THE WILTED LILY
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE GREATER CAPETIAN DYNASTY
WITHIN THE VERNACULAR TRADITION OF SAINT-DENIS, 1274-1464

by Derek R. Whaley

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the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
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ABSTRACT

Much has been written about representations of kingship and regnal authority in the French vernacular chronicles popularly known as *Les grandes chroniques de France*, first composed at the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Denis in 1274 by the monk Primat. However, historians have ignored the fact that Primat intended his work to be a *miroir* for the princes—a didactic guidebook from which cadets of the Capetian royal family of France could learn good governance and morality. This study intends to correct this oversight by analysing the ways in which the chroniclers Guillaume de Nangis, Richard Lescot, Pierre d’Orgemont, Jean Juvénal des Ursins, and Jean Chartier constructed moral character arcs for many of the members of the Capetian family in their continuations to Primat’s text. This thesis is organised into case studies that follow the storylines of various cadets from their introduction in the narrative to their departure. Each cadet is analysed in isolation to determine how the continuators portrayed them and what moral themes their depictions supported, if any. Together, these cases prove that the chroniclers carefully crafted their narratives to serve as *miroirs*, but also that their overarching goals shifted in response to the growing political crises caused by the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) and the Armagnac-Burgundian civil war (1405-1435). Where at first the chroniclers of the thirteenth century advocated many forms of Capetian dynasticism—the promotion of dynastic governance—by the fifteenth century, only forms of dynasticism that directly enhanced the authority of the kings of France were promoted by the continuators. The revelation that there is a conscious redirection of the narrative suggests a shifting awareness of the relationship between king and dynasty within late medieval French society. It also suggests that other contemporary chronicles likely functioned as *miroirs* and may require reassessment to verify whether they, too, reflect this change in perspective.
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................ vii
Figures.............................................................................................................................. ix
Note on Translations and Names................................................................................... xi
Table of Abbreviations...................................................................................................... xiii
Timeline of Chronicle History.......................................................................................... xv

1. Introduction: The Dionysian Vernacular Tradition .................................................... 1

   Part I: Capetian Dynasticism

   2. In the Shadow of the Lion ..................................................................................... 35
      2.1 Model Brethren.................................................................................................. 36
      2.2 Charles d’Anjou and the War for Sicily ......................................................... 43
      2.3 The Question of Artois ................................................................................. 54
   3. Cursed and Fortunate Kings ................................................................................... 65
      3.1 The Navarrese Double Monarchy ................................................................. 66
      3.2 The Valois Ascendancy ............................................................................... 71
      3.3 The Perseverance of the House of Évreux ................................................... 82
   4. All Roads Lead to War ............................................................................................ 93
      4.1 Suspicious Agnates ...................................................................................... 93
      4.2 The Flemish Problem ................................................................................... 101
      4.3 The War of the French Succession ............................................................... 109

   Part II: Regnal Supremacy

   5. The Times of Troubles......................................................................................... 125
      5.1 A Kingdom Without a King ........................................................................... 125
      5.2 The War of the Two Charles ....................................................................... 132
      5.3 Quarrelous Uncles ...................................................................................... 138
   6. The Apanage Kings ............................................................................................... 149
      6.1 The Burgundians ......................................................................................... 150
      6.2 The House of Orléans and the Armagnacs ................................................. 157
      6.3 Those Left Behind ...................................................................................... 164
   7. Reimagining the Capetian Dynasty ......................................................................... 175
      7.1 Redeeming the Capetians of Brittany ......................................................... 175
      7.2 Reframing Illegitimate Kin .......................................................................... 184
      7.3 Embracing Capetians of Another Father ................................................... 188
   8. The Triumph of Regnal Supremacy ....................................................................... 199
      8.1 The Rise of the Angevins ............................................................................ 199
      8.2 Echoes of the Hussites in France .................................................................. 205
      8.3 The Valois’s Sacrificial Lamb ...................................................................... 213

9. Conclusion: Les Chroniques de France ..................................................................... 223

Bibliography..................................................................................................................... 237
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To every person and organisation that helped me complete this momentous task, I give you my most sincere thanks and appreciation. I could not have done this without you.
FIGURES

Genealogical figures are typically arranged hierarchically with the senior-most generation at the top of the page and later generations descending. Marriages are marked by horizontal lines linking two individuals, while descent is noted by lines above names. Dashed lines (---) designate illegitimate descent. A row of individuals may not represent the same generation. References to later genealogical figures in this thesis and other lines of descent are differentiated by text in small caps. Not all children and spouses are noted, either because they are not mentioned by the chroniclers or because they do not feature in this study. Only relevant titles are listed. Years of reign are noted for titles of comital rank or higher.

General Key to Genealogical Charts:
- **Bolded names** – Emperors, kings, and queens regnant
- **Underlined names** – Dukes, earls, and counts, and regnant duchesses and countesses
- **Plain-text names** – Individuals with lesser titles or no titles, including clergy
- [Titles in brackets] – Individuals whose primary title is held in pretence
- **Italicised names** – Individuals not referenced in the chronicles under study

List of Figures:
1.1 Genealogy of Pasquier Bonhomme’s *Chroniques de France* ........................................ 19
1.2 Capetian Dynasty, 1223 – 1461 .......................................................... 27
2.1 Capetian Royal Family from the 7th Crusade to the Aragonese Crusade, 1248 – 1285 .......... 37
2.2 Capetian House of Anjou and the War for Sicily, 1223 – 1435 ............................... 44
2.3 Capetian House of Artois, 1237 – 1461 .................................................. 55
3.1 Rulers of Champagne and Navarre, 1152 – 1305 ........................................... 68
3.2 End of the Senior House of Capet and the Successions of 1316 – 1328 ......................... 72
3.3 Children of Charles de Valois ..................................................................... 79
3.4 Capetian House of Évreux, 1298 – 1441 ................................................... 83
4.1 Capetian House of Dreu-Brittany, 1213 – 1399 ................................ ......... 94
4.2 House of Dampierre, 1251 – 1405 ......................................................... 102
4.3 Houses of Plantagenet and Lancaster, 1299 – 1461 ........................................ 110
5.1 Senior House of Valois and the Sons of Jean II, 1350 – 1461 ............................. 139
5.2 Capetian House of Bourbon, 1269 – 1461 ............................................. 145
6.1 Capetian Houses of Burgundy and Valois-Burgundy, 1272 – 1461 ................. 151
6.2 Capetian House of Orléans and the House of Armagnac, 1319 – 1461 ............. 158
7.1 Houses of Châtillon-Penthièvre and Dreu-Montfort, 1364 – 1461 ................. 177
7.2 Houses of Harcourt, Albret, and Foix-Grailly, 1358 – 1461 ............................ 191
7.3 House of Luxembourg-Ligny, 1380 – 1461 .................................................. 195
8.1 Capetian House of Valois-Anjou, 1384 – 1461 ........................................ 201
8.2 Capetian House of Valois-Alençon, 1285 – 1461 ........................................ 214

NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND NAMES

All primary source quotations are presented in the body of the text in English and all such translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. Original language transcriptions for all translations are included in the footnotes except for simple statements, names, and titles.

Names of peoples are usually given in the modern spellings of the regions with which they were most prominently associated. Likewise, place names are given their modern regional spellings (e.g., Évreux, Reims, Guyenne) unless this may lead to confusion for English-language readers (e.g., Brittany rather than Bretagne, Burgundy rather than Bourgogne).
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

CKS – Chronica Karoli Sexti
CRJC – Chroniques des règnes de Jean II et de Charles V
GCF – Les grandes chroniques de France
GPT – Gesta Philippi Tertii
GSL – Gesta Sancti Ludovici
HCRF – Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>King</th>
<th>Wars &amp; Conflicts</th>
<th>Events &amp; Treaties</th>
<th>Chronicle Editions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1223</td>
<td>Louis VIII</td>
<td>Barons’ Crusade (1239-1241)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1226</td>
<td>Louis IX</td>
<td>Seventh Crusade (1248-1254)</td>
<td>Treaty of Paris (1259)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1270</td>
<td>Philippe III</td>
<td>War of the Sicilian Vespers (1282-1302)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Roman des Rois (1274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1285</td>
<td>Philippe IV</td>
<td>Aragonese Crusade (1284-1285)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1314</td>
<td>Louis X</td>
<td>Guyenne War (1294-1303)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1316</td>
<td>Philippe V</td>
<td>Franco-Flemish War (1297-1305)</td>
<td>Tour de Nesle Affair (1314)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1322</td>
<td>Charles IV</td>
<td>War of Saint-Sardos (1324-1325)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1328</td>
<td>Philippe VI</td>
<td>Anglo-French War begins (1337)</td>
<td>Trial of Robert III d’Artois (1329-1331)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330</td>
<td></td>
<td>War of the Breton Succession (1341-1365)</td>
<td>Edward III claims French throne (1340)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350</td>
<td>Jean II</td>
<td>Battle of Poitiers (1356)</td>
<td>Treaty of Brétigny-Calais (1360)</td>
<td>Lescot’s chronicle (c. 1350s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1364</td>
<td>Charles V</td>
<td>Western Schism (1378-1417)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Orgemont’s chronicle (1375-1382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1380</td>
<td>Charles VI</td>
<td>Battle of Agincourt (1415)</td>
<td>Charles VI falls ill (1392)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Louis d’Orléans assassinated (1407)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Treaty of Troyes (1420)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1422</td>
<td>Charles VII</td>
<td>Paris and Saint-Denis recaptured (1436)</td>
<td>Jeanne d’Arc active (1429-1430)</td>
<td>Chartier’s chronicle (1437-1464)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Normandy recaptured by French (1450)</td>
<td>Praguerie revolt (1440)</td>
<td>Juvénal’s chronicle (c. 1450s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guyenne conquered by French (1451)</td>
<td>Charles VII annexes Viennois (1456)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battle of Castillon (1453)</td>
<td>Trial of Jean II d’Alençon (1456)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1461</td>
<td>Louis XI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grandes chroniques (1476)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: The Dionysian Vernacular Tradition

Blanche was all alone. Her husband, Fernando de la Cerda, heir to the kingdom of Castile, died in 1275 and her father-in-law, Alfonso X of Castile, had withdrawn his support for her sons’ claims to the Castilian throne.¹ Because of this, ‘Blanche, their mother, was not given her rent nor dower nor anything on which she could live. The good woman remained troubled and lost among the Spanish, who barely noticed her’.² Had she been simply a Spanish noble-woman, Blanche would have probably disappeared into obscurity, her story deemed unimportant to the history of thirteenth-century Europe. But Blanche was not just anybody: she was a lily of France, the daughter of King Louis IX, and her brother Philippe was not amused.

Philippe III reigned during the most peaceful period of French history since Hugues Capet had seized the West Frankish throne in 987. Indeed, by the late-thirteenth century, descendants of Hugues—the Capetians—sat on virtually every throne in western Europe, a product of the wide net the dynasty had cast as it solidified its position in France over the previous three centuries. The monks at the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Denis near Paris were well aware of the important position the Capetian dynasty held in Europe. Their French-language chronicles, begun in 1274, are littered with hundreds of passages about the activities of Capetian kings, cadets, and their close relatives. Taken separately, most of these episodes appear as simple historical accounts or short biographical summaries. When considered together, however, they demonstrate far more than a passing knowledge by literate monks of important events and people—they constitute fully-realised stories and serve as examples from which readers could learn morality, good governance, and what it meant to be a Capetian prince. The first Dionysian vernacular chronicler, Primat, explains in his prologue that his text is composed of ‘examples for leading a good life, both for kings and princes who have lands to govern…that this history is a mirror of life’.³ Thus, the vernacular chronicles produced at Saint-


Denis were intended by their initiator to function as *miroirs des princes*, a medieval prose literary genre of instructive manuals given to members of royal families and the upper nobility to prepare them for a life of leadership. But stating this intention is not the same as following through. Traditionally, chronicles are not considered *miroirs* by most historians since they are not overt about their messages and do not appear, at least on the surface, to instruct ‘kings and lesser rulers about the virtues they should cultivate, their lifestyle, their duties, the philosophical and theological meaning of their office’. Although he hints that narrative sources were sometimes considered *miroirs* by their authors, Robert Lambertini does not name a single chronicle in his entry on the subject in the *Encyclopedia of the Medieval Philosophy*. Meanwhile, Einar Már Jónsson’s categorisation of the different types of *miroirs* overlooks chronicles entirely. Even Jean-Philippe Genet’s study on the evolution of the genre only hints at the idea that chronicles could serve as *miroirs*, naming two early Dionysian texts before turning away from the concept. This study seeks to challenge this preconception and determine whether the continuations to Primat’s vernacular chronicle reflect an overt desire by the authors to advance didactic messages to their readers.

A moral undertone certainly emanates from the story of Blanche and her sons. The Dionysian chronicler shows that the mistreatment of Blanche and disinheritance of her children enraged Philippe, who ‘demanded that [Alfonso] ensure that the dower of his sister Blanche was not taken nor otherwise barred from her, and that the right that his nephews ought to have to the kingdom of Castile was protected’. Alfonso did not appreciate being told what to do by his neighbour in France, so Philippe’s agents covertly rescued Blanche instead. A chase ensued, during which other malcontents joined the fleeing French, but the chronicler reminds the reader that their defections were justified since Alfonso ‘had perjured himself and that he had made a false oath’. Moral lessons such as these are commonplace throughout the vernacular

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5 Lambertini, 792.
6 Lambertini, 791-797.
9 ‘…il manda qu’il gardast bien que le douaire sa seur Blanche ne fust par li ne par autre empeeschié, et que le droit que ses neveus devoient avoir ou royame de Castelle leur fust gardé’. GCF, VIII:56. See GPT, 498.
11 ‘…comme cil qui estoit parjure et qu’il avoit faussé son convenant’. GCF, VIII:57. This sentiment
narratives and clearly show an intent to inform and educate the reader. Following Blanche’s rescue, Philippe again threatened the Castilian king, warning that ‘he would overrun his land and that he would take vengeance’ if the king did not restore the rights of his sister and nephews.\textsuperscript{12} But Alfonso ‘responded by words of pride and vanity and he said that he would do nothing whatsoever that the king of France asked of him’.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, the chronicler attributes cardinal sins to the Castilian monarch, thereby justifying on moral grounds Philippe’s repeated incursions into Castile in 1276, 1280, and 1285.\textsuperscript{14} Alfonso acts the part of a villain and Philippe is framed as the hero who is forced to break the peace of the realm in order to uphold the birthright of his nephews.

Crafting roles and archetypes for individuals found within the vernacular continuations was a technique adopted frequently by the Dionysian authors, especially in relation to Capetian cadets. Doing so allowed for narrative continuity between disparate passages and mental comparisons between different but similar individuals. Indeed, Gabrielle Spiegel argues that ‘the chronicles of Saint-Denis stand as true documenta for a study of the “mental context” in which the French state existed, developed, and achieved legitimacy’.\textsuperscript{15} If this is true, then uncovering how these chronicles functioned and were understood by their audience is essential to decoding the mindset of the late medieval French aristocracy.\textsuperscript{16} Andrew Lewis suggests further that

the image projected by [these chronicles] was not mere hagiography; it was drawn from the ideals of kingship and of Christian chivalry. Both ideals were shaped by the call to godly service, and they demanded blameless life of the individual. Both king and knight were to serve God in all that they did, to defend the church, promote justice, put down wrong-doing, protect the poor; piety, observance of good faith, avoidance of all sin were required of them.\textsuperscript{17} The shared traits of the royal and chivalric ideals suggest a community of values giving substance and context to the royalist expressions.

\textsuperscript{12} ‘…il mandoit bien qu’il courroit sus sa terre et qu’il en prendroit vengance’. \textit{GCF}, VIII:65.
\textsuperscript{13} ‘…il respondi paroles d’orgueil et de boban, et dist qu’il n’en feroit riens de quanque le roy de France li mandoit’. \textit{GCF}, VIII:65.
\textsuperscript{16} It remains unknown who specifically read or used the Dionysian vernacular chronicles. Discussing medieval literary audiences in general, Joachim Bumke, \textit{Courtly Culture: Literature and Society in the High Middle Ages}, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 508-509, notes that ‘only a small number of people could have participated continuously in the literary life of the courts: the princely patron himself and his family, the court clergy, the holders of the chief court offices with their wives, the closest advisors to the prince from the local nobility—all together surely not more than twenty to twenty-five people.... [O]ur understanding of literature in the Middle Ages involves categories different from the modern method of literary interpretation, which seeks to comprehend a work of art “in its entirety”’.
\textsuperscript{17} Andrew W. Lewis, \textit{Royal Succession in Capetian France: Studies on Familial Order and the State},
If such a ‘community of values’ existed in late medieval France, it seems likely that chroniclers of royal history would have integrated expressions of it into their works.\textsuperscript{18} And there is no more fulfilling or flattering way to accomplish this task than to use members of the royal family itself as the primary examples for all that Lewis describes. Joachim Bumke explains that ‘consideration of the intended audience must have played an important role even during the composing of the work, so that the creative process could almost be seen as a continuing dialogue between the author and his audience. In this way, the listeners were drawn into the work itself—they became participants’.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, it is likely that most of the moralising found in the vernacular continuations shows itself in the activities of the Capetian family since they are both the subjects and the audience of these texts, and it is through analysing their portrayals that the mentality of the Capetian royal family—or at least the Dionysian perception of that mentality—may be revealed.

Even when didactic messages are relatively clear in the narrative, they can shift or become muddled under different authors or due to changing circumstances. A decade after Philippe III’s death, Blanche’s children—the de la Cerda princes—took charge of their war for Castile personally. The chronicler makes sure to remind the reader that they were ‘sons of Blanche, daughter of the holy king Louis of France’—in other words, they were still family.\textsuperscript{20} The death of their uncle Sancho IV in 1295 gave the princes an excuse to assert their claim since the late king’s children were illegitimate.\textsuperscript{21} However, this moral cause did not lead to victory and early successes in 1296 could not be sustained once their uncle and strongest supporter, Juan, señor de Valencia de Campos, abandoned their cause in 1298.\textsuperscript{22} The final straw came in 1302, when the pope legitimated the sons of Sancho, depriving the princes of their moral purpose.\textsuperscript{23} From this point forward, the story of the de la Cerda family becomes a tale of dynastic decay within the vernacular narrative. Alfonso, a grandson of Fernando, is only called a ‘cousin of the king’ by the chronicler, but his death from fever while fighting for the

\textsuperscript{18} Bumke, \textit{Courtly Culture}, 518, clarifies that ‘[m]ost men and women of the nobility were incapable of reading a book. But even those who could read seem to have used this skill only infrequently, for courtly literature was a social event, and its purpose lay in creating and confirming a sense of community’.

\textsuperscript{19} Bumke, \textit{Courtly Culture}, 510.


\textsuperscript{22} \textit{GCF}, VIII:165-166, 170-172.

French king in Gascony is noted and his interment is described shortly afterwards. A decade later, France and Castile finally agreed to a permanent peace between the two realms, in effect ending any remaining support the de la Cerda princes could expect from their Capetian relatives. Since the pretensions of the de la Cerdas threatened domestic security, their overall importance to the dynastic narrative disappeared. The last prince of the line, Charles de la Cerda, was a close friend and confidant of Jean II of France, eventually becoming constable of France and count of Angoulême, but his assassination by a rival in 1354 closes the book on the family within the Dionysian narrative. In their earlier passages, the de la Cerdas presented a moral struggle against a sinful antagonist who threatened the rights of relatives of the Capetian dynasty. This is something the Dionysian authors could rally behind. But once the princes’ cause lost its moral focus and, more importantly, directly threatened French diplomacy, the chroniclers turned away from it.

The story of the de la Cerda family reflects a dualism found within the Dionysian vernacular continuations between the promotion of Capetian dynasticism and the advocacy of regnal authority. Dynasticism, as the term is used throughout this study, refers to the ways in which the chroniclers promoted dynastic governance and favoured narratives that highlighted specific Capetian cadets and cadet lines. The focus on dynasticism is strong throughout the *Roman des rois* and its first two continuations but then begins to fade beginning in the 1370s, when the life and activities of Charles V overshadow those of his relatives within the chronicles. This emphasis on dynasticism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries reflects contemporary perceptions of societal hierarchies and the relative autonomy of territorial units within France. Throughout this period, the king had titular authority over his nobility, but it was


27 Herbert H. Rowen, *The King’s State: Proprietary Dynasticism in Early Modern France* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 16, explains that ‘[f]eudal dispersal of power was in itself hardly good for the kingship; feudalism happened to kings, they did not deliberately create it. But they accepted it as part of the conditions of the time…. The kingdom became the highest feudal tenure, held of God himself but of no human being; it was a lordship (seigneurie) like that of vassals and rear-vassals down to the holders of manors, and therefore held as property…. The same limitations were placed upon the royal domain; although the king held these lands (and other rights) not as supreme overlord but in the same capacity as any vassal (that is, his revenues were received and his rights exercised not as king of France but as, say, duke of Aquitaine or count of Soissons), he could not alienate them any more than the crown itself’. 
often imprecise, based on traditions, and openly ignored. From the 1370s, however, the Dionysian chroniclers came to view regnal authority as a much more important facet of the king’s identity. Although they were wont to define regnal authority any more precisely than had their predecessors, their focus shifted away from narratives that promoted general dynasticism and moved toward specific examples of members of the Capetian dynasty serving the king. This change in focus reflected new perspectives on royal governance that were being developed throughout this period. Together, these two themes—dynasticism and regnal authority—and how focus on the former shifts to the latter within the Dionysian tradition only become obvious when the various continuations are analysed together.

The Dionysian vernacular continuations that were sponsored or otherwise patronised by the royal family form a surprisingly consistent and continuous narrative despite being written by multiple unaffiliated authors. Pasquier Bonhomme, a commercial printer in Paris, certainly considered this series of texts a single work when he compiled the first printed Chroniques de France in 1476. But the chroniclers themselves must have felt there was some continuity between the texts since they repeatedly copied and adapted earlier continuations into their own recensions. Nonetheless, no historian has examined the continuations together as a unit nor discussed the narrative transition that occurs within these chronicles in the mid-fourteenth century when the primary aim of the texts shifts from promoting general Capetian dynasticism to advocating strict regnal supremacy. Evidence for this transition is found throughout the chronicles and will be discussed in numerous examples throughout this thesis, but elements of it are also found in the de la Cerda story above. When the story begins, Philippe supports the cause of his nephews both diplomatically and militarily. Yet as their claim becomes less powerful, their contribution to the Capetian dynasty declines and their story is simplified within the chronicles. By the time Charles de la Cerda appears, he is an agent of the French king, not a pretender to the Castilian throne, and his reason for being in

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29 For a full discussion of this transition, see Chapter 5.

30 David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 30, argues that “[b]y the fifteenth century, the king was also a “seigneur souverain” and in this sense the notion of sovereignty had already been worked out by the glossators of the thirteenth century. An ordonnance of 1304 had referred to the “plenitude de la puissance royale”. It was during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that the concept of sovereignty was disseminated in the course of speculation about the king’s legislative powers and how far the power to initiate legislation extended beyond that of the purely positive law”.

INTRODUCTION: THE DIONYSIAN VERNACULAR TRADITION

Whaley

the story is not because of his eighty-year-old claim, but because he embodies King Jean’s regnal authority and his assassination initiates a challenge to that authority. In other words, the narrative has seamlessly transitioned and the moral role Charles plays within this new framework is as an innocent victim whose murder necessitates royal justice.

As the de la Cerda case demonstrates, the didactic nature of these tales is not always apparent when they are viewed as separate passages. Primat knew that some messages would be clear and others less so, but his purpose remained the same: to provide examples for his audience. He explains in his prologue that ‘[h]ere each can find good and bad, beauty and ugliness, sensibility and folly, and derive his profit above all by the examples of history; and for all these things that one reads in this book, even if they are not all profitable, the majority can provide guidance [aidier].’

Supporting this approach, Anne Hedeman explains that miroirs in general ‘shared a royal audience and a content designed to teach a prince to govern with sound moral principles’, to which Bernard Guenée adds that Primat’s text ‘was first of all an extended lesson in ethics’. The genre developed under the Carolingians as a means to promote ideals of kingship, with authors generally relying on Biblical and Augustinian ideals. It witnessed a resurgence in various forms under the reign of Louis IX, but the chronicles produced at Saint-Denis notably divert from the norm of abject moralising found in other miroirs by adopting an impersonal narrative style that forces the reader to identify and interpret the lessons found in the texts. Later continuations muddy the narratives further by interjecting long primary source documents such as letters, treaties, and witness accounts—inherently juristic in nature that do not always enhance the moral undercurrent in the texts. But Pierre Courroux reminds readers that, in the Middle Ages, ‘history for the sake of history did not exist: it is only because a chronicle had an intelligibility with respect to the present that it

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was read. The present casts a shadow over the past to better understand the future’. Modern readers have their own biases and filters through which they interpret medieval texts such as those from Saint-Denis, and identifying medieval lessons in ethics is neither an easy task nor foolproof. Nonetheless, drawing out some of these codes and lessons within the vernacular continuations is a primary goal of this study.

The vernacular chronicles produced at Saint-Denis may appear on the surface as medieval prose histories, but they also functioned as instructional manuals on rulership—*miroirs des princes*—or at least such was Primat’s desire. The first such chronicle was likely intended as a gift to Philippe III from his father, Louis IX, while the prince was still heir to the throne. Other chronicles from the same tradition also served as gifts and all continued to be infused with didactic messages and moral examples. Yet modern historians have not widely embraced this view. This study intends to restart the debate by analysing the portrayals and characterisations of Capetian cadets within a single series of continuations to Primat’s chronicle to determine whether and what moral messages lie beneath the surface.

1.1 Historiography

The textual material produced at the abbey of Saint-Denis did not live in a vacuum. The items there were but a few of hundreds of Latin and vernacular chronicles, chronicle rolls, religious treatises, polemics, and other instructive texts that circulated throughout France in the later Middle Ages. All of these documents hold one thing in common, though: their authors had an entirely different idea of what constituted truth when compared to modern historical conceptions. Dionysian chroniclers followed the pattern of other medieval writers and believed that previously written and oral sources collected at the abbey proved, by their very existence, the authenticity and credibility of their works. Primat explains this in his prologue, stating that ‘this history will be described according to the letter and the order of the chronicles of the abbey of Saint Denis in France, where the histories and the deeds of all the kings are written’. Thus, abbey records validated the truth found in his chronicle. Guenée suggests that ‘the dream of a [medieval] French historian was to write a trustworthy history,
that is to say a history that, by royal approbation, would be authenticated’, adding that, ‘once he had completed it, he…humbly submitted his work to the very Christian king “so that it might become, by the king’s sole authority, a public monument”’.\footnote{\textit{‘Le rêve d’un historien français était d’écrire une histoire digne de foi, c’est-à-dire une histoire que l’approbation royale rendrait authentique…. Lorsqu’il l’eut achevée…soumettait humblement son œuvre au roi très chrétien “pour qu’elle devint, alors seulement, par l’autorité du roi, un monument public”’}. Guenée, ‘Les \textit{Grands Chroniques}’, 191. See also Spiegel, \textit{Romancing}, 218-219.} While this sentiment may not have been universally true, especially for material not intended for a royal audience, it certainly was true in respect to vernacular chronicles commissioned by and for the Capetian dynasty.\footnote{Recensions of Primat’s chronicle were only owned by a small fraction of the French nobility and saw virtually no dispersion out of northern France or into the clerical, merchant, and peasant classes. The diffusion of the text was largely isolated to courts closely related to the Capetian dynasty genealogically, such as those of England and Flanders. Guenée, \textit{Histoire et culture historique dans l’occident médiéval}, Collection historique (Paris: Aubier, 1980), 289, 312.} Jean Chartier, the last vernacular chronicler in this study, wrote in his prologue that ‘I…have the intention to record in writing that which [the king] did in his time and during his reign, as truthfully as I can, and without showing any favour or partiality’.\footnote{‘…je, cronicqueur dessus nommé, ay intencion de rédiger par escript ce qu’il se fera son temps et règne durant, le plus véritablement que je pourray, et sans porter faveur à aucun, ne parcialité’. Jean Chartier, \textit{Chronique de Charles VII, roi de France}, new ed., ed. Auguste Vallet de Viriville (Paris: P. Jannet, 1858), I:27.} Despite a two-hundred-years gap between them, both Primat and Chartier strove to produce reliable, authoritative texts, proving that these qualities were a bedrock of Dionysian scholarship.

The beliefs that most chroniclers held regarding the truthfulness and reliability of their texts did not make their works any more factual. It must be emphasised that conceptions of historical truth based in the Middle Ages are incompatible with modern historical standards. Hans-Werner Goetz explains that

\textit{[h]istory was considered as (constant) change as far as the progress of time and the development of kingdoms was concerned, but it was perceived under the same structural conditions. That is why past events could easily be compared with features of the present and the present could be judged by their past precedents. This includes a typological approach, by regarding a historical person or fact as a ‘type’, that is, a precursor of a present and future realization.}\footnote{Goetz, 30.}

The implications of Goetz’s argument are troubling for modern historians. If most chroniclers could not differentiate between past and present institutions and mentalities or envision a different future, then they could only impose their present conceptions of reality upon the subject matter in their writings. This explains why archetypes and moral messages are so widespread within chronicles—they are a direct product of the moralistic mental context of their writers. This also means historical statements made in these texts may not necessarily be factually true. But this did not matter to the medieval reader nor should it trouble the modern historian.
The struggle to reconcile this ‘belief that history should be true with the obvious fictionality of so many’ texts has made the study of chronicles a contentious topic.\textsuperscript{44} In regard to French chronicles, historians of the 1830s were the first to begin seriously studying medieval texts, although their primary concern was centred on their usability and reliability as sources of historical fact. Because of this, vernacular chronicles, which are overwhelmingly derived from Latin sources, were discounted, if not wholly ignored. Exemplifying this attitude, Paulin Paris, an early editor of Dionysian vernacular chronicles, dismissively notes that ‘the true chronicles of Saint-Denis were without exception those compositions written in Latin’.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, his introductions to the first two volumes of his critical edition focus almost exclusively on the Latin origins of his vernacular subject matter. Similarly, Auguste Vallet de Viriville, who edited Chartier’s chronicle, includes an annotated bibliography of the various manuscripts and print editions of the chronicle and a detailed look at the sources Chartier likely employed in writing his work.\textsuperscript{46} In both instances, the editors failed to analyse the chronicles for differences between the Latin and French texts or address why such differences occur.

This generally negative attitude toward especially vernacular chronicles became more pronounced at the turn of the nineteenth century as structural theorists such as Leopold von Ranke came to distrust chronicle sources since they felt the perspectives of the authors impeded the modern historian’s access to truth.\textsuperscript{47} Historians of this period felt a need to ‘strip away rhetorical amplifications and legendary accretions, and to try to control for obvious partisanship and bias’.\textsuperscript{48} For example, Jules Viard, another editor of Dionysian vernacular texts, appends long introductions to almost every volume of his critical edition, outlining precisely which sources the chroniclers used when preparing their texts, which specific manuscripts were probably consulted, and the likely reasons why the author used those specific documents.\textsuperscript{49} Likewise, Roland Delachenal opens the third volume of his own edition by describing the manuscript history of his source, the process of writing, authorial intent, and even the writing quality of the chronicler.\textsuperscript{50} In addition, both editors include copious analytical

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\item \textsuperscript{44} Justin Lake, ‘Current Approaches to Medieval Historiography’, History Compass 13:3 (2015): 90.
\item \textsuperscript{47} John Wyon Burrow, A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances and Inquiries from Herodotus and Thucydides to the Twentieth Century (London, UK: Allen Lane, 2007), 463-464.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Lake, 89.
\item \textsuperscript{49} See Viard, introduction to GCF, I:vii-xxxii, VIII:i-xvi, IX:i-x.
\item \textsuperscript{50} See Roland Delachenel, introduction to CRJC, III:i-xlvi.
\end{itemize}
footnotes and appendices from a plethora of critical editions and transcriptions produced over the previous century, much of which highlights alternative versions of passages found in similar texts. Despite these new developments, historical interest in medieval texts—especially vernacular chronicles—remained relatively static, although historians such as Henri-François Delaborde, Jean Lemoine, and Paul Viollet did begin examining the historiography of the various scriptoriums and identifying authors.\footnote{See Delaborde, ‘Le vrai chronique’: 93-110; Jean Lemoine, ‘Richard Lescot: Un nouveau chroniqueur et une nouvelle chronique de Saint-Denis (1268-1364)’; Comptes rendus des séances de l’Académie des Inscriptions et belles-lettres 4:23 (1895): 141-151; Paul Viollet, ‘Une Grande Chronique Latine de Saint-Denis: Observations pour servir à l’histoire critique des œuvres de Suger’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 34 (1873): 241-254.}

Most historians remained focussed on Latin sources and their verifiability. With such limitations, it was impossible for researchers to reconcile their desire to uncover truth with the excessive hyperbole and blatant fabrication found throughout chronicle sources.

As historians began to turn away from structuralist approaches following World War II, they became intrigued with the process of myth-making and the construction of political ideologies.\footnote{Guenée notes the growing post-structuralist trend in 1964, writing that ‘the inventory and study of myths, which grounded French political life at the end of the Middle Ages, is far from over’, and suggests that much of this myth-building was intentional and promoted by the Capetian monarchy.\footnote{Mais l’inventaire et l’étude des mythes, qui ont marqué la vie politique française à la fin du Moyen Age, sont loin d’être achevés’. Guenée, ‘L’histoire’, 350.} Nonetheless, he also defends the older school of thought, emphasising that ‘the nature and action of the State is not simply caused by a mental context. It depends also on the social and economic context’.\footnote{‘La nature et l’action de l’État ne sont pas simplement conditionnées par un contexte mental. Elles dépendent aussi d’un contexte social et économique’. Guenée, ‘L’histoire’, 352. \textit{See also} Andre Burguieres, ‘The Fate of the History of Mentalities in the Annales’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 24:3 (1982): 426-427.} Indeed, historians of the 1960s began to blend many different fields of social science together, including cultural anthropology, archaeology, sociology, economics, ideological studies, and the study of emotions, using the scientific method to revolutionise social and historical enquiry.\footnote{Michael Bentley, \textit{Modern Historiography: An Introduction} (London: Routledge, 1999), 137.} Fundamentally, historians in this period ‘wanted answers, crystalline conclusions, whether they came as numbers or prosaic certainties’\footnote{Bentley, 137.}. It is in this environment that one finds Spiegel’s ground-breaking \textit{The Chronicle Tradition of Saint-Denis}, an inherently structuralist work which, nonetheless, became the springboard for all future Dionysian studies.\footnote{See Spiegel, \textit{Chronicle Tradition}. The 1960s were a rupture point...}
between the older, traditional, structural approaches of the modern period and the more mixed approaches of the post-structural era. Both schools survive today and often exchange and borrow ideas, but historians of each view and use chronicles differently within their research.

The primary difference between structuralism and post-structuralism relates to the ‘linguistic turn’, a concept adopted for use in history by Hayden White in 1978. White argues that historical narratives are, at their core, ‘verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much invented as found and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences’. Robert Levine, the English translator of some of Primat’s chronicle, states this too, arguing that ‘history in the Middle Ages…was a branch of rhetoric—that is, it was literature’. Because of these tendencies, White argues, ‘a historical narrative is not only a reproduction of the events reported in it, but also a complex of symbols which gives us directions for finding an icon of the structure of those events in our literary tradition’. In other words, chronicles such as those produced at Saint-Denis were designed to be relatable to their readers and it is through iconography and archetypes that one can most easily relate. White explains further that ‘history was not, and could not be, a transparent medium for the recounting of facts, but was instead a literary construct that made use of the same types of narrative forms as fiction’. For the Dionysian vernacular writers, that meant that the chronicler created ‘a horizontal frame unified by a fluid narrative, whereas the Latin chronicles which inspired it came from sources of a type that were more or less heterogeneous’. Courroux adds that Primat ‘did not hesitate to invent to reduce the inconsistencies’. But vernacular chroniclers did not simply reduce inconsistencies, they compressed the narrative and enhanced its moral themes. It must be emphasised that this process ‘cannot be explained through questions of propaganda and ideology. These anachronistic words badly explain the medieval reality that it was more a question of examples and didactic messages’. Justin Lake clarifies that the ‘use of writing to ensure that important events would be

60 White, 88.
61 White, 83. See also Lake, 91.
62 ‘Primat…crée dans son *Roman des rois* une trame horizontale unifiée par une narration fluide, là où les chroniques latines dont il s’inspire cumulent des sources de manière plus ou moins hétéroclite’. Courroux, 685.
63 ‘Il n’hésite pas à inventer pour réduire les incohérences’. Courroux, 685.
64 ‘Les manipulations de l’histoire ne peuvent être résumés à des questions de propagande ou d’idéologie. Ces mots anachronistiques couvrent mal une réalité médiévale où il est plus question d’exemplarité et de didactique’. Courroux, 586.
remembered in a certain way…should be distinguished from more traditional “synchronic” propaganda, which only really became possible with the advent of mass media’. 65 Thus, while the Dionysian chronicles and other medieval texts may often appear propagandistic to a modern reader, the urge to analyse them as such must be suppressed. Within the post-structuralist school, medieval chronicles should be viewed primarily as pieces of historical fiction with all of the accompanying traits, including unreliable narrators, character arcs, and moral messages.

Among post-structural historians analysing medieval texts, three distinct approaches have emerged that all respond in different ways to this linguistic turn. The least related to this study is the method adopted by art historians such as Anne Hedeman, who critically analyse the visual imagery found in chronicles in order to discover the ways in which medieval people viewed and interpreted their world. 66 Meanwhile, Guenée’s L’opinion publique à la fin du Moyen Âge d’après la Chronique de Charles VI du Religieux de Saint-Denis (Public Opinion at the End of the Middle Ages According to the Chronique de Charles VI by the Religieux of Saint-Denis) has set the standard for how a single medieval text can prompt a wide variety of interpretations using both structural and post-structural techniques. 67 In contrast, Spiegel has moved away from the structural undertones of her first book to focus specifically on the ways in which the linguistic turn impacts the modern study of medieval texts and why late medieval authors began adopting the vernacular in their writings, two topics that have proven controversial among structuralists and post-structuralists alike. 68 These latter two authors dominate the field of Dionysian studies today, producing between them scores of articles, chapters, and books on the subject and advancing the field in many new directions. However, other historians have also contributed to recent scholarship. Lindy Grant uses Dionysian texts to explore conceptions of church and state during the twelfth century. 69 Meanwhile, Chris Jones analyses, among other things, medieval perceptions of France’s relationship with the rest of Europe, especially the Empire, balancing the Dionysian position with those of other scriptoriums in western Europe. 70 And more narrowly, Marie-Thérèse de Medeiros has aggregated data

65 Lake, 95.
66 See Hedeman, Royal Image; and Morrison and Hedeman.
70 Chris Jones, Eclipse of Empire? Perceptions of the Western Empire and its Rulers in Late-Medieval France, Cursor Mundi 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007).
from various French chronicles to explore how different authors perceived the Jacquerie revolt in 1358. There are dozens more authors who have contributed to recent Dionysian and French chronicle research, many of whom are published in *Saint-Denis et la Royauté*. Related fields have also seen a recent awakening, with Maree Shirota and Thandi Parker examining within chronicle rolls ideas such as prophecy-fulfilment as a political tool and the role of women in genealogical narratives. Ultimately, the post-structuralist position regarding medieval texts is that they ‘reflect a plurality of “truths”, not a single Authorized Version’. They cannot be used as corroborators of facts, but they can serve as sources of public opinion, ideology, mythology, and mental context.

Within the field of Dionysian studies, post-structuralism holds sway, but it is not uncontested and older structuralist approaches still command respect. Outlining a facet of the latter perspective, Keith Busby explains that it is ‘undeniable that each manuscript possesses its own autonomy and must have constituted “the text” for its own readers or listeners in the Middle Ages, [but] the true individuality of a textual witness only emerges after detailed (and, some would say, tedious) comparison with all the other surviving copies’. He adds that the ‘exclusive use of a single-manuscript text-edition or unthinking use of the critical edition fails to do justice to practically every person involved in the process of transmitting the text: including the authors, scribes, artists, and planners’. Busby’s perspective reflects the thoughts of American structuralist historians Charles Haskins and Joseph Strayer, who, Michael Bentley explains, largely used ‘history as the early nineteenth century did, as a vehicle for locating groups and peoples and giving them a past that suits their present or encourages their sense of a future’. Their model is grounded on the idea that institutional history, including the study of bureaucracies, judiciaries, records, taxes, and the military, is fundamental to understanding how the Capetians consolidated their power. It looks from the present backwards to investigate the structural processes that ultimately created modern France. Prominent historians such

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74 Bentley, 143.


77 Bentley, 148.

78 Sean L. Field and M. Cecilia Gaposchkin, ‘Questioning the Capetians, 1180-1328’, *History Compass*
as Sean Field and M. Cecilia Gaposchkin strongly support the Haskins-Strayer model, asserting that ‘the basic narrative and analytic scaffolding constructed by [them] was ultimately reinforced rather than destabilized [by post-structural historians], precisely because these cultural approaches to representations and disseminations of power remained directly relevant to the underlying question of how identity and political community coalesced’. 79 Thus, they credit post-structuralism with opening new avenues of structuralist enquiry. As evidence, they note the massive œuvres of Elizabeth A. R. Brown and John W. Baldwin, two structuralists who have spent five decades producing hundreds of documents that collectively analyse nearly every aspect of medieval Capetian history. 80 It is undeniable that all French historians rely heavily on secondary material produced by structuralists. Likewise, most structuralists accept that “‘Political’ issues [related to royal ideologies, religious legitimacy, and truth claims about the king and kingdom] shade over into the realm of cultural history and evidence of art, rhetoric, literature, sculpture, and architecture’. 81 These are the areas in which post-structuralists excel. Indeed, there is much crossover between the two schools, but a fundamental difference remains. Spiegel explains that, ‘in treating documents as texts rather than sources’—a key feature of post-structuralism—‘it suggests the instability and opacity of all and any knowledge of the past, while at the same time…attacking the very foundations on which [structural] medievalists had constructed their professional legitimacy’. 82 This may have been true in previous decades, but today most historians accept some subjectivity in their sources and adopt elements of both approaches into their research, proving that structuralism remains viable and respected among medievalists. 83

This present study walks a precarious line between the two schools of historical thought. Its premise is based on an overtly post-structuralist statement made by Spiegel in The Past as Text, in which she explains that the chronicles at Saint-Denis have never been systematically exploited. Concerned with the chronicles as source material for other studies, both nineteenth- and twentieth-century discussion of them has focused on the problem of verifying their historical accuracy or exposing

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79 Field and Gaposchkin, 569.
80 Field and Gaposchkin, 569.
81 Field and Gaposchkin, 568.
known instances of distortion or downright fabrication. Indeed, it is only recently that medieval historiography in general has begun to be investigated as an intellectual tradition that demands the same sympathetic attention to its underlying beliefs and techniques of expression accorded other genres produced by medieval intellectual life. And that effort has not yet extended to the chronicle tradition of Saint-Denis.  

Despite a gap of nineteen years since she first published these observations, Spiegel remains correct in her sentiments regarding Dionysian studies. With the exception of Guenée’s *L’opinion publique*, the chronicles at Saint-Denis have only been used as contributing parts of long-format studies, not the sole source for them. Therefore, there is great potential for exploration within the texts of the Dionysian tradition. But Spiegel also makes an oversight in her assessment. By discounting the critical editions produced over the past two centuries, she seemingly ignores their potential usefulness, implying that only medieval manuscripts are important historical sources. This criticism discounts all the contributions made to the historiography of the Dionysian tradition by editors such as Paris, Viard, Delachenal, and Vallet de Viriville. Yet, through their critical commentaries, extensive footnotes, and frequent comparisons to other manuscripts, these historians have taken the first step toward unlocking the ‘underlying beliefs and techniques of expression’ that Spiegel claims they unsympathetically overlooked. On a practical level, medieval manuscripts do not provide the same attention to detail found within these critical editions. By writing their editions, the editors worked toward completing the arduous task of transcribing and critically comparing their source documents. They simply left the task of analysing, interpreting, and explaining the reasons behind the myriad contradictions, omissions, corrections, and selections made within the vernacular chronicles to future historians. The end result is that critical editions of all the Dionysian vernacular texts, from Primat’s 1274 chronicle to Chartier’s 1461 continuation, are currently available for use and historians do not need to balance both codicological interpretation and textual analysis. This study will use these critical editions and commentaries as a basis from which to answer a fundamentally post-structuralist question regarding the presence of didactic messages in Dionysian vernacular texts.

1.2 Methodology

This study will focus specifically on the portrayals and characterisations of various Capetian cadets found within specific Dionysian vernacular continuations, which is a novel

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84 Spiegel, *Past as Text*, 84.
85 Although, as noted above, dozens of journal articles and chapters exist analysing specific aspects of the Dionysian chronicles.
means of uncovering overt and subtle didactic messages within medieval documents. The reason for using Dionysian texts rather than material produced at other scriptoriums is straightforward: Saint-Denis was the home of the royal mausoleum and the crown jewels. Members of the Capetian dynasty frequently patronised the abbey throughout the later Middle Ages, making the chronicles produced at Saint-Denis the most likely to favour royal narratives and use cadets as supporting characters. Similarly, the focus on only a specific series of vernacular chronicles hinges on the fact that some texts had more direct connections to the royal family than others. Primat’s text was the first vernacular chronicle linked to a Capetian king, although similar chronicles had circulated among the French aristocracy since the early thirteenth century.86 Almost as soon as it was presented to Philippe III, the text was copied by scriptoriums across northern France and fell outside Dionysian control.87 While based largely on Dionysian documents, these editions, many of which were continued by their owners, cannot be said to be direct products of abbey scholarship and often include non-Dionysian material.88 Therefore, this thesis will focus on a single set of Dionysian vernacular continuations, specifically a series of texts commissioned or otherwise promoted by the royal family that together span the history of France from the death of Philippe II Auguste in 1223 to the death of Charles VII in 1461. Together, these continuations constitute the *Chroniques de France* as printed by Bonhomme in 1476, although whether they truly should be considered one continuous narrative will be discussed at the conclusion of this study.89

One constant theme in all these continuations is that the activities of the Capetian cadets and other close family members frequently motivated and dominated the narratives. Typically, however, the activities and portrayals of kings are the focus of historians, leaving cadets as a noticeable void in chronicle-centred scholarship.90 Cadets fulfilled many important

89 Bonhomme supplemented his *Chroniques* for the years 1403 to 1422 with an extract from the *Chronique du roi Charles VII* by the herald of Berry, Gilles le Bouvier, whose writings have no Dionysian origin but were associated with the French court at Bourges. Maureen Boulton, ‘Gilles le Bouvier’, in *Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle*, ed. Graeme Dunphy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 708; Guenée, ‘Les *Grandes Chroniques*’, 207.
90 See, for example, Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France*, trans. Susan Ross Huston (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Delogu, *Theoriz-
roles in medieval life as advisors and councillors, military commanders, peers and family, and trusted friends of the kings. Indeed, genealogy and family relationships are a key feature of the Dionysian continuations. Spiegel explains that, by ‘patterning his narrative along genealogical lines, the vernacular chronicler was able to create a seemingly coherent and realistic image of time and social affiliation that could give structure and meaning to an account of contemporary history’.  

91 Alain Demurger adds that the chronicles are ‘seeking the origins of a lineage or of a people’.  

92 The Dionysian chroniclers often highlight heritage, such as the origins of the Franks or the descent of Louis VIII from the Carolingians, and note genealogical relationships of individuals to parents, grandparents, siblings, and others.  

93 They are omnipresent reminders that the Capetian dynasty encompassed more than simply the ruler—it was a network of interconnected relationships and lineages that drives the narrative forward and provides it with necessary detail and structure. Therefore, this study will take the unusual approach of testing its hypotheses on those cadets of the Capetian dynasty mentioned within the continuations. The term ‘cadet’ will be used broadly to refer to both agnates, ‘persons related to each other through males only’, and cognates, ‘those relations who derive their common descent from the same pair of married persons, whether the descent be traced through males or females’.  

94 While such an all-encompassing definition is unusual, it better reflects how medieval peoples likely perceived family and dynastic relationships. In contrast, the name ‘Capetian’ will be used strictly to refer to agnates, including daughters but excluding their children, who descend in a male line from Hugh Capet.  

95 Because of their constant presence within the vernacular continuations, the Capetian cadets are ideal candidates for use as didactic messengers and it is through their portrayals and narrative arcs that this study will determine whether such messages were intentionally constructed.

It is not possible nor necessary to recount the entire history of the Dionysian vernacular tradition for the purposes of this study—Spiegel, Guenée, and Hedeman have accomplished this task with appropriate thoroughness—but it is essential that the history of those...
It is unknown whether a Descriptio qualiter of Descriptio quae est completed before 1180. However, the Historia regis Ludovici VII was completed after 1180. The Gesta Sancti Ludovici, completed c. 1280, was based on the Historia regis Ludovici VII and other sources.

The Speculum historiale was completed in 1244. The Ex Gestis Ludovici VIII Regis was completed c. 1285. The Gesta Philippii Tertii was completed c. late 1280s. The Chronicon, completed c. 1341, was based on the Speculum historiale and other sources. The Chronique française abrégée, completed c. 1342, was based on the Gesta Philippii Tertii and other sources. The Chronique universelle, completed c. 1345, was based on the Chronicon and other sources. The Chronique de Flandres, completed c. 1347, was based on the Chronique française abrégée and other sources.

The Legend indicates:

- BNF fr. 2813 – Critical edition used in this study
- Gesta Ludovici VIII – Source used in recensions

Sources:

- Avril, ‘Jean Fouquet’, 43-44.
- Gaposchkin, Making, 147.
- Guenée, Un roi, 71-73.
- Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 387, 394-395, 398-399, 424.
- Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition, 46-48, 90, 97, 102, 120.
- Un roi, 71-73.
- Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 387, 394-395, 398-399, 424.
- Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition, 46-48, 90, 97, 102, 120.
continuations discussed in this study is outlined. The tradition itself began with Primat, a monk who was commissioned by the abbot of Saint-Denis, Mathieu de Vendôme—undoubtedly under orders from Louis IX—to write a vernacular history of the kings of France. Primat’s completed product, commonly called the Roman des rois (Sainte-Geneviève 782), is primarily a compilation of heavily-edited and translated material, largely derived from a Latin anthology (BNF lat. 5925) that had been compiled at the abbey in the 1250s from works by Aimoin de Fleury, Einhard, and Suger, among others. The chronicle is organised chronologically via books documenting the reigns of each French king, which are subdivided into chapters that emphasise moments of significance. Thus, it differs in scope from the more common and popular universal chronicles of the period, which attempted to summarise the entirety of world history since Creation or the Deluge by drawing attention specifically to a sequence of historical figures. The continuators maintained this chronological framework and, with one exception, also retained the episodic chapter divisions. While Primat’s Roman is not included in this study, it is referenced on numerous occasions and Primat himself indirectly acted as its first continuator.

Continuations began almost immediately after Primat presented his Roman in 1274. Primat continued to write at the abbey until his death in 1277, although he appears to have never directly worked on continuations to his chronicle. Instead, he composed a Latin history of the reigns of Louis IX and Philippe to 1277. That text is now lost, but significant portions of it were translated by the Hospitaller Jean de Vignay and used in the first continuation to the Roman. All of the continuations produced at Saint-Denis until 1300 derived the remainder of their content from documents attributed to Guillaume de Nangis, another monk at

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96 For a graphical depiction of the chronicles used in this study, see Figure 1.1.
99 Morrison and Hedeman, 108.
101 Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition, 91.
102 Natalis de Wailly, Léopold Delisle, and Charles-Marie-Gabrielle-Bréchillet Jourdain, introduction to Primat, Chronique de Primat, traduite par Jean du Vignay, in Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France, vol. 23, eds. Natalis de Wailly, Léopold Delisle, and Charles-Marie-Gabrielle-Bréchillet Jourdain (Paris: H. Welter, 1894), 2. Jean de Vignay cites Primat as the source for the 1251 to 1277 continuation to his vernacular translation of Vincent de Beauvais’s Speculum historiale. This translation was written between 1335 and 1348. Jones, Eclipse, 77n102; Christine Knowles, ‘Jean de Vignay, un traducteur de XIVe siècle’, Romania 75 (1954): 371-
the abbey. Traditionally, Guillaume is credited with writing the Latin life of Louis IX now attributed to Primat, but Guillaume certainly edited and translated the life at least once.\footnote{Jones, \textit{Eclipse}, 62-63.} Indeed, a later recension of this text was appended to Sainte-Geneviève 782 at some point in the early fourteenth century, and it is this version that Viard included in his critical edition and which is referenced in this study.\footnote{Isabelle Guyot-Bachy and Jean-Marie Moeglin, ‘Comment ont été continuées les \textit{Grandes Chroniques de France} dans la première moitié du XIV\textsuperscript{e} siècle’, \textit{Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes}, 163:2 (2005): 393, suggest it was added after 1329, while Morrison and Hedeman, 109, state it was added between 1310 and 1320.} Guillaume also concluded Primat’s Latin life of Philippe and wrote his own universal history, the \textit{Chronicon}, which became the basis for numerous continuations and provided material for almost all continuations of Primat’s chronicle into the 1340s.\footnote{Isabelle Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 394-395; Spiegel, \textit{Chronicle Tradition}, 98-99.} However, these continuations were not direct copies; rather, they mixed material from the \textit{Chronicon} with, among other sources, continuations to Géraud de Frachet’s universal chronicle and Guillaume’s \textit{Chronique abrégée des rois de France}, a truncated history of the Capetian kings that was continued long after Guillaume’s death.\footnote{Isabelle Guyot-Bachy, ‘La chronique abrégée des rois de France et les \textit{Grandes chroniques de France}: concurrence ou complémentarité dans la construction d’une culture historiographique en France à la fin du Moyen Âge?’ in \textit{The Medieval Chronicle VIII}, eds. Erik Kooper and Sjoerd Levelt (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013), 209-210; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 398, 399.} Nonetheless, the pieces that would contribute to the first attempt at a coherent continuation in the 1340s were moving into place. Around 1285, another piece was added: a short Latin life of Louis VIII, derived primarily from the \textit{Chronicon Turonense} and Vincent de Beauvais’s \textit{Speculum Historiale}, that filled the chronological gap between Primat’s \textit{Roman} and his life of Louis IX.\footnote{Bethune, 37; Guenée, ‘Les \textit{Grandes Chroniques}’, 195-196; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 387; Spiegel, \textit{Chronicle Tradition}, 97. For a surviving fragment of this text, see \textit{Ex gestis Ludovici VIII regis}, in \textit{MGH SS} 26, ed. Georg Waitz (Hanover: Library of Hanover, 1882): 631-632.} This haphazard process of continuing Primat’s work defines the Dionysian vernacular tradition for its first seventy years and it is unlikely that these early continuations derived from direct Capetian patronage.

This situation changed once Richard Lescot took control of the scriptorium at Saint-Denis in 1329.\footnote{Guenée, ‘Les \textit{Grandes Chroniques}’, 197.} Like his predecessors, Lescot was a monk at the abbey, and it was he who began the difficult process of assembling the various Dionysian texts into one coherent document. One of his first attempts was a royal commission to compose an updated version of Primat’s chronicle that brought the history to 1328 (BL Royal 16 G VI).\footnote{Guenée, ‘Les \textit{Grandes Chroniques}’, 197.} This was completed in the 1340s and presented to the future Jean II, eldest son of Philippe VI, probably as a...
After Philippe’s death in 1350, Lescot compiled an entirely new continuation to Primat’s vernacular chronicle that brought the narrative up to 1350. In compiling this new work, he used a translation of the life of Louis VIII, new translations of the lives of Louis IX and Philippe III, and the Chronicon and its continuations. Increasingly, as the narrative advanced toward 1350, Lescot introduced translated portions of his own continuation to Géraud de Frachet’s chronicle, which he intermixed and ultimately replaced with selections from a continuation of the Chroniques abrégée des rois de France and the non-Dionysian Chronique de Flandres. The fact that this text was completed as early as 1356 and no later than 1360 suggests that it was intended, as the two royal compositions before it, as a miroir for the royal heir, in this case the future Charles V. However, Lescot’s text was not widely disseminated, possibly because of the civil war that erupted in northern France following the capture of Jean II at the battle of Poitiers in 1356. The only reason it did not fall into obscurity was because it was soon included in the best-known product of the Dionysian vernacular school.

As part of his campaign to glorify the French kingdom and definitively establish the legitimacy of the Valois line, Charles V usurped the traditional role of the Dionysian scriptorium and commissioned his chancellor, Pierre d’Orgemont, to compile a new vernacular history of the kings of France based on material produced at Saint-Denis (BNF fr. 2813). In this way, his chronicle remained a product of the Dionysian vernacular tradition although it was divorced from Dionysian oversight. A royal scribe, Henri de Trévou, completed the initial writing of this new edition in 1375, adopting almost verbatim the text of Lescot. His

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111 Four versions of this ‘Richard Lescot edition’ still exist—Grenoble Bib. mun. 1004, Lyon Bib. mun. 880, BNF fr. 17270, and BNF fr. 23140—but it is unclear which, if any, was the presentation version. Guénéé, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 201.
112 Guénéé, ‘Histoire’, 100-101; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 393.
113 Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 398, 399; Lemoine, 147-148. Only the years 1347 to 1350 are completely original to Lescot, although his editorial hand is present throughout the entire continuation. Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 426.
114 For a detailed history of this edition, see Guénéé, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 201; and Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 415-424.
117 Guénéé, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 203, goes so far to suggest that Saint-Denis may not have even possessed a copy of Orgemont’s chronicle.
recension was then updated and modified twice, once in 1377 and again in 1380, by another royal scribe, Raoulet d’Orléans. Raoulet added to Henri’s text an original history of the reign of Jean II as well as a partial history of Charles V’s reign that ended initially in 1375 and, ultimately, in spring 1379, roughly a year before Charles’s death. The clear intended recipient for this chronicle was none other than the future Charles VI, who was born in 1368. The 1377 continuation, in fact, ends with an admonition to the senior Capetian cadets to support and respect the regency agreement promulgated in 1375, suggesting that Charles V viewed this text as a miroir for his successor as well as an instruction manual for his successor’s guardians. In the 1380 edits, Raoulet modified a number of folios in the life of Philippe VI to better emphasise Valois legitimacy against English claims to the French throne. Hedeman notes that Raoulet’s edits ‘promote ideals of kingly behaviour in the context of contemporary political rivalries, exaggerating English misconduct and minimizing French deficiencies’. The governmental instability that followed Charles V’s death in 1380, as well as the unorthodox teaching practices of Charles VI’s tutor, Philippe de Mézières, likely contributed to the chronicle never receiving further updates. Delachenal, in his critical edition of Orgemont’s continuation, appends as an ending a text that matches the style of Raoulet and ends in 1382 (BNF fr. 17267), coinciding with the date that Orgemont left the court to become chancellor of the Viennois. This marks the end of what can be described as Primat’s vernacular tradition, or what many modern historians consider to be the ‘canonical’, ‘classical’, or ‘vulgate’ Dionysian vernacular chronicles. This reputation comes from the fact that dozens of manuscripts used Orgemont’s text as their basis over the subsequent century and that no new vernacular continuation issued out of Saint-Denis again until the mid-

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119 Morrison and Hedeman, 181.
120 Hedeman, *Royal Image*, 95.
121 Hedeman, *Royal Image*, 113.
122 Hedeman, *Royal Image*, 113. By the late 1370s, Charles was aware of his impending death and sought to check the likely struggle over the regency of his son. Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War*, vol. III: *Divided Houses* (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), 391.
123 Hedeman, *Royal Image*, 106-107; Morrison and Hedeman, 181.
126 Delachenal, introduction to *CRJC*, III:xlv; *CRJC*, III:42n2. Delechenal extends his edition two years further, using material from the same manuscript, but these additions lack the fluid prose of the scribe or chancellor. *CRJC*, III:43n2; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 385-386. 
fifteenth century. The critical edition of this text, edited by Viard and Delachenal in the early twentieth century, is referenced throughout this study for the years 1223 to 1226 and 1270 to 1382.

Lescot never returned to vernacular chronicle-writing, nor did anybody else at Saint-Denis, and for a hundred years, only Latin histories were produced at the abbey. Lescot’s successor, Michel Pintoin, usually known as the religieux of Saint-Denis, wrote a detailed Latin history of the reign of Charles VII from 1380 until the author’s death in 1421, but it is unclear whether this text was produced under royal commission. This chronicle was later abridged and edited between 1430 and 1470 by an author connected to the French court, who tradition states was Jean Juvénal des Ursins, archbishop of Reims. Royal control over the abbey was temporarily lost between 1420 and 1435 when the Anglo-Burgundians occupied Saint-Denis, and work at the scriptorium appears to have mostly ceased during this time. Reflecting this fact, Pintoin’s successor, Jean Chartier, did not complete Charles VI’s unfinished Latin life or begin his own history of the reign of Charles VII until he received a royal commission to do so in November 1437, a year after Saint-Denis had been recaptured. Chartier continued the Latin chronicle to 1450, at which point he abandoned the task and began a new French vernacular chronicle of the reign of Charles VII, using his own Latin

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131 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 207; Guenée, Un roi, 72. Guenée, Un roi, 427, notes that the Juvénal text ‘est partie un résumé français mais qui offri aussi pour partie un récit plus original’, thus it is not simply a translation of Pintoin’s work. Peter S. Lewis, Écrits politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1992), I.88, suggests that the portion through 1411 is derived from Pintoin, while René Plesschennau, ‘La “Chronique de la Pucelle”, Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 93 (1932): 95, disputes this, claiming everything until the Cabochien Revolt in 1413 is derived from Pintoin. Lewis, ‘L’histoire de Charles VI attribuée à Jean Juvénal des Ursins: Pour une édition nouvelle (information)’, Comptes rendus des séances de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 140:2 (1996): 565, 567-568, disputes the attribution to Juvénal entirely and argues that the translation was either a manuscript commissioned by Juvénal, a lost product of Saint-Denis itself, or a direct translation-compiler by Bonhomme’s printshop, although he does not entirely discount Juvénal’s influence over the chronicle’s creation. Claiming that a ‘Jouvenel compiler’ borrowed an earlier abridged translation of Pintoin’s chronicle written as early as the late 1430s, Lewis laments that one ‘cannot tell if the translation used by the Jouvenel compiler was made at Saint-Denis, even part of the vernacular tradition of Saint-Denis, or not’. Lewis, ‘L’Histoire’, 567n10; Lewis ‘Some provisional remarks’, 161. Hedeman, Royal Image, 180, and Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition, 125, speculate that Juvénal’s text was produced in the early 1430s, while Lewis, ‘L’histoire’, 567n10, argues that the chronicle could not have been written until 1455 and possibly as late as 1470.
text as a source intermixed with primary documents and new information. Lewis speculates that ‘Chartier may have turned to French possibly simply because of the difficulty of writing up modern technical terms in Latin’. In any case, Chartier ended this French chronicle shortly after the death of Charles VII in 1461 and the chronicler died in 1464, at which point royal historiography formally passed out of Dionysian control. It is to the modern critical editions of these specific continuations, which were all sponsored or otherwise promoted by the Capetian family, that this study will turn to analyse whether chronicles functioned as miroirs within late medieval French royal circles.

The key method of conducting this study is by analysing authorial intent. Goetz reasons that

by the choice and combination of facts, their respective themes and purposes and their manner of writing, judging and commenting on the facts…every chronicle actually was a new and independent work with its own aims and character, even if it was completely reliant on older traditions.

Taking this a step further, Spiegel suggests that

even literal translations are the product of conscious intentions and that if the Old French texts replicate the substance of Latin texts, it is because the translators believed those Latin works to offer adequate expressions of their own historiographical goals…. To assume anything less would do an injustice to the intelligence and purpose with which the creators of Old French prose historiography worked.

But definitively proving intentionality behind specific editorial decisions is impossible. Thus, this study will explore the idea of intentionality by analysing the portrayals of royal cadets to determine the ways in which Dionysian chroniclers actively constructed narratives that promoted didactic messages. Because Capetian cadets and their close relatives are ubiquitous within the vernacular chronicles, their portrayals by the chroniclers will serve as the foci of the study. The specific method of analysis used in this study is literary in nature: episodes involving cadets are isolated from the surrounding narrative and analysed to determine whether their portrayals constitute or contribute to a moral message. Detecting these messages is

134 Estelle Doudet, ‘Chartier, Jean’, in Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle, 267, dates the start of Chartier’s vernacular edition to 1445 and notes that the ‘French version is more detailed than the Latin and considerably longer’, but adds that the ‘years 1445, 1446, 1459, and 1460 are missing in the manuscripts’. See generally Guénaë, Le roi, 71-72; Samaran, 152.
136 Samaran, 149. After Chartier died, Louis XI gave the title of royal chronicler to Jean Castel, a monk at Saint-Martin-des-Champs, while in 1465, he named the Benedictine Guillaume Danicot historian of the king. Guéné, ‘Histoires’, 1013. The title of historiographer briefly returned to Saint-Denis from 1482 to 1483 when the monk Mathieu Levrien was given the position, but he died before making any meaningful contribution. Lewis, ‘Some provisional remarks’, 154.
137 Goetz, 32.
138 Spiegel, Romancing, 7.
conducted through a three-step process. First and primarily, episodes involving cadets in the vernacular narrative are reviewed on their own in order to reveal obvious didactic themes. Second, these episodes are compared to the Latin sources from which they derive, if such sources exist, to determine whether there are differences between the vernacular and source documents. And third, modern secondary sources are called upon to verify events and contribute scholarly opinions on the episodes. It must be emphasised, however, that these latter two steps are not intended to align events and characterisations with modern perceptions of truth. Rather, their purpose is to provide further evidence that narratives found within the chronicles have been intentionally altered in order to serve a specific purpose. Establishing empirical truth is not a goal of this study and, for the most part, the historical facts behind the events and people discussed by the chroniclers in this study do not matter. To better emphasise this point, Latin cross-references, archival documents, and secondary literature are primarily relegated to footnotes. Situating them thus allows the voices of the Dionysian vernacular continuators to remain at the forefront of this study. This process is repeated throughout this study to determine whether the Dionysian vernacular continuators intentionally crafted didactic narratives for their readers.

1.3 Structure

In order to best emphasise the ways in which the Dionysian continuators embellished their chronicles to advance moral themes, this study is divided into two parts.\(^{139}\) The first follows the earlier vernacular continuations and analyses how Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot adopted a broad approach to Capetian dynasticism by using the independent activities of cadets to serve as moral guides and didactic examples. The second part, in contrast, focusses on the ways in which attention within the chronicles shifts under Orgemont, Juvénal, and Chartier away from general dynasticism and more toward a targeted form of dynasticism that centres around the supreme authority of the king. Chapter 5 serves as the pivot point in this argument, assessing how Orgemont intentionally downplayed the roles of cadets and, indeed, villainised one cadet in particular in order to make the transition between Capetian dynasticism to regnal supremacy within his chronicle all the more obvious. However, many other case studies found throughout this study also span this transition period, such as the de la Cerdas above. Although a crude overall chronology is retained, with Chapter 2 beginning with the reign of Louis IX and Chapter 8 ending with the reign of Charles VII, the individual case

\(^{139}\) For a genealogically-based outline of this thesis, see Figure 1.2.
studies do not adhere to anything more than internal chronology. This allows for the individual stories of the various cadets to come to the forefront without being diluted by competing narratives. Cases of a similar nature are grouped within chapters so that they can be considered together and then compared to other cases within this study. While each chapter approaches the central issue differently, each contributes to the overall goal of determining whether there is an underlying moral purpose to the Dionysian vernacular continuations.

