

How to become an “*edelez herze*”: Interpassivity and the art of playing the game of collectively received narratives (not only) within the Middle Ages

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In the movie *Ocean's Twelve*, two protagonists represent two very different ways to receive a complex story: You can try very hard to interact mentally – and fail on a more or less high level (like 'Linus Caldwell'); or you can fake a mental interaction and assure just after the twist of the story that you already knew it (like 'Bruce Willis'). In the latter case – and if the fake succeeds – you will be objectively clever and participate in the benefits of the people who really knew it – whether they exist in reality or not. This special variation of interpassivity is not only a more or less lame game for the reception of postmodern movies: There are hints enough to assume that the Middle High German literature strongly promoted interpassive cleverness. And for the courtly audience of a medieval literary performance, the showmanship was way more important than for the audience of a today's movie. So, medieval narratives gave the opportunity of two complementary games of

reception: Interactive engaging and interpassive participating. The prize for both games is 'courtly merriment', a fundamental condition to be part of the court. These games of reception of collectively received narratives shall be shown using the example of Gottfrieds von Strassburg *Tristan* and other medieval narratives.

1. An autopoietic game manual: *Ocean's Twelve* and Bruce Willis' interpassive cleverness

In Steven Soderbergh's 2004 blockbuster *Ocean's Twelve*,¹ the master-thief François Toulour challenges the team of noble villains around Danny Ocean: Whoever will be able to steal a certain Fabergé Egg will be admitted to be the most significant thief ever. Stupidly, Danny Ocean and most of his friends are arrested during the preliminary stages by Europol. So, the badly decimated team calls Danny's wife Tessa to join them: Though she's not a master-thief at all, she has a significant similarity to the famous movie star Julia Roberts, who's actually expecting a baby. And that's the plan: Tessa will play the pregnant Julia Roberts who wants to get a private presentation of the Fabergé Egg; while admiring the precious item, Tessa shall fake a sudden feeling of faintness, and during the expectable fuss, the rest of the team wants to substitute the jewel with an imitation. Unfortunately, Tessa meets Bruce Willis in the museum, who is a special friend of Julia Roberts. Tess tries hard to perpetuate the cheat during her very nervous small-talk with Bruce Willis, and the movie has the opportunity to show a few minutes of a knockabout comedy. Finally, Tess is unmasked – however, not by Bruce Willis, but rather by the Europol agent Isabel Lahiri, who appears like a *deus ex machina* in order to show up the fraud. The only part of Bruce Willis regarding the detection of the role play is to stand back watching and to assert: "I knew it. Shame on you"².

With this scene, for the time being, the movie demonstrates an interactive reception of a fictional work of art, in this case: a crime movie. The character 'Bruce Willis' is the only one in *Ocean's Twelve* who actually is played by himself: The fictional character 'Bruce Willis', in a manner of speaking, is identical to the real person Bruce Willis; hence he

can bridge between the fictional world, where the story happens, and the real world, where the movie is watched. He operates as a spectator, copied into the film out of real world, who plays the game in a seemingly interactive manner: He observes the spectacle of Tessa playing Julia Roberts, and he also takes part of this action – at least marginally; he seems to collect clues for solving the intrigue (if you want to recognize increasing insight in his stone-faced countenance), and finally, he claims success of interpretation.

An evidence for this autopoietic perspective is ‘Willis’ statements regarding his movie *The Sixth Sense*³, just before ‘Julia Roberts’ turns out to be a fraud. First, ‘Willis’ is addressed by Linus Caldwell, the youngest of Ocean’s team:

- Caldwell: I loved it, but I figured it out. [*Caldwell regards to the famous twist in the movie: The character Willis is playing finally figures out that he is a ghost*]
- Willis: Not a lot of people did. That’s pretty amazing.
- Caldwell: The second that she doesn’t talk to you in the restaurant, I knew...
- Willis: You figured that out, hu?
- Caldwell: Yeah. I mean, the movie still totally works for me.
- Willis: Great.

Just a few seconds later – ‘Willis and ‘Julia Roberts’ are standing in front of the Fabergé Egg – a watchman addresses ,Willis’ analogously:

- Watchmen: The moment that she doesn’t talk to you in the restaurant, I knew.
- Willis: Your friends didn’t tell you?
- Watchman: No.
- Willis: That’s when you figured it out, huh?
- Watchman: Yeah. But the movie was still enjoyable for me.

Willis: Okay. Thanks. [*beside, to Tess, playing Julia Roberts*] If everybody's so freakin' smart, how come the movie did \$675 million worldwide – theatrical!⁴

Well, Willis objectively *is* a “freakin' smart” spectator – in contrast to his audience: From the very first moment he sees ‘Julia’, he watches narrowly, asking questions about the private life of Julia Roberts (which Tess isn't able to answer in a convincing way) and, first and foremost, he always shows a stone-faced countenance with a clever, little smile. Anyway, he is the star from *Die Hard*, so we want to believe him when he finally says that he knew that Tess wasn't Julia Roberts. Sometime before, his stone-faced little smile must have been indicated the very moment he knew. Most likely.

There is only one disfigurement: Tess actually *is* Julia Roberts in the meaning that the character of Tess Ocean – playing ‘Julia Roberts’ – is played by the actress Julia Roberts.

This offers two perspectives onto the scene: From a naive point of view, observing only the act ‘Willis’ is probably “freakin' smart”. But from a reflected point of view, observing the observation of the act, ‘Willis’ didn't get the point (in opposite to Willis, who surely had a lot of fun blaming Julia Roberts for playing Julia Roberts). If you include the reflected point of view, there is reasonable doubt regarding the cleverness of ‘Bruce Willis’: Just before the twist, he addresses Tess as Julia (as cited above), and his intimate message from movie star to movie star proves that he really thinks that he's talking to his friend (what he actually does, certainly, but just not within the fictional reality). And right after the twist he flirts with the Europol agent Isabel Lahiri (performed by Catherine Zeta-Jones) in a very dumb way: “Do you really have a boyfriend? Or were you just ... was that just part of the whole thing with them?” (Isabel – or Catherine? – ignores him completely). By the way: Flirting actually is the only verifiable interaction of ‘Bruce Willis’ during his complete cameo: The first shot shows him flirting with a beautiful stranger; he sees ‘Julia’

walking by and mumbles “Julia...”. His counterpart answers, a little bit offended: “My name is Teresa!”.

