**Represented speech in dementia discourse**

*When we select words in the process of constructing an utterance, we by no means always take them from the system of language in their neutral, dictionary form. We usually take them from other utterances, and mainly from utterances that are kindred to ours in genre, that is, in theme, composition, or style*. (Bakhtin 1986: 87)

1. **INTRODUCTION**

In order to make a narrative more interesting, narrators often represent what the protagonists say in direct speech. There is a long tradition of analyzing direct speech in narrative in both linguistics and literary analysis, but it has only recently been studied in the discourse of people with cognitive impairments, predominantly aphasia (Cummings, 2016). We examine represented speech, also called reported speech or constructed dialogue, in eighty conversations with five white American women in their mid- to late eighties, as they are moving from mild to early moderate dementia. Our primary aim is to investigate how these women present autobiographical facets of their repertoires of identities through conversational interaction embellished with represented speech in narratives. We deduce their autobiographical details as we examine how they construct biographical fragments for other people who have been important in their lives. Such narratives appear to be shared to expand initial categorization, create common ground, establish relationships, handle impression management, and perhaps even maintain positive face.

Our empirical data on the uses and functions of represented speech in early moderate dementia discourse is intended to contribute to ‘interactionally oriented’ (de Fina and Johnstone 2015:157) discussions of social identities and their self-presentation in the often-formulaic, often multiply-told narratives as the condition progresses. This can give us another window on the potential retention of pragmatic skills associated with being able to interact with others (Arundale, 2015) as well as on language change over time.

We begin by briefly discussing the nature of represented speech. Represented speech often occurs at the high point of an oral narrative because it makes the presentation more vivid and dramatic (Li, 1986:40). It often makes a story in which it is embedded more believable as well as more tellable (Ochs and Capps, 2001). As dementia increases, conversation becomes increasingly difficult. The use of represented speech may help the person with dementia to attract and keep the attention of the person they are talking with. Ms Tatter, for example, vividly represents what she and her mother said when she describes being frightened by a frog, in extract i)

i) I ran in the house crying and I said “that thing just jumped right at me

mama.” And he said, she said, “Uh, now what did it look like?” And, and I said “I, I can’t tell you. It was a thing.”

However, sociolinguists Tannen (1986, 1989) and Schiffrin (2002) indicate that such speech cannot be an accurate indication of what was originally spoken. Tannen (1986: 314) comments that “even when dialogue could conceivably have been spoken by the person to whom it is attributed (and the narrator was in a position to hear) our understanding of the powers of memory indicate that it probably wasn't.” She adds (1989:101) that “the words have ceased to be those of the speaker to whom they are attributed, having been appropriated by the speaker who is repeating them”. In representing what someone has said previously, the speaker concomitantly presents something about that person and also something about herself or himself.

Tannen states that rather than being a verbatim report, ‘reported speech’ is actually ‘constructed dialogue’ (1989:110), dialogue which can be constructed for multiple reasons and fulfill multiple functions. In a closely argued study of a Holocaust survivor, Schiffrin asserts that the constructed dialogues by the major speaker serve as “indicators of how [she] views the people of whom she is speaking and the actions that they take, and also of her own place within a relationship, and hence, of her self” (2002:316).

Both of the terms ‘reported speech’ and ‘constructed dialogue’ exist in the linguistics literature, with ‘constructed dialogue’ typically being used in sociolinguistics and ‘reported’, or ‘represented speech’ used in conversation analysis and clinical linguistics. Kindell et al. (2017: 394) describe how difficult it was to find articles that analyzed the conversational speech of people with dementia by using conventional terminology in search engines. Rather than using the probably more accurate term, ‘constructed dialogue’, or the clinical term, ‘reported speech’, we use ‘represented speech’ (RS) as a cover term.

1. **RESEARCH CONTEXT**

A focus on represented speech, stimulated in part by the emphasis on formulaic oral poetry, began to emerge in the mid-twentieth century with work such as Goffman’s dramaturgical approach (1956; 1963; 1981) to face and footing, and Sacks’ 1960s lectures on conversation (see Sacks, 1995).Though drawing heavily on linguistic concepts beginning with Jespersen (1924:290) and supplemented by Todorov and Benveniste among others (see Banfield, 1973; Fludernik, 2013), and often focused on the notion of voice, literary analysts – particularly in the second half of the twentieth century – emphasize point of view in narration, especially narratives in first (“I”) and third person (“he, she”) voices as opposed to stream of consciousness. Initially, it seems simple enough to represent the speech of oneself or another, but the subtle shades of meaning in how one reports or represents thoughts, perceptions and speech quickly become complex as that representation is always within some kind of context. Each of the following *means* something slightly different (depending, of course on how one defines *means*, but we will not enter that discussion):

* John said “Mary ate figs for breakfast” …
* John whispered that Mary ate figs for breakfast …
* He was all like Mary ate figs for breakfast …
* They thought he said she ate figs.
* At breakfast …her eating figs was noticed by more than one person passing through the dining room.

As noted earlier, clinical linguists generally use the term ‘reported speech.’ As noted by Cummings in a recent discussion (2016:316), it includes “discourse, social, interactional and referential functions”.Cummings highlights a handful of articles on reported speech in aphasia, but identifies none on its use in dementia beyond a study of semantic dementia (Kindell et al., 2013) where its use is explained as part of the compensatory strategy of “enactment,” that is, of orally and nonverbally acting out events. We emphasize that the language of persons with dementia (PWD) differs greatly from that of persons with aphasia and that analyses from the language of one group cannot necessarily be generalized to the language of the other. Aphasia is usually caused by a sudden-onset focal lesion in the brain and may partially resolve over time. Dementia, by contrast, usually has a slower onset, arises from widespread damage to the brain and is progressive, becoming worse over time (https://www.aphasia.org/aphasia-resources/dementia/).

According to Cummings (2016:34), reported speech has importance for diagnosis: a person using either direct (“I will...”) or indirect speech (“She said she will…”) must have a range of expressive language, semantic knowledge and syntactic skills, as well as pragmatic and discourse skills such as presupposition, anaphoric reference and deixis. Indeed

… the complex array of language skills which we have just discussed is matched by an equally complex set of cognitive skills. These latter skills can be broadly classified as executive functions and theory of mind skills (Cummings, 2016:35; cf Cummings, 2009)**.**

These executive functions include planning and communicative intention, as well as “working memory, impulse control, mental flexibility, planning and organization and the deployment of attention” (2016:35).

