Examining EU Power Narratives within an Emerging Region

Examining Normative Power Europe and Market Power Europe through Images and Perceptions of the European Union within External Partners in an Emerging Region

Southeast Asia – Indonesia and Malaysia

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in European Studies in the University of Canterbury

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Group of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of the Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEF</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CETA</td>
<td>EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Crude Palm Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSEU</td>
<td>Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCUSOR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del SurÑemby Ñemuha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINT</td>
<td>Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPE</td>
<td>Market Power Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Single Market Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>The Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Abstract

Since its conception, the European Union (EU) has battled to confirm its legitimacy as an influential player within the global arena, where some have considered the EU to be a “new superpower” (Reid, 2004; Schnabel, 2005; McCormick, 2006), while others consider the EU as a “divided, weak declining power” (Zielonka, 1998; Menon, 2008). External EU partners have long been seen as vehicles for the EU to strengthen their legitimacy claims through the reinforcement of their own identity. In the wake of the rise of a multipolar world, the EU is attempting to position itself within the realm of notable political players like that of the US and China. The narrative of “Normative Power Europe” (NPE) (Manners, 2002) has been long argued to be an integral part of the EU’s identity as a global player. The exportation of European ideological norms and values through economic, social and political agreements between the EU and external partners has been abundantly discussed in literature. Yet, the EU’s pull of ideological/cosmopolitan norms and values is often contrasted by scholars with a pull of liberal/market norms and values which leads to another reflection, and different narrative, of the EU’s global power – “Market Power Europe” (NPE) (Damro, 2012), proposed to demonstrate the EU’s might and influence through its economic and regulatory clout in relations with external partners. This thesis examines critically these two narratives and explores their perceptions among third country partners positioning its inquiry within the context of the EU’s latest institutional crises – the Brexit vote, the refugee migration crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Understanding the formation, communication and reception of the NPE and MPE narratives is argued to be critical for understanding the EU’s role and position in the evolving global order – in both the eyes of the EU and in the eyes of its global counterparts. Literature shows a lack of an in-depth empirical analysis of the Asia-Pacific players, therefore, this thesis focuses undertakes a two-pronged methodology in order to understand how NPE and MPE characteristics are communicated and understood in two of the EU’s partners in the Asia Pacific – Indonesia and Malaysia. Firstly, influential print media discourses in the two countries are analysed in order to understand the perceived impact of EU communication outside of its borders. Secondly, the thesis analyses elite perceptions of the EU. Both datasets are examined factoring in historical and cultural filters in the emerging geo-political region of Southeast Asia, case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Chapter One - Introduction

The evaluation of European Union (EU) external perceptions offers a valuable perspective on external expectations of the EU. Relevant literature also argues perceptions of the EU to be a critical checkpoint on the EU’s self-visions as an influential global actor and potentially one of the power poles in the increasingly multipolar world (Lucarelli, 2007; Lucarelli, 2013; Larsen 2014). As a supranational organisation, the EU has been characterised as having a mighty economic clout warranted by its Single Market Economy (SME), encompassing all 28-Member States (Damro, 2012). The EU’s more recent common policy developments have led to the strengthening of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This relative success in economic, political and security areas adds to the EU’s self-visions as a humanitarian and justice actor, able to actively promote its normative agenda, as well as an influential regional power, serving as a model for regional integration and region-to-region dialogues. These self-visions, as a humanitarian, justice actor and influential regional power, combine within the EU’s self-image as a global power in the multipolar vis-à-vis established global powers (such as the USA) and ‘emerging’ economies. The latter includes the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) – a vanguard group of emerging countries – as well as MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey), arguably the second echelon of the emerging powers (BBC, 2014). Directed by a set of self-images, the EU’s self-identity as a global power informed by normative and market power narratives serves to create a belief by the EU for these norms and values to be recognised, accepted, and emulated by their external partners. Yet, the question remains, how these power narratives and self-identities formulated and projected by the EU are recognised and received by the EU’s external partners. Tracking resonances – or clashes – between the EU’s external and self-images is crucial in understanding the EU’s role in global affairs, external expectations of the EU and which conditions are favourable to establishing meaningful dialogues with important global partners in the world of shifting power.

Tracing external perceptions of the EU’s narratives of ‘Normative’ and ‘Market Power Europe’ aims at identifying the perceived parameters of these frameworks, and questions if these perceptions support or contest the image of the EU as a global power. Insights into the reception of the two power narratives and their hypothesised interactions with each other adds to the growing literature on EU external perceptions within EU foreign policy studies (for reviews of the EU perceptions field see Lucarelli, 2007; Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2010; Lucarelli, 2013; Larsen, 2014; Chaban & Holland, 2014, 2015; Elgström & Chaban, 2015; Hoang, 2016; Chaban & Kelly, 2017). Echoing the literature, this research argues that systematic investigation of EU external images may help to assess the EU’s perceived capability and the opportunities it presents for regions and partners around the world. This thesis investigates EU images in Southeast Asia, a geopolitical region known for its historical links to Europe as well as cultural differences. Two countries are chosen as case studies – Indonesia and
Malaysia. Indonesia is a part of the MINT grouping of newly emerging economies, and Malaysia is an influential actor within a regional organisation the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Both countries are seen to hold characteristics that make them the “perfect partner for the EU in the 21st century” (Schmidt, 2016): they are located in Asia (one of the EU’s foreign policy priority areas (GSEU, 2016)) and characterised by dynamic economies (thus offering new opportunities for the EU’s trade). On the other side, in the eyes of the EU, “the rising influence of emerging powers and viewpoints” (Commission, A blueprint for an EU approach to a changing world order, 2017) has begun to challenge “democratic foundations, concern for basic human rights and liberal economic principles that have underpinned global governance since at least the end of the Second World War” (Commission, A blueprint for an EU approach to a changing world order, 2017). In this context, the emerging actors and regions like China, India and Southeast Asia are expected to contest the influences by the EU, especially in Asia – specifically those that are informed by, and based on, normative grounds.

This research is led by four main research questions 1) How do insights into EU external perceptions held by emerging regions and actors (Southeast Asia, in this case) help to assess the extent of the EU’s influence and recognition as a global actor?; 2) How does the narrative of ‘Normative Power Europe’ support or contest the image of the EU as a global power?; 3) How does the narrative of ‘Market Power Europe’ support or contest the image of the EU as a global power?; 4) How do two sets of perceptions interact with each other and the EU’s self-perceptions, and what do these interactions mean for the EU relations with external actors? A set of research sub-questions question cultural, historical and geopolitical filters which influence the EU’s perceptions as a power they are: What EU-specific factors impact EU external images? What location-specific cultural filters may influence the perceptions on the EU in Indonesia and Malaysia? What global factors influence perceptions on the EU in these two countries? What is the interplay between exogenous vs. endogenous vs. global issues? Special attention goes towards the EU’s images communicated by influential media discourses in the two countries and EU perceptions among national elites (politicians, business people, media professionals and non-government sector leaders). These two discourses are seen as the most influential when it comes to shaping and disseminating ideas and frames related to foreign policy and actors within a given society. After answering these questions, the thesis ends with discussion on how best the EU could trace and modify the reception of its power narratives in third countries to fine-tune its bilateral dialogue and recalibrate mutual expectations.

This research starts with a number of predictions. Firstly, we predicted that images of the EU within “normative” and “market” power narratives, communicated by leading news media and national elites, would lean towards a negative evaluation. News media tends to prioritise negativity in general,
as negative news is believed to leave a deeper impression on readers (see Pedersen, 2014; Pinker, 2018 for media’s use of negative coverage preferences). Elites as readers of this type of negative media may be influenced to form perceptions similar to the visions exported by the media. However, in addition to this general tendency typical in media practices worldwide (global factor), the expectation is that the EU, seen through a prism of European ideological and market values, may be perceived in a more negative than positive light due to the historical colonial legacy, and the post-colonial sentiments, of Europe in the two cases (location-specific factor). For instance, Dutch rule over Dutch East Indies, modern day Indonesia, was characterised by the “most repugnant racism” (Vltchek, 2012, p.17), an issue which may have an impact on current relations. In this instance, we expect to see differences between EU self-visions and external perceptions of the EU as a normative and/or market power within case study countries elites discourses. Finally, we expect that negative developments in the EU, linked to a number of its institutional crises, will also affect EU images as a normative and market power negatively. The prolonged Eurozone crisis and on-going refugee migration crisis (with a significant number of Muslim migrants affected) will predictably leave a negative dent on the EU’s images in the two countries (EU-specific factors). Based on expectations informed by observation of Southeast Asian media in the past (Chaban and Holland, 2008; 2014; 2015, Chaban, Kelly and Holland, 2014), for the media analysis specifically, the thesis expects most of the EU news to be coming from international sources, and predominantly from the English-language source. This sourcing is expected to lead to a particular type of coverage – namely without many “local hooks” for the EU – as international sources typically do not develop location-specific angles in their reportage sold globally.

Comparing media and elite images of the EU, the expectation is to see a more visible profile of the EU as an economic and civil power in the elite opinion, due to the elites’ higher awareness of foreign policy and international relations issues, including the EU’s normative agenda, as well as its immense economic strength potentially affecting the two locations (EU- and location-specific factors) (see Mills, 1956 on elites importance to decision making; see Elgström and Chaban, 2015 on elites informed images of the EU). A contrasting expectation is that the EU will not be viewed as a political power (Larsen, 2014 highlights this in his research). This is due to the perceptions of China and the US as the most powerful political players in the world and the region (global factors).

Empirically, this research focuses on evidence from two data sets. The first data set is a media analysis of EU images in four English-language newspapers in Indonesia and Malaysia, where 383 articles were collected using the online sourcing agency “PressDisplay”, during the period of January
1st to December 31st 2016. The Star and The Sun were chosen, as they are the two largest English-language newspapers in circulation in Malaysia in addition to The Malaysian Reserve regarded as one of Malaysia’s leading business publications. The Jakarta Post, based in Jakarta, was chosen from Indonesia due to it being the largest English-language newspaper in Indonesia, as well as a newspaper read by local educated readers and elites. The second data set, elite interviews came from the on-going “EU Global Perceptions” project (Chaban and Holland, 2014; 2015). The face-to-face interviews were conducted by Dr Daniel Novotny with 51 elites from Indonesian and Malaysian political, business, civil society and media circles in 2012-2013 in the two countries.

In terms of structure, this thesis firstly overviews the contexts of the EU’s respective relations with Indonesia and Malaysia. It begins with investigating the realities of the EU’s geopolitical pursuits and its historical relations with its neighbours and more distant partners, with a special focus on Southeast Asia and Indonesia and Malaysia specifically. The thesis then reviews relevant literature that lays out theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis. This leads into an in-depth review of self-visions of the EU by scholars and EU officials by investigating the two of the EU’s leading power narratives of Normative Power Europe (NPE) and Market Power Europe (MPE) (can just use the abbreviations as already abbreviated earlier ). Review of the EU perceptions literature illustrates why this scholarship is important for EU foreign policy studies and discuss a combination of factors impacting EU external images. This section also includes an overview of psychological mechanisms of image formation argued by image theory and political psychology to influence the formation of images of actors in international relations.

Next, the thesis details the methods focusing on the protocols of media content and elite opinion data collection and analysis. The empirical analysis in the follow-up section is presented against the theoretical frameworks outlined in the literature reviewed. The empirical section examines systematically how the NPE and MPE narratives projected by the EU are recognised, communicated, and perceived by external partners. After discussing empirical findings against initial predictions, the thesis concludes with recommendations for future research on EU relations with Indonesia and Malaysia, and a wider Southeast Asian region. Conclusions also outline direction for theoretical modifications in understandings of the EU’s projected power narratives.

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1 The January-February period of media analysis marked a media pilot analysis, and the period of 1 May-31 December was the main period of observation.

2 Other English-language media outlets from Indonesia focus on online content rather than print editions.
Chapter Two - The EU’s geopolitical actions

Understanding the EU’s external perceptions are intrinsically connected to the contexts in which international partners act and interact. The following section reviews the EU’s foreign policy objectives in general and towards Southeast Asia in particular. It first considers a broad context of geopolitics and explores if the EU aspires to be as a geopolitical actor. The section reviews how the EU interacts with external partners in different modes – in bilateral terms, as well as through multi-, trans- and inter-regional dialogues. These modes are considered for the case of EU-Asia relations, and within it, EU-Southeast Asia relations (case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia). The section examines historical and cultural backgrounds of EU interaction within the region, in addition to political and economic. This comprehensive consideration builds a background for this thesis research into EU perceptions in the two Southeast Asian countries.

2.1 Geopolitics – what is it?

Geopolitics has traditionally been defined as; “a state-centred conceptualisation that focused on perceived grand narratives of the world order, both real and imagined” (Scott, 2011, p.149) by political actors, scholars and institutions. For some scholars, it is an area of conceptualising the world on the “borderland of human geography and political science” (Mamadouh, 2015, p.54), an “interface between geography and international relations” (Mamadouh, 2015, p.55). Other researchers define it in more general terms, as “ways of looking at the world” (Dodds, 2007, p.5 cited by Sarawat & Meena, 2017, p.113). Recently, there has been a move away from traditional state-centred focus in defining geopolitics, supported by re-conceptualisations in political theory and philosophy and modified definitions of the increasingly globalising world.

At the core of geopolitics is a vision of major world powers competing for spheres of influence over certain regions and resources (Deudney, 1997, p.96-97 cited by Raik, 2016). Control over strategic territories and resources would lead to an actor assuming the title of a global power, hegemon or authority that would set the agenda for the direction of world politics. This phenomenon is not historically unique. Modelski (1987) argued several world powers have been seen in this dominant position since 1494. According to Modelski, the period between 1494 and the beginning of the 20th century is characterised by four distinct phases; 1) global war; or a period when a number of powers compete for the position of a single dominant global power; 2) world power, or the period when the winner of the global conflict asserts itself and its agenda; 3) delegitimation, or the period when the level of global control of the winners power slowly erodes leading to; 4) deconcentration, the period when new powers rise to challenge the established global power for dominance leading to a global conflict and restarting of the cycle (Modelski, 1987, p.40).
The colonial period from the 15th century to the mid-20th century was specifically instrumental in establishing a ‘core-periphery’ dynamic within the international system, where the European colonial powers (Northern and Western Europe in particular) were considered to be at the core centralising political power and influence while subordinating their colonies in the peripheries – in Africa, the Americas and Asia (Grodzicki & Geodecki, 2016). Initially, naval power was assumed to be the prerequisite to exert influence and power globally, leading to the likes of the Portuguese (16th century), Dutch (17th), British (18th and 19th) empires to dominate globally. Modern times brought different arenas open for influence, among those cyber space and market power as possible territories. Arguably a new, 21st century came with a period of delegitimation or even deconcentration of the US position as a global hegemon. This is due to the rise of emerging economies, including potential power shifts to Asia.

According to Flint (2017), geopolitics as a theoretical framework was born out of the analysis of the imperialist pursuits during the colonial period of the European colonial powers at the end of the 19th century. This period is characterised by increased competition in the global arena; notably the German-British rivalry, that ultimately fuel the geopolitical antagonisms and scholarly reflections on them. This period of geopolitical theorisation and discussion is seen as “classical geopolitics; the type of politics limited to international relations or interactions between countries” (Flint, 2017, p.3). New conceptual insights into geopolitics came in the 1980s, specifically critical and feminist geopolitics. These novel geopolitical conceptualisations critiqued the classical approach by applying tools of post-modernism, e.g. some had a specific interest in the role of women in geopolitics to counteract the oversimplification, others attempted to challenge the highly Eurocentric attitude ascribed to the foundations of the classical approach (Flint, 2017).

The development of critical and feminist geopolitical discussion argued that geography and borders did not exist prior to politics. Instead, statesmen and thinkers used geopolitics in the “spatialisation of international politics” (Saraswat & Meena, 2017, p. 113), which ordered the world on their geographies, strategically advantaging certain regions as important, while others were considered not (Saraswat & Meena, 2017). Importantly for this research, these novel reflections in the field of geopolitics aimed to distance themselves from the traditional Eurocentric geopolitical formulations pushing the boundaries of geopolitical theorisation. This included theorisation of post-colonialism from the standpoint of non-western regions as well as examination of the role of non-state political actors including NGOs, International organisations, individuals and groups (Sharp, 2013; Flint, 2017).

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3 This core-periphery power dynamics is now being contested by the rise of emerging powers traditionally in the periphery but currently challenging the core countries over influence and power.
2.2 The EU as a Geopolitical actor

Geopolitical research traditions provide for understanding the EU on the world stage. Reviewed literature suggests two arenas for the EU’s geopolitical actions. The first one deals with the consolidation of an “economic, social and political European space” (Scott, 2011, p.147) evidenced by the formation of the supranational entity of the EU, with its series of enlargements, the principles and values adopted by all Member States. The second one deals with the EU’s actions towards external partners and the EU’s projection of its normative identity onto these external partners. This latter arena is sometimes labelled the “Europeanisation of societies outside its borders” (Scott, 2011, p.147). Some scholars argue that these geopolitical actions in the latter arena – undertaken with a goal to influence EU external partners in line with the EU’s intended goals – carry characteristics of actions of an empire. Others have seen the EU’s power assertions aiding in creating the EU’s image as a counterweight to the USA, an alternative source of influence around the world (Andersen, 2007).

However, in the wake of existential crises impacting the EU – and among those Brexit, the on-going issues surrounding the Eurozone and the migration issues – these instances may have negated this effect. The EU’s Global Security Strategy (2016) outlined the EU’s desire to become a “responsible global stakeholder” (GSEU, 2016, p.8) seen to “promote a rules-based global order” (GSEU, 2016, p.8) in the changing multipolar world. The following section dissects the EU’s multidimensional geopolitical approaches in its external relations and pays special attention to the EU’s actions towards Asia, and Indonesia and Malaysia in particular.

2.3 The EU’s foreign policy formulation

The EU’s ability to act politically as a foreign policy actor began when the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was introduced in 1970. The EPC was a way to ensure European foreign policy coordination between the European Community’s (EC) members (at the time) (Smith, 2004). The EPC was formed as a mechanism to balance out the overall economic might that the EC held, and to allow the Member States of the EC to have a single unified voice on world affairs and act as a “step closer to a political union” (Smith, 2004, p.8). The EPC was structured as an informal foreign policy consultation between the Member States aiming to promote the interests of the EC throughout the international community. The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 helped in codifying the EPC, giving the foreign policy strategy ‘Treaty status’ amongst the EC’s legal framework.

In the wake of the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav crisis, it became clear that the weakness of the EPC was its lack of ability to cope with foreign policy matters within the EU’s own neighbourhood (Smith, 2004). Thus in 1992, in an attempt to strength the foreign policy objectives of the now EU, the Maastricht treaty established three pillars, which further enforced
foreign policy coordination between Member States with the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU as one, the supranational European community as the second, and the cooperation of police and judicial systems as the third.

However, the perception of the EU as a coherent and unified actor in foreign relations was dealt considerable blows after the formulation of the CFSP. The EU’s poor response to the Yugoslav crisis, and the withdrawal of US military from western Europe due to the fall of communism, encouraged discussion on the potential establishment of military capabilities of the EU. But this was seen as having a direct impact on the EU’s civilian power image projection, which was thought to be better serving in Eastern Europe than a military presence (Smith, 2004).

Further revisions of the CFSP with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1996-7 created the office of the ‘High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy’⁴ to co-ordinate and represent the EU’s foreign policy. Yet, EU foreign policy was again subject of criticism in the post 9/11 world. The critics commented on the split between EU Member States between those who supported and those who rejected the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq. This split effectively demonstrated that the “CFSP was shattered and in disarray” (Schmidt, 2015, p.448). This disarray and division amongst EU Member States on foreign policy issues created an environment that triggered a particular image of the EU – “the EU’s external image was severely blunted and the internal incoherence further strengthened the external perception of the EU as a weak and disjointed actor” (Bava, 2013, p.212 cited by Schmidt, 2015, p.448). Therefore, unification and strengthening of the EU’s foreign policy was needed to establish and project the EU as a credible and unified political actor in international affairs.

In 2009, with the enforcement of the Lisbon treaty, the pillar system ended and the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) was created⁵. The creation of the HR/VP was aimed at promoting greater foreign policy coordination for the EU, and acting as the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s international diplomatic core. With the aim of the EEAS to “strengthen the European Union on the global stage, give it more profile, and enable it to project its interests and values more efficiently” (EEAS, 2017a), it gave the EU an institution to voice their foreign policy objectives in external partners.

Yet, in the aftermath of the recent political crises on and near the EU’s borders, specifically the Arab Spring, the Ukraine crisis, the irregular migration crisis and the Syrian crisis, foreign policy of the EU

⁴ Held by Javier Solana until 1 December 2009
⁵ Firstly, Catherine Ashton from the United Kingdom from 9 February 2010 to 1 November 2014 and then by Frederica Mogherini from Italy from 1 November 2014 to the present.
has again been subject to much criticism. Engagement with the EU’s neighbourhood, the re-emergence of Russia as a regional great power and the perceived power shift from the global West to the global East (including Asia) has placed the EU’s foreign policy objectives and mechanisms in the firing line. Establishing a unified stance on political issues will always be difficult for the EU with the 28 Member States\(^6\) holding different priorities on issues. However, if the EU wishes to be recognised as an international global power, foreign policy coherence will have to play a special role in this recognition. Effectiveness and coherence of foreign policy have both been considered to be directly and not directly related. Chaban, Elgström and Kelly (2016) discuss how these perhaps are not directly related, where images of coherence were absent from their study, effectiveness was apparent. It was thought, “this divorce in opinion could be dependent on the unique combination of location-, issue-, and time-specific perceptions” (Chaban, Elgström and Kelly, 2016, p.512). Thus critical reflections on the relations between effectiveness and coherence and its impact on the image of EU foreign policy will no doubt continue to be discussed in the relevant research.

As a constantly evolving foreign policy actor of *sui generis* nature, the EU is shaping its interactions with global partners, including partners in Asia, in several modes: multilateralism, regionalism, interregionalism and bilateralism. This multidimensional approach to the EU’s external action is detailed below, with special attention to EU interactions with its partners in Asia.

**Multilateralism**

Multilateralism is defined here as the “practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990, p.731), and as “a way of acting that involves several states working together as a matter of practice” (Scott, 2013, p.31). Scholars differentiate between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ types of multilateralism. The former can be observed in informal dialogues between states and groups, such as the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). The latter is a form of cooperation with more binding agreements and structures among its cooperating actors. The EU, at its core, is considered to be a multilateral organisation. It exercises a supranational approach for its 28 Member States, and promotes effective multilateralism globally, which is also seen as an aspect contributing to the EU’s normative agenda. Literature of the EU’s multilateral efforts globally have discussed a series of factors needed for effective multilateralism and argued motivations for the EU to pursue multilateral efforts in the global arena. Peterson (2010) outlines minimum conditions for multilateral efforts to be successful in their application. One condition is patience by members in the pursuit of multilateral efforts – arguably,

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\(^6\) With the Brexit referendum in June 2016, EU member state the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU meaning in 2019 the number of Member States will go from 28 to 27.
there is a noticeable gap between the desired efforts by an organisation and the realisation of these efforts. Political impulse and leadership as well as the right domestic and internal political environments are other vital components for effective multilateralism.

The EU’s pursuit of multilateral efforts has been discussed as being due to the EU’s formation as a multilateral organisation itself. For others, it is also a result of “American unilateralism during the Bush administration of 2001-2009” (Scott, 2013, p.31), as well as the EU’s inability to act with any authority amongst the international power players. Several authors discuss the effect of the perceived inability of the EU to act effectively in the global arena by saying that multilateralism is a way of “compensation for EU weakness to operate in a multipolar great power way” (Scott, 2013, p.43). Others echo this sentiment – arguing that the EU is “impelled to endorse multilateral institutions and multilaterally developed norms, particularly in the areas in which its actorness is unclear” (Costa, 2013, p.1223). These arguments explain that the EU’s pursuit of multilateral efforts may have grounds, especially if you consider the EU’s inconsistencies in dealing with different partners. As said above, multilateral pursuits are thought to shield the EU from its perceived lack of ability to act in the global arena. However, the EU’s increasing use of bilateral agreements and particularly strategic partnerships with powerful states globally has been thought to impact on the EU’s prioritisation of multilateralism. Peterson (2010) alludes to this shift to bilateral agreements in trade policies. The example Peterson considers is the FTA with South Korea, citing less effort needed to negotiate with one state rather than a series of states with different interests from their local businesses and industries. Renard (2016) also comments that while the EU would most likely aim to pursue a multilateral world order, in the “short to medium term, enhanced bilateralism and minilateralism appear more promising for pursuing the EU’s values and interests worldwide” (Renard, 2016, p.32).

Looking at the EU’s multilateral approaches in Asia specifically, the EU can be credited for its informal multilateral dialogue with Asian actors within the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) format, accompanied by the EU’s outreach initiative with civil society through the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). ASEF is a social and cultural outreach mechanism of ASEM that aims to promote

“Greater understanding between Asia and Europe through intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges. Through ASEF, civil society concerns are included as a vital component of deliberations of the ASEM” (ASEF, 2018).

ASEM was formed in 1996 between the EU Member States, the seven members of ASEAN as well as China, Japan, South Korea and the European Commission, and created to foster dialogue in an informal and noncommittal fashion between Europe and Asia guided by their three cooperation pillars under political, economic and socio-cultural arenas (Reiterer, 2009). Today, this cooperation is
facilitated by the biennial ASEM summit by the heads of states and governments, the presidents of the European Council and European Commission as well as the secretary general of the ASEAN (ASEM, 2018).

With Indonesia and Malaysia being a part of these multilateral organisations, ASEM and ASEF, examining their interactions with the EU in this format may highlight linkages between the EU’s actions within this multilateral approach and bilateral approaches with the likes of Indonesia and Malaysia. One aspect of examination is discussed in literature examining the effectiveness of ASEM highlights concerns that come with engagement of the EU for external partners. Other authors, in contrast, argue that ASEM offers the EU a mechanism to enhance its legitimacy in global governance. Addressing the former dimension, Zhang (2008) discusses how ASEM has been a vehicle to serve European interests over that of Asian interests. This is highlighted by the formation of the organisation upon European experiences, which is common when the EU attempts to externally project models of European governance to partners. This insistence by the EU to base other regional organisations upon their experiences typically results in the systems becoming based upon the European way, making the European organisers the “rule-setters if problems are dealt with in the European way” (Zhang, 2008, p.502). This vision of a Eurocentric focus of the ASEM process and asymmetric notion of the Europe-Asia relationship highlights a need for a reconfiguration of approaches for better reflect an equal partnership in the face of growing strength of Asian members in the global political and economic arenas.

From the latter perspective, of attempts to enhance EU legitimacy in global governance, Jokela & Gaens (2012) examine the role of ASEM as the EU’s attempt to enhance its legitimacy in global governance in the face of their own internal legitimacy debate. At the very least, Jokela & Gaens (2012) see that the EU has “succeeded in creating a forum for constructive engagement and political dialogue to complement its economic agenda” (Jokela & Gaens, 2012, p.161) in the form of ASEM where the growing power of Asia is recognised and an increased political dialogue is needed for the EU to gain a foothold in the emerging region. This dialogue is still marked by the argued lack of effectiveness of the CFSP on the EU’s behalf, the forceful promotion of normative objectives from Europe on Asian partners and the issue of where leadership and sovereignty resides – with the EU or its Member States? However, this dialogue between the EU and its Asian partners within the ASEM framework have already “yielded results in the form of an increased understanding of human rights norms and their application” (Jokela & Gaens, 2012, p.162) by utilising ASEF as a vehicle to address sensitive human rights issues which are stymied within ASEM. This could highlight a viable mechanism for how the EU can communicate its normative messages while acting within the political and economic pillars within ASEM.
Finally, Thu (2014) dissects the contribution of ASEF to ASEM, where weaknesses and strengths of ASEM are mirrored within ASEF. Thu notes that there is a lack of separation of the socio-cultural and political pillars within the engagement process due to the proposed elitist feeling of the ASEM process. Even though there has been a considerable effort to split the pillars, it is suggested that realities must consider “political agenda[s] and sensitivities of Member States” (Thu, 2014, p.417), surrounding disproportionate funding contributions and maintaining commitment to multilateral and regional and state contexts. However, among the perceived lack of relevance and the non binding nature of agreements, Thu sees that ASEF is now an integral part of European-Asian dialogue, and is described as “a safe space for communication that does not alienate any of its partners” (Thu, 2014, p.417). As such, ASEF offers a potential to be a vital component in EU-Asia multilateral relations in the future. EU efforts in multilateral approaches may highlight similarities within bilateral agreements that they may have with external partners like Indonesia and Malaysia.

**Regionalism**

From examining the EU’s relations with multilateral organisations, zooming in on their approaches to regionalism and regional integration promotion may highlight similar aspects of the EU’s actions with external groups and partners. Regionalism is seen as a mechanism for sovereign states to group together in a geographical proximity to form a “unified shield against global shock, cushion economic downturns and in so doing boost security and lock in political structures” (Grenade, 2016, p.509). The EU is considered the prime example for regional integration. Three distinct waves of regionalism have been seen, the first generation labelled ‘old regionalism’ in the 1950s and 1960s, which was characterised by a focus on trade and security (Söderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2006). The second wave, or ‘new regionalism’, is more complex, comprehensive and political than in the past (Schulz *et al.* 2001 cited in Söderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2006, p.255; Söderbaum & Shaw 2003) looking at the interconnectedness of society and branching into non-economic matters such as culture, justice, the environment and wider society. Söderbaum & Van Langenhove (2006) also discuss the presence of new, third generation regionalism. Third generation regionalism characteristics encompass acting more externally, with the pursuit of interregional dialogue and becoming far more proactive in global affairs. Ultimately, this new third generation regionalism “is, by design, oriented more externally and towards shaping global governance” (Söderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2006, P.257). The EU can be considered within all three waves of regionalism: within the first wave, through the creation of the single market and as a security measure to stop conflict within Europe; the second wave, as it transformed to encompassing all facets of society; and the third, as it pursues dialogues with other regional groups and global
players. Other regional groups – such as MERCUSOR, ASEAN, and the EU’s interaction with ACP countries – have begun to act in similar ways. However, the EU is still considered the leading example of these three generations of regionalism and a showcase for successful regional integration.

Importantly, regional integration, and its promotion, has been a major foreign policy objective for the EU with its external partners (Rössler, 2009). With its foundations as a regional project, the EU has attempted to transport its experiences and lessons to other regions. This transportation – in hope that external partners will emulate the EU’s regional integration practices – helps in strengthening the EU’s internal and external perception as a capable and influential actor. These regional integration promotions are seen in the EU’s interactions with MERCOSUR7 in Latin America, ASEAN8 in Southeast Asia, SAARC9 in South Asia and partnerships with the African Union. The interaction with other regional groups in this mode gives rise to the EU’s internal and external visions as a centre point for regional agreements, which again helps in strengthening its own regional image and “own regionalist ideology” (Söderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2006, p.251). Söderbaum & Van Langenhove (2006) also discuss that the image of the EU interacting with other regions not only enhances the EU’s legitimacy as a prominent actor in the global arena, but also helps other regions gain visibility and actorness10 through increased interactions among regional groups on the global scene.

However, critics have claimed that the EU’s insistence on external partners to emulate its model in other regions that differ from Europe culturally and historically presents an “element of narcissism to the EU’s promotion of regional integration” (Fioramonti & Mattheis, 2016). This regional integration promotion, amongst other normative and market norms promotions, by the EU could also be considered as a soft form of spreading Eurocentric ideals and neo-colonial ambitions attempting to assert their superiority (Hoang, 2016). In the face of crises facing the EU (Brexit, irregular migration crisis, or the ongoing issues within the Eurozone), external partners may call into question some aspects of European regional integration methods (Fioramonti & Mattheis, 2016) and propose alternative forms of regional cooperation and integration as better suiting other regions. Implications of the impact of existential crisis’ on the EU’s regional integration promotion could be seen within elites discussion on the adoption or adaptation of further measures into regional organisations like ASEM, ASEF or ASEAN.

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8 Association for Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN
9 South Asian Association for regional cooperation - SAARC
10 Wunderlich (2008) “Distinguishes five requirements of actorness: (a) internal identity/self-perception, (b) external recognition, (c) international presence, (d) some form of institutionalisation and (e) a set instruments and policy-making procedures” p.18.
**Interregionalism**

Region-to-region dialogue has been labelled in the relevant literature and practice as “interregionalism” (Doidge, 2011). Interregionalism is defined as “a process of widening and deepening political, economic and societal interactions between international regions” (Roloff, 2006, p. 17) Three focal points are argued for interregionalism – all helping to explain the degrees of institutionalised relations between regional entities (Doidge, 2011):

“The view of such group-to-group structures as a mechanism for claiming significance in the international system remains prominent; a refocusing of bilateral regionalism; and an apparent re-evaluation of the utility of trans-regionalism (Doidge, 2011, p.79-80).

In addition, three distinct types of interregional practices are argued. The first is considered to be the “pure form” (Rössler, 2009, p.317) of interregional dialogue between two regional groups. Here, importantly for this analysis, the EU-ASEAN relationship is cited by the literature. The second one is “biregional or transregional” (Hänggi 2000, p. 7), which defines the interaction between two or more regional groups and/or nation-states (ASEM and APEC are examples here). Finally, the third type is discussed as hybrid, where regional groups partner with nation-states in bilateral agreements. This type is observed in the EU’s bilateral agreements and particularly with its strategic partners (Rössler, 2009).

**Bilateralism**

Finally, the EU is engaged with external partners in what is considered to be the most traditional form of relations between actors in the international system, bilateralism. According to Renard, bilateralism is often seen as the “default level of international relations” (Renard, 2016, p.31), a dominant form of cooperation for state actors. This form of interaction is thought to undermine the EU’s preferences for multilateral and regional approaches with external partners as bilateral forms of engagement are seen to be far more effective. Historically, the EU has had bilateral agreements with states globally, however, the EU’s preference was for multilateral and regional dialogues as discussed above (Renard, 2016).

Renard (2016) notes that the EU has become more willing to engage in bilateral agreements, due to the change in the global political arena, especially in trade agreements, to achieve its objectives, a direction which could be considered to undermine the EU’s normative agenda promotion (the EU’s normative agenda to be discussed further in 4.1 Normative Power Europe). One major example of this is the failure of the EU’s FTA with the regional group, ASEAN and the EU’s re-focus on bilateral agreements with the ASEAN members, which are considered to be more successful interacting with one state rather than a groups with different interests and desires, in achieving EU trade and political
objectives. In undertaking the bilateral approach, the EU has prioritised relations with major political players – and approach also known as ‘strategic partnerships’. The EU has ten strategic partners globally, with a number of these partners being strategically placed within Asia, those being China, Japan, India, and South Korea. Additionally fellow BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, South Africa, emerging economy of the MINT countries – Mexico, as well as North American economic power houses Canada, and the United States (US).

The use of strategic partnerships by the EU – as discussed by Michalski and Pan (2017) – sees strategic partnerships as a result of the “reconfiguration of the international system by the rise of emerging powers in the form of the BRICS countries” (Michalski & Pan, 2017, p.611-612). Thus, strategic partnerships can be used by international actors as a mechanism to “assert their international identities and enhance their status and prestige as global actors” (Michalski & Pan, 2017, p.612). In the case of the EU, its partnerships with these ten influential international actors was hoped to create an image of the EU as an influential political actor who is seen to interact with some of the world’s global powers, the likes of the US and China. As such, strategic partnerships are primarily thought to be an instrument for the EU to strengthen its political clout with major global powers and emerging economies.