The three chapters that constitute Part I assess the approaches taken by the earlier vernacular continuators regarding how they used Capetian cadets and close relatives of the royal family to tell an instructive tale. The clearest example of this in the entire study is found in the first case in Chapter 2, which focuses on the archetypes constructed by the chroniclers for the three brothers of Louis IX. With this serving as the exception rather than the rule, the remaining eight case studies in Part I require deeper analysis to uncover didactic themes. In the rest of Chapter 2, attention is directed to the Capetian houses of Anjou and Artois and the drastically different ways the chroniclers portrayed the activities of the two families as they became more distantly connected to the ruling line. Chapter 3 explores how Dionysian chroniclers depicted the merger of the kingdoms of France and Navarre in 1314 and how they dealt with the division of those kingdoms in 1328. This chapter also surveys the vernacular portrayal of the succession crises of 1316-1328, focussing specifically on the moral merits of the Capetian house of Valois. Chapter 4 concludes Part I with three examples of less loyal relatives of the Capetian dynasty. The first case in this chapter is that of the rulers of Brittany to 1399, who, though legitimate Capetian agnates, the chroniclers never treat with the same degree of respect given to other Capetian agnates. The counts of Flanders provide the second case and theirs proves to be a long narrative of dynastic merger, similar to that of the rulers of Navarre albeit with far more resistance. The final case is that of the Plantagenet rulers of England, who, although kings in their own right, were dukes of Guyenne in France and constantly desired the return of ancestral lands lost to them under King John. Their narrative is one of constant war, frequent treaties, and failed marriage alliances. The ways in which the vernacular chroniclers discuss them reveals much about the attitudes of the Capetian court towards their cross-Channel neighbours. Considered together, the nine case studies in Part I tell of a time when the French throne was not excessively under threat and the Dionysian scriptorium could focus on the activities of various Capetian relatives throughout western Europe. The messages in these case studies reflect common themes associated with Capetian dynasticism, including family loyalty, fraternal devotion, charity, and crusading zeal.

The cases found in the four chapters of Part II represent a direct reaction against some
INTRODUCTION: THE DIONYSIAN VERNACULAR TRADITION

Whaley 29

of these earlier themes. Later chroniclers such as Orgemont, but especially Juvénal and Chartier, promoted regnal authority, sacrificial devotion, and unquestioning loyalty. This reflects changing political conditions in France and evolving concepts of the role Capetian cadets played within French society. Chapter 5 primarily examines Orgemont’s changing attitude toward cadets, comparing the portrayals of the future Charles V to Carlos II of Navarre during a period when Jean II was imprisoned in England. The chapter ends by analysing how Juvénal discusses the minority of Charles VI, a period that witnessed intense feuding between Capetian agnates. These feuds erupted into open warfare between rival Capetian lines at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and Chapter 6 compares how Juvénal depicted these cadets—specifically those of the houses of Burgundy, Orléans, and Armagnac—and used them as examples for moral messages within his chronicle. Chapter 7 investigates the characterisations and didactic roles of more distant cadets through a number of non-traditional case studies. The first continues the story of the dukes of Brittany, examining how Juvénal and Chartier used members of the family for very specific moral purposes. Following this, the roles of bastards within the later continuations are assessed to determine why they suddenly appear in the vernacular texts of the fifteenth century and what their presence meant for Capetian society. Five short case studies conclude this chapter and each analyses distant cognatic branches of the Capetian dynasty that are not traditionally considered Capetian cadets yet nonetheless fulfil an important dynastic role within Chartier’s chronicle. The final case studies are found in Chapter 8 and they seek to prove that Chartier intended regnal supremacy to be the primary message of his chronicle. The first case, therefore, examines how the members of the house of Valois-Anjou were used as good representatives of Capetian loyalty and devotion. They are contrasted with three cadets who failed to live up to their obligations as Capetian cadets and, as a result, were vilified to varying degrees in the narrative. In the end, the primary message of Part II is that cadet ambitions should never overshadow the regnal authority of the French king and it is this idea that will be explored throughout these chapters.

Because the Capetians are an ever-present and essential part of Dionysian vernacular narratives, it seems certain that they also serve as the vessels of any moral messages placed within the chronicles. Indeed, simply through their actions, cadets provide examples of good and bad morality and act as archetypes, epitomes, stereotypes, and people whom readers could mimic or vilify. But the chroniclers also manipulated historical events, altered their sources, and fabricated moral themes to produce, via the cadets, a constant series of examples from

which readers could learn all that was required to become good Capetian rulers. If the purpose of a *miroir* is to provide a reflection, then it is undoubtedly the cadets of the Capetian dynasty who gaze back at readers. But not all the lessons are the same and some are better defined than others. Thus, it is only through detailed case studies such as those found within this study that the individual moral messages within the Dionysian vernacular continuations can be fully known.


The world the Dionysian chroniclers inhabited was changing rapidly. Primat wrote during a long period of peace when France was safe and untroubled, and this sense of security flows as an undercurrent throughout his narrative. For his continuators, though, uncertainty and fear cloud their texts. Their attitudes and perspectives are more visible and their motives more obvious because they held a personal stake in the matter. The events they record are not just moments in an obscure past, but something they lived through and may have still been experiencing. Guillaume wrote during the Anglo-Flemish wars that saw numerous French defeats. The Black Death, the battle of Crécy, and the loss of Calais darken Lescot’s writings. Orgemont, Juvénal, and Chartier all wrote after hard-fought victories, where ultimate triumph over the English was still uncertain. Because of this, the continuators lacked adequate hindsight to truly understand the implications of their messages and were forced to rely on foresight to interpret events, predict their outcomes, and derive moral meaning from them. Therefore, the task of identifying didactic messages within their texts is all the more difficult, but also more important. As continuations of Primat’s *Roman des rois*, these texts are also stewards of the moral lessons found within that chronicle. And since these texts were copied and continued repeatedly for over two centuries by monks, royal bureaucrats, and commercial printers, these didactic messages must have remained relevant and the examples set by previous generations of princes must have continued to provide guidance to future generations. It means individuals such as the de la Cerda princes were not simply historical oddities haphazardly thrown into a highly-derivative, crudely-constructed, French-language compilation; rather, they contributed something important to an intentionally-crafted narrative that was meticulously tailored to a specific audience for a specific purpose. This study will analyse such individuals and narratives to discover precisely what those purposes were.

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PART I
CAPETIAN DYNASTICISM
CHAPTER TWO

*In the Shadow of the Lion*

Any study on didactic messages within the Dionysian vernacular continuations must begin with the four sons of Louis VIII le Lion. Louis was the son of Philippe II Auguste, the king whose reign concludes Primat’s chronicle, and he was the father of Saint Louis IX, the king who commissioned the chronicle. The activities and lives of Louis IX and his brothers motivated chroniclers to continue the story that terminated in 1223, thereby converting a singular example of vernacular literature into a living history of the Capetian dynasty. Primat himself was responsible for the Latin text that first continued the story to 1277, and Guillaume de Nangis completed that text and may have provided the first French translation as well. Richard Lescot, writing in the 1330s, compiled a new translation that he appended to the end of Primat’s original manuscript, which, in turn, served as the basis for Pierre d’Orgemont’s edition.¹ Throughout these early recensions, one theme persisted: the affection and devotion shared among the sons of Louis VIII. The relationship between Louis IX, Robert I d’Artois, Alphonse de Poitiers, and Charles I d’Anjou represented Capetian dynastic solidarity as it had never been experienced before, and the chroniclers emphasised this by fitting each brother into archetypal moulds that could serve as examples to readers. The king supplies the most obvious—a pious defender of the faith who would be remembered by and inspire all his descendants, be they Valois, Angevin, Artesian, Bourbon, or even English—but his oft-overlooked brothers also support archetypes of their own.² However, as later generations of cadets drifted further from their archetypal ancestors, continuators began to use them as examples of dynastic devotion that transcended the traditional limits of French influence. It is only under Lescot that this emphasis on fraternal unity within the vernacular tradition begins to wane. Nonetheless, the dynastic models established by the sons of Louis VIII and perpetuated by their descendants continued to bring the senior Capetians, the Angevins, and the Artesians together repeatedly over the ensuing centuries. This chapter will analyse the archetypal representations of these brothers and their descendants within the Dionysian vernacular tradition and discuss the ways in which their portrayals by the chroniclers acted as a didactic tool to advance a message of Capetian dynastic unity and strength.

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¹ Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 393.
² However, Beaune, *Birth*, 124, argues that ‘pervasive Mendicant imagery soon after his death had made him into a model Christian rather than a model king [while] movements of protest among the nobility joined his name to fiscal freedoms and later to special privileges. This had made it difficult for a centralizing monarchy without financial resources to profit fully from his legend’. For a thorough discussion of the archetypal qualities of Louis IX, see Gaposchkin, *Making*. 
2.1 Model Brethren

Such an intimate relationship had not always existed among cadets—the vernacular life of Louis VIII mentions no Capetian by name except previous kings. Primat and Guillaume (who will be treated together for 1226-1250 since Primat’s text is missing for this period and the originator of the information is unclear) do mention agnates at the beginning of their life of Louis IX—primarily Pierre I, count of Brittany, and Latin Emperor Baudouin II—but all are portrayed as unrelated lords, their Capetian credentials never emphasised. In contrast, Lescot introduces the royal family in the first sentence of his recension of the life of Louis IX, inserting before his translation of Primat-Guillaume’s narrative a reference to all Louis VIII’s children together rather than giving each their name. This makes the brothers’ individual introductions appear more impactful, with Alphonse and Robert first introduced in 1236 as royal counsellors, and Charles named in 1241 revering the Crown of Thorns. It is in this order that they are best understood within the vernacular tradition. The chroniclers portray Alphonse as the very model of domestic steadfastness, the literal and figurative solution to the ongoing problems in Languedoc and Guyenne. Robert, meanwhile, represents the valiant chivalric crusader, a selfless warrior who sacrifices all for the righteous cause of the king. Conversely, Charles demonstrates the potential for the Capetian dynasty to expand outside the traditional boundaries of the kingdom. This section will explore how the chroniclers used the lives of these brothers as positive examples of Capetian dynasticism, thereby instilling in readers the idea that royal princes have important roles to play in the Capetian dynasty and that it is the duty of all Capetian cadets to participate.

Among the three brothers of Louis IX, Alphonse is presented by Lescot first, although he is only introduced by his title, count of Poitiers, rather than by his name. This treatment is important because the role of this prince in the Dionysian tradition is intimately linked to his

5 GCF, VII:32. Jean Richard, Saint Louis: roi d’une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 437, notes that the descendants of Louis VIII were ‘une famille qu’il s’individualise au sein du lignage capétien: les liens de parenté se sont distendus tant avec les Courtenay et les Dreux, qui sont issus de Louis VI, qu’avec les ducs de Bourgogne, détachés du tronc capétien au temps de Robert le Pieux. De ces trois familles, les armes ne retiennent pas les fleurs de lys, qui figurant sur l’écu de toutes les branches issues de Louis VIII: ceux-là seuls sont des “princes des fleurs de lys”’. See Figure 2.1.
7 GCF, VII:66.
Figure 2.1 The Capetian Royal Family from the Seventh Crusade to the Aragonese Crusade, 1248 – 1285

- **Louis VIII**
  - France: 1223 – 1226
  - Blanca de Castilla (d. 1252)

- **Louis IX**
  - France: 1226 – 1270

- **Robert I**
  - Artois: 1237 – 1250
  - House of Artois (See Figure 2.3)

- **Alphonse**
  - Poitiers: 1241 – 1271
  - Toulouse: 1249 – 1271

- **Joana**
  - Toulouse: 1249 – 1271

- **Charles I**
  - Anjou & Maine: 1246 – 1285
  - Sicily: 1265 – 1282
  - Naples: 1265 – 1285

- **Alfonso X**
  - Castile: 1252 – 1284

- **Philippe III**
  - France: 1270 – 1285

- **Jean**
  - Nevers: 1265 – 1270
  - Valois: 1268 – 1270

- **Pierre I**
  - Alençon: 1269 – 1284

- **Anjou**
  - Blanche (d. 1320)
  - Alfonso de la Cerda
    - Angoulême: 1350 – 1354
    - Constable of France

- **Alfonso de la Cerda**
  - (d. 1328)

- **Sancho IV**
  - Castile: 1284 – 1295

- **Fernando**
  - (d. 1275)

- **Blanche**
  - (d. 1320)

- **Fernando**
  - (d. 1275)

- **Charles de la Cerda**
  - Angoulême: 1350 – 1354
  - Constable of France

- **Dukes of Bourbon**
  - (See Figure 5.2)

- **Dukes of Burgundy**
  - (See Figure 6.1)
territorial possessions. The apanage is only granted to Alphonse in the narrative in 1241, when
the king ‘made messire Alphonse, his brother, a knight, and then gave to him as wife the
daughter of the count of Toulouse, and the country of Poitiers and the land of Auvergne and
that of Albigeois’. The count’s grants said much about his intended role in Capetian politics.
Through Albigeois and Joana, the only daughter of Raimon VII of Toulouse, Alphonse was
intended to resolve the recurrent revolts in Languedoc. Through Poitou and Auvergne, he be-
came lord of many vassals long beholden to the kings of England on the Aquitainian march.
Indeed, by joining Toulouse, Auvergne, and Poitou into a contiguous bloc, Louis IX effec-
tively surrounded the Plantagenet holdings in Aquitaine, creating a buffer between their iso-
lated duchy and the rest of France. But Primat-Guillaume demonstrate that this encirclement
prompted an immediate response from Henry III of England and his step-father, Hugues X de
Lusignan, who intermittently assaulted Alphonse’s lands for nearly two decades afterwards.
In both this situation and in the later treaty of Paris in 1259, Primat-Guillaume and Lescot turn
the prince into a passive victim of royal authority, who allowed large portions of his territory
to be signed away to the English upon his childless death. Nonetheless, Alphonse’s strategic
position in France made him the best candidate to act as regent alongside his mother, Blanca
of Castile, when the rest of the family departed for the Seventh Crusade in 1248. Not want-
ing to undermine the chivalric valour of this woebegone prince, Lescot, translating Primat-
Guillaume, clarifies that Alphonse ‘took the cross, but it was agreed by the king and the bar-
on that he would remain this year in France’. Alphonse travelled to Egypt the next year but
came too late to help capture Damietta, although he did participate in the ensuing attack on

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8 ‘…et fist messire Alphons, son frere, chevalier, et si li donna à fame la fille au conte de Thoulouse, et
la contrée de Poitiers et la terre d’Auvergne et celle d’Aubigois’. GCF, VII:85. See GSL, 334. ‘Le mariage de
Jeanne of Toulouse avec Alphonse de Poitiers avait été célébre entre 1238 et 1241’. Richard, 106, 136-138. The
apanage grants were arranged by Louis VIII in 1225, but were not confirmed until his sons reached a suitable age
or status. Thus, although the chroniclers are technically incorrect in attributing the apanage grants as coming
from Louis IX, Louis was responsible for conferring these grants upon his brothers. Lewis, Royal Succession,
162-165.
9 Richard, 135, emphasises that ‘la reine mère envisageait avec faveur l’installation de ses puinés dans
des territoires formant en quelque sorte frontière, et qu’elle pensait que cette installation, complétée par un ma-
riage avec la fille d’un puissant voisin, serait un facteur de sécurité pour le royaume’.
10 See generally Robert Ducluzeau, Alphonse de Poitiers: Frère préféré de Saint Louis, La Crèche
(France: Geste éditions, 2006), 56-59.
12 GCF, VII:211. Primat-Guillaume did not mention Alphonse in the discussion of the treaty of Paris.
Cf. GSL, 410, 412. See generally Richard, 352-353.
13 Ducluzeau, 68.
14 ‘…estoit-il croisé, mais il fu acordé du roy et des barons qu’il demourast celle année en France’.
GCF, VII:118. See GSL, 356. See generally Simon Lloyd, ‘King Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean’, in
England and Her Neighbours 1066-1453: Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais, eds. Michael Jones and Mal-
Mansoura. After a brief captivity, Alphonse returned ‘to guard the realm of France with queen Blanche his mother who guarded it very wisely’. In effect, Primat-Guillaume deprive the prince of any feats of valour while abroad and then write him out of the narrative entirely until 1270, when the family departed on the Eighth Crusade. Even on this campaign, Alphonse is only mentioned by the chroniclers after the crusade fails, when both he and his wife died in short succession due to a camp illness. Lescot ends their story by stating that the ‘county of Toulouse and the county of Poitiers descended and came to the king of France because they had no heirs of their bodies’, underlining the true role Alphonse plays in the Dionysian vernacular narrative: he was not a unique individual, but rather the manifestation of the stalwart, absolute duty French territorial magnates owed to their king and dynasty. In the end, the chroniclers deprived Alphonse of all personal glory and agency in order to better establish him as an example of Capetian devotion and faithfulness.

There are numerous narrative parallels between the lives of Alphonse and his elder brother Robert despite a different underlying agenda by the chroniclers in their presentations. Lescot first mentions Robert in 1236 at the same time as Alphonse, where he is named ‘Robert d’Artois’, thereby binding his name with his territory in a union that continued through his descendants into the fifteenth century. The following year, the king ‘desired to give land to Robert, his brother, and make him a knight. And he requested [of] the duke of Brabant that he would give Mahaut, his daughter, to him as wife…. And he gave to his brother the county of

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16 ‘…et manda son frere le conte de Pottiers, et li commanda qu’il alast garder le reamme de France avoec la royne Blanche sa mere qui moult le gardoit sagement’. GCF, VII:159. See GSL, 382. William Chester Jordan, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1979), 113, states that Alphonse ‘fell under Blanche’s accusing eye for leaving the war in the East, an act which had left a bad impression on many. It had saddened the king’, suggesting that Guillaume altered the facts of this episode. Alphonse took control of the royal council after Blanca died in late 1252, breaking a precedent that disallowed agnates from serving as regent. Lewis, Royal Succession, 179; Richard, 241, 259.
17 GCF, VII:261. See Primat, 39; GSL, 440. See generally Ducluzeau, 199.
Artois and the city of Arras’. Thus, Lescot links Robert’s land to marriage, just as with Alphonse, but Robert’s territory was small and the marriage did not bring additional territory into the kingdom. Robert first made his presence in the continuation felt in the 1242 Saintonge War, where he is portrayed by Primat-Guillaume as a steadfast defender and loyal servant to Louis when he negotiates a truce with the English. The chroniclers name him first among the laity to take the cross for the Seventh Crusade in 1245, and he departed for the Levant alongside the king and Charles d’Anjou in 1248. Primat-Guillaume also include Mahaut in these passages, uncharacteristically introducing her by name in 1236 and stating that a pregnancy prevented her from accompanying her husband to the Holy Land, although she later joined him in 1249. The significance of her inclusion in the continuation is not her devotion to Robert, but rather the offspring that resulted from both episodes. Soon after her first mention in 1248, she gave birth to Blanche, mother of Jeanne I of Navarre, the future wife of Philippe IV. Her reunion with Robert in Egypt produced his posthumous heir, Robert II, who quickly outshone his father in the vernacular tradition.

As if to emphasise his lack of importance after this point, Robert I’s defeat and death at Mansoura in 1250 is barely recounted by Primat-Guillaume, despite him being the closest relative of the king to die while on crusade. Robert’s seeming unimportance to the narrative demonstrates an evolving attitude toward the Artesian patriarch that emerged during the recension process at Saint-Denis. Whereas Primat-Guillaume viewed Robert as a favourable representation of Capetian chivalric virtue and considered his sacking of Mansoura to be a short-lived victory against the Saracens, Lescot realised that Robert’s son served this purpose far better and downplayed the count’s importance in his own recension.

None of the continuators criticised Robert to the

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21 ‘…si li prist talent de donner terre à Robert son frère et faire chevalier. Et requist le duc de Brebant qu’il li donnast Mahaut sa fille à fame…. Et donna à son frère la conté d’Artoys et la cité d’Arras’. GCF, VII:70-71. See GSL, 324, 326. See generally Richard, 135.


25 GCF, VIII:46-47. See GPT, 492. See also Chapter 3.1.

26 Robert II is first mentioned by Primat-Guillaume in 1267, when he is knighted alongside the future Philippe III. GCF, VII:246; GSL, 428; Van Kerrebrouck, II:227.

27 GCF, VII:149; GSL, 374. Jackson, Seventh Crusade, 72-73, contextualises this incident by adding that Robert was victorious on the battlefield but lacked sufficient troops to counter the disadvantages of street fighting. He redeems Robert somewhat, saying that ‘Joinville has been accused of turning Robert d’Artois into the scapegoat for the failure of the crusade, which was a foregone conclusion in any case’. Louis IX himself blamed the arrival of the sultan, while the Patriarch of Jerusalem blamed the dysentery overrunning the camp. Regardless, ‘Louis was deeply grieved by the death of his younger brother’. Gaposchkin and Field, introduction, 7.

28 Although his Latin life does not emphasise Robert’s bravery in 1250, Guillaume’s French life glamours the count’s chivalric boldness: ‘Iluec avint une aventure trop layde; car li cuens d’Artoys freres le roys
same degree as many non-Dionysian chroniclers. Therefore, the version of Robert’s story that survived in most recensions emphasises Robert’s virtues while setting up the narrative for the generation to come. In both Primat-Guillaume’s and Lescot’s versions, Robert’s chivalric sacrifices, much like Alphonse’s political sacrifices, demonstrate a selfless advancement of Capetian dynastic authority at great personal cost.

The chroniclers portrayed Charles d’Anjou as a blending of the attributes of his brothers, but there was something that made him unique as well: in Charles rested the potential of the dynasty to expand beyond the traditional boundaries of France. This archetypal model is constructed by the chroniclers in two phases, first when Charles became count of Provence and then when he became king of Sicily, the former of which will be examined here. Before he is introduced in the narrative, Charles is conspicuously preceded by his future wife, Beatriz, who was sovereign countess of Provence, an Imperial territory that served as the boundary between French Languedoc and Imperial Lombardy. Primat-Guillaume recount how, in 1246, Caim I of Aragón attempted to forcibly marry the girl to his son, for which Lescot notes ‘the damsel went into France to the queen, her sister, and she put her body and lands under the protection and guardianship of the king’. By possessing the countess, Louis was able to direct the future of Provence by marrying the countess Beatriz. And, indeed, he ‘gave her…to Charles, his brother…and then he gave him the country of Anjou and all the land of Maine’. Absent from this transaction was Provence, a tacit acknowledgment by Primat-Guillaume that was retained by Lescot that the king had no legal authority over the Imperial county. Instead, Louis gave Charles wealthy lands on the Breton march that held symbolic

Loys, qui chevaliers preus et hardis estoit, si fui apris les Sarrazins qui fuoiuent en la ville de la Massourre, parmi la porte que il vit ouverte, et iluec fu pris ou occis, si que puis nouvelle nen fu oye; dont ce fu molt grans domages; car il estoit bons chevaliers et hardis. Vie de Saint Louis, 375. Primat’s original thoughts on the matter are unknown, but may be reflected in Guillaume’s Latin text, which says little about Robert. GSL, 374. Jean Dunbabin, The French in the Kingdom of Sicily, 1266-1305 (Cambridge: University Press, 2011), 157, opines that ‘Robert II d’Artois probably thought of his father’s death at Mansoura as martyrdom’.


30 Only three Capetian agnatic lines operated outside of France at this time: those descended from Henrique, count of Portugal, since 1096; the family of Latin Emperor Pierre II, since 1216; and Guigues VI, dauphin of Viennois, since 1228. Van Kerrebrouck, II:456-457, 559, 624-625.


33 ‘...la donna...à Karle son frere...et si li donna la contrée d’Angou et toute la terre du Meine’. GCF, VII:115. See GSL, 354. See generally Jordan, Louis IX, 18; Lewis, Royal Succession, 165.

34 Richard, 139, explains the initial transfer of power, by writing that after ‘s’être entendu avec la comtesse mère, et laissant le gouvernement du comté à Romée de Villeneuve et Albeta de Tarascon, qui avaient
and strategic value as former Plantagenet possessions. This clarifies to the reader that Charles remained a French vassal, despite his extraterritorial domains.\(^{35}\) The chroniclers show that Charles later joined Louis and Robert on the Seventh Crusade, fighting and being captured at Mansoura before returning to France with Alphonse.\(^{36}\) Thus, Charles shared certain key traits with his brothers—he was a French territorial magnate and a crusader—but he served a different role in the overall narrative. Primat notes how in 1254, Marguerite II of Flanders attempted to install Charles as ruler over the Imperial county of Hainaut in opposition to her quarrelsome sons, an action that was rejected by the French king.\(^{37}\) This incident provided a counterpoint to Charles’s legitimate status in Provence, where in 1257 he suppressed a revolt as if it was any other provincial uprising.\(^{38}\) His right to the county _suo uxoris_ is never questioned and the continuator streamlines the narrative in such a way that it appears to be primarily an isolated burgher revolt in Marseilles followed by the rebellion of a single baron; there is no sense of widespread opposition to Angevin rule, nor is there a hint that this conflict lasted eighteen years.\(^{39}\) To the chronicler, Provence is the legitimate possession of Charles and the count was justified in prosecuting those who questioned his rule.\(^{40}\) This was in stark contrast to his claims to Hainaut, which were portrayed by the continuator as unjustified, and ruled as such by the king. Within the context of the vernacular narrative, Charles remained a loyal French vassal throughout his early life despite reigning over territories outside of France, suggesting to the reader that Capetian dynasticism and loyalty transcend the boundaries of the kingdom and are essential components to being a Capetian prince.

Together, the portrayals of these three royal brothers reflect different traits of Capetian dynasticism that the chroniclers highlighted throughout their lives of Louis IX. Alphonse serves as the quintessential territorial magnate and the solution to forty years of heresy,
crusades, and noble revolts in Languedoc. Robert, meanwhile, is the stalwart companion of the king, the stereotypical chivalric knight whose crusading adventure was unsuccessful, but whose memory was embraced and reinvigorated by his more important progeny. And Charles establishes the dynastic expectations and obligations for those cadets living in the French periphery. The Dionysian vernacular continuators encourage other agnates to look to these men for inspiration as they set off to advance Capetian dynasticism, both domestically and abroad.

2.2 Charles d’Anjou and the War for Sicily

Charles d’Anjou, unlike all three of his brothers, survived both of Louis IX’s crusades and lived through most of the reign of Philippe III before dying in 1285, having lost most of his erstwhile empire to the Aragonese. Indeed, the magnitude of Charles’s Italian adventures on European politics caused Primat to virtually abandon his life of Louis IX to focus specifically on Charles. But the chroniclers used the prince’s adventures in Sicily to highlight more profoundly the ways in which Capetian influence expanded beyond the traditional boundaries of France, building off the precedents discussed above. Snippets of information permeate the narrative between the excommunication of Emperor Friedrich II in 1245 and the crowning of Charles as king of Sicily in 1266, the latter of which led to a two-year campaign to suppress those who challenged the Angevin claim to the kingdom. But while Primat used Charles’s adventures as further proof of Capetian dynastic might abroad, the resulting Sicilian response in 1282 undeniably undermined the impact of this message in Guillaume’s continuation. Facing the loss of the island of Sicily, Charles and his son fought a twenty-year war that led to the unprecedented partition of the kingdom between the island and the mainland, an event that Guillaume and Lescot struggled to recount in any coherent detail. This division became the burden of the later Angevins and a constant reminder of their inglorious defeat. To Pierre d’Orgemont and Jean Juvénal des Ursins, the matter of Sicily was only a sideshow, rarely deserving attention, while Jean Chartier ignored it entirely. Thus, to view the Angevins in the Dionysian vernacular tradition is to read a story of two families—intimately entwined—drifting apart over generations as their interests and attentions shift. Constructed as a core example of Capetian dynastic solidarity under Primat, the Angevins in later continuations become representative of how reckless ambition and a lack of foresight can undermine the sustainability of that same solidarity.

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41 Provence gave Charles a solid base from which to begin his later invasions of Italy. Boyer, para. 11; Léonard, 77-80.
42 See Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 The Capetian House of Anjou and the War for Sicily, 1223 – 1435

Charles I
- Anjou: 1246 – 1285
- Sicily: 1265 – 1282
- Naples: 1265 – 1285

Beatrice
- Provence: 1245 – 1267

Friedrich I & II
- Sicily: 1197 – 1250
- Emperor: 1220 – 1250

Konrad IV & I
- Germany: 1237 – 1254
- Sicily: 1250 – 1254

Manfredi
- Sicily: 1258 – 1266

Charles II
- Provence: 1267 – 1309
- Naples: 1285 – 1309
- Anjou: 1285 – 1290

Konradin
- Sicily: 1254 – 1258, 1266 – 1268

Constanza (d. 1302)

Pero III
- Aragón: 1276 – 1285
- Sicily: 1282 – 1285

Mária of Hungary
(d. 1324)

Charles Martel
- [Hungary: 1290 – 1295]

Marguerite
(d. 1299)

Violant
(d. 1302)

Later Kings of Aragón and Sicily

Károly I
- Hungary: 1301 – 1342

Marguerite (d. 1299)

Later Rulers of Hungary & Poland

Károly I
- Hungary: 1301 – 1342

Poland: 1370 – 1382

Lajos I
- Hungary: 1342 – 1382

András
- Naples & Provence: 1343 – 1345

Giovanna I
- Naples & Provence: 1343 – 1381

Maria
(d. 1366)

Margherita
(d. 1412)

Carlo III
- Naples: 1381 – 1386

Giovanna II
- Naples: 1386 – 1414
- Naples: 1414 – 1435

Konradin
- Sicily: 1254 – 1258, 1266 – 1268

Roberto
- Naples & Provence: 1309 – 1343

Carlo
- Calabria: 1325 – 1328

Violant
(d. 1302)

Later Kings of Aragón and Sicily

Pero III
- Aragón: 1276 – 1285
- Sicily: 1282 – 1285

Late Rulers of Hungary & Poland

Lajos I
- Hungary: 1342 – 1382

Poland: 1370 – 1382

Violant
(d. 1302)

Late Rulers of Hungary & Poland

Lajos I
- Hungary: 1342 – 1382

Poland: 1370 – 1382

Violant
(d. 1302)

Late Rulers of Hungary & Poland

Lajos I
- Hungary: 1342 – 1382

Poland: 1370 – 1382
Beginning with the excommunication of Friedrich II by Pope Innocent IV in April 1245, Primat-Guillaume interject short bits of information regarding affairs on the Italian peninsula that provide context for the later Angevin conquest. They briefly outline the case against Friedrich, citing specifically the emperor’s lack of respect for the feudal dues he owed the Papacy for Sicily and the Empire. Lescot resumes this tale during his narrative of the Seventh Crusade, recounting how, after the death of the emperor’s son Heinrich, Friedrich went into Apulia to Manfredi, his bastard son, and began to draw the barons to him; then...he asked them that they make Manfredi their lord, and he showed them many things which were to the confusion of the church of Rome. Since [Friedrich] machinated against Pope Innocent, a throat tumour developed which blocked his windpipe so that he could not breathe, so he died.

The chronicler accomplishes much with this passage, primarily by showing how the Friedrich-Manfredi relationship led directly to the death of the emperor, which, in turn, caused a succession war in Sicily. Lescot states further that the pope challenged ‘Manfredi, who in all his power was against the Church, and he made alliances jointly with the Saracens so that they would help him, alongside all the powerful men of the land’. The author builds a convincing case against Manfredi in these passages and later ones, labelling him a bastard, a usurper, the son of an excommunicant and himself excommunicated in 1258, an ally to Saracens and Jews, a friend of heretics, a harbinger of evil men, an oath breaker, and a recalcitrant vassal. It was for these reasons that ‘Pope Urban [IV], who was desiring to put an end to the evilness of Manfredi, sent his messengers to the king of France, and requested that he would rescue and help the Church of Rome against the king Manfredi of Sicily, who had installed and imposed

43 Léonard, 35.
45 ‘...si s’en ala en Puille à Mainfroi son fiuz de bast et commensa à atraire les barons à soi; si...leurs requist qu’il leissent de Mainfroi leur sire, et leur monstra mout d’essemes qui estoient à la confusion de l’église de Romme. Si comme il machinoit contre le pape Innocent, une rieume li descendi en la gorge qui li estoupa les conduiz, si qui il ne pot avoir s’alaine, si en morut’. GCF, VII:160. Neither Guillaume’s Latin text nor the first French translation discusses Friedrich’s death in any detail. However, it is possible that this passage derives from Primat. Cf. GSL, 382; Vie de Saint Louis, 383. See generally Léonard, 36; Van Cleve, 529-530.
himself upon the land and the kingdom wrongly and without reason’. 48 Primat understood the importance of context in justifying the events that follow. He wanted to make clear to his readers that Capetians were not usurpers—an accusation that had haunted them since Hugues Capet took the West Frankish throne in 987—and he more specifically clarified that Charles was not some papal puppet unjustly installed on the Sicilian throne as a rival to Hohenstaufen authority, but rather he was a righteous saviour who had ventured into Italy to rescue the Church from the threat posed by a dangerous enemy. This nuance underlines the overarching message of dynastic legitimacy that Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot wished to instil in their readers, and it is only through this background that Charles’s actions could be glorified as a rightful expression of Capetian dynasticism.

Lescot, heavily modifying Primat, used similar means to justify how Charles took the Sicilian crown and conquered the kingdom. The continuator begins this process with Louis IX himself: when Urban’s messengers entered France in 1263, they met with the French king rather than Charles, and it was Louis who expressed concerns regarding the conditions of the papal grant and his approval which ultimately allowed the project to move forward.49 At this time, Lescot also presents the justice of the cause, emphasising that the Papacy had controlled the Sicilian crown since the time of Constantine and that Manfredi did not respect this arrangement.50 Borrowing directly from Primat, Lescot adds that Charles enthusiastically supported the plan on religious grounds, since ‘his will was to help the holy Church and to aid it in all of his power’.51 Thus, the chroniclers establish four prerequisites that lend legitimacy to the cause: papal support, royal approval, comital righteousness, and a just cause. Charles left France in 1266 and, upon his arrival in Rome, a fifth element was bestowed upon him: popular approval. Copying Guillaume, Lescot recounts that when the people greeted Charles, they

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said ‘truly the virtue of Our Lord is with him’ and made him their senator.\(^{52}\) Shortly afterwards, the ‘noblemen of Rome and of the country assembled on the day that the king was crowned, and they held a great festival in Rome; and the people began to cry “Vive le roy Karle”’.\(^{53}\) Although this sequence of events emphasises Charles’s popularity to the Roman people, the chroniclers still place a heavy emphasis on religious motivations. This is particularly evident in the speech Charles gave to his troops at Benevento, explaining to them that ‘you do not fight for me, but for the Holy Church, by whose authority you are absolved for all your sins. Look at your enemies who despise God and the holy Church, and who are excommunicated, which is the beginning of their death and of their damnation’.\(^{54}\) By including this speech, Primat confirms the crusading nature of Charles’s cause and converts a succession dispute into a war against apostates.\(^{55}\) The ensuing battle at Benevento further confirmed for the chroniclers the righteousness of the war against Manfredi since the Hohenstaufen usurper was killed in the engagement, a clear sign of divine judgment.\(^{56}\) However, with his death, the religious pretence was removed and Charles was forced to resort to more judicial means to solidify his legitimacy as king. When depicting the uprising led by Friedrich II’s grandson, Konradin, in 1268, Primat focuses primarily on the aftermath, emphasising how the rebels were executed and the young claimant was delivered to the courts and beheaded for his attempted usurpation.\(^{57}\) The chronicler implies that Charles’s actions were respected by the Neapolitan people and that this trial confirmed his juridical authority over them. Through these different aspects of legitimacy, the chroniclers build a strong case for Charles against the Hohenstaufen heirs, proving that Capetians are uniquely suited with the appropriate regnal qualities to sit

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\(^{52}\) ‘…veraiement la vertu Nostre Seigneur est avoec lui’. GCF, VII:237. See GSL, 420. Charles served as senator from 1263 until 1278, although the curia ruled it a breach of contract since the Papacy had no control over the election. He concurrently held the post of imperial vicar in Tuscany until 1279. Galasso, paras. 7-8, 11-12.


\(^{54}\) ‘…ne vous contabete pas pour moi, mès pour sainte Eglise, de laquelle auctorité vous estes absols de touz voz pechez. Regardez voz anemis qui despisen Dieu et sainte Eglise, et qui sont escommenié, qui est commencement de leur mort et de leur damnacion…’. GCF, VII:242. See Primat, 27. See generally Léonard, 58.

\(^{55}\) ‘The project was from the start designated a crusade…’. Housley, Italian Crusades, 18.

\(^{56}\) GCF, VII:242-245. See generally Housley, Italian Crusades, 19.

\(^{57}\) GCF, VII:258-259. See Primat, 37-39. Primat and Lescot clarify that some protested the boy’s sentence, but that the Neapolitans demanded his death, with the latter adding, ‘pour ce que Corrat [Konrad IV of Germany] son pere avoit abatu les murs de la cite de Naples et toutes les fortereces, et le pueple domagiement’. Jean-Christophe Cassard, L’âge d’or capétien 1180-1328, Histoire de France (Paris: Belin, 2012), 125, in contrast, says that Konradin’s execution was ‘sur l’ordre du nouveau roi, contrairement aux usages’, suggesting the chronicler is stretching the truth in this retelling. See generally Jones, ‘Perspectives from the Periphery: French Kings and their Chroniclers’, in The Medieval Chronicle X, eds. Ilya Afanasyev, Juliana Dresvina, and Erik Kooper (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2015), 77-78; Léonard, 71-72.
upon any throne.\textsuperscript{58}

Lescot, translating Primat, optimistically ends his recounting of the Sicilian affair by noting that ‘when all the realm of Sicily was conquered…the men of the land obeyed the king and were in peace’, but Lescot ominously appends ‘until Constanza, the queen of Aragón, re-started the quarrel’.\textsuperscript{59} This addendum foreshadows how Guillaume approaches the ensuing War of the Sicilian Vespers, which began in 1282 when the Sicilians, inspired by promises of Aragonese support, massacred all the French settlers on the island in one night.\textsuperscript{60} Lescot almost verbatim copies Guillaume’s depiction of this war. Guillaume establishes Constanza, the daughter of Manfredi, whom Lescot calls ‘the damned and excommunicated’, as the villain of this piece, supported by her husband, Pero III of Aragón, who ‘was very much in the malicious mind-set of his wife and believed whatever she said’.\textsuperscript{61} This Aragonese-Sicilian malevolence remains the underlying theme of Guillaume’s entire retelling. The chronicler begins by explaining how Pero deceived the pope into supporting a crusade against the Saracens, by which means he was able to legitimately bring his fleet to Tunis, just across the strait from Sicily.\textsuperscript{62} Once in Sicily, Guillaume continues, Pero crowned himself king, betraying promises to the Sicilians that he would only claim overlordship of the island.\textsuperscript{63} In response, Charles was forced to scrap a crusader fleet, fearing that it may come into enemy hands.\textsuperscript{64} Guillaume, therefore, links the failure of Charles’s proposed crusade to the Levant and the rejection of papal and Angevin authority in Sicily with the atrocities committed by the Sicilians in the name of Constanza and Pero. The chronicler also notes that Pope Martin IV excommunicated Pero

\textsuperscript{58} According to the contemporary French poet Rutebeuf, ‘Charles could be seen to imitate [Charlemagne] both as a crusader and as a defender of the Church…’. Jones, \textit{Eclipse}, 179-180. Similarly, Jean de Meun ‘saw in Charles the king with the power to checkmate, the model of effective kingship, demonstrated in his slaughter of Manfred, his execution of Corradin, and his long imprisonment…of Henry of Castile. These men’s terrible fates were entirely the results of their own misdeeds…. Writing at some time in the reign of Philippe III, Jean’s glowing words probably reflected the predominant French opinion of the matter’. Dunbabin, \textit{French}, 272. Dunbabin, \textit{Charles I}, 7, adds that ‘[f]or contemporaries, [Charles] was the archetype of the Machiavellian new prince’.


\textsuperscript{60} \textit{GCF}, VIII:83-84; \textit{GPT}, 516, 518. The actual uprising was prompted by the murder in the streets of an Angevin official who had taken advantage of a man’s wife, but Aragonese agents had been inciting violence for some time prior to this. Steven Runciman, \textit{The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century}, Canto edition (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 213, 215.


\textsuperscript{64} \textit{GCF}, VIII:89.
and wholesale condemned the kingdom of Aragón in retaliation.\textsuperscript{65} Lescot offhandedly comments here that Pero ‘planned how, by treachery, he could trick or deceive [Charles], because he did not have the talent to go against him in battle’.\textsuperscript{66} The Aragonese king’s solution, according to Lescot, was to challenge Charles to a duel, one hundred men on either side.\textsuperscript{67} But when the day of the combat arrived, the king ‘did not come, nor countermand, nor excuse himself of anything’.\textsuperscript{68} Through their careful retelling, Guillaume and Lescot reaffirm to readers that Pero lacked chivalric virtue and was an oath breaker, therefore justifying any action used against him in pursuit of his defeat.

The dichotomy between Constanza and the Angevins as developed by Guillaume and Lescot becomes more pronounced after Pero disappears from the Sicilian narrative in 1284. Lescot informs the reader that dispatches sent by Charles to his son, the future Charles II, were intercepted by Sicilian agents, which led to a naval battle at Naples during which the prince was captured.\textsuperscript{69} He also reveals Constanza’s ruthlessness by explaining how she held the captured prince by an axe blade, threatening to behead him if the Neapolitans did not give up her sister.\textsuperscript{70} They submitted to her, but widespread riots broke out in Naples during which many French residents were killed. Lescot then explains how Charles I ‘chastised [the Neapolitans] horribly [for submitting to Constanza], then he took and dragged and killed them by diverse torments’.\textsuperscript{71} Charles died soon afterwards and Lescot shows that, by possessing the heir to the throne, Constanza became increasingly paranoid ‘that those of Sicily would willingly reconcile themselves to their lord [Charles II]’.\textsuperscript{72} Lescot uses this fear to highlight Constanza’s tactical ineptitude: she sent the prince to her husband in Aragón at the same time that the king of France was invading ‘with so many men that none could count or estimate


\textsuperscript{66} ‘…se pourpensa comment, ne par quel barat, il pourroit celi conchier ou decevoir, car il n’avoir talent d’aler contre li à bataille…’. GCF, VIII:92. Cf. GPT, 522. See generally Léonard, 151.

\textsuperscript{67} GCF, VIII:92. Cf. GPT, 522. Runciman, 236, argues that Charles suggested this solution.

\textsuperscript{68} ‘Mais le roy d’Arragon ne vint ne ne contremanda ne ne s’escusa de rien…’. GCF, VIII:94. Cf. GPT, 524. Dunbabin, French, 39, states that ‘Pope Martin IV was appalled and ordered Edward I of England, in his capacity as duke of Gascony, to prevent the battle, because such a form of ordeal was against canon law. Charles and Peter each explained the failure of the battle to take place by the failure of the other to turn up at the appointed time’. See generally Runciman, 240-241.

\textsuperscript{69} GCF, VIII:99. Cf. GPT, 526. See generally Dunbabin, French, 103; Housley, Italian Crusades, 21.

\textsuperscript{70} GCF, VIII:99. See generally Runciman, 248.

\textsuperscript{71} ‘…si les chastia moulte horriblement, car il les fist pendre et trainer et mourir de diverse tormens…’. GCF, VIII:100. Charles only executed the ringleaders and pardoned the rest, but Guillaume does not make this clear in his narrative. Runciman, 248.

\textsuperscript{72} ‘Si s’apperçut bien que ceulz de Cecille se reconciliassent volontiers à leur seigneur…’. GCF, VIII:100, 104. Cf. GPT, 528. See generally Runciman, 254-255.
In the Shadow of the Lion

them’. The death of Pero in late 1285 prompted the chronicler to criticise Constanza one last time, noting that she ‘occupied the land of Sicily, against the inhibition and the commandment of the Church of Rome’, and he adds that the new pope upheld the excommunication imposed on her by his predecessor. Lescot narrates this war as one between a rightful king and those whose credentials made them unworthy of even their own kingdom, much less one directly under papal suzerainty. In so doing, he continues the model of legitimacy Primat and Guillaume constructed in the life of Louis IX and maintains their assertion that the Angevins represented the best features of the Capetian dynasty.

After 1285, Guillaume, via Lescot, turns his attention to family matters, demonstrating how under Charles II, the Capetian dynasty still retained a vested interest in the Angevin cadets. He notes how Philippe III’s brother Pierre d’Alençon and his cousin Robert II d’Artois came to Naples in 1282 and were installed as the prince’s guardians, with the former dying in that capacity and the latter becoming regent during Charles’s four-year captivity. Later, Edward I of England—a maternal first cousin of Charles—organised a meeting with the Aragonese at Oloron in Gascony in 1287 in order to negotiate the prince’s release, although papal opposition killed the treaty. Ultimately, it was Philippe IV who secured that release through a treaty in 1289, by which his brother, Charles de Valois, gained an Angevin bride and both Anjou and Maine as his dowry. Thus, the Angevin and Valois dynasties became intimately entwined, a fact that encouraged later chroniclers to continue the Sicilian narrative. However, with their major French territorial possessions gone, the Angevins no longer held a landed stake in French politics and, therefore, their overall importance to the dynastic narrative declined.

The Dionysian narrative turns toward Angevin-Valois relations after 1300. Evidence for this new focus presents itself soon after Guillaume died and his direct influence over the scriptorium at Saint-Denis ended. Lescot writes that, in 1302, Charles de Valois, who was fighting for Charles II in Naples, unilaterally made peace with Aragón, ending the War of the

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73 ‘…le roy de France venoit en son royaume d’Arragon a si grant gent que nulz ne les pooit nombrer ne esmer…’. GCF, VIII:104. See generally Runciman, 260.
77 GCF, VIII:136, 139, 144. Cf. Chronicon, 572-573, 574. This dowry was intended to satisfy Charles de Valois’s claims to Aragón and move the French towards peace. Galasso, para. 19. See also Chapter 3.2.
Sicilian Vespers and confirming the separation of Sicily from Naples in the process. He did this not to aid the Angevins, but rather so he could leave in good conscience to help his brother, Philippe IV, who was fighting a losing war in Flanders. The chronicler notes another Valois connection that is forged in 1313, when Catherine de Valois, the titular Latin Empress, married Philippe of Taranto, a son of Charles II. From this point forward, Lescot increasingly sensationalises the history of Naples. Charles II’s death in 1309 goes unremarked and the chronicler primarily discusses the new king, Roberto, through the lens of the Guelph-Ghibelline feud in Lombardy, in which the future Philippe VI de Valois was a notable participant. Decades pass within the narrative before the Angevins enter the story again. Lescot notes after the brutal murder in 1345 of András of Hungary, the husband of Queen Giovanna I of Naples, that he was ‘buried without great solemnity and without any of the royals of his lineage being present there’. He does not explain where they were, nor what circumstances brought Naples to this low point, and when Giovanna was ejected by the Angevin king Lajos of Hungary in 1348 for her possible complicity in her husband’s murder, Lescot merely writes for 1349 that ‘the kingdom of Sicily was once again acquired’. Thus, by the mid-fourteenth

78 GCF, VIII:213-215. Cf. Continuatio Chronici Guillelmi de Nangiaco, a monarcho Benedictino abbatie S. Dionysii in Francia, ab anno MCCCI ad MCCCLXIII, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, vol. 20, eds. Pierre Daunou and Joseph Naudet (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1840), 587. See generally Housley, Italian Crusades, 23. Dunbabin, French, 136, explains that the treaty of Caltabellotta ‘strongly displeased Boniface VIII, [but] came as a welcome relief to Charles II (who had ceased to believe that a victory in Sicily was possible)’.


century, the priorities of the Angevins were so different from those of their Valois kin in France as to render their inclusion in the chronicles nonessential to the overarching dynastic narrative.\(^83\) Simply stated, the cadets no longer provided the type of didactic examples their forebears had once produced.

The Western Schism drew the Angevins back into the Dionysian vernacular tradition, but in a manner that did not end well for the cadet house. When Juvénal first introduces Giovanna I to his chronicle, he calls her ‘Queen Jeanne of Sicily and of Jerusalem, daughter of Charles, duke of Calabria, son of Roberto, king of Sicily and Naples, and of Marie, sister of the king of France, Philippe [VI]’.\(^84\) By giving the monarch her full title and linking her directly to her Angevin and Capetian-Valois heritage, Juvénal reintegrates the Angevins into the narrative after an absence of over thirty years. However, it was Orge-umont who first saw the need to reintroduce the neglected kin because they were the first to accept the election of the Avignon pope in 1378.\(^85\) The chronicler contrasts them with Lajos of Hungary, who initially pledged support for Clement VI before siding with the Roman claimant.\(^86\) The repercussions of this schism were immediate for Naples. Giovanna’s nephew-in-law, Carlo of Durazzo, adopted the Roman position and invaded Naples in 1381 to bring it into obedience, proclaiming himself Carlo III.\(^87\) In response, the queen—heirless, her husband captured, and surrounded by enemies—adopted Louis I, duke d’Anjou and uncle of Charles VI of France, as her successor in the last act of Angevin-Valois dynastic loyalty depicted in

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83 Dunhabin, French, 46, notes this change occurred after 1305 because the ‘links of friendship were becoming strained; opportunities for reinforcing them becoming rare…. As Philippe [IV]’s concerns became increasingly northern, so Charles II was drawn to Piedmont and to Hungary. The bonds created by a common enterprise had notably loosened’. Galasso, para. 30, adds that it ‘n’est qu’avec Jeanne l’ que les Anjou deviendront vraiment et uniquement des princes napolitains et italiens et verront pratiquement se dissoudre leur physionomie de princes de la maison de France’.


87 CRJC, III:8-10; HCRF, 347. Cf. CKS, I:120, 122. See generally Casteen, 204; Croce, 88; Sumption, III:438-439.
the vernacular tradition. Juvénal villainises the Durazzo Angevins in much the same way that Guillaume villainises Manfredi: Carlo is characterised as a usurper, a poisoner, a schismatic, an oath breaker, uncharitable, deceptive, and unchivalrous. He was guilty of many of the sins of his predecessor, but, unlike in 1266, Carlo was the victor in this war and his family remained interruptedly on the Neapolitan throne until 1435. His son, Ladislao, recaptured Naples from a briefly triumphant Louis II in 1399, but Juvénal’s narrative is so broken and Valois-centric that none of the facts are clear. The chronicler includes two battles that Ladislao lost, but never shows any of the king’s earlier victories nor Louis’s abandonment of the campaign in 1411. The last Angevin ruler of Naples, Giovanna II, is never mentioned by Juvénal or Chartier in any context, although her usurping husband, Jacques II de la Marche, a Bourbon cadet, is ambiguously called ‘king’ by Juvénal in 1412. In the end, not enough information is given surrounding the circumstances of this conflict for the reader to ever understand what is happening in Italy in the early fifteenth century, but it is clear that the Durazzo Angevins are not considered by the chroniclers to be the true successors of Charles I or, for that matter, legitimate Capetian agnates. As such, Naples becomes little more than a sideshow for the chroniclers, barely worthy of mention and certainly a poor representative of Capetian dynasticism abroad.

This depiction of the Angevin-Valois succession dispute contrasts greatly with Guillaume and Lescot’s portrayal of the War of the Sicilian Vespers and highlights the fact that Neapolitan politics, even those of the Valois-Angevins, were of far less importance to Juvénal and Chartier than they had been to the earlier continuators, signalling a change in interest within the vernacular tradition that pivots with Orgemont. When Charles I claimed the Sicilian...
ian throne, he was elevated by Primat and Guillaume above all the other Capetian agnates including the French king himself. Charles’s struggles against Manfredi, Konradin, Constanza, and Pero become a trademark focus of their writing, one that their successors could not entirely abandon. Under Lescot and the Latin chroniclers he borrows from, Neapolitan politics retain a presence in the vernacular tradition, albeit one based primarily on the continued relationship between the Angevins and the Valois. Orgemont, breaking this pattern, avoids discussing the Angevins almost entirely, focussing instead on the life of Charles V. When he does finally return to the Angevins, it is in the context of the Western Schism and Giovanna I’s adoption of Louis d’Anjou—the focus is never on Naples-Sicily itself. For both Orgemont and Juvénal, Giovanna’s death in 1382 is but a footnote in a larger struggle in which the Angevins play a decreasingly significant part. The last Angevins, seven generations removed from Louis VIII, are no longer considered by the chroniclers to be agnates, but rather usurpers and rivals for the throne of Sicily against the legitimate claims of the house of Valois-Anjou. Although Charles I himself sets a noteworthy example of Capetian dynasticism in the Dionysian chronicles, the Angevins ultimately represent how genealogical, geographical, and political distance can weaken a cadet line, rendering it incapable of supporting the French king or Capetian dynasticism.

2.3 The Question of Artois

Dynasticism manifests itself in many ways throughout the Dionysian vernacular tradition and the chroniclers represent a very different aspect of it through the agnates who descended from Robert I d’Artois. The primary purpose of Robert’s story in the vernacular chronicles, as assessed above, is to establish the Artesians as valiant knights and crusaders, while also setting up the next generation for further greatness. It was with the second generation, embodied by Robert II, that the family reached its chivalric peak. Robert II was every bit his father’s successor, but because he was longer-lived, he provides a better example in the chronicles of the duty an agnate owed to the Capetian kings, be they French or Sicilian. Meanwhile, Lescot uses the rivalry of Robert’s heirs, Mahaut and Robert III, as a lesson in dynastic loyalty, contrasting the faithfulness of Mahaut with the treason of Robert. This serves the overarching narrative well since it villainises Robert, but not at the expense of his descendants. Orgemont rehabilitates the Artesians quickly and Juvénéal returns them to the same prominence as their forbears, portraying them as loyal vessels of regnal authority, both at home and abroad. The story of the Artesians in the vernacular tradition, so unlike that of the Angevins,
Figure 2.3 The Capetian House of Artois, 1237 – 1461

**Mathilde de Brabant** (d. 1288)

**Philippe IV**
- France: 1285 – 1316
- Navarre: 1274 – 1305

**Henri III & II**
- Champagne & Navarre: 1270 – 1274
- Jeanne I
  - France: 1285 – 1316
  - Navarre: 1274 – 1305

**Blanche** (d. 1302)

**Edmund Lancaster**
- Artois: 1267 – 1296

**Robert II**
- Artois: 1250 – 1302

**Amicie de Courtenay** (d. 1275)

**Othon V**
- Burgundy C: 1279 – 1303
- Artois: 1302 – 1329

**Philippe (d. 1298)**
- Seigneur de Conches

**Otho V**
- Mahaut
- Artois: 1329 – 1330

**Robert III**
- Beaumont: 1309 – 1342

**Jeanne II & I**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1315 – 1330

**Jeanne I**
- Navarre: 1274 – 1305

**Philippe V & II**
- France & Navarre: 1316 – 1322

**Marguerite I**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1361 – 1382

**Eudes IV**
- Burgundy B: 1315 – 1349

**Jeanne III & II**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1330 – 1347

**Marguerite I**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1361 – 1382

**Jeanne III & II**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1330 – 1347

**Jeanne I**
- Navarre: 1274 – 1305

**Jean** (d. 1363)
- Robert III
- Beaumont: 1309 – 1342

**Robert IV**
- Eu: 1387

**Philippe IV**
- France: 1285 – 1316

**Jeanne III & II**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1330 – 1347

**Marguerite I**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1361 – 1382

**Jeanne III & II**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1330 – 1347

**Robert III**
- Beaumont: 1309 – 1342

**Jean**
- Eu: 1351 – 1387

**Philippe IV**
- Eu: 1387

**Robert IV**
- Eu: 1387

**Philippe IV**
- Constable of France

**Charles**
- Eu: 1397 – 1471

**Jeanne II & I**
- Burgundy & Artois: 1315 – 1330

**Jeanne** (d. 1350)

**Robert IV**
- Eu: 1387

**Philippe IV**
- Constable of France
is one of brave agnates who passed through a crucible and resisted the urge to abandon dynastic responsibilities for personal glory, thereby reclaiming their status as praiseworthy exemplars of Capetian dynasticism.\textsuperscript{94}

Robert II, rather than his father, was the true standard for a Capetian crusader and knight in the Dionysian vernacular tradition. First introduced by Primat in 1267 when he was dubbed a knight alongside the future Philippe III, Robert joined the Eighth Crusade, for which he took the cross in 1270 beside his uncles Louis IX and Alphonse, the king’s sons Jean and Pierre, and numerous Capetian cognates.\textsuperscript{95} Robert is, thus, closely associated with prominent members of the dynasty from the very beginning. Primat notes that, during the crusade, Robert saved his men from being flanked by the enemy, suggesting he possessed an inherent tactical skill that his father had lacked at Mansoura.\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, Guillaume implies a close friendship between Philippe and Robert, which the chronicler develops from the former’s coronation ceremony in 1271, in which Robert participates, and emphasises when the new king visits the count in Artois later that year.\textsuperscript{97} This implied closeness, however, makes Robert appear unusually critical of the king in the continuations. Guillaume, via Lescot, reports that, after Philippe gave the count’s sister away to Edmund, earl of Lancaster, in 1276, Robert ‘was very displeased and became enraged, because he thought well that the king of England did not have a love for the king of France’.\textsuperscript{98} Robert was then sent into Navarre to relieve a siege and, after his victory, ‘he was infuriated, because he had thought to present [the traitors] to the king of France’.\textsuperscript{99} Guillaume portrays these outbursts as righteous anger, using them to show the count’s protective sense of duty to his king and dynasty.\textsuperscript{100} Philippe held Robert ‘as good and

\textsuperscript{94} See Figure 2.3.
\textsuperscript{100} Richard E. Barton, ‘“Zealous Anger” and the Renegotiation of Aristocratic Relationships in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century France’, in \textit{Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages}, ed. Barbara H. Rosenwein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 157, 159, explains that ‘[a]nger through zeal occurred when one grew angry against vices and those who committed vices, and thus this type of anger was virtuous…. Like Gods and kings, lords too might grow Righteously angry when evil threatened their position or the areas under their protection…. For if God, the ultimate source of authority in the universe, was known to have become Righteously angry when his will was flouted, then kings and lords, also representing legitimate authority in the world, should have been able to grow Righteously angry with those who flouted their will. Moreover, if theology and social reality tended to equate possession of authority with the legitimate expression of anger, it would not be long before the persons who resisted such authority would come to be seen as sinful, as deserving
loyal’, and this is the very image Guillaume wishes to impress upon his readers: Artesians do as they are told, even if they disagree.\textsuperscript{101} Such is the duty of all Capetians.

For the Artesians, dynastic loyalty extended beyond the borders of France. Guillaume recounts how Robert II joined his uncle Charles I in Italy in 1275, which served as a prelude to Robert’s return in 1282 to defend Naples against the Aragonese.\textsuperscript{102} Charles entrusted Robert with the guardianship of the future Charles II at this time, and Robert remained in Naples for nearly a decade, about which Guillaume, via Lescot, notes ‘the enemies never dared undertaking on foot nor dared come to battle against him, and it was commonly said that if he had remained in the lands, all Apulia and Calabria would have turned in this same year’.\textsuperscript{103} Guillaume implies here that Robert’s reputation and skill were such that his very presence in Italy could turn the tide of the Angevin-Aragón war.\textsuperscript{104} These same qualities are showcased in 1294, when Robert resolved a dispute between the counts of Armagnac and Foix while he was campaigning in Guyenne.\textsuperscript{105} However, it was only in their description of the Anglo-Flemish conflict that Guillaume and his continuator exhibit Robert’s true martial abilities. Guillaume shows him first in Guyenne in 1297, capturing English castles, before the count relocated to Flanders where he fought valiantly at Furnes, although his son, Philippe, was mortally wounded in the engagement.\textsuperscript{106} At Courtrai in 1302, Robert led the French army against the Flemish, but victory escaped him and he fell, prompting a poetic lament by Guillaume’s nameless continuator.\textsuperscript{107} Robert’s death rounds out this archetypal Capetian prince. The count’s bravery and chivalric qualities merge seamlessly with his dynastic devotion and his ultimate sacrifice, providing material upon which the chroniclers can build a standard of dynastic integrity that Capetians can follow in future generations.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[101]{‘Il tenoit pour bon et pour loyal…’. GCF, VIII:72. See GPT, 508.}
\footnotetext[103]{‘Tant comme il fu ou pays, les anemis ne furent onques si osés qu’il y meissent le pié ne n’osèrent onques venir à bataille contre li, et dist l’en communement que se il ne fust ou pays demouré, que toute Puille et toute Calabré fuss tournée en celle année meismes’. GCF, VIII:101. See GPT, 526. See generally Dunbabin, \textit{French}, 104; Housley, \textit{Italian Crusades}, 49.}
\footnotetext[104]{Dunbabin, \textit{French}, 106, supports this assertion, claiming that ‘Robert’s aim was to contain Aragonese intervention, which he came close to achieving, though with great difficulty’. Housley, \textit{Italian Crusades}, 21, counters that Robert ‘continued to suffer defeats in Sicily and southern Italy’.}
\footnotetext[105]{GCF, VIII:151. See \textit{Chronicon}, 575. See generally Hélary, 148-152.}
\footnotetext[106]{GCF, VIII:168-169, 175-177. See \textit{Chronicon}, 578, 579. See generally Cassard, 538; Dunbabin, \textit{French}, 119.}
\footnotetext[107]{GCF, VIII:207. See \textit{Continuatio}, 585. See generally Cassard, 539, 541.}
\footnotetext[108]{Dunbabin, \textit{French}, 119, disagrees, arguing that when ‘Philippe d’Artois, who had been trained to take over from him, died, [he left] a baby son who knew nothing of his grandfather’s hopes for the future. And with the death of Robert himself…, the hero of the story lost his great reputation as the most skilled French general of his age’.}
\end{footnotes}
The durability of this newly-erected archetype was tested almost immediately by Robert II’s quarrelsome successors: his only living child, Mahaut, and his grandson Robert III, seigneur de Conches-en-Ouche. None of the Dionysian vernacular writers dispute the former’s right to Artois. They demonstrate that, when Robert II was killed in 1302, the title passed without contention to Mahaut and her husband, Othon V of Burgundy; then it passed seamlessly to their eldest daughter, Jeanne, in 1329. Lescot specifically streamlines these successions to bring focus to Robert III, who enters the narrative as an aggressor because of his invasion of Artois in 1315. He was defeated not by his aunt, but by Philippe V, who ‘put him in prison for a long time until an agreement was made and he abandoned his case against the countess of Artois’, in return for which Robert was granted the county of Beaumont-le-Rogier. Lescot demonstrates that, after this seeming resolution, Robert began to express a key Artesian trait by performing meritorious acts of martial prowess alongside his Valois in-laws in both 1324 and 1328 against the English and the Flemish respectively. But these brief expressions of dynasticism merely serve to make the count’s later actions more damning.

Soon after the battle of Cassel in 1328, Robert appealed his case to Philippe VI, claiming that he had proof that his grandfather intended the county to pass to him. Lescot notes that several Capetian lords supported his pretensions, including the king’s brother, Charles II d’Alençon, and Jean III of Brittany. However, when the supporting documents were found to be forgeries, Robert denied the charges and fled the French court, never to return again.

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114 GCF, IX:110.

His trial was conducted entirely in absentia and the king’s final decision of banishment served as more of a confirmation of the status quo than an enforceable judgment.\textsuperscript{116} In the years that follow, Lescot blames Robert for the increased tensions between England and France, noting that ‘no truce could be made because Robert d’Artois inhibited many things’ and that everything Edward III did was ‘decided and ordered by the advice of messire Robert d’Artois’.\textsuperscript{117} Thus, Lescot blames Robert as much as Edward for the ensuing Anglo-French war.\textsuperscript{118} Nevertheless, the author understands that Robert sought above all else the restoration of his titles, and this explains why the exiled count joined the English in Flanders in 1340.\textsuperscript{119} Lescot dedicates significant space to the battle at Saint-Omer between Robert and his rival, Eudes IV, duke of Burgundy and husband of Mahaut’s granddaughter, Jeanne II d’Artois.\textsuperscript{120} Besides being a rare engagement between Capetian agnates, this battle was the culmination of the Artesian dispute, one that confirmed Mahaut’s line of succession and relegated Robert to little more than an English sycophant.\textsuperscript{121} Robert died ingloriously in Brittany in 1342, doing ‘many bad things’.\textsuperscript{122} By depicting his demise in this way, Lescot forewarns all who would turn against the dynasty of the potential fate that awaits them. Whereas Mahaut’s heirs remained loyal Capetians and only increased in stature and prestige, Robert lost his family, his property and titles, and his wealth, and then died in a foreign land, fighting for a cause that was not his own.\textsuperscript{123} Lescot emphasises that this is the penalty for abandoning Capetian dynastic solidarity, and it was a lesson that Robert’s children learned well after nearly two decades in French captivity.

Robert III left his Valois wife and their children behind, who were imprisoned and equally condemned by Lescot. Indeed, the chronicler reports that ‘the wife of messire Robert
d’Artois…was more culpable than her husband.

Yet the family’s rehabilitation begins almost immediately in Orgemont’s continuation. He implies their release when Jean II knighted Robert’s eldest son, Jean, alongside other prominent Capetian agnates during the coronation celebration in 1350. By April 1356, Jean was already count of Eu, and both he and his brother, Charles, assisted the king when he arrested Carlos II of Navarre in Rouen that year.

In this episode, Orgemont lists Jean and Charles directly after the king’s brother, Philippe d’Orléans, suggesting that the chronicler considered their place in the Capetian dynasty restored. At Poitiers, the brothers served in the French army and were captured by the victorious English. After peace was restored and Jean II died, Jean d’Eu took his place beside the new king, Charles V, during whose coronation procession he led the horse of the prestigious Capetian duchess Blanche, daughter of Charles IV and wife of the duke d’Orléans. Orgemont also names Jean one of the *fleurs de lis*—the first instance in the vernacular tradition in which this term is used—when describing the parlement that condemned Edward, prince of Wales, in 1369. Lastly, Jean, accompanying the king and other prominent Capetians, greeted Emperor Karl IV when he visited France in 1378. By the conclusion of his continuation, Orgemont has entirely reversed the perception of the Artesian agnates. Abandoned narratively by Lescot, the cadets are redeemed and emerge as good and loyal representations of regnal authority within Orgemont’s continuation.

Juvénal—abridging material from Michel Pintoin—advances the archetypal qualities of the Artesians further by restoring their status as paragons of chivalric virtue. Early in his chronicle, Juvénal recounts how Louis d’Anjou asked Philippe d’Artois, Jean’s son and ‘a valiant knight’, to ‘take the lead in going to fight’ Carlo [III] of Durazzo in Naples. Philippe’s role in Louis’s Neapolitan campaign is reminiscent of Robert II’s participation in

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126 CRJC, I:73. See generally Sumption, II:247, 462.

127 CRJC, II:4.


130 ‘[Il] escrivit à messire Philippe d’Artois, qui estoit vaillant chevalier, qu’il voulust prendre la charge d’aller combatte ledit Charles’. HCRF, 347. See *CKS*, I:120, 122. Juvénal and Pintoin may be confusing Philippe with his brother Robert, who married Giovanna, duchess of Durazzo, and was murdered in 1387 by order of Carlo III of Naples, her brother. Van Kerrebrouck, II:234.
Charles I’s Sicilian adventure a century earlier. But the comparison ends there. Unlike Robert’s, Philippe’s skill was not enough and he, as well as Giovanna I and her husband, Otto von Braunschweig, were captured by Carlo. This failure did not seem to mar his reputation, however, since in 1383 he served as standard-bearer for Charles VI against Despenser’s crusade, during which he ‘carried himself valiantly’. Juvénal portrays Philippe as both valiant in arms and a willing vessel for both the Valois-Angevin and French kings, eventually serving as constable of France for the latter, a position rarely granted to agnates. He also proved himself a crusader when he travelled to Hungary in 1393 and then, ‘displeased that he had made no exploits of war against the Saracens, learned…that the king of Bohemia was suspicious of several articles of faith, and was valued little better than a Saracen, and for this…he put the King and all the land into his subjection, and returned to great honour and praise’. Philippe joined the Hungarian king again in 1396 in the ill-fated siege of Nicopolis against the Ottoman Turks, although the count’s capture and eventual death in captivity are recorded neither by Juvénal nor Pintoin. Philippe’s son and the last Artesian agnate, Charles, was captured at Agincourt as a young soldier and does not return to the narrative until the Praguerie revolt in 1440, at which time he is portrayed by Chartier as a mediator between the rebels and Charles VII. His loyalty to the Capetian cause and his martial abilities are confirmed by the chronicler in his account of the 1449-50 invasion of Normandy, where Charles was one of the leading generals responsible for defeating the English, although his individual acts were merged with those of the other commanders. Ultimately, though, it was his role as one of the four

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132 ‘…se porta vaillamment messire Philippes d’Artois comte d’Eu…’. HCRF, 360. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:234. Philippe did not in fact become count d’Eu until 1387, following the death in rapid succession of his father and his brother, Robert IV.

