is some hidden core which forever eludes us.”³⁴

Part of what Žižek uncovers here is the way new “object-oriented” ontologies and new materialisms (works inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Manuel DeLanda) tend to conceive the subject and attempt to re-think ontology by way of emerging properties and assemblages³⁵. And as Zupančič deftly reveals (building on the work of Lorenzo Chiesa and Jean-Claude Milner), with the onset of modern science nature is no longer the empirical object or referent of science; rather (and this is what Mellaissoux crucially misses), the single most important consequence of the Galilean revolution was that, in its mathematization of science it introduced a cut in reality (the new dimension of the Real). The mathematization of science has consequences and can literally change our reality in any number of ways from the creation of new technologies to the curing of diseases and space exploration. Of utmost significance in this cut that produces the Real is that it emerges, as Zupančič relates, “not in the consistency of numbers (or letters), but by the ‘impossible,’ that is, by the limit of their consistency.”³⁶ And in a similar analysis of Deleuze’s conceptualization of materialism, of his “realized ontology” Zupančič argues that materialism be reconceived not in opposition to objective reality, but rather, as that which is always in excess of itself; the subject is not only the embodiment of reality’s contradiction but “is and above all what makes certain contradictions accessible to thought.”³⁷

In her consideration of why new realisms and new materialisms are emerging at present Zupančič refers to a certain *Zeitgeist* of our time, where thinkers are attempting to think the “great Outside”; to reinstate the Real in its absolute dimension and to ontologically ground the possibility of radical change. What she finds in Mellaissoux’s theory in particular is the fantasy that acts as a screen shielding us from the Real that is not an absolute, but rather “the irreducible other side” of our reality.³⁸ This fantasy “conceals the fact that the discursive reality is itself leaking, contradictory, and entangled with the Real as its irreducible other side.”³⁹ And we can detect a similar fantasy in contemporary films with, on the one hand, narratives that depict humans’ search for meaning or an ultimate purpose, if not in our time and place, then at least for aliens who might need us 3000 years into the future (Denis Villeneuve’s 2016 film *Arrival*), and on the other hand, films such as *Ex Machina* (Alex Garland), *Her* (Spike Jonze) and *Blade Runner 2049* (Denis Villeneuve), which offer

fantasies of our inevitable demise or survival in a post-human world. In these film fantasies we no longer erase ourselves from the picture so that a harmonious whole will survive, as happened in classical Hollywood melodrama (for example in *Stella Dallas*), but rather play with the notion that we ourselves can be erased.

Zupančič's stellar achievement in *What is Sex?* is to make clear that it's not enough that we figure out how the world works, or even how thinkers think, without also figuring out how we ourselves "work" within the foundational and persisting contradiction of our reality. Looking away at this contradiction would allow us to see that figures such as Kinsey's pervert and Theodore Kazcynski aren't just subjects who are out-of-joint with reality; rather, they reveal how reality is already out-of-joint with itself. As Zupančič puts it in one of her more daring speculations, we might conceive life itself as a perversion, "as the strange pleasure of the inanimate itself, as constituting the inanimate's 'tics and grimaces'."⁴⁰ Ultimately, what we learn from Zupančič's presentation of an "object dis-oriented" ontology is that any objectivized reality, any certainty (positivized knowledge) we have about sex, in any of its many formulations, as tied to biology and procreation, or attached to love in its many variations, or expressed through artistic and religious sublimations, is a reality that is necessarily not directly accessible. Reality, like the subject, is always in excess of itself and inherently incomplete (split from within). As Zupančič's work reveals in so many astounding ways, if this were not the case, there would be no need at all to talk about sex.

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- ¹ Alenka Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2017), 43.
- ² Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 67.
- ³ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 72. Ultimately, as Zupančič relates, "contradiction does not simply disappear, but the way it functions in the discursive structuring our reality changes radically." (*What is Sex?*, 72.)
- ⁴ Alenka Zupančič, "Biopolitics, Sexuality and the Unconscious," *Paragraph* 39:1 (2016), 51.
- ⁵ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 72.
- ⁶ Zupančič, "Biopolitics," 51.
- ⁷ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 69.
- ⁸ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 70.
- ⁹ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 101.
- ¹⁰ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 15.
- ¹¹ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 121.
- ¹² Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 134.
- ¹³ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 24.
- ¹⁴ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 25-26.
- ¹⁵ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 26.
- ¹⁶ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 66.
- ¹⁷ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 65-66.
- ¹⁸ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 68.
- ¹⁹ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 78.
- ²⁰ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 39.
- ²¹ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 28.
- ²² Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 29.
- ²³ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 83.
- ²⁴ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 84.
- ²⁵ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 97.
- ²⁶ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 104.
- ²⁷ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 106. Zupančič relates, "It is precisely with the notion of the drive that sex reaches deeply into ontological interrogations and works at significantly reshaping them" (93).
- ²⁸ Slavoj Žižek, *Incontinence of the Void: Economico-Philosophical Spandrels*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2017), 201.
- ²⁹ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 136.
- ³⁰ Alston Chase, *Harvard and the Unabomber: The Education of an American Terrorist*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).
- ³¹ Jacques Lacan, *Encore. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XX*. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 145.

- ³² Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 139.
³³ Žižek, *Incontinence*, 134.
³⁴ Žižek, *Incontinence*, 44 and n, 290.
³⁵ Žižek, *Incontinence*, 38.
³⁶ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 80.
³⁷ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 122.
³⁸ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 76.
³⁹ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 76.
⁴⁰ Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, 97.

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