Relevant literature looks at the EU’s relations with Asian strategic partners in particular, with many pointing to problematic dialogues (Michalski and Pan, 2017; Kavalski, 2016). Michalski and Pan (2017) discussed China’s opposition to certain human rights values promoted by the EU in the context of this strategic partnership. Kavalski (2016) looked at EU strategic partnership with the India. Kavalski’s assessment of the partnership is highly negative – it is argued to be “neither strategic, nor much of a partnership” (Kavalski, 2016, p.205). This assessment is considered to be due to little common interests, beyond commercial, between the EU and India, as well as India’s unwillingness to adopt the EU’s normative agenda and conditionality with the proposed FTA. Indian elites believe the EU’s conditions within the FTA would impact negatively on local businesses and industries. Finally, a limited partnership is also due to the perceived treatment of India by the EU. In particular, New Delhi is annoyed that India is seen to be treated unfairly by the EU and not considered as an equal even with India’s rise as an economic and political force in Asia. Similar to China’s reluctant reaction to adopt or at least listen to the EU’s normative agenda, India is unwilling to meet EU demands over climate change and multilateral efforts. MacFarlane (2004) (cited in Kavalski, 2016) sees the EU as a bit player in Asia with limited impact and leverage within Asian affairs. This risks becoming less with the strengthening of China and India’s economies as well as their emergence as global political players, along with other emerging powers like the new MINT group and regions like Southeast Asia. Other Asian countries (such as Indonesia and/or Malaysia) may have similar positions towards the
EU’s normative agenda within external relations; therefore looking at partners who are not strategic partners may uncover similar images of rejection of EU norms.

While most of the literature pays attention to the EU’s bilateral relations with its strategic partners in Asia, this thesis focuses on the EU’s bilateral relations with Indonesia and Malaysia. Both are dynamic Asian economies, yet both are not strategic partners of the EU. This is where this thesis adds value into the study of EU-Asia relations. The next section focuses on the EU’s external action towards Asia. The thesis next discusses the EU’s foreign policy direction towards Asia, with the emergence of the ‘Asian century’ recognised by EU officials, followed by a focus on the complexity of Southeast Asia as a region, where its geopolitical importance in the 21st century, diverse cultural setting, and historical ties with Europe promote it as an ideal candidate for research. This leads into a zooming in on two countries within this diverse region in Indonesia – an emerging power within the MINT countries – and Malaysia, a prominent member within ASEAN. Both of these countries were once colonies of former European empires, which also make for an intriguing filter in the perceptions research.

2.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, examining the EU’s geopolitical motives and actions can be seen through consolidation of an “economic, social and political European space” (Scott, 2011, p.147) in their supranational single market, and the projection of their normative agenda in the “Europeanisation of societies external to their border” (Scott, 2011, p.147). These processes have been discussed through their foreign policy formulation, and their historical engagement with external partners in their multidimensional approach to external relations seen in their multilateral, regional, interregional and bilateral relations with various multilateral, regional and bilateral partners. In examining the EU’s preferences for multidimensional approaches dialogue through their various relationship structures, we turn to the EU’s actions within Asia. We investigate their approach in the proposed “emerging Asian century” and then within a specific investigation into the diverse and complex region of Southeast Asia, and our two case study countries of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Chapter Three - EU external action towards Asia

The EU’s interactions with external partners can be characterised as a two-dimensional geographical model, where one dimension focuses on the EU’s immediate neighbourhood countries, those on its Member State borders and regions encompassing those borders. These interactions are governed by the EU’s “Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP). The second-dimension deals with the EU’s interactions with more distant partners not envisioned as a part of the EU’s neighbourhood. The EU’s interaction with Asia, and specifically Southeast Asia, belong to the latter group. This section dissects the EU’s foreign policy directions and initiatives in its dialogue with Asia.

The “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (GSEU, 2016), a new leading policy, put a particular emphasis on the EU’s relationship with Asia: “there is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security” (GSEU, 2016, p.37). The perceived shift of power from the global West to Asia in the East is argued to be behind this EU emphasis to re-direct political and economic attention towards the emerging continent. The priority assigned by the EU to Asia at a strategic level justifies the focus for this thesis. This section explores how the emergence of Asian states in the 21st century and historical and cultural factors in the region may have implications on the EU’s geopolitical motivations in Asia. Multilateral, interregional and bilateral approaches by the EU towards Asia will be discussed. A special focus will go to the EU’s interactions with Southeast Asia. The section will also examine the oldest interregional relationship of the EU with ASEAN as well as the EU’s bilateral relations with the two Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Malaysia.

3.1 Emerging Asia: ‘Asian Century’

The dawn of the 21st century saw a power shift from the traditional core powers in the Western world (the USA and Europe) to countries, which were formerly considered on the periphery, like Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and in particular in countries in East Asia: China and India. The rise of these dynamic economies of the BRICS – as well as MINT – countries is now said to be “disputing the traditional western powers hold on the matrix of power” (Lee et al., 2015, p.188) assigning images of economic clout to these emerging actors, in particular the rise of economic giants China and India, as well as the emergence of regions like Southeast Asia. This shift of economic power ‘from the West to East’ has led to the 21st century being labelled as the “Asian century” (Goh, 2015; Lee, 2016; Lee et al., 2015; Rizvi, 2012). This description follows on from conceptions of the 20th century as the “American century” (Bacevich, 2012), and the 19th century as the “British Imperial century” (Hyam, 1976), due to the global influence of the US and UK during those time periods. The 21st century shift in power is not only changing the image of Asia globally, but also within Asia itself. This perceived shift in power is predicted to trigger uneasy tension or even conflict in future international relations.
This shift is not only about economic power relations, but also about the societal structures. The societal change also encompasses the decolonisation of society and the deconstruction of colonies, described as the “colonial matrix of power” (Lee et al., 2015, p.187) contesting Eurocentric ideals. The colonial matrix of power stands for the ways of “management and control which emerged out of the 16th century” (Lee et al., 2015, p.187) by the European colonial powers which spread these models to their colonies to lay the foundations of the international system we see today. These processes go hand in hand with emergence of non-western critical thinking (Goh, 2015). In the search for alternatives to the traditional western thought, the non-western regions discuss different, potentially better, structures to battle social inequalities and environmental issues that arguably come with the western style governance. However, the ‘rise’ of the so-called Asian century is still a debated notion, as gradually increasing economic strength has not yet successfully translated into global political power. Jorgensen (2013) suggested that economic weight “is one thing, but the power we find in power politics is something different” (Jorgensen, 2013, p.55).

3.2 Southeast Asia: Distinctly Complex Region

Southeast Asia as a region has attracted interest from a wide range of scholars. The region features a number of established and emerging economies, as well as unique geo-political, cultural and historical profiles that make this regional distinctively different from other regions in Asia. With a special focus on Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, visions on the EU, examining how their formulated political, historical and cultural profiles may influence relations with the EU.

In geopolitical and historical terms, Southeast Asia has been a ‘melting pot’ of many traditions and cultures due to its geographical positioning. It was described as a “crossroads” (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001; Roberts, 2011: Tajuddin, 2012) for trade through their straits into the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean with access to Northeast Asia, India, the Middle East and the Pacific. Culturally, this region is a meeting point for four of the “great surviving human traditions” (Roberts, 2011, p.369) of the Sinic, Indic, Islamic and North Atlantic–Western civilizations which provided an environment for them to coexist for nearly a millennium (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001). Significantly, each of these traditions and civilisations separately are “crosscut by complex and intricate division” (Sharp, 1962, p.5 cited by Roberts, 2011, p369) due to the clashes between traditionalism and modernity, as well as the clashes between religious fundamentalism and secular ideals. This adds to the complexity of the geographical, historical and cultural profile of Southeast Asia.
The importance of religion in Southeast Asia is another defining feature. As a ‘crossroads’ of Sinic, Hindu, Islamic and Western civilizations, the region is home to traditional religious practices coming into contact with each other for centuries. However, scholars have underestimated Islam’s influence as a cultural and national identity marker (Hefner, 1997), where this influence importantly crosses “political and geographic boundaries of the region” (Federspiel, 2007, p.3). The first interaction between European colonisers and the Muslim majority colonies – in the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya– saw two different approaches by the colonists (Ali, 2016). Dutch colonists aimed at exploring various dimensions of Islam and its practices in the East Indies (Ali, 2016), whereas the British had experience with religious diversity from the Indian subcontinent and pursued an apathetic approach as a way of accepting Malaysian culture (Ali, 2016, p.75-76). After the decolonisation and the end of conflict in Vietnam in 1974, the 1970s displayed a resurgence of Islam in the Muslim majority countries. This religious resurgence has left a mark on Southeast Asian culture and national identities in Muslim majority countries, in particular Indonesia’s separatist movements within the Aceh province.

Tensions between Islam and the Western world since 9/11 left their imprint on the region, where the largest Muslim country in the world and several Muslim majority countries reside. Indonesia has been discussed as a potential model for ‘moderate Islamic practices’, where the religious extremism seen in the Middle East is apparently absent apart from small nationalist movement in some Indonesian provinces (Aceh). However, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent foreign policy direction of the USA, countries within Southeast Asia have become recruiting grounds for Islamists (Beyer, 2010). This is thought to be due to three reasons, notably the “general belief that the US are attacking and killing other Muslims, amongst the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a result of the failure of American leaders to clarify they were not “in a war with Islam and the fight is not against Muslims” (Beyer, 2010, p.100).

Historical ties with Europe make Southeast Asia an interesting region for examination. Apart from Thailand, all other countries within Southeast Asia were once a former colony of various European colonial powers. The French controlled Indochina, now Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The Spanish, and then the US control, over the Philippines. The British controlled Malay, Singapore and Brunei. The Dutch held control over the Dutch East Indies, present day Indonesia. The Dutch rule was characterised by the “most repugnant racism” (Vltchek, 2012, p.17), a point that may lay foundations for animosity in future relations. Historically, the colonies main function for the colonial powers was

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11 An area where the EU has a active presence through their mission to the region in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) after the "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Ache Movement"(EEAS, 2017b). Also the EU’s humanitarian aid to the province, discussed further by Gunaryadi (2006).
“to provide resources and raw materials” (Vltchek, 2012, p.xiv). Presently, some literature argues the EU could be considered as neo-colonists where examples in certain areas highlight a new form of colonialism – for example, low cost labour manufacturing is based in these countries (within Africa and Asia) with products sold back in Europe and North America with large profit (Langan, 2012).

One of the historical legacies of colonialism is also the arbitrary creation of territories (Kingsbury, 2001), which intersected and cut through Southeast Asia’s ethnic, cultural and religious lines. This arbitrary formulation of boundaries is argued to instil a social hierarchy within the colonies where native elite and cooperating groups were given privileged treatment by the colonists (Kingsbury, 2001). This artificial formation of countries boundaries may have aided in developing the foundations for today’s states in Southeast Asia, but also helped in creating regional divisions (Narine, 2002). The struggle for independence and the process of decolonisation are all seen as major points of national identity creation for these states in Southeast Asia (Christopher, 2011; Haake, 2003). The historical legacy of colonialism, as well as the impact of religious and cultural norms and values could impact on the diffusion of European norms and values within current and future relations. The following section specifically looks at the relationship of the EU and ASEAN and then details EU relations with Indonesia and Malaysia respectively.

3.3 EU engagement with Southeast Asia

**EU-ASEAN interregional relations**

The Association for Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN, was established on the 8th of August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand when the five founding members of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines signed the Bangkok declaration (ASEAN, 2017a). It was formed as a way to combat encroaching communist threats from Indochina, as a means for economic development and as a mechanism “of building a community of and for all Southeast Asian states” (ASEAN, 2017a). Another reason for the formation of ASEAN is thought to be as a reaction to the UK’s membership into the European Community: Malaysia and Singapore lost trade preferences in their trade with the UK similar to former colonies of the British Empire (Palmujoki, 2001; Chaban *et al.*, 2013b, p.438). Meaning Malaysia and Singapore turned to their neighbours’ to cushion the blow of losing preferential treatment to the UK market. Today, ASEAN has 10 members adding Brunei (in 1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999) into the regional group.

Relations between the EU and ASEAN began in 1972 where both regional groups recognized a “shared commitment to regional integration as a means of fostering regional stability, building
prosperity and addressing global issues” (ASEAN, 2017b). Relations have gone from strength to strength since then and in 1977 official “Dialogue Relations” were established between the EU and ASEAN, a term ASEAN is said to give to its privileged partnerships, including the EU (EEAS, 2017b). Currently the EU is ASEAN’s second largest trading partner after China with 13% of trade annually (EEAS, 2017b), however the EU’s annual trade share has dropped from 16% in 1990, and 14% in 2003 (Plummer, 2009, p.278) demonstrating the decreasing share of EU as a percentage of ASEAN’s trade annually, and perhaps also the EU’s importance. The EU will hope that this trend can be reversed as ASEAN “as a group of rapidly growing countries […] offers considerable market potential” (Robles, 2014, p. 1327) with its market potential of 650 million people within the regional group for EU investment and trade.

The EU-ASEAN relationship is considered to be “old interregionalism or bilateral interregionalism” (Hänggi, 2006, p.7) a dialogue between two regional organisations (Hänggi, 2000; Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004; Rössler, 2009; Meissner, 2016). It is suggested that the EU and ASEAN have the “common DNA” (Corderio, 2014, p.4) due to their long association with each other which has last for over 40 years, and have similar goals of peace, stability and prosperity for their citizens, and aim to “address issues with a multilateral approach and work with regional security issues of common interest and concern” (Corderio, 2014, p.4). However, there is also evidence that the two regional groups have visible differences, notably in their formulation, historical background and governance approach.

These differences can be seen in the cultural conflict through the different preferences in the regional organisations foundations between the EU and ASEAN. One aspect is the impact of the historical backgrounds of the regional groups on their formation and continuing evolutions, where the EU was formed as a result of the destructive wars that plagued the European continent in the early 20th century. In contrast, ASEAN Member States had only had a short period of existence after decolonisation and had not experienced the kind of devastating interstate war seen in Europe (Camroux, 2010). ASEAN’S intergovernmental approach differs from the EU’s supranational approach where it is seen that ASEAN’s relationship with its Member States shows minimal capacity to be invasive in the sovereign affairs of its Member States (Narine, 2016, p.166), and that the activities and process of ASEAN in the past have “never promoted fully-fledged economic, political or security integration in any substantial way” (Narine, 2016, p.166). Adding to this difference in governance models is seen also in the EU’s use of civil society within their own public diplomacy and foreign policy formulation, whereas for ASEAN and its Member States they have only ever played a minimal role, tending to be as vocal opponents to human rights violations within the Member States (Ravenhill, 2008; Corderio, 2014). The promotion of the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 has been a step towards a similar supranational approach to economic
governance in ASEAN much like that of the EU’s single market (ASEAN, 2017b). Inclusion of Member States with dissimilar levels of political and economic development is a point of conflict for the EU-ASEAN relationship.

The EU was vocal in its opposition to Myanmar’s inclusion into ASEAN, however ASEAN officials and Member States rejected the EU’s objections. The EU’s objections were of a normative nature where Myanmar’s human rights violations were points that the EU thought needed addressing before inclusion. ASEAN took an approach in line with their geopolitical strategies and saw inclusion of Myanmar as a mechanism to counter balance increasing Chinese influence. If Myanmar was to be left out of the regional organisation, it is thought that the conflict state would fall under the ever-increasing influence of China (Schembera, 2016). This rejection of the EU’s position on Myanmar’s inclusion demonstrates a cultural clash between Western ideals and Asian ideals. ASEAN members discussed they wished to deal with the situation in their ‘ASEAN Way’ as they could understand the situation through their historical and cultural similarities (Robles, 2004).

The relationship balance between the EU and ASEAN has historically been characterised as asymmetric with a ‘donor-recipient’ dynamic (Hwee, 2008). This dynamic was formed as the EU and ASEAN, at the time, were at different stages of economic development. The EEC (at the time) was considered a developed economy, whereas ASEAN and its Member States were only seen as developing countries and thus helped in reinforcing the perception that in the beginning ASEAN countries were in a far “weaker bargaining position” (Hwee, 2008, p.85). The bargaining position was seen further with the use of development aid given towards ASEAN members, based upon EU Member States colonial relationship with the ASEAN members. An example of this was with development aid given to the likes of Indonesia, largely funded by their former colonists the Netherlands, and Malaysia and Singapore funded by the United Kingdom (Camroux, 2010; Corderio, 2014). Only recently has the strengthening of economic systems in Asia, including in Southeast Asia, begun to level the economic relationships between ASEAN and the EU.

Literature on the EU-ASEAN relationship covers a wider array of areas from the interregional approach to relations (Robles, 2004): as a stepping-stone for the EU to stronger ties within Asia (Hwee, 2008), and examining perceptions of the EU within ASEAN as a recognized global power (Portela, 2010; Fitriani, 2011, 2014; Chaban et al., 2013b). Interregional relations between the EU and ASEAN are discussed by Robles (2004), who saw that the two partners in the oldest region-to-region relationship in the world have shied away from social matters, and overlooked the area of human rights and dialogue in the past, instead the “two actors focused on material resources” (Robles, 2004, p.169). Robles (2004) saw that initial interactions between the EU and ASEAN were in line with historical linkages, in particular former colonial powers and their former colonies (Robles, 2004). An example of this is seen with in Indonesia where they received “94% of Dutch granted aid”
(p.134) to ASEAN partners in the 1970’s, whereas Malaysia received nearly “34% of UK grants” (p.134) during the same time period, demonstrating the UK and the Netherlands, former colonial powers, having preferences for their former colonies. These economic relations and historical linkages have been seen as points of contact for greater interaction within Southeast Asia and as a stepping stone for the EU to forge stronger ties in Asia (Hwee, 2008). It is suggested that both the EU and ASEAN use this relationship for mutual benefit, as a mechanism for ASEAN “towards policy learning’s” (Hwee, 2008, p.87) and their increasing regional cooperation as well as for the EU, as ASEAN can be considered a “gateway to the wider Asia-Pacific” (Hwee, 2008, p.90).

Literature on perceptions of the EU in ASEAN (Portela, 2010; Fitriani, 2011; 2014; Chaban et al., 2013a) discusses cultural, economic and geopolitical filters, which have influenced perceived images as a global power. Historical legacies of previous European relations within Southeast Asia, and a supposed “European superiority complex” (Fitriani, 2011, p.54) are seen as some of the cultural filters that are considered as forming Asian resentment and trust issues for Asian partners with the EU, thus impacting on the EU’s perceptions within Asia. Portela (2010) demonstrates the EU was not recognized as a legitimate power, or as strongly as the US due to the lack of a “unified entity” (Portela, 2010, p.152). It is thought the EU would only be recognised in the same bracket as the US once it attained military capabilities to openly challenge the US. Fitriani (2014) identified that in the wake of the euro debt crisis, there was a perceivable turn by the EU to ASEAN countries to help recover from the financial down turn (Fitriani, 2014). This demonstrated the “global power shift, recognized in Asia, moved towards Asia” (Fitriani, 2014, p.78) and the likes of the EU acknowledged this shift in power. Chaban et al., (2013a) who investigated the perceptions emanating from Southeast Asian elites, found the EU as a “powerful indirect influencer” (Chaban et al., 2013a, p.70) as well as being a valuable example of a model for regional integration for ASEAN. Wong (2012) however, discusses that rather than the EU being described as a model for ASEAN’s regional integration, the EU is actually more of a reference point for “ASEAN’s past and future institutionalization” (Wong, 2012, p.679). Failure in EU-ASEAN cooperation and FTA negotiations have created an environment where the EU is unable to adequately coerce or attract ASEAN to accepting its normative approach within the negotiations. This is evident in the perceived “willingness of the EU to abandon its principles to accommodate ASEAN’s preference and demands” (Wong, 2012, p.679) in regards to conditionality on EU principles and the presence of Myanmar leadership in discussions. Wong (2012) suggest that “very little of the EU’s latent power is exercised in its interactions with ASEAN” (p.679).

Adding to Wong’s analysis, special attention is given to normative and market approaches (Sahakyan, 2016) and their ability to be transferred and emulated within ASEAN (Wong, 2012), where some successes and failure have been evident (as pointed out by Wong, 2012). One factor that may
influence the success or failure of these approaches is due to the promotion of the “ASEAN way” (Truong & Kino, 2016), based upon an amalgamation of regional cultural practices influenced by the historical and cultural mechanisms of diplomacy as well as post colonial forces of state craft, “sovereign equality, non-interference and non force which was considered to be new to the post-colonial Southeast Asia” (Truong & Kino, 2016 p.74). This helped in formulating a process “for members to engage in dialogue and build mutual confidence in order to find a peaceful resolution to conflict, thereby building unity within a community” (Truong & Kino, 2016, p.74), and “reject the use of supranational solutions, in favour of forms of informal and intergovernmental cooperation” (Orcalli, 2017, p.177), as well as a stance of non-interference in other sovereign states matters (Majumdar, 2015).

Cultural factors of the ASEAN way have deep roots within Asian values, which guide political choices “in compliance with what is considered to be appropriate behavior in terms of collective identity” (Orcalli, 2017, p.178). This importance of Asian values within political dialogue has been evident in past state leaders in ASEAN (Visone, 2017) to

Justify as values system that prioritizes economic development and the consequent improvement in standard living and can, therefore, overshadow individual rights at least until their denial is considered necessary to ensure economic success (Orcalli, 2017, p.178 citing Ehr-Soon Tay, 2007).

Therefore, economic success was widely acknowledged as being the result of the ASEAN way, in the regional cooperation between states post-1997 financial crisis (Nishikawa, 2007).

Other examples of this process is seen in the likes of political and security dialogue between the ASEAN Member States, with a notable example being Myanmar’s inclusion into ASEAN, a move objected by the EU (Du Rocher, 2013: Schembera, 2016), the inclusion was championed for security and geopolitical reasons by ASEAN members and highlighted ‘ASEAN’s way’ of non-interference and peaceful resolution to conflicts. This has been ignored by ASEAN Member States that are considered to have “frequently meddled in the internal affairs of other countries” (Majumdar, 2015, p.76). For instance, conflict over the South China Sea boundaries is a current issue which has, in the past, resulted in armed conflict between ASEAN Member States Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, as well as these members coming into conflict with global rising power China over this issue.

However, there have been examples where the EU has become more involved in the region, notably through the proposed (and subsequently abandoned) FTA negotiations between the EU and ASEAN, then the subsequent FTA negotiations with ASEAN Member States (Cameron, 2013). Further, a form
of regional integration through the AEC (Plummer, 2009) has been argued to be an example of the emulation of the EU’s market norms and practices within ASEAN. The AEC is seen as the starting point for great regional integration based upon similar lessons from the EU, however the issue of state sovereignty will always impact on the success of this example of EU market norms transference.

The next section digs deeper into the two case study countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. It is estimated that by 2050 Indonesia will have a population of over 300 million people with the 4th largest GDP (up from 8th in 2016). Malaysia by comparison with a much smaller population, estimated to be 40 million by 2050, with the 24th highest GDP, up from 27th in 2016 (PWC report, 2016). This projected rise of the two case studies economies could be vital in understanding the images the societies have of themselves, if they are aware of their economic potential, they may encourage a partnership with the western world on egalitarian foundations, whereas one which may project western partners as superior may be negatively evaluated by sectors within those societies.

**Indonesia**

Indonesia is considered “in many ways the ideal partner for the EU” (Schmitz, 2016): as one of the largest states within ASEAN, with a population of 261 million (World Bank, 2017), an annual GDP of USD 932 billion (World Bank, 2017) as an emerging economy within the ‘MINT’ group (BBC, 2014) with projections of it being the 4th largest economy by 2050 (Fealy et al., 2016), the third largest democracy in the world, and the largest Muslim country in the world (Schmitz, 2016). However, social and cultural norms expressed by Islamic and Asian civilization could be a potential point of conflict for the EU’s normative self-vision. The emerging nature of the Indonesian economy is a fertile environment for the EU yet to promise its market norms. Fealy *et al.*, (2016) suggested the potential for Indonesia to become a global power, but recognise the need for a “coherent set of aims, and realistic strategies to achieve them” (Fealy *et al.*, 2016, p.99). A partnership with the EU may aid in setting the aims for Indonesia. Finally, the historical linkages between Indonesia and Europe are divisive. As a former colony formerly ruled by the Netherlands, Indonesia may see EU normative and market approaches as a form of neo-colonialism.

Perceptions of the EU within Indonesia have been discussed at length by Islam (2011), Widodo (2007) and Gunaryadi (2005; 2006) who have all focused on the EU-Indonesian relationship within their research. Gunaryadi (2005) focuses on how the 1997 Asian financial crisis impacted on the EU-Indonesian relationship, as well as the growing interdependence of the EU and Indonesia moving forward, and increasing the visibility of the EU within Indonesia. The financial crisis was seen as a catalyst for political, economic and social change in Indonesia where regime change after three decades of authoritarian rule ended with the resignation of Suharto and parliamentary elections in
1999. The EU (at the time of the article) was Indonesia’s largest source of FDI for its growing economy, and the flip side saw the EU’s need for Indonesia as a market for its commodities (Gunaryadi, 2005). Traditional perceptions of the EU can be closely associated with a “trading community” (Gunaryadi, 2005, p.54) with little attention towards their supranational identity, but that has changed since the enlargement in 2004 when more European states were added with whom had little interaction with Indonesia in the past. This enlargement identified a need for more information on the EU and the incoming (at the time) Member States. Suggestions of dedicated research centres and centres for excellence in relation to EU studies are championed as a mechanism for more information. A critique of the EU’s presence in Indonesia surrounded the presence of individual EU Member States within Indonesia, thought to be an “important gateway” (Gunaryadi, 2005, p.61) to improve the EU’s visibility. However, for a coherent presence in Indonesia, Gunaryadi suggests the EU “should be considered as more of a single entity in the coming years instead of as fragmented states” (Gunaryadi, 2005, p.61).

Gunaryadi also examines the role of the EU within the peace process in the Indonesian province of Aceh (Gunaryadi, 2006). Gunaryadi investigated the EU’s motive in the peace negotiations by trying to understand their “political, economic, geopolitical and strategic motives” (Gunaryadi, 2006, p.89) in the EU’s initiative. Amongst this it is thought that Indonesia is a prime target for the EU’s normative agenda as it is “favourable terrain to promote democracy, good governance and rights values, and is a constructive partner in combating transnational terrorism” (Gunaryadi, 2006, p.90). Examples of these motivations are seen in their aspirations “for global power status in world politics; an ethical obligation to its development cooperation commitments; voice a moral message to the world that conflicts can be solved peacefully” (Gunaryadi, 2006, p.92-93) are very much in line with their normative approach.

Economic interests in EU humanitarian cooperation was seen in rebuilding Aceh after the 2004 Tsunami, as well as involvement in Aceh, a predominantly Muslim province would hopefully help in “drawing sympathy among the Muslims and to fortify the west-Muslim world’s relations” (Gunaryadi, 2006, p.95). These motivations underline the EU’s desire to be recognised as a global power, in line with its normative approach, as well as aiding in the EU’s “strategy of getting closer to Asia” (Gunaryadi, 2006, p.98). This humanitarian aid within the predominantly Muslim province of Aceh has exposed the public perception that the EU scores a better perception with the Indonesian public than the likes of the US. This public opinion is considered as a “main domestic determinant in foreign policy-making” (Gunaryadi, 2006, p.98) and continued approaches by the EU may in fact yield even greater results in the future.
Widodo (2007) examines the EU’s presence in Indonesia as a result of the influence of internal EU dynamics such as the single market, and increasing external actorness, in particular the reorientation towards Asia, amongst the change in global landscape and the rise of inter-regional dialogue. Widodo focuses on the EU in terms of its economic activities in Asia and argues the reorientation of the EU towards Asia in terms of the economic and political priorities. Historically, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK have had a presence in Indonesia in terms of FDI. Arguably, economic interactions pave the way to the projection of the EU’s market power norms, instrumental in the EU’s position within world trade systems and upgrading its economic links with Asia and Indonesia in particular.

Politically, a number of the EU’s normative approaches resonate with Indonesia. Among those are human rights as well as fight against crime and terrorism in Indonesia. The normative dialogue with Indonesia conceived with resonating issue in mind may ultimately result in stronger market links between the EU and Indonesia.

Significantly, Islam (2011), who examines the EU-Indonesia relationship, argues the continuing lack of presence of the EU within Indonesia. Islam championed the idea that Indonesia needs to be focused on similarly to China and Japan – as a strategic partner. This ‘upgrade’ of relations to a strategic partner status would not only benefit Indonesia who strives for “a stronger role in the region and as a global player” (Islam, 2011, p.169), but also the EU. A status of a ‘strategic partner’ assigned to Indonesia would help to “dispel notion the EU finds Southeast Asia as irrelevant” (Islam, 2011, p.165) compared to other Asian strategic partners. This is supported by Islam’s earlier work (2007) that argued that the EU with a stronger presence in Indonesia would help to shape the image of the EU as a power in Indonesia and Asia as a whole. Finally, an ‘upgraded’ status to EU-Indonesia relations would be considered not just a stepping stone into the EU’s greater role in Asia, but also “give a much needed fillip to the EU’s standing in the Islamic world” (Islam, 2011, p.169), due to Indonesia being the largest Muslim country in the world.

The changing nature of the EU-Indonesia relationship has also been examined. Scholars argue there has been a “perceptible shift in the EU’s concerns with Indonesia from political issues to economic ones” (Camroux & Srikandini, 2013, p.566). This is potentially due to the emergence of Indonesia as a rising global economic power, a leading example of the rise of the former margins (Sarawat & Meena, 2017), the changing ‘donor-recipient’ dynamic and the traditional core-periphery relations (Hwee, 2008). Indonesia’s rise is thought to exemplify that the current relationship is based less on “development dependency and more on a dynamic economic partnership” (Camroux & Srikandini, 2013).
Norms and values promotion is another distinct part of the EU-Indonesia relationship. Discussed by Schmitz (2016), one aspect that impacts on Indonesia’s profile as an emerging power is tainted by one issue: corruption (Schmitz, 2016). The EU has been active in addressing this issue with education and training initiatives to combat corruption within Indonesia society, especially in combating illegal logging, which has become an “institutionalised practices in Indonesia for decades” (Schmitz, 2016, p.80 citing Agung et al., 2004, 10). Murray (2015) also examines norms promotion by the EU in Southeast Asia, in particular Indonesia citing Oegronoseno (2012) who states, “EU Member States that have no historical linkages to ASEAN tend to place ASEAN at a third or fourth level on their foreign policy priorities, while Member States with historical relations with the region are sometimes stuck in a colonial mind set” (Murray, 2015, p.245). This mind set could affect norms recognition and emulation within Indonesia, as norms promotion could be considered as a form of neo-colonialism from European influences onto local customs. This may impact the perception of the EU in Indonesia in general, its images of a global power in particular.

**Malaysia**

Similar with Indonesia, Malaysia is another promising partner for the EU, while also being Asian, largely Muslim, and democratic (Schmitz, 2016). It is not as economically powerful as Indonesia, but has been considered to be developing at a fast rate – projections have it as the 24th highest GDP by 2050, up from 27th in 2016 (PWC report, 2016). Similar to Indonesia, the Asian and Muslim civilizational cultural norms may be a point of contestation for the EU’s normative visions projected. Malaysia too has historical linkages with Europe as a former colony of Britain. Historical grievances surrounding colonial legacy and the ‘abandonment of the Commonwealth’ by the UK when Britain joined the EEC, in 1972, could be factors impacting the normative and market power outreach of the EU and perceptions of it.

Perceptions of the EU from Malaysia have been extensively examined by Chaban et al., (2013b), who have identified leadership issues, economic prowess and cultural filters as intervening variable on perceptions formulated. It was seen that the Malaysian stakeholders of the study were by far the “most critical of the EU’s international leadership abilities” (Chaban et al., 2013b, p.442). Chaban et al., see a possible explanation for this critical vision of EU leadership is due to the perception that the US, followed by China are the “real political leader of international politics” (Chaban et al., 2013b, p.442). As a “successful and dynamically growing economy” (Chaban et al., 2013b, p.442), Malaysian respondents contributed to the perception of the EU as an economic leader. Interestingly the EU was barely visible as an environmental leader, a characteristic that the EU has actively aimed to be a world leader in (Chaban et al., 2013b). Finally the Islamic religious cultural filter resonated
negatively with Malaysia respondents, where issues surrounding the ineffective management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the “EU’s ambivalent position towards Turkish accession” (Chaban, et al., 2013b, p.442) were cited.

Other scholars looked at the effectiveness of EU norms being accepted into Malaysia society, discussions example of positive reception, such as cosmetic product movement in ASEAN (Zakaria, 2015), as well as negative reactions (e.g. the contestation of EU norms promotion in Malaysia (Robles, 2014; Napoli, 2013). In the former example, the EU’s single market norm of the free movement of goods has been adopted by the cosmetic industry in Malaysia (Zakaria, 2015). This was achieved through the harmonization of the products regulations between the ASEAN countries. This example illustrates that they EU market norms may be recognised and emulated by an external partner – a development that arguably strengthens the EU’s image as a power.

In another study, Napoli (2013) examines the reasons for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and Malaysia. With the emergence of Asian economies, their growing importance and market potential in the future is a massive factor in the pursuit of the FTA between the EU and Malaysia (Woolcock, 2007; Kim, Lee and Park, 2010). Other reasons are to “avoid competitors like the USA, keen to develop links into the region” (Napoli, 2013, p. 216 citing Garcia, 2012) and acquire a stepping-stone into the greater Asia region counterbalancing the growing Chinese presence in the region. Perhaps more importantly for this thesis, it is also hoped that the FTA could influence EU norms promotion and emulation within Malaysia and ASEAN in general as previous Partnership Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) were seen to be ineffective, with limited success “in creating norms changes among members [in ASEAN] due to weak incentivisation and high compliance costs” (Napoli, 2013, p.225).

Literature is also registering contestation of the EU’s normative projections in Malaysia. Robles (2004) discusses that norms emulation in the form of acceptance of human rights norms and values may be rejected by Malaysia and ASEAN members due to these countries “buttressed” (Robles, 2004, p.135) by Asian values ideology that claims to be a “coherent alternative to the liberal-democratic understanding of human rights” (Robles, 2004, p.135). This was exemplified by Malaysia rejecting, on behalf of ASEAN, any type of standards from the EU to be imposed upon ASEAN Member States, the example being the EU’s opposition to Myanmar’s inclusion into ASEAN. Attempts to link human rights to any development or economic agreement between the EU and Myanmar were rejected (Robles, 2004). The European Commission reluctantly said that in future agreements there would be “no link between trade and human rights” (Robles, 2004, p.144).
3.4 Conclusion

To conclude, in examining the EU’s external actions in Asia, specifically Southeast Asia and the countries of Indonesia and Malaysia, a number of political, historical and cultural factors have been seen to impact these interactions and the resulting perceptions formulated by these external partners. Firstly, China and India’s rise as potential ‘economic superpowers’ has been described in literature as depicting the 21st century as the ‘Asian century’ (Goh, 2015; Lee, 2016; Lee et al., 2015; Rizvi, 2012). This depiction helps to highlight the perceived shift of economic power from the western countries – seen in the past as “core” – to the former periphery countries such as BRICS, and increasingly MINT. This shift of power triggered a redirection of western powers’ interests towards these emerging power regions. In this respect, Southeast Asia is considered as an emerging region in geopolitical and economic terms. This region is seen as a crossroad of different cultural and religious civilizations, marked by the divisions between traditionalism and modernity, as well as religious fundamentalism and secular ideals. These features are making for a diverse and intriguing region to analyze. In looking at the EU’s interactions with the wider Southeast Asian region, and specifically examining the EU’s relationship with ASEAN, scholars agree that this is the oldest region-to-region dialogue in the world. This helps to illustrate how the EU can be seen and received as a promoter of regional integration norms, around the world, worthy to be emulated. Zooming into the EU’s relations with two countries in the Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, this research treats them as prominent members of ASEAN. Moreover, Indonesia is seen as an emerging regional and global geo-political and economic power, one within the next echelon of emerging powers of MINT. And Malaysia is argued to be a rising economic power in the region and globally. Both of these countries have historical relationships with EU Member States as former colonies – a legacy which is predicted to influence relations and perceptions of these countries with the EU. Their cultural and religious traditions are also expected to contribute to shaping images and perceptions formulation of the EU as an international actor and partner.