Regarding flirting, ‘Willis’ is a very interactive spectator – but regarding cracking the case, he actually is not interactive at all, respectively he interacts just too late with his phrase “I knew it!”. Isabel Lahiri doesn’t need any of the suspicious little mistakes of Tess during her flirt with ‘Willis’ in order to detect the cheat. For this story working, ‘Willis’ cameo could have been cut out completely. It is much more plausible for the fictional character ‘Willis’ that his investigating interaction is only faked. But objectively, he comes off the scene as a “freakin’ smart” person. With his “I knew it!”, he takes part of the cleverness of Isabel Lahiri, who definitively knew about the truth from the very first moment she saw ‘Julia Roberts’. And ‘Bruce Willis’ shows us how the trick works: You have to put on a little knowing smile, you have to act like you observe close – but don’t show too much differentiated mimic! – and – most important – you have to claim that you knew the truth the soonest possible after clarification. Regarding his ‘own’ movie, *The Sixth Sense*, ‘Willis’ mirrors this special way of Interpassivity: It is possible that actually now one belongs to the group of people who really knew about the real nature of Malcolm Crowe as a ghost before the twist in the movie – but by appropriate behaviour, everyone can take part of the delegated enjoyment: You can objectively show yourself as a clever interpreter without interpreting cleverly. And from an outside point of view, it is not differentiable whether or not you were intellectual interactive.

But the movie *Ocean’s Twelve* would not be as autopoeitic as asserted earlier if this special phenomenon of interpassivity would remain in the movie: The plot as a whole is constructed as an unsolvable riddle. There are several twists, and all of them are definitively unpredictable because the spectators get too less information even to get irritated in the right way, not to mention to solve the unseen riddles. For example, the head of Europol turns out to be the mother of Linus Caldwell, a member of the Ocean’s team – well, we didn’t get any hint

before the twist that her identity is questionable. So, we get the information that there is a riddle to solve just while it's solved. And after the twist a lot of unsolved questions emerge regarding this solution. This is the principle of all the twists in *Ocean's Twelve*. The confusion and misunderstanding of the spectator of the movie is also copied into the movie: Linus Caldwell, the youngest team member, is constantly shown trying hard to understand the plans of Danny and Rusty, the leaders of the smart team. He wants to join in the game, but he understands almost nothing. This cumulates in a scene where Danny and Rusty take Linus to meet Matsui, a very delicate contact and somehow inevitable for whatever plan. They talk in riddles, and Linus tries to become interactive:

Matsui: So, business?

Danny Ocean: Business.

Rusty Ryan: A doctor, who specializes in skin diseases, will dream he has fallen asleep in front of the television. Later, he will wake up in front of the television, but not remember his dream.

Matsui: [to Caldwell] Would you agree? [Caldwell is visibly perplexed and perturbed, shaking his head]

Danny Ocean: If all the animals along the equator were capable of flattery, then Thanksgiving and Hallowe'en... would fall... on the same day.

Rusty Ryan: Mm.

Matsui: Yeah. Hey. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

Matsui: When I was four years old, I watched my mother kill a spider... with a teacosy. Years later, I realised it was not a spider - it was my Uncle Harold.

Linus Caldwell: [*All eyes turn to him, expectantly*] Oh, let the sun beat down upon my face, stars fill my dreams. [*Ryan claps hand across eyes*] I am a traveller in both time and space, to be where I have been. [*Blank, yet stern, looks from everyone. Cut.*]

Linus Caldwell: [*Outside, Ryan and Ocean join Caldwell in the street*]
Is he alright? Are we alright?

Rusty Ryan: Kashmir?

Danny Ocean: Is that your idea of making a contribution?

Rusty Ryan: We hadn't even started. We ain't even got to the terms yet.

Danny Ocean: We came this close to losing that.

Linus Caldwell: Hey, I don't even understand what happened in there. What did I say?

Danny Ocean: You called his niece a whore.

Rusty Ryan: A very cheap one.

Linus Caldwell: What?

Danny Ocean: She's seven.⁵

Later on, the mother of Linus has to enlighten her clueless son that Danny, Rusty and Matusi just played a prank on him named "Lost in Translation" – and Linus only complains about his inability to figure out such stuff. This proves that the artificial complications of understanding the simple plot of the movie aren't accidents but intention. The movie ensures hereby that actually no one could belong to the group of spectators who really are understanding the plot in real-time. And with the characters Linus and 'Bruce Willis', it offers two different ways of reaction: You can, like Linus, try very hard to get interactive, quoting lyrics from Led Zeppelin⁶ in order to get in touch with a miraculous plot – and you will suffer from misunderstanding. Or you can play the game interpassively like 'Bruce Willis' – and you will belong to the group of spectators which doesn't exist actually, but which enjoys the reputation of being "freakin' smart".

2. Receiving the medieval narration like Linus or 'Bruce Willis': The long way or a shortcut to become an "*edelez herze*"

It is not a big surprise that a paradigmatic postmodern movie like *Ocean's Twelve* fits perfectly to the theorem of interpassivity, which was formed by Robert Pfaller, disputing the reception of art within the postmodern period. For the academic perspective of historic humanities, it is of great interest whether interpassivity has the potential to explain pre-modern phenomena of processes of reception, too. First experiments already have shown that indeed applying interpassivity to medieval

literature could be fruitful.⁷ So, in the following, I will try to apply the special principle of interpassivity by bluffing interactivity to the reception of medieval epics.

Certainly, in a first step, it has to be clarified to what extent the reception of a postmodern movie would be comparable with the reception of a medieval romance. Even though medieval literature seems to be a completely different medium compared to a movie. However, the special condition of medieval literature makes it similar to a movie: its performance and its collective reception. In distinction from modern literature, medieval narratives were performed in front of a group of spectators. Due to their minor capabilities in writing and reading, the noble members of courtly society principally needed performers to read, recite, scan, or even sing the epics they wanted to hear.⁸ And the situation of collective reception is mirrored in hundreds of autopoietic passages of medieval literature. Surely, these passages are only literarily shaped echoes from historical processes of reception, not the reception itself – equally to the postmodern film, where we regularly are confronted with autopoietic scenes reflecting the performative reception of the current movie.

