

A CONSTANT MAGIC: EXPLORATIONS OF MAGIC AND POLYPHASIC
CONSCIOUSNESS IN RECENT THEATRE AND FILM

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Abstract

This thesis explores what can be considered magical in contemporary theatre and film in an arguably post-magical age. I have taken an exploratory and interdisciplinary approach that brings together two diverse strands: the ‘deception’ of magical thinking and the ‘truth’ of neuroscience. This approach sees magic as an aesthetic experience that can be seen as significant for its immanence rather than its transcendence. Hence, I take a “mental-materialist” approach to neuroscience and focus on perception and affect as it impacts on the body and the senses. Bridging the diversity between magical thinking and neuroscience is the concept of ‘polyphasic consciousness’, an experiential and intuitive method of accessing knowledge that expands awareness and encompasses altered states.

My involvement as an actor and collaborator with Free Theatre Christchurch forms the basis of explorations into magic, which is underpinned by my experience with the magical myth of *Faust*. In addition to examining the Free Theatre production of Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* from 2010, I will discuss Jan Švankmajer’s 1994 film *Lekce Faust* and Werner Fritsch’s film poem *Faust Sonnengesang* (2012-2015). The remaining films and theatre productions contain significant Faustian themes and can also be discussed in terms of a magical aesthetic experience. These include five films by Werner Herzog and the Free Theatre production of *Frankenstein* from 2016.

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Introduction

This thesis seeks to expand the scope of what can be considered magical in contemporary theatre and film in an arguably post-magical age. This is not to say that magic in a Western context has disappeared – I mean to say the opposite: magic is ubiquitous in a way that often strips it of meaning. As anthropologist Ariel Glucklich puts it in *The End of Magic*, “The word *magic* works far too hard. We reach for it frequently, to describe wildly different things” (1997, vii). My explorations into magic began at a practical level with simple tricks in the theatre, and as such, the thesis that has developed from this starting point will be informed by this experience. As I continued to explore ideas about what magic *could* be, the material soon became more complicated. I began to wonder if it was all just illusion and tricks but found that it could encompass deeper truths, as it was meant to do in the past when belief in magic was more widespread. This thesis explores my search for those truths.

The thesis is underpinned with the myth of *Faust*, because it grew from my practical experience of it as an actor and collaborator with Free Theatre Christchurch.¹ It is also a myth that mixes magic with serious substantive issues and arose at a time when magical beliefs started to be challenged by the rise of scientific thinking. It began as a legend about a real scholar called Georg Faust who lived around 1480-1540 but quickly developed into a fantastical myth full of magic. It found its way into public consciousness via the low-brow media of marketplace puppet plays and a ‘folk-written’ chapbook, but today, the plays by Marlowe (c.1591) and Goethe (1808) are considered the epitome of high art and literary achievement. As such, it has penetrated both high and low cultural production and Faustian themes can still be found in many popular and artistic forms of entertainment, as it is an endlessly

¹ Free Theatre is New Zealand’s longest running producer of experimental theatre. Its shows are directed by founder and Artistic Director Peter Falkenberg. The company works as an ensemble that most often takes its starting place from an idea, cultural situation or text, and over a long devising period develops productions that position themselves geographically and culturally in the current reality of the troupe. In this way, the interests and concerns of individual troupe members are explored collectively, guided always by the director.

updatable myth that continues to evolve. I will discuss both Marlowe and Goethe's plays but will also take a broad overview and consider the central themes that drive the myth as a whole.

Two Free Theatre productions sparked my interest in *Faust* and in magic: *Faust Chroma* in 2008, which was inspired by Goethe's *Faust*,² and *Doctor Faustus* in 2010, which was adapted from Christopher Marlowe's play. The text of Marlowe's play was not the starting point for the latter production. We began by experimenting with magic tricks in order to explore their entertainment possibilities. We created shadow puppets and learned sleight of hand tricks. We experimented with light and shade using the principles of the Magic Lantern. We made short films in the style of the early film magician Georges Méliès that played with conjuration and metamorphosis using simple editing techniques. We dressed in black and stood in front of black curtains, thereby making ourselves appear invisible, and found that by moving coloured props or people around, they would appear to levitate and do impossible things. We followed instructions on conjuration, examined runes and tried out an ouija board. We explored the ways in which an actor can transform behind a mask or metamorphose from a goat into a demon with a quick and undetected change of mask. We explored the technological magic of creating new selves in Photoshop and avatars in computer games.

In the midst of all this we sat down and read through Marlowe's play, but rejected large swathes of it, shifting the focus away from some of the moral or religious concerns to highlight instead the role of the show and the showman. These were the uncomplicated beginnings of this thesis. I was delighted with how we achieved a sense of magical astonishment using these simple methods, some of which were

² In 2008 Free Theatre produced one of its most successful plays: *Faust Chroma*, which was based on a text by Werner Fritsch that took its inspiration from Goethe's *Faust*. This production explored the life of actor Gustaf Gründgens (1899-1963), who was famous in Germany for playing the devil Mephistopheles, but who, in real life, had made somewhat of a Faustian pact of his own with the Nazis in order to work in the theatre. I will discuss this production in the conclusion.

entirely demystified for the spectator but still appeared to be magical. But the concerns that drove the production were more profound, as was its effect on me. What I found so intriguing, although I had only an inkling of it at the time, was that these apparently frivolous magic tricks were being used to explore deeper truths. The production asked “What are we selling our soul for? And what sort of hell awaits us?” It interrogated the ways in which the distractions and entertainments that saturate our lives in a postmodern consumer culture have become its own kind of hell.

Other forms of magic were also explored in the production. In the original text, the devil-trickster Mephistopheles gives Faustus a lesson into the secrets of the universe, and I was charged with updating this segment with a new kind of magic that brings together contemporary New Age spirituality and quantum physics.³ In the lesson Faustus is essentially told that reality is an illusion, a trick of perception. Is it possible that our perceptual process, one of the most fundamental ways of navigating our experience of the world, could be seen as magical in itself? It was this kind of question that I wanted to interrogate further and which led me to write this thesis.

In exploring magic in contemporary theatre and film, I will take an exploratory and interdisciplinary approach that brings together two diverse strands: the ‘deception’ of magical thinking and the ‘truth’ of neuroscience. My approach to magical thinking is particularly influenced by both the psychologist Carl Jung and the sociologist Edgar Morin. Morin writes, “What characterizes *Homo* is not so much that he is *faber*, maker of tools, *sapiens*, rational and ‘realistic,’ but that he is also *demens*, producer of fantasies, myths, ideologies, magics” ([1956] 2005, 222 emphasis original). I have concentrated on an approach that considers magic as an *aesthetic experience* and can be seen as significant for its immanence rather than its transcendence. Hence, I will take what film scholar Patricia Pisters calls a “mental-materialist” (2009, 225)

³ This magic has been created by inflating quantum physics to sensational levels and uniting it with New Age spirituality. The material was adapted and compiled from the mystical documentary *What the #\$*! Do We (K)now!?* (Arntz et al 2004).

approach to neuroscience and focus on affective participation as it impacts on the body and the senses. She writes, “with the possibility of visualizing the brain in EEG, PET, MRI, fMRI and MEG scans, pictures of the brain are highly influential in neuroscientific research and they raise questions that travel back into popular culture and philosophy” (2009, 226). How the brain and body responds to theatre and film is an area of growing interest, and suggests a degree of ‘truth’ in the universality of responses to stimuli below the level of conscious awareness.⁴

I will try to bridge the diversity between the two strands of magical thinking and neuroscience with the concept of “polyphasic consciousness,” (Laughlin et.al. 1990, 155), which is an experiential and intuitive method of accessing knowledge that expands awareness and encompasses altered states. Some of the practices associated with altered states, such as hypnosis, hallucination, states of ecstasy, alchemy, telepathy, and shamanism, certainly involve imaginative magical thinking and, in many cases, have been considered supernatural magic. What neuroscientific research suggests, however, is that many of these practices can now be understood as natural processes that are available to anyone with guidance and practice. Glucklich writes, “The experience of magical events rests first and foremost on the sensory perception that all elements in the world are interrelated, not in a mystical union, but in a tapestry of natural interactions” (1997, 22). Polyphasic consciousness is a broadening of perceptual processes that encompasses multiple ways of accessing knowledge. In this way, it can include supernatural magic, but more importantly for my research, it can also offer other ways to consider the magical within a context that is not supernatural. Unlike in the Middle Ages, science and magic are now normally placed at odds with one another, but I will explore ways in which they can be mutually accommodated in the theatre productions and films I discuss. I will argue that polyphasic consciousness can be seen to encompass both the ‘deception’ of magical thinking and the ‘truth’ of neuroscience. I hope this opens up new ways of looking at contemporary theatrical and filmic productions that could be seen as magical.

⁴ See Hasson, Uri et al. 2008, Hamzelou, Jessica. 2010, Elliott 2010.

Magic has fascinated scholars throughout history and while I will not retrace that ground I will consider how magic was engaged with in Marlowe's time compared to how Free Theatre adapted and updated the material in 2010. And while the magical tricks of *Doctor Faustus* were the starting point, this is not a thesis about legerdemain and prestidigitation per se. I will focus on Free Theatre's *Doctor Faustus* in depth as it approaches magic both as a problem and a form of entertainment. The other Faustian case studies in this thesis are Jan Švankmajer's 1994 film *Lekce Faust* and Werner Fritsch's film poem *Faust Sonnengesang* (2012-2015), which includes footage from Free Theatre's production of *Faust Chroma*. I will argue that in addition to exploring Faustian themes, both the diegetic reality within the films and the spectatorial affect can be seen as magical, but for opposite reasons: *Lekce Faust* evokes the 'deceptive' magic of early cinema while *Faust Sonnengesang* looks to the future by advocating new 'truthful' ways of being in the present.

Other case studies contain more oblique Faustian themes but still carry the argument to the heart of the magical aesthetic experience I am exploring. The magic of early film magician Georges Méliès is discussed alongside an homage we made for *Doctor Faustus*, and again later when considering the magic of 3D cinema in the film *Hugo* (Scorsese 2011), also an homage to Méliès. The technological magic of creating one's own body is considered in Free Theatre's production of *Frankenstein* from 2016, another myth with significant parallels to *Faust*. I will also examine five films by Werner Herzog, a director who publicly opposes any connections to magic but whose filmmaking methodologies and thematic concerns propel his notion of "ecstatic truth" (Herzog 2010, 1), which I will argue can be seen as a magical means of striving for a kind of authenticity and depth.

One thing that the myth of *Faust* teaches us is that magic is dangerously associated with evil and devils. Mephistopheles tempts Faustus with magic in order to distract him just long enough to claim his soul. The Devil is the original trickster, a con-artist

who uses illusion to lure humanity away from God and towards destruction. In a performance studies analysis of conjuration magic, Michael Mangan argues that from its earliest days Christian orthodoxy has linked the performance of magical tricks with the Devil (2007, 28). But the Devil can also be seen as the shadow side of our psyche, the wild and irrational aspects of our personality that we repress. Goethe had Mephistopheles claim to be, “Ein Teil von jener Kraft, Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft” ([1808] 1961, 158.1336).⁵ According to Jung, there can be value in dealing with our inner demons. Suffice to say that even today, I believe it is still seen in some quarters as a bit devilish to deal with magic and I have found I am not immune to the discomfort this causes me when discussing my topic, especially with the religious branch of the family.

It was the problem of magic that attracted Edgar Morin to the subject of the magical in cinema in the 1950s when it was considered a “marginal, epiphenomenal subject for a ‘sociologist’ ” ([1956] 2005, 221). He found he was continually fascinated by the way the cinema impacted on his own life and began researching a book on the subject by trawling through cinematic surveys and studies. Ultimately, though, he found himself coming back to his “astonishment before this formidable imaginary universe of myths, gods, spirits, a universe not only superimposed on real life, but part of this anthroposocial real life” (ibid). What appeals to me in Morin’s ideas about cinematic magic is that he takes an academically rigorous approach to imagination, magical thinking and perception, and in doing so, he does not want to explain away the wonder that magic entails.

Morin published two books on the subject of cinema: *Le Cinéma ou l’Homme Imaginaire* in 1956 and *Les Stars* in 1957. For this thesis I will concentrate on the 2005 translated edition of *Cinema, or the Imaginary Man*. When it was first published in the 1950s it was criticised for concentrating on magic and mystery. As Pisters notes, film theory at that time was heading down the path of psychoanalysis,

⁵ “Part of that force which would / Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good.”

structural linguistics and Marxism, and Morin did not fit (2009, 224-225). Morin's work eschews traditional disciplinary boundaries, allows for complexity, and takes magical thinking seriously.

There has been relatively little scholarship around Morin's cinematic ideas (Mortimer 2001, 77), despite being mentioned throughout film history by some of its most prominent theorists, such as Jean Mitry, Christian Metz and the postmodernist Fredric Jameson. I have found, however, that scholars tend to explain away the magic from his writing. The most common approach to his work is to concentrate on his arguments as they relate to perception and the role of the imaginary in the spectatorial process. This is certainly a critical component, and yet it seems to me that few take seriously Morin's argument about how magic and magical thinking fit into ideas about perception and the imaginary, and how this might relate to cinema at a *fundamental* level. Film scholars Pisters and Blassnigg are exceptions in this regard and do consider the magical in Morin's work as they discuss conjuration films (Pisters, 2009) and clairvoyance (Blassnigg, 2006). In the following example, Blassnigg outlines how Morin's work has often been explained away:

This ability of cinema to enhance the spectator's perception, to some extent more drastically than other art forms have ever achieved, has on some occasions been treated ontologically as the 'magical' quality of cinema. The magical quality in this context has usually meant either *the technology or the psychological effect or even the precondition of the human perception* (2006, 106-107, emphasis mine).

I will argue in this thesis for a kind of magical aesthetic experience that can be seen to encompass *all* of these factors. In doing so, I will follow Morin closely, although I acknowledge that many of his ideas have been traversed in other forms, separate from Morin, throughout film history. Dudley Andrew describes him as "presemiotic" (2009, 418). Morin is often cited as a precursor to Christian Metz's semiotics and Andrew argues that "[Metz] owed Morin more than one footnote (although he is the first citation) for *Le significant imaginaire* (1977)" (Andrew 2009, 414). Morin does

sound somewhat simplistic in light of the semiotics that was to come later and even seems to apologise for this in the 1978 Preface to *Cinema or the Imaginary Man*, but in the end he concludes that his project “stops where semiotics begins [and] begins where semiotics stops” ([1956] 2005, 227), a circularity that is typical of his writing.

I intend to take Morin’s argument that all cinema can be seen as *fundamentally* magical more seriously than I believe it has been. Morin’s point is that the perceptual process enlists and engages our imagination, which then *creates something magical*, and I will not ignore this point. In the main, I will explore films that take me into the midst of the phenomena I am discussing, but the advantage of Morin’s notion of the way a magical sensibility lies at the core of our perception of cinema, is that it can be tested against all film, from the most fantastical to the most mundane.

Morin’s notion of filmic magic can also extend to other forms of mass communication. Diana Wade argues that Morin’s theories are not confined to cinema and can be applied throughout the technical evolution of images and into the digital era (2011, 203-221). In Chapter Three I will consider technology as magic. Morin’s ideas about the cinema emphasise the experience of spectatorial participation. He writes:

The magical structures of this universe make us unequivocally recognize its subjective structures. All cinematic phenomena tend to confer the structures of subjectivity on the objective image. They call into question all affective participation. It is the scope of these phenomena that we should evaluate, it is the mechanisms of excitation that we should analyze ([1956] 2005, 90).

In this way, as well as in both Pisters’ and Blassnigg’s chapters, Morin has been brought to bear on a re-evaluation of film theory as it relates to a “mental-materialist” approach. Such an approach frequently includes neuroscience, particularly in the way it relates to perception, to notions of affect as it impacts the body and the senses below the level of awareness, and to phenomena such as synaesthesia and mirror

neurons. In this regard, my own project accords with Pisters' stated goal when she writes, "I argue that the re-appreciation of the magical qualities of cinema and the illusionary quality of perception can be rethought interdisciplinarily by relating film theory to certain developments in neuroscience" (2009, 225). I feel she could have gone further than she does in her chapter on the subject but I intend to follow this path more fully. To that end I will discuss both the diegetic reality within the film and the spectatorial affect where appropriate, without limiting myself to one or the other.

For Pisters, neuroscience as it relates to film theory can include the theories of philosopher Gilles Deleuze as well as Morin, while Blassnigg discusses Morin alongside philosopher Henri Bergson and Deleuze. Andrew also mentions Bergson and Deleuze in his entry on Morin for *The Routledge Companion of Philosophy and Film* (2009). It is well known that Deleuze was influenced by Bergson, so a pairing of these two is common. I will argue that Morin also appears to have been influenced by Bergson. There is a recent trend in discussing Deleuze in particular with cinema, perception and neuroscience, and it stems from his assertions regarding the role of the brain and the screen. In an interview he states, "I don't believe that linguistics or psychoanalysis offer a great deal to the cinema. On the contrary, the biology of the brain – molecular biology – does" (Flaxman 2000, 366). All three theorists (Morin, Bergson & Deleuze) can be considered in a discussion that privileges the role of perception and affect as it relates to the body. In this way I agree with Blassnigg's assertion that such an approach can be treated as an event; that is to say, an *experience* (2006, 117).

I first encountered the term "polyphasic consciousness" in John Ryan Haule's two volume work on *Jung in the 21st Century* (2011). He describes the rationalism that typically dominates Western thinking as 'monophasic' and compares it with a 'polyphasic' attitude to consciousness as it is described by C.D. Laughlin et.al. in *Brain, Symbol and Experience: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Human Consciousness* (1990). The 'consciousness' component of this phrase is the trickiest

to define. Laughlin et.al. spend a chapter on it, and describe in detail both metaphorical and analytical configurations. In a brief summary though, they write that consciousness is “a term referring to the ongoing stream of experience that is mediated by a functional neural complex. This complex is a continuously transforming entrainment and disentrainment of neural networks which, among other things, models the world” (1990, 90). Haule argues that any definition of consciousness must retain a degree of looseness. A very loose definition from him is that “sometimes it designates *any* psychic phenomenon” (2011, 1:101). He also quotes the prominent neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and concludes that he *appears* to limit consciousness to “those states in which I know that I know” (ibid), although Rossi argues in *The Handbook of States of Consciousness* that “consciousness, the essence of knowing, does not know itself very well” (1986, 97).

I will use these tentative understandings to juxtapose ‘ordinary’ from ‘altered’ states of consciousness. During waking reality, awareness and an outer focus usually takes precedence, which is our ordinary state of consciousness, although many of our skills, such as how to drive a car, have aspects that have become unconscious through habit.⁶ I use Jung’s definition of the unconscious as the subliminal content of psychic phenomena, or, “the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of consciousness” ([1928] 1945, 275). He distinguishes ‘personal unconscious’ (which includes lost memories and repressions) from the ‘collective unconscious’ (which includes inherited qualities such as instincts and intuition) (ibid, 275-276).

With appropriate arousal or relaxation, we can slip from ordinary consciousness into altered states of consciousness such as trance and hypnosis and experience phenomena such as hallucinations. This is admittedly a somewhat simplistic definition, as Laughlin et.al. point out that Buddhist scriptural sources describe

⁶ Glucklich describes how neurologists and cognitive psychologists call this implicit learning, whereas “*explicit* learning is based on memory, language, and conscious awareness” (2005, 109 emphasis original).

eighty-nine distinct types of consciousness (1990, 80). But it will allow me to move into an understanding of polyphasic consciousness as an embodied approach to accessing knowledge that broadens perception away from a sole focus on rational thinking to include more than is usually accessible by ordinary, waking consciousness. In this way it might include altered states of consciousness and other forms of perceptual diversity.

Altered states and polyphasic consciousness are thoroughly discussed by the post-Jungian John Ryan Haule. He argues that recent neuroscientific advances support much of Jung's theoretical framework and particularly interrogates those theories for which Jung was labeled a 'mystic'. When discussing altered states of consciousness he argues that Jung was quite correct in believing these were not supernatural experiences, but "a universal feature of the human brain and nervous system" (Haule 2011, 2:2).

Anthropologist Ariel Glucklich also understands magic as a natural human experience. In *The End of Magic* he studies the history of magic in the Academy and the magical practices of the people of Banaras, India, where magicians are often preferred to medical doctors as healers of conditions mental, spiritual and physical. I will not take an anthropological approach to the material but have found his analysis invaluable. He surveys the history of magic from its earliest uses in ancient Persia, Greece and Italy, to the major contemporary theorists in the field. In charting the ways in which magic is explained by science, Glucklich also looks to new science such as quantum physics before suggesting a range of approaches that do not rely on meaning as much as suggesting where and how we might look for magic.

He examines magic within an ethnographic framework and develops a concept he calls 'magical consciousness'.⁷ A key component to Glucklich's magical

⁷ A similar approach is taken by anthropologist Susan Greenwood, who studies Western nature religions such as Paganism, New Age and Western Shamanism. They both examine magic within

consciousness is that it uses non-rational methods of connecting to the world to give rise to an awareness of the interconnectedness of all things, an approach that hinges on collective, rather than personal, experience. He argues that this understanding of the magical is essentially phenomenological: participatory, experiential and often numinous. He writes:

If magic is a matter of perception and is intrinsically subjective, it is probably most accurate to avoid using it as a noun. There is no such thing as magic, only a magical attitude, and following it a magical rite or belief. The noun implies the existence of an objective thing, like medicine or meteorology, and we have seen how easily such things can be made to disappear. The subjective attitude is the only valid way of considering magic; I call it the ‘magical experience,’ or ‘consciousness’ (1997, 22-23).

Glucklich’s aims as described in this passage accord with my own and I will bring his ideas into my understanding of polyphasic consciousness.

I stated at the beginning that the main theories in this thesis will bring together the diverse strands of magical thinking and neuroscience, and that polyphasic consciousness will form a bridge between the two. Magical thinking will concentrate primarily on Morin’s discussion of its importance and the role of imagination. The neuroscientific strand has already been charted by Pisters, Blassnigg and Andrew and places Bergson and Deleuze alongside Morin’s arguments about perception. The polyphasic consciousness bridge then follows Laughlin et.al, Glucklich and the post-Jungian Haule. This will bring altered states into the discussion in an attempt to reach a deeper understanding of how magic might be considered an aesthetic experience in the polyphasic sense.

an ethnographic framework and separately come up with a concept both call ‘magical consciousness’. Greenwood explains the consilience thus, “That we should independently come to the same conclusions using different ‘data’ is affirming of our idea that magic is a natural process of the human mind” (2005, xii).

In the course of exploring polyphasic consciousness, I came across a practice once seen as magical that now has a wealth of scientific material written about it: shamanism. While I will discuss this in detail in Chapter Two when I look at Werner Herzog's documentary *Cave of Forgotten Dreams* (2010), I wish to signal here that Herzog suggests that the 32,000 year old cave paintings that form the subject of the film can be seen as a kind of 'proto-cinema'. He argues that the urge to go into dark spaces to watch moving images is at least as old as the Upper Paleolithic; prehistorians Clottes and Lewis-Williams link what is known about the spatial organisation and the paintings inside the caves to the magical and performative practice of shamanism (1998, 29). It would seem from this possibility that bringing a cinematic imagination to the creation of the filmic goes deeper than just film. As a space and an experience, it can also be seen as theatrical and performative.

Ernst Kirby argues in *Ur-Drama* that shamanic performance can be understood as the origin of theatre (1975, 2). In a performance sense, the emphasis is on the participation of the audience and the affect of ritual, which often includes magic such as sleight of hand tricks, and is related to altered states of consciousness such as hypnosis, trance and hallucination (ibid, 5).

In this way, theatre and film will be brought together in this thesis with the proto- and the ur-. If the concept of polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience within the cinema can be seen as an experience of bodily affect, then an element of physical excitation and therefore liveness enters the spectatorial event, which suggests a performative element. Theatre and film have never been meaningfully separate for me as they have in common theories of genre, representation and performance. All of the theatre productions I discuss in this thesis had a filmic component and I would argue that most of the films can be seen as theatrical.

As signaled earlier, I will begin Chapter One with magic as it is found in one of its most academically acceptable forms: the myth of *Faust*. I will consider the role of

magic in Marlowe's time and will discuss Free Theatre's *Doctor Faustus*, where I played the roles of Cornelius and Covetousness, and operated a devil marionette. I will consider the ways in which this production played with magic and explored the concept of a magical hell while it searched for deeper truths. Following this starting point I will bring in Morin's argument that cinema can be seen as fundamentally magical, and outline how he approaches cinema as a kind of magic. As perception is key to this discussion, I will bring in Henri Bergson's philosophical understanding of perception to underpin Morin's argument. From here a re-appreciation of the filmic component of Free Theatre's *Doctor Faustus* can be examined. The role of film as a magical illusion was explored in the production by taking an historical approach to its development. It began with a Magic Lantern slide show and progressed through examples of *Faustian*-themed films from early to contemporary cinema. I will pay particular attention to the Méliès-style homage that we made for the production. I conclude the chapter with a close examination of Jan Švankmajer's 1994 film *Lekce Faust*, a magical film about the magic of *Faust* that can be seen to engage with many of the concepts Morin discusses as well as the magic of early film techniques. In this way I intend to ground the thesis in the theatrical magic of *Faust* and the cinematic magic of early film.

I will begin Chapter Two by looking at psychologist Carl Jung's insights into both *Faust* and magic. Jung's work was an early starting point in my research process because Goethe's *Faust* is profoundly important to him. In addition to affecting him on a deep personal level, he saw it as *the* myth of modern Western culture. While Jung's theories and perspective can be seen as dated, it was essential in leading me to the work of John Ryan Haule, whose post-Jungian, scientific approach to interrogating Jung's claims brought me to the notion of polyphasic consciousness.

Following the material found in Haule's work I began to ask myself if it was possible to reevaluate concepts of magic in the 21st century. Could some practices previously considered to be supernatural magic, such as telepathy and shamanism, now, with the

benefit of advances in neuroscience, be seen as natural processes available to everyone? This allowed me to begin to shift the focus away from considering magic as a noun (as Glucklich put it) and see it rather as a process that leads towards a broader, polyphasic attitude to a magical aesthetic experience, which I outline in detail in Chapter Two.

The introduction of neuroscience into the discussion will permit me to talk about the cinematic philosophy of Deleuze before considering the theoretical material alongside the films of Werner Herzog. While Herzog's films contain little or no overt magic within the diegesis, he is a director that can be seen as theatrical and whose concern to present deep and "ecstatic" images I will argue is yet another iteration of a quest for the magical.

I will look at four of his films in chronological order in this chapter as they might be seen to take a polyphasic attitude to a magical aesthetic experience. I will begin by focusing on Deleuze's crystal image with *Heart of Glass* (Herzog, 1976) because Deleuze declares that this film contains the "greatest crystal images in the history of cinema" ([1985] 2005, 73). *Nosferatu the Vampyre* (Herzog, 1979) will then be discussed alongside Antonin Artaud's concept of the plague from his Theatre of Cruelty. Magic is an important part of Artaud's thinking and given his prominence, can therefore be seen as important for modern theatre. I will attempt to bring his theatrical ideas to the discussion of this theatrical film. Following *Nosferatu*, I will look at the altered state of shamanism and recent trends in 3D films with a detailed examination of *Cave of Forgotten Dreams* and a brief discussion of two other 3D films: *Avatar* (Cameron, 2009) and *Hugo* (Scorsese, 2011). The chapter will conclude with Herzog's own concept of "ecstatic truth" as it can be seen to inform the volcano documentary *Into the Inferno* (Herzog, 2016).