133 HCRF, 390. See CKS, II:30. See generally Setton, 344. The only known earlier Capetian constable was Jacques I, count de la Marche, who served from 1354 to 1356. Anselme de Sainte-Marie, Histoire des grands officiers de la couronne de France avec l’origine et le progres de leurs Familles (Paris: Estienne Loyson, 1674), 32, 38.

134 ‘Le comte d’Eu desplaisant qu’il n’avait fait quelque exploit de guerre sur les Sarrasins, sceut…que le roy de Boheme sentoit mal en plusieurs araticles de la foy, et ne valoit gueres mieux que Sarrasin, et pource…mit le Roy et tout le pays en sa subjection, et s’en retourna à grand honneur et loüange’. HCRF, 396. See CKS, II:122, 124. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:234.

135 HCRF, 408. See CKS, II:428. See generally Setton, 345, 355, 360.


pallbearers of Charles VI in 1461 that confirms his status as a great Capetian lord.\textsuperscript{138} Despite initial hardships and the legacy of Robert III, the final Artesian agnates proved themselves to be just as valiant, chivalrous, loyal, and devoted to the Capetian dynasty as their house’s progenitors. This is precisely the message that the Dionysian vernacular continuators wished to impress upon their readers: that the Artesians express as well as any Capetian—and better than many—key qualities that all agnates should replicate in order to secure and advance Capetian dynasticism.

Such is the legacy of Artesian cadets within the Dionysian tradition. Their ancestor Robert I established the groundwork for a house built on chivalric virtue, crusading spirit, and dynastic loyalty, but it was only under Robert II that such an edifice was properly constructed. His role in French, Angevin, and crusading politics set a standard for the greater Capetian dynasty to follow. The vernacular chroniclers demonstrate how this legacy was embraced by all his agnates, who together retained the surname \textit{d’Artois} despite having lost their titular lands in 1329. Indeed, no other Capetian cadet branch is so consistently identified with its ancestral roots. Robert III is always named Robert d’Artois by Lescot, while Orgemont introduces Robert’s son as Jean d’Artois in 1350 and Juvénal names Jean’s son Philippe d’Artois in 1381.\textsuperscript{139} Although Robert III ultimately failed in his dynastic duties, he nonetheless exhibited much of the martial spirit of his predecessors, a fact that Lescot cannot entirely overlook. His failings provided the Capetians in general and Robert’s descendants in particular with a counterexample to the valour exhibited by earlier Artesians, and these also gave his children a basis from which to recover their reputation. These final agnates were able to embrace their martial heritage and combine it perfectly with their newfound respect for regnal authority, resurrecting the role that Robert II had established for the house at the beginning of the century. The Artesians in the Dionysian tradition are a unique family, but their emergence from the bleak depths of Robert III’s betrayal not only proves the durability of their specific didactic role within the Capetian dynastic narrative, but establishes the merits of pursuing a selfless approach towards advancing dynasticism.

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\textsuperscript{139} \textit{CRJC}, I:26, 63; \textit{HCRF}, 347. Chartier is the only chronicler not to link the cadets to their Artesian origins.
Devotion within a family is never a given, especially in one so powerful and influential as the Capetians of France. Indeed, before the time of Louis IX, the relationship between Capetian agnates was that of lords-to-lords or kings-to-vassals. What occurred between the children of Louis VIII, therefore, was unprecedented in French history. The Dionysian continuators realised this and used the potential of such a positive relationship to their benefit, creating for each prince an archetype to which other agnates could aspire to emulate. Within this narrative framework, Alphonse serves as the territorial magnate, the loyal vassal who protects the realm from outside threats at the cost of his own glory. Robert is the valiant knight, a crusader willing to sacrifice all for God and dynasty. And Charles is the great expansionist, a man capable of advancing dynastic authority out of the Capetian heartland and into the periphery. The descendants of the latter two agnates continued to test and refine the models set by their ancestors to varying degrees. For the Angevins, this produced diminishing returns as later Neapolitan monarchs lost progressively more land and status to rivals until all record of their deeds disappeared from the vernacular texts. The Artesians, meanwhile, reached new heights under Robert II only to pass through the fire of treason before their reputation was recovered and their legacy restored. The moral examples provided by these agnates informed the chroniclers and helped direct them as they wrote. Primat understood the inherent archetypal qualities of the king and his brothers when he presented his chronicle to Philippe III in 1274—the proof is in his later writings and in how Guillaume worked so diligently to continue what his predecessor began. But neither could predict how difficult it would be for subsequent generations of Capetian cadets to follow these archetypes. Nonetheless, the examples set by the sons of Louis VIII establish within the Dionysian vernacular continuations important didactic models upon which future Capetian kings and princes could reflect.

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140 Chazan, 469, notes more generally of thirteenth century French chronicles that ‘[l]a pieuse unanimité de la famille capétienne fait contraste avec l’indignité qui marque les descendants de Frédéric II...’. Thus, Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot’s writings fit within this larger literary framework of the period while also accomplishing their own independent goals.
CHAPTER THREE

Cursed and Fortunate Kings

The Capetian kings of the early fourteenth century did not measure well against their glorified forbearers. Endless warfare, brutal rebellions, public scandals, dynastic disunity, and a series of succession crises punctuated the period, leaving its kings as poor representatives of Capetian dynasticism and regnal authority. Reflecting on the death of Charles IV without a son in 1328, the Dionysian vernacular chronicler Richard Lescot laments that ‘all the lineage of King Philippe [IV] le Bel failed and disappeared in less than thirteen years, which caused very great damage’.¹ This final assessment is embraced by many later writers, and French historical fiction author Maurice Druon labels these monarchs the *rois maudits*—the accursed kings.² Although Lescot may not entirely agree with Druon’s characterisation of the rulers of this period, there is a truth to this sentiment that underlies the Dionysian narrative. To the continuators, the moral lessons that derive from the *rois maudits* begin with the intermarriages between the Capetian dynasty and the Champenois monarchs of the tiny Pyrenean kingdom of Navarre in the thirteenth century, and conclude in the early fifteenth century after the rulers of Navarre permanently abandoned French politics.

Rising above the ignominy of multiple rebellions against the regency government of Louis IX, the last Navarrese rulers of the house of Champagne married heavily into the Capetian dynasty until their family and titles were literally absorbed by their French royal kin. When Louis I of Navarre—Louis X of France—died young in 1316, his brother Philippe de

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² Popular history writer Alison Weir, *Isabella: She-Wolf of France, Queen of England* (London: Vintage Books, 2012), 103, argues that ‘given the dynastic scandal [the Tour de Nesle affair] that had overtaken Philip’s sons, it is hardly surprising that he and they quickly became known as “les Rois Mauduits”’. Meanwhile, paranormal researcher Bob Curran, *Frankenstein and Other Man-Made Monsters*, Haunted: Ghosts and the Paranormal (New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2014), 106, blames the epitaph on Jacques de Molay, the last grand master of the Knights Templar, who, as he was burning at the stake, ‘showed no fear and called on God to avenge him on his enemies: the king, the pope, and the Capetian line. Within a year, both Clement and Philip were dead…. The decline in the fortunes of the monarchy continued from 1314 to 1328…. This gave the common nickname to the rule of the later Capetian monarchs, *Les Rois Maudits*… and their fortunes were linked directly to de Molay’s supposed curse’. Famed fantasy author George R. R. Martin, ‘My hero: Maurice Druon by George RR Martin’, *The Guardian*, 5 April 2013, notes of Druon’s series—ergo, this period as a whole—that ‘it is the original game of thrones’. *See also* Maurice Druon, *Le Roi de Fer* (1955), *La Reine étranglée* (1955), *Les Poissons de la couronne* (1956), *La Loi des mâles* (1957), *La Louve de France* (1959), *Le Lys et le lion* (1960), and *Quand un Roi perd la France* (1977). The series was turned into a French television series twice. *See Les Rois maudits*, directed by Claude Barma, written by Marcel Julilian (ORTF, 21 December 1972-24 January 1973); and *Les Rois maudits*, directed by Josée Dayan, written by Anne-Marie Catois (France 2, 7 November-28 November 2005). For art of the period, *see* Danielle Gaborit-Chopin and François Avril, eds., *L’art au temps des rois maudits: Philippe le Bel et ses fils, 1285-1328* (Paris: Reunion des musées nationaux, 1998).
Poitiers seized both thrones against the rights of his niece, prompting a period of twelve years in which Navarre ceased to be an entity within the context of the Dionysian continuations. When the two realms were finally ripped apart in 1328, they fell into the hands of two Capetian cadets, agnatic grandsons of Philippe III. Philippe VI, son of the famed count and righteous warrior, Charles de Valois, succeeded to France, and the chroniclers dedicate considerable space thereafter to examining the political and religious reasons why Philippe is worthy of such an unlikely inheritance. Meanwhile, a similar approach is taken in describing Filippe III, son of Louis d’Evreux and suo uxoris king of Navarre, who proved himself a faithful Capetian prince and soldier of God throughout his fifteen-year reign. His descendants, however, were weaker champions of dynastic solidarity, and Pierre d’Orgemont and Jean Juvenal des Ursins often depict them groping desperately via murder, intrigue, and civil war for lands and titles which they had lost. This chapter will examine the ways in which the vernacular chroniclers portrayed these French and Navarrese rulers in order to determine whether their representations reflect a desire on the part of the continuators to create and advance a specific dynastic message about Capetian dynasticism and French regnal authority.

3.1 The Navarrese Double Monarchy

The merger of the French and Navarrese thrones in 1285 was an unprecedented event in Capetian history. The last union of crowns had occurred under the Carolingians four centuries earlier and the next would not happen until Charles VIII briefly seized the Neapolitan throne in 1495. To the chroniclers at Saint-Denis, this was a watershed moment. Primat, unaware of the future union, nevertheless sets the groundwork for it by emphasising the loyalty shown by the rulers of Navarre to Louis IX during the Eighth Crusade and afterwards. Within the context of the chronicles, this demonstrates a much more dramatic shift in opinion since the first Navarrese king of the house of Champagne, Thibaut I, was a frequent opponent of Louis’s regency government. Guillaume de Nangis and his anonymous continuators ultimately merged the Navarre and Capetian narratives together after 1285, with the later writers portraying Louis I of Navarre as a valiant, but loyal, Capetian warrior prior to his coronation as king of France. Louis’s death and the accession of his brother, Philippe de Poitiers, in 1316 ends any discussion of dual monarchy, leaving readers with the impression that Navarre became simply another part of the French kingdom. This section will explore how the continuators discuss the merger of the Navarrese and French royal lines at the end of the thirteenth century to determine the ways in which the event provided lessons in dynasticism.

Who precisely at Saint-Denis wrote the information covering the period 1226 to 1250
is unclear—it was either Primat, Guillaume de Nangis, or Lescot—but what is certain is that Thibaut is reviled by the chroniclers as a recalcitrant vassal of Louis IX in 1226 when he joins a rebellion against the young king. But Thibaut proved to be a poor rebel on multiple occasions and returned to Louis each time. His narrative arc in the continuation changes after Thibaut became king of Navarre in 1234 to one that advances a message of Capetian dynasticism. Thibaut’s leadership in the Barons’ Crusade of 1239 is emblematic of this change—the king proved himself a true soldier for Christ, much like earlier Capetian kings had done and Louis would shortly do, and this is the impression of the Navarrese king that the chroniclers leave with readers. Thibaut I’s successor, Thibaut II, is introduced in 1270 by Primat in precisely this same role. Indeed, the king is shown fighting alongside Louis at Tunis on the Eighth Crusade and, in response to Thibaut dying on the return journey, Primat, via Lescot, laments that ‘he was the greatest member of the host after the king of France and the most powerful, and he was a wise man and gave good counsel, and he was so large and wont to give to those who worked for him, and he especially never forgot the poor’. Thibaut’s wife, Isabelle, daughter of Louis, died soon afterwards because, as Lescot reports, ‘she had no more joy in her heart’. The chroniclers feel the loss of Thibaut is significant to the overarching narrative—his martial abilities, status, and his wife’s devotion are all evidence of his Capetian qualities. Furthermore, Thibaut and Isabelle embodied the first iteration of the Franco-Navarrese dynastic relationship that would be repeated and enhanced under subsequent rulers.

That dynastic unity would develop further under Thibaut’s successor and brother, Henri I, whose primary importance to the vernacular narrative is that he was the father of Jeanne I. This point is made manifest when Henri died in 1274, after which his widow

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5 See *GSL*, 328, 330; *GCF*, VII:77.
6 Le Goff, 183, suggests that ‘Saint Louis a peut-être vu dans la réussite de cette expédition un motif d’émulation personnelle’. Jordan, *Louis XI*, 42, holds a more critical view, arguing that Thibaut was forced to take a crusader vow after having been banished from Champagne in 1236, and notes of the crusade that it ‘was a disastrous failure’. Indeed, he adds that ‘memory of it had something to do with the opposition to Louis’s vow a few years later’. See also Le Goff, 111; Michael Lower, *The Barons’ Crusade: A Call to Arms and Its Consequences* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
8 ‘…c’estoit le greigneur membre de l’ost après le roy de France et le plus puissant; et estoit sages hons et donnoit bon conseil, et si estoit large et abandonné de donner à ceulz qui en avoient mester, et especalement il n’oblioit point les povres’. *GCF*, VIII:28; Primat, 84. See *GPT*, 482, 484. See generally Le Goff, 738; Richard, 571, 573.
9 ‘…ne n’ot onques puis joie à son cuer’. *GCF*, VIII:29. Primat notes more specifically that she died from falling off a horse, although adds that ‘la mort d’icelle troubla moulte très formente meesment le roy et puis tout l’ost’. Primat, 85. See generally Le Goff, 738.
10 *GCF*, VIII:46-47. See *GPT*, 492. See generally Sivéry, *Philippe III*, 150. See Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Rulers of Champagne and Navarre, 1152 – 1305

Antso VI
Navarre: 1150 – 1194

Antso VII
Navarre: 1194 – 1234

Blanka (d. 1229)

Thibaut III
Champagne: 1152 – 1181
Navarre: 1234 – 1253

Henri II
Champagne: 1181 – 1197
Jerusalem: 1192 – 1197

Louis VII
France: 1137 – 1180

Marie (d. 1198)

Philippe II
France: 1179 – 1223

Henri II

Louis VIII
France: 1223 – 1226

Louis IX
France: 1226 – 1270

Philipppe III
France: 1270 – 1285

Philippe I & IV
Navarre: 1284 – 1305
France: 1285 – 1314

Thibaut IV & I
Champagne: 1201 – 1253
Navarre: 1234 – 1253

Henri III & I
Champagne & Navarre: 1270 – 1274

Jeanne I
Champagne & Navarre: 1274 – 1305

Isabelle (d. 1271)

Later Capetian Kings & Rulers of Navarre
(See Figure 3.2)
hastened quickly to take her child into France’, where ‘Philippe [III] dutifully and willingly received the child and nourished her at his court at Paris with his children so that when she was of age, he could give her to some high lord in marriage’. Thus, Jeanne’s entry in the story parallels that of Beatritz of Provence forty years earlier. Lescot adds that ‘the king sent Eustache de Beaumarchais into Navarre and ordered that he receive in [Philippe’s] name as tutor and guardian of the child the homages of the barons of Navarre’. Within this single episode, the continuator demonstrates how decisively Navarre fell under French control, justifying the legitimacy of its de facto annexation via the voluntary flight of the dowager queen and the threat posed by a noble revolt. When the Navarrese did rise up against French overlordship in 1276, Philippe quickly suppressed the revolt and converted Navarre into what was essentially a client kingdom. This situation became permanent in 1284 when the king’s heir, the future Philippe IV, wed Jeanne and legally bound Navarre to the Capetian line. Upon her death in 1305, the title passed to her eldest son, Louis I, who continued to rule Navarre throughout his reign, even after becoming king of France as Louis X in 1314. Within the vernacular continuations, the story of the last Champenois rulers of Navarre is one of a prominent noble house merging seamlessly into the Capetian dynasty through marriage until it loses what makes it unique and becomes simply another aspect of Capetian identity.

The subsuming of Navarre into the kingdom of France was not without contest. Lescot explains that Louis was forced to subdue Navarre and claim the kingship personally in 1307, further bringing the kingdom into the French orbit. In this way, the chronicler demonstrates how noble revolts in Navarre against French authority actually cemented Capetian dynastic authority over the Pyrenean kingdom. From 1307, and especially after Louis became king of

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12 See Chapter 2.1.

13 ‘…le roy envoia maistre Huistace de Biau Marchais en Navarre et li commanda qu’il receust en son nom et comme tuteur et garde de l’enfant les hommages des barons de Navarre’. GCF, VIII:51-52. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 114.

14 GCF, VIII:67-71. See Primat, 94-96; GPT, 504-508 (even). Langlois, Histoire, 114, says that, after this revolt, it ‘fut gouvernée à la façon d’une sénéchaussée française’. See generally Sivéry, Philipp III, 151.


France in 1314, Navarre was little more than a status symbol for the king in the eyes of the chronicler. Lescot continues to associate Louis with both kingdoms throughout his short reign, but the Navarrese title declines in importance afterwards.\(^\text{18}\) When Louis died in 1316, his brother Philippe de Poitiers was called by Lescot ‘governor of the kingdoms of France and of Navarre, for all justice, etc.’\(^\text{19}\) Lescot intentionally does not name Philippe regent of the kingdoms, as his sources do, and he also leaves out all discussion of the rights of Joana, Louis X’s daughter and presumed heiress, discussed below.\(^\text{20}\) His text is streamlined to avoid any hint of usurpation. When Philippe ascended the thrones later that year, Lescot never explicitly says that Philippe also succeeded to Navarre—only Orgemont’s rubric, added in 1377, draws attention to this fact.\(^\text{21}\) The most that is said by Lescot is that, after the death of Louis’s posthumous son, Jean I, in 1316, Philippe ‘put himself in possession of the kingdoms’, although, notably, he was not specifically named king of either realm in this passage.\(^\text{22}\) Lescot does not mention Navarre at all during the formal reigns of Philippe V and his brother, Charles IV.\(^\text{23}\) In fact, Juvenal, writing a century later, does not seem to consider these two men rulers of the small kingdom when he calls a later king ‘Charles I’, a rejection of Charles IV’s claim to that name.\(^\text{24}\) Regardless, what is clear from the vernacular narrative is that, rather than treating France-Navarre as the dual monarchy that it legally was, Lescot overlooks Navarre as a political entity once its personal union with France was secured.\(^\text{25}\) This means either that Navarre ceased to be important to the vernacular continuators or that its erasure produced a more powerful statement about dynasticism and regnal authority within the chronicles.

The story of Navarre from 1250 to 1328 within the Dionysian chronicles is a narrative

\(^{18}\) GCF, VIII:305-307, 314, 319-332. See Chronique latine, I:415, 426; Continuatio, 612, 615.

\(^{19}\) ‘…Philippe filz du roy de France, gouvernant les royaumes de France et de Navarre, à touz justiciers, etc’. GCF, VIII:328, 332. Lewis, Royal Succession, 105, 178, 188.

\(^{20}\) Guillaume’s continuators name Philippe ‘Francie et Navaræ regens regna’, which was a stronger title than the mere ‘gouvernant’ title noted by Lescot, since, according to Lewis, Royal Succession, 187-188, it implied a right to the throne. Chronique latine, I:427; Continuatio, 615.

\(^{21}\) GCF, VIII: 333; Hedeman, Royal Image, 106. In contrast, Guillaume’s continuators note controversy surrounding Philippe’s succession and name both kingdoms. Chronique latine, I:617; Continuatio, 431-432.

\(^{22}\) ‘…Philippe conte de Poitiers se mist en possessions des royaumes’. GCF, VIII:334. See generally Lewis, Royal Succession, 149-150; Woodacre, 48.

\(^{23}\) Lescot writes that when Philippe V died in 1322, ‘vint en succession le royaume…à Charles conte de la Marche’. He neglects to reference Navarre in this succession. GCF, VIII:366.


\(^{25}\) Jones, Eclipse, 300, argues that this may have reflected the belief that ‘such unions were considered to be essentially matters of personal inheritance’, and that the acquisition of a throne ‘would not, in itself, alter the relationship between’ the two realms.
of dynastic cohesion, loyalty, and unity. Although long at odds with one another, the Navarrese and Capetians emerge as key allies due to the crusades of the thirteenth century. The unprecedented union of the crowns under Louis I/X in 1314 is the culmination of this dynastic cooperation. In a way, Lescot acknowledges this successful strategy by completely writing out Navarre after Philippe de Poitiers’s succession in 1316, a clear sign that France had consumed its neighbour wholesale and expanded its reach into the French periphery. More generally, the Navarrese rulers in this period—from Thibaut I to Louis I—represent the potential of Capetian dynastic outreach as demonstrated through successful marriage alliances, fraternal crusading zeal, and increased involvement in affairs along the French frontier. The story of Navarre prior to 1316 highlights for readers key methods through which Capetian dynasticism and regnal authority can expand and how interdynastic relationships can benefit both the Capetian dynasty and the kingdom of France.

3.2 The Valois Ascendancy

The Capetian monarchy as a whole experienced an identity crisis between 1316 and 1328 when the established framework for royal succession faltered and then failed entirely following the rapid deaths of Philippe IV’s three sons: Louis X, Philippe V, and Charles IV.26 Alone among his vernacular peers, Lescot must explain to his readers these successions in such a way that both emphasises the advancement of dynastic authority and justifies the sudden elevation of a cadet, Philippe de Valois, to the kingship, itself an unprecedented event in Capetian history. Philippe’s father, Charles de Valois, was for many years the most prominent royal in France after the king, a man whose activities attracted the interest of Lescot and prompted a eulogy by Orgemont. Indeed, the reasons for Philippe’s elevation to the throne are as much the legacy of his father as they are his own. Lescot—and Orgemont through later revisions—dedicates considerable space to explaining precisely why Philippe was the best-suited candidate in 1328, justifying his election in the face of opposition from others who could claim a share of the succession. Although the Valois were not guaranteed to inherit the French throne, their status within the kingdom and their personal merits ensured the viability of the cadet kings. This section will examine Lescot and Orgemont’s depictions of the successions of 1316-1328 and analyse the ways in which the chroniclers portray Philippe de Valois as both a Capetian cadet and an ideal candidate for the French throne.

The crises that overwhelmed France in the early fourteenth century began with three

26 See Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 The End of the Senior House of Capet and the Successions of 1316 – 1328

Marie de Brabant (d. 1322)
Philippe III France: 1270 – 1285
Isabel de Aragón (d. 1271)

Louis
Évreux: 1298 – 1319

Jeanne I
Champagne & Navarre: 1274 – 1305
Philippe I & IV
Navarre: 1284 – 1305
France: 1285 – 1314
Charles
Valois: 1285 – 1325

Philippe III
France: 1270 – 1285

Philippe VI
Valois: 1325 – 1328
France: 1328 – 1350

Joana II
Navarre: 1328 – 1349

Jean I
France & Navarre: 1316

Évreux Rules of Navarre
(See Figure 3.4)

Philippe V & II
France & Navarre: 1316 – 1322
Isabelle (d. 1358)
Edward II
England: 1307 – 1327
Charles IV & I
France & Navarre:
1322 – 1328
Blanche
(d. 1393)

Counts of Artois & Burgundy
(See Figures 2.3 & 4.2)

Edward III
England: 1327 – 1377

Edward III
England: 1327 – 1377

Valois Kings of France
(See Figure 5.1)

Joana II
Navarre: 1328 – 1349

Philippe V & II
France & Navarre: 1316 – 1322

Isabelle (d. 1358)

Évreux Rulers of Navarre
(See Figure 3.4)
marriages between Capetian cadets. Lescot, generally borrowing directly from his sources, describes how between 1305 and 1307, all three sons of Philippe IV wed: Louis I of Navarre to Marguerite of ducal Burgundy, Philippe de Poitiers to Jeanne of comital Burgundy, and Charles de La Marche to Blanche, Jeanne’s sister.27 These linkages became important in 1314 when the three wives were implicated in the Tour de Nesle affair, a scandal that Lescot recounts in a single paragraph and never directly relates to the later succession crises.28 Copying Guillaume’s continuators, Lescot summarises the court proceedings that proved Marguerite and Blanche to be adulteresses and writes that the women were imprisoned for their crimes.29 He adds that Jeanne was briefly imprisoned for knowledge of their affair, but was subsequently released and redeemed by her husband.30 Lescot underemphasises the ramifications of this scandal with skill. Marguerite’s death in April 1315 is noted simply in passing, with no suggestion that Louis may have had a role in it to allow for his marriage to Klemencia of Hungary.31 Similarly, when Charles IV became king, he petitioned the pope for a dispensation to divorce Blanche, yet Lescot intentionally emphasises that the king did not claim adultery as the reason for divorce; rather, the king claimed that he was too closely related to Blanche since her mother, Mahaut d’Artois, was the king’s godmother.32 By reframing the details of this affair in such a way, Lescot removes any hint that the children of Louis and Charles could have been illegitimate and masks anything that could have potentially undermined the regnal qualities of the last three Capetian kings.

From 1316, the personality and abilities of Philippe de Poitiers direct the course of the vernacular narrative. Of the three brothers, Philippe was the only one to reconcile with his wife and she was the only spouse to be exonerated of any wrongdoing, thereby confirming for Lescot the virtuosity of their marriage and the legitimacy of their offspring.33 In addition, Philippe was Louis’s nearest brother and the chronicler often associates the three siblings,


29 See generally Woodacre, 52.


31 GCF, VIII:316, 320. Cf. Continuatio, 613. Favier, La guerre, 29, asserts that her death was ‘délibérément provoquée’.

32 GCF, IX:3-4. In contrast, Guillaume’s continuator includes her adultery. Cf. Continuatio, 630; Chronique latine, II:39. See generally Hallam and Everard, 366.

implying a close personal connection between them. Thus, it makes sense within the context of the narrative that when Louis died, Philippe became regent while awaiting the birth of Louis’s posthumous child, the short-lived Jean I. The chronicler explains that Philippe was ‘received peacefully by the barons of France [and] at the same time took by their assent and agreement the guardianship and government of the kingdoms of France and Navarre’. Lescot frames Philippe’s elevation to governance as elective, and this pattern continues in subsequent passages. Shortly after recounting Jean’s death, the chronicler summarises that ‘several barons, nobles, prelates, bourgeois, who all assembled approved the coronation of Philippe le Long and promised him obedience as their lord…and also there were those of the University, and they approved the things abovesaid’. Again, the elective nature is emphasised, but the chronicler adds a key proviso that ‘it was declared that women did not succeed to the kingdom of France’, thus setting the precedent that strict agnatic primogeniture was the royal succession law of France. The impact of this ruling is immediate in the text. When Lescot references a brief debate between Philippe and Eudes IV of Burgundy over the rights of Louis’s daughter, Joana, to the throne, he explains that Philippe dismissed her claim outright because ‘others say that women cannot inherit the kingdom of France’. Through this simple scribal comment, Lescot reinforces the recent precedent in the course of a single succession. Furthermore, he emphasises that it was not Philippe but the French aristocracy who insisted upon this ruling, and its placement in the narrative suggests it may have been derived from the university’s academics. 

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35 GCF, VIII:328. See generally Woodacre, 53.
37 Guillaume’s continuators do not mention the elective nature of Philippe’s accession. Cf. Chronique latine, I:427; Continuatio, 615.
38 ‘…plusieurs barons, nobles, prelaz, bourgeois en la cite de Paris; lesquiex tous ensamble aprouverent la coronacion de Philipe le Lune et li promistrent obedience tant comme à leur seigneur…et aussi firent ceulz de l’Université, [et] aprouverent les choses dessus dittes…’. GCF, VIII:332. See Chronique latine, I:434.
39 ‘Et adonc fu il desclarei que femme ne succede pas ou royaume de France’. GCF, VIII:332. Woodacre, 53-54, argues that this proviso was not actually declared at this time, but rather after Philippe’s coronation in January 1317, and that Philippe intentionally delayed negotiations over Louis’s daughter’s status to secure his hold on the throne. For more on the history of royal succession in France, see Derek R. Whaley, ‘From a Salic Law to the Salic Law: The Creation and Re-Creation of the Royal Succession System of Medieval France’, Routledge’s History of Monarchy (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
40 ‘Mais les autres disoient que femme ne peut heriter ou royaume de France’. GCF, VIII:334-335. Guillaume’s continuators, rather, explain in further detail how many lords, including Charles de la Marche and Charles de Valois, disputed Philippe’s claim. Cf. Continuatio, 617. Brown, ‘Ceremonial’, 126, 235, 258-259, elaborates that the nobility rose up against Philippe to defend the rights of Joana. She also suggests that Louis recognised his daughter as heir presumptive, although he left no written record of this decision.
succession in his rubric, noting that ‘Philippe, count of Poitiers, was crowned as king of France after the death of the said son [Jean I], who was his nephew, as if he were the son of his brother, Louis’. Therefore, to Orgemont, this succession was justified because Philippe took the place of his deceased nephew via an abstract transference of royal authority. The precedent of agnatic succession was reinforced in 1322 when Charles de La Marche succeeded his brother, which Lescot notes he did ‘without any contradiction’, a tacit acceptance of agnatic succession. Lescot and his sources recount these two successions in such a way as to leave no doubt regarding their legitimacy, justifying them via aristocratic election, juristic and academic approval, and precedent.

Those precedents would be recalled again in 1328 when Charles died prematurely leaving behind a pregnant wife. Because of this, Lescot writes, the ‘barons and the nobles assembled to discuss the government of the kingdom’ and ‘it was only a question of to whom, as closest, the government of the kingdom ought to be committed’. Thus, just as with Philippe V, the election was decided by the lords of France rather than through any established principle, although there was here an added stipulation that the candidate must be nearest in blood, although to whom is not explicitly stated. At this point, the narrative is heavily abridged from the sources by Orgemont in order to remove any question of legitimacy surrounding the Valois kings. Orgemont concludes, paraphrasing Guillaume’s continuator, that ‘the said government belonged to the said Philippe, who was first cousin of King Charles and son of monseigneur Charles de France, late count of Valois, and full brother of the father and mother of King Philippe le Bel’. In other words, Philippe’s election as regent was supported

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41 ‘Philippe conte de Poitiers fu coronné en roy du royaume de France après la mort dudit roy Jehan, lequel estoit son neveu, so comme celui qui estoit filz de son frere Loys’. GCF, VIII:333.
42 The sixteenth-century French jurist Charles Loyseau defines this principle in detail in his Traité des Ordres and simples Dignitez. His ideas result from the evolution of juristic concepts that predate the 1316 succession, although his specific arguments relate to the French succession of 1589, and he argues that any Capetian prince can substitute as the son of a previous king in order of agnatic seniority if the king dies without leaving an heir. Ralph E. Giesey, Le rôle méconnu de la loi salique: La succession royale XIVe-XVIe siècles, Histoire, trans. Franz Regnot (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007), 261.
43 ‘…vint en succession le royaume, sanz nul contredit, à Charles…’. GCF, VIII:366. See Continuatio, 630. See generally Woodacre, 57.
45 ‘…furent assemblez les barons et les nobles à taictier du gouvernement du royaume…; mais seulement estoit question auquel, tant comme plus prochain, devroit estre commis le gouvernement du royaume’. GCF, IX:71-72. See Continuatio, 645. See generally Woodacre, 57.
46 Beaune, Birth, 156, and Woodacre, 56, argue that this proximity of blood refers to nearness to Louis IX.
47 GCF, IX:71-73. Cf. GCF, IX:72n2; Chronique latine, II: 82-86; Continuatio, 645-646. For an example of what was redacted in 1377, see GCF, IX:330-341. See generally Hedeman, Royal Image, 122.
48 ‘Si fu deliberé que audit Phelippe appartenoit ledit gouvernement, lequel estoit cousin germain du roy Karle et filz de monseigneur Charle de France, jadis conte de Valois, secont frere germain de pere et de mere du
because of his close genealogical relationship to the previous king and that king’s father, who was his uncle. This, in effect, placed him on equal footing with Edward III, who was put forward by some as a better candidate because he was Charles IV’s nephew. To further support the Valois claim, the continuator adds that ‘Philippe had the government of the kingdom since the death of the said King Charles’, thereby establishing him as the status quo candidate. Lastly, the chronicler returns to the precedents of 1316 and 1322, explaining that, after the dowager queen gave birth to a daughter, the succession passed to Philippe ‘because a girl does not inherit the kingdom’. Therefore, Orgemont, summarising Guillaume’s continuator, argues for the Valois regency and succession on the grounds that Philippe was the closest-related male to Philippe IV, that he already controlled the government, and that precedent excluded females, such as Charles’s posthumous daughter, from inheriting the throne. Orgemont concludes that ‘it appeared clearly that the right line of the kings of France was transferred [translatée] to a transverse line—that is from a cousin to a cousin’. To Lescot and Orgemont, justifying the Valois succession is of paramount importance. By drawing unignorable comparisons between the 1316 and 1328 successions and establishing firmly in the minds of their readers the precedents of quasi-elective kingship and agnatic succession, the two continuators present to their readers the incontestable legitimacy of the Valois succession—a triumphal moment for Capetian dynasticism.

Lescot, by including important biographical information provided by Guillaume and his continuators, establishes Charles de Valois, the second son of Philippe III, as a key component in Philippe VI’s claim to the French throne. Guillaume first introduces Charles in 1282 at the time of his election as king of Aragón, the benefactor of the pope’s excommunication and condemnation of Pero III of Aragón during the War of the Sicilian Vespers. The chronicler relates how Philippe led a crusade against Aragon in 1284 to seize the crown for Charles, an unsuccessful endeavour that resulted in the king’s death in 1285. Throughout this narrative, Charles is little more than a background character, the adolescent son of an overly-

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49 GCF, IX:73. See generally Viard, ‘La succession’, 220. For more on the Plantagenet claim to France, see Chapter 4.3.
51 ‘Et pour ce que fille ne herite pas au royaume…’. GCF, IX:73.
52 ‘…il appert clerement que la droite ligne des roys de France fu translatée en ligne transversale; c’est à savoir de germain en germain’. GCF, IX:75. See Continuatio, 646.
53 GCF, VIII:87-89; GPT, 520. See generally Strayer, ‘Crusade’, 444-445. See also Chapter 2.2.
54 GCF, VIII:97, 102-104, 119-120. See GPT, 524, 528, 530, 536, 538. See generally Strayer, ‘Crusade’, 442, 446.
ambitious king. He becomes more prominent in the Dionysian vernacular narrative beginning in 1290, when Charles, according to Guillaume, renounced his claim to Aragón in exchange for the counties of Anjou and Maine, which he received as a dowry for his marriage to Marguerite of Naples.\(^{55}\) The chronicler later recounts that Charles led an army against Hainaut in 1292, where he accepted the count’s submission on behalf of the king.\(^{56}\) Indeed, Charles frequently appears in the narrative leading armies for his brother and nephews: in Gascony in 1295, in Flanders in 1297, 1304, and 1315, and in Gascony again in 1324.\(^ {57}\) But Guillaume’s continuators demonstrate that Charles was more than simply a devout servant of his brother and nephews. In addition to his pretension to Aragón, the Latin Empire was also claimed by Charles following his marriage to Catherine I, successor to Emperor Philippe de Courtenay, in 1301.\(^ {58}\) Although Constantinople itself was recaptured by the Byzantines in 1264, remnant territories of the former empire still remained, a fact that led Charles on a far-flung campaign in 1301 to quell the Italian Peninsula in order to conquer his particulate empire.\(^ {59}\) Charles’s Italian adventures were cut short, however, in 1308 when his wife died unexpectedly.\(^ {60}\) The continuators and Lescot demonstrate that Charles was a successful diplomat who achieved a long-sought peace treaty that ended the War of the Sicilian Vespers in 1302 and aided in the peace accords with the rebellious French barons in 1315.\(^ {61}\) Most importantly, he was a faithful Christian, visiting the pope in 1301 and 1302, and attending the papal coronation at Lyon in 1305 alongside his brothers.\(^ {62}\) The chroniclers never leave any doubt regarding the meritorious qualities that define Charles de Valois throughout his life. He is portrayed unceasingly as a loyal Capetian prince, a defender of the faith, and a reliable counsellor and advisor.

The only deviation from this depiction is an incident in 1315, which Lescot converts into one of his most overtly didactic lessons within his continuation. The chronicler records that, only days after the death of Philippe IV, Charles and his nephews accused the royal chamberlain, Enguerrand de Marigny, of stealing from the royal treasury, for which he was

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\(^ {56}\) GCF, VIII:149-150. See Chronicon, 574, 576. See generally Petit, 25.


\(^ {58}\) GCF, VIII:190-191. See Chronicon, 582. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 301.


\(^ {60}\) GCF, VIII:258-259, 262. See Continuatio, 595. See generally Petit, 110-111.


imprisoned, tried by a court of his peers, and hanged. Louis X had originally sought clemency and advocated for Enguerrand to go into exile to Cyprus, but Charles maliciously countered by accusing Enguerrand’s wife and his sister-in-law of additional crimes against the kingdom, which further condemned the chamberlain and led to the imprisonment of the sisters as well. Had the story ended here, the message in the continuation would be one of Capetian justice against those who wronged the kingdom and dynasty. But Lescot returns to the matter again in his account of the events of 1325, when Charles was on the brink of death, and the entire episode is transformed as a result. As Charles lay dying,

several thought that in this illness he was conscious of the death of Enguerrand de Marigny, who was hanged, as several men said, to his regret, which he realised afterwards. When his illness grew worse, he arranged to give alms throughout the city of Paris; and those who gave the alms to the poor said, “take it for messire Enguerrand de Marigny and for messire Charles de Valois”. And because they named Enguerrand before that of messire Charles, several judged that he was conscious of the death of messire Enguerrand.

Lescot translated this passage almost directly from his sources, but the details of the incident in 1315 were expanded from the original material provided by Guillaume’s continuators. By elaborating on the earlier passages, Lescot more clearly illustrates the sins committed by Charles earlier in life and compares those to his penitent attitude upon death. Furthermore, Lescot not only redeems the man for his one episode of malice, but demonstrates how even an errant agnate can save himself by seeking forgiveness for his sins.

Ultimately, though, it is because of his children and descendants that Charles is important to the Dionysian vernacular tradition. Within the span of three decades and with three wives, Charles sired no fewer than nine children of note, whose descendants and their spouses would become prominent figures themselves within the continuations. The first of these marriages mentioned in the vernacular chronicles came in 1308, when Guy I, count of Blois,

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64 GCF, VIII:314, 316. See generally Petit, 152-153.

65 ‘...cuidierent plusiers que en celle maladie il feist conscience de la mort Engorran de Marigni, lequel fu pendu, so comme aucunes gens dient, à son pourchaz par ce que on apperceust aprés. Quant sa maladie l’en-grega, il fist donner une aumosne parmi la ville de Paris; et disoient ceulz qui donnoient l’amosne aus pouvres: “Priez pour messire Engerran de Marigni et pour messire Charles de Valoys.”’ Et pour ce qu’il nommoient avant le nom de messire Engerran que de messire Charles, plusieurs jugerent que de la mort messire Engerran il faisoit conscience’. GCF, IX:49. See Chronique latine, 64-65; Continuatio, 639. See generally Brown, ‘Philip the Fair’, 207-208; Petit, 219.

66 See Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 The Children of Charles de Valois

1. **Philippe VI**
   - Valois: 1325 – 1328
   - France: 1328 – 1350
   - Counts & Dukes of Anjou
     - Marguerite d'Anjou
       - Marguerite (d. 1358)
       - Guy I
         - Jeanne (d. 1363)
           + Robert III
             - Blanche (d. 1348)
               + Karl IV
                 - Bohemia: 1346 – 1378
                   Roman Emperor: 1355 – 1378

2. **Catherine II**
   - Latin Empress: 1307 – 1346
     + Philippe I
       - Albania: 1294 – 1332
         - Marie (d. 1331)
           + Carlo
             - Isabelle (d. 1383)
               + Pierre I
                 - Bourbon: 1342 – 1356

3. **Charles II**
   - Alençon: 1325 – 1346
   - Counts of Hainaut
     - Marguerite (d. 1342)
       + Guy I
         - Jeanne (d. 1352)
           + Guillaume III
             - Couths of Anjou & Kings of England
               - Catherine I
                 - Latin Empress: 1283 – 1307
                   + Mathilde de Châtillon (d. 1358)

Charles de Valois
- Aragon: 1284 – 1295
  - Valois: 1285 – 1325
    - Anjou: 1290 – 1314
      - Alençon: 1291 – 1325
        - Latin Emperor: 1301 – 1307
          + Marguerite d’Anjou (d. 1299)
          + Catherine I
            - Latin Empress: 1283 – 1307
              + Mathilde de Châtillon (d. 1358)
married Marguerite de Valois.\(^{67}\) One of their children was Charles de Blois, the future duke of Brittany during the War of the Breton Succession.\(^{68}\) Another marriage, that of Guillaume I, count of Hainaut, to Jeanne, produced, among other children, Philippa, wife of Edward III of England.\(^{69}\) And Charles’s former imperial title passed through his daughter, Catherine II, to Philippe I, the Angevin prince of Taranto, whose descendants vied for the Byzantine throne for the following seventy years.\(^{70}\) Other daughters would marry the notorious Robert III d’Artois, count of Beaumont-le-Rogier; Duke Carlo of Calabria, heir of Robert of Naples; Pierre I, duke of Bourbon; and the future Emperor Karl IV.\(^{71}\) More vital to dynastic survival, though, were Charles de Valois’s two surviving sons, Philippe and Charles, who resumed his pro-Angevin campaigns in Italy in 1319-20 and fought alongside their father in Gascony in 1324.\(^{72}\) The legacy of the elder son quickly merged into the dynastic history of France itself once he was elected king in 1328.\(^{73}\) In the end, the chroniclers promote the Valois family as an example of Capetian cadets who actively supported one another and constantly upheld regnal authority throughout their actions and marriages, thereby lending credibility to their right to the French throne.

When Philippe de Valois is first introduced in the continuation, he is a failed adventurer in a foreign land, which immediately informs readers that he is a cadet, not the heir to the French throne.\(^{74}\) Nonetheless, Lescot quickly emphasises Philippe’s merits once the man becomes king in the narrative. He records in detail how the first Valois king led a massive army into Flanders, proving his martial prowess by defeating the frequently recalcitrant Flemish at the battle of Cassel in 1328.\(^{75}\) He then borrows from Guillaume’s continuation to recount how the king flexed his juridical muscles in forcing Edward III to recognise him as suzerain over Guyenne and Ponthieu.\(^{76}\) Similarly, he demonstrates in numerous vignettes how the king used his judicial authority to settle the matter of the Artesian succession.\(^{77}\) But

\(^{67}\) GCF, VIII:262. See Continuatio, 598. See generally Petit, 241, 243.

\(^{68}\) See Chapter 4.1.

\(^{69}\) GCF, VIII:267. See generally Petit, 240-241.

\(^{70}\) GCF, VIII:290. See Continuatio, 607. See generally Housley, Later Crusades, 54; Petit, 244.

\(^{71}\) See generally Petit, 244, 247-248.

\(^{72}\) GCF, VIII:347, IX:33. See Chronique latine, II:57; Continatio Chronici, 625. See generally Housley, Italian Crusades, 74; Langlois, Histoire, 302; Viard, ‘Philippe de Valois’, 321.

\(^{73}\) For more on the younger son, Charles II, count d’Alençon, and his descendants, see Chapter 8.3.

\(^{74}\) Viard, ‘Philippe de Valois’, 324, notes that ‘pendant les deux années qui précédèrent son événement au trône, le nom de Philippe de Valois ne paraît pas souvent dans les documents ou les chroniques…’.

\(^{75}\) GCF, IX:84-85. See generally George Minois, La guerre de cent ans: Naissance de deux nations (Paris: Perrin, 2008), 35. For more on the Flemish wars, see Chapter 4.2.

\(^{76}\) GCF, IX:96-104. See Chronique latine, 105, 106-108. See generally Minois, 41. See also Chapter 4.3.

\(^{77}\) See Chapters 2.3 and 8.3.
perhaps the most important action taken by Philippe according to the chroniclers was the king’s advocacy for a new crusade in 1333, at which time he and other prominent French nobles took the cross and pledged upon holy relics to venture to the Levant. This not only gives Philippe similar saintly qualities to Louis IX and Philippe III, but implies an inherent religiosity surrounding the Valois king. It also became a point of contention when Edward III proclaimed himself king of France in 1340, since Philippe complained that ‘your enterprise, which shows your unreasonable will, has prevented the holy voyage to Outremer and resulted in a great quantity of Christians being put to death, and service to God being diminished, and the holy Church being less revered’. By including this statement, Lescot denies any legitimacy to the English claim to France by demonstrating how such a pretension directly interfered with God’s divine mission. By examining these various aspects of his character, Lescot builds the case that Philippe represented an ideal French king and a righteous counterpoint to England’s wanton aggression.

The concluding portion of Philippe de Valois’s narrative is due to Orgemont, not Lescot, and was added in 1377 to further emphasise the king’s moral traits. The chronicler explains to the reader the surnames that Philippe accumulated throughout his life and what each says about his character. Philippe was ‘the Fortunate’ because he was fortunate to have obtained the throne considering the circumstances, and he was ‘the Lucky’, for he won a great victory against the Flemish at Cassel. But more important are his other two surnames, ‘the Very Good Christian’ and ‘the Very Catholic’, the former ‘because he loved and feared God, and he honoured the power of the Holy Church’, and the latter ‘because…he showed this by faith and words in his life’. Orgemont then gives examples of the king’s righteousness, showing how Philippe demonstrated selfless piety in 1335 when he travelled barefoot throughout the Île-de-France to find a cure for his son’s illness and how he publicly criticised Pope John XXII for preaching a false message. By doing this, Orgemont converts Philippe

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79 Tyerman, 474, writes that ‘[n]o French monarch of the fourteenth century could ignore the legacy of Louis VII, Philip II and Louis IX. Crusading had become part of the essence of French kingship. The crusade was to confirm Philip VI’s position in France, in Europe and, even, in Paradise’.
80 ‘…vostre emprise qui est de volenté non raysonnable, a esté empeeschié le saint voyage d’outre mer, et grant quantité de crestiens mis à mort, et le service de Dieu apeticié, et sainte Eglise aornée de moins de reverence’. GCF, IX:201.
81 See generally Hedeman, Royal Image, 106-107.
82 GCF, IX:327.
83 ‘…car il amoit et doubitoit Dieu, et si homoroit à son povoir sainte Eglise’, and ‘car…il le monstra par fait et par dit en son vivant’. GCF, IX:327.
84 GCF, IX:148-149, 327-329. See generally Lucien M. Martin, La Rédemption, qu’est-ce donc? (Paris:
into the embodiment of a good man ruling in terrible times, a layman favoured by fortune and luck for his devout piety but who suffered greatly nonetheless because of the greed and ambitions of others. Within the Dionysian tradition, Philippe VI represents a cadet turned king and what is expected of a French monarch.

By using his sources in the way he does, Lescot never foreshadows that the Valois line would succeed the senior Capetians in 1328. Indeed, most of his sources were written before that date so could not have predicted it. Lescot abridges very little of what is said by Guillaume and his continuators and enhances a few key portions of text to further highlight the ultimate importance of the Valois to the narrative. It is ultimately Orgemont who is responsible for removing doubt regarding the legitimacy of the Valois succession. He removes Lescot’s discussion of the 1328 succession and replaces it with a simple summary that decisively undermines the arguments of rival candidates, making their claims appear fundamentally counter to French interests. Later in the text, the chronicler examines the reasons why Philippe VI was so deserving of the royal title, summarising his points as a way of reassuring readers of the cadet’s suitability. Through this process, he makes it abundantly clear that the Valois are worthy successors to the Capetians. Collectively, the chroniclers convey a message that kings, regardless of their origins, are expected to be valorous and devout, and that only those who express all these traits concurrently can successfully represent and promote Capetian dynasticism in the manner of the great kings who ruled before them.

### 3.3 The Perseverance of the House of Évreux

The triumph of the Valois came at the expense of Joana, the only surviving child of Louis I/X, who failed to secure the French throne for her family and was given as a consolation prize Navarre, since the kingdom permitted female succession and there was recent precedent for it. Lescot never grants the Pyrenean kingdom the same level of attention he and earlier chroniclers gave it prior to 1316, but its rulers maintain a constant presence in his text since they were actively involved in representing Capetian dynasticism. Within Orgemont’s continuation, Joana’s successors from the Capetian house of Évreux return to prominence due to the frequent intrigues and intra-dynastic conflicts encouraged by Carlos II, whose awareness of dispossessed ancestral territories motivated him to act against the Valois kings. A true

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Éditions Publibook, 2012), 141; Sumption, I:145.

85 Thibaut I inherited Navarre through his mother, sister of the last native king, Antso VII. Meanwhile, Jeanne I inherited Navarre from her father and passed the title to each of her surviving sons in turn. Woodacre, 60.

86 See Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 The Capetian House of Évreux, 1298 – 1441

Louis
Évreux: 1298 – 1319
Marguerite d’Artois
(d. 1311)

Joana II
Navarre: 1328 – 1349
Filipe III
Évreux: 1319 – 1343
Navarre: 1328 – 1343
Charles
Étampes: 1319 – 1336
Jeanne
(d. 1371)
Charles IV & I
France & Navarre: 1322 – 1328

Filipe
Longueville: 1353 – 1363
Louis
Étampes: 1336 – 1400
Blanche
(d. 1393)

Philippe VI
Blanka
France: 1328 – 1350
(d. 1398)
Jean II
France: 1350 – 1364
Jeanne
(d. 1373)
Carlos II
Évreux: 1343 – 1487
Navarre: 1349 – 1487

Carlos III
Évreux: 1387 – 1404
Navarre: 1387 – 1425
Nemours: 1404 – 1425
Petri
Mortain: 1376 – 1412

Later Rulers of Navarre
reconciliation between the Valois and Évreux came only with Carlos III, who is portrayed by Juvénal in a more neutral light. Considered together, the Évreux monarchs represent continuity of Capetian dynastic authority in Navarre, but also exemplify the conflict that can arise between agnates who feel themselves equal to their French royal peers. This section will explore the ways in which the Évreux family is represented within the Dionysian vernacular tradition to explore how their story enhanced the dynastic narrative.

When considering the Évreux agnates in any capacity, one must remember that they remained minor French territorial lords throughout their entire existence. Guillaume and Lescot emphasise repeatedly that the family’s patriarch, Louis, only son of Philippe III and his second wife, Marie de Brabant, was count of the small city of Évreux in Normandy. In 1300, he married the Capetian princess Marguerite, daughter of Philippe d’Artois and sister of Robert III, placing Louis firmly in the Capetian dynastic matrix. However, despite being a constant presence in Lescot’s text as a French commander in the Flemish wars of 1314-16, Louis is never described in any detail and his very existence seems inconsequential for a prince of such high lineage. His death in 1319 passes without note in the narrative and the marriage of his son, Philippe, to Joana in 1318 is equally unremarkable to Lescot, making their sudden joint inheritance of Navarre in 1328 an unexpected development. Rather than describing Louis in ways similar to his elder brothers, Philippe IV and Charles de Valois, Lescot chooses to largely ignore him, suggesting that he considers the count of little didactic benefit to his narrative of Capetian dynasticism.

Concerning the Navarrese succession itself, Lescot frames it as a royal grant, an action within the prerogative of the French king, stating that Philippe VI, ‘accepting the good counsel of the barons and the elders regarding the laws of the kingdom of Navarre and county of Champagne, restored the said kingdom of Navarre to [Philippe], count d’Évreux, because of his wife, the daughter of King Louis [X]. And regarding the matter of the county of Champagne, he assigned other rents in the county of La Marche, near Angoulême’. Lescot implies

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that Philippe VI held suzerainty over both Navarre and Champagne and that neither belonged to Joana by right, but only by his royal will. Thus, Philippe legally denied Joana her hereditary claims to Champagne because it never was hers in the first place. The issuing of Navarre to Philippe d’Évreux—hereafter Filipe III—rather than to Joana underlines this point. Filipe was a Capetian agnate, a man who, both by himself and via his wife, had a claim to the French throne nearly equal to the king himself. Thus, by emphasising Filipe as the Navarrese heir, Lescot is able to focus on dynastic unity rather than lingering on problematic claims. The chronicler notes that, immediately after his succession, Filipe fought beside Philippe in the same battalion at the battle of Cassel in 1328. He attended the wedding of Philippe’s son Jean to Bonne de Luxembourg in 1332. He later led the royalist forces in Flanders in 1334 and in the war against comital Burgundy in 1336. And he was foremost among the ranks of French generals in the earliest years of the Anglo-French war. His ultimate sacrifice while on crusade against the Saracens on the Iberian Peninsula in 1343 is the grandest display of his Capetian heritage. Lescot demonstrates that, by the time of his death, Filipe was a worthy example of Capetian dynasticism.

The vernacular portrayal of Joana, Filipe’s wife, is equally positive. In the narrative, en la comté de la Marche, empris Engolesme’. GCF, IX:77-78. See Lescot, 3. See generally Gaposchkin, Making, 231; Viard, ‘Début’, 271.

92 ‘Aux côtés de Philippe VI, le jeune comte d’Évreux [Philippe] fit figure, non de souverain indépendant, ni même de prince territorial émancipé, mais de jeune cousin sur le dévouement et l’affection de qui le roi de France put légitimement compter. Il était en effet…un satellite obligé de la couronne de France’. Charon, 230.

93 Following Lescot’s logic, Champagne was presumably merged into the royal domain upon the accession of Louis to the French throne in 1314, which was a common practice by earlier Capetian kings, who could not logically be their own vassals. Wood, French Apanages, 47. The final treaty wherein Joana and Filipe renounced Champagne was sealed in July 1336. Charon, 123.

94 ‘La guerre de Flandre (1328)’; Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 83 (1922): 368.


she emerges from her husband’s shadow only after his death, at which point she acted ‘by the council of the king of France’, suggesting that she remained under the influence of her Valois cousins.\textsuperscript{100} However, this aspect of the Évreux-Valois relationship is never further developed in the chronicles. Lescot takes a different approach when recording that Joana died of plague in 1349, placing a strong emphasis on her Capetian ancestry and ignoring entirely her life after 1328.\textsuperscript{101} He records that ‘Jeanne, queen of Navarre, daughter of Louis Hutin, king of France, died and was interred at Saint-Denis in France at the foot of her father and beside messire Jean, her brother, who was called king although he was never crowned’.\textsuperscript{102} Thus, she is buried in the crypt of the French kings, at the foot of a French king, and beside a child considered a French king, implying strongly to the reader that she is worthy of equal respect, although Lescot stops short of acknowledging her right to the throne. This lends further evidence to the argument that Lescot views the entire Évreux matter as part of the greater Capetian dynastic narrative. According to the chronicler, Filipe was a steadfast vessel of dynastic authority, and his wife, although sidelined narratively, was nonetheless a clear continuity marker, one whose genealogical positioning made her vital to understanding the approach to dynasticism found in the chronicles.

Under their son, Carlos II, this dynastic relationship utterly collapsed due to lingering animosities from the 1328 settlement and a perceived sense of deprivation maintained by the new Navarrrese king. Orgemont remarks that in 1351, Jean II granted the county of Angoulême to his friend Charles de la Cerda, a distant Capetian cognate and the constable of France.\textsuperscript{103} Earlier, Lescot mentions this county as land ceded to Filipe and Joana to settle outstanding claims to Champagne, but clearly it had reverted to the French crown, although neither chronicler notes this.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{100} GCF, IX:241. Woodacre, 74, suggests that Joana had more autonomy than Lescot implies, emphasizing that she ‘became more demanding about her rights, pursuing negotiations with the French king over disputed territories and dues. She complained in 1345 that the revenues of the county of Angoulême did not match what she had originally been promised and eventually negotiated an exchange for more strategic castles closer to Paris’. She adds further that the ‘French king and the Duke of Normandy were forced to obtain Juana’s consent and negotiate accords with her in 1343 and 1348 regarding the crucial levy of troops in Normandy as the Evreux holdings there were considerable’.

\textsuperscript{101} GCF, IX:320. See generally Woodacre, 59.

\textsuperscript{102} ‘…trespasssa madame Jehanne royne de Navarre, fille de Loys Hutin roy de France, et fu enterrée à Saint Denys en France as piez de son pere, et de costé messire Jehan son frere, lequel estoit appellé roy jasoit ce qu’il ne fust onques couronné…’. GCF, IX:320.

\textsuperscript{103} CRJC, I:33. See generally Bruno Ramirez de Palacios, Charles dit le Mauvais: Roi de Navarre, comte d’Évreux, prétendant au trône de France (Le Chesnay, France: La Hallebarde, 2015), 66. See also Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{104} GCF, IX:78. Viard, ‘La succession’, 221, states that, when Joana and Filipe received the counties of Angoulême and Mortain in 1328, it was a ‘rente annuelle et perpétuelle’, but there were no provisions in place for children.
chronicle, Carlos shortly afterwards condoned the murder of Charles, an event that initiated an intense hatred between the Navarrese and French kings.\textsuperscript{105} The first of many reconciliations came a few months later, about which Orgemont reports that Jean agreed to ‘grant to [Carlos] 38,000 livres tournois of land…for other land that the said king of France ought to hold due to certain treaties made a long time ago by the predecessors of the two abovesaid kings, because of the county of Champagne’.\textsuperscript{106} In exchange, Carlos pledged fealty to Jean and the French king’s heir, the Dauphin Charles of Normandy, for all his territories in France and Normandy.\textsuperscript{107} Orgemont shows that Jean broke this treaty almost immediately when he invaded Normandy and recaptured most of it from Carlos, prompting a second reconciliation in 1355.\textsuperscript{108} But the chronicler demonstrates Jean’s hatred for Carlos again in 1356, when the king covertly captured Carlos in Rouen while he was feasting with the dauphin.\textsuperscript{109} Orgemont justifies this act by clarifying that ‘since his reconciliation made to the king of France for the death of the abovesaid constable, the king of Navarre had machinated and arranged several things, to the damage, dishonour, and ill-will of the King and monseigneur, his eldest son, and to all the kingdom of France’.\textsuperscript{110} Unusually, Orgemont does not outline any of these misdeeds and, contextually, Jean appears to be the aggressor, ruthlessly executing Carlos’s compatriots without a trial.\textsuperscript{111} The chronicler implies that Jean’s heavy-handed actions against the Navarrese king made Carlos popular with the Parisian populace, and this expedited the process of turning the Évreux-Valois feud into a permanent fixture in French politics.\textsuperscript{112} Therefore, although he does not paint Jean in a good light, Orgemont views Carlos as an

\textsuperscript{105} CRJC, I:37-38. This murder took place in January 1354. Sumption, II:124.

\textsuperscript{106} ‘…le dit roy de France bailleroit au dit roy de Navarre XXXVIII mil livres à tournois de terre…pour autre terre que le dit roy de France li devoit asseoir par certains traitiez fais lonc temps avoit entre les predecesseurs des deux roys dessus diz pour cause de la comté de Champaigne’. CRJC, I:41. The lands in question are Beaumont-le-Roger and numerous territories in Normandy. Ramirez de Palacios, 87.

\textsuperscript{107} CRJC, I:42. He also married Jean II’s daughter, Jeanne, at this time, although Orgemont does not mention this fact. Charon, 134. See generally Ramirez de Palacios, 89.

\textsuperscript{108} CRJC, I:47, 51-52. Jean invaded Normandy in 1354 after convincing himself that the treaty with Carlos and a truce with Edward III were the products of pro-Navarre members of his royal council. Sumption, II:137, 139, 164, 166, 167.

\textsuperscript{109} CRJC, I:63. See generally Charon, 201-202; Ramirez de Palacios, 110-114; Sumption, II:205-206.

\textsuperscript{110} ‘La cause fu que, depuis leur reconsiliacion faite par le roy de France de la mort du devant dit constable, le dit roy de Navarre avoit machiné et traicté plusieurs choses, au dommage, deshonneur et mal du Roy et de monseigneur son ainsné filz et de tout le royaume de France’. CRJC, I:63-64.

\textsuperscript{111} Sumption, II:206, 207, explains that ‘John II was said to have received a cache of documents whose authenticity was hotly disputed but which appeared to disclose a scheme for murdering him and his son and delivering up Normandy to Edward III…. [T]his latest incident festered in John’s mind, and coalesced with the accumulated grievances of the past three years’. He adds that ‘[t]o the many in Normandy and elsewhere…it confirmed the widespread impression that [John] was irrational, unstable and impulsive, and that his government lived every day from one expedient to the next’.

\textsuperscript{112} CRJC, I:80, 90. For a detailed discussion of the political situation in France from 1356 to 1360 and how Carlos’s actions triggered a change in direction within the Dionysian vernacular tradition, see Chapter 5.2.
aberration in Capetian dynastic history, an agnate who not only undermined dynasticism but fought actively against regnal authority.

The inherent selfishness of Carlos and the repercussions of such greed are the reasons why Orgemont devotes so much space to the Navarrese king. Throughout the numerous conflicts and scandals that Carlos engaged in between 1351 and his death in 1387, his primary motivator within the chronicles remains the reassertion of Évreux authority over lands and titles seized by the Valois. When Carlos escaped from prison in November 1357, one of his first public acts was to demand either land or money derived from Normandy or Champagne, the latter of which reflected his outstanding claim on the county left unsettled in 1328. The matter of his inheritance is again an issue in 1358, when the future Charles V convinced Champagne to remain loyal to the Valois despite Carlos attempting to sway their allegiance, an acknowledgement by Orgemont that at least some in the county considered Carlos to be their rightful lord. More drastically, when Carlos took control of Paris, the chronicler indicates that he ‘said that he loved very much the kingdom of France and he was held in good regard there, as it is said, because he was of the *fleurs de lis* on all sides, and his mother would have been king of France if she had been a man, because she had been the only daughter of the king of France’. Orgemont strategically makes Carlos the architect of this pretension, allowing the chronicler to recount the claim, but not support it. However, he does acknowledge that the claim had enough merit to win over some citizens of Paris. When Charles retook Paris in August 1358, Orgemont justifies his execution of several traitors by explaining that many Parisians sought ‘to make the said king of Navarre king of France and put the English and Navarrese into Paris’. In other words, Orgemont considers Carlos a legitimate threat to the sustainability of the Valois kingship and he justifies Carlos’s defeat by targeting his unjust claim to the French throne. When a truce was finally agreed between Charles and Carlos in late 1359, Champagne and the matter of the 1328 succession were not broached. Instead, Charles re-granted Carlos his hereditary lands and gave him a substantial monetary payment for everything else. The treaty of Brétigny in 1360 confirmed this peace and marks for Orgemont the end of any legitimate complaints the Navarrese king may have

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113 *CRJC*, I:125. See generally Autrand, *Charles V*, 279, 283; Ramirez de Palacios, 138.
115 ‘Et entre autres choses dist que il amoit moult le royaume de France et il y estoit bien tenu, si comme il disoit; car il estoit des fleurs de lis de tous costez, et eust esté sa mere roy de France se elle eust esté homme, car elle avoit esté fille seule du roy de France’. *CRJC*, I:185. See generally Autrand, *Charles V*, 331.
117 *CRJC*, I:238-239. See generally Charon, 214-217; Ramirez de Palacios, 175-176.
had regarding Champagne and the French crown.\textsuperscript{118} Although Carlos schemed and intrigued against the Valois long after 1360, Orgemont suggests that his primary motivation was to regain his land in Normandy.\textsuperscript{119} In the end, Orgemont accepts the peace at Brétigny as the conclusion of the Évreux dispute over the 1328 settlement, and his treatment of Carlos throughout this narrative and afterwards suggests that he primarily considers the Navarrese king to be a schemer and manipulator of minds and, therefore, a very poor representative of Capetian dynasticism.

Very little is said of the Navarrese kings under Juvénal, and Carlos III, the eldest son of Carlos II, first appears in the narrative as king only in 1396 at the proxy wedding of Isabelle of France to Richard II of England.\textsuperscript{120} However, the matter of the 1328 settlement returns in 1397, when Carlos expressed his desire to permanently end the Évreux-Valois feud.\textsuperscript{121} Juvénal notes that there was a general fear ‘that it would be bad to deliver anything to [Carlos III], due to the horrible and detestable evil that his father had done in the kingdom’.\textsuperscript{122} Others feared that, ‘if he had the places in Normandy that he requested and he wanted to make war, that great inconveniences could come from it’.\textsuperscript{123} Juvénal conlates this first treaty, mentioned by Pintoin, with a later treaty in 1404, where Carlos was given a newly-created duchy centred at Nemours.\textsuperscript{124} In addition, Juvénal emphasises that Carlos was also granted a substantial income from Gastinois and Champagne, once again confirming the link between the lost Champenois inheritance and the rulers of Navarre.\textsuperscript{125} Because he conlates the two episodes, Juvénal repeats much of this story in 1404, focussing again on Nemours and the

\textsuperscript{118} CRJC, I:322, 329-330. Carlos refused to pledge homage a second time, arguing that ‘ce n’était pas lui qui avait forfait son engagement d’honneur et de fidélité’. Autrand, Charles V, 403. See generally Sumption, II:453.

\textsuperscript{119} CRJC, I:342, II:140-142, 153-155. Indeed, Orgemont transcribes two confessions into his chronicle, the longer of which by Jacques de Rue highlights that in 1370, Carlos intended to divide France between himself and Edward III, with the latter receiving the French crown, suggesting the Navarrese king had abandoned his claim to France. CRJC, II:289-291. In 1364, Carlos attempted to claim the duchy of Burgundy since he was the heir by primogeniture, although Orgemont does not discuss the matter in these terms. CRJC, I:342, 345-346, II:9-10. See generally Charon, 217-219, 693-700; Favier, La guerre, 294ff, 308ff, 361; Sumption, III:317-318, 320, 340; Woodacre, 78.

\textsuperscript{120} HCRF, 402. See generally Favier, La guerre, 408.

\textsuperscript{121} HCRF, 411. Pintoin includes a much longer discussion here, linking the Évreux-Valois agreement directly to the Navarre-Champagne inheritance and the crimes of Carlos II. Cf. CKS, II:536-540 (even). No modern historian mentions this treaty, focussing instead on the 1404 final treaty between Navarre and France.

\textsuperscript{122} ‘Et disoient aucuns, que ce seroit mal fait de luy rien bailler, veu les horribles et detestables maux que son pere avoit fait en ce royaume’. HCRF, 411. Pintoin does not mention any such fears and attributes discussion of Carlos’s ancestors to the Navarrese negotiator rather than anonymous French commentators.

\textsuperscript{123} ‘…que s’il avoit en Normandie les places qu’il demandoit, et il vouloit faire guerre, que grands inconvénients en pourroient advenir’. HCRF, 411.


\textsuperscript{125} HCRF, 411. The income was in fact the purchase price for the port of Cherbourg, although Juvénal
deprived Champagne and Norman estates. In this second instance, though, there is no suggestion that Carlos’s position was compromised by the activities of Carlos II. Indeed, Juvénal notes that ‘his son had none of the imagination of his father’. In the agreement, Carlos ‘ceded and conveyed all the rights that he could have, and had to the counties of Champagne and Évreux, and all that he had in Normandy. And in compensation, the King erected Nemours in Gastinois into a duchy, and assigned him 12,000 livres in rent from Gastinois and Champagne’. This was the definitive resolution to ninety years of debate over the Champenois succession. Carlos is last mentioned by Juvénal departing Paris in 1409, at which point the Évreux cadets disappear from the vernacular tradition entirely. Thus, the Navarrese king’s role in Juvénal’s chronicle is straightforward: he put an end to the matter of the 1328 succession and reconciled the Évreux cadets to the greater Capetian family. Furthermore, by restoring his place within the dynasty, Carlos represented the Christian idea that one should not pay for the crimes of their ancestor—a concept Juvénal undoubtedly wished to promote among Capetians in the years after the Armagnac-Burgundian war.

Ultimately, the story of the Évreux kings of Navarre in the Dionysian vernacular continuations is one of a cadet line quickly falling out of favour with their senior kin due to territorial disputes and failed pretensions. Lescot begins to develop this theme by exemplifying the first agnates’ loyalty to the senior Capetians and Valois, focusing specifically on the positive attributes of Filipe III of Navarre as both a Capetian prince and crusader. Orgemont, however, is faced with a very different sort of Navarrese monarch in the person of Carlos II and is forced to confront the fact that the succession of 1328 remained unresolved and acted as a justification for Carlos to openly rebel against the future Charles V in pursuit of his lost heritage.

