

If They Build It Will It Take Root? Applying Lessons of Colonial Legacy to Polity Imposition

Dawn Miller-McTaggart

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Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own original work.

Dawn Miller-McTaggart

1 December 2017

Dedication

To my mum, Virginia Garfield. Thank you for all your encouragement, support, and love. You instilled in me my love of research and analysis.

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Abstract

In this project, I explore whether imposed, liberal institutions installed by a colonial power affect the persistence of democracies in the postcolonial period. If a state imposes democratic institutions within another state will the imposed polity persist? To answer that question, I examine the impact of imposed liberal institutions and the citizenry's interaction with those institutions on democratic survival of the polity after independence. To test hypotheses regarding the imposition of liberal institutions and democratic survival, I employ duration analysis. In this project I introduce the concept of liberal steps which allows for modelling of the iterative expansion of liberal rights in polities. Using sequence analysis, a relatively new method to political science, to investigate the process of the installation of liberal steps in colonies and the effect of those steps on post-independence democracy. I find imposed liberal institutions contribute to the longevity of democracy in polities after independence. Each liberal step significantly enhances the likelihood of democratic survival of the polity. Using sequence analysis, I reveal two patterns of successful democracies those where institutions took root quickly and those which had many years of interaction with liberal institutions. Overall, my results indicate external impositions will be successful experiences and interactions with liberal institutions. Although built by imposers, the institutions must be adopted by the citizenry as they are seen as legitimate and able to channel political interests.

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Introduction to Colonial Legacy and Imposed Institutions

1.1 Introduction of Research Project

If a state imposes a government, or polity¹, within another state will it persist? Or is an imposed polity doomed to failure, as the governmental structures did not grow organically within the state? I explore the likelihood of the survival of imposed democratic polities. My research question is whether imposed, liberal institutions installed by the colonial power affect the persistence in the postcolonial period. I examine the relationship between liberal institutions and democratic survival. Lastly, using a relatively new method to political science, sequence analysis, I examine the process of the installation of liberal steps in colonies and the corresponding effect on the colony after independence.

The installation of new governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as, the advocacy of democracy as a cure for conflict and poor human rights provision draw attention to governments created by outside actors. Governments such as those most recently established in Afghanistan and Iraq are the products of outside influence and likely would not have developed as they did, or even at all, without such influence. While not new, attempts to impose polities have recently received increased attention internationally (Ajami 2003; Dawisha and Dawisha 2003; Patten 2003; Telhami 2003; Zakaria 2003; McFaul 2004; Enterline and Greig 2005*a*; Pickering and Peceny 2006; Youngs 2006; Walker and Pearson 2007; Enterline and Greig 2008*a,b*; Goldsmith 2008; Merkel 2009). However, systematic research on imposed polities, the persistence and legacy of imposition, is a relatively new and under-studied area of international relations and comparative politics.

Governments were installed in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States in an attempt to resolve regional and internal security concerns. Among the largest benefits

¹I explain the term in greater detail later in this chapter

is the alleged pacifying benefit of democracy. According to the democratic peace proposition, also referred to as the democratic peace, democracies do not go to war with one another; this proposition has been heralded as the closest thing to law in international politics (Levy 1988). The democratic peace traces its roots back to Kant's (1996) *Perpetual Peace* and was first empirically tested by Babst (1964). Since then, the democratic peace has expanded to a wide body of literature providing supporting and dissenting evidence for the proposition. Criticisms of the body of literature cite problems with the evidence (Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997); the war proneness of democratizing states (Mansfield and Snyder 1995); alternative causal arguments (Weede 2004; Gartzke 2007; McDonald 2007; Mousseau 2013); and operationalizations of the terms democracy and war (Bayer and Bernhard 2010; Spiro 1996). Despite the plethora of criticisms of the democratic peace literature, policy-makers and leaders of democratic states have embraced the proposition and cite it as a basis for unproblematized democratization policies.

The promotion of democracy has overtaken the foreign policy of the United States. Famously, in his 1994 State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton (1994) argues, "Democracies don't attack each other... Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere." Like Clinton, policy-makers advocate polity imposition or democracy promotion to cure a myriad of problems such as regional conflict, reconstruction of post-conflict states, and security threats (Bush 2002; Allaf, Ansari, Assam, Hollis, Lowe, Mekelberg, Ozel, Stansfield, and Yamani 2004; Tomkins 2004; Buisson 2007). In the Post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy shifted from an overarching policy of containment to democratic enlargement (Lake 1993). The promotion of democracy was argued as the best way to protect U.S. interests and security. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration states "[t]aken together, our strategy looks to the enlargement of democracy and markets abroad" (1993). Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. Republicans and Democrats have equally supported liberal expansion. A major tenet of George Bush's foreign policy agenda, also known as the Bush Doctrine, is the active extension of democracy, liberty, and security to all regions of the world. Under the Bush administration governments were imposed in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush articulated this tenet at a speech given at West Point: "we will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent" (2002).

The focus on democratization and democratic expansion remains a cornerstone of American foreign policy during the Obama presidency. Early in his administration, however, Obama sought to distance the United States from the practice of imposition and move instead towards a more vague support of democracies and liberal principles abroad. At Cairo University, President Barack Obama stated "no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by another" (2009). Later, he expressed support for democracy expansion in the 2010 National Security Strategy, in which he calls for the United States to ensure new and fragile democracies

“deliver tangible improvements for their citizens.” (Obama 2010, 37) Additionally, he called for constructive engagement with non-democratic regimes; the recognition of peaceful democratic movements; support of rights for women and children; the advancement of democratic values through a broad coalition of governments, nongovernmental institutions and intergovernmental organizations; and support of technological advances which promote free access to information (Obama 2010). More recently, in the 2015 National Security Statement, Obama indicated that there may be some unspecified rewards and punishments for movements to or away from democracy: “Our focus is on supporting countries that are moving in the right direction - whether it is the peaceful transitions of power we see in sub-Saharan Africa; the movement toward constitutional democracy in Tunisia; or the opening taking place in Burma. In each, instance, we are creating incentives for positive reform and disincentives for backsliding” (Obama 2015, 20). Even though Obama has attempted to distance the United States from the imposition of democracy, the promotion of democracy remains a central goal of American foreign policy.

The promotion and support for the expansion of democracy is not limited to the United States. The foreign policies of many western democracies and international organizations include support for liberal tenants and democratic expansion. Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom has supported democracy as a solution for conflict. Tony Blair argues the only viable state for Palestine is democratic state (Tomkins 2004). Likewise, Former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer (2006) explained, “liberal democracy is the soundest basis for peace and prosperity. It’s the basis for dynamism and innovation. It’s in Australia’s national interest for democracy to spread. And so it’s a core value of our foreign policy.” The United Nations fosters many programs to encourage democracy across the globe. Although democracy takes time to take root, Ban Ki-moon (2012) argued states in the world, “must join forces to nurture progress until democracy takes a firm root in all countries around the world... Democracy is not just a matter of giving people a voice ... it advances development.” Turning from their previous policy of avoiding democracy promotion, Indian policy-makers have released statements supporting democracy abroad and expressions of willingness to promote and support democratization abroad (Mazumdar and Statz 2015).

Critics of state-building and external democratization argue that the imposition of democracy is not effective in achieving foreign policy outcomes. Walzer (2008) argues democracies must grow organically, they cannot be created by outside actors but rather states wishing to promote or create polity change should support civic actors and movements within states. Research on the outcomes of polity imposition lend support to the argument that the benefits of polity imposition may not be as forthcoming as politicians and policy-makers infer. Enterline and Greig (2005a) find evidence that imposed polities are fragile over the entire existence of the polity. Thus, the polity may not last long enough or be robust enough to provide the intended foreign policy benefits.

Although some readers may object that polity imposition is a phenomenon of the past, as the most recent impositions in Iraq and Afghanistan have not fared well, I would answer that democracy promotion is still in the lexicon of foreign policy. Owen (2002) whose work I will discuss in greater detail later, argues that waves of imposition occur after major international events; in other words, polity imposition occurs regularly after wars or changes in power. Granted polity imposition may not occur frequently, it is important to study systematically, as it happens regularly. Such actions have important implications for the imposer, the imposed polity, the region of the imposed polity, and potentially, the international system. Despite the stalling of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, the promotion or enlargement of democracy is still a central part of foreign policy for the United States (Enterline and Greig 2008a), as well as many other industrialized democracies.

To study the impact of the imposition of liberal institutions, I turn to former colonies with imposed liberal institutions. Such colonies provide a good comparison group for imposed polities. Liberal institutions, also referred to as power-sharing institutions, were created to facilitate colonial administration and resource extraction. In many cases, the colonies retained the institutions after independence. The colonial legacy literature points toward the importance of institutions to the longevity of the polity in the post-colonial era (Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). The British were more likely than other colonizers to create institutions. The British tutelage systems were set up in the colonies because they understood the benefits for colonial administration. The institutions created allowed for delegation of power to local agents. Despite the argument's basis on institutions, this proposition is tested in the literature by dichotomous variables denoting British colonial history. However, British colonial practice varied across colonies. Some had a host of liberal imposed institutions while other had very few and others had none. Likewise, the postcolonial experience varied; some failed, while others persisted. I look towards imposed, liberal institutions to answer the question of why some persisted and others failed.

The study of external forces of democratization is small when compared to the body of work on internal forces of democracy; for the most part, research on regime transitions focuses on domestic factors contributing to shifts in political institutions. However, other researchers suggest the focus on domestic factors overlooks important causal contributions by foreign policy or international factors (Huntington 1991; Gasiorowski 1995; Remmer 1999). Investigating regime change and democratization through polity imposition contributes to an overlooked area in political research. This investigation of democratization through imposition is especially important as democratic promotion has become a central tenet of modern democracies' foreign policy.

Through this project, I seek to answer how imposed, liberal institutions installed by colonizers affect the longevity of the democratic polity of the former colony. In other words, I test the impact of imposed, liberal institutions on the likelihood of

democratic survival in the post-colonial period. This project addresses the gaps in knowledge between the installation of liberal institutions by a foreign power and the longevity of democracy.

1.2 Central Terms

Throughout this project, I use several key terms which I will identify in this section. I use Harold Laski's definition of state: "a territorial society divided into government and subjects claiming, within its allotted physical area, a supremacy over all other institutions" (2015, 21). Laski's definition is similar to Weber's definition which denotes a state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (2009, 155). However, this project does not concentrate on the state as a whole; rather, I am concerned with those structures which govern the state.

Government is frequently used to identify both the structure of the political institutions within the state and a particular government in power. For example, government may refer to a democratic government, which refers to a structure of authority in which there is participation by the citizens and the provision of civil rights. In the New Zealand context, the National Government, on the other hand, refers to the National Party, which holds control of the government. While government is the most commonly referred to term, I use polity as it relates more specifically to the topic of this thesis. A polity is defined as "a particular form of government that exists within a state or an institution" (Collin 2001, 183). As the main focus of my thesis is imposed institutions within a state, the term polity more accurately reflects that line of inquiry.

States whose institutions were created by outside powers are referred to as *imposed polities*. To build upon new work on imposed polities I adopt the same operationalization as Enterline and Greig (Enterline and Greig 2005a, 2008a,b). An imposed polity is a state whose governmental institutions have been created by foreign powers through military or nonmilitary forces. Under this definition, post-colonial states are not imposed polities unless the colonizer constructed institutions within the colony during the colonial period. A state is considered an imposed polity from the date of its imposition until it is replaced by a new polity or it experiences a period of polity interruption². It is considered to persist as long as it maintains the institutions similar to its founding. However, during its lifespan a polity's democracy score may vary. The imposer does not need to continue to interact with the target, as long as the institutions it created survives. Not all colonizers left institutions or created new polities during decolonization. Some simply withdrew from their colony without liberal structures in place. Therefore, it is extremely important to examine

²See *Polity 3d* for more information on periods of interruption.

each polity created as a result of decolonization to distinguish between those polities whose institutions were created by the colonial power and those whose institutions were indigenously created by the newly independent state.

The imposed institutions addressed here are liberal or democratic institutions that include power-sharing structures installed by the colonial power. Colonialism is “the policy and practice of a strong power extending its control territorially over a weaker nation or people” (Mclean and McMillan 2003, 92). Mahoney and vom Hau explain, “[b]y definition, a colonial state is subservient to another state; colonial states are not sovereign entities” (2005, 98). I am concerned with colonies which are ruled by foreign powers but are not settler colonies in which the colonial power sends its citizens to settle and control the territory. The colonies of interest in this study are those where power-sharing institutions were created to administer the colony. Colonial legacy refers to the lasting effects of colonization on various aspects of the colony after independence. The aspects include economic development, political cleavages, and political institutions. Out of all the aforementioned aspects, political institutions are the focus of this project.

Institutions imposed by the colonial powers in the colonies include free and fair elections, judiciary, popularly elected legislatures and constitutions. Imposed liberal steps capture the incremental installation of power-sharing structures. Most imposed, liberal institutions were created over time rather than imposed the complete institution at once. A prime example of this incremental process lies in the political institution of constitutions. The first constitution imposed often provided some civil liberties. Subsequent constitutions increased the civil rights provided by the constitutions. Each expansion of rights is considered a liberal step. In cases where an institution is withdrawn, then the number of liberal steps is decreased by one. In cases where an institution simply replaces another without expanding rights or power-sharing, it is not considered a liberal step. In Section 1.3, I discuss the identification of imposed, liberal institutions

1.3 Research Questions and Methodology

1.3.1 Does the presence of imposed, liberal institutions contribute to democratic survival?

My primary research question is whether imposed, liberal institutions lead to greater odds of democratic survival. In Chapter Two, I test whether the presence of imposed, liberal institutions support democratic survival after independence. First, I examine whether the presence of imposed, liberal institutions contribute to post-colonial democratic survival. Former colonies with liberal, imposed institutions are more likely to persist after independence than democracies which did not have liberal,

imposed institutions. Secondly, British colonies with liberal, imposed institutions are more likely to survive than British colonies without imposed, liberal institutions. I construct a dataset of democracies with imposed, liberal institutions installed by colonial powers. To compare the impact of the presence of imposed, liberal institutions, I use countries which started a democratic episode between 1946 and 1970 as a comparison group. My dataset includes 34 democratic episodes over the time period 1951-2010. The dataset consists of democratic episodes which end during the time period covered by the data set and those that endure past 2010. To test my hypotheses I employ a duration model, the results of which indicate the impact each variable has on the probability the polity will survive. The results provided by this model indicates the impact imposed, liberal institutions have on democratic survival. Prior studies have noted the importance of British colonial legacy. As I will discuss later in the literature review, the majority of arguments regarding British colonial legacy rest on the power-sharing institutions created within the country. Through my analysis, I test this relationship and the results expand our understanding of how imposed, liberal institutions contribute to the persistence of a colony's democratic polity.

1.3.2 Does experience with imposed, liberal institutions contribute to the survival of democratic polities?

In Chapter Three, I investigate the relationship between experience with liberal, imposed steps and the survival of democratic polities. Literature citing positive benefits of colonial power-sharing institutions imply experience with the institutions and the ability of the institutions to channel interests are central to the survival of the democratic polity. In other words, the institutions must work for the citizenry and there should be sufficient experience with the institutions over time to earn the citizen's faith in the institutions. Imposed, liberal institutions were installed over time rather than as complete institutions. To model this process, I use liberal steps to capture the expansion of liberal institutions. A liberal step denotes the expansion of democratic rights to the colony. To test my hypothesis that is the more experience with liberal steps in the colony, the greater likelihood of democratic persistence in the post-colonial period - I construct a dataset of democracies with imposed, liberal steps. I use duration analysis to test whether the number of imposed, liberal steps has an impact on democratic survival. To test whether the number of years with imposed, liberal steps contribute to greater likelihood of polity survival, I employ sequence analysis. This method, relatively new to political science, allows for comparison of sequences between polities which survived and those that failed. The inclusion of number of imposed, liberal steps and study of the sequences allow analysis of democratic experience on post-colonial democratic survival.

1.3.3 How does the imposition of liberal steps affect democratic survival?

In Chapter Four, I examine the process of the imposition of liberal steps and its impact on the survival of democratic polities. First, I present two brief case studies of


imposed polities: Jamaica and Uganda. Both polities were former colonies under British control in which the British imposed liberal institutions. However, Jamaica survived while Uganda failed. What accounts for the opposite outcomes? Through my analysis of the cases, I conclude that it is the amount of experience in terms of time and number of imposed liberal steps which is the key to answering my question. The more liberal imposed steps and the greater the amount of experience in terms of time, the more likely the polity is to survive in the post-colonial period. To test my proposition, I survey and gather data on the liberalization process for all countries with imposed, liberal steps in my dataset. This method allows me to examine the timing of imposed liberal steps and the depth of liberalization imposed by the colonial power. Additionally, it blends quantitative analysis with rich, descriptive data. Through this analysis, I reveal patterns of liberal imposition and how those institutions affect the polity after independence. It also illustrates the usefulness of sequence analysis in the examination of democratic transitions and other processes in political science.

1.4 Cases Included

I use Enterline and Greig's imposed polity conceptualization and data set, previously discussed in the literature review, to identify 18 former colonies with imposed institutions which gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Imposed, liberal institutions include a legislative body, a judiciary and an electoral system under which citizens directly elect representatives, elected leaders, constitutions outlining the rights of citizens and the government's obligations to its citizenry. The number of imposed institutions vary by colony; in some colonies very few institutions were installed, while others had a host of institutions created by the colonial power. The list of the former colonies with imposed institutions is included in Figure 1.1.

At the beginning of this project, I sought to gather data on whole, liberal institutions created by the colonizers. However, as I gathered data for my cases, I observed that the colonial powers did not install complete institutions. Constitutions installed by colonial powers did not grant a host of democratic rights, but rather the documents introduced rights in small increments. Another example of this process can be found in representation on legislative bodies. Often electoral elements in the legislative bodies were expanded over time. Rather than changing all members on legislative bodies from appointed to elected, the colonial powers often introduced elected members gradually. At first, one or two elected members were added to the legislative council. Over time, the colonial power increased the number of elected members on the body. "The development of democracy occurs in a piecemeal fashion with some elements of democracy occurring early, while other institutional components of democracy lagging behind" (Enterline and Greig 2008a, 325). This process led me to develop the conceptualization of imposed liberal step. An imposed liberal


Figure 1.1: Colonies with Imposed, Liberal Institutions



step is defined as the introduction of a democratic element to a colony's government. Each step builds upon the previous and expands the state's level of democracy and increases democratic rights for the citizen's of the colony. In other words, each step moves the state closer to a full democracy with universal suffrage, a judiciary, and an elected legislative body. Figure 1.2 illustrates the incremental process of democratization through the imposition of liberal steps. Institutional steps include:

- elected member on a decision-making body;
- judiciary;
- constitution outlining citizens' rights;
- expansion of suffrage;
- free and fair elections
- increase of number of elected members on a decision-making body;
- amendments to constitution to include more liberal rights;
- adoption of a new constitution which provides more rights than the previous constitution;
- popularly elected leader;

Figure 1.2: Liberal Steps



- full enfranchisement; and
- autonomous, democratic rule within colony.

For example, I code the creation of a legislative council with some elected representation as one step. If the council is expanded to allow more popularly elected representation, I code such a situation as another step as it is increasing the amount of democratic interaction available to the citizenry. If the council is transformed into a completely, popularly elected legislature, I code that as liberal step. Institutions were included only if they contributed to the liberalization of the colony. For example, the creation of Executive and Legislative Councils that included only appointed members are not coded as a liberal step. However, amendments to the councils which introduced an elected element are considered to be a liberal step. This operationalization allows for the colonies to be placed along a continuum indicating the level of liberal rights present within the colony prior to independence. I use this conceptualization as it reflects the actual process of liberalization used by the colonial powers as well as the technique used to imposed democracies

Appendix A includes time lines for each case where the liberal institutional steps, start of colony, independence, and failure of the polity, if the polity fails, are included above the time line. Important historical dates are included below the time line. I use historical records to gather my data on imposed liberal steps. In particular, I use *British Central Office of Information Pamphlets* which provided detailed information on the imposed institutions and liberal steps. Additionally, I consult *United States Library of Congress Country Reports*, Historical Dictionaries of the countries as well as individual country histories for my cases. These sources provide information on the date of creation and structure of the institution. Multiple sources allow for clarification of the structure of the institutions and the democratic element included

and confirmation of the accuracy of the institutions. This builds on previous work of colonial legacy and imposed institutions as previous work captured institutional impacts of colonial legacy indirectly. As a result previous researchers were unable to capture the incremental nature of this type of imposition. This data allows for the examination of why some democracies are more likely to persist than others. It also speaks to the ongoing debate about British colonial legacy by measuring the causal variable, liberal institutions and testing the impact of those structures on the survival of the polity.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This project speaks to three distinct literature - colonial legacy, democratization, and polity imposition. My thesis adds to the colonial legacy literature by clarifying the causal mechanism of colonial legacy. I build upon our understanding of the British colonial legacy effect by directly testing the institutional argument. I introduce the amount of time the polity had with the imposed institutions and, in addition, I examine the interaction of imposition and elite support for institutions. This project provides insight on the relationship between institutional experience and democratic survival, which also informs what we know about democratization. This project adds to the democratization literature by clarifying the role of external states in democratization and also contributes to our knowledge about how external actors can influence the internal dynamics of other states. Lastly, my project explains the institutional influence on the persistence of imposed democracies. The more experience with imposed democratic institutions the greater the likelihood of polity persistence.

The results of this project hold significance for today's international system. Using the results, policy-makers' assertions regarding democracy promotion may be assessed using empirical evidence rather than analogies. Additionally, lessons learned from my findings may be applied to state building and rebuilding post-conflict states. The contributions of this thesis can be divided into two areas: substantive and methodological. The substantive contribution of this project is the introduction of measurements of liberal imposed institutions and liberal steps to models of colonial legacy and democratic survival. This project demonstrates it is possible to capture and model institutional arguments present in the colonial legacy literature and the incremental process of democratization. Secondly, the use of duration and analysis and sequence analysis demonstrate the methodological contribution of introducing contextual details to quantitative analysis of democratization.

Following this section is a literature review of the relevant literature in imposed polities and colonial legacy. Chapter Two includes a test of whether imposed institutions have an impact on the persistence of imposed polities. Building upon the

institutional argument, I test the impact of institutional experience on the longevity of imposed, democratic polities in Chapter Three. Chapter Four includes an in-depth investigation of the process of liberal imposition using sequence analysis. Finally, Chapter Five includes a discussion of this project's conclusions and implications.

Literature Review

2.1 Overview of Literature Review

In the opening section of this chapter, I outlined and discussed the motivations for my study of imposed institutions in former colonies and what lessons they may provide for modern, imposed polities. The purpose of this chapter is to connect this study to previous scholarly attempts to understand the phenomena of democratization, polity imposition, colonial legacy, and democratic survival. Specifically, my purpose here is to establish what has been revealed in these four bodies of literature. Although these bodies of literature are often discussed separately, I explain how these bodies of work form the basis for the arguments examined in my study. In addition, I identify how this synthesis can inform our understanding of imposed political institutions and democratic survival.

The amount of potentially relevant literature is large; therefore it be divided into a number of sections. First, I discuss external factors which contribute to democratization. Second, I examine research on polity imposition; why states impose polities and what are the effects of polity imposition. Third, as some imposed polities are former colonies, I turn to the colonial legacy literature. Lastly, I assess the body of research on installed colonial institutions and the impact on post-independence, democratic survival. Having described the purposes and scope of this literature review, I will now review the democracy and democratization literature.