The following section examines the EU’s power narratives of the NPE and MPE dissecting the characteristics argued by the literature. Relevant literature is examined for these narratives’ conceptualisations, as well as for the critique of these concepts.
Chapter Four - EU Power Narratives – Normative and Market Power Europe

Literature discussing the conceptualisation of the EU’s international identity has described it in a number of ways. Duchene’s “civilian power” (1972) was based upon the spread of civilian and democratic norms. Others include the EU being characterised as a “soft power” (Nye, 2004), a “soft power with a hard edge” (Goldthau & Sitter, 2015) an “ethical power” (Aggestam, 2008) and a “gentle power” (Merlini, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2001). In recent years, Manners’ conceptualisation of Normative Power Europe (NPE) (2002) and Damro’s of Market Power Europe (MPE) (2012) have come to the fore as dominant power conceptualisations of the EU.

The EU’s normative foundations and projection of norms and values have fed into its normative image globally. The EU’s economic and regulatory clout has been also recognised by external partners, enhancing its image of economic prowess. This research focuses on the two respective conceptualisations of EU international identity -- NPE (Manners, 2002) and MPE (Damro, 2012). Both are argued by relevant literature to be instrumental in understanding two identity narratives projected by the EU to external partners. The former – NPE – is theorised within the constructivist tradition of international relations that argues a “desire to see world politics transformed by the spread of appropriate norms, identities and concepts of world politics” (Jervis, 1998, 2006, p.195). It invites to explore the EU actions based of particular self-visions and the projection of its core norms and values aimed at external partners’ emulation of those norms and values. In contrast, the latter, MPE belongs to the realist tradition, with its “emphasis on material power” (Pollock, 2001, p.222) to influence others. The EU’s economic clout in the world allows for the consideration of the MPE concept.

Both conceptualisations have their supporters and critics. Debate around these two conceptual approaches have informed EU foreign policy frameworks, and the GSEU (2016) in particular. The GSEU have recognised that the EU’s normative approach in some regions is contested. Factoring these external contestations, the EU talks about revisiting its approach, to incorporate economic enforcement mechanisms. These are thought to achieve their objectives with greater effect – the GSEU talks about

“how we will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled Pragmatism will guide our external action for years ahead” (GSEU, 2016).
This thesis argues that the NPE and MPE concepts and narratives have also impacted how the EU is perceived in Indonesia and Malaysia, the two case studies in focus.

4.1 Normative Power Europe

4.1.1 Conceptualisation

Ian Manners first proposed the NPE concept in 2002. After the end of the Cold War, traditional hard power mechanisms were seen as out-dated in the world and in Europe specifically. Civilian or military power concepts popular in the EU and IR scholarship before the 1990s were deemed insufficient to explain transformations in the Eastern and Central Europe, and a new concept was proposed.

Hypothesising the NPE’s appeal, Manners went beyond traditional notions of civilian or military power characteristics, by saying that the EU itself is “constructed on a normative basis” (Manners, 2002, p.252), arguing that the EU’s normative architecture “predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics” (Manners, 2002, p.252). This normative basis then is critical in formulating and assessing the EU’s role in the global order. Manners famously noted, “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002, p.252). Manners defines the EU on what it is as being founded upon a set of five core norms, these norms are seen to consist of “Peace, Liberty, Democracy, Rule of Law, and Human Rights” (Manners, 2002, p.242). Manners argued that the priority given to these norms comes from the realities of the post WWII world. Recognition of these norms was seen as a critical condition to establish a viable community of cooperation and avoid the atrocities of devastating wars.

Manners also formulated the four ‘secondary’ norms guiding the EU: “Social solidarity, Anti-discrimination, Sustainable development and Good governance” (Manners, 2002, p.242-3). The emergence of these norms is also linked to particular historical contexts in Europe – the end of the Cold War, the aftermath of the Yugoslav crisis and the rise of the EU as an environmental leader. As such, the concept of NPE feeds on historical contexts of European integration (with Western European states choosing closer relations as a means to stop the wars ravaging the continent and establishing a long lasting peace); the EU’s hybrid polity nation (with Members States giving up parts of their sovereignty and forming a sui generis framework of governance), and legal constitution (with the legal framework in the foundations of the Western European nation-states providing a historical and cultural basis for the respect of the legal constitutional dynamics within common treaties and declarations of the European community) (Whitman, 2013, p.177).

However, with the EU has been created on a normative basis, the questions remain opine whether and
how it could act normatively and project normative messages onto its partners. Manners argued several mechanisms of norms diffusion:

- **Contagion**: unintentional norms diffusion by external actors. Information: the result of strategic communication by the EU. Procedural: the institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU and a partner, and Transference: through programmes with Eastern enlargement countries. Both of these types of diffusion rely on conditionality between the EU and its external partners. Overt: the physical manifestation of the EU in partner countries. And Cultural filter, details the impacts of the norms diffused in international actors, leading to either ‘learning, adaption or rejection of the norms (Manners, 2002, p.245).

These mechanisms highlight the importance of the interlocutor for the EU’s normative transfers. This thesis argues the importance of EU perceptions as a normative power among EU external interlocutors. If the EU is recognised and perceived as an influential normative power, then EU norms and values have a chance to become normalised within external partners. Also, the ability to trigger norms diffusion, the process of cultural norms being transferred from one actor to another – recognised by external partners -- may indicate the image of the EU as a capable international actor, with an attractive political culture. As Manners suggested, “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all” (Manners, 2002, p.253).

The link between external perceptions and NPE is considered vital in understanding the EU as a power. Discussion surrounding the importance of the EU as the norms sender has been discussed at length (see Manners, 2002; 2006; 2013), but an in-depth look at the role of the norm-receiver has only been glanced over (Larsen, 2014; Chaban & Pardo, 2015; Björkdahl et al., 2015). Literature examining the link between external perceptions and NPE places norms receivers at the centre of the NPE reconceptualisation, highlighting the importance of perceptions on NPE. Larsen (2014) notes that external perceptions “offer some findings that are central for the NPE debate” (p.896). Where a new agenda focusing on the impact of geographical and interactional filters may impact on the reception and diffusion of exported norms. Pardo and Chaban (2015) argued “NPE is also determined, to some extent, by the local norm-receivers’ reactions. Moreover, without the receivers’ reactions the Union’s normative agenda may withdraw into the shadows” (Pardo & Chaban, 2015, p.41).

Cultural filters are considered as a major factor in the diffusion of norms as they “must occupy a key and central place in the NPE’s diffusion model, as it underlies and shapes other factors” (Pardo & Chaban, 2015, p.50). This diffusion is more successful in those receiver-locations whose “historically constructed domestic norms” (p.43) are similar to those of the norm-sender. This is seen as critical in “explaining the range of reactions to the norm senders intention of exporting norms and values” (p.39). Future NPE research “should not underestimate the role of local cultural and ideological forces in the daily conduct of international affairs” (Pardo & Chaban, 2015, p.39).
Björkdahl et al. (2015) outlined that the process of norms diffusion is the “interplay between the EU as a norm-maker and recipient countries as norm-takers” (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p.2), with the norm-takers’ reaction potentially ranging from adoption and adaption to resistance or rejection of the EU’s norms exports (Table 4.1). Adoption is defined as a “conscious and unambiguous translation of exported norms into local policies, institutions and practices”; adaptation is when “exported norms are changed in some way from European practice to meet local demands”; resistance is taking place when “normative practice must remain distinct from European practice”; and rejection when local norms, institutions, policies and practices diverge unambiguously and conscientiously from European norms (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p.5).

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<tr>
<th>Encounters</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tr>
<td>Encounters between external (EU) norms and local practices</td>
<td>Adoption</td>
<td>Adoption at the local level of EU norms. Local practices comply with new norms</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>Adaptation and contextualizing external (EU) norms to local characteristics and local practices comply</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Dominance of local characteristics. Limited import of EU norms. Few local practices comply with imported norms</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>Rejection of EU norms and thus local practices do not comply with EU norms</td>
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Source: (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p.4)

Björkdahl et al. 2015 argued that straightforward adoption and rejection are rare. Nevertheless, among notable examples of norms rejection is China’s rejection of human rights norms. Also, literature suggests that norms rejection is evident within Southeast Asian partners who refuse to accept norms initiatives, such as gender equality promotion, within FTA negotiations, (Björkdahl et al., 2015; Garcia and Masselot, 2015). An example of adaptation of EU norms is exemplified by the mirroring of EU regional integration practices in the likes of ASEAN. Interestingly, ASEAN is also discussed as an example of resistance. For example, ASEAN was formed a “hollow imitation of EU form without normative supra-national substance” (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p.252). In light of the reactions from norms receivers, including Indonesia and Malaysia, “the reflexive nature of EU norms diffusion has implications for the EU itself as a norm exporter (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p.8).
NPE conceptualisations and the discourse around it can be seen as vehicles to enable – or contest – the EU as a global power. As argued above, Manners theorised norms and values as vital components in the EU’s identity. Other scholars considered the forms of norms transmission. Lenz (2013), for example, described socialisation and emulation. Lenz defines socialisation as “the process of discursive engagement in which an actor actively appeals to another actor’s causal or normative understandings of the world to spread his/her norms and practices” (Lenz, 2013, p.214-5). Emulation is “the process by which an actor learns from or copies a successful exemplar’s or cultural peer’s norms and practices” (Lenz, 2013, p.214-5). These forms of diffusion can be important in understanding the reasoning for EU norms adoptions. Socialisation could be considered as an active enforcement of norms and values, whereas emulation could be seen as the recognition of desirable norms and values from one actor to another, thus leading to adoption of norms without any forms of coercion. In terms of EU external partners, socialisation of norms could be seen as a form of neo-colonialism, whereas emulation of norms, as a voluntary action, could enhance the EU’s normative agenda as desirable.

One example of the EU as a normative power with global appeal is linked to its stance on the death penalty. The EU has been a vocal proponent for the universal abolition of the death penalty globally, insofar as potential accession countries are obligated to emulating this approach for potential membership (Manners, 2002). This abolition of the death penalty by EU Member States and potential accession states is one powerful case of the EU becoming a global leader in the issue-area of human rights. The EU’s international identity is even more pronounced in comparison to the “two super executioners – China and the USA” (Manners, 2002, p.248). This norm then builds a basis for the EU’s conditionality in bi- and multilateral relations with external partners around the world. It has to be said that the projection of this position by the EU is received with various reactions externally. For some, it constituted a form of cultural imperialism by the EU as it attempts to influence external partners to change their view on their vision of the death penalty.

Another example of EU normative power influences is the diffusion of transnational policy formulation and regionalism (examples that also illustrate the EU’s normative agenda in action on the internal stage). Externally, other regional groupings (including ASEAN) are argued to be among the receivers of regionalism as a norm, using the EU’s experiences as a template for their own deeper regional integration. This is in conjunction with attempts of transnational policy formulation to streamline aspects of these regional associations and direction for policy in the future. In the EU, ‘transnational policy formulation’ comes under the EU’s ‘Common policies’ in regards to security, political and economic arenas (Birchfeild, 2013). However, relevant literature argues that transnational and regionalism norms diffusion may be problematic examples, with NPE’s core norms
difficult to export to other regions, the adoption of constitutional norms within external regional partners like ASEAN has not been evident (Hopkins, 2015). It should be noted, however, the EU has a strong legal constitutional basis within its Member States, whereas this is not the case for ASEAN members.

The global appeal of NPE has been challenged recently, with the EU impacted by a series of existential crises. The next section considers several critical outlooks towards the concept of the NPE.

4.1.2 Critiques and contestations of Normative Power Europe

Literature that adopts a critical position toward NPE is divided into two camps – works that negate the notion of the EU as an effective normative power and works that argue that the EU is a “hegemon” (Diez, 2013) using norms and values as a disguise to mask their own goals and interests within the global political arena. Critical positions within NPE studies invite revision of the concept in order to promote a greater degree of norms exportation and diffusion within external partners.

Scholars in the first group claim that NPE is seen as an “empty notion” (Pace, 2007, p.1060) and “lacking a clear criteria” (Janusch, 2016, p.505 citing Aggestam, 2008; Whitman, 2013). Others cite a lack of actual effective mechanisms to enforce the EU’s normative agendas globally (Vadura, 2015).

In the last group, Manners himself proposed to critically revise the methods of testing NPE within the international arena in order to understand if NPE is an effective power narrative (Manners, 2013). Scholars also proposed to introduce additional norms that can be seen as examples of effective influence on external partners. Among those ‘additional’ norms is economic liberalism (Rosamond, 2014) and legal constitutional norms (Hopkins, 2015). Finally, some scholars argue that the EU is a “hegemon” (Diez, 2013) or even a “Normative Empire” (Del Sarto, 2016) suggesting that the EU is promoting its own interests under the guise of the normative basis (Martin-Maze, 2015).

One of the main critiques of NPE is the EU’s “lack of effective mechanisms to enforce the norms and values” (Vadura, 2015). Examples illustrating resistance and rejection of norms promoted by the EU among external partners, notably in the ASEAN case, include the rejection of norms that are perceived to erode sovereignty and cultural processes (Birchfeild, 2013; Lenz, 2013; Poole, 2015). An example of this is ASEAN’s resistance to accepting EU norms of supranational approaches to regional governance compared to their intergovernmental approach at this time (Lenz, 2013; Poole, 2015). In contrast, the group talks about the “ASEAN way” (Poole, 2015, p.162), which refers to the way in which the ASEAN Member States deal with governance within the regional group, with some
norms and values seen as not compatible with EU norms and values. For example, EU legal constitution norms as a means of good governance in regional integration were rejected by ASEAN members, due to the lack of legal foundations in ASEAN Member States (Hopkins, 2015, p.281). This legal foundation is found in the EU, as mentioned above.

Others argue geographical distance and lack of cultural affinity to obstruct the reach of EU norms and values towards Asian partners: “Europe and Asia have neither geographical proximity nor cultural similarity, which, in turn, leads to the divergent values and interests between Asia and Europe the countries and peoples of the two regions” (Fitrani, 2011, p. 52 citing Palmujoki 1997; Letta 2002; Saberwal 2004; Loewen 2007). Garcia and Masselot (2015) highlight this divergence of values and interests from Asia and Europe where the strong resistance of EU norms exportation, of gender equality norms initiatives placed within FTA negotiations, from external partner states in Asia. On the note of proximity, it is also argued that the promotion of norms and values in the locations that are not close neighbours to the EU are not the priority of the EU (Larsen, 2014; Del Sarto, 2016), suggesting that the EU prioritises the promotion of norms within their conditionality agreements with neighbouring countries and potential accession countries in order to produce a “ring of friends” (Del Sarto, 2016, p.219) in the EU’s borderland and neighbourhood. This ‘ring’ would protect the EU from threats (e.g. irregular migration (Jurje & Laveneux, 2014)).

Yet another strand of works proposes to search for revisions of the NPE approach. Research in this vein offers to tackle the absence of norms and values that can be central to the EU’s images as a normative power globally. Scholars propose to consider the economic liberal mechanisms that are vital to the EU’s agreements, partnerships and foundations (Hyde-Price, 2006; Whitman, 2013; Rosamond, 2014; Garcia & Masselot, 2015); military measures (Hyde-Price, 2006); and, the legal constitutional norms in the foundation of the EU’s functioning (Hopkins, 2015). The addition of the economic liberal mechanisms to the NPE consideration is argued to show that the EU may be effective in relationship building on the normative basis. Before the conceptualisation of MPE, critics noticed a “gap between the EU’s economic strength and its lack of political clout” (Peterson, 2008 cited in Birchfeild, 2013, p.913).

However, potential military measures (Hyde-Price, 2006) in order to promote NPE were criticised by Manners (2006) who sees that the potential of “militarisation” by the EU would in fact hinder the EU’s capacity to diffuse its norms and values. In fact, Manners (2006) highlights that militarisation would impact on the progress made, where quick reactions to conflicts would “overtake traditional reliance on long-term structural conflict prevention and transformation” (Manners, 2006, p.194). A reconceptualisation of NPE by Manners (2013) cites these critiques and attempts to redefine the way
NPE will be theorised in the future listing the ‘pouvoir normatif’ (the normative form of power) puts emphasis on of NPE of the influence through ideals (norms and values) not through material incentives (economic attraction) and physical force (military force) (Manners, 2013).

A major critique of NPE concept come resides in works that see the EU resembling a “Hegemon” (Diez, 2013) or a “Normative Empire” (Del Sarto, 2016), pursuing its own interests over that of the norms promoted. This vision is echoed by works that examine asymmetric forms of relationships between the EU and norm-receivers who are developing countries (Björkdahl & Elgström, 2015) arguing a pattern of neo-colonialism between the EU and those external partners. In his discussion, Diez (2013) adopts Gramsci’s concept of a Hegemon, characterised by a noticeable “shift from brute force, to ideas and consensus” (Diez, 2013, p.195). The notion of a “Normative Empire” is a related concept – a “realist power in pursuit of its own interests” (Del Sarto, 2016, p.217) that focuses on economic gains and security assurances provided by the “ring of friends” (discussed above by Del Sarto, 2016). Essentially, the notion of “Normative Empire” (Del Sarto, 2016) demonstrates the interests-driven behaviour on behalf of the EU and “unequal relations in EU periphery relations” (Del Sarto, 2016, p.227). These unequal relations with periphery countries echo the notion of the “asymmetric relations” (Björkdahl & Elgström, 2015; Langan, 2012; Larsen, 2014) as a form of neo-colonialism. These were observed also in the case of EU relations with African countries (Olivier and Fioramonti, 2010; Sicurelli, 2010).

A final critique of NPE as a concept lies in the role and impact of the norm receiver within NPE, which has been largely absent from NPE research and debates. This neglect of external interlocutors and their perceptions of NPE highlight a highly Eurocentric focus of the NPE works, where literature has “considered norm-takers only in a crude way” (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p.5). Larsen (2014) highlighted that previous literature had failed to understand how external interlocutors perceive the EU. Geographical regions that recognise NPE remain within the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhood, such as the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova who “recognise both the great power status of the EU and the attractiveness of its normative agenda” (Bengston and Elgström, 2012, p.99), who are considered to desire for stronger links with the EU and possible membership. A contrast to visions of NPE around the world, where BRICS members do not view the EU as a normative power (Morini et al. 2010; Olivier and Fioramonti, 2010).

Discussion of how the EU’s economic presence is used as a form of neo-colonialism is mentioned within the literature on the emerging powers’ perceptions of the EU. For example, China discussed the EU’s economic clout is used to protect its own interests “rather than providing a special kind of help to the Third world” (p.906). Within Nicolaiidis and Whitman’s (2013) special issue, they look at
literature that critiques NPE in the decade after its conception. They highlight work by Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013) who discuss the potential for the decentring of Europe and European ideals from their central position from IR through a process of decolonising of NPE. A decolonisation of IR by Europe is noted argued to take place by understanding other countries’ and regions’ roles within their own geopolitical spheres and a repositioning of these non-European powers within the centre of IR debates. This, however, is not said to be a provincialising of Europe to the sidelines to reposition and replace it with a “Sino-centric or Indo-centric perspective” (p.296). This call aims to help develop theoretical insights to “enable students of global order – and Europe’s place therein – to better grasp the challenges and opportunities of our increasingly non-European and post western world” (p.297).

In parallel, Björkdahl et al. (2015) argued that consideration of the agency and reactions to the norm projection by norms receivers would facilitate analysis of normative interactions “in a less ‘EUcentric’ world” (p.5).

To summarise, NPE remains an influential concept that continues to trigger scholarly discussions. Critiques of the NPE approach, among other arguments, state that economy and market are seen as the effective mechanisms through which the EU influences external partners, and that economy- and market-related norms and values projected by the EU have a potential to be appealing globally. It is at this point the thesis considers another notion in conceptualising EU international identity – MPE

### 4.2 Market Power Europe

#### 4.2.1 Conceptualisation

The notion of MPE (Damro, 2012) was conceived in response to a conceptual gap. Discussions surrounding the NPE theoretical approach lacked a reflection on the EU as a sender of economic and market norms. This was especially important given that the “EU at its core is a market” (Damro, 2012, p. 682-3). To be fair, the notion of MPE is not the first time when the EU’s identity has been conceptualised through its extensive economic attraction and strength. Other concepts along these lines include “Trading Superpower” (Galtung, 1973) or a “Trading State” (Rosecrane, 1986). These concepts of the EU being a “Trading Superpower” (Galtung, 1973) or a “Trading State” (Rosecrane, 1986) reflected on the market and trading power of the EU (or at that time the EEC) as an essential feature of its international image and appeal. Critics of NPE, some of them cited above, were vocal as to how this identity – and economic and market norms underlying it – were overlooked by the NPE approach (Birchfield, 2013; Björkdahl & Elgström, 2015; Langan, 2012; Larsen, 2014). These scholarly deficits fed into Damro’s re-conceptualisation of the EU’s power narrative and
allowed to formulate the main tenets of the MPE concept while reflecting on the EU’s economic and market strengths and attraction of the respective norms and values (Damro, 2012).

Damro argues three main characteristics of MPE: 1) Material existence, exemplified by the single market and the EURO; 2) Institutional features, illustrated by the regulatory measures essential to the single market and trade agreements with external partners; and 3) Interest contestation, displayed by competition for market access into the EU single market, and the competition between industries and businesses over goods and services (Damro, 2012). These three characteristics are hypothesised to “predispose the EU to act as a Market Power” (Damro, 2012, p.689) and provide explanation to the EU’s means and tools to interact with both state and non-state actors (the latter include corporations, NGOs, etc.). When external partners (both state and non-state) fail to comply with the EU’s regulatory measures, the EU may exert authority and employ such tools as boycotts, embargoes, suspension or reduction of aid or development funds, and the rejection of loans. One example is the EU’s sanctions on the Russian Federation following the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Another example is the reduction of EU development aid to the ACP countries due to their failure to meet the agreed conditions (Langan, 2012).

Ultimately, MPE externalises itself on the international arena through its “economic and social market related policies and regulatory measures” (Damro, 2012, p.696). Damro discussed that in the EU-as-a-power debate, MPE was not designed to discredit or expel NPE from the EU’s power narrative scholarship, but to highlight the three characteristics that point how the EU may effectively externalise itself in the global arena. Damro advocated for further research into EU power projection through “market insights” (Damro, 2012, p.696). By using MPE as a starting point for EU identity formulation, “we can begin answering questions while rebuilding our understanding of the EU as a power and concentrating research on the implications of market power for the potential use of force and the projection of norms (normative power)” (Damro, 2012, p.697).

The concept of MPE recognises the economic strength of the EU rests on its market attraction, regulatory persuasion and institutional features. Arguably, these economic and market features have made their way into EU external relations not only when the EU deals with regulatory measures to protect EU industries, but also to fuel the EU’s normative agenda as well as security interests. Other scholars share this view, arguing that the EU itself has “leveraged its market attraction and its financial aid as bargaining chips to extract its preferred behaviour of others” (Garcia & Masselot, 2015, p.250). There are notable exceptions to this however (see Orbie & Khorana, 2015 about the EU-India FTA stall). However, literature in the field agrees that this type of EU influence has been
apparent for quite some time – and it is likely to build on the external image of the EU as a global power due to its economic prowess.

A way in which the EU has used its considerable economic clout as a bargaining chip in relations with external partners is apparent when analysing EU actions towards itself. Scholars argue that the strategic use of MPE characteristics, such as its attractive single market and institutional features such as movement of capital and labour, has helped the EU to shape security policy (Jurje & Lavenex, 2014). Jurje & Lavenex (2014) discuss the “trade-migration nexus” where the EU addresses their security challenges surrounding migration by enticing neighbouring transit countries with their vast economic assets, including “visa facilitation, economic concessions and labour mobility” (Jurje & Lavenex, 2014, p.321). For example, the EU’s deal to stop the flow of migrants through Turkey into the EU in exchange for the potential visa free regime for Turkish citizens. However, the economic attraction pull of the EU is seen, as massive incentive for illegal migration and mechanisms to combat this phenomenon has not yet been analysed in depth.

In the face of emerging crises impacting the EU and its international image, Damro (2015) revised and advanced his MPE conceptualisation in order to “stock-take MPE, so that future research can be flexible for future conceptualisation and empirical testing by others” (Damro, 2015, p.1337). In this revised version, the concept of MPE also included the EU’s intentional influence on external partners as well as unintentional influence. Both types of influence are still based on the three interrelated characteristics of MPE argued originally. Intentional influence can be seen in the processes when the EU aims to influence, as in the streamlining of partners’ regulatory measures to mirror those of the EU’s practices, an example being the “harmonization of cosmetics regulation between ASEAN countries” (Zakaria, 2014, p.57). Among unintentional influences is the adoption of regional integration globally, like that of ASEAN (Damro, 2015). Ultimately, according to Damro (2015, p.1341), MPE is a “dynamic tool” for theorising the EU as a global power. Where the EU’s flexibility is seen to encourage further reconceptualization of the theoretical framework, “insights into the ways in which MPE may contribute to the EU-as-a-power debates also help to identify other important areas for research” (Damro, 2015, p.1349).

### 4.2.2 Critiques of Market power Europe

Relevant scholarship features a range of reactions to the MPE conceptualisation. Some scholars accept MPE in principle, but revise the notion suggesting more variables when they consider the effectiveness of MPE in EU external relations. Others critique the MPE notion along the lines seen
with critiques of NPE while reflecting on the asymmetric relationships the EU conducts with some external partners. However, since MPE is a relatively recent theorisation, critical reflection on the MPE is not as extensive as on the NPE.

The critique of MPE from Kelstrup (2015) introduces three new intervening variables argued by the author to be overlooked by the MPE original conceptualisation. These are: 1) Global economic frameworks, such as WTO guidelines on trade. This is seen in the example of the EU’s interaction with Russia and the proceeding issues surrounding the WTO guidelines and regulation. 2) The EU’s administrative resources, where the EEAS in partner countries was responsible for negotiations of trade agreements and partnerships with their global partners; and 3) the EU’s ability to be unified (this is seen with the EU being unified on trade issues with external partners) or the EU’s inability to be unified (seen with the disunity between EU Member States over the issue of steel dumping on the world market by China) (Kelstrup, 2015). These variables were argued to further the conceptualisation of MPE. Importantly, these revisions demonstrated that the EU’s MPE could be influenced by an external entity, perceived presence within external partners to push through agreements, and the potential for a perceived disunity within the EU over economic issues.

As already noted in critical reflections on NPE, the EU’s relations with external partners could be marked by the EU’s protectionist policies or the perception of asymmetric relationships (Langan, 2012; Larsen, 2014; Björkdahl & Elgström, 2015). This literature highlights examples of the partnerships between the EU and developing African countries that demonstrates this asymmetric relationship. In these relations, the EU is in a superior position to its African counterparts, leaving the African partners to the whims of the EU’s regulations, e.g. flooding of the Kenyan market by EU goods which led to the collapse of the Kenyan textile industry in the 1990s (Langan, 2012). An example of protectionist policies by the EU may be found in relevant literature on the EU-India FTA negotiations. Indian elites from political, business and civil society cohorts oppose some of the EU regulations, specifically the financial costs of negotiations of governmental procurement laws as well as the insistence of ‘equal/national treatment’ to be given to EU firms and products bound to compete within the Indian market (Orbie & Khorana, 2015 citing Khorana & Asthana, 2014). The EU attempts to impose its regulatory conditionality within this agreement is seen as detrimental to external partners’ markets.

In summary, the MPE conceptualisation does not negate the EU’s image as a global power. If anything, MPE gives more legitimacy to the EU’s claim to global power. It attracts attention to the fact that the EU’s economic mechanisms can and do influence external partners. Critiques may reflect on the EU’s economic protectionist measures and asymmetrical partnerships; nonetheless external
partners are still willing to work with the EU due to its sheer size and market and economic potential and to recognise and event adopt and adapt norms and values communicated by the EU in its MPE capacity.

4.3 Principled Pragmatism – New Power Narrative?

Consideration of the NPE and MPE conceptualisations in this thesis aids in understanding the most recent formulation and projection of EU foreign policy (GSEU, 2016). This policy formulation guides EU external relations, including the ones with Asia, while attempting to introduce as a set of new narratives that frame EU interactions with external partners. One of the leading new narratives is principled pragmatism “where the EU will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world” (GSEU, 2016, p.8). Juncos discusses that this implies “the EU should act in accordance with universal values (liberal ones in this case), but then follow a pragmatic approach which denies the moral imperatives of those universal categories” (Juncos, 2017, p.2). The ‘Global Strategy’ acknowledges that the EU is facing a number of institutional crises, thus “being questioned” (GSEU, 2016, p.7). The answer to the crises, questions pertaining to how the EU will engage globally is based upon the premise of the EU adhering to a “rules based order” (GSEU, 2016, p.7). These rules aim to promote a multilateral world in line with UN global rules based order. These principles are to be the foundations of the EU’s new practical approach to the evolving nature of the world. This combination of foundational principles within a diplomatic approach, “will guide […] external action for years to come” (GSEU, 2016, p.8).

Arguably, principled pragmatism could be seen in the light of the NPE and MPE theoretical debates. Norms and values the EU aims to promote while being informed by the NPE concepts, positioned within the “rule based order” outlook, have a potential to interact with the MPE projections and influence external partners more effectively. Previous scholarship points to the examples of principled pragmatism in action – Garcia and Masselot (2015) note that historically “the EU has leveraged its market attraction and its financial aid as bargaining chips to extract its preferred behaviour from others” (p.250). FTAs with Asia partners are considered to be concrete examples of this approach where they are accompanied by Political Cooperation Agreements “which link core EU values to trade through the ‘standard clause’, whereby under certain circumstances, human rights’ abuses can trigger suspension of trade preferences” (Garcia and Masselot 2015, p.241).

However, critics of principled pragmatism see that “the EU needs to be either pragmatic or principled; it can’t have it both ways” (Juncos, 2017, p.2). Juncos (2017) examines the concept where theoretically it directs the EU to act in accordance with the promotion of its norms and values, but
then to follow a “pragmatic approach, which denies the moral imperatives of those universal categories” (Juncos, 2017, p.2). This pragmatic approach is considered to undermine the EU’s normative power identity by challenging the “universality of those values” (p.15) amongst the approaches directing the EU to address human rights and democratic issues on a case-by-case basis rather than universally among its external partners.

In its core, the “principled pragmatism” narrative formulated by the “Global Strategy” (GSEU, 2016) is intended to strengthen the EU’s ability to influence external counterparts in the face of challenges affecting the EU presently. Looming Brexit, the ongoing migration crisis, the prolonged Eurozone debt crisis and rising populism and Euroscepticism – all may influence the perceived capability of the EU to deal with internal issues and its image as a global power. The EU taking a pragmatic approach in addressing existential issues and executing external relations may send a signal of a capable EU. The impact of this new approach and narrative will be tested by future studies. Yet, it is already clear that the scholarly debates surrounding the NPE and MPE approaches, as well as the “principled pragmatism” uptake projected by the Global Strategy, should necessarily embrace insights into the receiver perspectives. It is impossible to assess the impact of a power without factoring if this power is recognised as a power (in normative and/or market terms). As such, a systematic analysis of the reception of the messages and policies communicated by the EU is needed. The Global Strategy confirms the importance of receivers – it articulates the importance of “mutual respect”, “partnership, reciprocity, mutual learning and co-creation” (GSEU, 2016, p. 4) in the EU’s foreign policy and external relations. This thesis addressed this call by systematically considering EU external perceptions and images in Asia (case-studies of Indonesia and Malaysia).

4.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, NPE and MPE literature discuss their conceptualisations and critiques on historical examples of EU norms projection. NPE itself is said to be based upon the norms and values which are the foundations of the EU (Manners, 2002), whereas MPE is said to highlight the EU’s actual prowess is through its economic and regulatory clout within the international arena (Damro, 2012). Critiques of NPE discuss its lack of norms adoption by external partners, potentially due to cultural filters, but also through the lack of effective mechanisms the EU can use to employ. Forms of norms diffusion, for both NPE and MPE, are discussed by Björkdahl et al. (2015) and Lenz (2013) who show how the transfer of cultural norms from one actor to another can be made, as a form of full adoption, yet reactions may differ along the spectrum, to complete rejection of exported norms. Also the projection of these norms has discussed the EU as a potential “Hegemon” (Diez, 2013), or “Normative Empire” (Del Sarto, 2016) as a means to mask their own interests behind their norms and values promotion. Literature also attempts to tackle the supposed EUcentric nature of NPE, which tend to illustrate
“asymmetric relations” (Björkdahl & Elgström, 2015; Langan, 2012; Larsen, 2014) between the EU and external partners. The potential for asymmetric relations highlights the recognition that these norms projections can be seen as a form of neo-colonialism (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013). Critiques suggest a decolonisation of international relations, which hold western interpretations at the centre of its conceptualisations. This is discussed to not be replaced by a Sino-, or Indic-centric conceptual focus, but more to investigate with approach from different regions to show the changing global dynamics.

MPE is seen as highlighting what mechanisms have been recognised to work within the international arena. Damro (2012) discusses that the EU as its core is a single market economy, and its power should be recognised in its economic and regulatory clout. Norms of material existence, interest contestation and institutional features (as discussed above) were the initial characteristics mentioned by Damro. Further critiques and reconceptualization have added three more intervening variables to add to MPE analysis, impact of global financial frameworks, EU administrative resources and the EU’s ability to be unified (as discussed above). Critiques of the MPE discuss the EU’s use of economic measures to achieve their goals, globally highlighting the potential for “asymmetric relationships” with external partners that are seen to benefit the EU rather than their partners. As noted, MPE is not seen to contest the EU as a global power, but is seen to give legitimacy to this perception, as its characteristics are recognised by external partners as effective in the international arena. This search for effectiveness may be seen within the formulations of the Global Strategy for the EU (GSEU, 2016). Taking a pragmatic approach to relations through economic measures within external relations, the EU continues to claim of being guided by the norms and values informed by its normative agenda. Thus, the formulation of the “Principled Pragmatism” (GSEU, 2016) in the Global Strategy.

The next section overviews existing scholarship on images in international relations and on EU external perceptions in particular, laying the foundation for the empirical analysis of EU perceptions as a power – in normative and/or market terms – in the selected cases in Asia.
Chapter Five - External Perceptions – Why do they matter?