Distinctions between direct and indirect represented speech blur into each other once the speaker goes beyond reporting that somebody else ‘said’ something, and says what that something is or may have been. Both are part of pragmatic competence and impact the processing load of the speaker. While people with mild to moderate dementia have fewer difficulties with pragmatics such as handling turn taking or answering questions (Rousseaux et al., 2010:3884) than with word-finding or referencing (Wengryn and Hester 2011:42), our data suggests that they do have problems with formulating indirect reports. Here, we follow Capone (2010:378) that indirect reports are “language games in which … the speaker offers two voices: the current speaker’s own, and that of the original speaker.” Weiland adds that as a speech act, an indirect report is “explicitly intercontexual and metarepresentational” (2013:14) which makes it inferential (p. 25). And it is here that we think speakers with impairment from dementia may have problems. For example, in an examination of theory of mind, Cummings (2013:38) cites findings by Cuerva et al. (2001) on problems with “conversational implications and indirect requests.” Guendouzi explains that compromised processing mechanisms interfere with the PWD’s drawing illocutionary inferences (2013: xi). Comprehending propositional and semantic content depends on the PWD’s “ability to understand implied meanings, ambiguity, figurative language, speaker’s intentions, [and] read non-verbal and paralinguistic signals” (Guendouzi and Savage, 2017:333), which grows more difficult for persons as dementia increases.

1. **METHODOLOGY**

We analyzed 80 conversations with 5 White women in their mid-eighties who live in memory care residences in the urban Southeast of the United States (U.S.) 56 of the conversations contain represented speech. Each of the women was described by administrative staff as having early moderate dementia; all were consented in accordance with IRB (Institutional Review Board) ethics regulations at the first author’s university. The IRB/HIPAA panel did not grant the authors permission to assess the cognitive level of the women, and the memory care residences did not retain or share details of any assessments that had been carried out beyond the original diagnosis which had been used for placement in the residence. Each woman assented to each conversation. All were first-language English speakers whose youth had been spent in rural areas or small towns on the U.S East Coast; four were originally from North Carolina. None were particularly hard of hearing, all were competent conversationalists and all, at least in the early conversations, knew where they were living. All their names have been changed and names of their conversation partners have been altered. Conversations were recorded and downsampled as mp3 files, transcribed by HIPAA-compliant transcribers and donated to the *Carolinas Conversations Collection* (<http://carolinaconversations.musc.edu)>. Later interviews with Littlejohn were video recorded with transcriptions being made from extracted audio files.

Throughout their conversations, which continued until the women no longer wished to talk, all of them commented that they were living somewhere other than ‘at home,’ whether that was a childhood home or the last one they occupied as an adult either with another person or as someone capable of living alone and maintaining health. At least four of the five were aware that ‘something was not quite right’ with their efforts to communicate or with where they were living: Tatter quit talking to student visitors when she realized she was having problems recalling details she wanted to explain. Long after her mother died, for example, she told a student, “What I don’t understand is I know that mother is still living, and I don’t know – don’t understand why she doesn’t take me into her home” (2010 dates given for quotations from speakers are when the conversations took place). Copeland had just received her dementia diagnosis when the researchers met her, and she orally wrestled with her fear of its stigma for the next two years after which she, too, chose not to talk to anyone. Barrington missed her dog: “I was in that restroom and just walked out and she was comin’ in the door. Boy, she almost knocked me down to get on my lap. Yeah …Mm. I really do miss her” (2011). Greystone commented: “I have grandchildren. And, I play Bingo, that's the reason I moved here. (clears throat) I had a nice brick home, that I had. And, I hated like the dickens to let it go, because we didn't quite have it all paid for when my husband died” (2005). Littlejohn stopped talking to students not long after moving to a second residence; she continued to talk to the first author until just before she died.

A total of 52 different conversational partners interacted with and recorded the women. As shown in Table 1 the conversations were held with family members (Barrington), the first author (Copeland, Littlejohn), or student volunteers taking an introductory gerontology course (Hancock et al., 2009) at a nearby university (Tatter, Greystone, Littlejohn, Barrington). All of the students received an hour or more of in-class training on techniques to support and maintain conversation with older persons who had some form or degree of dementia (see an extended description in Davis and Maclagan 2017: 214-217). The students who conversed with Barrington and Tatter spoke individually as did students A and B who conversed with Littlejohn. Nine of the students conversed with Greystone individually. The students who conversed with Littlejohn and two of the students who held conversations with Greystone worked in pairs, with each pair recording each participant twice. The first author and a colleague conversed with Copeland together. The first author conversed with Littlejohn alone, though she was sometimes accompanied in the later interviews by an assistant who worked the video camera.

**Table 1: Number of conversations analyzed**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Speaker** | **Conversation partner (CP)** | **# Conv** | **# Conv with RS** | **# Conversations per CP** | **Dates** | **Function of represented speech** |
| **Tatter** | 13 Students | 13 | 13 | I conversation per student | 2008-2010 | Childhood auto/biographical episodes illustrate maintenance of 5 narrative formats across 3 years |
| **Barrington** | 1 Family member  3 students | 4 | 4 | 1 with nephew  1 conversation per student | 1998  2012 | Unscaffolded monologic episodes 14 years apart (pre/post\* memory impairment) with emphasis on context for reminiscence and evaluation |
| **Greystone** | 11 students | 14 | 10 | 2 conversations with 1 pair of students  2 conversations each with 3 students (n=6)  1 conversation each with 6 students | 2005  2006 | Multiply repeated childhood auto/biographical episodes in interlocked performance narratives across 2 years |
| **Copeland** | First author and colleague | 10 | 6 | 10 conversations with first author and colleague | 2000-2002 | Represented thoughts, primarily autobiographical, across 2 years about the here and now in small stories after receiving dementia diagnosis |
| **Littlejohn** | 21 students | 31 | 17 | 2 conversations each with 4 pairs of students (n=8) | 2008-2010 | Brief performance narrative episodes, frequently auto/biographical and occasionally repeated, to entertain listeners across 6 years, often used to mask topic maintenance problems |
|  |  |  | 5 conversations with student A | 2010 |
|  |  |  | 5 conversations with student B | 2010 |
|  |  |  | 1 conversation each with 13 pairs of students | 2010-2014 |
| First author | 8 | 6 | 8 conversations | 2010-2014 |
| Totals | 52 | 80 | 56 |  |  |  |

Conv = conversations; RS = represented speech

\*Note: We cannot verify by clinical assessment whether Ms Barrington had problems with memory or language production in 1998, 14 years prior to her second set of interactions.

All examples of represented speech in the interviews were identified, with each speaker being analyzed individually. RS most frequently occurred in some form of conversational narrative (Norrick, 2007). We first classified the functions performed by the RS and the narrative formats within which it occurred. We used discourse analysis (De Fina and Johnstone, 2015; Johnstone, 2008) to identify and examine predominant functions: “the structure and sequences of narratives, the positions and identities speakers assume in dialogue, how participants respond to cues, and other discourse features speakers use to mark contexts beyond the conversation” (Davis et al., 2018). If the story was a canonical narrative as outlined by Labov and Waletzky (1967) with multiple components, we analyzed those components (Johnstone 2008:94-95). If the story was non-canonical in format (see Ochs and Capps, 2001), we used thematic analysis, going line by line or – depending on how the speaker presented her story – stanza by stanza, a more ethnographic analysis derived from Hymes (1981).