2.2 External Factors of Democratization

For the most part, research on regime transitions focuses primarily on domestic factors which contribute to shifts in political institutions. However, researchers of democratization (e.g. Huntington 1991; Starr 1991; Gasiorowski 1995; Pridham 1995; Linz and Stepan 2011; Anderson 1999; Remmer 1999) suggest that this focus on domestic factors is myopic and excludes important causal contributions by foreign

policy or international factors. Neighboring states, alliances, trade relationships, sanctions, conflict, and imposition are among the external factors that play an important role in democratization. Not all transitions to democracy come from within a polity; the impetus for democratization may stem from external actors, states, international organizations, or forces. Or an interaction between internal and external factors may lead to a democratic regime change (Beichelt 2012). External actors play an important role in democratization, argues Huntington (1991). He cites external forces as influential in the third wave of democratization. The European Community was instrumental in regime changes in Southern Europe, while the absence of the Soviet Union created opportunities for democratization in Eastern Europe. Lastly, the United States has acted as a promoter of democracy throughout the world in situations where democracy would be beneficial to its security interests.

Despite the call for more research on external factors of democratization, often they are given short shrift in studies of democratization for various reasons such as low causal impact, difficulty in modeling and lack of data (Peceny 1999b; Williams and Masters 2011). Although external forces may be marginalized in the literature, it is in fact crucial to research the impacts of external factors as democracy promotion has been on the foreign policy agenda of many western states in many different rhetorical forms. Although some readers may argue that internal factors are more important to democratization than external factors, I would answer that I am not arguing for their supremacy in the causal story of democratization, but as they play a role, they should be included in the discourse and analysis. Also, I argue, that the importance of external factors may play a larger role depending on the type of regime transition the polity experiences. If a state has externally imposed institutions or democratizes after an international war through treaty, as was the case in Germany and Japan, external factors may play a larger role in democratization. Haggard and Kaufman contend, "external political and economic pressures from donors or great power patrons were decisive in Comoros (1990), Cape Verde (1990), the Central African Republic (1993), and Cyprus (1983)" (2012, 507). Thus, the inclusion of external factors is needed in models and analyses of democratization.

External democratization may happen through diffusion, sanctions, aid conditionality, democratic assistance, by force, or through imposition. Perhaps the most passive form of democratization is diffusion. Diffusion and demonstration effects are the most passive of external methods of democratization. Under diffusion, states become democratic through the influence of neighboring states (Helliwell 1994; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2007; Elkins 2011). The states are able to observe the benefits of democratic norms and institutions within their democratic neighbors. Also, repeated interactions with democratic neighbors are likely to influence democratic regime change. States often seek to promote democracy, or curb undemocratic behavior through sanctions or aid conditionality. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) found limited support for sanctions affecting democratic change in the target. They conclude sanctions are more likely to work, when the goals of the sanctions are modest and limited. States may seek to

influence level of democracy through aid conditionality, under which states will provide aid only if the receiver complies with conditions set by the donor (Dreher 2009). A slightly more active way to promote democratization in a target is through foreign assistance for democracy building, often referred to as democracy assistance (Finkel, Perez Linan, and Seligson 2007). The United States, for instance, engages in democracy assistance through funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Continuing on the spectrum of actions used by the state to promote democracy, is democracy promotion through intervention (Meernik 1996; Kegley and Hermann 1997; Peceny 1999^{a,b}; Pickering and Peceny 2006). This extreme form of democratic manipulation may occur through either military or non-military means.

2.3 Imposed Polities

There are a myriad of choices a state may employ to influence or precipitate a regime change within another state. Polity imposition is the most extreme form of foreign policy a state may use to achieve regime change. The use of polity imposition as a strategy for a state to achieve a desired outcome is not new; states have used polity imposition as a tool of foreign policy since antiquity. Thucydides, in the *Melian Dialogue* contained in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, describes the conquering of the islands of Melos because the Melians did not change their foreign policy to the satisfaction of the Athenians. The Melians refused to renounce their alliance with Sparta. Because the Melians failed to comply, the Athenians subjugated the island nation of Melos (Thucydides 1998). More recently, governments were installed in Germany and Japan by the Allied Powers after World War II. Careful attention was paid to the structure of the new polities' institutions so that political fractionalization would not topple the fledgling governments. In addition to the creation of institutions, the imposers fostered economic development (U.S. Library of Congress 2008^{a,b}). Only decades after World War II, Germany and Japan's democracy was deeply entrenched and their economies were strong. As a result, Germany and Japan are often held as successful causes of imposed governments by policy-makers who advocate state-building (Bush 2003; Dawisha 2004). Beyond the analogy, however, policy-makers seldom draw contextual comparisons between Germany and Japan and modern imposed polities or potential targets. More specifically, policy-makers claim if democratic polity imposition was possible in Germany and Japan it is possible elsewhere without indicating what policies and economic conditions are necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Due to the prevalence and recurrence it is important to study systematically.

2.3.1 Imposed Polities

As the body of work addressing polity imposition is relatively new, there is not one commonly used term used in the literature. The common theme among the defini-

tions in the literature is that external actors seek to install political institutions in an other state. In his his article, "Forcing Them to Be Free," and book, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*, Peceny "defines military intervention as the direct or indirect use of military force focused on 'changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target state' Rosenau (1969, 161)" (1999b, 559). Similarly Owen identifies use of force as mode through which states install or preserve institutions. He denotes imposed polities as forcible domestic institutional promotion. He explains "domestic institutional promotion is any effort by state A to create, preserve, or alter the political institutions (as distinguished from the ruler or government) within state B" (Owen 2002, 377). Institutional promotion may be used to create democratic and authoritarian polities.

Not all polity impositions are achieved through the use of force. States may become imposed polities through colonization, non-military coercion, military force, or international treaty. Enterline and Greig (2005b) expand the definition of polity imposition to include imposition through nonmilitary means. They define an imposed polity as a state whose government institutions have been created by foreign powers through military or nonmilitary force. "Imposed democratic regimes are democratic governments installed by a foreign power in which the foreign power plays an important role in the establishment, promotion, maintenance of the institutions of government" (Enterline and Greig 2008a, 323). It is unlikely the that the polity would have developed as it had without outside influence. Enterline and Greig diverge from Owen and Peceny's definition in that the polity's establishment is the result of outside influence. Under this definition post-colonial states are considered imposed polities only if the colonizer constructed institutions in the polity. "A state is considered an imposed polity from the date of its imposition until it is replaced by a new polity or it experiences a period of "interruption."¹ An imposed polity persists as long as it maintains the institutions similar to its founding. However, during its lifespan a polity's democracy score may vary. Using the *Polity III*d data set (McLaughlin et al. 1998), Enterline and Greig identify the universe of imposed polities over the time period 1806-1994. The data set provides a good guide for the identification of imposed polities, but it is not without complications. For example, the new nation variable coding rules may be misleading. Using just the data set's criteria, all independent African countries are included as examples of polities imposed by colonizers. This is problematic and may lead to the misidentification of imposed polity cases. Not all colonizers left institutions or created new polities during decolonization. some simply withdrew from their colony. Therefore, it is extremely important to distinguish between colonies with institutions installed by the colonial powers and those that did not. Only those former colonies with installed, democratic institutions are considered imposed polities. After gathering their list of imposed polities from *Polity III*d , Enterline and Greig cross-checked the cases with *The Encyclopedia of World History* (Stearns 2001) to distinguish between those polities whose institutions were created by the colonial power and those whose institutions were indigenously created

¹See *Polity III*d data set for examples of interruption.

by the newly independent state. As this project is concerned with applying lessons of colonial legacy to modern imposed states, I use Enterline and Greig's definition of imposed polity for my inquiry.

2.3.2 Explaining Imposition

Other than explaining particular case studies, few scholars have systematically explored what leads states to impose polities within other states and the effects of imposition, in terms of survival and success. In this section of my literature review, I discuss work on what leads a state to impose a polity within another state. Second, I explore the recent literature which explores the implications of polity imposition.

Imposing a polity within another state is an extreme form of intervention. States have a range of choices to achieve foreign policy; why do states use a costly and extreme form of foreign policy? Contemporary work on imposition investigates the conditions under which one state is likely to replace the government in another state (Buono de Mesquita and Siverson 1996; Werner 1996; Buono de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). In their book, *The Logic of Political Survival*, Buono de Mesquita and Siverson explain a state may change a leader within another state to achieve their desired foreign policy outcome (1996). Werner contends that states will impose a polity within another state when they have the opportunity and willingness to install the polity. Werner operationalizes opportunity as the imposer possessing enough power to defeat the rival in war. Opportunity alone is not sufficient for imposition, under Werner's argument. They must also be willing. Although a state may have the opportunity to install a polity they may not be willing to engage in state-building. A state is willing to impose a polity within a rival when they feel that the rival poses a great threat to its security and the only way to neutralize the threat is polity imposition. Werner (1996) reports that polity imposition in a defeated state after war significantly reduces threats from it to the conquering imposer. Echoing Werner's argument, Meernik (1996) asserts the United States involvement in democratic promotion stems from security interests. Similarly, Williams and Masters identify democracy promotion as a "central security interest" for the U.S. (2011, 21). In other words, the United States is more likely to impose a polity in another state if the target regime poses a security threat for the United States. As the United States is one of the most active supporters of democracy promotion, several studies address what leads to the country's decision to engage in polity imposition and the implications of such action

(Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999a,b; Dobbins 2003; Dobbins et al. 2003). Enterline and Greig explain the puzzle, "the central benefit to the imposer lies in its potential for *self-maintenance*" (2008b, 884). The imposer may choose institutions which are compatible with their desired outcomes, which eliminate "the necessity of overt maintenance by the imposer in the form of repeated interventions" (2008b, 884). If

the state is able to create a polity that will deliver consistent and desired outcomes, it may be worth the hefty cost as opposed to interacting with another regime that may not be as cooperative or transparent.

The United States has often engaged in interventionist foreign policy with the justification for the promotion of democracy. Democrat and Republican administrations have expressed the desire to enlarge the democratic community, as well as, engaging in interventions with that goal in mind. In the past, the United States has opted for democracy promotion rather than “European-style colonial rule” (Peceny 1999a, 45). The puzzle of why the United State forcibly promotes democracy in through military intervention is the focus of Peceny’s book, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (1999b). In some cases the United States promoted democracy through intervention but in other cases it did not. In those cases the U.S. did the exact opposite by supporting of authoritarian regimes and counterinsurgency groups. To resolve this puzzle, Peceny used mixed-method analysis of case studies and statistical analysis. The answer to whether the U.S. engages in pro-liberalization intervention lies in domestic audience costs. If the domestic audience costs are higher than cost of violating the U.S. democratic principles, presidents are likely to back down from intervention. Domestic audience costs denote the political backlash encountered by the president through the election box, if military action produces more casualties than the public is willing to accept to achieve the foreign policy goal. This leads to a situation in which, “presidents appear doomed to repeat the pattern of gradually escalating U.S. involvement in these crises and then stepping away from the brink when it appears that military force might be necessary to achieve a solution” (Peceny 1999a, 181). Insightfully, Peceny argues that this is an odd interaction between the liberal value of democracy promotion and the liberal political institution of popular elections. Lastly, he examines the impact of U.S. interventions and concludes U.S. military interventions are unlikely to produce positive changes in democracy unless they employ pro-liberalization policies in the intervention.

Although Peceny’s results are a good first step at testing the impact of military interventions on democracy in the target. More work is needed to flesh out the causal picture. First, Walker and Pearson (2007) point out Peceny’s democracy variable only captures institutional democracy. They contend variables which capture democratic performance such as human rights, political rights, and civil liberties would be a better choice to capture the impact of interventions. Using these performance variables, Walker and Pearson do not find evidence that military interventions lead to improvements in democratic performance. Thus, it seems the impact of intervention with a presidential statement of support for free and fair elections, leads to what appears to be improvements at an institutional level, but fails to translate to actual democratic performance. Secondly, Peceny advances the modeling of intervention by including time in his model. However, his use of snapshots of time to capture change in democracy create a problem teasing out the causal picture as there are many confounding factors.

Changing the focus from United States efforts to promote democracy, Owen's work on imposed polities broadens both the imposers the cases covered and the time period. Owen (2002) is among the first researchers to study imposed polities systematically. His 2002 article provides a descriptive analysis of 198 cases of forcible polity imposition from the fourteenth century until the twentieth century. As previously mentioned, polity imposition has happened regularly throughout modern history. Owen concludes that polity imposition is not a rare event in the international system. He concludes polity imposition is more likely to occur during times of ideological tension and international insecurity. His findings lend support to Werner and Meernik's conclusions that insecurity will drive a state to impose a polity. Owen (2002), similar to Werner's argument, explains that at such times of tension, the need for states to expand power interacts with their desire to keep or put ideological allies in power in the target state. Once a state decides to impose a polity, Owen explains they are likely to impose institutions similar to their own in the target state. Installing similar institutions to those of the imposer may be more attractive since the imposer has extensive, first-hand knowledge of such institutions. For example, the British set up British tutelage systems in their colonies because they understood the benefits of the institutions, which allowed for delegation of power to local agents. The imposition of democratic institutions facilitate transparency. However, as Owen cautions, democracies do not always install democracies. If the imposing state wishes to achieve stability within the imposed polity it may install an authoritarian state that is less likely to buckle under interest overload which may overwhelm fledgling democracies.

2.3.3 Effects of Imposition

More recent studies of polity imposition focus on outcomes of polity imposition rather than on the decision to impose a polity. As discussed in imposed polity definitions, one way for a state to impose a polity is through military interventions. Many interventions are justified on the basis of spreading democracy. But do those interventions work? Examining 64 U.S. military interventions between 1945 and 1992 that were designed to protect or promote democracy, Hermann and Kegley, seek to answer the previous question. Their results indicate military intervention is an effective tool for encouraging democratic reform in the target. They point out, "past U.S. interventions have more often worked toward enlarging, rather than restricting the liberal democratic community" (1998, 108). The authors anticipate a possible criticism that democratization is mainly an internal phenomenon, they concede intervention is only one part of the democratization causal puzzle and they do not control for all factors which may influence democratic change. Further caution should be taken when applying these results to foreign policy practice, as there may be a selection bias. In other words, the United States may only engage in democratic enlarging interventions when it is most likely to succeed. In part due to the potential costs, both material and audience costs involved in such actions. Similar to Hermann and

Kegley's results, Peceny's analysis of U.S. military interventions, lends support to the argument that interventions by that state can have a positive effect of democracy in the target (1999b, 577). However, this positive effect is limited to cases in which U.S. intervention supported free and fair elections within the target of the intervention. Similar to previous work in this area, Meernik (1996) assesses the ability of American, military interventions to facilitate democratization within other states. In contrast to Hermann and Kegley's findings, he finds U.S. military interventions do not lead to short-term democratic improvements in the target. Interestingly, cases where the president released statements supporting democracy experienced a short-term increase of democratization.

Walker and Pearson (2007), while acknowledging Peceny's contribution towards our understanding of democratic interventions, question the strength of the findings presented in his article "Forcing Them to Be Free" (1999b). In their replication of Peceny's findings that U.S. military interventions followed by free and fair elections in the target, Walker and Pearson conclude the "'forcing them to be free' variable is highly contextual and dependent upon the cases that are included" (2007, 51). Thus, the results found by Peceny may not be generalizable to other democratizing interventions. Secondly expanding the model, they test the impact of democratic interventions on other measures of democratic performance. Included in the analysis are human rights, political rights, and civil liberties. Their analysis revealed no relationship between democratic interventions and the improvement of democratic success beyond free and fair elections. Hostile interventions do not lead towards the establishment of a broad range of democratic outcomes in the target. The authors conclude hostile interventions to advance democracy cannot be seen to be an effective tool of foreign policy to establish and promote democracies in other countries. The authors call for more sophisticated models such as hazard models to capture models rather than an arbitrary year as used by Peceny in his analysis. Despite their criticisms, they see "Forcing Them to Be Free" as an important piece in the dialogue to assess the ability of interventions to advance democratic rights.

Pickering and Peceny (2006) move beyond American military interventions to include other liberal democracies as well as the United States. Using a sample of military interventions by the U.S., U.K., France, and the United Nations over the time period 1946 to 1996, the authors analyzed whether the actions led to a positive change of democracy in the target. Limited evidence exists for the America's ability to affect democratic change in their target. Caution should be used in applying the results. As they explain, the results are mainly driven by cases in the Caribbean Basin. Overall, they do not find support indicating intervention by liberal states produce more democratic targets. On the other hand, interventions headed by the United Nations are more likely to produce changes in democracy (Pickering and Peceny 2006, 555). The authors call for more work on democracy promotion through polity imposition, both empirical and in-depth case studies to help arrive an a better understanding of the impact of democratic interventions.

In more recent work on military intervention, Williams and Masters (2011) evaluate the successful of military intervention as a tool to promote democracy in other states. Building on work in the aggressive democracy promotion and adding to the external democratization literature, they constructed a data set of military interventions by conventional forces of consolidated democracies², where the intention of the action is to promote democracy. Using public statements from the *New York Times*, *BBC*, *Foreign Relations Documents of the United States (FRUS)*, and the *United Nations Online Document Archive*, to determine whether the decision to intervene included democratic intentions. Their analysis suggest that “democratically intended military interventions” were not successful in achieving democratic change in the target. And yet, interventions which are directed against the current government and political elite did lead to democratic changes in the polity of the target. Furthermore, their results provide confirmatory evidence that previous democratic history is correlated with positive changes in democratization after the intervention (Williams and Masters 2011, 32). The authors caution that their results do not resolve the debate regarding whether intervention is an effective method of democracy promotion, but adds to the discussion of external forces and their role in democratization. Rather than democratization, they point out “the direct outcome of military intervention appears to be (at this point) a weakened state rather than a democratized state” (Williams and Masters 2011, 34). Williams and Masters question the utility of aggressive democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool. However, they highlight the need for more research on the impact of military intervention on democratization, as well as, the need for more work on how external factors may influence internal mechanisms of democratization.

Expanding the measures used to capture democratic success, Walker (2011) includes two measures of democratic success to capture not only the typically studied procedural democracy but also substantive democracy. Walker employs the Political Terror Scale (PTS) to capture the provision of human rights within the target. The assessment of both variables follows the argument that it is not enough that states possess the institutions of democracy; the state must actively engage in the provision and protection of human rights. Through his analysis he tests whether democratizing interventions have a long-term impact on democratic success of the target. In addition to the expanded democratic success measure, Walker includes three different types of democratizing interventions: interventions with post-intervention liberalizing policies, interventions with liberalizing intent, and interventions to impose democracy. Unfortunately, regardless of type, hostile, democratic interventions very rarely have an impact on democratic success within the target. However, Walker cautions more work is needed to capture the full picture of the impact of democratic interventions. In particular, he advocates future researchers to include internal contextual factors of the target in hazard models to build upon Enterline and Greig’s work (Walker 2011). Overall, the authors included in this section, highlight the need for more research on

²Williams and Masters denote a consolidated democracy as any state with a Polity score of 6 or greater on the *Polity IVd* scale.

intervention as an external factor of democratization.

Next, I discuss the effects of polity imposition through military and non-military means. Enterline and Greig demonstrate the need for systematic studies of the impacts of imposition as many policy-makers hold Germany and Japan as examples of successful imposition.

“Postwar Germany and Japan are generally considered exemplars of the successful cultivation of democratic institutions by foreign powers. Yet emphasis on the end-product of these impositions - stable, prosperous, peaceful, and democratic societies - minimizes acknowledgment of the risks and difficulties required to transform the political systems in these two states following World War II” (2008b, 909).

The use of Germany and Japan as analogies that polity imposition can successfully achieve foreign policy outcomes desired by the imposers under-emphasizes the difficulties faced by the imposer and the target state. Setting up new states, especially democracies may be problematic and the benefits of the new polity may not be as forthcoming, or as abundant, as policy-maker’s anticipate. There is evidence that imposed polities are fragile over their entire existence and may not deliver the policy results policy-makers promise (Enterline and Greig 2005a, 2008a,b). Even if the imposer is successful in imposing a polity within a state, it may not achieve its foreign policy objectives.

Policy-makers have argued that the installation of democracy will lead to democracy, prosperity, and peace within the region of target state. Under this argument, the imposed democracy serves as a “beacon of hope” for democracy within its locality. Enterline and Greig (2005a) test the relationship between democratic polity position and regional conflict and economic development. They separate their sample of imposed democracies into two categories: bright and dim beacons. The term beacons is used as policy-makers suggest a democracy in a region will serve as a beacon to inspire democratization in neighboring states. Bright beacons are strong democracies while dim beacons are weak democracies. Bright beacons, according to their duration analysis, are correlated with regional peace and higher levels of economic development in the region. However, and most importantly, their results indicate dim beacons, polities with weak democratic institutions, are associated with regional instability and do not promote regional prosperity or democratization (Enterline and Greig 2005a, 1095). Given that most new democracies are likely to be dim beacons, Enterline and Greig’s results support the argument that benefits of imposition may take quite a bit of time and work by the imposer.

Continuing their work on imposed polities, Enterline and Greig, construct a pooled-cross-sectional time series model of 43 democratic, imposed polities to determine whether the analogies of German and Japan are applicable to Iraq and Afghanistan

(2008a). To put it another way, they assess the prospects for the democratic futures of Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to imposition practices the economic and social setting in which they are installed is very important for the future of a polity. Thus, their argument follows, due to the lower levels of economic development in Iraq and Afghanistan than those in Germany and Japan, imposing a stable, democratic polities in Iraq and Afghanistan poses a much greater challenge. The authors develop a simulation to model conditions in post-invasion Iraq and what challenges posed to Iraq's polity. Their results provide confirmatory evidence of the argument. They report the future of successful democracy "in post invasion Afghanistan and Iraq is poor at best" (Enterline and Greig 2008a, 346). They conclude that Iraq, and Afghanistan, are likely to face on-going, domestic political challenges which are difficult to stop. The key, they argue, to halting domestic political challenges in imposed polities is to address them early in the polity's existence (2008b).

A myriad of challenges contribute to the frailty of imposed polities. Earlier research by Enterline and Greig (2005a) indicated imposed democratic polities are more fragile than democratizing states, their 2008 article revisits the question of fragility of imposed polities. In the argument, they argue consideration of imposers polity choices is not enough to analyze potential instability of the target, but social and economic conditions prior to the imposition are equally as important. Findings of their analysis indicate the greater the population and ethnic heterogeneity in a state the more likely it is to encounter domestic political challenges (2008b, 899). Additionally, past history provides insight for the future of the polity. The results reveal colonially imposed polities in the post-war period are more likely to experience domestic political challenges. Likewise, states which were imposed after a defeat in war during that time period, are likely to encounter domestic political challenges (2008b, 904).

Enterline and Greig's result regarding colonial imposed polities and instability may be driven by the use of a dichotomous variable to capture the impact of colonial legacy. The colonial experience is coded 1 for imposed polities which were created through imposed institutions during their colonization. In their argument, they assert colonial impositions are likely to be more stable as they have more time, or experience, with their institutions. Unfortunately, the dichotomous variable does not capture this relationship. Such a measure can only capture whether a polity was colonized, it does not account for the amount of time the polity has had with the institutions. Installation of institutions varied by colonizer and even among each colonizer's dependencies, the appropriate variable should capture that relationship. However, their result regarding colonial legacy does tell us about the general relationship between imposition through colonization and instability. The colonial relationship alone is not enough to contribute to stability, there may be another causal factor which works through colonization, such as time with the institutions, which may contribute to greater stability. I discuss colonial legacy in greater depth in the next section. explore the institutional arguments outlined in the literature which explains why British colonies are more likely to persist than other colonies.