I will bring the discussion into the recent past in Chapter Three by considering technology as a kind of magic, particularly new technologies. Erik Davis writes in

Techgnosis that “technology operates as easily in a magical universe as a rational one; indeed, from the perspective of cultural narratives and political power, technology often functions *as magic*” (1998, 172, emphasis original). I will consider virtual reality gaming as a hallucinatory experience before completing the discussion of Herzog films with his documentary about the internet, *Lo and Behold* (2016), where I will look at the ‘Internet of Me’ as a kind of black magic. From there I will examine Free Theatre’s 2016 production of *Frankenstein*, where technology and magic can be seen to intersect in Artaud and Deleuze’s concepts of the ‘body without organs’. I will also consider how the character of False Maria, which was modeled after the character in Lang’s film *Metropolis* (1927) could be seen as both a Faustian Homunculus and a robotic artificial intelligence.

I will conclude with Werner Fritsch’s two-part abstract film-poem *Faust Sonnengesang* (2012-2015), which I will consider alongside synaesthesia, mirror neurons, and his contemporary postmodern approach to *Faust*. The film includes footage of the Free Theatre production of *Faust Chroma* that sparked my initial interest in the myth of *Faust*. Fritsch uses a unique filmic technique that he developed called ‘Faust-Keil’. I will argue this technique provokes a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic sense. I believe he does this specifically to stimulate affective intensities in the spectator in such a way that it can lead to a perception-altering experience of the moment.

One of the motivating aims for me throughout this thesis has been to find ways of approaching the magical in theatre and film that alleviates some of its more negative associations with the demonic. I will argue that Fritsch achieves this with a kind of ‘white’ magic that seeks to raise consciousness, the full experience of which, in theatre and film, can lead to what Artaud calls “a constant magic” ([1938] 1958, 8).

It is this “constant magic” in a contemporary sense that this thesis ultimately seeks, whilst also acknowledging that notions the magical have been with us constantly in some form since the caves.

Chapter One: The Magic of *Faust* and the Magic of Film

Free Theatre's *Doctor Faustus* (2010)

The story of *Faust* began in Germany in the Middle Ages as a legend about a real scholar called Georg Faust who lived around 1480-1540. He had apparently mastered occult practices before dying violently. The story was used as an object lesson in the dangers of dealing in demonic sorcery (fear of witchcraft being rife), and within 50 years it had evolved into a myth of popular fantastical tales in which a scholar, dissatisfied with the limits of human knowledge, was granted magical powers in a pact with the Devil. It became staple marketplace entertainment in the form of puppet plays and was first published in a chapbook in 1587 by Johann Spies as the *Historia von D. Johann Fausten*, which allowed it to spread across Europe into England, where it was famously taken up and made into a successful play by Christopher Marlowe (first performed as *The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus* circa 1591) and later by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (published in 1808).

During the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance in Europe, there was little distinction between magic and science. They were both part of what was considered natural philosophy, ways of interpreting the relationship between man and the universe. Magicians were alchemists, astrologers, fortune tellers, spiritual advisors, dream interpreters and healers. They often travelled from town to town across Europe, offering their services. Famous names include Paracelsus, Cornelius Agrippa, and John Dee. It has been suggested that the real Faust was one of these wandering magicians, probably some kind of primitive alchemist (Morys 2010). The birth of modern science occurred around the 17th century, shortly after Marlowe's time, when chemistry came to replace alchemy, astronomy replaced astrology, and advances in germ theory destabilised the role of the magician-healer. Spiritual matters became the sole provenance of the Church. Throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, magician-scientists were subject to increasing suspicion, the concern

centering around the fear that they did not practice ‘natural’ but ‘black’ magic, the latter involving the assistance of devils. Marlowe biographer David Riggs writes:

The passage from this so-called ‘natural’ magic to idolatrous or ‘black’ magic occurred when the practitioner employed talismans, symbolic utterances or ritual practices in order to operate a demon (spirit, intelligence or demigod) that embodied an occult force. The boundary was imprecise, but somewhere along this spectrum the ‘white’ magician became an idolater practicing a pagan religion (2004, 176-177).

Faust desires God-like knowledge and this necessitates a contract with the Devil. On a BBC Radio programme about the endurance of the *Faust* myth, Ronald Hutton and Osman Durrani state that it was Luther who first condemned the real Faust for dealing with the Devil, and it is from Luther that the idea of a demonic pact takes hold in popular imagination. Luther believed in a personal devil, and as interest grew into what these devils might be like, people eventually came to the view that there were many different types, even a specialist devil for every sin. Mephistopheles, who has no biblical precedent and is found only in the *Faust* myth, apparently targeted the vulnerable intellectual who was constantly asking questions (Morys 2010).

According to Andrew Sofer in a *Theatre Journal* article titled “How to Do Things with Demons,” Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* may have been a part of cementing public concern over the practice of black magic, as it features numerous devils in various guises, and includes appearances by Lucifer and Belzebub. He outlines the three-point process for conjuring a devil: It requires the precise uttering of a spell, or citation, so it could not be done via improvisation. The demon summoned was subsequently compelled and could not refuse to appear, so the utterance was an imperative. Thirdly, the “magical utterance was autonomous” (Sofer 2009, 4). In other words, it did not require faith, only the correct performance, “blur[ring]the distinction between theatre and magic” (ibid, 2). To perform Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* requires uttering spells, and it was believed that the actor might actually, and inadvertently, cause the magic to happen and devils to appear. Sofer argues that this potential accounts for a large part

of the appeal of the play, as it “thrilled and alarmed Elizabethan audiences, causing them to see devils that were not literally there” (ibid, 3).

One of the perceived problems in dealing with conjured devils is keeping them under control. While Mephistopheles may allow Faustus to believe that he is controlling the devilish force, Sofer points out that Mephistopheles is interested only in distracting him long enough to get to the end of the 24 years without him repenting so that he can claim his soul, and so, at all times, he controls Faustus’ adventures, and he does this by distracting him with magic (ibid, 16).

When Free Theatre adapted and updated the play for its 2010 production, director Peter Falkenberg focused on the magic of distraction and the magic of hell, with interesting and unique results. There are two kinds of hell in the conventional reading of *Doctor Faustus*: the otherworldly torture-house of fire and brimstone, into which Faustus is finally dragged, and an internal hell, a state of mind suffered by the demon Mephistopheles for being deprived of God. The otherworldly hell remains unseen by the audience, and Faustus is allowed a dreadful glimpse of it only moments before he is taken away forever. This glimpse is described in some detail by the bad angel, who acts as local guide:

Now Faustus, let thine eyes with horror stare
 Into that vast perpetual torture-house.
 There are the furies, tossing damned souls
 On burning forks. Their bodies broil in lead.
 There are live quarters broiling on the coals,
 That ne’er can die: this ever-burning chair
 Is for over-tortured souls to rest them in.
 These that are fed with sops of flaming fire
 Were gluttons and loved only delicates
 And laughed to see the poor starve at their gates.
 But yet all these are nothing. Thou shalt see
 Ten thousand tortures that more horrid be (5.2, 115-126).

This is spectacular and theatrical imagery for all its invisibility, but the majority of scholarship around hell in *Doctor Faustus* focuses on the internal state of being separated from God. Here are two pertinent sections from the play:

Faustus: And what are you that live with Lucifer?
Mephistopheles: Unhappy spirits that fell with Lucifer,
 Conspired against our God with Lucifer,
 And are forever damned with Lucifer.
Faustus: Where are you damned?
Mephistopheles: In hell.
Faustus: How comes it that thou art out of hell?
Mephistopheles: Why this is hell, nor am I out of it.
 Think'st thou that I who saw the face of God
 And tasted the eternal joys of heaven
 Am not tormented with ten thousand hells
 In being deprived of everlasting bliss? (1.3, 66-77).

Later:

Mephistopheles: So now Faustus, ask me what thou wilt.
Faustus: First will I question thee about hell.
 Tell me, where is the place that men call hell?
Mephistopheles: Under the heavens.
Faustus: Aye, so are all things, but whereabouts?
Mephistopheles: Within the bowels of these elements
 Where we are tortured and remain forever.
 Hell hath no limits nor is circumscribed
 In one self place, but where we are is hell,
 And where hell is there must we ever be.
 And to be short, when all the world dissolves
 And every creature shall be purified
 All places shall be hell that is not heaven!
Faustus: I think hell's a fable.
Mephistopheles: Aye, think so still – till experience change thy mind
 (2.1, 115-140).

An alternative contemporary reading of “This is hell, nor am I out of it” can be found in Peter Falkenberg’s approach to the direction of Free Theatre’s production of the play. “What are we selling our soul for? And what sort of hell awaits us?” Falkenberg asks in the programme for the show. He does not see hell as a personal or psychological condition, but rather as a political and social one, “Where we are is

hell,” says Mephistopheles, who clearly knows more than we do. Expanding on this idea, hell in Falkenberg’s reading is the distractions and entertainments that have become the everyday experience of our lives in a postmodern, capitalist, consumer culture. Through Mephistopheles’ magic Faustus spends 24 years indulging in limitless luxuries and distracting entertainments. But while he experiences what for him appears to be a kind of paradise on earth, it turns out to be a fool’s paradise. Desire for knowledge is displaced with the desire to possess beauty and power. According to this scenario, the pact with the Devil never goes Faustus’ way, as even while Mephistopheles serves his every whim, the distracting experience can be seen as hellish.

In a modern reading on *Faustian Economics*, writer Wendell Berry focuses on a hell that “hath no limits” as Mephistopheles claims. Berry links a lack of limitation to an attitude that we have a right to pursue, without limit, whatever we desire and that greed has been made an honourable motive, normalising ideals of limitless knowledge, science, technology, progress, growth, and wealth. Faustus encapsulates this problem when he remarks that he wants “all nature’s treasury, to ransack the ocean,” which would, if followed through, cause economic meltdown and environmental degradation (Berry 2008). And therein lies the problem with limitlessness, with pushing every boundary: it can lead to destruction. Science has led to the atomic bomb, and economic progress has led to climate change. Because the payment for having no limits is never immediate, but always comes much later, writer Margaret Atwood refers to the pact with the Devil in *Payback* as “the first buy-now, pay later scheme” (2008, 163). Most of us will be living by this scheme in the form of mortgages and credit card debt. Lifestyle choices can also be seen to follow such a scheme when we find out, for example, that our use of plastics is contributing to the Great Pacific Garbage Patch or that microplastics is contaminating sea salt. Linking the Devil with limitlessness and a lack of regard for future consequences appears to be the kind of hell on earth supported by the modern Church of Satan. In the *Satanic Scriptures*, Satanist Aaron Gilmore writes, “We are... striving to understand and

utilize the universe for our personal indulgence... Anyone who excels in a material field *has* made a pact with Satan, as they have embraced the belief that success in the here and now is of the greatest importance” (2007, 195-196, emphasis original).

In Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* the limitlessness of hell is exemplified by the seven deadly sins, who are paraded before *Faustus* for his entertainment.⁸ Gluttony is singled out for special mention both literally and symbolically in the text,⁹ and this makes sense given Faustus’ greedy hunger for knowledge and experiences. But taking gluttony to its extreme leads to obesity, the symbolism of which I wish to compare with Jean Baudrillard’s political argument about obesity and obscenity in *Fatal Strategies* (1999). Obesity, he posits, can be seen as both a personal and societal state of empty inflation. For society to reach the level of obesity, it must have conformed with the system to such a degree that it has become gargantuan and filled in all spaces with superfluous signs (ibid, 27-28). The companion to this overload, obscenity, is the display of all this excess, so that nothing is hidden and the surface of things is saturated with meaninglessness. The equivalent in Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* would be Gluttony’s companion Lust, who lets it all hang out. This display of excess belongs to the ‘deception’ of magical thinking. As Baudrillard states, “we never desire the real event, but its spectacle, never things, but their sign” (ibid, 76). The spectacle that Lust suggests is one of pornography, that obscene state where everything is explicit, demonstrative and up-close. In this way she can be compared to the mythic figure of Helen of Troy, the image of whom is conjured by Mephistopheles at Faustus’ request. As the woman who launched a thousand ships, she can also be seen as a classic femme fatale figure, that virtual cinematic siren. In the *Faustbuch* Faust has sex with her, but the impossibility of having sex with an image confines her to the realm of

⁸ Falkenberg based the sins on Otto Dix’s 1933 painting, *The Seven Deadly Sins*. Dix’s painting portrays the sins in grotesque and theatrical fashion, meant as a political satire to be critical of the Nazi regime. Envy is shown, for example, wearing a Hitler mask.

⁹ The chorus informs the audience at the beginning of the play that Faustus becomes “glutted now with learning’s golden gifts” (Prologue, 23). Later the bad angel points out that in hell gluttons get fed sops of flaming fire (5.2, 123).

pornography, and this was how Helen of Troy was presented in Free Theatre's production.

Through the use of the Devil's magic, Marlowe's Faustus is able to indulge in distracting entertainments such as flying to Rome, accessing grapes out of season, and conjuring up an image of a powerful world leader and the most beautiful woman in the world. But these are feats that no longer need magic and are made available and normal to us today by technology. We can have grapes, and any other kind of produce, out of season, even delivered to our door via an order over the internet (and soon our fridge will automatically place the order for us when it detects we are running low). But there is a significant catch. In order to meet the demand, these grapes have been grown and processed in California by workers who are often exploited (Carroll 2016). In order to grow them quickly enough to make a profit and keep them fresh, up to 56 types of pesticides have been used (PAN 2010), consistently earning non-organic grapes and wine a place on Organics Magazine's Dirty Dozen list, which rates the foods with the highest pesticide residues. In the 2014 survey grapes topped the list (White 2014). It could be argued that we are poisoning ourselves for grapes out of season. Likewise we can fly to Rome, or anywhere else, but in doing so a single person would use over seven tonnes of polluting carbon emissions for the return flight between New Zealand and Rome. And we can not only download or watch on demand hundreds of moving and still images of world leaders or beautiful film stars, we can even add horns to their heads with photo-editing software, the way Faustus does with magic to the Emperor's Knight when he angers him. And if that is too mundane, we can design for ourselves idealised avatars and live a gaming world *Second Life* online, even if we are not actually living the first.

Scholarship around Faustus' damnation has focused in large part on his inability to repent, despite apparent opportunities. One common argument for this inability is the Calvin-inspired concept that one is either predestined for damnation or salvation, and repentance is therefore impossible. It is often cited that when Faustus is in his study

deciding whether or not to carry on with divinity, he bastardises the Bible by including the passages relating to damnation and leaving out the ones that directly follow proclaiming salvation is possible. Furthermore, we are told by the Chorus in the Prologue that “heavens conspired [Faustus’] overthrow!” (Prologue, 21). In *The Aesthetics of Antichrist* (2007) John Parker investigates the topic and sees a link between Faustus’ inevitable damnation and the need for Christ to die to pacify his Father’s wrath. He writes that Faustus signs his soul away in blood, “in the same manner that the blood of Christ also functions. The Bible, too, is signed in blood. That is how Jesus ratified his will and Testament... Faustus bequeaths his soul to Satan, that is, just as Christ surrenders to his bloodthirsty Father, whom Satan anyway had always imitated” (Parker 2007, 243). Parker’s reading echoes Calvinist readings more generally in concluding that there is no possibility of redemption for Faustus, which highlights a key problem with the structure of the play. This, in essence, is the argument against the need for the middle scenes. If Faustus’ damnation is inevitable, why not just have the scenes up to the signing of the pact and then jump straight to Faustus being dragged off to hell, in other words, Act One, the very beginning of Act Two, and then Act Five? Why the need for so much of the play to be taken up with Faustus’ tricks as a black magic entertainer?

This particular debate has spanned decades and focuses on long-standing questions about authorship and the differences between the A-text, published in 1604, already more than 10 years after the play was written and Marlowe had been murdered, and the B-text, published in 1616. It is generally accepted that at least parts of the comic scenes were written by one or more collaborators, or even that Marlowe may only have written the beginning and ending. Milena Kostic summarises this argument:

[Marlowe] could be considered the author only of the introductory and the concluding parts, those ‘mighty’ lines that deal with Faustus’ fearless tampering with tabooed knowledge and his final tragic realisation that he has been cheated both of ultimate metaphysical answers and of the worldly power he hoped to attain. The middle, filled up as it is with frivolous episodes involving Faustus’ tricks with the Pope or shows for

the Emperor and ending up in the petty and degrading acts of revenge upon innocent or merely foolish bystanders, must be, according to these critics, the work of a lesser hand than Marlowe's (2009, 216).

On the other side of the scholarly argument, Cleanth Brooks maintains the unity of the text is intact, arguing that the middle scenes develop the character of Faustus and are necessary for his "personal self-examination and inner conflict" (1986, 98). As with the understanding that Mephistopheles' hell is an internal state of deprivation, this argument sees Faustus' "fortunes, good or bad" as personal and psychological. By contrast, Falkenberg's political reading of "where we are is hell" elevates the significance of the middle scenes to a site where a concrete vision of hell could be presented. And just as Marlowe's Faustus was distracted by the magic of the Devil, Falkenberg updated this magic to include the distractions and spectacles of our entertainments and the dominance of technologies that simultaneously fill up *and* strip off meaning from our lives.

In performing Faustus in this hell, Falkenberg highlighted the role of the show and the showman. Faustus becomes an entertainer, plays dinnertime tricks on the Pope and performs sleight of hand magic directly for the audience. These distractions are all engineered by Mephistopheles, but Falkenberg points out how easily Faustus is lured away from truly probing questions about the universe, or any other potentially meaningful pastime. There is one attempt by Faustus to discover the truth about the universe, which took the form of an updated version of Mephistopheles' physics lesson. This included the latest theories on relativity and dark matter, and ended with a new kind of magic that seeks to join New Age spirituality with quantum physics, which was compiled from the mystical documentary *What the #\$*! Do We (K)now!?* (Arntz et al. 2004). These theories take some of the assertions of quantum physics – that reality at the quantum level is illusory, particles may be in multiple places at once and that everything is connected, or entangled, with everything else – and inflates them in sensational ways to magical proportions. In Free Theatre's production, this translated into Mephistopheles answering Faustus' attempts to

understand the universe with the tantalising proclamation that Faustus can be “his own God” and “can create his own reality.”

For Falkenberg’s subversive reading of hell to be successful, the middle scenes, that some argue are unnecessary, become absolutely crucial. It is here that a concrete vision of “this is hell, nor am I out of it” is explored. Hell becomes the experience of living with a glut of technology, or the nightmare of too much distraction. Slavoj Žižek argues in the documentary, *The Perverts Guide To Cinema* (Fiennes, 2006) that the realisation of fantasy does not lead to satisfaction, but to nightmare. In this way, the magical distractions that the Devil conjures to realise Faustus’ desires can be seen to have created a kind of hell out of the here and the now. Perhaps it could even be said that the modern world has accelerated the symbolic state of obesity and obscenity to such an extent that the experience of both the “buy now” and the “payback” have fused and are currently being experienced at the same time. In this way, illusion and tricks were used not only to conjure entertainment, but also to highlight what could be seen as the hellish state that our distractions create for us.

The magical distractions in Free Theatre’s *Doctor Faustus* also involved film, particularly that of early pioneer Georges Méliès. The beginning of cinema is often described as magical. Even if it is not true that people ducked in fright at the first Lumière screening in 1895 when a train seemed to come towards them, it must have been an awesome experience to gather with others in a darkened room and collectively see images of people like themselves move for the first time. Not long after Lumière’s first screening, Georges Méliès built his own camera and began making fantasy spectacles. He was first and foremost a stage magician, a showman who transferred his skills to the new celluloid medium. Most of the over 500 films he made included magic or fantasy within the narrative. But more than that, he saw the technology as a new kind of magic and developed tricks for the medium of film, such as superimposition to create copies of himself, double exposure and the dissolve,

which he used to turn one thing into something else, and the simple editing cut, which was used to make a person or creature appear or disappear in the blink of an eye.

While Méliès' screen tricks are considered simple today, they are still remarkably effective. I have made some basic appear/disappear vignettes with students of film history and they have always found them effective in a magical sense, even though the process is completely demystified for them. Despite the fact that they can see the trick for what it is, they still engage with, and enjoy it, as something magical. This signals an intentional engagement with our imagination in creating this magic, one of the cornerstones of Edgar Morin's argument about the significance of magic in cinema, which he outlined in his 1956 book *Le Cinéma ou l'Homme Imaginaire*.

In this book Morin considers the importance of imagination within our perceptual process as it relates to cinema, and finds that it can be seen as fundamentally magical. He starts with the photograph and considers the charm of the still image, or *photogénie*, as “[a] quality that is not in life but in the image of life” (Morin [1956] 2005, 15). He argues that the most mundane image can be given a status beyond its original, a process of valorisation that magnifies, enhances, exalts and elevates the image into a site of fascination. This is achieved, he argues, by a process of psychological *projection* and concrete, objective *alienation* (ibid, 23-24).

Morin sees the image as haunted by the specter of the *double*. His notion of the double harks back to archaic and universal myths of such doubles as reflections, mirror images, the shadow, dreams, the alter ego, doppelgängers, spirit doubles and anthropomorphism. In addition to possessing the quality of *photogénie*, we pour into the double our hopes, dreams, desires and fears. Morin writes:

Before projecting his terrors there, man first of all fixed upon the double all his life ambitions – ubiquity, the power of metamorphoses, magical omnipotence – and the fundamental ambition concerning his death: immortality. He put all his strength there, the best and the worst that he has not been able to actualize, all the still-foolish powers of his being.

The double is his image, at once accurate and radiating with an aura that goes beyond him – his myth (ibid, 26).

The process of valorising this image-double involves *imagination*, and the significance of the double within our mythical consciousness endows it with magical qualities. Méliès began experimenting with superimposition during the infancy of the cinematograph, and before long, it was doubles of all sorts that sprang up in his films – doubles of Méliès himself, or doubles of parts of his body (often his head) along with supernatural doubles: ghosts, specters, skeletons and demons. Morin states that he gives “ghostly superimposition and doubling pride of place because they have for us the familiar traits of ‘magic’ already evoked, but also because they possess the characteristics proper to the new world of the cinema” (ibid, 51).

Morin further argues that *metamorphosis* is a magical concept that, in the form of montage, is fundamental to the cinema. All editing, where one scene or image gives way to another, is a kind of transformation. Add to this the fluidity of cinematic time, where chronology is broken into fragments, where the past and present can become indiscernible, and where motion can be accelerated, slowed down or reversed, what is given rise to is “a universe that is itself fluid, where everything undergoes metamorphosis” (ibid, 58). Added to the metamorphosis of time is the metamorphosis of space. As soon as the camera began to move, everything in the *mise-en-scène* also appeared to transform, the inanimate as well as the animate, ultimately giving us the “*metamorphosis of objects*. The screen is literally a magician’s handkerchief, a crucible where everything is transformed, appears, and vanishes” (ibid, 62, emphasis original). In this way Morin argues that while metamorphosis is overtly visible in fantasy films, it is also just as present in realist films, where it is now experienced as the ordinary structure of cinema. For Morin, the language and structure of cinema has been developed from a basis of magical thinking and imagination. And if the metamorphosis of time and space is understood as a magical and ubiquitous part of cinema, then all cinema can be seen as magical at this fundamental level.

Through familiarity and repetition, Morin argues that what was magical about early cinema soon became the ordinary and clichéd language of film. I will return to this idea shortly but wish to note that while we quickly become familiar with, and naturalise, this language as children, at the time of writing my 5-year old, who had not experienced much screen time, was watching a contemporary music video set on a dance floor. As the camera swept around the two dancers, he commented that the floor was moving. He was seeing the film entirely differently from me. I had understood what I was seeing as an effect created by a moving camera as a means of psychologically heightening the giddy sentiments of love suggested by the song and the dancing, the external artistic expression of an internal feeling. But my 5-year old had perceived the imagery from a literal perspective – a perspective that I understand as being closer to Morin’s idea of cinematic magic. What my son *saw* was that the floor had transformed into a moving entity as if it had magically come to life, which signals another two-pronged aspect of Morin’s notion of cinematic magic – that of *anthropomorphism* and *cosmomorphism*.

Anthropomorphism is the process of projecting ourselves onto the world. It is a leap of imagination that can be seen as magical in that it grants a soul to the inanimate or the inhuman. Cosmomorphism is the process of identification with the world, of connecting ourselves with the universe. Morin argues that *projection* and *identification* are the “original energizing nature” of this anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism. He writes, “Projection is a universal and multiform process. Our needs, our aspirations, our desires, our obsessions, our fears, project themselves not only into the void as dreams and imaginings, but onto all things and all beings” (ibid, 85). Identification is then the process of absorbing the “environment into the self and integrat[ing] it affectively” (ibid, 86). Projection and identification, anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism oscillate around one another. The two are interconnected, dialectical, can be seen in terms of magical thinking, and are fundamental to the origin of the way we perceive cinema (ibid, 92).

As mentioned briefly above, Morin points out that unless the subject-matter is overtly fantastic, we no longer see as magical the cinematic fundamentals of photogénie, superimposition, the double, metamorphosis, anthropo-cosmomorphism and the transformative nature of montage. Morin describes the way in which Méliès' metamorphosis soon became the poetic effect of the dissolve; disappearance became the fade, and superimposition became indicative (ibid, 173). In other words, these features developed into the recognisable language of cinema. What was once understood as an alienated, fetishised, reified and concrete force, the power of objective magic has dimmed and become so devalued that it now only resides in the subjective imaginary as soul, sentiment and heart-felt feeling. Morin writes:

Magic is no longer belief taken literally, it has become feeling. Rational and objective consciousness makes magic recoil into its den. At the same time, 'interior' and affective life hypertrophies... The melting of magic liberates enormous fluxes of affectivity, a subjective flood. The stage of the soul, affective blossoming, succeeds the magical stage. Anthropo-cosmomorphism that no longer manages to cling on in the real flaps its wings into the imaginary (ibid, 88).

Morin sees the zone of internalised soul/sentiment/feelings as a remnant of magic, but no longer solid or powerful, the opposite of alienation, so that we are left with attractive reflection, entertaining shadow, fond contemplation etc. He writes, "It is not the original magic that comes back to life in the cinema, but a reduced, atrophied magic, submerged in the higher affective-rational syncretism that is the aesthetic" (ibid, 211). Where once the affective power of the image might lead to a feeling that would then blossom into an idea (Morin cites Eisenstein to illustrate this point) he argues that the common experience of most cinema is for the order of image-affect-idea to be broken, incomplete, or work backwards merely to provoke sentiment or to titillate (ibid, 184-185).

Morin argues, however, that the concrete magic of old is not lost entirely. When subjectivity and affective life are excessive enough magic can irrupt in a semifluid or

semireified state into what Morin calls “a new magic” (ibid, 89), which he explains using the imagery of volcanoes:

A violent burst of energy, and the solfataras once again become volcanoes and hurl out matter. Sartre indeed saw that emotion converts itself into magic. All exaltation, all lyricism, all élan take on an anthropocosmomorphic shading in their effusion... Extreme subjectivity brusquely becomes extreme magic. In the same way, the height of subjective vision is hallucination – its objectivation (ibid).

Morin’s use of volcanic imagery to explain such excess within the subterranean power of our imagination is poetic, but I mention it only briefly here because of its recurring nature throughout this thesis. The theme of the volcano taps into magical/mythological thinking (for the Romans, Vulcan was a God). Morin describes a spectrum of the magical in cinema as running along a line from the least magical zone of affective participation, where projection and identification are still the common experience of our imaginative process, through the mixed zone of anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism, which still contain shades of a magical consciousness, to the most magical end of the spectrum where doubling, metamorphosis and hallucination can be found (ibid, 113).