Due to the detective story as a basic narrative being unknown during the Middle Ages, the great goal for a 'prosperous' reception of epics wasn't to solve a riddle or to check the twist before its happening. Instead, the aim basically was to turn out to be perfect in ethical regard: Courtly literature told stories of courtly and uncourtly phenomena, behavior and persons, and within the differentiation of courtliness and uncourtliness, it formed a virtual sphere for its courtly spectators to identify with. In the prologues of epics, one can find concrete concepts of courtliness by evolving an ethical program. For example, the courtly romance *Iwein* by Hartmann von Aue from about 1190 begins its prologue with an ethical postulation, adjunct to King Arthur, and the promise of gratification if you follow:

Swer an rehte güete / wendet sîn gemüete, / dem volget saelde und êre. / des gît gewisse lêre / kûnec Artûs der guote, / der mit ritters muote / nâch lobe kunde strîten. (VV. 1-7; translation: He who turns his mind to true goodness will be attested by happiness and honour. Good King Arthur, who knew how to fight laudably and chivalrously, gives clear proof of this.)⁹

The courtly literature is only for courtly people, who are able to receive it properly, as the prologue of the short novel *Der Borte* (*The Belt*) emphasizes:

Ich bin der Borte genant, / hupschen luten sol ich sîn bekant, / den argen sol ich vremde sîn, / si sullen immer liden pin / durch ir missewende / unz an ir bitter ende. / man sol mich hupschen luten lesen, / di sullen mit mir vrolich wesen / durch ir tugent manicfalt, / wan nieman siner tugent engalt. (VV. 1-10; translation: I am called 'The Belt', and I shall be known by noble people. The rascals shall never know me; they shall forever suffer in pain due to their disgrace until to their vicious end. I shall be read to noble people, and they shall be merry together with me due to their many virtues because no one suffers through his virtues.)¹⁰

If you are virtuous, you are able to receive the story (who is talking itself within the prologue) in a merry manner (which is a basic courtly performance and not only a spontaneous expression of emotion at the medieval court)¹¹ and, consequently, you belong to the noble people. And, the other way around, the text makes very clear what the prize is for those who can't receive it in a proper way: If you aren't virtuous, you aren't able to receive the story and you will suffer in eternity instead.

In this case, the apparently intended interaction is comparatively obvious, if you want to play the game in the mould of Linus: You have to receive the upcoming story in 'courtly merriment', which is the comprehensive programme of '*hoher muot*' in Middle High German. '*Hoher muot*' is the unity of internal virtue and external egregiousness

and means in particular joyful proud, dignity, confidence, and high spirits.¹² The poets of courtly literature praise the actions that are leading to this attitude, and through the performers, the attitude reaches the audience.¹³ This complex circle is reflected by the prologue of *The Belt*. Well, getting into the right mood could have been pretty difficult, spectating the actual story of *The Belt*. After all, it confronts the noble audience with a noble lady, betraying her husband at the first opportunity, becoming a mighty knight magically and beating the very knight who had overcome her husband earlier on. In the end, even a pseudo-homosexual scene with the knightly transmuted lady and her former husband is shown – perhaps exactly this was the great interactive goal for a medieval audience: To keep face facing a very questionable story and to keep “*hohen muot*” considering the crass and queer goings-on.

Surely, we don't have the opportunity to observe directly what concrete interactions operationalized “*hohen muot*” in the Middle Ages; but perhaps we get comparable impressions if we look at the audience of a modern film premiere: Here, the audience isn't constrained to have “*hohen muot*” but to have a good time, to be curious, to be best informed, and to chat spirited about the movie in special or movies in common.

One of the most complex ethical programmes is evolved in the prologue of Gottfried's von Straßburg courtly romance *Tristan*. And here you can see the difficulties of a proper interactive reception of Middle High German courtly literature at its best – and also the shortcut to the award of “*hoher muot*”.

The narrator outlines very clear the audience, for whom he versified the romance:

*Ich hân mir eine unmüezekeit / der werlt ze liebe vür geleit / und
edelen herzen z'einer hage, / den herzen, den ich herze trage, / der
werlde, in die mîn herze siht. / ine meine ir aller werlde niht / als die,
von der ich hoere sagen, / diu keine swaere enmüge getragen /
und niwan in vröuden welle sweben. / die lâze ouch got mit*

*vröuden leben! / Der werlde und diseme lebene / enkumt mîn rede
niht ebene. / ir leben und mînez zweient sich. / ein ander werlt die
meine ich, / diu samet in eime herzen treit / ir süeze sûr, ir liebez leit,
/ ir herzeliep, ir senede nôt, / ir liebez leben, ir leiden tôt, / ir lieben
tôt, ir leidez leben. (VV. 45-63; translation: I have undertaken a labour
to please the polite world and solace noble hearts – those hearts
which I hold in affection, that world which lies open to my heart. I do
not mean the world of the many who (as I hear) are unable to
endure sorrow and wish only to revel in bliss. (Please God to let
them live in their bliss!) What I have to say does not concern that
world and such a way of life; their way and mine diverge sharply. I
have another world in mind which together in one heart bears in
bitter-sweet, its dear sorrow, its heart's joy, its love's pain, its dear life,
its sorrowful death, its dear death, its sorrowful life).¹⁴*

Like in *The Belt* the romance is dedicated exclusively for a special audience. But it is not only a noble audience to distinguish it from an uncourtly group of people: Both groups – the “*edelen herzen*” and the ‘normal world’ – have the possibility to have “*hohen muot*”, the courtly form of being happy. But whilst the ‘normal world’ has “*hohen muot*” in a simple, dualistic differentiation from feeling unhappy, the “*edelen herzen*” have a dialectic concept of “*hoher muot*”, which combines pain and felicity. Therefore, the minimum requirement for a ‘valid’ spectator regarding the following story the right way is to feel unhappy – and this is a requirement of emotional interactivity: The story of Tristan and Isolde tells about courtly, unhappy people, stuck together in love and pain, gaining “*hohen muot*” in the paradoxical combination of courtly love and uncourtly infidelity. The dialectic concept of “*hoher muot*” shall be a tight allegiance between the story and its reception – and the award for the group of ‘valid’ spectators, the emotional interactive “*edelen herzen*”:

*der hân ich mîne unmüezekeit / ze kurzewîle vür geleit, / daz sî mit
mînem maere / ir nâhe gênde swaere / ze halber senfte bringe, / ir
nôt dâ mite geringe. (VV. 71-76; translation: I have offered the fruits
of my labour to this world as a pastime, so that with my story its*

denizens can bring their keen sorrow half-way to alleviation and thus abate their anguish).

This is the quasi curative effect from an intense and interactive interpretation of a lovesick story by a lovesick spectator:

ein senelîchez maere / daz trîbe ein senedaere / mit herzen und mit munde / und senfte sô die stunde. (VV. 97-100; translation: Let a lover ply a love-tale with his heart and lips and so while away the hour).

Anyway, this medicine is bought dearly, because it requires from the “*edele herzen*” an emotional involvement characterized by fundamental paradox:

diz leit ist liebes alse vol, / daz übel daz tuot sô herzewol, / daz es kein edele herze enbirt, / sît ez hie von geherzet wirt. / ich weiz es wârez alse den tôt / und erkenne ez bî der selben nô: / der edele senedaere / der minnet senediu maere. (VV. 115-122; translation: This sorrow is so full of joy, this ill is so inspiring that, having once been heartned by it, no noble heart will forgo it! I know as sure as death and have learned it from this same anguish: the noble lover loves love-tales).