2.4 Colonial Legacy

Thus far, this review has outlined research on democratization and polity imposition. Although empirical literature on imposed polities is just starting to amass a body of work, there is a great deal of literature on colonial legacy. As discussed in the previous section, according to Enterline and Greig's definition, colonies with imposed institutions are a subset of imposed polities. Colonial impositions are different than those imposed after wars or through intervention. "Colonial impositions generally occur over an extended period, one that can facilitate the elimination of threatening political groups, the establishment of civil administration, and the development of political norms" (Enterline and Greig 2008b, 886). The conceptualization of colonial, imposed polities in this project does not include British settler colonies nor European internal colonies as the colonial legacies of the two types of colonies were vastly different. British settler colonies often enjoyed the "broad privileges of home rule" (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 227). Also, "European internal colonies did not experience modernity as an imposition in the same way that overseas colonies did" (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 227). In part, liberal institutions were installed to govern the colony as there was not population of settlers to serve in colonial government. It is those liberal institutions which produce the beneficial, institutional structure and norms that contributed to later democratic persistence after independence. Studies on colonial legacy indirectly test the impact of built, liberal institutions and colonization practices on democratic persistence.

2.4.1 Effects of Colonization

Decolonization in the postwar era led to the creation of many new democratic polities. Some of the new democracies failed, while others persisted years after independence. Some of the new polities survived, while the others failed. Extant research indicates colonial legacy plays an important role in the survival of democratic polities. Researchers of colonial legacy assert understanding of colonial history is necessary to understand contemporary social and political conditions of former colonies (Hadenius 1992; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992a; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Mamdani 1996; Conteh-Morgan 1997; Abernathy 2000; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). Early research on colonial legacy focused on the negative effects former colonies. Colonialism has been linked to government instability, dependency, and low economic growth. Early research on colonial legacy demonstrated the link between colonial practices and low levels of economic development. In addition, democratic, former colonies are less likely to survive post-independence than other democratizing states (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). This may seem at odds with the previous assertion institutions and some colonial practices are associated with post-independence survival. I will explore the arguments in turn, after I discuss the early research on the impacts of colonial legacy in this section.

Colonial experience produced long-lasting effects in the colonized country (Conteh-Morgan 1997; Brown 1999; Abernathy 2000; Posner 2003; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). For example, Africa's problems have roots in colonial experience. Mamdani explains, "key to understanding the state in contemporary Africa is the historical fact that it was forged in the course of colonial occupation" (1996, 62). To adequately identify post-independence issues, an examination of the colonial period is needed. Poor economic development is often associated with colonial past, which I will discuss in the next section.

One of the most researched areas on colonial legacy is concerned with its effect on economic development. Dependency theory associates colonial legacy with lower levels of economic development of the colonizers. This is due to the colonizers not considering the impact of colonial practices post-independence. In many arguments, the colonizer is portrayed as a predatory state (Abernathy 2000). Colonizers were often more concerned with short-term gains from the colony rather than the long-term well-being of colony or subsequent polity. Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1978) trace the disparity in economic development back to the economic practices of colonizers in their pursuit for raw materials. Colonizers were not interested in creating institutions beyond those that assisted with the extraction of resources. Resource extraction was common in South American and African colonies (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). The experience of colonies which were established for resource extraction was very different than those in settler colonies, such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Grier 1999).

Due to low levels of economic development, former colonies are more dependent on exports of primary goods than other states. As a result, some polities are more likely to suffer from price fluctuations on the world market (Furtado 1965; Robinson 1979; Tomlinson 1999). Their vulnerability to the world market has a negative impact on economic growth. With lower levels of economic development and vulnerability to the market, former colonies are at greater risk of democratic failure (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001).

In addition to negatively affecting the economy of the former colony, some colonizers reinforced existing social cleavages to their benefit (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978; Posner 2003). Those social cleavages such as religious or ethnic fractionalization, have lasting impacts on the likelihood of the polity's survival in the post-colonial period (Enterline and Greig 2008a). For example, during Uganda's colonial period, the political system favored the Baganda people. The constitutional changes prior to independence did not resolve the fractionalization of Uganda. The reforms the colonial governor, Andrew Cohen, implemented to facilitate independence and unification led to a division between factions in Buganda and those fearful of Baganda domination. The new constitution further exacerbated the division by granting Buganda and the Baganda people a special position and status in Uganda (Mittelman 1975; U.S. Library of Congress 1992; Rubongoya 2007).

In some cases ethnic groups were divided into different polities. While in other cases, conflicting ethnic groups were drawn into the same polity (Diamond 1993). Nigeria is an example of a territorial entity that did not exist until European colonization in 1903. Over the state's history Nigeria had 25-400 ethnic groups of different cultures and modes of political organization (U.S. Library of Congress 1991). To facilitate British colonial rule, the ethnic groups were drawn together in one state. The name Nigeria was adopted due to the river Niger that ran through the territory (U.S. Library of Congress 1991). Administrative and political reasons were the primary drivers for colonial borders. Little or no attention was paid to precolonial boundaries (Diamond 1988a). The ethnic cleavages, previously discussed further complicate chances for survival after independence. If the colonizers gave one group higher economic privileges based on ethnicity, social fragmentation is likely to contribute to the polity failure (Abernathy 2000). Ethnic rivalries, for example, have been a consistent source of instability in Nigeria since independence (U.S. Library of Congress 1991). Ethnic fractionalization, dependent economies and poor economic growth has haunted former colonies long after the colonizing power left the country.

Although research of colonial legacy indicate colonial practices led to numerous problems in the post-independence period, other studies indicate colonial legacy produced some positive effects in the former dependencies. Following the large amount of research examining the relationship between colonial legacy and development, scholars added to the literature by examining other corollaries to colonial legacy through the use of systematic studies (e.g., Mamdani 1996; Grier 1999; Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001). The new studies, which I explore in greater detail through the next subsections, revealed that colonial legacy may have some positive impact on former dependencies after independence. The positive outcomes of colonization were not designed for altruistic reasons, rather power-sharing institutions were introduced to ease colonial administration, as a response to resistance or a way to continue the beneficial relationship after independence. Although the colonizers did not intend to export democratization, they did bring power-sharing institutions to their colonies (Hariri 2012). The British were among the most likely to install power-sharing institutions.

2.4.2 Identity of Colonizer

2.4.2.1 Why Identity of the Colonizer Matters

More recent colonial legacy research indicates that the nature of colonial history's impact is dependent on the colonizer of the polity. The argument that western colonial experience is completely detrimental to democratic survival is misleading. To truly assess the impact of colonial legacy on democratic survival, the identity of the colonizer must be considered as western powers ruled their colonies very differently.

In other words, post-colonial experience varied based on which state served as the colonizer.

The identity of the colonizer must be considered, as different western powers used various methods and institutions to manage their dependencies. Some colonizers merely extracted wealth, whereas others were more likely to foster economic development of the colony. For instance, Belgium extracted resources from the Congo and did not foster economic development. By contrast, the British encouraged economic development in their colonies when such development would produce greater benefits of the United Kingdom. Conteh-Morgan (1997) described the different colonization practice of the colonizers. British were more likely to employ indirect rule. Although the French installed some power-sharing institutions, they used more direct rule to manage their colonies. An economic paternalist approach was used by the Belgians in their colonies while the Portuguese colonized using an oppressive assimilationist method (Conteh-Morgan 1997). Among the colonies, the British and French colonies were more likely to have the most liberal institutions or continuous pressure for democracy (Diamond 1988b). Consequently, the effects of colonial legacy are not the same for all colonies. The effects of their colonial past is highly dependent on which colonizer administered the polity (Conteh-Morgan 1997; Diamond 1988b; Grier 1999). Economic development is also influenced by the different practices used by the colonizers. Research indicates French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Belgian colonial legacy has a negative impact on polities after independence (Huntington 1984; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993). Grier explains, “the British, French, and Spanish had very different colonial philosophies. It is perhaps not surprising that the former British colonies have performed significantly better in the post-colonial era, given the fact that British decentralization and flexibility allowed colonies to adopt the institutions that best suited their situation” (1999, 320). Later, I will discuss the arguments about how indirect rule and strong civic institutions contribute to the persistence of the polity after independence. Lastly, although it can be said that colonizers have colonization patterns, the creation of liberal institutions was not uniform across all colonies, which I will discuss this further in Chapter 3.

In their 2004 article, Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004) test the relationship between colonial legacy and democratic survival. To test other factors which contribute to polity survival, they investigated the effect of economic development, social fragmentation, and the relationship between state and civil society on the duration of post-colonial democracies. They argue the relationship between state and civil society is related to the likelihood of democratic polity survival in the post-colonial period. Importantly, the relationship between government survival and colonial legacy is dependent upon the colonizer. Building on colonial legacy literature, authors’ assert British colonies differed from other colonies because the British were more likely to set up strong, civic institutions. Their general findings suggest that former colonies are likely to be underdeveloped and suffer from social fragmentation (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 240). In turn, underdevelopment and social fragmentation is correlated with polity failure. However, when they separate

the cases by colonizer, their results indicate British colonies transitioning to democracy are more likely to survive than French or Dutch colonies (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 240). Their results indicate, when grouped together without grouping by colonizer, former colonies are more likely to fail than other democratizing states, which is consistent with previous arguments in the colonial legacy literature. Once different colonization patterns are accounted for by including a variable to capture identity of the colonizer, their results lend support to the argument that institutions created by the British are beneficial to democratic survival after independence.

It is important to note Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom do not directly test the institutional argument, but use a dichotomous variable to denote whether the colony was a British dependency or not. Although their results are an advancement of our knowledge of colonial legacy, more work, as they suggest is needed to understand the relationship between institutions, civil society, and democratic persistence.

I will explore the arguments regarding the benefits of British colonial legacy in greater detail later, but first I will discuss French colonial practices.

2.4.2.2 French Colonial Practices

The British were not the only colonizers to install liberal measures and institutions in their dependencies. The French also used some liberal measures in their colonization (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). It is important to note, French colonial practice was not uniform; each colony's degree of autonomy varied (Mamdani 1996; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). As mentioned previously, the French were more likely to use association rather than assimilation as their colonial approach (Mamdani 1996; Williams and Masters 2011). An associational approach denotes a strong relationship with the colonizer in which native institutions were retained (Betts 1960). Whereas under an assimilation approach to colonization, the colonies works to transform the colony to become a "detached segment of the "mother country." (Betts 1960, 53). At first the French adopted an assimilationist approach but later changed to one of association. Williams and Masters explain, "France originally had no intent to sever ties with its African colonial acquisitions; it was simply going to make them French" (2011, 20). However, as pressure mounted to decolonize, France changed its policy to association rather than assimilation by installing democratic institutions in its dependencies. In many French colonies enfranchisement rights were given and elections were conducted shortly before independence (Zolberg 1966; Morgenthau 1970). The change in method have been linked with post-colonial problems.

French reforms did not always lead to successful democratic persistence. Colonial French legacy may not be as positive as some studies suggest, argues Collier (1982). The practice of direct rule did not allow for reforms tailored to the colonies. "The

consequence of this philosophy was a centralization of power in Paris and an autocratic system of colonial government that did not leave governors much freedom or latitude in dealing with local problems” (Grier 1999, 319). The use of centralization contributed to economic problems after independence. Grier further argues, “While centralization and bureaucratisation may have helped the Spanish to gain a foothold in the New World, and allowed the French to pursue the ‘republican ideal’ in West Africa, it may have established colonial institutions and customs that were not conducive to development and growth after the colonial period” (1999, 320). Previously mentioned as a benefit of French colonization, Collier (1982) suggests elections prior to independence contributed to the prevalence of one party regimes in former French colonies in the post-colonial era.

2.4.2.3 **British Colonial Practices**

As described earlier in the identity of the colonizer section of the literature review, British colonies are more likely to survive in the post-colonial era (Blondel 1972) and are more likely to be successful democracies (Blondel 1972; Huntington 1984; Diamond 1988*b*; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993). Bollen and Jackman’s analysis indicate British legacy is correlated with higher level of democracy in 1960 and 1965 (Bollen and Jackman 1985, 34). In many of their colonies, the British faced the challenge of diverse populations with many ethnic groups. Despite the heterogeneous populations, British colonies live longer than other colonies. Lange (2003) asserts colonial legacy explains post-colonial success despite the potential complications of ethnic heterogeneity. In addition to dampening complications from ethnic heterogeneity, British colonial legacy is associated with higher levels of economic development. Economic development was positively fostered through British colonial practices. “British colonialism introduced a rule of law, effective administration, and competitive markets, promoting development in the post-colonial period” (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006, 414). Lange attributes the economic success of Mauritius to the institutions created during the colonial period.

From my review of the British colonial legacy literature, I observed the benefits of colonial experience can be divided into four overlapping camps: indirect rule, institutions, civic culture, and infrastructure. The most commonly cited benefit of colonial legacy is their use of indirect rule. Bollen and Jackman contend the democratic success of former British colonies is tied to the use of indirect rule (Bollen and Jackman 1985, 34). The British were more likely to use customary institutions and the populace for public rule in their colonies than other colonizers (Cell 1999). In addition, the British tailored administrations as best fit the colony. According to Grier, “After 1765, the British did not automatically impose their constitution on the indigenous culture, but tried to individualize each country’s constitution to its specific needs” (1999, 319). By 1920, indirect rule was the cornerstone of British colonial policy. During the interwar period, Mamdani explains, indirect rule was a colonial

reform in response to resistance in African colonies (1996). The use of indirect rule as response to discontent was used in other colonies as well. The Government of India Act 1935 was created in response to discontent (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1977). As a result of the reforms, through the introduction of the middle class, the social base of indirect rule was broadened. Overall, Collier's (1982) results indicate the use of indirect rule encouraged slightly better democratic performance than other states in the post-colonial period. Indirect rule was often created through the installation of institutions, which I will discuss in greater depth in the next section.

As a result of their experience with democratic institutions, British colonies are better prepared for democracy in the post-colonial era. Evidence to support this argument can be found in several studies of the relationship between British colonial legacy and stable, long-lasting democracy (Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). Johnson explains the introduction of electoral rights and elections in Caribbean colonies led to the creation of more institutions. "Across the British Caribbean, the gradual introduction of representation government overlapped with the development of viable trade unions and political parties which provided much of the driving force for constitutional change" (1999, 17). The argument outlined in the literature contends the experience with civil administration and bureaucracies enable the states to weather the democratic growing-pains many new democracies face (Hyam 1999; Enterline and Greig 2008b). However, the amount and deepness of the institutions varied according to how heavily they settled the region. Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006) question the universality of institution creation across British colonies. The number of liberal institutions varied among colonies; some had a large amount of institutions while others had few imposed liberal institutions (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006).

In the literature, the institutions and practices installed by the British in their colonial is often referred to as the British Model. Weiner reports that there are two components of the British model: (1) rule of law through effective bureaucratic and judicial institutions and (2) the "provision for some system of representation and election (Weiner 1987, 8). He argues the components provided the elites an opportunity to engage with and experience democratic government (Weiner 1987). Therefore, it was not just institutions which had a positive benefits, but the institutions fostered civic culture within the colony as well. I will discuss civic culture in the next paragraph.

Colonial experience with imposed institutions encourages democratic political norms in the colony (Enterline and Greig 2008b). The benefits of British colonial legacy stem from the cultivation of a stronger civil society assert Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992a). Stronger civil society grew as the colonial liberal institutions did not allow elites to use the institutions as tools of repression of their opposition and lower classes. "The effects of British colonialism deviated from this negative pattern in so far as the colonial presence prevented the dominant classes from using the state apparatus to repress the emerging organizations of subordinate classes. Instead it

allowed for the gradual emergence of a stronger civil society, capable of sustaining democracy after independence (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992b, 2). For example, British land policy placed the authority of the British over elite interests (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006). Civic culture, Lange further explained, was strengthened during the colonial period through engagement with social actors and strengthening of institutions. Another way the British promoted civic culture within the colony was through the aforementioned use of tailoring of constitutions and practices to suite each colonies needs (Grier 1999).

Lastly, the British were more likely than other colonizers to create infrastructure. Although the infrastructure was primarily created to facilitate colonization, it has provided lasting benefits. A common argument in the literature, contends the infrastructure build by the British facilitated democracy in the post-colonial era. Infrastructure mentioned in the literature include: education, transportation, communication, structured and trained bureaucracies, which relied on local personal Von der Mehden (1964); Moore (1966); Dahl (1971); Weiner (1987); Diamond (1988b); Hadenius (1992); Brown (1999); Abernathy (2000) According to British education policy, subjects were taught in vernacular language and often trained indigenous leaders. Grier explains, "British colonial education policies made a conscious effort to avoid alienating the native culture, by teaching in the vernacular languages and training teachers from indigenous tribes" (1999, 319). This sensitivity to indigenous culture and groups, reinforced the construction of civic culture.

Some researchers doubt the positive benefits of British colonial legacy. Benefits of British indirect rule for democratic survival may be overstated (Herbst 2000). Herbst contends the differences between British and French techniques of colonialism may not be as great as argued in the literature. Extensions of previous studies, have not been successful in producing comparable results. Using Bollen and Jackman's (1985) model, Lipset, Seong, and Torres (1993) extend the cases covered from 1975 to 1985. They report they did not find a correlation between British Colonial Legacy and democratization for the years 1980 and 1985 (1993, 16). Hadenius's work on the impact of colonial legacy indicates that other factors may drive the correlation between colonial legacy and democracy. Hadenius adds level of economic development and number of Protestants in the colony to the colonial legacy model. After the inclusion of the variables, he found there was no correlation between British colonial legacy and level of democratization (1992). A potential explanation for the competing results in the literature is the variations found in colonization practices of the British. Although the British used common practices across their colonies. They were not uniformly applied in the same institutions and at the same time period. Samatar (1997) explains Although the term "British Model" is often used in the literature, British colonial experience varied across colonies (Samatar 1997). These doubts indicate that data and research on contextual factors, which capture the variations in practices, is needed to assess the relationship between colonial legacy and democratic survival. In the next section, I examine the differences between British and French colonial practices.

2.4.2.4 Difference Between British and French Colonial Practices

Despite both colonizers installing democratic institutions within their dependencies, there were important differences between the colonists. As discussed previously, the British were more likely to indirectly rule their colonies while the French were more likely to directly rule (Conteh-Morgan 2001). The use of indirect, rather than direct rule, accounts for the slightly better democratic performance in British colonies (Collier 1982).

Citizens in French colonies also had opportunities to participate in their governance, but did not have as many liberal institutions as the British colonies. Unlike the British, normally French colonies were ruled by a French governor and authority figures of the colony were only used at the lowest level of colonial government. In some cases, such as Benin, the French dismantled existing political structures and installed a direct, colonial government. British colonial practices allowed the citizenry of the colony to elect local assemblies, where French colonies enjoyed symbolic representation to the parliament of France. "Election of local assemblies were more important," suggests Abernathy, "to post-colonial survival than 'symbolic' representation in the *Assemblée Nationale*" (2000, 638). Mamdani's study of colonization in Africa revealed the British were more likely to have treaties and alliances with rulers of precolonial kingdoms whereas the French were often in conflict with the rulers. For example, British worked out alliances and treaties in Nigeria and Uganda. On the other hand, when actors refused to submit to the French, the French were more likely to use suppression. For example, when the military leader Samory Touré refused to acquiesce to French demands, they used military actions to force compliance (1996). The British provided education programs as part of their colonial practice, whereas in very few groups in French colonies received colonial education and those that did were isolated and only allowed to speak French (Grier 1997). Observations by Grier (1999) indicate at the point of decolonization in Africa, the citizenry in British colonies were more education than those of French colonies.

Despite the positive impact of British colonial legacy on institutions, British colonies are more likely to experience ethnic conflict in the post-colonial era than French colonies (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001). Blanton, Mason, and Athow find evidence that the decentralized system of government by the British fostered ethnic group competition, while the centralized French system discouraged such competition and encouraged assimilation. The decentralized structure of British colonialism allowed traditional authorities and institutions to exist and compete for power. Critiquing the positive benefits of colonial legacy in Africa, Collier (1982) contends neither the British nor the French produced favorable conditions for economic growth and persistence in Africa. However, he concedes the use of indirect rule by the British encouraged slightly better democratic performance by laying the groundwork for multiparty rule. The positive benefits of institutions for democracy is not just a post-colonial phenomenon. Institutions are linked with democratic survival. In the next section of this literature review, I examine the factors which are associated with democratic survival.

2.5 Conclusion of Literature Review

External factors or democratization are an under studied area of democratization. Neighboring states, alliances, trade relationships, sanctions, conflict and polity imposition have played a role in the democratizing of other states. Thus it is important to include external factors in models of democratization. External factors remain an understudied component in studies of the growth of democracy. I do not argue external factors should supplant internal factors but should be included in studies as they play a part in the transition to and maintenance of democratic polities. Without the inclusion researchers are left with an incomplete picture of how democracies are created and survive. Of interest in this project is the impact a state has within another state through the imposition of liberal institutions.

The polity imposition literature has added to the discussion of the most extreme form of external democratization. Although great strides have been made, more work is needed to determine what leads to long-lasting, stable imposed polities. To this date, research on specific imposed institutions has not been conducted beyond distinctions between autocracy and democracy. To understand how imposition affects polities over the long term, data on specific built institutions is needed. With the inclusion of imposed institutions in models of polity imposition, a deeper understanding of how different types of democratic institutions affect polity survival can be gained. Additionally, gathering information on institutions created allows for investigation of how different institutions interact with each other and are reinforced through repeated interaction. As democratic institutions are often built over time,

Most research involving the British colonial legacy seeks to identify why democracies which were once British colonies are more likely to last longer than other colonies, and even other democratizing states. Specifically, the institutions and power sharing practices used by the British are associated with persistence in the post-colonial period. It may therefore be advantageous to investigate how institutions and power sharing affect democratic survival after independence. However, current studies have not included liberal institutions in models to assess that relationship. Rather researchers have used indirect measures such as identity of the colonizer as a proxy variable which has yielded mixed findings. Therefore, future investigation using measures of imposed institutions would be helpful to better understand the effects of colonizer built institutions on democratic survival after independence. This project serves to fill that gap in the literature by introducing institutional variables into the study of democratic survival. The introduction of built institutions allows the focus to shift from the identity of the colonizer to the institutions which are the hypothesized causal factors.

In subsequent chapters, I will outline my data set which I use to capture institutional experience of imposed polities through colonization. Next, I directly test the institutional argument. Second, I test whether the amount of experience with the institutions answers the contending results in the polity imposition and colonial legacy

literature. Lastly, I use sequence analysis to better understand the process of liberal institution imposition.

Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival

3.1 Imposed Institutions and Democratic Longevity

Decolonization in the postwar era led to the creation of many new polities. Some persist to this day, while others failed only years after independence. What accounts for the difference in survival rates? What is it about the polities which lead some states to fail and others to persist? For a group of states, colonial experience comprise part of the state's democratic experience. Although colonization is associated with a list of damaging effects, in some cases where the colonizer installed democratic or power sharing institutions colonial legacy helped build the foundations for democratic success. In Chapter Two, I reviewed the literature on colonial legacy, imposed polities, and democratization and the connections between the bodies of literature. In particular, I discussed the literature on colonial legacy and democratic survival. Currently, the relationship between colonial, built institutions and democratic survival has been tested using the colonial power's identity to capture the impact of colonial practices on post-independence survival. The purpose of the chapter is to test the relationship between imposed liberal institutions and the democratic longevity of the former colonies.