To analyze the prevalent formats within which the RS occurred, we drew on our analysis of conversational narrative formats that we have found speakers with early moderate dementia able to produce (see Davis and Maclagan, 2018 for an extended discussion of these formats). The formats we identified are

* canonical (Labovian) unscaffolded narratives which the speakers produce as unsupported monologs
* scaffolded (Labovian) narratives, in which the interlocutor(s) support the narrator with backchannels, repetition or paraphrases
* small stories, which are mundane, largely ignored, very short stories told “in passing” (Bamberg et al., 2008)
* shadow stories “that can stay hidden behind the spoken narrative” unless probed (de Medeiros and Rubinstein, 2015:1620)
* narrative chunks, usually either a phrase giving a high point or one offering an evaluation of a longer but untold story
* an occasional chronicle or account, which are largely non-narrative, and which did not contain examples of RS.

Initially all five women told stories which often contained represented speech; however, many of the stories were repeated from interview to interview and sometimes even within the same interview. Davis (2011) analyzed the repeated and interlocking stories told by Greystone, finding that Greystone’s repeated stories made different contributions within the various conversations. Each instance of represented speech was therefore counted, whether it occurred in a story told once or in a story repeated many times. When listening to the recorded interviews it was always clear who had spoken the represented speech.

1. **ANALYSIS: THE RANGE FOR REPRESENTED SPEECH IN DEMENTIA DISCOURSE**

In what follows, we look at functions and frequency of represented speech used in early moderate dementia discourse. In our data, the overwhelming majority of instances of represented speech (94%) occurred in conversational narrative (Norrick, 2007). In order to ascertain the relative frequency of instances of RS in the data, we followed Ely and Ryan’s (2008) analysis of RS in written text by persons without dementia. We analyzed only the words of the speaker, and found that different speakers, like different writers, use different rates of RS. Ely and Ryan found that their unimpaired writers used between 1.29 and 2.02 instances of represented speech per 100 words of text. The speakers analyzed here produced similar frequencies of represented speech in spoken narratives. For example, Lucinda Greystone’s stories in general totaled 4586 words, and included 71 instances of RS (which could range from a short phrase to several sentences). 3008 of those words were in stories that included RS. Accordingly, she presented 2.4 incidences of RS per 100 words in stories with RS while presenting 1.5 instances per 100 words in stories overall. In contrast, Maureen Littlejohn used far more words but presented far fewer incidences of RS: in general, Littlejohn said 7519 words in all of her stories, but only 1559 words were associated with her 26 incidences of RS.

Represented speech allowed hearers to infer autobiographical aspects of a teller who animated as well as authored the auto/biography of the person(s) being told about, serving on occasion as the principal. Here we use Goffman’s original categories, in which the speaker-as-author creates the story and its characters, the animator voices it, and the principal is one of the main actors and holds responsibility for it (Goffman, 1963; cf Goodwin, 2006). As we discuss below, these categories point us to how we as hearers infer the stances taken by the speakers toward the situation and the participants in the episodes recounted. The episodes may or may not be true or realistic but were put forward as such by the speakers and accepted as such by the conversation partner (CP). In these conversational interactions the CP saw the PWD as an old woman living in an institutional setting; the PWD perceived the CP as a stranger, at least initially. On the one hand, disclosure of ‘self’ – either in the time and place of the story including the RS or in the here-and-now of the interaction – could be as deliberate character or self-presentation. On the other hand, self-disclosure could be inadvertent, allowing inference by hearers, or it could ‘leak’ through sidebar comments, subsequent evaluations of characters or events, and again support inference by the interlocutors.

The range of functions for represented speech used by the 5 women is shown in Table 1. The five speakers used RS in very different ways. Tatter maintained five different narrative formats across two years of conversation. Barrington paid particular attention to creating the contexts for RS in her conversational narratives. Greystone used RS as she created interlocking performance narratives. Copeland used it to report her thoughts and Littlejohn used RS in repeated stories to entertain her student listeners. In spite of the different uses of RS by the five women, the examples of RS all provided insights into their autobiographies and/or the biographies of other people who were significant to them.

*4.1 Tatter and the range of narrative formats*

The thirteen conversations that Tatter had with different students, on thirteen different occasions, held a total of at least 41 small stories, 21 scaffolded stories, 14 chunks of stories, 10 chronicles and 9 unscaffolded, rehearsed (frequently told) stories. Represented speech by Tatter was plentiful, particularly in the scaffolded stories.

Table 2 shows the number of excerpts by narrative type, including the identification of the persons or characters in the story world whose speech is (re)constructed. In effect, the represented speech presents a partial biography of ‘Mama’ from Tatter’s present-day evaluative perspective and allows listeners to infer a partial autobiography for Tatter by the way she positions herself.

Table 2: Tatter’s represented speech in different formats of narrative-in-conversation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Format | Total excerpts from Tatter’s 13 conversations | RS\* | People whose speech is represented | | | | |
|  |  |  | *Mama* | *T-child\** | *T-youth\** | *T-now\** | *Others* |
| unscaffolded | 9 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| scaffolded | 21 | 18 | 12 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| account/chronicle | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| chunk | 17 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| small stories | 41 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

\*RS = Represented speech; T-child, T-youth, T-now =Tatter as a child, as a young girl, and ‘now’ in 2006

Represented speech, which was most often used in narratives scaffolded by Tatter’s conversation partner, typically presents interaction between Tatter and another, usually her beloved mother, during Tatter’s childhood. In them, the mother is portrayed as wisely guiding a naïve and somewhat fearful child in learning baking and cooking as preparation for growing up. The direct speech serves to enact events, to evaluate the participants and the action, and to offer evidence of her mother’s care. At one point, Tatter reconstructs her own childhood speech, which we underline in extract ii). Tatter had found a bracelet down by the riverbank and we can assume her mother was horrified at the potential danger in that environment. Given her childhood pronunciation in her promises to remember her mother’s warning, we cannot be sure if, in her “yes, ma’am”, she is in the present, reporting the gist of her agreement in the past, or if she is representing childhood speech; we assume the former. Speech from the interviewer is in angle brackets; speech in square brackets is unclear.

ii) And she says, “Before I say anything else, I want you to know again, and again, and again you are not to go down to that water, uh, unless somebody is with you.” And I said, “Yes, ma'am.” She said, “Well that's what you said the [last] time I told ya.” (laughing) <I: Oh. (Laughing)> So I says, “I'll ’members mother. I'll ’members mother.” (laughing) <I: I know. I know> So. I-I used to say, “I-I ’members mama.”

Nine of Tatter’s thirteen conversations include anecdotes with direct speech representing dialogues with her mother. She discloses some information about her childhood or youth across all except the last of her conversations, using comments, chunks, or small stories (she graduated at sixteen, held several jobs, had a husband) and her current life (she lost an earring, she found a rosary in the grass). However, she typically uses represented speech only in stories showing her mother teaching her with love and patience. Indeed, the only times she uses it about someone other than her mother is in April, 2009 when she tells about spilling coffee as a waitress and how her husband, in one of his three mentions, was concerned about her taking a secretarial job instead. Extract iii) illustrates one of her rare productions of indirect represented speech, which we underline as well as her husband’s direct speech which we italicize.