Well, in a mere emotional meaning, this interactive programme isn't as difficult as it may sound at the first: Suffering from a sad love-story and enjoying it – this is *mutatis mutandis* comparable to many modern collectively receptions of a romantic movie. If we think of Baz Luhrmann's *William Shakespeare's Romeo + Juliet* from 1996 or James Cameron's *Titanic* from 1997, it is obvious that having pleasure from suffering, feeling good whilst crying and sobbing isn't really difficult for the right people – let's call them “*edele herzen*” for the time being.

But the special conceptualisation of “*hoher muot*” formed within the idea of the “*edele herzen*” is not solely an emotional challenge but also a

philosophical one: Tristan and Isolde, the happy, suffering lovers in the story, are both standing out due to comprehensive education. And this education – talking several languages, playing chess, being polite in various circumstances, cutting up meat in a very courtly way for example – is strongly linked to the concept of the “*edelen herzen*”. This coherence of “*edele herzen*”, “*hoher muot*”, and comprehensive education you can see plainest within the musical education Isolde receives from Tristan: Already a highly gifted musician before her education through Tristan, Isolde’s music goes strictly to the hearts of the “*edelen herzen*” after Tristan teaching her in an arcane art named “*morâliteit*”.

ir meister der spilman / der bezzerte si sêre. / under aller dirre lêre / gab er ir eine unmüezekeit, / die heizen wir morâliteit. / diu kunst diu lêret schoene site. / dâ solten alle vrouwen mite / in ir jugent unmüezic wesen. / morâliteit daz süeze lesen / deist saelic unde reine. (VV. 8000-8009; translation: Her tutor, the minstrel, much improved her. Together with all this instruction Tantris engaged her in a pursuit to which we give the name of Bienséance, the art that teaches good manners, with which all young ladies should busy themselves. The delightful study of Bienséance is a good and wholesome thing).

Surely: It remains pretty unclear, what exactly „*morâliteit*“ should be – beyond the impression that it is strongly linked with courtly education. Anyway, due to her new skills, Isolde reaches the “*edelen herzen*” through her musical performances:

si sanc in maneges herzen muot / offenlîchen unde tougen / durch ôren und durch ougen. / ir sanc, den s'offenlîche tete / beide anderswâ und an der stete, / daz was ir süeze singen, / ir senftez seiten clingen, / daz lûte und offenlîche / durch der ôren künicrîche / hin nider in diu herzen clanc. / sô was der tougenlîche sanc / ir wunderlîchiu schoene, / diu mit ir muotgedoene / verholne unde tougen / durch diu venster der ougen / in vil manic edele herze sleich / und daz zouber dar in streich, / daz die gedanke zehant /

vienc unde vâhende bant / mit sene und mit seneder nôt. (VV. 8113-8132; translation: She sang openly and secretly, in through ears and eyes to where many a heart was stirred. The song which she sang openly in this and other places was her own sweet singing and soft sounding of strings that echoed for all to hear through the kingdom of the ears deep down into the heart. But her secret song was her wondrous beauty that stole with its rapturous music hidden and unseen through the windows of the eyes into many noble hearts and smoothed on the magic which took thoughts prisoner suddenly, and, taking them, fettered them with desire!).

Analogous to the prologue, Isolde's recital splits the audience into two parts, and both of them are courtly. But only the "*edelen herzen*" have the possibility to interact emotionally in a paradoxical way: pleasure and grief. After all, the narrator gives his audience a direct invitation to interact strongly regarding the concept of "*morâliteit*":

ir lêre hât gemeine / mit der werlde und mit gote. / si lêret uns in ir gebote / got unde der werlde gevallen. / s'ist edelen herzen allen / ze einer ammen gegeben, / daz sî ir lîp nar unde ir leben / suoehen in ir lêre. / wan sîne hânt guot noch êre, / ezn lêre sî morâliteit. (VV. 8010-8019; translation: Its teaching in harmony with God and the world. In its precepts it bids us please both, and it is given to all noble hearts as a nurse, for them to seek in her doctrine their life and their sustenance. For unless Bienséance teach them, they will neither prosper nor win esteem).

"*Morâliteit*" is the midwife and the nurse of the "*edelen herzen*", wo if you also learn it, you can actively work on your capabilities to be part of the exclusive group of the "*edelen herzen*".

Unfortunately, the concrete meaning of "*morâliteit*" remains obscure after all. However, it isn't helping matters that Gottfried von Straßburg coins the term "*morâliteit*" as a neologism, neither today nor for a contemporary audience: The broad discussion of the concrete

meaning of the term in today's research might be only a faint echo from equivalent efforts in the Middle Ages.¹⁵ Gottfried gives his audience hints enough, but he also makes a clear identification of "*morâliteit*" impossible and every concept questionable. Again, this point makes the *Tristan* comparable with *Ocean's Twelve*: The piece of art aggravates its interactive interpretation artificially. If you want to play the game 'Tristan' in the fashion of Linus you will have analogue problems compared to his failure regarding *Ocean's Twelve*. And the doubtful concept of "*morâliteit*" is only one small part of ensemble of intellectual riddles the *Tristan* assigns to its spectators if they want to be an "*edelez herze*" in the philosophical meaning of the term: Like modern research a medieval spectator surely could spend a lot of energy to decode the "Minnegrotte" (a typological cave with a mysterious lock)¹⁶, to understand Petitcreiu (a magic, multicoloured dog, whose little bell banishes all pain)¹⁷, to relive Tristan's confusion considering Isolde Weißhand (another Isolde Tristan falls in love with in a way)¹⁸, all of them examples for the many confusing riddles within the *Tristan*, which all are strongly bound to the concept of the "*edelen Herzen*".

Surely, this is a very attractive intellectual exercise – but it also means a mountain of work to do with high confidence to remain haphazardly like Linus. But why working so hard, if you are able to partake of the benefits of a successful Linus without mental acrobatics? If you play the game like 'Bruce Willis', you only have to fake mental interactivity. That is to say: You have to look intelligent and contemplative, you have to nod sometimes, perhaps you have to exchange thoughtful glances with other spectators – but don't do too much, it is better to keep a stony face basically than to act in the false moment; and, first and foremost, you have to acknowledge whatever the narrator presents as doctrine, clue, or explanation as if you knew all just before. And if there are enough other spectators who act like you, you belong to the group of "*edele herzen*", although they might not exist in reality. It is critical that you can't distinguish mental interactivity and the interpassive fake of it from an external perspective: If you act convincing, you objectively are an

“*edelez herze*” – even if you are daydreaming during the literary performance.