External perceptions are argued to help define the role actors prescribe to themselves and other and play in the international political arena (Elgström & Smith, 2006). They also form an environment of legitimacy for the actor to act in certain ways. Thus, this recognition of an actor in the international arena is seen as a “justificatory mechanism for the rationalization of many foreign policy decisions or actions taken in favor (sic) of or against another nation” (Movahedi, 1985, p.2 cited in Chaban & Holland, 2015, p.287). Relevant literature suggests that an actor needs to be “recognized by others to have certain special rights and duties” (Bull, 1977, p. 196 cited in Chaban & Holland, 2015, p.287) to be afforded the image of a great power. Perceptions and images are also seen to fill the “subjective expectations, and serve as a powerful cultural filter” (Chaban & Holland, 2015, p. 287 citing Manners, 2002).

Perceptions are defined as the “result of the subjective or psychological cognition of the observer rather than the objective reflection of the object that is being observed” (Shiming, 2010, p. 269). Formulation of perceptions are seen to “trigger categorizations” (Chaban & Holland, 2014, p.9) of actors by individuals and groups. Categorisations help process large amounts of information when individuals and groups are bombarded by information flows (e.g. media messages, etc.) filtering them through historical legacies and cultural factors. The cognitive process of categorisation of observed actors is seen as one of the “fundamental aspects of perception” (Brosch et al., 2010, p. 377 cited in Chaban & Holland, 2014, p.9). These categorisations are seen as ways to which individuals and groups organise the complex world we live in, thus being able to cope with its ever-changing dynamics (Pickering, 2001, p. 2). Importantly, categorisations are not fixed, and the perceptions of international actors can be influenced by temporal changes and/or impacting events on actors involved.

5.1 Why do external perceptions matter for the EU?

There are a number of reasons why external perceptions matter for an entity like the EU. Chaban, Elgström and Holland (2006, p.245) stated that external perceptions “act as a fruitful resource to systematically evaluate the EU, providing insights into the effectiveness of EU international action from the perspective of outsiders”. Lucarelli and Fioramonti argued that EU external perceptions play an important role in the formation of an internal European Identity where external perceptions help to single out “variables that contribute to sharing a European political identity among the Europeans” (Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009, p.7). Kelly and Smith see the importance of external perceptions of the EU as having a “two-fold” effect. The first provides “important indicators of how well intentions have been translated into observable effect” (Kelly & Smith, 2013, p.219-220), and secondly, that “external perceptions reveal potential avenues for the
EU’s development as an international actor through illustrating outsiders’ expectations and desires” (Kelly & Smith, 2013, p.220). Literature in the field notes that in the past the EU has overlooked the importance of recognition and reception, often ending in a situation when it is seen as “talking to, instead of talking with” its external partners (Chaban, Knodt & Verdun, 2017, p.3). This was observed in the EU’s human rights promotion in Asia, where Asian partners see this as a form of neocolonialism and disrespect of the “ASEAN way” (Fitriani, 2011; Men, 2011; Lucarelli, 2014; Larsen, 2014), or when the EU formulates its positions on energy governance with emerging economies (Chaban, Knodt & Verdun, 2017).

Arguably, this ‘talking at’ attitude by the EU may be facilitated by the Euro-centric scholarship that has proposed concepts and interpretations of how external partners should be perceiving the EU as international actor. From Duchene’s “civilian power” (1972), to a “soft power” (Nye, 2004), a “soft power with a hard edge” (Goldthau & Sitter, 2015) an “ethical power” (Aggestam, 2008) and a “gentle power” (Merlini, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa, 2001). This thesis focuses is on the two power projections of Manners’ NPE (2002), to more recent Damro’s MPE (2012), these differing views provided some insights but also led to the confusion among external actors on how to best understand the EU in the evolving global order. But despite being very different, these power characterisations share one thing in common – they are founded upon a Eurocentric view, without taking into consideration how non-western academia and institutions characterise the EU in terms of power characteristics (Lucarelli, 2014; Keuleers, 2015; Hoang, 2016).

5.2 Filters which influence the perceptions of External Actors

Having proven the importance of external perceptions for EU foreign policy expectations and actions, scholarship on EU external perceptions is now increasingly turning to the factors that shape perceptions and images. Two levels in image production are argued – individual and country (Keuleers, 2015) (Table 5.1). The former is “influenced by characteristics of individuals, their day to day experiences and their beliefs and attitudes” (Keuleers, 2015, p.806). The latter “focuses on differences in average perceptions between countries, and is thus consistent with the idea that perceptions are mainly determined by country-level factors. Including general characteristics of the country itself, of its international relations and of political or media discourses at the national level” (Keuleers, 2015, p.806). The two levels may converge or diverge.

Keuleers (2015, p.808) notes that the multiple levels of explanation lent itself to the study of perceptions, (outlined in Table 5.1 below), within the perceptions filters schema distinguished between characteristics focusing on general and relations-specific perception filters. General characteristics of countries and individuals were discussed as potentially having “an impact on
perceptions of an international actor” (Keuleers, 2015, p.807). Where relation-specific characteristics detailed that “perceptions may be influenced by the relationship with that particular actor” (p.807).

The following table outlines the general and relational-specific characteristics to country and individual level factors that shape perceptions.

**Table 5.1: Individual and Groups factors shaping perceptions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country-level characteristics</th>
<th>General characteristics</th>
<th>Relation-specific characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of economic</td>
<td>Politicization of the relationship as an electoral issue by national politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>development</td>
<td>Media messages</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type of political regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual level</td>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
<td>Historical relationship with the partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>characteristics</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Current trade and investment relations with the partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban vs. rural area</td>
<td>Current aid/development relations with the partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media consumption</td>
<td>Importance attached to democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Importance attached to civil–political human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>View on donor influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Importance attached to infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Keuleers, 2015, p.808

Table 5.1 outlines the two types of variables that influence the country and individual-level perceptions formulation. **General characteristics at the country level**; are discussed as seen in the level of economic development, be it developed, developing or third world country, and the type of political regime, a western style democracy or other. In Keuleers’ research she noted general characteristics at the country level was the area where the least amount of attention was given, as they were considered to “fulfil an intermediary role, reducing or enhancing the affect of other explanatory variables” (Keuleers, 2015, p.808). **Relation-specific at the country level**, focused on filters that could affect perception that were based upon state actor’s relationships. This level saw the most attention within Keuleers research, with the relationship between the two countries were discussed in depth in affecting the perceptions. Historical ties were highly featured, as well as the view of donor influence.
Looking at the perception filters at the Individual level, discussed a number of demographic filters contributing to general characteristics. These were seen in the socio-politico and economic status of individuals, as well as the divide between urban and rural perceptions filters. Specific demographic factors of gender, Age and educational levels, are also discussed as factors to influence individuals’ perceptions. An individual’s media consumption was seen as an influential factor on perception formulation as in the results given, Ugandan youth who were “reliant on local media” (Shen & Taylor, 2012, p.708 cited in Keuleers, 2015, p.809), had an adverse negative effect on their perceptions of the EU. It was suggested that these filters were “not purely individual, but rather (partly) shared within a variety of smaller social groupings” (Keuleers, 2015, p.806). Finally, Individual-relation specific, receiving the least attention focused on “how perceptions are influenced by attitudes on topics of direct relevance to the relationship with a particular actor” (Keuleers, 2015, p.809).

Importantly, not all individuals within the same group will have the same demographic features. Also, groups within society that may have the same level of socio-economic development may have other cultural factors that may impact on the type of image and perception formulated. Relevant literature argues that it is important to gauge the group’s images of others on the basis the group’s ideals, values and norms as a whole rather than concentrating on the individuals within the groups. This macro-level in analysis of group identity has been undertaken to understand the use of stereotypes and attitudes of group-to-group image formulation and also individual-to-group image formulation. These group images are reliant on a perception of group cohesion to appear unified and productive. Cottam et al. describe this as ‘Entativity’, which maintains the importance of the perception that the in-group is perceived as one coherent entity (Cottam et al., 2014, p.109). Therefore, these filters of perceptions highlight differing factors for country level and individual level perception formulation. This thesis does not focus on the demographic filters, due to the lack of range of interviewees from differing socio-politico-economic backgrounds, as well as gender, age and education levels. However, understanding the role of economic development and political regime factors as well as relation-specific filters on country level and individual level from elites’ perspectives may help to unearth images of the EU as a global power.

5.3 Exogenous vs. Endogenous vs. Global forces that influence perceptions

Literature on EU external perceptions also argues that there is a set of exogenous, endogenous and global forces that are influencing EU external images and perceptions. Exogenous factors relate to impact of images emanating from the exporting actor itself; endogenous, “unrelated to what the EU is doing in its own territory and in the world” (Tsuruoka, 2008, p.3). Chaban and Magdalina (2014)
added to Tsuruoka’s framework with the addition of “global factors” (Chaban and Magdalina, 2014, p.213), which is aimed to highlight factors that are more generic to influences in the global landscape.

Tsuruoka’s model of the endogenous and exogenous factors links images to a Euro-positive and euro-sceptical factors of influence. Exogenous euro-positive factors are underlined by the perceived successes of the EU, at the time of the articles publishing the likes of the development of a common foreign and security policy, the creation of the single currency of the Euro, and the successful processes of enlargement, were considered positive factors. However, in the elapsed time these factors may have become negative it they are not considered as successful. Exogenous euro-sceptical factors are the perceived failures of the EU actions (among those, Tsuruoka singles out the lack of coherence and a ‘single voice’ on issues by the EU). Moreover, crises within the EU’s borders (including the perceived underperformance of the Eurozone in the euro debt crisis and the subsequent fallout out of Eurozone issues in the likes of Greece, Spain and Ireland) and repeated failures of the CFSP (specifically, in the EU’s neighbourhood) add to the formation of this factor. Endogenous euro-sceptical factors are linked to the perceived influences of a power superior to the EU – the USA. For Tsuruoka, who wrote his piece in 2008, the USA’s status of a unipolar power came with an image of global primacy supported by perceived economic and military capabilities.

In addition, the historical legacy of colonialism may be expected to influence perception of the EU internationally. While the EU institutions themselves did not partake in the practice, the colonial legacy of some EU Member States is still seen to trigger “Euro-scepticism and exaggerated nationalism in conjunction with anti-European sentiment” (Holland & Chaban, 2010, p.322). In Tsuruoka’s 2008 work, endogenous euro-positive factors were linked to anti-American sentiments from external partner countries (in the context of the Bush Jr. administration), which highlight the EU as a viable alternative in perceptions (a theme that potentially could be re-considered in the context of the erratic Trump administration). Other examples may include a perception of the EU as a supporter and advocate of a multipolar world dynamic, with the EU being one of the influencing poles, or an example of the welfare-politico governance model in action. Tsuruoka also argued that political affiliations of the receiving countries, especially centre-left political orientations of third countries, are correlating with euro-positive perceptions.

A combination of endogenous and exogenous factors, aligning along euro-positive or euro-sceptic lines are argued to “shape the direction of the EU’s present-day dialogue” with external partners (Holland & Chaban, 2010, p.322). EU partners in Asia are no exception. Holland & Chaban suggested that exogenous factors, both positive and sceptical, are considered to be “more obvious and thus easier to account for when analysing the EU’s external image” (Holland & Chaban, 2010, p.322).
Endogenous factors, however, tend to be “obscure and cryptic, and require additional cross-culturally sensitive and locally aware inquiries” (Holland & Chaban, 2010, p.322). The latter type of factors is considered to be difficult to impact by the EU, as the EU is typically seen to have little influence over these factors and any efforts to remedy their evaluation may result in negative responses from the external interlocutors.

Chaban and Magdalina (2014) cite Global factors as being important in shaping EU external perceptions, in addition to endogenous and exogenous factors by). Literature has also noted how the rise of China and India as major global economic powers in Asia resulted in the perception of the global shift in power from the western world to Asia (Rizvi, 2012; Shen & Men, 2014). This perception was reinforced by the ‘Asia Pivot’ announced by the US to its foreign policy under Obama’s administration. This extensive focus by the US on Asia led some scholars to argue the emergence of the “American Pacific Century” (Eckert, 2011). This formulation echoes an argument that 21st century will the “the Chinese/Asian century” (while the 19th century was the “British century” and the 20th century was the “American century”). If such century ensues, the shift of power from the US to China is seen to be “one of the great dramas of the 21st century” (Ikenberry, 2008 cited in Men & Shen, 2014, p.1). However, China and India are not the only rising powers, according to this literature. Importantly for this thesis, the rise of other economies in Asia have ‘added fuel’ to the vision of the global power shift “from the West to the rest”. Among those strong players are Indonesia and Malaysia – dynamic economies and attractive destinations for investment and businesses from all around the world. The transformations of the world – from the US’ unipolar hegemony to a multipolar world, with rising China’s influence – poses questions how these power shifts will impact EU global influences and how EU perceptions can help to identify the EU’s perceived role and impacts in the changing world.

To conclude, perceptions matter for a supranational entity like the EU. Perceptions and images serve as indicators how external partners understand the roles and positions of the EU in the international political arena. As stated by Bull (1997, p.196) any great power needs to be “recognized by others to have certain special rights and duties” (cited Chaban & Holland, 2015, p.287). Being recognised as a great power and major player in the international arena provides the EU with a sense of legitimacy in how it acts towards external partners and within the political arena. Images and perceptions are formulated through a combination of global, country-specific and individual level factors that engage with cultural filters, historical legacy and current relations that contribute to these images and perceptions of the EU. Traditional characterisations of the EU have been discussed through Eurocentric lenses, therefore dictating to external partners that these are proposed frameworks on how the EU should be seen by its partners. However, this may not be the case as external perceptions
shaped by a location-specific combination of factors may produce different or conflicting images. This thesis proposes that examining and understanding external perceptions of the EU in two major Southeast Asian states of Indonesia and Malaysia can help to understand the regions reactions and recognition of the EU and assess if the EU is seen as an effective, credible and legitimate international partner. This thesis now turns to three conceptual approaches that are argued to aid in understanding and explaining EU external perceptions – IR’s image theory, a broader interdisciplinary approach of political psychology and a paradigm of cross-cultural differences – considered in interaction with each in a novel for EU perceptions field way.

5.4 Image theory in IR

Image theory is a popular IR model for understanding political behaviour of individuals and groups. Expanding on ideas formulated by Jervis (1976), a pioneer in the study of images and perceptions in IR, scholars have defined images as “…ideas and cognition about other actors in world affairs … organized into clusters” (Herrmann et al., 1997, p.422). This, arguably, forms the basic foundations for the members of in- and out-groups to form images of each other as partners or competitors in various realms of world affairs. These images may reinforce the stereotypes of and attitudes towards the Others, group identities of the Self, and support perceived superiority or inferiority in the Self-Other relations.

Examining the psychological mechanisms that aid in forming these diverse images, literature suggests four different types of images. Beach & Mitchell (1987) outline these as “Self-image; which consists of personal beliefs, basic values, morals ethics etc. these are seen as ‘principles’; imperatives that guide one’s adoption or rejection of goals to pursue” (Beach & Mitchell, 1987, p.202). “Trajectory Image; consisting of one’s agenda for the future, the ‘strategic blueprint for where one is going, the ends one elects to pursue in light of one’s self image, the landmarks one foresees along one’s idealized life course” (p.202). “Action Image; consisting of the various plans that are in use at any moment for achieving the various goals that the decision maker is pursuing” (Beach & Mitchell, 1987, p.203). And finally, the “‘Projected Image’ consists of the anticipated events and states that one foresees occurring (1) if one adopts a particular candidate plan in order to attain a specific goal, or (2) if one continues with the plans that already have been adopted and that currently are being implemented” (Beach & Mitchell, 1987, p.204). In this context, the EU’s self-image based on a set of norms and values (which was discussed in a greater detail above in 4.1.1 Conceptualisation) will influence the EU’s trajectory, action and projected images when the EU builds its dialogues with Indonesia and Malaysia. How Self-images are interpreted and evaluated by EU policy- and decision-
makers in external relations will influence how the EU forms and projects the EU’s image internationally.

Other image theories’ categorisation schema deal with images in terms of the ‘enemy-ally, dependent-barbarian images’ (Alexander, Brewer and Herrmann, 1999) as well as the additional ‘colony and degenerate’ (Herrmann et al., 1997) and ‘imperialist’ (Alexander, Brewer and Livingston, 2005) images. These image categorisations of ‘out-groups’ help members of ‘in-groups’ characterise the former in accessible (if not simplistic) terms in order to interact with them. The enemy image is seen as one of the most prominent and disruptive images for cooperation between groups. If either competing actors or groups hold ‘enemy’ images of one another, escalation in tension seems to become imminent while the likelihood of diffusion of issue-specific ideas onto each other would become very difficult (Alexander, Brewer and Herrmann, 1999).

In contrast, an ally image justifies a search for cooperation between groups for their own mutual benefits as long as both parties perceive each other as allies. The barbarian image highlights the in-groups view of the out-group as being “violent, ruthless, irrational, and wantonly destructive” (Alexander, Brewer and Livingston, 2005, p.782). Here, insulating the in-group is seen as vital for the in-group’s safety. The dependent image notes that the in-group sees itself as culturally superior. As such, the exploitation of the inferior out-group is justified – the out-group is imagined as dependent on the help of the in-group. The colony image sees opportunity for the in-group to gain control over a polity of out-group perceived as inferior in capability and culture” (Cottam et al., 2014, p.53). The dependent image aims as justifying the exploitation of an out-group “in the guise of helping them or protecting them from themselves” (Alexander, Brewer and Livingston, 2005, p.783). The imperialist image is considered a complement to the dependent image. Where the imperialist in-group envisions itself as culturally inferior to the out-group, discussed as this by members of the in-group having “sold out to the out group [allowing] themselves to be used as pawns of the imperialists” (Alexander, Brewer and Livingston, 2005, p.783). And finally, the degenerate image denotes the negatively constructed impressions of out-groups by in-groups to view these out-groups as inferior.

The third and final schema of image theory looks into the “theory of strategic decision making that identifies the central judgments that guide basic foreign policy choices toward other actors” (Herrmann et al., 1997, p.407-8). This theory entails three variables that help in influencing images of actors with the Other. These are seen as actor’s perceived capabilities, perceived threat and opportunity, and the perceived culture of the other political actor (Herrmann et al., 1997, p.407-8). These variables are discussed as basic in their form, but are all interconnected in the formulation of images between actors within the international arena. Herrmann et al. (1997) note that the first two variables come from the same theoretical frame work set out by Boulding (1956; 1959) highlighting:
1) the perceived capabilities of the other, which demonstrate the importance of perceived power, described as a core function in realist theory, and 2) the perceived threat and opportunity of an actor, which point to the interests of actors within international relations (Herrmann et al., 1997; Boulding, 1956; 1959). The third concept is focusing on the perceived culture of an actor, whether it is inferior or superior to the Other’s culture. This final factor is thought to be a central concept in sociological and psychological studies of racial and ethnic conflicts that led to warfare between actors (Triandis, 1972, 1980; Horowitz, 1985). These three variables are instrumental in understanding the images of “enemy/ally/imperialist/barbarian/colonist/imperialist” discussed above (Herrmann et al., 1997) as understanding the combination of the perceived variables helps in identifying the images guiding the international relations. For example, a historically-incomed image of the imperialist actor who used to be a former colonial power may trigger a perception of threat to national interests. In another example, a perception of a degenerate actor may trigger a perception of cultural inferiority of the Other.

The application of power differentiation and the ideal of ‘self-concept consistency’ (Chen & English, 2011) to image theory display the impact on perceived stereotypes and negative attitudes of groups. In discussing ‘self-concept consistency’, it is thought that Westerners hold a high degree of consistency for their own self-concept, how they value their places in societies and place in the global political order. Whereas in East Asia, and arguably in Southeast Asian societies, they hold a low degree of self-concept consistency, with the cultures “emphasize adjusting the self to fit social demands (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Morling, Kitayama & Mityamoto, 2002)” (Chen & English, 2011, p.838). The emphasis on adjusting to fit societal needs may carry a major influence on how Western partners are perceived in various Asian societies, not lastly due to the Western cultural and philosophical stress on an individual. In an extreme scenario, differences may “reinforce the perceived stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes” (Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005, p.792) in the dialogue between European and Southeast Asian actors. Negative images of Eurocentrism from Southeast Asian groups may trigger negative images of their European counterparts, whereas the perception of subordination of individuals to fit societal demands within Asian societies may feed into prejudiced attitudes among Europeans on the inferiority of Asian political cultures in regards to the rights of individuals.

Finally, the account of self-images must always be complemented by the account how other actors view the Self. With the EU aiming to build a meaningful dialogue and partnership with Asian actors (GSEU, 2016), the understanding of the interactions between the EU’s self-images and its external images in Asia is critical. Here, the scholarship must account for the impact of perceived historical and cultural differences as these perceptions may affect the relevant behaviours and actions towards the EU, as well as account for cognitive and emotive elements that constitute images and perceptions.
5.5 Political Psychology

Political psychology – a broad interdisciplinary approach – encompasses a wide range of psychological research, including, but not limited to, the study of neurobiological, biopsychological, personality, cognitive, emotive and group identity traits, to address how and why individuals and groups act politically. Focusing on the cognitive and emotive aspects of political psychology, cognition is considered the “collective term for the psychological processes involved in the acquisition, organization, and the use of knowledge” (Cottam et al., 2014, p.38 as cited Bullock & Stallybrass, 1977, p.109). Emotive, on the other hand, is a process by which an individual determines that their emotional reaction proves something is true, regardless of the observed evidence. Cottam et al. (2014) discuss emotive processes as “difficult to study because of considerable agreement about what they are and how to measure them, and, in political science, it is often argued that rational decision making must be unemotional” (p.63). Therefore, understanding the processes of the acquisition, organisation and processing of images can be vital in the study of perceptions of one group to another. Importantly for this research, relevant works in the field of political psychology argued that interactions between personality, political institutions and cultural settings affect and influence an individual’s political participation (Huddy, Sears & Levy, 2013; Capra & Vecchinoe, 2013; Funk, 2013: Levy, 2013; Huddy, 2013) and help to understand a range of political actions by individuals and groups, from voting to mass demonstrations, violence and terror (Cottam et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2009; Joset et al., 2008; Hatemi & McDermott, 2012).

Insights into the history of political psychology point to a range of scholarly reflections on the ways in which individuals and groups think and act politically. Some suggested that political psychology reaches as far back as to Ancient Greece, with the works of Socrates and Plato discussing the psychology of political behaviour and attitudes in their ancient societies (Monroe et al., 2009). Modern studies of political psychology can be traced to the 1970s and 1980s where political psychology split from social sciences disciplines to form its own interdisciplinary branch of psychology. Emerging on the intersection of a range of social sciences, the conceptual basis of political psychology is in addressing human psychology in relation to the political system (Monroe et al., 2009; Cottam et al., 2014; Huddy, Sears & Levy, 2013). In contrast to political science that focuses on the political institutions and their processes, political psychology focuses on the “individual political behaviour working with and against those systems” (Monroe et al., 2009).

One aspect of political psychology is the importance of core values, norms and personality in understanding how individuals and groups form and export their specific political behaviour (Capra & Vecchinoe, 2013). Literature confirms the centrality of values in acting towards political behaviour, along with the central role values play in politics. They are seen “as a major organizer of individual’s
political judgements and preferences when it comes to political behaviour” (Capra & Vecchione, 2013, p.34-35 citing Rokeach (1973,1979); Feldman, 2003, 2013; Knutsen, 1995; Mitchel, Tetlock, Mellers & Ordonez, 1993; Schwartz, 1994). Whether these core norms and values influence rationally or irrationally remain to be determined. Values and norms may evoke individuals and groups to act irrationally as perceived attacks on these norms and values, which can equate to identity, may cause resentment between the victimized groups and the perceived aggressor.

Along with values and norms being central to understanding political behaviour, a new niche of examining the cognitive, neurobiological of political behaviour is now beginning to flourish. These factors are noted crucial in expanding the methods and techniques within political psychology field. Several authors (Funk, 2013; Hatemi & McDermott, 2012; Cottam et al., 2014) discuss the use of neurobiological, aspects to explaining the ways in which individuals become ‘political beings’ (Cottam et al., 2014, p.5) through their personality, values and identity, attitudes, emotions and cognitive processes. Consideration of the environment factors is thought to help establish a greater understanding of the individual’s political behaviour, revealing the ways in which these individuals form these images and perceptions to act in certain ways are seen to be crucial in how the political establishments can interact fruitfully with their target audiences.

Understanding the role emotions plays in affecting an individual’s and groups’ behaviour, for both in general and political, literature suggest a variety of reasons for differences in groups actions and reactions to issues and events. Emotions are thought to help individuals identify themselves within a group, and in comparison, to others. These attachments to groups, either positive or negative, through emotional reasoning can give these actors a foundational image of who and what they are in terms of an ‘other’. Emotions such as fear and anger may strongly influence an individual to an irrational emotional response to a certain situation, however scholars do suggest that emotional responses or actions are not just seen as irrational judgements but in many cases rational judgements due to the nature of the incident or intervening variable on the decision maker (Linklater, 2014). This appreciation of emotions role in identity-building and social embeddedness helps in illuminating the role it plays in political thought and action. It is noted, “social institutions and politics embody and produce emotions” (Linklater, 2014, p.574). Arguing that “emotions are social because culture influences their experience and expression”, and they have demonstrated that “who we are’ depends on ‘what we feel” (Linklater, 2014, p.574).

Touching on the influence of cultural factors on the behaviour of individuals and groups, Ellis & Tucker (2015), while investigating emotions role in social psychology, explain that “cultural differences are likely to influence functional organisation” (Ellis & Tucker, 2015, p.122) of
individuals and groups in different societies. For Europe and Asia, limited cultural similarities may lead to potential disagreements (and even conflicts) over understandings how society and political structures operate. And as discussed, the relevance of emotions to culture can lead itself to emotionally driven consequences of divergence (Fitriani, 2011; Palmujoki 1997; Letta 2002)

Foreign policy of the 21st century has been argued as emotionally driven. Literature suggests that after the 9/11 attacks, the foreign policy of the US, a leading western world actor, was driven by political anger searching for someone to be held accountable for the atrocities committed (Linklater, 2014; Hutchison & Bleiker, 2008). Hutchison and Bleiker (2008) discuss the decision to initiate a subsequent US-led involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq was seen as a result of a highly emotional driven social setting based on images from the 9/11 terror attacks. This social setting was seen as an environment where the perceived suspension of basic civil rights through the legitimation of torture was accepted as a way to hold someone accountable for the 9/11 attacks. These examples suggest that the foreign policy decisions and behaviour can, and often are, influenced by the emotional settings that colour the perceptions. Within the context of the EU’s bilateral relations with Indonesia and Malaysia, emotions surrounding past histories and current political issues (e.g. trade deals, regional disputes, religious conflicts) may influence foreign policy directions between the parties involved.

5.6 Individualism vs. Collectivism in Societies

The final set of explanations comes from a conceptual model proposed by cross-cultural studies. Specifically, Hofstede’s paradigm of cross-cultural differences (Hofstede 1980, 1984) adds to our understanding of how perceptions are shaped and how they may acquire emotional weighting (considered by political psychology on the levels of individuals and groups). According to Hofstede (1980; 1984), differences between cultures could be formulated along six cultural dimensions used to explain the characteristics of societies and values and beliefs within them:

1) **Power Distance**, related to the different solutions to the basic problem of human inequality; 2) **Uncertainty Avoidance**, related to the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future; 3) **Individualism** versus **Collectivism**, related to the integration of individuals into primary groups; 4) **Masculinity** versus **Femininity**, related to the division of emotional roles between women and men; 5) **Long Term** versus **Short Term Orientation**, related to the choice of focus for people's efforts: the future or the present and past; and 6) **Indulgence** versus **Restraint**, related to the gratification versus control of basic human desires related to enjoying life (Hofstede, 2011, p.8).
This analysis chooses to focus on one dimension of this paradigm – Individualism vs. Collectivism – chosen due to its relevance in characterising the differences between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ cultures. ‘Western culture’ (that is of Europe) is noted by scholars as being highly more individualistic in its characteristics and tendencies (Triandis, 1995). In contrast, relevant literature describes ‘Eastern culture’ (including cultures in the Southeast Asia) as more collectivistic in its characteristics (Hofstede, 1980; Peterssson, 2006). Respectively, the individualist vs. collectivist dichotomy is used in this analysis when considering relations and perceptions between the EU and its Southeast Asian partners of Indonesia and Malaysia. Still, it is important to note that the individualist vs. collectivist dichotomy in application to understanding of Europe-Asia relations remain rather simplistic, as there are societies within Europe which have a higher degree of collectivist nature associated with them (e.g. those in Southern Europe) (Reher, 1998; Leutzelberger, 2014).

Despite this limitation, works in the field continue to reference individualism and collectivism to discuss the degrees to which Western and Asian societies tend to fall into those categories (Peterssson, 2006). In the literature Western societies are typically described as far more individualistic than non-Western societies – Western outlook is argued to support political cultures that promote the rights of an individual, rather than the subordination of an individual to a given society. This outlook shapes values, beliefs and symbols in Western societies and defines what events and issues are seen as important (or not), assigning evaluations to them (Yoon, 2014; Triandis, 1995; Brewer & Chen, 2007; Darwish & Huber, 2003; Zhang, Lowry, Zhou & Fou, 2007).

The European intellectual legacy demonstrates that the concepts of individualism and collectivism were in the focus on various philosophical inquires. Individualism is found to have its foundations in the philosophical roots of the Sophists, philosophers of Renaissance and works of Adam Smith (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Consideration of collectivism is found in the works of such European scholars as Rousseau, and even earlier in Plato (Brewer & Chen, 2007). As such, the notions of individualism and collectivism have a long tradition of being utilised to understand political behaviour of groups and sub-groups.

As mentioned above, European self-reflection pointed out that there are differences within European cultures when it comes to individualist vs. collectivist tendencies. Some societies in Europe are seen as more individualistic and some more collectivistic. Literature points to the Northern vs. Southern Europe divide, as well as Eastern vs. Western Europe differences. Some scholars linked the characteristics of European family structures in northern and southern cultures to identifying whether these cultures have a high degree of individualist of collectivists tendencies (Reher, 1998; Leutzelberger, 2014; Gelharr et al., 2007; Ciochina & Faria, 2009). Northern European cultures (such
as the German, English, Dutch and Scandinavian) promote a weak link of an individual to familial structure to their respective cultures, whereas southern European cultures (Italian, Southern French, Spanish) have a strong link of an individual to familial structures (Triandis, McCucker and Hui, 1990). These weak and strong ties in the familial structures are argued to underline the coping mechanisms when individuals encounter stress and/or loneliness. Weak family ties suggest choice and autonomy in relationships, making individualistic societies more “relationally mobile” (Lykes & Kemmelmeier, 2014, p.472) and enabling individuals from such societies pick and abandon relationships easier than those from collectivistic societies (Schug, Yuki & Maddux, 2010).

Peterrson (2006) argued the role of Asian communitarianism to the historical patterns of community practice tracking it to the ‘hunter-gatherer’ dynamic and the ‘wheat vs. rice cultivation’ within Europe and Asia respectively. The hunter-gatherer society experienced in Europe is argued by some to lay the foundations to a more individualistic society than comes in Asia (Bell, 2000, p.32). Another group of scholars considered different processes of wheat (Europe) and rice (Asia) cultivation. Wheat cultivation is seen to be easier to harvest with families able to cultivate and harvest seasonal yields. Whereas rice cultivation needed the combined work of entire villages and communities to secure the food source in a short amount of time, thus laying the foundations to a particular type of community and a distinctive approach to society and value based norms (Tahlem et al., 2014).

Turning to consideration of individualism vs. collectivism in explaining a dialogue between European and Asian societies, this analysis considers Peterrson’s work that argues “Western Individualism vs. Asian Communitarianism” (Peterrson, 2006) (see also works by Triandis 1995 who argues that Western societies promote more individualistic ideals than non-western societies). Peterrson (2006) notes that Asian societies tend to promote a communitarian ideal, where the rights and wishes of the society triumph those of an individual. In this context, the promotion of individual’s rights for political participation, universal human rights and right for self-determination – political values proclaimed by most Western societies – could be seen as features of different, more individualistic societies. As such, human rights may not be seen as “universal” and collectivistic predispositions may be linked to the rhetoric of traditional Asian values. This differing cultural outlook may lead to the conflict of the outlook on political norms and values and serve as a powerful influencing factor on images and perceptions of the EU in Asian societies (including Indonesia and Malaysia).

5.7 Conclusion

The study of EU external perceptions is inherently multidisciplinary. This chapter overviewed the existing research of EU external images and perceptions and provided a board overview of several conceptual traditions that may be utilised to theorise and explain perceptions. The overview
considered IR’s image theory, a broader approach of political psychology and cross-cultural paradigm of cultural studies. The links between them has been traditionally overlooked in EU perceptions research. Image theory scholarship discusses the importance of the formulation of types of images of in-groups and out-groups through their interactions between the two. Different types of interactions are seen to create positive and negative images types of out-groups, vital in understanding the types of perceptions and relationship are had between groups. Political psychology scholarship considered in this review argues that understanding political behaviour of individuals and groups invites insights into cognitive, neurobiological and cultural determinants. These determinants can directly affect how individuals and groups form images and perceptions of complex political realities and how those perceptions may, in their turn, influence political behaviour. Political psychology scholars also argue the importance of emotional aspect in understanding the formation of perceptions. Emotive aspects have been traditionally seen as irrational and thus unreliable – decisions and actions in political realms were often seen as a function of rational thinking and facts. However, literature in political psychology argues that emotive aspects, in combination with historical and cultural outlooks (e.g. individualistic vs. collectivistic cultures and associated with them norms and values), are powerful shapers of perceptions and subsequent actions, including international relations.

The theoretical linkages between IR’s image theory, political psychology and cross-cultural studies highlight the importance of perceptions formulated by in-groups (Indonesia and Malaysia in this case) about out-groups (the EU in this case). Dissecting how perceptions and images are formed, communicated and received will help to identify whether the EU is seen as a legitimate player in the international arena and in Asia specifically or not. Linking EU power narratives helps in understanding the types of norms and mechanisms the EU exports to their external partners where analysis of norms receivers illustrates the success of this exportation, which in turn can influence the identity of EU power narratives themselves. Moreover, the realities of EU external action through their geopolitical and strategic actions aid in demonstrating how and why the EU interacts with different regions and powers. These factors, the linking of conceptual approaches to image formulation, with EU power narratives as a framework of norms to identify help in producing a theoretical framework on the EU’s realities, self-visions and external visions of their power narratives and images within the global arena. The next section outlines the methodological process in examining two data sets from the case study countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. The linkages discussed in perception formulation, power narratives and realities of EU external action will be utilised within an analysis framework in order to analyse media and elites discourse, gauging the evaluation of images from the EU within norms receivers.
Chapter Six - Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological tools used to evaluate EU external perceptions as one important indicator of the EU’s reception by external partners. On a macro-level of its research design, this thesis uses the method of case study. This method – focusing on two cases of Indonesia and Malaysia – allows assessing a range of images and perceptions of the EU in a culturally and economically distinct geo-political region. The information gathered in the two cases is treated as an indicator for EU perceptions emanating from the new echelon of economically emerging actors in the dynamic Asia. The two cases probed for external images and perceptions of the EU as a global power, and specifically for EU perceptions in terms of NPE and MPE. The two cases also tracked how external perceptions compare to and interact with EU self-visions, and explored how this interaction may affect EU external relations in general, and with South East Asia in particular. Finally, the case study method was instrumental in tracing how EU-specific, location-specific and global factors influence perceptions of the EU within Indonesia and Malaysia and examining the interplay between these factors.