1. I told uh, my husband that I, that's what I wanted to do and he said, “*Well more power to you”*. He s-, he said, *“But I would like to see you keep on taking the littlest, littler jobs,* he *-. Those uh, are, are not so highly rational*”.

Once Tatter shared a story about Mama, she usually presented at least one other on a related topic or theme, usually about baking or cooking. This occasionally allowed the interlocutor to infer her behavior as a child, as displayed in extracts iv) to vi). Each of these episodes, in which Mama is teaching the young Tatter to bake, occurs in the same conversation in which her use of pronouns suggests that she may be conflating several episodes. “We” in extracts iv) and v) suggests that she and at least one other sister were involved in the baking activities, but in extract vi), the “we” may refer only to her and her mother. Tatter may be shifting momentarily to the present time when she reports on her thoughts at that time and reveals that she had never previously been involved with breadmaking. In extracts iv) to vi), all from the same interview in 2008, direct represented speech is italicized, thought is underlined, interlocutor speech is in angle brackets and material in square brackets is unclear.

1. Mama says *“when you get them and if you save me a cup full I will make you some rolls.”* We didn't each [take?] a pinch … Mama said “*okay, now it's got to be a cup because that is what the recipe calls for.”* And, we said, *"Okay, we won't take them, Mama.*" Every once in a while a piece would [break off?] and we would say, *"Don't tell Mama*."
2. … Mother says, "*Well, whenever you get me enough, I'll make you some cookies”* and I say, *"Mama, no, don't make cookies, make the rolls."* <Make the rolls>. And they were so good and she would, she would say, *"Now, I don't want you to chop them up in little pieces, I want big pieces in these rolls."* And that's what we would do. And we had butternut trees, and we could, I don't know how many we could get. She would say*, "Now don't give me too many."*
3. … And I said, *"What we going to do, Mommy?"* She said, "*After you get done with your studies and with your homework, we're going to make bread."* I thought, make bread. I know Mama made bread but I was never in on it. So, anyway she uh, she said*, "It's not the kind of bread like we eat."* (2008)

*4.2. Barrington illustrates a focus on creating contexts for represented speech*

In 1998, Barrington allowed a relative to record their conversation and her reminiscences when she was in her mid-seventies and donated it (recording and transcript) to UNC Charlotte’s New South Voices oral history collection (<http://nsv.uncc.edu>/barrier). In 2012, fourteen years later, when she moved to an assisted living/memory care residence, she talked with three students as part of their gerontology class (Hancock et al., 2009). In 1998 Barrington used indirect represented speech as shown in extract vii), where she is reminiscing with her college-age nephew about their tightly bound family in both the past and the present. Laughter is enclosed in square brackets and angle brackets enclose speech by the interviewer. Indirect constructed speech is underlined. The context in extract vii) is considerably longer than the represented speech itself.

1. And uh, uh, so we, uh, were sitting in there one Saturday night and, [laughs] we heard the awfulest going on in there, you know, and, uh, so Papa went to the door, and, uh, I heard him ask if anybody was smoking. Nope, no, no, they weren't smoking. <Uh-huh.> And after a while, [laughs] after a while we heard another commotion, and Carl Junior was smoking a cigar.

Barrington used direct constructed speech in one story about Mary and two about Mama as parts of short unscaffolded narratives about her childhood. One story about Pop and another story about Mama are about Barrington and her brother Parks as young adults, roughly the same age as nephew Michael was in 1998. Indirect and direct represented speech in interactive monologic and dialogic stories about the present suggest that she is aging normally. Her stories display Barrington’s expertise in knowing family history and show her being consulted by other family members. In extract viii), for example, Barrington recalls how, in the 1930s, Mama allowed everybody to meet at their home.

1. because, you know mama wasn't that particular, she let us have a good time, she said, “My children come before the house.”

In extract ix), Barrington sets the context by referencing her baby carriage, which will furnish the humor about a dog’s chasing them during an attempt to trick or treat on Hallowe’en while they were dressed as ghosts by wearing Mama’s sheets.

1. I had my little baby carriage, just about this long, you know, and Mary came over here and she said, “Ida”, she said, “Let's trick-or-treat” … and that dog took out after us and there I am dragging my baby carriage up the road here and tripping on my sheet …

In her 2011 conversation in the memory care residence with a student volunteer, she tells two very short stories about her little dog whom she has had to leave behind in order to move to the residence. Later that year, in speaking with another student, she offers five narrative chunks about her little dog. All five dog stories are variations on the same schema, often repeating the same evaluation (“I miss her so much … She’s precious”), but their placement in the conversation suggests Barrington is showing slightly different aspects of having moved to assisted living/memory care. She then recounts a rehearsed story from her childhood, about holding her dog, Toots, one day and overhearing when her older sister “Tina” tattled on her for sucking her thumb. In this story in extract x) she alternates direct speech by Tina and Mama, using both prosodic emphasis and mimicry. Indirect represented speech is italicized.

1. And I used to suck my thumb and I know my sister, Joy’s mother, used to get so aggravated with me. Uh, when she’d come home from work – she rode with Mr. Harris – and when she’d come home from work I’d be sittin’ on the front steps suckin’ my thumb and holdin’ my cat and we had a dog – We had, had a big dog and, uh, I hopped up one day and followed Toots into the kitchen and, uh, I heard her tell mama, she said, “Mama, that is the most sickening thing I’ve ever seen.” Mama said, “What?” She said *I’m sittin’ out there holdin’ a cat* and, uh, “With a cat on her lap and holdin’ her dog and suckin’ her thumb.” And mama told her, she said, “Now Tina don’t you say a word to her ’cause, see, she’s been sittin’ out there since 2:00. Waitin’ on you to come home.” And this is like 5:30 –

*4.3 Greystone uses represented speech in creating interlocking performance narratives*

Greystone’s multiply repeated stories all interlock around her mother and most often around her mother’s skill in baking and cooking (Davis, 2011). The stories are represented graphically in Figure 1 (Davis, 2011). She replicates dialogues between herself and her grandfather about her mother’s cooking, and with her mother, when she chooses a molasses (‘lassy’) cake for her birthday. In the other stories, including those in which students ask about cooking, she acts as a first-person narrator of the past but without directly reporting speech. The molasses cake and Granddaddy dialogues are rehearsed performance pieces, told multiple times over two years to student visitors and probably throughout her life.


In 2005, Greystone was able to explain who was speaking: “My daddy’s name was ‘Hank’” as well as recreate both her grandfather’s and her own speech, as shown in extract xi). Direct represented speech is italicized; dashes represent pauses.

1. Well honey, I grew up with eight brothers and one sister, she was the oldest, and I was next to the youngest – we all learned to cook – and some of my brothers when my brothers they got married, taught their wives to cook [laughs]. But mother loved to cook – Her daddy always did tell my daddy, my daddy’s name was Hank – “*Hank*” – and mother’s name was Janet but they called her Jan – he said “*Hank when you took Jan you took my cook, these other girls can’t cook nothing*.” Well then I spoke up and said “*Well granddaddy you just come stay with us*” – He’d come but he didn’t stay. But he had a big garden, he had a big barn. I can see that little car, he’d come up with everything in the garden and the fields he’d have in the car for us.   (October 2005). (Davis, 2011:92).