Morin concludes his book, *The Cinema, or the Imaginary Man*, with a discussion of the significance of the imaginary in perception. In this way he could be seen to bring the ‘deception’ of magical thinking together with the ‘truth’ of neuroscience, although he predates modern neuroscience and does not refer to it as such. His was an early acknowledgement that not only was all thought and matter image, brought to us by our perceptual system, but that the whole body is implicated in the process of perception, not just the eye and brain. In this, he appears to be influenced by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, of whom he makes several brief mentions in the book.¹⁰

¹⁰ Both Dudley Andrew (2009, 413) and Roland Bélanger (1997, 377) also suggest that Morin appears to be influenced by Bergson, although neither goes into great detail on this point.

Durée is the key factor in discussing Bergson alongside Morin. In basic terms, ‘durée’ means, and is usually translated as, ‘duration’, but the complexity of Bergson’s concept of time is greater than the word ‘duration’ suggests, so I will continue to use ‘durée’ to distinguish Bergson’s thinking. He shifts the focus of our understanding of the world from one involving fixed bodies in space, and matter that is supposedly inert and dead, to one where time becomes the critically important factor. He sees the universe as consisting of dynamically vibrating fields of energy that we perceive unconsciously and absorb into the body as an affect before making conscious sense of it by way of our memory. I will return to each of these notions individually but first it is important to understand that for Bergson, this process of our experience of the world takes place within the dynamism of ever-shifting, but enduring, time. For him it is a mistake to think of the distinction between subject and object in terms of space but rather in terms of time and movement (Bergson [1896] 1912, 77). Morin clearly sees movement similarly, as when, for example, he states that “movement is the decisive power of reality: it is in it, through it, that time and space are real” ([1956] 2005, 118). The dynamism of durée and creative becoming is important to Bergson. He writes, “The universe *endures*. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that [durée] means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new” ([1907] 2001, 10, emphasis original). Durée is the psychological sense of time within our perceptual process, and as such, is not like the mathematical regularity of clock time. Hence consciousness flows in a durée that may appear to speed up or slow down depending on the situation (for example, the same period of time can appear to ‘fly by’ or ‘drag on’).

In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson’s pivotal second book, he posits that it is our memory that makes sense of the matter we perceive in/as/through time. Bringing perception into consciousness is done via memory in time, and this process turns the matter that has been perceived into an image. Every image is realised for us by all kinds of memory, from recent experience to habitual patterning and deeply buried

instincts. Bergson argues that within the concept of *durée* all “matter and memory” takes place in qualitative time and through movement, but it is also this process that doubles and virtualises matter into an image. While the virtual double of matter is not necessarily the same as Morin’s magical double, which, as discussed, is connected to our magical/mythological thinking about doubles such as doppelgängers and specters, the virtual double can be seen as a fundamental process of both perception and cinema. Bergson calls matter “*the aggregate of images*” ([1896] 1912, 8, emphasis original). He is not claiming there is no material universe ‘out there’, but, as part of overcoming Cartesian duality, he asserts that matter cannot be inert or fixed within the dynamism of *durée*.

To illustrate the proximity between Morin and Bergson, consider this quote of Morin’s on the perceptual process and the cinema:

The only reality of which we are certain is the representation, that is, the image, that is, nonreality, since the image refers to an unknown reality. Of course, these images are articulated, organized, not only according to external stimuli, but also according to our logic, our ideology, that is to say also, our culture. All that is perceived as real thus passes through the image form. Then it is reborn as memory, that is, an image of an image. Therefore, the cinema, like all visual representation (painting, drawing), is one image of an image, but, like the photo, it is an image of the perceptive image, and, better than the photo, it is an animated – that is – living image. It is as representation of living representation that cinema invites us to reflect on the imaginary of reality and the reality of the imaginary ([1956] 2005, 223, emphasis original).

The body is the central subjective point for all experience and perception in Bergson’s philosophy. The completed sentence that I began earlier reads, “*I call matter the aggregate of images, and perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body*” (Bergson [1896] 1912, 8, emphasis original). This focus on a subjective experience from the position of the body has

elements in common with phenomenology, which was to come after Bergson.¹¹ But Moulard-Leonard points out in *Bergson-Deleuze Encounters* that Bergson's philosophy differs from phenomenology in that it is based on the primacy of memory rather than Merleau-Ponty's primacy of perception (2008, 145). And in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, Boundas has noted that Bergson's movement has primacy over the body, arguing that "movement is not subordinate to a subject which performs it or undergoes it... We are dealing here with a 'pre-human' or 'inhuman' world having a privilege over the human-all-too-human world of phenomenology" (Boundas 1996, 84).

"There is no perception without affection," Bergson writes ([1896] 1912, 60). He postulates that images are perceived within our bodies by excitations that are then recognised and organised by memory. An affect need not be extreme (it usually is not) and may simply be, for example, the ear hearing a word spoken, which memory then recognises as a known word, allowing our perceptual system to understand it and organise an appropriate response. But this affect does always have a direct impact on the body, which, Bergson says, absorbs some of the action (ibid, 57). The point of affect is therefore the initial response or event as it is *experienced* rather than represented, for to represent the image means it has already been virtualised and removed from direct experience. To shift the focus of film theory from representation to bodily affect is also to shift the focus away from a concentration on judgement and towards the experience of the situational event. The film image that has already been doubled and represented virtually can still be experienced affectively at the point where it comes into contact with the spectator, who has yet to make his or her own virtual double of the screen image.

Bergson describes the interval between the initial "pure" affect and the intervention of memory as a "zone of indetermination" where the brain must "filter" and decide on

¹¹ The Phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty later held Bergson's position at the Collège de France (Barnard 2001, xxii).

what interests it and what it will eliminate ([1896] 1912, 32). If the brain were to accept all possible perceptions it would become overwhelmed and unable to function effectively, so Bergson argues that the brain's processing function necessarily involves both a diminution and a delay (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 22-26). This delay is as much as half a second, according to Libet's studies in the 1970s, as discussed by Brian Massumi in *Parables of the Virtual* (2002, 195). Bergson concentrates on the intervention of memory into the delay, but Massumi argues, from a perspective that includes, but is not limited to, Bergson, that the thought that fills in the gap is often fiction, exaggeration and even hallucination. As an example Massumi cites a scientific study where participants were asked to try and remember the colour of a friend's eyes. Researchers found they "almost always" chose an exaggerated shade. Massumi concludes that "the remembering of a color is not effectively a reproduction of a perception, but a transformation or becoming of it" (2002, 210). And in terms of gap filling, he writes:

Libet determined that thought covers up its lag: the awareness is 'backdated' so that each thought experiences itself to have been at the precise time the stimulus was applied. Thought hallucinates that it coincides with itself. So, the simplest perception of the simplest stimulus is already a fairly elaborate hoax, from the point of view of a theory of cognitive authenticity that sees truth in plain and present reflection (Massumi 2002, 195).

Massumi suggests that our basic thought processes involve not only imagination but a degree of deception in the hallucinatory sense. In other words, this view of the 'truth' of perception already involves a 'deception' – but can it be linked to the deception of magical thinking? Later Massumi writes:

The 'backdating' of matter-driven consciousness is also an argument that there is no essential difference between perception, cognition, and hallucination. This is a realist materialism with a paradoxically creative edge, summed up in the mantra: involuntary *and* elicited. The involuntary and elicited no-difference between perception, cognition and hallucination can in turn be summed up in a single word: *imagination* (ibid, 206-207, emphasis original).

As we have seen, the cornerstone of Morin's argument in *Cinema or the Imaginary Man* is that imagination plays a significant role in our normal perceptive process *and* is indelibly saturated with magical/mythological thinking. Massumi argues that our worldview is functionally energised by imaginative hallucination. For Morin, hallucination is the objective end of a concrete and reified magic; seeing something that is literally not there. Massumi suggests, however, that the creative input required by our perceptual process in order to realise any image situates hallucination as just another function of our normal perceptual process. This is an interesting blurring of the distinction between the 'truth' of neuroscience and the 'deception' of magical thinking. I mean to be careful here to equate the two without inflating them. Thinking is not always magical in the mythic sense, but it *can* be. Our normal perceptual process may include hallucination but it is not always excessive or magical. But perhaps it *could* be. I am reminded of Mephistopheles' temptations from Free Theatre's physics lesson that all perception is illusion and Faustus can create his own reality.

To return to Morin's arguments with the addition of Bergson, one can see that the deceptive and unfamiliar nature of early cinematographic images affected the senses in new and destabilising ways. But once these cinematic images developed into the normal language of film, that is to say, once our memory intervened to make sense of the symbolic norms of montage and movement and so on, the affect dulled into that which predominates today – its shirt-tail relative Morin calls affective-participation. In this state the subjective phenomena of projection-identification is commonly experienced, or the slightly more magical anthropo-cosmomorphism. Morin argues that these zones are characterised by emotion, sentiment, soul, heart and feeling. Morin gives the example of love on screen, where we might identify with, and psychologically project ourselves onto, the loved one, or identify inanimate objects with a person or character in such a way that it generates "festishizations, veneration,

and cults” ([1956] 2005, 90). There is a hint of magic left but it is channeled into unproductive entertainments.

By contrast, affect that lies in the zone of indetermination before memory intervenes can still hold the magical power of cinema in its undiagnosed affect, particularly if the affect is excessive enough, destabilising and original enough for the subjective to become objective (the realm of doubles and metamorphoses). When images affect us in an undiagnosed way, provoking our participation in the experience in such a way that they are subsequently allowed to blossom into a fresh idea, these images can still be considered magical. This is a significant point for me in terms of magical thinking, as without the dulling effect of cliché helping memory make sense of an experience, the affect that excites the body and disrupts the ordering of our sense-making systems, can allow for creative becoming, and these new becomings are potentially powerful transformative experiences. On the other hand, cinematic affect that is designed to dissolve into sentiment or pleasant contemplation is useless because it immediately falls back on habitual memory and only leads to a festished image that lazily wallows in pleasant reflection. Whenever the cinema uses its affective powers in clichéd ways only to arouse entertaining sentiment, magical thinking is diminished. In this watered down affective-participation Morin describes cinema as a robot of the imaginary, a machine that does our imagining for us (ibid, 202), a position similar to Bergson’s assertions about the cinema.

In *Creative Evolution*, first published in 1907, Bergson reveals his distaste for the cinematograph. He sees it as a “contrivance” depicting a false movement using what would later become known as persistence of vision – static frames put through a projector in such a way that they appear to move, except that Bergson is adamant that they never could. He writes, “with immobility set beside immobility, even endlessly, we could never make movement” ([1907] 2001, 294). For Bergson, movement on screen is an artificial externalising of the psychologically variable nature of *durée* and the dynamic process of creative becoming. Lazy or clichéd thinking works in a

similar way by simply putting together static snapshots of the already known. It is at this point that he concludes with the quote that “*the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind*” (ibid, 295, emphasis original). Perhaps Morin is referring to this quote when he writes that from Bergson we learn that film shows us “the very movement of conceptual thought” (Morin [1956] 2005, 180). Later he refers, in a similar vein, to “*this little cinema that we have in our head*” (ibid, 203, emphasis original). Ultimately, in equating the usual process of perception with the cinematic image, Morin does not move beyond Bergson’s assertion that the cinema shows us the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge, but this is precisely the leap made by Gilles Deleuze, as I will discuss in the next chapter. For now, though, I wish to return to *Doctor Faustus* with the benefit of Morin and Bergson’s insights.

In Free Theatre’s *Doctor Faustus*, the role of film as a magical illusion was explored. It took the form of an historical progression that began with the pre-filmic devices of shadow puppetry and the Magic Lantern, the latter of which Mangan states was first invented in the 17th century, although writings about experiments into light and shadow stretch back as far as Aristotle (2007, 121). In Free Theatre’s production, explorations into filmic magic progressed through examples of *Faustian*-themed films from early to contemporary cinema. For these sequences the apparatus that produced the magic was always made visible so that the operation of these devices could be seen. A data projector was rolled out for the Magic Lantern sequence and we brought onto the stage a 16mm projector to show a clip from Murnau’s *Faust* (1926). In this way, it was intended that by showing the workings of the magic, the sense that the machines themselves could be seen as something magical might be restored. This is in contrast to the way the apparatus that produces the magic is usually disappeared behind a surface of invisibility, which is the common experience of Hollywood movies, or of technology more generally. Morin writes that film magic exists when the image “tends to enrich a participation that does not decline into complacencies of the soul, but concentrates all its sap into the blossoming of an idea” ([1956] 2005, 184). To see the operation of the film and the Magic Lantern elevates the participation

of the viewer, requiring multiple levels of engagement and imagination, and thereby raising the possibility of giving it a magical quality. This was certainly my experience with the way the film students responded to making the Méliès-style appear/disappear vignettes, as mentioned earlier. It could be argued that to disguise magic by masking its operation devalues its potency.

Towards the end of the production, the technology was further updated when Faustus presented a clip from YouTube depicting the then fugitive Osama bin Laden magically morphing into the image of President Obama, whilst relaying a warning that the most powerful man in the world at the time was actually the Islamic terrorist in disguise. The video had achieved this transformation using a readily available, and simple to use, software programme. In the use of this video Falkenberg was tapping into mythological thinking that Osama was the devil of the time, living as he had in a cave in the bowels of the earth (hell). While Marlowe's text ends with Faustus being dragged into hell, Falkenberg's production ended with an escalating montage of fiery cinematic and media imagery. An avatar of Faustus that I had created ran through a video game hell fighting demons; documentary footage showed lava spewing from volcanoes; the iconic images from 9/11 were replayed; a plane flew over a landscape of flowing lava, and cities were torched and disintegrated in scenes from disaster movies. One image of fiery destruction transformed into another in a relentless and omnipotent manner, highlighting the mythical/magical thinking that the concept of hell is deeply linked with the spectacle of fire and volcanoes, and deeply affective in its excess.

A short film called *Dr Faustus Entertains* was made for the production and screened in the middle of the play.¹² It was an homage to Georges Méliès' *Les Cartes Vivantes* from 1905, a film where the magician Méliès plays card tricks on the audience. The intention to refer to Méliès in the production was due to his connection to the theatre,

¹² The Méliès-style short film *Dr Faustus Entertains* that was made for Free Theatre's production of *Doctor Faustus* can be viewed at www.freetheatre.org.nz/doctor-faustus.html.

to stage magic and to the way the new technology of film was quickly appropriated for the spectacle of the fantastic and the magical. The short film features the same actor who played Faustus, and objects and people are made to appear and disappear using the same principles Méliès used of substitution splicing and the double exposure of the dissolve. Faustus is seen performing card tricks and turns the King of Spades into Alexander the Great, who is then revealed to be a double of Faustus in disguise (the equivalent happens in Méliès' film). At the very end the 'screen Faustus' clicks his fingers, and at that moment, the 'stage Faustus' would burst through the paper screen on which the film was projected, thereby appearing to 'come to life'. In this way the show was brought back into a live context.¹³

In Morinian terms, 'screen Faustus' possessed a magical quality as the double of 'stage Faustus', further layered within the film by the prestidigitation that doubles him again as Alexander the Great. The moment Faustus bursts through the screen and comes back to his stage life, the alienated image of the screen double is violated. While the magic of Faustus coming to life is revealed to be just another trick of the showman, the transformation is an extreme one: from live actor onstage to alienated and valorised screen object only to become a superreal live subject again, but one that has overcome mortality and is able to bring his immortal image back from the dead to live again.

The 'screen Faustus' becomes Alexander the Great by the magic of metamorphosis. In reality it was achieved by the trick effect of multiple exposure. This effect was developed by Méliès, who would physically wind the film back so that a new image could be filmed over the original. The Free Theatre technician achieved the same result by using a simple feature offered by the editing programme Final Cut Pro that created the effect instantly. Metamorphosis can be seen as the magic of vanishings and apparitions, of transferring visible and invisible, but also, and more importantly to

¹³ Méliès too once burst through the screen at a 1929 gala held in his honour (Ezra 2000, 58).

Morin, of transmutations and transformations (or creative becoming in Bergsonian terms). Morin argues that while metamorphosis is overtly present in the fantasy films of Méliès, it also heralds the transformation of the cinematograph into the cinema and becomes, in the process, the first and most essential cinematic effect (ibid, 53-54). He writes, “if originally, essentially, the Lumière cinematograph is doubling, the cinema of Méliès is originally, essentially, metamorphosis” (ibid, 55). Both of these filmic effects are fundamental to cinema, and both can be seen as magical in the imaginative sense, whether or not the content overtly depicts magic.

Morin argues that once the more magical fundamentals of early film, such as the double and metamorphosis, became the normal language of film, the sense of the filmic image as something magical became instead the affective-participation of our imaginative process, dulled by heart-felt feelings and sentiment. But perhaps through an examination of the magical in productions such as Free Theatre’s *Doctor Faustus*, we can re-evaluate what it is that was so magical about the technology and the process of early film, and while ‘that old movie magic’ has become clichéd and ordinary, perhaps a kind of magic can still be found in the cinema of filmmakers such as Jan Švankmajer.

Švankmajer’s *Lekce Faust* (1994)

In *Faust: Icon of Modern Culture*, Durrani points out that while the first published version of the myth appeared as a chapbook in 1587, puppet versions based loosely on a combination of the chapbook and Marlowe’s play, with Punch-and-Judy-like additions, flourished throughout Europe in the 17th century. In this way they became part of folk tradition, as they were commonly performed at fairs and in marketplaces (2004, 85). Puppetry has remained a technique for transmitting the story ever since, and Durrani suggests its use is particularly effective since Faust “functions as the devil’s puppet” (ibid, 200). Theatre scholar Ernst Kirby points out more generally that puppets have been used throughout history to depict the magic of spirit possession

(1975, 18) and this also fits thematically and magically with Faustian issues of conjuration, free will and devilish trickery.

Free Theatre's *Doctor Faustus* made use of puppets in two ways: a shadow puppetry sequence illustrated the play's prologue and a devil marionette tempted audience members as they arrived at the theatre and seated themselves. This marionette was operated by me and the puppet and I would sidle up to audience members with such temptations as, "*shall I have thy soul? I'll be thy slave, and give thee all the treasures of the world, even more than thou hast wit to ask, power, greater than kings and emperors. Think of honour and of wealth. So, shall I have thy soul?*" At all times I was visibly the operator of the marionette and I based the performance on Jan Švankmajer's 1994 film *Lekce Faust (The Lesson of Faust)* which combines live action with stop-motion animation and puppetry.

Derek Katz declares it appropriate to view *Lekce Faust* "as a radical staging of the puppet play. This is what provides by far the greatest portion of the script and supplies the structure for its narrative" (Katz 2004, 340). Švankmajer's early career was spent as a puppeteer with Prague's *Laterna Magika* (Sorfa 2003, 102) and the tradition of folk puppetry has a rich history in Central Europe (Petek 2009, 80). In an interview with Peter Hames in *Dark Alchemy*, Švankmajer declares that the "puppet theatre has its own special kind of magic" (1995, 96-97). Through its uncanny unreality, puppetry can, like film, achieve the fantastic and the magical.

Scholarship on *Lekce Faust* has convincingly focused on Surrealism, psychoanalysis and abjection (for example O'Pray 1994; Hames 1995; Jackson 1997; Shera 2001; Hedges 2005; Petek 2009; Owen 2011) all of which, it could be argued, are types of magical thinking. Švankmajer is a committed member of the Czech Surrealist Group but describes his approach to Surrealism in similar terms to puppetry, as neither art movement nor aesthetic, but rather as a kind of magic. In the same interview with

Peter Hames, Švankmajer describes Surrealism as a collective “journey into the depths of the soul, like alchemy or psychoanalysis” (1995, 104).

Lekce Faust begins on the streets of present-day Prague. Suggesting a political dimension from the start, two men, who turn out to be agents of the Devil, are seen handing out what appears to be leaflets, agitprop style, but on closer inspection turns out to be a mysterious map. The film centres on a typical middle-class man ground down by late capitalist society. The map’s incomprehensibility is irresistible to someone living in a society where everything can be interpreted, quantified, packaged and consumed, and the film’s magic revels in opposing everyday order with the inexplicable and the unexpected. The anonymous man becomes Faust when he follows the map handed him, which leads him into a theatre. There he puts on a costume, reaches for a script and begins to read lines from Marlowe’s play, in which he resolves to commit himself to alchemy. The effect is that of a spell. He brings the play, and his role as its protagonist, into being, merely by reciting the correct words, recalling Sofer’s argument about performativity. It is revealed that Faust may be just a role; but crucially, it is a role that anyone can play as long as the correct words are recited. The mundane contrasts with the magical in the way the banality of real life opposes the artificiality of the theatre, and yet, it is in the magical space of the theatre that the man can truly explore the human condition.

Lekce Faust highlights why the myth of *Faust* is still relevant and why we continue to be entertained by it. In this way, it accords with Morin’s desire to recognise and re-evaluate our significant, meaning-giving myths. It is based on many sources: Marlowe, Goethe, Grabbe’s *Don Juan and Faust*, Gounod’s opera, and the Faust puppet traditions (Katz 2004, 339). Švankmajer looks back to the earliest form of the myth in his bawdy use of marionettes.

As with the devil marionette in Free Theatre’s production, the operation of the puppet is often made explicit in *Lekce Faust*, as in the example of the life-sized Bad Angel.

Its entrance is heralded by an image of hands shaking a metal board to make the sound effect of thunder, followed by the marionette's head rolling across a forest floor before being wound into place on the body of the puppet and lowered onto the stage in front of Faust. There is no attempt to hide or mask either the construction or operation of the marionette and the thunder sound effect. We frequently see the hand that operates the puppet, just as the apparatus that produced the magic was always displayed in Free Theatre's *Doctor Faustus*, as a way of engaging with the imagination process in producing the magic rather than trying to hide it.

For Švankmajer, the process of animation is one that involves magical thinking. He states in a BBC documentary:

Animation enables me to give magical powers to things. In my films, I move many objects, real objects. Suddenly, everyday contact with things which people are used to acquires a new dimension and in this way casts a doubt over reality (quoted in Wells 1998, 11).

Švankmajer's preferred method of animation is stop-motion, another technique that can be created with the most basic film equipment. While stop-motion is rarely, if ever, totally smooth, Švankmajer's is deliberately jagged and jarring, making the transformation process obvious and strained. Just like the visible puppeteer, I think the obviousness of the animation can be seen to make it more magical because it draws attention to the 'truth' of its unnaturalness and its struggle to live, rather than hiding its operation within seamless, natural motions. Švankmajer also uses this technique to animate the live actor. In post-production he drops frames from the footage so that the movement and speech of a live actor becomes stilted and unnatural. In this way a live actor becomes a kind of puppet.

The most widely available version of *Lekce Faust* has been dubbed into English, which makes this unnaturalness particularly pronounced, as words and mouth movement are out of sync with one another, giving the sense that the voice is disembodied, a magical 'voice from the beyond'. Even in the original Czech version a

lesser degree of disembodiment can be seen in Mephistopheles, as his live movements have been animated for that stilted effect. Sound is also used throughout in this way, made strange by extreme heightening or contrasting starkly with silence. Despite the presence of well-known lines from *Faust* source texts, there are very few words spoken throughout the film, and long periods of almost total silence. While Hollywood usually uses sound to provide emotional reassurance and guidance, Švankmajer's ultrafocus on sounds like sucking and slurping is unnerving, bringing it closer to the disruptive force of affect in Bergson's perception and Morin's film magic. The affect that is provoked is one of abjection.

Abjection, as articulated by Julia Kristeva in *Powers of Horror* (1980), has been convincingly discussed in Shera's reading of the film (2001) but can take on a slightly different emphasis with a Morinian/Bergsonian reading. Morin argues that magic is still present in film when a visceral response is evoked below the level of rational awareness, and abject content has the ability to affect us in this way. For Morin, film magic is well articulated by Eisenstein's approach to montage, where the raw image provokes a visceral affect before progressing on to the blossoming of an idea. In the outdoor pub scene of *Lekce Faust*, Faust eats a dumpling dish that in its appearance mirrors the severed leg that an old man is holding (which later becomes Faust's leg).¹⁴ The affect is heightened by presenting the eating in extreme close-up, complete with slurping noises. The initial gut reaction of revulsion is a response to the suggestion of cannibalism. Close-ups and noisy eating are common in Švankmajer's oeuvre, and evoke an abject response even without cannibalistic references. The aim is to defamiliarise our everyday habits. Puppetry is also used to provoke this feeling in the film. When Faust signs the pact with the Devil, he is in the form of a life-sized marionette, and he dips his quill repeatedly and explicitly into wet blood from a deep slit in his (wooden) wrist. Our imagination provokes a 'deceptive' response, filling in

¹⁴ In a gruesome twist at the very end of the film, the severed leg that Faust encounters at the outdoor pub becomes *his* severed leg when he is run over and killed as he leaves the theatre. While time is always fluid in a cinematic sense and, Morin argues, could therefore be seen as magical, at the end of *Lekce Faust*, it is revealed to be out of joint.

the gaps between what we see as wood and red liquid, and the magical thinking that imagines what it would be like to have a sharp object stabbed deeply into a vulnerable body part.

Shera argues that puppetry in *Lekce Faust* is presented with the abject horror of the soulless corpse, but one that is brought to life, its animation making it a “corpse reversed” (2001, 136). A male devil puppet transforms into a puppet version of Helen of Troy¹⁵ while Faust transforms at various points from live actor to life-sized marionette to animated live actor. Similarly, the clay face of Mephistopheles is rarely fixed and visibly morphs from a monstrous devil to a mirror-image of Faust. The magic of transformation and creative becoming is a constant but its overt and laboured nature is cinematically closer to Méliès than the seamlessness of Hollywood.

Seeking to escape the theatre, Faust slits the painted backdrop with his knife and climbs through it – except that the world he enters behind the curtain is not outside the theatre but the colonnade depicted on the painted backdrop magically become real. This leads him to the alchemist’s lab, a place of transformation and metamorphosis, a magical staple in *Faust* imagery but also metaphorically a process of artistry and enlightenment in Švankmajer’s view. He says, “In my work, like the old alchemists I am continually distilling the water of my experiences – from childhood, my obsessions, idiosyncrasies, anxieties – in order that, with this process, the ‘heavy water’ of knowledge, essential for the transmutation of life, begins to flow” (Hames 1995, 105).

This transmutation in the lab is achieved through the simple shock of stop-motion, by the vision of strange creatures that are alive but should not be, and by a creation made out of clay. This Homunculus is manufactured in a flask as in Goethe’s *Faust*, but by a bewildered Faust rather than his servant Wagner. The metamorphosis of the creature

¹⁵ In Marlowe’s original text Helen is a succubus who would have been played by a male actor (Sofer 2009, 17).

is a parody of the womb to tomb trajectory. Using claymation, the creature progresses from an amorphous lump into a baby. He is 'birthed' by Faust smashing the glass jar and feeding him a piece of paper on which the appropriate spell has been written. The baby's body is left in an infantile state while before our eyes its head matures into adulthood, takes on Faust's countenance and then decays into a snapping skull, still attached to the body of the baby. Horrified, Faust beats the creature to a pulpy death, again evoking an abject response, as the body being destroyed still looks much like a baby, but it also contains the horror of the magical double, so he is beating his own (helpless) self. Similarly, the strange creatures that scuttle around the lab are an amalgamation of different skeletons and taxidermied animal parts and also provoke a response in their inexplicable uncanniness. An important component of Morin's ideas about cinematic magic is that it is not always clear to our rational minds what we are seeing or why, and this 'deception' is perceptually destabilising. In this case, 'deception' plays a positive role in provoking different kinds of recognition, possibly even deeper truths.