On operational level, in order to provide a robust analysis, this research uses a mixed method by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. Such a combination was chosen as it “offers a synthesized approach to analysis” (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 113). For Hseih and Shannon (2005) the strength of the qualitative approach is in “its subjective interpretation” (p. 1278). Subjective interpretation helps in identifying themes and relationship structures within the data sets that “can provide you with details about human behaviour, emotion, and personality characteristics that quantitative studies cannot match” (UXmatters, 2018). Qualitative research also allows for “second order interpretations – meaning researchers construct explanations for the participants’ explanations” (Tracey, 2013, p.5) during data collection, and specifically in content analysis. However, some critics argue a weakness of this approach due to the difficulty of finding trends within collected data. Quantitative elements of analysis add strength to the analysis as they help to eliminate personal and emotive reasoning associated with qualitative analysis (reasoning that may influence the analysis of the data otherwise). It is argued to allow researchers to “transform data – including conversations, actions, media stories, facial twitches, or any other social or physical activity – into numbers. Quantitative methodologies employ measurement and statistics to develop mathematical models and predictions” (Tracey, 2013, p.24). These models and predictions highlight the use of statistical analysis (descriptive statistics in the case of this thesis) that helps “derive important facts from research data, including preference trends, differences between groups, and demographics” (UXmatters website, 2018) to identify the frequency of actors, themes and images apparent within the data sets. Its “great strength is providing data that is descriptive-for example, allowing us to capture a snapshot of a user population - but we encounter difficulties when it comes to
their interpretation” (UXmatters website, 2018). Respectively, a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches employed in this thesis allows identifying trends within data collected as well as delving into the data to extract interpretations of what the data means.

Relevant literature argues that the mixed method approach offers a greater and more detailed analysis of the topic researched (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007; Boring, 1953; Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Bouchard, 1976). It has also been suggested that not only does this analysis highlight the traditional importance of qualitative and quantitative research, but also “offers a third paradigm” (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 129) which encompasses elements from both qualitative and quantitative research. This is thought to provide the most “informative, complete, balanced, and useful research results” (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 129). In addition, the use of multiple methods “increases the validity of results from enhancing our belief that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact” (Bouchard, 1976, p. 268). Therefore the “triangulation characteristic” (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) of this research that uses multiple methods of data collection and analysis, is critical in gaining a greater understanding of the phenomenon researched – EU external perceptions.

This research applies qualitative and quantitative approaches within the framework of one method: content analysis – of the interview data and news media data (in combination with the archival method). The strength of the content analysis method lies in its easy accessibility to already existent information with minimal interference from the researcher. Regarding the archival method, the collection of pre-existing documents and texts allows for a degree of non-reactiveness and limits the “intrusiveness of other data collection aspects” (Wildemuth, 2009, p. 164). The interpretive analysis of the elite opinion – gauged through the content analysis of elite interviews, and in combination with the archival method – allowed to re-analyse the data collected by other scholars (in the case of this thesis, the author accessed the archive of 51 elite interview transcripts from Indonesia and Malaysia on the subject of EU perceptions) and online archives of EU news in leading Indonesian and Malaysian newspapers. The protocol of analysis gives special consideration to the media and elite images of the EU in terms of NPE and MPE characteristics. These are argued to play a leading role in shaping the image of the EU as a potential global power. Examining and understanding the extent to which the NPE and MPE characteristics play in EU external images is suggested to be critical in detecting convergences and divergences between EU power projections onto the external partners and external reception of EU external actions and its influence towards partners outside the EU’s borders (Malaysia and Indonesia in the case of this research).
6.1 Content analysis

Content analysis was used to investigate the images of the EU within the Indonesian and Malaysia. It was applied to study both media and interview data sets. This method is regarded as one of the more flexible methods for the analysis of text data (Cavanagh, 1997; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) which allows for both qualitative and quantitative insights. It is thought to come from the family of analytical approaches which encompass “impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analysis to systematic, strict textual analysis” (Rosengren, 1981 cited by Heish and Shannon 2005, p.1277 At the same, time content analysis may come with “the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002, p.1). Content analysis is also argued to help in “identifying of relationships between message characteristics” (Spurgin and Wildemuth, 2009, p.298) within the research process.

Qualitative content analysis is seen as one of the research methods which focus on the characteristics of language communication, examining in-depth the “content or contextual meaning of text” (Heish and Shannon, 2007, p.1278; Budd, Thorp & Donohw, 1967; Lindkvist, 1981; McTavish & Pirro, 1990; Tesch, 1990). Weber (1990) sees this as the process of categorising large amounts of text into an efficient number of sections with similar meanings to hopefully illuminate a series of patterns or distinct images. Elo & Kyngäs (2008) discuss the possible negative effects of content analysis, where disadvantages of this method occur when “research questions are ambiguous or too extensive. In addition, excessive interpretation on the part of the researcher poses a threat to successful content analysis” (p.114). However, this is seen to apply to all qualitative analysis, and puts responsibility on the researcher to construct and follow their research plan. As the ultimate goal of content analysis is to “provide knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study” (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992, p.314).

Content analysis is closely linked to the coding process and allows to process large amounts of data by applying the coding schemes (Weber, 1990). Coding schemes are defined as a translation device that helps in organising the raw data from data sets into easily defined categories (Poole & Folger, 1981). Relevant literature argues that the development of a good, trustworthy and reliable process is central to successful research based on content analysis (Folger, Hewes & Poole, 1984). Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) lay out their process to the creation of a successful and reliable coding scheme which argue for “inductive reasoning” (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p.309). This research follows their example and their “8 step process of analysis” (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p.309). The ‘8 step’ process includes “preparing data; defining the unit of analysis; developing categories and a coding scheme; testing the coding scheme; coding data; assess coding data consistency; draw conclusions;
reporting of methods and findings” (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p.310-312). It is also important to
note that even during the process of coding the data, data may demonstrate the need for revision and
redefining of the coding scheme initially created (Hiesh & Shannon, 2007). The method of content
analysis and the coding processes within it are seen as flexible enough to make these changes for a
greater understanding of the researched phenomenon.

Content analyses of news media and elite interviews texts used different units of analysis
respectively. The former data set used an article as a unit of analysis. The latter dataset used the text
of an individual interview as a unit of analysis. Coding schemes for both types of data – news media
and elite interviews – reflected on the main themes, actors, evaluations, and power narrative
characteristics. Similar categories in the coding schemes ensured comparison between the two
different datasets. Content analyses based on the coding schema were powered by e-forms created by
the author that helped to collate and code the data from an article and a text of an interview. The
resulting spread sheets (in Excel) were used for statistical measurements of the categories in the
analysis of EU representations.

Collected data formed two data sets: a set of press reports of the EU and its institutions from
influential Indonesian and Malaysian newspapers (data set #1) and a set of responses generated
through face-to-face semi-structured elite interviews in the two countries (data set #2). News
production by the leading national newspapers and opinions shared by local policy- and decisions-
makers are seen as examples of public and elite discourses that are indicative of influences within a
given society. Data set #1 is used to trace EU images identified through media analysis of the four
English-language newspapers published in Indonesia and Malaysia: for Indonesia The Jakarta Post;
and Malaysia The Malaysian Reverse, the Sun and the Star. The newspapers were observed on a daily
basis in two periods of observation – 1 January-29 February 2016 (pilot phase) and 1 May-31
December 2016 (main analysis) – with the data accessed through the Press Display e-archive. The
months of March and April were excluded from observation, as Press Display data were not available
in this period. The media analysis evaluates how the selected media framed and communicated the
EU.

Data set #2 is comprised of elite interviews texts. The interviews were conducted in Indonesia and
Malaysia with political, business, civil society and media stakeholders. Interview with elites from
different cohorts provide a nuanced insight into how local decisions and policy towards the EU is
informed and directed in different sectors. A set of 51 interviews was generated within the
framework of the research project “EU Global Perceptions” led by the NCRE and stored in the
project’s archives. The data were collected by Dr Daniel Novotny who conducted a field work in
Content analysis of the interview texts is complimented by consideration of a number of factors that may impact on EU external perceptions as a global power. These include: direct contact with the EU by the interviewees; influence from the media (framing of EU events and issues); and historical legacies (perceived grievances held against Europe).

6.2 Media Analysis

The importance of examining images of the EU in media is backed by literature that explores media influences on foreign policy actors’ images and perceptions formulation. Examining mass media’s influence on public opinion, McCombs and Shaw (1972) famously stated that, “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (p.193). Mass media are considered to influence individuals “implicit attitudes” (Sedick & Roos, 2011), which are argued by scholars in the field to be produced, reproduced and reinforced by mass media. Literature notes media’s ability to frame events and issues to a particular evaluation setting, which in turn helps to “shape the publics discourse to positive and negative effects” (Culley et al., 2010, p.499). Importantly, media framing of events can “affect the attitudes and behaviours of their audiences” (Chong and Druckman, 2007, p.109) and are attributed an “agenda setting” function (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Through the selection of “facets of events or issues” media are credited with a power to be “making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and or solution” (Entman, 2004, p.5). In his “cascading framing activation theory”, Entman (2003) discusses how foreign policy ideas flow top-down (from elites and administrators to the public) and bottom-up (from the public back up to the administrators and the elites) and specifically outlines the central role of news media in activation and dissemination of particular frames of foreign policy actors up and down the cascade. Previous EU perceptions studies undertook analysis of EU images in media (for review, see Elgström and Chaban, 2015, p.25). The above-mentioned project “EU Global Perceptions” offers one of the most comprehensive analyses of EU images in media around the world (Chaban, Kelly & Bain, 2012), including South East Asia (Chaban, 2007; Chaban & Holland, 2008; Chaban & Holland, 2014). Following research examples in EU external perceptions field, this research also utilised Entman’s (2003) ‘cascading activation framing’ model in understanding the external media messages to the public and elites about the EU acting within and outside of their countries. Literature suggests that a “comprehensive analysis of EU external perceptions must take place on different levels of the cascade – from the national administration, elites, journalists, media texts and the general public” (Elgström and Chaban, 2015, p.24).

With the news media hypothesised to be among the most powerful images-shapers of foreign counterparts, this thesis examines framing of the EU in news media (press) in Indonesia and Malaysia.
**Media sample**

Media data were collected from ‘PressDisplay.com’, an e-search engine archiving media texts in PDF format as an exact replica of the hard copy publication. The selected newspapers for this research included the most prominent English-language newspapers within the two countries (the choice of the English-language sample is due to language skills limitations by the author). For Malaysia, the EU images were observed in the *Malaysian Reserve*, *the Malaysian Star* and the *Malaysian Sun*. Only one English-language newspaper was observed in Indonesia – *the Jakarta Post*. It was the only English-language newspaper available through Press Display. Other search engine were assessed to access more outlets, yet they provided data of inferior to Press Display quality, thus the sample for Indonesia remained focused on one newspaper. Despite this limitation, the reputation of *the Jakarta Post* in Indonesia and specifically among local elites allows to track meanings that influence opinions of the local policy- and opinion makers. *The Jakarta Post* (established in 1983) is based in Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta. It is ranked in 2014 by ‘4International Media and Newspapers’ as second in daily circulation, only behind *Kompas* – “25,000 to 50,000” copies daily (4IM&N, 2014). Considered as a highly independent non-biased publication (World Press – Indonesia, 2018), it is one of the few papers that survived the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Its readership includes the Indonesian policy- and decision-makers, middle class and educated Indonesians (as well as and to foreigners inside and outside Indonesia who want to be updated on Indonesian events and perspectives). The readership profile makes this newspaper a valid source of data for analysis of EU images and perceptions in Indonesia.

The Malaysian newspapers were chosen on the basis of their circulation size and relevance to readership. *The Malaysian Reserve* began in 2007. It is owned and published by TMR Media Sdn Bhd, which began as print media and evolved to a multimedia format. In 2011, the *Malaysian Reserve* joined with the *New York Times* to distribute the *New York Times – Asia-Pacific edition*. The newspaper was chosen due to its prominence as a business-orientated, independently influenced publication, which was thought to be vital in understanding the market and economic issues surrounding the EU and its relations with Malaysia.

The *Malaysian Sun* has the largest free daily circulation of all English language newspapers in Malaysia (over 306,249 (ABC – Malaysia, 2017)). First published in 1993, it appeals to its target demographics – ‘white collar’ and youth who have the ability to read and write in English. From 2002, it has been a free newspaper for the Malaysian public. Its popular profile, as well as its independent reportage style (World Press – Malaysia, 2018) and availability make it another valid case to study EU media framing in Malaysia.
The *Malaysian Star* is also one of the most prominent English-language newspapers with an average daily circulation of 272,507 in 2015 (ABC, 2015). First published in 1971 from Penang as a regional paper, *The Star* went into national circulation in 1976. In 1987, the Star lost its publication licence during Operation Lalang, an operation conducted by the government to ease racial tensions within Indonesia. However, critics have stated that Operation Lalang was actually a move by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to control political opposition. In March 1988, the Star regained its publication licence, but was seen to have lost its liberal flavour and adopt a pro-government reportage stance. This political stance as well as the Star’s high circulation makes it another ideal newspaper for study.

The period of daily observation included two phases: a pilot phase (1 January–29 February 2016) and a main phase (1 May–31 December 2016) – in total 304 days of EU coverage observed. The period of observation included two major issues in EU most recent history – the discussion on the UK leaving the EU followed by the UK referendum in June 2016, the start of the irregular migration crisis in the EU, as well as the on-going issues surrounding the Eurozone. These events dominated the EU’s agenda in 2016 and are argued to impact how the EU is perceived externally in the nearest future. These events were expected to trigger high volume coverage of the EU in the two countries. The key search terms included: the ‘European Union’, the ‘EU’, ‘European’ and ‘Europe’, as it was considered that these terms would highlight the most relevant stories related to the EU within the time period observed, as well as bring forward content not only of political, social and economic nature (typically associated with the terms ‘European Union’/’EU’) but also content related to culture, history and values (potentially associated with the terms ‘Europe’/’European’). Articles in all section of the papers were observed, encompassing political, economic, cultural and social news items.

In total, 383 articles were collected from the four new media outlets during the collection period. Of those, 212 articles were collected from the Indonesian newspaper, while 171 articles were collected from the three Malaysian newspapers. Of the articles collected, only 35 did not contain both groups (one group being ‘EU/European Union’ and the other ‘Europe and European’) of key words, and of those, only four had ‘Europe/European’ as the only key words. However, these articles still had a focus on EU related issues, therefore showing their relevance to this research.

**Media Analysis Coding Scheme**

Collected news articles from the four media sources were analysed according to a set of content analysis categories (Table 1). These were based on the “8 step” coding process outlined by Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) discussed above.
### Table 6.1: Media Analysis Coding Scheme

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<td>Business</td>
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<td>Industry</td>
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<td>Social Affairs</td>
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<td>Actors</td>
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<td>EU Enlargement Candidates</td>
<td>EU Enlargement Officials</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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**Local Link**

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign (non-local)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correspondent</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Reuters</th>
<th>AFP</th>
<th>Associated Press</th>
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<td>Bloomberg</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus of Domesticity</th>
<th>EU or EU country</th>
<th>Third Country</th>
<th>Local</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Regional (for the EU)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluations</th>
<th>Evaluation of the EU</th>
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<td>Positive</td>
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<td>Neutral-Positive</td>
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<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>Neutral-Negative</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
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<td>Mixed</td>
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</table>

Keeping in view the main research interest of this thesis – the images of the EU as a power – and the view on the EU as NPE and/or MPE – the content was also coded for *Normative Power Europe*
Characteristics and Market Power Europe Characteristics (including their respective evaluation and the number of mentions).

Table 6.2: Normative Power and Market Power Europe Coding scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberty</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Social Solidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Power Europe</td>
<td>Material Existence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest Contestation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Institutional feature</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Economic Frameworks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU administrative resources</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU’s ability to be unified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step one: Categorisation
All the articles were firstly mapped in terms of their newspaper source and the time of publication. Temporal element of analysis was important as it allowed to track coverage characterised by particular patterns or a focus on a series events or issues emerging at particular time. Subsequently, categories of content analysis were devised and operationalised (inspired by EU external perceptions studies literature that dealt with EU media framing analysis (Chaban and Holland, 2008; Chaban, Kelly & Bain, 2012; Kelly & Smith, 2016)). Articles reporting the EU were analysed in terms of their visibility – through the categories of volume and degree of centrality as well as actors. Articles also were analysed in terms of their thematic priority (actors, information input and sub-frame, as well as placement) and local link (sources and focus of domesticity). Finally, the content was evaluated in terms of the evaluations assigned to the EU. In line with the research theme on images of the EU as a power, Special analysis was taken for NPE and MPE characteristics within articles collected. NPE and MPE characteristics were specially identified for their frequency and evaluations within articles, which are believed to contribute to imagery of the EU within media analysis.

Step two: Creation of coding form
The described above categories were subsequently operationalised within the coding scheme.
Visibility

- **Degree of centrality**: the analysis observed the centrality of the EU within an article and assessed whether it was presented as the major, secondary or minor focus of the article.
- **Length**: the analysis observed the length of the articles collected, whether these articles were long (over 800+ words), medium (350-800 words) or short (less than 350 words).

Longer articles that reported the EU with a major degree of centrality are argued to bear higher visibility for readers.

Thematic priority

- **Placement**: where EU articles are placed within the news outlets is argued to render an additional clue what sort of actor the EU is. For example, if an EU article is placed in a business section, then there is a strong change the EU’s framing is linked to trade or business actions or relations.
- **Information input**: what type of thematic framing of the EU is evident within an article that reports the EU. The analysis assessed if the EU was framed as a political, economic, social and cultural, environmental or developmental actor. If the EU was presented as an actor acting in multiple areas, the analysis noted all frames and established the leading one (see information inputs detailed in Table 6.1).
- **Sub-frames**: detail thematic frames within information input by focusing on specific areas of those frames. For example, *Trade* sub-frame was located within the larger *Economic* thematic frame.
- **Actors**: the analysis accounted for the actors visible within the articles reporting the EU (for the list of actors, see Table 6.1)

Local link

- **Sources**: the analysis tracked the news sources – whether the articles were from international agencies/media outlets/non-local correspondents, or if the articles were sourced locally (written by local correspondents or local news agencies within Indonesia and Malaysia).
- **Focus of domesticity**: the analysis assessed the domesticity of the EU’s actions – whether the EU was reported to act in Indonesia/Malaysia; or in the EU’s near region; in the EU/its Member States; or in the 3rd country (not within the EU, and not in Indonesia/Malaysia), or globally.
Evaluations: were gauged through subjective interpretation of the words and phrases, to gauge the emotive stance of the data sets on imagery of the EU. They were seen with the articles as,

- **Positive**: fully positive of the EU and its actions
- **Positive-Neutral**: slightly less positive of the EU than a positive evaluation, but not a neutral evaluation.
- **Neutral**: a neutral evaluation of the EU
- **Neutral-Negative**: a slightly more negative evaluation of the EU than neutral.
- **Negative**: fully negative of the EU and its actions.
- **Mixed**: a mixed evaluation of the EU, both positive and negative.

Power Narratives

- **Normative Power Europe**: the analysis examined the articles for the frequency of reports of the NPE characteristics and gauged their evaluation by using a subjective interpretation of the words and phrases. Ultimately, the analysis aimed to see which characteristics are the most visible in the EU reportage in the two countries: these characteristics are seen as Peace, Liberty, Democracy, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Social Solidarity, Anti-Discrimination, Sustainable Development and Good Governance.
- **Market Power Europe**: much like the normative Power Europe characteristics above. The analysis examined the articles for frequency of reports of the NPE characteristics and gauged their evaluation by using a subjective interpretation of the words and phrases. These characteristics consisted of Damro’s (2012) original conceptual characteristics of; Material existence, Interest Contestation, Institutional frameworks, as well as additional conceptual ideas from Kelstrup’s critique (2015) -- Global Finaical Frameworks, EU administrative resources and the EU’s ability to be unified.

Step three: Testing the coding form

The coding scheme was tested in the pilot phase of the media analysis. The coding protocol was respectively amended to reflect the new information and categories of analysis, which became apparent through the inductive approach discussed at the beginning of this section.

Step four: Coding of data

When the testing was completed, the coding scheme was used to design an e-template (powered by Google Forms) to input all data according to the coding scheme (Table 6.1).

Step five: Consistency of coding
The final step was to assess the consistency of the data coding and its analysis. This involved going over the spreadsheet produced (in Excel) and identifying if there were any gaps in the coded information. If the identified gaps were addressed, data re-entered and/or corrected. The Excel format helped to check for the coding consistency and later to create tables and graphs.

6.3 Elite Opinion Analysis

The importance of elite perceptions in IR study is argued extensively in the relevant literature. Elites are seen to holding a special place within a given society – “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision makers” (Jervis, 1976 cited in Chaban and Kelly, 2017, p.691). According to Mills, elites “are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centred the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity, which they employ” (Mills, 1956, p.3). Therefore, examining elites perceptions of IR-specific events, issues and actors can help illuminate how and why decisions are made; and actions are taken by certain actors. Previous EU perceptions research suggested that EU perceptions among external elites were “the most informed, nuanced, multifaceted and dynamic” (Elgström and Chaban, 2015, p.28) compared to the perceptions of the EU among the general public whose perceptions of the EU are typically more generic and less informed. In general, decision- and policy-makers are expected to have a more comprehensive knowledge of the EU if they are a part of foreign policy initiatives of their countries. Literature suggests that elites possess a “number of specialised channels and direct contacts as the main sources of information about the EU” (Elgström and Chaban, 2015, p.28). Therefore, elite perceptions are anticipated to feature plethora of sophisticated images of the EU and its interactions with respective countries. Elgström and Chaban (2015) point that that visions and perceptions of foreign policy actors, including the EU, are cohort-specific – perceptions could bear a particular evaluation at the elite level, but this evaluation may differ from evaluations observed in media discourses or among the general public. Thus, relevant literature underlines the importance of examining EU perceptions across levels, issues and different regions. The nuances discovered in such multi-faceted examinations are critical in shaping the EU’s informed external action and meaningful dialogue with various key stakeholders.

Research into EU perceptions using elite cohort is a popular direction in the EU perceptions studies (Lucarelli, 2007; Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2010; Chaban et al., 2013; Chaban and Holland, 2014, 2015; Chaban and Kelly, 2017). In regards to EU perceptions studies with a focus on elites perceptions within the Asia-Pacific region, “EU Global Perceptions” project, considered a main reference on EU external perceptions, remains an important source of findings and conceptualisations.
(Chaban and Holland 2008; Holland and Chaban 2010; Chaban and Holland 2014). This thesis is informed by the project’s framework of elite opinion analysis, as interview data were generously provided by the Project.

**Elite Sample**

The elite interviews accessed in this analysis were conducted in 2012 and 2013 as part of a study “EU Global Perceptions” led by Professor Natalia Chaban and Professor Martin Holland of the National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. In total, 51 elite interviews were conducted in 2013 (by Dr Daniel Novotny) for the international project “EU Global Perceptions” in Indonesia and Malaysia. This includes 37 semi-structured face-to-face key-informant interviews conducted with Indonesian elites (representatives of political (9 elites), business (10), civil society (10) and media (8) circles) and 14 interviews in Malaysia (from the political (3 respondent), business (3), civil society (6 elites) and media (2) circles). These cohorts were chosen as they were seen as groups of the policy-, opinion- and decision-makers who have a bearing on the foreign policy directions of their respective countries.

Dr Novotny who was trained in the methodology of the elite interviews conducted the interviews in the face-to-face format. The questionnaire used included questions on general images of the EU, perceptions of the EU in relation to other actors, as an international leader, a global power and a local partner. The questions also looked into sources of information about the EU and professional/personal connections (please see Appendix 1 for the questionnaire). As shown in the Analysis section, the professional and personal interactions between the elites and the EU are paramount in understating the mechanisms to further explain how the two entities interact in present and how future involvement with each other could happen. In addition to these, there was also a separate set of questions asked to the media elites (please see Appendix 2 for Media Elites only questions), which explored the ways in which the EU issues are reported and how the newsmakers make decisions on how to tell the EU’s story within Indonesian society.

**Elite Interviews Coding Scheme**

Analysing the interview data required multiple steps, from categorization of answers to the questions posed; creation of an appropriate coding form for the data categorized; testing the coding scheme; inputting that data into the coding forms; and assessing the consistency of the data coded within the Google Forms. Similarly like the media analysis, the elite interviews coding scheme followed Zhang and Wildemuth’s ‘8 step’ coding process, which included, as mentioned above, “preparing data; defining the unit of analysis; developing categories and a coding scheme; testing the coding scheme;
coding data; assess coding data consistency; draw conclusions; reporting of methods and findings” (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p.310-312).

**Step one: Categorisation**
All the answers for each question from all respondents across cohorts were considered in order to identify the major themes raised in the answers and compare the themes across cohorts. The main thematic categories included imagery of the EU as a global power (including NPE and MPE images); international leader; EU relations with a country in question; elites’ personal connection to Europe/the EU; and their emotive stance on the EU.

**Step two: Creation of coding form**
Coding scheme included the operationalisation of the above listed categories:

- **Is the EU as a Great Power?**
The analysis examined if the EU was seen as a great power. If yes, then the analysis looked in what terms the EU was seen as a great power – economic/market, political, militarily, or normative terms.

- **Is the EU as leader in international politics?**
The analysis examined if the EU was seen as a leader in international politics. If yes, the analysis delved into what terms the EU was a leader in international politics – through its economic strength, Member States militarily or normatively.

**EU-Malaysia/Indonesia relations**

*Importance of relations:* the analysis looked into the Indonesian/Malaysian views of importance of the EU compared to other prominent regions, such as China, the US, etc. If it is important, why? If it is not important, why not? The analysis also looked into how the elites described the relationship between the EU and Indonesia/Malaysia: as stable, deepening, or stagnant.

*Issues apparent in relations:* here, the analysis examined what current issues are perceived to impact respective relations of the EU and Indonesia/Malaysia as well as explored what issues are seen as able to impact future relations when looking at future policy directions. In special focus were local industry issues vis-à-vis external issues related to the EU as well as global forces.

The analysis looked into how the elites ranked the relationship between the EU and their respective countries now and in the future.
- **Personal connections with Europe**: analysis traced if elites had any personal connections with Europe/the EU

- **Media consumption of Elites**
  
  Analysis explored the types of media the elites are reporting when they need to access information on the EU. The analysis assessed the use of traditional media of print media, radio and television coverage as well as of new media of the Internet and social media

- **Normative Power Europe**: much like the media analysis, the analysis examined interview texts for characteristics of NPE and assessed the evaluation of those characteristics through the subjective interpretation of words and phrases. These characteristics consisted of Manners original conceptualisation of norms seen as Peace, Liberty, Democracy, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Social Solidarity, Anti-Discrimination, Sustainable development and Good Governance.

- **Market Power Europe**: the analysis also looked into the MPE characteristics within interviewee texts and judged their evaluations using a subjective interpretation of words and phrases. These characteristics consisted of Damro’s (2012) original conceptual characteristics of; Material existence, Interest Contestation, Institutional frameworks as well as additional conceptual ideas from Kelstrup’s critique (2015) -- Global Financial Frameworks, EU administrative resources and the EU’s ability to be unified.

**Step three: Testing of the coding form**

The coding scheme was pilot tested. The first interviews from each of the elite circles were used as a pilot exercise to note the variances in opinions and answers. If gaps in coding scheme were identified, the coding protocol was amended accordingly, following the inductive logic discussed earlier.

**Step four: Coding of data**

Once the testing was completed, all answers were coded according to the coding scheme presented above.

**Step five: Consistency of coding**

Similar to the media analysis, the final step of the elite data analysis was to assess the consistency of the coding. This involved going over the spread sheet produced (in Excel) and identifying and mending the gaps. The Excel spread sheets helped to check for the consistency of data analysis and create appropriate tables and graphs later in the analysis.
6.4 Limitations

Although the employed methodology is robust, there are some limitations. The case study method that informed research design is sometimes argued to possess a “lack of generalizability of study findings” (Choemprayong and Wildemuth, 2009, p.55). However, the same authors cite Stake (1995) who details that the ‘real business’ of case studies is not to generalise, but in fact is to “particularise” (p.55) the phenomena studied. It is also suggested that the use of case studies itself is not a methodological method, but more or less is the choice of what it is we choose to study (Stake, 2005).

The content analysis applied to the collected media texts and elite interviews is characterised by a low level of control of the research environment by the researcher. In the case of this thesis, interview data were generated and collected by other scholar who interviewed a limited number of elites (51). Yet, a mitigating factor here is an in-depth nature of the interviews (each lasting an hour on average) and key positions of the interviewed elites in their respective sectors.

In addition, only English-language newspapers were analysed, due to linguistic limitations of the author. The use of press in native language may provide a more nuanced insight into the framing of the EU. However, the influential nature and high circulation of the outlets observed in this research warrant a reliable insight into EU media framing in the two country cases.

The media discourse and elite interviews are viewed as valuable sources of information due to their influence on the decision, policy, and opinion making processes in the respective countries. On this note, this research does not examine the general public opinion. This cohort was excluded due to their potentially limited knowledge of the EU and limited influence on the foreign policy dealings with the EU. Yet, if the public opinion is in research focus, then future research designs may consider EU framing in digital and social media, when researching appeal of the EU to external general publics.

6.5 Conclusion

To conclude, this section outlined the methodological tools in use to examine the perceptions of the EU from the two case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia. This section described multiple sources of data (news media and policy- and decision-making elites), data collection methods and data analysis method (content analysis). Multiple methodological dimensions are important to garner a greater understanding of the phenomenon of EU external perceptions. Ultimately, this research aims at illuminating images of the EU as a global power – and specifically as a normative and/or market power – within an emerging geo-political region of Southeast Asia. The following section details the empirical results of this investigation in two cases – Indonesia and Malaysia – following the protocols described above.
Findings of Media and Elites Discourse Analysis: Indonesia and Malaysia

These two chapters highlight the results of the media and elite discourses analyses within Indonesia and Malaysia. Results were found by following the coding schemes detailed in the methodology section. The use of qualitative and quantitative were used to help in the evaluation of the EU images within both data sets, with qualitative methods garnering special attention to the emotive responses and rhetoric within articles and interviews in judging the EU’s evaluation. Quantitative methods helped in illustrating the leading trends and patterns within both data sets, which is illustrated by the graphs provided within this section. Theoretical frameworks on perception formulation, EU self-visions and realities of EU images as a global power discussed in detail above were consulted again when analysing the results.

The media analysis aimed at highlighting the level of saturation of EU representations within local print media in Indonesia and Malaysia. The analysis presented below aims to uncover not only the visibility of prominent events and actors of the EU and its Member States, but also the thematic framing of the EU images, their local groundings and evaluations. As mentioned above, a number of important developments took place in 2016, the observed period. That year, the institutional crises challenged the EU – the lead up to the United Kingdom’s referendum on EU membership in June, the eventual vote and discussions after the vote to leave. Also, 2016 featured the on-going migration crisis, as well as the on-going issues within the Eurozone. These events were considered as influential variables in the growing populism and euroskepticism that was thought to be increasing within the EU and its Member States. Externally, institutional crises led to inquiries into the EU’s perceived normative and market pull.

The elite discourse analysis aimed at gaining a more nuanced view of perceptions of the EU from Indonesia and Malaysian elites. As indicated in the previous section, these elites were from four cohorts – political, business, civil society and media – who are to be considered as the decision makers within their societies. Due to the time that those interviews were conducted (2013), the major events of 2016 were not addressed. However, potential images of NPE and MPE may be uncovered within the elite’s discussions of how they see the EU as a global power, and what aspects could foster better relations in the future.
Chapter Seven - Analysis of EU Media Frames: Indonesia and Malaysia

7.1 Visibility

Figure 7.1 – Sample distribution – Volume of EU news in the observed media sources

Figure 7.1 demonstrates the distribution of articles between the four news media sources in the observed period. As displayed, the *Jakarta Post* had a higher volume of articles that reported the EU in the observed period, with a total of 212 articles collected. In contrast, the Malaysian sources - the *Star* (118 articles), the *Sun* (39 articles) and the *Malaysian Reserve* (14) – all had a considerably lower volume of EU-related news. This suggests that readers of *the Jakarta Post* have greater exposure to EU news compared to the readers of the Malaysian newspapers in our sample.
Figure 7.2 – Sample Distribution – Volume by month

Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of articles through the observation period. As noted previously, January and February 2016 were the month of the pilot research. The highest number of articles collected in one month for both countries was in June. Notable events in June were the lead up to the referendum in the UK, and the subsequent outcome to leave the EU. Brexit vote outcome gathered extremely high coverage – nearly half of all articles collected in June were published from June 25\(^{th}\) onwards (26 articles in Malaysia and 19 in Indonesia). This peak on coverage indicated that the EU’s major visibility in both countries happened in the context of a dramatic and controversial event that presented the unity of the EU challenged.
As noted in the methodology, the degree of centrality was another category to assess the visibility of the EU in the press. This category invites to assess how central an actor is within the collected articles. In both countries, the EU was reporting from a predominantly major focus (Figure 7.3) – in around 75% (Indonesian sample) and 78% (in the Malaysian case). This major degree of centrality assigned to the EU and its actors within the articles correlates with the use of non-local news sources when reporting the EU. Major degree of centrality was observed in such topics as the lead up to the referendum on the UK’s vote to leave the EU, the vote on the 26th of June and the subsequent fallout out of the vote to leave. Also articles focusing on issues surrounding the migration crisis from the migration hotspots in the Mediterranean were major degree of centrality.

The EU was reported from secondary and minor perspectives when it was mentioned acting in 3rd countries (e.g. dealing with the migration crisis in Turkey, in Syria and in Libya; or in interactions with the US when articles discussed the impact of a President Trump on geopolitics and then mention the EU). This pattern indicated that the EU was presented as a somewhat visible player within the international arena.

Linking the degree of centrality to articles’ lengths reveals that the most articles were of medium lengths12 in both case studies. 53% (Malaysia) and 63% (Indonesia) of articles that presented the EU with a major degree of centrality were medium sized articles. The volume of long and short length

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12 Article lengths were seen as Short: 1-349 words; Medium: 350 – 799 words; Long: 800+ words.
articles was minimal in both cases. This correlation between the length and degree of centrality arguably suggests a relatively visible profile of the EU.

### 7.2 Local Links

![Diagram showing the focus of domesticity of the EU's representations in Indonesia and Malaysia.]