If we look closely, we can discover this objective impact of an interpassive reception of narration also in *The Belt*. In order to belong to the noble people, technically speaking, you only have to remain sitting also after the prologue. For an interpassive person, the speech of the personalized narration in the prologue (“I am called ‘The Belt’, and I shall be known by noble people” etc.) rather is a promise than a claim:¹⁹ If you only remain sitting you objectively will belong to the group of noble and virtuous people. A true mental interaction is maybe delightful but not necessary. However, there’s just one snag: When there is objectively no difference between real and faked mental interactivity, its signs are always questionable. This fundamental scepticism leads to a second layer of the game: In addition to faking mental interpassivity, you can validate the appropriate signs from the rest of the audience. Whom do you believe his or her participation to the group of insiders and whom not? The internal differentiation of the courtly audience sketched in the prologues hereby is mirrored on the level of reception.

True, such quite questionable processes of reception are usually not thematised within the courtly romances which are obligated to a courtly idealism. Fortunately, it is the function of the farce to reflect also dubious ways of reception. Here we find some pointers to interactive and interpassive acts of reception.

Nothing less than a warning of overly interactive reception gives the narrator in Hartmann’s von Aue courtly romance *Erec*. In a farcical passage the narrator, who calls himself “Hartmann”, trades barbs with a virtual spectator of the literary performance. The reason is a depiction of a horse’s saddle the narrator commences to tell his audience. In this very moment the spectator interrupts and asks if he could describe the saddle in place of the narrator. ‘Hartmann’ authorises him for the time being, and the virtual spectator does his very best. ‘Hartmann’ annotates his efforts, at first feigned approving and after that more and more sarcastically. In

the end, the interactive spectator remains as a fool and 'Hartmann' snubs him to leave narrating to the narrator: The experiment of interactive narration turned out to be a complete flop.²⁰

The farce *Der Wiener Meerfahrt* (The travel over sea by citizens of Vienna) presents a whole group of interactive spectators and exposes them as complete morons: Some citizens of Vienna are drinking too much wine and tell each other stories including the tale of a trip to Jerusalem. More and more they obsess over the idea and finally they think that they are really travelling over sea to the Holy Land. They read their dizziness due to their drunkenness as heavy swell and even reenact the biblical plot of Jonas: One passed out drunk is considered a sinner who is responsible for the asserted tempest and his friends are throwing him into the sea in order to moderate it. In reality, the drunk is thrown onto the street, where he receives great injury. Not until the next day they sober up and realize that they acted like complete morons by receiving the narration of the travel to the Holy Land interactively.²¹

These two examples only problematized an interactive reception of narration but didn't thematise an interpassive way. In a manner of speaking, courtly interpassive reception of a piece of art is in the centre of one episode of The Stricker's farce romance *Der Pfaffe Amis* (*Father Amis*):²² Amis, a cunning trickster, goes to the Parisian court and impersonates himself as a famous painter. He claims that he will paint the walls of a hall with astonishing pictures that only could be seen by persons who were born in wedlock. After a prosperous price negotiation, Amis resides in the hall for six weeks while doing absolutely nothing. After that, the king and then his vassals are entering the hall and all of them are praising the asserted pictures as masterpieces although no one can see a single brushstroke. Fearing the loss of honour and feud, everyone wants to join the group of fascinated spectators and acts appropriately:

*Ir ietslicher hette gesworn, / si sehens alle untz an in. / So jach er
allez nach in, / er sehez uzer mazen wol. Do was mancher zornes*

*vol / gegen siner muter umbe daz, daz si sich niht hette beguotet
baz. / Do siz allez wol besahen / und offentlichen jehen, / die arweit
wer wol bewant, / da begonde der meister sazehant / zu dem
kunege urloubes gern / und bat sich sines gutes wern.* (VV. 714-726;
translation: Every one of them would have been sworn that
everybody would see it except himself only. So, he repeated
everything after them and said that he would see it as exceeding
beautiful. A lot of people were angry there about their mother that
she didn't take care of herself better. After they had observed
everything and officially asserted that the work was well done, the
master [Amis] bid farewell to the king and asked after paying off).

The fraud is successful and Amis can leave the court as a rich and
honoured man. Here, we have a whole court which fakes interactivity in
order to participate interpassively in the benefits of the group of
interactive spectators: The noble audience performs with pointing,
discussing, praising, and paying an enjoyment of art which doesn't really
exist. And the noble knights even acclaim the magic phrase which also
uses 'Bruce Willis':

*Do si den kunich horten jehen, / da stunde daz und ditz hie, / als in
der meister wizen lie, / do sprachen si alle 'iz ist also'* (VV. 708-711;
translation: After they heard the king saying this and that would be
painted there (like Amis had told him before), they said all: 'even so').

The faked interactivity relieves the knights and the king from being
bastards and the loss of feud. They are participating interpassively in a
group of others, which definitively doesn't exist. But surely, the very
winner of this interpassive act of reception is Amis himself, who acts like
a narrator, explaining verbosely his inexistent pictures. In the end, he is
the most interpassive person: As a narrator he is of course very busy but
as a painter he does absolutely nothing. And exactly this inaction is the
key of an artistic (and, not to forget, financial) success he never would
have had if he had done only one brushstroke.

A successful interpassive participation of a whole audience to a not really existing interaction shows the wide-spread farce concerning a disputation between Romans and Greeks. The story is documented since the 12th century. I refer to the concise version of Johannes Pauli from the 16th century under the title *Ein Nar überdisputiert ein Witzigen* (*A moron conquers a sage*).²³ The story is situated at the founding of Rome: The Romans ask the Athens for their constitutional order which they want to adopt also for Rome. The Athens agree on the condition that the Romans can provide their wisdom in the context of a disputation. Due to language difficulties, the disputation shall proceed using hand gestures. The Romans arrange the disputation in an interpassive manner:

Da die Römer das horten, da legten sie einem Narren ein kostlichen hübschen Rock an und satzten im ein hübsch rot hoch Baret uff. Und ob es Sach wer, das der Kriech sie überwünd, so het er nicht mee dan ein Narren überwunden; und wer es aber Sach, das der Nar den von Athenis überwünd, so hetten die Römer alle überwunden. (translation: After hearing that the Romans dressed the moron with a fine frock-coat and donned him a fine high berret. If the Greek would overcome them, he would have overcome nobody but a fool; and if the moron would overcome the Athenian, the Romans would have overcome everybody).