The scene that conjures Mephistopheles is also confounding in this way, and offers the most spectacular example of Morinian cinematic magic, with both form and content dwelling on the magical act of conjuring. The beginning is familiar to the viewer in its use of a magic circle and runes, but it becomes increasingly unfamiliar and strange. It is hard to keep a rational hold on the barrage of startling images. Brooms appear and sweep themselves, drums and arms appear out of the ground and beat in a discordant, disembodied cacophony, crossbows are similarly fired from disembodied arms and a burning wagon drives itself. But it is the way locations change in baffling and 'deceptive' ways that renders this scene closest to Méliès in its structure. It is the simplest of editing that creates this magic. Faust begins in his magic circle in an abandoned warehouse. The shot shows a close-up of Faust beating a whip against a broom that sweeps itself; in the next shot Faust stands up and finds himself in a moonlit forest. As Faust is shot at by the crossbows, he crouches down to protect his head, rising to discover he is now impossibly perched on the pinnacle of a stack of

pancake rocks. In the next shot he is a tiny speck in a snow-covered field, then a waterfall descends from a mossy rock in a forest, drenching Faust, except that he is not in this forest but back in the warehouse. All of this is created by cutting scenes from different locations together, sometimes with a close-up of Faust inbetween to mask the change, and Faust appears to have magically shifted through space. This destabilising technique is also employed on other occasions, such as in the reworked Mothers' scene, where a troupe of ballerinas leave the theatre's wings and head out onto the stage but instead emerge in an outside field doing a ridiculous ballet that involves raking straw, eating stew and running through mud. Again, the lack of certainty and clarity about why this is happening ensures that the viewer does not end up in a complacent frame of mind where every intended meaning is made obvious and explicit.

When Faust finally does manage to conjure Mephistopheles, he appears in a monstrous form but quickly transforms his face (via claymation) so that it is a direct copy of Faust's. Mephistopheles takes this doubled mirror-form in every subsequent dealing he has with Faust. In one discussion the human Faust sits at a dresser talking to a Mephistopheles-Faust through a three-way mirror, a common cinematic (and psychoanalytic) sign of the fractured psyche. While this suggests more of a psychological rather than perceptual reading of the film, both can be accommodated when considering its magical aspects. As discussed, Morin's notion of the magical double harks back to archaic and universal myths. From Bergson and Morin we understand that the affective power is in the image, not the original, and that this image is always a double of reality. In this case, magic has conjured a literal double into Faust's waking consciousness who can be seen to have come from the depths of hell (or his unconscious). As such, Mephistopheles has all the power of the double Morin grants to cinematic magic.

It is not possible for us to view a film with the fresh eyes of Méliès' time, or as if we had never seen such technology before. Morin argues that the foundation of film was

magical because of the way our perceptual process creates an image informed by the magical/mythical thinking of our imaginary. Švankmajer, however, can be seen to provoke the 'deceptive' magic of early cinema in the way he uses metamorphoses, doubles and editing techniques. But in the case of *Lekce Faust*, the magic in both form and content resists the escapism that devalued magic in later film and allows images to remain strange by not giving the viewer an immediate guide to their meaning. Instead they are left to affect us in an undiagnosed way below the level of our consciousness, which, as articulated in Bergson's perceptual theory more generally, is a process that reformulates the represented image into a situational event, rather than falling back onto the habits of cliché, and provokes our participation in the experience of the image. In this way, the magical affect of early cinema is reinstated by Švankmajer.

Chapter Two: Polyphasic Consciousness as a Magical Experience

Treatments of the myth of *Faust* from the first chapbook onwards evolved to reflect the concerns of each era, so that by the time Goethe's version was published in 1808 the focus had changed dramatically from Marlowe's 1591 play. In *Faust: Icon of Modern Culture*, Durrani explains the shift thus:

No longer would Faustus be seen as a benighted alchemist with leanings toward black magic and a penchant for mildly entertaining clownish tricks. The gross mockery of secular scholarship that had been a characteristic of the chapbook, parts of Marlowe, and most of the puppet plays was incompatible with an age which thirsted after fresh insights into man's spiritual roots... Faust needed to outgrow his role as a warning to Christians if he was to become something more than a historical oddity of severely restricted appeal. Once this had been achieved his name became associated with progress, with striving (2004, 125).

To psychologist Carl Jung, *Faust* can be seen as *the* myth of modern Western culture. Jung saw Goethe as a kind of godfather and prophet after the young Swiss was profoundly affected when he first read *Faust* at 15 years old (Jung 1963, 93, 68). He felt that Goethe had written "virtually a basic outline and pattern of my own conflicts and solutions. The dichotomy of Faust-Mephistopheles came together within myself into a single person, and I was that person" (ibid, 222). He continued to meditate on it throughout his life.

Several publications have been written on the importance of *Faust* to Jung (for example Jantz 1962; Edinger 1990; Lowinsky 2009). Jung would use the myth to illustrate concepts such as the shadow/double, alchemy, transformation, projection/anthropomorphism, and the descent into the underworld of the psyche. As we have seen, several of these concepts are also found in Morin's notion of cinematic magic.

Jung felt that contemporary Western culture had replaced meaning-giving myths with the poor substitute of logic and materialism, with the result that “the white man had become an anxious, hollow-eyed searcher who no longer knew what he wanted” (Haule 2011, 1:161). Goethe’s *Faust* realises this problem in the characters of Faust and Mephistopheles, whom Jung understood not as two separate entities, but as the psyche of the modern individual who has lost ‘his’ roots and is metaphorically fractured. Goethe already knew that the Devil is not a separate physical entity but a struggle that resides within us when he has Faust say, “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust” ([1808] 1961, 144.1112).¹⁶ From a Jungian perspective, Mephistopheles is Faust’s shadow side, repressed into the unconscious and dismissed as evil, irrational and sinful. Faust, on the other hand, is overly ordered, materialistic, never satisfied, and always striving for progress, representing the conscious rational mind. Jung found him to be an immoral, characterless “windbag” and a “vapid and unthinking careerist” (Jung 1959, 183) while the character of Mephistopheles held far more significance for the drama. It is Mephistopheles, writes Jung, “who in spite of his negating disposition represents the true spirit of life” (1963, 222). For Jung, the ‘Faustian split’ is akin to a mythical drama involving the hero and the shadow, which requires the hero to battle his dangerous, dark unconscious before emerging triumphant (Jung 1964, 118).

In addition to his approach to *Faust*, Jung also discusses magic and magical thinking in his work. Jung argues that magical practices still accompany humanity and have become part of the heritage of our collective unconscious. He writes:

In so far as through our unconscious we have a share in the historical collective psyche, we live naturally and unconsciously in a world of werewolves, demons, magicians, etc., for these are things which all previous ages have invested with tremendous affectivity ([1917, 1928] 1953, 92.150).

¹⁶ “Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast.”

In response to a request to define “magical” and “demonic” as they relate to artistic creation, Jung makes an interesting distinction between white and black magic that can be applied to *Faust*. He explains that when society becomes too constraining, disorder will find ways to irrupt into being, and artistic creation is one such irruption. If the ideas that result hold the destructive forces at bay and promote the collective, it is white magic, whereas if it revels in the destruction and serves only the individual, it is black magic. The demonic is the unconscious force of negation that uses this black magic ([1952] 1973, 82). Edinger points out in *Goethe's Faust: notes for a Jungian commentary* that in this way, dealing with the demonic in the guise of Mephistopheles can be seen as, “having commerce with evil, the forbidden thing, the irrational, the repressed, the denied, the despicable – in a word, with the unconscious” (1990, 32). Freedom for Jung could not be achieved unless these wild, darker elements within the unconscious had been acknowledged and dealt with, as to deny these forces is dangerous and causes, “your devils [to] grow fatter and fatter” (Jung 1984, 53).

Švankmajer's *Lekce Faust* approaches the relationship between Faust and Mephistopheles in this way. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when Faust conjures Mephistopheles, he appears in a monstrous form but quickly adjusts his face so that it is a direct copy of Faust's. Thereafter Mephistopheles takes this doubled Faust-form in all their subsequent dealings. From Morin we learned that it is the double that holds the affective power of the image, and in the case of *Faust*, this power lies with the shadow-double Mephistopheles. For Faust to have commerce with this demon, and for that demon to be revealed as himself, sets the stage for a psychological battle of archetypal significance.

Despite their different approaches, there are many shared concerns between Jung and Morin, particularly the importance of myth and magic to the imaginary. It seems likely that Morin, at least, was familiar with Jung, as he began publishing only towards the end of Jung's formidable career, but there is no mention of Jung in *Cinema and the Imaginary Man*. They do share common ground by taking inspiration

from thinkers such as Henri Bergson and Lévy-Bruhl. It was from Lévy-Bruhl, who wrote about the magical practices of “archaic” societies, that Morin developed his ideas about complex thought and anthro-cosmomorphism (Mortimer in Morin 2005, xxii, xxiv). In a similar way, Jung adapted Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of *participation mystique*, which is useful for understanding his approach to magical thinking. In describing how *participation mystique* works, Jung writes:

When there is no consciousness of the difference between subject and object, an unconscious identity prevails. The unconscious is then projected into the object, and the object is introjected into the subject, becoming part of his psychology. Then plants and animals behave like human beings, human beings are at the same time animals, and everything is alive with ghosts and gods. Civilized man naturally thinks he is miles above these things... He too has a remnant of primitive unconsciousness, of non-differentiation between subject and object. Because of this, he is magically affected by all manner of people, things, and circumstances, he is beset by disturbing influences nearly as much as the primitive and therefore needs just as many apotropaic charms. He no longer works magic with medicine bags, amulets, and animal sacrifices, but with tranquilizers, neuroses, rationalism, cult of the will, etc. (1967, 45.66).

In John Ryan Haule’s two volumes titled *Jung in the 21st Century* (2011) the post-Jungian Haule demonstrates how recent scientific advances support Jung’s theoretical framework in areas such as archeology, evolutionary biology, quantum mechanics, psychology and neurobiology. Haule particularly interrogates the theories for which Jung was labeled a “mystic” such as synchronicity, shamanism and parapsychology. He also spends large portions of the books discussing altered states of consciousness, which he says Jung believed were not supernatural, but “a universal feature of the human brain and nervous system” (Haule 2011, 2:2) and with which the modern West has largely lost contact. For the purpose of this thesis, an altered state is any state not normally associated with ordinary, waking consciousness, such as dreaming, hallucination, mystical rapture and shamanism. Haule writes, “Altered states are valuable less for supporting the world of ordinary experience than for opening the way to unexpected depth and engaged meaning” (ibid, 1:167).

Haule points out that altered states flourished in societies that valued “polyphasic consciousness,” a phrase that appears to derive from C.D. Laughlin et al.’s book *Brain, Symbol and Experience: Towards a Neurophenomenology of Human Consciousness* (1990). They write, “The ethnographic literature amply demonstrates that people in most [non-Western] societies operate psychologically within the context of a cosmos composed of multiple realities... And these realities are frequently coded as experiential. Such people experience *polyphasic consciousness*” (155 emphasis original). It seems the term “polyphasic consciousness” is largely interchangeable with “perceptual diversity,” “expanded awareness,” “polyphasic attitude,” or “multiphasic consciousness”. Tara Lumpkin describes it thus in the abstract of an article on the subject (although she calls it “perceptual diversity”):

Perceptual diversity allows human beings to access knowledge through a variety of perceptual processes, rather than merely through everyday, waking reality. Many of these perceptual processes are transrational, altered states of consciousness (meditation, trance, dreams, imagination, transformation) and are not considered valid processes for accessing knowledge by science (which is based primarily upon quantification, reductionism, and the experimental method)... Transrational consciousness is being devalued in many societies as it is simultaneously being replaced by the monophasic consciousness of “developed” nations (2001, 37).

It seems to me that some of the practices that were considered supernatural magic in the past can be understood today as practices associated with altered states and polyphasic consciousness. These include shamanism, alchemy, visions, hallucinations, states of ecstasy or trance, meditation, mediumship, and hypnosis. In the Academy these states reside in a liminal zone when it comes to science, but Haule argues that recent neuroscience suggests they can be seen as tools available to anyone with guidance and practice (Haule 2:4). Polyphasic consciousness can include supernatural magic, but it can also offer other ways to consider the magical within a context that is not supernatural.

As discussed in the Introduction, I will also incorporate Glucklich's concept of the "magical experience" or "magical consciousness" (1997, 23) into my understanding of polyphasic consciousness. Glucklich understands magical consciousness as a natural process that uses non-rational methods to dissolve the sense of self (examples of which include chanting, singing, drumming and dancing, as well as altered states of consciousness). It also removes inhibitions, expands awareness and gives rise to a cosmomorphic understanding of the interconnectedness of all things. Glucklich emphasises the bridging of physiology and psychology in the experiential sense and promotes a phenomenological approach that advocates experience via participation (ibid, 108-110).

For Glucklich, four components are required in order to reach a magical experience: the heightening of perception, weakening of the ego, the embodiment of thinking and the performance of some kind of ritual or programme (ibid, 112). It could be argued that these conditions can be met in theatre and film if the affect is profound enough to destabilise rational, ordered thinking, and if perception is broadened in the polyphasic sense. As for ritual, the performance of viewing a play or film has often been discussed in ritual terms. In the 1970s it was a particular concern of film theorists writing on genre, as summarised and discussed by Rick Altman ([1986] 2003, 30-40). Rachel Moore argues in *Savage Theory* for an analogy between ritual and cinema and sees it as a significant foundation for a theory of cinematic magic (2000, 6). One strand of the wider discussion considers the way in which the experience of going to the cinema can be equated with the social and spiritual function of the Church service. Similarly, theatre has often been discussed in ritual terms as a social drama, beginning with Aristotle in a Western context. More recently this has been discussed by prominent Performance Studies scholars such as Victor Turner (*From Ritual to Theatre* 1982) and Richard Schechner (*The Future of Ritual* 1993).

Also able to be brought back into the discussion at this point is the philosophy of Henri Bergson. He was a contemporary of Jung's and in an article about the pair,

Gunter points out that Jung openly acknowledged developing some of his theories with inspiration from Bergson's ideas. While both use different methodologies, Gunter writes that "during the period 1913-1920 Jung specifically equates Bergson's ideas with his own concepts of instinct, intuition, the (limited) function of the human intellect, reaction-formation, and introversion-extroversion" (1982, 643). Gunter goes on to outline further conceptual connections between Jung's theory of libido and Bergson's concept of *élan vital* (ibid, 642). I would posit that Bergson talks of memory in a way that can accommodate Jung's concept of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, that is to say, of deep memories buried in our genetic makeup that foster instinct and intuition. Jung refers to archetypes as images and I believe he means it in the Bergsonian sense of the word. My reading of Bergson's theories can also accommodate a more 'mystical' approach, as has been outlined by thinkers such as William Barnard, Pete Gunter and Robert Grogin.

There is evidence that Bergson was interested in at least some aspects of psychical phenomena, although Barnard describes tensions between his clear interest and what appears to be a playing down of this interest in public (2011, 251, 253). Nevertheless, Bergson was elected president of the British Society for Psychical Research in 1913, joined the Institut Général Psychologique, which studied non-ordinary phenomena, and he apparently took part in six séances (Grogin 1988, 51-52). Robert Grogin writes about the milieu from which Bergson emerged and argues that a backlash against mechanistic determinism, positivism and dogmatic religious orders, coupled with a fashionable interest in symbolism, spiritualism, mysticism and psychical phenomena, is vital to understanding the climate into which his work became popular (ibid, 6). By the time Bergson wrote *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality* (1932), he is directly discussing mysticism and psi phenomena,¹⁷ although he suggests a distancing when he writes the term "psychical research" inside quotation marks. The main thrust of this book is a reflection on the evolution of religion, but along the

¹⁷ Psi phenomena is described by Krippner and George as an amalgam of altered states such as precognition, telepathy and psychokinesis (Wolman 1986, 332).

way he discusses traditional magic, arguing from an evolutionary perspective that it is a natural part of our human development and experience, albeit a misguided one ([1932] 1956, 165-180). He places science, religion and magic mostly at odds with one another, but what *The Two Sources* does highlight is the work of religious mystics in providing valuable insights into social action and positive moral behavior. Where a mystic might have been treated as “mentally diseased” or “abnormal” Bergson argues rather that these states are a “prelude to the ultimate transformation. [Mystics] talk of their visions, their ecstasies, their raptures” (ibid, 228). I will return to, and expand on, transformation shortly, with particular focus to how Bergson intersects in this regard with Jung.

There is a further interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy that I wish to consider, outlined by William Barnard in *Living Consciousness: The Metaphysical Vision of Henri Bergson* (2011). Barnard develops a neo-Bergsonian reading that goes into metaphysical and mystical realms by examining the implications of Bergson’s philosophy on the likes of non-ordinary experiences such as altered states, and argues that from this perspective, “a range of ‘magical’ phenomena and healing abilities should be possible” (ibid, 242). To outline this reading I will start with Bergson’s assertion that matter is not inert but contains at least a latent consciousness. In *Matter and Memory* he writes, “the material universe itself, defined as the totality of images, is a kind of consciousness” ([1896] 1912, 313). As discussed in the previous chapter, within the *durée* of a conscious universe, it is not the job of our brains to house our thinking minds but rather to “filter” out the massive amount of energy surrounding us so that we can function effectively without being overwhelmed with too much information. Barnard writes:

Bergson postulates that the neurochemical activity of the brain does not produce consciousness, but rather enables the brain to “tune into” appropriate “frequencies” of preexisting levels of consciousness – that is, the states of consciousness that correspond to waking life, dreaming, deep sleep, trance, as well as, at least potentially, the consciousnesses of other beings (2011, xxxiii).

Barnard finds direct speculation on such a possibility in Bergson's *Creative Mind* (1934) when he writes on the consciousness choices our filtering brains make within a universe where *durée* is paramount. Bergson writes:

Nothing would prevent other worlds, corresponding to another choice, from existing with it, in the same place and the same time: in this way twenty different broadcasting stations throw out simultaneously twenty different concerts which coexist without any one of them mingling its sounds with the music of another, each one being heard, complete and alone, in the apparatus which has chosen for its reception the wave-length of that particular station ([1934] 1946, 69-70).

Barnard calls this Bergson's "radio reception theory of consciousness" (2011, 237) and he uses it to argue that Bergson's philosophy can include non-ordinary phenomena such as ESP, hypnosis, mysticism and mediumship if one understands his notion of consciousness as different planes or rhythms of *durée* interacting with a conscious universe. Barnard writes, "telepathy, clairvoyance, mediumship, visionary encounters, and so on... are moments when, for a variety of reason, individuals 'change channels' and tune into dimensions of reality with which they are already connected subconsciously" (ibid, 238). From this perspective, Barnard argues, we can take the visionary experiences of the likes of shamans and mystics seriously. Such experiences usually pass beneath the level of our conscious awareness, but Barnard postulates, following Bergson, that it can happen accidentally when the brain's filter function fails to work properly, or when our personal consciousness is not kept in check and overlaps with the consciousness of others (ibid, 256). But it might also be achievable to some extent using Bergson's method of intuition.

Bergson developed the process he calls methodological intuition in order to access this hitherto unconscious material and apprehend the affect as pure perception. In discussing mystics in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Bergson explains that states of ecstasy and rapture, where visions are experienced, are the risky encounter between unconscious and conscious states that have the transformational

potential of achieving a “systematic readjustment with a view to equilibrium on a higher level” ([1932] 1956, 229).

Jung also discusses the value of transformation in a way that fits well with Bergson. For him, psychological transformation is a powerful experience and one that is a necessary part of the development of a whole and healthy psyche, which he called the individuation process. It involves dealing with the unconscious, in order to, as Haule puts it, “do battle with the figures we encounter there. What we learn in these encounters will change us. We will have integrated a bit of our psychic process that has been unconscious” (2011, 1:85). This process is part of Jung’s “constructive method,” which he explicitly links with Bergson’s intuitive method (Gunter 1982, 638). Jung writes:

Bergson’s philosophy suggests another way of explanation, where the factor of “intuition” comes in. Intuition, as a psychological function, is also an unconscious process. Just as instinct is the intrusion of an unconsciously motivated impulse to conscious action, so intuition is the intrusion of an unconscious content, or “image” into conscious apperception. Intuition is a process of unconscious perception, either of subjective unconscious contents, or of objective but subliminal facts ([1928] 1945, 274).

Both Bergson and Jung advocate a method of enquiry that has the potential to penetrate deeper than can be accessed by the conscious and rational intellect. Transformation is destabilising and Haule argues, following Jung, that profound transformation is not available in ordinary states of consciousness because “all our cultural training resists transformation” (2011, 1:168). It is, however, available in altered states of consciousness, which can bring about transformation in an individual’s worldview and understanding of self. While the altering of our consciousness is already a transforming experience by definition, not every experience of an altered state will result in a profound transformation, but Jung developed a process of “active imagination” or “original thinking” to effect the kind of altered state that could lead to a reorganisation in the understanding of self and

world (ibid, 1:162). This process involves applying a level of yogic concentration in order to apprehend images at the point of unconscious affect and paying attention to these images before memory intervenes to redirect them into the safety of our conscious habits. For Jung, the contents of the unconscious offerings that were brought up were of a symbolic kind that he linked with our cultural, collective myths in such tomes as *Symbols of Transformation* (1952).

While it may be possible to consider mysticism and non-ordinary phenomena within Bergson's theories, in no way is his philosophy linked with anything magical in a supernatural sense. On the contrary, in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* Bergson argues that it is the apparently materialistic notion of the Cartesian split that he sees as a kind of fantasy magic, particularly once the position of the subjective body is removed from the object in question and matter is treated as inert and separate from the experiencing body. He writes, "Here I am confronted by a transformation scene from fairyland. The material world which surrounds the body, the body which shelters the brain, the brain in which we distinguish centres, he abruptly dismisses... as by a magician's wand" ([1896] 1912, 33).

Both Bergson's methodological intuition and Jung's constructive method can be incorporated into the perceptual diversity of polyphasic consciousness. My understanding of this concept now includes altered states of consciousness such as psi phenomena and shamanism, the 'magical experience' or 'magical consciousness' as described by Glucklich, and Bergson and Jung's approaches to intuition and transformation. They form a bridge between the 'deception' of magical thinking and the 'truth' of neuroscience because they have all been, or still are, associated with a kind of magic, but, with the benefit of recent advances in neuroscience, can also be seen as natural processes. In this way, polyphasic consciousness can be understood as a kind of magical experience without needing to resort to the supernatural.

The philosopher Gilles Deleuze begins the first of his two Cinema books, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983) with a critique of Bergson's position on the cinematograph.¹⁸ Deleuze champions insights from *Matter and Memory* into the virtuality of the image and the role of *durée*, but argues that here already Bergson had proved that cinema was not like natural perception, so to later claim that it did in *Creative Evolution* amounted to an illogical u-turn. Deleuze argues that we don't see immobile sections of cinema, like screenshots or the animated film without the animation. Essentially rejecting the notion of persistence of vision, he argues that what we see is movement and we understand that movement in terms of a perspective in time. He writes, "natural perception introduces halts, moorings, fixed points, and separated points of view, moving bodies or even distinct vehicles, whilst cinematographic perception works continuously, in a single movement whose very halts are an integral part of it and are only a vibration on to itself" ([1983] 2005, 23).

I argued in Chapter One that Morin does not move beyond Bergson's assertion that the normal process of perception can be equated with the cinematic image. Yet there are hints that Morin almost reached a similar conclusion to Deleuze about the quality of movement and time in the cinema when he writes:

Time in the cinematograph was precisely real chronological time. The cinema, by contrast, expurgates and breaks up chronology; it puts temporal fragments in harmony and continuity according to a particular rhythm, which is one not of action but of images of action. Montage unites and arranges the discontinuous and heterogeneous succession of shots in a continuum. It is this rhythm that, starting from a temporal series of tiny, chopped-up morsels, *reconstitutes a new, fluid time*" (Morin [1956] 2005, 56, emphasis original).

This new fluid time that includes montage and movement as integral cannot be Bergson's false movement and brings Morin closer to Deleuze on this point.

¹⁸ Bergson argues that "*the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind*" ([1907] 2001, 295, emphasis original).

Deleuze argues that Bergson's mistake is to locate movement in the mechanical apparatus of the cinematograph rather than understanding that the movement-image shows us pure movement that goes beyond normal perception in a fundamental way because it frees it from its grounding in the "sensory-motor schema," upsetting and deterritorialising that which it already knows ([1983] 2005, 24). Deleuze gives examples from films where the camera leaves a character and focuses elsewhere, liberating it from its body-centred perspective.

In *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985) Deleuze shifts the focus away from the movement-image to consider the experience of cinematic images as they developed after the second World War, particularly in experimental or art cinema. Deleuze argues that the movement-image had become plagued by "the multiplication of clichés, the events that hardly concern those they happen to, in short the slackening of the sensory-motor connections" ([1985] 2005, 3). Morin similarly argues that cinema stupefied itself with clichés that became the recognisable language of cinema.

I will expand on this very brief introduction to Deleuze's approach to the cinema throughout the remainder of this chapter as I consider four of the films of German director Werner Herzog, whose career spans fifty-five years at the time of writing. With a relentless search for authentic images he aims for what he calls an "ecstatic truth." I would argue this amounts to another iteration of the drive towards a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic consciousness sense. Alongside Morin, Bergson, Jung and Deleuze, I will also bring in actor and writer Antonin Artaud. Like Herzog, his work is also informed by a drive for authenticity, but unlike Herzog, Artaud freely sees the drive as a magical one.

In the conclusion to Volume One of *Jung in the 21st Century*, Haule mentions that when he discusses his work with other psychologists, they often complain that his scientific approach has killed the "magic" from Jung (2011, 1:259). It may be, though, that he has simply dispensed with the supernatural in favour of the magical

experience. Following Bergson, Morin and Deleuze, what emerges is an acknowledgement of the significance of imagination within the normal process of image creation. The focus turns to affective intensities as they impact on the senses within an embodied approach to an event or situation. Add the perceptual diversity of polyphasic consciousness and this approach to a magical aesthetic experience has the potential to lead to deeper truths and to transformation and creative becoming.

Heart of Glass (Herzog, 1976)

I will consider *Heart of Glass* in terms of the ‘magic’ of hypnosis and clairvoyance, and Deleuze’s crystal image. The film begins with the cowherd Hias sitting immobile in the foreground with his back to us, looking across the vagueness of a foggy field of cows. After a closer shot of the cows, we return to the establishing shot, but now Hias is staring directly at the camera. We have still not seen him move. It transpires that he possesses the magical power of clairvoyance, of seeing the future. He is also one of the seers that characterises Deleuze’s concept of the postwar time-image: unable to move the action forward, he can only sit and watch, or sit and describe his apocalyptic visions. A series of unconnected images follows as Hias prophesises:

I look into the distance, to the end of the world. Before the day is over, the end will come. First, time will tumble, and then the earth. The clouds begin to race, the earth boils over; this is the sign. This is the beginning of the end. The world’s edge begins to crumble, everything starts to collapse, tumbles, falls, crumbles, and collapses. I look into the cataract. I feel an undertow, it draws me – it sucks me down. I begin to fall.

In the DVD commentary Herzog describes the images that accompany this sequence as “archetypes”: a close-up of a waterfall, forested hills with rolling clouds, boiling mud. While some appear to correspond to the Bavarian landscape where the film is set, Herzog states in the commentary that many are images of Alaska. Archetypal images appear again later in the film: pastoral scenes of Ireland, hot pools in California’s Yellowstone National Park, desert images from Monument Valley, and the final coda of the film takes place on an isolated, windswept island in Scotland.

Sounding like a magician in the act of conjuring, Herzog states in the commentary that “it doesn’t matter where, these images are inside all of us. I invoke them, awaken images that are already in us.” Within the concept of polyphasic consciousness, archetypal images can be understood in Jungian terms to appeal to our non-rational or analogical experience of the world, as symbols buried in our collective memory. These images can also be seen as features of Deleuze’s time-image: stand alone, fragmented, ‘deterritorialised’, ‘any-space-whatevers’, all of which could have been edited in any order without significantly changing the experience or the meaning (rather than continuity editing that keeps the movement-image active and rational).