British colonial legacy is the most commonly used measure to account for colonial legacy as it has often been linked with successful democracies. A number of scholars have argued, and produced supporting evidence, that British colonies are more likely to persist in the post-colonial period. However, more investigation is needed to understand how British colonial legacy is linked with democratic survival. The majority of studies argue the benefits of British colonial legacy stem from the institutions created during the colonization process. These previous works have shed light on how British colonial legacy can have a positive impact on post-independence democracy. However, due to the use of proxy variables denoting identity of the colonizer, the relationship between built institutions and subsequent democracy has

not been investigated completely. Generalizations made from the results of previous studies may lead to inaccurate conclusions and clouds our understanding of the causal phenomenon. Colonies, even those created by the same colonizer, have different institutional histories. Therefore, the impact of colonial legacy requires further investigation

In this chapter, I build upon previous work of colonial legacy by testing the institutional arguments of post-independence democratic survival. Previous researchers employed a dichotomous variable of British identity as a proxy variable of British colonial practices to investigate the relationship between colonial legacy and the survival of democracies after independence. This study differs from other studies of colonial legacy through the identification of built liberal institutions, and the number of imposed liberal steps. Using country reports from the British Central Office of Information and the U.S. Library of Congress, Bank's *Political History of the World*, historical dictionaries as well as various country histories, I gathered information on whether institutions were created in the polity. I identify the imposed institutions, and the expansion of liberal rights within the polity. Often colonizers expanded power sharing institutions over time. In other words, the degree of power sharing was often increased over time by the colonizer. I refer to this incremental expansion of democracy as liberal steps, which I will explore in greater detail in Chapter Four. Secondly, I expand our understanding of the effects of liberal imposed institutions.

The central research question of this chapter is: if liberal institutions were installed by colonizers, are those democratic polities with such institutions more likely to persist in the post-colonial period than those which did not have imposed liberal institutions. Using duration analysis, I test the impact of imposed institutions on the survival of democracy. The use of duration analysis allows me to analyze the effects of the institutions on democratic survival of the former colony including other variables which influence democratic survival. There are two advantages to my approach, I do not need to arbitrarily determine how many years to lag the variables included in the model. Additionally, I am able to test whether British colonies with liberal, imposed institutions are more likely to survive after independence than British colonies which did not have liberal institutions installed. Specifically, this allows the testing of the institutional argument which explains democratic survival as an outcome of the British creating liberal institutions in their colonies.

The outcomes of this study will lead to a deeper understanding of the relationship between imposed institutions and post-colonial, democratic survival. In particular, I explore how institutions built by the colonizer assisted democratic survival of the polity after independence. By shifting the focus from British colonial legacy to institutional legacy, the results of my inquiry can be applied to states with colonial-built power sharing institutions regardless of the identity of the colonial power. In addition to clarifying the impact of colonial legacy, this project tells us about how institutions created by other states may influence the future of democracy in the target state. Later in Chapter Five, I apply the lessons from colonial legacy to contemporary

imposed polities. Like colonial states modern imposed polities are unlikely to have developed as they did without outside influence.

To reiterate, this chapter tests whether built institutions contribute to the longevity of democracies after independence. First, I discuss the most common arguments regarding British colonial legacy and democratic persistence. Second, I describe the institutional impact on the democratic survival of former colonies. Third, I test my hypotheses regarding the built institutions and the likelihood of democratic survival using data I gathered on institutions created within 18 colonies. Fourth, I explain the results of my models and proportional hazard tests. Having described the purposes and scope of this chapter, I will now review the arguments most commonly used in the colonial legacy literature concerning democratic survival and British colonial legacy.

3.2 Argument

As stated previously, decolonization resulted in the creation of many polities, some of which have persisted for decades, while others perished shortly after independence. How can we explain the difference in survival rates? Why did some polities crumble shortly after independence, while others survived and are present today in the international system? Outlined earlier in the literature review, extant research indicates colonial legacy plays an important role in the survival of a polity. Previous studies demonstrate the actions of past colonizers and occupiers have lasting impacts on the colony long after the colonizer has left. The majority of work on colonial legacy examines the damage done by the colonial powers (Furtado 1965; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978; Robinson 1979; Diamond 1988*a*, 1993; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995; Mamdani 1996; Conteh-Morgan 1997; Grier 1999; Tomlinson 1999; Abernathy 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001; Posner 2003; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Enterline and Greig 2008*a*). Although colonialism has been linked with a variety of deleterious effects such as government instability, dependency, and low economic growth; under some circumstances colonial legacy has positively influenced the trajectory of democracy after independence.

Research in the colonial legacy literature points to different colonization patterns as an explanation of why some colonies are more likely to survive than others. Specific colonial practices produced institutions and patterns of behavior which provided support for democracy after independence. British, and to a lesser degree, French colonies, are associated with greater democratic persistence in the post-colonial period. Those states were more likely, than other colonizers, to introduce democratic, power sharing institutions in their colonies. In some cases, those institutions continued on long after independence. These arguments highlight the importance of liberal political institutions created by the colonizer on democratic survival. However, the

arguments have not been directly tested in the literature. Rather, researchers have used variables to denote the identity of the colonizer to indirectly capture the creation of liberal institutions within the colonies. In other words, models testing the phenomenon using a British and French colonial histories are used as a proxy for liberal, power sharing institutions. Although we can look at trends of colonial practices, experience varies among the colonized states. Colonies, even those administered by the same colonial power, had different experiences.

Other studies have improved models of colonial legacy and democratic survival through the introduction of duration of colonial rule, which allows researchers to determine whether shorter or longer periods under colonial rule are likely to lead to positive effects on democratic survival (Huntington 1984; Diamond 1988*b*; Hadenius 1992; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). Despite the improvements, these studies suffer the same problem previous studies have faced: the conflation of colonial experience with institutional experience. The colonial status, and even length of time under colonial administration, does not capture institutional experience. Such measures serve as a proxy for institutional experience. In this project I am interested in colonial experience in terms of the liberal institutions imposed by the colonizer and the impact of those on the democratic persistence of the state after independence. This chapter assesses the impact the built institutions have of the future of democratic polities.

3.2.1 Colonial Legacy

The bulk of the literature on colonial legacy focuses on the deleterious effects on the former colony during colonial occupation and, in particular, the long-lasting effects after independence. Colonial legacy is often associated with problems of development, democratic rule, and conflict in the developing world (Furtado 1965; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978; Robinson 1979; Diamond 1993; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995; Abernathy 2000; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001) Although the bulk of the literature addresses the negative effects, there are some aspects of colonial legacy which are associated with long-term, positive benefits in a polity's post-colonial period. These benefits stem from the institutions and civic culture built and used by the citizenry and later the independent government. Colonizers created institutions within colonies to assist colonial administration and resource extraction. Although, these institutions and culture were not initially created out of purely altruistic reasons, in many cases the imposed structures and culture which followed supported democratic survival long after the colonizer left the state. In other words, these built institutions have been associated with democratic survival in the post-colonial period.

Not all colonizers installed liberal institutions in their colonies. Therefore, it is necessary to identify which colonial powers created such power sharing institutions in

their colonies. More recent research regarding colonial legacy and democratic survival focuses on the identity of the colonizer. The shift in focus occurred after a number of researchers found British colonial legacy to be correlated with democratic success (Blondel 1972; Huntington 1984; Weiner 1987; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993). Such studies led other researchers to identify the colonial power in studies of colonial legacy. According to this line of thought, the identity of the colonizer is an important inclusion in studies of colonial legacy as each colonial power ruled their colonies differently. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004) assert the nature of colonial legacy is dependent upon which state colonized the polity. Recall my earlier point, some colonizers merely extracted resources from their colonies with little or no institutional construction. For example, Belgium extracted resources from the Congo and did not foster political development nor economic development (Conteh-Morgan 1997). On the other hand, some colonizers created a variety of power sharing institutions (Diamond 1988*b*). As stated previously these institutions were not initially created to foster democracy, but for ease of colonial administration. In other cases, the British installed institutions in their colonies to manage governance of the colony and ameliorate tensions. Towards the end of the colonial period, the United Kingdom anticipating the end of imperialism, installed liberal institutions and power sharing structures. Such institutions are likely to maintain the beneficial relationship between the former colony and the United Kingdom than less transparent polity structures. The result of these colonial practices set the stage for future democratic success of the former colonies. The implication of this argument is that colonial legacy varies according to the colonial power of the state. Therefore to fully understand the impact of colonial legacy on democratic survival, researchers must account for different colonial powers in their analysis as each had different colonial practices which consequently had divergent democratic prospects. In the next section, I discuss how colonial patterns varied by colonizer.

3.2.1.1 Colonial Practices Vary by Colonizer

Among the colonial powers, British colonies are more likely to remain democratic after independence. In other words, British colonial status is correlated with democratic success in the post-colonial period. As noted in early research of colonial legacy, among the most successful colonies in the post-colonial period, are those colonized by the British. In particular, several studies reveal evidence British colonial legacy is associated with democratic persistence (Blondel 1972; Huntington 1984, 1991; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Weiner 1987; Barro 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000; Clague, Gleason, and Knack 2001; Colaresi and Thompson 2003; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). What is often cited as the main point of difference between the British and other colonial powers is their colonization practices. The British were more likely than other colonizers to set up power sharing institutions and used indirect rule. Lipset asserts, the British colonial experience prepared colonies for their transition to freedom and served as a “socialization process” which enabled

the growth of civic culture (Lipset 1994, 5). As a result of the findings in this literature, British colonial legacy is often included as an explanatory or control variable in studies on numerous topics such as, democratization (Barro 1999; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006), human rights (Poe and Tate 1994), and conflict (Djankov et al. 2007).

Contemporary research on British colonial legacy and democracy indirectly tests the relationship either through regression models with dichotomous variables or case studies. In addition, researchers of colonial legacy test the more general proposition that some colonizers were better able to set their colonies up for democratic success after independence. To test this assertion Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom employ a duration model (2004). They identified European colonizers of colonies over the time period 1951 - 1995. Moving beyond correlation, they use duration analysis to directly test the relationship between colonial legacy and democratic survival. This method allows the researchers to determine the effect of British colonial status versus all other colonial powers on the likelihood of the democracy to survive while controlling for other relevant factors. Inherent in this type of model is time, the number of years a state was a colony is included in the model to capture colonial experience. The authors compare the colonies survival rates by colonial power. The general results of colonial legacy are consistent with the negative picture of colonial legacy. All colonial states, regardless of their colonizer, are more likely to fail than democratizing states who did not have a colonial past. When the cases are separated by colonial power they reveal different survival rates. This result indicates that identity should be considered in studies of colonial legacy. Their results support the assertion that British colonies are better prepared for democracy in the post-colonial era. Democratic polities which were former British colonies are more likely to survive than French or Dutch colonies (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 241). These findings are not limited to British colonies. When controls are included in the model to capture development and fragmentation, French colonies democratic survival rates are only surpassed by British colonies (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 243). This result lends support to claims that the French colonial practices encouraged democratic survival as they used some degree of power sharing. Like British colonies, citizens in French colonies had opportunities to participate in government. But due to French colonial practice, French colonies did not enjoy as much liberal institutional infrastructure as the British colonies. Typically, French colonies were ruled by a French governor and authority figures of the colony were used at the lowest level of government. This practice created more centralization of authority than the British colonies, which may explain why French colonies did not perform as well as British colonies.

3.2.2 Benefits of British Colonial Legacy

In this section, I examine the arguments present in the literature regarding the institutional benefits of colonial legacy. The majority of arguments regarding the posi-

tive benefits of colonial legacy focus on democratic power sharing, indirect rule, the British tutelage system, better infrastructure, elections of local bodies and legislatures, and liberal institutions.

3.2.2.1 **Indirect Rule and Power Sharing.**

One of the most frequently used explanation of post-colonial democratic success of former British colonies is the colonizer's use of indirect rule. Bollen and Jackman find indirect rule during colonization is a contributing factor to post-colonial success of former British colonies (1985, 34). In the British colonial legacy literature, indirect rule is referred to as power sharing by some authors. These terms are used in the literature to refer the arrangement between the colonizer and colony where varying degrees of authority is delegated from the Crown to local authorities to act on the behalf of the Crown. By the 1920s indirect rule was standard British colonial policy (Mamdani 1996). Although European colonizers did not intend to export democracy to their colonies, some colonizers brought power sharing institutions from their country (Hariri 2012). Eventually British policy did actively promote movements towards democratization, which I will discuss in greater detail in the discussion of the British tutelage arguments. The British, rather than creating a administration manned by British settlers, often used local elites to run the daily business of the colony (Emerson 1964). By using elites as their agents "rather than dismantling indigenous social structures, as the French did, the British left traditional patterns of social organization in tact" (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001, 480). Although this may seem beneficial for the colonies, in some cases this power arrangement was not without problems. In cases where minority groups comprised the majority of those who served as delegates or representatives, traditional cleavages and tensions were exacerbated. Blanton, Mason, and Athow assert in many cases this was used as a deliberate tactic to divide and conquer (2001).

Despite the potential danger of asymmetrical power relationships, indirect rule produced several benefits such as increased social base, foundation for democratic institutions, and encourages multiparty rule. The social base of the colonial polity was increased through the introduction of power sharing (Mamdani 1996). Also, it stimulated a new avenue for political participation in colonies. Such institutions enabled diverse groups with competing interests to solve longstanding conflicts through political institutions, thereby creating the foundation needed for stable democracy (Diamond 2005). In addition to colonial benefits, experience with democratic power sharing laid the ground work for successful democratic institutions in the post-colonial era. Under such institutions, the citizens had experience with power sharing institutions and are more likely to have faith that democratic institutions would work in the post-independence period. Lastly, it is noted in the literature the use of indirect rule allowed some British colonies to side step problems faced by colonies that had little or no power sharing. Collier argues the limited use of indirect rule by

the French explains the preponderance of one-party systems, and ultimately democratic breakdown, in former French colonies (1982). The corollary to that argument is indirect rule encourages multiparty systems in the post-independence period. The consensus view of authors who focus on British indirect rule and power sharing is that the delegation of authority to the colonies created the necessary foundation for future democratic institutions (Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Collier 1982; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Mamdani 1996; Hyam 1999; Johnson 1999; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Diamond 2005).

3.2.2.2 British Tutelage System

As well as power sharing institutions, the British installed a group of institutions from elected bodies to judicial systems as well as introducing educational institutions and reforms. The reasoning behind the implementation of the institutions was to train colonies in democratic governance and the benefits of civil society. Not only would this support colonial administration, but also would help to support a long-term, beneficial relationship past independence. Like many policy decisions, this practice was not based on altruistic reasons but rested on self-interest. Under this system, the British were able to use traditional rulers of the colonial government (Kurz 1978). This facilitated the rule of the colony with a small number of British colonial administrations. The installation of liberal institutions allowed the British to create structures which they knew how to use and would minimize interference from the elites of the colony (Owen 2002). An example of this process can be found in the early stages of British colonization of Tanzania, "German practice was followed where it was not repugnant to British law; but gradually new departments were established; for example, agriculture, education and forests; and in 1920 a judicial system was initiated and a Chief Justice appointed" (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961*b*, 28). This holistic approach is often referred to as the British tutelage model. The model is often cited as the reason for post-colonial democratic success of former British colonies. Under the British tutelage model the colonial administration and Governor serves as an instructor or guide through the introduction and imposition of British-style civil institutions and society. The colonial structure was constructed to guide the dependencies to "responsible self-government within the Commonwealth" (Jones 1948, 4). Responsible self-government refers to the provision of a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression. In addition to civil institutions, the British created and fostered programs which created a foundation for the acceptance and legitimacy of the institutions such as educational reforms and economic development programs.

Efforts to install institutions and programs to foster democratic rule increased across all British colonies after World War II. British foreign policy statements included declarations of a commitment to foster democracy in the colonies. Concurrently, British colonial policy shifted towards preparing their dependencies for self-government.

The central purpose of the United Kingdom in the dependencies is to help forward their economic, social and political progress and, in so doing, to create the conditions in which their peoples can develop self-government on democratic foundations and, whenever possible, independence within the Commonwealth. This task involves considerable investment, both public and private, and financial and technical assistance of many kinds from outside, principally from the United Kingdom. In some cases it involves the building up of new nations from modest foundations (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1959, 1).

This policy focus encapsulates the British tutelage model in that it underscores the creation of liberal institutions as well as conditions which enable the institutions to grow. The timing of this shift was in response to the growing nationalist trends in the world. Based on their previous experience in Ireland, India, and Egypt and lack of sufficient economic resources, decision-makers decided it would be unrealistic to actively resist national movements in their dependencies (Hyam 1999). Rather, than allowing nationalist groups to dictate moves towards self-rule, the British government strategically introduced reforms hoping to stay ahead of what they considered extremist groups and win the support of moderate groups within their country (Hyam 1999). Thereby, the British established “a tradition of meeting colonial discontent by reforms which associated the subject peoples more closely with their own governing” (Smith 2007, 6). In many cases, this close association contributed to faith in the political institutions during and well after independence.

Although the policy shift was not entirely altruistic, the imposition of the British tutelage model resulted in positive benefits such as growth of civic culture, rule of law, and faith in rule of law. As discussed previously, rule of law is a necessary precondition for democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991). The imposition of the bureaucratic and judicial systems, part of the British tutelage model, encouraged indigenous involvement in the bureaucratic and judicial systems, which in turn bolstered faith in the rule of law (Weiner 1987). Faith in rule of law was instrumental in the creation of a civic culture within the colony as it encourages greater growth in civic culture .

3.2.2.3 Election of Local Bodies and Legislatures

Rather than using the general British tutelage model, other researchers look towards the imposition of particular institutions to explain the success of former British dependencies. In particular, they cite elections of local bodies, legislatures, and judicial bodies as the most important determinant in post-independence democratic success. Installation of elected local bodies and legislatures was a common practice of the colonial administration. “The British method of promoting political advance in the [British] dependencies has been to create territorial governments which comprise a legislature or law-making body, an executive body (which, with the Governor, is

the executive authority) and an independent judiciary” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961*a*, 3). Some scholars argue the election of local bodies and legislatures during the colonial period prepared colonies for democracy in the post-colonial period (Weiner 1965; Diamond 1988*b*; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Abernathy 2000). The installation of elections was to assist the colonizer in the administration of the colony as well as serving to appease discontent. Elections were often used to quell dissatisfaction of the local population. Among the colonial powers, the British were more likely to use reform and compromise in response to contentious issues (Smith 1978; Hadenius 1992). In particular, expansion of indirect rule through the construction of local governing bodies and legislatures was a type of reform often used by the British in response to resistance (Mamdani 1996). As an unintended consequence, the elections of local governing bodies and legislatures prepared colonies for the transition to freedom. Such elections served as a “socialization process” for the polities (Lipset 1994, 5). The experience with elections prior to independence allowed habituation of elections and peaceful transfer of power. Additionally, such elections fostered faith in the ability of elections, and the subsequent elected officials, to peacefully channel disparate interests within government structures.

3.2.2.4 Better Infrastructure

Lastly, better infrastructure is another benefit associated with British colonial legacy. Colonists often created or enhanced existing infrastructure which allowed for more efficient extraction of resources and governing of their colonies. For example, to reach the interior of Kenya, the British extended the coastal railway originally built by the Imperial British East Africa Company. After the colonists left their dependencies, the built infrastructure was left intact. Such infrastructure supported economic growth within the former colony, which in turn supported the states democratization. Infrastructure is essential to encourage and support economic growth (Esfahani and Ramirez 2003), which in turn supports further democratization. The conceptualization of infrastructure within the literature varies by study, but often includes, education systems, transportation, communication structures, and bureaucracies as examples of colonial-built infrastructure. The British were more likely to create better infrastructure in their dependencies than other colonizers created within their colonies (Von der Mehden 1964; Moore 1966; Dahl 1971; Weiner 1987; Hadenius 1992; Diamond 1988*a*; Brown 1999; Abernathy 2000). Transportation and communication structures were created or strengthened and expanded in British colonies to ease colonial administration and enable resource extraction. To further support colonial administration, bureaucracies were staffed with local personnel. “Almost all the middle and lower grades of administrative services are filled by local people, and, with assistance from the United Kingdom in education and training, increasing numbers are being recruited into the higher grades” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961*a*, 3). To ensure there were enough local candidates to recruit for

bureaucratic positions, the British often introduced educational programs. In addition to support of colonial administration, infrastructure was put in place to prepare for the independence of the colonies. “The attainment of independence by each territory has represented the culmination of a process of development, not only of the constitutional structure but of the country’s public services (notably educational) and economy” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1970, 2).

The unintended consequence of the colonial-built institutions was the installation of an infrastructure which served as a foundation for democratic survival after independence. The transportation and communication components of the infrastructure were necessary for the newly independent nation to develop economically. As the colonies increased their levels of development, democracy was strengthened and further democratization was encouraged. Economic development encourages democracy through the transformation of workers’ social conditions and expansion of the middle class (Lipset 1959). Positive economic performance, in terms of positive growth and higher levels of development, support the endurance of democracies (Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963; Neubauer 1974; Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Bollen 1979; Gasiorowski 1995; Przeworski et al. 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Gasiorowski and Power 1998). In addition to the economic benefits of the transportation infrastructure, the installed bureaucracies fostered the necessary frameworks and administrative skills necessary for successful administration of democracies in the post-colonial period. As Schumpeter (1949) explains, an effective bureaucracy is essential to democracy and economic development.

Educational programs, another component of the colonial-built infrastructure, had lasting impacts on states’ politics and economic health. In particular, higher education supports democracy by “enhancing its economic and social foundations” (Diamond 1992, 36). Grier’s findings reveal higher levels of education are associated with post-colonial growth (1999, 329). Education has an even wider impact on states’ social foundations. The implementation of educational programs stimulates greater faith in democratic values and practices (Lipset 1959). In addition to fostering growth of values and practices, education and literacy rates are essential to the sustenance of democratic norms (Lipset 1959). Further, education contributes to the expansion of democracy. Along with higher education levels comes increased demand for democratization as can be seen in the case of Nigeria. “The spread of Western education, and of political consciousness resulting from it, created a growing demand amongst a section of the community for an increased share in political responsibility. The necessity for constitutional advance was recognized by the Governors of the period” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1960, 29). To respond to such demands the British installed liberal institutions. Not only does education lead to increased pressure for more liberalization, education plays a pivotal role in the facilitation of democratic transitions (Feng and Zak 1999). Thus, the built infrastructure facilitates democratic survival after independence by fostering economic growth, enabling the growth of the middle class, fostering faith in democratic values, and increasing demand for democratic rights.

3.2.3 Institutions and post-colonial survival

Although the arguments regarding why British colonies were more likely to survive after independence vary by the causal mechanism they identify, the arguments share one commonality - the creation of liberal, or power-sharing, institutions by the colonial power. In other words, the arguments for greater survival of former British colonies hinges on the positive impact liberal institutions had on the polity and its civil society. States in which the colonizer introduced liberal institutions were more successful in the post-colonial period (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006). The institutions facilitate a polity's survival after the withdrawal of the colonial power from the colony. Such institutions play a significant role in the survival of polities as they channel the interests of competing groups within the government (Schmitter and Karl 1991). This is particularly salient for former colonies as experience with strong political institutions are associated with the persistence of post-colonial states (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). The assertion that institutions are instrumental to polity survival of former colonies is consistent with work in the democratization literature which points to the important role institutions play in the persistence of democracies.