The disputation begins and both opponents are misunderstanding each other completely. For example, the Greek rises his open hand to show that everything is obvious in the eyes of God. The moron thinks that the Greek wants to slap him and he rises a clenched fist in order to threaten more. The Greek, however, interprets this sign as a pointer to the might of God and his power to hide all his plans from our eyes. So, in the end the Greek accepts the mental superiority of the Romans:

Also erkant der Kriech von Athenis, das sie würdig weren das Gesetz zü empfangen; wan sie hetten gelerte Leüt zü Rom, dieweil diser Nar stil schweig und nit ret. Da achtet in der Kriech von Athenis für ein weisen, hochgelerten Man; het er aber geret, so het

er gleich wol gesehen, was er für ein Man wer gewesen. Als noch hützi tag sich vil Ratherren des gebruchen. (translation: So, the Greek from Athens realized that they were merit to get the constitutional order. Because they had savant people in Rome due to the moron not talking. Therefore, the Greek from Athens thought him a wise and studious man; but if he would have been talking the Greek would have recognized what a man he was. Today, still a lot of councilmen do so).

The mentally interactive Greek fails and the interpassive Romans win a disputation which has never happened before. The Romans are profiteers of the benefits of a very clever communication which didn't proceed. And in the end Johannes Pauli emphasizes the fundament of this trick: The moron didn't talk, as well as 'today' a lot of councilmen do. When you don't communicate too much – like 'Bruce Willis' and unlike the foolish spectator in Hartmann's *Erec* – you become a projection surface for wisdom. And the Romans are participating in this projected wisdom although it's an illusion. They don't believe in their mental superiority or even equality regarding the Greek, but they delegate this belief to a naive moron who thinks that until the end he has advantage of his Greek antagonist.²⁴ The Romans don't cherish an illusion: They have chosen the moron themselves, they know that he is a dumb person, and they did it with shrewdness (cf. the forelast quotation).

The delegation is perfect: No matter what happens, the Romans will be the winner. Explicitly, the Romans and not the moron will be the profiteers. Subjectively, the Romans are only shrewd; but objectively, they are wise, so they get the Greek constitutional order. This is significant: In the end the Romans are objectively wise, and this is not only a misinterpretation of the Greek. The Romans participate also interpassively in the Greek's political wisdom which becomes a permanent benefit: At first, the Roman wisdom is fake, but it finally forms reality. By delegating the disputation to the naive moron the Romans absolve themselves from the stupidity the moron is characterized with.²⁵

3. The endeavor of a systematisation: Passive, interactive, and interpassive ways of approach to collectively received narratives

Regarding (medieval) literature and its reception interpassivity is a widespread phenomenon.²⁶ Within this contribution, only a small, special variety is subject: Interpassive participation in the benefits of faked mental interactivity whilst a collective reception.

At first, it is necessary to emphasize from a literary point of view that there is no 'passive' reception of narratives. It is a delusion from the interactivity-turn of the 90's that the 'normal' reception of art leads to a passive attitude and that it would be a primarily goal of contemporary art to force the audience to cooperate in a performative way regarding the completion of art. From a hermeneutic point of view every reception of a piece of art is mentally active in the sense of contributing preunderstanding and interrelating information; and from a performative point of view, the same is true of the performance of reception, which means the active generation of mimic, gesture, breathing, maybe commentary. As is generally known, Robert Pfaller created the theorem of Interpassivity by criticizing the claim of interactivity.²⁷ Doing this, the theorem of Interpassivity inherited in a way the questionable differentiation of a passive and an active model of reception. Especially for the situation of collectively received narratives we have to record that this differentiation either makes no sense or has to be refilled. Against this backdrop, a passive reception would be no reception as such but a fail: To receive a narrative passively means being in the situation of reception without actual reception. For example, this would be the case when you sit in a movie but you are woolgathering instead of perceiving the film. And an active reception, properly speaking, would be always interactive if you talk about collectively received narratives: The multifarious actions of an audience – be it in a movie or in a stage play or in a performance of a medieval narrative – belong naturally to the performative piece of art as theater studies emphasizes for decades. Instead of differentiating only an active and a passive way of reception in order to describe interpassivity, it is useful to differentiate the (inter-)active reception further on: With

Niklas Luhmann, you can divide a first order observation from a second order observation. A first order observer observes the piece of art, but this means that he or she can't observe himself or herself observing the piece of art. Luhmann calls this phenomenon of essential blindness the 'blind spot' of every observation. A second order observer observes the observation of the piece of art, be it concrete in form of looking to a friend laughing about a scene or more abstract in form of including the layers of citation, intertextuality, topics, or differentiated perspectivalisations in the reception. The specific blindness of observation is also valid for the second order observer, but he or she is able to see the blind spot of other observers he or she observes.²⁸

It seems that the special variation of interpassivity I want to sketch out here is a complex form of a second order observation which looks like a first order observation: You can't observe yourself observing the narration; but you can observe other spectators observing you observing the narration. And this works also in case if the first order observation didn't occur in the narrower sense. Instead of spectating the narration closely and with a high mental engagement (first order observation) you have to watch out for signs of intended 'interaction' and also for the reactions of the other spectators and act accordingly. In this respect, this special version of interpassivity can be very interactive, but just not regarding the piece of art itself. When the communication succeeds – in other words: When the other spectators are second order observers, who attest you an appropriate first order observation due to your 'interactions' – you are profiteer of the benefits of the group of highly engaged first order observers (which don't have to exist actually). That means you are objectively clever if you watch a crime movie; you are objectively empathetic if you watch a love story; you are an "*edelez herze*", if you receive the *Tristan*, and you belong objectively to the courtly people, if you take part of a performance of *The Belt*.

However, this interpassive observing of someone's observation of your own observation is a dangerous game: Every action you perform in order to approve your adequate first order observation might be

perceived as a sign of fake or misunderstanding. Accordingly the cited sources are emphasizing the term 'passivity' in 'interpassivity': It seems to be necessary to give only few, but best placed indications of mental interactivity. So, between observing the narration, observing the other spectators observing the narration and observing the other spectators observing the own observation, a very complex game develops which interferes and infuses the original game 'understanding the narration'. In a manner of speaking, we can talk about a first order game ('understanding the narrative') and a second order game ('self-presentation of understanding the narrative').

4. Playing the game(s) of collectively reception: It's a kind of magic

For a post-modern point of view, this might sound ridiculous. Surely, we all know showoffs and self-exposer and the most of us practiced the interpassive participation in the benefits of a group of wiseacres now and then in school, when we indicated understanding in Maths with all the others without understanding. But these practices seem marginal to us and not significant for a model of reception of narratives. Today, the first order game is the essence and the second order game are irrelevant and little bit deviant appendices.