Under Juvénal, the matter of outstanding claims to Champagne returned twice and its
resolution by an agreement between Carlos III and Charles VI permanently ended the Évreux presence in the vernacular tradition. For all these chroniclers, it is clear that Navarre remained an important aspect of French dynastic history throughout the fourteenth century, but it is how that narrative undeniably shifted from one of dynastic unity to one of dynastic distancing that reveals the true role the Évreux served in the vernacular tradition. When cadets prove themselves loyal and influential to the dynasty as a whole, their role is emphasised and their contributions praised by the chroniclers. When they prove themselves disloyal or simply unimportant, they are ostracized, either through narrative shaming or outright abandonment. It is for this reason that the Évreux rulers of Navarre disappear from the vernacular narrative: they serve as poor representatives of Capetian dynasticism and were, therefore, removed to make room for better examples.

Overall, the rulers of Navarre represent the benefits of good Capetian dynasticism within the Dionysian vernacular continuations. The earlier Champenois monarchs accepted their place within the Capetian dynasty and allowed their kingdom to fall under the umbrella of French regnal authority. As a result, France and Navarre merge together within the chronicles and are treated as one unit, the latter entirely subject to the will of the Capetian king. Once the two kingdoms are separated, though, the later Èvreux rulers of Navarre progressively become less affiliated with the Capetian dynasty and cease to support French regnal authority. While Filipe III and Joana II continued to act as positive representations of Capetian dynasticism, Carlos II directly challenged regnal authority repeatedly, prompting Orgemont to portray him as a villain. His son, Carlos III, was never quite able to restore his family’s reputation within the Capetian dynasty and, as a result, he eventually disappears from the Dionysian narrative. If the Dionysian continuations are intended to act as miroirs des princes, the later rulers of Navarre were poor reflections of dynasticism. Better candidates could be found in the brave and penitent Charles de Valois or his son, Philippe VI, who was continually blessed by fortune and divine favour. It is these individuals who most closely resemble the archetypal brothers of Louis IX. Individuals such as Thibaut II, Jeanne I, and Filipe III possess some of these traits, such as crusading zeal, martial valour, and dynastic devotion, but none are developed with the same detail as their Valois cousins. In the end, it was Philippe VI who represented a second birth for the Capetian dynasty, an ideal monarch ruling in uncertain times, and it was his succession that broke the curse of the kings who preceded him.
CHAPTER FOUR  
All Roads Lead to War

The relationship between the royal families of France and Navarre was one of many forged between the Capetian dynasty and its vassals and neighbours in the later Middle Ages. Indeed, the kings of France often sought to reinforce their suzerainty through strategic marriage alliances, as was the case with the rulers of Brittany, Flanders, and Guyenne. But the results of this strategy varied wildly and Dionysian vernacular chroniclers often struggled to derive didactic meaning from them. For example, Brittany, which was granted to a Capetian cadet in 1213, remained constantly disloyal to the French kings and war eventually broke out in 1341 between two rival ducal claimants, one who accepted French suzerainty and another who desired independence. Flanders similarly fought for its autonomy against French aggrandizement, although it was ultimately inherited by a cadet branch of the Valois. Guyenne, the largest Plantagenet possession in France after 1259, was a unique case. Despite five interdynastic marriages with the Capetian dynasty over a 145-year period, the Plantagenets of England maintained a state of near-constant war with France, especially after Edward III claimed the French throne in 1340. In each case, French suzerainty over autonomous territories was the primary point of conflict and the kings attempted to use dynasticism in unique ways to resolve them. This chapter will explore the ways in which the Dionysian vernacular continuators documented these disputes and how they used the families to serve as didactic examples of the potential pitfalls of poorly-implemented dynastic policy.

4.1 Suspicious Agnates

The thirteenth-century rulers of Brittany were a unique breed of Capetian cadets. Springing from the union of Pierre de Dreux and Alix de Thouars, the family drifted in their orientation between dynastic loyalists and troublesome neighbours. Pierre was given his position in order to bring Brittany into the Capetian fold, but under Louis IX, he established a pattern of Franco-Breton animosities that lingered until the end of the fourteenth century. His successors slowly regained their status within the vernacular continuations, if not within the Capetian dynasty, but their loyalties continued to drift, sometimes towards England, other times towards autonomy. The Franco-Breton relationship reached a high point during the reign of Jean III of Brittany, but his death in 1341 resulted in a violent feud between rival

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1 See Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 The Capetian House of Dreux-Brittany, 1213 – 1399

Louis VI
France: 1108 – 1137

Philippe II
France: 1179 – 1223

KINGS OF FRANCE
(See Figure 3.1)

Robert III
Dreux: 1218 – 1234

Later Counts of Dreux

Robert I
Dreux: 1152 – 1184

Robert II
Dreux: 1184 – 1218

Constance
Brittany: 1199 – 1206

Guy
Brittany: 1171 – 1201

Alix
Brittany: 1203 – 1221

Jean I
Brittany: 1237 – 1286

Jean II
Brittany: 1286 – 1305

Arthur II
Brittany: 1305 – 1312

John
Richmond: 1306 – 1334

Jean III
Brittany: 1312 – 1341

Guy
Penthièvre: 1317 – 1331

Jean
Montfort: 1322 – 1345

Jeanne
Penthièvre: 1331 – 1384

Jean IV
Montfort: 1345 – 1399

Charles
Brittany: 1341 – 1364

Jeanne
Brittany: 1341 – 1365

Charles
France: 1380 – 1422

Jeanne
(d. 1433)

Jean V
Brittany: 1399 – 1442

House of Montfort
(See Figure 7.2)

House of Châtillon-Penthièvre
(See Figure 7.1)
claimants that inadvertently restarted the Anglo-French war. Even after the War of the Breton Succession formally ended in 1364, animosities between the feuding factions as well as between Brittany and France continued until Jean IV died at the end of the century. This section will analyse the Dionysian vernacular depictions of the rulers of Brittany in this period to determine how their portrayals reflected a desire on the part of the continuators to use them as didactic examples of the challenges of promoting Capetian dynasticism.

There was nothing unusual about the fact that Philippe II Auguste arranged for his cousin Pierre, younger son of Robert II of Dreux, to marry the countess of Brittany, Alix, in 1213. Indeed, it was common practice to wed younger agnates of the dynasty to powerful families, partially because this expanded Capetian influence and partially because it satisfied any lingering claims these agnates could assert on the French throne. Primat clearly recognises the status of the Dreux family as Capetian agnates since he, borrowing from the chronicler Guillaume le Breton, names the count’s father ‘the cousin of king Philippe’. However, Primat also includes Guillaume’s entire genealogical discussion of Pierre’s new relationship to the previously-recognised count of Brittany, explaining how ‘Pierre...married the daughter of Guy...of Thouars, whose brother had been Arthur, count of Brittany, by the countess, his mother’, and that ‘in this manner, he had the lady and all the county by the gift and grace of the king’. Thus, the chroniclers reframe Pierre as a continuation of the Breton comital line and show how his marriage was permitted by the will of the king, who was suzerain over Brittany. By doing this, Primat, via his source, implies the de jure subjugation of Brittany under French suzerainty and removes any semblance of Breton independence from the arrangement. Primat then demonstrates what can result from such a relationship by showing Pierre leading a Breton army to support the future Louis VIII in his wars with John of England, implying that Philippe’s trust in Pierre was justified. The chronicler also shows Pierre mediating a dispute between the king and the viscount of Thouars, his uncle by marriage, in 1214. In this instance,

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2 Patrick Galliou and Michael Jones, *The Bretons*, The Peoples of Europe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 198. Although all Breton rulers styled themselves dukes, the title was only recognised in France in 1297. Galliou and Jones, 204.

3 Pierre’s great-uncle married a wealthy heiress; their children, the Courtenays, inherited her title. Meanwhile, an earlier Capetian agnate, Hugues, wed the countess of Vermandois under similar circumstances. Lewis, *Royal Succession*, 46, 54, 60.


5 ‘En ce tens espousa Pierres Mauclers...la fille Guy, le vieuconte de Thouart, qui seror ot esté Artur le conte de Bretaigne, de par la contesse sa mere. En tel maniere, ot la dame et tote la contée par le don et par la grace le roi’. GCF, VI:314-315. See Guillaume le Breton, 255.

6 GCF, VI:315. See generally Hallam and Everard, 177.
Pierre leveraged his heritage as ‘cousin of the king’ to seek mercy for his uncle.7 By borrowing from Guillaume le Breton, Primat defines Pierre by his Capetian status and exemplifies how a properly-placed cadet can increase Capetian dynastic authority in the French periphery.8

The later continuations by Primat and Guillaume de Nangis demonstrates how such faith in an agnate can be undermined by princely ambition. The chroniclers report that, not long after Pierre was entrusted with two royal castles in 1224, Louis VIII died leaving the throne to his young son Louis IX.9 This transfer of power prompted Pierre to seize the castles, forcing the regency government to retake them.10 Robert III of Dreux, Pierre’s brother, intervened and facilitated a reconciliation between the king and the count.11 Nonetheless, Primat-Guillaume caution the reader not to trust Pierre, noting that the king ‘was young and meek’ and that ‘[his councilors] cautioned him from making a mistake’.12 As if to prove his point, the chroniclers demonstrate how Pierre attempted to depose the regent, Blanca of Castile, and kidnap the king.13 Primat-Guillaume then explain that the count ventured to England, where he encouraged Henry III to invade France.14 By these examples, the chroniclers firmly establish in the minds of their readers that Pierre was an untrustworthy, dangerous man. Still, Richard Lescot, adding to Primat-Guillaume, notes that the count was forgiven by the king again in 1231 when his brother, ‘who was in good with the king’, arranged for a second reconciliation.15 This was Pierre’s last recorded rebellion against Louis and the chronicler emphasises that, afterwards, the barons of France ‘did not dare bring war against the king from that day forward’.16 Yet Primat-Guillaume continue to criticise Pierre: as a leader of the Barons’ Crusade in 1239, the count ignored the orders of Thibaut I of Navarre and led a skirmish against the Saracens, which resulted in the death and capture of many crusaders.17 Rather than

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10 GCF, VII:36. See generally GSL, 316.
11 GCF, VII:35-36. Guillaume de Nangis does not mention Robert as an intermediary. See generally Hallam and Everard, 269.
12 ‘Le roy qui fu jeunes et debonnaires…mais qu’il se gardassent de mesprendre’. GCF, VII:38. See GSL, 514.
14 ‘Le conte de Dreues, qui mout estoit bien du roy’. GCF, VII:47. See generally Galliou and Jones, 200.
focusing on heroic feats against the Saracens, the continuators dwell on Pierre’s crimes and neglect to mention his death while returning from the Seventh Crusade in 1250. Ultimately, Pierre’s story is one of contrasts. Primat, writing in the 1270s and aware of Pierre’s later exploits, nonetheless depicts the count as a faithful Capetian prince, a willing vassal to the French king in an historically hostile region. In the first continuation, though, Pierre becomes a recalcitrant lord who leverages his dynastic position to achieve undeserved forgiveness. Primat-Guillaume’s characterisation of the Breton lord deprives the house of Dreux of its Capetian heritage and establishes a negative image of the family as a whole within the continuations.

A total of four Breton rulers succeeded Pierre without contest, but Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot neglect to discuss any of them in detail. Pierre’s heir, Jean I, enters the Dionysian vernacular tradition in 1245 at the First Council of Lyon, where he took the cross in preparation for the Seventh Crusade. Primat-Guillaume place Jean in the middle of the list of attendees and never states whether he actually ventured to the Levant to fulfil his vow.

Similarly, Primat leaves the count out of the narrative of the Eighth Crusade in 1270, although Jean’s son is included at the end of a list of Capetian relatives. In this way, Primat-Guillaume almost entirely remove Jean from the history of France, retaining only enough information to demonstrate his crusading zeal. Jean II is erased even more decisively by the chroniclers and the elevation of Brittany into a French peer-duchy in 1297 goes unmentioned. His singular claim to fame is the fact that he died when an overladen wall crushed him at the papal coronation at Lyon in 1305. Although Lescot laments that his death ‘was a pity, sad and damaging’, these platitudes are standard eulogic rhetoric. The next duke, Arthur II, is entirely absent from Lescot’s chronicle, suggesting to readers that Jean III directly succeeded his grandfather. The chronicler does mention Arthur’s brother, John, the English earl of Richmond, who fled from the French in battle in 1297 and was captured by the Scots.

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18 Galliou and Jones, 199. Primat-Guillaume note, however, that Pierre took the cross at the Council of Lyon in 1245. GSL, 352.
19 GCF, VII:112. See GSL, 352. No modern source confirms Jean took the cross in 1245.
20 GCF, VII:112. Jean did not ultimately participate in the crusade.
23 GCF, VIII:245. See Continuatio, 592-593. See generally Galliou and Jones, 204.
24 ‘...don’t ce fu pitié, doleure et dommage’. GCF, VIII:245. These emotions seem to be Lescot’s, although Guillaume’s continuator notes that ‘meris confusionem superinduxit et lamentum’. Continuatio, 593.
in 1322, but he allows these episodes to speak for themselves.\textsuperscript{25} The relative neglect the Dreux family receives in the Dionysian continuations implies that they were too autonomous and too cozy with the English, thereby rendering them poor examples of Capetian dynasticism.

The only exception to this pattern was the last senior Dreux duke, Jean III. Lescot mentions Jean on three separate occasions and in each the duke is supporting the Capetian dynasty. In 1328, he appeared as a French commander at the battle of Cassel, where he was subsequently wounded.\textsuperscript{26} He served Philippe VI again in 1340, and this is the only instance where Lescot or his predecessors lists a Breton ruler among other Capetian lords.\textsuperscript{27} But the surest sign of a Franco-Breton detente occurred in 1334, when Jean attempted to name Philippe heir to Brittany in order to avoid a succession war. Jean, Lescot writes, ‘was considering the good of the kingdom and the peril which would come to this kingdom if the duchy of Brittany escheated into the hand of a woman, so the said Jean wished to leave the said duchy to the king of France after his death’.\textsuperscript{28} Approval for this plan pivoted on the acquiescence of the Breton barons, who resoundingly vetoed the anticipated loss of autonomy.\textsuperscript{29} Within the context of the Dionysian chronicles, Jean’s prophetic fears came true in 1341 when the duke’s death led to a succession war in Brittany. But Lescot’s decision to include this passage was a product of hindsight since he assembled his continuation a decade later.\textsuperscript{30} The chronicler clearly considered Jean to have been unique among the rulers of Brittany. Although no new marriage bonds were formed between the senior Capetians and their Breton cousins between 1213 and 1341, Lescot implies that the relationship between Jean III and Philippe VI was so strong that complete French suzerainty over Brittany was nearly achieved. Therefore, within the narrative, the Breton family came full circle. Jean’s willingness to sacrifice Brittany’s independence for a stronger, safer France made him the opposite of his ancestor, Pierre, who sought independence at the expense of France. But Jean’s failure to provide an uncontested heir shattered any hope for a definitive Franco-Breton reconciliation and rendered him an unfit example of Capetian dynasticism within the chronicles.

\textsuperscript{26} GCF, IX:85, 89-90. See generally Galliou and Jones, 205.
\textsuperscript{27} GCF, IX:204. See generally Jones, Creation, 211.
\textsuperscript{28} ‘Jehan le duc de Breaigne, considerans le bien du royaume et le peril qui à celui pourroit venir se la duchéie de Breaigne escheoit en main de femme, si vout ledit Jehan laissier ledit duchéie au roy de France après son decés…’. GCF, IX:147. See generally Jones, Creation, 211.
\textsuperscript{29} GCF, IX:147. See Lescot, 36-37. See generally Galliou and Jones, 221.
\textsuperscript{30} GCF, IX:217-218.
To Lescot and Pierre d’Orgemont, the War of the Breton Succession was fundamentally a struggle concerning French suzerainty over Brittany, fought between the Montforts—who sought autonomy—and the Blois-Penthèvres—who accepted French overlordship. Therefore, it was a fight between Capetian dynasticism and regnal authority. Lescot indisputably supports the latter’s pretensions, explaining that Charles de Blois’s claim derived from his wife, Jeanne de Penthèvre, daughter of the ‘second brother born of the abovesaid duke Jean [III]’, whose claim he compares to Jean, count of Montfort-l’Amaury, who was merely ‘thirdly born’. More important to Lescot is that Charles’s case was reviewed ‘by several wise men and experts and similarly by several bishops of the land…and it was said by decree that the king ought to receive and invest the abovesaid Charles for the homage of the duchy of Brittany’. In this way, Lescot portrays Brittany as a French fief, which means the king is vested with full power to confirm its duke. The chronicler also informs his readers that Charles was ‘the nephew of the king of France’, thus implying a dynastic motive for Charles’s nomination. But Jean de Montfort forged a dynastic alliance of his own when he married his son to the daughter of Edward III in 1342, thereby elevating the conflict into a war between France and England. The end result of these complex relationships was that neither Jean’s capture by the French in 1341 nor his death in 1345 nor Charles’s capture by the English in 1347 brought an end to the war. Indeed, Orgemont, writing after the first phase of the conflict ended, shows that it was only when Charles de Blois died in 1364 that Charles V recognised the legitimacy of Montfort claims to Brittany. Indeed, Orgemont appears to have had no choice but to acknowledge Jean IV, son of Jean de Montfort, as duke, since the former ‘did not find in all the said lands of Brittany anyone who would resist him or make any war’. Orgemont knew that the war for Breton autonomy had already ended: both claimants had agreed to accept French overlordship before their swords ever clashed. Regnal supremacy had won, albeit by those who championed dynasticism.

Orgemont and Jean Juvénal des Ursins demonstrate this rise of French suzerainty over Brittany in a series of interconnected episodes that span forty years. In the treaty of Brétigny

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33 *GCF*, IX:217. See generally Galliou and Jones, 217.
34 *GCF*, IX:228. See generally Jones, *Creation*, 267.
35 *GCF*, IX:220-221, 304-305. See generally Galliou and Jones, 223-225.
36 *CRJC*, II:6. See generally Galliou and Jones, 227.
37 ‘…le dit monseigneur Jehan de Montfort ne trouva, ou dit pays de Bretaigne, qui luy resistast ou feist aucune guerre’. *CRJC*, II:6.
in 1360, French suzerainty was agreed by both England and France.\(^{38}\) Later that year, Jean IV pledged homage to the French king for his county of Montfort-l’Amaury.\(^{39}\) Then, in 1365, Jeanne and her children renounced their claims to Brittany in the treaty of Guérande and Jean swore oaths to the king for the duchy the next year.\(^{40}\) Orgemont uses these moments to highlight how decisively and completely French suzerainty was extended over Montfort lands. Thus, when Jean betrayed this suzerainty and began cavorting with the English in 1373, Orgemont felt justified in branding him ‘he who had been duke of Brittany’.\(^{41}\) He also uses this as a segue to explain why Charles V conquered Brittany, adding as further justification that the duke had been deprived of all his titles, lands, and possessions.\(^{42}\) When the Bretons recalled Jean in 1379, Orgemont is critical of their decision, arguing that they were ‘acting against their oaths, loyalties, and promises’.\(^{43}\) The chronicler also reminds readers in 1381, when Brittany was returned to Jean, that the duchy had been ‘confiscated and forfeited to the King’ and that Jean ‘ought to make homage to the King, both for the duchy of Brittany and the county of Montfort’.\(^{44}\) To Orgemont, recognising French suzerainty remained key to the Breton narrative and he condemned any violation of Jean’s oaths. Michel Pintoin and Juvénal, meanwhile, emphasise that, even after this reconciliation, the Franco-Breton relationship sat at a precipice between war and peace.\(^{45}\) Jean IV secured his dynasty’s future by marrying his heir to Charles VI’s daughter—a political manoeuvre that brought the two dynasties closer together.\(^{46}\) This action emphasises the important role marriage could serve in reaffirming dynastic loyalty among cadets and shows how even long-maligned agnates can return to the Capetian fold with the correct incentives. The marriage became an important compromise within the narrative between the themes of regnal authority and Capetian dynasticism. While the Montforts agreed to acknowledge French suzerainty, thereby submitting to regnal authority, the French king agreed to remain aloof of Breton affairs, conceding an element of Capetian dynasticism.

\(^{38}\) CRJC, I:286-287. See generally Daru, II:120; Jones, Creation, 266.

\(^{39}\) CRJC, I:326-327.

\(^{40}\) CRJC, II:24-25. See generally Galliou and Jones, 227, 234.

\(^{41}\) CRJC, II:168-169, 171, 173, 183. See generally Galliou and Jones, 235; Sumption, III:104. Sumption, III:352, notes that the ‘French royal chancery had referred to John as the “former” duke ever since he had renounced his homage in 1373’.


\(^{43}\) ‘…en venant contre leurs foiz, loiautez et seremens…’. CRJC, II:363. See generally Galliou and Jones, 235.

\(^{44}\) ‘…le dit duc de Bretaigne devoit faire hommage au Roy, tant de la duché de Bretaigne comme de la comté de Montfort…’. CRJC, III:7. See generally Galliou and Jones, 236.


\(^{46}\) HCRF, 410, 412. See CKS, II:443. The ceremony was conducted in 1402. Autrand, Charles VI, 393. See also Chapter 7.1.
The Dreux-Montfort family saga ended in 1397 much as it began in 1213. In the latter year, Pierre became count of Brittany because of his position in the Capetian dynasty, his marriageability, and his suitability for the role. In the former, Jean IV was reconciled to his ancestral dynasty because of his willingness to submit to Capetian authority, the marriageability of his heir, and his uncontested status within Brittany. Juvénal seems to recognise this, too, since the final two entries in which Jean IV appears display him in a positive light, much like Primat’s first two entries about Pierre. But Pierre’s actions afterwards and Jean’s actions before, as well as the various activities of the five rulers that ruled between, leave the Breton rulers wanting. The history of Brittany in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was one of balancing two conflicting problems: its autonomy and its fealty to the French king. Each ruler dealt with this issue in his own way and the chroniclers praised those who placed their fealty first and criticised those who emphasised independence. Notably, very little actually changed over the two centuries, but by 1399 the Dreux rulers of Brittany were undeniably closer to the French royal family than ever before and French suzerainty was openly acknowledged, if not fully embraced. As with the rulers of Naples and Navarre, the rulers of Brittany serve within the Dionysian vernacular continuations as didactic examples of how Capetian cadets can advance dynasticism into the French periphery while simultaneously demonstrating why recalcitrance and independence undermine regnal authority and dynastic integrity.

4.2 The Flemish Problem

Within the Dionysian continuations, the Dampierre family of Flanders was a key example of how Capetians could overcome feudal recalcitrance during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.47 Throughout their continuations, the Dionysian authors dedicate scores of pages to the Dampierres’ struggle against French suzerainty. Guy de Dampierre, the first count mentioned in the vernacular continuations, frequently set himself against the Capetian kings, challenging their overlordship of Flanders and their influence in the Low Countries. His successors continued these rebellious tendencies, often allying with the English to keep Capetian expansion at bay. But the Capetians fought back, first militarily and then through targeted dynastic strategies, ultimately integrating their families together so tightly that the Dampierre family ceased its separate existence and merged into a Capetian cadet branch, much like the rulers of Navarre a century earlier. The chroniclers—some writing near-contemporaneous to these events, others many decades afterwards—viewed the history of this

47 See Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 The House of Dampierre, 1251 – 1405

Guy I & II
Flanders: 1251 – 1305
Namur: 1263 – 1298

Yolande II
Nevers: 1273 – 1280

Robert III
Flanders: 1305 – 1322

Philippe (d. 1318)

Jean I
Namur: 1298 – 1330

Philippe V
France: 1316 – 1322

Jeanne
Rethel: 1277 – 1328

Louis
Nevers: 1280 – 1322
Lord of Cassel

Robert (d. 1331)
Later Marquis of Namur

Marguerite I
Artois & Burgundy\(^C\): 1361 – 1382

Louis I
Flanders & Nevers: 1322 – 1346
Rethel: 1328 – 1346

Jean II
France: 1355 – 1364

Louis II
Flanders, Nevers & Rethel: 1346 – 1383
Artois & Burgundy\(^C\): 1382 – 1383

Marguerite III
Flanders, Artois, Nevers, Rethel & Burgundy\(^C\): 1383 – 1405

Marguerite I
Artois & Burgundy\(^C\): 1361 – 1382

Philippe II
Burgundy\(^D\): 1363 – 1404

Jean
Burgundy\(^D\): 1404 – 1419
Burgundy\(^C\), Flanders & Artois: 1405 – 1419

Valois House of Burgundy
(See Figure 6.1)

Burgundy\(^D\) – Duke of Burgundy
Burgundy\(^C\) – Count or countess of Burgundy
interdynastic strategy with uncertainty, with only Juvénal knowing how it would conclude. This section will explore the ways the chroniclers depicted the Capetian-Dampierre relationship from 1251 until 1405 and analyse how the Dampierres became positive representations of Capetian dynastic authority, first indirectly and ultimately as cadets of the dynasty itself.

Within the Dionysian tradition, Guy de Dampierre did not begin as a recalcitrant vassal of the French king; rather, he became one after his great hereditary rival, Jean II d’Hainaut, submitted to Philippe IV and requested French help in defeating the Flemish in 1293. \footnote{GCF, VIII:150. See Chronicon, 574-575. See generally Strayer, Reign, 320-321.} According to Lescot, translating Guillaume’s Chronicon, Philippe’s first action against the Dampierres came in 1294. In that year, Philippe captured Guy and his daughter, Philippa, who were attempting to arrange a dynastic alliance with the Plantagenets. \footnote{GCF, VIII:154. See Chronicon, 576. See generally Arblaster, A History of the Low Countries (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 83; David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London: Longman, 1992), 187-188.} Philippa decided that she would remain ‘with the children of the king in order to be taught and nurtured with them’. \footnote{Mais ycelle fille après ce demoura avec les enfans le roy pour estre enseigniée et nourrie avec eulz…’. GCF, VIII:154-155. See Chronicon, 576. See generally Nicholas, 288.} Although the text never calls her a hostage, her inevitable indoctrination is implied by the context. Her captivity did little to distract Guy from his rebellion. In 1297, the count sent a letter to the king declaring ‘that he held nothing of him in fiefdom nor in any other manner to be his subject’. \footnote{‘…nulle chose il ne tenoit de lui en fié, ne en autre quelconque maniere…estre à lui sougiet’. GCF, VIII:169. See Chronicon, 578. See generally Arblaster, 85.} Philippe used this pretence to invade Flanders, with the chronicler justifying this action by stating that Guy had ‘departed from his fealty’. \footnote{‘Gui le conte de Flandres qui de sa feauté estoit departi…’. GCF, VIII:173. See Chronicon, 579. See generally Nicholas, 189.} French suzerainty over Flanders, therefore, remained the primary issue and even the capture of Guy in 1300 did not stop the war. \footnote{Lesquiex amenez à Paris, qu roy de France requistrent pardon de leurs meffaiz et misericorde, et il la reçurent très piteusement. Mais jusques au temps d’avoir miseracion et pardon, furent mis par divers lieux en prison souz garde’. GCF, VIII:189. See Chronicon, 582.} Indeed, Lescot even records that Guy and his sons ‘requested pardon for their misdeeds and discord, and they received it from [Philippe] very piteously. But until such a time that they had his mercy and pardon, they were put in various places in prison under guard’. \footnote{GCF, VIII:187-188. See Chronicon, 581, 582. See generally Nicholas, 191.} The early thirteenth-century vernacular continuators prove that this lack of trust in the Dampierres was justified: another of Guy’s sons destroyed the French army in 1302 at the battle of Courtrai. \footnote{GCF, VIII:203, 208, 210. See generally Nicholas, 192-194.} Philippe, desperate for a resolution to this conflict, even briefly released Guy from prison ‘in order to appease the people—but it could not be done. And since every
day, the problematic pride of the Flemish showed their hatred of the French, the abovesaid Guy and his son returned to the places under their guard without doing anything’.56 The Dionysian texts demonstrate that anti-French sentiment was so strong during this period that the Flemish refused to listen to their own count—a recurring problem in Flanders. Ultimately, Philippe took to the field himself in 1304, risking his life to subdue the Flemish.57 Perhaps because Guy had relented before the end, the chronicler allowed the count’s story to conclude. He notes that ‘the count Guy of Flanders, detained in prison by the king of France, died at Compiègne and, by leave of the king, his body was taken into Flanders and he was interred with his ancestors at Marquette’.58 Nonetheless, death in prison certainly represents a failed policy from both the French and Flemish perspectives, and Guy’s fate showcases what happens to those who do not cooperate with the Capetian dynasty.

The next two generations of Dampierres provided further fodder upon which Lescot built his case against the family. Reflecting the beliefs of Philippe IV, Lescot blames a new rebellion in 1311 on Louis de Nevers, Robert’s heir. The king quickly confiscated Nevers and imprisoned Louis, temporarily resolving the crisis.59 Tensions between Philippe and Robert reached a breaking point in 1314, leading Lescot to begin counting the rebellions in his recension, noting ‘once more, after rebelling four times, the count of Flanders, Robert de Bethune, and the Flemish, who agreed to the peace with the king of France...in no manner would hold [to it]’.60 Because of this, Philippe led another army into Flanders and Lescot explains that ‘all Flanders could have been conquered and killed, so it would be rightly governed’, but the army was subsequently dismissed ‘without glory or honour’.61 Clearly, Lescot felt that Flanders warranted harsh penalties for its continued recalcitrance, but Philippe’s death later that year allowed the Dampierres to seek forgiveness instead from the new king. Louis X pardoned the Dampierre’s, but Robert himself remained condemned, prompting a fifth uprising in

56 ‘...pour le peuple apaisier; mais il ne pot estre fait. Et pour ce que touz jours en la haine des Françoys montoit le fol orgueil des Flamens, s’en revint rent arriere aux lieux de leur garde le devant dit Gui et son filz sans riens faire’. GCF, VIII:234. See Continuatio, 589. See generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 243.
57 GCF, VIII:240-241. See generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 243-244.
58 ‘...le conte Gui de Flandres, en la prison le roy de France detenu, mourut à Compiègne, et par le con-gié du roy fu son corps portez en Flandres, et en Marquete, avec ses ancesseurs u enterré’. GCF, VIII:224. Viard notes that he was actually interred at the monastery at Flines near Douai. See Continuatio, 591. See generally Arblaster, 86.
60 ‘...derechef, aprés le rebellement III foiz du conte de Flandres Robert de Bethune, et les Flamens qui les convenances de pais avec le roy de France...en nulle maniere ne vouloient tenir...’. GCF, VIII:301. See generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 507-508.
September 1315. The king responded by bringing into Flanders an army so large that ‘never had a king of France assembled so noble a host of Frenchmen’. Nevertheless, the Flemish won by flooding the countryside. It was only during the regency of the future Philippe V in 1316 that peace negotiations resumed. But Louis de Nevers remained dissatisfied and seized his French lands in Nevers and Rethel in 1318. When Robert attempted to broker a new settlement in 1320, ‘one malicious lawyer’ in his party effectively blocked him. However, Lescot gives Robert due credit, describing how the count went into Flanders and told the town leaders ‘that he would not leave Paris until he had made a firm peace with the king…and that if he returned without achieving anything, they would not have heads upon which they could put their hats’. Peace was secured shortly afterwards via a dynastic marriage between Philippe’s daughter and Robert’s grandson. Shortly afterwards, Louis and Robert died in quick succession, leaving the stability of Flanders in doubt. Lescot, therefore, demonstrates that the ultimate result of thirty years of Flemish resistance to French rule was a potential succession crisis and a strengthened Capetian-Dampierre relationship. These are hardly the hallmarks of a successful Flemish strategy of autonomy, and Lescot uses this situation to showcase a technique for his Capetian readers to use against recalcitrant vassals.

This Capetian-Flemish dynastic relationship did not simply arise at the beginning of the fourteenth century—it began much earlier with the marriage of Philippe II Auguste and Isabelle of Hainaut-Flanders in 1180. Decades later, monks at Saint-Denis convinced themselves—and the royal court—that Philippe and Isabelle’s son, Louis VIII, represented a return to the line of Charlemagne via his maternal descent from Charles of Lorraine, the last legitimate Carolingian agnate. The unknown author of Louis VIII’s vernacular life thoroughly

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63 ‘…ne fu d’aucun roy de France tel noble ost de François assamblé’. GCF, VIII:323. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 317.
64 GCF, VIII:324. See generally Nicholas, 197.
67 GCF, VIII:350-352.
68 ‘…leur fu dit que il ne se partiroient de Paris tant qu’il eussent fait ferme pais au roy…et que s’il retornoient sanz riens faire, il n’avoient teste où il peussent mettre leurs chaperons’. GCF, VIII:351-352. See Continuatio, 625. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 318.
69 GCF, VIII:351-352. The betrothal was arranged in 1317 but the subsequent rebellions delayed the marriage until 1320. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 318; Nicholas, 197.
72 Vincent de Beauvais was the first to articulate this doctrine in the form found in the Dionysian tradition, but he drew his inspiration from a speculative history by Andreas de Marchiennes in 1196. The Valerian prophecy, which underpins much of the doctrine, dates to 1040. Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ‘The Reditus Regni ad Stirpem Karoli Magni: A New Look’, French Historical Studies 7:2 (1971): 149. Philippe IV actively worked to
explains this theory, placing a strong emphasis on the Hainaut-Flanders family.\textsuperscript{73} But this dynastic connection is never recalled elsewhere in the Dionysian continuations and contributes nothing to depictions of the Capetian-Flemish relationship. Indeed, the only hint given by Primat or Guillaume of a Capetian-Flemish dynastic relationship occurs in their account of 1258, when Marguerite II of Hainaut-Flanders attempted to cede Hainaut to Charles d’Anjou, whose claim to the county originated from Isabelle.\textsuperscript{74} More frequently, Flemish dynastic crosscurrents appear in the context of the multi-generational Avesnes-Dampierre feud, which Primat and Guillaume only tangentially reference in their continuations. Although Guy de Dampierre joined Louis IX on the Eighth Crusade in 1270 and his son Philippe supported Charles II in Sicily until 1303—both clear reflections of Capetian influence—no new marriage ties were forged during this time.\textsuperscript{75} It was only in 1307, with the marriage of Jean I de Namur, Robert III’s brother, to Marguerite, daughter of Robert de Clermont, that new dynastic connections were formed.\textsuperscript{76} But the marriage of the future Louis I of Flanders and Marguerite, daughter of Philippe V, in 1320 was entirely different.\textsuperscript{77} It was a solid dynastic link between the royal and the comital families. Although earlier dynastic connections proved important to the Dionysian narrative, none adequately emphasised the success of Capetian dynastic policy in Flanders.

Lescot implies that Louis I’s succession in 1322 was a dynastic coup for the Capetians since the Flemish ‘communes had promised that they would have no other [count]’.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, with Flemish approval, a cognatic Capetian cadet ruled over the oft-rebellious county. Charles IV supported Louis when the latter’s uncles, Robert de Cassel and Mathieu of Lorraine, attempted to depose him in favour of their own claims in 1323 and 1325.\textsuperscript{79} However, it was precisely this increased Capetian involvement in Flemish affairs that prompted the Flemish to revolt in 1328 and 1338.\textsuperscript{80} Essentially, Louis’s intimate relationship with the Capetian family

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{73} GCF, VII:3-7. The chronicler was likely directly translating the Latin chronicle \textit{Ex Gestis Ludovici VIII. Regis}, but only fragments survive, none of which include this doctrine. \textit{See generally} Lewis, \textit{Royal Succession}, 113-114.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} GCF, VII:180-181. \textit{See Primat}, 10-11; GSL, 391. \textit{See Chapter 2.2}.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} GCF, VII:260, 265. \textit{See Continuatio}, 597.
  \item \textsuperscript{77} GCF, VIII:336, 351-352. \textit{See Chronique latine}, II:1. \textit{See generally} Nicholas, 197.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} ‘…lesquelles communes avoient juré que il n’auroient autre…’. GCF, IX:6. \textit{See Continuatio}, 651.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} GCF, IX:78, 94, 162-164. \textit{See Lescot}, 4, 9-10. \textit{See generally} Nicholas, 215; Sumption, I:186, 231-
eroded Flemish goodwill felt at the time of his succession. In 1338, Louis beheaded a Flemish knight ‘by the command of the king of France’ because the man ‘had received the coins of the king of England against the king of France’.  

This execution prompted months of revolt and Louis was eventually forced into exile in France, for which Philippe obtained an excommunication for everyone in Flanders. Lescot hints that Louis was to blame for this, noting that ‘the Flemish…suffered great injuries and griefs from the count of Flanders’, but he adds ‘so it is said’ afterwards to suggest that the statement was only a rumour. It is also clear from this text that Philippe considered Louis a cousin and viewed the entire Flemish rebellion an affront both to his suzerainty over Flanders and to Capetian dynastic authority. Louis’s death at the battle of Crécy fighting the English in 1346 supported his lifelong political orientation. Lescot demonstrates throughout this narrative that Louis lived his life as a loyal Capetian prince and died among like-minded individuals. His succession brought an end to a century of anti-French sentiment held by the Dampierre family and it decisively confirmed French suzerainty over the county, even if the Flemish people disagreed with such status.

The inevitable merger of the Capetian and Dampierre dynasties began under Louis I, but it was with his son, Louis II, and his granddaughter, Marguerite III, that the two families became intractably entangled. The younger Louis first appears in the continuations in 1346 when he entered Flanders following the death of his father. But when the bourgeois tried to force him to marry a daughter of Edward III against his will, Louis fled back to France, ‘for which the king of France and the mother of the said count expressed great joy and he was received very honourably’. Throughout this episode, Louis, Lescot demonstrates, acted like a proper Capetian cadet and rejected policies that went against the royal will. Louis’s later marriage to Marguerite of Brabant in 1347 is barely a footnote in the chronicles, a sign that it reflected Philippe VI’s intentions. Meanwhile, the chronicler frames the count’s final subjugation of Flanders in 1348 as a completed task and, indeed, Lescot does not mention

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81 ‘…par le commandement du roy de France li fist coper la teste, pour ce que l’en li metoit sus qu’il avoit receu les deniers du roy d’Angeterre contre le roy de France’. GCF, IX:162. See generally Sumption, 1:231.

82 GCF, IX:166. See Lescot, 46. Only those in Ghent were actually excommunicated. See generally Sumption, 1:231, 301.

83 ‘…les Flamens…souffrirent mout de injures et de griefs du conte de Flandres, si comme il disoient…’. GCF, IX:169.

84 GCF, IX:201.

85 GCF, IX:283. See generally Nicholas, 224.

86 GCF, IX:286. See generally Nicholas, 224.


88 GCF, IX:309. See generally Nicholas, 224.
Flanders again within his chronicle. To Lescot, Flanders being under firm comital control meant that the long Capetian-Dampierre struggle was at an end with a decisive French victory and a positive didactic example to convey to his readers.

It was left to Orgemont to conclude the story of independent Flanders. He recounts how, in 1368, plans were initiated to have Philippe II of Burgundy, the youngest son of Jean II of France, marry Louis II’s daughter and heir, Marguerite. Due to her ancestry, she was not only heiress to Flanders, but also Artois, comital Burgundy, Nevers, and Rethel—essentially a small kingdom’s worth of territories along France’s eastern frontier. Thus, it made dynastic sense to marry her to a cadet who already controlled territory adjacent to hers. Presumably, such consolidation would expand Capetian dynastic authority into the western Empire. Orgemont gives meticulous details regarding the marriage treaty, explaining how the towns of Lille and Douai were to return to Flemish control after sixty years of French occupation. But this was only another step towards finalising the Capetian-Dampierre union and reversing a century of Franco-Flemish animosity. It was the birth of their son and heir, Jean, in 1371 that marked the beginning of the end for the Dampierres. The chroniclers rarely note the birth of children to cadets, so this event’s inclusion by Orgemont marks it as especially important. The transition from Dampierre to Capetian control accelerated from 1382, when Louis’s mother, Marguerite de France, died leaving all her titles to him. Two years later, Louis himself expired and everything passed to his daughter, Marguerite III—Philippe of Burgundy’s wife.

Although it can be argued that the dynastic merger was only finalised when Jean inherited his parents’ titles in 1404 and 1405, the succession of Marguerite in 1384 was the functional culmination of the multi-generational dynastic plan of the Capetian kings. By the end of the fourteenth century, Flanders was completely under the control of the Capetian dynasty, its era of rebellion over and its suzerainty under the French king confirmed. The dynastic policy set in place by Philippe V reached its desired climax, giving readers of the chronicles a successful example of the possibilities inherent in supporting Capetian dynasticism.

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91 Autrand, Charles V, 521.
92 CRJC, II:116-131. Lille and Douai had been ceded to France in lieu of payment in 1314. Strayer, Reign, 342, 345. See generally Vaughan, Valois, 15.
93 CRJC, II:157.
94 CRJC, III:17; HCRF, 350. See CKS, I:156, 158. See generally Vaughan, Valois, 16.
95 CRJC, III:62; HCRF, 361. See CKS, I:298, 300. See generally Arblaster, 95.
96 HCRF, 427, 431. See CKS, III:144, 234. The existence of two other sons of Philippe and Marguerite protected the dynasty from issues that could result from premature deaths. Indeed, Nevers and Rethel did not pass to Jean but rather to his youngest brother, Philippe. Vaughan, Valois, 18. See generally Nicholas, 322-323.
When they set out to write their continuations, the Dionysian chroniclers recognised the important didactic examples that the Dampierre rulers of Flanders could contribute to the overarching narrative, even if they could not see the conclusion to their story. Primat and the anonymous author of Louis VIII’s life first hinted at this connection, but it was left to later continuators to develop it further. Guillaume and Lescot record the fall of the Dampierres, their rebellions and depravity, with neither entirely able to foresee the reconciliation to come. Orgemont, in contrast, always viewed the Dampierres as faithful cadets, so he focussed instead on the details of the merger of the two dynasties in the person of Marguerite III, with the result being the end of any separation between the families. Thus, his message is more direct: the Dampierres began as half-Capetians, but end as full cadets. When viewed as a whole, the Dampierres exemplify how far astray a family may drift before returning to their French roots and becoming faithful adherents of Capetian dynasticism. The narrative is a powerful message of dynastic cohesion, loyalty, and co-dependence. At the same time, the story sends a firm message that it was the duty of every French lord to represent the Capetian dynasty in their lands, even at the expense of regional autonomy and personal identity.

4.3 The War of the French Succession

The Dionysian vernacular continuators adopted a much more fluid approach toward the kings of England that responded to the changing relationship between the Plantagenet and Capetian dynasties. Following the treaty of Paris in 1259, the Plantagenets ruled the duchy of Guyenne in southern France as French vassals and peers, but the English chafed under French suzerainty and fought the advancement of French regnal authority at every opportunity. In response, the Capetians weaponised dynasticism, using intermarriage in an attempt to keep the Plantagenets faithful to their oaths of fealty and treaty obligations. From 1299 until 1444, no fewer than five marriages between Capetian princesses and reigning English kings intimately bound the dynasties together. But this strategy had unexpected consequences. When all of Philippe IV’s sons died without male progeny in 1328, the French succession was left open. Philippe de Valois’s accession did not erase Edward III’s hereditary claim to the French throne, and he and his descendants asserted this claim repeatedly over subsequent centuries until the matter of French suzerainty over Guyenne became little more than a sideshow to a much larger conflict over the rulership of France itself. To the vernacular chroniclers, there

97 See Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 The Houses of Plantagenet and Lancaster, 1299 – 1461

Philippe III
France: 1270 – 1285

Marguerite
(d. 1318)

Edward I
England: 1272 – 1307

Philippe I & IV
Navarre: 1284 – 1305
France: 1285 – 1314

Charles
Valois: 1284 – 1325

Edward II
England: 1307 – 1327

Isabella
(d. 1358)

Jeanne
(d. 1352)

Edward III
England: 1327 – 1377

Philippa d'Hainaut
(d. 1369)

Jean II
France: 1350 – 1364

John
Lancaster: 1361 – 1399

Charles V
France: 1364 – 1380

Philippe VI
France: 1328 – 1350

Edward III
England: 1327 – 1377

Edward (d. 1376)
Prince of Wales

Isabella
(d. 1308)

Henry IV
England: 1399 – 1413

Henry V
England: 1413 – 1422

Charles VI
France: 1422 – 1461

Charles VII
France: 1422 – 1461

Marguerite
(d. 1482)

Philippe VI
France: 1328 – 1350

Marguerite
(d. 1318)

Edward I
England: 1272 – 1307

Richard II
England: 1377 – 1399

Isabella
(d. 1409)

Catherine
(d. 1438)

Henry VI (d. 1471)
England: 1422 – 1461

Jean II
France: 1350 – 1364

Isabella
(d. 1409)

Charles V
France: 1364 – 1380

John
Lancaster: 1361 – 1399

Henry IV
England: 1399 – 1413

Henry V
England: 1413 – 1422

Richard II
England: 1377 – 1399

Edward (d. 1376)
Prince of Wales

Thomas
Norfolk: 1312 – 1338

Earls & Countesses of Norfolk
was never a question of the legality of Capetian kingship or their status as suzerains over Guyenne, but the writers could not overlook the bellicose actions taken by the Plantagenet kings against their Capetian overlords. Indeed, the ongoing Anglo-French conflict runs as an undercurrent throughout the continuations and helps glue its sometimes-divergent narratives together. This section will examine the dynastic relationship between the Capetians and Plantagenets within the context of the Dionysian vernacular chronicles to analyse how the English are portrayed in the texts and what didactic messages the chroniclers provide regarding the limits of Capetian dynasticism.

The Capetian-Plantagenet relationship was extremely complex and the conquests of Normandy, Anjou, and Aquitaine—the ancestral lands of the Plantagenets—by the French kings at the beginning of the thirteenth century only complicated it further. Guillaume and Lescot set the treaty of Paris, agreed between Henry III of England and Louis IX in 1259, as the baseline for Anglo-French relations.98 The treaty confirmed Plantagenet control over Guyenne, the remnant coastal portion of Aquitaine, but as a formal French fief. Thus, when Edward I declared war on France in 1294, Philippe confiscated Guyenne since, as Lescot argues, ‘it belonged as a fief to his kingdom, and he summoned Edward, king of England, to come to his parlement’.99 Although Guillaume notes events in the war on two occasions, Lescot only mentions that the status quo ante bellum was formally restored in 1303.100 The indecisive nature of this war made it irrelevant to Lescot’s overarching narrative. The shorter, albeit more decisive, War of Saint-Sardos in 1324 followed much the same pattern. Lescot states that Charles IV ‘reputed Gascony to be forfeited to him by right and that justice must be applied, because he had written to the king of England and summoned him to a certain place and time where he ought to be, and the king of England had accepted this, but did not come nor send somebody’.101 Again, the Plantagenet king abrogated the terms of the treaty of Paris and had

101 ‘…il reputa Gascoigne estre forfaite à lui par droit, et justice devoir estre appliquièe, tant comme pour ce qu’il avoit cité le roy d’Angleterre et semons à certain lieu et jour où il devoient toud II estre, et le roy d’Angleterre accepté, mais il ne vint ne envoia…’. GCF, IX:33. See generally Labarge, 114.
to pay the penalty. Shortly afterwards, the chronicler reports that ‘all Gascony was in the lordship of the king without much effort, except Bordeaux, Bayonne, and Saint-Sever, which held themselves and remained under the lordship of the king of England’.102 Although peace was restored when Edward II’s wife, Isabella, sister of Charles, intervened and their son, the future Edward III, pledged homage for Guyenne, Charles refused to return the seized lands, further aggravating Anglo-French tensions.103 In this way, Lescot establishes that those opposed to regnal authority within France must suffer the consequences of their recalcitrance.

Events began to snowball after Charles died in 1328. Soon after his accession, Philippe VI demanded an oath of homage from Edward III, but the English king demurred, so Philippe seized Guyenne, ‘but only during the time that the homage has not been made’.104 Lescot includes this unusual courtesy to showcase Philippe’s juristic integrity and desire to deescalate recent Anglo-French animosity. Before Edward relented, the English king demanded the return of lands seized in 1325, something that Philippe refused to do. Lescot—or more likely Orgemont in 1380—explains that ‘Edward [II] had forfeited this part and more, and that the said messire Charles [de Valois] well and justly had annexed it to the kingdom of France by right of battle and that no restitution was owed to him’.105 But the chronicler adds that Philippe was willing to compromise and promised that the matter would be decided ‘by the judgment of the peers of France, [and] he would do everything to the fulfilment of justice’.106 Thus, Lescot and Orgemont establish three key truths: that Philippe held Guyenne by feudal oaths, by right-of-conquest, and by the approval of the courts. To close his case, Lescot transcribes the entire oath of liege homage sealed by Edward two years later, which confirmed Philippe’s suzerainty over Guyenne.107 The chronicler masterfully manipulates these events in his retelling to prove the legality of Philippe’s position in relation to Edward and the subjugation of Guyenne under Capetian authority.

The precedents above are recalled by Lescot in 1337 when tensions in Guyenne reached a breaking point and open war erupted between the English and the French.

\[104\] ‘…mais seulement durant le temps que l’omage n’a pas esté fait…’. GCF, IX:97, 98. See Lescot, 10-11. See generally Labarge, 118; Vale, Origins, 251-252.
\[107\] GCF, IX:101-104.
Confiscation of the duchy was assumed under the circumstances.\(^{108}\) As before, Lescot focuses little on the war in the south and only returns to it in 1340, when Edward agreed to a Cape-tian-Plantagenet union on the condition that Guyenne was returned to him ‘as king Edward, his grandfather, had held it before, so that no sergeant of the king could oversee the lands’.\(^{109}\) This was not, in fact, how Guyenne operated under the terms of the treaty of Paris, although it was often the reality.\(^{110}\) Nevertheless, both parties agreed to the truce, but no marriage agreement was made to seal the pact. When the truce broke down in 1345, Guyenne became a battleground between rival forces again.\(^{111}\) However, the issue of suzerainty did not arise again until after Jean II was captured by the English at the battle of Poitiers in 1356.\(^{112}\) In 1359, Orgemont reports, Edward demanded the restoration of everything lost to the French since 1205 and he required full suzerainty over them.\(^{113}\) The prospect of ceding half of France to the English was unpopular with the French baronage and they declared war.\(^{114}\) A compromise was finally agreed at Brétigny in 1360.\(^{115}\) Orgemont shows that, within this treaty, Jean ceded to Edward most of historic Aquitaine in full suzerainty and, in exchange, Edward renounced his claim to the French throne.\(^{116}\) Thus, a century of Anglo-French conflicts had done nothing to advance regnal authority into Plantagenet lands and the new status quo significantly set that progress back.

The war that erupted in 1369 was a reaction against this new status quo.\(^{117}\) Orgemont outlines in juristic detail the ways in which the English failed to uphold the treaty of Brétigny and why they forfeited their right to suzerainty over Aquitaine.\(^{118}\) However, the durability of this agreement was evident five decades later, when Juvénal reports incredulously that Henry V ‘demanded Guyenne and Ponthieu and, in effect, that the treaty of Brétigny be held’.\(^{119}\) The English expanded upon their demands, though, once they invaded in 1414, and ‘maintained that they had rights to the duchies of Normandy and Guyenne and the counties of Anjou.

\(^{108}\) GCF, IX:157. See Lescot, 42. The other reason for the war was Edward’s unwillingness to surrender Robert d’Artois to Philippe. See generally Vale, Origins, 244, 260.

\(^{109}\) ‘...comme le roy Edouart son tyon la tint, par ainsi que nul serjant du roy ne peust sergenter au pays’. GCF, IX:208. No modern source confirms this marriage negotiation.


\(^{111}\) GCF, IX:253, 258-259, 316, 325. See generally Sumption, I:454.

\(^{112}\) CRJC, I:72-75. See generally Sumption, II:244-245. See also Chapter 5.1.


\(^{114}\) CRJC, I:236. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 368.

\(^{115}\) CRJC, I:259ff.

\(^{116}\) CRJC, I:268, 286. See generally Ormrod, 405.

\(^{117}\) CRJC, II:45-47, 67-68, 72-118. See generally Labarge, 162.

\(^{118}\) CRJC, II:76-116. See generally Labarge, 162-3.

Poitou, Maine, Touraine, and Ponthieu’. Finally in 1419, Henry insisted on ‘that which was agreed by the treaty of Brétigny…and with this, all the duchy of Normandy, both that which he had conquered and that which remained of the said duchy, and that in effect without homage, resort, and sovereignty’. Thus, the treaty of Brétigny became a touchstone for the English, the foundation for a peace that was never realised and the solution to a problem that was beyond resolution. The frequency with which the chroniclers recall the treaty by name suggests its power in the Anglo-French narrative, but also its wistfulness. Even as the Plantagenets attempted to advance their own form of dynasticism within France, the vernacular continuators actively worked against that goal, categorically undermining all aspects of the English claims to better assert the idea of Capetian suzerainty over Guyenne within their chronicles.

The task of downplaying English claims in France was made more difficult for the Dionysian chroniclers due to the close familial bond between the Capetian and Plantagenet dynasties. Guillaume first documents this growing kinship in 1299, when he reports the marriage of Edward I and Philippe IV’s sister, Marguerite. He also emphasises the birth of their first child, Thomas, noting he was ‘handsome’, a characteristic common to Philippe’s family. Edward II’s marriage to Isabelle, Philippe’s only daughter, occurred in 1308, but Guillaume’s continuator leaves out the political reasons behind this union—it appears as simply a family affair. Lescot emphasises this Capetian connection repeatedly through his narrative of the following two decades: he mentions it when recounting Edward III’s birth in 1312; it is a

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121 ‘…qui fut accordé par le traitté de Bretigny…et avec ce toute la duché de Normandie, tant ce qu’il avoir conquésté, que tout le demeurant de ladite duché, et ce en effet sans hommage, ressort et souvereineté…’. HCRF, 550-551. See generally Juliet Barker, Conquest: The English Kingdom of France 1417-1450 (London: Little, Brown, 2009), 25-26; Sumption, IV:635-642.


124 GCF, VIII:244, 259. See Continuatio, 597. The marriage was arranged at the treaty of Montreuil in 1299 (at which time Edward I and Marguerite wed). They were betrothed in 1303 and again in 1305, but the wedding did not occur until 1308. Lescot mistakenly places Edward’s marriage in 1305, but then duplicates this entry in 1308. He is the originator of this mistake as it does not appear in Guillaume’s continuation. See also Elizabeth A. R. Brown, ‘The Political Repercussions of Family Ties in the Early Fourteenth Century: The Marriage of Edward II of England and Isabelle of France’, Speculum 63:3 (1988): 578-595; and Brown, ‘The Marriage of Edward II of England and Isabelle of France: A Postscript’, Speculum 64:2 (1989): 373-379. See generally Labarge, 74; Phillips, 125.
major component in his depiction of the Anglo-French peace accords of 1325; and Lescot concedes that it made Edward a potential claimant to the French throne in 1328.\textsuperscript{125} Lescot, copying Guillaume’s continuator, adds another dimension to this relationship when he notes that Edward’s wife was the ‘niece of the king of France’, a fact not mentioned elsewhere.\textsuperscript{126} Indeed, this treatment even extends to other Plantagenet cadets like Edmund, earl of Lancaster, who is described as the ‘uncle of the king of France’.\textsuperscript{127} The Capetian-Plantagenet relationship is a recurring theme in the pre-1375 continuations, suggesting that the Plantagenets should be considered Capetian cognates within its context. To the early vernacular writers, the reality of Capetian-Plantagenet kinship cannot be ignored.

Orgemont never implies a familial connection between the rival dynasties, likely due to the fact that he wrote during a period of renewed Anglo-French tensions. But Pintoin, Juvénal, and Chartier include three occasions where attempts were made by the Plantagenets to re-establish their former dynastic bonds. In 1396, Richard II married Isabelle, eldest daughter of Charles VI, in exchange for a twenty-eight-year truce.\textsuperscript{128} The following year, Richard visited Charles personally to finalise the marriage, and Juvénal notes that, ‘from then on, the King called the king of England his son, and the other called him his father’.\textsuperscript{129} Because of this father-son relationship, Juvénal considers it an affront to Charles when Henry, duke of Lancaster, deposed Richard in 1399, stating that ‘when the King learned what had happened in England against his relative, he was very displeased and knew well that all the alliances and truces were void and that we were returning to war’.\textsuperscript{130} The family relationship, therefore, is directly linked to the likelihood of war. Henry V attempted to repair this familial damage and solve the ongoing crisis. Juvénal reports that, prior to the battle of Agincourt in 1415, Henry requested the hand of Catherine, Charles VI’s youngest daughter, as part of a comprehensive

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{GCF, VIII:287; IX:43, 73. Guillaume’s continuator does not mention Isabelle’s relationship to the French king in 1312 and it is not emphasised in 1325. Cf. Chronique latine, II:60-61; Continuatio, 607. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 310. See also Chapter 3.2.}
\footnote{GCF, IX:166-167. See Chronique latine, II:160. Ormrod, 38-39, 69-70, states that the ‘court of Philip VI had interpreted [the marriage proposals between Edward and a Capetian princess] as a unilateral attempt by the Plantagenets to insinuate themselves further in the extended royal family of France, and had vigorously resisted the proposal’.}
\footnote{GCF, IX:8-9, 114. Edmund of Lancaster was actually Philippe IV’s step-father-in-law since the former’s wife was Blanche, mother of Jeanne I of Navarre, Philippe’s wife. See generally Labarge, 64.}
\footnote{HCF, 402. Juvénal mistakenly claims that a thirty-eight-year-truce was arranged, but Pintoin notes the number correctly. Cf. CKS, II:366. See generally Nigel Saul, Richard II, Yale English Monarchs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 227, 230.}
\footnote{‘Quand le Roy seut ce qui avoit esté fait en Angletre contre son gendre, il en fut bien desplaisant, et cognut-on bien que toutes alliances et trefves estoient rompues, et qu’on estoit revenu à la guerre’. HCF, 418. Cf. CKS, II:730, 732. See generally Saul, 416-424; Sumption, III:864.}
\end{footnotes}
peace treaty between England and France. The last interdynastic marriage, between Henry VI and Marguerite d’Anjou in 1445, was part of a two-year truce agreement, but Chartier gives the union little context and does not suggest any ongoing peace project. Indeed, he neglects to reference Marguerite’s relationship to Charles VII (she was the king’s niece) and never hints at any previous kinship between the Plantagenets and the Capetians. Thus, while the chroniclers prior to Orgemont believed that familial bonds were essential to understanding the Capetian-Plantagenet relationship—indeed, they found it difficult to perceive the Plantagenets as anything other than Capetian cadets—the writers of the fifteenth century wrote with the retrospective knowledge that all such agreements failed to secure a lasting peace and none contributed to improving Anglo-French relations or ending the war. In other words, the later authors understood that earlier examples of interdynastic cooperation had failed and they made clear to their readers that attempting dynastic marriages with the Plantagenets was a hopeless endeavour.

The primary reason the chroniclers ultimately discount the Anglo-French dynastic relationship was due to the prevalence of the Plantagenet claim to the French throne in contemporary political discourse. The marriage of Edward II to Isabelle in 1308 created the possibility that a Plantagenet would one day assert a right to the French throne, as indeed happened after Charles IV died in 1328 without male issue. To place a stronger emphasis on the legitimacy of the Valois succession, Orgemont replaced Lescot’s original statements regarding the succession with a much more straight-forward depiction of the event. Because of this, he does not use legal arguments to nullify Edward III’s candidacy; rather, he simply states that ‘the king of England and other enemies of the kingdom held against reasonable opinion that the kingdom appartenist miex audit Anglois...’. Orgemont still outlines the source of Edward’s claim, but undermines it by including both of Edward’s oaths of homage to Philippe made in 1329 and 1331, thereby proving to the reader that the Plantagenet

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132 HCRF, 557. Pintoin includes the entirety of the treaty in his chronicle, although he agrees that it is unjust and illegal. CKS, VI:410-430, 436-440 (evens). See generally Barker, 29.
133 Chartier, II:43, 45-46. See generally Barker, 324-328.
134 Hedeman, Royal Image, 116-117.
135 ‘...le roy d’Angleterre, et autres ennemis du royaume, tenissent contre raisonnable oppinion, que le royaume appartenist miex audit Anglois...’. GCF, IX:73.
claimant accepted the Valois succession. Lescot similarly manipulates the events surrounding Edward’s proclamation as king of France in 1340 to redirect responsibility from Edward to the Flemish, writing that, ‘they made homage to the king of England as king of France, and they left their rightful lord, false and traitorous that they were to him’. In this new framework, Edward’s claim disrupted Capetian dynastic authority in the Low Countries. Lescot also includes two letters that the kings exchanged that year, wherein Edward petitioned Philippe to renounce the crown ‘to avoid the death of the people’. In response, Philippe emphasised that Edward ‘entered into our homage, in recognising us, as, is right, king of France, and promising obedience such as one ought to promise to his sovereign liege’. In summary, Edward broke his oaths in claiming the French crown and his actions imperilled the domestic stability that he, as a French peer and Capetian cognate, should have championed.

Lescot’s vernacular successors downplay the Plantagenet claim to the throne and never afford it significant space. Orgemont primarily focusses on debunking the English claim via official documentation that he transcribes into his narrative. For example, the claim is prominent in the English-authored treaty of Brétigny in 1360, but in that agreement, Edward promised to renounce ‘especially the name and the right to the crown and the kingdom of France’. But this became a problem since, after it was agreed, Edward ‘still did not renounce the said kingdom of France, and also the king of France did not renounce his resort and sovereignty nor the homage over the lands that he gave to the king of England, but [Edward] abstained from the name king of France and must renounce it, once certain lands would be delivered to him’. Orgemont later explains that, by 1369, ‘the king of England had been...

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136 GCF, IX:73, 100-104. Hedeman, Royal Image, 117, notes that combining the events of 1329 and 1331 ‘blur[s] distinctions between the homage that took place in 1329 and that which was described in 1331, distorting the actual ceremony of homage to bolster the French position and promote the legitimacy of the Valois line. Textual changes in the manuscript manipulate the description of the events of 1329 to imply that the English king unequivocally accepted the Valois succession immediately after Philip of Valois’s accession in 1328, rather than three years later’. Cf. GCF, IX:72n2, 330-331; Continuatio, 645. See generally Giesey, 51-53, 61.

137 ‘…il firent hommage au roy d’Angleterre comme roy de France, et laissierent leur droit seigneur, comme faux et traistres qu’il estoient’. GCF, IX:173. See Chronique latine, II:165. Ormrod, 212-214, clarifies by stating that ‘Edward agreed to announce himself king of France, and thus feudal suzerain of Flanders, in order that the men of Ghent, Bruges and Ypres might argue the justice of their cause against the Valois regime and escape the penalties that might otherwise befall them for making an act of rebellion against their superior lord’. See generally Sumption, I:348-349.

138 ‘…et pour eschever mortalité de peuple…’. GCF, IX:198-200.

139 ‘…car vous estes entrés en nostre hommage, en nous reconnaissant, si comme raison est, roy de France, et promis obeissance telle comme on la doit promettre à son seigneur lige…’. GCF, IX:201.

140 ‘…et par especial au nom et au droit de la coronne et du royaume de France…’. CRJC, I:267-300, especially 279-280.

141 ‘…mais il ne renonça pas encore au dit royaume de France, et aussi ne renonça pas le roy de France aus ressors et souverainetez des terres que il bailloit au dit roy d’Angleterre ne à l’omaige, mais il seurseoit du nom de roy de France et y devoit renoncier, quant certaines terres li seroient delivrées…’. CRJC, I:324. See generally Ormrod, 409-410.
refusing and delaying to make any renunciations, as he ought to make [and] until the said renunciations are made, the said resort and sovereignty would remain to the king of France. To support this argument, the chronicler appends a long transcription of the terms of the renunciation from 1360 as evidence that Charles V retained suzerainty over Guyenne. Through these documents, Orgemont argues that, since Edward did not renounce his titles, Charles could legitimately hear appeals from Gascon lords in the French parlement. Charles later recounted these facts to his cousin Emperor Karl IV when the latter visited the French court in 1378, thus giving Orgemont an opportunity to elaborate to the reader the justifications for the war. By using documentation to make his points, Orgemont makes a strong case against the English without ever explicitly taking a side in the conflict.

Juvénal and Chartier, meanwhile, largely ignore the French succession issue except when they cannot. For example, Juvénal, abridging Pintoin, writes that, when Henry V invaded France in 1414, he said that ‘he was the true king of France and that he would conquer the kingdom’. Juvénal, therefore, allows Henry to speak for himself. He also shows that the French replied by stating that ‘the king of France, our sovereign lord, is the true king of France, unlike the things in which you say to have right or have any lordship, not even to the kingdom of England; for it belongs to the true heirs of the late king Richard, not with you’. Thus, Juvénal uses a combination of documentation and juristic reasoning to undermine Plantagenet claims. Within this framework, Henry essentially had no valid claim to France (or even England), so he had to marry Catherine to support his pretensions. After Henry and Catherine’s marriage and the signing of the treaty of Troyes in 1420, Juvénal dispassionately concludes that ‘there were, in effect, three kings in France, those being [of] France, England, and monseigneur the Dauphin’. This perception of the repercussions of the treaty is a

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142 ‘Car le roy d’Angleterre avoit estee refussans et delayans de faire aucunes renonciacions, que il devoit faire…. Et toutevoies, jusques ad ce que les dictes renonciacions feussent fai[tes], les diz ressors et souverainnetez demourroient au roy de France….’ CRJC, II:47. See generally Labarge, 162-163; Ormrod, 500-501.  
144 See generally Labarge, Charles V, 545-567.  
145 ‘…Car le roy de France nostre souverain seigneur est vray roy de France, ny és choses esquelles dites avoir droict, n’avez aucune seigneurie, non mie encore au royaume d’Angleterre: mais compete aux vrais heritiers du feu roy Richard, ny avec vous….’. HCRF, 505. This sentiment reflects Juvénal’s 1446 treatise Tres crestien, tres hault, tres puissant roy, in which he denounces Henry VI’s right to either throne due to the stronger Yorkist claim to both. Craig Taylor, introduction to Debating the Hundred Years War: Pour ce que plusieurs (La loy Salicque) and A Declaracion of the Trew and Dewe Title of Henry VIII, Camden Fifth Series 29, ed. Craig Taylor (Cambridge: University Press, 2006), 3.  
damning indictment of Plantagenet politics and its impact on French territorial integrity. For his part, Juvénal never ceases to recognise the claims of the dauphin, whom he considers Charles VII after Charles VI died in 1422.148 Chartier only mentions the matter of the English claim twice, once at the beginning of his text and once when relating the coronation of Henry VI at Paris in 1431.149 The chronicler largely confirms Juvénal’s opinion, recounting that in 1422 ‘the more sane party wept and groaned…, considering the enormous evil which could come to them by the transference of their natural lord, and that the said lordship governed itself by strange manners and customs [naciones], which were and are against reason and rightful order, to the total destruction of the people of the kingdom of France’.150 Thus, both chroniclers consider the realities of the Plantagenet kingdom of France to be a direct threat to regnal authority and something that must be actively destroyed in order to restore Charles VII to full power.

The vernacular chroniclers had a difficult task when it came to discussing the constantly-evolving Plantagenet-Capetian relationship. Guillaume’s continuators and Lescot had the greatest ability to demonstrate how a simple squabble over suzerainty in Guyenne became complicated by the intermarriages between the two dynasties, resulting in an unforeseen Plantagenet claim to the French throne. But the repercussions of this claim were emphasised most strongly by Orgemont and Juvénal, who documented and summarised the diplomatic correspondence sent between the two courts as they haggled over lands, rights, titles, and marriage. By the time of Chartier, France was divided into three spheres of influence, an aberration of law and custom. While the Plantagenet princes may have briefly been a manifestation of Capetian dynasticism and been recognised by the chroniclers as cognatic cadets, the matter of the French succession became a solid barrier to future reconciliation. The later chroniclers realised this and concluded that the Plantagenets were anathema to Capetian dynasticism and that their ejection from the European continent not only was needed to stabilise the kingdom, but was essential if the dynasty wished to securely expand their influence into the French periphery. Collectively, the final message of the chroniclers is clear: nothing good ever comes from negotiating with or tolerating the existence in France of the Plantagenets.