**Figure 7.4 – Focus of Domesticity of the EU’s representations**

Figure 7.4 shows that both Indonesian and Malaysian press has a remarkably similar framing of the EU when it comes to the ‘domestication’ of the EU in news: 75% of the articles in each case report the EU as an actor who acts within EU borders or in an EU member state. *Third country* focus was the second most typical framing both in Indonesia and Malaysia, with the USA portrayed as the main interlocutor for the EU. This reportage appeared in the run up to the US Presidential elections when the media in the two Southeast Asian countries were considering the impact of Trump’s election on the EU-US relations. *Regional* focus of domesticity was observed in the articles that reported how the EU engaged in its neighbourhood region, and specifically dealing with the migration crisis. *Local* focus in EU reportage for both Indonesia and Malaysia was observed in less than one in ten articles. This extremely low profile may project images of the EU as an actor who is barely engaging with local actors and prompt a low salience assigned by the readers to EU relations with their respective locations. Yet, this low visibility might be related to the nature of news sources discussed below. As discussed below, Malaysian and Indonesian newsmakers prefer to use international sources when reporting the EU, and such sources typically overlook local links.
News sources are considered to be a powerful influence on shaping images of foreign policy actors. Figure 7.5 demonstrates the overwhelming use of international news sources when reporting the EU in both countries. In the Malaysian case, four out of five articles are sourced from non-local news agencies or correspondents, and in the Indonesian case five out of six articles are originating from non-local agencies or correspondents. This preference was explained by media elites from both countries when they were interviewed for this research. According to the local newsmakers, they prefer to use international news services to gather stories on the EU. Malaysian media respondent, for example, mentioned the use of “international news organisations like BBC, TIMEs and sometimes even the EU website” (Malaysian Media #1). Indonesian media professionals tend to use international news agencies like “AFP, Reuters” (Indonesia Media #1) to source stories about the EU. The use of international media and foreign correspondents is attributed to budgetary constraints. Both Indonesian and Malaysian news media respondents discussed their limited budgets for the coverage of events and issues outside of the Southeast/East Asia region (Malaysian Media #2, 2013). Budgetary limitations are behind the decisions not to assign reporters to solely cover the EU related issues – “none of the Indonesian media really does it” (Indonesian Media #8, 2013).

Arguably, this dominant use of non-local sources to report the EU could impact the images of the EU among media outlets’ readers. Multiples crises in the EU, such as Brexit, Eurozone crisis, migration crisis, are seen as “dramatic” and “bad” news, and thus it may fit the profile of the news that has a greater interest from readers: as one respondent stated, “Bad news is the good news” (Indonesian
Another Indonesian newsmakers echoed: “news about Europe collapsing” (Indonesian Media #7, 2013) triggered a massive interest among their readers. While this interest follows from the generic strong impact of the negative news stories, the news on the EU and/or Europe collapsing (in this case, due to the impact of the Eurozone crisis) caused a special attention from the readers. This meant that Indonesia was in a better position than other regions in the world. With the crises ongoing, the lasting negative image of the EU created and communicated by local media may solidify the EU’s image as a struggling global power.

Figure 7.6 – International sources used to report the EU

Figure 7.6 follows on from Figure 7.5 demonstrating different international news agencies used to source stories covering the EU. AFP is one of the most sourced international agencies for both Malaysia and Indonesia accounting for a third of all Malaysian articles and a fourth of Indonesian articles in this analysis. Reuters was also a popular source, with one fourth of Indonesian articles and one fifth of Malaysian articles sourced from Reuters. These media findings are again supported by the observations from the media elite interviews. Both Malaysian and Indonesian newsmakers, when discussing the use of international sources for news on the EU, admitted that there is a difficulty to get information from their own local correspondents so they tend to “just copy from the news wire” (Indonesia Media #1), re-print articles (e.g. “from the International Herald Tribune” (Indonesian Media #5, 2013)) or use international agencies such as Reuters (Indonesian Media #7 & #8, 2013). Local sources are also not involved as it is perceived that “readers seem to place Europe somewhere out of [the] traditional area of interest” (Indonesian Media #8, 2013), or “geographically, the EU is quite distant” (Indonesian Media #2, 2013). These responses highlighted that EU issues may not be
seen to be of paramount concern for Indonesian and Malaysian audiences. In recent EU official documents, the EU aims to increase its presence within the Southeast Asian region to help with security and human rights issues (GSEU, 2016). However, the lack of the EU’s local links in the reportage by leading news sources may create an impression of the EU as an absent partner – the imagery that is in stoking contrast to the image the EU is aiming to project.

7.3 Thematic Priority

![Figure 7.7 – Articles placement within observed newspapers](image)

Article placement helps to explore how EU issues and events are framed within local or international contexts and whether they are seen of high importance. Figure 7.7 demonstrates that articles reporting the EU appeared mostly within the World/International sections of media sources from both countries: two out of every three articles in Malaysia sources were found within this section, and three out of five articles in Indonesia. One quarter of the Malaysian articles within the international/world section came out of The Star’s special Sunday section ‘DOTS’ that was seen to provide a deeper insight into international topics dealing with a range of issues. In contrast, the profile of the EU in the sections that deal with local news was practically invisible. This placement could serve an additional indicator of the image of the EU as a seemingly absent partner for the two locations (this findings echoes the finding of the almost absent local focus of domesticity of the EU in the observed news).

The Malaysian Reserve had nearly one half of its articles about the EU c within the Business section – a placeman that may prompt the readers of the Malaysian Reserve frame the EU is an economic and business actors. Articles in this paper reported the EU in the context of the implication of Brexit on the banking industry in London (Campbell, 2016; Bloomberg #8, 2016; Morris & Son, 2016), Polish
government spending increases (Bloomberg #14, 2016), and the implication of the EU imposing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on Malaysian businesses (Archibald, 2016).

In the Jakarta Post, the second most popular placement was in the Opinion section, with articles sourced locally for that section, making them more locally relevant and engaging with local readership. These opinion pieces featured a range of topics: e.g. the impact of Brexit (Roselini, 2016; Zain, 2016; The Strait Times, 2016), combating illegal logging in Indonesia with the help of the EU (Malik, 2016), EU-Indonesia trade of agricultural products and moving away from palm oil production (Pematang, 2016; Hogan, 2016), and a comparison between the EU’s supranational approach to ASEAN’s intergovernmental approach (with the latter seen not eroding national sovereignty) (Mordecai, 2016). The issue of sovereignty came into the limelight due to the Brexit vote and growing Euroscepticism in Europe.

Figure 7.8 – Thematic frames of the EU

Figure 7.8 illustrates distribution of the thematic frames of the EU. Once again, the press in the two locations came with similar patterns in framing the EU. EU framing as a political actor led in both media samples: 157 articles in the Malaysian sources and 179 in the Indonesian sources (or 91% and 84% of the respective samples). The EU framed as an economic actor was found in 53% of Malaysian and 61% of Indonesian articles. Social and cultural themes in the EU reports were not as visible as the political and economic theme – they were present in 45% (Malaysia) and 30% (Indonesia) of the respective samples. Articles with only one major theme for EU actions were observed in only 49 (Malaysia) and 75 (Indonesia) instances. The rest of the coverage demonstrated that when the EU is reported many themes are intertwined – three out of every four in the Malaysian case and two out of
every three articles in the Indonesian case had two or more themes attributed to the EU. Specifically, Brexit coverage triggered such multi-themed consideration of the EU – reportage of the political actions of the EU in the context of the Brexit vote was complemented by economic themes (e.g. the impact of Brexit on slowing economies) as well as social/cultural themes (e.g. immigration crisis impact on the populists’ sentiments as a potential factor behind the “Leave” vote)

Representations of the EU as an environmental and developmental actor were limited compared to the other three major framing options. Environmental framing of the EU took place in just over 4% of the collected articles, and developmental framing was observed only in 1% of the coverage. Despite their overall low visibility, environmental actions of the EU tended to have a more visible local link in both case studies. Actions of the EU as a development actor were mostly framed in the context of migration: e.g. the EU was reported to aid the refugees in Turkey (AFP, 2016a; AFP, 2016d; Rowling, 2016); training of Libyan coast guard to combating migrant smuggling rings (AP, 2016a); or providing aid to educate migrants’ children in Greek refugee camps (Boltard, 2016). The only local development aid article was dedicated to the talks between the EU and Indonesia over initiatives put forth within the PCA (Salim, 2016). The low visibility of the environmental and developmental actions of the EU (closely linked to the normative self-visions of the Europeans as a part of their identity) suggests a divergence between self-images of Europe vis-à-vis external views on the EU.

The following graphs delve into the major thematic frames by detailing the sub frames – more detailed categorizations of political, economic, social and cultural, environmental representations of the EU and its actors.

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13 Brexit vote, the Migration Crisis, Eurozone issues, Euroscepticism and populism evident within article will be discussed further in Figure 7.19 where the evaluation of these issues are analysed in connection to local and foreign news sources to examine whether there is divergence between local and foreign media sources coverage.
Figure 7.9 – Distribution of Political Sub-Frames: Internal EU Political Actions vs. EU external actions

Figure 7.9 demonstrates the distribution of the sub-themes within politically-framed articles – here the analysis differentiated between the news on the EU’s political actions internally (inside the EU and/or its Member States) and the EU’s political actions externally (outside of the EU). A large number of the internally-focused articles covered the Brexit vote and Brexit’s possible implications for the EU. This visible sub-theme is argued to impact the EU’s image as a unified actor (one of the MPE characteristics), as well as the EU’s images in terms of good governance and social solidarity within the EU (the NPE characteristics). Other popular political topics on EU internal political events dealt with potential outcomes of French and German elections; or the Belgian regional political grievances that blocked trade negotiations between the EU and Canada over CETA (e.g. Ljunggren, 2016; AFP, 2016e).

Articles that reported the EU’s external political actions were less in volume. Most covered the EU’s response to the attempted coup in Turkey as well as to President Erdogan’s crackdown on coup leaders and other enemies of the state. Another visible topic was the EU-US relations in the context of the US presidential election campaign and eventual victory of Trump (e.g. Bershidsky, 2016).
Figure 7.10 illustrates the distribution of sub-frames within economically framed articles. The state of the EU’s economy attracts steady attention from the Malaysian and Indonesian newsmakers. The EU’s actions in industry, trade and business also attracted attention. In contrast, actions of the EU in the agricultural sector were of extremely low visibility. Brexit was framed to influence the economic actions of the EU, potentially impacting the EU’s industry, trade, business and state of the EU economy in a negative way. Reportage also investigated the potential impact of an economic slowdown in Germany; as well as Polish and Eastern Europe economic outlooks and industrial strength. Among many topics, TTIP negotiations were highly visible and specifically the pursuit of signing the deal before the then potential Trump presidency. Local authors discussed trade and industry potential in the context of EU-Indonesia and EU-Malaysia trade opportunities. In particular, Indonesian timber was discussed as a potential product for the EU’s single market (once the Indonesian timber industry gained licensing of their product to meet EU regulations). These examples demonstrate images of the EU’s economic strength conducive to the projections of the MPE.
Figure 7.11 demonstrates that immigration was the most visible topic when the EU was reported in social and cultural contexts: one out of three articles in Malaysia and one out of four articles in Indonesia. It is fair to note that this visibility was not solely due to the migration crisis. Brexit vote triggered consideration of migration within the EU as many EU nationals live in the UK. In particular, the news discussed the impact of Brexit on the large Polish and other Eastern European communities in the UK. The topics of diversity and multiculturalism were also linked to this theme, where the multicultural challenge posed by the migration crisis triggered reportage that talked about inclusion and anti-discrimination of minorities (dealing with the themes that are seen to belong to the EU’s normative agenda).

Reports also talked about terrorism and crime in the EU. Linking crime to migration, news examined the migrant smuggling ring. Reports about terrorism discussed the potential for large-scale Islamic State’s attacks “directed at soft targets, because of the impact it generates” (Agencies, 2016) in civilian areas. The impact of the Islamic State’s terrorist attacks was described to be Europe’s “Achilles heel”, seen to “arouse Islamophobia in the West” (Soros, 2016b). This situation was seen to be able to turn moderate Muslims in Europe towards terrorism if they are treated with suspicion in European societies. These topics are argued to have a special meaning to the readers in Indonesia and Malaysia, potentially raising the salience of such reports and EU images within them.
Figure 7.12 demonstrates the distribution of the sub-frames within the environmental reports of the EU: the EU’s internal and external environmental actions. With sustainable development being one of the NPE characteristics, reports of the EU on this theme may raise the visibility of the EU in the NPE terms. If the EU is reported to be involved in environmental issues of Southeast Asia, then such framing may give the EU’s NPE identity an additional boost among Indonesian and Malaysian readers. As mentioned above, the EU was reported to have such local links in the reports about the Indonesian timber industry, which were at the time in the process of receiving the FLEGT license to sell their timber within the EU market (AP, 2016b; Wardhani, 2016; Amirio, 2016; Salim, 2016a). This license follows the EU regulations and is in place to combat illegally logged timber (a harmful development to the Indonesian environment) (Malik, 2016). Another environmental factor discussed related to the issue of the palm oil label brought by Europe and impacting Malaysian and Indonesian industry. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib, also financial Minister, said Malaysia and Indonesia would fight the “no palm oil” labelling issue in Europe and will aim to work with the EU on the issue saying that “Malaysia subscribes to sustainable development of the palm oil industry and that there was no “slash and burn” practices in the country” (Bernama, 2016a) – practices which have been labelled by the EU as anti-environmental.
Figure 7.13 – Visibility of Actors in EU-related reportage

Figure 7.13 sums up the visibility of various actors observed in the articles reporting the EU. While the EU was the most visible actor (it was the key search term after all), the next two most visible actors (rather predictably) were the EU Member States and their officials. This actor visibility reflects on the degree of centrality in both cases (with the EU and its Member States being reported with major intensity in the majority of the observed reportage) and on the focus of domesticity (with the EU reported to act mostly within its own borders). These two patterns indicate that the impact of issues facing the EU, and evaluations of the progress and obstacles of Member States and their officials, were highly recognised. Reflecting on the nature of the news sources and placement patterns, Indonesia and Malaysia, were recognised as actors within the EU reports only minimally, being mentioned only in 6% of the total articles collected. There were a number of actors from outside of the EU and the two case countries who regularly appeared in the EU reportage. Among the most frequent were the USA and China. The EU’s interactions with the two global powers could give the EU the agency as a player in the international arena. Interactions with China noted by the news could help to communicate the message about the EU interacting with Asia, and inform images of the EU’s orientation to Asia as a region of importance. These images may counterbalance the EU’s images of a distant and/or locally irrelevant actor.
Figure 7.14 – Visibility of EU bodies

Figure 7.14 demonstrates the visibility of EU bodies identified by the analysis. The European Commission was the most visible institution both in Indonesia and Malaysia. In Indonesia the Commission was visible in 29% of the articles collected from Indonesian sources, compared to 9% of Malaysian sources. The European Parliament, European Council and European Central Bank were the next most visible EU bodies within the media sources.
Figure 7.15 shows the visibility of EU officials. The visibility of the four leading figures of the EU could be said to correlate with the visibility of the respective bodies they are heading. Schulz as the then head of the European Parliament was reported in one third of the articles, which mentioned this EU body. In contrast, Tusk was more visible than the European Council he is the head of. Still, Juncker was the most visible EU official in the media coverage in the two countries. He is often seen as the spokesperson for the EU on issues and challenges facing the EU, especially with the EU’s reactions to Brexit. Surprisingly, Mogherini was not as visible as expected. This may be due to the use of European news sources, which focused mainly on internal EU issues. It is also possible that Mogherini was focused on different regions during the period of media observation over 12 months, rather than on the EU’s interactions with the Southeast Asian region.
Figure 7.16 – Visibility of EU Member States

Figure 7.16 demonstrates the visibility of EU Member States within the EU-related reportage. The ‘Big 3’ of the EU – the UK, Germany and France – were by far the most visible than any other EU member state. The UK was the most visible, due to the coverage surrounding the Brexit referendum and the follow up of the “Leave” vote. Germany was the second most frequent EU member state mentioned in the EU-relevant news. Its visibility was mainly due to its leading role in the EU, and its position on the irregular migration crisis. Reports in Indonesia and Malaysia talked about the German Chancellor Angela Merkel as the de-facto leader of Europe – “when the chips are down in Europe, everyone turns to Merkel for a solution” (Reuters, 2016a). France’s visibility was linked to the news discussing the implications of Brexit and its position as one of the core EU members. Belgium was the next most visible state. This higher profile was linked to it being a host for the EU’s headquarters, but also to Belgium’s’ opposition to the CETA negotiations (e.g. Belgium farmers opposed the trade
deal with Canada, citing impact on their agricultural industry). Austria, Greece and Italy were mentioned in a number of articles concerning migration issues. While Greece and Italy were reported tackling the brunt of the migration flows linked to the irregular migration crisis, reports about Austria focused on the rise of right-wing anti-migration sentiments in the wake of Brexit and noted fuelling discontent with the flow of economic migrants into the country. The visibility of certain Member States correlated with the visibility of the EU member state officials (Figure 7.17). UK officials were the most visible, and among those former Prime Minister David Cameron, prominent Brexiteer Boris Johnson and Prime Minister Theresa May. Significantly, Nigel Farage, the UKIP leader and outspoken Brexiteer, was another visible actor, more visible than most of EU Member State heads of state. Angela Merkel was the second most visible member state official. It was not only her role as a leader for Europe that attracted media attention, but also her running for a fourth term in the times of the migration crisis also added to her profile in the 2016 coverage. François Hollande, former President of France, was another visible official, however his profile was much less pronounced. Reports that mentioned him tended to talk about him only when he was associated with Merkel, especially in discussions surrounding Brexit and potential of further economic integration of the Eurozone. Importantly, EU Member State officials were more visible than EU officials when the reportage dealt with critical events and issues in the EU.

![Figure 7.17 – Visibility of EU member state officials](image-url)
7.4 Evaluations

This analysis examines evaluations assigned to the EU. As mentioned by Culley et al. (2010), media and the stories they cover can “shape the publics discourse to positive and negative effects” (p.499). Importantly, media framing of events can “affect the attitudes and behaviours of their audiences” (Chong and Druckman, 2007, p.109) As such, evaluations communicated by influential media can have an impact on the EU’s image as a player in the international arena, as well as on the perceptions of NPE and MPE. Figure 7.18 demonstrates patterns in the evaluation of the EU. These were detected and categorised through the author’s subjective interpretation the emotively-coloured expressions in the EU’s representations. The analysis tracked evaluations in each case study (Indonesia and Malaysia) first. It also compared the evaluation patterns of EU news that originated from non-local sources vs. local sources. The evaluations were tracked in the main information inputs disused above, yet special attention was paid to two research cases: 1) EU evaluations found in the reports of critical events and developments: Brexit, Migration crisis, Eurozone crisis, euroscepticism, and populism; and 2) EU evaluations in the context of NPE and MPE characteristics reported by Indonesian and Malaysian media. These evaluations are argued to potentially impact the EU’s image as a global power.

Figure 7.18 – Evaluations of the EU
News sourced locally in Malaysia evaluated the EU in a similar pattern as the EU news sourced from international authors and agencies. In this case, fully positive stories or fully negative stories on the EU were rare. Both internationally- and locally-sourced EU news had positive profiles of the EU in fewer than 10% in each case. In contrast, negatively framed articles were more visible in the reports by local Malaysian authors, then in the reports coming from non-local sources (10% vs. 4% respectively). This contrasted the Indonesian media framing of the EU that presented the EU in a more positive light than their Malaysian counterparts. Locally-sourced EU news in Indonesia have a stronger tendency to positively evaluate the EU (56%). One of the main topics that attracted positive evaluations by the local authors was Indonesian-EU trade and industry relations, and the Indonesian Timber industry in particular. Local authors saw the opening of the EU market for Indonesian timber products as positive and beneficial development for Indonesia. EU news sourced from international sources was less positive, yet not minimal in their positive evaluations of the EU (20%).

**Evaluations of the EU in the context of multiple crises in the EU**

Figure 7.19 presents a summary of the evaluation patterns detected in EU news covering multiple EU crises within the time period observed: Brexit vote, irregular migration crisis, ongoing Eurozone challenges, populism and euroskepticism were reported by Indonesian and Malaysian media. Figure 7.19 compares EU profiles formed by non-local vis-a-vis local sources. As discussed earlier, Brexit was the most visible EU event/issue discussed by the press in both countries. The other critical evolutions (migration crisis, Eurozone crisis, rising euroskepticism and populism) received a lower profile, however when reported they often were framed as potential catalysts for the Brexit vote.
Figure 7.19 – Evaluations of the EU in the context of multiple crises in the EU
The five critical evolutions of the EU in 2016 received an overwhelmingly negative evaluation by the newsmakers. The topic of rising populism received a 100% negative evaluation within both local and foreign media sources. Local Indonesia and Malaysian sources also assigned only negative evaluations to euroskepticism and Eurozone challenges. In contrast, the report of Eurozone issues and euroskepticism that originated from foreign sources did not follow this trend. For example, two articles saw a growing euroskepticism as a positive development and considered the potential of sovereignty ‘given back’ to the Member States. Notably, these articles praised the anti-EU campaigner Nigel Farage.

The migration crisis was the second visible topic in the media coverage. News sourced from non-local authors and agencies discussed this issue at length. In contrast, reflections on this topic by local sources were scarce. Negative evaluations surfaced when news reported violations of human rights of the migrants coming into Europe, migration policy failures of the EU, Sweden expelling 80,000 asylum seekers, or the societal impact of refugees moving into the communities hit by terrorism in the past. Importantly, positive evaluations were also present: several articles talked about the potential of the migrants to become assets for the EU, in terms of labour resources and commercial consumers of products.

Evaluations of Brexit, the most visible topic reported, were similar both in locally and internationally sourced news – 71% of news stories by local sources mentioned Brexit and evaluated its potential impact on the EU’s economy as negative and 66% of news from foreign sources echoed this evaluation. Positive evaluations in the context of Brexit came in reports that talked about the UK gaining its national sovereignty back; the potential for FTAs between the UK and other international partners; and the UK’s reorientation back to the former commonwealth countries (Byrnes, 2016). Malaysian reports also discussed commercial potential for foreign corporations to buy depreciating assets in the EU in the wake of Brexit (Han, 2016). Mixed evaluations also surrounded the future negotiations, yet the catastrophic predictions were diminishing in visibility as time went by. Other risks of Brexit were also discussed. One example was a report on the prospects of a less centralised EU, a vision supported by several Visegrad countries (Asquin & Ide, 2016). Such reports illustrated a lack of cohesion within the EU and diversity of opinions on the nature of governance in the EU among its Member States.

Overwhelming negative evaluations assigned to the EU’s multiple crises aligned with the sentiment shared by newsmakers that “bad news is the most interesting ones” (IM#1, 2013). A visible profile given to highly negative stories about the EU may be due to the negative nature of the news itself, or the choices of the editors and media outlets agendas. As one interviewed media professional noted,
“boring news from inside the Brussels scene do not really sell, but news about Europe collapsing … would be very catchy” (IM#7, 2013). This view was supported by another media elite who confirmed that in 2013 it was the negatively-coloured topic of the Euro debt crisis in Greece which was very popular among the newsmakers when reporting the EU (MM#2).

*Evaluations of the EU in the context of NPE and MPE representations*

Looking at the evaluations of the NPE and MPE characteristics reported by the Malaysian and Indonesian press, this analysis first tracks the most visible characteristics and then assesses the evaluations communicated to the readers. Malaysian media had an almost equal distribution of the MPE and NPE references (310 and 305 mentioning’s respectively). In Indonesia, the MPE characteristics were more visible the NPE norms (504 vs. 214 mentioning’s respectively). Arguably, media framing of the EU in Indonesia communicated the EU from a strong MPE perspective, thus increasing the salience of this facet of the EU’s power identity in the eyes of the readers.

The distribution of MPE and NPE references was linked to the nature of the news sources. Local sources contained references to the MPE and NPE characteristics to a higher degree than the sourced foreign sources with local sources within Indonesia accounting for 17% (37) for NPE and 13% (65) of MPE characteristics visible within their media. Malaysia had similar findings where local sourced sampled 18% (57) of MPE and 14% (42) of NPE characteristics visibility. This indicator was actually higher for locally-sourced news than news coming from international sources (typically of western European origin). Indonesian local reports had a more positive view on both NPE and MPE if compared to the reports by local Malaysian sources. This positive profile may be due to Indonesia’s positive reactions towards strengthening EU-Indonesia relations through the partnership in two highly valued Indonesian industries of logging and Crude Palm Oil (Schmitz, 2016; Wardhandi, 2016; Salim, 2016).
Figure 7.20 highlights the evaluation of the NPE characteristics within Malaysian press under observation irrespective of the sources of coverage. Importantly, there is a clear contrast between the frequencies of characteristics mentioned by the news from foreign sources vis-à-vis local sources. In the locally-sourced EU news, there tends to be a more balanced evaluation of the EU in terms of NPE characteristics, with a neutral to neutral-negative evaluation of NPE norms dominant. Issues surrounding Brexit were highly visible in the NPE profile – Brexit was seen to impact EU coherence and democratic practices. Significantly, positive evaluations were seen within all norms, but peace was the most visible norm, including the EU’s promotion of peace building processes globally, very much like the foundation of the European project itself.

In Malaysian EU news sourced internationally, neutral to neutral-negative evaluations were assigned to EU representation in the areas of rule of law and democracy, the most visible norms within the foreign sources’ coverage. Brexit is one topic that profiled those evaluations assigned to these norms (e.g. reports on the discussion surrounding potential non-acceptance of the referendum result). Sustainable development, in contrast, was the most visible norm assessed positively within EU news from foreign sources. Such reports talked about the EU as a promoter of environmental standards as well as through the discussion surrounding the CPO industry impact within Malaysia. The timber industry in Indonesia was also mentioned in the Malaysian reports, thus linking both case studies.

The most negative evaluations came in the reports of such norms as democracy, rule of law, human rights and good governance. EU institutional crises triggered these evaluations: e.g. reports featuring
discussions on good governance in the EU following the Brexit vote, while observing the democratic principles. *Human rights* and *rule of law* norms were seen in the reportage on irregular migration crisis. Conditions of travel and treatment of migrants in Europe were viewed with criticism as they potentially disregarded migrants’ rights. Malaysian reports of the NPE characteristics were generally balanced in terms of evaluations, but lent themselves more to neutral/neutral-negative position on the evaluation continuum.

![Figure 7.21 – NPE Evaluations from Indonesian Media](image)

*Figure 7.21 – NPE Evaluations from Indonesian Media*

Figure 7.21 illustrates a rather positive evaluation of the NPE norms within Indonesian EU news. *Peace* was the most positive of the most visible norms. This characteristic came through in the reports detailing the EU’s formulations and actions in peace projects around the world. The EU’s presence within Indonesia as aiding with addressing extremist and separatists movements within the country. The EU was also reported to help Indonesia eliminate corruption from their public and private sectors.

*Rule of law* was another visible NPE norm, yet it attracted a mostly neutral evaluation. This evaluation was found in the reports on laws dealing with the migration crisis impacting the EU. Frames of the EU’s treatment of migrants, most of them Muslims from Syria, may have an effect on EU images in Indonesia, a largest Muslim state in the world. *Sustainable development* was the most visible NPE characteristic in EU news sourced locally. This news focused on the EU-Indonesia agreements surrounding timber and CPO industries.
Figure 7.22 – MPE Evaluations from Malaysian Media

Figure 7.22 demonstrates the distribution of evaluations assigned to the MPE characteristics evident in the Malaysian case. As with the NPE norms visibility, EU news from local Malaysian sources discussing MPE facets of the EU was less frequent. It typically carried a more negative evaluation of these norms. Brexit vote has influenced these representations, especially when potential impact of Brexit and the disastrous forecasts of growth and impact on EU businesses and industries were argued. In the case of EU news from non-local sources, the focus was similar – Brexit was seen as a major point of negative impact. Its impact on the single market and euro was recognised, as well as the impact on industry and businesses. Particular negative evaluations were found in news on the relocation of banking entities from London to Frankfurt after the vote outcome became public.

Overall, the MPE characteristics came with neutral/neutral-negative evaluations. A number of topics attracted such evaluations – challenges of the Eurozone; financial issues in the southern Member States; and most definitely the period after the Brexit referendum where stock markets dropped considerably and financial outlooks on the European markets were not favourable due to the impact of ‘Brexit’. The most prominent characteristic was material existence, with the references to the troubles of the single market and the euro.

Importantly, the global financial frameworks characteristics acquired a more negative evaluation for the EU than expected. This was due to the EU in the negotiations of TTIP and CETA. These were presented to have possible detrimental effects on EU industry and businesses. Another characteristic of interest contestation was observed in the reports on the EU’s businesses and industries which may gain entry into local (Indonesian) markets, where this potential could have a detrimental effect on the
local Indonesia businesses and industries which may not be able to compete with EU industries and products, like that seen with discussion around EU FTA negotiations with India (Orbie & Khorana, 2015) and the negative effects of EU industry and products on the Kenyan markets in the 1990s (Langan, 2012).

Figure 7.23 – MPE Evaluations from Indonesian Media

Figure 7.23 sums up the visibility and evaluation of the MPE norms within Indonesian EU news. The most visible MPE characteristics in the Indonesian EU news were material existence, institutional frameworks and interest contestation. Those three characteristics had on average a 50% positive/positive-neutral rating within the articles analysed (material existence - 52%; institutional frameworks – 45%; interest contestation – 51%). This may demonstrate that these characteristics could form a positive image for MPE and help in reinforcing the EU’s image as an economic power.

Similar to the NPE case discussed above, Indonesian reports communicated a far more positive evaluation of the EU in terms of MPE than the Malaysian reports (37.55% vs. 29.3% respectively). The economic potential of increased EU-Indonesia relations through the certification of Indonesia’s timber industry to trade with the EU had a massive positive profile with Indonesian industry. This was seen to offset the impact of EU regulatory measures on the perceived anti-environmental process as accompanied to the CPO industry (these are aspects that the EU also aims to promote within its NPE agenda through sustainable development). Indonesian local reports put only a limited focus on the EU’s internal institutional crises, thus reducing negative evaluations overall.

EU news sourced from non-local sources also had a substantial amount of positive evaluations assigned to the MPE characteristics. Negative evaluations came in the light of the news reports about
Brexit. Those critically questioned the image of the EU’s unity, both in the lead up to the referendum and when its outcome was announced. This image of disunity may have impacts on the image of the EU in the MPE terms. Through the perceived capability of the EU as a unified entity critical for the MPE projection may be seen as weakened, not lastly due to the ‘Big 3’ turning into a “Big 2”. These negative impacts may influence the image of the EU as a global power.

7.5 Conclusion

The media analysis highlighted the main characteristics of EU framing by leading press in terms of visibility, information input, local links and evaluations. Special attention was paid to the visibility and evaluations assigned to the EU in terms of NPE and MPE. The majority of EU news was sampled from non-local media sourced (as a rule from European news agencies and authors) typically presented the EU acting in the EU and its Member States. Both Indonesian and Malaysian reports showed remarkable similarity in assigning only a limited profile to the EU being connected to local events and actors, as well as to the EU’s global actions. The EU was framed predominantly as an actor within political and economic spheres, yet this actorness was seen to be challenged by multiple crises taking place in 2016, with Brexit being the most visible and damaging the images. The press in the two South East Asian countries also echoed each other in assigning profiles to EU actors – EU Member States and their leaders were more visible than the EU officials. The most visible were France, Germany and the UK, yet for difference reasons, most of them linked to the crises of Brexit and migration. Most of difference in EU framing between the two cases came in the representations of the EU in terms of NPE and MPE. As discussed above, Indonesian evaluation of NPE showed a more positive evaluation of the norms mentioned, whereas Malaysian NPE mentions held a more balanced evaluation, but tended to lean towards a neutral/neutral negative evaluation. These were seen to be influenced by institutional crises, especially Brexit’s potential impact on the norms of democracy and rule of law if results were not accepted. MPE as well was impacted by institutional crises evaluations with Brexit a major factor. Indonesia was seen to have a more balanced evaluation in MPE, with only the EU’s ability to be unified the only norms which leaned to the negative that the other five which lent positive. MPE evaluation in Malaysia lent towards neutral-neutral/negative with the EU’s ability to be unified, linked with the negative reaction of Brexit, as a factor in the overall evaluation.

The following section delves into the opinion of Indonesian and Malaysian elites from four cohorts to gauge actual external perceptions of the EU as a global power, international leader and partner, and the potential perceptions of the EU in terms of NPE and MPE.
Chapter Eight - Elite interviews results

To extend understanding of EU images in influential international discourses, the thesis now turns to the analysis of EU perceptions among Indonesian and Malaysian elites. As mentioned above, elites are an important demographic cohort within a given society decision makers and policy drivers within countries (Mills, 1956). They are also expected to possess more detailed and informed images of foreign partners (including the EU) in comparison to the general public. This chapter examines EU images and perceptions among elites from four cohorts – business, political, civil society and media. The analysis traces images of the EU’s presence as a global power and a leader in international politics, as well as perceived factors that influence the relationship between the EU and Indonesia as well as the EU and Malaysia. Linking the analysis of elite opinion to the analysis of media discussed above, the interviewed elites were asked how they gathered information on the EU and what specific types of media they used to gather this information. Throughout the analysis, special consideration was given to the frequency and evaluation of NPE and MPE characteristics. Observations on external narratives and perceptions of the EU in terms of power among elites were compared to the EU’s self-visions traced in policy documents and EU foreign policy scholarship discussed above. The analysis argues a complex interaction of EU-specific, location-specific and global factors in the shaping of NPE and MPE images among Indonesian and Malaysian elites. The chapter proceeds with the discussion of perceptions of the EU as an actor in the international arena, followed by the discussion on the perceptions of the bilateral relations with the EU and evaluations of the EU’s perceived important. In all sections, analysis highlights specific aspects of the perceived NPE and MPE and factors that influence EU images.

8.1 Images of the EU as an Actor in International Arena

Figures 8.1 and 8.2 present a summary of responses on whether the EU was seen as a great power and a leader in international politics by the elites in the two countries. These findings provide a point of reference to the role that the EU is seen to play not just in Southeast Asia but also globally, and specifically vis-à-vis the US and China in the evolving political order. The analysis of responses also points to what elements of the EU’s power narratives are recognised externally
Figure 8.1 – Do you see the EU as a Great Power?

Source of data: EU Global Perceptions.

Figure 8.1 demonstrates differences between perceptions of the EU as a great power among Malaysian and Indonesian elites. Half of the Indonesian sample (19 respondents) are more likely to perceive the EU as a great power compared to the Malaysian elites, 6 out of 15 interviewees saw the EU in such terms. In the Malaysian case, those who viewed the EU as a great power unequivocally recognised both NPE and MPE characteristics in the power image. In the MPE terms, the EU was considered as powerful actor through an economic lens (Malaysian Business #2). In the NPE terms, the EU was seen to be able to “consolidate rights and freedoms of those not only in the Europe region but globally” (Malaysian Political #2). It is important to note that some Malaysian respondents presented an ambivalent outlook on the EU – they denied the EU an attribute of global power (perhaps seeing it as a political power), yet to followed up with perceptions of the EU as an economically powerful actor. This suggests that MPE characteristics in the image of the EU as a global power are also a leading feature in the Malaysian case.

For Indonesian elites, the EU image of as a great power was associated foremost with its economic clout, where a location-specific example of the EU as one of Indonesia’s main trading partner was recognised (Indonesian Business #8). Importantly, other power attributer were also visible: the EU was seen as politically powerful (Indonesian Business #6), a great power in terms of development promotion and its supranational approach (Indonesian Business #7), and an actor whose power is seen to come from its organisation (Indonesian Political #4). The EU was seen to be powerful in the developmental aid field (e.g. “NGOs get a lot of support from the EU” (Indonesian Civil #2)).
A focus on EU-specific and global factors was recognised as reasons behind not seeing the EU as a great power highlighted. Location-specific factors were not evident within the discourses; elites discussed global and EU-specific factors for reasoning behind the EU not considered as a great power. In Malaysia, among EU-specific factors behind EU images were visions of the EU’s challenged unity and the lack of its “common voice” in international arena, as well as the recognition of larger Member States (e.g. the UK or Germany) overshadowing the EU on international stage (they “get more attention than the EU itself” (Malaysian Civil #4)). The lack of the EU’s military capability was also discussed as a factor behind not viewing the EU as a great power (Malaysian Political #1; Malaysian Political #3; Malaysian Business #2; Malaysian Business #3): e.g. there is no “European enforcement capabilities due to Member States holding military capabilities” (Malaysian Political #3). Malaysian elites also saw global factors influencing the EU’s image as a global power, and the main one was the position of China and the USA as the great powers (Malaysian C#3), while and the EU was “not comparable to the US” (Malaysian Civil #5).