Six months later, Greystone was still able to add these explanatory details, but she did not always add them at the most relevant places. In extract xii) she recreates her mother’s speech and her grandfather’s speech as well as her own. She still explains that her father’s name was “Hank” and her mother’s was “Janet” but her explanation that her mother came from Lincolnton is not clear. The juxtaposition of *daddy* with the pronoun *she* (underlined in extract xii) is potentially confusing: the slight pause before *she* is the only indication that Greystone is adding in another piece of background information about her mother. Direct represented speech is italicized.

1. We really did. I heard mother say a million times about the ten children if she had to give one of us up. She’d say, “*You can take me but you won’t get a single one of them!*’’ [Laughter from student listeners] That’s the way mother would tell them. But mother didn’t work in Carolina Mills, she had enough to do at home. But, uh, she did a lot of cooking. Those big shots in Maiden who had parties all the time, they found out that mother was a good cook. My granddaddy, [pause] she came from Lincolnton. She had two or three sisters there at the whole there. My grandfather. And my granddaddy always did tell me my daddy – my daddy’s name was Hank and mother’s name was Janet. They called her Jan for sh- short. And he’d say, ‘‘*Hank, when you took Jan, you took my cook!*’’ Their mother had two or three sisters left at home. ‘‘*Them other girls can’t cook worth nothin’.*’’ I said, ‘‘*Well granddaddy, you’ll just had to come eat with us.*’’ He says, ‘‘*Grandma won’t let me.*’’ (April 2006) (Davis, 2011: 94)

Greystone used her repeated stories as a way of socializing with the student strangers who came to visit her. Her performance narratives provided her with ways of pulling her visitors into her life and also showed her as a spirited, independent child who obviously agreed with her grandfather’s assessment of her mother’s cooking skills. Her stories intimate that those traits carried over into adulthood. When she received encouragement via laughter, she tended to provide more details, even if the details were not always provided at a place in the story that answered a listener’s needs for information. With Greystone, rehearsed performance which is dependent upon reported speech always occurs in emotionally laden stories from the past. We can infer that, although she came from a large family of ten children, she was not afraid to speak up, and even though her suggestions were not appropriate, there is no sense that they were ridiculed.



**Figure 1: Interlocking stories by Lucinda Greystone**

Graphic used by permission from McPherron and Ramanathan (2011:84)

*4.4 Copeland reports her thoughts*

In our first meeting, Copeland presented us with an amusing performance narrative, most of which was represented speech about family members. In it we are told about her mother and her feisty Irish grandmother who tried to avoid customs by strapping small bottles of whiskey around her waist. She did avoid the customs officer, but the bottles all broke and the whiskey was lost. In our conversations with Copeland, this story is the only real source that enables us to make inferences about her older family.However, during our two years of conversations (Guendouzi, Davis and Maclagan, 2015), she really preferred to share what Bamberg and Georgakopoulou (2008) call “small stories”. These are small, short, everyday stories that are largely undeveloped and unnoticed. Rather than offering reminiscence, she wanted instead to discuss what was on her mind in the present, which was her fear of losing her mind and her self and her on-going need to preserve her own face in her interactions with others in the retirement-cum-memory care residence where she was living. Her use of represented speech was primarily to represent her concerns, as if she were thinking out loud to her conversation partners. Much of this speech expressed her worries about the future or consisted of admonitions to herself to “snap out of it” and take a greater part in the life of the residence. Short pauses punctuated her reports and projections; we have noted them with (.) in extract xiii) where her represented speech and thought are italicized.

1. I understand that nothing's changed (.) I just feel (.) *what am I living for you know I'm going to become a vegetable (.) let's get it over with (.)* I'm not going to commit (.) suicide or anything but I have nothing to look forward to I'm not going to get better

\*\*\*

thought *it would pass (.) but* (.) I could look forward and there's nothing nice to look forward to (.) it's going to be bad

\*\*\*

you know but I (.) (.) it was just last night that I was thinking (.) *what's the point in this why don't I just go and it would make it easier on all the children and myself (.) I'm not afraid to die*

\*\*\*

well it is true yes (.) I just don't know how to --- I keep talking to myself about this andsaying *you've got to snap out of it* and I'm okay for maybe an hour and then all of a sudden it's all back again

(Feb 2000)

Copeland was very concerned that other residents did not seem to like her. In one conversation she said “I don't know, but I never had any trouble and I moved a lot. Never had any trouble with making friends, but nobody [here] calls me and wants to do anything” (Jan 01) When the researchers encouraged her to approach other residents her response was “How could I say ‘Why don’t you invite me? That’s a hard thing to say!’” As Copeland continued to express her fears for her future, she still presented as someone who was aware of her own face needs and the needs of others.

4.5. *Littlejohn: Repeated stories told to entertain listeners*

Littlejohn told stories that kept her student visitors laughing. They were mostly personal anecdotes “told as true reports of funny events experienced by the teller” (Norrick, 2003:1339). When she ran out of quick little stories about her previous life and her beloved Labrador retrievers, and the laughter quieted, she peppered the students with questions about what courses they were taking or what jobs they held. This also gave her time to chime in with similar experiences of her own or with advice for their future. In her stories, she kept the floor but she fed off their nods and laughter. As Norrick (2007:131) notes, “In story sections, formulaic speech, repetition, and dialogue provide special windows on narrative organization.” And it is here as well as in conversational rejoinders to student anecdotes that Littlejohn’s direct represented speech is used to good account. Much of her direct represented speech is mimicry of somebody else's voice, or more properly their stereotype, which she expects her listeners to recognize. She is still able to take the perspective of her listeners. She is selective about who she uses represented speech with (it seems to be people she wants to entertain yet keep at some distance) and she provides a great deal more context to her student visitors than to researchers as conversational partners. Table 3 gives examples of the context provided for student visitors. In her conversations with the students, Littlejohn self-presents as a competent adult, concerned for the welfare of her student visitors. The RS in Table 3 shows her self confidence in that she was not intimidated at the thought of offering the Archbishop of Canterbury one of her baskets. We can infer from this story and other examples of RS in her stories that she saw herself as competent and efficient as a younger adult.

https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v1/icons/mail/images/cleardot.gif

**Table** 3: **Samples of represented speech in conversations between Littlejohn and students**

*Mimicry or any kind of shift to show choice of another speaker/voice is italicized*; reference to previous telling or apology for retelling is in <angle brackets>; contextualization is underlined