148 HCRF, 562, 569. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 591.
150 ‘Maiz la plus saine partie plouroit et gémissait…considérans les énormes maux qui leur pouvoient venir par la mutacion de leur seigneur naturel, et que ladite seigneurie se gouverneroit par estranges manières et naciones, qui estoit et est contre raison et ordre de droit, à la totalle destruction du peuple et du royaulme de France’. Chartier, I:27-28.
Within the Dionysian vernacular chronicles, images of Capetian dynasticism projected by distant agnates such as the Dreux rulers of Brittany or cognates like the Dampierre counts of Flanders and Plantagenet kings of England differ significantly from each other, but they all provide didactic examples that could help instruct future Capetian rulers. The Breton rulers showcase the dangers in assuming that a family relationship can sustain French suzerainty over lands that are traditionally autonomous. Only increased involvement by the French kings and intra-dynastic marriage brought the Breton dukes back into the Capetian fold. Similarly, the perennial rebellions of the Dampierres forced the French kings to progressively integrate the Dampierre dynasty into their own, proving that aggressive dynasticism could sometimes resolve crises related to regnal authority. However, this strategy could have unforeseen consequences, as exemplified by the Plantagenets. In an attempt to end wars of a similar nature to those of the Dampierres, the Capetian kings forged closer marriage bonds with the Plantagenets, which unintentionally gave Edward III a claim to the French throne and provided the family with yet another reason to fight their French kin. Thus, improved dynastic relationships were a double-edged sword. As lessons within a miroir, these examples illustrate how Capetian princes must be cautious when using dynasticism as a method of empowering regnal authority because not all cadets, be they agnates or cognates, wish to support the king if it costs them their autonomy.
PART II

REGNAL SUPREMACY
Capetian dynasticism certainly was a central theme under Primat, Guillaume de Nangis, Richard Lescot, and the other anonymous continuators who wrote prior to the reign of Charles V. But their broad approach toward dynasticism narrowed sharply when Pierre d’Orgemont asserted himself as a continuator of the Dionysian vernacular chronicles in 1375. Later chroniclers never again adopted such an all-embracing approach to portraying members of the Capetian dynasty. The narrative turn that began under Orgemont was the result of a number of pivotal events that occurred in the latter half of the fourteenth century that fundamentally altered the direction of Capetian history. Jean II’s capture by the English in 1356 on the fields outside Poitiers halted much of the progress the Valois had made since 1328 to assert and secure their lordship over France. Jean’s young heir, Charles, duke of Normandy and dauphin de Viennois (later Charles V), struggled throughout the period of his father’s captivity to stabilise and unify the kingdom against the overwhelming threats aligned against him. Yet Orgemont, benefiting from twenty years of hindsight, glorified the deeds and actions of Charles, converting the entire situation between 1356 and 1360 into a tale of Valois and regnal triumph. Upon Charles’s death in 1380, a new crisis erupted resulting in more domestic instability and the threat of civil war between the late king’s brothers over the regency of the young Charles VI. Jean Juvénal des Ursins, abridging Michel Pintoin and writing decades after the events he recounts, strategically downplayed these instances of dynastic conflict, focussing instead on the inherent regnal authority of the king and ignoring the actual power wielded by his uncles. This chapter will examine the creative ways in which Orgemont and Juvénal redirected the Dionysian vernacular tradition away from a broad approach toward dynasticism, as their predecessors had done, and toward a narrower view that emphasises the promotion of regnal authority over cadet ambitions.

5.1 A Kingdom Without a King

The capture of Jean II reintroduced a recurring problem in late medieval French history: the kingdom had no obvious leader. Similar situations had occurred in 1226, 1316, and 1328, and in each instance, domestic revolt ensued. Unlike those crises, though, in 1356 there was still an adult king—he was just a hostage in England. Thus, Jean continued to assert his position over the French people, an activity against which the Dauphin Charles had to constantly struggle and that Orgemont generally condemned in his continuation. Charles, for his part,
was not simply the French heir but also a great lord, suffering constant attacks in his duchy of Normandy throughout the period of his father’s captivity, which forced him to divide his attention between Paris and Rouen. To make matters worse for the king’s lieutenant and, later, regent in France, most of the dauphin’s immediate family were held in captivity in England or actively fought against him, and none of the remaining cadets could give Charles more than token assistance. This section will explore how Orgemont balances his portrayal of the Dauphin Charles by showing him both as the embodiment of regnal authority and as a Capetian cadet, thereby making him an important transitional figure within the vernacular narrative.

Paradoxically for a narrative tradition ostensibly organised by the reigns of kings, Orgemont’s chronicle is not really interested in Jean II but rather focusses primarily on the young dauphin. But this makes sense—Orgemont wrote his continuation under commission from Charles V during his reign, probably as a miroir for the future Charles VI, who was born in late 1368. Nevertheless, Jean is initially depicted favourably. When the king declared war on the English in early 1355, the Estates approved the necessary subsidies and declared that ‘they would all live and die with the King, and put [their] body and possessions in his service’.1 In other words, to Orgemont, Jean was worthy of public trust and devotion. The king soon proved his judicial qualities, as well, when he imprisoned Carlos II of Navarre in April 1356, because, the chronicler explains, the Navarrese king ‘had schemed and plotted several things, to the damage, dishonour, and ill-will’ of Jean, the dauphin, and France.2 But this is virtually all the information about Jean that Orgemont gives his readers before noting that the king was captured by the English at the battle of Poitiers on 19 September 1356.3 The chronicler never directly blames the king for the subsequent chaos in France nor the governmental crisis that ensued—such issues are the faults of others. In this way, Jean remains in the Dionysian tradition a faultless monarch, firmly in control of his government and popular even after his capture, a depiction with which most modern historians would strongly disagree.4

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1 ‘…ilz estoient tous près de vivre et mourir avecques le Roy, et de mettre corps et avoir en son servise…’. CRJC, I:56. See generally Bove, 102.
2 ‘…le dit roy de Navarre avoit machiné et traictié plusieurs choses, au domage, deshonneur et mal…’. CRJC, I:64. See Chapter 3.3. See generally Charon, 201-203.
4 Sumption, II:262, notes that, after being captured, around Jean ‘arose a shadow court, injecting fresh uncertainties into an already difficult political situation…. [I]t cannot have taken these men long to perceive the growing chasm which was opening up between the King and his subjects’. Autrand, Charles V, 218, explains, though, that ‘L’image du roi Jean et du courage malheureux a traversé les siècles, image du roi-chevalier qui, sur le champ de bataille, bassinet en tête et épée au point, n’abandonne pas son peuple. Si certains ont pensé qu’il aurait mieux fait de ne pas se trouver là, d’éviter à son royaume un traité si désastreux et à ses sujets le poids écrasant de la rançon, ils ne l’ont pas écrit. Ou du moins pas avant longtemps. À vrai dire, le blâme se lit entre
The capture of Jean meant that, for the third time in a century, France found itself without a functional monarch, paralysing the government of the kingdom. Rather than moving on with the narrative as if nothing significant had occurred, as his predecessors had done after the deaths of Louis X and Charles IV, Orgemont redirects the entire story, transferring nearly all of the king’s regnal qualities to the eighteen-year-old dauphin, Charles, who becomes the primary protagonist of the chronicle. As the story unfolds, it is clear to the reader that Charles is an underdog, a man who must struggle against the government itself to assert his dynastic identity and claim the regnal authority left vacant by his father. Orgemont reports that, soon after Jean’s capture, Charles called together the Estates of Languedoïl in order to arrange a tax that could pay for the king’s ransom and fund the ongoing war. However, the contemporaneous divisions in Paris are immediately apparent within the narrative when the Estates rose up against the dauphin, declaring that ‘the King had been badly advised (gouvernez) in times passed...for which the kingdom was lain waste and [was] in peril of being entirely destroyed and lost’. Orgemont lists three demands that the people made to the dauphin: the imprisonment of numerous royal officers and the confiscation of their lands and goods; the establishment of a governing commission controlled by the Estates and presided over not by the dauphin, but by twenty-eight knights, prelates, and bourgeois; and the release of Carlos of Navarre. After this, Orgemont categorically counters each demand. First, he contrasts the Estates of Languedoïl with those of Languedoc, showing how the latter voted to raise taxes to continue the war without appending any demands. Next, he shows how the dauphin unilaterally dismissed the Estates of Languedoïl and then left the kingdom in the care of his brother Louis d’Anjou in order to confer with his uncle, Emperor Karl IV, thereby emphasising his confidence in his government. And finally, he remarks that Filipe of Navarre, Carlos’s
brother, continued to pillage Normandy, highlighting the faithlessness of the Navarrese and undermining the case for Carlos’s release.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, in Orgemont’s text, the dauphin almost immediately becomes a capable and reliable leader who justly desired above all else the return of the king and the defeat of the English, two objectives that were essential to reinstating Valois regnal authority over France.

The prominence of Charles in the narrative is at odds with the fact that Jean remains the titular focus of the continuation. Indeed, the relative power, influence, and authority of the dauphin and the king are so muddled within Orgemont’s narrative that identifying the originator of many governmental decisions is almost impossible. The literal absence of Jean from France is emphasised by the fact that the chronicler does not mention him again in the narrative until March 1357, when a two-year truce was agreed between the king and Edward III of England.\textsuperscript{12} This moment standardises Jean’s usual portrayal in Orgemont’s continuation: throughout his captivity, the king undermined the dauphin’s attempts to govern by negotiating peace settlements from England without first discussing his plans with the dauphin and the French government.\textsuperscript{13} When news of a proposed peace treaty reached Paris in December 1357, Orgemont frames it as an aside from the main text; when the negotiators arrived in Paris the next month, the ‘treaty was very pleasing to the said [dauphin] and councillors’, but nothing more is said of it in this passage.\textsuperscript{14} In March 1358, the king asked for notaries to be sent to him ‘in order to ordain the letters of the treaty of peace between him and the king of England’.\textsuperscript{15} But by this time, opinions of the treaty had turned icy, with Orgemont noting that ‘several no longer believed it, some because they did not want it, others because it had been ordered several times and still the English placed obstacles before it, and others who were very happy to believe it’.\textsuperscript{16} Orgemont depicts Jean’s demands regarding the treaty as the catalyst that compelled the dauphin to declare himself regent, thereby eliminating the captive king’s \textit{de jure} authority within the kingdom.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[11]{\textit{CRJC}, I:90-91. See generally Charon, 203-206.}
\footnotetext[12]{\textit{CRJC}, I:107. See generally Burne, Crécy War, 322.}
\footnotetext[13]{Bove, 102, notes that ‘Jean II persistait à prendre des décisions politiques depuis sa prison dorée londonnaïenne…. Mais il n’était plus obéi, car ses sujets le soupçonnaient, non sans raison, d’agir dans son intérêt personnel plus que dans celui du royaume: ni les états, ni le Dauphin ne donnèrent suite à ses injonctions’.}
\footnotetext[14]{‘Le quel traictié plot moult aux diz duc et conseilliers…’. \textit{CRJC}, I:127, 144. See generally Sumption, II:298-299.}
\footnotetext[16]{‘La quelle chose plusieurs ne creoient point, les uns pour ce que ilz ne le vousissent pas, les autres pour ce que par plusieurs foiz avoient ainsi esté mandé et toujourss les Anglois y avoient mis ampeeschement, et les autres qui en estoient forment joieux le creoient’. \textit{CRJC}, I:177. See generally Bove, 102.}
\footnotetext[17]{\textit{CRJC}, I:161-162. See generally Sumption, II:311.}
\end{footnotes}
May 1359, therefore, was ill-received by Charles, who led the Estates of Languedoïl in denouncing it outright as ‘not fair, nor feasible’. By usurping his father’s authority, Charles set himself upon an independent path, one that would later see him negotiate the treaty of Brétigny in 1360 without interference from his father. The chronicler resolves the issue of conflicting authority between the dauphin and Jean by downplaying the king’s influence in absentia, implying that Charles possessed all regnal power in the kingdom throughout the late 1350s. Uniquely within the Dionysian vernacular continuations, this results in the only positive portrayal of a Capetian cadet triumphing over the otherwise incontestable authority of the king, although the fact that Orgemont is aware that Charles will later become king undermines the gravity of this event considerably.

This line of argument prompts a question, though: did the chroniclers consider the heir to the French throne a Capetian cadet? It has been argued previously in this study that the chroniclers treated Louis X as a cadet for his kingdom of Navarre prior to 1314. A similar argument, indeed, could be forwarded for the future Charles V from 1349, since he was the independent dauphin de Viennois within the Empire. However, Orgemont never makes that specific case, possibly because Charles only visited the county once, and the chronicler rarely uses the title ‘dauphin’ to refer to the prince. Within France, however, both Jean and Charles held a lay peerage title prior to their elevations to the kingship. In 1331, Jean was granted the duchy of Normandy, the first Capetian to hold that title and one that Charles would later be granted. Both Lescot and Orgemont almost exclusively use this title to refer to the future kings in all their activities, including in matters of precedence, in effect treating them like generic Capetian agnates. While Lescot never directly links Jean’s actions to his territory at any point in the narrative, Orgemont suggests that Charles’s bonds to Normandy were important through several examples. He explains how Jean sent Charles into Normandy in 1355 to act as his lieutenant there, and then, shortly afterwards, the dauphin was appointed duke,
for which he gave homage to his father.\textsuperscript{25} By linking Normandy to Charles, Orgemont makes Carlos of Navarre’s autonomy in the duchy and Edward III of England’s pretensions to the ducal title more personal: they were literally attempting to take Charles’s title.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, the chronicler proves that the duke had a vested interest in his duchy. He was found at Rouen, the duchy’s capital, in 1356 with Carlos when Jean arrested the Navarrese king.\textsuperscript{27} Orgemont notes numerous other conflicts between the duke and his Navarrese and English rivals over the subsequent eight years.\textsuperscript{28} The only explanation for the duchy’s importance to the overarching narrative is its connection to the prince. Indeed, Orgemont demonstrates that Charles’s declaration of war on England in 1359 was due to the terms of the second treaty of London, which would have stripped the duke of everything he held in Normandy.\textsuperscript{29} Charles was only willing to compromise if those terms were removed, as happened in the later treaty of Bré- tigny.\textsuperscript{30} In the end, Charles was certainly not a typical Capetian cadet, but Orgemont likely characterises him in such a way to make his struggles appear more relatable to his princely audience.\textsuperscript{31}

When one reads Orgemont’s chronicle, it seems certain that he considered Charles to be the only relatable Capetian cadet operating in France during this time. Between 1356 and 1360, most representatives of the dynasty were either in captivity in England with the king, too young to actively assist the dauphin, or outspoken enemies of the Valois.\textsuperscript{32} There were exceptions, however. Jean’s younger brother, Philippe, duke d’Orléans, appears periodically in Orgemont’s narrative as a companion of his nephew, protecting Charles against the abuses of

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\textsuperscript{25} CRJC, I:50, 56-57. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 168, 170; Sumption, II:161, 200; Van Kerrebrouck, III:104-105.

\textsuperscript{26} CRJC, I:234.

\textsuperscript{27} CRJC, I:63. Sumption, II:205, explains that the ‘Dauphin was presiding over a council of the leading men of Normandy in Rouen Castle…. Charles of Navarre and….most of the more prominent noblemen of the province and the mayor and leading citizens of Rouen [were there]’.

\textsuperscript{28} See, for example, CRJC, I:67-70, 89-91, 125-134, 248, 322, 342. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 221-400; Sumption, II:250-404.

\textsuperscript{29} CRJC, I:234-236. See generally Perroy, 137-138.

\textsuperscript{30} CRJC, I:280. See generally Perroy, 138-140.

\textsuperscript{31} This line of argument conflicts with political thought that developed in the early fifteenth century, when French jurists, citing Roman law and Greek theories, argued that the king and his heir were considered one entity for legal purposes, a justification that was used to delegitimise the claims of Henry VI to the French throne when Charles VI died in 1422. Even if he were aware of these arguments, though, Orgemont had no need to call upon them since he wrote from hindsight, long after Charles V had succeeded to the throne without controversy. For more on this theory, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: University Press, 1957), 391-395.

\textsuperscript{32} CRJC, I:43, 47, 63, 72-74. Pierre I of Bourbon died at Poitiers, while his brother, Jacques I de la Marche, was captured alongside the king’s youngest son, Philippe (the future duke of Burgundy), and the Artesian counts Jean d’Eu and Charles de Longueville. Autrand, Charles V, 206-207; Given-Wilson and Bériac, 831-832.

\end{footnotesize}
the Estates in 1356 and later standing beside him in 1358 when Paris broke out in rebellion.\textsuperscript{33} In the latter instance, Philippe was accompanied by Louis, count d’Étampes, a paternal cousin of Carlos of Navarre who nonetheless supported Charles and peace.\textsuperscript{34} The dauphin’s brothers Louis d’Anjou and Jean de Berry also appear in the chronicle in isolated incidents as supporters of Charles, although their capabilities were restricted due to their young age. Louis, for example, acted as Charles’s lieutenant when the duke visited the emperor in late 1356, but the inexperienced count was incapable of controlling the rabble, forcing Charles to return to Paris.\textsuperscript{35} Later in March 1357, both brothers are shown attending an Estates meeting with Charles, but neither appear to have participated in the proceedings.\textsuperscript{36} Notably, all four of these cadets are listed as hostages in 1360 to ensure that Jean II complied with the terms of the treaty of Brétigny, thereby stripping the dauphin of the few supporters he had gained during his brief time ruling France.\textsuperscript{37} By devoting so little space to other Capetian princes during the period 1356 to 1360, Orgemont isolates Charles and highlights the relatively weak position of the Valois family at this time. But this framing simultaneously demonstrates how a single Capetian agnate was able to assert dynastic and regnal authority despite impossible odds, thereby producing a strong didactic message that a prince can overcome any adversity.

The Dauphin Charles is a pivotal figure in the entire Dionysian vernacular tradition, and the importance of his portrayal as both a Capetian cadet and the functional embodiment of regnal authority during his father’s captivity in England cannot be overemphasised. As a cadet, Charles was the duke of Normandy and dauphin of Viennois, a vassal of his father and his uncle, Emperor Karl IV. When he was operating in the role of royal lieutenant, he could never fully embrace the regnal authority of his father since Jean was still alive and occasionally issued decrees and memoranda. Even after becoming regent, his key aim remained the release of his father and a sustained peace with England, two goals that he accomplished. But, in so doing, he deprived himself of his regnal authority and became once again a simple Capetian cadet. Thus, it is only after reporting Jean’s death in 1364 that Orgemont fully merges Charles’s parallel identities. By representing both dynasticism and regnal authority, Charles highlights the merits of both. Dynastically, Charles demonstrates the paternal attitude that all Capetian cadets should show toward their subjects, even in uncertain times. Regarding regnal

\textsuperscript{33} CRJC, I:76, 85, 157-158, 166, 199. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 309, 324, 335; Sumption, II:251.

\textsuperscript{34} CRJC, I:157-158, 166, 199. See generally Sumption, II:316-317.

\textsuperscript{35} CRJC, I:91, 93-95. See generally Sumption, II:266.

\textsuperscript{36} CRJC, I:101. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 248.

\textsuperscript{37} CRJC, I:282, 323, 325-326. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 409.
authority, Charles shows how a prince should handle moments of regnal crisis and what role the French heir needs to take in such situations. With this example, Orgemont’s chronicle becomes not simply a miroir for all princes, but an exemplar specifically for the future Charles VI and other potential French kings.

5.2 The War of the Two Charles

Through his characterisation of the Dauphin Charles from 1356 to 1360, Orgemont changed the thematic direction of the Dionysian vernacular continuations away from promoting Capetian dynasticism and toward promoting a policy of regnal supremacy. The situation in France in the 1350s likely motivated this redirection. With the Plantagenets triumphant, the king and most of the loyal Capetian princes held captive in England, and the career of Carlos II of Navarre ascendant in Paris, promoting Capetian dynasticism distracted from the more important and immediate need to show a unified Valois. To accomplish this task, Orgemont contrasts a particularly bad example of Capetian dynasticism with a remarkably good example, with both individuals belonging to the same cadet branch: the Évreux. Following repeated petitions by the Estates of Languedoc for his release, Carlos II of Navarre escaped prison in 1357 and led a popular civil war both in Normandy and on the streets of Paris, undermining all of the Dauphin Charles’s attempts to restore regnal authority to the kingdom. Throughout his narrative, Orgemont builds a strong case against rampant Capetian dynasticism and Carlos constitutes his most important case study. Yet Orgemont does not completely undermine the concept of Capetian dynasticism, he simply restructures its nature and purpose. He does this by exemplifying the deeds of Jeanne d’Évreux, Carlos’s aunt and widow of Charles IV, who strove throughout the civil war to advance the regnal authority of the dauphin, repair family connections, and strengthen dynastic solidarity. This section will examine how Orgemont used the feud between Carlos of Navarre and the Dauphin Charles to transition the scope of the Dionysian vernacular continuations away from a tale of dynasticism and toward one of regnal supremacy.

At the first Estates meeting in October 1356, the tide had turned against the Valois. Orgemont, probably in attendance at this meeting, records that the council unanimously demanded the release of Carlos, claiming that ‘since this king of Navarre had been imprisoned, good things had not come to the King or to the kingdom due to the sin of seizing the king of

38 For more on Carlos II’s other activities before and after this period, see Chapter 3.3.
Navarre’. In February 1357, the Estates met again and the topic of Carlos was not broached, but Orgemont notes how ‘the iniquitous power of the three estates declined and came to nothing’ in the chapter’s rubric. In the streets of Paris, the public demanded the release of the imprisoned Navarrese monarch and Orgemont accelerates the narrative until November, when Carlos was released ‘without the consent, permission, or will of the said king of France, his lord’. Carlos immediately marched on Paris, armed with weapons and the self-assurance that the dauphin would respect his position as a senior Capetian prince and major territorial magnate, whether the young French heir liked it or not. It is here where Orgemont shows the dauphin at his weakest: politically outmatched, lacking an army, and trapped in Paris—a victim of his father’s hubris and his own naïveté. His lack of regnal authority is complete.

Concurrently, Orgemont describes how a populist triumvirate was established between Étienne Marcel, provost of the merchants of Paris; Robert Le Coq, bishop of Laon; and the liberated Carlos. The chronicler shows that Marcel gained his power by rallying the people against unpopular monetary policies recommended by the dauphin after the battle of Poitiers. Le Coq is first introduced at the February Estates meeting where he, echoing statements made anonymously in October, ‘said that the King and the kingdom had been, in times past, badly governed’, and then outlined a number of recent problems, placing the blame squarely on King Jean. Carlos, meanwhile, even before his escape, encouraged revolts in Normandy via his brother Filipe, who led a five-year guerrilla war against anyone who would oppose Évreux power in northern France. Orgemont condemns these malcontents in a rubric by stating that they ‘usurped the power of the governance of the kingdom’, thereby proclaiming his support for regnal supremacy at the expense of popular rule in France. Although the triumvirs maintained a public attitude of reconciliation and compromise, Orgemont implies that they undermined the inherent regnal authority of the dauphin. But the chronicler is not

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39 ‘…depuis que ycellui roy de Navarre avoit esté emprisonné, bien n’estoit venu au Roy ne au royaume, par le pechié de la prise du dit roy de Navarre’. CRJC, I:80. Orgemont is mentioned by name at the second meeting in March 1357. CRJC, I:102. See generally Sumption, II:255, 259.
41 ‘…sanz le consentement, sceu et volenté du dir roy de France, son seigneur…’. CRJC, I:116. See generally Charon, 207.
45 ‘…dist que le Roy et le royaume avoient esté, ou temps passé, mal gouvernez…’. CRJC, I:102. Cf. CRJC, I:78. See generally Sumption, II:258-260, 278-279.
47 ‘…au prevost des marchans et à autres, qui usurpoient la puissance, de gouverner le royaume’. CRJC, I:111.
beyond deceptive narrative tactics. When recounting how Charles was forced to submit to Carlos’s demands in December 1357, Orgemont appears to intrude into the thoughts of Marcel, who ‘wanted to say to [the dauphin]: “It will be done, if you want it or not”’. Thus, through creative use of his rubrics, narrative devices, and carefully-chosen details, Orgemont is able to frame these men as unjust, malevolent threats to Valois authority.

The chronicler also proves quickly that the triumvirate only had ephemeral authority in Paris. After Carlos left for Normandy to secure his hold over his lands there, Le Coq closed the gates and forbade any armed person from entering the city. Orgemont notes of this time that Charles became a virtual prisoner of Le Coq and Marcel, ‘because those of Paris had all the government’. Thus, the chronicler acknowledges Charles’s lack of regnal authority while simultaneously promoting the prince’s claim to said authority. The chronicler then explains how the dauphin escaped his captors and revealed himself to the people, and he includes a paraphrased speech by Charles, where the dauphin stated

that he was there, that he had the intention of dying and living with them, and that they should not believe anyone who said and publicised that he sought to bring men-at-arms to pillage and destroy, because he had never considered it. But he sought to bring the said men-at-arms to help defend and guard the people of France, who had suffered greatly, because enemies were spreading all over the kingdom, and those who tried to govern it did nothing to fix it. So it was his intention, so he said, to govern from then on and push back the enemies of France…

This passage is the first instance where Charles is shown to have personal initiative, and the continuator uses it to explain how the Parisians rallied to the dauphin, for which ‘the greater party held to him’, allowing the dauphin to seize control of the government and finally assert Valois rule over Paris. According to Orgemont, this action shattered the triumvirate. He recounts that Le Coq remained publicly loyal to Charles afterwards; Marcel went rogue, throwing Paris into chaos; and Carlos returned with a large armed force, ostensibly to discuss peace terms, but effectively to retake control of the city. The chronicler also demonstrates that this disunity between his rivals allowed Charles to confirm his position as regent

\[\text{\textsuperscript{48}}\text{…il vousist dire: “Il sera fait, vueilliez ou non”}. \textit{CRJC}, I:124. \textit{See generally Charon}, 207-208.\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{49}}\text{\textit{CRJC}}, I:127-129.\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{50}}\text{‘…car ceulz de Paris avoient tout le gouvernement…’}. \textit{CRJC}, I:135. \textit{See generally Sumption}, II:302.\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{51}}\text{‘Et dist à grant foison de peuple, qui là estoit, que il avoit entencion de morir et vivre aveques euls, et que ilz ne creussent pas aucuns qui avoient dit et publié que il fosoit venir genz d’armes pour les pillier et gaster, car il ne l’avoit onques pensé. Mais il faisoit venir les dictes gens d’armes pour aider à deffendre et garantir le peuple de France, qui moutil espandus par le royaume, et ceuls qui avoient entrepris le gouvernement n’y mettoient point de remede. Si estoit son entencion, si comme il disoit, de gouverner dès lors en avant et de rebouter les ennemis de France…’}. \textit{CRJC}, I:135.\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{52}}\text{‘…et se tenoit la plus grant partie par devers luy’. \textit{CRJC}, I:136, 139. \textit{See generally Sumption}, II:306.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{53}}\text{\textit{CRJC}}, I:137, 150-152, 156, 162. \textit{See generally}, Sumption, II:307, 309, 311, 315.\]
of France, giving him full regnal authority in the kingdom during his father’s absence.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, the resulting rebellions, encouraged by Carlos and Marcel, can only be viewed within the narrative as acts of treason and a direct attack on regnal authority itself.

Two concurrent rebellions arose in the spring of 1358.\textsuperscript{55} The chronicler states generally that ‘there was a great division in the kingdom, because several towns—and the greater part—held to the regent, their rightful lord, and others held to [those of] Paris’.\textsuperscript{56} Orgemont, therefore, holds Paris to blame for all the revolts and names the city, rather than Carlos or Marcel, as the propagator of revolt. Nonetheless, Carlos is almost immediately implicated with the Parisians, who wanted him to become their captain, for which Orgemont comments: ‘false and evil that they were’.\textsuperscript{57} As violence escalated in the Île-de-France, the dauphin found himself trapped in the countryside without an army and with an increasingly-large company of Capetian women and children, displaced nobles, and others seeking safety.\textsuperscript{58} Orgemont splits his focus between Charles and Carlos and demonstrates how the latter eventually ended the provincial revolt—the so-called Jacquerie—by executing one of its leaders, Guillaume Caillet, in June.\textsuperscript{59} For his victory, the Parisians named Carlos their captain, but the Navarrese king’s repeated negotiations with the dauphin as well as continued civil unrest lost Carlos the confidence of the Parisian citizenry, who soon invited Charles back.\textsuperscript{60} Le Coq, meanwhile, was finally separated from the dauphin in May 1358, after which he disappears from the narrative, with Orgemont later labelling him a traitor.\textsuperscript{61} The third triumvir, Marcel, met a gruesome end outside the gate of Saint-Antoine when he attempted to allow Carlos and his troops back into Paris after they had been ejected by the populace.\textsuperscript{62} Although Carlos continued his campaign against the dauphin for another year, his reign over Paris was at an end and Valois


\textsuperscript{56} ‘Et fu une grant division ou royaume, car plusieurs villes, et la plus grant partie, se tenoient devers le regent, leur droit seigneur, et autres se tenoient devers Paris’. CRJC, I:171.

\textsuperscript{57} ‘...come faulx et mauvais qu’ilz estoient’. CRJC, I:174.

\textsuperscript{58} CRJC, I:182-183. Orgemont states that Blanche, the wife of Philippe d’Orléans and daughter of Jeanne d’Évreux, was forced to flee Paris in May, while the dauphin’s wife and daughter, as well as his sister Isabel, were secured at Meaux under the guard of faithful adherents in June. CRJC, I:178, 182-183. See generally Sumption, II:317.

\textsuperscript{59} CRJC, I:184. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 326.

\textsuperscript{60} CRJC, I:185, 193-194, 210, 212. See generally Charon, 211, 239-248; Sumption, II:365.

\textsuperscript{61} CRJC, I:175, 212. Autrand, Charles V, 255, notes of Le Coq that, ’[a]vant de quitter la France, en 1361, Charles de Navarre s’inquiétait de son fidèle conseiller que le roi Jean avait exclu de l’amnistie et dont le pape n’avait pas encore réglé le sort. Faisant son testament avant de prendre la mer, Charles offrait à Robert Le Coq, en cas de besoin, l’hospitalité en Navarre, avec une rente de 800 écus. Et c’est aux portes de la Navarre que l’ancien évêque de Laon, transféré au siège épiscopal de Calahorra, au royaume d’Aragon, vint finir ses jours’.

\textsuperscript{62} CRJC, I:208-209, 212. See generally Sumption, II:345-346.
control over the kingdom quickly resumed, culminating in the May 1359 meeting of the Estates where Charles felt confident enough in his authority to declare war on the English. Orgemont constructs in this narrative a precise and fluid tale of the dauphin overcoming myriad obstacles to assert Valois regnal authority over the kingdom despite the interference by Marcel, Le Coq, and Carlos.

In the face of these challenges to regnal authority, Orgemont retasked Capetian dynasticism as a weapon to be used to bolster that authority. He unusually positions Jeanne d’Évreux, aunt of Carlos and third wife of Charles IV of France, as the primary mediator in the conflict, with her home in Paris sometimes serving as neutral ground for negotiations between the parties. The dowager queen first appears in Orgemont’s text in 1354, assisting in the reconciliation between Jean II and Carlos following the assassination of Charles de la Cerda by Carlos’s agents. When Carlos escaped captivity in 1357, he appealed to his aunt for help to reconcile with the dauphin. From this point until 1359, Jeanne is portrayed as the only moderating voice in France. In 1357-1358, she ‘treated for an agreement between the said duke [Charles], who was [at Paris], and the king of Navarre, who was at Mantes’. When Carlos became captain of Paris and locked the dauphin out of the city, Jeanne diligently worked to negotiate a truce between the Parisians and Charles, even leaving the city to seek out the French heir. Shortly afterwards, ‘those of Paris still held proudly and haughtily against’ the dauphin, but Orgemont prefaces this passage with a sentence about Jeanne desiring peace and follows with an entire chapter in which Carlos and the dauphin parlayed under Jeanne’s mediating eyes.

Jeanne ceased negotiating with Carlos directly from March 1358, instead discussing peace with ‘those of Paris’, over whom Carlos was captain. Thus, narratively, Carlos’s status as a Capetian cadet is erased and he is reduced to that of a spokesperson beholden to the Parisians, who were against any compromise with the dauphin. But even this untenable position did not stop Jeanne from obtaining her goal; within the same passage that

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63 CRJC, I:236. See generally Sumption, II:403.
64 See generally Anne-Hélène Allirot, Filles de roy de France: Princesses royales, mémoire de saint Louis et conscience dynastique (de 1270 à la fin du XIVe siècle) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 389.
65 CRJC, I:43. See generally Allirot, 387; Sumption, II:131.
66 CRJC, I:117. See generally Allirot, 389.
67 Allirot, 392, comments that ‘Jeanne d’Évreux [apparaît pour les chroniqueurs comme] une modèle de vertu et de piété, messagère de paix et de concorde’.
68 ‘…qui traictoient d’accort entre le dit duc, qui là estoit, et le roy de Navarre, qui estoit à Mante…’.
69 CRJC, I:186-187. See generally Perroy, 151; Sumption, II:308-309.
70 ‘…car ceulz de Paris se tenoient tousjours fiers et haulz contre le dit regent…’. CRJC, I:189, 190-191.
71 CRJC, I:187, 189.
72 CRJC, I:193.
Carlos renounces the reconciliation treaty, Jeanne is shown ‘often going to one and to the other in order to revive the said treaty’. In the end, her tenacity paid off and Orgemont credits her for their reconciliation in July 1358 and lists her first among the Capetians present at the treaty confirmation. Jeanne, her task done, disappears from the narrative leaving the final victory over Carlos to the dauphin. In this way, Orgemont shrewdly uses Jeanne to demonstrate how the primary role of any Capetian cadet, regardless of gender or familial relationship, is to promote regnal authority and dynastic unity.

When setting out to write his continuation, Orgemont did not have to document the war between the Dauphin Charles and Carlos of Navarre in such detail. Certainly, the conflict helped Charles establish himself as regnal material and saved the kingdom from a piecemeal annexation by the English and Navarrese, but the chronicler includes moments of weakness as well, where the dauphin was literally on the run, with few allies and no army to support him. Orgemont includes these instances to make an important point that Capetians must be self-reliant and never surrender, even when the odds are stacked against them. It is a message that Charles V especially wished to impress upon his heir, the future Charles VI, whose ambitious uncles were already jockeying for power even before the king died on 16 September 1380. The depiction of the civil war between the two Capetian agnates represented a turning point in the Dionysian vernacular tradition. Previously, the continuators had supported cadet ambitions, but Orgemont used the crisis of 1356 to 1360 to show exactly how such support could rebound disastrously. Carlos’s pretensions directly challenged the rights of Charles and the Valois. Had Orgemont promoted Carlos’s cause, it would have been to Charles’s detriment. Instead, the chronicler took a different approach, turning Carlos into an antagonist and making his goals antithetical to regnal authority. Within this context, it is Jeanne d’Évreux who transfers the narrative away from dynasticism by moderating the two conflicting forces and ultimately siding with the dauphin, who embodied regnal authority. By using her in such a way, Orgemont sacrifices the basic tenets of dynasticism established by earlier Dionysian continuators to transition the focus of the remaining vernacular narrative to one of regnal supremacy.

76 CRJC, II:382. See generally Sumption, III:390ff.
5.3 Quarrelous Uncles

The situation in France following Charles V’s death was not dissimilar to that experienced by Charles when his father was captured. The eleven-year-old Charles VI was in no position to rule the kingdom and his four uncles all fought for some role in the governance of the realm. Juvénal, however, adapts and manipulates his source material—Pintoin’s chronicle—to streamline the narrative and erase most instances of intrafamilial rivalry or cadet dynastic ambitions, thereby establishing from the beginning that his narrative does not support dynasticism except in instances where dynasticism enhances and promotes regnal authority. By adopting this technique, Juvénal disguises the fact that Charles VI did not assume personal power until 1388. Thus, numerous moments of dynastic strength are downplayed or ignored. For example, the career of Louis I d’Anjou as regent for his nephew is barely examined in the chronicle and the duke’s adventures in Italy, while mentioned, are neither glorified nor used to establish an archetype as Primat had done for Charles I d’Anjou a century earlier. Similarly, Philippe II of Burgundy, who dominated the regency council throughout Charles’s minority, is largely removed from Juvénal’s text in order to make the king appear capable of governing himself. Another casualty of this strategy is Louis II de Bourbon, Charles VI’s maternal uncle and co-guardian and a Capetian cadet of a line long neglected in the Dionysian vernacular chronicles. Whether Juvénal modified the dynastic narrative in this period out of hindsight, anticipating the domestic disturbances that would develop after Charles VI became mentally unstable in 1392, or he simply felt the story should focus more on the king cannot be known, but the result is the same: the Capetian cadets are removed from Juvénal’s chronicle during the time of the king’s minority. This section will examine the ways in which Juvénal intentionally crafted a narrative that downplayed Capetian dynasticism in order to emphasise the young king’s regnal authority.

Juvénal was not the first Dionysian chronicler to neglect Louis d’Anjou. Orgemont barely mentions the man throughout his continuation but does emphasise Louis’s incompetence as a royal lieutenant in 1356 and that he was to serve as regent for Charles VI. Indeed, Orgemont himself appears in Juvénal’s chronicle supporting Louis’s claim to the regency, but also advocates a role for Philippe of Burgundy and Louis de Bourbon. The fact that Louis d’Anjou had little long-term impact on Charles’s government likely motivated Juvénal to downplay his story. When Louis first appears in Juvénal’s narrative, he is attempting to assert

77 See Figure 5.1.
78 CRJC, II:384.
79 HCRF, 339. Pintoin includes full speeches for both Louis and Orgemont that explain how the regency was to work according to the wishes of Charles V. CKS, 1:8-12 (evens).
Figure 5.1 The Senior House of Valois and the Sons of Jean II, 1350 – 1461

Philippe VI
France: 1328 – 1350

Jean II
Normandy: 1332 – 1350
France: 1350 – 1364

Charles IV & I
France & Navarre: 1322 – 1328

Philippe
Orléans: 1344 – 1375
Blanche
(d. 1393)

Charles V
Normandy: 1355 – 1364
France: 1364 – 1380

Louis I
Anjou: 1351 – 1384
(Naples: 1382 – 1384)

Jean
Poitou: 1357 – 1416
Berry: 1360 – 1416

Philippe II
Touraine: 1360 – 1363
Burgundy: 1363 – 1404

Charles VI
France: 1380 – 1422

Louis I
Orléans: 1392 – 1407

Louis II
Anjou: 1384 – 1417
Naples: 1390 – 1399

House of Armagnac
(See Figure 6.2)

House of Valois-Anjou
(See Figure 8.1)

Charles VII
France: 1422 – 1461

Louis
Dauphin: 1423 – 1461

Later Valois Kings of France

Philippe
Orléans: 1344 – 1375

Dauphin: 1423 – 1461

[Louis XI from 1461]
his status as regent over his relatives, but, because of the growing instability within France, they would not allow the Angevin duke to rule alone and argued that ‘when the King is crowned, all such divisions [in the kingdom] would cease, and they would take the government in his name, and he would be well-advised’. Juvénal proves, however, that this is a misplaced hope. Indeed, he places the blame for many of the problems in the following years directly on the feuds between the royal uncles. Louis himself fought for his title of regent, his precedence in the coronation ceremony, and monies he took from the royal treasury. More generally, Juvénal blames the renewal of English attacks, general instability in France, and even the continuation of the Papal Schism on the Capetian agnates. Pintoin introduces all of these examples, but usually gives credit where credit is due, often by including speeches and documents that explain the various positions on the topics. In comparison, Juvénal, by abridging the narrative, removes much of the nuance given by Pintoin, resulting in an unbalanced narrative that places excess blame on the government and the royal dukes for issues that are considerably more complex and often outside their control. By the point in the narrative where Louis leaves France, Juvénal has largely dismissed him as a proponent of regnal authority within the kingdom. This negative portrayal also follows Louis and his son whenever the chronicler documents their attempts to assert themselves in Italy over subsequent decades.

Juvénal relates how, just like the senior Angevins, Louis would eventually become king of Naples, at least in name, something that his brother seemingly predicted when he appointed the duke lieutenant of Languedoc in 1364. The duke’s tenure over the southern part of France gave him an interest in the affairs of the adjacent county of Provence, an Imperial territory held by the senior Angevins. In June 1380, Queen Giovanna I of Naples, seeking to deprive her Durazzo cousins of their inheritance, adopted Louis as heir to all her titles, which served as a dynastic transference from the old Angevins to the new. Both Orgemont and

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80 ‘…et que quand le Roy seroit sacré, toutes telles divisions cesseroient, et prendroit le gouvernement en son nom, et aurait bon conseil’. HCRF, 340. Ultimately, Louis only held the title of regent for the few months between Charles V’s death and Charles VI’s coronation, after which he became simply the president of the regency council. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 9-10, 12-14, 20; Berger, 420.
83 Pintoin gives speeches for both sides of the debates surrounding increasing taxes in Paris, explains in detail the English attacks and how Brittany was not involved, and includes long discussions concerning the resolution of the schism. CKS, I:44-52, 56-66, 72-90 (evens).
85 Van Kerrebrouck, III:272. For more on the senior Angevins in Provence, see Chapter 2.1.
86 CRJC, III:8; HCRF, 347. See CKS, I:118-122 (evens). For the history of the senior Angevins in Italy,
Juvénal include details of what transpired next, although they are inconsistent. Orgemont emphasises that it was a family decision to support Louis’s bid on the Neapolitan crown, and he frames the entire affair as a part of the Papal Schism—a pro-Avignon attack against the followers of the Roman pope.\(^87\) Juvénal only implies the schism is a cause, arguing primarily that Louis’s motive was revenge against the usurper Carlos III, who killed Giovanna in 1382 in order to secure the kingdom for himself.\(^88\) He explains how Louis first moved on Provence in order to secure much-needed funds and ships for his campaign.\(^89\) This met with stiff opposition from the local populace, but after Pope Clement crowned Louis king of Sicily at Avignon, the Provençaux rendered obedience to him.\(^90\) Juvénal depicts the actual war in Naples as a much more personal affair between Louis and Carlos, with no other individuals named.\(^91\) Notably, this deviates from Pintoin’s chronicle, which focusses almost exclusively on the duke and rarely references Carlos, even indirectly.\(^92\) Therefore, Juvénal intentionally crafts a story that frames Louis as a righteous warrior fighting against a heretic and a usurper, just as Charles I d’Anjou had done before. But Louis’s sudden death after victory brings with it another message from Juvénal, that ‘this was a good example to princes: do not embark upon such enterprises if one does not know how’.\(^93\) This is a condemnation of not just Louis but any Capetian prince who neglects his homeland for foreign adventures, and it is a strong statement by the chronicler that Capetian dynasticism begins and ends with France.

For Juvénal, the Valois-Angevin narrative concludes with Louis I. Thus, the late duke’s son, Louis II, barely appears in Juvénal’s chronicle and, when he does, his story is substantially reduced. For example, Juvénal shows him being crowned king of Sicily by the pope at Avignon in 1389, but the chronicler leaves out details of Louis’s conquest of Naples

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\(^87\) CRJC, III:9-10. Casteen, 196, adds that ‘Johanna had become respected for her piety, wisdom, and loyalty to the papacy; suddenly, she was again notorious. Her transfer of obedience to Clement VII shattered her previous reputation, which, at least among Urbanists, was lost forever. She became, virtually overnight, a symbol of the division of the Church’.

\(^88\) HCRF, 347. Louis’s best opportunity to capture Naples was in mid-1380, soon after he became Giovanna’s heir, but the death of Charles V in September forced him to delay his plans, leaving Giovanna vulnerable. His later decision to go to Naples in 1382, however, was not because Giovanna had died—he had already left before this news reached him—but was in response to the limited power he was permitted as regent in France. Léonard, 459, 463, 467.

\(^89\) HCRF, 350. See CKS, I:158-168 (evens). See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:273. Louis won over the Provençal urban aristocracy early, but was only accepted by the rural elite after his coronation as king of Sicily (Naples). Boyer, 57. Casteen, 220, adds that ‘Johanna was an important symbol [in Provence]. Her murder validated not only the new Angevins’ campaign against their adversaries but also the Clementist struggle. Her adoptive family took up the story of her murder and wielded it as a rhetorical weapon in their efforts to assert their legitimacy in Provence and their right to the Regno’. See generally Léonard, 467.

\(^90\) HCRF, 351, 362-363. Louis was crowned king of Sicily at Avignon in 1389, but the chronicler leaves out details of Louis’s conquest of Naples

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\(^91\) HCRF, 351, 362-363.

\(^92\) Cf. CKS, I:326-338 (evens).

\(^93\) ‘Et ce fut bel exemple à prince, de ne faire telles entreprises, si on ne sçait bien comment’. HCRF, 363. This lesson appears to originate with Juvénal. See generally Léonard, 473.
over the following years, diverging from Pintoin’s narrative. Likewise, the chronicler barely mentions the reconquest of Naples by Carlo III’s son, Ladislao, in 1399, implying that the story did not advance Juvénal’s overarching narrative in any meaningful way. Even when Louis fought to support the Pisan pope Alexander V in 1409-10, Juvénal overlooks the victories of the Angevin prince, emphasising instead the heroic deeds of others. Louis appears periodically in Juvénal’s text afterwards, usually in the company of the king, but after he returned to Anjou in December 1415, the duke is never referenced again. Juvénal’s style makes it clear that he never considered Louis important to the overall story and the author omits the duke’s death in April 1417, once more deviating from Pintoin. In the end, Orgemont and Juvénal portray the Angevins as having abandoned Charles VI, which makes them poor representatives of Capetian dynasticism and an example of how cadet ambitions can distract from the authority of the French king.

Juvénal and Pintoin take a somewhat different approach to the other cadets who ruled France between 1382 and 1388. Jean de Berry, the next eldest brother of Charles V after Louis, never has a substantial role in Orgemont’s chronicle. Orgemont reports that he was a hostage in England for much of the 1360s, briefly served in the war against the English in 1377, and attended Emperor Karl IV in 1378, but these are the only instances the chronicler highlights. After Charles died, he was given no role in the government of the kingdom, so he asked his siblings in 1381 if he could serve as governor of Languedoc and Guyenne, which they allowed. As a consequence, Juvénal writes him out of the ensuing narrative. Jean’s only significant role in the chronicle during this period is as ambassador to the English from 1384 to 1385.

Philippe of Burgundy, the youngest brother, is likewise minimised prior to

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95 HCRF, 418. Cf. CKS, II:748. See generally Léonard, 478; Rohr, 20.
96 HCRF, 452, 455. Pintoin emphasises Louis in these battles, while Jean Juvénal des Ursins focusses instead on Paolo Orsini, whom he calls Paul des Ursins, likely to imply kinship between himself and the pro-Angevin Italian soldier. Cf. CKS, IV:310, 390-396 (evens). See generally Léonard, Angevins, 480-481; Rohr, 71-72.
97 HCRF, 474, 475, 477, 491, 494, 496, 497, 520, 522. Sumption, IV:474, comments that the ‘Duke of Anjou, affable, ineffectual and vacillating, was too ill and too frightened of John the Fearless to take an active role and anyway spent long periods away from Paris’.
98 Pintoin includes a brief chapter regarding Louis’s death. CKS, VI:76, 78. See generally Léonard, 484; Rohr, 82-83; Sumption, IV:523.
99 For Jean Chartier’s portrayal of the Valois-Anjou family, see Chapter 8.1.
101 HCRF, 345. See CKS, I:90-98 (evens). See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 16-17; Lehoux, II:16.
1388, perhaps because Juvénal and Pintoin could recall the later Armagnac-Burgundian war, but also because, in reality, the duke regularly subverted the power and authority of the king and, therefore, undermined the chroniclers’ message of regnal authority. The only instances where they afford Philippe any space are when things happened to members of his family, such as the deaths of Marguerite II and Louis II of Flanders, and the marriage of his son to a Hainauter princess. Thus, after Louis departed for Italy, the narrative is remarkably cleansed of powerful royal uncles. This allows Charles to appear as the one primarily responsible for subduing the Flemish and rebellious Parisians in 1382, halting Despenser’s Crusade in 1383, stopping the Flemish and English again in 1385, and confronting the duke of Guelders in 1388. It is not that the dukes are not present in the narrative, it is simply that Juvénal frames them as faithful agents of the king, often grouping them collectively under the style ‘the King and those of his blood’ or some similar variant. More strategically, though, both chroniclers downplay the activities of specific individuals during this period. This technique deflects attention away from the fact that members of the Capetian family other than the king ruled the kingdom. Indeed, the only direct reference to the minority regency in Juvénal’s text is in 1388, when the council is dissolved. Juvénal reports that it ‘was of the opinion that the King alone had the government of his kingdom and that he was not under the governance of anyone else, such as his uncles, and especially [not subject to] the duke of Burgundy, who was not expressly named, but was clearly implied’. Juvénal shortly afterwards adds that Philippe left Paris ‘very malcontented, and his men displeased, since they did not have the

103 John J.N. Palmer, England, France and Christendom 1377-99 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 3, explains that ‘Philip was perhaps an even more gifted ruler [than Charles V]; certainly he was a more supple politician. He not only rectified Charles’s mistakes in Flanders and Brittany but turned the situations there to his own advantage and to that of France. He was the equal of his brother, too, in political courage, and in the first two years of his nephew’s reign he guided the monarchy through the gravest crisis it had undergone since the days of Etienne Marcel and the Jacquerie. After his brother’s death, Philip’s effective control over the French government lasted almost exactly as long as the remainder of the war: he was dismissed by Charles VI on his return from the final campaign of the century’. Richard Vaughan, Philip the Bold: The Formation of the Burgundian State (London: Longmans, Green, 1962), 40, states more simply that ‘[a]fter Louis of Anjou’s departure in February 1382 Philip the Bold’s authority in France was unquestioned’.


106 ‘…le roy et ceux de son sang…’. HCRF, 344, 356, 369, 373. Pintoin does not use this terminology but rather states precisely who is doing what in most instances.

107 See generally Tracy Adams, The Life and Afterlife of Isabeau of Bavaria, Rethinking Theory (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2010), 12.

108 ‘Il fut d’opinion que le Roy seul eust le gouvernement de son royaume, et qu’il ne fust plus sous le gouvernement d’autrui, c’est à scavoir de ses oncles, et speciallement du duc de Bourgogne, combine qu’expressément il ne les nomma pas, mais on les pouvoit assez entendre’. HCRF, 376-377.
administration and authority that they had before, when they governed’. However, because Juvénal so thoroughly erased all implication that the royal uncles had previously had any substantial input in Charles’s regency government, these statements do not make logical sense. Why would Philippe be angry about losing power that he never had? Thus, Juvénal’s account of the minority of Charles VI is a strong narrative of regnal empowerment which conveniently ignores the dynastic drama that ran as an undercurrent throughout the period.

Another character in this drama who is conveniently excised from the narrative is the Capetian cadet Louis II de Bourbon, who appears to be simply forgotten by Juvénal, much as his ancestors were by earlier Dionysian chroniclers. The patriarch of the family, Robert de Clermont, youngest son of Louis IX, is never mentioned in the vernacular tradition, although Guillaume de Nangis did mention him in his Latin chronicle. His son Louis I, however, does appear in Lescot’s chronicle. After being introduced in 1310 at the time of his marriage, Louis becomes another example of someone with crusading and chivalric vigour within the vernacular narrative. According to Lescot, he attempted to go on crusade twice, in 1325 and 1328, and he also commanded the French rearguard at the battle of Cassel in 1328 and served in the royal army against the English in 1340. These are roles that Louis’s descendants later adopted and which characterised the cadet house throughout the Dionysian tradition, albeit never in any strong way. Lescot makes certain to highlight the elevation of Bourbon to a duchy in 1330, as well as the prestigious marriage of the duke’s daughter to the heir of the king of Cyprus the year before. Yet the chronicler says little more about the duke. He reserves only a single sentence for Louis’s death in 1342, noting his descent from Saint Louis but not commenting upon the duke’s character or achievements. Lescot only makes a passing reference to Louis’s successor, Pierre I, and his status as the only Capetian casualty of the

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109 ‘…le duc de Bourgongne en ses terres et seigneuries, tres-mal content, et ses gens desplaisans, de ce que ils n’avoyent l’administration et l’auctorité qu’ils avoient eu auparavant, quand ils gouvernoient’. HCRF, 377. Pintoin, though noting that the uncles were upset, does not elaborate or condemn anyone specifically. CKS, I:560, 562. Favier, La guerre, 402, explains that ‘Berry et Bourgogne tentèrent en vain d’obtenir un délai de réflexion. Ils marchandèrent finalement un dédommagement qui eût démembré le royaume: la Guyenne à l’un, la Normandie à l’autre. Le jeune roi eut le cran de refuser. Les ducs ne pouvaient que céder’. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 93; Vaughan, Philip, 42.

110 See Figure 5.2.

111 GPT, 512. Cf. GCF, VII:79-80. Robert was rendered an invalid at a tournament in 1278, which may explain why he does not appear in the vernacular chronicles. Hélay, 68; Wood, French Apanages, 44.


113 GCF, IX:49, 64, 85, 204. See Chronique Latine, II:81; Continuatio, 639. See generally Abbott, 190; Burne, Crécy, 48; Van Kerrebrouck, IV:53, 56n8.

114 For the activities of the later Bourbons, see Chapters 7.2 and 8.2.

115 GCF, IX:105, 107, 114. Another Bourbon princess, the daughter of Jean I de la Marche, married the king of Cyprus in 1411. HCRF, 455. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, IV:54, 55n1, 91.

Figure 5.2 The Capetian House of Bourbon, 1269 – 1461
battle of Poitiers in 1356 brings a swift end to his role in Orgemont’s continuation.\footnote{117} Louis’s brother and the constable of France, Jacques I de la Marche, has a similar arc in Orgemont’s text: after briefly fighting the English in Languedoc, he was captured at Poitiers and then killed fighting routiers a year after his release.\footnote{118} Even Charles V’s marriage to Jeanne, a daughter of Pierre, is only referenced in the context of the birth of a daughter sixteen years after their nuptials.\footnote{119} However, the chronicler’s account of the queen’s death in 1378 is the most substantial space devoted to any queen or Bourbon cadet in the entire Dionysian vernacular tradition, suggesting that Jeanne and her family were more important in reality than they appear to be within the chronicles.\footnote{120} To Orgemont and the earlier Dionysian authors, the small appanage and limited political involvement of the Bourbons meant that the cadets were generally unimportant to the overarching narrative and contributed little to advancing Capetian dynasticism.

Because of this lack of coverage by the chroniclers, it comes as a narrative shock to find Louis II co-guardian of Charles VI alongside Philippe of Burgundy in 1380. According to Orgemont, it was a position that granted him ‘all the profits, revenues, and fees, both ordinary and extraordinary, of the duchy of Normandy, the bailliages of Senlis and of Melun, and of the town and viscounty of Paris’—a powerful position for a man from a family rarely referenced in the vernacular texts.\footnote{121} The chronicler does occasionally hint that the duke was more important than he seemed. He notes that, during the visit of Karl IV in 1378, Louis hosted the emperor alongside other cadets, and he was also responsible for the protection of the future Charles VI at this time.\footnote{122} However, the revelation that Louis was a co-guardian comes so late in his narrative that Orgemont was unable to extrapolate additional information on the family and include it throughout the rest of his text. Juvénal, in contrast, did have such an opportunity, but clearly felt the Bourbons were unimportant in hindsight.\footnote{123} In the narrative, Louis is hardly mentioned during the eight-year period in which he was supposedly the king’s protector.\footnote{124} In fact, his sole moment of personal glory is on the Barbary Crusade of 1390, which

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\footnoteref{117}{GCF, IX:231; CRJC, I:72. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 219.}  
\footnoteref{118}{CRJC, I:55, 73, 336. See generally Burne, Crécy, 255.}  
\footnoteref{119}{CRJC, II:22. Jeanne herself is referenced indirectly as duchess of Normandy in 1358 and as a member of the Bourbon family in 1364, but her parentage is not noted on either occasion. CRJC, I:182, II:1-2. See generally Allirot, 82-84.}  
\footnoteref{120}{CRJC, II:278-282.}  
\footnoteref{121}{‘…le diz ducz de Bourgoigne et de Bourbon aroient le gouvernement, tous les prouffiz, revenues et emolumens, tant ordinaires comme extraordinaires, de la duchié de Normendie, des bailliages de Senlis et de Meleun et de la ville et viconté de Paris…’. CRJC, II:384. See generally Sumption, III:391.}  
\footnoteref{122}{CRJC, II:201-202, 212, 221, 237. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 786, 788.}  
\footnoteref{123}{Pintoin, too, rarely discusses Louis’s role.}  
\footnoteref{124}{Notably, the duke is not even mentioned among the councillors that Charles VI dismissed in 1388.}
he led and lost, although Juvénal comments that ‘for this voyage, the duke of Bourbon had great honour’.\textsuperscript{125} By including the crusade at all, the chronicler exemplifies what made the Bourbons important to the greater Capetian family: they were Saint Louis’s crusading heirs, constantly seeking martial feats for the glorification of the dynasty. It is no coincidence that most portrayals of the Bourbons in Juvénal’s text are of them fighting: Louis battled the English in Spain in 1387; Jacques II de La Marche, grandson of Jacques I, participated in the Nicopolis Crusade in 1396 and campaigned in England in 1403 and central France in 1411; Jean de Clermont, Louis’s son, used hit-and-run tactics against the English in Guyenne in 1404; and Louis de Vendôme, Jacques’s brother, fought at Naples in 1412.\textsuperscript{126} But in the entire vernacular tradition, there is only one instance where a duke of Bourbon is directly associated with his duchy. In 1409, a vassal, Amédée de Viry, revolted against Louis II and led a short uprising against him.\textsuperscript{127} Juvénal uses this incident to highlight not Louis’s authority over his lands, but rather the potential for familial compromise in troubled times, since Jean of Burgundy sided with the Bourbons even though Amédée wanted to pledge fealty to Jean. Both Jean de Clermont—who became duke in 1410—and Louis de Vendôme were captured at Agincourt, marking the end of the Bourbons in Juvénal’s narrative.\textsuperscript{128} Much like with Louis d’Anjou, their failings and generally minor contributions to Capetian dynasticism explain why the Bourbons are underemphasised by the vernacular writers. Juvénal, seeking ever to promote regnal authority despite the circumstances, sees no purpose emphasising cadets who contributed so little to domestic stability or restoring the king’s power over the kingdom. Although they appear everywhere in his narrative, Juvénal concludes that the Bourbons do not adequately represent the type of Capetian dynasticism that he advocates.

It seems certain that Juvénal was uninspired by all the Capetian cadets who lived during the minority of Charles VI. This reflected Pintoin’s negative opinions as much as his own and was undoubtedly intensified by the fact that Juvénal wrote years after the conclusion of the Armagnac-Burgundian war. But his final message is clear: Capetian princes could wield a tremendous amount of power, and that power threatened the stability of the kingdom


\textsuperscript{128} \textit{HCRF}, 519. See \textit{CKS}, V:574. See \textit{generally} Abbott, 190; Barker, 334; Alfred H. Burne, \textit{The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453} (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956; reprint, Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1998), 87. For the roles of Bourbon bastards in this period and afterwards, see Chapter 7.2.
and the authority of the king. To avoid showcasing this tendency, Juvénal minimises the roles of all the Capetians who sat on the regency council between 1380 and 1388. This task was made simpler by the fact that Louis d’Anjou went to Italy and Jean de Berry to Languedoc, so both voluntarily abandoned the royal administration and, therefore, the primary storyline. But with Philippe of Burgundy and Louis de Bourbon, Juvénal erases their influence, carefully structuring the narrative in such a way as to increase the authority of the teenaged Charles while simultaneously decreasing the power of the king’s co-guardians. In so doing, the chronicler constructs a story that showcases above all French regnal supremacy over the privileges and ambitions of Capetian cadets.

One thing the chroniclers all agree upon is that ruling during a time of regency is a difficult task and maintaining the appearance of regnal authority is key. During the long captivity of Jean II from 1356 to 1360, the Dauphin Charles struggled constantly to balance his duties as a Capetian cadet with his obligation to reassert regnal authority over the government. People such as Carlos of Navarre, Robert Le Coq, and Étienne Marcel saw weakness in his approach and exploited it, further destabilising France. Yet Orgemont strategically demonstrated that good Capetian cadets, such as Jeanne d’Évreux, could challenge the pretensions of bad cadets and help resolve dynastic conflicts and restore regnal authority. These are key lessons that Orgémont wanted to include within his chronicle so that it could function as a competent manual and _miroir_ for the young Charles VI. But it came at an irreversible cost. Orgemont in effect redirected the focus of the Dionysian vernacular tradition from exemplifying Capetian dynasticism to promoting regnal authority. Juvénal followed this trend when he described the regency of Charles VI from 1380 to 1388. Viewing the various Capetian cadets as a threat to domestic tranquillity, he focussed on the king almost exclusively to create a narrative that emphasised regnal supremacy over cadet ambitions. Thus, the activities of the king’s four uncles are largely ignored in his text. Within the context of the Dionysian tradition, these two moments of dynastic crisis mark a fundamental shift in the type of didactic messages conveyed within the vernacular continuations. Previously, the sustained peace in France allowed the chroniclers to select good and bad examples from the totality of the greater Capetian dynasty. But without peace, narrative attention shifted to focus singly on the king and those cadets willing to sacrifice their own dynastic ambitions to uphold and promote regnal authority.
CHAPTER SIX

The Apanage Kings

On 5 August 1392, Charles VI flew into a sudden, unprovoked rage, killing four men before he could be restrained.1 It was the first instance of a recurring illness that would define the remaining three decades of his reign.2 His uncle Philippe II of Burgundy immediately seized control of the government that had been taken from him four years earlier when Charles came of age.3 In many ways, this sequence of events was a repeat of that which came before: France found itself without a capable ruler, forcing the Capetian cadets to decide among themselves who was best-suited to rule during the king’s mental absences. By 1402, the regency was at times violently contested between two factions controlled by influential Capetian apanagists: the Burgundians, led by Philippe, his son Jean, and grandson Philippe III; and the Armagnacs, founded by Charles VI’s brother, Louis d’Orléans, and named after his close relative and powerful supporter, Bernard VII d’Armagnac. But no Capetian cadet sat out the conflict. The king’s uncle Jean de Berry, his wife, Queen Isabeau de Bavaria, and his sons, the dauphins, were all forced to take sides, though their loyalties often shifted. Also pulled into this bloody feud was a young Jean Juvénal des Ursins, who decades later navigated the political eddies of this conflict in an attempt to craft a didactic narrative worthy of the Dionysian tradition. His guides through this quagmire, from whom he borrowed heavily, were the Dionysian monk Michel Pintoin and his own father, Jean Juvénal, lawyer for the king in Parlement.4 Incapable of removing the cadets from the story as he did during Charles VI’s minority, Juvénal adopted various techniques to delegitimise the Armagnac and Burgundian causes, demonstrating to his readers the advantages of regnal, rather than dynastic, authority. By drawing out these tactics, this chapter will reveal the ways in which Juvénal problematised dynasticism through his characterisations of the major Capetian apanagists of the Valois line, thereby advancing a

1 Autrand, Charles VI, 287, 291; CKS, II:16-22 (evens); HCRF, 389.
2 For a thorough discussion of Charles VI’s disease, see Famiglietti, 1-21.
3 CKS, II:24-28 (evens); HCRF, 389-390.
4 Alain Demurger, ‘La Famille Jouvenal, quelques questions sur un tableau’, Annaire—Bulletin de la Société de l’histoire de France (1997): 35. The political leanings of both authors have been discussed by multiple historians. Adams, Life and Afterlife, 128, 147-148, states that Pintoin had Burgundian leanings, but Nicole Pons, ‘Michel Pintoin et l’historiographie orléanaise’, in Saint-Denis et la royauté: Études offertes à Bernard Guenée, eds. Françoise Autrand, Claude Gauvard, and Jean-Marie Moeglin (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 1999), 237-259, argues these have been exaggerated, especially in relation to Jean of Burgundy. Demurger, ‘La Famille Jouvenal’, 36, and HCRF make it clear that Jean Juvénal was an Armagnac, at least after the murder of Louis d’Orléans in 1407. However, Juvénal appears to borrow the pro-Burgundian perspective of Pintoin for his chronicle, at least until the Cabochien Revolt in 1413 when his own recollections and those of his father become more prominent within the text. Planchenault, ‘La “Chronique”’, 95. For more on the Juvénal family, see Pierre-Louis Péchenard, Jean Juvénal des Ursins, évêque de Beauvais et de Laon, archevêque-duc de Reims (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1876).
message of regnal supremacy.

6.1 The Burgundians

The seizure of the government by Philippe II, duke of Burgundy, in August 1392 fundamentally altered the relationship between Capetian cadets and French kingship. Reflecting on the matter decades later, Juvénal came to see agnates not as the bedrock of the kingdom, as his vernacular predecessors had, but as direct threats to the stability and sustainability of France. Philippe, as demonstrated by Juvénal through his depictions of the years the duke served as co-guardian of the child-king Charles VI, desired power and authority within France. This passed into his hands after the king fell ill. His feud with Louis d’Orléans was continued with vigour by his son Jean, whose confrontational personality led to the assassination of his rival and opened France up to civil war and foreign invasion. As a result, Philippe III becomes simply a product of his predecessors’ actions within the Dionysian vernacular continuations, and his generally negative portrayal by Juvénal and Jean Chartier represents the repercussions of betraying the king and the Capetian dynasty. Nonetheless, the chroniclers characterise each duke in a unique way that warrants individual attention, and this section will examine how these representations contributed to an overarching message of regnal supremacy within the Dionysian narrative.5

Juvénal was stubborn in his belief that regnal authority trumped dynasticism. After Charles VI fell ill, Juvénal resumes his rhetorical practice of attributing regnal decisions to the incapable king whenever possible or, more generally, to not attribute actions to any specific person at all.6 This technique effectively deflects attention from Philippe of Burgundy and implies the inherent capability of the king to rule. But the chronicler is not always able to maintain this fiction. In 1398, Juvénal directly acknowledges the growing domestic crisis, writing that ‘there was already great hatred, envy, and divisions between the dukes’.7 But the issue at stake was resolving the Papal Schism, since Louis d’Orléans supported the Avignon pope and Philippe sought to compromise.8 Otherwise, there is no evidence of dynastic rivalries during

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5 See Figure 6.1.
6 Throughout this period, Juvénal attributes decisions to ‘le Roy’, ‘le Roy, les oncles du Roy, et ceux du sang’, ‘le Roy et son conseil’, etc. See, for example, HCRF, 392, 395, 405. He also frequently informs the reader of the state of the king’s illness. See, for example, HCRF, 394, 404, 412. Pintoin more commonly attributes matters to the specific dukes, but he also interrupts his narrative to note the king’s health. See, for example, CKS, II:86-88, 402-408, 684-686 (evens).
7 ‘…il y avoit ja grandes haines, envies et divisions entre les ducs…’. HCRF, 414. Pintoin does not mention these early disagreements. See generally Bertrand Schnerb, Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons: La maudite guerre (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1988), 44.
8 HCRF, 415. See CKS, III:20, 22. See generally Famiglietti, 24, 26; Vaughan, Philip, 47.
**Figure 6.1 The Capetian Houses of Burgundy and Valois-Burgundy, 1272 – 1461**

Robert II

- Burgundy: 1272 – 1306
- Agnès de France (d. 1325)

Eudes IV

- Burgundy: 1315 – 1349

Jean II

- France: 1350 – 1364

Charles V

- France: 1364 – 1380

Charles VI

- France: 1380 – 1422

Philippe III

- Burgundy: 1349 – 1361

Marguerite III

- Flanders, Artois, Nevers, Rethel & Burgundy C: 1383 – 1405

Marguerite (d. 1441)

- Hainaut: 1417 – 1433
- Dauphiné: 1404 – 1419

Antoine

- Brabant: 1404 – 1415
- Later Dukes of Brabant (See Figure 7.3)

Philippe

- Nevers: 1404 – 1415
- Later Counts of Nevers & Rethel

Marguerite

- (d. 1441)

Jacqueline (d. 1436)

- Hainaut: 1417 – 1433

Hugues V

- Burgundy: 1306 – 1315

Jeanne

- (d. 1349)

Eudes IV

- (d. 1346)

Robert II

- Navarre: 1305 – 1316
- France: 1314 – 1316

Marguerite (d. 1315)

- Évreux Rulers of Navarre (See Figure 3.4)

Philippe II

- Burgundy: 1363 – 1404
- Flanders, Artois, Nevers, Rethel & Burgundy C: 1383 – 1405

Philippe

- (d. 1346)

Philippe I

- Burgundy: 1349 – 1361

Marguerite III

- Flanders, Artois, Nevers, Rethel & Burgundy C: 1383 – 1405

Marguerite (d. 1441)

- Hainaut: 1417 – 1433
- Dauphiné: 1404 – 1419

Later House of Valois-Burgundy

Michelle

- Burgundy: 1419 – 1467
- Hainaut: 1433 – 1467

Agnès de France (d. 1325)

- Later Duke of Burgundy

Philippe III

- Burgundy: 1419 – 1467
- Hainaut: 1433 – 1467

Marguerite (d. 1442)

- Dauphiné & Guyenne: 1401 – 1415

Louis

- Dauphiné & Guyenne: 1401 – 1415
- Touraine: 1401 – 1417
- Dauphiné: 1415 – 1417

Jean

- Jacqueline (d. 1436)
- Hainaut: 1417 – 1433
the time of the king’s illness until 1402. Philippe comes into his own within the chronicle at this time. Juvénal admits that ‘the principal cause [for the divisions] was to have the government of the Kingdom and also finances. And the said [dukes] of Orléans and Burgundy each ordered men-at-arms to gather, which came toward Paris and did many bad things’. 