Similar set of factors was observed in the Indonesian case. The economic power of the EU was considered a factor for the great power projection by the EU (EU-specific factor), however, the US and China were considered far more important great powers (Indonesian Political #3, 2013; Indonesian Political #6) (global factor). Indonesian elites also saw the EU’s power declining in the face of existential crises (again EU-specific factor): e.g. the EU was seen as a “shrinking and diminishing power due to the eurocrisis” (Indonesian Media #2) as well as declining (Indonesian Political #5).

![Figure 8.2](image-url)  
*Figure 8.2 – Specifically about politics, do you see the EU as a leader in International Politics?  
Source of data: EU Global Perceptions*
Figure 8.2 demonstrates differences in visions of the EU as a leader in international politics. Dominant view among Malaysian elites was that the EU was not seen as a leader in international politics, with 10 out of 14 respondents supporting this claim. Only one in seven elites did see the EU as an international political leader, with some expressing a sentiment that they “hoped to see the EU playing an important role in International Politics” (Malaysian Business #3) and an actor who can stand as an intermediary and help to “balance the relationship to the US” (Malaysian Business #3), highlighting the possibility of the EU could be a leader, in the future, compared to the likes of the US. This vision of the EU as a counter-balancing power to the influences of other big global players is significant as it gives the EU a concrete role in the political arena.

Indonesian elites were far more favourable in their perceptions of the EU than their Malaysian counterparts. One in four of the Indonesia respondents saw the EU as a leader in international politics, with just over one third of the Indonesian interviewees not seeing the EU as a leader in international politics. Another one in four saw the EU’s potential to become a leader, but the NATO and the US were seen as more effective political leaders internationally (Indonesian Media #1).

The Malaysian elites (Malaysian Political #2; Malaysian Civil #2) who saw EU as an international leader noted the EU’s normative approach through democracy and human rights promotion as aspects of leadership. The EU’s leadership presence through environmental promotion and economic strength was also registered. Indonesian elites expressed a wider range of views to why the EU could be characterised as a leader in international politics, with one stating that there “can’t be a world without the EU” (Indonesian Political #4). The EU’s economic, normative and environmental leadership (Indonesian Civil #2) was mentioned. The EU’s political power was viewed as a mechanism for the EU to be a leader, along with the strength of EU Member States as holding the power in international politics (Indonesian Political #8). The normative and economic aspect of the EU influencing international organisations and conventions were seen as a mechanism for the EU’s leadership (Indonesian Business #4; Indonesian Civil #9). The EU’s development cooperation with former colonies, especially in Africa, was seen as yet another aspect of leadership (Indonesian Business #3).

Importantly, elites in both countries had similar trains of thought on why they did not see the EU as a leader. Here, the analysis uncovers several major themes. Firstly, global factors influenced these perceptions. Similar to the perceptions of the EU as a global power discussed above, other political powers were seen to possess more leadership qualities in international politics than the EU. For example, the US, NATO (Malaysian Business #2) and China (Indonesian Media #1; Indonesian Media #4; Indonesian Business #6; Indonesian Media #2; Indonesian Media #7; Malaysian Media #2) were seen to be at the helm. One respondent mentioned that when China spoke everyone listened; however in the case of the EU, “people were not looking up to the EU” (MC#6). Secondly, EU-specific factors of the EU’s disunity and competition with the Member States in leadership projections were observed. Elites shared the vision of
the EU not being unified in the international political arena. This was seen to impact negatively on the EU’s perceived leading role. The influence of EU member states was also noted: elites commented that the “power lies with Member States” (Indonesian Media #7), while there is a lack of unity on many issues, and there are “still lots of rivalries” (Indonesian Political #7) in international politics between Member States (Malaysian Political #3). The EU was seen as “divided” (Malaysian Civil #4), “struggling to find a unified voice” (Indonesian Business #5), and having identity and consensus issues (Indonesian Civil #10; Indonesian Media #1). Additionally, the impact of the Eurozone crisis (mentioned by several interviewees) was seen as negative contributor to the image of a leader.

8.2 The Relationship between EU Malaysia and Indonesia

Figure 8.3 and 8.4 illustrate the perceptions patterns of elite views on their states bilateral relations with the EU. The analysis highlights how the EU compares to other regions and states that also interact with Indonesia and Malaysia and points to the dominant views on the state of their current relationships. This perceptions is important to trace as it points if the EU’s engagement within these two external partners is seen as successful or not as well as to what mechanisms are recognised to be effective within relationships that are deemed successful. On the other hand, external views on the potential controversial issues and conflicts in the relationships may help the EU to fine-tune its engagement strategy with the two partners as well as within the region. The analysis starts with an expectation that these images will be influenced by the past interactions between European actors and the two Southeast Asian states. These relations with the EU are also expected to indicate where the images of the EU are located on the continuum “ally – adversary,” argued by the image theory.
Figure 8.3 – How would you compare the importance of the EU to Indonesia/Malaysia in relation to other prominent regions?
Source of data: EU Global Perceptions

Figure 8.3 presents the summary of the elites opinions in the two countries and reveals that only two in seven elites from Malaysia saw the EU as an important or very important. In contrast, over half of the Indonesian respondents saw the EU as an important bilateral counterpart. Those in Malaysia who agreed with the importance of relations with the EU stressed EU investments in Malaysia: these were seen as important (Malaysian Political #2), with the EU being viewed as a “great investment partner” (Malaysian Political #1) as an ally of Malaysian businesses. Indonesian elites had a more positive view of EU importance compared to their Malaysia counterparts: three in five saw the EU as very important or important or saw the “EU as important as US and China” (Indonesian Business #9). The MPE aspects were recognised. Among those were “technology assistance” (Indonesian Business #1) and “trade and investment” (Indonesian Business #5). Additionally, normative and cultural characteristics were cited for the importance of the relations with the EU in comparison to other regions. The EU’s promotion of human rights and environmental norms were recognised (Indonesian Civil #9), highlighting the presence of the NPE characteristics, within elites visions of the EU. The attraction of the EU as education and culture hub for students and culture was also mentioned (Indonesian Civil #6),

Location-specific factors and global factors were engaged in shaping these images. Indonesia’s presence in the Middle East as the largest Muslim country meant they have a vested interest in the Middle East, and Syria in particular. The EU’s engagement with in the Middle East region was encouraged by the Indonesian elites, with the EU see as an actor able to produce a positive influence in the conflict. Overall, Indonesian respondents viewed the EU as a more important region than their Malaysian counterparts. One possible explanation is the increasing position of Indonesia in the global political system and the EU’s acknowledgement of Asia as a key geo-political region (also noted within Global Strategy for the EU (GSEU; 2016) (as discussed above)). The EU’s drive towards stronger relations with Asia – and Indonesia in it – may have had a positive impact on the EU’s images among elites.

However, the EU was also viewed as not that important compared to other prominent regions. Malaysian elites did not see the EU as the most important trading partner: the EU was considered “third, after the US first and Asia second” (Malaysian Civil #2). In Malaysia, the US and China were regarded as more important partners than the EU with the view that “the most important power is the US, and then their neighbours” (Malaysian Political #3). One elite stated that the “EU vis-a-vis Malaysia is really quite insignificant” (Indonesian Business #2). More positively, more involvement
by the EU in Malaysia was invited as it was thought, “Malaysia is strategically positioned” (Malaysian Business #3) in the geopolitical dynamics of the region.

Indonesian elites had similar thoughts on the EU’s importance. Respondents also mentioned perceptions of the EU as not being the leading trading partner for Indonesia, with one in four highlighting this vision. The position of the US and China were perceived as more important. In addition, the EU’s policies of CPO were viewed as being negative for Indonesia, thus influencing negative perception of the relations (Indonesian Business #10). ASEAN was considered to be within the most important “first layer” of partners (Indonesian Business #2) meaning that Indonesian elites assigned a higher priority to Indonesia’s interaction with their ASEAN neighbours (Indonesian Business #4) than with partners further afield such as the EU. Discussion on EU Member States as being of more importance to Indonesian than the EU was also visible (Indonesian Political #6; Indonesian Political #7). For example, business leaders do not look at the EU as a whole but rather “see particular countries” (Indonesian Business #3). Discussion on the reluctance of the EU to admit to the damaging effects of the Eurozone debt crisis raised disappointment in elites, who felt the EU was not recognising issues that affect their perceptions around the world.

**Figure 8.4** – How would you describe the relationship between Indonesia/Malaysia and Europe/the European Union (EU)?

*Source of data: EU Global Perceptions*

Figure 8.4 illustrates the ways to which the EU-Malaysia and EU-Indonesia respective relationships were best described by the interviewees. Generally, Malaysian elites saw their relations with the EU as stable, however one elite did feel that more progress was needed (Malaysian Business #3). By contrast, two respondents (Malaysian Political #1; Malaysian Civil #2) found the EU-Malaysia relationship as...
improving due to stronger ties formed between the EU and Malaysia in recent times, perhaps showing the EU’s recognition of Asia as an emerging region for greater cooperation. In contrast, Indonesian elite’s views were more dynamic – the respondents characterised their relationship with the EU as improving (nearly one in three), where increased interest in Indonesia for European companies for investment opportunities and consolidation of trade relations predominated (Indonesian Business #5; Indonesian Civil #9). In this respect, discussion that Indonesia itself has to improve its capacity to interact with the EU in all facets to continue this improving relationship (Indonesian Political #7) was evident. In addition, many shared a vision of the relations begin stable (nearly one in four) even though the EU is seen to be experiencing the crisis, “but [it] will overcome” the crisis (Indonesian Business #1). A more rare vision of relations being stagnant (one in seven) came when EU-Indonesia relations were compared to other relations with regions and nations, and were even seen as declining (Indonesian Political #5): “many opportunities that have not been grabbed – by Indonesia nor by the EU” (Indonesian Civil #4). In contrast, two respondents saw the relations as deepening and one respondent discussed the potential and need for further strengthening of relations between the EU and Indonesia outside of the economic arena, specifically with focus on education (Indonesian Political #6). Deepening of relations came with examples of the comprehensive partnership between the EU and Indonesia, where a desire for more communication was discussed, as “there is a lack of it sometimes” (Indonesian Business #7).

Figures 8.5 – 8.7 explicates the summary of issues that were viewed as impacting on the current relations of the EU and with the two states. Analysis of these perceptions may aid in the EU’s future policy formulation towards and dialogue with Indonesia and Malaysia to foster greater relations.

![Fig 8.5](image)

*Figure 8.5 – In your opinion, which issues in Indonesia/Malaysia-EU current relations have the most impact on Indonesia/Malaysia?*

*Source of data: EU Global Perceptions*
Figure 8.5 demonstrates which issues are viewed as currently (at the time of the interviews) impacting on relations between the EU and Malaysia and EU and Indonesia respectively. Overwhelmingly, economic and trade issues were the most visible issues considered to be impacting current relations for both Malaysian and Indonesian elites, identifying the MPE characteristics to impact the vision of the current relations between the EU and the two states respectively.

Malaysian elites were not as vocal on issues with only a limited number of elites answering this question (4/14). The most visible economic issues were the ones surrounding the financial situation in the EU at the time, trade and the impact of the Euro on the relations between the EU and Malaysia for investment and trade (Malaysian Political #3; Malaysian Civil #6). Interestingly, NPE characteristics were highly visible in the responses by the Malaysian elites. Developmental was seen in the form of human rights norms differing from that of project NPE norms. Arms trading was mentioned, surprisingly considered by one elite to be “more important than trade” issues (Malaysian Civil #5). In addition, “environmental standards that the EU is imposing” (Malaysian Business #3) were seen to be difficult for Malaysian companies and individuals to adhere too, which also were thought to potential impact negatively on relations between the EU. This highlights a potential example of resistance or rejection of NPE norms diffusion within Malaysia. It seems the elite perceptions point to ambivalent reception of the NPE characteristics of the EU in Malaysia, when it comes to concrete issues in the relationship.

For Indonesian elites, all respondents, apart from the media elites, were asked what they saw as issues impacting on current relations. All respondents highlighted economic issues as areas of importance that could have an impact on the image of the EU in terms of the MPE. Four major economic issues became visible in the responses: ‘economic issues in general’ (20 respondents), ‘trade and investment’ (12 respondents), ‘comprehensive economic partnership’ (4 respondents) and the ‘Euro crisis’ (4 respondents). Adherence to EU regulations and geographical indicators was also thought to be an issue for current relations, in particular for the CPO and timber industries which would have to mirror EU regulations and industry practices that may be foreign to Indonesian industries (Indonesian Business #3; Indonesian Business #7). Media coverage highlighted this issue as well, however it seemed steps had been taken to address these issues as the media articles discussed the logging industries adherence to EU regulations, a sign of adoption of environmental standards by Indonesian industries.

Other issues in this regard were environmental issues, with the EU regulations on CPO as a point of conflict – the proposed alternative of sunflower production was thought to cause just as much harm to the environment as CPO. This led to a perception of the EU’s “double standards” (Indonesian Business #10) and criticism of the environmental impact of CPO. Once again, the NPE visions came with an ambivalent valence. Additionally, development cooperation through coordination and technology assistance, with agriculture technology transfer from the EU to help with Indonesian agricultural advancement was seen as an example of cooperation in the environment field.
Political issues cited surrounded transparency in Indonesia, and also position on the Myanmar issue. It was expressed that the “EU should believe in what Indonesia does in the case of Myanmar, as Indonesia is a member of ASEAN and would have a better understanding to deal with the issue” (Indonesian Political #6). Arguably, a pointed stress on the cultural differences between the EU and Southeast Asian countries is important in crafting political dialogue between the EU and Indonesia. Finally, there was thought to be a need for the EU to intervene in the Arab Spring, due to Indonesia’s concern for other Muslims worldwide (being itself the largest Muslim majority country in the world) (Indonesian Political #7).

![Figure 8.6 – Looking in the future, what issues should be kept in mind when Indonesia/Malaysia is developing trade or government policy relating to the EU?](image)

*Source of data: EU Global Perceptions*

In response to the question “Looking in the future, what issues should be kept in mind when Indonesia/Malaysia is developing trade or government policy relating to the EU?”, Malaysian elites discussed were the most interested in discussing possible development issues as potential concerns for future relations (Figure 8.6). These ranged from political structures within Malaysia which were seen as “not as strong as the EU” (Malaysian Business #1) to discussion around improving democracy and free trade aspects (e.g. Malaysia needs to move towards the EU’s standard in those areas of democracy and free trade acceptance (Malaysian Political #1)). Several major economic issues were also apparent in responses, for example, the future FTA and highlighting of the impact of EU regulations on Malaysian products and industrial practices, in regards to the CPO industry. Foreign direct investment was noted by elites, with its benefits mentioned, but also that there should be a move away from FDI for long term growth, as it is only

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14 Indonesia’s position on Myanmar mirrors that of ASEAN’s where they believe the Myanmar should be left to the regional group to deal with within their own cultural framework.
beneficial “for short term goals” (Malaysian Civil #3). It is obvious the NPE and MPE characteristics of the EU are shaping the vision of the future issues for the EU-Malaysia dialogue, and the latter seems to be in the lead in the perceptions account.

A wide range of issues for future interactions was also made evident by Indonesian elites. The economic and development issues were in the lead, demonstrating a complex intersection of the NPE and MPE characteristics of the EU when local elite perceives the future of the bilateral relations. In the former case, it was thought that for both Indonesia and the EU “economic cooperation would be the main priority for the next 15-20 years” (Indonesian Political #9). The other economic issues mentioned included the FTA between the EU and Indonesia and the continuing impact of the Eurozone crisis on investment partners from the EU, an example being for Indonesian renewable energy projects (Indonesian Business #1). Sustainability and environmental issues were also calls for concern, as they also had industrial and growth implications. This was especially evident in regards to CPO regulations and access into the EU market. Energy and food security as well as climate change were also considered within the development arena, where these have been envisioned by both as common goals (Indonesian Political #8). Development aid was considered a concern. EU conditions put upon the aid provision are seen to have negative impacts on the environment at times, and can illustrate “double standards” (Indonesian Business #10) of the EU in its development cooperation with Indonesia.

In discussing political issues shaping agenda of relations in the future, respondents mentioned internal Indonesian concerns – possible separatism and extremist movements. These, if not addressed, could potentially challenge Indonesia and its foreign relations, as well as “impact on the stability of the whole region” (Indonesian Civil #10).

Cultural issues were seen to impact political and developmental realms. Here, respondents called the EU to develop an approach to Indonesia by accounting for cultural differences. This differentiation was seen to help in fostering better bilateral relations. It was thought that the cultural gap “can lead to misunderstanding sometimes”. Moreover, a more sensitive approach towards cultural issues is thought to be beneficial for the relations, especially a respectful equal bilateral approach from the EU (Indonesian Political #9).
One possible mechanism for better relations between the EU and Indonesia and Malaysia is the effective performance of EU Delegations, which are thought to be valuable resources in fostering mutually beneficial dialogue. With the EU Delegation objective to foster bilateral trade and business relations, EU Delegations may be considered an integral part of the projection of the MPE. With the EU conducting its foreign policy according to a set of ideological norms and principles, the EU Delegation are also seen as key in projecting and communicating the NPE characteristics through its actions and discourses.

Malaysian elites demonstrated a lack of interaction with the EU delegation within their country. Only two of the respondents mentioned they had interacted with the delegation (Malaysian Business #1; Malaysian Civil #1). This interaction was seen to be largely in the form of information gathering for the respondents as they saw the delegation as the best source, especially surrounding trade. These respondents did suggest that in the future the delegation could become a powerful education tool for Malaysians to learn and acquire information about the EU (Malaysian Business #1; Malaysian Civil #1). Even with the limited interaction by respondents, Malaysian elites did discuss several notable NPE features in their perceptions of the EU Delegation’s performance. Interviewees proposed to increase the Delegation’s support for political parties and NGOs in Malaysia to facilitate better democratic principles and practices (Malaysian Political #2). Malaysian Business #3 discussed the possibility of more outreach and educational activities to increase the EU’s profile with the new generation. Several elites saw the need for the EU Delegation to increase their openness and ability for access (Malaysian Civil #3), including being more flexible for interactions with local organisations and business (Malaysian Civil #2). However, and rather importantly,
the Malaysian government was seen by local elites as an obstacle for EU public diplomacy promotion (Malaysian Political #3).

Indonesian elites who were interviewed also admitted limited interaction with the EU Delegation (one in three interviewed knew about it but most had no direct involvement with it). Several respondents mentioned that they tend to use Member States’ embassies when dealing with European countries or organisations from particular Member States (Indonesian Business #9; Indonesian Civil #3; Indonesian Political #1). In regards to what more the EU Delegation could do to benefit the EU-Indonesia relation, many saw the potential of EU Delegation as an educational tool for Indonesians to gather information on the EU (Indonesian Business #7; Indonesian Civil #10; Indonesian Civil #9; Indonesian Civil #8; Indonesian Civil #7). The EU Delegation was also credited with an ability to promote several normative facets such as democratization and human rights promotion through civil society cooperation (Indonesian Civil #5). Those were seen as a success by those respondents who have collaborated with the EU Delegation in the past (Indonesian Business #5), and those hoping to collaborate in the future (Indonesian Political #1). The importance assigned to these NPE facets is argued to be instrumental in the recognition of the EU’s normative agenda by local decision- and policy-makers.

8.3 Perceptions of the EU’s importance

The analysis also assessed the perceived importance of the EU by the elites from the two states (Figure 8.8). With 1 being not important at all and 5 being very important, the elites were asked to rate how they viewed the importance of the EU to their country.
Figure 8.8 – On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is very important, how would you rate the importance of the EU to Indonesia in the present?
Source of data: EU Global Perceptions.

Figure 8.8 presents the summary of the responses how the EU’s importance to Indonesia and Malaysia is seen at the present time. If we combine responses from the two cases, the EU was generally seen to be of a mid- to high-level of importance (49 out of 51 respondents scored the EU’s level of importance at 3 or higher). The importance of the EU in the present typically was seen in the context of competition with other powers (e.g. the EU is seen to be very important but also there is a higher importance assigned to the US and China over the EU (Indonesian Political #1); the EU at the “same position as the US at a 4 or 5” (Indonesian Political #7)); or a need to raise its profile in and involvement with Indonesia (e.g. the EU is important but needs to strengthen presence and involvement in Indonesia, “particularly in the area of democratization, human rights, gender […] media and education” (Indonesian Political #6)). However, the opinions also had a negative reflection – for some respondents, the EU as “not the most important partner for us at the present time” (Indonesian Media #2). For some, the Euro debt crisis was seen as the main impact that downgraded the perceived importance of the EU: e.g. “before the eurocrisis, it would have been 3 or 4 but now it is for sure 3” (Malaysian Civil #5). Once again, we observe how the perceptions of the EU – this time of the current EU importance – are linked to EU- and location-specific influences as well as global factors.

Figure 8.9 – On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is very important, how would you rate the importance of the EU to Indonesia in the future?
Source of data: EU Global Perceptions.
Figure 8.9 presents a summary of the perceived importance of the EU to Indonesia and Malaysia in the future. The analysis reveals an ambivalent trajectory for EU images, with some elites seeing the EU as increasing in its importance in the future, and with others seeing that it as declining. Among the factors that were argued to increase the EU’s importance there were: the treatment of Indonesia by the EU as a trading partner (Indonesian Business #9) (Indonesia-specific factor) as well as the success of the EU coping with its internal challenges (Indonesian Business #7) (EU-specific factors). Another view explicated a mix of those two types of factors – if the EU were to defeat the crisis and strengthen itself economically, Indonesia would welcome increased investment and partnership for Indonesian “infrastructure, industries and agriculture” (Indonesian Business #4). Increasing importance in the future was also linked to the increased presence of EU Member States in Indonesia – they seem to create a larger footprint for Europe in Indonesia. In addition, Europe continues to be an attractive destination for Indonesian students for education opportunities, more so than the US (Indonesian Media #1). The educations ties were seen to be promising to strengthen future relations and secure positive perceptions of each other.

Importantly, the views remained ambivalent. Some Malaysian respondents agreed that there is a possibility for more EU presence in Malaysia: “I think it will go up” (Media Business #3), while others disagreed: “it will decline to probably a 2-2.5” in the future (Malaysian Media #2). The impact of the Euro debt crisis was cited to determine the future evaluation (Malaysian Civil #5).

8.4 Information on the EU

Keeping in mind the role of the media in informing external societies about the EU, this section looks into the channels through which external elites gather their information on the EU and asks which sources may be instrumental in improving visibility of the EU and their actions among external policy- and decision-makers. This part of the analysis has links to the media analysis discussed earlier, as the four local newspapers used within the media analysis were explicitly referenced by the interviewed elites and listed among their trusted media sources of information about the EU. Also important is the elites’ preference to access information about the EU from foreign media sources rather than then use local sources – yet another insight into the influence of the press analysed in this thesis.
Figure 8.10 demonstrates the preferred ways in which the elites gather their information on the EU. For Malaysian elites, international media agencies (e.g. CNN and BBC), as well as the Internet are used the most popular sources to collect information about the EU. Arguably, the popularity of the BBC was linked to the former colonial connections with the UK (Malaysian Business #3). Internet was popular to simple and convenient real-time access to main events. *The Star*, one of the studied here newspapers, was cited as another influential source of EU-related information (Malaysian Business #1). Malaysian elites also mentioned information sourcing from EU-specific channels such as Embassies, meetings with diplomats (Malaysian Political #2; Malaysian Business #2), and press releases. These sources were appreciated as elites felt they received information from a primary source rather than information filtered by newspapers or other media.

Indonesian elites also heavily relied on the Internet and international media agencies for their information on the EU. Again the BBC and CNN were among the most used international media agencies, however other agencies were popular too: Al Jazeera, France 24, Deutche Welle, the Economist, the Guardian and Euronews. These foreign agencies were preferred as it was a dominant opinion that local Indonesian newspapers would “not to show lots of information about the EU” (Indonesian Business #3), or does not “cover EU a lot” (Indonesian Civil #4) and it was easier to gather from international sources. However, *the Jakarta Post*, analysed in this thesis, was mentioned as an exception (Indonesian Business #5). Much like the Malaysian elites, personal and EU-specific sources were also mentioned as points of information gathering – elites got information through meetings with EU diplomats and personal contacts within EU.
Delegations (Indonesian Civil #6; Indonesian Civil #10), and these contacts were viewed positively and recommended to be further strengthened by Brussels.

8.5 Elite Perceptions of Normative and Market Power Europe

Addressing one of the leading research questions of this thesis on the perceptions of the EU in terms of NPE and MPE, the analysis assesses the frequency and evaluations assigned to MPE and NPE characteristics within the Malaysian and Indonesian elites discourses. The aim is to identify the visibility and valence of these characteristics in external perceptions and compare them to the EU self-visions postulated by relevant literature discussed earlier. Ultimately, the visibility and the evaluation of these images may carry will impact on the images of the EU as a global power, international leader and important counterpart for the location in question. The analysis aims to identify areas in the dialogue that are conducive (or not) for norms promotion and feed back to the established theorisations of NPE and MPE.

Overall, MPE characteristics were visible in 187 mentions (Indonesia -124 vs. 36 - Malaysia) across two locations, while NPE characteristics were referenced in 160 instances (Indonesia -139 vs. 48 - Malaysia). The analysis demonstrated that the distribution of the NPE and MPE characteristics was not disproportionally recognised within one country sample, but was evenly distribution compared to the actual sample of elites from Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesian elites account for 73%, whereas Malaysian elites account for 23% of the total elites interviewed. In regards to the share of NPE and MPE mentions for set of country elites, Indonesia accounted for 77.5% of NPE and 74.5% of MPE mentions. Malaysia accounted for 22.5% of NPE and 25.7% of MPE mentions. Therefore, the visibility and frequency of NPE and MPE were at similar levels in regards to the sample size.
Figure 8.11 – MPE characteristic evaluations within Indonesian interviews

Source of data: EU Global Perceptions.

Figure 8.11 illustrates the frequency and evaluation of the MPE characteristics within the Indonesian elite interviews. Overall, there was a generally positive impression of the MPE characteristics among Indonesian elites. The most visible characteristic was the material existence of MPE: elites referenced extensively the single market and the EURO. This characteristic has attracted positive evaluation overall – over 60%. This was even in the face of the Eurozone debt crisis, which was seen to negatively impact the image of the EURO. Institutional frameworks of the EU were seen as the least positive of the MPE characteristics. This view could be contributed to the regulatory nature of EU guidelines and demand to adhere to them by external partners industries (in Indonesia, the conditionality coming within the local CPO and timber industries). Interest contestation was the second most visible characteristic, with potential for Indonesian businesses and investment opportunities seen positively through the possibility of an FTA between the EU and Indonesia. Global economic frameworks and EU administrative resources were the least identified of the characteristics with mainly only passing mentions within several of the elite discussions. This finding questions the expanding of the MPE criteria advocated by Kelstrup (2015) as some characteristics do not seem to be recognised by external partners.

The EU’s ability to be unified as a characteristic not only mentioned in the reflections on business opportunities. Importantly, it saw respondents to move into the NPE-related discussion. A lack of coherence and lack of unified voice in the EU was seen as a source of negative images, where NPE-related examples mentioned differing stances within EU Member States on human rights and environmental issues. Arguably, the characteristic of ‘the EU’s ability to be unified’ formulated within the MPE
discussion may become a part of a modified NPE set of characteristics, where the EU’s ability to be unified on normative matters could also be examined.

Figure 8.12 – MPE characteristic evaluations within Malaysian interviews
Source of data: EU Global Perceptions.

Figure 8.12 also illustrates the frequency and evaluation of MPE characteristics from the perspective of Malaysian elites. Again there was an overall positive evaluation of the MPE characteristics. The material existence of the EU was the most visible characteristic with 60% of the MPE visibility attributed to material existence examples. These were seen in the appearance of the single market and the euro, which garnered a largely positive evaluation. There were only sporadic mentions of the other characteristics, with the second largest frequency of institutional features also discussed – the impact of EU regulations on Malaysian businesses and industries attempting to enter the EU market. An FTA between Malaysia and the EU was also discussed which would have regulatory impact on Malaysian businesses. This was discussed pertaining to whether Malaysia would be able to open its public sector to procurement. Mirroring the Indonesian case, the global financial frameworks and EU administrative resources were the least visible MPE characteristics, which could call for improvement in EU mechanisms to demonstrate these characteristics better, such as a greater presence of the EU Delegation within external partners. Finally, as in the Indonesian case, the EU’s ability to be unified was touched upon in both MPE and NPE-related reflections. Some respondents saw potential in the expansion of the EU into Eastern markets, but they also discussed whether it might have some risks involved for Malaysian businesses and coherence of the EU as a whole.
Figure 8.13 – NPE characteristics evaluations in Indonesian interviews
Source of data: EU Global Perceptions.

Figure 8.13 demonstrates the frequency and evaluation of NPE characteristics visible among Indonesian elites. Sustainable development was the most visible of all these characteristics. This was due to the image of the EU as an environmental leader in the world, but the image was also intertwined with the CPO and timber industry within Indonesia where the EU was seen to actively promote good environmental procedures and restrictions – due to those industries’ potential negative environmental effects. Peace was another visible characteristic, with elites viewing the EU as a peace building project and its formation in the post-World War 2 world helping to demonstrate its NPE agendas.

Human rights, rule of law and democracy were three NPE characteristics positively evaluated. They were seen as positive examples to be introduced into Indonesian society, in a bid to address lack of transparency and democratic freedoms within the country. Other characteristics, such as good governance, anti-discrimination, social solidarity and liberty were mentioned only in passing. These characteristics received overall positive evaluations but had received limited explanation, perhaps due to a limited amount of visibility in EU-Indonesia interactions.
Figure 8.14 demonstrates the frequency and evaluation of NPE characteristics visible within Malaysian elites. Compared to Indonesian elites, human rights were a highly visible characteristic, due to the EU’s position as a promoter of human rights globally, with an overall positive evaluation. Sustainable development was not as visible within Malaysian elites as it was with Indonesian, but did touch upon the CPO industry and the EU’s promotion of regulations that would negatively impact this commodity in Malaysia. Democracy was generally a positive image, with the process of the “EU practicing real democracy” (Malaysian Business #1) seen as a framework for possible political and democracy development within Malaysian society. This is also in line with rule of law, where its promotion within Malaysia society would hope to negate and eliminate corruption in various facets of Malaysian society. Again like the Indonesian elites, the other NPE characteristics, anti-discrimination, social solidarity, liberty and peace were all discussed as being apart of the fabric and foundations of the EU, aspects which could be emulated within Malaysian society as the EU is seen as an “entity that proclaims and aims to consolidate rights and freedoms of those not only in the Europe region but globally” (Malaysian Political #2).

8.6 Conclusion

To conclude, the elite discourses help in illustrating how elites from Indonesia and Malaysia see the EU within the global arena. EU-specific, location-specific and global factors are recognised as interlinked factors behind these perception formulations. The analysis demonstrated that these factors rarely act independently and more typically interact with each other affecting perceptions of the EU.
In general, Indonesian elite’s perceptions of the EU were more favourable compared to Malaysian elites when the interviewed elites discussed the EU as a great power. EU-specific issues (e.g. the impact of the Eurozone debt crisis) and global factors (e.g. the strength of China and the US as the global superpowers) were observed to influence the perceptions on the EU the most. The NPE and MPE characteristics visible within elite discourses highlighted an overall positive view on these characteristics. The analysis also pointed that elements that currently belong to the theoretical framework of the MPE may become a facet within the NPE analytical approach if we factor the external perceptions into theorisation. Specifically, the ‘EU’s ability to be unified’ as a variable in the MPE formulation seems to fit also into the NPE paradigm.

The next chapter discusses the empirical findings presented in this chapter against the theoretical frameworks outlined in the beginning of the thesis. Linking a systematic study of EU external perceptions to the typically Euro-centric scholarship of EU foreign policy and comparing external views against EU self-visions is argued to enrich the scholarship of the EU as an international actor in a globalising world.
Chapter Nine - Discussion of Findings

This chapter focuses on the discussion of the main findings of the media and elite opinion analysis, with a consideration of the hypotheses first mentioned in the Introduction. This chapter also features a discussion on the unexpected findings of the research, as well as practical and theoretical importance of this research. Finally, possible avenues of future research of external perceptions within Southeast Asia will be discussed, and specifically research with a focus on EU power narratives in image formation. The first section of this chapter summarises the key results of the media analysis of EU framing within the chosen theoretical frameworks and compares images communicated externally with the self-visions of the EU. Next, a summary of the key findings of the elite opinion analysis of EU images within the chosen frameworks comparing the images between Indonesian and Malaysian elite cohorts. The next section links the findings from the media and elite opinion analysis back to the hypotheses made at the beginning of this thesis, in regards to NPE and MPE imagery, an evaluation of the EU within news messages as well as the impact of EU-specific, location-specific and global factors on the images and perceptions of the EU within the data sets. The final section discusses the practical and theoretical importance of this research and its contribution to the debate on NPE and MPE recognition by external partners. This is proposed to enhance theorisation of EU power narratives, specifically when considering interconnections between external perceptions of NPE and MPE characteristics. Discussion also dissects a complex intersection between EU-specific, location-specific and global factors, advocating a need for a comprehensive approach in the study of external perceptions. Recommendation and future research directions are also outlined, with a special attention given to the call to examine different forms of media, including digital and social media, as well as diverse target group to highlight demographic differences in perception patterns. Discussion also points to the need to conduct the surveys of images and perceptions over time, from a longitudinal perspective, factoring the impacts of the major developments in the EU and in the world.

9.1 Summary of findings

The aim of this research was to examine whether the theoretical frameworks of NPE and MPE help to understand how external counterparts recognise the EU, and if the NPE/MPE characteristics support or contest the perception – and potentially reception – of the EU as a global power within third countries. The thesis has addressed these research questions using two case studies – Indonesia and Malaysia – focusing on EU images in their respective print media and among elites and applying a comparative approach. The choice of these external partners was due to their position as core actors within the economically and geopolitically emerging region of Southeast Asia and its regional group of ASEAN. The two cases were also chosen on the grounds of historical and cultural connections to Europe, such as colonial legacies, the impact of Asian and Islamic civilizations on Southeast Asian
identity, and the context of the rise of the Asian century. These factors are argued to influence relations between the EU and these external partners. The investigation into local news media sources aimed to demonstrate how the EU is communicated to Indonesian and Malaysian audiences. Analysis of elite opinion from Indonesia and Malaysia tracked perceptions of the EU among policy- and decision-makers as a part of the recognition/receptions process. Analysis examined whether EU images – in media and among elites – are influenced by EU-specific, location-specific and/or global factors.