The institutions, and subsequent civic culture, described as positive benefits of British colonial legacy are also cited in the democratic consolidation literature as necessary conditions for a polity's democratic consolidation and survival. Not only is the creation of institutions central to the transition to democracy (Przeworski 1991; Geddes 1999), institutions such as elections, power sharing bodies, judiciary, bureaucracy, and infrastructure are essential for democratic consolidation. A state is considered to be a consolidated democracy when its democratic institutions are fully formed and operational. Diamond explains, "the essence of democratic consolidation is a behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods by both elites and mass" (1999, 20). Similarly, Linz and Stepan consider democracy to be consolidated when a polity's institutions and procedures are viewed as "the rules of the game" (2011). For a consolidated state, institutions alone are not sufficient, the institutions and norms must be viewed as legitimate by the polity's citizenry. The institutions are viewed as legitimate because they resolve conflict, allow for the possibility of representation, monitor collective agreements, and are able to implement the laws passed by the legislature. First, power sharing institutions resolve conflict through the government (Rustow 1970). Institutions which allow for government representation of minority groups are likely to reduce the probability of ethnic conflict (Saideman et al. 2002). Thereby, reducing the threat that the polity will fail due to a violent, internal conflict. Elections do not eliminate conflict in a state, but provide for the pacific resolution of conflict (Rustow 1970; Przeworski 1986). The "peaceful rivalry for the exercise of power exists constitutionally" (Aron 1969, 41). Institutions allow consolidated democracies to channel and resolve conflict pacifically.

Among the most identifiable democratic institutions are free and fair elections. Although free and competitive elections are often associated with minimalist defini-

tions, consolidated democracies require more than the mere presence of such elections (Dahl 1971). For consolidated democracies, there must be legitimate competition between political organizations. Competing leaders and political organizations provide alternative public policies to the public and participate in the selection of those policies through elections (Schattschneider 1960). Groups are able to legally compete for power and those who gain power through election by the people are responsible to the people of the country (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Vanhannen 1997). All groups competing for power must obey the rules of the democratic game. Przeworski expounds, "democracy is a system in which parties lose elections. There are parties: divisions of interest, values and opinions. There is competition, organized by rules. And there are periodic winners and losers" (1991, 10). In a consolidated democracy, parties and their supporters accept the loss of an election because they know, due to the institutionalization of conflict, they will be able to run in future elections and may gain seats in the future.

Rule of law is another aspect of consolidated democratization (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999). To facilitate the observance of the laws and provide as a check to other branches of government, consolidated democracies require judicial systems. Judicial institutions serve as monitors of collective agreements (Carrubba 2005). Judicial systems ensure laws of the polity are applied consistently across all sectors of society (Linz and Stepan 2011). As stated previously, democratic consolidation is not just the presence of the all the institutions of a liberal democracy, but the attitudes and norms of a democracy must be upheld and habituated. The maintenance and integrity of the rule of law is essential for both "constitutional and attitudinal consolidation" (Walker 2006, 757). In other words, a judicial system ensures political activity is executed as outlined by a state's constitution and laws, but it also increases faith in the legitimacy of the polity and the democracy.

For democracies to persist they must possess a well-trained bureaucracy (Schumpeter 1949) and a functioning infrastructure. Concurring with Schumpeter, Suleiman asserts "no democracy can be truly anchored or consolidated unless the state has a reliable, competent bureaucratic organization at its disposal" (1999, 141-142). Modern democracies require a "usable state bureaucracy" (Linz and Stepan 2011, 11). Although legislatures enact laws, bureaucrats implement those laws. As such an effective bureaucracy must have the capacity to realize objectives (Rustow 1970). Through bureaucracy a polity is able to execute its duties in "an orderly, predictable, and legal manner" (Suleiman 1999, 143). A successful, impartial functioning of the bureaucracy signals to the citizenry that the ways laws are enacted are systematic and not capricious and tied to the party or parties which hold power in the polity. In a similar role, infrastructure provides the polity capacity to realize objectives (Rustow 1970). The infrastructure also supports economic development which is critical for democratic survival (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 1996). The arguments presented in the previous paragraphs indicate institutions built by the colonizer are the key to post-democratic survival rather than the identity of the colonizer.

To assess whether liberal, imposed institutions contribute to the democratic survival and how that compares with previous studies, I test competing arguments regarding colonial legacy. First, I start with the aforementioned assertion that British colonial legacy has a positive impact on the persistence of democracies. Democracies that were once British colonies are more likely to persist after independence due to the colonial practice of indirect rule and creation of liberal, political institutions.

Hypothesis 1: Democracies which were former British colonies are more likely to persist than democracies with different or no colonial legacies.

As outlined in the previous discussion, institutions and civic culture are indispensable to the construction, growth, and survival of democracy. However, in the current literature, the impact of post-colonial legacy is investigated through the use of identity of the colonizer as a proxy in tests to determine impact of colonial experience and the likely future of democracy in the former colony. Identity of the colonizer is used as colonial powers used different colonization practices. As stated earlier, the rationale for the use of identity is colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent France, were more likely to create power sharing institutions within their colonies. Due to the British propensity to install liberal institutions in their colonies, researchers often use a dichotomous variable denoting British colonial legacy as a proxy variable for democratic experience in studies which test a wide variety of dependent phenomena. Although such studies have advanced understanding of colonial legacy, the picture is incomplete as the amount of institutions and timing of those institutions has not been examined.

Institutions are key to post-colonial democratic survival, not the identity of the colonizer. The positive benefits of colonialism were proceeded by colonial-built institutions, not dependent on which state administered the colony. Identity of the colonial power alone is insufficient as colonizers did not employ uniform colonial patterns. Although we can speak about general patterns of colonization, colonizers did not engage in uniform behavior in the administration of its colonies. The British model of colonization was not systematically installed in all the Crown's dependencies. In some cases the British created very few institutions such as Malaysia and Uganda. While in other cases such as India and Jamaica, a large amount of liberal institutions were installed. Nor is the imposition of liberal institutions in colonies limited to British colonization. Like the British, other colonial powers imposed institutions to facilitate colonial administration. For example, Chad experienced imposition under French rule and as did the Philippines under American colonization.

As a result of focusing on whether a colony was held by the United Kingdom, the arguments regarding built institutions influence on democratic longevity have not been tested in the current literature. As pointed out earlier, it is the existence of the institutions, not the identity of the imposer, which produces the positive benefits for

democratic survival. Thus, it is necessary to test whether liberal institutions have an impact on whether democracy survives after independence. Although this has not been done before, the creation of institutions is a discrete phenomenon which can be identified, measured, and analyzed.

Although the crux of arguments regarding British colonial legacy lie in the positive impact power-sharing institutions had on democracy after colonization, measures to capture institutions are not used in the testing of democratic survival. This is due to, in part, the lack of data available to test those arguments. Rather, dichotomous variables are often used to capture the positive effects of the institutions installed by colonizers. The majority of studies use British colonial status as a variable to capture experience with democratic institutions. One implication of using a British dichotomous variable in tests of colonial legacy and democratic persistence is that it shifts focus from institutions to whether the state was a British colony. More recently, to account for other colonizers, the identity of the colonizer is included in empirical models of colonial legacy. The indirect measure is not sufficient to capture the amount of institutional experience, in terms of time and amount of democratization, or liberalization of the state. Other studies include a measure capturing the amount of time the state was a colony. This measure, although an improvement, does not capture institutional experience accurately. The amount of time a state was a colony may not produce an accurate picture of institutional experience. Although colonizers did have patterns of colonization, they did not use the same approach with all their dependencies. Institutions, even those created by the same colonizer, varied in both timing and number of institutions. In some cases colonizers introduced institutions early in the colonial relationship, while in others institutions were created shortly before independence. While in others, the colonizer created very few, or no institutions within the colony. Although we can describe colonial patterns of different colonizers in general terms, in practice colonization varied across each colony. Even the British, which are held as an exemplary institution builder, did not install institutions uniformly across its dependencies. "The British Model" is more of a tendency than a rule. "Because circumstances vary widely between territories, there is no set procedure for political development. Where circumstances are similar, however, a certain pattern is discernible" (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1959, 3). Thus, it is necessary to examine the process of liberalization in the colony to understand the subsequent impact on the democratic polity.

In addition to more accurately model the phenomenon, directly testing the institutional argument may provide an answer for conflicting results in the literature. Previous studies have revealed contradictory evidence for the effect of British colonial legacy. Hadenius's (1992) initial analysis of the relationship reveals a positive correlation between British colonial legacy and level of democracy. However, when variables to capture level of development and percentage of Protestant population were included in the model, the relationship between democratization and British colonial legacy disappeared. Those results led Hadenius to conclude that the relationship between British colonial legacy and democratization is spurious, indicating

that other factors drive democratization. Hadenius's disparate findings may be due to the assumption that all British colonies have a uniform institutional experience. This may have also led to Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom's (2004) surprising finding that Spanish colonies outperform British colonies in terms of post-colonial democratic survival. Although we can talk about the British model colonization, the colonial experience of British colonies varied. Patterns of colonization varied by number of institutions created within the colony, as well, as the timing of establishment of the institutions. This underscores the importance of directly testing the institutional argument. If colonizers do not create political institutions in the colonies, so the argument goes, the benefits of colonial legacy will not follow, regardless of the identity of the colonizer. These arguments hinge on political institutions and the benefits they provide, not the British identity of the colonizer. In other words, the positive benefits of British colonial experience can be attributed to imposed institutions installed by the colonizer rather than their colonial power. Therefore, it is the institutions and colonial practices of the British which explain why British colonial legacy is associated with greater survival. Liberal institutions created by the colonial power have lasting impacts on colonies. Many institutions created by colonizers and occupiers endure well past independence. The institutions created the grounding and structures which facilitate greater democratic persistence. Therefore, I posit:

Hypothesis 2: Former colonies with liberal, imposed institutions are more likely to persist after independence than democracies which did not have liberal, imposed institutions.

3.3 Methods

3.3.1 Democratic Survival Models

3.3.1.1 British Colonial Legacy Democratic Survival Model

Duration of Democratic Episode = $\alpha + \beta_1$ British Colonial Legacy + β_2 Economic Performance + β_3 Level of Development - β_4 Religious Fractionalization - β_5 Ethnic Fractionalization

3.3.1.2 Imposed Liberal Institutions Democratic Survival Model

Duration of Democratic Episode = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Imposed Liberal Institutions + β_2 Economic Performance + β_3 Level of Development - β_4 Religious Fractionalization - β_5 Ethnic Fractionalization

3.3.2 Duration Analysis

To test my hypotheses, I construct a data set of democracies that began their democratic episode over the time period 1946 - 1969. In the construction of my dataset, I use Enterline and Greig's imposed polity conceptualization and data set, previously discussed in the literature review, to identify 18 former colonies with imposed institutions which gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Next using Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom's (2004) Colonial Legacy Data Set, I identify democratic episodes which began between 1946 and 1969. They define a democratic episode as a period of democracy in a state's history. An episode ends when the democracy fails. A democratic episode contains multiple observations which capture each year of a state's democratic episode. The episodes included their data set include episodes for former colonies which include those with liberal, imposed institutions and those without such institutions, as well as states that did not experience colonization and whose democratic growth is mainly attributed to internal factors. The last year for both datasets is 1995. Using their operationalizations, I extend the datasets to 2010. My dataset includes 34 democratic episodes over the time period. The countries included in the dataset are listed in Figure 3.1¹. I exclude Germany and Japan from my data set as they are unique cases. Additionally, they are often held up as the prototypical example of democratic imposition. As they are the direct result of the outcome of WWII, a broad coalition of states, unprecedented economic programs to support the development of the nascent democracies. The inclusion of these exceptional cases would skew my results and lead to ungeneralizable results. In Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom's dataset, India's democratic episode is divided in to two periods: before and after the 1975 Emergency. In their dataset India's democratic experience is denoted by two democratic episodes. The first, democratic episode spans the time period from independence until the 1975 Emergency. The second episode picks up after the government returns to democratic practices in 1977 to the present. In Enterline and Greig's dataset (2008a), the Indian Polity is coded as a democratic polity from independence to 1994 which is the end of their dataset. As my research question focuses on imposed institutions, I use the continuous coding of the Indian polity. The Emergency temporarily interrupted the provision of democracy, however, the institutions remained in place and persisted throughout the turmoil.

The dataset consists of democratic episodes which end during the time period of covered by the data set and those that endure past 2010. In this dataset democratic polities do not re-enter the dataset as the imposed institutions ceased to exist at the first democratic polity failure. For subsequent periods of democracy, it is unlikely

¹There are two sets of countries included in the dataset. The first are former colonies with liberal, imposed institutions. The second serves as a comparison set of states experiencing a democratic episode. Those states do not have liberal, imposed institutions. Some of the states included in the second set are former colonies. Former Spanish colonies include: Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. The Dutch held Indonesia as a colony. Madagascar was a French colony. South Korea was under control of Japan. The United Kingdom colonized Myanmar and Trinidad. Somalia was under joint rule of the British and Italians.

Figure 3.1: Countries Included in Dataset





Figure 3.2: Duration Models Uncensored and Right Censored Cases



the imposed polities would be revived. The previous institutions may serve as a model for subsequent democratic or power sharing institutions but they would not be imposed by the former colonial power. Not all polities failed within the time frame of the data set. Some such as Botswana, India, Jamaica, and Mauritius persist past the 2010, the last year in the dataset. Polities without a failure are right-censored. This occurs when the data set ends and the event of interest has not happened. In this case, the event of interest is failure of the democratic polity. In other words the polity does not fail. Although the information is incomplete, this does not pose a problem as right-censored cases still give us information on how long the polity has persisted. As the end date of the polity is not included in the dataset, only the duration until the end of dataset is included in the analysis. Right-censored cases result in more conservative estimates because the complete length of duration is not included in the estimation of the hazard ratios. Figure 3.2 contains a graphical representation of the uncensored and right-censored cases as well as the time period over which data is gathered. A democratic episode has yearly observations for each polity while it remains democratic. Thus, the unit of analysis is the country-year. The dependent, independent and control variables are gathered over the time period of 1945 - 2010 which is labeled as the observation period in Figure 3.2. Therefore, all colonial legacy variables are fixed and those gathered after independence are time varying. I start with this model as it is similar to those employed in the contemporary colonial legacy literature and allows for better comparison of my results and previous findings regarding colonial legacy.

To test my hypotheses I employ an event history model, also known as duration

analysis. The results indicate the impact each variable has on the probability the polity will survive. This model allows me to estimate the effect each variable has on the hazard rate. This rate is the frequency at which the dependent phenomenon fails. In this study, failure occurs when a polity collapses. Like regression analysis, this approach allows for the analysis of how covariates affect the dependent variable. I use an event history model rather than a regression model because the event history model allows for the direct inclusion of time in the model. In regression analysis researchers often use techniques such as splines to account or correct for the effect of time in the model. Rather than using such techniques, time is built into this approach and is an essential part of the model (Mills 2011). Time can be measured in different metrics such as hours, days, months and years, as is the case in this study. As I do not have any *a priori* expectations regarding duration dependence, I assume the effects are the variables are linear. The use of this assumption allows for direct comparison with those models employed by Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004).

3.3.3 Dependent Variable: Length of Democratic Episode

Using duration analysis, I follow polities over time and observe at which time they experience a polity failure. Unlike regression analysis which focuses on the dependent phenomenon, duration analysis not only focuses on the dependent phenomenon as well as the time to an event (Mills 2011). This enables us to compare survival between two or more groups and to assess the relationship between explanatory variables and survival time. For this model, the dependent variable is failure of the democratic polity and the length of a state's democratic episode taken from Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom's Colonial Legacy Dataset (2004). A democratic polity fails when the the polity transitions to a non-democratic polity. As explained earlier, a democratic episode is a period of democracy in a polity's history. The size of the democratic episode is measured as the number of years in a state's democratic episode. A polity's democracy is considered to be lasting or persist as the democratic episode continues. A state enters a democratic episode when the state achieves a minimum level of democracy. A democratic episode ends when the democracy fails. In other words when the state transitions to another regime type or experiences an interruption or interregnum period. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004) gathered their cases from Polity III (Jagers and Gurr 1995), the Political Regime Change Dataset (Gasiorowski 1996), Freedom in the World, the Political Handbook of the World, and Classifying Political Regimes (Przeworski et al. 1996).

3.3.4 Independent Variables: British Colonial Legacy and Imposed Liberal Institutions

To accurately assess the impact of imposed institutions on democratic survival, I include variables to capture the presence of liberal, imposed institutions installed

by the colonial power. Institutions include, a legislative body, a judiciary, and an electoral system under which citizens directly elect a representative. In this chapter, I use two measures of liberal, imposed institutions. The first variable is of institutional experience is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if there were imposed liberal institutions in the polity and zero if no liberal institutions were installed by the colonial power. The second variable is an ordinal measure of the liberal steps created within the colony.

Ideally, I would like to include variables to capture British colonial history and imposed liberal institutions in the same model to test which has the greater impact on democratic longevity. However due to multicollinearity, I am unable to include both variables in the same model. The dichotomous variables which capture British colonial legacy and imposed liberal institutions have a correlation of 0.719. This high correlation is due to the high number of British colonies in my sample and the British tendency of installing liberal institutions in their colonies to aid with administration and foster the beneficial relationship after independence.

For the majority of imposed institutions, the colonizers did not create the institutions in one decree, act of law or instance. Rather the liberalization of colonies was progressive. “The constitutions are altered stage by stage to give local people a more representative and a more responsible share in the government in their country” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961*a*, 3). The process can be seen as an incremental one in which each expansion of liberal rights can be seen as a step towards democracy. “British colonial policy after 1945 prescribed the steady introduction of phase after phase of constitutional development, carefully graduated to the individual needs of each colony, until at the end of the day a more rapid acceleration became possible and desirable” (Darwin 2007, 89). This is consistent with the view of democracy as a process in contemporary research on democratization. Larry Diamond explains, “democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon” (1999, 18).

To reflect this incremental process, instead of coding discrete cases of institutional building or establishment, I code those incremental steps of liberalization which I defined in Chapter 1 as Liberal Steps. For example, I code the creation of a Legislative council with some elected representation as one step. If the council is expanded to allow more popularly elected representation, I code that as another step. If the council is transformed into a popularly elected legislature, that is coded as another step. This is consistent with work in democratization where democracy falls on a continuum and states may progress towards democratic consolidation.

As all colonial legacy variables are fixed in my models, I created a dichotomous variable to distinguish between those polities with 5 or fewer imposed, liberal steps and those with 6 or more liberal steps. This division was chosen to separate those cases with a small amount of liberal institutions and those with a larger number.

3.3.5 Control Variables

To accurately assess the impact of imposed political institutions and other factors of interest, I control for other factors influencing polity duration. Level of development, economic performance, presidential system, religious fractionalization, and ethnic fractionalization have significant impact on the persistence of polities.

Higher levels of economic development are associated with greater democratic persistence (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). To capture a state's level of economic development, I use GDP per capita in constant 1990 International Dollars. To facilitate analysis, I scaled the unit of measurement from one international dollar to 1,000 international dollars. The information was gathered from the 2013 Maddison Project Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013).

Conversely, economic contraction is associated with the failure of democratic polities. Poor economic performance is potentially damaging to the persistence of democratic polities (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Remmer 1991). Economic Performance is measured as the proportion of yearly change in GDP per capita. I used data from the 2013 Maddison Project Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013) to calculate the proportion of yearly change.

In addition to control for economic factors, I control for social fragmentation by including measures that capture ethnic and religious fractionalization. Ethnic and religious cleavages complicate the chance of survival for democracies. Such divisions create additional challenges to nascent political institutions, as they are more likely to have home interests than the fledgling political institutions are able to channel. I use Selway's ethnic and religious fractionalization measures from his Cross-cutting Cleavages Dataset (2011). Data for his indices were compiled from The World Values Survey, European Values Survey, The Eurobarometer, the Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project, The Asian Barometer, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and a survey performed by the World Health Organization (Selway 2011, 55). Selway defines fractionalization as "the probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a society belong to the same group" Selway (2016). Although these measures are included in the Cross-cutting Cleavages dataset, the variables are single-dimensional. That is, the measures capture the degree to which the states are ethnically or religiously fractured. Both measures range from zero to one where zero indicates no fractionalization and the larger the score, the more fractionalization present. Selway's measures of fractionalization are highly correlated with Reynal-Querol's (2002) and Fearon's (2003) ethnic and cultural fractionalization indices, as well as Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg's (2003) ethnic linguistic and religious fractionalization dataset. I use these measures as it is available over the time period covered by my dataset 1946-2010.

3.3.6 Models

The duration analysis was conducted on 34 polities. The mean duration of democracy is 21.3 years and the median democratic episode in the data set is 11 years. Over the time period covered by the dataset, 1945 - 2010, 25 of 34 polities failed. Nine polities persisted past 2010 which means they are right-censored in the dataset.

For each model, I estimate models with a Weibull form as this is the distribution chosen by Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom. They assert the form is appropriate as “there may be a consolidation effect that encourages democratic survival as democracy ages” (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 236). I use this model so I may directly compare my results with those of Bernhard Reenock and Nordstrom (2004). The Weibull distribution assumes the hazard rates vary monotonically across time. In other words, the proportional hazards do not vary across time in the model. Column one in my results tables include the Weibull results.

Additionally, I use a Cox model so I may test for violations of the proportional hazard assumption. Results of the Cox Model are reported in column two of the results table. Both Weibull and Cox models assume hazards are proportional over time. In other words, parameters remain stable over time (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). If a covariate or several covariates violate the proportional hazard assumptions errors in estimation can occur. For example if a model has a hazard ratio that decreases over time, using a distribution which assumes proportional hazards, the relative risk is underestimated. Also, the standard errors will be incorrect which leads to decreased power of significance test (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002). Nonproportionality may be introduced through memory effects of covariates, which will lead to a violation of the proportional hazards assumption (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). If nonproportionality is found in the model, it may be corrected by introducing an interaction variable of the coefficient violating the assumption multiplied by time (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). After estimating the Cox model, I test for violations of the proportional hazard assumption through a correlation of time with the scaled Schoenfeld residuals of the Cox model results. These scaled residuals can only be calculated using a Cox model. The first step to determining whether the proportional hazards assumption isn't violated is to look at the global test. If the global test's rho is significant, it indicates there may be a violation of the proportional hazards assumption. Next, an examination of covariate tests will identify if any of the covariates violate the assumption. If the rho is significant it “indicates that the residuals are trending over time and suggests nonproportional influence of that covariate” (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003, 36). To account for the fluctuations of hazards over time, the covariate may be multiplied by time and included in the model with all the covariates. When the interactive term or terms are included in the model it is referred to as a Cox Nonproportional Hazard.

3.4 Discussion of Results of Duration Models

The results of my analysis of hypotheses are presented in Tables 3.2, 3.4, 3.7 and 3.9. Table 3.2 reports the analysis for hypothesis one regarding British colonial heritage. As posited in the colonial legacy literature, democracies which were former British colonies are more likely to persist than democracies with different or no colonial legacy. For states with democratic episodes beginning between 1946 and 1969, British colonies are more likely to persist than states without British colonial heritage. The positive impact of British colonial legacy is consistent across all three models. The Weibull model indicates that states with British colonial legacy have 25.7 percent of the hazard of polities without British colonial heritage. British colonial heritage decreases the odds of democracy failing by 74.3 percent. The Weibull model indicates level of economic development has a positive impact on the persistence of democracy. Consistent with hypotheses regarding the dangers of ethnic fractionalization, the model indicates polities with higher levels of fractionalization are more likely to suffer a democratic failure.