Shortly afterwards, Philippe ‘held the government of the kingdom [and] he wanted to find certain means of reformation, to reform all men who participated in the government, both the King and others, both men of the Church and the laity’. However, the archbishop of Reims dissuaded him. Juvénal notes in 1403 that each duke was told to go to separate sides of the kingdom to subdue the English, but he laments that this plan ‘came to nothing, which was a great pity, having levied so much money, as one said was done, and without doing anything to benefit the public’. 

Shortly afterwards in the narrative, Philippe attempted to halt a new tax from being levied, but failed again. Through these examples, Juvénal characterises the duke in a simple manner that is maintained throughout the continuation. On the topic of Philippe’s death in 1404, Juvénal describes the duke as a ‘valiant, wise, and prudent’ man, although one who left several debts. Since Juvénal deprives the duke of examples of his governing ability, these complimentary terms accurately summarise how Philippe is represented in the chronicle. The reference to debts, though, hints at a selfish nature not elaborated upon but demonstrated through his feud with Louis. By largely downplaying Philippe’s influence and portraying the duke as complementing regnal authority, Juvénal successfully attributes excessive authority to Charles VI and undermines much of the dynastic basis for the ensuing Armagnac-Burgundian civil war.

In contrast to his father, Jean of Burgundy simply could not be overlooked by Juvénal due to the role he played in the dynastic conflict. The chronicler recounts that in 1405, Jean

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9 ‘Et toute la principale cause estoit pour avoir le gouvernement du Royaume, et mesmoen des finsances. Et manderent chacun desdits d’Orleans et Bourgogne gens d’armes à foison, lesquels vinrent autour de Paris, et firent des maux beaucoup’. 

HCRF, 420. See CKS, III:14. Vaughan, Philip, 56, states that ‘France was saved from the horrors of civil war by the successful mediation of the dukes of Berry and Burgundy and the queen…. After this, there was no further resort to arms’. See generally Bertrand Schnerb, Jean sans peur: Le prince meurtrier, Biographie Payot (Paris: Payot and Rivages, 2005), 165.

10 ‘…comme d’avoir le gouvernement du royaume, il voulut trouver certaines manieres de reformations, pour reformer toutes gens, qui avoient administrations, tant du Roy que d’autres, tant sur gens d’église que lais’. 

HCRF, 421. See CKS, III:34, 38. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 53.

11 ‘Mais tout vint au neant, qui estoit grande pitié, d’avoir levé tant d’argent, comme on disoit d’avoir fait, et sans rien faire au profit de la chose publique’. 

HCRF, 426. Pintoin does not mention this separation. In reality, both dukes had business elsewhere: Philippe went to Brussels to take possession of the duchy of Brabant, while Louis was in Luxembourg, consolidating his rule there. See generally Famiglietti, 34-35; Schnerb, Armagnacs, 56.

12 HCRF, 427. See CKS, III:38, 40. See generally Sumption, IV:125.

13 ‘…on tenoit vaillant, sage, et prudent’. 

HCRF, 427. Pintoin gives an expanded assessment of the duke, but one that largely conforms to Juvénal’s conclusions. CKS, III:144-148 (evens). See generally Vaughan, Philip, 240.
proposed a four-step plan to reform the government. He declared his intention to take back the government, restore justice, streamline taxation, and recall the estates.\textsuperscript{14} The first pledge he accomplished when he had the Dauphin Louis de Guyenne appointed regent, but Juvénal makes clear that Jean retained control over the government, because ‘his daughter had married monseigneur the dauphin, who had all of the government for the said Duke, and without him nothing was done’.\textsuperscript{15} To restore justice, Jean militarised Paris, bringing in Burgundian troops and arming the populace against the followers of Louis d’Orléans, but the chronicler notes how these troops were soon withdrawn to allow the two factions to negotiate a truce and how the Parisians declined Burgundian armaments.\textsuperscript{16} On the issue of taxation, Juvénal attributes nothing to Jean and claims that ‘the dukes took everything and distributed it to their servants, as it seemed good to them’, indirectly blaming all the Valois apanagists for the kingdom’s economic woes.\textsuperscript{17} Jean’s final proposal, to recall the Estates, is stillborn and never mentioned again by Juvénal.\textsuperscript{18} Despite this detailed and provocative introduction, however, Jean is still largely absent from the narrative of the early Armagnac-Burgundian war, only appearing in isolated episodes. Juvénal organises the duke’s narrative in a way that is intentionally inconsistent and vague, which underemphasises the duke’s influence within the government.

The murder of Louis d’Orléans by Jean’s agents on 20 November 1407 complicates Juvénal’s depiction of the Burgundian duke.\textsuperscript{19} Within the narrative, Jean transforms into a remorseless, power-hungry agnate determined to exert his control over Paris and the king.\textsuperscript{20} From his public insistence that Louis’s death was necessary to his refusal to apologise for his crime over the subsequent twelve years, the duke is never again favourably portrayed by Juvénal.\textsuperscript{21} For example, when Jean marches on Paris in 1408 and Charles d’Orléans, Louis’s orphaned successor, reconciles with him, Juvénal outlines how completely the duke controlled

\textsuperscript{14} HCRF, 432. Juvénal is summarising a much more detailed passage from Pintoin, but he changes the final demand from the original, which was to subdue the routiers pillaging the French countryside. CKS, III:296-304 (evens). See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 171.


\textsuperscript{16} HCRF, 432-433, 437. See CKS, III:308, 340-344 (evens). See generally Schnerb, Jean, 175, 177.

\textsuperscript{17} ‘En ce temps c’estoit grande pitié de voir le gouvernement du royaume: les ducs prenoient tout, et le distribuoient à leurs serviteurs, ainsi que bon leur sembloit’. HCRF, 443. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 133.

\textsuperscript{18} See generally Schnerb, Jean, 174.

\textsuperscript{19} HCRF, 444-445. See CKS, III:730, 732. See generally Famiglietti, 63.

\textsuperscript{20} See generally Schnerb, Jean, 513ff.

\textsuperscript{21} HCRF, 445, 479.
Paris and explains that Charles only forgave Jean ‘by the commandment of the king’.

Although Juvénal does not ignore the duke’s successes, he takes every opportunity to undermine them. One such instance that the chronicler includes takes place in 1410, soon after Jean left Paris to return to his territories. The duke was worried that the Armagnacs would take advantage of his absence and wrote to the Parisians asking if they needed assistance, to which they replied that ‘there was no doubt that they would guard themselves well, so that no inconvenience would arise’, thereby brushing aside his offer.

The next year, Waléran III de Saint-Pol, the duke’s agent in Paris, incited the butchers of the city to rise up, prompting a crisis that required Jean to return.

Juvénal explains how the duke entered the city accompanied by English soldiers—always a sign of treason—and promptly purged the city of Armagnacs and their supporters, after which he began cleansing the Île-de-France of Armagnac holdouts.

But the crisis Jean had manufactured with the butchers in Paris soon became unmanageable, causing the dauphin Louis to recall the Armagnacs and initiate a short-lived truce between the two factions. This allowed the Capetians to present a united front against the English at Agincourt in 1415. Nevertheless, popular opinion for the Burgundians remained strong in Paris for the remainder of Charles VI’s reign. Juvénal states this outright when recounting the Burgundian takeover of 1418, reporting that ‘[i]t is believed that God still wanted to chastise the kingdom because…the Burgundians entered Paris, and it is known…that the duke of Burgundy had many supporters in Paris’. Indeed, according to the chronicler, Jean’s murder on the bridge outside Montereau on 10 September 1419 by agents of the Dauphin Charles (the

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22 ‘...aussi fit Orleans par le commandement du Roy...’. HCRF, 449-450.
23 See generally Sumption, IV:269-270.
24 ‘...et qu’il ne fist doute qu’ils se garderoient bien, tellement que aucun inconvenient n’en adviendroit’. HCRF, 455.
25 HCRF, 466-467. See CKS, IV:444, 446. See generally Schnerb, Jean, 534; Sumption, IV:276.
26 HCRF, 468, 471ff.
27 HCRF, 489, 490. The Parisians initially requested the Armagnacs to come because Jean had been unable to stabilise the city after the butchers revolted in the summer of 1413 and the Parisians wanted peace. Jean’s two brothers, Antoine de Brabant and Philippe de Nevers, had supported Jean steadfastly prior to 1413, but advocated peace from 1414. Indeed, Philippe cried for mercy from the king, ‘en lui requerant qu’il luy voulust pardonner de ce qu’il avoit esté devant Paris avec son frere: et luy fit plusieurs grandes promesses, tant de le servir, que autrement. De plus, il mit toutes ses terres en sa main et subjection, ce qui fit que le Roy et monseigneur de Guyenne, bien et douement luy pardonnerent’. HCRF, 499. Both brothers died at Agincourt fighting for the French. HCRF, 521, 524. See generally Burne, Agincourt, 86-87; Alfred Coville, Les Cabochiens et l’ordonnance de 1413 (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1888); Schnerb, Armagnacs, 141-168; Sumption, IV:332-365.
28 ‘Or est à croire, que Dieu voulust encoreans chastier ce royaume: car le dimanche huictiesme jour dudit mois, les Bourguignons entretenrent à Paris: et pour sçavoir la maniere, il est vray, comme dessus a esté touché, que le duc de Bourgogne avoit de grands fauteurs à Paris’. HCRF, 540. Blockmans and Prevenier, 43, argue that the Parisians only returned to Burgundian loyalty in 1418 after a joint publicity and military campaign convinced them of the merits of the Burgundian cause. See generally Barker, 19-20; Schnerb, Jean, 666-669.
future Charles VII) only encouraged those in Paris to support the Burgundians more vehemently, even to the point of ceding the kingdom to the English. Juvénal, therefore, uses the riotous and anti-Armagnac sentiment in Paris to undermine the legitimacy of Jean’s cause, leading to the duke’s characterisation as an instigator whose motivations remain uncertain and whose actions abused the inherent privileges of a Capetian agnate and undermined regnal authority within France.

In retaliation for his role in the treaty of Troyes in 1420, Jean’s son, Philippe III, is given very little narrative space by Juvénal. The treaty, in which the new duke facilitated the transfer of the kingdom of France to Henry V of England after the death of Charles VI, serves as the fulcrum upon which the portrayal of Philippe turns. While recounting the funeral of Charles VI, Juvénal condemns Philippe, repeating what ‘several men said between their teeth’:

And you, duke of Burgundy, who in his life put [the kingdom] into the hands of his enemies, you have sealed his illness such that he never could escape and you knew well of his death, even delaying the funeral procession so that you would be there, and even longer would have been expected if you had ordered it; and yet you did not come anyway to it, so that in his life and in his death, you abandoned him.

This is a damning statement by Juvénal on Philippe’s character that blames the duke more for the crimes of his father than his own. In Chartier’s chronicle, the duke only features once directly early in the narrative. At the treaty of Arras in 1435, which ended the Armagnac-Burgundian war, the duke was not present to sign the agreement and his personal acceptance of the treaty is only made clear later in the chronicle. Philippe was also absent when Charles VII named his newborn son after the duke of Burgundy in 1436, and the son’s death soon afterwards undermines the impact of this sign of reconciliation. The chronicler includes two instances where the duke participated in the French reconquest of English-held lands in France, but these are framed as isolated episodes occurring concurrent with but separate from

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30 HRCF, 555-557. Like Juvénal, Pintoin (and Chartier for the portion 1421-1422) focusses very little on Philippe III, and the duke’s role in crafting the treaty of Troyes is severely downplayed. The treaty, which Pintoin includes in full, is framed as an agreement between Henry V and Charles VI. CKS, VI:408-440. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 216.
31 ‘Et vous, duc de Bourgongne, qui en sa vie l’avez mis és mains de ses ennemis, vous avez sceu sa maladic telle qu’il n’en pouvoit eschapper, et scuestes bien sa mort, mesme delaya-on le convoy funebre en intention que y fussiez; et encorees est-on plus attendu si l’eussiez mandé; et toutesfois vous n’y vinstes aucune-ment: par ainsi en sa vie et en sa mort vous l’abandonnastes…’. HCRF, 568. See general, Conquest, 49.
32 Chartier, I:31.
33 Chartier, I:185, 189-204, 212. See generally Schnerb, Jean, 709.
Charles VII’s campaigns.\textsuperscript{35} Similarly, Chartier includes three episodes where Philippe dealt with affairs in his own lands, but again these are divorced from the rest of the storyline.\textsuperscript{36} The only time when the narratives collide is in 1456, when the future Louis XI fled into Burgundian lands to seek asylum from Philippe, which caused a new diplomatic rift to form between Charles and the duke.\textsuperscript{37} In the end, Chartier simply felt that Philippe distracted from the larger narrative of the reconquest of northern France. The author wrote his chronicle after the treaty of Arras and, although he lived for many years in occupied Saint-Denis, he clearly felt that the Burgundians were better left out of the story. For both chroniclers, Philippe is somewhat of an enigma after 1420. Juvénal disliked the duke on a fundamental level for his crimes against the kingdom and Chartier felt the man was inconsequential to his narrative. These attitudes caused the continuators to keep the narrative tightly focussed on other figures who worked toward restoring regnal authority to the king.

The Dionysian writers approached each duke of Burgundy differently in order to make specific points about Capetian dynasticism and regnal authority. With Philippe II, Juvénal framed the duke in generally positive terms by minimising his overall influence over Charles VI’s government and downplaying the severity of his feud with Louis d’Orléans. Thus, he serves as a positive promoter of regnal authority in the narrative. In contrast, Jean of Burgundy directly threatened the king’s powers and, therefore, Juvénal rebuked him, strategically using the repeated partisan uprisings in Paris as a narrative device to further highlight the duke’s transgressions. The chronicler leaves little doubt that his death in 1419 was warranted and that his actions subverted the authority of the king. Regarding Philippe III, Juvénal refused to see him as anything other than a traitor to the king and kingdom, while Chartier merely saw him as irrelevant to the overarching narrative. Considered together, the story of the Burgundians is of an ambitious family that usurped the powers of the king to promote their own dynastic interests. Their story serves as a moral message to readers that when cadets advance their own goals over dynastic unity and domestic stability, the result is division, civil war, and a diminished monarchy.

\textsuperscript{35} Chartier, I:242-243, 245. In contrast, Philippe de Never’s son Charles served as a French commander during Charles VII’s campaigns against the English in Normandy and Guyenne, and fought alongside other Capetian cadets throughout this period, although no important feats are attributed to him. Chartier, II:142-236, 306-323, III:2. See generally Favier, La guerre, 608; Van Kerrebrouck, III:402.

\textsuperscript{36} Chartier, I:248-249, II:324, III:80-89.

6.2 The House of Orléans and the Armagnacs

The princes of the house of Orléans are approached in a similar manner to their Burgundian relatives, but Juvénal erects entirely new characterisations for each prince. Louis d’Orléans is eased into the narrative, appearing first as simply the brother of Charles VI in 1380, becoming the count of Valois in 1382 and duke of Touraine in 1386, and only gaining the apanage of Orléans in 1392.38 Regarding this latter event, Juvénal, summarising Pintoin, explains that ‘those of Orléans were very discontented, saying that the King had promised them that he would never partition [the duchy] from the crown, for which they made a strong case, but ultimately the point was abandoned’.39 Thus, from his entry as duke, Louis is maligned by the chronicler. Over the subsequent sixteen years, Juvénal morphs the duke into an antagonist who used his position to steal from the government and usurp the king’s authority. By the time of Louis’s murder in 1407, France was a divided kingdom, split between the Burgundians and Louis’s followers.40 A cognate of the Capetians, Bernard VII d’Armagnac, father-in-law to the orphaned son of Louis, Charles d’Orléans, quickly established himself as leader over Louis’s party and for a decade worked to defeat the Burgundians and unite France against the English. With his death in the streets of Paris in 1418, the Armagnac party came to be led by the future Charles VII. Meanwhile, the second generation of Orléans princes quickly disappear from the story since Charles and his brother Jean d’Angoulême became English hostages and Philippe de Vertus, another brother, died prematurely. Juvénal and Chartier, therefore, were left with a quandary: how did these Capetian cadets fit within their overarching narrative of enhancing regnal authority in France? In the end, they decided to respond to this issue through three entirely different methods, all of which will be examined within this section.

It is clear early in his chronicle that Juvénal held a low opinion of Louis d’Orléans. Indeed, he repeatedly infers that Louis was responsible for Charles VI’s illness. Juvénal reports that, in 1392, Louis was dabbling in witchcraft.41 This angered one of his companions, Pierre de Craon, whom Louis expelled from his court in response.42 Pierre, rather than blaming

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40 See Figure 6.2.
41 HCRF, 388. See CKS, II:2. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 272-273, 301; Sumption, III:800.
42 Pintoin clarifies that Pierre was exiled from the royal court, not just the duke’s entourage, and that his goods were confiscated by the king. CKS, II:6. See generally Famiglietti, 2.
Figure 6.2 The Capetian House of Orléans and the House of Armagnac, 1319 – 1461

Jean I
Armagnac: 1319 – 1373

Jean II
Armagnac: 1373 – 1384
Jeanne (d. 1387)

Jean
Berry: 1360 – 1416

Charles V
France: 1364 – 1380
Isabelle (d. 1373)
Gian Galeazzo
Milan: 1385 – 1402

Bonne (d. 1435)

Jean III
Armagnac: 1384 – 1391
Bernard VII
Armagnac: 1391 – 1418
Bonne (d. 1435)

Louis I
Orléans: 1492 – 1407

Valentina (d. 1408)

Jean IV
Armagnac: 1418 – 1450
Jean V (d. 1477)
Armagnac: 1450 – 1473

Bonne (d. c1435)

Charles
Orléans: 1407 – 1465
Philippe
Vertus: 1407 – 1420

Jean
Angoulême: 1407 – 1467
Jean
Dunois: 1439 – 1468

Later Dukes of Orléans

Later Counts of Angoulême

Later Counts of Longueville

Bernard
La Marche: 1435 – 1462

Eleonore
La Marche: 1435 – 1463

Jacques (d. 1477)
Comte de Castres
[Later Jacques III]
Louis, attributed his exile to the constable of France, Olivier de Clisson, who was an advisor to Louis. Pierre fled to Brittany and Clisson convinced the king to pursue him, on which journey Charles fell ill for the first time.\(^43\) Although Juvénal never directly links the duke’s actions to the king’s illness, the correlation is obvious from the context. The chronicler also accuses Louis’s wife, Valentina Visconti, of sorcery. When the king in his delirium became infatuated with the duchess in 1393, Juvénal notes ‘one said and publicised that she had bewitched him, by means of her father, the duke of Milan, who was a Lombard, and that in his lands one did such things’.\(^44\) Nothing actually came of this implication. During an inquiry in 1397, several courtiers of the duke were interrogated, including the king’s barber, but the investigation proved fruitless and the courtiers were released.\(^45\) Nonetheless, the inclusion of these instances creates a negative image of the duke and his court within the chronicle. In a more general statement, Juvénal explains that Louis “governed himself as he pleased, taking young foreign women to himself”.\(^46\) The chronicler implies that this immaturity also led him to support the Avignon pope in the late 1390s, despite the fact that the government was moving toward reconciliation.\(^47\) His execution of a suspected necromancer and summoner in 1398 was viewed not as a pious act, but as a direct attack on Philippe II of Burgundy, whom the deceased had served.\(^48\) Juvénal reserves virtually no space in his chronicle for any positive or beneficial deeds of the duke, but rather paints a portrait of a reckless and manipulative agnate who desired to sow division rather than enhance regnal authority.

Throughout the Armagnac-Burgundian war, Louis is framed as the aggressor, moving against the government of Philippe II of Burgundy in 1402. Juvénal explains how, during a moment of lucidity, Charles VI appointed Louis his lieutenant, but one of the duke’s first actions was to levy a hefty tax, which prompted Philippe and Jean de Berry to petition the king for a reversal of the duke’s appointment, which the king granted, returning the government to

\(^{43}\) HCRF, 389. See CKS, II:16-22 (evens).
\(^{44}\) ‘…on disoit et publioient aucuns qu’elle l’avoit ensorcelé, par le moyen de son pere le duc de Milan, qui estoit Lombard, et qu’en son pays on usoit de telles choses’. HCRF, 494. Pintoin includes this rumour but discounts it outright, saying ‘non tamen dicam probabilent’. CKS, II:88. Valentina left the royal court in 1396, partially due to accusations such as these, and she did not return until 1408, after her husband’s death. Emily J. Hutchison, ‘The Politics of Grief in the Outbreak of Civil War in France, 1407-1413’, Speculum 91.2 (2016), 438. See generally Émile Collas, Valentine de Milan: Duchesse d’Orléans, second edition (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1911), 187-227; Famiglietti, 4, 209n26; Sumption, III:809.
\(^{45}\) HCRF, 412. Pintoin does not imply the barber is a partisan of Louis and only notes one member of the duke’s retinue who was arrested. CKS, II:544, 546.
\(^{46}\) ‘[Il] se gouvernoit aucunement trop à son plaisir, en faisant jeunesses estranges…’. HCRF, 392. Pintoin only alludes to these activities. CKS, II:72. See generally Sumption, III:800.
\(^{47}\) HCRF, 414, 420. See CKS, III:20, 22. See generally Famiglietti, 24, 26.
\(^{48}\) HCRF, 415. Pintoin does not mention this incident.
Philippe. Louis immediately retaliated by purchasing the duchy of Luxembourg, which was strategically located between the Burgundian Low Countries and Burgundy, thereby escalating the feud. Although courtiers were able to separate Louis and Philippe in 1403, sending each to separate sides of the realm, Louis returned in 1404, where ‘one said that [he] had broken the outside door where the treasure of the King was and that he took all that he could find there’. Thus, Juvénal characterises the duke as an enemy to public welfare. The next year, Louis attempted to seize Normandy but the people of Rouen resisted and Charles refused to grant his brother the duchy. Another attempt was made in 1406 to separate the quarrelling dukes—now Louis and Jean of Burgundy—but Louis returned to Paris at the beginning of the next year, having accomplished little. His reputation tarnished and his loyalty to the crown questionable within the context of the chronicle, Louis was ingloriously murdered at night by Burgundian assassins on the street outside the queen’s home, the Hôtel Barbette. In response, Jean successfully argued before the king ‘several cases of various types which one said were committed by the said duke d’Orléans, for which he sustained that one ought to hold him and repute him a tyrant’. This damning indictment of Louis is the most direct attack on the duke’s character in Juvénal’s text, but it comes only after his murder, suggesting that Juvénal wanted an active player—Jean of Burgundy in this case—to act as his mouthpiece against Louis. In a similar manner, Juvénal lists a number of advocates who came forward to defend Louis, which ultimately led to a formal condemnation of Jean of Burgundy by

49 HCRF, 421. See CKS, III:24-28, 34-36 (evens). Adams, ‘Christine de Pizan’, 10, states rather that Isabeau had been lieutenant for the king prior to 1402 and resumed that post after Louis was assassinated. See generally Famiglietti, 26.

50 HCRF, 421. See CKS, III:42, 44. Adams, Life and Afterlife, 13-14, writes that ‘the Duke d’Orléans constructed a checkered empire to counter Philip’s Burgundian territories. His strategy…was less to create a hegemony in the kingdom than to spread his power throughout, as moves like the 1402 acquisition of rights over Luxembourg, smack in the middle of Philip’s holdings suggest’.

51 ‘Et si disoit-on que le duc d’Orleans avoit esté rompre les huis où le tresor du Roy estoit, et qu’il prit tout ce qu’il y trouva’. HCRF, 426, 427. See CKS, III:140. Jarry, 306, argues that the villainisation of Louis in this episode is ‘probablement affaire aux calomnies intéressées, répandues par Jean-sans-Per…; ce duc de Bourgogne était capable d’aussi vils moyens, puisqu’il l’était de méditer un assassinat’.


55 ‘…alleguait plusieurs cas de diverses especes, qu’on disoit avoir esté commis par ledit duc d’Orléans, pour lesquels il soustenoit qu’on le devoit tenir et reputer tyran’. HCRF, 445. Juvénal heavily condenses Pintoin’s narrative here. Pintoin also recounts that Jean accused Louis of attempting to usurp the throne and called Louis a scoundrel and a profligate sinner. CKS, III:754. See generally Famiglietti, 67-68; Hutchison, 435-436.

56 Hutchison argues that Jean took this stance ‘[i]n order to retain his position of influence over the
the royal council. Despite this, though, Louis’s role in initiating the Armagnac-Burgundian war is undeniable within the narrative framework that Juvénal establishes. His portrayal is one of a greedy Capetian cadet willing to plunge the kingdom into civil war to pursue personal goals. He, therefore, represents the fundamental threat that an overly-powerful apanagist could pose to domestic stability and regnal authority.

The death of Louis d’Orléans in 1407 shifted the nature of the late duke’s movement. No longer would a Capetian agnate oversee the party; rather, it would be led by a close relative, Bernard VII, count d’Armagnac, after whom the entire group would be named. Bernard is first introduced in Juvénal’s chronicle in 1405 as the husband of Bonne, daughter of Jean de Berry. Thus, his Capetian credentials are immediately established. In that year, Bernard ‘made strong war against the English [and] conquered about sixty places [in Guyenne]…and did great damage to the English’, eventually pushing into the Bordelais, the heartland of Plantagenet Guyenne. The count does not, therefore, enter the story as a follower of Louis, but as a Capetian warrior willing to attack the English in their undefended flank. Juvénal delays associating Bernard with either movement until the alliance of Gien in 1410, when the count formally joined the dukes of Orléans, Berry, Bourbon, and Brittany, and the counts of Alençon and Clermont—all Capetian agnates—in an alliance against Jean of Burgundy.

Both Juvénal and Pintoin neglect to include the marriage alliance that was established here between Bernard’s daughter Bonne and Charles d’Orléans, but Juvénal does note the next year that ‘because the count d’Armagnac was with the duke d’Orléans, one named those who held to his party Armagnacs’. Until his death, Bernard and the movement named after him merge

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57 HCRF, 447-448. In Pintoin’s chronicle, Jean Juvénal des Ursin’s father was responsible for delivering the rebuttal to Jean of Burgundy’s statements and much more space is given to this rebuttal than to Jean’s accusation. CKS, IV:90-128 (evens). Jean [I] Juvénal served as Louis d’Orléans lawyer in parlement from 1398 and continued in that capacity for Louis’s family. Louis Batiffol, Jean Jouvenel, prévôt des marchands de la ville de Paris (1360-1431) (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1884), 129, 151, 180.

58 HCRF, 434. See CKS, III:354. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 539.


60 HCRF, 452. The members of this alliance were condemned by the king as traitors on 3 October 1411. This condemnation also listed Charles d’Orléans’ brothers, Philippe de Vertus and Jean d’Angoulême. Jean de Berry and Charles d’Eu were originally members of the alliance, but were not condemned alongside their confederates. For the original condemnation, see ‘Letters par lesquelles Charles VI. declare les Ducs d’Orléans [etc.] coupables de rebellion…’, in Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre chronologique, vol. IX, ed. Louis-Guillaume de Vilevault (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1775), 635. See CKS, IV:316. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 506; Famiglietti, 88.

61 ‘Et pource que le comte d’Armagnac estoit avec le duc d’Orléans, on mit nom à ceux qui tenoient son party, Armagnacs’. HCRF, 467. Pintoin uses the name ‘Armagnacs’ but does not explain its origin. See CKS, IV:442. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 26; Famiglietti, 88.
together in the narrative, thereby supporting the idea that Bernard was considered a full member of the Capetian dynasty by Juvénal. Within the chronicle, the count is rarely separated from the other party leaders—Charles d’Orléans, Jean I de Bourbon, Jean I d’Alençon, and Charles d’Albret—but after Agincourt, where all four of his associates were either captured or killed, Bernard became sole leader of the party. Promoted to the constableship in late 1415, Bernard was powerless to halt the advance of the English and Burgundians into the Île-de-France. He eventually died as a martyr to his cause when a Burgundian mob in the streets of Paris murdered him in May 1418. From his introduction in the chronicle until his death, Bernard is shown championing the cause of the house of Orléans so much that the chronicler accepts him as a member of the family, but none of the stain of Louis d’Orléans’s reputation appears in his depiction, suggesting that Bernard represented something different to Juvénal: a bulwark against the Anglo-Burgundian tide and a champion of the king’s authority.

Although the Armagnac movement ultimately triumphed due to the treaty of Arras with the Burgundians in 1435 and the victory of Charles VII over the English in 1453, the cadet line that founded the party disappears into obscurity in Chartier’s narrative. According to Juvénal, Charles d’Orléans only briefly took over his father’s movement, and his capture at Agincourt severely reduces his importance to the vernacular narrative. Juvénal continues to mention the duke until his capture, but he is usually portrayed as just another cadet in the company of more important Armagnacs. In the few instances where he does act independently, he is seeking justice for the murder of his father, such as in 1408, when he and his mother petitioned the king to condemn Jean of Burgundy, which led to a formal declaration against the duke. Juvénal also includes verbatim a letter that the duke and his brothers wrote to the towns of France in 1411, in which he insists that they rise up against Jean in retaliation for the murder of his father. But when depicting the creation of the Gien confederacy in

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62 HCRF, 468. Bernard escaped the carnage since he was in the south at the time, negotiating a truce with the count of Foix. Burne, *Agincourt*, 100; HCRF, 507. Pintoin does not mention Bernard’s absence. See generally Autrand, *Charles VI*, 535; Burne, *Agincourt*, 87.


64 HCRF, 541. See CKS, VI:234. See generally Adams, *Life and Afterlife*, 203-204.

65 HCRF, 448-449, 455, 467-468. Pintoin downplays Charles d’Orléans role even more substantially than does Juvénal. Cf. CKS, IV:90-140 (evens). See CKS, IV:184, 190-202 (evens).


67 HCRF, 456-465. See CKS, IV:418-438 (evens). Jean countered this letter with one of his own, in which he called the Armagnacs traitors. See generally Famiglietti, 95-96.
1410, Juvénal credits Jean de Berry for uniting the Capetian cadets, not Charles or even Bernard.\textsuperscript{68} With his capture in 1415, Charles almost entirely disappears from the Dionysian vernacular tradition.\textsuperscript{69} Chartier mentions him only three times: in 1440 when he was released and married to a niece of Philippe III of Burgundy, in 1457 at a royal function, and in 1461 in the funeral procession of Charles VII.\textsuperscript{70} Equally useless to the overarching narrative are Charles’s brothers, Jean d’Angoulême and Philippe de Vertus. Juvénal explains that, while still a child, Jean was handed over to the English in 1412 as a hostage to ensure the payment of a bribe to the Lancastrian duke of Clarence.\textsuperscript{71} The count was not released until 1445.\textsuperscript{72} Chartier later notes that he participated in the campaigns of 1449 to 1453, and attended the function in 1457 and Charles VII’s funeral.\textsuperscript{73} Philippe was even less fortunate. The chronicler describes how he became a royal lieutenant after Agincourt and led a successful siege against Parthenay in 1419, for which ‘all the counties of Poitou, Berry, and Aunis were put into the obedience of [the Dauphin Charles]’.\textsuperscript{74} This cleared the area south of the Loire from Anglo-Burgundian strongholds and allowed Charles to establish his court-in-exile, but Philippe never saw this.\textsuperscript{75} The count of Vertus died suddenly in 1420 from an unknown illness, a fact Juvénal neglects to include in his chronicle.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, the Dionysian chroniclers mostly abandoned the second generation of Orléans cadets to focus on other, more useful members of the Capetian dynasty. The long captivities of Charles and Jean made them largely irrelevant to the primary story, and their return in the 1440s did not herald any change in fortune for the dynasty. In the opinions of the chroniclers, the Orléans princes simply did not impact regnal authority in any significant way, positive or negative, making them didactically useless to the overall story.

When reading the later Dionysian chronicles, one must constantly remember that both Juvénal and Chartier wrote their texts decades after the events described. Their chronological vantage point proved very important to how they chose to portray the Orléans princes. Thus, Juvénal felt comfortable placing the blame for the Armagnac-Burgundian war squarely at the
duke’s feet. In contrast, Bernard VII d’Armagnac loyally served the king before and throughout his tenure as leader of his namesake party. The fact that his movement ultimately merged with that of the king’s afforded his reputation some protection, but Juvénal may have personally remembered Bernard from his youth and felt that the Armagnac count deserved the positive portrayal he received in his chronicle. In contrast, neither Juvénal nor Chartier likely knew the second generation of Orléans princes at all. Charles d’Orléans was largely distrusted by Charles VII, so Chartier ostracised him from his chronicle. Jean d’Angoulême served in the army during the period of conquest from the English, and the chronicler says as much, but such was the duty of all Capetian cadets and nothing the count did made him especially noteworthy when compared to his companions. Therefore, within the Dionysian chronicles, each Orléans prince is villainised, praised, or ignored in direct relation to their contributions in advancing regnal authority within France.

6.3 Those Left Behind

Stuck between the two extremes of Burgundians and Armagnacs were dozens of Capetian cadets and other prominent nobles who were forced to take sides in the conflict. Among all of them, Juvénal emphasises the roles of several immediate members of the royal family. First among this group is Jean de Berry, a paternal uncle of Charles VI, who began as a staunch Burgundian but switched sides once it became clear that Jean of Burgundy had lost the moral high ground. Similarly shifting in her allegiance was Isabeau of Bavaria, Charles’s wife, who began as an Armagnac but ultimately defected to the Burgundians. However, it is the sons of Charles who truly represent the problems with governing France at this time, with three of the sons serving as rallying points for various factions in the ongoing civil war. This section will analyse how Juvénal portrays these Capetian family members as they attempted to restore regnal authority and explore why he believed the king’s youngest surviving son, the future Charles VII, succeeded where the other members of the family failed.

The characterisation of Jean de Berry is ever-changing in the Dionysian vernacular continuations. Orgemont says little of the duke throughout his chronicle and Juvénal spares few words for the man during the minority of Charles VI. Thus, it is only with the onset of Charles VI’s illness in 1392 that Jean’s role within the story begins to emerge. Throughout the first decade of the king’s infirmity, Jean appears regularly as a proponent for peace with

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77 See generally Barker, 295-296; Demurger, Temps, 184-185.
78 See Chapter 5.3.
79 HCRF, 389.
England and for the union of the Church, often alongside his brother Philippe.\(^80\) However, Juvénal frames all these activities as directed by the king, which deprives Jean of any actual influence over them. Jean is also nearly always accompanied by other Capetian cadets, making his specific contribution to anything less certain. Only on four occasions between 1392 and 1402 does Jean appear as an independent agent within the chronicle. When John of Gaunt died in 1399 and his ambitious son Henry resided at the French court, Jean ‘strongly comforted him and appeased him as much as he could’.\(^81\) But Juvénal uses this episode to contrast him with Louis d’Orléans, whom the chronicler implies influenced Henry to depose Richard II.\(^82\) The scene does establish Jean’s compassionate side, but Juvénal counters this with another episode in 1400, when the duke discovered his cousin Louis d’Étampes dead at his dinner table. In this situation, Jean laughed, thinking Louis was simply asleep, suggesting the duke was somewhat absentminded.\(^83\) In the other two instances, Juvénal showcases Jean’s religiosity. In 1393, the duke purchased the head of Saint Hilarius, which he gave to the saint’s church in Poitiers, and in 1400, he gifted to Saint-Denis bones of Saint Benedict, founder of the abbey’s order.\(^84\) All considered, these examples from Juvénal suggest that Jean before 1402 was a generally average duke whose actions were unremarkable and largely unimportant to the Dionysian vernacular narrative.

Once the rivalry between Philippe of Burgundy and Louis d’Orléans began in earnest, Jean de Berry becomes an important medium in Juvénal’s chronicle through whom the audience can relate. Juvénal demonstrates that the duke operated as a Burgundian for the first five years of the feud. He supported Philippe against Louis in 1402 and aided Jean of Burgundy in his attempt to reform the government in 1405.\(^85\) But the narrative makes it clear that the duke shifted his perceptions after Louis’s assassination in 1407. According to Juvénal, the crime was committed the evening after a truce was agreed between Louis and Jean of Burgundy that Jean de Berry had facilitated.\(^86\) Thus, it is framed as a personal betrayal of Jean de Berry by


\(^{81}\) ‘Dont monseigneur de Berry fort le confortoit, et l’appaisoit le plus qu’il pouvoit’. HCRF, 415. See CKS, II:676. See generally Sumption, III:854.

\(^{82}\) HCRF, 417-418. See CKS, II:700, 702. See generally Lehoux, II:417; Sumption, III:857.

\(^{83}\) HCRF, 418. Pintoin does not include these details in his account. CKS, II:750. See generally Van Kerrebroeck, I:179.

\(^{84}\) HCRF, 396, 420. See CKS, II:116-118, 780-782 (evens).


\(^{86}\) HCRF, 444-445. Pintoin states, rather, that no reconciliation could be found between the two dukes. CKS, III:732. For more on the murder and its immediate repercussions, see Bernard Guenée, Un meurtre, une société: L’assassinat du duc d’Orléans, 23 novembre 1407, Bibliothèque des histoires (Paris: Gallimard, 1992). The reconciliation was on 20 November, three days before the murder. Schnerb, Armagnacs, 70.
Jean of Burgundy. From this point until his death in 1416, Jean de Berry remains an Armagnac within Juvénal’s narrative. Indeed, Juvénal directly associates Jean with the founding of the Armagnac party in 1410, an alliance that cost the duke virtually everything. Increasing pressure by the Burgundians on his territorial holdings forced Jean to capitulate in 1412. Embracing Jean of Burgundy after years of feuding, Jean de Berry said to his nephew: ‘I did wrong and you still worse. Let us make an effort to return the kingdom to peace and tranquility’.

But Juvénal does not focus on the benefits of the Burgundians; rather, he explains in vivid detail through a long narrative—supplemented by his and his father’s experiences at the time—how the butchers of Paris rose up and took over the city. Eventually, the trapped Capetians in the city called for help from the Armagnacs, who captured the city and violently suppressed the revolt. After the takeover, Jean was left in charge of the government of France, alongside his nephew Louis II d’Anjou. Because of his advanced age and his position, the duke of Berry avoided the disastrous battle at Agincourt, but he soon found himself trapped in Paris and surrounded by Burgundians. In 1416, shortly before but unrelated to his death, a member of a hit squad was captured in Paris and claimed that ‘they had the intention of killing the king of Sicily [Louis II d’Anjou], the duke of Berry, and those who one suspected to be or have been of the party of the duke d’Orléans’. Thus, Jean’s affiliation with the Armagnacs undermined his authority and this episode demonstrates how the balance between the two factions in Paris shifted again following Agincourt. In the end, Juvénal laments Jean’s death, stating it ‘was a great shame for the kingdom, because he had been in his time a determined (valiant) and honourable prince. And…he feasted very willingly with foreigners.

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88 HCRF, 452-455. According to Juvénal, the Burgundians had Jean excommunicated, confiscated his goods, and revoked his lieutenancy over Languedoc. HCRF, 467, 470, 472. Juvénal implies Jean had held Languedoc since at least 1380, although he notes that the duke encountered resistance from the populace who disliked his ‘merveilleuses exactions’. HCRF, 378, 380. Pintoin, however, explains that Jean lost his lieutenancy in 1389. CKS, I:646. Pintoin does not list Jean among those excommunicated in 1410. Cf. CKS, IV:550. See also CKS, IV:316-320, 324-326, 532-552 (events). See generally Lehoux, III:166-170, 247.
89 Famiglietti, 104-108, explains that Jean de Berry was negotiating an Armagnac alliance with the English, which caused the Burgundian government to turn all their military might on his lands in Berry.
93 HCRF, 497. See CKS, V:284. See generally Lehoux, III:351; Rohr, 82.
95 ‘…ils avoient intention de tuer le roy de Sicile, le duc de Berry, et ceux qu’on soupçonnait estre ou avoir esté du party du duc d’Orléans’. HCRF, 531-532. Pintoin states rather that the conspirators intended to kill the king. CKS, VI:6. Coincidentally, the leader of this subterfuge was Nicholas d’Orgemont, second son of the chronicler Pierre d’Orgemont. See generally Lehoux, III:402-403.
and gave of himself generously’. 96 This statement summarises Jean’s role in the narrative well. Through many examples, Juvénal demonstrates how Jean was never arbitrary and always did what to him was right. Furthermore, the duke was charitable to the Church and mediated between the factions. In the end, his selfless devotion to peace and dynastic unity helped advance domestic stability, which was a prerequisite toward strengthening regnal authority within France.

When compared to the kings and agnates of the Capetian dynasty, the queens of France are rarely emphasised by the Dionysian writers. Thus, the mere presence of Isabeau of Bavaria in large portions of the narrative suggests that she serves an important role in the narrative. However, her characterisation in Juvénal’s chronicle is almost entirely negative. The chronicler sets the foundations for this early, linking the queen’s lavishly-described coronation in 1389 to increased taxation and claiming that the accompanying jousts ‘had come from dishonest things in the matter of love, from which many evils have come’. 97 Criticising Isabeau seems to come as second nature to Juvénal and from 1405 he repeatedly associates her with Louis d’Orléans, a man whom he regularly villainises. 98 The chronicler recounts that the queen attended a sermon and the preacher ‘began to accuse the Queen in her presence, discussing the exactions that she demanded of the people and the excessive state that she and her women held themselves’. 99 Twice Juvénal attributes uncanny weather phenomena to Isabeau—once in 1401 and again in 1405—and in the second event, he adds that ‘several notable men and Catholics’ thought ‘it was a divine example, and divine punishment’, for not withdrawing the extraordinary taxes Louis and Isabeau were levying. 100 When the anti-Burgundian leadership chose her as council chair in 1408, ‘it was advised that it was the least bad option for the Queen to preside over the council and have the government’. 101 From 1413, the

98 HCRF, 432-437. See CKS, III:266.
99 ‘Lequel commença à blasmer la Reyne en sa presence, en parlant des exactions qu’on faisait sur la peuple, et des excessifs estats qu’elle et ses femmes avoient et tenoient…’ HCRF, 434. See CKS, III:268, 270. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 135-137; Famiglietti, 41-42.
100 ‘Et y eut aucunes gens notables, et catholiques, qui advertirent la Reyne et le duc d’Orléans, que c’estoit exemple divin, et punition divine…’. HCRF, 420, 435. See CKS, III:6, 282, 284. See generally Famiglietti, 39.
101 ‘Et fut advisé que c’estoit le moins mal que la Reyne presidast en council, et eust le gouvernment…’. HCRF, 447. Pintoin notes that Isabeau and Louis de Guyenne controlled the government jointly at this time, but he makes no comment upon her qualifications. CKS, IV:90. Pintoin notes that Jean Juvénal was responsible for
queen’s servants became the target of the chronicler’s vitriol. Juvénal recounts a conversation between a Carmelite and the royal family where the monk called the queen’s brother, courtiers, and ladies-in-waiting ‘weeds’ that needed to be removed from the proverbial garden of the French court. Similarly, in 1417, Juvénal writes that ‘in the hotel of the Queen, several dishonest things were done…. And whatever war, storms, and tribulations there were, the ladies and damsels led great and excessive estates, and wore marvellous horned hats, tall and broad’. For her largesse, Isabeau was exiled from Paris and her household income and personnel were reduced by the Armagnacs. This pushed her into the Burgundian camp, and Juvénal depicts her almost continuously alongside Jean of Burgundy from 1417. Throughout 1419, the queen is portrayed as the chief agitator for peace with the English, even agreeing to the marriage of her youngest daughter, Catherine, to Henry V, but after Jean’s assassination that year, she completely disappears from the narrative. Her only mention by Chartier, the final Dionysian chronicler, is at the time of her death in 1435. Chartier does not blame Isabeau for the part she played in the Anglo-Burgundian takeover of northern France and even suggests that the queen was tricked by the English and her reputation blackened by Henry’s rhetoric after the treaty of Troyes. Nevertheless, the overwhelming perception within Juvénal’s narrative is that Isabeau of Bavaria was a malevolent force in France—a person who repeatedly aligned herself with the wrong faction and sacrificed her husband, and therefore regnal authority, to ensure her own safety and security. Within this context, Chartier’s final words regarding the queen suggest that all her plotting failed to deliver to her the tranquillity she so long desired. Her life serves as an important lesson within the Dionysian vernacular tradition that true peace can only be ensured when regnal authority is embodied by the rightful king of

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See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 244-245.

See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 32, 201; Gibbons, ‘Isabeau—Queenship’, 154.

HCRF, 533, 537. See CKS, VI:72, 76, 140. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 32, 201; Gibbons, ‘Isabeau—Queenship’, 154.


HCRF, 549. Pintoin states in a rubric that Isabeau is involved, but the queen does not appear in the negotiations and her role in general is substantially reduced in the text. CKS, VI:208ff.

Chartier, 1:208-212. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 36; Famiglietti, 44; Gibbons, ‘Isabeau—Creation’, 68.
France.

It is within this same mindset that Juvénal approaches the narratives of the many sons of Charles VI and Isabeau. Between 1223 and 1380, only twice did a French heir predecease his father, yet nowhere else in the entire history of France did a king outlive four sons. Of the first two sons, both named Charles, nothing needs to be said except that they died young. The third son, Louis de Guyenne, survived until almost the age of nineteen and became a nexus point for both factions during the Armagnac-Burgundian war, epitomised by the fact that he was named after his uncle, Louis d’Orléans, and married to a daughter of Jean of Burgundy. However, in most of Juvénal’s narrative, Louis is little more than a puppet for whichever party controlled Paris, a fact referenced explicitly in 1405 when ‘it was decided and concluded…that the Dauphin would have the government. But some said that the provision was not sufficient because, in effect, the duke of Burgundy would have it’. When Louis was appointed regent in 1408, he was too young to rule, prompting the nomination of his mother as head of government. Even once he began ruling in 1413, Juvénal largely deprives him of any independence. The two actions the chronicler directly attributes to him both occurred when the prince was trapped in Paris during the violent revolt that year. At that time, the dauphin led an expedition to free his imprisoned uncle and a cousin from the Louvre. Louis also called for help from the Armagnacs, undermining Jean of Burgundy’s authority in the city and forcing the duke to flee. Yet the success of the Armagnacs pushes Louis to the background of Juvénal’s narrative. Throughout 1414 and 1415, he is found with close members of his family and Juvénal attributes no part of the ongoing negotiations with England or the Burgundians to Louis’s influence. The dauphin also avoids participating in the tragedy at Agincourt. Even Louis’s death comes not through his own actions, but through his

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111 ‘…il fut ordonné et conclu le septiesme jour de novembre que monseigneur le Dauphin auroit le gouvernement. Mais aucuns disoient que la provisio n’estoit pas suffisante, pource qu’en effect le duc de Bour- gongne l’auroit…’. HCRF, 437. See generally Sumption, IV:173-175.


113 HCRF, 488. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 141.

114 HCRF, 486, 490-496. See CKS, V:70, 80, 82. See generally Sumption, IV:355.

115 HCRF, 496, 497, 502, 504. Juvénal attributes the negotiations to Charles VI himself, while Pintoin gives more credit to the Capetian agnates, including Louis. Cf. CKS, V:296ff.

116 HCRF, 520. See generally Sumption, IV:448, 461, 468-470.
mother’s: in December 1415, Louis visited Isabeau, who was sick, and he caught her illness, which led to his death two weeks later. Juvénal does not lament Louis’s passing and immediately moves on with the narrative. Similarly, the fourth dauphin, Jean de Touraine, only appears twice in Juvénal’s text. In the first instance, he is depicted as a Burgundian, and in the second, he dies while en route to Paris to assume the government in 1417. Implicitly referencing this dauphin’s inability to rule on his own initiative, Juvénal laments not his death, but the fact that ‘the count of Hainaut [Jean’s father-in-law] was a wise lord who intended to find means to a good peace with the duke of Burgundy’. Thus, Jean’s passing imperilled domestic stability since it deprived the kingdom of Guillaume II of Hainaut’s wisdom. Within the context of the Dionysian continuations, all that can be said about Louis and Jean is that they represented the potential of regnal authority. However, their relative ineffectiveness, emphasised by Juvénal’s lack of interest in either prince, suggests that both failed to actually advance regnal authority and contributed little to supporting the overarching themes of the chronicles.

In contrast, Juvénal describes the future Charles VII immediately after becoming heir as a boy of ‘good sense and understanding’, with a chancellor who is ‘a very prudent and wise cleric’. His portrayal of Charles here and afterwards is significantly more nuanced than Pintoin’s, reflecting the fact that Pintoin died in 1421, before the dauphin became king. After the Burgundian capture of Paris in 1418, Charles emerges in Juvénal’s text as a warrior prince, a man determined to reassert regnal authority in the Capetian heartland. To announce this ostentatious goal, Charles declared himself regent, and Juvénal uses this titulary for the remainder of his chronicle.

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117 HCRF, 525-526. Pintoin does not imply any connection between Louis’s death and his mother’s illness. CKS, V:586. Sumption, IV:471, rather, suggests Louis contracted dysentery while returning from Rouen with his troops.

118 See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 196-197.

119 HCRF, 525, 532. See CKS, VI:58, 60. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 172-173; Sumption, IV:508-512.

120 ‘…car le comte de Hainaut estoit bien sage seigneur, lequel avoit intention que par son bon moyen paix se trouveroit avec le duc de Bourgongne’. HCRF, 532. Pintoin only notes the medical reasons for his death. Cf. CKS, VI:58, 60. Jean had married Jacqueline, daughter of Guillaume II d’Hainaut, in 1406. Famiglietti, 55. Adams, Life and Afterlife, 31, notes that Jean’s ‘family status as son-in-law of William Count of Hainaut-Holland would seem to incline him to favor the Burgundians, but the Count of Hainaut-Holland initially refused to send his son-in-law to Paris, cautiously biding his time to see what would happen’.

121 HCRF, 532. See generally Vale, Charles VII, 21.

122 HCRF, 544-545. Adams, Life and Afterlife, 34, writes that ‘the dauphin Charles had assumed the leadership of the Armagnacs with the slaying of Bernard d’Armagnac] in May. As a faction leader, he participated directly in the feud, and, like the Armagnacs, he refused to negotiate with Jean [of Burgundy]. In this way, he was different from his brother Louis of Guyenne, who had distinguished himself from the factions, regarding his own role as mediatory, his goal as the restoration of peace’.

123 HCRF, 547ff. Pintoin only names Charles regent later as a contrast to Philippe III of Burgundy, who
south of the Loire for the Armagnacs, setting a territorial status quo that would barely shift until 1429. Juvénal directly calls Charles an Armagnac during the Anglo-Burgundian negotiations that began in 1419; however, the dauphin is nonetheless portrayed as conciliatory, whereas Jean of Burgundy and Isabeau ‘had no intention to hear any treaty with monseigneur the Regent’. In this context, the murder of Jean by Charles shortly afterwards seems counter to the dauphin’s intentions. Throughout the ensuing narrative, Juvénal deflects the blame from Charles and shows that the dauphin did not personally kill anybody but that his actions were rightly done. The chronicler even references a letter Charles wrote to the Parisians that explains why Jean was killed, although neither the Parisians nor Burgundians were swayed by his arguments. Over the subsequent three years in the narrative, Charles is shown to have expanded his authority over Languedoc and secured his position against the Anglo-Burgundians, but he lost control of the north. For this reason, Juvénal directly attacks the provisions of the treaty of Troyes and boldly proclaims that, ‘as it well belonged to him, [Charles] named himself and became king of France, so he was without doubt’. Juvénal clearly supports Charles’s cause, and the chronicler’s optimistic conclusion reflects his foreknowledge that Charles would, indeed, overcome the obstacles before him to become the unifying king France so desperately needed. Of the five dauphins in Juvénal’s text, only Charles effectively advanced regnal authority.

By ending with Charles VII, Juvénal provided his long, tragic narrative of dynastic civil war and foreign invasion with a glimmer of hope, albeit one that would be realised outside his authorial control. However, the other members of the immediate royal family did not contrib-

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124 HCRF, 547-548. Lacking hindsight, Pintoin does not mention this battle. See generally Sumption, IV:616.
125 ‘…ne faisoient aucun semblant d’entendre à aucun traité avec monseigneur le Regent…’. HCRF, 549. Pintoin also names Charles’s followers Armagnacs, but blames the dauphin’s bad councillors for the troubled negotiations and mournfully states that ‘circumspeci viri sumperunt evidens argumentum quod promissa que tam diu adimplere ex cordiali affectu processerant, nec sperabant quod pax inde sollida posset sequi’. CKS, VI:316, 328-348 (evens). See generally Famiglietti, 189-190.
127 HCRF, 554-555. Pintoin does not include or reference the letter Charles sent to the Parisians. See generally Famiglietti, 192; Vale, Charles VII, 31.
129 ‘…comme il lui appartenoit bien, se nomma et porta roy de France: aussi l’estoit-il sans nul doute’. HCRF, 569. Chartier, who wrote the conclusion to Pintoin’s text, alludes to the long war Charles would fight throughout his life against the Burgundians and English, but the chronicler does not name Charles king in 1422, perhaps saving that title for his coronation in 1429. CKS, VI:496. See generally Barker, 61.
ute anything substantial to create this positive message. The earlier dauphins collectively represent lost opportunities in the narrative, with their actions rarely strengthening the French kingship or stabilising the realm. Likewise, Jean de Berry, long a mediating voice in the kingdom, was unable to repair the divisions between the two sides in the conflict, and his death essentially ended any chance of the Armagnacs reconciling with the Burgundians after Agincourt. Isabeau of Bavaria, meanwhile, represented an inverse reflection of Jean in the chronicles. Her dalliance with Louis d’Orléans and defection to the Burgundians established her as an untrustworthy Capetian, someone who embodied all the problems that perpetuated the Armagnac-Burgundian feud. Thus, among these many royals, only Charles would ultimately unite the kingdom, albeit decades afterwards. A reader of Juvénal’s text is only left with the knowledge that France was divided at the time of Charles VI’s death, and that regnal authority was dispersed among the English, Burgundians, and the disinherited Dauphin Charles. Those most capable of healing the wounds of division became victims of that division, shifting allegiances when necessary but rarely doing anything that benefited the kingdom. The final message in the chronicle, therefore, is that the person most capable of embodying regnal authority other than the king himself is the future king, a conclusion that could only be made in hindsight. The duty of all other relatives, be they dauphin, uncle, or queen, is to support the king so that regnal authority can be restored.

At its core, Juvénal’s narrative of the reign of Charles VI is a lesson in greed and hubris. Greed for political power consumed Philippe II of Burgundy, causing him to seize the government following the onset of the king’s illness in 1392. Hubris overwhelmed his son, Jean, who took every opportunity to seize authority in the kingdom, depriving those who undeniably had a better claim. Greed also attracted Louis d’Orléans, who fought long and hard for land and power, but failed and, for his ambitions, was assassinated in 1407. Hubris subsequently encouraged his followers, the Armagnacs, to inflate the family feud into a full-fledged civil war. Juvénal makes it clear that everyone in the family, including Jean de Berry, Isabeau, and the later three dauphins, played a part in the ongoing political nightmare, and none was completely innocent in perpetuating the chaos. The only true victim was the weary king Charles, whose inherent regnal authority was seen by all as the golden goose, who, if possessed, would

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130 *HCRF*, 557. See generally Barker, xviii, 29.
give them all that they desired and allow them to impose their visions of peace on the realm. Yet the chronicler proves that the king’s peace, established by the treaty of Troyes, did not pacify the realm, but rather elevated the domestic conflict into a resumption of the Anglo-French war. Only the future Charles VII contributed to the end of this conflict, and this in itself is an important didactic message for the reader. In many ways, it is difficult to view Juvénal’s chronicle as a miroir des princes. The moral messages are less clear, the characterisations of individuals are more nebulous, and the general mood less hopeful than in earlier continuations. But one of the primary themes that comes out of this chronicle is the potential pitfalls inherent in the unrestricted promotion of dynasticism. Orgémont hinted at this throughout his chronicle, but Juvénal’s narrative provides the convincing argument that traditional dynasticism in France died as a result of the Armagnac-Burgundian war. It becomes clear by the end of Juvénal’s text that traditional forms of dynasticism cannot resolve dynastic crises—only the king or a future king can be trusted to end these types of conflicts. This largely agrees with Orgemont’s portrayal of the future Charles V, who is shown embodying his father’s regnal powers while dauphin. But unlike Orgemont, Juvénal attacks the problem of dynasticism directly and demonstrates through his narrative and his portrayals of the royal family what happens when cadets are left in charge of France. The result of their meddling is a splintered kingdom that is forced to await a new generation of cadets who are willing to sacrifice their own personal glory in order to finally restore due authority to the king.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Reimagining the Capetian Dynasty

By the middle of the fifteenth century, Capetian ancestry was ubiquitous among the French nobility. The plethora of descendants left by Louis VIII, Louis IX, and Jean II contributed the most to this dispersion, although most Capetian kings were responsible for at least some secondary progeny. Increasingly, the Dionysian vernacular continuators, especially Jean Juvénal des Ursins and Jean Chartier, expanded their lists of royal kin to include major French lords and their families, who had never before been considered a part of the Capetian dynasty and lacked the prerequisite agnatic or legitimate descent. Foremost among these individuals were the Montforts, true-born agnates of the dynasty whom the Dionysian continuators felt compelled to marginalize until the 1430s, when members of the family finally began to support the regnal authority of the Valois kings. Similarly, numerous bastards of royal ancestry, long ignored by previous chroniclers, suddenly appear within Capetian ranks as key agents of Valois regnal empowerment. The most marked change, however, related to the French nobility after the battle of Agincourt in 1415. Juvénal and Chartier highlight numerous Capetian cognatic families who stepped into the void left by those killed and captured at the battle, including members of the houses of Armagnac, Albret, Harcourt, Foix, and Ligny. Although the status of Capetians of agnatic descent was rarely discounted by the continuators, those of cognatic or illegitimate origins had rarely before been considered royalty and their sudden inclusion suggests a change in attitude prompted by the Armagnac-Burgundian and the Anglo-French wars. This chapter will examine the didactic examples these individuals contribute to the Dionysian vernacular narratives and the ways in which their unprecedented inclusion reinforced an overarching message of regnal empowerment.

7.1 Redeeming the Capetians of Brittany

Within the vernacular tradition, members of the house of Dreux always struggled for recognition as Capetian cadets. Primat and Guillaume de Nangis barely hinted at a relationship between the Breton rulers and the other Capetians in their continuations, and Richard Lescot followed in that vein, maligning the Montfort dukes as they attempted to seize the ducal throne from the Penthièvre family beginning in 1341.1 The primary stumbling blocks toward reconciliation were the close familial relationship of the Penthièvres to the Valois and

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1 GCF, IX:217-220. See Lescot, 54-56. For a discussion of the history of the Capetian house of Dreux before 1399, see Chapter 4.1.
the French government’s acceptance of Charles de Blois as duke. Even after the death of Charles and the treaty of Guérande in the mid-1360s, Montfort-Penthièvre tensions remained an obstacle to a Valois-Montfort reconciliation. Thus, it was only through the evolving situation caused by the Armagnac-Burgundian crisis and the resulting Anglo-French war that the Montforts were able to restructure their relationship with the French monarchy and be accepted back into the Capetian fold. According to Chartier, the primary agent of this change was Arthur de Richemont, who fought for Charles VII continuously from 1424. But most of the family contributed to the French victory in the war against the English. Chartier uses the Montforts as examples for how wayward cadets can restore their status within the Capetian dynasty. This section will analyse the ways in which these examples are expressed and how they strengthen the chroniclers’ message of regnal supremacy.

The rehabilitation of the Montforts in the Dionysian vernacular narrative begins with Jean V, who, two years prior to his accession in 1399, married Jeanne, daughter of Charles VI, in the first of many marriages that would embed the Montforts in the royal family. Eventually, his brothers, Arthur and Richard, and his son François would marry other Capetian princesses, further infusing their blood with that of the Valois. But a blood relationship did not ensure Montfort loyalty. Soon after their father died, Jean and his brothers were taken under the guardianship of Philippe II of Burgundy and raised with Charles VI’s children at court, a move that undoubtedly left an impression on their upbringing. Juvénal shows that Jean hesitantly joined the Armagnacs in 1407, although he does not list the duke among the signatories of the declaration of alliance made in 1410. At Agincourt, Jean arrived late or not at all, and during the fighting, Arthur was taken captive by the English. This proves to be a turning point for Jean in the narrative. With the death of another brother, Gilles de Chantocé, in 1412 and the capture of Arthur, Jean is presented as a failure to his family and the Capetian

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2 GCF, IX:218-220. See Lescot, 55. See generally Galliou and Jones, 220.
3 CRJC, II:5-8. See Figure 7.1. See generally Galliou and Jones, 227, 234.
4 HCRF, 410, 412. See CKS, II:443. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 393; Henri Poisson and Jean-Pierre le Mat, Histoire de Bretagne (Nantes: Coop Breizh, 2000), 180.
6 Galliou and Jones, 238 argue that the marital alliances made by Jean V allowed the Montfort family to remain aloof from much of the fighting.
8 HCRF, 445, 452-454. Jean was an original member of the League of Gien in 1410, but he rarely fought for either side in the conflict. Famiglietti, 88, 91, 169.
9 HCRF, 519. See CKS, V:556, 574. See generally Galliou and Jones, 237; Sumption, IV:458.
Figure 7.1 The House of Châtillon-Penthièvre and the Capetian House of Dreux-Montfort, 1364 – 1461

Olivier V (d. 1407)
Seigneur de Clisson
Constable of France
Marguerite
(d. 1441)

Charles
Brittany: 1341 – 1364

Jeanne
Brittany: 1341 – 1365
Penthièvre: 1331 – 1384

Jean I
Penthièvre: 1384 – 1404

Marie (d. 1404)
+ Louis I
Anjou: 1351 – 1384

Olivier
Penthièvre: 1404 – 1425
Limoges: 1404 – 1433
+ Isabelle of Burgundy (d. 1412)

Jean II de l’Aigle
Limoges: 1433 – 1452
Penthièvre: 1448 – 1452

Guillaume
Limoges: 1452 – 1455

Charles (d. 1436)
Seigneur d’Avaugour

François I
Brittany: 1442 – 1450
+ Yolande d’Anjou (d. 1440)

Jean IV
Brittany: 1364 – 1399

Jean V
Brittany: 1399 – 1442
+ Jeanne de France (d. 1433)

Arthur III de Richemont
Brittany: 1457 – 1458
Constable of France
+ Marguerite of Burgundy (d. 1442)

François I
Brittany: 1442 – 1450

Pierre II
Brittany: 1450 – 1457
Seigneur de Chantocé

Gilles (d. 1450)

Marie (d. 1446)
+ Jean I
Alençon: 1404 – 1415
+ Marguerite d’Orléans (d. 1466)

Richard
Étampes: 1423 – 1438

François II
Étampes: 1438 – 1488
Brittany: 1458 – 1488

Later Counts of Penthièvre
Later Counts of Limoges

Later Rulers of Brittany

See Figure 8.2
dynasty. As such, his actions in the chronicle appear very conservative and protectionist. For example, he signed a separate peace with the English in 1417 to protect Brittany from further attack and mediated in the treaty of Troyes in 1420 to ensure a defensible position between England and France. Ultimately, Jean’s wild vacillations between the Armagnacs and Burgundians after the murder of Louis d’Orléans in 1407 prompted Juvénal to generally write him out of his narrative as a bad agent of regnal authority.

A constant counterpoint to Jean that Juvénal calls upon is the Penthièvre family, descendants of Charles de Blois and his wife, Jeanne, who were dispossessed of Brittany in 1365. Over the ensuing generations, the family married into the Capetian houses of Anjou and Burgundy, pulling them back into the orbit of the French royal court. Notably, Juvénal links the Penthièvres both to Olivier de Clisson, a man despised by the Montforts and partially blamed for the king’s illness, and Jean of Burgundy, whom the chronicler personally disliked. These connections to the Burgundians and Clisson serve to discredit the family since their only other mention in the narrative is in 1420. In that year, Juvénal recounts, Olivier de Penthièvre and his brother Charles d’Avaugour kidnapped the duke of Brittany because ‘he held to the party of the king of England [and] had sworn homage and oaths to him’. The chronicler then describes how the Bretons rallied to the duke and ‘tore down the places that...belonged to the said count of Penthièvre: they even took and imprisoned the young brother [Guillaume] of the said count, whom they put in a very secure prison, even though he knew nothing and was pure and innocent’. When the Bretons began sacking Penthièvre holdings outside of Brittany, Jean de l’Aigle, another brother, agreed to release the duke, who promptly repudiated everything he promised while imprisoned. Juvénal takes a somewhat neutral stance on this entire episode, but his language suggests he leans toward the

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10 HCRF, 478. See CKS, IV:690, V:574. See generally Van Kerrebroeck, II:388.
12 Jean was an Armagnac from 1407-1411, highly variable 1411-1419, Anglo-Burgundian 1419-1424, Armagnac 1424-1427, and functionally neutral from 1427 to his death in 1442. Burne, Agincourt, 221; Leguay and Martin, 197-198; Small, 152-153.
13 See generally Van Kerrebroeck, III:237, 367.
15 ‘...ils le reputoient tenant le party du roy d’Angleterre: car il luy avoit fait hommage et serment’.
16 ‘...ils le reputoient tenant le party du roy d’Angleterre: car il luy avoit fait hommage et serment’. HCRF, 556. This accusation is not unfounded; Poisson and le Mat, 179, note that “[a]près l’assassinat de Jean sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne, Jean V abandonna la cause du dauphin Charles qu’il jugeait perdue (1419)”. See CKS, VI:400, 402.
17 ‘Les Bretons...abatirent les places qu’on disoit appartenir audit comte de Pointièvre: mesme ils prirent et emprisonnerent le jeune frere dudit Comte, lequel ils mirent en bien dure prison, combien qu’il n’en scavoit rien, et en estoit pur et innocent...’. HCRF, 556. Pintoin does not mention this pillaging. See generally Jones, Creation, 343; Sumption, IV:690.
Penthièvres, whom he implies the dauphin supported. Additionally, he neglects to mention the real repercussions of this incident, that the Penthièvres lost all their Breton possessions and titles and that Guillaume remained a prisoner for nearly thirty years. To emphasise their dramatic fall from power, the Penthièvres are hardly mentioned in Chartier’s continuation, with only Jean de l’Aigle named as a participant in the conquest of Guyenne in 1450-1453. While the Montforts proved to be poor agents of regnal authority, so too did the Penthièvres, so neither warranted significant space within Juvénal’s text. As with their predecessors, the Bretons were too independent-minded and recalcitrant to justify using them as positive didactic examples.