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Year/Topic** | **Context** | **Direct represented speech** |
| 2008  basket for the Arch-bishop | And he called in a panic and he was just kinda a typical bachelor, he would just get so upset about everything, he called and he said | “*Maureen, the archbishop is gonna be here, I’ve searched all over Waynesville for a gift for him.”* He says “*do you have a basket?”* and I said “*yes*.*”* |
| 2009  basket for the Arch-bishop | he called I got a f~ phone call late on a on a Saturday afternoon, | he says “*Maureen*,” he says, “*the Archbishop of Canterbury is going to be here”* he says “*I’ve been all over town trying to find a gift for him*.*”* He says “*I can’t find anything*,” he says “*do you have a basket?”* |
| 2013  behaviors | <But, as I'm sure I've probably told you this,> but I used to get it thrown up | “… *you shouldn't do this, or you should do that,”* or this, that and the other, “*because your mother was a teacher.”* Or,“*Your mother was a school teacher*.*”* [mimicry] |
| 2014  behaviors | <And I, as I’ve probably said before,> I could never get away with anything ’cos it was always thrown back to me | “*well you know better”* [mimicry] |

Anecdotes with represented speech are seldom used in the 4 years and 8 conversations with the researcher-conversation partner (RCP). RCP was about 12 years younger than Littlejohn. She was clearly not a student, her accent was similar to Littlejohn’s, she knew family members and friends, and she was a regular visitor. While Maureen Littlejohn may not have known her name – RCP never asked such a rude question – she did not act as though RCP was a stranger and greet her effusively the way she greeted most of the students. Other than her rehearsed story about the basket in 2012, she only occasionally used represented speech with RCP. Instead, she preferred presenting narratives that elicited responses from the RCP all the way through the story. When conversing with the students, Littlejohn used RS throughout her stories. With the RCP, by contrast, her rare uses of RS formed an evaluative commentary to her stories. In extracts xiv) to xix) with the RCP, direct represented speech/thought is italicized, context/indirect reporting is underlined and pauses are represented by a dash.

1. And I - I used to have that thrown up at me so much – *“now Maureen, you know better than that, your mother was a school teacher!”* (Nov 2011)
2. if you saw somebody there that you'd like to bring home with you for dinner you just ask em *“well come on home and we'll have dinner”* (Nov 2011)
3. mother would just say, or dad or whatever, *“just come on home with us and have dinner* (Nov 2011)
4. one of the persons there had known me before they says *“you know what I remember most about you?”* and I thought, *“oh yeah it's gonna be something great”*. And I said *“well what?*’*”* *“you always had an apple”* (Nov 2011)
5. She’ll just -- as we're walking out the door -- *“I'm taking Aunt Maureen out for lunch”* or what have you (Nov 2011)
6. and he said *“Maureen the Archbishop of Canterbury”* George Carey I think he was at that time, *- “is going to be in church today, - and I have searched all over town”* and that was Waynesville, which is a little if you know it's a little town, but, <Yeah.> - very touristy *“but I searched all over everywhere, - for a gift - for him, - and I can't find anything - that that's suitable!”* And he says *“Do you have a basket?”* and I said *“yes I have an egg basket.”*  (Feb 2012)

Littlejohn had a repertoire of stories like the one in extract xix) that she repeated often. The shared laughter indicated that she used them effectively to keep the interest of her student visitors. With the RCP, the laughter was more gentle. Littlejohn clearly did not feel that she needed to entertain the RCP and their later interactions became conversations between friends.

**5 DISCUSSION**

For this discussion we have examined eighty conversations between people with dementia and their conversational partners. At this point we find ourselves with more questions than answers. First, the represented speech retained in the conversations we reviewed is almost exclusively direct reported speech. As with both comprehension and production of irony and metaphor, perhaps we can safely assume that inference or indirect represented speech may be overly difficult to produce spontaneously for persons with dementia (Kempler, 1998; Welland, 2002; Altmann, 2008; Creamer, 2008; Cummings, 2016:46; Togher et al., 2014:104). Studies using natural language processing (NLP) with small corpora of speech to compare older impaired people with unimpaired people such as Boyé et al. (2014: 684) are able to identify problems – “they seldom use reported speech and interpolated clauses” – but not why such problems occur, other than to highlight the role of heterogeneity, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article. (We note, however, that the study by Boyé et al., like many designed to elicit conversation from persons with dementia, focuses on the use of picture prompts, which are not used in any of the conversations we analyze here.)

Next, those episodes containing represented speech occur most frequently in a range of narrative types, as opposed, for example, to accounts and non-narrative question-answer turns, ranging from un/scaffolded narrative to small stories and narrative chunks, as exemplified above for Tatter. That is, they are either stories of (or allusions to) past personal experience or the voicing of personal reflections in the past or in the present. Untrained listeners tend to ask are they “true” or “accurate”? For reminiscence, we follow Kruk (2015:274) who says

they should not be construed as accurate and omniscient representations of past events but as loci of subjective, creative and cognitive engagements … the teller’s interpretation of that reality.

All the stories have some emotional content and we would be highly reluctant to argue truth/nontruth for a person’s representation of their feelings.

Third, although episodic memory is known to be damaged very early in dementia, the direct represented speech occurs most frequently as part of specific dialogic episodes from the past and in fairly specific contexts. What are we to make of this? Comments, questions or self-disclosures by non-impaired conversation partners about food, holidays or early life seem to trigger rehearsed reminiscences, possibly allowing speakers to tap into general knowledge and activate remembered episodes. Klein et al. (2010: 10) suggests that PWD “may be operating from knowledge of a former self”, seeing themselves “as they were.” As Grilli (2017: 2) comments,

some personal semantic contents remain associated with spatiotemporal information reflective of lifetime periods (e.g., I lived in Boston), repeated events (e.g., I walked to work at that time) or unique life experiences (e.g., my son was born during a blizzard) and therefore are experience-near.

However, RS can also be used, at least in mild and early moderate dementia, to report present thoughts and feelings which may also include episodes. Our data suggests that without scaffolding from the conversation partner, such as signals of emotion and affiliation (Stivers, 2008) or questions requesting clarification or expansion, neither reminiscence episodes nor current representations of thoughts or feelings provide evidence that the speaker is taking the perspective of the conversation partner (Hamilton, 1994). By that we mean that the speaker does not always show that she is fully aware of what the partner needs to know in order to understand the story (cf the discussion of Greystone in 4.3). On the other hand, the PWDs are not always merely perseverating, even when repeating a rehearsed story in a single conversation with the same partner. Instead, they may be changing slight details in the story to suggest different stances or different facets of identities (Davis, 2011).

Perhaps the most salient aspect of the use of represented speech by PWD in our data is its use in suggesting something from the speaker’s repertoire of identities. Because a person has developed dementia, that does not mean that their repertoire has collapsed or vanished, but it does mean that as the disease progresses, their ability to access, negotiate or perform some or all of their identities becomes increasingly compromised. Identities can include the way the teller positions self and other, even including whether the storyteller can be seen as reliable (Herman, 2007). Both a conventional story format and a small story can be a “site for identity construction” (Lenchuk and Swain, 2009:9) and can be used by the teller as practices by which to make sense of his or her life. These practices are suggested to us by the way the reported speech positions the speaker-teller and the speakers in the story world. Bamberg (1997:337) asks us to look at three levels of positioning: the ways narrators position themselves as characters in the world of the story; how they position themselves and their listeners or co-participants in the actual interaction; and how a narrator can indicate ‘Who am I.’ Tatter, for example, did not stop being an older woman in the here-and-now of her conversations in 2008-09, or a former wife, a former employee (waitress and secretary) or a former child in her story worlds. However, she acknowledges that she is no longer as competent as she once was. She now needs a recipe in order to cook: “But if you're like me I, if I don't [have] the recipe in front of me, (chuckle) I’m out in left field.” Table 4 highlights the biographical and autobiographical elements in Tatter’s thirteen stories. The material that can be gleaned from RS is in italics.