It seems to me that, the other way around, in the Middle Ages the second order game was the essence of the literary game. And there are a lot of reasons making this assume plausible: At the medieval court image cultivation was a crucial ingredient of culture. In opposite to a modern civil society the medieval estatist society was not based on the principle of equality but on the overt aspiring after egregiousness. Narratives weren't part of a fully differentiated entertainment industry but a pivotal part of courtly lifestyle and self-concept. The farce of Amis as a painter gives us an idea how serious the games of art reception were played.²⁹ Because the medieval narratives were performed principally, the initial situation of interactive and interpassive approach to collectively perceived narratives is given basically. And since we have no differentiation between (illuminated) 'stage' and (unlit) 'auditorium' within

courtly performances of literature, the spectators are also exhibited for observation and naturally part of the performance (already before any interaction). Only in the written form, in which the medieval literature came down to us, this comprehensive performative dimension got lost.

It is crucial for the social importance of the literary game(s) that the court in the High Middle Ages – especially the German court – wasn't already a fixed institution. In narratives models of court could be virtually simulated, while the real court was acting itself, for representation being the actual way of existing of the court.³⁰ “*Hoher muot*”, for example, was a phenomenon which fluctuated between fictionality and reality and likewise did other courtly virtues like honor, loyalty, and courtly love.³¹ Ralf Schlechtweg-Jahn has already worked out that particular Gottfried's *Tristan* presented with its “*edele herzen*” a virtual mirror for the actual court, searching for its true identity.³² Against this background it is inevitable to involve the audience's passivity, activity, and interpassivity shown above in a historical meaning of literature performance: Everyone present contribute the literature performance, but everyone also plays his or her own game. The medieval literature regularly addresses this literary double game as complex and anything but harmless: It seems very plausible that receiving courtly narratives was an appealing and thrilling art form by itself – and the specific variation of interpassivity sketched above seems to be a very welcome shortcut in order to make the complex game playable without exhaustion. Almost always medieval courtly narratives are giving many hints for an adequate reception, be it in the form of didactical explanations or in form of basal (*The Belt*) respectively more complex manners (*Tristan*) which shall bring the courtly spectator to light. This ‘service’ of propositions for interpassive shortcuts aren't coincidence or the effect of very friendly poets: Courtly literature is always commissioned literature, contracted by the court and fitted to its necessities. The narratives which are formed in this setting, work regularly quasi magical by leveling up the court objectively (compare *The Belt*): You only have to stay, be quiet and let the performance go on in order to be part of an exclusive society by definition. In parallel, the narratives also give the opportunity of an

internal differentiation of a courtly and an even more courtly group (compare *Tristan*).

This magic operates on the basis of interpassivity: If you are sending the relevant signs you will belong to an ideal social group whose real existence is always questionable. In Middle High German literature this group of the others often has the form of a frenchified comity. At the time of Gottfried's *Tristan* the French *courtoisie* was the core culture the German courts aspired after.³³ The Middle High German courtly literature was a leading medium for this pursuit because as a rule German narratives were transmissions from French stories – Gottfried's *Tristan* for example is an adaptation of an old French romance by Thomas d'Angleterre. By receiving the Middle High German version the German nobles had the opportunity to participate in the French culture without really being part of this commendable social group. Therefore Middle High German literature has a fundamental interpassive disposition: Whilst commissioning German adaptations from French courtly narratives the German court takes interpassively part in the French culture. The active part in terms of an intense pursuit of the (literary) French culture takes the poet who is payed to adopt the narrative. Within this interpassive scope the Middle High German narratives offer two ideal typical ways of reception, two sorts of literary games: On the one hand the German nobles can take part in the offered sketch of frenchified *courtoisie* with a great deal of mental interactivity (first order game); the complexity of the courtly patterns developed within the narratives give ample opportunity for intense mental interaction. Or, on the other hand, the courtly people can participate interpassively by performing the appropriate indications of a sensible reception (second order game). In this case the narrator³⁴ does all the mental work vicariously and he gives his audience frequently hints for a proper interpretation of the story and signs for an appropriate performance of reception.

However, this differentiation is ideal-typical. In reality, we have to assume blending of the two literary games and switching between them. This interpassivity is a very active one, and the passage to interactivity is

fluent. This means that interpassivity in form of faked interactivity is not necessarily a fraud: Switching between mental interpassivity and interactivity, the audience is also oscillating between acting insights and having insights. The real magic is that interpassive participation can lead to factual participation at any moment like the story of the Romans disputation shows impressively: Surely, the wisdom of the Roman's was a fake at first, but whilst faking wisdom, they get the codified wisdom of the Greeks actually –

¹ *Ocean's Twelve*. Directed by Steven Soderbergh. Warner Bros Pictures. USA, 2004.

² *Ocean's Twelve*, 1:30:20.

³ *The Sixth Sense*. Directed by M. Night Shyamalan. Hollywood Pictures/Spyglass Entertainment. USA, 1999. The movie presents a famous twist: Dr. Malcolm Crowe, a psychiatrist who doctors a child which is able to see dead people, turns out to be a ghost himself.

⁴ *Ocean's Twelve*, 1:26:52-1:28:33.

⁵ *Ocean's Twelve*, 23:16-25:14.

⁶ Linus quotes the first strophe from Led Zeppelin's *Kashmir*. Surely, the ongoing of the songtext fits perfectly to Linus' situation: '*Sit with elders of the gentle race / This world has seldom seen / Talk of days for which they sit and wait / And all will be revealed. / Talk and song from tongues of lilting grace / Sounds caress my ear / But not a word I heard could I relate / The story was quite clear*'.

⁷ Cf. Wagner, S. (ed.) *Interpassives Mittelalter? Interpassivität in mediävistischer Diskussion*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2015.

⁸ Cf. Däumer, M. *Stimme im Raum und Bühne im Kopf. Über das performative Potenzial der höfischen Artusromane*. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013. Vitz, E. B., Regalado, N. F., Lawrence, M. (ed.) *Performing Medieval Narrative*. Woodbridge: Brewer, 2005.

⁹ Hartmann von Aue. *Iwein. Text und Übersetzung*. Edited by T. Cramer. 4th edition, Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2001. Translation: Tobin, F., Vivian, K., Lawson, R. H. *Arthurian romances, tales, and lyric poetry: The complete works of Hartmann von Aue*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.

¹⁰ Meyer, O. R. *Der Borte des Dietrich von der Glezze. Untersuchungen und Text*. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1915. Translation by myself.