To test for violations of the proportional hazards assumption, I use scaled Schoenfeld residuals of the Cox model, I tested the model and variables for any violations of nonproportionality. The results of the test for proportional hazards assumption is reported in Table 3.3. The significance of the global test indicates that the assumption of nonproportionality is violated in the model. To determine which variable or variables are violating the assumption, I look to see if the rhos of any of the variables in the model are to blame. The level of economic development variable violations the assumption; the hazards for the coefficient vary across time. To account for nonproportional hazards, I include level of development multiplied by time in the model. The inclusion of this interaction variable changes the type of model from a Cox model to a Cox Nonproportional Hazards Model, also known as the Cox NPH model. After accounting for nonproportionality, I have similar results to that of the Weibull model. Democracies with British colonial legacy are more likely to persist than democracies without British colonial heritage. British colonies are 72.9 percent more likely to survive than other colonies or democratizing states. Level of economic development contributes to democratic survival, however, the benefits of economic development are slightly lower in Cox NPH model. Ethnic Fractionalization is significant in the Weibull and Cox models. After accounting for nonproportionality, the variable is no longer significant as reported in the Cox NPH model. These results support hypothesis 1, democracies which were former British colonies are more likely to persist than democracies with different or no colonial legacies. These results are consistent with previous research on the positive impact of British colonial legacy on democratic survival after independence.

As argued previously, arguments regarding British colonial legacy rest on the institutions and power sharing structures installed by the British during colonization. Thus, it is the built institutions which produce the benefits rather than the identity

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
British Colonial Heritage	0.525	0.500	0	1
Imposed Liberal Institutions	0.465	0.499	0	1
Economic Performance	0.024	0.045	-0.149	0.279
Level of Economic Development	5312.657	4833.739	419.358	21314.380
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.438	0.200	0.002	0.930
Religious Fractionalization	0.412	0.213	0.003	0.799
	Per Polity			
697 total observations for 34 polities	20.5		1	60
First Entry Time = 0				
Exit Time	21.265		1	63
723 total analysis time at risk	21.265		1	63
25 Failures	0.735		0	1

Table 3.2: British Colonial Legacy and Democratic Survival (All Democratizing States)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>	<i>Cox NPH Model</i>
British Colonial Heritage	0.257*** (0.113)	0.312*** (0.135)	0.271*** (0.125)
Economic Performance	0.039 (0.192)	0.133 (0.677)	0.254 (1.348)
Level of Economic Development	0.668*** (0.101)	0.698*** (0.090)	0.409*** (0.114)
Ethnic Fractionalization	17.749** (25.198)	9.870* (13.598)	5.286 (7.664)
Religious Fractionalization	2.700 (2.847)	2.108 (2.0439)	2.449 (2.571)
Economic Performance x Time			1.016*** (0.005)
Constant	0.014*** (0.018)		
Log Likelihood	-41.107	-63.733	-62.223
Chi Square	34.30	26.22	23.21
Probability > Chi Square	0.00	0.00	0.00
Rho	1.331 (0.212)		

NOTE: $N = 691^2$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 3.3: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption for British Colonial Legacy Model

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
British Colonial Heritage	-0.043	0.05	0.826
Economic Performance	-0.157	1.32	0.250
Level of Economic Development	0.477	9.34	0.002
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.179	1.63	0.202
Religious Fractionalization	-0.212	2.93	0.087
Global Test	—	10.76	0.056

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table 3.4: Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival (All Democratizing States)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>	<i>Cox NPH Model</i>
Imposed Liberal Institutions	0.391** (0.174)	0.427* (0.214)	0.400* (0.202)
Economic Performance	0.260 (0.101)	0.054 (0.250)	0.070 (0.323)
Level of Economic Development	0.671*** (0.106)	0.700** (0.104)	0.479*** (6.917)
Ethnic Fractionalization	13.474* (19.801)	7.489 (10.313)	4.720 (6.917)
Religious Fractionalization	4.754 (5.136)	3.52 (3.761)	4.484 (5.057)
Economic Performance x Time			1.012*** (0.005)
Constant	0.214*** (0.018)		
Log Likelihood	-43.827	-65.633	-64.397
Chi Square	28.86	21.84	24.12
Probability > Chi Square	0.00	0.00	0.00
Rho	1.238 (0.808)		

NOTE: $N = 691$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 3.5: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption for Imposed Liberal Institutions Model

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Imposed Liberal Institutions	0.053	0.12	0.732
Economic Performance	-0.109	0.62	0.431
Level of Economic Development	0.370	6.3	0.012
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.131	1.20	0.273
Religious Fractionalization	-0.248	3.33	0.068
Global Test	—	9.68	0.085

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table 3.6: Model Comparison Statistics

	<i>Akaike's Information Criteria (AIC)</i>	
	<i>British Colonial Legacy</i>	<i>Imposed Institutions</i>
Weibull Model	96.214	101.655
Cox Model	137.466	141.266
Cox NPH Model	136.466	140.793
	<i>Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)</i>	
	<i>British Colonial Legacy</i>	<i>Imposed Institutions</i>
Weibull Model	127.814	133.422
Cox Model	160.157	163.957
Cox NPH Model	163.674	168.022

Table 3.7: Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival (Former British Colonies)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>
Imposed Liberal Institutions	0.0341*** (0.045)	0.151* (0.164)
Economic Performance	0.047 (0.295)	0.789 (2.287)
Level of Economic Development	0.242*** (0.0.125)	0.339** (0.109)
Ethnic Fractionalization	7938.061*** (0.218)	1784.356** (5709.097)
Religious Fractionalization	4.140.620*** (12087.050)	208.425* (639.431)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	
Log Likelihood	-10.818	-16.198
Chi Square	31.58	17.37
Probability > Chi Square	0.00	0.00
Rho	3.052 (0.849)	

NOTE: $N = 366$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 3.8: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption Former British Colonies

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Imposed Liberal Institutions	-0.0298	1.34	0.247
Economic Performance	0.0596	0.01	0.9299
Level of Economic Development	-0.307	0.89	0.3455
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.314	1.56	0.212
Religious Fractionalization	0.263	1.14	0.286
Global Test	—	2.39	0.286

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table 3.9: Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival (American and French Colonies and Democratizing States)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>	<i>Cox NPH Model</i>
More Than Six Liberal Steps	0.553 (0.667)	0.430 (0.452)	0.103** (0.111)
Economic Performance	0.000 (0.000)	0.015 (0.116)	0.060 (0.558)
Level of Economic Development	0.619** (0.138)	0.584* (0.196)	0.141*** (0.091)
Ethnic Fractionalization	5.543 (8.722)	3.273 (8.304)	0.294 (0.559)
Religious Fractionalization	0.764 (1.548)	0.756 (1.500)	0.591 (0.942)
Economic Performance x Time			1.036 (0.012)
Constant	0.049 (0.070)		
Log Likelihood	-21.560	-26.160	-23.916
Chi Square	19.49	12.68	18.86
Probability > Chi Square	0.00	0.03	0.00
Rho	1.419 (0.319)		

NOTE: $N = 331$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
 * $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 3.10: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption (American and French Colonies and Democratizing States)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
More Than Six Liberal Steps	0.673	24.42	0.000
Economic Performance	-0.313	2.36	0.125
Level of Economic Development	0.715	33.32	0.000
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.506	26.15	0.000
Religious Fractionalization	-0.370	15.96	0.000
Global Test	—	42.07	0.000

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

of the colonial power. In my second hypothesis, I posit: former colonies with liberal, imposed institutions are more likely to persist after independence than democracies which did not have liberal, imposed institutions. The results of my test of this hypothesis are reported in Table 3.4. Imposed liberal institutions have a positive impact on the survival of democracy. The presence of imposed liberal institutions increases the odds of democratic polities surviving by 60.9 percent. As I did with the previous model, I employed a Cox model and use the residuals to test for proportional hazards violations. The significance of the global test for violations of the assumptions indicates there is nonproportionality in the model. Like the model of British colonial legacy, level of economic development violated the proportional hazards assumption. The results of the Cox NPH model are consistent with the Weibull model. States with imposed liberal institutions are 60 percent less likely to fail than other democratizing states. Level of economic development has a significant impact on democratic survival in the Cox NPH model. The results reported in Table 3.4 lend support to the hypothesis that liberal, imposed institutions contribute to the survival of democracy.

The results reported thus far indicate that British colonial legacy and imposed liberal institutions have a positive impact on the survival of democratic polities I suspect this may be the case as polities persisting the longest since independence are former British colonies. Although I am unable to include variables which capture British colonial status and presence of imposed liberal institutions in the same model, I am able to compare the results of the models reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.4. There are two information criterion which may be used to compare survival models. The Akaike's Information Criteria and Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criteria. Unlike other model testing procedures, such as the likelihood-ratio and Wald tests, the models are not required to be nested to use the tests to compare the information criteria (StataCorp 2015). Akaike's Information Criteria or AIC is an index used to choose between competing intervals first introduced in 1973 (Akaike 1973). "The index takes into account both the statistical goodness of fit and the number of parameters that have to be estimated to achieve this particular degree of fit, by imposing a penalty for increasing the number of parameters. Lower values of the index indicate the preferred model, that is, the one with the fewest parameters that still provides an

adequate fit to the data" (Everitt 2012, 8). Like the AIC, Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criteria or BIC assesses the statistical goodness of fit of a model and privileges parsimonious models to those which are over-fitted. Again, like the AIC lower values are associated with a better fitting model. "If $n \geq 8$ this criterion will tend to favour models with fewer parameters than those chosen by Akaike's information criterion" (Everitt 2012, 337). Thus, I report both AIC and BIC criterion for all models of British colonial legacy and imposed liberal institutions.

The AIC and BIC results are reported in Table 3.6. After estimation of each model, I calculated the AIC and BIC criterion using the residuals of duration analysis. As both models violate the proportional hazards assumption, I report the AIC and BIC criterion for the Cox NPH Model. The AIC for the British Colonial Legacy Model is 136.466 while the AIC statistic for the Imposed Liberal Institution Model is 140.793. The AIC statistic for the British Colonial Legacy Model is lower than that of the Imposed Liberal Institution. However, the difference between the two criterion is small, 4.327. The BIC criterion indicated the British Colonial Legacy model was the better fitting model as well. The British Colonial Legacy Model BIC is 163.74 and the Imposed Liberal Institutions Model is 168.022. The difference between the BIC criterion is 4.348 which again is a small difference. As can be seen in Table 3.6, the results for the Weibull and Cox Models yield similar differences

It is important to note, the AIC and BIC statistics only tell us which model provides a better fit of the data. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones caution relying on statistics such as AIC or BIC alone to make choices regarding model construction. The choice of models should be based on theoretical reasoning (2004). Liberal institutions are at the heart of arguments regarding the positive benefits of British colonization. The results of the Imposed Liberal Institutions Model lend support to those arguments. The model indicates, imposed liberal institutions contribute to the survival of democratic polities. As those institutions are observable and quantifiable, when the theoretical argument rests on the benefits of those institutions variables capturing the institutions rather than the identity of the colonizer should be used.

If it is the liberal institutions rather than the "Britishness" of the colony, those with liberal institutions created by the British should persist longer than those British colonies without liberal imposed institutions. As mentioned earlier, not all British colonies shared the same colonial experience. The British did not impose liberal institutions in all of their colonies. Additionally, those where they did impose such institutions, the depth of those institutions in number and complexity varied. Thus, it is important to test the impact of liberal imposed institutions on the survival of democracy after British colonization. To assess the impact of imposed liberal institutions on the survival of British colonies, I created a subset of cases which were former British colonies. Then using the subset, I tested the institutional hypothesis using a Weibull and Cox models. Table 3.7 contains the results of the analysis. The results reported support the argument that the institutions created within British colonies play a large role in the survival of the democratic polity after independence. The

Weibull model indicates former British colonial polities with imposed liberal institutions are more likely to survive than those without such institutions. The odds of survival for polities with British-imposed liberal institutions are 96.6 percent higher than those without British-imposed liberal institutions. The Cox model produces similar, but slightly lower odds. Among polities with British colonial legacy, those with liberal imposed institutions are 84.9 percent more likely to persist than polities without such institutions. Again level of economic development has a positive impact on the survival of former British colonies. For polities with British colonial heritage, fractionalization is detrimental to survival. The test of proportional hazards, reported in Table 3.8, do not indicate any violation of the proportional hazard assumption either on the global or variable level. Therefore as there was no violation of the proportionality assumption, I did not use a NPH model. The results of my analysis of British colonies in my sample lend support to proposition that it is the institutions created by the British that are responsible for democratic longevity in the post-colonial period. It is important to note these results are from a subset of former British colonies which gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Further testing of all former British colonies is needed for a definitive description of the relationship between imposed liberal institutions and democratic longevity in former British colonies.

Next to investigate whether imposed liberal institutions have a similar effect on non-British colonies, I divided my sample into another subset which omitted former British colonies. The subset in this analysis includes colonies controlled by the United States and France and states which began democratic episodes between 1946 and 1969. In this subset, there are 3 French colonies and 1 American colony. The results of the Weibull and Cox, reported in Table 3.9, models did not indicate a significant relationship between liberal imposed institutions and democratic survival. The presence of imposed liberal institutions does not have an affect on the democratic survival of American or French colonies. These results may be due to the small number of colonies with imposed, liberal institutions included in the dataset. Or these results may be a reflection of French practice of direct rule rather than the creation of power-sharing institutions. Thirdly, the analysis here tests whether the presence of liberal, imposed institutions has an effect on democratic survival but does not account for experience with the liberal institutions.

Second, I test whether a certain number of imposed liberal steps influenced the likelihood of survival. In Particular, tested whether having more than six liberal steps had a positive affect on the survival of democratic polities. I chose the number of six as my threshold as the mode of imposed liberal steps among my 18 former colonies is 7. Again, the Weibull and Cox models do not indicate there is any significant relationship between imposed liberal steps and the longevity of democracy. However, the test for nonproportionality indicates the assumption is violated within this model as reported in Table 3.10. The global test as well as the hazards of several variables do not vary proportionally. Initially, I include time interaction variables for more than six liberal steps, level of economic development, ethnic fractionalization, and religious

fractionalization. Included the time interaction variable as a first step to capture the relationship between the number of liberal steps and interaction with the liberal institutions captured by the steps. Due to the low number of former colonies and democratizing states within this subset, the inclusion of all the interaction variables washed the model out. Therefore, I drop all the time interaction variables except for level of economic development as it was significant in the Weibull model and a significant contributor to democratic survival in previous models within this chapter. In the Cox NPH model, 7 or more liberal steps are associated with a 90.7 percent chance of democratic survival. My results indicate the imposition of only a few steps is not sufficient for the positive impact on democratic persistence in American and French colonies. Installing a few liberal measures does not lead to a higher likelihood of the survival of the democratic polity but there must be enough liberal steps created to demonstrate the usefulness and legitimacy of the institutions. It is important to note the results regarding imposed liberal institutions in these former colonies only serves as a first exploration. In the next chapter, I look at how repeated interaction with the liberal, imposed institutions affect survival of the democratic polity.

3.5 Conclusions and Implications

Prior studies have noted the importance of British colonial legacy. In this chapter, I expand our understanding of the relationship by testing whether institutions created by colonial powers contribute to post-independence survival of democratic polities. Consistent with previous research, my results indicate British colonial legacy has a positive impact on democratic survival after independence. Second, I evaluate the impact of imposed liberal institutions on the persistence of democracy. Polities with imposed, liberal institutions are more likely to survive after independence than other democratizing states. Both British colonial legacy and imposed liberal institutions are significant indicators of democratic survival of polities in the post-colonial period. Although the British Colonial Legacy Model is a better fit for the data, the theoretical arguments regarding British colonies revolve around the interaction of the citizenry with liberal imposed institutions. My results lend support to the argument that imposed liberal institutions contribute to the survival of democracies and therefore should be included in models of colonial legacy and democratic survival.

The majority of former colonies in my dataset are former British colonies and are among the longest lasting democratic polities. Thus, I examine the impact of imposed liberal institutions on former British colonies. My analysis included British colonies with imposed institutions and those that did not have imposed institutions. Results of the duration analysis indicate the built liberal institutions also have a strong, positive impact on the survival of former British colonies. The results suggest the British colonial practice of creating institutions within their colonies contribute to the post-independence democratic success. The liberal institutions built to facilitate colonial

administration and cultivate a long-term positive relationship after independence facilitated the survival of democracy after the end of the colonial period. Those British colonies without imposed liberal institutions are much more likely to fail after independence than those with such political structures.

To assess whether the positive impact of imposed liberal institutions is limited to former British colonies, I repeat my test on a subset of cases including American colonies, French colonies, and democratizing states without colonial legacy. The presence of imposed institutions is not connected with democratic survival in former American and French colonies. However, those colonies with six or more liberal steps are more likely to persist after independence. The results indicate there is a threshold for the number of imposed liberal steps. This implies that the installation of a small amount of liberal institutions is not likely to contribute to the democratic survival of former American and French colonies.

These results only tell us about one part of the relationship between imposed liberal institutions. Current analysis only studies the presence or absence of the imposed institutions it does not capture the breadth and complexity of the institutions. That is, this does not account for the timing of imposition of the institutions, the depth of the institutions, nor the citizenry's experience. In the next chapter, I introduce a dynamic model which accounts for the steps used to build the liberal institution as well as amount of time the institutions were present in the polity. This will allow for the testing of arguments regarding habituation and civic culture.

Institutional Experience and Democratic Survival

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explore the relationship between imposed liberal institutions and democratic survival. My results indicate the installation of such institutions within the polity by the former colonizer significantly increase the likelihood of post-independence survival. Liberal institutions contribute to the survival of democracy in imposed polities. Within this chapter, I turn the focus of my inquiry from presence of liberal, imposed institutions to experience with those institutions. To assess this relationship, I introduce a new conceptualization of imposed liberal institutions, imposed liberal steps. Colonial powers did not create complete, liberal institutions as a whole. Rather, they built the institutions over time in an incremental process. Colonial powers often introduced components of power-sharing institutions over time. For example, colonial powers often introduced an electoral element to a Legislative Council first and later it expanded electoral representation over time. An imposed liberal step is each expansion of liberal rights created in the polity by the imposer, in this case the colonial power. I employ two conceptualizations of experience; the *number* of imposed liberal steps and the *timing* of the liberal steps. Arguments regarding the benefits of built institutions focus on experience with institutions and the effect on democratic survival. Experience with the institutions is gained through interaction with a host of liberal institutions over a period of time. This chapter examines the following research question, what impact does experience with imposed liberal steps have on the post-independence democratic survival of former colonies? To test my research questions regarding liberal institutional experience and democratic survival, I use duration analysis and sequence analysis. Duration analysis allows me to model the impact of institutional experience in terms of number of imposed liberal steps enacted in each colony on the longevity of the democratic polity. Sequence analysis, relatively new in political science, allows for the inclusion of the number of liberal steps and the timing of the imposition of institutions during the colonial

experience. I will discuss this method in greater detail later in the chapter. My analysis included in this chapter provide insight into the relationship between liberal institutions and subsequent democratic survival. Also, the use of sequence analysis illustrates the usefulness of this method of the analysis of political process such as democratic transition and survival.

4.2 Arguments/Theory Section

The inclusion of imposed liberal polities in the study of colonial legacy provides greater insight into the relationship between colonial practices and democratic survival. Literature citing positive benefits of colonial power-sharing institutions imply experience with the institutions and ability of the institutions to channel interests are central to the survival of the democratic polity. In other words, the institutions must work for the citizenry of the colony and subsequent state. There should be sufficient experience with the institutions to earn the citizen's faith in the institutions. Therefore, depth of the liberal institutions and experience with imposed liberal institutions are important factors affecting the survival of democratic polities after the colonial power has relinquished control. As the institutions grow deeper and successfully channel interests of citizens, faith in the institutions and civic culture grows.

For imposed liberal institutions to contribute to the democratic survival after the colonial power leaves, the institutions must be habituated. Rustow asserts habituation is one of the necessary ingredients for the creation of democracy (1970). Similarly, Schmitter and Karl assert "to work properly the ensemble must be institutionalized - that is to say, the various patterns must be habitually known, practiced and accepted by most, if not all actors" (1991, 76). Ensemble refers to the system of governance and the various patterns of the system may be written or informal. More succinctly, they conclude the system of government becomes the 'rules of the game.' To achieve this habituation, the citizenry and elite must interact with institutions over time. In addition to habituation, interaction with liberal institutions leads to the growth of civic culture.

Like habituation, civic culture is a necessary component of a polity's democratic foundation. Almond and Verba, the preeminent scholars of civic culture define political culture as a set of values and attitudes shared by citizens of the state towards their political system. Verba explains political culture as "[t]he system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place" (1965, 513). Civic Culture is a particular type of political culture and is one of three types defined by Almond and Verba. According to Almond and Verba's conceptualization, civic culture is the relationship between people and their polity in which the citizens accept the authority of the state and are able to participate in their government. Political culture is "the connecting link between micro- and

macropolitics" (Almond and Verba 1963, 33). Civic culture denotes "a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that [permits] change but [moderates] it" (Almond and Verba 1963, 8). Almond and Verba assert that civic culture enables democracies to thrive (1963). Other authors such, as Putnam (1993), refer to these norms and behaviors, as well as the social institutions which support them as civic culture. Similarly, Putnam argues that civil society is necessary for democracies to function (1993). The culture in which institutions work is critical for the successful operation of democratic institutions (Putnam 1993). This underscores the argument that presence of institutions alone does not explain democratic survival. Civic culture provides an essential connection between mass civic culture and democratic institutions (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; Putnam 1993; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; van Deth and Scarbrough 1996; Inglehart 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2001; Norris 2002)

In addition to providing a base for democracy, civic culture is essential to the health of the polity and is a necessity for consolidated democracies. Furthermore, a state's democratic political institutions are reinforced and bolstered by civic culture (Fukuyama 1995). "The development of stable political commitment may hinge upon the ability of the political system, especially in its formative stages, to produce output that satisfies the expectations of the members of the system. Only in this way can a stable and balanced commitment to the system be created and maintained" (Almond and Verba 1963, 504). Although one may expect such a system to lead to collective action problems in which the majority may seek to change the rules to their favor, social capital functions as a solution for the collective action problem of civic activity (Putnam 1993). Social capital is the benefit people derive from cooperation. Those benefits lead to norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement which builds and reinforces trust. As people see the value in cooperative behavior, uncertainty and pay off for defection are reduced. Additionally, successful cooperation provides frameworks for future cooperation. As social capital grows, cooperation becomes iterative and the likelihood of cooperation among actors increases. Thereby, concludes Putnam, civic culture contributes towards a sturdy foundation for democratic institutions, assists in the deepening of the institutions, and through the reciprocal relationship supports democratic survival.

More specifically civil society has important implications on polities' democratic outcomes. Putnam found civic engagement to have positive impact on the efficacy of regional government (Putnam 1993). The fore-mentioned social capital not only prevents collective action problems but it contributes towards a strong economy which in turns bolsters a state's democracy (Almond 1980). Edward Shils asserts a strong civil society is able to protect minority groups from the self-interest of the majority (1991). The system is able to facilitate cooperation among groups and thereby foster successful democracies as these outcomes signal the efficacy of the system to the citizenry.