**Table 4:** **Tatter: Biography of Mama and inferable autobiography.**

Initials indicate the student conversation partner. *Material in italics is from represented speech.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Date**  **# Tatter’s words** | **Mama’s biography** | **Tatter’s inferable autobiography** |
| CO  Nov 2008  9499 words | Mama would always let Tatter come along when going anywhere.  *Didn’t think Tatter was ‘dumb’; wanted Tatter to feel adventurous*  *Taught her to make potato bread* *and homemade butter* | **Child**: *worried, didn’t want to be thought dumb but had trouble learning*  **Now**: Mama and husband are in heaven |
| HO  Nov 2008  1067 words | *Mama has Tatter collect nuts for cookies or rolls, Mama teaches her to make sweet rolls* | **Child:** loved the food mother cooked  **Now***:* enjoys eating dried fruits; wears a locket as a brooch, wants picture of Mama |
| AR  Dec 2008  989 words | Mama was good, unselfish; *teases about cost of yarn for Tatter’s knitting projects but praises them; promises not to make people laugh at her* | **Child***:* habit of picking up pennies  Knits coverlet for Mama  **Now***:* found cross in grass, *hopes to return it to owner* |
| JO  Feb 2009  3445 words | *Mama identifies strange jumping animal as frog* | **Child**: *afraid of jumping frog*  **Youth**: had a little foreign language teaching “little spaces here and there”  *Husband dubious about her getting secretarial job*  **Now**: has lost an earring; somebody in the residence takes things. Loves green; thinks department stores are expensive; looks at visitor’s purse; will tell Mama something (Mama is dead); thinks Mama gave her the cross. Sings. Was a waitress. |
| ST  Feb 2009  1660 words |  | **Youth**: bought a watch for her husband  **Now***:* has a cold; *group of students made her a vase which she loves*; loves green; brought door decoration inside; grew up on a farm; can’t finish talk |
| AL  Apr 2009  3991 words | *Tells ‘little one’ (Tatter) to stop inviting so many children as has to give something to each.*  Unselfish, patient teacher: taught Tatter to make butter and potato bread.  May have had a heart attack.  Superb baker, taught by example and *watched children try to do things* | **Child**: *called ‘little one’ and has been inviting too many children to play; loved chicken noodle soup*  **Youth***:* started dating late, nervous; quit college when Mama died, to take care of other children; became a secretary and also was a waitress; *returned a tip*. *Had 3 blonde sisters*; *she is brunette*.  **Now**: Green her favorite color; her lipstick is missing; she was extravagant in spending; memory slipping now; enjoys TV quizzes. |
| MO  Apr 2009  1090words |  | **Youth**: thinks she was too young when she graduated; *was a secretary*; *husband wanted her to take ‘littler jobs’; was a waitress who spilled coffee.*  **Now***:* Can’t remember the name of the president of the company where she worked. |
| HA  Apr 2009  829 | Mother loved flowers, gardens; a baker: made sweet rolls with nuts, yeast bread, potato bread | **Child*:*** lived on a farm  **Youth***:* lost some of her teeth  **Now***:* wishes she could have a garden, suddenly spotted missing earring, memory starting to slip |
| NA  Apr 2009  1329 words | Mama unhappy when Tatter lost her first pearl; *doesn’t want her to go near the water;* a wonderful cook; *amused at the mess Tatter makes* | **Child**: *found a bracelet*; *made a mess cooking;* mimics baby talk  **Youth**: *lost a pearl;* graduated at 16, felt too young  **Now**: needs recipe to cook; memory slipping from time to time |
| SE  Apr 2009  3654 words | *Mama and Daddy take family to visit Canada;* *Doctor gave Tatter a soft drink when Mama kept her out of the hospital;* didn’t want any dogs inside, *teases her about being like a puppy* | **Child**: had many dogs, cats, other animals  **Youth**: afraid of airplane flight; worked at Stouffers  **Now***:* Used to have a lot of jewelry, but has none now; can’t remember how long she has lived in Charlotte or what branch of the service her husband was in; likes soft drinks and talking to students. Now she thinks she might have made the cross. Sings song from youth/Glee Club. *Told ‘them’ [volunteers at the residence] not to use the nail polish that they put on her.* |
| VA  Mar 2010  2617 words | *Mama gave child pennies*; made sure children went to appropriate schools and developed their abilities; *helped them find jobs;* superb cook – canned vegetables, made bread, pies, taught child Tatter to cook | **Child***:* picked up pennies; had 10 siblings; had all the food they needed on their farm.  **Youth***:* had one brother in the navy, one in the army; went to secretarial school; took down court notes in shorthand; *suggests the courts record proceedings rather than using shorthand*  **Now***:* flatters interviewer; comments in French ‘c’est la vie’, says that she’s always been a ‘dumb-dumb’. |
| GR  Fall 2010  1627 words |  | **Child***:* saved every penny her mother gave her  ***Youth****:* enjoyed studying  **Now***:* doesn’t like all the things that are brought into her room to keep her occupied; her glasses were taken away and not returned; feels isolated; says *people ask her what she’s done to keep others away from her;* comments in French ‘ç’est la vie’; gets lonely and cries; says she ‘knows’ that her mother is still alive and wonders why she doesn’t come to take her home; flatters interviewer |
| CA  Nov 2010  963 words |  | **Now***:* *thinks she has been to Alabama, but isn’t sure.* Has a musical rose, doesn’t remember that her family gave it to her; comments in French ‘ç’est la vie’; flatters interviewer; doesn’t like other residents in her room |

Positioning theory, as explained by Davies and Harré (1990:32) includes how people assign status to each other, and the rights and responsibilities they have in particular positions. It is how we understand the location of participants in a dialogue and expect them to be “observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story-lines” (Harré and van Langenhove, 1994:362). This assumption is particularly interesting for PWD, who all too often are not regarded as having speaking rights (Davis and Pope, 2010). Medved and Brockmeier (2015:451) explain that the PWD’s autobiographical memories are all too often seen as

‘fragmented,’ ‘vague,’ ‘inconsistent’ or even ‘confabulatory’ or false [and PWD] not only have their recollections and viewpoints dismissed but also their right to self-presentation and moral self-positioning. The underlying assumption here is that individuals who have difficulty remembering their own past are unable to define a sense of self or be agentic subjects.

Indeed, they are all too often positioned malignantly, as explained by Sabat (2002:27).