At the heart of the film is the search for the alchemical secret of the ruby glass, lost with the death of one of the glass workers. The Master of the Glassworks, who goes insane with the search, states that the ruby glass protects him from the evil of the universe, that it is the soul of the people and will save them. This has a purely practical aspect to it, as the Glassworks is the main industry in the village, but in this way, the search for the ruby glass becomes cosmic and magical in a Morinian sense. The glass is anthropomorphised into a force of potential becoming and cosmomorphised into the wider search, as Deleuze puts it about the film, “for cosmic limits, as the highest tension of the spirit and the deepest level of reality” ([1985] 2005, 72-73).

The pre-industrial *mise-en-scène* indicates the film takes place in the 18th century, but in several ways, the world in the film exists in its own sense of time (or *durée*). Time is treated strangely in the slow pacing of the images and the actions, which together with Hias delivering his prophecies in a rhythmic, stream-of-consciousness manner, begins to slow the spectator into the altered state of hypnosis. A close-up of a fragment of a waterfall begins to have a hypnotic effect on the spectator while Hias talks of tumbling and falling (into a hypnotic state). This was Herzog’s aim, as stated in the commentary. He initially wanted to appear onscreen as an MC before the actual film starts, in order to hypnotise the audience, but thought it would be “too

dangerous.” He decided instead to let the film itself work this “magic” but he did hypnotise most of the actors. Their somnambulant state works with the archetypal imagery and the slow pacing of the film to add to the hypnotic effect. Herzog rejects the notion that there is anything mysterious about hypnosis and he states in the commentary that he fired the original hypnotist for his “bullshit New Age ideas about evoking cosmic powers.” In typical Herzog style, he took over the job of hypnotising the actors himself. As previously mentioned, hypnosis is one of the more common altered states within a polyphasic consciousness approach to accessing knowledge.

In a fitting description of the acting and behaviour of the characters in *Heart of Glass*, Deleuze describes a new type of actor within his concept of the time-image, that “might be called professional non-actors, or, better, ‘actor-mediums’, capable of seeing and showing rather than acting, and either remaining dumb or undertaking some neverending conversation, rather than of replying or following a dialogue” ([1985] 2005, 19). Hias’ endless prophecies contrast with other characters who remain entirely dumb throughout. Deleuze says characters in the time-image have become “seers” (ibid, xi) and this is literally the case with the clairvoyant Hias, but also to a lesser extent the servant girl Ludmilla, who delivers an apocalyptic vision whilst polishing ruby glass, and a worker from the glassworks who is invited to present his utopian visions of the glass at the Master’s dinnertable. In *Heart of Glass*, most of the actors are completely non-professional, chosen for their susceptibility to hypnosis and their Bavarian background. Some of the dialogue is unscripted, as Herzog would paint a general scenario for the hypnotised actors and film the response (DVD commentary). Ludmilla’s vision, for example, was improvised in this manner, making the actors true mediums for Herzog’s vision. Deleuze writes that the actor in the time-image is “prey to a vision, pursued by it or pursuing it, rather than engaging in action” ([1985] 2005, 3). With one notable exception in the form of an imaginary bear that Hias must slay, all he is able to do is spew forth apocalyptic prophecies and attempt to convince others of the imminent danger. His inability to act is striking in the film. In addition to remaining dumb, many of the actors are also entirely immobile, like the

man in the tavern who is frozen stiff, holding a hand of playing cards, or the tableaux of characters standing in groups staring at the camera: on the mountainside, in the tavern, in the glassworks. One of Hias' prophecies literalises this when he predicts, "I see the trees burning like matchsticks. I see many people running up a hill. Breathless, they stop at the top and, paralysed, they turn to stone, one beside the other. A whole forest of stone."

In the commentary Herzog states that he was after a "prophetic tone". When questioned, he rejects the idea that he has experienced clairvoyance himself, but states in the commentary that there were moments where he saw some things "very, very clearly. I wouldn't call it clairvoyance but where I saw my fate very clearly in front of me." Herzog's problem with anything remotely 'magical' seems to be semantic. After all, he displays considerable magical thinking in his book *Of Walking on Ice* (1978). The book describes his walk from Munich to Paris to visit ailing friend and film theorist Lotte Eisner. He decided to walk the entire length of the journey rather than drive or fly because he believed that the physical effort would keep her alive. That said, both positions are accommodated in my thesis. Hypnosis is not magic; it is an altered state available to everyone, but the altering of our rational state is what elevates it to a *magical aesthetic experience* in the polyphasic consciousness sense.

Deleuze writes:

in [the film], the Bavarian landscape harbours the hypnotic creation of the glass ruby, but goes still further beyond itself into hallucinatory landscapes which summon to the search for the great abyss of the Universe. Hence the Large is realised as pure Idea, in the double nature of the landscape and the actions ([1983] 2005, 189).

Several doubles of this nature can be seen in the film. The local Bavarian landscape doubles with archetypal landscapes. Hypnosis doubles with clairvoyance, two ways of seeing, of perceiving: one inward and reflective; the other outward and far sighted. The actor playing Hias was the only one not hypnotised (apart from the glassblowers

purely for safety reasons when they were working with ultra-hot material). Hias' far-sighted and penetrating gaze looks completely different from the inward trance of the villagers. The most direct and magical doubling, however, is with Hias and the invisible bear.

Towards the end of the film, Hias hunts down and fights this invisible bear, mostly using the strength of his own bear-like body. As he fights his magical double, he and the imaginary bear literally and symbolically become One. This is why he is unable to find anyone to help him slay the creature, and why the fight must involve Hias embracing the bear during the struggle, rather than shooting at it from a safe distance. Jung would see this as Hias accepting and coming to terms with his shadow self, another iteration of the double, but Deleuze would not focus on a psychological reading. In a discussion of Beckett's *Film* (1965), for example, Deleuze concentrates on the formal elements of the camera movement relative to the main character and analyses the moment this character is confronted by his literal double, which comes as a surprise for the character as well as the spectator. Deleuze writes of this moment, "we are in the domain of the perception of affection, the most terrifying... it is the perception of self by self, the affection-image" (ibid, 70). This is consistent with Morin's descriptions of a confrontation with a magical double. For him, it is the most terrifying and most objectively magical aspect of the double on screen.

In *Cinema 2: the time-image* Deleuze declares that *Heart of Glass* contains the "greatest crystal images in the history of cinema" (ibid, 73). In explaining the crystal image, Deleuze describes the way cinema is prone to surrounding itself with a coherent world of memory images in the Bergsonian sense, from whence we get the cinematic clichés we know so well. But in the crystal image, as a feature of the time-image, we lose the reference to a recollected world because the time between the perception of actual and virtual images is crystallised in a moment that is the shortest circuit possible between actual and virtual, or what Bergson calls the memory of the

present, the first memory associated with the object. This is a kind of pure description of an image that is free of the baggage of memory.

Here lies a critical component of the crystal image – without a substantial memory image to refer to, the actual and the virtual fuse together, still distinct but indiscernible from one another. The real no longer refers to an independent object but “stands for its object, replaces it, both creates and erases it... and constantly gives way to other descriptions which contradict, displace, or modify the preceding ones” (ibid, 122). The seer Hias presents us with a stream of visions, some accompanied by images and others merely announced. It is their simple description and endless potentials, without distinction between actual and virtual, that elevates them to crystal images. The film realises time in the purest sense as images are piled on top of each other, not building a narrative coherence but as a series of affective intensities that are arresting because the perceptual process (affect-memory-action) has been reduced to its smallest circuit, “We see time in the crystal,” says Deleuze, “a bit of time in the pure state” (ibid, 79).

Time is integral to every aspect of *Heart of Glass*’ realisation. It runs differently under hypnosis, as does the pacing of the film compared to a Hollywood action movie, and issues of past and future inform its present concerns. The threat of modernisation spells doom to the heart of the village, and Hias’ prophecies predict an apocalyptic future, while the past, represented by the ruby glass, is seen to hold the key to a more authentic way of life. As Powell puts it in *Deleuze: Altered States and Film*, the loss of the secret of the ruby glass causes the village to fall “under enchantment as though itself trapped within a crystal world” (2007, 151). The world inside the film exists in its own strange, crystallised vacuum. This is a typical device of Herzog’s. He often films in rugged and remote places where he creates a sense of isolation from the outside world.

The crystal image does not refer to anything real but to itself or to other images. Deleuze says, “You get falsity when the distinction between real and unreal becomes indiscernible. But then, where there’s falsity, truth itself becomes undecidable. Falsity isn’t a mistake or confusion, but a power that makes truth undecidable” (1995, 66). Deleuze calls these ‘powers of the false’ liberating. In other words, it is an affect without the usual sensory-motor extension or recourse to cliché and habit that we are familiar with. Pisters posits that Deleuze’s concept of the ‘powers of the false’ allows for a re-evaluation of magical illusion in film (2009, 236). In terms of polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience, the ‘powers of the false’ within the crystal image allows for something significant to emerge because within this scheme we can *create our own reality*, as Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus was promised in his physics lesson. Deleuze writes, “there is no more truth in one life than in the other; there is only becoming, and becoming is the power of the false of life, the will to power” ([1985] 2005, 137). This has implications for the reading of film in terms of narrative, which Deleuze cautions against because of its connection with systems of judgement, arguing instead that becoming is always innocent and endlessly creative rather than fixed by ‘truth’ or representation (ibid). Becoming has a connection to the unconscious in the sense of polyphasic consciousness, in that it favours intuition and the forces of affective-intensities.

Herzog states in the commentary that anything could stand in for the ruby glass, “the stone of wisdom, for example,” a reference to the ‘truth’ of the magical alchemical philosopher’s stone. Yet again this suggests the quest for the ruby glass is associated with authenticity. Other readings of the film discuss, for example, social inequality, the myth of origins, the *Heimatfilm*, and the Romantic sublime (see Heringman 2012). Deleuze, however, sees no possibility for such ‘truths’; instead the ‘powers of the false’ activate the creative potential of multiple visions, all of which are possible.

In *Negotiations*, Deleuze is asked why he doesn’t talk about the imaginary in his *Cinema* books. In his answer, he shifts the focus back to the crystal-image, arguing

that the imaginary is only a partial form of the crystal image, within which we see the ‘powers of the false’ and time itself ([1990] 1995, 66-67). He states, “To imagine is to construct crystal-images, to make the image behave like a crystal” (ibid, 66). For Deleuze, the imaginary, like ‘truth’, ceases to be useful, as the crystal is the more important notion upon which to place attention. He continues, “What I set out to do in these books on cinema was not to reflect on the imaginary but something more practical: to disseminate time crystals. It’s something you can do in the cinema but also in the arts, the sciences, and philosophy” (ibid, 67).

I place a higher value on the role of the imaginary than Deleuze; indeed, the notion of polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience relies on it, especially as it has been developed with Morin’s *Cinema, or the Imaginary Man*. In the original 1956 publication Morin maintains the distinction between subject and object, the real is associated with movement and objective ‘truth’, and the unreal with the virtual and imaginary. But in the preface to the 1978 version of the book, Morin clarifies what he considers the “nub” of the issues in the book. He argues that the process of perception gives us an “image-reflection” or double which can contain a distancing and objectivation but in their opposition and competition is also a confusion between ‘truth’ and ‘deception’, the real and the imaginary ([1956] 2005, 223-224). Hence, like Deleuze, Morin maintains there is always a separation between the two but there can also be a confusion about which is which. Morin writes, “the very mode of prevailing thought conceals the complex unity and complementarity of the real and the imaginary, one of these notions necessarily excluding the other” (ibid, 224). Likewise, Deleuze argues that while it is not possible to discern what is actual and virtual in the crystal-image, they always maintain a doubled separation and at any moment, one or the other will come to the fore without it being clear which is which ([1985] 2005, 68).

As mentioned previously, pure affect for Bergson and Morin is an unconscious sensation experienced by the body. Once memory intervenes and makes sense of the

affect, the image becomes virtual and represented. If totally objectified this may lead to the magic of hallucinations, doubles and metamorphoses, but it is more likely, via affective-participation, to lead to mere shades of magical experiences such as projection/identification and anthropo-cosmomorphism. Cinematic affect that is designed to dissolve into sentiment or pleasant contemplation is not magical because it immediately falls back on habitual memory and only leads to a festished image that lazily wallows in sentimentality and pleasant reflection. In this watered down affective-participation Morin describes cinema as a “robot of the imaginary,” ([1956] 2005, 202). The perceptual process as a whole is Morin’s imaginary, and this perceptual process always involves a doubling from actual to virtual. In Deleuze’s movement-image, the double can be a literal and magical moment of terror, as it is in Beckett’s *Film* when the main character is confronted with himself. But in the time-image, doubling in the perceptual process involves the shortest circuit possible with regards to the intervention of memory, just affective intensities without a substantial memory to refer to. Without a grounding in a known real, the distinction between the ‘truth’ and ‘deception’ of Hias’ prophecies becomes redundant, instead opening up the potential for creative becomings, transformations and metamorphoses.

Nosferatu the Vampyre (Herzog, 1979)

Nosferatu the Vampyre is Herzog’s remaking of Murnau’s celebrated silent film from 1922. While the mythical creature of Nosferatu is a supernatural demonic figure, there is remarkably little overt magic seen in the film beyond a clairvoyant connection between the vampire and the protagonist’s wife Lucy. Most of the supernatural aspects of the film’s magic are only discussed or implied, but I will argue that it can be seen as a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic sense when considered alongside Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty and the plague. In an interview, Herzog states that for him, the vampire film has an “intensive, almost dreamlike, stylization on screen... There is fantasy, hallucination, dreams and nightmares, visions, fear and, of course, mythology” (Cronin 2002, 151), a fruitful set of magical experiences to set out with.

The character of Nosferatu can be seen from a Jungian point of view as a Mephistophelian figure, a monstrous force lurking in our unconscious that must be confronted and overcome. Viewed through a Jungian lens, the protagonist Jonathan Harker is seen to leave the ordered stability of his home life (his conscious rational world) to travel (or transition) into an unknown and wild mountainous environment of strange customs and nocturnal mysteries (a journey down the depths of his repressed unconscious). As Prager points out in *A Companion to Werner Herzog*, Nosferatu's castle may exist only in Jonathan's imagination, as Nosferatu is clearly his double, or "doppelgänger" (2007, 102-103). Jonathan fails to defeat his magical double and is therefore unable to integrate this force into his psyche in a healthy way, resulting in his deterioration into an increasingly vegetative state (the triumph of his unconscious), the end result of which sees him fully taken over by this force as he is turned into the next incarnation of demonic evil, perpetuating the immortality of both the creature and the myth.

Nosferatu is a horror film and to a certain degree it follows many of the expected conventions of the genre, such as the trip to a haunted house, eerie soundscapes, the presence of an unnatural monster, chiaroscuro lighting with plenty of looming shadow-doubles of Nosferatu, and death. But the film avoids overt shock or gore, and instead focuses the majority of its unsettling affects on the figure of Nosferatu's body, which is a slowly twisting and rasping pain-body with elongated, sharp points and pale, waxy skin. Herzog has stated that he wished to "humanise" the vampire and portray an "existential anguish" (Cronin 2002, 155). Most threatening is the predatory nature of his sexual desire. From a Deleuzian perspective, the bodies of Nosferatu and Jonathan play out the drama of transformative becomings. Jonathan begins a strong and healthy man with a stable identity and a body that strides forward, but through his too-close encounter with the threatening/desiring body of Nosferatu, Jonathan's stability is disrupted and his body becomes haggard and immobilised before metamorphosing into the next immortal vampire. In a stark before and after contrast,

Jonathan's new body signals its arrival by realigning itself with the twisted postures that had belonged to the previous Nosferatu.

When the ship containing Nosferatu arrives in the town of Wismar, the townsfolk are displayed in a series of tableaux, a common device of Herzog's that is also used in *Heart of Glass*. The tableaux could be read from the perspective of Deleuze's time-image as depicting exhausted characters who are unable to act in a narrative sense. Del Rio proposes the tableau be read from a Deleuzian perspective as a "tense compression of vital affective energies" (2008, 83).¹⁹ This allows the tableaux in *Nosferatu* to be seen as a kind of repression or inhibition that is then contrasted with the carnivalesque activity that comes later with the plague, which releases the tension in an excessive frenzy of transformative becomings.

It is the affliction of the plague unleashed by Nosferatu that I wish to concentrate on, using Antonin Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty, where he argues that theatre can be like the plague. Artaud formulated his ideas about the theatre in the 1930s and outlined them in *The Theatre and Its Double* (1938). While Artaud is writing about theatre rather than film, Herzog can be seen as a theatrical film director in several ways. He has never filmed inside a studio, or with a false set. He prefers long takes, which allows for narrative development to take place *within* the diegetic space and encourages the actors to engage with one another as they would in theatre. By privileging the acting and the performance, Herzog reinvests a sense of presence into film. His fiction films often become a kind of "fantastic documentary," where the director sets up a scenario and then films it, often in one take, as if documenting a "unique" event.

Perhaps most significant for a discussion about the magical as an experience is that Artaud's description of the ideal actor as athlete *is* Herzog's description of the ideal

¹⁹ Del Rio discusses the tableau in relation to Fassbinder's film, *The Marriage of Maria Braun* (1979).

filmmaker as athlete. For both, the path to knowing is through physicality, a theatrical approach that, for Herzog, includes working out each shot in the doing rather than in the imagination. He dislikes storyboards and insists on physically experiencing the space being filmed. When working out scenes, he takes the place normally reserved for stand-ins. If a prop needs shifting, he does it himself. For large crowd scenes, he runs instructions back and forth (Herzog 1982, DVD commentary). The following quote from Filmmaker Volker Schlöndorff in *Werner Herzog* could equally be applied to Artaud, “Werner experiences [sic] everything with the body first, and he expects the same of the actors. The metaphysical comes as a give-away, or an act of mercy, if one doesn’t cheat on the physical” (Presser 2002, 29). For the filming of *Fitzcarraldo* (Herzog, 1982) this meant a three-storey steamboat had to be pulled over a mountain, *for real*. And the rats in the plague scenes in *Nosferatu* were also real. 10,000 were brought in especially for the filming (Cronin 2002, 157).

Artaud makes many references to magic in his writing. For him, an authentic experience can be transformative and therefore magical. At a fundamental level, the magical double is omnipresent in his Theatre of Cruelty, but he radically upends the expected perceptual order of theatre as a faithful and unchallenging copy of reality. Instead he positions the Theatre of Cruelty as the truly authentic space, while the ‘truth’ of the life outside the theatre is the inauthentic double. It is the oppressive nature of the ‘real world’, the (non-)life outside the theatre that he sees as ‘deceptive’ because it prevents us from being free. This is a Gnostic ontology, as discussed by Goodall in *Artaud and the Gnostic Drama*, in which “the world of forms is a false creation, that... continues to be governed and directed through the work of evil” (1994b, 17). Artaud feels that we are blind to the world and our own suffering, that the known world dulls the senses and stifles that which is magical, blocking the way to an authentic life. Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty as the plague aims to implicate both actor and spectator in a spectacular alchemical transformation.

Artaud envisages the plague as a volatile, anarchic force that lies within us at all times, but which is kept in a repressed and dormant state by social constraint. The plague has often been associated with magical thinking and was commonly seen as an act of God. By contrast, Artaud sees it as an organic upheaval, a magical “psychic entity” that only appears in sick societies (Artaud [1938] 1958, 18). Herzog chose the Netherlands town of Delft in which to set the Wismar town scenes where the plague erupts. Ringed with controlled canals that have tamed a river, the town is, as Casper and Linville note, the very picture of “bourgeois respectability and orderliness... a sense of stagnation, of life sacrificed to routine... In other words, Wismar is already the virtual land of the living dead” (1991, 21). The perfect stage for an Artaudian wake-up call, a devastating plague erupts with the arrival of Nosferatu and his army of rats. But while the rats and demonic nature of Nosferatu are supposedly the cause of the plague, in an Artaudian sense the plague can be seen as a physical, psychical and social disease.

Artaud describes what happens once the plague has taken hold of the body and is running rampant. Fluids become “crazed,” the pulse slows one minute and races the next, the head boils and the tongue swells. Once it has completely exhausted itself it begins to thicken and clog the arteries, shutting the body down and leaving it in a petrified state ([1938] 1958, 19-20). Goodall points out the alchemical process in this transformation, one that “plays between the volatile and the fixed. [The plague] volatilises the organs of the body in order to effect transubstantiations, then returns them to a fixed state” (1994a, 59). Artaud advocates a homeopathic approach, one that consciously fights like with like. The medicine, in his case, is theatre. Goodall writes, “The theatre operates homeopathically by being the equivalent of the plague but with its force harnessed to the cruelty of human consciousness instead of to a tyrannical fatality” (ibid, 61). If the actor admits this psychic plague, the equivalent of “the conflicts, struggles, cataclysms and debacles our lives afford us,” (Artaud [1938] 1958, 25) and rigorously applies conscious effort to its material aspect (its volatile cruelty), he or she can perform the ordeal and perhaps effect a deterritorialising shift

away from the empty distractions of the real world, the start of a process of purification and transformation in the alchemical sense. Performing the ordeal starts the trouble. The propelling agent for achieving such a profound shift comes by way of affect.

Artaud wants to affect the senses with, “a spectacle unafraid of going as far as necessary in the exploration of our nervous sensibility” (ibid, 87). To this end, he outlines a complete manifesto to reinvent the way theatre can be conducted and experienced. This includes finding the points of the body, like acupuncture points, that will elicit an affective response, which he links with the experience of an altered state. He writes, “To know in advance what points of the body to touch is the key to throwing the spectator into magical trances. And it is this invaluable kind of science that poetry in the theater has been without for a long time. To know the points of localization in the body is thus to reforge the magical chain” (ibid, 140). This is a magical aesthetic experience that engulfs the audience in a physically affective experience (ibid, 96).

The actor, and by extension, the audience, then experience the ‘cruelty’, which, as Artaud writes, “disturbs the senses’ repose, frees the repressed unconscious, incites a kind of virtual revolt (which moreover can have its full effect only if it remains virtual), and imposes on the assembled collectivity an attitude that is both difficult and heroic” (ibid, 28). The task of the actor in appealing to the senses in this way is demanding and Artaud argues that it requires a physically astute and athletic actor who can operate as a kind of magical conduit. Artaud refers to such an actor in double terms as “a perpetual specter from which the affective powers radiate” (ibid, 134). In this way, the plague can be seen as facilitating a physically affective and destabilising (magical aesthetic) experience.

During the volatile stage of the plague, Artaud describes how anarchy reigns, both inside and outside the body. He writes, “The last of the living are in a frenzy: the

obedient and virtuous son kills his father; the chaste man performs sodomy upon his neighbours. The lecher becomes pure. The miser throws his gold in handfuls out the window. The warrior hero sets fire to the city he once risked his life to save” (ibid, 24). In *Nosferatu* the revelry that breaks out with the plague is similarly anarchic, and can be compared to Bakhtin’s description of the carnival in *Rabelais and His World* as the performance of transgression where authority is mocked and the social order is temporarily dissolved. As with Artaud’s theatre, Bakhtin notes that the carnival is not just a spectacle but an experience. He writes, “[the people] live in it, and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people” ([1940] 1984, 7). In *Nosferatu*, the plagued townsfolk congregate in the town square to drink, dance and mock social taboos. One man plays a French horn to a chicken while another mounts a goat. Bakhtin describes how a second life is experienced during carnival, “as a liberation from the prevailing truth and the established order” (ibid, 10). The plague in *Nosferatu* has equalised the townsfolk and disrupted all ordering functions, which opens up the possibility of transformation and becoming in a Deleuzian sense, as befitting Artaud’s vision of an oozing and disregulating plague.

The heroine Lucy walks through the revelry, unaffected since she alone understands the plague’s true nature, and comes across an elegantly dressed group feasting at a fine table, while rats scuttle in the background. “We have all contracted the plague,” one man tells her, “let’s enjoy whatever time we have to *live*” (emphasis mine). The feast was a central component of carnival, a time where the people “entered the utopian realm of community, freedom, equality, and abundance” (ibid, 9). The scene cuts briefly to concentrate on dozens of rats in the background before returning to the feasting table, except that the group has magically disappeared and rats now swarm the table. As this sequence is shot from Lucy’s perspective while she walks through the revelry, the sudden disappearance of the group recalls the magical disappearances of Méliès films.

The people in Herzog's *Nosferatu*, however, prefer to remain only in the ecstatic stage of the carnival and hence fail to affect a kind of deterritorialising in the Deleuzian sense of breaking away from comfortable habits, or in the Artaudian sense of embracing chaos in order to explore a creative principle that might allow for new becomings (Artaud [1938] 1958, 90). Artaud is dismayed at "gratuitous" theatre, which he sees as an "epidemic" of useless actions where an actor has experienced a "paroxysm" of emotions but nothing comes of it (ibid, 24-25). This mirrors Morin's understanding of the direction cinema took into similarly safe and escapist pursuits. Morin explicitly links this decline with the diminishing of magic and Artaud argues that if our lives lack "a constant magic" (ibid, 8) it is because we are confined by the conventions and distractions of 'civilised' society and avoid really experiencing life. Like the concept of intuition for Jung and Bergson, 'Cruelty' requires concentration and *work*. Artaud writes, "Cruelty signifies rigor, implacable intention and decision, irreversible and absolute determination" (ibid, 101). Ultimately, Artaud's theatre is meant to change people, to have a meaningful and lasting impact. Carnival, by contrast, is a temporary phenomenon where order is eventually restored. A carnivalesque approach to the plague will therefore not be successful and ultimately the people of Wismar fail to defeat the plague for this reason. They do not harness the torment and rigorously work their way through the ordeal. This is also a problem afflicting film in Artaud's opinion, and he was critical of the way it avoids the confrontational work required of 'Cruelty'. In this way, the demon *Nosferatu* cannot be seen as entirely evil since he at least provokes a release from societal confines. The failure of the townsfolk can therefore be seen to serve as a warning: avoiding the 'truth' of the ordeal of the plague will not conquer the 'deception' of an inauthentic life.

Cave of Forgotten Dreams (Herzog, 2010)

Cave of Forgotten Dreams is a documentary about the 32,000 year old paintings recently discovered in the Chauvet-Pont-d'Arc Cave of Southern France. Like a modern-day shaman, Herzog leads us down into the cave to view, what he calls, our

“collective dreams.” He identifies with the cave painters as proto-filmmakers and the space of the cave as proto-cinema. I would also like to discuss it as it could be seen to relate to the ‘magical’ practice of shamanism.

In the film, renowned prehistorian Jean Clottes briefly suggests that the images in the Chauvet Cave might be associated with spiritual rituals. He is the co-author, along with David Lewis-Williams, of *The Shamans of Prehistory: Trance and Magic in the Painted Caves* (1998). Shamanism is the process of going into a deep trance in order to, from a magical/mythological perspective, explore other- or spirit-worlds. Initially it involves an introverted state of turning inwards to oneself, facilitated by a ritual practice such as drumming, dancing, chanting, exposure to extreme cold, or ingesting psycho-active drugs, before breaking through to the ‘other side’, where, in a state of ecstasy, the shaman flies free of his or her body and undertakes a visionary journey either by descending to the underworld or ascending to a celestial realm. To quote C.D. Laughlin et.al. from *Brain, Symbol and Experience*, the world of the shaman “is made of ritual, symbol, and myth generating a phenomenological cosmos with depths below and heights above the world of normal consciousness. This nonprofane world is approached first through a phenomenological descent and then a magical flight” (1990, 270).