9.1.1 Key findings of the Media Analysis

Visibility
Media analysis of the selected influential press demonstrated that the EU is typically presented to audiences in Indonesia and Malaysia as the major focus of news reports, with the major degree of centrality (75% average in both cases), raising the visibility of the EU. EU stories were located largely within the ‘World/International’ sections of the observed newspapers, with two out of three articles in Malaysia and three out of five articles in Indonesia located in those sections, this higher profile is a profile of a distant actor who is not seen to be directly engaging with the local societies of the readers.

Overall, the months of June and July featured the peak in the coverage of the EU in the observed period. The last six days of June (25-30 June) yielded half of all articles in June (26 in the Malaysia case and 19 in Indonesian case). The most visible thematic frames of the EU were largely located within the political, economic, and social spheres. Rarely articles focused only on one of these major themes.¹⁵ In particular, EU-specific issues related to the EU’s institutional crises impacting the EU in 2016 triggered multi-faceted images of the EU. The Brexit vote, the on-going migration crisis, and dealing with the Eurozone debt crisis, involved reflections on political fractures, economic instability and social and cultural implications of these crises. Brexit was presented as a considerable feature overall (61.4% of the total reported sample in Malaysia; 56.6% in Indonesia). Importantly, Brexit was seen to cross-political, economic, social and cultural boundaries. The migration crisis was the second visible topic (18.7% of the total sample in Malaysia; 16.5% in Indonesia). In contrast, Eurozone debt issues were not as visible (3.5% in Malaysia; 8% in Indonesia). This lower visibility was perhaps due to the press’ focus on the other two more recent crises to hit the EU.

Significantly, the crises impacting the EU in 2016 led to the articles paying substantial attention to the EU’s political aspects as a major focus in media content (90% of politically framed in Malaysia; 84% in Indonesia). Within the media portrayals of the EU as a political actor, the focus on the EU’s

¹⁵ Major Thematic Frames: Political; Economic; Social and Cultural; Environmental; Developmental.
internal political action was considerable (84% of total politically framed articles in Malaysia; 73% in Indonesia). The political lead up to, and the future implications of, Brexit were among the most visible topics in this regard, as well as the irregular migration crisis. Externally focused news stories about the EU noted global factors. The election of President Trump was the most visible context for this (e.g. the US Presidential campaign and the possible link of Brexit on it – an unlikely political outcome – as well as the impact of President Trump’s victory on the US-EU relations).

Framing the EU as an economic actor was the second most visible frame in both cases (53% of the total sample in Malaysia; 61% in Indonesia). Major attention was paid to discussing EU actions in relation to industries (74% of economically framed articles in Indonesia and 61% in Malaysia). These were largely focused on internal to the EU developments, with close attention to the implications of Brexit, and to the forecast of Brexit’s impact on industries’ outputs, particularly business relocations potential. State of the EU’s economy was discussed and reported in a visible manner too (71% Malaysia; 52% Indonesia). Once again, Brexit was a major feature in that reportage. Perhaps surprisingly, the EU’s actions as a business (14% Malaysia; 19.8% Indonesia) and trade actor were not very visible (only one in five in Malaysia and one in four articles in Indonesia reported the EU as a trade actor). When trade was reported, the news stories concentrated on FTAs of the EU, with CETA being visible yet attracting mostly negative evaluations due to an impasse that took place. Brexit was also seen to impact on businesses negatively. Agriculture was the least visible field of EU economic activities (1% of the total economically framed reportage in Malaysia; 4% in Indonesia).

Beyond EU-specific themes, location-specific EU news talked about the Indonesian Timber industry receiving certification to enter into the European single market – an event that added a positive tone to the EU’s evaluations.

Social and cultural actions of the EU were also visible (45% of total sample in Malaysia; 30% in Indonesia). The visibility of these topics was again influenced by EU institutional crises during 2016. The migration crisis was a massive factor in this visibility (it was also attributed to concerns over Brexit, a growing perception of Euroscepticism and populist ideals). Unsurprisingly, the immigration themes in the coverage were very visible (74% of socio-cultural framed reportage in Malaysia; 84% in Indonesia). These reports talked about diversity and multiculturalism frames, introduction of the migrants into EU Member States, as well as crime and potential movements of terrorist elements within the massive influx of migrants.

Environmental and development actions of the EU were the least visible among the major themes (only 6% in both Indonesian and Malaysia articles observed). Environmental themes typically appeared in the report about local industries in Indonesia and Malaysia with the FLEGT licencing of
Indonesian timber and the labelling of palm oil products as an issue of EU regulatory overstretch into local industry. Development frames focused on the migration crisis reporting the EU aid to Greece to deal with refugee camps, and the EU-Turkey deal to stem the flow of migrants from Turkey.

Assessing the visibility of EU actors, both EU and EU Member States actors were visible (with the “EU”/“European Union” being the key search terms). Three EU Members States – the EU’s ‘Big 3’ – had the highest profiles: the UK (visible in 70% of articles sampled for Malaysia; 65.6% in Indonesia), Germany (32.7% in Malaysia; 40.5% in Indonesia) and France (26.3% in Malaysia; 28.3% in Indonesia). These three strongest Member States were presented to be linked to differing critical circumstances in the EU (EU-specific factors): the UK was visible due to the Brexit developments, while Germany and France (the latter to a lesser degree) were frequently reported in the context of the irregular migration crisis. Among EU actors, the European Commission was the most visible, followed by the Parliament, the Council and the Central Bank. This correlates with the visibility of EU officials – Juncker, the President of the European Commission, being the most visible, followed by Tusk, President of the Council, and Schulz, the President of the European Parliament16. Interestingly HR Mogherini was not highly visible compared to other EU officials, perhaps demonstrating the EU’s focus on other regions and countries in 2016. However, EU Member State officials were more visible than EU officials. Again, officials from the ‘Big 3’ were the most visible, with UK officials the most visible (seen in the visibility of the former Prime Minister David Cameron, Prime Minister Theresa May and prominent Brexiteers Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage), followed by German officials (with Chancellor Angela Merkel having the most of media attention) and then French officials (specifically, the former President Francois Hollande).

As for non-EU actors interacting with the EU, the US was the most visible, followed by China. The US was visible in the articles about the presidential campaign 2016 and possible Brexit impact on that process, and election of the President Trump that put a different light on the EU-US relations.

Local Link

A dominant focus on the EU acting mostly on the European continent – and a minimal focus on the EU as an actor linked to Indonesia and Malaysia – is argued to relate to the nature of the preferred news sources. At least four out of five articles both in Malaysian (82%) and Indonesian (88%) samples were from foreign media agencies, and predominantly Western ones. Among the most popular, there were Reuters, AFP, Associated Press and Bloomberg, as well as many other smaller

16 At the time that the articles were sourced they were all the heads of the particular EU Bodies mentioned within articles sourced.
agencies. Within the EU, the UK and Belgium were the two locations reported the most in the news sourced outside Indonesia and Malaysia, with Germany following.

Differentiation between local and foreign news sources is essential. Evaluation of the EU representations within media sources highlighted a contrast between how the EU was framed by foreign vis-à-vis locally sourced news. Specifically in Indonesia, local Indonesian sources assigned a more positive/positive-neutral evaluation to the EU (60% of articles sourced locally), whereas within the same media outlet news sourced externally had only a 42% positive/positive-neutral evaluation. This positive profile of the locally-grounded EU news may be potentially due to the higher emphasis Indonesian public discourses put on EU-Indonesian relations, in particular when they discussed the licencing of the timber industry for the entry into the EU market. In contrast, Malaysian media outlets had a relatively similar evaluation of the EU within both types of sources. Both locally- and externally-sourced EU news had around 30% positive/positive-neutral evaluation of the EU each within the observed outlets. Arguably, this less positive profile may be linked to a lack of a major event in EU-Malaysia interactions that is seen as mutually beneficial. This lack of profile may present EU administrative resources (EEAS) within Malaysia an opportunity for greater visibility, from local media sources, in forms of local outreach initiatives like those seen with the CPO and logging industries in Indonesia.

Institutional crises of the EU during 2016 were highly visible within EU-focused articles with 95.8% of articles containing reference to one or more of these crises. It is important to reiterate that many articles had mentions of more than one of these crises (58.7% of the sample), with Brexit being the most covered one (mentioned in 61% of all articles that reported institutional crises from both samples). Needless to say, the predominant evaluation of these crises was highly negative, irrespective of the news sources. In Indonesia though, the foreign-sourced EU news were more negative in reporting of the EU in those crises than the local ones: Indonesian articles sourced from foreign agencies rated Brexit negatively in 58.8% compared to 38% in locally-sourced articles. Malaysian sources had an almost equal distribution of the negative evaluation assigned to the EU in the context of Brexit – 71% in locally-sourced news and 67% in foreign-sourced articles. Also, as a point of difference, local Malaysian sources gave a greater visibility to Brexit compared to Indonesian locally-sourced news. This is perhaps due to the historical linkages between Malaysia and the UK, as a former colony and a metropole. One article even discussed Brexit as a positive outcome as the UK could pivot back to the Commonwealth countries once it leaves the EU after 2019 (Byrnes, 2016).

Other institutional crises were not as visible as Brexit. The irregular migration crisis was visible in 17% of total articles collected. It was a more prominent feature within EU news sourced from foreign
agencies, both in Indonesia (46% of articles that referenced the migration crisis) and Malaysia (40%). Eurozone debt issues were less visible, with only 6%. Euroscepticism was mentioned in 8% and populism in the EU was reported in 6% of the total coverage. All articles that reported these multiple crises had an overwhelming negative evaluation (97%).

**Representation of the NPE and MPE**

With the NPE and MPE debates adding to the understanding of the EU as a power, this analysis traced how the respective norms are recognised and evaluated when the EU is communicated by opinion-shaping discourses of influential news media in third countries. As noted above, Indonesian sources displayed a more balanced evaluation of the EU, leaning more towards a positive-neutral evaluation. In contrast, Malaysian framing of the EU came with a stronger lean towards a negative-neutral evaluation.

There was a considerably larger amount of the MPE characteristics visible within the media coverage of the EU as an economic actor. Of interest, EU news sourced locally in Indonesia assigned the EU a more positive evaluation than EU news from foreign sources (an overwhelmingly positive evaluation was found in 72% of locally-sourced coverage that dealt with the MPE characteristics). As discussed above, this positive view was reflective of the strengthening of relations between the EU and Indonesia in certain important to Indonesian industries (logging and CPO). Economic cooperation with the EU was reported to positively benefit the country technologically, not lastly due to the introduction of new industry equipment, and economically, due to Indonesia’s access to the EU’s single market. Local sources in Malaysia, in contrast, were more negative. These assigned 56% of negative evaluations to the EU when its MPE characteristics were presented.

The NPE characteristics were visible within the case studies as well, but to a lesser degree. Despite lower visibility, 58% of Indonesian EU news sourced locally registered positive evaluation of the EU. Here, cooperation between the EU in logging and CPO industries was also seen to benefit Indonesia environmentally, through the protection of the environment. Malaysian local sources were less positive in their representation of the NPE characteristics than Indonesia (61% of such news carried neutral-negative valence). Negativity was traced in EU news that dissected the implications of Brexit and issues surrounding human rights and discrimination concerns surrounding the migration crisis. The same topics attracted negative assessment in the Indonesian representations of the NPE.

Foreign sources from both countries, on average, were more negative-neutral in their evaluations of the EU in terms of MPE and NPE characteristics. With this however, Indonesian audiences arguably
received a message about the EU being more positively evaluated in terms of MPE and NPE characteristics, than their Malaysian counterparts. Perhaps due to the EU’s increased engagement in local industries (logging and CPO) which were seen to have a positive benefit to Indonesia economically as well as technologically.

9.1.2 Key findings of the elite opinion analysis

The interview data illustrated a range of EU images among elites – the movers and shakers – from various sectors of two societies. Informed by the image theory framework, the analysis assessed perceived capabilities of the EU, opportunities and culture as parts of the EU image. Analysis of the emotive rhetoric helped in the identification of the overall evaluation of the EU and its power narratives of NPE and MPE.

Analysis of the elite opinion was linked to the media analysis. Results showed that international news sources were among the preferred ones to gather information about the EU, in addition to Internet. Foreign media sources were considered to have a more substantial coverage of the EU than local media outlets. This elite preference correlates with the news sources chosen for analysis – those also preferred to report the EU relying on foreign-sourced news. Importantly, observed newspapers were mentioned by the interviewed elites among trusted sources of information about the EU. Interviews with Indonesian and Malaysian newsmakers confirmed the importance of foreign media sources in reporting the EU and thus shaping an image of the EU among the readers. The newsmakers also stressed that negative news stories about the EU were “easier to sell” than “boring good” news stories. This highlights the tendency to prioritise negative news stories about the EU. Importantly, interviewed elites stressed that their use of print media is reducing, while their use of Internet to get news about the EU is increasing. Internet sources were seen as simpler to use and access information about the EU. The particular profiles of accessing information about the EU identified by this research may inform EU public diplomacy actions in the two Southeast Asian countries, and specifically the EU’s efforts in raising awareness among local stakeholders.

The elites demonstrated that when it comes to the images of the EU as a great power, the EU is considered to be an economic power through its vast single market and ability to exercise regulatory power. The EU was also viewed as a normative power, aiming to promote and consolidate human rights and freedoms globally. However, as predicted by the hypotheses, the EU was not seen as a political power. In this instance, the US and China were seen as the great powers in the world currently, while in the EU, larger EU Member States were considered to hold the power, and particularly military capabilities. These were thought to be the true characteristics of a ‘great’ power.
As predicted, crises (and the Eurozone debt crisis at the times of interviews) were seen as an issue negatively impacting the EU’s image.

Similar opinions were found on whether the EU was considered a leader in international politics. Less than one in four elites (both cases) considered the EU to be a leader in international politics. The EU was compared here to the US, NATO and China. A lack of unity and coherence within the EU on critical issues reinforced this vision. Those who did see the EU as a leader stressed its economic and normative characteristics, as well as the EU’s promotion of environmental protection and its development aid to regions, particularly former colonies.

When asked about the EU’s importance compared to other regions, the EU was considered very important/or important in Indonesia (53%) whereas Malaysian elites had a less favourable view of the EU’s importance with only 23% having similar views. The visions of the EU’s importance again revolved around the economic and normative approaches of the EU, where investment, technology assistance, human rights promotion, and trade were seen as adding to perceived importance. When the EU was perceived as not important, these perceptions revolved around the perceived importance of ASEAN neighbours instead, of significance assigned to trade with surrounding Asian partners rather than with the EU, and an image of China’s and the US’ involvement in the region vis-à-vis a low profile of the EU in this regard. Again, EU Member States were considered as more important partners, as some respondents recognised that they related to particular EU countries more than the EU as a whole. When asked to describe the current state of relationship, elites in Indonesia saw it as stable and/or improving, while most elites in Malaysia saw them as stable. These perceptions did not seem to be influenced by the EU experiencing difficulties with the Eurozone debt crisis at the time of the interviews. Nevertheless, economic issues were recognised as important issues in current relations, with the Eurozone debt crisis recognised to affect the perceived capability of the EU to be a unified and strong entity.

As mentioned in the theoretical section, image theory describes an ‘ally’ image when there is a perception of potential deepening of bilateral relations which would be advantageous for the partners. On this note, environmental and development measures of the EU were seen in Indonesia in the context of the ‘ally’ images – promoting these norms was seen to benefit Indonesia. Yet, this perception was not without controversy. The impact of the environmental and economic regulations advocated by the EU for agricultural businesses was also seen to be imposing and potentially harmful to local industries. This indicates the seeds for the ‘adversary’ image coming through, complemented perceptions of the EU as an actor acting from superiority standpoint. Such images may feed into conflict in future relations.
The impact of regulations, as well as economic, political and developmental issues were seen to be among the issues that will define future agenda of the EU relations with the two Southeast Asian countries. Of particular interest are development concerns that were highly visible. Those were seen in the development of institutional structures, in political, environmental, and educational standards, in the external partners. Indonesian and Malaysian elites recognised that their institutional structures were not at a high enough standard for future development of their societies, in comparison to the EU. This led to a view that the example of EU institutional structures needs to be emulated to ensure better relations. Environmental concerns touched on the issues of climate change, food and energy security, and sustainable development. These were the areas where the EU was see both as an ‘ally’ and ‘enemy’. As an ‘ally’, it was seen to present opportunities in promoting greater environmental protection policies. As an ‘enemy’ (in image theory formulation), it was seen to introduce regulations for the large local CPO industry which could have negative impact on the local growth. The EU’s cultural insensitivity also raised concern and a call for greater cultural understanding in order to ensure greater relations in the future.

The EU Delegation was considered as an effective mechanism to foster greater relations and improve the ‘ally’ imagery within the two external partners. Increased access to information and more education tools are thought to strengthen the links within partners and also educate locals on the EU’s interactions with the respective locations, in turn fostering a more informed generation of locals aware of the EU’s activities. The EU’s increased commitment to public diplomacy initiatives was seen as a positive mechanism for these initiatives, but local governmental practices were seen as possible obstacles for its success.

Finally, elites were asked to rate the EU’s perceived importance to their countries – at present and also in the future. Perceptions of the current importance saw an overall mid-to-high level of importance assigned to current relations. Answers to the question about the future importance arguably demonstrated a view on the potential trajectory of images – the perception of increasing capability and opportunity presented by the EU for Indonesia and Malaysia. The increase was traced to the levels of a high importance or very important position. However, this positive trajectory is not a given. The perception of increasing Chinese power in global affairs, as well as a recognition of internal EU challenges (such as the impact of multiple crises and other conflicting internal dynamics) could negatively impact the level of the perceived importance of the EU in the future.
**Perceptions of the EU in terms of NPE and MPE characteristics**

NPE and MPE characteristics of the EU were highly visible within elite discourses in the two countries. Although this was predicted, the main discovery was the overwhelmingly positive evaluation of both NPE and MPE characteristics within both countries.

The MPE characteristics were highly visible within both Indonesia and Malaysian elite opinions on the EU. The MPE characteristic of *material existence* was the most visible of all MPE norms, with positive evaluations from both sets of elites. This reinforced the image of the EU of an economic power. *Interest contestation* and *institutional features* were also visible characteristics, with generally positive evaluation assigned by elites. However, concerns were raised over EU regulations and the impact of the Eurozone debt crisis on the EU as an investment partner for external partners. In contrast, the other features proposed by Kelstrup (2015) – *the global financial frameworks influence on EU economic interests; the EU’s administrative resources* which are seen to promote the EU and its actions in external partners; and *the ‘EU’s ability to be unified’* on economic matters – garnered limited visibility in elites’ responses. Here, this research argues that the EU’s ability to be unified is seen to crossing into NPE reflections on the EU, where unity and coherence issues were discussed in non-market terms and as influencing ideological norms and values.

Similar to the media framing, the NPE characteristics were not as visible among elites as the MPE features. Overwhelmingly, those NPE characterises that were mentioned were positively evaluated by the elites. In Indonesian elite discourses, *sustainable development* was the most visible norms (40% of all mentioned NPE instances), due in part to the role of the EU-Indonesia cooperation in CPO and logging in Indonesian industry, as well as the impact of the EU’s promotion of environmental protection within these industries. Even with recognising reform of Indonesian CPO and timber industries, these EU norms garnered positive evaluation by Indonesian elites, who saw the benefit of the EU in terms of sustainability and environmentally friendly impacts. *Human rights, rule of law* and *democracy* were other visible characteristics, related to the EU’s role in the promotion of these values within the partner countries. Elites saw gave positive evaluations when the EU was seen strengthening *democratic practices* and *rule of law* or aiming to fight corruption. These efforts were viewed as important for improving societies. *Peace* and *liberty* were seen as positive identity factors that built the foundations of the EU. They were positively evaluated and seen to represent the EU’s image as an internationally recognised normative actor.
9.2 Expectations and Findings

In this section, the thesis revisits the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of this research. This analysis predicted that images of the EU within “normative” and “market” power narratives, communicated by leading news media and national elites, will lean towards a negative evaluation of the NPE and MPE norms. This could be due to another prediction – namely, that leading news media will prioritise negativity in general, as newsmakers believe that negative news leaves a deeper impression on readers. EU perception among elites (who are argued to be among the designated audiences of influential local news) may correlate with the EU frames presented by the media. However, in addition to this general tendency of the news media to prioritise negativity (global factor), the expectation is that the EU, seen through a prism of European ideological and market values, may be perceived in a more negative than positive light due to the historical colonial legacy of Europe and the post-colonial sentiments in the Southeast Asia (location-specific factor).

This analysis also expected to see differences in how the EU’s own discourses formulate the role of the EU in terms of its NPE and MPE vis-à-vis perceptions of the EU as a normative and/or market power. Another expectation was that negative developments in the EU, linked to a number of its institutional crises of political, social and economic nature, will also affect EU images as a normative and/or market power negatively. The prolonged Eurozone debt crisis and on-going irregular migration crisis (with a significant number of Muslim migrants affected) was predicted to leave a negative dent on the EU’s images in the two countries (EU-specific factors). Finally, the analysis expected that most of the EU news would be coming from international sources due to the increasing reliance on international news agencies in international news production due to cost-cutting bottom line strategies in news making world wide (global factor) as well as due to the nature of the chosen for analysis newspapers (English-language ones).

This analysis supported the expectation for the media analysis that the local media sources would rely heavily on foreign news agencies to source EU news. Nearly three out of every four articles discussing the EU came from non-local media sources, mainly from Western Europe. For EU public diplomacy, this reliance by local news media on foreign news agencies to sources EU-related stories may be problematic. News sourced from major international agencies tends to side-line local connections of the EU or locally-specific issues in the dialogue. Cooperation and regular dialogue with local newsmakers may help the EU increase the profile of the EU interacting locally. Such framing will help to demonstrate that the EU is not a distant actor, but a cooperative partner.

Another prediction was that negative news – with a focus on internal institutional crises in the EU – would be highly visible. The results supported this expectation – 95.8% of all articles that referenced
the EU contained references to one or more of the institutional crises. Brexit was the most visible of several crises that challenged the EU. For the EU, highly negative media profiles may impact the effectiveness of its public diplomacy – with negative information spread by local media leaving a more long-lasting effect in the public’s perception, the EU may encounter difficulties in projecting a positive image through public diplomacy means.

The expectation that the NPE and MPE evaluations would lean towards the negative end of the evaluation continuum was supported only partially. When focusing on the locally-produced EU news, the evaluation of the NPE and MPE characteristics was found to be largely neutral-to-negative in the Malaysian case. However, in the Indonesian case, locally-sourced news presentation the NPE/MPE characteristics with neutral-to-positive evaluation. Implications for these evaluations of the EU from foreign and local news sources helped in identifying that there in no one universal international image of the EU. Images within external partners are seen to be location-specific, where local perception filters (historical linkages, current relations, cultural differences) may influence the reception of EU public diplomacy initiatives within their countries. However, this may present an opportunity for EU administrative resources, responsible for public diplomacy initiatives, with new avenues for engagement with a decentring of their traditional approaches from European/Western ideals to initiatives more in line with local norms and customs.

Specifically for elite opinion, the prediction was that images of the EU as a power would focus on the EU as an economic power. The expectation was that the EU would be recognised as a civil actor but here a negative reception was expected due to differences in cultural values and norms between Western and Asian cultures. The prediction was also that the EU would not be recognised as a political power, due to the influence of China and the US. The results found these predictions to be supported only partially. The EU was indeed recognised as an economic and civil power by the interviewed elites. However, the EU’s civil and normative agenda was evaluated by elites in a highly positive manner – an unexpected finding. This recognition by elites of NPE in a positive manner may give legitimacy for the EU’s normative agenda, and potentially lead to more projections in the ways that are recognised as successful.

Finally, the prediction that the elites will use foreign media sources as a main source of information about the EU was supported. Nearly half of the interviewed elites confirmed they use international media sources to gather their news on the EU. This may again demonstrate that the EU may be viewed as a distant actor if they are not evident within locally sourced media from local news agencies. Elites also increasingly used the Internet to gather information about the EU. This source of information could be investigated by future research. The use of digital media, and social media may
form an environment where the EU, and its Delegations, could have direct contact with foreign publics rather than specific initiatives that may not be widely known about or accessible.

This analysis also came with a number of unexpected findings. Within the media analysis, Indonesian local sources demonstrated a more positive evaluation of the EU overall. This was surprising keeping in mind the number, and the impact, of multiple institutional crises that were expected to negatively influence the image of the EU. Another surprising factor was Indonesian media’s positive evaluation of the NPE norms – this is in spite of the institutional crises and the hypothesised influence of local cultural norms different from the EU’s norms. A further finding was the Indonesian elites’ vision and call for a more balanced relations between the EU and Asian partners – a relationship between equals, i.e. the EU as a global economic power and Southeast Asia as an emerging regional power. This view is informed by the recognition of the shift of power from the West to the East.

NPE evaluations within the elite interviews were another significant unexpected finding. Both case studies illustrated an overwhelming positive evaluation of the MPE and NPE characteristics. It was predicted that the influence of cultural dynamics within Asia, in line with Petersson’s (2006) ‘Western Individualism vs. Asian Communitarianism’ dynamics, would play a role in the rejection of EU norms promotion. It was predicted elites from Indonesia and Malaysia would judge the MPE and NPE projections as a form of neo-colonialism. Yet, elites evaluated these as positive and even saw the EU as an educator/teacher for the increasing of standards in many different societal facets from economic, democratic, political, environmental and educational means in terms of soft power, normative power and market power norms.

9.3 Practical and Theoretical Importance; Further Research and Recommendations

The practical and theoretical importance of examining external perceptions within emerging regions – EU external partners – can be seen in several ways. The investigation of the NPE and MPE projections and subsequent external reception illustrates whether, and how, the EU’s power narratives are recognised and accepted by the EU’s partners around the world. Results of the systematic empirical analysis informed by the MPE and NPE theorisations shows that the NPE and MPE characteristics were recognised by the two external partners in the Southeast Asia, and often positively evaluated by the local elites. These patterns of perceptions suggest that the EU’s projections of the NPE and MPE characteristics may meet a positive recognition and potential reception of these narratives. However, this positive perception does not mean that external partners will automatically emulate normative practices. The impact of local cultural customs (e.g. the ‘ASEAN Way’) was still acknowledged, while local elites called on the EU to increase cultural
sensitivity in its dialogue with Southeast Asia. The analysis also found that better synergies between the NPE and MPE characteristics in the EU’s projection might present advantages for the projections of the EU’s normative agenda – something already reflected in the EU’s leading document of its foreign policy – Global Strategy of the EU (GSEU). Specifically, the Strategy talks about the notion of “principled pragmatism”, where it is said, “the EU will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world” (GSEU, 2016, p.8). Essentially a combination of MPE characteristics which can be recognised as effective in norms diffusion, led by NPE norms and values which the EU is founded upon to attain the EU’s goals externally. Another factor to consider, found within this research, is the argument that MPE’s characteristic of the EU’s ability to be unified crossed over into NPE reflections on the EU. Future theoretical debate and research approaches using NPE theoretical framework may wish to include this characteristic into the assessment of perceptions and images within external partners as unity and coherence issues of the EU in 2016 (media analysis) and 2012-2013 (elite interviews) were seen to overlap into influencing ideological norms and values. NPE and MPE characteristics interacting with each other is argued to be a fruitful direction for future research of external images and perception of the EU.

This research examined what factors contribute to the formulation of images of the EU as a global power within an emerging region. A complex intersection of EU- and location-specific, as well global factors was traced (proposed by Chaban and Magdalena, 2014) – a novel approach in EU external perceptions studies. Considering the impact of the perceived power shifts, EU internal challenges and achievement, and location-specific issues on the recognition of the EU as a global power and leader, the systematic account of the factors will inform future studies on EU recognition globally and in Asia specifically.

Among other directions for future analysis is attention to a wider range of local news media sources (various press as well as broadcast media), and specifically digital sources of information. These could include influential online news engines and platforms, as well as social media. Examination of digital and social media also help to unearth additional information gathering paths for local audiences, yet this source of information should be treated with caution due to the challenges they present with regards to “fake” news. Nevertheless, with the development of social media as a tool for transporting EU messages to the general population, and for reciprocation from local audiences to EU bodies and officials, understanding the influence of these types of media sources on information gathering and image formulation may help in guiding future research on factors of image formulation.
Due to the practical limitations of this research, it only focused on media and elite images of the EU in Indonesia and Malaysia. Future studies may explore a wider array of target groups and unearth differing images of the EU. For example, future studies could look into EU images among educated youth with political science, economics, diplomacy backgrounds, who would be considered to be future diplomats and politicians. Future studies could initiate a research programme focused on elites, media and targeted general population groups for a more diverse and comprehensive evaluation of the EU as a global power within this or other emerging regions.

The interviews were conducted over a time period when the Eurozone debt crisis was plaguing Europe (2012-2013). Images from this crisis dominated elite discourses and influenced the views on the potential issues and concerns for the future. Future interviews may take into account the most recent political, cultural, and development changes and conduct comparison of EU images over time. This is particularly relevant if we consider the impact of Brexit, a potential point of EU disintegration, on EU images in Southeast Asia, as of the migration crisis. The sheer intensity and drama of these crises – addressed within the analysis – may invoke new images of the EU in the region. Elites did discuss the religious and cultural aspects as a potential bridge between the EU, the two Southeast Asian countries and the Muslim world. Further examination into the on-going effects of the migration crisis, could extrapolate more nuanced images of the EU within the region at a cultural level.
Chapter Ten - Summary

In summary, this thesis aimed at examining whether the theoretical frameworks of NPE and MPE supported or contested the recognition of the EU as global power by external partners within an emerging geo-political region. Indonesia and Malaysia were chosen as examples of the EU’s external partners in such a region and a comparative analysis of EU images in the two countries pointed to striking similarities of EU images in the emerging region of Southeast Asia, as well as highlighted some differences due to the inevitable location-specific nature of images and perceptions in IR.

Indonesia and Malaysia were chosen as candidates for the study of images and perceptions of NPE, MPE and the EU as a global power due to a number of reasons: 1) their history of past interactions with European powers, exemplified in the colonial legacies of the Dutch influence in Indonesia and the British in Malaysia; 2) civilizational features they bear by virtue of being Asian and Islamic cultures differing from traditional European cultural traits; and 3) their reputation as economically developing and emerging economies on a regional and global level. These factors suggest a complex mix of influences on how the EU and its NPE and MPE characteristics are recognized and how its actions trigger certain external receptions.

The research focused on investigating news media and images from elites, through their interviews, to judge how external partners within an emerging region perceived the EU. News media sources were treated as means to communicate the EU to local educated audiences by external opinion-makers. Following rich literature in communication studies, media visibility was assumed to relate to the salience assigned by newsreaders to the EU. This thesis aimed to examine not only the EU’s general visibility and evaluation assigned to the most visible representations, but the visibility and evaluations assigned to the representations of the NPE and MPE characteristics on the background of multiple EU crises. Elite discourses were used to identify images of the EU in terms of perceived capabilities, opportunities and culture among policy- and opinion-makers from different elite cohorts (political, business, civil and media).

The systematic analysis of EU images created and communicated by news media as well as elite opinion revealed that external visions of the EU as a global power incorporated characteristics of both NPE and MPE. The EU continues to be framed and recognized as an economic power, with detected overall positive evaluation of the MPE characteristics, especially in the elite opinion. The EU was also recognized as a civil power, – an image that again attracted mostly positive evaluation of the NPE characteristics. However, the EU was not recognized as a political power, similar to the power seen possessed by China and the US. Intervening influences – such as the EU’s internal institutional crises, a perceived lack of coherence among EU Member States, and an external perception of the EU
not being recognized as an actor with considerable influence, in the same vein as China or the US – all aided in contestation of the idea that the EU is a global political power.

Media analysis in this thesis found a large number of foreign sources used to report about the EU both in Indonesian and Malaysian cases. This suggests that educated audiences were mostly influenced by the western-centric frames of the EU. Low share of locally-sourced EU news results in an image of the EU as a distant counterpart to the two locations. Despite its low share, locally-sourced articles presented a different – more positive – image of the EU, especially in the Indonesian case. This finding suggests a potential for EU public diplomacy and invites it to dedicate special attention to the work with local newsmakers.

This research provided a template of how to examine EU power projections, with special attention to the NPE and MPE characteristics. Future studies may focus on examining a range of sources of information, including digital and social media, tracing a greater variety of channels that provide information on the EU to the general population. Future research may also focus on specific target groups within general populations – outside of the elite cohort – to judge the EU’s visibility and images from different sections of society, including the images of NPE and MPE.
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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Elite Interview Questions
1. Could you describe the nature of your professional involvement with the EU?
2. When thinking about the term ‘the European Union’, what three thoughts come to your mind?
3. Do you see the EU as a great power?
4. Specifically about politics, do you see the EU as a leader in international politics?
5. How would you compare the importance of the EU to Indonesia/Malaysia in relation to other prominent regions?
6. How would you describe the relationship between Indonesia/Malaysia and Europe/the European Union (EU)?
7. In your opinion, which issues in Indonesia/Malaysia-EU current relations have the most impact on Indonesia/Malaysia?
8. Looking at the future, what issues should be kept in mind when Indonesia/Malaysia is developing trade or government policy relating to the EU?
9. The EU has its Commission Delegation in Indonesia/Malaysia. How could the activities of the Delegation be of use to you and your organization?
10. What kind of risks and/or opportunities do you see for Indonesia/Malaysia when new countries join the EU?
11. How do you see the Euro as an international currency vis-à-vis the US dollar?
12. How would you describe the impact of the ASEM process on interactions between the EU and Indonesia?
13. Last year, there was an ASEM meeting in Helsinki in September. How would you describe the effect of that meeting on Indonesia?
14. Where do you get your information about the EU?
15. Which specific media do you use to access news about the EU?
16. Do you have personal contacts within Europe (friends, business, family, travel)? Which countries?
17. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is very important, how would you rate the importance of the EU to Indonesia in the present?
18. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is very important, how would you rate the importance of the EU to Indonesia in the future?
Appendix 2 – Media Elite only Questions
1. How is the coverage of the EU and European issues organized?
2. Which particular foreign news wires do you use for the coverage of EU?
3. Are special preparations made in advance?
4. Is a special budget allocated?
5. Do you assign more staff and hire experts to cover specific EU issues should the need arise?
6. What is the officially formulated policy on covering the foreign news? The news on the EU?
7. Does the news organization assume a reactive role or proactive, initiating role?
8. If the EU is proactive in disseminating news about itself, would your outlet be interested in considering such news?
9. Where do you see the balance of foreign reporting will shift in the future?
10. When reporting the EU, what news values lead your selection of the news?
11. How difficult is it to sell an EU story?
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## Sample of Coded spreadsheet of Elite Opinion Analysis – Malaysia

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<th>NATO/US Leader</th>
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<th>Potential as a Great Power</th>
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<tr>
<th>Timestamp</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1. Could you describe the nature of your professional involvement with the EU?</th>
<th>2. When thinking about the term 'the European Union', what three thoughts come to your mind?</th>
<th>3. Do you see the EU as a great power? How is it a great power?</th>
<th>4. Specifically about politics, do you see the EU as a leader in international politics? 4b. Why don't you see the EU as a leader in international politics? 4c. Why do you see the EU as a leader in international politics?</th>
<th>5. How would you compare the importance of the EU to Indonesia in relation to other prominent regions? 5b. Why is the EU not important to Indonesia in relation to other prominent regions?</th>
<th>6. How would you describe the relationship between Indonesia and Europe/the European Union (EU)?</th>
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