¹¹ Cf. Bumke, J. *Höfische Kultur. Literatur und Gesellschaft im hohen Mittelalter*. 10th edition, München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002, pp. 425-430.

¹² Cf. Wolf, B. *Vademecum medievale. Glossar zur höfischen Literatur des deutschsprachigen Mittelalters*. Bern i.a.: Peter Lang, 2002, p. 34.

¹³ Cf. Ehrismann, O. *Ehre und Mut, Aventure und Minne. Höfische Wortgeschichten aus dem Mittelalter*. München: C. H. Beck, 1995, p. 151.

¹⁴ Gottfried von Straßburg. *Tristan*. Two volumes. Edited by R. Krohn. 9th edition, Stuttgart: Reclam, 2001. Translation: Gottfried von Strassburg. *Tristan*. Translated entire for the first time. With the surviving fragments of the *Tristan* of Thomas. Newly translated. Edited by A. T. Hatto. Edinburgh: Penguin Books, 1960.

¹⁵ Cf. for example Jackson, W. T. H. "Der Künstler Tristan in Gottfrieds Dichtung". In *Gottfried von Strassburg*, by A. Wolf, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973, pp. 280-304. Briški, M. J. "Die Bildung in Gottfrieds *Tristan*: Bemerkungen zu ihrer epischen und symbolischen Funktion". In *Acta neophilologica* 29 (1996), pp. 13-25. Sziráki, A. *Éros Lógos Musike. Gottfrieds ‚Tristan‘ oder eine utopische renovatio der Dichtersprache und der Welt aus dem Geiste der Minne und Musik?* Bern i.a.: Peter Lang, 2003, pp. 482-510. Linden, S. "Die Amme der edelen Herzen. Zum Konzept der Moralität in Gottfrieds 'Tristan' ". In *Dichtung und Didaxe. Lehrhaftes Sprechen in der deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters*. Edited by H. Lähnemann and S. Linden, Berlin i.e.: De Gruyter, 2009, pp. 117-133.

¹⁶ Cf. VV. 16678-17658. For an enter point to the academic discussion of the passage cf. Huber, Ch. *Gottfried von Straßburg: Tristan*. 3rd edition, Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2013, pp. 113-128.

¹⁷ Cf. VV. 15765-16402. This is a metaphorical reading of the passage Wright, A. E. "Petritcreiu. A Text-Critical Note to the *Tristan* of Gottfried von Strassburg". In *Colloquia Germanica* 25 (1992), pp. 112-121.

¹⁸ Cf. VV. 18949-19548. For an enter point to the academic discussion of the passage cf. Thomas, N. "Duplicity and Duplexity: The Isolde of the White Hands Sequence". In *A Companion to Gottfried von Strassburg's ‚Tristan‘*. Edited by W. Hasty. Rochester: Camden House, 2003, pp. 183-204.

¹⁹ Detailed cf. Wagner, S. *Erzählen im Raum. Die Erzeugung virtueller Räume im Erzählakt höfischer Epik*. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015, pp. 243-275.

²⁰ Cf. Hartmann von Aue. *Erec*. Edited by Th. Cramer. 23rd edition. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000, VV. 7286-7766, especially VV. 7462-7581. For an interpassive interpretation of the passage cf. Wagner, S. "Stellvertretende Dummheit. Interpassivität im Vergleich zwischen Postmoderne und Mittelalter (*Erec*, Pferdebeschreibung)". In *Wir sind nie aktiv gewesen. Interpassivität zwischen Kunst- und Gesellschaftskritik*. Edited by Feustel, R., Koppo, N. and Schölzel, H. Berlin: Transcript, 2011, pp. 115-132.

²¹ Cf. *Der Wiener Meerfahrt*. Edited by R. Niewald. Heidelberg: Carl Winther's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1930. A sociocritical reading is provided by Albertsen, L. L. "Die Moralphilosophie in der Wiener Meerfahrt". In *ZfdA* 98 (1969), pp. 64-80.

²² Cf. *Der Stricker. Der Pfaffe Amis*. Edited by M. Schilling. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1994, VV. 496-798. An interpretation of the trickster Amis gives Ragotzky, H. *Gattungserneuerung und Laienunterweisung in Texten des Strickers*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1981, pp. 152-158.

²³ Johannes Pauli. *Schimpf und Ernst*. Edited by H. Österley. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1967, No. 32, pp. 33f. For the literal history of the matter cf. Grubmüller, K. *Novellistik des Mittelalters*. Berlin: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2011, pp. 1341-1345.

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- ²⁴ Cf. Pfaller, R. *Interpassivity. The Aesthetics of Delegated Enjoyment*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017, p. 7.
- ²⁵ The relief from stupidity through interpassivity is a widespread literary phenomenon (not only) within the Middle Ages, cf. Wagner, S. "Literarische Didaxe als Arbeit am Glauben der Anderen". In *Interpassives Mittelalter? Interpassivität in mediävistischer Diskussion*. Edited by S. Wagner, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2015, pp. 37-59.
- ²⁶ Cf. Wagner, S. *Interpassives Mittelalter? Interpassivität in mediävistischer Diskussion*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2015.
- ²⁷ Cf. Pfaller, R. *Interpassivity. The Aesthetics of Delegated Enjoyment*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017, p. 2f.
- ²⁸ Cf. Luhmann, N. *Die Kunst der Gesellschaft*, 3rd edition, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999, pp. 95f.
- ²⁹ For the sobriety of the game cf. Huizinga, J. *Homo Ludens. Vom Ursprung der Kultur des Spiels*. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956.
- ³⁰ Cf. Wenzel, H. *Höfische Repräsentation. Symbolische Kommunikation und Literatur im Mittelalter*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005.
- ³¹ Cf. endnote 12.
- ³² Cf. Schlechtweg-Jahn, R. "Virtueller Raum und höfische Literatur am Beispiel des Tristan". In *Virtuelle Räume. Raumwahrnehmung und Raumvorstellung im Mittelalter. Akten des 10. Symposiums des Mediävistenverbandes*. Edited by E. Vavra, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005, S. 69-86.
- ³³ Cf. detailed Elias, N. Vgl. Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*. 2 volumes, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987/1988.
- ³⁴ Regarding to Middle High German epics, the narrator is more than just a theoretical and fictional function of the text. Due to the performed realisation of the narrations, the narrator basically is also a real person, cf. Wagner, S. "Narrator and narrative space in Middle High German epic poetry (Parzival, Ehescheidungsgespräch, Prosalancelot)". In *Perspectives on Narrativity and Narrative Perspecticization*. Edited by N. Igl and S. Zeman, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Brepols, 2016, S. 115-138.