Shamanism can be understood as a magical experience, but it is also a neurobiological process that all humans have access to. This point is critical. In Haule’s books on Jung, shamanism is discussed as a “hard-wired” capability of our neurocognitive and physiological development, an “ability to tune our autonomic nervous system... alter our consciousness and explore what appears before our inner eyes as a greater cosmos” (Haule 2011 2:9). Over time, those of us living in the West and in cultures that value monophasic rationalism have largely lost touch with the practice.

Using a Jungian symbolic reading, shamanism can also be linked to *Faust* and Mephistopheles can be seen as a shaman. Jung writes:

One of the archetypes that is almost invariably met within the projection of unconscious collective contents is the 'magic demon' with mysterious powers... in *Faust* he is the actual hero. The image of this demon forms one of the lowest and most ancient stages in the conception of God. It is the type of primitive tribal sorcerer or medicine-man, a peculiarly gifted personality endowed with magical power ([1917, 1928] 1953, 94-95).

In this way, the shamanic journey can be understood as a trip into the unconscious where it would be common to have to deal with symbolic images from one's psyche in the form of creatures or spirits. In Goethe's *Faust Part Two*, Mephistopheles facilitates a shamanic journey for Faust when he gives him a key that allows him to journey to the underworld realm of the Mothers. Here lies "the creative aspect of the unconscious" (Jung [1952] 1956, 125.182). Faust is able to evoke the images of Paris and Helen and consummate the "royal marriage" in the alchemical sense (ibid).

According to Clottes and Lewis-Williams, caves are used for shamanic rituals because entry into a cave replicates the journey down a kind of *Alice in Wonderland* 'rabbit hole', passing through the portal of a dark entrance to another world. They write:

They would have believed that caves led into that subterranean tier of the cosmos. The walls, ceilings, and floors of the caves were therefore little more than a thin membrane between themselves and the creatures and happenings of the underworld. The caves were awesome, liminal places in which to be: Literally, they took one into the underworld (1998, 85-86).

Furthermore, the very act of being in a cave may induce an altered state. They write, "The social isolation, sensory deprivation, and cold that characterise caves are... important factors in the induction of trance. During the Upper Palaeolithic, entry into an actual cave may therefore have been seen as virtually the same thing as entry into deep trance via the vortex" (ibid, 29). They argue that without even trying, these conditions provoke the senses to hallucinate.

The paintings in Herzog's film include handprints, animals, a few humans, and magical creatures in the form of animal-human hybrids. In the shamanic world, animals are often seen anthropomorphically as spirit guides and either accompany the shaman or merge with him or her during the process. Many of the images inside the Chauvet Cave are partial and incomplete, such as a horse's head painted on a protruding rock that makes it look as if it is breaking through from the 'other side'; coming out of the wall towards the viewer. The many painted handprints in the cave could also be seen as a way of reaching towards or attempting to touch the 'other side'. Lewis-Williams, who later expanded upon Clottes theories in *The Mind in the Cave* (2002), points out that nodules might form the eye of an animal, or a stalactite might be a hind leg. Often images appear to float or are not realistic (211).

Lewis-Williams suggests that while individual shamans probably used the caves and the images to help enter a shamanic state, there are large caverns big enough for a community to gather and view the images collectively, which they may have done to learn about their mythscape (ibid, 208). It is in this way that the cave-space can be seen as a kind of proto-cinematic space.

The obvious association with cave painting as a cinematic process is Plato's Cave, but as Klinger notes in *Film Quarterly*, "Herzog rejects Plato's definition of these shadows as deceptive phantoms. It is their mysteries, rather than their realities, that are compelling" (2012, 42). Some of the paintings that appear on the walls of the cave in Herzog's film depict a single animal in a series of progressive movements, like a bison with eight legs, similar to the way movement is depicted frame by frame in an animated film. Herzog points out that under the dancing firelight of a flaming torch, these animals might have appeared to move then as film does for us today. While Herzog says no more on the matter, there are many connections to cinema that can be made from reading the works of Clottes and Lewis-Williams. I would argue, for example, that there is editing and direction in evidence in the caves, because the whole cannot be perceived at once. Lewis-Williams points out that in many caves the

light must be in a particular place for the proper effect to be experienced, and in some cases, a shadow completes the image, as they were not painted on a smooth surface. Prehistoric torches only illuminated a small area and not particularly brightly by our standards, so Lewis-Williams argues it must have been a powerful experience to move through the caves with images leaping out at you (2002, 222). There was probably also surround sound experienced. Instruments like the ‘bull-roarer’ have been found, which was a flat piece of bone or wood that was “attached to a cord and swung round and round to produce a powerful humming sound” (ibid, 224).

There are problems, however, with comparing cinema to shamanism. The shaman flies free of his or her body and travels through a mythic world that is presented as either vividly real or intensely dreamlike. Such imagery may be depicted in certain films or even a trance-like state experienced by the viewer, but crucially, this is an advanced stage in the drama of shamanism, and before one gets that far there is a painful period to undergo, akin to Artaud’s performance of the plague. In shamanism it is variously described as a death (or perhaps the annihilation of the conscious ego), a period of blackening (as it would be understood in alchemy), internal fragmentation or dismemberment, the cutting to pieces by shadowy entities, or painful despair and doubt (Laughlin et.al. 1990, 271). It is nothing short of an ordeal for the shaman to navigate this difficult terrain before reaching the mythic world, known as the ‘third stage’. Crucially, the experience of watching a film bypasses the *work* and the mastery required by a dedicated shaman, and goes directly to the exciting parts. It seems that, like Morin’s cinematic magic, the cinema as a shamanic space can only allude to a fraction of the affective experience associated with full-blown shamanism.

But the play of depth and protrusion on the uneven surface of the rock walls suggests a particular type of cinema: 3D. While 3D may seem to be a fairly recent phenomenon, Higgins points out in a *Film History* article that it began in the 1950s with features like de Toth’s *House of Wax* in 1953 and Hitchcock’s *Dial M for Murder* in 1954 (2012, 196). The current trend began with *The Polar Express* in 2004

(Zemeckis) but truly cemented its place in 2009 with the box office success of James Cameron's *Avatar* (ibid). In another *Film History* article, William Paul describes 3D as "the process that most closely approximate[s] the reality of our binocular vision" (1993, 336). This binocular vision allows us to see and estimate depth. A 3D image is filmed either with two cameras or one camera with two lenses. The further apart the lenses, the interocular distance, the larger the image's volume of space or appearance of roundness. It is the point at which the two images seem to converge into one that determines if the image appears to protrude from the screen (negative parallax) or add depth behind it (positive parallax).

One of the aims of 3D film is said to be immersion, but this is often seen as troubling in relation to protrusion. When an object seems to leap out towards the viewer, rather than feeling immersed, we are made aware of the screen surface from which the image has protruded. In Paul's article on the subject, which was written before the latest incarnation of 3D, he writes that "moving beyond the frame demands some notion that there *is* a frame to move beyond: [protrusion] depends on a sense of violation for its effect" (1993, 335, emphasis original). More recently, Higgins puts it similarly, "Protrusion may be 3D's signature effect, but the price paid is an acute awareness of the frame as a boundary, and of cinema's artifice in general" (2012, 197). Accusations of artifice fuel much of the criticism of 3D; protrusion in particular is often seen as a distracting, aggressive, cheap thrill and that a trend in cinema towards the production of 3D is therefore "déclassé" (ibid). But there is a significant shift in recent 3D films, as argued by Higgins. By and large, the level of protrusion has become quite conservative, with images keeping closer to the screen surface. Instead the trend is towards positive parallax (ibid).

Because the cave walls are not a flat surface like a film screen, it was a profoundly different experience watching *Cave of Forgotten Dreams* in 3D rather than 2D, and that difference can be summed up in one word: depth. It is simply not possible to fully appreciate the paintings in 2D because the camera flattens the images. You can still

see undulations in the wall, aided in particular by lighting, but what you fail to see are the deep hollows in the rock wall; the places where the head of an animal is painted on a deep recess while its fat belly protrudes. Every aspect of the animals seem to fit perfectly with the surface of the rock wall. Only after seeing it in 3D could I fully understand why Wigley has reported Herzog as stating, “This film is the only 3D film where I really know it was imperative to do it in 3D. I was and I still am a skeptic of 3D, but the moment I saw the cave it was absolutely clear it had to be done in 3D, no question, no discussion about it” (Wigley 2011, 28-30). Several times Herzog switches between positive and negative parallax, so that I could no longer tell if the painted head of the animal receded while its belly protruded, or if it was the other way around, because he shows it both ways at different times. And in one startling shot, he appears to shift the parallax *within* the shot. I was looking at a head receding and suddenly it was protruding. Either that, or the viewing experience had tricked my senses and I had begun to hallucinate. I can only presume Herzog is playing with our perception of depth.

The depth of the images in Chauvet fits well with the concept of shamanism. The experience of going into the cave, the possible meaning behind images that appear to be breaking through the walls, and the perceptual challenges in viewing these images, could be seen as a cinematic version of the altered state of shamanism, a magical aesthetic experience in the expansive, polyphasic consciousness sense.

It becomes possible at this point to compare shamanism with many other 3D films that emphasise depth, especially given the proliferation of narratives involving other worlds or alternative realities. I will briefly mention two: *Avatar* (Cameron, 2009) and *Hugo* (Scorsese, 2011). Cameron has stated that *Avatar* was heavily influenced by his experience as a deep-sea diver (MTV 2012), which could be understood as a journey deep down into a different kind of underworld realm. The shamanic journey within the narrative of *Avatar* is overt. The protagonist Jake enters a medically induced dreamworld before speeding through a vortex while his consciousness is downloaded

into a new being: his Na'vi avatar. In this form the normally paraplegic Jake can do the impossible: he can walk. It is common for the shaman to take on another form when in a trance state. Often these creatures are human-animal hybrids, as reflected in cave paintings as well as mythology from around the world. While the Na'vi are obviously their own race of beings, they are humanoid with animal features such as a tail and ears that twitch.

The Na'vi's world is explicitly shamanic. The voices of ancestors can be heard in the trees and the people listen to earth spirits. These spirits help to save the planet of Pandora by mobilising its creatures to fight the invading humans. Just as a shaman can be seen to take a magical flight through other worlds, the Na'vi navigate the forest in giant leaps and fly on the backs of the dragon-like ikran. Mirroring an apprentice shaman's development, Jake must initially overcome fearsome creatures and a hostile and sometimes seductive environment, before he finds his spirit guide in the form of the female Na'vi Neytiri, whom I believe Jung would see as Jake's anima, and who must awaken him so that he can 'see' and learn to navigate this Other World. This is realised towards the end when he tames and bonds with the monstrous 'dragon' taruk, one instance among several of Na'vi-animal hybridisation.

Avatar employs protrusion to add atmospheric effects or to heighten the aggression of weaponry. The machinery of war protrudes, and when the Home Tree is felled by incendiary weapons, leaves and bark fly towards the audience. But the depth of the world seems to be more important than the shock and awe of protrusion; that is to say, its shamanic significance lies with the 'subterranean' world that reaches back into the screen. Where *Avatar* seems most magical is in scenes of the Other World of the Na'vi, where the internal logic of the 3D imagery is maintained. CGI-ed Na'vi fit into their CGI-ed environment. On the other hand, while the interocular distance of camera lenses adds volume and roundness to human characters, this seems to make the more realistic-looking humans in the foreground become separated from the rest of the mise-en-scène. The humans don't fit the environment and oddly appear more

unreal than the CGI-ed Na'vi. Perhaps this is appropriate given their status as invading colonisers.

This sense of a disconnect between the foreground character and the rest of the mise-en-scène became particularly distracting when viewing the 3D version of Scorsese's *Hugo* (2011) which is a film that pays tribute to the magical cinema of Méliès. It makes heavy use of shallow focus, the cinematic dramaturgy of intimacy, but in 3D this seems to make the characters in the foreground appear hyperreal in relation to their less substantial, computer generated background. The naturalistic acting style seems to clash with such an environment, so that I found myself not immersed in the narrative but watching the acting instead. They are, after all, inside a studio, on a flimsy set, surrounded by green screens. Concentration is needed for the magic of shamanism to work and 3D is not as effective when there is a distracting distanciation between the 'truth' of a live actor and the 'deception' of a fake environment.

On the other hand, the three-dimensionality in *Hugo* seems most magical when watching the films of Georges Méliès that have either been recreated or converted into 3D. The theatrical flats in Méliès films never tried to look like anything other than what they were: set pieces. They were layered to create depth and 3D brings volume and space to this layering, so that it looks as if we are watching a magical show with a deep stage, complete with actors who are not trying to pretend that either their acting or their environment is real. This sense of authenticity lends weight to the emphasis on filmic magic and the magic of film.

Extending the idea of film as magic beyond Méliès and into film in general, *Hugo* presents a tribute to cinema that includes a screening of the Lumière train film, complete with an audience that ducks out of the way, as well as films from many other pioneers such as Buster Keaton, Charlie Chaplin, Edison, Harold Lloyd and Pabst. Through the enchanted reaction shots of the young protagonist, Hugo, and his friend, Isobelle, we are encouraged to see that cinema has been, and should always be,

a kind of magic. The times when 3D enhances the magic is when this new technology refreshes the old magical films of Méliès so that we are offered a new sense of spatial depth and a new way of viewing the beginning of film.

I had my own magical moment when I saw *Avatar* in the cinema. It was the first 3D film for many in the audience, myself included, and at the end several tweens ran up to the front and tried to touch the illusory images. They stood there with arms floating in the air like the paintings of handprints on the cave walls in Herzog's film, completely entranced. They were not mistaking the images for reality. It was more like they were trying to break through the screen wall to the magical world beyond.

Into the Inferno (Herzog, 2016)

I will consider Herzog's own concept of "ecstatic truth" as magical in his volcano documentary, *Into the Inferno*. It opens with an establishing shot that flies up a mountain slope to the choral music of monks singing Gitnik's *Unfailing Light*. It would be a traditional fly-over that establishes location, except that we are flying up the mountain in slow motion, an impossible act that has a dreamlike quality to it. As the camera gets closer to the summit, apprehension rises as the music swells and it becomes clear that there is something beyond the mountaintop that we cannot yet see. As the camera approaches the top ridgeline, five tiny figures, dwarfed by the scale of their environment, come into view. At this point we begin to feel the relaxed dreamlike quality is beginning to take on a nightmarish tone as the tension rises along with the advance of the flying camera, which never falters as it moves towards some kind of awesome abyss.

Finally the camera reaches the top and looks down over the edge of a vast sheer drop. This is an arresting moment, as far below we are presented with an image that is so powerful and terrifying it is almost unbearable to watch in its beauty and its horror: a roiling, boiling pit of red-black lava. Alarming, the camera continues over the precipice towards the lava lake as if we have leapt off the edge. But in an instant (an

edited cut) we must have free-fallen and be boiling alive because now we are down with the lake itself, in the horror of its restless surging as it leaps and crashes and folds over onto itself. The affect of being confronted with, and then seeming to join, the terrifying boiling pit is destabilising and it takes a moment even to make rational sense of what is being viewed.

This initial sequence and several others like it actualise Deleuze's point about the way the pure optical-sound image wallows in the intolerable and unbearable beauty of the moment, without any recourse to action. He writes:

It is a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities. *Stromboli*: a beauty which is too great for us, like too strong a pain. It can be a limit-situation, the eruption of a volcano, but also the most banal, a plain factory, a wasteland ([1985] 2005, 17, emphasis original).

In a deterritorialising move, we are given the opportunity to consider the fiery pit anew as Herzog forces us to stare into the molten pit for too long. The imagery is presented as a “thing in itself” with no need of justification and can, in this way, be appreciated in its most abstract kinetic form.

Herzog has criticised the use of worn out and superficial images across media and argues that war should be declared against commercials. From his perspective, the lack of “adequate images” in our society can be compared to global problems such as the nuclear threat and overpopulation (Blank, 1980). While he states that he is not necessarily after images no one has ever seen before, he is looking for “absolute images that reflect our civilization as a whole and our own deep inner voices” (Wenders, 1985). Herzog has often described this depth as a search for an “ecstatic truth.” This could be understood as a magical aesthetic experience, a raising of the spectator into a situation of sublimity, described by Herzog as a state where “something deeper become[s] possible, a kind of truth that is the enemy of the merely factual. Ecstatic truth, I call it” (Herzog 2010, 1). He peppers descriptions of “ecstatic

truth” with words like “poetic,” “mysterious,” a “kind of illumination.” His thinking on “ecstatic truth” is inspired by the first century literary critic Dionysus Longinus, who equates the experience of the sublime with a state of ecstasy that comes on like a “spell” (ibid, 10). Herzog explains that he “uses the concept of *ekstasis*, a person’s stepping out of himself into an elevated state” (ibid). This sounds distinctly like the experience of an altered state.

Deleuze writes that it is difficult to escape cliché and requires something very powerful. He writes, “It is not enough to disturb the sensory-motor connections. It is necessary to combine the optical-sound image with the enormous forces that are not those of a simply intellectual consciousness, or of the social one, but of a profound, vital intuition [sic]” ([1985] 2005, 21). The fiery pit of the volcano is just such an image with enormous force. As we have seen, it is a recurring symbol in our mythological imagination associated with hell, Mephistopheles, the unconscious and the shamanic underworld.

Herzog focuses most of his attention in *Into the Inferno* on three things: sublime images of volcanoes, the scientists who get very excited about them, and the way these volcanoes form the foundations of magical myths for the cultures that live in their wake. Herzog states in the film, “Obviously there was a scientific side to our journey, but what we were really chasing was the magical side, the demons, the new gods.” Chief Moses of Endu in Vanuatu explains that the dead go to live in their volcano and “the lava expresses the anger of the devils who are living in that fire.” In Indonesia we are shown a ritual designed to appease a monstrous demon produced by the union between a Sultan and the Queen of the South Seas that now occupies a dangerous volcano. Herzog tells us all the volcanoes in Indonesia are connected to a belief system and bear magical names such as “The Night Market of the Ghosts” and the “Dancing Place of the Spirits.” In Iceland, we learn that volcanoes have influenced mythical poetry and Herzog reads a passage with apocalyptic imagery that describes a volcanic eruption and a prophecy involving the end of pagan gods. In

North Korea, we visit Mt Paektu, the mythical birthplace of the Korean nation and witness university students rejoicing in its power and singing fervently to its glory. And the final location in the film is Tanna Island in Vanuatu, where the volcano is believed to have created a new God, an American GI who descended from the clouds and who, the film tells us, “promises to return with copious cargos of consumer goods.” In this way, Herzog’s imagery offers up the connection between magical myths and volcanoes, but also the connection between magic and the sublime, particularly in the way he sets choral, string and operatic music to lingering images that are too beautiful, terrifying and awesome.

To the sound of opera, a gigantic river of lava races along at an unbelievable speed, too close to the woman walking along its edge. In the next shot a tiny person stands in front of a curtain of raining fire. These images are sickeningly stunning, especially as we learn that the volcanologist-couple depicted in them, who were famous for such imagery, were both killed when they got too close to a volcano that erupted. For Herzog, danger is the yardstick by which he measures authenticity, and for Jung, any commerce with the ‘underworld’ of the unconscious is dangerous as it lets loose the darker forces we usually keep hidden. The film concludes with an apocalyptic vision of the end of the world brought about by a volcano, an interesting prospect if one considers the volcano part of our unconscious. As Herzog admits towards the end of the film, “it’s hard to take your eyes off the fire that burns deep under our feet... It is a fire that wants to burst forth.”

Herzog rails against the destruction of powerful images in contemporary society. Like Morin’s description of the watered-down affective-participation that replaced powerful magic in cinema, Herzog feels that the superficial and clichéd images that proliferate today contain no deeper truths and instead seek to numb and distract. Artaud is similarly dismayed at the way the machinations of the ‘real’ world stifle the ability to truly live an authentic life. But perhaps the magical aesthetic experience of polyphasic consciousness, encompassing altered states and intuition, as well as an

embodied, rigorous and experiential approach, can open up the “constant magic” of creative becoming.

Chapter Three: Technology as magic

The theme of this thesis has been to rethink the magical in theatre and film by bringing together a “mental-materialist” approach and the concept of polyphasic consciousness. “Mental-materialism” focuses on neuroscience, perception, and spectatorial, affective-participation as it impacts on the body and the senses. Polyphasic consciousness is a way of accessing knowledge that encompasses altered states. It is an embodied experience that gives rise to an awareness of interconnectedness and hinges on collective experience rather than personal. The thesis has moved through the shamanic beginnings of ur-drama and proto-cinema, considered magic in the 16th century as it functions in Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* and, following Edgar Morin, has regarded the beginning of cinema itself as magical. The trajectory has continued into the recent past and this chapter will examine the ways in which technology can be seen as a kind of magic.

In *Eros and Magic in the Renaissance*, Ioan Couliano argues that technology has merely realised what was considered magic in the past. He writes, “Historians have been wrong in concluding that magic disappeared with the advent of ‘quantitative science.’ The latter has simply substituted itself for a part of magic while extending its dreams and its goals by means of technology” (1987, 104). In *Techgnosis*, Davis argues that technology balances science and magical thinking. As an example he points out that advertising can be seen as a professional form of magical demonstration that is borne of empirical marketing methods *and* designed to manipulate our imaginations (1998, 175). It is common for television advertising to perform a kind of magic. To decide to buy the product is to engage with the magical thinking that its magic could work for you too.

Despite understanding that there is a solid scientific basis for our modern technological devices, we do not tend to think about the operation of electromagnetic radiation when we heat food in seconds or flip a switch and the lights come on. It is

just a kind of instant ‘magic’ that we have become used to. Recalling my discussion in Chapter One about the magic from Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus*, flying to Rome or accessing grapes out of season may have been magical in the 16th century, but we are quite used to such things these days. Cinema seemed to be a kind of magic when it first appeared at the turn of the 20th century, and arguably became so again when it popped out with 3D. The magic now is that these experiences can come *to us*. We can take a flight simulator to Rome and then visit any part of the city without leaving home. Cinematic magic is no longer even as far away as the screen. Virtual reality brings it to us.

While marketed as offering an immersive and interactive experience, virtual reality is potentially magical in the polyphasic sense because of the way in which the body’s senses are engaged with. The subject is placed at the centre of the surrounding action in such a way that it is common for the senses to be tricked. The body disappears and is usually replaced by only a pair of hands holding the controllers. This ‘body without an image’²⁰ has been described by Popat in an article titled “Missing in Action” as “presence-absence” (2016, 365). The experience, she says, is like having phantom limbs that you can feel but cannot see (ibid). This means that when a subject falls off a cliff or takes a rocket to the moon, the feeling is somewhat similar to that of a rollercoaster ride, despite the fact that there is little or no movement in the body.

Popat describes adrenaline flowing and muscles tightening as she raised her arms against a virtual hot-air balloon crash (ibid, 361). One of the most interesting discussions around virtual reality is whether or not it ‘reembodies’ or ‘disembodies’, as noted by Sobchack in *Carnal Thoughts* (2004, 202). Popat suggests, “The problem is not one of disembodiment, as so many earlier assumptions about [virtual reality]

²⁰ I have borrowed the phrase ‘body without an image’ from Brian Massumi, who uses it when discussing proprioception in *Parables of the Virtual* (2002, 58). He does not discuss the technology of virtual reality and is not discussed by Popat in her “Missing in Action” article, but I feel it is an appropriate phrase to describe the way the body continues to experience sensation but cannot see itself.

suggest; instead... the problem is in the proprioceptive mismatch between the embodied experience of self and the perception of the disembodied ‘Other’ – an ethical asymmetry” (2016, 377).²¹

I have discussed hallucination in the previous chapters with regards to perception, altered states of consciousness and a magical aesthetic experience. There is an obvious hallucination in virtual reality – the real world disappears and an entirely different illusory world is laid out in all directions. In *New Philosophies for New Media*, Hansen and Lenoir discuss the issue of hallucination as it relates to Bergson’s assertion that perception and affect need, and centre around, a body. Virtual reality is a visual medium that disappears the body but still has an affect upon it. Hansen and Lenoir write that “[it] brings to material fruition the thesis that perception is simulation – a process of construction or data-rendering that takes place in the body-brain” (2004, 166). This is not Massumi’s hallucination as the imaginative thought that fills the gap between perception and cognition that I discussed in Chapter One (2002, 206). He argues that our normal perceptual process always includes hallucination. The kind of hallucination inside virtual reality is closer to Morin, who describes it as seeing something that is literally not there. For him, it is the objective end of a concrete and reified magic.

My own experiences testing a range of games at a virtual reality lounge left me with the impression that in 2017 this fledgling technology is still too basic to be considered magical in any kind of polyphasic sense and had more in common with gaming predecessors such as Kinect and Xbox 360, which promote movement as their main point of difference. With those platforms, only a relatively limited amount of movement was possible and I wondered at the time (it was 2013) if I was moving or just going through the motions. Similarly, in virtual reality the player must stay within

²¹ Massumi defines proprioception as “the sensibility proper to the muscles and ligaments” (2002, 58) and goes on to describe it as “translat[ing] the exertions and ease of the body’s encounters with objects into a muscular memory of relationality” (ibid, 59).

a predefined cubic space. Two steps in any direction and blue grid lines appear as a warning of the limits of the bulky headset's range, breaking any sense of immersion I might have felt. I could choose to bring the environment *to me* from any direction I wanted, which differs greatly from Kinect and Xbox 360, but the limits of each virtual world were very quickly reached. I tried to exceed boundaries and refuse to do what the games dictate, but the virtual reality 'world' would quickly reset itself and try to put me 'back on track'.

Virtual reality is a totally illusory experience that takes you anywhere without actually taking you anywhere, while it tricks the body's senses into experiencing sensations such as falling. This can be compared to the shamanism discussion in Chapter Two, which is a similarly fully immersive and affective experience. The process of shamanism involves the sense of flying to fantastical places where it is common for a shaman to transform into other beings. This is also done whilst the shaman's body does not actually go anywhere. But the shaman has considerably more freedom inside the fantastical world than the player in virtual reality, where a finite virtual world has already been created by designers and programmers. Shamanism also requires no equipment other than the body, and is a practice Jung understood as available to anyone, not just those who can afford it.

Sobchack argues that "Each technology not only differently *mediates* our figurations of bodily existence but also *constitutes* them. That is, each offers our lived bodies radically different ways of 'being-in-the-world' " (2004, 173). It would seem that the way in which virtual reality mediates and constitutes figurations of bodily existence is, like Kinect and Xbox 360, to turn bodies into machines, despite the heavy emphasis on 'you' as the controller. Bodies are stepped through a series of relatively small, pre-programmed movements that cannot deviate greatly from narrow confines. This is the opposite of the spontaneous agency suggested by creative becoming, despite the tickling and tricking of the senses. Certainly virtual reality exposes and prioritises the affective basis of perception, as Hanson and Lenoir argue (2004, 168),

but it falls short of a magical aesthetic experience in a polyphasic sense because of the lack of freedom within the environment. The body is certainly at the centre of everything and most striking to me was the way in which the virtual worlds rushed to me, swirled around me, and happened because of me. This suggests an ego-driven magical development in technology that I will discuss in the course of exploring Herzog's 2016 documentary, *Lo and Behold: Reveries of a Connected World*.

Lo and Behold: Reveries of a Connected World (Herzog, 2016)

A magical tone is immediately set at the beginning of Herzog's film about the internet. To the heralding sound of the prelude to Wagner's *Das Rheingold*, a new dawn is announced as internet pioneer Leonard Kleinrock describes the magical moment when the internet was created in a lab at UCLA. He leads us into a plain room and tells us, "We are now entering a sacred location. It's the location where the internet began. It's a holy place and we've just come back to 1969 when the critical events of the origin began." This shrine to the internet contrasts the bland with the sacred and the sober scientist with the fantastical magician. It is a Faustian alchemist's lab where unnatural things are constructed and brought to life. The ugly insides of the first computer are spilled out for us to appreciate its grotesqueness, "so ugly it's beautiful," says Kleinrock. As we learned from *Faust*, when scientists create unnatural life, the devils step in. Davis argues that as soon as computers developed in the 1950s, they were associated with life and with animation, and cites the autonomous nature of viruses, worms, Trojan horses and bots (1998, 187). Add to this the looming threat of completely autonomous artificial intelligence and I think it is fair to say that this lab-created life is often associated with dangerous and possibly destructive entities that are out-of-control.