The benefits of habituation and civil society require interaction with the political system over a period of time. In this project, I refer to such interaction over time as democratic experience. Democratic experience is built through interaction with liberal institutions. Studies of democratization often use prior democratic experience as a control variable as it is a strong of democratic survival and consolidation. According to Feng and Zak, states with previous democratic institutions are five times more likely to lead to become consolidated democracies (1999, 174). Such experience facilitates growth of civic culture and faith in political institutions. Liberal institutions imposed by the colonial powers provide for experience with democracy. Weiner, discussing British colonial legacy, explains there are two parts of British tutelage benefits: institutions and political culture (Weiner 1987). The relationship between state and civil society is an important part of the democratic success of former British colonies. Particularly, experience with strong political institutions is associated with the persistence of post-colonial states (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004).

The amount of experience with institutions leads to greater faith in the institutions and view that the institutions, and subsequently the democratic regime, is legitimate. Institutionalization, or consolidation does not indicate that there is not conflict in the political system, but that there is regular conflict which is channeled pacifically through the democratic institutions. Rustow (1970) describes the role of conflict as central to the heart of democracy. Likewise, Przeworski (2005) asserts the survival of democracy relies on a state's ability to manage conflict. It follows, that successful processing of the conflict is a measure of democratic success not the absence of conflict.

For the majority of institutions, the colonizers did not create the institutions in one decree or act of law. Rather the liberalization of the colonies was progressive. The process can be seen as an incremental one in which each expansion of liberal rights can be seen as a step towards democracy. This process is reflected in British colonial policy after 1945 which "prescribed the steady introduction of phase after phase of constitutional development, carefully graduated to the individual needs of each colony, until at the end of the day a more rapid acceleration became possible and desirable" (Darwin 2007, 89). Later the policy was reiterated in 1961 report, *Political Advance in the United Kingdom Dependencies*, "The constitutions are altered stage by stage to give local people a more representative and a more responsible share in the government in their country" (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961a, 3). Such statements are consistent with the view of democracy as a process in contemporary research on democratization. Larry Diamond explains, "democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon" (1999, 18). Most democracies are built from "a patchwork of blocks and beams" (Diamond 1999, 21). Thus, institutions are created over time. I refer to the parts of this incremental introduction of democratic institutions as liberal steps. The more liberal steps the more experience with democracy and, subsequently, greater faith in the democratic polity after independence. Therefore, I posit:

Hypothesis 1: The more liberal steps in the colony, the greater likelihood of democratic persistence in the post-colonial period.

In addition to experience with liberal steps, time with the institutions is needed for habituation and the growth of civic culture. To allow for habituation of institution Rustow asserts the “ingredients” of democracy should be introduced over time (Rustow 1970, 35). Stepan concurs time is needed for the democratic empowerment of civilians necessary for them to monitor government actions (Stepan 1988). Jansson, Lindenfors, and Sanberg find evidence to support Rustow and Stepan’s assertions; concluding states which encounter slow transitions are more likely to survive 2013. Concurring, Gasiorowski and Power explain democratic consolidation is a slow process, democratic institutions need time to take root (1998). To summarize, democratization is a process which occurs gradually over time.

It is unlikely that the introduction of liberal institutions or liberal steps without sufficient time for interaction with the institutions would allow for the entrenchment and evolution of institutions. As discussed previously, the French and British built liberal institutions in their colonies, however, the colonizers differed in the timing of institution imposition. The French often introduced power-sharing elections shortly before independence. This late introduction led to the prevalence of one-party rule in the post-colonial period (Collier 1982). The British, on the other hand, created institutions at different points in the colonial period due to the domestic context of the colony (Brown 1999). In cases where institutions were created early, such as Jamaica, the colony had a longer time period for habituation and the growth of civic culture. On the other hand, in cases such as Uganda where institutions were created very close to independence, there was not much. The more interaction with liberal institutions, the more likely the institutions are to become habituated, seen as effective, and build civic culture which will serve to bolster faith in the institutions. Thus, I assert:

Hypothesis 2: The more interaction the citizenry has with liberal steps in the colony, the greater the likelihood of democratic persistence in the post-colonial period.

4.3 Hypothesis One Duration Analysis

4.3.0.1 Number of Liberal Steps Democratic Survival Model


Duration of Democratic Episode = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Number of Imposed Liberal Steps - β_2 Party Fractionalization + β_3 Economic Performance + β_4 Level of Development - β_5 Religious Fractionalization - β_6 Ethnic Fractionalization

4.3.1 Duration Analysis

To test my hypotheses, I construct a data set of democracies that began to democratize between 1946 - 1969. In the construction of my dataset, I use Enterline and Greig's imposed polity conceptualization and data set, previously discussed in the literature review, to identify 18 former colonies with imposed institutions which gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Next using Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom's (2004) Colonial Legacy Data Set, I identify democratic episodes which began between 1946 and 1969. They define a democratic episode as a period of democracy in a state's history. An episode ends when the democracy fails. A democratic episode contains multiple observations which capture each year a state is a democratic polity. The episodes included their data set include episodes for former colonies which includes those with liberal, imposed institutions and those without such institutions, as well as states that did not experience colonization and whose democratic growth is mainly attributed to internal factors. The last year for both datasets is 1995. Using their operationalization, I extend the datasets to 2010. My dataset includes 34 democratic episodes over the time period 1951-2010. The countries included in the dataset are listed in Figure 4.1¹.

¹There are two sets of countries included in the dataset. The first are former colonies with liberal, imposed institutions. The second serves as a comparison set of states experiencing a democratic episode. Those states do not have liberal, imposed institutions. Some of the states included in the second set are former colonies. Former Spanish colonies include: Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. The Dutch held Indonesia as a colony. Madagascar was a French colony. South Korea was under control of Japan. The United Kingdom colonized Myanmar and Trinidad. Somalia was under joint rule of the British and Italians.

Figure 4.1: Countries Included in the Dataset



Using this dataset allows for direct comparison with findings in the colonial legacy literature and those of the previous chapter. Later in this chapter, I build a model using sequence analysis to assess whether there is a patterns

4.3.2 Dependent Variable

For this model, the dependent variable is the length of a state's democratic episode taken from Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom's Colonial Legacy Dataset (2004). As explained earlier, a democratic episode is a period of democracy in a polity's history. The size of the democratic episode is measured as the number of years in a state's democratic episode. A state enters a democratic episode when the state achieves a minimum level of democracy. A democratic episode ends when the democracy fails. In other words, the episode ends when the state transitions to another regime type or experiences an interruption or interregnum period. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004) gathered their cases from Polity III (Jagers and Gurr 1995), the Political Regime Change Dataset (Gasiorowski 1996), Freedom in the World, the Political Handbook of the World, and Classifying Political Regimes (Przeworski et al. 1996).

4.3.3 Independent Variable

For my independent variable, I use number of liberal steps imposed by the colonial power. Liberal steps include:


- an elected member on a decision-making body;
- judiciary;
- constitution outlining citizens' rights;
- expansion of suffrage;
- free and fair elections
- increase of number of elected members on a decision-making body;
- amendments to constitution to include more liberal rights;
- adoption of a new constitution which provides more rights than the previous constitution;
- popularly elected leader;
- full enfranchisement; and
- autonomous, democratic rule within colony.

Each liberal step denotes an increase in democratic rights of the colony. The concept of liberal step captures the British colonial practice of installation of liberal institutions. Polities do not have a fixed number of liberal steps as the installation of power-sharing institutions varies across polities.

The British method of promoting political advance in the dependencies has been to create, with co-operation of the local people, sometimes from the most primitive beginnings, territorial governments which, like the governments of more mature democracies, comprise a legislature or law-making body, and executive body (which, with the Governor, is the executive authority) and an independent judiciary. The various Governments of the dependencies enjoy a large and increasing measure of autonomy. The role of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Colonial Office, is to advise and to guide rather than actually to direct their affairs (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1959, 3).

For the majority of institutions, the colonizers did not create the institutions in one decree, act of law or instance. Rather the liberalization of the colonies was progressive. “The constitutions are altered stage by stage to give local people a more representative and a more responsible share in the government in their country” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961a, 3). As democratization is an incremental process each liberal step moves a state along the continuum of democracy. “British colonial policy after 1945 prescribed the steady introduction of phase after phase of constitutional development, carefully graduated to the individual needs of each colony, until at the end of the day a more rapid acceleration became possible and desirable” (Darwin 2007, 89). This is consistent with the view of democracy as a process in contemporary research on democratization. Larry Diamond explains, “democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon” (1999, 18). To reflect this incremental process, instead of coding discrete cases of institutional building or establishment, I code those incremental steps of liberalization. For example, I code the creation of a Legislative council with some elected representation as one step. If the council is expanded to allow more popularly elected representation, I code that as another step. If the council is transformed into a popularly elected legislature, that is coded as another step. This is consistent with work in democratization where democracy falls on a continuum and states may progress towards democratic consolidation.

Figure 4.2: Ghana Liberal Steps



To gather liberal step data, I use historical records, historical dictionaries, as well as individual country histories for each of the 18 cases in this study. Particularly, I use *British Central Office of Information Pamphlets* which provided detailed information on the imposed institutions and liberal steps. Additionally, I consulted *United States Library of Congress Country Reports*, historical dictionaries and individual country histories for my cases. These sources provided information on the date of creation and structure of the institution. As I did not have the budget to hire multiple coders, I consulted multiple sources to corroborate the liberal expansions implemented by

the colonial power. However, additional coders were not needed as I use relatively simple coding rules which did not require judgments about the amount of liberal expansion created by each liberal step. Figure 4.2 contains the liberal steps imposed in Ghana. In this project, liberal steps are weighted equally. For each liberal institutions, or a liberal step, I record it on the country time line, noted the type of liberal step, and year in which it was created. As I do not have *a priori* expectations, equal weighting of each liberal step is the most appropriate approach. In future research, I will explore patterns of liberal expansion through different types and combinations of liberal steps. The coding scheme I employed for liberal steps is easily expanded and replicable. Appendix A contains time lines for each of my 18 cases. Each liberal step is noted above the time line while historical events are noted below.

4.3.4 Control Variables

To accurately assess the impact of imposed political institutions and other factors of interest, I control for other factors influencing polity duration. Level of development, economic performance, presidential system, religious fractionalization, and ethnic fractionalization all have been argued to have a significant impact on the persistence of polities.

Higher levels of economic development are associated with greater democratic persistence (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). To capture a state's level of economic development, I use GDP per capita in constant 1990 International Dollars. To facilitate analysis, I scale the unit of measurement from one international dollar to 1,000 international dollars. The information was gathered from the 2013 Maddison Project Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013).

Conversely, economic contraction is associated with the failure of democratic polities. Poor economic performance is potentially damaging to the persistence of democratic polities (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Remmer 1991). Economic Performance is measured as the proportion of yearly change in GDP per capita. I use data from the 2013 Maddison Project Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013) to calculate the proportion of yearly change.

In addition to control for economic factors, I control for social fragmentation by including measures that capture ethnic and religious fractionalization. Ethnic and religious cleavages complicate the chance of survival for democracies. Such divisions create additional challenges to nascent political institutions, as they are more likely to have home interests than the fledgling political institutions are able to channel. I use Selway's ethnic and religious fractionalization measures from his Cross-cutting Cleavages dataset (2011). Although this dataset includes cross-cutting cleavages, I use the single dimensional ethnic and religious fractionalization as the data is available over the time period of my dataset. Both measures range from zero to one where zero indicates no fractionalization and the larger the score, the more fractionalization present.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
Number of Liberal Steps	6 (mode)	7.739	0	26
Economic Performance	0.024	0.045	-0.149	0.279
Level of Economic Development	5312.657	4833.739	419.358	21314.380
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.438	0.200	0.002	0.930
Religious Fractionalization	0.412	0.213	0.003	0.799
		Per Polity		
697 total observations for 34 polities	20.5		1	60
First Entry Time = 0				
Exit Time	21.265		1	63
723 total analysis time at risk	21.265		1	63
25 Failures	0.735		0	1

4.3.5 Results of Duration Analysis

The dataset I employ to test hypothesis one includes 697 observations for 34 subjects. For this inquiry, the observation is the country-year. The subjects are democratic episodes of polities with imposed liberal steps and those without such steps. In the data set there is only one failure per state. The data is organized as a single-failure per subject which means there is only one failure per subject in the database. In this case failure denotes the end of the democratic episode. The polities were at risk of failure 723 times. Within the analysis, In this analysis there are 25 failures, which indicates 25 of the 34 democratic polities failed. The correlation between the variables capturing liberal steps and British colonizer is 0.61. A correlation describes the connection between two variables, particularly, it describes the degree to which the variables vary together. A high correlation between two variables indicates a strong relationship. As a result of this high correlation, I am unable to include both variables in the model. The high correlation is due to the British tendency to imposed liberal institutions within colonies to aid in the administration of the colony. However, this is not a problem, as this project is focused in assessing the impact imposed liberal institutions - not the identity of the colonizer. The use of number of imposed liberal steps assesses the impact each liberal step has on democratic survival. The high but not perfect correlation between British and liberal steps, lends evidence to the assertion the British did not uniformly impose institutions in all of their colonies.

The results of my are reported in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. My results indicate imposed liberal steps are associated with survival in the post-colonial period. The positive impact of imposed liberal steps is consistent across the Weibull, Cox and Non-Proportional Hazard models. In addition to the Weibull model, I use a Cox model and conducted a test for violations of the proportional hazard assumption of the Cox and Weibull models. This assumption assumes the hazards functions of a variable are proportional over time. The results of the test are reported in Table Three. Like Chapter Three, level of economic development violates this assumption.

Table 4.2: The Impact of Liberal Steps on Democratic Survival

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>	<i>Cox NPH Model</i>
Number of Liberal Steps	0.891*** (0.036)	0.901** (0.039)	0.897** (0.040)
Economic Performance	0.012 (0.047)	0.037 (0.168)	0.045 (0.209)
Level of Economic Development	0.661*** (0.101)	0.688*** (0.102)	0.478*** (0.122)
Ethnic Fractionalization	8.973 (13.381)	5.273 (7.394)	3.379 (5.051)
Religious Fractionalization	5.633* (5.939)	3.946 (4.007)	4.723 (5.074)
Economic Performance x Time			1.012** (0.005)
Constant	0.015		
Log Likelihood	-42.171	-64.422	-63.318
Rho	1.297 (0.171)		

NOTE: $N = 691$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 4.3: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Number of Liberal Steps	0.150	0.79	0.376
Economic Performance	-0.047	0.11	0.738
Level of Economic Development	0.412	6.89	0.009
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.190	2.37	0.124
Religious Fractionalization	-0.255	3.88	0.049
Global Test	—	9.48	0.091

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*) The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

To correct for the potential problems of this violation I include level of economic development multiplied by time. After correcting for the violation of the proportional hazard assumption, imposed liberal steps remain a significant predictor of democratic survival. For each liberal step installed in the colony, the odds of survival after independence increase by 10.3 percent. For the control variables, religious fractionalization was only significant in the Weibull model. Consistent with arguments present in the literature, religious fractionalization is hazardous for democratic survival. As with previous models, level of economic development has a strong, positive affect on the survival of imposed polities.


These results support my assertion that the more imposed liberal steps, the more likely the polity is to persist. The more the colonizer expands democracy within the colony prior to independence, the more likely the democratic polity will survive in its post-colonial period. The more liberal steps installed, the more interaction the citizenry has with the institutions. If the institutions are able to channel their interests, it is likely they will view the institutions as legitimate. Such positive interaction leads to the growth of civic culture which further reinforces the liberal political institutions. This, however, is only one part of the polities' democratic institutions. Inclusion of the Number of liberal steps in this model only provides information on one aspect of the impact on democratic survival but does not provide information on interaction over time with the liberal steps. In the next section, I use sequence analysis to examine how the length of time with the liberal institutions affects the likelihood of survival of the democratic polities.

4.3.6 Sequence Analysis

To test my second hypothesis, I use sequence analysis. As this method is relatively new to political science, I will explain the purpose of the method as well as some of its applications. Sequence analysis is a method which models processes. "It compares chronological sequences of states within a holistic conceptual model instead of observing allegedly independent observations over time" (Blanchard, Bühlmann, and Gauthier 2014, 1). The method was first used in the biological sciences to study sequences such as DNA. Later, it was adapted for use in the social sciences and is frequently used in sociology. Its use in political science is relatively new (Casper and Wilson 2011, 2015; Range, Wilson, and Sandberg 2015). Like duration analysis, time is integral to the model. However, it moves beyond providing likelihoods of survival and enables a detailed exploration of causal processes. Using optimal matching, the most often applied comparison of sequences, researchers are able to compare and contrast similarities and differences among sequences and subsequences. Thus, it provides a link between qualitative and quantitative analysis, it enables the investigation of social processes (Blanchard, Bühlmann, and Gauthier 2014). This approach is well-suited for the study of democratization and democratic survival as it allows for the investigation of institutions, norms, and values (Cornwell 2015). Second,

sequence analysis enables the quantification and testing of arguments regarding the order of political states (Casper and Wilson 2015). This approach enables researchers to examine questions regarding patterns of liberalization, transitions from or to democracy, the consequences of certain patterns, and how different time periods of a state's democratic experience influence its democratic future. As such, sequence analysis is an appropriate tool to analyze complex transitions and events.

Figure 4.3: Sequence Analysis Model




As the name would suggest, the main focus, or unit of analysis, is the sequence. Sequences are "the succession of the observed states for one unit of observation over a given time period" (Blanchard, Bühlmann, and Gauthier 2014, 5). Or more simply, an order lists of states or elements (Brzinsky-Fay, Kohler, and Luniak 2006; Cornwell 2015). In addition to states, sequences include events which denotes a move from one state to another. Sequences are composed of a finite number of states from an alphabet as defined by the researcher. The alphabet contains the complete set of states that may appear in sequences. For example the alphabet used to construct sequences in this chapter are C, L, I, and F, where C stands for colonial status, L for liberal steps, independence denotes independent democracy and F marks polity failure. Some states experience failure while others do not as the democracies persist after the last year in the dataset, 2010. A list of the sequences for each case are listed in Appendix C. Data in sequences are organized in ordered arrays (Macindoe and Abbott 2004). In many cases, the states are ordered according to a unit of time, i.e., day, month or year. I use year of colonial experience and democratic episode as the unit of time where the sequence begins with the first year of colonial possession continues each year until the independent, democratic polity fails. As it does not follow the calendar it is considered an internal time reference in which the origin of the time axis is the first observation of a starting event. States may be repeated throughout the sequence and may appear in consecutive time period. For this chapter, states are organized into four groups of states: colonial period, liberalization period, democratic

independence and polity failure. The sequence model in this chapter is reported in Figure 4.3 while the sequences for my 18 cases are listed in Appendix C. Once constructed sequences are used to describe, visualize, and summarize data as well as the identification of patterns.

After constructing my sequences, I import the sequences and covariates into an R database for analysis. The dataset, or data frame as it is referred to in R, is organized in longitudinal data representation where there is one row per country. I use the state-sequence or STS format which is the most commonly used representation in sequence analysis. In the data frame the sequences are contained in columns nine to 366 where sequence states are listed in consecutive columns. Those columns represent the years under colonial control and democratic episode with the maximum number of years over this period is 358. Columns one and two include country names and codes. The remaining columns, three to seven, contain covariates capturing years under colonial rule to the end of the democratic polity, years from independence to polity failure, number of imposed liberal steps and two variables capturing the level of imposed liberal steps.

Figure 4.4: Number of Years by State



Using The TraMineR package, a R-package for sequence analysis, I conduct my analysis (Gabadinho et al. 2010). I separate the sequences into two groups. The sequences were filtered based on whether the polities persisted or failed. At the heart of this


test is my interest in the impact of the amount of experience with liberal imposed steps on the duration of time spent as an independent democratic polity. An implicit assumption is that sequences are independent as the result of democratic survival is due to the institutional history and the growth of civic culture rather than influence of other democratizing states. I computed the mean of each state for the polities that failed and polities that persisted. The results are reported in Figure 4.4. The states whose democratic polity persisted had more experience with liberal, imposed steps. Conversely, states which failed had, on average, less interaction with liberal imposed steps. The results of this initial sequence analysis, support hypothesis two; the more experience with liberal, imposed steps, the more likely a democratic polity is to survive.

Second, I conduct optimal matching to investigate the common sequences among colonies with imposed institutions. This method is useful to identify similar patterns among groups of sequences (Casper and Wilson 2011). Optimal matching is descriptive rather than causal in its orientation (Macindoe and Abbott 2004). To identify the appropriate number of clusters for sequences I use the formula of $k = \sqrt{\frac{n}{2}}$ which is often used to identify the optimal number of categories for a sample (Cornwell 2015). For this analysis, $k = \sqrt{\frac{18}{2}}$ as there are 18 cases. Thus, the most appropriate number of clusters is three. Again using the TraMineR package, I computed pairwise optimal matching. In this analysis, distances between sequences with an insertion and deletion cost of one and a substitution matrix based on observed transition rates. I chose this insertion deletion cost as I do not have any *a priori* assumptions regarding the substitution costs. In optimal matching, the sequences are assumed to be independent. As the arguments regarding democratic survival are due to the institutional history and the growth of civic culture rather than other democratizing states, this assumption is not violated. Within the sequence used in the optimal matching analysis there are three statuses: colonization, liberal steps, and independence. During the colonization period, the polity is under colonial administration but liberal steps have not yet been introduced by the colonizer. Over the liberal steps period, the polity is still under colonial administration, however, the colonial power has introduced at least one liberal step. Lastly, over independence the polity is an independent, democratic polity no longer under colonial administration. The independence period ceases when the democratic polity fails.

The results of optimal matching are represented in Figure 4.5² Cluster One demonstrates a short period of liberal steps and a subsequent short period of independence. Nine of the sequences follow this pattern. The second cluster shows a period of imposed institutions early in the polity's colonial experience, a period of liberal steps and a longer period of independence. In this cluster there are six sequences. Cluster Three represents sequences where the polity was under colonial rule for a longer period of time before liberal steps were implemented. This group experienced less

²The graphics represent the tendencies of the similar sequences and are not the sequences stacked on top of each other.

Figure 4.5: Cluster Analysis of Sequences



years of liberal steps than cluster two but more liberal steps than those in cluster one. The liberal steps appear to have taken root and this group has the longest rates of democratic survival ($n=3$). These results demonstrate the disparate experiences of colonies with imposed liberal institutions. Those polities with few liberal steps over a shorter period are more likely to fail after independence. While those with more experience with liberal steps are more likely to persist after independence.

4.4 Conclusion and Implications

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of interactions with liberal, imposed institutions. As argued previously in this chapter, institutions must be habituated for the benefits to be present after independence. The mere presence of institutions nor a large number of institutions is sufficient for the imposed institutions to foster democratic survival in the post-colonial period. Habituation and civic culture are cultivated through successful interaction with the political institutions. Interaction with imposed liberal institutions referred to as democratic experience. As democratization is an iterative process, I introduce the conceptualization of liberal steps which captures each expansion of liberal rights. As described previously, each

liberal step denotes an expansion of liberal rights through the introduction or expansion of elected representation, elections, constitutions and judiciaries. Through the use of liberal steps, I am able to model the process of democratization using duration analysis as well as sequence analysis.

Using duration analysis, I explore the question whether experience contributes to post-independence democratic survival. My results indicate there is a link between imposed liberal steps during the colonial experience and the length of the democratic episode after independence. Results from my duration analysis identify a larger number of liberal steps is associated with longer democracy duration. Secondly, sequence analysis results suggests the longer time with imposed liberal steps is correlated with democratic survival. When combined my results indicate the more experience with liberal, imposed steps, in terms of number and time, have a lasting effect on ability of democracy to survive.