The Montforts benefited greatly from the political downfall of the Penthièvres, but such a victory is not immediately obvious in Chartier’s narrative. The chronicler is completely silent regarding Jean V’s involvement in the Anglo-French war, avoiding any mention of the flexible nature of the Breton allegiance to the Capetian cause or any pro-French military actions Jean took during his reign. When the duke does enter the narrative in 1431, it is in relation to an unpaid dowry owed to his nephew Jean II d’Alençon, and a resolution is quickly found with the help of Arthur de Richemont, who refused to bear arms against his relative. Chartier includes Jean’s ambassadors at the Arras conference in 1435, but the duke is not mentioned in the treaty text nor listed among the princes standing as surety for the Franco-Burgundian agreement. His continued loyalty to the English is cited in 1438, although Chartier adds ‘notwithstanding the Bretons serving the king of France against the said English of good will’. The duke is named a final time in the judicial matter of Gilles de Rais’s trial in 1440, but Chartier is clearly more interested in the details of the proceedings than the
Jean’s death in 1442 and the succession to the ducal throne of François I are nowhere mentioned, and François himself does not enter the narrative until the English sack Fougères in 1449. In the end, Chartier only shows any real interest in the judicial affairs of the Montforts and, in these instances, he focusses specifically on the non-ducal elements. The author neither acknowledges Jean as a Capetian prince nor calls him a traitor, suggesting that Chartier no longer considers the duke worthy of use as a didactic example. He has become simply a waypoint, helping guide other characters along their narrative journeys.

Chartier’s attitude toward the Montforts as a whole only begins to change in 1449, when François I became directly involved in the final phase of the Anglo-French war on the side of Charles VII. Indeed, it was his call for help to the French king that prompted the resumption of hostilities. Twice in this passage Chartier calls François the king’s ‘good nephew of Brittany’, a sign of familiarity never before used by a Dionysian chronicler to refer to a Montfort duke. In the latter passage, ‘the said duke promised to the king of France to serve him against the English in his person and power by sea and by land; never to treat for peace with those English nor abstain from war except by the consent, dismissal and good pleasure of the king’. From this point forward, the Montforts suddenly become major players in the chronicle, with Chartier repeatedly mentioning the duke’s relationship to the king. Indeed, François even briefly vies with his more famous uncle, Arthur de Richemont, for narrative space in Chartier’s retrospective on the invasion of Lower Normandy in September 1449. The duke appears among the Capetian martial ranks at Louviers and Château Gaillard, a sign of his acceptance into the Capetian familial network. Chartier notes at François’s death in 1450 that ‘he loved the king of France naturally, as it is quite apparent; because he brought war to all those who had been and who he knew to be against his royal majesty’, including his own brother Gilles. Thus, within the Dionysian vernacular tradition, François is the first

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26 Chartier, II:61. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:397; Wolffé, 205-207.
27 Chartier, II:61. Although the Bretons always reserved this option, the Montfort dukes rarely appealed to the French king for help prior to 1449, instead relying upon their own vassals. Peter S. Lewis, Essays in Later Medieval French History (London: Hambledon Press, 1985), 84. See generally Anthony James Pollard, John Talbot and the War in France 1427-1453 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1983), 64.
28 Chartier, II:64.
29 ‘Que ledit duc promectoit au roy de le servir à l’encontre des Anglois de sa personne et puissance par mer et par terre; ne jamais à icelx Anglois ne seroit traxtie paix ne abstince de guere que ce ne fust du consentement, congïé et bon plaisir du roy’. Chartier, II:73.
30 Chartier, II:72, 75, 106, 228.
31 Chartier, II:122-126. François and Arthur fought together throughout the campaign. Small, 163.
32 Chartier, II:111, 134. See generally Barker, 389.
33 ‘Ce dit prince, en son vivant, aimoit le roy de France naturellement, comme il y est assez apparu; car
Montfort duke worthy of being portrayed as a Capetian prince, which Chartier makes clear by explicitly stating how François successfully advanced regnal authority.

Chartier realised that the case of François’s brother Gilles de Chantocé represented an important shift in Montfort allegiance, which explains why his story is included after the duke’s eulogy. The anglophile was the English constable of France, and Chartier notes that Gilles acted ‘against reason, justice, and all order of right’ in his adherence to Henry VI, and that, despite forceful encouragement by the duke, ‘he wanted never to retire and deviate from his ill-placed courage and damnable purpose’. François eventually imprisoned his brother in 1446, much to the consternation of Henry, and the man was quietly strangled to death in 1450, thereby confirming for Chartier the duke’s complete loyalty to the king. The chronicler also exonerates François for the crime by adding that the murderers were later executed for perjury. Following François’s death, the Montforts largely disappear from the narrative again, but that is historically accurate as they were not heavily involved in the subsequent invasion of Guyenne. However, Chartier does include Pierre II’s pledge of homage for Brittany in 1450, as well as that of Arthur de Richemont (as Arthur III) in 1457 and François II in 1458. François enters the narrative earlier as the count of Étampes in 1453, leading the Breton battalion alongside other Capetian lords at the battle of Châtillon. His loyalty to the royalist cause is never doubted by the chronicler. Thus, within Chartier’s chronicle, the Montforts are recognised as full Capetian princes from 1449, fighting as commanders in the royal army against the English and acting in every way as proper champions of regnal authority.

Although the sack of Fougères acted as the catalyst for the dukes to enter the war on the side of the French, the Montfort rehabilitation would not have been possible without the support of Arthur, second son of Jean IV of Brittany, titular earl of Richmond in England and constable of France, who from 1425 became the most highly-regarded Montfort cadet in

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34 ‘…il soustenoit contre raison, justice, et tout ordre de droit…. [II] ne se voult jamais retraire et depar- tir de son mauvais courag e et damnable propos’. Chartier, II:229.
35 Chartier, II:230. Barker, 371-372, adds that the arrest of Gilles was provoked by Charles VII on be- half of Prégent de Coëtivy, admiral of France, a highly influential Breton in the French court. The continued imprisonment of Gilles by François was the justification for the English seizure of Fougères—the English government hoped to trade Fougères for Gilles, a gamble that backfired on the English spectacularly. Poisson and le Mat, 189. Gilles was never tried in court prior to his murder due to procedural difficulties and diplomatic pressures. Jones, Creation, 347. See generally Galliou and Jones, 239.
36 Chartier, II:230-231.
37 Poisson and le Mat, 191.
39 Chartier, III: 2, 6. See generally Poisson and le Mat, 191.
French history.\textsuperscript{40} Juvénal documents that Arthur was briefly raised by the Burgundians after his mother married Henry IV of England.\textsuperscript{41} However, as an adult he chose the Armagnac party, being named in a letter from Charles VI to Jean of Burgundy alongside many other Capetian lords in 1411.\textsuperscript{42} He remained in the company of these lords between 1413 and 1415, culminating with his capture at the battle of Agincourt, where he had served as a commander.\textsuperscript{43} Simply by including Arthur within the ranks of the Capetian princes, Juvénal clearly considers him one of them, giving the earl precedent over at least one other Capetian prince, Louis de Vendôme.\textsuperscript{44} When Arthur is released from captivity in 1424, Chartier is quick to note that, although Arthur had pledged to serve Henry V as a condition of his release, the said king of England being dead…it seemed to the said earl of Richmond that he was no longer bound by faith or promises to the successor of the said king of England, and that also they had been made under duress and in order to get himself out of prison, [he] always having the wish to serve the king of France, and it seemed to him that [since] the said king of England was dead, that all promises were void.\textsuperscript{45}

Thus, Chartier justifies why Arthur is not a perjurer and confirms that he never truly wavered in his loyalty to Charles.\textsuperscript{46} Arthur is then made constable of France and purges the government, executing two principal councillors of the king before installing Georges de La Trémoïlle in 1427.\textsuperscript{47} No space in the story is provided for Arthur’s long feud with La Trémoïlle or the constable’s exclusion from government between 1427 and 1433.\textsuperscript{48} But Arthur is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Gaussin, 110; Pernoud and Clin, 198.
\item \textsuperscript{41} HCRF, 422-423. CKS, III:40. See generally Poisson and le Mat, 177.
\item \textsuperscript{42} HCRF, 461. See CKS, IV:428. See generally Pernoud and Clin, 199.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Arthur retains a place immediately before Louis throughout Chartier’s chronicle. Chartier, I:85-86, 186, 204, 215.
\item \textsuperscript{45} ‘Et le dit roy d’Angleterre mort…il sembla au dit conte de Richemont que plus n’avoit de foy ne de promesse au successeur du dit roy d’Angleterre, et que aussy ce qui en avoit esté fait par contrainte et pour soy mettre hors de prison en ayant tousjours vouleté de servir le roy de France, et luy semblloit que le dit roy d’Angleterre mort, que de toutes promesses estoit quitte’. Chartier, I:47.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Arthur was probably an English loyalist from 1420 to 1424. Pernoud and Clin, 198-199, imply that Arthur renounced his allegiance because John of Bedford refused to give the earl a prestigious position in the English army. See generally Kerhervé, 99-100.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Chartier, I:48, 54. Arthur was recruited by Yolande of Aragon, Charles VII’s mother-in-law, as a potential step toward a Franco-Burgundian reconciliation. Rohr, 120-121. He was only the third Capetian constable in the history of France, the first two being Jacques I de La Marche (see Chapter 5.3) and Philippe d’Eu (see Chapter 2.3), although numerous cognates had served as constables, including Charles de la Cerda, Olivier de Clisson, Charles d’Albret, Waléran III de Saint-Pol, and Bernard VII d’Armagnac. Anselme, \textit{Histoire de grands officiers}, 32, 38, 47. See generally Gaussin, 126; Kerhervé, 101.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Arthur planned to remove La Trémoïlle from power soon after installing him, but his plans were thwarted and he was banished from court. La Trémoïlle, fearing for his life, quit the government permanently in 1433. Robert Jean Knecht, \textit{The Valois: Kings of France 1328–1589} (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), 65-66, 71.
\end{itemize}
mentioned repeatedly alongside other Capetians and Jeanne d’Arc in 1429, with Chartier noting, at the siege of Beagency, that Arthur was ‘well recommended, because here and in several other places he did great services for the king’. At the treaty of Arras in 1435, Arthur stood among the ‘cousins and other relatives of his blood’ as surety for the king. Soon after in the narrative, Arthur seized two pillagers and had them executed, for which Chartier observes, ‘[he] showed himself a good judge, and also he had the favour and renown of all the country’. Proof of this is found during the Praguerie revolt in 1440, when Arthur remained loyal to the king, placing him resolutely against the other Capetians who rallied to the dauphin. Arthur’s importance to the narrative is so great that when his wife died in 1441, Chartier mentions this event, something he and his predecessors did only rarely for any Capetian agnate and never for a prince of such low rank. His ascension to the Breton ducal throne in 1457 is referenced twice, once at his coronation and once at his death, again showing Chartier’s appreciation for the man. However, the bulk of Chartier’s text focusses on the war itself, in which Arthur was the head military commander. He fought prominently at the siege of Paris in 1436 and in the invasion of Normandy in 1449-50, always advancing the royal cause. Within Chartier’s chronicle, Arthur de Richemont is the quintessential Capetian cadet, a man recognised for his successful campaign to reclaim the land the English had seized and advance the regnal authority of Charles VII throughout France.

The Montfort family as a whole never had been nor would be a primary agent of regnal authority, but by the death of Charles VII in 1461, Chartier recognised a distinct shift in Breton ducal policy toward the French king. This change began with Jean V, but he was not its chief motivator and both Juvenal and Chartier saw him as an unreliable ally and potential enemy, a man who could not be trusted. With each successive duke, through, the Montfort family became closer to their Valois cousins, largely due to the influence and efforts of Arthur de Richemont, the family’s most visible representative. It is clear within the Dionysian vernacular tradition that, by the middle of the fifteenth century, the Montforts had redeemed themselves by sacrificing their dynastic pretensions and directing their focus to restoring the king’s

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49 ‘...en est ledit connestable bien à recommander, car icy et en plussieurs autres lieux a fait de grans services au roy’. Chartier, I:84. See generally Burne, Agincourt, 255-256, 259.
50 ‘...par ses cousins et autres parens de son sang’. Chartier, I:187, 203-204.
51 ‘Et se monstra en ce ledit connestable bon justicier, et aussi il en avoit la grâce et renommée par tous pays’. Chartier, I:216-217.
52 Chartier, I:258. Indeed, the king’s fondness for Arthur was a primary reason for the revolt. Knecht, 79. See generally Pernoud and Clin, 199. For further discussion of the Praguerie, see Chapter 8.2.
authority in Normandy and Anjou. In this way, the Montforts provide an example within the narrative for how to return to the Capetian fold, an important message for the many nobles who had pledged fealty to the English or Burgundians and, by the 1450s, desired to re-establish their traditional relationship with the Valois monarchy.

7.2 Reframing Illegitimate Kin

The Montforts certainly did not act alone in reconquering the English kingdom of France. One repercussion of the defeat at Agincourt was the sudden desperate need for noblemen capable of commanding Armagnac forces. Unable to rely on the usual stock of Capetian cadets, the Armagnacs fell back on their unorthodox progeny: sons long maligned or ignored because of their illegitimate parentage. The earlier Dionysian continuators completely ignore such progeny and most French kings throughout the later Middle Ages refused to acknowledge their disreputable offspring. But increasingly, bastards of Capetian extraction were not only recognised by the chroniclers but included alongside other Armagnac princes. The importance of one in particular, Jean d’Orléans, natural son of Louis d’Orléans, was so remarkable that he ranks as one of the most frequently-mentioned cadets in all the continuations. The sudden introduction of such kin was a development Juvénal and Chartier could not ignore. This section will survey the illegitimate offspring of the Capetian dynasty to determine how they operated as vessels of regnal authority within the vernacular narratives.

Illegitimacy had always been present in the royal family; however, the early vernacular continuators chose to overlook the less-than-ideal progeny of their subjects. Guillaume, Lescot, and Orgemont all shunned any bastard of agnatic Capetian ancestry, a tactic that worked prior to the Armagnac-Burgundian war largely because most royal bastards were not active in political circles. But Juvénal and Chartier both wrote after Jean d’Orléans and other illegitimate kin had proven their value to the dynasty. Indeed, Jean is the first acknowledged Capetian bastard found in the continuations. He appears in Juvénal’s text in 1408 after a eulogy for his father’s wife, Valentina Visconti, where the author notes that ‘she willingly recognised’ him, implying her acceptance of him as her trueborn son. Overall, though, Juvénal focusses primarily on Bourbon and Alençon bastards. He notes that Hector, natural son of Louis

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56 An exception to this was Louis d’Orléans, bishop of Poitiers and Beauvais, illegitimate son of Philippe d’Orléans, who was a peer of France from 1394-1395. Van Kerrebrouck, II:85.
57 Philippe Hurepel, son of Philippe II and his controversial second wife, Agnès de Méranie, appears in 1226, but by that date he had been legitimated by the pope. GCF, VII:37. See GSL, 312. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:110.
II de Bourbon, fought at Soissons in 1414 alongside other Armagnacs, giving his life to the cause when he was killed scouting a way into the city.\textsuperscript{59} Similarly, Guy de Bourbon, illegitimate son of Jean I, enters the narrative immediately prior to Agincourt alongside Charles d’Albret.\textsuperscript{60} After the battle, he was one of the captains of a French fleet that was resoundingly defeated by the English in 1417.\textsuperscript{61} He too sacrificed his future for the Armagnac cause, being captured by the English in that battle. Later, in Chartier’s chronicle, Guy returns alongside his brother Alexandre in 1435 as a leader of the \textit{écorcheurs}, a riotous free company with a reputation for flaying enemies.\textsuperscript{62} Guy disappears from the narrative but Alexandre’s role continues, leading the relief of Harfleur in 1440 before being drowned by the townsfolk of Bar-sur-Aube for pillaging the countryside.\textsuperscript{63} Meanwhile, yet another bastard, Pierre, natural son of Pierre II d’Alençon, enters Juvénal’s chronicle in 1417 as a significant threat to the English in Normandy and Maine.\textsuperscript{64} Unlike Guy, Pierre led a successful sea battle against the English in 1419, butchering many English sailors and drawing the ire of Henry V, who said of him that ‘it was very shocking that he took pleasure in killing his men when he took them’, to which Pierre replied that he acted ‘to avenge the death of his brother, who had been killed by them’ at Agincourt.\textsuperscript{65} Thus, Pierre’s motives were similar to those of the Bourbon and Orléans bastards who sought vengeance for their relatives who were killed in battle or held captive in England. Pierre continued campaigning against the English, appearing in Chartier’s chronicle at the battle of Broussinière in 1423 before being captured at Verneuil the next year.\textsuperscript{66} Indeed, many illegitimate Capetian relatives, including Bernard de Foix, Jean de Vendôme, and Archbishop Louis d’Harcourt of Narbonne, enter Chartier’s narrative as servants and soldiers of the French king.\textsuperscript{67} The Dionysian opinion of bastards had clearly changed in the aftermath of Agincourt and both Juvénal and Chartier recognised the important role illegitimate cadets


\textsuperscript{60} \textit{HCRF}, 509. \textit{See CKS}, V:534, 550.


\textsuperscript{62} Chartier, I:216. \textit{See generally Small}, 159.


\textsuperscript{64} \textit{HCRF}, 539-540, 545. \textit{See generally Sumption}, IV:686.

\textsuperscript{65} ‘…il estoit bien esbahy pourquoy il prenoit plaisir à ainsi tuer ses gens, quand il les prenoit”. Et il luy fit response, ‘que c’estoit pour venger la mort de son frere: lequel avoir esté par eux occis”’. \textit{HCRF}, 556. \textit{See generally Sumption}, IV:677.

\textsuperscript{66} Chartier, I:35, 43. \textit{See generally Barker}, 80.

\textsuperscript{67} Chartier, II:186, 265, 276, 317, III:77.
could play in advancing regnal authority.

This fact cannot be more strongly exemplified than by Jean, bastard d’Orléans. Raised alongside his legitimate brothers who were all captured or killed before 1420, Jean rose quickly to prominence as the *de facto* head of the house of Orléans. Indeed, when introducing him, Juvénal records that he ‘was best suited to avenge the death of his father’, Louis d’Orléans. Although Jean’s first military victory was at the siege of Montargis in 1427, Chartier chooses to introduce the bastard at the siege of Orléans instead. By doing this, Chartier achieves two things: he decisively connects Jean to the Armagnac agenda of defeating the Anglo-Burgundians and he links the bastard to Jeanne d’Arc, who enters Chartier’s narrative in the same episode. Indeed, from her entry in the narrative until the start of the coronation tour to Reims, Jeanne always appears immediately ahead of Jean in lists whenever they appear together. By associating Jean with Jeanne, Chartier establishes the bastard’s credentials as a loyal and reliable follower of Charles VII as well as a companion of Jeanne. It is therefore unsurprising within the context of the chronicles to find Jean leading the royalist armies as the successor to Jeanne from 1432 until the fall of Bayonne in 1451. However, Chartier holds Jean in special regard also because he recaptured Saint-Denis in 1435, which placed the abbey and its monks in debt to him for protecting their relics and royal tombs. This may explain why Chartier leaves Jean’s involvement in the *Praguerie* out of the chronicle, only ever showing the bastard alongside the other loyalists. Indeed, the chronicler places Jean at Harfleur during the revolt, removing any suspicion that he may have been involved. It is also at this moment, when Jean resolutely stood beside the king, that the bastard is first called in Chartier’s chronicle count of Dunois, a title he received in 1439 from his half-brother-in-exile. By naming him such here, Chartier associates his elevation to the nobility

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68 Contamine, Bouzy and Hélary, 674; Thibault, 132.
69 ‘...[il] fust si bien taillé de venger la mort de son pere...’. HCREF, 449.
70 Chartier, IV:61. See generally Rohr, 126; Seward, 208.
71 See generally Barker, 99; Pernoud and Clin, 165.
72 Chartier, I: 69, 73-74, 77, 81-83, 103-104.
73 Chartier, I:142-143, II:320. See generally Griffiths, 530.
74 Chartier, I:179-183, 220-226. The town had been captured by Jeanne d’Arc in August 1429 but was lost to the Anglo-Burgundians shortly afterwards. After Jean d’Orléan’s takeover in June 1435, it was recaptured again by the Anglo-Burgundians in September. It did not permanently fall into French hands until April 1436. See generally Barker, 135, 219-220, 242-243; Viriville, introduction to Chartier, I:viii.
75 Chartier, I:258. Barker, 278, explains that Jean joined the side of the rebels initially ‘because he was rightly suspicious of Charles’s willingness to assist in securing the release of his brother [Charles, duke d’Orléans]’. See generally Mikhaël Harsgor, ‘L’essor des bâtards nobles au XVe siècle’, Revue Historique 253:2 (1975): 342.
76 Chartier, I:259. The *Praguerie* was in April 1440 while the Harfleur siege was in October. Barker, 285.
77 See generally Pernoud and Clin, 195.
and the removal of his bastard identity with adherence to the king. Jean shows his ultimate dedication to the royalist cause in the aftermath of the English sack of Fougères in 1449 with Charles naming him ‘lieutenant general of the king in his wars’. This functionally situates Jean above all other Capetian relatives except the kings of France and Sicily, and Charles of Maine, the king’s chief councillor. Chartier implies at this time that Jean should be counted among the seigneurs du sang royal—lords of royal blood—when the count calls himself such in a treaty with the town of Bayeux made in 1450. Later in the narrative, the chronicler states that Jean was first among those who ‘greatly led, most valiantly and very honourably,’ in the conquest of Normandy, and he is the only individual named in a similar context after the conquest of Guyenne. And in his final mention in Chartier’s chronicle, the king calls Jean ‘our very dear and beloved cousin’, implying a level of intimacy and kinship between the king and a bastard that is unprecedented elsewhere in the Dionysian vernacular continuations. It cannot be doubted that Chartier greatly admired the man, but he also saw Jean as a symbol of regnal authority in the same vein as Jeanne d’Arc. Within the chronicle, the count is a selfless defender of the king and kingdom and the single best representative of Capetian dynasticism in recent history.

The Capetian bastards taught the chroniclers of the fifteenth century something that their predecessors had not before considered: that a Capetian did not necessarily have to be legitimate to be able to promote regnal authority. The earlier continuators rarely had to consider this since there were so few acknowledged illegitimate Capetians in France, but the

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78 In 1442, Chartier calls him ‘Monseigneur le bastard d’Orléans, conte de Dunois’. This marks the last time he is called bâtard, thus marking his formal transition from one identity to the other. Chartier, II:37. Jean acquired the prestigious county of Longueville from the king in 1443, which Chartier includes among Jean’s titles the next year. Philippe Contamine, ‘Jean, comte de Dunois et de Longueville (1403?-1468), ou l’honneur d’être bâtard’, in La bâtardise et l’exercice du pouvoir en Europe du XIIe au début du XVIe siècle, eds. Éric Bousmar, Alain Marchandisse, Christophe Masson, and Bertrand Schnerb (Lille: Revue du Nord, 2015), 295-296; Pernoud and Clin, 195. Jean became a peer for Dunois and Blois in 1446 and the titles became hereditary in his bloodline. Harsagor, ‘L’essor des bâtards’, 332n5.

79 Chartier, II:73, 82. See generally Favier, La guerre, 698; Griffiths, 530.

80 Chartier, I:86. The princes did not, however, lose their order of precedence, as evidenced by the treaty of Mantes, in which Jean is listed after the counts of Eu and Saint-Pol. See also Chartier, II:101, 141, 151, 153, 156.

81 Chartier, II:153, 207. Thibault, 135, adds that Jean ‘prit conscience que…il avait naturellement qualité de prince du sang’. A seigneur du sang royal is not the same as the later prince du sang, which did not enter popular usage until after Juvénal’s chronicle was written. Richard A. Jackson, ‘Peers of France and Princes of the Blood’, French Historical Studies 7:1 (1971): 33, states that it was the ‘addition of the word “prince” [that] was a crucial step in the development of the concept because it implied a separation of the Princes of the Blood from the other nobles of France’. The two terms should not be equated, even though the latter did evolve from the former.

82 ‘Ladite guerre durant s’y gouverna grandement, moult vaillamment et très-honoramment le susdit conte de Dunois, lieutenant général du roy…’. Chartier, II:236, 312. See generally Barker, 380; Seward, 256.

83 ‘…nostre très-chier et amé cousin…’. Chartier, III:92.
progeny of the family had increased greatly since 1274 and the fallout from Agincourt forced the chroniclers to recognise the current structure of the royal family. Many bastards, such as those of the Bourbon and Alençon houses, contributed to the defeat of the Anglo-Burgundians with several sacrificing their lives to the cause. Jean d’Orléans, meanwhile, spent his entire life serving Charles VII, an arrangement that earned him titles of nobility, military renown, and an unprecedented inclusion among the seigneurs du sang royal. Together, these natural sons of France formed a serendipitous phalanx against Anglo-Burgundian aggression, proving to readers that every member of the Capetian dynasty, be they legitimate or illegitimate, has a duty to uphold the authority of the French king.

7.3 Embracing Capetians of Another Father

An equally unique phenomenon occurred during this period that gained significant momentum following Agincourt: whereas with the Montforts and royal bastards, a person’s quality as a Capetian was hereditary, other men who had only distant genealogical connections to the dynasty also began to be treated by the Dionysian vernacular chroniclers as implicit or explicit cadets. Indeed, the very conflict in question was partially named after Bernard VII d’Armagnac, whose dominance over a faction in the war was such that he and his descendants were essentially adopted by the Capetian dynasty.84 But theirs was not a unique case. The cognatic descendants of Pierre I of Bourbon, the Albrets and Harcourts specifically, gained a remarkable prominence in the continuations after 1380 with their members supporting the Valois cause throughout the war. By the end of Charles VII’s reign, Chartier also suggests that the Graillys of Foix should be considered Capetian cognates, despite having little royal blood. More extreme still is Chartier’s acceptance of the count of Saint-Pol as a Capetian prince even though his family refused to accept the 1435 peace of Arras due to their loyalty to Henry VI of England.85 The substantial shift by the chroniclers toward accepting those of questionable Capetian kinship as members of the royal dynasty reflects the desperate measures taken by the supporters of Charles VII in the Armagnac-Burgundian and Anglo-French wars. This section will assess the vernacular portrayals of these princely families to determine why they are depicted as members of the dynasty and how their inclusion set a new standard regarding the qualities required of a Capetian prince.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Bernard VII d’Armagnac was fully enveloped into the Capetian fold, with Juvénal considering him both the leader of the Armagnac faction and a

84 For more on Bernard, see Chapter 6.2.
85 See generally Allmand, Lancastrian, 227; Pernaud and Clin, 191-192.
champion of regnal authority. Following his death, Bernard’s sons and grandsons by his wife, Bonne de Berry, initially remained loyal to the Armagnacs and Charles VII. By introducing them in this way, the chronicler jumps over the complex dynastic marriages the family had made since 1418 to reach his main point: the Armagnacs continued to be fundamental members of the dynasty two decades after their father’s death. However, their two stories diverge at this point. Bernard stayed by the king’s side during the Praguerie revolt in 1440 and his son Jacques de Castres served in the conquest of Normandy and Guyenne from 1449 to 1453. As late as 1457, Bernard is still found among his Capetian relatives. Thus, the loyalty of the junior line of the Armagnacs is never questioned and they are ever-present agents of regnal authority within France. In contrast, Jean IV and his son Jean V represent how tenuous an adoptive relationship with the royal family can be. The senior Jean disappears from Chartier’s chronicle after 1435, but Chartier notes that his son served with Jacques in Normandy in 1449 and 1450. The younger Jean is later included among the victors during the capture of Bordeaux in 1451, but is conspicuously absent from any account of the campaign itself. That is likely because Jean serves a different purpose in Chartier’s narrative. The chronicler relates that, in 1455, the count attempted to install his cousin as archbishop of Auch against the wishes of the king. Chartier uses this opportunity to warn that ‘it is a very hard and reckless thing to resist his lord, and push, as it is said, against a stinger’, a metaphor that implies the dangers of recalcitrance. Indeed, he demonstrates that the action cost Jean everything: Charles VII confiscated all his lands and, in the process, the count lost his adoptive identity.

86 See Figure 6.2.
87 Chartier, I:204.
88 Chartier, I:236. Most prominent among the marriages was Bernard de Pardiac’s to Éléonore de Bourbon, heiress of La Marche, in 1429. Gaussin, 105.
89 Chartier, I:258, II:110, 133, 141, 156, 166, 323, III:2. Both counts sat on the royal council numerous times between 1424 and 1460. Gaussin, 105. See generally Favier, La guerre, 554. See also Chapter 8.2.
90 Chartier, III:75-76.
91 Chartier, II:110, 133, 141, 156, 166. Small, 158, reports that a breach between Foix and Armagnac led to Jean IV’s bellicose attitude against the French monarchy. Favier, La guerre, 562-563, adds that Jean led a brief rebellion against the king in 1442, although he eventually bowed to the king’s arbitration. Another dispute over Jean’s use of the term ‘comte par la grâce de Dieu’ prompted a second invasion by the king leading to the count’s imprisonment from 1443 to 1446. See generally Gaussin, 80; Small, 162-163.
92 Chartier, II:305-306, 308. See generally Favier, La guerre, 608.
93 Chartier, III:50. See generally Cuttler, 209.
94 ‘…c’est chose bien dure et téméraire que de résister à son seigneur, et regimber, comme il se dit, contre l’aiguillon’. Chartier, III:51.
95 Chartier, III:51. Bove, 459, states that the reason for the confiscation was because Jean conquered the county of Comminges in 1454 without the king’s permission. Cuttler, 209, in contrast, argues that ‘it was apparently the count’s refusal to end his scandalous incestuous liaison with his sister that provoked Charles VII to take action against him’.
When he appears for a final time in 1457, Jean is just another name in a crowd of lesser nobles. 96 Taken as a whole, the story of the Armagnac family from 1405 to 1457 is one of a provincial family rising above its origins to become akin, both figuratively and literally, to royalty. But the moral of the story is more nuanced: regardless of how a person may become a Capetian, their continued acceptance by that body is entirely dependent on their unwavering acceptance of regnal authority over personal ambition, a lesson the junior Armagnacs realised but the senior cadets only learned through failure.

A desire to restore regnal authority also drove the Harcourts and Albrets to Charles VII’s camp, a development Juvénal and Chartier highlight frequently, although they never imply that the families were accepted into the Capetian dynasty to the same degree as their Armagnac kin. 97 Jean VI d’Harcourt, who was a brother-in-law to Charles V’s wife, Jeanne de Bourbon, first enters Orgemont’s chronicle in 1378 during the visit of Emperor Karl IV to the French court, although his relationship to the royal family is not mentioned. 98 Juvénal includes the count early in his continuation at the coronation of Charles VI, ranked in a list above the Capetian count d’Eu and among other dynastic agnates and cognates. 99 Jean is last mentioned in 1382, fighting for the king in Flanders. 100 His son, Jean VII, first enters the narrative in 1390 during the Barbary Crusade alongside Louis II de Bourbon. 101 Juvénal notes later, during the meeting between Charles and Richard II of England in 1396, that ‘before the King was the count of Harcourt, his close relative, who carried the sword of the King’. 102 This is the nearest Juvénal comes to acknowledging the Harcourts’ relationship to the Capetian dynasty. At Agincourt, Jean was captured, and his son Jean VIII enters the narrative shortly afterwards as the Armagnac guardian of Rouen in 1417. 103 Chartier notes that Jean was appointed in 1423 ‘governor for the king of France in the said lands of Anjou and Maine’, a title that acknowledged his guerrilla war against the English in northern France. 104 At Brous-sinière, Jean distinguished himself as a capable champion of Capetian authority north of the

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96 Chartier, III:77.
97 See Figure 7.2.
100 HCRF, 355. See CKS, I:210. See generally Tuchman, 387.
101 HCRF, 361, 383. Juvénal mistakenly places the crusade in 1383, although he also includes it in 1390. Jean is mentioned on both occasions. Pintoin calls Charles d’Albret, who is unmentioned by Juvénal on the crusade, and Jean d’Harcourt ‘cognati regis germani’. CKS, I:652. See generally Tuchman, 470.
102 ‘Et devant le Roy estoit le comte de Harcourt son prochain parent, lequel portoit l’espée du Roy’.
103 HCRF, 539. See generally Georges Martin, Histoire et généalogie de la maison d’Harcourt (La Ricamarie, France: Imprimerie Mathias, 1994), 52, 54.
104 ‘…iceluy conte d’Aumarle gouverneur pour le roy de France ou dit pays d’Anjou et du Maine’. Chartier, I:33. See also HCRF, 567. See generally Martin, Histoire, 52, 54.
Figure 7.2 The Houses of Harcourt, Albret, and Foix-Grailly, 1358 – 1461

Pierre I
Bourbon: 1342 – 1356

Catherine (d. 1427)
+ Jean VI
Harcourt: 1356 – 1389

Jean VII
Harcourt: 1389 – 1452

Jean VIII
Harcourt: 1415 – 1424

Louis (d. 1479)
Patriarch of Jerusalem

Jeanne (d. 1378)
+ Charles V
France: 1364 – 1380

Marguerite (d. 1416)
+ Arnaud (d. 1401)
Seigneur d’Albret

Charles I (d. 1415)
Seigneur d’Albret
Constable of France

Charles II (d. 1471)
Seigneur d’Albret

Guillaume (d. 1429)
Seigneur d’Orval

Jeanne d’Artois
(d. 1350)

Gaston I
Foix: 1302 – 1315

Roger Bernard III (d. 1350)
Vicomte de Castelbon

Gaston II
Foix: 1315 – 1343

Gaston III
Foix: 1343 – 1391

Mathieu
Foix: 1391 – 1398

Isabelle
Foix: 1398 – 1428

Archambaud
Foix: 1398 – 1413

Marguerite
(see Figure 5.2)

Isabelle
Foix: 1398 – 1428

Jeanne
(d. 1433)

Gaston IV
Foix: 1436 – 1472

Pierre (d. 1454)
Vicomte de Lautrec

Bernard de Béarn
(d. 1466)

Later Seigneurs d’Albrets

Later Counts of Foix
Loire; indeed, he is one of the only capable fighters Chartier highlights in the first three years of his chronicle. But the count is killed at Vermeuil in 1424, cutting his career short.105 The Harcourts are removed from the narrative from this point, but Jean VIII’s illegitimate son, Louis, returns in Chartier’s text, leading the funerary procession of Charles VII in his role as patriarch of Jerusalem, thus providing a poetic conclusion to his father’s activities at the beginning of the king’s thirty-nine-year reign.106 The Harcourts’ role in advancing regnal authority was brief and limited in impact, but their story is included in the chronicles to demonstrate how even the most minor members of the extended family were obliged to sacrifice for the greater good of the kingdom and dynasty.

Similar in many ways, the story of the Albrets is one of individuals sacrificing their lives to advance regnal authority. Juvénal shows that Charles I d’Albret, constable of France, struggled with the Burgundians and the English for a decade before his death at Agincourt.107 He appears among the Armagnac princes in 1411, but his membership is never as forcefully stated as that of Bernard d’Armagnac.108 Before Agincourt, Charles sought to attack Harfleur rather than engage the English directly, but he was overruled and his death cost the Armagnacs their chief strategist.109 Chartier suggests that Charles’s second son, Guillaume d’Orval, served as the short-lived martial successor to his father. In 1428, Guillaume attempted to recapture Maine from the English, but he died early the next year in the disastrous battle of the Herrings, never able to reach his full potential.110 Chartier does not welcome the family of Charles II, Charles I’s elder son, into the narrative until the reconquests of Normandy and Guyenne, although two earlier appearances serve as proof of Charles’s devotion to the Capetian cause.111 From 1449, one son, Arnaud d’Orval, served the king and his lieutenants as they reconquered Normandy, with the seigneur appearing over a dozen times in the narrative, often

105 Chartier, I:43. See generally Martin, Histoire, 54.
106 Louis was also archbishop of Narbonne, president of the king’s exchequer, and a frequent member of the royal council in the 1450s. Chartier, III:115; Gaussin, 117; Martin, Histoire, 55; Michel Nassiet, ‘Les bâtards dans l’ouest au XVᵉ et au début du XVIᵉ siècle’, in La bêtardise et l’exercice du pouvoir en Europe du XIIIᵉ au début du XVIᵉ siècle, eds. Éric Bousmar, Alain Marchandisse, Christophe Masson and Bertrand Schnerb (Lille: Revue du Nord, 2015), 232.
107 HCRF, 430, 439, 446, 521. See CKS, V:570. He was appointed constable in 1403 through the efforts of Louis d’Orléans, despite heavy opposition. Sumption, IV:103. Juvénal does not overtly include Charles among the Armagnacs until 1411. HCRF, 467. See generally Allmand, Lancastrian, 6.
109 HCRF, 518-519. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 535; Sumption, IV:451-452.
110 Chartier, I:58, 63. See generally Gaussin, 104; Pernoud and Clin, 10.
111 In 1429, Charles is shown in the company of Jeanne d’Arc, a possibly intentional prestige boost given to him by Chartier, while he is also shown in 1440 defeating the English at Tartas, which he subsequently granted to his eldest son. Chartier, I:104, II:10. Charles served on the royal council at least fifteen times from 1425, fought in the royal army continuously from 1429, and carried the king’s sword at his coronation at Reims. Gaussin, 104; Pernoud and Clin, 67.
in the company of other Capetian lords. Furthermore, Chartier records that, in 1450, Arnaud led a raiding party across the Bordelais in preparation for the conquest of Guyenne. The next year, Charles II himself joined the war alongside his two sons, Arnaud and Jean de Tartas, and the trio participated in the first siege of Bordeaux as well as the final conquest of Guyenne that followed the victory at Châtillon in 1453. In contrast to the Harcourts, the relationship between the Albrets and the Capetian dynasty is never stated by the chroniclers but only implied by Albrets frequently appearing alongside other Capetian princes. Nonetheless, they provide yet another example of the obligations required of cognatic relatives to sacrifice themselves to ensure the triumph of regnal supremacy in France.

The Grailly counts of Foix did not have such a close genealogical relationship with the Capetian dynasty. Indeed, Juvénal and Chartier generally treat the Graillys as simply rivals to the Armagnac family. Juvénal records that Jean de Foix governed Languedoc for the Armagnacs until 1420, placing him on equal footing with Bernard d’Armagnac, the constable of France. But whereas Bernard ultimately gave his life for the Armagnacs, Jean’s actions put him at odds with the Dauphin Charles, who invaded the south and stripped the count of his lieutenancy. Juvénal concludes his narrative with the Graillys in disrepute and Languedoc under the direct control of Charles VII. But Chartier ignores this transgression and when Jean re-enters the narrative in 1435, it is in the exact same context as the Armagnacs: among the surety lords for the treaty of Arras. By 1449, Jean’s son Gaston IV reclaimed the traditional role of the Graillys in Languedoc as the ‘lieutenant general of the king of France in the parts between the Gironde and the Pyrenees, his relative and subject’. Although Gaston shared a Bourbon heritage with the Albrets and Harcourts, Chartier implies that his relationship to the Capetian king was via his wife, Leonor, who was the granddaughter of Carlos III of Navarre. Like Jean V d’Armagnac, Gaston joined with his brothers Pierre de Lautrec and

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112 Chartier, II:110, 115, 122, 133, 141, 151, 154, 166, 177, 195, 204, 215, 225, 236. See generally Favier, La guerre, 607.
113 Chartier, II:246-247. See generally Favier, La guerre, 607.
115 HCRF, 556-557. Jean had been a passive Burgundian until Bernard d’Armagnac’s death in 1418, at which point he switched allegiance to the dauphin, although he accepted a lieutenancy from the Burgundians as well. Sumption, IV:624.
116 HCRF, 555. See generally Rohr, 112; Sumption, IV:680.
117 Chartier, I:204.
118 ‘...il estoit lieutenant général du roy de France ès parties d’entre Gironde et les Monts-Pyrénées, son parent et son subject’. Chartier, II:129. See generally Griffiths, 529.
Bernard de Béarn in a general rout of the English in Guyenne that continued into 1453. Chartier includes Gaston at the triumphal entries into Bordeaux and Bayonne alongside the other victorious Capetian cognates. Gaston’s reputation was enhanced further by the downfall of his uncle, the captal du Buch, in 1451. The captal was a supporter of Henry VI in Guyenne and, after his defeat by the French, he was forced to abandon guardianship of his children to Gaston, under whom they would become ‘good and loyal Frenchmen, subject and obedient to the king of France, Charles’. Thus, Gaston was literally charged with ensuring his cousins were raised as faithful promoters of regnal authority. This implies a strong trust in Gaston by the king, but also a more general expectation that cognatic relatives of the dynasty should advance the king’s authority as an inherent duty. Gaston’s last mention in Chartier’s chronicle is precisely where Bernard de La Marche’s story ends, at a gathering of the Capetian princes in 1457. Thus, the senior Graillys largely parallel the junior Armagnacs in that both families rose to prominence after the treaty of Arras and became instruments of regnal authority in Charles VII’s wars. By including them among the princes, Chartier emphasises that even those of the most remote dynastic kinship must still promote the restoration of the king’s authority in France.

This is especially exemplified by the house of Luxemburg-Ligny, princes of no French royal descent whose loyalty to the Capetian dynasty came only after a protracted alliance with the Anglo-Burgundians. Throughout the course of his narrative, Juvénal significantly changes his opinion of the family’s first notable member, Waléran III de Saint-Pol. When the count is introduced in 1385, he is framed as a loyal Capetian retainer in the unique position of representing both the English and the French due to his marriage to Richard II’s half-sister, Maud Holland. Because of these ties, he took the Lancastrian usurpation personally and harried the English from 1403 through 1405. It is only in his account of the events of 1411

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122 Chartier, II:291-298. Gaston purchased the county and later sold it back to the captal’s son. Abbott, 311. See generally Seward, 256-257.  
123 ‘…estre bons et loyaulx François, subjectz et obéisans au roy de France Charles…’. Chartier, II:296. See generally Perroy, 320.  
124 Chartier, II:75-76.  
125 Despite shared paternal kinship with the Luxembourger kings and emperors, the counts of Saint-Pol were not directly descended from any of them. Fabien Roucole, ‘De royale et impériale maison: Les liens de parenté de Jean de Luxembourg, comte de Ligny’, in Familles royales vie publique, vie privée aux XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. Christiane Raynaud (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’Université de Provence, 2010), 114. See Figure 7.3.  
Figure 7.3 The House of Luxembourg-Ligny, 1380 – 1461

Edward (d. 1376)
Prince of Wales

Richard II (d. 1400)
France: 1377 – 1399

Jeanne (d. 1407)
+ Antoine
Brabant: 1406 – 1415

Guy
Ligny: 1364 – 1371
Saint-Pol: 1360 – 1378

Mahaut

Jeanne
Saint-Pol & Ligny: 1430
Seigneur de Richebourg

Jean (d. 1397)
Bishop of Thérouanne

Joan
Kent: 1352 – 1385

Matilda Holland
(d. 1392)

Waléran III
Saint-Pol: 1371 – 1415
Ligny: 1378 – 1415
Constable of France

Jean (d. 1466)
Seigneur de Hautbourdin

Philippe
Saint-Pol & Ligny: 1415 – 1430
Brabant: 1427 – 1430

Pierre
Saint-Pol: 1430 – 1433

Jacquette (d. 1472)
+ John of Lancaster
Bedford: 1414 – 1435

Louis (d. 1443)
Bishop of Thérouanne

Catherine (d. 1492)
+ Arthur III de Richemont
Brittany: 1457 – 1458

Isabelle (d. 1472)
+ Charles
Maine: 1441 – 1472

Thibaut (d. 1477)
Seigneur de Fiennes

Jacques (d. 1487)
Seigneur de Richebourg
that Juvénal informs readers that Waléran became a Burgundian, but the context is telling: he makes Waléran personally responsible for agitating the civilians to revolt in Paris that year.\textsuperscript{128} From this point onward, the chronicler reduces Waléran to Jean of Burgundy’s henchman. As such, he is depicted as the callous governor of Paris, responsible for the deaths of many Armaignacs, and the usurping constable of France, who advocated civil war.\textsuperscript{129} His death in April 1415, while still supporting the Burgundians, was deemed unworthy of Juvénal’s pen.\textsuperscript{130}

Chartier’s portrayal of the Lignys remains decidedly negative when they first appear in his chronicle. Jean, bastard son of Waléran, appears as an Anglo-Burgundian soldier in 1429.\textsuperscript{131} Meanwhile, a nephew of Waléran, Louis, bishop of Thérouanne, served as English chancellor of France and was in charge of Paris.\textsuperscript{132} And lastly, Jean II de Ligny, an older brother of Louis, is introduced the next year as the person responsible for the capture of Jeanne d’Arc.\textsuperscript{133} In contrast to how Arthur de Richemont, Jean d’Orléans, and Charles II d’Albret are enhanced by their association with Jeanne, Jean de Ligny’s role in Jeanne’s capture earns him and his family condemnation by Chartier.\textsuperscript{134} At Arras in 1435, the Lignys represented the Burgundian establishment and, although Chartier suggests otherwise, Jean and Louis refused to support the treaty for the remainder of their lives.\textsuperscript{135} But Jean’s death in 1441 and Louis’s in 1443 allowed Ligny loyalties to shift.\textsuperscript{136} Within Chartier’s chronicle, this change occurs quickly. Louis de Saint-Pol, Jean and Louis’s nephew, is found in Charles VII’s army in 1443, receiving a knighthood for his valour.\textsuperscript{137} The count served in the vanguard of the French invasion of Upper Normandy alongside the count d’Eu and the bastard

\textsuperscript{128} HCRF, 466. See CKS, IV:442–446 (evens). Autrand, Charles VI, 439, first names Waléran a Burgundian in 1409.

\textsuperscript{129} HCRF, 469, 473–475, 477. See CKS, IV:458, 512, 568, 582, 584, 634, 672. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 444.

\textsuperscript{130} For more on the life of Waléran, see Céline Berry, ‘Waleran de Luxembourg, un grand seigneur entre loyauté et opportunisme (fin XIV\textsuperscript{e}–début XV\textsuperscript{e} siècle)’, Revue du Nord 380 (2009): 295–326.

\textsuperscript{131} Chartier, I:104. See generally Céline Berry, ‘La bâtardise au sein du lignage de Luxembourg’, in La bâtardise et l'exercice du pouvoir en Europe du XII\textsuperscript{e} au début du XVI\textsuperscript{e} siècle, edited by Éric Bousmar, Alain Marchandisse, Christophe Masson, and Bertrand Schnerb, 169–188 (Lille: Revue du Nord, 2015).

\textsuperscript{132} Chartier, I:107, 223. See generally Pernoud and Clin, 96.

\textsuperscript{133} Chartier, I:121–122. See generally Contamine, Bouzy and Hélary, 834.

\textsuperscript{134} Roucole, 123, adds that ‘[a]ucun des chroniques étudiés ne qualifie Jean de Luxembourg de cousin du roi, ce qui est probablement dû à leur orientation bourguignonner autant qu’aux prises de position du comte de Ligny’.

\textsuperscript{135} Chartier, I:189, 208. Chartier states that Jean de Ligny did sign the treaty after some hesitation, but, in reality, he remained opposed to the French until his death. See generally Allmand, Lancastrian, 227.

\textsuperscript{136} Barker, 380. This change is most visible in the marriages made between the Lignys and other dynasties. In 1433, Jean de Ligny’s niece Jacquetta married John, Duke of Bedford, paternal uncle of Henry VI. But after Jean’s death, two other nieces married the Capetian princes Charles de Maine, brother-in-law and chief councillor of Charles VII, and Arthur de Richemont, constable of France. Barker, 189–190; Van Kerrebrouck, II:414, III:316.

\textsuperscript{137} Chartier, II:39–41. Gaussin, 120, makes clear that Jean was immediately accepted on the royal council after Louis de Ligny’s death.
d’Orléans, and was rewarded for his service with the lordship of Gournay.138 Meanwhile, his brother, Jacques, was made lieutenant constable under Arthur de Richemont in the invasion of Lower Normandy.139 Chartier lists Louis among the assembled Capetian lords at Rouen, and at Harfleur, the count is named by Chartier in such a way to suggest he should be considered a seigneur de son sang—a lord of the king’s blood—which is the only outright suggestion made in any of the Dionysian continuations that a cognate could be considered a full Capetian prince.140 Thus, Chartier’s narrative is another story of redemption, demonstrating how the Ligny family overcame their Burgundian origins to advance regnal authority alongside the other Capetian princes. At the end of the chronicle, Louis is characterised as one of the heroes of the Capetian dynasty, a wealthy count who was rewarded not only with money and titles but with a status earned by actively promoting the authority of the king.

Each of the princes hitherto discussed sacrificed much for regnal authority and each ultimately aided in the final royalist victory over the English. The narratives of the Armagnacs and Graillys largely paralleled each other, but where the Graillys and junior Armagnacs remained steadfastly loyal to the Capetians, the senior Armagnacs drifted away, ostracised from the dynasty. The Harcourts and Albrets, in contrast, are portrayed by the chroniclers as never waverin in their campaign to restore regnal authority to the king, with both families sacrificing greatly for the royal cause. But Juvénal and Chartier never incorporate either family into the dynasty in quite the same way, leaving their genealogical relationship to the Capetians un-stated, though implied. However, the chroniclers reserved a special place in the dynasty for the Lignys, counts who had to abandon their past in order to embrace their future as lords of the royal house. In the end, the fifteenth-century Dionysian vernacular continuators determined that blood alone did not make one a Capetian, but that it was a potent mixture of complete loyalty and active participation in advancing regnal authority that truly proved one’s worthiness to be numbered among the lords of the blood.

138 Chartier, II:84ff. See generally Barker, 380.
140 The full passage reads: ‘Tantost après se partit le roy de Rouen, armé d’une brigandine, et dessus une jacquète de drap d’or, accompagné du roy de Cécille et de plusieurs aultres seigneurs de son sang, en grands et riches habillemens, par special le conte de Saint-Pol, lequel avoit ung chanfrain à son cheval d’armes prise trente mille escuz’. Chartier, II:156, 176.
Chartier approached dynasticism and regnal authority in a very different manner than had his predecessors. To him, the disaster at Agincourt forced the Capetian dynasty to go on the defensive, compelling those whose origins did not correspond to common conceptions of Capetian dynasticism to nonetheless embrace their dynastic heritage. For some, like the Montforts, that meant setting aside century-old grudges in order to support fully their ancestral dynasty. For others, like the many illegitimate offspring of Capetian ancestry, the chronicler had to overlook Church stigmas against bastardy, which may have influenced earlier Dionysian chroniclers, to prove that devotion to the king was more important. And for the wider diaspora of Capetian cognates—families such as the Armagnacs, Harcourts, Albrets, Graillys, and Lignys—ancestry itself was never the issue. For them, admission into the dynasty came only through absolute loyalty and allegiance to the king and none other. Together, these unlikely cadets led the armies of Charles VII, served in his retinue, and became his councillors and allies. By the end of the war and Charles’s death, Chartier acknowledges far more Capetians in France than there were agnates. Although this was not a unique message in the Dionysian vernacular tradition—all earlier chroniclers had included some cognates as members of the dynasty to some degree—the sheer scale that Chartier includes them is unprecedented and important. It served as a powerful didactic message to future kings and princes that the house of Capet was not simply a hereditary entity—it was open to all cognates who proved themselves capable of selflessly advancing regnal authority within France.
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Triumph of Regnal Supremacy

There is an ever-present sense of déja vu when examining Dionysian vernacular depictions of the Capetian dynasty in the later Middle Ages. The persistent themes of domestic divisions within and foreign threats without never abate, even in Jean Chartier’s continuation, which was written after the Capetian victory over the English in France. Yet it must be remembered that Chartier could only see his present circumstances: Charles VII had achieved major successes between 1449 and 1453, but nobody knew in the early 1460s that the century-long intermittent war with England had finally come to a decisive end. Indeed, no treaty between the kingdoms would be agreed until 1475 and the English monarchs continued to style themselves king (or queen) of France until 1801. Lacking this foreknowledge, Chartier nonetheless suggests that by the end of his reign, Charles was victorious and his authority undisputed in France. In order to achieve this, the chronicler intentionally restructured events to emphasise regnal authority. For example, he carefully constructed his portrayal of the Valois agnates of the house of Anjou to showcase how their activities enhanced regnal authority in France. Chartier also turns a failed noble uprising against the royal government in 1440 into an event that shifts the focus away from the independent activities of the Capetian princes and toward a unified story of regnal empowerment. The victims of this narrative reframing are the Dauphin Louis and Jean II d’Alençon, whose activities incurred the wrath of the king and condemnation from the chronicler. This final series of case studies will explore the ways in which Chartier manipulated the portrayals of specific Capetian cadets and events in order to de-emphasise dynasticism and showcase the ultimate triumph of regnal supremacy in France.

8.1 The Rise of the Angevins

The battle of Agincourt in 1415 and other engagements in the 1420s exhausted the royalist cause, depleting it of soldiers, military leaders, and government officials. As discussed in previous chapters, many unlikely candidates stepped in to fill the void left by the absent Capetian agnates, but the problem remained that most of the legitimate princes were either in captivity or too inexperienced to adequately fight. Although the contributions made by Louis III,

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1 Burne, Agincourt, 347; Perroy, 333, 343.
duke d’Anjou and titular king of Sicily, are completely ignored by Chartier, he does emphasise that the duke’s brothers, René and Charles, were fortunate to have been too young to participate in the battle of Agincourt. From 1429, the two cadets rarely leave the king’s side in the narrative, demonstrating for the first time a higher devotion by Angevins to the royal cause than to their traditional aspirations outside of France. Nevertheless, Chartier does occasionally divert the narrative to Angevin wars in Lorraine, but does so in order to demonstrate how Charles VII was able to manifest his regnal authority along the French periphery even while promoting his authority domestically. The end result is that the Angevins become some of the most inspiring figures in the continuation. They personally link the saga of Jeanne d’Arc in 1429 to the story of the French triumph over the English, serving as heroic figures that readers can aspire to follow. This section analyses how Chartier depicted the Angevin family and used them as purveyors of regnal authority within his narrative.

Chartier manipulates the story of the Angevins from the very beginning, carefully selecting events that emphasise regnal authority and downplay the family’s other activities. The Angevins first join the narrative with René, who enters after the coronation of Charles VII at Reims in July 1429 at the head of a company of soldiers who pledge themselves to the king. By skipping directly to this point, Chartier ignores the fact that René had previously been a recalcitrant Burgundian who was, at least nominally, an English vassal. Thus, Chartier converts René in a single sentence from the prodigal son he actually was into the vanguard of a dynastic resurgence. René is further glorified through his association with Jeanne d’Arc, whom he joined on her campaign in the Île-de-France in late 1429. Although René was captured by the Burgundians in 1431, he proved his value to the king’s cause, so Chartier considers the preceding battle as well as the later ransom negotiations important details to include in the narrative. Likewise, representatives of the duke are at the congress of Arras, pledging their duke as surety for the king, implying continuous contact between René and the Valois

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3 Jean Juvénal des Ursins only mentions Louis III once, in 1419. Chartier, meanwhile, only refers to Louis in the past tense to inform the reader of his passing. Another mention of the ‘duke d’Anjou’ at the treaty of Arras in 1435 must refer to René even though Chartier does not otherwise call him by that title until 1436. Chartier, I:204, 233; HCRF, 547. René was only six-years-old and Charles was not yet one at the time of the battle. See Figure 8.1. See generally Rohr, 107-108; Small, 149-150.

4 Chartier, I:97. See Jean Favier, Le roi René (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 38; Rohr, 159.

5 As a dependent of both Cardinal-Duke Louis de Bar and Charles II de Lorraine, both Burgundians, René was hesitant to renounce the oath of homage he had made to John, duke of Bedford, for his lands in English-held territories, such as the county of Guise. Favier, Le roi René, 32-33; Rohr, 151.


Figure 8.1 The Capetian House of Valois-Anjou, 1384 – 1461

**Louis I**
- Anjou: 1351 – 1384
- Provence: 1381 – 1384
- Naples: 1382 – 1384

**Marie de Châtillon**
- (d. 1404)

**Louis II**
- Anjou: 1384 – 1417
- Naples: 1390 – 1399

**Violante de Aragón**
- Heiress of Bar (d. 1443)

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**Isabelle**
- Lorraine: 1431 – 1453

**Charles**
- Maine: 1441 – 1473
- France: 1422 – 1461

**Antoine**
- Vaudémont: 1415 – 1458

**Yolande (d. 1484)**
- [Later duchess of Lorraine]

**Friedrich II**
- Vaudémont: 1458 – 1470

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**Jean II**
- Calabria: 1437 – 1470
- Lorraine: 1453 – 1470

**Marguerite (d. 1482)**
- [Later duchess of Lorraine]

**Nicolas (d. 1473)**
- [Later duke of Lorraine]
court during his captivity.\(^8\) Ultimately, René figures very little in the first half of Chartier’s chronicle, but his contributions to restoring regnal authority earn him a place of respect within the narrative.

In his brother’s absence, Charles d’Anjou catapulted himself to the forefront of French politics. First mentioned by Chartier in 1432, Charles is characterised as a warrior-prince fighting at the siege of Saint-Cénéré alongside Jean II d’Alençon and Arthur de Richemont.\(^9\) When he next appears in the narrative in 1433, he is at the head of a coup which saw him replace Georges de La Trémoïlle as the king’s chief councillor.\(^10\) In recounting this event, Chartier notes that Charles d’Anjou was ‘brother of the queen of France’, which establishes the prince’s genealogical credentials, and he adds that Charles and his allies ‘remained in great government and authority with the said king’.\(^11\) This episode is the only substantial hint Chartier gives of a much larger division that had existed at the French court since Arthur was removed from power by La Trémoïlle in 1427.\(^12\) However, because Arthur never falls out of favour with the king in Chartier’s narrative, it does not make logical sense for him to seize power again, thus Charles d’Anjou’s role in the affair is expanded to compensate for this inconsistency. An intimate relationship between Charles and the king is implied after this in two unusual passages included by Chartier: in 1436, Charles is named a godfather of the king’s son Philippe, a strange insertion into the chronicle since the boy died soon afterwards;\(^13\) then, in 1441, Charles is made count of Maine by his brother, a procedural transfer-of-title between brothers that rarely warrants attention in the continuations.\(^14\) Meanwhile, the brief falling-out between Charles and the king in the mid-1440s is entirely overlooked by Chartier, although the count is absent from the narrative during this time.\(^15\) This suggests the chronicler wished to gloss over moments of domestic instability, especially after 1435, to imply a stronger united front against the English.

Both Charles and René return to the narrative in 1449, which coincides with the French invasion of the English kingdom of France. At that time, Chartier credits the brothers

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\(^8\) Chartier, I:186-187, 203-204. René remained in contact with his mother, Violante de Aragón, but both she and Charles VII were more interested in a Franco-Burgundian peace. Resolving René’s ransom would have added an unnecessary stumbling block. See generally Levon, *Le bon roi René*, 80-81; Rohr, 189, 191.

\(^9\) Chartier, I:135, 166-167. Chartier misidentifies this fortress as Saint-Célerin. Barker, 185n17, 201.

\(^10\) Chartier, I:171. Charles’s mother and Arthur were responsible for orchestrating this coup. Rohr, 180-181. Charles sat on the royal council fifty-nine times from 1433 until the king’s death in 1461. Gaussin, 105.


\(^12\) Chartier, I:54. See generally Rohr, 125-131.

\(^13\) Chartier, I:220, 229. See also Chapter 6.1.

\(^14\) Chartier, II:33. Charles did not personally come into possession of Maine until April 1448 when the English reluctantly relinquished control over the county. Poull, 138.

with raising the king’s morale so much that ‘the king, seeing such noble chivalry, concluded and decided to proceed again with the conquest and recovery of his land of Normandy’.

Thus, the Angevins are not only depicted as supporters of the king at this time, they are made responsible for ensuring the campaign continues. Throughout the invasion, both René and Charles remained the king’s constant companions-in-arms. During the triumphal entry at Rouen in 1450, René and Charles flanked the king on either side, ‘armed all in white, their horses richly adorned and covered in coverings of similar velvet, with white crosses, and their devices among them, sown with tufts of gold thread’. It is an image Chartier includes to inspire awe and respect for the regal trinity of the king of France, the titular king of Sicily (René), and the king’s chief counsellor (Charles d’Anjou). In Guyenne, Charles remains in the field while René disappears, but for both, their purposes in the chronicle are essentially fulfilled.

To Chartier, the Angevins represented loyal Capetians who remained by the side of the king throughout the long war. Their wise advice and meritorious deeds made them foremost among the Capetians praised by Chartier as champions of regnal authority.

Much like Pierre d’Orgemont and Jean Juvénal des Ursins, Chartier devotes very little space to Angevin ambitions abroad. But what is unique is that he ignores entirely their campaigns in Italy and instead focusses on their duchies of Bar and Lorraine on the Franco-Imperial march. Even here, though, the continuator toys with chronology and facts in order to advance a narrative that promotes Angevin and—more legally dubious—French claims to the region. When René is first introduced in the chronicle, it is as the ‘duke of Bar and Lorraine’, even though he only had some authority over the former and none over the latter in 1429. After this, Chartier never again calls René duke of Lorraine. The simplest explanation for this

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16 ‘…le roy, voyans si noble chevalerie, conclut et délibéra de procéder outre à la conquête et recouvrement de son pais de Normendie’. Chartier, II:134.
18 ‘…armez tout à blanc, leurs chevaux richement parez et couverts de vouertures de veloux pareilles, avec des croix blanches, et leurs devises parmy, semées de houppètes d´e fil d´or…’. Chartier, II:164. See generally Levron, 111.
19 Chartier, II:323, III:2, 12-13. Favier, Le roi René, 184, notes that ‘René manifesta le peu d’intérêt que suscitait chez lui la conquête de la Guyenne. C’est l’Anglais de Normandie qui avait exercé une lourde pression sur le Maine et l’Anjou, non l’Anglais de Bourdeaux’.
20 Chartier calls René ‘king of Sicily’ following his release from captivity in 1437 and his son Jean is called ‘duke of Calabria’ from his introduction in the text in 1450, but neither the titles nor René and Jean’s attempts to claim the crown of Naples is ever discussed. Chartier, I:233, II:215, 224. René led an expedition into Naples in 1438 and his son led another in his father’s name in 1458. Jacques Bénet, Jean d’Anjou, duc de Calabre et de Lorraine (1426-1470) (Nancy: Société Thierry Alix, 1997), 80-81; Noël Coulet, Alice Planche, and Françoise Robin, Le roi René: le prince, le mécène, l’écritain, le mythe (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1982), 22.
21 René did not become sole duke of Bar until 1430, although he used the title from 1419 when his uncle, Cardinal-Duke Louis, named him heir and resigned the administration to him. He did not receive Lorraine until the death of his father-in-law, Charles II, in 1431. Chartier, I:97; Poull, 142, 144; Rohr, 106.
is that a portion of Bar was a French fief and held more status for René within France, while the remainder of Lorraine was within the Empire.\textsuperscript{22} Additionally, Chartier may have been acknowledging the recent Capetian ancestry of the dukes of Bar, something the Lotharingian dukes lacked.\textsuperscript{23} Alternatively, the chronicler could have been avoiding discussion of the disputed succession between René and the counts of Vaudémont, the latter of whom claimed Lorraine asagnates of the old ducal line.\textsuperscript{24} This final option seems the least likely, however, since Chartier carefully removes any trace of the Angevin-Vaudémont succession dispute from his chronicle and he did not know how the feud would conclude.\textsuperscript{25} When discussing René’s capture by Antoine de Vaudémont at the battle of Bulgnéville in 1431, Chartier frames the event as if it were a Burgundian counter-offensive against the overly-ambitious duke, nowhere hinting at a personal conflict between Antoine and René.\textsuperscript{26} The realities of the situation are further deflected when Chartier recounts René’s release five years later: in 1436, a group of Capetian princes began negotiations with Philippe of Burgundy, but Chartier apparently loses interest in the topic and recounts instead how Arthur de Richemont left the delegation in order to subdue rebel strongholds in Champagne.\textsuperscript{27} Later, the princes finally secured René’s freedom by negotiating a marriage between René’s son and Philippe’s niece, but René is framed as the victim here in the chronicles, a man forced to call upon his relatives for help, rather than a victor against Vaudémont claims to Lorraine.\textsuperscript{28} While this makes it easier to include the Vaudémonts in the royalist army in 1449, the reader is left with no notion that something important actually occurred beforehand.\textsuperscript{29} Only once does Chartier include an instance when the king was personally involved in the conflict—when the people of Metz refused to

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\textsuperscript{22} Abbott, 546, explains that ‘[i]n 1297 the count [of Bar], who had fought with his father-in-law, the English king, against king Philippe IV was made prisoner by the latter. In 1301, in order to obtain his freedom he had to render homage to the king of France for that part of the Barrois west of the Meuse. Henceforth this was the Barrois mouvant’. A later count, the son-in-law of Jean II of France, assumed the title duke of Bar to place him on par with his Capetian relatives, although the Imperial portion of Bar remained a fief of the duchy of Lor- raine. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 29, 31.

\textsuperscript{23} Juvénal alludes to this connection in 1410 when discussing Louis of Bar and his elevation to the cardinalate. Louis, the uncle of René, was the maternal grandson of Jean II of France. HCRF, 452. See CKS, IV:254. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 29.

\textsuperscript{24} For specifics regarding this feud, see Favier, Le roi René, 29-75; and Levron, 71-85.

\textsuperscript{25} The Vaudémonts eventually succeeded to Lorraine in 1473 as the result of a marriage made between René’s daughter, Yolande, and Friedrich II von Vaudémont. Abbott, 541.

\textsuperscript{26} Chartier, I:133-134. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 42-43.

\textsuperscript{27} Chartier, I:215. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 63.

\textsuperscript{28} Chartier, I:232-233. Jean, duke of Calabria, married Marie de Bourbon, daughter of Philippe’s sister, Agnès, although the original plan was for Marguerite d’Anjou, René’s daughter, to marry the Burgundian heir, Charles de Charolais. Levron, 82. In another part of this agreement, Philippe recognised René’s claims to Lor- raine over those of the Vaudémonts. However, René was forced to cede his holdings in Flanders to the duke of Burgundy and lands in Picardy to Louis, count of Saint-Pol. Favier, Le roi René, 64.

\textsuperscript{29} Chartier, II:110, 166, 216, 224-225, 233, 236. Friedrich von Vaudémont, René’s son-in-law, accompanied the Angevins in Normandy throughout 1449-1450. Favier, Le roi René, 182.
recognise the authority of René in 1444-1445—but in this instance, the author makes clear that Metz was just one city among many that Charles wished to subdue in the region.\(^{30}\) Although Chartier lingers at times on Angevin ambitions along the eastern fringe of France, he does so not to promote dynasticism but rather to highlight specific examples of Burgundian aggression that the king was forced to address in the years following the treaty of Arras. It therefore becomes just another method through which Chartier showcases the regnal authority and influence of the king, in this instance along the peripheries of the kingdom in lands not directly subject to French royal control.

Much like the Bourbons in the previous century, the Angevins become in Chartier’s chronicle exemplary Capetian princes due to their unceasing devotion to the king both personally and as head of the kingdom and dynasty. Within the chronicle, René is one of the first legitimate agnates to enter the narrative, after which he becomes a companion of Jeanne d’Arc and the king throughout their campaigns against the English. Likewise, Charles d’Anjou is quickly established as a reliable and faithful councillor to the king, although to accomplish this, Chartier removes any trace of the decade-long court struggle that secured for him his position and power. Similarly, the chronicler ignores Angevin claims abroad and reframes the succession dispute in Lorraine as an assertion of royal authority against Burgundian territories in the eastern marches, thereby erasing the Angevin-Vaudémont conflict. Thus, through this creative manipulation of facts, Chartier converts the struggles of the Angevins for dominance inside and outside of France—issues that do not directly impact the overarching narrative—into examples of regnal empowerment that glorify the king at the expense of those who would challenge his authority.

8.2 Echoes of the Hussites in France

Coincidentally, just when the historically distracted Angevins became undisputed champions of regnal authority within France, the notoriously loyal Bourbons turned their coats against the king. But Chartier does not condemn the entire family for the crimes of its head and maintains throughout his chronicle their traditional role as agents of regnal empowerment. Their one substantial deviance—the Praguerie revolt of 1440\(^{31}\)—is manipulated by the chronicler into a powerful statement about royal supremacy over princely ambitions.

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\(^{30}\) Chartier, II:43-47. Levron, 103-104, largely agrees with Chartier’s assessment but adds that Metz was the only recalcitrant city in the region and that their rebellion was specifically against the French king since they ‘prétendent qu’ils étaient d’allégeance allemande et n’avaient pas à obéir au roi de France’. See generally Favier, Le roi Rêne, 121-123.