Kleinrock explains that the first word transmitted across the internet was supposed to be 'log' but the system crashed after 'lo'. Of this he remarks in the film, "We couldn't have asked for a more succinct, more powerful, more prophetic message than lo". The tone is set for Herzog to focus on the mythical/magical nature of the internet, its

“glory” as he puts it. The viewing of the film itself does not particularly engender the more radical elements of altered states, or affect the spectator in such a way as to possibly lead to a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic sense (apart from some sublime imagery of solar flares) but the issues discussed suggest some interesting ways to consider the internet as a kind of magic.

The experience of telepathy, another aspect of polyphasic consciousness previously thought to be some kind of magic, is discussed when Herzog interviews brain researcher Marcel Just. He explains that it is already possible for a computer programme to read thoughts using an MRI scanner; that is to say, for thoughts to jump a few millimeters from the brain to the machine. Just argues it is only a matter of time before this technology becomes portable (described as something like a telepathy cap) and expands its range so that we will be able to communicate across thousands of miles using our thoughts. With this development, telepathy can no longer be dismissed as a supernatural magical practice and can be studied scientifically, which is something Jung hoped for (Haule 2011, 2:72). It does suggest, however, that the intervention of a machine into the process (the telepathy cap) will fall short of Jung’s assertion that telepathy is already possible with appropriate guidance and practice, without the need for bodies to be turned into machines.

The magical thinking of anthropomorphism is evident when Kleinrock explains his hopes for the internet’s future. In the film he states:

This room should know I’m here... I should be able to talk to it and it should be able to give me an answer. It should respond to me in a natural way, using gestures, touch, and even smell, all my senses to interact in a very humanistic way. And once it’s embedded in our walls, in our desks, in our bodies, in our fingernails, in our cars, in our offices, in our homes, it should disappear and become invisible.

Technology works to make effort invisible, and while this description of the internet makes it sound like a living but unseen spirit-double working away in the

background, I am reminded of my argument from Chapter One that invisibility degrades the magical aesthetic experience when it tries to disguise the ‘truth’ of its existence and pass the unnatural off as natural. An embedded internet as described by Kleinrock will at first appear spectacularly magical precisely because of its invisibility. But this will, like the beginning of cinema or flying to Rome, quickly become completely normal and lose its magic.

Another invisible development in technology that is likely to affect one’s sense of reality in a different way is the concept of the Internet of Me. Security Analyst Sam Curry describes it in *Lo and Behold* thus:

It is a world where when you walk into a room the lights dim to your preference level, you may have music that starts up, it may even have complex protocols for how to interact with somebody else’s ‘internet of me’. That’s interesting, and the world that will emerge as a result, eventually you won’t even need phones, the environment will be so wired that your experience will be brought to you... We tell children very often, you have to play with others, you have to share, your worldview isn’t unique, but when the world, the objects in it, start to tell you that you are, that you’re different, that’s egotistical. But it’ll also be a magical world, one where a wave of a hand will create doors moving and objects changing position. Imagine a generation that’s never known anything else but that.

In the previous chapter I considered Jung’s discussions in a letter to Horst Scharschuch on the difference between white and black magic as it relates to artistic practice. He writes that creativity that serves to hold back destructive forces while promoting the collective is white magic, while black magic revels in the destruction and serves only the individual ([1952] 1973, 82). The Internet of Me is the logical progression of the Internet of Things, where everyday objects, and even our bodies, are digitised so they can connect to the internet to serve the needs of the individual. Curry is describing a world where we will be seduced into the comfort of our own habits, where no effort, negotiation or compromise is required because everything is brought to the individual in an affirming way. In this environment, we will never have to seek out, or be exposed to, the *other*, or even people who hold opinions that differ

from our own. This way of living is the opposite of the intuitive and creative becoming that Bergson, Deleuze and Jung advocate, which is a rigorous environment that requires attention, concentration, bodily intuition and a willingness to embrace the unfamiliar. The Internet of Me suggests an extreme version of Bergson's assertion of the centrality of the body, as it is an environment that, like virtual reality, rushes to you, swirls around you, and happens because of you.

One of the conditions for considering polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience is the way in which a polyphasic attitude can give rise to an awareness of interconnectedness, an experience that hinges on the collective rather than the personal. It could be argued that the internet is a collective experience of the interconnectedness of all things, especially if pretty much *all* our *things* have been connected to the internet. To this end, the film gives clear examples of positive online experiences of connection. Herzog shows us, for example, how a community of hundreds of thousands of internet gamers worked together to play a game that ultimately assisted scientists with the intricate folding of RNA molecules, something that had, up until that point, eluded scientists using supercomputers. The results have a real-world application for the likes of cancer research.

On the other hand, in a chapter about social media, Fenton notes that by and large the experience of the internet is:

No more than an incessant version of a 'daily me'... that personalizes and depoliticises public issues and simply re-emphasises old inequalities while feeding corporations the necessary data for online marketing, business promotion and the exploitation of private affairs – a specifically anti-democratic turn leading to civic privatism (2016, 146).

This is the experience of distraction, which I have previously linked with the 'deceptive' tricks of the demonic. Fenton goes on to argue that this neoliberal environment predominantly reinforces existing hierarchies. In privileging consumption over community it lends itself to the production of self, to "personhood

rather than citizenship” (2016, 157). Social media, and the internet in general, has been outstandingly effective in this regard.

Jung’s definition of black magic contains two components: it serves only the individual and is motivated by destruction. The ego-driven nature of the Internet of Me can be seen to fit the first requirement but can it be seen to revel in destruction? We are already familiar with negative and harmful experiences of the internet, and Herzog specifically considers some of these, such as gaming addiction and threats to cybersecurity. Herzog shows us the family of a young woman who was killed in a car crash and explains that images of the woman’s nearly decapitated body went viral on social media. Her mother concludes from this experience that the internet is demonic in nature. She proclaims it to be the “manifestation of the anti-Christ, of evil itself. It is the spirit of evil and I feel like it’s running through everybody on earth and it’s claiming its victories in those people that are also evil.” The degree to which the internet is unregulated and out-of-control is an oft-discussed issue. In *Techgnosis*, Davis argues that “magic is technology’s unconscious, its own arational spell” (1998, 38). Such an association once again links this kind of magic with the demonic (Mephistophelean) unconscious.

The Internet of Me, where our bodies and our homes are embedded with devices that monitor our interests and health and so on, suggests a kind of state of possession in the magical sense. What has taken over the body, however, is not a ghost or demonic spirit, but machines controlled by corporations or governments, at least until the predicted arrival of the singularity when artificial intelligence takes over and functions entirely independently. It is interesting to consider the implications of possession in relation to a body that has literally been taken over by superintelligent, autonomous entities. Such posthuman notions certainly constitute a new figuration of bodily existence in the way Sobchack outlines (2004, 173). In terms of black magic, I would posit that this signals the most destructive aspect of the Internet of Me: loss of autonomy associated with the experiencing body.

The autonomy threatened by such an invasion affects not only the personal body, but the social one as well. Even without the Internet of Me the ubiquity of state surveillance is phenomenal in scale, and propaganda techniques such as the spinternet²², astroturfing²³ and social bots²⁴ are on the rise. Practices that are designed to maintain existing hierarchies, influence public opinion on sensitive topics, and promote extreme corporatisation, point to a loss of autonomy. I agree with Fenton when she argues the notion that the internet promotes freedom and community can be challenged by evidence and experience to the contrary (2016, 165). The Internet of Me promises a world where we will appear to have the power to create our own reality, one that rushes to serve the slightest whim, but it is an illusory reality full of the tricks of advertising and the media of spin, controlled by large corporations and governments. It will appear to be private but our actions (and even potentially our thoughts, the telepathy discussion implies) could be thoroughly monitored by vested interests.

Herzog examines our reliance on the internet and concludes that if a solar flare, natural disaster or artificial intelligence were to knock the internet out of our reach, society would quickly collapse. Even the most basic requirements for living, such as the distribution of food, are now organised entirely online. With this conclusion, Herzog finds refuge in a small community that lives offline. He implies that here lies the key to an authentic way of life — playing live music around a campfire. It may be a nostalgic and unrealistically idealised image, but it is one that is free of the internet's black magic.

²² Morozov explains that the spinternet is “a Web with little censorship but lots of spin and propaganda – which reinforces [government and corporate] ideological supremacy” (2011, 120).

²³ Astroturfing is a political tool of corporates used to “fak[e] support from the grass roots to seek political or corporate benefits” (Morozov 2011, 134).

²⁴ Social bots are “automated programmes, or bots, on social media aimed at influencing opinion and politics” (Neudert 2017). These bots masquerade as real people.

In the film Curry asks us to imagine a child who has grown up with the Internet of Me. If normalised, it is unlikely to appear magical. And yet, this child may never be required to “turn inwards” towards the body’s senses, if these senses are being monitored by machines. The magical aesthetic experience, as it impacts on the experiencing body, requires precisely this type of inward tuning. The Internet of Me signals instead a new era of the posthuman. But there are interesting and magical possibilities associated with moving away from the natural body, which I will discuss in relation to Free Theatre’s *Frankenstein*.

Frankenstein (Falkenberg, 2016)

Scientist and artist Dr Frankenstein invites you to be part of one of the most exciting projects of modern times as he is on the brink of creating a perfect human being. With your generous support, he can take this final step and create a new man. Come and hear the Doctor talk about his remarkable discoveries and see the extraordinary prototypes that have led to this exciting possibility (*Frankenstein* Press Release 2016).

In this production, Dr Frankenstein’s great, great, great, great, great Grandson, also called Dr Frankenstein, attempted to resuscitate his family’s maligned image by convincing the audience to support his quest to create a “better, more perfect human being” (Falkenberg 2016). The devised show used Shelley’s novel as a starting point from which to explore the evolution of the *Frankenstein* myth and its contemporary implications, as it has appeared in theatre, film, performance art and popular imagination.

The audience was brought into a theatrical replica of Dr Frankenstein’s Antarctic lab, complete with snow (actually salt) cascading through a large hourglass construction onto the middle of the floor. It transpired that Dr Frankenstein had shifted his operation from the Arctic of Shelley’s novel to the Antarctic, and in doing so, had encountered Maori, “in these parts,” as Dr Frankenstein put it. Hence, the show began with a Maori creation myth in the darkness of Po, the timeless state before creation, when the sky-father Ranginui and the earth-mother Papatūānuku were locked in a

close embrace. In the myth their children, cramped inside the embrace, rebel against their confines and force them apart. In Free Theatre's *Frankenstein*, a circle of creatures enacted a synchronised ritual around the hourglass that involved the growing breath as the creatures swelled and came into their own. In beginning this way, Falkenberg immediately linked the magic of Maori mythology with Frankenstein's science, and foreshadowed not only the rebellious nature of the monster from Shelley's *Frankenstein*, but also the rebellious and chaotic nature of humanity to both create and destroy.

The production was presented as a sales pitch in the style of a TED Talk, such as might be given by a technology magician like Elon Musk or Steve Jobs. Dr Frankenstein was boldly attempting to garner support and raise money for his ambitious project and in this way, implicated the audience in his efforts. A range of less-than-perfect prototypes were exhibited, including False Maria, inspired by the robot from *Metropolis* (Lang, 1927), Pandora, styled after *The Bride of Frankenstein* (Whale, 1935), a human-fly resembling the protagonist in *The Fly* (Cronenberg, 1986), a hunchbacked servant called Igor, Prometheus and an acrobat called Ariel, from the character in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*. Excerpts from a variety of *Frankenstein* films were also projected, including James Whale's 1931 version, Andy Warhol's *Flesh for Frankenstein* (1973) and Alex Garland's *Ex Machina* (2015), as well as images and clips of performance artists such as Orlan²⁵ and Stelarc.²⁶

²⁵ In the 1990s performance artist Orlan explored cosmetic surgery as a site of feminist resistance and utopia, interrogating both conventional standards of beauty and exploring a progressive sense of freedom, because "molding one's own skin means shaping one's destiny" (O'Bryan 2004, 10). A portrait of Orlan titled *Official Portrait with Bride of Frankenstein Wig* was presented during the Free Theatre show. It is an image taken after her third surgery in 1990, both beautiful and foreboding at once. As O'Bryan writes, "the interrogation of ideal beauty will prove to demand that she play between the extremes – ideal beauty and the monstrous feminine" (2004, 20). The drive for Orlan is on the dynamics of becoming as opposed to the finished state of perfection. She champions the temporary, the transitional, and, in her insistence on being photographed during surgery and immediately after, when her face is still bruised and swollen, the inbetween.

²⁶ Stelarc declares the natural body to be "obsolete" in the face of improvements that can be made using technology, and experiments with machine-body interfaces and hybrids to augment the natural body (Stelarc n.d.). His performances have included surgically constructing an extra ear on his arm, adding an ambidextrous, fully bendable third arm, and transforming himself into an

Shelley's novel is grounded in the Faustian notion of the diabolical scientist who strives for knowledge beyond natural boundaries, without sufficient regard for consequences. The devilry in this magic centres around an unnatural, blighted and murderous creation that turns against its maker. The act that creates the monster is magical but wishes to be seen as cold, hard science: stitched up pieces of dead bodies animated via electricity. In *Techgnosis*, Davis argues that electricity has always tapped into the magical and the mythological, a kind of union of alchemy and imagination he calls our "electromagnetic imaginary" (1998, 41). He writes, "Vibrating in the gap between life and physics, between matter and the unseen ether, electricity inhabits a liminal zone that calls down spirits and sublimities out of thin air" (ibid, 40). In the case of this Faustian scientist, the target is the limitations of the natural body, particularly the body that withers and dies. As Morin points out, the double and the quest for immortality are great universal myths, and both can be seen in Shelley's novel. Dr Frankenstein wishes to overcome death and his monster can be understood as his psychological double, brought up from the dark and dangerous depths of his unconscious.

Rather than focusing on overcoming death per se, Free Theatre's Dr Frankenstein was concerned more with creating a superior body. He also wished to grant his subjects the freedom to choose their own constructions, and I will argue that it is this aim that offers magical possibilities. In creating their own bodies, Dr Frankenstein's creatures could also create their own reality and, in this respect, are their own Gods. In this way the lure of the New Age/quantum physics magic discussed in Free Theatre's *Doctor Faustus* received a concrete focus in the form of the freely constructed body. It can be seen as every bit as diabolical as Mephistopheles' magical temptations, or as a way to overcome the constraints of both the natural and social bodies. Dr Frankenstein stated,

insect by climbing inside, and controlling, a six-legged robot. One of his aims is to redesign the human body.

for example, that after his attempt to create a mate for himself spiraled out-of-control (Pandora and her box) he decided to go beyond the notion of gender altogether. His wish was to overcome, by dissolution, notions of gender, race and even species²⁷ to create a ‘New Man’,²⁸ which he outlined thus:

1. The New Man has to be strong to survive. Therefore I want to create him in a laboratory of ice.
2. The New Man has no sex or gender. It is not divided into man or woman. It has a body without organs. In my laboratory theatre I want not to imitate but to create – gender is always created by imitation.
3. The New Man has to sing and dance his thoughts rather than burying them in books.

The “body without organs” is a concept from Artaud’s 1947 radio play *To Have Done with the Judgment of God*, where Artaud seeks a new human authenticity and freedom from what he considers the useless “automatic reactions” of a “badly constructed” body (1976, 570-571). Artaud’s concept is multi-layered and, as Dolphijn argues in “Man is Ill Because He Is Badly Constructed,” is in part a protest against the *Word* of God (2011, 21), but it is also aimed at the failing condition of his own body at this point in his life. He finished the recording of the radio play two months before his death in 1948. In the play he states:

I do know that space, time, dimension, becoming, future, destiny, being, non-being, self, non-self, are nothing to me; but there is a thing which is something, only one thing which is something, and which I feel because it wants TO GET OUT: the presence of my bodily suffering ([1947] 1976, 566, emphasis original).

Artaud argues in the play that “man is sick because he is badly constructed” (ibid, 570), both in the practical sense of the body that fails and dies and in the sense of bodies that are enslaved to the automatic reactions of the stable, socially controlled

²⁷ While this is a problematic notion, a thorough exploration of how feminist theory, among others, would intersect with such a privileged fantasy is outside the scope of this thesis.

²⁸ The New Man concept was adapted from Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* ([1883-1892] 2006, 5).

body. To find freedom, Artaud believes, we need to totally disrupt these ordering functions. The play ends, “When you will have made him a body without organs; then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom. Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out; as in the frenzy of dance halls; and this wrong side out will be his real place” (ibid, 571). Artaud’s body without organs is a body that is free from the tyranny of societal control and free to make itself howsoever it wishes.

Alongside Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze takes up Artaud’s idea of the body without organs (now the BwO), and focuses on finding ways of disorganising the body in an attempt to free it from the stability (and rigidity) of the ordering bodies of society. They write:

A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a body upon which that which serves as organs... is distributed according to crowd phenomena... in the form of molecular multiplicities... Thus the body without organs is opposed less to organs as such than to the organization of the organs insofar as it composes an organism. The body without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more alive and teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization (1987, 30).

The BwO can be seen as a magical utopian ideal where the body is free to experience the affects of pure intensities, without interference from ordering functions, and free to mix and meld with other bodies without organs in a collective, egalitarian, and unstructured way that eschews completion and revels in creation. It is against organisation and representation. It is positive in that it is playful, transformative and not concerned with lack, except for the lack of a subjective and stable “I”.

While Deleuze, Guattari and Artaud all focus attention on the creative process of destabilisation and a body opposed to centring, Artaud also seeks the kind of freedom (from the badly constructed body and controlling society) that might allow a body without organs to arrive at a new authenticity. This is in line with his Gnostic view of

the world as a false creation that is presided over by evil. Deleuze and Guattari are more concerned with continual becoming and transformation, where even the boundaries between bodies can become deterritorialised and fluid. This is both a magical condition in its seeming impossibility, but can also be seen as a magical experience in a polyphasic consciousness sense because it promises a state that is free from cliché and beyond the control of the rational organism.

In Free Theatre's production, the body without organs informed a significant portion of the text and concepts. Dr Frankenstein quoted text from *A Thousand Plateaus* and Artaud's play was quoted by *The Fly*, an undercooked creature born of decay and obsessed with shit, Artaud's pre-eminent image of the abject material that informs our bodily existence. *The Fly* emerged from circus silks suspended from the ceiling, screaming and squirming through its early hatching, physicalising the affective intensity of its creation as it descended. Artaud feels that words are a barrier to the mind and an insufficient means of expression, and as Dolphijn outlines, Artaud's attack is against the Word of God as the organisation of Judgement (2011, 21). In *The Theatre and Its Double*, Artaud insists that the theatre should build a concrete language of its own that plays with words as well as using incantatory rhythms, cries and screams, all of which is intended to appeal, first and foremost, to the senses ([1938] 1958, 37). Affective intensity, rather than words, drives the Theatre of Cruelty.

The abject condition of *The Fly* prompted Dr Frankenstein to apologise to the audience and pronounce it to be "a bit of a mess." He acknowledged that the prototypes were still works in progress but seemed unable to grasp the fact that the so-called 'abnormalities' of the creatures were their most striking features; they were all monstrous in either physical or social terms (or both).²⁹ In this way the production

²⁹ This recalls Susan Stryker's writing in 1994 comparing the transsexual body that has been altered by medical science with the monster's predicament in Shelley's *Frankenstein*. Stryker feels an affinity with a monster that is full of eloquent rage at its ostracisation from society but who also heralds a dangerous freedom. She writes, "I whose flesh has become an assemblage of

clearly positioned Dr Frankenstein's drive for perfection as a deluded one, and in doing so, suggested that he, rather than his creations, may in fact be the real monster.

Also suspended above the audience on circus silks were the characters of Ariel and False Maria, who began life as a formless double-yoked egg. The dance of birth that heralded their formation and subsequent separation was entirely realised aerobically. In *Metropolis*, False Maria is an evil robot created by a mad scientist. I would posit that she can also be seen as Homunculus from Goethe's *Faust*, an unnatural creature brought to life in a lab by Wagner's alchemical magic and the demonic presence of Mephistopheles.³⁰ Wagner can be compared to Dr Frankenstein, as he tells Mephistopheles that procreation is a poor method of making a human being and that his alchemical creation is superior. He states, "Wenn sich das Tier noch weiter dran ergötzt, So muß der Mensch mit seinen großen Gaben, Doch künftig höhern, höhern Ursprung haben" (Goethe in Fielder 1943, 77.15-17).³¹ Likewise, Homunculus can be compared to Dr Frankenstein's monster, not only because s/he (an hermaphrodite) is created unnaturally and calls Wagner "father" the way the monster refers to Dr Frankenstein, but also because s/he too can be seen as Wagner's demonic double. Mephistopheles and Homunculus refer to each other as "cousin" and Homunculus is able to see into, and interpret, Faust's dream while he is still dreaming, suggesting a link with the unconscious.

In *Goethe's Faust and Cultural Memory*, Bruce MacLennan points out that Homunculus is little more than a brain trapped in a glass flask, endowed with

incongruous anatomical parts, I who achieve the similitude of a natural body only through an unnatural process, I offer you this warning: the Nature you bedevil me with is a lie. Do not trust it to protect you from what I represent, for it is a fabrication that cloaks the groundlessness of the privilege you seek to maintain for yourself at my expense. You are as constructed as me" (Stryker [1994] 2006, 247).

³⁰ It is Faust's servant Wagner who makes Homunculus, but Edinger suggests he is unsuccessful in animating it until the arrival of Mephistopheles, whose mere presence brings it to life (1990, 61).

³¹ "What if the beasts still find it their delight, In future man, as fits his lofty mind, Must have a source more noble and refined" (Goethe [1831] 1959, 100).

intelligence but lacking a proper physical body – a fitting description of the “minimal embodiment” of robotic artificial intelligence. He writes, “[Artificial intelligence] systems are not literally disembodied – existing only in a mental realm – for computers are physical objects, but they are minimally embodied; they have trivial bodies capable of only impoverished interaction with their environments, like brains in vats” (2012, 192). Homunculus is a glowing fire spirit who hovers in the air inside his phial, just like the suspended False Maria who was lit with neon throughout the extended birthing sequence.

Once birthed, False Maria reached the ground and began to talk and dance, uncanny in her mix of lifelike and robotic gestures. She realised her consciousness with lines from La Mettrie’s *Machine Man* (1747) declaring the human body to be a machine that winds itself up like a clock. La Mettrie’s materialist view of the body as stable, ordered and regulated is the opposite of the body without organs. Both False Maria and Homunculus can be likened to a brain in a vat in the sense of minimal embodiment endowed with intelligence but lacking sensory systems. But Homunculus does not settle for the straitjacket that confines and keeps him/her from physically experiencing the world and can therefore be seen to strive after a more ambitious and magical project than an automaton.

In Goethe’s *Faust*, Homunculus smashes his/her flask and spreads his/her essence into the sea at the throne of Galatea. Durrani says he “proves unstable and unwilling to live in the ‘real’ world” (2004, 147). This sounds like the kind of charge that used to be levelled against Artaud when he was alive, as he himself acknowledges in the conclusion to his radio play. Similarly, the suicide of Homunculus can be seen as a rejection of his badly constructed minimal-body and a desire to create an alternative body without organ-isation. He breaks his flask seeking freedom from his glass shell and union with nature and the divine. As he spreads his essence into the sea he is transformed in a way that is literally fluid and entirely deterritorialised in the

Deleuzian/Guattarian sense, fulfilling their assertions that there is freedom in defying completion and choosing instead to mix and meld with others in unstructured ways.

A companion to Artaud's radio play was found in the Nick Cave song, *Higgs Boson Blues* (2013), which Dr Frankenstein sang towards the end. The lyrics bear witness to blues guitarist Robert Johnson's legendary pact with the Devil, in which he exchanged his soul for musical ability. The song displays a degree of fatigue at our empty distractions and rails against systems of order. We are looking for the God particle, the Higgs Boson, but meanwhile are creating hell. In questioning the wisdom of the scientific search for the God particle, Faustian priorities are also questioned. To destroy the mystery of creation risks opening Pandora's box to a host of unforeseen consequences and risks de-mythologising the world in favour of cold, hard science.

At one point, Dr Frankenstein proudly displayed "Tiki," a found creature from Maori mythology. Dr Frankenstein explained:

Ah, now this one I can't claim credit for. I didn't create him. I found him in these parts actually. But he has helped me towards perfection because, as with my third principle, here we have an example of a culture that does not bury its body in books but expresses it in song and dance. Do a little dance for them Tiki.

The dance that followed reenacted the making of the first woman, Hine. In this way, Tiki could be seen as a shaman, bringer of sacred knowledge. Essentially, he taught Dr Frankenstein the value of polyphasic consciousness: in this case, the value of singing and dancing rather than getting lost in words. Falkenberg, too, can be seen to take theatre back to the magical experience of its shamanic roots, with Dr Frankenstein's lab as the cave.

The production thus began with the wordy TED Talk but increasingly *the show itself* metamorphosed into its own kind of body without organs. That is to say, it began with the organising principle of the 'word' but increasingly dissolved into a polyphony of

overlapping performances of song and dance. As the singing and dancing was positioned at all corners of the theatre, the affective intensity enveloped and included the audience, as Artaud intended theatre to do. In this way, the entire production became a body without organs, rejecting all forms of finality and judgement, and reveling in a “constant magic” of visceral and open-ended creative becoming.

Artaud understood that his suffering was not his alone and encompassed the fabric of society. Thus, he wanted to turn everything on its head, to dance “wrong side out” (Artaud [1947] 1976, 571). Also dancing ‘wrong side out’ were Dr Frankenstein’s creatures when they decided towards the end, in true *Frankenstein* fashion, to turn against and annihilate their maker. The energy of the monsters transformed into an amorphous mix of limbs in a collective frenzy of bodies that felt and danced their experience rather than talked about it. The creatures circled and overwhelmed Dr Frankenstein, dragging him to the ground where they destroyed or united with him in a ritualised dance, taking up again the rebellion from the Maori creation myth that began the production. Dr Frankenstein’s lab/cave had brought forth a shamanic ritual in which the production itself also became its own body without organs that had taken over. Free Theatre’s Dr Frankenstein disappeared with his monsters under the pile of snow, and in this way, the production ended, somewhat like Shelley’s novel, with Dr Frankenstein and his monster(s) being swallowed up by the Ant/Arctic.

Conclusion

Faust Sonnengesang (Fritsch, 2012/2015)

I will conclude this thesis alongside a discussion of *Faust Sonnengesang* (*Faust Song of the Sun*), a six-hour film-poem in two parts released in 2012 and 2015 by German filmmaker and playwright Werner Fritsch. The film encapsulates many of the ideas discussed so far in this thesis, within the myth of *Faust* which has underpinned the work. It also points towards the future in interesting ways, allowing me to bring the arguments to a close. I will not focus on the spiritual meditations in the film, but will concentrate my exploration on both the magical within the diegetic reality, and the magical aesthetic experience of viewing the film, as the impact of its affective intensities can be seen to open a new vista onto a contemporary understanding of the magical experience.