When PWD are positioned malignantly by their conversational partners, they are not supported in their attempts to continue to (re-)construct any of their identities or to be viewed as competent and interesting conversational partners. As Guendouzi and Pate comment (2014:129), having cognitive deficits “increases risk of face threat” (See Blitvich 2013 on interconnections among face, identity, and impoliteness). Face “is conceptualised in terms of the relationship that is interactionally achieved between two or more persons” (Haugh and Bargiela-Chiappini 2010:2015). And persons with dementia have face which can be harmed by malignant positioning. The interactions with Copeland (section 4.4) illustrate her continuing concern with face when she expresses her unwillingness to impose on other residents at the dinner table. She considers that they are rejecting her and thus threatening her own face and does not wish to threaten their face by going where she feels she is not welcome. However, in conversational interaction, experienced, trained, or empathetic conversation partners can support PWD’s on-going positive face needs by encouraging the ongoing production of conversation and narrative incorporating RS for auto/biographical remembering. The excerpts in Table 5 expand on the material presented in Table 4 by identifying how the conversational partners in these conversations affiliated with the teller’s stance and aligned with the telling activity (Stivers 2008: 31; cf Lee and Tanaka 2016). In Table 5, partner utterances and analytic labels are italicized, pauses in seconds are indicated in square brackets for Littlejohn.

**Table 5: Example: Partner affiliation/alignment to support auto/biographical remembering**

Partner utterances and analytic labels are italicized, pauses in seconds are indicated in square brackets for Littlejohn.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Tatter** | |
| *I know which ones you're talking about.* | *Affiliation: statement of comprehension* |
| Those were the ones that we liked best and Mama says “when you get them and if you save me a cup full I will make you some rolls.” We didn't each [take] a pinch. | Childhood: Mama-bio.  Inferable auto-bio: included with children who could do things and be sneaky together |
| (*Chuckles*) | *Alignment: token* |
| P: (Chuckles). Mama, said “okay, now it's got to be a cup because that is what the recipe calls for.” And, we said, "Okay, we won't take them, Mama." Every once in a while a piece would [?fall?] and we would say, "Don't tell Mama." (Chuckles). | Childhood: Mama-bio.  Inferable auto-bio: included with children who could do things and be sneaky together |
| *(Chuckles*) | *Alignment: matching token* |
| P: But anyway, she said, “now I'm not going to put them in the cookies like this. I want you to go ahead and get the chopper and chop them up.” We put them in a jug like that and chop it like this but she said, "But don't chop them up too close, chop them up so that somebody thinks they are getting a nut whenever they get it." | Childhood: Mama-bio  Inferable auto-bio: needed to do exactly and precisely what Mama said in order to match her expectations |
| I: *She didn't want them fine. She wanted them chunks* | *Affiliation: paraphrase of what T said were Mama’s expectations* |
| **Copeland** | |
| you know but I and it was just last night that I was thinking “what's the point in this why don't I just go and it would make it easier on all the children and myself.” I'm not afraid to die. | Present day: Inferable auto-bio via self-disclosure of fear of condition and its difficulties since dementia diagnosis; concern for children. |
| *Okay* | *Alignment: token* |
| you know I think I'm going to heaven… | Present day: Inferable auto-bio via self-affirmation as worthy person |
| well it is true yes an’ I just don't know how to - I keep talking to myself about this and saying “you've got to snap out of it” and I'm okay for maybe an hour and then all of a sudden it's all back again | Present day: Inferable auto-bio via continuing self-disclosure of fear of condition and its difficulties since dementia diagnosis; how she battles her fluctuating fear |
| *but you know I think that you are so wise in fighting this tendency to despondency* | *Affiliation and alignment: statement of praise* |

In this discussion, our examples show how all five women, if to different degrees, position different aspects of their social selves in their story worlds and portray selections from their past and present repertoires of identities. Although all five women used direct RS, we found very few instances of indirect RS. We are heartened by Norrick’s (2016) comment on three-way distinction among direct report, indirect report and represented speech (which he calls ‘constructed dialogue’). In a discussion of tellability, Norrick (2016:110) bypasses the dichotomy between indirect and direct reporting in conversational narrative, asserting that

the (perlocutionary) effects of the following speech acts qua narrative performances seems [sic] to remain the same:

The station manager quit. direct report

The station manager said (that) she quit. indirect report

The station manager said, ‘I quit’. constructed dialogue

If all these types of acts have the same effect on the listener, then the PWD may not be quite so adversely affected in terms of conversation if they are no longer able to successfully produce indirect speech and indirect reports.

We started by suggesting that the narratives told by PWD appeared to be shared to expand initial categorization, create common ground, establish relationships, handle impression management, and perhaps even maintain positive face. The five women whose conversations are analyzed here use their stories to different effects. Initially the students saw the women as old ladies living in institutions. By the end of the conversations most of the students realized that the women were people with interesting histories who were worthwhile to talk to, and reported such to their instructors (Davis, Maclagan and Shenk 2014). The stories told by all the women greatly aided the process of changing this initial categorization. Tatter’s stories about baking and Littlejohn’s stories about her beloved dogs helped to create common ground with the students, with one student even bringing pictures of his own dog to show Littlejohn. The stories also helped with on-going impression management. From the students’ perspective, a woman who could tell entertaining stories was someone worth interacting with. On a more personal level, Copeland’s anxiety about the way the other residents viewed her demonstrate her on-going need to create a positive impression on other people. And finally, Copeland’s interactions show her need to maintain her own face, and some of Littlejohn’s conversations demonstrate her concern for the face of her student visitors.

6CONCLUSION

Represented/constructed/reported talk in dementia discourse deserves greater attention not only in order to learn more about the retention of pragmatic competencies and performance skills in disarrayed cognitive and linguistic situations but also for researchers of declarative hippocampal memory, to learn more about potential associations between emotion and autobiographical memory and for developers of communicative interventions to learn how better to support dementia discourse. Grainger (2013) suggests adding ethnographic approaches in order to better incorporate the hearer, whom we call conversation partner. For example, politeness markers, which help to create a positive affect, are retained as formulaic phrases as compensatory efforts to simulate conversational fluency (Davis, 2010). It would seem that the presentation of episodes incorporating reported speech may also be a compensatory strategy, this time in an effort to initiate or maintain relationships with other people, such as the current interlocutors. Accordingly, their expanded study could provide greater insight into relational work (Locher, 2013:146) as well as into retained pragmatic competencies.

It may be that the represented/constructed/reported talk shows up so often in scaffolded rehearsed stories because the narrator has been encouraged over time by the scaffolding of various interlocutors, so that both the story and the represented talk have become chronotopic, formulaic rehearsed elements (Guendouzi and Müller, 2001; Davis, 2017 ip), as in any oral-formulaic poetry (Watkins, 1995). Johnstone (2016) remarks that in Labov’s work in narratology, he showed the ordinary conversation to be as worthy of study as the Homeric epic. The fragments of represented speech and rehearsed story in the conversational narratives by people with dementia re-present the personally experienced epic of their lives and similarly deserve our full attention.

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