\(^{31}\) The Praguerie was named after the recent Hussite revolt in Prague (1419-1436), which many in France viewed as analogous. Chartier, I:258; Vale, Charles VII, 74.
Chartier accomplishes this by strategically avoiding discussion of the actual issues that prompted the result or the lingering difficulties the king had in keeping Capetian dynasticism in check. Simultaneously, the chronicler uses the rebellion to foreshadow the divisions between the Dauphin Louis, who was its figurehead, and Charles VII, a dispute that resulted in Louis’s exile to the Burgundian court and the functional annexation of the Viennois into the kingdom of France. This section will explore the ways in which Chartier portrays the changing nature of dynasticism in respect to the Praguerie, its prelude, and its aftermath.

The Praguerie was the brainchild of Charles I de Bourbon, a man whose family was historically synonymous with Capetian dynastic loyalty.\(^{32}\) Perhaps because of this, Chartier decides that the family itself should not suffer for one duke’s failings, and, therefore, he constructs a narrative that specifically discredits Charles while simultaneously praising the other Bourbon princes.\(^{33}\) He begins by introducing Charles in February 1429 as the leader of the disastrous Orléans relief expedition that is remembered as the battle of the Herrings.\(^{34}\) He then contrasts this by presenting as a companion of Jeanne d’Arc at the victorious battle of Patay the duke’s cousin Louis, count of Vendôme, who remained one of Jeanne’s staunchest supporters even after she was captured by the Burgundians in 1430.\(^{35}\) Although Chartier eventually associates Charles with Jeanne as well, their relationship is only highlighted in situations where Louis, too, is present in the narrative.\(^{36}\) Concluding this arc, the chronicler recounts how the duke, appointed lieutenant over recently-reconquered territories in the Île-de-France in autumn 1429, abandoned his post upon learning that the Bourbonnais was being ravaged by the Anglo-Burgundians.\(^{37}\) In contrast, Louis is praised by Chartier for stepping in and claiming the vacated lieutenancy.\(^{38}\) In this way, the chronicler erects a dualism between the condemned Charles, who prioritised his duchy over the kingdom, and the praised Louis, who bolstered regnal authority.\(^{39}\)

\(^{32}\) Cuttler, 196; Vale, Charles VII, 76. For earlier portrayals of the Bourbons, see Chapter 5.3.

\(^{33}\) See Figure 5.2.


\(^{36}\) Chartier, I:87-88, 100, 103-104, 107-109. Jeanne only begrudgingly worked with Charles de Bourbon since their campaign together was primarily to serve the interests of the Bourbons, not the king. Leguay, 343-344. Chartier does not include either Bourbon prince at the coronation at Reims in 1429, although Scott, 62, states that both represented absent peers during the ceremony.


\(^{38}\) Chartier, I:116.

\(^{39}\) Charles’s duchy—which was significantly larger than Vendôme—sat on the French side of the Anglo-Burgundian frontier and was prone to frequent incursions by the English, while Louis’s county was entirely under English control, making his position as lieutenant personally beneficial since he could use it to reclaim his land. See Abbott, 107; Perroy, 259, 273.
Beginning with the congress of Arras in 1435, the chronicler takes a more neutral line regarding the Bourbon princes. During the treaty negotiations, both lords acted as representatives of the king and as surety for him, a clear recognition by Chartier of their loyalty.\footnote{Chartier, I:86-187, 203-204. See generally Rohr, 189, 192.} In 1436, Charles, alongside his Angevin and Burgundian cousins, was named a godfather to the king’s short-lived son Philippe, an example that suggests intimacy between the king and his kin.\footnote{Chartier, I:215.} That same year, Louis escorted the dauphin’s new wife from Scotland to France, a procedural task that rarely merits inclusion in the continuations but nevertheless implies trust in the qualities of the escort.\footnote{Chartier, I:220-231. Louis was, in fact, the grand master of the hôtel and served as a councillor of the king thirty-five times between 1425 and 1446. Gaussin, 74, 102.} Furthermore, both princes led the party that eventually obtained the release of René d’Anjou from his Burgundian captors in 1437, an action that demonstrates dynastic loyalty to both the Angevins and the king.\footnote{Chartier, I:215, 232-233. René subsequenty joined a proposed revolt that Charles de Bourbon and Jean d’Alençon were organising, although the plan collapsed soon afterwards. Favier, La guerre, 552; Vale, Charles VII, 74. See generally Rohr, 191-192.} Although Louis did, in reality, participate in the \textit{Praguerie}, Chartier chooses not to record this fact, maintaining the fiction that he was a devout Capetian prince.\footnote{See Cutler, 196; Favier, Louis XI, 87; Vale, Charles VII, 76.} In his last narrative entry, Louis gives the king’s daughter Catherine in marriage to Charles de Charolais, son of Philippe III of Burgundy, a final reminder to the reader that Louis was a faithful, trustworthy, and loyal servant of the king and the dynasty.\footnote{Chartier, II:8-9.} But Charles de Bourbon is not similarly praised. He was pardoned for his leadership role in the \textit{Praguerie}, but Chartier nonetheless blames him for the revolt and erases the final sixteen years of the duke’s life in his chronicle—an implicit condemnation for his disloyalty.\footnote{Chartier, I:258-259. Leguai, 358, emphasises that ‘[l]e fin de la Praguerie valut au duché de Bourbon vingt-cinq ans de tranquillité’. Gaussin, 109, only lists Charles as a councillor of the king once after 1439, suggesting that Charles absented himself—or was forcibly removed—from the government after the \textit{Praguerie}.} Thus, the author maintains the dualism he established earlier in the chronicle between the two Bourbon princes. To Chartier, Charles is nothing more than a wayward and incompetent Capetian prince, incapable of adequately representing regnal authority, while Louis remains a man unwavering in his devotion to the king and kingdom.

Beyond these simple manipulations of facts, the \textit{Praguerie} itself is recounted by Chartier in a manner that deliberately alters events to more effectively empower Charles VII. The author leaves out all the background motives—Capetian dissatisfaction with the treaty of Ar-
ras, a failed noble uprising in 1437, and the attempts by the king to end écorcheur companies—enabling him to place the blame for the revolt squarely on the shoulders of the sixteen-year-old Dauphin Louis, who desired autonomy from his guardian, Bernard de la Marche. Chartier records that Louis commanded Jean II d’Alençon to serve him, and Charles de Bourbon soon joined as well, although the latter’s role as ‘principal author’ is only stated at the end of the episode. Yet it is the language that Chartier employs to describe the event that is telling. When recounting how Louis, Jean, and Charles captured Niort, Chartier calls them ‘rebels and disobedient men to the sovereign majesty’, a reference to the crime of lèse-majesté or treason. Indeed, one of Jean’s agents, Jacquet, is directly called ‘false and traitorous’ and later the ‘conductor of the treason’ for allowing the Praguists into Saint-Maixent, a crime which earned him immediate quartering upon his capture by the royal army. The legitimacy of the Praguists is undermined by the presence among their ranks of the discredited Georges de La Trémoïlle, who Chartier notes ‘had once been in great authority with the king’ but had since been displaced by Charles d’Anjou, who is listed among the king’s allies. Meanwhile, Jean, bâtard d’Orléans, is also listed exclusively on the side of the

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47 The end of the Armagnac-Burgundian war prompted popular outrage among some nobles who felt that the Burgundians benefited too much from the treaty of Arras. Loïc Cazaux, ‘Les lendemains de la Praguerie: Révolte et comportement politique à la fin de la guerre de Cent Ans’, in Lendemains de guerre... De l’Antiquité au monde contemporain: les hommes, l’espace et le récit, l’économie et le politique, eds. François Pernot and Valérie Tourellle (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2010), 365; Favier, La guerre, 551. A planned uprising in 1437, led by Charles de Bourbon, was a reaction to this and sought to remove certain influential councillors from the king, but the plot was discovered before it began. Favier, La guerre, 552. Charles called upon his écorcheur companies to lead the rebellion and they became the target of the king’s ire in 1439, when Charles sought to dissolve all such groups in favour of a more centralised military hierarchy, an action that bred further discontent and led directly to the Praguerie. Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 169; Cuttler, 196; Demurger, Temps, 185; Favier, Louis XI, 87; Knecht, 78. For the original 2 November 1439 ordonnances, see ‘Lettres de Charles VII, pour obvier aux pilleries & vexations des Gens de guerre’, in Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre chronologique, vol. XIII, ed. Louis-Guillaume de Vilevaulx and Louis George Oudard Feudrix de Bréquigny (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1782), 306-313.

48 Chartier, I:253. Chartier goes so far as to entitle the chapter: ‘Comment Monseigneur le Dauphin s’en alla d’avceques le roy son père sans son congé et contre sa voullenté’. Even here, though, Chartier misrepresents facts. Vale, Charles VII, 81, argues that Louis’s ‘major grievance…was that he had not yet been given the Dauphiné…. He also requested the lieutenancy of Languedoc and Guyenne, or of France…’.

49 Chartier, I:253, 254, 259. In contrast, Favier, Louis XI, 84, emphasises that ‘c’est le dauphin Louis que les ducs de Bretagne, d’Alençon, d’Anjou et de Bourbon…vont séduire pour légitimer leur mouvement’, implying that the prince was only a pawn in this entire plot. See generally Cazaux, 366-367; Henry de Surirey de Saint Remy, Jean II de Bourbon, duc de Bourbonnais et d’Auvergne 1426-1488, Nouvelle Collection d’Études Médiévales (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1944), 29.

50 ‘…comme rebelles et désobéissans à la souveraine majesté…’. Chartier, I:254. See generally Cazaux, 372; Favier, Louis XI, 87.


52 ‘…le sire de la Trimoullle, lequol avoit esté autrefois en grant auctoritee devers le roy’. Chartier, I:258. See generally Favier, La guerre, 551; Knecht, 78.
king despite initially joining the Praguists in an attempt to free his brother from captivity.\(^{53}\) Chartier strategically resolves this factual contradiction by including the ransoming of Charles d’Orléans two chapters later, thereby removing any reason for Jean to join the revolt.\(^{54}\) Other Capetian members of the government such as Bernard de la Marche—whom Chartier portrays as a victim of the dauphin’s ambitions—and Arthur de Richemont—the rival of La Trémoïlle—are also listed beside the king, thereby balancing the rebellious princes with loyal ones.\(^{55}\) The revolt ultimately ends ‘by the good means of the count of Eu [Charles d’Artois] and other lords and valiant men’, a judgment statement that suggests Chartier associates goodness with loyalty to the king.\(^{56}\) The author makes this clearer when he adds that ‘it was necessary that [all the Praguists] received the grace of the king and remission sealed with his great seal’, recognition that forgiveness only came through the king.\(^{57}\) But more importantly, this specific retelling emphasises the hopelessness of those rebelling against regnal authority, since ‘from the beginning until the end, [the king] did not cease to hold the field, and conquered the towns and castles and fortresses which held themselves for the party of the said dauphin and his allies, following them from one place to another until they submitted to full obedience’.\(^{58}\) Historically, this revolt marked the end of many of the court intrigues and rivalries that had come before, but for Chartier, who never focusses on these conflicts, the only purpose for recounting the Praguerie is to highlight the ways in which it demonstrates regnal supremacy over princely ambitions. Stated simply, the king will come for those who reject his authority and they will submit to him in the end, one way or another. Nowhere else does a vernacular continuator illustrate the realities of regnal authority so clearly.

Initially, the king’s heir, the future Louis XI, serves a similar purpose in the narrative as other dauphins discussed within this study. Born in 1423, he is not referenced in Chartier’s chronicle until 1436 on the occasion of his marriage to Margaret of Scotland.\(^{59}\) The author uses the Praguerie as the prince’s coming-of-age announcement, stating that ‘the said dauphin

\(^{53}\) Chartier, I:258. See generally Demurger, Temps, 185; Favier, La guerre, 555; Vale, Charles VII, 77.

\(^{54}\) Chartier, I:260. His release was secured not by the efforts of the king, however, but by the intervention of Philippe of Burgundy as an act of reconciliation with his long-time enemy, something Chartier only hints at by mentioning the marriage between Philippe’s daughter and the released Charles. Demurger, Temps, 185.

\(^{55}\) Chartier, I:258. See generally Favier, La guerre, 554.

\(^{56}\) ‘…par le bon moyen du comte d’Eu et autres seigneurs et vaillans gens…’. Chartier, I:258. See generally Favier, La guerre, 88.

\(^{57}\) ‘Et faillit qu’ilz eussent tous grace du roy et remission seellée de son grand seel…’. Chartier, I:258. See generally Cuttler, 197; Demurger, Temps, 185-186.

\(^{58}\) ‘…depuis le commencement jucques à la fin, ne cessa de tenir les champs, et conquist villes et chasteaulx et forteresses qui se tenoient du parti dudit Dauphin et de ses aliez, en suyvant icesux de lieu en autre et jucques à ce qu’ilz vindrent à plaine obéissance…’. Chartier, I:258.

began to take control of every aspect of his household and upbringing that the count of La Marche, to whom he was given by the king to teach good manners, had not shown him’.  

Furthermore, Louis declared that ‘he wanted to rule by his own will, saying that he would no longer be held subject as he had been in times past, and that it seemed to him that it would be very profitable to the kingdom’.  

As the tightly curated narrative of the Praguerie progresses, however, Louis is lost in the crowd, listed beside the dukes of Bourbon and Alençon, the actual architects of the revolt, but never again a focal point. Narratively, nothing is resolved for the dauphin and this seems to reflect Chartier’s dedication to the king’s story over that of the princes. But Louis does not disappear from the chronicle. In fact, Chartier shows him loyally fighting beside his father at Creil and Pontoise in 1441, at Dieppe in 1442, and at Metz in 1444.  

At Dieppe, the dauphin, according to Chartier, led his company, ‘desiring with all his heart to chase and destroy [the English], and through them acquire renown for his prowess and bravery’. Thus, he still adhered to the king’s goal of ejecting the English from France. However, like Jean II and Charles V before their successions, Louis was a territorial lord in his own right and his land was the Imperial county of Viennois, which meant he owed feudal service to Emperor Friedrich III. Chartier records that, at Metz, ‘a great lord named Monseigneur Bourga Le Moyne, whom the emperor had sent to Monseigneur the Dauphin, came to lead him into the lands of Basel…in order to subjugate the Swiss and the Germans who said they were not beholden to the said emperor’. In response, the dauphin led a short military campaign through the region, pillaging much but accomplishing little.  

Chartier alters the context of this affair by avoiding any question of feudal service or the dauphin’s split allegiances, instead framing the episode as simply the emperor requesting help from an ally.
Thus, the chronicler uses the dauphin’s campaign in Switzerland as an example of dynasticism in the French periphery.

Louis’s absence from the events of 1449-1453 does not go unnoticed by Chartier and, indeed, it becomes one of many points of contention when the dauphin re-enters the narrative twelve years after his last appearance. The catalyst for this reintroduction was his flight to the Burgundian court without the king’s permission, an action for which Charles ‘dreaded strongly that [the dauphin] would follow bad council, and that he would govern himself contrary to reason’ due to Philippe of Burgundy’s influence over him.67 This again distracts from the real issue—Louis’s increasing autonomy in the Viennois—which allows Chartier to adopt an explanation that better serves his narrative of regnal authority.68 The chronicler reasons that, since the dauphin was discredited and under the influence of an untrustworthy party, the king was justified in annexing the Viennois since it would force the dauphin to submit to the king.69 Naturally, the dauphin protested this seizure, but he further asserted that the king had never treated him with respect regarding his lands or his ambitions.70 These are accusations that neither the king nor Chartier take lightly, and the latter categorically denounces each. He establishes first and most forcefully that the dauphin went
directly against the desire and goodwill of those of the kingdom, even the council and advice of Monseigneur the duke of Burgundy and the other lords of the blood, and of noblemen and notable lords of this kingdom, who all gave [the king] advice and demanded that he force my said lord the Dauphin to his duty and to serve him….71

Thus, Chartier proves to his audience that the king acted with the support of his nobility and that Charles’s son was undeserving of any special treatment. Furthermore, the king was personally upset with his son’s departure because the prince missed the entire recovery of France from the English, and Chartier adds an explicit moral message here that ‘the glory of the father is when the son makes valiant and laudable works’.72 It is in this context that Chartier addresses the issue of returning the Viennois to the dauphin. Although Chartier records that the

68 Louis abandoned France for the Viennois in 1446 and, while there, married Charlotte of Savoy without his father’s permission. Charles ended his son’s pension in 1452 in response. Demurger, Temps, 189; Favier, Louis XI, 153; Hamon, 15-16; Knecht, 85-86; Vale, Charles VII, 164.
69 Chartier, III:56. Once there, Charles called the Estates, who approved his conquest. Favier, Louis XI, 159.
71 ‘…car ce seroit directement aller contre le désir et le bonne voulenté de ceux du royaume, més-mement contre le conseil et advis de Monseigneur le duc de Bourgoigne et des autres seigneurs du sang, et des nobles hommes et notables seigneurs de ce royaume, qui tous luy ont donné conseil et l’ont requis de réduire mondit seigneur le Dauphin à son devoir, et se servir de luy…..’. Chartier, III:61.
72 ‘…car le gloire du père est quand le fils fait œuvres vaillables et louables’. Chartier, III:62.
king ‘was always ready, and still is, to receive the said lord benignly’, there is little to suggest that Charles intended to grant the county full independence under Louis.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, after the king subdued the Viennois, Chartier notes that ‘all those of the land, when they perceived the good will of the king in this matter, were very joyous and relieved’.\textsuperscript{74} According to Chartier, the king acted as an agent of stability, a contrast to the poor governance of the dauphin.\textsuperscript{75} The issue is never resolved since Louis’s most faithful followers were still at the Burgundian court two years later.\textsuperscript{76} Chartier does record that, following the death of Charles VII, the people cried ‘Vive Louis, roy de France’, but he ends the chronicle before Louis is crowned.\textsuperscript{77}

Throughout this narrative, Charles is portrayed by the chronicler as a man mourning the loss of his son and who only sought the reunification of his family. In contrast, Louis is framed as a selfish, cowardly prince who was a poor representative of Capetian dynasticism and a threat to regnal supremacy.

By the end of the Dionysian vernacular tradition, some semblance of Capetian dynastic unity had already been established. Despite Charles de Bourbon’s inglorious erasure from history after the failed revolt that he led, his son, Jean de Clermont, returns to prominence in Chartier’s chronicle as a royal lieutenant in the counteroffensive against the English.\textsuperscript{78} The legacy of his father does not tarnish his portrayal nor impact the depiction of their cousin Louis de Vendôme. Indeed, within the Dionysian vernacular tradition, the Praguerie is a milestone in the establishment of regnal supremacy since forgiveness became tied to the submission of the Capetian agnates who led the rebellion. Within the compressed narrative structure of Chartier’s text, their defeat gives Charles VII the authority and confidence he needs to finally take the war on the offensive and defeat the English. Behind him in this endeavour was every significant Capetian prince with one glaring omission: the king’s heir. Louis’s struggle with his father is depicted as both a personal slight to the king and a larger threat to the kingdom since the dauphin allied himself to Philippe of Burgundy. However, Chartier uses this conflict to highlight why Charles annexed the Viennois, making clear that it was the dauphin

\begin{footnotes}
\item[73] ‘…le roy a tousjours esté prest, et encores est, de recevoir bénignement ledit seigneur’. Chartier, III:64. Louis wrote to his father on at least three occasions, but the king always insisted that the dauphin return to court, something that Louis was unwilling and afraid to do. Knecht, 86; Vale, Charles VII, 167.
\item[74] ‘…tous ceux du pays, quand ils ont aperceu le bon vouloir du roy en cette matièrre, ils en ont esté moult joyeux et console…’. Chartier, III:65. Vale, Charles VII, 167, adds that the Estates ‘had already agreed to obey [the king] and to “accomplish whatever it pleases the king to command them”’. Loyalty to the dauphin was thus non-existent in April 1457, even within the land which…he had governed so well’.
\item[75] Chartier, III:64-65.
\item[76] Chartier, III:87-88.
\item[77] Chartier, III:120. See generally Demurger, Temps, 189; Hamon, 208.
\item[78] Chartier, II:110ff, 312-313. See generally Barker, 395-396; Burne, Agincourt, 320; De Saint Remy, 35ff.
\end{footnotes}
who was at fault due to his reckless behaviour and flight from the kingdom. The events surrounding the *Praguerie* reverberate long after it, but Chartier carefully manipulates the details, downplaying and discounting the ambitions of the nobility so that regnal authority appears as the paramount source of power within the kingdom of France.

8.3 The Valois’s Sacrificial Lamb

The ostracised dauphin was not the only victim of regnal supremacy. Another Capetian agnate, Jean II, duke of English-occupied Alençon in Normandy, descended from the junior-most branch of the Valois line, whose loyalty to the Capetian dynasty over the previous century was indisputable. Rarely mentioned within the Dionysian vernacular continuations, the rulers of Alençon grew in prominence as the Anglo-French war progressed, but it was not until Jean that a chronicler finally granted one of their number substantial narrative space. Although Jean is long portrayed as a faithful follower of the king, hints of malice run as an undercurrent throughout Chartier’s text. When Jean’s secret negotiations with the English were confirmed by royal agents in 1456, the duke went on trial before a court of his peers. The proceedings are an extremely important moment within the Dionysian vernacular tradition and it is appropriate that they conclude this study. Not only does the trial stand as a resounding declaration against Capetian dynastic ambitions, but it also confirms for readers that regnal supremacy has become a permanent fixture in France. This final case will survey the Dionysian vernacular depictions of the Alençon lords since their beginning and examine the ways in which their family’s decline in fortunes was emblematic of this changing narrative focus within the continuations.

The Alençon lords were derived from the same stock as the Valois kings since both descended agnatically from Charles de Valois. The first member of the line, Charles II, brother of Philippe VI of France, is mentioned frequently by Richard Lescot until the count’s demise at the battle of Crécy in 1346. Pierre d’Orgemont, in contrast, holds virtually no interest in the Alençons except as members of the higher nobility and clergy, leading them to almost

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79 See Figure 8.2.
80 Lescot first mentions Charles during the war of Saint-Sardos in 1324. He then mentions him leading a battalion at the battle of Cassel in 1328 and being one of the peers at the trial of Robert d’Artois in 1329. Throughout the first decade of warfare with the English, the count was constantly on the battlefield, where he ultimately died. The inclusions of Charles in the narrative are additions made by Lescot specifically and do not appear to derive from other sources. GCF, IX:33, 83, 110, 283. See generally Burne, *Crecy*, 183; Raymond Cazelles, *La Société Politique et la Crise de la Royauté sous Philippe de Valois* (Paris: Librairie d’Argences, 1958), 43.
Figure 8.2 The Capetian House of Valois-Alençon, 1285 – 1461

**VALOIS KINGS OF FRANCE**

(See Figure 5.1)

**Philippe VI**
Valois: 1328 – 1350
France: 1328 – 1350

**Charles I**
Valois: 1285 – 1325
Alençon: 1291 – 1325

**Philippe (d. 1328)**
Archbishop of Rouen

**Jean I**
Alençon: 1367 – 1404

**Pierre de Neufville**
Seigneur d’Aunou-les-Faucons

**Jean II**
Alençon: 1415 – 1428

**Pierre (d. aft 1428)**
Seigneur d’Aunou-les-Faucons

**Charles II**
Chartres: 1314 – 1346
Alençon: 1428 – 1446

**Charles III**
Valois: 1291 – 1325
Alençon: 1291 – 1325

**Philippe (d. 1397)**
Archbishop of Rouen

**Louis**
Alençon: 1325 – 1328

**Charles II**
Valois: 1346 – 1428
Alençon: 1346 – 1428

**Charles III (d. 1375)**
Alençon: 1346 – 1361
Archbishop of Lyon

**Jean II (d. 1476)**
Alençon: 1415 – 1476

**LATER VALOIS DUKES OF ALAGENTON**
disappear from dynastic history during the thirty years spanned by his continuation. A later Alençon agnate, Jean I, enters Juvénal’s chronicle in 1405 and is quickly characterised as a martial prince in the war against the English. From 1410, he is frequently listed among the Armagnacs, and it was while fighting alongside them at the battle of Agincourt in 1415 that he died. His son, Jean II, is found early in Chartier’s chronicle supporting the government-in-exile of Charles VII as a brave royalist fighter who was captured by the English at the battle of Verneuil. Up until this point, neither Juvénal nor Chartier have any cause to question Jean’s loyalty to the Capetian cause and, indeed, he seems to embody the Capetian dynasty’s best qualities. His status was elevated further when he became the favoured companion of Jeanne d’Arc, a point that Chartier emphasises on numerous occasions during his recounting of their campaigns in the Île-de-France from 1429 to 1430. Jean’s amiable relationship with Charles was cemented when he was dubbed a knight by the king at the latter’s coronation. By the end of Jeanne’s saga, Jean had become the quintessential Capetian prince, the martial driving force behind the king’s campaign to restore his authority in France.

A different narrative quickly emerges after Jeanne is removed from the picture. Chartier demonstrates that Jean could be a vengeful prince when he lashed out against Jean V of Brittany over the unpaid dowry of his mother in 1431. The chronicler notes that, over the following two years, the duke continued fighting the English, but that most of his activities were localised to Normandy, Anjou, and Maine, which suggests a greater interest in reclaiming his own patrimony than in helping the king recover the entire kingdom.

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81 Charles III, the eldest son of Charles II, is present at Jean II’s coronation in 1350 and, with his third brother Pierre, at the signing of the treaty of Brétigny in 1360, after which the latter became an English hostage. Charles, as archbishop of Lyons, and his brother Philippe, as archbishop of Rouen, appear numerous times in their ecclesiastical roles. CRJC, I:26, 282, 325, II:65, 280, 298. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:412-413, 415-416.


84 HCRF, 565; Chartier, I:41, 43. Jean served as a royal councillor nine times, twice before Verneuil. Gaussen, 104. He was also the godfather of Louis XI and fought at the battle of Broussinère in 1423. At Verneuil, he was thought dead by his comrades ‘but he had been found alive by the British [sic] among the heaped-up corpses on the field of battle...’. Pernoud and Clin, 26, 172.

85 Chartier, I:81-83. See generally Burne, Agincourt, 255-259; Favier, La guerre, 554.


87 Chartier, I:157-160. See generally Jones, Creation, 252; Small, 158.

88 Chartier, I:166-167, 173. His activities were not appreciated by the king, who had ordered a retreat. Pernoud and Clin, 172.
that Jean’s dynastic resolve seems to waver in the narrative. When Jean supported an uprising in Normandy in 1435, Chartier reports that ‘the greater part of those in the commune returned…in order to make their peace with the English, and [the duke] abandoned the business, having achieved nothing’. 89 Chartier, thus, implies that Jean’s charisma alone was not enough to inspire the inhabitants to change their allegiance. At Arras in 1435, Jean was present at the conference but notably absent when the Capetian lords pledged themselves as surety for the king. 90 During the siege of Avranches in 1439, Jean left to capture Sainte-Suzanne in Maine, which Chartier informs the reader twice ‘belonged to the duke d’Alençon’. 91 After the seizure of the town, the duke’s anger peaked because the town’s guardianship was awarded by the king to the lord of Bueil, ‘who held [it] against the will and volition of the said duke d’Alençon’. 92 Although Chartier does not state it, this decision was the result of a new ordinance that transferred supreme military authority over apanages to the king. 93 Jean, angered by this new law, was the first to support the dauphin in the Praguerie according to Chartier, and, as such, he was responsible for the removal of Bernard de la Marche from power and for the capture of Saint-Maixent, where much of the subsequent narrative focusses. 94 After the revolt, he, like the Bourbons, disappears from the chronicle until 1449, an implicit disapproval by Chartier of the duke’s rebellious actions that undermined regnal authority. 95

Jean returns to the narrative during the invasion of Normandy, but Chartier makes clear that the duke’s participation was not about reclaiming land for the king—he intended to take back what was rightfully his. The duke is first mentioned outside Essay, a town in his duchy, and Jean is shown ruthlessly blackmailing the citizens into submission, ‘threatening them that otherwise, he would behead all his prisoners’. 96 When the duke captured his namesake town shortly afterwards, Chartier redirects some responsibility for the victory to ‘Louis de Beau- mont, [the king’s] governor of Le Mans, [who] went to the aid of this duke with sixty lances

89 ‘Et depuis s’en retournèrent la plus grant part d’icellui commun en pays de Normendie pour faire leur traicté avec les Angloiz, et ne sortist leur entreprise nul autre effect’. Chartier, I:173. See generally Allmand, Lancastrian, 40-41; Barker, 216.
90 Chartier, I:187, 204. See generally Rohr, 191.
92 ‘…lequel les tint contre le gré et voullenté dudit duc d’Alençon…’. Chartier, I:253.
93 Barker, 277-278; Cazaux, 368; Small, 160.
94 Chartier, I:253-255. See generally Vale, Charles VII, 79.
95 Chartier, I:258, II:111. Vale, Charles VII, 87-88, expands on this, stating that Jean ‘was virtually exiled from the king’s presence, his pension was reduced, and his lordship of Niort seized…. The other magnates might plead for him, as they did in March 1442, but the king remained adamant. Alençon would not be received back into favour, let alone be summoned to the council, “until he conducts himself as he ought to do”’.
96 ‘…les menaçant qu’autrement, il feroit trancher les testes à tous ses prisonniers’. Chartier, II:121. See generally Barker, 389.
and some archers’, thereby depriving the prince of a portion of the glory.97 Chartier continues to show Jean subduing his ducal lands throughout 1449—conquering Fresnay, Bellême, and Argentan—but in this time, the duke only ventured outside his duchy twice, to assist the king in taking Caen and Falaise, after which he permanently retired from combat and the narrative.98 At one point during these conquests, the chronicler uncharacteristically praises the duke, stating that ‘the duke d’Alençon showed himself to be a very valiant man, and he maintained himself there honourably’, but this is linked to a specific situation: the duke was surrounded by the English with few of his own soldiers, yet he still held the field.99 Since first becoming duke d’Alençon, Jean was a landless Capetian prince whose home was occupied, leaving him with nothing except vengeance. Chartier builds off this idea, curating his story in such a way that the duke becomes little more than a vessel of revenge, striking at the English in whichever way possible in his desperate attempt to reclaim what was denied to him. By the end of the conquest of Normandy in 1450, the prince regained nearly everything owed to him, ostensibly in the name of the king, but the chronicler overlooks Jean’s positive achievements and converts his lifetime of anger into fuel for his final textual journey.

The sudden arrest of the duke d’Alençon in 1456 for the crime of lèse majesté is a shocking turn of events narratively, especially since it follows the equally-startling seizure of the Viennois by the king.100 Lèse majesté is, according to the fourteenth-century jurist Jean Boutillier, ‘to plot, scheme or conspire in any way soever against the noble majesty of the king our lord’.101 More simply stated, it is treason against the king—the exact opposite of promoting regnal authority. Chartier streamlines the crime, arrest, trial, and punishment, and explains the entire situation primarily by publishing the king’s judicial decision, which spans nearly 5,000 words of text.102 Although similar trials had occurred throughout the previous two centuries, the vernacular chroniclers of Saint-Denis were silent on the subject with one significant exception: Robert III d’Artois. His trial for fraud in 1331 proved to be a landmark case in regard to trying peers and princes, and the similarities between it and Jean II

101 Cuttler, 21.
102 See generally, Mercier, 154.
d’Alençon’s trial in 1458 are undeniable. Both princes were Capetian agnates closely related through marriage to the king, both were peers of the realm whose conflict with the king was primarily driven by disputed land claims, and both were tried in a court of their peers during an extraordinary lit de justice—a trial over which the king presides. A striking difference between the two trials, though, is the status of the offending prince during the proceedings. Lescot notes that ‘when Robert d’Artois saw how things were going, he fled in disguise’, and he never returned to court, meaning that his trial was conducted entirely in absentia and the king’s decision meant very little practically. Jean, in contrast, was arrested without warning at Paris, imprisoned in Melun, and interrogated by his uncle, Arthur de Richemont. Although he was not present when the verdict was read, the duke was entirely at the mercy of the king and, because of this, the king was more flexible in his judgment. In addition, by giving his readers a full transcription of the king’s ruling, Chartier allows his audience a more intimate look at the complexities of the trial than does Lescot, who only mentions portions of Robert’s trial. More importantly for this study, it provides a unique look into how a Dionysian chronicler understood the lit de justice and how its development enhanced regnal authority.

Chartier begins by recounting the crime that Jean II d’Alençon was accused of committing, in the process making clear that the king was the primary victim. He states that Jean had conducted and aspired—and intended to conduct and aspire—to several treaties and agreements with our ancient enemies and adversaries, the English, and for this he sent into England and other lands of the said English several messages without our leave or license, and without informing us of anything, to the great prejudice of ourselves and to the common welfare of our kingdom.

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103 Cuttler, 96, 114, emphasises that the real precedent was set through the treason trials of Jean IV of Brittany and Carlos II of Navarre, neither of which is discussed in the Dionysian vernacular continuations. During these trials, the king pronounced his judgment and the peers only advised or served a decorative role. At the time, the peers objected, but during the trial of Jean d’Alençon, ‘they seem meekly to have accepted the situation… in all but form they had abandoned their right to render judgment’. For the trial of Robert III d’Artois, see Chapter 2.3.


106 Chartier, III:56-57. See generally Cuttler, 211.

107 Chartier, III:107, 110. Among those who pled for mercy for the duke were Jean Juvenal des Ursins, archbishop of Reims; Philippe of Burgundy; Charles d’Orléans; and Arthur de Richemont. Allmand, Lancastrian, 46; Cuttler, 104-105.

Through this simple condemnation, Chartier establishes why Jean was a traitor (he negotiated with the English), what crime he committed (he operated outside the purview of the king), and why his trial is important (he risked the security and stability of the kingdom). To these crimes, Jean ‘confessed liberally and of free will’ under oath, which is perhaps the most notable contrast to Robert, who repeatedly denied the charges against him. However, Chartier also allows hearsay to influence the reader’s judgment, inserting early in the account that ‘one said that he was culpable’. Because Jean was a peer of France and seigneur de sang, the assembly of judges had to be equally magnificent, so the king summoned to his court ‘several of the lords of our blood and lineage, peers of France and holders of lands, and the archbishops and bishops above named, also peers of France, and several other prelates, counts, barons, and knights, in great number, of our said court of parlement and others of our council’. Not a single one of these individuals, though, is actually named by the chronicler, which re-emphasises that this lit de justice was above all between the omnipotent king and his wayward vassal.

The bulk of Chartier’s report focusses on the nuances of Jean’s activities with the English from the latter’s recapture of Bordeaux in 1452 to the time of the duke’s imprisonment in 1456. From this evidence, it is clear that the duke was encouraging another English invasion of recently reconquered Normandy. Although Chartier explains that there was much discontent at this time in Normandy and Guyenne and that the king’s army was dispersed—ideal conditions for an English invasion—he never elaborates on Jean’s motives for defecting to the enemy. In reality, Jean had been forced to sell Fougères to Jean V of Brittany in 1428 in order to pay for his ransom and the king had refused to help him repay that debt or reclaim the town. When the English sacked Fougères in 1449 prompting the French king to reconquer Normandy, the duke of Brittany was confirmed in his possession of the town, prompting Jean to begin his intrigues with the English. Without this explanation, the duke’s actions appear

111 ‘…on disoit qu’il estoit couppable’. Chartier, III:90.
112 ‘…plusieurs des seigneurs de nostre sang et lignage, pers de France et tenans en parrye, et les arcevesques et evsesques dessus nommez aussi pers de France, et plusiieurs autres prélatz, contes, barons et che-valliers, en grant nombre, de nostre dite cour de parlement et autres de nostre conseil…’. Chartier, III:94.
113 Those present included all of the ecclesiastical peers, who were required to attend, the king’s younger son, Charles, Charles d’Orléans, Jean II de Bourbon, and the counts of Angoulême, Maine, Eu, La Marche, Vendôme, Foix, Dunois, and Laval, all associated closely with the royal family through blood. Contamine, ‘Le premier procès’, 114-115.
115 Contamine, ‘Le premier procès’, 104, 107; Jones, Creation, 45; Knecht, 83; Vale, Charles VII, 156.
petty and insidious, but also purposeless. Most damning is the repeated inference in Jean’s interro-
gation report that the dauphin was in some way involved in the plot. Chartier immediately in-
validates the evidence against Louis since his letters ‘were not in the form according to
which our said son is accustomed to writing to [his father]’, but the implication is that it was
not an impossibility. Additionally, the possible involvement by the heir to the French
throne suggests that a larger coup to replace Charles VII could have been the duke’s ultimate
goal. Chartier uses the king’s decision in the case, therefore, not only to malign Jean but also
to suggest that the dauphin was potentially subverting the king’s authority in favour of his
own. Furthermore, Chartier uses this trial to emphasise the continuing threat posed by the
recently-ejected English.

It is in this context that Chartier records Charles’s final judgment on the affair. Jean
himself was condemned to death and all of his goods, lands, and titles were declared forfeit to
the crown, although his execution was commuted at the king’s pleasure. But the king
showed himself merciful in regard to the next generation, allowing the children to be raised at
the court of François II of Brittany, ‘hoping also that the said children governed and con-
ducted themselves toward us as good, true, and loyal subjects ought to do toward their sover-
eign lords’. Additionally, the king granted to the children and their mother some land and
their moveable goods—minus weaponry—and allowed Jean’s son, René, to become count of
Perche, albeit without the status of peer. Nonetheless, the king emphasises initially that,
‘according to right and uses maintained in such a case, they must be deprived of all goods,
honours, and prerogatives, and live in such poverty and mendicancy that it is an example to all
others’, a warning Chartier includes for his readers to remind them that their primary duty is
to the king. Imprisoned, Jean was entirely subject to the king’s mercy; meanwhile, the new
count of Perche owed his life and livelihood, as well as that of his mother and siblings, to the
benevolence of the king of France. This firmly underlines Chartier’s final message that reg-
nal supremacy must always supersede dynastic ambitions. The era of dynastic jockeying for

116 ‘…elles n’estoient pas en la forme selon laquelle nostredit filz lui avoit acoustumé escrire’. Chartier, III:105.
118 ‘…espèreant aussi que lesdits enfans se gouverneront et conduiront envers nous comme bons, vrayes et
loyaux sujets doivent faire envers leurs souverains seigneurs…’. Chartier, III:108.
120 ‘…selon droit et usages gardez en tel cas, deussez estre privez et débouchez de tous biens, honneurs
et prérogatives, et vivre en telle povreté et mendicité que ce fust exemple à tous autres…’. Chartier, III:108. Vale
adds that ‘it was not Alençon who was on trial. The lit-de-justice effectively put the notions which had been de-
veloping among the king’s servants…to the test. It was a trial of strength between the monarchy and oligarchy’.
Vale, Charles VII, 162.
121 Cuttler, 242.
power and influence was at an end—the king would no longer suffer those who opposed his absolute authority within France.

Within the Dionysian vernacular narrative, the Alençon family undoubtedly exemplifies the evolution of Capetian dynasticism and the growth of regnal supremacy between 1328 and 1461. The cadets selflessly supported and sacrificed for their Valois kin from the War of Saint-Sardos to the battle of Verneuil. They were visible symbols of dynastic loyalty, and they were rewarded for their service repeatedly with titles, land, and status. Yet, like most of the other cadets in the dynasty, the Alençons wavered in their devotion during the Armagnac-Burgundian war and the final stages of the Anglo-French war. The conquest of all their hereditary lands in northern France by the English caused Jean II to reassess his priorities even while publicly supporting Charles VII. His loyalties became clear once he regained possession of his estates and abandoned the king’s cause. The punishment for his short-sightedness was imprisonment, confiscation, and the ever-present risk of execution—an important lesson for ambitious Capetian princes. Whereas two centuries earlier, Louis IX simply forgave recalcitrant lords for their rebellions, and a century before, war was the natural result of the king asserting his judicial prerogatives on his vassals, by the mid-fifteenth century, the king’s will had become the ultimate authority and those who fought against it suffered the consequences. In Chartier’s view, regnal supremacy had not only trumped dynasticism, but dynasticism itself became simply another vehicle of regnal authority.

For two centuries, feuding lords in France challenged the authority of the kings, denying them their self-perceived rights and threatening the very integrity of the Capetian monarchy. Under Charles VII, it became clear that, to promote regnal authority, the various lords had to be reined in and taught their place within the feudal hierarchy of the kingdom. Cadets such as René d’Anjou and his brother Charles exemplified this new type of obedient and submissive prince, and Chartier praises them for their desire to restore regnal authority to the king. But those who benefitted most from the old order, great dynastic lords such as Charles I de Bourbon, the Dauphin Louis, and Jean II d’Alençon, resisted such change and fought back. Chartier, as a sponsored advocate of the king, carefully constructed his narrative to turn every instance of noble discontent and rebellion into expressions of regnal authority. He corrupted his portrayals of Charles de Bourbon and Jean d’Alençon, building up cases that emphasised how untrustworthy these lords had always been and how their past activities undermined their legitimacy within the kingdom.
Even the king’s heir was not immune from Chartier’s moralising. Although often considered the most formulaic of Dionysian vernacular chronicles, Chartier’s continuation is also the most direct in its didactic agenda. From beginning to end, the chronicle serves as a *miroir des princes* with a singular, unifying message: dynastic disunity cannot longer be tolerated within France. In order to achieve regnal supremacy within the kingdom, apanagists must be put in their place. It is a message repeated *ad nauseam* within the continuations, but only Chartier states it with such impassionate bluntness. If there is a sense of déjà vu when reading these continuations, it is because every chronicler ultimately concludes that the Capetian king is and should be the only legitimate source of authority in France.
CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion: Les Chroniques de France

This study has proven that the agnates and cognates of the Capetian dynasty are a constant presence within the narratives, often serving as people to whom readers can better relate. Furthermore, these myriad cadets tie the various continuations together into one relatively fluid narrative. Guillaume de Nangis built off Primat when composing his Latin continuations, Richard Lescot adapted and expanded Primat and Guillaume’s texts, Pierre d’Orgemont copied and altered Lescot’s narrative, and Jean Chartier completed and continued Michel Pintoine’s Latin chronicle, which was abridged and translated by Jean Juvénal des Ursins. In the end, it is clear that there is a conscious continuity between these works and that certain themes are revealed only when the various continuations are analysed together. Pasquier Bonhomme recognised this when he first published the Dionysian vernacular chronicles in 1476, but modern historians have still been reluctant to view the continuations holistically. All of the texts Bonhomme chose for his collection share a Dionysian influence and focus primarily on the Capetian monarchy and its activities. But these texts are not only occupied with the activities of the kings; they depict the activities of many of the Capetian cadets as well. Primat hinted in his prologue that his intention was to emphasise individuals in direct proportion to their importance to his moral narrative, yet he never explained how he planned to accomplish this.1

More problematically for readers and historians, it remains unclear whether his continuators followed his premise. This study, therefore, has analysed and compared the portrayals of dozens of cadets who lived between 1223 and 1461 to determine whether they reflect an overt desire on the part of the continuators to advance specific didactic messages.

While this study has explored the depictions of the most visible cadets of the Capetian dynasty, it did not look at those who went unmentioned in the continuations. Naturally, it is difficult to derive didactic meaning from something that is not there, but the absence of key members of the French royal family within the Dionysian texts is not something that can be ignored. Among the branches of the Capetian dynasty, there are a surprising number of agnatic lines that are neglected by the continuators. Perhaps most conspicuous by their absence are the Burgundian dukes of the thirteenth century.2 Derived from the junior-most recognised

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1 GCF, 1:3.
2 For a brief discussion of them, see Chapter 6.1.
CONCLUSION: LES CHRONIQUES DE FRANCE

Whaley 224

Capetian line, the Burgundians are almost entirely ignored by Primat and Guillaume in their lives of Louis IX and Philippe III. Hugues IV is mentioned only once in 1249, while Robert II is referenced in 1278 and 1283. It is only from the marriage of the future Louis X to Marguerite of Burgundy in 1305 that the family begins to appear more frequently, although their presence remains remarkably understated considering their high status in the French peerage. For example, the counts of Viennois from 1228 and 1282, Burgundian cadets, never appear in the continuations, and the Burgundian kings of Portugal, who reigned in legitimate descent until 1383, are only ever framed as foreign monarchs, never agnates. Equally missing from the thirteenth-century continuations are the Courtenay rulers of the Latin Empire and their junior line in the Île-de-France. Emperor Baudouin II is only referenced when he sold the crown of thorns and other Passion relics to Louis IX in 1239, and the marriage of his granddaughter, Catherine I, to Charles de Valois is noted in 1301, after which her narrative becomes entwined with her husband’s. Even less is said of the junior Courtenays, whose sole representative in the continuations is the wife of Robert II d’Artois, Amicie, who died in Rome in 1275. Last among the more distantly-related Capetians are the counts of Dreux, who appear sporadically when one of their cadets, Pierre, became count of Brittany in 1214. But the senior line largely vanishes from the continuations afterwards. Jean I de Dreux appears only once in 1248 among the company of Louis IX’s crusaders and, a century later, Pierre de Dreux is included in the army of Philippe VI. Ultimately, the chroniclers left these cadets out of their narratives except in rare moments when their actions reflected well on the Capetian dynasty.

The Capetian agnates of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are significantly more prominent in the later continuations, but some are nonetheless neglected. The only branch that suffers a near-complete narrative absence is the senior house of Anjou. While the rulers of Naples maintain a token presence throughout the continuations, the Angevin rulers of Hungary, Poland, and the Latin Empire are not afforded such narrative space. Lajos I of Hungary

5 See, for example, GCF, IX:211; and CRJC, III:18-19.
6 GCF, VII:72-74; VIII:190-191. See Ex Gestis Ludovici, 631; GSL, 326, 328; Continuatio, 582.
7 GCF, VIII:58. See GPT, 500.
8 All of the dukes of Brittany from 1213 to the end of this study, with the exception of Charles de Blois, are members of the house of Dreux. See Chapters 4.1 and 7.1.
9 GCF, VII:120, IX:205. See GSL, 356.
10 Charles Martel, eldest son of Charles II of Naples, was given the kingdom of Hungary in 1290 as a papal grant, while his son, Károly I, married the heiress of Poland, Elżbieta, in 1320. Their agnatic descendants ruled Hungary until 1395 and Poland until 1399. John Van Antwerp Fine, Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans: A
is only referenced by Orgemont once, in 1378, within the context of the Papal Schism, while Juvénal does not hint at a Capetian presence in Eastern Europe at the end of the fourteenth century. Meanwhile, Lescot mentions the marriage of Catherine II de Valois, titular Latin Empress, to Filippo di Taranto, another Angevin cadet, but he and Orgemont do not discuss their descendants’ seventy-year struggle for authority in the Latin East. Other Capetian cadets appear but are severely downplayed. For instance, Juvénal includes in his narrative Jean of Burgundy’s two brothers, Antoine of Brabant and Philippe II de Nevers, who both died fighting in the French army at Agincourt in 1415. However, their children are almost entirely neglected by Chartier. Antoine’s two sons inherited the duchy of Brabant in turn, with the younger first succeeding to Saint-Pol after Waléran III’s death, but neither is mentioned by the chronicler. Chartier frequently includes Charles I de Nevers, the elder son of Philippe de Nevers, in the French army during the reconquest of Guyenne, albeit always in the company of others, but otherwise Philippe’s sons are also absent from the continuation. Lastly, it must be reiterated that Louis III d’Anjou and the entire second generation of Orléans princes are virtually erased from Chartier’s narrative. This intentional reduction in the number of cadets creates an illusion that the Capetian dynasty in the fifteenth century was considerably smaller and more focussed on re-establishing regnal authority than it was in reality.

In addition to male agnates of the Capetian dynasty, there are two other groups of people who are notable by their absence from the texts. The first are the powerful cognatic relatives of the Capetians, people such as the German emperors and kings, the Spanish monarchs, and the myriad regional dukes and counts of Arles, Italy, and the Low Countries, all of whom married into the Capetian family over the ensuing generations. The relationships between the imperial family and the Capetian kings are probably the most important to the Dionysian

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11 CRC, II:345.
13 HCRF, 521. See CKS, V:570.
16 For the rest of the Valois-Angevins, see Chapter 8.1, and for the house of Orléans, see Chapter 6.2.
narrative, with Jan of Bohemia, Jean II’s father-in-law, dying at the battle of Crécy while fighting alongside Philippe VI in 1346, and Jan’s son, Emperor Karl IV, making an extended appearance in Orgemont’s chronicle in 1378. Nonetheless, most of the German kings and emperors after the death of Friedrich II in 1250 only receive brief mentions within the vernacular continuations, usually at the time of their succession, and none is mentioned after Karl IV died in 1378. More unusually for the continuations, none of the interdynastic marriages between the Capetians and Imperial ruling families is noted, suggesting a conscious attempt by the continuators to remove the Germans from the narrative. Regarding the Spanish monarchs, only the rulers of Navarre are emphasised at all, even though each of the French kings from Louis VIII through Philippe IV married princesses of Iberian ancestry. Indeed, despite numerous offspring from Capetian-Iberian unions who lived in France from 1223 to 1461, narrative space is only granted to the de la Cerda family due to the fact that their activities intersected with those of Philippe III. In the Low Countries, the ruling families of Flanders and Hainaut make frequent appearances but those of the other principalities in the region are thoroughly neglected by the continuators. Further south, the ruling families of Lorraine and the county of Burgundy are equally forgotten except when they directly involved themselves in French affairs, such as with the Vaudémonts in the 1430s or the daughters of Otto IV of Burgundy, whose scandal presaged the succession crises of 1314-1328. Similarly, virtually nothing is said of Capetian relatives living in Italy except for those in Sicily and Naples. Indeed, the entire Orléans claim to Milan is ignored by Juvénal, although the chronicler does

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17 GCF, IX:283; CRJC, II:193-277. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 779-805; Sumption, I:526, 529.
18 The election of Rudolf von Habsburg is noted in 1273. GCF, VIII:46. The parentage of Heinrich VII von Luxemburg is mentioned in 1287. GCF, VIII:132. The election of Adolf von Nassau and a dispute that resulted from it is discussed in 1292. GCF, VIII:158-160. The death of Adolf in battle followed by the election of his successor, Albrecht I von Habsburg, is stated in 1298. GCF, VIII:180. Albrecht’s assassination and the succession of Heinrich VII is mentioned in 1308. GCF, VIII:265. Heinrich’s coronation is noted in 1310 and 1312, and his death is described in 1313. GCF, VIII:278, 286, 291-292. Ludwig IV of Bavaria’s election is referenced in 1317, while the succession dispute resulting from that election is discussed in 1319. GCF, VIII:339, 344-345, 349. Ludwig’s deposition by the pope is explained in 1324, after which his wars in the Empire are mentioned periodically by Lescot. GCF, IX:37-40, 57-60, 64-65, 75-78, 106, 112-113, 120, 158. For a discussion of Dionysian portrayals of German rulers in general, see Jones, Eclipse, chapter 3.
19 Blanche, daughter of Philippe III, married Rudolf, son of Albrecht I von Habsburg, in 1300. Another Blanche, daughter of Charles de Valois, married the future Karl IV in 1329, while Karl’s sister, Guta [Bonne], married Charles’s grandson, the future Jean II. Lastly, Charles VI married an agnatic descendant of Ludwig IV of Bavaria.
20 Louis VIII married Blanca of Castile, Louis IX wed Margarida of Provence (a branch of the Barcelonan royal house), Philippe III first married Isabel de Aragón, and Philippe IV wed Jeanne I of Navarre. For discussion of the rulers of Navarre, see Chapter 3.
21 For more on the de la Cerda family, see Chapter 1.
22 See Chapter 4.1.
23 See Chapters 3.2 and 8.1.
briefly mention the French occupation of Genoa between 1396 and 1409. In contrast, perhaps the most frequently mentioned cognatic cadets outside of France are the counts of Savoy, who appear throughout the entire span of the Dionysian continuations. For example, Amédée III, whom Primat-Guillaume names ‘uncle of the queen of France’, is depicted escorting Beatrice of Provence to her marriage in 1246. Lescot, meanwhile, notes how Amédée V helped negotiate a treaty with Flanders and France in 1303, and he later recounts a war fought between Guigues VIII de Viennois and Édouard of Savoy in 1325. Counts are mentioned as participants in Philippe VI’s wars in 1328 and 1340, while Amédée VIII is shown actively working to end the Armagnac-Burgundian war in 1412. But like the other cognates mentioned above, the rulers of Savoy make only infrequent appearances, their stories rarely important to the overarching narrative. This suggests that only those who actively advanced Capetian dynasticism or regnal authority were considered worthwhile inclusions in the vernacular continuations.

The exclusion of cognates of the family in the continuations extends to Capetian women as well, even though it was they—the daughters, sisters, and wives of the dynasty—who actually formed the genealogical foundation for Capetian dynasticism. Whether as a result of the process of translation and consolidation or simply because of editorial choices, few women appear in the Dionysian vernacular continuations and those who do are often portrayed negatively. Of the seventeen French queens who reigned during the timeframe covered by these continuations, most only enter sporadically in the context of marrying, giving birth, or dying. Some exceptional Capetian women are scattered haphazardly throughout the continuations, often in isolated moments that emphasise their contribution to the dynasty or highlight the damage their actions caused. Some, such as Mahaut d’Artois, the Marguerites of Flanders, Jeanne I and Joana II of Navarre, and Jeanne d’Évreux, are praised by the chroniclers for contributing to Capetian dynasticism in some tangible way. But other princesses,

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24 *HCRF*, 404, 424, 444. See generally Knecht, 120-121, 126.
26 *GCF*, VIII:223-224, IX:57, 64.
27 *GCF*, IX:90-91, 205-207; *HCRF*, 433, 473.
28 Indeed, Bumke, *Courtly Culture*, 509-510, argues that ‘women were active in court society not only as patrons, but also as readers and listeners, as lectors and copyists, as singers and dancers. Because they were better educated, women were more qualified than men to discuss literary matters…. If women made up a significant portion of the audience at court, they undoubtedly also had a considerable influence in shaping literary tastes’.
29 See Chapter 2.3 (Mahaut d’Artois), Chapter 3.1 (Jeanne I of Navarre), Chapter 3.3 (Joana II of Navarre), Chapter 4.2 (Flanders), and Chapter 5.2 (Jeanne d’Évreux).
including most of the royal daughters, are rarely mentioned within the chronicles. Indeed, with the exception of the saga of Jeanne d’Arc, the funeral of Isabeau of Bavaria, the marriage of Marguerite of Scotland to the Dauphin Louis, and a chapter on Charles VII’s mistress, Agnès Sorel, Chartier almost completely erases women from his continuation, as if they contributed nothing to the reestablishment of regnal authority in fifteenth-century France. Thus, there is a mismatch here between reality and the Dionysian narrative. The continuators, in their desire to streamline the narrative and emphasise the easily-observed activities of the Capetian princes, overlook women, even though it was through their cognatic lines that much of the aristocracy of France claimed royal descent. It is in this capacity that most Capetian women appear, as wives and mothers to important French lords. Their role as such is omnipresent in the continuations and the authors frequently acknowledge this fact, suggesting that this is where most women fit within contemporary conceptions of dynasticism: as progenitors of the dynasty itself.

Returning to those Capetian cadets who are developed and characterised by the Dionysian continuators, these individuals provide the narratives with the primary moral guides. In many ways, the kings are beyond reproach—the continuators cannot in good conscience criticise and critique them. Indeed, many of the continuators wrote during the reigns of their subject kings or in the reign of those kings’ sons. Therefore, the most they could do is erect positive moral portrayals of the kings and erase or downplay any negative traits. The cadets are different, though. The Dionysian continuators, especially when writing under royal commission, felt more comfortable commenting upon them and using them to create didactic messages. And Primat intended his chronicle to be a miroir for them. In describing his aims, he said that ‘[h]ere each can find good and bad, beauty and ugliness, sensibility and folly’. For the continuators, the cadets provided an abundance of material they could use to exemplify contrasts such as these. For example, Robert II d’Artois was a chivalrous, brave warrior, who is contrasted so easily with his conniving, deceitful grandson Robert III. The future Charles

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31 ‘Ci pourra chascuns trover bien et mal, bel et lait, sens et folie…’. GCF, I:3.
32 See Chapter 2.3.
CONCLUSION: LES CHRONIQUES DE FRANCE

Whaley 229

V serves as the very essence of goodness and is contrasted with Carlos II of Navarre, a hopeless schemer who callously disregarded regnal authority. Even the two Angevin lines, separated by a century, are comparable in this way. Whereas Charles I was glorified as a martial hero and adventurer of the Capetian dynasty, a century later, Louis I is written out of the chronicles as an agnate distracted by vain ambitions in foreign lands. This study has proven beyond a doubt that the portrayals of Capetian cadets often served didactic purposes. And this is to be expected. The intended audience of these chronicles was not just kings but ‘princes who have lands to govern’ such as apanagists, dukes, counts, and other landed Capetian cadets. Nowhere does it state that kings provide the only—or even the best—examples in the texts. Rather, it says clearly that one ‘derives his profit above all by the examples of history’ and that all of the examples ‘can provide guidance’. If ‘this history is a mirror of life’ for both kings and princes, then it must provide specific examples that princes can relate to, instances where great lords perform valorous feats that enhance their dynasty and strengthen the kingdom. And, indeed, this study has proven that there is a plethora of examples to choose from, found in each continuation from the succession of Louis VIII to the death of Charles VII.

The dozens of cases that have been analysed showcase the myriad ways in which Capetians provided didactic examples to the readers of the Dionysian continuations. Multiple positive archetypal figures were assessed, including Louis IX’s brothers, Robert II d’Artois, Charles V, Arthur de Richemont, René d’Anjou, and Charles du Maine. In contrast, a number of people were found to be villains and traitors, such as Robert III d’Artois, Pierre of Brittany, the Dampierres of Flanders, the Plantagenets of England, Carlos II, Louis d’Orléans, Isabeau of Bavaria, and Jean II d’Alençon. Some members of the family advanced dynasticism into the periphery, including Charles I and Charles II d’Anjou, Alphonse de Poitiers, and Jeanne I and Filipe III of Navarre. Others threatened the security of France, cadets like the early Montforts of Brittany, Jean and Philippe III of Burgundy, Louis I d’Anjou, the later Penthievres, the senior Armagnacs, and the future Louis XI. And some simply served as good examples of

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33 See Chapter 5.2. Wagner, 93, notes that because Carlos’s ‘quest for power seriously weakened the authority of the Crown, Navarre became known in the sixteenth century as “El Malo”, “the Bad”, a sobriquet later adopted by French historians’.

34 See Chapters 2.2 and 5.3.

35 ‘…aus princes qui ont terres à gouverner…’. GCF, I:3.

36 ‘…fere son preu de tout par les examples de l’estoire…’; ‘…de toutes ces choses que on lira en cest livre, se eles ne profitent toutes…’. GCF, I:3.

37 ‘…car I vaillans mestres dit que ceste estoire est miroers de vie’. GCF, I:3.
loyal cadets, people like Mahaut d’Artois, Thibaut II of Navarre, Charles de Valois, Jeanne d’Évreux, Bernard VII d’Armagnac, Jean de Berry, Jean de Dunois, and the many cognatic relatives who served in the recovery of France in the mid-fifteenth century. This list is not exhaustive and, even if it were, there are still many other individuals within these continuations that serve didactic purposes, including other relatives, royal bureaucrats, military commanders, members of foreign courts, and religious leaders. While each person is portrayed in their own unique way, they all contribute to the moral narrative that underlies the Dionysian vernacular continuations. By this point, there should be no doubt that these chronicles are *miroirs* due both to their narrative content and to the intentions of their authors.

This study has shown that the overarching narrative of the continuations reflects authorial reactions to and conscious restructuring of historical events in order to present a morally-enhanced narrative. All of the Dionysian vernacular continuators wrote with a veneer of impartiality and objectivity, and both Primat and Chartier state this intention outright in their prologues. Yet one cannot both moralise and remain objective. The Dionysian chroniclers’ solution to this paradox was to omit anything that did not advance their didactic messages while generally avoiding making anything up wholesale. However, this technique reveals the inherent dualism found within the vernacular continuations between the promotion of dynasticism and regnal authority. Contributors such as Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot wrote of the golden age of Capetian dynasticism, when the activities of cadets glorified the dynasty, expanded its influence throughout Western Europe, and brought renown upon the house of France. Under Orgemont, the narrative turned against the activities of the greater Capetian dynasty. The chronicler deemphasised other cadets and focussed specifically on the Dauphin Charles, a unique breed of cadet, and his struggles with Carlos II of Navarre. But when the dauphin becomes king within the narrative, the Dionysian chronicles shed the mantle of dynasticism and become a tale of regnal authority. Never again do cadets receive the same focus and respect within the continuations. Under Juvénal and Chartier, the Armagnac-Burgundian war and the Anglo-Burgundian occupation of northern France clouds their opinions of Capetian cadets. Both continuators witnessed the destruction caused by the rampant abuses of cadets, and their narratives reflect this fact. Thus, Orgemont’s 1377 continuation represents a fundamental shift within the Dionysian tradition. Whereas earlier continuators focussed on dynasticism and the benefits of a Western Europe ruled by a diaspora of interrelated princes,

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38 Chartier, I:27; *GCF*, I:2.
later continuators saw autonomous cadets as an existential threat to the inherent power of the French king. The focus within the vernacular continuations on Capetian cadets as didactic examples did not change, but the nature of their portrayals shifted. They went from being used as examples of dynastic ambition, chivalric valour, and pious sacrifice, to becoming examples of absolute loyalty, selfless devotion, and obligatory submission to the king. The history in the chronicles continued to be altered but the reason behind those alterations shifted to reflect changing perspectives and evolving narrative goals.

The Dionysian vernacular continuations also enhanced and advanced Capetian dynasticism in their own right. As a collective unit, the continuations tell an extended tale of the end of dispersed dynasticism and the rise of unitary dynasticism over the course of the later Middle Ages. When the first continuation begins its narrative in 1223, France was still a divided land, with major portions of the kingdom ruled by virtually autonomous rulers such as the counts of Brittany and Flanders, and the dukes of Guyenne. As the continuations progress, internal and external wars haemorrhage the kingdom and dynasty, prompting the chroniclers to narrow their focus progressively toward the top of the feudal pyramid. It is unsurprising, then, that each continuation was composed in moments when regnal authority was especially high and the realm was in a state of relative peace. Primat completed his initial work in 1274, during an especially peaceful time in the kingdom. His finished product celebrates a triumphant king at the pinnacle of his power. But the continuators proved it was the wrong king and the wrong century! Primat, lacking foresight, intended his chronicle to reflect the apogee of Capetian power as achieved by Philippe II Auguste in 1223. Guillaume lived in both peaceful and troubled times, but there was never a fundamental threat to the monarchy during his life and he likewise wrote from a place of security. Lescot wrote in the aftermath of the Black Death, during a long truce before fighting resumed in 1355. Orgemont worked in the late 1370s, after the English had largely been pushed out of Guyenne. And Juvénal and Chartier both wrote in the mid-fifteenth century, after the tide had turned against the English in France. In other words, the Dionysian continuations, when viewed together, deprive Primat of his perfect ending by demonstrating how ephemeral the peace established in the thirteenth century was. Yet even Chartier’s ending was premature since conflict continued to fracture the kingdom for another fifteen years. It is not unintentional that Bonhomme published the Dionysian vernacular chronicles when he did. His printed text released a decade after the War of the Public Weal, a
year after the Anglo-French peace at Picquigny, and concurrent with the collapse of the Burgundian hegemony. Much like Primat and Chartier before him, Bonhomme likely viewed the state of the realm as finally stabilising after centuries of recurring warfare and domestic disturbances. But unlike his predecessors, he was largely correct in his assessment, which is supported by the fact that his compilation was reprinted three times over the subsequent four decades without significant alteration. By the end of the fifteenth century, the collected works from the abbey of Saint-Denis could truly be called the *Chroniques de France*. They had become a part of the mythology of France, their recension, continuation, and publication history all direct reflections of and reactions to the historical events they record. They represent moments when members of the Capetian dynasty felt confident in their relative power in Western Europe and wished to record what they had learned for posterity.

Yet the chronicles produced at Saint-Denis cannot be the only medieval literary tradition that approached history as a vehicle for teaching contemporary morality. Hundreds of Latin and vernacular chronicles exist from throughout the Middle Ages and, while many were intended for a strictly monastic audience, others were commissioned by royal and noble families, merchant houses, religious and chivalric orders, and other organisations. Indeed, each chronicle was designed with a purpose. Sometimes this was stated explicitly, as in the case of Primat and Chartier’s chronicles, other times it was only implied or has been lost. However, simply viewing medieval chronicles from a structuralist perspective—as poor attempts at recording history—or from a post-structuralist perspective—as unreliable narratives revealing mental contexts—ignores the intentions of the chroniclers and binds the importance of these texts to modern conceptions of historical worth. Modern readers have their own biases and filters through which they interpret information and it is impossible to ever fully understand why chroniclers wrote what they wrote. Their texts are filled with omissions and additions, myths and legends, fabrications and simplifications, and many other literary techniques that blur the boundary between history and fiction. What is clear, though, is that morality is commented upon regularly and that the activities of individual people provide the narratives with substance.

This study has analysed how historical individuals in a medieval chronicle could be used to advance didactic messages. It has revealed that, rather than simply observing the titular and chronological subjects of these Latin and vernacular chronicles, a historian may do well to examine the storylines of those individuals whose lives ran parallel to the French
CONCLUSION: LES CHRONIQUES DE FRANCE

Whaley 233

kings. To do so, one must extract their stories from the text and examine them on their own merits. In so doing, one will discover what certain tangential people added to the primary narrative, what moral roles they played, and how they advanced the goals set out by the author. Furthermore, it may reveal the author’s perception of contemporary society and hint at the mental context from which they wrote. Lastly, this technique may help underline the importance of family relationships to the medieval world. Genealogical studies have become increasingly popular among amateur researchers, but remain in their infancy in the academy. Nonetheless, family relationships were one of the most fundamental aspects of late medieval life and one cannot even begin to fathom the complexities of the Middle Ages without first recognising and understanding this fact. Just with regard to royalty, family relationships determined who sat at tables, baptised children, led armies, negotiated peace, met with dignitaries, and appeared in chronicles such as those produced at Saint-Denis. By focussing on the dynasty as a whole and keeping the king on the sideline, this study inverts the standard method of historical analysis. The result is a new approach that can be used to further assess how late medieval chronicles functioned as moral treatises and miroirs for princes.

When viewed in retrospect, the Dionysian vernacular continuations were many things to many people. To the monks of Saint-Denis, the texts were a physical example of the abbey’s elevated status within the kingdom, due partially to its chroniclers who were frequently patronised by the French monarchy. To the Capetian kings and cadets, the volumes represented a didactic miroir—a reflection of history that revelled in the deeds of those who came before and attempted to derive moral meaning from their actions. And to the Capetian dynasty itself, the chronicles repeatedly showcased victory following defeat, unity over division, and family triumphing above all else. Primat and his successors perceived in their writings a continuity that spanned centuries—a grand narrative that unified the Frankish past with the French future—and it was through the members of the Capetian dynasty that they most clearly expressed this continuity. No, the story of France in the later Middle Ages is not one of singular national determination as some would like to believe. The reality is that medieval France was

full of intradynastic civil wars, recurring conflicts, court intrigues, and mutually-assured de-
struction. It was a garden of golden lilies wilting from decay and decadence. But this is not
the story one finds in the Dionysian vernacular continuations. Rather, one discovers a tale of
Capetian cadets coming together, first out of a sense of dynastic unity and later out of an obli-
gation to the French king. Each member of the royal family serves a purpose in this story as
an example upon which later kin can learn and reflect. For some, it is how to act like a brave
soldier, a loyal companion, or a faithful follower. For others, it is how to avoid becoming an
enemy of the French king and the Capetian dynasty. These chronicles were intended to be re-
fections of late medieval French aristocratic life and culture, miroirs for princes to gaze into
and see something toward which to aspire. Historians today will never know precisely what
readers saw when they read the Dionysian vernacular continuations, but by analysing the de-
pictions of the Capetian cadets and pinpointing the didactic messages contained within their
stories, one better understands the world in which they lived and the expectations and obliga-
tions that motivated them.
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