In 2008 Free Theatre performed three of Fritsch's plays in Christchurch while the playwright was present: *Faust Chroma*,³² *Nico Sphinx of Ice* and *Enigma Emmy Göring*. *Faust Chroma* was adapted by Peter Falkenberg and Free Theatre for its New Zealand setting, but was first performed in Germany in 2000 as *Chroma: Farbenlehre für Chamäleons*. The play centres around one of Germany's most successful actors, Gustaf Gründgens, who was famous for his role as Mephistopheles in *Faust*, but whose life could be compared to the character of Faust, as he made a pact of his own with the Nazis when Göring appointed him head of state-run theatre. This left him a compromised figure. In 1963 Gründgens gave up acting and embarked on a world trip, but died suddenly in his hotel room in Manila, Philippines, in what was a suspected suicide. *Faust Chroma* begins in Manila with Gründgens' life flashing before his eyes in the form of a 'last film'. Fritsch writes:

I wanted to discuss the *Faust* myth in the light of the biography of Gustaf Gründgens who played Mephisto in four different German states – on the

³² *Faust Chroma* ran for two seasons in Christchurch and toured to three additional New Zealand cities. It has been one of the company's most successful and award-winning productions.

stage of the Fronttheater in the First World War, in the Weimar Republic, under the Nazis, and after the Second World War. But this also failed to satisfy me, as it looked back into the past – instead of looking square AT the present, let alone the future. It seemed to me important to transform this material, which is ultimately an archive into which Goethe poured the essence of thousands of books, into our Now. By which I mean that for me transforming material into the Now does not mean transforming historical facts philologically, but poetically – into our present age. This means reformulating it afresh with one’s own language, and fermenting it by means of one’s own experience (2009, 1).

Faust Sonnengesang is a Goethean project for Fritsch that brings together text and footage from many of his artistic endeavours, including the Free Theatre production of *Faust Chroma*, and sections based around the texts of *Nico Sphinx of Ice* and *Enigma Emmy Göring*. The structure of *Faust Sonnengesang* is a ‘last film’ like *Faust Chroma*, or as Fritsch puts it, the film “we see when we close our eyes forever” (2013, 4). In this way, the entire film can be seen to take place in an altered dreamstate, although the intensity of the often abstract imagery signals another iteration of the more deeply altered state of shamanism. I have discussed caves as both proto-cinematic and shamanic spaces, and Fritsch writes, “Faust (Everyone) is going through the labyrinth of his life. He is going through a cave” (ibid, 5). In *Goethe’s Faust and Cultural Memory*, Susanne Ledanff describes the precursor to the film, which was a multimedia installation designed as a “picture cave” and presented with a triptych of screens on stage (2012, 157). Fritsch explicitly links the spatial architecture of this installation with caves and the “oldest images of mankind (rock-paintings)” (Fritsch 2009, 4). Much of the footage from this installation is also in the film in some form. Fritsch’s poetry is recited throughout in a rhythmic manner by a number of actors (including Fritsch as Faust) in a way that lulls the spectator into a meditative, hypnotic or even trance-like state. This is assisted by abstract imagery that is buoyed by constant movement and often frenetically paced. The overall effect is to challenge a rational grasping of the material and reaches instead towards deeper sensations that provoke the spectator to imagine in new ways, a distinctly shamanic attitude.

Fritsch tries to move away from the old magic of *Faust* while searching for a new kind of magical aesthetic experience. In an effort that would seem at home with Jung and Bergson's concepts of intuition, he asks, "What happens when a film enables concentration and consciousness instead of the typical media cocktail made of diversion and catastrophe? *Faust Song of the Sun* is the beginning of an awakening" (2013, 4). He specifically encourages the spectator to experience the film in an intuitive, polyphasic manner that broadens the perceptual frame, a way of looking differently that aims to let, "the synapses in the mind of the audience enter new connections and [rewire] both parts of the brain" (ibid, 6). I will treat it as a journey that winds its way through a labyrinth of ideas that I can apply to my understanding of polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience.

The film's images span five continents, corresponding to the five fingers of the hand. In this way Fritsch makes a connection between the literal definition of 'Faust' as a 'clenched fist' that he wishes to metaphorically open out (2009, 2) in order to look to other cultures for "different kinds of knowledge" (Fritsch 2013, 5). Like the Maori mythology discussed in Chapter Three with regard to *Frankenstein*, this is a polyphasic attitude that rejects the monophasic rationalism of Western culture as the font of all knowledge. Fritsch 'opens the fist' onto a new contemporary understanding of the connection between ourselves and our images, and ourselves and the myth of *Faust*.

The signature effect in the film is what Fritsch refers to as the "Faust-Keil" (hand-axe), where the camera becomes a body-part and is handled in the "Gestus" of a distinctive slicing effect (ibid); that is to say, shapes literally slice through the frame and metaphorically slice through rational thinking. This technique is produced when the camera is treated organically, often handheld, and panned, tilted, zoomed or waved about chaotically. The typical material filmed using this technique is bright lights against a dark setting, such as city lights or the sun rising out of the sea. A significant after-image streak is created by filming bright lights in a low-light setting

and moving the camera swiftly. The imagery is subsequently slowed down in post-production so that the after-image streak becomes the focus and appears to make the bright objects dance from one momentarily static form or pose to another. In this way, the imagery is almost totally abstracted, recalling, for example, the kind of play of lines and light seen in a Len Lye “scratch” film. The “Faust-Keil” technique is deceptively simple and can be created with a basic camera and editing programme. I have argued that simple magic is often the most effective and Fritsch uses minimal equipment compared to the more complex technological-based magic discussed in the previous chapter. But his aim lies away from technology, as much as it can for a film. He wants to “portray the ‘real world’ in a new shape” (ibid, 6). Ordinary images are thus made strange and destabilising in the proprioceptive sense, promoting instead an immersive perceptual event that privileges affect, sensation and deterritorialisation, components that I have argued (in relation to Morin, Bergson and Deleuze) support the experience of film as magical in the polyphasic consciousness sense. Like *Lekce Faust*, escapism is resisted and meaning is open-ended. As discussed in Chapter One, this throws the emphasis onto the situational within the viewing experience.

The “Faust-Keil” technique could also be understood as Fritsch making for himself a body without organs in the Artaudian/Deleuzian/Guattarian sense. He means to use this technique to make the visual material corporeal (ibid) and in this way his organic and frenetic use of the camera becomes an extension of himself, like an organ on the outside of the body. In Free Theatre’s *Frankenstein*, the body without organs was seeking freedom from the automatic reactions of a badly constructed body, from cliché and social systems of control, leaving it free to multiply in creative ways. I argued that the body without organs is a magical utopian ideal where the body can revel in the affects of pure intensities. Artaud argues that the body without organs will overturn stability and “dance wrong side out” (1976, 571). In its perceptually destabilising but still playful approach, this is what Fritsch’s “Faust-Keil” technique intends to do.

The “Faust-Keil” imagery can also be appreciated in terms of synaesthesia. In Paul Elliott’s article on film theory and neuroscience, he points out that synaesthesia used to be understood as a “sixth sense” (2010, 7) but recent neuroscientific research has moved away from such definitions and brought it more into the realms of what I would call the expanded awareness of polyphasic consciousness. It is a multi-sensory perceptual experience informed by one’s lived memory that is unique to each synaesthete, but might mean that shapes have a taste or smells are tactile. In *Synaesthesia: Classic and Contemporary Readings*, Baron-Cohen and Harrison explain it as “occurring when stimulation of one sensory modality automatically triggers a perception in a second modality” (1997, 3). A critical point is that the experience is not imagined; it is the way the brain of the synaesthete operates. Brian Massumi writes:

In synesthesia, other-sense dimensions become visible, as when sounds are seen as colors. This is not vision as it is thought of cognitively. It is more like other-sense operations at the hinge with vision, registered from its point of view. Synesthetic forms are dynamic. They are not mirrored in thought; they are literal perceptions. They are not reflected upon; they are experienced as events” (2002, 186).

Research suggests that synaesthesia is a universal process of perception that most of us grow away from. Elliot writes that it “can provide us with snapshots of how our brains work before cognition orders our world and constructs the reality that we are so used to” (2010, 7). This is especially significant for polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience because it lies in an expanded zone of awareness that is broader than the experience of monophasic rationalism and speaks to the moment of perception as it directly affects the body. Synaesthesia is thought to reside in the limbic system (lower animal brain) but higher cortical processes mask this kind of perceiving for non-synaesthetes. While it appears to affect everyone, only synaesthetes are consciously aware of this affect. Elliot extends its implications into film when he states:

Cytowic's thesis, that we might all be experiencing synaesthesia below the level of our consciousness, means that, when we watch a film for instance, our minds can be having one experience whereas our bodies and our limbic systems could be having another, altogether different one; one that is rooted in our past, in our sensual memory and in synaesthesia. It also means that the image of the spectator as the detached voyeur who merely witnesses visual images before him or herself has to be re-drawn to accommodate the experiences of the body and the animal brain (2010, 9).

While it is obviously not possible to know what every viewer is experiencing in his or her limbic system whilst watching a film (although an individual's response can be tested), there is a commingling of the senses in *Sonnengesang* that could be seen as a synaesthetic widening of the perceptual experience.

Massumi suggests a kind of hyperreal intensity is in operation for the synaesthete, which naturally forces a perceptual abstraction (2002, 189). The "Faust-Keil" technique creates an intense, dancing play of colours in the way light and movement is abstracted. A stained-glass window is frequently returned to and turned into a kaleidoscope of bright colours as the camera tilts and zooms wildly whilst images swim in and out of focus. In Chapter One I cited a study that suggests we exaggerate colour in our memories, transforming it, even *hallucinating* that it is a more intense shade than it really is (ibid, 210). The colour-images in *Sonnengesang* are often exaggerated and intense in their abstraction, revealing a visual correspondence between the senses that usually remains unconscious.

In *Sonnengesang* there is a synaesthetic coupling of visual information. "Faust-Keil" images have been superimposed (one of the signature magical cinematic tricks of Méliès), to create a coupling that is nearly constant throughout the film. Vertical dancing lights filmed using the "Faust-Keil" technique are overlaid with contrasting horizontal imagery, such as a landscape filmed from a moving vehicle. An alchemical double-play is evident as Fritsch plays with the fundamental duality at the heart of alchemy: sun and moon, male and female, fire and water, sulfur and mercury, light and dark, active and passive, high and low. The alchemical wedding of their union

strives towards balance and harmony. At one point, for example, a streaky sun and moon are superimposed over one another and appear to dance together in chaotic rhythms of freedom and becoming. Characters are also doubled: Mephisto and Faust, Mephisto and the female Mephista, Dante and Virgil, Fritsch and Faust.

One scene with coupled characters takes place in a cave, which, as mentioned earlier, can be understood in mythical terms as a liminal space that offers (metaphorical) entry into a variety of magical realms such as the dreamworld, the underworld, the domain of the Mothers, or facilitates the exploration of the unconscious or a shamanic trip. The cave can also represent the labyrinth of Faust's frustrated striving. In this particular scene from *Sonnengesang*, the silhouettes of Virgil and Dante slowly walk side-by-side towards the camera and into the blackness of the cave. They are at first only seen in the far distance, with hands and arms periodically merging into one, the synaesthetic joining of touch and vision. The joining of two senses in this way can be seen to facilitate entry into the consciousness-altering experience of synaesthesia.

The imagery in *Sonnengesang* can also be understood in terms of Deleuze's crystal image. Just like *Heart of Glass*, the film takes place in the magic of its own (dream)world, where real and virtual, 'truth' and 'deception' are indistinguishable and become instead a reality of its own making. Here the freedom and illusory qualities of Deleuze's 'powers of the false' predominate, unbound to the old Faustian narrative, or to filmic conventions such as continuity editing. There are explicit crystals: close-ups of icicles, references to crystalline waves and light dancing on water that is transformed into sparking sun crystals. Crystals are traditionally used for hypnosis and the imagery in these sequences suggests just such a perceptually expansive altered state.

Morin argues that cinematic images on screen are not practically lived – the spectator is out of harm's way. What we now know about mirror neurons, however, may signal an interesting update from Morin's 1950s view of cinema. In Paul Elliott's article on

film theory and neuroscience, he explains that recent research into mirror neurons suggests that to some degree we experience in our bodies what we see on screen, that our cellular and neurobiological structures are physically altered (2010, 10).

In 1996 Rizzolatti et.al. reported their findings into mirror neuron testing on monkeys. They write, “In area F5 of the monkey premotor cortex there are neurons that discharge both when the monkey performs an action and when he observes a similar action made by another monkey or by the experimenter” (131). There is some scepticism that the same phenomenon applies to humans,³³ although there appears to be clear evidence that it does (see for example Gallese et.al. 2004 and Stevenson 2013). Theatre and performance studies scholars such as Bruce McConachie (2013), Naomi Rokotnitz (2006) and Rhonda Blair (2008 and 2016) argue that it has profound implications for our understanding of empathy, affect and embodiment, and suggest that there is a symbiosis at the neuronal level between actor and observer; that without doing anything except watching, a spectator experiences an impact on the body below the level of awareness that corresponds to the action onstage or onscreen. In *Theatre & Mind* Bruce McConachie describes it as a kind of “mind-reading.” He writes, “sensorimotor coupling works together with imaginary transposition to facilitate the early stages of empathy – to allow one person to sense the emotions and read the intentions of another” (2013, 16). Just like the universality of shamanic abilities discussed in Chapter Two, or the telepathy discussed in Chapter Three, it would seem that yet another experience previously thought to be a kind of magic (mind-reading in this case) can now be seen as a natural part of the perceptual process. When Morin argues that “the permanent source of the imaginary is participation” ([1956] 2005, 207) he could not have known in the 1950s that specular engagement could be quite so physically affective.

³³ Watt Smith even goes so far as to write (in 2016), “To this date no direct evidence of mirror neurons in humans exists. And although the consensus among neuroscientists is that humans almost certainly do have a mirror system in the brain, there is growing scepticism about some of the claims made about it” (18).

In his article on film and neuroscience, Elliott cites a human study from the University of Rome, which is worth noting here. He writes:

Aglioti's subjects were shown videos of needles being pushed into the hands of volunteers on screen and the resulting neurological activity was measured using transcranial magnetic stimulation. At the same time the excitability of the subject's own hand was measured as well as a muscle that had no role in moving it. The results showed that subjects experienced a reaction in their own bodies that corresponded to the images they witnessed on screen (2010, 11).

In *Faust Sonnengesang*, there is footage of Fritsch's trip to Manila, which he undertook in the footsteps of Gründgens. There he filmed a Catholic re-enactment of the Good Friday crucifixion. Men are shown carrying the cross, being whipped across the back, nailed to a cross and strung up.³⁴ Fritsch states in the narration that the nail, hammer, blood and flagellation are all real, but in an article about Fritsch's work, Sinead Crowe points out that the "Filipino flagellant" is also a performer and the practice has increasingly become a tourist attraction, "an example of the commodification of authenticity" (Crowe 2007, 409). Authenticity is certainly the aim of these images. I have discussed authenticity as it relates to Herzog's concept of "ecstatic truth" and Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty. This view of the magical aesthetic experience is through physicality, either by doing it *for real* or *partaking* in the performance, so as to experience it first and foremost in the body.

Yet there is editorial stylisation of this footage in *Sonnengesang*. Diegetic sound has been muted in favour of poetic narration and choral music, and the images have been slowed down and edited. In order to better understand how the magical functions when the 'truth' of this documentary footage is mixed with the 'deception' of its stylisation, I will compare this section of *Sonnengesang* with the crucifixion scene in

³⁴ This footage was also used in Free Theatre's production of *Faust Chroma*, and plays above the character of Gretchen as she describes torture that includes having nails driven into her body. In a further layering, the footage from this section of Free Theatre's play is one of several scenes from *Faust Chroma* that recurs in *Sonnengesang*.

Mel Gibson's 2004 film *The Passion of the Christ*. Here, pain is displayed in Hollywood realism. For most of the film, the spectator is subjected to graphic, explicit and close-up violence as it is meted out on the body of Christ in his final hours.

I want to compare the sequence in the two films where the first nail enters the hand. In *Sonnengesang*, there is an anticipatory close-up of a nail, the hammer and the hand, and then a cut to a long shot of the whole body of a young man lying tied to a cross. This long shot is then held throughout the sequence in which the hammer comes down and the man loses control to the pain – his mouth opens in a silent cry of agony while his face squeezes tight and one leg jerks violently. *The Passion* has a similar close-up where the nail is placed in the middle of the hand, but the sharp point is highlighted as it is placed with rough force against the skin. As the hammer is raised the camera is placed under it looking up, so it falls towards the viewer, accompanied by the sound of swelling music and audible hammering. Several flashbacks provide some relief from the violence and frequent reaction shots individually show Mary, Magdalen and John's distress. There is also a close-up of a grimace on Christ's face – he displays pain but does not lose control like the Filipino man – rather, we see the stoic bravery of the Hollywood hero.

Elaine Scarry points out in *The Body in Pain* that it is not possible to know someone else's pain; it can only be experienced for oneself (1985, 4); an *experienced truth*. *The Passion* imagines Christ's crucifixion. But for the Filipino man, it is *unimaginable* – hence why it must be experienced. Only by doing it *for real* can he understand a little of what Christ is believed to have experienced. In this way, authenticity is not something one can just imagine but must be experienced through the body. Fritsch has stated that the real pain in these images contrasts with the actor who only portrays pain (Crowe 2007, 409). The Filipino man is not an actor. Even if the Black Friday crucifixions have become a tourist attraction, they are not performed for the audience. The mirror neuron experiment, where the needle was real, suggests that watching Fritsch's real crucifixion footage would provoke an affective reaction in the spectator.

But this is a side effect for Fritsch, who is not presenting these images for the purpose of affect. By contrast, affect is everything for Gibson's *The Passion*.

To understand how this affect functions, I will briefly review Morin's argument that all cinema can be seen as fundamentally magical. This is due to the way our perceptual process responds to filmic techniques such as doubles, metamorphoses and montage, and the part played by our imagination in bringing magical thinking into this process. But once these cinematic images developed into the normal and clichéd language of film, what had been a significant affect dulled into what Morin calls affective-participation. Magic became sentiment and heart-felt feelings, no longer reified, alienated and powerful. The order of image-affect-idea breaks down at the point of affect, which now becomes all pervasive and is turned into a commodity.

While I do not mean to suggest that Gibson is trying to be magical in *The Passion*, it can be seen in this way at least at the basic level of doubles, montage and metamorphoses. But it also employs Hollywood clichés so as to concentrate on repetitive and affective images that are designed to provoke a sentimental response. This applies to many Hollywood films but is especially evident in the excess of clichés in Gibson's imagery. The film purports to show what 'really' happened to Christ but only repeats clichés of pain and sentimental reaction shots. In this way it can be linked to the magic of 'deception' as it disguises itself as 'truth'. Extending this thinking one step further, the imagery also fetishises the *destruction* of Christ's body, and can therefore be seen as 'black' magic. As we learned from Jung and from *Doctor Faustus*, the demonic uses 'deceptive' and destructive magic for the purpose of distraction and for entertainment.

By contrast, Fritsch's imagery of the Black Friday crucifixions does not try, first and foremost, to provoke sentimentality. There are no reaction shots informing us how we are supposed to feel. The Black Friday crucifixions show us a 'truth' - they are real, but the stylisation works towards a deeper 'truth' than clichés of brutality and

sentimentality. Fritsch uses the imagery in his search to *understand* why this kind of devotion takes place and what can be learned from presenting such imagery. In this way Fritsch maintains the magical order of image-affect-idea. The magic that results seeks to raise consciousness rather than to revel in destruction and can therefore be seen as ‘white magic’.

What Fritsch appears to want to destroy is the sentimentality and brutality attached to our worn and relentless images of tragedy. He asks, “How do we escape from the images of tragedy that had [sic] been dominating us for centuries?” (2013, 4). There are many such examples in *Faust Sonnengesang*. Old movies show the horror of a headless body or images of hell, and documentary footage of Hitler can be seen in the segment on Emmy Göring. But Fritsch uses such imagery to highlight the ways in which they have been turned into empty distractions and entertainments. He seeks to overcome such tired repetitions, to move beyond them to consider a fresh approach to the Faustian issue of striving for the contented moment. In Goethe’s play, Faust will lose his wager with Mephistopheles if he wishes to hold on to a moment of contentment.³⁵ Fritsch rejects the negative and destructive elements of striving and dissatisfaction and instead seeks an affective intensity of pure sensation that alters spectatorial perception of the moment – a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic sense. “This is a film of the Now,” Fritsch says at the beginning of *Sonnengesang*, but, as Ledanff states, it is the ‘Now’ of an “*experience* which transcends the present, for the spectator” (2012, 149, emphasis mine).

In re-envisioning the moment, Fritsch seeks a new kind of striving. He writes, “*Faust Song of the Sun* is the attempt – against all ruling common sense – to maintain once again a certain human vision, or at least fulfilled moments” (2013, 4). This is informed, he says, by the philosophies of Gebser’s *Ever-Present Origin*,³⁶ Hannah

³⁵ “Werd ich zum Augenblicke sagen: Verweile doch! Du bist so schön! Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen, Dann mag die Totenglocke schallen” (Goethe [1808] 1961, 184.1699-1702).

³⁶ In *The Ever-Present Origin* (1985), Gebser outlines a series of structures of the historical development of human consciousness. The first is the archaic, characterized by zero-dimensional

Arendt's natality³⁷ and Ernst Bloch's utopian theories from *The Principle of Hope*. While a detailed discussion of each of these theories is outside the scope of this thesis, I would briefly like to consider Bloch's approach to *Faust*, which Hedges describes in *Framing Faust* as "the most serious and extensive counterweight to negative Faustian figures" (2005, 191). Human happiness is the aim for Bloch's philosophy. Hedges writes:

Central to this utopian project is Bloch's vision of the homecoming – life on earth finally made livable. For him, Faust's best quality is not that he is eternally unsatisfied or endlessly striving – this he regards as a "Schwindel, Hölle" (swindle, hell); instead, his greatness comes from the circumstance that he has a vision of a better world, but one that remains continually in progress – humanity's unfinished work as a dialectical process (2005, 192).

Bloch sees Faust's utopian ideal as a wishful landscape, an ideal that humanity has not yet arrived at ([1954-59] 1986, 2:811). He shifts the aim away from limitlessness onto a striving that works towards the "highest good" (ibid, 3:1016). In the process he privileges the phenomenological experience of the 'Here and Now' as a fulfilled and authentic moment (ibid). Ledanff argues that Fritsch seeks to shift the magical focus in *Faust* towards 'white' magic as he aims for a utopian 'Now' (2012, 162). Fritsch has re-envisioned the 'Now' as an embodied and potentially numinous experience, and reoriented the focus of Faust's striving onto the search for what I would call a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic consciousness sense. Older versions of

identity and original wholeness. The second is magical, a one-dimensional unity, where the concepts of anthro-cosmomorphism, collectivity and timelessness stand out. This is followed by the third structure, the two-dimensional mythic stage, where the boundary between subject and object solidifies and an awareness of inner life develops. It is described as an irrational mode of experiencing that ushers in the experience of time, particularly as it relates to retrospection. A three-dimensional mental structure follows, which is perspectival and associated with wakefulness, spatiality and rationalisation. The present is described as a four-dimensional sphere of integral consciousness. Among its characterizations is a contracting of consciousness, as well as a transparency, depth, intensity and an awareness of the whole (Rosen 2006, 152-157).

³⁷ Arendt's concept of natality involves a creative freedom and is concerned with, "the universal human capacity for fresh initiative" (Benhabib 2010, 5). Fritsch writes, " 'Natalität' ... is the word that the great Jewish philosopher, Hannah Arendt, gave the art of opposing the predictable, terrifying mechanics of history in order to turn it around" (2009, 1).

the myth saw Faust eternally dissatisfied or using nefarious means, including the magic of the Devil, to fulfil his every desire. A move away from limitlessness, greed, and the supernatural, amounts to a fundamental shift in *Faust* and one that requires a different approach to the demonic.

This has also been a motivating aim of mine throughout this thesis – to look through theatre and film for ways of discussing and approaching the topic of the magical that could emancipate it from ‘black’ magic. We have seen how the demonic has been linked with both the Jungian unconscious and the use of ‘deceptive’ magic for the purpose of distraction and destruction, as in Free Theatre’s *Doctor Faustus*. Jung argues that “[b]y understanding the unconscious we free ourselves from its domination” (1967, 44.64). Dealing with subterranean realms such as a shaman would encounter, or dealing with Mephistopheles in the guise of oneself, as in *Lekce Faust*, or fighting one’s imaginary bear, as in *Heart of Glass*, can lead to positive outcomes in the quest for a whole and healthy psyche. It is not as simple as cutting off the demonic – as we have seen, it is the demonic that can effect a necessary re-evaluation, “Part of that force which would / Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good” (Goethe [1808] 1961, 158.1336). It is the ‘deception’ that disguises itself as ‘truth’, or the ‘deception’ that is used for destructive purposes, that is negative in a ‘black’ magic sense.

Bloch sees the demonic in Goethe’s *Faust* neither as supernatural nor the unconscious in a psychological sense, but as political. He writes, “For [Goethe] the demonic is not the dark per se but the dark which exercises power. Seductive or dominating power and a power of fascination, which causes terror and desire together, attraction through terror” ([1954-59] 1986, 3:989). Rather than greedy striving he sees a ‘positive demonic’ in the form of Mephistopheles as, “the facilitator of Faust’s struggle for self-knowledge” (Hedges, 2005, 197). Fritsch’s aim can similarly be seen as redefining the Faustian task for the 21st century when he declares that “Mephistopheles or Mephista appear, not genuinely vicious, but how Faust imagines

them to be” (2013, 5). The final scene ends with Mephisto and Mephista taking Faust’s hands as they emerge into the ‘New’. As Fritsch writes, “It’s not the world coming to an end; it’s rather the coming of a new way of thinking and seeing” (ibid, 4).

Similarly, images of fire receive fresh concentration and an alternative reading, compared to its use as apocalyptic imagery in *Doctor Faustus*, *Heart of Glass* and *Into the Inferno*. Fritsch acknowledges its destructive potential and associations with hell, but seeks to overturn these (literally, in the case of volcanic imagery that is flipped upside-down) and focuses instead on its en-lightening and transformative properties.

Faust Sonnengesang can be seen to defamiliarise our perceptual process with its abstract “Faust-Keil” imagery and its affective intensities. The film feels as if it deliberately tries to lose the viewer in the proprioceptive sense; that is to say, to throw the viewer out of his or her rational mind in order destabilise habits and forge a new way through the old *Faust* material. This is where the new synapses and connections are formed that Fritsch is after.

Concluding Remarks

In the Introduction, I stated that I hoped to find a sense of the magical that was more significant for its immanence than its transcendence. I have argued that the broadening of perceptual processes, taking a polyphasic rather than monophasic attitude to accessing knowledge and experience, can bridge the gap between the ‘truth’ of neuroscience and the ‘deception’ of magical thinking. A polyphasic approach does not need to resort to supernatural magic when one can apply explanations derived from research in neuroscience.

This approach to magic as an aesthetic experience is not just to be imagined. For Herzog and Artaud, a physically rigorous experiential approach is required. This is

harder work than the easy distractions offered by Hollywood or what Artaud calls “gratuitous” theatre ([1938] 1958, 24). Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, Bergson “methodological intuition,” Jung’s “constructive method” and the practice of shamanism as Clottes and Lewis-Williams describe it, all involve courageous application. Artaud writes, “If our life lacks brimstone, i.e., a constant magic, it is because we choose to observe our acts and lose ourselves in considerations of their imagined form instead of being impelled by their force” (ibid, 8). This kind of magical experience, where there is a polyphasic attitude to consciousness, with deep immersive concentration and creative becoming, tries to reinstate a “constant magic” back into theatre and film, hoping to regain some of the power of the shamanic rituals of ur-drama and proto-cinema that began in the caves.

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