These results should not be taken as evidence that the presence of imposed institutions over a long period of time is sufficient to produce benefits of civic culture and habituation. Repeated interaction during which the citizenry's interests are channeled through the institutions is needed to build such benefits. Three distinct patterns arose in the the analysis of the sequences. Among former colonies with imposed institutions, those with very little liberalization and colonial history have shorter democratic episodes. Secondly, in some cases the imposed institutions took root quickly and supported strong democracies after independence. Lastly, states with great deal of liberalization during the colonial period also have long democratic episodes.

Prior studies have noted the importance of previous democratic experience for democratic survival and consolidation. These results support those previous results. However, rather than relying on variables to capture the identity of the colonizer or the tendencies of particular colonizer, I include the institutions in the analysis. The inclusion of institutions in the model explain disparate findings in the the colonial legacy literature. Colonial experience, especially in institutional terms, varied across colonies. Therefore, the inclusion of one variable which does not account for differences in number of imposed institutions nor timing cannot fully describe the impact of the colonial period after independence. Secondly, the inclusion of institutions in the model enables an exploration of the path of democratization in states rather than concentrating on factors which lead to one discrete outcome.

Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

In this project, I explore whether imposed, liberal institutions installed by a colonial power affect the persistence of democracies in the postcolonial period. Of particular interest is the impact of imposed liberal institutions and the citizenry's interaction with those institutions on democratic survival of the polity after independence. Lastly, using sequence analysis, a relatively new method to political science, I investigate the process of the installation of liberal steps in colonies and the effect of those steps on post-independence democracy. My overarching question is - if a state imposes democratic institutions within another state will the imposed polity persist?

The installation of democracy within other states by foreign powers is a reoccurring theme of international politics since antiquity. Active efforts to impose democracy have waxed and waned over modern history, resulting in cycles or waves of imposed democracy (Owen 2002). Today, many developed democracies include democratic expansion as a major foreign policy tenet. Within these tenets, democratic enlargement is presented as a solution to solve a variety of regional and international problems as well as to further the foreign policy of democratic powers. The persistence of democratic expansion through imposition points to the importance of systematic study of external democratization. Additionally, this area of research contributes to our understanding of external democratization, an understudied area in comparative politics and international relations. However, one area of external democratization which has received a great deal of attention is British colonial legacy particularly the benefits of the creation of liberal institutions to enable administration of the colony. Despite the large amount of literature on the impact of British colonial legacy, there are conflicting conclusions on whether British colonial legacy contributes to democratic survival. I assert the lack of consensus is due to the indirect testing of the relationship between imposed institutions and post-colonial survival. In this project, I draw from the literature on polity imposition, external democratization and British colonial literature to build my hypotheses. Unlike existing studies of British colonial legacy, I directly test the impact of imposed institutions by colonial powers on

democratic survival. The change in focus from British colony to imposed institutions allows for the inclusion of other colonizers who imposed institutions. More importantly, it allows for applications of the findings to contemporary imposed polities. In this chapter, I will summarize the key findings of this project. Second, I examine the implications of the findings and what they tell us about existing knowledge of colonial legacy, imposed, liberal institutions and polity imposition. Third, I will discuss the limitations of my study and indicate ways future research may improve upon those limitations. Fourth, I summarize the broad themes present in the study and what they tell us about existing research. In the fifth section of my conclusion, I examine areas of future research. Lastly, I summarize the findings and conclusions revealed in this project.

5.2 Results and Implications

In Chapter Three, I assess the impact of imposed institutions on the survival of democracy. Arguments present in the British colonial legacy literature point to the importance of liberal, power-sharing institutions on the persistence of democracies after the colonial power withdraws. This relationship has been previously untested in the literature. The results of my analysis indicate imposed, liberal institutions are associated with democratic survival after independence. Polities with imposed liberal institutions are 60.9% more likely to persist than other democratizing states. Consistent with previous research, British colonial legacy is associated with democratic survival. However, this relationship is only limited to those British colonies which have imposed, liberal institutions; former British colonies who did not have imposed institutions were more likely to experience democratic failure than those that did have such institutions installed. These results support the assertion that the positive relationship between British colonial legacy and democratic survival rests on imposed institutions rather than the British identity of the colonizer. Furthermore, the results challenge the assumption that British colonial legacy is uniform across colonies. This assumption is inherent in previous studies of colonial legacy and democratic survival. The uniformity of colonial legacy is likely the cause of conflicting results in the literature regarding the effect of British-built liberal institutions and democratic survival. To accurately model colonial legacy, researchers must include conceptualizations and variables which capture precisely what it is about British colonial legacy which produces the lasting benefits for the democratic polities after independence.

Additionally, arguments in the British Colonial Legacy Literature infer the more experience former British colonies have with imposed liberal institutions, the more likely democracy is to survive after independence. To model this process, I gather information from historical dictionaries, individual country histories and colonial papers regarding the democratic institutions installed in the colony by British, French,

and American colonial powers. To model the democratization process and to provide an accurate picture of democratic imposition, I employ the conceptualization of liberal steps to capture this incremental installation of power-sharing institutions. A liberal step denotes the expansion of democratic rights within a colony. Using duration analysis, I test whether experience with imposed liberal steps positively influence the likelihood of democratic survival. My initial examination in Chapter 3 indicates democratic polities with six or more liberal steps are more durable than those polities with fewer.

In Chapter Four, I use liberal steps to model the process of democratization through imposition. This approach allows me to include interaction with the liberal steps over time. Using optimal matching I identify three distinct patterns of democratization within former colonies with imposed liberal institutions. First, those polities with few liberal steps and little interaction with them were likely to fail shortly after independence. The second group experienced imposition of liberal steps but over a short period of time. These democratic polities lasted longer than the polities with very few imposed steps over a short time. In the second group the liberal steps were able to take root quickly. The third group of imposed polities experienced a host of liberal steps over a long period of time. These polities had longer democratic episodes after independence. This group had more opportunities over time to interact with the institutions created by the liberal steps which enabled the citizenry to build a civic culture.

Democratic success appears more likely in those states where interaction with the institutions has been habituated. This habituation enabled civic culture to grow within the polity. My results indicate habituation and civic culture play an important role democratic success. My sequence analysis reveal two different types of democratization patterns through imposed institutions - those which took root quickly, and others which happened over a longer period of time. It is not sufficient enough for the imposer to create institutions and wait for democracy to grow. The institutions must be adopted and used by its citizenry and seen as effective in channeling their political demands. Thus, it appears they are not purely imposed polities but rather a hybrid in which the liberal institutions were installed by the colonial power but later adopted by the people of the polity. Further, the imposer did not install the necessary foundation of civic culture but that was built, over time, by the citizenry.

The first implication of this study is the need for researchers to change focus from the identity of colonizer to the power sharing institutions in studies of democratic survival. Not only is it possible to include institutions in the models of colonial legacy and democratic survival; it is important to do so to accurately model the relationship and assess the impact of those institutions. Colonizers who built liberal institutions in their colonies did not do so in all their colonies nor to the same extent - some colonies had few liberal institutions imposed while others had a large number over a greater period of time. Due to the non-uniform creation of institutions, it is necessary to capture the experience of each colony to accurately assess the impact of those

institutions in the postcolonial period. This assertion is supported by my findings indicating polities with more than six liberal steps are more likely to persist than other democratizing steps. Secondly, the institution building process can be broken down into observable components, referred to as liberal steps in this project. Liberal steps mark the expansion of liberal rights through the introduction of elections, civil rights, and judicial bodies. The interaction with the liberal steps produce habituation and the growth of civic culture within the citizenry of the polity. Lastly, there seems to be two patterns of lasting democratization in former colonies with imposed liberal institutions; those which had numerous liberal steps over a short period of time, and those which had numerous liberal steps over a longer time. This indicates that there are different ways for liberal institutions to be habituated within former colonies. In a future study I will investigate these patterns of democratization in greater detail.

5.3 Limitations

Although this study has produced insights on the impact of imposed, liberal institutions on democratic survival, there are limitations to this study. First, the study includes former colonies which gained independence between 1945 and 1969 and democratizing states whose democratic episode begins over the same time period. This time period was chosen for a variety of reasons; to capture the second wave of democratization (Huntington 1991); to allow for comparison of results with those from existing colonial legacy literature; and, lastly, to allow for data gathering of liberal, imposed steps. As a result, any broad generalizations and comparisons with later time periods should be made tentatively. Second, there are only a few non-British, imposed polities included in the analysis. However, this is not a large problem as the focus on my thesis is imposed institutions rather than the identify of the colonizer. This change in focus enables direct testing of the institutional argument and allows for inclusion of other colonial powers who built liberal institutions in their colonies. Additionally, this focus on imposed liberal institutions creates opportunities to compare with contemporary imposed polities. Third, as I draw from colonial legacy this study does not include non-colonial imposed polities and more recent cases of polity imposition. In future studies, I will expand my analysis to include more colonies as well as modern, imposed polities with imposed institutions. In Chapter Four, I use sequence analysis to identify patterns of democratization present in polities, with imposed liberal steps. The sequence analysis conducted only scrapes the surface of the types of exploration which can be done with this method. In a subsequent study, I will create a more complex sequence which differentiates the depth of imposed, liberal steps in terms of number of liberal steps by the amount of experience with the liberal, imposed steps. Lastly, this study only looks at imposed democratic polities. This study does not tell us how imposed authoritarian institutions contribute to the survival of autocratic states. Imposition of institutions which fall across the authoritarian/democratic spectrum pose a rich area of research for polity imposition.

Despite the limitations of this project produces testable hypotheses and fruitful areas for future research.

5.4 Contributions

The contributions of this thesis can be divided into two areas: substantive and methodological. The substantive contribution of this project is the introduction of measurements of liberal imposed institutions and liberal steps to models of colonial legacy and democratic survival. Through this, I demonstrate it is possible to capture and model institutional arguments present in the colonial legacy literature and the incremental process of democratization. Secondly, the use of duration and analysis and sequence analysis demonstrate the methodological contribution of introducing contextual details to quantitative analysis of democratization.

5.4.1 Institutions

I contribute to literature on democratic survival and colonial legacy by showing it is possible and necessary to include measures to capture imposed liberal institutions. This project shifts the focus from British colonial legacy to imposed liberal institutions on democratic survival. The British did not install power-sharing institutions within all their colonies. Equally important, the British were not the only colonial power to introduce liberal institutions in their colonies; some French and American colonies experienced liberal institution imposition. This shift of focus to imposed liberal institutions allows for better understanding of the impact of those institutions after independence. In this project, I demonstrate it is possible to gather information on institutions created by the colonizer. I intend to expand the data to include other colonies with imposed liberal institutions and other types of imposed polities. Imposed institutions can be used in future studies where colonial legacy has an impact on the dependent phenomenon such as democratization, human rights provision and conflict.

5.4.2 Liberal Steps

In my examination of the institutions imposed by colonizers, I observe liberal institutions were created over time. To incorporate this expansion of rights, I introduce the concept of liberal steps. Using this measure of democratization, I am able to test hypotheses of habituation and growth of civic culture. The analysis of liberal steps in Chapter 4 is only the beginning of how this can be used in studies of democratization. As liberal steps captures various kinds of liberal expansion such as suffrage, elections, civil rights and judicial bodies, it allows for the use of contextual

factors to study factors of democratization. The use of liberal steps is not limited to external democratization but also democratization in general. This conceptualization of democratic expansion enables researchers to study the habituation and growth of civic culture as this conceptualization introduces a way to model the interaction with the liberal steps over time. Further, this analysis demonstrates a fruitful method to capture the incremental expansion of liberal institutions in imposed and other democratizing polities. Additionally, the inverse of the conceptualization can be used to study movements from democracy to autocracy.

5.4.3 Methods: Duration and Sequence Analysis

Although not new to studies in international relations, the use of duration analysis demonstrates the usefulness of this approach in the study of democratization. It builds upon the work of (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004) to assess the impact of imposed liberal institutions on democratic survival. The use of duration analysis allows for the inclusion of competing variables to assess their impact on the dependent phenomenon with time as an inherent part of the model. This approach is useful for any phenomenon in which researchers are interested in how factors contribute to the longevity of a polity, period of peace or human rights provision.

The second methodological contribution of this thesis is the demonstration of the fruitfulness of sequence analysis. This approach is an extension of duration analysis which enables researchers to include contextual factors in duration analysis. In particular, it allows for the modelling of processes with a holistic conceptual model which does not require observations to be independent over time. Like duration analysis, time is integral to the model. However, it moves beyond providing likelihoods of survival and enables a detailed exploration of causal processes. Using optimal matching, the most often applied comparison of sequences, researchers are able to compare and contrast similarities and differences among sequences and subsequences. Thus, it provides a link between qualitative and quantitative analysis and it enables the investigation of social processes (Blanchard, Bühlmann, and Gauthier 2014). This approach allows for the study of processes such as democratization and democratic survival whilst concepts such as habituation, civic culture and the interaction with institutions can also be included in sequences. Sequence analysis is an appropriate tool for researchers to study complex transitions and events.

5.5 Conclusion

This project demonstrates the importance of the inclusion of imposed, liberal institutions in the study of colonial legacy as well as polity imposition. As this is the first study to identify and include political institutions and their building blocks, liberal

steps, there are numerous areas for future research. First, an expansion of the data on imposed liberal institutions and liberal steps to include other types of imposed polities and time periods is needed. Second, this project only scratches the surface of what sequence analysis can tell us about the process of democratization through the imposition of liberal steps. In my next paper, I will use sequence analysis to test the interaction of the number of liberal steps by the amount of experience the polity had with the liberal steps prior to independence. Future research will include analysis on whether certain patterns of liberal imposition are more fruitful for future democracies. Using sequence analysis, researchers will find further information about the habituation and rooting of imposed liberal institutions in polities. In subsequent studies, I will need to address at what point does an imposed democratic polity change to its own democratic polity. As my results indicate it is the citizenry's successful interaction with liberal institutions and liberal steps, it follows that it is not so much the act of imposition which is important but how the institutions work within the polity is important. Lastly, an important area of future research lies in the comparison of past imposed polities with contemporary polities such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

In this thesis, I test hypotheses regarding British colonial legacy on democratic polities which were once former colonies. Particularly, colonies with imposed liberal institutions that enable colonial administration are more likely to persist after independence. If a state imposes liberal institutions within another state, will the polity survive after the imposer leaves? As revealed in the literature review, the arguments about the benefit of British colonial legacy are based on the liberal power-sharing institutions introduced by the British in colonies. Installation of imposed, liberal institutions are not limited to British colonies. I add to the study of colonial legacy by expanding the inquiry to include other colonies which imposed liberal institutions such as those held by France and the United States. I find imposed liberal institutions contributed to the longevity of democracy in the polity after independence. To analyze the impact of the imposition of liberal institutions, I introduce the concept of liberal steps which allows me to model the incremental process of building liberal institutions by outside forces. The results of the duration analysis indicate each liberal step significantly enhances the likelihood of democratic survival. Using sequence analysis, a new method in political science, I examine the patterns of colonial history and their impact on subsequent democratic survival. I identify two patterns of successful democracies those where the institutions took root quickly and those which had many years of interaction with liberal institutions. My results indicate external impositions will be successful only when the polity has successful experiences and interactions with the liberal institutions. Although built by imposers, the institutions must be adopted by the citizenry as they are seen as legitimate and able to channel political interests.

Polity Timelines

Figure A.1: Benin Polity Time Line




Figure A.2: Botswana Polity Time Line




Figure A.3: Chad Polity Time Line




Figure A.4: Congo Polity Time Line




Figure A.5: The Gambia Polity Time Line




Figure A.6: Ghana Polity Time Line




Figure A.7: India Polity Time Line




Figure A.8: Jamaica Polity Time Line




Figure A.9: Kenya Polity Time Line




Figure A.10: Malaysia Polity Time Line




Figure A.11: Mauritius Polity Time Line




Figure A.12: Nigeria Polity Time Line




Figure A.14: Sierra Leone Polity Time Line




Figure A.15: Sri Lanka Polity Time Line





Figure A.16: Sudan Polity Time Line







Figure A.17: Tanzania Polity Time Line

Figure A.18: Uganda Polity Time Line



Additional Tests

B.1 Tables of Additional Tests

- All Cases with British Colonial Heritage - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969. Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
 - Duration of Colonial Rule - No significant effect on duration of democracy, control variables consistent with other models: level of development positive, ethnic and religious fractionalization deleterious to democratic health.
 - PH Tests and NPH Model Years under colonial rule violates the proportional hazard assumption. However, once I account for proportional hazards, results duration of colonial rule still insignificant for former British colonies

- British Colonial Heritage Cases - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969. Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
 - Categorical Number of steps - Variable of Interest
 - * greater than 7 liberal steps
 - Weibull Results 0.268 in Weibull but not significant in the Cox model
 - Cox Results
 - PH Test no violation of proportional hazard assumption

- British Colonial Heritage Cases - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969. Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
 - Number of Imposed Institutions - Variable of Interest the more liberal, imposed steps the less likely the polity is to fail

Table B.1: Model 2a: The Effect of Years Under Colonial Rule on Former British Colonies

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>	<i>Cox NPH Model</i>
Years Under Colonial Rule	0.993 (0.008)	0.996 (0.004)	0.912 (0.58)
Economic Performance	0.051 (0.310)	0.232 (0.985)	0.200 (0.804)
Level of Economic Development	0.243** (0.175)	0.322*** (0.130)	0.322** (0.184)
Ethnic Fractionalization	143.351** (368.384)	196.320** (473.448)	55.587* (127.563)
Religious Fractionalization	209.628** (491.746)	36.624** (67.305)	36.804* (70.670)
Years Under Colonial Rule × Time			1.003 (0.002)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)		
Log Likelihood	-13.378	-17.117	-14.954

NOTE: $N = 360$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
 $*p < 0.10$. $**p < 0.05$. $***p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table B.2: Model 2a: Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Years Under Colonial Rule	0.537	7.67	0.006
Economic Performance	-0.131	0.11	0.744
Level of Economic Development	0.169	0.08	0.772
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.478	2.14	0.144
Religious Fractionalization	0.147	0.15	0.701
Global Test	—	2.35	0.799

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table B.3: Model 2c: The Effect of Moderate to High Number of Imposed Liberal Steps on Former British Colonies

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>
Seven or More Imposed Liberal Steps	0.268* (0.093)	0.399 (0.254)
Economic Performance	0.093 (0.623)	0.366 (1.426)
Level of Economic Development	0.268* (0.187)	0.325*** (0.131)
Ethnic Fractionalization	330.724* (727.169)	327.050*** (714.577)
Religious Fractionalization	122.936** (257.2218)	39.491*** (56.720)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	
Log Likelihood	-12.202	-16.473

NOTE: $N = 360$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table B.4: Model 2c: Test of Proportional Hazrd Assumption

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Seven or More Imposed Liberal Steps	-0.228	0.40	0.525
Economic Performance	-0.058	0.02	0.902
Level of Economic Development	-0.081	0.01	0.915
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.292	0.42	0.517
Religious Fractionalization	0.063	0.03	0.869
Global Test	—	1.46	0.918

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df) The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table B.5: Model 2d: The Effect of the Amount of Liberal Imposed Steps on Former British Colonies

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>
Number of Liberal Imposed Steps	0.749*** (0.086)	0.824*** (0.048)
Economic Performance	0.018 (0.114)	0.145 (0.452)
Level of Economic Development	0.256** (0.150)	0.330*** (0.115)
Ethnic Fractionalization	963.390*** (2185.777)	614.357*** (1580.914)
Religious Fractionalization	1213.539*** (3075.790)	152.373** (324.876)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	
Log Likelihood	-10.578	-15.757

NOTE: $N = 360$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
 $*p < 0.10$. $**p < 0.05$. $***p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table B.6: Model2d: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Number of Liberal Imposed Steps	-0.142	0.04	0.833
Economic Performance	-0.133	0.04	0.839
Level of Economic Development	-0.287	0.30	0.581
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.268	0.55	0.457
Religious Fractionalization	0.211	0.33	0.566
Global Test	—	1.01	0.961

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table B.7: Model 3a: The Effect of Years Under Colonial Rule on Former Colonies

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>
Years Under Colonial Rule	1.003 (0.005)	1.003 (0.005)
Economic Performance	0.086 (0.565)	0.172 (0.856)
Level of Economic Development	0.441 (0.251)	0.614 (0.193)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1350.824** (4035.334)	184.726** (419.707)
Religious Fractionalization	209.9812** (462.833)	15.241* (15.241)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	
Log Likelihood	-17.205	-25.039

NOTE: $N = 320$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
 $*p < 0.10$. $**p < 0.05$. $***p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table B.8: Model 3a: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Years Under Colonial Rule	0.388	2.15	0.142
Economic Performance	0.293	0.85	0.357
Level of Economic Development	0.332	0.49	0.482
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.414	0.76	0.384
Religious Fractionalization	-0.254	0.47	0.494
Global Test	—	2.16	0.826

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table B.9: Model 3b: The Effect of the Amount of Imposed Liberal Steps on Former Colonies

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>
Number of Imposed Liberal Steps	0.849 (0.118)	0.874 (0.861)
Economic Performance	0.020 (0.130)	0.053 (0.288)
Level of Economic Development	0.397* (0.224)	0.581 (0.241)
Ethnic Fractionalization	217.083** (498.820)	25.986* (45.885)
Religious Fractionalization	253.500** (574.332)	13.287 (0.111)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	
Log Likelihood	-16.525	

NOTE: $N = 320$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parantheses.

* $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

- Weibull Results 74.9% of hazard of comparison group
 - Cox Results 82.4% of hazard of comparison group
 - PH Tests no violation
- All Cases of Colonial Heritage - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969. Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010. this set of analyses, I test the effect of competing arguments regarding colonial legacy on all former colonies with imposed, liberal steps that began democratizing between 1945 and 1969.
 - Duration of Colonial Rule - no effect on democratic duration has implications for use of variable to capture colonial rule over time - does not capture
 - PH Tests No PH violation
 - All Cases of Colonial Heritage - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969. Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
 - Number of imposed institutions - Variable of Interest not significant in all former colonies - need to account for institutions x experience
 - PH Tests - No PH violation

Table B.10: Model 3b: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Imposed Liberal Institutions	0.365	1.30	0.254
Economic Performance	0.165	0.28	0.596
Level of Economic Development	-0.113	0.05	0.823
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.024	0.00	0.9513
Religious Fractionalization	0.0349	0.01	0.934
Global Test	—		

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table B.11: Model 3c: The Effect of Moderate to High Number of Imposed Liberal Steps on Former Colonies

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Weibull Model</i>	<i>Cox Model</i>
Seven or More Imposed Liberal Steps	0.293* (0.208)	0.354* (0.198)
Economic Performance	0.083 (0.579)	0.238 (1.270)
Level of Economic Development	0.327* (0.193)	0.470** (0.177)
Ethnic Fractionalization	149.125** (343.1286)	25.367* (45.872)
Religious Fractionalization	238.190** (571.880)	16.926** (24.615)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	
Log Likelihood	-15.752	-24.124

NOTE: $N = 320$. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$ All significance tests are two-tailed.

Table B.12: Model 3c: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption

<i>Variable</i>	<i>rho</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Seven or More Liberal Steps	-0.098	0.11	0.743
Economic Performance	0.078	0.04	0.847
Level of Economic Development	0.031	0.00	0.968
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.011	0.00	0.974
Religious Fractionalization	-0.142	0.22	0.642
Global Test	—	0.24	0.642

NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 *df*)
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.

Table C.18: Uganda Polity

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